Pippa Norris-Radical Right - Voters and Parties in The Electoral Market (2005)

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Radical Right
Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market
During recent decades, radical right parties have been surging in popularity in many nations, gaining legislative seats, enjoying the legitimacy
endowed by ministerial office, and striding the corridors of government power. The popularity of leaders such as Le Pen, Haider, and
Fortuyn has aroused widespread popular concern and a burgeoning
scholarly literature. Despite the interest, little consensus has emerged
about the primary factors driving this phenomenon. The core puzzle is
to explain why radical right parties have advanced in a diverse array of
democracies including Austria, Canada, Norway, France, Italy, New
Zealand, Switzerland, Israel, Romania, Russia, and Chile while failing to make comparable gains in similar societies elsewhere, such as
Sweden, Britain, and the United States.
This book expands our understanding of support for radical right
parties by presenting and systematically testing an integrated new theory. The wealth of cross-national survey evidence used covers almost
forty countries, facilitating a broader perspective than ever seen before.
Pippa Norris is the McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Her work
compares elections and public opinion, gender politics, and political
communications. Companion volumes by this author, also published by
Cambridge University Press, include A Virtuous Circle (2000), Digital
Divide (2001), Democratic Phoenix (2002), Rising Tide (2003), Electoral Engineering (2004), and Sacred and Secular (2004).
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Radical Right
PIPPA NORRIS
Harvard University
iii

Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, So Paulo
Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge , UK
Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521849142
Pippa Norris 2005
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of
relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place
without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published in print format 2005
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Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of s

for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not
guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
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Contents
List of Tables
List of Figures
page vii
ix
Preface and Acknowledgments
xi
part i understanding the radical right

1 Understanding the Rise of the Radical Right
2 Classifying the Radical Right

3 Comparing Parties
part ii the regulated marketplace
4 Ballot Access and Campaign Finance
5 Electoral Systems
35
52
83
105
part iii electoral demand

6 The New Cleavage Thesis: The Social Basis of
Right-Wing Support
7 None of the Above: The Politics of Resentment
8 Us and Them: Immigration, Multiculturalism,
and Xenophobia
129
149
166
part iv party supply

9 Location, Location, Location: Party Competition
191
10 Consolidating Party Organizations
217
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Contents
part v consequences
11 Assessing the Rise of the Radical Right and Its
Consequences
253
Notes
Select Bibliography
Index
273
315
339
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Tables
2.1 The Comparative Framework

page 40
3.1 Classification of Contemporary Radical Right Electoral
Parties, Thirty-Nine Nations
54
4.1 Regulations Governing Party Funding and Campaign
Media Access
98
4.2 Campaign Regulations and Support for Radical Right
Parties
100
5.1 The Thirty-Nine Electoral Systems under Comparison
110
5.2 Electoral Systems and Support for Radical Right Parties
112
5.3 Types of Electoral System and Radical Right Electoral
Parties
115
5.4 Electoral Rules and Support for Radical Right Parties
121
5.5 Compulsory Voting and Support for Radical Right Parties
123
6.1 The Social Structure of Radical Right-Wing Votes, ESS 2002
138
6.2 The Class Basis of Radical Right Voters
140
6.3 The Educational Background of Radical Right Voters
142
6.4 Social Indicators, Type of Area, and Radical Right Voters
143
6.5 The Gender Gap among Radical Right Voters
145
6.6 The Age Profile of Radical Right Voters
146
7.1 Dimensions of Trust and Satisfaction
156
7.2 Trust, Satisfaction, and Radical Right Vote
157
7.3 Trust, Satisfaction, and Radical Right Vote by Nation
158
8.1 National-Level Indicators and Radical Right Support
173
8.2 Dimensions of Cultural Attitudes, ESS 2002
176
8.3 Cultural Attitudes and the Radical Right Vote, Pooled
Sample
183
8.4 Cultural Attitudes and the Radical Right Vote by Nation
184
9.1 Party Competition and Radical Right Parties
194
vii
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viii
9.2 Public Perceptions of Ideological Dispersion in Each

Nation
9.3 Hypotheses about the Impact of Electoral Systems on
Radical Right Support
9.4 Ideological and Partisan Attitudes and the Radical Right
Vote, Pooled CSES Thirteen-Nation Sample
9.5 The Ideological Basis of Radical Right Votes, Selected
Cases
10.1 Selected Election Case Studies Illustrating the Typology
10.2 Trends in Party Identification, EU 19701999
10.3 The Share of the Vote in National Legislative Elections for
Relevant Radical Right Electoral Parties in Established
Democracies, 19482004
10.4 Vote Cast for Leading Minority Party Candidates for
President: United States 19402000
Tables
200
206
208
212
226
228
236
241
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Figures
1.1 Mean Vote for Seven Radical Right Parties in Western

Europe, 19802004
page 8
1.2 The Theoretical Model of Party Competition
20
2.1 Expert Location of Party Competition in Western Europe
48
3.1 Percentage Vote for Relevant Radical Right Parties in
Established Democracies, 19502004
59
3.2 Percentage of Votes Cast for Radical Right Parties in
Europe, Latest National Legislative Elections
60
4.1 The Sequential Model of the Main Stages to Elected Office
85
5.1 The Ratio of Votes-to-Seats Won by Radical Right Parties,
20002004
117
7.1 Institutional Trust and Radical Right Voters
159
7.2 Satisfaction with Government
160
8.1 Number of Refugees and Radical Right Votes
174
8.2 Unemployment Rates and Radical Right Votes
175
8.3 Anti-immigrant Attitudes Scale by Nation
180
8.4 Anti-immigrant Attitudes and Support for the Radical
Right
181
8.5 The Distribution of Anti-immigrant Attitudes in Public
Opinion
186
9.1 Party Competition and Radical Right Parties
195
9.2 Public Perceptions of the Maximum Distance in Party
Locations on the Ten-Point Left-Right Ideology Scale, Six
Largest Parties in Each Nation
203
9.3 Comparing Leadership and Party Popularity
213
10.1 Trends in Party Identification, EU 19701999
227
10.2 Trends in Voting Support for the Front National, France
19732002
229
ix
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11.1 Austrian Party Competition and Support for the FPO,

19491995
11.2 Norwegian Party Competition and Support for the FrP,
19451993
11.3 French Party Competition and Support for the Front
National, 19461997
11.4 Canadian Party Competition and Support for the Reform
Party, 19451997
Figures
266
268
269
270
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In considering the explanation for the varying fortunes of contemporary

radical right parties, my thoughts turned to my previous book, Electoral
Engineering (2004), which had developed a set of propositions about
how the institutional context of the formal electoral rules could shape
the strategic behavior of parties and how, in turn, these actions could
have a systematic impact upon patterns of voting behavior in the mass
electorate. The simple idea was that richer insights could be derived if
the comparative study of electoral systems, parties, and voters could be
reintegrated, rather than treating each of these as distinct subdisciplines.
Electoral Engineering examined many dimensions of voting behavior and
political representation, including patterns of turnout, the impact of social
cleavages, and the inclusion of women in parliament, but it did not seek to
apply the theory to understanding the electoral fortunes of any particular
party family. Building upon the approach developed earlier, this book
focuses upon the puzzling advance of the radical right, to see how far
the general theory could provide valuable insights into the roots of the
Le Pens Front
popular support mobilized by parties such as Haiders FPO,
National, and Bossis Lega Nord.
The argument developed here suggests that the rules determining ballot nomination, campaigning, and election are important, not just for
the share of seats which are awarded mechanically to radical right challengers, but also for the effectiveness of the ideological strategies they
adopt. What matters for their enduring success is less the underlying conditions in mass society, exemplified by levels of unemployment, patterns
of population migration, or the growth of new social risks, than how radical right parties craft their values and build their organizations to fit the
xi
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broader structural constraints set by electoral rules. In this regard, parties

do not work under conditions of perfect competition; instead, their actions
are constrained in a regulated marketplace by the broader institutional
context.
In developing this argument, the book, as ever, owes multiple debts to
many friends and colleagues. The book originated during a visit to the
Research School in the Social Sciences, Australian National University,
and I greatly appreciate all the warm hospitality and exceptional collegiality received there. The theme of the book received encouragement in
conversations over the years with many colleagues, and I am most grateful to all those who went out of their way to provide feedback on initial
ideas, to send me advance proofs of forthcoming publications, to advise
me about contemporary developments in their country, or to read through
draft chapters and provide chapter-and-verse comments. Among others,
particular thanks are due to Tim Bale, Andre Blais, Shaun Bowler, Wouter
van der Brug, Liz Carter, Ivor Crewe, Cees van der Eijk, Lynda Erickson,
David Farrell, Mark Franklin, Rachel Gibson, Elisabeth Gidengil, Jim
Jupp, Jenny Mansbridge, Dave Marsh, Ian Marsh, Ian McAllister, Cas
Mudde, Fritz Plasser, Marian Sawer, Pat Seyd, Stefaan Walgrave, and
Chris Wlezien.
The book could not have been written without the evidence collected
by collaboration among many colleagues. The study owes a large debt of
gratitude to all who conducted the surveys and assembled the datasets,
especially the principal investigators, as well as the funding agencies
which generously supported the cross-national survey research. The primary datasets used in this book include the European Social Survey 2002
(ESS), the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 19962001 (CSES),
the Expert Judgment Survey of Western European Political Parties 2000,
the Manifesto Research Group, and International IDEAs Handbook on
Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns, as well as selected
case studies. The surveys provide data from countries ranging from longestablished democracies with market economies to authoritarian states
and post-Communist societies.
The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems is a collaborative program
of cross-national research among election study teams in more than fifty
countries, with core funding provided by the National Science Foundation under grant nos. SES-9977967 and SBR-9317631. The survey data
is integrated, cleaned, and released by the CSES secretariat, directed by
David Howell assisted by Karen Long, based at the Center for Political
Studies, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan.
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xiii
The European Social Survey 2002 is an innovative, academically driven

social survey designed to chart and explain the interaction between
Europes changing institutions and the attitudes, beliefs, and behavior
patterns of its diverse populations. The survey covers more than twenty
nations and employs the most rigorous methodologies. It is funded via the
European Commissions Fifth Framework Programme, with supplementary funds from the European Science Foundation, which also sponsored
the development of the study over a number of years. The project is directed by a Central Coordinating Team led by Roger Jowell at the Centre
for Comparative Social Surveys, City University. The five other partners
are Bjorn Henrichsen at NSD Norway, Ineke Stoop at SCP Netherlands,
Willem Saris at the University of Amsterdam, Jack Billiet at the University
of Leuven, and Peter Mohler at ZUMA Germany.
The Expert Judgment Survey of Western European Political Parties
2000 was conducted by Marcel Lubbers at the Department of Sociology,
University of Nijmegen, and the data was distributed via the Steinmetz
Archive in Amsterdam.
The Manifesto Research Group/Comparative Manifestos Project,
formed in 1979, has content analyzed party platforms since 1945 in
twenty-five nations. The data was collected by a collaborative team led by
Ian Budge, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, and
Eric Tanenbaum.
International IDEAs Handbook on Funding of Political Parties and
Election Campaigns, edited by Reginald Austin and Maja Tjernstrom

and published in 2003, is an invaluable compilation of the regulations
governing party and election funding. I am grateful, in particular, to
Julie Ballington at IDEA for making the data available in electronic
format.
Draft chapters from this book have been presented at various professional venues, providing invaluable feedback and comments, including the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in
Chicago, the annual conference of the Elections, Parties and Public Opinion (EPOP) group at Nuffield College, Oxford, and the plenary lecture of
the European Consortium of Political Research at Budapest.
I also greatly appreciate the generous financial assistance provided for
the books research by the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs
at Harvard University and the warm encouragement of the Director, Jorge
Dominguez, as well as the stimulating collegiality provided by the Minda
de Gunzburg Center for European Studies at Harvard. The support of
Cambridge University Press has been invaluable, particularly the efficient
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assistance and continuous enthusiasm of my editor, Lew Bateman, as well

as the comments of the anonymous book reviewers. Lastly, this book
would not have been possible without the encouragement and stimulation provided by many colleagues and students at the John F. Kennedy
School of Government and the Department of Government, Harvard
University.
Cambridge, Massachusetts
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part i
UNDERSTANDING THE RADICAL RIGHT
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1
Understanding the Rise of the Radical Right
On 21 April 2002, the defeat of the Socialist Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin,
by Jean-Marie Le Pen in the first round of the French presidential elections,
sent a profound shock wave throughout Europe. The result galvanized
massive antiFront National demonstrations by millions of protestors
all over France. One of the best-known leaders on the radical right, Le
Pen dismissed the Holocaust as a detail of history, and he continues to
voice anti-Semitic, racist views. These events were rapidly followed in
the Netherlands by the assassination on 6 May 2002 of Pym Fortuyn, a
flamboyant and controversial figure, leading to a sudden surge of support
for his party in the general election. The anti-immigrant Lijst Pym Fortuyn
(LPF), formed just three months before the election, suddenly became the
second largest party in the Dutch Parliament and part of the governing
coalition. Nor are these isolated gains; during the last two decades, radical
right parties have been surging in popularity in many nations, gaining
legislative seats, enjoying the legitimacy endowed by ministerial office, and
entering the corridors of government power. Some have proved temporary
flash parties while others have experienced more enduring success across
a series of contests. The popularity of figures such as Jean-Marie Le Pen,
Haider, Umberto Bossi, Carl Hagen, and Pym Fortuyn has aroused
Jorg
widespread popular concern and a burgeoning scholarly literature.1
The core puzzle that this book seeks to explain is why these parties have
established a clear presence in national parliaments in recent years in a
diverse array of democracies such as Canada, Norway, France, Israel,
Russia, Romania, and Chile and even entered coalition governments in
Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Italy while
failing to advance in comparable nations such as Sweden, Britain, and
3
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Understanding the Radical Right
the United States. Their rise has occurred in both predominantly Catholic
and Protestant societies, in Nordic and Mediterranean regions, in liberal
Norway and conservative Switzerland, as well as in the European Union
and in Anglo-American democracies. The puzzle is deepened by the fact
that they have surfaced in many established democracies, affluent postindustrial knowledge societies, and cradle-to-grave welfare states with
some of the best-educated and most secure populations in the world, all
characteristics which should generate social tolerance and liberal attitudes
antithetical to xenophobic appeals.2 Moreover, radical right parties are
not confined to these countries; they have also won support within certain
post-Communist nations, as well as in some Latin American democracies.
Their rise is all the more intriguing given the remarkable resilience of established party systems and the difficulties that left-libertarian insurgents,
exemplified by Green parties, have commonly encountered when trying
to break through into elected office.
Despite extensive interest, little consensus has emerged about the reasons for this phenomenon. This book reexamines classic questions about
the underlying conditions facilitating the rise of the radical right, the nature of electoral change, and the drivers behind patterns of party competition. Building on ideas of rational voters and rational parties developed
nearly half a century ago, this phenomenon is understood here through the
concept of a regulated political marketplace which distinguishes between
public demand and party supply, both operating within the context of
the electoral rules. On the demand side, the book suggests that certain
conditions in the mass electorate, notably the growth of political disaffection and partisan dealignment in contemporary democracies, make it
easier for supporters to defect, at least temporarily, from mainstream parties. The rising salience of cultural protectionism, in a backlash against
globalization and population migration, has altered the public agenda
in each country, providing sporadic openings for new parties. But these
developments are common across contemporary societies, so they are insufficient by themselves to account for the varying fortunes of the radical
right. The theory developed here argues that the key to radical right success depends upon the complex interaction of public demand and party
supply under conditions of imperfect competition in a regulated electoral
marketplace. Each section of the book is organized to explore a different
dimension of this account.
r Part I provides an overview and introduction.
r Part II examines the broader institutional context of the type of
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regulated marketplace, comparing the formal rules determining the

nomination, campaigning, and election process.
r Part III considers the role of public demand, notably conditions of
widespread political disaffection and attitudes sympathetic toward cultural protectionism.
r Part IV analyzes how far party supply matches electoral demands,
in particular whether radical right parties emphasize either ideological or populist appeals within this environment, contributing toward
sporadic electoral gains, and the condition necessary for persistent
success whether the radical right manages to build and consolidate
effective party organizations.
This theory is tested against survey evidence derived from almost forty
societies. The conclusions drawn from the study are designed to contribute toward informing the debate about the role of the radical right in
contemporary democracies, by dismissing certain common fallacies while
highlighting other underemphasized causes. By contrast, the study establishes that remarkably little evidence supports many other popular myths
about the reasons for their success, for example the claim that the radical
right have advanced most strongly in societies with rampant unemployment or strong waves of immigration, or that they appeal most strongly
to socially disadvantaged sectors of the electorate. Nor does this account
emphasize, as others commonly suggest, that radical right fortunes depend primarily upon where other mainstream center-right and center-left
parties locate themselves across the ideological spectrum, or that charismatic leaders are vital to their success. Taken by themselves, none of the
core propositions advanced in this book can claim to provide particularly striking or original insights; indeed, they can be regarded as fairly
conventional assumptions pervasive in many standard rational choice accounts of electoral systems, voting behavior, and party competition. The
book borrows from, and thereby builds upon, the substantial literature
in these subfields, rather than seeking to reinvent the intellectual wheel.
Nevertheless, the combination and dynamic interaction of these factors
have been insufficiently understood theoretically, still less demonstrated
empirically, to explain this particular phenomenon.
the rise of radical right parties

Before setting out the key components of the argument developed at
the heart of this study, and discussing how this argument relates to the
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previous literature, for those unfamiliar with this phenomenon, the study
first briefly sets the stage by describing the basic facts concerning where
and when the radical right have advanced most successfully during the
postwar era and where they have failed. The precise definition and categorization of parties within the radical right family are discussed in detail
in subsequent chapters, but here, for an overview of this phenomenon,
some of the best-known contemporary cases are highlighted.
In the postwar decade, the remnants of the radical right existed at the
shadowy fringe of party politics in established democracies. The most significant parliamentary party which could trace its origins to Europes fascist past was the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), although in postwar
German politics the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD)
remained active at the margins. In the United States, powerful forces of
racist right-wing reaction included the Ku Klux Klan and George Wallaces
American Independent Party. The most dramatic new insurgent, which
shocked established party systems, arose in France, where the Poujadists
registered sudden albeit short-lived gains during the 1956 general election.
By the early 1970s, however, initial signs suggested that the deep tectonic
plates of European party politics were starting to shift elsewhere. In 1972,
Mogens Glistrup established the Danish Fremskridtspartiet (FP). Tremors
reverberated throughout Western Europe when, just a year later, they became the second largest party in the Danish Folketing, gaining 16% of
the vote on a radical antitax program. Other leaders sought to emulate
their success in Britain (with the National Front, founded in 1967), France
(Le Pens Front National, FN, founded in 1972), and Norway (the sister
Fremskrittspartiet, or FrP, created in 1973). The initial electoral record
of these parties remained erratic and uncertain during this decade: by the
early 1980s, national parliaments in Western democracies contained only
a half-dozen parties which could be classified as constituting part of the
radical right family, even by the most generous definition.
Today, by contrast, multiple contenders jostle for power. To give just
a few illustrations of their contemporary success, as well as the recent
contests in France and the Netherlands mentioned earlier, in Italy, the
government was returned to power in May 2001, resting on the support of the xenophobic Lega Nord (LN), led by Umberto Bossi, and
the Alleanza Nazionale (AN), led by Gianfranco Fini (with roots in
Haiders Freiheitliche Partei
the fascist MSI). In Austria, in 1999 Jorg
won 26.9% of the vote and the FPO

(although not
Osterreichs
(FPO)
Haider) became part of the new coalition government led by the con
servative Osterreichische
Volkspartei (OVP).
In the 2001 Danish general
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election, the Dansk Folkeparti (DF), headed by Pia Kjaersgaarg, got 12%
of the vote. In Norway that year, Carl Ivar Hagens Fremskrittspartiet
won 14.7% of the vote, becoming the third largest party in the Storting.
In Belgium, in October 2000, the Vlaams Blok, or VB (led by Frank
Vanhecke), became the biggest party on Antwerp City Council, winning
twenty out of fifty seats. During the June 2004 European elections, Vlaams
Blok won the second largest share of the Belgian vote. In Switzerland, the
Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP) consolidated gains in the October 2003
elections with 26.6% of the vote, becoming the largest party in the Swiss
Parliament, with 55 out of the 200 seats in the Nationalrat, gaining an
additional seat in the executive Federal Council. By no means all these
peaks were sustained in subsequent elections. Nevertheless each temporary surge administered a sharp shock to mainstream parties and generated considerable alarm in popular media commentary.
So far we have only mentioned some recent electoral gains for the
more successful contemporary radical right parties in Western Europe.
The list remains far from complete. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, in
Anglo-American democracies similar parties include New Zealand First,
the Canadian Reform Party (subsequently known as the Alliance and then
the Conservative party),3 the British National Party (BNP) and the UK Independence Party (UKIP), Ross Perots Reform Party in the United States,
and One Nation in Australia. In post-Communist Europe, ultranationalist
right-wing forces emerging since the fall of the Berlin Wall in Central and
Eastern Europe are exemplified by the Hungarian Justice and Life Party,
the Slovene National Party, the Greater Romania Party, the Romanian National Unity Party, and the Liberal Democratic parties in Russia and the
Ukraine.4 In regional elections, the National Democratic Party (NDP) and
the German Peoples Union have also registered some modest gains in the
former Communist eastern Germany. Comparisons elsewhere include the
Independent Democratic Union and National Renewal parties in Chile,
and the National Religious Party and National Union (IL) in Israel.
Figure 1.1 summarizes some of the basic trends in party support. The
graph illustrates the proportion of votes cast for seven relevant radical
right parties in Western Europe which contested a continuous series of
national elections since the early 1980s. This includes votes cast for the
Swiss SVP, Danish FP/DF, Norwegian FrP,
Italian MSI/AN, Austrian FPO,
Belgian VB, and French FN. All these parties are defined as relevant as
they have achieved over 3% of the vote in one or more national parliamentary elections during this period, and they represent some of the more consistently successful radical right contenders in Western Europe. The figure
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8
18.0
16.0
14.0
12.0
10.0
8.0
6.0
4.0
2.0
0.0
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
figure 1.1. Mean Vote for Seven Radical Right Parties in Western Europe, 1980
2004. This figure summarizes the average share of the vote in the lower house from
1980 to 2004 for the following parties in Western Europe, all of which have contested a continuous series of national parliamentary elections since 1980: Italian
Swiss SVP, Danish FP/DF, Norwegian FrP, Belgian VB,
MSI/AN, Austrian FPO,
French FN. All these parties can be defined as relevant; i.e., they have achieved
over 3% of the vote in one or more national parliamentary elections during this
period. In the Italian and Danish cases, splits occurred within parties, but there
are still recognizable continuities in renamed successor parties. Sources: Thomas
T. Mackie and Richard Rose. 1991. The International Almanac of Electoral History. London: Macmillan; Thomas T. Mackie and Richard Rose. 1997. A Decade
of Election Results: Updating the International Almanac. Studies in Public Policy.
295. Glasgow: University of Strathclyde; recent elections from Elections around
the World. www.electionsworld.org.
demonstrates the dramatic advance of these parties: in the early 1980s,

support remained flat and the radical right was often excluded from parliament through failing to meet the necessary vote thresholds over successive
elections. The surge gathered momentum from the mid-1980s onwards
until these parties eventually reached a slight plateau in 2001, with the
support of around one in six European voters. To summarize, during
the last two decades, popular support for these parties almost tripled.
By now, too many gains have occurred in too many countries to accept the idea that the radical right is simply a passing fad or fashion, a
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temporary phenomena which will eventually fade away on the contemporary political scene. Still, the success of the radical right should not be
exaggerated: for example, the British National Party, the German NDP,
and Australian One Nation currently remain stranded at the peripheries of
power, attracting disproportionate media angst and headline news coverage despite, so far, only sporadic and limited electoral success. Flash parties, exemplified by Lijst Pym Fortuyn, enjoy a meteoric rise but an equally
precipitate fall. Elsewhere, however, as will be discussed in Chapter 10,
some other contenders such as Lega Nord, the Norwegian FrP, and the
Belgian Vlaams Blok have managed the successful transition from fringe
into minor party status. After their initial entry into local government or
national parliaments, parties which have consolidated support over successive elections have gradually gained status, resources, and legitimacy,
which they can use to build grassroots party organizations, select more experienced candidates, and expand access to the news media and to public
campaign funding, all of which can provide a springboard for further advances. Access to legislative office often provides important opportunities
to accumulate valuable political resources such as access to public funding, political patronage, and media coverage between elections, which are
denied to fringe parties persistently excluded from power.
alternative explanations in the literature

Of course, no shortage of alternative explanations for the rise of the radical right is available, as will be discussed further in subsequent chapters.
The reasons for this phenomenon have attracted widespread speculation
in popular commentary and in the academic literature.5 Research on the
extreme right is hardly new; indeed classics in political sociology published during the late 1950s and early 1960s focused on understanding
grassroots support for fascism and Nazism (Adorno et al., Lipset), the
French origins of Poujadism (Hoffman), and the American phenomenon
of McCarthyism (Bell).6 One summary of the literature by Rydgren developed the following shopping list of reasons which had been proposed in
research to explain the emergence of contemporary radical right parties:
1. A postindustrial economy.
2. Dissolution of established identities, fragmentation of the culture,
multiculturalization.
3. The emergence or growing salience of the sociocultural cleavage
dimension.
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10
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Widespread political discontent and disenchantment.

Convergence between the established parties in political space.
Popular xenophobia and racism.
Economic crisis and unemployment.
Reaction against the emergence of New Left and/or Green parties
and movements.
9. A proportional voting system.
10. Experience of a referendum that cuts across the old party
cleavages.7
Other commentators have identified ten distinct theories of the radical
right.8 Yet it remains unclear how these various ad hoc causes relate to
each other theoretically. Nor is it evident how structural developments
which are thought to be common in most postindustrial nations, such as
political disaffection, can account satisfactorily for contrasts in the electoral fortunes of the radical right within or among similar societies, such
as Wallonian and Francophone Belgium, or western and eastern Canadian
states. Many common propositions, such as the assumed role of economic
conditions or patterns of immigration, have found only limited or mixed
support in the literature. The research also remains divided in part because, rather than offering systematic comparative analysis with testable
generalizations, the subfield remains heavily dependent upon descriptive
narratives about specific national case studies. As a result, contingent
factors emphasized as critical for the rise of specific radical right parties
in some particular countries (or elections) are reported as unimportant
in others. Many of these explanations are discussed and considered further throughout this book but found to be less closely and consistently
linked to the rise of the radical right in many countries than the account
developed here.
To make sense of the contemporary literature, and as a brush-clearing
exercise, the predominant perspectives can be categorized analytically into
three main schools. The most common sociological approach has long
emphasized structural trends altering popular demands in mass society,
notably developments in the socioeconomic background and political attitudes of the electorate, which are thought to have generated opportunities
for new parties. Alternatively, more recent institutional accounts have often focused more heavily upon supply-side factors, including the strategic
activities of parties as rational agents and where they choose to locate
themselves across the ideological spectrum when seeking to compete for
votes and seats. Finally, the traditional approach found in the literature
on electoral systems has long stressed the importance of the institutional
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context, emphasizing the formal electoral rules constraining both supply

and demand in the regulated marketplace.
Social Structure and Public Demand
Essentially, one-level models based on how changes in the social structure have fueled public demand for the radical right are by far the most
pervasive approach in the previous literature, drawing upon sociology,
social psychology, and political economy. These accounts emphasize longterm bottom up generic conditions and secular trends in mass society
notably the growth of a marginalized underclass in postindustrial
economies, patterns of migration flows, and/or the expansion of longterm unemployment which are thought to have facilitated public demand for these parties as an outlet for political frustrations among the
losers in affluent societies.9 Specific arguments within this perspective
claim, alternatively, that the radical right is strongest under conditions
where: (i) new waves of immigration, asylum seekers, and refugees have
raised public concern about this issue; (ii) the electorate has become widely
discontented with the mainstream parties and mistrustful of the political
system; (iii) a breakdown has occurred in the traditional class and religious
cleavages structuring mainstream political affiliations and party loyalties;
(iv) a cultural backlash is evident against the rise of postmaterial values;
and/or (v) cuts in the welfare state, growing levels of job insecurity, and
rising patterns of unemployment have generated new forms of social risk
and disadvantage. These conditions are regarded as largely structural in
the sense that they are understood as persistent and enduring developments in mass society which constrain the behavior of all actors in the
political system. This relationship between society and parties involves
some endogeneity; in the long term, public policies can gradually transform society, for example through cuts in the welfare state expanding
the number of households living in poverty, or through legal restriction
on the influx of immigrants, asylum seekers, and refugees.10 Politicians
seek to shape and alter public opinion, for example by populist rhetoric
heightening fears of outsiders, or by proposing new legislation restricting immigration, thereby raising the salience of the issue on the policy
agenda. Nevertheless, demand-side approaches treat mass society as the
given context within which political parties have to fight any particular
election.
Although frequently assumed, for example by commentators in the
news media, in fact some of the most popular explanations fail with just
a cursory glance at the comparative evidence. Many accounts blame job
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insecurity and unemployment rates in each society, assuming that radical

right support is strongest among poorer and less-educated groups, who
feel threatened by rapid socioeconomic change. Contemporary accounts
commonly echo postwar theories in social psychology offered by Adorno
et al., suggesting that low-status individuals are more prone to suffer from
authoritarian personalities, where frustration born of experience of urban overcrowding, poverty, and joblessness in industrial societies is translated into hostility and prejudice against outsiders.11 Studies emphasize
the rise of new social cleavages which are believed to facilitate these parties, for example if the politics of resentment is concentrated among an
underclass of low-skilled and low-qualified workers in inner-city areas,
experiencing growing levels of job insecurity and underemployment, who
have fallen through the welfare safety net in affluent societies.12 Yet, contrary to these predictions, the survey evidence presented in Chapter 6 in
fact establishes little support for this popular view. Some radical right parties do draw heavily upon the socially disadvantaged populations among
the poorest and least-educated social sectors; others attract a mix of social sectors. Class-based explanations fail to account for radical right support found among the comfortably self-employed bourgeoisie, as well as
among the lower working class.13 Moreover, if we compare the aggregate
evidence, the contemporary radical right has surged ahead in European
nations where unemployment rates are relatively low (Switzerland and
Austria) as well as fairly high (France).14 Simple accounts of structural
change have limited capacity to explain this phenomenon.
Nor can this rise be attributed in any straightforward, mechanical,
and mono-causal fashion simply to a backlash against the growth of the
borderless European Union, and waves of population migration, guest
workers, political refugees, and asylum seekers.15 As will be discussed
later in Chapter 8, contemporary radical right-wing parties have failed
to enter the German Bundestag, the Swedish Riksdag, and the British
House of Commons, for example, despite the fact that these countries
have absorbed some of the highest proportions of asylum seekers in
Western Europe. United Nations estimates suggest that during the 1990s
there were almost 1 million refugees and asylum seekers in Germany,
200,000 in the UK, and 175,000 in Sweden.16 By contrast, Italy hosted
about 7,000 refugees and asylum seekers during this decade, yet during the 2001 general elections the Alleanza Nationale elected two dozen
deputies with the support of more than one in ten voters. Other variants within this perspective include those who claim that a backlash
has occurred in Western Europe against powerful cultural tides and the
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rise of post-materialist values.17 But the classic value change thesis of

Ronald Inglehart predicted the gradual emergence of left-libertarian and
Green parties in postindustrial societies, due to long-term cultural shifts
in values among the secure younger generation, and the gradual process
of population replacement, but not a return to the authoritarian past.18
Simple path-dependent historical explanations also fail: the radical right
has advanced in Austria and Italy, scarred by memories of fascism, but
also in Norway, at the forefront of Allied resistance.
What of protest politics? The politics of resentment is often brought
into explanations where the populist rhetoric of the radical right is believed to tap into deep-seated public disaffection with the political system,
an erosion of trust in the institutions of representative government, and
the expression of disgust against all of the above.19 There is also considerable survey evidence that the rise of the radical right in recent decades
has been accompanied in many established democracies by growing popular disaffection with political institutions and with mainstream parties.20
But despite the apparent links between these trends, if the rise of political
disaffection is fairly universal, why should this estrangement generate the
rise of the radical right in Austria and not Germany, why Norway and not
Finland, why New Zealand and not Britain? As will be discussed further
in Chapter 7, the assumed direction of causality in this relationship can
also be questioned: on the one hand, voters may indeed seek an outlet
for expressing disaffection with all of the above by casting ballots for
the radical right. Alternatively, on the other hand, losers who support
fringe and minor parties on the radical right which consistently fail to
win legislative and government office may rationally come to feel greater
disaffection with the political system and mistrust of the institutions of
representative democracy.21
Another prime candidate concerns theories of partisan dealignment. In
political science, a wealth of survey evidence indicates a loosening of the
lifelong bonds tying loyalists to mainstream parties in many established
democracies.22 This process is also believed to have occurred throughout
postindustrial societies, due to common structural developments (rising
educational levels, generating greater cognitive skills, and the ubiquity of
nonpartisan sources of information through the spread of the electronic
media). Where more voters are up for grabs this should facilitate electoral volatility and sudden surges in popular support, including for newer
challengers. Although closer to the mark, again these accounts only take
us so far. In particular, they remain silent about the reasons why the beneficiaries of this process should necessarily be Le Pen, Haider, and Hagen,
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for example, rather than multiple other challengers and insurgent minor
parties in the crowded electoral marketplace, whether Green, regionalnationalist, ethno-religious, left-wing populist, or reformed Communist.
Moreover, since the causes of partisan dealignment are thought to lie in
social processes and structural trends common in most affluent postindustrial societies, by itself this explanation fails to account for marked
cross-national variations in popular support for the radical right. As will
be discussed in Chapter 10, some of the clearest evidence for partisan
dealignment can be found in Ireland, West Germany, and Britain, all nations where the radical right has failed to establish a serious challenge. By
contrast, the proportion of partisan identifiers has not fallen so dramatically in Denmark and Belgium, both countries where radical right parties
have made considerable advances into legislative office.
In short, separate demand-side accounts frequently expressed in popular and academic commentaries often contribute an important part of the
puzzle, and they can provide building blocks useful for developing more
comprehensive theories. But their failure to provide an overall explanation is clear from even a simple glance at the clear contrasts in radical
right fortunes found between neighboring states which appear to share
similar cultural values, postindustrial service-sector economies, and comparable institutions of representative democracy, such as the differences in
these parties between the Netherlands and Germany, France and Britain,
or Canada and the United States.
Party Agency: The Role of Supply-Side Factors
By contrast, two-level models emphasizing supply-side factors have recently become more common in the literature, for example in historicalinstitutional accounts, descriptive case studies, and rational choice theories of political economy, as well as in theories linking challenger and
insurgent parties with the rise of new social movements. This approach
suggests that demand-side analysis is too simple and instead we need to
give far greater emphasis to what parties can do through their own actions
as strategic agents. Supply-side approaches focus upon patterns of party
competition, including where mainstream parties decide to place themselves to the left, center, or right across the ideological spectrum as
well as the actions taken by the radical right themselves, and the dynamic
interaction of both these factors. In particular, research working within
this perspective has emphasized factors such as the anti-immigrant and
economic policies carried in radical right manifestos; the communication
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channels, populist styles, and rhetorical strategies these parties use when
targeting voters; the characteristics and popularity of their leadership; and
the financial resources and organization of each party.23
One of the most influential theories along these lines, developed by
Herbert Kitschelt, suggests that the spatial location of mainstream parties
across the ideological spectrum constrains the opportunities for the radical right to expand. In particular, in countries where the major parties
of the left and right converge in the moderate center of the political spectrum, and where the mainstream parties fail to address issues of race relations, immigration, and free market economics that concern the electorate,
Kitschelt suggests this allows the most space for the radical right to maximize their support.24 Following a similar logic, van der Brug et al. also suggest that radical right parties are more successful when the largest mainstream right-wing competitor, in particular, occupies a centrist position.25
Carter argues that the electoral fortunes of the radical right may also
depend upon the ideological position that these parties choose to adopt
within the available political space, along with cross-national variations
in their party leadership and organization.26 Alternatively, others such
as Martin Schain theorize that when mainstream parties seek to articulate
and coopt the radical right signature issues of political disaffection and
anti-immigration, or where they accept them as coalition partners, this
may serve to legitimize radical right parties in the eyes of the electorate.27
This general approach assumes that the electorates demand for public policies can be regarded as constant across affluent nations, on the
basis that broadly similar processes of globalization, population migration, structural unemployment, and multiculturalism have transformed
most postindustrial societies. Variations in the success of the radical right
across similar nations are therefore attributed to how far parties respond
effectively to public demands through their own actions and strategies.
Radical right parties are believed to react as rational actors to the opportunities arising from the ideological position of other mainstream parties,
as well as, in turn, influencing the position of their rivals.
Electoral Rules: The Role of the Institutional Context
By themselves, however, supply-side explanations suffer from some important limitations; for example, during the postwar decade many established democracies experienced a broad social and economic consensus, with most mainstream parties clustered within the moderate center
of the political spectrum, agreeing about the importance of maintaining
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the welfare state and Keynesian planned economies, yet in most places,
although there was much ideological space to develop, radical right parties remained marginalized throughout this era. Chapter 9 will compare
expert perceptions of party locations and establish the relatively poor fit
between the type of radical right party found in a range of European
democracies and either the size of the ideological gap between the mainstream center-left and center-right parties (the Kitschelt thesis), or the size
of the right-wing space (the van der Brug thesis). What is needed is a
more comprehensive understanding of this phenomenon which provides
insights into the interaction of the distribution of public opinion (electoral demand) with how parties respond in their ideological locations
(party supply). Recognizing party supply as well as electoral demand,
while representing an important step forward, is also limited in the sense
that in practice party competition is imperfect; instead supply and demand
operate within a regulated electoral marketplace. Three-level nested models emphasize the institutional context of the political system, notably the
formal and informal rules determining the nomination, campaign, and
election process, which, in turn, influence both party supply and public
demand.
Ever since the seminal work of Maurice Duverger, the mechanical
effects of the electoral rules are well known, with majoritarian systems
depressing the seat share of minor parties, and this process is often assumed to affect smaller radical right parties.28 The rules can also set a legal
threshold of exclusion, or the minimum share of the vote stipulated in the
constitution to secure a seat. Whether parties and candidates can get ballot
access or equal campaign funding is also shaped by the formal rules. What
is less well established, by contrast, are the psychological (informal or indirect) effects concerning how the legal rules shape the informal norms,
attitudes, and behavior of parties and citizens, including their strategic
calculations made in anticipating how the formal mechanisms work.29
Such psychological effects include strategic contests (whether and where
parties contest seats), strategic campaign communications (which electors parties target and why), and strategic voting (whether citizens vote
for their second-choice party, if they regard ballots cast for smaller radical
right parties as wasted votes). The institutional context of the electoral
system is also partly dependent upon party activity, for example where
the governing parties pass legislation controlling the nomination process,
campaign funding, and ballot access which restricts or even excludes minor parties. But during any contest, the electoral rules can be regarded as
largely stable constraints operating upon all parties and candidates, and
thereby shaping patterns of ideological competition.
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17
Building upon this literature, theories of new social movements developed by Gamson and Tarrow popularized the idea of a political opportunity structure.30 Several accounts have utilized this concept when
emphasizing the opportunities which new radical right insurgents face
within the external constraints set by existing electoral rules and the
established patterns of party competition.31 Yet rather than using this
framework, it seems preferable to keep the electoral system and patterns
of party competition as logically separate. In the long term, formal electoral rules operating at the level of the political system are usually the
stable and fixed institutional context within which patterns of party competition evolve and develop in the medium to short term, for example
as parties adjust their ideological position and programmatic policies between elections and even within campaigns. Governing parties can and
do alter the formal rules at irregular intervals. Occasional radical reforms
transform the basic electoral system, as exemplified by major changes in
the early 1990s in New Zealand, Italy, and Japan. More commonly, modest incremental adjustments amend the legal and administrative rules governing the nomination, campaign, and election process, for example the
regulations used in U.S. presidential elections for campaign funding, constituency redistricting, and presidential debates. But the basic institutional
context usually proves far more stable than the policy platforms and specific position of parties across the political spectrum, which are more commonly adjusted from one contest to another. Patterns of party competition
are also best understood as an interactive and dynamic process, where radical right parties both respond to the position of other mainstream parties
and in turn also influence them. Mixing both patterns of party competition and the electoral rules into a political opportunity structure is
conceptually confusing and adds little clarity to the analysis of the radical
right. As Koopmans argues, some versions of the political opportunity
model overstretch the context to include aspects which are not political
nor structural, or which just happen to fit the particular case study.32
As such, this book avoids the term altogether and instead analyzes the
impact of how party agencies position themselves ideologically and programmatically in any contest within the given context of formal electoral
rules.
The institutional rules governing nomination, campaigning, and election are both formal and informal. Formal electoral rules are understood
here as the legislative framework governing nomination, campaigning,
and election, as embodied in official documents, constitutional conventions, legal statutes, codes of conduct, and administrative procedures,
authorized by law and enforceable by courts. It is neither necessary nor
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sufficient for rules to be embodied in the legal system to be effective;

social norms, informal patterns of behavior, and social sanctions also create shared mutual expectations among political actors.33 Nevertheless the
formal rules which will be compared in Chapters 4 and 5 are important
as these are the core instruments of public policy, open to amendment
whether by legislation, executive order, constitutional revision, judicial
judgment, or bureaucratic decree. Although there is a gray overlapping
area, by contrast most social norms are altered gradually by informal processes such as social pressures, media campaigns, and cultural value shifts
located outside of the formal policy arena.
This study will examine evidence supporting both demand and supply perspectives with a critical eye, but it will also build upon previous
studies to offer an alternative and more comprehensive middle way of understanding the dynamics of this phenomenon. Taken in isolation, each
of these perspectives emphasizing popular demands, party responses,
and the context of electoral rules provides limited insights. But in combination, if we understand their interaction, these factors go a long way
toward explaining variations in the rise of the radical right. This book
seeks to develop an integrated approach, where the varying fortunes of
the radical right are understood to be the product of the way in which
the formal institutional rules set the context of, and thereby interact with,
both party supply and public demand in any election. It develops a theoretical framework for understanding the role of parties as strategic actors
crafting their ideological appeals to match public demands, within the
constraints set by electoral rules. This deceptively simple analytic step,
developed in an earlier book, provides an extremely powerful and comprehensive lens through which to understand the dynamics of public opinion
and party competition.34 The challenge is to understand how shifts in attitudes toward cultural protectionism, coupled with partisan dealignment
and growing political disaffection, have altered the distribution of public opinion in mass society (demand); how mainstream and radical right
political parties have responded strategically to, and contributed toward,
these changes in public opinion when emphasizing their party platforms
and ideological values (supply); and how both demand and supply are
constrained by the formal rules regulating the nomination, campaigning,
and election processes, thereby determining which parties get into power.
Understanding the puzzle of the sporadic rise (and occasional fall) of
these parties is important, even where the radical right remain marginalized on the fringes of public life, for a number of reasons. As will be
explored in the final section of the book, there are plausible grounds to
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believe that successful radical right parties are exerting growing influence over public policy, especially on their signature issues of race and
immigration, by encouraging the center-right parties to adopt more restrictive policies toward refugees and asylum seekers. The dynamic theory of party competition presented here suggests that where radical right
parties succeed, they expand the perceived zone of acquiescence, so others will follow in subsequent contests. Their success could also signify a
profound realignment of traditional party systems, as well as potentially
legitimating greater social intolerance in contemporary democracies. Yet
at the same time it is also true that some of the more alarmist concerns
commonly expressed by popular commentators about the consequences
of their rise for the overall health of democracy may well be exaggerated.
the theoretical framework: the interaction

of structure, agency, and rules
If social structure, party agency, and electoral rules are the key analytic
building blocks of this theory, how are they theorized to interact? Rather
than a one size fits all approach, the argument developed here seeks to
explain significant variations in the strategic appeals and electoral success
of parties within the radical right family, for example the sharp contrasts
evident between the political fortunes of the U.S. and the Canadian Reform parties, or the French and British National Fronts, or the radical
right in Norway and Sweden. The focus is primarily upon explaining the
outcome of contemporary elections, and the consequences of this for party
competition and for political systems, rather than upon individual-level
voting behavior, although the latter helps to underpin the former. The
core argument is evaluated against alternative explanations and competing counter-hypotheses offered in the literature, using national-level and
survey data drawn from almost forty countries. This account unfolds in
far greater depth throughout the book, along with the supporting evidence, but here the logic of the main argument is sketched out as a series
of theoretical propositions.
(i) The Proximity Model of Voter Demand and Party Supply

The theory at the heart of this study starts from conditions of perfect
electoral competition, and then modifies this position subsequently to account more realistically for behavior under a regulated marketplace. The
traditional Downsian rational choice axiom assumes that both voters and
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figure 1.2. The Theoretical Model of Party Competition
parties are located at ideal points across an ideological spectrum ranging

from left to right.35 The proximity model of voting behavior assumes that
each voter can locate him- or herself at a point in this space reflecting the
voters ideal preference. The position of each party can also be represented
by a point in the same space. The theory assumes that under conditions of
perfect competition, rational voters will choose the party whose position
is closest to their own ideological preference and will shun the parties
furthest away.36 This process generates voter demand for parties. At the
same time, rational parties seek to maximize their share of votes and seats
by adopting the ideological position closest to the median voter, thereby
generating party supply.
Further, the distribution of public opinion across the ideological spectrum is assumed to follow a normal curve (Figure 1.2). Some issues do
not fall into this pattern, for example if opinion is heavily skewed toward one side of the distribution, but as we shall demonstrate in subsequent chapters, public opinion reflects a normal distribution on most
major issues, such as preferences for tax cuts versus public spending, or
attitudes toward tolerance of ethnic minorities. In the ideological space,
the theory assumes that some policy options are located too far left for
the publics acceptance, some are located too far right, and there is an
asymmetrical zone of acquiescence between them with a range of choices
that are acceptable to the public.37 A broad public consensus exists about
issues and values within this zone. Typically, these are exemplified by the
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desirability of bread-and-butter valance public policies, such as broad

agreement about the importance of maintaining economic growth, basic
standards of health care, educational services, law and order, and national security, as well as a consensus about shared social and political
values such as the desirability of social tolerance, protection of human
rights, and support for democratic processes and principles. Mainstream
center-left and center-right parties typically compete primarily over which
team is more competent to manage these valance issues. The public acquiesces to policies within this central zone because the differences among
the alternative policy proposals are relatively minor, involving incremental more-or-less shifts rather than absolute black-and-white options. In
democratic societies with competitive party systems, elected representatives are assumed to respond fairly sensitively to the distribution of public
preferences. Rational politicians wish to maintain popular support (and
hence office) by remaining safely within the zone of acquiescence, where
the public is in accord with policy proposals and social values, rather than
moving too far across the ideological spectrum to either the extreme left
or right, where they risk gaining some votes but also losing others. Most
politicians therefore implement policy changes step by step, broadly in
terms of their perceptions of what the public wants. It follows that successful parties shape their policy platforms, rhetorical appeals, and values
to maximize their popularity within the publics zone of acquiescence.
Citizens converge in this zone and hence a center position generates the
greatest electoral rewards and the least risks for parties.
(ii) The Dynamics of Public Demand
Yet the zone is not static. At a certain stage, the theory suggests, public preferences on the demand side may shift toward either the right or
left. These movements are assumed to occur in response to shocks to
the status quo, which may include: (i) the impact of external events (exemplified by the sudden and dramatic impact of 9/11 on American perceptions of threats to national security); (ii) public reactions to major
changes in government policies (such as the implementation of drastic reductions in public spending or taxation); (iii) the gradual and cumulative
influence of long-term cultural trends (typified by growing public concern about the environment, rising support for gender and racial equality,
or greater tolerance of homosexuality); or the persuasive arguments and
rhetoric of politicians.38 This specific account assumes that external events
are important to the dynamics of public opinion, notably the impact of
globalization in all its manifestations. But from the point of view of the
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general argument, the theory is broadly agnostic about the impact of different exogenous factors in causing shifts in public opinion. The essential
assumption made here is that public opinion is not static, irrespective of
the exact cause of such change. An expanding literature based on the
analysis of long-term trends in opinion polls, for example by Page and
Shapiro, suggests that mass public opinion shifts fairly rationally and predictably in response to these sorts of social and political developments.39
The theory suggests that government policies, however, often continue to
overshoot the new public consensus, until policymakers become aware
of the shift and move back into line with the zone of acquiescence. If
politicians fail to perceive a significant change in public sentiment, or else
fail to respond to the shift, they face the threat of electoral defeat. In the
short term, the link between public preferences and electoral outcomes remains crude and imperfect, since parties and candidates may be returned
to power on successive occasions for many reasons, such as distortions
of the electoral system, the personal popularity of charismatic leaders,
or the impact of media campaign coverage, even when the policy mood
is slowly moving against them. In the longer term, however, the theory
assumes that in democracies, politicians remaining outside the zone of acquiescence and unable to turn the tide of public sentiments will eventually
suffer electoral defeat.
The challenge facing rational office-seeking politicians is therefore to
maintain their position close to the zone of acquiescence in public opinion
where they can maximize their support among electors. The art of politics is like a circus dog balancing on a rolling balloon. Politicians may lag
behind public opinion if they believe that certain policy options remain
popular, such as programs promising tax cuts, even though the public
has now shifted preferences toward public spending. Alternatively, policymakers may also run ahead of public opinion, for example if they are
more liberal than the electorate in their own attitudes toward political
refugees. Perceptual and information barriers often hinder how far political leaders can identify public preferences with any degree of accuracy.40
But when lagging or leading, politicians face an electoral penalty. Assuming the proximity model of voting behavior, where rational voters
seek to maximize their utility by opting for the party closest to their
ideological preferences, and against parties furthest away, in the longer
term any growing disjunction between public preferences and the actions
of policymakers can be expected to produce an electoral response that
throws the rascals out in favor of others more in tune with the national
mood.
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(iii) The Impact of Globalization Has Functioned as an External

Shock to Public Opinion, Driving the Rising Demand
for Cultural Protectionism
If we accept that the zone of acquiescence is not static, the study theorizes
that one such major external shock, which has altered demand-side public opinion during recent decades, can be identified as growing emphasis
on the values of cultural protectionism. The key catalyst for the value
change, we theorize, is not just patterns of immigration flows per se, but
rather the broader impact of globalization in all its multiple manifestations. Globalization is a complex phenomenon which is understood here
to refer to the expansion in the scale and speed of flows of capital, goods,
people, and ideas across borders with the effect of decreasing the effects of
distance. Multiple studies have documented patterns of globalization using indicators such as levels of international trade, communications, and
migration.41 We assume that public opinion has reacted most strongly to
some of the most visible manifestations of this phenomenon, especially
to perceived threats arising from growing rates of immigration, ethnic
diversity, and job losses arising from the greater permeability of national
borders during recent decades. As we shall demonstrate later, attitudes
toward cultural protectionism represent a powerful force, tapping into
older nationalist sentiments. The radical right are far from the exclusive
beneficiaries of the public reaction against globalization; certain core protectionist beliefs, such as suspicion and mistrust about the consequences of
untrammeled free trade and the hegemony of multinational corporations,
are also advocated by diverse parties and social movements on the libertarian left. Nevertheless, the more xenophobic and least tolerant dimensions
of cultural protectionism have become, in many ways, the signature issue
of the radical right. The rising salience of this issue in recent decades,
as a parochial backlash against globalization and cosmopolitanism, has
created openings for these parties and problems for all governments in
established democracies.
(iv) Radical Right Parties Have Responded Most Effectively to This

Shift in Public Opinion by Articulating Concerns and Supplying Policies
about Cultural Protectionism, Thereby Meeting Popular Demand
Within this context, on the supply side, the strategic challenge facing
radical right parties is how to mobilize sufficient support to carve out a
niche section of the electoral market which is not already occupied by
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the established parties on the center and center-right. The study theorizes
that they can do this in at least three distinct ways.
One supply-side strategy open to the radical right is an attempt to compete with the established center-left or center-right parties on consensual
left-right values, by stressing their ability and competence to manage the
economy, public services, or national security. Yet party competition remains fiercest on these valance issues. Without the experience, legitimacy,
and authority that come from an established record in government, or the
resources derived from elected office, new radical right parties face serious
problems in establishing their credibility and authority on these issues.
Rather than emphasizing their positive competence, the radical right
may instead seek to undermine support for the political system by negative
attacks, especially those directed against the performance and record of
the main party or party coalition in government, or by sowing general
mistrust of political institutions and politicians as a class. Populist rhetoric
directed against all of the above, fueling popular resentment about the
political system, is commonly used by outsiders. Parties can thereby hope
to gain support during any period of government unpopularity, although,
of course, this is a risky strategy since they cannot be certain whether any
voter dissatisfaction will benefit them, whether it will boost support for
other alternative opposition parties, or whether citizens will simply stay
home and fail to participate at the ballot box.
Alternatively, radical right parties may seek to appeal positively to the
electorate by supplying specific values and supplying policy proposals perceived to lie outside of the zone of acquiescence, and therefore neglected by
the mainstream parties in the center. Minor parties can seek to gain ownership of these values. Given the normal distribution of public opinion
on issues to the extreme left or right, new parties may thereby maximize
support among the smaller sectors of the electorate located at these poles.
Radical right parties therefore emphasize the values associated with cultural protectionism in a strategic attempt to build support, emphasizing
signature issues such as the repatriation of immigrants, the closure of borders to foreigners, and economic protectionism. They may also advocate
more diverse economic and social policies only loosely related to cultural
protectionism, such as proposing harsh anticrime laws or stringent requirements to qualify for public services and welfare benefits, although
they can be framed and understood implicitly as coded attacks upon foreigners and outsiders. These issues and values are usually regarded as too
far outside the publics zone of acquiescence to be adopted by the mainstream center-right parties: by emphasizing these values, any marginal
gains major parties might make from the small proportion of extreme
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right voters carry serious risks of counterbalancing losses from the larger
number of moderate center-left voters. But new radical right parties are
assumed to be less risk averse, since they also contain fewer incumbents
facing potential electoral losses. If radical right parties succeed in gaining
popular support by advocating these values, then the theory predicts that
mainstream parties will probably move toward the right flank in subsequent elections, adjusting their perceptions of the state of public opinion,
as a rational strategy to keep within the shifting zone of acquiescence.
(v) Facilitating Demand-Side Conditions: Partisan Dealignment
and Political Disaffection
Within this context, support for the radical right is further assisted by
demand-side processes of partisan dealignment which loosen voter loyalties and by growing disaffection with government, both of which weaken
habitual support (brand loyalty) for mainstream center-left and centerright parties, and thereby encourage electoral volatility. This should provide opportunities for newer competitors to attract supporters, especially
short-term voter defections in second-order elections, exemplified by midterm contests for regional bodies and for the European Parliament. In
occasional deviating and critical elections these contests can provide
important breakthroughs for the radical right, whether on a short-term
or longer-term basis. But, as will be discussed in depth in subsequent chapters, it would be a mistake to regard partisan dealignment and political
disaffection as sufficient in themselves for explaining the rise of radical
right parties; any weakening of traditional party-voter loyalties and any
upsurge of protest voting could be channeled equally into support for a
range of other minor parties and candidates seeking to provide a choice
not an echo, whether Green, regional, ethno-nationalist, ethno-religious,
personalist, or independent, as well as encouraging nonvoting or exit.
Not surprisingly, as a result indicators of political disaffection and partisan dealignment are expected to prove significant but relatively weak
predictors of electoral support for the radical right.
(vi) Yet under Conditions of Imperfect Competition, in a Regulated
Marketplace, Radical Right Parties Face Institutional Barriers
to Nomination, Campaigning, and Election
So far, we have sought to explain the dynamic interaction between the
demands of rational voters and the supply of public policies and ideological values by rational parties under conditions of perfect competition.
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The theory is simple and parsimonious. Far from being novel, the main
assumptions are those conventionally accepted within the rational choice
literature on proximity models of voting behavior and party competition.
The account generates certain potentially testable propositions open to examination against the empirical evidence. The theory is powerful because
it seeks to provide a general explanation applying to the strategic behavior of political parties in electoral democracies, not limited to the fortunes
of specific radical right parties and their leaders in particular countries,
whether the charismatic charm of Haider, the financial resources of Perot,
or the legacy of Italian fascism.
Yet the theory developed in this book modifies traditional Downsian
models by recognizing and emphasizing that the pursuit of office is also
constrained in important ways by electoral institutions. In practice, it
is more realistic to assume a regulated electoral marketplace, rather than
conditions of perfect competition. In particular, this account assumes that
the electoral system determines how the share of the popular vote translates into seats, patterns of voter and party behavior, and whether just a
few major parties are represented in national parliaments or whether multiple parties are included. If electoral systems were perfectly proportional
then there would be no need to bring in this intervening condition: any
partys share of seats would automatically reflect its share of the vote. But
in practice, no electoral system is perfectly proportional. The most important features of electoral systems that affect party competition include
the effective electoral threshold (the average percentage of votes needed
to gain a seat) and also, to a lesser extent, the structure of opportunities
regulating ballot access and party finance. These regulate competition and
constrain both demand- and supply-side factors.
The assumption that the electoral system matters for the distribution
of seats is also hardly contentious, let alone original; ever since the classic
work of Maurice Duverger and Douglas W. Rae, an extensive literature
has established that basic electoral rules shape the degree of party fragmentation, and thus influence the electoral fortunes of minor parties of
any political stripe and ideological persuasion.42 As discussed earlier, the
direct or mechanical impact of rules is widely acknowledged, for example, how the legal threshold prevented the NDP from entering the
Bundestag in 1969, or how the temporary shift to proportional representation (PR) in the 1986 French parliamentary elections helped Le Pens
Front National. But the indirect impact of these rules on party ideological
strategies is often overlooked, especially in studies limited to comparing
radical right parties in Western European parliamentary elections, which
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27
include few majoritarian electoral systems. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the

reasons for this relationship and confirm the proposition that the electoral
system represents an important part of the explanation for cross-national
variations in the emergence and consolidation of radical right parties, although these rules function as necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for
their rise.43
(vii) The Electoral System Also Shapes the Success of Emphasizing
Core Ideological Values or Vaguer Populist Appeals
Building upon these insights, the seventh proposition of this theory is
that within the established system of electoral rules constraining actors,
the effectiveness of adopting either ideological or populist strategies to
maximize potential seat gains depends in part upon the type of electoral
system. In this regard, parties are not just prisoners of their environment, but rather can become masters of their electoral fate. All radical
right parties are located, by definition, toward the far right section of the
ideological spectrum (for example, ranged from seven to ten on the conventional left-right ten-point scale), but nevertheless they are expected to
differ systematically in the ideological appeals they adopt to maximize
their support under different types of electoral systems.
Strategies emphasizing core ideological values work best in proportional representation electoral systems with low effective thresholds. The
theory predicts that in this context, radical right parties can gain seats
by adopting bonding strategies emphasizing the signature ideological
appeals which distinguish them most clearly from mainstream competitors on the center-right and center-left. Under these rules, minor radical
right parties can gain seats by focusing their appeals almost exclusively
upon the values of cultural protectionism, emphasizing hard-line xenophobic rhetoric, proposing racist anti-immigration and anti-refugee policies, and advocating radical economic and social policies, such as a flat
tax or the abolition of welfare eligibility for noncitizens. The extreme
nature of these proposals means that they are rejected by the majority of
the electorate in most democracies, but there remains some support for
these values among the public located to the extreme right. Low effective
vote thresholds, common in PR elections, allow radical right parties to
gain elected office through this strategy based on a relatively modest share
of the popular vote. The theory predicts that party systems under proportional rules will therefore be centrifugal, with competition dispersed
throughout the ideological spectrum and issue space.44
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By contrast, vaguer populist strategies work best in contests with higher

effective electoral thresholds to gain seats, common in majoritarian systems. In this context, radical right parties will fail to gain office unless
they also expand their policy platform and ideological appeals beyond
cultural protectionism to encompass a broader range of values and if
they dilute their ideology with populist appeals. An effective electoral
strategy requires radical right parties to advocate more diverse social and
economic values, and to emphasize vague rhetoric and simple slogans,
largely devoid of any substantive policy content. Majoritarian electoral
systems have higher electoral hurdles, since parties need a simple plurality
or a majority of votes in each district to win. Under these rules, successful parties commonly adopt populist strategies designed to gather votes
among diverse sectors of the electorate.45 This proposition suggests many
important consequences, not least that under majoritarian electoral rules
electorally successful radical right parties such as the Canadian Reform
Party (subsequently the Alliance and the Conservative Party) have to appeal beyond narrow single-issue anti-immigration or antitax policies to
expand their electoral support. Of course, radical right parties, such as the
UK National Front and Australias One Nation, may decide to focus only
on their core values, emphasizing single-issue xenophobic antiforeigner
cultural protectionism, prioritizing ideological purity over electoral popularity. But under majoritarian electoral rules, given the distribution of
public opinion on these issues, the theory suggests that such parties will
repeatedly fail to surmount the hurdles to become elected on a sustained
basis and they will remain marginalized at the periphery of power. The
theory therefore predicts that party systems under majoritarian rules will
prove more centripetal, clustered closely around the center point of the
ideological spectrum. Other accounts, notably work by Kitschelt and by
van der Brug et al., have also emphasized patterns of party competition,
but they have usually treated these patterns as static, and have often regarded radical right parties as passive actors in the process, rather than developing theories of the dynamics of party competition within institutional
constraints.46
(viii) For Sustained Success, New Radical Right Challengers Also Need
to Develop and Consolidate Party Organizations
The theory assumes that parties need effective ideological strategies to
gain support. But for persistent success over a series of elections they
also need to build and consolidate their organizational structure. Here
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the evidence remains more fragmentary, but nevertheless case studies suggest that new radical right fringe parties can occasionally enjoy sudden
electoral success, but whether they manage to sustain their position over
successive elections depends upon what ideological or populist strategies
they adopt and also whether they manage to develop effective organizational structures. This includes agreeing on the formal procedures facilitating leadership succession and internal decision-making processes, as
well as maintaining party discipline in parliament, and fostering a grassroots base among party activists, members, and voting loyalists in local communities. If parties remain poorly institutionalized, then they are
more likely to capsize following developments such as internal factional
splits, legal difficulties, or the loss of their founder-leader. The process
of institutionalization also means that parties qualify for public funds
allocated for election campaigning and full-time party staff; gain access
to the powers of patronage to favor supporters; develop links with the
news media, access to election broadcasting, and networks of volunteers
to manage political communications; and build the modern infrastructure
which maintains contemporary party organizations through good times
and bad.
(ix) Where Radical Right Parties Have Surged in Popularity in One
Election, by Meeting Popular Demand for Cultural Protectionism,
Other Mainstream Competitors Will Respond by Attempting to
Appeal to the Electorate on Their Issues in Subsequent Elections
If radical right parties are perceived as expanding their electoral popularity due to public demand for cultural protectionism, then the theory predicts that other parties within the same country will not simply
stay static; instead they will seek to emulate their success by adopting
their rhetoric and taking a more right-wing position on their signature issues of immigration, anticrime, and cultural protectionism in subsequent
elections. The zone of acquiescence thereby expands further towards the
right. Again this poses challenges for the sustained electoral success of
newer parties, if established competitors can steal their clothes and also
appeal more effectively on mainstream issues, such as economic performance and public service delivery. Any contagion of the right over issues
of cultural protectionism is likely to have significant consequences for
the public policy process and for government, for example by encouraging more restrictive immigration laws, as well as for patterns of party
competition.
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evidence for these propositions?

Are the core propositions arising from these assumptions supported by
good evidence? Ever since seminal work by Douglas Rae and Arend
Lijphart, there is certainly an established literature in comparative politics demonstrating that the parliamentary fortunes of minor parties are
directly determined by the type of electoral system.47 What is less well
understood is how the structural context interacts with party strategies
and the distribution of public opinion to explain the fortunes of the radical right. The analysis of party strategies is a complex and difficult area
of study. This book does not seek to analyze direct evidence for campaign and electoral appeals, since it is difficult to gauge these reliably and
consistently, especially across the wide range of countries contained in
this study. Data from the Manifesto Research Group/Comparative Manifestos Project, coding party platforms published from 1945 to 1998 in
twenty-five nations, allows comparison of left-right party policy programs within a common content analysis framework across many Western democracies.48 This material is invaluable for tracking the ideological
position and electoral fortunes of parties in countries such as France,
Austria, and Norway, as will be seen later in Chapter 11. Unfortunately it
has certain limitations as a guide that could be used to classify the range
of parties contained in this study. In particular, the dataset excludes some
important contenders, such as the British National Party, Perots Reform
Party in the United States, and Lijst Pym Fortuyn in the Netherlands, as
well as radical right parties in the newer democracies in post-Communist
Europe and Latin America. The coding scheme, developed in 1979, also
focuses primarily upon the economic and social policy concerns most
commonly dividing the major parties in Western democracies during the
postwar era, exemplified by issues of nationalization, economic planning,
and the welfare state. It was not designed to track detailed information
about many signature radical right issues which have become increasingly salient during the last decade, including policies hostile toward asylum seekers, refugees, and immigrants. In recognition of the need for
updating, the coding scheme and methodology are in the process of being
revised.49
Alternative qualitative attempts to determine party electoral strategies
directly, for example by asking campaign managers which voters and
regions they targeted, or by interviewing party leaders about their priorities, encounter serious problems of accessibility to pre-hoc war room
campaign plan secrecy, and the dangers of post-hoc self-serving spin
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rationalizations after the event. Indeed rational parties, like rational voters, may even be following certain strategies unconsciously, adapting to
their institutional constraints without ever realizing the reasons behind
their actions. Another alternative approach is to estimate party positions
using proxy measures, such as indicators of party election spending on
certain target voters, or content analysis of media coverage, campaign
speeches, party websites, and election literature.50 But again this evidence
is simply not available on a functionally equivalent reliable basis for a wide
range of parties and countries, and it is also often contextually driven; for
example spending limits and control of TV advertising are often determined by campaign finance laws and broadcasting regulations.
The most reliable alternative research strategy for a consistent crossnational comparison is to define party families from expert surveys which
ask a sample of political scientists in each country to locate each party on
a left-right ten-point ideological scale, or an equivalent scale on specific
issues. This technique has been widely used in the literature and, building
on previous studies, this book draws upon expert (and public) judgments
for the location of parties contained within the CSES survey, and also
the most recent expert survey, conducted in 2000 by Marcel Lubbers.51
Chapter 2 uses these measures to define and classify which parties can be
regarded as falling within the radical right family. Subsequent chapters
then analyze and compare the attitudes, values, and social characteristics
of supporters of these parties with other voters in the mass electorate.
Under PR systems, where radical right parties are predicted to focus on
mobilizing core voters on their core signature issues, including appeals
to xenophobia, nationalism, and cultural protectionism, their supporters
are expected to be fairly homogeneous in their values, and ideological cues
are predicted to be stronger guides to voting choices. Under majoritarian
systems, by contrast, where radical right parties need to broaden their
appeal to succeed in gaining office, their supporters are expected to prove
more heterogeneous in their attitudes and values, and populist appeals
are expected to be more important than ideological cues in determining
voter choice. The theory predicts that the type of electoral rules will have
important results for the campaign strategies adopted by successful radical
right parties. These appeals can be tested empirically by examining survey
evidence about the characteristics of party supporters in many nations, as
well as by comparing selected detailed case studies illustrating historical
processes in specific countries.
Most analysis of voting behavior is conventionally conducted at the individual level with comparisons made among groups of party supporters
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within each country. Cross-national comparisons then add a second level,
for example by comparing the class basis of voting for the Austrian FPO
52
and the Italian Lega Nord, examining contrasts between supporters of
the Flemish Vlaams Blok and the Wallonian Front National in Belgium,53
or analyzing trends over time in political attitudes among supporters for
radical right parties in one or two countries.54 But with comparative studies limited to just a few countries it is difficult, or even impossible, to
isolate institutional effects, such as the role of electoral and party systems
on voting support for different parties. As a result, explanations which
appear to be based on the social or ideological profile of voters for particular parties may, in fact, be due to the electoral and party systems in
operation in each country.
Given this understanding, this study compares individual voters clustered in their support for relevant radical right parliamentary parties (defined as those with over 3% of seats in the lower house) within national
elections. In turn, national elections are clustered into different types of
electoral systems. The type of electoral institutions, and the socioeconomic
conditions in each country, are classified and gauged at macrolevel. This
data is combined with survey evidence monitoring voting behavior, political attitudes, and social characteristics, all measured at individual level.
This evidence is compared across a wide range of nations, thirty-nine in
total, including established and newer democracies from many regions
in the world, using the thirty-two-nation Comparative Study of Electoral
Systems 19962001 (CSES) and the twenty-two-nation European Social
Survey 2002 (ESS) as the primary survey datasets. In combination, as will
be discussed in detail in the next chapter, these recent large-scale crossnational surveys allow us to compare electoral support for radical right
parties at individual level within varying institutional contexts. The comparative framework contains established and newer democracies, as well
as industrial and postindustrial societies, including countries in Western,
Central, and Eastern Europe, North and South America, and Asia-Pacific.
Plan of the Book
The challenge for this book is to explore the evidence supporting the
strategic agency theory compared with alternative accounts. The theory
does not claim to be particularly novel in its components. Many have
regarded either the direct impact of electoral systems, or the breadth of
the policy appeal of the radical right, or the rise of cultural protectionism,
as important parts of the explanation for their success. The combination
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of these factors, however, has been insufficiently emphasized to explain

exactly how successful party strategies respond to different electoral contexts. Chapter 2 explains the comparative framework and sources of survey and expert data used in this study. Chapter 3 clarifies the party
classification, an important preliminary step in order to examine whether
parties identified as located within the radical right family share common social and ideological characteristics, as commonly assumed, as well
as describing patterns of support for the most important parties on the
radical right in each country.
Building on this foundation, Part II then starts to test the empirical
evidence for the importance of formal rules in explaining the rise of the
radical right in some affluent societies and established democracies, but
not in others. Chapter 4 focuses upon the impact of ballot access and
campaign finance rules, while Chapter 5 considers how far electoral systems generate patterns of party competition and opportunities for minor
parties.
On this basis, Part III examines three dimensions of electoral demand.
Chapter 6 considers survey evidence to see whether contemporary radical
right support is drawn disproportionately from the petit bourgeoisie, as
with classic fascist movements during the interwar era, or whether today
these parties mobilize an underclass of the less affluent and less educated
strata who feel resentment against ethnic minorities, so that radical right
support is concentrated within disadvantaged sectors, or instead whether
processes of partisan dealignment mean that these parties gain votes from
different social sectors and classes. Chapter 7 focuses upon the protest
politics thesis, which suggests that support for the radical right is essentially motivated by negative evaluations of the performance of the party in
government, the lack of electoral choices due to closure of the gap between
the center-left and center-right, or a more diffuse rejection of democratic
institutions. Chapter 8 looks in more depth at attitudes toward immigration, multiculturalism, xenophobia, and cultural protectionism, and, in
particular, how far electoral support for the radical right is linked to lack
of tolerance toward ethnic minorities, asylum seekers, and refugees.
Part IV turns to the role of agency, representing the strategic appeals,
ideological values and policy proposals that parties present to the electorate. Chapter 9 compares the impact of the perceived ideological location of radical right parties, leadership popularity, and partisanship. The
study also uses case studies to see whether their ideological location is
more strongly associated with votes for radical right parties in countries
with PR rather than majoritarian electoral systems, as predicted by the
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strategic agency theory. Yet the analysis of cross-national survey evidence

remains limited in its capacity to document processes of party change
over time, and how some radical right parties move from the periphery
to becoming minor partners in coalition governments, while others fail.
Chapter 10 outlines the importance of organizational development and
consolidation for sustained success and then illustrates this by selected
case studies in nations where the radical right has, and has not, advanced
into power.
Lastly, Part IV considers the wider consequences of this phenomenon
for party competition, public policy, and the political system. Chapter 11
recaps the theoretical framework, summarizes the major findings established throughout the book, and also seeks to understand the broader
implications of this development for representative democracy. Many liberals are alarmed by the contemporary resurgence of the radical right, but
are these concerns actually justified? The conclusion reflects on whether
these parties represent a healthy outlet for the expression of genuine public concern about issues of multiculturalism, thereby contributing toward
public debate and diffusing tensions, or whether the growing legitimacy
and power of the radical right poses substantial threats to social tolerance,
political stability, and therefore the fundamental health of democracy.
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2
Classifying the Radical Right
This chapter starts by clarifying the comparative framework and the

primary sources of survey data employed in this study. The book is based
upon the most different research design, including thirty-nine countries
with contrasting democratic histories, patterns of industrial development,
and political institutions, as well as divergent electoral fortunes for the
radical right. Countries are compared if included in either of the primary survey data sources: the European Social Survey 2002 and the
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 19962001. The national variations are important since they provide insights into the underlying conditions facilitating electoral support for these parties. The chapter then
discusses the best way to conceptualize and define parties such as the
and the Belgian Vlaams Blok,
French Front National, the Austrian FPO,
and explains the party typology used in this study. For a consistent classification, this book uses both expert and voter judgments to identify the location of parties across the ideological spectrum. This chapter
draws upon the most recent expert survey, conducted in 2000 by Marcel
Lubbers, supplemented by those contained in the Comparative Study of
Electoral Systems and by similar sources.1 Careful classification is an important preliminary step before examining whether parties within the
radical right family share certain similar social and ideological characteristics, as so often assumed. On this basis, Chapter 3 then goes on to
briefly summarize the electoral fortunes of the most significant contemporary radical right parties studied in depth throughout the rest of
the book.
35
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the comparative framework and data sources

The most common approach adopted by comparative studies of the radical right is to adopt the most similar framework.2 Edited volumes have
often focused upon right-wing party fortunes within Western Europe,
post-Communist Europe, or Latin America. Or they have sought to compare advanced industrial societies or established democracies. The virtue
of the most similar design is that these countries are believed to share
certain similar historical traditions, levels of development, and cultural
characteristics; this design can also draw upon the national expertise of
area and regional specialists. By controlling for certain common features, such as the length of experience of democracy, or the strength of
Catholic or Protestant religious traditions, the analyst can thereby exclude
these factors from the analysis and focus upon those conditions that do
vary systematically within the selected universe, such as levels of unemployment or patterns of immigration. Given the common problem of too
many variables and insufficient cases, this research design is attractive yet
it is also limited. In particular, the most similar framework can overlook
certain structural and institutional arrangements which may be critical
in explaining the success of the radical right, simply because they do not
vary within a specific region or type of democracy under comparison.
For example, studies confined to Western Europe cannot easily compare
the role of electoral systems because nearly all established democracies in
the region use proportional representation. Older postwar dichotomies
between Western and post-Communist Europe, based on the Cold War
era, may overlook growing convergence and the emergence of striking
similarities, such as those shared today by member states within the expanded twenty-five-nation European Union, drawing upon centuries of
shared cultures. Moreover it may be dangerous to expand generalizations
beyond each region, for example to assume that the results of research
analyzing the fifteen existing members of the European Union, or the nineteen nations contained in Western Europe, can be applied to the broader
range of contemporary democracies found today in Central and Eastern
Europe, Latin America, and Asia.
By contrast, the diverse range of thirty-nine nations included in this
study requires the adoption of the most different comparative framework. The advantage is that this approach allows us to examine systematic variations in patterns of voting support for radical right parties
under many conditions, whether in terms of types of electoral systems
(including majoritarian, combined, or proportional systems), rates of
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37
economic development, levels of dissatisfaction with government performance, or ethnic heterogeneity or homogeneity. A comparison covering
many (although not all) Western European nations and Anglo-American
democracies, as well as some Latin American and post-Communist states,
expands the scope of the empirical generalizations that can be explored
under a wide variety of contexts.
Yet this approach also carries certain well-known limitations. In particular, due to the multiplicity of variables under comparison it remains
difficult to establish whether the factors thought to explain the rise of the
radical right in this study are indeed the key drivers. Taken in isolation, no
single indicator, set of data, national case study, or analytical technique
can provide a comprehensive picture or definitive evidence. As with other
controversies in the social sciences, the core concepts, definitions, and
measures concerning electoral support for radical right parties can be understood and operationalized in many alternative ways. Any one piece of
the puzzle can be reasonably challenged by skeptics and the results should
be taken with a strong pinch of salt. But where alternative approaches using multiple indicators, social surveys, and methods of analysis produce
patterns found consistently across a wide range of nations, and where a
logical and parsimonious theory can account for the relationships, then
their cumulative effect increases confidence in the reliability and robustness of the results and the conclusions become more compelling.
In particular, rather than making up ad hoc theories to account for the
popularity of the radical right, it is far more satisfactory to relate explanations to what is already known more broadly from the established literature on patterns of voting behavior, party competition, and elections. This
book provides a general theory, based on standard rational choice explanations of voting and parties, that remains open to further development.
Area studies specialists can explore the theory further to see whether it
fits by using more detailed qualitative case studies of the rise of the radical
right within specific nations, while regional experts can expand the scope
of the inquiry to consider how far the explanation works in other societies. This research is limited to examining the evidence from three main
sources: (i) trends in national election results in many countries, including
the percentage votes and seats won by the radical right during the postwar era; (ii) analysis of survey data in the thirty-nine countries included in
the European Social Survey 2002 and the Comparative Study of Electoral
Systems 19962001; and lastly (iii) case studies of party competition in
selected elections and content analysis of party platforms collected by the
Manifesto Research Group/Comparative Manifestos Project. The cases
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illustrate secular dealigning elections, exemplified by the failure of the

National Front and British National Party despite weakening partisan attachments in the UK; deviating elections, shown by the Reform Partys
performance in the 1992 and 1996 presidential elections in the United
States, and critical elections with an enduring shift in party competition,
indicated by the 1993 breakthrough for Reform in Canada and the 1984
European contests for Le Pens Front National.
A major source of survey data for this book is the twenty-two-nation
European Social Survey 2002.3 This study is designed to chart and explain the interaction between Europes changing institutions and the attitudes, beliefs, and behavior patterns of its diverse populations. The survey includes a wide range of items designed to monitor voting behavior,
partisanship, and an extensive range of social and political attitudes, including multiple items which can be used to develop scales of attitudes
toward immigration and refugees, as well as indicators of political interest, efficacy, trust, subjective well-being, family and friendship bonds,
and a rich array of detailed sociodemographic data including household
composition, work status, dependence on state benefits, ethnicity, type of
area, and occupational class. The size of the total pooled sample (with
over forty thousand cases) allows us to monitor voting behavior among
smaller population subgroups, such as ethnic minorities. The survey includes four nations in Scandinavia (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark),
eight nations in Northern Europe (Austria, Britain, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Switzerland), six from Mediterranean Europe (Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Turkey, and Israel), and
four post-Communist societies in Central Europe (the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia). As shown in Table 2.1, all these countries fall within the category of electoral democracies, classified by Freedom House in 20012002 as fully free in their political rights and civil
liberties, using the Gastil index. Most can also be categorized as affluent
postindustrial economies, with an average per capita GDP in 2002 ranging from sixteen thousand dollars (in Greece) to thirty thousand dollars
(in Norway), although all of the post-Communist states except Slovenia fall below this level. The ESS facilitates comparison across a range
of advanced industrialized societies in Western Europe sharing a broadly
similar cultural heritage and level of development.
This survey is supplemented by the Comparative Study of Electoral
Systems 19962001. This project is based on work by an international
team of collaborators who have incorporated a special battery of survey
questions into the national election studies, using a representative sample
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39
of the electorate in each country. Data from each of the separate election
studies was coordinated, integrated, and cleaned by the Center for Political Studies, Institute for Social Research, at the University of Michigan.4
The dataset is designed to facilitate the comparison of macro- and microlevel electoral data. Module 1 of the CSES (released in July 2002) used in
this study allows us to compare surveys of a representative cross-section
of the electorate in thirty-seven legislative and presidential national elections in thirty-two countries. The geographic coverage includes countries
containing in total over 1.2 million inhabitants, or one-fifth of the worlds
population. The focus on voters choices, the cross-national integration,
and above all the timing of the data collection (within a year following
each of the elections) provide a unique opportunity to compare voting
behavior in a way that is not possible through other common sources
of comparative data. Throughout the book, the national elections under
comparison in the CSES are those held from 1996 to 2002 for the lower
house of the national parliament and for presidential contests.
The most different research design is particularly well suited to the
societies included in these surveys as they range from low- or middleincome developing nations, such as Thailand, Mexico, Ukraine, Belarus,
and Romania (all with a per capita purchasing power parity (PPP) GDP
of less than five thousand dollars in 1998), to some of the most affluent
societies in the world, including Switzerland, the United States, and Japan
(with an equivalent per capita GDP of more than $30,000). Table 2.1 illustrates some of the basic charactistics of these nations. The countries
under comparison in the CSES have varied political institutions, rates of
population migration, levels of democratization, and cultural historical
traditions, all of which can be incorporated into comprehensive explanations of patterns of right-wing support. Ethnically homogeneous societies
such as Poland, Norway, and Britain are included, as well as plural societies with multiple social cleavages, exemplified by Israel and Belgium.
The length of time that each country has experienced democratic institutions also varies considerably, as measured by the mean score 19722003
on the Gastil index measured by Freedom House, which can be expected
to have an important impact upon electoral behavior and patterns of party
competition. While Australia and Sweden are long-established democracies, countries such as Spain and Portugal experienced their democratic
revolutions in the early 1970s, while still others like the Ukraine, Russia,
and Belarus are characterized by unstable and fragmented opposition parties, ineffective legislatures, and limited checks on the executive, with a
patchy record of civil liberties and political rights.5
40
Australia
Austria
Belarus
Belgium
Canada
Chile
Czech Rep.
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
AUS
AUT
BLR
BEL
CAN
CHL
CZE
DNK
FIN
FRA
DEU
GRC
HUN
ISL
IRL
ISR
ITA
JPN
Abrv.
4
16
53
6
8
43
32
11
14
17
18
24
38
2
12
22
21
9
25,693
26,765
7,544
27,178
27,840
9,417
13,991
27,627
24,996
24,223
25,103
16,501
12,416
29,581
29,866
20,131
23,626
26,755
GDP per
capita PPP
2000
(World
Bank
2002)b
18,880,000
7,705,000
10,236,000
10,161,000
31,147,000
15,211,000
10,244,000
5,293,000
5,176,000
59,080,000
82,220,000
10,645,000
10,036,000
281,000
3,730,000
5,122,000
57,298,000
126,714,000
Total pop.
2002 (World
Bank 2002)
1.0
1.0
5.9
1.1
1.0
3.9
4.6
1.0
1.5
1.5
1.4
2.1
3.8
1.0
1.1
2.1
1.4
1.4
Freedom
House Mean
Political
Rights &
Civil
Libertiesc
19722003
1.0
1.0
6.0
1.0
1.0
1.5
1.5
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.5
1.5
1.0
1.0
2.0
1.0
1.5
Freedom
House
Rating
Political
Rights &
Civil
Libertiesc
2002
Asia-Pacific
W. Europe
C. & E. Europe
W. Europe
N. America
S. America
C. & E. Europe
Scandinavia
Scandinavia
W. Europe
W. Europe
W. Europe
C. & E. Europe
Scandinavia
W. Europe
Middle East
W. Europe
Asia-Pacific
Region
AV
List PR
Two round
List PR
FPTP
List PR
List PR
List PR
List PR
Two round
CD
List PR
CD
List PR
STV
List PR
CD
CI
Type of
electoral
system
(IDEA
1997)d
4.3
10.0
.
13.6
25.5
44.2
1.0
12.6
0.0
13.2
0.3
2.2
4.4
0.0
0.0
9.7
16.3
0.0
% Vote
radical
right
20002004
CUNY008B/Norris
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
Nation
HDI
rank
2001
(UNDP
2003)a
table 2.1. The Comparative Framework
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Korea, Rep.
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Peru
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Thailand
Ukraine
UK
U.S.
38
39
46,844,000
3,670,000
431,000
98,881,000
15,786,000
3,862,000
4,461,000
25,662,000
38,765,000
9,875,000
22,327,000
146,934,000
1,986,000
39,630,000
8,910,000
7,386,000
22,401,000
61,399,000
50,456,000
58,830,000
278,357,000
39
3.7
4.5
1.1
3.6
1.0
1.0
1.0
3.8
3.8
1.8
5.2
5.4
4.5
2.1
1.0
1.0
4.0
3.6
5.2
1.2
1.0
39
2.0
1.5
1.0
2.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
2.5
1.5
1.0
2.0
5.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
2.0
2.5
4.0
1.0
1.0
39
Asia-Pacific
C. & E. Europe
W. Europe
N. America
W. Europe
Asia-Pacific
Scandinavia
S. America
C. & E. Europe
W. Europe
C. & E. Europe
C. & E. Europe
C. & E. Europe
W. Europe
Scandinavia
W. Europe
Asia-Pacific
Asia-Pacific
C. & E. Europe
W. Europe
N. America
39
CI
CI
List PR
CD
List PR
CD
List PR
List PR
List PR
List PR
List PR
CI
List PR
List PR
List PR
List PR
CI
CD
CI
FPTP
FPTP
38
0.0
1.3
0.0
0.0
5.7
10.4
14.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
21.0
11.5
4.4
0.1
1.4
29.5
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.0
July 5, 2005
38
15,054
7,106
46,833
9,023
25,657
20,070
29,918
4,799
9,051
17,290
6,423
8,377
17,367
19,472
24,277
28,769
.
6,402
3,816
24,455
34,142
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) ranking of all nations worldwide according to the Human Development Index in 2001. The HDI is
based on longevity, as measured by life expectancy at birth; educational achievement; and standard of living, as measured by per capita GDP (PPP $U.S.).
A high rank represents greater development. Human Development Report, 2003.
Gross Domestic Product (2000) measured in $U.S. in Purchasing Power Parity. World Bank Development Indicators, 2002.
Freedom House Gastil index: A 7-point scale used by Freedom House, measuring political rights and civil liberties every year, where high equals most
democratic. www.Freedomhouse.com.
International IDEA.
39
30
45
15
55
5
20
1
82
35
23
72
63
29
19
3
10
.
74
75
13
7
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KOR
LTU
LUX
MEX
NLD
NZL
NOR
PER
POL
PRT
ROM
RUS
SVN
ESP
SWE
CHE
TWN
THA
UKR
GBR
USA
CUNY008B/Norris
total
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
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This study therefore compares a wide range of older democracies,

newer democracies, and a few nondemocratic states. To classify levels
of democratization on a systematic and consistent basis, the book uses
indices developed by Freedom House, monitoring political rights and
civil liberties since 1972. Recent years have seen increasingly sophisticated attempts to develop effective measures of democracy. These include minimalist definitions, such as the dichotomous classification of
all political systems into democracies and autocracies developed by Przeworski et al., multidimensional scales used by the World Bank to rank
national levels of corruption, stability, and rule of law, and immensely
rich and detailed qualitative democratic audits conducted in just a few
countries.6 Alternative summary indices emphasize different components.
All suffer from certain conceptual or methodological limitations in their
reliability, consistency, and validity. Nevertheless, a comparison of nine
major indices of democracy by Munck and Verkuilen concluded that, despite these methodological differences, in practice simple correlation tests
showed considerable similarity in how nations were ranked across different measures: For all the differences in conceptualization, measurement
and aggregation, they seem to show that the reviewed indices are tapping
into the same underlying realities.7 Systematic biases may be generated
from reliance by all the indices on similar sources of evidence, or from
common data limitations, but the correlation of outcomes suggests that
the adoption of one or another measure is unlikely to generate widely
varying classifications of countries. The Gastil index, used by Freedom
House, is adopted here from the range of alternatives, as in previous work
by the author, because it provides comprehensive coverage worldwide, including all nation-states and independent territories around the globe.8
The index also facilitates time-series analysis of trends in democratization, since an annual measurement for each country has been produced
every year since the early 1970s. The index has become widely accepted as
one of the standard measures providing a multidimensional classification
of political rights and civil liberties. Table 2.1 shows the mean annual
Freedom House ratings calculated from 1972 to 2003, as an indicator of
democratic histories, and it also provides the most recent rating available
(2003) for comparison.9
Based on this measure, older democracies are defined as the thirty-nine
states around the world with at least twenty years continuous experience
of democracy from 1983 to 2003 and a Freedom House score of 1.0 to
1.5 in the 2002 rating. Newer democracies are classified as the forty-seven
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43
states with less than twenty years experience with democracy and a 2002
Freedom House rating of 1.0 to 1.5. Another forty-seven states were
classified as semi-democracies (Freedom House describes them as partlyfree; others use the terms transitional or consolidating democracies); these
states have been democratic for less than twenty years and have Freedom
House ratings in 2002 of 2.0 to 3.5. Nondemocracies are the remaining
sixty-two states, with a Freedom House score in 2002 from 4.0 to 7.0;
they include military-backed dictatorships, authoritarian states, elitist oligarchies, and absolute monarchies. Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus are rated
as more authoritarian today than the other countries under comparison;
nevertheless they are included since they provide an opportunity to examine support for the radical right in a few of the societies with more
restricted political rights and civil liberties.
classifying party families

Within this comparative framework, how can parties on the radical right
be defined and classified? Political scientists have developed numerous
typologies based on perceived similarities in certain party characteristics,
whether in terms of shared programmatic policies and doctrinal appeals,
common formal organizational structures, similar social characteristics of
their supporters, networks through transnational organizational links, or
even party names.10 Certain categories of party families are now well established and clearly recognized in the literature, such as the Greens,
Socialists, or Communists. Yet it remains unclear whether a single
phenomenon labeled the radical right exists, even as a loose category.
Parties commonly seen as exemplifying the radical right, such as Lega
Nord, the Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs,

and the Dansk Folkeparti, can
also be regarded as highly diverse in their ideological appeals, organizational structures, and leadership rhetoric.11 The classification process is
relatively straightforward through membership of international party organizations. Most Social Democratic, Socialist, and Labour parties, for
example, recognize common affiliations through membership of the Socialist International, even when parties within this family diverge in their
ideological positions and programmatic stances, such as contrasts over
economic and foreign policy between Blairs Labour Party and Schroeders
Social Democrats. Radical right parties represented within the European
Parliament have developed some common transnational party networks,
notably affiliation with the Group of Independents for a Europe of the
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the Belgian VB and FN, the

Nations, which includes the Austrian FPO,
French FN, and the Italian AN, among others.12 But not all parties within
this family share this affiliation, even within the EU.13
Consistency in the literature is not helped by the transience of many
fringe radical right parties, where these organizations collapse, splinter,
merge, or reinvent themselves under new leadership and labels when fighting successive elections. In the Netherlands, for example, the extreme nationalist Nederlanden Volksunie fragmented and was succeeded by both
the Centrum Partij (Center Party CP) and a splinter group, Centrum Partij 86, eventually becoming the Centrumdemocraten (Center Democrats
CD). Under the leadership of Hans Janmaat, the CD campaigned on
anti-immigrant sentiments, law-and-order issues, and populist antipolitics rhetoric, winning only 1% or 2% of the vote over successive elections,
peaking with three seats in 1994 before suffering a dramatic decline in
more recent elections. The rise of the more successful Lijst Pym Fortuyn
tapped electoral support based on a similar appeal, becoming the major
opposition party with 17% of the vote on their first attempt in 2002,
before they subsequently fell by two-thirds in parliamentary elections the
following year; then they crashed and burned in the 2004 elections to the
European Parliament. Another illustration comes from Canada, where
the radical right fought successive elections as the Reform Party (in 1988,
1993, and 1997), the Canada Reform Conservative Alliance (or Alliance
for short) in the 2000 Canadian election, and then, after merging with the
Progressive Conservatives, the Conservative Party of Canada (in 2004).
Nor are a common nomenclature and terminology shared among parties on the radical right, in part because deep-rooted social sanctions
against the fascism indelibly associated with Hitler and Mussolini makes
modern parties disown this historical tradition. Orwellian doublespeak
is also common, notably the adoption of democratic and progressive
labels by parties which stand for neither of these things. Standard reference works use alternative typologies and diverse labels categorizing
parties as far or extreme right, new right, anti-immigrant, neoNazi or neofascist, antiestablishment, national populist, protest,
ethnic, authoritarian, antigovernment, antiparty, ultranationalist,
or neoliberal, libertarian, and so on. Some commentators suggest that
it may prove misleading to categorize parties together conceptually, as
is common, into a single family. Instead it might be more precise to discern two or three distinct subfamilies, for example neoliberal, antiimmigrant, or populist strands. In Central and Eastern Europe, for
example, Ramet classifies radical right parties (seen as sharing organized
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intolerance) into five discrete strands: ultranationalists, fascist and cryptofascist, clerical, ultraconservative, and radical-populist.14 Each category
carries certain distinct historical associations, ideological identities, and
philosophical ideas.
The label new right is perhaps the most inappropriate since it has
become closely associated with the promarket economic ideas of privatization and rolling back the frontiers of the state, as propagated
by Thatcherism and Reaganism.15 Neoconservatism falls into the same
category; for example many of those at the heart of the Bush administrations interventionist foreign policy and tax-cutting economic agenda
are popularly known as the neocons, including Richard Perle, Paul
Wolfowitz, James Woolsey, Donald Rumsfeld, and Dick Cheney. Kitschelt
has argued persuasively that neofascist would be an inaccurate label, since
the French FN, and the Swiss Democrats
parties such as the Austrian FPO,
deny any links with historic fascism, they derive support from a different
class base, and they do not espouse many of the characteristic ideas traditionally associated with this ideology, such as the strong anticapitalist
populist appeal to the common man against the forces of big business
and corporatist economic policies: The fascist rhetoric was authoritarian, communitarian, and anti-capitalist, a rather different blend of appeals
than that of the NRR.16
The nomenclature extreme right is another common alternative, but
this can imply groups well beyond the legal boundaries of democratic
politics that are willing to use violent direct actions, or even terrorist
tactics. In Europe, incidents of racist violence by right-wing social movements and youth groups are monitored by organizations such as Human
Rights Watch and Amnesty International. Reports document direct acts
of anti-Semitism (such as hate mail and vandalizing synagogues), terrorist
intimidation of immigrant communities, and neo-Nazi bombings against
foreigners. In America, violent pro-life groups employ acts of bombing
and arson against abortion clinics and physicians in the United States,
while paramilitary groups in the Patriot or Militia movement also fall into
the extreme right category.17 Examples of genuinely extreme right ultrafringe parties include the Norwegian Fedrelandpartiet (the Fatherland
Party) and Hvit Valgallianse (the White Electoral Alliance), the National
Democratic Party of Austria, and the Partei Rechtstaatlicher Offensive
(Law and Order Party) in Hamburg, Germany. By contrast, the parties
studied within this book compete using conventional electoral channels
and disown the explicit adoption or use of violent tactics and terrorist
practices.
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Whereas many of these terms have various weaknesses, the term radical right presents certain advantages. The concept is well established; it
was first popularized by Daniel Bell in The Radical Right, published in
1963, and it became widely adopted by other American social scientists
during this era.18 The German literature also commonly used this term
following the lead of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution,
which prohibited certain parties from standing for election. The value of
this terminology is that it avoids prejudging the programmatic content
or rhetorical appeal of these parties, for example by labeling these parties anti-immigrant, nationalist, antisystem, or populist, which can
generate a circular logic in any empirical analysis. It remains to be seen
whether or not parties actively espouse these policies and stances. The exercise of analytical classification and typologies for its own sake may be a
somewhat arid pursuit, unless it tells us something more theoretically or
empirically, for example in identifying the drivers of electoral support or
in understanding the impact of these parties on public policy. At the same
time, the label adopted in this study denotes that these parties are located
toward one pole on the standard ideological left-right scale where parties are conventionally arrayed, and it remains to be determined if these
parties do or do not share other important characteristics.
Classifying Party Ideology
The question arises whether diverse parties, conventionally classified as
belonging to the radical right party family can, indeed, be regarded as having shared ideological goals, core identities, or social characteristics.19 The
study uses systematic evidence to classify contemporary parties based on
expert judgment surveys. This approach has been widely used in the literature on party politics, including a pioneering study in 1984 by Castle and
Mair, replicated in 1992 by Laver and Hunt, and again in 1995 by Huber
and Ingleharts study covering a broader range of nations.20 Coppedge
conducted a similar exercise covering Latin American parties.21 The most
recent expert survey in Western Europe, conducted by Marcel Lubbers
in January 2000, sent a questionnaire to a random sample of 290 political scientists in all fifteen member states of the European Union as
well as in Norway and Switzerland. The survey achieved a satisfactory
response rate (150 or 52% of the questionnaires were successfully completed and returned). The questionnaire asked respondents to place political parties in their country on scales ranging from 0 to 10. These scales
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47
represented (i) the current position of each party on an ideological scale

ranging from left (0) to right (10); (ii) the current position of each party
on an immigration scale ranging from not very restrictive (0) to very
restrictive (10); the past position of each party in 1990 on a similar immigration scale. Information was also gathered about party organizations
and leadership. There was a high degree of inter-coder reliability, and the
results of the left-right Lubbers scale were compared with the 1995 Huber and Inglehart survey as an additional cross-check on external validity.
The scores on the two independent expert scales were highly correlated
(R = .99).
Figure 2.1 shows the pattern of party competition in each country
according to the ideological placement of each party, with the left-right
scale plotted on the vertical axis and the restriction of immigration scale
shown on the horizontal axis. The size of each party is also illustrated
in terms of its share of the vote in the most recent national legislative
elections. The results show that parties scored by experts as most rightwing on the left-right Lubbers scale were also usually scored as most
restrictive on the immigration Lubbers scale. For example, according to
Belgian VB, French FN, and UK BNP
these scales, the Austrian FPO,
are all consistently located in the top right corner of the scatter-gram
for each country. By contrast, European Green and Communist parties
are usually located in the bottom left position. Only one case (Norway)
shows a more divergent pattern among parties on the right. Accordingly
these two scores were combined for analysis. Parties were classified in
this book as part of the radical right if their mean scores on the combined
left-right and immigration 10-point scales in the Lubbers survey were
greater than 8.0. This list was cross-checked against the literature and
found to be consistent with most previous classifications, although there
is dispute about borderline cases and the appropriate cut-off point on any
measures.22
Yet unfortunately the Lubbers expert survey covers only seventeen
European nations. To supplement this resource with comparisons from a
wider range of countries, where appropriate this study also draws upon
expert judgments made in the 1995 study by Huber and Inglehart, by
Coppedge for parties in Latin America, as well as studies by Ramet and by
Lewis of party systems in Central and Eastern Europe, and by the principal investigators in the thirty-two-nation Comparative Study of Electoral
Systems 19962001, who were asked to classify the parties included
in this study along a ten-point left-right scale.23 These judgments were
figure 2.1. Expert Location of Party Competition in Western Europe. The location of parties on ten-point scales
measuring left-right economic positions (vertical axis) and tolerance of immigration (horizontal axis). Source: Marcel
Lubbers [principal investigator]. 2000. Expert Judgment Survey of Western-European Political Parties 2000. Nijmegen,
the Netherlands: NWO, Department of Sociology, University of Nijmegen.
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49
supplemented in a few cases where such evaluations are not available by

careful judgments based on a review of the existing research and standard
reference sources.24
Classifying Party Strength
As well as their ideological position, the electoral strength of radical right
parties also needs to be classified systematically based on their share of
votes or seats. Some fringe parties in this family struggle to contest local,
regional, or national parliamentary elections, but gain no more than a
handful of seats, if that, in one or two contests before simply fading away.
Indeed some extraparliamentary parties, which function more like interest groups or social movements, never contend national elections. Other
parties on the radical right gradually develop a substantial base of supporters in the electorate, allowing members of parliament to be returned
to office consistently over a series of elections, with all the legitimacy and
credibility that this process entails. Within each election, parties can have
a sudden breakthrough in support, or they may experience an equally
rapid decline in their fortunes. By definition, flash parties are particularly prone to this volatility, for example the sudden wave of sympathy for
Lijst Pym Fortuyn triggered by the assassination of their leader and their
subsequent fall from popularity. Party fragmentation also complicates estimates of party strength, where parties split into contending factions,
or where they relaunch themselves under new labels, because it makes it
difficult to establish whether there is genuine continuity in any one party
organization. In Italy, for example, there was an identifiable continuity
when the MSI, which had operated throughout the postwar era, dissolved
and relaunched their party in January 1995 as the Alleanza Nazionale. In
Denmark, however, the older Fremskridtspartiet (FP), founded by Mogens
Glistrup in 1972, suffered a leadership split in 1995 and were gradually
displaced in subsequent elections by the more radical Dansk Folkeparti,
founded by Pia Kjaersgaard.
To exclude some of these volatile fluctuations, and to develop a more
reliable and consistent classification, contemporary party strength is measured here as the mean share of votes or seats won over the series of national legislative elections held since 1990. This historical watershed is selected because of the major discontinuities in party systems brought about
by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Communist party hegemony in Central and Eastern Europe. Party systems in some established
democracies (notably Italy and New Zealand) were also transformed in
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the early 1990s, following major reforms to the electoral system producing the disintegration of older patterns of party competition. Electoral
parties are defined in this study as those parties contesting seats in the
lower house of the national legislature (excluding purely regional parties
fighting only local contests).
Electoral parties can be further subdivided based on their share of the
vote in elections to the national legislature since 1990. Relevant electoral
parties are defined as those achieving at least 3.0% of the mean share
of the vote. By contrast, fringe electoral parties achieve 2.9% or less
of the vote.25 The relevant parties are also the most politically influential, through winning the greatest share of parliamentary seats and exercising the strongest impact upon public policy and the political system,
although their legislative representation depends on the electoral system.
Elections results are derived from Mackie and Rose, The International
Almanac of Electoral History, and subsequent publications in this series,
supplemented in the most recent contests by results from Elections around
the World.26 The study compares more than forty parties, of which about
half can be classified as relevant with the remainder fringe.
It should be recognized that these distinctions remain imprecise. There
is room for debate about borderline cases, such as the Belgian Front National (falling just below the threshold) or the Danish Fremskridtspartiet
(just above). Nevertheless, the criterion adopted here is the conventional
cut-off point for monitoring party strength and counting the effective
number of parties adopted by many other studies.27 The results are also
sensitive to marginal differences in periodization, for example if the mean
share of the vote is estimated from a slightly earlier or later year. Moreover
these measures do not take account of other indicators of party popularity, such as vote or seat gains in local councils, regional assemblies, or the
European Parliament, support for parties monitored in regular opinion
polls, or other indicators of party membership, finances, or organizational
strength. Often minor parties can be excluded from national parliaments
while demonstrating pockets of strong support in local areas or municipalities, especially in federal systems; for example the share of the vote for
the Belgian Front National is far greater if measured in the Francophone
region of Wallonia rather than across the whole of Belgium. Despite these
limitations, the selected indicators do provide a consistent and reliable
nationwide yardstick that can be used to compare party strength across
different countries and political systems. Alternative measures were tested
and it is doubtful if the inclusion or exclusion of any particular borderline
case would cause fundamental revisions to the main conclusions drawn
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51
from the study. The distinction is an important one; in contrast to fringe

parties, relevant parties are more likely to be in a position to consolidate
support over a series of elections, for example building up a grassroots
network of local volunteers and activists, institutionalizing internal party
bodies, creating official rules of candidate nomination and leadership succession, formalizing decision-making processes in the party organization,
establishing party discipline and coordination within parliament, developing a body of experienced and well-known legislators at local, regional,
and national levels, and accumulating organizational and financial resources which can lead to further electoral success. In short, there are no
guarantees that minor parties will succeed in institutionalizing their organization, but they are closer to power and, even with sporadic successes,
fringe parties are more likely to prove transient. Indeed the occasional
election which symbolizes the shift from fringe to minor party status,
which we will discuss in Chapter 10, is a critical one for new challengers
to party systems.
Given this approach, how far are the electoral fortunes of radical right
parties determined by their broader institutional context? Where have
they succeeded in establishing a beachhead in elected office and where
have they failed to gather any substantial popular support? Before analyzing the causes of this phenomenon, the next chapter first describes the
main parties that are then analyzed throughout the rest of the book.
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3
Comparing Parties
During the postwar era, party systems in established democracies enjoyed

considerable stability. The standard explanation for this phenomenon was
provided by Lipset and Rokkans seminal work, which suggested that patterns of party competition in Western Europe were frozen from the 1920s
until the mid-1960s between the block of Social Democratic, Labour, and
Communist parties on the left and the block of Christian Democratic,
Liberal, and Conservative parties on the right, in a mold established with
the expansion of the working-class franchise decades earlier.1 Yet from
the late 1960s or early 1970s onwards, challenges to established party systems emerged sporadically at intervals in some Western democracies, with
occasional electoral successes catalyzed by diverse issues, movements, and
parties. One of the first indicators occurred with the sudden success of the
radical right Fremskridtspartiet (FP, or Danish Progress Party), which became Denmarks second largest party in 1973. This led observers such as
Mogens Pedersen to detect evidence of greater electoral volatility in some
European democracies, notably in France, Germany, Denmark, and Norway. Yet stability continued elsewhere, such as in Austria, Switzerland,
and Sweden, where the relative strength of parties hardly changed from
one election to the next.2 Since the mid-1980s, many indicators have confirmed observations of growing party fragmentation and electoral volatility following the rise of new challenger parties, including those on the
radical right.
This chapter compares legislative election results for radical right parties in established democracies in Western Europe and Anglo-American
societies since 1945 with similar patterns in selected newer democracies
in post-Communist Europe and in Latin America since 1990. Leaving
52
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53
aside the ultramarginal extraparliamentary parties and social movements as well beyond the scope of this study, Table 3.1 summarizes the
contemporary electoral parties of the radical right in the nations under
comparison. Parties are identified as falling within this family if located at
or above 8.0 on the expert 10-point combined ideological scales described
in the previous chapter, or (if not included in the Lubbers comparison)
from other standard expert judgments and reference sources.3 In total,
forty-three parties meet this criterion. These are then further subdivided
according to their contemporary electoral strength into the categories of
relevant and fringe parties (relevant parties are defined as those with
an average of 3.0% or more of the vote in national legislative elections
held during the 1990s).
In older democracies, the relevant parties on the radical right that are
the focus of this study include the Italian MSI/AN, the Italian LN, the
the Dutch LPF, the Swiss SVP, the Danish FP, the Danish
Austrian FPO,
DF, the Norwegian FrP, the Belgian VB, the French FN, Pauline Hansons
One Nation, New Zealand First, and the Canadian Reform/Alliance/
Conservative Party. Similar parties in selected post-Communist European
nations under comparison include the Hungarian Justice and Life Party,
the Slovene National Party, the Greater Romania Party, the Romanian
National Unity Party, and the Liberal Democratic Party in Russia and the
Ukraine. Comparisons also include the Independent Democratic Union
and National Renewal in Chile, and the National Religious Party and
National Union in Israel. The heart of this book focuses upon explaining
the popular success of these parties and yet the failure of any equivalent breakthroughs in other established democracies where any similar
sister parties remain marginalized in terms of winning popular support,
exemplified by the German NDP, the BNP in Britain, and the Belgian
Front National. It should be acknowledged that the distinction between
relevant and fringe becomes less clear-cut where smaller parties display
strength within particular local communities or regional assemblies, or
where their candidates are elected to the European Parliament, even if
failing to break through successfully as effective players over a sustained
series of national contests. Yet the basic contrast remains between relevant
parties playing an important role in national legislatures and the public
policy process, with all the legitimacy, status, resources, and media publicity which flow from elected office, and fringe parties which fail to break
through this critical barrier even if fighting national or European elections.
Another category includes the ultrafringe radical right parties, factions,
and organizations which prioritize direct action and extraparliamentary
54
Pauline Hansons One
Nation
Freiheitliche Partei
Osterreichs
LiberalnaDemokratycnaja
Partja
Vlaams Blok
Front National
Reform
Democrata
Union
Independiente
Nacional
Renovacion
Republikanska Strana
Cesk
a
Dansk Folkeparti
Fremskridtspartiet
Isanmaallinen
Kansallis-Liitto
Front National
Mouvement pour la
France
Australia
Belarus
France
France
Danish Peoples Party

Progress Party
Patriotic National
Alliance
National Front
Movement for
France
1972
1995
1973
1993
1987
1990
1978
1983
1988
1988
FN
MPF
DF
FP
IKL
RN
RSC
VB
FN
RP
UDI
BPP
9.6
8.5
9.2
8.9
9.1
9.6
9.7
Relevant
Fringe
Relevant
Relevant
Fringe
Relevant
Relevant
Relevant
Fringe
Relevant
Relevant
Fringe
Relevant
FPO
8.8
Relevantc
ON
Abrv.
13.0
0.8
9.7
4.0
0.0
14.4
4.0
9.0
1.7
21.2
18.2
19.6
6.4
2002
2002
2001
1001
2003
2001
2002
2003
2003
2000
2001
2001
2002
2001
Latest
yearb
11.3
0.8
12.0
0.6
0.0
12.0
1.0
11.6
2.0
25.5
22.0
10.0
4.3
%
Votes
0.0
0.2
12.3
0.0
0.0
18.3
0.0
12.0
0.7
21.9
29.1
0.9
9.8
0.0
%
Seats
July 5, 2005
Denmark
Denmark
Finland
Flemish Block
National Front
Reform
Independent
Democratic Union
National Renewal
Republican Party
1994
1956
1997
Year
founded
Mean %
vote in
elections
since 1990a
0 521 84914 4
Chile
Czech Rep.
Belgium
Belgium
Canada
Chile
Liberal Democrat
Freedom Party
One Nation
Party
trans.
Type
of
party
CUNY008B/Norris
Austria
Party
Nation
Lubbers
expert
scale
table 3.1. Classification of Contemporary Radical Right Electoral Parties, Thirty-Nine Nations
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Ha-Lkhud Ha-Leumi
Alleanza Nazionale
Lega Nord
Movimento
Sociale-Fiamma
Tricolore
None
None
Lietuvos Laisves Sajunga
None
None
Israel
Italy
Italy
Italy
Japan
Korea, Rep.
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Mexico
1992
1999
1995
1989
1995
1956
1994
1993
2003
1964
1983
1987
1999
LLaS
IL
AN
LN
MsFt
Mafdal
EM
MIEP
LAOS
NPD
Rep
DVU
MNR
8.0
8.3
9.4
9.7
9.1
9.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.1
3.3
12.0
7.5
0.7
0.0
0.0
5.7
0.1
3.8
2.2
0.2
1.5
0.9
1.1
2000
2003
2001
2001
2001
2003
2003
2002
2003
2002
2002
2002
2002
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.7
5.8
3.8
4.9
0.0
0.0
0.0
5.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
(continued)
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.3
5.5
12.0
3.9
0.4
0.0
0.0
4.2
0.0
4.4
2.2
0.0
0.3
0.0
1.1
July 5, 2005
None
None
None
None
Fringe
Relevant
Relevant
Relevant
Fringe
None
None
Relevant
Fringe
Relevant
Fringe
Fringe
Fringe
Fringe
Fringe
0 521 84914 4
None
None
Lithuanian Freedom
Union
None
None
National Republican
Movement
Republican Party
German Peoples
Union
National Democratic
Party
Populist Orthodox
Rally
Greek Front
Hungarian Justice &
Life Party
None
None
National Religious
Party
National Union
National Alliance
Northern League
Social Movement 3
Color Flames
CUNY008B/Norris
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Greece
Hungary
Greece
Nationaldemokratische
Partei Deutschlands
Laikos Orthodoxos
Synagermos
Eliniko Metopon
Magyar Igazsag es Elet
Partja
None
None
Mifleget Datit Leumit
Mouvement National
Republicain
Die Republikaner
Deutsche Volksunion
Germany
Germany
Germany
France
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55
56
Lijst Pym Fortuyn
Centrumdemocraten
New Zealand First
Fremskrittspartiet
Fedrelandspartiet
None
None
None
Partidul Romania
Mare
Partidul Unitatii
Nationale Romane
LiberalnoDemokratischeskaja
Partija
Sovenska Nacional
Stranka
Falangistas
Sverigedemokraterna
Ny Demokrati
Schweizerische
Volkspartei
Netherlands
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Norway
Peru
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Romania
Spain
Sweden
Sweden
Switzerland
1988
1990
1971
1991
Fal
SD
NyD
SVP
SNS
LDPR
9.6
9.1
8.7
8.7
9.3
Fringe
Fringe
Fringe
Relevant
Relevant
Relevant
Relevant
Relevant
Fringe
Relevant
Relevant
Fringe
None
None
None
Relevant
0.1
0.5
2.0
19.2
5.9
15.5
5.2
11.4
0.8
9.1
12.1
0.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
9.9
Mean %
vote in
elections
since 1990
2000
2002
2002
2003
2000
2003
2000
2000
2003
2003
2002
2001
2001
Latest
year
0.1
1.4
0.0
26.6
4.4
11.5
1.5
5.7
0.0
10.4
14.7
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
19.5
%
Votes
0.0
0.0
0.0
55.0
5.7
8.0
0.0
5.3
0.0
10.8
15.8
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
24.2
%
Seats
July 5, 2005
Slovene National
Party
Falange
Swedish Democrats
New Democracy
Swiss Peoples Party
1988
PUNR
PRM
1992
1992
LPF
CD
NZFP
FrP
FLP
Abrv.
2002
1986
1993
1973
1991
Year
founded
Type
of
party
0 521 84914 4
Slovenia
List Pym Fortuyn

Center Democrats
New Zealand First
Progress Party
Fatherland Party
None
None
None
Greater Romania
Party
Romanian National
Unity Party
Liberal Democrat
Party
Party
trans
Lubbers
expert
scale
CUNY008B/Norris
Russia
Party
Nation
table 3.1 (continued)
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None
None
Ukrainian National
Assembly
British National
Party
National Front
Independence Party
None
Union of Federal
Democrats
Swiss Democrats
Ticino League
Freedom Party
1967
1993
1983
1990
1985
1991
NF
UKIP
BNP
UNA
SD
LdT
FPS
EDU
9.7
9.4
9.3
9.2
9.0
Fringe
Fringe
None
Fringe
None
None
Fringe
Fringe
Fringe
Fringe
Fringe
0.1
0.2
0.0
0.2
0.0
0.0
2.3
1.3
2.6
1.2
2001
2001
2004
2001
2002
2003
2003
2003
2003
0.0
1.5
0.0
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.1
1.0
0.4
0.2
1.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.0
1.0
0.0
2.0
Note: Radical right parties are defined as those scoring 8.0 or more on the combined 10-point Lubbers expert judgment scale or, where not included, from other reference sources.
Only contemporary parties are listed, defined as those contesting the most recent national legislative elections, excluding historical parties which have subsequently declined in
national elections.
a
Mean share of the vote in national parliamentary elections held from 1990 onwards.
b
The share of the vote and seats for each party in the latest parliamentary elections (date specified), held from 2000 to 2004.
c
Relevant electoral parties are defined as those winning at least 3% of the mean vote in national parliamentary elections held since 1990.
Sources: Marcel Lubbers [principal investigator]. 2000. Expert Judgment Survey of Western-European Political Parties 2000 [machine readable dataset]. Nijmegen, the Netherlands:
NWO, Department of Sociology, University of Nijmegen. Thomas T. Mackie and Richard Rose. 1991. The International Almanac of Electoral History. Washington DC: CQ Press;
Tom Mackie and Richard Rose. 1997. A Decade of Election Results: Updating the International Almanac. Studies in Public Policy 295. Glasgow: University of Strathclyde; Elections
around the World. www.electionworld.org; Richard Rose, Neil Munro, and Tom Mackie. 1998. Elections in Central and Eastern Europe since 1990. Studies in Public Policy.
Glasgow: University of Strathclyde; Sabrina P. Ramet. Ed. 1999. The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
National Front
Independence Party
None
Eidgenossische
Demokratische Union
Schweizer Demokraten
Lega dei Ticinesi
Freiheits Partei der
Schweiz
None
None
Ukrainska Natsionalna
Asambleya
British National Party
CUNY008B/Norris
UK
UK
US
UK
Taiwan
Thailand
Ukraine
Switzerland
Switzerland
Switzerland
Switzerland
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57
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organization over contesting national elections, as well as the extreme

right social movements, but these groups fall well beyond the scope of
this study.
To provide a brief overview of support for these parties, Figure 3.1
illustrates trends in the share of the radical right vote in national parliamentary elections in older democracies during the postwar era. The graphs
show how these parties have moved from margin to mainstream in recent
decades, although marked contrasts are apparent in the patterns of electoral support among these nations. The illustrations highlight the erratic
fluctuations in their electoral fortunes in Denmark and Norway, for example, by contrast to their strong surge in popularity experienced in Canada,
Switzerland, and Austria. Figure 3.2 maps voting support for radical right
parties in Europe in the most recent national legislative election, showing the patchwork quilt of popularity rather than any simple geographic
concentration in any one region. A brief summary description of the main
players and their electoral fortunes during the postwar era in each major region (including (i) continental Western Europe, (ii) Anglo-American
democracies, (iii) post-Communist Europe, and (iv) Latin America) familiarizes us with their basic features before we go on to analyze the main
factors driving their support in subsequent chapters.
(i) The Radical Right in Continental Western Europe
France
In France, a dramatic seismic political tremor occurred in January 1956
when the established parties were rocked by the success of Poujades
party, the Union for the Defense of Merchants and Artisans (UDCA),
which gained fifty-eight deputies and 12.3% of the vote at their first
national election. Under Pierre Poujade, a grocer, the party represented
a coalition of petty bourgeoisie, independent artisans, shopkeepers, entrepreneurs, and peasant farmers attracted by populist rhetoric directed
against taxes, big business, and big government.4 Their aim was to preserve the economic viability of the independent self-employed petite bourgeoisie, threatened by large corporations and government regulations, but
under assault from the government and established parties, their rebellion
proved short lived. Perhaps the best known of the contemporary radical
right parties in Western Europe is the Front National (FN), a persistent
presence in French politics since it was founded in 1972 by Jean-Marie
Le Pen.5 For years, the party could not make a decisive breakthrough at
national level; in 1981, for example, Le Pen failed to scrape together the
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59
Australian ON
Austrian FPO
Canadian Reform
Danish DF
Danish FP
Dutch LPF
Flemish VB
French FN
Italian LN
Italian MSI-AN
% Vote
25.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
% Vote
25.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
New Zealand NZFP
Norwegian FrP
% Vote
25.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
Swiss SVP
% Vote
25.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
1950 1960 197019801990 2000
Year
figure 3.1 Percentage Vote for Relevant Radical Right Parties in Established
Democracies, 19502004. This summarizes the percentage share of the vote in
nation elections to the lower house of parliament from 1950 to 2004 for the
following parties in established democracies: Australian One Nation, Austrian
Freedom Party, Canadian Reform Party, Danish Progress Party, Danish Peoples
Party, Dutch Lijst Pym Fortuyn, Flemish Vlaams Blok, French Front National,
Italian Lega Nord, Italian MSI/AN, New Zealand First, Norwegian Progress
Party, and the Swiss Peoples Party. Sources: Thomas T. Mackie and Richard
Rose. 1991. The International Almanac of Electoral History. Washington, DC:
CQ Press; Thomas T. Mackie and Richard Rose. 1997. A Decade of Election Results: Updating the International Almanac. Studies in Public Policy 295.
Glasgow: University of Strathclyde; recent elections from Elections around the
World. www.electionsworld.org.
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figure 3.2 Percentage of Votes Cast for Radical Right Parties in Europe, Latest
National Legislative Elections. For the classification of parties see Table 3.1. The
percentage share of the vote is for the most recent national legislative elections
for the lower house (held between 2000 and 2004). Sources: Thomas T. Mackie
and Richard Rose. 1991. The International Almanac of Electoral History. Washington, DC: CQ Press; Thomas T. Mackie and Richard Rose. 1997. A Decade
of Election Results: Updating the International Almanac. Studies in Public Policy
295. Glasgow: University of Strathclyde; recent elections from Elections around
the World. www.electionsworld.org.
minimum 500 signatures needed to contest the presidential election. Yet

in April 2002, Le Pen shocked commentators by coming second with 17%
of the vote, gaining over six million ballots, in the first round of the French
presidential elections. The Parti Socialiste Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin,
was knocked out of the race. Millions of French citizens were jolted out
of electoral apathy, and massive protests erupted spontaneously in many
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61
cities, before the final round ballot two weeks later eventually assured
President Chiracs Gaullist defeat of Le Pen.6
The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, Koekoeks Farmers Party (BP) came closest to French
Poujadism, opposing European integration and development aid. The BP
peaked in the 1960s, winning seven seats in the Tweede Kaamer in 1967.
In 1971, they lost much of that support, and never really regained it, losing their last remaining seat in 1981. The main Dutch radical right party
was the Nederlanden Volksunie (Netherland Peoples Union), which was
succeeded by the Centrum Partij (Center Party, or CP) and the splinter
Centrum Partij 86 (Center Party 86). The Centrumdemocraten (Center Democrats, or CD) was formed in 1986, gaining marginal support
throughout the 1990s (peaking with 2.5% of the vote in 1994). In May
2002, the assassination of Pym Fortuyn just before the Dutch general election led to a sudden surge of support for his party, the anti-immigrant Lijst
Pym Fortuyn (LPF). Founded just three months earlier, the LPF entered
parliament as the second largest party in their first attempt, becoming
part of a coalition government led by the Christian Democrats. Their initial success caused shock waves in the Dutch political system although,
lacking experienced leaders or clear policies, and with scandal and divisions destabilizing the coalition, the government did not last for long. In
the subsequent January 2003 general election, the LPF vote faded from
17% to 5.7%, causing the loss of two-thirds of their elected members.
The party achieved a marginal share of the vote and had no members
elected in the 2004 elections to the European Parliament.7 The May 2002
election exemplified a deviating election, providing a radical jolt to the
party system, but one that ultimately proved short lived.
Belgium
Next door, in the Flanders region of Belgium, the xenophobic Vlaams Blok
(Flemish Block, or VB) began in 1978 as a split from the more moderate
Volksunie (Peoples Union). VB support has been concentrated in the city
of Antwerp, where they gradually expanded their vote, rising from the
smallest party in 1982 to the largest in 1994. In October 2000 the party
won a third of the vote, and almost half of the seats, in Antwerp City
Council elections, where support crumbled for the traditional Christian
Democrats and Social Democrats who traditionally divided up power.8
Building on this base, in parliamentary elections on May 2003, the party
surged to 11.6% of the national vote, including 17.9% in their home
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region of Flanders. Vlaams Blok had campaigned under the slogan Our
people first!, demanding that Belgium close its borders to immigrants
and prohibit multicultural education, as well as under a radical platform
advocating regional independence.9 Although these are their defining issues, the party also stand for a broader range of right-wing positions,
by defending traditional moral values, evoking hard-line anticrime measures, and fostering free market economic policies.10 By contrast, in the
Francophone Wallonian region the Front National, born in 1985, remain
far weaker, based largely on groups of radical activists but suffering from
ineffective leadership. Their peak of support was 7.9% of the Wallonian
vote (2.9% Belgium-wide) achieved in the 1994 elections to the European
Parliament. The Belgian FN follow the model of Le Pens Front National,
with similar slogans and policy platforms, but with less success.
Austria
or Freedom Party)
In Austria the Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs
(FPO,
was founded in 1956 by former Nazi Anton Feithaller, with support from
Nazi sympathizers. During the 1970s the party adopted more moderate
policies, ejecting extremist elements, and in 1983 they joined a governing
coalition with the Socialists. This collapsed in 1986 with the election as
Haider, who shifted the party toward
the new party chairman of Jorg
Haider was notorious for alleged Nazi sympathies and his
the right. Jorg
plans to halt immigration, a particularly sensitive issue given Austrias past
history. The party gained support from the early 1990s onward, until by
had become the second largest party
the time of the 1999 election the FPO
in Austria with 26.9% of the vote and fifty-five seats in the Nationalrat.11
into government, in coalition with the conservative
The entry of the FPO
Osterreichische Volkspartei (OVP,

or Austrian Peoples Party), triggered
an international outcry and diplomatic sanctions mounted against Austria
by the European Union and the United States. Haider was forced to resign
subsequently lost ground in national elections in
as leader and the FPO
November 2002, although they remain in coalition government with the
OVP,
as well as holding pockets of electoral strength in local and regional
politics.12
Switzerland
In Switzerland, the most notable challenge to the mainstream right is the
Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP, or Swiss Peoples Party). Support for the
SVP, which had averaged about one in ten Swiss voters since the party was
founded in 1965, suddenly jumped to 14.9% in 1995 and then to 23.3%
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in 1999. As in the Austrian case, the most plausible explanation for this
rise is the outspoken views of their charismatic leader, Christoph Blocher,
shifting the SVP sharply rightward in the mid-1990s by emphasizing a
populist, anti-immigrant, and anti-EU platform. Nor was this election a
deviating case; the gains registered by Schweizerische Volkspartei were
consolidated in the October 2003 elections, when they became the largest
party in the Swiss parliament with 26.6% of the vote and 55 out of the
200 seats in the Nationalrat. Victory led to the inclusion of two SVP members in the Federal Council, not one, the first change to the magic formula traditional division of cabinet spoils in Switzerland for over forty
years.13 The result stunned commentators, not least because it had occurred in one of the most affluent and stable democracies in Europe. The
SVP are not alone; other smaller radical right parties on the fringe of Swiss
politics include the National Aktion Party, which became the Schweizer
Demokraten (SD - Swiss Democrats) in 1991, and the regional Lega dei
Ticinesi (Ticino League).14
Germany
In Germany, extreme right parties have been subject to strong social sanction as well as legal regulation by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, due to the historical legacy of the breakdown of the Weimar Republic and the scar of National Socialism. The 1949 constitution banned
parties and organizations that reject basic liberal-democratic principles,
such as political pluralism, respect for human rights, and free elections.
Nevertheless, various radical right parties have enjoyed sporadic electoral
success, although they are generally marginalized in national elections well
below the 5% voting hurdle required for representation in the Bundestag.
In West Germany about two dozen right-wing extremist parties, such as
the Sozialistische Reichspartie (SRP) and Deutsche Reichspartei, fought
elections after 1949, achieving limited support in the early years of the
Federal Republic, but this waned with the stabilization of the party system
and growing economic prosperity after 1952. The Nationaldemokratische Partie Deutschlands (NDP), founded in 1964, represent the start of
a second wave of the radical right, along with the Deutsche Volksunion
(German Peoples Union or DVU, established in 1971). After several years
of intermittent success in Lander

elections, in 1969 the NDP peaked with
4.3% of the second (party list) votes in Bundestag elections, narrowly
missing the 5% threshold for entry.15 Since then the NDP appear to have
declined in terms of popular support, down to an estimated five thousand
members, although in September 2004 the NDP achieved 9% of the vote
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in regional elections in Saxony, above the 5% exclusion threshold, gaining
seats in the Lander

assembly for the first time since 1968. In neighboring
Brandenburg, the Deutsche Volksunion polled above 6% in simultaneous contests. Their success has been attributed to welfare cuts by the
Schroeder government coupled with high levels of long-term unemployment, with almost one in five out of work in eastern Germany. Some observers have also identified a third wave of the radical right with support
for the hard-core Republikaner, founded in 1983, with their strongest or
ganizational base in Bavaria and Baden-Wurttemberg.
The Republikaner
achieved only modest and sporadic bursts of support in second-order
elections, achieving their best nationwide result (7.1% of the vote) in the
1989 European Parliamentary elections, and subsequently gradually fading during the 1990s. Nevertheless, estimates suggest that recruitment to
militant neo-Nazi extreme right groups has expanded, particularly in the
new Lander
of unified Germany, and there are indications that racially
motivated violent offenses have also increased.16
Italy
German radical right parties have enjoyed limited success. Until the 1990s,
a similar pattern was evident across the border in Italy where the neofascist
Movimento Italiano Sociale (MSI, or Italian Social Movement, founded
in 1946), achieving very modest electoral support, had long been isolated
from other parties. For this reason, however, they were less afflicted by
the charges of sleaze which engulfed many of their rivals in the early
1990s. The breakdown of the postwar party system, with the Christian
Democrats and the Socialist Party in disarray, expanded the opportunities
for radical electoral change.17 As a result, in the March 1994 election the
MSI share of the vote more than doubled from 5.4% to 13.5%, producing 109 deputies in the lower chamber.18 A month later, the MSI entered
coalition government with Silvio Berlusconis Forza Italia the first time
a radical right party had served in government in Europe since the Second World War. The MSI reinvented themselves officially in January 1995
as the Alleanza Nazionale (AN), based on a nationalist platform against
immigration and multiculturalism, and they strengthened their vote to
15.7% in the 1996 elections. In 2001 they maintained their role in supporting the government coalition with Berlusconi, holding several cabinet
posts, and their leader, Gianfranco Fini, served as Italys deputy prime
minister.
The populist Lega Nord (LN) was founded by Umberto Bossi in 1991
based on a merger between the Liga Veneta and Lega Lombarda. The
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early campaigns of Lega Nord stressed an ethno-regional appeal in demanding a federal state and the creation of a new independent region in
the north, Padania, breaking away from the poorer south. In the early
years, the party also emphasized the appeal of clean government in
standing against Tangentopoli in Rome and the widespread problems of
corruption, clientelism, the mismanagement of public finances, and vote
rigging. The party subsequently focused upon attacking multiculturalism
and presenting a populist antiestablishment message against immigrants,
refugees, homosexuals, Communists, Roma, and poorer southern Italians,
tapping into political disaffection. In recent years, the party have fueled
popular fear of immigration, globalization, crime, and social change. The
Lega Nord won 8.4% of the vote and 117 seats in the 1994 Italian general election, benefiting from their concentration of support in the new
system of single-member districts, becoming the largest single party in
parliament following the dramatic breakdown of Christian Democratic
hegemony. Lega Nord were included in Berlusconis coalition cabinet with
Forza Italia. Within a decade, the Lega had risen to become the largest
electoral force across much of northern Italy.19 But LN broke suddenly
with the coalition by withdrawing over the planned pension reforms, and
they brought down the government. In the 1996 general election, the LN
share of the vote improved to 10.1% but they did less well by holding
only fifty-nine seats. Following the 2001 general election, support fell further to only 3.9% of the vote and thirty seats, although members were
still appointed to three ministries in the new Berlusconi cabinet, with Umberto Bossi becoming the new Minister for Devolution. It can be argued
that the Lega Nord are more populist in their antisystem appeal, and
so they may not be strictly part of the radical right, based on the perceived ideological self-location of their voting supporters.20 The Lubbers
expert survey confirms that the LN are located at 7.55 on the 10-point
left-right ideological scale, less extreme in this regard than the Alleanza
Nazionale and the fringe Movimento Sociale-Fiamma Tricolore (MsFt).
This does make their classification more ambiguous than other parties
in this comparison. Nevertheless, the Lubbers estimate of Legas position
on the anti-immigration scale placed them at 9.0 on the 10-point scale,
making the party clearly within our scope.
Spain and Portugal
By contrast to the situation in Italy, during the last decade the radical
right have attracted minimal popular support in Spain, where the Falange
parties have divided into rival splinter factions which have been unable to
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shake off their association with their ultra-authoritarian and antidemocratic history, and the fascism of the Franco regime.21 In Portugal, as well,
the radical right remain marginalized, attracting negligible support in the
electorate.22 It seems likely that the authoritarian history of these countries produced a public reaction against radical right-wing parties in the
new democracies.
Denmark
In Scandinavia, the strong liberal and egalitarian culture permeating the
smaller welfare states of northern Europe, along with the fact that these
are some of the most prosperous countries in the world, might be expected
to have immunized these countries against this phenomenon. Not so.23
Indeed the rise of the radical right in Europe was sparked in the early
1970s when Denmark witnessed the success of the Fremskridtspartiet
(FP, or Danish Progress Party), which became Denmarks second largest
party in 1973 under Mogens Glistrups leadership on a neoliberal, antitax, and antistate platform.24 The Fremskridtspartiet generated a minor
earthquake in this election, gaining 15.9% of the vote, and encouraging
the development of a similar party in Norway. The party subsequently
split into contending factions, due to leadership problems. The successor
Dansk Folkeparti (DF, or Danish Peoples Party), founded in 1995, rose
to became the third most popular party in the November 2001 general
elections. Under the leadership of Pai Kjaersgaard DF adopted a more
extreme platform than FP, advocating radical tax cuts, law-and-order reforms, and the exclusion of immigrants. Favoring the preservation of a
traditional Danish culture, including strong internal and external security,
the party oppose the European Union. As the statement of principles on
their website states: Denmark is not an immigrant-country and has never
been so. Therefore, we will not accept a transformation to a multiethnic
society. Denmark belongs to the Danes and its citizens must be able to
live in a secure community founded on the rule of law, developing only
along the lines of Danish culture.25
Norway
In Norway, following the wave of success for the Danish party, in 1973
Anders Lange founded the Party for the Substantial Reduction in Taxes,
Duties, and Governmental Interference. The party achieved 5% of the
vote and four seats in their first contest but the leadership was racked by
dissent and for the next three elections they struggled to stay above the
4% legal threshold required for seats in the Storting, despite relaunching
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the party in 1977 as the Fremskrittspartiet (FrP). Under the leadership of

Carl Hagen, the anti-immigrant wing of the party became more prominent
and the fiscal conservatives deserted the party. In 1989 the party experienced a major breakthrough on this platform, when their share of the vote
surged from 3.7% to 13.0%.26 The Fremskrittspartiet then stayed around
this level (with a temporary dip in 1993) in the subsequent parliamentary
elections in September 2001, making them the third largest parliamentary
party in Norway, with about one-sixth of all seats. Although excluded
from ministerial office, due to an informal cordon sanitaire among the
major players, the party have lent support to the center-right Hyre minority coalition consisting of the Christian Peoples Party and Liberals,
and the Fremskrittspartiet may have sometimes exerted blackmail influence over their immigration policies.27
Sweden
In Sweden, Ny Demokrati (New Democracy, or NyD) emerged in 1990
on a platform of cutbacks in state services and taxes, anti-EU membership, and anti-immigration, and they won 6.7% of the national vote and
twenty-four seats in their first parliamentary election the following year.
Yet contrary to developments in Norway and Denmark, NyD failed to
consolidate their support and they lost all their seats in the 1994 election,
in part due to internal leadership squabbles, before practically disappearing in the 1998 contest. Another contender, the Sverigedemokraterna (SD,
or Sweden Democrats), have failed to achieve any significant success to
date at national level, where they remain marginalized, although they are
represented at local level in thirty municipalities. Moreover a growing
range of anti-EU, anti-asylum, and anti-immigrant movements are active
in Sweden, as well as neo-Nazi and skinhead groups, and it has been argued that the conditions are ripe in Sweden for the emergence of a radical
right party.28
Elsewhere in the Nordic region, although the usual scattering of ultrafringe radical right groups and organizations exists in Finland and Iceland,
no contemporary party has managed to gain any substantial support in
either country.29
(ii) The Radical Right in Anglo-American Democracies
One possible explanation for the rise of the radical right could lie in
the expansion and deepening of the European Union as an agency of
multinational governance, which could have triggered a public backlash
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against the loss of national autonomy compared with the fiat of Brussels
bureaucrats. This might sound plausible if this phenomenon was confined
to European Union member states. But it is not. Anglo-American democracies have also seen growing radical right challenges to the mainstream
pattern of party competition in Canada, New Zealand, and Australia (see
Table 3.1). These parties have proved most successful where their votes
are geographically concentrated; they have faced stronger hurdles in gaining parliamentary seats under majoritarian electoral systems where their
support is dispersed geographically.
Australia
In Australia the most notable breakthrough was achieved by Pauline
Hansons One Nation party. In 1996 Pauline Hanson first stood for the
Federal Parliament as a Liberal candidate in Queensland. She was officially disowned by the party two weeks before polling day for racist comments although she won as an independent. Her maiden speech to the
Federal Parliament later that year caused a sensation when she claimed
that Australia was in danger of being swamped by Asians. She denounced
the inequality of giving welfare money to Aborigines that was not available to other Australians. Many other groups came in for criticism during
the speech, including government bureaucrats, fat cats, do-gooders, big
business, foreign investors, and the United Nations. The outrage following this speech made her a national figure and she founded the One Nation
party with a few close associates in 1997. The partys positions on Aboriginal issues, multiculturalism, and Asian immigration gained extensive
media coverage, playing the race card, heightening the issue of immigration on the policy agenda. Hanson attempted to link Australian economic
insecurities to the issues of globalization, proposing protectionist tariffs,
economic nationalism, and other policies to reduce unemployment. The
party gained support from other far-right groups, such as Australians
against Further Immigration, the League of Rights, and National Action.
In their first contest in the Queensland state election in 1998, the party
won almost one-quarter of the vote (23%), gaining eleven out of seventyeight seats, on a platform combining opposition to Asian migrants and
Aboriginal rights with support for gun ownership. After this result, Prime
Minister John Howard moved his party sharply to the right by introducing
a controversial but popular policy of turning away boatloads of asylum
seekers before they could reach Australias shores. In the November 1998
federal elections, One Nation won 8.4% of the first preference vote and no
seats, and this share of the vote fell to just 4.3% in the 2001 election. This
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pattern was consistent with the high vote hurdles facing minor party challengers in the Australian preferential voting system used for the House of
Representatives, where the major Labour-Liberal/Nationalist parties remain predominant.30 In January 2002 Hanson announced her retirement
from politics as she was deeply damaged by legal charges of electoral
irregularities in party registration and campaign finance. She was found
guilty of illegally using the names of five hundred members of a support
group to register One Nation as a political party, as well as fraudulently
obtaining almost A$500,000 (US$325,000) in electoral funds. She was
discredited by a three-year jail term awarded in August 2003, although
it was suspended on appeal three months later. Given the publicity, and
lacking effective leadership, doubts surround whether One Nation represent a continuing serious presence in Australian party politics, given that
they only achieved just over 1% of the vote in the October 2004 federal
elections. In retrospect, their success in the 1998 Queensland contest can
probably be best understood as a classic example of a deviating election, or a flash party phenomenon, rather than signaling any significant
challenge to the status quo in Australian party politics.31
New Zealand
New Zealand had an entrenched two-party Westminster system during
most of the twentieth century. Government office rotated between the
conservative National Party and the center-left Labour Party, excluding
minor party contenders from legislative and government office. Dealigning trends weakened party identification during the 1980s, and electoral
volatility rose, but with little effect on parliamentary politics due to the
use of the first-past-the-post single-member electoral system.32 The major
shock to the system came from the introduction of the mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral system in 1993, which fragmented the party
system. This produced opportunities for the rise of the anti-immigrant
populist New Zealand First party, founded by Winston Peters in 1993.
The party won 8.3% of the vote and two seats in their first general election, rising to 13.4% of the vote and seventeen seats in 1996. Following
this result, in conjunction with the National Party, New Zealand First
unexpectedly formed the first coalition government in the country since
the 1930s. The coalition fell apart in August 1988, producing some internal party divisions. Their support subsequently slumped to just five seats
in the 1999 general election but it rebounded again in the 2002 election,
where New Zealand First were the third most popular party, with 10%
of the parliamentary vote and thirteen MPs.33
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New Zealand First can be seen as more moderate than some of the
other parties under comparison, for example in their policies on health
care, unemployment, and the environment, and yet they can also be regarded as part of the radical right family through their strong emphasis
on economic and cultural nationalism. The party currently remain protectionist in their economic policy, calling for New Zealand ownership of
key assets and infrastructure, arguing against economic globalization, and
favoring limits on the extent of foreign ownership in the country. In this
regard, they are similar to One Nation. At the same time, the statement
of party principles on their official website, and contained in leadership
speeches, presents a strong defense of cultural nationalism, including criticism of the legal rights enjoyed by the Maori aboriginal population under
the Treaty of Waitangi. Winston Peters, for example, argued that
The public has legitimate concerns over the influx of immigrants the dramatic
changes in the ethnic mix culture and the other aspects of national identity and
the mindless, unthinking way change is inflicted on our society. In their contempt
for the past, Labour and National have swept away many of the old landmarks
often selling them off to overseas investors and have dismantled much that was
valued and cherished by New Zealanders. . . . There are many apparent threats
to our way of life from open door immigration policies, through to a growing
obsession with the fundamentalism which has sprung up around the Treaty of
Waitangi and to the disturbing increase in lawlessness in our society.
Their party website opens with a poster image of Winston Peters and
the classic slogan that could be adopted by many of the parties under comparison: Immigrations up. Treaty costs up. Crimes up. Had
enough?
Canada
In 1987 Canada experienced the rise of the Reform Party, formed with a
base in Ontario by Preston Manning as a populist neoconservative party
reflecting alienation with the established party system.34 The Reform Party
can be regarded as sharing concerns about the issues of multiculturalism
and out-group threats to nativism with many of the other parties under
comparison, although they blended these issues with an antiwelfare, antitax, small-government, free market philosophy where they were close
to the old-right Progressive Conservatives. While initially regarded as a
temporary protest in 1993, where Reform benefited from the meltdown of
the Progressive Conservatives, the party subsequently consolidated their
position by becoming the largest opposition party in subsequent elections.
They repackaged under the label of the Canada Reform Conservative
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Alliance to expand their regional western base, winning 25.5% of the

vote in the November 2000 general election. They subsequently merged
on 15 October 2003 to become the new Conservative Party of Canada,
and today it remains unclear to most observers whether this party can be
regarded as legitimately constituting part of the radical right.35 The declaration of principles issued on merger was fairly moderate, emphasizing
the older conservative tradition in Canada, characterized by tolerance of
multiculturalism combined with free market economics. Yet at the same
time, tensions within their leadership, and certain remarks by parliamentary candidates on issues such as abortion rights and gay marriage during
the June 2004 campaign, indicated a strong strain of social conservatism
within the new party. Some Progressive Conservatives campaigned for
Liberal candidates, although others remained within the new party. The
2004 federal election produced a Liberal minority government. The Conservatives, under Stephen Harpers leadership, became the main opposition, with ninety-nine MPs and 29.6% of the vote, although not doing as
well on polling day as opinion polls had predicted. A series of campaign
gaffes, and the perception that the partys position remained ambiguous
and uncertain on many policies, appear to have caused some support to
drain away during the final stages of the general election.
Britain
In Britain, the mid-1970s saw growing concern about the virulently antiimmigration National Front, which achieved a very modest share of the
vote where they contested local and general elections.36 Their greatest support was located in urban working-class areas with high immigrant populations, notably the East End of London, cities such as Wolverhampton
and West Bromwich in the West Midlands, Leicester in the East Midlands,
and Bradford in West Yorkshire. The National Front were replaced in the
early 1980s by the British National Party (BNP), which broke away in
1983. The BNP have subsequently been marginalized in general elections;
for example in 2001 the BNP contested only thirty-four parliamentary
seats, achieving 3.7% of the vote in these constituencies.37 Their best
result was 16% of the votes cast in both Oldham constituencies, after
race-related riots in the area. The BNP have registered more gains at local
level but these still remain strictly limited; for example, the party fielded
more than two hundred candidates on an anti-asylum-seeker platform
in the May 2003 English local council elections, becoming the official
opposition party briefly on Burnley District Council, and making seat
gains in Oldham Council, a traditional working-class area in Northwest
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England with a high Asian population. Despite these gains, the BNP have
regularly attracted national attention in the news media out of all proportion to their level of electoral popularity and their threat to the major
parties.
The most recent right-wing challenge to mainstream politics has arisen
with the UK Independence Party (UKIP), founded in 1993 to seek Britains
withdrawal from the European Union. The official manifesto of the
party claims that they are nonracist and moderate in orientation, thereby
distancing themselves from the National Front and the BNP, and their
primary focus is to detach Britain from Brussels. The party also argue
that they favor maintaining asylum for genuine refugees fleeing political persecution. Nevertheless the official party policy is against unlimited
European immigration, or overcrowding in their own words: With the
fourth largest economy in world, the UK is the very attractive destination for people seeking a better life. The trouble is the UK is already full
up.38 Moreover survey analysis of the 2004 European elections found
that many UKIP voting supporters shared many political attitudes with,
and also sympathized with, the BNP.39 The party won only 1.4% of the
vote in the 1994 European elections, rising to 7% and three seats in 1999.
The party failed to make much of a mark in the 2001 UK general election,
however, with 428 candidates gaining only 1.5% of the UK vote, despite
the fact that, with the demise of the Referendum Party, UKIP were the
sole vehicle for the anti-European cause.40 In the June 2004 elections,
however, the party won twelve seats to the European Parliament with
16% of the vote, more than doubling their share and thereby beating the
Liberal Democrats into third place. In simultaneous elections, they also
came fourth and won 10% of the second-preference votes in the London
mayoral contests. It remains to be seen how UKIP develop in their Euroskeptic ideological location and the level of popular support for the party
in subsequent elections.
The United States
In the United States, multiple extreme right groups, social movements,
and radical organizations have flourished on the fringes of American
politics, from the Klu Klux Klan and neo-Nazi skinheads to the militia
movement.41 Yet contemporary third parties of any ideological persuasion
have had an exceptionally difficult time in gaining traction against the
Democrats and Republicans, due, in part, to the structural barriers of
single-member plurality districts used for elections to Congress, the majoritarian Electoral College employed for presidential contests, and the
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implementation of restrictive state registration procedures determining

ballot access in primary and general elections, which will be described
in the next chapter.42 The distinctive history and traditional culture of
the United States, founded upon successive waves of immigrants which
continue today, but also marked by the scar of African slavery, have left
a deep and enduring imprint upon racial politics and discourse, which
contrasts sharply with the colonial history and more recent experience of
immigration in many European democracies.
Despite the steep institutional hurdles, during the postwar era, occasional right-wing challenges to the two-party system in America have
proved effective. In 1948, the splinter-group States Rights or Dixiecrat
Party broke away from the Democrats over the civil rights platform
of President Harry Truman. The party, led by South Carolina governor Strom Thurmond, won thirty-nine Electoral College votes from four
southern states, gaining over one million ballots nationwide (representing 2.4% of the popular vote). Although defined in terms of states rights,
the partys main goal was continued racial segregation and maintaining
the Jim Crow laws which sustained it. In the 1968 election, a deep split
over the 1964 Civil Rights Act, polarizing liberal and conservative wings
within the Democratic Party, led to the formation of Governor George
Wallaces prosegregationist American Independent Party, which gained
12.9% of the popular vote and forty-six Electoral College votes. America
was rocked by turbulent race riots and antiVietnam war protests during
this era. Wallace went on to contest the 1972 and 1976 presidential elections on a states rights platform, but he never recovered fully from an
attempted assassination in 1972 which left him permanently paralyzed.
In recent elections, the Libertarian Party, although extremely marginalized, persist in fielding presidential candidates on an individualistic antistate, antitax platform, yet one also tolerant of the rights of immigrants.
Although it clearly differed ideologically from contemporary radical right
parties in Europe, arguably the strongest challenge from a populist party
in recent years came from the billionaire Ross Perots Reform Party, gaining almost one-fifth of the popular vote (18.3%) in the 1992 presidential
election and 9% in 1996. As will be discussed further in Chapter 10,
the party subsequently fragmented into contending leadership factions,
and Pat Buchanan, who tacked further to the right, failed to sustain the
momentum as their figurehead in the 2000 presidential elections. In 2004,
the party officially endorsed consumer advocate Ralph Nader as their candidate, gaining him ballot access in Florida, thereby leading Reform in a
very different direction.
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(iii) The Radical Right in Post-Communist Europe

In post-Communist Europe, complex and fluid patterns of party competition are evident during the transition and consolidation stages experienced by newer democracies. In most of the newer democracies in
Central and Eastern Europe, for example, the process of party formation
is by no means complete, although parties have increasingly developed
characteristics which allow them to be compared with West European
counterparts. In these nations, the basic concept of ranging parties across
the left-right ideological scale is widely familiar, although there are commonly greater difficulties in classifying parties consistently into a single
category called the radical right, or even identifying parties using the leftright ideological continuum that is conventional in Western Europe.43 For
example, the traditional conservative appeal of maintaining familiar social
values and a nostalgic return to the past has often been most strongly associated with orthodox Communist parties or their successor movements
on the left which have not reconstructed themselves into social democratic organizations.44 The most suitable equivalent to the radical right
in Western Europe is probably the more extreme ultranationalist parties,
which have established a presence, although often achieving marginal electoral success, in most countries in the region. These parties have played a
critical role in the politics of the Balkans, however; well after conflict subsided, the Serbia Radical Party (SRS) became the largest party with over
one-quarter of the vote (28%) in the December 2003 legislative elections.
A comprehensive comparative overview provided by Paul Lewis identified a range of radical right nationalist parliamentary parties in Central and Eastern Europe.45 Subsequent detailed case studies, by Ramet
and by others, serve to confirm this basic classification.46 Based on these
sources, the most important parties in this category in the countries under comparison include the Hungarian Justice and Life Party, the Slovene
National Party, the Greater Romania Party, and the Romanian National
Unity Party. To this list should be added, in Russia, the xenophobic and
ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Vladimir Zhirinovsky and
the sister party in Belarus. Table 3.1 provides a summary of voting support
for these parties, both during the 1990s and in the latest national legislative election.47
The Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP) was launched in 1993 on
an explicitly anti-Semitic platform. Their growing influence was apparent
through organizing antigovernment rallies before they secured fourteen
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seats in the 1998 legislative elections. In the subsequent 2002 Hungarian

general election, however, the MIEP won only 4.4% of the vote, dropping
below the minimum legal threshold. The Slovene National Party (SNS)
stand for a militarily strong and sovereign Slovenia, and the preservation
of the countrys cultural heritage. The SNS won 9.9% of the vote and
twelve seats in December 1992, before slipping in support after experiencing leadership divisions. In the last two general elections, four members
were elected to parliament, qualifying as a relevant party with about 3%
to 4% of the vote. In Romania, the extreme nationalist Partidul Romania

(Greater Romania Party, or PRM) achieved a modest share of the
Mare
vote during the 1990s until the November 2000 elections, when their legislative representation jumped to eighty-four seats in the lower house and
thirty-seven in the upper, with a fifth of the vote, second only to the Social
NaDemocrats. The Romanian National Unity Party (Partidul Unitatii
PUNR) adopted a hard right platform. After some initial
tionale Romane
success in the 1992 election, internal tensions developed during the mid1990s, and the party subsequently achieved poor showings at the polls.
In Russia, the Liberal Democratic Party (Liberalno-Demokratischeskaja
Partija Rossii LDPR) was founded in March 1990. Their controversial
leader, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, won over six million votes (7.8%) in the
1991 presidential poll on a series of extravagant promises. The party ran
even more strongly in the 1993 legislative contest, coming second with
more than a fifth of the national vote. In subsequent contests, however,
support slipped so that the party came third in the 1995 legislative ballot,
and only fifth in the 1996 and 2000 presidential contests. The LiberalDemocratic Party of Belarus (Liberalna-Demokraticheskaya Partiya Belarusi, LDPB) is an extremist party, dedicated to restoring the USSR. It
opposes NATO and what it calls international monopolies. The party
has no democratic structure, but is run by its leader, Sergey Haidukevich.
The party gathers its main support from ex-servicemen and those bent on
restoring the Soviet Union, and it is especially strong in Minsk, Vitchsk,
and some regional cities. The LDPBs main domestic ally is the Patriotic
Party, and it has links to vague business circles.
This classification of contemporary radical right parties in the selected
post-Communist nations under comparison is far from comprehensive.
The definition remains less clear-cut than the situation in established
democracies, given only partial democratization in Eastern Europe, and
the fluidity of many party systems in this region. But this identification
can be used to explore whether supporters of these parties can indeed be
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consistently related to their radical right counterparts in Western Europe

and elsewhere, whether in terms of their social characteristics or their
ideological orientations.
(iv) Radical Right Parties in Latin America
The diverse range of consolidating democracies in Latin America also
displays complex patterns of party competition and there have been a
number of attempts to develop typologies categorizing these patterns.48
It is particularly difficult to array contemporary parties across the familiar
left-right socioeconomic spectrum in Latin American nations, where party
leaders usually gather temporary factions around personalistic and clientalistic electoral appeals, especially in presidential contests, rather than
developing cohesive party organizations and policy platforms with distinctive ideological positions, ideas, or interests. In Brazilian politics, for
example, modern presidential campaigns often revolve primarily around
the personalities of alternative leaders, rather than involving serious and
sustained debate about substantive policy issues and each partys collective
programmatic platform.49 Catchall, fluid, and personalistic congressional
parties in Brazil support popular presidents in temporary alliances, but
these coalitions often disintegrate when leaders fall from public esteem
in difficult times.50 Weak party discipline in the Brazilian Congress, and
minimal accountability of elected members to grassroots party members
or local constituents, generate few effective sanctions if politicians cast
legislative votes contrary to the party line, or if they switch party affiliations and cross the floor.51 Moreover, throughout Latin America, a retreat
from radical ideological politics occurred during the 1990s, as countries
consolidated political rights and civil liberties, and moved toward neoliberal markets with economic restructuring. The history of militarybacked juntas and right-wing dictators abusing human rights in the region
had discredited support for older parties expressing a fascist or neofascist
discourse, such as the Chilean Parti Nacista. The revolutionary left was
also in retreat following the downfall of the Soviet Union and the growth
of democracy.
Despite these difficulties, some populist relevant right-wing parties
can be identified in Chile, which includes parties from the extreme right
to the revolutionary left, although not in Peru and Mexico, the other
Latin American nations under comparison.52 Coppedge also used the
methodology of an expert survey to distinguish ideological competition
among Latin American parties existing in the region until the mid-1990s,
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comparable to the approach already discussed. The study identified a

range of Latin American parties that could be regarded as either on
the secular or Christian right, distinguished from the center-right.53 In
Democrata
Chile this procedure identified the Union

Independiente (Inde Nacional (National
pendent Democratic Union, or UDI) and Renovacion
Renewal, or RN) as relevant opposition parties, fighting in coalition after
1997 as the Union for Chile, located on the radical right of the political spectrum. In the 2001 elections, the Union for Chile held 57 out of
120 seats in the Chamber of Deputies of the National Congress, and a
slim majority in the Senate. Other far right ultramarginal Chilean parties include the National Advance Guard (AN), with links to the state
intelligence operation under Pinochet. Again, it remains to be determined
whether the background and ideas of voters for these parties are similar
or different to supporters of radical right parties in Western Europe.
(v) Middle East and East Asia
Lastly, the comparative framework in this book includes a few other party
systems from other world regions. In East Asia, the study includes Japan,
Thailand, Taiwan, and the Republic of Korea. Although these countries
contain a variety of small right-extremist groups, most intensely nationalist, and also moderate conservative and neoliberal parties, no relevant
radical right parties were identified from standard reference sources.54 As
in Latin America, political parties in the newer democracies of East Asian
often tended to consist of elected legislators grouped around leadership
factions and splinter groups, usually poorly institutionalized, with centrist competition, rather than presenting a clearly defined ideological profile, stable organization, and party program. In the contemporary Korean
Republic, for example, political parties are described as fluid, dominated by personalities, and all centrist or conservative in parliament.55
In Taiwan, the primary cleavage revolves around issues of national identity and divergent views toward relationship with mainland China, rather
than socioeconomic left-right issues such as social welfare.56
In the Middle East, Israel represents a special and particularly complex case. In most European countries, contemporary radical right parties
have been largely secular in orientation, reflecting the predominant social
values in this region. In Israel, however, the extreme right has been sharply
defined by the role of ultra-orthodox religious factions within the Knesset
and by attitudes toward the primary cleavage revolving around Zionism
and the Palestinian question.57 The extreme fragmentation of the party
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system, the existence of multiple splinter ultranationalist organizations,

the depth of violent conflict in Middle East politics, and the existence
of many shifting electoral alliances, also complicate the analysis.58 The
main contemporary contenders which can be identified as relevant parties
on the radical right today include the National Religious Party (Mafdal),
dedicated to the principles of religious Zionism and evolving into a militantly nationalist group calling for the outright annexation of the West
Bank, and the National Union, formed as an electoral alliance, including
the Homeland Party (Moledet), an ultra-Zionist secular party also calling
for the annexation of the occupied territories. Both parties formed part
of the coalition government headed by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.
exaggerating their rise?

This brief review can only sketch out thumbnail portraits giving the basic characteristics of the most important parties in the countries under
comparison. Yet in summarizing their electoral fortunes, critical skeptics
could point out that the contemporary success of the radical right may
have been exaggerated, in this account, for a series of reasons.
First, some electoral breakthroughs have proved extremely short lived.
This pattern might be expected to prove common if antiestablishment
parties encounter problems in maintaining their image as outsiders when
they enter governing coalitions.59 Temporary extremist flash parties, notably the Poujadists in France, have suddenly surged and then faded away
in the past, leaving only a faint enduring imprint upon the body politic.60
Other radical right parties, however, have now maintained a significant
presence in a succession of national parliamentary elections for more than
two decades, notably the Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs

in Austria (which
shifted rightwards during the mid-1980s), the Front National in France,
and the Schweizerische Volkspartei (which became more radical in 1999).
Measuring support for radical right parties according to their average
share of the vote in successive elections held for the lower house of parliament during the 1990s should avoid some of the problems of electoral
volatility encountered in studies of smaller parties, by evening out peaks
and troughs.
It can also be argued that, rather than representing a consistent shift in
patterns of party competition across postindustrial societies, the specific
factors leading toward the breakthrough of radical right parties in each
country can be regarded as almost accidental, or at least highly contingent
upon particular historical factors, events, or circumstances, which differ
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from place to place. It remains extremely difficult to generalize systematically about the role of party leadership, for example Ross Perots millions
bankrolling his idiosyncratic and quixotic 1992 presidential campaign
for the Reform Party, Pauline Hansons populist rhetoric in Queensland,
Haiders charismatic appeal in Austria. For this reason,
Australia, or Jorg
detailed case studies of the development of specific parties, and the processes of building electoral support over many years, need to be used to
supplement cross-national comparisons across a wide range of countries.
Another difficulty is that scholars often unintentionally overemphasize the strength of the radical right by selecting cases on the dependent variable, that is, by focusing attention exclusively upon the success
stories, and thereby neglecting countries and regions where the radical
right remains peripheral.61 Yet the characteristic features which generate
cross-national variations can only be distinguished by comparing levels
of party support consistently and systematically across the universe of
postindustrial societies, or among a wide range of electoral democracies.
This error is common in the literature; for example van der Brug and Fennema caution against this tendency, yet their own study focuses upon the
seven West European nations with the largest parties of the radical right,
rather than comparing all fifteen countries contained in their dataset, the
1999 European Election Study.62 The macro conditions underlying crossnational variations in party support, for example the role of electoral systems or political culture, can only be fully grasped if studies systematically
compare countries where the radical right have, and have not, advanced.
Focusing attention exclusively upon the most successful parties, such as
the French Front National or the Italian Alleanza Nazionale, neglects the
way that elsewhere equivalent parties failed to achieve equivalent breakthroughs, for example in Britain, Finland, Greece, Spain, Sweden, and
Ireland. Another tendency common in the literature is to exaggerate support by citing the peak vote achieved by radical right parties at any level,
whether in subnational, national, presidential, or European elections.63 It
makes more sense to compare their average share of votes or seats won
consistently over a series of equivalent contests.
Any exaggeration is not simply a matter for scholars; the popular press
often overplays the success of the radical right in banner headlines, even
when parties win only modest support or a handful of seats in local elections. Journalists, commentators, and politicians commonly express alarm
about any gains by the radical right and the implications of such gains,
whether for political and social instability, for race relations, for asylum
and immigration policy, or for what this signifies about the rejection of
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mainstream parties, the legitimacy of the radical right, and public attitudes
toward democracy. Support for these parties is often associated in popular
accounts with public sympathy for more extreme right groups, organizations, and social movements who use violence, such as skinheads, neoNazi sympathizers, and terrorist organizations, including racist attacks,
anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim incidents, and aggressive acts of brutality
directed against asylum seekers, guest workers, and immigrant populations. Post 9/11, this issue has become of growing concern.64 Yet although
they are commonly assumed to be related, with the radical right legitimizing racist and antiminority rhetoric, in fact there may also be little
association between voting for radical right parties and active support for
violent manifestations of racism or ethnic hatred. Indeed some commentators have suggested that a trade-off exists between these phenomena,
if radical right parties provide an outlet for social pressures that might
otherwise be channeled into antiminority violence.65
All of these reasons can often lead toward overstating the level of
support for radical right parties; nevertheless, even acknowledging these
tendencies, this does not mean that nothing important is going on here.
During the last decade there have been just too many electoral gains for
parties which can be loosely regarded as coexisting within the extended
family of the radical right, occurring in too many different countries, to
dismiss this development as simply a passing short-lived phase, or the
coincidental conflux of specific causes within each specific nation.
Based on these definitions and sources of evidence we can now proceed
to examine some of the structural explanations for the rise of the radical right, in particular how far the electoral fortunes of these parties are
shaped by the institutional context set by nomination and campaign regulations (Chapter 4), the electoral system and vote thresholds (in Chapter 5), and by new social cleavages (in Chapter 6). All these factors are
regarded as part of the puzzle, representing necessary but not sufficient
structural conditions helping to explain their success.
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part ii
THE REGULATED MARKETPLACE
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4
Ballot Access and Campaign Finance
Electoral laws and regulations structure opportunities for party competition within each country. Far from being neutral, these can provide
formidable constitutional, legal, and administrative barriers for smaller
parties. This chapter sets out a conceptual framework to understand these
issues. The study then analyzes evidence for the impact of the formal rules
and legal regulations governing all steps in the process of winning elected
office, namely: (i) the nomination stage (including ballot access and party
registration); (ii) the campaign stage (including the distribution of party
funds, state subsidies, and access to party political broadcasts); and (in
Chapter 5) (iii) the election stage (including the major type of electoral system, the effective threshold, and the use of compulsory voting).1 The study
examines how formal rules governing this process influence the electoral
fortunes of radical right parties, measured by their national share of votes
and seats in legislative elections in the nations under comparison. The
logic is straightforward: minor parties seeking to break into office (and
thus many radical right parties) are generally expected to perform well
in political systems which facilitate more egalitarian conditions of party
competition, for example where all parties are equally entitled to ballot
access, free campaign media, direct public funds, and indirect state subsidies. By contrast, minor parties face a harsher environment where such
public resources are allocated in a cartel arrangement biased toward
established parties already in the legislature, thereby protecting incumbent politicians.2 Minor challengers face even more serious limitations in
regimes holding manipulated elections, where the rules for the allocation
of public resources, such as media airtime, are grossly biased toward the
ruling party.
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The Regulated Marketplace
The main conclusion, from the case-study evidence considered in this

chapter, is that nomination rules are probably important for the electoral
success of minor parties on the radical right in some countries, exemplified
by the difficulties that American third parties experience in gaining ballot
access, the constitutional restrictions on extremist parties in Germany, and
limits on hate speech generating legal charges against the radical right in
Belgium. Although minor parties should also benefit from rules giving
them equitable access to public funds, state subsidies, and free media
party campaign broadcasts, in fact no consistent link could be established
in the available evidence between the existence of these formal rules and
the electoral fortunes of the radical right. Subsequent chapters develop the
arguments further by considering the impact of electoral systems, on the
grounds that proportional representation elections with low thresholds
are commonly regarded as a necessary, although not sufficient, condition
facilitating opportunities for extremist parties.
the conceptual framework

Most attention in the literature has focused on how electoral systems
shape party competition. Yet this represents only the final hurdle faced
by minor parties, which may be excluded from the contest well before
reaching this stage, either by legal restrictions on ballot access or by lack
of financial resources and media access. In the United States, for example,
the use of single-member plurality districts in winner-take-all elections
makes it difficult for minor parties to mobilize votes, but their task is
even harder where they are unable to secure enough signatures to even
appear on the ballot or, once on the ballot, if they cannot afford TV ads
to mobilize support.
The process of winning elected office can be understood as a sequential
process, illustrated in Figure 4.1, including three stages. Nomination includes the legal regulations governing party registration and the process
whereby parties nominate candidates on the official ballot paper. The
campaign stage includes the legal regulations governing access to electoral resources, including the allocation of any free advertising time on
broadcast media and the distribution of public funds or state subsidies for
parties. The election stage revolves primarily around the minimum share
of the vote required for a party to win a seat. Each stage can be seen as
progressively narrowing the opportunities to gain office, where some potential contenders fall by the wayside, while others remain in the contest,
rather like a complex game of musical chairs. Moreover the process is not
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figure 4.1. The Sequential Model of the Main Stages to Elected Office
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neutral or free from partisan bias, since incumbents holding elected office
have the power to shape the legal and constitutional rules of the game
(illustrated via the feedback loop), along with the courts and judiciary.
Rules governing the process can be categorized into three broad ideal
types. Egalitarian regulations are designed to be fairly permeable and
open, facilitating plural party competition among multiple contenders at
all stages, with equal access to public resources and minimal legal restrictions on which parties and candidates appear on the ballot. Cartel
regulations, by contrast, limit party competition through a variety of restrictive practices designed to benefit established parties in parliament
or in government, including the requirements for ballot access, the regulations governing the allocation of public funding, and the rights to
free campaign broadcasts and state subsidies for related services such as
postage and staff. Cartels are designed to skew resources toward insiders, with a high effective vote threshold protecting against outside challengers. Autocratic regulations are explicitly skewed toward the ruling
party, restricting all opposition parties and dissident movements, to prop
up repressive regimes and one-party states. Most liberal democracies attempt to strike a balance between totally open competition, which could
result in hundreds of parties and candidates on the ballot, extreme party
fragmentation in parliament, and political instability in government, and
unduly restricted competition, thereby limiting basic political rights and
civil liberties.
Following Duverger, the model recognizes that the effects of electoral laws and regulations can be regarded as both mechanical and
psychological.3 Mechanical (formal or direct) effects can be conceptualized as those which depend upon the implementation of the formal rules
governing the requirements of nomination, campaigns, and election, for
example the legal threshold of exclusion, or the minimum share of the vote
stipulated in the constitution to secure a seat. Formal rules are understood
here as the legislative framework governing elections, as embodied in official documents, constitutional conventions, legal statutes, codes of conduct, and administrative procedures, authorized by law and enforceable
by courts. It is neither necessary nor sufficient for rules to be embodied in
the legal system to be effective; social norms, informal patterns of behavior, and social sanctions also create shared mutual expectations among
political actors. Formal rules are important as core instruments of public
policy which are open to amendment by the political process, whether by
legislation, executive order, constitutional revision, judicial judgment, or
bureaucratic decree.4
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By contrast, psychological (informal or indirect) effects concern the

way that the legal rules shape the informal norms, attitudes, and behavior of parties and citizens, including their strategic calculations made in
anticipating how the formal mechanisms work. Such psychological effects
include most importantly strategic contests (whether and where parties
contest seats), strategic campaign communications (which electors parties target and why), and strategic voting (whether citizens vote for their
second-choice party, if they regard ballots cast for smaller radical right
parties as wasted votes). Although there is a gray overlapping area, most
social norms are altered gradually by informal processes, located outside
of the formal policy arena. While in practice it remains difficult to disentangle mechanical and psychological effects from the analysis of national
election results (which combine both), the distinction is an important one
which is frequently overlooked in the literature. This chapter focuses upon
the mechanical or direct impact of formal rules on the nomination and
campaign stages. How parties react to the context of opportunities set by
the formal electoral rules through strategic campaigns, and how the public
responds to electoral choices through strategic voting, will be examined
in subsequent chapters, using individual-level survey data.
i the nomination stage: party registration

and ballot access
The primary mechanical obstacle to the first hurdle getting nominated
includes any legal regulations or constitutional requirements designed to
limit or prevent minor parties from either registering, nominating candidates for office, or otherwise gaining official ballot access. Under the most
egalitarian regulations, parties are only loosely governed by law. Party
organizations are regarded as private associations which should freely
determine their own internal rules, procedures, and structures, much like
other voluntary sector interest groups in civil society. Any intervention
or regulation by the state, beyond the normal legal framework governing
all voluntary organizations, can conflict directly with the basic principles of civil liberties, free speech, freedom of association, and freedom
of assembly, which are central to liberal conceptions of human rights
and representative democracy. Given these assumptions, most established
democracies have been reluctant to impose any strong regulations limiting
party competition. Yet minor parties commonly encounter some cartelized
barriers, with varying degrees of severity, including routine administrative
requirements for ballot access (exemplified by the United States); civil law
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affecting all parties, where some radical right organizations have fallen
foul of campaign funding and race relations legislation (exemplified by
Australia, Belgium, and the Netherlands); outright legal bans on extreme
parties advocating violence or terrorist tactics (exemplified by Germany
and Spain); and, where autocratic regulations exist, repression and intimidation of opposition parties, manipulation of electoral law, and serious
limits on free speech and association in the most authoritarian regimes
(exemplified in this comparison by Belarus and Ukraine).
Registration Requirements
In a few countries, including France, Sweden, and Ireland, there are no
requirements for parties to register with official authorities before appearing on the ballot. But in many countries requirements have generally
increased in recent years, in part due to the provision of public campaign
funds, and in some, parties face complex and lengthy bureaucratic requirements to register legally, the first step to gaining ballot access. Party
registration processes vary cross-nationally (as well as among states in
America) but common requirements are that these organizations have to
deposit with the electoral authorities a written declaration of principles
and the party constitution, statutes, statement about the organizational
structure, and rulebook, as well as a list of party officers, and the names
of a certain minimum number of party members or signatures.5 There
are sometimes regional distributional requirements and parties need to
contest a minimum number of candidacies. Some illustrative examples of
these practices, with brief extracts from the official regulations and laws
governing parties, published by the national election commissions in each
country, are as follows:
Mexico: For an organization to be registered as a national political party, it
must fulfill two fundamental requirements: Submit a declaration of principles,
as well as a consistent program and bylaws to regulate its activities. Account
for three thousand members in at least ten of the thirty-two federal entities, or
300 in at least 100 of the 300 single-member districts in which the country is
divided for electoral purposes, although the law sets forth that the total number
of its members may never amount to less than 0.13% of the registered voters in
the national electoral roll used in the ordinary federal election that preceded the
submission of the register application.
Canada: To become eligible to be registered, a party must include in its application for registration the following information: A resolution of the party
appointing the leader, certified by the leader and another officer of the party. The
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names, addresses and signed consent of at least three officers in addition to the
leader. The names, addresses and signed declarations of at least 250 members.
A signed declaration by the leader that one of the fundamental purposes of the
party is to participate in public affairs by endorsing one or more of its members as
candidates and supporting their election. Registered and/or eligible parties must
provide an annual statement by the leader about the partys fundamental purpose,
in addition to the already required annual update of its registration information.
Australia: Essential features of federal registration are that a party: Must be established on the basis of a written constitution; must have at least 500 members
who are entitled to be on the Commonwealth Electoral Roll, or at least one member who is a member of the Parliament of the Commonwealth; cannot rely on a
member who has been used by another party for the purposes of registration (i.e.
the list of members upon which a party bases its registration must be unique to
that party); may have the registered party name or abbreviation printed beside the
names of its endorsed candidates on ballot papers for House of Representatives
and Senate elections; qualifies for election funding in respect of those of its endorsed candidates who obtain at least 4% of the formal first preference votes in the
election contested; must lodge annual financial disclosure returns; must appoint
an agent to be responsible for receipt of funding and its disclosure obligations;
and is subject to compliance audits by the Australian Electoral Commission.
UK: To register with the Electoral Commission a party must: complete an application form giving details of: the party name; at least two party officers; where in
the UK the party is to be registered; and whether the party will have any accounting units; submit a copy of the partys constitution; submit a financial scheme
showing how the party will comply with the financial controls; and include a fee
of 150.
Radical right parties are not necessarily unduly disadvantaged by these

types of regulations, but insofar as they represent a barrier for all new
challengers and minor players then these could deter some contenders.
Any specific requirements specifying that parties have to share certain democratic goals and principles, as will be discussed later in the
case of Germany, can certainly affect some of the more extreme right
organizations.
Ballot Access
Once parties are officially registered, regulations intended to limit the
nomination of frivolous candidacies include required payment of an official deposit prior to election (common in majoritarian systems), or the
collection of a certain number of valid signatures per candidate or party
list. In most democracies, the deposit required for a candidate to stand for
election is relatively modest, for example (in U.S. dollars per candidate)
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$125 in New Zealand, $140 in France, $180 in Australia, and $350 in

Ireland.6 The deposit rises to $640 in Canada, $735 in Britain, and a
hefty $22,400 in Japan. Deposits are often returnable if candidates or
parties achieve a minimal share of the valid votes, for example over 5%
in New Zealand and the UK. But when high deposits are combined across
multiple candidacies, the requirements can deter serious contenders with
limited financial resources; for example, if they lost every deposit by falling
below the minimum 5% threshold, it would cost the Greens almost half
a million dollars to contest every seat in a UK general election.
The requirements for signature petitions collected prior to nomination
are often fairly modest, and parties already represented in parliament are
exempt from some of these requirements. Austria and Belgium, for example, specify collecting 200500 signatures per district, while Italy requires
500 signatures for candidates in single member districts and 1,5004,000
for party lists. But some petitions are more demanding; Norway, for instance, requires 5,000 signatures to register a party. Perhaps the clearest
case of overt partisan manipulation of the rules is the United States, where
Democrats and Republicans appear automatically on the ballot, but third
parties and independents have to overcome a maze of cumbersome legal
requirements for ballot access which vary from state to state, posing serious barriers, especially in presidential contests.7 Formal requirements
are fairly easy to achieve in some states, yet others such as New York,
Georgia, and Oklahoma implement stringent limits on which third parties are entitled to ballot access, for example requiring the collection of
a certain percentage of valid electors signatures on petitions within a
specified period prior to each contest before a candidates party affiliation
is listed on the official ballot paper. In Georgia, for example, state law
requires all third-party candidates to obtain signatures from 5% of the
registered voters living in the district they wish to represent. Because of
the rigorous validation process, candidates must get substantially more
signatures than the state minimum in order to compensate for those that
will be discarded because they cannot be verified. For candidates seeking
statewide or congressional office, this means obtaining tens of thousands
of signatures. To qualify for all state ballots, each third-party presidential
candidate needs volunteers or pay staff to gather over a million signatures. Historically this process has strained the already limited resources
of many third-party candidates over the years, including George Wallace,
Eugene McCarthy, and John Anderson, as well as deterring Ross Perots
Reform Party, as will be discussed further in Chapter 10. In the November
2004 presidential elections, Ralph Nader secured a place on the ballot in
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91
thirty-seven states, including those with close races in Florida, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania. But in the process he faced bitter opposition from
the Democrats, with court challenges to his ballot petitions across the
nation.
Laws Governing Civil Society
Recent years have seen growing legal regulation of internal party organizations, including the process of nominating legislative candidates and
campaign funding. Some radical right leaders have fallen foul of such
laws and, because these parties remain poorly institutionalized, they are
vulnerable to sudden collapse or setback. Examples include Pauline Hansons One Nation party in Australia; when its leader was imprisoned
in 1999 on charges of electoral misrepresentation and fraud, after One
Nation was found guilty of solicited bribes from candidates in federal
election, the party assets were frozen and the party was officially deregistered in New South Wales.8 Previous instances of party leaders who have
encountered serious legal problems, dragging down their party support,
include Mogens Glistrup, founder of the Danish Progress Party, who was
convicted in 1979 of tax fraud and sentenced to three years imprisonment,
before being expelled from the Folketing a few years later.9 Both party
leaders and followers have also been associated with protest skirmishes,
street fracases, and violent brawls. In France, for example, Jean-Marie
Le Pen was convicted of assaulting a French Socialist candidate during
the 1988 election campaign, and as a result he was temporarily banned
by the European Court from taking his seat in the European Parliament,
although the resulting media furor may not have damaged his popularity
among his supporters.
Party organizations, along with other associations in the voluntary and
public sector, have also found themselves subject to an increasing body
of legal regulations governing race relations and hate crimes, and certain court cases implementing these laws have had an important impact
upon the radical right.10 In Belgium, the anti-immigrant Vlaams Blok
was subject to tough financial and operating restrictions in April 2004,
just before regional and European elections, when a Ghent court ruled
that it had broken antiracism laws. The court noted that the Vlaams
Blok regularly portrayed foreigners as criminals who take bread from
the mouths of Flemish workers and found it guilty of permanent incitement to segregation and racism. Associations which managed the
partys finances were severely fined by the court. As a result, Vlaams Blok
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closed down and relaunched itself with a new label as Vlaams Belang
(Flemish Interest) to avoid financial collapse. Moreover proposed legislation would strengthen Belgian antiracist legislation and allow authorities
to ban financing of parties which violate human rights. Similar fines for inciting racial hatred were imposed in the mid-1990s on the Centrum Partij
in the Netherlands, contributing toward its electoral decline. Britain has
seen attempts to ban mass marches organized by the British National
Party near ethnic minority communities, on the grounds that these actions
could exacerbate racial tensions, provoke incidents of violent clashes with
Anti-Nazi League opponents, and possibly generate outbreaks of mass
rioting.
Legal Bans on Extremist Party Organizations
Certain important exceptions to liberal principles of party competition
have always been made for undemocratic party organizations advocating
violence or using terrorist tactics. Postwar Germany developed some of
the strictest requirements with the Federal Constitutional Court responsible for banning extremist and undemocratic parties from organizing and
contesting elections. These requirements are embodied in Article 21 of the
Basic Law (or constitution), which specifies:
(1) The political parties shall participate in the forming of the political will of the
people. They may be freely established. Their internal organization shall conform
to democratic principles. They shall publicly account for the sources and use of
their funds and for their assets. (2) Parties which, by reason of their aims or the
behaviour of their adherents, seek to impair or abolish the free democratic basic
order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany shall be
unconstitutional. The Federal Constitutional Court shall decide on the question
of unconstitutionality.
The court has outlawed two parties over the years, including the Sozialistische Reichspartei in 1952, which proclaimed itself neo-Nazi to the
extent of acknowledging Admiral Donitz, Hitlers designated successor,
as the only legitimate authority, as well as a far left Communist party. In
2001 the German Government also tried to disband the far right National
Democratic Party. But the attempt suffered a serious setback after a number of NDP members brought forward to give evidence in the case were
revealed to have been government informants. The court has also banned
many xenophobic skinhead groups, ultranationalist organizations, and
neo-Nazi movements which were actively engaged in violent acts of intimidation and hate crimes against asylum seekers, Turkish migrants,
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93
foreigners, and the Jewish community, for example the German branch
of an international white supremacist group, Blood and Honor.11
Elsewhere, hard-line fringe parties associated with terrorist acts of violence have also been outlawed, such as the Chilean September 7 Command, which claimed responsibility for murdering several government
opponents following the 1986 attempt on General Pinochets life, and
the neofascist National Alliance, banned by the Czech government in
April 2000. In Russia, the deputy leader of the paramilitary and antiSemitic Russian Revival (Russkoye Vozrozhdeniye) was arrested in 1995
on suspicion of inciting racial hatred and threatening murder, and its
Moscow branch was banned for violating federal statutes. In Spain, legal
actions have been directed against Batasuna, the political wing of ETA,
which demands separatism in the Basque region; Batasuna was banned in
March 2003 for being associated with a series of terrorist bombings and
assassinations of local policemen and political leaders. France has used
a 1936 law allowing the government to dissolve private militias to ban a
number of far right groups such as the neofascist New Order and the
Defence Union Group (GUD) as well as the 1970s left-wing urban guerrilla group Action Directe. In July 2002 the French authorities resorted to
this law when they outlawed Radical Unity, a tiny neo-Nazi group, after
one of its members tried to assassinate President Chirac during a Bastille
Day Parade. Radical Muslim parties have also faced bans, such as the
Welfare Party, the largest parliamentary party at the time in Turkey, which
was shut down in 1998 by the Constitutional Court, despite mobilizing
considerable reservoirs of popular support. In March 2003 the Constitutional Court also moved to ban Turkeys only legal Kurdish party, the
Peoples Democracy Party (HADEP). The authorities claim that the party
has links with the militant separatist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK),
which announced in 2002 that it would disband and reform under a new
name. In Britain, broadcasting bans were imposed on Sinn Fein by Mrs.
Thatchers government, although this policy was lifted in 1994, and the
party has always been allowed to contest elections, mobilizing growing
support in recent years.
Repression of Opposition Parties
Cases of autocratic regulations can be found among the most repressive
regimes, which hold flawed plebiscitary elections and have employed a variety of draconian tactics to restrict opposition party activities and to limit
challenges to their rule, including using rigged and manipulated polls, and
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employing intimidation and imprisonment of party leaders and dissidents

who challenge the government. Amnesty International, Freedom House,
and Human Rights Watch document multiple cases of such malpractices
in one-party regimes around the globe which outlaw, persecute, intimidate, or repress opposition movements, including Syria, Eritrea, Laos,
Saudi Arabia, and North Korea. One of the best-known cases concerns
the Burmese military juntas refusal to hand over power, and the house
arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi and party members, after the National League
for Democracy won an overwhelming landslide in the 1990 election.
Among the countries included in this comparison, Belarus exemplifies the poorest human rights record.12 The government staged deeply
flawed parliamentary elections in 2001 and President Lukashenka maintained his grip on power by manipulation and repression. State agents
were associated with the disappearance of some well-known opposition
figures, and the country witnessed a spate of political show trials staged
against government critics by the Supreme Court. In the run-up to 2001
parliamentary elections the government intensified its crackdown on the
opposition, which struggled to remain unified in calling for a boycott. Due
to extensive election violations, no intergovernmental organization recognized the legitimacy of the election results.13 Human rights observers
also report that Ukraine and Russia have suffered from recent incidents
of informal political censorship, progovernment bias in television election news, and even outright manipulation of election results, depressing
support for opposition movements.14 In the comparison, these states also
registered the lowest Freedom House ratings in their record of civil liberties and political rights.
Therefore the case studies suggest that, even in liberal democracies,
under certain conditions, cartelized rules can seriously limit the opportunities for party competition, including those regulations facing radical
right parties. Restrictions range from cumbersome and onerous administrative requirements for third parties to register and obtain ballot access
in the United States to constitutional bans on extremist parties and legal
regulations covering hate crimes found in some Western European states,
and even outright intimidation or repression of opposition parties found
in a few of the undemocratic regimes under comparison. Court cases and
judicial decisions, implementing the legal and constitutional hurdles, generate the mechanical or direct effects of these rules on patterns of party
competition.
But, as Duverger noted, as well as certain mechanical effects, we would
also expect that certain psychological or indirect effects would flow from
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95
these rules, concerning the strategic calculations that parties make about
whether it is worth while to fight certain contests or districts.15 If parties
regard their chances of ballot access or their electoral prospects as poor,
or even hopeless, then they may well be discouraged from running, preferring to conserve their limited organizational and financial resources for
other campaigns. In majoritarian electoral systems, for example, minor
parties such as the BNP are highly selective in targeting just a few chosen
council seats and parliamentary constituencies in their heartland regions,
such as Burnley, Bradford, and Oldham, after estimating that they cannot
mobilize sufficient support to stand a realistic chance of winning many
seats across the whole country. All other things being equal, the more
stringent the formal requirements for party registration and ballot access,
the stronger we expect the psychological effects of electoral rules to be on
the strategic nomination decisions of smaller radical right parties. Like
Sherlock Holmes dog which didnt bark, the strength of minor parties
needs to be assessed where they did, and did not, stand. In this regard, it
is misleading to compare the average party share of the vote achieved in
selected districts or heartland regions which they contested, such as VBs
success in the southern Ausvote in the Antwerp town hall or the FPOs
trian province of Carinthia, rather than their share of the national vote
across all seats which they could legally contest.
ii the campaign stage: funding and media access

Once parties are officially entitled to nominate candidates, then the next
stage in the process concerns the official rules and statutory regulations
governing direct public funding, indirect state subsidies, and access to
campaign broadcasting. All of these requirements can limit opportunities
for minor party challengers to campaign effectively or on an equal basis
with the major players.16 Access to money and television are two of the
most important factors that help parties in conveying their message and
mobilizing potential supporters. Studies suggest that many West European
parties have experienced steady erosion in their mass membership since
the 1960s, losing activists who used to function as an important source of
revenue and volunteer labor during campaigns.17 As a result, parties have
become increasingly dependent upon other sources of funding to sustain
the costs of routine interelectoral activities and election campaigns, particularly revenue streams from direct public funding provided for members
of parliament, parliamentary party groups, or national and regional party
organizations. Parties also receive many indirect state subsidies, such as
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the provision of matching funds, tax incentives, and services. Another

important resource concerns the allocation of party political and election
broadcasts, free of charge, provided in all established democracies except
the United States. The growth of public resources has driven greater demands for transparency and accountability in how campaign funds are
used, and more stringent regulatory policies, including bans and limits
restricting either campaign fundraising or expenditures.18 Katz and Mair
argue that in countries where campaign finance regulations function to
protect established political cartels, then parties that are already in office can use their control over the allocation of resources to promote their
interests and thereby deter challengers: Because these subventions are often tied to prior party performance or position, whether defined in terms
of electoral success or parliamentary representation, they help to ensure
the maintenance of existing parties while at the same time posing barriers
to the emergence of new groups.19 More egalitarian systems of public
finance and state subsidies, however, such as those used by electoral commissions to allocate public funds and campaign broadcasts equally to all
parties in Mexico and Russia, should generate a more level playing field
for challengers and for smaller parties struggling to enter office.
Although the logic is clear, we are only starting to develop a systematic classification of the formal statutes and regulations governing state
funding of political parties in many countries across the world. The most
comprehensive guide currently available is the handbook published in
2003 by International IDEA: Funding of Political Parties and Election
Campaigns.20 This source includes a matrix classifying the major finance
laws and regulations governing parties and elections at the national level in
111 countries around the world, including 33 nations under comparison in
this book.21 The study was developed from primary sources, including the
original laws, administrative decrees, and official regulations. The twentyeight categories in the IDEA matrix focused on the official regulation and
enforcement of the financing of political parties, the disclosure of income,
ceilings of expenditure, and both direct and indirect public funding provisions. Of these, ten criteria were chosen as most relevant to shaping the
electoral opportunities for minor parties. The assumption behind the selected indicators is that smaller parties (and therefore radical right minor
parties) should face a more equal election contest where states specify
maximum ceilings on levels of campaign contributions and/or spending,
and where parties have access to campaign resources derived from direct
public funding, rules governing free media access, and/or state subsidies.
By contrast, elections are expected to provide more unequal competition,
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97
with biases toward established parties, where there is minimal regulation

over campaign spending and fund raising (thereby benefiting incumbents
over challengers) and where there is no provision of state subsidies, free
media, or public funding of parties.
Table 4.1 lists the indicators included in this study. Summary scales
were constructed by adding items (all coded as binary variables where
yes = 1) covering the regulation of party finances and access to public resources, as well as an overall score on all these items. In addition, the way
that public funding and media access are allocated may also prove important. For example, if resources are distributed based on the percentage of
seats in the current legislature, as in Switzerland or the Netherlands, such
provisions can act as a cartel allocating public goods to incumbent politicians and established parliamentary parties. On the other hand, minor
challengers have more opportunities to benefit if these resources are distributed on a more egalitarian basis, either via the percentage of votes cast
in the previous or the current election (such as in Spain), via the number of
candidates running in the present election (used to determine party broadcasts in the UK), or on a wholly equal basis across all registered parties
(as in Russia). For comparison, to eyeball the data, the last two columns
in Table 4.1 summarize the share of the votes and seats won by radical
right parties in the most recent national elections. The IDEA matrix classification indicates substantial contrasts in the regulations of campaign
funding across the countries included in the study, with minimal provisions in Austria, Finland, Iceland, and Switzerland and, by contrast, the
most equitable formal regulations of campaign funding and broadcasting
access in countries such as Russia, Italy, Mexico, and Spain. The countries are ranked in the table according to the summary scale from the least
regulated down to the most regulated, in the assumption that, all other
things being equal, greater regulation of party finances and greater access
to campaign resources should benefit minor parties (including those on
the radical right).
Despite the plausible arguments that more egalitarian provision should
logically benefit minor parties (and thereby many smaller parties of the
radical right), in fact the results of correlation analysis provide no support
for this hypothesis. Table 4.2 indicates no significant relationship could
be established between the share of votes or seats won by the radical
right and the indicators of party funding regulations and access to public
resources. Moreover this pattern cannot simply be attributed to the small
number of nations included in the comparison, as the direction of the
relationship between electoral support for the radical right and each of the
98
14
15
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Do
Is there
parties
a ceiling
receive
on party
direct
election
public
spending? funds?
(iv)
(v)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Are
parties
entitled
to free
media
access?
(vi)
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
Are
parties
entitled
to tax
exempt
status?
(vii)
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
4
5
4
4
4
4
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
Do
parties
receive
indirect
public
Summary
subsidies? scale
(viii)
(iviii)
None
Mixed
None
% votes
% seats
None
% seats
% seats
% votes
% seats
% votes
% votes
Mixed
Mixed
None
What
is the
basis
for
direct
public
funding?
Equal
N. cand
% votes
None
% seats
Mixed
None
None
None
% seats
None
Equal
Mixed
Equal
None
What
is the
basis for
allocating
free
broadcasting
time?
Allocation criteriaa
0.0
1.0
34.0
0.0
5.7
10.4
10.0
0.0
0.0
29.3
4.3
12.6
14.8
1.4
0.0
%
Vote
radical
right
0.0
0.0
47.4
0.0
5.3
10.8
9.8
0.0
0.0
59.0
0.0
12.3
15.8
0.0
0.0
%
Seats
radical
right
Most recent
election
July 5, 2005
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Is there
a ceiling
on
contributions
to
parties?
(iii)
ALL
0 521 84914 4
10
11
12
13
Austria
Finland
Iceland
Switzerland
Australia
Denmark
Norway
Sweden
United
States
Chile
Ireland
Netherlands
New
Zealand
Peru
Czech
Republic
Nation
Is there
provision
for
disclosure
for contributions to
parties?
(ii)
Access to public resources
CUNY008B/Norris
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Is there
a system
of regulation for
financing
parties?
(i)
Degree of party
financial regulation
table 4.1. Regulations Governing Party Funding and Campaign Media Access
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Col 1
Col 3
28
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Col 6
15
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Col 18
15
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
26
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Col 19 Col 24
28
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Col 26
14
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Col 28
13
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
7
8
8
8
7
7
7
7
7
7
5
5
6
6
6
6
6
6
Col 20
Equal
% seats
Equal
% votes
% seats
Mixed
% votes
Mixed
Mixed
Equal
% votes
None
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
% votes
% seats
Col 25
% seats
Equal
Mixed
% votes
Mixed
N. cand
Equal
Equal
Mixed
Equal
Mixed
Equal
% seats
Other
% seats
Equal
Mixed
N. cand
0.0
16.3
0.0
0.1
9.7
0.0
1.3
0.0
21.0
11.5
0.3
0.1
13.6
25.5
13.2
4.4
0.0
0.2
0.0
8.7
0.0
0.0
10.8
0.0
0.7
0.0
24.2
8.0
0.0
0.0
12.7
21.9
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
Equal: all parties get an equal allocation; % votes: depends upon the proportion of votes won in the previous or current election; % seats: depends upon the proportion of seats
won in the previous or current election; n. cand: depends upon the number of candidates fielded in the previous or current election; mixed: a mixture of these rules is used; none:
no campaign funds or media access are allocated.
b
For the relevant coding, see the IDEA matrix of each column labeled Col.
Source: International IDEA. 2004. Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns. Stockholm: International IDEA.
28
idea matrixb
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
0 521 84914 4
total
Germany
Ukraine
Belgium
Canada
France
Hungary
Poland
United
Kingdom
Israel
Japan
Lithuania
Portugal
Romania
Russian
Federation
Thailand
Italy
Mexico
Spain
CUNY008B/Norris
30
31
32
33
24
25
26
27
28
29
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
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99
100
.18
.05
.15
Degree of party financial regulationc

Access to public resourcesd
All campaign regulationse
.27
.06
.22
% Seats
.24
.00
.16
Ratio
.14
.00
.09
% Votesa
.29
.05
.23
% Seatsa
Most recent election

.21
.09
.20
Ratioa
.09
.17
.04
ENPPb
33
33
33
Number of
countries
CUNY008B/Norris
Note: The figures represent the simple correlation coefficients between support for the radical right parties and indicators of campaign regulations, without
any prior controls. None of the correlation coefficients proved significant at the conventional 0.05 level (two-tailed).
a % Votes and seats won by radical right parties and the ratio: See Table 3.1.
b Effective number of parliamentary parties, calculated following the method of Laakso and Taagepera (1979).
c A summary 4-point scale constructed from columns iiv in Table 4.1.
d A summary 4-point scale constructed from columns vviii in Table 4.1.
e A summary 8-point scale constructed from columns iviii in Table 4.1.
% Votes
Scales
Elections 19902004
table 4.2. Campaign Regulations and Support for Radical Right Parties
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101
regulatory indicators usually proved in the contrary direction (negative)

to that predicted. This means that radical right parties did better where
there was less regulation of party funding and access to public resources,
not more. The cases of Austria and Switzerland illustrate the way that
radical right parties have sometimes been extraordinarily successful in
elections despite minimal regulation of campaign financing or access to
public resources in these countries, while by contrast such parties are
marginalized in Spain, Mexico, and Portugal, where these regulations
are some of the most egalitarian for all parties. Examining the allocation
criteria used to distribute direct public funding and free broadcasting time
also failed to unravel this puzzle. Distribution of resources can be equal
among all parties, or given out on the basis of current representation in the
legislature, the vote performance at the previous or the current election,
the number of candidates nominated in the present election, or some
mixed criteria combining some of these requirements. Logically, systems
where these resources were distributed on a more egalitarian basis (either
equally among all parties contesting an election or as a proportion of votes
won) should benefit minor parties more than cartel arrangements, where
these resources served to reinforce incumbents (through being distributed
on the basis of the proportion of seats held in parliament at a previous
election). Yet in fact the share of votes and seats for radical right parties
was higher under cartel allocation criteria, such as in Switzerland.
This is a puzzle which cannot be resolved by the available evidence
but there are several reasons why the hypotheses may have failed to be
supported by this evidence. First, it should be noted that although IDEA
provides the most comprehensive available cross-national data, the handbook matrix reflects the formal requirements for campaign media and
party funding. This provides only an imperfect guide to practice, as implementation depends upon whether courts and election officials enforce
the regulations, as well as many detailed matters within specific statutes.
For example, in Russia, by law all registered parties are entitled to equal
access to the free party political advertising which is broadcast on television during campaigns. This should level the playing field but, with
the multiplicity of parties and television ads, the impact of this access in
mobilizing support for any one party is inevitably diluted. Every party,
large or small, gets its thirty-second moment of fame. By contrast many
reports by official observers have documented a heavy progovernment
bias in the television campaign news shown on all main channels, which
strongly benefited presidents Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin in successive elections.22
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Moreover, many other factors are generating support for the radical
right, so their effects may outweigh specific provisions regulating party
funding and campaign media. What might matter more, for example,
is the organizational ability of parties to raise independent funds from
private sources and voluntary contributions, and their ability to use multiple channels of communications to get their message out during elections through free media, exemplified by the extensive publicity (albeit
much of it negative) which radical right parties often attract in the news
headlines. The cumulative effects of newspaper and TV news throughout the campaign may easily outweigh the impact of one or two party
election broadcasts. In addition, as with many attempts to measure institutional effects, the indicators of campaign regulation and funding remain
extremely crude and imperfect. If the devil is in the details, patterns of
party competition may be influenced by the specific level of any ceiling
on campaign spending, whether the free access to party political broadcast is supplemented by the ability to purchase paid advertisements, or
the extent to which parties depend upon direct public campaign funds
versus independent sources of revenue. Any campaign finance regulation
and public funding may effect all parties fighting an election fairly evenly,
in which case those on the radical right would not be particularly advantaged compared with other minor challengers, such as the Greens or
left-libertarians.
Or the hypotheses, no matter how intuitively plausible, may simply be
wrong. Others have tested the impact of changes in ballot access, media
access, and state subsidy rules from the 1960s to the 1990s, and also found
no systematic link between these rules and the measures of party system
change, such as in the proportion of independents, in the effective number
of electoral parties (ENEP), or in the effective number of parliamentary
parties (ENPP).23 The soundest judgment we can probably make is that
the available evidence considered here provides no support for the claim
that minor parties on the radical right necessarily benefit from more egalitarian regulations governing financial and media access, but given limitations in the available cross-national evidence, this proposition cannot be
conclusively ruled out. The detailed case studies later in the book provide
another opportunity to consider these issues in greater depth.
conclusions
This chapter outlined the main reasons why the laws and regulations governing ballot access for nominations and funding access for campaigning
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103
are expected to generate a permissive or inhospitable structure of opportunities for minor party challengers, and analyzed the cross-national
evidence in the thirty-nine nations under comparison. The results suggest
certain main findings relating to the processes outlined in the conceptual
model.
Nomination: Case studies suggest that the legal requirements governing party registration and ballot access at nomination probably play an
important role in limiting opportunities for radical right parties under
four main conditions:
r Where the process of ballot access proves cumbersome and burdensome for minor parties (as in the United States);
r Where these parties fall foul of civil law, notably race relations legislation governing hate speech (as in Belgium and the Netherlands), or
campaign finance regulations (as in Australia and Denmark);
r Where constitutional provisions and court decisions ban extremist or
antidemocratic parties (exemplified by Germany, Chile, and Spain);
and
r In repressive regimes holding manipulated and flawed elections where
the ballot access and campaign rules are grossly biased toward the
ruling party (illustrated by Belarus).
Few liberal democracies ban radical right parties outright, or even implement strict limits on party competition, on the grounds that this would
interfere with basic human rights and civil liberties in free elections. But
there are specific cases in Germany, Spain, and Chile where fringe
extremist right party organizations associated with violence or terrorism
have been forced to disband and sometimes reorganize under new labels. The fragile institutionalization of minor parties also means that the
fortunes of radical right parties remain vulnerable to specific legal challenges, such as the prosecution of party leaders charged with electoral
irregularities or the propagation of hate speech.
Campaigning: There are many reasons why the legal statutes and formal regulation governing access to campaign media and party funding
either could also serve as a political cartel, reinforcing the power of incumbent parties already in elected office, or could generate a more level
playing field which could boost opportunities for minor party challengers,
including those on the radical right. Despite this logic, the evidence compared here could find no significant relationship between the formal legal
requirements for financial and media access and national levels of support for the radical right (or more general patterns of party competition).
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Several limitations mean that we should be cautious about drawing any

strong inferences from the available evidence, but at best the claim must
be regarded as essentially unproven. Subsequent case studies allow us to
return to this issue later. The next step is to examine the role of the electoral system, the final stage in the pursuit of elected office, to which we
now turn.
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5
Electoral Systems
Electoral laws and regulations structure opportunities for party competition within each country. Building upon the framework developed in
the previous chapter, here we can focus upon the final stage in the pursuit of elected office, including the impact of the major type of electoral
system, the effective threshold, and the use of compulsory voting.1 Using the same approach, this chapter analyzes the impact of these formal rules on the electoral fortunes of radical right parties, measured by
their national share of votes and seats in legislative elections in the nations under comparison. Much attention in the literature has focused
on how electoral systems shape party competition; in particular the use
of proportional representation (PR) is often regarded as a necessary,
although not sufficient, condition facilitating opportunities for extremist parties. Yet the evidence needs to be reexamined because, although
widely assumed, the validity of this claim has been challenged.2 Moreover the contrast is not simply between all majoritarian and all proportional electoral systems, since important variations exist among nations using PR: for example, Israels combination of a single nationwide
constituency with a low legal vote threshold (1.5%) allows the election
of far more minor and fringe parties than Poland, which has a 7% legal vote threshold and fifty-two small electoral districts for party lists.
As a result, we also need to examine the effects of specific components
of electoral systems, such as the impact of any national legal or effective threshold of exclusion, the mean district magnitude, and the level of
proportionality.
The main conclusion, from the evidence we shall consider in this chapter, is that electoral laws do have an important impact on the electoral
105
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fortunes of the minor parties on the radical right. But this impact is
generated primarily through their mechanical effects in translating votes
into seats (especially the role of legal thresholds in PR systems), more
than their psychological effects in deterring voting support. In this regard, the conventional wisdom about how far PR facilitates extremist
parties is only partially correct. Subsequent chapters develop the arguments further by considering the main reasons underlying these patterns,
using individual-level survey evidence to explore strategic campaigning
by parties and strategic voting by citizens.
theoretical framework
Where minor parties manage to overcome inequalities of ballot access
and funding access, the main mechanical hurdle remaining at the election stage concerns the barriers created by the electoral system and, in
particular, the effective threshold that all parties have to surmount before
being eligible to gain any seats. The conventional wisdom suggests that
PR systems are an important contextual constraint on the electoral fortunes of the radical right. Ignazi summarizes this view: As with every
new/minor party, extreme right parties need low institutional/electoral
thresholds to enter the political arena. The thresholds are low when the
electoral system is proportional, the requirements to participate (financial deposits, signatures, etc.) are minimal, and when the first electoral
contest is run as a second-order election.3 Critics commonly charge
that PR systems with low thresholds facilitate party fragmentation and
extremism, which, in turn, is associated with hung parliaments, unstable and ineffective governments, and, in extreme cases, even state failure.
An extensive literature providing systematic comparisons of the relationship between electoral systems and party systems has developed since the
seminal work of Douglas Rae.4 Much of this has focused upon the evidence surrounding Duvergers first law: (1) The plurality single-ballot
rule tends to party dualism. The second claim is that (2) The doubleballot system and proportional representation tend to multipartyism.5
While these claims were originally stated as universal lawlike regularities,
without exception, Duverger subsequently suggested that they were only
weaker probabilistic generalizations.6 The conditions under which these
relationships hold, and their status as laws, have attracted considerable
debate in the literature marked by continued reformulations of the original statement and many efforts to define precisely what is to count as a
party in order to verify these claims.7
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107
Much of the literature, notably Lijpharts classic study, supports

Duvergers generalization that plurality electoral systems tend toward
party dualism, while PR is associated with multipartyism.8 My previous
study compared the results of the most recent national election for the
lower house of parliament in 170 contests held worldwide from 1995 to
2000.9 The research found that the mean number of parliamentary parties (based on the simplest definition of parties holding at least one seat)
was 5.22 in the countries using majoritarian systems, 8.85 in combined
(or mixed) systems, and 9.52 in societies with proportional representation
electoral systems. In other words, nations using any form of PR had almost twice as many parliamentary parties as countries using any form of
majoritarian electoral system.10 Confirming this broad pattern, although
with less of a sharp contrast between the major types of electoral system,
the comparison of the mean number of relevant parties in these elections
(holding over 3% of parliamentary seats) was 3.33 in all majoritarian systems, 4.52 for combined systems, and 4.74 for all proportional systems.
Party systems are usually more competitive and fragmented in PR elections, while majoritarian systems often restrict opportunities for minor
parties.
The literature has also established evidence supporting the thesis that
extremist parties flourish best under PR.11 For example, Katz compared
the ideological position of parties in established democracies, using expert
scales by Castle and Mair, and also by Laver, as discussed earlier, under
different electoral systems. The study concluded that a wider range of
parties stood for election in PR than in single-member plurality systems:
Clearly, PR is associated with more small parties and with more extreme
and ideological parties, while single-member plurality and other barriers
to the representation of small parties are associated with fewer parties
and a tendency towards an abbreviated political spectrum.12
Moreover, before-and-after case studies, monitoring the impact of
electoral reform over successive elections within particular countries, lend
credence to the conventional assumption that these rules matter for radical right party fortunes. In France, for example, the Front National won
no seats in the 1981 parliamentary elections (held under the second-ballot
majoritarian electoral rules), suddenly gained thirty-five deputies (6.3%)
under the proportional representation system tried in the 1986 parliamentary election, and then plummeted to only one deputy in 1988, despite an
unchanged share of the vote, after PR was repealed.13 Only a few FN candidates have ever been elected to the National Assembly under the secondballot system, but by contrast they have been far more successful under PR
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rules in European and regional contests. The impact of electoral reform

can also be demonstrated by the electoral opportunities of New Zealand
First under the Mixed Member Proportional system adopted in 1993,
when a two-party system became a multimember system overnight.14 Although before and after natural experiments within each country are
persuasive, they cannot furnish conclusive proof. Much else can change
over successive elections the issue agenda, the leaders, or the governments performance which can also alter party fortunes. Moreover the
exact conditions under which electoral systems constrain the success of
radical right parties are only imperfectly understood.
Despite the body of evidence, the claim that PR necessarily depresses
popular support for extremist parties, although common, has been questioned elsewhere in the literature. Kitschelt, for example, compared voting support for the radical right in different countries in Western Europe
during the 1980s and found that this did not vary significantly and consistently under majoritarian, combined, or proportional electoral systems.
On this basis, he dismisses the role of these institutional rules: While
electoral laws have a non-negligible impact on party formation and the
fragmentation of party systems taken by themselves, they explain very
little about the actual dynamics of competition.15 Another recent study
by Carter compared the electoral formulas used in sixteen West European
countries and estimated the mean share of the vote won by extreme rightwing parties from 1979 to 2002 under each major type of system. The
conclusion agreed with Kitschelt, suggesting that, contrary to popular assumptions, PR systems do not promote party extremism: The share of
the vote won by the West European parties of the extreme right in the
period 19792002 appears unrelated to the type of electoral system in
operation in the various countries.16
The idea that the type of electoral system should affect support for
minor parties is based on the notion of strategic voting. In highly disproportional systems, in Duvergers words: The electors soon realize that
their votes are wasted if they continue to give them to the third party,
whereas their natural tendency to transfer their vote to the less evil of its
two adversaries.17 The basic simple idea of strategic voting (also known
as tactical, insincere, or pragmatic voting) is that these considerations
come into play among voters whose favorite party has a poor chance
of winning in their constituency, but who have a preference between the
parties perceived to be in first and second place.18 The necessary but not
sufficient conditions for casting a tactical vote are threefold: voters need to
have a clear rank order of preferences among parties; voters need to have
certain expectations based on the available information about how well
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109
each party is likely to do in their constituency; and, lastly, voters need to

rationally calculate that the benefit of casting a ballot for their secondpreference party outweighs the costs of not supporting their favorite
party. The wasted vote thesis assumes that higher thresholds commonly
found in majoritarian elections deter rational citizens from casting a ballot for minor parties on the radical right, if they believe that their chosen
party stands little chance of entering parliament, let alone government
office. Such rational supporters of the radical right, the wasted vote thesis assumes, should either stay home, thereby reducing levels of turnout,
or they should switch support to another party on strategic or tactical
grounds. Citizens are expected to cast a strategic vote for their secondpreference choice, in the belief that casting a ballot for smaller radical
right parties under these rules will generate no direct policy benefits. This
thesis assumes that people are instrumentally rational; that is, they care
about whom they vote for only insofar as this affects the outcome in seats,
thereby maximizing their utility in terms of policy outcomes. They are not
concerned to express their symbolic support for a party, nor do they wish
to swell the national vote share for their favorite party, nor attempt to
exercise indirect influence over the policy platforms of other parties.
evidence
The basic proposition to be explored is that the type of electoral system,
and specific aspects of electoral law, will shape support for the radical
right. In particular, compared with systems of proportional representation, majoritarian elections characterized by high electoral thresholds are
expected to create greater mechanical and psychological hurdles for minor
parties, and hence to prevent many radical right contenders from gaining
office. To reexamine the basis for these claims with systematic evidence,
electoral systems in the thirty-nine countries under comparison are classified in this study into three major families, as listed in Table 5.1, each
including a number of subcategories: majoritarian formulas (including
first-past-the-post, second ballot, the block vote, single nontransferable
vote, and alternative voting systems);19 combined systems (incorporating
both majoritarian and proportional formulas); and proportional formulas
(including party lists as well as the single transferable vote systems).
The Effect of the Electoral System on Radical Right Votes
Based on this classification, Table 5.2 compares the share of the votes
and seats won by radical right parties in the nations under comparison.
110
1996
1997
2001
FPTP+PR
FPTP+PR
FPTP+PR
FPTP+PR
FPTP+PR
FPTP+PR
Closed
Closed
Open
Closed
Closed
Closed
Open
Closed
Closed
Closed
2nd+PR
FPTP+PR
SNTV+PR
FPTP+PR
1999
1996
1998
148
260
295
577
659
435
LR-Hare
d Hondt
Hare
St-Lague
LR-Hare
Hare
LR-Hare
LR-Hare
LR-Hare
656
386
630
120
500
500
141
450
334
450
dHondt 500
LR-Hare 299
Majority
Majority
Plurality
Majority
Plurality
Plurality
0
0
0
0
0
0
328
176
475
65
300
400
328
110
155
55
200
100
71 70
225 225
234/27 100
225 225
300 200
253 46
148
260
295
577
659
435
N. of
SMD
1
20
1
1
5
1
1
1
2
1
11
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
18.0
46.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
100,000 328.0
20,000
6.0
75,131 155.0
21,400 55.0
110,800 40.0
85,000 100.0
21,653 70.0
242,700 225.0
42,900 50.0
86,500 225.0
193,400
114,900
91,500
29,432
78,300
77,161
68,400
436,700
5
None
4
5
2
5
5
5
5
4
None
5
None
None
None
None
None
None
5.0
11.3
4.0
5.0
2.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
4.0
4.0
5.0
50.0
50.0
35.0
50.0
35.0
35.0
94
86
90
96
91
76
89
95
86
86
84
83
75
80
94
84
3.30
3.45
6.69
3.78
2.66
3.05
4.20
5.40
2.46
5.98
2.93
2.36
2.98
3.70
2.11
1.99
2.61
4
4
5
3
3
4
4
4
4
5
4
4
5
5
5
2
July 5, 2005
1998
1998
Closed
Closed
None
None
None
None
None
None
FPTP+PR
FPTP+PR
AV
2nd ballot
FPTP
2nd ballot
FPTP
FPTP
Party
list
Max.
years
between
elections
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1996
2000
1997
1996
1997
1996
Year of Electoral
election system
% Nat vote
Total
number of Average Mean
N. of district
VAP per district
Legal
Effective
list
for lists
member magnitude threshold threshold Prop. ENPP
MPs
CUNY008B/Norris
Combined
Independent
Japan
Korea,
Republic
Lithuania
Russia
Taiwan
Ukraine
Dependent
Germany
Hungary
Italy
New Zealand
Mexico
Thailand
Majoritarian
Australia
Belarus
Canada
France
UK
USA
Type of
district
Total
n. of
Formula MPs
table 5.1. The Thirty-Nine Electoral Systems under Comparison
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1996
1996
1996
1998
1999
1997
average
Open
Open
Open
Closed
Open
Closed
Open
Closed
Closed
Open
Open
Closed
Closed
Open
Closed
Open
Panachage
Open
Open
Open
Closed
St-Lague
d Hondt
Hare
Hare
Droop
d Hondt
Droop
d Hondt
St-Lague
dHondt
d Hondt
dHondt
d Hondt
LR-Hare
d Hondt
St-Lague
d Hondt
296
179
200
300
63
166
120
60
150
165
120
460
230
343
90
350
349
200
Hare
183
d Hondt 150
Binomial 120
LR-Droop 200
183
150
120
200
140 154
0 179
0 200
288
0 63
0 166
0 120
0 60
0 150
0 165
0 120
0 460
0 230
0 343
0 90
0 350
0 349
0 200
0
0
0
0
14
17
14
56
9
41
1
4
1
19
1
52
22
42
8
52
29
26
9
20
60
8
20.3
7.5
2.0
25.0
69,037
48.6
23,000
7.9
20,779 14.3
26,311
5.1
3,121
6.3
16,156
4.0
30,700 120.0
5,600 15.0
80,000 150.0
20,000
8.7
127,000 120.0
60,700
8.8
33,935 10.5
48,800
8.2
17,000 11.0
88,600
7.0
19,800 10.7
28,700
7.7
35,319
53,300
80,289
39,300
2
None
3
None
None
1.5
None
0.67
4
None
7
None
3
3
3
4
None
4
None
None
5
11.5
2.0
5.0
3.0
10.8
16.3
1.5
4.8
0.7
4.0
0.6
7.0
6.7
3.0
3.0
3.0
4.0
9.0
4.0
9.2
29.2
5.0
90
98
92
88
97
89
96
92
95
95
98
82
90
82
84
93
97
93
99
96
86
89
3.92
4.81
2.35
3.81
2.95
2.61
3.37
5.52
2.73
4.29
5.08
2.99
5.63
4.92
5.15
2.12
3.41
9.05
5.18
4.15
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
4
4
4
4
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Source: Pippa Norris. 2004. Electoral Engineering. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. For definitions, see the notes for Electoral Engineering, table 4.5.
PR Lists
PR Lists
PR Lists
PR Lists
STV
PR Lists
PR Lists
PR Lists
PR Lists
PR Lists
PR Lists
PR Lists
PR Lists
PR Lists
PR Lists
PR Lists
PR Lists
PR Lists
PR Lists
PR Lists
PR Lists
CUNY008B/Norris
1998
1997
2000
1997
1996
1998
1996
1999
Proportional
Austria
Belgium
Chile
Czech
Republic
Denmark
Finland
Greece
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway
Peru
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
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table 5.2. Electoral Systems and Support for Radical Right Parties
Elections
19902004
Most recent
election
Major type of
electoral system
%
Votes
%
Seats
Ratio
%
Votes
%
Seats
Ratio
Number of
countries
Majoritarian
system
Combined
system
Proportional
system
8.6
3.5
0.40
7.2
3.8
0.52
4.4
2.1
0.48
3.6
2.3
0.64
12
7.9
8.7
1.10
7.1
9.9
1.39
21
total
6.9
5.9
0.85
6.1
6.6
1.08
39
R (Sig.)
.059
.255
.375
.065
.226
.319
Note: The results summarize the mean percentage of votes and seats won by radical right
parties in elections for the lower house in the national legislature. For the classification of
electoral systems by nation see Table 5.1 and also Pippa Norris. 2004. Electoral Engineering.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chapter 2.
Sources: Thomas T. Mackie and Richard Rose. 1991. The International Almanac of Electoral History. Washington, DC: CQ Press; Tom Mackie and Richard Rose. 1997. A Decade
of Election Results: Updating the International Almanac. Studies in Public Policy. Glasgow:
University of Strathclyde; Elections around the World www.electionworld.org ; Richard
Rose, Neil Munro, and Tom Mackie. 1998. Elections in Central and Eastern Europe since
1990. Studies in Public Policy 300. Glasgow: University of Strathclyde.
Two periods are selected for analysis, to check whether the results are
robust and consistent across both periods: the mean vote and seat share
won by radical right parties in national elections held in each country
since 1990, and, for comparison, the votes and seats share in the most
recent national elections (held from 2000 to 2004).
The results in Table 5.2 suggest two main conclusions. First, contrary
to the conventional wisdom, the share of the vote achieved by radical
right parties in the most recent national legislative elections was similar
under majoritarian (7.2%) and proportional (7.1%) electoral systems.
How do we explain this pattern, which is consistent with Kitschelt and
Carter, given that it runs counter to the wasted vote thesis? There are
at least two possible reasons suggested by the proximity model of voting
used in this book why the wasted vote assumption could be misspecified.
First, any instrumental calculation by voters depends, in part, upon the
proximity or distance of parties across the ideological spectrum. Moderate parties are placed in an optimal position to be affected by strategic voting, since because they are the halfway house it is relatively easy
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113
for their supporters to switch either to or from other second-preference

parties on either the center-left or center-right. In the 1997 British general
election, for example, the closure of the ideological gap between the main
opposition parties with Tony Blair stealing Liberal Democrat clothes
on constitutional issues and Paddy Ashdown campaigning on Labours
territory of education and health may have significantly reduced the
costs facing voters of transferring from one to the other. The main opposition parties offered more of an echo than a choice. If both parties were
perceived to favor similar policies, then strategic considerations made
it easier for voters to switch their vote more effectively in seats where
this mattered. The 1997 election saw a considerable flow of the vote between Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters designed (successfully)
to defeat the Conservative government.20 Yet the ideological position of
radical right-wing parties is usually located well away from mainstream
contenders across the political spectrum, which makes it more costly for
their supporters to cast a strategic or tactical vote for another candidate,
even if their favorite party faces little hope of winning any seats. Other parties on the center-right, whether Christian Democrats, Conservatives or
Liberals, are simply located too far away from their ideal policy position.
For this reason, we might expect little strategic voting among supporters
of the radical right, even if their preferred party cannot win office.
Moreover, if we relax the assumption of instrumental rationality, supporters of the radical right could be understood to be seeking political
benefits beyond electing members to the legislature who can have a direct impact upon the public policy process. If people want to cast an
expressive or symbolic ballot, such as registering disgust with the immigration policies adopted by both the mainstream governing and opposition parties, they might well remain willing to vote for a radical
right party, even if their chosen candidate or party cannot hope to gain
office.21 By sending a message through the ballot box, radical right supporters may still hope to influence public policy indirectly, for example
causing the governing party to adopt more restrictive policies toward
refugees and asylum seekers, even if not gaining any elected parliamentary representatives. The rational choice facing supporters of smaller
radical right parties in majoritarian elections is therefore exit (staying
home) or else casting an expressive ballot for the radical right, with
a potential indirect impact upon public policy, rather than switching
to a party which is located far away from their ideal ideological location. The evidence supporting this proposition is explored more fully in
Chapter 7, analyzing individual-level survey data to see whether voter
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defection is less common among radical right than moderate center

parties.
The Effects of the Electoral System on Radical Right Seats
Despite these patterns, and confirming the conventional wisdom, the
mechanical effects of the electoral formula on the ratio of votes-to-seats
are also strikingly evident. The second major finding in Table 5.2 is that,
despite having roughly the same share of the vote, radical right parties
were more than twice as successful in gaining seats under PR as under
majoritarian elections. In the most recent elections, radical right parties
won 3.8% of seats under majoritarian rules and 9.9% under PR. Another
way of summarizing this data is to calculate the votes:seats ratio.22 Under majoritarian systems, with 7.2% of votes, radical right parties won
3.8% of seats, or a ratio of 0.52. Under combined or mixed systems
the ratio is 0.64. Under PR it becomes 1.39, meaning that radical right
parties win a far higher share of seats than they get votes. Similar patterns
were evident in the comparison of all national legislative elections held
since 1990. The effect of majoritarian systems was therefore not to depress the popular vote for radical right parties, contrary to expectations
of strategic voting, but rather to limit their access to legislative office and
all the trappings of power and legitimacy that flow from this position.
In this regard, majoritarian electoral systems work exactly as proponents
claim by excluding extreme parties from parliament. Combined systems
prove the intermediate position, as predicted, because they include elements from both the majoritarian and PR systems. In confirmation of
the conventional wisdom, radical right parties reaped their greatest parliamentary rewards under PR elections. The outcome for their share of
seats is politically important because, in turn, it determines the power,
legitimacy, status, and resources that flow from elected office. The type
of electoral system is therefore critical in constraining the legislative influence of extreme parties, even where they tap into reservoirs of popular
support.
These patterns can be illustrated in more detail by classifying types of
radical right parties by their electoral strength (measured by their average
share of the national vote during the 1990s). Table 5.3 shows the relative
success of these parties under different electoral systems. Three relevant
radical right parties (gaining on average over 3% of the vote) compete in
nations with majoritarian electoral systems (Pauline Hansons One Nation
in Australia, the Canadian Reform Party, and the French Front National),
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table 5.3. Types of Electoral System and Radical Right Electoral Parties
Majoritarian
Nation
Party
Combined
PR
Nation
Party
Nation
Party
Relevant Parties
Australia
One Nation
Hungary
Austria
Freedom Party
Canada
Reform
Italy
Belgium
Flemish Block
France
National
Front
Italy
Hungarian
Justice & Life
Party
National
Alliance
Northern League
Chile
Liberal
Democrat
Party
Chile
Independent
Democratic
Union
National
Renewal
Russia
Czech Rep.
Denmark
Denmark
Israel
Israel
Netherlands
New
Zealand
Norway
Romania
Romania
Slovenia
Switzerland
(3)
Fringe Parties
Belarus
Liberal
Democrat
UK
British
National
Party
(4)
Republican
Party
Peoples Party
Progress Party
National
Religious
Party
National Union
List Pym
Fortuyn
New Zealand
First
Progress Party
Greater
Romania
Party
Romanian
National
Unity Party
Slovene
National
Party
Swiss Peoples
Party
(16)
Germany
Republican Party
Belgium
National Front
Germany
German Peoples
Union
Finland
Patriotic
National
Alliance
(continued)
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Majoritarian
Combined
PR
Nation
Party
Nation
Party
Nation
Party
UK
National
Front
Germany
National
Democratic
Party
Social
Movement
3 Flames
Ukrainian
National
Assembly
Lithuanian
Freedom
Union
France
Movement for
France
France
National
Republican
Movement
Populist
Orthodox
Rally
Greek Front
Italy
Ukraine
Lithuania
Greece
Greece
Netherlands
Norway
Spain
Sweden
Sweden
Switzerland
Switzerland
Switzerland
Switzerland
(3)
None
U.S.
None
(1)
(6)
Japan
Korea
Rep.
Mexico
Taiwan
Thailand
Center
Democrats
Fatherland
Party
Falange
Swedish
Democrats
New
Democracy
Union of
Federal
Democrats
Swiss
Democrats
Ticino League
Freedom Party
(15)
None
None
Iceland
Ireland
None
None
None
None
None
Luxembourg
Peru
Poland
Portugal
None
None
None
None
(6)
(5)
Note: Radical right parties are classified on the basis of the Lubbers expert survey (where included) or by other
reference sources, as discussed in Chapter 2. Electoral parties are defined as those radical right parties contesting
seats in the lower house of the national legislature. Relevant electoral parties are defined as those with an average
of 3.0% or more of the vote in national legislative elections held during the 1990s. Fringe electoral parties are
defined as those with an average of 0.1 to 2.9% in national legislative elections held during the 1990s. None are
where no parties meet these criteria.
Source: Classified from Tables 2.1 and 3.1.
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figure 5.1. The Ratio of Votes-to-Seats Won by Radical Right Parties, 2000
2004. The proportion of votes and seats won by radical right parties in the most
recent national legislative election for the lower house (held from 2000 to 2004).
The regression line summarizes the relationship between votes and seats. Source:
See Table 5.1.
along with a few fringe parties. Four relevant radical right electoral parties exist in countries using combined (or mixed) electoral systems. By
contrast, there are sixteen relevant radical right parties under PR systems
(including all those parties that have ever entered governing coalitions),
along with fifteen fringe radical right parties.
The impact of the electoral rules is also illustrated by Figure 5.1, showing the proportion of votes to seats achieved by radical right parties under
the three basic types of electoral system. The majoritarian systems provide
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the least proportional results for these parties, notably in France, where
Le Pens Front National gain minimal deputies in the French National
Assembly, due to the second-ballot majoritarian system, despite having
the support of more than one in ten voters. In Canada, by contrast, as
mentioned earlier, the Reform Party do relatively well in Parliament, because of the regional nature of Canadian electoral politics. The combined
systems, used for national legislative elections in countries such as Hungary, Russia, Italy, and New Zealand, prove moderately proportional.
And the PR electoral systems, used in places such as Switzerland, Romania, and Norway, prove most proportional for radical right contenders.
Electoral Thresholds
The evidence considered so far confirms that, compared with PR, majoritarian electoral systems usually limit how far radical right candidates and
parties succeed in entering legislative office, unless their vote is spatially
concentrated within a specific region where they can overcome these hurdles for example the Canadian Reform Party tapped into regional antiQuebecois sentiments in Western Canada. Yet there remain substantial
variations in the success of radical right parties, even within PR systems:
for example their considerable success in Switzerland and Israel, compared with their marginalization in Sweden and Spain. If all PR schemes
were perfectly proportional then we would not have to investigate further conditions, but in fact these vary a great deal depending on specific
arrangements such as the mean district magnitude and the use of legal
thresholds. To explore variations between and within the main types
of electoral systems, we need to compare specific components, including the legal and effective electoral thresholds that minor parties face.
Under the second-ballot electoral system used in France, for example,
Front National parliamentary candidates need to get an absolute majority (50%+) of the vote in their department to enter the National Assembly,
and the same barrier faces One Nation under the Australian Alternative
Vote system. British National Party candidates standing in single-member
plurality districts, with at least three rivals, often need to get a third of
the vote or more to win a Westminster seat, a barrier which they have
consistently failed to overcome. These are all far more daunting obstacles
than that faced by Mifleget Datit Leumit (Mafdal) when seeking office in
the highly proportional Knesset elections, where parties have to win just
1.5% of the national vote to overcome the minimum legal threshold for
representation.23
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119
Two basic types of threshold determine the minimum vote that a party
needs to obtain in order to be represented. Some proportional or combined electoral systems specify a legal (otherwise known as a formal or
artificial) threshold, representing the minimal percentage share of the vote
in the electoral district or the whole nation which all party lists must meet
in order to be eligible for a seat. Parties falling below the specified legal
threshold are automatically excluded from office. Examples include the
German Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, which won 4.3%
of the second (party list) votes in the 1969 federal elections, falling below
the 5% threshold for entry into the Bundestag, before declining in popular support in subsequent contests.24 The aim of formal thresholds is to
reduce party fragmentation by excluding fringe and extreme parties from
the legislature. Electoral laws differ according to their level of application
(whether there needs to be a minimum share of the vote achieved at the
district or the national level, or both); the percentage specified for any
legal threshold (ranging from 0.67 in the Netherlands to 10% of the vote
in Turkey); whether the threshold is applied to the first or any subsequent
stage of any seat allocations; and whether the threshold varies for parties
and for party alliances.25 Moreover the effects of the legal threshold depend on the context; in Germany, for example, as already observed, the
5% threshold proved critical for the NDP, whereas the 3% legal threshold
in Greece has little effect since many minor parties fail to get elected due
to the use of fifty-six districts for party lists. A national legal threshold (as
in Germany) applied across the whole country limits minor parties such
as the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), who are strongest in the east
but who fell below the 5% level nationally in the 2002 Bundestag election,
whereas a district-level legal threshold (such as that used in Spain) will
not affect small parties such as the Basque Nationalists, who are returned
in their regional strongholds.
In other PR systems, if no legal threshold is specified by electoral law,
then there is an informal (sometimes known as the natural or mathematical) threshold. This is strongly influenced by the mean district magnitude,
meaning the average number of legislators returned per district, ranging
from one member of Parliament per constituency elected to the British
House of Commons, and two Congressional deputies per district in Chile,
up to 150 members in the Netherlands. But the informal threshold can
also be affected, to a lesser extent, by the working of the electoral formula translating seats into votes (for example differences in proportionality among the dHondt, Sainte-Lague, LR-Droop, and Hare formulas),
and by the number of political parties competing in a seat. It has two
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boundaries: the threshold of representation is the minimum percentage

of the vote that can earn a party a seat under the most favorable circumstances. The threshold of exclusion is the maximum percentage of
the vote that, under the most favorable conditions, may be insufficient
for a party to win a seat. These can be understood as representing the
upper boundaries (where it is possible to win a seat) and lower boundaries (where it is guaranteed to win a seat). Following Lijphart, the informal threshold is calculated as the mean of the threshold of representation and exclusion, so that it is assumed to be half-way between the
upper and lower threshold.26 Estimating the informal threshold at national level, however, is not a precise matter as this represents a range,
which can also vary from district to district.27 Any national estimates
have to remain approximate because the precise conditions under which
electoral thresholds curtail opportunities for minor parties depend heavily upon the distribution of party support and the number of members
returned within each district. For example, even in first-past-the-post majoritarian elections, smaller parties can overcome vote thresholds and gain
districts if their support is spatially concentrated, such as the Reform
Party, which picked up substantial votes and seats in their heartland of
Western Canada. At the same time, even in proportional systems, minor parties with popularity dispersed across many regions can be heavily
penalized; Poland, for example, has open list PR but sets a 7% legal
national voting threshold which smaller parties must surmount to gain
a single parliamentary seat. Nevertheless, the basic proposition expected
here is that the higher thresholds commonly found in majoritarian systems
will restrict opportunities for minor parties, including smaller parties on
the radical right, compared with the lower thresholds usually evident in
PR systems.
The two types of threshold can be combined for analysis. The effective
national-level electoral threshold is defined as either the legal threshold
(in countries where this is specified at national level) or, where this is
not specified by electoral law, the informal threshold at national level. To
examine the effects of specific features of electoral systems on the vote
and seat shares for radical right parties, as well as on the effective number
of parliamentary parties (ENPP) in a country, we can compare a number
of indicators, including the legal and the effective electoral threshold at
national levels, as well as the mean district magnitude (the average number
of representatives elected per district), and the index of proportionality.
The specific measures used are listed under Table 5.4.
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table 5.4. Electoral Rules and Support for Radical Right Parties
Elections 19902004
%
%
Votes Seats
Ratio
Legal
.358 .481 .432
electoral
thresholds in
PR systemsb
Effective
.171 .026
.163
thresholds in
all systemsc
Index of
.004 .098
.137
proportionalityd
Mean district
.002 .096
.067
magnitudee

%
%
Votes Seats
Ratio
Number of
ENPPa countries
.302 .366 .493 .314
21
.192
.038
.148
.204
39
.061
.048
.134
.218
38
.101 .121
.017
.281
39
Note: The figures represent the simple correlation coefficients between support for the radical right
parties and electoral rules.
a
Effective number of parliamentary parties, calculated following the method of Laakso and Taagepera
(1979).
b
This is the minimum share of the vote (in the district or nation) required by law to qualify for a seat.
50%
c
Following Lijphart (1994), the legal threshold, where available, or else M+1
+ 50%
, where M is the
2M
district magnitude.
d
Calculated as the difference between a partys share of the vote and its share of the total seats in
parliament, summed, divided by two, and subtracted from 100. Theoretically it can range from 0
to 100. This is a standardized version of the Loosemore-Hanby index. For details see Rose, Munro,
and Mackie (1998).
e
The average number of seats (representatives returned to parliament) per electoral district.
Sig. .001 = ; sig. .01 = ; sig. .05 = .
Source: See Table 5.1.
The results in Table 5.4 demonstrate that PR systems with low legal
thresholds, exemplified by Israel or the Netherlands, facilitate the share of
seats won by radical right parties. This process is critical: through winning
even a handful of parliamentary seats, radical right parties thereby gain
legitimacy and a public platform which they can use to consolidate their
power and gradually expand their influence. But the results also suggest
that legal thresholds do not affect the share of the vote for the radical
right. Other features of electoral systems which are under comparison,
including the effective threshold, the index of proportionality, and the
mean district magnitude, also fail to affect the vote or the seat share
won by the radical right, and the ENPP measure of party competition.
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One reason why the national level of effective thresholds may prove less
important than expected is the role of electoral geography; in particular
where support for the radical right is concentrated in particular regions
and areas, what matters for their exclusion is the effective threshold at
district, not national, level. If parties can mobilize votes in their heartland
areas, they can overcome the effective threshold in these areas, whether in
majoritarian or proportional electoral systems. The results provide further
confirmation of Lijpharts findings that the electoral system is not a strong
instrument in shaping the party system, especially the effective number of
elective parties.28 It appears that, although each of these specific aspects
could affect the radical right, it is use of PR systems in general, and the use
of restrictive legal thresholds in particular, which has a significant impact
upon their share of seats.
Compulsory Voting
In addition to these features, other specific variations in the electoral rules
could also shape the fortunes of minor parties. Electoral laws and administrative procedures cover numerous matters including the administration
of voting facilities, the frequency of contests, the drawing of constituency
boundaries, and citizenship qualifications for the franchise. Discussing
how all these matters could affect the electoral fortunes of radical right
parties would take us too far from the main subject of this book, but nevertheless we should consider the impact of compulsory voting, as a plausible
explanation which has been discussed in the literature. These laws have
been suggested as one factor influencing the success of the Vlaams Blok
in Antwerp, for example, since under these rules citizens are required to
cast a ballot, even where they are dissatisfied by the performance of the
major parties, and so they may be tempted to cast a protest vote for the
radical right as an expression of antiparty sentiment.29 Similar patterns
may be evident in some of the other nations using compulsory voting,
such as Italy and Australia.
Worldwide, twenty-three countries currently use compulsory voting in
national parliamentary elections, including Australia, Belgium, Greece,
Luxembourg, and Italy. This practice is also used in a few provinces in
Austria and in Switzerland, and (until 1970) in the Netherlands. Table 5.5
compares the share of the vote and seats won by radical right parties in
the countries which did and did not use such regulations. The results show
that the radical right did fare slightly better in the eight nations which use
compulsory voting, with perhaps an extra two to three percentage points
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table 5.5. Compulsory Voting and Support for Radical Right Parties
Elections 19902004
%
Votes
%
Seats
Compulsory 6.3
voting is
not used
Compulsory 9.0
voting
is used
Difference
+2.7
5.1

%
Votes
%
Seats
.41
5.9
7.5
.37
+2.4
.04
Ratio
Ratio
Number of
countries
5.9
.41
31
8.8
8.6
.37
+2.9
+2.7
.0.4
39
Note: The results summarize the mean percentage of votes and seats won by radical right
parties in elections for the lower house in the national legislature. For the classification of
compulsory voting by nation see Pippa Norris. 2004. Electoral Engineering. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. Chapter 7. The mean difference in the proportion of votes and
seats won by radical right parties between countries which did and did not use compulsory
voting were not significant at the conventional .95 confidence level when tested by ANOVA
(Aanalysis of Variance).
Source: See Table 5.1.
in the vote. This evidence is suggestive but, given the limited number of
cases, not surprisingly the modest difference was not statistically significant at the conventional level. This suggests that we need more conclusive proof from survey evidence at individual level before we can safely
conclude that the radical right do indeed benefit from compulsory voting
laws.
One reason why the results are ambiguous is that the strength of any
effect may depend upon how strictly compulsory voting regulations and
any associated sanctions are implemented and enforced.30 In practice, legal rules for voting may be de jure or de facto. The most common legal
basis is statutory law, although the obligation to vote may also be rooted in
constitutional provisions. Implementation ranges from minimal de facto
enforcement to the imposition of various sanctions. Fines are most common, as in Luxembourg, although other punishments include the denial
of official documents like passports, identity cards, drivers licenses, or
government benefits, used in Italy and Greece, and even occasionally the
threat of imprisonment as a criminal offence. The effectiveness of any
legal penalties is dependent upon the efficiency of the prior registration
process and, where the initiative falls upon the elector, whether there are
fines or other penalties associated with failure to register.31
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conclusions
The study examined evidence for the impact of electoral systems and
electoral thresholds, particularly the standard claim that PR facilitates
support for smaller extremist parties. The results suggest three main
findings:
i. A revised version of the conventional wisdom is partially correct:
electoral systems do affect the seats gained by minor radical right
parties, with their rise facilitated by PR systems with low legal
thresholds.
ii. Nevertheless the evidence suggests an important and overlooked
qualification to the conventional wisdom: the effect of electoral systems works through determining their share of seats not votes. The
effects here are mechanical rather than psychological, for reasons
discussed below.
iii. And lastly, within PR systems, legal thresholds also exert a critical
mechanical impact on the radical right share of seats.
The clear role of electoral systems and thresholds on the distribution
of seats can be illustrated by a few examples. Under majoritarian elections, for example, Le Pens Front National have been stranded on the
sidelines of French politics for decades. By contrast, after gaining a similar share of the vote (1112%) in the most recent national general
elections, under PR the Vlaams Blok constitute one-tenth of the members of the Belgian Parliament, while Alleanza Nazionale hold ministerial office in Berlusconis cabinet. Politically this process is vital, since
parliamentary representation provides the radical right with legitimacy,
resources, and power. Through PR, parties gain access to a platform
on the national stage, allowing them to propagate their views, influence debates, and mobilize popular support via the national news media, not just gain sporadic bursts of publicity during occasional election
campaigns.
There is one important qualification to these conclusions, as it should
be noted that the evidence about the impact of electoral systems in newer
democracies remains limited, and the direction of causality in this relationship, in particular, cannot be determined from cross-sectional evidence alone. What this means is that we cannot say whether majoritarian electoral systems penalize and thereby discourage extremist parties
from competing, or, alternatively, whether newer democracies containing
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125
multiple parties dispersed widely across the political spectrum are more
likely to adopt PR rules in their electoral laws and constitutions. What
we can conclude, however, is that in established democracies which have
had relatively stable electoral systems over successive decades, or even
for centuries, in the long term it seems plausible that the rules of the
game (adopted for whatever reason) will constrain subsequent patterns
of party competition. In Britain, for example, the system of plurality
single-member districts has persisted in elections for the House of Commons since the Great Reform Act of 1832, with the exception of a few
dual-member seats which were finally abolished in 1948. This system
has greatly limited the opportunities for minor center parties to challenge the Labour and Conservative predominance at Westminster, despite
growing patterns of partisan dealignment and surges of popular support
for the Liberal Democrats in recent decades. In the 2001 general election, the manufactured majority bias for the governing Labour Party
was the largest since World War II.32 Where electoral rules have persisted
unchanged for many decades, we can conclude that they determine how
parties respond strategically to the structure of opportunities they present.
The conventional wisdom remains partially incorrect; although the institutional context of the electoral system might be expected to influence
popular support for minor parties, with majoritarian systems having a
psychological effect in depressing their vote share for the radical right,
this turns out not to be the case. The wasted vote thesis does not hold
for these parties; given the proximity theory of voting, their supporters
are located too far away from other contenders across the ideological
spectrum for them to switch to their second-preference choice for tactical or strategic considerations. Fuller support for this argument is presented in Chapter 7, examining survey evidence of protest and strategic
voting.
In subsequent chapters in this book we also need to consider other
psychological effects of electoral rules, in particular whether the basic
type of electoral system exerts an important indirect impact upon the
campaign strategies and ideological positions adopted by minor parties on
the radical right. As will be explored in detail later, majoritarian rules with
higher thresholds are expected to generate incentives for rational voteseeking parties to adopt bridging strategies, appealing to citizens across
different ideological persuasions and social backgrounds. By contrast,
under proportional systems with lower thresholds, rational parties have
greater incentive to adopt bonding strategies, appealing more exclusively
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to their home base.33 Far from being irrelevant, therefore, the strategic
agency theory presented in this book regards the electoral system as central
to understanding variations in the electoral success of the radical right,
as well as how these parties respond to the institutional constraints on
their behavior. The next step is to examine the social background and
ideological profile of radical right supporters.
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ELECTORAL DEMAND
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6
The New Cleavage Thesis
The Social Basis of Right-Wing Support
Demand-side accounts focus upon developments in the mass electorate

which are believed to have fueled the popularity of radical right appeals,
whether structural changes in the socioeconomic basis of postindustrial
society, the rise of political disenchantment, or shifts in public opinion
toward immigrants and ethnic minorities. Ever since early work on the
origins of fascism and authoritarianism, a series of studies in political
sociology have explored these issues. Three distinct strands emerged in the
literature.1 Classic accounts published during the 1950s and 1960s sought
to explain the phenomenon of the rise of fascism in Weimar Germany, as
well as Poujadism in France, and McCarthyism in the United States, as
a revolt against modernity led primarily by the petite bourgeoisie small
entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, merchants, self-employed artisans, and independent farmers squeezed between the growing power of big business
and the collective clout of organized labor.2 Echoing and updating these
concerns, contemporary theorists argue that a new social cleavage has
emerged in affluent societies. In this view, some residual elements of the
appeal of the radical right among the petite bourgeoisie can still be detected, but during the last decade their populist rhetoric has fallen upon
its most fertile ground among a low-skilled blue-collar underclass, with
minimal job security, and among those populations most vulnerable to
new social risks who have tumbled through the cracks within affluent
societies.3 Alternatively, theories of partisan dealignment suggest that today the appeal of the radical right is not based upon a single identifiable
social cleavage common in all countries, whether the unskilled working
class or the petite bourgeoisie. Rather, the theory predicts significant variations in the social basis of support for parties within the radical right
129
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Electoral Demand
family, and an erosion in how far social structure and partisan loyalties
are related to voting behavior.
Section I discusses the reasons underlying the alternative theoretical
frameworks and considers the rival hypotheses in more detail. The chapter then compares evidence to analyze the social basis of the radical right
vote across fifteen nations, using data from the European Social Survey
2002 and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 19962001. Previous case studies analyzing voting support for specific parties, such as
Vlaams Blok or Lega Nord, have often reported inconsistent results. These
variations may be attributed to genuine contrasts found in the national
electorates, or they may be due to the use of inconsistent classifications of
social stratification and occupational class employed in alternative studies,
as well as the common problems of limited sample size and measurement
error.4 The number of respondents included in the pooled cross-national
samples in the surveys used in this book, combined with the consistency
of the measures and the range of indicators they tap across different countries, allows us to surmount some of these problems. Section II focuses
upon the role of social stratification while Section III considers the enduring gender gap and patterns of generational support. The conclusion
considers the implications of these results for understanding the basis of
radical right popularity, and for the stability and longevity of these parties.
i theoretical framework and rival hypotheses

Classic Sociological Accounts: A Crisis of Modernity?
The classic account of voting behavior by Lipset and Rokkan emphasized
that social cleavages shaped patterns of party competition in Western
Europe.5 They argued that the enduring foundations for political parties were formed from historical divisions in the electorate, existing at
the time of the expansion of the mass franchise, between Catholics and
Protestants, core and peripheral regions, and owners and workers. Parties
were thought to reflect and channel these interests into the public sphere.
These structural theories in political sociology are rooted in broader processes of societal modernization, identifying multiple long-term secular
trends associated with the rise of industrial and postindustrial societies.6
The most fundamental economic developments shaping European societies during the early twentieth century include the consolidation of largescale manufacturing industry through the economies of scale generated
by assembly-line production, the unionization of the labor force, and
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131
the growth of professional and managerial white-collar employees in the

service sector. These developments were closely associated with the expansion of secondary and higher education, rising middle-class affluence,
and growing standards of living.
The early seminal accounts in political sociology linked these economic
and social developments to the roots of support for fascism in Italy and
Germany, and for McCarthyism in America. These ideas were contained
in a series of essays in The New American Right, edited by Daniel Bell, first
published in 1955, and in Political Man, published by Seymour Martin
Lipset in 1959. Fearing downward mobility and loss of social status, Lipset
and Bell argued, radical right-wing movements tapped fears and insecurities among those who lost out to industrialization: Extremist movements
have much in common. They appeal to the disgruntled and psychologically homeless, to the personal failures, the socially isolated, the economically insecure, the uneducated, unsophisticated, and the authoritarian
persons.7
In particular, Lipset argued, it was the small individual entrepreneurs,
especially those lacking education and those socially isolated in rural areas and small towns, who formed the traditional bedrock support for
fascism, trapped between the threat of big business and manufacturing
industry on the one hand, and the collective strength of organized labor on the other. The petite bourgeoisie consisted of small entrepreneurs,
shopkeepers, urban merchants, self-employed craftsmen, and independent
family farmers. These groups differ in many regards. What they share in
common is that they risk their own modest reserves of capital, and they
lack the security that comes from managerial and professional careers
employed in large organizations or from the collective bonds of trade
union membership. The self-employed, working in family businesses, are
exposed to market forces and they remain vulnerable to sudden economic
downturns, hyperinflation, or rising interest rates. Bell and Lipset emphasized, however, that it was the threat of loss of status by the petite bourgeoisie in industrial societies, more than purely economic threats, which
triggered their resentment against big business and organized labor, boosting the appeal of American movements offering simple populist solutions,
exemplified by Coughlinism in the 1930s, McCarthyism in the 1950s, and
the John Birch Society in the 1960s, as well as mass support for fascist
movements in Germany and Italy. Subsequent historical research on the
origins of European fascist movements during the interwar period lends
further support to these conclusions.8 If there is some historical continuity
in the social basis of contemporary politics, then the theory predicts that
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electoral support for radical right parties will be concentrated most

strongly among the petite bourgeoisie.
Modern Sociological Accounts: A New Social Cleavage?
Modern sociological explanations echo, but also update, some of these
concerns. The core ideas and ideological appeals that characterized populism and fascism in earlier decades differ sharply from modern rightwing movements today, and these shifts may attract a different social
base. The traditional platform of interwar fascism advocated corporatist
and state-controlled economies, with strong government authority built
around a hierarchical political leadership, in sharp contrast to the free
market, small government, and antistate appeal of the contemporary
right.9 The signature issue mobilizing support for the radical right today,
however, is not primarily fear of big business and organized labor per se,
but rather the threat of the other, driven by patterns of immigration,
asylum seekers, and multiculturalism. The radical right have responded
to the way that modern postindustrial societies have been transformed
during the late twentieth century by multiple social developments which
have transformed living conditions, life chances, and patterns of socioeconomic inequality in advanced industrial societies. These include processes of globalization, reducing national barriers for labor, trade, and
capital mobility; the liberal restructuring of economic markets and the
shrinkage of the welfare state, reducing social protection; and the decline
of local communities and traditional working-class formal organizations,
exemplified by trade unions and labor cooperatives. Contemporary sociological accounts emphasize that these processes have largely benefited
those social groups with the educational and cognitive skills, geographic
mobility, and professional career flexibility to take advantage of the new
economic and social opportunities in affluent societies.10
At the same time, commentators argue that these developments have
left behind a residual underclass of low-skill workers, who face shrinking life chances, poorer opportunities for full-time employment and wellpaid secure careers in the job market, reduced state benefits, and growing conditions of social inequality.11 The less-educated poor face being
stuck in low-skill, low-wage casual work, usually with minimal job security. It might be thought that these groups would naturally gravitate
toward mainstream socialist, social democratic, labor, and Communist
parties of the center-left and extreme left, the traditional advocates for
the socially disadvantaged; or mainstream conservative parties that stand
for security, law and order, and national identity. But instead, theorists
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argue, mainstream parties have been unable or unwilling to respond to

a displaced constituency generated by increased economic inequality and
social insecurity among the losers of modernity, combined with growing
multiculturalism. These conditions have encouraged the politics of resentment against immigrants, kindling the conflagration sparked by populist
rhetoric and fanned by extremist party leaders.
The old left may have proved unresponsive to these concerns, and social
inequality may have worsened, where these parties have become increasingly catchall in pursuit of support among the rapidly expanding middle
classes, and where the forces of globalization and international market
pressures have constrained the autonomy of center-left governments to
pass protectionist measures.12 Traditionally the left has been concerned
with protection against the type of social disadvantage that seriously limits the capacity of wage earners to extract an income from the labor
market, such as industrial accidents, unemployment, disease, invalidity,
or old age. Protection against these social risks became the key objective
of the welfare states throughout postwar Western Europe and elsewhere,
with social policies developed primarily by Social Democratic parties in
alliance with the labor movement, as well as by Christian Democratic
parties. Where mainstream center-left parties have failed to recognize or
respond to the emergence of populations experiencing new social risks,
and where patterns of economic retrenchment mean that spending on
the welfare state has been sharply reduced, this may create new social
cleavages in the electorate which can be exploited by entrepreneurial new
parties. At the same time, Betz suggests that social individualization and
fragmentation have eroded the mass membership of traditional collective
organizations, social networks, and mass movements that used to mobilize working-class communities, exemplified by workers cooperatives
and the trade union movement. Socialist and Social Democratic parties
functioned in the past as a channel for the collective organization and
expression of working-class grievances.
It is these new socially disadvantaged groups, Betz suggests, who are
most prone to blame ethnic minorities for deteriorating conditions, to
support cultural protectionism, and to criticize government for failing to
provide the growing prosperity and social security that was characteristic
of postwar Europe. The failure of center-left political elites to restore a
sense of security and prosperity to the unemployed and underprivileged
in Western Europe, this account argues, fuels support for populist leaders who do make such promises.13 In short, the politics of resentment
are believed to generate conditions favorable to populist leaders offering
simplistic solutions. Some empirical evidence sustains this argument; for
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example, Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers report that in Western Europe

radical right support at individual level is significantly stronger among the
unemployed, blue-collar workers, the retired, and less-educated sectors, as
well as among younger voters, the nonreligious, and men.14 Yet these were
specific, not diffuse effects: they did not find stronger right-wing voting in
nations with higher levels of unemployment.15 The gender gap in support
for extreme right parties has been a well-established and persistent pattern, although the reasons for this are not clearly understood.16 In a fivenation comparison, Niedermayer also found that white-collar employees
and professionals are consistently underrepresented in the electorates of
radical right parties, although he also demonstrated that the proportion
of blue-collar workers and those with low educational achievement var the
ied substantially among different parties such as the Austrian FPO,
17
German Republicans, and the Danish Progress Party.
Some aggregate-level studies have also found a relationship between
national unemployment rates and the share of the vote cast for far right
parties in each country, for example work by Jackman and Volpert.18 The
authors emphasized that the effects of macroeconomic conditions were
expected to operate at sociotropic level, affecting all groups within a society, but not necessarily at egotropic level, so that support for the radical
right was not anticipated to be stronger among those individuals with
direct personal experience of long-term unemployment, among unskilled
workers, or among poorer social sectors. A similar link has been found
between unemployment and radical right voting patterns when analyzing
regional variations in France and Austria.19 Golder, however, argues that
there is an interaction effect, reporting that unemployment only matters
where immigration is high.20 The new cleavage thesis therefore emphasizes that bottom up secular trends common in affluent postindustrial
societies, particularly the growth of disadvantaged populations subject
to contemporary social risks, have created a disgruntled pool of citizens
open to the appeals of the radical right. If this account is supported by the
survey evidence, then we would expect to find that contemporary voting
support for the parties under comparison should be disproportionately
drawn from unskilled manual workers, the less educated, and those people with personal experience of unemployment or job insecurity.
Partisan Dealignment and Weakening Social Cues
Yet not all the evidence is consistent with this thesis; for instance van
der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie compared support for seven radical right
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parties, reporting that they attracted support equally across all social
strata. After controlling for ideological proximity and political attitudes,
the study found that the indicators of social stratification were rarely
significant associated with party support (including the role of social
class, income, religion, and education), and no significant patterns were
found consistently across all parties.21 Studies of French voting behavior also suggest that the class and the religious profiles of electors fail
to prove a particularly powerful predictor when explaining support for
the Front National.22 General processes of social and partisan dealignment may have eroded any distinctive social profile of the radical right
voter, along with the role of class and religious cleavages in predicting
support for many mainstream parties on the center-left and center-right.
A large body of research suggests that the class cleavage in party politics has gradually faded over the last three decades in many postindustrial societies, with more cross-cutting cleavages arising in multicultural
societies, and growing partisan dealignment weakening traditional voterparty loyalties.23 The most recent review of the evidence by Dalton and
Wattenberg compared indicators of party attachments across a wide variety of advanced industrialized democracies, based on time-series survey
analysis of Eurobarometer and national election studies. They concluded
that over time the total number of the electorate expressing a party identification had eroded significantly (at the .10 level) in thirteen out of nineteen
nations under comparison, and nonpartisanship had spread most widely
among more politically sophisticated and better-educated citizens, as well
as among the younger generation.24
If the rocklike ballast of class and partisan identities no longer anchors
voters to mainstream parties over successive elections, this may have significant consequences for patterns of growing volatility in electoral behavior and in party competition, opening the door for more split-ticket
voting across different levels and the occasional sudden surge of support
for the parties based on protest politics, as well as more vote switching
within and across the left-right blocks of party families.25 The dealignment thesis suggests that the radical right may be able to capitalize on
protest politics, particularly benefiting from any temporary widespread
disaffection with governing parties, in second-order elections held during periods of mid-term blues, or from sudden events (exemplified by the
wave of support for Lijst Pym Fortuyn following the assassination of their
leader), to pick up votes generally across the board, rather than presenting
a distinctive social profile. At the same time, this thesis also suggests that
any short-term gains for the radical right may be dissipated in subsequent
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elections, as they will not be based on stable social and partisan cleavages
which make supporters stick with parties through good times and bad.
ii comparing the social basis of support

To recap the core alternative hypotheses, the roots of the contemporary
radical right will continue to reflect patterns of electoral support for interwar fascism in the crisis of modernity thesis if the evidence demonstrates that their vote is disproportionately concentrated among the petite bourgeoisie, whether in self-employed professional and managerial
workers, such as family farmers, freelance architects, and restaurant proprietors, or in own-account manual occupations, such as self-employed
builders, taxi drivers, and casual plumbers. On the other hand, modern
sociological accounts of the emergence of a new social cleavage will be
confirmed if radical right support in many countries draws disproportionately upon the most socially disadvantaged and poorer sectors of the
electorate. And the partisan dealignment thesis will be demonstrated if
social cleavages are only weakly related to voting behavior today.
What evidence could be used to test these propositions? Previous survey analyses of the social basis of the radical right vote have often been
hampered by poor measurement of vulnerability to new social risks, experience of job insecurity, and socioeconomic inequality (including fairly
crude measures of social class categories). This problem is compounded
by the limited sample size of most standard social surveys, restricting
analysis of the small number of radical right voters contained within each
sector. Moreover, due to the limitations of survey data and the available
measures, previous analysis has often failed to distinguish in sufficient detail among distinct segments of the new working class, such as examining any similarities in voting behavior among self-employed professionals
and own-account skilled manual workers, as well as party support among
those with direct experience of job and financial insecurity.
To examine the systematic cross-national evidence, this study draws
upon the European Social Survey 2002 and the Comparative Study of
Electoral Systems 19962001. These surveys facilitate consistent comparisons across fifteen industrial and postindustrial nations containing
relevant right parties, including diverse Anglo-American, West European,
and post-Communist states, to see whether there are similarities in the
electorate across and within societies. These sources also allow analysis of more finely grained measures of the social and attitudinal structure of support for radical right parties at individual, party, and country
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levels. The ESS 2002 survey includes several indicators of social deprivation and experience of long-term unemployment. Ratio measures are
used to present the results, as the clearest and most straightforward way
to compare how far support within each group is greater or less than the
average party vote among all the electorate in each country. Ratios are
measured as the proportion of each group who voted for the radical right
divided into the proportion of the national electorate who voted for the
radical right in each country. A ratio of 1.0 suggests that the proportion
of a group voting for the radical right reflects the share of the vote that the
party received from across the whole electorate (e.g., if the Lega Nord received 10% of the national vote and the support of 10% of the unskilled
working class). A ratio less than 1.0 indicates that, compared with the
national average, the group is underrepresented in voting for the radical
right. And a ratio greater than 1.0 (flagged in tables in bold) suggests
that, compared with the national average, the group is overrepresented in
voting for these parties.
To test the impact of social stratification with systematic evidence,
we follow the fivefold Goldthorpe-Heath classification of occupational
class, used by Heath, Jowell, and Curtice for understanding the British
electorate, on the basis of a schema originally developed by the sociologist John Goldthorpe.26 This distinguishes among five groups: (i) the
salariat (employees who are managers and administrators, supervisors,
and professionals, with relatively high career security, salaries, and status);
(ii) routine non-manuals (employees such as accounts clerks, sales workers, and personal assistants, with lower work security, income, and
prestige); (iii) the petite bourgeoisie (self-employed farmers, small proprietors, and own-account manual workers, exposed to market risks through
reliance upon their own capital); (iv) the skilled working class (manual employees including electricians, machinists, and crafts persons); and
(v) the unskilled working class (more casual employees, such as plant
operatives, laborers, and domestic helpers, with the lowest job security,
pay, and status). Respondents were classified by their own work, based
on the ISCO88 occupational code, if employed in the paid workforce,
rather than by head of household. We focus in this chapter upon simple
descriptive models measuring the direct effects of social cleavages upon
voting support, leaving aside for the moment any indirect effect that may
run from social cleavages through political attitudes to party support.
The first model in Table 6.1 presents the results of a binary logistic
(logit) regression model, including the unstandardized beta coefficients
(B), the standard errors, and their significance, in the pooled eight-nation
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138
table 6.1. The Social Structure of Radical Right-Wing Votes, ESS 2002
Predictors of voting
for the radical right,
pooled eight-nation
European sample
B
Std. error
Sig.
.005
.307
1.04
.002
.074
.249
.051
.030
N/s
.267
.297
.372
.390
.198
.033
.120
.105
.119
.102
.085
.012
(Constant)
Demographic background
Age (in years)
Sex (male = 1, female = 0)
Ethnic minority (ethnic minority = 1, else = 0)
Socioeconomic status
Education (highest level attained on a 6-point
scale from low to high)
Salariat (professional and managerial employees)
Petite bourgeoisie (self-employed)
Skilled manual working class
Unskilled manual working class
Ever been unemployed (for more than 3 months)
Religiosity (self-identified as religious on a 7-pt
scale)
3.08
Nagelkerke R2
Percentage correctly predicted
.025
93.1
Note: The model presents the results of a binary logistic (logit) regression model including
the unstandardized beta coefficients (B), the standard errors, and their significance, in the
pooled eight-nation European sample weighted by design and population size. The nations
were selected from all those in the ESS 2002 based on whether they contained a relevant
party on the radical right (including Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, Israel, Italy,
the Netherlands, and Norway). France was excluded from the pooled sample because the
standard occupational classification was not measured in the survey. The dependent variable
is whether the respondent voted for a radical right party. All coefficients were confirmed
to be free of multicollinearity errors. The pooled sample contained 13,768 respondents in
total, including 932 voters for the radical right (6.8%). The routine non-manual category
of social class was dropped as the default (comparison) case in this model.
Sig. .001 = ; sig. .01 = ; sig. .05 = .
Source: Pooled sample eight nations, European Social Survey 2002 (ESS).
European sample. Countries were selected from all those in the ESS 2002
based on whether they contained a relevant radical right electoral party,
defined as those with over 3% of the vote, including Austria, Belgium,
Switzerland, Denmark, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway. The
dependent variable is whether the respondent voted for a radical right
party. The results of the pooled model confirm that nearly all the basic
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social indicators were significant at the conventional .95 probability level

and coefficients pointed in the predicted direction; the one exception was
education, which was negatively related to support for the radical right,
as predicted, but which was only significant at the .90 probability level.
The results confirm what many others have found in previous studies;
namely in these nations support for the radical right was significantly
stronger among the older generation and men, and ethnic minority voters
were underrepresented. The analysis by social class indicates that support for the radical right was underrepresented among the salariat, and
overrepresented among the petite bourgeoisie, as well as skilled manual and unskilled manual workers. Moreover support for these parties
was greater among those who had experienced unemployment, as well as
among the less religious. This social profile of radical right voters broadly
reflects that found earlier by Lubbers et al. based on analysis of other
cross-national surveys conducted in Western Europe in the mid-1990s,
strengthening confidence in the stability of these findings.27
Overall these patterns suggest that structural characteristics continue
to differentiate radical right voters; lacking consistent time-series data,
we cannot establish whether the impact of these variables has weakened
over the years, as theories of partisan dealignment suggest. What we can
conclude with more confidence, however, is that radical right parties are
not simply appealing across all social sectors equally, for example based
on temporary protest politics and a period of widespread public disenchantment with mainstream politics, as some previous studies suggest.28
The continued attraction of the petite bourgeoisie to the contemporary
radical right, for example, indicates that there are deeper roots which also
characterized interwar fascism. To go further, the pooled results need to
be broken down by nation and by type of social cleavage, as well as being
compared with the social profile of the radical right electorate in other
Anglo-American and post-Communist countries, to see whether there are
consistent patterns across postindustrial societies.
Table 6.2 summarizes the ratio measures of class voting for the radical
right in thirteen countries containing relevant radical right parties, without any prior controls. The evidence confirms that support for these parties remains disproportionately overrepresented among the petite bourgeoisie, as well as the skilled manual and the unskilled manual working
class, in most of the countries under comparison. In particular, compared
with the general electorate, support for the radical right is at least twice
as strong among the petite bourgeoisie in Hungary, Italy, and Romania,
showing the greatest resemblance to the classic roots of European
140
FPO
VB, FN
RSC
DF, FP
FN
MIEP
Mafdal, IL
AN, LN, MsFt
PF, CD
NZFP
FrP, FLP
PRM, PUNR
SVP, EDU, SD, LdT, FPS
Austria
Belgium
Czech Rep.
Denmark
France
Hungary
Israel
Italy
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Romania
Switzerland
1.3
0.8
1.3
0.7
0.9
0.8
2.0
1.1
2.0
1.1
1.0
1.1
2.4
1.7
Petite
bourgeoisie
1.3
0.7
1.3
0.3
1.1
1.3
1.3
1.3
0.8
1.9
2.3
2.0
1.4
Skilled
manual
1.2
1.0
0.5
0.7
1.1
1.1
2.0
0.9
1.0
1.8
1.4
1.5
1.6
Unskilled
manual
July 6, 2005
Note: The figures represent the ratio of each groups support for the radical right compared with the national average (measured as the proportion of each
group who voted for the radical right divided into the proportion of the national electorate who voted for the radical right in each country). A coefficient of
1.0 suggests that the group was perfectly proportional to the national average. A coefficient of less than 1.0 suggests that group was underrepresented among
radical right voters. A coefficient greater than 1.0 (in bold) suggests that the group was overrepresented among radical right voters. For the list of parties
included, see Table 3.1.
Sources: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, France, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway analyzed from data in the ESS 2002. The Czech Republic,
New Zealand, Romania, and Hungary analyzed from data in the CSES 19962001. Note that self-employment was not classified in Canada, Russia, and
Slovenia, necessitating dropping these nations from the comparison in this table, while standard occupational category was not classified in France.
0.9
0.5
0.9
0.7
1.2
0.9
0.8
1.3
0.9
1.4
1.7
1.2
0.6
0.8
0.5
0.3
0.9
0.8
0.8
0.9
0.7
0.9
Routine
non-manual
1.0
0.5
0.9
0.3
Salariat
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6.2
3.2
4.4
5.6
6.8
3.2
2.2
4.6
6.1
11.5
10.9
11.9
3.2
8.8
Party(s)
Nation
The ratio of voting support for the radical

right in each class compared with the national
average share of the vote
CUNY008B/Norris
mean
% Who voted for

the radical right,
all voters
table 6.2. The Class Basis of Radical Right Voters
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fascism. By contrast, the salariat are underrepresented within the radical right electorate in every country except for Hungary, Italy, and Israel.
This remains the radical rights greatest area of electoral weakness, given
the substantial expansion in professional and managerial employees in
service sector economies, and the limited size of the petite bourgeoisie.
Some important cross-national differences are also apparent, exemplified
(confirming the subby the more blue-collar base of the Austrian FPO
stantial growth of their support among the working class in elections
during the 1990s, documented elsewhere),29 in contrast to the greater
attraction of the Romanian PRM and PUNR among lower-middle-class
voters and the Lega Nords strongest base among the petite bourgeoisie.
Later chapters examine whether these social differences relate to systematic patterns of ideological support, as case-study comparisons suggest
and the Lega Nord can
that the different class base found in the FPO
be explained by their divergent programmatic appeals, with Lega Nord
maintaining their advocacy of radical free market neoliberal policies while
altered their platform under Haider to favor more protectionist
the FPO
measures.30
The educational profile of voters is broken down in more detail in
Table 6.3, showing a not dissimilar pattern across nations, which is not
surprising given the close link between prior educational achievement
and subsequent social status. Again the radical right in Hungary (MIEP),
Israel (Mafdal and IL), and Italy (AN, LN and MsFt) draw disproportionately upon those with better education, just as they have a stronger
imprint among the salariat. In nearly all other countries, support for the
radical right tends to be stronger among those with low or moderate education. Nevertheless there are variations in these patterns, and it would
be an exaggeration to claim that party support is confined to early schoolleavers with the lowest level of educational attainment and cognitive
sophistication.
We can go beyond these basic indicators to also see whether those
with experience of being unemployed and the poorest groups living in
low-income households are more prone to support the radical right, as
many suggest. This is important given that many aggregate-level studies
in political economy argue that rising levels of unemployment, coupled
with the perceived threat of migrant foreign workers to job security, play
a major role in explaining the rise of the radical right in the European
Union.31 We can also examine the location of respondents, to see whether
votes for these parties are concentrated either within poorer inner-city
urban neighborhoods, or else, as classic accounts of fascism suggested,
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table 6.3. The Educational Background of Radical Right Voters
Nation
Party(s)
FPO
VB, FN
RP
RSC
DF, FP
FN
MIEP
Mafdal, IL
AN, LN,
MsFt
Netherlands
PF, CD
New Zealand NZFP
Norway
FrP, FLP
Romania
PRM, PUNR
Russia
LDPR
Slovenia
SNS
Switzerland
SVP, EDU, SD,
LdT, FPS
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Czech Rep.
Denmark
France
Hungary
Israel
Italy
mean
The ratio of voting support for

the radical right in each group
compared with the national
% Who voted
for the radical
right, all voters
Low
Moderate High
education education education
3.2
4.4
18.9
5.6
6.8
3.2
2.2
4.6
6.1
1.1
1.3
0.9
1.4
1.4
1.5
0.8
0.2
0.7
1.0
1.0
1.1
1.1
1.1
0.5
1.0
0.8
1.3
0.8
0.3
0.9
0.6
0.1
0.5
1.7
1.8
1.4
11.5
10.9
11.9
3.2
1.5
2.2
8.8
1.1
1.5
1.3
0.6
1.3
0.5
0.7
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.2
1.5
1.3
1.2
0.7
0.8
0.4
1.3
0.7
1.1
0.5
6.2
1.0
1.1
0.9
Note: The figures represent the ratio of each groups support for the radical right compared with the
national average (measured as the proportion of each group who voted for the radical right divided
into the proportion of the national electorate who voted for the radical right in each country). A
coefficient of 1.0 suggests that the group was perfectly proportional to the national average. A
coefficient of less than 1.0 suggests that group was underrepresented among radical right voters.
A coefficient greater than 1.0 (in bold) suggests that the group was overrepresented among radical
right voters. For the list of parties included, see Table 3.1.
Sources: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, France, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, and
Norway analyzed from data in the ESS 2002. Canada, the Czech Republic, New Zealand, Romania,
Russia, Slovenia, and Hungary analyzed from data in the CSES 19962001.
within rural areas and small villages. Table 6.4 demonstrates that those
with experience of unemployment were overrepresented among supporters of the radical right in about half the nations under comparison, with
particularly strong effects in the Czech Republic and the Russian Federation. Yet the results can hardly be seen as providing strong confirmation
for claims that individual experience of job insecurity and unemployment
is a major factor behind the success of these parties. The comparisons
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table 6.4. Social Indicators, Type of Area, and Radical Right Voters
Nation
Party(s)
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Czech Rep.
Denmark
France
Hungary
Israel
Italy
FPO
VB, FN
RP
RSC
DF, FP
FN
MIEP
Mafdal, IL
AN, LN,
MsFt
PF, CD
NZFP
FrP, FLP
PRM, PUNR
LDPR
SNS
SVP, EDU, SD,
LdT, FPS
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Romania
Russia
Slovenia
Switzerland
mean
6.2
The ratio of voting support for the radical

right in each group compared with the
national average share of the vote
% Who voted
for the
radical right,
all voters
Unemployed
Live in
Live in
during the
Low
rural area a large
last 5 years income or village city
3.2
4.4
18.9
5.6
6.8
3.2
2.2
4.6
6.1
0.8
1.6
0.9
2.3
1.1
0.8
1.5
0.8
0.8
0.8
1.1
0.9
1.1
1.2
0.9
1.0
0.6
0.6
1.2
1.2
1.0
1.2
0.9
0.8
1.0
1.6
0.8
0.6
0.9
1.0
0.1
0.8
0.6
2.2
0.9
1.7
11.5
10.9
11.9
3.2
1.5
2.2
8.8
1.4
1.1
1.1
0.3
2.0
0.8
0.6
0.9
1.5
0.7
0.8
1.5
0.7
0.9
1.0
1.3
1.0
1.0
0.8
1.0
1.1
0.9
0.9
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.0
0.2
1.1
0.9
1.1
0.9
national average (measured as the proportion of each group who voted for the radical right divided into
the proportion of the national electorate who voted for the radical right in each country). A coefficient
of 1.0 suggests that the group was perfectly proportional to the national average. A coefficient of less
than 1.0 suggests that group was underrepresented among radical right voters. A coefficient greater
than 1.0 (in bold) suggests that the group was overrepresented among radical right voters. For the list
of parties included, see Table 3.1.
Sources: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, France, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway
analyzed from data in the ESS 2002. Canada, the Czech Republic, New Zealand, Romania, Russia,
Slovenia, and Hungary analyzed from data in the CSES 19962001.
among low-income households were even more equivocal: support for

the radical right was only overrepresented in this group among one-third
of the nations under comparison. The analysis by area also demonstrates
that there were mixed patterns, with six countries where the radical
right was stronger in rural areas and only three cases where they gained
more votes among urban residents. On balance, the interpretation of the
contemporary right as simply being the product of disaffection among the
poorest and least-educated social sectors appears to be an exaggerated
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stereotype; while it is true that radical right parties in Austria, Denmark,

and the Czech Republic do derive considerable reservoirs of support from
these social sectors, at the same time these parties attract considerable
votes across the spectrum in Hungary and the Netherlands, and they gain
slightly greater than average support among the petite bourgeoisie and
the highly educated in Italy and Israel.
iii demographic factors: gender and generation

Research on gender differences in the electorate has been a recurrent
theme in political science ever since the earliest systematic surveys of
voting behavior.32 Many hoped, and others feared, that once women
were enfranchised there would be a distinctive womens vote. Gender was
not regarded as a primary electoral cleavage, equivalent to class, region,
and religion, because women and men experienced many cross-cutting
forces, but the seminal account of European voting behavior by Lipset
and Rokkan viewed gender as one of the secondary cleavages shaping
the electoral base of party politics.33 The early classics in the 1950s and
1960s established the orthodoxy in political science: gender differences in
voting were generally fairly modest, but women were likelier than men to
support center-right parties in Western Europe and in the United States, a
pattern that has been termed the traditional gender gap.34 Most explanations of this phenomenon emphasized structural differences between men
and women in religiosity, longevity, and labor force participation; for example, women in Italy and France were more likely to attend churches
associated with Christian Democratic parties.35 During this era, women
were also commonly assumed to be more conservative in their political attitudes and values, producing an ideological gap underpinning their
party preferences.36 Yet at the same time many studies suggested that men
were far more likely to belong to extreme right parties, such as the fascist movement.37 The traditional gender gap on the center-right gradually
faded and the literature suggested that the old thesis of female conservatism was apparently no longer evident; instead, the situation in the
1980s seemed contingent upon political circumstances: in some established democracies women seemed to lean toward the right, in others to
the left, and in still others no significant differences could be detected.38
By the end of the 1990s, however, women had shifted toward the centerleft of men in many established democracies.39 What is the pattern on the
extreme right, and have there been parallel shifts?
The results of the comparison by gender in Table 6.5 confirm a consistent pattern; men continue to be overrepresented among the radical
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table 6.5. The Gender Gap among Radical Right Voters
Nation
Party(s)
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Czech Republic
Denmark
France
Hungary
Israel
Italy
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Romania
Russia
Slovenia
Switzerland
FPO
VB, FN
RP
RSC
DF, FP
FN
MIEP
Mafdal, IL
AN, LN, MsFt
PF, CD
NZFP
FrP, FLP
PRM, PUNR
LDPR
SNS
SVP, EDU, SD,
LdT, FPS
mean
The ratio of voting support for

the radical right in each group
compared with the national
% Who voted
for the
radical right,
all voters
Men
Women
3.2
4.4
18.9
5.6
6.8
3.2
2.2
4.6
6.1
11.5
10.9
11.9
3.2
1.5
2.2
8.8
1.3
1.2
1.2
1.4
1.3
1.3
1.2
1.0
1.4
1.0
1.0
1.2
1.2
1.6
1.0
1.2
0.7
0.8
0.8
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
0.7
1.0
1.0
0.7
0.8
0.7
1.0
0.9
6.2
1.2
0.8
Note: The figures represent the ratio of each groups support for the radical right compared with
the national average (measured as the proportion of each group who voted for the radical right
divided into the proportion of the national electorate who voted for the radical right in each
country). A coefficient of 1.0 suggests that the group was perfectly proportional to the national
average. A coefficient of less than 1.0 suggests that the group was underrepresented among radical
right voters. A coefficient greater than 1.0 (in bold) suggests that the group was overrepresented
among radical right voters
right electorate in a dozen of the countries under comparison, and in

the remainder there is no gender difference. The gender gap in support
is greatest in support for the Liberal Democrats in Russia, the Repub
likanska Stiana Cesk
a (RSC) in the Czech Republic, and the AN, LN, and
MsFt in Italy. Although some parties such as Le Pens Front National have
made a particular effort to change their traditional male-dominated image by picking more women candidates for elected office, nevertheless the
leadership and the grassroots base of these parties remain predominately
male. It remains to be seen in subsequent chapters whether this pattern is
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146
table 6.6. The Age Profile of Radical Right Voters
Nation
Party(s)
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Czech Rep.
Denmark
France
Hungary
Israel
Italy
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Romania
Russia
Slovenia
Switzerland
FPO
VB, FN
RP
RSC
DF, FP
FN
MIEP
Mafdal, IL
AN, LN, MsFt
PF,CD
NZFP
FrP, FLP
PRM, PUNR
LDPR
SNS
SVP, EDU, SD,
LdT, FPS
mean
The ratio of voting support

for the radical right in each
group compared with the national
% Who voted
for the
radical right,
all voters
Younger
Middle
Older
3.2
4.4
18.9
5.6
6.8
3.2
2.2
4.6
6.1
11.5
10.9
11.9
3.2
1.5
2.2
8.8
0.9
1.0
0.8
1.3
1.2
0.3
0.7
0.9
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.9
1.0
1.2
1.7
0.7
0.8
1.2
1.1
1.2
0.8
1.4
1.1
1.2
1.1
1.1
1.0
1.0
1.1
1.1
0.6
1.2
1.8
0.8
1.1
0.2
1.4
1.3
1.1
0.9
1.0
0.9
1.6
1.1
0.9
0.7
0.3
1.3
6.2
1.0
1.0
1.0
national average (measured as the proportion of each group who voted for the radical right divided
into the proportion of the national electorate who voted for the radical right in each country). A
coefficient of 1.0 suggests that the group was perfectly proportional to the national average. A
coefficient of less than 1.0 suggests that group was underrepresented among radical right voters.
A coefficient greater than 1.0 (in bold) suggests that the group was overrepresented among radical
right voters. For the list of parties included, see Table 3.1.
due to the issues and policies advocated by the radical right, such as their
xenophobic and antistate appeals, or whether it can be attributed more
generally to long-standing gender differences toward the use of violence,
and the association of extreme right movements with acts of aggression
and direct-action radical tactics.
The generational profile is important as this can tell us much about the
future of these parties. If their support is overrepresented among the older
generation, reflecting a nostalgic appeal to the past, then in the long term
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these parties may gradually fade in popularity through the usual process
of population replacement and the shrinkage of their mass base. If, however, they manage to attract and retain a younger generation, for example
appealing strongly to unemployed male youth, then this could contribute
toward their future expansion. Table 6.6 demonstrates the age profile of
radical right voters; the results show that there is little consistency across
countries; in some (notably post-Communist Russia, Slovenia, and the
Czech Republic) the younger generation are disproportionately attracted
to these parties, but in others (New Zealand, Switzerland, and Austria,
in particular) their appeal is stronger among the older generation. This
suggests that the specific age-related profile of these parties varies crossnationally, which may be due to their historical roots in each society
and their leadership images, campaign strategies, and ideological appeals
among different groups of voters.
conclusions
One of the classic ways of explaining patterns of party support relates
to the distribution of social cleavages in the electorate. Where parties
are based upon distinct social sectors, then they can forge enduring ties
with these groups, representing their interests and concerns in the political system. Where such ties have weakened, through social and partisan
dealignment, then we would expect greater electoral volatility and more
potential for protest voting. What do the results suggest about enduring
patterns of support for the radical right?
The comparison of the social class profile of radical right voters,
including indicators of social inequality, suggests that they are disproportionately overrepresented both among the petite bourgeoisie selfemployed professionals, own-account technicians, and small merchants
and among the skilled and unskilled working class. In many countries
patterns of individual-level voting support among the unemployed and
among low-income households are not as strong as suggested by many
aggregate-level accounts in political economy. This cross-class coalition
means that we should look skeptically upon the idea that radical right
parties are purely a phenomenon of the politics of resentment among the
new social cleavage of low-skilled and low-qualified workers in innercity areas, or that their rise can be attributed in any mechanical fashion to growing levels of unemployment and job insecurity in Europe.
The social profile is more complex than popular stereotypes suggest. It
remains to be seen in subsequent chapters whether, as some claim, it
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is the particular combination of experience of unemployment and antiimmigrant attitudes which matters, rather than job insecurity alone.40
At the same time the traditional gender gap persists, with men fueling
support for these parties. Moreover, although the pooled analysis suggests that there are some common factors, the results disaggregated by
nation show considerable variations in who voted for the radical right.
Chapter 10 considers in more detail the systemic impact of dealigning
elections and the consequences of weakening voter-party loyalties for
patterns of party competition and the opportunities facing new radical
right challengers. In some countries, we demonstrate that dealignment
has facilitated the rise of these parties, with either deviating or critical
elections, whereas in others cases, such as Britain and the United States,
despite widespread evidence of a long-term erosion of partisan identities,
radical right parties have failed to surmount the electoral barriers to make
a sustained series of gains.
Therefore, based on this evidence we can conclude that classic sociological theories of a crisis of modernity, or modern accounts emphasizing the
emergence of a new social cleavage, only take us so far in explaining variations in the success and failure of radical right parties. What we need to
understand is not just how social conditions might facilitate their rise, but,
even more importantly, how parties respond to these factors in crafting
their strategic and programmatic appeals, in building their organizations,
and in consolidating their support. To consider these issues further, we
need to look more closely in the next chapter at the politics of resentment
thesis, and how far there is any direct evidence that widespread political
disaffection drives party popularity.
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7
None of the Above
The Politics of Resentment
The demand-side politics of resentment thesis regards rising support for

the radical right as essentially expressing a negative protest against the
status quo, and hence an indicator of rising political disaffection with
democratic politics. This perspective is commonly used in the academic
literature on new parties, for example to explain support for Ross Perots
Reform Party in the United States, One Nation in Queensland, Canadian
Reform, and New Zealand First.1 This argument is not necessarily antithetical to the new cleavage thesis, as these explanations can be combined where it can be suggested that political disaffection is concentrated
among disadvantaged social sectors. Nevertheless these explanations remain logically distinct. Betz articulates one of the strongest versions of
this argument, suggesting that the rise of populist politics in Europe has
been fueled by resentment and alienation from the political institutions
of representative government:
A majority of citizens in most Western democracies no longer trust political institutions that they consider to be largely self-centered and self-serving, unresponsive
to the ideas and wishes of the average person, and incapable of adopting viable
solutions for societys most pressing problems. . . . It is within this context of growing public pessimism, anxiety and disaffection that the rise and success of radical
right-wing populism in Western Europe finds at least a partial explanation.2
This claim is also commonly heard in popular commentary where the

growth of widespread political cynicism, civic malaise, and social alienation, particularly disaffection with mainstream parties (parteienverdrossenheit), is believed to have provided a springboard for radical right
antiestablishment appeals.3 The language of party leaders from Glistrup
149
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and Haider to Le Pen and Bossi is richly flecked with vivid antiparty and
antiestablishment sentiments and it is believed that this constitutes an
essential part of their appeal.4
Despite the popularity of the politics of resentment thesis, and its intuitive plausibility, systematic empirical studies that demonstrate the negative motivations of radical right voters remain scarce, and some research
throws serious doubt on this thesis.5 Evidence favoring the protest vote
hypotheses has come from open-ended survey questions, where voters for
anti-immigrant parties often mention that they were motivated by discontent with mainstream or governing parties. Nevertheless, as with other direct motivational questions, it remains difficult to know how much weight
to put on these responses, whether regarded as reasons or rationalizations
for support.6 One of the most sophisticated comparative analyses of this
question has been conducted by Wouter van der Brug and colleagues,
who classified voting motivations into four categories: idealistic, pragmatic, clientalistic, and protest.7 Idealistic voters are seen as those who
rationally cast a vote on the basis of ideological proximity. Pragmatic
voters (who can also be regarded as strategic or tactical) take account
of ideological proximity plus the size of the party, on the grounds that
it is perfectly rational to vote for a second-choice party which is close
to ones policy positions if this party stands a better chance of getting
into power. Clientalistic voters rationally cast a ballot for concrete material benefits, such as the delivery of individual or public goods (pork).
Protest voters are regarded as the default category in the analysis, understood as those whose objectives are to demonstrate a rejection of all other
parties. Based on this classification, van der Brug and colleagues used
party preferences, measured by probability to vote for a party (not votes
cast), as their dependent variable in the 1994 and 1999 European Election
Studies. They concluded that in the 1994 elections, party preferences for
seven radical right parties in the EU could be largely explained by the
same mix of idealistic and pragmatic motivations that accounted for support for other parties. The propensity to vote for radical right parties in
European Parliamentary elections could be accurately predicted by voters
ideological (left-right) proximity and their anti-immigrant attitudes, coupled with pragmatic considerations of party size. The only exception
to this rule was found for one party (the Dutch Centrumdemocraten).
Their replicated study in the 1999 European elections again confirmed
Alleanza Nazionale,
a similar pattern concerning support for the FPO,
Dansk Folkeparti, and Vlaams Blok. Yet they also concluded that these
factors could not satisfactorily explain party preferences for the Danish
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Fremskridtspartiet, the French Front National, the Lega Nord, the

Germany Republikaner, the Wallonian Front National, and the Dutch
Centrumdemocraten, who could therefore have attracted support based
on protest votes.
This provides one of the most thorough cross-national comparisons of
radical right party preferences in second-order European elections, but
the analysis suffers from the critical weakness that protest voting is regarded as the default category, so that their conclusions rely upon circumstantial evidence. The study fails to consider any direct evidence for or
against protest voting, such as indicators of political disaffection, trust,
and alienation among radical right supporters. As a result, as the authors
acknowledge, the study cannot prove that the default category is actually
motivated by a protest rejection of all of the above, as they have no direct evidence of public attitudes toward the political system.8 Their models
might be misspecified by failing to consider other plausible explanations
for supporting radical right parties, such as the attraction of charismatic
leaders, the strength of party identification, the impact of other important demographic factors including gender or race (both commonly and
consistently linked to radical right voting), and indeed any of the multiple
salient policy issues in the European elections (such as attitudes toward
the governments performance on education, health care, and crime) not
included in their study. One of the well-known characteristics of elections
to the European Parliament is that these are widely regarded by the public
as a mid-term referendum upon the performance of national governments
in each country, rather than determined by European-wide issues such as
the adoption of the euro or the role of the Commission. As such, their
claims about protest voting should be regarded as an interesting thesis
but essentially unproven.
theories of protest politics

Moreover, much previous analysis of this issue remains underconceptualized as there are several distinct ways to interpret support for the radical
right as an outlet for protest politics, each of which needs careful disentangling both analytically and empirically. Rather than seeing support
for the political system as all of one piece, ever since the classic work
of David Easton it is widely recognized that different levels or objects of
support can be distinguished.9 These can be understood to range from
the most specific level, including support for individual politicians and
party leaders, through support for the performance and institutions of
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the regime, to the most abstract level, representing support for the nationstate as a whole.10 In the United States, for example, it is commonly
found that people often trust particular politicians, such as the member
of the House of Representatives elected from their district, and yet express cynicism about Congress as an institution.11 Or they might express
confidence in the U.S. Congress and yet still have little faith in the party
controlling the White House. Or they might feel intensely patriotic about
America and yet still mistrust most politicians in Washington, DC. There
is no logical inconsistency in distinguishing among these different components of the political system. People may also trust each other (social
or interpersonal trust) and yet have little or no confidence in political
institutions.12
Any interpretation of how far support for the radical right reflects
protest politics depends upon how deeply any disaffection is thought to
extend. The protest politics thesis implies that negative reasons are the
primary drivers of support for the radical right, and these factors are
expected to outweigh any positive motivations in electoral decisions, for
example if supporters are attracted by the radical right because they see
themselves as ideologically close to their positions on salient issues such
as immigration or taxes, or because they admire the charisma, rhetoric,
and leadership of figures such as Jean-Marie Le Pen, Umberto Bossi, or
Haider. Theories of protest politics assume that voters support the
Jorg
radical right primarily for negative reasons, but they differ in how they
conceptualize the objects of such negativity. This could be because:
i. Radical right voters may be deeply dissatisfied with the performance
of the government over specific issues, such unemployment rates,
European integration, or immigration policies; or,
ii. They may be alienated and socially intolerant citizens lacking interpersonal trust (the social capital argument associated with Putnam);
or alternatively
iii. They could be deeply unhappy with the general workings of the
political system and lack confidence in representative democratic
institutions in their country (the Betz view).
In other words, any disaffection tapped by the radical right could be directed mainly against the governments record, against society in general,
or against the major institutions of representative government. Negative
protest voting could be expressed at each level, but we need to distinguish
among these in order to determine the significance and consequences of
the rise of the radical right.
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(i) Dissatisfaction with the Governments Record

The weakest version of this claim suggests that radical right support is generated primarily by retrospective evaluations of the record of the governing party or parties, most commonly triggered by general dissatisfaction
with liberal policies about immigration following an influx of migrants
and asylum seekers, perceived high rates of crime, or worsening levels
of unemployment, or by dramatic government failures, such as headlines about sexual or financial scandals involving high-ranking officials. In
this view, support for the radical right surges, especially in second-order
mid-term elections such as local, regional, or European contests, to send
a message of public protest directed against those in power. Support is
expected to subside again once government popularity recovers, for example if economic growth resurges, if rates of immigration subside, or if
there are distinct improvements in the delivery of public services.
We can examine whether electors who vote for radical right parties express exceptionally high levels of dissatisfaction with the state of the health
service and education and the state of the economy, as well as with the
performance of the national government and the way democracy works
in each country, after controlling for the social structural factors such as
age, gender, and class that we have already demonstrated help predict
radical right support. If we establish a consistent relationship, however,
it remains difficult to regard this as a matter of great public concern,
since negative voting to express dissatisfaction with government policies
and performance essentially represents the essence of normal democratic
politics.
(ii) Social Capital and Interpersonal Trust

In recent years theories of social capital have come into vogue, emphasizing that the United States has experienced a steep erosion of social capital
during the postwar era, with a fall in generalized reciprocity (including social trust and social tolerance) and in social connectedness (including formal associational participation and informal socializing). Work by Robert
Putnam suggests that the hemorrhaging of social capital has had important consequences for civic participation, and thus for the health and
vitality of American democracy.13 Putnam warns that multiple indicators
display a consistent secular fall in America since the 1960s and 1970s,
including membership of voluntary associations, indicators of traditional
political participation, civic attitudes, the strength of informal social ties,
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and levels of social trust. The core claim of Toquevillian theories of social
capital is that typical face-to-face deliberative activities and horizontal
collaboration within voluntary organizations far removed from the political sphere exemplified by sports clubs, social clubs, and philanthropic
groups promote interpersonal trust, social tolerance, and cooperative
behavior.14
In turn, these norms are regarded as cementing the bonds of social
life, creating the foundation for building local communities, civil society, and democratic governance. In a win-win situation, participation in
associational life is thought to generate individual rewards, such as career opportunities and personal support networks, as well as facilitating
community goods, by fostering the capacity of people to work together
on local problems. The causes of this phenomenon are complex but are
argued by Putnam to include the modern pressures of time and money,
the movement of women into the paid workforce and stresses in the twocareer family, geographic mobility and suburban sprawl, and the role of
technology and the mass media. The ubiquity of television entertainment,
in particular, is thought to play a critical role in privatizing leisure hours
for couch potatoes.15 If any erosion of social trust has occurred more generally across postindustrial societies, due to common social trends, then
this could have reduced social tolerance, generated social alienation, and
indirectly encouraged support for extreme political movements, groups,
and parties.16 Accordingly in this chapter we can explore whether there is
a significant link at individual level between lack of social or interpersonal
trust and voting support for radical right parties.
(iii) Or Deep-Rooted Alienation from Political Democratic Institutions?
The strongest version of the protest politics argument, expressed by Betz,
interprets support for radical right parties as a deep-seated rejection of the
core institutions of democracy, particular an erosion of confidence in political parties and parliaments, representing a crisis in the political system
as a whole. It is within this context of growing public pessimism, anxiety,
and disaffection that the rise and success of radical rightwing populism
in Western Europe finds at least a partial explanation.17 Betz supports
this claim by the response of Lega Nord, French Front National, and FPO
voters in open-ended questions when they reported casting their vote as a
protest act, as well as by the cross-class composition of these parties support, suggesting that they gained protest votes by appealing to different
social groups. Some limited survey evidence has been found for this view;
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for example Lubbers et al. observed that, even with a battery of prior
social controls, people dissatisfied with the workings of democracy were
significantly more likely to vote for extreme right parties.18 Yet, despite
the popularity of the politics of resentment claim, and its important implications, the thesis needs further exploration as the available systematic
evidence remains limited. We can examine whether radical right voters
express less confidence and trust in a range of political institutions such
as parliaments and the courts. In this argument, the rise of the radical
right reflects a profound lack of confidence in core institutions of representative democracy, not just a rejection of the electoral choices offered
by mainstream parties at the ballot box. If the ascendance of the radical right does represent a rejection of these institutions, as well as a lack
of social tolerance for minority groups, then this could lead to serious
consequences, especially in more fragile transitional and consolidating
democracies, such as Russia and the Ukraine.
evidence
Before accepting or rejecting the protest thesis, it is important to examine
direct evidence. We need to establish whether support for radical right
parties can be accurately predicted by attitudes such as satisfaction with
government performance, confidence in political institutions, and social
or interpersonal trust. The European Social Survey 2002 contains a battery of items monitoring political and social attitudes. Factor analysis
(shown in Table 7.1) confirmed that a series of selected items fell into
three dimensions: social trust, satisfaction with government, and trust in
political institutions. Scales were constructed based on these items. Trust
in institutions (with each item measured on ten-point scales) included both
international organizations such as the European Parliament and United
Nations and national parliaments, politicians, the legal system, and the
police, all of which formed one dimension. Satisfaction with government
included evaluations of the state of education and the performance of
the health service, the national government, the present state of the national economy, the way democracy works in each country, and satisfaction with life as a whole. There is some controversy about the most
appropriate way to conceptualize the question about how democracy
works, in terms of whether it relates primarily to assessments of democracy as an abstract ideal or whether it taps a sense of how well the government is performing in each country.19 On this scale, evaluations were
clearly related to the latter interpretation. Lastly, social or interpersonal
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table 7.1. Dimensions of Trust and Satisfaction
Component
Institutional
trust
Trust in the European Parliament
Trust in the United Nations
Trust in countrys parliament
Trust in politicians
Trust in the legal system
Trust in the police
Satisfaction
with
government
.794
.740
.732
.715
.677
.582
State of education in country

nowadays
State of health services in country
nowadays
How satisfied with the national
government
How satisfied with present state of
economy in country
How satisfied with the way democracy
works in country
How satisfied with life as a whole
.687
.663
.648
.647
.627
.474
Most people try to take advantage of

you, or try to be fair
Most people can be trusted or you
cant be too careful
Most of the time people helpful or
mostly looking out for themselves
Percentage of variance
Social trust
.819
.797
.726
22.9
17.8
15.05
Note: The coefficient represent the results of principal component factor analysis rotated by
varimax with Kaiser normalization, in the pooled eight-nation European sample weighted by
design and population size. The nations were selected from all those in the ESS 2002 based
on whether they contained a relevant party on the radical right (including Austria, Belgium,
Switzerland, Denmark, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway). The pooled sample contained 13,768 respondents in total, including 932 voters for the radical right (6.8%).
Source: Pooled sample nine nations, European Social Survey 2002 (ESS-2002).
trust was gauged by three measures, again using ten-point scales, about
how far people take advantage of you, how far most people can be trusted
most of the time, and how helpful people are.
These scales were entered into the pooled eight-nation weighted sample with the logit regression model developed in the previous chapter, to
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table 7.2. Trust, Satisfaction, and Radical Right Vote

Predictors of voting
for the radical right, pooled
eight-nation European sample
B
Std. Error
Sig.
(Constant)
3.48
Age (In years)
Ethnic minority (ethnic minority = 1,
else = 0)
.008
.322
.376
.003
.097
.336
.059
.040
N/s
.231
.165
N/s
.597
.038
.072
.387
.114
.186
.148
.115
N/s
N/s
.042
.017
.035
.035
.005
.006
.025
.008
Education (highest level attained on a
6-point scale from low to high)
Salariat (professional and managerial
employees)
Ever been unemployed (for more than
3 months)
Religiosity (self-identified as religious
on a 7-pt scale)
Indicators of trust and satisfaction
Institutional trust (60-pt scale)
Satisfaction with government (60-pt
scale)
Social trust (30-pt scale)
Nagelkerke R2
N/s
.056
92.4
Note: The model presents the results of a binary logistic (logit) regression model including the
unstandardized beta coefficients (B), the standard errors, and their significance, in the pooled
eight-nation European sample weighted by design and population size. For the construction
of the scales for trust and satisfaction see Table 7.1. Note that France is not included in this
model because it lacked the classification of occupational class.
Sig. .001 = ; Sig. .01 = ; Sig. .05 = .
Source: Pooled sample eight nations, European Social Survey 2002 (ESS-2002).
see whether these attitudes contributed toward explaining voting support

for the radical right after controlling for the other demographic and social
characteristics that we have already found to be important. The results in
Table 7.2 show that in the pooled sample, after introducing all the prior
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table 7.3. Trust, Satisfaction, and Radical Right Vote by Nation
Nation
Party
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
France
Israel
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Switzerland
FPO
VB, FN
DF, FP
FN
Mafdal, IL
AN, LN, MsFt
PF, CD
FrP, FLP
SVP, EDU, SD,
LdT, FPS
total
Satisfaction
Institutional trust with government
Social trust
(60-point scale) (60-point scale) (30-point scale)
2.8
8.7
6.2
6.4
2.9
0.5
5.4
4.4
2.4
3.4
N/s
N/s
+0.7
3.6
0.7
6.8
+4.8
+3.6
2.5
3.3
1.3
N/s
0.5
N/s
N/s
1.3
2.8
2.1
1.9
+2.6
0.5
1.8
2.4
0.0
0.5
N/s
N/s
N/s
Note: For the construction of the scales see Table 7.1. The coefficients represent the mean difference between the position of voters for radical right parties and all other citizens on these
scales. The significance of the mean difference between groups is measured by ANOVA (Analysis
of Variance). The sample was weighted by design and population size.
Sig. .001 = ; Sig. .01 = ; Sig. .05 = .
Source: European Social Survey 2002 (ESS 2002).
controls, the indicators of institutional trust and social trust proved significantly related to radical right support, in the expected negative direction.
This suggests that people who voted for the radical right usually expressed
lower confidence in institutions such as national and the European parliaments, politicians, and the legal system, and they also had less trust in
people around them. By contrast, contrary to expectations, the measure
of government satisfaction proved significant and positive, indicating that
radical right voters had higher than average evaluations of government
performance, not lower.
Alienation from Political Institutions?

In order to make more sense of these findings we need to see how far
these attitudes vary across the nine countries in the survey which contain
relevant radical right parties. The results in Table 7.3 describe the mean
difference between the position of radical right voters on these scales and
the average position of all other citizens in these nations, without any
controls. Institutional confidence provides the clearest picture: overall,
radical right voters were consistently more negative across all societies,
displaying lower than average trust in a range of political institutions.
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40
159
39
38
36
36
34
34
33
32
30
32
30
32
32
32
29
30
29
28
27
28
32
31
27
26
26
24
22
21
22
er
l
ta
Sw
itz
To
la
w
or
N
et
N
Didn't vote RR
nd
ay
s
he
rla
Ita
nd
ly
el
ra
Is
Fr
m
D
en
an
k
ar
m
Be
lg
iu
ria
st
Au
ce
20
Voted for RR
figure 7.1. Institutional Trust and Radical Right Voters. For the institutional
trust sixty-point scale, see Table 7.1. For the significance of the difference between
groups, see Table 7.3. Source: European Social Survey 2002 (ESS 2002) weighted
by design and population size.
The size of this trust gap on the sixty-point scale was not large overall and it varied among nations (see Figure 7.1), displaying the greatest
gap in Belgium (8.7 points), France (6.4), Denmark (6.2 points), and the
Netherlands (5.4 points), but it proved significant in every country except
two (Israel and Italy), despite the limited number of radical right voters
included in the national samples. This finding provides the most convincing evidence for the protest vote thesis: people supporting parties such
as the Vlaams Blok, Danish Fremskridtspartiet, and Lijst Pym Fortuyn
were consistently more cynical about some of the core institution of representative democracy, such as parliament and the legal system. As many
suggest, there is a significant link between disenchantment with politics
and radical right support. But does this prove causality? Not necessarily.
What this evidence cannot resolve is (i) whether citizens were attracted toward these parties because these voters already held more cynical attitudes
toward the workings of representative institutions, as many assume, or
(ii) whether the populist rhetoric and antiestablishment language of these
parties encourages greater suspicion of the state among their supporters, or alternatively (iii) whether supporters of radical right minor parties
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160
45
42
42
40
38
37
35
35
36
36
36
35 34
34
34
33
33
33
30
32
29
30
28
25
23
er
l
ta
Sw
itz
To
la
w
or
N
et
N
Didn't vote RR
nd
ay
s
he
rla
Ita
nd
ly
el
ra
Is
Fr
m
en
an
k
ar
m
D
Be
lg
iu
ria
st
Au
ce
20
Voted for RR
figure 7.2. Satisfaction with Government. For the satisfaction with government
sixty-point scale, see Table 7.1. For the significance of the difference between
groups, see Table 7.3. Source: European Social Survey 2002 (ESS 2002) weighted
by design and population size.
became more cynical because these parties sometimes fail to be elected or,
if entering parliament, rarely tread the corridors of ministerial office.
Dissatisfaction with the Governments Record

Disentangling the direction of causality in this relationship is a complex
matter, but the results of the comparison of satisfaction with government
in each country throw some additional light on it (see Figure 7.2). In Italy
and Israel, supporters of radical right parties were strongly and significantly more positive in their evaluations of government, and a fainter
positive pattern was also detected in Austria (although this did not prove
significant). By contrast, in the other six countries radical right voters
were more negative in their assessment of the government, such as the
performance of the education system, the health service, the state of the
economy, and the performance of democracy.
Further exploration suggests that this pattern was not simply the result of the particular survey questions asked in the ESS 2002 and/or the
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limited number of cases of radical right voters in each country. The results
could not be replicated exactly in the CSES, as in the previous chapter, as
this dataset contained alternative questions monitoring satisfaction with
government as well as a different range of countries. Nevertheless, the
specific items and nations contained in the CSES facilitate some comparison of the general principle that supporters of minor parties included
in governing coalitions expressed more positive orientations toward the
political system than those excluded from power. The CSES monitored
satisfaction with democracy, how far people felt that the last election was
fairly conducted, and whether people felt that political parties care what
ordinary people think. The dataset covered seven democracies containing
relevant radical right parties in legislative elections (Canada, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, New Zealand, Norway, Israel, and Switzerland), and
in the last two nations these parties are in government. Again in most
countries, compared with the general public, supporters of the radical
right were consistently more negative in their evaluations across all three
items. But in Israel and Switzerland, by contrast, radical right voters were
more positive than average in their satisfaction with the performance of
democracy, the fairness of the electoral process, and their sense of party
responsiveness.
The results of both surveys therefore indicate that mistrust of government is not necessarily an inevitable feature of radical right support in
every nation. Instead this evidence strongly suggests a more instrumental
interpretation; either where radical right leaders hold ministerial office
(as in Israel and Italy), or where right-wing governments in power are
broadly sympathetic to their aims and values, then radical right followers
hold more positive attitudes toward government and display related indicators of satisfaction with the political system. Where these parties are
systematically persistently excluded from power, then, not surprisingly,
radical right voters hold more critical attitudes toward the performance of
the government. The exclusion or inclusion of minor parties in legislative
and governmental office seems to influence approval of the governments
record. In Italy, for example, where Lega Nord share ministerial office
with Forza Italia, their supporters display far greater satisfaction with government than radical right supporters in France, where the Front National
are persistently excluded from office due to the majoritarian second-ballot
electoral system, despite gaining about one-fifth of the vote in recent legislative contests.
We can theorize that patterns of winners and losers from the political system are structured by the constitutional arrangements and, over
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a long period of time, this accumulated experience can be expected to

shape general orientations toward the political regime.20 At the simplest
level, if people feel that the rules of the game allow the party leaders that
they endorse to be elected to power, they are more likely to feel that policymaking processes are responsive to their needs and to approve of the
governments performance. If they feel that the party they prefer persistently loses, over successive elections, they are more likely to feel that their
voice is excluded from the decision-making process, producing dissatisfaction with government. Over time, where constitutional arrangements
succeed in channeling popular demands into government outcomes, then
we would expect this to be reflected, not just in specific support for particular government coalitions, but also in more diffuse support for the public
policy process in general. In a series of studies, Christopher Anderson has
demonstrated that system support is consistently influenced by whether
people are among the winners or losers in electoral contests, defined by
whether the party they endorsed was returned to government.21 Following
the same logic, the cross-national evidence suggests that dissatisfaction with government among radical right supporters does not seem to
be an inherent characteristic of these supporters; instead attitudes depend upon the rational calculation of the exclusion of their party from
power.
Social Trust
Explanations based on theories of social capital suggest that extremist
parties may flourish under conditions of social intolerance and alienation;
societies lacking interpersonal trust may provide suitable conditions nurturing the radical right. This taps into traditional images of radical right
supporters as alienated individuals, isolated from the broader integrative bonds of family, community, and workplace. We tested the available
survey evidence at individual level where social trust proved to be significantly more negative among radical right voters in five out of nine nations
(Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark). In the remainder, either radical right voters did not differ significantly from the
general population (in three nations), or else (as in Israel) they proved
more trusting. The mixed pattern found in different societies suggests
that although social mistrust is associated with radical right support in
many countries, this fails to provide a consistent explanation for this
phenomenon. The fact that attitudes are significantly more negative than
average across the available indicators of institutional trust, satisfaction
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with government, and social trust in Belgium, France, the Netherlands,

and Norway suggests that the radical right tap into the reservoir of disaffected citizens most strongly in these nations. But this pattern fails to hold
consistently in the other five countries containing relevant radical right
parties. As predicted earlier, theoretically demand-side factors do help
provide part of the explanation of why the radical right succeed more
in some countries rather than others, but the key concerns are how far
parties manage to tap into reservoirs of popular disaffection, and hence
the role of protest politics alone is not sufficient to account for variations
in their share of votes and seats.
conclusions
On the basis of this evidence, three main conclusions can be drawn. First,
the overall results suggest that there is some systematic support for the
protest politics thesis, but commentators should be careful not to exaggerate either the strength or the consistency of the indicators. Popular explanations common in journalism often claim that the ascendancy
of the radical right in Europe since the mid-1980s has been fueled by
various modern developments, including popular disillusionment with
government due to their perceived failure to deliver public services; the
growth of public cynicism with politics or deep disaffection with public
affairs; and/or a widespread and pervasive erosion of social trust and social capital. The evidence suggests that the more lurid claims about the
role of protest politics fueling radical right votes appear to be greatly
overstated and oversimplified, and a more cautious judgment would be
more appropriate.
Even where radical right voters express above-average political disaffection, there remain reasons to hesitate before concluding that growing
cynicism automatically spurs their support. The results presented in this
chapter throw doubt on the argument that radical right voters are exceptionally critical of government; instead the cross-national evidence suggests that evaluations of government performance, on matters such as the
delivery of public services or the performance of the economy, are strongly
shaped by whether parties are included or excluded from power. Where
radical right parties become part of governing coalitions, or where conservative governments which are closely sympathetic to the aims of the
radical right rise to power, then radical right supporters are more positive
in their orientations toward government. Where parties are consistently
excluded from power, then, not surprisingly, this may well encourage their
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supporters to mistrust the responsiveness and performance of government. Far from a deeply irrational rejection of democratic politics, as the
authoritarian personality thesis implied, instead less positive orientations
toward the political system may be the rational product of the persistent
exclusion of their preferred party from power, or the more general lack
of responsiveness of the political system to the particular concerns and
policy priorities of radical right supporters.
The most accurate interpretation of the evidence presented here confirms that those who cast their ballots for the radical right are indeed less
trusting of a range of political and legal institutions. This does indeed provide partial support for one aspect of the protest politics thesis. Research
also suggests that a gradual erosion of institutional trust and confidence
has occurred among the public during recent decades in many established
democracies, especially concerning trust in the core institutions of political parties and parliaments.22 This process is likely to have swelled the
potential constituency among the electorate who would be generally sympathetic toward radical parties emphasizing antiestablishment sentiments.
But certain important points need to be borne in mind before jumping to
the conclusion that the erosion of institutional trust has necessarily caused
the rise of the radical right, or even contributed substantially to their success. Firstly, evidence suggests that mistrust of representative institutions
has grown in many advanced industrialized democracies, so it becomes
difficult to use this explanation to account for the substantial variations in
the electoral fortunes of the radical right found in these countries, such as
the dissimilarity noted earlier in the Nordic region between Norway and
Sweden, or in the Mediterranean area between Italy and Spain, or even
within countries, such as between Francophone or Wallonian Belgian regions, or Francophone and Anglophone Canada. Moreover, even though
Belgian, Norwegian, and Dutch supporters of radical right parties were
found to consistently express more negative attitudes across all the indicators, it remains difficult to disentangle the direction of causality here. It
might be that those who are more disenchanted with mainstream parties,
and more alienated from the political system, tend to gravitate toward the
radical right, who articulate these concerns. Alternatively, the exclusion
of these parties from power, coupled with the populist antiestablishment
rhetoric of radical right leaders, could plausibly encourage greater mistrust of political institutions amongst their followers.23
To go further, we need to turn toward the specific issues which are
thought to be most conducive to generating mass demand among the
electorate, including the distribution of public opinion on matters such as
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immigration and cultural protectionism. We shall see in the next chapter

whether these attitudes and values more strongly determine variations in
the electoral success of radical right parties, and hence the major contrasts
evident between the fortunes of these parties in Austria and Germany,
Belgium and Portugal, Norway and Sweden, and Canada and the United
States.
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Us and Them
Immigration, Multiculturalism, and Xenophobia
Alternative variants of the demand-side thesis suggest that the rise of the
radical right is fueled by shifts in public opinion generated by the growth
of multiculturalism and more ethnically diverse societies found today in
postindustrial nations. Social change is thought to be driven by many
factors associated with processes of globalization, notably by patterns of
long-term population migration, growing numbers of refugees and asylum
seekers fleeing armed conflict, civil wars, and failed states, and more permeable national borders and more open labor markets.1 Many accounts
assume that a public backlash against these trends has triggered the success of outspoken leaders such as Le Pen and Haider, especially where
mainstream parties and liberal elites in the European Union and AngloAmerican democracies have failed to respond to any public resentment
and growing hostility directed against foreigners by setting stricter limits
on immigration and asylum seekers.2 Election results are often regarded
as a direct indicator of the state of public opinion in a society; given their
heated rhetoric about the need for cultural protectionism, the electoral
popularity of the radical right in Austria, Switzerland, and Belgium is understood to reflect growing racial intolerance and widespread xenophobia
throughout these societies.3
Although a popular argument, this account demonstrates that in fact
no automatic and direct relationship exists between aggregate indicators
of the growth of multiculturalism in society (including the inflow of immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers into any country), the balance of
public opinion on these issues, and the share of the vote won by radical
right parties. Instead this study theorizes that a contingent relationship exists, mediated by the role of party strategists who decide how to craft and
166
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pitch their campaign appeals about the values of cultural protectionism

to gain maximum advantage, within the context of the electoral rules.
This chapter first sets out the theoretical framework and discusses the
sources of aggregate and individual-level evidence. We demonstrate that
the share of the vote won by the radical right at national level cannot be
explained satisfactorily by a wide range of aggregate indicators of ethnic
diversity, including both objective measures, exemplified by the official
rate of immigration and asylum seekers entering each nation, and subjective measures, notably anti-immigrant attitudes found in public opinion
within each country. Radical right parties can gain ground in societies
where attitudes toward ethnic minorities remain relatively liberal and tolerant, such as Norway, as well as faring poorly elsewhere in countries
where the public proves more hostile toward outsiders, such as Greece.
But at the same time, at individual level, attitudes toward cultural protection do help to explain why some people vote for these parties; the
study demonstrates how negative feelings toward immigration, refugees,
and multiculturalism predict whether somebody casts a ballot for a radical right party, even after including a range of prior controls for social
background and political trust. Attitudes toward cultural protectionism
prove far more significant predictors of radical right voting than economic
attitudes. This pattern is found in nearly every country containing a relevant radical right party where we have data from the European Social
Survey 2002, although there are two important exceptions to this pattern
(Italy and Israel). The chapters conclusion reflects on why different patterns emerge at individual and aggregate levels, and then considers the
implications of these findings for the interpretation of election results and
for understanding public opinion.
i theoretical framework
In one of the most influential studies, as discussed in Chapter 1, Kitschelt
argues that radical right party fortunes are not determined mechanically
by structural trends in society; instead what matters is how parties respond (as agents) to social developments, within the context set by overall
patterns of party competition.4 In particular, he argues that where the ideological gap between moderate left and right parties closes for example
if a broad middle-of-the-road consensus develops around issues such as
the need for social tolerance of ethnic diversity, the protection of displaced
populations, and respect for the human rights of political refugees this is
believed to provide the ideal opportunity for radical right elites to harvest
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popular support among the public located on the far right of the ideological spectrum. In this context, the optimal platform for radical right parties, Kitschelt suggests, will combine anti-immigrant, xenophobic rhetoric
with free market economic policies. The ideological appeals and policy
positions which party agents adopt are assumed by Downsian theories to
be largely autonomous free choices, under conditions of perfect competition. Like chess players, political strategists are thought to decide whether
their party should tack toward the center ground, or to shift further right
or left, in rational pursuit of maximum electoral advantage.
There are grounds for skepticism about Kitschelts specific claim that
the closure of patterns of mainstream party competition opened the right
flank to advance by the more radical challengers, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter. Despite this important qualification, we can
still build upon and further develop the general insights about parties as
agents suggested by Kitschelts theory. In particular, we agree that parties
are not simply political epiphenomena bobbing willy-nilly on the tides
of deep-rooted sociological trends; instead they can become masters of
their fate through astute judgments and effective strategies tailored to
respond to popular demands, within certain institutional constraints. Essentially Kitschelts two-level model (consisting of the democratic market where party supply of public policy issues needs to match public
demands) should be recognized instead as a three-level nested model
(combining the electoral regulations setting the context for both party
supply and voter demand). The strategic agency theory developed in
this book argues that parties should not be understood as purely autonomous rational actors competing against rivals for votes and seats.
Instead, there is a regulated marketplace, and the most effective campaign
appeals that parties adopt to mobilize popular support, and to maximize
their potential seat gains, are constrained by the basic type of electoral
system.
There are several building blocks in this theory. We have already
demonstrated how the mechanical effects of electoral rules function as an
important determinant for the entry of radical right parties into elected office and thus into government. The function of the rules controlling ballot
access, campaign access, and election is analogous to protectionist regulations in the economic market, designed primarily by incumbent political
parties and providing barriers, with different levels of severity, to reduce
the seats awarded to minor challengers. What remains to be established in
this chapter is whether the distribution of public opinion toward cultural
protectionism is an important factor contributing toward the success of
the radical right. On this basis, the next chapter can examine whether
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electoral rules also generate certain psychological effects upon strategic

campaigning, by shaping the tactical calculations made by parties when
crafting and targeting their broader ideological messages.
ii explaining the national share of

the vote for the radical right
Electoral support for the radical right is commonly interpreted in demandside accounts as representing a grassroots reaction by European publics
directed against growing ethnic heterogeneity and multiculturalism in society. Structural theories in political economy and sociology suggest that
the ascendancy of these parties is generated primarily by a public backlash
directed against rising numbers of immigrants and asylum seekers, and
the failure of mainstream governing parties to curb these numbers and
protect national identities through effective public policy regulations.5 As
Betz claims:
It should come as no surprise that the emergence and rise of radical right-wing
populist parties in Western Europe coincided with the growing tide of immigrants
and particularly the dramatic increase in the number of refugees seeking peace,
security, and a better life in the affluent societies of Western Europe. The reaction
to the new arrivals was an outburst of xenophobia and open racism in a majority
of West European countries. . . . This has made it relatively easy for the radical
populist Right to evoke, focus, and reinforce preexisting xenophobic sentiments
for political gain.6
In effect, the distribution of public opinion in any country is read directly

from election results.
Although this is a popular view, empirical studies investigating this
relationship have generated somewhat mixed results; some have indeed
confirmed that aggregate rates of immigration, and levels of refugees and
asylum seekers in each country or subnational region, are linked to national levels of voting support for radical right parties, although others
have reported finding little support for this relationship.7 Kitschelt examined three measures the proportion of the foreign-born population in
a country, the change in rates of immigration during the 1980s, and the
share of political refugees in a population and concluded that there was
no significant correlation between these measures and the voting strength
of right-wing parties during the 1980s in Western Europe.8 For example,
Sweden (with a negligible far right presence) absorbed far more immigrants than Norway (where the FrP performed relatively strongly). By
contrast, Lubbers et al. compared the proportion of non-EU citizens in a
country, using multilevel models, and reported that this factor contributed
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toward cross-national variations in extreme right-wing voting support.9

Further confirmation of this relationship was provided by Golder, who
also examined this thesis by analyzing the proportion of the resident population living in each country who were foreign citizens.10
Possible reasons for the inconsistent results in the literature is that
national-level evidence remains extremely limited, characterized by an
immense amount of noise and measurement error.11 Alternative indicators of levels of immigration, citizenship, asylum seekers, and ethnic
heterogeneity are employed by different studies. Comparisons of the proportion of foreign citizens in a country, for example, may generate some
muddy results, depending upon the relative ease or difficulty of obtaining legal citizenship in each nation, as well as the accuracy of any census
data and the official government records used to monitor the proportion
of illegal aliens resident within each country. Moreover the primary debate about cultural protectionism in the European Union today does not
revolve around the presence of foreign citizens per se; for example relatively little concern is heard about the proportion of Belgians living in
Luxembourg, British citizens buying second homes in northern France,
or German citizens working in Switzerland. By contrast, heated popular
debate surrounds rates of refugees, asylum seekers, and guest workers
drawn from outside of either Western Europe or the European Union,
such as the arrival of displaced Somalians, Turkish Kurds, and Balkan
exiles in Paris, Berlin, and Vienna. Countries differ in they way that they
collect migration statistics and who they consider to be a migrant. Some
statistics are based on administrative data, for example who applies for
residency permits or citizenship, or border records, while others use survey data such as the official census. The time period for any data collection
is also critical; for example whether measures capture past waves of immigration to Europe following earlier periods of decolonization, such as
Algerians who moved to France or Ugandan Asians who entered Britain,
or whether they focus upon more recent migration flows. And of course
there may also be a substantial perceptual gap between official rates of
population flows and public perceptions of these trends.
To reexamine the available evidence, we can first look at whether voting
support for the radical right is related directly to a range of aggregatelevel indicators of ethnic heterogeneity in each nation under comparison,
utilizing a series of objective measures of the number of immigrants and
asylum seekers entering each country (both the current number in 2002
and the total number of asylum seekers during the previous decade), as
well as subjective indicators of ethnic heterogeneity from survey data.
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At national level, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

(UNHCR) collects the most comprehensive series of international statistics monitoring the contemporary national inflow of refugees, asylum
seekers, and other populations of related concern. There are reasons to
be cautious about the reliability and consistency of these official statistics,
for all the reasons already discussed, but nevertheless they remain perhaps
the best that are currently available. These indicators suggest that the number of such displaced populations grew rapidly during the early 1990s,
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, protracted armed conflict, and
cases of human rights abuses or political repression. Some of the largest
population inflows into advanced industrialized societies came from displaced refugees and asylum seekers from the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq,
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Somalia, China, and Iran.12
Yet the number of refugees and asylum seekers does not take into account the impact of previous patterns of immigration on multiculturalism,
exemplified by the 1950s influx of West Caribbeans and Asians into Britain
following decolonization, North Africans moving into France, or patterns
of labor mobility during the 1980s among Turkish guest workers in
Germany and Sweden. Unfortunately official census data provides unreliable cross-national estimates of the degree of ethnic heterogeneity within
each country, in part because of varying national definitions of what constitutes an ethnic minority, as well as different measures of race, religion,
and citizenship which have not been adequately standardized by international bodies. In this study, to gauge the degree of ethnic heterogeneity, we
can also draw upon estimates derived from the European Social Survey
2002 to compare the proportion of residents of a country in the sample
who report that they were not born in that country and also the proportion
who say that they are not citizens. These reported figures may generate a
systematic slight underestimate of ethnic heterogeneity, if any illegal immigrants are reluctant to admit to noncitizenship, but any such bias should
be of roughly similar levels across countries. In addition, we also need to
test for the effects of standardized aggregate rates of unemployment and
also per capita GDP in each society. Studies of political economy report
that the impact of immigration matters most under conditions of high unemployment, with an interaction effect where people blame foreigners
for job insecurity, low wages, or loss of employment.13 Levels of average income may be important in countries where support for the radical
right is drawn disproportionately from among poorer social sectors.
Two dependent variables are used to assess mass support for the radical right at national level in the countries under comparison: namely, the
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percentage share of the radical right vote won in the most recent (2000
2004) legislative elections and also the type of contemporary radical right
party existing in each county (divided into none, fringe, or relevant
categories). The results of the comparison, presented in Table 8.1, show
that, contrary to theories of political economy, support for the radical
right at national level is unrelated to any of the available aggregate indicators of ethnic diversity in the societies under comparison. This pattern
holds irrespective of the specific measure of ethnic heterogeneity which is
considered, including the official number of refugees, asylum seekers, and
the total population of concern to the UNHCR in the most recent year
available, or the survey estimates of the proportion of noncitizens and
residents born overseas. Figure 8.1 illustrates the pattern more clearly by
showing how the total size of the population of concern to the UNHCR
(including asylum seekers and refugees in each country) ranges substantially among the nations under comparison, with Germany, the United
States, Britain, and Sweden containing some of the largest numbers, although none of these nations contain a relevant radical right party. None
of the correlations in Table 8.1 prove significant, and some even point
in the contrary direction to that predicted; for example the most recently
available UNHCR figures suggest that an estimated fifteen thousand asylum seekers live in each of the seventeen nations containing a relevant
radical right party, compared with more than twice this number of asylum seekers (thirty-seven thousand) living in the eleven nations without
such a party. Similarly, the ESS estimates of the proportion of resident
noncitizens suggest that this group constituted about 9.9% of the population sample in the countries without a radical right party, compared
with 3.2% of the population in countries with a fringe radical right, and
2.8% of the population in countries with a relevant radical right party.
This is the opposite of what is predicted by oversimple claims that the
radical right are most successful in ethnically heterogeneous societies. Of
course considerable care is needed in interpreting this relationship as this
may involve a case of reverse causality; the presence of a successful radical right party gaining popular votes or seats in the legislature may well
pressure the governing party or parties to further restrict the number of
immigrants or asylum seekers who are allowed to enter the country legally,
as commentators suggest has occurred in the Netherlands and France.14
But under these circumstances it becomes even more difficult to argue
that the success of the radical right in certain countries and their failure
elsewhere are driven by structural population trends.
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table 8.1. National-Level Indicators and Radical Right Support

Means by type of contemporary
radical right party
Indicators
Objective indicators
Number of refugees,
2002
Number of asylum
seekers, 2002
Number of asylum
seekers, 19922001
Total population of
concern, 2002
Total pop. of concern
standardized per
1,000 residents
Proportion of
residents born
overseas
Proportion of resident
noncitizens
Economic indicators
Standardized rates of
unemployment,
2002
Per capita GDP 2000
(US$)
Subjective indicators
Anti-immigrant
attitude 100-pt scale
Number of countries
Data
source
None
Fringe
party
Relevant
party
Correlation with %
radical right vote
R.
Sig.
(i)
57,755
152,328
40,737
.015
N/s
(i)
37,429
17,517
15,290
.059
N/s
(iv)
158,530
426,310
147,760
.128
N/s
(i)
95,185
171,637
112,358
.117
N/s
(i)
.16
.46
.51
.194
N/s
(ii)
10.5
7.7
9.9
.109
N/s
(ii)
9.9
3.2
2.8
.018
N/s
(iii)
7.7
7.9
5.7
.204
N/s
(v)
20,849
16,840
20,064
.060
N/s
(ii)
51.8
56.0
53.6
.142
N/s
11
17
36
Note: The coefficients represent the national-level means by the type of radical right party and the correlation with the proportion of radical right vote 20002004 in each country. None of the correlations
or difference between means proved significant (at the 95% confidence level).
Sources: (i) UNHCR. July 2003. Asylum Applications Lodged in Industrialized Countries: Levels and
Trends, 20002002. Geneva: UNHCR. http://www.unhcr.ch. The total population of concern to the
UNHCR in each country includes all refugees, asylum seekers, refugees returning home, and people
uprooted within their own countries (internally displaced persons).
(ii) Estimate from the European Social Survey 2002, weighted by design and population. For the
100-point standardized anti-immigrant attitude scale, see Table 8.2.
(iii) OECD Main Economic Indicators 2004. www.oecd.org.
(iv) OECD inflows of asylum seekers into selected OECD countries, 19912001. www.oecd.org.
(v) World Bank World Development Indicators, 2002. The per capita GDP is standardized by Purchasing Power Parity. www.worldbank.org.
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figure 8.1. Number of Refugees and Radical Right Votes. The total number of refugees, asylum seekers, and others of concern to the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, 2002, by country of residence. Three countries (the United States, Russia, and Germany) each containing about 900,000
refugees, asylum seekers, and other populations of concern to the UNHCR are
excluded as outliers in the data. The inclusion or exclusion of these countries does
not change the substantive interpretation of the results. Source: UNHCR 2002
Statistics. http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/statistics.
The results also suggest that similar national-level comparisons made

with the standardized rate of unemployment and per capita income in
each country are also insignificantly related to support for the radical
right; for example 7.7% of the working population were unemployed in
the societies under comparison where there was no relevant radical right
party, whereas the rate was slightly lower (5.7%) where there was such a
party. Figure 8.2 illustrates the lack of any consistent pattern even more
clearly. Further attempts to uncover any interaction effects, for example
by combining alternative indicators of ethnic heterogeneity with rates of
unemployment, also failed to prove significant.
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Standardized unemployment rates 2002 (OECD)
20.0
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175
Type of radical right
party
No RR party
Fringe party
Relevant RR party
Pol
15.0
Sp
Greece
10.0
5.0
Can
Belg
Czech
Jap
Ita
Fr
Fin
Ger
Austl
Hung
GB Por
Ire
Lux
NZ
Den
Nor
Neth
Swi
Aus
R Sq Linear = 0.042
0.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
% Vote radical right 2000-2004
figure 8.2. Unemployment Rates and Radical Right Votes. Standardized unemployment rates 2002 from OECD Main Economic Indicators 2004. www.oecd.org.
Subjective Attitudes toward Cultural Protectionism

An alternative plausible explanation of this phenomenon is that support
of radical right parties may be generated less by the objective number of
refugees and asylum seekers entering a country, or by the actual proportion of ethnic minorities living in any society, than by the subjective feelings toward the perceived threats from multiculturalism.15 After all, few
people may be aware of the exact number of immigrants, or their proportion of the population, but what may matter is whether many people believe that there are too many outsiders and foreigners who endanger traditional social values and norms in each national culture. This claim is, after all, the core focus of much contemporary radical right rhetoric. To explore this issue, the European Social Survey 2002 contains a wide range of
suitable items carried in a special battery designed to tap attitudes toward
immigrants, multiculturalism, and race relations. Exploratory factors
analysis was used to reduce these items to four primary dimensions,
listed in Table 8.2, concerning perceptions of the instrumental threat of
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176
table 8.2. Dimensions of Cultural Attitudes, ESS 2002
Negative attitudes toward

Immigrants
Immigrants take jobs away in
country or create new jobs
(110)
Immigrants harm economic
prospects of the poor more
than the rich (15)
Average wages/salaries
generally brought down by
immigrants (15)
Immigration bad or good for
countrys economy (110)
Immigrants make country
worse or better place to live
(110)
Countrys cultural life
undermined or enriched by
immigrants (110)
Immigrants make countrys
crime problems worse or
better (110)
Government should be
generous judging
applications for refugee
status (15)
Granted refugees should be
entitled to bring close family
members (15)
Financial support should be
offered to refugee applicants
while cases considered (15)
People applying refugee status
should be allowed to work
while cases considered (15)
Immigrants should be given
same rights as everyone else
(15)
Better for a country if a variety
of different religions
(reversed) (15)
Refugees
Multiculturalism
.716
.713
.702
.680
.649
.614
.408
.478
.712
.684
.663
.609
.507
.797
Economic
equality
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Immigrants
Refugees
Economic
equality
.672
Better for a country if almost

everyone shares customs
and traditions (15)
Government should reduce
differences in income levels
Employees need strong trade
unions to protect work
conditions/wages
Percentage of variance
explained by each factor
Multiculturalism
.782
.779
20.3
14.4
10.1
8.7
Note: Exploratory principal component factor analysis of cultural attitudes using varimax rotation
with Kaiser normalization. The analysis is based upon the pooled twenty-two-nation European Social
Survey weighted by design and population. Each scale was summed from these items and standardized
into a 100-point scale.
Source: European Social Survey 2002.
immigration, attitudes toward refugee policy, the perceived threat of multiculturalism, and lastly, for comparison, economic attitudes.
Attitudes toward Immigration

Race relations and the integration of ethnic minorities from former
colonies has long been a concern in European societies, such as the integration of Algerians in France, Indonesians in the Netherlands, and Asians
in Britain, along with the role of guest workers (Gastarbeiter), notably
Turks recruited into the German labor force and North Africans who
moved to France. The instrumental argument suggests that what matters
are not levels of immigration per se, but rather the belief that any influx of
new minorities could take away public benefits such as housing, depress
wages in low-skilled jobs, or exacerbate unemployment rates. The rhetoric
of the radical right is littered with such claims; for example Jean-Marie
Le Pen propagated the slogan Two million immigrants are the cause of
two million French people out of work.16 Haiders slogan, Stop the
Uberfremdung, or over-foreignization, could have been well received
where Austrians were already afraid of losing their jobs to Central and
East European migrants, or of seeing their children attending schools with
many Muslim immigrants.
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To see whether this rhetoric fell upon sympathetic ears among radical
right voters, the first scale measured instrumental attitudes toward immigration, combining seven selected survey items monitoring how far
these groups were regarded as an economic or cultural threat to the
country, for example by depressing wages and taking away jobs, or by
undermining cultural life. These items can be seen as tapping instrumental, pragmatic, or resource-based evaluations of the expected consequences of population migration, resting upon perceptions of threats
to the material interests of white Europeans. The survey does not seek
to define or measure the type of immigrant group, for example by distinguishing among Muslim or Catholic e migres; instead the conception
of what constitutes an immigrant is left to survey respondents in each
society.
Attitudes toward Refugee Policy
Negative attitudes toward immigrants represent only one potential form
of opposition to ethnic diversity in modern societies. The most recent
wave of population migration during the last decade concerns the wave
of asylum seekers and refugees, often from the Balkans, Central Europe,
and Africa, seeking to live and work in the European Union, as well as
seeking settlement in Australia and Canada. The second scale included
five items which were designed to measure tolerant or restrictive attitudes
toward government policy concerning asylum seekers and refugees, for
example how far people felt that refugees should be given financial aid
while their cases were being considered, how far they should be provided
with work permits, or how far they should be entitled to bring close family
members with them.
Attitudes toward Multiculturalism
The third attitudinal dimension examined attitudes toward multiculturalism, to see if broader aspects of cultural globalization have generated
a backlash benefiting strongly nationalist parties. Public support for the
radical right could also be triggered by a broader sense of the threat
posed to national values by growing multiculturalism, or a more symbolic identity-based opposition to ethnic diversity, based on perceptions of the threat of foreigners to national cultures (expressed through
fears about the loss of the predominant language, religion, food, and so
on). Processes of globalization have weakened the protection of national
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borders, symbolized by the worldwide proliferation of internationally

traded consumer brands, the ascendancy of popular cultural icons and
celebrities, and instantaneous communication through telecommunications, broadcasting, and the Internet around the globe.17 Patterns of population migration have certainly accelerated these trends, but they are only
part of a broader phenomenon driven by factors such as the burgeoning
of new information and communication technologies, the expansion of
free markets and trade, and greater political integration within the everwidening EU. Multiculturalism is measured in the ESS by items monitoring attitudes toward the value of religious diversity and the importance of
sharing cultural traditions, both of which can be regarded as representing
a threat to cultural identities.18
Economic Attitudes
Lastly, attitudes toward traditional left-right economic policies could also
help to explain the attraction of the radical right; Kitschelt argues that it
is the combination of free market liberalism with traditional authoritarian policies toward minorities which has created the winning conditions
for these parties.19 To capture this dimension, the fourth economic scale
monitored attitudes toward economic inequality and the need for strong
trade unions. The available items were far from ideal, as they only cover
a limited range of economic values, but they probably tapped two important attitudes that are strongly related to broader positions toward free
market versus planned economies. Claims about income equality lie at
the heart of traditional socialism, as do attitudes toward the role of trade
unions. While not sufficient for any detailed analysis, these items allow
us to test the Kitschelt thesis.
Each of these scales was constructed by recoding the direction of the
items, combining them, and standardizing the final scales to 100 points,
all in a negative direction (representing hostility to immigration, refugees,
multiculturalism, and economic equality), for ease of interpretation. These
measures can be used to examine the common claim that countries where
radical right parties have succeeded in mobilizing electoral support most
successfully are those where the general public is most hostile toward immigrants and least tolerant of refugees and asylum seekers. This proposition is widely assumed in popular commentary, where the popularity
of parties promulgating racist antiforeigner policies, such as in Austria
and Switzerland, is often taken as indicative of exceptionally strong racist
sentiments in the general population as a whole.
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180
80
70
70
54 55 56 56 56
52 52 52 52 53 54
51
51
49
49
60
50
61
59 60
54
44 45
40
30
20
10
Total
Greece
Hungary
Portugal
Czech Republic
Slovenia
Israel
United Kingdom
Poland
Belgium
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Ireland
Spain
Austria
Norway
Switzerland
Denmark
Finland
Sweden
Luxembourg
figure 8.3. Anti-immigrant Attitudes Scale by Nation. Nations containing a relevant radical right party are highlighted in solid columns. For the construction
of the 100-point attitudinal scale, see Table 8.2. Source: European Social Survey
2002 (ESS 2002).
Figure 8.3 demonstrates that anti-immigrant feelings do indeed

vary across European countries, from the most tolerant (Sweden and
Luxembourg) to the least (Hungary and Greece). Yet at aggregate level,
the distribution of public opinion in each country fails to predict either
the share of the vote won by the radical right or the existence of relevant
radical right parties. The smaller liberal Scandinavian welfare states prove
some of the most tolerant toward outsiders, whether Norway (with the
FrP) and Denmark (with the DF and FP), or Sweden and Finland (without a relevant radical right party). By contrast, the least tolerant European nations include Greece and Portugal (without such a party), but also
Hungary (with the MIEP) and the Czech Republic (with the RSC).
To compare this further, Figure 8.4 displays the average level of support for anti-immigrant attitudes in each country compared with the mean
share of the vote won by radical right parties. Again no relationship
is apparent at national level, and this remains true even if we exclude
Switzerland as an outlier. Although we shall demonstrate that individual
attitudes hostile toward cultural protectionism (toward foreigners,
refugees, and ethnic diversity) do indeed predict whether a particular person will cast a ballot for a radical right party, this does not mean that the
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Greece
70

party
No RR party
Fringe party
Relevant RR party
65
Anti-immigrant attitude scale
17:14
Hung
60
Czech
Por
GB
55
50
45
Slov
Isr
Belg
PolGer
Neth
Sp
Ire
Fin
Aus
Ita
Nor
Swi
Den
Lux
Swe
R Sq Linear = 0.02
40
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
figure 8.4. Anti-immigrant Attitudes and Support for the Radical Right. For the
construction of the attitudinal scale, see Table 8.2. Source: European Social Survey
2002 (ESS 2002).
electoral success of these parties can be predicted at national level by

public opinion in any country.
iii explaining individual support for the radical right

So far this chapter has failed to detect any significant link between electoral
support for the radical right, aggregate-level indicators of ethnic heterogeneity, and public opinion. Yet despite this pattern, attitudes on these
issues do help to predict whether individuals vote for the radical right.
The study ran a binary logistic (logit) regression model to analyze patterns of individual-level radical right voting within the pooled European
sample, including the nine countries with a relevant right party that were
contained in the ESS 2002. The results can be compared with the similar
models used in previous chapters. The demographic and socioeconomic
characteristics were first entered in the model, then the indicators of institutional trust, satisfaction with government, and social trust which we
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have already employed as significant predictors of radical right support.

These factors act as prior controls in the multivariate model, assuming
that background characteristics such as age, gender, and class will influence general orientations toward the political system, including patterns
of institutional trust, social trust, and satisfaction with government. In
turn, these factors are expected to shape more specific instrumental and
identity-based attitudes toward immigration and political refugees, perspectives on cultural protectionism, and preferences for egalitarian economic policies.
The results of the pooled model in Table 8.3 confirm the significance of
all the cultural attitudes: as expected, negative attitudes toward immigration, refugees, multiculturalism, and economic equality all predicted individual radical right-wing votes, remaining significant even after including
the full battery of prior controls. The overall fit of the model still remained modest but it also strengthened (evaluated by the Nagelkerke R2 ),
compared with previous estimates. To go further, we again need to explore
these patterns when broken down by nation, without any controls.
As Table 8.4 illustrates, the cultural indicators measuring negative attitudes toward immigration, refugees, and multiculturalism proved significant predictors of individual radical right voting in seven of the nine
nations containing a relevant radical right party (in Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland). Compared
with the attitudes of the general public, these indicators proved quite
strong in these societies, such as strong anti-immigrant and anti-refugee
in Austria and Lijst Pym
sentiments expressed by supporters of the FPO
Fortuyn in the Netherlands. Moreover, in these seven countries the indicators measuring negative attitudes toward economic equality failed to
predict voting patterns. Admittedly the economic measures contained in
the ESS 2002 remain limited; nevertheless, contrary to Kitschelts thesis
of a winning formula, it appears that antiforeigner feelings and cultural
protectionism provide far better explanations of the success of the radical
right in Austria and Switzerland than any appeal to free market liberalism. In Italy there was a slightly different pattern, however, as support for
the radical right in this country was more strongly related to economic
attitudes than anti-immigrant feelings. The major exception to the general
pattern concerns Israel, where none of these attitudinal scales proved to
be significantly related to voting support for Mafdal and IL. It appears as
though the deep religious cleavage in Israel, dividing secular and more orthodox Jews, as well as Jews and Muslims, and related attitudes toward
issues of national security, the Palestinian question, and the role of the
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table 8.3. Cultural Attitudes and the Radical Right Vote, Pooled Sample
Predictors of voting for the radical right,
pooled eight-nation European sample
B
(Constant)
Age (in years)
Ethnic minority (ethnic minority =
1, else = 0)
Education (highest level attained on
a 6-point scale from low to high)
Salariat (professional and
managerial employees)
Ever been unemployed (for more
than 3 months)
Religiosity (self-identified as
religious on a 7-pt scale)
Indicators of trust and satisfaction
Institutional trust (60-pt scale)
Satisfaction with government (60-pt
scale)
Social trust (30-pt scale)
Cultural attitudes
immigration
Negative attitudes toward refugees
multiculturalism
Negative attitudes toward economic
equality
Nagelkerke R2
Std. error
Sig.
.010
.209
.007
.003
.109
.376
.016
.046
N/s
.201
.178
N/s
.573
.118
.156
.364
.129
.207
.164
.128
N/s
N/s
.072
.019
.017
.004
.006
.007
.016
.010
N/s
.013
.004
.010
.009
.004
.003
.006
.003
5.887
N/s
N/s
.218
91.2
Note: The model presents the results of a binary logistic (logit) regression model including the unstandardized beta coefficients (B), the standard errors, and their significance, in
the pooled eight-nation European sample weighted by design and population size. The dependent variable was whether the respondent had voted for a radical right party. For the
construction of the cultural scales, all standardized to 100 points, see Table 8.1.
Sig. .001 = ; Sig. .01 = ; Sig. .05 = .
Source: Pooled sample eight nations, European Social Survey 2002 (ESS 2002).
184
FPO
VB, FN
DF, FP
FN
Mafdal, IL
AN, LN, MsFt
PF, CD
FrP, FLP
SVP, EDU, SD, LdT, FPS
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
France
Israel
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Switzerland
10.3
9.6
7.5
10.3
12.9
11.6
18.6
2.8
2.6
7.5
N/s
5.9
7.8
10.1
10.8
14.7
13.7
9.0
6.3
2.0
10.0
N/s
Multiculturalism
5.6
9.0
3.5
7.0
2.3
0.9
0.1
2.3
6.9
2.7
N/s
N/s
N/s
N/s
N/s
N/s
Economic equality
Note: For the construction of the 100-point standardized scales see Table 8.1. The coefficients represent the mean difference between the position of
voters for radical right parties and all other citizens on these scales. The significance of the mean difference between groups is measured by ANOVA.
The sample was weighted by design and population size.
Sig. .001 = ; Sig. .01 = ; Sig. .05 = .
Source: European Social Survey 2002 (ESS 2002).
4.5
N/s
N/s
Refugees
0 521 84914 4
6.8
7.7
11.3
13.9
14.7
18.5
7.3
0.6
9.3
Immigration
CUNY008B/Norris
total
Party
Nation
table 8.4. Cultural Attitudes and the Radical Right Vote by Nation
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West Bank, coupled with the unique history and origins of the Israeli state
as a nation of immigrants and refugees, means that these attitudes fail to
resonate in generating support for these particular parties.
conclusions
It is widely assumed in popular commentary that secular trends in modern
multicultural societies are critical for rising levels of support for radical
right parties. In particular, patterns of population migration, the influx of
immigrants and refugees, and the perceived cultural threat from globalization are generally believed to have encouraged more racist attitudes in
the public, which leaders such as Le Pen and Haider have been keen to
foster and exploit. Support for extremist political groups may also have
been encouraged more recently by xenophobia directed against Muslim
populations, indicated by reports of rising levels of hate crimes in the
United States and within Europe in the aftermath of 9/11 and subsequent
terrorist incidents.20 Yet the previous literature examining the empirical
link between aggregate indicators of ethnic heterogeneity and the proportion of votes cast for radical right parties has reported inconclusive
results.
Two major conclusions can be drawn from the evidence analyzed here.
First, this chapter has demonstrated that no significant relationship exists
at national (aggregate) level between the national share of the vote cast
for radical right parties and a wide range of indicators of ethnic diversity, whether measured objectively by estimated official rates of refugees
and asylum seekers, the proportion of nonnationals and noncitizens living in a country, or subjectively by public opinion toward immigration.
and One Nation have cerParties such as the Vlaams Blok, the FPO,
tainly emphasized racist rhetoric, antiforeigner diatribes, and the theme
of cultural protectionism as the leitmotif recurring throughout their leadership speeches and at the heart of their manifesto policies. Other issues,
such as criticism of the European Union powers and policies, or attacks
on the welfare state, are also often implicitly framed in ways tapping into
culturally protectionist sentiments. Although the electoral success of these
parties is often interpreted by media commentators, news journalists, and
some scholars as a public backlash directed against ethnic minorities in
the countries where they do well, in fact the relationship proves far more
complicated and nuanced.
At individual level, however, support for cultural protectionism does
indeed predict who will vote for the radical right, as expected, with
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186
1400.00
1200.00
Frequency
1000.00
800.00
600.00
400.00
200.00
Mean = 54.104
Std. Dev. = 14.99938
N = 27,047
0.00
20.00
40.00
60.00
80.00
Anti-immigrant attitudes
Cases weighted by All weight (dweight*pweight)
figure 8.5. The Distribution of Anti-immigrant Attitudes in Public Opinion. For

the construction of the attitudinal scale, see Table 8.2. Source: Pooled eight-nation
European Social Survey 2002 (ESS 2002).
anti-immigrant and anti-refugee attitudes remaining significant variables

even after applying a battery of prior social and attitudinal controls. This
pattern is found consistently in many, although not all, of the nine countries in the ESS survey that contained a relevant right party. By contrast,
the limited measures of attitudes toward free market or egalitarian economic policies failed to prove consistently significant predictors of radical
right support in most nations.
Why do these results appear inconsistent at different levels? Quite simply, the well-known ecological fallacy suggests that we should not assume
that patterns found at national level will also be found at individual level.
And the individual fallacy means that we should not assume that patterns
found at individual level will also exist among public opinion at national
level.21 The main reason for the disparity is the skewed nature of radical
right votes; these parties usually gain the support of only a small sector
of the electorate, even in countries where they qualify as relevant. Hence
it is highly misleading to generalize on the basis of the attitudes held by
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their supporters to the general distribution of public opinion existing in

the countries where they perform relatively well. Figure 8.5 illustrates the
distribution of anti-immigrant attitudes more clearly, in the pooled European sample. There is a normal curve in this distribution, but in the polar
extremes it is skewed toward the right. The group most hostile toward
ethnic diversity forms the pool of potential electoral support most likely
to vote for the radical right. But this does not mean that the outcome for
the radical right in votes, still less in seats, can be read as an accurate
indicator of the state of public opinion in each country.
The demand-side interpretation therefore does contribute part of the
explanation for radical right success, and yet because both political disaffection and cultural protectionism are characteristic of many postindustrial societies, it is difficult to use these factors to explain where these
parties have, and have not, advanced. Even at individual level, in the
pooled model the combination of the social background of voters, their
level of political trust, and their attitudes toward cultural protectionism
only explained, at most, roughly one-fifth of the variation in voting for
the radical right. On this basis, we need to also consider the supply side of
the equation, and how parties respond to the public when crafting their
ideological values and developing their organizational base, within the
constraints set by the broader type of institutional context and electoral
system.
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PARTY SUPPLY
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9
Location, Location, Location
Party Competition
Previous chapters have established that the share of the national vote
gained by radical right parties is not directly linked with structural trends
in aggregate levels of immigration, multiculturalism, and ethnic diversity.
Instead, supply-side theories suggest that parties play a critical role as
active agents connecting social developments and political attitudes with
voting behavior. What we have not yet had the opportunity to analyze
is direct evidence for the role of party strategy. This includes (i) the ideological space created on the far right of the political spectrum by the
location of the mainstream parties, (ii) where the radical right parties
choose to place themselves in the same space, and also, the subject of
Chapter 10, (iii) how effectively these parties build and consolidate their
organizational base. Observers have commonly noted that some radical
right parties emphasize core hard-right ideological values, while by contrast others characteristically prioritize vaguer populist appeals. We can
see whether these strategies are an important predictor of their success.
Moreover, so far we have been unable to compare whether the broader institutional context, particularly the electoral rules, affects party strategies
in their choice of ideological locations. The analysis of relevant radical
right parties contained in the European Social Survey 2002 has also limited
the comparative analysis in another important regard, because nearly all
are based in nations using proportional representation electoral systems
in national contests.
To consider these issues, after setting out the theoretical framework
and evidence, Section I of this chapter analyzes the relationship between
radical right support and mainstream patterns of party competition, utilizing the Lubbers expert estimates for the location of parties. Section II
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then examines patterns of voting behavior in the broader range of parties

and electoral systems contained in the Comparative Study of Electoral
Systems. To consider the impact of majoritarian and proportional rules,
Section III focuses upon analyzing voting support for the radical right
in four selected case studies: Canada and France, selected as nations exemplifying majoritarian electoral systems, compared with Norway and
Switzerland, illustrating elections under proportional representation. The
conclusion considers the implications for how parties behave strategically
as agents, and how voters react, under different rule-based constraints.
i the ideological space generated by

mainstream party competition
Parties can be seen as competing by arraying themselves across an ideological space, conventionally from left to right on a ten-point scale. The
supply-side thesis developed by Herbert Kitschelt suggests that support
for radical right parties is fueled by a broader unhappiness with the electoral choices offered by the established mainstream parties, especially
where there has been closure of the gap between the center-left and centerright on many major social and economic policy issues.1 In postindustrial
societies, any convergence of Social Democrat and moderate Conservative
major parties, he argues, coupled in particular with an extended period
of government by the center-right, creates the most opportune electoral
opening for the radical right. In Britain, for example, the new Labour
Party under Blairs leadership have adopted liberal free market economic
policies on trade, taxation, welfare reform, and labor mobility. In periods when the Conservatives have hedged back toward the center ground
on Europe and the welfare state, to try to recapture middle-of-the-road
support, then this leaves parties such as the BNP and the UK Independence Party maximum room to expand their support on the far right by
banging the nationalist antiforeigner, anti-Brussels drum. A middle-ofthe-road consensus at elite level, for example a tacit agreement by major
parties to avoid playing the race card, may lead voters, unhappy with the
mainstream electoral choices, to opt increasingly for alternative extremist parties that provide a choice not an echo. Radical right parties do
particularly well under these conditions, Kitschelt argues, as exemplified
by Denmark, France, and Norway, if they offer a winning formula combining neoliberal promarket policies on economic issues with an authoritarian stance on social issues concerning citizenship, lifestyle, or cultural
politics.
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193
As well as evidence presented by Kitschelt, support for this thesis has

been found in some other studies. Abedi, for example, classifies party
positions based on expert judgments and compares the proportion of
votes cast for antiestablishment parties since 1945 in sixteen postindustrial societies. He concludes that the closure of the mainstream parties on
the left-right dimension generated greater opportunities for the electoral
success of antiestablishment parties (including, although not confined to,
those of the radical right).2 Following a similar line of reasoning, van der
Brug et al. also suggest that radical right parties are more successful when
the largest mainstream right-wing competitor, in particular, occupies a
centrist moderate position. This is thought to facilitate an opening for
radical right contenders, who can thereby pick up far right voters who
would otherwise lack a home.3 The study reported that the left-right position of the main right-wing competitor party was a significant predictor
of the share of the vote won by more than two dozen radical right parties
in EU nations; indeed this was the strongest factor in their models.
Nevertheless, this interpretation needs to be reexamined, since the evidence has been disputed. For example, Lubbers et al. reported that, contrary to Kitschelt and Abedi, support for radical right parties was not
larger where there was greater space in party competition on the issue
of immigration.4 Another question concerns periodicity: Ignazi has argued that the specific timing of ideological shifts in party competition
fails to support Kitschelts claims. He points out that historically the
mainstream center-right moved in a neoconservative direction following the rise of Reaganism and Thatcherism during the late 1970s and
early 1980s, well before the ascendancy of the radical right occurred in
the early 1990s.5 We can reexamine the evidence for the Kitschelt thesis using the Lubbers expert scales monitoring the ideological position of
parties, as discussed earlier. The normative implications of this theory are
also important to consider. If support for radical right parties does indeed
represent an alternative outlet of expression for those unhappy with the
choices offered by the existing party system, for example frustration with
the overwhelming predominance of the Republicans and Democrats in
the United States, then the radical right could still function as a healthy
part of political competition, by widening democratic choices at the ballot
box, the scope of deliberative debate in public affairs, and the political
agenda in legislatures. Classical liberal thinkers such as John Stuart Mill
would disagree deeply with the xenophobic attitudes, intolerant sentiments, and the politics of hatred expressed by the radical right, but so
long as parties acted nonviolently within the confines of the law, classical
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table 9.1. Party Competition and Radical Right Parties
Major rightist Major leftist Left-right

party
party
gapa
Type of
Right-wing radical
gapb
right party
7.50
7.96
5.96
6.65
7.41
6.61
4.14
3.96
3.80
3.65
3.41
3.35
2.50
2.04
4.04
3.35
2.59
3.39
Relevant
Fringe
None
Relevant
Relevant
Relevant
France
Sweden
Portugal
Italy
Norway
Belgium
Francophone
Denmark
Finland
Belgium
Flemish
Netherlands
Spain
Britain
Germany
Greece
Austria
Ireland
RPR
M
PSD
FI
H
PRL
7.20 KF
6.43 KOK
6.76 PVV
3.97 SD
3.23
3.21 FPDL 3.22
3.58 SP
3.18
2.80
3.57
3.24
Relevant
None
Relevant
6.71
6.85
7.07
6.36
7.38
6.25
5.93
3.69
3.96
4.43
3.96
5.08
4.31
4.06
3.02
2.89
2.64
2.40
2.30
1.94
1.87
3.29
3.15
2.93
3.64
2.62
3.75
4.07
Relevant
Fringe
Fringe
Fringe
Fringe
Relevant
None
Mean relevant
Mean fringe
Mean none
6.89
7.12
6.11
3.24
2.84
2.96
2.88
3.89
3.11
VVD
PP
Con
CDU
ND
OVP
FG
3.36
4.00
2.16
3.00
4.00
3.26
3.65
4.29
3.14
PS
SAP
PCP
PCI
DNA
PS
PvDA
PSOE
Lab
SPD
Pasok
SPO
Lab
The left-right gap is calculated as the difference between the major rightist and major leftist
party in each nation, to examine Kitschelts claim that it is the closure of this gap which creates
the greatest opportunities for radical right success.
b The right-wing gap is calculated by subtracting the position of the major rightist party from
ten, the maximum point on the left-right scale, to examine van der Brug et al.s thesis that the
radical right get most votes in countries where the major rightist party is most centrist.
Source: The position of each party is calculated from Marcel Lubbers [principal investigator]. 2000.
Expert Judgment Survey of Western European Political Parties 2000 [machine readable dataset].
Nijmegen, the Netherlands: NWO, Department of Sociology, University of Nijmegen.
liberals would defend their rights to articulate these views and stand for
elected office.6
There are two hypotheses to examine. The Kitschelt thesis suggests
that the closure of the ideological space between the major parties on the
center-left and center-right provides opportunities for electoral advance
by radical right parties. If correct, then we should expect to find that
the smaller the ideological gap between the center parties, then the greater
the popularity of the radical right. The alternative van der Brug version of
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party
No RR party
Fringe party
Relevant RR party
Fr
Swe
Ideological gap between major parties
4.00
17:29
Por
+
Ita
3.50
Belg
Den
Fin
+
Nor
Neth
3.00
Sp
GB
Ger
2.50
Greece
R Sq Linear = 0.131
2.00
Aus
Ire
+
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
figure 9.1. Party Competition and Radical Right Parties. For the estimates of
the size of the ideological gap between major parties, see Table 9.1. For the classification of parties, and the percentage share of the vote for the radical right, see
Table 3.1. Source: The size of the ideological gap between major parties is calculated from Marcel Lubbers [principal investigator]. 2000. Expert Judgment Survey
of Western European Political Parties 2000 [machine readable dataset]. Nijmegen,
this thesis claims that it is the location of the mainstream right-wing party
in each nation, in particular, which is vital: the more centrist the rightwing party, the larger the spatial opportunity for radical right challengers.
Evidence to test these two claims can be derived from the Lubbers expert
ideological ten-point scales, used and discussed earlier, monitoring the
position of all electoral parties located from extreme left (0) to extreme
right (10).7
Table 9.1 and Figure 9.1 present the results in sixteen European societies without any prior controls for the type of electoral system, which
might also be expected to influence patterns of party and ideological competition. All these nations are established democracies and postindustrial
economies, to facilitate comparison of similar societies. The table identifies the ideological location of the major rightist and major leftist party in
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each nation, and then calculates the size of the left-right gap (the difference between the two locations). To consider first the evidence concerning
the Kitschelt claim, the comparison of the mean ideological gap between
center-left and center-right was 3.24 in countries which contained a relevant radical right electoral party, compared with 2.84 in countries with
a fringe radical right electoral party, and 2.96 where there were no successful electoral radical right contenders. This evidence therefore fails to
support the Kitschelt prediction that the radical right will flourish most
successfully where the ideological gap between the main parties is smallest.
Figure 9.1 illustrates the correlations graphically; a cluster of countries,
notably Italy, Belgium, Norway, and Denmark, exhibit high ideological
polarization among the mainstream parties and also a flourishing share
of the vote for the radical right, the antithesis of the Kitschelt claim. At
the same time, there are many countries ranging across levels of party ideological competition, from low (Ireland) to high (Sweden), with minimal
voting support for contemporary radical right parties. In these sixteen
societies, no significant correlation existed between the size of the major party left-right gap and the mean share of the radical right vote or
seats (whether calculated by the average vote or seats for these parties in
elections held from 1990 to 2004, or during the most recent period, from
2000 to 2004).
The van der Brug variant of this thesis claims that it is the ideological
location of the mainstream right-wing party which is critical for maximizing or minimizing opportunities for the radical right. The size of the
right-wing gap is calculated in each society by simply subtracting the position of the major right-wing party from the maximum score (10) on the
ideological scale. Table 9.1 shows that the right-wing gap on the right was
slightly greater in nations where there was a relevant radical right party
(3.24) than in those countries where there were fringe parties (2.84), or
no radical right party (2.96), as expected, but this was only a very modest
difference. Of course there are a limited number of cases under comparison, and this restricts the analysis; nevertheless, again there was also an
insignificant correlation between the size of the right-wing gap and the
vote or seat share of the radical right (using the same periods as described
above). It appears that there are grounds for skepticism surrounding the
claim that the ideological positions of the mainstream parties provide
automatic opportunities for radical right parties. What might matter, instead, might be the ideological strategies radical right parties adopt to
maximize their support, within the constraints of the electoral rules and
the distribution of public opinion.
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ii the constraints on party competition

Most supply-side rational choice theories treat parties as largely autonomous agents, deciding where to locate themselves across the ideological spectrum in pursuit of popular support, assuming conditions of
perfect competition. By contrast, the account offered here suggests that
the electoral rules serve to regulate both demand and supply factors, especially the electoral strategies that parties follow. As discussed in the
Introduction, proximity or spatial theories of voting behavior start
from the traditional Downsian rational choice axiom that both voters
and parties are located at ideal points on the classic left-right ideological
dimension.8 The proximity model used here follows this tradition by assuming that voters can position themselves at a point in this continuum
reflecting their ideal preference. The ideological position of each party
can also be represented by a point in the same continuum. Building upon
this foundation, the strategic agency theory developed in this book makes
certain important claims about how:
(i) The electoral system generates incentives for either centripetal or
centrifugal patterns of party competition, and, as a result;
(ii) The rules influence where rational parties decide to locate themselves on the left-right ideological spectrum; and, in turn,
(iii) Patterns of party competition shape how citizens respond to the
available electoral choices, and the importance of ideological or
populist appeals in voting behavior.
Proximity models of voting behavior assume that the distribution of
public opinion on the left-right ideological spectrum usually follows a unimodal normal curve with a single peak in the center of the distribution.
Public opinion commonly reflects this pattern on most major values, such
as preferences for tax cuts over public spending, for free market liberalism over state-planned economies, or for stricter or liberal regulation of
refugee entry. In this ideological space, as discussed in the Introduction,
the theory assumes that some policy options are located too far left for
the publics acceptance (such as allowing all refugees who apply into a
country), some are located too far right (such as denying asylum even to
refugees from bloody civil wars or victims of human rights abuses), and
there is an asymmetrical zone of acquiescence between these poles with a
range of intermediate policy choices (allowing some, but not all) that are
broadly acceptable to the general public.9 A broad consensus exists about
valance issues found within this zone. Given the normal distribution of
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public opinion around most values, support for extremist values on the
far right or far left usually remains confined to a minority of the electorate.
In this context, standard Downsian rational choice models assume that
most parties have a strategic incentive to compete by emphasizing similar values in the middle ground of the ideological spectrum, since that
is where most voters cluster.10 If public opinion is normally distributed,
rational vote-maximizing parties will try to position themselves within
the left-right ideological space to maximize their appeal among as many
citizens as possible. Under most circumstances, parties are therefore subject to strong centripetal pressures to emphasize values where there is
widespread agreement, for example to suggest that they offer an experienced leadership team capable of managing economic growth, providing
effective security, and maintaining a basic welfare safety net offering social protection against the problems of old age, unemployment, and ill
health. Party policies and platforms are expected to converge with the
position of the median voter on these issues. This account provides a
logic consistent with predictions made in the mid-1960s about the end
of ideology (Bell) and the growth of catch-all parties (Kirchheimer).11
Simple proximity models provide a potential explanation for why major
parties usually cluster in the center ground of politics, given the normal
distribution of public opinion.
Yet standard proximity theories are less good at explaining why rational vote-maximizing and seat-maximizing radical right parties do not simply moderate their policy positions and tone down their heated rhetoric
in the pursuit of popular support clustered in the center-right ground of
the political spectrum. To go further, building upon arguments developed
by Cox, we assume that the strategic incentives facing rational parties
vary systematically according to the institutional context of the electoral
system.12 In particular, as already observed, the electoral threshold determines the number of parties elected to the legislature, and thus, as Cox
suggests, it may shape the incentives for either centripetal patterns of party
competition (where most parties and candidates advocate moderate policies clustered in the middle of the zone of acquiescence) and centrifugal
patterns (where parties adopt more extreme positions ranged across the
full ideological spectrum).
Earlier chapters have demonstrated how PR electoral systems with
low thresholds allow minor parties to gain office even if they receive
only a modest share of the popular vote. Under these rules, we theorize
that radical right minor parties have a strategic incentive to win seats by
adopting bonding strategies which they can use to mobilize and activate
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199
niche cleavages within the electorate. Such appeals stress signature issues
and hardline values characteristic of the far right of the ideological
spectrum, notably xenophobic, anti-immigrant, and antiestablishment
rhetoric. Such values distinguish radical right parties most clearly from
their mainstream competitors, thereby generating support among their
hard-core base. The theory assumes that it is easier for minor parties
to mobilize certain distinct segments of the electorate, for example, for
Green parties in Western Europe to attract the younger generation on environmental issues, or for reformed Communist parties to mobilize older
voters in Central Europe by emphasizing the importance of maintaining
welfare services and social security. By contrast, it is more difficult for
minor parties to compete in the center ground of party politics, such as
on consensual or valance issues of national security and competent management of the economy, since party competition is most crowded here,
and many minor radical right parties lack the credibility derived from
the experience of government office. By helping to mobilize supporters,
raise funds, attract volunteers, and therefore contribute ultimately towards their electoral success, minor radical right parties can gain many
benefits from prioritizing clear ideological principles, distinctive programmatic party platforms reflecting these goals, and a sense of one-of-us
belonging to a clan with boundaries demarcating them and us.
By contrast, in contests under majoritarian rules, and/or with higher
effective electoral thresholds, radical right parties will fail to surmount the
barriers to elected office (and thus the rewards of status, power, and legitimacy that flow from office) unless they adopt broader populist, bridging,
or catchall strategies. In this context, radical right vote-seeking parties
are forced to expand their ideological and social appeals beyond far right
antiforeigner cultural protectionism to encompass a broader range of issues and populist appeals, based on vague rhetoric, leadership popularity,
and simple slogans largely devoid of substantive policy content, designed
to attract a more diverse sector of the electorate. Leadership popularity should be particularly important in this context, for example attracting popular support through charismatic appeals, effective rhetoric, and
modern communication skills. Of course radical right parties fighting in
majoritarian electoral systems, such as the British National Front and the
British National Party, may still decide to focus hard-line anti-immigrant
and racist appeals upon narrow segments of the electorate, opting for
ideological purity over electoral popularity. But, in this case, the theory
predicts that such parties will remain stranded on the fringes of public life,
and they may even die out over time, as they will attract too few votes to
200
1996
2001
1999
1997
1997
1996
1998
2002
1998
1998
1999
1996
2000
1997
1997
1998
Australia
Belarus
Belgium
Britain
Canada
Czech Rep
Denmark
France
Germany
Hungary
Iceland
Israel
Korea
Lithuania
Mexico
Netherlands
Year
Green Left
4.53
5.35
3.47
4.98
6.02
5.95
2.35
5.55
3.92
2.66
2.64
3.40
3.29
2.54
8.34
6.12
5.38
5.66
6.37
4.87
5.55
5.16
4.89
5.11
4.29
5.45
5.74
4.91
5.04
5.36
5.77
5.56
Median voter
July 5, 2005
8.06 Homeland Union

6.20 Institutional
Revolutionary Party
(PRI)
7.38 Peoples Party for
Freedom & Democracy
Justice and Life (MIEP)

Independence Party
Likud
United Liberal Democrats
Front National
CSU Bavaria
National (Country)
Liberal-Democrat
Vlaams Blok
Conservative Party
Reform Party
Civic Democratic
Danish Peoples Party
Difference
0 521 84914 4
7.91
8.41
7.46
6.56
7.85
6.32
6.50
5.30
7.00
7.19
5.94
8.93
8.64
Most rightist party
CUNY008B/Norris
2.85
Green Party
Communist Party
Anders Gaan Leven
Labour Party
Bloc Quebecois
Communist Party
Socialist Peoples
Party
2.30 Workers Struggle
2.40 Party of Democratic
Socialism
2.93 Socialist Party
2.39 Left Greens
1.51 Meretz
4.21 Democratic Liberal
Party
2.71
2.73 Cardenista Party
3.84
2.66
3.60
3.90
3.40
0.59
2.52
Most leftist party
table 9.2. Public Perceptions of Ideological Dispersion in Each Nation
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1997
1996
1999
1996
1996
1998
1999
1996
1998
1996
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Ukraine
United States
ACT New Zealand

Progress Party
Peru Possible
Solidarity Election Action
7.32
Peoples Rukh
7.72 Popular Party

6.78 National Peasant &
Christian Democratic
8.09 Union of Right Forces
6.57 Christian Democrats
7.47 Partido Popular
9.02 Moderate Rally
7.65 Swiss Peoples Party
5.80 Nationalist Party
8.03
8.30
5.76
8.11
3.29
4.28
5.18
5.52
6.20
3.13
5.21
7.78
4.65
1.36
6.00
2.94
5.36
5.89
1.47
6.42
5.34
5.29
5.33
5.38
5.64
5.15
4.94
4.55
4.96
5.17
5.38
5.34
6.10
5.62
5.18
5.76
5.60
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Note: The publics perceived location of the six largest parties in each country, and the location of the median voter, on the left-right ideological scale,
where 0 = most left and 10 = most right.
Source: Calculated from CSES Module 1 19962001 for all nations except France, which draws upon Module II.
Communist Party
Social Democrats
United Life
Left Party
Green Party
Democratic
Progressives
1.80 Communist Party
1.89
3.44
2.26
1.24
3.00
4.44
Alliance
Socialist Left
Solucion Popular
Democratic Left
Alliance
1.72 Left Block
3.84 Social Democrats
2.67
2.41
4.29
1.69
CUNY008B/Norris
Mean Majoritarian
Mean combined
Mean PR
1996
1997
2001
1997
New Zealand
Norway
Peru
Poland
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surmount the higher threshold for elected office characteristic of majoritarian elections. As we shall discuss in the next chapter, radical right
parties may make sporadic gains under these circumstances, especially
through protest politics in second-order elections such as regional or
European contests, but they will fail to consolidate their position.
Evidence for Ideological Competition
Following Cox, a growing body of literature has theorized about the
effects of electoral systems on patterns of centrifugal and centripetal party
competition, but few have attempted to evaluate the empirical evidence
for this relationship across many types of electoral systems. Empirical
support for this theory has been found by Dow, however, who compared
the location of parties, measured by voter evaluations in national election
surveys, in two majoritarian systems (Canada and France) and in two
proportional systems (the Netherlands and Israel). The study reported
that, as expected, parties were generally located closer to the median
voter in majoritarian than PR systems.13 In majoritarian elections, the
radical right parties under comparison (the French Front National and the
Canadian Reform parties) remained the furthest away from the median
voter, while the winning parties were most centrally located.
To see whether these findings remain robust under different circumstances, the conclusions deserve reexamining in a wider range of national
and electoral contexts. Evidence to test these propositions can be derived
from the CSES, allowing comparison of party ideological competition in
elections held in thirty nations, including both West European and postCommunist societies, as well as majoritarian, combined, and PR electoral
systems.14 In the CSES survey, people in each country were asked to place
the six largest parties on a ten-point left-right ideological scale ranging
from left (0) to right (10).15 This data can be used to explore whether
the perceived pattern of party competition on this standard scale varied
according to the basic type of electoral system. The estimate of degree
of left-right party competition is calculated as the difference between the
mean position of the most leftist party in each country and the mean position of the most rightist party in each country, as described in Table 9.2.
The fact that we are comparing the six largest and most relevant parties in
each nation standardizes the comparison and it means that the degree of
ideological competition is not merely a reflection of the number of parties
elected in each nation, for example the inclusion of more fringe and minor
parties in PR systems with low thresholds, such as in Belgium.
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0
Canada
Belarus
Australia
Britain
France
Taiwan
Korea
Mexico
Germany
Hungary
Lithuania
New Zealand
Ukraine
Russia
Peru
Romania
Slovenia
Belgium
Netherlands
Switzerland
Spain
Norway
Israel
Portugal
Iceland
Denmark
Poland
Sweden
Czech Rep
203
2
10
Majoritarian systems (mean 3.34)
Combined systems (mean=4.28)
Proportional systems (mean=5.19)
figure 9.2. Public Perceptions of the Maximum Distance in Party Locations on

the Ten-Point Left-Right Ideology Scale, Six Largest Parties in Each Nation. The
graph shows the maximum distance in the ideological location of the most leftwing and the most right-wing of the six largest parties in each country, on the
ten-point left-right ideological scale, as placed by all respondents in each nation.
See Table 9.1. Source: Calculated from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems
19962001 Module I, with France from CSES Module II.
The results, illustrated visually in Figure 9.2, generally confirm that

party competition proves more centrifugal under PR electoral systems
and more centripetal under majoritarian systems, with combined electoral systems falling into the middle of the distribution. The ideological
distance between the most left and most right party was 3.29 points on
the 10-point scale in majoritarian electoral systems, 4.28 points in combined systems, but ranged across 5.18 points in proportional systems.
Figure 9.2 shows that not all the countries under comparison fell exactly where predicted; in particular, the Peruvian presidential election, although a proportional system, showed the smallest ideological left-right
gap among parties, which probably reflects the clientalistic and personalistic nature of presidential contests in this country.16 A similar lack of
ideological polarization was also evident in Taiwan, using the combined
electoral system. By contrast, although using the majoritarian secondballot electoral system, French party competition displayed considerable
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polarization between the Workers Struggle on the far left and the Front
National on the far right. This pattern may be generated by the secondballot system, which allows multiple parties to compete in the first-round
elections, where people can traditionally express a vote with their heart,
before finally casting a ballot with their head for the major center-left and
center-right contenders, although further comparisons would be necessary to confirm this pattern.17 Despite these exceptions, the broad pattern
found in most countries does confirm the expectation that the electoral
system has psychological effects by influencing the ideological strategies
which parties adopt, as well as having mechanical effects which determine the effective number of political parties elected in any country (as
documented in Chapter 5). Ideological competition is usually more centripetal under majoritarian rules and more centrifugal under proportional
electoral rules.
iii radical right ideological or populist appeals

So how does the pattern of party competition influence voting behavior?
One of the most basic propositions in proximity theories of electoral behavior is that rational voters are expected to maximize their utility by
voting for the party closest to their own preferences while shunning parties furthest away.18 Many accounts focus upon issue proximity, on the
assumption that voters match their attitudes toward a series of specific
public policies, such as on education, health care, and defense, with the
policy platforms offered by parties. Yet it is widely recognized that issue
voting makes considerable information demands upon citizens when assessing where parties stand on each policy that voters care about. Issue
voting also requires judgments about whether parties are likely to deliver
upon their promises, based upon their past performance and their record
in office, a matter that is particularly difficult to evaluate for new parties.
In line with many other accounts, the theory tested here suggests that
when deciding how to vote, citizens commonly use a variety of cognitive shortcuts through general left-right ideological cues (understood to
represent a running tally of the past performance and an assessment of
future actions taken by each party), as effective ways of reducing information demands in each election, while matching general policy preferences,
at least in a rough approximation, to the party and candidate choices
available.19 The left-right scale is the most common summary measure for
evaluating parties and candidates, widely used in the literature comparing
party competition and electoral behavior, so it provides a standard test
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of how far ideological cues guide voting choices.20 Evidence for the basic claim about ideological voting can be tested using the CSES, which
asked people in each country to place themselves on a ten-point left-right
ideological scale ranging from left (0) to right (10).21 This allows us to
analyze whether citizens do indeed support the radical right party if they
locate themselves on the far right of the ideological spectrum.
The relative impact of left-right ideology on voting behavior needs to
be compared against alternative factors commonly thought to determine
support for the radical right. Much of the literature emphasizes the role
of populist appeals, which can be regarded as affective orientations based
on how far people like a particular party and the party leader, drawing upon general party images and broad rhetorical appeals, but largely
devoid of references to substantive policy content or issue positions. Although rarely analyzed with systematic evidence, and with only loose reference to the original Weberian notion of charisma, historical national
case studies often claim that charismatic leaders such as Umberto Bossi,
Jean-Marie Le Pen, Pauline Hanson, Ross Perot, Mogens Glistrup, Anders Lange, and Pym Fortuyn have played a decisive role through founding
and organizing new parties, as well as acting as the figurehead for media
attention and controlling the party organization.22 In some cases, subsequent problems of leadership succession are believed to have undermined
support for radical right parties, perhaps best exemplified by the difficulties in establishing a viable Reform Party candidate in the 2000 U.S.
presidential election, after Ross Perot retired. Similar problems of continuity were evident in the Danish Progress Party after Mogens Glistrup
was imprisoned for tax fraud. One Nation faced a parallel sharp fall in
the Australian polls after Pauline Hanson was convicted of electoral irregularities. Leadership effects are also exemplified in cases when new
Haider and Christoph Blocher have risen to power
leaders such as Jorg
within the internal hierarchy of established parties. Both Haider and
Blocher moved their parties sharply hard right, especially on race and
immigration, thereby driving out more moderate factions. Following the
change of leadership, the substantial rise registered in party support for
the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs

after 1986, and for the Swiss
Schweizerische Volkspartei after 1999, certainly suggests that the leaders
role may have been decisive, although it remains unclear whether this
surge was due to their personal appeal among the public or their ideological shift in party policy and rhetoric.23 The strategic agency theory
suggests that populist appeals by leaders will be particularly important in
generating support for radical right parties within majoritarian electoral
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206
table 9.3. Hypotheses about the Impact of Electoral Systems on

Radical Right Support
Type of electoral system
PR
Combined
Majoritarian
Ideological location
(respondents position
on 10-point left-right
scale)
Affective party
popularity (10-point
like/dislike scale)
Stronger
Moderate
Weaker
Weaker
Moderate
Stronger
Exemplar cases
Norway
Switzerland
Hungary
Russia
Canada
France
systems, for example for Ross Perots Reform Party and for the Canadian
Reform/Alliance/Conservative Party.
Radical right voters may also be swayed by other affective considerations, in particular by their general sense of partisan attachment. The classic Michigan model of voting behavior gives primacy to the importance
of an affective sense of party identification as one of the core factors driving electoral support.24 Party identification, regarded as a long-standing
anchor for voting behavior, is seen in this account as the best single predictor of the vote, modified by changing circumstances, such as economic
conditions and the personality of the leaders, that influence short-run and
medium-term electoral forces. A substantial literature suggests that strong
loyalties have gradually eroded over the years through partisan dealignment in many established democracies.25 Nevertheless, partisan identities
may continue to play an important role in voting choice, especially when
considering whether to support fringe and minor parties which have no
record in government and which stand little chance of actually implementing any policy proposals in office.
The institutional context, particularly the electoral system, is therefore
expected to influence the relative importance of ideological cues and populist appeals. This generates certain testable propositions, summarized in
Table 9.3. In proportional representation electoral systems, minor radical
right parties are expected to target core supporters through advocating
strong ideological appeals on core issues and values. Hence, in this context, it is predicted that in PR systems (exemplified here by Denmark and
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Switzerland), votes cast for radical right parties will be strongly predicted
by the perceived ideological proximity of citizens to parties. By contrast,
in majoritarian electoral systems (exemplified by Canada and France),
radical right parties are expected to emphasize more diffuse populist appeals, so that votes cast for these parties will be more strongly predicted
by party popularity. The ideological profile of radical right supporters
in combined (otherwise known as mixed or dual) electoral systems,
which incorporate elements from both PR and majoritarian systems, is
predicted to fall into an intermediate position.
Based on these considerations, the regression models presented in
Table 9.3 first examine which factors prove to be the strongest predictors
of voting choices for radical right parties in the pooled sample of thirteen
nations with a relevant radical right party contained in the CSES. The
models compare left-right ideology, affective orientations toward leaders,
general party popularity, and partisan identification on voting for the radical right. Using a series of standard ten-point scales, respondents in each
country were asked to locate their own position on the left-right ideological spectrum, as well as to indicate how far they liked the party leader
and the party in general.26 This allows us to analyze whether leadership
popularity lagged behind, or led, overall levels of party popularity. The
survey also monitored the direction and strength of partisan identification, measured by the party that respondents felt closest toward.27 The
multivariate models control for most of the factors already established
as important in previous chapters, notably the demographic and social
characteristics of radical right voters, as well as their greater disaffection
with government. Omission of factors already found to predict support
for the radical right may result in misspecified models that systematically
overstate the importance of ideological values.28 Replication of the logit
(binomial logistic regression) models already used with the ESS also allows us to double-check the robustness and reliability of some of the core
findings, although identical results would not be expected given some
important methodological differences in each survey.29
Table 9.4 demonstrates the results in logit models predicting voting for
relevant radical right parties in the pooled CSES thirteen-nation sample of
countries containing a relevant radical right party in national legislative
elections. Model A enters the social and demographic factors, and political disaffection, where radical right support proved to be greatest among
men, younger voters, ethnic majorities, and the less educated, as well
as those least satisfied with the democratic process. These results generally
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table 9.4. Ideological and Partisan Attitudes and the Radical Right Vote, Pooled
CSES Thirteen-Nation Sample
Model A:
social background
and political trust
Std.
error Sig. B
B
(Constant)
1.86
Social background and political trust

Age (in years)
.008
.483
Ethnic majority (ethnic
1.06
majority = 1, else = 0)
Education (highest level attained
.161
on a 3-point scale from low to
high)
Salariat (professional and
.030
managerial employees)
.244
.136
.304
Currently unemployed (1)
.048
Satisfaction with democratic
.286
process (4-point scale)
Partisan attitudes
Ideological left-right
self-placement (10-point scale)
Liking of radical right party
leader (10-point scale)
Liking of radical right party
(10-point scale)
Partisan identification (feels
closest to a radical right party)
Nagelkerke R2
Model B: social
background, political trust,
and partisan attitudes
Std.
error Sig.
9.169
.003
.098
.112
.066
.122
.160
.145
.178
.279
.056
.000
.199
.742
.004
.151
.164
.586
.106
N/s
.203
.183
N/s
N/s
N/s
N/s
N/s
.013
.323
.266
.761
.073
.250
.228
.288
.416
.088
N/s
N/s
N/s
N/s
N/s
.064
.030
.156
.039
.466
.043
.165
3.04
.064
91%
N/s
N/s
.668
96%
Note: The table presents the results of binomial logit regression analysis models where the dependent variable is whether the respondent reported voting for the relevant radical right party in
each country in the pooled thirteen-nation CSES sample. The table includes the unstandardized
beta coefficients (B), the standard errors, and their significance,. See note for Table 6.1. Ethnicity
is defined by the linguistic majority in each country (1), or the linguistic minority (0), based on the
primary language spoken at home. For the construction of the ideological and attitudinal scales,
all standardized to ten points, see text. The countries include the thirteen nations with a relevant
radical right party in legislative elections contained in the CSES (Belgium, Canada, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia,
and Switzerland).
Sig .001 = ; Sig .01 = ; Sig .05 = .
Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) Module 1 19962001.
208
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reflected the demographic profile of radical right voters found earlier in

Chapters 6 and 7, with replication lending greater confidence to the results
derived from two independent surveys. The Goldthorpe-Heath measure
of social class showed a similar pattern to that found earlier, with support
for the radical right slightly lower among the salariat while being strongest
among the petite bourgeoisie and the unskilled working class, although
the beta coefficients failed to prove statistically significant. Model A also
explained little variance in radical right voting. Further exploration of
the data suggested that this difference in the results was probably due
to the inclusion of a broader range of nations contained in the pooled
sample in the CSES survey, including post-Communist societies such as
Poland, Russia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, with a distinctive class
structure and historical traditions.
Model B maintained these demographic, socioeconomic, and attitudinal factors as controls, and then added the additional indicators of the
respondents ideological position, affective orientations toward parties
and party leaders, and partisan identification. The model was tested and
confirmed to be free of problems of multicollinearity. The results of Model
B indicate that, even with prior controls, the measures of left-right ideology, leadership popularity, party popularity, and partisan identification all
proved significant predictors of voting for the radical right. Moreover once
these factors were entered, most of the social and demographic characteristics (with the exception of ethnicity and education) became insignificant.
The overall fit of the model improved dramatically (indicated by the final Nagelkerke R2 of .668), confirming that political attitudes predicted
support for the radical right far more strongly than social characteristics. The results suggest that social background does affect the propensity to vote for these parties, and the effect works indirectly, through
shaping political ideology and affective orientations toward the radical
right.
The Impact of the Electoral System on Party
Competition and Voting Behavior
But does the electoral system also influence this process, so that populist appeals are stronger predictors of radical right support in majoritarian systems while ideological cues prove more important in PR systems,
as theorized earlier? This claim can be most clearly illustrated by analyzing voting behavior in four case studies in France, Canada, Norway,
and Switzerland, selected to represent comparable affluent postindustrial
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societies and established democracies, and all containing a relevant radical

right party, but varying in their electoral systems.
We can compare support for the Reform Party in the 1997 Canadian
election and votes for the Front National in the 2002 French presidential election, both of which exemplify majoritarian electoral systems.30
Canadian parliamentary elections are fought using single-member plurality districts (first-past-the-post), requiring that the winning candidate
gain a simple plurality of votes in each riding. The French presidential
elections use the second-ballot system (runoff elections), where the first
round of the contest determines if any candidate gets an absolute majority
of votes (50%+). If none do, then the top two candidates with the highest
share of the vote go on into the second-round election two weeks later.
The 2002 elections were particularly appropriate to test the basis of Front
National support; in the first round Jean-Marie Le Pen unexpectedly came
second, with 17% of the vote, his best ever result, shocking commentators and generating massive waves of street protests by those who had
been expecting that the second round would be a traditional left-right
contest between Jacques Chirac and Lionel Jospin, the Parti Socialiste
candidate and French premier, who won only 16.2% of the vote.31 The
case studies also allow us to examine further the important differences
we have already noted between Canada and France in the degree of party
ideological competition.
These contests are compared with support for radical right parties in
two European countries which exemplify PR systems with far lower effective thresholds. The Norwegian Fremskrittspartiet almost tripled its vote,
from 6.3% in 1993 to 15.3% in the 1997 parliamentary election, led by
Carl I. Hagen. One critical factor which seems to have played a role is the
salience of the issue of immigration in the election, which was linked by
the Progress Party to problems of juvenile delinquency, unemployment,
and dependence on social security, along with a broader antitax movement. In the 1999 election the Swiss Schweizerische Volkspartei also saw
a substantial advance in voting support, from 14.9% in 1995 to 23.3%,
under the more radical ultranationalist, anti-EU, and isolationist rhetoric
of their leader, the billionaire industrialist Christoph Blocher.32 Both the
Norwegian and Swiss elections are highly proportional in their ratio of
votes to seats (the Rose standardized version of the Loosemore-Hanby
index of proportionality is 95% and 93% respectively). Norway employs
closed party lists for the 165 members of the Storting, a 4% legal threshold, and a Sainte-Lague formula. Switzerland elects 200 members to the
Federal Assembly using the dHondt formula of votes to seats, panachage
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211
lists, and no formal legal minimal voting threshold.33 The societies also
differ substantially in the nature of their electoral cleavages, with Norway
relatively homogeneous and divided primarily by a traditional class cleavage, as well as an urban-rural pattern, while Switzerland exemplifies a
deeply plural society strongly divided by language, region, and class.
The result of the logit (binomial logistic regression) analysis are presented in Table 9.5, which first entered the standard social characteristics
and satisfaction with democracy measures as controls. The models then
entered the respondents left-right self-placement on the ten-point scale
(as an indicator of their ideological position) and the scale measuring
affective orientations toward radical right parties (as an indicator of populist appeal).34 The models in Table 9.4 demonstrate that affective party
popularity proved significant in all systems, suggesting that populist appeals generating a positive affective orientation toward the radical right
represent an important part of their support. By contrast, political ideology proved a significant predictor of voting for the radical right only in the
two countries using proportional representation electoral systems, when
generating support for the Norwegian Fremskrittspartiet and the Swiss
Schweizerische Volkspartei. Moreover, the ideological cues were not significant predictors of radical right voting in the cases of the Canadian
Reform Party and the French Front National, in elections held under majoritarian rules. Of course the number of case studies remains limited; in
particular, ideally it would have been desirable to test these patterns in a
broader range of countries using majoritarian electoral systems. One important reason why few such nations currently contain a relevant radical
right party is due to the mechanical effects of electoral systems that were
already noted. But despite these limitations, the results of the selected
cases are consistent with the basic theory that the type of electoral rules
has certain psychological effects by influencing the choice of party ideological strategy, and that, in turn, the appeals that radical right parties
emphasize shape patterns of voting behavior. Populism appears to play
an important role in all the case studies, with a very strong association
with radical right voting behavior, but ideological cues are also relatively
strong in Norway and Switzerland, yet insignificant in the cases using
majoritarian electoral systems. Overall the full models in each country,
containing social background, political trust, and the measures of ideology and party popularity, successfully explained a considerable amount
of the variance in radical right voting (as measured by the Nagelkerke R2 ,
ranging from 47% of the variance in France and Switzerland to 61% in
Canada).
212
913
817
N/s
N/s
1,537
.024
.517
92%
.797
.206
.008
.314
.534
.117
2.33
.176
.066
.065
.007
.236
1.45
.112
1.44
.174
1.79
N/s
N/s
N/s
N/s
N/s
N/s
Sig.
1,219
.121
.477
88%
.552
.142
.015
.393
2.01
.117
2.33
.093
8.44
.046
.052
.006
.185
.330
.112
1.44
.153
.764
Std.
error
N/s
N/s
N/s
Sig.
July 5, 2005
Note: The table presents the results of binomial logit analysis models where the dependent variable is whether the respondent reported voting for the relevant radical right
party in each country. See note for Table 6.1. Ethnicity is defined by the linguistic majority in each country (1), or the linguistic minority (0), based on the primary language
spoken at home. Note that since self-employment was not included in Module II of the CSES, the Goldthorpe-Heath class classification could not be constructed, so this was
dropped from the analysis for consistent comparison across the countries.
Sources: Canada, Norway, and Switzerland The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, Module I 19962001. France The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems,
Module II 20012005.
.089
.470
95%
.169
.613
88%
.067
.075
.009
.596
.212
.233
.365
.592
.011
.369
8.24
Std.
error
0 521 84914 4
N/s
N/s
N/s
.024
.723
1.18
Switzerland 1999
(Peoples Party)
PR electoral systems
Norway 1997
(Progress Party)
CUNY008B/Norris
Model A: Nagelkerke R2
Model B: Nagelkerke R2
Model B: Percentage correctly
predicted
Number of cases per nation
N/s
7.09
1.03
5.96
Model A: Controls for social background and trust

Age (years)
.024
.007
Sex (male = 1)
.399
.225
Ethnicitya
1.33
.433
Education (3-category scale)
.031
.198
Currently unemployed (yes = 1)
.119
.602
Satisfaction with democracy (4-point
.393
.165
scale)
Model B: Ideology and party popularity with prior controls
Left-right ideological self-placement
.050
.066
(10-pt scale)
Like the radical right party (10-point
.761
.057
scale)
(Constant)
Sig.
Std.
error
Std.
error
Sig.
France 2002
(Front National)
Canada 1997
(Reform Party)
Majoritarian electoral systems
table 9.5. The Ideological Basis of Radical Right Votes, Selected Cases
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Leadership popularity radical right parties
7.00
6.00
5.00
Nor
Isr
Pol
4.00
NZ
Swi
Can
Den
3.00
Hung
Rus
R Sq Linear = 0.842
Czech
2.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
Party popularity radical right
figure 9.3. Comparing Leadership and Party Popularity. Leadership popularity

and party popularity for the six largest parties were both estimated by respondents
in each country using ten-point scales, ranging from dislike (0) to like (10). Source:
Calculated from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 19962001.
Among specific factors, many accounts emphasize that leadership plays

a particularly important role in radical right popularity, where studies
stress the importance of figures such as Haider, Le Pen, and Zhirinovsky
in generating support for their parties. The analysis of the survey evidence available in the CSES showed that leadership and party popularity were closely associated in each country; the strong correlation
(R = .804) is illustrated in Figure 9.3. The leader was slightly ahead of
levels of party popularity in a few countries, notably in Israel, as well
as in the Fremskrittspartiet in Norway, the latter perhaps because the
leaders long-standing control was such that it was sometimes described
as Hagens party.35 By contrast, despite his high profile and long-standing
role, support for Christoph Blocher fell slightly behind the general popularity of the Swiss Peoples Party. From this cross-sectional evidence,
however, it remains difficult to determine any independent effect from
party leaders per se. Clearly contingent factors will play a role in any
particular election, such as the media coverage which the parties receive,
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the appeal of specific party leaders, or the salience of immigration on the

issue agenda. Specific events will also help to flesh out explanations of
specific results, exemplified by the assassination of Pym Fortuyn before
polling day, the unexpected success of Le Pen in coming second ahead of
Jospin in May 2002, and the merger of the Reform/Alliance/Conservative
parties in Canada. But a large part of the reason why people vote for
the radical right can be explained fairly successfully by similar factors to
those which also explain support for other types of parties, namely the
ideological location of parties and voters (within institutional contexts)
and the affective partisan orientations of voters, as well as the usual sociodemographic cleavages in the electorate.
conclusions
Previous supply-side accounts suggest that variations in the success of the
radical right can be attributed in large part to the ideological position of
the mainstream parties and the opportunities this provides for the radical
right. The argument developed in this study suggest that party competition is indeed an important aspect of the explanation for radical right
success, but that what is more important is how far the ideological location of radical right parties works within the context of electoral rules
and the distribution of public opinion. The core thesis of this book is
that the broader institutional context, particularly the electoral rules, affects the electoral strategies that radical right parties adopt to maximize
their appeal, and hence that the role of ideological cues and populist appeals vary in generating voting support for these parties. This account
emphasizes the role of electoral incentives for spatial patterns of party
competition. Three conclusions can be drawn from the available expert
and mass survey evidence considered in this chapter.
The analysis based on a comparison of how the electorate perceived
the ideological position of parties in thirty nations supports the thesis
that party competition is clustered more closely around the median voter
in most majoritarian systems, while being dispersed more centrifugally
across the whole ideological spectrum from far left to far right in most
PR systems. This provides consistent support for the institutionally constrained proximity model of party behavior presented in this study.
It is more difficult to test the proximity model of voting behavior for
the radical right. Nevertheless the available evidence in the CSES survey
in the pooled thirteen-nation models indicates that both ideological and
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populist appeals are part of the explanation for the attraction of radical
right parties; indeed once these factors were entered into the pooledsample models, ideological values and affective orientations toward
parties reduced the significance of almost all of the social-demographic
variables.
Lastly the illustrative case studies of Canada, France, Switzerland, and
Norway serve to support the broader claim that the electoral system also
plays a role in party strategies and voting behavior; while ideology and
partisanship are both important in predicting voting support for the Swiss
Peoples Party and the Norwegian Progress Party, only the indicators of
partisanship (not ideology) proved significant in the elections concerning
the Canadian Reform Party and the French Front National, held under
majoritarian rules.
The theory that we have presented concerning the incentives facing
vote-maximizing parties therefore goes some way further down the path
of explaining the success of the radical right in some countries and not
others. Electoral rules are understood to generate certain important mechanical and psychological effects. First, if challengers do not believe that
they stand any chance of being elected in majoritarian systems, the existence of strong electoral thresholds may deter any radical right activists
from channeling their energies into political parties; instead they may
prefer to mobilize through other organizations, such as social movements
and interest groups. If activists do decide to challenge elections through
working within party organizations, the mechanical effects of the higher
vote thresholds found in majoritarian electoral systems mean that most
will fail to gain elected office, with the status, visibility, and resources
that entails. Without such resources, radical right parties remain poorly
institutionalized extraparliamentary bodies which have problems in maintaining any continuity, becoming subject to internal party factionalization
and fragmentation. And if they fight elections, over a succession of elections, majoritarian systems are likely to generate rational vote-maximizing
incentives for successful radical right parties to focus upon populist strategies and more moderate ideological appeals, which are necessary for them
to get elected.
What we have not yet had a chance to consider are the conditions for
radical right parties not just to make sporadic gains but also to sustain
their success over a series of elections, and in particular how far organizational development and consolidation are necessary. To consider these issues, the next chapter goes on to compare a series of case studies, including
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Britain, where the radical right have failed to make headway despite secular dealignment; the Netherlands and the United States, where there have
been occasional deviating elections with temporary sudden advances
but equally sudden falls; and Austria, France, and Canada, where radical
right parties have consolidated their position after experiencing an initial
breakthrough.
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Consolidating Party Organizations
Previous chapters suggest that party strategy when emphasizing ideological or populist appeals plays a vital role in determining the electoral fortunes of the contemporary radical right, within institutional constraints.
Yet the cross-national survey evidence considered so far, while essential
for constructing a picture of the factors associated with individual-level
voting behavior and the outcome of specific contests, cannot demonstrate
the conditions necessary for sustained radical right success over a series of
elections. Fringe and minor electoral parties often remain fragile and unstable organizations, vulnerable to unexpected shocks caused by internal
organizational splits, difficult leadership transitions, factional rivalries, or
sudden scandals. The history of the radical right is littered with short-lived
flash parties, exemplified by the Poujadist movement in France, the Reform Party in the United States, and Lijst Pym Fortuyn in the Netherlands.
Such parties can surge into the headlines on a tidal wave of public protest,
to the consternation of many commentators, gaining seats in deviating
elections, but they can equally suddenly fall back into obscurity when circumstances change. Without ballast, they bob in the wake of government
and opposition popularity. Minor parties can also experience a precipitate
rise and an equally sudden decline. The Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs
became part of the OVP

coalition government in spring 2000, for example, with the support of one in four voters, but their share of the popular
vote plummeted to just 10% four years later. Many reasons probably
fortunes, including organizational
contributed toward the decline in FPO
difficulties illustrated by public conflict between the conservative nationalist wing and the more pragmatic faction within the parliamentary party,
and problems of ineffective communications by the party leader.1
217
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By contrast, minor parties which have developed effective party organizations and forged more enduring roots among activists can be expected to prove more resilient to sudden fluctuations of electoral fortunes.
They may experience a breakthrough into minor party status in a critical election, and then manage to consolidate and build upon this success
in subsequent contests. In these circumstances, certain radical right parties have proved more durable. The Alleanza Nationale, for example,
repackaged in 1994 as the Movimento Sociale Italiano, was first founded
almost six decades ago. Le Pens Front National has survived turbulent
electoral peaks and troughs in a long series of elections for thirty years, as
has the Fremskrittspartiet in Norway. The question is whether many of
the parties under comparison have built and consolidated effective party
organizations to maintain them through gains and losses.
To consider these issues, Section I in this chapter develops a theoretical framework based on classifying types of elections based on the
strength of party-voter alignments. Section II then applies this framework by comparing contests where the radical right have, and have
not, steadily advanced into power over successive contests. The chapter compares six case studies which are selected from among established
democracies and affluent postindustrial economies and which demonstrate party competition within both majoritarian electoral systems and
adversarial democracies (including contests in Britain, Canada, and the
United States) and also within PR elections and consensus democracies
(exemplified by elections in Austria and the Netherlands).2 The case-study
examples illustrate the conditions facilitating persistent success among the
radical right. Admittedly the evidence about the importance of party organizations remains less systematic than in several earlier chapters, as
we lack much reliable comparative data on matters such as party membership and financial resources. Nevertheless this dimension remains an
important part of the theoretical framework for explaining radical right
success and some of the cross-national contrasts can be illustrated from
the cases.
The evidence presented here suggests that, by themselves, trends in partisan dealignment fail to account satisfactorily for radical right success;
many commentators highlight Britain, for example, as a country exemplifying secular dealignment, with steadily weakening party loyalties and
class identities, but, despite a few limited and sporadic victories, the
National Front, BNP, and UKIP currently remain marginal forces on
the periphery of the political system. Yet a loosening of traditional voter
linkages with the mainstream parties does facilitate intermittent cases of
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deviating elections, exemplified by the meteoric rise of LPF popularity in

the May 2002 election in the Netherlands and by Perots Reform Party
vote in the 1992 U.S. presidential election. More importantly, the occasional critical election represents an enduring breakthrough for radical
right parties, and a long-term realignment in traditional patterns of party
competition. This process is exemplified by breakthroughs for radical
right parties which subsequently consolidated, notably the success of the
FN in the 1984 European elections in France, the sudden shift in FPO

support during the 1986 Austrian election, and the watershed for the
Reform Party in the 1993 Canadian election. The conclusion builds on
this framework to consider the conditions under which the radical right
can consolidate its rise and how we should interpret the occasional flash
success.
i a framework for classifying elections

and party competition
To understand the conditions under which radical right parties can experience a sudden electoral breakthrough, and the conditions facilitating
a longer-term process of consolidation in their fortunes, elections can be
classified into distinct categories. The fivefold typology employed here
as a heuristic framework distinguishes among maintaining alignments,
secular dealignments, deviating dealignments, secular realignments, and
critical realignments.3 These types of election each have important consequences for the radical right and also more broadly for party systems,
understood here as the stable and enduring pattern of interaction and
competition among political parties in any country. Particular parties can
and do experience fluctuating electoral fortunes in each contest, but the
party system represents the broader and longer-lasting features of competition in government and in the electorate among all parties which persist
over a series of elections.4 The conceptual framework helps to interpret
the results of specific elections and the way that these have, or have not, altered the long-term fortunes of radical right parties and enduring patterns
of party competition.
(i) Maintaining Alignments

The prospects for any advance by new radical right challengers are theorized to be least favorable in elections characterized as maintaining
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alignments which essentially reflect the status quo in the party system.
In such contests, no strong issues, events, or major shifts in public policy deflect citizens from expressing their habitual electoral preferences,
and each party typically mobilizes its normal base of support. This concept requires splitting the actual vote cast for a party into two parts:
a normal or baseline vote to be expected from a group, based on its
behavior over successive elections in the past, and the current deviation
from that norm, due to the immediate circumstances of the specific election. This concept draws upon the traditional Michigan model originally developed in The American Voter (1960), whereby most voters
are perceived to be psychologically attached to parties for long periods
of time, perhaps for their lifetime, through developing stable social and
partisan alignments.5 During the 1960s and early 1970s, partisan identification was found to be closely related to voting choice in the United
States and in many other established democracies which had developed a series of national election surveys, such as Britain, France, and
Norway.6
Maintaining elections are characterised by electoral flux more than
flow; a few waverers shift between parties, leaving the balance of power
largely unchanged. In these contests, the underlying party system persists largely unaltered; they rarely produce much incumbency turnover,
let alone changes of government, allowing minimal opportunities for
new parties to challenge the status quo. The conventional wisdom, accepted during the 1960s and 1970s, assumed that most elections fell into
this category and as a result party systems were largely frozen in established democracies, so that outsiders had few realistic prospects of
entering parliament, let alone government. Lipset and Rokkans classic
account regarded the pattern of party competition as highly stable, predictable, and unchanging after the initial expansion of the mass franchise in European democracies, based on enduring links which parties
forged with core social groups, leaving minimal room for new challengers:
The party systems of the 1960s reflect, with few but significant exceptions, the cleavage structures of the 1920s.7 Maintaining elections
generate minimal shocks to disturb the status quo in parliament and in
government, effectively eliminating new challengers. As a result, maintaining elections provide the fewest opportunities for either incremental
or stepped gains in the electoral fortunes of new radical right parties, or
for other insurgent parties such as the Greens or nationalists, as the traditional mainstream parties consolidate and maintain their usual share of
the vote.
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(ii) Secular Dealigning Elections

Secular dealigning elections are characterized by loosening bonds linking
voters with mainstream parties. In these elections, the traditional party
system in each country may persist through institutional inertia, and indeed the government in power may be returned to office, as in maintaining contests, but nevertheless beneath the ice the underlying conditions
of electoral support become destabilized, less predictable, and potentially
more fluid. This expands the opportunities for fringe or minor radical
right parties to expand their share of the vote, at least on a temporary basis, from citizens dissatisfied with the mainstream status quo or unhappy
with the government.
With secular dealignment, the ability of social and partisan identities to
predict voting behavior is gradually weakened in a steady series of incremental steps over successive contests, like glaciers eroding rock. During
the early 1960s, most voters in established democracies were regarded
as largely stable in their voting choices, due to enduring social identities and long-term party loyalties which framed attitudes toward voting
choices. This stability was attributed to a cohesive socialization process
reinforcing social cues and party identification acquired within the family, school, work group, and social milieu. Lipset and Rokkan suggested
that patterns of party politics reflected the main social class, religious,
and center-periphery cleavages in the European electorate. Since the early
1970s, there is considerable evidence that changes in the workforce and
process of secularization have gradually worn away some of the most important class and religious identities which used to anchor voters to parties
over successive elections, so that today many contests are expected to fall
into the dealignment category.8 Such elections are expected to expand
the opportunities for radical right challengers to gradually improve their
share of the vote over a series of contests. But any support they gather is
expected to prove conditional upon specific contingent factors such as
the appeal of individual leaders, the policy issues they emphasize, the effectiveness of their campaign organization and political communications,
and their general party image, as well as the popularity of other parties.
(iii) Deviating Elections

Secular and deviating cases of dealignment are closely related, but they
differ in a specific election primarily in the pace and durability of electoral change. The long-term process of dealignment can also be expected
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to facilitate occasional deviating elections, characterized by a temporary

rapid reversal in the normal share of the vote for major parties, but
one which proves highly transient in subsequent contests. The change can
be best understood as one of trendless fluctuations or impulse-decay,
where a temporary shift is not sustained, leaving no lasting imprint on
the party system. Such contests are characterized by dramatic negative
protests against the governing parties, for example concerning a series of
highly publicized ministerial scandals or a dramatic failure of government
policy, which cause dissatisfied supporters to defect temporarily to minor
parties, only to return home again in the next contest. Second-order midterm contests are particularly prone to fall into this category where voters
register a temporary mid-term kick against the party or parties in power
in local or regional elections, by-elections, and elections to the European
Parliament, without the risk of causing the government to fall.9 In deviating cases the breakdown of traditional party-voter linkages is more
sudden, dramatic, and sharp, for example due to institutional reforms to
the electoral system, or decisive events transforming the political agenda,
such as the impact of the end of the Cold War on foreign policy and
security issues. In such contests, we expect that the radical right fringe
and minor parties and candidates can suddenly surge in popularity, unexpectedly gaining votes and seats, but that this proves transitory as they
fail to consolidate their gains. Deviating elections, where radical right
support proves ephemeral, while dramatic, usually have few long-term
consequences for the party system.
(iv) Secular Realigning Elections
By contrast, secular realigning elections generate an evolutionary and cumulative strengthening in a new party system, meaning an enduring pattern of party competition in government and the electorate which persists
over a series of elections. The idea of realignment has attracted a substantial literature, and the utility of this notion as a way of distinguishing
distinct periods in the history of American party politics continues to
be debated.10 For V. O. Key, the American party system was thought
to display a stable equilibrium for long periods of time; over successive maintaining elections, the pattern of voting by Southerners, AfricanAmericans, or Italian immigrants was regarded as largely predictable. But
in the exceptional cases of realigning elections, the American party system
was thought to experience an abrupt but enduring change, with long-term
consequences for patterns of party competition, for party identification
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in the electorate, and for governance and public policy, which persisted
over a long series of contests.11 The potential impact of realigning elections is most evident where radical right parties have made a consistent
and sustained series of advances at multiple levels over successive contests,
including in local and regional councils, the European Parliament, and national parliaments, thereby gaining greater status, power, and resources.
The impact of any sudden growth in radical right voting support can be
expected to prove more enduring if the party use this as a springboard
to nurture a grassroots mass movement, if they win seats in a range of
local, regional, and national bodies, and if they expand their membership
and activist base, consolidate their party organization, and accumulate
financial resources.
Secular realignment is a familiar model in political sociology, giving
primacy to broad sociodemographic developments which gradually alter
the structural basis of the population, workforce, and community. These
processes are exemplified by patterns of generational turnover, where the
young gradually replace older cohorts in the electorate; by significant
population migrations within or across national borders, such as the influx of Latin American Hispanics seeking work in California, Texas, and
New Mexico; by processes of secularization reducing religiosity in most
postindustrial societies; and by long-term socioeconomic trends, notably
the decline of the manufacturing industry and the expansion of the service sector economy. Their impact upon voting behavior is exemplified by
the evolution of the modern gender gap in many affluent nations, where
younger generations of women have gradually moved leftward, and also
by the erosion of churchgoing habits, the lower salience of religious values,
and the weakening links connecting the church to Christian Democratic
parties.12 Long-term patterns of party support can also be gradually transformed by the enfranchisement of new groups of voters, for example the
1964 U.S. Civil Rights Act expanding voting opportunities for AfricanAmericans, and the impact of the reduction in the qualifying age of the
franchise on voting turnout. The secular realignment model is understood
to produce an incremental, durable, and persistent strengthening in the
long-term contours of party support. In this context, any electoral gains
made by the radical right are expected gradually to consolidate and institutionalize over a series of contests. Voter-party bonds may strengthen,
for example if voters develop habitual preferences for radical right parties, or if an initial breakthrough gives the party access to public funding,
media visibility, and the resources and legitimacy that derive from elected
office, so that they strengthen campaign organizations and build a core
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grassroots base of party activists and loyalists who will stick with them
through good times and bad.
(v) Critical Elections
Certain exceptional contests, however, can be understood to represent
critical elections, characterized by abrupt, significant, and durable realignments in the electorate with major consequences for the long-term party
order. While secular realignments produce a gradual shift in the electorate over successive elections, with the more or less continuous creation
of new party-voter linkages and the decay of the old, by contrast critical
elections generate a more rapid realignment of the party system in government and in the mass electorate. Such contests have a significant impact,
not just by altering the electoral fortunes of a single party, but also by
generating an enduring shift in general patterns of party competition and
in the dominant policy agenda of successive governments. In this sense,
the pendulum of party competition ratchets decisively in a new direction.
The periods before, and after, these contests can be regarded, rightly, as
distinct historical eras. While every contest sees some electoral flux back
and forth between parties, lasting transformations of the party order occur rarely. V. O. Key identified critical elections as those in which more
or less profound readjustments occur in the relations of power within
the community, and in which new and durable electoral groupings are
formed.13 Critical elections move the party system from equilibrium to
a new level, which subsequently stabilizes and consolidates, in a model of
punctured equilibrium. Maintaining elections remain the norm, due to a
process of dynamic equilibrium, but the occasional experience of a profound external shock can produce stepped change, before maintaining
elections again set in producing another period of institutional stasis and
party-voter alignments.
The standard exemplar of this phenomenon in the American literature is the 19281932 American presidential elections, which saw the
assembly of Roosevelts New Deal coalition, securing Democratic control
of the White House for a quarter century and still evident in faded form
today.14 Experience of the Great Depression was thought to reinforce
cross-cutting issue cleavages which subsequently consolidated around
fundamentally different visions of the role of government in society presented by Democrats and Republicans. Other historical examples include
the 1924 and 1945 general elections in Britain, and probably the 1997
Labour landslide as well, as watersheds where the party order changed at
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Westminster, and changed decisively.15 Contemporary illustrations also

include the 1993 Canadian election, which saw the meltdown of the
Progressive Conservative governing party, the rise of Reform, and widening regional cleavages in party politics; the 1994 Italian election, witnessing the disintegration of the long-dominant Italian Christian Democrats;
and the 1993 New Zealand general election held under the Mixed Member
Proportional electoral system, which produced a dramatic fragmentation
of the traditional two-party system. Critical elections are often attributed
to ideological causes and specific events, notably the emergence of new,
salient, polarizing issues which cross-cut traditional left-right ideological cleavages, or the growing irrelevance of old divisions, scrambling
and reassembling the familiar landscape of party competition. As V. O.
Key noted: Only events with widespread and powerful impact or issues
touching deep emotions produce abrupt changes.16 But, as the New
Zealand case shows, fundamental reforms to the electoral system can
also generate these changes. In critical elections, radical right parties have
not just achieved a short-term victory, for example based on a temporary
protest vote, but they have managed to consolidate their support and alter
patterns of competition in the party system within each country. Through
substantial parliamentary gains, these parties have an opportunity to improve their resources and status, institutionalize their organization, and
consolidate processes of leadership transitions, and thereby sustain popular success over a further series of contests.
ii evidence and cases

The insights provided by this fivefold typology can prove most valuable
when interpreting the outcome of specific elections and the implications of
the results for the radical right, in particular when judging whether any
sudden breakthrough which they experience is likely to be a relatively
transient shock to the party system (classified as a deviating election),
or a more enduring change in the traditional party system (if regarded
as a critical election). It often remains difficult or even impossible for
contemporary commentators to make any satisfactory classification immediately after any specific contest but, with the benefits of hindsight and
the insights derived from analysis of a series of national election surveys,
contests can be classified more reliably based on subsequent developments
over a series of elections. In considering how best to classify and interpret elections using this typology, this study uses a series of indicators.
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table 10.1. Selected Election Case Studies Illustrating the Typology
Secular dealignment
Deviating elections
UK National Front and

British National Party
Dutch Lijst Pym

Fortuyn (LPF) (2002)
U.S. Reform Party
(199296)
Critical realigning
elections
Austrian Freiheitlche
Partei Oesterreichs
(1986)
(FPO)
French Front National
(FN) (1984)
Canadian Reform Party
(1993)
In particular, the most important evidence concerns any changes in party

identification over successive elections; maintaining elections see little
change in the strength of these attachments, whereas weakening party
identification suggests dealignment, and strengthening identification suggests a realignment process. The degree and persistence of electoral change
are also important indicators, along with any major shifts in ideological
competition. In particular, elections which involve a major breakthrough
by the radical right are interpreted here as a critical realignment only if
they fulfill certain strict conditions, namely: (i) if any sudden surge in the
share of votes or seats won by a radical right party is consolidated and
sustained over a series of subsequent elections; (ii) if the party strengthens
its support among core identifiers; and also (iii) if other parties respond to
the advance of the radical right by changing their ideological position and
shifting further rightward. The typology can be illustrated by considering
six cases, selected to compare radical right parties seeking office under
different electoral rules, as shown in Table 10.1.
The Progressive Weakening of Partisan Attachments
The long-term erosion of social and party identities in electoral behavior,
and the growth of dealignment, have now been established by a large body
of evidence in many established democracies.17 The most comprehensive
recent comparison by Dalton and Wattenberg collected data from the
series of National Election Studies and Eurobarometer (EB) surveys conducted in advanced industrialized democracies. The study reported that
the proportion of the electorate willing to express a party identification fell
significantly over time in thirteen out of nineteen postindustrial societies
and the erosion of strong party identifiers who felt very close to a party
was even more widespread and consistent cross-nationally.18 To update
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NETHERLANDS
GREECE
ITALY
DENMARK
GERMANY-WEST
PORTUGAL
FRANCE
LUXEMBOURG
GREAT BRITAIN
BELGIUM
IRELAND
SPAIN
partyid
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
partyid
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
partyid
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
NORTHERN IRELAND
partyid
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
1970 1980 1990 2000
YEAR
figure 10.1. Trends in Party Identification, EU 19701999. Q: Do you consider

yourself to be close to any particular party? <If yes> Do you consider yourself
to be very close, fairly close, or merely a sympathizer? % Yes. The proportion
yes, from 1970 to 1999, and the regression line summarizing the trend. Source:
The Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File, 19701999.
this analysis, and to replicate earlier work by Schmitt and Holmberg,19

patterns of partisan attachments can be compared in thirteen societies
based on the Eurobarometer. The Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File
has integrated these biannual surveys on a consistent basis from 1970 to
1999. The Mannheim data facilitates analysis of the trends in the proportion of all party identifiers (Figure 10.1), while the regression lines
summarize the direction of the trends and their significance across the
series (in Table 10.2). The results clearly illustrate and further confirm
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table 10.2. Trends in Party Identification, EU 19701999
All partisan identifiers
France
Belgium
Netherlands
West Germany
Italy
Luxembourg
Denmark
Ireland
Britain
Northern Ireland
Greece
Spain
Portugal
Strong partisan identifiers
Std. error
Sig.
Std. error
Sig.
.007
.002
.001
.007
.009
.006
.001
.014
.008
.013
.003
.013
.001
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.001
.000
.000
.000
.001
.001
.001
.001
.000
.000
.008
.000
.000
.000
.031
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.646
.035
.038
.039
.027
.021
.027
.034
.011
.029
.016
.039
.049
.072
.003
.003
.003
.003
.002
.005
.003
.004
.003
.008
.004
.012
.015
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.003
.000
.050
.000
.000
.000
Note: Binomial logistic (logit) regression analysis of the effect of year on party identification
as the dependent variable, coded as a dummy variable. Q: Do you consider yourself to be
close to any particular party? <If yes> Do you consider yourself to be very close, fairly
close, or merely a sympathizer? All % Yes. Strong identifiers are very close.
Source: The Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File, 19701999.
the steep erosion of party identification found in seven of the thirteen

European societies under comparison, plus the more gentle subsidence
of party identities occurring in another three societies. The only exceptions, although they are important ones, are the newer Mediterranean
democracies, which experience a slight growth in the proportion of party
identifiers over a shorter time period, a statistically significant pattern
in Greece and Spain (although not Portugal). It seems plausible that the
particular historical experience of autocracy and third-wave democracy
in these countries may have maintained or even strengthened party loyalties, although unfortunately the difference in time periods of the available
comparisons based on EB surveys makes it difficult to test this proposition
with any certainty. A significant decline is also observed for the proportion
of strong party identifiers in nine European societies under comparison,
although not in Ireland, Spain, and (contrary to some national election
study data) Britain.
Dispute in the literature continues to surround the interpretation of
these trends; as Figure 10.2 illustrates, the magnitude, pace, and precise
timing of partisan dealignment are far from identical in every country.
The idea of party identification may also have less meaning in European
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18
17
16
15 15
15
14
14
12
12
11
12
11
11
10
10
15
10
10
8
6
4
2
1
0
1
0
Regional
figure 10.2. Trends in Voting Support for the Front National, France 1973
2002. The percentage share of the vote won by the Front National, including
the first-round vote in second-ballot elections. Sources: Thomas T. Mackie and
Richard Rose. 1991. The International Almanac of Electoral History. Washington, DC: CQ Press; Tom Mackie and Richard Rose. 1997. A Decade of Election
Results: Updating the International Almanac. Studies in Public Policy. Glasgow:
University of Strathclyde; Elections around the World. www.electionworld.org.
parliamentary democracies, where this measure often tends to fluctuate

consistently with voting choice, rather than acting as a long-term stable
home anchoring loyalists over successive elections.20 Indeed the limited
panel survey election data which is available in the United States also
throws doubt on the validity of the basic anchoring proposition, even in
America.21 Yet at the same time, despite these serious doubts, alternative
indicators, including measures of public confidence and trust in parties,
also indicate growing skepticism about political parties as institutions in
many established democracies.22
Moreover the picture painted by the survey data is supported by
other important aggregate indicators of system-level electoral change in
these countries, which is consistent with the thesis of partisan dealignment (although theoretically these indicators could always rest upon
other causes, such as the impact of top-down shifts in party strategies
or electoral reform). This includes evidence of declining party membership, growing electoral volatility, the greater fragmentation of party systems, more split-ticket voting, the later timing of electoral decisions,
2002
2002
1999
1998
1997
1995
European
1994
1993
1992
Presidential
1989
1988
1988
1986
1986
1984
1981
1981
1978
1978
1973
1973
Parliamentary
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and increasingly leader-centered campaigns.23 For example, Dalton,

McAllister, and Wattenberg compared twenty-one advanced industrial
democracies, and found that party fragmentation increased during the
last four decades in two-thirds of the countries, measured by the effective
number of parliamentary parties which existed in the 1950s compared
with the 1990s.24 An alternative measure of system-level change is the
share of the vote won by new parties in Western Europe, defined as
those which began to contest elections no earlier than 1960. Mair found
that the proportion grew steadily decade by decade: new parties won
3.9% of the vote during the 1960s, 9.7% during the 1970s, 15.3% during the 1980s, and 23.7% during the 1990s.25 Total electoral volatility at
aggregate level can be measured using the Pedersen index, summarizing
the aggregate electoral gains of all winning parties in a given election.26
A comparison of fifteen Western European nations found that volatility
stayed fairly steady from the 1950s until the 1980s, in the range of 7.9 to
8.8%, but during the last decade this index rose sharply to 12.6%.27
What are the implications for the radical right? Any long-term weakening of the bonds anchoring voters to parties and growing electoral volatility expands the opportunities for newer challengers to mobilize support
and (within institutional constraints) to break through into elected office.
More voters become up for grabs on a contingent basis, which could plausibly lead toward more short-term support for radical right parties based
on the factors already seen as important in earlier chapters, notably disaffection with the government and the mainstream opposition, combined
with the particular ideological strategies and signature issues they adopt.
The process of secular dealignment in many established democracies since
the 1970s, as well as weak party-voter alignments in newer democracies,
could therefore be an important part of the underlying conditions generating openings for new challenger radical right parties. Certainly the
few exceptional cases where partisan alignments have not deteriorated
Portugal, Spain, and Greece are also ones where radical right parties
currently remain extremely marginal.
Nevertheless this common claim needs certain important qualifications.
By undermining established party systems, the process of electoral dealignment can benefit any challenger parties and independent candidates from
across the political spectrum, not just the radical right. Therefore elections characterized by secular dealignment should perhaps be understood
as representing a necessary but not a sufficient condition facilitating the
advance of the radical right; what matters is how far challenger parties
take advantage of the greater permeability provided by this context in
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crafting their electoral appeals and ideological strategies. There is nothing automatic about partisan dealignment causing the rise of the right.
Moreover, dealignment implies that any electoral gains made by radical
right parties are based upon contingent factors whether disaffection
with government, the popularity of leaders such as Haider and Le Pen, or
the salience of the issues of cultural protectionism so under these conditions these parties remain equally vulnerable to sudden voting losses in
subsequent contests. Support remains conditional and temporary, rather
than enduring and loyalist.
secular dealigning elections: britain

Social and partisan dealignment is a long-term process which has occurred in most established democracies, whereas, as we have seen, the
radical right demonstrates a highly varied electoral performance in these
countries. Despite the overall pattern, there is, in fact, only a poor fit at
macro level between the countries which have witnessed the most successful advance of the radical right and those which have seen the greatest
fall in party loyalties. Table 10.2 shows that some of the clearest evidence
for partisan dealignment since the early 1970s can been found in Ireland,
West Germany, and Britain, for example, all countries where radical right
parties have failed to establish a serious and sustained challenge.28 By
contrast, the proportion of partisan identifiers did not fall so sharply in
Denmark and Belgium, both countries where radical right parties have
established a very successful and enduring presence in parliament. In fact,
there are numerous examples of countries where radical right-wing parties
have failed to make any sustained impact over a long series of contests, despite substantial evidence of dealignment in the mass electorate, including
the failure of the National Front in Britain and in Francophone Belgium,
as well as the Republikaner Party in Germany (despite some minor fluctuations in support for this party during the early 1990s after unification).
The reason is that partisan loyalties are only one important legal barrier
to new parties, and their erosion is insufficient to facilitate the rise of
the radical right if there are prior institutional constraints, derived from
majoritarian elections or barriers to ballot access.
The British NF and BNP
This pattern is perhaps best illustrated by the British case, where both the
National Front and the British National Party have failed to break through
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in successive elections, despite substantial evidence for social and party

dealignment in the British electorate, as well as the growth of a strongly
multicultural society profoundly transformed by patterns of ethnic and
religious diversity, and the erosion of national borders caused by membership of the European Union, all conditions which might be considered
conducive to the advance of the radical right.
The National Front party was formed in 1967 in Britain following
the merger of the Racial Preservation Society, the British National Party,
and the League of Empire Loyalists. The NF made repeated attempts to
win Westminster seats during the 1970s, fielding 10 parliamentary candidates in the 1970 general election, 54 in February 1974, 90 in October
1974, and 303 in 1979. Yet at the peak of their popularity, during the
mid-1970s, the party achieved a negligible share of the nationwide vote
(less than 1%). The NF had became engaged in violent scuffles in mass
street demonstrations, actively opposed by the Anti-Nazi League and the
Labour Party, so their image became indelibly associated with extremist skinhead and Union-Jack-wearing football-hooligan gangs of young
men. The liberal consensus in British mainstream party politics agreed
not to play the race card, although in January 1978 (in the run-up to
the 1979 general election) Mrs. Thatcher came out with a widely publicized television comment in which she claimed that she understood the
fears of the British people of being swamped by people with a different
culture. This coded message about Conservative policy toward immigration, and a shift rightward symbolized by Thatcherism, coupled with
the steep vote threshold required at Westminster first-past-the-post elections, constituted an insurmountable barrier for the NF. The party had
a poor result in the 1979 general election, despite contesting almost half
the available seats nationwide.29 After 1979, the NF split into contending factions, and disappeared as an effective force in national politics,
although persisting on the ultrafringe of public life.30 The new Conservative government introduced the British Nationality Act in 1981, slightly
tightening the definition of citizenship and introducing new registration
requirements, although this was arguably influenced by the 1981 Brixton
riots, and the instinctively populist strain of the party represented by
Enoch Powell, as much as by any perceived electoral threat from the NF.
Conservative immigration policy was however diluted by the traditional
paternalism of the Tory wets in cabinet, led by the Home Secretary, Willie
Whitelaw.31
The extremist fringe of the public transferred their energies from the
National Front to the breakaway British National Party, formed in 1983.
Yet this party also failed to achieve more than a negligible share of the
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vote at Westminster elections; in 2001, for example, the BNP contested

34 out of 659 UK parliamentary seats, achieving 3.7% of the vote in these
constituencies.32 They gain disproportionate campaign publicity among
journalists and commentators and perform best at local level, in northern
councils like Burnley and Oldham with substantial Asian populations, although there remain fewer than two dozen NF councillors out of almost
twenty-two thousand seats in Britain.33 In the June 2004 local government elections in England and Wales, for example, the party fielded a
record number of local candidates (309), had a controversial party political broadcast shown on national TV, and hosted a high profile visit by
Jean-Marie Le Pen. Nevertheless, with an average 16.1% of the vote in
the wards they fought, the party picked up only four additional council
seats, making in the total only twenty-one BNP councillors nationwide.34
In the simultaneous British elections to the European Parliament, held
under PR rules, the BNP won 808,000 votes (4.9%), an increase, but no
seats. The protest vote in these contests mainly benefited the anti-EU UK
Independent Party, which doubled its share of the vote to 16.1%, returning a dozen MEPs. A single-issue right-wing party which shares hostility
toward Brussels, UKIP advocates British withdrawal from the European
Union, but without the overt racist baggage and violent skinhead image
which characterize the NF and BNP. UKIP performed well in the European
contests, using regional party list PR, but it proved difficult for them to
repeat this performance in the 2004 general election, with a broader political agenda, with leadership splits, and with the higher vote thresholds
found in single-member plurality districts for Westminster.35 Long-term
processes of secular dealignment facilitate the growth of minor parties,
and the conditions should be ripe for radical right parties in Britain, given
widespread public hostility toward the entry of asylum seekers and political refugees, as well as pervasive anti-EU sentiments and illiberal attitudes
toward Britains ethnic minorities.36 Nevertheless the growth of the NF
and BNP has been curtailed so far by their extremist image, their narrow,
single-issue agenda, and the substantial vote thresholds facing parties contesting the single-member plurality districts, used to date in local council
and Westminster elections.
deviating elections: the netherlands

and the united states
Secular dealignment also facilitates deviating elections, where radical right
contenders can occasionally achieve temporary popularity as flash parties,
experiencing sudden surges in popular support and short-term seat gains,
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but then failing to consolidate these advances, with support abruptly melting away in subsequent contests. This pattern was exemplified in earlier
decades by the 1959 French election, where a temporary surge in popularity by the Poujadists caused shock waves in the political establishment,
as well as by the 1969 American presidential election, where George
Wallaces American Independent Party gathered support as a southern
backlash against attempts at racial integration, civil rights, and the expansion of the welfare state. Deviating elections are also evident more recently by Perots success as a third-party challenger in the 1992 and 1996
presidential elections, by Pauline Hansons One Nation partys prominence on an openly racist antiAboriginal-rights platform in the 1999
state elections in Queensland, Australia, by Ny Demokratis temporary
gain of twenty-five seats in the 1991 Swedish election,37 and most dramatically by Lijst Pym Fortuyns stunning performance to become the main
opposition party on their first attempt in the May 2002 Dutch general
election. These contests were widely regarded by contemporary commentators as symbolizing a cataclysmic breakdown of established party systems, but in fact these proved, with the benefit of hindsight, to be strictly
temporary phenomena. Deviating elections provide dramatic media headlines, attracting considerable popular and academic attention, but they fail
to overturn enduring patterns of party competition.
The Dutch Elections in May 2002 and Lijst Pym Fortuyn
The May 2002 general election in the Netherlands provides a classic illustration of a deviating case. Pym Fortuyn began organizing his party
in February 2002, after he was removed as head of the candidate list for
the Leefbar Nederland for making controversial statements. A flamboyant personality and strong debater who was an openly gay publicist and
former professor, Fortuyn proved a controversial politician who attracted
a diverse group of candidates, most without any political experience. The
party platform promised the standard radical right policies, including
tougher action against immigrants who did not assimilate into Dutch
culture, stronger measures against crime, and less government bureaucracy, as well as some moderate social policies reducing teacher shortages
in schools and shortening hospital waiting lists. The immigration issue
caused heated debates all over the Netherlands. Fortuyn was accused of
being a far right racist, an accusation he vehemently denied, and he distanced himself from Le Pen and Haider. He did not advocate deporting
immigrants already in the country, nor closing all borders, though he
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did propose setting an immigration quota that prohibited Muslims from

entering the country. In addition, he favored revoking the article of the
Dutch constitution which prohibited discrimination. The assassination of
Fortuyn by an animal rights activist, Volkert van der Graaf, on 6 May
2002, just nine days before the Dutch general election, led to a sudden
surge of support for the Lijst Pym Fortuyn. The party, founded just three
months earlier, caused an electoral earthquake by gaining 17% of the national vote and 26 out of 150 members of Parliament, making them the
second largest in Parliament.
After a period of negotiations, the party entered coalition government
with the Christen Democratisch Appèl (CDA) and the Volkspartij voor
Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD), with the cabinet led by Prime Minister
Jan Peter Balkenende. Studies suggest that the electoral success of LPF
was due to the popularity of Fortuyn among those who had cynical attitudes toward government or who were dissatisfied with the performance
of the incumbent government, as well as by attitudes relating to asylum seekers and the integration of foreigners in the country.38 A critical
precondition for their rise was the exceptionally low vote thresholds in
the PR nationwide electoral system used in the Netherlands, where any
party requires only 0.67% of the national share of the vote to win a
parliamentary seat. Yet the sudden LPF advance proved transient; in the
months following the election, the recently established party was beset
by power struggles between various factions. The news media provided
extensive coverage of continuous bickering and scandals within the LPF
party as a whole, within their parliament faction, between LPF ministers
and high-ranking government officials, and between their officials and the
press. Party officials came and went. Moreover, the Balkenende cabinet
proved highly unstable, afflicted by the resignation of a series of ministers, including two appointed by the LPF. The party fell apart, without its
founder and leader, prior experience of government, and a coherent program. The administration lasted only eighty-six days, the shortest-lived
Dutch cabinet in the postwar period. Their most notable decisions were
supporting the United States invasion of Iraq and approving EU expansion plans. Lacking experienced political leaders and internally divided,
in the January 2003 Tweede Kaamer election which followed the governments collapse the LPF vote faded to just 5.7% (see Table 10.3). Reduced to only eight MPs, the party lost two-thirds of their parliamentary
representatives.
Commentators suggest that the populist outsider appeal of the LPF
also contributed toward their initial surge, but they lost this advantage
236
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
5.5
11.0
11.4
4.4
5.1
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5.4
7.1
4.8
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7.7
6.5
5.8
2.0
CUNY008B/Norris
11.0
11.7
Canada Austria
Switzerland France Norway Italy
Netherlands Denmark NZ
Belgium Italy Denmark Australia
Ref
VdU/FPO SVP
FN
FrP
MSI/AN LPF
DF
NZFP VlB
LN FP
ON
table 10.3. The Share of the Vote in National Legislative Elections for Relevant Radical Right Electoral Parties in Established
Democracies, 19482004
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1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988 2.1
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993 18.7
1994
1995
1996
11.6
11.1
6.1
5.0
14.9
12.4
6.3
13.0
3.7
4.5
1.9
15.7
13.5
5.4
5.9
6.8
5.3
13.4
8.4
7.8
6.6
1.9
1.4
1.1
1.4
10.1
8.4
8.7a
6.4
6.4
4.8
9.0
3.6
8.9
11.0
14.6
13.6
15.9
(continued)
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22.6
21.9
11.9
9.7
10.0
0.2
0.3
6.1
8.7
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16.6
11.0
9.9
5.4
5.0
CUNY008B/Norris
9.7
11.0
5.5
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238
25.5
19.4
19.2
19.6
12.9
8.1
11.3
12.1
8.1
14.7
15.3
11.7
7.3
12.0
11.4
11.4
5.7
17.0
9.7
9.7
12.0
7.4
9.1
9.1
10.4
4.3
9.0
5.2
11.6
9.9
7.8 3.9
7.8 9.1
3.9 0.6
2.4
6.4
6.4
4.3
8.4
0 521 84914 4
Note: Relevant electoral parties are defined as those winning on average at least 3% of the vote in successive elections to the lower house of the national
legislature held since 1990. Radical right parties are defined as those with a mean combined score on the Lubbers expert judgment scales of 9.0 or more out
of 10.
a The 1992 result was for the Lega Lombarda, the predecessor of the Lega Nord.
Sources: Thomas T. Mackie and Richard Rose. 1991. The International Almanac of Electoral History. Washington, DC: CQ Press; Tom Mackie and Richard
Rose. 1997. A Decade of Election Results: Updating the International Almanac. Studies in Public Policy. Glasgow: University of Strathclyde; Elections around
the World www.electionworld.org.
14.0
26.6
23.3
10.9
10.0
26.9
14.9
CUNY008B/Norris
mean
16.4
1948+
mean
21.2
1990+
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Canada Austria
Switzerland France Norway Italy
Netherlands Denmark NZ
Belgium Italy Denmark Australia
Ref
VdU/FPO SVP
FN
FrP
MSI/AN LPF
DF
NZFP VlB
LN FP
ON
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239
once they became part of the coalition government. This parallels the
after they entered into coalition goverosion of support for the FPO
ernment in Austria, so this may represent a classic dilemma facing populist antiestablishment parties, undermining their long-term success in
government.39 The contests which followed in the June 2004 elections
to the European Parliament saw no LPF members elected, and their
long-term prospects as a viable force in Dutch politics must remain in
doubt, despite continuing disaffection with mainstream party politics in
the Netherlands. The initial success of this party in May 2002 exemplifies deviating elections which generate a short, sharp, shock to the party
system, representing dramatic events for headline writers, but without
lasting consequences for long-term patterns of party competition. Their
meteoric rise and fall, and the subsequent period of political instability and upheaval, did have consequences, however, for the Netherlands,
as constitutional reform arose on the political agenda, with debate about
electoral reform designed to strength linkages between representatives and
constituents.40
Perots Reform Party and the 1992 U.S. Presidential Election
Also in this category, H. Ross Perots candidacy in the United States, and
the subsequent fragmentation of the Reform Party, provides insights into
the reasons why American independent candidates and third parties have
had so little success.41 It can be argued that Perot had little in common
with the virulently anti-immigrant racist appeal typical of radical right
and indeed the Reform Party
parties such as the Vlaams Blok, FN, or FPO,
could be regarded as more center-right than many others in this study, as
well as being a one-man show rather than an organized mass-based party.
Nevertheless Perot emphasized many classically populist, antiestablishment, and outsider themes in his campaign, adopting folksy appeals and
simplistic slogans designed to attract the little man, and focusing mainly
upon the need to reduce the size of government and levels of taxation,
with the anti-NAFTA theme tapped into fears of foreigners stripping
away American jobs and companies.42
In the early primary season for the Clinton-Bush 1992 presidential election, Ross Perot was a guest on CNNs Larry King Live when he first declared that he would run for president if citizens would get him nominated
on the ballots in all fifty states. This triggered a remarkable outpouring of
volunteer activism, especially among those most negative toward government institutions and the major party candidates; for example supporters
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from every state started collecting the necessary nomination petitions to

get Perot into the race, while over one million people were estimated to
have called the 800 telephone number asking Ross Perot to be their presidential candidate.43 The campaign suffered, however, from the candidates
erratic behavior; in mid-July, despite success in state petitions, Perot suddenly withdrew from the contest, shocking his volunteer activists; then
in early September, after the last petitions were validated, Perot did a
volte-face and stepped in again by announcing his official candidacy. By
the fall, his support stood at around 57% in the opinion polls and he
was included in all the presidential debates, as well as airing thirty-minute
info-mercials. On polling day, Perot eventually won one-fifth of the
popular vote across the country, with the support of almost 20 million
Americans, a remarkable figure, easily the best result for a third-party candidate in postwar American politics. As Table 10.4 illustrates, the closest
equivalent was the 9.9 million votes cast for George Wallace in 1968 and
the 5.7 million that John Anderson won in 1980. Perots support was especially strong, not surprisingly, among those dissatisfied with the major
party candidates, a pattern similar to that also found in earlier elections
for Wallace and Anderson.44
As a result of this performance, Perot qualified for $29.5 million in
matching public campaign funds during the 1996 Clinton-Dole presidential election, in return for accepting spending limits on private funds.
Nevertheless, in this contest he was excluded from the official presidential debates, and public satisfaction with the economic performance of
President Clinton reduced Perots support to 9% of the popular vote
(8 million). The following year, the National Reform Party was created
as a more independent organization, with an elected executive and a
membership convention. Their greatest success was the election of Jesse
Ventura, who ran under the Reform Party banner in 1998 as Governor
of Minnesota. In the run-up to the 2000 presidential elections, however,
the nascent party organization fell apart, with factions and the executive divided by internal squabbles about whether the party should move
further right, before they eventually adopted Pat Buchanan as the official
nominee. Many third-party and independent candidates contest American
elections but they have minimal success, in large part because of the
complex legal procedures for gaining ballot access in American states,
discussed earlier, designed as protectionist cartel arrangements to deter
challengers, coupled with the exceptionally high costs of campaigning,
and the vote threshold required in the majoritarian electoral college. The
permeability of the primary nomination process in the major parties also
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241
table 10.4. Vote Cast for Leading Minority Party Candidates for
President: United States 19402000
Election
Candidate
Party
Vote (000s)
1992
1968
1996
1980
2000
1948
1948
1972
1980
1976
1996
2000
1988
1992
1984
1988
1976
1952
1940
1956
1944
1972
1984
1944
1952
1940
1968
1960
1960
1964
1956
1964
H. Ross Perot
George Wallace
H. Ross Perot
John Anderson
Ralph Nader
Strom Thurmond
Henry Wallace
John Schmitz
Ed Clark
Eugene McCarthy
Ralph Nader
Pat Buchanan
Ron Paul
Andre Marrou
David Bergland
Lenora B. Fulani
Roger McBride
Vincent Hallinan
Norman Thomas
T. Coleman Andrews
Norman Thomas
Benjamin Spock
Lyndon H. LaRouche.
Claude Watson
Stuart Hamblen
Roger Babson
Henning Blomen
Eric Hass
Rutherford Decker
Eric Hass
Eric Hass
Clifton DeBerry
Independent
American Independent.
Reform Party
Independent
Green
States Rights
Progressive
American
Libertarian
Independent
Green
Reform
Libertarian
Libertarian
Libertarian
New Alliance
Libertarian
Progressive
Socialist
States Rights
Socialist
Peoples
Independent
Prohibition
Prohibition
Prohibition
Socialist Labor
Socialist Labor
Prohibition
Socialist Labor
Socialist Labor
Socialist Workers
19,742
9,906
8,085
5,720
2,883
1,176
1,157
1,099
921
757
685
449
432
292
228
217
173
140
116
111
79
79
79
75
73
59
53
48
46
45
44
33
Sources: Congressional Quarterly, Washington, DC, America at the Polls, 1920

1996, 1997; America Votes, biennial.
deters candidates from pursuing more independent paths. For all these
reasons, the 1992 and 1996 presidential elections proved to be deviating
contests for the Reform Party; in 2000, Buchanan won less than half a
million votes. In 2004 the Reform Party moved in a radically different direction by officially endorsing Ralph Nader, the consumer advocate and
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independent candidate, facilitating his entry on the ballot in Florida and

other states.
critical elections: france, austria, and canada

Three cases exemplify critical elections, generating durable changes in
party competition in each nation, include the surge in support for Le Pens
Front National, registered in the 1984 European elections in France; the
advance by the Freiheitliche Partei Oesterreichs

in the 1986 parliamentary
elections in Austria; and the decisive improvement in Reform Party fortunes in the 1993 Canadian general election. The Austrian case involved
PR elections and a consociational or consensus democracy, but Canada
illustrates that such decisive changes can also occur in majoritarian elections and adversarial democracies.
The 1984 European Election and Le Pens Front National
Jean-Marie Le Pens Front National has been a persistent presence in
French politics, attracting around one-fifth of the French electorate in different contests during the last fifteen years, after an initial breakthrough
or critical election occurring in the mid-1980s. The party was founded by
Jean-Marie Le Pen in 1972 but during the first decade the FN achieved a
negligible share of the national vote, receiving less than 1% of the firstround vote in parliamentary elections in 1978 and 1981 (see Table 10.3
and Figure 10.2).45 Le Pen failed to become a presidential candidate in
1981, after he could not gather the 500 sponsorship signatures needed to
qualify, and the party won a miserable 0.18% of the vote in the parliamentary elections that year. In the following years the party made some
modest gains in second-order elections, including at cantonal and municipal levels as well as in by-elections, raising its visibility, with Le Pen
appearing on French national TV for the first time.
The critical election which catapulted the NF from fringe into minor
party status was the 1984 contest for the European Parliament.46 Held
under PR rules, with Le Pen heading the party list of eighty-one candidates, this campaign represented a decisive historical breakthrough. FN
won one-fifth (11%) of the vote, electing ten MEPs, with particularly
strong support concentrated in Paris, Lyon, Alsace, and the Marseilles
areas.47 The lower vote barriers under PR, combined with the opportunity to cast a temporary mid-term protest vote in a second-order contest
against the Mitterrand Socialist government, allowed the Front National
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to gain credibility as a force in national politics. Their success led to

a growing number of party members and local deputies. The European
elections gave the party momentum which sustained it at roughly the same
level with the support of about one-fifth of the French electorate in the
1986 parliamentary elections, in which Mitterrand had introduced PR
temporarily in an attempt to divide the French right. Although shortly
afterwards the electoral system reverted back again to the second-ballot
majoritarian system, in an attempt to put the FN genie back in the bottle,
by then Le Pen was a force on the national political stage.48 The shift in
rules failed to dampen the FN share of the first-ballot vote in the 1988
parliamentary contests, which was fairly stable (9.7%), but support rose
to 14.4% in the first round of the presidential elections that year.
As shown in Figure 10.2, subsequent contests saw FN voting support
fluctuating from the low of 6% in the 1999 European elections, immediately after a damaging split in the party, to a peak of 16.9% in the first
round of the May 2002 presidential elections. The latter caused a minor
political earthquake, jolting French voters out of electoral apathy, when
Le Pen came out just ahead of the Socialist Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin.
Although Le Pen secured 17.7% of the vote in the second round, party
support fell back to 11% just a month later in the June 2002 elections
for the National Assembly. After their initial electoral breakthrough in
the early 1980s, the Front National have become a persistent presence in
French politics. The party have developed their organization and membership, consolidated the loyalty of core party supporters, fielded candidates
with growing success at regional, national, and European levels (gaining
patronage and negotiating governing coalitions with the center-right in
five of the twenty-two regions), gained resources from generous campaign
funding laws and from commercial and investment income, and have arguably influenced the national political agenda by raising the salience of
the issue of immigration, forcing the major parties in France to respond
to this agenda.49
The 1986 Austrian Election and the Freiheitliche
Partei Osterreichs
(FPO)
Critical elections which benefited the radical right are also exemplified by the 1986 Austrian parliamentary elections. The Verband der
Unabhangigen (League of Independents) was formed in 1949, and subse
quently renamed the Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs
or Austrian Freedom
Party (FPO) in 1956. The party was led by a group dissatisfied with the
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predominance of the conservative Osterreichische

Volkspartei (Austrian
Peoples Party, or OVP) and the socialist Sozialdemokratische Partei
Anton Reinthaller, the original chairman of the FPO,
Osterreichs
(SPO).
focused attention on opposition to Marxism and pride in the countrys
past, arguing that all Austrians should see themselves as part of a greater
German cultural community, attracting many ex-Nazis and army veterans. Reinthaller died two years after founding the party, and was succeeded by an ex-SS officer, Friedrich Peter. Aware that their connection
to nationalism was tarnished by the connection to their working with the
aimed to modernize by developing
Nazis after the Anschluss, the FPO
liberalism. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s support for the party stalled
at around 57% of the vote, with the division of government spoils divided between the Social Democrats and Peoples Party, except for a short
joined the SPO
governing coalition.
period in 1983 when the FPO
The FPOs turning point was the surge in popularity which occurred in
1986 when their leader, Norbert Steger, left office and was replaced by Jorg
50 When Haider
Haider, a man who became the public face of the FPO.
took over the leadership, the party share of the vote almost doubled,
from 5% in 1983 to 9.7% in 1986. The young and dapper Haider moved
sharply toward the radical right, based on an anti-immigrant
the FPO
and anti-EU platform, and populist exploitation of government disaffection, as well as displaying some neo-Nazi sympathies in his language and
favors strict enforcement
rhetoric.51 For example, the platform of the FPO
of existing immigration laws. All potential immigrants, they feel, should
be required to prove that they have jobs and accommodation. They also
believe in actively searching out and deporting all illegal immigrants in
Austria, deporting legal immigrants guilty of any crime, and mandating
all aliens carry state-issued identification. The new name chosen officially
in 1995, Die Freiheitlichen (the Freedom Movement), dropped all party
share of the vote leap
references in the title. The 1990 election saw the FPO
from 9.7% to 16.6%, with their seats rising from eighteen to thirty-three.
Nor was this simply a one-off deviating case; instead, they consolidated
this advance and even rose further to take one-fifth of the vote in the next
two general elections, before advancing to take one-quarter of the vote in
1999, winning fifty-two members of Parliament, and thus tying in second
place, equal to the OVP

(see Table 10.3).
into the Austrian governThis result led to the entry of the FPO
ment, in coalition with the mainstream conservative OVP

of Chancellor
Wolfgang Schuessel. This step provoked immediate outrage with mass
demonstrations at home and, for a few months, a diplomatic boycott
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by Austrias partners in the European Union and the withdrawal of the

U.S. Ambassador. To avoid major political sanctions, and to keep the
in power, Haider stepped down and Herbert Haupt, the new party
FPO
leader, became the Austrian Vice Chancellor. Haider continued to remain
into the gova strong influence within the party. The entry of the FPO
erning coalition reflected a major break with traditional patterns of government formation and alternation in Austria, producing a fundamental
shift in the options for cross-party cooperation and competition within
the legislature. Following divisions within the party and instability in the
subsequently fell sharply to just 10% in
leadership, support for the FPO
the 2002 general election, leading some commentators to suggest that radical right parties may experience serious problems in sustaining their appeal as outsiders once they enter governing coalitions.52 Public divisions
appear to have damaged their credibility,
within rival wings of the FPO
and critics argue that their leadership has been ineffective. The party may
also have been hurt by a broader shift in the Austrian public policy issue
agenda, shifting priorities from problems of immigration to rising concern
about the economy, unemployment, and social security. The entry of the
into coalition government also probably undermined their antiestabFPO
lishment image. Nevertheless, despite falling party popularity reported in
the opinion polls, in March 2004 Haider was reelected as Governor of
Carinthia, his home province, slightly increasing his share of the vote. The
future of the party remains to be determined by subsequent contests, so it
would be foolhardy to predict their role in Austrian party politics. Compared with their previous performance, however, the 1986 election represents a watershed contest which changed the credibility, status, and influ leading toward their later victories and their entry into
ence of the FPO,
government.
The 1993 Canadian Election and the Reform Party
Breakthrough contests are not confined to PR electoral systems; the Canadian case also illustrates how these events can occur among parties with
support concentrated in a strong regional base even in majoritarian systems of first past the post. The geographic distribution of voting support is vital for success within single-member districts. The Canadian
Reform Party was formed in 1987 by Preston Manning as a populist
neoconservative party reflecting alienation with the established party system, and also a reaction by the western states against the rise of nationalist demands by the Bloc Quebecois (BQ) in Francophone Canada.53
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Like other parties under comparison, the Reform Party shared a populist
style and certain concerns about the issues of multiculturalism and outgroup threats to nativism, although these issues combined with more
traditional free market economic philosophy, where they were close to
the old-right Progressive Conservatives, by emphasizing the need for retrenchment of the Canadian welfare state and reductions in income tax.
The party promised a new kind of politics, rejecting pan-Canadian accommodation, interest group pluralism, and the recognition of special minority rights. Reform contested the 1988 general election but they won only
2.1 percent of the vote and no seats. The 1993 election is widely regarded,
rightly, as the equivalent of an electoral earthquake in Canadian party politics. The election saw the meltdown of the Progressive Conservatives; the
party which had been in government saw their seats decimated from 169
to just 2. The beneficiaries were the Bloc Quebecois and Reform, both new
challengers intent on remaking the Canadian party system. Support for
Reform jumped from 2.1% to 18.7% of the national vote, with support
concentrated in Ontario and western English-speaking provinces, returning 52 MPs, in third place just behind the Bloc Quebecois 54. The result
was initially regarded as a temporary protest vote against government and
a regional reaction against BQ, but Reform consolidated their position
in subsequent contests, winning 19.4% and 60 MPs in the 1997 general
election, with support concentrated in the western states.54 Repackaged
under the label of the Canada Reform Conservative Alliance (Alliance
for short), in the attempt to expand out from their regional base, the
party won 25.5% of the vote and 66 MPs in the November 2000 general
election.
Reform/Alliance subsequently merged with the Progressive Conservatives on 15 October 2003, to become the new Conservative Party of
Canada under Stephen Harpers leadership. The merger occurred too close
to the June 2004 general election to allow development and publication
of an official party platform laying out detailed policy proposals, but
their declaration of general principles, agreed at merger and available
on their website, emphasized the older conservative tradition in Canada,
characterized by fairly vague platitudes but also expressing tolerance of
multiculturalism combined with free market economics. Yet at the same
time, even after the election, the position of the party remains ambiguous;
certain campaign comments and candidate speeches seemed to indicate
a hard-line stance against abortion rights and gay marriage, which may
indicate a strong strand of social conservatism within the new party. The
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situation still appears to be in flux so that at this point in time the party
still has important elements of the old radical right, such as some Reform activists running the 2004 campaign, although the party leader appears to recognize that this is not where the partys ideal target voters
lie. Some coming from the old centrist Progressive Conservative tradition
saw the merger of the two parties as a hostile takeover by the Alliance.
The former PC leader and prime minister, Joe Clark, actually left the new
party and campaigned for Liberal candidates, albeit not for the party
as a whole. Several other former MPs also defected and ran as Liberals. Yet there are also elements of the PC party remaining in the party
mainly from Atlantic Canada although whether they will be heard in a
parliamentary caucus dominated by westerners from the Reform movement remains to be seen.55 Compared with the Alliance in 2000, surveys
suggest that people were much less likely to name the new party when
asked if any federal party was just too extreme.56 After the election, the
Conservatives became the official opposition, with ninety-nine MPs and
29.6% of the vote, facing a minority Liberal-NDP administration, and
the prospects of another possible general election in the foreseeable future. This result was an achievement and yet their vote share was less than
the combined vote for the Alliance and the Progressive Conservatives in
2000, despite public fury with the Liberals. The new party is in transition
and it remains to be seen whether the party leadership and parliamentary
party adopt more moderate appeals, in the attempt to maximize their
support, necessary under majoritarian rules if they are ever to attain government, or whether Reform activists will pull the party in a more radical
direction.
conclusions
Understanding the rise of the radical right promises to provide general insights into processes of electoral change and party competition, including
the facilitating conditions and campaign strategies that could, in principle, allow any minor party to expand their base, whatever their ideological persuasion. The process of partisan dealignment is widely regarded
as integral to the fragmentation of party systems, with weakening psychological anchors to mainstream parties allowing newer challengers to
emerge. The evidence considered in this chapter relies upon selected case
studies, a less reliable process of comparison than the cross-national survey data used in earlier parts of the book, although specific illustrations
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also facilitate more contextual description of the conditions leading toward radical right success.
The evidence we have considered suggests that, by itself, secular
dealignment fails to account for radical right success. A loosening of
traditional voter-party linkages does facilitate intermittent cases of deviating elections. More importantly, the occasional critical election represents an enduring breakthrough for the radical right and a long-term
shift in national patterns of party competition. The examples which have
been described show that the breakthrough of the radical right has occurred in specific contests under many different conditions; in both majoritarian and proportional electoral systems, in Anglo-American democracies such as Canada as well as in Western Europe, in adversarial as
well as consensus democracies. The most important distinction shown
in this chapter is the contrast between dealigning elections, where the
radical right have failed to register any substantial and sustained advance (exemplified by the NF and BNP in Britain); deviating elections,
where they have made some sudden progress which has subsequently receded (shown by the Reform Party in the United States and by the Lijst
Pym Fortuyn in the Netherlands); and critical elections, where parties
and Canadian Reform have made
such as the French FN, Austrian FPO,
an initial breakthrough which they then solidified in a series of subsequent contests, altering patterns of party competition on an enduring basis
across the political system, and thereby generating processes of partisan
realignment.
Proportional electoral systems with low thresholds, combined with
partisan dealignment and disaffection with the mainstream alternatives,
facilitate breakthroughs by minor party challengers, as in the Austrian and
French cases. But even under the most favorable conditions, there are no
simple guarantees that radical right parties can maintain and build upon
any initial breakthrough to consolidate their support on a long-term basis, as shown by the rise and equally rapid downfall of Lijst Pym Fortuyn.
Some contextual conditions are beyond each partys control, but the cases
strongly suggest that at least part of the answer for long-term success lies
in their own hands. The shift rightward that occurred under Haiders lead a long-established party in Austria, generated a strong
ership in the FPO,
improvement in their fortunes. There are also many cases, notably Perots
Reform Party, which show how organizational failures, notably disputes
about leadership succession, ideological splits, and internal fractionalization, have proved deeply damaging for new and poorly institutionalized
parties, causing public support to dissipate rapidly. What remains to be
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considered in the concluding chapter is whether the advance of new radical right challengers has caused other parties to respond by also moving
rightward, for example on issues of immigration and race relations, and
what consequences the rise of these parties has had on broader processes
of representative democracy and the public policy agenda.
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CONSEQUENCES
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11
Assessing the Rise of the Radical Right
and Its Consequences
After summarizing and integrating the key findings of the previous chapters, this conclusion considers their broader implications for party competition and for democracy, including whether there is any contagion of
the right, with other parties responding to their success. The results from
the study may help to dispel certain common fallacies, while also emphasizing some overlooked factors leading to radical right success. To recap
the argument, the advance of new challenger parties is open to multiple
interpretations, and demand-side, supply-side, and institutional perspectives can be found in the literature seeking to explain the rise of the radical
right. Let us summarize the evidence presented throughout the book, then
consider some of the consequences of this phenomenon.
the institutional structure of opportunities

From Duverger onwards, the classic literature on electoral systems suggested that these rules have an important mechanical impact upon the
number of parties elected to office, with the implication that minor and
fringe parties, including the radical right, have more opportunities to gain
seats under proportional representation than under majoritarian systems.
More recently this conventional wisdom has been questioned by studies
which have suggested that electoral systems play little role in the success
of the radical right.1 Indeed it is true that there are examples where these
parties have advanced within majoritarian systems (such as in Canada)
as well as under PR (illustrated by the Netherlands, Norway, Belgium,
and Switzerland). Nevertheless, the balance of evidence indicates that in
general rules do matter. The study considered the institutional structure
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of opportunities that minor parties face in the nomination, campaign, and

election stages of the pursuit of elected office.
The conclusion from Chapter 4 was that nomination rules probably
contribute toward the electoral success of minor radical right parties.
Case studies suggest that the legal requirements governing party registration and ballot access play an important role in limiting opportunities
for radical right parties under four main conditions: where the nomination process for ballot access proves cumbersome and burdensome for
minor parties (as in the United States); where these parties fall foul of
civil law, notably race relations legislation governing hate speech (as in
Belgium and the Netherlands), or campaign finance regulations (as in
Australia and Denmark); where constitutional provisions and court decisions ban extremist or antidemocratic parties (exemplified by Germany,
Chile, and Spain); and in repressive regimes holding manipulated and
flawed elections where the ballot access and campaign rules are grossly
biased toward the ruling party (illustrated by Belarus). Few liberal democracies ban radical right parties outright, or impose serious limits on the
parties or candidates who can be nominated for election, on the grounds
that this would interfere with fundamental human rights and civil liberties
in free elections. But in a handful of cases such as in Germany, Spain,
and Chile extremist party organizations that are directly associated with
the illegal use of violence, or which condone terrorist tactics, have been
forced to disband or occasionally reorganize under new labels. The fragile
institutionalization of minor parties means that the fortunes of the radical right remain particularly vulnerable to legal challenges, such as the
prosecution of party leaders charged with campaign finance violations,
vote-rigging irregularities, or propagating hate speech.
There are many reasons why the legal statutes and formal regulation
governing access to campaign media and party funding could serve as a political cartel, reinforcing the power of incumbent parties already in elected
office, or alternatively could generate a more level playing field which provides opportunities for minor party challengers. Despite this clear logic,
the evidence examined here could find no significant relationship between
the available indicators of the formal legal requirements for financial and
media access and the national levels of voting support won by the radical
right (or more general patterns of party competition). Several important
limitations mean that it is advisable to be cautious about drawing any
strong positive or negative inferences from the existing evidence, and at
best the hypothetical claim must be regarded as essentially unproven.
This is a topic deserving of further research, for example historical
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case studies monitoring developments where the campaign finance rules

change to distribute more resources to fringe and minor parties.
The book also examined evidence for the impact of electoral systems,
particularly the standard claim that proportional representation with low
legal vote thresholds facilitates the election of smaller parties. The results
of the comparison presented in Chapter 5 indicate that a revised version of
the conventional wisdom is partially correct: electoral systems were found
to affect the proportion of seats gained by minor radical right parties,
confirming that their representation was facilitated by PR systems with
low legal thresholds. Even within the category of PR systems, the existence
of high legal vote thresholds also exerts an important mechanical brake
on the radical right share of seats. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests an
important and overlooked qualification to the standard view: the electoral
system works through determining the radical rights share of seats, not
votes. The effects in this regard can be regarded as mechanical rather than
psychological. The institutional context of the electoral system might be
expected to influence popular support for minor parties, with majoritarian
systems having a psychological effect by depressing the vote share for
fringe and minor radical right parties, where voters switch to more viable
parties for strategic or tactical reasons. Yet this turns out not to be the case
after all. It remains unclear why the wasted vote thesis fails, but given
the proximity theory of voting, probably the main reason is that radical
right supporters are located too far away from other contenders across
the ideological spectrum for them to switch to their second-preference
choice for tactical or strategic considerations.
The impact of the electoral system upon seats can be illustrated by a few
examples. Under majoritarian elections, for example, the previous chapter
showed how the Front National emerged from the fringe in the mid-1980s,
boosted by the 1984 European elections held under PR, but after the rules
reverted back to the majoritarian runoff system, its subsequent role in the
French parliament has remained marginal. The last legislative elections in
France, in June 2002, saw the FN receive the support of about 11.3% of
the electorate, yet they failed to win a single seat in the National Assembly,
due to the second-ballot electoral system. By contrast, after gaining a
similar share of the national vote (1112%) in the most recent general
elections, under PR the Vlaams Blok constitute one-tenth of the members
of the Belgian Parliament, while Alleanza Nazionale hold ministerial office
in Berlusconis cabinet. Politically, winning seats, not votes, is vital for
power, since parliamentary representation provides the radical right with
legitimacy, resources, and patronage which can be leveraged, with luck
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and skill, into further advances. Through winning office, minor parties
gain access to a public platform on the national stage, allowing them to
propagate their views, influence debates, and mobilize popular support
via the national news media, not just gain sporadic bursts of publicity
during occasional election campaigns.
At the same time, certain important qualifications to these conclusions
should be noted. In particular, the evidence about the impact of electoral
systems remains limited, and the direction of causality in this relationship
cannot be determined from cross-sectional evidence alone, particularly
in newer democracies. What this means is that it is not possible to say
for certain whether majoritarian electoral systems penalize and thereby
discourage extremist parties from competing, or, alternatively, whether
newer democracies containing multiple parties dispersed widely across
the political spectrum are more likely to adopt PR rules in their electoral
laws and constitutions. What can be said more confidently, however, is
that in established democracies with relatively stable electoral systems
over successive decades, or even for centuries, in the long term it seems
plausible that the rules of the game (adopted for whatever reason) will
probably constrain subsequent patterns of party competition. In Britain,
for example, the system of plurality single-member districts has persisted
in elections for the House of Commons since the Great Reform Act of
1832, with the exception of a few dual-member seats which were finally
abolished in 1948. This system has greatly limited the opportunities for
fringe and minor parties like the National Front and BNP to challenge
Labour and Conservative predominance at Westminster, despite growing
patterns of partisan dealignment and occasional surges of popular support for minor challengers like the UK Independence Party in second-order
parliamentary by-elections and European elections. Where electoral rules
have persisted unchanged for many decades, they influence how radical
right minor parties respond strategically to the structure of opportunities
they face. Before and after cases also confirm the impact of rules. For example, when electoral reforms were introduced by the Blair government,
changing the system used in European elections from first-past-the-post
to regional party list PR, this improved the subsequent performance of
fringe parties, including the BNP and the UK Independence Party.
the social basis of support and a new social cleavage

in the electorate?
The institutional context of the nomination and election process therefore shapes the opportunities facing radical right parties. As discussed
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in Chapter 6, structural explanations commonly relate patterns of party

support to the major social cleavages in the electorate. Interpretations
of the nature of the social base of the radical right differ, with classic
accounts of European fascism emphasizing their strength among the petite bourgeoisie displaced by organized labor and big business, and new
cleavage theories emphasizing support among the socially disadvantaged
in affluent postindustrial societies, while accounts of partisan disadvantage suggest that social identities have generally weakened in their ability
to structure voting choices. Where parties are based upon distinct social
sectors, then Lipset and Rokkan suggest that they can forge enduring ties
with these groups, representing their interests and concerns in the political system. Where such ties have weakened, through social and partisan
dealignment, then we would expect greater electoral volatility and more
potential for protest voting. What do the results of the survey analysis
suggest about the social base of support for the radical right?
As we have seen, the systematic evidence supporting the new social
cleavage thesis remains limited, at best. The social class profile of the radical right electorate presented in Chapter 6, including multiple indicators
of social inequality, suggests that they are disproportionately overrepresented both among the petite bourgeoisie self-employed professionals,
own-account technicians, and small merchants and among the skilled
and unskilled working class. The survey evidence presented in Chapter 6
throws doubt on the claim that support for the radical right in all countries is disproportionately based upon its appeal to a new social cleavage
or underclass of low-skilled and low-qualified workers in inner-city areas,
or that its voting support is strongest among those with direct experience
of unemployment or poverty. This cross-class coalition means that we
should look skeptically upon the idea that the rise of the radical right
is purely a phenomenon of the politics of resentment among the underclass of low-skilled and low-qualified workers in inner-city areas, or that
it can be attributed in any mechanical fashion to growing levels of unemployment and job insecurity in Europe. The socioeconomic profile is
more complex than popular stereotypes suggest. At the same time the
traditional gender gap has persisted, with these parties drawing disproportionate support from men. Although the pooled analysis suggests some
common patterns, the results disaggregated by nation show considerable
variations in the social profile of radical right voters. As shown in Chapter 8, radical right voters are significantly more likely to believe that immigrants take jobs away from workers, just as they are also more likely to
express instrumental racist sentiments concerning the cultural or general
economic threat of immigrants. But this pattern reflects the attitudes of
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radical right voters rather than their direct experience, for example of unemployment. It could be that alternative, more sensitive, survey measures
could capture any direct linkages between perceptions of job insecurity,
hostility to immigrants, and support for the radical right, but the available
evidence from the ESS fails to support this thesis.
the politics of resentment?

Another common perspective regards rising support for the radical right
as indicative of widespread protest against the status quo, anger at the
choices offered by mainstream parties, and hence an indicator of broader
public disaffection in democratic societies. The politics of resentment thesis is pervasive in the literature, tapping into the older traditional explaining the propensity of authoritarian personalities to support European fascism.2 This argument is not necessarily antithetical to the new
cleavage thesis, as these accounts can be combined where political disaffection is concentrated among disadvantaged social sectors. Nevertheless
the explanation remains logically distinct.
The evidence presented in Chapter 7 confirms that those who cast their
ballots for the radical right are indeed less trusting of a range of political institutions in representative democracy. Studies also suggest that a
gradual erosion of institutional confidence has occurred among the public during recent decades in many established democracies, especially a
decline of political trust toward parties and parliaments.3 This process
should have expanded the constituency of those who are potentially sympathetic toward the expression of antiestablishment sentiments. The evidence presented here therefore does support the politics of resentment
thesis to some extent, but we should not exaggerate either the strength
or the consistency of the indicators. Certain important points need to be
borne in mind before concluding that any erosion of institutional trust in
contemporary democracies can be blamed for the rise of the radical right.
First, growing mistrust of representative institutions is widespread
throughout contemporary democracies, so it is difficult to use this explanation to account for the substantial variations in the electoral fortunes
of the radical right, such as the contrasts between Norway and Sweden,
or Italy and Spain, as well as differences in their performance within
countries, such as the popularity of the Front National in Francophone
Belgium and the Vlaams Blok in Wallonian Belgium, or how well the
Canadian Reform/Alliance/Conservative Party performed in Quebec and
the western states.
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In addition, popular journalistic explanations often claim that public disillusionment with politics and dissatisfaction with government has
fueled the ascendancy of the radical right. Yet the interpretation of the direction of causality in this relationship remains open to question. Citizens
disenchanted with mainstream parties, and alienated from the political
system, may indeed gravitate toward supporting the radical right as the
party best able to articulate these concerns. Alternatively, the exclusion of
radical right parties from power, coupled with the populist antiestablishment rhetoric of their leaders, could plausibly encourage mistrust of political institutions amongst their followers.4 Chapter 7 established crossnational variations in positive or negative evaluations of government performance among radical right supporters, which were related to whether
radical right parties are either included or excluded from power.5 Where
these parties become part of governing coalitions, or where conservative
governments rise to power which are closely sympathetic to their aims,
then radical right supporters in these nations prove more positive toward
government. Where radical right parties are excluded, then, not surprisingly, this encourages mistrust of the responsiveness and performance of
government among their supporters. In practice, with cross-sectional survey evidence, it is difficult to disentangle the direction of causality in the
relationship between trust and radical right voting. In practice, some interaction effects are probably at the heart of this pattern, rather than the
simple one-way relationship often assumed, and analysis of time series,
multiwave panel surveys, or experimental data is probably necessary to
resolve this issue.
the growing salience of cultural protectionism?

Another common sociological explanation for the rise of the radical right,
indeed the conventional wisdom, focuses upon the spread of multiculturalism and more ethnically diverse societies found today in postindustrial
nations. This process is driven by many factors associated with processes
of globalization, notably by patterns of long-term social change and population migration, the growth of refugees and asylum seekers fleeing armed
conflict and failed states, and more permeable national borders and open
labor markets. Many accounts assume that a public backlash against these
trends has triggered the popular success of leaders such as Le Pen and
Haider who articulate these concerns. In this view, the radical right can
be regarded as a single-issue party, especially where mainstream parties
and liberal elites in the European Union and Anglo-American democracies
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have failed to respond to any public resentment and growing hostility

directed against foreigners and outsiders by setting stricter limits on
immigration and asylum seekers.6
The evidence analyzed in Chapter 8 suggests that, contra the standard
account, no significant relationship existed at aggregate level between the
national share of the vote cast for radical right parties and a wide range of
indicators of ethnic diversity in a country, whether measured by estimated
official rates of refugees and asylum seekers, the proportion of nonnationals and noncitizens living in a country, or public opinion toward immigra and the Front National
tion. Parties such as the Vlaams Blok, the FPO,
have consistently emphasized racist rhetoric, antiforeigner diatribes, and
the theme of cultural protectionism as the leitmotif recurring throughout
leadership speeches and at the heart of their election campaigns. Other
policies which they advocate, such as restrictions on welfare services or
the need for strong law and order, are also often coded implicitly within a
racist frame. As a result, the electoral success of these parties is often interpreted to signify a public backlash directed against ethnic minorities in the
countries where they do well. But, in fact, the relationship proves more
complicated. At the same time, at individual level, anti-immigrant and
anti-refugee attitudes, as well as general support for cultural protectionism, do predict who will vote for the radical right. Their electoral support
was typically stronger among people who believed that immigrants are
an economic threat, by taking away jobs or depressing wages, that the
nations culture was undermined by foreigners, or that there should be
restrictive policies toward refugees. These attitudes remained significant
even after applying the standard battery of prior social controls. This
pattern was found consistently in many, although not all, of the eight
countries in the European Social Survey with a relevant right party. By
contrast, attitudes concerning economic policies, such as government policy toward income inequality or the role of trade unions, failed to prove a
significant predictor in many nations, although admittedly the full range
of economic attitudes toward the role of markets and the state were only
poorly gauged in this particular survey.
The apparent mismatch in the results found at both these levels can
be accounted for by the well-known ecological fallacy, which suggests
that patterns found in public opinion at national level do not necessarily
hold at individual level, and also by the individual fallacy, which implies
that patterns established at individual level cannot necessarily be assumed
to reflect public opinion at national level.7 Minor radical right parties
gain the support of a minority of the electorate, even in countries such
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as Switzerland, where they are strongest, and this minority is strongly

skewed in terms of the normal distribution of public opinion; hence it is
misleading to generalize on the basis of the attitudes held by radical right
supporters to the general state of public opinion existing in the countries
where the radical right performs well. The minority most hostile toward
immigration, ethnic diversity, and multiculturalism are indeed most likely
to vote for the radical right, as many others have reported. But this does
not mean that the popularity or success of the radical right in a country
indicates the balance of public opinion toward cultural protectionism,
immigration, or race relations within that nation. It may simply mean
that public opinion is sharply polarized around these issues and values,
not that the median voter favors cultural protectionism.
ideological appeals
On this basis, we can conclude that sociological theories of structural
change only take us so far. What needs to be considered is not just how
social conditions might facilitate attitudes conducive toward the rise of
the radical right, but, even more importantly, how parties respond to
public demands when crafting their strategic ideological and value appeals, targeting voters, and building their local and national organizations.
Supply-side explanations emphasize these factors, strongly influenced by
the Kitschelt thesis that the central ideological location of mainstream
parties, for example a liberal elite consensus emphasizing tolerance of
refugees and asylum seekers, can maximize opportunities on the far right
of the political spectrum for newer insurgents. Yet the comparison of the
ideological location of the mainstream center-left and center-right parties
in sixteen countries, presented in Chapter 9, failed to support the claim
that the radical right advanced most successfully where the left-right gap
was smallest. Nor was there strong support for the van der Brug variant
of this argument, claiming that it is the ideological position of the mainstream right-wing party which is critical for maximizing opportunities for
the radical right.
The argument developed in this book suggests that the broader context constrains party locations across the ideological spectrum. This claim
builds on the observation in Chapter 5 that under PR electoral systems
with low thresholds, minor parties can gain elected office by winning a relatively modest share of the popular vote. Under these rules, minor parties
have a strategic incentive to win seats by adopting bonding strategies
which they can use to mobilize and activate niche cleavages within the
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electorate. Using such strategies, the radical right typically stress the signature issues of cultural protectionism which distinguish these parties
most clearly from their mainstream competitors on the center-right and
center-left. By contrast, in majoritarian electoral systems, with higher effective electoral thresholds, minor parties will fail to surmount the hurdles
to elected office (and thus the rewards of status, power, money, and legitimacy that flow from office) unless they adopt broader populist or catchall
appeals by emphasizing a wider range of values, based on vague rhetoric
and simple slogans largely devoid of substantive policy content.
The evidence in Chapter 9, based on comparing the perceived ideological location of parties in thirty nations, confirms the idea that party competition is usually more centripetal in majoritarian systems while being
dispersed more centrifugally across the whole ideological spectrum from
far left to far right in PR systems. The survey evidence also suggests that
both ideological values and affective orientations toward parties were important predictors of voting for the radical right in the multivariate analysis of the pooled sample, drawing upon all thirteen nations where these
factors could be compared. These attitudes reduced the significance of
almost all of the social-demographic variables in the model. But to take
account of the institutional context, the analysis was broken down into
more detailed case studies, comparing voting behavior in Canada and
France (exemplifying majoritarian electoral systems) with Norway and
Switzerland (illustrating proportional systems). The multivariate models
analyzed the relative impact of left-right ideological location and populist orientations (liking for the far right party) on casting a vote for the
radical right in each election, including a battery of prior social and attitudinal controls. The results confirmed that in Switzerland and Norway,
using proportional party list electoral systems, both ideology and partisanship played a significant role in shaping the appeal of the radical right.
But in the countries using majoritarian electoral systems, in both Canada
and France, only populist appeals (not ideological proximity) proved significant predictors of radical right votes. It would have been useful to
explore the basis of the radical right vote in more countries using majoritarian systems, such as the background and attitudes of BNP supporters
in Britain or One Nation in Australia, but there were too few radical
right voters contained in the standard election surveys in these countries
to facilitate analysis. Given these limitations, the case-study comparison
cannot be regarded as definitive, but the results are consistent with the
theory that electoral rules shape radical right party strategies and electoral
appeals.
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organizational consolidation
The factors leading to an initial surge in support for the radical right are
not necessarily sufficient to sustain their advance, as shown by the sudden rise and fall of flash parties. Parties which have developed effective
organizations building up financial campaign resources, institutionalizing party rules, encouraging internal party discipline and cohesion, and
fostering a grassroots base are more likely to endure through good electoral times and bad. Minor challengers and insurgents are also likely to
have more difficulties in mobilizing support where mainstream parties
have established and maintained enduring partisan attachments in the
mass electorate. The case studies discussed in Chapter 10 serve to illustrate the broader conditions under which radical right parties have, and
have not, consolidated their advance in successive elections. Britain exemplifies a country which has experienced processes of social and partisan
dealignment, but where the National Front and British National Party
have consistently failed to surmount other institutional barriers to gain
entry at Westminster. Yet dealignment can also facilitate occasional deviating elections; examples include the Netherlands, where the Lijst Pym
Fortuyn had sudden success in May 2002, only to fall equally sharply
within two years, as well as the short-term breakthrough that Ross Perots
Reform Party enjoyed in the 1992 and 1996 U.S. presidential elections.
By contrast, critical elections involve an enduring shift in patterns of party
competition, exemplified by the 1984 European elections in France, where
Jean-Marie Le Pens Front National, which had enjoyed poor fortunes for
a decade, experienced a major breakthrough from fringe to minor party
status, a position which proved durable in subsequent contests; the 1986
Haider moved the
Austrian election representing a decisive contest as Jorg
Austrian Freedom Party from the margins to mainstream; and the 1993
Canadian elections marking the initial breakthrough for the Reform Party,
subsequently sustained as the Alliance and then Conservative Party.
the consequences for party competition

in representative democracies
The broader implications of this study may also help us to understand
the potential impact of radical right parties on the institutions of representative democracy. Many commentators have expressed considerable
concern about the advance of the radical right, on the assumption that
this development poses substantial threats to government stability, the
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public policy agenda, and indeed the fundamental health of representative democracies.8 But are these anxieties actually justified? In particular,
here we can consider whether there is good evidence supporting the contagion of the right thesis, which suggests that the advance of the radical
right has caused mainstream parties to become more socially conservative
on issues of immigration and race relations, for example by encouraging
governments to adopt more restrictive policies toward asylum seekers and
political refugees.
Many commentators suggest that radical right parties have probably
had their greatest influence by raising public concern about their signature issues, especially those of race relations, immigration policy, welfare reform, and law and order, thereby tugging moderate parties toward the extreme right.9 In France, for example, Schain suggests that the
center-right parties, the Rassemblement pour la Republique and Union
pour la Democratic Francaise, adopted the Front National anti-immigrant
rhetoric after 1986, in the attempt to preempt Le Pens support.10 Along
similar lines, Pettigrew argues that Austria implemented more restric entered coalition government
tive policies toward refugees after the FPO
11
with the OVP. In spring 2004, the Dutch government legislated to remove tens of thousands of failed asylum seekers, a measure that seems to
have been influenced by Lijst Pyim Fortuyns electoral success. The New
Zealand First party have long adopted a hard-line position over race
relations, critiquing the Treaty of Waitangi safeguarding Maori rights.
Following their example, in January 2004 Don Brash, the leader of the
main right-wing opposition Nationalist Party, gave a speech echoing their
rhetoric and playing the race card over Maori rights, generating a surge
of popular Nationalist support in the polls.
Of course these developments in public policy might have occurred
anyway, as governments responded to global patterns of population migration, growing multiculturalism in modern societies, and the shifting
tide of public opinion on these issues. In recent years, many EU states
have tightened immigration policies, even where these parties remain
weak. Yet the growth of the radical right could plausibly have played an
important role in this process through challenging the liberal consensus
among mainstream governing parties, altering public discourse, expanding the issue space to draw mainstream parties rightwards, heightening
the salience and polarization of the issue of immigration on the policy
agenda, and legitimating policies founded upon racism and intolerance.12
Some of the most systematic evidence supporting this thesis was developed
by Harmel and Svasand, who compared the content analysis evidence of
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party manifestos in Norway and Denmark. In these countries, the policy

platforms for the moderate Conservative parties have moved rightward
since the early 1970s, and this shift can be interpreted as a response to the
electoral challenge posed by the success of the Progress parties on their
extreme flank.13
Building upon this approach, we can use the time-series data provided
by the Manifesto Research Group (MRG) to see whether critical elections
in France, Canada, Switzerland, and Austria, which saw considerable vote
and/or seat gains by a radical right party, were consistently associated with
a subsequent rightward ideological shift in the policy platforms offered by
mainstream parties. The Manifesto Research Group/Comparative Manifesto Project has used content analysis to code party platforms published
from 1945 to 1998 in twenty-five nations, facilitating comparison of
party policy programs within a common framework across many Western
democracies.14 Party platforms, manifestos, and election programs provide an important source of information about party priorities and values.
They represent authoritative documents, given considerable prominence
in election campaigns, which have been widely used in the literature to
gauge the relative distance or proximity of parties. The records of parties in government are also commonly evaluated against the manifesto
promises they made before coming into power, and studies suggest that
many policy pledges are indeed often implemented through legislation,
spending budgets, or administrative decisions.15 The content analysis coding scheme developed by the MRG uses fifty-seven categories of issues,
measuring the proportion of manifesto sentences devoted to topics such as
law and order, free enterprise, and the expansion of social services, assuming that the amount of attention in the manifesto reflects the relative priority which each party gives to each issue. A summary left-right scale is then
developed among a subgroup of twenty-six items, calculated simply by
subtracting the sum of left percentages from right percentages. The left
coding includes statements about issues which typify social democratic or
socialist principles, such as the expansion of social services and education,
positive references to labor groups and trade unions, and favorable mentions of economic planning and nationalization. The right reflects priorities such as policies favoring free enterprise, law and order, and the military. The position of the radical right can be compared against the location
of other parties in each election based on the overall left-right summary
scale. It should be noted that the MRG scale represents the attempt to
develop a generic left-right ideological scale, focused heavily upon classic
issues of the role of the state versus the free market economy, rather than
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266
25
60
20
40
15
20
0
10
% Vote for FPO
Left << party positions >> Right
80
-20
5
-40
0
-60
1995
1994
Greens
1990
1986
1983
1979
OVP
1975
1971
1970
FPO
1966
1962
1959
1956
1953
1949
SPO
% Vote FPO
19491995.
figure 11.1. Austrian Party Competition and Support for the FPO,
The estimated left-wing or right-wing party positions are derived from the Manifesto Research Group coding of party platforms. Source: The Manifesto Research
Group.
the issues of immigration and race relations, which are more properly
the distinctive territory of the radical right. Nevertheless, it is one of the
best available measures which facilitates time-series analysis of party locations since 1945. The contagion of the right thesis suggests that after a
national election where a radical right party registers a sharp gain in their
share of votes and/or seats, then in subsequent elections other mainstream
parties in the same country who may feel threatened will respond (particularly parties on the center-right) by moving their own position further
rightwards. This thesis can be tested in cases where a critical election occurred and where the MRG project coded the platforms of radical right
parties, including the sudden rise of the Reform Party in the 1993 Cana in
dian election, the Front National in the 1984 French election, the FPO
the 1986 Austrian election, and the Progress Party in the 1989 Norwegian
election.
Austria
The trends in the Austrian case, presented in Figure 11.1, illustrate these
patterns. The graph displays the steadily eroding voting support for the
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267
Freedom Party from the mid-1950s until 1983, then the sharp surge in the
in successive elections from 1983 to
share of the vote won by the FPO
1994, before a slight fall to 1995 (the latest date available for the Austrian
manifesto data in the MRG project). The figure also illustrates the rightwards shift in this party in 1986, after Haider took over the leadership,
which continued in successive elections to 1995. The graph also shows
the way that, after a short time-lag, other Austrian parties also followed
suit by moving their own position rightward, including the shift evident
and even the Greens. Now this evidence does not

in the OVP,
the SPO,
produced
and cannot demonstrate that the electoral success of the FPO
a follow-my-leader effect. Indeed all the Austrian parties (including the
could have been moving rightward simultaneously during the early
FPO)
nineties, due to many independent external factors. The fall of the Berlin
Wall, the end of the Cold War, and conflict in the Balkans, for example,
could have altered foreign policy and security priorities on Austrias borders during this era. The influx of refugees, asylum seekers, and migrant
labor from southeastern Asia and post-Communist Europe (especially
Bosnia and Albania) could have heightened social tensions and renewed
attempts to strengthen national borders. The Austrian welfare state could
have been facing growing pressures in this period due to many social
trends common in modern European societies, such as rising health-care
costs, rising unemployment, the breakdown of the traditional family unit,
and the growing size of the elderly population. But at the same time the
rightward shift evident in the policy platforms of the other major parties
in Austria during the early 1990s could also be plausibly explained as
followtheir attempt to curtail the growing electoral success of the FPO,
ing recognition that the publics zone of acquiescence had moved right on
issues of cultural protectionism.
One way to confirm the interpretation with greater confidence is to see
whether there are consistent patterns for a contagion of the right which
occur in other countries, where the timing of changes in party competition can be attributed to the electoral popularity of radical right parties.
Examination of trends in party competition in Norway, illustrated in Figure 11.2, show that Austria was not simply an exceptional case; instead
similar patterns can also be detected where the sharp rise in support for
the FrP between 1985 (3.7% of the vote) and 1989 (13.0%) was followed
by a rightward shift among all the other major party platforms between
1989 and 1993. We cannot establish whether it was the rise of the radical
right vote in 1989 Norwegian election which caused a subsequent shift
rightward among center-right parties, since again many other exogenous
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14
60
12
40
10
20
-20
-40
-60
% Vote for FrP
Consequences
268
8:29
0
1945 1949 1953 1957 1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1981 1989 1993
NKP/SV
DNA
KrF
SP
FrP
% Vote FrP
figure 11.2. Norwegian Party Competition and Support for the FrP, 19451993.
The estimated left-wing or right-wing party positions are derived from the Manifesto Research Group coding of party platforms. Source: The Manifesto Research
Group.
factors may have generated this pattern. The fact that the Austrian and
Norwegian changes in party competition occurred during roughly the
same period (between 1989 and 1993 in Norway and between 1986 and
1995 in Austria) means that this pattern could possibly be dismissed as the
result of a broader cultural shift in the political zeitgeist. Indeed the timing
of such a shift could plausibly be regarded as a cause of growing support
for the radical right, rather than the result of their rise in popularity.
But in each case the timing was certainly coincident with the argument
that the initial popular surge of radical right support in one national
contest triggered a rightward shift to occur in the ideological position
and the public policies adopted by the other major parties in subsequent
contests.
Yet there are good reasons to be cautious about assuming that this is a
general pattern which holds across diverse nations and electoral systems.
In particular, the comparison of trends in party competition in both France
and Canada, in contests held under majoritarian rules, shows mixed patterns, or no consistent evidence supporting a contagion of the right thesis
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16
14
40
12
20
10
8
-20
% Vote FN
60
4
-40
2
0
-60
1946 1951 1956 1958 1962 1967 1968 1973 1978 1981 1986 1988 1993 1997
PCF
PS
Gaul
Cons
UDF
FN
%Vote FN
figure 11.3. French Party Competition and Support for the Front National,
19461997. The estimated left-wing or right-wing party positions are derived
from the Manifesto Research Group coding of party platforms. Source: The Manifesto Research Group.
in these countries (see Figures 11.3 and 11.4). In France, the graph shows
that the Front National moved ahead in the mid-1980s (notably with
their breakthrough in the 1984 European elections), but Figure 11.3 indicates no apparent subsequent rightward shift among other parties in
this country. In Canada, as well, the sudden emergence of Reform in
1993 as a serious force in parliamentary politics was not followed by
a subsequent rightward shift by other parties, possibly because of the
simultaneous meltdown of the Progressive Conservatives as the major
opposition party, along with the regional pattern of party competition in
this country. The evidence from the comparative manifesto data remains
impressionistic and limited, in both the countries and the time period. But
the four-nation comparison of trends allows us to conclude that a contagion of the right effect was probably apparent in Norway and Austria,
both exemplifying consensus democracies using proportional representation electoral systems, but this pattern was not apparent in Canada and
France, using majoritarian rules.
To summarize, this book has only sketched out certain features leading
toward the success of the radical right. There are many avenues for further
research which are opened by this study, and further cross-national survey
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270
60
40
20
-20
-40
-60
1945 1949 1953 1957 1958 1962 1963 1965 1968 1972 1974 1979 1980 1984 1988 1993 1997
NDP
LP
PC
RP
SC
BC
%Vote RP
figure 11.4. Canadian Party Competition and Support for the Reform Party,
19451997. The estimated left-wing or right-wing party positions are derived
from the Manifesto Research Group coding of party platforms. Sources: The
Manifesto Research Group.
analysis would allow us to explore the consistency of these patterns in

far greater depth and across a wider range of societies. It would also be
invaluable to examine the nature of the party organizational structures
used by the radical right and to analyze the background and attitudes
of their grassroots membership, where they have developed such a base.
This study has also been unable to analyze the type of campaign coverage
these parties receive in the news media, which is likely to be an important
part of their success if they receive disproportionate attention relative to
their size. Further work is necessary to document the legislative activities
and policy priorities of the radical right once they enter elected office and
whether they do have problems in reconciling their antipolitics message
with their role in power. The impact of their leadership, including their
rhetoric and style, would provide important insights into the popularity
of the radical right, along with studies of the communication networks
linking these parties with broader social movements and diverse groups
on the extreme right. In short, a broad and diverse research agenda could
build upon and expand some of the initial propositions outlined in this
account, providing further insights into this phenomenon.
We can conclude that rather than one-level demand, or even twolevel supply and demand models, more comprehensive accounts can be
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enriched by considering the interaction of supply and demand within a

broader institutional context. The book theorizes that the institutional
context governing the nomination, campaigning, and election process is
critical to the electoral fortunes of fringe and minor parties, notably the
use of low threshold PR electoral systems. The most important political attitudes are the existence of widespread political disaffection and processes
of partisan dealignment, both of which weaken the anchors of habitual
voting choices, coupled with the rising salience of the values of cultural
protectionism and antiglobalization. These factors are not confined to explaining the rise of the radical right per se; instead, they can potentially
function to benefit other minor parties across the political spectrum. The
survey evidence in this account also throws serious doubt on the thesis
that support for the radical right is disproportionately based upon their
appeal to a new social cleavage or underclass of low-skilled and lowqualified workers in inner-city areas, or to those with direct experience
of unemployment or poverty. While common as a popular stereotype, in
fact the class basis of support for the radical right remains mixed, drawing
upon the petite bourgeoisie as well as traditional working class. There is
also no automatic and direct relationship between rates of immigration,
asylum seekers, and refugees in a country and the radical right share of
votes or seats in that nation.
Within this context, how far radical right parties are capable of responding to popular demands remains critical for their electoral success.16
And this is not a purely contingent phenomenon. Their ideological values
and organizational development are particularly important in determining whether radical right parties remain marginalized at the periphery of
the political system (such as the BNP), or whether they become significant
political actors influencing the policy agenda, gaining elected office, and
Their rise depends
even entering government ministries (such as the FPO).
heavily upon how far their own strategic ideological appeals work within
the constraints set by the electoral system and the distribution of public
opinion.17 Under PR systems with low thresholds, radical right parties
can be successfully elected by adopting more extreme ideological appeals
based on emphasizing their signature issues of cultural protectionism. By
contrast, under majoritarian systems with higher thresholds, radical right
parties need to adopt more populist strategies to succeed. And where they
rise, the process of building, institutionalizing, and consolidating party organizations is critical for the enduring success of the radical right, including developing formal procedures governing leadership succession and
organizational structures, mobilizing a grassroots base of supporters and
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loyalists, and maintaining party discipline within the legislature. Parties

which fail to institutionalize can occasionally surge in support in certain
deviating elections, but if they fail to consolidate their success, they remain vulnerable to equally sudden collapse. The lessons of this study have
important implications, not just for the success of the radical right, but
also for patterns of party competition across political systems, for the
future public policy agenda on issues of social tolerance, race relations,
and multiculturalism, and thus for the underlying health of contemporary
democracies.
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Notes
Chapter 1: Understanding the Rise of the Radical Right

1. For comparative overviews see, for example, Paul Hainsworth. Ed. 1992.
The Extreme Right in Europe and the USA. New York: St. Martins
Press; Peter H. Merkl and Leonard Weinberg. Eds. 1993. Encounters
with the Contemporary Radical Right. Boulder, CO: Westview Press;
Hans-Georg Betz. 1994. Radical Rightwing Populism in Western Europe.
New York: St. Martins Press; Herbert Kitschelt, with Anthony J. McGann.
1995. The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan; Luciano Cheles, Ronnie Ferguson, and
Michalina Vaughan. Eds. 1995. The Far Right in Western and Eastern Europe.
New York: Longman; Peter H. Merkl and L. Weinberg. Eds. 1997. The
Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the Nineties. London: Frank Cass; HansGeorg Betz and Stefan Immerfall. Eds. 1998. The New Politics of the Right:
Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies. New York:
St Martins Press; Paul Hainsworth. Ed. 2000. The Politics of the Extreme
Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream. London: Pinter; Rachel Gibson.
2002. The Growth of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe. Lewiston,
NY: Edwin Mellen Press; Martin Schain, Aristide Zolberg, and Patrick
Hossay. Eds. 2002. Shadows over Europe: The Development and Impact
of the Extreme Right in Western Europe. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan;
Piero Ignazi. 2003. Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe. New York:
Oxford University Press; Elisabeth Carter. 2005. The Extreme Right in Western Europe: Success or Failure? Manchester: Manchester University Press.
2. For the expectation that a worldwide liberal revolution would supersede the
attractions of authoritarianism, see, for example, the argument presented by
Francis Fukuyama. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. London:
Hamish Hamilton.
3. The Canadian Reform Party, although showing considerable continuity, has
relaunched its organization occasionally in recent years. The party became
the Canada Reform Conservative Alliance (or Alliance for short) in the 2000
273
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4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
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Canadian election, and subsequently merged with the Progressive Conservatives in October 2003 to become the Conservative Party of Canada.
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See Paul G. Lewis. 2000. Political Parties in Post-Communist Eastern Europe.
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The supply and demand distinction is developed by Roger Eatwell. 2003.
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This perspective is common throughout the literature but it is perhaps best
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One of the clearest theoretical arguments along these lines is developed in
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Theodor W. Adorno, Else Fraenkel-Brunswick, David J. Levinson, and R.
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See Hans-Georg Betz. 1994. Radical Rightwing Populism in Western Europe.
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The class basis of radical right voters is explored in Chapter 6.
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17. For this argument see Piero Ignazi. 1992. The silent counter-revolution:
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23. See, for example, Elisabeth Carter. 2005. The Extreme Right in Western
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24. Herbert Kitschelt, with Anthony J. McGann. 1995. The Radical Right
in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan. For a critical discussion of the historical evidence supporting this
thesis, see the conclusion of Piero Ignazi. 2003. Extreme Right Parties in
Western Europe. New York: Oxford University Press.
25. Wouter van der Brug, Meindert Fennema, and Jean Tillie. 2005. Why some
anti-immigrant parties fail and others succeed: A two-step model of aggregate
electoral support. Comparative Political Studies forthcoming.
26. Elisabeth Carter. 2005. The Extreme Right in Western Europe: Success or
Failure? Manchester: Manchester University Press, chapter 4.
27. Martin Schain. 1987. The National Front in France and the constitution of
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29. For a discussion of the distinction between the mechanical and psychological aspects see Andre Blais and R. Kenneth Carty. 1991. The psychological
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33. We put aside, for the moment, any consideration of informal electoral rules,
which can be understood as those widely shared tacit social norms and conventions governing electoral behavior enforced by social sanction within any
particular culture. These are more properly understood as social norms
rather than informal institutions. This definition also excludes more ambiguous cases, such as party rulebooks that are enforced by internal committees
within particular party organizations rather than by court of law, although
there is a gray dividing line, as these cases may be relevant for legal redress.
For a discussion of the meaning of rules see J. M. Carey. 1999. Parchment,
equilibria, and institutions. Comparative Political Studies 33 (67): 735761.
See also Pippa Norris. 2004. Electoral Engineering. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
34. For the previous development of this theory, see Pippa Norris. 2004. Electoral
Engineering. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
35. For alternative rational choice accounts of political extremism, see Albert
Breton, Gianluigi Galeotti, Pierre Salmon, and Ronald Wintrobe. 2002.
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Press.
36. The proximity model is also known as the least-distance model. This
model is adopted for the study, rather than the alternative Rabinowitz and
McDonald directional model, in part because of the absence of suitable issue scales in the datasets under comparison. George Rabinowitz and Stuart
Elaine MacDonald. 1989. A directional theory of voting. American Political Science Review 83: 93121. For a discussion and comparison of these
models, and the extensive literature flowing from these theories, see Samuel
Merrill III and Bernard Grofman. 1999. A Unified Theory of Voting: Directional and Proximity Spatial Models. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
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37. The classic argument is presented in Anthony Downs. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row. See also James
M. Enelow and Melvin Hinich. Eds. 1984. The Spatial Theory of Voting.
New York: Cambridge University Press. The modified version of the theory presented here has been influenced by the account developed by James
A. Stimson. 1991. Public Opinion in America: Moods, Cycles and Swings.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press, as well as by work on party competition under
different electoral rules, notably Gary Cox. 1990. Centripetal and centrifugal incentives in electoral systems. American Journal of Political Science 34:
903935.
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roles, and sexual liberalization, documented in Ronald Inglehart and Pippa
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40. Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski. 2004. Why parties fail to learn: Electoral
defeat, selective perception and British party politics. Party Politics 10 (1):
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CA: Stanford University Press; Paul Hirst and G. Thompson. 1996. Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of
Governance. Cambridge: Polity; Joseph Nye and John Donahue. Eds. 2002.
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Success or Failure? Manchester: Manchester University Press.
44. Gary Cox. 1990. Centripetal and centrifugal incentives in electoral systems.
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45. The distinction between bridging and bonding parties is derived from the
literature on social capital, as originally applied to social groups and associations. See Robert D. Putnam. 2002. Democracies in Flux. New York: Oxford
University Press, p. 11. The term bridging party is similar to the use of the
term catch-all developed by Kirchheimer, except that these concepts carry
different normative baggage. See Otto Kirchheimer. 1966. The transformation of Western European party systems. In Political Parties and Political
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University Press.
Michigan; Wouter van der Brug, Meindert Fennema, and Jean Tillie. 2005.
Why some anti-immigrant parties fail and others succeed: A two-step model
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48. See David Robertson. 1976. A Theory of Party Competition. London: Wiley;
Ian Budge, David Robertson, and Derek Hearl. Eds. 1987. Ideology, Strategy
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51. For previous expert surveys, see Francis G. Castles and Peter Mair. 1984.
Left-right political scales: Some expert judgments. European Journal of
Political Research 12 (1): 7388; John Huber and Ronald Inglehart. 1995.
Expert interpretations of party space and party locations in forty-two societies. Party Politics 1 (January): 73111. This book draws mainly upon the
most recent survey, conducted in 2000 by Marcel Lubbers, for which we are
much indebted. Details of the data, methodology, and codebook are available
from Marcel Lubbers [principal investigator]. 2000. Expert Judgment Survey of Western European Political Parties 2000 [machine readable data-set].
Nijmegen, the Netherlands: NWO, Department of Sociology, University of
Nijmegen. For a discussion of the pros and cons of this approach, see Ian
Budge. 2000. Expert judgments of party policy positions: Uses and limitations in political research. European Journal of Political Research 37 (1):
103113.
52. See, for example, Hans-Georg Betz. 2002. The divergent paths of the FPO
and the Lega Nord. In Shadows over Europe: The Development and Impact
of the Extreme Right in Western Europe, ed. Martin Schain, Aristide Zolberg,
and Patrick Hossay. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
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53. See Patrick Hossay. 2002. Why Flanders? In Shadows over Europe: The
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Chapter 2: Classifying the Radical Right
1. This book draws mainly upon the most recent expert survey, conducted in
2000 by Marcel Lubbers, for which we are much indebted. Details of the data,
methodology, and codebook are available from Marcel Lubbers [principal
investigator]. 2000. Expert Judgment Survey of Western European Political
Parties 2000 [machine readable dataset]. Nijmegen, the Netherlands: NWO,
Department of Sociology, University of Nijmegen.
2. For a discussion of the most different and most similar approaches to comparative politics, see Todd Landman. 2000. Issues and Methods in Comparative
Politics. London: Routledge, chapter 2.
3. For more details of the European Social Survey, including the questionnaire
and methodology, see http://naticent02.uuhost.uk.uu. net/index.htm. Data
for an initial twenty countries, along with comprehensive documentation, is
accessible at http://ess.nsd.uib.no. It is anticipated that subsequent releases
will include data from two more countries which participated in Round
One, namely France and Turkey. The survey is funded via the European
Commissions fifth Framework Program, with supplementary funds from the
European Science Foundation, which also sponsored the development of the
study over a number of years. I am most grateful to the European Commission and the ESF for their support for this project, and to the work of the
ESS Central Coordinating Team, led by Roger Jowell, for making this survey
data available.
4. The CSES dataset also includes an election survey in Hong Kong, but this was
dropped to facilitate consistent comparison across independent nation-states.
The dataset used in this study is based on the 31 July 2002 release of Module 1,
with the exception of France which was derived from the early release of
Module II of the CSES. Full details are available at www.umich.edu/nes/cses.
I am most grateful to the CSES secretariat, and all the partner national election
survey organizations, for making this dataset available.
5. Although use of the term transitional democracies may be misleading. See
Thomas Carothers. 2002. The End of the Transition Paradigm. Journal of
Democracy 13 (1): 521.
6. See Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and
Fernando Limongi. 2000. Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 19501990. New York: Cambridge
University Press. For the World Bank indicators of good governance see
Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi. May 2003. Governance
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7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
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Notes to Pages 4246

Matters III: Governance Indicators 19962002. http://www.worldbank.org/
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measuring democracy Evaluating alternative indices. Comparative Political
Studies 35 (1): 534.
See, in particular, Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris. 2003. Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change around the World. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Societies are defined based on the annual ratings provided by Freedom House
since 1972. The level of freedom is classified according to the combined mean
score for political rights and civil liberties in Freedom Houses 19722000
annual surveys Freedom of the World. www.freedomhouse.org.
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Cas Mudde. 2000. The Ideology of the Extreme Right. New York:
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Simon Hix. 2002. Parties at the European level. In Political Parties in
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Sabrina P. Ramet. Ed. 1999. The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe
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Herbert Kitschelt, with Anthony J. McGann. 1995. The Radical Right
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Michael Coppedge. A classification of Latin American political parties.
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Kansallis Liitto (IKL Patriotic National Alliance), launched in April 1993,
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30. The preferential voting system used for the Australian House of Representatives, where electors cast rank-ordered ballots, is also known as the Alternative Voting System. Of the thirty-nine federal elections held in Australia since
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first-preference vote. See Ian McAllister. 2002. Political parties in Australia:
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the author.
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Arthur S. Banks, Thomas C. Muller, and William R. Overstreet. Eds.
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48. Robert Jackson Alexander. Ed. 1988. Political Parties of the Americas:
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Carlos Pereira and Lucio Renno.
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For example, from the country entries contained in Arthur S. Banks, Thomas
C. Muller, and William R. Overstreet. Eds. 2002. Political Handbook of the
World 20002002. Binghamton, NY: CSA Publications.
John Fuh-Sheng Hsieh and David Newman. Eds. 2002. How Asia Votes.
Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, p. 121.
John Fuh-Sheng Hsieh and David Newman. Eds. 2002. How Asia Votes,
Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, pp. 3839.
Kenneth Wald and S. Shye. 1995. Religious influence in electoral behavior:
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blocs: Israel in the 1990s. Party Politics 7 (6): 689710; D. Peretz, R. Kook,
and G. Doron. 2003. Knesset election 2003: Why Likud regained its political
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58.
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63.
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and politics. In Encounters with the Contemporary Radical Right, ed. Peter
H. Merkl and Leonard Weinberg. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Ami Pedahzur and A. Perliger. 2004. An alternative approach for defining
the boundaries of party families: Examples from the Israeli extreme rightwing party scene. Australian Journal of Political Science 39 (2): 285305;
Shai Bermanis, Daphna Canetti-Nisim, and Ami Pedahzur. 2004. Religious
fundamentalism and the extreme right-wing camp in Israel. Patterns of Prejudice 38 (2): 159176.
R. Heinisch. 2003. Success in opposition Failure in government: Explaining the performance of right-wing populist parties in public office. West
European Politics 26 (3): 91130.
Peter Davis. 2002. The Extreme Right in France, 1789 to the Present: From
De Maistre to Le Pen. London: Routledge; Seymour Martin Lipset. 1960.
Political Man. New York: Doubleday, pp. 154163.
See, for example, Herbert Kitschelt, with Anthony J. McGann. 1995. The
Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.
Wouter van der Brug and Meindert Fennema. 2003. Protest or mainstream?
How the European anti-immigrant parties developed into two separate
groups by 1999. European Journal of Political Research 42: 5576.
See, for example, Roger Eatwell. 1994. Why are fascism and racism reviving
in Western Europe? Political Quarterly 65 (3): 313325; Roger Eatwell. 2000.
The Rebirth of the Extreme Right in Western Europe? Parliamentary
Affairs 53: 407425.
R. Witte. 1995. Racist violence in Western Europe. New Community 21:
489500.
R. Koopmans. 1995. A Burning Question: Explaining the Rise of Racist and
Extreme Right Violence in Western Europe. Berlin: WZB.
Chapter 4: Ballot Access and Campaign Finance

1. See Richard S. Katz. 1997. Districting: Apportionment and gerrymanders.
In Democracy and Elections (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
2. For the argument that many established democracies have been moving toward a cartelized party system, see Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair. 1995.
Changing models of party organization and party democracy: The emergence
of the cartel party. Party Politics 1: 528.
3. See Andre Blais and R. Kenneth Carty. 1991. The psychological impact of
electoral laws Measuring Duvergers elusive factor. British Journal of Political Science 21 (1): 7993; Ken Benoit. 2002. The endogeneity problem in
electoral studies: A critical re-examination of Duvergers mechanical effect.
Electoral Studies 21 (1): 3546; Pippa Norris. 2004. Electoral Engineering.
4. For a discussion, see J. M. Carey. Parchment, equilibria, and institutions.
Comparative Political Studies 33 (67): 735761.
5. Election Process Information Collection (EPIC). 2004. Registration requirements for parties running in national elections. http://epicproject.org/ace/
compepic/en/PC01.
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289
6. See Shaun Bowler, Elisabeth Carter, and David M. Farrell. 2003. Changing party access to elections. In Democracy Transformed? ed. Bruce Cain,
Russell Dalton and Susan Scarrow. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Louis
Massicotte, Andre Blais, and Antoine Yoshinaka. Establishing the Rules of
the Game. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, table 2.1.
7. See Steve Rosenstone, R. L. Behr, and E. H. Lazarus. 1996. Third Parties in
America. 2d ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chapter 2; Michael
Lewisbeck and P. Squire. 1995. The politics of institutional choice: Presidential ballot access for third parties in the United States. British Journal of
Political Science 25: 419427.
8. Carol Johnson. 1998. Pauline Hanson and One Nation. In The New Politics of the Right, ed. Hans-Georg Betz and Stefan Immerfall. New York:
St. Martins Press; S. Jackman. 1998. Pauline Hanson, the mainstream and
political elites: The place of race in Australian political ideology. Australian
Journal of Political Science 33 (2): 167186.
9. Tor Bjrklund and Jrgen Goul Andersen. 2002. Anti-immigration parties
in Denmark and Norway: The Progress Party and the Danish Peoples Party.
In Shadows over Europe, ed. Martin Schain, Aristide Zolberg, and Patrick
Hossay. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
10. Meindert Fennema. 2000. Legal repression of extreme-right parties and
racial discrimination. In Challenging Immigration and Ethnic Relations Politics, ed. Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
11. Christopher T. Husbands. 1995. Militant neo-Nazism in the Federal Republic of Germany in the 1990s. In The Far Right in Western and Eastern
Europe, ed. Luciano Cheles, Ronnie Ferguson, and Michalina Vaughan. New
York: Longman.
12. Elena A. Korosteleva, Colin W. Lawson, and R. Marsh. 2003. Contemporary Belarus: Between Democracy and Dictatorship. London: Routledge; S.
Navumava. 2004. Parties without power: Harmless thorns in the side of the
autocracy. Osteuropa 54 (2): 316.
13. Human Rights Watch. World Report 2001. http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/
europe/belarus.html; Human Rights Watch. World Report 2002. http://www.
hrw.or/europe4.html.
14. Timothy Colton and Michael McCaul. 2003. Popular Choice and Managed
Democracy: The Russian Elections of 1999 and 2000. Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution Press.
in the Modern State. New York: Wiley.
16. For a study of these factors, see Shaun Bowler, Elisabeth Carter, and
David M. Farrell. 2003. Changing party access to elections. In Democracy
Transformed? ed. Bruce Cain, Russell Dalton, and Susan Scarrow. Oxford:
Oxford University Press. For an application of these factors to the radical
right, see Elisabeth Carter. 2005. The Extreme Right in Western Europe:
Success or Failure? Manchester: Manchester University Press, chapter 5.
17. Richard Katz and Peter Mair. Eds. 1994. How Parties Organize: Change and
Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies. London: Sage,
table 1.1; Peter Mair and Ingrid van Biezen. 2001. Party membership in
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20.
21.
22.
23.
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Notes to Pages 95105
290
18.
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twenty European democracies 19802000. Party Politics 7 (1): 721; Susan

Scarrow. 2001. Parties without members? In Parties without Partisans, ed.
Russell J. Dalton and Martin Wattenberg. New York: Oxford University
Press; Pippa Norris. 2002. Democratic Phoenix. New York: Cambridge University Press, chapter 6.
For comparative studies, see Herbert E. Alexander and Rei Shiratori. Eds.
1994. Comparative Political Finance among the Democracies. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press; Arthur B. Gunlicks. Ed. 1993. Campaign and Party Finance
in North America and Western Europe. Boulder, CO: Westview Press; KarlHeinz Nassmacher. Ed. 2001. Foundations for Democracy. Baden-Baden:
Nomos; International IDEA. 2003. Funding of Political Parties and Election
Campaigns. Stockholm: International IDEA.
Peter Mair. 1997. Party System Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
chapter 5 (with Richard S. Katz), p. 106. See the debate surrounding the
notion of party cartels in Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair. 1995. Changing models of party organization and party democracy: The emergence of
the cartel party. Party Politics 1: 528; Ruud Koole. 1996. Cadre, catchall or cartel? A comment on the notion of the cartel party. Party Politics 2 (4): 507523; Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair. 1996. Cadre, catchall or cartel? A rejoinder. Party Politics 2 (4): 525534; L. Helms. 2001.
The cartel party thesis and its critics. Politische Vierteljahresschrift 42 (4):
698708.
International IDEA. 2003. Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns. Stockholm: International IDEA.
Information was not classified by the IDEA handbook for six nations under
comparison: Belarus, Greece, the Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Slovenia,
and Taiwan.
Ellen Mickiewicz. 1999. Changing Channels: Television and the Struggle for
Power in Russia. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Shaun Bowler, Elisabth Carter, and David M. Farrell. 2003. Changing party
access to elections. In Democracy Transformed? ed. Bruce Cain, Russell
Dalton, and Susan Scarrow. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chapter 5: Electoral Systems

1. Given limitations of space, this chapter will set aside the impact of partisan
bias arising from any malapportionment or gerrymandering of constituency
boundaries, which could also disadvantage minor parties. This is an important but complex topic. See Richard S. Katz. 1997. Districting: Apportionment and gerrymanders. In Democracy and Elections. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
2. Jackman and Volpert conclude: Electoral disproportionality (through the
mechanism of thresholds) increasingly dampens support for the extreme right
as the number of parliamentary parties expands. At the same time, multipartyism increasingly fosters parties of the extreme right with rising electoral proportionality, p. 516. See Robert W. Jackman and Karin Volpert.
1996. Conditions favouring parties of the extreme right in Western Europe.
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4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
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291
British Journal of Political Science 264: 501522. Others, however, critique

this assumption. For example, after reanalyzing Jackman and Volperts
dataset, Golder concludes: There is no evidence that (national) electoral
thresholds actually influence extreme right parties at all (my parenthesis),
p. 8. See Matt Golder. 2003. Electoral institutions, unemployment and extreme right parties: A correction. British Journal of Political Science 33 (3):
525534. See also Elisabeth Carter. 2002. Proportional representation and
the fortunes of right-wing extremist parties. West European Politics 25 (3):
125146; Matt Golder. 2003 Explaining variation in the electoral success of
extreme right parties in Western Europe. Comparative Political Studies 36
(4): 432466; Elisabeth Carter. 2004. Does PR promote political extremism?
Evidence from the West European parties of the extreme right. Representation 40 (2): 82100.
Piero Ignazi. 2003. Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, p. 205. See also Robert W. Jackman and Karin Volpert. 1996.
Conditions favouring parties of the extreme right in Western Europe. British
Journal of Political Science 264: 501522.
Douglas W. Rae. 1971. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. Rev.
ed. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Maurice Duverger. 1954. Political Parties, Their Organization and Activity
in the Modern State. New York: Wiley.
Maurice Duverger. 1986. Duvergers Law: Forty years later. In Electoral
Laws and Their Political Consequences, ed. Bernard Grofman and Arend
Lijphart. New York: Agathon Press.
Douglas W. Rae. 1971. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. Rev.
ed. New Haven: Yale University Press; William H. Riker. 1976. The number
of political parties: A reexamination of Duvergers Law. Comparative Politics
9: 93106; William H. Riker. 1982. The two-party system and Duvergers
Law: An essay on the history of political science. American Political Science
Review 76: 753766; William H. Riker. 1986. Duvergers Law revisited. In
Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, ed. Bernard Grofman and
Arend Lijphart. New York: Agathon Press; Arend Lijphart, 1994. Electoral
Systems and Party Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Rein Taagepera.
1999. The number of parties as a function of heterogeneity and electoral
system. Comparative Political Studies 32 (5): 531548; Patrick Dunleavy and
Francoise Boucek. 2003. Constructing the number of parties. Party Politics
9 (3): 291315.
Arendt Lijphart. 1994. Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of
Twenty-Seven Democracies, 19451990. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
See also Richard S. Katz. 1997. Democracy and Elections. New York/Oxford:
Pippa Norris. 2004. Electoral Engineering. New York: Cambridge University
Press, chapter 4.
Similar patterns were found when the analysis was confined to the thirtyseven nations classified worldwide by the Freedom House Gastil index as
older or newer democracies. In these countries, the mean number of parliamentary parties was 7.4 in majoritarian systems and 10.2 in PR systems.
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11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
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The mean effective number of relevant parties was 3.0 in majoritarian systems
and 5.5 in PR systems.
See the discussion in Arend Lijphart. 2001. The pros and cons but mainly
pros of consensus democracy. Acta Politica 35:363398; R. B. Andeweg.
2001. Lijphart v. Lijphart: The cons of consensus democracy in homogeneous societies. Acta Politica 36: 117128.
Richard S. Katz. 1997. Democracy and Elections. New York/Oxford: Oxford
University Press, p. 154. See also tables 10.4 and 10.5. See also David
M. Farrell. 2001. Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction. London:
Palgrave, pp. 199200.
Paul Hainsworth. 2004. The extreme right in France: The rise and rise of
Jean-Marie Le Pens Front National. Representation 40 (2): 101114.
Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Susan Banducci, and Jeffrey Karp. 1998. Voters
Victory? New Zealands First Election under Proportional Representation.
Auckland: Auckland University Press; Jack Vowles. 1995. The politics of
electoral reform in New Zealand. International Political Science Review
16 (1): 95116; D. Denemark and Shaun Bowler. 2002. Minor parties and
protest votes in Australia and New Zealand: Locating populist politics. Electoral Studies 21 (1): 4767.
See Herbert Kitschelt, with Anthony J. McGann. 1995. The Radical Right in
Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, table 2.4, p. 60.
Elisabeth Carter. 2002. Proportional representation and the fortunes of rightwing extremist parties. West European Politics 25 (3): 125146; Elisabeth
Carter. 2004. Does PR promote political extremism? Evidence from the
West European parties of the extreme right. Representation 40 (2): 82100;
Elisabeth Carter. 2005. The Extreme Right in Western Europe: Success or
Failure? Manchester: Manchester University Press. It should be noted that
both Kitschelt and Carter limited their comparison to examining the evidence for the effect of the major type of electoral systems on the radical right
share of voting support, rather than seats.
Maurice Duverger. 1954. Political Parties, Their Organization and Activity
in the Modern State. New York: Wiley, p. 226.
For a detailed discussion, see Gary W. Cox. 1997. Making Votes Count. New
York/Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
It can be argued that a further distinction needs to be drawn between majority and plurality elections, given the higher effective electoral threshold used
in the former. Nevertheless the classification used in this study is more parsimonious, the ballot structure used for plurality and majoritarian elections
is similar (casting a vote for a single candidate), and it reflects the standard
typology used in the literature.
Geoffrey Evans, John Curtice, and Pippa Norris. 1998. New Labour, New
Tactical Voting? In British Elections and Parties Review, ed. Charles Pattie
et al. London: Frank Cass, pp. 6579.
A. Schuessler. 2000. A Logic of Expressive Choice. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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293
22. Calculated simply by dividing the percentage of votes won by radical right
parties into their percentage of seats.
23. Support for this relationship has been found by Matt Golder. 2003. Explaining variation in the success of extreme right parties in Western Europe.
Comparative Political Studies 36 (4): 432466; Kenneth Wald and S. Shye.
1995. Religious influence in electoral-behavior: The role of institutional and
social forces in Israel. Journal of Politics 57 (2): 495507.
1988. The problem of rightwing extremism in West Germany.
24. Richard Stoss.
Cass.
25. Dieter Nohlen. 2001. Threshold of exclusion. In The Encyclopedia of Electoral Systems, ed. Richard Rose. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
26. Lijphart estimates the effective threshold as the mean of the threshold of
representation and exclusion. It is calculated as 50%/(M + 1) + 50%/2M,
where M is the district magnitude. See Arendt Lijphart. 1994. Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 19451990.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 2556.
27. See Arendt Lijphart. 1994. Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of
Twenty-Seven Democracies, 19451990. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
See also Rein Taagepera and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1989. Seats and
Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems. New Haven:
Yale University Press; Rein Taagepera. 1998. Effective magnitude and
effective threshold. Electoral Studies 17 (4): 393404; Rein Taagepera.
2002. Nationwide threshold of representation. Electoral Studies 21 (3):
383401.
28. Arendt Lijphart. 1994. Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of
Twenty-Seven Democracies, 19451990. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
p. 141.
29. Marc Hooghe and K. Pelleriaux. 1998. Compulsory voting in Belgium: An
application of the Lijphart thesis. Electoral Studies 17 (4): 419424; Leuvan
De Winter and J. Ackaert. 1998. Compulsory voting in Belgium: A reply to
Hooghe and Pelleriaux. Electoral Studies 17 (4): 425428.
30. Wolfgang Hirczy. 1994. The impact of mandatory voting laws on turnout:
A quasi experimental approach. Electoral Studies 13(1): 6476; Arend
Lijphart. 1997. Unequal participation: Democracies unresolved dilemma.
American Political Science Review 91: 114; Mark Franklin. 1999. Electoral
engineering and cross-national turnout differences: What role for compulsory
voting? British Journal of Political Science 29 (1): 205216; Wolfgang Hirczy.
2001. Compulsory voting. In The International Encyclopedia of Elections,
ed. Richard Rose. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
31. Ian McAllister. 1986. Compulsory voting, turnout and party advantage in
Australia. Politics 21(1): 8993.
32. Pippa Norris. 2001. Apathetic landslide: The 2001 British general election.
In Britain Votes, 2001, ed. Pippa Norris. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
33. Pippa Norris. 2004. Electoral Engineering. New York: Cambridge University
Press, chapter 4.
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Chapter 6: The New Cleavage Thesis: The Social Basis of Right-Wing Support
1. Note that performance-based theories of political economy are discussed in detail in later chapters. These are distinct from the sociological accounts focusing
upon secular trends, as political economists emphasize the impact of more specific developments in government policy performance on radical right support,
notably surges in immigration, refugees, and asylum seekers, combined with
rates of unemployment and job insecurity among poorer sectors. See Chapter 8 for details and also Terri E. Givens. 2002. The role of socioeconomic
variables in the success of radical right parties. In Shadows over Europe, ed.
Martin Schain, Aristide Zolberg, and Patrick Hossay. Houndmills: Palgrave
Macmillan; Matt Golder. 2003. Explaining variations in the success of extreme right parties in Western Europe. Comparative Political Studies 36 (4):
432466.
2. Exemplified by Seymour Martin Lipset. 1960. Political Man: The Social Basis
of Politics. New York: Doubleday; Daniel Bell. Ed. The Radical Right. 3rd
ed. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publisher (first published in 1955 as The
New American Right, subsequently expanded in the 2d ed. in 1963).
3. Hans-Georg Betz. 1994. Radical Rightwing Populism in Western Europe.
New York: St Martins Press, chapters 1 and 5; Piero Ignazi. 2003. Extreme
Right Parties in Western Europe. New York: Oxford University Press. See
also Herbert Kitschelt with Anthony J. McGann. 1995. The Radical Right in
Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, table 2.11; J. G. Anderson and T. Bjorkland. 1990. Structural changes
and new cleavages: The Progress Parties in Denmark and Norway. Acta Sociologica 33 (3): 195217.
4. For example, Betz collects together many separate studies from the literature,
but each uses slightly different measures and definitions of occupational class
and education. See Hans-Georg Betz. 1994. Radical Rightwing Populism in
Western Europe. New York: St. Martins Press, chapter 5.
Alignments. New York: Free Press.
6. For some of the key classics in this literature, see Daniel Lerner. 1958. The
Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East. New York: Free
Press; Walt W. Rostow. 1952. The Process of Economic Growth. New York:
Norton; Walt W. Rostow. 1960. The Stages of Economic Growth. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press; Daniel Bell. 1999. The Coming of Post-Industrial
Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting. New York: Basic Books.
7. Seymour Martin Lipset. 1960. Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics.
New York: Doubleday, chapters 4 and 5 and p. 175. See also Daniel Bell. Ed.
The Radical Right. 3rd ed. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publisher (first
published in 1955 as The New American Right, subsequently expanded in
the 2d ed. in 1963); W. Sauer. 1967. National Socialism: Totalitarianism or
fascism? American Historical Review 73 (4): 404424.
8. Juan Linz. 1976. Some notes toward a comparative study of fascism
in sociological historical perspective. In Fascism: A Readers Guide,
ed. Walter Laquer. Berkeley: University of California Press; Detlef
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10.
11.
12.
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14.
15.
16.
17.
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Muhlberger.
1987. The Social Basis of European Fascist Movements. London:
Croom Helm.
Cas Mudde. 2000. The Ideology of the Extreme Right. New York: St.
Martins Press.
Piero Ignazi. 2003. Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe. New York:
Oxford University Press, p. 218.
See, for example, G. Esping-Anderson. 1990. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Paul Pierson.
1998. Irresistible forces, immovable objects: Post-industrial welfare states
confront permanent austerity. Journal of European Public Policy 5: 539
560; G. Esping-Andersen. 1999. The Social Foundations of Post-industrial
Economies, Oxford University Press.
Indeed the relative lack of class dealignment in Swedish party politics has
been suggested as one reason why the radical right has failed to make much
headway in this nation. See Jens Rydgren. 2002. Radical right populism
in Sweden: Still a failure, but for how long? Scandinavian Political Studies 25 (1): 2756; Jens Rydgren. 2003. Meso-level reasons for racism and
xenophobia: Some converging and diverging effects of radical right populism in France and Sweden. European Journal of Social Theory 6 (1):
4568.
Seymour Martin Lipset. 1960. Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics.
New York: Doubleday; Hans-Georg Betz. 1994. Radical Rightwing Populism in Western Europe. New York: St. Martins Press; Marcel Lubbers,
Merove Gijsberts, and Peer Scheepers, 2002. Extreme right-wing voting in
Western Europe. European Journal of Political Research 41 (3): 345378,
table 4.
Marcel Lubbers, Merove Gijsberts, and Peer Scheepers, 2002. Extreme rightwing voting in Western Europe. European Journal of Political Research 41
(3): 345378. See also Marcel Lubbers and Peers Scheepers. 2001. Explaining the trend in extreme right-wing voting: Germany 19891998. European
Sociological Review 17 (4): 431449. Knigge also reported a negative relationship between national levels of unemployment and voting support for
extreme right parties. Pia Knigge. 1998. The ecological correlates of rightwing extremism in Western Europe. European Journal of Political Research
34: 24979.
Terri E. Givens. 2004. The radical right gender gap. Comparative Political
Studies 37 (1): 3054.
Oskar Niedermayer. 1990. Sozialstruktur, politische Orientierungen und die
Uterstutzung extrem rechter Parteien in Westeuropa. Zeitschrift fur Parlamentsfragen 21 (4): 564582; Herbert Kitschelt with Anthony J. McGann.
1995. The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan, table 2.11.
Robert W. Jackman and Karin Volpert. 1996. Conditions favouring parties
of the extreme right in Western Europe. British Journal of Political Science
264: 501522.
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19. Terri E. Givens. 2002. The role of socioeconomic variables in the success of
radical right parties. In Shadows over Europe, ed. Martin Schain, Aristide
Zolberg, and Patrick Hossay. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
20. Robert W. Jackman and Karin Volpert. 1996. Conditions favouring parties
of the extreme right in Western Europe. British Journal of Political Science
264: 501522; Matt Golder. 2003. Explaining variations in the success of
(4): 432466.
21. Wouter van der Brug, Meindert Fennema, and Jean Tillie. 2000. Antiimmigrant parties in Europe: Ideological or protest vote? European Journal
of Political Research 37 (1): 77102; Wouter van der Brug and Meindert
Fennema. 2003. Protest or mainstream? How the European anti-immigrant
parties developed into two separate groups by 1999. European Journal of
Political Research 42: 5576.
22. Michael Lewis-Beck and G. E. Mitchell. 1993. French electoral theory: The
National Front test. Electoral Studies 12 (2): 112127; John W. P. Veugelers.
1997. Social cleavage and the revival of far right parties: The case of Frances
National Front. Acta Sociologica 40 (1): 3149; Subrata Mitra. 1988. The
National Front in France: A Single-Issue Movement? West European Politics
11 (2): 4764.
23. Ivor Crewe, Jim Alt, and Bo Sarlvik. 1977. Partisan dealignment in Britain
19641974. British Journal of Political Science 7: 12990; Norman Nie,
Sidney Verba, and John Petrocik. 1976. The Changing American Voter.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Ivor Crewe and David Denver.
Eds. 1985. Electoral Change in Western Democracies: Patterns and Sources
of Electoral Volatility. New York: St. Martins Press; Mark Franklin, Tom
Mackie, Henry Valen, et al. 1992. Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving
Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Russell J. Dalton, Scott Flanagan, and Paul Allen
Beck. Eds. 1984. Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies:
Realignment or Dealignment? Princeton: Princeton University Press; Mark
Franklin 1985. The Decline of Class Voting in Britain: Changes in the Basis of Electoral Choice, 19641983. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Jeff Manza
and Clem Brooks. 1999. Social Cleavages and Political Change: Voter Alignments and U.S. Party Coalitions. New York: Oxford University Press; Terry
Nichols Clark and Seymour Martin Lipset. Eds. 2001. The Breakdown of
Class Politics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
24. Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg. Eds. 2001. Parties without
Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies. New York:
Oxford University Press. For a discussion of the trends, see chapter 2.
25. Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg. Eds. 2001. Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies. New
York: Oxford University Press. For a discussion of the consequences, see
chapter 3.
26. Anthony Heath, Roger Jowell, and John Curtice. 1985. How Britain Votes.
Oxford: Pergamon; John H. Goldthorpe. 1980. Social Mobility and Class
Structure in Modern Britain. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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297
27. The Lubbers et al. study used data derived from the 1994 Eurobarometer
European Election Study and the 1998 International Social Survey Program.
See Marcel Lubbers, Merove Gijsberts, and Peer Scheepers 2002. Extreme
right-wing voting in Western Europe. European Journal of Political Research
41 (3): 345378.
28. Wouter van der Brug, Meindert Fennema and Jean Tillie. 2000. Antiimmigrant parties in Europe: Ideological or protest vote? European Journal
of Political Research 37 (1): 77102.
29. Piero Ignazi. 2003. Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe. New York:
Oxford University Press. See table 6.2. See also Max Riedisperger. 1992.
Heil Haider! The revitalization of the Austrian Freedom Party since 1986.
Politics and Society in Germany, Austria and Switzerland 4 (3): 1847.
30. Hans-Georg Betz. 2002. The divergent paths of the FPO and the Lega Nord.
In Shadows over Europe, ed. Martin Schain, Aristide Zolberg, and Patrick
Hossay. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 76.
31. See, for example, Robert W. Jackman and Karin Volpert. 1996. Conditions
favouring parties of the extreme right in Western Europe. British Journal of
32. Herbert L. G. Tingsten, 1937. Political Behavior: Studies in Election Statistics.
London: P. S. King, pp. 3765.
33. Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan. 1967. Party Systems and Voter Alignments. New York: Free Press.
34. Maurice Duverger. 1955. The Political Role of Women. Paris: UNESCO,
pp. 6566; Seymour M. Lipset. 1960. Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, p. 143; Angus Campbell, Philip Converse,
Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes. 1960. The American Voter. New York:
Wiley, p. 493.
35. Seymour M. Lipset. 1960. Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. Garden
City, NY: Doubleday, p. 260; Jean Blondel. 1970. Votes, Parties and Leaders.
London: Penguin, pp. 5556.
36. For a critical summary of the assumptions in the early literature, however, see
Murray Goot and Elizabeth Reid. 1984. Women: If not apolitical, then conservative. In Women and the Public Sphere, ed. Janet Siltanen and Michelle
Stanworth. London: Hutchinson.
37. Seymour M. Lipset. 1960. Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. Garden
City, N.Y: Doubleday; Terri E. Givens. 2004. The radical right gender gap.
Comparative Political Studies 37 (1): 3054.
38. Ola Listhaug, Arthur H. Miller, and Henry Vallen. 1985. The gender gap
in Norwegian voting behavior. Scandinavian Political Studies 83: 187206;
Maria Oskarson. 1995. Gender gaps in Nordic voting behavior. In Women
in Nordic Politics, ed. Lauri Karvonen and Per Selle. Aldershot: Dartmouth;
Lawrence Mayer and Roland E. Smith. 1985. Feminism and religiosity: Female electoral behavior in Western Europe. In Women and Politics in Western Europe, ed. Sylvia Bashevkin. London: Frank Cass; David DeVaus and
Ian McAllister. 1989. The changing politics of women: Gender and political alignments in eleven nations. European Journal of Political Research
17: 241262; Donley Studlar, Ian McAllister, and Bernadette Hayes. 1998.
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Explaining the gender gap in voting: A cross-national analysis. Social Science Quarterly 79; Clyde Wilcox. 1991. The causes and consequences of
feminist consciousness among Western European women. Comparative Political Studies 23 (4): 519545; Lee Ann Banaszak and Eric Plutzer. 1993. The
social bases of feminism in the European Community. Public Opinion Quarterly 57 (1): 2953; Lee Ann Banaszak and Eric Plutzer. 1993. Contextual
determinants of feminist attitudes: National and sub-national influences in
Western Europe. American Political Science Review 87 (1): 147157; Frank
L Rusciano. 1992. Rethinking the gender gap: The case of West German
elections, 194987. Comparative Politics 24 (3): 33557.
39. Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart. 2003. Rising Tide: Gender Equality and
Cultural Change Worldwide. New York: Cambridge University Press.
40. As argued by Matt Golder. 2003. Explaining variations in the success of
(4): 432466.
Chapter 7: None of the Above: The Politics of Resentment
1. D. Denemark and Shaun Bowler. 2002. Minor parties and protest votes
in Australia and New Zealand: Locating populist politics. Electoral Studies 21 (1): 4767; Colin Rallings and Michael Thrasher. 2000. Personality
politics and protest voting: The first elections to the Greater London Authority. Parliamentary Affairs 53 (4): 753764; P. L. Southwell and M. J. Everest.
1998. The electoral consequences of alienation: Non-voting and protest voting in the 1992 presidential race. Social Science Journal 35 (1): 4351. For
an American interpretative monograph, see Jean Hardisty. 1999. Mobilizing Resentment: Conservative Resurgence from the John Birch Society to the
Promise Keepers. Boston: Beacon Press.
New York: St. Martins Press, pp. 3738.
3. For an overview of the evidence of disaffection with political institutions and
with mainstream parties in advanced industrialized democracies see Russell
J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg. Eds. 2000. Parties without Partisans:
Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Russell J. Dalton. 2004. Democratic Challenges: Democratic
Choices. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4. Piero Ignazi. 2003. Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe. New York:
5. Some support is found at aggregate level by Pia Knigge. 1998. The ecological
correlates of right-wing extremism in Western Europe. European Journal of
Political Research 34: 249279. On the other hand, a more skeptical perspective is provided at individual level by Jack Billiet and H. De Witte. 1995.
Attitudinal dispositions to vote for a new extreme rightwing party: The
case of Vlaams Blok. European Journal of Political Research 27 (2): 181202.
6. Richard Rose. 2000. The end of consensus in Austria and Switzerland.
Journal of Democracy 11 (2): 2640.
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299
7. Wouter van der Brug, Meindert Fennema, and Jean Tillie. 2000. Antiimmigrant parties in Europe: Ideological or protest vote? European Journal
of Political Research 37 (1): 77102; Wouter van der Brug and Meindert
Fennema. 2003. Protest or mainstream? How the European anti-immigrant
parties developed into two separate groups by 1999. European Journal of
Political Research 42: 5576.
8. Wouter van der Brug and Meindert Fennema. 2003. Protest or mainstream?
How the European anti-immigrant parties developed into two separate
groups by 1999. European Journal of Political Research 42: 5576. In the
absence of direct indicators of protest voting, our conceptualization of protest
voting is necessarily based on circumstantial evidence. The consequence of
this is that some conceivable results may not be interpretable without ambiguity. If votes for anti-immigrant parties are largely protest votes, we must find
a weaker effect of ideology and party size than for other parties. However,
in case we do find such a weaker effect, other explanations may conceivably
exist, p. 83. Moreover reliance of the study upon party preferences as the
dependent variable (measured by probability to vote scales), rather than voting intentions or reported votes cast, provides another important limitation,
as this procedure is likely to underestimate the extent of actual pragmatic
voting due to a systematic bias.
9. David Easton. 1975. A reassessment of the concept of political support.
British Journal of Political Science 5: 435457.
10. For a fuller discussion, see Pippa Norris. 1998. Critical Citizens: Global
Support for Democratic Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. See
also Russell J. Dalton. 2004. Democratic Challenges: Democratic Choices.
11. Joseph Cooper. Ed. 1999. Congress and the Decline of Public Trust. Boulder,
CO: Westview Press.
12. For a discussion see Kenneth Newton and Pippa Norris. 2000. Confidence in public institutions: Faith, culture or performance? In Disaffected
Democracies: Whats Troubling the Trilateral Countries? ed. Susan Pharr
and Robert Putnam. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Kenneth Newton.
2001. Trust, social capital, civic society, and democracy. International
Political Science Review 22(2): 201214.
13. The seminal works are Robert D. Putnam. 1993. Making Democracy Work:
Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press;
Robert D. Putnam. 1996. The Strange Disappearance of Civic America.
The American Prospect 24; Robert D. Putnam. 2000. Bowling Alone: The
Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and
Schuster. More recent comparative research is presented in Susan Pharr
and Robert Putnam. Eds. 2000. Disaffected Democracies: Whats Troubling
the Trilateral Countries? Princeton: Princeton University Press; Robert D.
Putnam. Ed. 2002. Democracies in Flux. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
14. For alternative conceptualizations of this concept see Pierre Bourdieu. 1970.
Reproduction in Education, Culture and Society. London: Sage; James S.
Coleman. 1988. Social capital in the creation of human capital. American
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15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
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Journal of Sociology 94: 95120; James S. Coleman. 1990. Foundations of
Social Theory. Cambridge: Belknap.
Robert D. Putnam. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of
American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster.
For comparative work see Jan Willem van Deth. Ed. 1997. Private Groups
and Public Life: Social Participation, Voluntary Associations and Political Involvement in Representative Democracies. London: Routledge; Jan Willem
van Deth and F. Kreuter. 1998. Membership of voluntary associations. In
Comparative Politics: The Problem of Equivalence, ed. Jan W. van Deth.
London: Routledge, pp. 135155; Kees Aarts. 1995. Intermediate organizations and interest representation. In Citizens and the State, ed. HansDieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Peter Hall. 1999. Social capital in Britain. British Journal of Political Science
29 (3): 41761. See also William L. Maloney, Graham Smith, and Gerry
Stoker. 2000. Social capital and associational life. In Social Capital: Critical Perspectives, ed. Stephen Baron, John Field, and Tom Schuller. Oxford:
Oxford University Press; Michael Johnston and Roger Jowell. 2001. How
robust is British civil society? In British Social Attitudes: The Eighteenth
Report, ed. Alison Park et al. London: Sage; Pippa Norris. 2002. Democratic
Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
New York: St. Martins Press, p. 41.
Marcel Lubbers, Merove Gijsberts, and Peer Scheepers. 2002. Extreme rightwing voting in Western Europe. European Journal of Political Research 41
(3): 345378.
J. Linde and J. Ekman. 2003. Satisfaction with democracy: A note on a frequently used indicator in comparative politics. European Journal of Political
Research 42 (3): 391408; D. Canache, J. J. Mondak, and Mitch A. Seligson.
2001. Meaning and measurement in cross-national research on satisfaction
with democracy. Public Opinion Quarterly 65 (4): 506528. Jeffrey A. Karp,
Susan A. Banducci, and Shaun Bowler. 2003. To know it is to love it? Satisfaction with democracy in the European Union. Comparative Political Studies
36 (3): 271292.
Pippa Norris. 1999. Institutional explanations for political support. In Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance, ed. Pippa Norris.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, chapter 11.
Christopher J. Anderson. 1995. Blaming the Government: Citizens and the
Economy in Five European Democracies. New York: M. E. Sharpe; Christopher J. Anderson. 1996. Economics, politics, and foreigners: Populist party
support in Denmark and Norway. Electoral Studies 15 (4): 497511; Christopher J. Anderson and Christine A. Guillory. 1997. Political institutions
and satisfaction with democracy. American Political Science Review 91 (1):
6681.
Pippa Norris. 1998. Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Russell J. Dalton. 2004. Democratic
Challenges: Democratic Choices. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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301
23. See, for example, J. W. Koch. 2003. Political cynicism and third party support
in American presidential elections. American Politics Research 31 (1): 4865.
Chapter 8: Us and Them: Immigration, Multiculturalism, and Xenophobia
1. Christian Boswell. 2002. European Migration Policies in Flux: Changing Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Sarah
Spencer. Ed. 2003. The Politics of Migration. Oxford: Blackwell.
2. For a discussion, see Hans-Georg Betz. 1994. Radical Rightwing Populism
in Western Europe. New York: St. Martins Press, chapter 3; Roger Karapin. 2002. Far right parties and the construction of immigration issues in
Germany. In Shadows over Europe: The Development and Impact of the
Extreme Right in Western Europe, ed. Martin Schain, Aristide Zolberg,
and Patrick Hossay. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan; Rachel Gibson, Ian
McAllister, and T. Swenson. 2002. The politics of race and immigration in
Australia: One Nation voting in the 1998 election. Ethnic and Racial Studies
25 (5): 823844; Cas Mudde. 1999. The single-issue party thesis: Extreme
right parties and the immigration issue. West European Politics 22 (3): 182
197; R. A. DeAngelis. 2003. A rising tide for Jean-Marie, Jorg, and Pauline?
Xenophobic populism in comparative perspective. Australian Journal of Politics and History 49 (1): 7592. The fullest account of this thesis can be found
in Rachel Gibson. 2002. The Growth of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western
Europe. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press; and also Rachel Gibson. 1995.
Anti-immigrant parties: The roots of their success. Current World Leaders
38 (2): 11930.
3. C. Boswell. 2000. European values and the asylum crisis. International Affairs 76 (3): 53747.
4. Herbert Kitschelt, with Anthony J. McGann. 1995. The Radical Right in
Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
5. See, for example, Jeff Crisp. 2003. The closing of the European gates? The
new populist parties of Europe. In The Politics of Migration, ed. Sarah
Spencer. Oxford: Blackwell; Grete Brochmann and Tomas Hammar. Eds.
1999. Mechanisms of Immigration Control: A Comparative Analysis of
European Regulation Policies. New York: Berg.
New York: St. Martins Press, p. 81.
7. For a discussion, see Thomas F. Pettigrew. 1998. Reactions toward the
new minorities of Western Europe. Annual Review of Sociology 24:77103;
Rachel Gibson. 2002. The Growth of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western
Europe. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press.
9. Marcel Lubbers, Merove Gijsberts, and Peer Scheepers. 2002. Extreme rightwing voting in Western Europe. European Journal of Political Research 41
(3): 345378.
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14. For details about the classification and typology of electoral systems, see
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15. CSES question A3031: In politics people sometimes talk of left and right.
Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means
the left and 10 means the right? It should be noted that Module I of the
CSES did not include issue scales, so we cannot use this dataset to test the
directional theory of voting.
16. Michael Coppedge. 1998. The dynamic diversity of Latin American party
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18. The proximity model based on left-right political ideology, also known as
the least-distance model, is adopted for the study. The proximity model of
issue voting and the Rabinowitz and McDonald directional model of issue
voting were not able to be tested as neither the ESS nor Module I of the CSES
incorporated suitable issue voting scales. The directional account suggests
that people will vote for a party that is most likely to change policies in a
way that will leave them most satisfied, depending upon a neutral point from
which to judge the expected direction of change. See George Rabinowitz and
Stuart Elaine MacDonald. 1989. A directional theory of voting. American
Political Science Review 83: 93121. For a discussion and comparison of
these models, and the extensive literature flowing from these theories, see
Samuel Merrill III and Bernard Grofman. 1999. A Unified Theory of Voting:
Directional and Proximity Spatial Models. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
19. See, for example, Morris P. Fiorina. 1979. Retrospective Voting in American
National Elections. New Haven: Yale University Press; Samuel L. Popkin.
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105.
21. CSES question A3031: In politics people sometimes talk of left and right.
Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means the
left and 10 means the right? It should be noted that Module I of the CSES
did not include issue scales, so we are unable to use this dataset to test the
directional theory of voting.
22. See, for example, R. Barraclough. 1998. Umberto Bossi: Charisma, personality, and leadership. Modern Italy 3 (2).
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26. CSES A3020: Id like to know what you think about each of our political
parties. After I read the name of a political party, please rate it on a scale
from 0 to 10, where 0 means you strongly dislike that party and 10 means
that you strongly like that party. A3021: And now, using the same scale,
Id like to ask you how much you like or dislike some political leaders. Note
that in some nations up to nine parties were coded on these scales, but the
comparison in this study is restricted to the first six parties, defined in terms
of those with the greatest share of the vote in the election under comparison,
in order to standardize results across all nations.
27. The direction of party identification was measured in the CSES by the following questions: Q: Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular
political party? (If yes) Which party is that? The first party mentioned by
the respondent was coded. The strength of party identification was measured
as well by the following: Do you feel very close to this party, somewhat
close, or not very close?
28. For a discussion, see James Adams. 2001. A theory of spatial competition
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29. In particular, the ESS and CSES surveys differed in their detailed occupational
codings, and in their classification of self-employment and religion, as well in
their timing. It should also be noted that we cannot provide direct comparison
with previous chapters concerning attitudes toward cultural protectionism,
such as negative feelings toward immigrants and refugees, since these were
not monitored in the CSES survey.
30. The data for the French 2002 presidential election are derived from the second
module of the CSES, released May 2003.
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ACT New Zealand, 285

Action Direct (France), 93
Alleanza Nazionale (Italy), 6, 12, 49, 64,
65, 79, 124, 150, 218, 255
MSI (Italy) and, 218
American Independent Party, 6, 73,
234
The American Voter, 220
Amnesty International, 45, 94
Anderson, Christopher, 162
Anderson, John, 90, 240
Anti-Nazi League, 232
anti-Semitism
of Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 3
Article 21 of the Basic Law (Germany), 92
Ashdown, Paddy, 113
Australia, 266272. See also National
Action; One Nation party
electoral registration requirements in,
89
preferential voting system in,
284
radical right parties in, 6869
Australians against Further Immigration,
68
Freedom
Austria. See also FPO;
Movement; League of Independents;
National Democratic Party (Austria);
OVP;
SDP
diplomatic sanctions against, 62
Haider, Jorg,
in, 62
immigration issues in, 264
League of Independents in,
243
authoritarianism
low-status individuals and, 12
personality thesis for, 164
radical right parties and, 179
autocratic (electoral) regulations, 86
electoral access under, 9395
psychological effects as result of, 95
Balkenende, Jan Peter, 235
ballot access
deposits for, 89
electoral nominations and, 8991, 103
electoral rules and, 8991
in Germany, 92
for NDP (Germany), 92
for Reform Party (U.S.), 90
requirements for, 89, 254
for Sozialistische Reichspartie
(Germany), 92
in U.S., 90
Batasuna party (Spain), 93
Belgium. See also Front National party
(Belgium); Vlaams Blok; Volksunie
(Peoples Union) Party
partisan dealignment theories and, 14
Bell, Daniel, 46, 131
Berlusconi, Silvio, 64
Blair, Tony, 113, 306
Blocher, Christoph, 63, 205, 210, 213
Blood and Honor (Germany), 93
BNP (British National Party), 7, 9, 30, 38,
53, 71, 72, 118, 192, 199, 218, 232,
256, 262, 263
secular dealigning elections and, 231
339
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bonding strategies
bridging v., 278
niche cleavage activation by, 198
of radical right parties, 27, 198199,
261
Bossi, Umberto, 3, 64, 65, 152, 205
Lega Nord and, 6
BP (Farmers Party) (Netherlands),
61
Brash, Don, 264
bridging strategies
bonding v., 278
British National Party. See BNP
British Nationality Act, 232
Buchanan, Pat, 73, 240
campaigns (electoral), 83, 84, 95102,
103104
communications within, 16
finance regulations for, 102, 254
funding sources for, 9596
media access for, 96, 254
organization of, 102
state subsidies for, 95
Canada. See also Conservative Party
critical elections in, 225, 245247
8889
electoral systems in, 210
multiculturalism in, 246
Canada Reform Conservative Alliance
party, 44, 53, 70, 206, 214, 246, 258,
269, 273
formation history of, 246
Canadian Reform Party, 7, 28, 44, 70, 118,
120, 149, 210, 211, 215, 219, 242,
248, 266, 269, 273274
formation of, 245
partisanship and, 215
cartel (electoral) regulations, 86
CD (Centrumdemocraten) party
(Netherlands), 44, 61, 151
CDA (Christen Democratisch Appèl)
(Netherlands), 235
Centrum Partij (Netherlands), 44, 61,
92
Centrum Partij 86 (Netherlands), 44,
61
Centrumdemocraten party. See CD
charismatic leaders, 5
Cheney, Richard, 45
Chilean Parti Nacista (Chile), 76
Chirac, Jacques, 210
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Christen Democratisch Appèl.
See CDA
civil laws, 9192
electoral nominations and, 9192, 103,
254
Clark, Joe, 247
class dealignment, 295
clientalistic voting, 150
Clinton, Bill, 240
cognitive shortcuts, 204
communications
within electoral rules, 16, 87
Communist Party
collapse of, 49
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems.
See CSES
competition patterns
conditions for, 19
dynamic theory of, 19
in PR electoral systems, 263272
proximity models for, 1921
supply-side demand (political) and, 14,
15
compulsory voting, 122123
fines and, 123
statutory laws and, 123
Conservative Party (Canada), 71
contagion of the right thesis, 264, 266,
268, 269
crisis of modernity thesis, 136, 148
critical elections, 218, 219, 224225,
242247, 248
in Canada, 225, 245247
(Austria) and, 243245
FPO
in France, 306
Front National party (France) and,
242243
secular realigning elections v., 224
in UK, 224225, 306
CSES (Comparative Study of Electoral
Systems) 19962001, 31, 32, 35, 37,
47, 130, 136, 161, 192, 306
ESS v., 38, 305
geographic coverage for, 39
national income demographics within,
39
party identification in, 305
questions in, 304, 305
systematic biases in, 42
cultural protectionism, 4, 18, 23, 167,
231, 259261, 271. See also
immigration
in EU, 170
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radical right parties and, 24, 27, 185,
262
subjective attitudes toward, 175177,
185186
Czech Republic
immigration attitudes in, 180
Danish Progress Party, 91, 134, 205
Dansk Folkeparti (Denmark), 6, 43, 49, 53,
66, 150
democratic alienation, 158160
protest politics as result of, 154155,
258
democratic systems
newer, 42
older, 42
party fragmentation in, 52
protest politics and, 154155
semi, 42
in Western Europe, 52
Denmark. See also Dansk Folkeparti;
Danish Progress Party; FrP (Denmark)
Deutsche Reichspartei (Germany), 63
Deutsche Volksunion party. See DVU
deviating elections, 38, 221222,
233242, 248
Cold Wars influence on, 222
flash parties and, 233
mid-term contests as, 222
trendless fluctuations in, 222
displaced constituencies, 133
Dixiecrat Party. See States Rights Party
(U.S.)
Downsian rational choice models
for party competition patterns,
198
Duverger, Maurice, 16, 26
Duvergers first law, 106
DVU (Deutsche Volksunion party)
(Germany), 63, 64
Easton, David, 151
ecological fallacy, 186
economic policy
free market liberalism, 179
effective number of electoral parties. See
ENEP
effective number of parliamentary parties.
See ENPP
egalitarian (electoral) regulations, 86
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elections
deviating, 38, 221222
and electoral rules, 83, 84
partisan dealignment theories and,
148
secular dealigning, 221
secular realigning, 222224
Elections around the World (study), 50
Electoral College
in U.S., 7273
electoral markets
supply-side demand and, 26
electoral nominations, 83, 84, 8795, 103,
254
ballot access as part of, 8991, 103
civil laws and, 9192, 103
legal challenges to, 254
registration requirements for, 8889
state regulation of, 87, 103, 254
electoral parties
definition of, 50
fringe, 50
in Israel, 79
in Poland, 105
relevant, 50
electoral penalties, 22
electoral rules, 83
autocratic, 86
campaigning and, 83
cartel, 86
communications within, 16, 87
egalitarian, 86
elections and, 83
ENEP and, 102
formal, 1718
government dissatisfaction from, 162
informal, 276
institutional context for, 1519
Kitschelt thesis and, 16
mechanical effects of, 16, 86, 168
nominations as part of, 83
party ideology location and, 16
political opportunity structures and,
17
psychological effects of, 16, 8687
public opinion and, 16
radical right parties and, influence on,
89, 101
right-wing space and, 16
strategic agency theory and, 86, 197
strategic contests as part of, 16, 87
strategic voting as response to, 16, 87
three-level nested models for, 16
in U.S., 84
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electoral systems
in Canada, 210
compulsory voting under, 122123
CSES 19962001, 31, 32, 35, 37, 47
disproportionality in, 290291
in France, 210, 242
index of proportionality under, 121
in Israel, 105
majoritarian, 28, 107
mean district magnitude under, 121
mechanical effects of, 211, 255256
in Norway, 210211, 262
party competition under, 209214
in Poland, 105, 120
PR, 106109, 255
psychological effects of, 211
radical right parties and, influence on,
109118
in strategic agency theory, 197
in Switzerland, 210, 262
thresholds under, 118122
electoral thresholds, 118122, 198
of exclusion, 119, 120
in Germany, 119
in Greece, 119
at national levels, 120
under PR systems, 119120, 261
ENEP (effective number of electoral
parties), 102
ENPP (effective number of
parliamentary parties), 102, 120, 121,
230
ESS (European Social Survey 2002 ), 32, 35,
37, 130, 136, 155, 160, 167, 171, 172,
175, 191, 279
CSES v., 3839, 305
factor analysis in, 155
national income demographics within,
39
nations as part of, 38
resident noncitizen estimates in,
172
sample size for, 38
systematic biases in, 42
trust parameters in, 155156
ethnic minorities, 171
EU (European Union)
cultural protectionism in, 170
democratic systems in, 52
immigration policies in, 264
radical right (political) parties in, 5867,
134
Eurobarometer surveys, 226
July 6, 2005
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Index
European Election Studies, 79, 150
European Social Survey 2002. See ESS
European Union. See EU
external shocks
to zone of acquiescence, 23
extremist parties
under PR electoral systems, 107,
108
in UK, 232233
Fedrelandpartiet (Norway), 45
Feithaller, Anton, 62
Fini, Gianfranco, 6, 64
Finland. See also IKL; Poujadist Finnish
Rural Party/True Finns Party
flash parties, 3, 9, 78, 217, 263. See also
radical right (political) parties
deviating elections and, 233
Lijst Pym Fortuyn party as, 49, 217
Poujadist movement (France), 217,
234
Reform Party (U.S.), 217
volatility of, 49
Folketing party (Denmark), 6
Fortuyn, Pym, 3, 205, 214, 234
assassination of, 61, 235
Forza Italia (Italy), 64, 65, 161
(Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs)
FPO
(Austria), 6, 32, 35, 43, 53, 62, 78,
134, 141, 150, 182, 185, 205, 217,
219, 239, 242, 243, 244, 245, 248,
260, 263, 264, 266, 267
critical elections and, 243245
divisions within, 245
electoral strength of, 217
Feithaller, Anton, and, 62
Freedom Movement (Austria) and,
244
immigration laws and, 244
propaganda of, 311
France. See also Action Direct; Front
National party (France); New Order
and the Defence Union Group; Partie
Socialist; Radical Unity; Workers
Struggle party
ballot access in, 93, 203
critical elections in, 306
electoral system in, 210, 242
immigrant issues in, 264
Partie Socialist in, 60
Poujadists in, 6
PR system in, 243
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radical right parties in, 5861,
203204
UDCA party in, 58
free market liberalism, 179
Freedom House, 38, 39, 94, 280
Gastil Index for, 38, 39, 42, 291
Freedom Movement (Austria), 244,
267
Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs. See FPO

Fremskridtspartiet. See FrP (Denmark)
Fremskrittspartiet. See FrP (Norway)
fringe electoral parties (radical right), 45,
50, 281
Fedrelandpartiet (Norway), 45
Hvit Valgallianse (White Electoral
Alliance) party (Norway), 45
National Democratic Party (Austria), 45
Front National party (Belgium), 32, 50, 53,
62, 151, 258
Front National party (France), 3, 26, 35,
38, 53, 58, 78, 79, 107, 118, 124, 135,
145, 151, 154, 161, 204, 210, 211,
215, 218, 219, 239, 242, 248, 260,
263, 264, 266, 269
campaign funding for, 243
critical elections and, 242243
Le Pen, Jean-Marie, and, 58, 242, 243
under majoritarian electoral system,
255
FrP (Fremskridtspartiet) (Denmark), 6, 7,
9, 49, 50, 52, 53, 66, 151, 159
FrP (Fremskrittspartiet) (Norway), 67,
210, 211, 218
Funding of Political Parties and Election
Campaigns (International IDEA), 96
classifications in, 97
summary scales in, 97
German Peoples Union, 7
Germany. See also Blood and Honor;
Deutsche Reichspartei; DVU; NDP;
Partei Rechstaatlicher Offensive; PDS;
Republikaner Party; Sozialistische
Reichspartie
Article 21 of the Basic Law in, 92
ballot access laws in, 92
electoral threshold in, 119
Office for the Protection of the
Constitution in, 63
political refugees in, 12
Gibson, Rachel, 302
343
Glistrup, Mogens, 6, 49, 66, 91, 205
globalization, 23, 132, 259, 271
multiculturalism and, 178
public opinion on, 23
Goldthorpe, John, 137
Goldthorpe-Heath classifications, 137,
209
petit bourgeoisie, 137
routine non-manuals, 137
salariat, 137
skilled/unskilled working class, 137
government dissatisfaction, 160162,
259
from electoral rules, 162
protest politics as result of, 153,
164
Great Depression
Great Reform Act of 1832, 125, 256
Greater Romania Party, 7, 53, 74, 75
issue cleavages as result of, 224
Greece
electoral thresholds in, 119
Grofman, Bernard, 276
guest workers
immigration and, 177
Hagen, Carl Ivar, 3, 7, 67, 210
Haider, Jorg,
3, 6, 62, 79, 152, 177, 185,
205, 231, 234, 244, 245, 248, 259,
263
political issues of, 244
Haidukevich, Sergey, 75
Hanson, Pauline, 53, 68, 79, 91, 205,
234
Harper, Stephen, 71, 246
Haupt, Herbert, 245
Homeland Party (Israel), 78
Howard, John, 68
Howard, Michael, 192
Human Rights Watch, 45, 94
Hungary. See also Justice and Life Party
Hvit Valgallianse (White Electoral Alliance)
party (Norway), 45
idealistic voting, 150, 261262
under majoritarian electoral systems, 31
under PR electoral systems, 27, 31, 204,
206207
identity politics, 178
IKL (Patriotic National Alliance)
(Finland), 284
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immigration
attitudes toward, 177178, 302
in Austria, 264
Czech Republic and, 180
Denmark and, 180
in EU, policies, 264
Finland and, 180
(Austria) and, 244
FPO
in France, 264
Greece and, 180
guest workers and, 177
Hungary and, 180
in the Netherlands, 234
Norway and, 180
population migration and, 185
Portugal and, 180
radical right parties and, 132, 169, 261,
264
Sweden and, 169, 180
Vlaams Blok (Belgium) and, 62
incumbency bias
in electoral nominations, 103
in media access, 101
Independent Democratic Union (Chile), 7,
53
index of proportionality, 121
individual fallacy, 186
Inglehart, Ronald, 13
instrumental rationality, 113
The International Almanac of Electoral
History (Mackie/Rose), 50
Ireland
14
Israel. See also Homeland Party; Mifleget
Datit Leumit; National Religious
Party; National Union party
issue cleavages
from the Great Depression, 224
issue proximity, 204
cognitive shortcuts and, 204
Italy. See also Alleanza Nazionale; Forza
Italia; Lega Lombarda; Lega Nord
party; Liga Veneta; Movimento
Sociale-Fiamma Tricolore; MSI
Janmaat, Hans, 44
Japan
Jim Crow laws (U.S.), 73
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John Birch Society, 131
Jospin, Lionel, 3, 210, 243
Partie Socialist (France) and, 60
Jowell, Roger, 279
Justice and Life Party (Hungary), 7, 53,
74
political history of, 7475
Key, V. O., 222, 224, 225
Kitschelt, Herbert, 15, 192
Kitschelt thesis, 261. See also supply-side
thesis
Kjaersgaard, Pia, 7, 49, 66
Korea
Ku Klux Klan, 6, 72
Kurdistan Workers Party (Turkey),
93
Labour Party (UK), 192, 232
Lange, Anders, 66, 205
Larry King Live, 239
Latin America
Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 3, 91, 152, 177, 185,
205, 210, 231, 233, 234, 242, 259,
263
anti-Semitic views of, 3
Front National party (France) and, 58,
242, 243
League of Empire Loyalists (UK), 232
League of Independents (Austria), 243
League of Rights (Australia), 68
Lega Dei Ticinesi (Ticino League)
(Switzerland), 63
Lega Lombarda (Italy), 64
Lega Nord party (Italy), 6, 9, 32, 53, 64,
130, 141, 151, 154, 161
national support for, 65
Lewis, Paul, 74
Liberal Democratic Party (Russia), 53, 74,
75, 145
Liberal-Democratic Party of Belarus,
75
Libertarian Party (U.S.), 73
Liga Veneta (Italy), 64
Lijphart, Arend, 30
Lijst Pym Fortuyn party (Netherlands), 3,
9, 30, 44, 53, 135, 159, 182, 219, 234,
235, 263, 264
as flash party, 49, 217, 248
genesis of, 61
Lipset, Seymour Martin, 131
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logit regression models, 181182
Lubbers, Marcel, 31, 35, 46, 278,
279
Lubbers scale surveys, 4647, 65, 191, 195,
278, 279
majoritarian electoral systems, 28, 107,
255, 262
electoral thresholds under, 262
ideological values influence on, 31,
204
party dualism as result of, 107
penalties under, 256
populist appeals under, 207, 271
PR systems v., 292
radical right parties under, 114,
117
relevant parties under, 107
Manifesto Research Group/Comparative
Manifestos Project, 30, 37, 265266
code party analysis in, 265
coding schemes in, 265
Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File,
227
Manning, Preston, 70, 245
McCarthy, Eugene, 90
McCarthyism, 9
McDonald, Stuart Elaine, 276,
304
mean district magnitude, 121
mechanical effects
of electoral rules, 16, 86, 168
of electoral systems, 211, 255
media access
for electoral campaigns, 96, 254
incumbency bias in, 101
Merrill, Samuel, 276
Mexico
88
Mifleget Datit Leumit (Mafdal) (Israel),
118, 182
Mill, John Stuart, 193
Movimento Sociale-Fiamma Tricolore
(Italy), 65
Movimento Sociale Italiano. See MSI
MSI (Movimento Sociale Italiano) (Italy),
6, 49, 53, 64, 218
Alleanza Nazionale and, 218
multiculturalism, 259
attitudes toward, 178179
in Canada, 246
globalization and, 178
identity politics and, 178
345
public demand thesis and, 166
Nader, Ralph, 73, 90, 241
National Action (Australia), 68
National Advance Guard (Chile), 77
National Aktion Party (Switzerland),
63
National Alliance (Czech Republic), 93
National Democratic Party. See NDP
National Democratic Party (Austria), 45
National Election Studies, 226
in U.S., 229
National Front party (UK), 28, 38, 71, 72,
199, 218, 231, 256, 263
formation of, 232
secular dealigning elections and, 231
National League for Democracy
(Sri Lanka), 94
National Party (New Zealand), 69
National Reform Party, 240. See also
Reform Party (U.S.)
National Religious Party (Israel), 7, 53,
78
National Renewal party (Chile), 7, 53
National Union party (Israel), 7, 53
Nationaldemokratische Partei
Deutschlands. See NDP
NDP (National Democratic Party)
(Germany), 6, 7, 9, 26, 53, 119
ballot access for, 92
Nederlanden Volksunie party
(Netherlands), 44, 61
neoconservatism
radical right (political) parties and, 45
Netherlands, 3. See also BP; CD party;
CDA; Centrum Partij; Centrum Partij
86; Lijst Pym Fortuyn party;
Nederlanden Volksunie party
deviating elections in, 234239
immigration issues in, 234
radical right parties in, 44, 61
The New American Right (Bell), 131
New Order and the Defence Union Group
(France), 93
new social cleavages, 12, 129, 130, 133,
136, 137, 147, 148, 256258, 271
by economic class, 135
134136
ratio measures as part of, 137
social risks as factor for, 133
thesis for, 134
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New Zealand. See also ACT New Zealand;
National Party
PR systems in, 69, 108, 225
Treaty of Wattangi influence in,
70
New Zealand First party, 7, 53, 69, 108,
149, 264
Peters, Winston, and, 69
niche cleavages, 198
1964 Civil Rights Act, 73, 223
nomination stage. See electoral
nominations
Norway. See also Fedrelandpartiet; FrP
(Norway); Hvit Valgallianse party
Norwegian Progress Party, 215, 266
Ny Demokrati (New Democracy)
(Sweden), 67, 234
Office for the Protection of the
Constitution, 63
One Nation party (Australia), 7, 9, 28, 53,
68, 91, 118, 149, 185, 205, 234,
262
history of, 6869
Osterreichische
Volkspartei. See OVP
OVP
(Osterreichische
Volkspartei)
(Austria), 6, 62, 244, 264, 267
parliamentary parties, 281
Partei Rechstaatlicher Offensive (Law and
Order) (Germany), 45
Partie Socialist (France), 60, 210
Jospin, Lionel, and, 60
partisan alignments (political), 219220,
226231
normal votes and, 220
party identification and, 228
partisan dealignment theories, 135136,
229, 230, 247248
Belgium and, 14
causes within, 14
Denmark and, 14
elections and, 148
Germany and, 14
Ireland and, 14
party fragmentation and, 247
social cleavages and, 134136
supply-side demand in, 25
UK and, 14, 263
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party competition patterns
Downsian rational choice models for,
198
proximity models of, 197198, 304
in strategic agency theory, 197
Party for the Substantial Reduction in
Taxes, Duties, and Governmental
Interference, 66
party identification, 308309
in the Netherlands, 308
Party of Democratic Socialism. See PDS
PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism)
(Germany), 119
Pedersen, Mogens, 52
Pedersen index, 230
Peoples Democracy Party (Turkey),
93
Perot, H. Ross, 7, 73, 79, 90, 149, 205,
234, 239, 248, 263. See also Reform
Party (U.S.)
Peter, Friedrich, 244
Peters, Winston, 69, 70
petit bourgeoisie (Goldthorpe-Heath
classification), 137, 147
radical right parties and, support for,
139141, 147, 257
Poland
electoral systems in, 105, 120
political leaders
charismatic, 205
popularity of, 199
Political Map (Lipset), 131
political opportunity structures, 17
political refugees
in Germany, 12
in Italy, 12
in Sweden, 12
in UK, 12
U.N. estimates of, 12
politics of resentment, 13, 149, 258259.
See also protest politics
population migration
immigration and, 185
patterns of, 179, 185, 259
populism, 211
majoritarian electoral systems and, 207,
271
Portugal
post-Communist Europe
Poujade, Pierre
UDCA party and, 58
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Poujadist Finnish Rural Party/True Finns
Party (Finland), 284
Poujadist movement, 6, 9, 78, 217
as flash party, 217, 234
Powell, Enoch, 232
PR (proportional representation) electoral
systems, 106109, 255
competition patterns in, 263272
double-ballot systems and, 106
electoral thresholds in, 119120, 261
extremist parties under, 107, 108
in France, 243
ideological values role in, 27, 31, 204,
206207
majoritarian electoral systems v., 292
multipartyism as result of, 107
in New Zealand, 69, 108
radical right parties under, 114
vote thresholds effect within, 27, 124,
248, 271
pragmatic voting, 150
preferential voting systems, 284
proportional representation. See PR
electoral systems
protest politics, 13, 33, 151155, 163
authoritarian personality thesis and,
164
from democratic alienation, 154155,
258
from government dissatisfaction, 153,
163, 164, 258
social capital theories and, 153154
protest voting, 150, 299
proximity models (voter demand/supply),
276
for competition patterns, 1921
policy option locations in, 20
rational politicians in, 21
valance public policies in, 21
proxy measures
for radical right parties, 31
public demand thesis, 166, 187
cultural trends influence on, 21
dynamics of, 2122
external events influence on, 21
government policy changes and, 21
multiculturalism and, 166
in regulated politics, 4, 6
social structure and, 1114
public opinion, 22. See also public
demand thesis
on globalization, 23
radical right response to, 2325
11:55
347
Putin, Vladimir, 101
Putnam, Robert, 153
Rabinowitz, George, 276, 304
Rabinowitz/McDonald directional model,
276
Racial Preservation Society (UK), 232
Radical Right (Bell), 46
radical right (political) parties
classification of, 4346
economic profiles for, 132, 141143,
147, 257
educational profile for, 141
electoral strategies for, 3031
electoral strength of, 4951, 169, 171
entrepreneurs and, 131
factors for, emergence of, 910, 11
fragmentations effect on, 49
gender differences in, 134, 144146,
257
generational profile of, 146147
geographic factors for, 143
new, 45
popular press and, 7980
in post-Communist Europe, 7476
skilled/unskilled working-class support
for, 139, 147, 257
terminology of, 4446
Radical Unity (France), 93
Rae, Douglas W., 26, 30, 106
ratio measures, 137
rational politicians, 21
in zone of acquiescence, 21
Reform Party (U.S.), 7, 30, 38, 73, 79,
149, 205, 206, 219, 239242, 248,
263
ballot access for, 90
campaign funding for, 240
as flash party, 217
volunteer activisms effect on, 239
refugee policy, 178. See also
immigration
regulated politics, 4
supply side factors in, 4
Reinthaller, Anton, 244
relevant electoral parties, 50, 281
organizational strengths of, 51
under PR systems, 107
Renovacion Nacional (Chile), 77
Republikaner Party (Germany), 134, 151,
231
Romanian National Unity Party, 7, 53, 74,
75, 141
Rumsfeld, Donald, 45
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348
Russia. See Liberal Democratic Party
(Russia)
Russian Revival (Russia), 93
salariat (Goldthorpe-Heath classification),
137
radical right parties and, support for,
141
Schain, Martin, 15
Schuessel, Wolfgang, 244
Schweizer Demokraten party. See SD
Schweizerische Volkspartei. See SVP
SD (Schweizer Demokraten) party
(Switzerland), 63
SDP (Sozialdemokratische Partei
Osterreichs)
(Austria), 244
secular dealigning elections, 221, 230,
248
National Front party (UK) and, 231
in UK, 231233
secular realigning elections, 222224
critical elections v., 224
political sociology models and,
223
September 7 Command (Chile), 93
Serbia Radical Party. See SRS
Sinn Fein (Ireland), 93
Slovene National Party (Slovenia), 7, 53,
74
political history of, 75
social capital theories
community connectedness in, 153
generalized reciprocity in, 153
protest politics and, 153154
social trust as part of, 162
social trust, 162163
in social capital theories, 162
Soviet Union, 49
collapse of, 171
Communist Party in, 49
Sozialdemokratische Partei Osterreichs.

See
SDP
Sozialistische Reichspartie (Germany),
63
ballot access and for, 92
Spain. See also Batasuna party
ballot access in, 93
SRS (Serbia Radical Party) (Serbia),
74
States Rights Party (U.S.), 73
status loss
Steger, Norbert, 244
strategic agency theory, 168169, 197

party competition patterns in, 197
strategic contests
within electoral rules, 16
strategic voting, 16, 87, 108, 109, 255
conditions for, 108109
electoral rules influence on, 16
for radical right parties, 113
supply-side thesis (political), 4, 1415, 18,
187, 191, 192, 194, 261
electoral rules and, 14, 15, 16
partisan dealignment in, 25
party competition patterns and, 14, 15
party location as part of, 194195,
196
periodicity as part of, 193
proximity model for, 197
regulated electoral markets and, 26
winning formula thesis as part of, 182,
192
Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden Democrats),
67
SVP (Schweizerische Volkspartei)
(Switzerland), 7, 53, 62, 63, 78, 205,
210, 211, 213
Sweden. See also Ny Demokrati;
Sverigedemokraterna
class dealignment in, 295
immigration to, 169
Switzerland. See also Lega Dei Ticinesi;
National Aktion Party; SD party;
SVP
Taiwan
Thatcher, Margaret, 232
Thurmond, Strom, 73
Treaty of Wattangi, 70, 264
Truman, Harry, 73
Turkey
ballot access in, 93
UDCA (Union for the Defense of
Merchants and Artisans) party, 58
Poujade, Pierre, and, 58
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UK (United Kingdom). See also Labour
Party; League of Empire Loyalists;
National Front party; Racial
Preservation Society; UKIP
critical elections in, 224225, 306
89
extremist parties in, 232233
Great Reform Act of 1832 in, 125
manufactured majority in, 125
partisan dealignment theories and, 14,
263
radical right parties, 7172
UK Independence Party. See UKIP
UKIP (UK Independence Party), 7, 38, 192,
218, 233, 256
UNHCR (United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees), 171, 172
asylum Seeker rates and, 172
Union Democrata Independiente (Chile),
77
Union for Chile, 77
Union for the Defense of Merchants and
Artisans party. See UDCA
United Kingdom. See UK
United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees. See UNHCR
United States. See also Libertarian Party;
Reform Party; States Rights Party
ballot access limitations in, 90
Electoral College in, 7273
electoral rules in, 84
Jim Crow laws in, 73
National Election Studies in, 229
vote thresholds in, 240
11:55
349
Vlaams Blok (Belgium), 7, 9, 32, 35, 53, 61,
91, 122, 124, 130, 150, 159, 185, 239,
255, 260
immigration reform and, 62
Volksunie (Peoples Union) party and,
61
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie.
See VVD
Volksunie (Peoples Union) Party
(Belgium), 61
vote thresholds
PR electoral systems and, influence on,
27, 124, 248, 271
in PR systems, 27, 124, 255
in U.S., 240
voting behavior
Michigan model of, 206, 220
party identification and, 206
voting motivations, 150
clientalistic, 150
idealistic, 150
pragmatic, 150
protest, 150
VVD (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en
Democratie), 235
Wallace, George, 6, 73, 90, 234, 240
wasted vote thesis, 109, 112, 125, 255
Welfare Party (Turkey), 93
welfare systems, 132
Western Europe. See EU
Whitelaw, William, 232
winning formula thesis, 182, 192
Wolfowitz, Paul, 45
Woolsey, James, 45
Workers Struggle party (France), 204
Yeltsin, Boris, 101
valance public policies, 21, 24

value change thesis, 13
van der Burg, Wouten, 150
van der Graaf, Volkert, 235
Vanhecke, Frank, 7
Ventura, Jesse, 240
Zhirinovsky, Vladimir, 74, 75

zone of acquiescence, 23, 267
external shocks to, 23
radical right parties influence on, 19, 29
rational politicians in, 21

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What is the book about?

What is the book about?

What factors are driving the increasing popularity of radical right parties?

What factors are driving the increasing popularity of radical right parties?

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February 18, 2005

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Preface and Acknowledgments

part i understanding the radical right

2 Classifying the Radical Right

part iii electoral demand

part iv party supply

10 Consolidating Party Organizations

2.1 The Comparative Framework

9.2 Public Perceptions of Ideological Dispersion in Each

1.1 Mean Vote for Seven Radical Right Parties in Western

11.1 Austrian Party Competition and Support for the FPO,

Preface and Acknowledgments

In considering the explanation for the varying fortunes of contemporary

Preface and Acknowledgments

broader structural constraints set by electoral rules. In this regard, parties

Preface and Acknowledgments

The European Social Survey 2002 is an innovative, academically driven

Election Campaigns, edited by Reginald Austin and Maja Tjernstrom

Preface and Acknowledgments

assistance and continuous enthusiasm of my editor, Lew Bateman, as well

Understanding the Radical Right

Understanding the Rise of the Radical Right

regulated marketplace, comparing the formal rules determining the

the rise of radical right parties

Understanding the Radical Right

won 26.9% of the vote and the FPO

Understanding the Rise of the Radical Right

Understanding the Radical Right

demonstrates the dramatic advance of these parties: in the early 1980s,

Understanding the Rise of the Radical Right

alternative explanations in the literature

Understanding the Radical Right

Widespread political discontent and disenchantment.

Understanding the Rise of the Radical Right

context, emphasizing the formal electoral rules constraining both supply

Understanding the Radical Right

insecurity and unemployment rates in each society, assuming that radical

Understanding the Rise of the Radical Right

rise of post-materialist values.17 But the classic value change thesis of

Understanding the Radical Right

Understanding the Rise of the Radical Right

Understanding the Radical Right

Understanding the Rise of the Radical Right

Understanding the Radical Right

sufficient for rules to be embodied in the legal system to be effective;

Understanding the Rise of the Radical Right

the theoretical framework: the interaction

(i) The Proximity Model of Voter Demand and Party Supply

Understanding the Radical Right

figure 1.2. The Theoretical Model of Party Competition

parties are located at ideal points across an ideological spectrum ranging