LAND TRANSFER &

DEEDS
Acquisition of Lands; Citizenship Requirement (2003)

In 1970, the spouses Juan and Juana de la Cruz,

then
Filipinos, bought the parcel of unregistered land
in the
Philippines on which they built a house which became
their

residence. In 1986, they migrated to Canada and

became
Canadian citizens.
Thereafter, in 1990, they applied, opposed by the
Republic,

for the registration of the aforesaid land in their

names.
Should the application of the spouses de la Cruz be
granted
over the Republics opposition? Why? 5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, the application should be granted. As a rule,

the
Constitution prohibits aliens from owning private
lands in

the Philippines. This rule, however, does not

apply to the

spouses Juan and Juana de la Cruz because at the time

they

acquired ownership over the land, albeit

imperfect, they

were still Filipino citizens. The application for

registration is

a mere confirmation of the imperfect title which

the
spouses have already acquired before they became
Canadian
citizens. (Republic v. CA, 235 SCRA 567 [1994]).
Adverse Claims; Notice of Levy (1998)

Section 70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,

concerning
adverse claims on registered land, provides a 30day period
of effectivity of an adverse claim, counted from the
date of

its registration. Suppose a notice of adverse

claim based
upon a contract to sell was registered on March
1, 1997 at
the instance of the BUYER, but on June 1, 1997,
or after
the lapse of the 30-day period, a notice of levy on
execution
in favor of a JUDGMENT CREDITOR was also
registered
to enforce a final judgment for money against the
registered
owner. Then, on June 15, 1997 there having been no
formal

cancellation of his notice of adverse claim, the BUYER

pays

to the seller-owner the agreed purchase price in

full and
registers the corresponding deed of sale.
Because the
annotation of the notice of levy is carried over to
the new
title in his name, the BUYER brings an action
against the

JUDGMENT CREDITOR to cancel such annotation, but

the latter claims that his lien is superior because

it was
annotated after the adverse claim of the BUYER
had ipso
facto ceased to be effective. Will the suit prosper?
[5%]
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The suit will prosper. While an adverse claim duly

annotated
at the back of a title under Section 7O of P.D. 1529 is
good
only for 30 days, cancellation thereof is still necessary
to
render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription thereof
will
remain annotated as a lien on the property. While the
life of
adverse claim is 3O days under P.D. 1529, it
continuous to
be effective until it is canceled by formal petition filed
with
the Register of Deeds.

The cancellation of the notice of levy is justified

under
Section 108 of P.D. 1529 considering that the
levy on
execution can not be enforced against the buyer
whose
adverse claim against the registered owner was
recorded
ahead of the notice of levy on execution.

Annotation of Lis Pendens; When Proper (2001)

Mario sold his house and lot to Carmen for P1

million
payable in five (5) equal annual installments. The
sale was
registered and title was issued in Carmen's
name. Carmen
failed to pay the last three installments and
Mario filed an.
action for collection, damages and attorneys fees
against
her. Upon filing of the complaint, he caused a
notice of lis
pendens to be annotated on Carmen's title. Is the
notice of

lis pendens proper or not? Why? (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The notice of lis pendens is not proper for the

reason that

Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR)

and can
only be acquired by lease. (P.D. 705)
(3)

Free Patent is a mode of concession under

the case filed by Mario against Carmen is only for

collection,
damages, and attorney's fees.

Section 41,

Annotation of a lis pendens can only be done in

only for agricultural lands.

cases
involving recovery of possession of real property,
or to
quiet title or to remove cloud thereon, or for
partition or
any other proceeding affecting title to the land or the
use or
occupation thereof. The action filed by Mario does not
fall
on anyone of these.
Foreshore Lands (2000)

Regina has been leasing foreshore land from the

Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources for the past 15
years.
Recently, she learned that Jorge was able to
obtain a free
patent from the Bureau of Agriculture, covering
the same
land, on the basis of a certification by the District
Forester

that the same is already "alienable and

disposable".

Moreover, Jorge had already registered the patent

with the

Register of Deeds of the province, and he was

issued an
Original Certificate of Title for the same. Regina
filed an
action for annulment of Jorge's title on the
ground that it
was obtained fraudulently. Will the action prosper?
(2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

An action for the annulment of Jorge's Original

Certificate
of Title will prosper on the following grounds:
(1)
Under Chapter IX of C .A, No. 141, otherwise
known

as the Public Land Act, foreshore lands are

disposable for
residential, commercial, industrial, or similar
productive
purposes, and only by lease when not needed by
the
government for public service.

(2) If the land is suited or actually used for

fishpond or
aquaculture purposes, it comes under the Jurisdiction
of the

Chapter VII of the Public Land Act, which is

applicable
(4) The certificate of the district forester that
the land is
already "alienable and disposable" simply means
that the
land is no longer needed for forest purposes, but the
Bureau

of Lands could no longer dispose of it by free

patent
because it is already covered by a lease contract
between
BFAR and Regina. That contract must be respected.
(5)

The free patent of Jorge is highly irregular and

void ab

initio, not only because the Bureau has no

statutory
authority to issue a free patent over a foreshore
area, but
also because of the false statements made in his
sworn
application that he has occupied and cultivated
the land
since July 4, 1945, as required by the free patent law.
Under
Section 91 of the Public Land Act, any patent
concession or

title obtained thru false representation is void ab

initio. In
cases of this nature, it is the government that shall
institute
annulment proceedings considering that the suit
carries with

it a prayer for the reversion of the land to the

state.
However, Regina is a party in interest and the
case will
prosper because she has a lease contract for the
same land
with the government.
Forgery; Innocent Purchaser; Holder in Bad Faith (2005)

Rod, the owner of an FX taxi, found in his vehicle

an
envelope containing TCT No. 65432 over a lot
registered in
Cesar's name. Posing as Cesar, Rod forged Cesar's
signature

on a Deed of Sale in Rod's favor. Rod registered

the said
document with the Register of Deeds, and
obtained a new

title in his name. After a year, he sold the lot to

Don, a
buyer in good faith and for value, who also registered
the lot

in his name.
a)

Did Rod acquire title to the land? Explain. (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, Rod did not acquire title to the land. The

inscription in

the registry, to be effective, must be made in

good faith.
The defense of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title
does not
extend to a transferee who takes the certificate of title
with
notice of a flaw. A holder in bad faith of a certificate of
title

is not entitled to the protection of the law, for the

law
cannot be used as a shield for frauds. (Samonte v.
Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 104223, July 12, 2001)
In the case at bar, Rod only forged Cesar's signature
on the
-Deed of Sale. It is very apparent that there was bad
faith on
the part of Rod from the very beginning. As such, he is
not
entitled to the protection of the Land Registration Act.

b)

Discuss the rights of Don, if any, over the

property. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

It is a well-known rule in this jurisdiction that

persons
dealing with registered land have the legal right
to rely on
the face of the Torrens Certificate of Title and to
dispense
with the need to inquire further, except when the
party
concerned has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances
that would impel a reasonably cautious man to
make such
inquiry.
(Naawan Community Rural Bank v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 128573, January 13, 2003)
In the given problem, the property was already
registered in
the name of Rod when he bought the same from the
latter.
Thus, Don could be considered as a buyer in good faith
and

for value. However, since Rod did not actually

sell any

property to him, Don has no right to retain ownership

over
the property. He has only the right to recover the

purchase

price plus damages.

Forgery; Innocent Purchaser; Mirror Principle (1991)

Bruce is the registered owner, of a parcel of land

with a
building thereon and is in peaceful possession
thereof. He
pays the real estate taxes and collects the rentals
therefrom.

Later, Catalino, the only brother of Bruce, filed a

petition
where he, misrepresenting to be the attorney-infact of
Bruce and falsely alleging that the certificate of title
was lost,

succeeded in obtaining a second owner's

duplicate copy of
the title and then had the same transferred in his
name
through a simulated deed of sale in his favor. Catalino
then
mortgaged the property to Desiderio who had the
mortgage

annotated on the title. Upon learning of the

fraudulent
transaction, Bruce filed a complaint against
Catalino and

Desiderio to have the title of Catalino and the

mortgage in
favor of Desiderio declared null and void.
Will the complaint prosper, or will the title of Catalino
and
the mortgage to Desiderio be sustained?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The complaint for the annulment of Catalino's

Title will
prosper. In the first place, the second owner's
copy of the
title secured by him from the Land Registration
Court is
void ab initio, the owner's copy thereof having never
been
lost, let alone the fact that said second owner's copy of
the
title was fraudulently procured and improvidently
issued by

the Court. In the second place, the Transfer

Certificate of

Title procured by Catalino is equally null and void, it

having

been issued on the basis of a simulated or forged

Deed of
Sale. A forged deed is an absolute nullity and
conveys no
title.
The mortgage in favor of Desiderio is likewise null and
void

because the mortgagor is not the owner of the

mortgaged
property. While it may be true that under the
"Mirror
Principle" of the Torrens System of Land

Registration, a

for

buyer or mortgagee has the right to rely on what

appears on

annulment of O.C.T. No. 375 and T.C.T. No. 4576

should
be denied for the following reasons:

the Certificate of Title, and in the absence of

anything to
excite suspicion, is under no obligation to look beyond
the

certificate and investigate the mortgagor's title,

this rule
does not find application in the case at hand
because here.
Catalino's title suffers from two fatal infirmities,
namely:

a)
The fact that it emanated from a forged
deed of a
simulated sale;
b)
The fact that it was derived from a
fraudulently

1) Eddie cannot claim protection as an innocent

purchaser for value nor can he interpose the
defense of
indefeasibility of his title, because his TCT is
rooted on

a void title. Under Section 91 of CA No. 141,

as
amended, otherwise known as the Public
Land Act,
statements of material facts in the applications for
public land must be under oath. Section 91 of the
same
act provides that such statements shall be
considered as

The mortgage to Desiderio should be cancelled

without
prejudice to his right to go after Catalino and/or
the

essential conditions and parts of the

concession, title,
or permit issued, any false statement therein,
or
omission of facts shall ipso facto produce the
cancellation of the concession. The patent
issued to

government for compensation from the assurance

fund.

Nestor in this case is void ab initio not only

because it

procured or improvidently issued second owner's copy,

the real owner's copy being still intact and in the

possession of the true owner, Bruce.

Fraud; Procurement of Patent; Effect (2000)

In 1979, Nestor applied for and was granted a

Free Patent
over a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 30
hectares,

located in General Santos City. He presented the

Free
Patent to the Register of Deeds, and he was
issued a
corresponding Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
375,

Subsequently, Nestor sold the land to Eddie. The

deed of
sale was submitted to the Register of Deeds and
on the
basis thereof, OCT No, 375 was cancelled and
Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 4576 was issued in the
name

of Eddie. In 1986, the Director of Lands filed a

complaint

for annulment of OCT No, 375 and TCT No. 4576 on

the
ground that Nestor obtained the Free Patent through
fraud.

Eddie filed a motion to dismiss on the ground

that he was
an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith
and as
such, he has acquired a title to the property which is
valid,
unassailable and indefeasible. Decide the motion. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The motion of Nestor to dismiss the complaint

was obtained by fraud but also because it

covers 30
hectares which is far beyond the maximum of
24
hectares provided by the free patent law.

2) The government can seek annulment of the

original
and transfer certificates of title and the reversion
of the

land to the state. Eddie's defense is

untenable. The
protection afforded by the Torrens System to
an
innocent purchaser for value can be availed
of only if
the land has been titled thru judicial proceedings
where

the issue of fraud becomes academic after

the lapse of
one (1) year from the issuance of the decree
of
registration. In public land grants, the action
of the
government to annul a title fraudulently obtained
does
not prescribe such action and will not be barred
by the
transfer of the title to an innocent purchaser for
value.
Homestead Patents; Void Sale (1999)
In 1950, the Bureau of Lands issued a Homestead
patent to

A. Three years later, A sold the homestead to B.

A died in
1990, and his heirs filed an action to recover the
homestead

from B on the ground that its sale by their father

to the
latter is void under Section 118 of the Public
Land Law. B
contends, however, that the heirs of A cannot
recover the
homestead from him anymore because their
action has
prescribed and that furthermore, A was in pari
delicto.
Decide. (5%)

suffers the loss of the fruits realized by the

vendee who in
turn forfeits the improvement that he has
introduced into
the land." (Obot vs. SandadiUas, 69 OG, April 35, 1966}
FIRST ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

The action to declare the nullity of the sale did not

prescribe

(Art. 1410}, such sale being one expressly

prohibited and

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

declared void by the Public Lands Act [Art. 1409, par.

(7)].

The sale of the land by A to B 3 years after

issuance of the
homestead patent, being in violation of Section
118 of the

the heirs of A such that their recovering the property

would

Public Land Act, is void from its inception.

The action filed by the heirs of B to declare the

nullity or
inexistence of the contract and to recover the
land should
be given due course.
B's defense of prescription is untenable because
an action
which seeks to declare the nullity or inexistence
of A
contract does not prescribe. (Article 1410; Banaga vs. Soler,
2
8CRA 765)

On the other hand, B's defense of pari delicto is

equally
untenable. While as a rule, parties who are in
pari delicto
have no recourse against each other on the
principle that a
transgressor cannot profit from his own wrongdoing,
such
rule does not apply to violations of Section 118 of the
Public Land Act because of the underlying public
policy in

the said Act "to conserve the land which a homesteader has acquired
by gratuitous grant from the government for himself and his family".
In keeping with this policy, it has been held that
one who
purchases a homestead within the five-year
prohibitory
period can only recover the price which he has paid by
filing
a claim against the estate of the deceased seller
(Labrador vs.
Delos Santos 66 Phil. 579) under the principle that no

one

shall enrich himself at the expense of another.

Applying the
pari delicto rule to violation of Section 118 of the Public
Land
Act, the Court of Appeals has ruled that "the
homesteader

The prohibition of the law is clearly for the

protection of

enhance the public policy regarding ownership

of lands
acquired by homestead patent (Art. 1416). The
defense of
pari delicto is not applicable either, since the law
itself
allows the homesteader to reacquire the land
even if it has
been sold.
SECOND ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

Prescription does not arise with respect to actions to

declare

a void contract a nullity (Article 1410). Neither is

the
doctrine of pari delicto applicable because of public
policy.
The law is designed for the protection of the plaintiff
so as
to enhance the public policy of the Public Land Act to
give
land to the landless.

If the heirs are not allowed to recover, it could be

on the
ground of laches inasmuch as 40 years had
elapsed and the
owner had not brought any action against B especially
if the
latter had improved the land. It would be detrimental
to B if
the plaintiff is allowed to recover.
Innocent Purchaser for Value (2001)

Cesar bought a residential condominium unit

from High
Rise Co. and paid the price in full. He moved into the
unit,

but somehow he was not given the Condominium

Certificate of Title covering the property. Unknown to
him,

High Rise Co. subsequently mortgaged the entire

condominium building to Metrobank as security for a
loan

of P500 million. High Rise Co. failed to pay the

loan and

the bank foreclosed the mortgage. At the

foreclosure sale,
the bank acquired the building, being the highest
bidder.
When Cesar learned about this, he filed an action
to annul
the foreclosure sale insofar as his unit was
concerned. The
bank put up the defense that it relied on the
condominium
certificates of title presented by High Rise Co., which
were
clean. Hence, it was a mortgagee and buyer in good
faith. Is
this defense tenable or not? Why? (5%.)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Metrobank's defense is untenable. As a rule, an

innocent
purchaser for value acquires a good and a clean
title to the
property. However, it is settled that one who closes his
eyes
to facts that should put a reasonable man on guard is
not an

innocent purchaser for value. In the present

problem the
bank is expected, as a matter of standard
operating
procedure, to have conducted an ocular
inspection, of the
promises before granting any loan. Apparently,
Metrobank

did not follow this procedure. Otherwise, it

should have
discovered that the condominium unit in
question was
occupied by Cesar and that fact should have led it to
make
further inquiry. Under the circumstances, Metrobank
cannot
be considered a mortgagee and buyer in good faith.

1965 X sold it to Y, new titles were successively

issued in
the names of the said purchasers.
In 1977, C filed an action to annul the deeds of sale to
F, X
and Y and their titles, on the ground that he (C) had
been in
actual physical possession of the land, and that the
sale to F

and the subsequent sales should be set aside on

the ground
of fraud. Upon motion of defendants, the trial
court
dismissed the complaint, upholding their
defenses of their
being innocent purchasers for value, prescription
and
laches. Plaintiff appealed.
(a) Is the said appeal meritorious? Explain your
answer
(b) Suppose the government agency concerned joined
C in

filing the said action against the defendants,

would that
change the result of the litigation? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(a) The appeal is not meritorious. The trial court

ruled
correctly in granting defendant's motion to dismiss for
the
following reasons:
1. While there is the possibility that F, a former lessee
of the

land was aware of the fact that C was the bona

fide
occupant thereof and for this reason his transfer
certificate

Mirror Principle (1990)

of title may be vulnerable, the transfer of the same

land and

In 1950's, the Government acquired a big landed

estate in
Central Luzon from the registered owner for
subdivision

purchasers for value render the latter's titles

indefeasible. A

into small farms and redistribution of bonafide

occupants, F
was a former lessee of a parcel of land, five hectares
in area.
After completion of the resurvey and subdivision, F
applied
to buy the said land in accordance with the guidelines
of the

implementing agency. Upon full payment of the

price in

1957, the corresponding deed of absolute sale was

executed
in his favor and was registered, and in 1961, a new
title was
issued in his name. In 1963, F sold the said land to X;
and in

the issuance of new TCTs to X and Y who are

innocent

person dealing with registered land may safely

rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title and the law will not in

any way oblige him to go behind the certificate to

determine

the condition of the property in search for any

hidden
defect or inchoate right which may later
invalidate or
diminish the right to the land. This is the mirror
principle of
the Torrens System of land registration.

2. The action to annul the sale was instituted in

1977 or

more than (10) years from the date of execution

thereof in

the property being an innocent purchaser for value.

1957, hence, it has long prescribed.

A forged deed is an absolute nullity and conveys

3. Under Sec 45 of Act 496, the entry of a

no title.

certificate of
title shall be regarded as an agreement running
with the
land, and binding upon the applicant and all his
successors
in title that the land shall be and always remain
registered
land. A title under Act 496 is indefeasible and to
preserve
that character, the title is cleansed anew with every
transfer
for value (De Jesus v City of Manila; 29 Phil. 73; Laperal v
City of Manila, 62 Phil 313; Penullar v PNB 120 S 111).

The fact that the forged deed was registered and a

certificate
of title was issued in his name, did not operate to vest
upon

an ownership over the property of X and Y. The

registration of the forged deed will not cure the
infirmity.

However, once the title to the land is registered in the

name

of the forger and title to the land thereafter falls

into the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value, the latter
acquires

a clean title thereto. A buyer of a registered land

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(b) Even if the government joins C, this will not

alter the
outcome of the case so much because of estoppel
as an
express provision in Sec 45 of Act 496 and Sec
31 of PD
1529 that a decree of registration and the
certificate of title
issued in pursuance thereof shall be conclusive
upon and
against all persons, including the national
government and
all branches thereof, whether mentioned by
name in the
application or not.
Mirror Principle; Forgery; Innocent Purchaser (1999)

The spouses X and Y mortgaged a piece of

registered land
to A, delivering as well the OCT to the latter, but
they
continued to possess and cultivate the land,
giving 1/2 of
each harvest to A in partial payment of their loan
to the
latter, A, however, without the knowledge of X and Y,
forged a deed of sale of the aforesaid land in favor of
himself, got a TCT in his name, and then sold the land
to B,
who bought the land relying on A's title, and who
thereafter
also got a TCT in his name. It was only then that the

spouses X and Y learned that their land had been

titled in
B's name. May said spouses file an action for
reconveyance
of the land in question against b? Reason. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The action of X and Y against B for reconveyance

of the
land will not prosper because B has acquired a clean
title to

is not
required to explore beyond what the record in the
registry

indicates on its face in quest for any hidden

defect or
inchoate right which may subsequently defeat
his right
thereto. This is the "mirror principle' of the
Torrens
system which makes it possible for a forged deed
to be the
root of a good title.

Besides, it appears that spouses X and Y are

guilty of
contributory negligence when they delivered this
OCT to
the mortgagee without annotating the mortgage
thereon.
Between them and the innocent purchaser for
value, they
should bear the loss.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

If the buyer B, who relied on the teller A's title,

was not
aware of the adverse possession of the land by
the spouses
X and Y, then the latter cannot recover the property
from

B. B has in his favor the presumption of good

faith which
can only be overthrown by adequate proof of bad
faith.
However, nobody buys land without seeing the
property,
hence, B could not have been unaware of such
adverse
possession. If after learning of such possession,
B simply
closed his eyes and did nothing about it, then the
suit for

reconveyance will prosper as the buyer's bad faith will

have

become evident.

Notice of Lis Pendens (1995)

Rommel was issued a certificate of title over a parcel
of land

in Quezon City. One year later Rachelle, the

legitimate
owner of the land, discovered the fraudulent
registration
obtained by Rommel. She filed a complaint against
Rommel

for reconveyance and caused the annotation of a

notice of
lis pendens on the certificate of title issued to
Rommel.
Rommel now invokes the indefeasibility of his
title
considering that one year has already elapsed
from its
issuance. He also seeks the cancellation of the
notice of Lis
pendens.
May the court cancel the notice of lis pendens
even before
final judgment is rendered? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

A Notice of Lis Pendens may be canceled even

before
final Judgment upon proper showing that the notice is
for

the purpose of molesting or harassing the

adverse party or

that the notice of lis pendens is not necessary to

protect the
right of the party who caused it to be registered.
(Section 77,
P.D. No. 1529)
In this case, it is given that Rachelle is the legitimate
owner
of the land in question. It can be said, therefore, that
when

she filed her notice of lis pendens her purpose

was to
protect her interest in the land and not just to
molest
Rommel. It is necessary to record the Lis
pendens to
protect her interest because if she did not do it,
there is a
possibility that the land will fall into the hands of
an
innocent purchaser for value and in that event,
the court
loses control over the land making any favorable
judgment

thereon moot and academic. For these reasons,

the notice
of lis pendens may not be canceled.

Notice of Lis Pendens; Transferee Pendente Lite (2002)

Sancho and Pacifico are co-owners of a parcel of

land.
Sancho sold the property to Bart. Pacifico sued Sancho
and

Bart for annulment of the sale and reconveyance

of the
property based on the fact that the sale included
his onehalf pro-indiviso share. Pacifico had a notice of lis pendens
annotated on the title covering the property and ordered the

cancellation of the notice of lis pendens. The notice of

lis
pendens could not be cancelled immediately because
the
title over the property was with a bank to which the
property had been mortgaged by Bart. Pacifico appealed the

case. While the appeal was pending and with the

notice of

lis pendens still uncancelled, Bart sold the

property to
Carlos, who immediately caused the cancellation
of the
notice of lis pendens, as well as the issuance of a new
title in

his name.
Is Carlos (a) a purchaser in good faith, or (b) a
transferee
pendente lite? If your answer is (a), how can the
right of
Pacifico as co-owner be protected? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

A.
Carlos is a buyer in bad faith. The
notice of lis
pendens was still annotated at the back of the
title at the
time he bought the land from Bart. The uncancelled
notice
of lis pendens operates as constructive notice of its
contents

as well as interests, legal or equitable, included

therein. All
persons are charged with the knowledge of what it
contains.

In an earlier case, it was held that a notice of an

adverse
claim remains effective and binding
notwithstanding the
lapse of the 30 days from its inscription in the registry.
This
ruling is even more applicable in a lis pendens.
Carlos is a transferee pendente lite insofar as
Sanchos share

in the co-ownership in the land is concerned

because the
land was transferred to him during the pendency
of the
appeal.

B.
Pacifico can protect his right as a
co-owner by
pursuing his appeal; asking the Court of Appeals
to order
the re-annotation of the lis pendens on the title
of Carlos;
and by invoking his right of redemption of Barts
share
under Articles 1620 of the New Civil Code.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

A. Carlos is a purchaser in good faith. A possessor

in good faith has been defined as one who
is unaware that
there exists a flaw which invalidates his
acquisition of the
thing (Art. 526, NCC). Good faith consists in
the
possessors belief that the person from whom
he received

facts from which laches may be inferred. Mere delay

in filing
an action, standing alone, does not constitute laches
(Agra v.
PNB. 309 SCRA 509).
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

b) The four basic elements of laches are; (1) conduct

on the

part of the defendant or of one under whom he

claims,
giving rise to the situation of which complainant
seeks a
remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant's
rights, the
complainant having had knowledge or notice of
the
defendant's conduct and having been afforded an
opportunity to institute suit; (3) lack of
knowledge on the

the thing was the owner of the same and

could convey his
title. In the case [at bar], in question, while
Carlos bought

part of the defendant that the complainant would

assert the
right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or
prejudice

the subject property from Bart while a notice of

lis pendens
was still annotated thereon, there was also an
existing court

complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred.

order canceling the same. Hence, Carlos

cannot be
considered as being aware of a flaw
which invalidates
[their] the acquisition of the thing since
the alleged flaw,
the notice of lis pendens, was already
being ordered

cancelled at the time of the purchase. On this

ground alone,
Carlos can already be considered a buyer in
good faith. (Po
Lam v. Court of Appeals, 347 SCRA 86, [2000]).

B. To protect his right over the subject

property, Pacifico should have timely filed an
action for reconveyance
and reinstated the notice of lis pendens.
Prescription & Laches; Elements of Laches (2000)

In an action brought to collect a sum of money

based on a
surety agreement, the defense of laches was
raised as the
claim was filed more than seven years from the
maturity of
the obligation. However, the action was brought within
the
ten-year prescriptive period provided by law wherein
actions
based on written contracts can be instituted.
a) Will the defense prosper? Reason. (3%)
b) What are the essential elements of laches? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the defense will not prosper. The problem did not
give

to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to

the
Prescription & Laches; Indefeasibility Rule of Torrens Title
(2002)
Way back in 1948, Windas husband sold in favor of
Verde

Sports Center Corp. (Verde) a 10-hectare

property

belonging to their conjugal partnership. The sale was

made

without Windas knowledge, much less consent.

In 1950,
Winda learned of the sale, when she discovered the
deed of

sale among the documents in her husbands

vault after his

demise. Soon after, she noticed that the construction

of the

sports complex had started. Upon completion of

the
construction in 1952, she tried but failed to get
free
membership privileges in Verde.

Winda now files a suit against Verde for the

annulment of the sale on the ground that she did
not consent to the sale.
In answer, Verde contends that, in accordance
with the
Spanish Civil Code which was then in force, the sale in
1948

of the property did not need her concurrence.

Verde
contends that in any case the action has
prescribed or is
barred by laches. Winda rejoins that her Torrens
title
covering the property is indefeasible, and

imprescriptible.
A. Define or explain the term laches. (2%)

B. Decide the case, stating your reasons for your

decision.
(3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

A.
LACHES means failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to
do what,
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done
earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a
reasonable time. (De Vera v. CA, 305 SCRA 624 [1999])

B. While Article 1413 of the Spanish Civil Code

did not require the consent of the wife for the
validity of the
sale, an alienation by the husband in fraud of the
wife is
void as held in Uy Coque v. Navas, 45 Phil. 430 (1923).
Assuming that the alienation in 1948 was in fraud of
Winda

and, therefore, makes the sale to Verde void, the

action to
set aside the sale, nonetheless, is already barred
by
prescription and laches. More than 52 years
have already
elapsed from her discovery of the sale in 1950.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

B. Windas claim that her Torrens Title covering

the

subject to prescription.
Prescription (1990)

In 1960, an unregistered parcel of land was

mortgaged by
owner O to M, a family friend, as collateral for a
loan. O
acted through his attorney-in-fact, son S, who
was duly
authorized by way of a special power of attorney,
wherein O
declared that he was the absolute owner of the land,
that the

tax declarations/receipts were all issued in his

name, and
that he has been in open, continuous and
adverse
possession in the concept of owner.

As O was unable to pay back the loan plus

interest for the
past five [5) years, M had to foreclose the mortgage.
At the

foreclosure sale, M was the highest bidder. Upon

issuance
of the sheriffs final deed of sale and registration in
January,

1966, the mortgage property was turned over to

M's
possession and control M has since then developed the
said
property. In 1967, O died, survived by sons S and P.

property is indefeasible and imprescriptible [does not

hold

In 1977, after the tenth (10th) death anniversary

a
Torrens Title means that after one year from the

father O. son P filed a suit to annul the mortgage deed

and

water] is not tenable. The rule of indefeasibility of

date of
issue of the decree of registration or if the land
has fallen
into the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value, the title
becomes incontestable and incontrovertible.

IMPRESCRIPTIBILITY, on the other hand, means

that no
title to the land in derogation of that of the registered
owner
may be acquired by adverse possession or acquisitive

prescription or that the registered owner does

not lose by
extinctive prescription his right to recover
ownership and
possession of the land.

of his
subsequent sale of the property, etc., on the
ground of
fraud. He asserted that the property in
question was
conjugal in nature actually belonging, at the time
of the
mortgage, to O and his wife, W, whose conjugal share
went
to their sons (S and P) and to O.

(a) Is the suit filed by P barred by prescription?

Explain
your answer.

(b) After the issuance of the sheriff's final deed of

sale in
1966 in this case, assuming that M applied for
registration
under the Torrens System and was issued a Torrens
Title to

The action in this case is for annulment of the sale

the said property in question, would that added

fact have

executed

any significant effect on your conclusion? State your

reason.

by the husband over a conjugal partnership

property
covered by a Torrens Title. Action on contracts are

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(a) Under Art. 173 of the Civil Code, the action is

barred by

prescription because the wife had only ten (10)

years from
the transaction and during the marriage to file a suit
for the
annulment of the mortgage deed.
Alternative Answers to (a) first Alternative Answer:
(a) The mortgage contract executed by O, if at all, is
only a

voidable contract since it involves a conjugal

partnership

property. The action to annul the same instituted in

1977, or
eleven years after the execution of the sheriff's final
sale, has
obviously prescribed because:

1) An action to annul a contract on the ground

of fraud
must be brought within four (4) years from the
date of
discovery of the fraud. Since this is in essence an
action

to recover ownership, it must be reckoned

from the
date of execution of the contract or from the
registration of the alleged fraudulent document
with
the assessor's office for the purpose of
transferring the

tax declaration, this being unregistered land,

(Bael u.
Intermediate Appellate Court G. R. L-74423 Jan.30, 1989
169 SCRA 617).

2) If the action is to be treated as an action to

recover
ownership of land, it would have prescribed
just the
same because more than 10 years have
already elapsed
since the date of the execution of the sale.
SECOND ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

(a) The action to recover has been barred by

acquisitive

to the land; or
2. An action in personam against M for the
reconveyance of
the title in their favor. Again, this remedy is available
within

four years from the date of the discovery of the

fraud but
not later than ten (10) years from the date of
registration of
the title in the name of M.

Prescription; Real Rights (1992)

A owned a parcel of unregistered land located on the
Tarlac

side of the boundary between Tarlac and

Pangasinan. His
brother B owned the adjoining parcel of
unregistered land
on the Pangasinan side.

A sold the Tarlac parcel to X in a deed of sale executed

as a
public instrument by A and X. After X paid in full the,
price

of the sale, X took possession of the Pangasinan

parcel in
the belief that it was the Tarlac parcel covered
by the deed
of sale executed by A and X.

After twelve (12) years, a controversy arose

between B and
X on the issue of the ownership of the Pangasinan
parcel, B

claims a vested right of ownership over the

Pangasinan
parcel because B never sold that parcel to X or
to anyone
else.

prescription in favor of M considering that M has

possessed
the land under a claim of ownership for ten (10) years
with

On the other hand, X claims a vested right of

ownership
over the Pangasinan parcel by acquisitive
prescription,
because X possessed this parcel for over ten (10]
years

(b) If M had secured a Torrens Title to the land,

under claim of ownership.

Decide on these claims, giving your reasons.

a just title.

all the
more S and P could not recover because if at all
their
remedies would be:

1. A Petition to Review the Decree of

Registration. This
can be availed of within one (1) year from-the entry
thereof,

but only upon the basis of "actual fraud." There

is no
showing that M committed actual fraud in securing his
title

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

At this point in time, X cannot claim the right of

vested
ownership over the Pangasinan parcel by acquisitive

prescription. In addition to the requisites

common to
ordinary
and extraordinary acquisitive
prescription
consisting of uninterrupted, peaceful, public,
adverse and
actual possession in the concept of owner,
ordinary

acquisitive prescription for ten (10) years

requires (1)
possession in good faith and (2) just title. "Just title"
means

that the adverse claimant came into possession

of the
property through one of the modes recognized by law
for

the acquisition of ownership but the grantor was

not the
owner or could not transmit any right (Art. 1129.
Civil
Code). In this case, there is no "just title" and no
"mode"
that can be invoked by X for the acquisition of
the
Pangasinan parcel. There was no constructive
delivery of
the Pangasinan parcel because it was not the subjectmatter

of the deed of sale. Hence, B retains ownership

of the
Pangasinan parcel of land.

Primary Entry Book; Acquisitive Prescription; Laches

(1998)
In 1965, Renren bought from Robyn a parcel of
registered
land evidenced by a duly executed deed of sale. The
owner
presented the deed of sale and the owner's certificate
of title

to the Register of Deeds. The entry was made in

the
daybook and corresponding fees were paid as
evidenced by

official receipt. However, no transfer of

certificate of title

was issued to Renren because the original certificate

of title
in Robyn's name was temporarily misplaced after fire
partly
gutted the Office of the Register of Deeds. Meanwhile,
the

land had been possessed by Robyn's distant

cousin,

Mikaelo, openly, adversely and continuously in the

concept
of owner since 1960. It was only in April 1998 that
Renren

sued Mikaelo to recover possession. Mikaelo

invoked a)
acquisitive prescription and b) laches, asking
that he be
declared owner of the land. Decide the case by
evaluating
these defenses, [5%]
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

a)
Renren's action to recover possession of the
land will
prosper. In 1965, after buying the land from
Robyn, he
submitted the Deed of Sale to the Registry of

Deeds for
registration together with the owner's duplicate copy
of the

title, and paid the corresponding registration

fees. Under
Section 56 of PD No. 1529, the Deed of Sale to
Renren is
considered registered from the time the sale was
entered in
the Day Book (now called the Primary Entry Book).
For all legal intents and purposes, Renren is
considered the

registered owner of the land. After all, it was not

his fault
that the Registry of Deeds could not issue the
corresponding transfer certificate of title.

Mikaelo's defense of prescription can not be

sustained. A
Torrens title is imprescriptible. No title to registered
land in

derogation of the title of the registered owner

shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
(Section 47,
P.D. No, 1529)

The right to recover possession of registered

land likewise
does not prescribe because possession is just a
necessary
incident of ownership.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

b)
Mikaelo's defense of laches, however,
appears to be
more sustainable. Renren bought the land and
had the sale
registered way back in 1965. From the facts, it
appears that
it was only in 1998 or after an inexplicable delay of 33
years

that he took the first step asserting his right to

the land. It
was not even an action to recover ownership but
only
possession of the land. By ordinary standards, 33
years of
neglect or inaction is too long and maybe
considered
unreasonable. As often held by the Supreme
Court, the
principle of imprescriptibility sometimes has to yield
to the

equitable principle of laches which can convert

even a
registered land owner's claim into a stale demand.

Mikaelo's claim of laches, however, is weak

insofar as the
element of equity is concerned, there being no

showing in
the facts how he entered into the ownership and
possession

of the land.

Reclamation of Foreshore Lands; Limitations (2000)

Republic Act 1899 authorizes municipalities and

chartered
cities to reclaim foreshore lands bordering them
and to
construct thereon adequate docking and harbor
facilities.
Pursuant thereto, the City of Cavite entered into
an
agreement with the Fil-Estate Realty Company,
authorizing

the latter to reclaim 300 hectares of land from

the sea
bordering the city, with 30% of the land to be
reclaimed to

be owned by Fil-Estate as compensation for its

services.
The Solicitor General questioned the validity of
the
agreement on the ground that it will mean
reclaiming land
under the sea which is beyond the commerce of
man. The
City replies that this is authorized by RA. 1899
because it
authorizes the construction of docks and
harbors. Who is
correct? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The Solicitor General is correct. The authority of the

City of

Cavite under RA 1899 to reclaim land is limited

to

the reclaimed land and it may convey a portion

thereof as
payment for the services of the contractor.
ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

On the assumption that the reclamation contract

was
entered into before RA 1899 was repealed by PD
3-A, the
City of Cavite is correct. Lands under the sea are
"beyond
the commerce of man" in the sense that they are
not
susceptible of private appropriation, ownership
or
alienation. The contract in question merely calls
for the
reclamation of 300 hectares of land within the coastal

waters of the city. Per se, it does not vest,

alienate or
transfer ownership of land under the sea. The
city merely

engaged the services of Fil-Estate to reclaim the land

for the

city.

Registration; Deed of Mortgage (1994)

How do you register now a deed of mortgage of a
parcel of
land originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage
Law?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

a) After the Spanish Mortgage Law was abrogated by

P.D.
892 on February 16, 1976, all lands covered by
Spanish titles
that were not brought under the Torrens system
within six

foreshore lands. The Act did not authorize it to reclaim

land
from the sea. "The reclamation being unauthorized,
the City

16] months from the date thereof have been

considered as

land. Not being the owner, it could not have conveyed

any
portion thereof to the contractor.

under the Spanish Mortgage Law is now

governed by the
system of registration of transactions or
instruments

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

affecting unregistered land under Section 194 of the

Revised
Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 3344.
Under
this law, the instrument or transaction affecting
unregistered
land is entered in a book provided for the purpose but
the

of Cavite did not acquire ownership over the

reclaimed

It depends. If the reclamation of the land from

the sea is
necessary in the construction of the docks and the
harbors,
the City of Cavite is correct. Otherwise, it is not. Since
RA
1899 authorized the city to construct docks and
harbors, all

works that are necessary for such construction

are deemed

authorized. Including the reclamation of land from the

sea.

The reclamation being authorized, the city is the

owner of

"unregistered private lands."

Thus, a deed of mortgage affecting land originally
registered

registration thereof is purely voluntary and does

not

adversely affect third persons who have a better right.

b) By recording and registering with the Register of
Deeds

of the place where the land is located, in

accordance with
Act 3344. However, P.D. 892 required holders of
Spanish
title to bring the same under the Torrens System
within 6
months from its effectivity on February 16, 1976.
Remedies; Judicial Confirmation; Imperfect Title (1993)

On June 30, 1986, A filed in the RTC of Abra an

application for registration of title to a parcel of land
under

P. D. No. 1529, claiming that since June 12, 1945,

he has
been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious
possession and occupation of said parcel of land
of the
public domain which was alienable and disposable,
under a

bona fide claim of ownership. After issuance of

the notice
of initial hearing and publication, as required by
law, the

petition was heard on July 29, 1987. On the day

of the
hearing nobody but the applicant appeared.
Neither was
there anyone who opposed the application.
Thereupon, on
motion of the applicant, the RTC issued an order of
general

default and allowed the applicant to present his

evidence.
That he did. On September 30, 1989, the RTC
dismissed
A's application for lack of sufficient evidence. A
appealed to
the Court of Appeals.

The appellant urged that the RTC erred in

dismissing his
application for registration and in not ordering
registration

of his title to the parcel of land in question

despite the fact
that there was no opposition filed by anybody to
his
application.
Did the RTC commit the error attributed to it?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the RTC did not commit the error attributed to it.
In an

application for Judicial confirmation of imperfect

or
incomplete title to public agricultural land under
Section 48

of the Public Land Act, the lack of opposition and

the
consequent order of default against those who
did not
answer or show up on the date of initial hearing,

does not
guarantee the success of the application. It is still
incumbent
upon the applicant to prove with well nigh
incontrovertible
evidence that he has acquired a title to the land that is
fit for
registration. Absent such registrable title, it is the
clear duty

of the Land Registration Court to dismiss the

application
and declare the land as public land.

An application for land registration is a proceeding in

rem.

Its main objective is to establish the status of the

res
whether it is still part of our public domain as
presumed
under the Regalian doctrine or has acquired the
character of

a private property. It is the duty of the applicant

to
overcome that presumption with sufficient evidence.
Remedies; Judicial Reconstitution of Title (1996)
In 1989, the heirs of Gavino, who died on August 10,
1987,

filed a petition for reconstitution of his lost or

destroyed
Torrens Title to a parcel of land in Ermita, Manila.
This was

opposed by Marilou who claimed ownership of

the said
land by a series of sales. She claimed that Gavino
had sold
the property to Bernardo way back in 1941 and as
evidence

thereof, she presented a Tax Declaration in 1948

in the
name of Bernardo, which cancelled the previous
Tax
Declaration in the name of Gavino. Then she
presented two
deeds of sale duly registered with the Register of
Deeds, the

first one executed by Bernardo in 1954 selling

the same
property to Carlos, and the second one executed by
Carlos

in 1963, selling the same property to her. She

also claimed
that she and her predecessors in interest have
been in
possession of the property since 1948.

If you were the judge, how will you decide the

petition?
Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

If I were the judge, I will give due course to the

petition of

the heirs of Gavino despite the opposition of

Marilou for
the following reasons:
a) Judicial reconstitution of a certificate of title under
RA.
No. 26 partakes of a land registration proceeding
and is
perforce a proceeding in rem. It denotes
restoration of
an existing instrument which has been lost or
destroyed

in its original form and condition. The

purpose of
reconstitution of title or any document is to
have the
same reproduced, after proceedings. In the
same form

they were when the loss or destruction occurred.

b) If the Court goes beyond that purpose, it acts
without

or in excess of jurisdiction. Thus, where the

Torrens
Title sought to be reconstituted is in the
name of

Gavino, the court cannot receive evidence proving

that

Marilou is the owner of the land. Marilou's

dominical
claim to the land should be ventilated in a
separate civil
action before the Regional Trial Court in its
capacity as
a court of general jurisdiction.
REFERENCES: Heirs of Pedro Pinate vs. Dulay. 187 SCRA 12-20

(1990); Bunagan vs. CF1 Cebu Branch VI. 97 SCRA 72 (1980);

Republic vs. IAC. 157 SCRA 62,66 (1988); Margolles vs. CA, 230
SCRA 709; Republic us, Feliciano, 148 SCRA 924.

Remedies; Procedure; Consulta (1994)

What is the procedure of consulta when an

instrument is
denied registration?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

1)

The Register of Deeds shall notify the

interested party in writing, setting forth the defects of
the instrument or

the legal ground relied upon for denying the

registration, and advising that if he is not
agreeable to
such ruling, he may, without withdrawing the
documents from the Registry, elevate the matter
by

Consulta to the Administrator of the Land Registration

Authority (LRA).
2.) Within five {5) days from receipt of notice of
denial,

the party-in-interest shall file his Consulta with

the

Register of Deeds concerned and pay the consulta fee.

3)
After receipt of the Consulta and
payment of the
corresponding fee the Register of Deeds makes
an
annotation of the pending consulta at the back of
the

certificate of title.

4)
The Register of Deeds then elevates
the case to the
LRA Administrator with certified records thereof and a
summary of the facts and issues involved.

5)
The LRA Administrator then conducts
hearings after
due notice or may just require parties to submit
their
memoranda.
6)
After hearing, the LRA Administrator issues

an order
prescribing the step to be taken or the memorandum
to
be made. His resolution in consulta shall be conclusive

and binding upon all Registers of Deeds unless

reversed on appeal by the Court of Appeals or by
the
Supreme Court. (Section 117, P.D. 1529).

The procedure of consulta is a mode of

appeal from
denial by the Register of Deeds of the
registration of
the instrument to the Commissioner of Land
Registration.

Within five days from receipt of the

notice of denial,
the interested party may elevate the matter by
consulta

to the Commissioner of Land Registration who

shall
enter an order prescribing the step to be taken
or
memorandum to be made. Resolution in consulta shall

be binding upon all Registers of Deeds provided

that
the party in interest may appeal to the Court of
Appeals
within the period prescribed (Sec. 117, P.D. 1529).

Remedies; Reconveyance vs. Reopening of a Decree;

Prescriptive Period (2003)
Louie, before leaving the country to train as a chef in a
fivestar hotel in New York, U.S.A., entrusted to his firstdegree

cousin Dewey an application for registration,

under the
Land Registration Act, of a parcel of land located
in
Bacolod City. A year later, Louie returned to the
Philippines
and discovered that Dewey registered the land and
obtained

an Original Certificate of Title over the property

in his
Deweys name. Compounding the matter, Dewey sold
the

land to Huey, an innocent purchaser for value.

Louie

promptly filed an action for reconveyance of the

parcel of
land against Huey.
(a)
Is the action pursued by Louie the
proper remedy?
(b) Assuming
that reconveyance is the
proper remedy,
will the action prosper if the case was filed beyond one
year,

but within ten years, from the entry of the

decree of
registration? 5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

(a) An action for reconveyance against Huey is not

the proper remedy, because Huey is an innocent
purchaser

for value. The proper recourse is for Louie to go

after
Dewey for damages by reason of the fraudulent
registration

and subsequent sale of the land. If Dewey is

insolvent,
Louie may file a claim against the Assurance Fund
(Heirs of
Pedro Lopez v. De Castro 324 SCRA 591 [2000] citing Sps.
Eduarte v. CA, 323 Phil. 462, 467 [1996]).

(b)

Yes, the remedy will prosper because the

action
prescribes in ten (10) years, not within one (1)
year when a
petition for the reopening of the registration decree
may be

filed. The action for reconveyance is distinct

from the
petition to reopen the decree of registration
(Grey Alba v.

De la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49 [1910}). There is no need to

reopen
the registration proceedings, but the property should
just be
reconveyed to the real owner.

The action for reconveyance is based on implied

or
constructive trust, which prescribes in ten (10)
years from
the date of issuance of the original certificate of
title. This
rule assumes that the defendant is in possession of the
land.
Where it is the plaintiff who is in possession of the
land, the
action for reconveyance would be in the nature of a
suit for
quieting for the title which action is imprescriptible
(David
v. Malay, 318 SCRA 711 [1999]).
Remedies; Reconveyance; Elements (1995)
Rommel was issued a certificate of title over a parcel

of land

in Quezon City. One year later Rachelle, the

legitimate
owner of the land, discovered the fraudulent
registration
obtained by Rommel. She filed a complaint against
Rommel

for reconveyance and caused the annotation of a

notice of
lis pendens on the certificate of title issued to
Rommel.
Rommel now invokes the indefeasibility of his
title
considering that one year has already elapsed
from its
issuance. He also seeks the cancellation of the
notice of Lis
pendens.
Will Rachelle's suit for reconveyance prosper?
Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, Rachelle's suit will prosper because all elements

for an
action for reconveyance are present, namely:

a) Rachelle is claiming dominical rights over the

same
land.
b) Rommel procured his title to the land by fraud.
c) The action was brought within the statutory period
of
four (4) years from discovery of the fraud and not
later

than ten (10} years from the date of

registration of
Rommel's title.

d) Title to the land has not passed into the

hands of an
innocent purchaser for value.
Rommel can invoke the indefeasibility of his title if
Rachelle

had filed a petition to reopen or review the

decree of
registration. But Rachelle instead filed an ordinary
action in

personam for reconveyance. In the latter action,

indefeasibility is not a valid defense because, in
filing such
action, Rachelle is not seeking to nullify nor to impugn
the
indefeasibility of Rommel's title. She is only asking the
court

to compel Rommel to reconvey the title to her as

the
legitimate owner of the land.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

Yes. The property registered is deemed to be

held in trust
for the real owner by the person in whose name
it is
registered. The Torrens system was not designed to

shield

one who had committed fraud or

misrepresentation and
thus holds the title in bad faith. (Walstrom v. Mapa Jr.,
(G .R
38387, 29 Jan. 1990) as cited in Martinez, D., Summary of SC
Decisions, January to June, 1990, p. 359],
Remedies; Reconveyance; Prescriptive Period (1997)

On 10 September 1965, Melvin applied for a free

patent
covering two lots - Lot A and Lot B - situated in
Santiago,
Isabela. Upon certification by the Public Land
Inspector
that Melvin had been in actual, continuous, open,
notorious,

exclusive and adverse possession of the lots

since 1925, the

Director of Land approved Melvin's application on 04

June

1967. On 26 December 1967, Original Certificate

of Title
(OCT) No. P-2277 was issued in the name of Melvln.

On 7 September 1971, Percival filed a protest

alleging that
Lot B which he had been occupying and
cultivating since
1947 was included in the Free Patent issued in
the name of
Melvin. The Director of Lands ordered the
investigation of

Percival's protest. The Special Investigator who

conducted
the investigation found that Percival had been in
actual
cultivation of Lot B since 1947.
On 28 November 1986, the Solicitor General filed in
behalf

of the Republic of the Philippines a complaint for

cancellation of the free patent and the OCT
issued in the
name of Melvin and the reversion of the land to
public
domain on the ground of fraud and
misrepresentation in
obtaining the free patent. On the same date,
Percival sued
Martin for the reconveyance of Lot B.

Melvin filed his answers interposing the sole

defense in
both cases that the Certificate of Title issued in
his name
became incontrovertible and indefeasible upon the
lapse of
one year from the issuance of the free patent.

Given the circumstances, can the action of the

Solicitor
General and the case for reconveyance filed by
Percival
possibly prosper?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

"If fraud be discovered in the application which

led to the
issuance of the patent and Certificate of Title,
this Title
becomes ipso facto null and void. Thus, in a case
where a
person who obtained a free patent, knowingly made a
false

statement of material and essential facts in his

application

for the same, by stating therein that the lot in question

was

part of the public domain not occupied or

claimed by any

other person, his title becomes ipso facto canceled and

consequently rendered null and void."

"It is to the public interest that one who

succeeds In
fraudulently acquiring title to public land should
not be
allowed to benefit therefrom and the State,
through the
Solicitor General, may file the corresponding
action for
annulment of the patent and the reversion of the
land
involved to the public domain" (Dinero us. Director of
Lands; Kayaban vs. Republic L-33307,8-20-73; Director of
Lands us. Hon. Pedro Samson Animas, L-37682, 3-29-74.)

This action does not prescribe. With respect to

Percival's
action for reconveyance, it would have
prescribed, having
been filed more than ten (10) years after
registration and
issuance of an O.C.T. in the name of Melvin, were it
not for

the inherent infirmity of the latter's title. Under

the facts,
the statute of limitations will not apply to Percival
because

Melvin knew that a part of the land covered by

his title
actually belonged to Percival. So, instead of
nullifying in
toto the title of Melvin, the court, in the exercise of
equity
and jurisdiction, may grant prayer for the
reconveyance of
Lot B to Percival who has actually possessed the land
under
a claim of ownership since 1947. After all, if Melvin's
title is
declared void ab initio and the land is reverted to the
public

domain, Percival would just the same be entitled

to

preference right to acquire the land from the

government.
Besides, well settled is the rule that once public
land has
been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious
possession under a bonafide claim of acquisition
of
ownership for the period prescribed by Section
48 of the
Public Land Act, the same ipso jure ceases to be public
and

in contemplation of law acquired the character of

private
land. Thus, reconveyance of the land from Melvin
to
Percival would be the better procedure, (Vitale vs. Anore,
90
Phil. 855; Pena, Land Titles and Deeds, 1982, Page 427)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

The action of the Solicitor General should

prosper,
considering that the doctrine of indefeasibility of title
does
not apply to free patent secured through fraud. A
certificate

of title cannot be used as shield to perpetuate

fraud. The
State is not bound by the period of prescription
stated in
Sec. 38 of Act 496. (Director of Lands vs. Abanilla, 124
SCRA 358)

The action for reconveyance filed by Percival

may still
prosper provided that the property has not
passed to an
innocent third party for value (Dablo us. Court of Appeals.
226 SCRA 618), and provided that the action is filed

within
the prescriptive period of ten years (Tale vs. Court of
Appeals. 208 SCRA 266). Since the action was filed by
Percival 19 years after the issuance of Melvin's
title, it is

prescribe if the plaintiff is in possession of the

property.
(Olviga v. CA. GR 1048013. October 21, 1993)
Remedies; Reopening of a Decree; Elements (1992)

What are the essential requisites or elements for

the
allowance of the reopening or review of a decree
of
registration?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The essential elements are: (1) that the

petitioner has a real
or dominical right; (2) that he has been deprived
thereof
through fraud; (3) that the petition is filed within
one (1)
year from the issuance of the decree; and (4)
that the
property has not yet been transferred to an
innocent
purchaser {Rublico vs. Orellana 30 SCRA 511; Ubudan vs.
Gil
45 SCRA 17).
OPTIONAL EXTENDED ANSWER:

Petition for review of the Decree of Registration. A

remedy

expressly provided in Section 32 of P. D. No.

1529
(formerly Section 38. Act 496), this remedy has
the
following elements:
a)
The petition must be filed by a person
claiming

dominical or other real rights to the land

registered in

the name of respondent.

b)
The registration of the land in the name of
respondent

was procured by means of actual, (not just

constructive) fraud, which must be extrinsic.
is

Fraud

The action for reconveyance filed by Percival will

prosper,

actual if the registration was made through

deceit or
any other intentional act of downright dishonesty
to
enrich oneself at the expense of another. It is
extrinsic
when it is something that was not raised,
litigated and

become private land by open, continuous, public,

exclusive

passed upon in the main proceedings.

c)
The petition must be filed within one (1)
year from the
date of the issuance of the decree.

submitted that the same is already barred by

prescription.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER (to second part of question)

because the land has ceased to be public land

and has
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership
for more
than thirty years, and Percival is still in
possession of the
property at present. His action for reconveyance
can be
considered as an action to quiet title, which does
not

d)
Title to the land has not passed to an
Innocent
purchaser for value (Libudan vs. Gil, 45_ SCRA
27,
1972), Rublico vs. Orrelana. 30 SCRA 511,
1969); RP
vs. CA, 57 G. R No. 40402. March 16, 1987).

Torrens System vs. Recording of Evidence of Title (1994)

Distinguish the Torrens system of land registration
from the
system of recording of evidence of title.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

a) The TORRENS SYSTEM OF LAND

REGISTRATION is a system for the registration of title
to the land. Thus, under this system what is

entered in the Registry of Deeds, is a record

of the owner's estate or interest in the land,
unlike the system under the Spanish Mortgage
Law or the system under Section 194 of the
Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act
3344 where only the evidence of such title is
recorded. In the
latter system, what is recorded is the deed of
conveyance
from hence the owner's title emanatedand not
the title
itself.
b) Torrens system of land registration is that
which is
prescribed in Act 496 (now PD 1529), which is
either
Judicial or quasi-judicial. System or recording of
evidence of
title is merely the registration of evidence of
acquisitions of
land with the Register of Deeds, who annotates the
same on

the existing title, cancels the old one and issues

a new title
based on the document presented for registration.
Unregistered Land (1991)
Maria Enriquez failed to pay the realty taxes on her

unregistered agricultural land located in

Magdugo, Toledo
City. In 1989, to satisfy the taxes due, the City
sold it at
public auction to Juan Miranda, an employee at
the
Treasurer's Office of said City, whose bid at
P10,000.00 was

the highest. In due time, a final bill of sale was

executed in
his favor.
Maria refused to turn-over the possession of the
property to
Juan alleging that (1) she had been, in the meantime,
granted
a free patent and on the basis thereof an Original
Certificate
of Title was issued to her, and (2) the sale in favor of
Juan is

void from the beginning in view of the provision

in the
Administrative Code of 1987 which prohibits
officers and
employees of the government from purchasing

directly or
indirectly any property sold by the government
for
nonpayment of any tax, fee or other public charge.

(a) Is the sale to Juan valid? If so, what is the

effect of the
Issuance of the Certificate of Title to Maria?

(b) If the sale is void, may Juan recover the

P10,000.00? If
not, why not?

(c) If the sale is void, did it not nevertheless,

operate to
divert Maria of her ownership? If it did, who then is
the
owner of the property?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

A. The sale of the land to Juan is not valid, being

contrary
to law. Therefore, no transfer of ownership of the land
was
effected from the delinquent taxpayer to him. The
original
certificates of title obtained by Maria thru a free
patent grant

from the Bureau of Lands under Chapter VII, CA

141 is
valid but in view of her delinquency, the said title is
subject

to the right of the City Government to sel the

land at
public auction. The issuance of the OCT did not
exempt
the land from the tax sales. Section 44 of P.O. No.
1529
provides that every registered owner receiving a
Certificate

of Title shall hold the same free from an

encumbrances,
subject to certain exemptions.

B. Juan may recover because he was not a party

to the
violation of the law.

C. No, the sale did not divest Maria of her title

precisely
because the sale is void. It is as good as if no sale
ever took
place.
In tax sales, the owner is divested of his land initially
upon
award and issuance of a Certificate of Sale, and finally
after

the lapse of the 1 year period from date of

registration, to
redeem, upon execution by the treasurer of an
instrument

sufficient in form and effects to convey the property.

Maria

remained owner of the land until another tax

sale is to be
performed in favor of a qualified buyer.