Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 157610
October 19, 2007
ORLANDO G. TONGOL, Petitioner,
vs.
FILIPINAS M. TONGOL, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 25, 2002 in CAG.R. CV No. 66245, and its Resolution of March 19, 2003, denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration. The CA Decision affirmed, in toto, the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 149, which dismissed the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage filed by herein petitioner Orlando Tongol.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Orlando G. Tongol (Orlando) and Filipinas M. Tongol (Filipinas) were married on August
27, 1967. Out of their union, they begot four children, namely: Crisanto, born in 1968;
Olivia, born in 1969; Frederick, born in 1971, and; Ma. Cecilia, born in 1972.
On May 13, 1994, Orlando and Filipinas filed a petition for dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of gains, which was granted in a Judgment issued by the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 143 on April 24, 1995.
On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the RTC of Makati City a verified petition for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Filipinas on the ground that the latter is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations.
In his Petition, Orlando contended that he and Filipinas got married over the objection of
the latter's family; their marriage was not a happy one because of her parents' continued
interference and attempt to break up their union; greatly influenced by her parents,
Filipinas, even at the early stages of their marriage, already treated Orlando with
contempt and without the love and respect due him as her husband; when Orlando started
a junk shop business, Filipinas ridiculed him instead of giving him encouragement; later
on, his business became successful and he was able to embark upon another business
venture; he put up a pharmaceutical company which also became profitable; Filipinas
then became interested and began to interfere in the operation of the business; however,
because of her bad attitude, the employees were aloof; she also resented the fact that her
husband got along well with the employees; as a result, she quarreled with her husband
causing the latter embarrassment; she even suspected that the income of the business was
being given to her husband's relatives; their continued fighting persisted and affected
their children; efforts at reconciliation proved futile because their differences had become
irreconcilable and their marriage impossible; in 1990, Orlando decided to live separately
from Filipinas; in 1994, the spouses filed a petition for dissolution of their property
relationship; and the petition was granted in 1995.
In her Answer with Counter-Petition, Filipinas admitted that efforts at reconciliation have
been fruitless and that their marriage is a failure. However, she claims that their marriage
failed because it is Orlando who is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his obligations

as a married man.
Evidence for Orlando consisted of his own testimony, that of his sister, Angelina Tongol,
and of Annaliza Guevara, an employee in the pharmaceutical company owned by the
spouses Tongol. Orlando also presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist who
conducted a psychological examination of both parties. Orlando submitted documents
evidencing their marriage, the birth of their four children, the RTC decision granting the
petition for dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the written evaluation
of Dr. Villegas regarding the spouses' psychological examination. On the other hand,
record shows that evidence for Filipinas only consisted of her own testimony.
On June 30, 1999, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 149, rendered a Decision dismissing
the petition.
On appeal, the CA affirmed, in toto, the Decision of the RTC.
Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:
1. "WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF THE
TRIAL COURT AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT DRA.
CECILIA VILLEGAS FAILED TO STATE WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT'S
INADEQUATE PERSONALITY DISORDER WAS GRAVE, PERMANENT AND
INCURABLE" (par. 12, p. 3, Annex "A", hereof).
2. "WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING
THE APPEAL" (p. 7,ibid.).
3. "WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING
THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION" (Annex "B", hereof).2
The basic issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not the totality of the
evidence presented in the present case is enough to sustain a finding that herein
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital
obligations.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,3 the term psychological incapacity was defined as:
[N]o less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated. x x x4
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by:
(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.5
While the CA has already extensively quoted the ruling in Republic of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals and Molina,6 wherein the guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 367 of the Family Code was laid down, this Court finds it

significant to reproduce the same quoted portion, to wit:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x
x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic

Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.8
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages,9 which took effect on March 15, 2003, the foregoing guidelines
have been modified. Section 2(d) of the said Rule provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.xxxx
(d) What to allege.- A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically
allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the
time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion
need not be alleged.
The new Rule dispensed with the certification from the Solicitor General, stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition. Attachment of expert opinions
to the petition is also dispensed with.
In the instant case, the RTC and the CA gave credence to the conclusion of the examining
psychiatrist, Dr. Villegas, that respondent is suffering from Inadequate Personality
Disorder. However, both courts ruled that the behavior exhibited by respondent does not
amount to psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code.
This Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the assessment of the RTC and the CA
for the following reasons:
First, petitioner relies heavily on the findings of Dr. Villegas who made the following
written evaluation regarding respondent's psychological makeup:
xxxx
On the other hand, Mrs. Filipinas Mendoza-Tongol belonged to a matriarchal family
where the mother assumed a more active and dominant role. She was left to the care of
her aunt and developed a basic feeling a (sic) rejection.
The only college graduate among 7 children her operating intellectual ability is lowaverage. Sudden change overwhelmed her. When seized by an impulse, she is likely to
give way, even minor pressures upset her and when this happens, emotional control could
not be relied upon.
In marriage when her husband shows good relationship with their employees, especially
with females, she became (sic) suspicious, jealous, and threatened, and this is related to
her basic feelings of rejection in early life. She coped (sic) up with her uncomfortable
feelings by exhibiting temper tantrums, irritability and dominance, a replica of her

mother's attitude, but to the distaste of her husband.

At present she is depressed, though hostile, and now living in the expectation of further
rejection. Additionally, she is threatened by a neurological illness (tremor of the hands)
for which she is consulting a neurologist.
Based on the above findings, it is the opinion of the undersigned that Mr. Orlando Tongol
is suffering from some depressive features, which seems to be a recent development as a
result of marital problems. On the other hand, Mrs. Tongol is suffering from an
Inadequate Personality Disorder, with hysterical coloring, which renders her
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. She
is unable to cope with the sudden work and environmental shifts, that overwhelmed her,
due to insufficient psychological inner resources.10
In her testimony, Dr. Villegas explained respondent's personality disorder in this wise:
ATTY. VILLAREAL xxxx
Q- What exactly do you mean [by] inadequate personality disorder?
A- Inadequate personality disorder means, there are not times that in all aspects of her
life, she could not function in the way that she feels or she is confident. She has always
been very much in doubt of her own capabilities, Sir.
Q- What about hysterical coloring?
A- Hysterical coloring means, there is always an exaggeration of her psychological
reactions to any stresses, Sir.
Q- Exaggeration in what aspect?
A- Exaggeration in any emotional reactions or situations like if she would be seeing the
husband talking to some employees then, she is suddenly irritable and would present
some tantrums. In short, she cannot control her emotion at the moment of stresses
circulations, Sir.11
When asked how such personality disorder affects respondent's capacity to assume the
essential obligations of marriage, Dr. Villegas expounded as follows:
ATTY. RENDOR xxxx
Q- How about Mrs. Tongol, what are your findings?
A- Mrs. Tongol is a college graduate and she finished commerce. Basically, she has a
feeling of rejection from the start of her development and this was carried on into her
adult life. When the husband started having some good relationship with his employees,
then she started to get jealous and she would embarrass him in front of their employees
and insulted him and would go into tantrums and this was very much resented by Mr.
Tongol, Sir.
ATTY. RENDOR Q- In your expert opinion, Doctor, can you tell us the reason why Mrs. Tongol acted in
such a way?
A- Because of her basic rejection at that time, Sir. She was afraid that Mr. Tongol was
already rejecting her as a wife and being attracted to other people, but it is the way of
how Mrs. Tongol reacted to her own feelings of rejection, Sir.
xxxx
Q- What made you say that because of inadequate personality disorder, Mrs. Tongol
rendered her psychological (sic) incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities

of the marriage. What is your basis in saying that?

A- She belongs to a very matriarchal family. The mother was very dominant. She always
gets what she wanted in the house. In short, she was the authority in the house and during
her growing up stage, she was given up to the aunt, for the aunt to take care of her. She
only came back to the family when she was already a sort of an early teenager. With this,
there has always been a feeling of rejection during her personality development. Besides,
she feels that she is one of those not favor (sic) by the mother during her growing up
stage, Sir.
Q- Based on your examination of the spouses, what do you recommend as far as the
marriage is concerned, considering that this is a petition for the annulment of marriage?
A- I could recommend that they have their marriage annulled because it will only be
sufferings from (sic) both of them because on the part of Mrs. Tongol, it is one that is
more or less permanent and Mr. Tongol is also suffering from some depression, Sir.12
The Court can only gather from the foregoing explanations of Dr. Villegas that as a child,
Filipinas had always felt rejected, especially by her mother; that she never got rid of those
feelings of rejection even when she became an adult and got married; that her fits of
jealousy and temper tantrums, every time she sees her husband having a good interaction
with their employees, are ways of coping up with her feelings of rejection. However, Dr.
Villegas failed to link respondent's personality disorder to her conclusion that respondent
is psychologically incapacitated to perform her obligations as wife and mother. The Court
cannot see how respondent's personality disorder which, according to Dr. Villegas, is
inextricably linked to her feelings of rejection, would render her unaware of the essential
marital obligations, or to borrow the terms used in Santos, "to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage." What has been established in the instant case is that, by reason of
her feelings of inadequacy and rejection, respondent not only encounters a lot of
difficulty but even refuses to assume some of her obligations towards her husband, such
as respect, help and support for him. However, this Court has ruled that psychological
incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal" or a "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations.13 As held in Santos:
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.14
Second, Dr. Villegas also failed to fully and satisfactorily explain if the personality
disorder of respondent is grave enough to bring about her disability to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Petitioner contends that respondent's exaggerated
reactions to normal situations, her unreasonable feelings of rejection brought about by her
dysfunctional upbringing, are all indications of the gravity of her psychological condition.
Even granting that respondent's psychological disorder is serious, the fact remains that
there is no evidence to prove that such condition is of such nature as to render respondent
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage.
Third, there is no evidence that such incapacity is incurable. Neither in her written
evaluation nor in her testimony did Dr. Villegas categorically and conclusively
characterize respondent's inadequate personality disorder as permanent or incurable. Dr.
Villegas was not sure of the permanence or incurability of respondent's illness as shown

by her following statement:

I could recommend that they have their marriage annulled because it will only be
sufferings from (sic) both of them because on the part of Mrs. Tongol, it is one that is
more or less permanent and Mr. Tongol is also suffering from some depression, Sir.15
(Emphasis supplied)
Fourth, the psychological incapacity considered under Article 36 of the Family Code is
not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses.16 The fourth guideline in
Molina requires that the psychological incapacity as understood under Article 36 of the
Family Code must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
In the present case, the testimonies of both petitioner and respondent as well as the other
witnesses regarding the spouses' differences and misunderstanding basically revolve
around and are limited to their disagreement regarding the management of their business.
In fact, respondent herself, in her Memorandum submitted to the trial court, claimed that
their quarrels arose solely from their disagreement on how to run their business.17 This is
confirmed by the testimony of petitioner's sister who lived with the spouses for a
considerable period of time.18However, a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.19
In addition, it is true that the marital obligations of a husband and wife enumerated under
the Family Code include the mutual responsibility of the spouses to manage the
household and provide support for the family, which means that compliance with this
obligation necessarily entails the management of the income and expenses of the
household. While disagreements on money matters would, no doubt, affect the other
aspects of one's marriage as to make the wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a sufficient
ground to declare a marriage null and void. In the present case, respondent's disagreement
with her husband's handling of the family's business and finances and her propensity to
start a fight with petitioner spouse regarding these matters can hardly be considered as a
manifestation of the kind of psychological incapacity contemplated under Article 36 of
the Family Code. In fact, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that disagreements
regarding money matters is a common, and even normal, occurrence between husbands
and wives.
Fifth, marital obligation includes not only a spouse's obligation to the other spouse but
also one's obligation toward their children. In the present case, no evidence was presented
to show that respondent had been remiss in performing her obligations toward their
children as enumerated in Article 220 of the Family Code.20
It is settled that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves.21 It refers
to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
marriage.22 It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.23 In the
instant case, the Court finds no error in the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA,
that the aversive behavior of petitioner and respondent towards each other is a mere
indication of incompatibility brought about by their different family backgrounds as well
as their attitudes, which developed after their marriage.
In sum, it is not disputed that respondent is suffering from a psychological
disorder.1wphi1 However, the totality of the evidence presented in the present case does

not show that her personality disorder is of the kind contemplated by Article 36 of the
Family Code as well as jurisprudence as to render her psychologically incapacitated or
incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in
its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution.24 Hence, any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity.25
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 25, 2002 Decision and March
19, 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66245 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
NACHURA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
AT T E S T AT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Penned by Justice Amelita G. Tolentino and concurred in by Justices Martin S.
Villarama, Jr. and Remedios Salazar-Fernando; rollo, pp. 44-56.
2 Rollo, p. 19.
3 310 Phil. 21 (1995).
4 Id. at 40.
5 Republic of the Philippines v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA
508, 521.
6 335 Phil. 664 (1997).
7 Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage, shall

likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
8 Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, supra note 6, at 676-680.
9 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
10 Exhibits "G-3" and "G-4", records, pp. 141-142.
11 TSN, April 1, 1998, p. 16; records, p. 369.
12 TSN, April 1, 1998, pp. 9-10, 14-15 (records, pp. 362-363, 367-368).
13 Choa v. Choa, 441 Phil. 175, 186-187 (2002), citing Republic of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals,supra note 6, at 674.
14 Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 3, at 40.
15 TSN, April 1, 1998, pp. 14-15 (pp. 367-368, records)
16 Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, October 27, 2004, 441 SCRA 422,
433, citing Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 3.
17 Records, p. 226.
18 TSN, June 26, 1997, pp. 4, 15-16 (records, pp. 316, 327-328).
19 Choa v. Choa, supra note 13, at 187; Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,
supra note 6, at 674.
20 Art. 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect to
their unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept
and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;
(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and
understanding;
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty,
integrity, self- discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic
affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;
(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their
activities, recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company, and
prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;
(5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interest;
(6) To demand from them respect and obedience;
(7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and
(8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians.
21 Republic of the Philippines v. Iyoy, supra note 5, at 526.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, supra note 16, at 436.
25 Id.