Jurisprudence Prospective Overruling in Reference
Jurisprudence Prospective Overruling in Reference
Jurisprudence Prospective Overruling in Reference
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Doctrine of Prospective Overruling originated in the American Judicial System. The literal meaning of
the term overruling is to overturn or set aside a precedent by expressly deciding that it should no
longer be controlling law. Similarly prospective means operative or effective in the future. So,
combined together, prospective overruling means construing an earlier decision in such a way that it
would not have a binding effect to the parties of the original suit or to the cases decided on the basis of
that judgment, and yet changing the law, applying it only prospectively to the future cases. For
example, if principle A is laid down in the case of X v. Y and later on the court disagrees with the
Principle A, it changes the principle prospectively without affecting the judgment of X v. Y and thus the
new principle will apply only to the future cases.
There are two views on the doctrine of Prospective Overruling. The first view is by Blackstone who
believes that the Doctrine of Stare Decisis should be followed the courts in the administration of justice.
Thus a precedent once set should be adopted by the lower courts also in their judicial processes and it
must be left to the judges to decide which decision shall be applied retrospectively and which shall be
applied prospectively. Thus it can be interpreted that there is no such requirement of this doctrine as
the judges can decide accordingly keeping in view the question in hand. This view is totally against the
doctrine of Prospective Overruling.
The second view is that of Cardozo J. who is known as the originator and propounder of Prospective
overruling. He laid down this doctrine in the case of Northern Railway v. Sunburst Oil and Refining
Co where he refused to make the ruling retroactive. He has specifically mentioned that
This is not a case where a court, in overruling an earlier decision, has given to the new ruling a
retroactive bearing, and thereby has made invalid what was valid in the doing.
The basic objective of prospective overruling is to overrule a precedent without having a retrospective
effect. According to Cardozo J. if this doctrine is not given effect it will wash away the whole dynamic
nature of law, it will be against the concept of judicial activism. Cardozo J. was of the view that the law
should keep up with the changes occurring in the society, the law has to be dynamic and not static. If in
a new and changed society, the citizens are bound by an old law it will lead to grave injustice. The
citizens whose lives are bound by the law of land should be given laws according to changed needs.
Therefore the doctrine of Prospective Overruling is an important tool in the hand of judiciary to give fair
and timely justice to its citizens.
doctrines, namely, that a court finds the law and that it does make law and it finds law but restricts its
operation to the future. It enables the court to bring about a smooth transition by correcting, its errors
without disturbing the impact of those errors on past transactions. By the application of this doctrine the
past may be preserved and the future protected. Our Constitution does not expressly of by necessary
implication speak against the doctrine of prospective overruling.
postponed giving effect to the ruling for five years from the date of the judgment. This case not only
sees the extension of the application of the doctrine but even the elongation of the time period when the
judgment would be effective.
Furthermore explaining the principle, in the case of Harsha Dhingra v. State of Haryana , the
Honourable Supreme Court has held that since it is indisputable that a court can overrule a decision
there is no valid reason why it should not be restricted to the future and not to the past. Prospective
overruling is not only a part of the constitutional policy but also an extended facet of stare decisis and
not judicial legislation.
But a critique of the doctrine can be found in Narayani Bai v. State of Maharashtra where it was
observed that even the Judges for whom Subba Rao CJ spoke did not accept the doctrine of
prospective overruling in all its implications as understood by the American Courts.
Conclusion
We have seen through various case laws as to how this doctrine was incorporated in to Indian judicial
system for the first time in Golak Naths case by then C.J. Subba Rao. What we have adopted in India
is the view of Cardozo J. It is very important to note that we live in a dynamic society and for laws to
govern us effectively constantly changes have to be brought in them to suit the present requirements. A
tool like this doctrine thus can be adopted by the Courts to meet the requirements of the society. But
what we must keep in mind is that it can also pose a danger to our system if we recklessly adopt any
doctrine from other systems of law without analyzing and modifying it to suit our system.
The Supreme Court has effectively by laying down certain propositions since incorporation of the
doctrine into our system kept a check on it. By expressly laying down that only the Supreme Court can
decide as to whether the law will apply prospectively or retrospectively, the court has made sure that
there is no injustice caused to any person in the society. It is very essential that the doctrine is applied
within a definite scope for meeting the ends of justice. The application of the doctrine in Mandal
Commission case shows how the doctrine has been applied literally and not to meet the ends of justice
as the judgment of the court has been made to be effective from a particular date which doesnt signal
anywhere of application of the doctrine to meet the ends of justice and to avoid confusion.
If a critical date is set out from which the new law shall be applicable then it will help in the efficient
application of the doctrine. Also it is suggested that to remove confusion and not avoid unnecessary
litigation, even the High Courts should be allowed to apply this doctrine under the supervision of the
Supreme Court.
It is thus concluded that the doctrine has not been applied in toto by the Indian Courts in respect of the
American counterpart form which it is adopted. Rather modifications have been made in the doctrine to
suit our Indian system and furthermore even the scope of the doctrine has been extended to ordinary
statutes as well.