Watson, Alan, Evolution of Law Continued, 1987

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Citation: 5 Law & Hist. Rev. 537 1987

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The Evolution of Law: Continued

Alan Watson
In my book The Evolution of Law I I sought to give a general theory of
legal evolution based on detailed legal examples from which generalizations
could be drawn, offering as few examples as were consistent with my case
in order to present as clear a picture as possible. I was well aware as I was
writing that some critics would regard the examples as mere isolated
aberrations and for them and for other readers who, whether convinced of
the thesis or not, would like further evidence, I want here to bring forward
a few extra significant examples.
In the first chapter I wanted to show that it is, above all, lawyers thinking
about law, not societal conditions, that determines the shape of legal change
in developed legal systems. I chose to show as the main example that it was
the thought pattern of the Roman jurists, rather than conditions in the society
at large, that determined the origins and nature of the individual Roman
contracts, and that the jurists were largely unaffected by society's realities.
Of course, social, economic, political and religious factors, did have an
impact but to an extent that was very much less than their general
importance in society. What was true for one main-perhaps the most
original and the most important-branch of law, developed over centuries
by jurists in one of the world's most innovative systems, is also true it will
now be argued, for law in general developed over centuries by judges, in
another of the world's innovative secular systems, the English medieval
common law.
In contrast to my handling of the Roman law of contract I do not want to
produce a radically new theory of the development of the common law. That
is why I omitted this example from the book. Rather I want to demonstrate
that my general thesis is implicit in standard accounts of the growth of the
common law, especially as exemplified by the best-known modern account,
Alan Watson is University Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.

I am grateful to my friends, Stephen B. Burbank, John W. Cairns, Michael H. Hoeflich, and Peter
Krause, who criticised drafts of this paper.
1. Alan Watson, The Evolution of Law (Baltimore, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Watson,
Evolution].
Law and History Review

S. F. C. Milsom, HistoricalFoundationsof the Common Law. 2 1 would not
want to accuse Milsom of sharing my viewpoint on legal evolution but, on
very many pages on individual points and in the picture contained overall in
his book, his argument strikingly confirms my thesis; assuming, of course,
he is correct in what he tells us of the history of English law.
Thus, in discussing feudal tenures-and for long feudal law was at the
heart of the English legal system-he can say: 'The military tenures, of
uncertain value as a provision for warfare, brought with them a logic which
was to generate anachronisms throughout our history.' 3 After the Norman
Conquest, almost all those who held land directly from the King held it by
knight service which entailed the obligation of providing a fixed number of
fully armed horsemen for forty days per year. The cavalry was so recruited
for almost a century - though the military disadvantages of such a system
are obvious -but eventually money payments called scutage were substituted. Though knight service was abolished in 1660 many of the incidents
4
of the tenure resulting from its military origins remained until this century.
Again, at the low legal level of manor courts and manor law Milsom writes:
'Some of this law was to perish, some to live to a sad old age as what came
to be called copyhold.' 5 Of the defects of copyhold many have written, 6 but
much of the land of England was held by copyhold until 1925. 'Although
copyhold now [in the early 17th century] had equal protection, it retained its
separate identity for three useless centuries, providing a measure of
economic obstruction, traps for conveyancers, and puzzles for the courts.
These puzzles concerned such matters as the entailing of copyhold, and they
were of absorbing legal interest. Today their only value is as an object lesson
in the great intellectual difficulty a legal system can encounter when it seeks
to rejoin matters which became separated for reasons which are extinct. ' 7 On
the evolution of land ownership he remarks: 'It is hard to say which story is
the more extraordinary: the evolution of the fee simple as ownership, with
only its name and its necessary words of limitation to remind us of its
tenurial beginnings; or the series of seeming accidents which produced the
fee tail. But this juridical monster, beyond the desires of donors seven
hundred years ago, beyond the intention of the legislator and far beyond
2. S. F. C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law (Toronto, 2nd ed.,

1981) [hereinafter cited as Foundations].
3. Ibid. at 20.
4. See e.g. A. W. B. Simpson, Introduction to the History of the Land Law (Oxford,
1961) 8.
5. Foundations, supra note 2 at 21.
6. See e.g. E. H. Burn, Cheshire'sModern Real Property (London, 11 th ed., 1982) 24;
R. E. Megarry and H. W. R. Wade, The Law of Real Property(London, 3rd ed., 1966)
29; (5th ed., 1984) 32.
7. Foundations, supra note 2 at 165.
Essay: Evolution of Law: Continued

reason, is with us yet.' 8 'The settlement, by which an owner of property can
divide the ownership in time between beneficiaries who will take one after
another, is the most distinctive creation of the common law, and perhaps the
most unfortunate
For the historian the special interest of the
development is its repeated demonstration of the strength of purely legal

phenomena. Results were reached which, although absorbed and exploited,
cannot have been desired.' 9
Examples can also be taken from the law of torts. Milsom points out that
in the fourteenth century a suit in the royal courts against a blacksmith for
negligence in shoeing a horse had to allege breach of the king's peace, and
that this situation was remedied around 1370 when writs were issued which
did not allege such a breach. '0 But the vi et armis writ for cattle trespass 'had
been extended to the case of straying animals when wrongs still could not
come into royal courts unless contra pacem was alleged; and in this case the
writ was never modified as was the smith's to make an honest action on the
case. Nor was this a curiosity without consequence: in the twentieth century
the defendant owner would still be liable without the affirmative showing of
fault which became necessary in an action on the case.'' And again writing
of the period before 1370: 'Or consider the sale of a diseased horse
deceitfully warranted sound. As early as 1307 a buyer had sued in the king's
court, but again only because he was on the king's service. The ordinary
plaintiff could hardly represent the wrong as contra pacem: but it might
seem capricious that he could not get to the king's court when the smith's
ill-used customer could. ' 2 Slightly further on: 'Trespass, then, lost its
original sense by being identified with trespass vi et armis and distinguished
from case. It was from that distinction that the modern sense of trespass
grew; and to hindsight the process seems perverse. When contra pacem lost
its jurisdictional importance about 1370, its importance in the matter of
process unhappily survived; and a chance of reuniting the law of wrongs was
missed. A second chance came in 1504, when the same process was
extended to all trespass actions. Contra pacem was thereafter without
consequences in the real world except for a nominal fine to the king. But it
was too late. The two categories existed in lawyers' heads, as the statute
itself shows. It was certain there was a distinction even if nobody knew what
it was; and a distinction is never without consequence in a law court.'13
Discussing the system of civil judicature as it was around 1300 Milsom
writes: 'The system was to make some sense until the sixteenth century, to
last until the nineteenth, and to leave its imprint in every common law
8. Ibid. at 177.
9. Ibid. at 166.
10. Ibid. at 290f.
11. Ibid. at 291.
12. Ibid. at 292f.
13. Ibid. at 308f.
jurisdiction today.'1 4 Significantly for us, as we shall see, he adds: 'But it

was not devised as a national system of civil judicature. It was an
accumulation of expedients as more and more kinds of disputes were drawn
first to a jurisdictional and then also to a geographical centre. One result was
to invest the machinery which controlled jurisdiction with an importance
that was to outlive and to overshadow its reason.' And on the fact that, in
general, courts could not act without special authority, namely a writ from
chancery in each case, he says: 'This jurisdictional accident was to be of
growing consequence. In the middle ages it hampered the expansion of the
common law by restricting the kinds of claim that could be brought before
the court. If ordinary private disputes had continued to come before a
jurisdiction like that of the eyre, to which plaintiffs had direct access, the
common law could have reacted directly to changing needs; and in particular
it could have continued to admit kinds of claims familiar in local courts but
at first regarded as inappropriate for royal judges. But plaintiffs could not
get to the court without a chancery writ, and the formulae of the writs, most
of which were highly practical responses to the needs of thirteenth-century
litigants, became an authoritative canon which could not easily be altered or
added to. Important areas, some new but many older than the king's courts
themselves, were in this way cut off from legal regulation, and they could
later be reached only by devious ingenuity in the common law courts, or by
resorting to the chancellor's equitable jurisdiction, to which once more the
litigant could directly complain . . . . All this was no more than the
constriction of red tape. But so complete did it become that in the eighteenth
century it engendered a purely formalistic view of the law and of its
5
development which has lasted until our own day.'
Speaking specifically of 'trespass', but his meaning can be generalized,
Milsom wrote: 'The law itself was seen as based, not upon elementary
ideas, but upon the common law writs, as consisting in a range of remedies
which had as it were come down from the skies. If a case fell within the
scope of one writ, then in general no other writ could be proper."16
Many other passages could be cited to the same effect. Whether an action
was available depended on a system (of writs) which had lost its meaning
centuries before; whole parts of the law remained in effect though the
societal structure at their base had disappeared centuries before; the scope of
a remedy-whether for instance fault was an essential of a particular tortdepended and may still depend on devices and dodges invented centuries
ago to meet difficulties dead centuries ago. Of one distinction, as we have
seen, Milsom remarks that it 'seems capricious'. So it does, and so does the
legal result in the other instances quoted; but only if we look at the law from
society's point of view, from a consideration of the economic and social
realities. It is not capricious if we look at law from the point of view of the
14. Ibid. at 33.
15. Ibid. at 36.
16. Ibid. at 309.
Law's phase lag.
541
legal elite, in this instance the judges, making the law. 'But practitioners and
judges do not normally give a pin for legal development. Their duty is to
7
these clients and the proper disposition of this case', says Milsom.'
Precisely. Judges cannot dispose of a case just as they wish. They are boxed
in, especially in a system based on precedent, by former decisions whether
relating to jurisdiction or to points of substantive law. Writing specifically
of land settlements Milsom declares: 'The rules under which so much of the
wealth of England was held for so much of its history were made and
unmade by these processes, so extraordinary when looked at as a whole and
backwards, so reasonable step by forward step.' 8 In the attempt to give a
decent remedy in a particular situation the judges may make matters worse
both by complicating the law and by directing its course for the future. ' 9 In
judge-made law, the input of society at large-both in terms of the views of
the inhabitants and of economic interests-is different from what it is in
jurist-made law. At the very least the case comes before the judge only
because there is a problem, and the issues are put vehemently-as
vehemently at least as the system allows-by the interested party. But
society's input is not matched by the outcome. That is determined by the
judges' view of the law. It cannot surprise that there are rules of judging,
that judges are blinkered by law that they see as existing in its own right,
even if they can at times twist it to a rather different shape. If there is any
cause for surprise it is-as with the Roman law of contract-the acquiescence in this type of legal evolution by the ruling elite and society at large.
But, then, if there was not this acquiescence most of the time, law would not
evolve as largely autonomous, involved with its own culture, in the way that
I claim.
The nature of legal evolution in England by judicial precedent leads to a
fundamental question (which will not be answered here). Because of its
emphasis on development by precedent and in ignoring Roman law, English
law came eventually to be unique in Western Europe with different legal
rules, divisions of law, legal structures, systematization, and hierarchies of
law-makers. What does this tell one about society in general and the ruling
elite? Was England really different in social structure and values from the
rest of Europe? And if it was, what were the significant social differences?
Saxony, for example, taking the other route of building upon the Corpus
Juris Civilis, was by the middle of the nineteenth century the possessor of
a much more sophisticated, systematic, analytical system of law than
England then had. Does this tell one anything except about law? I doubt that
it does until someone documents the differences in the societies that account
for the difference in legal approach. What is one to make of the fact that for
a long time, from 1714 until the death of King William IV in 1837, the king
of England was the king of Hannover in Germany where a very different
17. Ibid. at 77.
18. Ibid. at 199.
19. For a particular example see Watson, Evolution, supra note I at 35ff.
Law's authonomy
legal system prevailed? Even then Ernest Augustus, Duke of Cumberland,

became King of Hannover and reigned until 1851. And was England, by
avoiding the Reception of Roman law, more innovative in law than were the
other Western European states? If it was, what meaning does this have?
Law has, as Martin Kriegier emphasizes, a 'pervasive traditionality', that
to a considerable extent the legal past is a normatively and authoritatively
significant part of the legal present. 20 As he puts it, 'In every complex
tradition, such as law, what is present at any particular time is the currently
authoritative or persuasive residue of deposits made over generations,
recording and transmitting inconsistent and often competing values, beliefs
and views of the world. Current law is full of elements caught in and
transmitted by legal tradition over generations. Dig into this diachronic
quarry at any particular time, and the present will be a revealing mixture of
fossils, innovations of the long gone, and recent deposits.' This incoherence
is very obvious, as we have seen, in a system such as that of England built
up by judicial precedent. It also appears with astonishing clarity in a federal
country where neighboring provinces or states, having much in common,
build up over centuries very different legal rules on matters of fundamental
concern. The law of the Swiss cantons at the time of the preparation of the
Swiss Civil Code, Schweizerisches Gesetzbuch (ZGB), is a good example.
Virgile Rossel (who prepared the French translation) was one of the two
rapporteurs for the French language at the debate of the Conseil National in
1905 on the draft code of Eugen Huber, and he emphasised that the
differences existing between the cantonal laws then in force had, almost
always, origins that could not be explained by religion, language or even by
race. Then he continued:
What is, for example, the matrimonial regime that is the nearest to that of the canton of
Neuchatel? Do not search too close by: go, on the contrary, to the extreme eastern
frontier of Switzerland, in the canton of the Grisons! Perhaps you think that the
matrimonial regime of the canton of Thurgau and even the whole economy of its civil
legislations is strongly attached to the neighboring canton of Zurich? The analogies are
much more striking between the code of Thurgau and the code Napolion than between
the same code of Thurgau and that which Bluntschli drew up. Gentlemen, I borrow
some other perceptions, no less characteristic, from the message of the federal council
of 24 November 1896:
'The cantonal law gives the advantage to the sons to the detriment of daughters in the
cantons of Lucerne, Fribourg, Zug and Thurgau. Schaffhausen and Neuchatel give to
ascendants and collaterals the right of property return according to the origin of the
goods. Appenzell, Argau, Basel, Fribourg and Solothurn make no distinction between
the paternal and the maternal lines. Geneva, Thurgau, the Bernese Jura, Sankt Gallen,
Vaud, Fribourg, Ticino and Solothurn make of ascendants a special class of heirs.
Fideicommissary substitutions are forbidden in Geneva, the Bernese Jura, Lucerne,
Glaris, in the Grisons and in Zug. Geneva, the Bernese Jura, Neuchatel, Appenzell,
Aargau, Valais, Bern, Vaud, Glaris and Fribourg give the illegitimate child a share in
the inheritance to his father. Zurich, Geneva, Thurgau, Soleure, Ticino, Neuchatel,
Sankt Gallen and the Bernese Jura have permitted adoption. Bern, Thurgau, Aargau,
20. M. Krygier, 'Critical Legal Studies and Social Theory: A Response to Alan Hunt',
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 7 (1987) 26.
Law's pervasive traditionality

Geneva, Soleure, Neuchatel, Fribourg and Ticino give the mother, on the father's death,
the paternal power and the guardianship of the children. Geneva and Nidwalden have
instituted the family council whose task is to look after the tutor's administration. In the
realm of the law of property, we find a land registry in Basel-city, Soleure, in the canton
of Vaud, in Schwytz and Nidwalden . . .' I cut short my quotation. But is that not the
best demonstration of what is artificial and fortuitous in our Swiss law? This mosaic,
which seems the result of fantasy and chance at least as much as of ethical or moral
influences, ought not to fill us with such veneration that we do not dare to lay hands on
it.21
(Here we are concerned with the fact of the incoherence of legal rules in
neighboring cantons or states in a federal nation, not with explaining the
causes of the differences. But investigation would show that many of the
differences had their origins in particular events which were not deeply
rooted in local consciousness. An individual dispute might require court
resolution. And the court's decision might be followed in subsequent cases
as being the best evidence of local custom, whether or not any local custom
existed. A similar neighboring state might reach a contrary decision,
possibly for reasons inhering in the particular case, and that decision in time
21. Amtliches Stenographisches Bulletin der Schweizerischen Bundesversammlung,
Nationalrat(1905) 436.
Quel est, par exemple, le r6gime matrimonial qui se rapproche le plus de celui du
canton de Neuchftel? Ne cherchez pas trop pros; allez au contraire A l'extr~me
fronti~re orientale de la Suisse, dans le canton des Grisons! Vous pensez peut-6tre
que le regime matrimonial du canton de Thurgovie et m~me toute l'6conomie de
sa ldgislation civile le rattachent 6troitement au canton voisin de Zurich? Les
analogies sont beaucoup plus frappantes entre le code thurgovien et le code
Napoleon, qu'entre le m~me code thurgovien et celui qu'a redigd Bluntschli.
J'emprunte, Messieurs, au message du conseil f6ddral du 24 novembre 1896
quelques autres constatations non moins caractrfistiques:
'Le droit des cantons avantage les fils au detriment des filles dans les cantons de
Lucerne, Fribourg, Zoug et Thurgovie. Schaffhouse et Neuchatel donnent aux
ascendants et collatraux le droit de retour selon l'origine des biens. Appenzell,
Argovie, Bale, Fribourg, Soleure ne font aucune distinction entre les lignes
paternelle et maternelle. Gen~ve, Thurgovie, le Jura bernois, Saint-Gall, Vaud,
Fribourg, Tessin et Soleure font des ascendants une classe sp~ciale d'heritiers. Les
substitutions fiddicommissaires sont interdites AGen~ve, dans le Jura bernois, A
Lucerne, Glaris, dans les Grisons et AZoug. Gen~ve le Jura bernois, Neuchatel,
Appenzell, Argovie, le Valais, Berne, Vaud, Glaris et Fribourg accordent A
l'enfant naturel tine part dans la succession de son pre. Zurich, Gen~ve
Thurgovie, Soleure, Tessin, Neuchatel, St-Gall et le Jura bernois ont admis
l'adoption. Berne, Thurgovie, Argovie, Gen~ve, Soleure, Neuchatel, Fribourg et
le Tessin donnent A ; le mere, au decks du p~re la puissance paternelle et la tutelle
des enfants. Gen6ve et Nidwald ont institu6 le conseil de famille, qui a pour
mission de surveiller la gestion du tuteur. Dans le domaine du droit des choses,
nous trouvons le registre foncier a Bale-ville, Soleure, dans le canton de Vaud A
Schwytz et A Nidwald.' . . . J'abr~ge ma citation. Mais n'est-elle pas la meilleure
demonstration de ce qu'il y a eu d'artificiel et de fortuit dans la formation de notre
droit suisse? Cette mosaique, qui semble le r~sultat de la fantaisie et du hasard pour
le moins autant que des influences dthiques ou morales, ne doit pas nous remplir
d'une vn6ration telle que nous n'osions pas y toucher.

might be treated as the basis of local custom. Or at the time of the
codification of cantonal law a new rule might be adopted without much
thought from an outside code, whether of a different canton or of a foreign
state like France which at the time had general prestige. And, once accepted
22
for whatever reason, a rule lives on.)
As the example of England also makes abundantly plain, legal development is greatly affected by the sources of law that are available. And here
I want to point out one aspect of development by juristic opinion that has been
understressed, namely the ability and power of jurists to react against the
existing tradition and in part create a new one. They are, of course, still bound
by what they know, but jurists can attempt to reject much of what has gone
before. Much more freely than judges, they can decide whom they wish to
regard as authoritative and whom they will despise. They do not have to give
a ruling that will be acceptable in a particular case and, to be effective, they
need not cause a change in accepted dogma or methodology at once. They
can have long term aims. The prime example of jurists adopting a new
influential approach must be that of the great Humanists of the Renaissance,
such as Cuiacius and Donellus, with the rejection of the methodology of the
Glossators, Post-Glossators and, above all, of the Bartolists. To assess the
extent of their impact would require volumes but that need not detain us
here. 2 3 What needs to be emphasized is only that jurists can powerfully affect
the tradition. In this regard, naturally, the Humanists do not stand alone.
One other example of the power of jurists is significant. It comes from the
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and more particularly from Naples, from the
late seventeenth well into the eighteenth century. 24 There was a change in
attitude among the law professors, away from the traditional authorities to
other international figures. Their works contain references to philosophers
such as Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu and Descartes, as well as to
jurists such as Cuiacius, Donellus, Hotman, Brissonius, Bynkershoek,
Pufendorf, Stryk and Grotius. 25 The Praelectiones ad Institutiones
22. For demonstration of such developments in particular cases see e.g. Watson, Evolution,
supra note I at 28ff, 43ff (and especially at 58f).
23. But I have argued elsewhere that the Humanists, by showing that to a great extent the
Corpus Juris Civilis was not of classical origin, weakened its authority and thus
academics could more respectably pay attention to other aspects of local law. This was
an important factor in the codification of civil law systems. See A. Watson, The Making
of the Civil Law (Cambridge, Mass., 1981) 7If. There are implications for 'schools' of
jurists in D. Osler, 'A Star is Born', 2 RechtshistorischesJournal (1983) 194f.
24. See G. Manna, Della Giurisprudenzae del ForoNapoletano della sua Originefino alla
Pubblicazione delle nuove Leggi (Naples, 1859) 186f.
25. Examples of such book are F. Rapolla, De jure regni neapolitani Commentaria in
ordine redacta (Naples, 1746); C. Fimiami, Elementajuris privati neapolitaniin duos
libros redacta (Naples, 1782); M. Guarani, Syntagma romanijuris ac patrii secundum
serien Institutionum Imperialium (Naples, 1773); G. Maffei, Institutionesjuris civilis
Neapolitanorum (Naples, 1784); G. Basta, Institutiones juris romani neapolitani
(Naples, 1782); 0. Fighera, Institutionesjuris regni neapolitani (Naples, 1782).
Legal development: juristic

doctrine instance.
Justiniani(1779) of M. Guarani may serve as one particular instance. The

book contains, among legal citations, references to local case law and
statute. Of references to foreign authors I made the following count: Noodt
30; Bynkershoek 22; Grotius 20; Stryk 19; J. Gothofredus 17; Vinnius 16;
Cujacius and Donellus 15 each; Heineccius 14; U. Huber 11; Pufendorf 10;
and fewer than 10 to many others. To Italian writers I find: Doctores 12 and
Glossa 3; Baldus 5; Bartolus 4; Irnerius, Accursius and Julius Clarus 1 each.
Astonishingly, given the Spanish connection, I find to Spanish jurists only
two references to Gomes and one to Covarruvias; and more surprisingly
still, none at all to the famous Neapolitan De Lucca. This rate of citation
seems very lopsided. This new approach was slow to have an impact but was
eventually powerfully felt as can be seen from the writings from the most
26
important writer on the practice of the time, the advocate Giuseppe Sorge.
This Neapolitan phenomenon is quite typical of what happens when
jurists wish to change the existing tradition. To begin with, works which
previously were treated as authoritative are either not cited or are cited only
to be summarily dismissed; in either eventuality the opinions contained in
them are not properly considered. Then some other jurists are continually
cited, to an extent that to an outsider seems extreme-it still seems
astonishing that the Neapolitan Guarani cites the Dutchman Gerhardt Noodt
more often than anyone else (apart from himself), and that he cites ten
'foreigners' each more often than ten times and no Italian (other than
reporters of cases) more often than five times. Finally, it should be noted
that it takes time for their approach to have a practical impact. 27
II
It is usually said that custom becomes law (in a system which has regard
for customary law) when people obey certain norms in the belief that they
are the law. I argued in the second chapter of The Evolution of Law that (in
such a system) so-called customary law is declared by judicial decision
(even where in general precedent has no binding force) and becomes law
thereby whether there was or was not an existing custom, whether if there
26. See Giuseppe Sorge, Jurisprudentiaforensisuniversijurismaterias, 11 vols. (Naples,
1740-44); Giuseppe Sorge, Enucleationes casuum forensium, sive additamenta ad
opus jurisprudentiaeforensis, I I vols. (Naples 1756-58).
27. An example closer to home, and equally typical of development by juristic interpretation, is provided by the group in the contemporary U.S. known as Critical Legal
Studies scholars. They, too, attempt to reject much of what has gone before, though
they are bound by what they know. A glance at the footnotes in their writings will
quickly reveal whom they wish to regard as authoritative-references to Roberto Unger
and Duncan Kennedy are de rigueur-and whom they will despise. Indeed, some
writings of the masters are always, in all contexts, treated as of the greatest relevance.
A true believer reveals his faith by referring to these writings favorably in the opening
pages of his own piece. For the group see the bibliography of Critical Legal Studies by
Alan Hunt in 47 Modern Law Review 369ff (1984).
546
was one the judge followed it, and that frequently the rules of so-called
customary law are borrowed from elsewhere. Customary law derives its
validity from official recognition, I claimed, not from past popular
behavior.
In some instances the traditional view is clearly wrong. 'Fueros' is the
name given in Spain to collections of local municipal law, often containing
particular privileges. These are usually classed as short ('breves') or
extended ('extensos'). The majority of the former date from the eleventh and
twelfth centuries, the majority of the latter a little later. It is a peculiarity of
the fueros that the most successful were, totally or partially, granted to or
borrowed by other municipalities. The main outlines of the transfer of fueros
from town to town are well-known; in fact Ana Maria Barrero Garcid in her
Fuero de Teruel publishes a map with arrows showing the direction, and
dates indicating the time, of movement of fueros from municipality to
municipality. 28 So long as fueros are regarded as containing customary law,
it is hard to see how their movement can be regarded as consistent with the
traditional notion that customary law emerges from norms people obey in
the belief that they are law. Yet F. Tomis y Valiente, the most highly
regarded of the younger generation of Spanish legal historians, writes:
'Because they contain the customary law, alive in that place; because they
are in part the fruit of the municipal autonomy and at the same time its
guarantee, given that they contain the privileges on which this autonomy is
based and the rules for the choice by the locals of judges and town officials;
and because of the complete and self-sufficient nature of the order contained
in them, the municipal fueros were considered by the towns and cities as
their own property and very important, and accordingly were defended
against other types of law (that of the king and that of the learned jurists
because, as we shall see, both began to develop in the 13th century).' 29 With
no apparent awareness that he is contradicting his first clause, his next
sentences run: 'Just as happened with short fueros, the extended fuero of one
town was often enough granted directly to another. At times the redactors of
the fuero of one city utilized as a model the already written text of the law
of another.' The rest of his first passage just quoted is more convincing for
the importance attributed to fueros. Inhabitants defended their fuero because
it granted them privileges; not because it contained the good old norms
derived from their habitual behavior.
Nor was this movement of municipal customary law from town to town
confined to Spain. It occurred frequently elsewhere; in Normandy for
example. Thus, Eu borrowed the privileges of Saint Quentin, at Les Andelys
the rules were copied from those of Mantes, and in general the rules of
Norman towns derived from those of Rouen. 30
28. Ana Maria Barrero GarciAi, Fuero de Teruel (Madrid, 1979) 7.
29. F. Tom6s y Valiente, Manual de Historiadel derecho Espahol (Madrid, 4th ed., 1983)
150.
30. See, e.g., R. Besnier, La Coutume de Normandie, histoire externe (Paris, 1935) 32
547
There is another problem with the traditional view: the spatial limits of
customary law coincide with the political frontiers. Robert Besnier, writing
of the Coutume of Normandy, puts it this way: 'The political, framework
becomes fixed at the moment when the necessity of a coutume imposes itself
upon the Normans. Hence comes the parallelism between the creation of the
institutions and the elaboration of the law. The limits of the dukedom and
the jurisdiction of the custom coincide: the latter is essentially fixed by the
repetition of identical acts in similar situations, it develops everywhere,
simultaneously, as well in the courts of justice as in daily relations or in the
presence of officers charged with administrative, military or financial
matters. At a time when functions are not yet clearly specialized there are no
organisms which do not play their role in this slow elaboration.' 3' This
spatial coincidence is more easily explained, as I argued on other grounds,
if one says that where customary law is recognised it is created only when
it is officially recognised or accepted, and this recognition is signalled by
court decisions. Court jurisdictions and political boundaries then necessarily
coincide.
I also argued that a difficulty for believing that customary law rested on
a general conviction that it was law was that often the custom was difficult
to find even when it could be said that there was something that could be
designated as the custom. A striking instance of the difficulty of knowing
the custom even when there was one is given by the Coutume de Toulouse.
This was written down in the 'livre blanc' which was kept in the town hall,
but it was written in Latin! Cazaveteri published an edition in 1545 with
short notes but still in Latin. Francois-Franqois in 1615 published selected
titles with commentary, this time in French, but the work contained less than
half of the Coutume. In the eighteenth century very few copies of these (long
out-of-print) books were to be found in lawyers' offices or at booksellers.
Only at the very end of the 18th century was the whole Coutume translated
into French and published by Soulatges with the express intention of making
32
it accessible to lawyers and others.
Toulouse was by no means the only place whose custom was written in
Latin; the same occurred elsewhere, for instance in Spain. Thus, the
customs of Lrida which were the first redaction of local laws in Catalonia
were written in Latin in 1228 by Guillermo Botet. Subsequently they were
turned into Catalan but significantly that version has not survived though
there are five manuscripts of the Latin. 33 And if one accepts, as I think one
[hereinafter cited as Coutume]. If, as often the privileges of one town were granted to
another by the ruler then the result is statute, not customary law. Nonetheless, as with
the redaction of coutumes in France in general, the written redaction was regarded in
fact as containing customary law.
31. Ibid. at 22.
32. Soulatges, La Coutume de Toulouse (Toulouse) ix. The work is not dated, but the latest
reference is to 10 November, 1769.
33. See P. Loscertales de Valdeavellano, Costumbres de Lgrida (Barcelona, 1946) 10ff.

should, that fueros ought to be regarded in part as containing customary law
then one should include as customs written in Latin those of, for instance in
Extremadura, Calatayud (1131), Daroca (1142), Teruel (1177) and Cuenca
(1188 or slightly thereafter).
Of course, often in a customary system law is needed where there is no
law or, if there is, it cannot be found. The law has to be created. To give one
further example: King Liutprand of the Lombards in several years of his
reign issued a number of laws. In some of the preambles he expressly states
that the laws that follow are enacted precisely because the custom is not
known or, if it is, is not wanted by persons other than him. Thus, for his
thirteenth year (725 A.D.): 'Because I remembered that subjects of ours
coming into our presence brought causes in controversy among themselves
which we were not certain how to bring to an end according to custom nor
were provided for in the body of the Edict. ,34 The Lombards were fortunate
that theirs was a society with statutory law as well as custom; otherwise a
custom would just have been imagined to exist.
Also, as I maintained, the whole notion of customary law being what
people do is undermined by the usual approach in medieval and later France
of accepting the law of somewhere else, usually of Rome as the law was set
out in the Corpus Juris Civilis or of Paris as the law was to be found in the
Coutume de Paris, as subsidiary law when the local coutume failed to give
the answer. Whichever was chosen, conditions in early Byzantium or the
capital of France were very different from those, say, in parts of Brittany or
the Auvergne. And there is no doubt that gaps often had to be filled in the
local coutume. But what is the standard doctrine of customary law to make
of the fact that just before the French Revolution (which was to put an end
to local custom) it could still be questioned in general whether recourse was
to be had to the Corpus Juris Civilis or the Coutume de Paris?35 In circumstances such as these one cannot even say that in the absence of a custom it
was the custom to look at the custom or other law of some other particular
place!
Apart from any other considerations, there is one reason that I should like
to mention that will make it very difficult for my thesis on the nature of
customary law to become acceptable. The reason is very practical. No society
that accepts a system of customary law can operate it on the open basis that
I postulate. The law would lack authority. Such societies operate in law by
a myth. In general they have no legislation, do not accept judicial decisions
as binding precedent, either have no law books or do not see them as
authoritative. How then do they resolve disputes? The legitimate answer for
those living under such systems can only be that they look for the norms of
34. 'Dum memorassem quod venientes homines nostri, in praesentiamnostram, adduXerint

caussas, inter se altercantes quae nec per usum fuimus certi ad terminandum, nec in
Edicti corpore anterioriincerto.' See also for slightly different issues the preambles
from his fourteenth (726 A.D.) and fifteenth (727 A.D.) years.
35. See., e.g., Soulatges, La Coutume de Toulouse, supra note 32 at xiff.

practical behavior that are generally regarded by the populace as binding.
There cannot be open recognition that there may not be a custom, that a rule
may be accepted as law simply because it exists elsewhere, or that a judge
is just making up a rule. But a myth to live by is to the outsider no less a myth.
To illustrate the preceding paragraph we can turn again to the Costumbres
de Lerida. Botet lists at the beginning of the work the sources of law in
Lrida and he includes mores, customary behavior. But he says he was
urged by his fellow consuls and other citizens to write down the custom and
he explains in the opening paragraph why he did so: 'I Guillermo Botet have
put in some little effort in order to collect in one place and set out in writing
the various and different customs of our city in order to take away the
opportunity of evil-doing from some people who declare, when a custom is
in their favor, that it is the custom. If it is alleged against them in a similar
case they insist that it is not the custom. Hence, proof of customs delays the
progress of law suits and thus litigants incur severe costs.' 36 If the difficulty
of finding and knowing the custom can plausibly be given by Botet as his
reason for writing down the customs then in fact he incidentally gives the lie
to the notion that customary law arises from normative behavior which
occurs because people believe it is the law. Yet, as we have seen, Botet
himself says that in this connection it is the mores which are law. He also
tells us in paragraphs 168 and 169 that among the sources of law ranking
after customs are inter alia Visigothic law then Roman law. Visigothic law
is seldom followed, he says, but Roman law often is especially in matters
which do not arise every day. In effect he is saying that in the absence of
custom, custom assumes that Roman law will be assumed to be the custom.
There is no other basis for accepting that Roman law is authoritative.
Equally significantly, the fuero of Cuenca-as do many other collections
of customs-gives as the justification for their redaction into writing:
'Because therefore human memory is transient.' Again, if customs cannot
be remembered they cannot be obeyed because of a consciousness that they
are law. 37 Even if the transience of memory is not a reason for the redaction
of custom it is significant that it is given.
36. 'Ego Guillelmus Botetus dedi aliquantulamoperam ut consuetudines ciuitatisuarias et

diuersas in unum colligerem et scriptis comprehenderem ut aufferretur quibusdam
occasio malignandi qui quando erat pro eis consuetudo et esse consuetudinem
affirmabant. Si contra eos in consimili casu allegabatur non esse consuetudinem
asserebant. Unde processus causarum probacio consuetudinis retardabat et litigantes
inde dispendia grauia senciebant.'
37. 'Quoniam igitur humana labilis est memoria nec rerum turbe potest sufficere ob hoc
cautele sagaci actum est arbitrio leges autentice institutionis et iura civica, que
consulta discretione ad sedendam seditionem inter cives [et incolas] de regali
auctoritate manarunt, litterarum apicibus anotari, ut majori, quia regali tuicione
munitas, malignantium versucia nullatenus possint infringi, vel alicuius subreptioris
molestia deinceps eneruari;' to be found in R. de Urefia, Fuero de Cuenca (Madrid,
1935) 111. Of course, since the compilation is official it has become statute and the
fuero does contain legislative materials but that does not affect the issue.
550

III
1)
In the third chapter of The Evolution of Law I sought to explain what

happens when legal systems of very different levels of sophistication come
into powerful contact. Above all I wanted to show that the Reception of
Roman law in Western Europe, far from being one of the most difficult
problems of history, corresponds to cultural patterns of development. A
mature legal system in writing can easily be used as a quarry even by
societies with very different economic and social structures. Each society
takes what it wants, when it wants, and there is no great desire to search for
the most appropriate rule. Who in particular does the taking and who in
particular does not want to search too far is obvious: the law making elite.
The developed system in writing is above all accessible, with rules that can
be used to fill gaps in the other systems. Such a Reception presents difficult
problems only for those-and they are many-who believe that there is a
very close correlation between the law of a society and the life of the
society.
I did not go beyond explaining the Reception of Roman law. That great
example illumines others. But it is worth examining one modern phenomenon to show that it, too, corresponds in great measure to the pattern. The
phenomenon I mention is the taking over in whole or in large part of a
modern western code by a 'third world country' with the specific aim of
modernization.
The example I wish to discuss is Turkey which in 1926 took into its civil
code virtually all of the two Swiss codes, the Schweizerisches Gesetzbuch
and the Obligationenrecht. Turkey in the same year promulgated its
commercial code which was a compilation of at least a dozen foreign
statutes, and issued in 1929 its code of the sea which is a translation of book
four of the German commercial code (Handelsgesetzbuch).
The Turkish Minister of Justice of the time, Mahmut Esad Bozkurt, on the
occasion of the Festschrift of the Istanbul Law Faculty to mark the civil
code's fifteenth birthday, explained the reasons for the codification. The
first was that the Turkish legal system was backward and primitive. Three
kinds of religious law were in force, Islamic, Christian and Jewish, each
with its appropriate court. Only a kind of law of obligations, the 'Mecelle',
and real property law was common to all. The second was that the
recognition of such an odd system of justice, namely that three kinds of law
applied through three kinds of courts, could not correspond to the modern
understanding of the state and its unity. The third and most important was
that each time Turkey had demanded the removal of the capitulation terms
of the First World War by the victorious Allies, the latter refused, pointing
to the backward state of the Turkish legal system and its connection with
religion. When as a result of the Lausanne Peace Treaty the capitulation
terms were removed, the Turks took it upon themselves to form a completely
new Turkish organization of justice with a new legal system, new laws and
new courts. Bozkurt said that in one word the system was to be 'Worldly'.
The duties undertaken by the Turks under the Lausanne Treaty had to be
551
accomplished as quickly as possible. During the First World War commissions were already set up in Istanbul to prepare laws and they had started
work. The results were examined in 1924. After seven or eight years there
were only completed 200 articles on a law of obligations, the sections on
succession, guardianship, formation of marriage and divorce of a civil code,
of a criminal code between seventy and eighty articles, and even the code of
land transactions was only a torso. 38 Consequently after various systems
were looked at, the two Swiss codes were virtually adopted in their entirety.
Though the motivation was different from most earlier receptions-drastic
modernization of society rather than the filling of gaps in the law-the
Turkish reception was otherwise similar. The creation of new autochthonous
law is difficult, it is much easier to borrow from an already existing, more
sophisticated system which can be used as a model, above all where the donor
system is accessible in writing. By this time, of course, there were various
excellent codes which could have provided a model, notably the French,
German and Swiss all of which were greatly admired. Why was Swiss law
chosen? Various answers have been given but three strike me as most
important; the Swiss laws were the most modern; 39 Switzerland had been
neutral during the War whereas French law was that of a former enemy and
German law was that of a defeated ally; and Bozkurt had studied law in
Switzerland, so Swiss law was most familiar to him. Hirsch, a German
scholar who was a professor of commercial law at Istanbul and Ankara
between 1933 and 1952 emphasizes the-to him, overriding-importance of
the last factor.4 0 In any event, there is no reason to think that somehow Swiss
law was more adapted than were French or German law to the society that
Turkey wanted to become.
Hirsch stresses the nature of such a reception. What is imported, he
insists, is neither foreign law nor foreign codes, but foreign cultural property
which only after its linguistic and systematic transformation finds the
appropriate external form, and only in the act of legislation is it fixed as a
binding legal rule and comes into force. 4 1 Even after such legislation a
reception is not a once and for all act, but a social process extending over
many years. The result will not be Swiss law in Turkey, but Turkish law that
owes much to Swiss legal culture, concepts and rules.
To continue with Turkey as an example. Some Swiss rules will not be
accepted at all and others will be changed. For instance, the legal regime in
Switzerland for spouses' property is community property (ZGB 178), in
38. Bozkurt is quoted (in German) in E. E. Hirsch, Rezeption als sozialer Prozess (Berlin,
1981) 33f [hereinafter cited as Hirsch, Rezeption].
39. See e.g. H. V. Velideoglu, 'Erfahrungen mit dem Schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuch
in der Turkei', Zeitschrift far Schweizerisches Recht [hereinafter cited as ZSR] 81
(1962) 51ff at 53.
40. Hirsch, 'Die Einflusse und Wirkungen auslindischen Rechts auf das heutige Tiurkische
Recht', Zeitschriftfir das gesamte Handelsrecht 116 (1954) 201ff at 206.
41. Hirsch, Rezeption, supra note 38 at 1If.

Turkey it is separate property (Turkish Civil Code 170); the surviving
spouse's right to a usufruct is smaller in Turkey (TCC 444 2) than in
Switzerland (ZGB 462 2); the judicial separation of spouses may in
Switzerland be pronounced for an indefinite time (ZGB 147 1) but not
in Turkey (TCC 139 1); desertion as a ground of divorce must in the former
country have lasted at least two years (ZGB 140), in the latter at least three
months (TCC 132); the minimum age for marriage in the former is for males
twenty, for females eighteen (exceptionally eighteen and seventeen,) in the
latter for males eighteen, for females seventeen. Other rules will be
accidentally mistranslated and the final result need not be that of the donor
nation. Others will be deliberately given a different value in the translation.
Still others will remain a dead letter because they have no counterpart in
Turkish conditions. The Turkish courts in giving flesh to the rules through
interpretation may, as they usually but not always have done, follow the
interpretation of the Swiss courts. Again, many rules will have a different
societal value in the two countries, such as those on a minimum age for
marriage or on the requirements for a divorce. 42 Finally such a reception, as
fast as Atatuirk wanted it to be, will, like that of Roman law and of other
systems, be a slow process, and the speed and the extent of its successnever complete-will vary with circumstances.
A little more must be said on this last point. To begin with, any new law
resulting from such a massive transplantation has to be learned by judges
and lawyers as well as by the people before it becomes effective. In the case
of Turkey, where the new legal system was so different from what had gone
before but was so closely attached to European models, the solution was to
import foreign professors from Germany and Switzerland, notably Andreas
B. Schwartz and Ernst E. Hirsch, to teach the new law and to send budding
lawyers and law professors to study law in Europe. 43 Secondly, aspects of
traditional social life, such as marriage, will respond only slowly to the
pressures of new law especially in country districts. Significantly, essays in
a collection" published to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the Turkish
codification stress the extent to which the reception had not 'taken' whereas
those in another collection to mark the fiftieth anniversary accept the
reception but emphasize its continuing nature and the fact that is not, nor
will be, complete. 45 In 1956, Kurt Lipstein could describe the consequences
of compulsory civil marriage as 'disappointing, to say the least'.46 In 1978,
June Starr reported that, in a particular village which she had studied, she
42. See e.g. Hirsch, Rezeption, supra note 38; M. Zwahlen, 'L'Application en Turquie du
Code civil requ de la Suisse', ZSR 95 (1976), 249ff.
43. See Hirsch, Rezeption, supra note 38 at 56f.
44. Annales de la Facultg de Droit d'Istanbul 5 (1956) [hereinafter cited as AFDI].
45. Finfzig Jahre Tiirkisches Zivilgesetzbuch, ZSR 95 (1976), 217ff.
46. Kurt Lipstein, 'The Reception of Western Law in Turkey', AFDI, supra note 44 at 6,
3ff at 18.
2)
found little evidence 'that villagers are lax in obtaining state marriage
licenses'.47
The success or partial, yet still growing, success of the transplanting of
Swiss legal ideas into Turkey gives many insights into what happens when
a less 'modern' or less 'developed' system comes into powerful contact with
a sophisticated modern system. These insights become almost blinding
when we recall that Eugen Huber who virtually alone was responsible for the
ZGB said that 'The law must be delivered in speech out of the thought of the
people. The reasonable man who reads it, who has pondered the age and its
needs, must have the perception that the law was delivered to him in speech
from the heart.' ('Das Gesetz muss aus den Gedanken des Volkes heraus
gesprochen sein. Der verstdndige Mann, der es liest, muss die Empfindung
haben, das Gesetz sei ihm vom Herzen gesprochen.' )48 And Virgile Rossel,
declared 'In particular if one could say of the code Napolgon that it was
'written reason' we intended to work according to the sense of the national
spirit, raising the moral level of our law so far as possible, and we would be
happy if it was said one day of the Swiss civil code that it is, to some extent,
the written internal moral sentiment.' ('En particulier si l'on a pu dire du
code Napolgon qu'il etait la 'raison 9crite' nous avons cru travailler dans
le sens de 1'esprit national en moralisant notre droit autant que faire se
pouvait, et nous serions heureux si l'on disait un jour du code civil suisse
qu'il est un peu la conscience 9crite.' )49 Yet the same Virgile Rossel, as we
saw in the first section, was well aware that the differences in the laws of the
various Swiss Cantons could not be explained on the basis of religion,
economy, language or 'race'.
Thus, the Swiss codification was intended by those who worked on it to
be the written moral consciousness of the Swiss people. The arbitrary rules
of cantonal law were to be remedied by federal law appropriate to the
conditions of the Swiss. The 'Swissness' of the codification is stressed. Yet
the Swiss codification could be taken over, almost in its entirety, some years
later by Turkey, a country with a vastly different history, legal tradition,
religion, culture, economy, political setup, geographical and climatic
is a prime example not only of legal
circumstances. Turkey under Atatiirk
50
transplant but of revolution in law.
To the picture in chapter three I have nothing more directly to add, but it
is frequently suggested to me that if the Reception was so natural then I
47. June Starr, Dispute and Settlement in Rural Turkey (Leiden, 1978) 276.
48. Eugen Huber, Erlauterungen zum Vorentwurf des Eidg. Justiz- und Polizeidepartementes (Bern, 2nd ed., 1914) 2.
49. Virgile Rossel, Amtliches Stenographisches Bulletin der Schweizerischen Bundesversammlung, Nationalrat (1905) 438.
50. See Watson, Evolution, supra note 1 at 116. For an illuminating example of largely
inappropriate rules being borrowed 'Just because they were there' see S.B. Burbank,
'Procedural Rulemaking under the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act of 1980', 131 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 283ff (1982).
2.1)
ought to explain why it did not also occur in England. What follows then is
a preliminary attempt at that explanation.
A first point that should be stressed is that within the areas most affected
by the Reception there were particular reasons for accepting easily the
authority of Roman law. For the Italian states there was no problem in their
seeing themselves as the direct descendants and heirs of the Roman legal
tradition. Moreover, even during the period of personal rather than territorial
law Roman law remained powerful: the Catholic Church in particular was
governed by it. It had also had a powerful influence on Lombard law, both
on the codifications and on its subsequent development, and the Lombard
lawyers at the University of Pavia used Roman law as a universal subsidiary
system to fill gaps. 5' In France, the Reception was powerful in the South,
the pays de droit icrit, from a line on the coast just west of the he d'Ol6ron,
proceeding roughly eastwards along a line just north of Saintonge,
Langued6c, Lyonnais, Maconnais and Bresse. Apart from Poitou, Berry and
Haute-Bourgogne which were territories of customary law, this territory
was, in earlier times when personal law flourished, precisely the land of the
Burgundians and the Visigoths who issued for their Gallo-Roman subjects
the lex Romana Burgundionum and, more particularly, the highly prized and
influential Breviarium Alaricianum.52 In these circumstances it is not
surprising that Roman law was treated as the law of the land, but as law by
custom; and in force only in so far as it was not replaced by a subsequent,
dissonant custom. As for the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation,
that was regarded as a continuation of the Roman Empire from as early as
the twelfth century; indeed the notion that the German empire was a
continuation of the Roman Empire appears as early as the Carolingian
period. 53 In fact, some legislation of the Emperors Frederick I and II was
interpolated into the Corpus Juris, and some doctrines of Roman law were
seen as favoring the Emperor. In 1165 Frederick I spoke of 'the example of
our divine Emperors who are our predecessors'. [MGH Const I, n. 227, 322
c.3] 54 In a constitution in the Libri Feudorum, 2.27, he describes himself as
'Romanus Imperator'; and in another constitution recorded in the same
work, 2.52, dated 7 November, 1136, Lothar calls himself the third
'ImperatorRomanorum'.
Present-day Netherlands and Switzerland also experienced the Reception.
But precisely at the most significant time, that of the translatioimperii, they
formed part of the Holy Roman Empire.
51. See e.g., Hastings Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages (F. M.
Powicke and A. B. Emden, ed., (Oxford, 2nd ed., 1936) 105. F. Calasso, Medio Evo
del Diritto I (Milan, 1954), 1611f, 215ff, 235ff, 267ff, 305ff.
52. See above all, E. Chrnon, Histoire Gnrale du Droit franvais Public et Priv des
Origines d 1815 1 (Paris, 1926) 488.
53. See e.g. H. Conrad, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte (Karlsruhe, 2nd ed., 1962) ii: 233f
[hereinafter cited as Conrad, Rechtsgeschichte].
54. Ibid. at i: 234.

2.2)
Secondly, it is easily overlooked that for a very long time England was by
no means an exceptional case. The Reception even where the soil was
fertile, was, as we shall see in the case of Germany and France, not fast.
Thus, despite the 'theoretical Reception' in Germany (the notion that the
Holy Roman Empire was a continuation of the Roman Empire), the
'practical Reception' (the actual acceptance of Roman legal rules as living
law) came much later. No sharp distinction can really be drawn between the
'theoretical' and the 'practical Reception' but, for the latter, 1495 is usually
regarded as a significant date when the Reichskammergericht was created as
the supreme court of the Holy Roman Empire and when it was enacted that
half of the judges of it should be doctores iuris, that is, judges trained in
Roman law. Despite the enormous boost given to the Reception of Roman
law in Germany by the theory of the continuation of empire, the real
Reception in the sense of actual acceptance in practice is to be dated to the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. 55 It was then that the Corpus Juris Civilis
so far as glossed -'Quidquid non agnoscit glossa, non agnoscit curia'was accepted as a whole as law, though indeed only as subsidiary law which
was displaced by local statute or custom.
The so-called 'Lotharian Legend', that the Emperor Lothar of Supplinburg had expressly received Roman law as statute in 1135, which was
apparently the invention of Phillip Melancthon, was refuted by Hermann
Conring in his De origine juris Germanici of 1643. Thereafter, both Italy
and Germany had need of new theoretical answers to the question why the
Corpus Juris Civilis was given authority. Into these we need not go. 56 The
Reception had already basically occurred.
In France, in the pays de droit coutumier, the progress of the Reception
was even slower. The various local coutumes were eventually to be reduced
to writing (and converted into statute law) as a result of Charles VII's
Ordonnance de Montil-les-Tours which was dated April 1453. The slow
redaction of the coutumes was virtually complete by the middle of the 16th
century. 57 These written coutumes were influenced to various degrees by
Roman law but in none did it appear as the predominant element. Much for
the future was to depend on the outcome of a doctrinal battle which was
mentioned in the preceding section. Some authorities, notably Pierre Lizet
(1482-1554), First President of the Parlement of Paris, wanted Roman law
to be the common law of France as lex scripta58 but this was opposed
55. Conrad, Rechtsgeschichte, ii: 339ff.

56. But see above all K. Luig, 'Der Geltungsgrund des r6mischen Rechts in 18.
Jahrhundert in Italien, Frankreich und Deutschland' in La Formazione storica del
Diritto moderno in Europa 2 (1977)
819ff [hereinafter cited as Luig, 'Geltungs-
grund'].
57. For more detail and references see, e.g., A. Watson, Sources ofLaw, Legal Change, and
Ambiguity (Philadelphia, 1984) 47ff [hereinafter cited as Watson, Sources of Law].

58. In fact he inserted much Roman law into the customs he drew up, such as that of Berry;
see R. Filhol, Le premier president Christofle de Thou (Paris, 1937) especially at 67.
Theoretical and practical

reception
vigorously by others such as Christophe de Thou, (1508-1582) also First

President of the Parlement of Paris, Guy Coquille (1523-1603), Etienne
Pasquier (1529-1615), and later by Nicholas Catherinot (1628-1688) who
wanted Roman law treated only as ratio scripta. The distinction was crucial.
If Roman law was only ratio scripta then, in the absence of a rule in the
coutume, it would have authority for a judge only if it were in harmony with
the principles of the coutume, only if it appeared just (and then for the judge
its authority was precisely because it was just); and the judge could prefer
the authority of another coutume such as the Coutume de Paris. But if
Roman law were lex scripta and was thus the law in force in the absence of
a contrary custom, then the judge would have to apply it. In the event, in
accordance with the spirit of the Ordonnance of Phillipe-le-Bel of 1312,
Roman law was treated only as ratio scripta in most of the pays de droit
coutumier. 59 The main exceptions, where the coutumes expressly adopted
Roman law in the absence of a relevant provision, were the Coutumes of
Berry, Haute-Marche, Auvergne and Bourbonnais which were adjacent to
the pays de droit 6crit, the Coutumes of Burgundy, Franche-Comt6 and les
Trois-Eveeh6s which were close to the territory of the Holy Roman Empire,
and some of the coutumes in Flanders. 60 This apparent influence of
geography is very revealing.
The debate on the nature of the authority of Roman law may be seen as
part of, or related to, a larger issue, namely the unification of the coutumes.
This was above all the great desire of Charles Dumoulin or Molinaeus
(1500-1566), who was to have a preponderant influence in future development, though not perhaps in a way that he envisaged. The Coutume de
Parisof 1510 was very short and incomplete. In 1539 Dumoulin published
his treatise on fiefs, which was the beginning of a commentary on this
Coutume. Here he expressed his criticisms and proposed new approaches,
most of which were adopted by the Parlement of Paris. Consequently there
was disaccord between the Coutume and the case law which led to the
promulgation in 1580 of a much larger and improved Coutume de Paris
under the guidance of Christophe de Thou. The Parlement of Paris operated
in effect as a court of appeal for many other towns; its 'ressort' covered the
jurisdiction of fifty municipal and local coutumes. Etienne Pasquier, who
had participated in the preparation of the new Coutume de Parisheld that in
these fifty jurisdictions the Coutume de Parisshould be known and followed
'because', as he put it, 'Paris was in this kingdom what Rome was in the
Empire'. This called forth the wrath of Guy Coquille who believed that other
coutumes should be used equally with the Coutumes de Paris to supplement
6
the local law. '
In fact the Coutume de Paris was to prove very acceptable in other
59. For the doctrinal debate see above all V. Guizzi, '11diritto comune in Francia nel xvii
secolo', T.v.R. 37 (1969), 1ff; Luig, 'Geltungsgrund', supra note 56 at 832ff.
60. See above all, E. Chdnon, Histoire ggngrale 2 (1929) 33 If.
61. See above all, ibid. at 317ff; Watson, Sources of Law, supra note 57 at 70f.
jurisdictions. A significant step in that direction occurred in 1747 when

Francais Bourjon published Le Droit Commun de la France et la Coutume
de Paris. The opening paragraph of this work seems obscure until one
realizes that he is treating the common law of France and the Coutume de
Paris as the same thing. This in itself is indicative of the success of the
Coutume but in its turn Bourjon's large and clear text spread the message
that the Coutume de Pariswas the law of France.
But one must not exaggerate the extent to which there had not been a
Reception of Roman law in France, on the eve of the Revolution. First, of
course, there was a full Reception in the pays de droit dcrit. Secondly, this
Reception had a continued effect on the pays de droit coutumier because
through it Roman rules and solutions were known since books on the law of
France set out the law in the pays de droit dcrit as well as the provisions of
the various coutumes. Thirdly, even when a jurisdiction looked to the
Coutume de Parisor some other coutume to fill gaps, when a solution was
not found in that way recourse was still had to Roman law. And even the
reformed Coutume de Paris had many gaps, with only 372 articles.
Fourthly, French jurists, even those most addicted to their coutumes had
deep knowledge of and great respect for Roman law. Roman law is
prominent in their works. The influential Robert Pothier (1699-1722) may
serve as an example. Fourthly, many books, including that of Bourjon,
show the influence of Justinian's Institutes on their structure. This is
especially true of institutional writings 62 such as Gabriel Argou's Institution
du droitfrangaiswhich was first published in 1692 and reached its eleventh
edition in 1787. The structure of the French code civil is similar to that of
the works of Bourjon and Argou. Thus, the Reception, even in favored
locales such as Germany and France, was slow.
2.3)
A third point that is frequently downplayed is that much Roman law was
actually borrowed by English law. Around 1600 Thomas Craig, in his Jus
Feudale, at 1.7.22,3 puts it this way: 'The Civil Law is rarely used in
England, and although among the English are found very learned men in
every branch of learning, still there are few who devote themselves to the
Civil Law, they are content with a bowing acquaintance with it, since native
institutions and customs are more in use with them: hence the learned say
that the English use municipal law when the Scots are governed by the Civil
Law. But so little are they free from the Civil Law in their judgments, that
reasons and decisions of it, as if living sparks, are found in all matters and
controversies which they, however, prefer to ascribe to their own men than
to owe to the ancient jurists. In the event a great dependence on the Civil
Law shines forth in all controversies to such an extent that an expert in Civil
Law understands that the greatest controversies of English law can be
62. For this notion see K. Luig, 'The Institutes of National Law in the seventeenth and
eighteenth Centuries,' Juridical Review (1972), 193ff; J. Cairns, 'Institutional
Writings in Scotland Reconsidered', Journal of Legal History 4 (1983) 76ff. For
France and the code civil see now above all C. Chene, L'Enseignement du Droit
frangais en pays de droit ecrit (1679-1793) (Geneva, 1982) especially at 323ff.

decided according to the sources of the Civil Law and the replies of the
jurisconsults or Emperors, as often appears from the reports of Plowden and
Dyer.' As elsewhere, Craig exaggerates: his motivation is to indicate that
the differences between Scots law and English law are not so great as are
often supposed. And yet, without some considerable admixture of Roman
law into England, his claim would have appeared simply ridiculous.
Accuracy, in the state of the evidence, is difficult to attain, but what can
surely be stated is that the influence of Roman law in England varied from
time to time and from type of court jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
In this instance it is perhaps sensible not to begin at the beginning.
Writing of formularies, of collections of writs, Milsom claims:
In one respect the most illuminating of these formularies was that which acquired the
title Brevia Placitata.Dating from soon after the middle of the thirteenth century, it is
a conflated formulary giving both writs and counts. But the writs, which in real life were
always in Latin, are here translated into French, the language in which counts, at any rate
in the king's courts, were actually spoken, the ordinary language of the upper classes.
This collection was for the use, or more probably the instruction, of professional men,
literate men, but men not at home in the Latin tongue and not interested in the riches to
which it gave access. The common law had started its career as an alternative learning,
cut off from even the legal learning of the universities which until the eighteenth century
taught only Roman and canon law.
Almost at the same time as the counters' modest Brevia PlacitataBracton gave final
shape to a much larger and more ambitious book; and it is one of the important facts in
the history of western thought that the former was to prove fruitful, the latter sterile. 63
By the last sentence of his first paragraph, Milsom means, I think, not that
the origins of the common law lay in an alternative learning, cut off from the
universities, but that it was at this time around the middle of the thirteenth
century that the common law cut itself off from the universities and became
an alternative learning. If this interpretation is correct then Milsom's
position, I suppose, would be that in England, as elsewhere in Europe in,
say, the eleventh century, the local law was more or less free from Roman
influence but that influence began to be felt in England as elsewhere, though
not necessarily so early or so powerfully, until it was disrupted in the age of,
or succeeding, Bracton.
Thus, the law book written apparently shortly before 1118 which is
known as Leges HenriciPrimi 64 cites for instance Salic and Ripuarian laws
and Frankish capitularies; hence it is significant as John Barton, the leading
expert on Roman law in medieval England, observes that there are so few
traces of Roman law. 65 No attempt was being made by the author to
Romanise. Another private work of the time, the Leis Willelme, contains
some Roman law, but of this Barton endorses Maitland's judgment: 'It
63. Foundations, supra note 2 at 40f.
64. F. Pollock and F. W. Maitland, History of English Law 1 (Cambridge, reissued 1968),
99f [hereinafter cited as History].
65. John Barton, Roman Law in England (Milan, 1971) 7 [hereinafter cited as Barton,
Roman Law].

shows us how men were helplessly looking about for some general
principles of Jurisprudence which would deliver them from their practical
and intellectual difficulties.' 66
The treatise written in the 1180s and which goes under Glanvill's name is
a very practical work based on what was happening in the royal courts. 'The
author is writing of matters which are in regular use and within his own
experience. If there are cases which the King's court is not prepared to deal
with, he says so. He is under no temptation to fill the gaps with matter
borrowed from Salian or Ripuarian Franks or, for the matter of that, from
Roman law. By the same token, when he does borrow from the civil law,
this is a very much more significant circumstance than the use of a few
maxims by the author of the Leis Willelme.' 67 Some use is made of Roman
terminology though not always with the Roman meaning, 68 and book ten
which treats of the English equivalents of Roman contracts shows some
acquaintance with Roman law. But despite the use of the Roman contractual
terms the substantive law looks very different: 'The most striking feature of
this book of the treatise is the conflict, if this be not too strong a term,
69
between the form and the substance. '
Henry of Bracton was a royal judge who died in 1268. The treatise, De
Legibus et ConsuetudinibusAnglie, which goes under his name shows very
considerable knowledge both of Roman law directly and of the learned
continental jurists, notably Azo. 70 The arrangement of the work also owes
much to the structure of Justinian's Institutes. What is not so easily
determined is the extent to which Roman law had influenced the substance
of English law. As Barton puts it, at times Bracton Romanises but at other
times he is clearly anglicizing. How far Bracton accurately depicts the
common law and the extent to which English rules in resembling Roman
rules betray their origin are questions too difficult to be resolved here. What
concerns us more is the likelihood that, because of the Romanised
appearance of the De Legibus, if Bracton's treatise had been influential and
if he had been followed on the Bench by others trained as he was, England
would have undergone a Reception. But as Milsom noted, it was the Brevia
Placitatathat was to prevail.
Yet, to contrast England with continental states of the period, one should
not ignore the success of the unromanised works such as the Brevia
Placitata. After all, not so long before-certainly before 1235, probably
between 1221 and 1224-had been written the enormously successful
66. History, supra note 64 at 1, 102; quoted by Barton, Roman Law, supra note 65 at 8.
67. Ibid. at 9.
68. See G. D. G. Hall, ed., The Treatise on the Laws and Customs of the Realm of England
commonly called Glanvill (London, 1965) xxxvi.
69. Barton, Roman Law, supra note 65 at 11.
70. See above all, ibid. at 13ff.

Sachsenspiegel.7' Originally in Latin it was rapidly turned into low German,
probably East Saxon, by its author, Eike van Repgow. It was in turn
translated into other German dialects, Dutch and back into Latin. Of its two
parts, over 200 manuscripts survive of the 'Landrecht' and nearly 150 of the
'Lehnrecht'. Its influence was great well beyond the confines of the area
whose customary law it described. And, in France too, even much later than
Bracton, books such as the Tres Ancienne Coutume de Bretagne of 1315
were to prove influential. The clue to the different development that is
taking place and will continue lies not in the use made of Roman law in these
works. In England, France and Germany alike, there were books very much
influenced by Roman law and books which were very much less so. Both
existed side-by-side. But whereas books such as the Sachsenspiegel and
French works on customary law set out the substantive law, the English
works such as the Brevia Placitata,72 Novae Narrationes,73 Placita
Coronae,74 and the Court Baron75 are formularies setting out writs and
pleadings. The successful English works are geared very narrowly to aiding
the practising lawyer to bring the suit in the proper formal manner. This was
to be the direction for English law in the succeeding centuries. And here
Roman law had no role to play.
Bracton may be regarded as the high-water mark of the influence of
Roman law in medieval England. The attitude to Roman law in medieval
England, as in Scotland and continental Europe, corresponded to that
described by the present writer in a general account of the Reception of
Roman law: customary systems of law are very much disposed to borrow
from a mature, detailed system in writing even when the latter is constructed
on very different lines and was created for very different social, economic
and political conditions. But the borrowings may be very slow and
piecemeal. The reasons are not hard to find.
What is in issue here, in fact, is not that England did not borrow from
Roman law when others were doing so-it also did -but the question is
why England alone did not come to accept the Corpus Juris Civilis as
authoritative. We have already seen part of the answer. Lands prominent in
the Reception had particular reasons for accepting the Corpus Juris as
authoritative. And for a long time England was not so different from other
territories. But more must be said to explain why, in the result, England was
the odd-man-out.
Before we do that, though, a word must be said about Roman law in later
71. For this see in English, A. Watson, Sources of Law, supra note 57 at 28ff.
72. G. T. Turner and T. F. T. Plucknett, eds., Brevia Placitata, Selden Society, 66,
(London, 1951).
73. E. Shanks and S. F. C. Milsom, eds., Novae Narrationes, Selden Society, 80,
(London, 1963).
74. J. M. Kaye, ed., Placitata Coronae, Selden Society, Supp. Ser., iv, (London, 1966).
75. F. W. Maitland, ed., Court Baron, Selden Society, 4, (London, 1890).
2.4)
2.5)
England. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there was an upsurge of

the influence of Roman law, particularly in substance. It is this which lends
some credence to the paragraph of Craig set out at the beginning of this
section. But after Bracton there was never a danger of a Reception in the
sense of the Corpus Juris Civilis becoming authoritative. 76
A fourth point to be emphasized is that, before the Corpus Juris Civilis is
treated as the law of the land or as directly and highly persuasive, Roman
law is influential and infiltrates other systems by filling the gaps. The
greater the gaps the greater the potential for Roman law influence. As Craig
(1.2.14) puts it: 'In Scotland there is the greatest scarcity of written laws and
therefore, naturally, in most matters we follow the Civil Law. Not because
we are learned or well-grounded in it, because to this point no one-so far
as I am aware-were professors of law who taught law publicly (which is of
course to be regretted), but almost against our will, since we are deprived of
our own written law we are led there by the sole beneficence of nature or the
worth of that law.'
Here we are, of course, speaking of private law, the sphere in which lay
the achievement of the Romans. But English private law developed
precociously. Statutes were very important for private law from an early
77
date. Thus, Henry 11 (1154-89) can be characterized as 'a great legislator'
and Edward 1 (1272-1307) was responsible for some of the most important
laws in English history. 78 Maitland, indeed, goes so far as to say: 'The
vigorous legislation of the time has an important consequence in checking
the growth of unenacted law.' 79 This consequence, he believes is revealed
both in the check to the further advance of Roman law which had been
growing in importance under Henry III (1216-72) and in hampering further
development by case law. And early there was developed a system of King's
courts, applying the same law through the country. National courts, as
distinct from local courts, apply to far more people: there are more cases and
relevant law is more readily established. And, as we shall see, precedent
was regarded early on as important in England for fixing the law.
The mention of the King's courts brings us to a fifth point, the writ system
which has Anglo-Saxon roots. 80 The need to have a writ to bring the cause
before the court meant that high priority was centered on that and on proof,
76. See, e.g., W. Holdsworth, History of English Law (London, 3rd ed., 1945) iv: 283ff;
B. P. Levack, The Civil Lawyers in England (Oxford, 1973) 122ff; J. H. Baker,
Introduction to English Legal History, (London, 2nd ed., 1979) 36f. [hereinafter cited
as Baker, Introduction]. Significantly, Milsom does not mention any danger of a
Reception in that period: Foundations, supra note 2.
77. F. W. Maitland, ConstitutionalHistory of England (Cambridge, 1920) 10 [hereinafter
cited as Maitland, History].
78. Ibid. at 18ff.
79. Ibid. at 21.
80. See, e.g., R. C. van Caenegem, The Birth of the English Common Law (Cambridge,
1973) 30.
2.6)
rather than on systematic development of legal rules. S. F. C. Milsom goes

so far as to claim that from, say, the thirteenth to the early sixteenth century
the lawyers did not see the law as a system of substantive rules at all, and
he contrasts them with Bracton and his kind who 'were accustomed to think
in terms of substantive law'. But Bracton's was the last English law-book
for centuries to be written with such terms in mind. 8' With such a
framework the infiltration of Roman law would be no easy matter. It could
either take the citadel by storm-which did not happen-or leave the field.
And the emphasis in England on what happened in court led early to the
high practical standing of precedent. Craig (1.7.20) says: 'If nothing is
settled by the principles of the common law or by custom (general or
manorial) then in similar cases the authority of previous decisions, especially of the King's Bench, prevails. And now disputes are settled primarily
in this way if it is shown that it was previously decided otherwise. Nor is
there any defense to this form of judging unless the case can be distinguished
for it very often happens that the whole situation of fact for the decision is
changed by minute circumstances of fact. Hence come the many volumes of
cases (for so the situations of fact are called) in Plowden, in Dyer and
others.' And he demonstrates the rather lower value of precedent in Scotland
(1.8.13,14,15). Yet Scotland, along with England, were the main countries
where institutional writers cited precedent as authority for propositions of
law. 82 This is as true of Lord Stair, Institutions of the Law of Scotland (first
edition 1681) as of John Cowell, Institutiones luris Anglicani (first edition
1605). But even much earlier, Bracton's De Legibus et Consuetudinibus
Angliae of the thirteenth century (now thought to have been written in the
1220s and 1230s and brought up to date by Bracton in the 1240s and
1250S) 83 contains about 500 references to decided cases. Case law was an
important source of legal growth in the reign of Henry III (1216-72). and the
first Year Books, the earliest English law reports, date from 1292.
The use of precedent also militates against the infiltration of Roman law.
First, there are fewer gaps to be filled. Secondly, gaps can be filled by
analogy with previous cases. Thirdly, where judges are given the high social
status of lawmakers-even if they talk as if their role was that of
law-finders-they will bolster their own position and prestige by relying on
the authority of other judges rather than looking elsewhere for authority.
One final factor which is by no means the least important and which
perhaps deserves pride of place for England being different from the other
states of western Europe in its attitude to Roman law is feudalism and the
different standing of feudal law in England.
To begin with, feudalism by its very nature ought to operate as a powerful
82. But elsewhere, too, an institutional writer might refer to precedent. A notable example
from southern France is Claude Serres, Les Institutionsdu droitfrangoissuivantI'ordre
de celles de Justinien (Montpellier, 1753).
83. See, e.g., Baker, Introduction, supra note 76 at 101.

barrier to the encroachment of Roman law. The law flowing from feudalism
affects the most powerful interests. Landholding is central to the feudal
system, and land was the basis of wealth in the Middle Ages. The feudal
relationship was primarily knightly and military. Wealth and high social
status go together in ensuring that legal rules deriving from feudalism will
have a major impact on law in general. But the concepts and categories that
flow naturally from feudalism into feudal law cut across those of Roman law
to such an extent that they make Roman law seem irrelevant within their
sphere of influence. Thus, firstly, by its very nature feudal law makes no
distinction between public and private law, partaking of both, whereas the
foremost distinction in Roman law is into public and private, with the stress
almost entirely on the latter. As Maitland puts it, 'we may describe
"feudalism" as a state of society in which all or a great part of public rights
and duties are inextricably linked with the tenure of land, in which the whole
governmental system-financial, military, judicial-is part of the law of
private property' .84 Secondly, for the law of persons in feudal law the most
important division is into lord and vassal, a division that has no place in
Roman law. Thirdly and more importantly, fealty, a central element in the
feudal system, is an obligation or one side of an obligation or partly an
obligation. But it does not fit neatly into Roman notions: looked at from a
Romanist point of view it is in some sense a contract but it has very different
effects from contract. Moreover, the other contracts which are so familiar
from Roman law have no role to play in feudal law. Fourthly, Roman law,
especially as set out in the Corpus Juris Civilis, made scarcely any
distinction between land and moveable property. But for feudal law, only
land was usually relevant. Moreover, the feudal grant of land in England
was for an estate in the land, a time in the land, and not of ownership. The
whole doctrine of estates as it was to develop was unknown to Roman law.
In addition the acquisition of an estate involved a formal ceremony, of
fealty, and such ceremonies were unknown to the CorpusJuris. Fifthly, the
nature of the feudal grant had an automatic impact on the law of succession.
Since originally an estate in land ended on death there would be no feudal
succession to land. Gradually, it came to be expected that the lord would
renew. Still, this would mean in the case of land that there would be no
testate succession: the lord would not want the vassal to have a right of
choosing the next vassal. Also it would mean that primogeniture would be
favored: the lord would not want the vassal's obligations to him to be
divided among a number of people. And there would be a preference for
males: the main obligation of the vassal was military service which could not
be performed by a female. These characteristics are very different from
those of Roman law, where testacy was freely permitted, where no
distinctions were drawn for inheritance between land and movables, where
there was no primogeniture and where for the most part male and female
were equally entitled to inherit, both under a will and on intestacy. Thus, in
84. Maitland, History, supra note 77 at 23f.
564
all branches of substantive law, feudal law presented a very different face
from Roman law. In addition, in all feudal relations the superior retained the
power of jurisdiction over his vassal. 85 The more important feudal law was
in a society, the greater the obstacle it presented against the Corpus Juris
becoming authoritative.
But feudal law was bound to have a greater impact in England than
elsewhere. On the one hand, it was only in England that land holding
involved the doctrine of estates that resulted in so much convoluted legal
reasoning and learning. Such was the overwhelming importance of this
subject that it is scarcely surprising that Milsom can say that 'Littleton could
write his Tenures, which can properly be regarded as a text-book of land
law, nearly four centuries before text-books were written on other branches
of the law'.86 But such massive emphasis on a topic where Roman law was
irrelevant would reduce the general authority of Roman law. And borrowing
is often from a system which has achieved general respect. Moreover, pride
in one native English achievement would increase the native self-confidence
to go it alone in other fields of law. On the other hand, England, with
Normandy and Brittany following hard upon, was the only territory where
all of the land was held in feudal tenure. Where land is allodial, or not in
feudal tenure, non-feudal principles will determine ownership, transfer,
rights of succession and so on. Another system will have to apply, and
Roman law is an obvious resource. On this argument it is not surprising that
at the time of the French Revolution, Normandy and Brittany had received
relatively little of Roman law. And it is consistent with this argument that
Friesland whose law was notoriously more Romanized than the other United
Provinces had relatively more of its land held allodially than had the others.
In a very different way feudal law would be more of a barrier to the
penetration of Roman law in England than elsewhere. The Libri Feudorum
are the greatest monuments of the feudal law and seem to have been
composed mainly in Milan in the first half of the twelfth century. A second
version contained constitutions of the Emperor Frederick I, dating from
1154 and 1158. Hugolinus, the Bolognese jurist, completed a third version
and the books acquired a semi-official status 87 when he inserted it in the
volumen parvum which contained the Institutes and the Authenticum (a
version of the Novellae) of the Corpus Juris. In fact it was treated as an
appendix to the nine collationes of the Authenticum and hence was even
called the tenth, decem collatio. It was glossed like the parts of the Corpus
JurisCivilis-that name is later-and the gloss was accepted into the Glossa
Ordinariaof Accursius. Its fate and fortune was thus linked with those of
the Corpus Juris. It was even taught along with it, and the same celebrated
85. See, e.g., Craig, Jus Feudale, 1.9.3.6.

87. See, e.g., General Survey of Events, Sources, Persons and Movements in Continental
Legal History by various European authors (Boston, 1912) 74 (by C. Calisse).
565
European scholars like Cuiacius, Baldus, Julius Clarus, Hotman, wrote on

both.
But this linking of the Libri Feudorum with the Corpus Juris Civilis
would restrict the impact of feudalism to feudal law. To begin with, the
elements of the Corpus Juris, in particular the Digest and Code, had such a
high status and were so detailed that the Libri Feudorum could scarcely
encroach. Then again, the Libri Feudorum were much less detailed, and
treating them with the Corpus Juris would result in the gaps, inconsistencies, ambiguities in the Libri Feudorum being resolved or filled by the
Corpus Juris. Craig, 1.9.36 puts it this way in discussing the nine
characteristic qualities of feus (1.9.36): 'Third, any point in relation to a feu
which is not expressly settled in the Libri Feudorum ought to be decided by
the Jus Civile or the law of the Romans. Feudal decisions, on the other hand,
have no relevance except in relation to feudal questions.'
Again, and even more significantly, with this continental attitude towards
the Libri Feudorum and feudal law, when feudalism as a social system
declined, as it began to do early with the decline of knight service, there
would be no obstacle from feudal law to using the rules and categories of the
Corpus Juris to develop the local law.
But the Libri Feudorum were used in this way only in continental Europe
and in Scotland: not in England. There is no trace of their ever having
influence on English law, and no sign of any knowledge of them in English
works such as Littleton on Tenures. But where the Libri Feudorum,
restricted and reined in by the Corpus Juris, were not used, there were not
these obstacles to feudal law dominating the legal scene and hindering legal
growth on other principles, and to remaining dominant long after feudalism
itself had declined.
As we have seen, there is a strong tendency for legal rules, structures and
concepts to continue in life long after the social structure has died. So it was
with feudal law in England after the death of feudalism. And feudal law was
the dominant part of English law, and its ideas were very different from
those of Roman law.
Feudal law was thus a major factor in preventing the Corpus Juris from
becoming authoritative in England while being much less of an obstacle
elsewhere. I am tempted by a paradox: it was above all the failure to receive
the Corpus Juris Civilis as authoritative in England that led to the failure in
England to accept the Corpus Juris Civilis as authoritative. The steps in the
paradox are: failure to receive the Corpus Juris Civilis as authoritative
involves the failure to receive the Libri Feudorum as authoritative: at a
certain stage in Western European history feudalism, and with it the legal
rules relating to the feudal system, is very potent for development; rules of
feudal law cut across the notions of Roman law; for the rest of Western
Europe the most important ideas of feudal law are contained in the Libri
Feudorum; where the Corpus Juris Civilis is treated as authoritative, the
Libri Feudorum are appended to it and treated as subsidiary; it is this
relationship which keeps feudal law to its proper sphere, and causes its
decline when feudalism declines.

IV
In the fourth chapter of The Evolution of Law I tried to show how the
themes of the three preceding chapters-the importance of the legal tradition
itself for legal development, the nature of customary law and the Reception
of Roman law-come together in Western legal history, choosing as an
example a single Scottish case of the seventeenth century in which the legal
discussion centered on the corresponding provisions of Roman law although
they were not economically appropriate and were not a necessary part of
Scots law. Judging is rooted in the legal tradition to the neglect of local
societal conditions. No legal case, I maintained, can be understood as law
in action if one neglects the legal tradition that sets the parameters of debate.
The tradition is not noticed by the actors who live it, and they are unaware
of its impact. They know not what they do.
Elsewhere I have given examples from other systems where to outsiders
judges acted in an extreme way and obtained inappropriate results, but
where the judges thought of themselves as good judges acting out the rules
of the judging game according to their own particular tradition. 88
Naturally enough, courts such as those in Scotland and South Africa, do
not always show themselves to be unaware of changed circumstances when
they reason from Roman or Roman-Dutch law. But even then the legal
culture may also emerge clearly. I should like to cite an example from
Scotland, Halkerston v. Wedderburn of 1781:
Mr. Halkerston, thinking his garden at Inveresk injured by a row of elms, the branches
of which hung over it from the garden of Mr. Wedderburn, applied to the Sheriff for
redress. After various steps of procedure, the cause was moved to the Court of Session
by advocation; when the following abstract question came to be considered, viz.
Whether a person is bound to allow his property to be overshaded by the trees belonging
to a conterminous heritor?
Pleaded for Mr. Wedderburn; The climate of Scotland is such as has induced the
legislature to encourage the planting of forest-trees in hedge rows, for the sake of
shelter; and, for some time, it was even imposed as a duty upon every proprietor; act
1661, cap. 41. This, however, would have been an elusory enactment, if the common
law permitted a conterminous heritor to lop such trees, whenever their branches
extended beyond the line of march. By the common law, an heritor may plant so near
the march, in praediis rusticis, that the trees will protrude their branches into the air,
over the adjacent ground; nor is there any thing in that law, which authorises the
conterminous heritor to lop off such branches, unless he can qualify a material damage
arising from their protrusion.
In England, as well as in Scotland, the highways are understood to be vested in the
King, for behoof of the public; yet in both kingdoms, statutes have been found necessary
to authorize Justices of the Peace, Way-wardens, &c. to cause prune trees hanging over
the road; which could not have been the case, had the common law allowed any such
power to a conterminous heritor.
In like manner, though the Roman law allowed the proprietor of a praedium rusticum
to prune such trees to the height of fifteen feet, yet this was not a right inherent in him
upon the principles of common law, but was derived from the laws of the twelve tables,
88. 'A House of Lords Judgement, and Other Tales of the Absurd', American Journal of
Comparative Law (1985), 673ff.

and confirmed by an edict of the Praetor; L.I.7, 8, 9. D. De arb. caed. And this very
limitation of the right shews, that the Romans did not think the protrusion of branches
in itself any encroachment upon the right of property; except so far as it obstructed or
impeded the immediate exercise of it. They considered the air as a res communis,
incapable of appropriation; and thought, that no encroachment upon it afforded a proper
ground of challenge.
Answered for Mr. Halkerston; It is understood to be a general rule of law, that no
person is entitled to encroach upon the property of another, unless he can show a right
of servitude to that effect. One may dig a trench upon his own property, though the
effect of it may be, to cut the roots, and destroy the whole of his neighbour's trees. He
may raise his wall to any given height; and, in doing so, he may cut down every branch
that stands in his way. While a branch from his neighbour's tree does him no harm, he
will allow it to remain, upon the same principle of good neighborhood, that he allows
him to hunt over his fields, or to angle in his stream. But the moment this branch does
him a real or an imaginary injury; whenever, in short, he wishes to remove it, the law
entitles him to do so, in the same manner, and upon the same principles, that it entitles
him to protect his property from any other kind of encroachment.
The regulations for the encouragement of planting and inclosing, introduced by the
act 1661, can never apply, with any propriety, to two contiguous gardens in the village
of lnveresk; and it is not very obvious how the powers given by statute to the public
officers entrusted with the care of high-ways, at all derogate from the private right of
parties to demand what they are empowered to do.
Neither does the argument on the other side derive any support from the Roman law.
The edict referred to, related only to praedia rustica; but, where a similar
encroachment was made upon a praedium urbanum, as seems more properly to be the
case here, another edict of the Praetor authorised the whole tree to be cut down; L. I.
2. D. De arb. caed. At any rate, it is nothing to us, in what manner the Romans chose
to limit the natural right now contended for. Under an Italian sun, it might probably be
thought, that there could not be too much shade; but the same idea can never be
entertained in a northern climate; and, accordingly, the learned Groenwegen, in his
treatise, De legibus abrogatis et inusitatis, in Hollandia vicinisque regionibus, says
expressly, 'Si arborfundo, vel aedibus alienis impendeat, nostris et Gallorum moribus,
non totam arborem a stirpe exscindere sed id quod super excurrit in totum adimere
licet; tit. De arb. caed.'
The Court had no doubt upon the principle; and, therefore, adhered to the Lord
Ordinary's interlocutor, 'Remitting the cause to the Sheriff, with this instruction, that he
find Mr. Wedderburn is bound to prune his trees in such a manner, as they may not hang
over the mutual wall, and thereby be of prejudice to Mr. Halkerston's fruit and
garden.' 89
As is usual for the time the advocates' arguments are given much more
prominence than the judges' reasoning. For the defender maintaining his
right to have his trees overhang and overshadow the pursuer's garden it was
argued that there was no obstacle thereto at Roman common law; though it
was conceded that by statute, namely the XII Tables, the aggrieved
neighbor could prune such trees up to fifteen feet from the ground, and that
this was confirmed by edict. This distinction between common law and
statute is based on the notion that statute is an encroachment and ought to
be interpreted strictly. The notion itself came into Scots law from England
and was unknown to the Romans. The argument is a blending of the two
foreign elements in Scots law: the scope of a Roman rule should better be
89. Halkerston v. Wedderburn (1781) M.10495.
568
determined by Roman principles, not by much later English ideas. In fact

the XII Tables, the codification of the fifth century B.C., was regarded as
the foundation of all Roman law. 9 Thus, the defender wants to give as
restricted a scope as possible to the Roman rules, but never does he argue
that they ought to be treated as irrelevant. Yet Roman law was not the law
in Scotland, though it could be treated as of great authority.
The argument for the pursuer is of more interest for us. First it is claimed
that in fact under the edict, the overhung neighbor had full right to cut down
the offending tree. Then comes the argument from changed circumstances.
Even if, it is suggested, the Romans did restrict the right to prune or cut
down overhanging trees, that is of no relevance for Scotland: 'Under an
Italian sun, it might probably be thought, that there could not be too much
shade; but the same idea can never be entertained in a northern climate.' Yet
the presumption that Roman law applies has to be rebutted by legal authority
and since there was none for Scotland 9 the pursuer looks to Holland and
France: 'If a tree overhangs another's land or buildings, then, by our and
French custom it is not permitted to cut out the whole tree from the root, but
to remove completely what overhangs.' This quotation he takes very
significantly from Groenewegen, De legibus abrogatis et inusitatis, in
Hollandia vicinisque regionibus, (1649) a work which as the title shows is
dedicated to setting out the Roman rules which were not accepted or were
abrogated in Holland and neighboring territories. 92
V
The conclusions of this paper remain those that I drew in chapter five
of The Evolution of Law. Legal change comes about through the culture of
the legal elite, the law makers, and it is above all determined by that
culture.
But law is not the culture of the legal elite alone and it is not the only
culture of the legal elite. As to the first of these, law is also the cultural
heritage of other lawyers and of society at large. But to effect change, other
lawyers and other members of society have to operate on and through the
93
legal elite, whereas the elite can initiate change on its own.
As to the second of these, the law-making elite also partakes of the
general culture of society. Thus, where the society as a whole or its ruling
elite is cosmopolitan or innovative, the law making elite will tend to be
90. See e.g. D. 1.2.2.6; Cicero, de oratore, 1.44.195.
91. On the paucity of Scottish authority see J. Rankine, The Law of Land-ownership in
Scotland (Edinburgh, 4th ed., 1909) 631ff.
92. For a South African case in which changed circumstances-this time of law-were
taken into account see Simons and Others v. Board of Executors 1915 C.P.D. 479.
93. See already A. Watson, 'Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture', University
of Pennsylvania Law Review 131 (1983) 1121ff, especially at 11 51ff.
Legal traditions determine legal

change

cosmopolitan or innovative. The general culture has many strands and
many roots, resulting from geography, history, economics, politics,
religion and so on and it is as part of the general culture that these factors
influence law making. But what has to be stressed is, as we have seen, the
very powerful role that the legal culture itself has on law making. The
law-making elite comes to regard law as existing in large measure in its
own right, as an end in itself, as having its being distinct from other
institutions of society.
Legal change also comes about by organized pressure from outside of the
legal elite. But when it does, the emerging law is still given its contours by
94
the law-making elite.
Two restrictions on all of the above should be set forth right at the end of
this paper so that their importance should not be ignored. The first is that the
argument here is not that the law-making elite is never aware of, and fully
responsive to, wider societal conditions. It may well be, and the legal rules
on a particular topic may well be entirely satisfactory for those making use
of them. It may be for instance that at times the business community will
have such close contacts with some part of the legal elite in the shape of
academics whom it hires as consultants that their concerns are very much the
same, and a view of law is proferred which is in harmony with commercial
interests. Even then, of course, in a developed system that view of law put
forward by academics will prevail only if it is also adopted by judges and the
legislature who, in their turn, are also of course blinkered by their own part
of the tradition. My point is only that it is the legal elite who shape the legal
rules, that they are fixed within their cultural tradition, and that to a very
considerable extent the rules often do not meet the needs and desires of those
who use them and that that is not a matter of immediate concern to the legal
elite. No better illustration of this can be found than in English land law
which for centuries until 1925 (at the earliest) was very unsatisfactory for
land owners and was beneficial to no one (except practising lawyers). Those
who had no property had no concern with the rules, those who had were also
those who as judges and legislators were in a position to change the rules.
But (in Oliver Cromwell's phrase) the 'tortuous and ungodly jumble' of
English land law was to prevail for centuries. 95 A glance at the confused and
unsatisfactory state of the law (for those using it) in the contemporary U.S.
96
on copyright infringement with regard to the fair use of factual works
should point a warning to those who believe American law is in harmony
with the needs of law users.
The second restriction ought not to need mentioning; I am concerned
with the development of the legal rules themselves, not with how the legal
94. See already A. Watson, 'Comparative Law and Legal Change', Cambridge Law
Journal 37 (1978) 313ff.
95. For the argument see A. Watson, Society and Legal Change (Edinburgh, 1977) 47ff.
96. See G. Francione, 'Facing the Nation: The Standards for Copyright, Infringement and
Fair Use of Factual Works', 134 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 519ff
(1986).

rules operate in society. For reasons at least partly connected with the wider
society, the same legal rule may operate to different effect in different
societies. The present paper is written on the premise that actual legal rules,
97
as authoritatively set forth, have themselves an impact.
97. See already Watson, 'Legal Change', supra note 95 at I 138f.
Authority differs
operability.

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Citation: 5 Law & Hist. Rev. 537 1987

The Evolution of Law: Continued

Alan Watson is University Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.

Law and History Review

2. S. F. C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law (Toronto, 2nd ed.,

Essay: Evolution of Law: Continued

For the historian the special interest of the

development is its repeated demonstration of the strength of purely legal

Law and History Review

jurisdiction today.'1 4 Significantly for us, as we shall see, he adds: 'But it

Law's phase lag.

Essay: Evolution of Law: Continued

Law and History Review

legal system prevailed? Even then Ernest Augustus, Duke of Cumberland,

Law's pervasive traditionality

Essay: Evolution of Law: Continued

Law and History Review

Legal development: juristic

Essay: Evolution of Law: Continued

Justiniani(1779) of M. Guarani may serve as one particular instance. The

Law and History Review

Essay: Evolution of Law: Continued

Law and History Review

34. 'Dum memorassem quod venientes homines nostri, in praesentiamnostram, adduXerint

Essay: Evolution of Law: Continued

36. 'Ego Guillelmus Botetus dedi aliquantulamoperam ut consuetudines ciuitatisuarias et

Law and History Review

In the third chapter of The Evolution of Law I sought to explain what

Essay: Evolution of Law: Continued

Law and History Review

Essay: Evolution of Law: Continued

Law and History Review

Essay: Evolution of Law: Continued

55. Conrad, Rechtsgeschichte, ii: 339ff.

819ff [hereinafter cited as Luig, 'Geltungs-

Ambiguity (Philadelphia, 1984) 47ff [hereinafter cited as Watson, Sources of Law].

Theoretical and practical

Law and History Review

vigorously by others such as Christophe de Thou, (1508-1582) also First

Essay: Evolution of Law: Continued

jurisdictions. A significant step in that direction occurred in 1747 when

Law and History Review

Essay: Evolution of Law: Continued

Law and History Review

Essay: Evolution of Law: Continued

England. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there was an upsurge of

Law and History Review

rather than on systematic development of legal rules. S. F. C. Milsom goes

Essay: Evolution of Law: Continued

84. Maitland, History, supra note 77 at 23f.

Law and History Review

85. See, e.g., Craig, Jus Feudale, 1.9.3.6.

Essay: Evolution of Law: Continued

European scholars like Cuiacius, Baldus, Julius Clarus, Hotman, wrote on

Law and History Review

Essay: Evolution of Law: Continued

89. Halkerston v. Wedderburn (1781) M.10495.

Law and History Review