APC Fundamental Principles of Network Security

Fundamental Principles
of Network Security
By Christopher Leidigh
White Paper #101
Executive Summary
Security incidents are rising at an alarming rate every year. As the complexity of the threats
increases, so do the security measures required to protect networks.
Data center
operators, network administrators, and other data center professionals need to comprehend
the basics of security in order to safely deploy and manage networks today. This paper
covers the fundamentals of secure networking systems, including firewalls, network
topology and secure protocols. Best practices are also given that introduce the reader to
some of the more critical aspects of securing a network.
2005 American Power Conversion. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be used, reproduced, photocopied, transmitted, or
stored in any retrieval system of any nature, without the written permission of the copyright owner. www.apc.com
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Introduction
Securing the modern business network and IT infrastructure demands an end-to-end approach and a firm
grasp of vulnerabilities and associated protective measures. While such knowledge cannot thwart all
attempts at network incursion or system attack, it can empower network engineers to eliminate certain
general problems, greatly reduce potential damages, and quickly detect breaches. With the ever-increasing
number and complexity of attacks, vigilant approaches to security in both large and small enterprises are a
must. Figure 1 illustrates the steep rise in security incidents occurring each year, as reported to the CERT
Coordination Center (a center of Internet security expertise).
Figure 1 Security incidents by year CERT.ORG

100,000
95,000
90,000
Number of Incidents Reported
85,000
82,094
80,000
75,000
70,000
65,000
60,000
55,100
55,000
50,000
45,000
40,000
35,000
30,000
25,000
21,756
20,000
15,000
9,859
10,000
5,000
2,340
1995
2,412
1996
2,573
1997
2,134
1998
3,734
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Year
1998-2003 by Carnegie Mellon University
This paper presents security fundamentals as well as some best practices regarding the network, computer
hosts and infrastructure network elements. Since there is no such thing as the only way to approach
security, it is left up to the reader / implementer to best judge what measures are appropriate.
The people problem

People are truly the weakest link in any security schema. Most people are not careful about keeping secrets
such as passwords and access codes that form the basis for most secure systems. All security systems rely
on a set of measures employed to control access, verify identity and protect disclosure of sensitive
information. These measures usually involve one or more secrets. Should a secret be revealed or stolen
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then the systems that are protected by these secrets can be compromised. It may seem like a terribly
obvious statement, but most systems are compromised in very basic ways. Leaving a Post-It note with a
system password stuck to the side of a computer monitor may seem foolish, but many people in fact do such
things. Another example, which is only slightly less obvious, is the tendency to leave factory default
passwords in certain network devices. One such device might be a network management interface to a
UPS. UPS systems, whether small in capacity or large enough to power 100 servers, are often overlooked
in a security scheme. If such devices are left with default usernames and passwords, it could just be a
matter of time before someone gains access knowing nothing more than the device type and its published
default credentials. Imagine a server bank with rock solid security protocols on each web and mail server
crashed by a simple power cycle on an unprotected UPS!
Security, the big picture

A secure enterprise, big or small, should have an approach to security that is comprehensive and end-toend if it is to be effective. Most organizations do not have such policies and practices in place. There are
some good reasons for this; security clearly comes at a cost. This cost can be measured not just in dollars,
but also in complexity, time and efficiency. To make things secure, it is necessary to spend money, perform
more procedures, and wait for these procedures to complete (or perhaps involve someone else).
The reality is that true security programs are difficult to achieve. It is usually necessary to choose a schema
that has a certain amount of cost and an understood amount of security coverage. (This is almost always
less than comprehensive and end to end.) The point here is to make educated decisions for each aspect
of an overall system and to consciously employ more or less in a calculated fashion. If one knows the areas
that are less protected, one can at least monitor such areas to determine problems or breaches.
Security Basics
Knowing the network
It is not possible to protect anything unless one clearly understands WHAT one wants to protect.
Organizations of any size should have a set of documented resources, assets and systems. Each of these
elements should have a relative value assigned in some manner as to their importance to the organization.
Examples of things that should be considered are servers, workstations, storage systems, routers, switches,
hubs, network and Telco links, and any other network elements such as printers, UPS systems and HVAC
systems. Other important aspects of this task include documenting equipment location and any notes on
dependencies. For instance most computers will rely on power backup systems such as UPSs which
themselves may be part of the network if they are managed. Environmental equipment such as HVAC units
and air purifiers may also be present.
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Understanding different threats

The next step is to identify the potential threats to each of these elements as shown in Table 1. Threats
can come from both internal and external sources. They may be human based, automated or even nonintentional natural phenomenon. The latter might more appropriately be categorized under system health
threats as opposed to security threats, but one issue can lead to the other. One example is a power outage
to a burglar alarm. The power outage could be intentional or through some natural event such as a lightning
strike. In either case security is diminished.
Table 1 Summary of various threats with consequences

Threat
Internal \ External Threat Consequences
e-mail with virus
External origination,
internal use
Could infect system reading email and subsequently

spread throughout entire organization
Network virus
External
Could enter through unprotected ports, compromise

whole network
Web based virus
Internal browsing to
external site
Could cause compromise on system doing browsing and

subsequently affect other internal systems
Web server attack
External to web servers
If web server is compromised hacker could gain access

to other systems internal to network
Denial of service
attack
External
External services such as web, email and ftp could

become unusable
If router is attacked, whole network could go down
Network User Attack

(internal employee)
Internal to anywhere
Traditional border firewalls do nothing for this attack.

Internal segmentation firewalls can help contain damage.
Physical security, protection on the inside

Most experts would agree that all security starts with physical security. Controlling physical access to
machines and network attach points is perhaps more critical than any other aspect of security. Any type of
physical access to an internal site creates a major exposure of the site. Secure files, passwords, certificates
and all sorts of other data can usually be obtained if physical access is possible. Fortunately there are all
sorts of access control devices and secure cabinets that can help with this problem. For more information
on physical security of data centers and network rooms see APC White Paper #82, Physical Security in
Mission Critical Facilities.
Partitioning and protecting network boundaries with firewalls

Besides the basic physical security of a site, the next most important aspect is controlling digital access into
and out of the organizations network. In most cases this means controlling the points of connectivity to the
outside world, typically the Internet. Almost every medium and large-scale company has a presence on the
Internet and has an organizational network connected to it. In fact there is a large increase in the number of
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smaller companies and homes getting full time Internet connectivity. Partitioning the boundary between the
outside Internet and the internal intranet is a critical security piece. Sometimes the inside is referred to as
the trusted side and the external Internet as the un-trusted side. As a generality this is all right, however,
as will be described, this is not specific enough.
A firewall is a mechanism by which a controlled barrier is used to control network traffic into AND out of an
organizational intranet. Firewalls are basically application specific routers. They run on dedicated
embedded systems such as an internet appliance or they can be software programs running on a general
server platform. In most cases these systems will have two network interfaces, one for the external network
such as the Internet and one for the internal intranet side. The firewall process can tightly control what is
allowed to traverse from one side to the other. Firewalls can range from being fairly simple to very complex.
As with most aspects of security, deciding what type of firewall to use will depend upon factors such as traffic
levels, services needing protection and the complexity of rules required. The greater the number of services
that must be able to traverse the firewall the more complex the requirement becomes. The difficulty for
firewalls is distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate traffic.
What do firewalls protect against and what protection do they not provide? Firewalls are like a lot of things; if
configured correctly they can be a reasonable form of protection from external threats including some denial
of service (DOS) attacks. If not configured correctly they can be major security holes in an organization.
The most basic protection a firewall provides is the ability to block network traffic to certain destinations.
This includes both IP addresses and particular network service ports. A site that wishes to provide external
access to a web server can restrict all traffic to port 80 (the standard http port). Usually this restriction will
only be applied for traffic originating from the un-trusted side. Traffic from the trusted side is not restricted.
All other traffic such as mail traffic, ftp, snmp, etc. would not be allowed across the firewall and into the
intranet. An example of a simple firewall is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2 Simple firewall to network

Private (Enterprise)
Network
Internet
Firewall
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An even simpler case is a firewall often used by people with home or small business cable or DSL routers.
Typically these firewalls are setup to restrict ALL external access and only allow services originating from the
inside. A careful reader might realize that in neither of these cases is the firewall actually blocking all traffic
from the outside. If that were the case how could one surf the web and retrieve web pages? What the
firewall is doing is restricting connection requests from the outside. In the first case all connection requests
from the inside are passed to the outside as well as all subsequent data transfer on that connection. From
the exterior, only a connection request to the web server is allowed to complete and pass data, all others are
blocked. The second case is more stringent as connections can only be made from the interior to the
exterior.
More complex firewall rules can utilize what is called stateful inspection techniques. This approach adds to
the basic port blocking approach by looking at traffic behaviors and sequences to detect spoof attacks and
denial of service attacks. The more complex the rules, the greater the computing power of the firewall
required.
One problem most organizations face is how to enable legitimate access to public services such as web,
ftp and e-mail while maintaining tight security of the intranet. The typical approach is to form what is known
as a DMZ (demilitarized zone), a euphemism from the cold war applied to the network. In this architecture
there are two firewalls: one between the external network and the DMZ, and another between the DMZ and
the internal network. All public servers are placed in the DMZ. With this setup, it is possible to have firewall
rules which allow public access to the public servers but the interior firewall can restrict all incoming
connections. By having the DMZ, the public servers are still provided more protection than if they were just
placed outside a single firewall site. Figure 3 illustrates the use of a DMZ.
Figure 3 Dual firewalls with DMZ

Private (Enterprise)
Network
DMZ
Internet
Internal
Firewall
Firewall
FTP Server
Using internal firewalls at various intranet boundaries can also help limit damage from internal threats and
things like worms that have managed to traverse the border firewalls. These can even be run in standby so
that normal traffic patterns are not blocked, but tight rules turned on in a problem situation.
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Workstation firewalls
There is an important network security factor that most people are only now becoming aware of and that is
that EVERY node or workstation on a network could be a potential security hole. In the past, basic attention
was paid to firewalls and servers, however, with the advent of the web and the proliferation of new classes of
nodes such as internet appliances, there are several more dimensions to protecting networks. A variety of
worm virus programs hijack computers and use them to both further spread themselves as well as
sometimes harm systems. Many of these worms would be stopped or greatly hindered if organizations had
internal systems more locked down. Workstation firewall products can block all port accesses into and out
of individual hosts that are not part of the normal needs of the host. Additionally firewall rules on the
INTERNAL side that block suspicious connections out of the organization can help prevent worms spreading
back out of an organization. Between the two, both internal and external replication can be reduced. For the
most part, all systems should be able to block all ports that are not required for use.
Basic Network Host Security

Port lockdown and minimizing running services
Many network devices and computer hosts startup network services by default, each of these services could
represent an opportunity for attackers, worms and Trojans. Very often all of these default services are not
needed. Doing port lockdown by turning off services reduces this exposure. As mentioned under the firewall
section , similar to Network firewalls, desktops and servers can run basic firewall software to block access to
unnecessary IP ports on the host or restrict access from certain hosts, This practice is important for internal
protection when the outer defenses have been breached or from other internal threats There are many
desktop firewall software packages available that do a great job of protecting hosts, for example, as of
Windows XP Service Pack 2, Microsoft is actually bundling a basic firewall as well.
Username and password management

As mentioned in the introduction, poor username and password management is a typical problem in most
enterprise networks. While sophisticated, centralized authentication systems (discussed later) can help
reduce problems, there are basic guidelines that if followed can help tremendously. Four basic rules that
need to be followed for usernames and passwords include:
1.
Do not use obvious passwords such as spouses name, favorite sports team, etc.
2.
Use longer passwords with mixed numbers or symbols
3.
Change passwords on a regular basis
4.
NEVER leave default credentials in network equipment
Unless computers or equipment have built in policies that can enforce the above concepts, these are rules
that must be self enforced. Rule (4) can at least be tested for by having network probes that try to detect
equipment with default credentials.
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Access control lists

Many types of equipment or hosts can be configured with access lists. These lists define hostnames or IP
addresses that are valid for accessing the device in question. It is typical, for instance, to restrict access to
network equipment from the inside of an organizations network. This would then protect against any type of
access that might breach an external firewall. These types of access lists serve as an important last defense
and can be quite powerful on some devices with different rules for different access protocols.
Securing Access to Devices and Systems

Since data networks cannot always be assumed to be protected from the possibility of intrusion or data
sniffing, protocols have been created to increase the security of attached network devices. In general there
are two separate issues to be concerned about, authentication and non-disclosure (encryption). There are a
variety of schemes and protocols to address these two requirements in secure systems and communication.
The basics of authentication are discussed first and then encryption.
User authentication for network devices

Authentication is necessary when one wants to control access to network elements, in particular network
infrastructure devices. Authentication has two sub concerns, general access authentication and functional
authorization. General access is the means to control whether or not a particular user has ANY type of
access right to the element in question. Usually we consider these in the form of a User account.
Authorization is concerned with individual user rights. What, for example, can a user do once
authenticated? Can they configure the device or only see data. Table 2 is a summary of the major
authentication protocols, their features, and their relevant applications.
Table 2 Summary of major authentication protocols

Protocol
Features
Protocol Uses
Username \ Password
Plaintext, memorized token
Telnet, HTTP
CHAP
(Challenge Handshake
Authentication Protocol)
Uses hashes of passwords and time

variant data to avoid straight password
transmission
MS-CHAP, PPP, APC Http, Radius
RADIUS
CHAP or straight passwords,

authorization and accounting methods
Backend for Telnet, SSH, SSL, Front end for

Microsoft IAS Server. Typical central
authentication method for network devices
TACACS+
Authentication, Authorization,
Accounting, full encryption support
Cisco protocol, central authentication, some

RAS use (Remote Access Service)
Kerberos
Service authentication and authorization,

full encryption
Kerberized applications like telnet, Microsoft

domain authentication service integrated with
Active Directory
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Restricting access to devices is one of the most important aspects of securing a network. Since
infrastructure devices are supporting both the network and computing equipment ipso facto, compromising
these can potentially bring down an entire network and its resources. Paradoxically, many IT departments
go through great pains to protect servers, institute firewalls and secure access mechanisms, but leave some
basic devices with rudimentary security.
At a minimum, all devices should have username password authentication with non-trivial (10 character,
mixed alpha, numbers and symbols). Users should be restricted in both numbers and type of authorization.
Care should be taken when using remote access methods that are not secure, i.e. usernames and
passwords passed in the clear over the network. Passwords should also be changed with some reasonable
frequency, perhaps every three months and when employees leave, if group passwords are used.
Centralized authentication methods

Appropriate authentication methods are important at a minimum, however, centralized authentication
methods are even better when either a) large numbers of users for devices are involved or, b) large numbers
of devices are in the network. Traditionally centralized authentication was used to solve problems found in
situation (a); the most common was remote network access. In remote access systems such as dial-up
RAS, the administration of users on the RAS network units themselves was just not possible. Potentially any
user of the network could attempt to use any of the existing RAS access points. Placing all user information
in all RAS units and then keeping that information up-to-date would exceed the abilities of RAS units in any
large enterprise of users and be an administrative nightmare.
Centralized authentication systems such as RADIUS and Kerberos solve this problem by using centralized
user account information that the RAS units, or other types of equipment, can access securely. These
centralized schemes allow information to be stored in one place instead of many places. Instead of having
to manage users on many devices, one location of user management can be used. If user information
needs to be changed, such as a new password, one simple task can accomplish this. If a user leaves, the
deletion of the user account prevents access for all equipment using centralized authentication. A typical
problem with non-centralized authentication in larger networks is remembering to delete accounts in all
places. Centralized authentication systems such as RADIUS can usually be seamlessly integrated with
other user account management schemes such as Microsofts Active Directory or LDAP directories. While
these two directory systems are not themselves authentication systems, they are used as centralized
account storage mechanisms. Most RADIUS servers can communicate with RAS or other network devices
in the normal RADIUS protocol and then securely access account information stored in the directories. This
is exactly what Microsofts IAS server does to bridge RADIUS and Active Directory. This approach means
that not only is centralized authentication being provided for the users of RAS and devices, but also the
account information is unified with the Microsoft domain accounts. Figure 4 shows a Windows Domain
controller operating as both an Active Directory server and a RADIUS server for network elements to
authenticate into an Active Directory domain.
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10
Figure 4 Windows Domain Controller

Windows
Domain Controller
with IAS Radius server
Active
Directory
DC
Database
Login
Response
Radius
Client
User
Login
Request
Authentication
Response
Device
CUPS /
Management Card
IAS /
Radius
Radius
Authentication
Request
Securing network data with encryption and authentication

In some cases it is important to be concerned about disclosing information that is exchanged between
network elements, computers or systems. Certainly it is not desirable that someone could access a bank
account that is not theirs or capture personal information that may be transmitted over a network. When one
wishes to avoid data disclosure over a network, encryption methods must be employed that make the
transmitted data unreadable to someone who might somehow capture the data as it traverses a network.
There are many methods to encrypt data and some of the major methods are described. With respect to
network devices such as UPS systems, the concern is not traditionally about the value of protecting data
such as UPS voltages and power strip currents; however, there is a concern with controlling access to these
elements.
The non-disclosure of authentication credentials such as usernames and passwords is critical in any system
where access is done over non-secure networks, the Internet for example. Even within organizations
private networks, protection of these credentials is a best practice. While it is less common, many
organizations are starting to implement policies that ALL management traffic be secure (encrypted) not just
authentication credentials. In either case, some form of cryptographic methods must be employed.
Encryption of data is usually accomplished by the combination of plaintext data (the input) with a secret key
using a particular encryption algorithm (i.e. 3DES, AES, etc.). The result (output) is ciphertext. Unless
someone (or a computer) has the secret key, they cannot convert the ciphertext back to plaintext. This basic
methodology is at the core of any of the secure protocols (described later). Another basic building block of
cryptographic systems is the hash. Hash methods take some plaintext input and perhaps key input and
then compute a large number called a hash. This number is a fixed length (number of bits) regardless of the
size of the input. Unlike the encryption methods that are reversible, where one can go back to plaintext with
the key, hashes are one way. It is not mathematically feasible to go from a hash back to plaintext. Hashes
are used as special IDs in various protocol systems because they can provide a check mechanism on data
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11
similar to a CRC (cyclic redundant check) on a disk file to detect data alteration. The hashes are used as a
data authentication method (different than user authentication). Anyone trying to secretly alter data in transit
across a network will alter the hash values thus causing detection. Table 3 provides a basic comparison of
cryptographic algorithms and their uses.
Table 3 Summary of major cryptographic algorithms

Algorithm
Primary Use
Protocol Uses
DES
Encryption
SSH, SNMPv3, SSL/TLS
3DES
Encryption
RC4
Encryption
SSL/TLS
Blowfish
Encryption
SSH
AES
Encryption
SSH, SSL/TLS
MD5
Hash, Message authentication codes
SHA
Hash, Message authentication codes
Secure Access Protocols

There are a variety of protocols such as SSH and SSL that employ various cryptographic mechanisms to
provide security through authentication and encryption methods. The level of security provided is dependent
upon many things such as the cryptographic methods used, the access to the transmitted data, algorithm
key lengths, server and client implementations and most importantly, the human factor. The most ingenious
crypto scheme is thwarted if a users access credential, such as a password or certificate, is obtained by a
third party. The classic case mentioned earlier is the password on a Post-It note on a persons monitor.
The SSH protocol

The Secure Shell (SSH) client-server protocol was developed in the mid 1990s in order to provide a secure
mechanism to access computer consoles or shells remotely over unprotected or non-secure networks.
The protocol provides secure methods by addressing user and server authentication and full encryption of
all traffic exchanged between the client and server. The protocol has two versions, V1 and V2, which differ
slightly in the cryptographic mechanisms provided. Additionally, V2 is superior in its ability to protect against
certain types of attacks. (An attempt by a non-participating third party to intercept, forge or otherwise
alter exchanged data is considered an attack.)
While SSH has been used as a secure access protocol to computer consoles for years, it has traditionally
been less employed in secondary infrastructure equipment such as UPS and HVAC equipment. However,
since networks and the network infrastructure that support them are becoming more and more critical to the
business practices of enterprises, using such a secure access method to all equipment is becoming more
common.
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The SSL\TLS protocol

While SSH has been the common secure protocol for console access for command-line like management,
the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and later the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol have become the
standard method of securing web traffic and other protocols such as SMTP (mail). TLS is the most recent
version of SSL and SSL is still commonly used interchangeably with the term TLS. SSL and SSH differ
mostly with respect to the client and server authentication mechanisms built into the protocols. TLS was
also accepted as an IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) standard while SSH never became a full IETF
standard even though it is very widely deployed as a draft standard. SSL is the secure protocol that protects
http web traffic, also referred to as https for http secure. Both Netscape and Internet Explorer support both
SSL and TLS. When these protocols are used, a formal authentication of the server is made to the client in
the form of a server certificate. Certificates are described subsequently. The client can also be
authenticated with certificates, though usernames and passwords are most typically used. Because the SSL
sessions are all encrypted, the authentication information and any data on web pages is secure. SSL is
always used on web sites that wish to be secure for banking and other commercial purposes since clients
usually access these sites over the public Internet.
Since web based management of network devices (embedded web servers) has become the most common
method of basic configuration and point user access, protecting this management method is very important.
Enterprises that wish to have all network management done securely, but still take advantage of graphical
interfaces such as http, should use SSL based systems. As mentioned before, SSL can also protect other
non-http communication. Should non-http based device clients be used, these systems should also employ
SSL for their access protocols to insure security. Using SSL in all of these cases also has the advantage of
using standard protocols with common authentication and encryption schemes.
Best Practices for Network Security

Well thought out security policies can significantly increase the security of a network. While policies can be
both complex and cumbersome or basic and straight forward, it is often the simple aspects that prove most
useful. Consider the combination of a centrally managed anti-virus update system and a host scanner to
detect new or out of date systems. While this system would entail setup, central administration and software
deployment capabilities, these are all generally available with todays Operating Systems. In general,
policies and ideally automatic enforcement tools help reduce the obvious holes in system security so that
one can concentrate on the more complex issues. The following would typically be part of an enterprise
network security policy:
Firewalls at all public-private network transit points
Version controlled and centrally deployed firewall rule sets
External resources placed in dual firewall, DMZ protected networks
All network hosts lock down unneeded network ports, turn off unneeded services
All network hosts include centrally managed anti-virus software
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All network hosts utilize central security updates
Secure central authentication such as Radius, Windows/Kerberos/Active Directory
Centrally managed user management with password policy (i.e. must change every three months
and must be secure password
Proactive network scanning for new hosts, out of date systems
Network monitoring for suspicious behavior
Incident response mechanisms (policies, manual, automated, etc.)
The above list represents the key items one should have in a policy. There are potentially other wide
reaching items one could have in a policy. Of course, its always important to balance factors such as
company size, risk analysis, cost and business impact when determining the type and breadth of a policy.
As mentioned above, a system analysis is typically a good starting point, followed by the business analysis.
While not obvious even very small companies should have some form of security policy, since all networks
can be targets regardless of their size.
Conclusions
With the increased number of threats to networks such as worms, viruses and clever hackers, security can
no longer be viewed as an option, even within private networks. Securing all equipment, including physical
infrastructure equipment such as UPS systems and HVAC systems, is critical to maintaining uptime and
seamless access to services. Providing and maintaining security across the enterprise typically means
increased administration. Historically, this has been the largest barrier to broad implementations of security.
Today, the amount of time spent repairing a network due to just a single worm or virus attack can easily be
greater than the upfront time to more adequately secure an enterprise. Fortunately, there are many options
in systems and software to increase the security of the network while reducing the overhead of managing
such systems. Even basic practices such as periodic software updates, locking down all devices and using
centralized authentication and secure access methods can go a long way to reducing risks. Institution of
appropriate security policies and frequent network audits further increase the overall protection of the
network.
About the Author:

Christopher Leidigh is the Director of Communications and Technology Research with APC based in
Rhode Island, USA. He has 18 years of programming and design experience in computer and
microprocessor systems with a current focus on communication systems, IP networking, security and
embedded systems research and design. He has been with APC for ten years leading the embedded
networking and management product line. He received a Bachelor of Science degree in Bio-Electrical
Engineering from Brown University. He is a regular speaker at the Embedded Systems Conferences in the
US and abroad as well as a member of the advisory board. Publications include the Journal of Physiology,
Communications Systems Design, Embedded Systems Programming and the EE Times.
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Fundamental Principles

White Paper #101

Figure 1 Security incidents by year CERT.ORG

Number of Incidents Reported

The people problem

Security, the big picture

Understanding different threats

Table 1 Summary of various threats with consequences

Internal \ External Threat Consequences

e-mail with virus

Could infect system reading email and subsequently

Could enter through unprotected ports, compromise

Web based virus

Could cause compromise on system doing browsing and

Web server attack

External to web servers

If web server is compromised hacker could gain access

External services such as web, email and ftp could

Network User Attack

Traditional border firewalls do nothing for this attack.

Physical security, protection on the inside

Partitioning and protecting network boundaries with firewalls

Figure 2 Simple firewall to network

Figure 3 Dual firewalls with DMZ

Basic Network Host Security

Username and password management

Use longer passwords with mixed numbers or symbols

Change passwords on a regular basis

NEVER leave default credentials in network equipment

Access control lists

Securing Access to Devices and Systems

User authentication for network devices

Table 2 Summary of major authentication protocols

Plaintext, memorized token

Uses hashes of passwords and time

MS-CHAP, PPP, APC Http, Radius

CHAP or straight passwords,

Backend for Telnet, SSH, SSL, Front end for

Cisco protocol, central authentication, some

Service authentication and authorization,

Kerberized applications like telnet, Microsoft

Centralized authentication methods

Figure 4 Windows Domain Controller

Securing network data with encryption and authentication

Table 3 Summary of major cryptographic algorithms

SSH, SNMPv3, SSL/TLS

SSH, SNMPv3, SSL/TLS

Hash, Message authentication codes

SSH, SNMPv3, SSL/TLS

Hash, Message authentication codes

SSH, SNMPv3, SSL/TLS

Secure Access Protocols

The SSH protocol

The SSL\TLS protocol

Best Practices for Network Security

Firewalls at all public-private network transit points

Version controlled and centrally deployed firewall rule sets

External resources placed in dual firewall, DMZ protected networks

All network hosts include centrally managed anti-virus software

All network hosts utilize central security updates