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Extending the Life of

Ageing Pipelines

Andrew Palmer and Associates

A member of the Penspen Group

Paul A Henderson,
Phil Hopkins
and
Andrew Cosham
of Andrew Palmer and Associates

Prepared for:
The Offshore Pipeline Technology
Conference USA 2001

Andrew Palmer and

Associates
40 Carden Place
Aberdeen
Scotland, U.K.
AB10 1UP
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ANDREW PALMER AND ASSOCIATES

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OPT USA 2001

EXTENDING THE LIFE OF AGEING PIPELINES

ABSTRACT
Many of our offshore pipelines are now either showing signs of age (e.g. corrosion), or are
approaching the end of their design life. This problem can be addressed by using a variety
of engineering methods to predict the remaining safe life of the pipelines. These methods
include both simple and complex fitness for purpose analyses, but must consider other
aspects of the care of an ageing asset, e.g. inspection and repair.
This paper presents a holistic view to pipeline life extension and describes the technologies
in use today, and the technologies needed in future to ensure safe, long life operation

INTRODUCTION
Offshore pipelines are expected to operate safely and securely in a variety of hostile
environments. At their start of life, given they are designed and constructed to recognised
standards, their day 1 safety and security will be excellent. However, as the pipelines age,
they will inevitably deteriorate or become defective, and hence an Operator must be able to
both assess the significance of this damage, and ensure that the pipelines do not fail as
they age. Failure does not necessary mean an escape of product from the pressure envelope,
it may be outwith a service limit. This is the whole life approach to pipeline design and
operation.
Additionally, an Operator may wish to extend the life of the pipeline; this can be achieved
by adopting methods of analysis that show the line is safe for an extended life.

0.16
0.14
0.12
0.10
0.08
0.06
0.04

41-45

36-40

31-35

26-30

21-25

16-20

11-15

6-10

0.02

1-5

Corrosion Spills/year/1000km

Figure 1 shows the oil spills/annum recorded in onshore oil lines in Western Europe. The age
of the pipeline is not a significant factor, provided it is inspected and maintained
correctly(1).

Age of Pipeline at Time of Spill

Figure 1. The Effect of Pipeline Age on Spills Caused by Corrosion

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Hence, we have clear evidence that pipelines can continue safely into later life, or even
extended life, provided we manage their integrity. This paper starts with a simple summary
of what pipeline integrity is, and how we manage our pipeline integrity. It then suggests
inspection strategies to check the pipelines integrity and then presents a holistic view of
the work required to extend pipeline life. and methods for assessing defects detected in
pipelines

WHAT IS PIPELINE INTEGRITY, AND INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT?

Pipeline integrity is ensuring a pipeline is safe and secure for the efficient transportation of
hydrocarbons (2,3). This not only includes the obvious physical and human aspects but also
protects the investment, operation and environment. It involves all aspects of a pipelines
design, management, inspection and maintenance. This presents an Operator with a complex
jigsaw to solve if they are to maintain high integrity while optimising available resources,
Figure 2.

Figure 2. The Pipeline Integrity Jigsaw

(4)

Pipeline integrity management is the management of all the elements of this complex jigsaw;
the management brings all these pieces of the jigsaw together for each specific pipeline
system and ensures their continued integration.
Pipeline Integrity Management Systems not only stipulate the requirements of the various
functions but also specifically identify the need for an integrity monitoring scheme for the
pipeline system. Integrity monitoring collates all the data from condition monitoring,
process control and production control to produce an overall review of the pipeline
condition, this is shown in Figure 3. No one technique can provide sufficient information to

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give the complete picture of the pipelines condition. The collection and analysis of all this
data is the ultimate deliverable required of the pipeline integrity monitoring scheme.

CONDITION MONITORING

PROCESS CONTROL

PRODUCT CONTROL

Leak

Corrosion

Atmospheric

Subsea

Internal

Process

Product

Chemical

Detection

Monitoring

Inspection

Inspection

Inspection

Data

Analysis

Injection

Annual Pipeline Review

Repairs

Modifications

Engineering

Atmospheric

Annual Status Report of

Pipeline Integrity

Subsea

Maintenance

Figure 3. Pipeline Integrity Monitoring Scheme

To give the true picture of the pipeline condition the integrity monitoring scheme must
identify those elements of the pipeline, which are at most risk to potential modes of failure.
To achieve this we adopt a Risk and Reliability Based Inspection Strategy.
Pipeline failures are usually related to a breakdown in a system, e.g. the corrosion
protection system has become faulty, and a combination of ageing coating, aggressive
environment, and rapid corrosion growth may lead to a corrosion failure. This type of failure
is not simply a corrosion failure, but a corrosion control system failure. Therefore, an
engineer must appreciate the system to prevent the failure; understanding the equation
that quantifies failure pressure is just one aspect. Figure 2 summarises the many aspects of
pipeline integrity that need to be appreciated to be able to manage a pipeline effectively
and safely.
Additionally, failures affect the as the shareholders investment as well the surrounding
people and environment, therefore an appreciation of the consequences of failure is
essential. This means an understanding of risk analysis.
The need to understand the many aspects of pipeline integrity means that a holistic
approach (Figure 2) to pipeline integrity training is needed. This approach will allow a
company to present a training course that will provide the engineer with all the necessary
skills to assess pipeline integrity(4) .

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OPT USA 2001

THE MOVE TOWARDS REGULATING AND STANDARDISING PIPELINE

INTEGRITY
REGULATION
In 2000Note 1, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) proposed regulations that will
require pipeline integrity validation through inspection, testing, and analysis of pipelines
that run through or near high consequence areas (HCAs). HCAs are defined as populated
areas, commercially navigable waterways, and areas that are unusually sensitive to
environmental damage.
The DOTs Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) now expects Operators of HCA pipelines to have
an integrity management programme that continually assesses and evaluates the integrity of
HCA pipelines. These programmes would be applied on the basis of either prescriptive
requirements from OPS or risk-based decisions made by the pipeline Operator.
The OPS do not consider the investment aspect. It is incumbent on the Operator to protect
the investment on behalf of the Partners and Shareholders of the pipeline.

STANDARDISATION OF PIPELINE INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT - API 1160

(5)

The American Petroleum Institute (API) is developing an industry consensus standard that
could provide a basis for a company's approach to satisfying the proposed DOT regulation.
This standard development initiative is titled "High Consequence Area Pipeline Integrity
Standard, API 1160." It is expected to be finalised in 2001. API 1160 gives guidance on
developing Integrity Management Programmes. An outline of the suggested API framework
is given in Figure 4.
Identify Potential
Pipeline Impact to
HCAs

Initial data gathering

and review
Initial Risk
Assessment
Develop Baseline
Plan
Perform
Inspection/Mitigation

Revise
Inspection/Mitigation

Evaluate
Program

Update Data

Reassess risk

Note 1. A final rule applying to hazardous liquid pipeline operators was issued in 2000; operators are
required to perform a baseline assessment of their pipeline system by e.g. smart pigs, hydrotesting, etc..
Baseline assessment must include identification of all pipeline segments, methods to assess integrity,
schedule for integrity assessments, and explanation of all risk factors. Additionally, operators must
maintain a written integrity management plan.

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Figure 4. API 1160 Approach to Integrity Management

These programmes must:
Identify & analyse all events that could lead to failure,
Examine the likelihood and consequences of potential pipeline incidents,
Examine and compare all risks,
Provide a framework to select and implement risk mitigation measures,
Track performance.
The programme starts with a good pipeline design and construction, satisfying all other legal
and code requirements, and:
It is flexible,
It is built on trained people, using defined processes,
It should be tailored to an operators needs,
An integral part is a risk assessment, and this is a continuous process,
It should be externally audited,
There is no best approach.
The above API 1160 approach is in agreement with approaches being adopted by other
pipeline companies around the world, and other regulators(6), although the above is often
referred to as risk management, rather than integrity management.

EXTENDING LIFE THROUGH BASELINE PLANNING AND SURVEYS

An Operator with an ageing asset who wants to determine extended life beyond initial
design limits and ensure future integrity must first of all conduct some type of baseline
survey against which the performance of the pipeline can be judged. This may be a smart pig
run, a review of operating records, etc. It is however important to recognise that an
accurate assessment depends on good quality data collected over the life of the pipeline.
Good quality data requires preparation and cleanliness of the pipeline. API 1160 again gives
guidance, and recent proposed legislation by the Railroad Commission of Texas is also
informative:
The baseline assessment should contain at least:
Identification of the pipelines & segments covered by the plan
A priority ranking of the pipeline/segments of each system based on an analysis of
risks
Assessment of pipeline integrity using at least one of the following methods
appropriate for each segment:
in-line inspection,
pressure test
direct assessment (e.g. coating inspection), or
other new technology.
Management methods for the pipeline segments which may include remediation or
increased inspections as necessary; and
Periodic reviews of the pipeline integrity assessment and management plan every 36
months or more frequently if necessary.
Clearly we will have to decide on an optimum plan. The following section shows how we can
assess the benefits of inspection methods using probabilistic methods.

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RISK AND RELIABILITY BASED INSPECTION STRATEGY

The aim of this strategy is to answer the questions of what, where, how and when to
examine or test pipelines in order to maintain the integrity of the pipeline.
To achieve this strategy a structured approach must be used to identify the hazards that
threaten the integrity of the pipeline, then analyse the risks associated with those hazards
and identify the inspection techniques and tools to report on those hazards. Those hazards
that are more onerous can be further analysed using reliability techniques.
Hence inspection will only be directed to those failure modes where change in the
degradation of the pipeline can be detected.
The structured approach to a risk and reliability based inspection strategy
Figure 5 and it can be seen that this is similar to the API 1160 approach.

(2)

is shown in

Review Pipeline Data

Identify all Failure Modes

Risk Analysis

Inspection Needs
Reliability Analysis

Risk Based Inspection

Assessment

Inspection Methods

Inspection Strategy
Inspection Programme
Reliability Based
Inspection Assessment

Inspection

Evaluate Results
Feedback

Figure 5. Risk and Reliability Based Inspection Strategy

RISK BASED INSPECTION

Review of Pipeline Data
It is, for example, important to understand the rate of degradation of a pipeline and to be
able to forecast future degradation. The better the data quality then the smaller the
associated uncertainties and hence a reduced perceived risk is achieved.
Typical information required is:

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OPT USA 2001

Design data
As-built data
Past and present operating conditions
Forecast operating conditions
Inspection data available
Loading and environmental data

Identification of all Failure Modes and Mechanisms

Dependent on the location over its length, the pipeline will be exposed to different hazards
with their associated frequency and consequence. For example dropped objects may be
more prevalent adjacent to platforms than at mid line or erosion be more prevalent at bends
rather than on straight sections.
To assist in the identification of all hazards and their potential to effect the integrity of
the pipeline, the pipeline is divided into the following sections:

Valves and fittings

Riser and Spool pieces
Safety zone
Mid-line
Shore approach

By adopting hazard identification analysis techniques all potential hazards affecting the
integrity of a pipeline can be identified. In conjunction, by using a simplified version of
fault tree analysis and event tree analysis the failure modes and mechanism respectively can
be identified.
Risk Assessment
For each failure mechanism/mode identified for each section of the pipeline system the
qualitative risk on the system is determined as follows:
Risk = Frequency or Probability of the event x Consequence of the event
Limit State may be approach used to define failure events as follows:

Major System Failure

Minor System Failure
Operability
Serviceability

By combining the assessed Probabilities and Consequence for each failure mode or
mechanism on each section of a pipeline the risk of failure is determined. This is presented
by Boston Square technique and gives a subjective number. It provides as a glance those
failure modes at low risk, the bottom left hand corner and those failure modes at high risk
which require immediate attention, the top right hand corner.

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Inspection Criticality Analysis

Having identified the high risk scenarios for each mode and mechanism on every section of
the pipeline the value of inspection is assessed. For example internal corrosion can be
monitored closely by inspection and measures taken to remedy the rate of decay. This
technique of inspection has a high value. Conversely the risk of trawl board impact cannot
be monitored by inspection as the event can occur immediately after inspection and
therefore this inspection technique has a low value.
Inspection Techniques and Equipment
Having determined the critical failure modes for which inspection can provide a good return,
the corresponding type of defects will be known. With this knowledge the critical defect
size that will pose a threat to the integrity of the pipeline can be determined.
Knowing the type and size of defects that can be tolerated the appropriate inspection
technique and associated equipment can be identified.
This process is repeat for all failure modes and mechanism identified for each pipeline
section.

RELIABILITY BASED INSPECTION

From the subjective list of risk assessment those modes and mechanisms that pose the
greatest threat to a pipeline system can be more accurately analysed. Using reliability
based inspection methods a quantitative value for probability of failure at present and also
over the remaining life of the pipeline system can be determined. Similarly a more detailed
analysis of the effects of different types of inspection techniques, equipment and
inspection intervals can be evaluated. Reliability based analysis is numerically intensive and
time consuming an should therefore be limited to only the most onerous failure modes and
mechanisms. To limit the uncertainties good quality data must be used.
Probabilistic Analysis
The statistics of the input parameters and the engineering models then determine, by
probabilistic analysis, the failure probability for each particular failure mode or mechanism
and the variation of this failure probability over time. Using the Monte Carlo simulation
method the predicted growth of defects over time can also be established.
Inspection Techniques and Equipment
Each different inspection method and its associated equipment will have different
capabilities of observing and reporting defects. These capabilities can alter the failure
probability of a pipeline that in turn may effect the inspection strategy in terms of the
inspection interval. The inspection capabilities that need to addressed are:

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Detection Limits
Probability of Detection
Sizing Accuracy
Repeatability
Locational Accuracy

INTRODUCING PROBABILISTIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR INSPECTION

The best approach to assessing the benefits of any inspection (e.g. a smart pig run) is to use
probabilistic methods that accommodate these uncertainties.
This approach requires the operator to maintain the pipeline below a specified failure
probability, i.e. the pipeline failure probability is not allowed to exceed a certain level
throughout the design life. Therefore, inspections are only undertaken when the failure
probability approaches this specified level, and the accuracy and reliability of the inspection
tool is included in the calculations, as it will affect failure probability.
The mathematics behind this probabilistic approach is beyond the scope of this paper, but
an example of the type of relationship can be illustrated on a pipeline with corrosion
problems when its fluid is both flowing, and stagnant.

Pf ( Pipeline) = 1 1 Pi _ flowing

where:-

Pf(Pipeline)
Pi_flowing
Nflowing
Pi_stagnant
Nstagnant

N flowing

+ 1 1 P
i _ stagnant

N stagnant

= probability, either Serviceability or Ultimate, of the failure

of the pipeline.
= probability, either Serviceability or Ultimate, for individual
defect failing under flowing conditions.
= Number of individual defects under flowing conditions.
= probability, either Serviceability or Ultimate, for individual
defect failing under Stagnant conditions.
=
Number of individual defects under Stagnant conditions.

Two types of possible failures are considered; an ultimate failure where the pipeline
reaches some condition where it is unsafe e.g. a rupture causes a loss of containment of the
fluid, or a serviceability failure, where the pipeline reaches a condition where it cannot be
operated effectively, e.g. stressing above the pipelines yield strength.
The information needed for this calculation needs an estimate of the defects expected,
which will require both estimation and expert judgement.
When the effect of a smart pig inspection is included in the above Equation it is essential
not only to have an estimate of the expected defect lengths and depths (so that an
inspection is not undertaken when these defects may fall below the threshold limit of the
inspection tool), but also the inspection tools threshold limits, and tolerances on readings.
We will now look closer at probabilistic methods and pigging.

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Using Probabilistic Methods to Determine Which Smart Pig to Use

We can again illustrate the effect of differing pigs, using this probabilistic approach. If we
take an example of a 36 inch diameter trunk line with a nominal wall thickness of 28.6 mm
(11/8 inches).
We assume two different pigs, and want to evaluate which of these pigs to use on our
pipeline, which has an active corrosion mechanism. The two pigs are:
1.

2.

Pig 1. The detection threshold of corrosion depth of this tool for general corrosion
defects i.e. defect length > 3t, is quoted as 0.1t, where t is the nominal wall thickness.
These correspond to ~2.9 mm for any defect 85.7mm in length in this particular
pipeline. The accuracy of this tool is quoted as 0.1t, corresponding to 2.9mm.
Pig 2. This tool has a quoted standard detection threshold depth of 1 mm, and a
quoted accuracy of 0.5 mm.

10
9
8
7

Low (5%) Prediction

Mean (50%) Prediction
Upper (95%) Prediction

Pig 2

Pig 1

4
3
2
1
0

Pipeline Age

Figure 6. Selecting the Most Suitable Intelligent Pig Using Probabilistic Methods
It is important to note that the above detection and accuracy limits are based on present
inspection technology. Over time, inspection technology will be expected to improve results
in the lower threshold limits and report with greater accuracy. There is also the possibility
that new inspection methods may be developed.
Figure 6 shows the time dependency of a predicted corrosion depth over time on the
sensitivity of the two intelligent inspection tools. Three corrosion probability levels are
presented in this example: 5%, 50%, and 95% percentiles. These predictions span the likely

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corrosion rates, and resulting depths. The mean predicted corrosion growth is given by the
50% percentile.
Pig 2 has a higher probability of detecting defects earlier, than Pig 1, due to its smaller
detection threshold. It can be seen that Pig 2 will detect corrosion very early, and there is
little likelihood of Pig 1 detecting any corrosion in this pipeline until well into the life of the
pipeline.
This difference can be quantified by analysing the probabilities calculated. Figure 6 does
not show the results of this calculation, but Pig 2 is nearly 30 times more likely to detect
corrosion early in the life of this pipeline, and then about 2 times more likely as the pipeline
ages.
Figure 6 is purely an assessment of the pigs capabilities, in terms of detectability.
Operators have also to consider the track record of a pig company; does the company have
a good record for conducting the surveys on time, to cost, and do they deliver the results to
the specified times and quality. However, most importantly, to allow the pig to perform to
its specification it is vital that the pipewall is clean.
Having collated this information a decision can be made on which inspection technique will
give the most meaningful results based on:
How does the technique influence the failure probability of the pipeline?
What are the predicted number and sizes of defects in the pipeline?
How much does the inspection cost?
Based upon these factors the most appropriate inspection technique can be chosen
Using Probabilistic Methods to Set an Inspection Interval
The inspection interval depends on the following basic variables
1. Variation of the failure probability over time
2. Acceptance of failure probability
3. Rate of defect growth
4. Choice of inspection technique
Normally we use deterministic methods to set inspection intervals. The inspection interval is
set when a defect depth reaches a level determined using failure calculations. The input into
these calculations is usually lower bounds, or conservative estimates, with a suitable safety
margin on the final calculation of failure. This means that we have a simple go/no go
situation and the inspection interval is set deterministically, when the predicted defect
depth exceeds a predicted acceptable defect size.
When using probabilistic methods, we use the same failure equations, but we input
distributions for corrosion rates, etc.. Consequently, we obtain a failure probability from
our calculations. This means that we need to inspect when the predicted failure probability,
exceeds a predicted acceptable failure probability.
The concept of "acceptable" failure probability is a complex issue, and deals with many
aspects. It has received some attention in the literature, but much more work needs to be
undertaken in this area. Table 1 shows some proposed acceptable corrosion failure

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probabilities, published for offshore pipelines (7), by the SUPERB project (which formed
the basis of section in the DNV offshore code DNV OS F101).
OFFSHORE
Limit States

ACCEPTABLE FAILURE PROBABILITIES (per year)

SAFETY ZONE

OPEN WATER

Ultimate

10-5 - 10-6

10-3 - 10-4

Serviceability

10-1 - 10-2

10-1 - 10-2

Table 1. Acceptable Failure Probabilities

(7)

The consequences of failure are controlled in the above table by introducing zones in
offshore pipelines. These have the effect of limiting the number of people in the vicinity of
the pipeline, and hence reducing the number of people effected by a possible failure. This
gives a measure of an acceptable qualitative risk level.
Using these type (Table 1) of acceptable failure probabilities, we can calculate the most
suitable time to inspect. Figure 7 shows an example of this calculation, using the pipeline
from Figure 6, and an acceptable or target failure probability of 10-6.

1
0.1
0.01
0.001
0.0001

Failure Probability: Lower Limit

Failure Probability: Upper Limit
Acceptable Limit

1E-05
1E-06
1E-07
1E-08
1E-09

Acceptable Limit
Inspection

1E-10

Pipeline Age
Figure 7. Setting the Time of Your First Intelligent Pig Inspection Using Probabilistic
Methods
It is not usually appropriate to set the timing of a second inspection, because of the
necessity to include the findings of this first inspection in the calculation of the second
inspection timing.
The inspection strategy is therefore one where the pipeline system is maintained below the
maximum failure probability throughout its design life. This is achieved by matching the

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correct inspection technique and inspection interval with the expected defects to be found.
It is important to feed the results of any inspection back into the system to fine tune the
future inspection campaigns.
By following this strategy greater confidence is achieved in the condition of the pipeline
system and savings can be made in inspection programmes.

STEPPED APPROACH TO THE ASSESSMENT OF AGEING PIPELINES

A review of the pipeline design has to be undertaken to evaluate its fitness for purpose and
demonstrate its future integrity. The review can be restricted to those areas of the
original design that have changed if there is historic data on the performance of the
pipeline. This is when the benefit of good record keeping is rewarded (8).
CHANGES TO DESIGN CONDITIONS
The changes can be categorised as:
Errors or Unknowns at the Design Stage
Revised Design Predictions Based on Operational Knowledge
Extended Design Life
Errors or Unknowns at the Design Stage
During the design process an attempt is made to consider all the issues that affect the
design. However, misunderstandings may sometimes occur during the design or improved
understanding of some phenomena may now exist. Similarly issues may arise during the
operational life of the pipeline that were unknown during the design phase.
Examples of these could be:
Seabed conditions
Thermal expansion
Spanning
Upheaval buckling
Revised Design Predictions Based on Operational Knowledge
Certain predictions would have been made at the design stage. These predictions can be
characterised by a scarcity of initial data for the design such as environmental data,
product data or external loading. With the benefit of hindsight actual data will be available
which will permit an assessment of the pipeline service life as well as more accurate
projected data for future use.
Predictions of product fluid with regard to volumes and composition would initially have been
based on well tests. Subsequently real data would have been collected thereby providing a
revised starting point for future predictions. The transported fluid would have varied in
terms of pressure, temperature, flowrate and composition. These changes have an impact on
the rate of internal corrosion, thermal expansion and suitability of pipeline fittings.

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An example of changed loading would be fishing gear interaction loads of dropped object
loads. New gear and larger bollard pull boats mean that there is the potential for loads
greater than at the original design stage to be experienced.
Extended Design Life
Some failure mechanisms are time dependent. A pipeline is therefore conservatively
designed for finite life, usually based on the predicted field life. Where there is an
extension to predicted life of the pipeline, caused by, say new fields being tied back, then
the time dependent mechanisms need to be reassessed. The availability of operational data
may allow conservatively predicted degradation rates and safety factors to be replaced by
real data and realistic predictions of future degradation.
Areas of unsupported pipe, such as risers or freespans, will allow some degree of movement
and will, therefore attract a fatigue loading. Fatigue damage is time dependent and the
increase in the anticipated life must be assessed against remaining fatigue life.
Some materials, such as concrete weight coating, degrade with time and this degradation
has to be assessed, in this case against the stability of the pipeline.
Most corrosion protection systems are based on an anti-corrosion coating and cathodic
protection afforded by sacrificial anodes. The systems are designed such that the anodes
provide sufficient protection against poor application and degradation of the coating
systems for the design life. An extension to the design life requires that the remaining life
of the anodes and the condition of the anti-corrosion coating be assessed.

ASSESSING DEFECTS AND DAMAGE IN AN AGEING TRANSMISSION

PIPELINE SYSTEM
Any reported defects in our pipeline can be assessed using fitness-for-purpose methods.
However, the urgency of the analysis and any resulting repair depends upon:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.

defect severity: location, depth, length, orientation,

financial/strategic value of pipeline,
threat to environment & public relations,
regulatory/legal/insurance considerations,
failure/further failures consequences.

This Section does not cover detailed assessment methods available to assess defects in
pipelines, as they have been published extensively for over thirty years (e.g. 9-12). However
it should be emphasised at the outset that these type of assessments are only as good as
the data available as inputs; poor quality data should not be used. Also, most of these
methods, although ostensibly simple, do require expert supervision.
This Section deals with the general methods of assessment.

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ASSESSMENT METHODS
There are many documents and publications that assist pipeline operators to assess the
significance of defects in pipelines. Most have their basis in Reference 9, and they are
summarised in (for example) Reference 10.
It should be noted that not all defects are pipewall defects. Some will be structural
anomalies (e.g. buckles or unsupported spans) that will require design/structural analysis.
Therefore, a fitness-for-purpose assessment may involve extensive engineering and require
design support.
Deciding On the Correct Level of Assessment
Having decided that a defect assessment can be conducted, it is now necessary to
determine the level of detail and complexity that is required.
Different levels of defect assessment, ranging from simple screening methods (e.g. the
ASME B31.G) to very sophisticated finite element stress analyses or probabilistic/risk
methods are available. The methods used depend on the defects detected, or the type of
pipeline, or the Operator requirements. Figure 8 summarises the differing levels of defect
assessments, and the required data. Generally, fitness-for-purpose assessments are
conducted up to Level 3. If defects still remained unacceptable at this stage, a higher level
assessment, or repair would be necessary.
The higher levels may require risk analyses. Risk is a function of the probability of failure
and the consequences of failure. Such analyses are becoming increasingly popular (6), but are
also very complicated. Similarly, limit state analyses, which also work out the probability of
failure, are also becoming popular (13).

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DATA
DEFECT
SIZE & TYPE

STAGES
LEVEL 1
QUALITATIVE e.g. Company or Code
Workmanship Levels

Accept

AS ABOVE, PLUS PIPE

DATA, PIPE PRESSURE

Accept

LEVEL 2 QUANTITATIVE e.g. ASME B31.G CODE

Simple Stages

Reject

Reject

AS ABOVE, BUT
ADDITIONAL DEFECT,
PIPE & MATERIAL DATA

LEVEL 3 QUANTITATIVE e.g. Fracture Mechanics Calc

Accept

Reject

Reject

AS ABOVE, PLUS PIPE

SAMPLE OR MATERIAL
PROPERTIES

Accept

Reject
LEVEL 4a EXPERIMENTAL Model/ Full Scale Testing

Expert Levels

LEVEL 4b QUANTITATIVE Numerical Analysis

Reject Reject
Accept

Reject
AS ABOVE, PLUS PLUS
DISTRICUTIONS OF
PIPE, MATERIAL &
DEFECT DATA

LEVEL 5 PROBABILISTIC
(Using Limit State Analysis),
or Risk Analysis

Accept

Reject

REPAIR

ACCEPT

Figure 8. Differing Levels of Fitness-For-Purpose Assessments

If an Operator requires a risk analysis, then both probability and consequences of failure
need to be considered in a probabilistic and detailed manner. Usually a fitness-for-purpose
analysis of defects does not entail a risk analysis, although due account of the consequences
of failure will be taken in a qualitative manner, and the recommended safety factor will
reflect this. The fitness-for-purpose assessment will usually involve a deterministic
assessment of the defects, on a go/no go basis. If there is a problem with the defects, or
with defects with a significant consequence on failing, then a risk analysis may be
recommended.

Paul A. Henderson

17 of 19

October 2001

ANDREW PALMER AND ASSOCIATES

www.penspen.com

OPT USA 2001

CONCLUSIONS
We now have methods and technologies to:
-

assess risk of failure of ageing pipelines

identify and apply appropriate inspection techniques
set economic inspection intervals to prevent failures
limit risks to an acceptable level
quantify the present integrity
predict the future integrity, with continued engineering effort

Operators can now safely extend the life of ageing pipelines by having a planned and
structured approach to managing the integrity of these pipelines to ensure continued safe
and efficient transportation for hydrocarbons.

Paul A. Henderson

18 of 19

October 2001

ANDREW PALMER AND ASSOCIATES

www.penspen.com

OPT USA 2001

REFERENCES
1.
2.

3.

4.

5.
6.
7.

8.
9.
10.

11.

12.
13.

14.

Anon., 25 Years of CONCAWE pipeline Incident Statistics, Volume 6-Number 2October 1997.
Henderson, P.A., Engineering and Managing a Pipeline Integrity Programme, Risk &
Reliability & Limit State in Pipeline Design & Operation Conference, Aberdeen, UK,
14 - 15th May 1996
Henderson, P.A., Offshore Pipeline Operation,Maintenance and Inspection,
Offshore Pipeline and Subsea Engineering, IBC Training Course, London, UK, 2 4th
October 2000.
Hopkins,P., Pipeline Integrity - Training Our Engineers And What They Need To
Know, PEMEX Int Pipeline Exhibition and Conference,, Congreso Internacional de
Ductos, Mrida, Yucatn, Mexico, 14 16 Noviembre del 2001, Paper E3875
Anon, High Consequence Area Pipeline Integrity Standard, API 1160, USA,
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Hopkins, P., Risk And Integrity Management Of A Transmission Pipeline, 2nd Int.
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Jiao, G, et al, The Superb Project: Wall Thickness Design Guideline for Pressure
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Henderson, P.A., Good Pipeline Record Keeping and Its Use In Cutting Pipeline
Costs, Offshore Pipeline Technology Conference, Paris, France, February 1990.
Kiefner, J. F. et al., 'Failure Stress Levels of Flaws in Pressurised Cylinders', ASTM
STP 536, pp 461-481, 1973.
Hopkins, P., Cosham, A., How to Assess Defects in Your Pipelines Using Fitness-forPurpose Methods, Advances in Pipeline Technology 97 Conference, Dubai, IBC,
Sept. 1997.
Anon., 'Guidance on Methods for the Derivation of Defect Acceptance Levels in
Fusion Welds', BSI 7910, British Standards Institution, London, 1999. (Update of
PD 6493).
Anon., Recommended Practice for Fitness for Service, API 579, 2000.
Hopkins, P., Haswell, J., The Practical Application of Structural Reliability Theory
and Limit State Concepts to New and In-service Transmission Pipelines, Int.
Seminar on Industrial Applications of Structural Reliability Theory, ESReDA, Paris,
France, October 1997.
Zimmermann, T., et al Target Reliability Levels for Pipeline Limit State Design,
International Pipeline Conference - vol1, ASME, p.111, 1996

Paul A. Henderson

19 of 19

October 2001