Freedom of Expression, Libel and National Security

Baguio Midland Courier v. CA, G.R. No. 107566, November 25, 2004

[G.R. No. 107566. November 25, 2004]

BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT

AND GENERAL MANAGER, OSEO HAMADA AND CECILLE
AFABLE, EDITOR-IN-CHIEF, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS (FORMER SP, 6TH DIVISION) AND RAMON LABO,
JR., respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated 07 January 1992, and the Resolution, dated 29 September
1992, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), dated 14 June 1990,
which dismissed herein private respondents claim for damages.
[1]

[2]

Culled from the records are the following facts:

During the time material to this case, petitioner Oseo C. Hamada (Hamada) was the
president and general manager of the Baguio Printing and Publishing Co., Inc., which
publishes the Baguio Midland Courier, a weekly newspaper published and circulated in
Baguio City and other provinces within the Cordillera region. He was also, at that time,
the business manager of said newsweekly. Petitioner Cecille Afable (Afable) was
Baguio Midland Couriers editor-in-chief and one of its columnists who ran the column
In and Out of Baguio.
On the other hand, private respondent Ramon L. Labo, Jr., was among the
mayoralty candidates in Baguio City for the 18 January 1988 local elections. Prior to
this, in 1984, private respondent had already embarked on a political career by running
for a seat in the former Batasang Pambansa during which time he appointed a certain
Benedicto Carantes (Carantes) as his campaign manager. It appears that as part of the
campaign propaganda for private respondent in the 1984 local elections, political ads
appeared in the various issues of Baguio Midland Courier and campaign paraphernalia
were printed by Baguio Printing and Publishing Co., Inc., on his behalf.
[3]

Apart from his political endeavors, private respondent was also an active member of
the civic group Lions Club having been elected governor of said organization in 1984,
1986, and 1988.

Before the 18 January 1988 local elections, petitioner Afable wrote in her column a
series of articles dealing with the candidates for the various elective positions in Baguio
City. Quoted hereunder are excerpts from said articles, as well as the respective dates
when they were published in the Baguio Midland Courier

January 3, 1988
. . . Of all the candidates for mayor, Labo has the most imponderables about
him, people would ask, Can he read and write? Why is he always talking
about his Japanese father-in-law? Is he really a Japanese Senator or a barrio
kapitan? Is it true that he will send P18 million aid to Baguio? Somebody
wanted to put an advertisement of Labo in the Midland Courier but was
refused because he has not yet paid his account of the last time he was a
candidate for Congress. We will accept all advertisements for him if he pays
his old accounts first.
[4]

January 10, 1988

I heard that the Dumpty in the egg is campaigning for Cortes. Not fair.
Some real doctors are also busy campaigning against Labo, because he has
not also paid their medical services with them. Since he is donating millions
he should settle his small debts like the reportedly insignificant amount of
P27,000 only. If he wins several teachers were signifying to resign and leave
Baguio forever, and Pangasinan will be the franca-liqua of Baguio.
[5]

Claiming that the aforequoted portions of petitioner Afables column were tainted with
malice, private respondent instituted separate criminal and civil actions for libel against
herein petitioners. In a resolution, dated 26 December 1988, the Department of Justice
dismissed the criminal case due to insufficiency of evidence while the civil suit was
raffled off to RTC, Branch 6, Baguio City.
[6]

In the complaint for damages, private respondent alleged that in her 03 January
1988 and 10 January 1988 columns, petitioner Afable made it appear that he (private
respondent) could not comply with his financial obligations; that Yuko Narukawa Labo
(Narukawa Labo), his co-plaintiff in the case before the trial court, was accused of
misrepresenting her social status to the general public thereby subjecting her to public
ridicule; that the subject articles were written solely for the purpose of destroying his
reputation, integrity, and personality as well as that of Ms. Narukawa Labo; and that said
articles were false, untrue, libelous, and published with evil intent. Private respondent
and Ms. Narukawa Labo, therefore, prayed for moral damages, exemplary damages,
litigation expenses, attorneys fees, and costs of litigation.

Prior to filing their respective answers, petitioners filed separate motions to

dismiss upon the ground that there was failure to comply with Section 6 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay
Law, which required the referral of certain disputes to the barangay conciliation process
before they are filed in court. Petitioner Hamada also claimed that the complaint stated
no cause of action.
[7]

[8]

On 05 April 1988, private respondent and Ms. Narukawa Labo filed a motion with
leave of court to amend and admit attached amended complaint. Impleaded in the
amended complaint was the Baguio Printing and Publishing Co., Inc., as the publisher
of the Baguio Midland Courier.
[9]

[10]

In its Order, dated 12 April 1988, the trial court denied petitioners motions to
dismiss. According to the trial court, as one of the parties to this case was a
corporation, P.D. No. 1508 was not applicable as said statute pertained only to actions
involving natural persons. In the same order, the trial court granted private respondent
and Ms. Narukawa Labos motion to admit their amended complaint and directed the
petitioners to file their answers.
[11]

In their answer, petitioners Baguio Midland Courier and Hamada denied that
petitioner Afables 03 and 10 January 1988 articles were libelous. They also claimed
that per their companys records, private respondent still owed them a certain sum of
money for the political ads and campaign paraphernalia printed by Baguio Printing and
Publishing Co., Inc., during private respondents 1984 campaign, and that the 03
January 1988 column did not accuse Ms. Narukawa Labo of misrepresenting herself
before the public. Moreover, they asserted that petitioner Afables write-ups were fair
comments on facts and reports that were of public interest as private respondent was a
mayoralty candidate at that time. Finally, petitioners Baguio Midland Courier and
Hamada interposed counterclaims for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys
fees, and costs.
[12]

In her answer, petitioner Afable also denied that the quoted portions of her 03 and
10 January 1988 column were libelous, insisting that they were devoid of malice and at
most contained valid and timely doubts. She also contended that the contents of her
column were protected by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the
press and that the same were privileged as they dealt with a public figure. Petitioner
Afable likewise sought counterclaims for moral damages, exemplary damages, and
attorneys fees.
[13]

[14]

During the pre-trial of the case on 31 March 1989, the parties agreed to limit the
issues to the following: (1) whether the published items were libelous, false and
malicious; (2) whether plaintiffs below were entitled to damages; and (3) whether

petitioners (defendants therein) were entitled to damages as claimed in their respective

counterclaims.
On 17 July 1989, private respondents counsel manifested before the trial court that
Ms. Narukawa Labo would no longer testify in support of the allegations in the amended
complaint as far as they pertain to her. In addition, the 03 January 1988 article was no
longer offered in evidence by the private respondents counsel thus, the trial court
interpreted this development to mean that the same ceased to be a part of this suit.
The court a quo thereafter proceeded with the trial of the case taking into consideration
only the 10 January 1988 column.
[15]

In the trial that ensued, private respondent testified that he felt that the phrase
dumpty in the egg referred to him, interpreting the same to mean someone who is a
failure in his business undertakings. Private respondent asserted that such allegation
was baseless as he was successful in his various endeavors abroad. With regard to the
remainder of the article, private respondent insisted that petitioner Afable made it
appear to the public that he owed P27,000 in unpaid medical expenses while in truth, he
could not remember having been hospitalized.
[16]

[17]

Subsequently, private respondent presented Dr. Pedro Rovillos, his fellow Lions
Club member, who testified that he understood the term dumpty in the egg to mean a
zero or a big lie. He further testified that the 10 January 1988 article painted private
respondent as a balasubas due to the latters alleged failure to pay his medical
expenses.
[18]

[19]

On the other hand, the petitioners presented Ms. Sylvia Lambino (Lambino), Baguio
Printing and Publishing Co., Inc.s, bookkeeper and accountant, as their first witness.
According to Lambino, Baguio Printing and Publishing Co., Inc., sent several statements
of accounts and demand letters to private respondent pertaining to his unpaid
obligations amounting to P27,415 which he incurred during his campaign for
the Batasang Pambansa in 1984. She further testified that despite the repeated
demands to private respondent, the aforementioned obligations remained unpaid.
[20]

[21]

Thereafter, petitioner Hamada himself took the witness stand. In his testimony,
petitioner Hamada stated that as the president and general manager of the Baguio
Printing and Publishing Co., Inc., and as the business manager of the Baguio Midland
Courier, he only dealt with the business and advertising aspects of their newspaper
business and that the contents of the articles appearing in the pages of the Baguio
Midland Courier were overseen by the rest of the staff. In addition, petitioner Hamada
also corroborated the earlier testimony of Lambino with respect to the outstanding
obligations of private respondent.
[22]

On 20 December 1989, Carantes took the witness stand for the petitioners.
Carantes testified that he was appointed as private respondents campaign manager
when the latter ran for assemblyman in Batasang Pambansa in 1984 and that in his
capacity as campaign manager, he hired the services of a certain Noli Balatero to
oversee the printing of campaign paraphernalia and publication of political
advertisements of private respondent. Carantes further testified that the P27,415
indebtedness to Baguio Printing and Publishing Co., Inc., had remained unpaid because
the campaign funds private respondent entrusted to him were already fully exhausted.
Besides, according to Carantes, the campaign materials printed by the Baguio Printing
and Publishing Co., Inc., and political advertisements published in Baguio Midland
Courier were no longer covered by the agreement he had with Balatero. However,
these materials were printed and published upon the instructions of one Atty. Conrado
Bueno who acted as private respondents unofficial campaign manager during the said
election. Carantes thus concluded that private respondent was supposed to pay for
these campaign materials and advertisements before or after the 1984 election.
[23]

[24]

For her part, petitioner Afable acknowledged having written the 10 January 1988
article but denied that the same was malicious and intended to destroy private
respondents reputation and integrity; that the phrase dumpty in the egg referred to
Horato Aquino who was among the candidates for the 1988 local elections in Baguio
City; and that the P27,000 pertained to private respondents unpaid obligation to Baguio
Printing and Publishing Co., Inc., the exact amount of which was P27,415.
In its decision, dated 14 June 1990, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack
of merit. According to the trial court, the article in question was privileged and
constituted fair comment on matters of public interest as it dealt with the integrity,
reputation, and honesty of private respondent who was a candidate for local elective
office at that time.
This decision of the trial court was, however, reversed by the appellate court in a
decision, dated 07 January 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads:

Construed in the light of the facts and the principles on the matter, and under
the plain language of the applicable law, We hold that the evidence was
sufficient to prove by preponderance of evidence that the defendants were
GUILTY of committing libel on the person of the complainant Ramon Labo, Jr.
and should be liable to pay damages. The decision of the trial court is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the defendants are hereby ordered to pay
the plaintiffs as follows:
1)

The amount of P200,000.00 as moral damages;

2)

The amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;

3)

The amount of P50,000.00 for attorneys fees plus costs of litigation.

[25]

In brushing aside the conclusion reached by the trial court, the Court of Appeals
noted that private respondent was, at the time the article in question was published, not
a public official but a private citizen seeking an elective office and petitioner Afables
article was intended to impeach his honesty, virtue or reputation and to make him
appear in the eyes of the public as unfit for public office.
The appellate court also declared that the malicious nature of the article may be
deduced from the fact that it was published in the Baguio Midland Courier a few days
before the scheduled local elections and from the style and tone of writing employed by
petitioner Afable. According to the Court of Appeals, while the entire article was
composed of ten paragraphs and referred to several unnamed personalities, it was only
in the disputed paragraph where a specific individual was named herein private
respondent. The appellate court therefore concluded that the phrase dumpty in the
egg could only refer to private respondent and the claimed P27,000 indebtedness is
imputable solely to him.
Petitioners thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the
aforementioned decision of the Court of Appeals but these were denied through a
resolution of the appellate court, dated 29 September 1992. Thus, petitioners now
come before us raising the following issues:
[26]

[27]

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING

THAT THERE IS GOOD REASON AND REASONABLE GROUND TO
ASSUME THAT THE PUBLICATION OF THE LIBELOUS ARTICLES WAS A
MANIFESTATION OF THE SPOUSES (DEFENDANTS OSEO HAMADA and
CECILLE AFABLE) THINKING ON THE MERIT OR DEMERIT OF
CANDIDATES FOR BAGUIO CITY MAYOR FOR THE JANUARY 18, 1988
ELECTIONS SINCE THEY ARE NOT SPOUSES NOR RELATED TO ONE
ANOTHER.
II

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

CONCLUDING THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT RAMON LABO, JR. WAS THE
ONE REFERRED TO AS THE DUMPTY IN THE EGG.

III

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

CONCLUDING THAT THE PORTION OF THE SUBJECT ARTICLE WHICH
STATES THAT SINCE HE IS DONATING MILLIONS HE SHOULD SETTLE
HIS SMALL DEBTS LIKE THE REPORTEDLY INSIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF
P27,000.00 REFERS TO AN INDEBTEDNESS OF LABO TO THE REAL
DOCTORS AND NOT TO THE BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER.
IV

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING

THAT THERE WAS MALICE WHEN THE DEFENDANT-APPELL(ANT)
CECILLE AFABLE INVITED PUBLIC ATTENTION ON LABOS PRIVATE LIFE
BEING A CANDIDATE FOR THE HIGHEST PUBLIC OFFICE IN THE CITY
OF BAGUIO OR THAT THE DEFENDANTS WERE ACTUALLY NOT
MOTIVATED BY GOOD AND JUSTIFIABLE ENDS IN PUBLISHING SAID
ARTICLES ABOUT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
V

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF MERIT.
[28]

In a manifestation dated 10 November 1993, we were informed of the death of

petitioner Hamada. In our resolution of 08 December 1993, we resolved to substitute
the estate of Oseo C. Hamada, for the deceased petitioner Hamada.
[29]

The Courts Ruling

We shall first address the contention of petitioners with regard to alleged errors of
facts committed by the Court of Appeals. While we adhere to the principle that findings
of fact of the appellate court are binding and conclusive upon us, such adherence has
not prevented this Court from setting aside the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
when circumstances so warrant. In the recent case of The Insular Life Assurance
Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals and Sun Brothers & Company, this Court had the
occasion to enumerate the exceptions to the general rule as regards the conclusiveness
of the findings of fact of the appellate court, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings
[30]

[31]

of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8)
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of facts are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.
[32]

In the case at bar, except for numbers (1), (6), (9), and (10), all of the above
exceptions are present.
First. Contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals that private respondent was
the only candidate named in petitioner Afables column on 10 January 1988, said article
actually dealt with the other named candidates for the 1988 local elections in Baguio
City and Benguet. A perusal of said article would likewise reveal that it contained not
only the opinion of petitioner Afable regarding private respondent but also her take on
the other issues involving the other candidates. It would be grave error to impute malice
on the subject article based upon a finding that private respondent was unduly singled
out by petitioner Afable in her column. In this regard, we dismiss the following
conclusion of the appellate court:

. . . Malice may also be inferred from the style and tone of the
publication. The entire column on In and Out of Baguio on January 10 was
composed of ten paragraphs and each paragraph featured or referred to a
single person without knowing the person; however, in the second paragraph
which mentions the non-payment of P27,000.00, the complainant [private
respondent herein] was specifically mentioned in name; hence, no amount of
reasoning would erase the fact that the dumpty in the egg was referring to
Labo. (Emphasis supplied)
[33]

Second. From the abovequoted portion of the Court of Appeals ruling, it is daylight
clear that the appellate court assumed that since the name of private respondent and
the phrase dumpty in the egg appeared in the same paragraph, the epithet referred
only to the former. We cannot, however, subscribe to such simplistic deduction. A
perusal of the paragraph in question easily reveals that the person alluded to by
petitioner Afable in her use of dumpty in the egg was someone who was campaigning
for a certain Atty. Reynaldo Cortes - one of the mayoralty candidates in Baguio City at
that time. If, indeed, dumpty in the egg referred to private respondent, it follows that
he campaigned for his own opponent during the 1988 local elections. Although such

gracious attitude on the part of private respondent towards his political opponent would
have been commendable, nevertheless, the same is totally contrary to human
experience. On this score, we uphold the following argument of petitioners:

Clearly, the private respondent was hallucinating when he claims himself as

the person referred to as the Dumpty in the egg. Otherwise, he would be the
one making a mockery out of himself for campaigning against himself and in
favor of his political opponent. Had he done that, it is doubtful whether he
could have won as City Mayor of Baguio in the 1988 elections, which he
actually did.
[34]

Third. In its assailed decision, the Court of Appeals likewise highlighted the fact that
petitioners Hamada and Afable were husband and wife and went on to conclude, albeit
erroneously, that (t)here is good reason and reasonable ground to assume that the
publication of the libelous article was a manifestation of the spouses thinking on the
merit or demerit of candidates for Baguio City mayor for the 18 January 1988
elections. Again, we disagree in this conclusion of the appellate court. The records of
this case clearly establish the fact that petitioners Hamada and Afable were siblings and
not spouses in that during his testimony on 19 December 1989, petitioner Hamada
referred to petitioner Afable as his sister. The Court of Appeals supposition, therefore,
that the article subject of this petition reflected the stance of the husband and wife
team of the petitioners utterly lacks factual support.
[35]

[36]

Having addressed the factual issues of this case, we shall now proceed to discuss
its substantive question of whether the 10 January 1988 article of petitioner Afable was
defamatory.
It is a basic precept that in cases involving claims for damages arising out of alleged
defamatory articles, it is essential that the alleged victim be identifiable although it is not
necessary that he be named. It is enough if by intrinsic reference the allusion is
apparent or if the publication contains matters of descriptions or reference to facts and
circumstances from which others reading the article may know the plaintiff was
intended, or if extraneous circumstances point to him such that persons knowing him
could and did understand that he was the person referred to.
[37]

[38]

In the case of Borjal v. Court of Appeals, this Court declared that [i]t is also not
sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed,
but it must be shown that at least a third person could identify him as the object of the
libelous publication. Plainly, private respondent has the bounden duty to present
before the court evidence that a third person could easily identify him as the person
libeled. In this case, private respondent has utterly failed to dispose of this
responsibility.
[39]

[40]

To be sure, private respondents lone witness, Dr. Rovillos, was able to offer his own
understanding of what the phrase dumpty in the egg meant. However, during his
cross-examination, he failed to sufficiently explain before the court a quohow he arrived
at the conclusion that the term referred to private respondent, thus:
[41]

Now, you said you read this first sentence that says: I heard that the Dumpty in
the egg is campaigning for Cortes. Then you gave us what you thought was the
meaning of Dumpty in the egg. You did not tell us, however, whether you thought
that was Ramon Labo or somebody else. Could you tell us, Doctor, when you
heard that, you understood that to be Ramon Labo?

That is what I understand.

You understood that to be Ramon Labo because a dumpty in the egg means a big
zero. Why? You consider Labo a big zero that is why you understood him to be
referred to when Cecille C. Afable said dumpty in the egg?

That is what I understand.

You also said a dumpty in the egg is a big lie. You consider Ramon Labo a big lie
that you also thought he was referred to as dumpty in the egg?

No, sir.

In fact, Ramon Labo, in your assessment, is the exact opposite of a dumpty [in] the
egg?

That I cannot answer.

So, from your honest perception, some this this Labo (sic) is a big zero or a big
lie that is why you cannot say he is the exact opposite?

Maybe.[42]

This Court finds Dr. Rovilloss proposition as to what dumpty in the egg meant is
insufficient to support any finding of liability on the part of the petitioners as he was
unable to offer an iota of justification for his conclusion that it pertained to private
respondent.
The Court of Appeals also maintained that petitioners could not invoke public
interest in their defense. It ruled that [a]n abuse of the freedom of speech and the
press should not be tolerated and encouraged if the article published transcends the
limit of decent, fair and impartial news reporting and instead becomes a bludgeon or a
scalpel to brow beat or slice into shreds a private citizen, of his rights to his good
name.
[43]

We do not agree.
Concededly, private respondent was not yet a public official at the time the 10
January 1988 article was published. Nevertheless, this fact does not remove said
article from the mantle of protection guaranteed by the freedom of expression provision
of the Constitution. Indeed, as early as 1909, in the case of United States v. Sedano,
this Court had recognized the publics right to be informed on the mental, moral, and
physical fitness of candidates for public office.
[44]

Subsequently, in the leading case of New York Times Co. vs. Sullivan, the US
Supreme Court expounded on this principle, viz:
[45]

. . . It is of the utmost consequence that the people should discuss the

character and qualifications of candidates for their suffrages. The importance
to the state and to society of such discussions is so vast, and the advantages
derived are so great, that they more than counterbalance the inconvenience of
private persons whose conduct may be involved, and occasional injury to the
reputations of individuals must yield to the public welfare, although at times
such injury may be great. The public benefit from publicity is so great, and the
chance of injury to private character so small, that such discussion must be
privileged.
...
In such a case the occasion gives rise to a privilege, qualified to this extent:
any one claiming to be defamed by the communication must show actual
malice or go remediless. The privilege extends to a great variety of subjects,
and includes matters of public concern, public men, and candidates for office.
[46]

Plainly, the rule only applies to fair comment on matters of public interest, fair
comment being that which is true, or which if false, expresses the real opinion of the
author based upon reasonable degree of care and on reasonable grounds. The
principle, therefore, does not grant an absolute license to authors or writers to destroy
the persons of candidates for public office by exposing the latter to public contempt or
ridicule by providing the general public with publications tainted with express or actual
malice. In the latter case, the remedy of the person allegedly libeled is to show proof
that an article was written with the authors knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not. While the law itself creates the presumption
that every defamatory imputation is malicious, nevertheless, the privileged character of
a communication destroys said presumption. The burden of proving actual malice shall
then rest on the plaintiff, private respondent herein.
[47]

[48]

[49]

In the present case, private respondent was unable to prove that petitioner Afables
column was tainted with actual malice. Verily, the records are replete with evidence
that, indeed, private respondent incurred an obligation which had remained unpaid until
the time the questioned article was published. While counsel for private respondent
persistently harped at the difference between the P27,000 which appeared in petitioner
Afables column and the P27,415 actual indebtedness of private respondent to Baguio
Printing and Publishing Co., Inc., the minuscule difference in the amount fails to
establish reckless disregard for truth on the part of petitioners. As held by this Court in
the Borjal case

Even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error,
inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or
misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and
debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not
be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or
imperfections in the choice of language. There must be some room for
misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only by giving them much
leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as critical
agencies in our democracy.
[50]

Lastly, we hold that petitioner Afables article constitutes a fair comment on a matter
of public interest as it dealt with the character of private respondent who was running for
the top elective post in Baguio City at the time. Considering that private respondent
assured his would-be constituents that he would be donating millions of his own money,
petitioner Afables column with respect to private respondents indebtedness provided
the public with information as regards his financial status which, in all probability, was
still unbeknownst to them at that time. Indeed, the information might have dissuaded
some members of the electorate from voting in favor of private respondent but such is
the inevitable result of the application of the law. The effect would have been adverse to
the private respondent but public interest in this case far outweighs the interest of
private respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated 07 January 1992, and its Resolution, dated 29 September 1992, denying
reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the trial courts Decision of 14
June 1990 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED