Microsoft-Yahoo Search Business Case

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Analyzing decision of the

European Commission

Microsoft | Yahoo! Search Business


Competition, Strategy, and Institutions

Yulia AN | Yulia MIRONOVA

Decision of European Commission


Market overview
Positive effects
Negative effects
Post-transaction analysis
Conclusion

European Commission

Parties
Microsoft

Yahoo!

Online Services Business division


Internet search platform, Bing.
Online search advertising
platform, adCenter.

Online web-wide algorithmic


search
Search advertising businesses
including online search
advertising platform Panama.

European Commission

Subject

10-year exclusive license to


Yahoo's search technologies.
Yahoo internet search and search
advertising staff.
Microsoft as the exclusive internet
search and search advertising
provider used by Yahoo.
12% of the search revenues
generated on Yahoos and its
partners' websites during the first
five years of the agreement will
go to Mirosoft.
Rest 88% will go to Yahoo as a
traffic acquisition cost.

European Commission

Decision

Horizontal Merger approved

European Commission

Market overview
Positive effects
Negative effects
Post-transaction analysis
Conclusion

Market overview

Organic
web search

Search-based
advertising

Non-search-based
advertising

Contextual

Contextual

Non-context

Text

Text Display

Display

Adapted from European Commission (2008)

Market overview
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2010

2011

Paid search
Source: ZenithOpen

2012
Display

2013
Classified

2014

Market overview

Advertisers
Users

Market overview

g:
in
d
id
b
n
io
t
c
u
A
e
ic
r
P
d
n
o
c
e
S
Generalized

aint
r
s
n
o
c
e
ic
r
p
o
Zer

Market overview

g
in
m
o
h
ilt
u
M
~

g
in
m
o
h
le
g
in
S
~

Market overview

Production costs

Switching costs

Market overview

Production costs
Highly specific fixed costs
Negligible variable costs
Sunk

Switching costs

Market overview

Production costs
Highly specific fixed costs
Negligible variable costs
Sunk

Hardware (USD 1 000 mln)


Human capital (USD 1 000 mln)
Server infrastructure
IP patents
Algorithm development
Algorithm update
R&D

Switching costs

Market overview

Production costs
Highly specific fixed costs
Negligible variable costs
Sunk

Switching costs
High

Low

Market overview

Production costs
Highly specific fixed costs
Negligible variable costs
Sunk

Switching costs
High
Credence
good

Low
One click
away

Market overview

Production costs
Highly specific fixed costs
Negligible variable costs
Sunk

Switching costs
High
Credence
good

Network externalities

Low
One click
away

Market overview

Production costs
Highly specific fixed costs
Negligible variable costs
Sunk

Switching costs
High
Credence
good

Network externalities
High entry barriers

Low
One click
away

Market overview

Production costs
Highly specific fixed costs
Negligible variable costs
Sunk

Switching costs
High
Credence
good

Network externalities
High entry barriers
High market concentration

Low
One click
away

Market overview
UK

France

Germany

92%

94,76%

95,69%

Ireland

Italy

Spain

94,67%

97,54%

96,96%

Google
Yahoo! Bing
Other

Digital Clarity. (2011).


Yahoo & Bing Search
Engine Merger. Available
at http://www.digitalclarity.com/blog/searchengines/yahoo-bingsearch-engine-merger/

European Commission
Market Overview

Positive effects
Negative effects
Post-transaction analysis
Conclusion

Positive effects

Microsoft
Economies of scale

Yahoo!
Reduction of costs

Positive effects

Microsoft
Economies of scale

Yahoo!
Reduction of costs

Rationalisation of operational costs


Stronger competitor to Google
Greater value to advertisors

European Commission
Market overview
Positive effects

Negative effects
Post-transaction analysis
Conclusion

Users
Advertisers

Publishers
Distributors

Merger

Advertisers
Merger

Advertisers
Merger
Increased cost per click (CPC)
increased bidder density for
particular keywords

Users

Merger

Users

Merger
reduction of variety of choice
degradation of organic search
unilateral effect

Publishers

Merger

Publishers

Merger
increased competition among publishers
reduced competition between the remaining
advertising platforms
lower prices paid for publishers web space

Distributors
Merger

Distributors
Merger
reduced competition between search platforms
for distribution agreements
increased Microsofts ability to leverage its market
power in areas other than online advertising

European Commission
Market overview
Positive effects
Negative effects

Post-transaction analysis
Conclusion

Post-transaction analysis

100,00%
90,00%
80,00%
70,00%
60,00%
50,00%
40,00%
30,00%
20,00%
10,00%
0,00%

AOL, Inc.

8,9%

18,7%

19,3%

10%

64,7%

July 2009

Ask Network
Microsoft sites
Yahoo! sites

67,6%

Google sites

April 2014

Total U.S. search market


share Home & Work
Locations (2009, 2014).
ComScore Explicit Core
Search Share Report.
comScore qSearch

Post-transaction analysis

37%

40%
30%

22%

20%
10%

10%

14%

13%

0%
-10%

Impressions

Clickthrough
Rate
-10%

Cost-Per-Click

-20%
Yahoo! Bing Network

U.S. Percentage
change of the main
search market
indicators of Yahoo!
Bing Network and
Google on a yearover-year basis (Q4
2011 Q4 2012)

Google

Marin Software. (2012).


Online Advertising
Report, OctoberDecember 2012

Post-transaction analysis
Consumer
surplus under
normalized
network benefit
parameters

Iurkov, V. (2013).
Competition, mergers
and exclusive dealing in
two-sided markets with
zero-price constraints:
The case of search
engines. Universita
CaFoscari Venezia.

Post-transaction analysis
Total welfare
under
normalized
network benefit
parameters

Iurkov, V. (2013).
Competition, mergers
and exclusive dealing in
two-sided markets with
zero-price constraints:
The case of search
engines. Universita
CaFoscari Venezia.

Post-transaction analysis

A merger between two platforms leads to a slight


decrease in consumer surplus and total welfare, but
to an increase in total platform profits.
However, as t , consumer surplus and total
welfare tend to be equal under no merger and merger
configurations.
Iurkov, V. (2013). Competition, mergers and
exclusive dealing in two-sided markets with
zero-price constraints: The case of search
engines. Universita CaFoscari Venezia.

European Commission
Market overview
Positive effects
Negative effects
Post-transaction analysis

Conclusion

Discussion

References
Photography of Microsoft Office by Jeff Wong, www.jeffwongdesign.com/2013/10/microsoft-office-interior

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