Saudi Arabias Foreign Policy on Iran and the

Proxy War in Syria:

Toward a New Chapter?
Benedetta Berti and Yoel Guzansky
Benedetta Berti is a research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
in Tel Aviv. She specializes in terrorism and political violence in the Middle East, radical
Islamic organizations, and Palestinian and Lebanese politics. She holds a PhD from the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Dr. Berti is the author of the
recently published Armed Political Organizations: From Conflict to Integration and
co-author (with Joshua L. Gleis) of Hezbollah and Hamas: A Comparative Study.
Yoel Guzansky is a research fellow at the INSS, specializing in Iran, GCC states, and Gulf
Security. Mr. Guzansky joined the INSS after coordinating work on the Iranian nuclear
challenge at the National Security Council in the Prime Ministers Office. He is a graduate
of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv University, and a doctoral candidate in
international relations. Since joining the INSS, he has written and edited monographs and
published policy papers, op-eds and peer-reviewed work in academic journals.
Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in recent years have been characterized
by religious-ideological antagonism, competing political and geostrategic interests,
and an ongoing competition for regional hegemony.1 With the onset of the Arab
Awakening, the hostility between the two states has intensified, especially as the
regional revolutionary wave arrived in Bahrain and Syria, creating a direct clash
between Saudi and Iranian interests and policies.
Moreover, the revolutionary potential of the Arab Awakening, along with what
Riyadh perceived as Iranian attempts to consolidate regional achievements and
influence, largely roused Saudi Arabia out of its relative passivity in foreign
policy and led it to attempt to promote a new inter-Arab alignment as a potential
counterweight to the perceived Iranian threat, which seemed to loom ever larger
on the horizon.
Since the beginning of the 2011 Middle Eastern revolutionary wave, the Saudis
generally known for their role as a pro-status quo and reactionary regional
powerhave at times acted as a revolutionary force, while at others have played
the role of a counter-revolutionary one, depending on their interests. For instance,
Saudi Arabia was heavily involved in the crisis in Yemen and engineered the deal
that led President Ali Abdullah Saleh to step down (in exchange for immunity
from prosecution). The Gulf Kingdom also played an important role in building
regional political support for external intervention against Muammar Qadhafis

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regime in Libya. On the other hand, Saudi efforts as a counter-revolutionary

force were no less substantial, with the country employing military force to crash
protests and keep the al-Khalifa regime in place in Bahrain. The kingdom also
played a reactionary role when it came to Egypt. At first, in the early days of
the revolution, Riyadh supported Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Later, the
Saudis allocated billions in aid to the military regime, both before and after the
brief reign of Muslim Brotherhood President Mohamed Morsi. This firm support
for counter-revolutionary forces in Bahrain and Egypt can be contrasted with
Saudi activism in the case of Syria, where the country has assumed a remarkably
anti-status quo position and has focused on supporting the military and political
opposition to President Bashar al-Assad and his regime. 2
These interesting variations in Saudi foreign policy with respect to the Arab
Awakening are best explained in terms of the deeply troubled relationship
between Saudi Arabia and Iran. In recent years, Saudi Arabia has perceived Iran
as the main security and political threat in the region for several reasons. The
first relates to Tehrans desire to promote a security system in the Gulf, free of
foreign involvement, and to contain the Iranian presence in the areas it perceives
as being part of its natural sphere of influence. In this sense, Irans pursuit of
nuclear weapons and the potential impact it could have on shaping the regional
agenda also threatens Saudi Arabia. From the Saudi perspective, Irans ambitions
and its military capabilities might be used to further Iranian influence over the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and over the Shiite
minority population in the Saudi kingdom.3
This current security and political conflict also builds on complex historical
relations and deep ideological animosity between the two states. The ideological
rivalry is centered on competing claims of Islamic authenticity and legitimacy,
as well as on preexisting clashes between Irans Shiite Islam and Saudi Arabias
Wahhabist Sunni Islam, with its historical reluctance to accept Shiite Islam.
The convergence of this deep ideological and historical rivalry with current
competing geostrategic and political interests helps explain Saudi and Iranian
strategy and interests in Syria and their role in fueling sectarianism in the region.
Saudi Foreign Policy on Syria: The Proxy War? (201113)
Saudi Arabias relations with Syria, Irans main Middle Eastern and Arab ally,
quickly deteriorated following Assads violent suppression of the initially peaceful
political protests there, which began in March 2011, and with the subsequent
civil conflict that followed. Saudi Arabias current policy with respect to Syria
constitutes a significant change in the kingdoms attitude toward the Assad regime.

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Benedetta Berti and Yoel Guzansky

Indeed, after the severe rift between the two states in the wake of the assassination
of Lebanese Prime Minister and Saudi national and protg Rafik al-Hariri in
2005, the kingdom shifted from an initial strategy of isolation to one of relative
openness with respect to Syria.4 After unsuccessfully attempting to isolate Syria
between 2005 and late 2007, Riyadh decided to change its tune in 2008. This
change of attitude was strengthened after the May 2008 Doha Agreement,5 which
created a national unity government in Lebanon. Until then, that country had
served as the main arena for the Saudi efforts to weaken and isolate Syria. After
2008, the Saudis went from isolation to engagement in an attempt to drive a wedge
between Damascus and Tehran. The SyrianSaudi reconciliation efforts became
especially prominent following Israels Operation Cast Lead (December 2008
January 2009), and culminated in King Abdullahs historic trip to Damascus in
October 2009, during which the parties pressed Lebanon to break the political
impasse and create a national unity cabinet to govern the country.6 In the following
two years, SaudiSyrian communication continued, such as on the issue of the
UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Yet relations between the two countries were
never truly upgraded to a solid political alliance, partly because Riyadhs attempts
to break up the Axis of Resistance and downgrade the SyrianIranian alliance
never materialized.
Since then, relations between Syria and Saudi Arabia have cooled off gradually,
with the protests in Syria sparking a more severe rift between the two parties.
Indeed, as the unrest in Syria grew and the regimes brutality in handling the
mobilizations became clearer, Saudi Arabia swiftly shifted from an initially
cautious stance to one of outright condemnation, with the kingdom recalling its
ambassador to Riyadh as early as August 2011.7
Riyadhs anti-Assad stance, along with Saudi support and direct military
intervention to quell Shiite social and political protests in Bahrain, was evidence
that the kingdom had decided to stand up to what it perceived as growing Iranian
influence in the Arab Middle East.8 By weakening the Assad regime, the Saudis
hoped they would reduce the power of the Shiite Axis.9 Indeed, since the
beginning of the Arab Awakening, the kingdom has acted consistently on this
assumption. Together with Qatar, Saudi Arabia has taken action in order to further
weaken the IranianSyrian axis. The two nations, for example, cooperated to
suspend Syrias membership in the Arab League and continue to provide financial
and military support to various elements within the Syrian opposition.10
These measures are in keeping with the approach Saudi Arabia has adopted since
the beginning of the Arab Spring, which is both more assertive than in the past
and more forceful in its attempt to reshape the map of alliances in the region
in accordance with its interests. Historically, Saudi Arabia has preferred a more

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nuanced and largely reactionary approach to confrontation. Even on Syria, the

Saudis would have preferred that their historical ally, the United States, support
the anti-Assad opposition and deeply resent it for not having stepped up to the
plate and led the efforts to weaken Assad and Iran.11
Yet, when the much-awaited American silver bullet failed to materialize, Saudi
Arabia, with its deep coffers and rich Sunni Islamic influence, decided to assume a
more prominent regional role and lead the efforts to support the anti-Assad camp.
Indeed, as noted, while Riyadhs previous attempts at distancing Assad from the
Iranian axis were unsuccessful, the rebellion against him gave the Saudis a new
opportunity to attempt to weaken Iranian influence in the area by his ouster.
Saudi Arabia and its allies began to adopt a tough stance vis--vis Assad in the
summer of 2011, when the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) called on Syria to
stop its deadly suppression of citizens. This was followed by an unusually sharp
statement by King Abdullah, who demanded that Syria stop the killing machine.12
This new tone resulted from the Saudi kings frustration with the refusal of the
Alawite minority regime (which he more than likely considers heretical) to go
along with Saudi attempts at mediating between the warring parties, as well as
from the realization that Syrian opposition achievements could lead to a regime in
Syria that would tip the regional balance of power against Iran.
Since then, Saudi Arabia, alongside the United Arab Emirates and Qatar (which
has since cut back on its involvement), has been aiding all rebel forces it regards
suitable for the anti-Iranian cause within the Syrian rebel camp. The strategic
goal of overthrowing Assad (and weakening Iran and Hizbullah) has been indeed
spearheading Saudi Arabias foreign policy. Its aim is to strengthen elements
among the rebels, so that if and when Assad falls, those elements will gain control
over what remains of the Syrian state. To that end, Saudi Arabias role has not just
been focused on providing material and financial assistance, but also on offering to
boost the status and capabilities of the political opposition to Assad, and especially
the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. This is
the case, though Saudi funding has by no means been directed exclusively toward
the National Coalition and the Free Syrian Army; indeed, money from Saudi
Arabia in particular and the Gulf in general has been channeled to virtually all the
main opposition groups.
Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia has been officially opposed to funding the more
radical sectors of the opposition, and it has designed both Jabhat al-Nusra and
the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS, now Islamic States or IS) as terrorist
entities since March 2014.13

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Indeed, the kingdom is suspicious of groups such as ISIS. Although belonging

to the same Islamic sect, ISIS views the Gulfs ruling families as illegitimate. A
recent map released by the group indicates the GCC lands it intends to claim.
This is worrisome for Saudi Arabia, which is also concerned about the growing
sectarianism within its borders and the potential increased appeal of local jihadists.
In the early summer of 2014, Saudi officials arrested sixty-two suspects, including
thirty-five Saudi nationals, accused of being part of an ISIS cell that was planning
to assassinate officials of the regime and to target government installations.
At the same time, this policy has not prevented private donations from the Gulf
States, notably Kuwait and the UAE, to reach the more radical Sunni rebel groups.
This has caused further radicalization and fragmentation within the rebel ranks
in a rampant competition for funds and influence that has strengthened the more
radical elements among the anti-Assad supporters.
In addition to directly assisting anti-Assad forces, Saudi Arabia has been calling
for greater international pressure against Assad, while encouraging the US to take
a more active role. For instance, when the Assad regime reportedly used chemical
weapons in August 2013, the Arab Gulf countriesled by Saudi Arabiatried
to persuade Washington that the Assad regime had crossed the red line set by
President Obama in August 2012 and again in March 2013, and that military
intervention was the most appropriate response to such violation.
According to The Wall Street Journal, Saudi Arabian intelligence presented the
US with proof in February 2013 that the Syrian regime had already resorted to
chemical weapons.14 However, American reluctance to get involved in Syria has
caused the Gulf States in general and Saudi Arabia in particular to question the
ability of the UStraditionally their main defense providerto deliver. Indeed,
numerous analysts in the Gulf have been relying on Washingtons manifest interest
in staying out of the Syrian conflict as a sign of its diminishing regional influence.
It was even reported that the Saudi king, frustrated with US policy in the region
and especially with the lack of intervention in Syria and the rapprochement with
Iran, sent Obama a message saying that Americas credibility was on the line if it
let Assad prevail.15
The Saudis more muscular regional influence also extends to the political situation
in Lebanon, a country in which Saudi Arabia has historically been politically and
economically invested. Recently, Riyadh reportedly offered to provide $3 billion
in aid to the Lebanese Armed Forces, as part of its effort to preserve influence in
the country.16 Not surprisingly, Hizbullah has been rather critical of the increased
Saudi investment in the Lebanese army, with the group asserting that Saudi Arabia
has been orchestrating an unprecedented intelligence campaign, led by the Saudi

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prince Bandar bin Sultan, to cripple Hizbullahs organizational infrastructure,

target its assets, and weaken its political position within the Lebanese political
arena.17
New Year, New Policy: Retreat or Rapprochement? (2014)
By the spring of 2014, an analysis regarding the chances of yet another dramatic
shift in Saudi regional policy started to emerge. Simply put, the assessment was that
Saudi Arabia had started to come to terms with the reality of the Syrian battlefield
and with Assads slow and steady tactical victories.18 In short, the Syrian regime
managed to improve its position on the battlefield through a number of important
victories: first the battle of Qusayr in the summer of 2013 and then the battles for
the Qalamun area and Homs in the first months of 2014. These were all stepping
stones to securing a safe corridor between Syria and Lebanon and establishing a
link between the Syrian capital and the Alawite areas in the northwestern coastal
areas of the country. Accordingly, with the regime improving its odds of survival
and with the main groups within the opposition still deeply divided and cornered
into simultaneously battling the rise of radical groups like ISIS as well as the
regime, many observers predicted a reversal in Saudi policy. This could mean an
attempt at a more conciliatory strategy aimed at bridging preexisting differences
with Iran.
Signs of these strategic adjustments included a number of conciliatory statements
toward Iran, beginning with the May 2014 declaration by Saudi Foreign Minister
Prince Saud al-Faisal that his Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Javad Zarif, could
visit Riyadh anytime he sees fit.19 In addition, the removal of key proponents of
the aggressively anti-Assad Syria policy, such as former Intelligence Chief Prince
Bandar bin Sultan and former Deputy Defense Minister Prince Salman bin
Sultan, was also taken as a sign of policy recalibration. 20
The invitation to visit Saudi Arabia, and the generally more courteous tones of
the exchanges between Saudi Arabia and Iran, are significant because they point
to the attempt of the two main ideological and geostrategic rivals in the Middle
East to maintain open channels of communication, if only for tactical reasons. In
addition, the timing of the invitation seems to further point to a mutual interest in
mitigating tensions and preventing an open confrontation.
Although Saudi Arabia and Iran are engaged in a struggle to shape the balance
of power in the Middle East, they are both seeking to keep their struggle
covert through the use of soft power, inter alia, through mutual incitement and
psychological warfare by means of radio and television networks, and through the
funding of domestic opponents and proxies. For example, Iran has some influence

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among the kingdoms Shiites, while Saudi Arabia has ties with the Baluches and
the Arab minority in Khuzestan. Meanwhile, economic and diplomatic channels
remain open.
Increased communication between the parties is taking place against the backdrop
of the possible deal between Iran and the West on the nuclear issue. Riyadh is less
concerned by the technical details of the Iranian nuclear program than by the
specter of strong USIranian relations resulting from a permanent agreement,
which would strengthen Irans posture in the Gulf region. In Riyadhs analysis,
an AmericanIranian rapprochement would also facilitate Washingtons intended
disengagement from the region, further complicating the Saudi position vis--vis
the looming Iranian threat and representing an incentive to improve bilateral
relations. From a GCC perspective, the growing unrest and chaos in Iraq may
help Iran in its potential grand bargain with the US, by creating common
ground between the parties and by providing Washington with yet another reason
to deepen its dialogue with Tehran.
In this context, it does make sense for both sides to endeavor to manage the
deep-seated rivalry and keep the channels for dialogue open. Yet, despite these
minimalist policy objectives, it seems unlikely that either Iran or Saudi Arabia
will manage to pursue more maximalist bargains or compromise. This is especially
true when seeking a common strategy to solve the current Syrian impasse and
plan for the day after. Here, the chances of finding a formula that would satisfy
both sides remain slim, because for both countries the events in Syria are to a
large extent a zero-sum game. The civil war has reached the point at which Iran
and Saudi Arabia will have a hard time retreating from the positions they have
presented and the (contradictory) commitments they have made to the respective
sides.
So, for the time being, the IranianSaudi conversation has not honed in on a
common approach to Syria, nor has it led to a significant change in strategy by
either party. Even though there are no Saudi illusions about a sweeping victory
in Syria, support for the anti-Assad opposition has not been withdrawn. The
kingdom is all too aware of the advantage in weaponry, organization, and external
support enjoyed by Assad and his allies. However, the Saudis hope the support
they provide will tip the scales in their favor, bleeding their adversaries financially
and militarily, with no significant direct cost to the kingdom.21 To this end, while
Saudi Arabia is worried about the long-term role and plans of ISIS, it would
not object to seeing Iran bogged down fighting on two fronts: Syria and Iraq
respectively (with Iranians painfully aware of this Saudi preference, heightening
animosity between the parties).

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Yet, the Saudi calculation may underestimate the dangerous potential and regional
ramifications of the worrisome rise of radical elements operating in Syria and Iraq.
The risk that some of these groups may plan to operate in the Gulf and could
therefore upset stability between Shiite and Sunni communities in Iraq, Kuwait,
and the Saudi kingdom itself cannot be discounted.22
Tensions over the current policy are heightened by internal conflicts between
parties favoring stability and antiIranian hardliners within different regimes in
the Gulf. Along with many in the Arab world, hardliners believe that the overthrow
of the Assad regime could restrain Tehran and restore Iran to its natural size,
hopefully without leading to a frontal confrontation between Iran and the Saudis.
This confrontation has been avoided until now.
Yet not everybody in the Gulf believes that overthrowing Assad and weakening
Iran should be done by aggressively investing in and funding the opposition. There
is indeed a more cautious, pro-stability camp that has been increasingly alarmed
at the possibility that by funding fighters abroad, they might be also fueling the
growth of extremist and radical groups such as ISIS.23 That group has become a
concrete threat to the kingdom, with its ability to attract new recruits from the
region and globally, along with its growing financial resources and experience on
the battlefield. Moreover, the prospects of a new generation of mujahideen returning
home and perpetrating terrorist attacks in the Saudi kingdom and across the Gulf
is very worrisome to Riyadh.
Therefore, the rise of ISIS and the expected disintegration of Iraq add another
layer to the already complex SaudiIranian relations. It is difficult to tell what Gulf
leaders view as the bigger threat: the spread of ISIS or Irans growing influence in
the region. Meanwhile, it seems as if they are attempting to find a way of dealing
with both issues.
With the Saudis testing Iranian resolve to the limit, despite the kingdoms inferior
demographic and geopolitical position with respect to Iran and its allies, cornered
as it is by a vast Sunni majority yet more than eager to fight,24 it is unclear how and
when this bloody deadlock will be resolved.
Looking forward, it is possible to see how tactical cooperation between Iran and
Saudi Arabiafor example on the issue of Lebanese presidential elections and
the current failure of the country to elect a successor to Michel Sleimanmay
occur, whereas longer-term, substantial strategic cooperation may still prove
elusive. Yet, as the cost of financing and keeping the Syrian war going continues
to escalate, and as the shared hope of containing the conflict to Syria is shattered
by the advance of ISIS in Iraq and by the growing regional instability, both parties

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may indeed begin to weigh the expected long-term gains of vanquishing their foe
in Syria against the substantial long-term costs of securing such an elusive victory.
The translation of this realization into policy may be what is needed to move from
minimalist communication to a more significant strategic shift.
Notes
Paul Aarts, and Joris Van Duijne, Saudi Arabia after USIranian dtente: Left in the
Lurch, Middle East Policy, XVI:3 (2009), p. 70, www.mepc.org/journal/middle-eastpolicy-archives/saudi-arabia-after-us-iranian-detente-left-lurch.
2
Nasser Chararah, Hezbollah escalates rhetoric against Riyadh, Al Monitor,
December 10, 2013, www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/12/hezbollah-escalatesrhetoric-saudi-arabia.html.
3
Vali Nasr, When the Shiites rise, Foreign Affairs, LXXXV:4 (2006), 59.
4
Benedetta Berti, Lebanons Quest for Independence: Between Fragmentation,
Political Instability and Foreign Intervention, Religion, Education, and Governance
in the Middle East: Between Tradition and Modernity, Sai Felicia Krishna-Hensel (ed.)
(London, 2012).
5
That agreement established a national unity government in Lebanon and sought to
find a consensus candidate for the presidency of the country.
6
Berti, op. cit.
7
Jim Muir, Saudi Arabia recalls ambassador to Syria, BBC website, August 8, 2011,
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14439303.
8
Mehran Kamrava, The Arab Spring and the Saudi-led Counterrevolution, Orbis,
LVI:1 (2012), 10103.
9
Adam Entousand, Sioban Gorman, Behind Assads Comeback, a Mismatch in
Commitments. The Wall Street Journal, December 31, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10001424052702303453004579292543464208138.
10
Assad: Our Battle With Saudi Is Open-Ended, Al Akhbar, November 30, 2013,
http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/17763.
11
Herman F. Elits, Saudi Arabias foreign policy, Diplomacy in the Middle East: The
International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers, L. C. Brown (ed.) (London, 2004),
23840.
12
Adrian Blomfield, Syria unrest: Saudi Arabia calls on killing machine to stop,
The Telegraph, August 8, 2011, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/
syria/8687912/Syria-unrest-Saudi-Arabia-calls-on-killing-machine-to-stop.html.
13
Lori Plotkin Boghardt, Saudi Funding of ISIS, Washington Institute, Policywatch
2275, June 23, 2014, www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/saudifunding-of-isis.
14
Adam Entous, Nour Mallas, and Margaret Coker, A Veteran Saudi Power Player
Works To Build Support to Topple Assad, The Wall Street Journal, August 25, 2013.
15
Ibid.
1

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Anna Barnard, Saudis Grant to Lebanon Is Seen as Message to US, The New York
Times, January 6, 2014, www.nytimes.com/2014/01/07/world/middleeast/saudis-grantto-lebanon-is-seen-as-message-to-us.html?_r=0.
17
Chararah, op. cit.
18
See Paul Pillar, Iran and Saudi Arabia: Rapprochement on the Horizon? National
Interest, May 15, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/paul-pillar/iran-saudi-arabiarapprochement-the-horizon-10469.
19
Glen Carey and Dana El Baltaji, Saudi Foreign Minister Says Invited Iran
Counterpart to Visit, Bloomberg website, May 13, 2014, www.bloomberg.com/
news/2014-05-13/saudi-foreign-minister-says-invited-iran-counterpart-to-visit.html.
20
F. Gregory Gause, III, SaudiIranian Rapprochement? The Incentives and the
Obstacles, March 17, 2014, www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2014/03/17-iranksa-rapprochement-gause.
21
Joby Warrick, Syrian conflict said to fuel sectarian tensions in Persian Gulf,
Washington Post, December 19, 2013, www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/syrian-conflict-said-to-fuel-sectarian-tensions-in-persian-gulf/2013/12/18/
e160ad82-6831-11e3-8b5b-a77187b716a3_story.html.
22
Elizabeth Dickenson, Playing with Fire: Why Private Gulf Financing for Syrias
Extremist Rebels Risks Igniting Sectarian Conflict at Home, Saban Center for
Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution, December 6, 2013, p. 6, www.brookings.
edu/research/papers/2013/12/06-private-gulf-financing-syria-extremist-rebelssectarian-conflict-dickinson.
23
Ibid, pp. 1820.
24
Doyle McManus, Syria and the perils of proxy war, Los Angeles Times, January 12,
2014, http://articles.latimes.com/2014/jan/12/opinion/la-oe-mcmanus-column-proxywar-syria-20140112.
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