Dilemmas for US Strategy

US Options in Syria
David S. Sorenson
Abstract: This article considers the military choices for the United
States as it seeks both to terminate the Syrian civil war on favorable
terms and to contain the conflict within Syria's borders. However,
few military options promise a reasonable chance to influence the
Syrian civil war itself. Thus, America should focus its military and
other policy instruments on containing the crisis. That is also a complex problem, but a worse one would be the Syrian civil war spreading to the larger eastern Mediterranean region.

he United States has important interests in the Eastern

Mediterranean region and because Syria is a pivotal country
in that area, American national decisionmakers must consider
whether and how to use military power to defend those interests. The
horrifying moral costs of the Asad regime, and the danger of a failed
or jihadist Syrian state, make the ongoing Syrian conflict harmful to US
and regional partner country interests. The other danger is the possibility
the conflict will increasingly spread to Syrias neighbors. The human cost
alone is staggering: over 117,000 dead, hundreds of thousands wounded,
over six million displaced, ruined cities, half the population in need of
food, and two instances of chemical weapons use. However tragic the
war is, there is very little assurance the United States could, through direct
intervention in the Syrian civil war, stop or slow the destruction. Given
the intensity of the civil war, smaller military measures may not only fail
to make much difference, but may initiate escalation. The United States
should rule out direct intervention to stop the fighting, and instead,
concentrate on holding the fighting to Syria proper, as much as possible.

American Interests

US eastern Mediterranean security objectives include sustaining

regional stability, avoiding havens for terrorists, preventing weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, supporting Israeli security,
encouraging economic growth, and promoting democratization, though
many would quibble with the exact order.1 The United States must try
to prevent the Syrian civil war from extending beyond its source and
destabilizing the region. Moreover, as the conflict between Islams
largest sects, Sunna and Shia, escalates, it is clearly important to limit
religious conflict, which can spread rapidly, and cause poles of religious
authority, such as Iran, to gain influence. It is also in Americas interest
to terminate major internal wars in the region if it has the means and
ability to do so, and at an acceptable cost.

1Given the fate of fledgling democracies in the Arab world, democracy advocates may well
reconsider its desirability as an early outcome of a political transition.

David S. Sorenson is Professor

of International Studies at
the Air War College, and the
author of three books on
the Middle East, including
Introduction to the Modern Middle
East (forthcoming in 2014),
and three other books on
US national security issues,
along with numerous articles
and papers. He has a Ph.D.
from the Graduate School
of International Studies,
University of Denver.

Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013

Ending the Civil War

Given the importance of regional stability, the White House must

work to prevent a pivotal country like Syria from collapsing entirely.
The human and physical costs are already staggering, and the longer
the conflict lasts, the more the human suffering and post-war recovery
periods. Thus one possible, indeed likely, outcome of the Syrian civil
war is a failed state that becomes a haven for terrorists and criminals,
which would obviously harm regional US interests.2 No matter which
side (or sides) wins the war, the damage done thus far may doom
Syria to decades of painful recovery, with large areas of lawlessness and
suffering. Moreover, the chances of a favorable outcome for the United
States are remote; either the Asad regime prevails over a broken country,
or Sunni jihadists gain the upper hand, but the most likely outcome
is continued fighting until mutual exhaustion. And even if a secular
democratic-oriented group or groups prevail in Syria, the cost and difficulty of reconstruction may doom Syria to decades of instability.
While there are clearly moral implications for the United States (and
the world), it is highly unlikely a major American military intervention
would succeed in dislodging the Asad regime or in ending the fighting.
This is because the conflict is widespread throughout Syrias populated
areas, is waged by diverse groups, and is driven by not only the stubbornness of the ruling regime, but also by religious motives beyond simple
revolution. Unlike other Arab spring countries, the ruling elite, and
the approximately 15 percent of its Alawi population, have nowhere else
to go; for them the civil war is a fight to the death. Some of the radical
Sunni opposition declared the war to be jihad, and appear willing to
fight to the death. It is, in short, a deeply embedded war that may well
continue even if the Asad regime ends, with the fighting shifting to
religiously aligned purposes and fueled by outside actors. Yet the United
States does have a vital interest in containing the war, and this is where
US decisionmakers must place their emphasis.

Reducing the Shia-Sunni Divide

One of the key dangers of the Syrian civil war is its effect on the
Shia-Sunni schism that has rapidly accelerated since 2003.3 While the
sources and nature of the division are too complex to detail here, the
Syrian civil war embeds the Shia-Sunna conflict. The majority of Syrias
population is Sunni while the Asad regimes key leaders adhere to the
Alawi sect, which is approximately 12 percent of the total population.4
While the Alawi ties to the Shia are theologically tenuous, Alawi Syrian
president Hafez Al-Asad, after taking power in a 1970 coup, received a
fatwa from Lebanese cleric Musa Al-Sadr stating that the Alawi were a
community of Shia Islam, and Asads decision to side with Shia Iran over
Sunni-ruled Iraq in the 1981-88 Iran-Iraq war, cemented his position as
2Andrew J. Tabler, Syrias Collapse: And How Washington Can Stop It, Foreign Affairs 92
(July/August 2013): 90.
3The schism dates to the succession debate following the Prophet Muhammads death in 632,
and while that schism has flared up over the centuries, it rarely became the basis of a sustained
conflict (the 1981-88 Iraq-Iran conflict was much more about two despotic leaders in a struggle for
power and possession than it was about religious differences, for example).
4While a majority of the Alawite support the Asad rule (a few do not), support also comes from
some Syrian Christians, who fear that one outcome of the Syrian civil war would be a radical Islamist
regime that might persecute Syrian Christians.

Dilemmas for US Strategy

Sorenson

a member of the Shia world, which passed on to his son Bashar, Syrias
current ruler. 5
For the United States, it is vital the intra-Muslim schism not grow
and exacerbate intra-faith fighting in other regional countries, particularly Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and the Arabian Gulf countries; currently
the Shia-Sunni fighting in Iraq has already reached post-US departure
levels and threatens to undo the fragile post-Saddam state the United
States tried to reconstruct. Fighting in Yemen, Bahrain, and Lebanon
could spread to US regional partners.

WMD Issues

A core US regional interest is to prevent proliferation of weapons

of mass destruction, though the concern has focused more on nuclear
weapons than on chemical or biological weapons. While an Israeli
airstrike obliterated Syrias reported embryonic experiment in nuclear
research in September 2007, Syria retains deliverable chemical weapons,
and the United States has warned them several times about both moving
or using them. In June 2013, the United States claimed it had proof of
Syrian chemical weapons use against anti-regime forces, and in August,
the regime renewed its chemical attacks. While the Obama administration stated that Syrian regimes use of chemical weapons would cross a
red line, the initial response to the June attack was an announcement
that the United States would offer some lethal military equipment to
rebel forces.6 The second use of chemical weapons resulted in a mix of
military threats and diplomatic activity, though none of this directly
involved the threat of the proliferation of chemical weapons outside
Syria. There are multiple avenues for trafficking these weapons: the
regime could transfer them to a third party (Hezbollah, in Lebanon, or
to an Iraqi Shia groups, or the Iraqi regime), or the Syrian opposition
could capture Syrian chemical weapons and transfer them itself. In the
latter case, the al Qaeda-affiliated Syrian rebel groups could transfer
these weapons to be used in the Middle East and beyond.

Containing the Civil War

The Syrian conflict may spread beyond current limited incursions by all sides over the Lebanese, Turkish, Jordanian, Israeli, and
Iraqi borders. A significant spillover across any of those borders would
seriously threaten regional stability. Syria shares porous borders with
these countries, and all have refugee camps with tens of thousands of
Syrian refugees who could be swept into an expansion of the Syrian civil
war. Such camps may become centers for resistance outside Syria, and
Syrian security forces may cross borders to curb any anti-regime activity
stemming from such camps. Even a small incursion into neighboring
countries could provoke escalation, either by invading forces who push
refugees out of the camps and deeper into the country, or by defending
forces, who might pursue Syrian security forces back over their border.
5Fouad Ajami, The Vanished Imam: Musa Al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1986), 174.
6Benjamin J. Rhodes, Text of White House Statement on Chemical Weapons in Syria, June 13, 2013.
Following on the credible evidence that the regime has used chemical weapons against the Syrian
people, the President has augmented the provision of non-lethal assistance to the civilian opposition,
and also authorized the expansion of our assistance to the Supreme Military Council (SMC) . . . .

Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013

The expansion of the conflict beyond Syria would imperil US regional

interests. Should the Syrian civil war escalate over borders, it will likely
worsen the growing regional Sunni-Shia dispute.

Reviewing US Military Options

Washington faces a challenging environment in the Middle East;

there is clearly political and military exhaustion after years of inconclusive engagement, and US defense expenditures will decline sharply over
the next decade. Thus, any military options will be constrained. Still,
policymakers must generate feasible options, which Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey offered in his letter to
Senate Armed Services Committee Chair Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) on
19 July 2013 (his categories italicized):7
Train, advise, and assist the opposition, to include supplying logistics,
weapons, and intelligence. The troops required could range from
several hundred to several thousand, with a cost estimate of $500
million annually, according to General Dempsey.8 The letter did not
specify where the troops would deploy, but presumably in safe zones
in neighboring countries.
Conduct standoff attacks and assist the opposition, by air weapons against
high-value regime targets, including bomb-carrying aircraft and missiles. The purpose would be to decimate targets the regime values or
needs to maintain its grip on power. Such targets might be similar to
those in Libya or Serbia: regime leadership living quarters, the homes
and businesses of regime supporters, military and supportive militia
targets, communications capability, supply lines (possibly including
flights from outside Syria supplying the regime), for examples.
Establish a no-fly zone. For General Dempsey, a no-fly zone would be
limited to combating Syrian air assets in their attacks against antiregime elements and their supporters. Dempsey noted US rescue
personnel would have to enter Syria to retrieve downed aircrews, and
the no-fly zone costs could average $1 billion per month because of
high force requirements and operating costs.
Establish buffer zones. This option would create areas along borders (most
likely Turkey and Jordan) where anti-regime forces could train, heal,
and resupply, and where wounded civilians could receive treatment.
It would require protection from air and ground attacks, though the
size of such a protective force would depend on the size and location
of the buffer zones.
Control of chemical weapons. The United States and possibly allied forces
would destroy or seize Syrian chemical weapons and, presumably,
their delivery vehicles and supporting equipment. Attacking chemical
weapons is difficult and potentially dangerous as only very high heat
can destroy poison gas, thus blowing up a warhead can spread its lethal
effects for miles. Finding the launchers is also problematic; there
is doubt over the location and number of tactical ballistic missiles
7Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin E. Dempsey, Letter to The Honorable Carl Levin,
July 19, 2013.
8Ibid., 2.

Dilemmas for US Strategy

Sorenson

(SCUDs), not to mention the smaller missiles.9 Seizing them can also
be problematic; they must be moved quickly out of enemy territory
without leaks, detonations (some may be equipped with a detonating
device), or theft by other forces. Finding chemical weapons is also very
difficult; they are small and easily hidden.
United States strategic planners must consider all these options as
possible force application packages, as General Dempsey noted, but all
require careful calculation of costs and benefits relative to American
national security interests. Planners must also calculate the most likely
outcomes of these actions, singularly, or in a package: will they hasten
the complete collapse of the Asad regime or further fragment Syria into
fiefdoms, each dominated by a sectarian warlord. Paradoxically, they
might empower the Asad regime, allowing it to argue that it is now
fighting the Americans, pushing some Syrians to commit to the regime.
Planners must also recognize there are very few discrete options, once
the United States strikes (as punishment for Syrian chemical weapon use).
It becomes much more difficult to abstain from further engagement.
While General Dempsey offered force package options, he did not
offer his perspective on desirable end states, or how military force might
accomplish them. The following section links these force options to
possible conflict outcomes.

Ending the Civil War on Favorable Terms

While the White House has not had a hostile relationship with the
Asad regime in the past few decades, its behavior in the civil war, including its attacks on civilians, its links with Russia and Iran, and its alliance
with Hezbollah, which the State Department lists as a terrorist group,
might justify an end state of terminating that regime in favor of a stable
government. But experience alone suggests the likelihood of success
is low. While the United States has used force (usually with allies) to
facilitate regime change, it ended relatively well only in the campaign
to end the Serbian Milosevic regime. In Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan,
unstable countries remain after decades of war, at the cost of thousands
of Americans killed and wounded, and trillions of dollars spent.
Moreover, no feasible military scenario offers much chance of stemming Syrian violence. The most-often suggested policies are either a
no-fly zone, as used in Libya, Serbia, and Iraq before 2003, or a offshore strike with missiles against select targets like chemical weapons
delivery systems, or assets highly valued by the Asad regime. If a no-fly
zone is limited to striking air assets, it can degrade enemy capacity to
conduct counterinsurgency air operations, and if the United States
conducted such an operation with standoff weapons, it could be done
at an acceptable cost for both lives and dollars, using precision-guided
munitions from naval platforms and naval and Air Force planes with
air-launched missiles. Attacks on airfields, munitions, fuel, and aircraft
might limit Syrian ability to use air weapons to attack insurgent and

9Mary Beth Nikitin, Paul K. Kerr, and Andrew Feickert, Syrias Chemical Weapons: Issues for
Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service 7-5700, August 30, 2013), 4-5.

10

Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013

civilian targets.10 Targeting helicopters is much more difficult, as they do

not require runways, and can quickly land and hide after striking targets.
Yet, while Syria has certainly used aircraft to bomb civilians, most of
the civilian attacks by regime forces usually involve ground units, either
military or militia, and if the US or other-nation air forces vigorously
patrol Syrian skies, it will only drive the Asad regime to shift more effort
to ground forces, and especially artillery.11 And while a no-fly zone can
evolve into a no-tank zone, targeting ground force weapons like tanks
and other heavy vehicles, such operations are difficult in urban areas.
Striking a tank from the air can easily cause civilian casualties; tanks
filled with fuel and ammunition can devastate entire neighborhoods
when they explode. Even with advanced targeting systems, misses are
possible. Even a no-fly or no-vehicle zone destroys most if not all of
Syrian air weapons and military ground vehicles, the death and damage
from smaller weapons will continue to climb.
The other US option is sending arms and other supplies to the
opponent forces, but the numbers and types of equipment are not likely
to make a difference against a regime armed by Russia and supported by
Hezbollah. Fears that sophisticated arms would make their way either
to jihadists or the regime have limited the supply, leading to a growing
belief that the United States is only trying to prolong the fighting and
ensure no side wins.12 Whether or not that is a true intention may not
matter, because arming rebels will still produce only more inconclusive
fighting, whatever the US motive.
The Syrian use of chemical weapons in June and August 2013 drove
the Obama administration to declare the actions had crossed a red
line, though the line itself was unclear.13 The president indicated that he
planned a limited strike both to punish Syria for using chemical weapons
and deter future use in Syria or beyond. The president appeared aware
of the limited impact of a strike: That doesnt solve all the problems
inside Syria, and it doesnt obviously end the death of innocent civilians
inside of Syria.14 A limited strike (not conducted at the time of this
writing) would not only fail to be decisive, but also provoke a predictable
response from the Asad regime. It would continue its campaign in a
show of defiance, perhaps using chemical weapons again, thus forcing
the United States to consider striking again. America stands to lose
either way; should it fail to respond, it appears weak, but should it attack,
it steps into a cycle of escalation that it is unwilling to pursue. The Asad
regime has much higher stakes than the White House; it is fighting for
its life, while the United States is trying to reduce or terminate the war
on terms it favors. Even a successful attack in response to a chemical
10Christopher Harmer, Required Sorties and Weapons to Degrade Syrian Air Force Excluding Integrated
Air Defense System (IADS) (Institute for the Study of War, July 31, 2013).
11This is also the conclusion reached by Karl P. Mueller, Jeffrey Martini, and Thomas Hamilton,
Airpower Options for Syria: Assessing Objectives and Missions for Aerial Intervention, RAND
Center for Middle East Public Policy, RR-446-CMEPP (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013),
2-3.
12Ann Barnard, Deal Represents Turn for Syria; Rebels Deflated, The New York Times,
September 15, 2013.
13As of this writing, proof of Syrian chemical weapons use is not available, though the evidence
appeared to indicate that some side in the war used some kind of chemical agent against civilians.
Whether or not the agent was also lethal (though not banned) was unclear.
14Michael R. Gordon, Aim of U.S. Attack: Restore a Red Line That Became Blurred, The
New York Times, August 30, 2013.

Dilemmas for US Strategy

Sorenson

11

weapons attack may propel the Asad regime to decide it is in a game

of chicken with Washington, and dare it to continue to respond as it
launches more chemical weapons attacks. The United States is likely to
lose this game of chicken.

Containing the Civil War

If the Syrian civil war spills into neighboring countries, it directly

affects key US regional partners and, in the Turkish case, a NATO ally.
Says Cordesman, Americas real strategic interests are tied to the destabilizing impact of the civil war on Syrias neighbors, the growing role
of Iran and Hezbollah in Syria, and the pressure on Iraq to join with
Iran and Syria if Syria remains dependent on Iran.15 Small incursions
have occurred, and will most likely continue. However, a major breach
of borders would clearly threaten US regional interests. It is one thing
to have one country in violent conflict; it is quite another to have the
fighting spread to four or more countries which have ties to the United
States It could threaten the Lebanese, Jordanian, and Iraqi governments,
it could spill into Israel, it could disrupt the flow of commerce in the
eastern Mediterranean, and it could expand into countries weakened by
the Arab spring movements. Should jihadists in Syria expand their
operations into the Sinai, or Libya, for example, joining other jihadi
already there, and bringing weapons captured from the Syrian military,
those countries will become much more unstable than they already are.
The new aggressiveness of the Syrian Kurdish rebels could bolster their
kinfolks efforts to gain more power and to resist the regimes in both
Turkey and Iraq.16
The Syrian civil war could expand in several ways. The Assad regime
could expand the conflict if refugee camps outside Syria become staging
and training areas for anti-regime forces, or if the regime should try to
halt the flow of weapons to insurgents. These weapons come into Syria
by land and sea routes (smuggled into Mediterranean ports). Insurgents
could attack weapons ships, thus forcing the conflict into the eastern
Mediterranean. The United States Navy, and allied and friendly navies,
would thus have a role in containing the maritime aspect of the conflict,
though containment could also become more active, with those navies
seizing vessels carrying arms to the Syrian regime.17
A major movement of Assads forces into Turkey or Jordan would
quickly embroil those countries in the civil war, as a Syrian incursion
into the Golan would generate an Israeli response. Turkey, Jordan, and
Israel have capable militaries, and Syrian leadership might be reluctant
to challenge them. But an intrusion over Lebanese borders is more
problematic; Syrian forces long occupied Lebanon, and it remains in
the Syrian sphere of interest (Syrian maps do not show an independent
Lebanon, instead showing Lebanon as a part of Syria). Several Syrian
incursions into Lebanon, either by government forces or by rebels, have
already occurred and might certainly happen again. The Lebanese army
15Anthony H. Cordesman, U.S. Strategy in Syria: Having Lost Sight of the Objective
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies), September 12, 2013.
16Emile Hokayem, Syrias Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant (London: International Institute
for Strategic Studies), 129.
17This would obviously be a high-risk option, and would likely exempt Russian-flagged ships
due to the potential for quick and dangerous escalation.

12

Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013

is lightly armed, designed much more for domestic policing that in repelling an outside invader.18 Iraq faces a similar problem; its military is
still rebuilding in the post-Saddam era, but US assistance and training
has improved its quality. While there is always the danger that further
American help might get into the wrong hands, the United States should
still increase its military assistance and other ties to Iraqs military as a
part of a ring of Syrian containment.
The United States has experience implementing containmentit
was the core strategic doctrine during the Cold War, but the lessons
from that experience may be difficult to apply in containing the civil
war within Syrian borders. Cold War containment relied heavily on
the threat of punishment against the former the Soviet Union or the
Peoples Republic of China for spreading their influence, along with
supporting alliances and friends, supplying partners with arms, training, and jointly operated military bases on the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR) and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) rimlands.
However, neither the USSR nor the PRC was waging a war against its
own people; rather the perceived danger was expansion. Still, though
the United States would construct it differently, containment should be
seriously considered as the primary military response to the Syrian civil
war. While it needs an element of threatened punishment, it will have to
rely more on efforts to seal Syrias borders.
America could threaten targets valued by the Syrian regime by air,
or by stealthy penetrations should Syrian forces cross borders; through
assassinations of key officials; or inflicting widespread damage against
regime supporters. Attacks in Serbia focused on assets held by Milosevics
supporters, and the same could hold for Syria. However, the regime has
already suffered considerable punishment; and punishment attacks are
very likely to include civilian casualties, which the regime can blame on
the United States, solidifying its argument that it is resisting American
influence in the region. Trying to surround Syria with a containing ring
of bases would be expensive, time-consuming, and not popular in any
of the potential hosting countries. Most of the border areas are difficult
to police and easily crossed through mountain areas or large swaths
of desert. These areas have long been smugglers havens. Volunteer
fighters, many of them jihadi-oriented, are also sneaking into Syria, with
popular transit points being northern Lebanon and the Turkish-Syrian
border, partly because of the ease of flying into Beirut and Turkish cities
from other countries.19
Containment against physical incursions over borders is difficult
enough, but even if such monitoring works to prevent physical border
incursions from either side, it cannot stop the flow of information and
ideas that may inspire supporters of any side in the conflict to carry out
retaliation outside Syria. Lebanese opponents of Hezbollah, outraged
over Hezbollah actions in Syria, could bomb a Hezbollah neighborhood in Beirut, for example, or Shia Iraqis, angered over a Sunni action
in Syria, could attack a Sunni neighborhood somewhere in Iraq. Still,
18Oren Barak, The Lebanese Army: A National Institution in a Divided Society (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 2009); David S. Sorenson, Global Security Watch: Lebanon (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 2009), Chapter 6.
19Jeremy M. Sharp and Christopher M. Blanchard, Armed Conflict in Syria: Background and
U.S. Response (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service 7-5700, September 6, 2013), 14.

Dilemmas for US Strategy

Sorenson

13

the United States must attempt to contain the civil war by supporting
friendly countries, sharing information, and maintaining forces (air
and naval forces in particular) proximate to Syria, to threaten the Asad
regime with unacceptable damage to its military capacity should he
attempt to expand the conflict. The red lines must be real, and the
White House must prepare to carry out threats, because the other core
element of containment must be its credibility. Announcing a chemical
weapon red line, and then hesitating to enforce it, places American
policy in a credibility deficit.
Containing the flow of material into Syria is difficult enough.
Sudan is reportedly shipping arms, paid by Qatar, to some rebel groups,
which complicates Sudanese declared policy to support both Sunna
Islamist movements while maintaining good relations with Shia Iran.20
Containing such land bridges to the Syrian combatants would be very
difficult, and even if Washington and other parties can slow it, weapons
to the Asad side will still likely flow from Russia. The United States
should, however, put as much pressure as possible on suppliers to both
Asad and the jihadist groups opposing his rule to curtail weapons
supplies. If Qatar is actually supplying jihadist groups in Syria, either
directly or indirectly, the United States needs to exert quiet but firm
diplomacy to curtail the supply chain, including the threat to remove the
US presence in Qatar that the emirate relies on for defense. Iran is flying
in weapons, reportedly through Iraq, though the Al Maliki government
denies the charges.21 Iraq and Iran are more difficult, but Iraq still needs
US military assistance, which the United States can threaten to curtail
(though it is in Americas interests for it to continue), while Irans new
president, Hassan Rouhani, might be at least approachable on the question of mutual restraint on arming Syrian civil war factions.22 While Iran
may derive limited benefits from supporting Shia and their affiliates in
Syria and elsewhere, Iran and the United States have a mutual interest in
containing intra-Islamic conflict in general. Should diplomacy not work,
there are few additional nonmilitary instruments available as the United
States and most other countries are already observing strict diplomatic
isolation and economic sanctions on Iran for its nuclear activities. There
may be a few military options, though, such as harassing Iranian flights
to Syria, or demonstrations of regional military power (large combined
exercises, for example); but those have both dangers and limited impact.
There are no simple solutions.
To implement containment, the United States must bolster its
regional forces, and quickly augment regional friendly forces. American
forces are now in Jordan, providing Patriot batteries and F-16 combat
aircraft; and Jordan has requested additional US assistance in securing
its border with Syria to stem the flow of smuggling and illegal weapons.23 The United States has stationed forces in Turkey for decades, and
recently moved Patriot batteries to the Syrian-Turkish border after Syria
20Arms Shipments Seen from Sudan to Syrian Rebels, The New York Times, August 12, 2013.
Sudan officially denies shipping arms to Syria.
21Michael R. Gordon, eric Schmitt, and Tim Arango, Flow of Arms to Syria Through Iraq
Persists, to U.S. Dismay, The New York Times, December 1, 2012.
22The Iranian president has limited influence over Iranian foreign and security policy, which is
largely the responsibility of the Supreme Leader.
23Thom Shanker, Jordan Asks for Assistance in Securing Syrian Border, The New York Times,
August 14, 2013.

14

Parameters 43(3) Autumn 2013

launched Scud missiles near that border. The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) air base at Incirlik is only 100 km from the Syrian
border. American forces have largely evacuated Iraq, but Iraqi president
Nuri Al-Maliki has requested US assistance to deal with the estimated
30,000 al Qaeda fighters, many from the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant.24 Maliki suspects this group of carrying out a spate of bomb
attacks against oil infrastructure and civilians, and while such bombings
have been too much a part of Iraqi life since 2003, their escalation may
be related to the fact that many of the 30,000 al Qaeda members are from
Syria.25 Here US surveillance would be useful in containing the flow of
such insurgents over the Iraqi-Syrian border, as it would on the other
borders Syria shares. Some of the surveillance may be armed as well, and
though attacks from drones are controversial, the unknown danger of a
lurking drone may deter some insurgents from border crossings.
The Obama Administration faces a strategic quandary relative to
Lebanon; it has intervened in Lebanon before, in 1958 and 1982-84,
though it has shown relative indifference to Lebanons tragic quarrels,
as in the 1975-90 civil war, and the 2006 war between Hezbollah and
Israel. Previous engagement history does not clarify the strategic value
of Lebanon and its political status for the United States. However,
should the Syrian conflict begin to embroil Lebanon in a significant way
(large-scale border crossings, shelling of Lebanese targets, engagement
with the Lebanese military, for example), the risk is high the conflict will
escalate further. So while neither the United States nor Lebanon would
want American forces on Lebanese territory, the United States Navy
could maintain a posture of off-shore balancing, ready to support the
Lebanese army in attempting to repel any Syrian attack on Lebanese soil.
A complicating factor, however, is the possibility that forces beyond those
of the Asad regime might cross into Lebanon; for example, Hezbollah
and Lebanese Sunni jihadist forces could fight in northern Lebanon
(there have already been skirmishes), and while the fighting might relate
to the Syrian civil war, it would be very difficult for the United States to
intervene in such a fight. Still, the Obama administration is bolstering its
military assistance to Lebanon, increasing training for Lebanese military
in particular.

Conclusions

The Syrian civil war has produced a considerable dilemma for

American policymakers. How do we respond to a crisis where there
are no clear choices? It is in US interests to see the Syrian civil war
end, but an American effort to hasten the termination of the tragedy
would require a huge force, a long commitment (with few, if any, allies),
and no quick exit. Like some other protracted wars (Lebanons civil
war, Somalia, Rwanda, for example), the Syrian civil war may end only
when the participants are exhausted, or when their outside patrons stop
supplying them with the means to fight on. While the Asad regime
has committed moral outrages (as have some opposition groups), the
United States does not have the ability to terminate or reduce the Syrian
regimes behavior, and probably a greater chance to worsen the fighting.
As noted earlier, al Qaeda and its associated radical groups could be the
24 Salah Nasrawi, Iraq Eyes US to Fight Insurgents, Al Ahram, August 21, 2013.
25 Ibid.

Dilemmas for US Strategy

Sorenson

15

real winner in a post-Asad Syria, though the United States does not have
the means to shape the Syrian conflict. The clear danger to American
regional interests is in containing the civil war within Syria, and though
containment of it will be difficult under the best of circumstances, it is on
this mission that the United States must commit its military forces. The
White House must aid regional countries to keep the fighting contained
within Syrian borders, must study the lessons of Cold War containment,
and must quickly implement it, while at the same time living with the
consequences of several decades of costly military engagements. The
United States must also avoid entanglement in the growing intra-sect
conflict within regional Islam because errors here could only fan religious passion and extend the fighting. One core reality is that none of
the regional countries benefit from the spread of the Syrian civil war,
regardless of their relationship with the United States, other regional
countries, or religious orientation. If the fire spreads, everyone gets
burned. Containment is in the interests of all countries bordering Syria,
and the White House must stress and build on that point in its own
policy. While containment never offers easy choices, and does not offer
them now, it should still be the central emphasis for the United States as
it confronts the Syrian civil war.