EN BANC

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR.,

Complaina
nt,

Adm. Case No. 2474

ATTY. LEO J. PALMA,

Respondent.
X --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:

The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure

up to certain rigid standards of mental and moral fitness. For the admission
of a candidate to the bar, the Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of
academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral
character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after
admission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk
of suspension or removal.[1]
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. filed with this Court the instant complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Leo J. Palma, alleging as grounds deceit,
malpractice, gross misconduct in office, violation of his oath as a lawyer and
grossly immoral conduct.
The facts are undisputed:

Complainant and respondent met sometime in the 70s. Complainant

was a client of Angara Concepcion Regala & Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA) and
respondent was the lawyer assigned to handle his cases. Owing to his
growing business concerns, complainant decided to hire respondent as his
personal counsel.
Consequently, respondents relationship with complainants family
became

intimate. He

traveled

and

dined

with

them

abroad. [2] He

frequented their house and even tutored complainants 22-year old daughter
Maria Luisa Cojuangco (Lisa), then a student of Assumption

Convent.
On June 22, 1982, without the knowledge of complainants family,
respondent married Lisa in Hongkong.

It was only the next

day that respondent informed complainant and assured him that everything
is legal. Complainant was shocked, knowing fully well that respondent is a
married man and has three children. Upon investigation, complainant found
that respondent courted Lisa during their tutoring sessions. Immediately,
complainant sent his two sons to Hongkong to convince Lisa to go home to
Manila and discuss the matter with the family. Lisa was persuaded.
Complainant also came to know that: (a) on the date of the supposed
marriage, respondent requested from his (complainants) office an airplane
ticket to and from Australia, with stop-over in Hong Kong; (b) respondent
misrepresented himself as bachelor before the Hong Kong authorities to
facilitate his marriage with Lisa; and

(c) respondent was married to

Elizabeth Hermosisima and has three children, namely: Eugene Philippe, Elias
Anton and Eduardo Lorenzo.
On August 24, 1982, complainant filed with the Court of First
Instance, Branch XXVII, Pasay City a petition[3] for declaration of

nullity of the marriage between respondent and Lisa, docketed as Civil Case
No. Pq-0401-P.

In the Decision[4] dated November 2, 1982, the CFI declared

the marriage null and void ab initio.

Thereafter, complainant filed with this Court the instant complaint [5] for
disbarment, imputing to respondent the following acts:
a.
In grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence
reposed in him by complainant and his family and taking undue advantage
of his tutoring sessions with Maria Luisa, respondent secretly courted her.
The great disparity in intelligence, education, age, experience and
maturity between Maria Luisa and respondent gave the latter an
overwhelming moral ascendancy over Maria Luisa as to overcome her
scruples and apprehensions about respondents courtship and advances,
considering that he is a married man with three (3) children;
b.
Respondent courted Maria Luisa with persistence and
determination and even pursued her in her travels abroad under false
pretenses that he was traveling on official business for complainant. To
break down the final resistance of Maria Luisa and assuage her pangs of
guilt, he made representations that there was no legal impediment
whatsoever to his marrying;
c.
With his moral ascendancy over Maria Luisa and his
misrepresentation that there was no legal impediment or prohibition to his
contracting a second marriage, respondent succeeded in inducing and
beguiling her into marrying him. Without complying with the requirements
of Philippine law that he should first obtain a judicial declaration of nullity
of his marriage to Elizabeth H. Palma and that the advice of Maria
Luisas parents should first be obtained she being only twenty-two (22)
years of age, respondent succeeded in contracting marriage with her in

Hongkong on June 22, 1982 by falsely representing himself before the

Hongkong authorities that he is a bachelor. x x x.

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss [6] on the ground of lack of cause

of action. He contended that the complaint fails to allege acts constituting
deceit,

malpractice,

gross

misconduct

or

violation

of

his

lawyers

oath. There is no allegation that he acted with wanton recklessness,

lack of skill or ignorance

of the law in

serving

complainants

interest. Anent the charge of grossly immoral conduct, he stressed that he

married complainants daughter with utmost sincerity and good faith and
that it is contrary to the natural course of things for an immoral man to
marry the woman he sincerely loves.
In the Resolution[7] dated March 2, 1983, we referred the case to the
Office

of

the

Solicitor

General

(OSG)

for

investigation,

report

and

recommendation. Former Assistant Solicitor General Oswaldo D. Agcaoili

conducted the investigation.
Meanwhile, on December 28, 1983, the First Division of this Court
issued

in

G.R.

No.

64538 [8] a

Resolution[9] (a) setting

aside

the

CFI Decision dated November 2, 1982 in Civil Case No. Pq0401-P

declaring the marriage between respondent and Lisa null and void ab initio;
and (b) remanding

the

case

to

the

CFI

for

proper

proceeding

and

determination. To this date, the records fail to disclose the outcome of this
case.

On March 19, 1984, respondent filed with the OSG an Urgent Motion to
Suspend Proceedings[10] on the ground that the final outcome of Civil Case
No. Pq0401-P poses a prejudicial question to the disbarment proceeding.

It

was denied.
Respondent sought refuge in this Court through an Urgent Motion for
Issuance of a Restraining Order.[11] In the Resolution dated December 19,
1984, we enjoined the OSG from continuing the investigation of the
disbarment proceedings.[12]
Thereafter, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline.

On

October

19,

1998,

Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo issued the following order:

Considering the length of time that this case has remained
pending and as a practical measure to ease the backlog of this
Commission, the parties shall within ten (10) days from notice,
manifest whether or not they are still interested in prosecuting this
case or supervening events have transpired which render this case
moot and academic or otherwise, this case shall be deemed closed
and terminated.[13]
In his Manifestation,[14] complainant manifested and confirmed his
continuing interest in prosecuting his complaint for disbarment against
respondent.
On the other hand, respondent sought several postponements of
hearing on the ground that he needed more time to locate vital documents in
support of his defense. The scheduled hearing of December 4, 2001 was
reset for the last time on January 24, 2002, with a warning that should he fail
to appear or present deposition, the case will be deemed submitted for

resolution.[15]

Respondent again failed to appear on January 24, 2002;

hence, the case was considered submitted for resolution. [16]

On March 20, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan
submitted a Report and Recommendation finding respondent guilty of grossly
immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer.

She recommended

that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three
(3) years. Thus:
The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not
respondent committed the following acts which warrant his disbarment:
a)

Grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence

reposed in him by complainant;

b)

His misrepresentation that there was no legal

impediment or prohibition to his contracting a second
marriage;

c)

The acts of respondent constitute deceit, malpractice,

gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct and
violation of his oath as a lawyer.

Respondent admits that he married Maria Luisa in Hongkong

representing himself as a bachelor, however, he claimed that the marriage
certificate stated a condition no different from term spinster with respect
to Luisa.
There is no question that respondent as a lawyer well versed in the
law knew fully well that in marrying Maria Luisa he was entering into a
bigamous marriage defined and penalized under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. The respondent betrayed the trust reposed in him
by complainant. He was treated as part of the family and was allowed to
tutor Maria Luisa.
For the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that respondent
committed grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer,
and it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of three (3) years.

SO ORDERED.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the above Report
and Recommendation, but it reduced respondents penalty to only one (1)
year suspension.
Except

for

the

penalty,

we

affirm

the

IBPs

Report

and

Recommendation.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the law profession does not
prescribe a dichotomy of standards among its members. There is no
distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the lawyers
professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not
divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen
at another.[17] Thus, not only his professional activities but even his private
life, insofar as the latter may reflect unfavorably upon the good name and
prestige of the profession and the courts, may at any time be the subject of
inquiry on the part of the proper authorities.[18]
Respondent claims that he had served complainant to the best of his
ability. In fact, the complaint does not allege that he acted with wanton
recklessness, lack of skill and ignorance of the law.
While, complainant himself admitted that respondent was a good
lawyer,[19] however, professional competency alone does not make a lawyer
a worthy member of the Bar. Good moral character is always an
indispensable requirement.

The ringing truth in this case is that respondent married Lisa while he
has

subsisting

marriage

with

Elizabeth

Hermosisima.

The

Certification[20] from the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City shows that he
married Elizabeth on December 19, 1971 at Cardials Private Chapel, Cebu
City.

On the other hand, the Certificate of Marriage[21] from the Deputy

Registrar of Marriages, Hong Kong, proves respondents subsequent marriage

with Lisa on July 9, 1982. That Elizabeth was alive at the time of
respondents second marriage was confirmed on the witness stand by Atty.
Victor P. Lazatin, Elizabeths classmate and family friend.[22]
Undoubtedly, respondents act constitutes grossly immoral conduct, a
ground for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required
of him as a member of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage
which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.

His act of

contracting a second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and

morality.[23]
This is not the first occasion that we censure immorality.

Thus, we

have somehow come up with a common definition of what constitutes

immoral conduct, i.e., that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion
of the good

and

respectable

members

of

the

community.[24] Measured against this definition,

respondents act is manifestly immoral. First, he abandoned his lawful
wife and three children. Second, he lured an innocent young woman into

marrying him. And third, he misrepresented himself as a bachelor so he

could contract marriage in a foreign land.
Our rulings in the following cases are relevant:
1)

In Macarrubo vs. Macarrubo,[25] respondent entered into multiple

marriages and then resorted to legal remedies to sever them. There, we

ruled that [S]uch pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the
institutions of marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to for
the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the
survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our
nation as a whole.

As such, there can be no other fate that awaits

respondent than to be disbarred.

(2) In Tucay

vs.

Tucay,[26] respondent

contracted

marriage

with

another married woman and left complainant with whom he has been
married for thirty years. We ruled that such acts constitute a grossly
immoral conduct and only indicative of an extremely low regard for the
fundamental ethics of his profession, warranting respondents disbarment.
(3) In Villasanta vs. Peralta,[27] respondent married complainant while
his first wife was still alive, their marriage still valid and subsisting.

We held

that the act of respondent of contracting the second marriage is contrary to

honesty, justice, decency and morality. Thus, lacking the good moral
character required by the Rules of Court, respondent was disqualified from
being admitted to the bar.
(4) In Cabrera vs. Agustin,[28] respondent lured an innocent woman
into a simulated marriage and thereafter satisfied his lust. We held that

respondent failed to maintain that degree of morality and integrity, which at

all times is expected of members of the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred from
the practice of law.
(5)

In Toledo vs. Toledo,[29] respondent abandoned his wife, who

supported him and spent for his law education, and thereafter cohabited with
another woman. We ruled that he failed to maintain the highest degree of
morality expected and required of a member of the bar. For this,
respondent was disbarred.

(6) In Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr.,[30] respondent abandoned his lawful wife
and child and resumed cohabitation with his former paramour.

Here, we

ruled that abandoning ones wife and resuming carnal relations with a
former paramour, a married woman, constitute grossly immoral conduct
warranting disbarment.
The circumstances here speak of a clear case of betrayal of trust and
abuse of confidence. It was respondents closeness to the complainants
family as well as the latters complete trust in him that made possible his
intimate relationship with Lisa. When his concern was supposed to be
complainants legal affairs only, he sneaked at the latters back and courted
his daughter. Like the proverbial thief in the night, he attacked when
nobody was looking. Moreover, he availed of complainants resources by
securing a plane ticket from complainants office in order to marry the
latters

daughter

in

Hongkong. He

did

this

without

complainants

knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity to assure complainant that

everything is legal. Clearly, respondent had crossed the limits of propriety

and decency.
Respondent justified his conduct by professing he really loved Lisa and
since he married her, he cannot be charged with immorality.

His reasoning

shows a distorted mind and a brazen regard on the sanctity of marriage. In

such relationship, the man and the woman are obliged to live together,
observe
[31]

mutual

respect and fidelity.

How could respondent perform these obligations to Lisa when he

was previously married to Elizabeth? If he really loved her, then the noblest
thing he could have done was to walk away.
Respondents culpability is aggravated by the fact that Lisa was just a
22-year old college student of Assumption Convent and was under
psychological treatment for emotional immaturity. [32]

Naturally, she was

an easy prey.
Anent respondents argument that since the validity of his marriage to
Lisa has not yet been determined by the court with finality, the same poses a
prejudicial question to the present disbarment proceeding. Suffice it to say
that a subsequent judgment of annulment of marriage has no bearing to the
instant

disbarment

proceeding. As

we

held

in In

re

Almacen,[33] a

disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal
but is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of its
officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not
determinative of an administrative case against him, [34] or if an affidavit of
withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course, [35] then the
judgment of annulment of respondents marriage does not also exonerate

him from a wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof

--- clear preponderance of evidence --- in disciplinary proceedings against
members of the bar is met, then liability attaches.[36]
The interdict upon lawyers, as inscribed in Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, is that they shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. This is founded on the
lawyers primordial duty to society as spelled out in Canon 1 which states:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.

It is not by coincidence that the drafters of our Code of Professional

Responsibility ranked the above responsibility first in the enumeration. They
knew then that more than anybody else, it is the lawyers -- the disciples of
law -- who are most obliged to venerate the law.

As stated in Ex Parte Wall:

[37]

Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly

bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all
men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them
underfoot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to
his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the
insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic.

Corollarily, the above responsibility is enshrined in the Attorneys Oath

which every lawyer in the country has to take before he is allowed to
practice.
In sum, respondent committed grossly immoral conduct and violation
of his oath as a lawyer. The penalty of one (1) year suspension

recommended by the IBP is not commensurate to the gravity of his

offense. The bulk of jurisprudence supports the imposition of the extreme
penalty of disbarment.
WHEREFORE, respondent Leo J. Palma is found GUILTY of grossly
immoral

conduct

and

violation

of

his

oath

as

lawyer,

and

is

hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.

Let respondents name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys
immediately. Furnish the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and all courts throughout the country with copies of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 187226, January 28, 2015 - CHERYLL SANTOS LEUS, Petitioner, v.
ST. SCHOLASTICAS COLLEGE WESTGROVE AND/OR SR. EDNA QUIAMBAO,
OSB, Respondents.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 187226, January 28, 2015
CHERYLL SANTOS LEUS, Petitioner, v. ST. SCHOLASTICAS COLLEGE
WESTGROVE AND/OR SR. EDNA QUIAMBAO, OSB, Respondents.
DECISION

REYES, J.:
Cheryll Santos Leus (petitioner) was hired by St. Scholasticas College
Westgrove (SSCW), a Catholic educational institution, as a non-teaching
personnel, engaged in pre-marital sexual relations, got pregnant out of
wedlock, married the father of her child, and was dismissed by SSCW, in that
order. The question that has to be resolved is whether the petitioners
conduct constitutes a ground for her dismissal.
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision1 dated September
24, 2008 and Resolution2 dated March 2, 2009 issued by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100188, which affirmed the Resolutions
dated February 28, 20073 and May 21, 20074 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC CA No. 049222-06.
The Facts
SSCW is a catholic and sectarian educational institution in Silang, Cavite. In
May 2001, SSCW hired the petitioner as an Assistant to SSCWs Director of
the Lay Apostolate and Community Outreach Directorate.
Sometime in 2003, the petitioner and her boyfriend conceived a child out of
wedlock. When SSCW learned of the petitioners pregnancy, Sr. Edna
Quiambao (Sr. Quiambao), SSCWs Directress, advised her to file a
resignation letter effective June 1, 2003. In response, the petitioner
informed Sr. Quiambao that she would not resign from her employment just
because she got pregnant without the benefit of
marriage.5chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On May 28, 2003, Sr. Quiambao formally directed the petitioner to explain in
writing why she should not be dismissed for engaging in pre-marital sexual
relations and getting pregnant as a result thereof, which amounts to serious
misconduct and conduct unbecoming of an employee of a Catholic
school.6chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In a letter7 dated May 31, 2003, the petitioner explained that her pregnancy
out of wedlock does not amount to serious misconduct or conduct
unbecoming of an employee. She averred that she is unaware of any school
policy stating that being pregnant out of wedlock is considered as a serious
misconduct and, thus, a ground for dismissal. Further, the petitioner
requested a copy of SSCWs policy and guidelines so that she may better
respond to the charge against her.

On June 2, 2003, Sr. Quiambao informed the petitioner that, pending the
promulgation of a Support Staff Handbook, SSCW follows the 1992 Manual
of Regulations for Private Schools (1992 MRPS) on the causes for
termination of employments; that Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS cites
disgraceful or immoral conduct as a ground for dismissal in addition to the
just causes for termination of employment provided under Article 282 of the
Labor Code.8chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On June 4, 2003, the petitioner, through counsel, sent Sr. Quiambao a
letter,9 which, in part, reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
To us, pre-marital sex between two consenting adults without legal
impediment to marry each other who later on married each other does not
fall within the contemplation of disgraceful or immoral conduct and
serious misconduct of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools and
the Labor Code of the Philippines.
Your argument that what happened to our client would set a bad example to
the students and other employees of your school is speculative and is more
imaginary than real. To dismiss her on that sole ground constitutes grave
abuse of management prerogatives.
Considering her untarnished service for two years, dismissing her with her
present condition would also mean depriving her to be more secure in terms
of financial capacity to sustain maternal needs.10
In a letter11 dated June 6, 2003, SSCW, through counsel, maintained that
pre-marital sexual relations, even if between two consenting adults without
legal impediment to marry, is considered a disgraceful and immoral conduct
or a serious misconduct, which are grounds for the termination of
employment under the 1992 MRPS and the Labor Code. That SSCW, as a
Catholic institution of learning, has the right to uphold the teaching of the
Catholic Church and expect its employees to abide by the same. They further
asserted that the petitioners indiscretion is further aggravated by the fact
that she is the Assistant to the Director of the Lay Apostolate and
Community Outreach Directorate, a position of responsibility that the
students look up to as role model. The petitioner was again directed to
submit a written explanation on why she should not be dismissed.
On June 9, 2003, the petitioner informed Sr. Quiambao that she adopts her
counsels letter dated June 4, 2003 as her written
explanation.12chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Consequently, in her letter13 dated June 11, 2003, Sr. Quiambao informed

the petitioner that her employment with SSCW is terminated on the ground
of serious misconduct. She stressed that pre-marital sexual relations
between two consenting adults with no impediment to marry, even if they
subsequently married, amounts to immoral conduct. She further pointed out
that SSCW finds unacceptable the scandal brought about by the petitioners
pregnancy out of wedlock as it ran counter to the moral principles that SSCW
stands for and teaches its students.
Thereupon, the petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the
Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Quezon City against SSCW and
Sr. Quiambao (respondents). In her position paper,14 the petitioner claimed
that SSCW gravely abused its management prerogative as there was no just
cause for her dismissal. She maintained that her pregnancy out of wedlock
cannot be considered as serious misconduct since the same is a purely
private affair and not connected in any way with her duties as an employee
of SSCW. Further, the petitioner averred that she and her boyfriend
eventually got married even prior to her dismissal.
For their part, SSCW claimed that there was just cause to terminate the
petitioners employment with SSCW and that the same is a valid exercise of
SSCWs management prerogative. They maintained that engaging in premarital sex, and getting pregnant as a result thereof, amounts to a
disgraceful or immoral conduct, which is a ground for the dismissal of an
employee under the 1992 MRPS.
They pointed out that SSCW is a Catholic educational institution, which
caters exclusively to young girls; that SSCW would lose its credibility if it
would maintain employees who do not live up to the values and teachings it
inculcates to its students. SSCW further asserted that the petitioner, being
an employee of a Catholic educational institution, should have strived to
maintain the honor, dignity and reputation of SSCW as a Catholic
school.15chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
On February 28, 2006, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision, 16 in NLRC
Case No. 6-17657-03-C which dismissed the complaint filed by the
petitioner. The LA found that there was a valid ground for the petitioners
dismissal; that her pregnancy out of wedlock is considered as a disgraceful
and immoral conduct. The LA pointed out that, as an employee of a Catholic
educational institution, the petitioner is expected to live up to the Catholic
values taught by SSCW to its students. Likewise, the LA opined
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Further, a deep analysis of the facts would lead us to disagree with the
complainant that she was dismissed simply because she violate[d] a Catholic
[teaching]. It should not be taken in isolation but rather it should be
analyzed in the light of the surrounding circumstances as a whole. We must
also take into [consideration] the nature of her work and the nature of her
employer-school. For us, it is not just an ordinary violation. It was
committed by the complainant in an environment where her strict adherence
to the same is called for and where the reputation of the school is at stake. x
x x.17
The LA further held that teachers and school employees, both in their official
and personal conduct, must display exemplary behavior and act in a manner
that is beyond reproach.
The petitioner appealed to the NLRC, insisting that there was no valid ground
for the termination of her employment. She maintained that her pregnancy
out of wedlock cannot be considered as serious misconduct under Article
282 of the Labor Code since the same was not of such a grave and
aggravated character. She asserted that SSCW did not present any evidence
to establish that her pregnancy out of wedlock indeed eroded the moral
principles that it teaches its students.18chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Ruling of the NLRC
On February 28, 2007, the NLRC issued a Resolution,19 which affirmed the LA
Decision dated February 28, 2006. The NLRC pointed out that the
termination of the employment of the personnel of private schools is
governed by the 1992 MRPS; that Section 94(e) thereof cites disgraceful or
immoral conduct as a just cause for dismissal, in addition to the grounds for
termination of employment provided for under Article 282 of the Labor Code.
The NLRC held that the petitioners pregnancy out of wedlock is a
disgraceful or immoral conduct within the contemplation of Section 94(e)
of the 1992 MRPS and, thus, SSCW had a valid reason to terminate her
employment.
The petitioner sought reconsideration20 of the Resolution dated February 28,
2007 but it was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution21 dated May 21, 2007.
Unperturbed, the petitioner filed a petition22 for certiorari with the CA,
alleging that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that there was
a valid ground for her dismissal. She maintained that pregnancy out of
wedlock cannot be considered as a disgraceful or immoral conduct; that
SSCW failed to prove that its students were indeed gravely scandalized by

her pregnancy out of wedlock. She likewise asserted that the NLRC erred in
applying Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS.cralawred
The Ruling of the CA
On September 24, 2008, the CA rendered the herein assailed
Decision,23 which denied the petition forcertiorari filed by the petitioner. The
CA held that it is the provisions of the 1992 MRPS and not the Labor Code
which governs the termination of employment of teaching and non-teaching
personnel of private schools, explaining that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is a principle of statutory construction that where there are two statutes
that apply to a particular case, that which was specially intended for the said
case must prevail. Petitioner was employed by respondent private Catholic
institution which undeniably follows the precepts or norms of conduct set
forth by the Catholic Church. Accordingly, the Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools followed by it must prevail over the Labor Code, a general
statute. The Manual constitutes the private schools Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232 or the Education Act of 1982. x x
x.24
The CA further held that the petitioners dismissal was a valid exercise of
SSCWs management prerogative to discipline and impose penalties on
erring employees pursuant to its policies, rules and regulations. The CA
upheld the NLRCs conclusion that the petitioners pregnancy out of wedlock
is considered as a disgraceful and immoral conduct and, thus, a ground for
dismissal under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS. The CA likewise opined
that the petitioners pregnancy out of wedlock is scandalous per se given the
work environment and social milieu that she was
in, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Under Section 94 (e) of the [MRPS], and even under Article 282 (serious
misconduct) of the Labor Code, disgraceful and immoral conduct is a basis
for termination of employment.
xxxx
Petitioner contends that her pre-marital sexual relations with her boyfriend
and her pregnancy prior to marriage was not disgraceful or immoral conduct
sufficient for her dismissal because she was not a member of the schools
faculty and there is no evidence that her pregnancy scandalized the school
community.
We are not persuaded. Petitioners pregnancy prior to marriage is scandalous

in itself given the work environment and social milieu she was in.
Respondent school for young ladies precisely seeks to prevent its students
from situations like this, inculcating in them strict moral values and
standards. Being part of the institution, petitioners private and public life
could not be separated. Her admitted pre-marital sexual relations was a
violation of private respondents prescribed standards of conduct that views
pre-marital sex as immoral because sex between a man and a woman must
only take place within the bounds of marriage.
Finally, petitioners dismissal is a valid exercise of the employer-schools
management prerogative to discipline and impose penalties on erring
employees pursuant to its policies, rules and regulations. x x x. 25 (Citations
omitted)
The petitioner moved for reconsideration26 but it was denied by the CA in its
Resolution27 dated March 2, 2009.
Hence, the instant petition.
Issues
Essentially, the issues set forth by the petitioner for this Courts decision are
the following: first,whether the CA committed reversible error in ruling that
it is the 1992 MRPS and not the Labor Code that governs the termination of
employment of teaching and non-teaching personnel of private schools;
and second, whether the petitioners pregnancy out of wedlock constitutes a
valid ground to terminate her employment.cralawred
The Ruling of the Court
The Court grants the petition.
First Issue: Applicability of the 1992 MRPS
The petitioner contends that the CA, in ruling that there was a valid ground
to dismiss her, erred in applying Section 94 of the 1992 MRPS. Essentially,
she claims that the 1992 MRPS was issued by the Secretary of Education as
the revised implementing rules and regulations of Batas Pambansa Bilang
232 (BP 232) or the Education Act of 1982. That there is no provision in BP
232, which provides for the grounds for the termination of employment of
teaching and non-teaching personnel of private schools. Thus, Section 94 of
the 1992 MRPS, which provides for the causes of terminating an
employment, is invalid as it widened the scope and coverage of BP 232.

The Court does not agree.

The Court notes that the argument against the validity of the 1992 MRPS,
specifically Section 94 thereof, is raised by the petitioner for the first time in
the instant petition for review. Nowhere in the proceedings before the LA,
the NLRC or the CA did the petitioner assail the validity of the provisions of
the 1992 MRPS.
It is well established that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not
raised in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel. Points of
law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial
court ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal. To consider the alleged facts and
arguments belatedly raised would amount to trampling on the basic
principles of fair play, justice, and due process.28chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In any case, even if the Court were to disregard the petitioners belated
claim of the invalidity of the 1992 MRPS, the Court still finds the same
untenable.
The 1992 MRPS, the regulation in force at the time of the instant
controversy, was issued by the Secretary of Education pursuant to BP 232.
Section 7029 of BP 232 vests the Secretary of Education with the authority to
issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of BP 232.
Concomitantly, Section 5730 specifically empowers the Department of
Education to promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the
administration, supervision and regulation of the educational system in
accordance with the declared policy of BP 232.
The qualifications of teaching and non-teaching personnel of private schools,
as well as the causes for the termination of their employment, are an
integral aspect of the educational system of private schools. Indubitably,
ensuring that the teaching and non-teaching personnel of private schools are
not only qualified, but competent and efficient as well goes hand in hand
with the declared objective of BP 232 establishing and maintaining
relevant quality education.31 It is thus within the authority of the Secretary
of Education to issue a rule, which provides for the dismissal of teaching and
non-teaching personnel of private schools based on their incompetence,
inefficiency, or some other disqualification.
Moreover, Section 69 of BP 232 specifically authorizes the Secretary of
Education to prescribe and impose such administrative sanction as he may
deem reasonable and appropriate in the implementing rules and regulations
for the [g]ross inefficiency of the teaching or non-teaching personnel of

private schools.32 Accordingly, contrary to the petitioners claim, the Court

sees no reason to invalidate the provisions of the 1992 MRPS, specifically
Section 94 thereof.cralawred
Second Issue: Validity of the Petitioners Dismissal
The validity of the petitioners dismissal hinges on the determination of
whether pregnancy out of wedlock by an employee of a catholic educational
institution is a cause for the termination of her employment.
In resolving the foregoing question, the Court will assess the matter from a
strictly neutral and secular point of view the relationship between SSCW as
employer and the petitioner as an employee, the causes provided for by law
in the termination of such relationship, and the evidence on record. The
ground cited for the petitioners dismissal, i.e., pre-marital sexual relations
and, consequently, pregnancy out of wedlock, will be assessed as to whether
the same constitutes a valid ground for dismissal pursuant to Section 94(e)
of the 1992 MRPS.
The standard of review in a Rule 45
petition from the CA decision in labor
cases.
In a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, such as the
instant petition, where the CAs disposition in a labor case is sought to be
calibrated, the Courts review is quite limited. In ruling for legal correctness,
the Court has to view the CA decision in the same context that the petition
forcertiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; the Court has to examine the
CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence
or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on
the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was
correct.33chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The phrase grave abuse of discretion is well-defined in the Courts
jurisprudence. It exists where an act of a court or tribunal is performed with
a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.34 The determination of the presence or absence of grave abuse
of discretion does not include an inquiry into the correctness of the
evaluation of evidence, which was the basis of the labor agency in reaching
its conclusion.35chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Nevertheless, while a certiorari proceeding does not strictly include an
inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence (that was the
basis of the labor tribunals in determining their conclusion), the

incorrectness of its evidentiary evaluation should not result in negating the

requirement of substantial evidence. Indeed, when there is a showing
that the findings or conclusions, drawn from the same pieces of
evidence, were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence
on record, they may be reviewed by the courts. In particular, the CA
can grant the petition for certiorari if it finds that the NLRC, in its assailed
decision or resolution, made a factual finding not supported by substantial
evidence. A decision that is not supported by substantial evidence is
definitely a decision tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.36chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The labor tribunals respective
conclusions that the petitioners pregnancy
is a disgraceful or immoral conduct
were arrived at arbitrarily.
The CA and the labor tribunals affirmed the validity of the petitioners
dismissal pursuant to Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS, which provides
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sec. 94. Causes of Terminating Employment In addition to the just causes
enumerated in the Labor Code, the employment of school personnel,
including faculty, may be terminated for any of the following
causes:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
xxxx
e. Disgraceful or immoral conduct;
xxxx
The labor tribunals concluded that the petitioners pregnancy out of
wedlock, per se, is disgraceful and immoral considering that she is
employed in a Catholic educational institution. In arriving at such conclusion,
the labor tribunals merely assessed the fact of the petitioners
pregnancy vis--vis the totality of the circumstances surrounding the same.
However, the Court finds no substantial evidence to support the
aforementioned conclusion arrived at by the labor tribunals. The fact of the
petitioners pregnancy out of wedlock, without more, is not enough to
characterize the petitioners conduct as disgraceful or immoral. There must
be substantial evidence to establish that pre-marital sexual relations and,
consequently, pregnancy out of wedlock, are indeed considered disgraceful
or immoral.

The totality of the circumstances

surrounding the conduct alleged to be
disgraceful or immoral must be assessed
against the prevailing norms of conduct.
In Chua-Qua v. Clave,37 the Court stressed that to constitute immorality, the
circumstances of each particular case must be holistically considered
and evaluated in light of the prevailing norms of conduct and
applicable laws.38 Otherwise stated, it is not the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the conduct per se that determines whether the same is
disgraceful or immoral, but the conduct that is generally accepted by society
as respectable or moral. If the conduct does not conform to what society
generally views as respectable or moral, then the conduct is considered as
disgraceful or immoral. Tersely put, substantial evidence must be presented,
which would establish that a particular conduct, viewed in light of the
prevailing norms of conduct, is considered disgraceful or immoral.
Thus, the determination of whether a conduct is disgraceful or immoral
involves a two-step process:first, a consideration of the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the conduct; and second, an assessment of the
said circumstances vis--vis the prevailing norms of conduct, i.e., what the
society generally considers moral and respectable.
That the petitioner was employed by a Catholic educational institution per
se does not absolutely determine whether her pregnancy out of wedlock is
disgraceful or immoral. There is still a necessity to determine whether the
petitioners pregnancy out of wedlock is considered disgraceful or immoral in
accordance with the prevailing norms of conduct.
Public and secular morality should
determine the prevailing norms of conduct,
not religious morality.
However, determining what the prevailing norms of conduct are considered
disgraceful or immoral is not an easy task. An individuals perception of what
is moral or respectable is a confluence of a myriad of influences, such as
religion, family, social status, and a cacophony of others. In this regard, the
Courts ratiocination in Estrada v. Escritor39 is instructive.
In Estrada, an administrative case against a court interpreter charged with
disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Court stressed that in determining
whether a particular conduct can be considered as disgraceful and immoral,
the distinction between public and secular morality on the one hand, and
religious morality, on the other, should be kept in mind. 40 That the distinction

between public and secular morality and religious morality is important

because the jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular
morality.41 The Court further explained that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular,
not religious x x x. Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may
influence the civil public order but public moral disputes may be resolved
only on grounds articulable in secular terms. Otherwise, if government
relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and
morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity
to what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The
non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of
conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a compelled religion,
anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions
upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and
thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that
would not support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full
religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those
whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens. Expansive religious
freedom therefore requires that government be neutral in matters of
religion; governmental reliance upon religious justification is inconsistent
with this policy of neutrality.
In other words, government action, including its proscription of
immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have
a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct
because it is detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon
which depend the existence and progress of human society and not
because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or
the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might
have a compelling influence on those engaged in public deliberations over
what actions would be considered a moral disapprobation punishable by law.
After all, they might also be adherents of a religion and thus have religious
opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence on them; the human
mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of society
in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a law
could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest
roots, but it must have an articulable and discernible secular
purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. x x
x.42(Citations omitted and emphases ours)
Accordingly, when the law speaks of immoral or, necessarily, disgraceful
conduct, it pertains to public and secular morality; it refers to those conducts
which are proscribed because they are detrimental to conditions upon

which depend the existence and progress of human society. Thus,

inAnonymous v. Radam,43 an administrative case involving a court utility
worker likewise charged with disgraceful and immoral conduct, applying the
doctrines laid down in Estrada, the Court held
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For a particular conduct to constitute disgraceful and immoral
behavior under civil service laws, it must be regulated on account of
the concerns of public and secular morality. It cannot be judged
based on personal bias, specifically those colored by particular
mores. Nor should it be grounded on cultural values not
convincingly demonstrated to have been recognized in the realm of
public policy expressed in the Constitution and the laws. At the same
time, the constitutionally guaranteed rights (such as the right to privacy)
should be observed to the extent that they protect behavior that may be
frowned upon by the majority.
Under these tests, two things may be concluded from the fact that an
unmarried woman gives birth out of wedlock:
(1) if the father of the child is himself unmarried, the woman is not
ordinarily administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral
conduct. It may be a not-so-ideal situation and may cause
complications for both mother and child but it does not give cause for
administrative sanction. There is no law which penalizes an
unmarried mother under those circumstances by reason of her
sexual conduct or proscribes the consensual sexual activity
between two unmarried persons. Neither does the situation
contravene any fundamental state policy as expressed in the
Constitution, a document that accommodates various belief
systems irrespective of dogmatic origins.
(2) if the father of the child born out of wedlock is himself married to
a woman other than the mother, then there is a cause for
administrative sanction against either the father or the mother.
In such a case, the disgraceful and immoral conduct consists of
having extramarital relations with a married person. The sanctity
of marriage is constitutionally recognized and likewise affirmed by our
statutes as a special contract of permanent union. Accordingly, judicial
employees have been sanctioned for their dalliances with married
persons or for their own betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.
In this case, it was not disputed that, like respondent, the father of her child
was unmarried. Therefore, respondent cannot be held liable for disgraceful

and immoral conduct simply because she gave birth to the child Christian
Jeon out of wedlock.44(Citations omitted and emphases ours)
Both Estrada and Radam are administrative cases against employees in the
civil service. The Court, however, sees no reason not to apply the doctrines
enunciated in Estrada and Radam in the instant
case. Estrada and Radam also required the Court to delineate what conducts
are considered disgraceful and/or immoral as would constitute a ground for
dismissal. More importantly, as in the said administrative cases, the instant
case involves an employees security of tenure; this case likewise concerns
employment, which is not merely a specie of property right, but also the
means by which the employee and those who depend on him
live.45chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It bears stressing that the right of an employee to security of tenure is
protected by the Constitution. Perfunctorily, a regular employee may not be
dismissed unless for cause provided under the Labor Code and other
relevant laws, in this case, the 1992 MRPS. As stated above, when the law
refers to morality, it necessarily pertains to public and secular morality and
not religious morality. Thus, the proscription against disgraceful or immoral
conduct under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS, which is made as a cause
for dismissal, must necessarily refer to public and secular morality.
Accordingly, in order for a conduct to be considered as disgraceful or
immoral, it must be detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon
which depend the existence and progress of human society and not because
the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other.
Thus, in Santos v. NLRC,46 the Court upheld the dismissal of a teacher who
had an extra-marital affair with his co-teacher, who is likewise married, on
the ground of disgraceful and immoral conduct under Section 94(e) of the
1992 MRPS. The Court pointed out that extra-marital affair is considered as
a disgraceful and immoral conduct is an afront to the sanctity of marriage,
which is a basic institution of society, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We cannot overemphasize that having an extra-marital affair is an afront to
the sanctity of marriage, which is a basic institution of society. Even our
Family Code provides that husband and wife must live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Our laws, in implementing this constitutional edict on marriage and
the family underscore their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.47
The petitioners pregnancy out of

wedlock is not a disgraceful or immoral

conduct since she and the father of her
child have no impediment to marry each
other.
In stark contrast to Santos, the Court does not find any circumstance in this
case which would lead the Court to conclude that the petitioner committed a
disgraceful or immoral conduct. It bears stressing that the petitioner and her
boyfriend, at the time they conceived a child, had no legal impediment to
marry. Indeed, even prior to her dismissal, the petitioner married her
boyfriend, the father of her child. As the Court held in Radam, there is no
law which penalizes an unmarried mother by reason of her sexual conduct or
proscribes the consensual sexual activity between two unmarried persons;
that neither does such situation contravene any fundamental state policy
enshrined in the Constitution.
Admittedly, the petitioner is employed in an educational institution where the
teachings and doctrines of the Catholic Church, including that on pre-marital
sexual relations, is strictly upheld and taught to the students. That her
indiscretion, which resulted in her pregnancy out of wedlock, is anathema to
the doctrines of the Catholic Church. However, viewed against the prevailing
norms of conduct, the petitioners conduct cannot be considered as
disgraceful or immoral; such conduct is not denounced by public and secular
morality. It may be an unusual arrangement, but it certainly is not
disgraceful or immoral within the contemplation of the law.
To stress, pre-marital sexual relations between two consenting adults who
have no impediment to marry each other, and, consequently, conceiving a
child out of wedlock, gauged from a purely public and secular view of
morality, does not amount to a disgraceful or immoral conduct under Section
94(e) of the 1992 MRPS.
Accordingly, the labor tribunals erred in upholding the validity of the
petitioners dismissal. The labor tribunals arbitrarily relied solely on the
circumstances surrounding the petitioners pregnancy and its supposed
effect on SSCW and its students without evaluating whether the petitioners
conduct is indeed considered disgraceful or immoral in view of the prevailing
norms of conduct. In this regard, the labor tribunals respective haphazard
evaluation of the evidence amounts to grave abuse of discretion, which the
Court will rectify.
The labor tribunals finding that the petitioners pregnancy out of wedlock
despite the absence of substantial evidence is not only arbitrary, but a grave
abuse of discretion, which should have been set right by the CA.

There is no substantial evidence to

prove that the petitioners pregnancy out of
wedlock caused grave scandal to SSCW
and its students.
SSCW claimed that the petitioner was primarily dismissed because her
pregnancy out of wedlock caused grave scandal to SSCW and its students.
That the scandal brought about by the petitioners indiscretion prompted
them to dismiss her. The LA upheld the respondents claim, stating
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In this particular case, an objective and rational evaluation of the facts
and circumstances obtaining in this case would lead us to focus our attention
x x x on the impact of the act committed by the complainant. The act
of the complainant x x xeroded the moral principles being taught and
project[ed] by the respondent [C]atholic school to their young lady
students.48 (Emphasis in the original)
On the other hand, the NLRC opined that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the instant case, when the complainant-appellant was already conceiving
a child even before she got married, such is considered a shameful and
scandalous behavior, inimical to public welfare and policy. It eroded the
moral doctrines which the respondent Catholic school, an exclusive
school for girls, is teaching the young girls. Thus, when the
respondent-appellee school terminated complainant-appellants
services, it was a valid exercise of its management prerogative.
Whether or not she was a teacher is of no moment. There is no separate set
of rules for non-teaching personnel. Respondents-appellees uphold the
teachings of the Catholic Church on pre-marital sex and that the
complainant-appellant as an employee of the school was expected to abide
by this basic principle and to live up with the standards of their purely
Catholic values. Her subsequent marriage did not take away the fact that
she had engaged in pre-marital sex which the respondent-appellee school
denounces as the same is opposed to the teachings and doctrines it
espouses.49 (Emphasis ours)
Contrary to the labor tribunals declarations, the Court finds that SSCW
failed to adduce substantial evidence to prove that the petitioners
indiscretion indeed caused grave scandal to SSCW and its students. Other
than the SSCWs bare allegation, the records are bereft of any evidence that
would convincingly prove that the petitioners conduct indeed adversely
affected SSCWs integrity in teaching the moral doctrines, which it stands for.

The petitioner is only a non-teaching personnel; her interaction with SSCWs

students is very limited. It is thus quite impossible that her pregnancy out of
wedlock caused such a grave scandal, as claimed by SSCW, as to warrant
her dismissal.
Settled is the rule that in termination cases, the burden of proving that the
dismissal of the employees was for a valid and authorized cause rests on the
employer. It is incumbent upon the employer to show by substantial
evidence that the termination of the employment of the employees was
validly made and failure to discharge that duty would mean that the
dismissal is not justified and therefore illegal.50 Substantial evidence is more
than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if
other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine
otherwise.51chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Indubitably, bare allegations do not amount to substantial evidence.
Considering that the respondents failed to adduce substantial evidence to
prove their asserted cause for the petitioners dismissal, the labor tribunals
should not have upheld their allegations hook, line and sinker. The labor
tribunals respective findings, which were arrived at sans any substantial
evidence, amounts to a grave abuse of discretion, which the CA should have
rectified. Security of tenure is a right which may not be denied on mere
speculation of any unclear and nebulous basis.52chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The petitioners dismissal is not a
valid exercise of SSCWs management
prerogative.
The CA belabored the management prerogative of SSCW to discipline its
employees. The CA opined that the petitioners dismissal is a valid exercise
of management prerogative to impose penalties on erring employees
pursuant to its policies, rules and regulations.
The Court does not agree.
The Court has held that management is free to regulate, according to its
own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring,
work assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work,
processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations,
transfer of employees, work supervision, lay off of workers and discipline,
dismissal and recall of workers. The exercise of management prerogative,
however, is not absolute as it must be exercised in good faith and with due
regard to the rights of labor. Management cannot exercise its prerogative in

a cruel, repressive, or despotic manner.53chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SSCW, as employer, undeniably has the right to discipline its employees and,
if need be, dismiss them if there is a valid cause to do so. However, as
already explained, there is no cause to dismiss the petitioner. Her conduct is
not considered by law as disgraceful or immoral. Further, the respondents
themselves have admitted that SSCW, at the time of the controversy, does
not have any policy or rule against an employee who engages in pre-marital
sexual relations and conceives a child as a result thereof. There being no
valid basis in law or even in SSCWs policy and rules, SSCWs dismissal of
the petitioner is despotic and arbitrary and, thus, not a valid exercise of
management prerogative.
In sum, the Court finds that the petitioner was illegally dismissed as there
was no just cause for the termination of her employment. SSCW failed to
adduce substantial evidence to establish that the petitioners conduct, i.e.,
engaging in pre-marital sexual relations and conceiving a child out of
wedlock, assessed in light of the prevailing norms of conduct, is considered
disgraceful or immoral. The labor tribunals gravely abused their discretion in
upholding the validity of the petitioners dismissal as the charge against the
petitioner lay not on substantial evidence, but on the bare allegations of
SSCW. In turn, the CA committed reversible error in upholding the validity of
the petitioners dismissal, failing to recognize that the labor tribunals gravely
abused their discretion in ruling for the respondents.
The petitioner is entitled to
separation pay, in lieu of actual
reinstatement, full backwages and
attorneys fees, but not to moral
and exemplary damages.
Having established that the petitioner was illegally dismissed, the Court now
determines the reliefs that she is entitled to and their extent. Under the law
and prevailing jurisprudence, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to
reinstatement as a matter of right.54 Aside from the instances provided
under Articles 28355 and 28456 of the Labor Code, separation pay is, however,
granted when reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained
relations between the employer and the employee. In cases of illegal
dismissal, the accepted doctrine is that separation pay is available in lieu of
reinstatement when the latter recourse is no longer practical or in the best
interest of the parties.57chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In Divine Word High School v. NLRC,58 the Court ordered the employer
Catholic school to pay the illegally dismissed high school teacher separation

pay in lieu of actual reinstatement since her continued presence as a teacher

in the school may well be met with antipathy and antagonism by some
sectors in the school community.59chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In view of the particular circumstances of this case, it would be more
prudent to direct SSCW to pay the petitioner separation pay in lieu of actual
reinstatement. The continued employment of the petitioner with SSCW
would only serve to intensify the atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism
between the parties. Consequently, the Court awards separation pay to the
petitioner equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service, with a
fraction of at least six (6) months considered as one (1) whole year, from the
time of her illegal dismissal up to the finality of this judgment, as an
alternative to reinstatement.
Also, employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled to full backwages,
inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent,
computed from the time their actual compensation was withheld from them
up to the time of their actual reinstatement but if reinstatement is no longer
possible, the backwages shall be computed from the time of their illegal
termination up to the finality of the decision.60 Accordingly, the petitioner is
entitled to an award of full backwages from the time she was illegally
dismissed up to the finality of this decision.
Nevertheless, the petitioner is not entitled to moral and exemplary damages.
A dismissed employee is entitled to moral damages when the dismissal is
attended by bad faith or fraud or constitutes an act oppressive to labor, or is
done in a manner contrary to good morals, good customs or public policy.
Exemplary damages may be awarded if the dismissal is effected in a wanton,
oppressive or malevolent manner.61chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Bad faith, under the law, does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of a wrong, or a breach of a known duty through some
motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of
fraud.62chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It must be noted that the burden of proving bad faith rests on the one
alleging it63 since basic is the principle that good faith is presumed and he
who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. 64Allegations of bad
faith and fraud must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence.65chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The records of this case are bereft of any clear and convincing evidence
showing that the respondents acted in bad faith or in a wanton or fraudulent

manner in dismissing the petitioner. That the petitioner was illegally

dismissed is insufficient to prove bad faith. A dismissal may be contrary to
law but by itself alone, it does not establish bad faith to entitle the dismissed
employee to moral damages. The award of moral and exemplary damages
cannot be justified solely upon the premise that the employer dismissed his
employee without cause.66chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
However, the petitioner is entitled to attorneys fees in the amount of 10% of
the total monetary award pursuant to Article 11167 of the Labor Code. It is
settled that where an employee was forced to litigate and, thus, incur
expenses to protect his rights and interest, the award of attorneys fees is
legally and morally justifiable.68chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Finally, legal interest shall be imposed on the monetary awards herein
granted at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this
judgment until fully paid.69chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarychanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition
is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 24, 2008 and Resolution dated
March 2, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100188 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The respondent, St. Scholasticas College Westgrove, is hereby declared
guilty of illegal dismissal and is hereby ORDERED to pay the petitioner,
Cheryll Santos Leus, the following: (a) separation pay in lieu of actual
reinstatement equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service,
with a fraction of at least six (6) months considered as one (1) whole year
from the time of her dismissal up to the finality of this Decision; (b) full
backwages from the time of her illegal dismissal up to the finality of this
Decision; and (c) attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total
monetary award. The monetary awards herein granted shall earn legal
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the
finality of this Decision until fully paid. The case is REMANDED to the Labor
Arbiter for the computation of petitioners monetary awards.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Villarama, Jr., and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.