SPOUSES MANALO, Petitioners versus ROLDAN-CONFESOR, et al.

,
Respondents
(G.R. No. 102358, March 30, 1993, 1st Division)
BELLOSILLO, J.
TOPIC: Clear and Convincing Evidence
FACTS:
Petitioners sued private respondents for illegal exaction, false
advertisement and violation of other pertinent labor laws, rules and
regulations. In its 7 May 1990 Order, POEA suspended the authority of Career
Planners Specialists' International, Inc. (CAREER), for four (4) months for
illegal exaction on two counts or, in lieu thereof, a fine of P40,000.00 was
imposed, plus restitution of P28,714.00 to petitioner-spouses Vicente and
Gloria Manalo, meted on respondent therein Filipino Manpower Services, Inc.
(FILMAN), also a fine of P40,000.00 on two counts of misrepresentation, and
reiterated its perpetual disqualification from recruitment activities.
On 4 February 1991, however, on the basis of the same facts, POEA
reversed itself on the penalty imposed on illegal exaction, reasoning that a clear
and convincing evidence was necessary to justify the suspension of the
authority/license of CPSI. On appeal, Undersecretary Confesor sustained
POEA in reversing itself and held that the charge of illegal exaction should be
supported by other corroborative circumstantial evidence, and on 9 October
1991 denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the POEA and DOLE Orders dated 4 February 1991, 5
July 1991 and 9 October 1991, finding private respondents not guilty of illegal
exaction, are themselves supported by substantial evidence, and are therefore
not subject to judicial inquiry.
HELD:
No. The POEA committed grave abuse of discretion. Public respondents
may be correct in saying that where two conflicting versions are supported by
substantial evidence, the administrative body may choose which to uphold and
for that reason even flip-flop on its factual findings without thereby incurring
grave abuse of discretion. In this case however, public respondent reversed the
penalty, not on the basis that one version is more believable than the other, but
that the testimonies of complainants, after describing them to be "more
convincing than respondent's stand" and which "inspired belief," were not clear
and convincing. Thus, to that extent, public respondents committed grave
abuse of discretion correctable by certiorari.
Admittedly, an appellate court may not reverse an award for civil liability
because an obligation was not established beyond reasonable doubt for, in civil
cases, only a preponderance of evidence is required. Likewise, an
administrative body may not require a degree of proof higher than the
substantial evidence contemplated in Sec. 5, Rule 133, of the Rules of Court,
and the rules of administrative due process enunciated in Ang Tibay v. The

Court of Industrial Relations, otherwise, what would prevent an agency from

demanding proof beyond reasonable doubt or require at least two or more
witnesses to support an administrative finding of fact. Then, an agency may
even create its own degree of proof like requiring five witnesses, or an
evidence be totally uncontested, to prove a claim all in the spirit of the
relative independence of administrative bodies from technical rules.

LAURA and ERIBERTO BAUTISTA, Petitioner, versus HON. COURT OF

APPEALS and FERNANDO MORELOS, Respondents
(G.R. No. 158015. August 11, 2004, 1st Division)
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

TOPIC: Clear and Convincing Evidence

FACTS:
A parcel of land with an area of approximately 105 square meters was
previously owned and registered in the name of the late Cesar Morelos. Cesar is
the uncle of petitioner Laura Morelos Bautista, being the brother of her mother,
Rosario Morelos. Cesar, who was married to Rosario Duran, did not have any
children. Rosario died in 1972. Cesar died of cardiac arrest on April 15,
1982. During his lifetime, Cesar sold and conveyed the above-mentioned
parcel of land in favor of petitioner Laura Morelos Bautista, as evidenced by a
Deed of Absolute Sale notarized by Luis M. de Guzman. Respondent
Fernando Morelos, claiming to be the illegitimate child of Cesar Morelos with
Angelina Lim-Gue, instituted a complaint for the declaration of nullity of sale
and title with damages. At the trial, he presented testimonies of expert
witnesses who claimed that the signature of Cesar Morelos on the Deed of
Absolute Sale and the fingerprint appearing on his Residence Certificate were
not his. Petitioners countered that the Deed of Absolute Sale was valid. The
witness to the Deed, Carmelita Marcelino, testified that she saw Cesar Morelos
and petitioner Laura Bautista sign the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the testimonies of expert witnesses are conclusive to be a

strong basis to nullify a duly executed and notarized deed of absolute sale.

HELD:
Under Rule 132, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, the genuineness of
handwriting may be proved in the following manner: (1) by any witness who
believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the
person write; or he has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the
witness has acted or been charged; (2) by a comparison, made by the witness
or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party, against
whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the
judge.
As a general rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by
clear, positive and convincing evidence. The burden of proof lies on the party
alleging forgery. Hence, a finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the
testimony of handwriting experts. Although such testimony may be useful, the
judge still exercises independent judgment on the issue of authenticity of the
signatures under scrutiny. In the case at bar, the presumption of validity and
regularity prevails over allegations of forgery and fraud. As against direct
evidence consisting of the testimony of a witness who was physically present at
the signing of the contract and who had personal knowledge thereof, the
testimony of an expert witness constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence
at best. Carmelita Marcelino having been physically present to see the
decedent Cesar Morelos and petitioner Laura Bautista affix their signatures on
the document, the weight of evidence preponderates in favor of petitioners. The
result of examinations of questioned handwriting, even with the benefit of aid
of experts and scientific instruments, is, at best, inconclusive. Besides, a
notarial document is evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal manner
therein expressed and has in its favor the presumption of regularity.
ROCKWELL PERFECTO GOHU, Petitioner, versus SPOUSES ALBERTO
GOHU and ADELAIDA GOHU, Respondents.
(G.R. No. 128230. October 13, 2000, 1st Division)
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
TOPIC: Clear and Convincing Evidence
FACTS:
Civil Case No. 89-5919 was a Complaint for Specific Performance filed by
petitioner against respondents to compel them to accept the P500,000.00

balance of the purchase price of P600,000.00 for a parcel of land allegedly sold
to him by the latter via an Option to Buy, and to execute a corresponding Deed
of Sale thereafter. The case was originally heard before Branch 142 of the
Makati Regional Trial Court with Judge Salvador P. De Guzman, Jr.
presiding. Respondents denied petitioner's claim, alleging that their signatures
on the purported Option to Buy, as well as those of the supposed witnesses
thereto, were forged. The NBI and the PC Crime Laboratory found that indeed
the signatures were forged. Respondent thus filed a Motion to Resolve Motion to
Dismiss. Before this incident could be resolved, petitioner filed a Motion for
Inhibition, on the ground that respondent's designated attorney-in-fact was a
relative of Judge De Guzman. This was denied by Judge De Guzman who
clarified that said attorney-in-fact was not a close relative of his. On June 28,
1991, Judge De Guzman granted the Motion to Dismiss but on appeal to the
Court of Appeals, the dismissal order was reversed and the case ordered
reinstated.
On June 29, 1995, petitioner filed a Motion for Disqualification of Judge
Francisco Donato Villanueva, who had replaced Judge Salvador as presiding
judge of Branch 142, on the ground that a partner in the law office
representing respondents, Gregorio Narvasa II, was the son-in-law of Atty.
Eduardo C. Tutaan who, in turn, acted as counsel for Judge Villanueva in an
administrative case filed against the latter. Judge Villanueva denied the said
Motion and set the case for pre-trial conference on August 28, 1995. During
the pre-trial conference, petitioner requested that he be allowed to have the
signatures of respondent Adelaida Gohu as well as those of the two witnesses
of the Option to Buy examined by expert witnesses as well. This was denied by
Judge Villanueva for being premature.
Following the continued resetting of the pre-trial, Judge Villanueva
ordered the pre-trial terminated and for trial to commence. He then gave the
parties five (5) days from receipt of the pre-trial order within which to file
motions for correction thereof, if any, and set the first trial date of the case on
February 16, 1996. On the scheduled trial date, counsel for petitioner
manifested that he had not yet received a copy of the pre-trial orders. Judge
Villanueva thus gave him an unsigned copy and directed him to read the same
and manifest any correction he may wish to make so that trial could proceed as
scheduled.
On March 4, 1996, at the scheduled trial for reception of petitioner's
evidence, petitioner instead filed a Second Motion for Inhibition based on Judge
Villanueva's alleged actuations that "grossly exhibited his bias for private
respondents and/or prejudice against the petitioner." The Motion was
denied. On the same date, Judge Villanueva issued an Order stating that
petitioner's case is deemed submitted for resolution without evidence in its
support.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not ordering the inhibition
of Judge Villanueva.

HELD:
In a string of cases decided by this Court, we said that while bias and
prejudice, which are relied upon by petitioner, have been recognized as valid
reasons for the voluntary inhibition of the judge under Rule 137, Section
1(2), of the Rules of Court, the rudimentary rule is that mere suspicion that a
judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence to
prove the charge of bias and partiality. Bare allegations of partiality and
prejudgment will not suffice. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed especially
if weighed against a judge's sacred obligation under his oath of office to
administer justice without respect to person and do equal right to the poor and
the rich.
In the case at bar, we agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner failed
to convincingly show Judge Villanueva's bias or prejudice. Indeed, we are in
accord with the Court of Appeals that such actuations did not engender
suspicion and doubt as to the fairness and ability to decide the case with the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge.

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION,

represented by the Philippine Department of
Justice, Petitioner, versus HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN
ANTONIO MUOZ, Respondents.
(G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007, En Banc)
SANDOVAL-GUTTIEREZ, J.
TOPIC: Clear and Convincing Evidence
FACTS:
Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with
three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation
of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong
Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of Conspiracy to defraud,
penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest were issued
against him. On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong
Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private
respondent. The RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against
private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.
Private respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition
for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition
cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." Judge Bernardo, Jr.
inhibited himself from further hearing the case, it was then raffled off to
Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. Private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail and this was
granted by respondent judge. Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the
above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the
Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
HELD:
No. Extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the
potential extradite nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely

administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person

accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from
which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. It does not necessarily
mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should
diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so,
where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by
international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not,
therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a
certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met. In his Separate Opinion in
Purganan, then Associate Justice Puno, proposed that a new standard, which
he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in
extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof
beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The
potential extradite must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not
a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition
court. In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented
evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. The case was remanded to the trial
court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the
basis of clear and convincing evidence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, versus RICARDO
JANAIRO y BACOMO, Accused-appellant.
[G.R. No. 129254. July 22, 1999, 3rd Division)
PANGANIBAN, J.:
TOPIC: Clear and Convincing Evidence
FACTS:
On November 13, 1992, an Information was filed charging appellant with
murder allegedly committed as follows: That on or about the 24th day of
October, 1992, in the afternoon, at the Palawan State College [PSC] Compound,
Barangay Tiniguiban, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with treachery and
evident premeditation, with intent to kill and while armed with a deadly
weapon, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack
and stab one Bencibeis Aguilar, thereby inflicting upon the latter [a stab]
wound on the chest, which was the direct and immediate cause of his death.
Trial ensued. Thereafter, the lower court promulgated its assailed
Decision, the dispositive part of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Court finds that the [p]rosecution has proven Ricardo Janairo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of [h]omicide and sentences him to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA with all its accessory penalties
and to pay the heirs of Bencibeis Aguilar actual damages in the amount of
P39,789.26 and P50,000.00 as compensation for the death of Bencibeis
Aguilar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant proved the elements of self-defense and
accident.

HELD:
No. Invoking self-defense is admitting authorship of the killing. Hence,
the burden of proof shifts to the accused, who must establish with clear and
convincing evidence all of these elements of the justifying circumstance: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person resorting to self-defense.
Herein appellant, however, failed to demonstrate the foregoing elements
clearly and convincingly. As the lower court observed, the testimonies of the
defense witnesses were improbable, inconsistent and unworthy of belief.
Assuming arguendo that these witnesses indeed saw the victim pull out a
knife, this fact alone did not establish unlawful aggression, since the victim
was not shown to have used the deadly weapon to attack the appellant.
The appellant also maintained before the lower court that the stabbing of
the victim was merely an accident; that is, it was not intentional. It must be
stressed that the accused has the burden of proving the elements of this
exempting circumstance. He must show the following with clear and convincing
evidence: 1) he was performing a lawful act with due care, 2) the injury caused
was by a mere accident, and 3) he had no fault or intention of causing the
injury. None of these was supported by the evidence on record. As has been
noted by the Court, the failure of the accused to prove self-defense belies his
claim that he was performing a lawful act one of the essential elements of
the exempting circumstance of accident.