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PP VS DY
158 SCRA 111
FACTS:
Accused is the owner of Bennys Bar at Boracay Island and was
sentenced with murder before the trial court for shooting a Swiss national in
his bar. The accused contends the court erred in admitting the presentation
of the prosecution of evidence that he came to a police officer and made a
confession on the crime and informed said officer where to find the gun he
used, a statement the accused denied to have done. They assail its
admissibility to the court on the grounds that such statement was not made
in writing and is in violation of the due process required in custodial
investigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence presented by the prosecution be
admissible to warrant guilt of the accused.
HELD:
In view of the documentary evidence on record, the defense lost its
credibility before the court. An oral confession made by the accused to the
officer and telling him the gun is in his bar which he wants to surrender can
be held admissible in court as evidence against him. This is because such
confession was made unsolicited by the police officer and the accused was
not under investigation when he made the oral confession. Therefore there is
no need to invoke compliance of the proper procedure in
a custodial investigation at the case at bar.
The rule on res gestae is applicable where a witness who heard the
confession is competent to satisfy the substance of what he heard if he
heard and understood it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim,
but in such a case it must be given in substance. Thus the oral confession
made by the accused outside the ambit of custodial investigation can be
admissible in court and was given due credence to warrant the judgment
of the accused being guilty of the crime.

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MAGONCIA VS PALACIO
80 PHIL 770
FACTS:
ZacariasMagoncia was arrested for the crime of robbery by a band
committed at the homeofHilarioEnovejas in Pangasinan. The police chief
ordered 4 policemen to go to Magoncia's home. These policemen, without a
search warrant, entered Magoncia's house where Magoncia's wife scolded
them for searching their home while Magoncia was not around. The
policemen found a paltik, a hand grenade, a box containing 42 rounds and
some pieces of cotton cloth owned by HilarioEnovejas.
A complaint of robbery by a band and illegal possession of firearm
were filed against the accused. For the complaint of illegal possession of
firearms, Magoncia filed a motion asking the trial court to order the return of
the illegally seized effects and to order the Fiscal (Palacio) to desist from
using such effects as evidence. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant
now comes to the Supreme Court on certiorari and requests to revoke the
order of the trial court judge and to order the fiscal to desist from using
the seized items as evidence for the reason that they have been illegally
seized.
ISSUE:
WON the defendant is entitled to the return of the items seized
HELD:
No.Republic Act No. 4 prohibits the possession of firearm; the mere
possession is a crime. Possession ofcontraband is punishable by law. The
Constitution does not guarantee immunity to a smuggler.Return of the items
to the defendant and to prevent them from being presented as evidence is
toexonerate the crime punished by RA No. 4.
There is a wide distinction between the seizure of property lawfully
within the possession of aperson and the seizure of property held and used in
violation of law. Thus contraband articles andthose things which under the
law one has no right to possess, for the purpose of issue ordisposition, are
not embraced in the protection of the constitutional guaranty. Indeed,
anindividual in the possession of such goods is entitled to no protection
whatsoever, for such goodsare not subject to ownership, and may be
forfeited or destroyed. They are, therefore, subject tosearch and seizure.

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PP VS MIRANTES
249 SCRA 179
FACTS:
Appellant and a certain GuarbertoBalolong were charged with having
conspired and confederated in wilfully and feloniously selling, transporting
and delivering two sticks of marijuana cigarettes.
At the arraignment, appellant Mirantes pleaded not guilty to the charge
against him. Curiously, the records do not disclose the specific participation
of accused GuarbertoBalolong, except as hereinafter noted in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, and the certification in said
information merely states that "accused GuarbertoBalolong y Chin could not
be contacted and his whereabout(s) could not be ascertained." No warrant
for his arrest appears to have been issued and it was only at the penultimate
hearing of the case that the trial court ordered the issuance of a warrant of
arrest upon being informed by the trial fiscal that said accused was still at
large.
After trial, appellant was found guilty as charged by the court a
quo which rendered the assailed judgment. He now comes to this Court for
the reversal of said verdict, contending that the trial court erred in (1) giving
absolute credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses which are
inherently improbable, inconsistent and unbelievable; (2) appreciating the
seizure receipt of property signed by him without the assistance of counsel
during custodial investigation; and (3) convicting him despite the existence
of overwhelming doubts.
ISSUE:
WON there was a violation of the rights of the accused in the case at
bar.
HELD:
Yes. The oft-cited presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions cannot by itself affect the constitutional presumption of
innocence enjoyed by an accused, particularly when the prosecution's
evidence is weak. The evidence of the prosecution must be strong enough to
pierce the shield of this presumptive innocence and to establish the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. And where the evidence of the

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prosecution is insufficient to overcome this presumption, necessarily, the

judgment of conviction of the court a quo must be set aside. The onus
probandi on the prosecution is not discharged by casting doubts upon the
innocence of an accused, but by eliminating all reasonable doubts as to his
guilt.

PP VS DUHAN
142 SCRA 100 ; 1986
FACTS:
From the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila finding them
guilty of violating Section 4 in relation to Section 21, Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended, Jose Duhan, Manuel Recla and Roger Reyes, have appealed to this
Court. Appellants Duhan and Recla.They were all charged under an
information reading as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of June, 1982, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused not being authorized by law to sell, deliver, give
away to another or distribute any prohibited drugs, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly jointly sell or offer for sale to the public the
following: dried marijuana leaves wrapped in an aluminum foil and one stick
of marijuana cigarette, which is a prohibited drug.
Upon the other hand, the appellants contend that the evidence on
record does not justify the Trial Court's findings, but on the contrary,
demonstrates the existence of a quite different version of the facts, for which
reason they are entitled to an acquittal at least on reasonable doubt. They
invoke the familiar doctrine that "an accused should be convicted on the
strength of the evidence presented by the prosecution and not on the
weakness of his defense."
ISSUE:
WON there was a violation of the rights of the accused in the case at
bar.
HELD:
Yes. As it is the obligation of the investigating officer to inform a person
under investigation of his right to remain silent and to counsel, so it is the
duty of the prosecution to affirmatively establish compliance by the

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investigating officer with his said obligation. Absent such affirmative

showing, the admission or confession made by a person under investigation
cannot be admitted in evidence.

PP VS MARTI
193 SCRA 527
FACTS:
On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley
Reyes went to Manila Packaging and Export Forwarders to send packages to
Zurich, Switzerland. It was received by Anita Reyes and ask if she could
inspect the packages. Shirley refused and eventually convinced Anita to seal
the package making it ready for shipment. Before being sent out for delivery,
Job Reyes, husband of Anita and proprietor of the courier company,
conducted an inspection of the package as part of standard operating
procedures. Upon opening the package, he noticed a suspicious odor which
made him took sample of the substance he found inside. He reported this to
the NBI and invited agents to his office to inspect the package. In the
presence of the NBI agents, Job Reyes opened the suspicious package and
found dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case was filed against Andre Marti in
violation of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the court a quo.
Andre filed an appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that his
constitutional right of privacy was violated and that the evidence acquired
from his package was inadmissible as evidence against him.
ISSUE:
WON there was an invalid search and seizure in the case at bar.
HELD:
There was none. The evidence seized herein is admissible in evidence.
Also, there was no violation of the right of privacy of the accused.

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The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas

that the Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the
state.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures
therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its
agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not meant to be
invoked against acts of private individuals.
It will be recalled that Mr Job Reyes was the one who opened the box in
the presence of the NBI agents in his place of business. The mere presence
of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Mr.
Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the constitution.
Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.

MANALILI VS CA
280 SCRA 400 ; 1997
FACTS:
Narcotics officers were doing surveillance and chanced upon the accused in a
cemetery who seemed to be high on drugs. He tried to resist the police
officers and upon inquiry, found that the accused was possessing what
seemed to be crushed marijuana leaves.
HELD:
A stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a
police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for
weapons. It has been held as one of the exceptions to the general rule
against searches without warrant.

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MANALILI VS CA
280 SCRA 400 ; 1997
FACTS:
The Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police was conducting
surveillance in front of the Kalookan City Cemetary due to reports of drug
addicts frequenting the area. They observed Alain Manalili in the area, with
reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner, signs of being high on
drugs. They stopped Manalili and asked for the contents of his hands, which
turned out to be a wallet. Inside the wallet, police officers found what later
on turned out to be crushed marijuana. He was charged with Illegal
Possession of Marijuana under the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Manaliliclaimed the charges were trumped up and that the police
officers had blackmailed him. In addition, petitioner asserts that the evidence
seized was inadmissible against him, as fruits of an illegal seizure.
On the otherhand, the Solicitor General counters that the search and
seizure was valid, but regardless of its validity, its defense had been waived
by petitioner since it was not raised in the lower court.
ISSUE:
WON the search of Manalili and seizure of marijuana valid
HELD:
Yes. The General Rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by
a judicial warrant, otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional.
However, there are exceptions to the rule: 1) search incidental to a lawful

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arrest, 2) search of a moving vehicle, 3) seizure in plain view, 4) customs

search and 5) waiver by the accused.
The court added another exception, the stop-and frisk, which is the
right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him and pat
him for weapons. This is for the safety of police officers and the general
public. Of course, the stop-and-frisk must be grounded on probable cause
that the accused has committed an offense. As such, the court ruled that the
search and seizure was valid and admissible as evidence. In addition,
Manalili had effectively waived the defense of an invalid search since this
issue was not raised during the trial. Such issues may not be raised for the
first time on appeal

PP VS MALMSTEDT
G.R. NO.91107 ; JUNE 19, 1991
FACTS:
Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first regional
command (NARCOM) stationed at camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a
temporary checkpoint for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from
the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint was prompted by
persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs. And an information also was received
about a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited
drugs.
The bus where accused Malmstedt, a Swedish National, was riding
was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced
that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an
inspection. During the inspection CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on the waist of
the accused. Suspecting the bulge on the waist of the accused to be a gun,
the officer asked for accuseds passport and other identification papers.
When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out
whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. And it turned out to be a
pouched bag and when accused opened the same bag the officer noticed
four suspicious looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape. It contained
hashish, a derivative of marijuana.

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Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the bus for questioning.
But before he alighted from the bus accused stopped to get two travelling
bags. The officer inspects the bag. It was only after the officers had opened
the bags that the accused finally presented his passport. The two bags
contained a stuffed toy each upon inspection the stuff toy contained also
hashish.
ISSUE:
WON there was unreasonable search and seizure.
HELD:
None. The constitution states that a peace officer or a private person
may arrest a person without a warrant when in his presence the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense.
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited
drugs. A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was
caught in flagrante delicto, thus the search made upon his personal effects
falls squarely under the law, which allows a warrantless search incident to a
lawful arrest.
Also, the offense was recognized with the warrantless search
conducted by NARCOM prompted by probable cause: (1) the receipt of
information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had
prohibited drugs in his possession and (2) failure of the accused to
immediately present his passport.
receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had
prohibited drugs in his possession and (2) failure of the accused to
immediately presenthis passport.

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PP VS MALMSTEDT
G.R. NO.91107 ; JUNE 19, 1991
FACTS:
Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, was found, via a routine NARCO
M
inspection at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay Mountain Province, carrying Hashish
,a
derivative of Marijuana. RTC La Trinidad found him guilty for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. The accused filed a petition to the Supreme Court for
the reversal of the decision arguing that the search and the arrest made was
illegal because there was no search warrant.
ISSUE:
WON there was an illegal warrantless arrest.
HELD:
None. The constitution states that a peace officer or a private person
may arrest a person without a warrant when in his presence the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense. The offense was recognized with the warrantless search
conducted by NARCOM prompted by probable cause: (1)
thereceipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada
had prohibited drugs in his possession and (2) failure of the accused to
immediately present his passport.

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PP VS SALVATIERRA
276 SCRA 55
FACTS:
While Charlie Fernandez was walking towards Quiapo, appellant and
the two accused lunged a pointed instrument at Charlie, hitting the latter at
the left breast which eventually resulted to his death.
On Nov. 15, 1990 the police received a complaint that appellant was
creating a commotion. He was thereafter taken in custody. Appellant put up
the defense of alibi alleging that he was having merienda with his wife and
children when the incident occurred. He also alleged that he had an
altercation with a woman on that day who caused his arrest for the crime of
malicious mischief, wherein he was detained after. Then, when the police
arrived, they brought him to the Homicide Section where he was investigated
for the stabbing of Fernandez. Appellant claimed that the arrest was made
almost 3 months after the commission of the crime and no warrant had been
obtained during the 3-month intervening period between the commission of
the crime and his apprehension, thus making the arrest illegal.
ISSUE:
WON the arrest herein made is violative of the constitutional rights of
the accused.
HELD:
No. Appellant is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest
considering that he never raised it before entering his plea. Any objection
involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure in the acquisition over the
person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise,
objection is deemed waived.

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SPOUSES SING VS CHOA-CHUY

G.R. NO.179736 ; JUNE 26, 2013
FACTS:
This case involves two families that owned adjoining properties in
Mandaue City, Cebu. The Choachuys built an auto repair shop in their
premises. Later, the Hings began to construct a fence around their property
which was being used as a business office.
The Choachuys went to court to demand that their neighbor be ordered
to desist from constructing the fence because it allegedly did not have a
valid permit and that it would destroy the wall of their shop that was
adjacent to the fence. The court denied the petition for failure to
substantiate the damages claimed. Smarting from this defeat, the
Choachuys installed in their shop two video surveillance cameras facing their
neighbors property to record the construction of the fence.
The Hings resented the installation of the cameras and, invoking
invasion of their right to privacy, asked the court to order the removal of the
CCTVs and illegal surveillance.
ISSUE:
WON there is a violation of petitioners right to privacy.
HELD:
Yes, there is. In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to
privacy, courts use the reasonable expectation of privacy test. This test
determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and
whether the expectation has been violated.
In this case, considering that petitioners have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in their property, whether they use it as a business office or as a
residence and that the installation of video surveillance cameras directly
facing petitioners property or covering a significant portion thereof, without
their consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy.

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RAMIREZ VS CA
G.R. NO.93833 ; SEPTEMBER 28, 1995
FACTS:
A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the
RTC of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a
confrontation in the latters office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated
her in a hostile and furious mood and in a manner offensive to petitioners
dignity and personality, contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy.
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of
the event. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a
tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioners recording of the event and alleging that the
said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent
filed a criminal case before the RTC of Pasay City for violation of R.A. 4200,
entitled An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wiretapping and Other Related
Violations of Private Communication, and Other Purposes.
ISSUE:
WON there was a violation of right to privacy in the case at bar.
HELD:
Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal
for any person, not authorized by all parties to any private communication,
to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law
makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the
private communication. The statutes intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of qualifier
any. Consequently, as respondent CA correctly concluded, even a (person)
privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another
without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator under this
provision of RA 4200.

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The unambiguity of the express words of the provision therefore plainly

supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to
penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law
makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

SALCEDO ORTANEZ VS CA
G.R. NO.110662 ; AUGUST 4, 1994
FACTS:
Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the Quezon City RTC a
complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner
Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or
psychological incapacity of the petitioner.
Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three cassette tapes
of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified
persons. These tape recordings were made and obtained when private
respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home
telephone.
Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to Rafaels oral offer of
evidence. However, the trial court admitted all of private respondents
offered evidence and later on denied her motion for reconsideration,
prompting petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with the CA to assail the
admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.
ISSUE:
WON there was a violation of right to privacy in the case at bar.
HELD:
Yes. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire
Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and
for other purposes expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in
evidence. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for
any person, not authorized by all parties to any private communication, to
secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder.

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Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone

conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the
subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.

BOARD OF EDUCATION VS ALLEN

392 US 236
FACTS:
The New York's Education Law requires local public school authorities
to lend textbooks free of charge to all students in grades seven to 12,
including those in private schools. Appellant school boards sought a
declaration that the statutory requirement was invalid as violative of the
State and Federal Constitutions, an order barring appellee Commissioner of
Education from removing appellants' members from office for failing to
comply with it, and an order preventing the use of state funds for the
purchase of textbooks to be lent to parochial students.
ISSUE:
WON the statute in the case at bar is violative of the law on the
separation of the church and the State.
HELD:
No. The express purpose of the statute was the furtherance of
educational opportunities for the young, and the law merely makes available
to all children the benefits of a general program to lend school books free of
charge, and the financial benefit is to parents and children, not to schools.
Parochial schools, in addition to their sectarian function, perform the
task of secular education, and, on the basis of this meager record, the Court
cannot agree with appellants that all teaching in a sectarian school is
religious, or that the intertwining of secular and religious training is such that
secular textbooks furnished to students are, in fact, instrumental in teaching
religion.

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Since appellants have not shown that the law coerces them in any way
in the practice of religion, there is no violation of the Free Exercise Clause.

ENGEL VS VITALE
370 US 421
FACTS:
A New York State law required public schools to open each day with the
Pledge of Allegiance and a nondenominational prayer in which the students
recognized their dependence upon God. The law allowed students to absent
themselves from this activity if they found it objectionable. A parent sued on
behalf of his child, arguing that the law violated the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment, as made applicable to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
ISSUE:
WON school-sponsored nondenominational prayer in public schools
violates the freedom to religion
HELD:
Yes. The majority, via Justice Black, held that school-sponsored prayer
violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The majority
stated that the provision allowing students to absent themselves from this
activity did not make the law constitutional because the purpose of the First
Amendment was to prevent government interference with religion. The
majority noted that religion is very important to a vast majority of the
American people. Since Americans adhere to a wide variety of beliefs, it is
not appropriate for the government to endorse any particular belief system.

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NEAR VS MINNESOTA
283 US 697
FACTS:
The Saturday Press (the Press) published attacks on local officials. The
Press claimed that the chief of police had illicit relations with gangsters.
Minnesota officials obtained an injunction in order to abate the publishing of
the Press newspaper under a state law that allowed this course of action. The
state law authorized abatement, as a public nuisance, of a malicious,
scandalous and defamatory newspaper, or other periodical. A state court
order abated the Press and enjoined the Defendants, publishers of the Press
(Defendants), from publishing or circulating such defamatory and
scandalous periodicals.
ISSUE:
WON the statute authorizing such proceedings is consistent with the
conception of theliberty of the press as historically conceived and
guaranteed
HELD:
No. Judgment of the state court reversed. The fact that the liberty of
press may be abused by miscreant purveyors of scandal does not affect the
requirement that the press has immunity from previous restraints when it
deals with official misconduct. Subsequent punishment for such abuses as

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may exist is the appropriate remedy, consistent with the constitutional

privilege. Therefore, a statute authorizing such proceedings is not consistent
with the conception of the liberty of the press as historically conceived and
guaranteed and is thus, unconstitutional. The statute in question cannot be
justified by reason of the fact that the publisher is permitted to show, before
injunction issues, that the matter published is true and is published with
good motives and for justifiable ends. This statute, if upheld, could lead to a
complete system of censorship. Thus, the statute is a substantial
infringement on the liberty of the press and in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution.

Dissenting Opinion:
This statute does not operate as a previous restraint on publication within
proper meaning of that phrase.
Discussion:
The Supreme Court of the United States in this case extended the
presumption against prior restraint in the licensing context to judicial restraints as
well.

KINGSLEY BOOKS VS BROWN

354 US 436
FACTS:
A New York state law authorized the legal counsel for a municipality to
seek an injunction against and the destruction of material deemed by the
courts to be obscene. Peter Campbell Brown, Corporation Counsel for the
City of New York, sought such an injunction against several bookstores. The
process of review that followed was a civil, rather than criminal procedure,
and the courts ultimately granted the injunction and sought to destroy the
obscene material.
ISSUE:
WON the civil procedure as laid out by New York statute violate the
booksellers' rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment by not allowing for a criminal trial before imposing an injunction
and destroying the obscene material
HELD:

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No. In a 54 opinion authored by Justice Felix Frankfurter, the Court

concluded that the civil procedure complied with the requirements of due
process. Justice Frankfurter noted that the procedural safeguards were not
significantly different from many state criminal misdemeanor procedures, nor
were the penalties any more severe. The opinion also reaffirmed the existing
notion that the constitutional protection of speech does not extend to
obscene material.

GROSJEAN VS AMERICAN PRESS CO.

297 US 233

FACTS:
A Louisiana law imposed on publishing companies a license tax of 2%
of the gross receipts for the privilege of engaging in advertising in
newspapers, magazines or periodicals if their circulation is more than 20,000
copies per week. Nine Louisiana-based publishers of newspapers, with
circulations of more than 20,000 copies per week each, filed a suit to enjoin
the enforcement against them of the said provision. They assailed the
validity of the act on the ground, inter alia, that it abridges the freedom of
the press in contravention of the due process clause contained in the
FourteenthAmendment of the U.S. Constitution.

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ISSUE:
WON the statute abridge the freedom of the press in contravention of
the due process clause contained in the Fourteenth Amendment
HELD:
Yes. A unanimous U.S. Supreme Court held that the act imposing the
tax in question is unconstitutional under the due process of law clause
because it abridges the freedom of the press.
The tax here involved is bad not because it takes money from the
pockets of the appellees. If that were all, a wholly different question would be
presented. It is bad because, in the light of its history and of its present
setting, it is seen to be a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a
tax to limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled in
virtue of the constitutional guaranties. A free press stands as one of the
great interpreters between the government and the people. To allow it to be
fettered is to fetter ourselves.

IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS CA
259 SCRA 529
FACTS:
Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program AngIglesiani Cristo of
the religious group Iglesiani Cristo (INC) were rated X i.e., not for public
viewing by the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and
Television (now MTRCB). These TV programs allegedly offended and
constituted an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by
law because of petitioner INCs controversial biblical interpretations and its
attacks against contrary religious beliefs.

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The CA ruled that: (1) the respondent Board has jurisdiction and power
to review the TV program AngIglesiani Cristo, and (2) the respondent Board
did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the
exhibition on TV of the three series of AngIglesiani Cristo on the ground
that the materials constitute an attack against another religion. The CA also
found the subject TV series indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good
customs. Dissatisfied with the CA decision, petitioner INC appealed to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
WON there was a violation of the freedom of religion and freedom of
speech of appellant herein.
HELD:
Yes. Respondent board cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesiani
Cristo simply because it attacks other religions. It is only where it is
unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the
security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom
may be justified. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the
tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the
threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech,
cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a
substantive and imminent evil.

PRIMICIAS VS FUGOSO
80 PHIL 71
FACTS:
An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the
respondent to issue a permit to them to hold a public meeting in Plaza
Miranda for redress of grievances to the government.

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The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the
permit is, "that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous
utterances and upon the fact that passions, especially on the part of the
losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered
tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their
government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten
breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order
ISSUE:
WON there is a violation of the freedom of speech in the case at bar.
HELD:
Yes. The Mayors first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury
cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the
function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify
suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that
serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable
ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be
reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one.
The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of
property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the
probability of serious injury to the state.

SCHENCK VS US
249 US 97
FACTS:
During World War I, Schenck mailed circulars to draftees. The circulars
suggested that the draft was a monstrous wrong motivated by the capitalist

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system. The circulars urged "Do not submit to intimidation" but advised only
peaceful action such as petitioning to repeal the Conscription Act. Schenck
was charged with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act by attempting to
cause insubordination in the military and to obstruct recruitment.
ISSUE:
WON the actions (words, expression) of appellant herein are protected
by the free speech clause of the First Amendment
HELD:
No. The Court concluded that Schenck is not protected in this situation.
The character of every act depends on the circumstances. "The question in
every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."
During wartime, utterances tolerable in peacetime can be punished.

TERMINIELLO VS CITY OF CHICAGO

337 US 1
FACTS:

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Father Arthur Terminiello, in an auditorium in Chicago, delivered a

vitriolic speech in which he criticized various political and racial groups and
viciously condemned the protesting crowd that had gathered outside the
auditorium. Policemen assigned to the event were unable to prevent several
disturbances by the "angry and turbulent" crowd. The police arrested
Terminiello for "breach of the peace." He was then tried and convicted for his
central role in inciting a riot.
ISSUE:
WON the ordinance violate Terminiello's right of free expression
guaranteed by the First Amendment
HELD:
Yes. The Court held that the "breach of the peace" ordinance
unconstitutionally infringed upon the freedom of speech. Noting that "the
vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends on free
discussion," the Court held that speech could be restricted only in the event
that it was "likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious
substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or
unrest."

BAYAN MUNA VS ERMITA

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488 SCRA 226

FACTS:
Petitioners in this case come in three groups :BayanMuna et al, Jess del
Prado et al, and Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) et al. Their rally was scheduled to
proceed along Espaa Avenue in front of the University of Santo Tomas and
going towards Mendiolabridge. Police officers blocked petitioners herein
along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further. They
were then forcibly dispersed causing injuries upon some of them while others
were arrested. All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the
Calibrated Pre-emptive Response Policy adopted by the administration
against public rallies. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under the
no permit, no rally policy and the CPR policy.
On the other hand, respondents herein aversthat neither B.P. No. 880
nor CPR is void on its face. Petitioners cannot honestly claim that the time,
place and manner regulation embodied in B.P. No. 880 violates the threepronged test for such a measure, to wit: (a) B.P. No. 880 is contentneutral, i.e., it has no reference to content of regulated speech; (b) B.P. No.
880 is narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, i.e., the
interest cannot be equally well served by a means that is less intrusive of
free speech interests; and (c) B.P. No. 880 leaves open alternative channels
for communication of the information.
ISSUE:
WON B.P. 880 and the CPR is unconstitutional.
HELD:
The petitions herein are granted in part. B.P. 880 is not an absolute ban
of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place
and manner of the assemblies. It refers to all kinds of public assemblies that
would use public places.
However, the so-called Calibrated Pre-emptive Response policy has no
place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that
shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police
agents to justify abuses. Insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu
of maximum tolerance, this was declared null and void. Respondents are
enjoined to refrain from using it and to strictly observe the requirements of
maximum tolerance.

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SANTIAGO VS SC
A.C. NO.7399 ;AUGUST 25, 2009
FACTS:
After Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago was not considered for the
position of Chief Justice by the Judicial and Bar Council, she delivered a
speech on the Senate floor and was quoted as saying:
I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am
suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel
like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am
nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his
cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of
Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another
environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots. . .
In a sworn letter complaint dated December 22, 2006, a certain Antero
J. Pobre asked the Supreme Court to undertake disbarment proceedings or
other disciplinary action against Senator Santiago on the ground that her
statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards
then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court
and constituted direct contempt of court.
In her comment, Senator Santiago, through counsel, did not deny
making the statements. However, she explained that those statements were
covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being
part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of
Congress. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in
the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future
remedial legislation.
ISSUE:
WON Senator Santiagos act are protected by her constitutional rights.
HELD:
Yes. The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the
provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution.
Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the
manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee
rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of

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the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the
privilege. The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not the
courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the
name of parliamentary immunity.
SORIANO VS MTRCB
G.R. NO.165636
FACTS:
Ang Dating Daan host Eliseo S. Soriano uttered the following
statements in his TV program against Michael Sandoval (Iglesiani Cristos
minister and regular host of the TV program AngTamangDaan):
Lehitimonganak ng demonyo[!] Sinungaling [!]
Gagokatalaga[,] Michael[!] [M]asaholka pa saputangbabae[,] o di ba[?] []Yung
putangbabae[,] anggumaganalangdoon[,] []yungibaba, dito kay Michael[,]
anggumaganaangitaas, o di ba? O, masahol pa saputangbabae []yan.
Sobraangkasinungalingan ng mgademonyongito.

As a result, The MTRCB initially slapped Sorianos Ang Dating Daan,

which was earlier given a G rating for general viewership, with a 20-day
preventive suspension after a preliminary conference. Later, in a decision, it
found him liable for his utterances, and was imposed a three-month
suspension from his TV program Ang Dating Daan.
ISSUE:
WON Sorianos statements during the televised Ang Dating Daan part
of the religious discourse and within the protection of the freedom of speech.
HELD:
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case and considering the
adverse effect of petitioners utterances on the viewers fundamental rights
as well as petitioners clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the
MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three
months. Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioners
suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as a
prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given
above (re the paramount of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character
of a broadcasters role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast
media), a requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary
effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There
are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less
offensive language.

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BORJAL VS CA
301 SCRA 1
FACTS:
A civil action for damages based on libel was filed before the court
against Borjal and Soliven for writing and publishing articles that are
allegedly derogatory and offensive against Francisco Wenceslao, attacking
among others the solicitation letters he send to support a conference to be
launch concerning resolving matters on transportation crisis that is tainted
with anomalous activities. Wenceslao however was never named in any of
the articles nor was the conference he was organizing. The lower court
ordered petitioners to indemnify the private respondent for damages which
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. A petition for review was filed before
the SC contending that private respondent was not sufficiently identified to
be the subject of the published articles.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to constitute guilt of
petitioners for libel.
HELD:
There are none. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the
victim be identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It is also
not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person
attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person could
identify him as the object of the libelous publication. These requisites have
not been complied with in the case at bar. The element of identifiability was
not met since it was Wenceslaso who revealed he was the organizer of said
conference and had he not done so the public would not have known.
The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of
the press and that privileged communications must be protective of public
opinion. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and
constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander.

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BORJAL VS CA
301 SCRA 1
(Constitutional Law Right to Free Press, Newspaper Commentaries is
Privileged Communication)
FACTS:
Private respondent filed for damages against petitioners for the series
of articles written by the latter in a newspaper column, which dealt with
alleged anomalous activities without naming or identifying private
respondent. Petitioners contend that the right to free press is a privilege
communication.
ISSUE:
WON commentaries on matters of public interest are privilege.
HELD:
Yes. No culpability could be imputed to petitioners for the alleged
offending publication without doing violence to the concept of privileged
communications implicit in the freedom of the press.

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IBP VS ATIENZA
G.R. NO.175241 ; FEBRUARY 24, 2010
FACTS:
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, thru its president Jose Anselmo
Cadiz filed a letter application for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola
Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 to 5:30 PM, before the Office of the City
Mayor of Manila, Mayor Jose Atienza. The latter granted a permit but
changed the venue to Plaza Miranda, which permit the IBP received on June
19, 2006. The IBP, Attys. Harry Roque, Joel Butuyan, and Anselmo Cadiz then
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Action. Having been unacted
within 24 hours from its filing, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari
with the Supreme Court, which it denied because of the pendency of the CA
petition. The rally pushed thru on June 22, 2006 at the foot of the Mendiola
Bridge, despite the Manila Police District barring them from doing so. After
the rally, they voluntarily dispersed. On June 22, 2006, the MPD filed a
criminal case against Atty. Cadiz for violation of the Public Assembly Act for
staging a rally not indicated in the permit, which he answered.
ISSUE:
WON the Public Assembly Act violates the right to assembly.
HELD:

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Yes. It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not
devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a permit would be
granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence
requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly
occur but of what may probably occur, given all the relevant
circumstances, still the assumption especially so where the
assembly is scheduled for a specific public place is that the permit
must be for the assembly being held there. The exercise of such a
right, in the language of Justice Roberts, speaking for the American
Supreme Court, is not to be abridged on the plea that it may be
exercised in some other place.

REYES VS CA
G.R. NO.182161 ; DECEMBER 3, 2009
FACTS:
Fr. Reyes was among of those who were arrested during the Manila
Peninsula Hotel siege, 30th of November, 2007 and they were temporarily
held at Camp Crame. A Hold Departure Order (HDO) for the petitioner and to
the other accused was issued by the DOJ upon the request of the
Department of Interior and Local Government. Probable cause was found
during investigation and petitioner was charged with rebellion. The RTC
however dismissed the charge against him but the HDO was still in effect.
Petitioner requested that HDO should be lifted in view of the dismissal of the
criminal case. Petitioner argued that a writ of amparo should be issued
against the respondents, violating the whole breadth of rights enshrined in
the Constitution, specifically, his right to travel.
ISSUE:
WON the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
HELD:

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No. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any

person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of
a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
The restriction on petitioners right to travel as a consequence of the
pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner
has failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and
to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty
and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or
remedy.
A persons right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed
by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases,
whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for
humanitarian reasons is a matter of the courts sound discretion.

MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS
G.R. NO.88211 ; SEPTEMBER 13, 1989 & OCTOBER 27, 1989
FACTS:
After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his
family fled to Hawaii. Now in his deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to
order the respondents to issue their travel documents and enjoin the
implementation of the Presidents decision to bar their return to the
Philippines. Petitioners contend under the provision of the Bill of Rights that
the President is without power to impair their liberty of abode because only a
court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor, according to the
petitioners, may the President impair their right to travel because no law has
authorized her to do so.
ISSUE:
WON the Presidents act violates the constitutional right of the
Marcos.

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HELD:
No. The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the
people, promote their welfare and advance national interest. This case calls
for the exercise of the Presidents power as protector of the peace. The
president is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of
emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-day problems of maintaining
peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign
foe appears on the horizon.
The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or
with grave abuse of discretion in determining the return of the petitioners at
the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines.

ADMU VS CAPULONG
222 SCRA 644
FACTS:
On February 8, 9, and 10 of 1991, a fraternity in Ateneo Law School
named Aquila Legis conducted its initiation rites upon neophytes.
Unfortunately, one neophyte died as a result thereof and one was
hospitalized due to serious physical injuries. In a resolution dated March 9,
1991, the Disciplinary Board formed by Ateneo found seven students guilty
of violating Rule 3 of the Rules on Discipline. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, then
president of Ateneo, on the basis of the findings, ordered the expulsion of the
seven students. However, on May 17, 1991, Judge Ignacio Capulong of the
Makati RTC, upon the students petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus, ordered Ateneo to reverse its decision and reinstate the said
students.

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ISSUE:
WON the Ateneo Law School has violated the students right of
association.
HELD:
No. Ateneo has the competence and the power to dismiss its erring
students and therefore it had validly exercised such power. The students do
not deserve to claim such a venerable institution such as Ateneo as their
own a minute longer for they may forseeably cast a malevolent influence on
students currently enrolled as well as those who come after them. This is
academic freedom on the part of the school which includes: a. freedom to
determine who may teach; b. freedom to determine what may be taught; c.
freedom to determine how it shall be taught; d. freedom to determine who
may be admitted to study.

IN THE MATTER OF IBP MEMBERSHIP DUES DELINQUENCY OF ATTY.

MARCIAL EDILLON
A.M. NO. 1928
84 SCRA 554 ; AUGUST 3, 1978
FACTS:
This is an administrative case against Edillon who refuses to pay his
IBP membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A
and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP ByLaws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and
suspension for failure to pay the same. He contends that the stated

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provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights of being

compelled to be a member of the IBP in order to practice his profession and
thus deprives his rights to liberty and property and thereby null and void.
ISSUE:
WON the assailed provisions constitutes a deprivation of liberty and
property of the respondent.
HELD:
No. The court held that the IBP is a State-organized Bar as
distinguished from bar associations that are organized by individual lawyers
themselves, membership of which is voluntary. The IBP however is
an official national body of which all lawyers must be a member and are
subjected to the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar which
includes payment of reasonable annual fee for the purpose of carrying out its
objectives and implementation of regulations in the practice of law. The
provisions assailed does not infringe the constitutional rights of the
respondent as it is a valid exercise of police power necessary to perpetuate
its existence with regulatory measures to implement. The name of Edillon
was stricken out from the rolls of attorney for being a delinquent member of
the bar.

CLEMONS VS NOLTING
42 PHIL 702

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LIM VS REGISTRAR OF DEEDS

46 OG 3665

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LOVING VS VIRGINIA
388 US 1
FACTS:
In 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a black woman, and
Richard Loving, a white man, were married in the District of Columbia. The
Lovings returned to Virginia shortly thereafter. The couple was then charged

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with violating the state's antimiscegenation statute, which banned interracial marriages. The Lovings were found guilty and sentenced to a year in
jail (the trial judge agreed to suspend the sentence if the Lovings would
leave Virginia and not return for 25 years).
ISSUE:
WON Virginia's antimiscegenation law violate the equal protection
clause
HELD:
Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that distinctions drawn
according to race were generally "odious to a free people" and were subject
to "the most rigid scrutiny" under the Equal Protection Clause. The Virginia
law, the Court found, had no legitimate purpose "independent of invidious
racial discrimination." The Court rejected the state's argument that the
statute was legitimate because it applied equally to both blacks and whites
and found that racial classifications were not subject to a "rational purpose"
test under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court also held that the Virginia
law violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "Under
our Constitution," wrote Chief Justice Earl Warren, "the freedom to marry, or
not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual, and cannot
be infringed by the State."

ZABLOCKI VS REDHAIL
44 US 674
FACTS:

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Roger C. Redhail, a Wisconsin minor, fathered a child. A court ordered

him to pay child support. Two years later, he applied for a marriage license in
Milwaukee County. His application was denied by County Clerk Thomas E.
Zablocki who declined to issue the license under a state statute on the
ground that Redhail owed more than $3,700 in child support. Redhail filed a
class action in federal district court against Zablocki and all Wisconsin county
clerks. The court ruled in Redhail's favor. Zablocki appealed to the United
States Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
WON the Wisconsin statute violates the equal protection clause
HELD:
Yes. The Court held that the Wisconsin's statute violated the equal
protection clause and reaffirmed that marriage was a fundamental right. The
Court emphasized marriage as part of the right to privacy found in the
Fourteenth Amendment. While the state has an interest in ensuring that child
support obligations were fulfilled, this statute only regulated those who
wished to be married and did not justify the restriction on the right to
marriage.

SKINNER VS OKLAHOMA
316 US 535

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FACTS:
Oklahoma defined a habitual criminal as a person who, having been
convicted two or more times for crimes amounting to felonies involving
moral turpitude either in Oklahoma or another State, is thereafter convicted
of such a felony in Oklahoma and is sentenced to a term of imprisonment in
a Oklahoma penal institution. Such habitual criminals could be subject to
forced sterilization. The Petitioner had been twice arrested for theft offenses
before being arrested and confined for armed robbery. During his third
incarceration, the Act was passed and proceedings were instituted against
him.
ISSUE:
WON the State may sterilize an individual against his will for being
convicted of threefelonies involving moral turpitude
HELD:
No. A unanimous Court held that the Act violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since some crimes such as
embezzlement, punishable as felonies in Oklahoma, were excluded from the
Act's jurisdiction, Justice Douglas reasoned that the law had laid "an unequal
hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense."
Moreover, Douglas viewed procreation as one of the fundamental rights
requiring the judiciary's strict scrutiny.

MELKIN VS WOLFE
2 PHIL 74

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US VS DIAZ CONDE
42 PHIL 766, 770 ; 1922
FACTS:

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On December 30, 1915, complainants Bartolome Oliveros and

EngraciaLianco entered into a contract with the defendants concerning a
debt of P300. Oliveros and company were obligated to pay five percent
interest per month within the first ten days of every month.
On May 6, 1921, Vicente Diaz Conde and Apolinaria R. De Conde were
charged with violating the Usury Law in the Court of First Instance of the City
of Manila. They were found guilty, sentenced to pay a fine of P120.00 and in
case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in accordance with the
provisions of law.
ISSUES:
a. WON the Usury Law has a retroactive effect in this case;
b. WON the law impaired the contract in the

case at bar

HELD:
a. No. The Usury Law, a penal law, cannot become retroactive unless it
is favorable to the person accused. (Art. 21 and 22 Penal Code)
b. Yes. If a contract is legal at its inception, it cannot be rendered illegal
by any subsequent legislation.

CALDER VS BULL

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3 DALLAS 386, 390 ; 1798

FACTS:
Mr. and Mrs. Caleb Bull, the stated beneficiaries of the will of Norman
Morrison, were denied an inheritance by a Connecticut probate court. When
the Bulls attempted to appeal the decision more than a year and a half later,
they found that a state law prohibited appeals not made within 18 months of
the original ruling. The Bulls persuaded the Connecticut legislature to change
the restriction, which enabled them to successfully appeal the case. Calder,
the initial inheritor of Morrison's estate, took the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
WON the Connecticut legislation a violation of Article 1, Section 10, of
the Constitution, which prohibits ex post facto laws
HELD:
No. The Court held that the legislation was not an ex post facto law.
The Court drew a distinction between criminal rights and "private rights,"
arguing that restrictions against ex post facto laws were not designed to
protect citizens' contract rights. Justice Chase noted that while all ex post
facto laws are retrospective, all retrospective laws are not necessarily ex post
facto. Even "vested" property rights are subject to retroactive laws.

US VS JUEVES

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23 PHIL 100 ; 1905

FACTS:
The appellants in this case, seven in number, were charged under
Section 1 of Act No. 518 as amended by Section 1 of Act No. 1121 with the
crime of brigandage or highway robbery, and each sentenced to twenty
years' imprisonment.
Counsel insist, first, that the court of Tayabas had no jurisdiction to try
these appellants for the reason that the territory where the acts complained
of were committed belong to the Province of Ambos Camarines at the time of
the commission of said acts, although it has since been transferred to the
Province of Ambos Camarines at the time of the commission of said acts,
although it has since been transferred to the Province of Tayabas;
ISSUE:
WON the assumption of jurisdiction over crimes committed before
jurisdiction was conferred is in violation of the ex post facto clause of the
Philippine Bill.
HELD:
No. The assumption of jurisdiction over crimes committed before
jurisdiction was conferred is not in violation of the ex post facto laws of the
Philippine Bill. The change of the territory after the crime was committed and
before the institution of this action does not touch the offense nor change
the punishment. It does not prejudice the rights of the accused.

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ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF LIPA VS MUNICIPALITY OF TAAL

38 PHIL 367

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SANTOS VS SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATION

G.R. L-16049 ; MARCH 18, 1967

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LAUREL VS MISA
77 PHIL 856
FACTS:
A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Anastacio Laurel. He claims
that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and
comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime
of treason for the reasons that the sovereignty of the legitimate government
in the Philippines and consequently the correlative allegiance of Filipino
citizen thereto were then suspended; and that there was a change of
sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine
Republic.
ISSUE:
WON the absolute allegiance of a Filipino citizen to the Government
becomes suspended during occupation.
HELD:
No. The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a
territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign
is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation because the
sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred
thereby to the occupier. It remains vested in the legitimate government.
What may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty
with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy
passes temporarily to the occupant. The political laws which prescribe the
reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are
suspended in abeyance during military occupation.