Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18753

March 26, 1965

VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor-appellant.
Antonio Gonzales for petitioner-appellant.
J.C. Zulueta, G. D. David and N. J. Quisumbing for oppositor-appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the
City of Manila leaving properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will written
in Spanish which she executed at her residence at No. 2 Legarda St.,
Quiapo, Manila. She affixed her signature at the bottom of the will and on
the left margin of each and every page thereof in the presence of Pilar
Borja, Pilar C. Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza, who in turn affixed their
signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of each and
every page of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other.
Said will was acknowledged before Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the
testatrix and her witnesses.
In said will the testatrix made the following preliminary statement: that she
was possessed of the full use of her mental faculties; that she was free
from illegal pressure or influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of the
will and from any influence of fear or threat; that she freely and
spontaneously executed said will and that she had neither ascendants nor
descendants of any kind such that she could freely dispose of all her
estate.
Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of
P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named
Josefina Mortera. To said spouses the testatrix left the usufruct of her
interest in the Calvo building, while the naked ownership thereof she left in
equal parts to her grandchildren who are the legitimate children of said
spouses. The testatrix also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and

universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed
of in the will.
On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the
will before the Court of First Instance of Manila which was set for hearing
on September 3, 1955 after the requisite publication and service to all
parties concerned.
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a
deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of
Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed on September
2, 1955 an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following
grounds: (1) said will was not executed as required by law; (2) the testatrix
was physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its
execution; and (3) the will was executed under duress, threat or influence
of fear.
Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the
oppositor had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, after due
hearing, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of
Francisca Mortera, and on June 17, 1959, the oppositor amended her
opposition by alleging, the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to
the share of Dr. Rene Teotico because the latter was the physician who
took care of the testatrix during her last illness.
After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered
its decision on November 10, 1960, admitting the will to probate but
declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the
statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to
the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession.
Petitioner Teotico, together with the universal heir Josefina Mortera, filed a
motion for reconsideration of that part of the decision which declares the
portion of the estate to be vacated by the nullity of the legacy made to Dr.
Rene Teotico as passing to the legal heirs, while the oppositor filed also a
motion for reconsideration of the portion of the judgment which decrees the
probate of the will. On his part, Dr. Rene Teotico requested leave to
intervene and to file a motion for reconsideration with regard to that portion
of the decision which nullified the legacy made in his favor.

The motions for reconsideration above adverted to having been denied,

both petitioner and oppositor appealed from the decision, the former from
that portion which nullifies the legacy in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico and
declares the vacated portion as subject of succession in favor of the legal
heirs, and the latter from that portion which admits the will to probate. And
in this instance both petitioner and oppositor assign several errors which,
stripped of non-essentials, may be boiled down to the following: (1) Has
oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding?; (2)
Has the will in question been duly admitted to probate?; (3) Did the probate
court commit an error in passing on the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the will and in determining who should inherit the portion to be vacated by
the nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico?
These issues will be discussed separately.
1. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to
intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or
in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a
claimant of the estate (Ngo The Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua, et al., L-17091,
September 30, 1963); and an interested party has been defined as one
who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a
claim against the estate like a creditor (Idem). On the other hand,
in Saguinsin v. Lindayag, et al., L-17750, December 17, 1962, this Court
said:
According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for
letters of administration must be filed by an "interested person." An
interested party has been defined in this connection as one who
would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a
claim against the estate, such as a creditor (Intestate Estate of Julio
Magbanwa 40 O.G. 1171). And it is well settled in this jurisdiction that
in civil actions as well as special proceedings, the interest required in
order that a person may be a party thereto must be material and
direct, and not merely indirect or contingent (Trillana vs. Crisostomo,
G.R. No. L-3370, August 22, 1951; Rapinosa vs. Barrion, 70 Phil.
311).
The question now may be asked: Has oppositor any interest in any of the
provisions of the will, and, in the negative, would she acquire any right to
the estate in the event that the will is denied probate?

Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she
has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor
does she have any claim to any property affected by the will, because it
nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or
devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will
either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any
portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof, and while she
previously had an interest in the Calvo building located in Escolta, she had
already disposed of it long before the execution of the will.1wph1.t
In the supposition that, the will is denied probate, would the oppositor
acquire any interest in any portion of the estate left by the testatrix? She
would acquire such right only if she were a legal heir of the deceased, but
she is not under our Civil Code. It is true that oppositor claims to be an
acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the
deceased, and also an adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera, a deceased
sister of the testatrix, but such claim cannot give her any comfort for, even if
it be true, the law does not give her any right to succeed to the estate of the
deceased sister of both Jose Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And this is so
because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from
succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father. Thus, Article 992
of our Civil Code provides: "An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother; ... ." And the philosophy behind this provision is well expressed
in Grey v. Fabie, 68 Phil. 128, as follows:
Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or
mother who acknowledged it, the Code denies any right of
succession. They cannot be called relatives and they have no right to
inherit. Of course, there is a blood tie, but the law does not recognize
it. On this, article 943 is based upon the reality of the facts and upon
the presumption will of the interested parties; the natural child is
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the
legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the natural child; the latter
considers the privileged condition of the former and the resources of
which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the natural
child nothing but the product of sin, a palpable evidence of a blemish
upon the family. Every relation is ordinarily broken in life; the law does
no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of
resentment. (7 Manresa, 3d., p. 110.)

The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an
adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship
established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and
does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted
child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is
created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents.
As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the
relatives of the adopter.
The relationship established by the adoption, however, is limited to
the adopting parent, and does not extend to his other relatives,
except as expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot
be considered as a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the
adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may have
after the adoption, except that the law imposes certain impediments
to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the children of the
adopted considered as descendants of the adopter. The relationship
created is exclusively between the adopter and the adopted, and
does not extend to the relatives of either. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the
Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 652).
Relationship by adoption is limited to adopter and adopted, and does
not extend to other members of the family of either; but the adopted is
prohibited to marry the children of the adopter to avoid scandal. (An
Outline of Philippine Civil Law by Justice Jose B. L. Reyes and
Ricardo C. Puno, Vol. 1, p. 313; See also Caguioa, Comments and
Cases on Civil Law 1955, Vol 1, pp. 312-313; Paras, Civil Code of the
Philippines, 1959 ed., Vol. 1, p. 515)
It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as
testamentary or as legal heir in this probate proceeding contrary to the
ruling of the court a quo.
2. The next question to be determined is whether the will Exhibit A was duly
admitted to probate. Oppositor claims that the same should not have been
admitted not only because it was not properly attested to but also because
it was procured thru pressure and influence and the testatrix affixed her
signature by mistake believing that it contained her true intent.

The claim that the will was not properly attested to is contradicted by the
evidence of record. In this respect it is fit that we state briefly the
declarations of the instrumental witnesses.
Pilar Borja testified that the testatrix was in perfect state of health at the
time she executed the will for she carried her conversation with her
intelligently; that the testatrix signed immediately above the attestation
clause and on each and every page thereof at the left-hand margin in the
presence of the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public; that it
was the testatrix herself who asked her and the other witnesses to act as
such; and that the testatrix was the first one to sign and later she gave the
will to the witnesses who read and signed it.
Pilar G. Sanchez also testified that she knew the testatrix since 1945; that it
was the testatrix herself who asked her to be a witness to the will; that the
testatrix was the first one to sign and she gave the will later to the
witnesses to sign and afterwards she gave it to the notary public; that on
the day of the execution of the will the testatrix was in the best of health.
Modesto Formilleza also testified that he was asked by the testatrix to be
one of the witnesses to the will; that he read and understood the attestation
clause before he signed the document, and all the witnesses spoke either
in Spanish or in Tagalog. He finally said that the instrumental witnesses and
the testatrix signed the will at the same time and place and identified their
signatures.
This evidence which has not been successfully refuted proves conclusively
that the will was duly executed because it was signed by the testatrix and
her instrumental witnesses and the notary public in the manner provided for
by law.
The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is
also belied by the evidence. On this point the court a quo made the
following observation:
The circumstance that the testatrix was then living under the same
roof with Dr. Rene Teotico is no proof adequate in law to sustain the
conclusion that there was improper pressure and undue influence.
Nor is the alleged fact of isolation of the testatrix from the oppositor
and her witnesses, for their supposed failure to see personally the
testatrix, attributable to the vehemence of Dr. Rene Teotico, to

exclude visitors, took place years after the execution of the will on
May 17, 1951. Although those fact may have some weight to support
the theory of the oppositor, yet they must perforce yield to the
weightier fact that nothing could have prevented the testatrix, had she
really wanted to from subsequently revoking her 1951 will if it did not
in fact reflect and express her own testamentary dispositions. For, as
testified to by the oppositor and her witnesses, the testatrix was often
seen at the Escolta, in Quiapo and Sta. Cruz, Manila, walking and
accompanied by no one. In fact, on different occasions, each of them
was able to talk with her.
We have examined the evidence on the matter and we are fully in accord
with the foregoing observation. Moreover, the mere claim that Josefina
Mortera and her husband Rene Teotico had the opportunity to exert
pressure on the testatrix simply because she lived in their house several
years prior to the execution of the will and that she was old and suffering
from hypertension in that she was virtually isolated from her friends for
several years prior to her death is insufficient to disprove what the
instrumental witnesses had testified that the testatrix freely and voluntarily
and with full consciousness of the solemnity of the occasion executed the
will under consideration. The exercise of improper pressure and undue
influence must be supported by substantial evidence and must be of a kind
that would overpower and subjugate the mind of the testatrix as to destroy
her free agency and make her express the will of another rather than her
own (Coso v. Deza, 42 0. G. 596). The burden is on the person challenging
the will that such influence was exerted at the time of its execution, a
matter which here was not done, for the evidence presented not only is
insufficient but was disproved by the testimony of the instrumental
witnesses.
3. The question of whether the probate court could determine the intrinsic
validity of the provisions of a will has been decided by this Court in a long
line of decisions among which the following may be cited:
Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the
will cannot be entertained in Probate proceeding because its only
purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in
accordance with the requirements of the law." (Palacios v. Palacios,
58 0. G. 220)

... The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such

as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with
those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the
validity of wills. It does not determine nor even by implication
prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions, these may be
impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication.
The questions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and
may be raised even after the will has been authenticated. ...
From the fact that the legalization of a will does not validate the
provisions therein contained, it does not follow that such provision
lack the efficiency, or fail to produce the effects which the law
recognizes when they are not impugned by anyone. In the matter of
wills it is a fundamental doctrine that the will of the testator is the law
governing the interested parties, and must be punctually complied
with in so far as it is not contrary to the law or to public morals.
(Montaano v. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676, 679-680)
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the
facts that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and
that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose
of the proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec.
625.) The judgment in such proceedings determines and can
determine nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass
upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. It can not decide,
for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one is valid.
(Castaeda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426, 428)
Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the
court a quo declaring invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will
Exhibit A must be set aside as having been made in excess of its
jurisdiction. Another reason why said pronouncement should be set aside is
that the legatee was not given an opportunity to defend the validity of the
legacy for he was not allowed to intervene in this proceeding. As a
corollary, the other pronouncements touching on the disposition of the
estate in favor of some relatives of the deceased should also be set aside
for the same reason.
WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which
declares that the will in question has been duly executed and admitted the

same to probate, the rest of the decision is hereby set aside. This case is
ordered remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Regala,
Makalintal,
Bengzon,
J.P.,
and
Zaldivar,
JJ.,
concur.
Dizon, J., took no part.
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