Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro

39 Phil. 660 Political Law Delegation of Powers Liberty and due process
Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro were
ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their
native habitat and to established themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still in the
province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they
escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and
for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian
tribe who were considered to be of very low culture.
One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was later
caught and was placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the
reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf by Rubi and other
Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial
board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their
liberty. In this case, the validity of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code, which
provides:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any
province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a
course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants
to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him
and approved by the provincial board. was challenged.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code constitutes undue
delegation. Whether or not the Manguianes are being deprived of their liberty.
HELD:
I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of
this section of the Administrative Code. Under the doctrine of necessity, who else was
in a better position to determine whether or not to execute the law but the provincial
governor. It is optional for the provincial governor to execute the law as circumstances
may arise. It is necessary to give discretion to the provincial governor. The Legislature
may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom
it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
II. No. Among other things, the term non-Christian should not be given a literal
meaning or a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of
civilization. The term non-Christian it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in
a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a
low grade of civilization. In this case, the Manguianes were being reconcentrated in

the reservation to promote peace and to arrest their seminomadic lifestyle. This will
ultimately settle them down where they can adapt to the changing times.
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was
neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things: . . . one
cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of
civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good
and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has
not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal
protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is
enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies
alike to all of a class.

People vs Cayat
G.R. No. L-45987

May 5, 1939

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CAYAT, defendant-appellant

Facts:

Cayat was a native from Baguio, Benguet, Mt. Province who was found guilty of
violation of Sections 2 and 3 of Act 1639: It shall be unlawful for any native of
the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the
meaning of the Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to buy,
receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or
intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and
liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to
make prior to the passage of this Act, except as provided in section one hereof;
and it shall be the duty of any police officer or other duly authorized agent of
the Insular or any provincial, municipal or township government to seize and
forthwith destroy any such liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any
member of a non-Christian tribe.
SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this
Act shall, upon conviction thereof, be punishable for each offense by a fine of
not exceeding two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding
six months, in the discretion of the court.
Issues:

1.

If said law is discriminatory and denies EP of laws;

2.

If said law is an improper exercise of the police power of the state.

Held:

1. Said statute does not deny EP of laws; the guaranty of the equal protection of
the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based
on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable:
a.

must rest on substantial distinctions;

b.

must be germane to the purposes of the law;

c.

must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

d.

must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act 1639 meets all such requirements. The classification rests on real and
substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based
upon "accident of birth or parentage but upon the degree of civilization and
culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but to
natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in
tribal relationship apart from settled communities.

When the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance
of a certain practice by certain class of persons, the hand of the
Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by
any incidental inconvenience which some members of the class may
suffer. The private interests of such members must yield to the paramount
interests of the nation. The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian
tribes as "an inferior or less capable race." On the contrary, all measures thus
far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a
recognition of their inherent right to equality in that enjoyment of those
privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true
equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the
government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture
and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the
ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of
true equality.
The prohibition is germane to the purposes of the law. It is designed to insure
peace and order in and among the non- Christian tribes has often resulted in
lawlessness and crime thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise
their standards of life and civilization. This law is not limited in its application to
conditions existing at the time of the enactment. It is intended to apply for all
times as long as those conditions exists. The Act applies equally to all

members of the class. That it may be unfair in its operation against a

certain number of non- Christians by reason of their degree of culture is
not an argument against the equality of its operation nor affect the
reasonableness of the classification thus established.
2.

Said statute is not an improper exercise of the PPS. Any measure intended to
promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people or
to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its
wealth and prosperity is legitimate exercise of police power, unless shown to be
whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an individual.
Act 1639 is designed to promote peace and order to non-Christian tribes and to
eventually hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their
Christian brothers.

PT&T vs NLRC
PT&T vs. NLRC
272 SCRA 596
FACTS:
PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired
Grace de Guzman specifically as Supernumerary Project Worker,
for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as
reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again
invited for employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went
on leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July
19, 1991 to August 8, 1991.
On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as
a probationary employee where probationary period will cover 150
days. She indicated in the portion of the job application form under
civil status that she was single although she had contracted
marriage a few months earlier. When petitioner learned later about
the marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman
a memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included
in the memorandum, was a reminder about the companys policy of
not accepting married women for employment. She was dismissed
from the company effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed
down decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner
illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status of
a regular employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that she had

been discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in

violation of company policies.
ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be
grounds to terminate the services of an employee.
HELD:
Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women,
explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a
female employee. It is recognized that company is free to regulate
manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their
discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases of
unlawful discrimination or those provided by law.
PT&Ts policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any
woman worker who contracts marriage is afoul of the right against
discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor laws and
by our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzmans
ties with PT&T were dissolved principally because of the companys
policy that married women are not qualified for employment in the
company, and not merely because of her supposed acts of
dishonesty.

The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature

adopted by PT&T. As stated in the labor code:
ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an
employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of
employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate
expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee
shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss,
discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee
merely by reason of marriage.
The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in
Art.136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from
any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her
employment and it likewise is contrary to good morals and public
policy, depriving a woman of her freedom to choose her status, a
privilege that is inherent in an individual as an intangible and
inalienable right. The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the
very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social
institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of the nation.
Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or

dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws

of the land not only for order but also imperatively required.

Estrada v. Escritor Digest

Estrada v. Escritor
A.M.No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
Puno, J.:
Facts:
1. Respondent is the Court interpreter of RTC Branch 253 in Las Pinas City. The
complainant Estrada requested for an investigation of respondent for living with a
man not her husband while she was still legally married and having borne a child
within this live-in arrangement. Estrada believed that Escritor is committing a
grossly immoral act which tarnishes the image of the judiciary, thus she should not
be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones
her act.
2. Respondent admitted she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. more than 20
years ago when her husband was still alive but living with another woman. She
likewise admitted having a son with Quilapio but denies any liability for alleged
grossly immoral conduct because, 1) She is a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses
and the Watch Tower Society, 2) That the conjugal arrangement was in conformity
with their religious beliefs, and 3) That the conjugal arrangement with Quilapio has
the approval of her congregation.
3. Escritor likewise claimed that she had executed a Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness' in accordance with her religion which allows members of the Jehovahs
witnesses who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations.
The Declaration thus makes the resulting union moral and binding within the
congregation all over the world except in countries where divorce is allowed.
Held:
Escritor was therefore held not administratively liable for grossly immoral
conduct. Escritors conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a
case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to religion. The
Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms
including religious freedommay be enjoyed.
In the area of religious exercise as preferred freedom, however, man stands
accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to
be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the

state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that the state
interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.

Estrada v. Escritor Digest

Estrada v. Escritor
A.M.No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
Puno, J.:
Facts:
1. Respondent is the Court interpreter of RTC Branch 253 in Las Pinas City. The
complainant Estrada requested for an investigation of respondent for living with a
man not her husband while she was still legally married and having borne a child
within this live-in arrangement. Estrada believed that Escritor is committing a
grossly immoral act which tarnishes the image of the judiciary, thus she should not
be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones
her act.
2. Respondent admitted she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. more than 20
years ago when her husband was still alive but living with another woman. She
likewise admitted having a son with Quilapio but denies any liability for alleged
grossly immoral conduct because, 1) She is a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses
and the Watch Tower Society, 2) That the conjugal arrangement was in conformity
with their religious beliefs, and 3) That the conjugal arrangement with Quilapio has
the approval of her congregation.
3. Escritor likewise claimed that she had executed a Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness' in accordance with her religion which allows members of the Jehovahs
witnesses who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations.
The Declaration thus makes the resulting union moral and binding within the
congregation all over the world except in countries where divorce is allowed.
Held:
Escritor was therefore held not administratively liable for grossly immoral
conduct. Escritors conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a
case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to religion. The
Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms
including religious freedommay be enjoyed.
In the area of religious exercise as preferred freedom, however, man stands
accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to
be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the
state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that the state
interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.
ADONG VS. CHEONG SENG GEE

SE NG

G E E ,

43

P HI L

4 3

FACTS
Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in Zamboanga and left property worth nearly
P100,000.
The estate of the deceased was claimed by Cheong Seng Gee, an alleged legitimate child by a
marriage contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Dit in China in 1895. On the other hand, Mora
Adong, the alleged lawful wife of the deceased who married him in 1896 in Basilan, and her
daughters are also claiming as heirs of the decedent.
The conflicting claims to the estate were ventilated in the CFI of Zamboanga.
The trial judge reached the conclusion that the proof of the marriage of Tan Dit to the decedent
was not sufficient.
Cheong Seng Gee should share in the estate as a natural child.
On the other hand, the trial judge reached the conclusion that the marriage between the Mora
Adong and thedeceased had been adequately proved, but, under the laws of the Philippine
Islands, it could not be held to be alawful marriage; thus, the daughters Payang and Rosalia
would inherit as natural children.
The order of the trial judge, following these conclusions, was that there should be a partition of
the property of thedeceased Cheong Boo between the natural children, Cheong Seng Gee,
Payang, and Rosalia.
Thus, both parties appealed.
ISSUE:1.
W/N the marriage between Tan Dit and the decedent is valid.2.
W/N the marriage between Mora and the decedent is valid considering that it is a Mohammedan
marriage.

RULING
First issue:
SC ruled that to establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is first
necessary to provebefore the Philippine courts the existence of the foreign law as a question of
fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence.
THE PROOF PRESENTED IN COURT DID NOT SUSTAIN THE VALIDITY OF THE
MARRIAGE OF TAN BIT ANDTHE DECEDENT.
The Court noted a strong inclination on the part of the Chinese witnesses, especially the brother
of Cheong Boo, to protect the interests of the alleged son, Cheong Seng Gee, by overstepping
the limits of truthfulness. The Court also noted that reliable witnesses stated that in the year
1895, when Cheong Boo was supposed to have been in China, hewas in reality in Jolo, in the
Philippine Islands.
The immigration documents only go to show the relation of parent and child existing between
the deceased Cheong Boo and his son Cheong Seng Gee and do not establish the marriage
between the deceased and the mother of Cheong Seng Gee.

Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah

FACTS

The city of Hialeah passed an ordinance banning animal sacrifice. The Church of
Lukumi Babalu Aye filed a lawsuit against the city of Hialeah for violating the
churchs rights under the Free Exercise Clause. The District Court supported the
ordinances and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE

Are the ordinances that the city of Hialeah passed constitutional under the Free
Exercise Clause?
HOLDING

No, these ordinances are not constitutional because the ordinances violate the rights
under the Free Exercise Clause of the Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye.

REASONING

Rule:

The U.S. Supreme Court said that,a law is neutral and of general applicability need
not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the
incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice. A law failing to satisfy
these requirements must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and
must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest.

A law is neutral if this law does not infringe upon or restrict practices because of
their religious motivation The court looks at the object, text, historical record, and
effect of the law to figure out whether this law is neutral or not. The object or purpose
has to be determined by looking to the text of the law. A law must not discriminate on
its face. The record of the case cannot suppress a religious action. The effect of a law
cannot affect just a religion. The effect must affect all of society.
APPLICATION:

The law at hand is not neutral. These ordinances lack neutrality on its face because the
lawmakers used the words ritual and sacrifice with strong religious suggestions.
The record of this case suppresses the fundamental component of the Santeria worship
services. The text of these ordinances says that the citizens of Hialeah stated concerns
of a certain religion. The effect of the law affects the members of the Santeria
religion. The issues at hand are genuine governmental concerns, but the ordinances
together reveal a purpose outside of these genuine governmental concerns. The first
ordinance omits almost all killings of animals except for religious sacrifices. The
second ordinance falls on Santeria supporters, but almost no other religions or groups.
The third ordinance says that the killing of animals for religious purposes is
unnecessary, but other killings fall out of this prohibition. The second part of this rule
is the strict scrutiny rule. The city of Hialeah said that they had two governmental
interests when making these ordinances: protecting the public health and stopping the
cruelty to animals. These ordinances neglect to forbid nonreligious behavior that
jeopardizes these interests. Thus, these ordinances cannot survive the rule of strict
scrutiny. All of these ordinances are too general and could be narrower to not burden
religious practices.

TANGONAN VS CRUZ PANO

FACTS:Petitioner brought suit for mandamus to compel the Capitol Medical Center School of
Nursing to admit her for the academic year 1976-1977.She had been previously provisionally
admitted the previous school year, but she failed in Psychiatric Nursing. She tried to take the
courseagain in another school, but she was refused admission bec. she tried to bribe the dean of
the school. When she tried to re-enrol at the Capitol Medical Center, she was denied
admission. She brought the matter on certiorari.
.ISSUE: WON the school can be compelled by the court to re-admit petitioner.

NO.HELD: Any duty on the part of the school to enrol pet. is not merely a ministerial duty but
one w/c involves the exercise of discretion not compellable by Mandamus. Capitol was perfectly
justified in refusing to admit her, its refusal (being) sanctioned by the Manual of Regulations of
Priv. Schools w/c considers academic delinquency & violation of disciplinary regulations as
valid grounds for refusing enrollment of a student. Further, to grant relief to pet. would be doing
violence to the academic freedom enjoyed by Capitol enshrined under Act. XV sec. 8(2)
Consti. Academic freedom includes not only the freedom of professionally qualified persons to
inquire, discover, publish & teach the truth as they see it in the field of their competence subject
to no control or authority except of rational methods by w/c truths and conclusions are sought
and established in these disciplines, but also the right of the school or college to decide for itself
how best to attain them - the grant being to institutions of higher learning - free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when the over-riding public welfare calls for some
restraint. It has a wide spread of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. Said
constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging
fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose and nullify its intent.

Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996), was a decision by the United States
Supreme Court, which held that innocent owner defense is not constitutionally
mandated by Fourteenth Amendment Due Process in cases of civil forfeiture.
Tina B. Bennis was a joint owner, with her husband, of an automobile in which her
husband engaged in sexual activity with a prostitute. In declaring the automobile
forfeit as a public nuisance under Michigan's statutory abatement scheme, the trial
court permitted no offset for petitioner's interest, notwithstanding her lack of
knowledge of her husband's activity. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, but was
in turn reversed by the State Supreme Court, which concluded, among other things,
that Michigan's failure to provide an innocent-owner defense was without federal
constitutional consequence under this Court's decisions.

Riley v. California
Docket No.

Op. Below

Argument

Opinion

Vote Author

Term

Jun 25, 2014

9-0

OT 2013

Apr 29, 2014

13-132

Cal.

Tr.Aud.

Roberts

Disclosure: Disclosure: Goldstein & Russell, P.C., whose attorneys contribute to this blog in
various capacities, was among the counsel to the petitioner in this case at the certiorari stage through

the Stanford Law School Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, but it is not participating in the case at the
merits stage.
Holding: The police generally may not, without a warrant, search digital information on a
cellphone seized from an individual who has been arrested.
Judgment: Reversed and remanded, 9-0, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts on June 25,
2014. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

Holding
Police generally may not, without
a warrant, search digital information
on a cell phone seized from an
individual who has been arrested.
Court membership
Chief Justice
John G. Roberts

Associate Justices
Antonin Scalia Anthony Kennedy
Clarence Thomas Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Stephen Breyer Samuel Alito
Sonia Sotomayor Elena Kagan

Case opinions

Majority

Roberts, joined by Scalia,

Kennedy, Thomas,
Ginsburg, Breyer,
Sotomayor, Kagan

Concurren
Alito
ce
Laws applied
/L;Lnd belongings. The court then proceeded to
apply United States v. Edwards to hold that the search was valid despite the fact that it
had occurred 90 minutes after arrest. In the Edwards case, an arrestee's clothing was
seized 10 hours after arrest in order to preserve evidence (paint chips) that might be
present on the clothes. Given these cases, the court concluded that the search and
seizure of Riley's cell phone was valid.
The case of Riley v. California as heard before the Supreme Court combined two
cases, Riley itself and United States v. Wurie. Petitioner Riley argued, based on
]

Opinion of the Court[edit]

Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, concluding that a
warrant is required to search a mobile phone. [6] Roberts wrote that it fails the w the
ruling of People v. Diaz, the digital contents of a smartphone do not threaten the safety
of police officers. Therefore limiting searches to circumstances where officers have a
reasonable belief of evidence of a crime still violates constitutional rights. [citation needed]

In Riley v. California, Stanford University law professor Jeffrey L. Fisher argued on

behalf of petitioner David Riley. Fisher claimed that at least six courts hold that
the Fourth Amendment permits searches of this type, but that three courts do not.
[4]
Edward C. DuMont delivered the oral argument on behalf of the respondent.
Michael R. Dreeben acted as the deputy solicitor supporting the respondent.
Fisher warned that it could open up "every American's entire life to the police
department, not just at the scene but later at the station house and downloaded into
their computer fo410112 2 /DAF //rever".[5] Fisher also told the justices there are
"very, very profound problems with searching a smartphone without a warrant".
[5]
Many people believe that if the pol6 ic 001e can access your cell phone without a
warrant, they can access your entire life. [citation neededarrantless search test established
in Chimel v. California:
"Digital data stored on a cell phone cannot itself be used as a weapon to harm an
arresting officer or to effectuate the arrestee's escape. Law enforcement officers
remain free to examine the physical aspects of a phone to ensure that it will not be
used as a weapon--say, to determine whether there is a razor blade hidden between the
phone and its case. Once an officer has secured a phone and eliminated any potential
physical threats, however, data on the phone can endanger no one." [7]
Although possible evidence stored on a phone may be destroyed with either remote
wiping or data encryption, Roberts noted that is "the ordinary operation of a phone's
security features, apart from any active attempt by a defendant or his associates to
conceal or destroy evidence upon arrest". [8] He then argues that a warrantless search is
unlikely to make much of a difference:
"Cell phone data would be vulnerable to remote wiping from the time an individual
anticipates arrest to the time any eventual search of the phone is completed ...
likewise, an officer who seizes a phone in an unlocked state might not be able to begin
his search in the short time remaining before the phone locks and data becomes
encrypted."[9]
Roberts then cites several common examples to either turn off or prevent the phone's
security features. Furthermore, Roberts argued that cell phones differ in both a
quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects in a person's pocket:
"Modern cell phones are not just another technological convenience. With all they
contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans the privacies of life".

The fact that technology now allows an individual to carry such information in his
hand does not make the information any less worthy of the protection for which the
Founders fought."[10]
Alito concurring opinion[edit]
Justice Samuel Alito wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, citing his dissent in Arizona v. Gant that called Chimel's reasoning
"questionable". That said, he agreed that

"we should not mechanically apply the rule used in the predigital era to the search of a
cell phone. Many cell phones now in use are capable of storing and accessing a
quantity of information, some highly personal, that no person would ever have had on
his person in hard-copy form."[11]
However, in trying to find a balance between law enforcement and privacy issues, he
expressed concern that the majority opinion creates anomalies: "Under established
law, police may seize and examine [hard copies of information] in the wallet without
obtaining a warrant, but under the Court's holding today, the information stored in the
cell phone is out."[12] Alito further suggested that Congress or state legislatures may
need to consider new laws that draw "reasonable distinctions based on categories of
information or perhaps other variable",[13] otherwise "it would be very unfortunate if
privacy protection in the 21st century were left primarily to the federal courts using
the blunt instrument of the Fourth Amendment". [14]