CANON I

[A.M. No. RTJ-91-712 July 9, 1996]

BEN D. MARCES, SR., complainant,
vs.
JUDGE PAUL T. ARCANGEL, Presiding Judge, Branch 12, Regional Trial Court Davao
City, respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:p
Respondents was, at the time material to this case, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Brach 12, at Davao City. 1 He is charged with serious misconduct, grave abuse of
authority, harassment, and immorality.
The complaint alleges the following:
(1) Complaint is a 61-year old retiree, married to Ruth Jovellar, by whom he has five children,
namely, Farley, Lydia, Ben Jr., Nikki and Allan. Complainant and the members of his family
are residents of the BRC Village, Catalunan Penqueo, Davao City.
In 1984 the spouses Wilfredo and Flordeliza Caas moved into complaint's neighborhood.
They became the nearest neighbors of the complainant, their houses being only 45 meters
apart. In that year, a domestic helper of the Caases sought complainant's help for alleged
maltreatment she had received from her employers. Complainant, who was the incumbent
Purok leader, referred the matter to the barangay authorities. The dispute was resolved, but the
relation of the Marces and the Caas families became strained.
On September 27, 1990, Mrs. Flordeliza Caas had an exchange of words with Mrs. Ruth
Marces and the latter's daughter, Lydia, during which they hurled invectives at each other. The
incident was triggered by a relatively minor matter involving a fight between the turkeys
owned by the two families but which, because of the bad blood between them, became a major
issue.
The following day, September 28, Mrs. Caas, together with her sister and a neighbor, boarded
a passenger jeepney despite the fact that there were no more seats available because
complainant was riding on that vehicle. It turned out that Mrs. Caas had intended to cause the
complainant's arrest, because as the jeepney neared the police station, Mrs. Caas asked the
driver to stop the vehicle. Mrs. Caas then got off and called a policeman and had the
complainant Ben D. Marces arrested.
The arrest was made on the basis of alias warrants of arrest handed to the policeman by Mrs.
Caas. The warrants had been issued by MTCC Judge Edipolo Sarabia in three criminal cases
against the herein complainant for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Complainant was
detained for one night without the knowledge of his family, a fact of which Mrs. Caas
allegedly boasted in the neighborhood.

The following day, complainant saw Judge Sarabia and explained that the criminal cases
against him, in connection with which the alias warrants were issued, had long been amicably
settled. Judge Sarabia told the complainant that he really did not know anything about the
cases and that he had only been requested by respondent Judge Paul Arcangel to issue the
warrants.
(2) As a result of the September 27, 1990 shouting incident, Mrs. Caas also filed a complaint
with the Barangay Captain against complainant's wife and daughter, Lydia. Mediation
conferences between the two families were conducted on October 27, 1990 and on November
3, 1990. Although he had not been asked to, respondent Judge Arcangel attended the
conferences. It is alleged that respondent judge
disturbed the proceedings by walking in and out of the Barangay Hall where the
conferences were being held;
introduced himself as the Executive Judge of the RTC of Davao City in an obvious attempt
to influence the Barangay Officials; and
accompanied Mrs. Caas and acted as the baby-sitter of the latter's daughter.
During the October 27, 1990 conference, respondent judge allegedly confronted the
complainant, accusing him of sending the judge a death threat by means of a letter which
purported to have been sent by the New People's Army.
The barangay officials failed to amicably settle the dispute. It is averred that Mrs. Caas
showed "arrogance and callousness at all times as if to prove that she is protected by a hard
rock and impregnable when she is with the judge."
(3) The feud between the Marces and Caas families worsened. On December 29, 1990, there
was a violent confrontation between members of the two families. Some of the parties were
injured as a result of hacking. Investigations were conducted by the police during which,
according to complainant, he saw respondent Judge Arcangel talking to the policemen.
(4) On the night of January 2, 1991, armed men in uniform arrived in two military vehicles
and arrested members of the complainant's family and took them to the Davao Metrodiscom
Headquarters. The arrests were made on orders of a certain Col. Nelson Estares. A summary
inquest was conducted which complainant laments to be irregular as the arrests were prearranged and the complaint sheet was fabricated. Complainant avers that the illegal issuance
and service of the "warrant" (i.e., so-called Arrest Orders) by the Commander of the Davao
Metrodiscom "can only be done by a person with a strong connection, power and influence,"
such as respondent judge, considering his high position in the government and close relations
with the Caas family.
(5) In a resolution dated May 11, 1991 the investigating prosecutor, Albert Axalan, found
probable cause and filed charges of attempted murder against complainant Ben D. Marces, his
wife and his son, Farley. Complaint's countercharges were dropped. Three days after, warrants
of arrest were issued by the RTC against complainant, his wife Ruth and son Farley

respectively. Complainant alleges that respondent Judge Arcangel, taking advantage of his
position, influenced the conduct of the preliminary investigation.
(6) Subsequently, complainant's son, Farley, was arrested. He was handcuffed and taken to the
Ma-a City Jail. It is alleged that respondent's Toyota car, with plate number LBT 555, followed
the car of the arresting policemen "as if to make sure that the evil plan" allegedly "authored by
Judge Arcangel is well followed and executed." "To add insult to injury," it is alleged that
while the applications for bail bond of complainant, his wife and Farley were being processed
at Branch 8 of RTC of Davao City, respondent Judge Arcangel arrived and questioned the
validity of the bond posted, telling the representative of the bonding company, "Hindi puwede
ito, who gave you the authority to issue?" He then removed the receipts and arrogantly left
with the receipts.
(7) Because of these events, complainant started asking why a judge should have a special
interest in his family's feud with the Caas family. All he knew before was that the judge's car
was often parked in front of the house of Mrs. Caas, especially when Mr. Caas was away
working overtime.
In his Comment submitted in compliance with the resolution of this Court, respondent judge
alleges (1) that the charges against him are not only false and malicious but utterly baseless;
(2) that the same were filed merely to gratify complainant's personal spite and animosity
against him; and (3) that the complaint was filed in anticipation of the cases which the
respondent intends to file against the complainant for slander and threats.
Respondent judge further avers:
Anent the charge of causing the issuance of warrants of arrest against the complainant and the
handling of the same to Mrs. Caas for enforcement, it was Mrs. Esperanza Deiparine and
Mrs. Flordeliza Caas who obtained the warrants. He only requested judge Sarabia of the
MTCC of Davao City to issue them. 2 Respondent judge claims the warrants were valid,
having been issued in connection with pending cases and that there were other warrants
against complainant which could not be served because of complainant's close connection with
the officers of the warrant section. 3
As to the allegation that he disturbed the barangay conciliation proceedings in the case
between the Mares and Caas families and allegedly acted as "an escort" of Mrs. Caas and
"baby-sitter" of her daughter, respondent judge denies he acted as escort and baby-sitter and
claims that he could not have disturbed the proceedings because none were held on November
3, 1990. He claims that he went to the barangay hall because he filed his own complaint
against Ruth Marces and her daughter Lydia. Apparently, respondent judge is referring to the
incident on September 27, 1990 during which Mrs. Marces and daughter Lydia allegedly
called Mrs. Caas "KABIT, KABIT, KABIT SA ABOGADO" ("PARAMOUR, PARAMOUR,
PARAMOUR OF A LAWYER"). 4 The judge probably felt alluded to.
Respondent judge likewise denies that he pressured the police officers and the prosecutors to
file charges in court as a result of the December 29, 1990 hacking incident.
Respondent vehemently denies having illicit relations with Mrs. Caas and that he went to the
house of the Caas family whenever Mr. Wilfredo Caas was away. Respondent claims that he

has known the Caas family since 1983, when he was still a City Judge. According to him, in
1989 he used to go to the Caas residence on request by Mrs. Caas to mediate in the latter's
family problem. After this was settled, he continued going there because he and Mr. Caas had
business interests in the manufacture of appliance protectors.
Finally, it is alleged that complainant is actually a fugitive from justice, who has a string of
criminal cases 5 and is notorious in the community. Respondent further discusses the merits of
the December 29, 1990 hacking incident pointing to complainant, his wife and son as the
felons and the guilty parties.
On February 27, 1992, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation, report and recommendation. A Reply was subsequently filed by the complainant,
alleging harassment by respondent judge, as follows: (a) respondent judge wrote the
Administrator of the Social Security System, pretending to be interested in purchasing an
acquired asset consisting of a house and lot, which happens to be the residence of the
complainant; (b) the management of the Philippine Airlines was asked by a fictitious person to
revive the criminal cases against the complainant; (c) the respondent judge, together with a
certain Fiscal Dumlao, had been visiting witnesses to the December 29, 1990 hacking
incident; (d) the respondent judge filed an administrative case with the Professional
Regulations Commission against Nikki Marces; daughter of the complainant who had just
passed the Nursing Board Examinations; and (e) respondent still visited the house of Mr. and
Mrs. Caas.
Complainant further avers that the criminal cases against him are all business-related, being
cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and for estafa arising from the issuance of
bouncing checks. He calls attention to the fact that respondent judge discussed in his pleadings
the merits of the December 29, 1990 hacking incident and contends that this is improper and
unethical.
On May 26, 1992, the Court referred the case to Associate Justice Luis Javellana of the Court
of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation. Unfortunately, Associate Justice
Javellana suddenly died on August 25, 1993. The case was thereafter reassigned to Associate
Justice Fidel P. Purisima, but the reception of the evidence was assigned to Executive Judge
Romeo D. Marasigan of Branch XVI, RTC-Davao City. On September 18, 1993, Judge
Marasigan forwarded the records of the case, together with the evidence adduced before him,
to this Court. The records were later transmitted to Justice Purisima.
In his Report and Recommendation dated May 30, 1994, Associate Justice Purisima
recommends dismissal of the charges against respondents judge for insufficiency of evidence,
except the charge that respondent judge attended mediation conferences between the feuding
families and tried to intervene. As to this charge the Investigating Justice finds that the
evidence establishes the same. Justice Purisima recommends that respondent judge be
admonished and sternly warned that repetition of the acts of impropriety by respondent will be
dealt with more severely. The pertinent portions of Justice Purisima's report states:
The charge concerning the frequent visits by respondents Judge at the
residence of Mrs. Flordeliza Caas in Barangay Catalunan Pequeo,
Davao City, and allusion that the former has illicit relation with the latter
are utterly devoid of sufficient substantiation. The mere suspicion on the

part of the complainant and members of his family that the respondent
Judge has an affair with Mrs. Flordeliza Caas has been completely
effaced and reduced to nothing reprehensible or censurable by the
unequivocal and straightforward testimonies of Flordeliza's husband and
parents that the respondent Judge is just a family friend whose visits did
not have any immoral implication. According to these knowledgeable
witnesses, the latter was their frequent visitor in 1990, when respondent
Judge and Engr. Wilfredo B. Caas, were engaged in the manufacture of
appliance protectors.
Obviously, Engr. Wilfredo B. Caas, the lifetime partner of Mrs.
Flordeliza Caas, day and night, should be in the best position to observe
her. Whether or not his wife is unfaithful to him is a matter within the
sphere of the husband to detect. Here, Engr. Wilfredo B. Caas having
given his wife clean slate, We an do no less. A different conclusion and
ruling could ruin families, which society cherishes and protects (Article
215, New Civil Code; Article 149, Family Code).
xxx xxx xxx
So also, respondent Judge cannot be held administratively liable for the
handcapping [sic] of a son of complainant, who was allegedly handcapped
[sic] and brought to the Ma-a jail, while working at the Davao Light and
Power company. Absent any admissible evidence that the respondent
Judge was the one who caused such malfeasance to happen, he is not
answerable therefor.

All things studiedly considered, with due regard to the testimonial and
documentary evidence adduced, pro and con, before Honorable Executive
Judge Romeo D. Marasigan of the Regional Trial Court, Davao City; the
ineluctable conclusion is that on October 27, and November 3, 1990, the
respondent Judge intruded into the conference room, and interfered with a
mediation conference then being held between the family of the herein
complainant and the Caas family, before the Lupon Tagapayapa of
Catalunan Pequeo, Davao City, and while inside said room, tried to
influence barangay officials thereat, by identifying himself as the
Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Davao Regional Trial Court; a
misbehavior and an improper actuation under the premises.
Equally anemic of evidentiary support is the charge that the respondent
Judge influenced the prosecutors and police authorities of Davao City to
harass the family of complainant.
The Court finds the conclusions of the investigator that respondent judge is guilty of improper
conduct to be fully supported by the evidence in the record. It only needs to be added that the
claim of respondent judge that he was at the mediation conference held on October 27, 1990
because he had himself filed a complaint against Ruth Marces and the latter's daughter, Lydia,
is belied by the fact that respondent judge's complaint was filed only on November 3, 1990.
The report of the Investigating Justice fails to consider other serious allegations in the
complaint, of which there is also sufficient evidence in the record, to wit:
(1) That respondent judge caused the issuance of alias warrants of arrest by requesting another
judge, before whom the case against the complainant was pending, to issue the warrants; and

xxx xxx xxx

But the charge that the respondent Judge was present during the mediation
conference between the Marces family and Caas family on October 27
and November 3, 1990, before the Lupon Tagapayapa of Catalunan
Pequeo, Davao City, and that during such conference, respondent Judge
was in and out of the conference room, trying to interfere with the
proceedings, and to wield influence as Regional Trial Court Judge, is
firmly anchored on Complainant's evidence, which has not been
effectively traversed and negated by respondent's evidence.
From the evidence on hand, it is clear that on October 27, 1990, the
respondent Judge arrived at the Barangay Hall of Catalunan Pequeo,
Davao City, in the company of Mrs. Flordeliza Caas, and the latter's
small child. During the said mediation conference between the Marces
family and Caas family, respondent Judge entered the conference room
and made it known to all and sundry that he is the Presiding Judge of
Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao. Such actuation was
indiscreet and improper because the disputes and controversies between
the two warring families could develop into a litigation before any of the
courts of Davao.

(2) That the arrest of the members of the Marces family on January 2, 1991 would not have
been made without the intervention of respondent judge.
These charges have not only been proven by substantial and convincing evidence, but have
actually been admitted by respondent judge. Thus, complainant alleges that he was informed
by Judge Sarabia that the warrants had been issued by him upon the request of respondent
judge. This allegation is supported by a handwritten not (Exh. E) of respondent judge, which
reads:
Judge Edipolo Sarabia
Br. 3, City Trial Court
Davao City
Dear Ed:
If these cases (Cr. Case Nos. 9-C-M, 10-C-M & 11-C-M) are still pending,
please issue another aliaswarrants as the accused is now in town.

trying to manipulate the case by making it appear that they were the
victims. . .
In addition, complainant presented a certification by the Clerk of Court 6 of the
MTCC-Davao City, Branch 3, stating the following:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY, that according to the records of this Court, the
three (3) Estafa Cases against MR. BEN MARCES under Criminal Cases
Nos. 9-CM, 10-CM and 11-CM has been in archive since December 28,
1983 due to non-arrest of the accused and an alias warrant of arrest was
issued against the accused.
That its discovery and revival was made possible upon the request for
verification of its status and information by Judge Paul T. Arcangel that
accused is back in town and that ultimately resulted to the dismissal of the
three (3) cases on March 11, 1991, without which verification the said
cases would have remained pending to date.
Instead of being delivered to the warrant officer, the warrants were actually given to Mrs.
Caas. The entry in the Daily Record of Events of the Ulas Police Substation 7 stated that
"[e]lements of this unit led by P/Cpl. VA Secretaria arrested with alias warrant of arrest one
BEN MARCES Y DOMANILLO. . .who was charge[d] with violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 with Criminal Case No[s]. 9-CM, 11CM duly signed by Judge Edipolo Sarabia this
28th of September 1990 at Davao City. The warrant was given by one FLORDELIZA CAAS
Y Pelegrino, 26 years old, married, housewife. . . ."
To cap it all, respondent judge himself admitted in his Comment, dated December 27, 1991,
that Mrs. Esperanza Deiparine and Mrs. Flordeliza Caas requested him "to have the warrants
renewed, thus, he requested Judge Sarabia for the issuance of the new warrants" 8 against the
complainant.
Respondent judge justifies his intervention on the ground that complainant Ben D. Marces had
been able to evade service of the warrants because of connections with the warrant officers of
Davao City. Even if this had been the case it would not excuse respondent judge in using his
own influence.
Indeed this is the same excuse given for respondent judge's interceding with the Metrodiscom
authorities for the issuance of a so-called order of arrest as a result of which complainant Ben
D. Marces, his wife Ruth and his children Farley, Lydia, Nikki and Allan were arrested on
January 2, 1991. Respondent's own witness, Wilfredo Caas, stated that he was accompanied
by respondent to Col. Nelson Estares. It was Col. Estares who ordered the arrest of
complainant and members of his family. Thus, in his affidavit dated August 23, 1991, Wilfredo
Caas, stated:
13. That when my wife and mother-in-law were attacked and hacked by
Ben Marces and his family within the premises of our house on December
29, 1990, I called Judge Arcangel for assistance because Ben Marces was

14. That when I followed up the case at the Talomo Police Station and at
the Tugbok Police Station, I was given a run around by the police
authorities and I sensed that a ranking police officer was interceding in
behalf of Ben Marces and his family;
15. That when the police authorities could not come up with a report of the
incident after more than three days, I sought the assistance of Judge
Arcangel, who accompanied me to Metrodiscom Chief Col. Nelson
Estares, to whom I explained the entire incident and treatment I received
from the police who was investigating the case;
In addition, Wilfredo Caas testified in the investigation and affirmed that it was because of
the help of respondent judge that he was able to talk with Col. Estares, thus: 9
[JUDGE ARCANGEL conducting examination:]
Q: In connection with the hacking of your wife and
mother-in-law, what action did you take?
A: I tried to follow up the complaint to the police
station about the hacking incident. I even went to the
Tugbok police station.
Q: What action was taken at the police station?
A: The police station did not entertain my complaint
and they tried to pass me around.
Q: When no action was taken in your complaint by the
police station, what did you do?
A: Sensing that there is no hope (to go to the) police, I
asked Judge Arcangel to accompany me to Col.
Estares.
Q: When Judge Arcangel accompanied you to the
Office of Col. Estares, what did you do?
A: He introduced me to Col. Estares and I told Col.
Estares that my wife and my mother-in-law were
attacked by the Marces family and they were hacked
and I requested Col. Estares to help me because the
police did not take any action and I even sensed that
somebody was supporting the Marces family.

With the above-cited charges having been duly proven, in addition to the factual findings of
Justice Purisima, it is clear that (1) respondent judge intervened in the feud between the
complainant's family and the Caas family and (2) such interference was not limited to the
barangay mediation proceedings but extended as well to the various stages of the conflict.
These acts of respondent judge must be viewed not as single, isolated actuations but in their
totality and in the context of the enmity between the two feuding families. Thus viewed we
find the actuations of respondent judge improper and censurable.
Respondent is, as we have so often said, the visible representation of the law, 10 the
intermediary between conflicting interests, 11 and the embodiment of the people's sense of
justice. 12 Unless it was a case filed with his court, it was improper for him to intervene in a
dispute or controversy. The Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the
private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the
impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge. 13
He should not suffer his conduct to create the impression that any person
can unduly influence him or enjoy his favor. 14
Respondent judge allowed himself to be dragged into what was a purely private
matter between feuding families. In attending, at the request of Mrs. Caas, the
barangay conciliation proceedings and introducing himself there as the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court in an obvious demonstration of support for Mrs.
Caas, respondent lent the prestige of his office to a party in a case.
Respondent's request to the judge of a lower court to issue warrants of arrest against the
complainant is no less censurable. As the Court had occasion to state in Sabitsana,
Jr. v. Villamor: 15
Cardinal is the rule that a Judge should avoid impropriety in all activities.
The Canons mince no words in mandating that a Judge shall refrain from
influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending
before another Court (Canon 2, Rule 2.04). Interference by members of
the bench in pending suits with the end in view of influencing the course or
the result of litigation does not only subvert the independence of the
judiciary but also undermines the people's faith in its integrity and
impartiality.

the subject of litigation in his court should have deterred him from getting involved in the
feud.
Nothing can bring courts into disrepute more than the failure of the occupants thereof to be
ever scrupulous in their conduct. Canon 30 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics cautions judges
"in pending or prospective litigation before him [to] be scrupulously careful to avoid such
action as may reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or
friendships constitute an element in determining his judicial course." It cannot be
overemphasized that "a judge's official conduct should be free from appearance of
impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of
official duties but also in everyday life, should be beyond reproach." 16
For the foregoing reasons, we find respondent judge guilty of improper conduct. We do not
agree with complainant, however, that respondent's misconduct justifies his dismissal from the
service. While in some cases involving similar acts the penalties imposed on the erring judges
were dismissal, there were in those cases other grounds warranting the imposition of such
drastic disciplinary penalty. For example, in Ubarra v. Mapalad, 17respondent, aside from
pressuring complainants to drop criminal charges against the accused, likewise refused to
inhibit herself when she knew it was improper to decide the case, and was guilty of delay in
deciding the case. On the other hand, in Sabitsana, Jr. v. Villamor 18 the respondent was found
guilty of attempting to influence another judge to acquit the accused in a criminal case and, in
addition, of making untruthful statements in the certificate of service.
In the case at bar, there is no other charge against respondent judge. This is his first
administrative case. On the other hand his record as City Judge of Davao City, from 1975 to
1983, and as Regional Trial Court Judge in the same city since 1983 is otherwise exemplary.
In the circumstances of this case, the penalty of reprimand with warning that commission of
the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely, should suffice to
accomplish the purpose of disciplining an erring member of the judiciary who has not shown
himself to be beyond correction. As the Book of Proverbs says, "A single reprimand does more
for a man of intelligence than a hundred lashes for a fool." (17:10)
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED with WARNING that commission of
similar acts of impropriety on his part in the future will be dealt with more severely. All other
charges are hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.

nks.
Respondent judge also acted improperly in accompanying Wilfredo Caas to Col. Nelson
Estares who ordered the arrest of complainant and members of the latter's family. It would
have been impossible for the Caas family to procure the arrest of complainant and of
members of his family by the Davao Metrodiscom were it not for the intervention of
respondent judge.
Wilfredo Caas' claim that he had to seek the help of respondent judge because even after
three days the police still had not made a report on the incident on December 29, 1990 cannot
justify respondent's intervention in the quarrel. The possibility that the incident could become

[A.M. No. 11-190-CA-J

: April 24, 2012]

COMPLAINT OF EMIL MEDENILLA, PEDRO ANONUEVO, JERICHO

INOCENTES, CARLITO SALOMON AND ATTY. JESUS F. ACPAL AGAINST
JUSTICE SOCORRO B. INTING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated APRIL 24, 2012, which
reads as follows: cralaw
"A.M. No. 11-190-CA-J (Complaint of Emil Medenilla, [*] Pedro Anonuevo, Jericho
Inocentes, Carlito Salomon and Atty. Jesus F. Acpal against Justice Socorro B. Inting of the
Court of Appeals).
RESOLUTION
Complainant officers and trustees of Katarungan Village Homeowners Association, Inc., (the
Association) of Barangay Poblacion, Muntinlupa City, namely, Emil Medenilla (PRO), Pedro
Anonuevo (trustee), Jericho Inocentes (trustee), Carlito Salomon (trustee), and Atty. Jesus F.
Acpal (village administrator), filed a complaint-affidavit [1] dated September 30, 2011 against
Justice Socorro B. Inting of the Court of Appeals (CA) for grave misconduct, grave abuse of
authority, and conduct unbecoming of a Court of Appeals Justice in violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct and Code of Professional Responsibility.
The complaint-affidavit alleges in substance that two sets of candidates, one from the
Pagbabago Party and the other from the Balisado Performance Team, competed in the June 19,
2011 elections of their Association's officers and trustees. The Pagbabago group won the
positions of President, Secretary, Treasurer, Auditor, and PRO while the Balisado group won
only the seats of the Vice-President and Business Manager. [2] For the Board of Trustees,
however, eight from the Balisado group, including Justice Inting, won the majority of the 14
positions of trustees. The Pagbabago group won the remaining six positions. [3]
Complainants further alleged that, soon after the winners took their oath of office, Justice
Inting committed the following wrongful acts:
a) During the July 9, 2011 monthly regular meeting of the Association's board of trustees and
officers, someone introduced a resolution that authorized its President, Fiscal Leoncio D.
Suarez, Jr. and Treasurer, Jose A. Abundo, to transact business with its banks. Justice Inting
opposed the passage of the resolution, however, claiming that the newly elected officers and
trustees had not as yet properly assumed their offices in view of the required 60-day turn-over
transition from the outgoing officers provided in Section 6, Rule 11 of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act 9904 (R.A. 9904) [4] although these rules did not
suppose to take effect yet. [5]
b) Justice Inting joined some members of the association in filing complaints of grave abuse of
authority, among others, against its newly elected officers before, the Housing and Land Use

Regulatory Board (HLURB) [6] where her impartiality might reasonably be questioned should
the case reach the CA where she worked. [7]
c) Justice Inting and other trustees of the Association prodded Evangeline Bersabe, its
accountant, to disobey the President's order for her to surrender the association documents and
keys in her possession.[8]
d) Justice Inting and others in the Board of Trustees supposedly passed Resolution 2011-21,
entitledStrengthening the Internal Control and Disbursement Policies of the Association,
[9]
when such matter did not appear in the August 27, 20 U special meeting agenda or in its
minutes. Nobody proposed such a resolution and the board did not deliberate or vote on it.
Since only Justice Inting was the only lawyer in the group, complainants conclude that she
prepared that resolution and manipulated her supporters in the board.
e) Justice Inting used her title as justice of the CA to justify the supposed board action. [10]
When her group displayed tarpaulins announcing the implementation of the challenged board
resolution, the Association's security personnel removed and seized the tarpaulins. Reacting to
this, Justice Inting went to the Association's office and, standing on the middle of the street,
questioned what the security personnel did. Complainants alleged that she arrogantly said on
that occasion that she was a CA Justice, conveying the message that her action was proper and
cannot be questioned.[11]
f) Justice Inting and her cohorts usurped the general and management powers of the
Association's President to reassign or reshuffle its employees to other positions or to perform
other duties and responsibilities.[12]
g) She violated Rule 5.01 (d)[13] and Rule 5.10[14] of Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
when she joined the political party of her group and contributed to its party funds.
Complainants point out that the elections for the board of trustees and officers of the
Association had become so politicized that she, as a CA Justice, ought not to have taken part
in them since they detracted from the dignity of that court. [15]
In her December 2, 2011 comment, [16] Justice Inting assails the complaint as motivated by ill
will, malice, and a desire to prevent her from fulfilling her duties as member of the
Association's board of trustees.[17] It was unavoidable, she says, that she and the others in the
board had to institute their action against complainants even if there was a chance that the
matter could go up to the CA where she worked. But, since she was involved in the case in her
personal capacity as a trustee of the Association, she simply would have to inhibit herself
voluntarily if such matter be assigned to her Division. [18]
Justice Inting claims that the action they filed with the HLURB was not altogether groundless
since the HLURB even granted their application for a cease and desist order against
complainants' group.[19] She rejects as baseless the charge that the Association's elections
partake of political activities. And, although she was active in the affairs of the Association,
she excelled in her work as Justice of the CA as borne by its records. [20]
In their reply of January 10, 2010, [21] complainants contend that Justice Inting appeared before
the HLURB in her personal capacity since she had not been personally aggrieved by
complainants' action nor had they violated her rights. [22] They claim that the HLURB cease and

desist order appeared questionable, given a report that it was issued because Justice Inting
used her influence as a Justice of the appellate court and because her schoolmates at that
agency helped her.[23]
The issue before the Court is whether or not there is sufficient basis to warrant further
administrative investigation of the complaint against Justice Inting.

While it is the Court's duty to investigate every allegation of wrong-doing against judges and
other court personnel, it is also its duty to protect them from frivolous charges. [25]cralaw
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the present administrative complaint against Justice
Socorro B. Inting of the Court of Appeals for want of substance.

l Arcangel
Here, the main thrust of the complaint against Justice Inting is that, as Justice of the CA, she
should have desisted from joining the elections for the officers and members of the Board of
Trustees of her homeowners association and gotten embroiled in the issues that animated the
two groups which shared the powers of the association, thus getting drawn into a bitter
litigation.
But joining the judiciary does not mean that a judge should live the life of a hermit. The Code
of Judicial Ethics does not bar him from joining associations or institutions that promote the
common good. To be sure, no social or moral considerations prevent him from taking active
part in organizations that aim to promote the welfare of his family or community, like a
homeowners association.
Perchance, serious issues could develop even within socially desirable organizations but it
cannot be on account of such a risk that the judge should stay off from all forms of human
associations. He does not, by becoming a judge, cease to be a human being cast off from the
society of men. Such society is his natural habitat. It is membership in questionable
organizations or actively engaging in the operation of business organizations while serving as
judge that he is enjoined to avoid.[24]
As a trustee of her village's homeowners association, Justice Inting has the right to stand her
ground on any legitimate issue that might arise in the course of the discharge of her duties. She
could of course be wrong on those issues but it is not for this that she can be subjected to
administrative action. None of those issues are related to her work as Justice of the CA.
Essentially, complainants want the Court to resolve by their present action some of the very
issues that they raise against her in the HLURB case. But this is not a function of this
administrative case. Only when she purposely uses her position as Justice of the CA to get an
advantage over or cause prejudice to others can she be administratively sanctioned. As it
happens, there is no clear allegation in the complaint in this case that establishes this. The
allegations about her using her judicial rank to her advantage in the HLURB case are
admittedly speculative.
The closest to her invoking her judicial rank was when she stood on the middle of the street to
confront the village security personnel who removed and seized the posters that the Board of
Trustees put up to announce the need for the Association to comply with its resolution
enjoining compliance with the internal controls and disbursement policies that it had enacted.
It is plain that those security personnel used raw force to silence the voice of the Board of
Trustees expressed through those posters. And, assuming that Justice Inting mentioned the fact
that she was a Justice of the CA when she confronted the security personnel, she appears to
have done so spontaneously to show that she knew what she was talking about or to
discourage those security personnel from using physical force against her that they seemed
quite capable of.

CANON II
[A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691
April 2, 2013]
(Formerly A.M. No. 07-7-04-SC)
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner,
vs.

JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO, Branch 2; JUDGE GIL R. ACOSTA, Branch 3;

JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS, Branch 4; and JUDGE EDGEMELO C.
ROSALES, Branch 8; all of MTCC-Cebu City; CELESTE P. RETUYA, Clerk III,
MTCC Branch 6, Cebu City; CORAZON P. RETUYA, Court Stenographer, MTCC,
Branch 6, Cebu City; RHONA F. RODRIGUEZ, Administrative Officer I, Office of the
Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court (RTC) Cebu City; EMMA D. VALENCIA, Court
Stenographer III, RTC, Branch 18, Cebu City; MARILOU CABANEZ, Court
Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City; DESIDERIO S. ARANAS, Process Server,
MTCC, Branch 3, Cebu City; REBECCA ALESNA, Court Interpreter, MTCC, Branch
1, Cebu City; and HELEN MONGGAYA, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu
City. Respondents.
*PERLAS-BERNABE
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This Court has long held that "[the] administration of justice is circumscribed with a heavy
burden of responsibility. It requires that everyone involved in its dispensation from the
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk live up to the strictest standards of competence,
honesty, and integrity in the public service."1
THE CASE
This is an administrative case that stemmed from the 6 July 2007 Memorandum of the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA).2 The judicial audit team created by the OCA reported
alleged irregularities in the solemnization of marriages in several branches of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) and Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City. 3 Certain package
fees were offered to interested parties by "fixers" or "facilitators" for instant marriages. 4

In its 10 July 2007 Resolution, this Court treated the Memorandum dated 6 July 2007 of the
judicial audit team as a formal administrative complaint and directed Judge Anatalio S.
Necessario, Judge Gil R. Acosta, Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, and Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales
to submit their respective comments. 7 The Court also suspended the judges pending resolution
of the cases against them.8
On 24 August 2007, the OCA through Senior Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao
submitted its Memorandum dated 29 August 20079 and Supplemental Report.10 Six hundred
forty-three (643) marriage certificates were examined by the judicial audit team. 11 The team
reported that out of the 643 marriage certificates examined, 280 marriages were solemnized
under Article 3412 of the Family Code.13 The logbooks of the MTCC Branches indicate a
higher number of solemnized marriages than the number of marriage certificates in the courts
custody.14 There is also an unusual number of marriage licenses obtained from the local civil
registrars of the towns of Barili and Liloan, Cebu. 15 There were even marriages solemnized at
9 a.m. with marriage licenses obtained on the same day. 16 The town of Barili, Cebu is more
than sixty (60) kilometers away from Cebu City and entails a travel time of almost two (2)
hours.17 Liloan, Cebu, on the other hand, is more than ten (10) kilometers away from Cebu
City.18
The judicial audit team, after tape-recording interviews with other court and government
personnel, also reported the following:
1) Celeste P. Retuya admitted that she assisted couples who wanted to get married by checking
whether their documents were complete and referred them to Judges Tormis, Necessario, and
Rosales afterwards;19
2) Corazon P. Retuya referred couples who wanted to get married to Judge Necessario. There
were also "assistants" who would go over the couples documents before these couples would
be referred to Judge Necessario. Retuya also narrated several anomalies involving foreign
nationals and their acquisition of marriage licenses from the local civil registrar of Barili,
Cebu despite the fact that parties were not residents of Barili. Those anomalous marriages
were solemnized by Judge Tormis; 20

THE FACTS
On 3 July 2007, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Region 7 Judicial Supervisor, proceeded to Cebu City
and headed the audit team created by OCA in investigating Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8 of the
MTCC in Cebu City.5 A female and male lawyer of the audit team went undercover as a
couple looking to get married. They went to the Palace of Justice and were directed by the
guard on duty to go to Branch 4 and look for a certain "Meloy". The male lawyer feared that
he would be recognized by other court personnel, specifically the Clerk of Court of Branch 4
who was a former law school classmate. The two lawyers then agreed that only the female
lawyer would go inside and inquire about the marriage application process. Inside Branch 4, a
woman named Helen approached and assisted the female lawyer. When the female lawyer
asked if the marriage process could be rushed, Helen assured the lawyer that the marriage
could be solemnized the next day, but the marriage certificate would only be dated the day the
marriage license becomes available. Helen also guaranteed the regularity of the process for a
fee of three thousand pesos (P3,000) only.6

3) Rhona F. Rodriguez assisted couples and referred them to any of the available judges. She
admitted that after the payment of the solemnization fee of three hundred pesos (P300), a
different amount, as agreed upon by the parties and the judge, was paid to the latter. 21 She
admitted that she accepted four thousand pesos (P4,000) for facilitating the irregular marriage
of Moreil Baranggan Sebial and Maricel Albater although she gave the payment to a certain
"Mang Boy"; 22
4) Emma D. Valencia admitted that she assisted couples seeking to get married and that most
of the marriage licenses were obtained from the local civil registrar of Barili and Liloan, Cebu
because the registrars in those towns were not strict about couples attendance in the family
planning seminar. She also admitted that couples gave her food while the judge received five
hundred pesos (P500) if the marriage was solemnized inside the chambers. Foreigners were
said to have given twice the said amount. The judge accepted one thousand five hundred pesos
(P1,500) for gasoline expenses if the marriage was celebrated outside the chambers; 23

5) Marilou Cabaez admitted that she assisted couples and referred them to Judges Tormis,
Necessario, or Rosales. However, she denied receiving any amount from these couples. She
told the audit team that during the 8th, 18th, and 28th of the month, seven (7) to eight (8)
couples would go directly to Judge Rosabella M. Tormis for a fifteen-minute marriage
solemnization;24
6) Desiderio S. Aranas admitted that he started assisting couples in 2003. He told the
investigating team that Judge Gil Acosta would talk to couples wishing to get married without
a license. He would produce a joint affidavit of cohabitation form on which he or the clerk of
court would type the entries. The judge would then receive an envelope containing money
from the couple. Aranas also confirmed the existence of "open-dated" marriage certificates; 25
7) Antonio Flores, Branch 9 Process Server of RTC Cebu City, told the investigating team that
couples looked for Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 9, Cebu City, "para menos ang bayad."26 The excess of three hundred pesos (P300) that
couples paid to Judge Econg as solemnization fee went to a certain "sinking fund" of Branch
9;27
8) Rebecca L. Alesna admitted that she usually referred couples to Judges Necessario or
Tormis. Couples who wanted to get married under Article 34 of the Family Code were advised
to buy a pro-forma affidavit of joint cohabitation for ten pesos (P10);28
9) Arvin Oca, Branch 1 Process Server of the MTCC of Cebu City, admitted that he referred
couples to Branch 2, Clerk of Court, Harrish Co. Oca declared that on 28 June 2007, he
accompanied a couple to the chambers of Judge Necessario. 29 He informed the judge that the
couple only had birth certificates. 30 The respondent judge then inquired about their ages and
asked them if they had been previously married then proceeded to solemnize the
marriage;31 and

Mary Anne Flores-Patoc was a resident of Barrio Luz, Cebu City. In her 5 July 2007 affidavit,
she recounted how she and her boyfriend went to the Provincial Capitol to get married in
February 2006. While logging in at the entrance, they were offered assistance by the guards
for a fee of one thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500). The guard also offered to become
"Ninong" or a witness to the wedding. The couple became suspicious and did not push through
with the civil wedding at that time.
On 27 November 2007, the Court En Banc issued a resolution: a) requiring Judges Anatalio S.
Necessario, Gil R. Acosta, Rosabella M. Tormis, and Edgemelo C. Rosales of the MTCC,
Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8, respectively, of Cebu City, to comment on the findings of the 14
August 2007 Supplemental Report of the OCA, within fifteen (15) days from notice; b)
directing the Process Servicing Unit to furnish the judges with a copy of the Supplemental
Report; c) requiring the court personnel listed below to show cause within fifteen (15) days
from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against them for their alleged grave
misconduct and dishonesty and impleading them in this administrative matter:
1) Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City;
2) Corazon P. Retuya, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City;
3) Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Cebu
City;
4) Emma D. Valencia, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Branch 18, Cebu City;
5) Marilou Cabaez, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City;
6) Desiderio S. Aranas, Process Server, MTCC, Branch 3, Cebu City;

10) Filomena C. Lopez, local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu, declared that she does not
scrutinize marriage applications.32 Couples who are non-Barili residents are able to obtain
marriage licenses from her Barili office because these couples have relatives residing in Barili,
Cebu.33 She also added that while couples still need to submit a certificate of attendance in the
family planning seminar, they may attend it before or after the filing of the application for
marriage license.34
Affidavits of private persons were also attached to the records. Jacqui Lou Baguio-Manera
was a resident of Panagdait, Mabolo, Cebu and on 21 May 2007, she and her then fianc
wanted to set a marriage date. 35 Her younger sister who was married in a civil wedding last
year gave her the number of a certain "Meloy". After talking to Meloy on the phone, the
wedding was scheduled at 2 p.m. on 23 May 2007 and the couple were asked to bring their
birth certificates. No marriage license was required from them. Meloy asked for a fee of one
thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500). According to Baguio-Manera, their marriage certificate
was marked as "No marriage license was necessary, the marriage being solemnized under Art.
34 of Executive Order No. 209". Their marriage was solemnized that day by Judge Rosabella
M. Tormis. Baguio-Manera claimed that they did not understand what that statement meant at
that time. However, in her affidavit, she declared that the situation premised under Article 34
did not apply to her and her fianc.

7) Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter, MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu City;

8) Helen Mongaya,Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City.
The Court in the same resolution also: a) ordered the referral to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas for appropriate action on the administrative matter involving the
violation of the law on marriage by Ms. Filomena C. Lopez, Local Civil Registrar of Barili,
Cebu, and one Ms. Veronica S. Longakit, former Local Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu; b)
directed the Process Serving Unit to furnish the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Visayas with a copy of the Supplemental Report of the OCA; and c) required Judge Geraldine
Faith A. Econg, RTC, Branch 9, Cebu City, to comment within fifteen (15) days from notice
on the statement of staff member Antonio Flores saying that Branch 9s court personnel
received an amount in excess of the P300 solemnization fee paid by couples whose marriages
were solemnized by her. This amount goes to the courts "sinking fund". 36
In their Comments and/or Answers to the Memorandum dated 5 July 2007 of the OCA and its
Supplemental Report,37 the respondent judges argued the following:

Judge Anatalio S. Necessario relies on the presumption of regularity regarding the documents
presented to him by contracting parties. 38 He claims that marriages he solemnized under
Article 34 of the Family Code had the required affidavit of cohabitation. He claims that pro
forma affidavits of cohabitation have been used by other judges even before he became a
judge.39 He avers that he ascertains the ages of the parties, their relationship, and the existence
of an impediment to marry.40 He also asks the parties searching questions and clarifies whether
they understood the contents of the affidavit and the legal consequences of its execution. 41 The
judge also denies knowledge of the payment of solemnization fees in batches. 42 In addition, he
argues that it was a process server who was in-charge of recording marriages on the logbook,
keeping the marriage certificates, and reporting the total number of marriages monthly. 43

On 12 November 2007, Judges Tormis and Rosales filed a Memorandum of Law with Plea for
Early Resolution, Lifting of Suspension and Dismissal of Case. 59 This Court in a Resolution
dated 11 December 2007 lifted the suspension of the respondent judges but prohibited them
from solemnizing marriages until further ordered. 60

Judge Gil R. Acosta argues that the law only requires a marriage license and that he is not
required to inquire whether the license was obtained from a location where one of the parties
is an actual resident.44 The judge believes that it is not his duty to verify the signature on the
marriage license to determine its authenticity because he relies on the presumption of
regularity of public documents. 45 The judge also outlines his own procedure in solemnizing
marriages which involves: first, the determination whether the solemnization fee was paid;
second, the presentation of the affidavit of cohabitation and birth certificates to ascertain
identity and age of the parties; third, if one of the parties is a foreigner, the judge asks for a
certificate of legal capacity to marry, passport picture, date of arrival, and divorce papers when
the party is divorced; fourth, he then asks the parties and their witnesses questions regarding
cohabitation and interviews the children of the parties, if any. 46

THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE OCA

Judge Rosabella M. Tormis denies the charges brought by the OCA. She calls the actions of
the judicial audit team during the investigation an "entrapment". 47 She also claims that there is
nothing wrong with solemnizing marriages on the date of the issuance of the marriage license
and with the fact that the issued marriage license was obtained from a place where neither of
the parties resided.48 As to the pro forma affidavits of cohabitation, she argues that she cannot
be faulted for accepting it as genuine as she and the other judges are not handwriting
experts.49 The affidavits also enjoy the presumption of regularity. 50 Judge Tormis also
discredits the affidavit of Baguio-Manera as hearsay.51 The respondent said that when BaguioManera and her husband were confronted with the affidavit they executed, they affirmed the
veracity of the statements, particularly the fact that they have been living together for five
years.52 The judge also attributes the irregularity in the number of marriages solemnized in her
sala to the filing clerks.53
Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales denies violating the law on marriage. 54 He maintains that it is the
local civil registrar who evaluates the documents submitted by the parties, and he presumes
the regularity of the license issued. 55 It is only when there is no marriage license given that he
ascertains the qualifications of the parties and the lack of legal impediment to marry. 56 As to
the affidavits of cohabitation, the judge believes there is nothing wrong with the fact that these
are pro forma. He states that marriage certificates are required with the marriage license
attached or the affidavit of cohabitation only and the other documents fall under the
responsibility of the local civil registrar. He surmises that if the marriage certificate did not
come with the marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation, the missing document might have
been inadvertently detached, and it can be checked with the proper local civil registrar. As to
the payment of the docket fee, he contends that it should be paid after the solemnization of the
marriage and not before because judges will be pre-empted from ascertaining the
qualifications of the couple. Besides, the task of collecting the fee belongs to the Clerk of
Court.57 The judge also argues that solemnization of marriage is not a judicial duty.58

On 7 December 2007, Judges Tormis and Rosales filed a Motion for Early Resolution with
Waiver of Formal and/or Further Investigation and Motion to Dismiss. 61 In a Resolution dated
15 January 2008, the Court noted the motion and granted the prayer of Judges Tormis and
Rosales for the payment of their unpaid salaries, allowances and all other economic benefits
from 9 July 2007.62

In its Memorandum dated 15 June 2010,63 the OCA recommended the dismissal of the
respondent judges and some court employees, and the suspension or admonition of others. The
OCA summarized the liabilities of the respondents, to wit:
JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for
solemnizing marriages with questionable documents and wherein one of the contracting
parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of the
required certificate from his embassy. He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for
solemnizing marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code wherein one or both of the
contracting parties were minors during the cohabitation.
xxx
JUDGE GIL R. ACOSTA is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for failure to make
sure that the solemnization fee has been paid. He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law
for solemnizing marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code wherein one or both of the
contracting parties were minors during the cohabitation.
JUDGE EDGEMELO C. ROSALES is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for
solemnizing marriages with questionable documents, for failure to make sure that the
solemnization fee has been paid and for solemnizing marriages wherein one of the contracting
parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of the
required certificate from his embassy. He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for
solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license.
JUDGE ROSEBELLA M. TORMIS is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for
solemnizing marriages with questionable documents, for failure to make sure that the
solemnization fee has been paid, for solemnizing marriages wherein one of the contracting
parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of the
required certificate from the embassy and for solemnizing a marriage with an expired license.
xxx
HELEN MONGGAYA is guilty of grave misconduct for violating Section 2, Canon I of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel that prohibits court personnel from soliciting or

10

accepting any gift, favor or benefit based on any or explicit or implicit understanding that such
gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions and for giving false information for
the purpose of perpetrating an irregular marriage.

of the solemnization process which were disregarded by the judges. The Court will now
discuss the individual liabilities of the respondent judges and court personnel vis--vis the
evidence presented by the OCA against them.

RHONA RODRIGUEZ is guilty of gross misconduct for violating Section 2, Canon I of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and for inducing Maricel Albater to falsify the
application for marriage license by instructing her to indicate her residence as Barili, Cebu.

Liability of Judge Anatalio S. Necessario

DESIDERIO ARANAS and REBECCA ALESNA are guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service for providing couples who are to be married under Article 34 of the
Family Code with the required affidavit of cohabitation.
CELESTE RETUYA, EMMA VALENCIA and REBECCA ALESNA are guilty of violating
Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel which prohibits court
personnel from receiving tips or other remuneration for assisting or attending to parties
engaged in transactions or involved in actions or proceedings with the Judiciary.64
The OCA, however, recommended the DISMISSAL of the complaints against Judge Geraldine
Faith A. Econg, Corazon P. Retuya, and Marilou Cabaez, for lack of merit.
THE ISSUE
The issue now before this Court is whether the judges and personnel of the MTCC and RTC in
Cebu City are guilty of gross ignorance of the law, gross neglect of duty or gross inefficiency
and gross misconduct, and in turn, warrant the most severe penalty of dismissal from service.
THE COURTS RULING
The findings in the 2010 Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator are supported
by the evidence on record and applicable law and jurisprudence.
This Court has long held that court officials and employees are placed with a heavy burden
and responsibility of keeping the faith of the public. 65 In Obaana, Jr. v. Ricafort, we said that:
Any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions
must be avoided. This Court shall not countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of
all those involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public
accountability and diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.66
The OCA described accurately the Palace of Justice in Cebu City as a hub of swift marriages.
The respondent judges and court personnel disregarded laws and procedure to the prejudice of
the parties and the proper administration of justice.
The OCA found that Judges Anatalio S. Necessario, Gil R. Acosta, Rosabella M. Tormis, and
Edgemelo C. Rosales are all guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty when they
solemnized marriages without following the proper procedure laid down by law, particularly
the Family Code of the Philippines and existing jurisprudence. The OCA listed down aspects

The OCA reported that Judge Necessario solemnized a total of one thousand one hundred
twenty-three (1,123) marriages from 2005 to 2007. 67 However, only one hundred eighty-four
(184) marriage certificates were actually examined by the judicial audit team. 68 Out of the 184
marriages, only seventy-nine (79) were solemnized with a marriage license while one hundred
five (105) were solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code. Out of the 79 marriages with
license, forty-seven (47) of these licenses were issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Liloan,
Cebu. This translates to 42.93% of the marriages he solemnized with marriage license coming
from Liloan for over a period of years. 69 There were also twenty-two (22) marriages
solemnized by the judge with incomplete documents such missing as marriage license,
certificate of legal capacity to marry, and the joint affidavit of cohabitation. 70
Judge Necessario solemnized nine (9) marriages that had questionable supporting documents
such as marriage licenses. 71 The OCA found that the place of residence of the contracting
parties appearing in the supporting documents differ from the place where they obtained their
marriage license.72 The documents invited suspicion because of erasures and superimpositions
in the entries of residence. 73 Likewise, in lieu of the required certificate of legal capacity to
marry, a mere affidavit was submitted by the parties. 74 Variations in the signatures of the
contracting parties were also apparent in the documents. 75
The respondent judge solemnized forty-three (43) marriages under Article 34 of the Family
Code. These marriages appeared dubious since the joint affidavit of cohabitation of the parties
show minority of one or both of them during cohabitation. 76 For example, he solemnized on 14
May 2004 the marriage of 22-year-old Harol D. Amorin and 19-year-old Dinalyn S. Paraiso
who are residents of Lapu-Lapu City.77
There are also sixteen (16) marriage licenses with attached official receipts of the
solemnization fee but the corresponding marriage certificates cannot be found. 78 The presence
of the receipts implies that these marriages were solemnized.
Liability of Judge Gil R. Acosta
Judge Acosta solemnized a total of eighty-seven (87) marriages from 2003 to
2007.79 However, the logbook showed that he solemnized two hundred seventy-two (272)
marriages while the monthly reports of cases showed that he solemnized five hundred twelve
(512) marriages over the same period. Out of the 87 marriages, he solemnized seventy-five
(75) under
Article 34 of the Family Code.80 This is equivalent to 86.21% of the marriages solemnized
under Article 34 in a four-year period.81
There were forty-one (41) marriage certificates signed by Judge Tormis or Judge Necessario as
solemnizing officers found in his custody. 82 There were also ten (10) marriages under Article

11

34 of the Family Code where one or both of the contracting parties were minors during
cohabitation.83 To illustrate, respondent judge solemnized on 4 May 2004 the marriage of
Julieto W. Baga, 22 years old, and Esterlita P. Anlangit, 18 years old. 84

(38) marriage licenses out of the sixty-six (66) obtained or 57.57% were from the local civil
registrar of Barili, Cebu.101 Nineteen (19) or 28.79% were from the local civil registrar of
Liloan, Cebu.102 Nine (9) or 13.64% were from other local civil registrars. 103

There were seventeen (17) marriages under Article 34 where neither of the contracting parties
were residents of Cebu City.85 The judge solemnized three (3) marriages without the foreign
partys required certificate of legal capacity to marry. 86 Lastly, there was no proof of payment
of the solemnization fee in almost all of the marriages the judge officiated. 87

There were marriage documents found in his court such as marriage licenses, applications for
marriage license, certificates of legal capacity to contract marriage, affidavits in lieu of
certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage, joint affidavits of cohabitation, and other
documents referring to the solemnization of one hundred thirty-two (132) marriages, with no
corresponding marriage certificates. 104 He solemnized two marriages of Buddy Gayland
Weaver, an American citizen, to two different persons within nine (9) months. 105 No copy of
the required certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage or the divorce decree was
presented.106

Liability of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis

Judge Tormis solemnized a total of one hundred eighty-one (181) marriages from 2003 to
2007 based on the marriage certificates actually examined. 88 However, the monthly report of
cases showed that she solemnized three hundred five (305) marriages instead for the years
2004 to 2007.89 The OCA report also noted that it was only in July 2007 that her court started
to use a logbook to keep track of marriages. 90
Respondent judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages with incomplete or missing
documents such as the marriage license, certificate of legal capacity to marry, and the joint
affidavit of cohabitation.91 In several instances, only affidavits were submitted by the foreign
parties in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity to marry. 92
Judge Tormis solemnized thirteen (13) marriages despite the questionable character of the
validity of the required documents particularly the marriage license. 93 The judicial audit team
found numerous erasures and superimpositions on entries with regard to the parties place of
residence.94
In one instance, the judge solemnized the marriage of Rex Randy E. Cujardo and Anselma B.
Laranio on 28 December 2006 despite the marriage license containing a rubberstamp mark
saying, "THIS LICENSE EXPIRES ON" and a handwritten note saying "12/28/06" under it. 95
The judge solemnized a total of forty-seven (47) marriages under Article 34 of the Family
Code wherein the marriage requirements authenticity was doubtful due to the circumstances
of the cohabitation of the parties and the given address of the parties. 96 These irregularities
were evident in the case of 22-year-old John Rey R. Tibalan and Ana Liza Secuya who were
married on 25 May 2007. The residential address of the couple in the marriage certificate is
"Sitio Bamboo, Buhisan, Cebu City." However, there was an application for marriage license
attached to the marriage certificate showing that Secuyas address is "F. Lopez Comp. Morga
St., Cebu City."97
Liability of Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales
Judge Rosales solemnized a total of one hundred twenty-one (121) marriages from 2006 to
2007 based on the marriage certificates examined by the judicial audit team. 98 However, only
three (3) marriages were reported for the same period. 99 Out of the 121 marriages the judge
solemnized, fifty-two (52) or 42.98% fall under Article 34 of the Family Code. 100 Thirty-eight

The judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages without or with incomplete supporting
documents such as the certificate of legal capacity to marry and the joint affidavit of
cohabitation.107 He solemnized nine (9) marriages under questionable circumstances such as
the submission of an affidavit or affirmation of freedom to marry in lieu of the certificate of
legal capacity to marry, the discrepancies in the residence of the contracting parties as
appearing in the marriage documents, and the solemnization of the marriage on the same day
the marriage license was issued.108
Judge Rosales also solemnized forty-three (43) marriages with no proof that the solemnization
fee of P300 was paid.109 On the other hand, there were twenty-six (26) marriages whose
solemnization fees were paid late.110
To summarize, the liabilities of the judges are the following:
First, Judges Necessario, Tormis and Rosales solemnized marriages even if the requirements
submitted by the couples were incomplete and of questionable character. Most of these
documents showed visible signs of tampering, erasures, corrections or superimpositions of
entries related to the parties place of residence. 111These included indistinguishable features
such as the font, font size, and ink of the computer-printed entries in the marriage certificate
and marriage license.112 These actions of the respondent judges constitute gross inefficiency. In
Vega v. Asdala,113the Court held that inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance,
and carelessness.
Second, the judges were also found guilty of neglect of duty regarding the payment of
solemnization fees. The Court, in Rodrigo-Ebron v. Adolfo, 114 defined neglect of duty as the
failure to give ones attention to a task expected of him and it is gross when, from the gravity
of the offense or the frequency of instances, the offense is so serious in its character as to
endanger or threaten public welfare. The marriage documents examined by the audit team
show that corresponding official receipts for the solemnization fee were missing 115 or payment
by batches was made for marriages performed on different dates. 116 The OCA emphasizes that
the payment of the solemnization fee starts off the whole marriage application process and
even puts a "stamp of regularity" on the process.
Third, Judges Necessario, Tormis, and Rosales also solemnized marriages where a contracting
party is a foreigner who did not submit a certificate of legal capacity to marry from his or her
embassy. What the foreigners submitted were mere affidavits stating their capacity to marry.

12

The irregularity in the certificates of legal capacity that are required under Article 21 of the
Family Code117 displayed the gross neglect of duty of the judges. They should have been
diligent in scrutinizing the documents required for the marriage license issuance. Any
irregularities would have been prevented in the qualifications of parties to contract marriage. 118
Fourth, Judges Necessario, Acosta, and Tormis are likewise guilty of gross ignorance of the
law under Article 34 of the Family Code119 with respect to the marriages they solemnized
where legal impediments existed during cohabitation such as the minority status of one
party.120 The audit team cites in their Supplemental Report that there were parties whose ages
ranged from eighteen (18) to twenty-two (22) years old who were married by mere submission
of a pro forma joint affidavit of cohabitation. 121 These affidavits were notarized by the
solemnizing judge himself or herself. 122
Finally, positive testimonies were also given regarding the solemnization of marriages of some
couples where no marriage license was previously issued. The contracting parties were made
to fill up the application for a license on the same day the marriage was solemnized. 123
The Court does not accept the arguments of the respondent judges that the ascertainment of the
validity of the marriage license is beyond the scope of the duty of a solemnizing officer
especially when there are glaring pieces of evidence that point to the contrary. As correctly
observed by the OCA, the presumption of regularity accorded to a marriage license disappears
the moment the marriage documents do not appear regular on its face.
In People v. Jansen,124 this Court held that:
the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license
has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer
needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be
presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain
whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.
However, this Court also said in Sevilla v. Cardenas, 125 that "the presumption of regularity of
official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty." The visible superimpositions on the marriage licenses should have alerted the
solemnizing judges to the irregularity of the issuance.
It follows also that although Article 21 of the Family Code requires the submission of the
certificate from the embassy of the foreign party to the local registrar for acquiring a marriage
license, the judges should have been more diligent in reviewing the parties documents and
qualifications. As noted by the OCA, the absence of the required certificates coupled with the
presence of mere affidavits should have aroused suspicion as to the regularity of the marriage
license issuance.
The judges gross ignorance of the law is also evident when they solemnized marriages under
Article 34 of the Family Code without the required qualifications and with the existence of
legal impediments such as minority of a party. Marriages of exceptional character such as
those made under Article 34 are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of
the formal requisite of a marriage license. 126 Under the rules of statutory construction,
exceptions as a general rule should be strictly but reasonably construed. 127 The affidavits of

cohabitation should not be issued and accepted pro forma particularly in view of the settled
rulings of the Court on this matter. The five-year period of cohabitation should be one of a
perfect union valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage
contract.128 The parties should have been capacitated to marry each other during the entire
period and not only at the time of the marriage. 129
To elaborate further on the gravity of the acts and omissions of the respondents, the Family
Code provides the requisites for a valid marriage:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties
before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a)
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void
ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2). A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not
affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall
be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)
The absence of a marriage license will clearly render a marriage void ab initio. 130 The actions
of the judges have raised a very alarming issue regarding the validity of the marriages they
solemnized since they did not follow the proper procedure or check the required documents
and qualifications. In Aranes v. Judge Salvador Occiano, 131the Court said that a marriage
solemnized without a marriage license is void and the subsequent issuance of the license
cannot render valid or add even an iota of validity to the marriage. It is the marriage license
that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage and the act of
solemnizing the marriage without a license constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
As held by this Court in Navarro v. Domagtoy:
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts are at least proficient in the
law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary layman. They should be skilled and
competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with
basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case. It is not too much to expect
them to know and apply the law intelligently.132
It is important to note that the audit team found out that Judge Rosabella M. Tormis ordered
Celerina Plaza, a personal employee of the judge, to wait for couples outside the Hall of
Justice and offer services. 133 Crisanto Dela Cerna also stated in his affidavit that Judge Tormis
instructed him to get all marriage certificates and bring them to her house when she found out
about the judicial audit.134 In the language of the OCA, Judge Tormis considered the
solemnization of marriages not as a duty but as a business. 135 The respondent judge was
suspended for six (6) months in A.M. No. MTJ-071-962 for repeatedly disregarding the

13

directives of this Court to furnish the complainant a copy of her comment. She was also fined
the amount of five thousand pesos (P5,000) in A.M. Nos. 04-7-373-RTC and 04-7-374
RTC.136 She was reprimanded twice in A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609 and in A.M. No. MTJ001337.137 Finally, in the very recent case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon.
Rosabella M. Tormis and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817, promulgated last 12
March 2013, Judge Tormis was found guilty of gross inefficiency, violation of Supreme Court
rules, directives and circulars and gross ignorance of the law by this Court. She was dismissed
from service, with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any,
with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
The respondent judges violated Canons 2 138 and 6139 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which
exact competence, integrity and probity in the performance of their duties. This Court
previously said that "Ignorance of the law is a mark of incompetence, and where the law
involved is elementary, ignorance thereof is considered as an indication of lack of
integrity."140 In connection with this, the administration of justice is considered a sacred task
and upon assumption to office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal. He or she becomes the
visible representation of the law and more importantly of justice. 141
The actuations of these judges are not only condemnable, it is outright shameful.
Liability of Other Court Personnel
The Court agrees with the recommendations of the OCA on the liability of the following
employees:
Helen Mongaya, Court Interpreter of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu
City, is guilty of grave misconduct when she informed the female lawyer of the judicial audit
team that she can facilitate the marriage and the requirements on the same day of the lawyers
visit.142
What Monggaya was proposing was an open-dated marriage in exchange for a fee of P3,000.
Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel prohibits court personnel from
soliciting or accepting gifts, favor or benefit based on any explicit or implicit understanding
that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions.
Mongayas claim that she was merely relating to the lady lawyer what she knew from other
offices as the usual practice 143 is inexcusable. As found by the OCA in its Memorandum,
"Monggaya deliberately gave false information for the purpose of perpetrating an illegal
scheme. This, in itself, constitutes grave misconduct." 144Sec. 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules
on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service defines grave misconduct as "a grave offense that
carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service even on a first offense.
In Villaceran v. Rosete, this Court held that:

Court personnel, from the lowliest employee, are involved in the dispensation of justice;
parties seeking redress from the courts for grievances look upon court personnel, irrespective
of rank or position, as part of the Judiciary. In performing their duties and responsibilities,
these court personnel serve as sentinels of justice and any act of impropriety on their part
immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the peoples trust and
confidence in this institution. Therefore, they are expected to act and behave in a manner that
should uphold the honor and dignity of the Judiciary, if only to maintain the people's
confidence in the Judiciary.145
Mongaya acted improperly and in a manner opposite of what is expected of court personnel.
Her actions placed doubts on the integrity of the courts.
Rhona Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the MTCC,
Cebu City, is guilty of gross misconduct. She assisted the couple, Moreil Sebial and Maricel
Albater, and demanded and acceptedP4,000 from them.146 The act was a violation of Section 2,
Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel. As found by the OCA and adopted by
this Court, Rodriguez induced Albater to falsify the application for marriage license by
instructing her to indicate her residence as Barili, Cebu. 147 The claim that she gave the amount
to a certain Borces who was allegedly the real facilitator belies her participation in facilitating
the marriage. According to the OCA, when the couple went back for their marriage certificate,
they approached Rodriguez and not Borces. 148 When Borces told Rodriguez that the marriage
certificate had been misplaced, it was Rodriguez who instructed Sebial to fill up another
marriage certificate. 149
This Court has held that improper solicitations prohibited by Section 2, Canon I of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel, merits a grave penalty. 150 Such penalty can be dismissal from
service.
Desiderio Aranas, Branch 3 Process Server, MTCC, Cebu City and Rebecca Alesna are guilty
of conduct prejudicial to the best of interest of the service. Aranas provided couples who were
to be married under Article 34 of the Family Code with the required affidavit of
cohabitation.151 On the other hand, Alesna refers such couples to Aranas to acquire the said
affidavit which according to Alesna costs P10. As aptly put by the OCA, even if the amount
involved in the transaction is minimal, the act of soliciting money still gives the public the
wrong impression that court personnel are making money out of judicial transactions. 152
The Court said in Roque v. Grimaldo 153 that acts of court personnel outside their official
functions constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service because these acts
violate what is prescribed for court personnel. The purpose of this is to maintain the integrity
of the Court and free court personnel from suspicion of any misconduct.
Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III of Branch 6 of the MTCC, Cebu City, Emma Valencia,
Stenographer III of Branch 18, RTC, Cebu City, and Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter of
Branch 1, MTCC, Cebu City, admitted to the audit team that they received food from couples
they assisted.154 This is in violation of Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel which prohibits court personnel from receiving tips or other remuneration for
assisting or attending to parties engaged in transactions or involved in actions or proceedings
with the Judiciary. As recommended by the OCA, they are admonished considering that this is
their first offense and the tips were of minimal value. In Reyes-Domingo v. Morales, this

14

Court held that commission of an administrative offense for the first time is an extenuating
circumstance.155
The Court finds that there is insufficient evidence against Corazon P. Retuya. The OCA reports
that Corazon Retuya admitted initially that she received P5,000 from spouses Ichiro Kamiaya
and Mary Grace Gabiana to secure necessary documents. 156 The information was volunteered
by Corazon Retuya with no supporting sworn statement from the couple. However, she denies
this fact later on in her Comment. 157 Finding the earlier statement of Corazon Retuya as
unclear and lacking support from evidence, the Court adopts the findings of the OCA and
decides to give her the benefit of the doubt.
The Court also finds insufficient evidence to support the claims against Marilou Cabaez.
Cabaez was only implicated in this case through the sworn statement of Jacqui Lou BaguioManera who attested that they paid a certain "Meloy" P1,200 for the wedding under Article 34
of the Family through the assistance of Cabaez. 158Cabaez denies that she was the one who
assisted the couple and explained that it may have been Celerina Plaza, the personal assistant
of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis. Baguio-Manera got the nickname "Meloy" not from Cabaez
herself but from Baguio-Maneras younger sister.159 When Baguio-Manera met the said
"Meloy" at the Hall of Justice, she did not obtain confirmation that the said "Meloy" is
Cabaez. The Court adopts the findings of the OCA that there is lack of positive identification
of Cabaez and finds merit in her denial.160
The Court accepts the recommendation of the OCA as to the dismissal of the case against
Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg. The judge was only implicated through the statement of
Process Server Antonio Flores about an "alleged sinking fund". No evidence was presented as
to the collection of an excess of the solemnization fee. Neither was it proven that Judge Econg
or her staff had knowledge of such fund.

4. Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 8,
Cebu City, GUILTY of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law
and that he be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of his retirement benefits,
except leave credits, if any, and that he be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to
any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;
5. Helen Mongaya, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City,
GUILTY of violating Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and that
she be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except
leave credits, if any, and that she be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;
6. Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Court, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross misconduct for Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct
for Court Personnel and for inducing Maricel Albater to falsify the application for marriage
and that she be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits,
except leave credits, if any, and that she be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to
any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;
7. Desiderio S. Aranas, Process Server, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Cebu City,
GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and that he be SUSPENDED
without pay for a period of six (6) months with a warning that a similar offense shall be dealt
with more severely;

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents:

8. Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Cebu City,
GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and of violating Section 2(b),
Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and that she be SUSPENDED without
pay for a period of six (6) months with a warning that a similar offense shall be dealt with
more severely;

1. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2,
Cebu City, GUILTY of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law
and that he be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of his retirement benefits,
except leave credits, if any, and that he be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to
any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;

9. Celeste Retuya, Clerk III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6, Cebu City, and Emma
Valencia, Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Cebu City, GUILTY of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and of violating Section 2(b), Canon III of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and that they be ADMONISHED with a warning that a
similar offense shall be dealt with more severely;

2. Judge Gil R. Acosta, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Cebu City,
GUILTY of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that he
be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except leave
credits, if any, and that he be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;

The complaints against Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 9, Cebu City; Corazon P. Retuya, Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Branch 6, Cebu City; and Marilou Cabaez, Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

3. Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4,
Cebu City, GUILTY of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law
and that she would have been DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her
retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and disqualified from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation, had
she not been previously dismissed from service in A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817 (Formerly A.M.
No. 09-2-30-MTCC);

The case against Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, including the sworn statements of Celerina Plaza
and Crisanto dela Cerna, should be REFERRED to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the
purpose of initiating disbarment proceedings against the judge.
The Honorable Mayors of Barili, Cebu and Liloan, Cebu, are to be furnished copies of the
Supplemental Report dated 14 August 2007 and are ADVISED to conduct an investigation
with respect to the statements of Filomena C. Lopez, Civil Registrar of Barili, Cebu, and

15

Bonita I. Pilones, Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu, regarding the processing of marriage
licenses and to take the necessary action as the findings of the investigation may warrant.
Let a copy of this Decision be included in the respondents files that are with the Office of the
Bar Confidant and distributed to all courts and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. MTJ-09-1734 [FORMERLY OCA I.P.I. NO. 07-1933-MTJ] : January 19, 2011]
FLORENDA V. TOBIAS, Complainant, v. JUDGE MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR.,
PRESIDING JUDGE, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, VALLADOLID-SAN
ENRIQUE-PULUPANDAN, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, Respondent.
DECISION

In his Comment,[7] respondent denounced the allegation that he offers "package deals" to
prospective litigants as malicious, baseless and a lie. He denied that he demanded from
complainant the additional payment of P10,000.00. He alleged that he does not know
complainant and she is a total stranger to him.
Respondent attached to his Comment the Affidavit [8] dated September 29, 2007 of Atty. Robert
G. Juanillo, who stated therein that he received as counsel of the complainant in the ejectment
case the sum of P10,000.00 from complainant's sister, Lorna Vollmer. From the P10,000.00,
he paid filing fees and miscellaneous fees in the amount of P3,707.00, while the remaining
balance of P6,293.00 was paid to him for his services, consisting of the preparation and filing
of the complaint for ejectment, including acceptance fee.
Respondent also attached to his Comment the Affidavit[9] dated September 29, 2007 of Court
Stenographer Salvacion B. Fegidero, denying the allegation that she offered a "package deal"
to complainant's sister, Lorna Vollmer. She declared that the allegations of complainant were
malicious and unfair, and that complainant and her sister could have been misled by some
people who lost cases in the said court.

PERALTA, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from the complaint filed by complainant Florenda V. Tobias
against respondent Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Fourth Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Valladolid-San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental.
Complainant charged respondent with corruption for allegedly offering "package deals" to
litigants who plan to file cases in his court.
In her verified Complaint[1] dated June 6, 2007, complainant alleged that respondent Judge
Limsiaco, Jr. offers "package deals" for cases filed in the court where he presides. She stated
that sometime in June 2006, she requested her sister, Lorna V. Vollmer, to inquire from the
Fourth MCTC of Valladolid-San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental about the
requirements needed in filing an ejectment case. Court Stenographer Salvacion
Fegidero[2] allegedly proposed to Vollmer that for the sum of P30,000.00, respondent would
provide the lawyer, prepare the necessary pleadings, and ensure a favorable decision in the
ejectment case which they contemplated to file against the spouses Raymundo and Francisca
Batalla. Fegidero allegedly required them to pay the initial amount of P10,000.00 and the
remaining balance would be paid in the course of the proceedings. It was made clear that they
would not get any judicial relief from their squatter problem unless they accepted the package
deal.
Further, complainant alleged that on June 23, 2006, Lorna Vollmer, accompanied by Salvacion
Fegidero, delivered the amount of P10,000.00 to respondent at his residence. Subsequently, an
ejectment case was filed in respondent's court, entitled Reynold V. Tobias, represented by his
Attorney-in-fact Lorna V. Vollmer v. Spouses Raymundo Batalla and Francisca Batalla,
docketed as Civil Case No. 06-007-V.[3] Respondent allegedly assigned a certain Atty. Robert
G. Juanillo to represent the complainant in the ejectment case. Complainant stated that
respondent, however, immediately demanded for an additional payment of P10,000.00. She
allegedly refused to give the additional amount and earned the ire of respondent. She asked
her sister, Lorna Vollmer, to request Atty. Robert Juanillo to voluntarily withdraw as counsel,
[4]
which he did on April 16, 2007. Complainant also asked Vollmer to withdraw the case. [5]
Respondent granted the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel on April 23, 2007 and the Motion to
Withdraw Case on May 3, 2007.[6]

Meanwhile, the ejectment case was assigned to Judge Herminigildo S. Octaviano, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Bago City, Negros Occidental, in view of respondent's inhibition on July
30, 2007.[10]
On February 20, 2008, the Court issued a Resolution,[11] which noted the Report of the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) on the complaint against respondent. Due to the conflicting
allegations of the parties, the OCA opined that a formal investigation was necessary to afford
the parties opportunity to substantiate their respective claims and to determine the alleged
participation of court employee Salvacion Fegidero. Upon recommendation of the OCA, the
Court referred the complaint to Executive Judge Frances V. Guanzon, Regional Trial Court,
Bago City, Negros Occidental for investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days
from receipt thereof.
On May 20, 2008, the parties were summoned for a formal investigation before Investigating
Judge Frances V. Guanzon. Those who appeared before the Investigating Judge were
complainant Florenda V. Tobias, respondent Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., Court
Stenographer Salvacion Fegidero and respondent's witness, Atty. Robert Juanillo.
Complainant's witness, Lorna Vollmer, did not attend the investigation, because per
information of complainant, Vollmer was in Germany and she was expected to be back in the
country in December 2008.
In his Report dated June 2, 2008, Investigating Judge Guanzon stated that complainant
testified that it was her sister, Lorna Vollmer, who informed her about the alleged "package
deal" through long distance telephone call. Complainant testified that she met Salvacion
Fegidero only after the filing of the instant administrative complaint and that she did not talk
with her even once.[12] Complainant further claimed that she had no personal dealings with
respondent or with Salvacion Fegidero, and that she met respondent only after the filing of the
ejectment case.[13]
Moreover, complainant testified that respondent neither personally received from her the
initial payment of P10,000.00 for the alleged package deal nor personally asked from her for
an additional payment of P10,000.00.[14] It was her sister, Lorna Vollmer, who told her through
telephone about the demand for an additional P10,000.00, but she (complainant) did not send

16

the money.[15]
Complainant testified that she was the one who went to the house of Atty. Robert Juanillo,
bringing with her the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel prepared by respondent for Atty.
Juanillo to sign.[16]
Respondent and Court Stenographer Salvacion Fegidero categorically denied the accusation
that they had a package deal with Lorna Vollmer. Respondent testified that he met and talked
with Vollmer when she went to his court to inquire about the filing of an ejectment case
against the spouses Raymundo and Francisca Batalla. Respondent advised Vollmer that since
there was no lawyer in Valladolid, Negros Occidental, she had to choose the nearest town
lawyer as it would lessen expenses in transportation and appearance fee, and respondent
mentioned the name of Atty. Robert Juanillo.[17] Moreover, respondent testified that Vollmer,
together with her husband and Salvacion Fegidero, went to his house once to ask him for the
direction to the house of Atty. Robert Juanillo. Respondent denied that he received the amount
of P10,000.00 from Vollmer.[18]
Further, respondent testified that he met with complainant after the ejectment case was filed,
when she went to his court and told him that she was withdrawing the services of Atty. Robert
Juanillo. Respondent admitted that he prepared the motion for the withdrawal of appearance of
Atty. Juanillo, since respondent wanted to help complainant as she said it was urgent, but
respondent did not charge her.[19]
Atty. Robert Juanillo testified that he received the amount of P10,000.00 from Lorna Vollmer
at the Municipal Court of Valladolid, Negros Occidental. From the amount, he paid filing fees
amounting to P3,707.00 to the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Circuit Court of ValladolidPulupandan and San Enrique, which payment was evidenced by five official receipts. Atty.
Juanillo testified that the balance of P6,293.00 was payment for his legal services.

Nevertheless, Investigating Judge Guanzon stated that although the alleged offer of package
deals by respondent to litigants was unsubstantiated, it was improper for respondent to talk to
prospective litigants in his court and to recommend lawyers to handle cases. Likewise, Judge
Guanzon found respondent's act of preparing the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Atty.
Robert Juanillo to be improper and unethical.
Investigating Judge Guanzon recommended the dismissal of the administrative complaint
against respondent as regards the alleged offer of package deals to litigants who plan to file
cases in his court. However, Judge Guanzon recommended that respondent be reprimanded for
talking to a prospective litigant in his court, recommending the counsel to handle the case, and
preparing the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Atty. Robert Juanillo, which pleading was
filed in respondent's court and was acted upon by him.
In a Resolution dated August 4, 2008, the Court referred the Report of Investigating Judge
Guanzon to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation within 30 days from notice.
The OCA found respondent's acts, consisting of (1) advising Lorna Vollmer about the
ejectment case she was about to file before his court; (2) recommending Atty. Robert Juanillo
as counsel of the complainant in the ejectment case; and (3) helping complainant to prepare
the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, to be violative of the rules on integrity,[21] impartiality,
[22]
and propriety[23] contained in the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary. The OCA recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative
matter and that respondent be found guilty of gross misconduct constituting violations of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct and be fined in the amount of P20,000.00.
In a Resolution dated February 25, 2009, the Court required the parties to manifest whether
they were willing to submit the case for decision, on the basis of the pleadings/records already
filed and submitted, within 10 days from notice.

Court Stenographer Salvacion Fegidero denied that she was involved in the alleged package
deal complained of by Florenda Tobias. She testified that she met Lorna Vollmer for the first
time when Vollmer went to the court in Villadolid and asked if there was a lawyer in
Valladolid, because she was intending to file an ejectment suit. She referred Vollmer to
respondent Judge Limsiaco, since there was no lawyer in the Municipality of Valladolid,
Negros Occidental. The courtroom of Valladolid, Negros Occidental consists only of one room
where everybody holds office, including respondent. She saw respondent talk with Vollmer
for 15 minutes, but she did not hear what they were talking about. [20]

On August 18, 2010, the Court issued a Resolution resolving to inform the parties that they are
deemed to have submitted the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings/records already
filed and submitted, considering that they have not submitted their respective manifestations
required in the Resolution dated February 25, 2009, despite receipt thereof on April 1, 2010.

Investigating Judge Guanzon found that the complainant did not have personal knowledge of
the alleged "package deals" to litigants who file cases in the court of respondent. The
allegations in the Complaint were all based on the information relayed to complainant though
telephone by her sister, Lorna Vollmer. During the investigation, complainant admitted that
respondent did not personally receive from her the amount of P10,000.00 as payment for the
alleged package deal, and respondent did not ask from her an additional P10,000.00.

However, the investigation revealed that respondent committed acts unbecoming of a judge, in
particular, talking to a prospective litigant in his court, recommending a lawyer to the litigant,
and preparing the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Atty. Robert Juanillo, which pleading
was filed in his court and was acted upon by him. The conduct of a judge should be beyond
reproach and reflective of the integrity of his office. Indeed, as stated by the OCA, the said
acts of respondent violate Section 1 of Canon 2 (Integrity), Section 2 of Canon 3
(Impartiality), and Section 1 of Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary,[24] thus:

According to Investigating Judge Guanzon, the only person who could have shed light on the
alleged offer of package deals to litigants was Lorna Vollmer, complainant's sister.
Unfortunately, Vollmer was not present during the investigation. Per manifestation of
complainant, Vollmer was then in Germany and she was expected to return to the Philippines
in December 2008. Hence, the complaint of corruption was unsubstantiated.

The Court agrees with the findings of Investigating Judge Guanzon that complainant failed to
prove by substantial evidence her allegation that respondent offers "package deals" to
prospective litigants in his court.

CANON 2
INTEGRITY

17

1.
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the
personal demeanor of judges.
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.

2.

xxxx

3.

Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including government-owned or controlled corporations; Provided, however,
That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but
not exceeding six (6) months; or
A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the
decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.
xxxx
SEC. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of
the judge and of the judiciary.
CANON 4

In imposing the proper sanction against respondent, the Court takes note that respondent had
been found guilty of grave misconduct in A.M. No. MTJ-03-1509[28] and was fined
P20,000.00, with a warning against repetition of the same or similar act. Moreover, per
verification from court records, respondent compulsorily retired from the service on May 17,
2009.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., former Presiding Judge of the
Fourth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Valladolid-San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental, is foundGUILTY of gross misconduct for which he is FINED in the amount of
Twenty-five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00). The Office of the Court Administrator
is DIRECTED to deduct the fine of P25,000.00 from the retirement benefits due to Judge
Limsiaco, Jr.
No costs.

PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities
of a judge.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly.
In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the
judicial office.
The aforementioned acts of respondent constitute gross misconduct. "Misconduct" means a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, willful in character, improper or
wrong behavior.[25] "Gross" has been defined as "out of all measure, beyond allowance;
flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused."[26] Respondent's act of preparing the
Motion to Withdraw the Appearance of Atty. Juanillo as counsel of complainant is
inexcusable. In so doing, respondent exhibited improper conduct that tarnished the integrity
and impartiality of his court, considering that the said motion was filed in his own sala and
was acted upon by him.
Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct is a serious charge
under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.[27] Under Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, the sanctions against a respondent guilty of a serious charge may be any of the
following:

18

CANON III
[A.M. No. RTJ-09-2189
January 18, 2011]
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-2837-RTJ)
VICTORIANO SY, Complainant,
vs.
Judge OSCAR E. DINOPOL, Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal
City, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
We resolve in this Decision the Verified Complaint, dated March 11, 2008, 1 filed by Victoriano
Sy against Judge Oscar E. Dinopol of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 24, Koronadal
City, South Cotabato, for Conduct Unbecoming a Member of the Judiciary and for Gross
Ignorance of the Law, in relation to Civil Case No. 1403-24, entitled Sps. Victoriano Sy and
Loreta Sy v. Metrobank, for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Real Estate
Mortgage, and Misc. Case No. 1440-24, entitled Metrobank v. Sps. Victoriano Sy, et al., for
Issuance of a Writ of Possession.
The Antecedents Facts
The facts are set out in the memorandum/report, dated May 25, 2009, 2 of the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA), and are summarized below.
The Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) was the mortgagee in good faith and
for value of twenty-three (23) parcels of land all located in Koronadal City. The mortgagors
were Marvella Plaza Hotel, Sprinter Lumber, Hardware and Auto Parts, Inc. and/or Sps.
Victoriano Sy and Loreta Cabaies-Sy and/or Sps. Vicente and Antonia Mandanas.
Metrobank foreclosed the mortgage for violation of the terms and conditions of the mortgage
agreement. At the public auction on August 31, 1998, the mortgaged parcels of land were sold
to Metrobank as the highest bidder. Metrobank was issued a certificate of sale which was
registered on September 18, 1998 with the Register of Deeds of South Cotabato. The
mortgagors failed to redeem the 23 parcels of land within the redemption period.
Thereafter, Sps. Victoriano and Loreta Sy, and Sprinter Lumber, Hardware and Auto Parts, Inc.
filed with the RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City, presided over by Judge Dinopol, a complaint
against Metrobank for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage,
Extrajudicial Foreclosure Proceedings and Certificate of Sale, with Damages and Attorneys
Fees and with prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and
Preliminary Injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 1403-24.
On April 16, 2004, Judge Dinopol inhibited himself from further acting on the case 3 on the
ground that he received a call, on April 12, 2004, from a ranking officer of the Philippine
Judicial Academy, interceding in behalf of the defendant bank and an earlier call (July 2003)
from a ranking personnel of the OCA, appealing in behalf of the plaintiffs. He claimed he
wanted to avoid being charged with partiality either way he acted on the case.

On September 15, 2005, Metrobank filed with the RTC, South Cotabato, a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Possession over the parcels of land subject of the foreclosed mortgage
against Marvella Plaza Hotel, Sprinter Lumber, Hardware and Auto Parts, Inc., and/or Sps.
Victoriano and Loreta Sy, and/or Sps. Vicente and Antonia Mandanas, docketed as Misc. Case
No. 1440-24,4 and assigned to the RTC, Branch 24, Koronadal City, presided by Judge
Dinopol.
On July 13, 2006, Judge Dinopol issued an Order granting the petition, 5 and issued the writ of
possession on July 21, 2006.6
Meanwhile, or on May 22, 2006, Sprinter Lumber, Hardware and Auto Parts, Inc. filed with
the RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, a petition, entitled In the Matter of: Petition for the
Declaration of State of Suspension of Payments with Approval of Proposed Rehabilitation
Plan, docketed as Corp. Case No. 1585-06.7
On June 26, 2006, the RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, issued an Order 8 staying the enforcement
of all claims against the debtor, its guarantors and sureties not solidarily liable with the debtor.
The same court subsequently approved the rehabilitation plan.
In the meantime, Sheriff Conrado B. Dapulang, Jr. proceeded to implement the writ of
possession issued by Judge Dinopol, but it was returned unsatisfied in view of the stay order
issued by the RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, in Corp. Case No. 1585-06. 9
Consequently, the respondents in Misc. Case No. 1440-24 filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings due to the issuance of the stay order and the approval of the rehabilitation plan by
the Rehabilitation Court, and a motion for inhibition on grounds of bias and partiality on the
part of Judge Dinopol. Judge Dinopol denied the motions in an Order dated February 11,
2008, and directed Deputy Sheriff Ricardo G. Publico to re-implement the writ of execution of
July 31, 2006.10
Shortly thereafter, Sy filed the present administrative complaint 11 charging Judge Dinopol of
gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a member of the judiciary.
Gross Ignorance of the Law
Sy alleged in his complaint that while Civil Case No. 1403-24 (in which he and his wife
sought the declaration of nullity of the foreclosure proceedings against Metrobank) was
pending before Judge Dinopols sala, the judge inhibited himself from acting on the case. This
notwithstanding, and to Sys surprise, Judge Dinopol still handled Misc. Case No. 1440-24, a
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by Metrobank, a matter closely
intertwined with Civil Case No. 1403-24. Judge Dinopol then issued an order granting
Metrobank the right to possess the foreclosed properties. 12
Sy further alleged that despite the issuance by the RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, of a stay
order13 and the approval of the rehabilitation plan, as well as the pendency of Metrobanks
petition before the Court of Appeals (CA) Twenty-Third Division in Cagayan De Oro City
(CA G.R. SP No. 01824) assailing the validity of the stay order, Judge Dinopol ordered that
the writ of possession be implemented. 14
Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge

19

Sy claimed in relation with his charge that while Civil Case No. 1403-24 was pending in Judge
Dinopols sala, the judge asked him for commodity loans in the form of construction materials
to be used in the construction of the judges house. The transaction was evidenced by delivery
receipt no. 15178 (March 8, 2005),15 and charge invoices no. 9817 (March 8, 2005)
for P16,000.00,16 no. 9826 (March 9, 2005) for P850.00,17 and no. 9838 (March 10, 2005)
for P780.00.18
Sy further claimed that aside from the commodity loans, Judge Dinopol obtained cash loans
from him on various occasions between December 2, 2005 to July 14, 2006, in the total
amount of P121,000.00, and Judge Dinopol borrowed from him his Suzuki Multi-cab and
returned it after the judge was suspended in September 2007. Sy presented disbursement
vouchers, official receipts and an acknowledgement to prove his claim. 19
Judge Dinopols Comment
In a 1st indorsement dated March 18, 2008, 20 the OCA required Judge Dinopol to comment on
the complaint, which he did on April 21, 2008.21
Judge Dinopol denied Sys accusations. He stressed that he inhibited himself from Civil Case
No. 1403-24 on April 16, 2004 and had not acted on the case since then; nobody intervened
and pleaded in behalf of Metrobank after Misc. Case No. 1440-24 was filed. He was not aware
nor had he been given notice that Metrobank filed a petition before the CA (CA G.R. SP No.
01824), nor did he receive any order from the appellate tribunal enjoining him to desist from
performing or acting on the incidents pending in Misc. Case No. 1440-24.
Judge Dinopol denied that he committed any breach of procedural rules that could be
characterized as gross ignorance of the basic rules of civil procedures. He maintained that Sy
did not allege any specific actuations of deceit, malice or intent to cause injury to Sy, and that
he had acted fairly and objectively. He added that he observed the requirements of the Code of
Professional Responsibility as a lawyer, relative to his handling of Misc. Case No. 1440-24.
With respect to the alleged accommodations he received from Sy at the time his house was
under construction, Judge Dinopol claimed that when he obtained the commodity loans from
Sy in March 2005, he had already inhibited himself from handling Civil Case No. 1403-24; he
did so on April 16, 2004. He explained that Misc. Case No. 1440-24 was filed only on
September 15, 2005, and was assigned to his sala on September 22, 2005. He denied that he
received from Sy cash loans in the amount of P121,000.00. He also denied borrowing Sys
Suzuki Multi-cab and claimed that it was Rogelio Villanueva who borrowed it.
Judge Dinopol countered that it was Sy who acted with sinister design and employed deceit
and cunning to frustrate the administration of justice in the cases he handled.
In a Resolution dated July 15, 2009, the Court resolved to: (1) note Sys complaint and Judge
Dinopols answer/comment; (2) re-docket the complaint as a regular administrative matter;
and (3) require the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the matter for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings. The Court also noted the OCA Report dated May 25,
2009,22 which found no basis for the charge of ignorance of the law on the part of Judge
Dinopol, but found him liable for conduct unbecoming a judge.
The Courts Ruling

The OCA evaluation is well-founded. Judge Dinopol cannot be disciplined for ignorance of
the law and of procedure in his handling of Civil Case No. 1403-24 (for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage) filed by Sps. Victoriano and Loreta Sy against
Metrobank, as he inhibited himself from the case, nor in his handling of Misc. Case No. 144024 (Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession) filed by Metrobank against Sps.
Victoriano Sy, et al., because of the essential nature of the proceeding itself.
In issuing the writ of possession and in directing its re-implementation when it was returned
unsatisfied the first time it was enforced, Judge Dinopol acted in accordance with the rules and
jurisprudence on the matter.
As the Court held in Santiago v. Merchants Rural Bank of Talavera, Inc., 23 the proceeding in a
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is ex-parte and summary in nature. It is
brought for the benefit of one party only and may be granted even without notice to the
mortgagor, in this case, complainant Sy. Moreover, the duty of the court to grant a writ of
possession is a ministerial function. The court does not exercise its official discretion or
judgment.24 Judge Dinopol, before whom the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession
was filed, had no discretion on whether to issue the writ of possession or not. It cannot be said,
therefore, that Judge Dinopol exposed himself or exhibited bias in favor of Metrobank when
he issued the writ of possession.
Further, regardless of whether there is a pending suit for the annulment of the mortgage or the
foreclosure itself, the purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice of course
to the eventual outcome of the annulment case. Once the writ of possession is issued, the trial
court has no alternative but to enforce the writ without delay.25
From another perspective, a stay order only affects claims filed against the assets and
properties belonging to a debtor. Properties that have already been foreclosed, and those
whose titles have already passed on to the winning bidder are no longer considered properties
of the debtor.26 In such case, it is a ministerial duty on the part of the trial court to grant a
possessory writ over the foreclosed properties.27
Clearly, Judge Dinopol was well within his authority and committed no impropriety in
directing the re-implementation of the writ of execution in Misc. Case No. 1440-24.
On the other hand, we cannot say the same thing with regard to Sys charge of conduct
unbecoming against Judge Dinopol. The latters denial of having committed the acts
complained of flies in the face of indications in the records and documentary evidence that he
obtained commodity loans from Sy in the form of building materials for the construction of his
house in Koronadal City. There was also Sys claim of cash loans to Judge Dinopol on various
occasions, between December 2, 2005 and July 14, 2006, amounting to P121,000.00, as well
as the loan of Sys Suzuki Multi-cab to the Judge.
The commodity loans were evidenced by receipts 28 indicating delivery of construction
materials to Judge Dinopols residence. The cash loans appear to have been covered by
disbursement vouchers,29 and the borrowed multicab is the subject of an
"acknowledgement"30 from Judge Dinopols driver Rogelio Villanueva.
There is substantial evidence showing that Judge Dinopol obtained the commodity loans from
Sy. The judge himself admitted that he wrote Sy, on March 4, 2005, regarding the purchase of
materials for his house which was then under construction, although he claimed that it was his
wife who transacted with Sy and it was Sy himself who offered to deliver the materials to his
residence.31 Judge Dinopol pleaded innocence regarding the commodity loans or even the cash

20

loans saying that the transaction with Sy regarding the construction materials occurred when
there was no case pending in his sala where Sy was a party.

SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of
the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.

The above disclaimer notwithstanding, we find Judge Dinopol to have committed a serious
impropriety in his or his familys financial or business dealings with Sy.

Moreover, Canon 4 mandates a judge to observe and maintain proper decorum and its
appearance in his public office:

Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct in relation to a judges impartiality

provides, inter alia, as follows:

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities
of a judge.

Sec. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of
the judge and the judiciary.

SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.

Sec. 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the

occasions on which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding
cases.
Judge Dinopol violated the above provisions when he received accommodations from Sy for
the building materials he needed for the construction of his house. He compromised his
position as a judge. Although at the time he and his family had business dealings with Sy there
was no pending case involving the businessman, he should have been more circumspect in
securing the construction materials. The sphere of Sys business operations was within his
territorial jurisdiction. As the OCA aptly noted, "it is neither impossible nor remote that a case
might be filed in his court with complainant as a party. In such a case, his (respondent)
business and financial dealings with complainant would create a doubt about his fairness and
impartiality in deciding the case and would tend to corrode the respect and dignity of the
court."32
In addition, we find that Judge Dinopol also violated Section 1 of Canon 1, Canon 2 and
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Section 1 of Canon 1 highlights the independence of a judge in performing his official duties,
thus:
SEC. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their
assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free
of any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect,
from any quarter or for any reason.
Canon 2 requires a judge to promote integrity in the discharge of his official functions:
Integrity is essential not only in the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the
personal demeanor of judges.
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in view of a reasonable observer.

By his own admissions, Judge Dinopol failed to observe these ethical standards. In his
Answer/Comment, Judge Dinopol admitted that he talked with Sy on several occasions to
discuss Misc. Case No. 1440-24.33 Judge Dinopol also admitted that Sy, in at least two
instances, requested him to delay the resolution of the writ of possession. 34Judge Dinopols
actions no doubt created the inference that at some point, he acceded to Sys requests to delay
the proceedings. This conclusion, is in fact, bolstered by Judge Dinopols knowledge that the
counsel for Metrobank was instructed to immediately secure the order for the issuance of the
writ of possession.35 Regardless of the representations allegedly made to him by Sy, Judge
Dinopol should have immediately issued the writ of possession in Metrobanks favor.
From these inappropriate actions, we find that Judge Dinopol compromised not only his
impartiality in handling Misc. Case No. 1440-24 but also his independence and integrity as a
judge. His actions no doubt diminished public confidence and public trust in him as a judge.
His actions gave the public the impression and the appearance that he can be influenced by
extraneous factors - other than the legal arguments and the court evidence in discharging his
judicial functions.
In addition, we find that Judge Dinopol committed impropriety in talking with litigants outside
court proceedings. His improper conduct was further aggravated by the fact that these
conversations took place in the absence of the opposing litigants and/or the opposing counsel.
In Agustin v. Mercado,36 we declared that employees of the court have no business meeting
with litigants or their representatives under any circumstance. In Re: Affidavit of Frankie N.
Calabines,37 the Court minced no words in explaining that such unethical conduct constitutes
"a brazen and outrageous betrayal of public trust." 38 The Court further declared in the said
case:
x x x The Court cannot overemphasize the need for honesty and integrity on the part of all
those who are in the service of the judiciary. x x x
The image of a court as a bastion of justice depends to a large extent on the personal and
official conduct of its employees. Thus, from the judge to the lowest clerk, judicial personnel
have the sacred duty to maintain the good name of the Judiciary.
All employees in the judiciary should be examples of responsibility, competence and
efficiency. As officers of the court and agents of the law, they must discharge their duties with
due care and utmost diligence. Any conduct they exhibit tending to diminish the faith of the
people in the judiciary will not be condoned.39
Certainly, these responsibilities become more exacting when one occupies the position of a
judge. Time and again, we have emphasized that judges are expected to conduct themselves in
a manner that would enhance respect and confidence of the people in the judicial

21

system. 40 The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges
must not only maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; they must also avoid
any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the peoples faith in the
Judiciary.41These standards apply not only to the decision itself, but also to the process by
which the decision is made.42
Without a doubt, Judge Dinopol is liable for gross misconduct in office and deserves to be
sanctioned under the above findings. His track record as a judge, in this regard, is far from
exemplary.1wphi1 He is a repeat offender, as demonstrated by the following cases where
we penalized him for questionable conduct:
First, in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1969 decided on June 15, 2006, Judge Dinopol was found guilty of
gross ignorance of the law and was fined P20,000.00. 43
Second, in A.M. No. RTJ-06-2020 decided on September 20, 2006, he was found guilty of
gross ignorance of the law and abuse of authority, and was fined P20,000.00. 44

Lastly, as we sanction Judge Dinopol, we remind the members of the bench that:
[a]lthough every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater
demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the [J]udiciary.
A magistrate of the law must compose himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct,
official and otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him
as the epitome of integrity and justice.49
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge Oscar E. Dinopol, Regional Trial Court, Branch
24, Koronadal City, is declared GUILTY OF GROSS MISCONDUCT and is hereby
DISMISSED from the service, with FORFEITURE of all benefits, except accrued leave
credits, if any, with prejudice to his re-employment in any branch or service of the
government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.

Third, in A.M. No. RTJ-06-2003 decided on August 23, 2007, he was found liable for undue
delay in rendering a decision or order and for violating the clear provisions of A.M. No. 01-107-SC, and was fined P11,000.00.45
Fourth, in A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2173-RTJ decided on August 28, 2006, he was strongly
admonished, even as the complainant desisted from pursuing the complaint against the judge
for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority and discretion. 46
And more recently, in A.M. No. RTJ-07-2052 decided on March 30, 2009, Judge Dinopol had
been reminded and warned against entertaining litigants outside court premises. 47
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross misconduct constituting a violation
of the Code of Judicial Conduct as a serious charge. Under Section 11 of the same Rule, the
respondent found guilty of a serious charge may be meted any of the following sanctions:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court
may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or reappointment to any
public office;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3)
months but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
Considering his repeated infractions and numerous breaches of the standard ethical conduct
demanded of judges, we find Judge Dinopol unfit to discharge the functions of a judge. We
impose upon him the severest penalty of dismissal from the service, with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave benefits, and disqualification from reinstatement
or reappointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.48

22

[A.M. No. RTJ-08-2145

DECISION

beginning to end, the prerogative of rendering the decision still rests entirely on the presiding
judge.
On 18 September 2006, Judge Tabora rendered a decision in the case adverse to Tabisula.
Tabisula then wrote a Letter dated 2 October 2006 to Judge Carbonell requesting for a copy of
his decision. On 9 October 2006, Judge Carbonell replied to Tabisulas letter and attached a
copy of his decision which favored Tabisula.
Tabisula then filed this case against Judge Tabora for maliciously and deliberately changing,
altering and reversing a validly rendered decision of a court of equal and concurrent
jurisdiction. Tabisula added that this has caused her undue injury since the defendant in Civil
Case No. 6840, Rang-Ay Rural Bank Inc., represented by its President, Ives Q. Nisce, was
allegedly a relative of Judge Taboras husband.

The Case

Tabisula also charged Lacsamana for alleged manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and gross
inexcusable negligence for refusing to furnish a copy of the decision rendered by Judge
Carbonell despite several verbal and written demands.

June 18, 2010]

JUDGE MONA LISA T. TABORA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, San
Fernando City, La Union, Branch 26, Complainant,
vs.
(Ret.) JUDGE ANTONIO A. CARBONELL, former Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 27, Respondent.

CARPIO, J.:

This administrative case arose from an Affidavit-Complaint dated 17 October 2006 filed by
Caridad S. Tabisula (Tabisula) against Judge Mona Lisa T. Tabora (Judge Tabora), Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court (RTC), San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 26, and Alfredo V.
Lacsamana, Jr. (Lacsamana), Officer-in-Charge, Branch Clerk of Court (OIC-BCOC) of the
same court. Tabisula charged Judge Tabora with (1) violation of Section 3(e) 1 of Republic Act
No. 30192 (RA 3019) or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; (2) violation of Section 1,
Canon 33and Section 2, Canon 54 of A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC5 or the New Code of Judicial
Conduct; (3) violation of Republic Act No. 6713 6 (RA 6713) or the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees; and (4) gross ignorance of the law,
grave abuse of authority, oppression, serious neglect of duty and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service. Further, Tabisula charged Lacsamana with (1) violation of Sections
3(e)7 and (f)8 of RA 3019; (2) violation of Articles 2269 and 315(3)(c)10 of Act No. 381511 or
the Revised Penal Code; and (3) violation of Sections 5(a), 12 (d),13 and (e)14 of RA 6713.
The Facts
In her Affidavit-Complaint dated 17 October 2006 submitted to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), Tabisula stated that she was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 6840 entitled
"Caridad S. Tabisula v. Rang-ay Rural Bank, Inc." for specific performance with accounting
and damages. This case was raffled to the RTC of San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 26
presided by Judge Tabora. Tabisula narrated that due to the prolonged absence of Judge Tabora
caused by a serious illness, Judge Antonio A. Carbonell (Judge Carbonell), now retired but
then pairing/vice-executive judge of the RTC of San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 27,
took over and heard the case from the beginning up to its termination.
Later, Tabisula found out that a decision had already been rendered by Judge Carbonell so she
requested from Lacsamana a copy of the decision. However, despite several requests,
Lacsamana allegedly refused to furnish Tabisula with a copy of the decision upon the
instruction of Judge Tabora, who at that time had already reported back to work. Tabisula sent
a Letter-Request dated 24 August 2006 addressed to the RTC asking Judge Tabora to direct
Lacsamana to give a copy of the decision rendered by Judge Carbonell. However, instead of
granting the request, Judge Tabora issued an Order dated 30 August 2006, informing Tabisula
that an Order dated 8 August 2006 was issued by the RTC requiring the parties to submit their
respective memorandum within 15 days from receipt of the Order. Also, Judge Tabora
informed Tabisula that even if the pairing judge was the one who heard the case from

In an undated Comment submitted to the OCA, Lacsamana clarified that his official
designation is Sheriff IV and he was only designated as OIC-BCOC by Judge Tabora on 1
August 2006. Lacsamana explained that Judge Carbonell handed him a copy of his decision in
Civil Case No. 6840 on 11 August 2006. However, that day being a Friday, Lacsamana was
able to submit the decision to Judge Tabora only on the next working day, 14 August 2006.
Judge Tabora informed him to just leave a copy of the decision at her table. From then on,
Lacsamana had no more knowledge of what happened to the decision.
Lacsamana added that he was the one who received Tabisulas Letter dated 24 August 2006
addressed to Judge Tabora. Lacsamana reasoned that he was not the person in charge of
releasing decisions, orders, and other documents relative to a pending case and it was not
within his functions to release a decision without the presiding judges authority.
Judge Tabora then filed her Comment dated 26 February 2007 with the OCA. Judge Tabora
indicated that she underwent surgery on 15 May 2006 and was later diagnosed with a serious
illness. Prior to her surgery, she conducted a hearing in Civil Case No. 6840 on 21 April 2006.
However, the same had been reset due to the absence of Tabisulas counsel.
On 18 May 2006, Tabisula filed a Motion for the pairing judge to hear Civil Case No. 6840 on
the basis of Judge Taboras absence. On 26 May 2006, while Judge Tabora was on leave,
Judge Carbonell proceeded to hear the testimony of the lone witness for the defendant in the
case without first issuing an order granting the motion filed by Tabisula.
On 13 June 2006, Judge Tabora reported back to work. However, on 19 June 2006, Judge
Carbonell still acted on the formal offer of evidence by the defendants and issued an Order
submitting the case for resolution.
On 8 August 2006, in the course of her inventory of court records, Judge Tabora noticed that
Civil Case No. 6840 had been submitted for decision on 19 June 2006 by Judge Carbonell.
Since the 90-day period for rendering a decision was soon to expire, she immediately issued
an Order dated 8 August 2006 directing the parties to submit their respective memorandum.
Three days later, on 11 August 2006, Judge Carbonell issued in Civil Case No. 6840 a decision
which was received by Lacsamana. On 14 August 2006, Lacsamana turned over a copy of the
decision to Judge Tabora.

23

After receipt of the decision, Judge Tabora immediately went to Judge Carbonell and informed
him that she issued an Order dated 8 August 2006 requiring the parties to submit their
respective memorandum. Judge Carbonell immediately cut her off and told her to just recall
her earlier order.
Judge Tabora then carefully studied the entire records of the case and found out that Judge
Carbonells decision was not in accordance with the facts of the case and the applicable law
and appeared to have unjustly favored Tabisula.
Judge Tabora also wondered how Tabisula came to know of the unpromulgated decision of
Judge Carbonell. Judge Carbonells decision was never officially released to any of the parties
and did not form part of the records of the case.
Judge Tabora pointed out that it was Judge Carbonell who directly furnished Tabisula with a
copy of his decision a month after the decision of Judge Tabora had already been released to
the parties. Also, Tabisulas insistence for the release of Judge Carbonells decision made her
determined to exercise her judicial independence since such decision would result in a
miscarriage of justice.
Judge Tabora also clarified that the defendant in Civil Case No. 6840 was a bank, a corporate
entity with a distinct personality. She was not disqualified from sitting in the case since under
Section 1, Rule 13715 of the Rules of Court her husbands relation with the banks
representative was remote or way beyond the 6th degree. Thus, the relationship has absolutely
no bearing on the outcome of the case. Judge Tabora prayed that the complaint be dismissed
for lack of merit.
On 14 August 2007, the OCA submitted its Report finding no sufficient and factual legal basis
to hold Judge Tabora and Lacsamana liable for any of the charges filed by Tabisula. The OCA
stated that Judge Tabora, in rendering her own decision in Civil Case No. 6840, was well
within her power to decide the case since she had full authority over all cases pending in her
official station. As for Lacsamana, the OCA found that he could not be faulted for his failure
to comply with Tabisulas request since he was only obeying the lawful order of Judge Tabora,
his superior. Also, Judge Carbonells decision in Civil Case No. 6840 was not even
promulgated and did not form part of the official records of the case. Thus, there was no "prior
existing valid decision."
The OCA also found that there is a need to scrutinize the actuations of Judge Carbonell since
he overstepped the bounds of his authority as pairing judge for Branch 26 and has shown
unusual interest in the disposition of Civil Case No. 6840.
The OCA recommended that:
(1) that the instant complaint be DISMISSED as against respondents Judge Mona
Lisa T. Tabora and OIC Branch Clerk of Court Alfredo V. Lacsamana for lack of
merit;
(2) that the COMMENT of respondent Judge be considered as a complaint against
Judge Antonio A. Carbonell, and that Judge Carbonell be furnished with a copy of
such comment and, be in turn REQUIRED to COMMENT thereon.

In a Resolution dated 1 October 2007, the Court resolved to (1) dismiss the administrative
complaint against Judge Tabora and Lacsamana for lack of merit; and (2) consider the
Comment dated 26 February 2007 of Judge Tabora as a complaint against Judge Carbonell and
require Judge Carbonell to file his Comment within 10 days from notice.
In his Comment dated 29 October 2007, Judge Carbonell admitted the facts of the case as
stated by Judge Tabora in her Comment dated 26 February 2007 from the time he took over
Civil Case No. 6840 until he submitted his decision to OIC-BCOC Lacsamana. However, he
disagreed with Judge Taboras contention that the decision he rendered in Civil Case No. 6840
was not validly promulgated and released to the parties. Judge Carbonell maintained that the
act of filing the decision with the clerk of court already constituted a rendition of judgment or
promulgation and not its pronouncement in open court or release to the parties.
Judge Carbonell added that he was not aware of what subsequently transpired after he turned
over the records of the case but admitted that after receipt of the letter-request of Tabisula
asking for a copy of his decision, he immediately responded by furnishing Tabisula with a
copy.
Judge Carbonell further stated that the instant administrative matter does not involve him. The
dispute was originally between Tabisula against Judge Tabora and Lacsamana. The only issue
between him and Judge Tabora was a divergence of legal opinion.
Thereafter, Tabisula filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 27 November 2007 on the
Courts Resolution dated 1 October 2007. Tabisula stated that the Court erred in dismissing the
complaint she filed against Judge Tabora and Lacsamana.
In a Letter dated 5 March 2008, Lacsamana and seven other employees of the RTC of San
Fernando City, La Union, Branch 26, wrote the OCA and narrated their negative experience
toward a co-employee, Olympia Elena O. Dacanay-Queddeng (Queddeng), Legal Researcher
II of the same court. In the same letter, they also gave their support in an unrelated
administrative complaint filed by Judge Tabora against Queddeng.
In a Resolution dated 25 June 2008, the Court referred the case to the OCA for evaluation,
report and recommendation.
The OCAs Report and Recommendation
On 18 September 2008, the OCA submitted its Report finding Judge Carbonell guilty of
simple misconduct for violating Section 2, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. The
OCA reiterated that Judge Carbonell overstepped the bounds of his authority as pairing judge
of Branch 26 when he prepared the decision in Civil Case No. 6840 and furnished Tabisula
with a copy of such decision. As a result, Judge Carbonell created the impression that he had
taken a special interest in the case.
The OCA recommended that:
(1) the Motion for Reconsideration dated November 27, 2007 of Mrs. Caridad S.
Tabisula on the Resolution dated October 1, 2007, be DENIED for lack of merit;

24

(2) this case be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter and Judge

Antonio A. Carbonell be FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00)
to be deducted from the retirement benefits that he may receive; and
(3) the Letter dated March 5, 2008 of Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr., Court Sheriff, and
seven (7) other employees of RTC, Branch 26, San Fernando City, La Union, against
Mrs. Olympia Dacanay-Queddeng, Legal Researcher, same court, be DETACHED
from the records of this administrative matter and the same be included in A.M. No.
P-07-2371 (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Ms. Olympia Elena D. Queddeng,
Court Legal Researcher II, RTC, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union).
The Courts Ruling
The Court finds the report of the OCA well-taken.
The authority of a pairing judge to take cognizance of matters of another branch in case the
presiding judge is absent can be found in two circulars issued by the Court: (1) Circular No.
716 effective 23 September 1974 and (2) Circular No. 19-98 17 effective 18 February
1998.1avvphi1
Judge Carbonell, as the pairing judge of the RTC of San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 26,
assumed cognizance of Civil Case No. 6840 upon Judge Taboras leave of absence in May
2006 due to a serious illness. Judge Carbonell fulfilled his duties by conducting hearings in the
said case from May until June 2006. On 13 June 2006, Judge Tabora reported back to work as
presiding judge of Branch 26. However, even though Judge Carbonell knew that Judge Tabora
had already re-assumed her duties, he still issued an Order submitting the case for resolution
on 19 June 2006 and even submitted a written decision to OIC-BCOC Lacsamana on 11
August 2006.
Clearly, Judge Carbonell fell short of the exacting standards set in Section 2, Canon 3 18 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct which states:
CANON
IMPARTIALITY

Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the
decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.
xxxx
SEC. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of
the judge and of the judiciary. (Emphasis supplied)
Lower court judges play a pivotal role in the promotion of the peoples faith in the judiciary.
They are front-liners who give human face to the judicial branch at the grassroots level in their
interaction with litigants and those who do business with the courts. Thus, the admonition that

judges must avoid not only impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety is more sternly
applied to them.19
As correctly observed by the OCA, Judge Carbonell should have sought the conformity of
Judge Tabora in rendering his own decision to the case as a matter of judicial courtesy and
respect. Judge Carbonell tried justifying his act by reasoning that the act of filing a decision
with the clerk of court already constituted a rendition of judgment or promulgation. We find
this explanation unsatisfactory. Judge Carbonell had no authority to render a decision on the
subject civil case. As clearly laid down in Circular No. 19-98, the pairing judge shall take
cognizance of all cases until the assumption to duty of the regular judge. Since Judge Tabora
was already present and performing her functions in court, it was improper for Judge
Carbonell to have rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6840 without the approval of the
regular presiding judge.
Also, Judge Carbonell should have extended the same judicial deference in referring the letter
of Tabisula requesting for a copy of his decision to Branch 26 for appropriate action. Instead,
Judge Carbonell directly furnished Tabisula with a copy knowing fully well that she was the
plaintiff in the subject case. Judge Carbonell not only disregarded the functions of the clerk of
court as custodian of court records but also undermined the integrity and confidentiality of the
court.
For violating Section 2, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, we find Judge
Carbonell guilty of simple misconduct. Simple misconduct has been defined as an
unacceptable behavior that transgresses the established rules of conduct for public
officers.20 We adhere to the OCAs recommendation of a fine of P10,000.00 to be deducted
from Judge Carbonells retirement benefits which have been withheld pursuant to the Courts
Resolution dated 24 September 2008, which granted the payment of his disability retirement
benefits subject to the withholding of P200,000.00 pending final resolution of the
administrative cases against him.
Further, we adopt the other recommendations of the OCA in its Report dated 18 September
2008. We deny for lack of merit the Motion for Reconsideration dated 27 November 2007
filed by Tabisula on this Courts Resolution dated 1 October 2007. We also direct the OCA to
detach from the records of this administrative matter the Letter dated 5 March 2008 of
Lacsamana and seven other employees of the RTC of San Fernando City, La Union, Branch
26, against Queddeng, Legal Researcher of the same court. The Letter is to be included in
A.M. No. P-07-2371 entitled "Office of the Court Administrator v. Ms. Olympia Elena D.
Queddeng, Court Legal Researcher II, RTC, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union."
WHEREFORE, we deny the Motion for Reconsideration dated 27 November 2007 filed by
Caridad S. Tabisula for lack of merit. We find respondent Judge Antonio A. Carbonell, former
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 27, GUILTY of
simple misconduct and FINE him P10,000.00, to be deducted from his retirement benefits
which have been withheld pursuant to the Courts Resolution dated 24 September 2008.
We DIRECT the Office of the Court Administrator to detach from the records of this
administrative matter the Letter dated 5 March 2008 of Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr. and seven other
employees of the Regional Trial Court, San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 26, against
Olympia Dacanay-Queddeng, Legal Researcher of the same court and include the Letter in
A.M. No. P-07-2371 entitled "Office of the Court Administrator v. Ms. Olympia Elena D.
Queddeng, Court Legal Researcher II, RTC, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union."
SO ORDERED.

25

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

26

CANON IV
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2267
January 19, 2011
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 03-1788-RTJ)
MANSUETA T. RUBIN, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JOSE Y. AGUIRRE, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Himamaylan, Negros
Occidental,Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
In a verified complaint, dated June 14, 2003, 1 filed before the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), Mansueta T. Rubin (complainant) charged Judge Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr.2 of
Graft and Corruption, Betrayal of Public Trust, Grave Abuse of Authority of a Judge, Manifest
Bias and Partiality, and Violation of Judicial Conduct. In her verified complaint, the
complainant alleged:
II
That Complainant is the widow of the late Feliciano Rubin who was appointed as the Judicial
Administrator of the Estate of the Spouses Dioscoro Rubin and Emperatriz Rubin;

B
That the aforesaid consolidated labor cases were decided and became final and
executory and the judgment was already satisfied and paid for personally by
Dioscoro Rubin when he was still alive in the amount of P44,000.00 in the form of
check which was given to Atty. Corral, counsel for the claimants, through Atty.
Rogelio Necessario, counsel for Hacienda Fanny and Dioscoro Rubin x x x.
C
That respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and grave abuse of
authority by ordering the aforesaid Estate to pay P205,125.00 upon a Motion based
on a non-existing final or executory decision, which order was illegal and improper
and without any notice and/or hearing accorded to the Estate through its then
Judicial [Administrator] Feliciano Rubin. x x x x
D
The labor case decided by Labor Arbiter Oscar Uy awarded the claimants in the
amount of P205,125.00, which decision was appealed by Judicial Administrator
Feliciano Rubin and was ordered rema[n]ded and decided by Labor Arbiter Octavio
in the consolidated cases with the reduction of the award in the amount of
P62,437.50. The judgment amount was further reduced after an audit in the amount
of P44,000.00. x x x x
E

III
That Complainant, during the lifetime of her husband, Feliciano Rubin, who is the aforesaid
Judicial Administrator, had witnessed and experienced that her husband and their family were
victims of Graft and Corruption, Grave Injustice amounting to Violation of the Constitution,
Betrayal of Public Trust, Grave Misconduct, Grave Abuse of Authority, Gross Ignorance of
Law, Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge or Judicial Magistrate, Manifest Bias and Partiality, and
Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, on the part of the respondent Judge committed
during the conduct of the proceedings in Special Proceeding No. 28, Intestate Estate of the
Spouses Dioscoro Rubin and Emperatriz Rubin, and in Civil Case No. 184, an Annulment of
Adoption pending before him, as follows:
A
The respondent Judge, by way of devious schemes and clever machinations extorted
money from the aforesaid Estate by lending expertise in connivance with other
lawyer in pursuing an alleged claim against the Estate allegedly intended for
workers wages as money claims against the Estate, in a labor case entitled
"Constancia Amar, et.(sic) al. versus Hacienda Fanny and Dioscoro Rubin," RAB
Case Nos. 1092-81 and A-593-81, both consolidated and numbered as 0104-82,
which was then pending and decided by Labor Arbiter Ricardo T. Octavio;

That respondent Judge had threatened the Judicial Administrator and threatened to
be cited for contempt if he will not pay the said labor claims, further threatened to
sell the properties if he will not pay the said labor claims, and likewise threatened
that he would order the x x x properties of the Estate to be sold at public auction if
the said claim will not be paid. x x x x The evident purpose of the respondent Judge
was to cause harassment and anxiety against the then Judicial Administrator which
made his health condition deteriorate so fast that facilitated his death.
F
That Complainants deceased husband who was the Administrator of the said Estate
was forced to pay the amount ordered by the respondent Judge which was deposited
in court but which was ordered released by the same respondent Judge [b]ecause the
money claim ordered to be paid by respondent Judge had already been paid and
satisfied by Administrator Feliciano Rubin, naturally no recipient would claim the
amount nor anybody can be found from the records of the case or that no laborer
came forward to claim that he had not been paid of his money claim;

27

G
The respondent Judge was grossly ignorant of the law when he ordered the change
of Administrator after the then Judicial Administrator Feliciano Rubin refused to
follow the invalid and unlawful orders of the respondent Judge, as he ordered his
Clerk of Court, Atty. Gregorio A. Lanaria to act as Special Administrator of the
Estate with orders to sell the properties of the Estate to satisfy the outstanding claim
or obligations of the Estate, which was part of the clever scheme of respondent
Judge to extort money from the Estate x x x.
H
That respondent Judge had extended unwarranted benefit, advantage and preference
to the newly appointed Judicial Administratrix of the Estate, Aileen Rubin, through
his manifest bias and partiality and evident bad faith towards the late
Administrators wife, complainant herein, and the surviving heirs, especially in his
conduct of the proceedings involving the Estate and the Annulment of Adoption
case. Respondent Judge even appointed Aileen Rubin as Administratrix of the Estate
whose legal personality is still the subject of the Annulment of Adoption case, and
even pronounced that under the eyes of the law Aileen Rubin is the sole and legal
heir of the aforesaid Estate thus prejudging the cases before him even if the
proceedings are still pending;
I
That respondent Judge ordered his appointed Administratrix, Aileen Rubin, to enter
into the Estate, and having entered therein, she and her cohorts ransacked the
premises, took out records, personal belongings of the deceased Feliciano Rubin,
then Administrator of the Estate, and his wife, the complainant herein x x x. 3

In its report, the OCA recommended that the case be docketed as a regular administrative case
considering the varying positions taken by the parties, and considering, too, the failure of
Judge Aguirre to explain in his Comment why he invited Mr. Feliciano Rubin to see him
personally in court.
In the Resolution dated March 17, 2004,9 the Court referred the case to Justice Josefina
Guevarra-Salonga (Investigating Justice) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Investigating Justice found that except for the charge of Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge
and Violation of Judicial Conduct, the other charges against Judge Aguirre were "bereft of
factual and legal basis."10 The Investigating Justice found that Judge Aguirre committed an
impropriety when he sent a letter to Mr. Feliciano Rubin "to discuss and to expedite a possible
extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Spouses Rubin." 11 The Investigating
Justice explained:
[H]is act of sending a letter to a party litigant for a personal conference, however motivated,
does not validate his action and the damning implications it may generate to the [J]udiciary
this is especially so since the content of said letter can constitute as an act of fraternizing with
party-litigants. It must be emphasized that in-chambers sessions without the presence of the
other party and his counsel must be avoided. The prohibition is to maintain impartiality. Being
a judicial front-liner who has a direct contact with the litigating parties, the respondent judge
should conduct himself beyond reproach.12
The Investigating Justice ruled that Judge Aguirre violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which states that a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety
in all activities. The Investigating Justice recommended that Judge Aguirre be reprimanded
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt more severely.
The Courts Ruling

The complainant submitted documentary evidence to support the above allegations. 4

We find the findings of the Investigating Justice to be well-taken.

In his Comment, Judge Aguirre claimed that the complaint contained malicious and scurrilous
allegations that smacked of harassment. The complaint was filed by the disgruntled
complainant who mistakenly believed that she should be appointed as the Judicial
Administratrix of the Estate of the late Spouses Dioscoro and Emperatriz Rubin, instead of
Aileen Rubin, the adopted child of the deceased spouses. Judge Aguirre asserted that his
appointment of Aileen Rubin as Special Administratrix was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals5 (CA) and by the Supreme Court.6
He also asserted that the complainant had confused two labor cases. 7 Only the amount
of P44,000.00 was paid as separation pay in RAB Case No. VI-0104-82. In RAB Case No. A593-81, Judge Aguirre issued orders to compel Mr. Feliciano Rubin, the former Administrator
of the Estate of the late Spouses Dioscoro and Emperatriz Rubin, to pay lawful and valid
claims against the estate. Judge Aguirre emphasized that he had already been penalized by the
Supreme Court for delaying the enforcement of the final and executory decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against the estate of the late spouses Dioscoro
and Emperatriz Rubin.

First, the complainants claims of alleged devious schemes, clever machinations, and
connivance employed by Judge Aguirre to extort money from the Estate of the Spouses
Dioscoro and Emperatriz Rubin are unsupported by evidence. A perusal of the documents
submitted by both parties shows that the orders issued by Judge Aguirre to compel Mr.
Feliciano Rubin to settle the money claims filed against the Estate of the Spouses Dioscoro
and Emperatriz Rubin in RAB Case No. A-593-81 were lawful. The orders were issued to
enforce a final and executory decision of the NLRC in the case; we even previously penalized
Judge Aguirre for his failure to promptly act on the motions filed by the laborers in RAB Case
No. A-593-81, for the enforcement of the final NLRC decision. 13
In addition, the evidence on record also refutes the complainants claim that the money claims
in RAB Case No. A-593-81 had been previously settled. The records show that what Mr.
Feliciano Rubin actually paid was a claim for separation pay in RAB Case No. VI-0104-82
an illegal dismissal case; the money claims in RAB Case No. A-593-81 pertained to the
payment of wage differentials.
Second, we find no evidence supporting the allegation of bias and partiality when Judge
Aguirre appointed Ms. Aileen Rubin as Judicial Administratrix of the estate of her adopting
parents. Notably, the propriety of the order of her appointment by Judge Aguirre was upheld,

Judge Aguirre submitted his own documentary evidence to corroborate his allegations. 8

28

on appeal, by the CA in its Decision dated July 19, 2002 14 and its Resolution dated September
26, 2002,15 and by this Court in its Resolution of December 11, 2002.16
Third, in Guerrero v. Villamor,17 we held that a judge cannot be held liable for an erroneous
decision in the absence of malice or wrongful conduct in rendering it. We also held that for
liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge
in the performance of official duties must not only be erroneous but must be established to
have been motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other like motive. 18 The
complainant failed to prove any of these circumstances in this case. We find no evidence of
corruption or unlawful motive on the part of Judge Aguirre when he made the said
appointment.
Although the appointment by Judge Aguirre of his branch clerk of court as Special
Administrator for the Estate of the Spouses Dioscoro and Emperatriz Rubin was erroneous for
having violated a standing Court circular and for being contrary to existing jurisprudence, 19 we
find that the appointment was made in good faith. Good faith connotes an honest intention to
abstain from taking unconscientious advantage of another.20 In this regard, Judge Aguirres
good faith is strengthened by evidence showing that the appointment of his branch clerk of
court was prompted by the continued refusal of Mr. Feliciano Rubin to settle the money claims
filed against the estate in RAB Case No. A-593-81. The records show that Mr. Feliciano Rubin
did not obey the several orders issued by Judge Aguirre to settle the money claims, and that an
administrative case was even filed against Judge Aguirre for his failure to rule on the laborers
motion in RAB Case No. A-593-81.
Despite these findings, we find that Judge Aguirre committed an impropriety when he sent a
letter, in his official letterhead, to Mr. Feliciano Rubin to discuss a matter pending before his
own court.
In Agustin v. Mercado,21 we declared that employees of the court have no business meeting
with litigants or their representatives under any circumstance. This prohibition is more
compelling when it involves a judge who, because of his position, must strictly adhere to the
highest tenets of judicial conduct; 22 a judge must be the embodiment of competence, integrity
and independence.23 As we explained in Yu-Asensi v. Villanueva:24
...[W]ithin the hierarchy of courts, trial courts stand as an important and visible symbol of
government especially considering that as opposed to appellate courts, trial judges are those
directly in contact with the parties, their counsel and the communities which the Judiciary is
bound to serve. Occupying as he does an exalted position in the administration of justice, a
judge must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him. Thus, a judge must comport
himself at all times in such manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most
searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice. x x
x it is essential that judges, likeCaesar's wife, should be above suspicion.

the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his every day life, should be beyond reproach."
In Rosauro v. Kallos,26 we ruled that impropriety constitutes a light charge. Section 11(C) of
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court 27 provides the following sanctions if the respondent is found
guilty of a light charge:
C. If the respondent is guilty of a light charge, any of the following sanctions shall be
imposed:
1. A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00 and/or;
2. Censure;
3. Reprimand;
4. Admonition with warning.
The Investigating Justice recommended the penalty of reprimand with stern
warning.1wphi1 In light of Judge Aguirres death, however, we resolve to impose a fine
of P5,000.00 instead. Jurisprudence holds that the death of the respondent in an administrative
case, as a rule, does not preclude a finding of administrative liability, save for recognized
exceptions.28 None of the exceptions applies to the present case. 29
The P5,000.00 fine shall be taken from the amount of P50,000.00 which we previously
retained/withheld from Judge Aguirres retirement benefits due to the administrative cases
filed against him.30
WHEREFORE, we find Judge Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr. guilty of impropriety, in violation of Canon
2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. We hereby
impose a fine of P5,000.00 which shall be deducted from the P50,000.00 withheld from his
retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

Under the circumstances, Judge Aguirres act was improper considering that he opened
himself to suspicions in handling the case. His action also raised doubts about his impartiality
and about his integrity in performing his judicial function.
We take note that the complained act was committed before the New Code of Judicial Conduct
took effect on June 1, 2004. Under the circumstances, Judge Aguirre is liable under the
provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics. 25 Canon 2 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "[a] judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities." Carrying the same guiding principle is Canon 3 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics which states, "[a] judges official conduct should be free from

29

[A.M. No. RTJ-08-2136

September 21, 2010]

SUSAN O. REYES, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE MANUEL N. DUQUE, Regional Trial Court, Branch 197, Las Pias
City, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Facts
In her Verified Complaint, Susan O. Reyes (Reyes) charged respondent Judge Manuel N.
Duque (Judge Duque) of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 197, Las Pias City (RTC-Branch
197), with Impropriety, Corruption and Gross Misconduct. Reyes alleged that she was a partyin-intervention in Land Registration Case No. 06-005 entitled "In re: Petition of Philippine
Savings Bank for Issuance of a Writ of Possession under Act No. 3135 over Properties covered
by TCT Nos. T-85172 and T-84847" filed by the Philippine Savings Bank (bank) against the
spouses Carolyn Choi and Nak San Choi (spouses Choi). In a Decision dated 6 November
2006, Judge Duque granted the motion for the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the
bank and ordered the spouses Choi and all those claiming rights under them to vacate the
properties covered by TCT Nos. T-85172, T-84848, and T-84847 situated in BF Resort Village,
Talon 2, Las Pias. On 13 August 2007, Reyes filed an "Urgent Petition for Lifting and Setting
Aside of Writ of Possession and Quashal of Notice to Vacate" claiming that she bought the
subject property covered by TCT No. T-85172 from the spouses Choi and that she was in
actual possession of the property with full knowledge of the bank.
At the hearing of Reyes petition, Atty. Herminio Ubana, Sr., (Atty. Ubana) the lawyer of
Reyes, introduced her to Judge Duque who allegedly gave Reyes 30 days to settle matters with
the bank. Reyes was unable to re-negotiate with the bank. On the first week of December
2007, Reyes allegedly received a phone call from Judge Duque and the latter instructed Reyes
to go "to his house and bring some money in order that he can deny the pending motion to
break open." As she did not have the money yet, Reyes allegedly told Judge Duque that she
would see him the following day as her allotment might arrive by that time. The following
day, when her allotment arrived, Reyes went to the PNB Cubao Branch in Quezon City to
withdraw P20,000. She, her secretary, and driver went to the house of Judge Duque at No. 9
CRM Corazon, BF Almanza, Las Pias. The son of Judge Duque opened the gate. At his
house, Judge Duque demanded P100,000. Reyes gave him P20,000 and she asked for time to
give him the balance. After a week, Atty. Ubana called Reyes telling her that Judge Duque was
asking for her and waiting for the balance he demanded. On 21 December 2007, Reyes went to
the house of Judge Duque withP18,000 on hand. Judge Duque allegedly scolded her for not
bringing the whole amount of P80,000. Reyes explained that she had difficulty raising the
amount. Judge Duque locked the main door of his house and asked Reyes to step into his
office. Judge Duque pointed to a calendar posted on the wall and pointed to December 26 as
the date when she should complete the amount. All of a sudden, Judge Duque held the waist of
Reyes, embraced and kissed her. Reyes tried to struggle and free herself. Judge Duque raised
her skirt, opened her blouse and sucked her breasts. He touched her private parts and

attempted to have sexual intercourse with Reyes. Reyes shouted for help but the TV was too
loud. As a desperate move, Reyes appealed to Judge Duque saying: "kung gusto mo, huwag
dito. Sa hotel, sasama ako sayo." Judge Duque suddenly stopped his sexual advances and
ordered Reyes to fix her hair.
In his Comment,1 Judge Duque averred that since the complaint of Reyes was filed after he
retired on 21 February 2008, he was no longer under the jurisdiction of the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA). He denied the charges hurled against him and claimed the allegations
were "fabricated, false and malicious."
In its Report dated 26 June 2008, 2 the OCA found that Reyes actually filed four identical
complaints. First, Reyes filed a complaint dated 16 January 2008 duly subscribed on 23
January 2008. Reyes was directed to comply with the requirement of verification and she
complied by filing on 20 February 2008 verified complaints with the Office of the Chief
Justice and the OCA. On 12 March 2008, Reyes filed for the third time another verified
complaint with the OCA which was a mere reiteration of her previous complaints. The OCA
opined that the jurisdiction of the Court at the time of the filing of the complaint was not lost
by the mere fact that Judge Duque had ceased to be in office during the pendency of the case.
Thus, as recommended by the OCA, the case was referred to a Court of Appeals Justice 3 for
investigation, report and recommendation per Resolution dated 6 August 2008. 4
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Justice
On the charge of graft and corruption, Reyes presented photocopies of P1,000 bills to prove
that Judge Duque demanded and received money from her in consideration of a favorable
ruling. The Investigating Justice, however, found no compelling evidence to corroborate
Reyes accusation as it was doubtful whether these were the same bills used to pay off Judge
Duque.5
On the charge of impropriety and gross misconduct, the Investigating Justice opined that the
act of Judge Duque in embracing and kissing Reyes, sucking her breasts and touching her
most intimate parts were certainly acts of lewdness that were downright obscene, detestable,
and unwelcome. These acts were established by substantial evidence. The Investigating
Justice, however, stated that Reyes description of the sexual assault could not be deemed as
attempted rape.6
The Investigating Justice found Judge Duque guilty of impropriety and gross misconduct
constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and recommended the imposition of
fine of P40,000 which should be deducted from the retirement benefits of Judge Duque.
Report of the Court Administrator
In his Memorandum,7 the Court Administrator 8 confirmed that Judge Duque compulsorily
retired from the judiciary on 21 February 2008. He opined that the conduct of Judge Duque
bore the marks of impropriety and immorality. The actions of Judge Duque fell short of the
exacting standards for members of the judiciary. Judge Duque failed to behave in a manner
that would promote confidence in the judiciary. The Court Administrator recommended that
a P40,000 fine be imposed on Judge Duque which should be deducted from his retirement
benefits.

30

externalized. He should not only possess proficiency in law but should likewise possess moral
integrity for the people look up to him as a virtuous and upright man.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the recommendation of both the Investigating Justice and the OCA for the
imposition of a fine ofP40,000 on Judge Duque.
First, on the question of jurisdiction as Judge Duque is no longer a member of the judiciary
having retired from the service on 21 February 2008, the records show that Reyes filed four
similar complaints against Judge Duque. A complaint dated 18 January 2008 addressed to then
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno and subscribed on 19 February 2008 was received by the OCA
on 20 February 20089 and by the Office of the Chief Justice also on 20 February 2008, 10 or one
day before the date of retirement of Judge Duque. A similar complaint subscribed on 19
February 2008 was received by the OCA on 12 March 2008. 11 An identical complaint
addressed to the OCA and subscribed on 23 January 2008 was filed and received by the OCA
on 25 January 2008.12 As pointed out by the OCA, Judge Duque was "inadvertently sent" a
copy of the complaint that was filed and received on 12 March 2008. 13 The filing of similar
and identical complaints on different dates was due to the directive of the OCA requiring that
the complaint be "verified" or that the "original copy of the verified complaint" be
filed.14Nonetheless, it is clear from the records that Reyes filed her intended complaint before
Judge Duque retired. Consequently, the Court no doubt has jurisdiction over this
administrative case.

Judges should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.19 Judges should conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of
the judicial office.20 Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief,
association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they should always conduct
themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the
impartiality and independence of the judiciary.21
The conduct of Judge Duque fell short of the exacting standards for members of the judiciary.
He failed to behave in a manner that would promote confidence in the judiciary. Considering
that a judge is a visible representation of the law and of justice, 22 he is naturally expected to be
the epitome of integrity and should be beyond reproach. Judge Duques conduct indubitably
bore the marks of impropriety and immorality. He failed to live up to the high moral standards
of the judiciary and even transgressed the ordinary norms of decency of society. Had Judge
Duque not retired, his misconduct would have merited his dismissal from the service.
WHEREFORE,
we
find
respondent
Judge
Manuel
N.
Duque GUILTY of IMPROPRIETY and GROSS MISCONDUCT. We FINE him P40,000
to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.

On the charge of graft and corruption, the Investigating Justice and the OCA found insufficient
evidence to sustain Reyes allegation that Judge Duque demanded and received money from
her in consideration of a favorable ruling. Thus, this charge should be dismissed for being
unsubstantiated.1avvphi1
On the charge of impropriety and gross misconduct, and after a thorough investigation
conducted by the Investigating Justice, it was established, and Judge Duque admitted, that
Reyes went to his house.15 Substantial evidence also pointed to Judge Duques liability for
impropriety and gross misconduct when he sexually assaulted Reyes. 16 There is no need to
detail again the lewd acts of Judge Duque. The Investigating Justices narration was sufficient
and thorough. The Investigating Justice likewise observed that Judge Duque merely attempted
to destroy the credibility of Reyes when he insinuated that she could be a "woman of ill repute
or a high class prostitute" or one whose "moral value is at its lowest level." However, no judge
has a right to solicit sexual favors from a party litigant even from a woman of loose
morals.17 In Tan v. Pacuribot,18 this Court further stressed:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

[A.M. No. RTJ-08-2124

August 27, 2009]
[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2631-RTJ]
JUDGE RIZALINA T. CAPCO-UMALI, RTC, Br. 212, Mandaluyong City, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE PAULITA B. ACOSTA-VILLARANTE, RTC, Br. 211, Mandaluyong
City, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

We have repeatedly reminded members of the Judiciary to so conduct themselves as to be

beyond reproach and suspicion, and to be free from any appearance of impropriety in their
personal behavior, not only in the discharge of their official duties but also in their everyday
lives. For no position exacts a greater demand on the moral righteousness and uprightness of
an individual than a seat in the Judiciary. Judges are mandated to maintain good moral
character and are at all times expected to observe irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage
public decency. We have adhered to and set forth the exacting standards of morality and
decency, which every member of the judiciary must observe. A magistrate is judged not only
by his official acts but also by his private morals, to the extent that such private morals are

A.M. No. RTJ-08-2125

[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2632-RTJ]
JUDGE PAULITA B. ACOSTA-VILLARANTE, RTC, Br. 211, Mandaluyong
City, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE RIZALINA T. CAPCO-UMALI, RTC, Br. 212, Mandaluyong City, Respondent.

31

By 1st Indorsement of August 1, 2007,10 the administrative complaints were referred to the
OCA.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
By Complaint-Affidavit of April 25, 20071 filed with the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA), Judge Rizalina Capco-Umali (Judge Capco-Umali) charged Judge Paulita AcostaVillarante2 (Judge Acosta-Villarante) with violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary3 (New Code of Judicial Conduct), Canon 2, Section 2 4 and Canon 4,
Sections 1 and 2.5
The facts which spawned the filing of Judge Capco-Umalis complaint are not disputed.
Judge Acosta-Villarante wrote a Memorandum of March 27, 2007 6 addressed to Executive
Judge Maria Cancino-Erum of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City. The
Memorandum, copies of which were furnished the Offices of the Chief Justice and the
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, the Judicial and Bar Council, Representative Benhur
Abalos, Mayor Neptali Gonzales II, the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong, the Clerk of Court
of Mandaluyong RTCs, and the other judges of Mandaluyong City, reads:
This refers to that unfortunate incident which occurred during the first meeting of RTC Judges
ever [sic] held on March 23, 2007 (Friday) under your executive judgeship where the newly
appointed vice executive Judge Rizalina Capco-Umali marred the event by conduct very
unbecoming of a judge by uttering unsavory remarks and epithets or words of the same import
designed to humiliate the undersigned in the presence of fellow judges and assistant clerk of
court Atty. Leynard Dumlao, coupled with her attempt to inflict physical harm to the
undersigned which you, as the newly appointed executive Judge, miserably failed to control
and dominate and opted to take a passive stance.
The conduct of the newly appointed vice executive judge does not speak well of her being a
judge who is expected to conduct herself in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the
judicial office.
While the meeting of the judges is an ideal forum for the exchange of ideals and information,
and to promote camaraderie among judges in the interest of public service, there is no
assurance that the uncalled for incident on March 23, 2007 will not be repeated.
It is therefore moved that the holding of monthly meeting of judges be suspended.
(Underscoring supplied)
On account of the underlined statements of Judge Acosta-Villarante in her above-quoted
Memorandum, Judge Capco-Umali filed a complaint for libel docketed as I.S. No. 07-7732D,7 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City.
Judge Acosta-Villarante countered by also filing an Administrative Complaint of April 26,
2007 charging Judge Capco-Umali with violation of Canon 4, Sections 1 and 2 8 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct, and a complaint for Grave Oral Defamation and Grave Threats,
docketed as I.S. No. 07-71846-E,9 before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Mandaluyong City.

The details of Judge Capco-Umalis complaint are contained in her Complaint-Affidavit for
Libel as follows:
After having been designated by the Supreme Court a[s] the new Executive Judge and ViceExecutive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Mandaluyong City, Judge Maria A. Cancino-Erum and
the Vice Executive Judge (complainant) together with Executive Judge Ofelia Colo of the
Metropolitant [sic] Trial Court Br. 59 agreed to pay a courtesy call/visit to May[o]r Neptali
"Boyet" Gonzales II, City Mayor of Mandaluyong City. The visit took place at noontime of
March 15, 2007 (Thursday). After briefing the Mayor [about] the purpose of our visit, he
warmly and graciously entertained us. Until the conversation was shifted to the topic of local
allowance. Such being the topic, Judge Maria A. Cancino-Erum showed to the Mayor the
payroll for the month of April 2007 for early approval considering that most judges would take
their vacation. Perusing intently the payroll Mayor Gonzales noticed the disparity in figures
(amount) as to the allowance received by each Judges. He noticed that respondent Villarante
was receiving additional three thousand pesos (P3,000) on top of her regular allowance as
Executive Judge; and additional five thousand pesos (Php5,000) on top of her allowance as
Acting Judge of Br. 209. He also noticed that I [Judge Capco-Umali] and Executive Judge
Maria A. Cancino-Erum received additional two thousand pesos (P2,000) each on top of our
regular allowances. Asking us as to why and as to where those additional allowances come
from, complainant told the mayor that TERRE, the one preparing the payroll told us (I and
Executive Judge Erum)[ about the P2,000 allowance.]
xxxx
Executive Judge Maria A. Cancino-Erum for her part informed the Mayor, thus: "Sabi po ni
Judge Villarante nirequest daw niya po iyon sa inyo approved nyo, at pinirmahan niya ang
payroll. Tinanggap naman po naming [sic] nitong February."
But as regards the additional P3,000 (as Executive Judge) and P5,000 (as Acting Judge) of
Judge Villarante, we told the Mayor that we have no knowledge as to how they come about
"Wala akong alam na request, wala akong inaprove, at lalong wala akong pangdagdag. Walang
pondo. Iyon ngang mga tao ko, hindi ko maincreasan. E, kayo mga judges kayo, syempre
pirma na lang ako pag prisinta sa akin an[g] payroll."
The Mayor summoned LOIDA, her staff and directed the latter to retrieve the previous
payrolls including the 2006 payrolls. He also said that "ang laki naman ng increase ng
Executive Judge, lalo na ang sa Acting, hindi naman ganyan yan ah. Pero in case na naaprove
ko yan, ibibigay na natin yan sa bagong Executive Judge at iyong dating Executive Judge,
balik sa dati niyang tinatanggap."
xxxx
Come, March 23, 2007 (Friday) Monthly Judges Meeting hosted by the newly designated
Executive Judge Maria A. Cancino-Erum. The meeting was going smoothly until the topic of

32

local allowance had been touched. Reporting to the body what transpired during the courtesy
call at the Mayors Office on March 15, 2007, when the matter of giving to the new executive
judge the increased allowances of Executive Judge Paulita B. Acosta-Villarante and that the
latter would revert back [sic] to the authorized amount for Executive Judges was discussed,
respondent Villarante was angered and blurted out addressing the new Executive Judge, thus:
"Kayo, simula ng maupo sa pwesto, wala ng ginawa kundi kutkutin at maghanap ng evidencia
para ako masira, nagsusumbong, nagmamanman. Wala naman pakialaman sa allowance kanya
kanya yan dapat.["]
Having personal knowledge of the conversation that transpired at the Mayors Office on
March 15, 2007, and much aware that respondents accusations were baseless, complainant
felt obliged to come to the rescue of the embattled Judge Maria A. Cancino-Erum and to refute
respondents misplaced tirade by stating matter of fact the truth and what I saw and heard.
For his part, Judge Carlos A. Valenzuela who admitted his presence during the courtesy call
confirmed the truthfulness of complainants report and also confirmed the transfer of
Executive Judges allowance to the new Executive Judge thus: "Totoo ang sinabi ni Judge
Umali nandoon ako, ililipat nga allowance sa bagong Executive Judge at ang dating Executive
Judge will receive former amount."
While complainant is still enlightening her fellow Judges of the real facts that transpired at the
Mayors Office, the respondent kept talking too and even shouting at the top [of] her voice
towards complainant visibly irked by complainants revelation on the matter. Respondent even
called complainant a liar (sinungaling) repeatedly[;] when complainant demanded from
respondent her basis for saying that complainant is a liar, respondent was not able to answer it
but continued calling her "sinungaling". Even telling her to stop talking because her
(complainant) voice is so sharp to her ear ("nakakahiwa boses mo"). Respondent continued
verbally attacking complainant with words connoting malicious imputations of being an
incorrigible liar and of being in cahoots with Judge Maria A. Cancino-Erum in peddling lies
[that] the complainant got upset by the verbal aggression made by Judge Villarante that she
told the latter, thus: "Matanda ka na, halos malapit ka na sa kamatayan gumagawa ka pa
ng ganyan, madadamay pa kami." Judge Villarante fought back: "Bog, sana mangyari sa
iyo, bog!".

merely requested for the suspension of the holding of the monthly meeting of judges to avoid a
repetition of the incident and to afford the parties an opportunity to "cool off."
In causing the circulation of the Memorandum, Judge Acosta-Villarante explained that she had
an "obligation to bring to the attention of concerned officials the personal demeanor of another
member that would put the Judiciary in constant public scrutiny and disrespect." Her version
of the incident goes:
After taking up the first agenda of the meeting x x x, the agenda on allowances of Judges was
called to be taken up.
Whereupon, Complainant requested to take the floor and manifested as follows:
Judge P.A. Villarante:
"mga kapwa kong Hukom, bago natin talakayin ang agenda ng allowances, maari bang
ipaabot ko sa kaalaman ng lahat na may tumawag ng aking kaalaman at pansin na mayroon
di-umanong Hukom ng RTC na nagpahiwatig sa Tanggapan ng City Mayor na di-umano hindi
ko hini-hearing o dinidinig ang mga asunto ng RTC, Br. 209, na sakup ng aking designasyon
bilang Acting Presiding Judge, na may kaugnayan sa ating pag-uusapan na allowances.
Pinatunayan ko na hindi tutoo at pawang kasinungalingan ang bintang sa pamamagitan
ng "Minutes of Court Hearings" at "Certification" ng Branch Clerk of Court ng RTC, Br. 209.
Mga kasama sa Judiciary, nakikiusap ako na iwasan natin ang nakakasirang bagay na hindi
totoo x x x"[.]
"x x x Ugnay sa representation sa pagtaas ng allowance ng Judges sa local Government ay
napagbigyan naman. Pakiusap ko, huwag naman siraan ang kapwa x x x," at iba pa.
On the matter, a Judge in the group made a comment to wit:

Complainant welcomed the challenge, thus: "handa akong mamatay kahit anong oras dahil
wala akong ginagawang masama".

"x x x upang maiwasan ang hindi pagkakaunawaan ng isat isa sa atin, hinihiling ko sa bawat
isa sa atin na kung ano ang tinatanggap ng sino man sa atin, huwag ng questionin x x x" at
iba pa.

At said instance complainant once more prompted Judge Villarante as to her authority or basis
in the increase in the payroll, and Judge Villarante answered: "May nag-oofer nga!".

at that juncture Judge Capco-Umali stood up and in a mode of anger pointing a finger against
herein Complainant, she repeatedly said in a loud voice:

More heated exchanges ensued because Judge Villarante kept o[n] saying sinungaling to the
complainant.

"Matanda ka na! Mamamatay ka na!..." at iba pa na may kahalintulad.

Thereafter, cooler heads intervened. Judge Edwin Sorongon brought respondent out of the
room while Atty. Leynard Dumlao [was] pacifying the complainant. 11 (Emphasis partly in the
original and partly supplied; underscoring supplied; italics in the original)
By Comment of May 28, 2007,12 Judge Acosta-Villarante denied that she wrote the
Memorandum to maliciously impute a crime, vice or defect on Judge Capco-Umali as she

On the impropriety of the unruly and disrespect behavior and conduct of Judge
Capco-Umali in the presence of fellow-judges and others, a Judge tried to say
something in an effort to appease her unruliness, but she kept on unkindly berating
herein Complainant who was then speechless out of her shock on her unexpected
behavior.
Regaining a bit of composure and wit, Complainant appealed to the respondent in
this manner:

33

"x x x Judge Umali magpakatao at makinig ka naman para makapagunawaan tayo,

nakakahiya na ito x x x"
to which she became more angry and shouted
"x x x Judge ako! Judge ako x x x!".
as she was pounding her breast continuously with her fist; because of the shock and fright
generated by the unruly behavior of respondent, complainant did not clearly comprehend the
rest of her berating statements made against her in the process.
When respondent Judge Umali already appeared to be more uncontrollable in her decorum,
complainant then in fear took steps to get out of the place with Judge Sorongon then tending
her on her shoulder assisted her in haste towards the exit door; and when about to step out of
the exit door, complainant turning her face on the then commotion at her back she saw
Respondent Judge Umali still berating her and in the act of catching her at the back but on the
then timely intervention of Atty. Leynard Dumlao who then was close at complainants back,
prevented respondent to reach her who then hastily moved to the safety of her courtroom still
with the assistance of Judge Sorongon, thus complainant got out of the wrath of respondent
Judge Umali.13 (Italics and underscoring in the original)
In her May 22, 2007 Comment, 14 Judge Capco-Umali, admitting having uttered the
remarks "matanda ka na, halos malapit ka na sa kamatayan gumagawa ka pa ng ganyan,
madadamay pa kami" to Judge Acosta-Villarante, explained that it was "due to exasperation"
as Judge Acosta-Villarante called her "an incorrigible liar" or "sinungaling."
Also admitting having uttered "Judge ako! Judge ako!," she explained that it was to remind
Judge Acosta-Villarante that she deserved respect and courtesy, for while she was speaking on
the topic of allowances, Judge Acosta-Villarante kept interrupting her by "making interjections
and unnecessary comments."
In her June 8, 2007 Reply,15 Judge Acosta- Villarante, admitting calling Judge Capco-Umali
"sinungaling," explained that she was only "constrained" by the situation, adding that Judge
Capco-Umali is a "pathological liar."
In its March 5, 2008 Report and Recommendation, 16 the OCA made the following evaluation:
xxxx
The admissions made by the concerned Judges anent the allegations they hurled against each
other provide for the strongest evidence to establish their individual liability.
Time and again, the Court has constantly reminded Judges that as magistrates of the law, they
must comport themselves at all times in such a manner that their conduct, official or otherwise,
can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to them as epitome of integrity
and justice. They must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for others to
follow. They must studiously avoid even the slightest infraction of the law (Alumbres vs.
Caoibes, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1431, January 23, 2002). The actions of the respondent Judges fell
short of this exacting ethical standard demanded from the members of the Judiciary.

Section 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (A.M.
[No.] 03-05-01-SC, [effective] 01 June 2004) enunciates the rule that "[J]udges shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities."
Judge Capco-Umali failed to live up to the standard of propriety entrenched in the aforequoted
code of conduct. While, she might have been provoked by Judge Acosta-Villarantes referral to
her as a liar, she should have maintained her composure instead of shouting back at a
fellow judge. She should have exercised self-restraint instead of reacting in such a very
inappropriate manner considering that she is in the presence of fellow Judges and other
employees of RTC, Mandaluyong City. She should have put more consideration and effort on
preserving the solemnity of the said meeting, and on giving those who are present the courtesy
and respect they deserved. It was held in Quiroz vs. Orfila (272 SCRA 324 [1997]) that
"[f]ighting between court employees during office hours is disgraceful behavior reflecting
adversely on the good image of the judiciary. It displays a cavalier attitude towards the
seriousness and dignity with which court business should be treated. Shouting at one another
in the workplace and during office hours is arrant discourtesy and disrespect not only towards
co-workers, but to the court as well. The behavior of the parties was totally unbecoming
members of the judicial service."
Judge Capco-Umali, however, does not bear this responsibility alone. Judge AcostaVillarante should also be required to answer for her failure to observe the basic norm of
propriety demanded from a judge in relation with the aforementioned 23 March 2007 incident.
At the outset, it was Judge Acosta-Villarantes unseemly behavior, calling Judge Capco-Umali
"sinungaling" in front of their fellow Judges that initiated the altercation between the two
Judges. Judge Acosta-Villarante should have been more cautious in choosing the words to
address the already volatile situation with Judge Capco-Umali.
Judge Acosta-Villarante also repeated the uncalled for conduct when she wrote the
memorandum dated 27 March 2007 and caused its circulation. If indeed the memorandum was
produced strictly to allow the parties to cool off and avoid a repetition of the incident, on this
ground alone, there was no need to mention the alleged misbehavior of Judge Capco-Umali
during the meeting. The memorandum was thus written as a medium for retaliation
against Judge Capco-Umali.
Judge Acosta-Villarante cannot also use as justification in writing and circulating of the
memorandum the claim that "she has an obligation to bring to the attention of concerned
officials the personal demeanor of another member that would put the Judiciary in constant
public scrutiny and disrespect" pursuant to her oath of office. As a Judge, respondent AcostaVillarante is aware that there are proper avenues for ventilation of grievance against anyone in
government service. Moreover, the termination of the conflict between her and Judge
Capco-Umali (through the suggestion of giving the parties opportunity for "cooling off") is
clearly not what she is up to for what she did only worsened the situation (with the filing of
several complaints and counter-complaints).1avvphi1
An act complained of anchored on a violation of Code of Judicial Conduct, may only
constitute a serious charge under Section 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court if the same
amounts to gross misconduct. The respective acts for which the herein respondents have been
charged do not amount to gross misconduct. Thus, the charges against them cannot be
considered serious. Nevertheless, respondents should be held administratively liable for
violation of Section 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary. Under Section 11(B) in relation to Section 9 (A) of Rule 140, as amended by A.M.
No. 01-8-10-SC, violation of Supreme Court rules constitutes a less serious charge.
Respondents, therefore, may be sanctioned with: [1] suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than (1) nor more than three (3) months; or [2] a fine of more than
P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

34

In the case of Judge Capco-Umali, however, the imposable penalty should be

tempered because it is clear from the record that she was dragged into the tiff by an act of
provocation.17 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, for violating Section 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct which is a less
serious charge under Section 11(B) in relation to Section 9 (A) of Rule 140, as amended by
A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, the OCA recommended that Judges Capco-Umali and AcostaVillarante be fined in the amount of P11,000 and P16,000, respectively.
The Court finds the evaluation of the complaints by the OCA well-taken.
Courts are looked upon by the people with high respect. Misbehavior by judges and
employees necessarily diminishes their dignity. Any fighting or misunderstanding is a
disgraceful occurrence reflecting adversely on the good image of the Judiciary. 18 By fighting
within the court premises, respondent judges failed to observe the proper decorum expected of
members of the Judiciary. More detestable is the fact that their squabble arose out of a mere
allowance coming from the local government.
Under Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC 19 (September 11, 2001), a violation of
the Code of Judicial Conduct is classified as a serious charge only if it amounts to gross
misconduct. Since, as correctly found by the OCA, the same does not constitute gross
misconduct, it should be considered only as a violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and
circulars, which is classified as a less serious charge, in which case, any of the following
sanctions may be imposed: (1) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not
less than one nor more than three months; or (2) a fine of more than P10,000 but not
exceeding P20,000.
The Court finds, however, that Judges Capco-Umali and Acosta-Villarante should each be
fined P11,000.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judges Rizalina T. Capco-Umali and Paulita B. AcostaVillarante GUILTY of violation of Section 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary, for which they are each FINED in the amount of Eleven
Thousand (P11,000) Pesos.
In view of the retirement of Judge Paulita B. Acosta-Villarante, the Fiscal Management and
Budget Office, Office of the Court Administrator is ordered to DEDUCT the amount of Eleven
Thousand Pesos (P11,000) from her retirement benefits.
Judge Rizalina T. Capco-Umali, who is still in the service, is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of similar acts will be dealt with more severely. The same stern warning applies to
retired Judge Paulita B. Acosta-Villarante in her capacity as a member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

35

CANON V
[A.M. No. RTJ-10-2242
August 6, 2010]
[Formerly OCA IPI No. 09-3149-RTJ]
ATTY. RAUL L. CORREA, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 36,
CALAMBA CITY, LAGUNA,Respondent.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a Verified-Complaint dated February 20, 2009 filed by complainant Atty. Raul L.
Correa charging respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 36, Calamba City, Laguna of Misconduct.
Complainant narrated that he was one of the Co-Administrators appointed by the court in
Special Proceedings No. 660-01C, entitled "Intestate Estate of Hector Tan." He revealed that
during the hearing of the case, respondent Judge Belen disagreed with various items in the
Administrators Report, including the audited Financial Report covering the said estate, and
immediately ruled that they should be disallowed. Complainant added that respondent Judge
Belen scolded their accountant, branded her as an incompetent, and threatened to sue her
before the regulatory body overseeing all certified public accountants.
Complainant further claimed that, in the course of the proceedings, he was asked by
respondent Judge Belen to stand up while the latter dictated his order on their Administrators
Report. Respondent Judge Belen even rebuked him for some mistakes in managing the affairs
of the estate, adding that it is regrettable "because Atty. Raul Correa is a U.P. Law Graduate
and a Bar Topnotcher at that." Complainant regrets the actuations and statements of
respondent Judge Belen, especially because the remark was uncalled for, a left-handed
compliment, and a grave insult to his Alma Mater. Worse, respondent Judge Belen ousted
complainant as co-administrator of the estate of Hector Tan.
On June 18, 2008, respondent Judge Belen issued an Order citing complainant for indirect
contempt, allegedly with administrator Rose Ang Tee, for surreptitiously and unlawfully
withdrawing from and emptying the account of the estate of Hector Tan. The June 18, 2008
Order contained snide remarks, viz
x x x. The action of Rose Tee and Atty. Raul Correa is contumacious and direct challenge to
lawful orders, and judicial process of this [c]ourt and malicious assault to the orderly
administration of justice, more specifically abhorrent the act and deed of Atty. Raul Correa, a
U.P. Law alumnus and Bar Topnotcher, who as a lawyer knows very well and fully
understands that such action violates his oath of office which the Court cannot countenance. x
xx
Lastly, complainant insisted that he should not have been cited for indirect contempt because
he had fully explained to the court that he had done his part as co-administrator in good faith,
and that, through his efforts, the estate was able to meet the deadline for the latest Tax
Amnesty Program of the government, consequently saving the estate the amount of no less
than P35 Million.

In his Comment dated August 18, 2009, respondent Judge Belen argued that a judge, having
the heavy burden to always conduct himself in accordance with the ethical tenets of honesty,
probity and integrity, is duty bound to remind counsel of their duties to the court, to their
clients, to the adverse party, and to the opposing counsel.
Respondent Judge Belen claimed that the conduct of complainant in handling the settlement of
the estate of Hector Tan violated and breached the tenets and standards of the legal profession
and of the Lawyers Oath. He alleged that, despite the clear tenor of a lawyer-client
relationship, complainant associated himself as corresponding counsel and member of the
Ongkiko Law Office, the counsel of the opposing party in the settlement proceedings.
Respondent Judge Belen further alleged that complainant, in connivance with Rose Ang Tee,
surreptitiously released millions of pesos for the now deceased Purification Tee Tan and to
themselves, in clear violation of complainants legal and fiduciary relationship and
responsibilities as court-appointed co-administrator.
Both the Verified-Complaint and the Comment were referred to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report, and recommendation.
In its Report dated March 10, 2010, the OCA found respondent Judge Belen guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a judge for his use of intemperate language and inappropriate actions in
dealing with counsels, such as complainant, appearing in his sala. The OCA said that
respondent Judge Belen should have just ruled on the motion filed by complainant instead of
opting for a conceited display of arrogance. The OCA also noted that the incidents subject of
this administrative matter were not the first time that respondent Judge Belen had uttered
intemperate remarks towards lawyers appearing before him. It noted that in Mane v.
Belen,1 the Court found respondent Judge Belen guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge and
was reprimanded for engaging in a supercilious legal and personal discourse.
Based on its evaluation, the OCA recommended that (a) the administrative case against
respondent Judge Belen be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; and (b) respondent
Judge Belen be fined in the amount ofP10,000.00 for conduct unbecoming of a judge, with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
The findings and the recommendations of the OCA are well taken and, thus, should be upheld.
Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary exhorts members of the
judiciary, in the discharge of their duties, to be models of propriety at all times. Canon 4
mandates

CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities
of a judge.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.

36

xxx
SEC. 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association
and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a
manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence
of the judiciary.

[A.M. No. RTJ-06-2004

October 19, 2007]
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 04-2145-RTJ)
DOROTEO M. SALAZAR, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ANTONIO D. MARIGOMEN, Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Bogo,
Cebu, Respondent.

The Code also calls upon judges to ensure equality of treatment to all before the courts. More
specifically, Section 3, Canon 5 on Equality provides
SEC. 3. Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons,
such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without
differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.
We join the OCA in noting that the incidents narrated by complainant were never denied by
respondent Judge Belen, who merely offered his justification and asserted counter accusations
against complainant.
Verily, we hold that respondent Judge Belen should be more circumspect in his language in the
discharge of his duties. A judge is the visible representation of the law. Thus, he must behave,
at all times, in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can withstand the most
searching public scrutiny. The ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential
to the preservation of the peoples faith in the judicial system. 2
A judge must consistently be temperate in words and in actions. Respondent Judge Belens
insulting statements, tending to project complainants ignorance of the laws and procedure,
coming from his inconsiderate belief that the latter mishandled the cause of his client is
obviously and clearly insensitive, distasteful, and inexcusable. Such abuse of power and
authority could only invite disrespect from counsels and from the public. Patience is one virtue
that members of the bench should practice at all times, and courtesy to everyone is always
called for.1avvphi1
Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of
the Revised Rules of Court, penalized under Section 11 (c) thereof by any of the following: (1)
a Fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand;
and (4) Admonition with warning. Inasmuch as this is not respondent Judge Belens first
offense, the penalty of fine of P10,000.00 is deemed appropriate.

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
By Complaint1 dated November 10, 2004, Doroteo M. Salazar (complainant) charged Judge
Antonio D. Marigomen (respondent), Presiding Judge of Branch 61, Regional Trial Court,
Bogo, Cebu, with gross ignorance of the law, bias, conduct prejudicial to the interest of the
service and rendering a decision violative of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Rules
of Procedure and the Constitution in connection with Election SPC Case No. BOGO-00789.
Zenaida F. Salazar, wife of complainant, and a mayoralty candidate in the Municipality of
Madridejos, Cebu in the May 2001 elections, filed on July 4, 2001 an election protest against
the proclaimed winner Lety2 Mancio (Mancio) before the Regional Trial Court, Bogo, Cebu
where it was docketed as Election SPC Case No. BOGO-00789.
The election case was first heard by then Acting Presiding Judge Jesus S. dela Pea who, on
April 1, 2002, issued an order directing the revision of the contested ballots in the premises of
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) where the ballot boxes were being
kept. Respondent took over and started presiding over the election case on June 3, 2002.
By Decision3 of August 8, 2003, respondent dismissed the election protest and declared
Mancio as the duly elected municipal mayor of Madridejos, Cebu with total votes of 5,214. 4
On appeal, the COMELEC First Division, by Resolution 5 of March 25, 2004, reversed and set
aside the August 8, 2003 Decision of respondent and declared complainants wife Zenaida
Salazar as the duly elected mayor.6
Thus, spawned the filing of the complaint at bar.

WHEREFORE, we find Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Calamba City, Branch 36, GUILTY of Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, and FINE
him P10,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt
with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

By complainants claim, respondent admitted in evidence uncertified photocopies of the

contested ballots,7 the original copies of which were in the custody of the HRET, contrary to
Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court8which provides:
SEC. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original
of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents
may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. (Italics in
the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied);
and respondent considered the uncertified photocopies-exhibits for Mancio in deciding the
case. Hence, the charge of gross ignorance of the law.9

37

Respondents partiality was, by complainants claim, shown in several instances, viz: When
protestant Zenaida Salazar objected to the presentation of the plain photocopies of the
contested ballots, respondent ordered his Clerk of Court to coordinate with counsel for
protestee and to testify for her; and respondent allowed Atty. Reinerio Roeles, the co-counsel
for the protestee, to testify despite the protestants objection on the ground that his testifying
would be a violation of professional ethics 10 and despite respondents citation of authorities on
the matter.11
Complainant further claims that respondent was acting as if he were the counsel for the
protestee, demonstrated during the testimony of the Clerk of Court when protestees counsel
had difficulty explaining the nature of the clerks testimony and respondent laid the basis
thereof.12
Complainant additionally claims that respondent was "too liberal and tolerant of the
maneuverings and manipulations of the protestee," 13 thereby dragging the proceedings which
started on July 4, 2001 (when it was filed) up to August 8, 2003 (when it was decided), in
violation of the period provided by the Omnibus Election Code.
Furthermore, complainant claims that despite the parties agreement to follow the
Memorandum on Policy Guidelines dated March 12, 2002 executed between the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) 14 allowing the
submission of affidavits of witnesses in lieu of their testifying in court, subject to cross
examination, respondent allowed protestee to present witnesses to give oral testimonies. 15
Finally, complainant claims that respondent violated the COMELEC Rules of Procedure as
well as the Constitution for not clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the law on which his
decision was based.16
In his Comment,17 respondent proffers that complainant is not the real party in interest and, in
any event, the complaint is moot and academic as the election protest had been decided on
appeal by the COMELEC; and if errors were committed, "they pertain to the exercise of his
adjudicative functions [which] cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings." 18
As to the charge of gross ignorance of the law, respondent cites Section 5, 19 Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court as his legal basis for the admission of the uncertified photocopies.
Denying complainants claim that he was biased in favor of the protestee relative to the
presentation of her counsel Atty. Roeles as a witness, respondent claims that despite the
counsel for the protestants commitment to submit a memorandum of authorities to support his
objection to Atty. Roeles presentation, no memorandum was submitted. 20
Respecting his having propounded questions in the course of the testimony of the witnesses,
respondent claims that he did so in good faith "in order to ascertain the falsity or truth of the
subject matter."21
On the charge of conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service, respondent disclaims any
intentional delay of the proceedings on his part. As for the non-observance of the
Memorandum on Policy Guidelines, he argues that if the protestant had agreed to observe the
memorandum, he could not compel the protestee to also observe the same as the policy
guidelines are merely recommendatory and not compulsory. 22

Finally, respondent maintains that his decision clearly stated the facts and the law on which it
was based, and if there are errors therein, they are correctible by judicial remedies and not by
administrative proceedings.23
The OCA, by Report24 of April 4, 2006, found the complaint meritorious in light of the
following evaluation:
. . . Administrative matter involves the exercise of the Courts power to discipline judges. It is
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare, that is, to maintain the faith and
confidence of the people in the government. Thus, unlike in ordinary cases, there is no private
offended party in administrative proceedings who may be entitled to judicial relief. The
complainant need not be a real party in interest, as anyone may file an administrative
complaint against a judge, the only requirement being that the complaint be verified and it "be
in writing and shall state clearly and concisely the acts and omissions constituting violations of
standards of conduct prescribed for Judges by law, the Rules of Court, or the Code of Judicial
Conduct."
The admission of the uncertified or plain photocopies of the contested ballots by respondent
Judge in favor of Mancio betrays his ignorance of Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
The Rule, otherwise known as the Best Evidence Rule, simply provides that as long as the
original evidence can be had, the court should not receive in evidence that which is
substitutionary in nature, such as photocopies, in the absence of any clear showing that the
original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court. In this case, the
original copies of the contested ballots have neither been lost nor destroyed. They are in the
custody of the HRET, and had respondent judge wanted to examine them, he could have easily
ordered the transfer of their custody to the court.
His invocation of Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court to justify his admission of the
plain copies of the contested ballots is misplaced. The Rule allows the admission of secondary
evidence when the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be found.
However, the offeror is burdened to prove the predicates thereof: (a) the loss or destruction of
the original was without bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror which can be shown by
circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of documents; (b) the proponent
must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or
destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but
unsuccessful search has been made for the document in the proper place or places.
Verily, as the original copies of the contested ballots are in the custody of the HRET, which
fact was known to respondent judge, there was no occasion to apply Section 5, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. When the law is so elementary, not to know it constitutes gross ignorance of
the law.
Respondent judge took special interest in the presentation of Atty. Caayon as a witness for
Mancio. The purpose of Atty. Caayons testimony was to show that the photocopies of the
ballots were the same as the original ballots in the custody of the HRET. When the counsel for
Salazar, Atty. Manuel S. Paradela, refused to stipulate on the faithful reproduction of the
original ballots, the counsel for Mancio declared that they could request HRET to bring the
original ballots to the court for comparison. Respondent judge, however, ignored the
manifestation, and proceeded to ask Atty. Paradela if the latter was represented during the
photocopying of the original ballots. Nonetheless, the counsel for Mancio, Atty. Nathaniel
Clarus, requested for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum to bring the
original ballots to the court. Despite that manifestation, respondent judge allowed Atty.
Caayon to affirm the veracity of the photocopies in his possession, thus:

38

xxxx
[Judge Marigomen]: We will present the Clerk of Court (Atty. Caayon) to affirm the veracity
of those ballots in his possession of the tribunal copy and now existence (sic) in the possession
of the Clerk of Court. x x x
Clearly, respondent judge was more interested in presenting Atty. Caayon as a witness than the
party (Mancio) who would have benefited from the testimony. His actuations did not speak
well of the cold neutrality required of an impartial judge, as he showed his manifest bias for
one party over the other.
The bias of respondent judge for Mancio was further demonstrated when Atty. Caayon was
being qualified as a witness. After every objection raised by Atty. Paradela to the questions
propounded by Atty. Clarus to Atty. Caayon, respondent judge would always propound
questions himself to Atty. Caayon, instead of ruling on the objections . . .
xxxx
Respondent judges bias for Mancio was further shown by respondent judge when he allowed
one of the counsels for Mancio, Atty. Reinerio Roiles, to testify despite the vigorous objection
of Salazar through his counsel, as the testimony was in violation of Rule 12.08, Canon 12 of
the Canons of Professional Responsibility. The Rule prohibits a lawyer from testifying in
behalf of his client, except on formal matters such as the mailing, authentication or custody of
an instrument, or on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of
justice. In this case, Atty. Roeles was allowed to testify on matters not contemplated by the
exceptions. As admitted by respondent judge, he allowed Atty. Roeles to testify "to prove that
he is one of the legal panel (sic) of the protestee; that he was at the Municipality of Madridejos
last May 12, 2001 to May [1]5, 2001; and that there was (sic) no goons, terrorism and other
election activities as alleged by the protestant." Surely, the matters testified to by Atty. Roeles
are neither formal matters nor essential to the ends of justice; rather, they were self-serving
declarations intended to strengthen Mancios cause.
In his attempt at justifying his act in allowing Atty. Roeles to testify, respondent judge
committed falsehood when he declared in his comment that he allowed Atty. Roeles to testify
over the objection of Salazar after the latter, through counsel, failed to submit a memorandum
in support of her objection. However, the records of this case belie that claim. It appears that
Salazar through Atty. Paradela filed a Manifestation dated February 24, 2003, calling attention
to the unethical presentation of Atty. Roeles as a witness for his own client, Mancio. The
manifestation was filed with, and received by, the court on the same day, as evidenced by the
stamp "RECEIVED" appearing on the upper right hand corner of the first page of the
Manifestation.
There is also merit in the complaint that respondent judge failed to abide by the express
mandate of the COMELEC Rules and Procedure and the Constitution to state clearly and
distinctly in every decision the facts and the law on which it is based.
The questioned decision dismissing for lack of merit the election protest filed by Salazar
against Mancio, and declaring the latter to be the duly elected municipal mayor of Madridejos,
Cebu, with a total votes of 5,214 as against the 5,144 votes garnered by Salazar, or a
difference of 70 votes. The final tabulation of votes came about after the respondent judge
declared on the penultimate page of the 22-page decision, thus:
After reviewing or re-appreciating the ballots of the contested precincts, the Court invalidated
ninety (90) votes of the protestant and has not validated stray votes in her favor as she has not

formally offered the claimed stray votes or ballots. The court shall only consider ballots which
are presented and formally offered.
After a thorough examination of the questioned decision, it became obvious that the
invalidation of the 90 votes against Salazar was made without indicating in the decision the
factual and legal bases therefor. Expectedly, the COMELEC First Division, in its Resolution
promulgated on March 25, 2004, reversed and set aside the August 8, 2003 Decision of
respondent judge, and declared Salazar as the duly elected mayor of Madridejos, Cebu.
Time and again, the Court had instructed judges to exert effort to ensure the decisions would
present a comprehensive analysis or account of the factual and legal findings that would
substantially address the issues raised by the parties. Respondent failed in this respect.
xxxx
In fine, respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law, manifest bias and deliberate
falsehood or dishonesty. Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross ignorance of
the law is considered a serious charge. Similarly, bias and deliberate falsehood, which are
tantamount to grave misconduct, are considered serious charges under the same Rule. The
penalty imposable for serious charges ranges from fine to dismissal. 25(Italics in the original,
emphasis supplied; and underscoring partly in the original and partly supplied)
The OCA recommended that respondent be found guilty of (a) gross ignorance of the law and
fined in the amount of P20,000, and (b) bias and dishonesty, amounting to grave misconduct
and suspended for six months without pay.26
In compliance with this Courts Resolution 27 of June 19, 2006 requiring them to manifest
whether they are willing to submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings/records
already filed and submitted, complainant and respondent manifested in the affirmative.
The Court finds the evaluation of the case by the OCA in order. Respondents questioned acts
do not conform to the following pertinent canons of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary which took effect on June 1, 2004.
CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the
decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.
SECTION 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias or prejudice.
SEC. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of
the judge and of the judiciary.
xxxx

39

CANON 5
EQUALITY
xxxx
SEC. 2. Judges shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct,
manifest bias or prejudice towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
And respondent indeed committed falsehood, as found by the OCA. Respondents claim that
he allowed the protestees counsel, Atty. Roeles, to testify over the objection of the protestants
counsel because the latter failed to submit a memorandum in support of the objection, is belied
by the records of the case. Thus, in a pleading captioned "Manifestation," the protestants
counsel submitted a memorandum of authorities on the matter.
In Re: Compliance of Judge Maxwel S. Rosete, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Santiago City, Isabela,28this Court observed:
. . . [T]he lack of candor he has shown by the misrepresentation which he made before the
Court is incongruent with the primordial character which a magistrate must possess, especially
so in this case where the act of dishonesty was committed against the Court. A member of the
bar owes candor, fairness, and good faith to the Court. He must not do any falsehood or
consent to the doing of any in court; neither shall he mislead or allow the Court to be misled
by any artifice. The moral standard of honesty is equally, if not much more, expected
from members of the Judiciary, as they are the agents through which the Court ensures
that the end of justice is served. Dishonesty is anathema to the very nature of functions
which a magistrate performs.29 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent also indeed failed to state in his decision why he invalidated 90 ballots in favor of
the protestant and to specify the ballots being set aside, thereby violating the Constitution. 30
This Court modifies the recommendation of the OCA, however, given the number of
infractions committed by respondent.1avvphi1 Instead of suspension, it imposes on respondent
a fine of Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000) Pesos for manifest bias and dishonesty. And it
increases the recommended fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000) Pesos for gross ignorance of
law or procedure to Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000) Pesos.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent, JUDGE ANTONIO D. MARIGOMEN,
GUILTY of 1) gross ignorance of the law or procedure and is FINED in the amount of Twenty
Five Thousand (P25,000) Pesos, and 2) manifest bias and dishonesty amounting to grave
misconduct and is FINED in the amount of Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000) Pesos.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

[A.M. No. MTJ-07-1666

September 5, 2012]
(Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 05-1761-MTJ)
GERLIE M. UY and MA. CONSOLACION T. BASCUG, Complainants,
vs.
JUDGE ERWIN B. JAVELLANA, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, LA CASTELLANA,
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL,Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This administrative case arose from a verified complaint 1 for "gross ignorance of the law and
procedures, gross incompetence, neglect of duty, conduct improper and unbecoming of a
judge, grave misconduct and others," filed by Public Attorneys Gerlie 2 M. Uy (Uy) and Ma.
Consolacion T. Bascug (Bascug) of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), La Carlotta District,
against Presiding Judge Erwin 3 B. Javellana (Javellana) of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC),
La Castellana, Negros Occidental.
Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug alleged the following in their complaint:
First, Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug cited several occasions as examples: (a) In Crim. Case No.
04-097, entitled People v. Cornelio, for Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana issued a warrant
of arrest after the filing of said case despite Section 16 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure; (b) In Crim. Case No. 04-075, entitled People v. Celeste, et al., for Trespass to
Dwelling, Judge Javellana did not grant the motion to dismiss for non-compliance with the
Lupon requirement under Sections 18 and 19(a) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure,
insisting that said motion was a prohibited pleading; (c) Also in People v. Celeste, et al., Judge
Javellana refused to dismiss outright the complaint even when the same was patently without
basis or merit, as the affidavits of therein complainant and her witnesses were all hearsay
evidence; and (d) In Crim. Case No. 02-056, entitled People v. Lopez, et al., for Malicious
Mischief, Judge Javellana did not apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and, instead,
conducted a preliminary examination and preliminary investigation in accordance with the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, then set the case for arraignment and pre-trial, despite
confirming that therein complainant and her witnesses had no personal knowledge of the
material facts alleged in their affidavits, which should have been a ground for dismissal of said
case.Second, Judge Javellana gave the impression that he was a co-agent in a surety company
with a certain Leilani "Lani" Manunag (Manunag). Judge Javellana had conveyed to the public
on several occasions that Manunag was in a special position to influence him in granting
provisional liberty to the accused. 4 In different cases, Judge Javellana (a) instructed the wife of
an accused to file the Motion to Reduce Bond prepared by the PAO with Manunag, leading the
wife to believe that Manunag was a court personnel, hence, said Motion was never filed with
the MTC and, instead of the cash bond the accused intended to post, the accused was released
on a surety bond issued by Manunags company for which the accused still had to pay
premium;5 (b) reduced the bail from P 40,000.00 to P 30,000.00, consistent with the reduced
bail amount Manunag instructed the representative of the accused to seek, not to P 10,000.00

40

as prayed for by the PAO in the Motion for Reduction of Bail or to P 20,000.00 as
recommended by the Chief of Police;6 (c) did not warn Manunag against getting involved in
court processes as she was engaged in surety insurance and did not even question a counteraffidavit of an accused prepared by "Lani;" 7 (d) instructed the relatives of the accused to go to
Manunag who knew how to "process" an affidavit of desistance, and when said relatives did
approach Manunag, the latter charged them fees; 8 (e) did not set the Motion to Reduce Bail for
hearing but granted the same because it was filed by "the intimate friend of judge who is an
agent of surety" and took cognizance of the amount of premium for the surety bond in
determining the amount of bail;9 (f) denied the Motion to Extend Time to File CounterAffidavit for violation of the three-day notice rule, but granted the Motion to Reduce Bail
facilitated by Manunag even when it was filed in violation of the same rule; 10 and (g) issued
warrants of arrest under questionable circumstances, more particularly described in the
immediately succeeding paragraph, in which cases, the bail bonds of the accused were
facilitated by Manunag.
Third, Judge Javellana violated Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure and issued warrants of arrest without propounding searching questions to the
complainants and their witnesses to determine the necessity of placing the accused under
immediate custody. As a result, Judge Javellana issued warrants of arrest even when the
accused had already voluntarily surrendered or when a warrantless arrest had been effected.
Fourth, Judge Javellana failed to observe the constitutional rights of the accused as stated in
Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. Judge Javellana set Crim. Case No. 03-097,
entitled People v. Bautista,11 for preliminary investigation even when the accused had no
counsel, and proceeded with said investigation without informing the accused of his rights to
remain silent and to have a counsel.
Fifth, Judge Javellana was habitually tardy. The subpoena in Civil Case No. 05-001, entitled
Villanueva v. Regalado,12 only stated that the hearing would be "in the morning," without
indicating the time. Judge Javellana failed to arrive for the pre-trial of the case set in the
morning of April 14, 2005. Judge Javellana was still a no-show when the pre-trial was reset in
the morning of April 15, 2005 and May 3, 2005. Finally, anticipating Judge Javellanas
tardiness, the pre-trial was rescheduled at 1:30 in the afternoon of another date.
Sixth, Judge Javellana whimsically or inconsistently implemented laws and rules depending
on stature of the parties, persons accompanying the parties, lawyers of the parties, and his
personal relations with the parties/lawyers. Judge Javellana, in several cases, 13 denied or
refused to receive Motions for Extension of Time to File Counter-Affidavits signed only by
the accused, yet in other cases,14 granted such motions. In another case, 15Judge Javellana
denied the Motion to Extend Time to File Counter-Affidavit for violation of the three-day
notice rule, but granted the Motion to Reduce Bail, which was in violation of the same rule.
Judge Javellanas inconsistent and irregular ruling could be due to the fact that the former
motion was filed by Public Attorney Bascug, with whom Judge Javellana had an axe to grind,
while the latter motion was facilitated by Manunag.
Seventh, Judge Javellana also adopted the mantra that the "litigants are made for the courts"
instead of "courts for the litigants." In Crim. Case No. 03-104, entitled People v. Fermin, the
accused, assisted by Public Attorney Uy, pleaded guilty to the crime of attempted homicide.
The accused filed a Petition/Application for Probation, prepared by the PAO but signed only
by the accused. Judge Javellana refused to accept said Petition/Application and required the
father of the accused to return the Petition/Application all the way from the MTC in La
Castellana to the PAO in La Carlota, despite the great distance between these two cities. The
PAO already adopted the practice of preparing the motions for extension of time to file
counter-affidavit, motions for release of minor, or applications for probation, but letting the
accused themselves or their parents (in case the accused were minors) sign the
motions/applications, thus, enabling the PAO to serve as many clients as possible despite the

lack of lawyers. Such practice is not prohibited considering that under Rule 138, Section 34 of
the Rules of Court, a party may conduct his litigation in a municipal court "in person, with an
aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for the purpose or with aid of an attorney." 16
Eighth, Judge Javellana did not observe the proper procedure in airing his complaints against
public attorneys. Judge Javellana rebuked the public attorneys in the Orders he issued. In one
such Order,17 Judge Javellana misleadingly stated that Public Attorney Uy "has already
expressed her desire not to attend todays hearing," when Public Attorney Uy actually waived
her personal appearance at said hearing as she had to attend the hearing of a criminal case at
the MTC of Pontevedra. In another Order,18 Judge Javellana reported, prior to confirmation,
that the PAO lawyer refused to prepare the motion for extension of time to file counteraffidavit, thus, prompting the accused to hire a special counsel. Additionally, Judge Javellana
improperly filed his complaints against the public attorneys appearing before his court with
the Department of Justice or the District Public Attorney (DPA) of Bacolod City, instead of the
appropriate authorities, namely, the DPA of La Carlota City or the PAO Regional Director.
Moreover, Judge Javellana had required Public Attorney Bascug to explain why she allowed
the accused in Crim. Case No. 03-090, entitled People v. Earnshaw, to sign the Motion for
Extension of Time to File Counter-Affidavits, even when she was the one who prepared said
Motion. Judge Javellana did not verify first whether it was indeed Public Attorney Bascug
who prepared the Motion in question, thus, violating her right to due process. Also, Judge
Javellana was already encroaching upon the domain of the PAO. It is the concern of the PAO
and not the court "as to how the Public Attorneys Office will be managed, specifically, what
policies to use in the acceptance of cases brought to its Office, how one could avail of its legal
services, at what point in time one is considered a client of said Office x x x ." 19
Lastly, to support their complaint, Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug attached a hand-written
note20 relating the observations of an anonymous member of Judge Javellanas staff, viz:
Page One
1. Honorable Judge reports to duty at past 11:00 A.M. and hurriedly conducts
preliminary investigations or preliminary examinations after making party litigants
wait from 8:00 A.M. until 11:00 A.M. There had been occasions when litigants
became impatient for waiting for several hours for the Judges arrival and would
leave the court. Judge then would forego the examination.
2. Judge spends more time conversing in cafeterias than stay in the court. Litigants
who are in a hurry to go home would bring the affidavits to the cafeteria for Judges
signature.
3. Most of the time, in Court, in front of litigants as audience and even while
solemnizing civil marriage Judge would keep repeating these remarks:
I am a criminal lawyer.
I did not come from the DAR or the COMELEC.
I am an intelligent Judge.

41

I am the counsel of the famous Gargar-Lumangyao and Spider

Hunter cases and I have caused the execution of Col. Torres.
I am not under the Mayor or the Chief of Police.
and other remarks as if he is the only intelligent, credible and qualified
judge in the whole world.
4. Judge tolerates the negligence of duty of his court utility worker. Said utility
worker never reports to open or close the court; he never cleans the courtroom; most
of the time he stays in his Karaoke bar which is some few meters away from the
MTC of La Castellana. As a matter of fact the MTC of La Castellana is the dirtiest
of all the courtrooms in the whole province.
Page Two
5. Motion for Extension of Time to File Counter Affidavit in CC 03-090-Pp. vs.
Efraim Earnshaw made by Atty. Bascug was denied by Judge on the ground that it
was the accused who signed the Motion and Atty. Bascug was ordered to explain.
Other motions had been denied for not meeting the 3-day rule but others were
granted.
6. Motion to Reduce Bail received by court on January 7, 2004 was not set for
hearing but was ordered granted because it was filed by the intimate friend of the
judge who is an agent of Surety. This did not meet the 3-day rule CC 03-108 Pp. vs.
Lowell Panaguiton for "Homicide."
Page Three
1. Criminal Case No. 03-102- Julius Villanueva "Frustrated Homicide"
Urgent Motion to Stay Transfer to Provincial Jail - Filed 1/21/2004 was
not heard but order was issued January 21, 2004 also.
2. Criminal Case No. 03-090- Efraim Earnshaw "Less Serious Physical
Injuries" January 26, 2004 - Scheduled for arraignment but upon order of
Judge on affidavit of Desistance of Melanie Pabon and Motion to Dismiss
was filed and case dismissed.
3. Deonaldo Lopez Case - Motion for Extension of Time to File Counter
Affidavit dated 10-3-02 was signed by accused namely Deonaldo Lopez,
Jojo Balansag, Junnel Jorge, and Bernie Bello - granted by judge. 21
Based on the foregoing, Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug prayed that Judge Javellana be
removed from the MTC of La Castellana.

In his Comment22 on the complaint against him, Judge Javellana discounted the allegations of
Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug as "baseless, untruthful, intrigues, malicious and a
harassment tending to intimidate him," and countered as follows:
First, Judge Javellana asserted that he was not grossly ignorant of the rules of procedure and
explained his actions in particular cases: (a) In People v. Cornelio, Judge Javellana issued a
warrant of arrest for the two accused charged with Malicious Mischief in the exercise of his
judicial discretion, and the necessity of holding the accused in detention became evident when
it was revealed during trial that the same accused were wanted for Attempted Homicide in
Crim. Case No. 04-096; (b) In People v. Celeste, et al., Judge Javellana insisted that referral of
the dispute (involving an alleged Trespass to Dwelling) to the Lupong Tagapamayapa was not
a jurisdictional requirement and the Motion to Dismiss on said ground was a prohibited
pleading under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure; (c) Still in People v. Celeste, et al.,
Judge Javellana refused to dismiss outright the complaint as prayed for by Public Attorney Uy
as the Judge had to accord due process to the complainant in said case; and (d) In People v.
Lopez, et al. another case for Malicious Mischief, Judge Javellana reiterated that a motion to
dismiss is a prohibited pleading under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and added
that he could not dismiss the case outright since the prosecution has not yet fully presented its
evidence.
Second, Judge Javellana denied acting as the co-agent of Manunag. Manunag was an
Authorized Surety Bond Agent of Commonwealth Insurance and Surety Bond Company, a
bonding company duly accredited by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). The
relationship between Judge Javellana and Manunag was "purely on official business." That
Manunag influenced Judge Javellana in fixing the amount of bail in several cases was a
malicious and deliberate lie, based on mere speculation and suspicion. Judge Javellana had
consistently granted the reduction of the amount of bail to only 75%, and not as low as 25%,
of the amount stated in Department Circular No. 89 dated August 29, 2000 of the Department
of Justice (DOJ). Judge Javellana even chided Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug that as officers
of the court, said public attorneys were duty bound not to demand outrageous reduction of
bail. In addition, Judge Javellana could not warn Manunag to stay away from "the processes
(sic) premises in the Court" because "everybody are allowed to attend Court proceedings
unless otherwise the attendance of the public is prohibited." 23 Judge Javellana likewise stated
that he could not interfere with the processing of surety insurance and bond for such was a
private matter between the insurance and bonding company and its authorized agents.
Referring to case records, Judge Javellana pointed out that he only granted the motions to
reduce bail that complied with the three-day notice rule.
Third, Judge Javellana claimed to have conducted preliminary examination, asking the
complainants and their witnesses searching questions, before issuing warrants of arrest.
According to Judge Javellana, he would sign the official form of the warrant of arrest right
after the preliminary examination. In some cases, Judge Javellana was not aware that the
accused had already voluntarily surrendered or was already taken into custody by virtue of a
warrantless arrest because police officers did not timely inform the court of such fact.
Fourth, Judge Javellana did not violate the constitutional rights of the accused in People v.
Bautista. Judge Javellana argued that while a judge can ask clarificatory questions during the
preliminary investigation, a preliminary investigation is mandatory only when the law imposes
the penalty of imprisonment of at least four years, two months, and one day. Judge Javellana
further averred that he always advised litigants to secure the services of a counsel or that of a
public attorney from the PAO. However, even when the public attorney failed or refused to
appear before the court, Judge Javellana still proceeded with his clarificatory questions since
there was yet no full blown trial for which the accused already needed the services of a
competent lawyer.

42

Fifth, Judge Javellana explained his failure to arrive for the pre-trial in Villanueva v. Regalado
scheduled on April 14, 2005. Judge Javellana averred that he had been suffering from diabetes,
as evinced by his medical records from the Supreme Court Health and Welfare Plan, and on
said date, his blood sugar rose to 300, which caused him to be lethargic, weak, and drowsy.
Sixth, Judge Javellana repudiated the allegation that he applied the law and ruled whimsically
and inconsistently. Judge Javellana asserted that he "applied the law and the rules according to
what he believes is fair, just and equitable in the exercise of his judicial discretion." 24 Judge
Javellana never favored Manunag and in all criminal cases involving homicide, he had granted
the reduction of bail toP 30,000.00 (75% of the recommended bail of P 40,000.00).
Seventh, Judge Javellana admitted not accepting petitions, applications, and motions prepared
by the PAO but signed only by the accused, asseverating that public attorneys should affix
their signatures and state their Roll of Attorneys number in every pleading they file in court.
Judge Javellana asked that "if all courts admits (sic) any pleading filed by any litigant then
what will happen to the practice of law?"25
Eighth, Judge Javellana emphasized that government lawyers, such as Public Attorneys Uy
and Bascug, are paid with peoples money, so they should be sincere and dedicated to their
work and, whenever possible, go the extra mile to serve poor litigants. Thus, Judge Javellana
reported Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug to higher PAO officials to guide said public
attorneys and not to interfere with the performance of their functions.
And ninth, Judge Javellana identified the member of his staff who wrote the note containing
more allegations against him as Mr. Ray D. Pineda (Pineda), Process Server. Judge Javellana
described Pineda as "very abnormal, eccentric and queer in his relationship with his fellow
staff as shown by his quarrelsome attitude and fond of inciting litigants to criticize the Clerk of
Court and other personnel and most of all his loyalty to the Official of the Municipality rather
than to this Court x x x."26 Judge Javellana clarified that he often mentioned the GargarLumangyao Kidnapping with Double Murder Case and the Spider Hunters Multiple Murder
and Multiple Frustrated Murder Case not to boast but to relay the impression that he meant
business as Presiding Judge. These cases were dubbed as the "Case of the Century" by then
Executive Judge Bernardo Ponferrada of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City (who later
became Deputy Court Administrator) because the same involved big time personalities. Judge
Javellana mentioned the said cases even when solemnizing marriages because he would then
be reading the Holy Scriptures and he had to highlight that he survived the trials and threats to
his life because of the Holy Bible. Judge Javellana also did not have a Court Aide who owned
a Karaoke Bar whose negligence the judge was tolerating. Pineda was just "jealous" because
he was not designated by Judge Javellana as Acting Docket Clerk in lieu of Mr. Vee Caballero
who was already on terminal leave prior to retirement. Judge Javellana further narrated that he
had reprimanded Pineda several times, even in open court. In one of these instances, it was
because Pineda submitted a falsified information sheet to the Supreme Court Personnel
Division, stating therein that he had never been charged with a criminal offense, when in truth,
he was previously charged with "Physical Injury." Judge Javellana advised Pineda to rectify
the latters records by executing an affidavit to be submitted to the Supreme Court Personnel
Division, but Pineda did not heed the same.
In the end, Judge Javellana stressed that the charges against him were baseless and malicious;
and the acts being complained of involved judicial discretion and, thus, judicial in nature and
not the proper subject of an administrative complaint. Judge Javellana hinted about a
conspiracy between the Municipal Mayor, on one hand, and Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug,
on the other. The Municipal Mayor was purportedly angry at Judge Javellana because the latter
caused the arrest of and heard the cases against the formers supporters and employees; while
Public Attorney Bascug was suffering from a "Losing Litigants Syndrome" and "Prosecution
Complex," and was influencing Public Attorney Uy, a neophyte lawyer.

Consequently, Judge Javellana sought the dismissal of the instant complaint against him.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its report 27 dated January 2, 2006, found
Judge Javellana liable for gross ignorance of the law or procedure when he did not apply the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure in cases appropriately covered by said Rule; and (2)
gross misconduct when he got involved in business relations with Manunag, implemented the
law inconsistently, and mentioned his accomplishments for publicity. The OCA thus
recommended that:
1. The instant administrative complaint be REDOCKETED as a regular
administrative matter; and
2. Judge Edwin B. Javellana, MTC, La Castellana, Negros Occidental be
SUSPENDED from office without salary and other benefits for three (3) months
with a STERN WARNING that repetition of the same or similar acts in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.28
In a Resolution29 dated February 5, 2007, the Court re-docketed the complaint as a regular
administrative matter and required parties to manifest their willingness to submit the case for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed.
On separate dates,30 the parties manifested their willingness to submit the case for resolution
based on the pleadings already filed.
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OCA, except for the penalty imposed.
I
Gross Ignorance of the Law
The Revised Rule of Summary Procedure shall govern the following criminal cases:
SECTION 1. Scope. This Rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction.
xxxx
B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;

43

(4) Violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Checks Law).

(5) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense
charged is imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding one
thousand pesos (P 1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties,
accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom: Provided, however,
That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, this
Rule shall govern where the imposable fine does not exceed ten thousand pesos
(P 10,000.00). (Emphasis supplied.)
The cases People v. Cornelio31 and People v. Lopez, et al.32 pending before Judge Javellana
were both for malicious mischief.
The crime of malicious mischief is committed by any person who deliberately causes damage
to the property of another through means not constituting arson. 33 There are special cases of
malicious mischief which are specifically covered by Article 328 of the Revised Penal Code,
which provides:
ART. 328. Special cases of malicious mischief. Any person who shall cause damage to
obstruct the performance of public functions, or using any poisonous or corrosive substance;
or spreading any infection or contagion among cattle; or who causes damage to the property of
the National Museum or National Library, or to any archive or registry, waterworks, road,
promenade, or any other thing used in common by the public, shall be punished:
1. By prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the
damage caused exceeds 1,000 pesos;
2. By arresto mayor, if such value does not exceed the above- mentioned amount but
is over 200 pesos; and
3. By arresto menor, if such value does not exceed 200 pesos. (Emphasis ours.)
All other cases of malicious mischief shall be governed by Article 329 of the same Code,
which reads:
ART. 329. Other mischiefs. The mischiefs not included in the next preceding article shall be
punished:
1. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the damage
caused exceeds 1,000 pesos;
2. By arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value is over 200
pesos but does not exceed 1,000 pesos; and
3. By arresto menor or fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not
more than 200 pesos, if the amount involved does not exceed 200 pesos or cannot be
estimated. (Emphasis ours.)

Without any showing that the accused in People v. Cornelio and People v. Lopez, et al. were
charged with the special cases of malicious mischief particularly described in Article 328 of
the Revised Penal Code, then Article 329 of the same Code should be applied. If the amounts
of the alleged damage to property in People v. Cornelio and People v. Lopez, et
al., P 6,000.0034 and P 3,000.00,35 respectively, are proven, the appropriate penalty for the
accused would be arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods which under Article
329(a) of the Revised Penal Code, would be imprisonment for two (2) months and one (1) day
to six (6) months. Clearly, these two cases should be governed by the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure.
Judge Javellanas issuance of a Warrant of Arrest for the accused in People v. Cornelio is in
violation of Section 16 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, categorically stating that
"the court shall not order the arrest of the accused except for failure to appear whenever
required." Judge Javellana never claimed that the accused failed to appear at any hearing. His
justification that the accused was wanted for the crime of attempted homicide, being tried in
another case, Crim. Case No. 04-096, is totally unacceptable and further indicative of his
ignorance of law. People v. Cornelio, pending before Judge Javellanas court as Crim. Case
No. 04-097, is for malicious mischief, and is distinct and separate from Crim. Case No. 04096, which is for attempted homicide, although both cases involved the same accused.
Proceedings in one case, such as the issuance of a warrant of arrest, should not be extended or
made applicable to the other.
In People v. Lopez, et al., Judge Javellana conducted a preliminary investigation even when it
was not required or justified. 36
The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not provide for a preliminary investigation
prior to the filing of a criminal case under said Rule. A criminal case within the scope of the
Rule shall be commenced in the following manner:
SEC. 11. How commenced. The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule
shall be either by complaint or by information; Provided, however, That in Metropolitan
Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information, except
when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio.
The complaint or information shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and of
his witnesses in such number of copies as there are accused plus two (2) copies for the courts
files. If this requirement is not complied with within five (5) days from date of filing, the case
may be dismissed.
SEC. 12. Duty of Court.
(a) If commenced by complaint. On the basis of the complaint and the affidavits
and other evidence accompanying the same, the court may dismiss the case outright
for being patently without basis or merit and order the release of the accused if in
custody.
(b) If commenced by information. When the case is commenced by information,
or is not dismissed pursuant to the next preceding paragraph, the court shall issue an
order which, together with copies of the affidavits and other evidence submitted by
the prosecution, shall require the accused to submit his counter-affidavit and the

44

affidavits of his witnesses as well as any evidence in his behalf, serving copies
thereof on the complainant or prosecutor not later than ten (10) days from receipt of
said order. The prosecution may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after
receipt of the counter-affidavits of the defense.
SEC. 13. Arraignment and trial. Should the court, upon a consideration of the complaint or
information and the affidavits submitted by both parties, find no cause or ground to hold the
accused for trial, it shall order the dismissal of the case; otherwise, the court shall set the case
for arraignment and trial.
If the accused is in custody for the crime charged, he shall be immediately arraigned and if he
enters a plea of guilty, he shall forthwith be sentenced.
Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure only requires that a
preliminary investigation be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an
offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one
(1) day without regard to the fine. As has been previously established herein, the maximum
penalty imposable for malicious mischief in People v. Lopez, et al. is just six (6) months.
Judge Javellana did not provide any reason as to why he needed to conduct a preliminary
investigation in People v. Lopez, et al. We stress that the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
was precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases,
and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of cases. 37
Judge Javellana cannot be allowed to arbitrarily conduct proceedings beyond those
specifically laid down by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, thereby lengthening or
delaying the resolution of the case, and defeating the express purpose of said Rule.
We further agree with the OCA that Judge Javellana committed a blatant error in denying the
Motion to Dismiss filed by the accused in People v. Celeste, et al. and in insisting that said
Motion was a prohibited pleading, even though the case was never previously referred to the
Lupong
Tagapamayapa as required by Sections 18 and 19(a) of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure.
The pertinent provisions of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure read:
Sec. 18. Referral to Lupon. Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 where there is no showing of compliance with
such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after such
requirement shall have been complied with. This provision shall not apply to criminal cases
where the accused was arrested without a warrant.

(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding
section. (Emphases ours.)
We see no ambiguity in the aforequoted provisions. A case which has not been previously
referred to the Lupong Tagapamayapa shall be dismissed without prejudice. A motion to
dismiss on the ground of failure to comply with the Lupon requirement is an exception to the
pleadings prohibited by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Given the express
provisions of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, we find irrelevant Judge Javellanas
argument that referral to the Lupon is not a jurisdictional requirement. The following facts are
undisputed: People v. Celeste, et al. was not referred to the Lupon, and the accused filed a
Motion to Dismiss based on this ground. Judge Javellana should have allowed and granted the
Motion to Dismiss (albeit without prejudice) filed by the accused in People v. Celeste, et al.
The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure has been in effect since November 15, 1991. It finds
application in a substantial number of civil and criminal cases pending before Judge
Javellanas court. Judge Javellana cannot claim to be unfamiliar with the same.
Every judge is required to observe the law. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it
to his office to simply apply it; and anything less than that would be constitutive of gross
ignorance of the law. In short, when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law.38
In Agunday v. Judge Tresvalles, 39 we called the attention of Judge Tresvalles to Section 2 of
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure which states that a "patently erroneous
determination to avoid the application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is a ground
for disciplinary action." We went on further to interpret said provision as follows:
Although the said provision states that "patently erroneous determination to avoid the
application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is a ground for disciplinary action,"
the provision cannot be read as applicable only where the failure to apply the rule is deliberate
or malicious. Otherwise, the policy of the law to provide for the expeditious and summary
disposition of cases covered by it could easily be frustrated. Hence, requiring judges to make
the determination of the applicability of the rule on summary procedure upon the filing of the
case is the only guaranty that the policy of the law will be fully realized. x x x. 40 (Emphasis
ours.)
Resultantly, Judge Javellana cannot invoke good faith or lack of deliberate or malicious intent
as a defense. His repeated failure to apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure in cases
so obviously covered by the same is detrimental to the expedient and efficient administration
of justice, for which we hold him administratively liable.
As for Judge Javellanas refusal to dismiss People v. Lopez, et al. and People v. Celeste, et al.,
however, we exonerate him of the administrative charges for the same. Judge Javellana is
correct that the appreciation of evidence is already within his judicial discretion. 41 Any alleged
error he might have committed in this regard is the proper subject of an appeal but not an
administrative complaint. We remind Judge Javellana though to adhere closely to the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure in hearing and resolving said cases.

Sec. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings, motions, or petitions
shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
II
Gross Misconduct

45

Judges are enjoined by the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary 42 to act
and behave, in and out of court, in a manner befitting their office, to wit:
Canon 2
INTEGRITY

SECTION 8. Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance their
private interests, or those of a member of their family or of anyone else, nor shall they convey
or permit others to convey the impression that anyone is in a special position improperly to
influence them in the performance of judicial duties.
xxxx

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the
personal demeanor of judges.
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the
integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.

SECTION 14. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to their
influence, direction or authority, to ask for, or accept, any gift, bequest, loan favor in relation
to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done in connection with their duties or
functions.
xxxx
Canon 5
EQUALITY

xxxx
Canon 3
IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the
decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.
SECTION 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias or prejudice.
SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains
and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality
of the judge and of the judiciary.

Ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential to the due performance of
the judicial office.
xxxx
SECTION 2. Judges shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or by conduct,
manifest bias or prejudice towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds.
xxxx
SECTION 2. Judges shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct,
manifest bias or prejudice towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds.

xxxx
Canon 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities
of a judge.

SECTION 3. Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all
persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without
differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.
xxxx

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.
SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions
that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and
willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the
dignity of the judicial office.

Canon 6
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE
Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office.

xxxx

xxxx

46

SECTION 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved
decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.
SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and
be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with
whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal
representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.
Judge Javellana had violated the aforequoted canons/standards in several instances.
Judge Javellana did not admit having a business relationship with Manunag, contrary to the
finding of the OCA. What Judge Javellana stated in his Comment was that his relationship
with Manunag was "purely on official business," since Manunag was a duly authorized agent
of a credited bonding company. Nonetheless, Judge Javellana, by referring the accused who
appeared before his court directly to Manunag for processing of the bail bond of said accused,
gave the impression that he favored Manunag and Manunags bonding company, as well as the
reasonable suspicion that he benefitted financially from such referrals. Judge Javellana should
remember that he must not only avoid impropriety, but the "appearance of impropriety" as
well.
Moreover, Judge Javellana was conspicuously inconsistent in Granting 43 or denying44 motions
for extension of time to file pleadings which were signed only by the accused. Judge Javellana
reasoned in his Comment that the PAO lawyers who prepared the motions should have signed
the same as counsels for the accused, but this only explained Judge Javellanas denial of said
motions. It did not address why, in other cases, Judge Javellana had granted similar motions
signed only by the accused. Without any satisfactory basis for the difference in his ruling on
these motions, Judge Javellana had acted arbitrarily to the prejudice of the PAO lawyers.
Judge Javellana himself admitted that he often mentioned his previous accomplishments as
counsel in big and controversial cases, claiming that he only did so to impress upon the parties
that he meant business and that he relied greatly upon God to survive the trials and threats to
his life. We are not persuaded.
The previous Code of Judicial Conduct specifically warned the judges against seeking
publicity for personal vainglory.45 Vainglory, in its ordinary meaning, refers to an individuals
excessive or ostentatious pride especially in ones own achievements. 46 Even no longer
explicitly stated in the New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are still proscribed from
engaging in self-promotion and indulging their vanity and pride by Canons 1 (on Integrity)
and 2 (on Propriety) of the New Code.

more reasons should judges be prohibited from seeking publicity for vanity or selfglorification. Judges are not actors or actresses or politicians, who thrive by publicity. 47
Judge Javellanas actuations as described above run counter to the mandate that judges behave
at all times in such a manner as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary.48 We cannot stress enough that "judges are the visible representations of law
and justice. They ought to be embodiments of competence, integrity and independence. In
particular, municipal judges are frontline officers in the administration of justice. It is therefore
essential that they live up to the high standards demanded by the Code of Judicial Conduct." 49
For his violations of the New Code of Professional Conduct, Judge Javellana committed gross
misconduct. We have defined gross misconduct as a "transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public
officer."50
There is no sufficient evidence to hold Judge Javellana administratively liable for the other
charges against him contained in the complaint. Yet, we call Judge Javellanas attention to
several matters pointed out by the OCA, that if left unchecked, may again result in another
administrative complaint against the judge: (1) notices of hearing issued by Judge Javellanas
court must state the specific time, date, and place 51; (2) in case Judge Javellana is unable to
attend a hearing for any reason, he must inform his Clerk of Court as soon as possible so that
the latter can already cancel the hearing and spare the parties, counsels, and witnesses from
waiting52; and (3) he must take care in ascertaining the facts and according due process to the
parties concerned before levying charges of incompetence or indifference against the PAO
lawyers appearing before his court.53
III
Penalty
Gross ignorance of the law54 and gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct55 are classified as serious charges under Rule 140, Section 8 of the Revised
Rules of Court, and penalized under Rule 140, Section 11(a) of the same Rules by:
1) Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court
may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided,
however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2) Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3)
but not exceeding six (6) months; or

We have previously strongly reminded judges in that:

3) A fine of more than P 20,000.00 but not exceeding P 40,000.00
Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain terms that "a judge
should not seek publicity for personal vainglory." A parallel proscription, this time for lawyers
in general, is found in Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: "a lawyer shall
not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, selflaudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services." This
means that lawyers and judges alike, being limited by the exacting standards of their
profession, cannot debase the same by acting as if ordinary merchants hawking their wares. As
succinctly put by a leading authority in legal and judicial ethics, "(i)f lawyers are prohibited
from x x x using or permitting the use of any undignified or self-laudatory statement regarding
their qualifications or legal services (Rule 3.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), with

The OCA recommended that Judge Javellana be suspended without salary and benefits for
three months.1vvph!1 Given the gravity and number of violations committed by Judge
Javellana, we deem it appropriate to impose suspension without salary and benefits for a
period of three months and one day.
WHEREFORE, Judge Erwin B. Javellana is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and
gross misconduct. He is SUSPENDED from office without salary and other benefits for a
period of three (3) months and one (1) day with a STERN WARNING that the repetition of the

47

same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision
be attached to his records with this Court.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

48

CANON VI
[A.M. No. MTJ-11-1796
June 13, 2012 ]
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 10-2279-MTJ)
FE D. VALDEZ, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE LIZABETH G. TORRES, METC, Branch 60, Mandaluyong City, Respondent.
DECISION

Receipt showed that respondent received the 1st Indorsement on July 5, 2010 but she failed to
file her comment within the period prescribed.
The OCA sent a 1st Tracer dated September 15, 2010 reiterating the order for respondent to
submit her comment to the administrative complaint against her within 10 days from receipt of
said tracer, otherwise, the complaint shall be submitted for resolution without her
comment.12 The Registry Return Receipt established that respondent received the 1st Tracer on
October 22, 2010, yet she still did not comply with the same.
In the meantime, complainant filed a letter before the OCA on September 8, 2010, requesting
action on her administrative complaint given that respondent has still not decided Civil Case
No. 20191.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Fe D. Valdez against respondent
Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 60,
Mandaluyong City, for delay in the disposition of Civil Case No. 20191.

On November 23, 2010, this Court promulgated its Decision in three other consolidated
administrative cases against respondent, Lugares v. Gutierrez-Torres, 13 already dismissing her
from service.
In its report14 dated August 25, 2011, the OCA made the following recommendations:

Civil Case No. 20191 was an action for damages and attorneys fees instituted on October 25,
2005 by complainant against Prudential Guarantee & Assurance, Inc. (PGAI) and Charlie Tan
(Tan), which was raffled to the Mandaluyong MeTC-Branch 60, presided over by
respondent.1 Complainant alleged that she bought comprehensive insurance policy for her
motor vehicle from PGAI, through broker Tan; that she had fully paid her premium; that
during the validity of her insurance, the insured motor vehicle was damaged; that the repair of
the motor vehicle cost P167,278.56; and that PGAI and Tan refused to pay her claim despite
several demands. Complainant prayed for judgment awarding in her favor P167,278.56 as
actual damages,P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, P50,000.00
attorneys fees, plus P2,000.00 appearance fees.
Respondent proceeded to hear Civil Case No. 20191 in accordance with the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. After the parties had filed their respective position papers, respondent
submitted Civil Case No. 20191 for decision on July 19, 2006.2
Almost a year had passed but Civil Case No. 20191 remained unresolved, prompting
complainant to file a motion for immediate resolution of Civil Case No. 20191 on June 27,
2007.3 Complainant followed-up with a second motion for immediate resolution filed on
October 19, 2007,4 third motion for immediate resolution filed on December 11, 2007, 5 fourth
motion for immediate resolution filed on April 15, 2008, 6 fifth motion for immediate
resolution filed on June 11, 2008,7 sixth motion for immediate resolution filed on July 7,
2008,8 seventh motion to resolve filed on April 21, 2009, 9 and eighth motion to resolve filed
on January 17, 2010.10
Frustrated by the long wait for the resolution of Civil Case No. 20191, complainant filed the
present administrative complaint on June 4, 2010 against respondent, alleging unreasonable
delay by the latter in the disposition of said case to the damage and prejudice of the former.
Through a 1st Indorsement dated June 10, 2010, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
informed respondent of the administrative complaint against her and required her to submit
her comment thereon within 10 days from receipt of said indorsement. 11 The Registry Return

RECOMMENDATION: Premises considered, it is most respectfully recommended for the

consideration of the Honorable Court that:
1. The instant administrative complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular
administrative matter against respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres, former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 60, Mandaluyong City;
2.
Respondent
Lizabeth
Gutierrez-Torres
be
found
GUILTY of
INSUBORDINATION, GROSS INEFFICIENCY, and GRAVE and SERIOUS
MISCONDUCT;
3. In view of her previous dismissal from the service, a FINE OF P20,000.00 instead
be imposed upon her, to be deducted from her accrued leave credits;
4. To effect the same, the Employees Leave Division, Office of Administrative
Services-OCA be DIRECTED to compute respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres
earned leave credits; and
5. The Leave Division, thereafter, be DIRECTED to forward respondent Lizabeth
Gutierrez-Torres total accrued leave credits to the Finance Division, Fiscal
Management Office-OCA, for the latter to compute the monetary value of the said
leave credits and deduct therefrom the amount of the fine herein imposed, without
prejudice to whatever penalty the Court may impose on other remaining and/or
pending administrative cases, if any.15
The Court then issued a Resolution 16 dated October 3, 2011 re-docketing the administrative
complaint against respondent as a regular administrative matter and requiring the parties to
manifest within 10 days from notice if they were willing to submit the matter for resolution

49

based on the pleadings filed. Following the failure of both parties to submit their respective
manifestations despite notice, the Court deemed the instant case submitted for decision.
At the outset, the Court notes that respondent had been given ample opportunity to address the
complaint against her. The OCA had sent and respondent received the 1st Indorsement dated
June 10, 2010 and 1st Tracer dated September 15, 2010, both of which explicitly required her
to file her comment on the complaint. However, up until the resolution of the present case,
respondent has not complied with the OCA directives. Moreover, respondent had also failed to
comply, despite due notice, with the Resolution dated October 3, 2011 of the Court itself
requiring the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the present
administrative matter for resolution based on the pleadings filed.
It is true that respondents failure to submit her comment and manifestation as required by the
OCA and this Court, respectively, may be tantamount to insubordination, 17 gross inefficiency,
and neglect of duty.18 It is respondents duty, not only to obey the lawful orders of her
superiors, but also to defend herself against complainants charges and prove her fitness to
remain on the Bench.19 As a result of her non-compliance with the directives of the OCA and
the resolution of this Court, respondent had completely lost the opportunity to defend herself
against complainants charges.
As for the merits of the instant administrative complaint, the pleadings and evidence on record
satisfactorily establish respondents guilt for the undue delay in resolving Civil Case No.
20191.

He should be punctual in the performance of his judicial duties, recognizing that the time of
litigants, witnesses, and attorneys is of value and that if the judge is unpunctual in his habits,
he sets a bad example to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction with the administration of
justice.
Administrative Circular No. 1 dated January 28, 1988 once more reminds all magistrates to
observe scrupulously the periods prescribed in Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution, and
to act promptly on all motions and interlocutory matters pending before their courts.
Prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty
of judges. If they do not possess those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable to
the prejudice of litigants. Accordingly, judges should be imbued with a high sense of duty and
responsibility in the discharge of their obligation to promptly administer justice. 21
Unfortunately, respondent failed to live up to the exacting standards of duty and responsibility
that her position requires.1avvphi1 Civil Case No. 20191 was submitted for resolution on July
19, 2006, yet it was still pending when complainant filed the present administrative complaint
on June 4, 2010, and remained unresolved per complainants manifestation filed on September
8, 2010. More than four years after being submitted for resolution, Civil Case No. 20191 was
still awaiting decision by respondent.

Section 15(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, mandates that cases or matters filed with the
lower courts must be decided or resolved within three months from the date they are submitted
for decision or resolution. With respect to cases falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure,
first level courts are only allowed 30 days following the receipt of the last affidavit and
position paper, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, within which to render
judgment.

Respondent irrefragably failed to decide Civil Case No. 20191 within the 30-day period
prescribed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Her inaction in Civil Case No. 20191
is contrary to the rationale behind the Rule on Summary Procedure, which was precisely
adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce
the constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of cases. 22 Indeed, respondent
even failed to decide Civil Case No. 20191 within the three-month period mandated in general
by the Constitution for lower courts to decide or resolve cases. Records do not show that
respondent made any previous attempt to report and request for extension of time to resolve
Civil Case No. 20191.

As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or
certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of
needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very
nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory. 20

Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, classifies
undue delay in rendering a decision as a less serious charge for which the penalty is
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for one month to three months, or a
fine of P10,000.00 to P20,000.00.

Judges are oft-reminded of their duty to promptly act upon cases and matters pending before
their courts. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, directs judges to "dispose of
the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods." Canons 6 and 7 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics further exhort judges to be prompt and punctual in the
disposition and resolution of cases and matters pending before their courts, to wit:

The Court is well-aware of the previous administrative cases against respondent for failure to
act with dispatch on cases and incidents pending before her. In Del Mundo v. GutierrezTorres,23 respondent was found guilty of gross inefficiency for undue delay in resolving the
motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 18756, for which she was finedP20,000.00. In Gonzalez v.
Torres,24 respondent was sanctioned for unreasonable delay in resolving the Demurrer to
Evidence in Criminal Case No. 71984 and meted the penalty of a fine in the amount
of P20,000.00. In Plata v. Torres,25 respondent was fined P10,000.00 for undue delay in
resolving the Motion to Withdraw Information in Criminal Case No. 6679, and
another P10,000.00 for her repeated failure to comply with Court directives to file her
comment on the administrative complaint against her. In Winternitz v. Gutierrez-Torres, 26 the
Court held respondent guilty of undue delay in acting upon the Motion to Withdraw
Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 84382, 84383, and 84384, and suspended her from office
without salary and other benefits for one month. In Soluren v. Torres, 27 respondent was once

6. PROMPTNESS
He should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering that justice
delayed is often justice denied.
7. PUNCTUALITY

50

again adjudged guilty of undue delay in acting upon repeated motions to withdraw the
information in Criminal Case No. 100833 for which she was fined P20,000.00. In Lugares v.
Gutierrez-Torres,28 promulgated on November 23, 2010, the Court already dismissed
respondent from the service for gross inefficiency, gross ignorance of the law, dereliction of
duty, and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, in relation to Civil Case Nos. 19887,
19063, 17765, and 18425; as well as for insubordination because she defied Court orders by
failing to file her comment on the charges against her. Finally, in Pancubila v. Torres, 29 the
Court imposed another fine of P20,000.00 upon respondent for undue delay in rendering a
decision and violation of a directive in connection with Civil Case No. 20700. In all the
foregoing administrative cases, respondent was sternly warned that a repetition of the same or
similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

[A.M. No. RTJ-09-2198*

Given that respondent had been previously dismissed from the service, the penalty of
suspension is already inapplicable herein. Instead, the Court imposes upon respondent, for her
undue delay in resolving Civil Case No. 20191, a fine in the maximum amount of P20,000.00,
to be deducted from her accrued leave credits.

This administrative case at bench stemmed from a judicial audit and inventory of pending
cases conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in Branch 27, Regional Trial
Court, Sta. Cruz, Laguna (Branch 27, Sta. Cruz), and in Branch 74, Regional Trial Court,
Malabon City (Branch 74, Malabon).

WHEREFORE, respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres is found GUILTY of the less serious

charge of undue delay in resolving Civil Case No. 20191, for which she is FINED the amount
of P20,000.00, to be deducted from her accrued leave credits, since she had already been
dismissed from the service. To effect the penalty imposed, the Employees Leave Division,
Office of Administrative Services-OCA, is DIRECTED to ascertain respondent Lizabeth
Gutierrez-Torress total earned leave credits. Thereafter, the Finance Division, Fiscal
Management Office-OCA, is DIRECTED to compute the monetary value of respondent
Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torress total accrued leave credits and deduct therefrom the amount of
fine herein imposed without prejudice to whatever penalty the Court may impose on other
remaining and/or pending administrative cases, if any.

The audits were conducted because respondent Judge Leonardo L. Leonida (Judge
Leonida) applied for Optional Retirement effective July 5, 2008. Judge Leonida was the
presiding judge of Branch 27, Sta. Cruz, from October 1997 until his retirement and was
detailed as assisting judge of Branch 74, Malabon.

SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO*
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, First Division

January 18, 2011]

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,

vs.
FORMER JUDGE LEONARDO L. LEONIDA, OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
BRANCH 27, STA. CRUZ, LAGUNA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:

On May 21, 2009, then Court Administrator Jose P. Perez issued a Memorandum 1 on the audit
teams findings, among which are:
1) As of audit date, March 5 and 6, 2009, Branch 27, Sta. Cruz had a total caseload
of 507 cases consisting of 280 criminal cases and 227 civil cases based on the
records actually presented to, and examined by, the audit team.
2) Out of the total number of pending criminal cases, no further action was taken
after varying considerable periods of time in 14 cases. 2
3) Pending incidents and motions filed by parties in 8 criminal cases 3 were left
unresolved for more than one (1) year in 3 cases, and three months in 2 cases.
4) Twenty-nine (29) criminal cases4 submitted for decision, the earliest in 2001,
were undecided.
5) Of the 227 civil cases lodged in the court, no setting for hearing and no further
action was taken on 46 cases.5
6) Twenty-four (24) civil cases6 have pending motions/incidents awaiting resolution,
the earliest since 2002.
7) Fifty-seven (57) civil cases7 submitted for decision from 2000 to 2009 were
undecided at the time of the audit.

51

8) In the course of the audit in Branch 27, Sta. Cruz, several records of criminal
cases were found to be incomplete. The records were not paginated. Certificates of
arraignment, minutes of hearings and notices of hearing were missing from the files.

(1) APPRISE the Acting Presiding Judge, from time to time, of

cases submitted for resolution/decision and those cases that
require immediate action;

9) The record of one case, Criminal Case No. 12178, 8 an appealed case submitted
for resolution, is missing and is in the possession of Judge Leonida as per
certification issued by Atty. Bernadette Platon, the Branch Clerk of Court. 9

(2) ORDER the stitching of all orders issued, minutes taken,

notices of hearing issued, certificates of arraignment in all
appropriate case folders especially those jointly tried, including
their chronological arrangement and pagination as well as the
proofreading of all orders and notices; and

Regarding Branch 74, Malabon City, the OCA also looked into the Monthly Report of Cases
submitted by said branch for August-October 2008 and January-March 2008 and noted that 95
criminal cases and 18 civil cases were submitted for decision. 10 Considering that Judge
Leonida applied for Optional Retirement effective July 5, 2008, he should have decided 91 of
the 95 submitted criminal cases and 16 of the 18 submitted civil cases.
In sum, Judge Leonida failed to decide 102 criminal cases and 43 civil cases both in Branch 27
and Branch 74, and failed to resolve motions in ten (10) civil cases in Branch 27.
The same report bears the recommendations of the OCA that were eventually adopted by the
Court in a Resolution dated July 29, 2009,11 to wit:
(1) RE-DOCKET the judicial audit report as an administrative complaint against
former Judge Leonardo L. Leonida for gross incompetence and inefficiency;
(2) REQUIRE Judge Leonida to MANIFEST whether he is willing to submit the
case for decision on the basis of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted,
within ten (10) days from notice;
(3) DIRECT:
(a) Hon. Jaime C. Blancaflor, Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 27,
Sta. Cruz, Laguna to:
(1) TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION on Criminal Case Nos.
xxx which are without further action for a considerable length of
time;
(2) RESOLVE with dispatch the pending incidents/motions in
Criminal Case Nos. xxx and furnish the Court, through the
OCA, a copy of the resolution/order within ten (10) days from
issuance/resolution thereof; and
(3) DECIDE with dispatch Criminal Case Nos. xxx
and Furnish the Court, through the OCA, a copy of the decision
within ten (10) days from its promulgation; and

(3) SUBMIT report of compliance therewith to this Court within

fifteen (15) days from notice.
On October 4, 2009, Judge Leonida filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File
Manifest and Memorandum.12 He cited the short period compounded by the typhoons and
floods which ravaged Manila as his reason for requesting an additional period of twenty (20)
days within which to file the same. In its October 28, 2009 Resolution, the Court noted Judge
Leonidas motion.
On October 22, 2009, Judge Leonida filed a Manifest and Memorandum 13 expressing his
willingness to submit the case for decision based on the pleadings. He explained that he failed
to finalize and promulgate cases pending in his sala because of the severely clogged docket of
Branch 74. With an overwhelming number of more than 1,000 cases, he calendared an average
of 30 cases daily in order to "keep all the cases moving." According to Judge Leonida, "the
court sessions together with the preparation/correction/review of the orders in the cases set for
hearing almost ate up" his time as a judge. The fact that Branch 74, a commercial court, was
still included in the raffle of regular cases exacerbated the situation. Voluminous pleadings
requiring extensive dissection and research, and cases involving numerous intervenors who
raised different and complex issues, made matters much more difficult that he even had to
conduct hearings on applications for search and seizures until nighttime. Judge Leonida
further claimed that his work encroached upon the time he had to devote to his wife and eight
children. Finally, the reconstruction and review of case records submerged in flood waters
added up to his struggle to expedite the disposition of cases assigned to his court.
Anent the missing record in Branch 27, Judge Leonida alleged that the case was raffled to said
branch long after he assumed the position of Assisting Judge of Branch 74; that he neither saw
nor had possession of the said record; and that there was no reason for him to take the record
anywhere. He pleaded for compassion and leniency from the Court, invoking his unblemished
record in government service for twenty-three (23) years. He likewise offered his sincere
apologies to those who were prejudiced.
In its evaluation of the charges against Judge Leonida, the OCA recommended that for his
failure to resolve motions in ten (10) civil cases; decide eleven (11) criminal cases, and
twenty-seven (27) civil cases in Branch 27, and to decide ninety-one (91) criminal cases and
sixteen (16) civil cases in Branch 74, he be found guilty of gross incompetency and
inefficiency, and fined the amount of P50,000.00 pesos to be deducted from his retirement
benefits.

(b) Atty. Bernadette Platon, Branch Clerk of Court, to:

The recommendations of the OCA are well-taken.

52

Precedents have shown that the failure of a judge to decide a case within the reglementary
period warrants administrative sanction. The Court treats such cases with utmost rigor for any
delay in the administration of justice; no matter how brief, deprives the litigant of his right to a
speedy disposition of his case.14 Not only does it magnify the cost of seeking justice; it
undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings
it to disrepute.15
No less than Section 15 (1), Article 8 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that all cases or
matters filed before all lower courts shall be decided or resolved within three (3) months from
the date of submission. The prescribed period is a firm mandatory rule for the efficient
administration of justice and not merely one for indulgent tweaking.
As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or
certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of
needless delays and for the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very
nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory. 16 In the same vein, Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct is emphatic in enjoining judges to administer justice without delay
by disposing of the courts business promptly and deciding cases within the period prescribed
by law.
Corollary to this, Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999, requires all judges
to scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the Constitution for deciding cases, because
failure to comply therewith violates the constitutional right of the parties to speedy disposition
of the cases.17 Only in certain meritorious cases, that is, those involving difficult questions of
law or complex issues, may a longer period to decide the case be allowed but only upon proper
application for extension of the period has been made by the concerned judge. 18
Judge Leonida was clearly remiss in his duties as a judge for he did not take the above
constitutional command to heart. Neither did he observe the above rules which have
encapsulated the Courts strict message: "the need and the imperative" for judges to promptly
and expeditiously decide cases including all incidents therein. 19 In this case, the findings of the
OCA showed that Judge Leonida failed to decide a considerable number of cases: (102)
criminal cases and forty-three (43) civil cases. Judge Leonida openly admitted his culpability
in the delay of disposition of cases.
His proffered explanation is unacceptable given the ample period that he had. He cannot take
refuge behind the common excuse of heavy caseload to justify his failure to decide and resolve
cases promptly. He could have asked the Court for a reasonable period of extension to dipose
of the cases but did not.
Due to his inefficiency, the constitutional right of parties to a speedy trial was violated out of
neglect. Instead of justice wrought by efficient and competent handling of judicial business,
the lower courts handled and assisted by Judge Leonida produced unnecessary financial strain,
not to mention physical and emotional anxiety, to litigants. Delay derails the administration of
justice. It postpones the rectification of wrong and the vindication of the unjustly prosecuted.
It crowds the dockets of the courts, increasing the costs for all litigants, pressuring judges to
take short cuts, interfering with the prompt and deliberate disposition of those cases in which
all parties are diligent and prepared for trial, and overhanging the entire process with the pall
of disorganization and insolubility. More than these, possibilities for error in fact-finding

multiply rapidly between the original fact and its judicial determination as time elapses. If the
facts are not fully and accurately determined, even the wisest judge cannot distinguish
between merit and demerit. If courts do not get the facts right, there is little chance for their
judgment to be right.20
The Court has always considered a judges delay in deciding cases within the prescribed
period
of
three
months
as
gross
inefficiency.21 http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/am_03-7-170-mctc_2009.html
- fntUndue delay cannot be countenanced at a time when the clogging of the court dockets is
still the bane of the judiciary. The raison d' etre of courts lies not only in properly dispensing
justice but also in being able to do so seasonably.22
Aside from the delay in deciding the reported cases, the audit findings likewise show that the
case records/rollo in Branch 27 were not chronologically arranged. Certificates of
arraignment, minutes of hearings and notices of hearing were unsigned by the accused and
his/her counsel, or worse, missing from the files. Judge Leonida was asked to explain the
whereabouts of the case records of Criminal Case No. 12178. His bare denial however, does
not overcome the fair conclusion that Section 14 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court 23 was not
observed. The expectation directed at judges to exercise utmost diligence and care in handling
the records of cases was certainly not met, or at least approximated.
The administration of justice demands that those who don judicial robes be able to comply
fully and faithfully with the task set before them. 24 As frontline officials of the judiciary,
judges should, at all times, act with efficiency and with probity. They are duty-bound not only
to be faithful to the law, but likewise to maintain professional competence. The pursuit of
excellence must be their guiding principle. This is the least that judges can do to sustain the
trust and confidence which the public reposed on them and the institution they represent. 25
Therefore, as recommended by the OCA after a thorough judicial audit and considering the
unrebutted audit reports on record, proper sanctions must be imposed. The penalty imposed for
undue delay in deciding cases varies in each case: from fine, suspension, suspension and fine,
and even dismissal, depending mainly on the number of cases left undecided within the
reglementary period, and other factors, such as the damage suffered by the parties as a result
of the delay, the health and the age of the judge. 26
The Court agrees with the OCA that the total number of cases which Judge Leonida failed to
timely decide or act on warrants a fine higher than that prescribed by the rules. In Lugares v.
Judge Gutierrez-Torres,27 the defaulting judge who was found guilty of gross inefficiency for
her undue delay in resolving cases submitted for decision for a number of years was dismissed
from the service.
In view of Judge Leonidas retirement on July 5, 2008, the only penalty that the Court can
impose against him is a fine, pursuant to the rule that the retirement of a judge does not release
him from liability incurred while in the active service.lavvphil
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Leonardo Leonida, former Presiding Judge
of Branch 27, Regional Trial Court, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, and Assisting Judge in Branch 74,
Regional Trial Court, Malabon City,GUILTY of gross incompetence and gross inefficiency

53

for failure to decide one hundred two (102) criminal cases and forty-three (43) civil cases for
which he is FINED P50,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement/gratuity benefits.
Judge Jaime C. Blancaflor, Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 27, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, and
Atty. Bernadette Platon, Branch Clerk of Court, are hereby ordered to report on their
respective compliance with the orders of the Court contained in its July 29, 2009 Order, within
ten (10) days from receipt hereof. The Court notes that, in its February 10, 2010 Resolution,
Judge Blancaflor was granted a non-extendible period of sixty (60) to comply with its July 29,
2009 Order.
Judge Blancaflor is hereby ordered to cause the reconstitution of Criminal Case No. 12178
within three (3) months from receipt hereof and to report his compliance thereon within ten
(10) days from completion.
Atty. Bernadette Platon is hereby ordered to include the status of said case in her Monthly
Report of Cases.

THE CASES
The First Case: A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Florentino
V. Floro, Jr.)
It was in 1995 that Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first applied for judgeship. A pre-requisite
psychological evaluation on him then by the Supreme Court Clinic Services (SC Clinic)
revealed "(e)vidence of ego disintegration" and "developing psychotic process." Judge Floro
later voluntarily withdrew his application. In June 1998, when he applied anew, the required
psychological evaluation exposed problems with self-esteem, mood swings, confusion,
social/interpersonal deficits, paranoid ideations, suspiciousness, and perceptual distortions.
Both 1995 and 1998 reports concluded that Atty. Floro was unfit to be a judge.
Because of his impressive academic background, however, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
allowed Atty. Floro to seek a second opinion from private practitioners. The second opinion
appeared favorable thus paving the way to Atty. Floros appointment as Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Judge of Branch 73, Malabon City, on 4 November 1998.

SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460

March 31, 2006]

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR., Respondent.
x--------------x
A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC

March 31, 2006

Re: RESOLUTION DATED 11 MAY 1999 OF JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR.

x--------------x

Upon Judge Floros personal request, an audit on his sala was conducted by the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) from 2 to 3 March 1999.2
After conducting the audit, the audit team, led by Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura,
reported its findings to erstwhile Court Administrator, Alfredo L. Benipayo, who submitted his
own report/memorandum 3 to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. dated 13 July 1999
recommending, among other things, that his report be considered as an administrative
complaint against Judge Floro and that Judge Floro be subjected to an appropriate
psychological or mental examination. Court Administrator Benipayo recommended as well
that Judge Floro be placed under preventive suspension for the duration of the investigation
against him.
In a Resolution4 dated 20 July 1999, the Court en banc adopted the recommendations of the
OCA, docketing the complaint as A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, in view of the commission of the
following acts or omissions as reported by the audit team:

A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988

March 31, 2006
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 99-812-RTJ)

(a) The act of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements

regarding qualifications and for announcing in open court during court session his
qualification in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02, Canons of Judicial Conduct;

LUZ ARRIEGO, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR., Respondent.

(b) For allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters;

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
"Equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless lives." Justice Brandeis,
Loughran v. Loughran 1

(c) For rendering resolutions without written orders in violation of Rule 36, Section
1, 1997 Rules of Procedures;
(d) For his alleged partiality in criminal cases where he declares that he is proaccused which is contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct;
(e) For appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M-98 pending before
Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan in violation of Canon 5, Rule

54

5.07, Canons of Judicial Conduct which prohibits a judge from engaging in the
private practice of law;
(f) For appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the Supreme Court
and without filing the corresponding applications for leaves of absence on the
scheduled dates of hearing;
(g) For proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on Recognizance
filed by the accused without the presence of the trial prosecutor and propounding
questions in the form of examination of the custodian of the accused;
(h) For using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually
dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of
settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant and the
accused to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor;
(i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor, ordering
the mental and physical examination of the accused based on the ground that the
accused is "mahina ang pick-up";
(j) For issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from that which he issued in
open court in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide;
(k) For violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct when he openly
criticized the Rules of Court and the Philippine justice system;
(l) For the use of highly improper and intemperate language during court
proceedings;
(m) For violation of Circular No. 135 dated 1 July 1987.

denied by Justice Ramirez in an Order dated 11 July 2000. 10 Judge Floros motion for
reconsideration 11 suffered the same fate. 12 On 27 July 2000, Judge Floro submitted the
question of Justice Ramirezs inhibition/disqualification to this Court. 13 On 8 August 2000, the
Court ruled against the inhibition of Justice Ramirez. 13
On 11 September 2000, the OCA, after having been ordered by the Court to comment on
Judge Floros motion to dismiss, 15 recommended that the same should be denied.
Judge Floro presented his last witness on 6 March 2001. 16 The day after, Justice Ramirez
came out with a "Partial Report" recommending the dismissal of Judge Floro from office "by
reason of insanity which renders him incapable and unfit to perform the duties and functions
of Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro
Manila, Branch 73." 17
In the meantime, throughout the investigation of the 13 charges against him and even after
Justice Ramirez came out with his report and recommendation on 7 March 2001, Judge Floro
had been indiscriminately filing cases against those he perceived to have connived to boot him
out of office.
A list of the cases Judge Floro filed in the wake of his 20 July 1999 preventive suspension
follows:
1. OCA IPI No. 00-07-OCA against Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura, Team
Leader, Judicial Audit Team, Office of the Court Administrator 18
2. OCA IPI No. 00-933-RTJ against Judge Benjamin Aquino, Jr., Regional Trial
Court, Branch 72, Malabon City 19
3. AC No. 5286 against Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo and Judge
Benjamin Aquino, Jr.20

Per the same resolution of the Court, the matter was referred to Retired Court of Appeals
Justice Pedro Ramirez (consultant, OCA) for investigation, report and recommendation within
60 days from receipt. Judge Floro was directed to comment within ten days from receipt of the
resolution and to subject himself to an appropriate psychological or mental examination to be
conducted "by the proper office of the Supreme Court or any duly authorized medical and/or
mental institution." In the same breath, the Court resolved to place Judge Floro under
preventive suspension "for the duration of the investigation of the administrative charges
against him." He was barely eight months into his position.

4. AC No. CBD-00-740 against Thelma C. Bahia, Court Management Office, Atty.

Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura, Atty. II, Court Management Office, both of the
Office of the Court Administrator and Atty. Esmeralda G. Dizon, Branch Clerk of
Court, Branch 73, Malabon21

On 20 August 1999, Judge Floro submitted a Verified Comment where he set forth both
affirmative and negative defenses 6 while he filed his "Answer/Compliance" on 26 August
1999.

6. A.M. No. 03-8-03-0 against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez 23

On 3 March 2000, Judge Floro moved for the provisional/final dismissal of his case for failure
to prosecute.7However, on 21 March 2000, he presented himself as his first witness in the
hearing conducted by Justice Ramirez. 8 Subsequently, on 7 July 2000, Judge Floro filed a
"Petition for Inhibition/Disqualification" against Justice Ramirez as investigator 9 which was

5. AC No. 6282 (CPL No. C-02-0278) against former Court Administrator Justice
Alfredo L. Benipayo and (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez, Consultant, Office of the
Court Administrator22

7. A.C. No. 6050 against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez 24

On 1 February 2006, Judge Floro moved that the cases he filed, now totaling seven, be
dismissed.25 On 14 February 2006, the Court granted the motion to dismiss. 26

55

The Second Case: A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988(Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)
This charge is likewise the subject matter of charge "h" in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460: "(f)or
using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case
No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by
persuading the private complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without the
presence of the trial prosecutor." The complainant Luz Arriego is the mother of the private
complainant in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN.
On 28 June 2001, Arriego testified, while court stenographer Jocelyn Japitenga testified on 16
July 2001. On 31 July 2001, Arriego filed her Formal Offer of Evidence which was opposed
by Judge Floro on 21 August 2001. On 5 September 2001, Judge Floro testified on his behalf
while Atty. Galang testified against him on 4 October 2001. On 16 October 2001, Judge Floro
filed a Memorandum in this case.27
The Third Case: A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 of Judge
Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)
As can be gathered from the title, this case concerns a resolution issued by Judge Floro on 11
May 1999 in Special Proceeding Case No. 315-MN "In Re: Petition To Be Admitted A Citizen
Of The Philippines, Mary Ng Nei, Petitioner." The resolution disposed of the motions for
voluntary inhibition of Judge Floro and the reconsideration of the order denying the petition
for naturalization filed by petitioner in that case, Mary Ng Nei.
This resolution found its way to the OCA through a letter written by Atty. David S. Narvasa,
the petitioners counsel.28 The OCA, through Court Administrator Benipayo, made the
following evaluation:
In the subject resolution, Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for inhibition and
declared it as null and void. However, he ordered the raffling of the case anew (not
re-raffle due to inhibition) so that the petitioner, Mary Ng Nei, will have a chance to
have the case be assigned to other judges through an impartial raffle.
When Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for inhibition, he should have continued
hearing and taking cognizance of the case. It is improper for him to order the raffle
of the case "anew" as this violates Administrative Circular No. 1 (Implementation of
Sec. 12, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution) dated January 28, 1988 which provides
to wit:
"8. Raffle of Cases:
xxxx
8.3 Special raffles should not be permitted except on verified application of the
interested party who seeks issuance of a provisional remedy and only upon a finding
by the Executive Judge that unless the special raffle is conducted, irreparable
damage shall be suffered by the applicant. The special raffle shall be conducted by at
least two judges in a multiple-sala station.

x x x x"
Based on the foregoing, a judge may not motu proprio order the special raffle of a case since
such is only allowed upon a verified application of the interested party seeking a provisional
remedy and only upon the Executive Judges finding that if a special raffle is not conducted,
the applicant will suffer irreparable damage. Therefore, Judge Floro, Jr.s order is contrary to
the above-mentioned Administrative Circular.
Moreover, it is highly inappropriate for Judge Floro, Jr. to even mention in his resolution that
Justice Regino C. Hermosisima, Jr. is his benefactor in his nomination for judgeship. It is not
unusual to hear a judge who speaks highly of a "padrino" (who helped him get his position).
Such remark even if made as an expression of deep gratitude makes the judge guilty of
creating a dubious impression about his integrity and independence. Such flaunting and
expression of feelings must be suppressed by the judges concerned. A judge shall not allow
family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment (Canon 2, Rule
2.03, Code of Judicial Conduct).
The merits of the denial of the motion for inhibition and the ruling on the motion for
reconsideration are judicial matters which this Office has no authority to review. The remedy
is judicial, not administrative. 29
The OCA thus recommended that Judge Floro comment on (a) his act of ordering the raffle of
the case in violation of Administrative Circular No. 1; and (b) his remark on page 5 of the
subject resolution that "Justice Hermosisima, Jr. x x x helped undersigned so much, in the
JBC, regarding his nomination x x x."
In a Resolution dated 17 August 1999, the Court en banc adopted the recommendations of the
OCA.30 Judge Floro, through his counsel, filed his Comment on 22 October 1999 31 which was
noted by this Court on 7 December 1999. On 11 January 2000, Judge Floro filed a Formal
Offer of Evidence which this Court, in a resolution dated 25 January 2000, referred to Justice
Ramirez for inclusion in his report and recommendation.
For the record, the OCA is yet to come up with its report and recommendation in this case as
well as in the second case (i.e., A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988). Thus, in a resolution dated 14
February 2006, the Court directed Judge Floro as well as the other parties in these two cases to
inform the Court whether or not they are willing to submit A.M. RTJ-06-1988 and A.M. No.
99-7-273-RTC for decision on the basis of the pleadings filed and the evidence so far
submitted by them or to have the decision in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of the two.
On 20 February 2006, the OCA, thru Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., manifested
its willingness to submit A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC for resolution based on the pleadings and
the evidence submitted therein. Complainant Luz Arriego in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 likewise
informed this Court, in a Letter dated 28 February 2006, her willingness to submit her case for
decision based on the pleadings already submitted and on the evidence previously offered and
marked. On the other hand, on 3 March 2006, Judge Floro manifested his preference to have
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of A.M. RTJ-06-1988 and A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC.
In the interest of orderly administration of justice, considering that these are consolidated
cases, we resolve to render as well a consolidated decision.

56

But first, the ground rules: Much has been said across all fronts regarding Judge Floros
alleged mental illness and its effects on his duties as Judge of a Regional Trial Court. For our
part, figuring out whether Judge Floro is indeed psychologically impaired and/or disabled as
concluded by the investigator appointed by this Court is frankly beyond our sphere of
competence, involving as it does a purely medical issue; hence, we will have to depend on the
findings of the mental health professionals who interviewed/analyzed Judge Floro. Our job is
simply to wade through the evidence, filter out the irrelevant and the irreverent in order to
determine once and for all if Judge Floro is indeed guilty of the charges against him. If the
evidence makes out a case against Judge Floro, the next issue is to determine the appropriate
penalty to be imposed.
Finally, we will have to determine whether Judge Floro acted with an evil mind or because of
a psychological or mental incapacity. Upon the resolution of this question hinges the
applicability of equity.
As an aside, it bears pointing out that some of the charges ("c" and "g", "h" and "j", "e" and
"f") will be jointly discussed as they had likewise been jointly discussed by the OCA. These
charges involve common facts and to treat them separately will be superfluous.
DISCUSSION
As alleged and as proven, the 13 specified charges do not warrant the supreme penalty of
dismissal against Judge Floro
(a) Re: Charge of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements regarding
qualifications AND for announcing in open court during court session his qualifications in
violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02, Canons of Judicial Conduct
As narrated by the audit team, Judge Floro was circulating calling cards bearing his name as
the Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City, and indicating therein that he is a "bar
exams topnotcher (87.55%)" and with "full second honors" from the Ateneo de Manila
University, A.B. and LL.B.32 The audit team likewise reported that: "(b)efore the start of court
session, Judge Floro is introduced as a private law practitioner, a graduate of Ateneo de Manila
University with second honors, and a bar topnotcher during the 1983 Bar Examinations with
an average score of 87.55%. Afterwards, a reading of the Holy Bible, particularly the Book of
Revelation according to Saint John, was made. The people in the courtroom were given the
opportunity to ask Judge Floro questions on the matter read. No questions were asked; hence
the session commenced."33
Judge Floro argues that, per commentary of Justice Ruperto G. Martin, 34 "the use of
professional cards containing the name of the lawyer, his title, his office and residence is not
improper" and that the word "title" should be broad enough to include a Judges legal standing
in the bar, his honors duly earned or even his Law School. Moreover, other lawyers do include
in their calling cards their former/present titles/positions like President of the Jaycees, Rotary
Club, etc., so where then does one draw the line? Finally, Judge Floro argues that his cards
were not being circulated but were given merely as tokens to close friends or by reciprocity to
other callers considering that common sense dictates that he is not allowed by law to seek
other professional employment.

As to the charge that he had been announcing in open court his qualifications, Judge Floro
counters that it was his branch clerk of court, Atty. Esmeralda Galang-Dizon, who suggested
that during his initial court session, she would briefly announce his appointment with an
introduction of his school, honors, bar rating and law practice. Naively, Judge Floro agreed as
the introduction was done only during the first week of his assumption into office.
Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain terms that "a judge
should not seek publicity for personal vainglory." A parallel proscription, this time for lawyers
in general, is found in Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: "a lawyer shall
not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, selflaudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services." This
means that lawyers and judges alike, being limited by the exacting standards of their
profession, cannot debase the same by acting as if ordinary merchants hawking their wares. As
succinctly put by a leading authority in legal and judicial ethics, "(i)f lawyers are prohibited
from x x x using or permitting the use of any undignified or self-laudatory statement regarding
their qualifications or legal services (Rule 3.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), with
more reasons should judges be prohibited from seeking publicity for vanity or selfglorification. Judges are not actors or actresses or politicians, who thrive by publicity." 35
The question, therefore, is: By including self-laudatory details in his professional card, did
Judge Floro violate Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct?
In Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., 36 we explained that the use of an ordinary and simple
professional card by lawyers is permitted and that the card "may contain only a statement of
his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and
special branch of law practiced." In herein case, Judge Floros calling cards cannot be
considered as simple and ordinary. By including therein the honors he received from his law
school with a claim of being a bar topnotcher, Judge Floro breached the norms of simplicity
and modesty required of judges.
Judge Floro insists, however, that he never circulated his cards as these were just given by him
as tokens and/or only to a few who requested the same. 37 The investigation by Justice Ramirez
into the matter reveals otherwise. An eye-witness from the OCA categorically stated that Judge
Floro circulated these cards. 38 Worse, Judge Floros very own witness, a researcher from an
adjoining branch, testified that Judge Floro gave her one of these cards. 39
As this charge involves a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, it should be measured
against Rule 140 of the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC being more
favorable to respondent Judge Floro. Rule 140, before its amendment, automatically classified
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct as serious charges. As amended, a violation of the
Code of Judicial Conduct may amount to gross misconduct, which is a serious charge, or it
may amount to simple misconduct, which is a less serious charge or it may simply be a case of
vulgar and/or unbecoming conduct which is a light charge.
"Misconduct" is defined as wrong or improper conduct while "gross" connotes something "out
of all measure; beyond allowance; not to be excused; flagrant; shameful." 40 For serious
misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by an
intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. 41

57

With the foregoing as yardstick, we find the act of Judge Floro in circulating calling cards
containing self-laudatory statements constitutive of simple misconduct in violation of Canon
2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it appears that Judge Floro was not motivated
by any corrupt motive but, from what we can see from the evidence, a persistent and
unquenchable thirst for recognition. Concededly, the need for recognition is an all too human
flaw and judges do not cease to be human upon donning the judicial robe. Considering,
however, the proscription against judges seeking publicity for personal vainglory, they are held
to a higher standard as they must act within the confines of the code they swore to observe.
As to the charge that Judge Floro, through his branch clerk of court, had been announcing in
open court his qualifications, we find that this is likewise violative of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct as it smacks of unnecessary publicity. Judges should not use the
courtroom as platform for announcing their qualifications especially to an audience of lawyers
and litigants who very well might interpret such publicity as a sign of insecurity. Verily, the
public looks upon judges as the bastion of justice confident, competent and true. And to
discover that this is not so, as the judge appears so unsure of his capabilities that he has to
court the litigants and their lawyers approval, definitely erodes public confidence in the
judiciary.
As it is not disputed, however, that these announcements went on for only a week, Judge Floro
is guilty of simple misconduct only.
(b)Re: Charge of allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters
The audit team observed that "inside Judge Floros chamber[s], there is a folding bed with
cushion located at the right corner of the room. A man, who was later identified as Judge
Floros driver, was sleeping. However, upon seeing the audit team, the driver immediately
went out of the room." 42
Judge Floro contends that this charge is without legal or factual basis. The man the audit team
saw "sleeping" on his folding bed, J. Torralba, was Judge Floros aide or "alalay" whom he
allows to rest from time to time (in between periods and especially during court sessions) for
humanitarian reasons. J. Torralba was not sleeping during that time that the audit team was in
Branch 73 as he immediately left when he saw the members thereof.
This charge must fail as there is nothing inherently improper or deplorable in Judge Floro
having allowed another person to use his folding bed for short periods of time during office
hours and while there is no one else in the room. The situation would have been different if
there had been any allegation of misuse or abuse of government funds and/or facilities such as
in the case of Presado v. Genova 43 wherein Judge Genova was found guilty of serious
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service when he and his family
used his chambers as residential quarters, with the provincial government paying for the
electrical bills.
Be that as it may, it does not augur well for a new judge to allow such familiarity from his aide
as this becomes fodder for gossip as what had apparently happened in this case. Judge Floro
should have been aware of and attuned to the sensibilities of his staff who were
understandably uncomfortable with the uncommon arrangement of a judge allowing his aide
easy access to his folding bed.

(c) Re: Charge of rendering resolutions without written orders in violation of Rule 36, Section
1, 1997 Rules of Procedure
(g) Re: Charge of proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on Recognizance
filed by the accused without the presence of the trial prosecutor and propounding questions in
the form of examination of the custodian of the accused
The memorandum report reads:
c. It was reported by the staff of Branch 73 that regardless of the absence of the trial
prosecutor, Judge Floro, Jr. still proceeded with the hearing of the following matters:
(c-1) "Motion for Release on Recognizance" filed by the accused, in Criminal Cases Nos.
20384, 20371, 20246 and 20442 entitled "People vs. Luisito Beltran", "People vs. Emma
Alvarez, et al.", "People vs. Rowena Camino", and "People vs. John Richie Villaluz",
respectively. In the hearing of these motions, Judge Floro, Jr. propounded questions (in a form
of direct examination) to the custodian of the accused without the accused being sworn by the
administering officer. (Note: initially, Judge Floro, Jr. ordered the Branch Clerk of Court
Dizon to place the accused under oath prior to the start of his questions. However, COC Dizon
refused). The hearing on the aforesaid motions is an offshoot of a previous hearing wherein
the accused had pleaded guilty to a lesser offense. After the reading of the sentence, Judge
Floro, Jr. would automatically inform the accused that they are qualified to apply for
probation. In fact, Judge Floro, Jr. would even instruct his staff to draft the application in
behalf of the accused so that a motion for release on recognizance will immediately be heard
and be consequently granted. As appearing in the minutes of the hearing (attached herewith as
Annexes "3" to "6"), the custodians of the accused are either a barangay kagawad, barangay
tanod or a member of the lupong tagapamayapa. Likewise, no written order granting the
motion for release on recognizance is being issued by Judge Floro, Jr. since according to him
neither rules nor circular mandates the issuance of a written order. Instead, after granting the
motion, Judge Floro, Jr. just requires the parties to sign the minutes of the session. Photocopies
of the minutes dated March 4, 1999 in Criminal Cases Nos. 20384-MN; 20373-MN; and
20371-MN are hereto attached as Annexes "3" to "5".
On March 11, 1999, in Criminal Cases Nos. 20426-MN and 20442-MN, Judge Floro, Jr.
granted a similar motion without issuing a written order. Copies of the minutes are hereto
attached as annexes "6" to "7." 44
In his Verified Comment, Judge Floro argues that he never violated any rule of procedure with
respect to the cases mentioned by the Audit Team, asserting that
Contrary to the stance of the TEAM, Sec. 1 of Rule 36, Rules of Court refers only to final and
not interlocutory orders. Only final orders and judgments are promulgated, rendered and
entered.
xxxx

58

Applying the foregoing well-settled doctrines of law to the case at bar, herein respondent
faithfully complied with the requirements of Sec. 7 of P.D. 968 as amended, regarding the
applications for release on recognizance, thus:
a. The application for release on recognizance, although captioned as MOTION
FOR RELEASE ON RECOGNIZANCE, is primarily governed by Sec. 7 of P.D.
968, a Special Law on Probation.
b. Any Application for Release on Recognizance, is given due course/taken
cognizance of by respondent, if on its face, the same bears the rubber stamp
mark/receipt by the Office of the City/Public Prosecutor.
c. The consistent practice both in RTC, METRO MANILA (all courts), especially in
RTC, MALABON, and in Malolos, Bulacan (where respondent practiced from
1985-1998 almost 14 years), [and especially the practice of former Judge A. V.
Cabigao, Br. 73, RTC, Malabon, Metro Manila], is to interview the custodian, in the
chambers, regarding his being a responsible member of the community where the
accused reside/resides; the questions propounded are in the form of direct and even
cross examination questions.
d. The accused is not required to be placed on the witness stand, since there is no
such requirement. All that is required, is to inform the accused regarding some
matters of probation (optional) such as whether he was sentenced previously by a
Court, whether or not he has had previous cases, etc.
e. Even if RTC Judges in Malabon do not conduct Court hearings on application for
release on recognizance, respondent, for caution in most of the applications,
included the interview/hearing on the applications for release on recognizance,
during criminal trial dates, where a fiscal/trial prosecutor is available; at other times,
the hearing is held in the chambers.45
The explanation given by Judge Floro betrays his liability for ignorance of the rules on
probation under Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law), as amended. Contrary to his
remonstrations, the release of an accused on recognizance entails more than a cursory
interview of the custodian and the applicant. Under the Probation Law, 46 and as we explained
in Poso v. Judge Mijares,47 it is incumbent upon the Judge hearing the application to ascertain
first that the applicant is not a "disqualified offender" as "(p)utting the discharge of the
accused on hold would have allowed [the judge] more time to pass upon the request for
provisional liberty."
Moreover, from Judge Floros explanations, it would seem that he completely did away with
the requirement for an investigation report by the probation officer. Under the Probation Law,
the accuseds temporary liberty is warranted only during the period for awaiting the
submission of the investigation report on the application for probation and the resolution
thereon.48 As we explained in Poso v. Judge Mijares49 :
It must be stressed that the statutory sequence of actions, i.e., order to conduct case study prior
to action on application for release on recognizance, was prescribed precisely to underscore
the interim character of the provisional liberty envisioned under the Probation Law. Stated

differently, the temporary liberty of an applicant for probation is effective no longer than the
period for awaiting the submission of the investigation report and the resolution of the
petition, which the law mandates as no more than sixty (60) days to finish the case study and
report and a maximum of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the report for the trial judge to
resolve the application for probation. By allowing the temporary liberty of the accused even
before the order to submit the case study and report, respondent Judge unceremoniously
extended the pro tem discharge of the accused to the detriment of the prosecution and the
private complainants. (Emphasis supplied)
As to the argument of Judge Floro that his Orders for the release of an accused on
recognizance need not be in writing as these are duly reflected in the transcript of stenographic
notes, we refer to Echaus v. Court of Appeals50 wherein we held that "no judgment, or order
whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is set down in writing,
signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to
the parties and implementation." Obviously, then, Judge Floro was remiss in his duties as
judge when he did not reduce into writing his orders for the release on recognizance of the
accused in Criminal Cases No. 20384, 20371, 202426 and 20442 entitled, "People v. Luisito
Beltran," "People v. Emma Alvarez, et al.," "People v. Rowena Camino," and "People v. John
Richie Villaluz." 51 From his explanation that such written orders are not necessary, we can
surmise that Judge Floros failure was not due to inadvertence or negligence on his part but to
ignorance of a procedural rule.
In fine, we perceive three fundamental errors in Judge Floros handling of probation cases.
First, he ordered the release on recognizance of the accused without the presence of the
prosecutor thus depriving the latter of any opportunity to oppose said release. Second, Judge
Floro ordered the release without first requiring the probation officer to render a case study
and investigation report on the accused. Finally, the order granting the release of the accused
on recognizance was not reduced into writing.
It would seem from the foregoing that the release of the accused on recognizance, as well as
his eventual probation, was already a done deal even before the hearing on his application as
Judge Floro took up the cudgels for the accused by instructing his staff to draft the application
for probation. This, Judge Floro did not deny. Thus, we agree in the observation of the audit
team that Judge Floro, as a matter of policy, had been approving applications for release on
recognizance hastily and without observing the requirements of the law for said purpose.
Verily, we having nothing against courts leaning backward in favor of the accused; in fact, this
is a salutary endeavor, but only when the situation so warrants. In herein case, however, we
cannot countenance what Judge Floro did as "the unsolicited fervor to release the accused
significantly deprived the prosecution and the private complainants of their right to due
process." 52
Judge Floros insistence that orders made in open court need not be reduced in writing
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Likewise, his failure to follow the basic rules on
probation, constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 53
Verily, one of the fundamental obligations of a judge is to understand the law fully and uphold
it conscientiously.54 When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know
and simply apply it for anything less is constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. 55 True, not
every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does
not warrant administrative sanctions. 56 To hold otherwise "would be nothing short of

59

harassing judges to take the fantastic and impossible oath of rendering infallible
judgments." 57 This rule, however, admits of an exception as "good faith in situations of
fallible discretion inheres only within the parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply
where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal principle evident and as to be beyond
permissible margins of error." 58 Thus, even if a judge acted in good faith but his ignorance is
so gross, he should be held administratively liable. 59
(d) RE: Charge of partiality in criminal cases where he declared that he is pro-accused which
is contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct
The audit team reported that Judge Floro relayed to the members thereof that in criminal cases,
he is always "pro-accused" particularly concerning detention prisoners and bonded accused
who have to continually pay for the premiums on their bonds during the pendency of their
cases.
Judge Floro denies the foregoing charge. He claims that what he did impart upon Atty.
Buenaventura was the need for the OCA to remedy his predicament of having 40 detention
prisoners and other bonded accused whose cases could not be tried due to the lack of a
permanent prosecutor assigned to his sala. He narrated as well to Atty. Buenaventura the
sufferings of detention prisoners languishing in the Malabon/Navotas jail whose cases had not
been tried during the vacancy of his sala from February 1997 to 5 November 1998. At any
rate, Judge Floro submits that there is no single evidence or proof submitted by any litigant or
private complainant that he sided with the accused.
Atty. Dizon, Judge Floros Clerk of Court, on the other hand, categorically stated under oath
that Judge Floro, during a staff meeting, admitted to her and the staff of Branch 73 and in the
presence of his Public Attorneys Office (PAO) lawyer that he is pro-accused for the reason
that he commiserated with them especially those under detention as he, himself, had been
accused by his brother and sister-in-law of so many unfounded offenses. 60
Between the two versions, the testimony of Atty. Dizon is more credible especially since it is
corroborated by independent evidence, 61 e.g., Judge Floros unwarranted eagerness in
approving application for release on recognizance as previously discussed.
Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: "A judge should so behave at all times as
to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." This means
that a judge whose duty is to apply the law and dispense justice "should not only be impartial,
independent and honest but should be believed and perceived to be impartial, independent and
honest" as well. 62 Like Caesars wife, a judge must not only be pure but above
suspicion. 63 Judge Floro, by broadcasting to his staff and the PAO lawyer that he is proaccused, opened himself up to suspicion regarding his impartiality. Prudence and judicial
restraint dictate that a judge should reserve personal views and predilections to himself so as
not to stir up suspicions of bias and unfairness. Irresponsible speech or improper conduct of a
judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary. 64 "His language, both written and spoken,
must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued." 65
On a more fundamental level, what is required of judges is objectivity if an independent
judiciary is to be realized. And by professing his bias for the accused, Judge Floro is guilty of

unbecoming conduct as his capacity for objectivity is put in serious doubt, necessarily eroding
the publics trust in his ability to render justice. As we held in Castillo v. Juan 66 :
In every litigation, x x x, the manner and attitude of a trial judge are crucial to everyone
concerned, the offended party, no less than the accused. It is not for him to indulge or even to
give the appearance of catering to the at-times human failing of yielding to first impressions.
He is to refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or prejudging matters. It would be deplorable
if he lays himself open to the suspicion of reacting to feelings rather than to facts, of being
imprisoned in the net of his own sympathies and predilections. It must be obvious to the
parties as well as the public that he follows the traditional mode of adjudication requiring that
he hear both sides with patience and understanding to keep the risk of reaching an unjust
decision at a minimum. It is not necessary that he should possess marked proficiency in law,
but it is essential that he is to hold the balance true. What is equally important is that he should
avoid any conduct that casts doubt on his impartiality. What has been said is not merely a
matter of judicial ethics. It is impressed with constitutional significance.
(h) Re: Charge of using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually
dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the
civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant and the accused to sign the
settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor.
(j) Re: Charge of issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from that which he issued in
open court in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide.
The memorandum report states:
During the arraignment and pre-trial of Criminal Case No. 20385-MN entitled: "People vs.
Nenita Salvador", Judge Floro, Jr., in the absence of the public prosecutor and considering that
the private complainant was not being represented by a private prosecutor, used his moral
ascendancy and influence to convince the private complainant to settle and eventually cause
the dismissal of the case in the guise of settling its civil aspect by making the private
complainants and the accused sign the settlement. (Copy of the signed stenographic notes is
hereto attached as Annex "8").
xxxx
In an Order dated March 8, 1999 in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide,
Judge Floro, Jr. put on record the "manifestations" of the private complainant and the accused
relative to their willingness to settle the civil aspect of the case. In the same order, Judge Floro,
Jr. reserved his ruling on the said settlement until after the public prosecutor has given his
comment. However, per report of the court employees in Branch 73, the aforesaid order was
actually a revised one or a deviation from the original order given in open court. Actually, the
said criminal case was already settled even without the presence of the public prosecutor. The
settlement was in the nature of absolving not only the civil liability of the accused but the
criminal liability as well. It was further reported that the private complainants signed the
compromise agreement due to the insistence or persuasion of Judge Floro, Jr. The audit team
was furnished a copy of the stenographic notes (unsigned draft order) and the revised order
(signed). Copies of the stenographic notes and the revised order are hereto attached as

60

Annexes "8", "13", and "14". (Note: the stenographic notes were signed by the parties to the
case).
In the meantime, the mother of the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, Luz
Arriego, filed an administrative case against Judge Floro docketed as A.M. OCA-I.P.I. No. 99812-RTJ. In her Affidavit Complaint 67dated 9 August 1999, she alleged that on 8 March 1999,
Judge Floro forced them to settle her daughters case against the accused therein despite the
absence of the trial prosecutor. When the parties could not agree on the amount to be paid by
the accused for the medical expenses incurred by complaining witness, they requested
respondent that they be given time to study the matter and consult a lawyer to which Judge
Floro replied that the case be settled immediately, uttering, "ngayon na! ngayon na!"
Moreover, Judge Floro allegedly made them believe that the counter-charges filed by the
accused against the complaining witness would likewise be dismissed, so they agreed to settle
the case. However, the written Order issued by respondent Judge did not reflect the agreement
entered into by the parties in open court.
Judge Floro takes exception to the foregoing OCA report and the complaint filed by Mrs.
Arriego, maintaining that the hearing on said case was not only in accordance with the Rules
of Court but was also beneficial to the litigants concerned as they openly manifested their
willingness to patch up their differences in the spirit of reconciliation. Then, considering that
the parties suggested that they would file the necessary pleadings in due course, Judge Floro
waited for such pleadings before the TSN-dictated Order could be reduced to writing.
Meanwhile, in the course of a conversation between Judge Floro and Court Administrator
Benipayo, the latter opined that under Section 27 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, an offer of
compromise in criminal cases is tantamount to an admission of guilt except in some cases.
With this in mind, the 8 March 1999 Order of the hearing on even date was superseded by the
revised written Order likewise dated 8 March 1999.
Judge Floro asserts that contrary to Atty. Buenaventuras stance that he has no power to revise
an Order, courts have plenary power to recall and amend or revise any orally dictated order in
substance and in form even motu proprio.
The rule on the matter finds expression in Echaus v. Court of Appeals 68 wherein we declared:

the stamp of judicial approval, the written order merely stating that Judge Floro was reserving
its ruling regarding the manifestations of the parties to enter into a compromise agreement
after the public prosecutor shall have submitted its comments thereto. 69
Considering then that it was well within the discretion of Judge Floro to revise his oral order
per the Echaus ruling and factoring in his explanation for resorting to such an amendment, we
find no basis for the charge of dishonesty (under paragraph "j" of the complaint).
Anent the charge that Judge Floro used his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss
Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect
of the case, by persuading the private complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even
without the presence of the trial prosecutor, the same must likewise fail for lack of basis. The
controversial settlement never came to pass. It was not judicially approved as reflected in the
revised Order of 8 March 1999, thus, Mrs. Arriego actually had no cause for complaint. She
cannot, on one hand, complain that the written order did not reflect the agreement reached
during the hearing and, on the other hand, claim that this agreement was reached under duress
at the instance of Judge Floro.
(i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor, ordering the mental
and physical examination of the accused based on the ground that the accused is "mahina ang
pick-up"
The audit team reported that in an Order dated 8 February 1999 in Criminal Case No. 20347MN, Judge Floro "motu proprio ordered the physical and mental examination of the accused
by any physician, over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor, on the ground that the
accused is "mahina ang pick-up." 70
In refutation, Judge Floro argues -In the case at bar, respondent/Court carefully observed the demeanor of the accused NESTOR
ESCARLAN and noted the manifestations of his counsel de oficio, Atty. E. Gallevo, PAO
lawyer, and the comment/objections of the trial prosecutor, Prosecutor J. Diaz, thus:

x x x [N]o judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and
unless it is set down in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the
Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and implementation, and that indeed, even after
promulgation, it does not bind the parties until and unless notice thereof is duly served on
them by any of the modes prescribed by law. This is so even if the order or judgment has in
fact been orally pronounced in the presence of the parties, or a draft thereof drawn up and
signed and/or copy thereof somehow read or acquired by any party. In truth, even after
promulgation (i.e., filing with the clerk of court), and even after service on the parties of notice
of an order or judgment, the Court rendering it indisputably has plenary power to recall and
amend or revise it in substance or form on motion of any party or even motu proprio, provided
that in the case of a final order or judgment, the same has not attained finality. (Emphasis
supplied)

a. Atty. Gallevo manifested to the Court that the accused opted to enter a plea of not
guilty;

In herein case, what was involved was an interlocutory order made in open court ostensibly
a judicial approval of a compromise agreement which was amended or revised by removing

e. Considering the grave situation, Atty. Gallevo, upon citation by the

Court/respondent of the pertinent provisions of the Rules, namely Rule 28 (Mental
Examination of Persons), Sec. 12 of Rule 116, and Sec. 5(g) of Rule 135, Rules of

b. But upon query of the Court, the accused approached the bench and he appeared
trembling and stammering;
c. Atty. Gallevo, upon questions by respondent, readily admitted that accused is
"nauutal", has difficulty of reasoning, of speaking, and very nervous;
d. Atty. Gallevo also manifested that the accused often changed his mind regarding
the plea, from not guilty to guilty and to not guilty, and so forth;

61

Court (plenary powers to issue orders to conform to justice), manifested orally that
the accused is "mahina ang pick-up";
f. Hence, respondent exercised his sound discretion in issuing the ORDER OF
MENTAL EXAMINATION.
The MENTAL examination ORDER finds legal support, since it is well-settled that "the court
may order a physical or MENTAL examination of a party where his physical or mental
condition is material to the issues involved." (27 C.J.S. p. 119, cf. MARTIN, p. 107, id.). 71
PAO lawyer Erwin Joy B. Gallevo took the witness stand for Judge Floro. He testified that he
moved for the suspension of the arraignment of the accused Nestor Escarlan Escancilla in
order to assess his mental fitness for trial. 72 As reflected in the Order for suspension, however,
and as admitted by Judge Floro himself in his Comment, Atty. Gallevo merely manifested that
accused is "mahina ang pick-up."
Be that as it may, we cannot fault Judge Floro for suspending the arraignment motu proprio
and "over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor." It must be remembered that the
scheduled arraignment took place in February 1999 when the applicable rule was still Section
12(a) of Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
SEC. 12. Suspension of arraignment. The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time
thereof:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively
renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently
thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his
confinement for such purpose.
The above-cited rule does not require that the suspension be made pursuant to a motion filed
by the accused unlike Section 11(a), Rule 116 of the present 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure
which decrees that the suspension be made "upon motion by the proper party." 73 Thus, it was
well within the discretion of Judge Floro to order the suspension of the arraignment motu
proprio based on his own assessment of the situation. In fact, jurisprudence imposes upon the
Judge the duty to suspend the proceedings if it is found that the accused, even with the aid of
counsel, cannot make a proper defense. 74 As we underscored in People v. Alcalde 75 :
Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or discovers that an accused is apparently in a
present condition of insanity or imbecility, it is within his discretion to investigate the matter.
If it be found that by reason of such affliction the accused could not, with the aid of counsel,
make a proper defense, it is the duty of the court to suspend the proceedings and commit the
accused to a proper place of detention until his faculties are recovered. x x x.
xxxx
The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
under the Bill of Rights carries with it the correlative obligation to effectively convey to the
accused the information to enable him to effectively prepare for his defense. At the bottom is

the issue of fair trial. While not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental
deficiency on the part of the accused is sufficient to justify suspension of the proceedings, the
trial court must be fully satisfied that the accused would have a fair trial with the assistance the
law secures or gives. x x x.
Whether or not Judge Floro was indeed correct in his assessment of the accuseds mental
fitness for trial is already beside the point. If ever he erred, he erred in the side of caution
which, under the circumstances of the case, is not an actionable wrong.
(e)Re: Charge of appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M-98 pending before
Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan in violation of Canon 5, Rule 5.07, Code
of Judicial Conduct which prohibits a judge from engaging in the private practice of law
(f)Re: Charge of appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the Supreme Court
and without filing the corresponding applications for leaves of absence on the scheduled dates
of hearing
In support of the above charges, the memorandum report states:
i.Judge Floro, Jr. informed the audit team that he has personal cases pending before the lower
courts in Bulacan. He admitted that Atty. Bordador, the counsel of record in some of these
cases, is just signing the pleadings for him while he (Judge Floro, Jr.) acts as collaborating
counsel. When attending the hearing of the cases, Judge Floro, Jr. admitted that he does not
file an application for leave of absence.
Based on the reports gathered by the audit team, Judge Floro, Jr. has a pending civil case in the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan and a criminal case in Municipal Trial Court,
Meycauayan, Bulacan. It is reported that in these cases, he is appearing and filing pleadings in
his capacity as party and counsel for himself and even indicating in the pleadings that he is the
Presiding Judge of Branch 73, RTC, Malabon.
Upon verification by the audit team, it was found out that Judge Floro, Jr. indeed has a
pending case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan docketed as Civil
Case No. 46-M-98, entitled: "In Re: In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Robert
V. Floro, Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr., Petitioner - versus Jesie V. Floro and Benjamin V.
Floro". In this case Judge Floro, Jr. filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Entry of
Judgment with Manifestation and/or Judicial Admission" wherein he signed as the petitioner
and at the same time indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon,
Metro Manila. Court stenographer Marissa Garcia, RTC, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan
confirmed this information. Judge Floro, Jr. even attached a copy of his oath taking and his
picture together with President Joseph Estrada to the aforesaid pleading. Photocopy of the said
Motion is hereto attached as Annex "9".
Judge Floro, Jr. has a pending request with the Court Management Office, Office of the Court
Administrator, to appear as counsel or collaborating counsel in several civil cases (except the
above-mentioned case) pending before lower courts. 76

62

Well ensconced is the rule that judges are prohibited from engaging in the private practice of
law. Section 35, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court unequivocally states that: "No judge or other
official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall
engage in private practice as member of the bar or give professional advice to client." Canon
5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, on the other hand, provides that: "A judge shall
not engage in the private practice of law."
Judge Floro vehemently denies the foregoing charge claiming that he hired lawyers to attend
to his personal cases. 77
A scrutiny of the voluminous records in this case does not reveal any concrete proof of Judge
Floro having appeared as counsel in his personal cases after he had already been appointed
Judge except that he prepared a pleading ("Ex Parte Motion For Issuance of Entry of Judgment
With Manifestation and/or Judicial Admission") jointly with his counsel of record in
connection with a habeas corpus case he filed against his brothers for the custody of their
"mild, mentally-retarded" brother. He explained, however, that he prepared the said pleading
in the heat of anger as he could not accept the judgment of dismissal in that case. 78 He likewise
explained that the pleading was signed by him alone due to inadvertence and that he had
rectified the same by filing an Amended Manifestation with Affidavit of Merit. 79 Finally,
during the hearing of this case, Judge Floro argued that he filed the subject pleading as
petitioner and not as counsel. 80
The proscription against the private practice of law by judges is based on sound public policy,
thus:

influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or
administrative agency." By doing what he did, Judge Floro, to say the least, put a fellow judge
in a very awkward position.
As to charge (f), the OCA has failed to substantiate its claim that Judge Floro has been
attending the hearing of his personal cases without filing for leave of absence. As Judge Floro
vehemently protests the charge as untrue, it was incumbent upon the OCA to prove its case.
Time and again we have held that although administrative proceedings are not strictly bound
by formal rules on evidence, the liberality of procedure in administrative actions is still subject
to limitations imposed by the fundamental requirement of due process. 84
(k) Re: Charge of openly criticizing the Rules of Court and the Philippine justice system
(l) Re: Charge of use of highly improper and intemperate language during court proceedings
The memorandum report reads:
In the course of the judicial audit, the audit team was able to observe the way Judge Floro, Jr.
conducts court proceedings. With the assistance of the court staff, the team was able to obtain
a tape-recorded proceeding conducted by Judge Floro, Jr. Attached is the transcript of the
proceedings (Annex "15"). The tape record of the court proceedings is also submitted along
with this report as Exhibit "A".
xxxx

[T]he rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are inherently
incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a
judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give their full time and attention to their judicial
duties, prevent them from extending special favors to their own private interests and assure the
public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions. These objectives are dictated
by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote the public interest. 81

The case for hearing that day was Civil Case No. 1256 MM. A certain Atty. Abelarde was
appearing for the plaintiff while Atty. Emmanuel Basa was appearing for the defendant.
During the hearing, it seems that the counsels for both parties were guiding Judge Floro, Jr. on
how to proceed with the trial.
There was one instance when Judge Floro, Jr. criticized the Rules of Court, to wit:

Based on the above rationale, it becomes quite evident that what is envisioned by "private
practice" is more than an isolated court appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
action, a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to
the public as a lawyer. 82 In herein case, save for the "Motion for Entry of Judgment," it does
not appear from the records that Judge Floro filed other pleadings or appeared in any other
court proceedings in connection with his personal cases. It is safe to conclude, therefore, that
Judge Floros act of filing the motion for entry of judgment is but an isolated case and does not
in any wise constitute private practice of law. Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that Judge
Floro is obviously not lawyering for any person in this case as he himself is the petitioner.

"Judge Floro, Jr.: Kasi nga ang may plano nito ay ang Rules of Court, hindi nila maayos ang
Rules of Court natin, hindi realistic kinopya lang sa law of California on Civil Procedure;
pagdating dito eh dahil sa kanila maraming nagkakaproblema, masyadong maraming eh
ako wala akong pinagkopyahan yan but ginawa ko lang yon Sabi ko si Judge nagkocomplain kasi, sabi ko nga pagka ang lawyer hindi alam yan talo na sa akin except na
hindi papayag kasi marami diyang "

Be that as it may, though Judge Floro might not be guilty of unauthorized practice of law as
defined, he is guilty of unbecoming conduct for signing a pleading wherein he indicated that
he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City and for appending to the pleading
a copy of his oath with a picture of his oath-taking. The only logical explanation we can reach
for such acts is that Judge Floro was obviously trying to influence or put pressure on a fellow
judge by emphasizing that he himself is a judge and is thus in the right. 83 Verily, Canon 2,
Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a "judge shall refrain from

"Sabi ko paano ko matatagpuan ang katarungan dito sa korteng eto bulok ang hustisya. Ang
kapatid ko napakayaman, ako walang pera."

In another proceeding conducted on a different day, Judge Floro, Jr., instead of holding trial,
discussed, in open court, the case involving his brother. He even condemned the Philippine
justice system and manifested his disgust on the unfairness of the system. Thus, he said:

He continued:

63

"Yung kapatid ko. Hindi ko makuha kundi makita ko lang. Bawal kasi; yung kapatid ko
retarded, bawal. In memory of my brother, Robert Floro. So, ngayon nag-file ako. Sabi ni
Judge Agloro senermonan pa ako, ganun ganun Sabi ko paano ko makikita ang
katarungan. Tapos ngayon ang nangyari di Judge na ako, hindi ko pa nakita ang kapatid ko. Di
ngayon, ang ginawa ko na-dismiss na yung case, hindi ko inano kasi wala akong nakikitang
katarungan dahil ang kapatid ko ay napakaraming pera. Alam ko naman kung ang isang court
eh parehas o may kiling eh. Yung abogado niya malakas na malakas doon. Sana hindi nakarecord eto (laughs) baka ako ma-contempt dito." 85
Judge Floro denies the foregoing accusations, emphatically arguing that these are all hearsay
fabrications supplied by his Clerk of Court, Atty. Dizon, and by disgruntled RTC personnel
due to ill or ulterior motives (i.e., to allegedly cover-up their consistent tardiness, habitual
absenteeism and gross neglect of duties which were all unearthed by Judge Floro).
As to the tape recording of an alleged court hearing wherein he criticized the Philippine
judicial system, Judge Floro contends that this recording was done clandestinely by his staff in
violation of the Anti-Wire Tapping Law (Republic Act No. 4200) and, to suit their plans, they
twisted the facts by cutting portions thereof. They also made it appear that the conversation
took place in a court proceeding when, in fact, this was inside his chambers.
During the investigation, it was established that the two tapes in question were submitted to
the OCA sans the "yellow notes" and the official transcribed copy thereof. 86 This means that
the transcribed copy that was submitted by the audit team as Annex "15" is but an unofficial
copy and does not, by itself, prove that what was being recorded was a court proceeding. This
being the case, the two tapes, without concrete proof that they were taken officially during a
court proceeding, cannot be used against Judge Floro as the unauthorized recording of a
private conversation is inadmissible under Rep. Act No. 4200. 87
Without the tape and transcribed copies of the contents thereof, we are thus left with only
Judge Floros word against that of Atty. Dizon, his Clerk of Court who testified under oath as
to Judge Floros alleged propensity to criticize the judiciary and to use intemperate language.
Resolving these particular charges would therefore depend upon which party is more credible.
Atty. Dizon stated on the witness stand that:
Q: Is Judge Floro guilty of Violation of Canon 1 Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct when he
openly criticized the Rules of Court and the Philippine Justice System?
A: Yes. Judge Floro has mentioned to each and everyone of us in branch 73 the alleged
"kabulukan ng hustisya". Time and again he said the Rules of Court is of no use. He said that
since theory and the practice of law are very different, the Rules of Court does not always
apply to different cases. Not only the justice system did he criticize but likewise Judges and
Justices. He told us . . . and I quote "Dyan sa Malolos sangkatutak ang corrupt na Judges . . .
Sa Court of Appeals P25,000.00 ang pinakamababang lagayan diyan."
To our mind, how can a Judge like him openly criticize the very institution he is now serving?
Where is his respect to the court, to the bar and to the bench? How can he uphold courts as
temples of justice if he himself did not believe in the justice system?

xxxx
Q What can you say about charge letter "L" which reads for the use of highly improper and
intemperate language during court proceedings?
A Judge Floro, if in the presence of all his staff, during the presence of me, the Court
Interpreter, the Legal Researcher, maybe a Clerk, he always discuss matters regarding
practitioners in our court. There is one time one Atty. Feliciano a lady lawyer, he said, "Lukaluka, talaga yang babaing yan" and then he would call even not during court session, but
during office hours our Court Interpreter "malandi, luka-luka, may fruit of the sun". So, it did
not surprise us one time when during a pre-trial conference in a Civil Case, for Civil Case No.
25-86-MN "Lopez v. Reyes and Mercado", he uttered offensive language against his fellow
judge. Take the transcription of this court proceeding is already adapted by the Court
Administrator. It was the content of the tape he sent the Court Administrator. Actually, for
consultation and advise after hearing what Judge Floro discussed in open Court, before all of
us, the court staff present in the hearing and before the lawyer and the defendants in the case,
we were in quandary whether or not to attach in the record the stenographic notes or even the
actual transcription of the proceedings because it contained offensive languages against the
justice system, against a certain judge, against a certain Clerk of Court named Jude Assanda,
against people he is disgusted with. In fact, instead of discussing the merit of the case or the
possibility of the amicable settlement between the parties, he integrated this kind of
discussion. So, as a Clerk of Court, I may not use my discretion whether or not to advise the
stenographer to indeed present the same or attach the same in the record because it contained
offensive languages highly improper and intemperate languages like for example, "putang
ina", words like "ako ang anghel ng kamatayan, etcetera, etcetera". 88
The denials of Judge Floro are insufficient to discredit the straightforward and candid
declarations of Atty. Dizon especially in the light of confirming proofs from Judge Floro
himself.
The Court finds the version of Atty. Dizon more credible because subject utterances are
consistent with Judge Floros claims of intellectual superiority for having graduated with
several honors from the Ateneo School of Law and having placed 13th in the bar
examinations. Moreover, his utterances against the judicial system on account of his
perception of injustice in the disposition of his brothers case are not far removed from his
reactions to what he perceived were injustices committed against him by the OCA and by the
persons who were either in charge of the cases against him or had some sort of participation
therein. Consequently, although there is no direct proof that Judge Floro said what he is
claimed to have said, nonetheless, evidence that he sees himself as intellectually superior as
well as evidence of his habit of crying foul when things do not go his way, show that it is more
likely that he actually criticized the Rules of Court and the judicial system and is thus guilty of
unbecoming conduct. Verily, in administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary for a
finding of guilt is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 89 In this case, there is ample and competent proof
of violation on Judge Floros part.
(m) Re: Charge of violating Circular No. 13-87 dated 1 July 1987
The memorandum report stated that Judge Floro

64

[D]eviat[ed] from the regular course of trial when he discusses matters involving his personal
life and beliefs. Canon 3, Rule 3.03 provides that "[a] judge shall maintain order and proper
decorum in the court." A disorderly judge generates disorderly work. An indecorous judge
invites indecorous reactions. Hence, the need to maintain order and proper decorum in court.
When the judge respects himself, others will respect him too. When he is orderly, others will
follow suit. Proceedings in court must be conducted formally and solemnly. The atmosphere
must be characterized with honor and dignity befitting the seriousness and importance of a
judicial trial called to ascertain the truth. Anything which tends to detract from this atmosphere
must be avoided. And the judge is supposed to be in control and is therefore responsible for
any detraction therefrom.

Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious charge. Under Rule 140 as amended, a
judge guilty of a serious charge may be dismissed from the service, suspended from office
without salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months or fined in
the amount of P 20,000.00 but not exceeding P 40,000.00 depending on the circumstances of
the case. In herein case, considering that Judge Floro had barely warmed his seat when he was
slammed with these charges, his relative inexperience is to be taken in his favor. And,
considering further that there is no allegation or proof that he acted in bad faith or with corrupt
motives, we hold that a fine is the appropriate penalty. The fine is to be imposed in the
maximum, i.e. P 40,000.00, as we will treat the findings of simple misconduct and
unbecoming conduct as aggravating circumstances. 91

Circular No. 13 (Guidelines in the Administration of Justice) dated July 1, 1987 provides that
trial of cases should be conducted efficiently and expeditiously. Judges should plan the course
and direction of trials so that waste of time is avoided.

Judge Floro must be relieved of his position as Judge of RTC Malabon Branch due to a
medically disabling condition of the mind that renders him unfit to discharge the functions of
his office

Moreover, a judge should avoid being queer in his behavior, appearance and movements. He
must always keep in mind that he is the visible representative of the law. Judge Floro, Jr.s
claims that he is endowed with psychic powers, that he can inflict pain and sickness to people,
that he is the angel of death and that he has unseen "little friends" are manifestations of his
psychological instability and therefore casts doubt on his capacity to carry out the functions
and responsibilities of a judge. Hence, it is best to subject Judge Floro, Jr. once again to
psychiatric or mental examination to ascertain his fitness to remain in the judiciary. 90

As we have explained, the common thread which binds the 13 seemingly unrelated
accusations in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 is the charge of mental illness against Judge Floro
embodied in the requirement for him to undergo an appropriate mental or psychological
examination and which necessitated his suspension pending investigation. This charge of
mental illness, if true, renders him unfit to perform the functions of his office notwithstanding
the fact that, in disposing of the 13 charges, there had been no finding of dismissal from the
service against Judge Floro.

Circular No. 13-87, by itself, does not define nor punish an offense but, as its title would
suggest, it merely sets the guidelines in the administration of justice following the ratification
of the 1987 Constitution.

The Supreme Court Clinic first had occasion to interview Judge Floro when the latter applied
for judgeship (which application he later voluntarily withdrew) way back in September 1995.
The psychological report, as prepared by Cecilia C. Villegas, M.D. (Director III, Chief SC
Clinic Services) and Melinda C. Grio (Psychologist), stated in part:

The arguments forwarded by the OCA, however, best exemplify the fact that the 13 charges
are inextricably linked to the charge of mental/psychological illness which allegedly renders
Judge Floro unfit to continue discharging the functions of his office. This being the case, we
will consider the allegation that Judge Floro proclaims himself to be endowed with psychic
powers, that he can inflict pain and sickness to people, that he is the angel of death and that he
has unseen "little friends" in determining the transcendental issue of his mental/psychological
fitness to remain in office.

PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION:
There are evidences of developing psychotic process at present.
REMARKS:

4) Charge "e" unbecoming conduct

Atty. Floro was observed to be restless and very anxious during the interview. He was
argumentative and over solicitous of questions asked, giving the impressions of marked
suspiciousness. He centered on his academic excellence, an Ateneo de Manila graduate of the
College of Law, rated top 13th place in the bar examination. He emphasized his obsessive and
compulsive method of studying, at least 15 hours per day regardless of whether it was school
days or vacation time. Vying for honors all the time and graduated Law as second honor, he
calls this self-discipline and self-organization. He expressed dissatisfaction of his
achievements, tend to be a perfectionist and cannot accept failures. To emphasize his ultra
bright mind and analytical system, he related that, for the past 3 to 5 years, he has been
experiencing "Psychic vision" every morning and that the biggest secret of the universe are the
"unseen things." He can predict future events because of "power in psychic phenomenon" as
when his bar results was to be released, he saw lights in the sky "no. 13-1," and he got the 13th
place. He has been practicing "parapsychology" seeing plenty of "dwendes" around him.

5) Charges "k" and "l" unbecoming conduct

He can talk on and on of bizarre ideas, that tends (sic) to be irrelevant.

But before we even go into that, we must determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed for
the seven of the 13 charges discussed above. To recapitulate, we have found Judge Floro
guilty, in one way or another, of seven of the 13 charges against him. Thus:
1) Charge "a" - simple misconduct
2) Charges "c" and "g" gross ignorance of the law
3) Charge "d" unbecoming conduct

65

Intellectually, he has high assets, however, evidence of ego disintegration are prominent
findings, both in the interview (conscious) and psychological test results. (unconscious
level). 92
Approximately three years later, in June 1998, Judge Floro again presented himself to the
Supreme Court Clinic when he applied anew for judgeship, this time of RTC Malabon.
Psychologist Beatriz O. Cruz and Celeste P. Vista, M.D. (Psychiatrist and Medical Officer IV)
did the interview and evaluation. Dr. Vista observed:
Atty. Floro has an impressive academic achievements (sic), and he takes pride in this. During
the interview, he was quite reluctant to reveal information about his family background and
would rather talk about his work and academic achievements. However, he failed to integrate
his knowledge into a cohesive unit which he can utilize to cope with the various tasks that he
undertakes. This renders him confused and ambivalent with a tendency to vacillate with
decision-making. He also has a low self-esteem and prone to mood swings with the slightest
provocation.
From the interview, there seems to have been no drastic change in his personality and level of
functioning as a lawyer in private practice. However, he showed a pervasive pattern of social
and interpersonal deficits. He has poor social skills and showed discomfort with close social
contacts. Paranoid ideations, suspiciousness of others motives as well as perceptual
distortions were evident during the interview.
Atty. Floros current intelligence function is along the mild mental retardation (68) which is
below the expected cognitive efficiency of a judge. Despite his impressive academic
background and achievements, he has lapses in judgment and may have problems with
decision-making. His character traits such as suspiciousness and seclusiveness and
preoccupation with paranormal and psychic phenomena though not detrimental to his role as a
lawyer, may cloud his judgment, and hamper his primary role as a judge in dispensing justice.
Furthermore, he is at present not intellectually and emotionally equipped to hurdle the
responsibilities of a judge and he may decompensate when exposed to anxiety-provoking and
stress-laden situation. 93
It would seem that the JBC disregarded the above-quoted report as it allowed Judge Floro to
seek a second opinion from private practitioners. A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, however, resurrected
the issue of his mental and psychological capacity to preside over a regional trial court. Thus,
the Resolution of 20 July 1999 specifically ordered Judge Floro to submit to "appropriate
psychological or mental examination."
On 1 February 2000, per recommendation of Justice Ramirez, 94 the Court clarified that the
"appropriate psychological or mental examination" being adverted to in the Resolution of 20
July 1999 is to be conducted by the SC Clinic. The Court thereby directed Judge Floro to
"submit himself to the SC Clinic for psychological or mental examination, within ten (10)
days from notice." 95 Judge Floro sought reconsideration which was denied by the Court on 22
February 2000. 96

On 24 October 2000, Judge Floro sought reconsideration of the 17 October 2000 Resolution
with a conjunctive special motion for him to undergo psychiatric examination by any duly
authorized medical and/or mental institution. 98 This was denied by the Court on 14 November
2000. 99
On 10 November 2000, Judge Floro moved, among other things, for the inhibition or
disqualification of Supreme Court Clinic doctors 100 and psychologist 101 with a manifestation
that he filed cases against them for revocation of licenses before the Professional Regulatory
Commission (PRC), the Philippine Medical Association (PMA) and the PAP 102 for alleged
gross incompetence and dishonorable conduct under Sec. 24 of Rep. Act No. 2382/1959
Medical Act/Code of Medical Ethics. 103
On 16 November 2000, Justice Ramirez, with the approval of Court Administrator Benipayo,
moved that Judge Floro be sanctioned for obvious contempt in refusing to comply with the 1
February 2000 and 17 October 2000 resolutions. According to Justice Ramirez, Judge Floros
filing of administrative cases with the PRC against Dr. Mendoza, et al., is an indication of the
latters intention to disregard and disobey the legal orders of the Court. 104The Court en banc
agreed in the report of Justice Ramirez, thus Judge Floro was ordered to submit to
psychological and mental examination within 10 days from receipt, otherwise, he "shall be
ordered arrested and detained at the jail of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) x x
x." 105
Judge Floro finally complied with the directive on 13 and 15 December 2000. 106 He likewise
sought the services of a private practitioner, Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, who came out with his
own evaluation of Judge Floro on 3 January 2001. 107
Thus, Judge Floro trooped to the Supreme Court Clinic for the third time in December 2000,
this time in connection with A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460. Francianina G. Sanchez, Clinical
Psychologist and Chief Judicial Staff Officer reported that "(o)ver all data strongly suggest a
delusional disorder with movement in the paranoid direction." Dr. Celeste Vista, for her part,
stated that:
Based on the clinical data gathered, it appears that Judge Floro is basically a cautious, and
suspicious individual with a compulsion to analyze and observe motives in his milieu. Despite
his status, cognitive assets and impressive educational background, his current functioning is
gauged along the LOW AVERAGE intelligence.
He can function and apply his skills in everyday and routine situations. However, his test
protocol is characterized by disabling indicators. There is impairment in reality testing which
is an indicator of a psychotic process. He is unable to make an objective assessment and
judgment of his milieu. Hence, he is apt to misconstrue signals from his environment resulting
to perceptual distortions, disturbed associations, and lapses in judgment. Such that, cultural
beliefs in dwarfs, psychic and paranormal phenomena and divine gifts of healing have become
incorporated in a delusional (false and unshakable beliefs) system, that it has interfered and
tainted his occupational and social functioning. Hence, he is found to be unfit in performing
his court duties as a judge. 108

The order to submit to the appropriate psychological examination by the SC Clinic was
reiterated by the Court on 17 October 2000 with the admonition that Judge Floros failure to
do so would result in appropriate disciplinary sanctions. 97

66

Pursuant to the aforecited December 2000 interview of Judge Floro, Supreme Court Senior
Chief Staff Officer Rosa J. Mendoza, M.D., reported to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in
March 2001 that
The findings of mental and psychological incapacity is thus substantially supported by
evidence. Based on the three[3] psychological tests and evaluation of the two[2] psychiatrists,
the undersigned has no other recourse but to recommend that Judge Florentino Floro be
declared unfit to discharge his duties as a Judge, effective immediately.
Not one to take this last recommendation sitting down, Judge Floro submitted earlier
psychological evaluations conducted by several mental health professionals which were all
favorable to him. The first three evaluations were in connection with his application as RTC
Judge of Malabon City in 1998 brought about by him having "failed" the examination given
by the Supreme Court Clinic. The report dated 04 September 1998 by staff psychologist,
Rowena A. Reyes as noted by clinical Psychologist, Ma. Teresa Gustilo-Villasor of the
Metropolitan Psychological Corporation (MPC), states in part:

JUDGE AQUINO:
Q: Now, that we are telling you that Judge Floro based on his testimony here and on every
available records of the proceedings, has been claiming that he [is] possessed with Psychic
Powers and he did not tell you that in the interview. Would you consider his failure to tell you
about his Psychic Powers to be a fatal [flaw]?
xxxx
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Very grave one, because it will affect the psychological outlook of the patient?
A: Yes, Sir.
xxxx

I. INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS
SUMMARY OF INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS
1. FFJ can draw from above average intellectual resources to cope with
everyday demands. He is able to handle both concrete and abstract
requirements of tasks. Alert to details, he has a logical approach in
evaluating the relationship between things and ideas.

Q: I tell you now, Judge Floro has been claiming in [these] proceedings and you were here
when we were cross-examining Mr. Licaoco and you heard that we mentioned in the course of
our cross-examination. Would you consider his failure to tell you about his power of by
location to be a fatal [flaw] and your assessment of his psychological outlook?
xxxx
A: Yes, Sir.

2. He thrives in predictable and structured situations, where he can

consider solid facts to arrived (sic)at concrete, tangible outcomes. Taskoriented, he can organize procedures and details so as to get things done
correctly and on schedule. He uses conventional standards to determine
personal progress. Set in his views, he may not readily accept others ideas
and contributions especially if these oppose his own.
3. A serious and thorough approach to his commitments is expected of
FFJ. Generally, he prefers to control his emotions and does not let this get
in the way of his judgment and decisions.

Q: Fatal [flaw]?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Did Judge Floro tell you also in the course of the interview that he is capable of being in a
trance?
A: He did not.

II. EMOTIONAL/INTERPERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

Q: So, he did not tell you that while in a trance he could type letters?

FFJ is motivated by the need to be recognized and respected for his undertakings.
Achievement-oriented, he sets high personal standards and tends to judge himself
and others according to these standards. When things do not develop along desired
lines, he may become restless and impatient. Nevertheless, he is careful of his social
stature and can be expected to comply with conventional social demands. 109

A: He did not.

Testifying as one of Judge Floros witnesses, Rowena A. Reyes opined on cross-examination

that "psychologically speaking," Judge Floro was not fit to be a judge. Thus:

xxxx
Q: And reality oriented and a reality oriented person is one who will not be pronouncing or
making pronouncement concerning his psychic powers. Is this not correct?
xxxx

67

A: Yes sir.
Q: A reality oriented person is also one who will not claim that he is capable of having trances
in the course of his private activities and even in the course of the performance of his official
duty as a Judge. Will you not agree with that?

Comments: The over-all results of this psychiatric evaluation of Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr.
do not contradict his nomination and appointment to the post he is seeking. 112
On the witness stand, however, and testifying as Judge Floros witness, Dr. Jurilla clarified
that the interview had its limitations 113 and he might have missed out certain information left
out by his patient. 114 The following exchange is thus instructive:

A: I agree with you, Sir.

Q: And if he will do so, he will not be actually a reality oriented person. Meaning tatagalugin
ko na po nakukuha naman "na ako ay psychic, na ako ay pwedeng ipower ng by location, na
kaya kong mag trance. Gumawa pa ng ibat iba pang bagay at the same time." Yan ay hindi
compatible sa pagiging reality oriented?

JUDGE AQUINO: x x x. Did Judge Floro tell you in the interview that he has little unseen,
unheard friends known as duwendes?
DR. JURILLA: He did not.
xxxx

A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And a person who is not reality oriented is not fit to sit as a Judge.

Q: Did you interview Judge Floro or did he [volunteer] to you information about his claim to
be the number five psychic in the country?

xxxx

xxxx

Q: I will add the phrase Psychologically speaking.

A: No, Your Honor.

xxxx

Q: He did not tell you also that he is gifted also with this so called, psychic phenomena?

A: Yes, Sir. 110

A: He did not.

Another psychiatrist, Pacita Ramos-Salceda, M.D., Senior Consultant Psychiatrist of the

Makati Medical Center, stated in her report dated 3 September 1998 that at the time of the
interview Judge Floro

xxxx

[W]as enthusiastic and confident. He is well informed about current issues, able to discuss a
wide variety of topics intelligently without hesitation. His thinking is lucid, rational, logical
and reality based. He is well oriented, intelligent, emotionally stable, with very good
judgment. There is no previous history of any psychological disturbances. 111
This was followed by the evaluation of Eduardo L. Jurilla, M.D., dated September 1998, who
stated in his report that
Atty. Floro is an asthenic, medium height, fairly groomed, be-spectacled person with graying
hair. When interviewed he was somewhat anxious, elaborative and at times approximate in his
answers. He was alert, oriented, conscious, cooperative and articulate in Pilipino and English.
He denied any perceptual disturbances. Stream of thought was logical and goal-directed. There
was pressure of speech with tendency to be argumentative or defensive but there were no
flight of ideas, thought blocking, looseness of associations or neologisms. Delusions were not
elicited. Affect was broad and appropriate but mood was anxious. There were no abnormal
involuntary movements or tics. Impulse control is good. Cognition is intact. Judgment, insight,
and other test for higher cortical functions did not reveal abnormal results.

Q: He did not tell you also that in [traveling] from one place to another, at least four (4)
kilometers apart, he used to ride on a big white or whatever it is, horse?
A: Not during our interview.
xxxx
A: It is possible like any other psychiatrist or mental health doctor you might have missed
some information or it is possible that our clients or patients might not [have] told us
everything.
Q: And if your clients or patients did not tell you things such as those that Judge Floro did not
admittedly tell you in the course of the interview, your opinion of the patient would be altered
a little?
xxxx
A: The answer has something to do whether my evaluation may be altered. Yes, Your Honor in
the absence of any corroborative contradiction.

68

Q: More so, if the presence of confirming events that transpired after the interview, would that
be correct?

xxxx
A: If there is data toward that effect prior to September 1998, probably drastically altered.

115

A: The interview has its limitations.

Q: Let us say, what Judge Floro did [not] tell you during the interview are confirmed by events
that transpired after the interview, would you not say you have more reason to have your
evaluation altered?

Lastly, Judge Floro presented the psychiatric evaluation of Eduardo T. Maaba, M.D.,
3 January 2001, the relevant portions of which state:

116

dated

Q: Especially so if you will now know that after that interview Judge Floro has been
proclaiming himself as the number five psychic in the country [where] no one has called him
as a psychic at all?

Affect was adequate and no mood incongruity was observed. Content of thought did not reveal
delusional thought. He was proud of his achievements in line with his profession and
expressed his frustration and dissatisfaction with the way his colleagues are handling his
pending administrative cases. He was observed to be reality-oriented and was not suffering
from hallucinations or abnormal perceptual distortions. Orientation, with respect to time, place
and person, was unimpaired. Judgment and decision-making capacity were adequately
functioning.

xxxx

xxxx

Q: Would it be really more altered?

An open-ended clinical interview was conducted at our clinic on December 26, 2000. He
talked about his family and academic achievements. He claimed to possess a divine gift for
prophecy and a gift of healing. He also talked about a "covenant" made during a dream
between him and 3 dwarf friends named Luis, Armand and Angel. He reported that the first
part of his ministry is to cast illness and/or disease and the second part is to heal and alleviate
sufferings/pain from disease.

A: Yes.

A: I would say so.

xxxx
Q: Returning to the confirming proofs, meaning after the interview, which are confirmations
of what Judge Floro did not tell you during the interview, would your finding of [J]udge Floro
be drastically altered if he will tell you that he is capable or possessed of the power of
bilocation?
xxxx
A: I would probably try to for a diagnosis.
Q: Which may make a drastic alteration of your evaluation of Judge Floros mental and
psychological x x x?
A: My diagnosis I will be seeking for an abnormal condition.
Q: When you said abnormal something would have made you suspect that there was
abnormality in the person of Judge Floro?
A: Given the data.
Q: We will give you the data or additional information. Would you also have your evaluation
favorable to Judge Floro drastically altered if I tell you that based on record Judge Floro has
claimed that while in a trance he is capable of typing a letter?

A series of psychological test was administered to Judge Floro on December 28, 2000. The
battery of test consisted of the following: (1) Otis-Lennon Mental Ability Test (2) SRA
Language Test (3) Purdue Non-Language Test (4) Sacks Sentence Completion Test and (5)
Draw A Person Test. Test results and evaluation showed an individual with an Above Average
Intelligence. Projective data, showed an obsessive-compulsive person who is meticulous to
details and strive for perfection in tasks assigned to him. He is reality-oriented and is deemed
capable of making day-to-day decisions in his personal as well as professional decisions.
Confusion with regard to sexual identification, was further observed.
Based on the clinical observation and the results of the psychological tests, respondent Judge
Florentino V. Floro, Jr., was found to be a highly intelligent person who is reality-oriented and
is not suffering from any major psychotic disorder. He is not deluded nor hallucinated and is
capable of utilizing his superior intellect in making sound decisions. His belief in supernatural
abilities is culture-bound and needs further studies/work-ups.
On cross-examination by Judge Aquino, however, Dr. Maaba also stated that Judge Floro was
unfit to be a judge. 117 The relevant exchanges between Dr. Maaba and Judge Aquino are
hereunder reproduced:
JUDGE AQUINO: And would you say that something is wrong with a judge who shall claim
that he is possessed with power of [bi-location]?
xxxx

69

DR. MAABA: A reality-oriented individual would not claim to be in two (2) places at one
time.
Q: And that something must be wrong?

A: Yes.
Q: Would you consider a person claiming in the course of a judicial, quasi-judicial or
administrative proceedings particularly in the course of his testimony that while he was doing
so, he was under trance normal.

A: Yes.
xxxx
Q: Okay. Would you say that something is wrong also with a judge claiming in the course of
his testimony and in this very case that while [he] was so testifying there is another spirit,
another person, another character unseen who is with him at the same time or in tagalog
"sumapi sa kanya".
xxxx
A: The observation that Judge Floro had unseen companion "sumapi" to me is unbelievable.
Q: Unbelievable. And anyone claiming it might be suffering from some delusion?

A: Let me explain the phenomenon of trance it is usually considered in the Philippines as part
of a culture bound syndrome and it could also be an indication Basically the phenomenon
of trance are often seen in cases of organic mental disorder. It is also common in culture bound
syndrome and the effect of person is usually loss of concentration in a particular settings or
situations so that a person or a judge hearing a case in court would [lose] concentration and
would not be able to follow up testimony of witnesses as well as arguments given by the
counsel for the defense and also for the prosecution, so I would say that there is this difficulty
in manners of attention span and concentration if that person sitting as a judge experience
trance as in the case of Judge Floro, this trance is manifested by flashing of lights and he
might not be able to rationalize or to control expressions or as well as physical when he is in a
trance.

xxxx
Q: Have you heard of a judge claiming that in the course of a proceeding, he was in a trance?
A: It could be and it could not be considered as perceptual distortion, your Honor.
A: No, I have not encountered any.
Q: No, Delusion.
A: Delusions, no, but Hallucinations, maybe yes.

Q: And if you hear one and will be shown records of one maybe such claim you will call that
person not a normal person.

Q: Ah, Hallucination, and which maybe worse?

A: Maybe weird.

A: Both are on the same footing.

Q: I will now show to you portions of the stenographic notes of the proceedings in these cases
held on October 10, 2000, afternoon session, page 30 we start with the question of Atty.
Dizon. "Atty. Dizon: Mr. witness, can you tell us? Are you in trance at this very precise
moment? JUDGE FLORO, JR.: "Nakalakip sila". I call it a trance, but I distinguished not the
trance that you see the nag-sa-Sto., Nino, naninigas. Thats a trance that is created by the so
called Because Fr. Jaime Bulatao, multi awarded Jesuit priest, considered that as mind
projection. He is correct in a sense that those nagta-trance na yan, naninigas, the mind
projection or the hypnosis do come, and there is a change in the psychological aspect of the
person. But in my case I never was changed physically or mentally. Only the lights and heat
will penetrate that person. ATTY. DIZON: That will do. So at this very moment, Mr. witness,
"meron kayong kalakip ngayon?"" "Ngayong oras na ito?" JUDGE FLORO: Yes, they are
here. Atty. DIZON: Where are they? Judge Floro, Jr.: They cannot be seen but ATTY.
DIZON: No, can you see them?" To point to us where are they in this room?", Now that you
have read and seen this portion wherein Judge Floro himself admitted that in the course of his
testimony in these cases he was in a trance, would you still consider him at least insofar as this
claim of his to be a normal person?

Q: Okay. Would you say that the person declaring in a proceeding as a witness about
hallucinatory matters would turn out to be fit to become a judge?
xxxx
A. If these delusions or hallucinations are part and parcel of a major psychiatric disorder like
schizophrenia or an organic mental disorder, this individual suffering from hallucinations or
delusions is unfit to sit as a judge, however, there is, this symptom might also exi[s]t in a nonpsychotic illness and the hallucinations and delusions could be transient and short in duration.
Q: But of doubtful capacity to sit as a judge?
A: Yes, doubtful capacity.

A: No.
Q: Now, trance is something covered by the field of which you are practicing with psychiatry.

70

Q: No, okay, so he is not normal. Now, Judge Floro in these proceedings also and I will show
to you the transcript of stenographic notes later have claimed that he had, always had and still
had a socalled counter part, his other side, other self, what can you say to that claim, would
that be the claim of a normal, mental sound person?
A: No.
Q: And one who is not normal and mentally sound is of course not fit to sit as judge?
xxxx
A: Yes. 118
Based on the foregoing, the OCA, thru Justice Ramirez, reported that:
Upon the testimony of his own witnesses, Drs. Eduardo T. Maaba, Ma. Nieves Celeste and
Eduardo L. Jurilla, respondent Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. is unfit because of insanity to
remain in office as Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73.
It is weird for respondent Judge to state in one of his pleadings in this case that President
Estrada would not finish his term as President. It is unusual and queer of him to state in his
calling card that he is a graduate of Ateneo de Manila, second honors, bar topnotcher with a
grade of 87.55% and include in his address the name Colonel Reynaldo Cabauatan who was
involved in a coup detat attempt. So is it strange of him to make use of his alleged psychic
powers in writing decisions in the cases assigned to his court. It is improper and grandiose of
him to express superiority over other judges in the course of hearings he is conducting and for
him to say that he is very successful over many other applicants for the position he has been
appointed. It is abnormal for a Judge to distribute self-serving propaganda. One who
distributes such self-serving propaganda is odd, queer, amusing, irresponsible and abnormal. A
judge suffering from delusion or hallucination is unfit to be one. So is he who gets into a
trance while presiding at the hearing of a case in court. One need not be a doctor of medicine,
a psychiatrist and a psychologist to determine and conclude that a person in such
circumstances is mentally unfit or insane and should not be allowed to continue discharging
the duties and functions of a judge. The life, liberty and property of the litigants in the court
presided by such judge are in his hands. Hence, it is imperative that he is free from doubt as to
his mental capacity and condition to continue discharging the functions of his office.
RECOMMENDATION
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that by reason of insanity which renders him
incapable and unfit to perform the duties and functions of Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73, respondent Florentino
V. Floro, Jr. be REMOVED and DISMISSED from such office. 119
We are in agreement with the OCA that Judge Floro cannot remain as RTC Judge because of
the findings of mental impairment that renders him unfit to perform the functions of his office.
We hasten to add, however, that neither the OCA nor this Court is qualified to conclude that

Judge Floro is "insane" as, in fact, the psychologists and psychiatrists on his case have never
said so.
When Justice Ramirez recommended that Judge Floro be dismissed from the service due to
"insanity," he was apparently using the term in its loose sense. Insanity is a general laymans
term, a catchall word referring to various mental disorders. Psychosis is perhaps the
appropriate medical term 120 as this is the one used by Drs. Vista and Villegas of the Supreme
Court Clinic. It is of note that the 1995, 1998 and 2000 psychological evaluations all reported
signs and symptoms of psychosis.
Courts exist to promote justice; thus aiding to secure the contentment and happiness of the
people. 121 An honorable, competent and independent judiciary exists to administer justice in
order to promote the stability of government, and the well-being of the people. 122 Carrying
much of the weight in this daunting task of administering justice are our front liners, the
judges who preside over courts of law and in whose hands are entrusted the destinies of
individuals and institutions. As it has been said, courts will only succeed in their tasks if the
judges presiding over them are truly honorable men, competent and independent. 123
There is no indication that Judge Floro is anything but an honorable man. And, in fact, in our
disposition of the 13 charges against him, we have not found him guilty of gross misconduct
or acts or corruption. However, the findings of psychosis by the mental health professionals
assigned to his case indicate gross deficiency in competence and independence.
Moreover, Judge Floro himself admitted that he believes in "psychic visions," of foreseeing
the future because of his power in "psychic phenomenon." He believes in "duwendes" and of a
covenant with his "dwarf friends Luis, Armand and Angel." He believes that he can write
while on trance and that he had been seen by several people to have been in two places at the
same time. He has likened himself to the "angel of death" who can inflict pains on people,
especially upon those he perceived as corrupt officials of the RTCs of Malabon. He took to
wearing blue robes during court sessions, switching only to black on Fridays. His own witness
testified that Judge Floro explained that he wore black from head to foot on Fridays to
recharge his psychic powers. Finally, Judge Floro conducted healing sessions in his chambers
during his break time. All these things validate the findings of the Supreme Court Clinic about
Judge Floros uncommon beliefs and that such beliefs have spilled over to action.
Lest we be misconstrued, we do not denigrate such belief system. However, such beliefs,
especially since Judge Floro acted on them, are so at odds with the critical and impartial
thinking required of a judge under our judicial system.
Psychic phenomena, even assuming such exist, have no place in a judiciary duty bound to
apply only positive law and, in its absence, equitable rules and principles in resolving
controversies. Thus, Judge Floros reference to psychic phenomena in the decision he rendered
in the case of People v. Francisco, Jr. 124 sticks out like a sore thumb. In said decision, Judge
Floro discredited the testimony of the prosecutions principal witness by concluding that the
testimony was a "fairytale" or a "fantastic story." 125 He then went to state that "psychic
phenomena" was destined to cooperate with the stenographer who transcribed the testimony of
the witness. The pertinent portion of Judge Floros decision is quoted hereunder:

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3. The testimony of the prosecutions PRINCIPAL witness (sole eyewitness of the incident)
NORMANDY is INCREDIBLE, is full of inconsistencies (major and not regarding minor
points), ergo, the court concludes that due to several indicia of fraud/perjury (flagrant/palpable
deception of the Court), his testimony is not worthy of belief, assuming ex-gratia argumenti,
that the same may be admissible, and his Court narrative is hereby declared a FAIRY TALE or
a FANTASTIC STORY of a crime scene that is acceptable only for SCREEN/cinematic
viewing. The following details, are proof of the foregoing conclusion:
a.) NORMANDY swore that he, Ponciano Ineria and Raul Ineria were "sinalubong"
by Lando/accused on June 21, 1987 at 2:30 a.m. at alley Wesleyan/Tangos, Navotas,
and that he saw the "nagpambuno" between Raul and Ando, and that HE SAW P.
INERIA dead, but HE WAS NO LONGER THERE, but he still saw the
"nagpambuno"; MORE IMPORTANTLY, he SWORE that HE NOTICED the
ACCUSED P. Francisco THE FOLLOWING DAY;
b.) The foregoing verily demonstrate his 11th HOUR CONCOCTION (Big Lie,
having been asked to submit false testimony); for how could have he witnessed the
stabbing by accused when he NOTICED him the following day? (TSN dated May 2,
1995, pp. 1-2); assuming arguendo that the TSN was incorrect due to typographical
error, or maybe the Court Stenographer III Eloisa B. Domingo might have been
SLEEPING during the testimony, so that the word DAY should have been corrected
to another word SUITABLE to Normandys FAIRY TALE, still, the Court had
synthesized the entire NARRATIVE of Normandy, but the Court found no reason
that the seeming error DAY should be corrected; the Courts sole/remaining
conclusion is that EVEN the STENOGRAPHIC NOTES cooperated by PSYCHIC
PHENOMENA perhaps of FOR SURE, in having BEEN DESTINED to be
FATEFULLY INSCRIBED WITH THE WORDS FOLLOWING DAY (line 3, p. 3
TSN, id.) 126 (Emphasis supplied)
In State Prosecutors v. Muro 127 we held that
What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An independent judiciary does not mean
that judges can resolve specific disputes entirely as they please. There are both implicit and
explicit limits on the way judges perform their role. Implicit limits include accepted legal
values and the explicit limits are substantive and procedural rules of law. 128
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is
not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or goodness. He is to
draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to
vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition,
methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinate to the "primordial necessity of
order in the social life." 129
Judge Floro does not meet such requirement of objectivity and his competence for judicial
tasks leaves much to be desired. As reported by the Supreme Court Clinic:
Despite his impressive academic background and achievements, he has lapses in judgment and
may have problems with decision-making. His character traits such as suspiciousness and
seclusiveness and preoccupation with paranormal and psychic phenomena though not

detrimental to his role as a lawyer, may cloud his judgment, and hamper his primary role as a
judge in dispensing justice. x x x 130
Judge Floros belief system, as well as his actuations in the eight months that he served as
RTC judge, indubitably shows his inability to function with the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge.
Verily, Judge Floro holds an exalted position in our system of government. Thus:
Long before a man dons the judicial robes, he has accepted and identified himself with large
components of the judges role. Especially if he has aspired to a judges status, he is likely to
have conducted himself, more or less unconsciously, in the fashion of one who is said to have
"the judicial temperament." He is likely to have displayed the kinds of behavior that the
judges role demands. A large proportion of his experiences on the bench develop and
reinforce such conformity, moreover. The ritualistic elements of investiture and of court
procedure, the honorific forms of address, and even the imposing appearance of some court
buildings serve to emphasize the demands upon his behavior. Even the most unscrupulous
former ambulance chaser who owes his position to a thoroughly corrupt political organization
must conform at least in part to the behaviors expected of him as a judge. 131
The expectations concerning judicial behavior are more than those expected of other public
officials. Judges are seen as guardians of the law and they must thus identify themselves with
the law to an even greater degree than legislators or executives. 132
As it has been said, "[j]udges administer justice judicially, i.e., not according to some abstract
ideas of right and justice, but according to the rules laid down by society in its Code of Laws
to which it gives its sanctions. The function of the judge is primarily adjudication. This is not a
mechanical craft but the exercise of a creative art, whether we call it legislative or not, which
requires great ability and objectivity." 133 We, thus, quote Justice Frankfurter, in speaking of
the functions of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States:
To practice the requisite detachment and to achieve sufficient objectivity no doubt demands of
judges the habit of self-discipline and self-criticism, incertitude that ones own views are
incontestable and alert tolerance toward views not shared. But these are precisely the
presuppositions of our judicial process. They are precisely the qualities society has a right to
expect from those entrusted with judicial power.
xxxx
The judicial judgment must move within the limits of accepted notions of justice and is not
to be based upon the idiosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment. 134
In fine, Judge Floro lacks the judicial temperament and the fundamental requirements of
competence and objectivity expected of all judges. He cannot thus be allowed to continue as
judge for to do so might result in a serious challenge to the existence of a critical and impartial
judiciary.

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Equitable considerations entitle Judge Floro backwages and other economic benefits for a
period of three (3) years.
In retrospect, we are forced to say that Judge Floro should not have joined the judiciary as
RTC judge. However, we have assiduously reviewed the history of this case and we cannot
hold anyone legally responsible for such major and unfortunate faux pas.
Judge Floro did not breach any rule of procedure relative to his application for judgeship. He
went through the entire gamut of tests and interviews and he was nominated by the JBC on the
strength of his scholastic achievements. As to having failed the psychological examinations
given by the SC Clinic, it must be pointed out that this was disregarded by the JBC upon
Judge Floros submission of psychiatric evaluations conducted by mental health professionals
from the private sector and which were favorable to him. Nowhere is it alleged that Judge
Floro acted less than honorably in procuring these evaluations.
The JBC in 1999 had all the discretion to refer Judge Floro to a private clinic for a second
opinion of his mental and psychological fitness. In performing its functions, the JBC had been
guided primarily by the Constitution which prescribes that members of the Judiciary must be,
in addition to other requirements, persons of proven competence, integrity, probity and
independence. 135 It was only on 18 October 2000 when it promulgated JBC-009, the "Rules of
the Judicial and Bar Council," that the JBC put down in writing guidelines or criteria it had
previously used in ascertaining "if one seeking such office meets the minimum constitutional
qualifications and possesses qualities of mind and heart expected of the Judiciary." 136 Rule 6
thereof states:
SECTION 1. Good health. Good physical health and sound mental/psychological and
emotional condition of the applicant play a critical role in his capacity and capability to
perform the delicate task of administering justice. x x x
SEC. 2. Psychological/psychiatric tests. The applicant shall submit to
psychological/psychiatric tests to be conducted by the Supreme Court Medical Clinic or by a
psychologist and/or psychiatrist duly accredited by the Council.
It would seem that as things stood then, the JBC could very well rely on the evaluation of a
private psychologist or psychiatrist not accredited by the JBC. Thus, the JBC cannot be faulted
for accepting the psychological evaluations of mental health professionals not affiliated with
the Supreme Court Clinic.
It goes without saying that Judge Floros appointment as RTC judge is fait accompli. What
awaits us now is the seemingly overwhelming task of finding the PROPER, JUST AND
EQUITABLE solution to Judge Floros almost seven years of suspension in the light of the
fact that the penalty imposed herein does not merit a suspension of seven years.
Verily, the Supreme Court is vested with the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts. 137 The Constitution limits this power through the
admonition that such rules "shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights." 138

Rule 140 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure to be followed in administrative cases
against judges. Glaringly, Rule 140 does not detail the steps to be taken in cases when the
judge is preventively suspended pending investigation. This is the state of things even after its
amendment by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC which took effect on 1 October 2001.
The Supreme Courts power to suspend a judge, however, is inherent in its power of
administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. 139 This power -consistent with the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in
all courts -- is hemmed in only by the Constitution which prescribes that an adjective law
cannot, among other things, diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
The resolution of 20 July 1999 which put Judge Floro under preventive suspension resolved
to:
(1) DIRECT Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. to answer the foregoing charges against him within
ten (10) days from notice; (2) REFER this case to Retired Justice Pedro Ramirez, Consultant,
Office of the Court Administrator for investigation, report and recommendation, within sixty
(60) days from receipt of the records thereof; (3) SUBJECT Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. for
appropriate psychological or mental examination to be conducted by the proper office of the
Supreme Court or any duly authorized medical and/or mental institution.
Moreover, the Court RESOLVED to place Judge Florentino Floro, effective immediately
under PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION for the duration of the investigation of the administrative
charges against him. 140
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted resolution, Judge Floros suspension, albeit
indefinite, was for the duration of the investigation of the 13 charges against him which the
Court pegged at 60 days from the time of receipt by the investigator of the records of the case.
Rule 140, as amended, now states that "(t)he investigating Justice or Judge shall terminate the
investigation within ninety (90) days from the date of its commencement or within such
extension as the Supreme Court may grant" 141 and, "(w)ithin thirty (30) days from the
termination of the investigation, the investigating Justice or Judge shall submit to the Supreme
Court a report containing findings of fact and recommendation." 142
From the foregoing, the rule now is that a Judge can be preventively suspended not only for
the entire period of his investigation which would be 90 days (unless extended by the Supreme
Court) but also for the 30 days that it would take the investigating judge or justice to come up
with his report. Moreover, the Court may preventively suspend a judge until such time that a
final decision is reached in the administrative case against him or her. 143This is because
[U]nlike ordinary civil service officials and employees, judges who are charged with a serious
offense warranting preventive suspension are not automatically reinstated upon expiration of
the ninety (90)-day period, as mandated above. The Court may preventively suspend a judge
until a final decision is reached in the administrative case especially where there is a strong
likelihood of his guilt or complicity in the offense charged. Indeed, the measure is intended to
shield the public from any further damage or wrongdoing that may be caused by the continued
assumption of office by the erring judge. It is also intended to protect the courts image as
temples of justice where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled and justice solemnly
dispensed.

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This is a necessary consequence that a judge must bear for the privilege of occupying an
exalted position. Among civil servants, a judge is indeed in a class all its own. After all, in the
vast government bureaucracy, judges are beacon lights looked upon as the embodiment of all
what is right, just and proper, the ultimate weapons against justice and oppression. 144

suspension exceeding the ninety-day (90) period actually becomes without basis and would
indeed be nothing short of punitive. It must be emphasized that his subsequent acquittal
completely removed the cause for his preventive suspension in the first place. Necessarily,
therefore, we must rectify its effects on just and equitable grounds. 147

In the case of Judge Floro, he is under preventive suspension up to the present because of the
serious charge of mental unfitness aggravated by the fact that the actual investigation into his
cases dragged on for a much longer period than 90 days. And the reasons for the delay, for the
most part, can be directly ascribed to Judge Floro himself. From the records, it would seem
that not only did Judge Floro move for several re-settings of the hearings of his cases; he
likewise dragged his feet with respect to the order to submit himself to the appropriate
psychological/mental examination. Worse, what started out as single case against him
ballooned into 10 cases which were consolidated into one due to common questions of fact
and law. 145 All in all, Judge Floro filed seven cases against those he perceived had connived to
remove and/or suspend him from office, the last of which he filed on 19 May 2003 against
Justice Ramirez. 146

Taking off from the case of Judge Iturralde, we hold that Judge Floro is likewise entitled to the
payment of back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits being at the receiving end
of a rule peculiar to judges who find themselves preventively suspended by the Court "until
further orders" or, as this case, "for the duration of the investigation." Judge Iturraldes
suspension of 13 months even pales in comparison to Judge Floros suspension of 81
months, more or less. During this entire excruciating period of waiting, Judge Floro could not
practice his profession, thus putting him solely at the mercy of his brothers largesse. And,
though he was given donations by those who came to him for healing, obviously, these could
not compensate for his loss of income as Judge.

Be that as it may, EQUITY demands that we exercise utmost compassion in this case
considering that the rules on preventive suspension of judges, not having been expressly
included in the Rules of Court, are amorphous at best. We have ruled similarly in the case of
Judge Philbert Iturralde, thus:
Be that as it may, we cannot in conscience hold that a judge who was placed under preventive
suspension pending investigation is not entitled to the payment of back salaries, allowances
and other economic benefits for the entire duration of the preventive suspension. The inequity
of the doctrine as applied to judges is clearly apparent, given the peculiar circumstance in
which a judge finds himself preventively suspended by the Court "until further orders".
In this case, Judge Iturralde was preventively suspended for 13 months, during which period
he was not paid his salaries, allowances and other benefits. Except for a teaching job that the
Court permitted him to undertake pending resolution of the administrative case, Judge
Iturralde had no other source of income. He thus incurred several loans to provide for his
familys basic needs.
It would thus be unjust to deprive Judge Iturralde of his back salaries, allowances and other
economic benefits for the entire period that he was preventively suspended. As we have said in
Gloria v. Court of Appeals, preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty but
only a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered formal
investigation. We held that ninety (90) days is ample time to conclude the investigation of an
administrative case. Beyond ninety (90) days, the preventive suspension is no longer justified.
Hence, for purposes of determining the extent of back salaries, allowances and other benefits
that a judge may receive during the period of his preventive suspension, we hold that the
ninety-day maximum period set in Gloria v. Court of Appeals, should likewise be applied.
Concededly, there may be instances when an investigation would extend beyond ninety (90)
days and such may not be entirely unjustified. Nevertheless, we believe that in such a
situation, it would be unfair to withhold his salaries and other economic benefits for the entire
duration of the preventive suspension, moreso if the delay in the resolution of the case was not
due to his fault. Upon being found innocent of the administrative charge, his preventive

Unlike the case of Judge Iturralde, however, wherein we held that the period of suspension
exceeding 90 days should be the basis for the payment of back salaries, we hold that, as a
matter of equity, Judge Floro is entitled to back salaries, allowances and other economic
benefits for a period corresponding to three of his almost seven years suspension. We cannot
apply the ruling in Gloria that any suspension served beyond 90 days must be compensated as
we would be, in effect, rewarding Judge Floros propensity to delay the resolution of his case
through the indiscriminate filing of administrative cases against those he perceived connived
to oust him out of office. In Judge Iturraldes case, the investigation was not delayed through
any fault of his. More importantly, Judge Iturralde was ultimately held innocent, thus, using by
analogy Gloria v. Court of Appeals, his suspension in excess of 90 days was already in the
nature of a penalty which cannot be countenanced precisely because, being innocent, he
cannot be penalized. Judge Floro, on the other hand, and as already discussed, contributed to
the delay in the investigation of his cases. Moreover, unlike Judge Iturralde, Judge Floro has
not been adjudged innocent of all the 13 charges against him.
These facts, however, as we have already discussed, do not put Judge Floro beyond the reach
of equity. To paraphrase Justice Brandeis, equity does not demand that its suitors are free of
blame. As we are wont to say:
Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice where
courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their
judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent so to do. Equity regards the
spirit of and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather than the
circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different courts. 148
In fine, notwithstanding the fact that Judge Floro is much to blame for the delay in the
resolution of his case, equitable considerations constrain us to award him back salaries,
allowances and other economic benefits for a period corresponding to three years. This is
because Judge Floros separation from the service is not a penalty as we ordinarily understand
the word to mean. It is imposed instead upon Judge Floro out of necessity due to a medically
disabling condition of the mind which renders him unfit, at least at present, to continue
discharging the functions of his office.

74

The period of three years seems to us the most equitable under the circumstances. As
discussed, if we were to give him more than three years of back salaries, etc., then it would
seem that we are rewarding him for his role in delaying the resolution of these cases (as well
as the seven cases he filed which were only dismissed on 14 February 2006 at his own
bidding). On the other hand, if we were to peg the period at less than three years then the same
would only be a pittance compared to the seven years suspension he had to live through with
Damocles sword hanging over his head and with his hands bound as he could not practice his
profession.
Judge Floros separation from the service moots the case against him docketed as A.M. No.
99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 Of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) A.M.
No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.), on the other hand, is
dismissed for lack of merit.
A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC
It cannot be gainsaid that Judge Floros separation from the service renders moot the
complaint in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC. As it is, even the most favorable of resolutions in this
case will not cause a ripple on the Courts decision to separate Judge Floro from the service.
Thus, this charge is dismissed for being moot and academic.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988
Considering that this case is a replica of charge "h" in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 and considering
that charge "h" is without basis, this particular complaint filed by Luz Arriego must
necessarily be dismissed for lack of merit.
Judge Floros separation from the service does not carry with it forfeiture of all or part of his
accrued benefits nor disqualification from appointment to any other public office including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
As Judge Floros separation from the service cannot be considered a penalty, such separation
does not carry with it the forfeiture of all or part of his accrued benefits nor disqualification
from appointment to any other public office including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
In fact, the psychological and psychiatric reports, considered as the bedrock of the finding of
mental impairment against Judge Floro, cannot be used to disqualify him from re-entering
government service for positions that do not require him to dispense justice. The reports
contain statements/findings in Judge Floros favor that the Court cannot overlook in all
fairness as they deserve equal consideration. They mention Judge Floros assets and strengths
and capacity for functionality, with minor modification of work environment. Thus:

c. "(C)haracter traits of suspiciousness, seclusiveness, pre-occupation with

paranormal and psychic phenomena not detrimental to his role as a lawyer." 151
d. "Everyday situations can be comprehended and dealt with in moderate
proficiency . His concern for the details that make up a total field represents his
attempts at being systematic and cautious." 152
e. "(E)quipped with analytical power." 153
Consequently, while Judge Floro may be dysfunctional as a judge because of the sensitive
nature of said position, he may still be successful in other areas of endeavor.
Putting all of the above in perspective, it could very well be that Judge Floros current
administrative and medical problems are not totally of his making. He was duly appointed to
judgeship and his mental problems, for now, appear to render him unfit with the delicate task
of dispensing justice not because of any acts of corruption and debasement on his part but
clearly due to a medically disabling condition.
Finally, if Judge Floros mental impairment is secondary to genetics 154 and/or adverse
environmental factors (and, unfortunately, such essential information is not available), we
cannot condemn people for their faulty genes and/or adverse environment factors they have
no control over.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
1) FINE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. in the total amount of FORTY THOUSAND
(P40,000.00) PESOS for seven of the 13 charges against him in A.M. No. RTJ-991460;
2) RELIEVE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. of his functions as Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 73, Malabon City and consider him SEPARATED from the
service due to a medically disabling condition of the mind that renders him unfit to
discharge the functions of his office, effective immediately;
3) As a matter of equity, AWARD Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. back salaries,
allowances and other economic benefits corresponding to three (3) years;
4) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino
V. Floro, Jr.) for LACK OF MERIT; and
5) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May
1999 Of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) for MOOTNESS.

a. High intellectual assets as a result of "self-discipline and self- organization." 149

SO ORDERED.
b. "(I)mpressive academic achievements" with "no drastic change in his personality
and level of functioning as a lawyer in private practice." 150

75

RULE 137, RULES OF COURT

[G.R. No. 171765

March 21, 2012]

THE INCORPORATORS OF MINDANAO INSTITUTE INC. and THE BOARD OF

TRUSTEES OF MINDANAO INSTITUTE INC., represented by ENGR. VICTORIOSO
D. UDARBE, Petitioners,
vs.
THE UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE PHILIPPINES, acting through
AGUSAN DISTRICT CONFERENCE UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by REV. RODOLFO BASLOT, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the
September 30, 2005 Decision1 and the March 1, 2006 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 79156, which dissolved the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction3 dated July 9, 2003 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cabadbaran, Agusan del
Norte, Branch 34 (RTC).
The Factual and Procedural Antecedents
On April 29, 2003, Gregorio D. Calo, Zoilito L. Cepeda, Victorioso D. Udarbe, Tita B.
Udarbe, Edgar B. Palarca, Louie Libarios, Anna Mae Pelegrino, Cirilia A. Sanchez, Anita V.
Carloto and Eduardo Andit, the incorporators of Mindanao Institute Inc. (MI Incorporators),
represented by Engineer Victorioso D. Udarbe (Engr. Udarbe),4 filed a Petition for Declaratory
Relief with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order(TRO) and Preliminary
Injunction5 against the United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP), acting through the
Agusan District Conference of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines and represented
by Reverend Rodolfo Baslot (Rev. Baslot), before the RTC, which was docketed as Special
Civil Action Case No. 03-02. The incorporators prayed that Mindanao Institute, Inc. (MI) be
declared the sole owner of the assets and properties of MI and to prevent the impending
takeover by UCCP of MIs properties. They averred that UCCP was unlawfully claiming
ownership of MIs properties.
On June 5, 2003, UCCP filed its Answer with Counterclaim, 6 asserting its ownership of MIs
properties based on certain documents. 7 It claimed that the question of ownership in this case
was a settled issue and required no further discourse because "they constitute a majority of the
Board of Trustees and, therefore, in complete control thereof x x x."8

representatives, attorneys, agents or any other person acting in their behalf from seizing
control and management of the assets and properties of Mindanao Institute.
IT IS ORDERED.10
Meanwhile, UCCP received copies of MIs Amended Articles of Incorporation 11 (2003
Amended AOI) which was adopted by the MI Incorporators on May 9, 2003 and approved by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)on May 26, 2003.
On June 11, 2003, UCCP, represented by Rev. Baslot, and MI, represented by its President Dr.
Edgardo R. Batitang (Dr. Batitang), lodged a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the 2003
Amended Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws of Mindanao Institute with Prayer for the
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction and/or Damages 12 before
the RTC, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 09-2003. UCCP and MI asserted that the
Amendment of MIs Articles of Incorporation effected by signatories in a reckless and hasty
fashion was accomplished without the required majority vote in clear violation of Section
1613 of Corporation Code.14 Of the ten (10) signatures appearing in the 2003 Amended AOI
constituting 2/3 of the Board of Trustees of MI, five (5) were affixed by mere representatives
who were not duly authorized to vote. Further, UCCP and MI, as represented by Dr. Batitang,
stressed that the procedure in the acceptance of corporate members as embodied in the
Amended By-Laws contains discriminatory provisions, wherein certain members maybe
subjected to confirmation and acceptance or rejection, but aimed specifically at members to be
nominated by UCCP.
On June 17, 2003, the signatories moved to dismiss15 the complaint for declaration of nullity
of the 2003 Amended AOI. They contended that the SEC, in approving the amendments to the
Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, was exercising its quasi-judicial function and,
therefore, a co-equal body of the RTC. Thus, the RTC could not grant any of the reliefs prayed
for by UCCP.
At the scheduled joint hearing of Special Civil Action Case No. 03-02 and Civil Case No. 092003 to determine the propriety of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the Law
Office of Bernabe, Doyon, Bringas and Partners entered its appearance 16 as collaborating
counsel for UCCP. Incidentally, Atty. Roy Doyon (Atty. Doyon), the son of Executive Judge
Orlando F. Doyon (Judge Doyon), was one of the partners in the said law firm. This prompted
Atty. Nelbert T. Poculan, UCCPs lead counsel, to move for the inhibition of Judge Doyon
from the case. On the other hand, Atty. Rolando F. Carlota, MI Incorporators counsel,
expressed no objection to the continued participation of Judge Doyon in the proceedings of the
case despite the said development.
Subsequently, Judge Doyon proceeded with the joint hearing. Thereafter, the RTC granted the
MI incorporators prayer for preliminary injunction against UCCP in its Omnibus
Order17 dated July 4, 2003, the decretal portion of which states:

On June 10, 2003, the RTC issued a TRO 9 against UCCP reasoning out that MI would suffer
grave and irreparable damages if the ownership and possession of its assets and properties
would be transferred to UCCP. The RTC disposed:

WHEREFORE, the prayer for issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order in Civil Case No.
09-2003 is hereby denied with finality.

WHEREFORE, it appearing that petitioners will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury,
let a temporary restraining order against respondents be issued restraining respondents, their

As prayed for in Special Civil Case No. 03-02, let a Writ of Preliminary Injunction be issued,
restraining, prohibiting, and enjoining respondents, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE

76

PHILIPPINES (UCCP) acting thru AGUSAN DISTRICT CONFERENCE (ADC-UCCP),

represented by Rev. Rodolfo Baslot, their agents, representatives, attorneys, and any other
persons acting for and in their behalf from taking over, seizing control, managing, or
administering MINDANAO INSTITUTE and preventing plaintiffs in discharging their
functions and duties in the management, control and administration of the school, its premises
and assets, upon plaintiffs putting up a bond in the amount of P 200,000.00 duly approved by
the Court, which bond shall be executed in favour of the defendants to answer for whatever
damages they may sustain by reason of or arising from the issuance of the writ in the event
that the Court will finally rule that the plaintiffs are not entitled thereto.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In issuing the preliminary injunction against UCCP, the RTC explained:
The prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, hereinafter known as TRO, in
Civil Case No. 09-2003, is anchored on the assumption that the Amended Articles of
Incorporation and Amended By-Laws of Mindanao Institute adopted on May 26, 2003, is null
and void for being ultra vires. However, at this stage of the proceedings where the action of
the Court is generally based on initial and incomplete evidence, the Court cannot just
precipitately rule that the amendments were ultra vires acts of the respondents.
It should be stressed that the questioned Amended Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws is
duly approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission, hereinafter referred to as SEC. As
such, there being no evidence thus far presented to the contrary, the presumption is that the
official duty of the SEC has been regularly performed.
Thus, the actuations of respondents in Civil Case No. 09-2003 based on those documents are
presumptively valid unless declared void by this Court after a full-blown trial. In other words,
plaintiffs at this stage, have not shown the existence of a clear legal right which has been
violated warranting the issuance of a TRO, because before a TRO or injunction is issued, it is
essential that there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected and that
the act against which the injunction is issued is a violation of such right.

In its Omnibus Order20 dated August 20, 2003, Judge Doyon inhibited himself from the cases
citing the fact that his sons law firm entered its appearance as collaborating counsel for
UCCP.
Disappointed with the unfavorable ruling, UCCP and MI, as represented by Dr. Batitang,
sought relief with the CAvia a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in issuing the assailed order.
The CA granted the petition in its September 30, 2005 Decision, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, above premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The writ of
preliminary injunction issued against the United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP)
in Special Civil Case No. 02-03 is herebyDISSOLVED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.21
The CA reasoned, among others, that the petition for certiorari (Civil Case No. 09-2003)
having been jointly filed by UCCP and MI, as represented by Dr. Batitang, was adequate
evidence to support the conclusion that MI did not require any injunctive relief from UCCP.
The CA also stated that in actions for declaratory relief, the court was only called upon to
determine the parties rights and obligations. Citing Republic v. Court of Appeals,22 it reasoned
out that the RTC could not issue injunction in an action for declaratory relief in as much as the
right of the MI incorporators had not yet been violated. Moreover, it stated that the subsequent
inhibition of Judge Doyon in the cases was pursuant to the rules on compulsory
disqualification of a judge under Rule 3.12(d) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. 23
The MI incorporators, represented by Engr. Udarbe, moved for reconsideration but the motion
was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated March 1, 2006.
Hence, this petition.
THE ISSUES

On the other hand, plaintiffs in Special Civil Case No. 03-02 have shown that they have the
legal right in the management and administration of Mindanao Institute because their
actuations are based in an Amended Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws duly approved by
the SEC. The allegation that it was approved by the SEC in record time cannot be taken as
evidence that per se the approval was against any law, rule or regulation.
It is precisely for this reason that the Court issued a TRO because from the amendments,
plaintiffs in Special Civil Case No. 03-02 and respondents in Civil Case No. 09-2003 have
clear legal rights over the management and administration of Mindanao Institute and that the
acts of plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 09-2003 and respondents in Special Civil Case No. 03-02
are in violation of those rights. Pending determination, therefore, of the principal action in
Special Civil Case No. 03-02, the Court is inclined to issue a preliminary injunction to protect
and preserve the rights of plaintiffs. 18
UCCP moved for a reconsideration but the same was denied by the RTC in its
Resolution19 dated August 15, 2003.

I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPECIAL
TWENTY THIRD DIVISION, IN AN ORIGINAL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI
UNDER RULE 65 ERRED IN CONSIDERING AND RULING ON FACTUAL ISSUES
NOT YET HEARD AND TRIED IN THE COURT OF ORIGIN AND BASED ITS
DECISION THEREON.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPECIAL
TWENTY THIRD DIVISION ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF RULE 3.12(D) OF
THE CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS UNDER THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING THIS CASE.24

77

In their Memorandum,25 the petitioners argue that the CA went beyond the province of a writ
of certiorari by resolving factual questions, which should appropriately be threshed out in the
trial. On the inhibition, they pointed out that it was solely the law partner of Judge Doyons
son, Atty. J. Ma. James L. Bringas (Atty. Bringas), who personally entered his appearance as
collaborating counsel, and not the law firm. Furthermore, they claim that Atty. Doyon, Judge
Doyons son, was neither present in court on the day Atty. Bringas entered his appearance nor
was he present in any of the previous hearings of the subject cases. Hence, petitioners claim
that Rule 3.12(d) of the Code of Judicial Conduct 26 is not applicable in this case because Atty.
Doyon never represented any party in any of the subject cases being heard by Judge Doyon.
In its Memorandum,27 respondent claims that the petition for review on certiorari filed by the
petitioners was not properly verified as to authorize Engr. Udarbe to file the same - a fatal
procedural infirmity. Further, it points out that petitioners are raising questions of fact in their
petition not cognizable by this Court.
THE COURTS RULING
The petition lacks merit.
The Court is called upon to resolve the issue of whether or not the CA erred in dissolving the
writ of preliminary injunction issued against UCCP. The writ of preliminary injunction
enjoined UCCP from taking control and management of MI and preventing petitioners from
discharging their functions in its management. Thus, the Court shall confine itself only with
the concerned writ and not the merits of the cases, which are still pending with the RTC. A
preliminary injunction, being a preservative remedy for the protection of substantive rights or
interests, is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a
main suit.28
A preliminary injunction is defined under Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, as follows:
Section 1. Preliminary injunction defined; classes. A preliminary injunction is an order
granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a
party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. x x x
A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to in order to preserve
and protect certain rights and interests during the pendency of an action. 29 The objective of a
writ of preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be
fully heard.1wphi1 Status quo is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested situation which
precedes a controversy.30
Significantly, Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the grounds for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction:
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction may be
granted when it is established:

complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited
period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant;
or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to
do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of
the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and
tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
Based on the foregoing provision, the Court in St. James College of Paraaque v. Equitable
PCI Bank31 ruled that the following requisites must be proved before a writ of preliminary
injunction will issue:
(1) The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is, a
right in esse;
(2) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right;
(3) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant;
and
(4) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of
irreparable injury.32[Underscoring supplied]
It bears stressing that to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the
violation against that right must be shown. A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only
upon clear showing of an actual existing right to be protected during the pendency of the
principal action.33 When the complainants right or title is doubtful or disputed, he does not
have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not proper.34
In the present case, the records fail to reveal any clear and unmistakable right on the part of
petitioners. They posit that they are suing in behalf of MIs interests by preventing UCCP from
unlawfully wresting control of MIs properties. Their claimed derivative interest, however, has
been disputed by UCCP in both its Answer with Counterclaim in Special Civil Action Case
No. 03-02 and its Complaint in Civil Case No. 09-2003, wherein MI itself, represented by Dr.
Batitang himself, is its co-petitioner.1wphi1 Evidently, the conflicting claims of the parties
regarding the issue of ownership over MIs property create the impression that the petitioners
derivative right, used as basis for the issuance of the preliminary injunction, is far from clear.
Petitioners claimed right is still indefinite, at least until it is properly threshed out in a trial,
negating the presence of a right in esse that requires the protection of an injunctive writ.
Verily, petitioners cannot lay claim to a clear and positive right based on the 2003 Amended
AOI,the provisions of which are strongly disputed and alleged to be invalidly obtained.

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of
such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts

78

As regards the issue of Judge Doyons disqualification to sit as judge in the subject cases, the
Court agrees with the CA. The pertinent rule on the mandatory disqualification of judicial
officers is laid down in Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 thereof provides:
SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in
which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniary interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or
in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to
counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which
he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or which he has presided in
any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written
consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. [Underscoring
supplied]
x x x.
Moreover, Rule 3.12 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which took effect from
October 20 1989 until May 31, 2004, the applicable rule then, reads as follows:
A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judges impartiality might reasonably
be questioned. These cases include, among others, proceedings where:
xxx

[G.R. No. 160966 October 11, 2005]

PAGODA PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
UNIVERSAL CANNING, INC.,* Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
he Rules on voluntary inhibition do not give judges the unfettered discretion to desist from
hearing a case. The motion for inhibition must be grounded on just and valid causes. The mere
imputation of bias or partiality is not enough basis for them to inhibit, especially when the
charge is groundless.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, challenging the
August 14, 2003 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 77514 and the
November 24, 2003 Resolution3 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The decretal
portion or fallo of the assailed Decision reads as follows:

(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree
or to counsel within the fourth degree. [Underscoring supplied]

"WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the instant petition for mandamus is hereby

GRANTED. Public respondents Order dated May 22, 2003, voluntarily inhibiting himself
from the case is hereby SET ASIDE. Public respondent is DIRECTED to continue hearing the
case and dispose of the same with utmost dispatch."

The prohibitions under the afore-quoted provisions of the Rules are clear. The disqualification
is mandatory and gives the judicial officer concerned no discretion but to inhibit himself from
trying or sitting in a case. The rationale, therefore, is to preserve the people's faith and
confidence in the judiciary's fairness and objectivity.35

The Facts

While the Court finds it ludicrous that it was the counsel of UCCP, Atty. Poculan, who sought
the inhibition of Judge Doyon, considering that the law firm of the latters son is his
collaborating counsel, still the mandatory prohibition applies. Judge Doyon should have
immediately inhibited himself from the case upon learning of the entry of appearance of his
sons law firm. Where the disqualifying fact is indubitable and the parties to the case make no
waiver of such disqualification, as in the case at bench, Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of
Court forthwith completely strips the judge of authority to proceed. 36
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed September 30, 2005 Decision and
March 1, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 79156, are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

The facts are narrated by the CA as follows:

"[Petitioner] filed a civil complaint against [respondent] for Trademark Infringement, False
Representation and Unfair Competition with Damages and Injunction. The case was docketed
as Civil Case [N]o. 02-102988.
"[Petitioner] claimed that [respondents] Familys Brand Sardines is confusingly similar with
[petitioners] Family Brand Sardines. [Petitioner] insisted that it has superior right to use the
trademark Family than [respondent].
"[Respondent] filed an Answer with Compulsory Counter-claim and Motion to Dismiss and
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction.
"[Respondent] prayed that [petitioner] be enjoined from using the trademark Family and to
pay damages. [Respondent] further asked [Judge Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr.] to set the hearing
for its motion to dismiss the action on the grounds of lack of authority of the affiant of the
complaint to institute the action, insufficient verification and failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.

79

"After hearing, [Judge Eugenio] issued a temporary restraining order enjoining [petitioner] to
use the trademark Family.

The Petition is unmeritorious.

First Issue:

"On March 21, 2003, [Judge Eugenio] dismissed without prejudice, [petitioners] complaint on
the ground of insufficient verification as invoked by [respondent].
"[Respondent] filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dismissing [petitioners]
complaint, claiming that the defect in the verification has been rendered moot and academic
by subsequent rulings respective to the application for preliminary injunction and that the
attending circumstances of the case warrant liberal compliance [with] the rule.
"[Petitioner] filed a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition, requesting [Judge Eugenio] to inhibit
himself from proceeding to hear, try and decide the pending incidents of the case to afford
[petitioner] an impartial trial.
"[Respondent] opposed [petitioners] Motion for Voluntary Inhibition.
"On May 22, 2003, [Judge Eugenio] issued an Order voluntarily inhibiting himself from
further hearing the case.
"Hence, [the] petition [filed with the CA] by [respondent] for mandamus to compel [Judge
Eugenio] to continue to hear the pending incidents of the case." 4
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Remedy Against the

Order of Voluntary Inhibition
At the outset, we note that petitioner, in an effort to cover its bases, filed the present Petition
as both a petition for review under Rule 45 and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. The applicable rule is Rule 45, which clearly provides that decisions, final
orders or resolutions of the CA in any case -- regardless of the nature of the action or
proceeding involved -- may be appealed to this Court through a petition for review. This
remedy is a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. 7 "It is basic that where
Rule 45 is available, and in fact availed of as a remedy -- as in this case -- recourse under Rule
65 cannot be allowed either as an add-on or as a substitute for appeal." 8
The procedural infirmity notwithstanding, this Court shall deal with this Petition as one filed
under Rule 45 only and shall treat the alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA
as an allegation of reversible error.
Petitioner claims that respondent erred when the latter questioned the trial judges Order of
Voluntary Inhibition --supposedly a purely discretionary act -- through a Petition for
Mandamus filed with the CA.

Hence, this Petition.5

While, ordinarily, mandamus will not prosper to compel a discretionary act, the writ shall
issue in instances of gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of
authority, equivalent to denial of a settled right to which petitioner is entitled; and when there
is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. 9 This Court has recognized that "[a] judges
decision to refuse to act on account of some disqualification is not conclusive, and his
competency may be determined on an application for mandamus to compel him to act." 10

Issue

Second Issue:

The issue was worded by petitioner in this wise:

Inhibition

"The principal issue raised by the petitioner for this Honorable Court to resolve is whether or
not a petition for mandamus is the proper remedy to assail a purely discretionary act of Judge
Antonio Eugenio, Jr. of voluntarily inhibiting himself from hearing Civil Case No. 02-102988
and corollary thereto, whether Judge Eugenio, Jr. who inhibited himself in accordance with the
law and the Rules, can be compelled to perform an act he had already decided not to do with
the intention of assuring the litigants of an impartial trial." 6

Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides:

Finding no valid and just reason for the voluntary inhibition of Judge Eugenio, the CA issued
the writ of mandamus. It ruled that the present case fell within the exception that mandamus
would lie in instances of gross abuse of discretion.

The Court believes that there are actually two issues to be settled in this case: first, whether
mandamus is the proper remedy to assail an order of voluntary inhibition; and second, whether
there was a valid and just reason for the voluntary inhibition of the trial court judge.

"Section 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in
which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise,
or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or
to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in
which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has
presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the
written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

The Courts Ruling

80

"A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case,
for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above."

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

The Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibition: compulsory and voluntary. Under the first
paragraph of the cited Rule, it is conclusively presumed that judges cannot actively and
impartially sit in the instances mentioned. The second paragraph, which embodies voluntary
inhibition, leaves to the sound discretion of the judges concerned whether to sit in a case for
other just and valid reasons, with only their conscience as guide. 11

[G.R. No. 179583

In Umale v. Villaluz,12 the Court traced the history of the second paragraph of the above-quoted
provision, which had been added only as an amendment to the Rules of Court in 1964. Prior to
that year, the question on whether to take cognizance of the case did not depend upon the
discretion of the judges not legally disqualified to sit in a given case. If those concerned were
not disqualified, it was their official duty to proceed with the case or else risk being called
upon to account for their dereliction. They could not voluntarily inhibit themselves on grounds
of prejudice or bias, extreme delicacy, or even if they themselves took great interest and an
active part in the filing of the case. Gutierrez v. Santos13 and Del Castillo v. Javelona14 paved
the way for the recognition of other circumstances for disqualification --those that depended
upon the exercise of discretion of the judges concerned.
The judges right, however, must be weighed against their duty to decide cases without fear of
repression. "Verily, the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 does not give judges the
unfettered discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing a case. The inhibition must be
for just and valid causes. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for
them to inhibit, especially when the charge is without basis. This Court has to be shown acts or
conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the
stigma of bias or partiality." 15
A perusal of the records of the case fails to reveal that any bias or prejudice motivated Judge
Eugenio in issuing the Writ of Preliminary Injunction in favor of respondent or in dismissing
petitioners Complaint. Neither did this Court find any questionable or suspicious
circumstances leading to the issuance of those Orders, as suggested by petitioner.
This Court has repeatedly held that for bias and prejudice to be considered valid reasons for
the voluntary inhibition of judges, mere suspicion is not enough. Bare allegations of their
partiality will not suffice "in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the
presumption that a judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and
evidence and without fear or favor." 16
In his questioned Order of Inhibition, Judge Eugenio himself satisfactorily clarified his
actuations and the circumstances leading to the issuance of the questioned injunction and
Order of dismissal. Obviously not believing that he had been motivated by bias or prejudice,
he nonetheless granted petitioners Motion to Inhibit. Understandably, he did so with the
intention to uphold the integrity of the judiciary as an institution worthy of public trust and
confidence. Under the circumstances, however, to affirm his Order of Inhibition would open
the floodgates to a form of forum-shopping, in which litigants would be allowed to shop for a
judge more sympathetic to their cause. 17 Such action would be antithetical to the speedy and
fair administration of justice.

September 3, 2009]

JIMMY BARNES a.k.a. JAMES L. BARNES, Petitioner,

vs.
TERESITA C. REYES, ELIZABETH PASION, MA. ELSA C. GARCIA, IMELDA C.
TRILLO, MA. ELENA C. DINGLASAN, and RICARDO P.
CRISOSTOMO, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the
June 28, 2007 Decision1 and the September 18, 2007 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 94016. The relevant antecedent facts and proceedings follow.
In 1999, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 215 a
complaint for specific performance with damages docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-37219. On
motion of respondents, the complaint was dismissed. The appellate court later affirmed the
dismissal in CA-G.R. SP No. 69573. This Court, however, in its decision in G.R. No. 160753
on September 30, 2004, reversed and set aside the order of dismissal and remanded the case to
the trial court with the instruction that the same be heard and tried with deliberate
dispatch.3 On June 28, 2005, the Court denied with finality the motion for the reconsideration
of the said decision.4
RTC, Branch 215, of Quezon City, thus, proceeded to hear Civil Case No. Q-99-37219. On
February 23, 2006, however, petitioner filed his motion for the inhibition 5 of the presiding
judge, Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla, allegedly to preclude doubts or apprehensions of
partiality and to give the parties breathing space and peace of mind in the course of the
adjudication of the proceedings.
After respondents filed their opposition, the RTC judge issued the March 7, 2006
Order6 declaring that she was voluntarily inhibiting herself from hearing the case and that she
was granting the motion in order to dispel any doubt and perception of bias, and so that the
faith and confidence in the justice system would not be eroded.
Disagreeing with the trial judge, respondents, on April 10, 2006, filed before the CA their
Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction. 7 Respondents contended in the main that there was no
sufficient ground for the trial judge to inhibit herself from hearing the case.
On June 28, 2007, the CA rendered the assailed Decision 8 granting the petition for mandamus,
reversing and setting aside the inhibitory order issued by the trial court, and directing the said
court to hear and decide the civil case with deliberate dispatch. It ruled, among others, that the
allegations of preconceived bias and partiality thrown against the trial judge were more

81

imaginary than real; that the records bore no suspicious circumstances that would create doubt
on the impartiality, fairness and objectivity of the trial judge; that no extrinsic evidence
appeared on the records to establish that the trial judge acted with bad faith, malice or corrupt
purpose all throughout the proceedings; and that there was no just and valid cause for the
disqualification of the trial judge from presiding over the case.
The appellate court, in the further assailed September 18, 2007 Resolution, 9 denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved, petitioner brought the matter to this Court via the
instant Rule 45 petition.
The Court denies the petition.
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides that
Section 1. Disqualification of judges.No judge or judicial officers shall sit in any case in
which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise,
or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or
to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in
which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has
presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the
written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case,
for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
The first paragraph of the section relates to the mandatory inhibition of judges; the second, to
their voluntary inhibition.
The discretion referred to in the second paragraph is a matter of conscience and is addressed
primarily to the judges sense of fairness and justice. 10 Indeed, as this Court has held in
Pimentel v. Salanga,11 judges may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation.
However, when suggestion is made of record that they might be induced to act with bias or
prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a
state of mind, they should conduct a careful self-examination. Magistrates should exercise
their discretion in a way that the peoples faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. They
should, therefore, exercise great care and caution before making up their minds to act or
withdraw from a suit. If, after reflection, they resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in a
case in which their motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, their action is to be
interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of
the Rules of Court.12

decision or order itself. 14 Stated differently, the bare allegations of the judges partiality will
not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that
the judge will undertake his noble role of dispensing justice in accordance with law and
evidence, and without fear or favor. Verily, for bias and prejudice to be considered valid
reasons for the involuntary inhibition of judges, mere suspicion is not enough. 15 Let it be
further noted that the option given to a judge to choose whether or not to handle a particular
case should be counterbalanced by the judges sworn duty to administer justice without fear of
repression.16
In the case at bar, petitioner, aside from his bare allegations, has not shown that Judge
Quijano-Padilla had been biased and partial against a particular party in the proceedings in
Civil Case No. Q-99-37219. The judge even acknowledged in the inhibitory order that the
motion for her disqualification contained no statement of specific act or acts that would show
her partiality or bias in the treatment of the case. Her voluntary inhibition was only on account
of dispelling any doubt and perception of bias on the part of petitioner. Clearly, therefore, no
just and valid reason supports the inhibition of Judge Quijano-Padilla.
The fact that Judge Quijano-Padilla ruled adversely against petitioner in the resolution of the
motion to dismiss, which this Court later reversed in G.R. No. 160753, is not enough reason,
absent any extrinsic evidence of malice or bad faith, to conclude that the judge was biased and
partial against petitioner. As this Court has emphasized in Webb v. People, 17 the remedy of
erroneous interlocutory rulings in the course of a trial is not the outright disqualification of a
judge, for there is yet to come a judge with the omniscience to issue rulings that are always
infallible. The courts will close shop if we disqualify judges who err, for we all err.1avvphi1
Finally, the Court notes that if it were to affirm the inhibitory order in this case, then it would
be opening the floodgates to a form of forum-shopping, in which litigants would be allowed to
shop for a judge more sympathetic to their causes.18
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The June 28, 2007 Decision
and the September 18, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94016 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Nonetheless, while the rule allows judges, in the exercise of sound discretion, to voluntarily
inhibit themselves from hearing a case, it provides that the inhibition must be based on just or
valid reasons. In prior cases interpreting this rule, the most recent of which is Philippine
Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Wilson Dy Hong Pi, etc., et al., 13 the Court noted
that the mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially
when the charge is without basis. Acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or
prejudice has to be shown. Extrinsic evidence must further be presented to establish bias, bad
faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the

82

[G.R. No. L-37635 July 22, 1975]

CRESENCIO MARTINEZ, petitioner,
vs.
LEOPODO B. GIRONELLA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Abra, Branch
II, respondent.
Petitioner in his own behalf.
Respondent for and his own behalf.

CONCEPCION JR., J.:

In Criminal Case No. 21 of the Court of First Instance of Abra, Branch II, Cresencio Martinez,
as principal, and Viernes Duclan and Arnold Bayongan, as accessories after the fact, were
charged with the murder of one Alfredo Batoon. As the first two were not apprehended, trial
proceeded with respect to the third, Arnold Bayongan. Thereafter, decision was rendered, the
pertinent and dispositive portions of which are as follows
xxx xxx xxx
It is worthy to state, however, that the offense of murder was clearly
established and was committed by Cresencio Martinez, from the evidence
on record, there is no showing that Arnold Bayongan is an accessory after
the fact. The evidence as a whole, however, tends to allude Gregorio
Banawa, the then incumbent Mayor of Sallapadan to have knowledge of
the perpetrator and commission of the crime but did not take any action. It
is further informed that Gregorio Banawa to date is hiding the principal
accused Cresencio Martinez.
In view of the foregoing consideration, the Court hereby dismisses the
charge against Arnold Bayongan and is therefore ordered ACQUITTED.
The Provincial Fiscal is hereby directed to investigate this case further to
avoid miscarriage of justice and the possibility of including Gregorio
Banawa and for the prompt apprehension of the principal accused
Cresencio Martinez. (pp. 10-11, rollo).
xxx xxx xxx
Subsequent to the acquittal of Arnold Bayongan, Cresencio Martinez surrendered to the
Philippine Constabulary and later was arraigned before Branch II of the same Court of First
instance. After having pleaded "not guilty" to the charge, and before the prosecution started to
present its evidence, counsel for accused Cresencio Martinez moved that the trial Judge inhibit
himself from hearing the case on its merits on the grounds "(1) that the respondent had the

chance to pass upon the issue and has formed an opinion as to who committed the crime of
murder; (2) that it would not be fair that he would sit, hear and pass judgment; and (3) that the
respondent is no longer impartial," and prayed that the case be transferred to Branch I of the
same Court.
Respondent denied the oral motion. Petitioner did not move for a reconsideration of the denial
of the motion so the trial proceeded. When the trial was already in the rebuttal stage for the
government, this Petition for Prohibition was filed. In his petition, Cresencio Martinez asks for
a writ of prohibition commanding respondent Judge to desist from hearing and deciding
Criminal Case No. 21 of the Court of First Instance of Abra; declaring the hearing heretofore
had as a mistrial; and ordering that said criminal case be heard anew by the presiding Judge of
Branch I of the said Court or any other Court within the Judicial District.
On being required to comment, the Solicitor General did so, and, citing the cases of Dais vs.
Torres, et al., 57 Phil. 897, 903; Luque vs. Kayanan, 29 SCRA 165; and Geotina vs. Gonzales,
41 SCRA 66, opined "that it would be in the best interest of justice and in keeping with the
clear intendment and pronouncements of the Honorable Court that the case should be tried
anew by another judge and that the respondent Judge should desist from further taking
cognizance of the case."
On the other hand, respondent Judge maintains that the trial was fair, impartial and liberal to
the herein accused-petitioner as can be gleaned from the records of Criminal Case No. 21.
Respondent explains that the statement that the "crime was committed by Cresencio Martinez"
appearing in the decision acquitting Arnold Bayongan after a separate trial "was based merely
on the prosecution evidence where petitioner was not on trial, therefore did not confront
witnesses, did not submit his defense evidence and surely will not in any way affect or apply
to him. The decision to be rendered shall be based upon the evidence adduced and submitted
by both parties."
The trial of the case has already been terminated and the Case submitted for decision.
Two issues are presented before us first, whether or not to order a new trial for petitioner;
and second, whether or not respondent judge should be allowed to decide petitioner's case.
It cannot be denied that elementary due process requires that a case be heard by a tribunal that
is impartial and disinterested. And if an accused has been the victim of an unfair and partial
trial, this court will certainly not hesitate to order a new trial in the interest of justice. 1 In
asking that the case be tried by another Judge, petitioner alleges in general that respondent
should not be impartial as contemplated in the New Constitution. No specific resolution, order,
or ruling of respondent is cited in particular as one of partiality. It should be noted that after
petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not guilty, and after respondent had denied petitioner's
motion for the former to inhibit himself from trying the case, petitioner did not move for a
reconsideration of the denial of the motion. Instead the trial proceeded. Petitioner took no
further action towards the disqualification of respondent until the trial was already in the
rebuttal stage for the government at which time the present Petition for Prohibition was filed.
The only conclusion we can draw from these circumstances is that the trial was fair and
impartial. We are, therefore, not inclined to order a new trial for petitioner.
As to the second issue: A Judge has the duty not only to render a just and impartial decision,
but also render it in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to its fairness and
impartiality, and also as to the judge's integrity. 2 While we grant respondent's capacity to
render a just and impartial decision, his statement in the decision acquitting Arnold Bayongan
to the effect that the "crime was committed by Cresencio Martinez" renders it impossible for

83

respondent to be free from the suspicion that in deciding petitioner's case, respondent will be
biased and prejudiced. We therefore hold that under these circumstances petitioner has the
right to have his case decided by another Judge.
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is granted. Respondent is ordered to transmit the
records of Criminal Case No. 21 of the Court of First Instance of Abra to Branch IV of the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, and the Judge presiding the said court will decide the
same. Without pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.

REPRESENTATIVES NIEL C. TUPAS JR., JOSEPH EMILIO A. ABAYA, LORENZO

R. TANADA III, REYNALDO V. UMALI, ARLENE J. BAG-AO (other complainants
comprising at least one-third (1/3 of the total Members of the House of Representatives
are indicated below), Complainants.
xx
VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR IMPEACHMENT
Undersigned COMPLAINANTS most respectfully file this duly Verified Complaint for the
Impeachment of the Honorable Renato C. Corona, currently the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court (hereafter, Respondent), upon the grounds of Betrayal of Public Trust, Culpable
Violation of the Constitution, and Graft and Corruption, as follows:
PREFATORY STATEMENT
Never has the position of Chief Justice, or the standing of the Supreme Court, as an institution,
been so tainted with the perception of bias and partiality, as it is now: not even in the dark days
of martial law, has the chief magistrate behaved with such arrogance, impunity, and cynicism.
And yet, for the authentic rule of law to prevail, the public must have absolute trust and
confidence in the justice, probity, integrity, and impartiality, of the members of the Supreme
Court. To have any justice, much more, a Chief Justice, who does not live up to the
expectation of being like Caesars wife beyond reproach- is to fatally impede the ability of
our institutions to function and dispense true justice to the people.
The Constitution provides a process for holding the judiciary to account, on the principle that
sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. The
Constitution provides for a mechanism to remove high officials who betray public trust,
commit culpable violations of the Constitution, and graft and corruption.
On May 17, 2010, a little over a month and a half before the new government was to be sworn
in, Respondent Renato Corona was appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to protect,
aid, and abet Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in her efforts to escape accountability for her acts as
President of the Philippines. His appointment was made in violation of the Constitution and by
overturning long-established ethical and legal principles forbidding presidents from making
midnight appointments. His assumption of the position of Chief Justice was thus made
possible by a combination of violating the Constitution, and then finding ways to justify it,
while ignoring examples of honourable and ethical behavior that should have made it
impossible to accept, much less assume, office under such dubious and dishonorable
circumstances.

[IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT OF RENATO C. CORONA AS CHIEF

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES,]

The Supreme Court itself, in Aytona v. Castillo,1 where it decided to uphold President
Diosdado Macapagal in voiding the midnight appointments of his predecessor, Carlos P.
Garcia, paid tribute to one of its former chiefs. Pointing out that President Elpidio Quirino
offered a midnight appointment to former Chief Justice Manuel Moran: Being ambassador in
Spain and desiring to return to this Court even as associate justice, Moran was tendered an ad
interim appointment thereto by President Quirino, after the latter had lost the election to
President Magsaysay, and before leaving the Presidency. Said Ambassador declined to qualify
being of the opinion that the matter should be left to the incoming newly-elected President.

84

In tackling President Garcias midnight appointments, the Supreme Court observed that
democratic respect and official self-restraint should have characterized Garcias actions:
When a nation embarks on electing its leadership, our Constitution, laws, judicial and
historical precedents all emphasize that incumbents must be barred from abusing their powers
to give themselves or their partisans undue advantage, thwart the public will, or harass and
harm a successors administration by tying its hands by means of maliciously-motivated
appointments. Furthermore, It is common sense to believe that after the proclamation of the
election of President Macapagal, his was no more than a care-taker administration. He was
duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority the incoming President, and he
should not do acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his
successor, the Supreme Court said.
With this precedent in mind, and with the healthy attitude towards limiting official power at
the close of an administration, so as not to sabotage the next, the present 1987 Constitution
enshrined a clear prohibition on midnight appointments. When President Fidel V. Ramos tried
to make judicial appointments in the closing days of his administration, the Supreme Court
voided them,2 restating the strict ban on appointments, not just to executive department
positions, but the judiciary.
And yet, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo decided to ignore all past precedents,
including the one established by her own father, President Diosdado Macapagal, in order to
appoint a Chief Justice when by any measure the history of the Court, as shown by
the delicadeza of former Chief Justice Manuel Moran; the landmark case of Aytona; the 1987
Constitution itself; and the November 9, 1998 en banc Resolution of the Supreme Court
voiding President Ramos midnight judicial appointments such an appointment was viewed
as dangerous and inimical to authentic democracy.
The decision of Mrs. Arroyo was premised on Respondents proven usefulness, and his
ambitions combining with her political calculations to make him a willing partner in Mrs.
Arroyos plan to evade and avoid accounting for her official actions. His usefulness and
ruthlessness were proven from the time he served as her Presidential Chief of Staff,
Presidential Spokesman, and as Acting Executive Secretary: all positions of the highest trust,
confidence, and utility to her in her official and personal affairs.

His leadership of the Supreme Court has severely eroded public confidence in the very
decision-making process of the High Court, due to the manner in which the Court has handed
down decisions, only to reconsider, overturn, and overturn again, those decisions: resulting in
an unprecedented state of flux in terms of the verdicts of the highest court in the land.
As Chief Justice, Respondent has been lavish in the spending of public funds; blind to ethical
standards of behavior expected not only of him, but his family; intrigued and conspired against
his fellow justices; and behaved more like a scofflaw than Chief Justice in refusing to disclose
his assets and liabilities. Not only has he behaved in a manner that is inconsistent with the
dignity and probity expected of a member of the high court, but has used his administrative
powers for partisan political ends, to protect other officials put in office for the same reason he
was appointed: to Mrs. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and ensure she evades
accountability for her acts.
His ethical blindness, introduction of political partisanship at the expense of due process, and
intrigue into the court at the expense of the reputation of his fellow justices, his undermining
basic, and cherished principles of intellectual, financial, and ethical honesty by using his
powers not to arrive at the truth, or hold the court to the highest standards, but instead, to
cover up and excuse the shortcomings of the court, has betrayed public trust by eroding public
confidence in the administration of justice.
Public office is premised on the maintenance of public trust; having betrayed that trust,
Respondent Renato Corona is manifestly unfit to continue as Chief Justice. He must be
impeached.
NATURE OF THIS ACTION
Therefore, this action for impeachment is brought against Chief Justice Renato C. Corona in
accordance with the provisions of Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, on the
grounds of: (a) Betrayal of Public Trust; (b) Culpable Violation of the Constitution; and (c)
Graft and Corruption.
THE PARTIES

His loyalty and subservience thus earned him an appointment to the Supreme Court as
Associate Justice at a time when Mrs. Arroyo was facing numerous challenges and besieged
by a public clamor for accountability.
Faced with a vacancy in the position of Chief Justice, she then went one step further and
conspired with Respondent Corona to maneuver his appointment as Chief Justice: by breaking
precedents established by her own father which premised midnight appointments as malicious
interference in the ability of a newly-elected president to have a free hand in fulfilling his
mandate.

Complainants are current Members of the House of Representative, responsible Filipino

citizens and taxpayers, and are all of legal age. For purposes of the instant Verified Complaint
for Impeachment, complainants may be served with pleadings, notices and processes at the
House of Representatives, Constitution Hills, Batasan Complex, Quezon City. They bring
this action for and on behalf of the People of the Republic of the Philippines by authority of
the 1987 Constitution, consistent with their civic and constitutional duties as citizens, public
servants, members of the bar, and Members of the House of Representatives as agents of the
People, the various sectors of the nation and other peoples organizations.

In the Supreme Court, Respondent has consistently acted in a manner that protects Mrs.
Arroyo, her legal maneuvers while in office, and the legal and administrative landmines she
left behind, so as to impede the governments efforts to exact accountability and justice.

Respondent RENATO C. CORONA is the incumbent Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
the Philippines, and is being sued in his official capacity. He may be served with summons and
other processes at his office address at the Supreme Court Building, City of Manila.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

85

When Respondent assumed office as Chief Justice on May 17, 2010, he did so despite a
Constitutionally-imposed ban on appointments which the Supreme Court made possible and
permitted under an interpretation that strained credulity, logic and common-sense and even
worse, effectively broke the law. The Justices that made this possible constitute a voting block
that Respondent leads as Chief Justice.

The Complainants hereby accuse Respondent of numerous acts that comprise: (a) Betrayal of
Public Trust; (b) Culpable Violation of the Constitution; and (c) Graft and Corruption, that
render him absolutely unfit for the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

The appointment was met with widespread public indignation and protests as it was obviously
morally dubious. His appointment came just one week after a new President was already
elected, and just a few weeks before a new President was to formally assume office. Despite
the Constitutional prohibition, the precedent established in Aytona v. Castillo, which declared
that an incumbent President appointing officials after the election of his successor, as President
Diosdado Macapagal argued, represented malicious sabotage of the expressed will of the
people; and despite the Supreme Courts own history, which presented the sterling example of
a former Chief Justice, Manuel Moran, who declined reappointment to the court by President
Elpidio Quirino as it constituted a midnight appointment, Respondent eagerly accepted his
position. This was notwithstanding the fact that of the three branches of Government, the
Judiciary was the most greatly dependent upon moral ascendancy and ethical integrity as the
foundation of its power and legitimacy. However, he attempted to camouflage his brazen
ambition by taking his oath of office before then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in secret,
supposedly at ten in the morning of May 17, 2010, beyond the scrutiny of the mass media and
the public.3

Respondent betrayed the Public Trust, committed Culpable Violation of the Constitution
and Graft and Corruption in the following manner:

Respondents voting pattern and actions after his appointment as Associate Justice and later, as
Chief Justice, as discussed below, have been anything but fair and impartial.
In the year that Respondent has presided over the Court of Last Resort, the Filipino peoples
faith in the justice system has been greatly undermined rather than uplifted, through a series of
dubious decisions engineered by him.
Instead of assuring and strengthening the independence and impartiality of the Judiciary,
Respondent has instead demonstrated he is predisposed to favor and protect Mrs. Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, who had appointed him to his position as Chief Justice in brazen disregard
of the Constitution.
In fact, results of the Social Weather Stations Surveys net satisfaction ratings in the third
quarter of 2011 indicate that among the countrys top officials, only Respondents satisfaction
ratings have been a zero since September 2010, i.e., his satisfaction rating is consistently
negated by his dissatisfaction rating4.
Along the way, Respondent, contrary to his pronouncements, has allowed and even
encouraged the deterioration of the respect and trust due to the High Court by putting
obstacles in the path of the peoples search for truth against graft and corruption; encroaching
on the exclusive power of the House of Representatives to initiate impeachment proceedings,
providing a semblance of legal cover to give Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and
her husband the opportunity to escape prosecution and frustrate the ends of justice; permitting
the High Court to repeatedly flip-flop on its own decisions in violation of its own rules;
excusing plagiarism in contrast to the stringent standards expected of ordinary college students
and teachers; and even reportedly engaging not only in illicitly acquiring assets of high value
but even resorting to petty graft and corruption for his own personal profit and convenience.

GROUNDS FOR IMPEACHMENT

ARTICLE I
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HIS TRACK
RECORD MARKED BY PARTIALITY AND SUBSERVIENCE IN CASES
INVOLVING THE ARROYO ADMINISTRATION FROM THE TIME OF HIS
APPOINTMENT AS SUPREME COURT JUSTICE AND UNTIL HIS DUBIOUS
APPOINTMENT AS A MIDNIGHT CHIEF JUSTICE TO THE PRESENT.
ARTICLE II
RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
AND/OR BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST WHEN HE FAILED TO DISCLOSE TO
THE PUBLIC HIS STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES, AND NET WORTH AS
REQUIRED UNDER SEC. 17, ART. XI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
ARTICLE III
RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION
AND/OR BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST BY FAILING TO MEET AND OBSERVE
THE STRINGENT STANDARDS UNDER ART. VIII, SECTION 7 (3) OF THE
CONSTITUTION THAT PROVIDES THAT [A] MEMBER OF THE JUDICIARY
MUST BE A PERSON OF PROVEN COMPETENCE, INTEGRITY, PROBITY, AND
INDEPENDENCE IN ALLOWING THE SUPREME COURT TO ACT ON MERE
LETTERS FILED BY A COUNSEL WHICH CAUSED THE ISSUANCE OF FLIPFLOPPING DECISIONS IN FINAL AND EXECUTORY CASES; IN CREATING AN
EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT WITH MRS. ARROYO THROUGH HER
APPOINTMENT OF HIS WIFE TO OFFICE; AND IN DISCUSSING WITH
LITIGANTS REGARDING CASES PENDING BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT.
ARTICLE IV
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST AND/OR COMMITTED
CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION WHEN HE BLATANTLY
DISREGARDED THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS BY ISSUING A
STATUS QUO ANTE ORDER AGAINST THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN
THE CASE CONCERNING THE IMPEACHMENT OF THEN OMBUDSMAN
MERCEDITAS NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ.
ARTICLE V

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RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH WANTON

ARBITRARINESS AND PARTIALITY IN CONSISTENTLY DISREGARDING THE
PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA IN THE CASES INVOLVING THE 16 NEWLYCREATED CITIES, AND THE PROMOTION OF DINAGAT ISLAND INTO A
PROVINCE.
ARTICLE VI
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST BY ARROGATING UNTO
HIMSELF, AND TO A COMMITTEE HE CREATED, THE AUTHORITY AND
JURISDICTION TO IMPROPERLY INVESTIGATE A JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXCULPATING HIM. SUCH AUTHORITY AND
JURISDICTION IS PROPERLY REPOSED BY THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES VIA IMPEACHMENT.
ARTICLE VII
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HIS PARTIALITY IN
GRANTING A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) IN FAVOR OF
FORMER PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AND HER HUSBAND
JOSE MIGUEL ARROYO IN ORDER TO GIVE THEM AN OPPORTUNITY TO
ESCAPE PROSECUTION AND TO FRUSTRATE THE ENDS OF JUSTICE, AND IN
DISTORTING THE SUPREME COURT DECISION ON THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE
TRO IN VIEW OF A CLEAR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CONDITIONS OF
THE SUPREME COURTS OWN TRO.
ARTICLE VIII
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST AND/OR COMMITTED GRAFT
AND CORRUPTION WHEN HE FAILED AND REFUSED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE
JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND SPECIAL ALLOWANCE FOR THE
JUDICIARY (SAJ) COLLECTIONS.

DISCUSSION OF THE GROUNDS FOR IMPEACHMENT

I. RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HIS TRACK
RECORD MARKED BY PARTIALITY AND SUBSERVIENCE IN CASES
INVOLVING THE ARROYO ADMINISTRATION FROM THE TIME OF HIS
APPOINTMENT AS SUPREME COURT JUSTICE WHICH CONTINUED TO HIS
DUBIOUS APPOINTMENT AS A MIDNIGHT CHIEF JUSTICE AND UP TO THE
PRESENT.
1.1. Sec. 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution clearly prohibits the President from making
appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to
the end of his term, except for temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. In the case of In Re

Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B.
Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24,
Cabanatuan City,5 the Supreme Court rules that this provision bars the appointment of
members of the judiciary.
1.2. However, in the case of Arturo de Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council and President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et. al., In Re Applicability Of Section 15, Article VII Of The
Constitution To Appointments To The Judiciary, Estelito P. Mendoza, Philippine Bar
Association vs. JBC, et al.6, the Supreme Court reversed the Valenzuela ruling and held that
the Constitutional prohibition singularly does not apply to the Supreme Court, implying that it
applies only to the executive department and all other courts lower than the Supreme Court.
Despite the obviously negative and confidence-shattering impact that a midnight
appointment by an outgoing President would have on the peoples faith in the Supreme Court
and the judicial system, Respondent eagerly, shamelessly, and without even a hint of selfrestraint and delicadeza, accepted his midnight appointment as Chief Justice by then-President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
1.3 All judges must ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer. 7 In addition, (t)he behavior and
conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must
not merely be done but must also be seen to be done. 8 These are required under two of the
most important sections of the Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically Canon 2 on Integrity.
However, as a matter of public record, from his very promotion to the highest position in the
judicial hierarchy, Respondent has violated these premier provisions.
1.4. Indeed, Newsbreak reported that the voting record of Respondent shows that he has
consistently sided with the administration in politically-significant cases (i.e. Arroyos
policies and administration). Newsbreak further reported when it tracked the voting pattern of
Supreme Court justices, Corona lodged a high 78 percent in favor of Arroyo and this was
before his midnight appointment as Chief Justice.9
1.5. This trend continued, even worsened, betraying Respondents predisposition to side with
Arroyo or her interest at any and all costs even at the cost of prostituting the noble cause of
justice.
1.6. Thus, in Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,10Respondent dealt the
fatal blow to Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled Creating the Philippine
Truth Commission of 2010. Simply, Respondent prevented any such body from being created
now or in the future thereby protecting his patroness from investigation.
1.7. Another case: the Status Quo Ante Order in Bai Omera D. Dianalan-Lucman v.
Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr,11 is equally appalling. Seemingly on cue,
Respondents Supreme Court would not be content against simply nullifying Executive Order
No. 1 dated July 30, 2010. To extend Arroyos control and influence over the new
administration done through massive last-minute appointments in critical public positions,
Respondent would again find fault in Executive Order No. 2 dated July 30, 2010.
1.8. Executive Order No. 2 was issued precisely to revoke Midnight Appointments made by
the Arroyo Administration in departments, agencies, offices, and instrumentalities, including

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government-owned or controlled corporations. These Midnight Appointments were made

possible by Mrs. Arroyo churning out appointments for plum posts in government owned and
controlled agencies, on a daily basis and backdating them to before the constitutional ban on
appointments during an election period. 12 Further, such appointments had the effect of eroding
the integrity of the executive. Likewise, the same was made in complete disregard of the intent
and spirit of the constitutional ban on midnight appointments, effectively depriving the new
administration of the power to make its own appointments to these positions. It was for these
reasons that an Order from the Executive needed to be made in order to prevent the further
degradation of the peoples trust and confidence in our government institutions.

1.14. Below is a table that tracks Respondents voting pattern in cases highly impressed with
public interest and involving the Arroyo governments frontal assaults on constitutional rights
prior to his appointment as Chief Justice. As the table will show, Respondents vote is dictated
not by his conscience but his loyalty and subservience to his appointing power:

1.9. Yet, consistent with his pattern of supporting Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Respondents
Supreme Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order to prevent the implementation of Executive
Order No. 2. Again, the instant case reflects an affront to the independence of the judiciary. It
is likewise a case of judicial overreach upon a co-equal branch of government meant to derail
its efforts to curb corruption by successively nullifying its issuances.
1.10. As Associate and Chief Justice, Respondent has ignored ethical precedents, behaved with
a lack of integrity, casting the Supreme Court in disrepute. Judges are expected to be beyond
reproach, financially, ethically, and the use of their authority and powers. Partisanship, a wilful
refusal to recuse himself so as to avoid any possible imputation of a conflict of interest,
including the paying back of debts of political gratitude or loyalty, are a betrayal of public
trust and contrary to the canons of judicial conduct.
1.11. As for the case of Benigno Simeon Aquino III v. Commission on Elections, supra, the
Supreme Court denied the petition of then Sen. Benigno S. Aquino III against RA No. 9716
creating and/or redefining the first and second districts of Camarines Sur. It was widely
believed and confirmed by subsequent events, that the districts were re-defined and created to
assure that the President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos son, Dato Arroyo, could run and win in
the newly created district to avoid a contest between the presidents son and DBM Secretary
Rolando Andaya who wanted to return to Camarines Sur to run in his old district. This new
district was upheld contrary to the explicit constitutional requirement 13 that mandates a
minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative
district.
1.12. Then Sen. Aquino argued that Republic Act No. 9716 creating the first and second
districts of Camarines Sur was unconstitutional, because the proposed first district would end
up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383. Despite this clear fact, Respondent
Corona voted in violation of the Constitution against then Sen. Aquinos petition.
1.13. Worse, Respondent, who at that time was already being considered by Mrs. Arroyo as
the next Chief Justice, did not inhibit himself. The simple fact is Respondents patroness, was
the mother of the principal beneficiary of the creation of the new district. Thus, a vote in favor
of the new district was a vote in favor of Mrs. Arroyos son and, would thus endear him more
to Mrs. Arroyo and ensure his appointment. In simplest terms, Respondent wanted and needed
something from Mrs. Arroyo (i.e., his appointment as next Chief Justice); Mrs. Arroyo, in turn,
wanted or needed something for Respondent (i.e. to create a new legislative district for her
son, Dato Arroyo). The People can do the math.

88

89

1.15. Aside from the specific cases herein discussed, the following cases decided by the Court
with Respondent as Chief Justice further betray his consistent lack of independence and bias
towards protecting Arroyo:

II.
RESPONDENT COMMITTED
CULPABLE
VIOLATION
OF THE
CONSTITUTION AND/OR BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST WHEN HE FAILED
TO DISCLOSE TO THE PUBLIC HIS STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES, AND
NET WORTH AS REQUIRED UNDERSEC. 17, ART. XI OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION.
2.1. It is provided for in Art. XI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution that a public officer or
employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law,
submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the
President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and other constitutional offices,
and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to
the public in the manner provided by law.
2.2. Respondent failed to disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities, and net
worth as required by the Constitution.

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2.3. It is also reported that some of the properties of Respondent are not included in his
declaration of his assets, liabilities, and net worth, in violation of the anti-graft and corrupt
practices act.
2.4. Respondent is likewise suspected and accused of having accumulated ill-gotten wealth,
acquiring assets of high values and keeping bank accounts with huge deposits. It has been
reported that Respondent has, among others, a 300-sq. meter apartment in a posh Mega World
Property development at the Fort in Taguig. Has he reported this, as he is constitutionallyrequired under Art. XI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities
and Net Worth (SALN)? Is this acquisition sustained and duly supported by his income as a
public official? Since his assumption as Associate and subsequently, Chief Justice, has he
complied with this duty of public disclosure?

recall of a September 7, 2011 Decision of the Supreme Courts Second Division denying a
Second Motion for Reconsideration of the 2008 ruling in favor of FASAP, on a mere letter
from Philippine Airlines counsel Atty. Estelito Mendoza (who is the reported lead counsel of
Respondents patroness; see Annexes F to F-3, infra), and without requiring a comment
from or notice to the other parties to hear their side, betray Respondents lack of ethical
principles and his disdain for fairness which has eroded the faith of the people in the Judiciary
for Respondent himself caused and allowed the violation of the adverse partys
constitutional right to due process.
3.3.1. The matter is made worse since the recall is reported to have been at the instance of
Respondent Corona, who admitted that in 2008, he inhibited from the case. How then can he
justify his interference in this case today? Why take part or interfere now?

III. RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATIONS OF THE

CONSTITUTION AND/OR BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST BY FAILING TO
MEET AND OBSERVE THE STRINGENT STANDARDS UNDER ART. VIII,
SECTION 7 (3) OF THE CONSTITUTION THAT PROVIDES THAT [A] MEMBER
OF THE JUDICIARY MUST BE A PERSON OF PROVEN COMPETENCE,
INTEGRITY, PROBITY, AND INDEPENDENCE IN ALLOWING THE SUPREME
COURT TO ACT ON MERE LETTERS FILED BY A COUNSEL WHICH CAUSED
THE ISSUANCE OF FLIP-FLOPPING DECISIONS IN FINAL AND EXECUTORY
CASES; IN CREATING AN EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT WITH MRS. ARROYO
THROUGH HER APPOINTMENT OF HIS WIFE TO OFFICE; AND IN DISCUSSING
WITH LITIGANTS REGARDING CASES PENDING BEFORE THE SUPREME
COURT.

3.3.2. What is even more disturbing is that under Respondent Coronas watch as Chief Justice,
the Supreme Court appears to be acting on mere letters kept hidden from those concerned and
the other parties and all from the same lawyer Estelito Mendoza.

3.1. Respondent was appointed to the Supreme Court on April 9, 2002 by Mrs. Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. Prior to his appointment, he served Arroyo for many years as her chief of
staff, and spokesman when she was Vice-President, and later as her Presidential Chief-ofStaff, Presidential Spokesman, and Acting Executive Secretary.15

3.3.4. In this connection, Respondents voting pattern even prior to his dubious appointment as
Chief Justice, clearly proves a bias and manifest partiality for Mrs. Arroyo. It must be noted
that under the law, bias need not be proven to actually exist; it is enough that the Chief
Justices actions lend themselves to a reasonable suspicion that he does not possess the
required probity and impartiality. In Rosauro v. Villanueva,21 the Supreme Court held that:
A judge should not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in such
a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality and as to his
integrity. While a judge should possess proficiency in law in order that he can competently
construe and enforce the law, it is more important that he should act and behave in such a
manner that the parties before him should have confidence in his impartiality. Thus, it is not
enough that he decides cases without bias and favoritism. Nor is it sufficient that he in fact rids
himself of prepossessions. His actuations should moreover inspire that belief. Like Caesars
wife, a judge must not only be pure but beyond suspicion. [Underscoring supplied]

3.2. Art. VIII, Section 7 (3) of the 1987 Constitution provides that [a] Member of the
Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.
Members of the Judiciary are expected to have these four qualities mandated by the
Constitution because these form the very foundation for maintaining peoples faith in the
Judiciary. Thus, it has been ruled by no less than the Supreme Court that:
People who run the judiciary, particularly justices and judges, must not only be proficient in
both the substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly, they must
possess the highest degree of integrity and probity and an unquestionable moral uprightness
both in their public and private lives.16
Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater
demand on moral righteousness and uprightness than a seat in the Judiciary. High ethical
principles and a sense of propriety should be maintained, without which the faith of the
people in the Judiciary so indispensable in an orderly society cannot be preserved.17
3.3. Just very recently, the flip-flopping of the Corona Court on Flight Attendants and
Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP) v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., et al. the

3.3.3 It must be recalled that the same Estelito Mendoza wrote a personal letter to Respondent
which also caused the flip-flopping in the League of Cities v. COMELEC19 case. It must also
be recalled that Estelito Mendoza is also the same person who filed Administrative Matter No.
10-2-5-SC,20 and was among the petitioners in the Supreme Court who posited that Mrs.
Arroyo may appoint the next Chief Justice despite the constitutional ban; and through which
petition, made it possible for the Supreme Court to legitimize and provide not only a strained
but obviously erroneous basis for the midnight and constitutionally-prohibited appointment of
Respondent.

3.3.5. The bar is higher for judges, and by inference, highest for Justices and most especially
the Chief Justice, because the character of a judge is perceived by the people not only
through his official acts but also through his private morals, as reflected in his external
behavior.22 Thus,
a judge should, in a pending or prospective litigation before him, be scrupulously
careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that his social
or business relations or friendships constitute an element in determining his judicial
course.23 [Underscoring and emphases supplied]

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3.3.6. If a decision that is legally correct or justifiable can suffer from a suspicion of
impartiality, more so will a decision that is entirely unsupported by legal reasoning. Thus, it
has been held that a judge who is ignorant of fairly elementary and quite familiar legal
principles and administrative regulations, has a marked penchant for applying unorthodox,
even strange theories and concepts in the adjudication of controversies, exhibits indifference
to, and even disdain for due process and the rule of law, applies the law whimsically,
capriciously, and oppressively, and displays bias and partiality, is unfit to be a judge. 24
3.4. Respondent further compromised his independence when his wife, Cristina Corona,
accepted an appointment on March 23, 2007 from Mrs. Gloria Arroyo to the Board of the John
Hay Management Corporation (JHMC). The JHMC is a wholly-owned subsidiary corporation
of the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), a government-owned-andcontrolled corporation created under Republic Act No. 7227.
3.4.1. Shortly after assuming her well-paying job at JHMC, serious complaints were filed
against Mrs. Corona by her fellow Board members, as well as from the Management and rankand-file employees of the JHMC. Mrs. Coronas election as Director and President was
reportedly withdrawn in a resolution passed by the Board of Directors of JHMC because of
acts of misconduct and negligence. Copies of the JHMC Board Resolution withdrawing Mrs.
Coronas election as JHMC President and Chairman, the Position Paper prepared by the
JHMC Management, and the resignation letter of retired Court of Appeals Justice Teodoro
Regino from the JHMC Board of Directors, all of which chronicle the serious irregularities
committed by Mrs. Corona, are attached hereto as Annexes G, H and I, respectively.
3.4.2. Instead of acting upon the serious complaints against Mrs. Corona, Mrs. Arroyo
instructed all members of the JHMC to tender their courtesy resignations immediately. After
the resignations, Mrs. Corona was retained and even promoted after President Arroyo
expressed her desire for Mrs. Coronas election as OIC Chairman of the JHMC Board.
3.4.3. Despite the numerous other complaints against Mrs. Corona, including one from Baguio
Mayor Reinaldo Bautista where he protested Mrs. Coronas move to replace the members of
the JHMC Management Team, in violation of the terms of City Council Resolution No. 362
which protects the security of tenure in the JHMC of local residents occupying key positions
in the corporation (a copy of his letter dated July 25, 2007 is attached as Annex J), and
despite adverse findings in the COA report that also established that she was improperly
holding office in St. Ignatius Village in Quezon City, Mrs. Corona was not removed from her
position. She was even allowed to rack up unnecessary expenses totalling Six Hundred Ninety
Thousand And One Hundred Eighty-Three Pesos (P690,183.00) which she spent holding
office in Quezon City when JHMCs operations were all in Baguio City. A copy of the COA
report is attached as Annex K.
3.4.4. Mrs. Coronas job was ensured with specific instructions of Mrs. Arroyo expressed
through several desire letters issued to the BCDA specifically to ensure the election of Mrs.
Corona to several positions in the JHMC, copies of which are attached as Annexes L, L1 and L-2. This also explains why despite the serious complaints against Mrs. Corona,
Mrs. Arroyo never removed her from JHMC but instead kept on promoting and protecting her.
3.4.5. Mrs. Coronas appointment is a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct that provides:
Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct

or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the
private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that
they are in a special position to influence the judge. [Sec. 4, Canon 1; emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance their private
interests, or those of a member of their family or of anyone else, nor shall they convey or
permit others to convey the impression that anyone is in a special position improperly to
influence them in the performance of judicial duties. [Sec. 8, Canon 4; emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
3.4.6. The New Code of Judicial Conduct further provides that it is unethical for a magistrate
and members of his family to ask for or receive any gift in exchange for any act done or to be
done by the judge in the course of his judicial functions:
Judges and members of their families shall neither ask for, nor accept, any gift, bequest,
loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him or her in
connection with the performance of judicial duties. [Sec. 8, Canon 4; emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by, the
executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear to be free therefrom
to a reasonable observer. [Sec. 5, Canon 1; emphasis and underscoring supplied]
3.4.7. Clearly, a grossly improper (although personally and mutually beneficial) relationship
between the Respondent and Mrs. Arroyo was created when Mrs. Corona was appointed to the
JHMC. The JHMC is a GOCC under the Executive Department headed by Mrs. Arroyo. The
appointment of Mrs. Corona in JHMC as its highest management officer is clearly intended to
secure the loyalty and vote of Respondent in the Supreme Court. In a similar case, the
Supreme Court found it unethical for the judge to allow his daughters to accept the business
offer of persons who have a pending case before the judges court:
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary prescribes that judges shall
ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the
view of a reasonable observer. Thus, judges are to avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all their activities. Likewise, they are mandated not to allow family, social or
other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment, nor convey or permit others to
convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge. The Code
clearly prohibits judges or members of their families from asking for or accepting, any gift,
bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him
or her in connection with the performance of judicial duties. Respondent judge failed to live
up to these standards. Despite knowledge of Onofre and Marianos intentions in offering the
business to his daughters, respondent judge allowed his daughters to accept the offer of
business partnership with persons who have pending cases in his court. 25
3.4.8. Respondent should be held to even higher standards because he is the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court. Since joining JHMC, Mrs. Corona received a substantial salary, aside
from other perks of the job, including cars and various travel opportunities. In exchange, as
discussed above, the voting record of Respondent in the Supreme Court indicate an

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unmistakable pattern of favoring Arroyo in cases brought before the Supreme Court
challenging her policies and actions. All these foregoing facts betray the Respondents lack of
qualification as Chief Justice as he has demonstrated a lack of competence, integrity, probity,
or independence.
3.4.9. Respondent reportedly dipped his hands into public funds to finance personal expenses.
Numerous personal expenses that have nothing to do with the discharge of his official
functions, such as lavish lunches and dinners, personal travels and vacations, and fetes and
parties, have reportedly been charged by the Respondent to judicial funds. In essence,
Respondent has been reportedly using the judicial fund as his own personal expense account,
charging to the Judiciary personal expenditures. 26
3.4.10. It is therefore apparent that there is reasonable ground to hold Respondent for the
reported misuse of public funds, and in acts that would qualify as violations of the anti-graft
and corrupt practices act, including malversation of public funds, and use of public funds for
private purposes.
3.5. In addition, Respondent Corona failed to maintain high standards of judicial conduct in
connection with the Vizconde massacre case, in the process, casted doubt upon the integrity of
the Supreme Court itself.
3.5.1. All judges must exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to
reinforce public confidence in the judiciary, which is fundamental to the maintenance of
judicial independence.27 To do so, it is required that his or her conduct, both in and out of
court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in
the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary. 28 Included in this prescription of what
constitutes acceptable and non-acceptable conduct is that rule that judges shall not
knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come before them, make any comment that
might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest
fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might
affect the fair trial of any person or issue. 29 Likewise, (j)udges shall not, in the performance
of judicial duties, by words or conduct, manifest bias or prejudice towards any person or group
on irrelevant grounds.30
3.5.2. Despite these strictures, Respondent has directly, deliberately, and shamelessly
attempted to destroy the credibility and standing of the Supreme Court with respect to one
important and publicly-celebrated case that was before it on automatic appeal: the celebrated
Vizconde Massacre case.31
3.5.3. Sometime in early September 2010, Lauro Vizconde, surviving member of the Vizconde
family who were murdered in 1991, and Dante Jimenez of the Volunteers Against Crime and
Corruption (VACC) paid a courtesy call upon the Respondent in his chambers after his
appointment as Chief Justice.
3.5.4. During the courtesy call, Vizconde asked the Respondent about the status of the multiple
murder case against Hubert Webb and the other accused, which was at the time pending appeal
before the Supreme Court. Despite the obvious impropriety, Respondent, instead of rebuffing
Vizconde for asking the questions, engaged Vizconde in a personal and ex-parte conversation
regarding a case then pending consideration before the Supreme Court.

3.5.5. Worse, in the course of the conversation, Respondent told Vizconde, in the presence of
Jimenez, that fellow Justice Antonio Carpio was allegedly lobbying for the acquittal of Hubert
Webb. According to Vizconde in a sworn Affidavit dated January 27, 2011, Respondent said
that Talagang brina-braso at ini-impluwensiyahan ni Carpio ang kanyang mga kasama para
mapawalang-sala si Webb [Carpio was really arm-twisting and influencing his colleagues to
acquit Webb], or words to that effect. Jimenez corroborated Vizcondes statement in his own
sworn Affidavit dated January 26, 2011.
3.5.6. The fact that Respondent spoke with Vizconde regarding a case pending before the
Supreme Court is in itself already a serious breach of the rule of confidentiality that must be
maintained by the Court with respect to cases pending before it, as well as the deliberations of
the members of the Court. Such confidentiality is absolutely necessary in order to ensure that
members of the Court are insulated from lobbying and pressure coming from any of the
litigants of a pending case. Respondents action, as Chief Justice, is in itself unbecoming and
unworthy of a Chief Justice.
3.5.7. Indeed, in Re: Letter of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez,32 the Supreme Court
sanctioned a justice of the Court of Appeals for a similar act of discussing a pending case with
interested parties for having failed to maintain the high standard of independence and
propriety that is required of him. The Supreme Court further held:
Taking his conversation with his brother and his encounters with Mr. de Borja together,
Justice Sabio gives the impression that he is accessible to lobbyists who would unfairly try to
manipulate court proceedings. Even assuming arguendo that Justice Sabio was not moved by
his brothers request and that he rejected Mr. de Borjas bribe offer, the Court feels compelled
to call Justice Sabios attention to his own shortcomings under the circumstances. At the very
least, Justice Sabio should have realized that his discussions of court matters, especially those
that have not yet been made of public record, with persons who are interested in the case were
incredibly indiscreet and tended to undermine the integrity of judicial processes. We see no
reason to reverse the Panels finding that Justice Sabios conversations with his brother and
Mr. de Borja were indiscreet and imprudent.
3.5.8. Significantly, Respondent signed and concurred with the above-mentioned Resolution of
the Supreme Court. Yet, Respondent Corona committed the same pernicious act of discussing
a pending case with interested parties.
3.5.9. Worse, however, is the fact that Respondent intrigued against the honor and integrity of
a fellow Justice in his absence, in the process, maligning and undermining the credibility of
the Supreme Court as an institution. By painting for Vizconde a picture of a Court that is
subject to the influence of one out of 15 Justices, and making it appear that the eventual
decision of the Court in the case would be attributable to internal arm-twisting and influence,
Respondent destroyed the credibility of the very institution that he was supposed to be leading.
3.5.10. In trying to pin the blame of a possible acquittal upon a fellow Justice, Respondent was
himself sowing the seeds of discontent and distrust of the Supreme Court with a party litigant.
As it happened, Vizconde and Jimenez did raise the supposed internal arm-twisting and
influence before the media while the case was in the final stages of decision. By provoking
Vizconde to pre-empt the decision with negative publicity, Respondent himself is guilty of

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directly undermining the trust and confidence of the public in the Supreme Court regardless of
what its decision would have later turned out to be.
3.5.11. Worse still, is that the act of the Respondent violates Sec. 3(k) of Rep. Act 3019, or
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which prohibits any official from (d)ivulging
valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him on account
of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance of its
authorized release date. It is clear from the context of the conversation with Vizconde and
Jimenez, that Respondent was signalling the latter to prepare for an acquittal, and giving them
someone to blame therefor. Given the high profile of the case, it is not unreasonable to assume
that at the time of the conservation, the Supreme Court had already begun deliberations on the
case, and that Respondent already had a sense of what the decision of the Court would
probably be.
3.6. Respondent Corona with undue haste, impropriety and irregularity, dismissed the interpetal recreational corporation case33 under suspicious circumstances.
3.6.1. Respondent was accused by Fernando Campos of unethical conduct when he met ex
parte with the lawyer of the adverse party in connection with a pending case before him. In an
attempt to defend himself against the complaint for unethical conduct filed against him by
Campos, Respondent explicitly admitted violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct. In his
letter dated February 8, 2010 to the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), Respondent refuted the
claim of Campos that he allegedly met with a lawyer of Philweb Corporation in connection
with a case pending before him but countered that:
On the contrary, it was Campos himself who actively tried to pressure me into deciding G.R.
No. 186711 in his favor. I was pestered by calls from different people on his behalf. By his
own admission in his executive summary, he asked Justice Angelina Gutierrez, Santiago
Kapunan and Leonardo Quisumbing, among others to intercede for him. (Emphasis supplied)

Sec. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the
private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are
in a special position to influence the judge.
Sec. 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by,
the executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear to be free
therefrom to a reasonable observer.
Canon II
Integrity
Sec. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
Sec. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of
the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
Sec. 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or
court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become aware.
Canon III
Impartiality
xxx
Sec. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of
the judge and of the judiciary.

3.6.2 In his very own words, Respondent admitted that various persons were able to
communicate with him in connection with a case that was pending before him precisely in an
attempt to influence him in his resolution of the said case. In allowing himself to be
approached by persons which he knew were trying to exercise their influence over him on a
particular case pending before him and in failing to take or initiate appropriate disciplinary
measures against such actions, Respondent violated basic precepts of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct, which provides, among others, that:

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities
of a judge.

Canon
Independence

Sec. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.

Sec. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their
assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free
from extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from
any quarter or for any reason.

3.6.3. To restate in In Re: Letter of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez,34 the Supreme
Court held that such conduct amounted to a failure to maintain the high standard of
independence and propriety that is required of a judge.

xxx

Canon IV
Propriety

3.6.4. For emphasis, Respondent signed and concurred with the above-mentioned Resolution
of the Supreme Court. Surely, Respondent, as Chief Justice, cannot be exempt from the same
rule and principle. As Chief Justice, he must in fact be held to a higher standard. The Supreme
Court further said of justices:

94

While it may be true that from a psychological stand point ordinary persons can have a wide
variety of valid reactions to any given situation, Justice Sabio should bear in mind his high
office as a magistrate of the appellate court sets him apart from ordinary persons. Being
the subject of constant public scrutiny, members of the bench should freely and willingly
accept behavioral restrictions that may be viewed by ordinary citizens as
burdensome.35 (emphasis supplied)
3.6.5. Moreover, Respondent not only should have scrupulously guarded his reputation as a
Supreme Court Justice, it behooved upon him to have done a positive act to ensure that
Campos and the latters emissaries be dealt with administratively for the brazen attempt to
influence a magistrate of the Supreme Court.36 This he utterly failed to do.
IV. RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST AND/OR COMMITTED
CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION WHEN IT BLATANTLY
DISREGARDED THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS BY ISSUING A
STATUS QUO ANTE ORDER AGAINST THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN
THE CASE CONCERNING THE IMPEACHMENT OF THEN OMBUDSMAN
MERCEDITAS NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ.
4.1. On September 13, 2010, Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez filed a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition before the Supreme Court seeking to enjoin the Committee on Justice of the
House of Representatives from proceeding with the impeachment proceedings against her.
Gutierrezs sixty-paged Petition prayed for a Temporary Restraining Order against the
impeachment proceedings.
4.2. With undue haste, the following day after filing, Respondent immediately tabled
Gutierrezs Petition despite the fact that not all the Justices had received or read the Petition.
Respondent railroaded the proceedings in order to have a Status Quo Ante Order issued in
favor of Gutierrez. This was confirmed by Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno in her Concurring
Opinion to the February 15, 2011 Decision37:
On a final note, the issuance of the Status Quo Ante Order in this case was most unfortunate.
It was issued over the objections of Justices Antonio Carpio, Conchita Carpio Morales, and
myself. I believed then, as I believe now, that the Court, in issuing the said order, was overly
intrusive with respect to a power that does not belong to it by restraining without hearing a coequal branch of Government. This belief was made more acute by the fact that the order
was voted upon in the morning of 14 September 2010, without the benefit of a genuinely
informed debate, since several members of the Court, myself included, had not yet then
received a copy of the Petition.
4.3. A Supreme Court delivery receipt published by the news magazine Newsbreak also
showed that most of the justices received the Petition after the deliberations, while three (3)
justices who voted to issue the Status Quo Ante Order received the petition only on September
15, 2011, a day after the status quo ante order was granted. These justices were Justices
Velasco, Bersamin and Perez.38
4.4. The issuance of the Status Quo Ante Order is a betrayal of the public trust since it clearly
showed Respondents high-handedness, bias, subservience and partisanship. The issuance of
a Status Quo Ante Order against a co-equal branch of government, without even the benefit of

the Justices reading the decision, is a tyrannical abuse of power to favor a litigant and to
obstruct the impeachment process. The issuance of the order also directly violates the principle
of separation of powers since the Supreme Court prevented the House from doing its
constitutional mandate of initiating impeachment proceedings.
V. RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH WANTON
ARBITRARINESS AND PARTIALITY IN CONSISTENTLY DISREGARDING THE
PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA IN THE CASES INVOLVING THE 16 NEWLYCREATED CITIES, AND THE PROMOTION OF DINAGAT ISLAND INTO A
PROVINCE.
5.1. The principle of immutability of final judgments is one of the primordial rules for having
a credible and effective system of administration of justice. Under this principle:
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere and it is essential to an effective
and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning
party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. 39
5.2. As explained by the Supreme Court in its earliest years, such a principle is an important
requirement for a credible and effective system of administration of justice, thus:
It is true that it is the purpose and intention of the law that courts should decide all questions
submitted to them as truth and justice require, and that it is greatly to be desired that all
judgments should be so decided; but controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of
sound practice in the courts demand that at the risk of occasional error, judgments of courts
determining controversies submitted to them should become final at some definite time fixed
by law, or by a rule of practice recognized by law, so as to be thereafter beyond the control
even of the court which rendered them for the purpose of correcting errors of fact or of law,
into which, in the opinion of the court it may have fallen. The very purpose for which the
courts are organized is to put an end to controversy, to decide the questions submitted to the
litigants, and to determine the respective rights of the parties. With the full knowledge that
courts are not infallible, the litigants submit their respective claims for judgment, and they
have a right at some time or other to have final judgment on which they can rely as a final
disposition of the issue submitted, and to know that there is an end to the litigation. 40
5.3. Respondent, however, has turned his back on this time-honored principle of the
immutability of final judgments in not just one, but several, cases of public significance, thus
allowing the Court to gain public notoriety as a flip-flopping Court. 41 At least two of these
flip-flops are known to have been instigated through personal letters or exparte communications addressed to the Respondent.
5.4. Three celebrated cases have particularly established the Supreme Courts flip-flopping
reputation: the League of Cities v. COMELEC42 case involving the creation of 16 new cities,
the case of Navarro v. Ermita43 which involved the promotion of Dinagat Island from
municipality to province, and the FASAP v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., et al. 44 case which
involved the retrenchment (previously held to be illegal) of flight attendants by the nations
flag carrier. In the the League of Cities and FASAP cases, the Respondents culpability was
betrayed by the fact that the flip-flop was preceded by personal and ex-parte communications,
not pleadings, from a lawyer of a party, and which were granted without giving the other party

95

any notice or due process. In the Navarro case, the flip-flop was instigated by the intervention
of non-parties who stood to benefit financially and politically from the re-opening of a final
and executory judgment to the original case.

should not have allowed the Court to entertain prohibited pleadings because it undermines the
integrity of the Court and its rules of procedure.

5.5. The League of Cities v. COMELEC case was originally decided by the Supreme Court on
November 18, 2008, wherein the Court declared as unconstitutional and void the conversion
of 16 municipalities into cities due to failure to meet the legal requirements for income for
cities under the Local Government Code. Upon motion for reconsideration, The Court
affirmed its judgment on April 28, 2009, after the Court denied a prohibited second motion for
reconsideration filed by the 16 municipalities. The ruling became final on May 21, 2009.

5.10. Despite this ruling, the Supreme Court under Respondents leadership then
entertained an unusual and totally unprecedented fourth motion for reconsideration filed by the
16 municipalities on September 14, 2010. On February 15, 2011, the Court granted the motion
for reconsideration, and reversed the reversal of the reversal of the original decision, i.e., it
reinstated its highly irregular decision reversing a judgment that had long been final and
executory. The unprecedented flip-flopping of the Supreme Court happened in just a span of
six months and under the same tutelage of Respondent Corona.

5.6. Despite the finality of the original judgment, as well as the standing prohibition against a
second motion for reconsideration, the aggrieved parties persisted in seeking a reversal of
the Courts original decision. They filed several pleadings all obviously intended to
circumvent the prohibition against second and subsequent motions for reconsideration and to
subvert the rule on immutability of final judgments, to wit:

5.11. Subsequently, in the case of Navarro v. Ermita46 dealing with the constitutionality of the
creation of the Province of Dinagat Island, the Supreme Court under Respondents watch
again performed judicial acrobatics when it reversed its original decision even though it had
already become final and executory, a status all the more highlighted by the fact that there was
already an Entry of Judgment.

a. Motion to Amend the Resolution of April 28, 2009 By Declaring Instead that Respondents
Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31, 2009 and Motion for Leave to
File, and To Admit Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision Dated
November 18, 2008 Remain Unresolved and to Conduct Further Proceedings Thereon (Motion
to Amend the Resolution of April 28, 2009);

5.12. In this case, the Supreme Court had decided against the constitutionality of the creation
of the Province of Dinagat Island back in February 10, 2010. The judgment became final and
executory, and an Entry of Judgment was made on May 18, 2010. According to the Rules of
Court, the Entry of Judgment is a ministerial act that records the absolute irrevocability of a
decision of a court, after the same has become final and executory. Beyond all plausible
reason, however, the Supreme Court found the means to conduct the verbal gymnastics and
semantic contortions necessary to perform a totally unprecedented judicial somersault.

b. Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 2 June 2009;

c. Urgent Motion to Resolve Pending Incidents;
d. Appeal to Honorable Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo
B. Nachura to Participate in the Resolution of Respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution of June 2, 2009.
5.7. On January 19, 2009, the legal counsel [who is reportedly also the lead counsel of former
President Arroyo in her Plunder and other cases: see Annexes X to X-2] for the sixteen
(16) cities, Estelito Mendoza, wrote a personal letter (not a pleading) to the Supreme Court,
asking for the Court to reconsider its decision by allowing the participation of justices who
were not present during the deliberation of the original decision dated November 18, 2008.
Another personal letter (not a pleading) was sent to the Supreme Court, by the local chief
executives
of
the
sixteen
(16)
municipalities/prospective
cities. 45
5.8. On December 21, 2009, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of November 18, 2008
despite the fact that the decision was already final and executory, and that the pleadings and
communications that led to the decision were either expressly prohibited pleadings or nonpleadings that have no place in litigation or the Rules of Court.
5.9. This prompted the League of Cities to file a motion for reconsideration to reverse the
December 21, 2009 ruling, calling the attention of the Court to the inconsistency of the
decision with the standing Rules of Court and the principles of finality of judgment. On
August 24, 2010, the Supreme Court reversed the December 21, 2009 decision and reinstated
its original November 28, 2008 decision. As Chief Justice and leader of the Supreme Court, he

5.13. This amazing maneuver was accomplished upon the instigation, a full month after the
entry of judgment, of so-called motions for intervention by the prospective provincial officials
and congressional representatives of Dinagat Island, which were denied by the Court
considering that they were not even parties to the original proceedings and intervention cannot
be allowed after the case has already been terminated. This was followed by an Urgent
Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment dated October 10, 2011 filed by these non-parties, which
the Court then granted, paving the way for a reconsideration and reversal of the judgment
which was already final.
5.14. In so doing, the Supreme Court, under Respondents leadership, has made a travesty of
its own rules of procedure, and demonstrated that there is actually only one important rule:
where theres a will (and connection?), theres a way. And everything that lawyers know
about judicial procedure, common sense, fair play, and Justice will become moot and
academic when confronted with this perversion of the Rules of Court. So blatantly contrary to
all judicial reason was this act of the Court that even Associate Justice Brion pointed out in his
Dissenting Opinion that the decision directly violated its own internal rules and at least three
major foundations of the administration of justice, particularly:
a. the rule on reconsideration by allowing a motion for reconsideration contrary to the rule
against second motions for reconsideration and after the proceedings had already terminated;
b. the rule on finality of judgments, by re-opening a case that already attained finality through
the artifice of a motion to recall entry of judgment; and

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c. the rule on intervention by allowing intervention after the proceedings had already
terminated.
5.15. In fact, Associate Justice Brion could not hide his absolute disgust with the Courts
ruling in his dissent, closing it as follows:
Unlike the case of Lazarus who rose from the dead through a miracle, Dinagat resurrected
because the Court disregarded its own rules and established jurisprudential principles. Of
course, it can similarly be called a miracle as no reversal could have taken place if just one of
the series of transgressions pointed out did not take place. How such resurrection can happen
in the Supreme Court is a continuing source of wonder! 47
5.16. These two cases on gerrymandering are, of course, on top of the case of FASAP v.
Philippine Airlines, Inc.48, which showcases the Supreme Courts penchant for issuing flipflopping decisions. In this case, the Supreme Court had already promulgated a decision dated
22 July 2008, holding that the retrenchment effected by PAL in 1998 of more than 1,400 of its
flight attendants was illegal. This decision became final after the Supreme Court denied, with
finality, PALs Motions for Reconsideration on 02 October 2009 and 07 September 2011.
Curiously, however, the Resolutions denying PALs Motions for Reconsideration were recalled
by another Resolution in what seemed to be a separate administrative case, A.M. No. 11-10-1SC, on the sole basis of a personal letter submitted to the Supreme Court by Estelito Mendoza,
PALs lawyer. And as with the League of Cities v. COMELEC case, no opportunity was given
to the other party to respond to Estelito Mendozas personal appeal letter. What these flipflopping decisions clearly establish is that the Supreme Court, under Respondent Coronas
watch, is willing to bend over backwards to accomodate mere letters bearing the signature of
Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos lawyer.
VI. Respondent Betrayed the Public Trust By Arrogating Unto Himself, And To A
Committee He Created, The Authority And Jurisdiction To Improperly Investigate An
Alleged Erring Member Of The Supreme Court For The Purpose Of Exculpating Him.
Such Authority And Jurisdiction Is Properly Reposed By The Constitution In the House
of Representatives via Impeachment.
6.1. Canon 2, sec. 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct demands extremely high moral
standards of all judges and Justices: they must ensure that not only their conduct is above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer. This is but
consistent with a very long line of jurisprudence laid by the Supreme Court that judges should
avoid all forms of impropriety, including the appearance of impropriety. It is also practically a
universal rule among judiciaries worldwide.
6.2. The Vinuya vs. Executive Secretary 49 case concerned a petition by other legal scholars on
behalf of the surviving Filipino comfort women (women pressed into sexual slavery by
occupying Japanese forces during the Second World War), on the theory that the prohibition
against rape and sexual abuse in times of war is jus cogens in international law, and therefore
the State had a duty to pursue their claims from the Japanese government. Upon review of the
Courts decision denying the comfort womens petition, it was alleged that rampant plagiarism
was committed by the ponente, Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo.

6.3. The alleged plagiarism in Vinuya comprised the verbatim lifting, without attribution and
encompassing both the original authors written text and footnotes, of significant portions of
books and articles from international law journals that supported the theory. At least three
foreign authors works were allegedly plagiarized. But aside from the issue of plagiarism itself,
after copying from the articles, the Court allegedly made them appear to support
the opposite conclusion; i.e., the Court used them to deny the petition, whereas the
materials per se should have been seen to favor the grant thereof.
6.4. It appears that, with a clear intent of exonerating a member of the Supreme Court,
Respondent, in violation of the Constitution, formed an Ethics Committee that determined the
culpability of a Justice of the Supreme Court an impeachable officer. Respondent had no
power to do this since under the Constitution, the power to make accountable impeachable
officers belonged to the House of Representatives. Thus, Respondent betrayed the public
trust by arrogating unto himself, and to a Committee he created, the authority and
jurisdiction to investigate an alleged member of the Supreme Court. To reiterate, such
authority and jurisdiction has been reposed by the Constitution in the House of
Representatives via impeachment. By constituting such a committee, and by arrogating unto
himself power to determine the culpability of Justice del Castillo and exonerating him in the
end, Respondent thereby encroached on the sole power and duty of the House of
Representatives to determine, by impeachment, whether Justice Del Castillo was to be held
accountable, in violation of the principle of separation of powers of the Legislature and the
Judiciary.
6.5. It may be recalled that the original authors separately complained to the Supreme Court
about the incident,50 while the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the
Respondent, speaking through the Court Administrator, initially announced that no action
would be taken on the matter. 51 This was despite the receipt of the complaints from the first of
three authors. Only when the number of authors had increased to three did the Respondent
decide to act by announcing the formation of an Ethics Review Committee comprised of
members of the Court to investigate the matter.52
VII. RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HIS
PARTIALITY IN GRANTING A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) IN
FAVOR OF FORMER PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AND HER
HUSBAND JOSE MIGUEL ARROYO IN ORDER TO GIVE THEM AN
OPPORTUNITY TO ESCAPE PROSECUTION AND TO FRUSTRATE THE ENDS OF
JUSTICE, AND IN DISTORTING THE SUPREME COURT DECISION ON THE
EFFECTIVITY OF THE TRO IN VIEW OF A CLEAR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
THE CONDITIONS OF THE SUPREME COURTS OWN TRO.
7.1. The Supreme Court, under the Respondent, inexplicably consolidated the separate
petitions filed by former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and her husband Miguel Arroyo
in order to question the validity of the Watch List Orders issued against them by the
Department of Justice pursuant to DOJ Circular No. 41 ironically issued by the DOJ under
Arroyos administration. By consolidating the petitions, the Supreme Court under Respondent
unduly gave Miguel Arroyo an unwarranted benefit since the alleged urgent health needs of
President Arroyo would now be extended to him. 53
7.2. Worse, the Supreme Court, under the Respondent, immediately acted upon the Petition
and granted the TRO despite the fact that there are clear inconsistencies in former President

97

Arroyos petition that casts serious doubts on the sincerity and urgency of her request to leave
the Philippines. As detailed in the dissent of Justice Ma. Lourdes Sereno, President Arroyo
presented inconsistent, and probably untruthful statements about her situation. Justice
Sereno cited documents submitted by the former presidents doctors belying her claims of
threat to life. Aside from changes in the list of countries she wanted to visit, President Arroyo
was also planning to participate in two conferences. Hence, Justice Sereno noted: It seems
incongruous for petitioner who has asked the Department of Justice and this Court to look
with humanitarian concern on her precarious state of health, to commit herself to attend these
meetings and conferences at the risk of worsening her physical condition.
7.3. Moreover, it appears from reports that the ponente to whom the petitions were raffled was
an Associate Justice. Under the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, a TRO can only be
considered upon the recommendation of the ponente. Evidently, in view of certain objections
against the grant of the TRO, a holding of a hearing within the short period of five (5) days
was recommended. Despite this recommendation, the Respondent engineered a majority of 8
votes (as against five dissenters) the immediate grant and issuance of the TRO in favour of
former President Arroyo and her husband in blatant violation of their own internal rules.
7.4. It also appears from the coordinated acts of the Arroyos that they were coordinating with
Respondents Court. For how can it be explained that they made multiple bookings on the
same day expecting that they can leave the country on the very same day their plea for a TRO
was to be decided? It is not difficult to see that the hasty issuance of the TRO was a brazen
accommodation to the Arroyos. Not only that. Respondent bent over backwards to aid and abet
the Arroyos plan to leave the country on the very day of the session on their TRO plea. The
Courts office hours that usually end at 4:30 pm were extended to allow the Arroyos to post a
measly P2 million bond later and the Court process server was drafted to serve the TRO upon
the DOJ and the OSG after office hours.
7.5. Also, despite that fact that the Court, under Respondent, laid down conditions for the
issuance of the TRO, Respondent allowed the issuance of the TRO notwithstanding the fact
that it was established that President Arroyo and Miguel Arroyo failed to comply with an
essential pre-condition that was meant to ensure the vesting of court jurisdiction in the event
the Arroyos flee prosecution. The condition was, to wit:
(ii) The petitioners shall appoint a legal representative common to both of them who will
receive subpoena, orders, and other legal processes on their behalf during their
absence. The petitioners shall submit the name of the legal representative, also within five (5)
days from notice hereof; (Emphasis supplied.)
7.6. The Special Power of Attorney dated November 15, 2011 which they issued to their
counsel fails to state that their counsel had the power to receive subpoenas, orders and other
legal processes. Instead, they only empowered their counsel to produce summons or receive
documentary evidence:
That I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, of legal age, married, Filipino with residence
at 14 Badjao Street, Pansol, Quezon City, do hereby name, constitute and appoint ATTY.
FERDINAND TOPACIO, likewise of legal age, Filipino, with office address at Ground floor,
Skyway Twin Towers, H. Javier St., Ortigas Center, Pasig, Metro Manila, as my legal

representative in the Philippines and to be my true and lawful attorney-in-fact, for my name,
place and stead, to do and perform the following acts and things, to wit:
1. To sign, verify, and file a written statement;
2. To make and present to the court an application in
connection with any proceedings in the suit;
3. To produce summons or receive documentary evidence;
4. To make and file compromise or a confession of judgment
and to refer the case to arbitration;
5. To deposit and withdraw any money for the purpose of any proceeding;
6. To obtain copies of documents and papers; and
7. Generally to do all other lawful acts necessary for the
conduct of the said case. (Emphasis supplied.)
By virtue of the Arroyos abject failure to comply with this pre-condition, the TRO
should not have been issued, nor deemed effective.
7.7. Due to the Arroyos abject failure to comply with Condition 2, the Supreme Court en
banc in its November 18, 2011 deliberations, by a vote of 76, found that there was no
compliance with the second condition of the TRO. Consequently, for failure to comply with an
essential condition for the TRO, the TRO is not effective. However, by a vote of 7-6, the
Supreme Court decided there was no need to explicitly state the legal effect on the TRO of the
noncompliance by petitioners with Condition Number 2 of the earlier Resolution. As
succinctly stated in Justice Ma. Lourdes Serenos dissent:
The majority argued that such a clarification is unnecessary, because it is clear that the TRO
is conditional, and cannot be made use of until compliance has been done. It was therefore the
sense of the majority that, as an offshoot of the winning vote that there was failure by
petitioners to comply with Condition Number 2, the TRO is implicitly deemed suspended until
there is compliance with such condition. Everyone believed that it would be clear to all that a
conditional TRO is what it is, conditional.54
7.8. However, the Supreme Court Spokesperson, Midas Marquez, made a public claim which
was aired in all media outlets that the Court ostensibly decided that the TRO was effective
despite non-compliance with an essential condition of the TRO. He even posited that the
Arroyos can still leave the country. It is notable that Respondent did not chastise Marquez
for his outrightly false and public misrepresentation. Respondent, as Chief Justice,
should have called to task Marquez for misleading the public as to the import of the
Supreme Courts en banc ruling. Instead, he remained silent and did not bother to
contradict Marquez thereby aiding Marquez in spreading false news about the action of
the Supreme Court.
7.9. Worse, the Respondent did not correct the decision that was issued despite the fact that the
decision did not reflect the agreement and decision made by the Supreme Court during their
deliberations on November 18, 2011. Respondent subverted the will of the Supreme Court and
imposed his unilateral will by making it likewise appear that the TRO was effective despite
non-compliance with his own imposed pre-condition.

98

7.10. Clearly, therefore, Respondent knowingly fed Marquez the wrong sense and import of
the deliberations of the Court on the TRO issue. This false messaging intended for the public
was deliberately made by Respondent to make it appear that indeed the Arroyos can leave
immediately and at any time. Clearly, Respondents action showed bias and a partisan stance
in favor of the Arroyos. Respondents action of causing a false message and twisting the sense
and understanding of the Court during its deliberations on this matter, betray not only his lack
of independence, competence and probity, but more importantly, the moral fiber to dispense
justice as he would allow a frustration of justice for the Filipino People for personal gain and
commitment to his midnight benefactor.
7.11. Worse, despite the finding that the Arroyos failed to comply with an essential condition
of the TRO, the Supreme Court, headed by Respondent Corona in a 9-4 vote, ruled that the
TRO was in effect.

of the House of Representatives, constituting at least one-third of all the members thereof,
hereby file the instant Verified Complaint/Resolution of Impeachment against Respondent
Honorable Chief Justice Renato C. Corona. Accordingly, it is most respectfully prayed that in
accordance with Rule IV of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings promulgated
by the House of Representatives, to transmit to the Senate of the Philippines the
instant Verified Complaint/Resolution of Impeachment to serve as the Articles of Impeachment
for trial.
Thereafter, undersigned Complainants respectfully pray that the Honorable Members of the
Senate conduct trial forthwith and thereafter, render a judgment of conviction against
Respondent Honorable Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.
Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for.
Quezon City, Metro Manila, December 12, 2011.

VIII. RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST AND/OR COMMITTED

GRAFT AND CORRUPTION WHEN HE FAILED AND REFUSED TO ACCOUNT
FOR THE JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND SPECIAL ALLOWANCE
FOR THE JUDICIARY (SAJ) COLLECTIONS.
8.1. The Supreme Court has an independent source of income other than its share in the
national budget. It collects from every litigant filing a complaint docket fees, which are used
for the Special Allowance for the Judiciary (SAJ) and basic legal fees, which go to the Judicial
Development Fund (JDF). It is worth noting that the Judiciary Development Fund and the
Fiduciary Fund partake of the nature of trust funds. The JDF is being collected for the benefit
of the members and personnel of the Judiciary to help ensure and guarantee the independence
of the Judiciary in the administration of justice. It is also intended to augment the allowances
of the members and personnel of the Judiciary and to finance the acquisition, maintenance and
repair of office equipment and facilities.
8.2. Respondent has reportedly failed and refused to report on the status of the JDF Funds and
the SAJ collections. Under his leadership, the Supreme Court has reportedly failed to remit to
the Bureau of Treasury all SAJ collections in violation of the policy of transparency,
accountability and good governance. There is likewise the reported failure of Respondent to
account for funds released and spent for unfilled positions in the judiciary and from authorized
and funded but not created courts.
8.3. In particular, the annual audit report of the Supreme Court of the Philippines (Annex Y)
contained the observation that unremitted funds to the Bureau of Treasury amounted to P5.38
Billion (page 38 of Annex Y).
8.4. On the other hand, the Special allowance for Judiciary along with the General Fund,
Judiciary Development Fund in the amount of P559.5 Million were misstated resulting from
delayed and/or non-preparation of bank reconciliation statements and non-recording
/uncorrected reconciling items (page 41 of Annex Y).

[RULE 140, RULES OF COURT]

Charges Against Judges of First Instance
Section 1. Complaint - All Charges against judges of first instance shall be in writing and shall
set out distinctly, clearly, and concisely the facts complained of as constituting the alleged
serious misconduct or inefficiency of the respondent, and shall be sworn to and supported by
affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged, and shall be
accompanied with copies of documents which may substantiate said facts.
Section 2. Service or dismissal. - If the charges appear to merit action, a copy thereof shall be
served upon the respondent, requiring him to answer within ten (10) days from the date
service. If the charges do not merit action, or if the answer shows to the satisfaction of the
court that the charges are not meritorious, the same shall be dismissed.
Section 3. Answer; hearing. - Upon the filing of respondents answer or upon the expiration of
the time for its filing, the court shall assign one of its members, a Justice of the Court of
Appeals or a judge of first instance to conduct the hearing of the charges. The Justice or judge
so assigned shall set a day for the hearing, and notice thereof shall be served on both parties.
At such hearing the parties may present oral or written evidence.
Section 4. Report - After the hearing, the Justice or judge shall file with the Supreme Court a
report of his findings of fact and conclusions of law, accompanied by the evidence presented
by the parties and the other papers in he case.
Section 5. Action - After the filing of the report, the court will take such action as the facts and
the law may warrant.

RESOLUTION and PRAYER

WHEREFORE, pursuant to the procedure laid down by Section 3, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution on Accountability of Public Officers, the undersigned Complainants, as Members

Section 6. Confidential. - Proceedings against judges of first instance shall be private and
confidential.

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2. Maximum Use of Judge Time and Effective Court Management:

2.1 All Presiding Judges are directed to comply strictly with the guidelines established in
Circular No. 13, July 1, 1987, on punctuality and observance of office hours, effective use of
pretrial and discovery procedures, effective management of trials, the availment of annual
conferences.

[ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 1 JANUARY 28, 1988]

SUPREME COURT CIRCULARS AND ORDERS
TO: THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE COURT OF
TAX APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND SHARI'A DISTRICT COURTS
AND SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURTS
SUBJECT: IMPLEMENTATION OF SEC. 12, ART. XVIII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION
Pursuant to Sec. 12, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating the adoption of a
systematic plan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the
Supreme Court and the lower courts prior to the effectivity of the Constitution on February 2,
1987, the following directives must be complied with strictly by all concerned.

2.2 A strict policy on postponement should be observed to avoid unnecessary delays in court
proceedings. Faithful adherence to Secs. 3, 4 and 5 of Rule 22, Rules of Court should be
observed.
2.3 The preparation of the court calendar should not be left entirely in the hands of the clerk of
court, must be closely supervised by the Presiding Judge. A rational calendar plan should be
followed so that each case in the calendar is assured of a hearing on the scheduled day of trial.
2.4 The Presiding Judge must have a calendar of cases submitted for decision, noting the exact
day, month and year when the 90-day period is to expire. As soon as a case is submitted for
decision, this must be noted in the calendar of the Judge, the records duly collated with the
Exhibits and trial notes of the judge, and placed in the judge's chambers.
3. Prompt Action on Dilatory Petitions to Delay Enforcement of Executory Judgments:
3.1 It has become a common practice for litigants to file dilatory petitions
for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction in order to delay or thwart enforcement of final an
executory judgments of both the regional trial court or of other inferior
trial courts.

1. Effective Docket Control:

1.1 All presiding judges of trial courts must, upon assumption of office, and every
semester thereafter on June 30th and December 31st of every year conduct a
physical inventory of their dockets for the purpose of determining the actual number
of cases pending in their salas.
1.2 An inventory shall be prepared to indicate the cases pending trial, the cases
submitted for decision and the cases that have been archived. Copy of such
inventory shall be submitted to the Supreme Court through the Court Administrator
within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Circular and the Inventory Form.
1.3 The Presiding Judge and the Clerk of Court shall initial the Records or Rollos of
each case to indicate the date of actual inventory. The inventory shall include a list
of cases submitted for decision, indicating the title and case number and the date of
filing of said case. An updated inventory be submitted to the Supreme Court every
six (6) months thereafter as required in Paragraph 1.1 hereof.

3.2 Where such petitions are filed, the court concerned should exercise the
greatest restraint to avoid delay in the enforcement of final and executory
judgments. Attention is called to Sec. 6, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
which provides that such petition may be given due course only if
"sufficient in form and substance." Hence, summons should not
immediately be issued until the Court finds the petition sufficient in form
and substance. Only then should the order issue requiring defendant or
defendants to answer. Restraining orders or preliminary injunction should
not be issued without prior notice and hearing and showing of a clear right
thereto.
4. Redistribution of Pending Cases in Multi-Sala Station:
4.1 In multi-sala stations where former incumbents have either retired or were promoted
leaving undecided pending cases such volume that the present incumbent finds extreme
difficulty in attending thereto, the Executive Judge should promptly make a report and
recommendation on the equitable redistribution of these cases to the other salas.

1.4 Preference in Disposition. - All cases of matters submitted for decision or

resolution before the effectivity of the Constitution shall be given preference by the
presiding judge in his disposition of his docket.

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4.2 As much as practicable, the incumbent judges should arrive at an agreement on the matter;
otherwise, the matter should be brought to the attention of the Court Administrator for prompt
action.

7.3 Administrative intervention is also warranted in case of conflict of opinions among the
judges as to the proprietary of the inhibition.
8. Raffle of Cases:

5. Decision-Writing:
5.1 All Presiding Judges must observe scrupulously the periods prescribed in Art. VIII, Sec. 15
of the Constitution.
5.2 All judges are reminded that the Supreme Court has applied the "Res Ipsa Loquitur" rule in
the removal of judges even without any formal investigation whenever a decision, on its face,
indicates gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law or gross misconduct. (See People
vs. Valenzuela, 135 SCRA 712; Cathay Pacific Airways vs. Romillo, Jr., 142 SCRA 262; In re
Laureta, 149 SCRA 570).
5.3 Judges should make complete findings of facts in their decision, and scrutinize closely the
legal aspects of the case in the light of the evidence presented. They should avoid the tendency
to "generalize and to form conclusion without detailing the facts from which such conclusions
are deduced." (See People vs. Alvero, G.R. No. 69564, Jan. 29, 1988; Pengson vs. IAC, 130
SCRA 289).
6. Motions and Other Interlocutory Matters:
6.1 All Presiding Judges must endeavor to act promptly on all motions and interlocutory
matters pending before their courts.
6.2 Unless authorized by the Rule, and only in situations of extreme urgency, no motions or
other applications for relief should be acted upon ex parte. Delays in court proceedings have
often times been due to such ex parte applications, resulting in the aggrieved party having to
seek relief from higher courts.
6.3 All courts from the Court of Appeals down are reminded of the injunction in Habaluyas vs.
Judge Japzon, and subsequent cases, G.R. No. 70895, May 30, 1986, 142 SCRA 209
(reiterated in Circular No. 10, August 28, 1986) that no motion for extension of time to file a
motion for new trial or reconsideration of judgment or final order shall be allowed. The
granting of such prohibited motion for extension shall not preserve the judgment or order from
becoming final and executory for lapse of the period to appeal. Such motions for extension
may be filed only in the Supreme Court which reserves the right in its discretion to grant or
deny the same.
7. Inhibitions and Disqualifications:
7.1 All judges are reminded that as already pointed out in Circular No. 7, dated November 10,
1980, inhibitions and disqualifications are judicial actions which do not require prior
administrative approval.
7.2 Administrative intervention is necessary only when the inhibitions is by a judge of a single
sala court, and the case has to be transferred to another judge of another station.

8.1 Raffle of cases should be done in open session in the presence of lawyers and spectators,
immediately after the court opens its sessions:
8.2 The minutes of the Raffle should be distributed within 24 hours after completion thereof to
the judges of the other salas, and a copy sent to the Office of the Court Administrator.
8.3 Special raffles should not be permitted except on verified application of the interested
party who seeks issuance of a provisional remedy and only upon a finding by the Executive
Judge that unless the special raffle is conducted, irreparable damage shall be suffered by the
applicant. The special raffle shall be conducted by at least two judges in a multiple-sala
station.
8.4 There must be strict compliance with Administrative Order No. 6, dated June 30, 1975 and
Circular No. 7 dated September 23, 1974 requiring that no case may be assigned in multi-sala
courts without raffle; a raffle committee composed of the Executive Judge and two other
judges shall be constituted where practicable, raffle proceedings should be stenographically
recorded, and the results signed by the Judges or their representatives and the Clerk of Court,
and the branch assignment shall be recorded in words and figures on theRollo.
9. Bar Relations:
9.1 All Executive Judges shall conduct dialogues and conferences at least once every semester
with the officers of the Integrated Bar Chapter in their respective jurisdictional areas.
9.2 At this conference, the Executive Judge shall discuss with the IBP Officers problems
confronting the lawyers, and examine approaches and solutions to enable both the court and
the bar to assist each other in the speedy resolution of pending cases.
10. Maintaining Public Confidence in the Courts:
10.1 All judicial efforts should be addressed towards maintaining public confidence in the
courts.
10.2 As we enjoined in Circular No. 13, dated July 1, 1987, "all trial judges should endeavor
to conduct themselves strictly in accordance with the mandate of existing laws and the Code
of Judicial Ethics that they be exemplars in their communities and the living personification of
justice and the Rule of Law."
10.3 The reduction of case loads would be an efficacious design to strengthen public
confidence in the Courts. All efforts should be exerted so that case disposals should exceed
case inputs. Whenever obstacles present themselves which delay case disposition, the
Presiding Judge should immediately call the attention of the Supreme Court through the Court

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Administrator when the situation requires remedies beyond the control or capability of the
judges.
11. Deadlines for Decisions for all Cases filed after February 2, 1987.
11.1 All courts are reminded of the mandatory provisions of Article VIII, Section 15 of the
Constitution setting deadlines for determination and adjudication of cases filed thereunder and
for issuance of a Certification by the Presiding Judge stating the reason why a decision or
resolution has not been rendered or issued within the deadline period. The provisions are here
in below reproduced for ready reference:
Sec. 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided
or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and,
unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three
months for all other lower courts.
(2) A case or matter should be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of
the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
(3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the
Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the
record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a
decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.

A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC(Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against

Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special
Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both
as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar.)
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan;
judges of regular and special courts; and court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds
which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of
the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional
Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized
as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a
disciplinary action against the respondent Justice, judge or court official concerned as a
member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint
and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinarily
sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one
decision or resolution.
This Resolution shall supplement Rule 140 of the Rules of Court and shall take effect on the
first day of October 2002. It shall apply to administrative cases already filed where the
respondents have not yet been required to comment on the complaints.
This Resolution shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

(4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to
such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve
the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay.
[A.M. No. RTJ-08-2138

August 5, 2009]

12. Publication:
12.1 Let the Clerk of Court distribute this Circular among all courts and the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and cause the publication thereof in the Official Gazette, as well as distribute
copies thereof to the media for their dissemination.

OLGA M. SAMSON, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE VIRGILIO G. CABALLERO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION

January 28, 1988.

Per Curiam:
[A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC.September 17, 2002]
RE:AUTOMATIC CONVERSION OF SOME ADMINISTRATIVE CASES AGAINST
JUSTICES OF THE CA & THE SANDIGANBAYAN, et al.
EN BANC
Gentlemen:

This is an administrative complaint for dishonesty and falsification of a public document

against respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30,
Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija.
In her complaint,1 complainant Olga M. Samson alleged that respondent Judge Virgilio G.
Caballero should not have been appointed to the judiciary for lack of the constitutional
qualifications of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence 2, and for violating
the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) which disqualifies from nomination any
applicant for judgeship with a pending administrative case. 3

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 17 SEPT 2002.

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According to the complainant, respondent, during his JBC interviews, deliberately concealed
the fact that he had pending administrative charges against him.
She disclosed that, on behalf of Community Rural Bank of Guimba (Nueva Ecija), Inc., she
had filed criminal and administrative charges for grave abuse of authority, conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service and violation of Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code
against respondent in the Office of the Ombudsman on July 23, 2003.
At that time a public prosecutor, respondent allegedly committed certain improprieties 4 and
exceeded his powers by overruling the Secretary of Justice in a reinvestigation he conducted.
On March 24, 2004, the Ombudsman dismissed the charges. 5 It also denied the complainants
motion for reconsideration.6
Thereafter, the complainant filed a petition for review 7 on October 28, 2004 in the Court of
Appeals (CA). In a decision8 dated November 25, 2005, the appellate court held that it could
not take cognizance of the criminal charges against respondent on the ground that all appeals
from the decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman pertaining to criminal cases should be
taken to the Supreme Court by way of a petition for certiorari. 9 As to the administrative aspect,
the CA reversed and set aside the decision and joint order of the Ombudsman dismissing the
charges against respondent. The CA then directed Ombudsman to file and prosecute the
administrative charges against respondent.
While the complainants petition was pending in the CA, respondent was interviewed several
times in the JBC from February 2005 to August 2005 for the position of RTC judge. On
August 25, 2005, he was appointed to the RTC, Branch 30, Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija. The
complainant charged that respondent never informed the JBC of his pending cases. This, she
said, made it possible for him to be nominated and, subsequently, appointed.
In his comment,10 respondent admitted that complainant had lodged criminal and
administrative cases against him in the Ombudsman. He, however, insisted that these were
already dismissed by virtue of the immediately effective and executory March 24, 2004
decision of the Ombudsman. Thus, there were actually no more pending cases against him
during his interviews in the JBC from February to August 2005. Accordingly, there was no
impediment to his nomination to and assumption of the position of judge. However, he
insisted that he informed the JBC of the said cases.
The complainant filed a reply,11 stating that the March 24, 2004 decision of the Ombudsman
was not yet final and executory as it was timely appealed by way of a petition for review filed
on October 28, 2004 in the CA. In fact, the petition was even granted.
To further support her charge of dishonesty against respondent, complainant pointed to the
Personal Data Sheet (PDS) filed by respondent on March 21, 2006 in the Office of
Administrative Services-Office of the Court Administrator (OAS-OCA) RTC Personnel
Division.12 According to her, respondent categorically denied ever having been charged
formally with any infraction.
On the basis of the pleadings and documents presented by both parties, the OCA found
respondent administratively liable for dishonesty and falsification of an official document for
his false statement in his PDS. It recommended respondents dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to reemployment in the government service.
We agree with the findings of the OCA that respondent is guilty of dishonesty and falsification
of an official document.

We have no way of knowing whether respondent withheld information from the JBC, as both
he and complainant never backed their respective allegations with concrete evidence. 13 Thus,
no probative value can be given either to the charges or to the defenses.
However, respondent is not to be exonerated on the basis of the foregoing alone. Regardless of
whether he disclosed his pending cases during his interviews, the fact remains that he
committed dishonesty when he checked the box indicating "No" to the question "Have you
ever been formally charged?" in his March 21, 2006 PDS filed in the OAS-OCA RTC
Personnel.14
Respondents act of making an obviously false statement in his PDS was reprehensible, to say
the least. It was not mere inadvertence on his part when he answered "No" to that very simple
question posed in the PDS. He knew exactly what the question called for and what it meant,
and that he was committing an act of dishonesty but proceeded to do it anyway. To make
matters worse, he even sought to wriggle his way out of his predicament by insisting that the
charges against him were already dismissed, thus, his negative answer in the PDS. However,
whether or not the charges were already dismissed was immaterial, given the phraseology of
the question "Have you ever been formally charged?," meaning, charged at anytime in the past
or present.
In Ratti v. Mendoza-De Castro,15 we held that the making of untruthful statements in the PDS
amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an official document. Dishonesty, being in the
nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification
from reemployment in the government service.
Respondent, a judge, knows (or should have known) fully well that the making of a false
statement in his PDS could subject him to dismissal. This Court will not allow him to evade
the consequences of his dishonesty. Being a former public prosecutor and a judge now, it is his
duty to ensure that all the laws and rules of the land are followed to the letter. His being a
judge makes it all the more unacceptable. There was an obvious lack of integrity, the most
fundamental qualification of a member of the judiciary.
Time and again, we have emphasized that a judge should conduct himself in a manner which
merits the respect and confidence of the people at all times, for he is the visible representation
of the law.16 Regrettably, we are convinced of respondents capacity to lie and evade the truth.
His dishonesty misled the JBC and tarnished the image of the judiciary. He does not even
seem remorseful for what he did as he sees nothing wrong with it.
He deserves the harsh penalty of dismissal from the service.
This administrative case against respondent shall also be considered as a disciplinary
proceeding against him as a member of the Bar, in accordance with AM. No. 02-9-02SC.17 This resolution, entitled "Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases
Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and
Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar," provides:
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan;
judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are based on
grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for
violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of
Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally
recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a
disciplinary action against the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a
member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint

103

and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary
sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one
decision or resolution. (Emphasis supplied)
Before the Court approved this resolution, administrative and disbarment cases against
members of the bar who were likewise members of the court were treated
separately.18 However, pursuant to the new rule, an administrative case against a judge of a
regular court based on grounds which are also grounds for the disciplinary action against
members of the Bar shall be automatically considered as disciplinary proceedings against such
judge as a member of the Bar.19
This must be so as violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the new
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct and the
Canons of Judicial Ethics constitutes a breach of the following Canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR):20
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF
THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful act.
CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT.
Rule 10.01 - a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
CANON 11 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO
THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR
CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Since membership in the bar is an integral qualification for membership in the bench, the
moral fitness of a judge also reflects his moral fitness as a lawyer. A judge who disobeys the
basic rules of judicial conduct also violates his oath as a lawyer. 21 In this particular case,
respondents dishonest act was against the lawyers oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court."
Respondents misconduct likewise constituted a contravention of Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, which strictly enjoins a lawyer from committing acts of deceit, otherwise, he
may be suspended or disbarred. Thus:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for

any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
This Court did not hesitate to apply the provisions of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC in a plethora of
cases.22 Of particular importance to this case is our decision in Caada v. Suerte 23 where we
applied the rule to its fullest extent: automatic disbarment.1avvphi1
In Caada v. Suerte, complainant charged respondent Judge Suerte with grave abuse of
authority, grave misconduct, grave coercion, dishonesty, harassment, oppression and violation
of Article 215 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and the Canons of Judicial Ethics. The
complaint alleged, among others, that respondent tried to sell a dilapidated cargo pick-up truck
and Daewoo car to complainant. The latter refused. Their friendship later on turned sour when
they failed to reach an agreement on the commission respondent was supposed to receive as
agent-broker for the contemplated sale of complainants beach lot. The complainant voiced out
his fear that respondent would use his judicial power to persecute him for what respondent
may have perceived as complainants infractions against him.
In his comment, respondent denied offering to sell the vehicles to complainant since,
according to him, he never owned a dilapidated cargo pick-up truck nor could he recall if he
had a Daewoo car in 1998.
However, a perusal of respondents Statements of Assets and Liabilities for the years 19982001 revealed that among his personal properties were a Daewoo car acquired in 1996 and an
L-200 double cab acquired in 1998. Accordingly, we found respondent guilty of dishonesty for
having falsely denied that he ever owned the aforementioned vehicles. For his infraction,
respondent judge was fined in the amount of P40,000. He would have been dismissed from the
service were it not for the fact that he had already been dismissed therefrom because of an
earlier case.24
Significantly, pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, we deemed respondent Judge Suertes
administrative case as disciplinary proceedings for disbarment as well, and proceeded to strip
him of his membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Under the same rule, a respondent "may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint
and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary
sanctioned as member of the Bar." The rule does not make it mandatory, before respondent
may be held liable as a member of the bar, that respondent be required to comment on and
show cause why he should not be disciplinary sanctioned as a lawyer separately from the order
for him to comment on why he should not be held administratively liable as a member of the
bench.25 In other words, an order to comment on the complaint is an order to give an
explanation on why he should not be held administratively liable not only as a member of the
bench but also as a member of the bar. This is the fair and reasonable meaning of "automatic
conversion" of administrative cases against justices and judges 26 to disciplinary proceedings
against them as lawyers. This will also serve the purpose of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC to avoid the
duplication or unnecessary replication of actions by treating an administrative complaint filed
against a member of the bench27 also as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a lawyer by
mere operation of the rule. Thus, a disciplinary proceeding as a member of the bar
is impliedly instituted with the filing of an administrative case against a justice of the

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Sandiganbayan, Court of Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals or a judge of a first- or secondlevel court.28
It cannot be denied that respondents dishonesty did not only affect the image of the judiciary,
it also put his moral character in serious doubt and rendered him unfit to continue in the
practice of law. Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to
the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of law. 29 If the practice of law is to
remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those counted within its ranks
should not only master its tenets and principles but should also accord continuing fidelity to
them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the
general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. 30
A parting word.
The first step towards the successful implementation of the Courts relentless drive to purge
the judiciary of morally unfit members, officials and personnel necessitates the imposition of a
rigid set of rules of conduct on judges. The Court is extraordinarily strict with judges because,
being the visible representation of the law, they should set a good example to the bench, bar
and students of the law. The standard of integrity imposed on them is and should be higher
than that of the average person for it is their integrity that gives them the right to judge.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 30, Cabanatuan City, GUILTY of dishonesty and falsification of an official document.
He is ordered DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges,
except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Respondent is likewise DISBARRED for violation of Canons 1 and 11 and Rules 1.01 and
10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his name STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys.
Let a copy of this resolution be entered into respondents records in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. RTJ-04-1857. July 29, 2005]
GABRIEL DE LA PAZ, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE SANTOS B. ADIONG, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

On October 22, 2004, Judge Santos B. Adiong was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law
in A.M. No. RTJ-04-1863 for which he was meted a penalty of six months suspension without
salary and benefits.
On November 23, 2004. Judge Adiong was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
abuse of authority with a penalty of six months suspension without pay in the instant
administrative case.
Judge Adiong now comes before the Court with an Urgent Motion for Clarification inquiring
on whether the abovementioned two decisions each imposing penalties of six months
suspension should be served simultaneously or successively. In the alternative, Judge Adiong
prays that should said two penalties be served successively, the six months suspension in the
present case be reconsidered and modified to a Fine reasoning that: a) he admits his procedural
lapses; b) has served the judiciary for 38 years; c) his continued suspension will cause the
clogging of the courts docket considering that the acting judge therein, Hon. Amer Ibrahim is
at the same time the Executive Judge and is likewise busy attending to his own cases which
includes electoral protest cases needing preferential attention; d) in one case, Admin. Case No.
532-MJ1, the Court reconsidered the six months suspension of the respondent therein to a Fine;
e) he is the family breadwinner with 6 children ages 5, 7, 8 and 9 and the other two still in
college; f) he is suffering from prostrate cancer and severe gout/arthritis but has to stop
medication because of financial restraint; g) in 1990, they were attacked by a losing litigant as
a result of which, his wife died from gunshot wounds and he survived because of timely
medical attention; and, h) he intends to file an application for optional retirement. Judge
Adiong also informs the Court that he has already served the penalty of six months in A.M.
No. No. RTJ-04-1863.
The penalty of suspension for six months shall be served successively. These two cases
arose from two different causes of action and, therefore, the penalties should both be
served. Moreover, in theen banc Resolution dated February 25, 1992, the Court
categorically stated that in case of two or more suspensions, the same shall be served
successively by the erring lawyer.
Anent Judge Adiongs prayer that the six months suspension be converted to a Fine.
Adm. Case No. 532- MJ is not applicable in the present case for the facts obtaining in the
aforesaid case are different. In the said case, the respondent judge was found guilty of
ignorance of the law with a penalty of six months suspension without pay. Pending resolution
of his Motion for Reconsideration, he continued to perform his judicial duties. However, the
Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the Court, in contemplation of the said decision, withheld
payment of the salary of the respondent judge for six months. When the motion for
reconsideration was denied, six months have elapsed. Upon a Clarificatory Manifestation on
whether he will still be suspended for six months but with pay since the monetary portion of
the judgment had already been satisfied when his salary for the period had been withheld from
him, the Court amended the penalty to the effect that the respondent judge is sentenced to pay
a Fine equivalent to his salary for six months.
ACCORDINGLY, Judge Santos B. Adiong shall serve the penalty imposed on him in A.M.
No. RTJ-04-1863 and in this case, SUCCESSIVELY. The prayer for a modification of the
penalty to a Fine is DENIED for lack of merit.

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SO ORDERED.

4. Failure to cooperate in giving due course to impeachment proceedings against

him;
5. Negligence in handling the election-related case of the petitioner; and

[A.C. No. 7197

January 23, 2007]

6. Persecution of the petitioner,

INTERNATIONAL MILITIA OF PEOPLE AGAINST CORRUPTION AND

TERRORISM, represented by ATTY. ELLY VELEZ PAMATONG, Petitioner,
vs.
CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. (Ret.) Respondent.
RESOLUTION
GARCIA, J.:
In the petition of January 31, 2006 filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Atty.
Elly V. Pamatong, representing the International Militia of People against Corruption and
Terrorism, seeks the disbarment of retired Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
Upon receipt of the petition, docketed at the IBP as CBD Case No. 06-1646, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Director Rogelio A. Vinluan, issued on
February 2, 2006 an Order directing the respondent to submit an answer within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the Order. The Order was apparently not sent to the correct address of the
respondent, for the CBD subsequently directed the petitioner to furnish the Commission with
the respondents appropriate address.
On August 2, 2006, Director Vinluan forwarded to the Court the records of CBD Case No. 061646.
Records show that respondent Davide came to know of the existence of the petition to disbar
only after being served a copy of the Courts Resolution dated July 18, 2006, noting (a) the
May 29, 2006 1st Indorsement of then Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban referring to the
Court a copy of the Order of February 2, 2006, supra, of the IBP Director on Bar Discipline,
and b) the said Order.
Shortly after obtaining a copy of the petition in question, respondent filed on November 6,
2006, a MOTION TO DISMISS with a prayer that, in relation to his Order of February 2,
2006 adverted to, Director Vinluan be ordered to show cause why he should not be held in
contempt of court for usurpation of power.
A perusal of the petition readily shows that the causes of action enumerated therein, namely:
1. Overthrow of a duly elected president;
2. Abandonment of impeachment proceedings against President Estrada;
3. Usurpation of the revenue-raising power of Congress;

are not grounds for disbarment. They are, as the respondent correctly observed, all related to
incidents or proceedings while he was Chief Justice and are related to or connected with the
exercise of his authority or the performance of his official duties. It cannot be overemphasized that the bona fides of such discharge of duty and authority are presumed.
Not lost to the Court is the fact that the petition is summary in form and consists, for the most
part, of self-serving and gratuitous conclusions and offensive innuendoes, when the Rules of
Court requires that a complaint for disbarment shall state clearly and concisely the facts
complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of
the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate such facts. 1 The Court
also notes that the petitioner filed this case out of ignorance of the authority of the Court and
how it operates, as typified by his condemnation of the respondent and a group of justices for
imposing what he perceives to be exorbitant filing fees when, according to him, the revenue
raising power of the government is exclusively vested upon the legislative branch.
In both form and substance, the instant petition deserves to be dismissed outright.
On the matter of citing CBD Director Rogelio A. Vinluan for contempt, we note that the
petition, as pointed out by the respondent, was filed with the Court, albeit through the IBP. In
effect, the petition was directly invoking the primary jurisdiction of the Court. Accordingly,
the CBD should have immediately referred the petition to the Court for such action it may
deem appropriate to take, instead of assuming initial jurisdiction thereon by ordering the
respondent to submit an answer.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court loathes to initiate contempt proceedings against
Director Vinluan on account alone of his having issued the Order of February 2, 2006. As it
were, there is no indication that he harbored ill-will toward the respondent or was moved by a
malicious desire to undermine the authority and jurisdiction of the Court. Far from it. For
Director Vinluan, doubtless after realizing his mistake or being apprised of extant rules
relating to disbarment proceedings, issued, on June 6, 2006, an Order recalling his earlier
Order of February 2, 2006 and required Atty. Pamatong to file his petition to disbar directly
with the Court pursuant to its existing rules and guidelines relating to retired justices and
judges. Indeed, as an immediate off-shoot of the matter at hand, the Court, by Resolution
dated September 5, 2006, approved in principle the amendment of SC Circular No. 3-89 such
that the IBP is henceforth required to forward to the Court for appropriate disposition all
complaints for disbarment and discipline filed with the IBP against all justices and judges,
sitting or retired, for acts and/or omissions committed during their tenure in the judiciary.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves as follows:
1. The instant petition for disbarment against retired Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. is hereby DISMISSED for utter lack of merit; and

106

2. The motion to cite IBP Commission on Bar Discipline Director Rogelio A.

Vinluan for contempt is DENIED. He or his successor, as the case may be, is
admonished, however, to be more circumspect in disposing of similar petition or
complaint to disbar in the future.
SO ORDERED.

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