RCBC foreclosed on properties mortgaged by BF Homes in October 1984 after BF Homes filed for rehabilitation but before the SEC appointed a management committee in March 1985. The Court held that under PD 209-A, suspension of claims only takes effect upon appointment of a management committee, not just filing for rehabilitation. Therefore, RCBC's foreclosure preceding the committee's appointment was valid according to the clear language of the law, even if departing from it could be seen as more logical. The Court cannot depart from unambiguous law through judicial legislation.
RCBC foreclosed on properties mortgaged by BF Homes in October 1984 after BF Homes filed for rehabilitation but before the SEC appointed a management committee in March 1985. The Court held that under PD 209-A, suspension of claims only takes effect upon appointment of a management committee, not just filing for rehabilitation. Therefore, RCBC's foreclosure preceding the committee's appointment was valid according to the clear language of the law, even if departing from it could be seen as more logical. The Court cannot depart from unambiguous law through judicial legislation.
RCBC foreclosed on properties mortgaged by BF Homes in October 1984 after BF Homes filed for rehabilitation but before the SEC appointed a management committee in March 1985. The Court held that under PD 209-A, suspension of claims only takes effect upon appointment of a management committee, not just filing for rehabilitation. Therefore, RCBC's foreclosure preceding the committee's appointment was valid according to the clear language of the law, even if departing from it could be seen as more logical. The Court cannot depart from unambiguous law through judicial legislation.
RCBC foreclosed on properties mortgaged by BF Homes in October 1984 after BF Homes filed for rehabilitation but before the SEC appointed a management committee in March 1985. The Court held that under PD 209-A, suspension of claims only takes effect upon appointment of a management committee, not just filing for rehabilitation. Therefore, RCBC's foreclosure preceding the committee's appointment was valid according to the clear language of the law, even if departing from it could be seen as more logical. The Court cannot depart from unambiguous law through judicial legislation.
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Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court and BF Homes
G.R. No. 74851 (December 9, 1999) Facts: Petitioner RCBC is a mortgagor-creditor of the party respondent BF Homes. BF Homes, being a distressed firm, filed before the Securities and Exchange Commission a Petition for Rehabilitation and for Declaration of Suspension of Payments. Consequently, RCBC requested the sheriff of Rizal to levy on execution the properties of party respondent, and consequently obtained favorable judgment. RCBC being the highest bidder during the public auction is now seeking for the transfer certificate of titles from the Register of Deeds issued in its name. It is worthy to note that it was on October 26, 1984 that RCBC obtained favor over the execution of the respondents properties, and it was only on March 18, 1985 that a Management Committee was organized by the SEC for BF Homes. Issue: Whether or not the Court may depart from the words of the law which clearly provides that a creditor may levy execution on a firms properties when such execution precedes SECs organization of a Management Committee to act as its receiver. Held: PD 209-A states that suspension of claims against a corporation under rehabilitation is counted or figured up only upon the appointment of a management committee or a rehabilitation receiver. The holding that suspension of actions for claims against a corporation under rehabilitation takes effect as soon as the application or a petition for rehabilitation is filed with the SEC may, to some, be more logical and wise but unfortunately, such is incongruent with the clear language of the law. Suspension of actions for claims commences only from the time a management committee or receiver is appointed by the SEC. Petitioner RCBC rightfully moved for the extrajudicial foreclosure of its mortgage on October 26, 1984 because a management committee was not appointed by the SEC until March 18, 1985. No matter how practical and noble a reason would be, in order to depart from the words of the law stated in clear and unambiguous manner, would be to encroach upon legislative prerogative to define the wisdom of the law. Such is plainly judicial legislation.