Legal Ethics

Constitutional
Submitted
by:
Safeguards
on
Group 1
Judicial
Independence
Boniel, Junnieson

Paderanga, Emmanuel
Antonio Jr.
Barbac, Luzalej Faith
Piit, Rhally Mae
Superable, Joanna
Bianca
Talon, Sittie Nashiba

Submitted to:
Judge Evelyn Nery
Legal Ethics
Professor

What Is Judicial Independence?

Under
the
Judiciarys
unique
circumstances,
independence
encompasses the idea that individual judges can freely exercise their
mandate to resolve justiciable disputes, while the judicial branch, as a whole,
should work in the discharge of its constitutional functions free of restraints
and influence from the other branches, save only for those imposed by the
Constitution itself. Thus, judicial independence can be "broken down into two
distinct
concepts:
decisional
independence
and
institutional
independence." Decisional independence "refers to a judges ability to render
decisions free from political or popular influence based solely on the
individual facts and applicable law." On the other hand, institutional
independence "describes the separation of the judicial branch from the
executive and legislative branches of government." Simply put, institutional
independence refers to the "collective independence of the judiciary as a
body."
One concept is individual judicial independence, which focuses on each
particular judge and seeks to insure his or her ability to decide cases with
autonomy within the constraints of the law. A judge has this kind of
independence when he can do his job without having to hear or at least
without having to take it seriously if he does hear criticisms of his personal
morality and fitness for judicial office. The second concept is institutional
judicial independence. It focuses on the independence of the judiciary as a
branch of government and protects judges as a class.
A truly independent judiciary is possible only when both concepts of
independence are preserved - wherein public confidence in the competence
and integrity of the judiciary is maintained, and the public accepts the
legitimacy of judicial authority.1

Why is it important?
An erosion of this confidence threatens the maintenance of an
independent Third Estate. Recognizing the vital role that the Judiciary plays
in our system of government as the sole repository of judicial power, with the
power to determine whether any act of any branch or instrumentality of the
1

Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by
the Retired Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31,
2012.

government is attended with grave abuse of discretion, no less than the

Constitution provides a number of safeguards to ensure that judicial
independence is protected and maintained.2

Constitutional safeguards to insure Judicial

Independence
The group has identified the following safeguards, embodied in the
1987 Philippine Constitution, to secure Judicial Independence:
1. The Supreme Court is a constitutional body. It cannot be
abolished nor its membership or the manner of its meeting be
changed by mere legislation.
The Congress cannot pass a law for the abolition, reorganization
or in any manner alters the organization thereof for it requires the
amendment or revision of the Constitution itself which, in turn, requires
a three-fourths vote of all members of the Congress.
Article VIII, Section 4 (1) of the 1987 Constitution provides that
the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law. As the Constitution speaks
only of one Supreme Court, it is not competent for the legislature to
create even a temporary Supreme Court to sit in special cases.
2. The members of the Supreme Court may not be removed
except by impeachment.
Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that aside
from the President, Vice-President, Ombudsman and members of the
constitutional commissions, the members of the Supreme Court may
also be removed through impeachment. Only the Congress can initiate
impeachment since the power to impeach expressly rests upon it.
3. The Supreme Court may not be deprived of its minimum
original and appellate jurisdiction.

Ibid.

Jurisdiction is defined as the authority by which courts take

cognizance of and decide cases, the legal right by which judges
exercise their authority.
Article VIII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme
Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 thereof.
The jurisdiction spoken of in this provision is jurisdiction over
cases, to be prescribed by the Congress subject to the constitution
limitations. As provided in Article VIII, Section 5 (1) of the 1987
Constitution: Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
the Supreme Court can take cognizance of the litigation in view of
international repercussion certain cases where immunity of diplomats
and even consuls are waived expressly or impliedly. Normally, under
international law, these representatives of other States are not subject
to the jurisdiction of the courts of the receiving State.
The petitions for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and quo
warranto are special civil actions. The questions raised in the first three
petitions are questions of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and,
in the fourth, the title of the respondent. The petition for habeas
corpus is a special proceeding.
Although jurisdiction in these matters is also conferred
concurrently on the Court of Appeals and the regional trial courts in
proper cases, the nature and importance of the issues raised may
warrant direct resort to the Supreme Court.
4. The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may not be
increased by law without its advice and concurrence.
The right to appeal is not embraced in the due process of law. As
long as the parties have been given the opportunity to be heard in the
lower court, they cannot demand the right to appeal if the legislature
sees fit to withhold it. Appeal is, as a general rule, a matter of statutory
right entirely dependent upon the discretion or policy of the lawmaking

body. The Congress may validly provide that decisions of the lower
courts shall be final and no longer appealable to the Supreme Court.
However, this rule is not absolute. Article VIII, Section 5 (2) of the
1987 Constitution provides that:
Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as
the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders
of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or
toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher.
e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
The cases enumerated in this provision, an aggrieved party may,
on appeal or certiorari, question the judgment and decrees of a lower
court before the Supreme Court, which may review, revise, reverse,
modify of affirm the same. This appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court is irreducible and may not be withdrawn from it by the Congress.
5. Appointees to Judiciary are nominated by the Judicial and Bar
and Council and are not subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Philippines Constitution
provides:
The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts
shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.
Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within
ninety days from the submission of the list.

The Judicial and Bar Council consists of independently minded

people, who are to screen and assist the skills, competence, integrity,
probity and industry of the appointees to the judiciary. This is to ensure
that whoever is appointed to the judiciary is competent and impartial
in rendering judgment towards true dispensation of justice.
The appointees to the judiciary must not be subjected to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments in order to secure
the degree of independence of the judiciary. Otherwise the appointees,
if subject to such confirmation, would be impartial by expectedly giving
in to the demands of the political leaders who acquire moral influence
over them.
6. The Supreme Court has administrative supervision over all
lower courts and their personnel.
Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Philippines Constitution
provides:
The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over
all courts and the personnel thereof.
The Supreme Court must have administrative supervision over all
courts and the personnel thereof precisely to ensure independence of
the judiciary, that is, to shelve the judges from pressure and
suggestions coming from the other branches of the government. This is
to keep the principle of checks and balances.
7. The Supreme Court has exclusive power to discipline judges of
lower courts.
Section 11, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippines Constitution
provides:
The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts
shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of
seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their
office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline
judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority
of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted thereon.

The Supreme Court has the exclusive and inherent power to

discipline, to rectify and remedy the excesses committed by the lower
court in the discharge of their functions. Otherwise, it would defeat the
objective towards dispensation of justice.
8. The members of the Judiciary have security of tenure, which
cannot be undermined by a law organizing the Judiciary.
Section 2, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that The
Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of
its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof. No law shall
be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security
of tenure of its Members.
Security of tenure is a term used to describe a constitutional or
legal guarantee that a political office-holder cannot be removed from
office except in exceptional and specified circumstances. Without
which, one may find his powers and duties restricted by fear that
whoever disapproves of his decision may be easily removed from
office. Security of tenure offers protection to those who are Members of
the Judiciary, by ensuring that an office-holder cannot be victimized for
exercising their powers, functions and duties. In summation, although
the authority to create courts also includes the authority to abolish the
same, courts may not use the power to abolish courts as a subterfuge
for removing judges.
9. Members of the Judiciary cannot be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that
The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by
law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions.
Quasi-judicial functions are those having a partly judicial
character by possession of the right to hold hearings on and conduct
investigations into disputed claims and alleged infractions of rules and
regulations and to make decisions in the general manner of courts.
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation
and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for; their own
welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry

out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the
administrative agency by the organic law of its existence
The following reason may be given for the prohibition:
a. Such designated violates the doctrine of separation of powers
between judicial and executive branches of the government.
b. It may compromise the independence of the members in the
performance of their judicial function.
c. With so many cases pending in the courts, the practice will
result in further delay in their disposition.
10.
The salaries of Members of the Judiciary cannot be
decreased during their continuance in office.
Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law.
During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.
COMPENSATION OF MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY:
1) Prohibition against reduction.
The salary of the members of the Supreme Court and of judges
of lower courts shall be fixed by law. Until Congress shall provide
otherwise, the initial annual salary of the Chief Justice is P240,000 and
each Associate Justice, P204,000. (Art. XVIII, Sec 17)
2) Purpose of the prohibition.
This is to attract good competent men to the bench and to
promote their independence of action and judgment. The prohibition of
the diminution of the salary of Justices and judges during their
continuance in office is intended as a protection for the independence
of the judiciary. The salaries of the members of the Supreme Court and
judges of lower courts are subject to payment of income tax.
11.

The Judiciary has fiscal autonomy.

CONST. Art. VIII, Sec. 3, The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Appropriations for the judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature
below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after
approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.
The grant of constitution to the judiciary of fiscal autonomy is an
assurance of its independence. Fiscal autonomy means the
appropriations for the judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature
below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after
approval, shall be automatically and regularly released. Although
appropriations of judiciary in not exempted from the judiciary process,
it should be automatically and regularly released. Legislative body
cannot lower down what was allocated in the previous year.
Jurisprudence ruled that a notice requirement, and the scheduling of
releases, as such, do not impinge on the constitutional grant of fiscal
autonomy Civil Service Commission v. Department of Budget and
Management, G.R. No. 158791, February 10, 2006.The grant of fiscal
autonomy does not amount to the Judiciary having unlimited discretion
over its appropriations, especially over its savings. The Constitution
itself prohibits transfer of appropriation, except by specific offices
(relative to their savings, in order to augment other items of their
appropriations) and only through subsequent legislation: CONST Art. VI
Sec. 25, No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of
appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate,
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by
law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
12.
The Supreme Court has exclusive power to promulgate
rules of pleading, practice, and procedure.
CONST Art. VIII, Sec. 5, par.5, Promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the unprivileged. Such rules
shall provide a simplified and expensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of

procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain

effective unless disapprove by the Supreme Court.
This article is the basis of creating Writ of Amparo. Writ of
Amparo is issued when Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued first and the
one being served with that Writ denied that they are in custody of the
person being requested to produce the body thereof. Thus, the Court
may issue Writ of Amparo to search the place of the one being served
by the Writ. Judiciary has the inherent power to suspend their rules in
instances in order to do justice. The traditional power of the Supreme
Court is its authority to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure and admission to the practice of law thus making
Supreme Court an independent judiciary. However there are limitations
and guidelines to this grant. Supreme Court shall provide speedy
disposition that is inexpensive, shall be uniform of all courts of the
same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights.
13.
Only the Supreme Court can temporarily assign judges to
other stations.
CONST Art. III, Sec. 5, par. 3 Assign temporarily judges of lower
courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary
assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the
judge concerned.
The Supreme Court alone can assign temporarily judges of lower
courts to other stations provided that it is due to public interest. The
temporary assignment of transfers could last no longer than six
months without the consent of the judge concerned. Other stations
means that the transfer can also be effected even the transfer is to a
branch within the same region. If the transfer is prolonged, there
should be consent because Judges might be threatened with poor
facilities if their previous station has better facilities. However the
provision is silent about permanent transfer on who can effect
permanent of transfer and the determination of the residence of
Judges. The legislative department has the authority to determine
additional qualifications of judges of lower.
14.
It is the Supreme Court who appoints all officials and
employees of the Judiciary.

CONST Art III, Sec 5, par 6 Appoint all officials and employees of
the judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service law.
The reason that the Supreme Court is granted authority over
appointing their officials is to be independent and safeguard their
department.

Philippine Jurisprudence:
(In relation to Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution)
Nitafan vs. Commissioner on Internal Revenue
G.R. No. 78780, July 23 1987
Facts:
Petitioners David G. Nitafan, Wenceslao M. Polo, and Maximo A.
Savellano are duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches
52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the RTC in Manila. Petitioners herein seek to
prohibit and perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner on Internal
Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any
deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries
Petitioners contend that any tax withheld from their emoluments or
compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease of their salaries,
contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
mandating that during their continuance in office, their salaries shall not be
decreased.
Issue:
Whether or not tax withheld from the emoluments or compensation of
judicial officers constitutes a decrease of their salaries, thus, violates Section
10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
The records of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the provision
on the salary of justices and judges was approves on the understanding that
a provision similar to that in the 1973 Constitution would be inserted, which
says:

No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee,

including Constitutional Officers, shall be exempt from payment of income
tax.
The Supreme Court held that the true intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution was to make the salaries of the members of the Judiciary
taxable.

(In relation to Section 11, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution)

Gualberto J. De La Llana, et al., v. Manual Alba, et al.,
GR. No. L-57883
March 12, 1982
Facts:
This case is a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition
assailing the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, an act which
provided for the reorganization of the Judiciary and the appropriation of
funds therefor. Prior to the enactment of the questioned act, a Presidential
Committee on Judicial Reorganization was organized on August 7, 1980. The
committee was tasked to formulate plans on the reorganization of the
Judiciary, which included all lower courts except the Sadiganbayan. The
committee submitted a report which called for institutional reforms in the
Judiciary in order to cope with the increasing demand brought about by
economic development, population growth, rapid urbanization and other
factors.
After the submission of the said report, Cabinet Bill No. 42, which
became the basis of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, was introduced. Cabinet Bill
No. 42 was drafted on the basis of the guidelines set by the Committee .
Among the changes questioned by the petitioners were the abolition of some
lower courts and the grant of authority given to the President to fix the
compensation and the allowances of the Justices and judges therein
appointed. These changes, as contended by the petitioners, are an
encroachment upon the Constitutional safeguard of Judicial independence as
these changes violated the Judiciarys security of tenure. Furthermore, there

was undue delegation on the President with regard to the fixing of the
allowance and compensation of the appointed Justices and judges.
Issues:
1. Does Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 violate the security of tenure conferred by
the Constitution on the Judiciary?
2. Is there undue delegation in granting the President the authority to fix the
allowance and compensation of the newly appointed Justices and judge?
3. Is Batas Pambansa 129 an infringement on
Judiciary?

the independence of the

Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129.
Reason for the Ruling:
According to the Supreme Court, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 does not
ignore nor disregard the security of tenure provided by our Constitution. The
abolition of an office if done in good faith is valid; it has been settled that
valid abolition of an office is neither removal nor separation of the
incumbents. Also, removal from office does not tantamount to termination
by abolition of an office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office.
After the abolition, there is in law no occupant; in removal, there is an office
with an occupant that would thereby lose his position. Moreover, with regard
to the incumbent judges and justices, the Supreme Court shall be
consulted and its view shall be fully considered. The Court also stated that
Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested with the authority to reorganize
inferior court and in the process abolish existing ones. The court is therefore
obliged to attempt to harmonize the provisions of the Constitution and the
act in order to avoid clashes between the three branches of the government.
As to the delegation of the authority to fix the compensation and allowance
of the newly appointed judge and justices, the Court deemed that the
delegation was proper because of there was a standard which marks the
limit and maps out the boundaries of the delegated power.

(In relation to Section 3, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution)

Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties
Purchased by the Retired Chief/ Associate Justices of the Supreme Court
A.M. No. 11-7-10 SC
July 31, 2012
Facts:
The case stems from an Opinion issued by the Commission on Audit
pertaining to certain underpayments made by 5 retired Chief Justices in the
purchase of personal properties (vehicles) assigned to them. According to
the Commission, the said underpayments resulted from the Courts use of a
wrong formula in appraising the value of the vehicles. The COA thus
concluded that the Court should have used the formula for appraising value
of properties found in their memorandum. The Office of Administrative
Services then recommended that the Commission should respect the inhouse formula utilized by the Court because the Constitution itself grants the
Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling of its budget and resources.
Issue:

1. Is the Opinion of the Commission on Audit an encroachment upon the

fiscal autonomy of the judiciary?
Ruling:
Yes. The Court found merit in the Office of the Administrative Services
contention.
Reason for the Ruling:
The Court stated that although the Commission on audit is expressly
conferred with the authority to conduct post-audit examinations on
constitutional bodies granted fiscal autonomy, the said authority must be
read in light of the Courts judicial independence as. Judicial Independence
encompasses not only decisional independence, or the judges ability to
render decisions free from political or popular influence, but also institutional
independence, or the separation of the judiciary from the other branches of
government. The independence of the Judiciary is safeguarded by our
Constitution, and among the important aspect of judicial independence is
fiscal autonomy. The courts may not be obstructed from their freedom to use
or dispose of their funds for purposes germane to judicial functions. This is
essential because if the judiciary is to perform its functions of adjudications,
then it must be able to command adequate resources for that purpose.
Furthermore, the Courts declaration in the case of Bengzon v. Drilon that the
grant of fiscal autonomy is more extensive than mere automatic and regular
release of its approved annual appropriations implies that the Judiciary has
the authority to use and dispose of its properties at will, free from any
outside control or inference. Thus, under this grant, the Chief Justice and
the Court en banc determines who, what, where, when, and how the
privileges and benefits shall be given to its members. The use of the formula
in appraising the value of a property is therefore discretionary upon the
Court.

(In relation to Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution)

CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO C. CORONA, Petitioner, vs. Search SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES sitting as an IMPEACHMENT COURT, BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, ARLENE "KAKA" BAG-AO, GIORGIDI
AGGABAO, MARILYN PRIMICIAS-AGABAS, NIEL TUPAS, RODOLFO FARINAS,
SHERWIN TUGNA, RAUL DAZA, ELPIDIO BARZAGA, REYNALDO UMALI, NERI
COLMENARES (ALSO KNOWN AS THE PROSECUTORS FROM THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES), Respondents
G.R. No. 200242
July 17, 2012
The Case:
This case is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for immediate
issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary
injunction filed by the former Chief Justice of this Court, Renato C. Corona

Facts of the Case:

A caucus was held by the majority bloc of the HOR during which a verified
complaint for impeachment against petitioner was submitted by the
leadership of the Committee on Justice. After a brief presentation, on the
same day, the complaint was voted in session and 188 Members signed and
endorsed it, way above the one-third vote required by the Constitution. On
December 13, 2011, the complaint was transmitted to the Senate which
convened as an impeachment court the following day, December 14, 2011.
On December 15, 2011, petitioner received a copy of the complaint charging
him with culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and
graft and corruption, allegedly committed as follows:
Article I
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HIS TRACK RECORD
MARKED BY PARTIALITY AND SUBSERVIENCE IN CASES INVOLVING THE
ARROYO ADMINISTRATION FROM THE TIME OF HIS APPOINTMENT AS
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE AND UNTIL HIS DUBIOUS APPOINTMENT AS A
MIDNIGHT CHIEF JUSTICE TO THE PRESENT.
ARTICLE II
RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
AND/OR BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST WHEN HE FAILED TO DISCLOSE TO
THE PUBLIC HIS STATEMENT OFASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH AS
REQUIRED UNDER SEC. 17, ART. XI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
ARTICLE III
RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION
AND/OR BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST BY FAILING TO MEET AND OBSERVE
THE STRINGENT STANDARDS UNDER ART. VIII, SECTION 7 (3) OF THE
CONSTITUTION THAT PROVIDES THAT "[A] MEMBER OF THE JUDICIARY MUST
BE A PERSON OF PROVEN COMPETENCE, INTEGRITY, PROBITY, AND
INDEPENDENCE" IN ALLOWING THE SUPREME COURT TO ACT ON
MERE LETTERS FILED BY A COUNSEL WHICH CAUSED THE ISSUANCE OF FLIPFLOPPING DECISION IN FINAL AND EXECUTORY CASES; IN CREATING AN
EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT WITH MRS. ARROYO THROUGH HER
APPOINTMENT OF HIS WIFE TO OFFICE; AND IN DISCUSSING WITH LITIGANTS
REGARDING
CASES
PENDING
BEFORE
THE
SUPREME
COURT.

ARTICLE IV
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST AND/OR COMMITTED CULPABLE
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION WHEN HE BLATANTLY DISREGARDED THE
PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS BY ISSUING A "STATUS QUO ANTE"
ORDER AGAINST THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE CASE
CONCERNING THE IMPEACHMENT OF THEN OMBUDSMAN MERCEDITAS
NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ.
ARTICLE V
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH WANTON
ARBITRARINESS AND PARTIALITY IN CONSISTENTLY DISREGARDING THE
PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA IN THE CASES INVOLVING THE 16 NEWLYCREATED CITIES, AND THE PROMOTION OF DINAGAT ISLAND INTO A
PROVINCE.
ARTICLE VI
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST BY ARROGATING UNTO HIMSELF,
AND TO A COMMITTEE HE CREATED, THE AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION TO
IMPROPERLY INVESTIGATE A JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE
PURPOSE OF EXCULPATING HIM. SUCH AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION IS
PROPERLY REPOSED BY THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
VIA
IMPEACHMENT.
ARTICLE VII
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HIS PARTIALITY IN
GRANTING A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) IN FAVOR OF FORMER
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AND HER HUSBAND JOSE MIGUEL
ARROYO IN ORDER TO GIVE THEM AN OPPORTUNITY TO ESCAPE
PROSECUTION AND TO FRUSTRATE THE ENDS OF JUSTICE, AND IN
DISTORTING THE SUPREME COURT DECISION ON THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE
TRO IN VIEW OF A CLEAR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURTS OWN TRO.
ARTICLE VIII
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST AND/OR COMMITTED GRAFT
AND CORRUPTION WHEN HE FAILED AND REFUSEDTO ACCOUNT FOR THE

JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND SPECIAL ALLOWANCE FOR THE

JUDICIARY (SAJ) COLLECTIONS.
Issue:
Whether or not the impeachment complaint which was signed by the
Members of the HOR and immediately transmitted to the Senate was done in
a Constitutional manner.
Court Resolution:
Impeachment Court granted the prosecutions request for subpoena directed
to the officers of two private banks where petitioner allegedly deposited
millions in peso and dollar currencies.

(In relation to Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution)

In the matter of the intestate estate of the late Kaw Singco (alias Co Chi
Seng). SY OA, administratrix appellee, vs. CO HO, oppositor-appellant
G.R. No. L-48444

June 30, 1943

It is maintained that our interpretation of Article VIII, section 2, No. 3, of the
Constitution, and section 138, No. 3, of the Revised Administrative Code, as
enunciated in Reyes vs. Diaz, G.R. No. 48754 and Bernabe et al. vs. Vergara,
G.R. No. 48652, is erroneous. In Reyes vs. Diaz we said that the term
"jurisdiction" as used in the Constitution and in the statutes, means
jurisdiction over the subject-matter only, unless an exception is clearly
intended by reason of its employment in a breader sense. We do ruled,
because, independently of the American laws and facts involved in the
American decision therein cited, such interpretation appears to be the clear
intent of our substantive laws. A perusal of all the laws of jurisdiction in the
Philippines Act No. 136 and its amendments; Philippine Constitution,
Article VIII, sections 2 and 3; and Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3 will readily
show that the word "jurisdiction" as used in their different provisions is
intended to havereference to the subject-matter only. It may fairly be
assumed, therefore, that when particularly the same word is used in clause 3
of the section 2 of Article VIII of the Constitution and in clause 3 of section
138 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Acts
Nos. 3 and 259, it is also intended to refer to the same kind of jurisdiction,
since there is nothing therein to show that it is employed in a broader sense.

(In relation to Article VIII, section 11 of the 1987 Constitution)

People of the Philippines v. Hon. Eustaquio z. Gacott, Jr., Presiding Judge, RTC,
Branch 47, puerto Princesa City, Arne Strom and Grace Reyes,
G.R. No. 116049

July 13, 1995

Facts
Respondent Judge Eustaquio z. Gacott, Jr. was reprimanded and fined
by the Court for gross ignorance of the law when he granted the motion to
quash in Criminal Case No. 11529. The respondent Judge thereby filed a
motion for reconsideration and a supplemental motion for reconsideration,
averring in the said motions that spreading the Courts decision on his
personal record will bar his chance of promotion in the judiciary. However,
the Court upheld their decision, stating that the respondent judge exhibited
gross ignorance of the law when he failed to read and apply to his decision
Letter of Instruction No. 2, more so when he averred that the duty to inform
the Court on the applicable law to a particular case is the tasked to the
prosecutor. Had the respondent judge read the aforementioned LOI, he would
not have granted the motion to quash. The Court also stated that the
respondent judges mistake is not merely a simple error but amounts to
gross ignorance of the law which could easily undermine the public's
perception of the court's competence. Furthermore, the spreading of the
Supreme Courts decision on the personal record of the respondent is an
official procedure which cannot be violated to cater to the respondents
request. The respondent judge then questioned the competence of the
Second Division of the Supreme Court to administratively discipline him,
citing that Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution provides "The Supreme
Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or
order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually
took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon."
The respondent further asserts that it is only the full Court, not a division
thereof that can administratively punish him.
Issue:
Is the Second Division of the Supreme Court capable of
administratively disciplining judges of lower courts?
Decision:
Yes, the Second Division of the Supreme Court is divested with the
authority to discipline judges of the lower courts.
Reason for the Decision

According to retired Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, who was the

committee chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, the addition of the word en banc in the 1987
constitution is not intended to make a difference, because reference to the
Court by itself necessarily means the Court en banc. The word en banc was
only added because all internal procedural and administrative matters, as
well as ceremonial functions, are always decided by or conducted in the
Court en banc. Also, the first clause of Section 11, Article VIII is a statement
of the grant of disciplinary power to, and the determination of the procedure
in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. The phrase does not intend
that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard by the full Court, to
do so would be absurd because it would result to a congested docket and
undue delay. However, it is only when the penalty imposed does not exceed
suspension of more than one year or a fine of P10,000.00, or both, that the
administrative matter may be decided in division. When the case involves a
dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the Judiciary, disbarment of a
lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one
(1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00, or both, it is necessary the Court
en banc decide such cases. It is also stipulated in Circular No. 2-89
promulgated by the Supreme Court that A decision or resolution of a
Division of the Court, when concurred in by a majority of its members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in a case and voted
thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such
Members, is a decision or resolution of the Supreme Court (Section 4[3],
Article VIII, 1987 Constitution). The contention of the respondent is
therefore not tenable.