SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-08-1712

August 20, 2008
(Formerly OCA IPI NO. 08-2020-MTJ)
CONRADO Y. LADIGNON, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE RIXON M. GARONG, Municipal Trial Court (MTC),
San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija, respondent.
RE S O LUTI ON
BRION, J.:
The present administrative case has its roots in the letter dated July 17,
2006 of Judge Rixon M. Garong, Municipal Trial Court, San
Leonardo, Nueva Ecija (respondent Judge), addressed to the
Chairman, Administrative Council, First United Methodist Church,
28400 Evergreen, Flat Rock, Michigan, USA 48134. Judge Garong
forwarded, through his letter, a copy of the letter-complaint of one
Rolando G. Gustilo of the Banard Kelly Memorial United Methodist
Church, complaining of the surreptitious manner of incorporating their
church and singling out Conrado M. Ladignon (Ladignon) the
complaint in this administrative case to be part of the deception.
The respondent Judges letter prompted Ladignon to complain to the
Justices of this Court against the respondent Judges improper conduct
as a member of the Judiciary, for his use in a private communication of
his official court stationery and his title as a judge.
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, through a 1st indorsement dated
December 3, 2007, referred Ladignons letter to Court Administrator
Zenaida N. Elepano, for appropriate action. The latter in turn required
Judge Garong to comment on Ladignons complaint.

The respondent Judge admitted using the letterhead of his court and
signing his letter using the word "judge." He claimed, however, that he
merely used an ordinary bond paper where he typed his courts station
"to indicate the return or inside address" from where he wrote the
letter. He further alleged that he "did not see any harm or abuse in
using the word judge on the honest belief that he is entitled to use
such appellation," and that "[t]he practice of using papers in whatever
sizes with the address of their office printed on it is a very regular
occurrence among government offices, be it a personal or official one."
On May 22, 2008, Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao submitted
her evaluation, reporting as follows:
The courts heading or letterhead serves as a primary identifier
of the office. Written correspondence bearing the courts
heading gives the impression that it has the imprimatur of the
court, and that the signatory carries such representation.
Considering this important implication, scrupulous use of the
courts heading must be observed at all times.
Respondents use of the courts heading in his personal letter to
the First United Methodist Church (FUMC) in Michigan, USA
is inappropriate. He has unwittingly dragged the name of the
court into his private affairs, giving the appearance that there is
an implied or assured consent of the court to his cause.
Notwithstanding his avowed good intentions, regard should
have been given to the possible and even actual harm that
inappropriate use of the court heading might entail. Hence,
respondent judges use of the court heading outside of judicial
business warrants disciplinary action for violation of the Code
of Judicial Conduct particularly Section 1, Canon 4 which
states that "judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety in all of their activities."

We agree with the Report that what is involved here is the rule that
"Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all of their activities".1 Indeed, members of the Judiciary should be
beyond reproach and suspicion in their conduct, and should be free
from any appearance of impropriety in the discharge of their official
duties as well as in their personal behavior and everyday life. No
position exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and
uprightness on the individual than a seat in the Judiciary. Where we
significantly differ with the Report is in its sweeping implication that
any use of a courts letterhead for non-official transactions would
necessarily expose the user to liability for "impropriety" or giving the
"appearance of impropriety".
The Judges claim that he used an ordinary bond papers and placed
thereon his official station as return address is not totally without
merit. For, indeed, this is not an unusual practice and it would be
hypocritical to deny its occurrence at all levels of the Judiciary. For
example, some members of the Judiciary may use a social card with
the letterhead of their office to indicate their address as well as their
station within the judicial hierarchy; some also use notepads bearing
their names, designation and station.
A thin line, however, exists between what is proper and what is
improper in such use, and this was the line that the respondent Judge
crossed when he used his letterhead and title the way he did. As the
Report stated, his use of the letterhead and his designation as a Judge
in a situation of potential dispute gave "the appearance that there is an
implied or assured consent of the court to his cause." This
circumstance, to our mind, was what marked the respondent Judges
use of his letterhead and title as improper. In other words, the
respondent Judges transgression was not per se in the use of the
letterhead, but in not being very careful and discerning in considering
the circumstances surrounding the use of his letterhead and his title.

To be sure, this is not the first case relating to the use of a letterhead
that this Court has encountered and passed upon. In Rosauro v.
Kallos,2 we found the respondent Judge liable for violating Rule 2.03
of the Code of the Judicial Conduct when he used his stationery for his
correspondence on a private transaction with the complainant and his
counsel parties with a pending case in his court. The Court held:
By using his salas stationery other than for official purposes,
respondent Judge evidently used the prestige of his office x x x
in violation of Rule 2.03 of the Code.
We do not depart from this rule on the use of official stationary. We
clarify, however, that the use of a letterhead should not be considered
independently of the surrounding circumstances of the use the
underlying reason that marks the use with the element of "impropriety"
or "appearance of impropriety". In the present case, the respondent
Judge crossed the line of propriety when he used his letterhead to
report a complaint involving an alleged violation of church rules and,
possibly, of Philippine laws. Coming from a judge with the letter
addressed to a foreign reader, such report could indeed have conveyed
the impression of official recognition or notice of the reported
violation.
The same problem that the use of letterhead poses, occurs in the use of
the title of "Judge" or "Justice" in the correspondence of a member of
the Judiciary. While the use of the title is an official designation as
well as an honor that an incumbent has earned, a line still has to be
drawn based on the circumstances of the use of the appellation. While
the title can be used for social and other identification purposes, it
cannot be used with the intent to use the prestige of his judicial office
to gainfully advance his personal, family or other pecuniary interests.
Nor can the prestige of a judicial office be used or lent to advance the
private interests of others, or to convey or permit others to convey the

impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.3

To do any of these is to cross into the prohibited field of impropriety.
Time and again, this Court has reminded the members of the Judiciary
that one who occupies an exalted position in the administration of
justice must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him; his
private as well as his official conduct must at all times be free from the
appearance of impropriety. Because appearance is as important as
reality in the performance of judicial functions, a judge like Ceasars
wife must not only be pure and faithful but must be above
suspicion.4 The respondent Judge, even if he did not intend to take
undue advantage of the use of his letterhead and his title, at least gave
the appearance of impropriety when he did so under the circumstances
of his use. To this extent, we find him sufficiently liable to merit the
admonition and warning of this Court regarding any future
inappropriate use of his letterhead and title. We limit ourselves to an
admonition and warning since this is the respondents first brush with
our ethical rules and no bad faith or ill motive attended his actions.

DEE C. CHUAN & SONS, INC., represented by Efren A.

Madlangsakay, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE WILLIAM SIMON P. PERALTA, Presiding Judge
Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 50, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
In a verified complaint dated May 5, 2004 filed in the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA), complainant Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc.1
(DCCSI) which was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 02-105031 entitled
Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. v. Tek Hua Enterprising Corporation,
Manuel C. Tiong and So Ping Bun, charged respondent Judge William
Simon P. Peralta, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 50, with undue delay in the disposition of pending
motions in connection with that case.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Rixon M. Garong of the

Metropolitan Trial Court, San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija, liable under
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Ethics and Rule 2.03 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. We accordingly ADMONISH him to be ever
mindful of the standards he has to observe in his use of his letterhead
and title, and WARN him that a repetition of this transgression shall be
dealt with more severely.

Complainant alleges that on September 13, 2002, the Metropolitan

Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 62 rendered a decision3 in the
unlawful detainer case ordering defendants Tek Hua Enterprising
Corporation (represented by its president Manuel C. Tiong) and So
Ping Bun to vacate the leased premises and to jointly pay the cost of
suit, attorneys fees and rentals for the reasonable use and occupation
of the premises beginning June 1991.4

SO ORDERED.

An appeal was filed in RTC Manila and the case was raffled to Branch
50 wherein respondent was presiding judge.5 On March 18, 2003,
DCCSI filed a "motion to dismiss appeal and for issuance of writ of
execution" for failure of the appellants to post the required bond and to
pay the rentals due in accordance with the decision of the MeTC.
Acting on the motion, respondent issued an order dated March 21,
2003 requiring the appellants to file their comment thereto.

FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1917
April 16, 2009
[Formerly OCA I.P.I No. 04-2006-RTJ]

Consequently, three motions to resolve were filed by DCCSI dated

August 11, 2003, October 20, 2003 and December 3, 2003
respectively. However, despite the lapse of more than one year,
respondent failed and refused to resolve the pending motions,
prompting complainant to file this complaint.6
In his comment dated June 4, 2004, respondent merely informed the
OCA that the subject case "ha(d) been resolved by (his) Court and the
same (was) already for mailing" and attached a copy of his order dated
May 5, 2004. In his order, he dismissed the appeal for failure of the
appellants to file their memorandum and directed the issuance of a writ
of execution in favor of DCCSI.
The OCA, in its report dated December 15, 2004, found that
respondent indeed failed to resolve several motions for more than a
year and showed indifference in his comment. It recommended that
respondent be held liable for inefficiency in the performance of his
official duties and fined in the amount of P11,000.
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the OCA but
modify the penalty.
The Constitution mandates that all cases or matters filed before all
lower courts shall be decided or resolved within 90 days from the time
the case is submitted for decision.7 Respondent ignored this mandate.
He was also in violation of the Canon of Judicial Ethics8 and Code of
Judicial Conduct9 which require judges to dispose of the courts
business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.10
For more than a year, the respondent failed to resolve several motions
the motion to dismiss appeal and for issuance of writ of execution
as well as the three motions to resolve. Had the OCA not required him
to comment on this complaint, these motions might well have
remained pending up to now.

Failure to comply within the mandated period constitutes a serious

violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy
disposition of their cases.11 Considering that the subject case was an
unlawful detainer case, its prompt resolution was a matter of public
policy as it was subject to summary procedure.12 It is disappointing
that it was the respondent himself who caused the delay.13
The Court has always considered a judges failure to resolve motions
and incidents within the prescribed period of three months as gross
inefficiency.14 It undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the
judiciary,15 lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute.16 Undue
delay cannot be countenanced at a time when the clogging of the court
dockets is still the bane of the judiciary.17 The raison d' etre of courts
lies not only in properly dispensing justice but also in being able to do
so seasonably.18
It is opportune to remind respondent of the evils of judicial delay:
Delay derails the administration of justice. It postpones the
rectification of wrong and the vindication of the unjustly prosecuted. It
crowds the dockets of the courts, increasing the costs for all litigants,
pressuring judges to take short cuts, interfering with the prompt and
deliberate disposition of those causes in which all parties are diligent
and prepared for trial, and overhanging the entire process with the pall
of disorganization and insolubility. More than this, possibilities for
error in fact-finding multiply rapidly as time elapses between the
original fact and its judicial determination. If the facts are not fully and
accurately determined, then the wisest judge cannot distinguish
between merit and demerit. If courts do not get the facts right, there is
little chance for their judgment to be right.19
Furthermore, it is distressing that in his one-page comment containing
two very brief paragraphs, respondent did not even bother to counter
the accusation of DCCSI. Neither did he offer any reason or

justification on why it took him more than a year to resolve the

motions.
The Court will not tolerate the indifference of respondent judges to
administrative complaints and to resolutions requiring comment on
such complaints. An order or resolution of this Court is not to be
construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with
partially, inadequately or selectively.20 To do so shows disrespect to
the Court, an act only too deserving of reproof.21
Respondent judge ought to be reminded that a resolution of this Court
requiring comment on an administrative complaint against officials
and employees of the Judiciary is not to be construed as a mere request
from this Court. On the contrary, respondents in administrative cases
are to take such resolutions seriously by commenting on all
accusations or allegations against them as it is their duty to
preserve the integrity of the judiciary. The Supreme Court can
hardly discharge its constitutional mandate of overseeing judges and
court personnel and taking proper administrative sanction against them
if the judge or personnel concerned does not even recognize its
administrative authority.22
(Emphasis supplied)
A magistrates delay in rendering a decision or order and
failure to comply with this Courts rules, directives and
circulars both constitute less serious offenses under Rule 140,
Section 9 of the Rules of Court.23 Section 11(B) of Rule 140
provides the following sanctions for less serious offenses:
Sec. 11. Sanctions.
xxx xxx xxx

B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the

following sanctions shall be imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for not less than one (1) month nor more than
three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding
P20,000.00.
xxx xxx xx
In the light of the circumstances of this case, we find that a fine of
P15,000 would be just and fair.
Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,24 this administrative case against
respondent as a judge based on grounds which are also grounds for the
disciplinary action against members of the Bar, shall be considered as
disciplinary proceedings against such judge as a member of the Bar.25
Violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct embodied in
the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes a breach of Canons 1 and 11
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR):
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
CANON 11 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN
THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL
OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY
OTHERS.
Certainly, a judge who falls short of the ethics of the judicial office
tends to diminish the peoples respect for the law and legal processes.

He also fails to observe and maintain the esteem due to the courts and
to judicial officers.26 Respondent must always bear in mind that it is a
magistrates duty to uphold the integrity of the judiciary at all times.
Respondents delay also runs counter to Canon 12 and Rule 12.04 of
the CPR which provides:
CANON 12 A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND
CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND
EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

hereby found GUILTY of two less serious offenses: (1) undue delay in
rendering a decision or order and (2) violation of Supreme Court
directives. He is FINED P15,000 payable within 10 days from his
receipt of this resolution.
Respondent is further hereby FINED P5,000 for his violation of
Canons 1, 11, 12 and Rule 12.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility payable within the same period stated above.1avvphi1
He is STERNLY WARNED that the commission of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

xxx xxx xxx

Rule 12.04 A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes.
For such violation of Canons 1, 11, 12 and Rule 12.04 of the CPR, he
should be further fined in the amount of P5,000.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge William Simon P. Peralta,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 50 is

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Court

Administrator and the Office of the Bar Confidant to be attached to
respondents records.