Bail - Rule 114

Sec. 5 - When a matter of discretion

JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE v. COURT OF APPEALS
& PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 189122, 17 March 2010, THIRD
DIVISION, (Corona, J.)
Facts
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas,
Leviste was convicted by the RTC of Makati City for
the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of
prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of
reclusion temporal as maximum.
He appealed his conviction to the CA. Pending
appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to
bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and
health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk
or possibility of flight on his part. The CA denied his
application for bail.
ISSUE:
In an application for bail pending appeal by an
appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of
imprisonment for more than six years, does the
discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending
appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted
absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court?
RULING:
NO.
If none of the circumstances mentioned in
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present, the appellate court has the discretion to
grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending
appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating
circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 are absent. In other words, the appellate
court's denial of bail pending appeal where none of
the said circumstances exists does not, by and of itself,
constitute abuse of discretion.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the
appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion,
that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the
enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so
determines, it has no other option except to deny
or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the
appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave
abuse of discretion will thereby be committed.
Any application for bail pending appeal should
be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the
determination of discretion stage, where the appellate
court must determine whether any of the
circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not
the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or
stringent discretion in resolving the application for
bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion
stage where, assuming the appellant's case falls
within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound
discretion, the appellate court may consider all
relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in

the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including

the demands of equity and justice; on the basis
thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar
with respect to future as well as pending cases before
the trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the
following policies concerning the effectivity of the bail
of the accused, to wit:
1) When an accused is charged with an
offense which under the law existing at the
time of its commission and at the time of the
application for bail is punishable by a penalty
lower than reclusion perpetua and is out on
bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial
court of the offense charged or of a lesser
offense than that charged in the complaint or
information, he may be allowed to remain free
on his original bail pending the resolution of
his appeal, unless the proper court directs
otherwise pursuant to Rule 114, Sec. 2 (a) of
the Rules of Court, as amended;
2) When an accused is charged
with a capital offense or an offense which
under the law at the time of its
commission and at the time of the
application for bail is punishable by
reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and
after trial is convicted by the trial court of
a lesser offense than that charged in the
complaint or information, the same rule
set forth in the preceding paragraph shall
be applied;
3) When an accused is charged with a
capital offense or an offense which under the
law at the time of its commission and at the
time of the application for bail is punishable by
reclusion perpetua and is out on bail and after
trial is convicted by the trial court of the
offense charged, his bond shall be cancelled
and the accused shall be placed in
confinement pending resolution of his appeal.
As to criminal cases covered under the third rule
abovecited, which are now pending appeal before this
Court where the accused is still on provisional liberty,
the following rules are laid down:
1) This Court shall order the
bondsman to surrender the accused within ten
(10) days from notice to the court of origin.
The bondsman thereupon, shall inform this
Court of the fact of surrender, after which, the
cancellation of the bond shall be ordered by
this Court;
2) The RTC shall order the transmittal
of the accused to the National Bureau of
Prisons thru the Philippine National Police as
the accused shall remain under confinement
pending resolution of his appeal;

3) If the accused-appellant is not

surrendered within the aforesaid period of ten
(10) days, his bond shall be forfeited and an
order of arrest shall be issued by this Court.
The appeal taken by the accused shall also be
dismissed under Section 8, Rule 124 of the
Revised Rules of Court as he shall be deemed
to have jumped his bail.
FELISA TABORITE & LUCY T. GALLARDO v.
JUDGE MANUEL S. SOLLESTA
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1388, 12 August 2003, THIRD
DIVISION, (Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.)
Facts
Reyaldo Divino was charged with murder of
Bienvenido Taborite, husband of Felisa Taborite and
brother of Lucy Gallardo. PNP - Criminal Investigation
Group (PNP-CIG) of Koronadal, South Cotabato
arrested Divino. He then filed with the MCTC a
petition for bail set for hearing on September 23,
1998. Complainants and the PNP-CIG did not receive
any subpoena. The hearing was reset on September
30, 1998. This time, SPO2 Wilfredo D. Bautista of the
PNP-CIG was notified, but not the public prosecutors.
During the hearing, only counsel for the accused and
SPO2 Bautista appeared. Then, Judge Sollesta granted
the bail at P50,000.00.
ISSUE:
Is the grant of bail by Judge Sollesta valid
despite absence of prosecutors?
RULING:
NO.
Before a judge may grant an application for
bail, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, the
prosecutor must be given reasonable notice of
hearing or he must be asked to submit his
recommendation, as per Section 18, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended.
In Cortes vs. Catral, the Court laid down the
following rules outlining the duties of the judge in
case an application for bail is filed:
1. In all cases whether bail is a matter
of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of
the hearing of the application for bail or
require him to submit his recommendation
(Section 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion,
conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the
guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8,id.);
3. Decide whether the guilt of the
accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not
strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bail bond (Section 19, id);
otherwise, the petition should be denied.

The prosecution must first be accorded an

opportunity to present evidence. It is on the basis of
such evidence that judicial discretion is exercised in
determining whether the evidence of guilt of the
accused is strong. Any order issued in the absence
thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion
but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness.
Granting bail in non-bailable offenses
without hearing is gross ignorance of the law.
Sec. 21 - Forfeiture of bail
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner, vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO,
Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71,
Pasig City, and EVANGELINE
PONCE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Ivler was charged before the MTC
Pasig City for two separate offenses: Reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries
(Criminal Case No. 82367) and reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and damage of
property (Criminal Case No. 82366). The first
offense for the injuries suffered by herein respondent
and the second offense for the death of her husband
and damage to the spouses vehicle. Ivler pleaded
guilty on the first offense and meted public censure as
penalty. He invokes this conviction as a ground in his
motion to quash the information for the second offense
contending it places him in double jeopardy for the
same offense of reckless imprudence. MTC refused
quashal of the information thus petitioners motion for
certiorari was elevated before the RTC while moving
for the suspension of the criminal case before the MTC
pending resolution of the prejudicial question as
subject of his motion for reconsideration at the RTC.
MTC
however
proceeded
with
the
criminal
proceeding. The non-appearance of Ivler to the
proceeding resulted to the cancellation of his
bail and order of his arrest was issued. By virtue
of this arrest order, respondent filed a motion to
dismiss the motion for certiorari filed by Ivler on
ground that he loss standing to maintain suit. RTC
dismissed said petition on this ground thus this
petition to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
1
2

Whether or not the petitioner loses his

standing to maintain suit?
Whether or not the petitioners right against
double jeopardy a bar to another prosecution
on the second offense charged on Criminal
Case No. 82366?

Ruling:
The court held that petitioner did not lose his
standing to maintain his petition. The lower court
based its ruling from Rule 124, Section 8, second par.
that provides that an appeal may be dismissed when
an appellant escapes from custody or violates the
terms of his bail bond. The appeal contemplated in

this section is applicable on a suit to review judgment

of conviction. No judgment has yet been rendered
against the petitioner. Section 21, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that a defendants absence in a proceeding
merely renders his bondman liable, subjecting
the bond to cancellation if it fails to produce
defendant before the court within 30 days. This
does not ipso facto convert the standing of an
accused as a fugitive to lose his standing before
the court. Moreover, the court observed that contrary
to the lower court contention that petitioner failed to
attend the hearing without justified reason it failed to
appreciate the fact that there is a pending motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioner which was left
unresolved by the lower court.

issued by the Bureau of Immigration showing that

respondent has an Alien Certificate of Registration
(ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR).
Trial court issued an Omnibus Order canceling his
bail. Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari with application for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and a writ preliminary
injunction. CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining the arrest of respondent, holding that the
latter should not be deprived of his liberty pending
resolution of his appeal as the offense for which he
was convicted is a non-capital offense; and that the
probability that he will flee during the pendency of his
appeal is merely conjectural. Hence, the instant
petition for certiorari.

On the issue on double jeopardy, the two

charges were prosecuted by the court under the
provision of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code that
penalizes quasi-offenses such as negligence. What this
provision contemplates in quasi-offenses of criminal
negligence is punishing the act of negligence that if
intentionally done will constitute a criminal offense.
Thus, the law punishes the negligent act and not the
result thereof. It takes into account the gravity of the
offenses in determining the penalty but not to qualify
the substance of the offense. It treats a negligent act
as single whether the injurious result affects one or
several persons. The offense of criminal negligence
remains as one and cannot be split into different
crimes and prosecutions. The contention of the lower
court to invoke Article 48 where light offenses such as
slight physical injuries cannot be complexed with
grave or less grave felony such as homicide that the
court is compelled to separate both charges is
untenable in this case. The principle of prosecuting
quasi offenses remain intact in the case thus the
petitioner cannot be prosecuted for 2 offenses of
similar charges on reckless imprudence. His
prosecution on the first offense thus bars another
prosecution for the second offense by virtue of the
principle of double jeopardy. The Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the lower court.

Is the cancellation of bail valid?

Sec. 22 - Cancellation of Bail

RUFINA CHUA v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
WILFRED N. CHIOK
G.R. No. 140842 April 12, 2007 FIRST DIVISION
(SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.)
FACTS:
Crime: Estafa
Place of commission: Pasig City
Rufina Chua met Wilfred Chiok, who
represented himself as a licensed stockbroker and an
expert in the stock market. Chiok issued two checks as
payment to Chua but when petitioner deposited them
in the drawee bank, the checks were dishonored for
insufficient funds. Respondent was charged of estafa.
The trial court convicted respondent of estafa and
sentencing him to suffer twelve (12) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. The prosecution then filed a
motion for cancellation of bail on the ground that
respondent might flee or commit another crime. The
prosecution presented a Record Check Routing Form

ISSUE:
HELD:
Yes
The petition for certiorari with prayer for a
TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction is not the
proper recourse in assailing the trial court Omnibus
Order canceling his bail. Section 5, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Private
respondents appropriate remedy against the trial
courts Omnibus Order canceling his bail is by filing
with the Court of Appeals a motion to review the said
order. The filing of a separate petition via a special
civil action or special proceeding questioning such
adverse order before the appellate court is proscribed.
Hence, the Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing
outright respondents petition for certiorari. The basic
rule is that such petition may only be availed of when
"there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law."
The resolution of CA granting respondents
application for a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining the implementation of the trial courts
Omnibus Order canceling his bail, is bereft of any
factual or legal basis. To be entitled to an injunctive
writ, the applicant must show that (1) he has a clear
existing right to be protected; and (2) the acts against
which the injunction is to be directed are in violation
of such right. The first requisite is absent. Respondent
has no right to be freed on bail pending his appeal
from the trial courts judgment. His conviction carries
a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years (to be
exact, 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum) which
justifies the cancellation of his bail pursuant to the
third paragraph of Section 5 (b), (d) and (e) of Rule
114, quoted above. Moreover, he failed to appear
despite notice during the promulgation of judgment.
His inexcusable non-appearance not only violated the
condition of his bail that he "shall appear" before the
court "whenever required" by the latter or the Rules,
but also showed the probability that he might flee or
commit another crime while released on bail.
Sec. 26 - Bail not a bar to objections of
illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary
investigation
TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR., BEJASA,
MANUEL, JR., LEE, DIZON, DE LEON,
GONZALES, JR., and YU LIM, JR., v.

MAGDALENO M. PEA and JUDGE MANUEL Q.

LIMSIACO, JR., G.R.. No. 143591 May 5, 2010
FACTS:
Pea filed a case for recovery of agents
compensation against Urban Bank and the petitioners
based on contract of agency to perform acts necessary
to prevent unlawful occupation of the Banks property.
Petitioners argued that they never appointed
the respondent as agent or counsel. Documents were
presented in an attempt to show that the respondent
was appointed as agent by Isabela Sugar Company
and not Urban Bank or by the petitioners.
Pea filed his Complaint with the OCP
claiming the said documents were falsified because
the alleged signatories did not actually affix their
signatures, and the signatories were neither
stockholders nor officers and employees of ISCI.
Worse, petitioners introduced said documents as
evidence before the RTC knowing that they were
falsified. The corresponding informations were filed
with the MTCC. Thereafter, the judge issued warrants
of arrest of the petitioners.
Petitioners filed Omnibus Motion to Quash and
on the same day, posted bail. Their bail bonds
expressly provided that they do not intend to waive
their right to question the validity of their arrest. On
arraignment, petitioners refuse to enter their plea.
MTCC upheld the validity of arrest.
ISSUE:
Did the petitioners act of posting a bail constitute
waiver of their right to question the validity of their
arrest?
HELD:
No, the issues raised by the petitioners have
not been mooted by the fact that they had posted bail
and were already arraigned.
The erstwhile ruling of the Court was that
posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity
in the issuance of a warrant of arrest has already been
superseded by Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rule of Criminal Procedure. The principle that the
accused is precluded from questioning the legality of
the arrest after arraignment is true only if he
voluntarily enters his plea and participates during
trial, without previously invoking his objections
thereto.
Their bail bonds likewise expressly contained
a stipulation that they were not waiving their right to
question the validity of their arrest. On the date of
their arraignment, petitioners refused to enter their
plea due to the fact that the issue on the legality of
their arrest is still pending with the Court. Thus,
when the court a quo entered a plea of not guilty for
them, there was no valid waiver of their right to
preclude them from raising the same with the CA or
SC. The posting of bail bond was a matter of
imperative necessity to avert their incarceration; it
should not be deemed as a waiver of their right to
assail their arrest.
Applicant must be in custody

JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, AND

ROMEO B. OCON, PETITIONERS, VS. VIRGILIO
M. TULIAO, RESPONDENT.
G.R. NO. 158763, March 31, 2006, FIRST
DIVISION, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Murder - Grave
Santiago City

abuse

of

Discretion

(Anghad);

Facts
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal
was arrested and executed a sworn confession and
identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B.
Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet
dela Cruz and Amado Doe for the death of Vicente
Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao1. After the filing of the
charges, Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest
against petitioners. In the hearing of the urgent
motion to complete preliminary investigation and for
the quashal of the warrants of arrest, Judge Tumaliuan
noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint
Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that,
since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their
persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the
court.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge
Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and issued a
Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge
Tumaliuan consequently ordering the cancellation of
the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner
Miranda. Later on, Judge Anghad dismissed the
informations
for
murder
against
petitioners
notwithstanding the SC granting the prayer for a
temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad
from further proceeding with the criminal cases.
Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to
Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that
Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed
contempt of court when he issued on 15 November
2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing
the informations for murder which was referred to the
Court of Appeals.
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals
rendered the assailed decision granting the petition
and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases
in the RTC of Santiago City, as well as the issuance of
warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2
Maderal.
Issue
WON the adjudication of a motion to quash does not
require jurisdiction or custody of law over the body of
the accused.
Decision
Yes, adjudication of a motion to quash a
warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the
person of the accused, nor custody of law over the

1 A previous case was filed against SPO1 Wilfredo

Leao, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B.
Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal,
and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Santiago City for the same deaths. They were
subsequently acquitted based on reasonable doubt by
the SC.

body of the accused. Our pronouncement in Santiago

shows a distinction between custody of the law and
jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is
required before the court can act upon the application
for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of
other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere
application therefor constitutes a waiver of the
defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by
arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over
the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest
or voluntary appearance. One can be under the
custody of the law but not yet subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when
a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion
before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the
other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of
the court over his person, and yet not be in the
custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes
custody after his trial has commenced.
Being in the custody of the law signifies
restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his
own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient
to the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally
custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but
is not limited to, detention.
There is, however, an exception to the rule
that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief
constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent
submission of one's person to the jurisdiction of the
court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is
precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the
court, which only leads to a special appearance.
These pleadings are:
1

In civil cases, motions to dismiss on the

ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, whether or not
other grounds for dismissal are included;
In criminal cases, motions to quash a
complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
and
Motions to quash a warrant of arrest.

The first two are consequences of the fact that

failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the
defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The
third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very
legality of the court process forcing the submission of
the person of the accused that is the very issue in a
motion to quash a warrant of arrest.2

2 The court nevertheless found that there was grave

abuse of discretion by Judge Anghad first; he quashed

the standing warrant of arrest because of a
subsequently filed appeal to the Secretary of Justice,
and because of his doubts on the existence of probable
cause due to the political climate in the city. Second,
after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutor's
resolution, he dismissed the criminal cases on the
basis of a decision of this Court in another case with
different accused, doing so two days after this Court
resolved to issue a temporary restraining order
against further proceeding with the case

Arraignment of accused not prerequisite to

hearing on his bail petition
ATTY. EDWARD SERAPIO, PETITIONER, VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL
LEANDRO MENDOZA, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS
In 2000, criminal complaints against Joseph Estrada,
Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner, together with other
persons were filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
after Gov. Singson publicly accused them of engaging
in several illegal activities, including its operation on
the illegal numbers game known as jueteng.
Consequently, the Ombudsman filed with the
Sandiganbayan several Informations against the
accused, including petitioner, charging them with
plunder. The Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of
the accused, including petitioner and thereafter,
petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent
Petition for Bail. The hearing for the said petition was
rescheduled for several times due to subsequent
motions filed by the Ombudsman and the petitioner.
The Sandiganbayan then reset the arraignment of
accused and the hearing on the petition for bail of
petitioner for July 10, 2001 to enable it to resolve the
pending incidents and the motion to quash of
petitioner. However, even before the Sandiganbayan
could resolve the pending motions, petitioner filed
with the SC a petition contending that the
Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its
discretion when it deferred the hearing of his petition
for bail to July 10, 2001, arraigned him on said date
and entered a plea of not guilty for him when he
refused to be arraigned.
ISSUE
WON petitioner should first be arraigned
before hearings of his petition for bail may be
conducted
RULING
NO.
The contention of petitioner is well-taken. The
arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite
to the conduct of hearings on his petition for
bail. A person is allowed to petition for bail as
soon as he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of
his arrest or voluntary surrender. An accused
need not wait for his arraignment before filing a
petition for bail.
In Lavides vs. Court of Appeals, this Court
held that in cases where it is authorized, bail should
be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused
may be precluded from filing a motion to quash.
However, the foregoing pronouncement should not be
taken to mean that the hearing on a petition for bail
should at all times precede arraignment, because the
rule is that a person deprived of his liberty by virtue of
his arrest or voluntary surrender may apply for bail as
soon as he is deprived of his liberty, even before a
complaint or information is filed against him. The
Courts
pronouncement
in Lavides should
be
understood in light of the fact that the accused in said
case filed a petition for bail as well as a motion to
quash the informations filed against him. Hence, we

explained therein that to condition the grant of bail to

an accused on his arraignment would be to place him
in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing
a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail
because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his
arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the
filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned
at once and thereafter be released on bail. This would
undermine his constitutional right not to be put on
trial except upon a valid complaint or Information
sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to
bail.
It is therefore not necessary that an
accused be first arraigned before the conduct of
hearings on his application for bail. For when
bail is a matter of right, an accused may apply for
and be granted bail even prior to arraignment. In
fine, the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of
its discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in
ordering the arraignment of petitioner before
proceeding with the hearing of his petition for bail.
Bail in deportation proceedings - aliens in
deportation proceedings have no inherent
right to bail
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS OF: ANDREW HARVEY, JOHN
SHERMAN & ADRIAAN VAN DEL ELSHOUT v.
COMMISSIONERMIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO
OF COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION
G.R. No. 82544, 28 June 1988, SECOND
DIVISION, (Melencio-Herrera, J.)
Facts
Harvey, Sherman both Americans and Adrian
Van Elshout, a Dutch citizen, were apprehended by
agents of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation (CID) by virtue of Mission Orders issued
by Commissioner Defensor Santiago of the CID.
Petitioners are presently detained at the CID
Detention Center. They were among the twenty-two
(22) suspected alien pedophiles after three months of
close surveillance by CID agents.
When deportation proceedings were instituted
against them, they filed a Petition for Bail which,
however, Defensor Santiago denied.
ISSUE:
Is Commissioner Defensor Santiago correct in
denying the petition for bail by Harvey, et al. in a
deportation proceedings?
RULING:
YES.
The denial by respondent Commissioner of
petitioners' release on bail, also challenged by them,
was in order because in deportation proceedings,
the right to bail is not a matter of right but a
matter of discretion on the part of the
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation.
Thus, Section 37(e) of the Philippine Immigration Act
of 1940 provides that "any alien under arrest in a
deportation proceeding may be released under bond
or under such other conditions as may be imposed by
the Commissioner of Immigration." The use of the
word "may" in said provision indicates that the grant

of bail is merely permissive and not mandatory on the

part of the Commissioner. The exercise of the power is
wholly discretionary. Neither the Constitution nor
Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code
guarantees the right of aliens facing deportation
to provisional liberty on bail. As deportation
proceedings do not partake of the nature of a criminal
action, the constitutional guarantee to bail may not be
invoked by aliens in said proceedings.
Remedy when bail is denied
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. ROGELIO REYES GOMEZ a.k.a.
PHILIP ROGER LACSON and ROGER ELEAZAR
GOMEZ, accused-appellant. G.R. Nos. 131946-47.
February 8, 2000
TOPIC: Remedy when bail is denied, petition for
certiorari is the proper remedy
CRIME:
Illegal recruitment in large
resulting in economic sabotage and estafa

scale

FACTS:
On 29 December 1995 an Information was
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque
charging Rogelio Gomez y Reyes a.k.a. Philip Roger
Lacson or Roger Eleazar Gomez with illegal
recruitment in large scale resulting in economic
sabotage.
The Information alleged that Rogelio
Gomez, without the requisite license or authority from
the POEA, recruited seven (7) individuals, namely,
Rebecca M. Talavera, Herminia S. Antones, Cynthia P.
Castillo, Guillermo D. Gumabon Jr., Dionisio M. de los
Reyes, Ramil del Rosario and Ronnie Agpalo for
employment in Japan and charged them placement
fees ranging from P65,000.00 to P160,000.00 each.
On 10 January 1996 eight (8) Informations
were also filed before the same court each charging
Rogelio Gomez with estafa. Analiza G. Santos was
added to the list of complainants as she also alleged
that she was defrauded by the same accused.
Accused-appelant promised these applicants
various jobs in Japan for placement fees ranging from
P65,000.00 to P160,000.00. Upon handing them their
travel
documents,
the
applicants
whereupon
discovered that what was given to them by Rogelio
Gomez are plane tickets and visa for China only.
Rogelio Gomez however promised that he would soon
follow them in China to issue the ticket and visa for
Japan. Upon arrival at China, Gomez did not arrive
until the pocket money of these applicants were
gradually depleted, which made them decide to go
home. Upon coming home to Philippines, they learned
that Rogelio was being held at the NBI detention cell
as he was facing charges of illegal recruitment,
prompting them to file their separate affidavits of
complaint.
NBI Special Investigator III Syrus Aluzan
testified that on 23 November 1995 Rebecca M.
Talavera filed an initial pro-forma complaint for illegal
recruitment and estafa against Rogelio Gomez. Upon
the filing of the complaint he conducted a verification
with the Records Division of the NBI where he
unearthed eight (8) outstanding warrants of arrest
against accused. On 10 December 1995 Rebecca M.
Talavera returned to the NBI station to execute an

affidavit of complaint. On the morning of 13 December

1995 agent Aluzan with elements of the NBI arrested
Rogelio Gomez at his home in Paraaque. Prosecution
witness Graciano Ocos, Public Employment Officer of
the POEA, testified that Rogelio was not licensed to
recruit workers for Japan. He also verified the
authenticity of the certification executed by Salome
Mendoza, Manager of the POEA Licensing Branch,
that Rogelio Gomez was not authorized to recruit
workers for overseas employment.
On 26 September 1997 he was convicted of
illegal recruitment in a large scale and ws also found
guilty to estafa.
Rogelio Gomez now appeals the Decision of
the RTC arguing that (a) he was unlawfully arrested
by the NBI agents headed by NBI Special Investigator
III Syrus Aluzan; (b) the trial court erred in denying
his application for bail after his arraignment; and, (c)
the trial court erred in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
ISSUE:
WON the trial court erred in denying
application for bail after his arraignment.

his

RULING:
NO. Regarding the issue of bail, accusedappellant argues that although his counsel was given
the chance to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses
at the bail hearings, he was not given the opportunity
to submit rebuttal evidence to disprove that the
evidence of his guilt was strong. In such cases, where
the prosecution was not given the chance to present
evidence to prove that the guilt of the accused was
strong, we held that the proper remedy was for him to
file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. This same
principle must apply to cases where the defense was
not accorded a chance to present any rebuttal
evidence. When the trial court denied his application
for bail accused-appellant should have filed a petition
for certiorari before the appellate court. Hence, it is
also too late for him to question the trial courts
decision of denying his application for bail. Besides,
the conviction of accused-appellant undoubtedly
proves that the evidence of guilt against him was
strong.
Rule 116 - Arraignment and Plea
Plea of guilty
PEOPLE V COMENDADOR
TOPIC: Plea of guilty effect on aggravating
circumstances
CRIME: Robbery with homicide
FACTS:
Accused
DIOSDADO
COMENDADORwas
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
ROBBERY with HOMICIDE, and sentencing him to
suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH. The trial court
based its ruling on accused's plea of guilty which it
found to have been "freely and voluntarily" given and
reiterated despite the Court's admonition that the
death penalty may be imposed, on the accused's
extrajudicial confession.

The prosecution, after submitting its evidence, rested

its case. The defense, however, did not present any
evidence nor did the accused take the witness stand.
The case was, thereupon, submitted for decision.
Thus, this review en consulta of the judgment of the
trial court.
ISSUE:
WON the trial court erred in finding against
the appellant the aggravating circumstances of craft,
uninhabited place and abuse of confidence and
obvious ungratefulness.
HELD:
Plea of guilty, as a rule, constitutes also an
admission of all the aggravating circumstances set
forth in the information, however, this court held that
the three aggravating circumstances, namely: 1. craft;
2. uninhabited place; and 3. abuse of confidence or
obvious ungratefulness, are not supported by the
evidence. As held in People vs. Galapia, 84 SCRA
526: "The rule is that a judicial confession of guilt
admits all the material facts alleged in the information
including the aggravating circumstances listed
therein. But, where such circumstances are disproven
by the evidence, it should be disallowed in the
judgment."
Thus, the aggravating circumstances of:
CRAFT in the commission of the crime based
on the allegation in the information that the accused
employed a cunning scheme by acting as guide
professing to be familiar with Cebu City, should not
and cannot be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance because it is not such an intellectual
trickery or cunning device, scheme or artifice resorted
to by the accused in order to carry out his evil design.
The accused may have been actually familiar with
Cebu City as he was a resident of Sumon, Tuburan,
Cebu. He may also have been motivated with good
intentions to act as guide at the start of the trip but
only decided to kill the victim upon reaching the forest
area at Sitio Apid, Cantabaco, Toledo City. And there is
no showing that the accused merely pretended to be
familiar with Cebu City.
UNINHABITED PLACE which is alleged in
the information in that "(t)he accused deliberately
lured the victim in such a place with the pretense to
visit his wife fully knowing that the victim is not
acquainted with the place to ensure the commission of
the offense" should not also be appreciated against
said accused because the evidence shows that the
body of the victim was found a few hours after his
death, a fact indicating that the place is not
unpeopled.
ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE OR OBVIOUS
UNGRATEFULNESS as it was alleged that "(h)e was
given food and shelter by the father of the victim,
aside from his salary as a farm laborer and was also
treated by the victim for being their farm laborer," the
contention of the accused-appellant that such
aggravating circumstance should not be considered
against him is meritorious. For this circumstance to be
taken and appreciated, it is necessary that there
exists a relation of trust and confidence between
the accused and the one against whom the crime
was committed and the accused made use of such

relation to commit the crime. Inasmuch as the

relation of trust and confidence that exists in this case
is between the accused-appellant and the father of the
deceased, there is no immediate and personal
relationship between accused-appellant and the
deceased. Hence, abuse of confidence or obvious
ungratefulness is not warranted or justified under the
premises
Thus, crime committed by the accusedappellant is robbery with homicide with the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, without
any aggravating circumstance but with two
mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and
voluntary surrender.
Sec. 2 - plea of guilty to a lesser offense (plea
bargaining)
DAAN V SANDIGANBAYAN
TOPIC: Plea of guilty to a lesser offense (plea
bargaining)
CRIME(s): Malversation of public funds and
Falsification of public documents by a public officer or
employee
FACTS:
Accused Joselito Daan together with Benedicto
E. Kuizon, were charged for three counts of
malversation of public funds involving the sums of
P3,293.00, P1,869.00, and P13,528.00, respectively,
which they purportedly tried to conceal by falsifying
the time book and payrolls for given period making it
appear that some laborers worked on the construction
of the new municipal hall building of Bato, Leyte and
collected their respective salaries. Thus, in addition,
the accused were also indicted for three counts of
falsification of public document by a public officer or
employee.
In the falsification cases, the accused offered
to withdraw their plea of "not guilty" and substitute
the same with a plea of "guilty", provided, the
mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of guilt
and voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their
favor. In the alternative, if such proposal is not
acceptable, said accused proposed instead to
substitute their plea of "not guilty" to the crime of
falsification of public document by a public officer or
employee with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser
crime of falsification of a public document by a private
individual. On the other hand, in the malversation
cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea of
"not guilty" thereto with a plea of "guilty", but to the
lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to
render accounts.
Insofar as the both cases are concerned, the
prosecution found as acceptable the proposal of the
accused to plead "guilty" to the lesser crime. However,
Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's motion to plea
bargain, on the ground that no cogent reason was
presented to justify its approval.
ISSUE:
WON the plea of accused to the lesser offense is valid
HELD:

YES, plea bargaining is authorized under Sec.

2, Rule 116 of the Revised Criminal Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. -- At
arraignment, the accused, with the consent of
the offended party and the prosecutor, may be
allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a
lesser offense which is necessarily included in
the offense charged. After arraignment but
before trial, the accused may still be allowed to
plead guilty to said lesser offense after
withdrawing his
plea of
not guilty. No
amendment of the complaint or information is
necessary.
Records show that there was a favorable
recommendation by the Office of the Special
Prosecutor to approve petitioner's motion to plea
bargain.
In the cases at bar, there is no dispute that
JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted
the total amount of P18,860.00. In short, the damage
caused to the government has already been restituted
by the accused. There is also no dispute that accused
DAAN voluntarily surrendered in the instant cases.
Moreover, the accused is also willing to plead guilty to
a lesser offense which to our mind, merits
consideration.
With respect to the falsification cases earlier
mentioned, it appears that the act of the accused in
pleading guilty for a lesser offense of falsification by
private individual defined and penalized under Article
172 of the Revised Penal Code will strengthen our
cases against the principal accused, the Municipal
Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears to be the
master mind of these criminal acts. After all, the
movants herein JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN was
merely designated as draftsman detailed as
foreman/timekeeper of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte.
Moreover, the lesser offenses of Falsification by
Private Individuals and Failure to Render Account by
an Accountable Officer are necessarily included in the
crimes of Falsification of Public Documents and
Malversation of Public Funds, respectively, with which
petitioner was originally charged. GRANTED.

Crimes charged and lesser offenses:

Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised
Penal Code, for the crime of Falsification of Public
Documents through an untruthful narration of facts
to be established, the following elements must concur:
(a) the offender makes in a document untruthful
statements in a narration of facts; (b) the offender has
a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts
narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the offender are
absolutely false; and (d) the perversion of truth in the
narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent
of injuring a third person.
On the other hand, Falsification by Private
Individuals
penalized
under
Article
172,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code has the
following elements: (a)the offender is a private
individual or a public officer or employee who did not
take advantage of his official position; (b) the offender
committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated

under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code; and (c)

the falsification was committed in a public or official
or commercial document.
Malversation of Public Funds defined and
penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code, with which petitioner was also charged, the
elements are as follows: (a) the offender is a public
officer; (b) he has custody or control of funds or
property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) the
funds or property involved are public funds or
property for which he is accountable; and (d) he has
appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has
consented to, or through abandonment or negligence
permitted, the taking by another person of such funds
or property.
It also provides that the failure of the public
officer to have duly forthcoming such public funds or
property, upon demand by a duly authorized officer,
"shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such
missing funds or property to personal use." In this
regard, it has been ruled that once such presumption
is rebutted, then it is completely destroyed; in fact, the
presumption is never deemed to have existed at all.
Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code,
Failure to Render Account by an Accountable
Officer, the lesser offense which petitioner seeks to
plead guilty of, the following elements must concur:
(a) the offender is a public officer; (b) the offender
must be an accountable officer for public funds or
property; (c) the offender is required by law or
regulation to render accounts to the COA or to a
provincial auditor; and (d) the offender fails to render
an account for a period of two months after such
accounts should be rendered.
Sec. 3 - Plea of guilty to a capital offense
People v. Romeo Delos Santos,
March 26, 2001;
Melo, J.
According to Nenita( daughter of Romeo), it
was 1997 while she was 14y/o, around 9pm while she
was about to go to sleep, when her father suddenly
held her waist and poked a knife at her side and
threatened to kill her if she would tell anybody. Romeo
boxed her on the abdomen inflicting so much pain that
caused her to fall on the floor and in such position
removed her short pants and panties even while she
resisted; but Romeo overpowered Nenita and
succeeded having sexual intercourse.
To add Ignominy, Nenita cried the whole night
not only due to the pain in her geniatlia but more so
due to the betrayal of the man who gave her life and
whom she trusted to protect her. Nenita was sexually
abused by her father for several times but due to
shame and fear she did not tell anybody about it. After
several days of mustering courage, she went to the
police to report the incident and submit herself to
medical examination to substantiate her allegations of
MULTILE RAPE (3counts).
Upon arraignment, Romeo pleaded not guilty.
Dr. Felma Caybot testified that she was able to insert
two fingers in Nenitas genitalia without any changes
in the facial expression and that there are healed
lacerations. However, when Nenita testified, she had
barely started her narration when Romeo said in court

that he was changing his plea to GUILTY provided that

the Information is amended to SINGLE RAPE. When
Romeo was put in the witness tand and the court was
satisfied that he fully understood the consequences of
his guilty plea, the court allowed the amendment of
the Information and change of plea. Romeo even
manifested that he had no evidence to present during
his turn.
TC: GUILTY ; Death penalty and civil indemnity of
P50,000
ISSUE:
WON the TC erred in not applying the the safeguards
to a plea of guilty to a capital offense.
HELD:
Petition PARTIALLY meritorious but not sufficient to
warrant reversal.
In accordance to Sec. 3, Rule 116, 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure, the TC should have taken the
necessary measures to ensure that Romeo really and
freely understood the meaning, full significance and
consequences of his plea. Here, Romeo pleaded guilty
due to his pity on her daughter which is NOT a
sufficient reason to allow a change of plea. The TC
should also have impressed on Romeo that by
changing his plea, he was, in effect, admitting
authorship of the crime of Rape, which they failed to
do so.
Nevertheless, there is adequate evidence to
warrant and justify the conviction namely: Med. Cert
and Testimony of Nenita which was unrebutted. His
Guilty plea effectively corroborated and substantiated
Nenitas allegations. Of no small significance too is the
fact that Romeo changed his plea after arraignment
and after after the prosecution has presented their
witnesses (Dr.Caybot and Nenita).
RA.7659 (Death Penalty Law) punishes Rape
of a Minor with Death. The allegation of Minority must
be roved with equal certainty and clearness as the
crime itself. Here, the prosecution did not present any
independent proof of Nenitas minority, such failure
removes the case from the operation of the Death
Penalty Law. A principle in criminal prosecution that,
where life of another human being is hanging on the
balance, proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact
is necessary to constitute the crime.
Thus, Romeo is sentenced to RECLUSION
PERPETUA, being indivisible, Indeterminate Sentence
Law is not applicable.
People v. Vicente Flores y Mondragon;
November 23, 2000; Davide, J.
Facts
In 1996, around 4pm at Negros Oriental,
accused unlawfully PLANT and CULTIVATE Indian
hemp / Marijuana (230grams). Upon arraignment,
with the assistance of his counsel, he pleaded GUILTY.
The TC inquired into the voluntariness of the plea and
his comprehension thereof. It also informed Flores
that he admitted a crime carrying Reclusion Perpetua
to death as penalty, but Flores was firm in his plea.
With such, TC sentenced him with RECLUSION
PERETUA and P500 fine.

(First error) Flores moved for reconsideration

contending that, since only 230 grams (w/c is below
750grams) were found to have been cultivated and
planted, in accordance with Sec. 17 of RA 7659 and
with the doctrine of P v. Simon, he should have been
sentenced only with 6 MOS of ARRESTO MAYOR (min)
to 2YRS and 4MOS of PRISION CORRECIONAL (max)
and without any fine, for it is a conjunctive penalty
only with Reclusion Perpetua to Death. The same was
denied.

cannot be said that the TC erred when it failed to

require the prosecution to resent evidence for basis of
decision.

(Second error) Flores also argued that since

TC was of the view that this involved a caital offense
failed in observing Sec 3 of Rule 116. The judge is
required of the following:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RENATO

TALUSAN y PANGANIBAN
G.R. No. 179187 July 14, 2009 SECOND
DIVISION
(CARPIO MORALES, J.)

1) to conduct a searching inquiry into the

voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea of the accused;

Hence, appellant can be sentenced to 4mos of

arresto mayor 2yrs 4mos and 1day of prision
correctional medium, as max. Deletion of fine is
sustained.
Meaning of searching Inquiry

FACTS:
Topic: Meaning of searching inquiry

2) require the prosecution to prove the

guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his
culpability

Crime: kidnapping with rape

3) inquire whether or not the accused

wishes to present evidence on his behalf and
allow him to do so if he so desires.

Facts

This procedure is mandatory and failure of which

commits grave abuse of discretion.
According to the OSG, they agree with the first
assigned error but not with the second one because
Sec 3 of Rule 116 is not applicable in this case. Flores
did not plead to a capital offense since the imposable
penalty is only Prision Correcional.
ISSUE:
WON the TC erred in not applying the safeguards to a
plea of guilty to a capital offense
HELD:
GRANTED. The penalty rendered by the TC
will apply only if the quantity of the dangerous drugs
involved is 750grams or more. If less than 750grams,
only Prision Correcional to Reclusion Perpetua should
have been rendered. Here, with only 230grams,
Prision Correcional is the imposable penalty.
It is settled that a plea of guilty not merely
joins the issues of the complaint or information, but
amounts to an admission of guilt and of the material
facts alleged in the complaint of information and in
this sense takes the place of trial itself. Such plea
removes the necessity of presenting further evidence
and for all intents and purposes the case is deemed
tried on its merits and submitted for decision. It leaves
the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty
prescribed by law. If formally entered on arraignment,
it is sufficient to sustain a conviction for any offense
charged in the information without the necessity of
requiring additional evidence, since by so pleading,
the defendant himself supplied the necessary proof.
As to whether the offense is capital or not, the
only determinant factor is the information, and
according to which appellant is being charged of noncapital offense wherein Sec 4 of Rule 116 is the
applicable rule. With the present Rules of Court, it is
only discretionary for the court to take additional
evidence as to the guilt and circumstances attending a
NON-CAPITAL offense after entry of plea of guilt. It

Place of commission: Las Pias City

Renato Talusan y Panganiban (appellant) was
charged of kidnapping with rape of AAA, a minor of six
years. Upon arraignment, appellant, with the
assistance of his counsel de oficio, entered a plea of
guilty. The lower court thereupon conducted a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness of appellants
plea, and despite repeated questions and just as
repeated answers showing that appellant understood
his plea and its consequences, the trial court still
ordered the prosecution to, as it did, present evidence.
The trial court convicted appellant (death). The case
was forwarded to this Court on automatic review due
to the death penalty imposed. However, the Court
referred the case to the Court of Appeals for
intermediate disposition. The Court of Appeals upheld
with modification appellants conviction (reclusion
perpetua). In his lone assignment of error, appellant
faults the trial court for convicting him on the basis of
an improvident plea of guilt as it failed, so he claims,
to judiciously follow the guidelines set forth in People
v. Pastor.
ISSUE:
Did the trial court comply with the guidelines set forth
in People v. Pastor?
HELD:
Yes. In Pastor, the Court, holding that "there is no
definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must
conduct a searching inquiry," nevertheless came up
with the following guidelines:
1. Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he
was brought into the custody of the law; (b)
whether he had the assistance of a competent
counsel during the custodial and preliminary
investigations; and (c) under what conditions he
was detained and interrogated during the
investigations. This is intended to rule out the
possibility that the accused has been coerced or
placed under a state of duress either by actual
threats of physical harm coming from malevolent
quarters or simply because of the judge's
intimidating robes.

2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as

to whether he had conferred with, and completely
explained to, the accused the meaning and
consequences of a plea of guilty.
3. Elicit information about the personality profile
of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic
status, and educational background, which may
serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give
a free and informed plea of guilty.
4. Inform the accused the exact length of
imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the
law and the certainty that he will serve such
sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads
guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon
bad advice or because of promises of the
authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he
admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of
the judge to ensure that the accused does not
labor under these mistaken impressions because a
plea of guilty carries with it not only the admission
of authorship of the crime proper but also of the
aggravating circumstances attending it, that
increase punishment.
5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with
which he is charged and fully explain to him the
elements of the crime which is the basis of his
indictment. Failure of the court to do so would
constitute a violation of his fundamental right to
be informed of the precise nature of the
accusation against him and a denial of his right to
due process.
6. All questions posed to the accused should be in
a language known and understood by the latter.
7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the
accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The
accused must be required to narrate the tragedy
or reenact the crime or furnish its missing details.
As long as the voluntary intent of the accused and
his full comprehension of the consequences of his plea
are ascertained, as was done in the present case, the
accuseds plea of guilt is sustained. In the present
case, even without the plea of guilt of appellant, the
evidence presented by the prosecution supports his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex
crime of kidnapping with rape under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659.
Sec. 5 - Withdrawal of improvident plea of
guilty
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PEDRO
NUELAN y LUDOVICE,
G.R. No. 123075 October 8, 2001, (PARDO, J.)
FACTS:
Topic: Withdrawal of improvident plea of guilty Sec.
5
Crime: Rape
Place of commission: Paracale, Camarines Norte
Thirteen-year-old Margie L. Nuelan, assisted
by her mother Lily Nuelan, filed with the MTC,
Paracale, Camarines Norte a criminal complaint
against her father, accused Pedro Nuelan y Ludovice

charging him with three counts of rape. Provincial

prosecutor of Camarines filed with the RTC,
Camarines Norte three informations against the
accused for rape. The accused entered into pleabargaining. With the consent of the prosecution, the
offended party and her mother, the trial court dropped
the first criminal case (Criminal Case No. 8209) on
condition that the accused would plead guilty to the
other 2 criminal cases (Criminal Cases Nos. 8210 and
8211). Upon re-arraignment on the same occasion, the
accused assisted by his counsel pleaded guilty to the
charges.
After
a
searching
inquiry
on
the
voluntariness of the plea, the trial court found that
accused did not fully comprehend the consequences of
the plea of guilty. The accused thought that the two
cases were only for attempted rape. The trial court
allowed the accused to withdraw the improvident plea
of guilt to the 2 criminal cases, and ordered the
reinstatement of the first criminal case. The trial court
rendered a decision convicting the accused of the
crime of rape (death penalty). Hence, the automatic
review of the death sentences.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in failing
to immediately inquire into the voluntariness of his
plea of guilty in the other 2 criminal cases?
HELD:
Yes, the trial court erred.
The trial court did not impress on the accused
the full comprehension of the consequences of his plea
of guilty. Under the formulation, 3 things are enjoined
on the trial court after a plea of guilty to a capital
offense has been entered by the accused:
1. The court must conduct a searching inquiry
into the voluntariness and full comprehension
of the consequences of his plea;
2. The court must require the prosecution to
present evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused and the precise degree of his
culpability; and
3. The court must ask the accused if he desires
to present evidence in his behalf and allow him
to do so if he desires.
When accused-appellant was re-arraigned, the
trial court failed to observe the required procedure of
conducting a searching inquiry. The plea of guilty that
the accused-appellant improvidently entered is null
and void. The plea of guilt must be based on a free and
informed will of the accused. Thus, the searching
inquiry of the trial court must be focused on: (1) the
voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea. A
"searching inquiry" means more than informing
cursorily the accused that he faces a jail term but also,
the exact length of imprisonment under the law and
the certainty that he will serve at the national
penitentiary or a penal colony. After the accused
withdrew the plea of guilty, the trial court did not rearraign
accused-appellant.
Re-arraignment
is
necessary. When life is at stake, we cannot lean on the
presumption that the accused understood his plea.
Hence, the necessity of a re-arraignment and retaking
of his plea.

TOPIC: Withdrawal of Improvident Plea (Sec. 5,

Rule 116)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. OSCAR M.
DOCUMENTO, G.R. No. 188706, March 17, 2010,
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:
Oscar Documento was charged before the RTC
with 2 counts of Rape, as defined and punished under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. He was accused
of raping his daughter AAA, a minor, 16 years of age.
One information was for the alleged rape committed
on April 22, 1996 at Ochoa Avenue, Butuan City, and
another information was for the alleged rape
committed on October 15, 1995 at Barangay
Antongalon,
Butuan
City.
Upon
arraignment,
Documento pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, however,
he changed his earlier plea to one of guilt. As such,
the RTC ordered a re-arraignment and entered
appellants plea of guilt to the charges. Thereafter, the
prosecution presented evidence consisting of the
testimonies of private complainant herself, AAA, her
mother, BBB, and Dr. Johann A. Hugo which
established that Documento raped AAA. Documento
testified as the sole witness for the defense. He
asseverated that he pled guilty to the crime of Rape
only because Prosecutor Salise convinced him to do
so. Documento contended that he did not rape AAA,
and that, to the contrary, they had a consensual,
sexual relationship. He further alleged that the
incident did not happen in Butuan City, but in Clarin,
Misamis Occidental. Finally, on cross-examination,
Documento disowned the handwritten letters he had
supposedly written to his wife and to AAA, asking for
their forgiveness. The RTC convicted Documento of
both counts of Rape. CA affirmed.
ISSUES:
1. WON the prosecution failed to establish that the 2
counts of rape were perpetrated in Butuan City NO!
2. WON the Court gravely erred in failing to
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntainess
and full comprehension by accused of the
consequences of his plea YES! (but this was not
enough to remand the case to the trial court)
RATIO:
1. Contrary to the insistence of Documento
that the prosecution failed to establish that 2 counts of
Rape were perpetrated in Butuan City, the CA pointed
to specific parts of the records which show that,
although AAA did not specifically mention "Butuan
City" in her testimony, the incidents in the present
cases transpired in Barangay Antongalon and on
Ochoa Avenue, both in Butuan City. The 2 informations
also clearly state that the crimes were perpetrated in
Butuan City. The inclusion of the two Barangays in the
City of Butuan is a matter of mandatory judicial notice
by the trial court.
2. It is true that the appellate court noted the
trial courts failure to conduct the prescribed
"searching inquiry" into the matter of whether or not
Documentos plea of guilt was improvidently made.
Nonetheless, it still found the conviction of appellant
proper. Nothing in the records of the case at bench

shows that the trial court complied with the guidelines

set forth by the Supreme Court in a number of cases
after appellants re-arraignment and guilty plea. The
questions propounded to appellant during the direct
and cross-examination likewise fall short of these
requirements. The appellant was not fully apprised of
the consequences of his guilty plea. In fact, as argued
by appellant, "the trial court should have informed him
that his plea of guilt would not affect or reduce the
imposable penalty, which is death as he might have
erroneously believed that under Article 63, the death
penalty, being a single indivisible penalty, shall be
applied by the court regardless of any mitigating
circumstances that might have attended the
commission of the deed." Moreover, the trial court
judge failed to inform appellant of his right to adduce
evidence despite the guilty plea.
With the trial courts failure to comply
with the guidelines, appellants guilty plea is
deemed improvidently made and thus rendered
inefficacious. This does not mean, however, that
the case should be remanded to the trial court.
This course of action is appropriate only when
the appellants guilty plea was the sole basis for
his conviction.
As held in People v. Mira: Notwithstanding the
incautiousness that attended appellants guilty plea,
we are not inclined to remand the case to the trial
court as suggested by appellant. Convictions based
on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only
if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If
the trial court relied on sufficient and credible
evidence in finding the accused guilty, the
judgment must be sustained, because then it is
predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the
accused but also on evidence proving his
commission of the offense charged.
Sec. 11 - Suspension of Arraignment
Topic: Suspension of Arraignment (Sec. 11, Rule
116)
SPOUSES ALEXANDER TRINIDAD and CECILIA
TRINIDAD, v. VICTOR ANG, Respondent
G.R. No. 192898, January 31, 2011, BRION, J.:
FACTS:
The Office of the City Prosecutor, Masbate
City, issued a Resolution recommending the filing of
an Information for Violation of BP 22 against the
petitioners in which the latter countered by filing with
the DOJ a petition for review challenging the same in
October 10, 2007. Notwithstanding the pending
appeal, the City Prosecutor proceeded to file the
information before the MTCC. The petitioners filed
a Manifestation and Motion to Defer Arraignment and
Proceedings and Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of
Warrants of Arrest praying, among others, for the
deferment of their arraignment in view of the
pendency of their petition for review before the
DOJ. The MTCC granted the motion, subject to
paragraph c Section 11, Rule 116 of Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure. On August 10, 2009, the MTCC
reconsidered this order, and set the petitioners
arraignment on September 10, 2009 .
The

petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the

RTC which was denied and subsequently filed a
motion for reconsideration which was also denied. The
RTC held that the MTCC judge did not err in setting
the arraignment of the petitioners after the lapse of
one (1) year and ten (10) months from the filing of the
petition for review with the DOJ. It explained that the
cases cited by the petitioners were decided before the
amendment of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. After the amendment of the Rules on
December 1, 2000, the Supreme Court applied
the 60-day limit on suspension of arraignment in
case of a pendency of a petition for review with
the DOJ.

In addition, the cases cited by the petitioners

Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How, Roberts, Jr.
v. CA, and Dimatulac v. Villon were all decided prior
to the amendment to Section 11 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure which took effect on
December 1, 2000. At the time these cases were
decided, there was no 60-day limit on the suspension
of arraignment.

ISSUE:

Arnel Alcalde was convicted by the RTC of

Santa Cruz, Laguna of two counts of parricide
committed against his wife, Wendy, and 11-month-oldson, and two counts of frustrated parricide committed
against his two daughters, Bernalyn and Erica that
happened on August 29, 1997. Before such conviction,
Arnel refused to speak upon arraignment and then the
trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty in each
of the cases. The defense now assails the validity of
the arraignment on the ground that he was not
informed of the nature and cause of accusations
against him during the arraignment and pre-trial since
he was afflicted with psychosis and could not
comprehend.
Despite
his
strange
behavior
characterized by his deafening silence, motionless
appearance, and single direction blank stare the trial
court insisted on his arraignment. However, the OSG
maintains that the defense should have asked for the
suspension of the arraignment on the ground of his
mental condition as provided for under Section 11,
paragraph (a), Rule 116 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

WON the arraignment of an accused should be

deferred until the petition for review with the DOJ is
resolved.
RATIO:
The grounds for suspension of arraignment are
provided under Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules
of Court, which provides:
SEC. 11. Suspension of Arraignment.
Upon motion by the proper party, the
arraignment shall be suspended in the
following cases:
(a)

The accused appears to be

suffering from an unsound mental
condition which effectively renders
him unable to fully understand the
charge against him and to plead
intelligently thereto. In such case,
the court shall order his mental
examination and, if necessary, his
confinement for such purpose;

(b) There
exists
question; and
(c)

prejudicial

A petition for review of the

resolution of the prosecutor is
pending
at
either
the
Department of Justice, or the
Office
of
the
President; Provided, that the
period of suspension shall not
exceed sixty (60) days counted
from the filing of the petition
with the reviewing office.

In Samson v. Daway, the Court explained

that while the pendency of a petition for review is a
ground for suspension of the arraignment, the
aforecited provision limits the deferment of the
arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned
from the filing of the petition with the reviewing
office. It follows, therefore, that after the
expiration of said period, the trial court is bound
to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to
defer arraignment.
In the present case, the petitioners filed their
petition for review with the DOJ on October 10, 2007.
When the RTC set the arraignment of the petitioners
on August 10, 2009, 1 year and 10 months had already
lapsed. This period was way beyond the 60-day limit
provided for by the Rules.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARNEL

ALCALDE Y PASCASIO
G.R. No. 139225-28, May 29, 2002, Davide, Jr.,
C.J.
Facts:

Issue:
Whether the failure to ask for the suspension
of the arraignment on the ground that accused
appears to be suffering from an unsound mental
condition is tantamount to a waiver of such right
Ruling:
No. The arraignment was held on October 22,
1997 and what was applicable was Section 12(a) of
Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
which reads:
SEC. 12. Suspension of arraignment.
The arraignment shall be suspended, if at
the time thereof:
(a)

The accused appears to be

suffering from an unsound mental
condition which effectively renders
him unable to fully understand the
charge against him and to plead
intelligently thereto. In such case,
the court shall order his mental
examination and, if necessary, his
confinement for such purpose.

Based on the foregoing, the said section did

not require that a motion by the accused be filed for
the suspension of arraignment. Hence, the absence of
such motion could not be considered a waiver of the
right to a suspension of arraignment. Though the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure now requires

motion by the proper party, it could not be applied in

this case since the new set of rules took effect only on
1 December 2000. Besides, a waiver must be
knowingly and intelligently made by the person
possessing such right. Unfortunately, Arnel was
apparently deprived of such mental faculties and no
waiver, impliedly or expressly, could have been made
by him at the time of his arraignment by reason of his
mental condition.
It is a settled rule that when a judge is
informed or discovers that an accused is apparently in
a present condition of insanity or imbecility, it is
within his discretion to investigate the matter. If it be
found that by reason of such the accused could not,
with the aid of counsel, make a proper defense, it is
the duty of the court to suspend the proceedings and
commit the accused to a proper place of detention
until his faculties are recovered. Section 12(a) of Rule
116 mandates the suspension of the arraignment and
the mental examination of the accused should it
appear that he is of unsound mind. The trial court
should have ascertained Arnel's mental state instead
of proceeding with his arraignment and its subsequent
proceedings.
It
failed
to
exercise
utmost
circumspection in assuming that Arnel was in full
possession of his mental faculties and understood the
proceedings against him since the behavior of Arnel
was brought to the attention of the trial court as
manifested by his strange actions in a manner as if he
was out of touch with the world and would not utter
any word and it was also alleged by the defense in its
demurrer to evidence.
The Court remanded the cases to the trial
court for further proceedings to allow the defense to
present evidence to prove that Arnel was either unfit
for arraignment and trial or was insane at the time the
crimes charged were committed.
SOLAR TEAM ENTERTAINMENT, INC. and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. HON.
ROLANDO HOW, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch 257 of
Paranaque and MA. FE F. BARREIRO
G.R. No. 140863; August 22, 2000; GONZAGAREYES, J.
Facts:
On May 28, 1999, an information for estafa
was filed against Barreiro before the RTC of
Paranaque City based on the complaint filed by Solar
Entertainment, Inc. The arraignment which was
supposed to be on Aug. 5, 1999 was reset by the court
to Sept. 2 on the ground that private respondent had
filed an appeal with the Department of Justice. It was
again rescheduled to Nov. 18. The respondent court
issued again, upon the motion filed by the accused, an
Order further deferring the arraignment until such
time that the appeal with the said office (SOJ) is
resolved. Petitioner alleges that the twin orders
deferring the arraignment and denying its motion for
reconsideration violate Section 7 of the Speedy Trial
Act of 1998 (RA 8493) and Section 12, Rule 116 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure [now Sec. 11].
The Speedy Trial Act requires that the arraignment of
an accused shall be held within thirty (30) days from
the filing of the information, or from the date the
accused has appeared before the justice, judge or

court in which the charge is pending, whichever date

last occurs.
Issues:
Whether the trial court can indefinitely
suspend the arraignment of the accused until the
petition for review with the Secretary of Justice (SOJ)
has been resolved
Ruling:
Yes, it did not act with grave abuse of
discretion when it suspended the arraignment of
private respondent to await the resolution of her
petition for review with the Secretary of Justice.
The Secretary of Justice is empowered to
review the resolutions of his subordinates even after
the information has already been filed in court. Review
as an act of supervision and control by the justice
secretary over the fiscals and prosecutors finds basis
in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or
negligence committed in the initial steps of an
administrative activity or by an administrative agency
should be corrected by higher administrative
authorities, and not directly by courts. As a rule, only
after administrative remedies are exhausted may
judicial recourse be allowed.
Although the court is in complete control of
the case after the filing of the information and any
disposition therein is subject to its sound discretion, it
can grant or deny the motion to suspend the
arraignment of the accused as an exercise of such
discretion. The Court held in number of cases that a
court can defer to the authority of the prosecution arm
to resolve the issue of whether or not sufficient
ground existed to file the information. It cannot
interfere with the prosecutors discretion over
criminal prosecution. The authority of the Secretary of
Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates even
after an information has already been filed in court
does not present an irreconcilable conflict with
Section 7 of the Speedy Trial Act since the said
provision is not absolute and subject to exceptions as
provided by law. The court reasoned that such
suspension is to give opportunity to the accused to
exhaust the procedural remedies available, to allow
the Secretary of Justice to review the resolution of the
City Prosecutor so as not to deprive him of such
power, and based on the discretionary power of the
trial judge.
Before the amendment of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the grounds for suspension are
the
following:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an
unsound mental condition which effectively renders
him unable to fully understand the case against him
and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the
court shall order his mental examination and, if
necessary, his confinement for such purpose.(b) The
court finds the existence of a valid prejudicial
question.
There is nothing in the said provision that
expressly or impliedly mandates that the suspension of
arraignment shall be limited to the cases enumerated
therein.
Moreover,
jurisprudence
has
clearly
established that the suspension of arraignment is not

strictly limited to the two situations contemplated in

said provision.
Rule 117 - Motion to Quash
Sec. 9 - Consequences of failure to move or
failure to allege
CRISTOPHER GAMBOA v. Judge ALFREDO CRUZ
G.R. No. L-56291 June 27, 1988
Facts
In 1979, Gamboa alleged that he was arrested
for vagrancy without a warrant of arrest, by Patrolman
Palencia. Thereafter, he was brought to the precinct
where he was booked and then detained together with
several others. Then, during the lineup of five (5)
detainees, including Gamboa, complainant Erlinda
Bernal pointed to petitioner and said that one is a
companion. After the identification, the other
detainees were brought back to their cell and he was
ordered to stay on. While the complainant was being
interrogated by the police, Gamboa was told to sit
down in front of her.
An Information for Roberry was filed against
Gamboa. Gamboa was then arraigned and hearings
were held. In 1980, Gamboa, by counsel, instead of
presenting his defense, manifested in open court that
he was filing a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer to
Evidence on the ground that the conduct of the lineup, without notice to, and in the absence of his
counsel, violated his constitutional right to counsel
and due process. The motion was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the motion to quash should be granted
Ruling:
No. The right to counsel attaches upon start of
investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts
to ask questions to elicit information and/or confession
or admissions from the respondent/accused. At such
point or stage, the person being interrogated must be
assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of
extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions
from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation,
for the commission of an offense.
On the right to due process, petitioner was not
deprived, as he was duly represented by a member of
the Bar. He was accorded all the opportunities to be
heard and to present evidence to substantiate his
defense, only that he chose not to and instead opted to
file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had
rested its case.
In any event, certiorari and prohibition are not
the proper remedies against an order denying a
Motion to Acquit. Sec. 1, Rule 17 or Rules of Court
provides that, upon arraignment, the defendant shall
immediately either move to quash the complaint or
information or plead thereto, or do both and that if
defendant moves to quash without pleading, and the
motion is withdrawn or overruled, he should
immediately plead, which means that trial should
proceed. If, after trial on the merits, judgment is
rendered adversely to the movant (in the motion to
quash), he can appeal the judgment and raise the
same defenses or objections (earlier raised in the
motion to quash) which would then be subject to
review by the appellate court.

On the other hand, if a defendant does not

move to quash the complaint or information before he
pleads, he shall be taken to have waived all objections
which are grounds for a motion to quash, except
where the complaint or information does not charge
an offense, or the court is without jurisdiction of the
same. Here petitioner filed a motion to acquit only
after the prosecution had presented its evidence and
rested its case. Since the exceptions, above stated, are
not applicable, petitioner is deemed to have waived
objections which are grounds for a motion to quash.
Besides, the grounds relied upon by petitioner in his
Motion to Acquit are not among the grounds provided
in Sec. 2, Rule 117.
Sec. 3 - Facts do not constitute an offense
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARTIN
ALAGAO, et. al.
G.R. No. L-20721 April 30, 1966
Facts:
In 1961, an Information was filed against the
defendants, being then members of the Manila Police
Department for conspiring to incriminate or impute to
Marcial Apolonio the commission of the crime of
bribery through unlawful arrest. Apolonio was
arrested and delivered to the authorities, and while
being supposedly investigated by the said accused, the
said accused place or comingle a marked P1.00 bill
together with the money taken from Apolonio,
supposedly given to the latter by one Emerita de
Aresa, so that Apolonio, then an employee of the Local
Civil Registrars Office, would appear to have agreed
to perform an act not constituting a crime in
connection with the performance of his duties, which
was to expedite the issuance of a birth certificate.
The defendants, through counsel, moved to
quash the information against them on the ground
that: (1) the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense; and (2) the court trying the case
has no jurisdiction over the offense charged. Later on,
the defendants filed a supplemental motion to quash,
alleging that the information charges more than one
offense.CFI granted the motion to dismiss.
Issue:
Whether or not the information filed alleges the
complex crime of incriminatory machinations through
unlawful arrest
Ruling:
Yes. The trial court cannot be sustained. It is
the general rule that in resolving the motion to quash
a criminal complaint or information that facts alleged
in the complaint or information should be taken as
they are. The exceptions to this general rule are those
cases where the Rules of Court expressly permit the
investigation of the facts alleged in the motion to
quash. The grounds or facts relied upon in this motion
to quash are not included in the exceptions we have
adverted to. It is apparent that by the use of the
phrase through unlawful arrest in the information an
idea conveyed that the unlawful arrest was resorted to
as a necessary means to plant evidence on Apolonio,
thereby incriminating him. Without detaining,
investigation and searching Apolonio it would have
been impossible, if not, difficult, for the accused to

plant the marked one peso bill. Because they could not
have simply held Apolonio and placed the marked bill
in his pocket without the latter vigorously protesting
the act.
The allegation in the information that the
accused
committed
the
complex
crime
of
incriminatory machinations thru unlawful arrest, and
also the allegation that the act of planting the
incriminatory evidence took place during the supposed
investigation after the unlawful arrest, are basis for
the logical assumption, in the absence of evidence,
that the two acts imputed to accused that of
unlawfully arresting and that of planting incriminatory
evidence had closely followed each other, and that
the former was a necessary means to commit the
latter. For a criminal complaint or information to
charge the commission of a complex crime, the
allegations contained therein do not necessarily have
to charge a complex crime as defined by law. It is
sufficient that the information contains allegations
which show that one offense was a necessary means to
commit the other.
Sec. 3 (i) and 7 - Double Jeopardy
GALMAN v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 72670, September 12, 1986
FACTS:
President Ferdinand Marcos created the
Agrava Fact- Finding Board to investigate the
assassination of Ninoy Aquino and the alleged gunman
Rolando Galman. The President then referred the
Agrava
Board
reports
to
the
Tanodbayan
(Ombudsman) for its resolution.
The report
contradicted the version of the military. The reported
concluded that Galman was only a fall guy and that
Ninoys assassination was the product of a military
conspiracy and not a communist plot. Nevertheless,
the President disdained and rejected his own Boards
findings and insisted on the version that Galman was
Aquinos assassin.
Saturnina Galman and Reynaldo Galman and
twenty-nine other petitioners filed the action for
temporary restraining order to nullify the proceedings
before the Sandiganbayan and to restrain the court
from rendering a decision on the merit. The
petitioners
alleged
that
Tanodbayan
and
Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities
constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage
of
justice
and
gross
violation
of
the
constitutional rights of the petitioners and the
sovereign people of the Philippines to due
process of law. The petitioners pray for a re-trial
before an impartial tribunal by an unbiased
prosecutor. However, the Sandiganbayan issued its
decision acquitting all the accused of the crime
charged, declaring them innocent and totally
absolving them of any civil liability.
After the 1986 EDSA Revolution, Deputy
Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera as reported in the March
6, 1986 issue of the Manila Times entitled "Aquino
Trial a Sham," revealed that President Marcos had
ordered the Sandiganbayan, the Tanodbayan, and the
prosecution panel to whitewash the criminal cases
against the 26 respondents accused and produce a
verdict of acquittal. With that, the petitioners filed a

motion for reconsideration and such was granted by

the Sandiganbayan. A three- member commission was
created to investigate the charges of collusion. Their
Report concluded that the proceedings in the case
have been vitiated by lack of due process because
the prosecution and the Justices who tried and
decided the same acted under the compulsion of
the president, which not only prevented the
prosecution from fully ventilating its position
and offering all the evidences which it could have
otherwise presented, but also predetermined the
final outcome of the case. The Sandiganbayan
approved and adopted such report. However, the
respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy and
argued that the previous judgment of acquittal of the
Sandiganbayan rendered the case moot and academic.
ISSUE:
Did the Sandiganbayan violate the rule against double
jeopardy?
HELD:
NO, Double jeopardy cannot be invoked
against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts'
judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the
prosecution which represents the sovereign
people in criminal cases is denied due process.
Where the denial of the fundamental right of due
process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard
of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction and the
court rendering such decision is ousted of its
jurisdiction.

As a rule legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon

a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c)
after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been
entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the
accused. However, the court was not competent as it
was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right
of the prosecution to due process. In effect, the
further hearing of the case does not constitute double
jeopardy.
In the case at bar, the prosecution and the
sovereign people were denied due process of law with
a partial court and biased Tanodbayan under the
constant and pervasive monitoring and pressure
exerted by the authoritarian President to assure the
carrying out of his instructions. A dictated, coerced
and scripted verdict of acquittal is a void judgment. In
legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither
binds nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is "a lawless
thing which can be treated as an outlaw". Therefore,
the Sandiganbayans resolution of acquittal was a void
judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction
and hence no double jeopardy attaches. A void
judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all by it no
rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be
attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded
upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars

anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims

flowing out of it are void.

People of the Philippines v. Nelson Balunsat

G.R. No. 176743
July 28, 2010
Crimes: two counts Statutory rape against AAA and
Attempted rape against BBB
RTC: guilty of both crimes
CA: guilty of one count of statutory rape and act of
lasciviousness against BBB
SC: affirmed the decision of CA
FACTS:
Three information were filed against Nelson
Balunsat before the RTC of Tuao, Cagayan which
alleged that Balunsat committed statutory rape
against his ten year old first cousin AAA and
attempted rape against his eleven year old first cousin
BBB. It was narrated during the trial that the rape
happened when AAA was alone in their house, Nelson
took off the shorts and underwear of AAA and,
thereafter, took off his short pants and underwear. He
forced AAA to lie down on the floor and, opening wide
her legs, succeeded in having sexual intercourse with
her. While the attempted rape was committed when
AAA and BBB were sleeping in their grandmothers
house, Nelson arrived and removed his shorts and
underwear and lay down beside BBB. The accused
tried to insert his fully erect penis into BBBs private
parts. However, BBB resisted and the accused could
not make any penetration of his penis on the
former. Failing to satisfy his lust on BBB, the accused
told her to move over and then lay himself down
beside AAA. He removed the shorts and panties of
AAA and had sexual intercourse with her. Nelson
pleaded not guilty. The RTC rendered decision finding
Nelson guilty of both crimes and the sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of 17 years of reclusion temporal as
minimum to reclusion perpetual as maximum.
He filed his appeal before the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court rendered decisions
finding Nelson guilty of the crime of statutory rape
against AAA in the first criminal case but acquitted
him in the second criminal case, while the crime of
attempted rape was downgraded to acts of
lasciviousness. The penalty was reduced to four month
of arresto mayor as minimum to two years, four
months and 1 day of prison correctional as maximum.
He filed the present appeal on the ground that the
guilt of the accused was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
ISSUE:
Can the court review the three criminal cases?

his convictions for rape in first criminal case and for

acts of lasciviousness. The Court can no longer pass
upon the propriety of Nelsons acquittal because, the
judgment acquitting the accused is final and
immediately executory upon its promulgation, and that
accordingly, the State may not seek its review without
placing the accused in double jeopardy. Such
acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground
of double jeopardy whether it happens at the trial
court or on appeal at the Court of Appeals.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals modified
the guilty verdict of the RTC against Nelson from
attempted rape to acts of lasciviousness. The court
can no longer review the downgrading of the crime
by the appellate court without violating the right
against double jeopardy, which proscribes an appeal
from a judgment of acquittal or for the purpose of
increasing the penalty imposed upon the accused. In
effect, the Court of Appeals already acquitted Nelson
of the charge of attempted rape, convicting him only
for acts of lasciviousness, a crime with a less severe
penalty. Hence, the court is limited to determining
whether there is enough evidence to support Nelsons
conviction for acts of lasciviousness.
LYDIA C. GELIG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 173150, July 28, 2010, FIRST DIVISION,
(DEL CASTILLO, J.)
The Prosecution's Version
Lydia and private complainant Gemma B.
Micarsos (Gemma), were public school teachers at the
Nailon Elementary School, in Nailon, Bogo, Cebu.
Lydia's son, Roseller, was a student of Gemma at the
time material to this case.
On July 17, 1981, at around 10:00 o'clock in
the morning, Lydia confronted Gemma after learning
from Roseller that Gemma called him a "sissy" while in
class. Lydia slapped Gemma in the cheek and pushed
her, thereby causing her to fall and hit a wall divider.
As a result of Lydia's violent assault, Gemma suffered
a contusion in her "maxillary area", as shown by a
medical certificate issued by a doctor in the Bogo
General Hospital. However, Gemma continued to
experience abdominal pains and started bleeding two
days after the incident. On August 28, 1981, she was
admitted in the Southern Islands Hospital and was
diagnosed, to her surprise, to have suffered
incomplete
abortion.
Accordingly,
a
medical
certificate was issued.
The trial court convicted Lydia of the complex
crime of direct assault with unintentional abortion.
The CA vacated the trial court's judgment and
convicted Lydia of Slight Physical Injuries instead. The
accused appealed to the SC.
ISSUE:
Is the re-opening of the case for appellate review will
constitute Double Jeopardy?

HELD:

HELD:

No, the courts review will only be limited

to his conviction of rape in the first criminal case
and his conviction on the acts of lasciviousness.

NO. When an accused appeals from the

judgment of his conviction, he waives his
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy
and throws the entire case open for appellate
review. We are then called upon to render such
judgment as law and justice dictate in the exercise of

Given that Nelson was already acquitted of the

charge of rape in second criminal case on the ground
of reasonable doubt, his instant appeal relates only to

our concomitant authority to review and sift through

the whole case to correct any error, even if
unassigned.
The prosecution's success in proving that
Lydia committed the crime of direct assault does not
necessarily mean that the same physical force she
employed on Gemma also resulted in the crime of
unintentional abortion. There is no evidence on
record to prove that the slapping and pushing of
Gemma by Lydia that occurred on July 17, 1981 was
the proximate cause of the abortion. While the
medical certificate of Gemma's attending physician,
Dr. Susan Jaca (Dr. Jaca), was presented to the court
to prove that she suffered an abortion, there is no data
in the document to prove that her medical condition
was a direct consequence of the July 17, 1981
incident. It was therefore vital for the prosecution to
present Dr. Jaca since she was competent to establish
a link, if any, between Lydia's assault and Gemma's
abortion. Without her testimony, there is no way to
ascertain the exact effect of the assault on Gemma's
abortion.
It is worth stressing that Gemma was admitted
and confined in a hospital for incomplete abortion on
August 28, 1981, which was 42 days after the July 17,
1981 incident. This interval of time is too lengthy to
prove that the discharge of the fetus from the womb of
Gemma was a direct outcome of the assault. Her
bleeding and abdominal pain two days after the said
incident were not substantiated by proof other than
her testimony. Thus, it is not unlikely that the
abortion may have been the result of other factors.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DANTE TAN
G.R. No. 167526, July 26, 2010, SECOND
DIVISION (Peralta, J.)
Facts
Tan, being the beneficial owner of 84,030,000
Best World Resources Corporation (BWRC) shares, a
registered security which has been sold pursuant to
the Revised Securities Act, which beneficial ownership
constitutes 18.6% of the outstanding shares of the
company, way above the 10% required by law to be
reported, fail to file with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and with the Philippine Stock
Exchange (PSE) a sworn statement of the amount of
all BWRC shares of which he is the beneficial owner,
within ten (10) days after he became such beneficial
owner. Thus, informations for violation of Rules of the
Revised Securities Act, were filed by the People of the
Philippines (People) against Dante Tan in the Pasig
RTC.
Tan filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave to File
Demurrer to Evidence and to admit the attached
Demurrer to Evidence. The RTC issued another
granted it. The People filed a petition before the CA
assailing the orders of the RTC. In denying the
petition, the CA ruled that the dismissal of a criminal
action by the grant of a Demurrer to Evidence is one
on the merits and operates as an acquittal, for which
reason, the prosecution cannot appeal as it would
place the accused in double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
Did the CA err in applying the rules on double
jeopardy?

HELD:
NO. The elements of double jeopardy are (1)
the complaint or information was sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court
had jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned
and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or
acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his
express consent.
These elements are present here: (1) the
informations filed in against Tan were sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the
RTC had jurisdiction over the criminal cases; (3) Tan
was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty; and (4)
the RTC dismissed the criminal cases on a demurrer to
evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence
which amounts to an acquittal from which no appeal
can be had.
This Court finds that the RTC did not abuse its
discretion in the manner it conducted the proceedings
of the trial, as well as its grant of Tan's demurrer to
evidence.
There is no showing that the conclusions made
by the RTC on the sufficiency of the evidence of the
prosecution at the time the prosecution rested its
case, is manifestly mistaken. Assuming, however, that
there is an error of judgment on the denial of
admission of certain exhibits of the prosecution and
the appreciation of the prosecution's case, there is to
this Court's mind, no capricious exercise of judgment
that would overcome the defense of double jeopardy.
Withal, it bears to stress that the fundamental
philosophy behind the constitutional proscription
against double jeopardy is to afford the defendant,
who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard
him from government oppression through the abuse of
criminal processes. While petitioner insists that the
RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion, this Court
finds that none can be attributed to the RTC.
Consequently, the CA did not err when it affirmed the
assailed Orders of the RTC.
Sec. 3(a), (b), (g) and (i) - execution of
affidavit of desistance not a ground
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DEMETRIO
SALAZAR
Rule 117, Sec. 3. Execution of affidavit of desistance
not a ground
FACTS.
Demetrio Salazar allegedly raped his 12-year
old stepdaughter (AAA) on two separate occasions in
their residence at Lavezares, Northern Samar. For
this, he was charged with 2 counts of statutory rape
by the RTC. In his arraignment on December 13,
1999, he pleaded not guilty. He managed to escape
from detention but was caught again so the hearing of
the case proceeded on July 27, 2000. Meanwhile, on
February 22, 2000,
AAA purportedly executed an
Affidavit of Desistance wherein he stated that she was
not raped by Salazar and that she no longer intends to
pursue the cases filed against the accused-appellant.
However, during the hearing, AAA explained that her
own mother forced her to execute the said affidavit
upon threat of harm. RTC found Salazar guilty of 2
counts of statutory rape. CA affirmed the conviction

but modified the crime to 2 counts of simple rape

since the evidence failed to establish that the victim
was 12 years old at the time of the crimes.
ISSUE.
WON the Affidavit of Desistance purportedly executed
by the victim should be given weight.
HELD.
NO. The alleged affidavit was executed
after the case had already been instituted. Thus,
the Court already acquired jurisdiction over the
case and control over the proceedings. As the
Court ruled in People v. Montes: x x x the Affidavit
even when construed as a pardon in the erstwhile
private crime of rape is not a ground for the
dismissal of the criminal cases, since the actions have
already been instituted. To justify the dismissal of the
complaints, the pardon should have been made prior
to the institution of the criminal actions.
In People v. Ramirez, Jr. the Court was even
more circumspect: As a rule, a recantation or an
affidavit of desistance is viewed with suspicion and
reservation. Jurisprudence has invariably regarded
such affidavit as exceedingly unreliable, because it can
easily be secured from a poor and ignorant witness,
usually through intimidation or for monetary
consideration. Moreover, there is always the
probability that it would later on be repudiated, and
criminal prosecution would thus be interminable.
By itself, an affidavit of desistance or
pardon is not a ground for the dismissal of an
action, once it has been instituted in court. In
the present case, private complainant lost the
right or absolute privilege to decide whether the
rape charge should proceed, because the case
had already reached and must therefore continue
to be heard by the court a quo.
Moreover, as the CA earlier ruled: the affidavit
of desistance relied upon by the appellant could not be
given any probative weight considering that it was not
duly sworn to. Further, when private complainant was
confronted about it, she testified that her mother
threatened to kill her should she refuse to execute the
affidavit.
Sec. 3(a), (b), (g) and (i) - absence of
preliminary investigation not a ground
CONSTANCIO C. TORRALBA, PETITIONER, VS.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE OMBUDSMAN AND
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 101421, February 10, 1994, EN BANC,
VITUG, J.
Crime: violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act Place: Bohol
Facts
On June 14, 1990, Felix T. Rengel, filed a
complaint with the Ombudsman for the investigation
of an alleged conspiracy of Gov. Torralba, Atty. Lim,
Manuel Navarro, and Christopher Lim for the
overpricing two (2) units of Nissan double-cab pickups purchased by the provincial government. After
being dismissed for lack of prima facie evidence, the
complaint was reinstated due to an audit report dated

December 19, 1990 thus, Petitioner was charged with

violation of the Anti-graft law with the Sandiganbayan.
On 24 July 1991, Torralba filed motions to quash the
warrant for his arrest and for reinvestigation premised
on the ground that they were not furnished copies of
the resolutions of the Ombudsman and that no valid
preliminary
investigation
was
conducted
in
contravention of Sec. 7 AO no. 7 but the
Sandiganbayan denied such motions.
Issue
WON the information filed against the petitioner
should be quashed on the ground of the absence of a
preliminary investigation
Held
No, an incomplete preliminary investigation
does not warrant the quashal of the information, nor
should it obliterate the proceedings already had.
Neither is the courts jurisdiction nor validity of an
information adversely affected by deficiencies in the
preliminary investigation. Instead, the Sandiganbayan
is to hold in abeyance any further proceedings therein
and to remand the case to the Office of the
Ombudsman for the completion of the preliminary
investigation, the outcome of which shall then be
indorsed to Sandiganbayan for its appropriate action.
Nevertheless, the right to such preliminary
investigation, is still an indispensable element of our
criminal justice system that may not be treated lightly,
let alone ignored. The averment of the petitioners that
they have not been served with copies of the final
Resolution of 20 May 1991, as well as of the approved
modified memorandum of SPO Lantion and the special
audit report, has not been controverted. In fact, the
petitioners have come to know of the resolution only
through daily newspaper accounts which chronicled
the filing of the charges against them. The special
audit report itself, upon which the resolution is based,
has not been presented during the preliminary
investigation proper at the level of the Office of the
Ombudsman for Visayas. The Solicitor General, who
has begged leave to be excused from filing a comment
on the petitions, has himself opined that the
petitioners should have at least been furnished with
the audit report, since the rules do grant to the
petitioners the right to submit counter-affidavits and
controverting evidence.
Sec. 3(a), (b), (g) and (i) - Malum prohibitum
and Malum in se
ROSITA SY, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
FACTS
Sometime in 1997, petitioner went to the
house of Felicidad in Talisay, Batangas and convinced
her to work in Taiwan by assuring the latter of a good
salary and entitlement to a yearly vacation if she
decides to take the job. Petitioner promised Felicidad
that she will take care of the processing of the
necessary documents, including her passport and visa.
Succumbing thereto, Felicidad handed to the
petitioner, in the latters house in Las Pinas, the
amount of Php120,000.00 to which no receipt was
issued to acknowledge receipt of the said amount.
Thereafter, petitioner sent to Felicidad the birth

certificate of a certain Armida Lim, which Felicidad

would use in applying for a Taiwanese passport, the
Marriage Contract of Armida Lim's parents, Alien
Certificate of Registration and an Immigrant
Certificate of Registration. These documents were
submitted to and eventually rejected by the Taiwanese
authorities, triggering the filing of illegal recruitment
and estafa cases against appellant. The RTC convicted
the petitioner of estafa but acquitted her of illegal
recruitment, which was subsequently affirmed by the
CA on appeal.
ISSUE
WON petitioners acquittal in the illegal
recruitment extinguished her criminal liability in the
estafa cases
RULING
NO. Illegal recruitment and estafa cases may
be filed simultaneously or separately. The filing of
charges for illegal recruitment does not bar the filing
of estafa, and vice versa. Sy's acquittal in the illegal
recruitment case does not prove that she is not guilty
of estafa. Illegal recruitment and estafa are entirely
different offenses and neither one necessarily includes
or is necessarily included in the other. A person who is
convicted of illegal recruitment may, in addition, be
convicted of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a)
of the RPC. In the same manner, a person acquitted of
illegal recruitment may be held liable for estafa.
Double jeopardy will not set in because illegal
recruitment is malum prohibitum, in which there is no
necessity
to
prove
criminal
intent,
whereas estafa is malum in se, in the prosecution of
which, proof of criminal intent is necessary.
In the instant case, all the elements of estafa
are present. It was proven beyond reasonable doubt,
as found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, that Sy
misrepresented and falsely pretended that she had the
capacity to deploy Felicidad for employment in
Taiwan. The misrepresentation was made prior to
Felicidad's payment to Sy of P120,000.00. It was Sy's
misrepresentation and false pretenses that induced
Felicidad to part with her money. As a result of Sy's
false pretenses and misrepresentations, Felicidad
suffered damages as the promised employment abroad
never materialized and the money she paid was never
recovered.
The Decision of the CA is hereby affirmed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION),
ABELARDO P. PANLAQUI, RENATO B. VELASCO,
ANGELITO PELAYO and WILFREDO CUNANAN,
Respondents
G.R. No. 173396, September 22, 2010
TOPIC: MALUM PROHIBITUM AND MALUM IN
SE
CRIME: VIOLATION OF RA. 3019
PLACE OF CRIME: MUNICIPALITY OF SASMUAN,
PAMPANGA
FACTS:
That on or about the 1st day of September,
1991, the respondents, being public officers of the
Municipality of Sasmuan, Pampanga, while in the

performance of their official functions, taking

advantage of their position, committing the offense in
relation to their office, and conspiring and
confederating with one another and with WILFREDO
CUNANAN,
the
representative
of
J.S.
Lim
Construction, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
criminally and with evident bad faith cause undue
injury to the Government and grant unwarranted
benefits to J.S. Lim Construction in the following
manner: accused ABELARDO P. PANLAQUI, without
being authorized by the Sangguniang Bayan of
Sasmuan, Pampanga, entered into a Contract of Lease
of Equipment with J.S. Lim Construction, represented
by accused WILFREDO CUNANAN, whereby the
municipality leased seven (7) units of Crane on Barge
with Clamshell and one (1) unit of Back Hoe on Barge
for an unstipulated consideration for a period of thirty
(30) days, which equipment items were to be
purportedly used for the deepening and dredging of
the Palto and Pakulayo Rivers in Sasmuan, Pampanga.
Thereafter accused caused it to appear that work on
the said project had been accomplished and 100%
completed. Payments were made to and received by
accused WILFREDO CUNANAN notwithstanding the
fact that no work had actually been done on the Palto
and Pakulayo Rivers.
Sandiganbayan rendered an assailed decision
declaring the accused not guilty for Violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, for failure of
the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered
ACQUITTED of the said offense charged against them.
The People, represented by the Office of the
Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, then filed the present petition for
certiorari, alleging that:
I
THE COURT A QUO ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION
WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE MANDATORY
PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
(PD) NO. 1594 AND SUPPLIED A DEFENSE
NOT INVOKED BY RESPONDENTS AND
ANCHORED ITS DECISION ON
POSSIBILITIES, MERE ASSUMPTION OR
CONJECTURE RATHER THAN ON FACTS
ESTABLISHED BY EVIDENCE ON RECORD,
THEREBY VIOLATING PETITIONER'S
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
OF LAW.
II
THE COURT A QUO ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION
WHEN IT IGNORED THE EVIDENCE
ADDUCED BY THE PETITIONER AND
DECLARED THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED
TO PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE TO PROVE
THAT SAID RESPONDENTS VIOLATED THE
PROVISIONS OF SECTION 3(e) OF R.A. 3019.
ISSUE:
WON there is a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

RULING:
The petition is unmeritorious. It is fitting to
reiterate the holding of the Court in People v. TriaTirona, to wit:
x x x it is clear in this jurisdiction that after trial
on the merits, an acquittal is immediately final
and cannot be appealed on the ground of double
jeopardy. The only exception where double
jeopardy cannot be invoked is where there is a
finding of mistrial resulting in a denial of due
process.
x x x Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors
by the trial court in its appreciation of
theevidence of the parties, and its conclusions
anchored on the said findings and its conclusions
of law.
The Court further expounded in First
Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of
Appeals, thus:It is a fundamental aphorism in law that
a review of facts and evidence is not the province of
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra
ordinem - beyond the ambit of appeal. In certiorari
proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as
to examine and assess the evidence of the parties
and to weigh the probative value thereof. It does
not include an inquiry as to the correctness of
the evaluation of evidence. Any error committed
in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error
of judgment that cannot be remedied by
certiorari. An error of judgment is one which the
court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An
error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained
of was issued by the court without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, which is
tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and
which error is correctible only by the extraordinary
writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure
errors of the trial court in its appreciation of the
evidence of the parties, or its conclusions anchored on
the said findings and its conclusions of law. It is not
for this Court to re-examine conflicting evidence,
re-evaluate the credibility of the witnesses or
substitute the findings of fact of the court a quo.
The foregoing is essentially an issue involving
an alleged error of judgment, not an error of
jurisdiction. Petitioner has not convincingly shown
that the prosecution has indeed been deprived of due
process of law. There is no showing that the trial court
hampered the prosecution's presentation of evidence
in any way. On the contrary, the prosecution was given
ample opportunity to present its ten witnesses and all
necessary documentary evidence. The case was only
submitted for decision after the parties had duly
rested their case. Respondent trial court clearly stated
in its decision which pieces of evidence led it to its
conclusion that the project was actually undertaken,
justifying payment to the contractor. Clearly,
petitioner failed to show that there was mistrial
resulting in denial of due process.
In People v. Tria-Tirona, the Court held that
when the trial court arrives at its decision only after
all the evidence had been considered, weighed and
passed upon, then any error committed in the
evaluation of evidence is merely an error of
judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari.

In sum, there being no mistrial in this case,

the acquittal of private respondents can no longer be
reviewed by the Court as this would constitute a
violation of the constitutional right against double
jeopardy. Moreover, since the alleged error is only one
of judgment, petitioner is not entitled to the
extraordinary writ of certiorari.
Sec. 4 - Amendment available as a cure
MUSTAPHA M. GANDAROSA v. EVARISTO
FLORES AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 167910, July 17, 2007, THIRD
DIVISION, (CHICO-NAZARIO, J.)
Facts
The Daily Informer, a newspaper of daily
circulation in Iloilo City, touted the banner
headline, "Gandarosa Wants Flores Out for Personal
Convenience? "Back-door-pay" anomaly exposed."
According to the article, petitioner, in his capacity as
the Assistant Regional Director of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) - Regional Office, revealed to
members of the media that high-ranking BIR officials,
among them Regional Director Sonia Flores and
Revenue District Officer Willy Narnola, are involved in
anomalous transactions to favor certain taxpayers in
the assessment of their taxes. A photo of Sonia Flores
and Willy Narnola was similarly plastered on the
newspaper's front page. This prompted respondent
Evaristo Flores, husband of Sonia Flores and with the
conformity of the latter, to file a Complaint (I.S. No.
2075-2000) with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Iloilo City against petitioner, Manny Regalado Alcalde,
the author of the aforesaid article; and Rey P. Alcalde
and Bernie G. Miaque, editor and publisher,
respectively, of the Daily Informer.
Pending the resolution of the Motion for
Reconsideration, an Information for Libel was filed
before the RTC of Iloilo City against petitioner, Manny
Regalado Alcalde, Rey P. Alcalde and Bernie G.
Miaque.
Several months following his arraignment, the
DOJ issued a Resolution, reversing the Resolution of
the City Prosecutor of Iloilo City, and directing the
amendment of the Information for Libel and the
dropping of petitioner from the charge. It held, inter
alia, that the accusation is not synonymous with guilt;
and only the persons who publish, exhibit, or cause
the publication or exhibition of any defamation in
writing are the ones responsible for Libel; and from
the evidence presented, petitioner did not cause the
same. The Office of the City Prosecutor filed with the
RTC a Motion with Leave of Court to Amend
Information. The RTC denied the Motion. CA denied
the same.
ISSUE:
Did the RTC and CA err in denying the Motion to
Amend Information?
HELD:
NO. Contrary to petitioner's contention, a
cursory reading of the assailed Order would reveal
that the RTC did not deny the Motion on the lone basis
that it had already acquired jurisdiction over the

criminal action. It denied

formidable legal grounds.

the

Motion

on

more

The reason for the RTC's denial of petitioner's

Motion bears reiterating, viz:
Nonetheless, the instant Motion is filed
after the said accused has already been
arraigned. Under Section 4, Rule 117, which allows
the amendment of complaint or information, the same
shall be done before the accused entered his plea,
hence, the desirability of amendment, since the Court
will not entertain any Motion to Quash, after the
arraignment pursuant to Section 1, Rule 117. This is
so because with accused'[s] arraignment the issue has
been joined.
The crucial fact is, on 31 October 2001, the
petitioner was unconditionally arraigned. He was
arraigned with the assistance of his counsel, Atty.
Marlou Ubano. He already entered his plea during his
arraignment. Subsequently, a plea of not guilty was set
in the records.
Nothing in the records discloses that
petitioner's
arraignment
was
with
restriction,
condition, or reservation. Jurisprudence is clear that
with the arraignment of the petitioner, the DOJ
Secretary can no longer entertain the appeal or
petition for review because petitioner had already
waived or abandoned the same. In the case at bar,
following petitioner's arraignment, he is deemed to
have waived or abandoned his petition for review
earlier filed with the DOJ Secretary.
Moreover, when the petitioner brought forth
the denial of the Motion to Amend the Information to
exclude his name from the charge, and to seek the
quashal of the Information before the Court of Appeals
on certiorari, he was in error in his choice of remedy.
This Court emphasizes the established rule that the
writ of certiorari will not lie against the denial of a
motion to quash an information. The remedy is for
petitioner to go to trial on the merits, and if an
adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom
in a manner authorized by law. We have, however,
sanctioned a writ of certiorari on the basis of a patent,
capricious and whimsical exercise of discretion by a
trial judge or when an appeal will not promptly relieve
petitioner from the injurious effects of the disputed
orders. No such special circumstances are herein
present that would convince us to treat the instant
case as an exception.
Sec. 5 - Effect of order granting motion to
quash
RAFAEL GONZALES v. HON. TRANQUIL
SALVADOR AND GLEN DALE
G.R. No. 168340, December 5, 2006, THIRD
DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)
Facts
Rafael Gonzales filed before the Makati City
Prosecutor's Office a complaint against Glen Dale
arising from the publication in the issue of Today of
his article, entitled "Glad Tidings for Manila Polo Club
members" in the "Bizz 'N' Fizz" column, under the
nom de plume Rene Martel. The Prosecutor's Office
found probable cause to hale Dale into court for Libel.
Dale filed a Motion to Quash on the ground of lack of

jurisdiction over the offense charged, there being no

allegation in the Information that the offended party
actually resides in Makati or that the allegedly libelous
article was printed or first published in Makati. Dale
cited Article 360 of the RPC as prescribing a specific
venue for libel. The RTC granted the Motion to Quash,
holding that the Information was defective for failure
to allege that the newspaper article was printed and
first published in Makati or that petitioner actually
resided in Makati at the time of the commission of the
act complained of. Gonzales filed a Motion (to Order
the Public Prosecutor to Amend the Information and to
Admit said Amended Information), invoking Sections 4
and 5 of Rule 117 of the ROC which was later granted.
Dale filed an MR on the ground that under Section 5
of Rule 117, the order to file another information must
be contained in the same order sustaining the motion
to quash since the accused would have been
discharged by the time the new information is filed.
The RTC granted the MR. The Court of Appeals
dismissed Gonzales petition which assailed the orders
of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Did the CA err in holding that the order to file
another information was discretionary with the court?
HELD:
NO. In cases falling under Section 5 of Rule
117, where the motion to quash is sustained on
grounds other than those stated in Section 6 of the
same Rule, the trial court has the discretion to order
the filing of another information within a specified
period which is extendible to such further time as the
court may allow for good cause. The order to file
another information, if determined to be warranted by
the circumstances of the case, must be contained in
the same order granting the motion to quash. If the
order sustaining the motion to quash does not order
the filing of another information, and said order
becomes final and executory, then the court may no
longer direct the filing of another information.
It is gathered that Gonzales never asserted the
propriety of amending the Information, he having
maintained that the allegations in the Information
provided sufficient and adequate bases to confer
jurisdiction. When the RTC granted the motion to
quash, Gonzales did not assail the same within the
reglementary period. The order quashing the
Information thus became final and executory.
The clause denotes no other construction than
a plain extension of time. The allowance of additional
time qualifies the period of filing a new information
pursuant to an order, and not the period of issuing an
order to file a new information. It presupposes that an
order has been previously issued, as signified by the
prior phrase "if having been made." As earlier stated,
this order to file another information, ifthe RTC finds
that circumstances warrant its issuance, must be
included in the order granting the motion to quash.
The time limitation in the rule was intended to prevent
the accused from being unnecessarily detained at the
whim of the prosecution. Since the order granting the
motion to quash had attained finality, it had become
immutable.
At all events, the prosecution is not, under the
circumstances attendant to the case, precluded from

refiling an information against respondent as long as

prescription has not set in.
Sec. 6 - order sustaining the motion to quash
not a bar to another prosecution
ATTY. REYNALDO P. DIMAYACYAC v.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
VICENTE ROXAS, IRENE AGBADA-CRUZ, SIXTO
AGBADA CRUZ, MERCEDES ARISTORENAS, and
ROMEO GOMEZ and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Rule 117, Sec. 6. Order sustaining the motion to quash
not a bar to another prosecution
FACTS.
The Assistant City Prosecutor accused and
charged Atty. Reynaldo Dimayacyac and three others
of the crime of falsification of a public document in the
RTC of Quezon City. Before petitioners arraignment,
he moved to quash the information on two grounds:
(1) that the officer who filed the information had no
legal authority to do so, and (2) that more than one
offense was charged in the information.
Judge
Benigno Dayaw of Branch 80 of the RTC of QC granted
petitioners motion to quash upon the second ground.
Accordingly, the information was quashed. More than
two years after the quashal, the Quezon City
Prosecutor filed against the same accused two
informations for falsification of public documents.
Now, Atty. Dimayacyac argued that he would be placed
in double jeopardy as he was indicted before for the
same offenses and the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.
ISSUE.
WON CA erred in concluding that an ORDER
sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense, as it has no legal
basis.
HELD.
NO.
The general rule is that an order
sustaining a motion to quash is not a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense unless the motion
was based on grounds specified under Section 3(g)
and (i) of Rule 117. The issue in this case boils down
as to whether or not there exists double jeopardy
which is one of the exemptions to the general rule.
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon valid
indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after
arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered, and
(e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused.
In Sta. Rita v. CA, the Court held that the
reinstatement of criminal cases against the accused
did not violate his right against double jeopardy since
the dismissal of the information by the trial court had
been effected at his own instance when the accused
filed a motion to dismiss x x x.
In this case,
considering that since the dismissal of the
previous criminal case against the petitioner was
by reason of his motion for the quashal of the
information, petitioner is thus deemed to have
expressly given his consent to such dismissal.
There could then be no double jeopardy in this

case since one of the requisites therefore, i.e.,

that the dismissal be without accuseds express
consent, is not present. Therefore, the general rule
that an order sustaining a motion to quash is not a bar
to another prosecution applies in the case at bar.
Remedy from denial of motion to quash
RESTY JUMAQUIO, PETITIONER, VS. HON.
JOSELITO C. VILLAROSA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDING JUDGE OF SAN JOSE CITY
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 39,
RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 165924, January 19, 2009, THIRD
DIVISION, NACHURA, J.
Facts
On August 2, 2003, Resty Jumaquio allegedly
threatened and assaulted two young men, then ages
13 and 17. As narrated by the minors, Resty, upon
seeing the younger child, belted out his anger and
yelled.3 Later in the evening, while the minors and
their mother were traversing the road fronting
another neighbor's house, petitioner, who was then
having a drinking session, cursed them. Aghast, the
mother cursed him back. Resty thence threw a stone
towards the older child, but missed him. When the
children's father went out of their nearby house, Resty
picked up another stone to fling towards the father,
but the older child rushed to Resty to grab it. At that
moment, Resty repeatedly punched the 17-year-old.
The family hurried home when Resty bellowed at his
son for the latter to get a gun. Resty then pelted
stones at the family's house again cursing at them4.
Two informations were filed against the
petitioner, one for grave threats under RA 7610 and
physical injuries under the same law. After posting bail
and before the arraignment, petitioner moved for the
quashal of the informations for being duplicitous. He
argued that, under the informations, he stood charged
with several crimes - grave threats and violation of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610, and physical injuries and
another violation of the aforesaid law; that grave
threats in relation to R.A. No. 7610 could not be
considered a crime; and that the said separate crimes
could not even be complexed, as neither may be
considered to fall within the ambit of Section 10, R.A.
No. 7610. Following Section 3(e), Rule 117of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the informations
should therefore be quashed. The RTC denied the
motion hence, this petition.
Issue
WON the informations filed against the
petitioner should be quashed.
Decision
No, immediately apparent is that the instant
petition disregards the hierarchy of courts. While

3 "Putang ina mong bata ka namumuro ka na sa akin,

at susunugin ko `yung pamilya mo!"

4 He was shouting "Putang ina ninyo, zone leader ako

papatayin ko [ kayong] lahat!"

the SCs original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary

writs is not exclusive - it is shared with the Court of
Appeals (CA) and the RTC - the choice of where to file
the petition for certiorari is not left entirely to the
party seeking the writ. The principle of hierarchy of
courts serves as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for the said petition. A becoming
regard for judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates
that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs
against first-level courts should be filed with the RTC;
and those against the latter, with the CA.
As a rule, when a motion to quash in a
criminal case is denied, petitioner's remedy is not
certiorari, but to go to trial without prejudice to
reiterating the special defenses invoked in his motion
to quash. In the event that an adverse decision is
rendered after trial on the merits, an appeal therefrom
is the next appropriate legal step.
On its merits, the petition should likewise be
dismissed. The questioned informations separately
charge two distinct offenses of child abuse--Criminal
Case No. SJC-78-04 for child abuse committed through
the use of threatening words, and Criminal Case No.
SJC-79-04 for child abuse through the infliction of
physical injuries. Thus, contrary to his contention,
petitioner is not in jeopardy of being convicted of
grave threats and child abuse in the first case, and
slight physical injuries and child abuse in the second.
Moreover, an information is not duplicitous if
it charges several related acts, all of which constitute
a single offense, although the acts may in themselves
be distinct offenses. The specific acts are only alleged
to complete the narration of facts.
Petition Dismissed.
Sec. 8 - Provisional Dismissal
PEOPLE VS. LACSON
FACTS
The petitioners filed an MR of the Resolution by the
SC remanding the instant case to the RTC of Quezon
City for the determination of several factual issues
relative to the application of Section 8 of Rule 117 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the
dismissal of several criminal cases filed against the
respondent and his co-accused. In the said criminal
cases, the respondent and his co-accused were
charged with multiple murder for the shooting and
killing of eleven male persons bandied as members of
the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. The Court ruled in the
Resolution sought to be reconsidered that the
provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases were
with the express consent of the respondent as he
himself moved for said provisional dismissal when he
filed his motion for judicial determination of probable
cause and for examination of witnesses. The
petitioners aver that Section 8, Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable
to the said criminal cases because the essential
requirements, respondents express consent to the
dismissal and due notice to the private complainants,
for its application were not present when Judge Agnir,
Jr., issued his resolution.
ISSUE

WON Sec.8, Rule 117 of the RRCP

applicable to the criminal cases herein disputed

is

RULING
NO. Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure reads:
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be
provisionally dismissed except with the express
consent of the accused and with notice to the
offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable
by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine
of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one
(1) year after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived. With respect to offenses
punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6)
years, their provisional dismissal shall become
permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived.
Having invoked said rule before the petitionerspanel of prosecutors and before the Court of Appeals,
the respondent is burdened to establish the essential
requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely:
1. The prosecution with the express conformity
of the accused or the accused moves for a
provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the
case; or both the prosecution and the accused
move for a provisional dismissal of the case;
2. The offended party is notified of the motion
for a provisional dismissal of the case;
3. The court issues an order granting the
motion
and
dismissing
the
case
provisionally;
4. The public prosecutor is served with a copy
of the order of provisional dismissal of the
case.
The foregoing requirements are conditions
sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the
second paragraph of the new rule. The raison d etre
for the requirement of the express consent of the
accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is
to bar him from subsequently asserting that the
revival of the criminal case will place him in
double jeopardy for the same offense or for an
offense necessarily included therein.
In this case, the respondent has failed to prove
that the first and second requisites of the first
paragraph of the new rule were present when Judge
Agnir, Jr. dismissed the criminal cases. Irrefragably,
the prosecution did not file any motion for the
provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. For his
part, the respondent merely filed a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause and for examination
of prosecution witnesses alleging that under Article
III, Section 2 of the Constitution and the decision of
this Court in Allado v. Diokno,[17] among other cases,
there was a need for the trial court to conduct a
personal determination of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against respondent and
to have the prosecutions witnesses summoned before
the court for its examination. The respondent did not
pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of the
criminal cases. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or
expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases.

The Court also agrees with the petitioners

contention that no notice of any motion for the
provisional dismissal of the criminal cases or of the
hearing thereon was served on the heirs of the victims
at least three days before said hearing as mandated by
Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. In the case at
bar, even if the respondents motion for a
determination of probable cause and examination of
witnesses may be considered for the nonce as his
motion for a provisional dismissal of the criminal
cases, however, the heirs of the victims were not
notified thereof prior to the hearing on said motion on
March 22, 1999. There is no proof on record that all
the heirs of the victims were served with copies of the
resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the said cases.
It should also be noted that when the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect on December
1, 2000, the State only had one year and three months
within which to revive the cases or refile the
Informations. The issue which arose from such event
was whether the time-bar in Section 8 of Rule 117
thereof should be applied prospectively and not
retroactively against the State, to which the Court
ruled that procedural laws may be applied
retroactively.
The time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is
akin to a special procedural limitation qualifying the
right of the State to prosecute making the time-bar an
essence of the given right or as an inherent part
thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to
extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the
accused. The time-bar under the new rule does not
reduce the periods under Article 90 of the Revised
Penal Code, a substantive law. It is but a limitation of
the right of the State to revive a criminal case against
the accused after the Information had been filed but
subsequently provisionally dismissed with the express
consent of the accused. Upon the lapse of the timeline
under the new rule, the State is presumed, albeit
disputably, to have abandoned or waived its right to
revive the case and prosecute the accused. The
dismissal becomes ipso facto permanent. The State
may revive a criminal case beyond the one-year or
two-year periods provided that there is a justifiable
necessity for the delay.
MR granted. The Resolution of the Court is set
aside.
ARIEL M. LOS BAOS v. JOEL R. PEDRO
G.R No. 173588, 22 April 2009, EN BANC, (Brion,
J.)
Facts
Pedro was charged for carrying a loaded
firearm without the required written authorization
from the Comelec a day before the May 2001 elections
accusation as per BP 881 (Omnibus Election Code) in
Boac, Marinduque.
A Complaint was filed against him. After
Inquest, the Information was filed in court. When his
motion for Preliminary Investigation was granted, it
did not materialize. Hence he filed Motion to Quash
arguing that the Information contains averments
which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification and/or that the facts charged do not
constitute
an
offense.
He
attached
a

Comelec Certification that he was exempted from

the gun ban. The RTC granted the quashal.
Private
prosecutor
Ariel
Los
Baos,
representing the checkpoint team, moved to reopen
the case, as Pedros Comelec Certification was a
falsification, and the prosecution was deprived of
due process when the judge quashed the information
without a hearing. The RTC reopened the case, as
Pedro did not object to Los Baos motion. Pedro filed
an MR for the RTCs order primarily based on Section
8 of Rule 117, arguing that the dismissal had become
permanent. The RTC denied Pedros MR.
The CA initially denied Pedros petition. In his
MR, Pedro manifested the exact date and time of the
Marinduque provincial prosecutors receipt of the
quashal order to be 2:35 p.m., December 10, 2001,
and argued that based on this date, the provisional
dismissal of the case became permanent on
December 10, 2002. Based on this information, the
CA reversed itself ruling that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion because it failed to apply
Section 8, Rule 17 and the time-bar under this
provision.
ISSUE:
Is the CA correct in applying Sec. 8, Rule 117
in this case?
RULING:
NO. In People v. Lacson, we ruled that there
are sine quanon requirements in the application of the
time-bar rule stated in the second paragraph of
Section 8 of Rule 117. We also ruled that the time-bar
under the provision is a special procedural limitation
qualifying the right of the State to prosecute, making
the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an
inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar
operates to extinguish the right of the State to
prosecute the accused.
The modifier provisional directly suggests
that the dismissals which Section 8 essentially refers
to are those that are temporary in character, and not
the dismissals that are permanent. Based on the law,
rules, and jurisprudence, permanent dismissals are
those barred by the principle of double jeopardy, by
the previous extinction of criminal liability, by the rule
on speedy trial, and the dismissals after plea without
the express consent of the accused. Section 8, by its
own terms, cannot cover these dismissals because
they are not provisional.
A second feature is that Section 8 does not
state the grounds that lead to a provisional
dismissal. This is in marked contrast with a motion to
quash whose grounds are specified under Section
3. The delimitation of the grounds available in a
motion to quash suggests that a motion to quash is a
class in itself, with specific and closely-defined
characteristics under the Rules of Court.
Section 8 simply states when a provisional
dismissal can be made, i.e., when the accused
expressly consents and the offended party is given
notice. The consent of the accused to a dismissal
relates directly to what Section 3(i) and Section 7
provide, i.e., the conditions for dismissals that lead to
double jeopardy. This immediately suggests that a
dismissal under Section 8 i.e., one with the express

consent of the accused is not intended to lead to

double jeopardy as provided under Section 7, but
nevertheless creates a bar to further prosecution
under the special terms of Section 8.
This feature must be read with Section 6
which provides for the effects of sustaining a motion
to quash the dismissal is not a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense unless the basis for
the dismissal is the extinction of criminal liability and
double jeopardy. These unique terms, read in relation
with Sections 3(i) and 7 and compared with the
consequences of Section 8, carry unavoidable
implications that cannot but lead to distinctions
between a quashal and a provisional dismissal under
Section 8. They stress in no uncertain terms that, save
only for what has been provided under Sections 4 and
5, the governing rule when a motion to quash is
meritorious are the terms of Section 6. The failure of
the Rules to state under Section 6 that a Section 8
provisional dismissal is a bar to further prosecution
shows that the framers did not intend a dismissal
based on a motion to quash and a provisional dismissal
to be confused with one another; Section 8 operates in
a world of its own separate from motion to quash, and
merely provides a time-bar that uniquely applies to
dismissals other than those grounded on Section
3. Conversely, when a dismissal is pursuant to a
motion to quash under Section 3, Section 8 and its
time-bar does not apply.
The Court notes also the following differences
stressing that a motion to quash and its resulting
dismissal is a unique class that should not be confused
with other dismissals:
First, a motion to quash is invariably filed by
the accused to question the efficacy of the complaint
or information filed against him or her (Sections 1 and
2, Rule 117); in contrast, a case may be
provisionally dismissed at the instance of either
the prosecution or the accused, or both, subject
to the conditions enumerated under Section 8,
Rule 117.
Second, the form and content of a motion to
quash are as stated under Section 2 of Rule 117; these
requirements do not apply to a provisional dismissal.
Third, a motion to quash assails the validity of
the criminal complaint or the criminal information for
defects or defenses apparent on face of the
information; a provisional dismissal may be
grounded on reasons other than the defects
found in the information.
Fourth, a motion to quash is allowed before
the arraignment (Section 1, Rule 117); there may be a

provisional dismissal of the case even when the trial

proper of the case is already underway provided that
the required consents are present.
Fifth, a provisional dismissal is, by its own
terms, impermanent until the time-bar applies,
at which time it becomes a permanent
dismissal. In contrast, an information that is quashed
stays quashed until revived; the grant of a motion to
quash does not per se carry any connotation of
impermanence, and becomes so only as provided by
law or by the Rules. In re-filing the case, what is
important is the question of whether the action can
still be brought, i.e., whether the prescription of
action or of the offense has set in. In a provisional
dismissal, there can be no re-filing after the time-bar,
and prescription is not an immediate consideration.
To recapitulate, quashal and provisional
dismissal are different concepts whose respective
rules refer to different situations that should not
be confused with one another. If the problem
relates to an intrinsic or extrinsic deficiency of
the complaint or information, as shown on its
face, the remedy is a motion to quash under the
terms of Section 3, Rule 117. All other reasons
for seeking the dismissal of the complaint or
information, before arraignment and under the
circumstances outlined in Section 8, fall under
provisional dismissal.
The grounds Pedro cited in his motion to
quash are that the Information contains averments
which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification [Section 3(h), Rule 117], and that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense [Section
3(a), Rule 117]. We find from our examination of the
records that the Information duly charged a specific
offense and provides the details on how the offense
was committed. Thus, the cited Section 3(a) ground
has no merit. On the other hand, we do not see on the
face or from the averments of the Information any
legal
excuse
or
justification.
This
COMELEC Certification is a matter aliunde that is not
an appropriate motion to raise in, and cannot support,
a motion to quash grounded on legal excuse or
justification
found
on
the
face
of
the
Information. Significantly,
no
hearing
was ever called to allow the prosecution to contest the
genuineness of the COMELEC certification.
As a consequence, a valid Information still
stands, on the basis of which Pedro should now be
arraigned and stand trial.