Managing The Internationalization Process: Learning Outcomes

Managing the
internationalization
process
Learning outcomes
After reading this chapter, you should be able to:
Understand the motives for internationalization.
Apply the theories underpinning the internationalization process.
Explain the Psychic Distance and Born Global concepts.
Advise a multinational firm on choosing an appropriate entry mode for internationalization.
Advise a multinational firm on de-internationalization.
148
Global strategic development
Opening case study Internationalization of a

French retailerCarrefour
In 1960, Carrefour opened its first supermarket in France. In 1963, Carrefour invented a
new store conceptthe hypermarket. The hypermarket concept was novel, and revolutionized
the way French people did their shopping. It moved daily shopping from small stores to enormous stores where customers find everything they want under one roof, in addition to selfservice, discount price, and free parking space. The first Carrefour hypermarket store was
established at the intersection of five roadshence the name, Carrefour, which means
crossroads. Carrefour is the leading retailer in Europe and the second largest worldwide, with
Exhibit A International development of Carrefour

Year
Country and mode of entry
No. of stores
Formats
(2009)
1969
BelgiumCarrefours first
hypermarket outside France
120
1973
Spain
1975
BrazilCarrefours first hypermarket

in the Americas
476
162(HM), 39(SM), 267(HD), 8(CS)
1982
Argentina
518
67(HM), 112(SM), 339(HD)
1989
TaiwanCarrefours first
hypermarket in Asia
1991
Greece
544
31(HM), 209 (SM), 271 (HD), 33(CS)
1993
Italy
494
66(HM), 236(SM), 178(CS), 14(C&C)
1993
Turkey
578
22(HM), 125(SM), 431(HD)
1994
Malaysia
1995
China
1996
Thailand
1997
Poland
1997
Singapore
HM
1998
Colombia
59
HM
1998
Indonesia
43
HM
2000
Japan
2,241
59
16
443
31
303
57(HM), 63(SM)
162(HM), 96(SM), 1,972(HD), 11(CS)
HM
HM
134(HM), 309(HD)
HM
78 (HM), 225(SM)
Note: HM = hypermarkets, SM = supermarkets, HD = hard discount stores, CS = convenience stores,

C&C = cash and carry stores.
Source: P. Kamath and C. Codin (2001), French Carrefour in South-East Asia, British Food Journal 103(7):
47994; E. Colla and M. Dupuis (2002), Research and managerial issues on global retail competition:
Carrefour/Wal-Mart, International Journal of Retail and Distribution Management 30(2): 10311; and
Carrefours website at http://www.carrefour.com/.
Managing the internationalization process
more than 15,000 stores in thirty countries. In 2009, almost 55% of its revenues came from its
international stores.
In 1969, Carrefour opened its first hypermarket store outside France, in Belgium. Although
French consumers welcomed the hypermarket concept, smaller stores lobbied against the spread
of hypermarket stores in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and in 1973, the French legislature passed
the Royer Law, which restricted the introduction of more hypermarkets. Carrefour had no choice but
to expand internationally. It first moved to neighbouring European countries: Switzerland in 1970;
Britain and Italy in 1972; and Spain in 1973. However, Carrefour soon withdrew from the Belgian
and British markets, focusing mainly on southern European and Latin American countries where the
distribution system was not yet modernized. In 1975, it expanded its format outside Europe, to Brazil.
Carrefours internationalization strategy further accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s (see Exhibit A).
Carrefours international strategy is based on the hypermarket format with local adaptability. For
example, while the store format is the same anywhere around the world, the company sells hot
meals to French customers in France and pasta in Argentina and Italy, and has sushi bars in most
Asian countries. The success of Carrefours export of its hypermarket concept is due, at least in part,
to its careful choice of countries and to its ability to adapt its format to local business environments.
As shown in Exhibit A, most countries are emerging economies with a growing urban middle-class
population that find the hypermarket concept appealing.
The international concept of Carrefour is based on:
A simple and clear idea. People in major cities prefer to do all their shopping under one roof.
Carrefours logic is based on the belief that choice, self-service, free parking, and low prices
have universal appeal. Although these principles might seem simple, the introduction of free
parking in South Korea and Singapore was considered revolutionary, given the high cost of
land in these countries.
Evolving ideas. Each hypermarket around the world is expected to keep reinventing itself to
meet the demands of local customers. For instance, the company has introduced organic food
in France, optical shops and tyre fitting in Taiwan, and petrol stations in Argentina.
As shown in Exhibit A, different formats are present in different countries. While the hypermarket
model is the only format in emerging economies in South America (with the exception of Brazil
and Argentina) and Asia, different formats exist in European countries. This is mainly due to: (1)
planning restrictions on building hypermarkets in Western European countries; and (2) historical
growth through acquisition of small outlets. In addition, in contrast to its standard entry mode by
ownership, Carrefour entered several countriesthe United Arab Emirates, Madagascar, Qatar,
Romania, the Dominican Republic, and Tunisiathrough a franchise partnership.
Most Carrefour stores are still located in Europe. However, the importance of non-European
markets has been steadily increasing. For instance, the number of Carrefour stores in Belgium fell
from 483 to 120 in the ten-year period of 19992009, while the number of stores in Italy fell from
912 to 494. At the same time, the number of Carrefour stores in Brazil increased from 193 to 476,
while the number of stores in China increased from 23 to 443.
149
150
5.1
Introduction
Understanding the motives behind a firms decision to internationalize its business activities
helps to explain why and how firms should engage in international business activities.
For example, Carrefour was compelled to make its first international move in the 1970s
because of the introduction of the Royer Law, which restricted its growth in France. Later
on, it was attracted by opportunities in South American, Asian, and Middle Eastern markets.
In this chapter, we discuss factors that push and pull firms to internationalize their business
activities.
In addition to the motives for internationalization, we need to understand the different
modes of entering a foreign country or a region. There is no best way to enter a foreign market.
For example, Carrefours mode of entry differed from one country or region to another. The
company started its first international experience cautiously, expanding to countries it knew
quite well and in moves which involved small risks. As it gained more experience in foreign
markets and confidence in its ability to operate effectively outside its home market, its attitudes
towards operating and risk in foreign markets changed. This resulted in further expansions
into more challenging and unknown markets, such as the Middle Eastern and Asian markets.
5.2
Decision and motives to internationalize
In addressing the question of why certain firms are engaged in international business activities
while others are not, researchers have focused on the elements stimulating a firms decision
to initiate foreign market entry (Albaum 1983). Internationalization stimuli can be defined
as those internal and external factors that influence a firms decision to initiate, develop, and
sustain international business activities.
Two sets of factors lead firms to consider the possibility of operating outside their home
market: organizational factors arising from within the firm, and environmental factors which
are outside the firms control (see Exhibit 5.1) (Aharoni 1966).
5.2.1
Organizational factors
Organizational factors can be split into two forces: decision-maker characteristics and firmspecific factors.
Decision-maker characteristics
Recognition by the top manager, or the top management team, of the importance of international
activities is an essential part of the process of internationalization. The top managers (or top
management teams) exposure to foreign markets is a critical component in the decision to
internationalize (Karafakioglu 1986; Jaw and Lin 2009). Management characteristics such as
Exhibit 5.1 Factors behind the decision to internationalize
Firms decision to internationalize
Organizational factors
Decision-maker
characteristics
Firm-specific
factors
Environmental factors
Unsolicited
proposals
'Bandwagon'
effect
Attractiveness
of
host country
perceptions of risk in foreign operations have a strong influence on management perceptions

of international business activities. Reid (1981) found the following characteristics positively
influenced the internationalization decision:
Foreign travel and experience abroad. Managers who travel abroad extensively are more
open-minded and interested in foreign affairs, thus being more able and willing to meet
foreign managers and form business partnerships. They also have more opportunities to
observe first-hand the advantages that foreign partnerships and foreign countries may
offer, have a foreign business network in place, and are able to attract and negotiate with
managers from different cultures.
Foreign language proficiency. The number of languages spoken by the top manager is
a good indication of his or her interest in international activities. Managers who speak
several languages tend to travel more to foreign countries and thus are more able to
establish social and business contacts, understand foreign business practices better, are
better placed to negotiate a good deal for the company, and communicate not only with
top managers of foreign affiliates who could speak the home countrys language but with
line managers and employees as well.
The decision-maker background. Having been born abroad, lived abroad, or worked
abroad could influence ones view of risks and opportunities in foreign markets. For
example, international work experience exposes managers to foreign opportunities, and
therefore makes it easier for them to take the first step into foreign markets.
Personal characteristics. Natural risk-takers are more likely to engage in an international
activity than risk-averse managers. Similarly, managers with high ambitions tend to
internationalize more than managers with low personal ambitions.
151
152
Firm-specific factors
There are two firm-specific factors:
Firm size. As will be discussed later, size matters, and bigger firms tend to internationalize
more than smaller ones. This is because large firms possess more managerial and financial
resources, have greater production capacity, attain higher levels of economies of scale,
and tend to be associated with lower levels of perceived risks in international operations.
Large Chinese firms such as the Haier Group (see closing case study) and the oil company
Sinopec have internationalized much faster than smaller Chinese firms.
International appeal. Production of a unique product or service with an international
appeal could act as a stimulus for international expansion. This is often demonstrated by
the speed with which international sales are first obtained after start-up. The source of
appeal could be the concept as seen in the opening case study, or the product or service
offered by the company on the basis of their unique features and quality, or promotion
through heavy advertising, sales promotion, and public relations. Products like Nike
shoes, Levis jeans, Pepsi, McDonalds, and electronics products have all crossed global
borders because of their international appeal.
5.2.2
Environmental factors
The external business environment has a major impact on the strategic direction of a firm.
Many external driving forces stimulate a firm to internationalize. Among the most important of
these are listed as follows.
Unsolicited proposals
Some unsolicited proposals from foreign governments, distributors, or clients are hard to resist
and may stimulate a firm to go international (Wiedersheim-Paul et al. 1978). For example,
Volkswagen decided to enter the Chinese auto market after a Chinese delegation visited
Volkswagens headquarters in Germany in 1978 and proposed a joint venture that had the
support of the Chinese government; Volkswagen later became Chinas largest producer of cars
(see opening case study, Chapter 10).
Thanks to the Internet, firms are now receiving unsolicited inquiries through the firms website.
For example, the first international contract of the Indian software development firm, Ekomate,
came from a British firm, which came across Ekomates website on the Internet by accident.
After its first international encounter, Ekomate expanded into the US market. Ekomates clients
and partners subsequently included multinational firms such as IBM, Ford, and Citibank.
The bandwagon effect

Competing firms tend to observe, benchmark, evaluate, and imitate each others strategic
moves, especially in industries with only a few big domestic players. International expansion
can provide a firm with competitive advantages vis--vis its competitors in the home market,
for instance, by obtaining cheaper materials, new knowledge, or larger economies of scale. If
one firm internationalizes, its competitors may fear being left behind if the internationalizing
firm gains competitive advantages in foreign locations. Therefore, the internationalization of
one firm may sometimes create a bandwagon effect among domestic competitors, that means,
firms imitate the internationalizing firms strategic move to expand overseas (Knickerbocker
1973; Head et al. 2002; Gimeno et al. 2005).
For example, US telecommunications firms internationalized at about the same time;
indeed, seven different US telecommunications firms have made large investments in the
local long-distance market in Mexico at about the same time (Gimeno et al. 2005). As another
example, foreign banks that expanded to China imitated the competitive moves of their home
country competitors (Kuilman and Li 2006).
Attractiveness of the host country

Attractiveness describes the degree to which the countrys host market is desirable for business
operations by foreign firms. Multinational firms may be attracted because of the host countrys
market size. Market size is attractive to foreign firms because it offers greater potential for
growth, profit, and stability of operations. In addition to market size, per capita income is a good
measure of a countrys attractiveness for market seeking multinationals. Customers in countries
with high per capita income have high purchasing power and high demand for industrial and
consumer goods. Other factors that attract foreign firms are cheap labour, availability of skills,
and proximity to the market (Ferdows 1997; Vereecke and Van Dierdonck 2002).
KEY CONCEPT
Internationalization stimuli are those internal and external factors that influence a firms
decision to initiate, develop, and sustain international business activities. Two sets of factors
lead firms to consider the possibility of operating outside their home market: organizational
factors arising from within the organization and environmental factors which are outside the
organizations control.
5.2.3
Motives for foreign investment
A company may simply decide to internationalize without investing in a foreign location.

A company may benefit from an unsolicited proposal or a host countrys attractiveness
by exporting or franchising to a foreign market (see section 5.5). Why would a company want
to invest in a foreign location, given that a foreign investment is more expensive and riskier
than exporting and franchising? According to John Dunning, there are four motives for
establishing an investment in a foreign location (Dunning 1993; Narula and Dunning 2000):
Natural resource seeking. A company may seek to invest in a foreign country in order to
obtain natural resources.
Market seeking. A company may seek to invest in a foreign country in order to service
a large domestic market and adjacent regional markets, to overcome existing barriers to
exporting to a country or to locate closer to customers.
153
154
Efficiency seeking. A company may seek to invest in a foreign country in order to decrease
costs through cheaper labour or materials, to locate in a specific industrial cluster or to
benefit from better integration of international activities.
Strategic asset seeking. A company may seek to invest strategically in a foreign country
in order to obtain important knowledge resources, accelerate innovation, or learn from
different consumer preferences.
The first three motives primarily help a multinational firm to exploit assets in other countries
by using the firms existing capabilities. The last motivestrategic asset seekingserves to
improve the firms capabilities through learning in foreign locations. Firms can have different
motives for foreign investments. For example, Carrefour (see opening case study) was primarily
market seeking, while the Haier Group (see closing case study) was primarily strategic asset
seeking but the company was also market seeking.
5.3
The internationalization process
The previous section explained why firms internationalize (the internationalization stimuli).
Once a firm decides to expand internationally, it must decide when and how to internationalize
(the internationalization process).
5.3.1
Timing of market entry
The environmental factors in the previous section explain why many firms enter a market at
a particular time: when a firm is approached by a customer; when competing firms enter an
important market; or when a market is growing very fast. For instance, Carrefour decided to
expand in emerging markets such as Poland and China at the very time when the economies
of these countries were quickly expanding and consumers had increasingly more money to
spend on shopping.
Firms may also decide to enter a market at a particular time for wider strategic reasons.
Previous research highlighted the strategic importance of the timing of market entry, suggesting
that first movers in foreign markets perform better than later market entrants (Mascarenhas
1992, 1997; Isobe et al. 2000; Geng and Hon-Kwong 2005; Frynas et al. 2006). The concept of a
first mover advantage suggests that pioneering businesses are able to obtain higher profits and
other benefits as the consequence of early market entry (Lieberman and Montgomery 1988).
Early entry into a foreign market can have five generic advantages (Kerin et al. 1992;
Lieberman and Montgomery 1998; Frynas et al. 2006):
Cost advantages (e.g., allowing the firm to have larger economies of scale and accumulating
experience about the foreign market before the entry of competitors).
Pre-emption of geographic space (e.g., pre-empting competitors by securing a specific
geographic space or marketing channel).
Technological advantages (e.g., adapting products and processes to the local market and
implementing new innovations before competitors enter the market).
Differentiation advantages (e.g., higher switching costs for buyers or reputational
advantages of established brands).
Political advantages (e.g., the support of foreign government in raising barriers to entry for
late movers).
For instance, Lockheed Martin has been able to reap considerable first mover advantages by
expanding into Russia in the late 1990s before the companys competitors did so (see closing
case study in Chapter 2). The entry into Russia greatly helped the company to gain a leading
position in the global market for satellite launch services ahead of competitors. Lockheed
Martin benefited from joint marketing of satellite launches with the best joint-venture partners
available in Russia (pre-emption of geographic space), obtaining new technology from Russian
joint-venture partners (technological advantages) and benefiting from the Russian and
American government support in raising barriers to entry for late comers (political advantages)
(Frynas et al. 2006).
However, some studies suggested that there can also be considerable first mover
disadvantages and early market entry does not automatically endow pioneers with higher
profitability (Tellis and Golder 1996; Shankar et al. 1998; Shamsie et al. 2004). The timing of
market entry is clearly as important as the firms ability to fully exploit the early market entry.
Studies show that first mover advantages in foreign markets depend on several internal and
external factors, including the strategic importance of an investment, the close linkage of an
investment to core business activities, the rate of technological change in the industry, and the
policies of the host country government (Isobe et al. 2000; Goerzen and Makino 2007; Frynas
et al. 2006).
KEY CONCEPT
First mover advantages are benefits related to the ability of pioneering businesses to obtain
profits as the consequence of early market entry. There are five generic first mover advantages:
cost advantages; pre-emption of geographic space; technological advantages; differentiation
advantages; and political advantages.
5.3.2
Obstacles to internationalization
Many companies have discovered that it can be very difficult to expand internationally, even
if you offer a superior and cheaper product or service compared with your competitors. For
instance, Carrefour faced government restrictions on opening hypermarkets in different
countries, problems of adapting its organization to different national contexts, and logistical
problems in countries with underdeveloped transport infrastructure. In 2008, some Chinese
nationalists called for a boycott of Carrefour following controversial comments of the president
of France about China, on the ground that Carrefour is a French-based company.
155
156
Carrefour and other multinational firms are aware that expanding internationally
can produce liabilities. Foreign companies may be disadvantaged by the government
(e.g., restrictions on investment), discriminated against by consumers (e.g., consumer
boycotts), unable to transfer their competitive advantages to foreign markets (e.g., inability
to replicate a low-cost base due to logistical problems), lack the essential knowledge to
operate successfully in a country (e.g., lack of understanding of consumer preferences and
distribution networks) (Cuervo-Cazurra et al. 2007). Studies show that internationalizing
firms face additional costs in foreign markets, increased failure rates and problems of
coordinating operations in different countries (Zaheer 1995; Hitt et al. 1997; Cuervo-Cazurra
et al. 2007).
The difficulties of internationalizing firms can be the consequence of at least four different
types of liabilities:
Liability of foreignness. The difficulties as a result of the different norms and rules
that constrain human behaviour, including culture, language, religion, and politics;
companies may lack the knowledge and social networks to understand the different
norms and rules of how to operate successfully in a foreign country (Zaheer 1995; Mezias
2002).
Liability of expansion. The difficulties as a result of an increase in the scale of a firms
activities; domestic companies may also face problems of increased transportation,
communication, and coordination as a result of expansion but these problems are usually
greater for multinational firms because of the high costs of coordinating international
operations (Hitt et al. 1997; Cuervo-Cazurra et al. 2007).
Liability of smallness. The difficulties as a result of small company size; in particular, smalland medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) may have fewer financial resources for foreign
investments, limited information about the characteristics of foreign markets, a lack of
human resources to conduct relevant business development work, and less negotiating
leverage vis--vis potential business partners and foreign governments (Aldrich and
Auster 1986; Child et al. 2009).
Liability of newness. The difficulties as a result of being new to a market; new domestic
market entrants also suffer disadvantages compared with established firms but these
problems are larger for internationalizing firms because they lack experience of foreign
transactions or lack certain resources needed in foreign markets (Freeman et al. 1983;
Cuervo-Cazurra et al. 2007).
When Carrefour expanded in China, for example, it faced the liability of foreignness
(Carrefour was targeted in a consumer boycott by Chinese nationalists in 2008 because it was a
French company); the liability of expansion (Carrefour faced transportation, communication
and coordination problems because of Chinas vast geographical size, therefore it needed
to establish eleven regional procurement centres); and the liability of newness (Carrefour did
not initially know where to find the best local suppliers and how to deal with local
government authorities, therefore it had to rely on the knowledge of local Chinese joint
venture partners).
5.3.3
Perceptions of managers
The previous section demonstrated that there are many objective reasons why it can be
very difficult for companies to expand internationally. However, subjective perceptions of
managers about foreign markets are often the key reasons why companies decide to expand
internationally in a certain direction.
Managerslike any other human beingstend to avoid unfamiliar situations compared
with familiar ones. They do not like uncertainty and prefer to invest in markets they are familiar
with rather than in unfamiliar markets. Their decisions are influenced by their subjective
perceptions of how easy it will be to operate in a new market. The concept of psychic distance
helps to understand why these perceptions affect the internationalization process of firms.
Psychic distance can be defined as the distance that is perceived to exist between characteristics
of a firms home country and a foreign country with which that firm is, or is contemplating, doing
business or investing (Child et al. 2009). High psychic distance (that is, subjective perceptions of
large differences between countries) can discourage the firms international expansion into a
given country because it generates uncertainties among business decision-makers.
Despite the tendency of some previous studies to regard psychic distance as purely
cultural differences (e.g., Kogut and Singh 1988), studies show that managerial perceptions
are influenced by many different factors. Factors which influence managerial perceptions of
psychic distance include: geographical distance, language, religion, education levels, levels
of industrial development, logistics infrastructure, political systems, legal systems, and
government regulations, among others (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul 1975; Ghemawat
2001; Dow and Karunaratna 2006; Child et al. 2009).
KEY CONCEPT
Psychic distance can be defined as the distance that is perceived to exist between characteristics
of a firms home country and a foreign country with which that firm is, or is contemplating, doing
business or investing. High psychic distance can discourage the firms international expansion
into a given country because it generates uncertainties among business decision-makers.
5.3.4
Psychic distance and internationalization
An influential explanation of the internationalization process was offered by Swedish

researchers (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul 1975; Johanson and Vahlne 1977, 1990).
Johanson and his colleagues developed the proposition that internationalization proceeds
through stages of decreasing psychic distance.
Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) made two observations about the way in which
firms internationalize. First, firms start expanding to neighbouring countries or countries with
small psychic distance. A firms international expansion depends on its experiential knowledge
of foreign markets. Experiential knowledge is knowledge obtained from experience. By
implication, there is a direct link between market knowledge and market commitment. The
better the knowledge of a market, the stronger the commitment to that market.
157
158
Second, firms expand their international operations step by step. In other words, a
firms international expansion occurs as a result of incremental decisions. Johanson and
Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) studied the internationalization process of four large Swedish
multinationals, and found that the internationalization patterns of these firms were marked
by a number of small incremental changes. They identified four successive stages in the firms
international expansion:
1. No regular export activities.
2. Export activities via independent representatives or agents.
3. The establishment of an overseas subsidiary.
4. Overseas production and manufacturing units.
These two observations form the basis of the Uppsala Model, which suggests that a firms
international expansion is a gradual process dependent on experiential knowledge and
incremental steps. Johanson and Wiedersheim-Pauls (1975) work was further developed
and refined by Johanson and Vahlne (1977), who formulated a dynamic Uppsala Modela
model in which the outcome of one cycle of events constitutes the input to the next (see
Exhibit 5.2).
5.3.5
The Uppsala Model
The Uppsala Model suggests that firms proceed along the internationalization path in the form
of logical steps, based on their gradual acquisition and use of information gathered from foreign
markets and operations, which determine successively greater levels of market commitment
Exhibit 5.2 The Uppsala Model
Market knowledge
leads
to
Market commitment
Market knowledge
leads to
more
Market commitment
and so on
leads to
more
to more international business activities. The concept of market commitment suggests that
resources located in a particular market present a firms commitment to that market, so foreign
direct investment means higher market commitment than exporting or licensing. Market
commitment is composed of two factors: the amount of resources committed and the degree
of commitment. The amount of resources refers to the size of investment in a given market. The
degree of commitment refers to the difficulty of finding an alternative use for the resources and
transferring them to the alternative use.
The Uppsala Model assumes that the more the firm knows about the foreign market, the
lower the perceived market risk will be, and the higher the level of investment in that market. The
perceived risk is primarily a function of the level of market knowledge acquired through ones
own operations (Forsgren 2002). So, over time, and as firms gain foreign commercial experience
and improve their knowledge of foreign markets, they tend to increase their foreign market
commitment and venture into countries that are increasingly dissimilar to their own. This, in
turn, enhances market knowledge, leading to further commitment in more distant markets.
The model helps to understand a firms initial choice of international location and its mode
of entry into foreign markets. For example, French firms such as Carrefour initially expand
to other Western European countries such as Belgium and Spain, before making direct
investments in Turkey, the United States, or China. At the same time, firms initially export to
other countries or engage in strategic alliances with foreign firms, before committing capital
towards wholly-owned foreign investments.
It should be pointed out that there are three exceptions to the Uppsala Model. First, firms
that have large resources and experience can take larger internationalization steps. This
helps to explain why smalland medium-sized enterprises follow the Uppsala Model more
closely than very large multinational firms. Second, when market conditions are stable and
homogeneous, relevant market knowledge can be gained from sources other than experience.
Third, when the firm has considerable experience of markets with similar conditions, it may be
able to generalize this experience to any specific market.
KEY CONCEPT
The Uppsala Model suggests that a firms international expansion is a gradual process dependent
on experiential knowledge and incremental steps. It assumes that firms proceed along the
internationalization path in the form of logical steps, based on the gradual acquisition and use
of information gathered from foreign markets and operations, which determine successively
greater levels of market commitment to more international business activities.
5.4
Criticisms of the Uppsala Model
Despite the intuitive appeal of the Uppsala Model, there is much concern about its current
usefulness. The model does not explain what triggers the first internationalization step.
The model largely explains the international expansion of firms in the early stages of
159
160
internationalization and does not explain the behaviour of large established multinational
firms that already have extensive international experience and operations across the world
(Melin 1992). Above all, the Uppsala Model cannot explain why some firms do not follow the
logical sequence of steps suggested in the Model and why some firms are born global from the
start.
5.4.1.
Firms not following Uppsala Model
Multinational firms do not always expand in countries with low psychic distance before
entering more distant countries. Sometimes, a firms international expansion is not the
outcome of a learning process (as the Uppsala Model suggests), but the outcome of a rational
strategic choice (i.e., a conscious choice to enter a specific foreign market). For example, if a
European firm makes a deliberate decision to relocate its manufacturing production to a lowcost country, it may be more likely to invest in distant China than in a neighbouring European
country. This helps to explain, for instance, why many Norwegian firms did not make initial
foreign investments close to the home country and would not necessarily internationalize in
incremental steps (Benito and Gripsrud 1992).
Furthermore, the Uppsala Model may not always explain the international expansion of
firms from emerging markets. Firms from countries such as China may seek to catch up with
established multinational firms through the accelerated learning that entry into psychically
distant countries can entail. Studies show that companies from emerging markets seek to
learn new skills or acquire new technologies from their strategic partners or their subsidiaries
in psychically distant developed countries (Child and Rodrigues 2005; Lyles and Salk 2007;
Liu et al. 2008). Therefore, some companies from emerging markets may take a strategic
decision to expand to the United States or Europe as early as possible in order to enhance their
capabilities.
5.4.2
The Born Global firm
There are firms which do not follow the traditional internationalization process at all,
but which are multinational firms from the very start. In 1993, the consultants, McKinsey,
published the findings of a survey for the Australian Manufacturing Council on the
internationalization of small and medium firms in Australia (McKinsey 1993). The report
put forward evidence that a large number of the surveyed firms in Australia viewed
the world as their marketplace from the outset and see the domestic market as a support
for their international business (p. 9). One example of such a firm is Tyrian Diagnostics
(see closing case study in Chapter 6). The McKinsey report referred to these firms as Born
Global firms.
Other researchers observed the Born Global phenomenon, but used different terms to
describe it, including international new ventures (McDougall et al. 1994; Oviatt and McDougall
1994), born internationals (Kundu and Katz 2003), and early internationalizing firms (Rialp
et al. 2005a). In essence, the terms Born Global firm or International New Venture describes
firms that, right from their birth, seek competitive advantage by using resources from different
countries and by selling their products in multiple countries. The terms, Born Global firm or
International New Venture, can be defined as:
a business organization that, from inception, seeks to derive significant competitive
advantage from the use of resources and the sale of outputs in multiple countries.
The distinguishing feature of these start-ups is that their origins are international, as
demonstrated by observable and significant commitments of resources (e.g. material,
people, financing, time) in more than one nation. (McDougall et al. 1994: 49)
Born Global firms generally share three characteristics (Knight and avusgil 1996; Kotha
et al. 2001; Rialp et al. 2005b):
Company size. Born Global firms are usually small- and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs), which have recently started operations.
Hi-tech focus. Born Global firms are usually hi-tech firms that are able to offer very
specialized products or services in global niche markets. The fact that they are hi-tech
enables Born Global firms to sell their product or service to global customers with
minimum adjustments.
Decision-maker characterictics. Born Global firms are managed or founded by people
who have either greater international experience or access to better international business
and personal networks, compared with managers of gradually internationalizing firms.
In addition, the managers of such firms may have higher risk tolerance than managers of
gradually internationalizing firms.
Firms originating from small countries such as Nordic countries are more likely to adopt a
Born Global strategy than firms from large countries such as the United States. For example,
Lindmark et al. (1994) reported that nearly 50% of hi-tech start-ups in the Nordic countries
began exporting within two years of establishment. The small size of the home market forces
firms to sell their products globally from the start in order to be competitive.
KEY CONCEPT
A Born Global firm is a business organization that, within a short period from inception, seeks
to derive significant competitive advantage from the use of resources and the sale of outputs
in foreign markets.
5.4.3
Response to criticisms
The Uppsala Model cannot explain the expansion of Born Global firms. The criticisms of the
Uppsala Model might therefore be thought to undermine the analytical contribution offered
by the Model and the psychic distance concept. However, recent research suggests that there
are relatively few Born Global firms, even among start-up technology firms (Lopez et al. 2009).
Indeed, what the criticisms of the Uppsala Model actually undermine is the assumption that
161
162
psychic distance generates uncertainties which business people are unwilling or unable to
tackle (cf. Child et al. 2009).
The attractiveness of some foreign markets in terms of their size, growth rate or technological
development might be sufficient to offset, in the judgement of business decision-makers,
the uncertainties and risks associated with psychic distance. This can help to explain why
European firms seeking new markets or Chinese firms seeking new technologies jumped over
stages in the Uppsala Model. Johanson and Wiedesheim-Paul (1975) themselves admitted that
foreign market size may independently influence decisions in the internationalization process.
Johanson and Vahlne (2009: 1421) point out: There is nothing in our model that indicates that
international expansion cannot be done quickly.
Born Global firms and firms from emerging markets such as China also face the same
problems of psychic distance like other firms (Child et al. 2002; Isenberg 2008). However,
instead of expanding to psychically close countries first, these firms sometimes use different
methods to help them cope with psychic distance. They use social networks, rely on a local
agent or partner, hire local professionals, or expand in foreign cities with a high number of
migrants from their country of origin, which in turn helps these firms to obtain tacit knowledge
of foreign regulations, culture, and business practices (Zhou et al. 2007; Child et al. 2002, 2009).
This does not necessarily suggest that the Uppsala Model and the psychic distance concept are
out of date, but rather that smart managers may find ways of bridging distance and exploiting
market opportunities (see Exhibit 5.3).
Exhibit 5.3 Internationalization of Three Hong Kong SMEs

SME #1
Electric Utilities
SME #2
Banking
SME #3
Food processing
Hong Kong
Hong Kong
Hong Kong
PR China
PR China
United States
Taiwan
Singapore
PR China
Thailand
United States
Malaysia
India
UK
The figure above represents the first internationalization steps by three different small- and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) from Hong Kong.
SME #1an electric utility firmfollowed the Uppsala Model very closely. The firm expanded
first to Chinese-speaking neighbouring territories, and then to other Asian countries. SME #2a
family bankfirst expanded to two Chinese-speaking countries close to home; however, the
company then expanded very quickly to very distant countries. SME #3a food processing
firmappeared to defy the Uppsala Model and expanded first to the distant United States, before
expanding closer to home.
How can the internationalization of SME #2 and SME #3 be explained? The companies motives
for investment allow some reconciliation with the psychic distance concept. In both cases, the
overseas investments in the United States were established, not to cater to Western consumers,
but to a large overseas Chinese community. In other words, the Chinese overseas community
provided a ready market for the two firms.
The managers perceptions were also crucial for their decision to expand in a distant country.
The managers were less worried about the distance to the United States because of the presence
of social networks (a trusted friend, a loyal staff member, or a local partner) among the Chinese
community in the United States, who helped them bridge the psychic distance between Hong
Kong and the United States. In the case of SME #3, the managers preferred the United States as
they perceived the country to have a stable environment, safeguarded by the rule of law. In other
words, the managers did not perceive the psychic distance to be so large and they were able to find
ways to bridge psychic distance between their home country and the host country.
Source: J. Child, S.-H. Ng, and C. Wong (2002), Psychic distance and internationalization: evidence from
Hong Kong Firms, International Studies of Management & Organization 32(1): 3656.
When companies expand internationally, business networks are the best method for bridging
psychic distance. Business networks are much more important today than twenty or thirty
years ago. The Uppsala Model was originally based on the assumption that a firm accumulates
experiential knowledge through its own international expansion. However, the proponents
of the Uppsala Model now admit that knowledge about foreign markets can often come from
business networks: strategic partners, customers, suppliers, etc. (Johanson and Vahlne 2003,
2009). Business partners can provide information, for example, about the best local suppliers
and how to deal with local government authorities. For example, when expanding in China,
Carrefour initially relied on the knowledge of local Chinese joint venture partners to help the
company bridge psychic distance.
It is certainly true that the speed of international expansion is much faster today than twenty
or thirty years ago. For instance, the Japanese company Matsushita waited for almost thirty
years between the start of international exports and the establishment of an overseas plant.
The Chinese company, Haier Group (see closing case study), achieved this step in less than ten
years. It took Matsushita twelve years from building its first overseas plant to its first acquisition
163
164
of a foreign company, while the Haier Group achieved the first acquisition after only five
years. However, while Matsushita and the Haier Group started their international expansion
at different times and at different speeds, their internationalization process was similar and
broadly followed incremental steps (Yang et al. 2009).
Recent studies provide evidence that the Uppsala Model and the psychic distance concept
can still explain the international expansion of firms (Barkema and Drogendijk 2007), including
new multinational firms from emerging markets (Elango and Pattnaik 2007; Erdilek 2008; Child
et al. 2009; Yang et al. 2009). International managers cannot ignore issues related to psychic
distance. Rather, they need to learn how to bridge psychic distance in order to speed up their
firms international expansion.
5.5
Entry mode strategies
We have previously referred to modes of entry into foreign markets. When firms decide to enter
a foreign market, they are faced with a large array of choices of entry mode, which could be
grouped into five main categories: export, licensing, franchising, international joint venture,
and wholly-owned operations. This section will only focus on four modes of entry, leaving aside
international partnerships between firms. Because of the importance and complex nature of
international joint ventures and strategic alliances, we have allocated a whole chapter to this
issue (see Chapter 6).
5.5.1
Export
A simple definition of exporting is the action by the firm to send produced goods and services
from the home country to other countries. This can be ascribed to the fact that exporting does
not need the commitment of large resources and is thus less costly than alternatives such
as joint ventures (Morgan and Katsikeas 1998). It is also easier for the multinational firm to
withdraw its operations with minimum damage (see Exhibit 5.4). Because of the physical
distance, however, the export strategy does not enable the multinational firm to control its
operations abroad.
Export is a frequently employed mode of internationalization and one of the simplest
and most common approaches adopted mainly by small- and medium-sized firms in their
endeavour to enter foreign markets.
There are three different exporter categories according to firms level of export involvement:
experimental involvement, where the firm initiates restricted export marketing activity; active
involvement, where the firm systematically explores a range of export market opportunities;
and committed involvement, where the firm allocates its resources on the basis of international
marketing opportunities (avusgil 1984).
As shown in Exhibit 5.4, generally firms export for two reasons. First, firms need experiential
knowledge, and exporting has the potential to provide firms with international experience
without their taking high risk or strong commitment. Second, firms use exporting to expand
their sales in order to achieve economies of scale.
Risks of exporting
Export strategy, compared with the other modes of entry, is a low-risk strategy. The major risks
of exporting are:
When countries experience major political instability, export could be disrupted, with
consequential delays and other defaults on payments, exchange transfer blockages, or
confiscation of property.
The multinational firm has no control over some costs, such as costs of land transport to
the port, transfers, shipping costs, insurance, and foreign exchange risk.
5.5.2
Licensing
International licensing is the transfer of patented information and trademarks, information

and know-how, including specifications, written documents, computer programs, and so forth,
as well as information needed to sell a product or service, with respect to a physical territory
(Mottner and Johnson 2000: 171).
Licensing does not mean duplicating the product in several countries. Most products
going into foreign countries require some form of adaptation: labels and instructions must be
translated; goods may require modification to conform with local laws and regulations; and
marketing may have to be adjusted.
Benefits of licensing include speed to market, especially when a firm lacks sufficient skills,
capital, or personnel to enter a foreign market quickly (see Exhibit 5.4). For instance, German home
appliance manufacturers Liebherr and Bosch-Siemens entered several emerging markets such as
China and Turkey through licensing agreements for manufacturing refrigerators and other white
goods. In turn, emerging market firms such as the Haier Group of China (see closing case study) and
Arelik of Turkey used the foreign licensing technology to expand internationally through exporting.
In addition to being used as an entry mode to foreign markets, licensing may also be used as a
step towards a more committed mode of entry such as a joint venture or a wholly-owned form.
For example, when in 1997, Phoenix AG, a German manufacturing concern, agreed to license
the production of its automotive and railway components in India to Sigma Corp. of Delhi,
the licence agreement was no more than a step towards establishing a joint venture, which
would integrate Sigmas manufacturing capability into Phoenixs global strategy (Mottner and
Johnson 2000).
Risks of licensing
Several risks are associated with international licensing. Mottner and Johnson (2000) identified
the following risks:
Sub-optimal choice. This risk is associated with the possibility of licensing being not the
best possible choice and or selecting the wrong partnerhence not realizing the full
potential of the partnership.
Risk of opportunism. The possibility that the licensee takes the opportunity to appropriate
the technology or process that has been licensed to it and internalizes it.
165
International
franchising
Licensing
Provides very small experiential knowledge in foreign markets
Inexpensive way to gain experiential knowledge in foreign markets
High potential for opportunism

Hard to enforce agreements
Provides a small experiential knowledge in foreign markets
High monitoring costs
High potential for opportunism
Could damage the firms reputation and image
Does not require a high resource commitment in the targeted

country
Can be used as a step towards a more committed mode of entry
Low-cost strategy to expand sales in order to achieve economies

of scale
Speedy entry to foreign market
Requires a moderate resource commitment in the targeted

country
Moderate-cost strategy to expand sales in order to achieve

economies of scale
Does not provide experiential knowledge in foreign markets
Hard to monitor partners in foreign markets
Speedy entry to foreign market
Low-cost strategy to expand sales in order to achieve economies

of scale
Hard to control operations abroad
Does not require a high resource commitment in the targeted

country
Export
Disadvantages
Advantages
Mode of entry
Exhibit 5.4 Advantages and disadvantages of different modes of entry
166
Mergers and
acquisitions
Wholly-owned
ventures Greenfield
strategy
Potential difficulty in accessing existing managers and
employees familiar with local market conditions
Adds extra capacity to the existing market
The firm is seen as a foreign firm by local stakeholders
Able to control operations abroad
Provides high experiential knowledge in foreign markets
Low level of conflict between the subsidiary and the parent firm
Managers of acquired foreign subsidiaries may have a weak

attachment to the parent firm
Able to control operations abroad
Does not add extra capacity to the market
Access to existing managers and employees familiar with local

market conditions
Could rely on pre-existing relationships with customers, suppliers,

and government officials
Provides high experiential knowledge in foreign markets
Problem of integrating foreign subsidiaries into the parents

system
Low risks of technology appropriation
Managers of foreign subsidiaries have a strong attachment to the

parent firm
Does not have the problem of integrating different cultures,

structures, procedures, and technologies
Could not rely on pre-existing relationships with customers,

suppliers, and government officials
Low risks of technology appropriation
167
168
Quality risks. These risks are associated with the possibility that some licensees might not
be able or willing to maintain the quality of the product or service and hence compromise
the reputation of the licensor.
Production risks. These risks are related to the possibility that licensees will not produce
in a timely manner, or will not produce the volume needed, or will overproduce.
Payment risks. There are risks associated with licensees not being able to or decide not to
pay for royalties.
Contract enforcement risk. This risk is associated with licensors not being able to enforce
the agreed contract. This usually occurs in emerging economies where there is weak
infrastructure for commercial law enforcement.
Marketing control risk. This risk is related to the possibility that some licensees may not
market the licensed product or process properlyunder-spending on marketing activities,
using inappropriate channels of distribution, and so forth.
5.5.3
International franchising
Franchising has been increasingly utilized as a method of business expansion over the
last thirty years (Eroglu 1992). Several multinational firms, such as the Body Shop, Benetton
Group, and McDonalds, have developed a successful international franchising network.
For example, 7-Eleven, a US company founded in Dallas, Texas, in 1927, has used
international franchising to enter foreign markets for about forty years. At the beginning of
2009, the company had 35,200 7-Eleven stores in seventeen countries, most of which were
franchises. An application for a new franchise can be simply made through the 7-Eleven
website.
International franchising is a contract-based organizational structure for entering new
markets (Teegen 2000: 498). It involves a franchisor firm that undertakes to transfer a business
concept that it has developed, with corresponding operational guidelines, to non-domestic
parties for a fee. Teegen notes that:
once the potential franchisor has established a reputation for its business concept, this
develops demand as a leasable commodity. The franchisor packages the business concept,
operational guidelines and access to its trade and brand marks, and offers this business
format to firms, who purchase the rights to exploit commercially the concept and trade names
for a given period of time (typically between five and fifteen years) in a given geographical
territory. Typical franchise contracts require an up-front payment to the franchisor as well
as royalty payments based upon sales in the stipulated territory.
Franchisers are responsible for improving the product/service mix, policing outlet quality, and
promoting the brand in the host country.
The franchise network system implies mutual cooperation and commitment between
often distinct and, at least to some degree, autonomous firms. This cooperation is based, not
only upon mutual advantages, but also on reciprocity. Thus, successful cooperation between
franchisers and franchisees requires a high level of trust to alleviate the fear of opportunistic
behaviour and to enhance the performance of the franchise.
Multinational firms are increasingly relying on master franchisers to manage their franchise
network in a particular country. Generally, master franchisers are from the host country. They
are given the rights to develop and manage the franchise network in a particular country
or region. Their duties include selecting suitable local franchisees, providing them with the
necessary assistance, and collecting the franchise fee.
Risks of international franchising

While using a master franchiser with knowledge of local markets and cultural awareness has
several advantages, it involves several risks (see Exhibit 5.4). These are:
The master franchiser may not follow the directives of the franchisor.
Franchisers may not understand the fundamental concept of the franchisor and as a result
may communicate the wrong concept to the franchisees.
The fact that franchisers are responsible for improving the quality of the product, policing
outlet quality, and promoting the brand may increase the potential for franchisees to free
ride, in the belief that the franchisers efforts are sufficient for the franchise to succeed.
This can result in franchisees attempting to increase profits by reducing the quality of
inputs (e.g., by under-staffing).
A franchise may damage the franchisers image and reputation in the host country,
because customers often cannot distinguish between franchised and company-owned
outlets: a poor experience in one franchise outlet may hurt the reputation of the entire
chain.
Because of these risks, several multinational firms do not use a franchise system. For example,
Starbucks Coffee Company uses only three business structures in international markets: joint
ventures, licences, and company-owned operations.
5.5.4
Wholly-owned ventures
In contrast to exporting, licensing, and franchising, wholly-owned subsidiaries involve a

higher degree of risk. Multinational firms have two options: greenfield investment in a
completely new facility, or acquisition of or merger with an already established local firm.
The greenfield strategy

A greenfield strategy entails building an entirely new subsidiary in a foreign country from
scratch to enable foreign sales and/or production.
Typically, a greenfield investment signifies that the parent firm has decided to clone
its strategy and structure in the foreign plant by transferring its technology, supply chain,
organizational structure, and corporate culture (Hennart and Park 1993). For instance, during
169
170
the 1980s and 1990s, Japanese firms adopting a global strategy structure preferred to clone
their home country structure and strategy in foreign markets through greenfield strategies
(Harzing 2002).
Generally, greenfield investments are preferred when specific technical and organizational
skills define a firms ability to compete. For example, Japanese multinationals with weak
competitive advantage tend to use mergers and acquisitions (M&As), while those with strong
advantages prefer greenfield investments to transfer their advantages to foreign markets
(Hennart and Park 1993).
Risks of the greenfield strategy The greenfield strategy is a high-risk strategy. In addition to
the above risks associated with other modes of entry, such as political instability in the host
country, other risks specific to the greenfield strategy (see Exhibit 5.4) include:
The risk of not being able to build relationships with customers, suppliers, and government
officials in the new country.
The risk of not being able to recruit managers and employees familiar with local market
conditions.
The risk of being seen as a foreign firm by local stakeholders.
The mergers and acquisitions (M&As) strategy

An international merger is a transaction that combines two companies from different
countries to establish a new legal entity. International acquisition refers to the acquisition of
a local firms assets by a foreign company. In an acquisition, both local and foreign firms may
continue to exist. Barkema and Vermeulen (1998: 405) noted that, for companies to prefer
acquisition to greenfield entry, the cost of constructing new facilities, installing equipment,
and hiring and training new labour force must exceed the costs of purchasing and recasting
existing properties.
In the short-term, cross-border M&As can have positive benefits for the shareholders of
the acquired firm. In the longer term, however, profitability gains through are often limited or
nonexistent (King et al. 2004). There are three types of M&A:
Horizontal M&As involve two competing firms in the same industry. This type of M&As
is more common in industries where consolidation is required, such as automobile,
petroleum, and pharmaceutical industries.
Vertical M&As involve a merger between firms in the supply chain. This involves, for
example, a distributor or a supplier merging with a manufacturer.
Conglomerate M&As involve a merger of two companies from two unrelated industries.
Conglomerate M&As were very popular in the late 1980s, but have been declining ever
since as firms retreated to their core business during the 1990s and 2000s.
The motives for M&As can be classified into three types (Hopkins 1999: 212):
Strategic motives aim to improve the overall strategic position of the multinational firm.
This includes the intention to create synergy, to strengthen market power, and to gain
speedy access to foreign markets (Hopkins 1999: 212). Synergy is the potential ability
of two firms to be more successful as a result of a merger or an acquisition. If synergy is
achieved, the combined firms value after the merger or acquisition should be higher than
the combined value of the two firms operating independently.
Economic motives can include the desire to achieve economy of scale by joining
productive forces, cost reduction by eliminating redundant resources after the M&As and
entry of firms from slow-growing economies into high-growth economies (Gonzalez et al.
1998).
Personal motives can sometimes guide business decision-makers even if there are no
significant economic gains from an international M&A for the firm. A top management
team or a chief executive of a multinational firm may simply seek an M&A to satisfy their
hubris and ego through empire-building, or for motives of self-interest such as increasing
their reward package and job security.
Risks of the M&A strategy The major risks associated with the M&A strategy (see Exhibit 5.4)
include:
The different corporate and national cultures, structures, technology, and procedures may
cause great problems for integrating the acquired subsidiary into the parent companys
system. This may result in inferior performance and, in some cases, the subsequent failure
of the acquired subsidiaries.
Managers of the acquired foreign subsidiary may not accept the parent company, which
results in a weaker degree of attachment between the managers of the acquired foreign
subsidiary and the parent firm.
5.6
Entry modes and risk v. control
Each of the five entry modes has its advantages and drawbacks. Therefore, multinational
firms have to make trade-offs when they decide on the most suitable entry mode strategy.
Controlthe desire to influence decisions, systems, and operations in the foreign affiliate
and risk are the two most important factors in the decision formula when deciding on the type
of entry mode (see Exhibit 5.5). The two factors often go hand in hand. To obtain control, the
multinational firm must commit resources to, and take responsibility for, the management of
its foreign plants. In other words, more control requires high risk and vice versa (Anderson and
Gatignon 1986).
When selecting the appropriate entry mode, multinational firms have to answer two
questions: what level of resource commitment are they willing to make? And, what level of
control over the operation do they desire? The firm has to look at the risks in the general
environment, risks in industry, and firm-specific risks. For markets where total perceived
risk is low, firms use entry strategies that involve a high level of resource commitment,
171
172
Exhibit 5.5 Modes of entry and control versus risk

High
Exporting
Licensing
Franchising
PERCEIVED
RISK
International joint
venture
Whollyowned
High
Low
CONTROL
such as wholly-owned and joint-venture strategies (Brouthers 1995). In markets where

the perception of risk is too high, however, the management might no longer believe that
it has control over the risk. In this case, the management must abandon its desire to
control and adopt a low resource commitment strategy by sharing risk with other firms
through a joint venture or franchise, or pass the risk management to another firmto a
licensing or a franchise partnerwhich might be better qualified to manage the risks (see
Exhibit 5.5).
Recent research suggests that many different factors affect a firms choice of entry mode.
A multinational firm may, for instance, be more willing to take greater risks and expand
internationally via foreign investments if: it has considerable previous experience of
international operations (Dikova and Van Witteloostuijn 2007); has market seeking motives
(Paul and Wooster 2008); has significant competitive advantages vis--vis its competitors
(Brown et al. 2003); or if it adopts a globalrather than internationalstrategy (Cui and Jiang
2009).
KEY CONCEPT
Multinational firms have to make trade-offs when they decide on the most suitable entry
mode strategy. More control involves high risk and vice versa. When perceived risk is low, the
multinational firm should use entry strategies that involve a high level of resource commitment,
such as wholly-owned and joint-venture strategies. In contrast, when the perceived risk is high,
the multinational firm should adopt a low resource commitment strategy by sharing risk with
other firms through a joint venture or franchise, or pass the risk management on to a local firm
through a licensing or a franchising agreement.
5.7
De-internationalization
Internationalization is a two-way street. Multinational firms do not only enter new markets. They
may have to reduce their international activities by pulling out of a country or a region, or by
putting an end to their international aspirations when necessary. We refer to this phenomenon
as de-internationalization or international divestment. De-internationalization refers to any
voluntary or forced actions that reduce a companys engagement in or exposure to current
cross-border activities (Benito and Welch 1997: 8). It includes total or partial withdrawal of a
firm from an operational presence in a foreign country or region. Exit may result from corporate
failure, organizational restructuring, or a successful sale of the firm, among others. Exit may be
accomplished through sale of assets, international store swaps, bankruptcy, or related events
(Burt et al. 2002; Alexander et al. 2005; Cairns et al. 2008).
The decision to de-internationalize can be the result of two different processes: company
failure (a forced process) or strategic decision-making (a voluntary process). A multinational
firm may sometimes be forced to de-internationalize, either because the firm underperformed
as a whole, or because a firms subsidiary in a specific country underperformed. For instance,
Marks & Spencer was forced to withdraw from most European countries in 2001 because of the
firms underperformance. Alternatively, a multinational firm may take a voluntary decision to
de-internationalize for strategic reasons, for example, in order to improve efficiency through
concentration on fewer subsidiaries or in order to make investments in other more profitable
ventures. For instance, Tesco made a strategic decision in 1997 to withdraw from France,
the home market of Carrefour; in 2005, Tesco withdrew from Taiwan in an asset swap deal
with Carrefour in return for Carrefours stores in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Tescos
de-internationalization in 1997 and 2005 was part of the companys overall strategy to
concentrate the firms resources on countries where Tesco could obtain a dominant market
position. Similarly, Carrefour withdrew from Russia in 2009 because the company could not
obtain a dominant market position in the country.
The de-internationalization process can be more complicated than the internationalization
entry process. While countries tend to welcome multinational firms, governments and interest
groups do not feel the same way when foreign companies decide to leave. For instance, the
withdrawal of Marks & Spencer from France in 2001 led to strikes by the firms French employees, a
court case against the company by French trade unions, and criticism by the French government.
Multinational firms must develop and execute a de-internationalization strategy very carefully.
Choosing the wrong de-internationalization strategy, or implementing the correct strategy
poorly, can increase the cost of exit. The withdrawal of Marks & Spencer from France illustrates
how a bad handling of the de-internationalization process could be very costly (Burt et al. 2002).
KEY CONCEPT
De-internationalization can be defined as any voluntary or forced actions that reduce a companys
engagement in or exposure to current cross-border activities. De-internationalization can involve
total or partial withdrawal of a firm from an operational presence in a foreign country or region.
173
174
5.8
Summary
Different types of internationalization stimuli can lead firms to consider the possibility of
operating outside their home market: organizational factors arising from within the firm, and
environmental factors that are outside the organizations control. In addition, firms may have
four different motives for establishing an investment in a foreign location: (1) natural resource
seeking motive; (2) market seeking motive; (3) efficiency seeking motive; and (4) strategic asset
seeking motive. These different factors combined lead a firm to a decision to internationalize
its business activities.
In addition to the initial decision and the motives to internationalize, one needs to
understand the different modes of entry into a foreign country or a region. When firms decide
to enter a foreign market, they are faced with a large array of choices of entry mode, ranging
from export to wholly-owned operations. There is no best way to enter a foreign market and
the mode of entry may differ from one country or region to another, as the opening case on
Carrefour demonstrates. Multinational firms have to make trade-offs when they decide on the
most suitable entry mode strategy. Controlthe desire to influence decisions, systems and
operations in the foreign affiliateand risk are the two most important factors in the decision
formula when deciding on the type of entry mode.
The Uppsala Model seeks to explain the internationalization process by suggesting that a firms
internationalization proceeds through stages of decreasing psychic distance. Its main argument
is that firms generally proceed along the internationalization path in the form of logical steps,
based on their gradual acquisition and use of information gathered from foreign markets and
operations, which determine successively greater levels of commitment to more international
business activities. They start with no regular export activities, then move to export activities via
independent representatives or agents; after that, they tend to establish an overseas subsidiary;
and, finally, they commit themselves to overseas production and manufacturing units.
Multinational firms do not only enter new markets. They sometimes withdraw from a foreign
country or region, or de-internationalize, as a result of company failure (a forced process) or
strategic decision-making (a voluntary process). The de-internationalization process can be
more complicated than the internationlization process.
Key readings
J. P. Buckley and P. N. Ghauri (1999), The Internationalization of the Firm: A Reader (London:
Thompson Business Press) is a collection of some of the key articles on internationalization.
On the Uppsala Model, see Johanson and Vahlne (2009).
On entry modes and risk and control, see Brouthers (1995); and K. Brouthers and L. E. Brouthers
(2001), Explaining the National Cultural Distance Paradox, Journal of International Business
Studies 32(1): 17789.
Discussion questions
1. Select a multinational firm and identify and discuss the internationalization stimuli. Was the
firm pushed or was it pulled?
2. To what extent do multinational firms follow the Uppsala Model? Justify your answer with
examples.
3. Identify a Born Global firm and discuss its internationalization process.
4. There is no one best way to enter foreign markets. It is a case of horses for courses. Discuss
this statement.
5. Why is the de-internationalization process sometimes more complex than the internationalization process?
Closing case study Internationalization of a Chinese

firmthe Haier Group
The Haier Group began as a nearly bankrupt refrigerator company called Qingdao General
Refrigerator in Qingdao, China. In 1984, Zhang Ruimin was appointed as plant director and he has
remained the companys CEO until today. In 1992, the company was renamed the Haier Group.
Under the leadership of Zhang Ruimin, the Haier Group rose to become the third largest home
appliance manufacturer in the world, with 240 subsidiary companies and over 50,000 employees
around the world. In the period 19952005, the companys global revenue increased from RMB4.3
billion to RMB103.4 billion (see Exhibit B). In 2008, the Haier Group was ranked as No. 13 on Forbes
Reputation Institute Global 200 list. The company also ranked as No. 1 among Chinese enterprises
on the Financial Times 2008 list of the most respected global companies.
Zhang Ruimin had an international outlook from the start. Already in 1984, soon after becoming
the companys director, he introduced technology and equipment from the German company,
Liebherr, to produce refrigerators in China. In 1990, the company started exporting its products to
Europe as a contract manufacturer for multinational brands such as Liebherrs Blue Line brand.
Zhang Ruimin said: We started exporting to developed markets first because if your products are
good enough for consumers in Europe and in the US, you will have better products in developing
markets. Zhang Ruimins ambition was to create Chinas first multinational firm.
The companys exports to the United States started in 1994. Michael Jemal, a partner in the
import company, Welbilt Appliances, contacted Haier in order to buy 150,000 refrigerators for the
US market. All the refrigerators sold within a year, helping Haier to capture 10% of the US market
for small compact refrigerators. Following on from this success, the company collaborated with
Jemal to market a wider range of products in the US market.
In the 1990s, the company acquired many other Chinese companies. The product range expanded
beyond refrigerators to include other home appliances such as washing machines, televisions,
175
176
air-conditioners, and telecommunications equipment. The company improved its products by

acquiring foreign technology through joint ventures with companies such as Mitsubishi of Japan
and Merloni of Italy. Zhang Ruimin said: First we observe and digest. Then we imitate. In the end,
we understand it well enough to design it independently.
By 1998, the Haier Group had a market share of over 30% in refrigerators, washing machines, and
air-conditioners in the Chinese market. But the Chinese home appliances market was saturated
and there were few opportunities for further domestic expansion. The Chinese government
encouraged the company to expand internationally. Furthermore, the company faced greater
domestic competition, as foreign companies began to expand aggressively in the Chinese market.
In the mid 1990s, a fierce price war broke out among home appliance manufacturers in China. The
Haier Groups CEO, Zhang Ruimin, saw an urgent need for international expansion in 1996: Only
by entering the international market can we know what our competition is doing, can we raise our
competitive edge. Otherwise, we will lose the Chinese market to foreigners. Therefore, the Haier
Group began setting up operations overseas.
Zhang Ruimin pursued a different internationalization strategy to other Chinese companies, which
were satisfied with exporting low-cost products from China as contract manufacturers for foreign
firms multinational brands. In contrast to other Chinese companies, the Haier Group emulated the
strategies of successful Japanese and Korean firms such as Sony, Samsung, and LG in terms of taking
its own brand to foreign markets and in terms of establishing production in foreign markets.
Zhang Ruimin believed that, by setting up manufacturing plants overseas, the Haier Group could
gain advantages from avoiding import tariffs and reducing transport costs. He also believed that the
companys products would appeal more to consumers in developed countries, if the products were
no longer regarded as Chinese imports. All success relies on one thing in overseas markets creating
a localized brand name. We have to make Americans feel that Haier is a localized U.S. brand instead
of an imported Chinese brand, said Zhang Ruimin.
Exhibit B Revenue of the Haier Group

120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
Revenue (RMB billions)
2003
2004
2005
The Haier Group started its international expansion in developing countries. In 1996, the
company established a manufacturing plant for refrigerators and air-conditioners in Indonesia. In
1997, further expansions took place in the Philippines, Malaysia, Iran, and Yugoslavia. Once the
company gained some international experience, it decided to expand to developed countries.
In 1999, the Haier Group expanded to the United States: a refrigerator plant was established in
South Carolina and a design centre was established in Los Angeles, California. The companys
investment of US$30 million was the largest foreign investment by a Chinese company in the
United States. In 2001, the Haier Group purchased a refrigerator plant in Italy and the company
opened research and development (R&D) centres in Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands.
In 2006, the company expanded to Japan (see Exhibit C).
Initially, the Haier Group expanded internationally through joint ventures with local firms in
Indonesia, Yugoslavia, and other countries. Within three years, the company decided to expand
through wholly-owned investments (see Exhibit C). But the companys executives are flexible
when taking decisions on international market entry. The entry into the Japanese market through
Exhibit C Milestone foreign direct investments by the Haier Group

Country
Year of entry
Mode of entry
Indonesia
1996
Joint venture
Philippines
1997
Joint venture
Malaysia
1997
Joint venture
Iran
1997
Joint venture
Yugoslavia
1997
Joint venture
India
1999
Joint venture
United States
1999
Wholly-owned
Bangladesh
2001
Joint venture
Pakistan
2001
Wholly-owned
Italy
2001
Wholly-owned
Germany
2001
Wholly-owned
Denmark
2001
Wholly-owned
Netherlands
2001
Wholly-owned
Jordan
2005
Wholly-owned
Japan
2006
Joint venture
Source: D. Yuping (2003), Haiers survival strategy to compete with world giants, Journal of Chinese
Economics & Business Studies 1(2): 25966; Yang et al. (2009); G. Duysters, J. Jacob, C. Lemmens, and
Y. Jintian (2009), Internationalization and technological catching up of emerging multinationals: a
comparative case study of Chinas Haier Group, Industrial and Corporate Change 18(2): 32549; K. Palepu, T.
Khanna, and I. Vargas (2006), Haier: taking a Chinese company global, Harvard Business School Case
No. 9706401; and Haier Group website at http://www.haier.com/.
177
178
a wholly-owned investment would be difficult, so the company set up a joint venture with the
Japanese company Sanyo in October 2006 as a means for entering the Japanese market.
The Haier Group used its international expansion, not only to sell products overseas, but also to
learn new knowledge and skills in foreign markets. The company established research and design
centres in the United States, Canada, Japan, and France, among others. It also engaged in strategic
alliances with companies such as Mitsubishi, Philips, and Sanyo. Zhang Ruimin had the ambition to
create a truly innovative global company that competes on the basis of new product innovations,
not on the basis of low costs.
As a result of the Haier Groups international success, the company now faces global competitors.
When the Haier Group expanded to the United States, it focused on niche markets such as small,
compact refrigerators for students and offices, in order to avoid direct competition with companies
such as Whirlpool and GE. But foreign competitors have now formulated strategies to counteract
the Haier Groups international expansion. Whirlpool and Electrolux have invested tens of millions
of dollars to establish a manufacturing and distribution base in China. These competitors hope that
aggressive competitive moves in the Chinese market will prevent the Haier Group from earning
more profits that the company would otherwise use to expand further internationally.
The Haier Group executives are ready to face the challenge of global competition. We are
number three in the world for white goods, said Yang Mianmian, the companys group president.
We want to be number one.
Discussion questions
1. Why did the Haier Group expand internationally?
2. To what extent did the expansion of the Haier Group follow the Uppsala Model?
References
Aharoni, Y. (1966). The Foreign Investment Decision
Process (Boston, MA: Graduate School of Business
Administration, Harvard University).
Albaum, G. (1983). Effectiveness of government
export assistance for smaller-sized manufacturers:
some empirical evidence, International Marketing
Review 1(1): 6875.
Alexander, N., Quinn, B., and Cairns, P. (2005).
International retail divestment activity, International
Journal of Retail & Distribution Management 33(1):
522.
Aldrich, H., and Auster, E. (1986) Even dwarfs
started small: liabilities of size and age and their
strategic implications, in B. Staw and L. L. Cummings
(eds), Research in Organizational Behavior, Vol. 8
(Greenwich: Jai Press), pp. 16598.
Anderson, E., and Gatignon, H. (1986). Modes
of foreign entry: a transaction cost analysis and
propositions, Journal of International Business

Studies 17(Fall): 126.
Barkema, H., and Vermeulen, F. (1998). International
expansion through start-up or through acquisition:
a learning perspective, Academy of Management
Journal 41(1): 726.
Barkema, H., and Drogendijk, R. (2007).
Internationalising in small, incremental or larger
steps? Journal of International Business Studies
38(7): 113248.
Benito, G. R. G., and Gripsrud, G. (1992). The
expansion of foreign direct investments: discrete
rational location choices or a cultural learning
process? Journal of International Business Studies
23(3): 46176.
Benito, G. R. G., and Welch, L. S. (1997). Deinternationalization, Management International
Review 37(2): 725.

Bilkey, W. J., and Tesar, G. (1977). The export
behaviour of smaller Wisconsin manufacturing
firms, Journal of International Business Studies 8:
938.
Brouthers, K. (1995). The influence of international
risk on entry mode strategy, Management
International Review 35(1): 728.
Brown, J. R., Dev, C. S., and Zhou, Z. (2003).
Broadening the foreign market entry mode decision:
separating ownership and control, Journal of
International Business Studies 34(5): 47388.
Burt, S. L., Mellahi, K., Jackson, P., and Sparks, L.
(2002). Retail internationalisation and retail failure:
issues from the case of Marks & Spencer, International
Review of Retail, Distribution and Consumer Research
12(2): 191219.
Cairns, P., Doherty, A., Alexander, N., and Quinn,
B. (2008). Understanding the international retail
divestment process, Journal of Strategic Marketing
16(2): 11128.
avusgil, S. T. (1984). Differences among exporting
firms based on their degree of internationalisation,
Journal of Business Research (12): 195208.
Child, J., Ng, S.-H., and Wong, C. (2002). Psychic
distance
and
internationalization:
evidence
from Hong Kong Firms, International Studies of
Management & Organization 32(1): 3656.
Dunning, J. (1993). Multinational Enterprises and the

Global Economy (Harlow: Addison-Wesley).
Elango, B., and Pattnaik, C. (2007). Building
capabilities for international operations through
networks: a study of Indian firms, Journal of
International Business Studies 38( ): 54155.
Erdilek, A. (2008). Internationalization of Turkish
MNEs, Journal of Management Development 27(7):
74460.
Eroglu, S. (1992). The internationalisation process of
franchise systems: a conceptual model, International
Marketing Review 9(5): 1930.
Ferdows, K. (1997). Making the most of foreign
factories, Harvard Business Review 75(2): 7388.
Forsgren, M. (2002). The concept of learning in
the Uppsala internationalisation process model: a
critical review, International Business Review 11(3):
25777.
Freeman, J., Carroll, G. R., and Hannan, M. T.
(1983). The liability of newness: age dependence
in organizational death rates, American Sociological
Review 48(5): 692710.
Frynas, J. G., Mellahi, K., and Pigman, G. (2006).
First mover advantages in international business
and firm-specific political resources, Strategic
Management Journal 27: 32145.
Child, J., and Rodrigues, S. B. (2005). The

internationalization of Chinese firms: a case
for theoretical extension? Management and
Organization Review 1(3): 38141.
Geng, C., and Hon-Kwong, L. (2005). Order of entry

and performance of multinational corporations
in an emerging market: a contingent resource
perspective, Journal of International Marketing
13(4): 2856.
Child, J., Rodrigues, S. B., and Frynas, J. G. (2009).

Psychic distance, its impact and coping modes:
interpretations of SME decision makers, Management
International Review 49(2): 199224.
Ghemawat, P. (2001). Distance still matters: the hard

reality of global expansion, Harvard Business Review
79(8): 13747.
Cuervo-Cazurra, A., Maloney, M. M., and

Manrakhan, S. (2007). Causes of the difficulties in
internationalization, Journal of International Business
Studies 38(5): 70925.
Cui, L., and Jiang, F. (2009). FDI entry mode choice
of Chinese firms: a strategic behavior perspective,
Journal of World Business 44(4): 43444.
Dikova, D., and Van Witteloostuijn, A. (2007).
Foreign direct investment mode choice: entry and
establishment modes in transition economies,
Journal of International Business Studies 38(6):
101333.
Dow, D., and Karunaratna, A. (2006). Developing
a multidimensional instrument to measure psychic
distance stimuli, Journal of International Business
Studies 37(5): 578602.
Gimeno, J., Hoskisson, R. E., Beal, B. D., and

Wan, W. P. (2005). Explaining the clustering of
international expansion moves: a critical test in
the U.S. telecommunications industry, Academy of
Management Journal 48(2): 297319.
Goerzen, A., and Makino, S. (2007). Multinational
corporation internationalization in the service sector:
a study of Japanese trading companies, Journal of
Gonzalez, P., Vasconcellos, G. M., and Kish, R. J.
(1998). Cross-border mergers and acquisitions: the
undervaluation hypothesis, Quarterly Review of
Economic Finance 38(1): 2545.
Harzing, A.-W. (2002). Acquisition versus greenfield
investments: international strategy and management
of entry mode, Strategic Management Journal 23(3):
21127.
179
180

Head, K., Mayer, T., and Ries, J. (2002). Revisiting
oligopolistic reaction: are decisions on foreign direct
investment strategic complements? Journal of
Economics & Management Strategy 11: 45372.
Hedlund, G., and Kverneland, A. (1985). Are
strategies for foreign markets changing? International
Studies of Management and Organization 15(2):
4159.
Hennart, J. F., and Park, Y. R. (1993). Greenfield
vs. acquisition: the strategy of Japanese investors in
the United States, Management Science 39(9):
105470.
Hitt, M. A., Hoskisson, R. E., and Kim, H. (1997).
International diversification: effects on innovation
and firm performance in product-diversified
firms, Academy of Management Journal 40(4):
76798.
Hopkins, H. D. (1999). Cross-border mergers and
acquisitions: global regional perspectives, Journal of
International Management 5: 20739.
Isenberg, D. J. (2008). The global entrepreneur,
Harvard Business Review 86(12): 107111.
Isobe, T., Makino, S., and Montgomery, D. B.
(2000). Resource commitment, entry timing, and
market performance of foreign direct investments
in emerging economies: the case of Japanese
international joint ventures in China, Academy of
Management Journal (43)3: 46884.
Jaw, Y., and Lin, W. (2009). Corporate elite
characteristics and firms internationalization: CEOlevel and TMT-level roles, International Journal of
Human Resource Management 20(1): 22033.
Johanson, J., and Wiedersheim-Paul, F. (1975). The

internationalization of the firm: four Swedish cases,
Journal of Management Studies 12: 30522.
Karafakioglu, M. (1986). Export activities of Turkish
manufacturers, International Marketing Review 3(4):
3443.
Kerin, R. A., Varadarajan, P. R., and Peterson
R. A. (1992). First-mover advantage: a synthesis,
conceptual framework, and research propositions,
Journal of Marketing 56(4): 3352.
King, D., Dalton, D., Daily, C., and Covin, J. (2004).
Meta-analyses of post-acquisition performance:
indications of unidentified moderators, Strategic
Knickerbocker, F. T. (1973). Oligopolistic Reaction
and Multinational Enterprise (Boston, MA:
Division of Research, Graduate School of Business
Administration, Harvard University).
Knight, G. A., and avusgil, S. T. (1996). The
born global firm: a challenge to traditional
internationalisation theory, Advances in International
Marketing 8: 1126.
Kogut, B., and Singh, H. (1988). The effect of
national culture on the choice of entry mode, Journal
of International Business Studies 19(3): 41132.
Kotha, S., Rindova, P. V., and Rothaermel, F. T.
(2001). Assets and actions: firm-specific factors
in the internationalization of U.S. Internet firms,
76991.
Kuilman, J., and Li, J. (2006). The organizers
ecology: an empirical study of foreign banks in
Shanghai, Organization Science 17(3): 385401.
Johanson, J., and Vahlne, J.-E. (1977). The

internationalization process of the firm: a model
of knowledge development and increasing foreign
commitments, Journal of International Business
Studies 8(1): 2332.
Kundu, S. K., and Katz, J. A. (2003). BornInternationals SMEs: BI-level impacts of resources
and intentions, Small Business Economics 20:
2547.
Johanson, J., and Vahlne, J.-E. (1990). The

mechanism of internationalization, International
Marketing Review 7(4): 1124.
Lieberman, M. B., and Montgomery, D. B. (1988).

First-mover advantages, Strategic Management
Journal 9 (Summer Special Issue): 4158.
Johanson, J., and Vahlne, J.-E. (2003). Business

relationship learning and commitment in the
internationalization process, Journal of International
Entrepreneurship 1(1): 83101.
Lieberman, M. B., and Montgomery, D. B. (1998).

First-mover (dis)advantages: retrospective and link
with the resource-based view, Strategic Management
Journal 19(12): 111125.
Johanson, J., and Vahlne, J.-E. (2009). The Uppsala

internationalization process model revisited: from
liability of foreignness to liability of outsidership,
141131.
Lindmark, L., Christensen, P. R., Eskelinen, H.,

Forsstrm, B., Srenson, O. J., and Vatn, E. (1994)
Smfretagens internationaliseringen jmfrande
studie
(Small
Firms
InternationalizationA
Comparative Study), in Swedish (Stockholm:

Nordiska institutet fr regionalpolitisk forskning
(NordREFO)).
enterprises: new realities for developing countries,

Oxford Development Studies 28(2): 14167.
Liu, X., Xiao, W., and Huang, X. (2008). Bounded

entrepreneurship and internationalisation of indigenous
Chinese private-owned firms, International Business
Review 17(4): 488508.
Oviatt, B. M., and McDougall, P. P. (1994). Toward

a theory of international new ventures, Journal of
Lopez, L. E., Kundu, S. K., and Ciravegna, L. (2009).

Born global or born regional? Evidence from an
exploratory study in the Costa Rican software
industry, Journal of International Business Studies
40(7): 122838.
Lyles, M. A., and Salk, J. E. (2007). Knowledge
acquisition from foreign parents in international joint
ventures: an empirical examination in the Hungarian
context, Journal of International Business Studies
38(1): 318.
Mascarenhas, B. (1992). Order of entry and
performance in international markets, Strategic
Mascarenhas, B. (1997). The order and size of
entry into international markets, Journal of Business
Venturing, 12(4): 28799.
McDougall, P., Shane, S., and Oviatt, B. M. (1994).
Explaining the formation of international new
ventures: the limits of theories from international
business research, Journal of Business Venturing 9(6):
46987.
McKinsey and Co. (1993). Emerging Exporters
(Melbourne: Australian Manufacturing Council).
Melin, L. (1992). Internationalization as a strategy
process, Strategic Management Journal 13 (Winter
Special Issue): 99118.
Mellahi, K. (2003). The de-internationalization
process, in C. Wheeler, F. McDonald, and I. Greaves
(eds), Internationalization: Firm Strategies and
Management , (London: Palgrave): 15062.
Mezias, J. M. (2002). Identifying liabilities of
foreignness and strategies to minimize their effects,
Strategic Management Journal 23(3): 22944.
Morgan, R. E., and Katsikeas, C. S. (1998). Exporting
problems of industrial manufacturers, Industrial
Marketing Management 29(2): 16176.
Mottner, S., and Johnson, P. J. (2000). Motivations
and risks in international licensing: a review and
implications for licensing to transitional and
emerging economies, Journal of World Business
35(2): 17188.
Narula, R., and Dunning, J. (2000). Industrial
development, globalization and multinational
Paul, D. L., and Wooster, R. B. (2008). Strategic

investments by US firms in transition economies,
24966.
Preece, S. B., Miles, G., and Baetz, M. C. (1999).
Explaining the international intensity and global
diversity of early-stage technology-based firms,
Journal of Business Venturing 14(3): 25982.
Reid, R. S. (1981). The decision-maker and export
entry and expansion, Journal of International
Business Studies 12(2): 10112.
Rialp, A., Rialp, J., and Knight, G. A. (2005a). The
phenomenon of early internationalizing firms: what
do we know after a decade (19932003) of scientific
inquiry?, International Business Review 14(2): 14766.
Rialp, A., Rialp, J., Urbano, D., and Vaillant,
Y. (2005b). The Born-Global phenomenon: a
comparative case study research, Journal of
International Entrepreneurship 3: 13371.
Shamsie, J., Phelps, C., and Kuperman, J. (2004).
Being late than never, Strategic Management
Journal 25: 69-84.
Shankar, V., Carpenter, G., and Krishnamurthi, L.
(1998). Late mover advantage: how innovative late
entrants outsell pioneers, Journal of Marketing Research
35: 5470.
Sirower, Mark L. (1997). The Synergy Trap: How
Companies Lose the Acquisition Game (New York:
Free Press).
Sullivan, D., and Bauerschmidt, A. (1990).
Incremental internationalization: a test of Johanson
and Vahlnes thesis, Management International
Review 30(1): 1930.
Teegen, H. (2000). Examining strategic and
economic development implications of globalising
through franchising, International Business Review
9(4): 497521.
Tellis G., and Golder P. (1996). First to market, first
to fail? Real causes of enduring market leadership,
Sloan Management Review 37(2): 6575.
Vereecke, A., and Van Dierdonck, R. (2002). The
strategic role of the plant: testing Ferdowss model,
International Journal of Operations & Production
Management 22(5): 492514.
181
182

Wiedersheim-Paul, F., Olson, H. C., and Welch,
L. A. (1978). Pre-export activity: the first steps in
internationalization, Journal of International Business
Studies 9(1): 4758.
Yang, X. Jiang, Y., Kang, R., and Ke, Y. (2009).
A comparative analysis of the internationalization of
Chinese and Japanese firms, Asia Pacific Journal of
Management 26: 141162.
Zaheer, S. (1995). Overcoming the liability of foreignness, Academy of Management Journal 38(2):
34163.
Zhou, L., Wu, W., and Luo, X. (2007). Internationalization
and the performance of born-global SMEs: the mediating
role of social networks, Journal of International Business
Studies 38(4): 67390.
Online resource centre

Please visit www.oxfordtextbooks.co.uk/orc/frynas_mellahi2e/ for further information.

Managing The Internationalization Process: Learning Outcomes

Uploaded by

Document Informationclick to expand document information

Copyright:

Available Formats

Managing The Internationalization Process: Learning Outcomes

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Managing The Internationalization Process: Learning Outcomes

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Managing the

Global strategic development

Opening case study Internationalization of a

Exhibit A International development of Carrefour

Country and mode of entry

BrazilCarrefours first hypermarket

162(HM), 39(SM), 267(HD), 8(CS)

67(HM), 112(SM), 339(HD)

31(HM), 209 (SM), 271 (HD), 33(CS)

66(HM), 236(SM), 178(CS), 14(C&C)

22(HM), 125(SM), 431(HD)

Note: HM = hypermarkets, SM = supermarkets, HD = hard discount stores, CS = convenience stores,