Philosophy and Its Development in The Nikayas and Abhidhamma

Fumlmaro Watanabe
Philosophy and. its Development

In
The Nikayas and Abhidhamma
FUMIMARO WATANABE
MOTILAL BANARSIDASS
Delhi
0
Varanasi
0
Patna
First Published In 1983

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Published by Narendra Prakash Jain, for Motilai Banarsidass,

Delhi110007.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
vii
FOREWORD
xi
PREFACE
xv
ABBREVIATIONS
PART I
I.
2.
3.
The Origin of Abhidhamma Philosophy

Introduction
On the Polysemy of the Word 'Dhamma'
The Conception of Abhidhamma and its
Characteristics
4. Abhidhamma and MiitiM
5. The Systematization of Miltikiis
0';' the Tikas and Dukas

5.3
On KhandhiJ.yatanadhiJ.tUj)la, etc. 5.6
On Disputable Topics
5.13
3
9
18
37
46
48
53
65
PART II The Development of the Dialogue Form

6. The Method of Progress of a Dialogue
and the Four PafihabyiJ.karaQas
7. Metaphysical Questions and Tetralemmas
8. T akka and'Dhammatakka
9. Forms of Reasoning and Argument
10. Logical Arguments in the Dialogues
(Suttas)
II. Advanced' Forms of Questions and
Answers in the K athavatthu and the
71
88
94
107
127
VijfiiinakiiJ'a
154
12. Conclusion
209
WORK> CITED
212
INDEX
219
FOREWORD
Professor Watanabe's main theme in this study is the development of logic, as a method of thinking or reasoning, in the
Buddhist tradition. Thediscourses and especially dialogues attributed to the Buddha himself are full of arguments, partly informal
and conversational but partly set out in a systematic way embodying logical principles. It should be noted here that, in order to
establish whether the texts studied belong to the earliest accessible phase of the Buddhist tradition, Professor Watanabe has
throughout collated the Pali recension with the Chinese translations from other recensions. This collation should give us, in
the CflSC: of agreement, texts as current before the schisms of the
3rd century B.C. which separated these recensions. In the
subsequent period of the growth of the Abhidhamma in the
various schools we find a new stage of strictly formalised arguments and debates, recorded especially in the Pitli KatMvatthu
and the Chinese translation of the Sabbatthiviida Vijfiiinakiiya.
These two texts of the 'Emptiness' Schools of the Theravada
group in fact seem to be based on records of the same debates
against the 'Person' School which seceded, according to the
tradition, in B.C. 286.
Professo! Watanabe first seeks the meaning of the term
abhidhamma, literally 'about the dhamma', since he rightly supposes
that the earliest methods of argument and reasoning led directly
into the systematic and formalised expressioll of the texts
collected as abhidhamma. His initial conjecture is thus that this
method called abhidhamma is itself the early logic of the Buddhists. This conjecture appears to be confirmed by the evidence
of the earlier Sutfa texts in which the origins of the method can
be traced. But before investigating the meaning of the term
abhidhamma it is first necessary to "ci!uify the meaning of the
simple term dhamma from which it was formed; thus dhamma, in
which Professor Watanabe finds the four meanings 'truth'~
viii
"doctrine', 'morality' and 'principle', forms the actual starting

point of this study.
The investigation shows that the dialogue form, or asking
questions in order to elicit acceptable answers, is fundaIIl:ental,
a thread which runs through Buddhist philosophical analysis
from the outset and' through the whole period of the elaboration
-of abhidhamma texts.
Before studying the types of argument used in these dialogues
in detail, Professor Watanabe takes note of a different element

jn the developme-nt of abhidhamma, namely the t,n4tikas, 'matrices'
<>r lists of topics which provided its conte,nt. He distinguishes
two main types of matika: the 'practical' principles of meditation
and the 'theoretical' principles which are the constituents of the"
'world' and of 'man'. The former were studied synthetically by
bringing together texts from the suttas bearing on the same
topics. The latter were studied analytically by making dichotomies (on the basis of the principle of contradiction),
trichotomies (of contraries and the neutral position between
them) and various other classifications. The extant abhidhamma
texts are shown to have been constructed by applying these
methods of investigation.
After reviewing a selection of the'I somewhat informal methods
of argument found in thesuttas, Professor Watanabe in Chapter
11 takes up the strictly formalised debates of the Kalhavatthu and
Vijfiiinakiiya. Here a truly 'formal logic' is first found in the
Buddhist tradition. The partial agreement of these two texts, of
schools which separated during the reign of the Emperor Asoka,
appears to confirm the 3rd century B.C. as the period of the
origin of a formal logic out of the practice of a formal debate
with strict rules of procedure. The most valuable part of
Professor Watanabe's study is his full account of the Vijiiiinakqya
version of the debates against the 'Person' (Vajjiputtaka or
Vatsiputriya) School, which had not so far been adequately
analysed and compared with the Kalkavalllm record.
Professor Watanabe arrives at the logically stimulating

conclusion that the' Buddha's philosophy is based on the mode
of negation, is an avoidance of dogmatism, characterised1,y
ix
'completely negative thinking'. This, he argues, is the mode or

way which leads to freedom and humanism. It has been a
pleasure to work with Professor Watanabe on these problems
and we look forward to many more fruits of his negative
thinking.
February 1982
A. K. Warder
PREFACE
It is said that ten years is an epoch. I tacitly understand this
as a warning that at least during ten years something remarkable
must be done with respect to learning. It is almost a decade
~ince I completed the doctoral courses of the Department of
Sanskrit and.Indian Studies at the University of Toronto. In the
meantime, I made slow progress in my study on account of my
heart valves' operation in July, 1973. For me, fifteen or twenty
years may be needed in order to make an epoch in learning. Or
no matter how sufficient time is, it might be impossible for me
to make it. But I think it is important to spend a lifetime in
learning.
On reflection, it was Professor, E. Mayeda of Aichi Gakuin
University in Nagoya, Japan who first introduced to Japan
Professor A. K. Warder's fascinating as well as extremely
valuable study of the metres in the Pitli Canon, entitled Pali
Mttrt-A Contribution to the History of Indian Literature, and
afterward, my uncle, S. Hanayama, Professor Emeritus of
Tokyo University informed me that Professor A. K. Warder
teaches at the University of Toronto and afforded me the
occasion to go abroad for study. Then I became his student
there because of my wish to carry on researches under him.
It was 1965. I note, in passing~ that in the spring of 1966
Professor E. Mayeda was first invited as a visiting professor
from Japan to the University of Toronto by Professor A. K.
Warder. I am deeply. grateful to both Professor E. Mayeda
and Emeritus Professor S. Hanayama for cultivating the
opportunity to meet Professor A. K. Warder.
As a graduate student of the University of Toronto, I was
much influenced by Professor A. K. Warder's lectures on
linguistics, philosophy and literature, especially on selections
from the Piili Canon and on Abhidhamma philosophy, since I
was very interested in such subject matters when enrolled as a
graduate student at Ryukoku University in Kyoto, Japan. I
xii
therefore decided to make a special study of the Nikiiyas and

Abhidhamma, and after obtaining the M.A. degree and going on
to the Ph.D .. courses of the Department of Sanskrit and Indian
Studies at the University of Toronto, I worked through the
literature on the subjects under him for very long. Here I wish
to express my deepest obligations to Professor A. K. Warder for
critically reading my thesis and tirelessly making invaluable
suggestions.
I was also given much useful information and helpful advice
in their classes and in informal discussions by my other teachers:
Professor T. Venkatacharya of the University of Toronto, Dr.
H. Saddhatissa of the British Mahabodhi Society, who was a
visiting professor of the University of Toronto at that time, Dr.
J. W. Crichton who was then a professor of the Department
of Philosophy at the U{liversity of Toronto, Professor H. G.
Herzberger of the University of Toronto, Professor. B. K.
Matilal of the University of Toronto, Professor J. D. Dhirasekera
who is now the Editor-in-Chief of the Encyclopedia of
Buddhism in Colombo, and many other professors. They are
versed respectively in Sanskrit, Pali, Modern Logic, Philosophy
of Language, Indian Logic, Indian Philosophy, and other
various fields of learning. To all of them I acknowledge with
thanks my indebtedness.
My cordial thanks are likewise due to my colleague and able

instructor ProfessorC. D. C. Priestley of the University ofToronto
for giving me his good opinions and helping me improve my
English style.
Nowadays I realize the weight of the words 'kaf,ydQa mitta',
which literally mean 'good friend'. For me, he is sometimes a
good adviser and a good teacher, by whom I am always brought
up in many ways in my life. When I learn the fact that
throughout the whole of Buddhism, to meet a good friend or to
have good friends is very important in seeking the truth and in
living the best life, I am very glad to have met many good
teachers and friends, by whom so far I have been brought up in
various respects. It is in fact the 'kind help of my teachers,
colleagues, and friends which has enabled me to present my
book in its p~esent form.
xiii
Finally, I would like to add a word of grateful acknowledgement to my wife for her constant encouragement. I believe that
my late parents and the eldest son protect me with blessings of
the Triple Gem.
Kinki University
Higashi Osaka
January 1979
F. Watanabe
ABBREVIATIONS
AA.
AngullaTa nikaya.
Angultara Atthakatha
adj.
Pilli) : ManoTathapaTa~i.
adjective.
A.
(Commentary, in
D.
Digha nikilya.
DAWB.
Deutschen Akadefnie der Wissenschaften

zu Berlin.
Dh.
Dhs.
Dpvs.
esp.
GWG.
IRQ.
ltv.
JPTS.
JRAS.
Kv.
lit.
M.
MA.
Miln.
Miln. T.
Nd(l)
Nd(2)
orig.
P.
Plm.
PTS.
RA
Dhammapada.
Dhammasanga{li.
DipavaTflSa.
especially
Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften in GOttingen .
.Indian Historical Quarterly, Calcutta.
, [tivuttaka.
Journal rif the Pali Text Socie!)!, London.
Journal rif the Royal Asiatic Socie!)!, London.
Kathavalthu.
literally.
Majjhima nikaya.
Majjhima Atthakathii (Commentary, in
Pilli) : Papancasudani.
Milindapanha.
Milinda-T!kii.
Mahiiniddesa.
CuJanidtksa.
originally.
Pilli.
Pafisambhidiimagga.
Pilli Text Society.
Royal Asiatic Society.
S.
SA.
Samanta.
SBB.
Skt.
Sn.
T.
Ud.
Vhh.
Vin.
ZDMG.
xvi
Samyutta nik4JIa.
Samyutta Allhqkathil (Commentary, in
Piili) : Siiratthappakiisini
Samantapiisiidikil.
Sacred Books of the Buddhists.
Sanskrit.
Suttanipiita.
TiM Taislw Edition of the Chinese Tripitaka
(Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo) .
Udiina.
Vibhanga.
Vinaya
Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenltlndischen
Gesellschaft.
PART I
THE ORIGIN OF ABHIDHAMMA

PHILOSOPHY
1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 It was a samafJll (striver) philosopher who claimed to
have discovered the Four Truths. He founded his teachings
on them. He was, therefore, called the Buddha, which is a
title, meaning the 'enlightened'. To his disciples, his teachings
were spiritual food. And even today, they are fresh gold in
our cultural melting pot. After his enlightenment (531 B.C.),'
he preached various doctrines to people of different spiritual
and intellectual capacities, just as a doctor gives each patient a
different type of medicine according to the nature of the illness.
This is the manifestation of his pai/iii1 (understanding) and his
karuQt'l (compassion). This fact can also be realized from his
last discourse in the MahdparinihhiInasutta, which is the work
descril>ing the scene before and after his final extinction
(parinilibiIna) ;'
Monks, the dhammas (doctrines' ) which I have discovered
and taught should be well learned by you, and practised,
1. We provisionally adopt 566 B.C. as a date for the birth. 537 B.C.
for the renunciation, 531 B.C. fat the enlightenment and 486 B.C. fot the
Bnal extinction of the Buddba. because there is a certain doubt CollCeming
the life oE the Buddha. On tbis, sec A. K. Warder, ltulian Buddhi.tm t'llt
edttion), p. 44.
2. D.lI, 1I9-20. This is available to us in several reccllIions. Refer to
T. I, 110-30 b, 1601>-175 c, 176 a-191 a, 191 1>-207 c, T. 24,127 b-129b and tho
Skt. t... publi.hed by E. Waldachmidt in 1939, 1950 and 1951.
9. One of the mea.nings of the word dhamma, 4doctdne Or ftea<:hing'
I. ,eneraUy accepted in Buddhism as the tint of itl sense. But. AI we .han
lee In chapter 2, th~ word iJlAmma in this context could al.o be undentood
as melJlins 'principle'.
Abhidhomma Philosophy
developed and cultivated, so tl:iat this best life (brahmacarrya)
should be enduring and last long for the benefit and happiness of many people, for the world, for the welfare, benefit
and happiness of men and gods. And which are the dhommas ?
They are:
I. four bases of self-possession,
2.
four right exertions,
3. four bas.. of power,

4. five faculties,
5. five strengths,
6. seven factors of enHg};Jtenment,
7. eight factors of the way.
These are called the thirty-seven bodkipakkkiya dkamma (doctrines
-or principles pertaining to enlightenment), which are widely
used as the summary of the Buddha's teachings in Buddhist
texts. Later on, these thirty-seven dkammas (which can also be
"ailed a set of seven headings) underlie the development of
Abkidkamma philosophy.
1.2 After the Buddha's parinibbIJ.na, a great number of dkammas

(principles) taught by him and his chief disciples were
compiled and came to be known as the Sutta Pi/alea, the collection
of suttas,l At the same time; the constitution of the Buddhist
communities was codified as the Vinaya Pi/aka, the collection of
~he discipline. In addition to these two Pi/altas, many-doctrinal topics (miitikii) were gathered as the Abkidhamma Pi/aka
(which could also be expressed as MdtikiJ. Pi/alea, a. we shall
.ee in chapter 4). A. a result, these Pi/aleas came to be known
as the Tip; taka, three kinds of collection.
About a century after the Buddha's parinibbiina, the Buddhists
began to split up into separate schools. They seem each to
,.
}. It is known in general that mUa is a sacred book (or scripture) be~

'ginning with the words eoam me sulam (thus I ha.ve heard). But originally
.sulfa meant 'dialogue' in Buddhi,t texts. This original meaning can also be
discerned from those characteristics of S~tt4 reckonf'd as one o~ the nine
.aiJgas (types) of scripture, (na/Jcvlga s6.Sanas, see chapter 2.1), e.g. those
characterized by being divided into two parts : the explained and the ex"
plaining. On thi!, lee E. Mayeda, A Hiswry qf the Formation of Original Buddhist
7 ..", pp. 21-24.
Introduction
r
have had its own recension of the Tipilalea. According to the
Sthaviravada school, the Sulla Pi/alea was arranged by the
name of the "five Nikdyas" (collections) in the Pflli language
(bhiiJd),' preserved intact in Ceylon, Burma, Cambodia and
Siam. According to the Chinese renderings, these, collections
are called the four (or five) .Jgamas (traditions). The Nikdyas
and kamas available to us are as follows:
PaIi
l.
Digha Nikdya
2.
3.
Mqjjhima Nikilya
Samyutta Nikiiya
Anguttara Nikdya
4.
Chinese renderings
en'ang all hsien (Dirgha Agarna)
Cnung ak Asien (Madhyama Agama)
Sheng yii to ak Asien (SaTf!)lUkta Agama)
rang chUeh to 10 an mien (Etottara
Jgarna)
5. Khuddak. Nikiiya'
The above five Nikdyas belong to the Sthaviraviida school. On
the other hand, the four kamas belong to more than one school.
The Dirgha conjecturallY belongs to the Dharm;guptaka school.
The Mad4yama and Sa'flyukta seem to belong to the Sarviistivada school. There is another SaTJ!yukta which is incomplete.
This is ascribed to the Kiisyapiya school. And the EkottQfa is
said to be a Dharmaguptaka text. 3
As to the Vinaya Pi/alea now extant, we can mainly see the
following texts, which belong to various schools:
1. The Vin'!Y. Pi/alea of the Sthaviraviida school. (Pali)
2. The Shin-sung-tii of the Sarva'tivllda school (sixty-one
fascicles) .
3. The Ssu,jen-/U of the Dharmagupta school (sixty fascicles)
1. It is pointed out that by Pili is understood the language in whjch
is composed the Tipi/i1kQ, . The word Pd/i however signifies only U (tacrtd}
text."' Ifwe wed this word to deagnate the language, it is merely a ron.
veni~nt abbreviation for JHllibk4.rd. On this, see W. Geiger. Pdli LittrabJr4 and
lAnguage, p. 1.
2. As the fifth ,Agama, we .ee the name of Chu 1'0 chia ah hsien (KllldraJro)
corresponding to KhuddtJka in which twelve siUras are reckoned. On this, IU
A. K. Warder~ Indian BuddkiJm (1st cditiOll) J pp. 2024.
3. Ibid, pp. 89.
Abhidhamma Philosophy
The Mo-ho-s,ng-chih-lii of the MahasaI)1ghika school
(forty fascicles) .
5. The jiue-diuision-Vinaya of the MahiSasaka school (thirty
fascicles) .
6. The Kln-pen-shuo-i-ch'ieh-yu-pu.p'i-nai-yeh of the Miilasarvastivada school (fifty fascicles). (incomplete work)
4.
We also have the Miilasarvastivada Pitalea from Tibet in the

Tibetan language, and some Sanskrit fragmentary texts of the
SatTa and Vinaya Pitaleas.
1.3 We cannot deny the fact that the Nikiiyas and Agamas
at our disposal include a number of late additions. But they
are the' oldest among all the Buddhist texts, so that we may
grasp from them the Buddha's words and thought content directly; we might find out from them the best treasure (dhanagga)
in Buddhism in common between the Mahayana and the old
school,S. Which are then the words he really spoke? It is certainly difficult to determine this point. Ortly one thing we can
say here is that it may be possible to do so by examining the
Nikqyas and Agamas from all viewpoints. Fortunately, in order
to determine which parts of the Nikiiyas are likely to be the
most original, so far some text-critical works have been carried
out by certain scholars (e.g. A. K. Warder, Piili MetTe and
Indian Buddhism). Therefore, on the basis of their works, we
can start our study.
1.4 Under the title Philosophy and its Deuelopment in the
Nikilyas and Abhidhamma, we intend to trace the development
of the philosophical, and especially the logical aspects of Buddhist thought from the Nik4yas down to the systematic texts of
the Abhidhamma class, finding certain embryonic anticipations
of formal logical procedures.
This book is composed of twelve chapters, which can be
divided into two Parts. The title of Part One is the Origin of
Abhidhammu Philosophy, in which a brief survey of Miitiklls
(doctrinal topics) in the Sutta and Abhidhamma texts is given
with the explanation of the thirty-seven dhammas as the summary
of the Buddha's teachings, because it seems that in the earliest
period the Abhidhamma Pitaka consisted simply of some set of
Introduction
Mdtiklls, originating from the Nikl!Yas and Agamas. The title

of Part Thois the Development of the Dialogue Form, where
the characteristics of the style of argument used by the early
Buddhists are clarified from a logical point of view.
In lact, it is impossible to read the Nikiiya texts without
constantly coming across important words such as dhamma and
abhidhamma, which have multiple meanings. It is impossible to
understand how the philosophical study of dhammas (principles)
was made without noticing the conception of abhidhamma and
its characteristics. Without clarirying the relationship between
Abhidhamma and Mdtikii, it is impossible to know the origin of
Abhidhamma philosophy. Thus we shall examine these subjects
in chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5.
Seeing that signs of fairly well advanced dialogue form are
shown in the Nikdyas and Agamas, it will be necessary first of all
to discuss how the dialogue on dhammas (doctrines) was conducted and to see the characteristic of the four panhabyiikaraQas
(methods of answering questions) ; moreover, we cannot overlook the fact that the methods of Sanjaya's answer (in the time
of the Buddha the teacher Sanjaya was known as the leader of
the Agnostics) have something in common with. the fourfold
formulation or tetralemma, which is connected closely with the
Buddha's way of thinking. These points are therefore discussed
in chapters 6 and 7.
In the sense that certain words occupy a significant position
in the evolution of thought, the relationship between takka and
dhammaJakka, both meaning logic, 'is discussed, especially from a
semantical point of view, in chapter 8.
The logical analysis of suttas in the Nikayas teaches us many
important points in making clear the forms of argument used by
the early Buddhists. In this sense, forms of reasoning and argument appearing in the NiklJyas are examined in chapter 9, and
logical arguments in the dialogues (sutlaS) are clarified in
chapter 10.
In order to trace the development of forms of questions and
answers from the Nikiiyas into the Abh.dh.mm. texts, we take
up the pugg.lak.thii chapter in both the K.thiiv.tthu and the
Vi}i'ianakdya, and examine how questions and answers are treated
in it in chapter II.
----
Abhidhamma Phil.sophy
It goes without saying that in our study, we need a compari.on of the Nikayas with the .-Igamas, and so we refer to the
Chinese versions according to the need. Where there is not
much correspondence between the Nikllyas and .-Igamas, it will
be indicated in this book.
As a rule, Buddhist terms are given in their Pali forms,
because Pilli, though probably not the language of the Buddha,
is close to it than Sanskrit. References are to the Taisho EdItion .J the Chinese Tripi/aka and to the Pilli Text Society's edition
of Pali texts. Previous translations of some texts into English
have been used, and quoted, but in many cases the technical
terms have been retranslated to provide consistency with Qur
discussions. For this reason, in quoting Chinese texts in English,
their terms will be restored not into Sanskrit, but into Pali,
except for terms in the Vijiillnakaya of the Sarvastivada school.
Even Sarvilstiviidin Abhidhamma terms have usually been
given in Pilli for purposes of comparison, although these texts are
believed to have been composed in Sanskrit. Titles of texts in
Chinese and names of schools in Buddhism are by convention
given in Sanskrit.
2
ON THE POLYSEMY OF THE WORD
'DHAMMA'
2.1 It is said that the first Buddhist council was held at
Rajagaha under the leadership of Mahiikassapa immediately
after the Buddha had passed away. It is also said that the
Dhamma(doctrine) and the Vinaya (discipline) taught by the
Buddha were collected at this time. l It is, however, recorded
in other texts that the teachings called Abhidhamma were
collected with Dhamma and Vinaya,' or that the nine types of
scripture (navanga sasanas)3 wefe assembled also
this time.'
Nowadays, Buddhist scholars recognize that Dhamma and
Vinaya were compiled at the first Buddhist councill on the basis
of oral tradition. Now, how does the word dhamma differ
from the word abhidhamma? It is necessary for us to clarify
this point in making a study of philosophy and its development
in the Nikiiyas and Abhidhamma. But, prior to doing this, we
need to define the word dhamma itself, because it has many
meanings. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that in the
history of Indian philosophy the examination of various usages
of the word dhamma may be one of the main subjects for
at
1. Yin. II, 285. The

salpghika Yin. (T. 22. 491
2. The Sarvastivada
(T.22. 968 b).
3. They are known as
Jdtaka, Abbhutadhamma and
4. Dpv. p. 31.
MahiSiisaka Yin. (T.22, 190 h-c). The Maha~

c-492 a).
Yin. (T.23. 445 b). The Dharmagupta Virt.
Sutta, Geyya.
Vedalla.
V~l!)'dkarapaJ
Gtithl1. Uddna, ltivuttakao;
IO
study. Even the concept of dhamma used in the Xik;;y", is very

complicated, and later on, among different schools ofBuddhism
(e.g. the Sthaviravada school, the Sarvastivada school, etc.)
great diversity of understanding exists as to what dhamma
means in itself.
2.2 The purpose of this chapter is, however, to' make clear
the many meanings of dhamma in .the Xik;;yas, not to make
reference to the different inter'pretations of dhamma maintained
by Buddhist schools. Therefore, it is of crucial importance to
determine the meanings of the word dhamma by judging the
contexts in the Xik;;yas in which the word dhamma occurs.
Apart from the etymological explanation of dhamma which
can be derived from the verb dhr meaning 'to hold', 'to bear',
'to wear', 'to have', 'to support', etc., as far as the Nik4yas are
concerned, our attention should be directed first towards the
work of A. K. Warder, who indicates the basic meaning of the
word dhamma to be approximately 'nature', and ..its usages
divided into seven categories: 1
t
1. (true, natural) doctrine;
2. natural phenomenon (including bad as well as good),
natural element, natural substance, natural principle,
phenomenon, element;
3. custom, way, law of nature, justice;
4. world, nature;
5. mental object, mental phenomenon, mental state, idea;
6. good mental object, good mental phenomenon, good idea
(when opposed to bad: adhamma) ;
7. quality.
Afterwards, A. K. Warder tried to condense the above seven
categories into five, like the following, because Nos. 5 and 6 of
the seven are to be included in the same category as Nos. 2
and 3:'
1. doctrine.
2. phenomenon.
1. Inlrodu6tian to Pdli, pp. 398-9.
2. Indian Buddhism (1st edition), pp.97-100, pp. 162-5. p. 304, p. 443,
esp. refer to pp. 578-9.
On the PolYsemy qfthe Word'Dhamma'
II
3. custom or justice.
4. nature (which occurs at the end of a compound).
5. quality or predicate (as a logical term).
The definition of the term dhamma (Skt. dharma) fOrI}lulated by

him is an exhaustive one.
Moreover, he published an' article on "Dharmas and Data,"1
in which he points out that a general notion of dhamma can be
derived from the usages of the term in the Veda, in the prephilosophical and proto-philosophical discourses, meaning
something like 'maintaining', and further, that dhamma meaning
an 'element' (as used by Th. Stcherbatsky') and 'phenomenon'
is not quite satisfactory, at least in the old Nikiiyas; instead,
'principle' seems to be a closer equivalent for dhamma. Except
for dhamma signitying 'virtue' or 'justice' and the prominent
:~ '" usage of dhamma meaning 'doctrine' which could be derived
from the idea of "the way things are," there is an interrelation
between all otherdhammas (e.g. khandhas 'aggregates' or 'groups',
ayatanas 'spheres', dhatus 'elements', etc.). Also, some of them
reduce to others and some are included in others. Thus, if these
dhammas are taken as 'elements', the idea of 'elementary' must
be distorted too much to accommodate them. They present more
complexity than elements as an account of what there is. As far
as we can see in the Nikayas, there areiwideas about the
nature of all dhammas, .as impermanent, empty, without soul,
being stations or bases (dhiitus) for other dhammas, etc.; there
are attempts to establish the regularity of dhammas as determined
by dependent origination; and there is a tendency to consider
the dhammas as realities under the proper conditiOIi's; these
dhammas are not merely 'elements' but 'principles'. Thus he ,
states: "The term principle raises no expectation of a 'substance'
or the like for it to inhere in. It also suggests something real
and a cause or source, as well as regularity and truth ... It
may even be flexible enough to allow of the overlapping
1. Journal of Indian Philosophy. Vol. I, No.3, November 1971, pp. 272-95.

2. He elucidates the Buddhistic technical dhammaJ, namely: khandhdS,
4yatanas, dhdtus, and so forth, and regards the meaning of dhamma (s) as the
element (s) of existence of matter and mind. On this see Tiu Central Concep~ion of Buddhism and llu Meaning of the Word "Dharma", p. 3.
12
or inclusion of dhammas which we find in the Nikiiyas."

(pp. 290.91)
It can he realized from the above that since 'principle' is
closer to the import of the term dhamma in the Nikiiyas and can
cover more meanings, it is appropriate to substitute 'principle"
for 'element' and 'phenomenon'.
Recently, A. K. Warder has also brought out a second edition
of his book Indian Buddhism,' where he makes a considerable
revision of the meanings of dhamma and concisely expresses the
meanings of Nos. 2, 3 and 4 defined in a first edition of Indian
Buddhism as 'principle'. Therefore, the meanings are:
1. doctrine.
"
2. principle.
3. quality or predicate (in the later logic).
This decidedly shows the way to the simplification from the

complexity of the dhamma-meanings, picking up the essence of
the meaning underlying a wide range of occurrences of the
term.
As compared with the philological approach made by
Magdalene and Wilhelm Geiger, who collect the usages of the
word dhamma through Pali canonical literature and elucidate
more than sixty different meanings of it, ' the above authentic
studies made by A. K. Warder give us clear information of the
meanings of dhamma as a philosophical concept, continuing the
research of Th. Stcherbatsky. On the basis of A. K. Warder's
studies, therefore, we would like to look at how the meanings of
dhamma work in their respective contexts. For the sake of
precision we would like to classify the differences in the meaning
of dhamma into four types, because we will make use of the term
frequently in our studies hereinafter. Since only one of them
normally fits into a given context, let us sec each case.
2.3 The Dhamma as the Truth. Although the generally
accepted meaning of the word dhamma in Buddhism in the first
of its senses as noted above is 'doctrine'. it can also be understood as signifying 'truth'. For the Buddha's dhamma manifes!&
I.
2.
Publi.shed in 1980.
Pdli Dhnmma.
On Ihe Polysemy of Ihe Word'Dhamma'
the 'truth' which is naturally derived from his doctrine (s) or

teaching (8), so that 'doctrine' and 'truth' may be in a certain
sense inseparable. It would however be expedient to subdivide
the Buddha's dhamma into two meanings: 'truth' and 'doctrine'.
The former may be used as a narrow meaning and the latter,
as a wide meaning.
As is generally known, that which the Buddha realized, the
dhamma, was the order of law of the universe. And the Buddha
was not a creator, but a discoverer of this order of the universe,
in which the rational and the ethical elements are fused into
one. This dhamma as discovered by the Buddha is synonymous
with "the truth." And the Buddha is called "the Perfected
OneH or "one who is truly enlightened" (samma-sambuddha).
Therefore, the following statements, which express the essence
of Buddhism, are recorded in the Niktiyas and Agamas :
(I) Yo kho dhammarh passali so mal]l passali; yo m41]l passali so
dhammam passali. 1
(2) Yo paticcasamupptidain passali so dhammarh passali; yo
dhammam passali so pa/iccasamuppddam passali.'
Especially, the first quotation suggests that the Buddha and the
truth that he discovered are identical.
2.4 The DhaDllna as Doctrine. The universal truth discovered by the Buddha is represented by the doctrine of the
Four Truths (saccas) , namely: (I) unhappiness (dukkha) ,
(2) its origination (samuday;) , (3) its cessation (nirodha) and
(4) the way leading to this cessation (magga). It goes without
saying that this dhamma was respected highly among a great
many disciples of the Buddha as the doctrine leading to bodhi
(enlightenment). However, because the Buddha preached his
doctrine according to the mental and spirituai capacities of his
disciples, a great number of doctrines (dhammas) were produced.
Above all, the principles called "thirty-seven bodhipakkhiyl1
1. He who sees the truth sees me (the Buddha); be who sees me (the
Buddha) sees the truth. On thil, lec S. III, 120, T. 2,652 c.
2. He who sees dependent origination sccs the truth; he who sees the
truth sees dependent origination. On this, see M. I. 190-1, T.I, 467 a.
14
Abhidhamma Philosop",
dhammd" were esteemed greatly as the dkammas of practice which

to insight, to enlightenment, to extinction (nibb4na,
--<>f bhaoa 'existence'). The thirty-seven bodkipakkhiyd dhammd,
we will calJ "thirty-seven dhammas" or "thirty-seven practical
dkammas" below.
On the other hand, there are many doctrines which lead to
enlightenment by understanding the Buddha's teachings logically or philosophically. For instance, the theory of dependent
origination (paliccasamuppMa): "This being, this is (imasmim
sati idatlt hoti); from the arising of this, this arises (imassuppMd
idam uppajjati). This not being, this is not (imasmim asati idatlt
na hoti); from the cessation of this, this ceases (imassa niTodhii
Mam niTujjhat,) .'" Or the doctrine of the twelve-linked chain of
dependent origination (doMasa pa/iccasamuppadangas); these
(namely, the theory of the dependent origination, the doctrine
of the twelve-linked chain of dependent origination, and the
like) would be called "theoretical doctrines (dkammas)."
Strictly speaking, the element of practice is included in any
theoretical doctrine-for example, under the tree Bodhi-duma,
the Buddha is said to have realized the chain of causation in
direct and reverse orders by having given himself over to deep
meditation (jlziina). In this case, the doctrine of the chain of
causation would be the theoretical dhomma and the jllana (or the
four jhanas) would be the practical dhamma. Therefore, the
practical and the theoretical dhammas mayor may not he separable. But, in what we regard as theoretical dhammas, there are
doctrines such as the five "handhas, six ayatanas and eighteen
dhatus, which became the subject of study as the principles of
matter (rapa) and sentience (nlima) especially in Abhidhamma
Buddhism, so tha t we would like to distinguish between the
practical and the theoretical dhammas hereinafter.
lead to calm,
2.5 The Dhamma as Morality. In order to demonstrate

that the word dhamma means morality, Buddhaghosa (in the
5th century A.D.) quoted the following verse from the Theragdthd
(No. 304):
...
1.
M. II, 32)
s. '11, 28, T.2, 98 b, 100., etc.
On 1M Polysemy
if the Word 'Dhamma'
15
Na hi dhammo adhammo ca uhha samaviptllcino; adhammo nirayam

neti dhammo pareti suggalim.'
Thus, we see that the term dhamma meaning 'morality', 'merit'
and the like is sometimes used with the tenn adhamma which
means 'immorality', 'demerit' and the like. To take one more
illustration, the point. is:'
The class of brahmans (briihmfJT)aS: priests) is not always the

highest ... It must be decided by virtue of merit (dhamma) ,
without demerit (adhamrna).
Moreover, we see the word adhamma-r4ga,3 which
'unlawful passion' or 'non-customary'.
means
The morality in Buddhism which is expressed by the term

dhamma probably means "moral consciousness" of man rather
than "discipline" (vinaya) and ''virtue'' (sila) in the Buddhist
communities. In other words, moral law of itself does not apply
physical restraint to the body, but by the high development of
his moral consciousness a man approaches enlightenment. Such
an idea about moral consciousness seems to have accelerated
studies of kilesas (defilements), and to have been seen as causing
the element of kusala (the good), akusala (the bad) and a'!)ltllcata
(the undetermined). The high development of one's moral
consciousness, or good quality, or merit is called dhamma.
In this context, we find the words kusalil dhammiJ or akusala
dhammd in the Nikilyas. The dhammii in kusalil dhammil (or
akusalil dhammil) are not 'morality'.
They are whatever
principles are 'good' (or 'bad') and this has nothing to do with
dhamma in the sense of morality.
2.6 Dhammas as the Principles of Matter and

Sentience. The Buddha is said to have taught the five
disciples as well as many other disciples that khantihas, tlyatanas,
1. For dhamma (merit) and adhamma (demerit) do not both bea.r relulta.
that are equal; demerit ,leads to an unhappy state, merit, to a happy state.
On this, lee the Allhasdlinf, p. 38.
2. D. III, 83, T.I, 37 a. In the latter. there 11 no word correspondina to
'without demerit'.
3. D. III, 70, T.I,40 a.
Ahhidhamma Philosophy
16
etc. are impermanent, painful and egoless. 1 However, these

dhammas, in course of time, particularly in Ahhidhamma Buddhism,
came to be regarded as the principles of a sentient body, which
is called nlimar.pa, a compound of rupo (matter) and nama
(sentience) .
In the twelve tlyatanas which consist of six indriya (faculty)4yatanar (1. calckhu 'eye', 2. sota 'ear', 3. ghdna 'nose', 4. jivhii
'tongue', 5. kdya 'body', 6. mano 'mind') and six visaya (object)dyatanas (1. Tupa 'sight' or .'visible objecf, 2. sadda 'sound',
3. gandha 'odour', 4. rasa 'taste', 5. pho/thahha 'tangible object',
6. dhamma), mano deals with dhomma as cakkhu deals with rupa
(visible object). In other words, the six visaya-lJyatanas are the
objects of six indriya-dyatanas. In this case, how should we
translate the word dhamma into English? As pointed out by
T. W. and C. A. F. Rhys Davids, it is difficult to make any
English term coincide with either dhamma- or dhammii. 2 Nevertheless, they do translate the word dhamma as 'mental object' or
'state of mind' or 'idea'. According to Th. Stcherbatsky, the
word 'dhamma treated in the sixth liyatana is translated as 'nonsensuous object'. 3 According to _Nyanatiloka, it is translated as
'mind-object' . But, as we have seen in chapter 2.2, following
the lead of A. K. Warder, we prefer 'principle' to 'mental
object', 'non-sensuous object', 'mind-object', etc. which were
translated by some Buddhist scholars, as far as the Nikayas are
concerned. The point is that the mind is able to perceive all the
principles which can be known in Buddhist philosophy.
In the same category as the term dhamma as one of the six
ayatanas, the following words can be found
dhammesu dhammi!nupassi viharati.

This is one of the four satipatlMnas (bases of self-possession)
and runs 'to live with reference to dhammas observing dhammas'.
In this case, we also prefer to translate the above word dhamma
l. Yin. I, 134.
2. Dialogues of lhe Budtfha, vol. 2, p. 325.
3. The Ctnlral Conception of Buddhism and tM Meaning of the Word
p. B.
4. Buddhist DielitPfary. P: 25.
"D"arma'~,
On the PolYsemy
of the
17
WOTd 'Dhamma'
as 'principle', because the term principle has a wide meaning,

as compared with what was translated by the above scholars.
The first khandha, Tupa, comprises four elements (mahlibhatas
'great existents': 1. pathavi 'earth', 2. dpo 'water', 3. teJo
'heat', and 4. vayo 'air'). Except for the first khandha, the others
were distributed among the four mental classes. Except for the
fifth khandha, the three mental classes are called "mental
dhammas," though we can see many other mental dhammas in
the Dhammasangll1,!i (Enumeration of Principles), one of the
Abhidhamma texts of the Sthaviraviida school. The fifth khandha,
vinnd7)a, 'consciousness', includes eighty-nine types- of thought
(citta) in the Abhidhamma Buddhism of the Sthaviraviida school.
In this case, we caU them "eighty-nine cit/as." But, even in
the early Buddhism, it seems that there was a tendency that not
only the five khandhas, but also the six dhatus, the twelve ayatanas,
the eighteen dhatus and so forth were to be regarded as the
principles of matter and mind. In this case, these principles
are also called dhammas.
2.7 We have learned that the term dhamma includes various
meanings, and the sense of it depends on the context within
which it appears. Apart from the term quality or predicate, as
indicated in chapter 2.2, which is used as a logical term in the
later period, on referring to the meanings of the word dhamma
shown by A. K. Warder, we may sum up the meanings of
dhamma and divide them into the following four categories:
2.3
truth, perfect enlightenment, dependent

universal law .
origination,
2.4
doctrine, teaching, theory, discourse.
2.5
morality, merit, good quality, virtue, discipline.
2.6
principle.
However, when coming across the term abhidhamma in the

Nikdyas and Agamas, we cannot have a disregard for the.
seman tical relationships between dhamma and ahhidhamma. In
order to clarify the complexity of them, we would like to discuss
the difference between dhamma and abhidhamma and to find an
important clue to the origin of Abhidhamma philosophy.
3
THE CONCEPTION OF ABHlDHAMMA
AND
ITS CHARACTERISTICS
3.1 Sometimes in the NikiIyas, Agamas and Vinayas the tenn
abhidhamma seems to refer to an Abhidhamma Pi/aka.' Sometimes,
however, the term seems to refer only to certain types of
discussion (kathiI) , out of which Abhidhamma Pi/akas were subse-'
quendy elaborated. It will be important first of all to examine
the meaning of the term abhidhamma and then to make clear its
characteristics in relation to the term dhamma.
3.2 Let us begin with instancing examples in which the
term abhidhamma (with abhivinaya) is used :
1. A monk (bhikkhu) loves the Buddha's doctrine, the
utterance of it is~' dear to him, he finds exceeding joy
(p4mujja) in abhidhamma and abhivinaya.
-1-, ,- For "example, in the Agamtu there is the word abhidhamma together
with the words Jutta and vinaya which can be regarded as the Abhidhamma
Pi/aka: T.l,606 a, 857 a, which correspond partly to A. IV, 274-9; T. 2, 195
c; T.2, 552 bj T.2,652 b, which corresponds in part to A. II, 16B; T.2, 673 b,
which corresponds partly to S. II, 203-5. But, in the Pali suflas shown
above, there is no word abhidhamma. Also, in Vin.IV, 144 the words sut/anto,
gdlM, abhidhammtl and viruzya can be found; in Vin. IV, 344 the words
suttanta lIinaya and abhidhammo arc shown. Incidentally, the word galM
in Vin.'IV, 144 seems important in the senle that in the lame way as the
three Pi~okas were gradually formed from suttanto, ViMyO and abhidhammo, one
more Pi,ako might have been elaborated as the Khuddaka Pi/aka from gdthd,
which is of course presumably included in the suttanto now, but is known as
the Khuddaka Nilrdya of the Sthaviravada school. But we need not complica'te
our discussion here.
2. D. III, 267.
The Conception of Abhidhamma
19
2. Concentration (yoga) on ahhidhamma and abhivinaya

should be made by a monk who is living in the forest
(drafiflaka) .'
Although, as we shall see below, there
multiplicity of interpretations concerning the
term abhidhamma, we should give attention
points which have been attempted so far by
is a bewildering
prefix ahhi and the
especially to three
modern scholars:
I. An attempt to interpret abhi-dhamma as a prepositional

compound.
2. An attempt to interpret the prefi~' abhi as an adjective
modifying the noun dhamma.
3. An attempt to use both items I and 2 properly in the
contexts.
I tern I is based merely on a philological point of view, so that

as W. and M. Geiger point out,2 there is not a philosophical
meaning in the word abhidhamma itself. They turn their
attention to the fact that the terms abhidhamma and abhivinaya are
always expressed in the locative case, and interpret ahhidhamma
as meaning 'iiber den Dhamma'. Since the prefix abhi means
'towards', 'about', and the like,3 we cannot deny the fact that
the philological meaning of abhidhamma is 'about the doctrine'.
Their interpretation is even to this day accepted by scholars.
For example, A. K. Warder points out that the word
abhidhamma meant originally 'concerning the doctrine'." As far
as only the Nikayas are concerned, W. and M. Geiger's viewpoint is correct tha t the term abhidhamma as well as abhivinaya is
always expressed in the locative case. But we must notice that
the term abhidhamma appearing in the Agamas (when it does not
mean the Abhidhamma Pitaka) is not always expressed in the
l. M. I, 472.
2. Pdli Dhamma, p. 118-9.
3. A. K. Warder, Introduction to Pdli, p. 388. The prefix abhi is alsopt-rmissible in Pali poetry to elevate the tone of a passage (Ibid., pp. 355. ~62 k
4. Indian Buddhism, p. 10. But he points out that the term afterward!> was.
used for a systematic study of doctrine.
20
locative case, but is expressed in the accusative case in some

instances: "The Buddha realized that the monk Rahula had
not been released t9 perfection and had not been capable of
receiving abhidhamma from the Buddha. "1
According to the Poli-English Diclwnary, the word abhidhamma
means 'special Dhamma'. In this case, the prefix abhi functions
as an adjective, meaning 'special', It seems that the translators
from Pali into English follow this meaning: T. W. and C. A. F.
Rhys Davids put the term abhidhamma and abhivinaya in the
Nikdyas into" (in) the advanced teaching of both Doctrine and
Discipline,"2 F. L. Woodward, into "(a question about) extra
doctrine or extra discipline"! or "(in) further dhamma and
further discipline,"4 and E. M. Hare translates abhidhamma as
"(on) More-Dhamma."s All these translators recognize that
.abhidhamma mentioned ahove is not the so-called Abhidhamma
Pi/aka, nevertheless, that there must be a difference between
dhamma,and abhidhamma. In this sense, we can assent to their
views.
In deciding what the term abhidhamma means, it is important
for certainty to refer to the whole context in which the term is
used. 1. B. Horner stresses this point. She collects the usages
of abhidhamma and abhivinaya from the Sulta and Vinaya Pi/akas
and examines them minutely,6 and as a result, she uses the
expression" (in) Further-Dhamma, (in) Further-Discipline" in
.some cases,' and the expression "(in) what pertains to dhamma,
(in) what pertains to discipline" in some cases. B We see that
she takes the best care of translating various terms in Pcili into
English. It is certain that the meaning of the term abhidhamma
is debatable, since this term must have gone through several
1. T.2,51a.
2. Dialogtus tif the Buddha, vol. 3, p. 246.
3. The Book of the Gradual Sa.l'ings, vol. I, p. 267.
4. Ibid., vol. 5. p. 19. p. 139, p. 217. etc.
5. Ibid., vol 3, p. 85.
6. uAhhidhamma,Abhivinqya in the First Two Pi/akas of the Pali Canon."
IHQ.Vol. XVII, No.3 (Sept. 1941). pp. 219310.
7. Th, Middle Length Sayings, vol. 2, p. 145.
8. The Book of tile Discipline, vol. 4, pp. -83-4. in which she states: the
term abhidhamma in this crue cJearly has the Abhidhamma Pi/aka in mind.
The Conception qf Abhidhamma
21
fluctuations before coming to stand as the title of the Abhidhamma

Pi/aka. Thus, according to her,l the particular meaning ascribed
to this term in anyone context must depend largely on the
sense, linguistic style and terminology of that whole context,
which should therefore be considered on its own merits. However, her dual interpretations are so flexible that it is difficult
to grasp the conception of abhidhamma commor, in the Niku,yas
and Agamas.
3.3 The reason why certain scholars regarded abhidhamma as
meaning "extra doctrine," "further dhamma", "More-Dhamma",
and the like lies in the fact that they followed Buddhaghosa's
commentary on the interpretations of the prefix abhi and the
definitions of the abhidhamma. According to the Samantapdsddikd
written by him, abhi shows the five different meanings, namely:
1. Vuddhi (increase).
2. Salakkha~a (characteristic).
3. Piijitd (respect).
4. Paricchinnii (distinguishing, defining).
5. Adhikd (excellence).
Furthermore, the examl"les of abhi are given as follows:
The term abhi in such a case as, "much pain attacks
(abhikkamanti) me, and does not step backwards, etc." means
'comes to increase (vuddhiya)'; such abhi as "it is distinguished (abhinniitli) and marked (abhilakkhita) night, etc." is used
in the sense of 'characteristic (salakkhat)a)'; abhi like "a great
king (ahhirdja), or a lord of men, etc." is the meaning of
'revered (pujita)'; abhi like "complete training in abhidhamma
and ahhivina)'a, etc." is used in the sense of 'distinguished (or
defined: paricchinna) '. It is said that this is for the sake of
getting rid of confusion between dhamma and vinaya; abhi indicating "with a beautiful (abhikkanta) colour, etc." is in the
meaning of 'excellent (abhika) '.'
In another work by Buddhaghosa, we can also see the explanation of the term abhi as follows: 8
1. Tlu Book of the Discipline, vol. 3, p. x.
2. See Samanta, p. 20.
3. The Atthasiiiinr, p. 2, pp. 19-20.
22
Herein what is meant by Abhidhamma ? That which exceeds

and is distinguished from the Dhamma (the Sulta). The prefix
abhi, like ati, is used in the sense of preponderance and distinction, as in such passages as, "severe pains overwhelm
(abhikkamanti) me, brother; and do not abate"; and "of
eminent (abhikkanta) beauty." Again: Hence when many
sunshades and flags are uplifted, the sunshade which excels the
fest in s~e and is of distinguished colour and form is called
atichatta"" "the pre-eminent sunshade," and the flag which
is the largest and is replete with various distinguished paints
and colours is called atidhaja, "the pre-eminent flag." And
when many princes and gods are gathered together, the prince
who is specially distinguished and surpasses others in birth,
property, pomp, dominion, and other attain~ents is called
atirajakumara, "the prince par excelIence"; and the god who
is specially distinguished and surpasses others in age, beauty,
dominion, pomp, and other attainments is called atideva or
abhideva, "the peerless god." Similarly Brahma is called
Atihrahmd, "the supreme Brahma." Even so this dhamma is
called abhidhamma, because it excels and is distinguished by
several qualities from the other dhamma. 1
In addition to the above explanations, we see the following
definitions concerning abhidhamma (katluJ) : uttama-dhamma 'the
highest doctrine';' ahhivisillha,dhamma 'very distinguished
doctrine'.' For a certainty, Buddhaghosa's explanations are
very helpful.in considering the conception of abhidhamma in the
Nikdyas. Before being inclined towards P"li commentaries, however, we would like to turn our eyes to the explanations of
abhidhamma in Chinese versions.
3.4 In the Chinese version of the Samantapdsadikd, the explanations of aMi and dhamma are described as follows:'
The term ahhi means 'mindful', 'conscious', 'praiseworthy',
'distinctive', 'excessive', 'wide', 'large', and 'unsurpassed'.
1. See The Expositur, tr. Pe Maung Tin, vol I, pp. 3.-4.
2. AA. 1lI, 271.
3. MA. IV, 29.
4. T. 24, 676 b-c.
The Conception of Ahhidhamma
23
And dhamma means 'attainment' (attain to nibbana) , 'drawing power' (draw in the path of virtue), and 'defence'
(defend a man from an evil way).
It is not easy to find out the explanations in common between
the Samantapasddikii and its Chinese version. Nevertheless, we
see that the term abhi is used in the sense of 'distinctive' or
'distinguishing', and that there are therefore distinctive (or
distinguishing) characteristics in what is called ahhidhamma.
In the Ahhidharmamahiivihhii,ii!iistra (translated in Chinese by
Hsuan-chuang between 656A.D.and 659 A.D.), and another
incomplete Ahhidharmamahiivihhii#iSiistra (translated by Buddhavarman in 437A.D.), various explanations of ahhi and ahhi
dhamma which many scholars and schools tried are shown. We
see in the former: 1
According to a certain grammarian, a means 'eliminable', and

hhi, 'penetrative'. For, by the teaching called Ahhidhamma, one
eliminates the lusts such as gantha (fetter), anusaya (tendency),
upakkilesa (corruption), and parryullhiina (prepossession); one
penetrates the true dhammas such as khandhas, dhdtus, ayatanas,
pa/iccasamuppdda, saccas, ahara (food), samanna (profession of
asceticism), and hojjhangas (factors of enlightenment). In the
opinion of Buddharak~ita, abhi means 'revealable'. For, by
ahhidhamma involving all kusaladhamma (good principles), one
reveals enlightenment. In the opinion of Buddhadeva, abhi
means 'undue'. For one who makes an undue estimate of
oneself is called ahhimdna (self-conceit or undue estimate of
oneself); one who is free from lusts is called adhimutta (of firm
resolve or determination) and the like.
According to Vamalabdha, abhi means 'respecting'. For that
which shows respect for everything is called abhiviidana
(salutation).
And we see in the latter as foIl ows;'

In the opinion of Vasumitra, the reason why Ahhidhamma
is called abhidhamma is that it treats the analysis of the twelve
1. T.27,4b-c.
2. T. 28, 3 c-4 a.
24
types of scripture; the explanation of the twelve-linked chain

of dependent origination (dvddasa pa/iccasamuppiidangas), and
on.
,-\;
In the opinion of Mahabhadanta, the reason why Ahhidhamma is called ahhidhamma is that it treats of the collection
and the analytical explanation of the dhammas such as kilesas,
ganthas, vimokkha (freedom), .ihM.a, and so forth.
In the opinion of Ghosa, the reason why Ahhidhamma is
called ahhidhamma is ~ha t it analyzes all teachings of' the
Buddhajust as "this is the noble truth of unhappiness"; "this
is the noble truth of the origination of unhappiness"; "this is
the noble truth of the cessation of unhappiness"; "this is the
noble truth of the way leading to the cessation of unhappi-
,0
ness" ; and so on.

In the opinion of ParSva, the reason why Abhidhamma is
called ahhidhamma is that it treats of iiii~as (know ledges) which

express the enlightenment.
In the opinion of Abhidhammavadin (one who disputes
or preaches some doctrine), the reason why Abhidhamma is
called abhidhamma is that it deals with the real nature of
profound (gamhhira) dhammas . .. and it treats of the salakkha~a (own characteristic) and siimaiiiialakkha~a (universal
characteristic) of each dhamma from the standpoint of
understanding, and so on.
According to the MahiSilSaka school, Ahhidhamma is just
like the brightest lamp, which means the highest knowledge.
According to the Dharmagupta school, abhidhamma means
'increase', and 'understanding which is the best one of all

dhammas',
In the opinion of Avadanavadin, nihMna is the highest of
all the dhammas and Abhidhamma comes second.
From these various interpretations of abhi and ahhidhamma (or
Ahhidhamma, that is, the texts which contain ahhidhamma), it is
very
di~cult
to choose what interpretation expresses the true
meaning of aMi, because all Abhidhamma texts now extant (of

the Sthaviravada, the Sarvastivada, the Dharmaguptaka, the
Sarp.mitiya and the Bahusrutiya schools) seem to include some

elements which were interpreted above. But, judging from
The Conception of Abhidhamma
25
what has been interpreted above in various ways, the most

general sense of abhidhamma seems to be making distinctions,
., defining dhammas. An abhidhamma text will thus be a book of
)'.,~ definitions. In order to ascertain this point further, we would
like to pay attention to the usages of abhidltamma (and also,
ohhivinaya) in the Nikayas and Agamas and to try to grasp
firmly the conception of ahhidhamma.
3.S Let us begin with introducing ahhidhamma and abhivinaya

appearing in the Gulissanisutta which has its Chinese version.
(I) Abhidhamma and Abhivinaya in the Gulissiinisutta. This sutta preached by Sariputta presents the Buddhist
manners in a Buddhist community (sangha) by taking those of
a monk, Gulissani as an example. 1 Above all, discussions on
abhidhamma and abhivinaya are considered important practices: 2
Sir, concentration (yoga) on abhidhamma and abhivinaya
should be made by a monk who is living in the forest
(arOJinnka). There are those who will question a monk who
is living in the forest concerning abhidhamma and ahhivinaya.
If a monk who is living in the forest, on being asked a
q~estion on abhidhamma and abhivinaya, cannot explain, there
will be those who speak about him and say: What is the
good of this venerable one who is living alone in the forest
doing as he pleases, but who, on beillg asked a question on
abhidhamma and abhivinaya, cannot explajn. Therefore,.
concentration on abhidhamma and abhivina)'a should be made
by a fllonk who is living in the forest.
A Chinese version of the above sutta runs as follows ;3
Monks, when a monk living in a forest joins a Buddhist
community, he must study to treat of abhivi'naya and abhidhamma. Why? Because, when joining the Buddhist community, somebody will come up to treat of abhivina)'a and
abhidhmnma with him. Monks, if he cannot treat of them in
1. M. I, 469-73, T. 1,454 c-456 a.
2. See M. I, 472~
3. T. 1, 455 c.
26
the Buddhist community, he will he called to account by

them like this: In spite of the fact that he cannot treat of
abhivinaya and abhidhamma, why does he join the Buddhist
community? It is dear that he will be called to account, if
not treating of abhivinaya and abhidhamma. Therefore, monks,
when a monk living in a forest joins the Buddhist community,
he must study to treat of these doctrines.
The term abhidhamma is to be distinguished from dhamma and
the term abhivinaya is likewise to be distinguished from vinaya.
Both the latter are general terms for teachings and disciplines
taught by the Buddha. In other words, we might say that the
above abhidhamma and abhivinaya show specific dhamma and
vinaya respectively, which disciples of the Buddha must practice
by all means. The teaching consists of dhamma (doctrine) and
vinqya (discipline); the thorough study of each of these will be
its abhi-. Abhivinqya might actually refer to the Suttavibhanga or
Vinayavibhanga, the old commentary on the Piitimakkhasutta which
is incorporated in the Vinaya text (just as the Abhidhammavibhanga explains the dhamma).
(2) Abhidhamllla and Abhivinaya in the Dialogue of
the Buddha with a Disciple, Subhiiti.
Again, Subhiiti, 'a monk delights in dhamma (teaching),
the utterance of it is dear to him, he delights exceedingly in
abhidhamma and abhivinaya. Insofar as a monk is such,
Subhilti, this also is the harvest of belief (saddhdpadiina) in a
believer.l
From the above, it is hard to understand completely the differences between dhamma and abhidhamma. But, in this case, it is
clear that "delight in dhamma" (dhammakiima) and "exceeding
delight in abhidhamma and abhivtnaya" (abhidhamme abhivinaye
uliiraPiimujja) are respectively not identical. In this respect,
case (2) is similar to case (I).
(3) Ahhidhamma in the Mahiigosmgasutta.
time, in order to listen to the discourse ( dhamma)
1.
A. V, 339
At one
of the
Th8 Conception of Abhidhamma
27
venerable Sariputta, then staying in f\ grove in the GosiJiga

sal-wood (salavana), many famous disciples (ranking as elders),
such as Ven. Moggalifma, Ven. Kassapa, Ven. Anuruddha,

Ven. Revata, Ven. Ananda approached Ven. Sariputta. Ven.
Sariputta asked Ven. Moggallana: "Delightful is the Gosinga
sal-wood; it is a clear moonlight night; the sal-trees are in full
blossom; by wha t type of monk would the Gosinga sal-wood be
illuminated ?" Then, Yen. Moggallana answered as follows: 1
In this connection, Yen. Sariputta, two monks, are talking
on ahhidhamma; they question one another; in answering one
another's questio~s they respond and do not fail; and their
talk on dhamma goes forward. By a monk of sucb a type, Ven.
Silriputta, would the Gosinga sal-wood be illuminated.
On the other hand, in the Chinese text of the MahiJgosingasutta,

the questioner is Yen. Sariputta and the answerer is Yen.
Kaccayana. Yen. Kaccayana '5 answer corresponds with the
Pilli text. Especially, a noteworthy point in the Chinese text is
that the word gambhira (profound) is added before the word
<lbhidhamma.' From this fact, it is understood that what is
called abhidhamma means to talk on dhammas (they may be
specific doctrines) in the form of questions and answers, and
that it is to derive the intrinsic value Of t~e profound theory
from talks on dhammas. To demonstrate this point further, let
us observe another sutta.
(4) AbhidhaDlIna in the Kintisutta. In this, the Buddha
lays down rules on the treatment of monks who discuss the
meaning and letter of the doctrine: 3
Therefore, monks, those dhammas (doctrines or principles)
taught to you by me out of insight, that is to say the four
bases of self-possession (satipallhanas), the four right exertions
(sammappadhanas), the four bases of power (iddhipadas), the five
faculties (indriyas) , the five strengths (balas), the seven factors
1.
2.
634 c,
3.
M. I. 212-9, T. 1,726 c-729 b.

,
Such a .word can be found widely in Chinese texts, e.g. T. I, 450 a.
688 c, 728 c, etc.
M. II, 238-43.
28
of enlightenment (boJJhangas), the excellent eight factors of the

way (maggangas)-all together, in harmony (samagga), in
agreement (sammodamana) and without contention (avivadamana) ,
you should train yourselves in all of these. But when you, monks,
all together, in harmony, in agreement and without contention
train yourselves in these, there might be two monks speaking
differently about abhidhamma. If it occurs to you concerning
this: "Between these venerable ones there is a difference
concerning the meaning (altha) and the letter (byalijana),"
then, approaching that monk whose speech yoa think better,
you should speak thus to him: "Between these venerable ODes there is a difference concerning the meaning and
the letter, on account of which they should know that there
is a difference concerning the meaning and the letter. Don't
let the venerable ones fall into contention." Mter that,
approaching a monk of another group whose speech you think
bettc':", you should speak thus to him: ~'Between these venerable ones there is a difference concerning the meaning and
the letter, on account of which they should know that there
is a difference concerning the meaning and the letter. Don't
let the venerable ones faU into contention. "
This exists in Pilli only. But, as can be realized from the
above, where two monks differ in opinion on abhidhamma, other
monks suggest restraint on the part of the one monk who speaks
better. It is to be understood that the differences in opinion .between two monks were an outgrowth of the heated discussion
on abhidhamma. Therefore, we might say that the purpose of
the discussion between monks was to derive the intrinsic value
or the profound theory from dhammas (principles) taught by the
Buddha or by some great disciple of his. The problem of what
abhidhamma originally meant will also be solved by looking at the
context within which the words dhammakathii and abhidhammakathii appear.
3.6 The words dhamma-kathd mean 'a talk on dhamma',
though the meaning of the word katha is, according to the
Pali-English Dictionary, classified into six categories: I. talk (ing),
conversation, 2. speech, sermon, discourse, lecture, 3. a (long)
story, 4. word ( s), advice, 5. explanation, exposition, and
The Conception
rif Abhidhamma
29
6. discussion. A:3 far as the word katha is concerned in the Nikayas

and Agamas, howeve", it is not a word used only for a philosophical discussion; rather the usage varies, fo~ we see the words
gama-kalM meaning 'gossip about village-ii/fairs', which is
regarded as low (hina) and vulgar (gamma) talks, also called
tiracchilnakatha (lit. 'talk on animals or childish talk'). The
Buddha and his great disciples admonish many disciples not to
talk tiracchiinakathd, because such a talk is not concerned with
true profit; is not the essentials of life; does not conduce to dispassion: to cessation, to tranquillity, to full understanding, and
to complete enlightenment. Therefore, first in importance is the
content of katha, that is, to carry out talks on dhamma or
abhidhamma.
In the Rathavinitasutta,l after the Buddha has instructed, roused,
incited, delighted Mantfll;.iputta with dhammakathii, who is
known as a monk wanting little for himself and at the same
time, as a monk who talks to others on wanting little; as a
monk who is content for himself and who also talks to others
on conte1'ltment, etc., Sariputta meets Mantal):iputta and
discusses the Buddha's teachings warmly with him. Manti'q.iputta characterizes the dhammakathii by explaining to Sariputta
that the best life (brahmacariya) under the Master (bhagavant: a
title of the Buddha) is lived neither for the purity of virtue
( silavisuddhatta), nor for the purity of thought (cittavisuddhatta),
nor for the purity of view (ditthivisuddhatta), but for the
attainment of liberation from existence (parinibbana) without
attachment (anuptidii), and that the liberation can be attained
finally by means of the purity of virtue, thought, view, etc., just
as King Pasenadi of Kosala reaches the palace-gate at Saketa at
last by changing chariots seven times. A noteworthy point in this
discussion is that the words gambhira gambhira paiihii are indicated: Mantal):iputta says, "it is wonderful that the very profound
questions were asked step by step by the venerable Sariputta
who knows the Master'~ instruction." But these words do not
always suggest the words gambhira abhidhamma, rather they
mean that a talk on dhammas taught by the Buddha was zealously
carried ou t.
1.
M. I, 145-151, T. 1,429 c-431 c, T. 2, 733 c-735 b.
30
In the discourse named Cfiiahalthipadopamasulta,' where the

monk Pilotika explains to the brahman ja'.lUssot:li about the greatness of the Buddha by way of the four similes of the elephant's
footprint, we see the following expression in which dhammalcathii
is used:
Such and such adversaries hear: Undoubtedly the recluse

Gotama will visit some village or little town (nigama). They
prepare'a question, thinking: Having approached the recluse
Gotama, we wi\l ask him this question of ours. If, on being
asked by us thus, he answers thus, we will refute him in this
manner; and if, on being asked by us thus, he answers thus,
we will refute him in that manner. They heard: It is certain
that the recluse Gotama is visiting the village or the little
town. So they approached the recluse Gotama. He instructed,
roused, incited, delighted them with dhammalcathii. Those who
were instructed (sandassita), roused (samadapita) , incited
(samuttejita) , and delighted (sampaharilSita) by the recluse
Gotama with dhammakathd, did not ask him the question at
all. How could they refute him? On the contrary, they
became disciples of the recluse Gotama.
It is clear that the purpose of the ahove-mentioned is to describe the capacity of the Buddha who excelled in dhammakathd.
At this point, we can quote another passage from the Arryaparryesanasulta, which corresponds exactly with the Chinese
version:!
The Buddha approached the hermitage of the brahman
Rammaka. At that time, a number of monks happened to
be sitting down and talking about dhamma (dhammalcathii) in
the hermitage of the brahman Rammaka. Then the Buddha
stood outside the gateway and waited for the talk to finish.
Then the Buddha, knowing that the talk had finished, coughed
and knocked on the bar of the door; those monks opened the
door to the Buddha. Then the Buddha, having entered the
hermitage of the brahman Rammaka, -sat down on the
appointed seat. Having sat down, the Buddha said to the
1. M. 1,176, T.l,656 b.
2. M. I, 161, T. 1, 775 <-776 a.
The Conception of A bhidhamma
31
monks: As you were sitting down just now, what was your
talk about, monks? What was your talk that was interrupted ?
Buddha, 'our dhammakathii that was interrupted was about
the Buddha himself; then he arrived.
Then the Buddha teaches his disciples that there are two things
to be done: either talk about dhamma or the noble silence (arira
tu~hibhdva) .
Besides the word dhammakathii, we can find the word dhammasiikacchii in the .NikiIyas.' The meaning of the word silkacchd
is 'conversation', 'talking over', 'discussing'. Therefore, it is
regarded as having the same meaning as the word kathii. Apart
from the strict usage of kathd and siIkacchd. it i. true that the
word kathiI rather than the word siikacchd was widely used,
because in addition to the word dhammakdtha, we see the word
abhidhammakatha and also, the word vinayakatM in a Vinaya
text. 2
As far as we can tell of dhammakatha, it seems to be used in

general as a talk on dhammas taught by the Buddha, which were
then elaborated as ten katkas (discussions): I. on wanting little
(appiccha) , 2. on contentment (santullhi) , 3. on seclusion
(paviveka) , 4. on avoiding society (asamsagga), 5. on putting
forth energy (virirarambha), 6. on moral practice (sila), 7. on
concentration of mind (samiidhi), 8. on understanding (Paiinti) ,
9. on liberation (vimutti), and 10. on knowledge and insightof
liberation (vimuttiiidr;adassana), 3 and to be used as' a discussion to
conduce to complete enlightenment opposite to tiracchanakathd.
3.7 Compared with dhammakathii, the word abhidhammakatka
is seldom used in the .Nikiiyas and Agamas. But abhidhammakathil
seems to indicate an advanced discussion on dhamma: 4
1. For example, see Sn. 266.

2. Vin. 11,168.
3. M. III, 113, 115, A. III, 117, 118, IV, 357, V. 67, Ud. 36. etc. In
Chinese Texts (e.g. T. 1,492 b, 739 h, etc.), there are 15 items including all
those in the P<ili: 1. on austere penance (sallekha) , 2. on self-abnegation
(ntkkhammasarikappa), 3. on cessation (nirodha), 4. on dependent origination
{paliccasamllppdda).5. on charity (dana).
4.
A. III, 107.
32
(I) Monks, in 'the long road of the future, there will be

monks who have not practiced the subduing of this body
(unpracticed in body), not made virtue a habit, not brought
thought into order, and not made insight into guidance.
Monks who have not achieved this "becoming" will not be
fully awake to the meaning, but will enter on a state of darkness, when giving a talk on abhidhamma (abl:idham:nakatlaTfl)
or on vedalla (vedallakathaTfl).' Thus verily, monks, from the
pollution of dhamma (doctrine) comes that of vinaya; from the
pollution of vinaya comes that of dhamma.
The above suggests that monks who do not devote themselves to
Buddhist practice should not give a talk on abhidhamma or on

vedalla. In other words, only monks who earnestly try to achieve
Buddhist practice are qualified for giving a talk on abhidhamma,
Moreover, the following statement is worth noticing:
( 2) Ven.. Silriputta, two monks give a talk on abhidhamma
(abhidhammakathaTfl kathenti) ; they ask one another (annamanna)
questions; in answering one another's questions they respond
(vissajjati) and do not fail (samsidati) , and their talk on
dhamma goes forward (pavattati). Ven. Silriputta, by a monk
of such a type the Gosinga sal-wood would
, be illumined.'
As we have already seen in chapter 3.3, commenting on ,abhi...
dhammakatha, Buddhaghosa says: it is uttamadhamma;':atham,
which means 'a talk on the highest doctrine'. But it Seems to
import essentially 'an illuminating or a philosophical talk on
doctrine'. This point may be clearly demonstrated by the
following words : 3
(3) At one time, when the Buddha dwelt near Benares in the
Deer Park at Isipatana, a number of elder monks who had
returned from alms-gathering sat together in the round hall
(maQalamiila) and spoke on abhidhamma, From time to time,
Ven. Citta Hatthisariputta interrupted their talk. And Ven.
,
1. Although vedolla is regarded as one of the nine types of ,scripture,
originally it probably means 'style based on questions and answers'.
2. M. I, 214.
3. A. Ill, 392.
The Conception ~ Abhidhamma
33
Mahako\thita said to him: let not Yen. Hatthisiiriputta constantly interrupt when the elders talk on abhidhamma; Yen.
Hatthisariputta should wait until the talk is over.
From the above, it can readily bi: imagined that this talk on
dhamma by elder monks (therd bhikkhii) must have had depth,
because they had learned much of the doctrines of the Buddha,

were leaders of young monks, and had given discourses for the
Buddha at times. Therefore, the above words teach us that
novices or young monks were not permitted to interrupt when
their elders talked on abhidhamma.
Judging from the usages. of dhammakathii and abhidhammakathii, the latter has some ele:nent which distinguishes it from
the former. That is to say, it seems that. the word abhidham-
means 'understanding a certain profound meaning

or a philosophical meaning of dhamma by the medium of questions and answers'. We see that it sometimes happened that
the difference of opinion as to the meaning or the expression
of dhammas was discussed among disciples of the Buddha, and
that in such a case, they had to think to the utmost extent of
the reason why there was the difference and to cultivate a better
understanding by asking it of the Buddha or his elder monks.
17lIJkathii
3.8
In connection with the usages of abhidhamma and abhiit must be noted that three
stereotyped expressions are discovered throughout the Nikdyas
vinaya mentioned in chapter 3.5,
an~d Vinayas:
(a)
(b)
Dhammaklimo hvti piyasamudllhliro abhidhamme abhivinaye

u!lirapamujjo.l
Abhidhamme khv Pants abhivinaye panha". putthv saTflSddeti
no vissajjeti. 2
t;
1. A monk loves the Buddha'. doctrine, the utterance of it is dear to

him, he finds exceeding joy in abhidhamt7UJ and abhivitUJya. See D. III, 267,
A. V, 24, 27,90,201. 339, 341, etc.
2. On being asked a question on abJridhamma and abhivinaya, he falters
and cannot explain. See A. I, 288, 290, 291, IV, 398, 399, 400, etc. Also,
we Can find the following passage: Abhid/uJmrn8 aMiuinaye panharh plUckitdro. See
M. 1,472.
34
(c)
Aparehi pi bhikkhave pancah' afigehi sammannligatena hhikkhund na upasampddetahha", na .issayo ddtahho na siimal'!'To
upallhlipetahho: na pa/ihalo hoti . . ahhidhamme vinetu'[l,
abhivinaye vinetuqz.l
We see even from these three stereotyped expressions that there
is a distinct difference between dhamma and abhidhamma, and
between vinaya and abhivinaya.
To sum up the arguments which have been given about
ahhidkamma(kathii) and ahhivinaya appearing in the Nikiiyas and
Agamas, it may be said that whilst dhamma and vinaya are
words to express teaching and discipline generally, abhidhamma
as well as ahMvinaya seems to be used to develop dhamma( doctrine)
and to define dhammas (principles) and vinaya (s)in the forest (which
seems to indicate 'by oneself', 'alone', see example (1) of chapter
3.5) or in question and answer form (see examples (3) and (4)
of chapter 3.5 and examples (1), (2) and (3) of chapter 3.7),
and also the discussion on abhidhamma is to understand a certain
profound meaning of dhamma and to understand the relations of
a dhamma to other dhammas. Therefore, the Buddha and his
disciples seem to have already formed a philosophical conceplion in the term ahhidhamma (also in aMivinaya) itself; otherwise, we cannot realize the following aspects: only monks who
have been released to perfection are capable of receiving
abhidhamma from the Buddha or his great disciples;2 those who
rank as elders (like Ananda) are capabk of expounding in detail (vittharena) the meaning of the teaching made in brief
(sankhittena) by the Buddha;' they must study to treat of
ahhivinaya and abhidhamma;' elder monks can talk on gambhira
abhidhamma;' the Buddha lays down rules on the treatment of
monks who discuss the meaning and letter of the doctrine;6
1. If a monk is possessed of five qualities, he should not ordain. These
qualities are namely, ira monk is not adequate to lead a disciple in the
fundamental! of conduct; ... to lead him in abhidhamm4; to lead him in
abhivinqya. See Yin. I. 64, V. 181, etc.
2. See quotation in chapter 3.2.
3.
4.
S. IV, 93.
See example (1) of chapter 3.5.
5.
6.
See example (3) of chapter 3.5 It",d example (3) of chapter 3.7.
See example (4) of chapter 3,5.
The ConceptiOTl
'If Abhidkamma
35
only monks who earnestly try to achieve Buddhist practice are

qualified for giving a talk on abhidhamma,' and so forth.
In addition, we must notice that further discllssion came to
be held among the disciples, sometimes in the presence of the
Buddha, to analyze the thirty-seven dhtPllmas, to expound
dependent origination, to formulate the theory of anicca, dukkha,
anatta1l, and to classify many other dhammflS into different
types, such as the practical, the theoretical, etc. (vibhallga: lit.
'division') by being free from taking narrow views (by
vitthdra: lit. 'breadth'). In this connection, we see that as to all
dhammas taught by the Buddha, his disciples gave attention to
two points, namely: dhamma1{l vibkajati and (Gotamassa bMsit-'
assa) atlM1{l vibhajati. The verb vibhajati (3rd person, singular
of the root vi~bhaJ, lit. 'divide' )is translated as meaning 'anaiyze')'explain' J 'expound', etc. 2 But it seems that the former originally means to divide dhamma (or dhammas) into certain group.
or classes or categories, and that the latter, to explain or expound
the meaning (altha) of their respective dhammas divided first. As
far as we can tell of the Nikayas, both dhamma1{l vibhajati and attka1{l
vibhqjati are not always indicated simultaneously, but there is
a sharp distinction between the two' In the su/ta named
Vi6hanga, the Buddha divides the doctrine of dependent origination into the twelve paceaya""karas (the aspects of condition),
and then expounds on their respective items.' Also, certain
suttas called Vibhaflga must be noted, in which a detailed
analysis of dependent origination, the eight fuctors of the way,
the four satipatthdnas, the five indriyas, etc. are dealt with. 6
We can also see that apart from the doctrinal items of the
Angutlaranikiiya and the Ekottaragama which are classified according to the numerical order from ones up to elevens, there is an
elaborated sulta named S.angitisutta (as well as the Dt1.5utlarasutta)
of the Dtghani.lcqya (also, the Dirghagama), in which numerous
1.
2.
See example (2) of chapter 3.7.

For example, see The Book of Ihe Kindred Sayi"g.(, vol. 2, p. 2. 59. The
Middle Leng/h Sayings, vol. 2. p. 27, etc.
3. The former : S. 11,2. M. I, 364. etc. The latter: S. IV, 93,97, M.
III, 203, 223, etc.
4. S. II, 2, T. 2,85 a. Cf S. III, 73-4, T. 2, 4 b.
5. M. III, 187-257, T. 1,6900-706 c.
36
Abhidkamma Philosophy
principles ( dhammas) are classified and expounded by Sariputta

systematically from ones up to tens. l This scheme is a kind of
index to the doctrine scattered through the Nikliyas and
Agamas.
3.9 Thus we cannot deny the fact that the word abhidkamma
means etymologically 'concerning dhamma': But, when we
trace the origin of Abhidhamma philosophy back to the NiklJyas
and Agamas, we come to know that the term abhidhamma was
med for a study of the doctrine in which a philosophical
conception has already been formed in the sense that the
Buddha and his disciples attempted:
1. defining dhamma( s),
2. seizing the relations ofa dhamma to other dnammas,
3. analyzing dkammas,
4. classifying dhammas into different types,
5. arranging dhammas in numerical order.
In this sense, we may define the terln abhidhamma in the
Nikdyas and Agamas as 'an elementary philosophical study of
dhammas'. (For the sake of convenience, the expression 'abhiw
dhamma study' will be used below according to the need.) In
the five different meanings of abki which Buddhaghosa explain."j, item 2 (see chapter 3.3), namely, salakkhm,uJ meaning
'characteristic' is similar to the meaning of abhi used widely in
the Nikayas and Agamas, because some characteristic element
would be included in what is called "specific dhamma," i.e.
abhidhamma, stated in the Pali-English Dictionary. Item 4 also
(especially) seems relevant: 'distinguishing', 'defining'; and
further, abhi seems to be analysis of, theory of, discussion of or
about, so that we might prefer the views of Mahiibhadanta, Ghosa
and the Abhidhammavadin. The meaning of abhi should not be
limited to some scholars) opinion that abhi shows 'ex.cellent' or
'increasing'. And among the various interpretations of abhidhamma
(which were recorded in the Abhidhermamahavibhii,iISiistra), the
explanation presented by Abhidhammavadin seems to be
similar to the original meanjng of abhidhamma (see chapter 3.4).
1.
D. 111,207-271, T. I, 49 b-52 c.
4
ABHIDHAMMA AND MATlKA
4.1 It has become clear that the Buddha's disciples formed
the conception of ahhidhamma as an elementary philosophical
study of dhammas and carried on this study. Such a study was
made: (I) in the form of questions and answers, or (2) in the
way of minute explanation by one monk to others, or (3) by
. one monk alone (see example (I) of chapter 3.5 and chapter
3.8). Apart from item 3, items I and 2 should be discussed
from a different point of view, because item 1 is vitally concerned
with the problem of dialogue form, which will therefore be
examined in another Part.
As we have seen in chapter 3.6, the word kathii used in the
.Nikdyas has rio other meaning than 'taJk', 'discussion', and it is
not a word used only for a philosophical discussion. Therefore,
ahhidhammakathtl means that (the Buddha and his disciples)
discuss abhidhamma or talk on abhidhamma. What is then the
original (or simple) form of tne Ahhidhamma Pilaka ? Before
examining this point, let us look at how the abhidhamma study was
advanced.
4.2 In chapter 3.9, we have learned that the disciples'
attempts at the elementary philosophical study of dhammas
consisted of five points. If we discuss especially the first
(defining dhammas) aIlfl fifth points (arranging dhammas in
numericiU order) of the five by adducing examples, the embryonic element of Abhidhamma philosophy may be brought to
light. The first point will of course be related directly or indirectly to the second, third and the fourth points.
38
In illustration of the first point, we may take the examples of a

series of Vibhangasuttas, of which the Uddesavibhangasutta (Dis-'
course on a Summarized Description and Analysis) consists
of botb the Buddha's brief statement and Maha-Kaccima's
detailed explanation of it,' whilst in the otber Vibhangasuttas
tbe Buddba's brief statement is given first and then expiained in
detail by the Buddha himself in most cases. To say more
precisely, the Udd"avibhangasutta is characterized by an elaborate method: The Buddha left bis seat without having explained
the meaning in detail of a summarized description which was
taught in brief by him first, in spite of the fact that he says, "I
will teach you, monks, a summarized description and (its)
analysis," and then Maha-Kaccana defined in detail the
dhammas taught first by the Buddha such as the consciousness
which is not externally diffused (visala) and the consciousness
which is not internally set (saQlhila) , and finally the Buddha
concluded: "Maha~Kaccana is, mon~, leamed,-of great understanding. If you had questioned me as to this meaning, I too
would have explained it precisely as he did. This is indeed the
exact meaning of that, and tbus you should hold it." In this
sutta aha-Kacdi.na alone continues to explain minutely
the teaching made in brief by the Buddha and from start to
finish, a large audience listen to him without asking any
questions. This teaches us two matters: (I) that Maha-Kaccana has a full understanding of abhidhamma and (2) that he
knows completely the way that the abhidhamma study should be.
It seems that the Buddha encouraged his disciples to preach
the dhamma (discourse) wbich is possessed of the meaning and
to investigate the meaning of dhamma (doctrine). This fact is
more explicit in the following two different statements ;' ,
I. Monks, preach the dhamma (discourse) wbich is beautiful

in the beginning, in the middle and in tbe end; and which
is possessed of the meaning (s4ttha) and expression
( savyaiijana).'
.
~.'"
L" M. !1I, 223-9, T. 1,'69-r b-696 b.

2. S. IV, 315; A/'1I:14rl, m,.t13, D. I, 62, T. 1,438 b, 727 a, 2. 58 e,
etc. F. L. Woodward regarw ::thit ~ragraph as the Buddha's epithets, so
that he translates it into Eoglish by referring not to dlU17nma itself but to the
Abhidhamma and Milt;"iI
39
2. It is important to listen to the Buddha's teathings and to

investigate the meaning of them (altkupapariJr.lchati) by
reflecting on them (OIluvitizklr:eti) , pondering on them
( anuvicilreti) and poring over them (anup."lchati).'
Item 1 can be regarded as one's attjtude to djs~ourse, and item
2 is important for the disciples (especially, for the novices) in
trying to define dhammas. It can therefore be understood that
from the very beginning, the way to define dhammas was
probably held among the disciples, and that in the course of
time, it was established as the way that the abhidhamma study
should be. To define or expound in detail the meaning of the
teaching made in brief by the Buddha is closely connected with
both dhammam vibhajali and- attham vibhqjati (see chapter 3.8).
Both of them are also related to the Buddha's admonishment :
"Show the true meaning of dhamma..r, expound on it, open it up,
make it clear,"2 "Don't speak of the false meaning by concealing it when one asks the true meaning, "3 "Give pure or clear
expression (parisuddha vohiira),." etc.
In connection with the definition of dhammas ta1lght by the
Buddha, there are two types of statement which must be
noticed. Since the Buddha sometimes speaks in conventional
everyday terms, such as 'being' (satta), 'reborn' (upapad) ,
'universe' (loka), as if accepting the opinion that there is some
kind of permanent soul, which he elsewhere rejects, there rather
appears to be some obscurity or inconsistency in his doctrine.
To resolve this difficulty we must recognize that two types of
statement have to' be distinguished in the Nilcliyas: those
consisting of popular terms and those consisting of terms of
strict truth. The former belongs to everyday language, literally
'concealing' (sammuti), and the latter, to philosophical language,
'ultimate' (paramattha). The philosophical language is called
"'-:
time of1ife. nameIy~ "He is one who teaches dhamm,a,.love1y in youth. lovely
in middle age, lovely at the end of life, both in t~e spirit and the letter."
See The Book oftlu Gradual Sayings, vol, 2,Pp.15I and 221.
1. A. Ill, 381-3, T. 2, 266
2. S. IV, 93, V, 262, etc.
3. Sn. 126.
4. A. II, 188.
40
'having the meaning drawn out' (nitat/ha), i.e. to be taken as

it stands, as an explicit and definitive statement, while everyday
language is called 'having the meaning requiring to be drawn
out' (neyyattha), i.e. that which require. restating so as to
relate it to.the philosophical standpoint of ultimate truth.' In
this context, we can see the following words :2
These two slander the thus-gone (tathiigata). Which two?
He who elucidates a dialogue (suttanta) whose meaning
requires to be drawn out as one whose meaning is drawn out;
and he who elucidates a dialogue whose meaning is drawn
out as one whose meaning requires to be drawn out.
This implies immediately that there were two types of statement:
the everyday and the philosophical. This can also be understood
as implying the rule of definition (or interpretation) which
must be observed by the disciples. Thus we see that the
Buddha instructed the proper relation between questions and
answers: instead of posing meaningless problems such as "Who
desires ?" or "Who is conscious ?" or "Is he who acts the same
as he who experiences the result of the action ?", one must
substitute the proper questions "Through what condition is
there consciousness?" or "Through what condition does such
and such a result occur ?", and as a result, one will obtain the
proper answers: "A is the cause of B," or "Conditioned by B,
there is A. "3
The fact that the definition of dhammas was formulated by
the chief disciples (or by the Buddha himself in some cases)
marks clearly the first stage of helping the growth of Abhidhamma
philosophy, in which the analytical study of the five khandhas,
the twelve dyatanas, etc. is established, i.e. to divide and classify
these dhammas into the principles of matter and mind, or to
expound on them from a philosophical and psychological point
of view. The Vihkanga and Dkammasatigll!li of the Sthaviravada
school are, though they must have gone through several
1. On this see A. K. Warder, Indian Buddhism, pp. 15051.
2. A.l, 60.
,. j ...
3. S. II, 13, T. 2. 102 a. Also, on this Ice A. K. Warder, "The Concepi:
ora Concept," Journal of InJian PhilQsophy.. vol. 1, No.2, pp.
181~82.
Abhidhamma and MdtikiJ
41
fluctuations before coming to stand as tbe Abhidhamma texts, in

faet tbe most representative of the Abhidhamma texts in which
many dhammas are set forth systematically from the standpoint
of both dhammal'{l viMajati and atthal'{l viMajati.
4.3 In illustration of the fifth point (arranging dhammas in
numerical order), we may take the examples of the Sangitisutta
and the Dasuttarasutta (also, their Chinese versions), as we have "mentioned briefly in chapter 3.B. In the beginning of the
Sangitisutta,' it is recorded that after the death of Nigal.llha
Nathaputta, the Nigal.lthas (lit. meaning 'free from bonds',
followers of Niithaputta here) became disunited and divided
into two parties by disputing with one another as to their
doctrine (dhamma) and discipline (vinaya)-this record can also
be seen in the Pdsddika.sutta. 2 Therefore, in order to avoid such
a dispute in the Buddhist community, in this sutta Sariputta
tries to collect various doctrinal principles (dhammas) which
were well set forth and imparted by the Buddha and to arrange
"them in numerical order. It seems that this sutta shows
Sariputta's study on concentration of abhidhamma.
It was probably important at the time of the Buddha to
collect dhammas taught by him and to distinguish them from
what was not taught by him. This will be understood from the
following statement;3
If there is a person who explains as the utterance of the
tathiigata what he has never talked or uttered, a"d who does
not explain as his utterance what has been talked or uttered
by the tatMgata, he is a slanderer of him.
,
What was not taught by the Buddha, this is in fact to be

understood as metaphysical subjects such as the eternity or noneternity of the world, the existence or non-existence of the
tathdgata after death, etc. ,( which will be discussed in another
v
1. D. 111,209-10, T. 1,49 c, and the Skt. text: E. Waldschmidt, "Die

Einleitung de! Sangitisiltra'J (ZDMG 1956), p. 301, and alga see: Dos Sarigi'isulra und Kommentar Satigitiparyiiya, ed. Valentina Stache-Rosen (Dogmatische
Begriffsreihen irn alter-en Buddhismus, II, Berlin, DAWB, 1968), Teill, p. 44.
2. D. III, 117-8, T. I, 72 c.
3. A. I, 60.
42
chapter). To the question "Was it taught by tbcBuddha~"

his disciples had to answer immediately in the affirmative in
.some cases or in the negative in other cases, as we :;ee, for
example, in the Ciila-Malunkya-sutta, where 'the Buddha points
out to MiilUllkyaputtathat metaphysical speculations are
not conducive to enlightenment, asking the questions of
MiiluIikyaputta.
' .;
Did I speak ever thus to you: "the world is eternal ?"
"the tathligata exists after 'death ?"
No, reverend sir. 1
Such questions and answers are most important in checking
whether or not his disciples draw a clear distinction between
dhammas taught by the Buddha and what does not belong to the
dhammas. In addition to these question and answer forms, which
play'also a major role in the development of Abhidhamma
philosophy, to distinguish dhammas taught by the Buddha from
what was not taugh~ by him and to arrange them in numerical
order show clearly a step in the progress of Abhidhamma
philosophy. The Satigiliparyaya of the Sarviistiviida school is
made up in this manner. The Satigiliparyiiyais an Abhidhamma
text, but it is based on the, Sangitisfltra of the Sarvastivada
schooL In 'fact the SatiJiliparyaya is simply a kind of commentary
on the Sarigi#sutra, each dhamma mentioned being explained by .
quotations from other suttas and by Qther discussions. Tht
method is like some parts of the Dharmaskandha of the
Sarviistiviida school or the Vibhanga of the Sthaviraviida school.
4.4 Through the medium of the special study of dhammas.

such as defining dhammas and arranging them in numerical
order, the Buddha's disciples established a sound foundation of
the Abhidhamma Pi/aka, and called thesd'dhammas which were
defined and arranged Mlitikli. The word rnatika means 'matrix'
or list of topics, We can see from the Nikayas and Aga,"as that
what was called Malika was rehearsed (probably in "abhidhamma
study"), though it is difficult to decide' what kinds of doctrinal
I.
M. 1,428, T. 1,804 boc.
43
Abhidhamma and Miltiled
topics it meant. In the Mahliparinibbiinasutta the following

statement can be seen: 1
,,.
In such and such a dwelling-place many elder monks live,
having much learning (bahussuta) as handed down by tradition (dgatligama) , versed in the doctrine (lfhammadhara) , versed
in the discipline (vinayadhara) , versed in the doctrinal topics
(miitikiidhara).
And also, we see in another text;2

Monks, there is a monk who frequents the monks, having
much learning as handed down by tradition, versed in the
doctrine, versed in the discipline, versed in the doctrinal
topics (miitikiidhara). He inquires (paripucchati) of them and
questions (paripanhati) thus: "How is this, reverend sir?
What is the meaning of this ?" They then open up (vivarati)
to him what was unopened (aviva/a) , make clear (uttlini
karoti) what was obscure (anuttdnikata) , and .as to diverse
doubtful points of doctrine (kankhdllhiiniya Ifhamma) , they
dispel (pa/ivinodeti) his doubts. This is how he finds his
strength (nissayasampanna).
The word miitikii can also be found in the Vinaya Pi/aka,

where it appears with the word vibhanga (indicating the
Suttavibhanga or Vinayavibhanga) and the word khanlfhaka
(indicating the Khandhakas).' Therefore, it is also a word used
for a special study of vinqya (abhivinaya: probably studying the
Plitinwkkhasulta, see example( I )of chapter 3.5 and chapter 3.8).
However, it seems that the word matikd came to be used as a
special word for abhidhamma.
In Chinese Yinqya texts such as the Ken-pe1l-shuo-i-ch'ieh:J!u-pup'i-nai-yeh of the Miilasarviistiviida school' and the Mo-ho-seng-
1. D. 11,125, T. I, 17 c. T. I. 182 c, in which the word 'doctrine' can

be seen.
.,
2. A.I, 117, III,179,361, V, I516,M. 1,221.T. 2,3430, in which

the word 'abhidhamma' is used.
3. Yin. V. 86.
4.
T. 24, 408 b.
44
chih-lii of the Mahiisamghika school,' and also in "A Story of

the King Asoka" (A!o~iioadana),' the word miitika is used as a
synonym for the word abhidhamma, and is regarded as the
Abhidhamma Pitaka, one of the three Pitakas. However, Miitikd
cannot be regarded as the Abhidhamma Pitaka now extant, but
Can be considered to be the simple form of the Abhidhamma
Pitaka. In fact such MatiNs are served as the kernel of the
respective Abhidhamm. texts (particularly the seven well 'known
texts of the Sthaviraviida and the Sarviistiviida schools). On

this point, A. K. Warder's opinion is worthy of note: It seems
very probable that in the earliest period this third section of
the Tripitaka consisted simply of some set of Matrkd headings,
possibly propounded by the Buddha himself when giving
systematic instruction to his followers, and that this was only
later fully elaborated into Abhidharma expositions.'
What are then the original Mdtikiis? It is difficult to draw
them exactly from the Nikiiyas and Agamas. The Mulasarviistivada Vinl!Ya states that Miitikas are: 4
I.
2.
3.
4.
S.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
II.
12.
13.
14.
IS.
16.
satipallhiinas (bases of self-possession),

4 sammappadhiinas (right exertions),
4 iddhipiidas (bases of power),
S indriyas (faculties),
S balas (strengths),
7 bojjhangas (factors of enlightenment) ,
8 maggangas (factors of the way),
4 vesarajjas ,( bases of self-confidence),
4 pa/isambhidiis (bases of comprehension) ,
4 siimmaiifillphalas (fruits of striverhood),
4 dhammapadas (bases of 'the doctrine),
arat)adhamma (?) (peacefulness),
pantasamiidhi (?) (mental concentration),
3 samddhis (bases of concentration),
samiidMbhdvanli (?) (development of concentration),
abhisamaya (insight),
'I,
I. T. 22, 334 c.
2. T. 50, 113c.
3. Indian Buddhism, p 10
4. T. 24, 408 b.
Abhidhamma and Mdtikii ."..
45
17. sammutifiiJ~a (?) (common knowledge) ,

18. samathavipassanii (tranquillity and insight),
19. dhammasang~! (enumeration of principles) ,
20. dhammakkhandhas (groups of principles) .
It is understood that these MiItikiis do not indicate Abhidhamma

Pitaka books except for the last two, which actually show the
titles of Abhidhamma texts of the Sthaviravada and the Sarvasti-
varla schools, but doctrinal topics or list of topics, a set of notes

giving just the headings of a body of doctrine. Accordingly, we
could justifiably say that in the earliest period Miitikiis like the
above were rehearsed in an abhidhamma study. The various
Mdtikiis mentioned above neither cover ~ all the topics in the
Abhidhamma texts, nor include the universal ones in early
Buddhism. In the Nikiiyas and Agamas, there are many sut/as
(dialogues) which collected the varied topics of dhammas without
using the word miitikd. And it is certain that these topics
helped the growth of AbhidhammamiitikiJs. Above all, the mo;t
representative topics are thirty..seven practical dhammas or a set
of seven headings. Therefore, this point should be discussed in
the following chapter.
5
THE SYSTEMATIZATION OF MATIKAS
5.1 It is doubtful whether any Abhidhamma texts were
recited at the time of the Buddha, though we could say that by
comparing the available Abhidhamma - texts, a substantial
development took place within the first two centuries after the
Buddha's parinibMna, and in great part before the First, Schism
(not earlier than a hundred and thirty-seven years after the
parinibbiina: placing the event in B.C, 349 1). However,.we have ,.-':'.
learned that Miitiklis had already existed in the earliest period
(see chapter 4.4). We would say that since the Buddha's
disciples showed an attitude of analyzing dhammas. taught by
the Buddha clearly and of organizing them synthetically in an
abhidhamma study, they maintained the same attitude in dealing
with Mdtiklis.
Not only various Mdtikiis in the Sangitiparyilya, 2 which are
classified and expounded in the order of ones, twos, threes, etc.
up to tens, but also Mdtikds in the other Abhidhamma texts have
served as headings of a body of doctrine, We have already
indicated some of the available Abhidhamma texts in previous
1. On this see A. K. Warder, IndianBuddhism, pp. 13-4, 214.218.
2. In Das Satigflisatra und sein Kommenlar SmigUiparydya, a comparison of
Mtltr/cds in the Satigitisatra in Skt., Pili and Chinese with those in the Sangi.
tipary4ya is made (Berlin, DAWB, 1%8, Teil I, pp. 213-7), and also in the
Vinaya section ofa Japanese translation of the Chinese TripiJoka (Kokuyaku
Issaikyo). a comparison of Mdtrkds in the Sarigitiparyd,Ya with those in the
Satlgitisutlanta and its Chinese, version is made (vol. 1) pp. 729).
Tke Systematization of, Matikds
47
pages. But, at this point, let us introduce the seven well known
Abhidkamma texts of the Sthaviravada and the Sarvastivada
schools. The seven well known Abhidhamma texts of the
Sthaviravada school are: 1
I. Dhammasanga~i,
2. Vibhanga,
3. Dhatukathii,
4. Puggalapaiinalli,
5. Katkilvallku,
6. ramaka,
7. Pal/hana.
On the other hand, the Abhidharma texts~f the Sarvastivada

s~hool, preserved in its Chinese version, also comprise seven
treatises. They are as follows: 1
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Jiiiinaprasthana of Arya Katyayanlputra,

SangitiparyiJya of MahakauHhila,
Prakar~apiJda ofBthavira Vasumitra,
Vijficinakiiya of Sthavira Devasarman,
DhdtakiJya of PiirI,la,
Dharmaskandha of Arya 8ariputra,
Prajiiapti1lJstra of Arya Maudgaiyayana.
In addition to the above texts of the two different schools, we'

cannot overlook the Silriputrllbhidharma!lJstra, probably of the
Dharm"guptaka school, which seems to COver the whole field of
Abhidhamma. That is to say, the Siiriputrilbhidharma!lJstra itself
includes the subject matter of the Dharmaskandha, Vibhanga,
Puggalapaiinatti (Concept of 'Per.on'), and so on. How were
then various_Matikas in these Abhidhamma texts worked up?
5.2 According to A. K. Warder, the seven Abhidhamma texts

of the Sthaviravada school are based on three primary and
1. For details, see Nyanatiloka Mahathera, Guide Through W Abhidhtlmma..

Pi/aka.
2. For details, see A. C. Banerjee, Sarlldstivdda Likrature,

3. On Ihis sec A. Bareau. ':Les origines du $driputnJhhidharma.J4stra,'~
Museon, t. LXIII, 1..2, pp. 69.95, and A. K. Warder, Indian Buddhism.
p.220.
Abhidh(l11lma Philosophy
separate lists of topics, worked up in a variety of ways. They

are seen in the following order~l
(I) The list of twenty-two tikas (triplets) and 100 dukas
(couplets), to which a list of a further forty-two Suttantilea
dukas is sometimes appended. This Miltikii, which is set out at
the beginning of the Dhammasanga~i, is the basis of that book
and also of the Pailluina.
Besides, we can see that the
Panhapucchaka sections in the Vibhanga (pp. 12-61) analyze the
dhammas according to these tikas and dukas, and the DIuitukathiJ
simply adds the twenty-two tikas and 100 dukas to the khandhas
(groups), ayatanas (spheres), dMtus (elements), etc. The
Puggalapaiinatti also adds its own miitikds of puggala samayavimutta
(one who is emancipated in season), puggala asamayavimutta
(one who is emancipated out of season), etc., culled from the
SuUa texts. But this is placed under No.2.
.
(~ The groups of dhammas such as the khandhas, ayatanas,
dhiltus, etc. The list of such groups is very variable, but it
forms the basis of the Vibhanga, DMtukatM, Puggalapannatti and
ramaka. The dhammas (phassa: touch, vedaniI: sensation, saiina:
perception, etc.) of the Dhammasanga~i seem to be connected
with this.
(3) The list of controversial topics in the K athilvatthu.
We have no objection to the above. So we would like to
examine each of the three different types.
5.3 On Tikas and Dukas. For us, it is unnecessary here to
make a full list of twenty-two tikas and 100 dukas in the
Dhammasang~i and Pa llhilna. The most important is to know
the reason why such miitikiis were produced. It is said that the
DhiltukatM adding the twenty-two tikas and 100 dukas to the
khandhas, dyatanas, etc. is a mere exercise in classifying all these
dhammas by khandhas, ayatanas, and dhiltus.' This exercise is,
however, important in the case of analysis and systematic study
of dhammas taught by the Buddha. That is, from the very
beginning the Buddha's disciples had to understand his teachiIl:gs analytically and systematically. In this case, what was
lor,Ed. A. P. Buddhadatta and A. K. Warder, Mohavicchtdan;, p. xix.
2. 'See Mohavicehedanr, p. xix.
The SystematiZJJtion of Mdtikds
49
always required of his disciples is to grasp the contrary concept

of words or to see contradictory terms. Generally speaking,
Indian languages (including Pilli) have various prefixes (upasaggas) expressing the negative, such as a, antal, nits), vi,
etc., and also use indeclinable particles (nipatas) for negation,
such as na, no, m4, alam, halam, and so on. For example, in
a list of cu!anlaraduka (the short intermediate set of couplets),
the following dukas are given;1
I. Sa(p)/JIlCcl!JNldhamma; a-(p)pacco,ya dhamma (principles that
are causally related; not causally related).
2. Sa.khata dhamma; a-sankhata dhamma (principles that are
activated; unactivated).
3. Sanidassana dhamma; a-nidassana dhamma (principles that are
visible; invisible).
4.Sa-{; )pa/ighadhamma; a-(p )pafigha dhamma (principles that
reactions; not reactions) .
5. RUpi dhamma; aropi dhamma (principles that have visible
object; that have invisible object) .
6. Lokiya dhamma; lokultara dhamma (principles that are
mundane; supramundane) .
7. Vinnryya dhamma; no vinnryya dhamma (principles that may
be cognized in a given way; that may not be cognized in
that given way) .
are
These dukas are shown clearly by using both upasaggas and

nipatas expressing negation (except for No.6) and are contradictory to each other. To say that the "pasaggas and nipatas
were already used in the time of the Buddha is no more than
to say that they were part of the language. (Of course the way
in which he used them may well have been new.) For instance,
the Sa"rJiuttanikiiya deals with varieties of synonym denoting the
concept for nibbana (extinction) in which there are negative
expressions :1
1. An-asava : non-influence.
2. A -jajjara ; unfading.
3. Nis-papanca ; non-differentiation.
1.
2.
Dh. pp. 23.

S. IV, 368-73, T. 2, 224 a.
50
4. A-mata : deathlessness.
5. An-alaya : non-attachment.
Also, the word 'fulsity' that is contrary to 'truth' (bhata) i.
expressed by the words a-bhilta, the word 'bad' that is contrary to 'good' (kusala) is expressed by the words a-kusala and
so forth. Thus, we cannot overlook the fact that the practical
use of negative prefixes accelerated the development of Matikas
of tikas and dukas. This may be clarified further from a logical
point of view.
5.4 As can be realized from the above, the words sappaccaya dhamma are contradictory to the words appaccaya
dhamma, and the former is the contradictory term of the
latter. For the sake of convenience, let us put the capital letter
B for sappacca dhamma and put -B (expressing the denial of B) 1
for appaccaya dhamma. At this point, we should not fall into the
fallacy that duka-Miltikiis consist, like the following, of two
propositions :
( I) Everything is B.
(2) Everything is not B.
If so, item (I) is A form and item (2), E form according to
traditional Aristotelian logic, which we will refer to more or
less in another chapter. Four ways of joining terms pairwise
into statements have been treated as fundamental throughout
,\?, the logical tradition stemming from Aristotle: 'All Fare G'.
'No Fare G', 'Some Fare G' J and 'Some F are not G'. State'"
ments of these four forms were called categorical. The four
forms were distinguished by special nomenclature and by code
'A', 'E','I',and 'O',as follows:
A (Universal affirmative) : All Fare G.
E (Universal negative) : No Fare G.
I (Particular affirmative) : Some Fare G.
o (Particular negative) : Some F are not G.
Apart from the explanation of the four forms,' a matter of
great importance concerning the dukais the relationship between
,
1.
2.
Ou this see W:V. Quine. Elementary Logie, p. 11.

For details, see W. V. Quine, Mdh9ds of Logie, pp. 66-9.
The Systematizatum of Miitikiis
51
B and not B. Specifically, the relation of the two can be

expressed through what is called alternation, which correspol1:cls
to the connective "or," or "either ... or ... ": Either B or
not B. The components connected by "or" or "either ... or
... " are called alternants and there may be two or more of
them. 1 The components may be interchanged in position' without affecting the meaning (unlike components in conditionals).,
and they may be categorical, non-categorical, compound, or
any other kind of proposition.
Now, the relation of duka, namely: sappaccaya dhamma and
appaccaya dhamma becomes:
(3) Anything is B or not B.
I t does not become:
(4) Everything is B or everything is not B.
Although "anything" includes case a, case b, case c, ... case x,
which can be viewed as "everything," items (3) and (4) are not
the same. If we replace the term 'everything' by the universal
quantifier' (x) " (3) becomes:
(x) [(x is B) or - (x is B) 1
And (4) becomes with the "false proposition, which contain.

(1) and (2) :
'
.(x) (x is B) or (x) - (x is B)
Thus most of the duka-Miitikiis are based on contradictory terms,
which can be expressed by item (3) above. It seems that
various Miitikiis of dukas were produced with the object of
clarifying the fundamental standpoint of Buddhism, of clearing
~.
1. In ordinary speech the words "either . . .or ... " arc taken in two different senses. One sense may be called the "inclU9ive sense" of alternative pro_
positions. (In this case, "v" of the word vel in Latin is used.) ,In this sense
a statement of the form: "Either p or q" would be considered true if (a) p
were true, (b) q were true, or (e) p and q were both tru~; it would be considered false only in case p was false and q was false also. The other sense
may be called the "exclusive sense". (In this case, the connective or is used
in modern logic.) Ordinjlry speech sometimes treat! "either...ar ... It as.
implying that one alternant or the other mwt be true exclusively, and thus.
that "Either p or q" would be false if both p and q were true at the same
time. This .second sense of"either ...or ... " is called the "exclusive sense". On
this, see Richard B. Angell Reasoning and Logic, p. 145.
52
up doubts, and of comparing what one knows with the knowledge of others. In view of the fact that Buddhists had a good
command of upasaggas and niptitas expressing negation, it was
linguistically not difficult for them to understand contradictory
terms. And by doing so, they could carry on the further
analysis and systematic study of dhammas.
5.5 Tika-Matikas can be produced from the concept of
-contrary terms. As ODe of the most representative tikas, we see
the words sukha (happiness), dukkha (unhappiness) and
'adukkhamasukha' (neither unhappiness nor happiness). Both
sukha and dukkha are contrary to each other, from which the
"neutral" can be drawn: adukkhamasukha. A certain sutta text
states: 1
,<
There are three feelings (or sensations, vedana) : (I) happy

feeling (sukha vedana), (2) unhappy feeling (dukkha vedana) ,
and (3) feeling that is neither unhappy nor happy (adukkhamasukha vedand). What is item (I)? That which is experienced,
whether by body or mind, and is happy and sweet (sata) ,
this is a happy feeling. What is item (2)? That which is
experienced, whether by body or mind, and is unhappy and
unsweet (asdta) , this is an unhappy feeling. What is item
(3)? That which is experienced. whether by body or mind,
and is neither sweet nor unsweet, this is a feeling that is
neither unhappy nor happy.
And in another place, the following statement can be seen :2
Whenever one feels item (I). one feels neither item (2) nor
item (3).
Whenever orle feels item (2), one feels neither item (I) nor
item (3).
Whenever one feels item (3), one feels neither item (I) nor
item (2).
Therefore, this expression would be "All men feel either happiness or unhappiness or neither-happiness-nor-unhappiness." This
is sche?,atized by:
1.
2.
M. I, 302303.
M. I, 500, D. II, 66, T. 1,61 c, 2, 249 c, 449 b, etc.
The Systematizatu,n of Mdtikds
53
(x) Ex is a man::J ( (x is a) or (x is h) or - (x is a v x is b 1
After this fashion, in theDhammasaliga~i,all dhammas (principles)
are systematized according to the criteria of kusala (good),
akusala (bad) and avyakata (neither-good-nor-bad), because
Buddhists came to the conclusion that the root of one's mind
was not always aviJJii (ignorance), and there was the element
of kusala, Musala and avyakata. Although the words .-kusala
are philologically contradictory to kusala, the former is not
always equivalent to that which is expressed by the negative of
the latter, nan;lely: a-kusala meaning 'not good'.l In other
words, a-kusala should be regarded as meaning 'bad' which is
contrary to 'good' (kusala). From the contradictory of the two,
the neutral avyakata can be produced. Therefore, we can sec
the expression "The root of one's mind is either good or bad or
neither-good-nor-bad." Since "one's~ind" here can be viewed
as "anyone's mind," the schematization becomes:
(x) [(x is a) or (x is h) or - (x is a v x is h) 1
From the preceding discussions, we are led to the conclusion
that by understanding a certain profound meaning of tikas and
dukas,' Buddhists attempted th", analysis and systematic study
of such doctrinal topics, and at the same time, that through
the cOJ.ltradictory concept of terms and the concept of contrary
terms, they tried to realize a view of life and the world in
Buddhism.
'.
5.6 On Khandhayatanadhatuyo. etc. About the groups
of dhammas such as the khandhas, dyatanas, dhdtus, etc., there is
little need to talk at length. Our main task is to survey how
the doctrinal topics or Mdtikds which form the basis of AMidhamma philosophy developed from the Nikiiyas and Agamas, and
how the Miitikiis were classified in the Ahhidhamma texts.
, For Buddhists, one of the chief tasks in developing the
Buddha's doctrines as the Ahhidhamma texts must have been the
1. We see from this that logic is not given by -the language, which uses
negative prefixes inconsistently (for both contradictories and -contraries).
Logic had to be imposed on the natural language by philosopher..
2. On these detailed explanations of tikas and dukas, translated into
English, see C. A. F. Rhys Davids, A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics,
,
00. cv_cxii.
54
selection and the arrangement of Matikiis; e.g. the 18 topics

reckoned iIi the Vibhanga of the Sthaviravada school, the 21
topics in the Dharmaskandha of the Sarvastivada school, the first
21 topics iJa the ,siiriputriibhidharmafastra of the Dharmaguptaka
school (probably) and the like, because some groups or aggregates of doctrinal topics (dhammakkhandhas) can be found in the
Nikdyas and Agarnas. In this case, these do not always mean the
Sutta texts which collect topics numerically such as Sangitisutta, Dasuttarasutta and so on. For instance, the Chachakkasutta
(M. III, 280-87) and its Chinese version (T. I, 562 a-566 a) ;
the Culavedatlasutta (M. I, 299-305) and its Chinese version
(T. I, 788 a-790 b); the Mahiivedallasutta (M. I, 292-98) and
its Chinese version (T. I, 790 b-792 b) are the typical texts
which involve some aggregates of doctrinal topics. Above all,
many topics in the Chinese rendering of the Chachakkasutta
correspond to chapters in the Dharmaskandha, one of the seven
well known Abhidhamma texts of the Sarvastivada school (T.
26, 453 b-514 a). The former seems to be the original text of
the latter:
.
Topics in the Chachakkasutta
Chapters in the Dharmaskandha
. 19th vagga (chapter).
5 khandhas (groups). :
6 ajjhattikayatanas (internal spheres) ]
18th vagga.
6 biJhiriiyatanas (,external spheres)
.
6 vinndl)akiiyas (bodies of consciousness)
6 phassakdyas (bodies of touch)
6 vedaniikiiyas (bodies of sensation)
6 saiiniikayas (bodies of perception)
6 sancetaniikiiyas (bodies of thought)
6 taT!hiikiiyas (bodies of thirst)
6 dhiitus (elements). . . . .
. 20th vagga.
12 paJiccasamuppiidas (dependent originations) '" 21st vagga.
4 satipallMnas (bases of self-possession)
. 9th vagga.
4 sammappadhiinas (right exertions)
. 7th vagga.
4 iddhipiidas (bases of power) .
. 8th vagga.
4 jhiinas (meditations) .
' . . 11th vagga.
4 saccas (truths).
. 10th vagga.
4 sannas (perception)
4 appamafinas (boundlessness). .'
12th vagga.
4 arupas (invisible object). .
13th vagga.
The Systematization of Matikas
4 ariyavamsas (noble lineages)

4 samlltlas (strivers) .
5 vimuttayatanas (liberation from spheres)
5 indriyas (faculties) .
5 balas (strengths)
5 nissarar.zadhatus (liberation from elements)
7 dhanas (treasures)
7 balas (strengths)
7 bojjharigas (factors of enlightenment)
8 maggarigas (factors of the way) .
4 lakkha~as (characteristics)
55
6th vagga.
4th vagga.
17th vagga.
15th vagga.
10th vagga.
The above Matikds are arranged at random. The most elaborated Ml1tikas in the Nikayas and Agamas are the thirty-seven
practical dhammas (or a set of seven headings for them)
According to the Mahaparinibbdnasutta, when in Vesiili on his
way to Kusinara, the Buddha convened his monks and explained that his doctrine should be the 'refuge' (sara",,) for his
monks, and later he says it will be the teacher after he has
gone. At that time, as a summary of his teachings, the thirtyseven dhammas are indicated. l This summary seems to have been
common to all schools of Buddhism. Apart from the versions
of the M ahapariRibbiinasutta which give it such prominence,
we find the same list of seven headings, from the four bases of
self-possession (satipallhanas) to the noble eightfold way (or
eight factors of the way), in many other texts of all known
schools,2
We would say that the thirty-seven practical dhammas given
by the Buddha at Vesiili gave rise to the idea of a set of matikas
and in due course. to the various elaborations of it as
Abhidhamma philosophy, and at the same time, that the four
saccas, together with the nine or twelve paticcasamupP4das as the
theory of causation, which is really an expansion of the second
truth of the four saccas, came to be chlssified as the matikas for
1.
D. II, 119'20.
2. ~ the Parinibbdnasutta translated by Fu-to--yeh-she and Chu Fu-nien

(T. I, 16 c) as well as in the Sutta translated by an anonymous person
(T.1, 181 b), forty-one dluzmmas (with the four jhanas added to the 37 dJuzmmas)
are given.
56
study of panna (understanding) and the Buddhist analysis of

life and eventually of the universe.
5.7 Such a tendency is displayed clearly in the case of
khandhayatanadhatuyo, which are a group of dhammas composed
of the five *handhas, twelve (or six) dyatanas, and eighteen dhdtus
-also we find six dhatus which are the principles constituting
matter and mind. These are collected in both the SoThyuttanikdya and Stltflyukt4gama. They contain sections called "khandha
samyutta,"l "safayatana samyutta,"1 and "dhdtu samyutta."8 Also,
in the Pali Vinqya, we can see a discourse on the five khandhas
which was given to five monks by the Buddha:'
Matter (rapa as physical principles) is non-ego. Ifmatter
were ego, it 'wo~ld not be involved in sickness, and one could
say of matter: "Thus let it be. Thus let it not be." But,
inasmuch as matter is non-ego, that is why matter is involved
in sickness, one cannot say of matter: "Thus let it be.
Thus let it not be." Sensation (vedanti) is non-ego ... "Thus
let it be. Thus let it not be." Perception (sanna) is non-ego ...
"Thus let it be. Thus let it not be." Forces (sankhdra) are
non-ego . .. "Thus let them be. Thus let them not be."
Consciousness (viiiiiii1.1a) is non-ego. . . "Thus let it be. Thus
let it not be. II
From the above, we can understand that the five khandhas (as
well as six !iyatanas) preached by the Buddha were the dhammas
(doctrines) which would lead to the realization of anieta,
dukkha, and anattan in this phenomenal world. Also, the
Buddha always said, "Sabba (everything) in the world is , anicea,
dukkha and anattan."1 In this case, sabba,' of course, involves
the five khandhas or six ayatanas. However, in course of time,
the five khandhas or six ayatanas were regarded as the principles
composing the human being, and became the subject of an
analytical study. Because the list of eighteen dhatus was created
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
S. III, 1-183, T. Z, I 0-22 b, 29 e-37 b,64 1>-72 b.

S.IV, 1-204, T. 2,49 b79 0,86 e-93 b,310 b-317 b.
S. II, 140-7/, T. 2, 114 e-119 a.
Yin. I, 1O~4. T. 22, 789 a, Also, see T. 22, 105 a, 24, 128 b-c, etc.
S. IV, 15, T. 2, 91 ab.
57
The Systematization q/Miitikiis
by adding six kinds of COJ;lSciOllsness to the twelve ayatanas

(which are composed of six sense-organs and their objects),
a group of dhammas
consisting of the five khandhas, twelve
dyatanas, and eighteen dhiitus came to develop -in the direction
of,an analytical study of man. As a result, the Ahhidhamma texts
presented the topics of khandhiiyatanadhiituyo, in which many
dhammas (principles) were linked with one another. We cannot
see yet the study of the components of man in the JVikiiyas
and Agamas, but there is no denying the fact that many
Sutta texts which have reference to the eighteen dhiitus have a
great influence on the study of the classification of man.
5.8 As can be realized from the discussions in chapter 5.6

and 7, there is a distinct difference between the group of the
thirty-seven dhammas and that of khandhayatanadhiituyo, etc. The
former gives a consistent and orderly exposition of the striving
of the early Buddhists, and the latter, the Buddhist analysis of
life with its constituent principles, and the theory of causation.
The analysis of principles and of causation belongs to the field
of insight rather than of striving and meditation, but its understanding was doubtless considered to be dependent on the
training of Buddhists. In this sense, we can agree with A. K.
Warder's view that a comparison of the Pali tradition with the
Sarvastivada Ahhidhamma and with the lists of miitikii in the
Aiokavaddna (A Story of the King Asoka) and in the Miilasarvastivada Vinaya suggests an early system of twenty-one groupS:1
,
I. 4 satipallhiinas: 4 bases of self-possession.
2. 4 sammappadMnas:' 4 right exertions.
3. 4 iddhipadas: 4 bases of power.
4. 5 indriyas: 5 faculties.
5. 5 halas: 5 strengths.
6. 7 hojjharigas: 7 factors of enlightenment.
7. 8 maggaflgas: 8 factors of the way.
1. See Mohaviccludanr, pp. xxii. A. K. Ward~r has recently stated that an

early system of twenty-one Rroups may be revised in the light of additional
evidence, e.g. SdriputrdbhidharmaSdstra, etc.
58
B. 5 (orig. 4?) sikkhiipadas: 5 precepts.

9. 4 siimafinaphalas: 4 fruits of striverhood.
10. 4 ariyavamsas: 4 noble lineages.
II. 4 pa/isambhidas: 4 comprehensions.
12. 4 jhiinas: 4 stages of meditation.
13. 4 appamafifias: 4 kinds of houndlessness.
14. 6 (orig. 4?) abhififiiis: 6 kinds of insight.
15.
16.
17.
lB.
19.
20.
21.
5. khandhas: 5 groups.
12 ayalanas: 12 spheres.
18 dhiilus: 18 elements.
22 (?) indriyas (? or pafifios) : 22 faculties (or understandings) .
? puggalas or ekottaras: persons or one up.
4 saccas: 4 truths.
12 pa/iccasamuppiidas: twelve-linked chain of dependent
origination.
The first seven topics are very constant, even in internal order,
in the several sources, and seem to have constituted the whole
miitikii at first. ,At; mentioned in chapter 5.6, these are identical
with the list of the thirty-seven dhammas attributed to the
Buddha in the Mahiiparinibbiinasutta (D. II, 120) as a summary
of his teachings, elsewhere called bodhipakkhiyii dhammii or simply
saddham71UJ (true doctrh.e).' The middle seven topics list the
stages of the Buddhist life and especially of samiidhi (concentration). The last seven topics are what we have called theoretical dhammas (see chapter 2.4) or the Buddhist analysis of
life (see chapter 5.6).
For a certainty, the topics in the Ahhidhamma texts are presented' by arranging the Ma/ikas as displayed above. That is to
say, the IB topics in the Vihhanga, the 21 topics in the
Dharmaskandha and the first twenty-one topics in the 8iiripulriibhidharmailistra are related to one another. But- the" arrangement of the topics differs greatly in the three texts. This indicates
the different sectarian characteristics of these three texts and the
different stages of the development of the study of Abhidhamma.
At this point, let us collate the toplcs in the three texts:
1.
Vbh. p. 372.
T he Systematization
<if Miltikas
Vibhanga
59
Dharmaskandha
Siiriputrabhidharma
I. khandha
(group)
sikkhiipada
ayatana
2. ayatana
(sphere)
sotapaltryanga
(factor of obtaining
the stream)
dhiitu
3. dhiitu
aveccappasiida
(complete confidence)
khandha
( element)
4. sacca
(truth)
5. indriya
(faculty)
6. paccayakdra
(aspect of
condition)
7. satipallMna
8.
9.
10.
II.
12.
13.
14.
(base of selfpossession)
sammappadhdna
(right exertion)
iddhipiida
(base of power)
bojjhanga
(factor of
enlightenment)
magga
(way)
jhana
(meditation)
appamafifiii
(boundlessness)
sikkhdpada
(precept)
slbnafifia
sacca
(profession of
asceticism)
abhiiiiiapatipadii ~
(way of knowledge)
indriya
ariyavatiua
(noble lineage)
bojjhanga
sammappadhana
akusala-miUa
(bad root)
iddhipiida
kusala-mula
(good root)
mahd-bhiita
(great existent)
upiisaka
(lay disciple)
satipallMna
sacca
jhdna
dhiitu
appamafifia
kamma
(action)
puggala
(persol))
aruppa
(invisible object)
bhdvana
(development)
niiT}a
15. pa/isambhidii
bojjhanga
(comprehension)
paccayiikara
16.
satipallMna
ii(1)a
(knowledge)
khuddakavatthu
60
17. khuddakavatthu
(minor ground)
18. dhammahndaya
(heart of the
teaching)
19.
20.
21.
Abhidhamma Phi{osophy
indriya
sa,!,mappadMna
ayala.a
iddhipada
khandha
dhlitu
paccayiik4ra
jhd.a
magga
kilesa
(defilement)
5.9 The first fifteen chapters of the Dharmaskandha deal with

moral and practical dhammas pertaining to enlightenment, and
the remaining chapters deal with the theoretical dhammas belonging rather to the field of insight. The main topics of the
Dharmaskandha appear to be in the first fifteen chapters. To
speak more precisely, the first, second and the third chapters
include a great many dhammas (teachings) which the laym~n
and the novices of the Buddha ought to study. The fourth,
fifth and the sixth chapters explain the methodology of studying
Buddhism. The last nine chapters (from the seventh to the
fifteenth) expatiate upon the thirty-seven dhammas and other
paths of practice. Therefore, the purpose of tbe Dharmaskandha
was to arrange a series of dhammas (doctrines) according to a
certain definite system. For example, although the internal
order of the thirty-seven practical dhammas is free and not in the
regular order, namely:
5th chapter deals with 5 indriyas and 5 balas,
7th chapter deals with 4 sammappadhilnas,
8th chapter deals with 4 iddhiplidas,
9th chapter deals with 4 sa/ipallhilnas,
10th chapter deals with 8 maggarigas,
15th chapter deals with 7 bojjhangas,
yet the thirty dhammas are systematized by the seven bojjhangas.
In other words, the main topic in the thirtyseven dhammas is theseven bojjhangas.
The arrangement of the twelve chapters in mahlivagga of the
Samyuttanikaya is also. free :1
1. S. V, 1-473.
61
The Systematization of Mlitiklis
46th chapter deals

47th chapter deals
48th chapter deals
49th chapter deals
50th chapter deals
51st chapter deals
56th chapter deals
with 7 bojjhOllgas,
with 4 satipallhiinas,
with 5 indrryas,
with 4 sammappadhiinas,
with 5 balas,
with 4 iddhipiidas,
with 8 maggaflgas.
And the arrangement of the nine chapters in the maggavagga of

the StJ11lyukt4gama is free too :'
lst chapter deals with 4 satipallhlinas,
2nd chapter deals with 5 indriyas,
3rd chapter deals with 5 balas,
4th chapter deals with 7 bojjhaflgas,
5th chapter deals with 8 maggangas;
9th chapter deals with 4 sammappadhdnas.
So we might say that the Dharmaskandha follows in succession the

way of the Nikliyas and Agamas. But it is also true that there is
a basic difference between them. In the Nikiiyas and Agamas,
there is apparently not any system of arrangement among all the
dhammas. On the other hand, the dhammas in the Dharmaskandha
tend to be systematized according to the Abhidhammic explanation. For example, we can see the relationship between the four
satipatthlinas and the five khandhas as follows:
1. K d y a - - - - - - 1 . Rapa
2. Vedanli
2. Vedana
3. Citta
3. V;niillQa
4. Sanna
[ 5. Sarhkhiira
4. Dhamma-----/
In view of the fact that according to A. K. Warder,' the old

Nikllyas anticipate in some ways the classification of dhammas
worked out in the Abhidhamma, where some dhammas are
1. T. 2, 1)0 <-205 < and 219 b-226 .
2. "Dharmas and Data," Journal 0/ Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, No.3,
November, 1971, p. 287.
62
AbhidMmma Philosophy
included in others, it might be recognized in the Nikdyas and

Agamas that the fourth dhamma of the four satipallhiinas
includes all five khandhas as mental object. However, the
Dharmaskandha seems to be intended to emphasize especially
the relation of the fourth dhamma of the four satipallhanas to
both sanna and sarhkhara.
The eleventh and the twelfth chapters in the Dharmaskandha
are devoted to the exposition of the four jhiinas (meditations)
and the four appamaniids (boundlessness). There are eight stages
of meditation. It is from the four jhOnas that one starts the
lowest meditation, and the highest meditation is included in the
four appamaiirias. The purpose of this arrangement is to
systematize both of these dhammas. The last six chapters deal
with the five khandhas, twelve ayatanas, eighteen dhatus and the
like) but the arrangement of these chapters is not systematic.
Regardless of the fact that the first three chapters of the Vibhanga
are arranged according to the regular order of- the dhammas :
khandhdyatanadhatuyo, chapter eighteen, nineteen and twenty in
the Dharmaskandha deal with these dhammas irregularly: ayatana
- ___ kMndM-.... dhatu. On the whole, the last six chapters are
not arranged in any system, whereas fifteen chapters are organized
into mutual relationship. It seems that the last six chapters were
added to the first fifteen chapters which were compiled earlier.
But these six chapters help the growth of Abhidhamma philosophy
in the later period.
".
5.10 The Vibhanga expatiates upon the important doctrines

of Buddhism. The first six chapters explain the Buddhist
epistemology; view of the world and psychology. From the
seventh to the eleventh chapter, the thirty-seven dhammas are
treated. The twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, and the
sixteenth chapters deal with the three types of learning, namely:
(I) sila (virtue), (2) samiidhi (concentration), and (3) paiiiid
(understanding); and the last two chapters explain mental
dhammas and the occasion of them in detail from the standpoint
of Buddhism. And also, in each chapter there are three types of
explanation, namely, the suttanta-bhajaniya (analysis according
to the teaching), the abhidhamma-bhdjaniya (analysis according
to Abhidhamma) , ana the paiihapueeM (interrogation). The
The Systemati;:;atio"
of Mil/ikils
63
characteristic of the Vibhaftga i. that the regular arrangement of

khandhiiyatanadlziituyo is adopted in the first three chapters. The
treatment of the pa/isambhidhli (comprehension), iid~a (knowledge) and the dhammahadaya (the heart of the teaching) i.
found in the later half of the eighteen chapters, and the theoretical dhamma; seem to be systematized, such as the five khandhas,
the twelve ilyatanas, the eighteen dhiltus and so forth. Therefore,
the chapters dealing with the moral and practical dhammas such
as the four satipallMnas, the sammappadhilnas and the like are
found in the mi~dle, and moreover, there is no chapter teaching
the five indriyas and the five balas in the Vibhanga. In this sense,
we might say that the compilation of the ViManga seems to
have heen designed to systematize the theoretical dhammas hy
way of questions and answers.
Incidentally, the categories of khandhiiyatanadhiituyo form the
subjects of the second, third and fourth chapters of the ramaka
(Pair), which lists a large number of propositions with their
converses, enquiring whether both are true: 1. Is all S P ? and 2. Is
,. all P S ? And many of the passages in the Vibhanga are also
found in the fatisamblzidlimagga (Way of Comprehension), which
is in content a supplement to the Vibhanga and consists of thirty
discussions (kalhlis).~ Both the Vibhanga and the Pa/isambhidiimagga
are often referred to and quoted in the Visuddhimagga (Path of
Purification) , written by Buddhaghosa.
5.11 The Siiriputriibhidharma is a work in four divisions consisting of thirty-three chapters, called (1) Sapramaka (with
questions), (2) ApraJnaka (without questions), (3) SaT{lgrahaSaT{Iyoga (inclusion and conjunction) and (4) PrastMna (basis) ;
and it has more pages than the other two treatises. This work
contains materials which belong to the middle and the late
Abhidhamma texts such as the Prakara~apiida, the Dhiitukiiya and
the like. The first division deals with ayatanas, dMtus, khandhas
and so on. The second division deals with dMtus, kammas
(actions), puggalas (persons) and so on. Especially, the
thirteenth chapter in this divisiondescn"bingpuggalas is generally
similar to the Puggalapannatti,' which collects most of the
I.
See T. Kimura, A Study IJf AbhidMrma Texts., pp. lla.25.
64
statements about many types of persons made in the Sulta

texts. The third division deals with only two chapters,
namely: inclusion and conjunction, i.e. principles occurring
together and inclusion in classes as two basic kinds of relatton between principles.' This division is the subject of the
Dhdtukathd and the Dhatuktiya, though these are compiled
as separate Abhidhamma texts in the Sthaviravada and Sarvastivada schools. The last division explains the ten paccayas (conditions) , ten hetus (causes) and others in detaiL But this work is
generally simple and primitive,
The purpose of the Stlriputrtlbhidharma as well as the Vibhanga
was to systematize theoretical dhammas. It is one of the
characteristics of the Siiriputriibhidharma that the twelve ayata"as,
the eighteen dhatu, and the five khandhas are adopted in the
first three chapters; and the explanations of a great many
kilesa, (defilements) are given in the following four chapters:
akusala-mala (root of the bad), kusala-mula (root of the good).,
kammo and kilesa, The main subject of the Siiriputriibhidharma is
the study of the mental dhammas of man rather than that of the
practical dhammas such as the thirty-seven dhammos. However,
this does not always mean that the practical dhammas are treated briefly. The thirteenth chapter especially deals with seventyfive kinds of puggalas and tries to explain the meaning of each
puggala. Also, the fourteenth chapter deals with many iitilJds. In
short, the contents of the Sariputrabhidharma and its ways of
description are immature, even though it contains many pages.
5.12 From the above evidence, we are led to the conclusion that the doctrinal topics in the three Abhidhamma texts
were mainly grouped by the respective schools with a definite
purpose, that of:
I. Analyzing the thirty-seven. dhammas before the summary of

the Buddha's teachings.
2. Listing the stages of Buddhist life, and further expounding
and elaborating the training of the thirty-seven dhammas.
3. Classifying the principles composing the human being and
the universe.
l. See A. K.
Ward~r,
Indian Buddh~m, p. 221.
The Systematization oj Mdtikiis
65
4;' Making a special study of the theory of causation and

"""', knowledge.
,l
'';\1:
V\
Items 3 and 4 were developed by the Sthaviravada and Sarvastivada schools. Especially, the Sarvastivada later came to
recognize a list of seventy-five dhammas indicating all principles
of existence by adding ',certain groups of sami<hiiras (forces) 'to
the topics (or categories) resultitlg from th~ investigation 6f
items
3 and 4.. . (,eethe,.!a't seven topics of chapter 5.8).' 'I.e .
'l-,
,!)!"
:<5.13 011. 'Disputable Topics It is mentioned in u.e

Mahdvedallasutta that Mahako\\hita a!lkeda series of questions
on disputable topics, e.g. understanding (panna), consciou$lless
( viiiil""a) v sensation (vedana) , percePtion ,0 (saiiiia), mental
consciousness,,(man>:JViiinalja), etc and Sariputta answered his
questions.'"And the Potthapddasutta deals, with a discussion between the Buddha and the wanderer Potthapada in which a
chain of controversial tppics is indicate~), such as .perception,
soul {atton},:training (sikkhii), virtue (silo) and acquisition of a
personality (atta-pa/iliihha).3 Such topics are the topics which
were hotly debated between Buddhist monks and other strivers,
or' 'among'the Buddha's disciples, from the very beginning.
The,; topics were naturally gathered by hi> disciples after his
parinibbiina, and in the COUTSe of time compiled into the Abhidhamma texts.
"'The tniktClimportant of these is the Kathiivatthu (Ground for
Discussion). It consists of twenty-three chapters, and is a collection of 219 controversies and refutations of the views
maintained by other schools of Buddhism (supposedly compiled
in the 3rd century B. C. but undoubtedly added to after that da te' ).
On the other hand, the Vijndnakdya (Body of consciousness)
which C!,h he 'regarded as similar to the K~thauatthu contains,six
c,hap'torS.The first chapter records Maudgalyayana's opinion,
h.
"'.'
",bout pudgala (perSon), tndTryi'S (faculties ),.,;lIas (thoughts),
1
lo,
f.:V. "",~,i,,'
.) ,-":i
t. On. this see Th. Stcherbatiky,
:".-tl:lh"
,-\~;.\,:Wtr.
The Central ConcefJtWn of Buddhism and

lilt .\f(iJning 4 the Word '~Dhanna", pp. 95.. lO7.
'l)-r~
....'d,2. M. h .292.8. -T~ 1,- 790 b-792 b,' in which- Mah;;\kouhit8' answers
SiripuUa's qUest101U.
~,,'
3. D, 1,178-203, T. 1. 109<-112<.
4. See A. K. Warder, Outline sf Indian Philosophy, p. 85.
66
kldas (pefilements), v!Jnana (consciousness), etc., and refutes

his views concerning the non .. existence of past and future
(principles or phenomena). The second chapter contains a
refutation of the Vatsiputriya doctrine of pudgala, very similar
in its arguments to the first chapter in the Katlulvatthu. It has
been said that this refutation was probably inherited from the
older school as it was immediately after the personality schism,l
"the third and fourth chapters deal with the theory of conditions
and analyzes the mental phenomena. The fifth and sixth chapters deal with the mental functions of a person under training
and define the mental states of the arhant (perfected one, Pali :
arahant).
There will be no necessity for introducing the contents of
these texts any further, for a noteworthy point here is that we
see from the texts how controversial topics were discussed between the schools in order to argue the opponent down. In a
word, the method applied in the discussions is in most cases a
purely logical one, so that it is important to clarify the established logical techniques in them.'
5.14 We may, therefore, reasonably conclude that the three

types of miltikiis in the Abhidhamma texts (see chapter 5.3, 6 and
13) were collected from the Sutta texts in the following
stages :'
I. The synthetic .tudy of the thirty-seven bodhipakkhiya
dhammii in seven groups.
2. The settling of stages of the Buddhist life, training and
meditation.
1. See A. K. Warder, Indian Buddhism. p. 344.
2. This point will be discussed in another Part. We find that the TatllJiJsiddhiJdstra (T. 32~ 293 a-373 b) by Harivarman (3rd century A.D.) of the
Babusrutiya school deals with the abhidhamm4 type of ten discussions
(kallrd.r)-T. 32;233 c-260 c. Especially. the tenth katlul of the ten is the
anatlan (non-ego) chapter, in which Harivarman refutes the Vitsiputriya
school's doctrine which maintains the t'~tcnce ofthepuggala (person) or
something like allan (ego) in the form. of questions and answers (T.32,
259 a-260 c). Such a form is similar to 'that in the Kathdvatthu and the
Vijildnakd)'a. However, the KalMvallhu and the Vijfltlnakd,a deal with more
logical arguments than the TattvariddhiJdstra.
3. On thu, see Mokaviccludani, p. xxvii.
Tn. Systematization of Matikiis
67
.'
3. The analysis and classification of the khandhtiyatanadhiituyo,

etc.
4. The collection and definition of disputable topics.
5. The analysis of the tilea and duka topics.
6. The study of theory of causation and knowledge.
5,15 Briefly speaking, Abhidhamma philosophy may be said
to have been established firmly by both the synthetic study of
dhammas and the analytical study of dhammas, It goes without
saying that the origin of such studies can be found in
the NiMyas and Agamas, where there are attempts: (I) to
define dhammas, (2) to seize the relations of a dhamma to
other dhammas,_(3) to analyze dhammas, (4) to classify dhammas
into different types, and (5) to arrange dhammas in numerical
order, Our study in Part One was therefore directed towards the
examination of these points in relation to Miitikas which had
already existed in the time of the Buddha, And it was suggested
that the thirty-seven dhammas were the original Matikiis, and
that the synthetic study of such practical dhammas and the analysis and classification of the theoretical dhammas such as
khandhdyatanadhdtuyo, etc. especially came to establish the basis
of Abhidhamma philosophY,
PART II
THE DEVELOPMENT
OF
THE DIALOGUE FORM
6
THE METHOD OF PROGRESS OF
A DIALOGUE AND
THE FOUR PANHABYAKARA~AS
6.1 It has already been pointed out that from the very
beginning, one of the abhidhamma studies was made in the form
of questions and answers (see chapter 4.1). How then was
the dialogue on dhammas (doctrines) developed and what sort
of logical techniques were established in the form of questionsand answers? These points will be our main subject for study
in Part Two.
6.2 The Buddha decided to preach his teachings (dhammas)

to man. At first, he taught five old friends, known as .trivers
(Satna(Uls) including Assaji. After that, the Buddha preached
his teachings to many persons until his pari.ibM.a. As the
Buddha himself said, enlightenment in itself is beyond logic
(atakkavacara) :'
This dhamma (truth) attained by me is profound, difficult
to see, difficult to understand, peaceful, beyond logic, subtle,
intelligible to the wise.
This means that the truths are facts to be experienced and
verified personally by recluses. There is no question of believing
1. M. I. 167, II. 172, T. 2, 103 c, 786 c~787 a, ctc. As we shall see later,
'beyond logic' in such a case means the well established conclusion which
cannot be controverted.
72
anything simply on authority, not even on the authority of the

Buddha himself. "The outlook is that of the making of a
scientific discovery' and announcing it to the world, whereupon
others may investigate its truth for themselves."l
However, the Buddha did not make light of the expression
and communication of his own thought by the use of words,
though we are told that his mind did not incline to teaching
dhamma (truth) soon after his enlightenment. 2 For example,
we can see the following explanation: 3
Through discussion {s4kaccM),you must learn understanding (panna) .. f Hereupon, monks, a. person by discussing
with another knows thus :J~dgillg f~om this reverend's approach
toa question (~mmagga),judging from his intention (ahhinihiira), judging from his behaviour towards a question (panhasamud!lcara
)., he has understanding
(pailiiavant),
he is not,weak
'(
,
,
.
",in understanding (dupppfifia) . W~~t is th~.cause of that? III
, this c~e, this reverend
utters
t~~ meaning and words
li
, ,"',
'/"'_'''1
'
'" (Mthapada) which" ~re profound{peaceful, excellent, beyond
.~ l<;>gic, subtle,)ntelllgibJe '~o .,the wise. As to the dhamma
" (teaching) the reverend talks", he. is compe~ent both in
" brief and ill detail;' is competent to"~~plain its m'eaning,. to'
expound on it, to make it clear, to lay it down, to open 'it
f up, ~ to analyze it and tomait.e it plain. This reverend has
understanding, he is not weak in understanding~
~FG~
.. g
,~.. .
'~lt/
~
,0,.
We can real~e from .:the. "bove Wat rigorous methods of
a,rgument Were established. In the Nikdyas and Agamas, th~
following representative forms of' a dialogue can be found:
; '
'
"
.tJJ.":U~h;.r~"~r.ques~ioner l.demands~ 'Yes' or
,':I.bdr answerer.
"
"
'No' from an
~."t.l..,:)!~~.~ fJ~~~!.c;"'t')b.
"'p
2. '\There a questioner requests 'some explana~ion ,of an

answerer.
h3. Where an answerer returns a reply in the form of a ,new
~!Jp t).l!' 'ii ''''/~l~'f',1 .2:3::':....;!,)':rJ
~r.t'i:v. question.
. '.
-~
'I
," ,1" 'A. K. Warder, Outlbuo! Indian'Philosophy, p. 49 .
~ 2." M. 1,168. Il,<fj:!j;.<

3. A. II, 1879.
The Mtthod of Progress of a Dialogue
73
4. Where a questioner suggests some reply to an answerer

(i.e. leading-question),
In entering upon the consideration of these forms of dialogue,
it is fitting to note first of all how the dialogue on dhammas
was conducted.
6.3 It is said that public debating was an ancient custom in
India.' This can he also inferred from the following words used
in the Potlhapadasutta,' the Sam.~zama~(iikasutta,a etc.:
I. Samayappavddaka: hall for debating on different views.

2. SamanuyuiiJati: to cross-question, to take up.
3. Samanugiihati: 1'0 ask for reasons, to cross-examine. " .;~,,-'
4. Samanubhdsati: to criticize, to refute.
And moreover, it can readily be. imagined from the Kosambiya'.
.sutta,' the Stimag{imaSllita" etc. that a discussion was very heated
on occa_sion: some monks, ~ecome quarrels0Il1:e (bha7Jt/.anaJata),
become contentio;'s (kalahajala), fall into dispute.( vivadapanna),
~nd li,Ve ~ttacki,ng.one another:'\.Vith pierciI1g words. 5 But the
Buddha did not encourage his disciples to argue for the sake
of argument, though he did not make light of.helpful discussion
pertaining to enlightenlT)ent. It is therefore natural that the
Buddha pointed out' the wrong ~ attitude towards holding a
di"logue and taught the right method of progres~ of It. As the
Nikayas and Aganzasdeal with one's attitude. of Inind in a
di"logue and treat of what a debate should be, let lIS turn our
eyes to them and learn how . the dialogue on dham.mas ,was
conducted.
6.4 The Allgutfar'.,dka)a states that if any person practises

anyone of the following nine things, he is not fit for
discussion :6
\ ,,1:'
I.
2.
A. K. W.arder,'Outlineo! Indian PlUl()saphy. p. 85.

D. 1,178, T .!, 110 a .
M. 11,22, T. 1,720 b.
3.
4. M. I, 320, T. 2~' 626 b.
S-. M. n. 243;~T.'1. 752 c.
6.
A. I, 198. In the Chin". text, 15tbinga afe indicat.d(T. 1,609 a-b)_
74-
Abhidlulmma Philosophy
I. To evade the question by asking another irrelevantly

(annendiiiia", palicarati)
2. To carry the discussion away from' the point (hahiddha

katham apanilmeti) .
3-5. To display ill-temper, aversion and mistrust (kopan ca

6.
7.
8.
9.
""san co appaccayan co patokaroti).

To blame (one's opponent) (ahhihaTati).
To beat down the questioner (ahhimaddati).
To laugh the questioner to scorn (anupajagghati).
To catch the questioner up when he falters (khatita",
go.hati).
Generally speaking, the aim of dialogue is to express methodically one's own opinions and to make a listener (or listeners)
understand them. The dialogue is characterized by judging
directly whether or not the listener understands completely
what one has explained of his ideas or his opinions. In this
sense, the dialogue is a very important way to help people
understand the Buddhist teaching dealing with truth. Especially,
when we learn that, as indicated above, public debating was an
ancient custom in India, we can say that from the early days of
Buddhism a great deal of discussion, including public debates,
must have been of great importance, not only for discussions
among Buddhists themselves, but for refuting the views of nonBuddhists (also in the Ahhidhamma period, for refuting Buddhists
belonging to different schools). Therefore, the correct attitude
of carrying on a dialogue is clearly displayed in the Nikdyas
and Agamas.
6.5 In holding a discussion, the early Buddhists were required to hold the same idea consistently throughout the discussion. In other words, it was important that what they had
spoken at the beginning was consistent with what they spoke
at the end. As we have seen in chapter 4.2, the Buddha encourages his disciples to preach the dhamma (discourse) which
is beautiful in the beginning, in the middle and in the end.
This suggests not only one's attitude to discourse, but also
one's attitude for discussiq,n. Such an attitude for -discussion was
maintained also in the discussions with non-Buddhists, whilst
non-Buddhists talked ambiguously and gave equivocal answers,
The Metlwd of Progress tif a Dialogue
75
as we shaH see in another chapter. We can learn from many

discourses (e.g. Calalwl/hipadapamas,tta)' that non-Buddhists
who were gifted with eloquence met the Buddha to confute his
doctrine, and aH of them were argued down by him; consequently, they became his disciples. This indicates definitely
that the Buddha was an eloquent debater. Therefore, th~ Buddha
is caHed "one who speaks at the proper time (kiila-vMin),"
. . one who speaks truth (bhfJta-vadin) ," 'one who speaks what
is significant (atlha-viidin)," "one who speaks according
to the doctrine (dhamma-vadin)," Hone who speaks in accordance
with the discipline (vinaya-vadin)"2; it is also said of him, "as he
speaks, so he acts: as he acts, so he .peaks (yathii-vMin /alhiikarin, yatha-karin tatha-oM;n)," etc." And the disciple who follows the Buddha is called "a wise elder (pa~dita Ihera)." From
the explanation of one's attitude for any discourse and many
epithets of the Buddha, we come to know that he did not talk
ambiguously, nor gave equivocal answers, but did hold the
same idea consistently throughout discussion with his disciples
and non-Buddhists.
As mentioned already in chapter 6.4, in order not to evade the
question by asking another irrelevantly and not to carry the dis,cussion away from the point, the Buddha's disciples (especially,
his novices) alwayshav~ to listen to the Buddha's teachings and
to bend their mind to the investigation of the meaning of them.
And they have to advance their arguments with cogency. To
build up a cogent argument, this can be in a Sense drawn from
right thinking or logical thinking. Now the question of the
lluddha's and his disciples' way of thinking comes up. We
would say in a word that his way of thinking is quite logical
(this point will be discussed in another chapter), so that to
become the Buddha's disciple is nothing other than to agree
with the Buddha's ways of thinking and to maintain in dialogue
the same attitude as the Buddha's. In this sense, to investigate
the meaning of the Buddha's teachings by reflecting on them,
I.
2.
3.
4.
T.
D.
D.
A.
I, 656.-658., M. I, 175-84.
I, 4-5, 165, llI, 175, A. II, 209, III, 205, T. 1,89 a, 103 b, etc.
II, 224)229~ Sn. 357. ltv. p. 122, T. 1,31 a, etc.
II, 22.
,76
pondering on them and poring over [hem (see chapter 4.2),

this was probably the best training for [he disciples in having
a controversy. \Vhen we examine ,the NikdYfls and- Agamas, most
of them are scriptures in -dialogue .( sutta) form, in which it is
recorded that not only the Buddha, but also his chief disciples
had d,iscussions with monks and "non-Buddhists .. There are~ for
instance, many sutlas (dialogues) in the Sa".yulctagama which
refer to Sariputta. Theyare broadly divisible into four .groups
as follows:
1. The suftas in which the Buddha questioned Sariputta.
2. The suttas in which Sariputta questioned bhikkhus (monks) .
3. The suttas in which Sariputta questioned some of the
Buddha's disci'ples': a. Ananda; h. Mahakotthita; c. Sona;
. d. Candimaputta; e.
AnathapiJ.l<;lika; f.
Nakula;
-g. Yamaka.
1(,
4. The sutlas in which Sitriputta questioned non-Buddhists:
a. Jambukkhadaka; b. Titthiyas (-ya.).
It is recorded in the SuMasutla that the Buddha said to the
Brahman youth Subha. Todey'y~'s son, "I am not a one-sided
answerer (ekarilsavtidaJ., but I am an analytical' answerer (vibha)j~v~da).';l It.is certa,in that both'the terms ekamsaviida and
vihhajjaviJda dq not mean an in<;lividual one of the four patihabyiikaraQllS. (4 methods of answering questions), whieh will be
,discussed .later. We should realize that the former si~nifies "a
'prejudicep answer arisen from a narrow view," and the latter,
on the other hand, "knowing how to use the four paiihabyiikaravas properly." We can learn from the Jitikdyas and Agamas the
fact that the Buddha and his disciples made the dialogues on
dhammas progress logically until they argued down many
philosophers.
,;;''C.
6.6
Another method of explanation very prominent in the.
'Nik'ayas and Agamas is by using metaphors, similes and analogies.

It goes without saying that'the method of making one's opinion
understood by a listener is to use figures of speech such as
hyperbole, metaphor, metonymy, simile and so on. We could
1.
M. II, 197.
77
The Method of Progress of a Dialogue
say that 'simile' plays an important role in the Nikiiyas. In the

PAli canon, the .words. ~u.pama.'" 'opamma' and the like a-re used.
And .although the term uparru% is, translated in many cases into
'simile', in the Nikayas.it is- not always used as a simple simile;
sometimes it is used ',as an extended .simile. We can .learn that
the Buddha t~ied to explain his teachings by adopting similes
in them, and recommended. his disciples to make use of simile
in their explanations of Buddhism. The Buddha says:'
Wen .then, .Sandaka, I will make you a simile (upamil),
for by a siinile some. intelligen't persons (vullil1 purisii) here
understood the tnea,nirlg ofwh'at has been said.
"d.
;~
And moreove-r, most upamdsgivenin the Nikayas and Agamas are
s~t~ments by ana~ogy. ,The most representative sutta containing analogy is the Pdyiisi;utta in which, the existence of another
world is argued for merely. '~n . the basis of analogy against a
materiallst._2 In ~genera:J~"l ~ the applIcation of a"nalogy in ~he expl~nation of doctrinal points "has" been effective as a teaching
method throughout the wholeof lhe Buddhist canon. Certainly,
among si,miles. wl:th:~h ar~ found _widely in the Pall canon, there
are not a few -~nsuccessfuI ones. " "
'.,Howe,~er, i'i,.~an, he seen i~ ~h{'Nika)'as and Agamas that, ~any
disciples put
forth ,great
efforts 't~.
give similes and applied them
.
-,-"
ro< "
to their arguments. At this point, we would like to touch brielly
upon the. role of simile in the Nikijyas and Jgamas.
., "
;.
, _ .
" "
"
,I"
'
".
" " -"::'-
: /.
-- .,
'
'1\)
6.7 As'stated above, both tl1eilwords 'upamd' and 'opamma'

could be under&tooQ as meaning. simile, though the latter means
in some cases,_ 'comparison'.... For.-instance, we see the following
Juttas (dialogues)" in which .IUlmefOUs similes are given
1. Vat/ha-upamii: The' simile, of: the cloth.( M. 1,36.40 },.,"
.! 2.: Kakaca-upama: The simile of the saw (M.I,1.22_29),
': 3. Alagadda-upamii; Thesjmile ofthe water-sn""e ( M.I,.130.42).
4. Hatthipada-upamil: The simile of the elephant's footprint
q,',
(Lesser and Greater, M.l, 175-84 ,md 184-91).:"
5. Sara-upamii: The simile of the pith (Greater' and Lesser.
M. I, 192-97 and 198-205).
1.
2.
,-,- ""
"-,'
-:~
"
1;';",
'
M. I, 523, A. V, 194. T. 2.248 ','etc.

D, II, 31658. T. 1, 42 b-47 a, 525 .532 b, 831 a.83'i,c.
78
6. La/ukita-upama: The simile of the quail (M.I, 447-56).

The word 'adhivacana' means 'designation' but is sometimes
extended to a 'metaphor'. Iu pointed out by A. K. Warder,l
in various texts of the Nikayas, the word 'adhivacana' as well as
the words 'samanna' (agreed usage), 'nirutti' (expression),
'sa1J1kh6,' (denomination), etc., appears approximately synonymous with the word 'pannatti' (concept). To say nothing of the
relation of paniiatti to adhivacana, we see the following usages of
adhivacana:'I.
a. The anthill (uammika) , this is a desigoation (adhivaeana)
for the body made of the four great elements (mahdbhDtas);
b. 'Brahman', this isa desigoation for the tathdgata, perfected
one (arahant) ;
c. The wise~(sumedha), this is a designation for a monk who
is learning (sekha) and many other things. 3 However, when we
examine figurative expressions with examples of simile and
metaphor in the Niktpai and Agamas, we see that passion (rilga)
is expressed by the word 'acei' (flame) or 'visa' (poison) and
that the Buddha's preaching is expressed by the word 'slhanada'
(a lion's roar).' These are good examples of metaphor. In this
sense, it might be possible to regard Brahman as a metaphorical expression (adhivactl1la) of the tathiigata. Mter this fashion,
we see that there is the expression: "The bottomless pit (patala)
is a metaphor (or metaphorical expression) of unhappy feeling
(dukkha vedand)". Moreover, from the explanation of the 'piJriJyana'
chapter in the Sutlanipdta, which deals with the sixteen brief
verse dialogues between the Buddha and brahmanas on the
doctrine, mostly consisting of a bare question and answer, the
word 'piJrll.yana' (the way across) could be regarded as a metaphorical expression of the Buddha's teachings.'
,
Generally speaking, metaphor is a kind of transfer, by which
the meaning or appearance of one thing is imaginatively ascribed
1.
"The C<?ncept of a Concept,U Journal of Indian Philosophy 1 (1971) ,pp.
183-4.
2. M.l,IH.
3. Beiides, see S. IV, 174.
4. }"faM (and Cii/a).sihandtksutta (M.I, 6368. 6883).
5. S. IV, 206.
6. Sn. p. 218.
Th. Method of Progress of a Dialogue
79
to some other thing, while simile is based on a comparison of

subjects or objects that are basically different. Bu: to the effect
that rhetorical devices matter much to the way of thinking or
the development of ideas, metaphor must be especially observed
in consideration of simile and vice versa. Moreover, as we have
mentioned in chapter 6.6, some of them are in the form of an
analogy. With regard to this, let us illustrate a few examples of
similes as analogy.
6.8 Analogy is the means of reaching c"nclusions on the

basis of comparison or similarity. If the analogy is weak, the
argument will have little power to persuade, but in any of the
arguments found in'the Nikayas, the analogy therein does not
appear as a weak form.
II is also necessary to emphasize the fact that analogy never
gives proof in the strict sense of the word, but in some dialogues
(suttas) of the Nikiiyas and Agamas analogy is apparently
advanced as actual proof, although we see no actually recognized distinction between analogy and strict inference.
I.
The bundle of reeds (nalakalflpi):'
II 'is just as if (seyyathiipi) there stood two bundles of reeds one

leaning against the other. Even so, conditioned by a sentient
body i. consciousness (nilmarflpapaccayii viflfia~am). Conditioned
by consciousness is a sentient body (vinnii~patcayi1 niimarfjparp).
If I were to pull towards me one of the bundles of reeds, the
other would fall; If I were to pull towards me the other, the
former would fall. Even so, from the cessation of a sentient
body is the cessation of consciousness (ndmarflpanirodhd vifiiiaa1Janirodho). From the cessation of consciousness is the cessation of
a sentient body (vinn~anirodhii. nilmarapanirodho).
To sum up the above statement:
"A (or B) exists through the condition of B (or A)"
is analogous to
"By leaning one against the other, two bundles of reeds stand.')
"If there were no A (orB), there would be no B (or A)"
is analogous to
1.
S. II, 114, T. 2,
~I
b.
80
AbMdhmma Philosophy
"If I were to pull towards me one of the bundles of reeds,

the other would fall. If I were to pull towards me the other,
the former would fall;"
Thus we eome to know that analogy helps us to understand

the doctrine of the depe.ndent origln~tioQ.
2.
The elephant's footprint:'
(a) AJ; among all living beings that can walk their footprints
(padajdtas) are included in an elephant's footprint (iultthipizda),
and as the elephant's footprint in point of size is the chief
among all kinds of footprints, (A) all good principles of mind
are included aIflong the four noble truths: I. unhappiness,
2. its origination, 3. its cessation and 4. the. way kading to
this cessation.
It goes without saying that the Four Truths form the essenti.]s
of the content of the Buddha's enlightenment and are the basic
doctrine of Buddhism, which is the knowledge of how the 'inllu."
ences' (dsava: passion, desire for existence and ignorance) can
be exhausted. Therefore, we can realize from the abo~e that
the small letter (a) analogously suggests the situation of the
capital letter (A).
3.. On fire:'
Just as a fire is blazing through its contact with firewood and
grass, and is extinguished in the absence of such contact, the
thus-gone (tatMgata) exists through his five, khandhas. And just
as one could not say in which direction the fire's flame will
spread to after its extinction, one could not say the pl~t;e
where the thus-gone is reborn after his death.
We have simplified the original statement such as the above to
clarify its meaning. Its"ems that in Iodian philosophy the subject
of the thus-gone was a matter of primary concern from the
very beginning. Especially, for brahman. and strivers (sanulllas)
1. M.I, 184, T. 1,464 b, S.I,86, A.III,364.

2. See the Atli-Vacthogottasu.tla (M.I,482-9, T.2,245 h-246 a.).
81
the answer to the following questions (including the above subject) was a much debated point:'
Is the thus-gone reborn?
Is he not reborn?
Is he both reborn and not reborn?
Is he neither reborn nor not reborn?
Consequently, the Buddha attempted to make himself understood

by illustrating the example of fire which is in the form of an
analogy.
.
On the whole, although it is difficult to distinguish between
them, the analogies in the Niktlyas and Agamas are of two types,
namely: the logical analogy and the figurative analogy. It is,
however, clear that the Buddha and his disciples used both of
them to explore their ideas and to clarify or support their convictions or positions. The above three examples have the follow..
ing characteristic in common with one anothor. That is, since
analogy promotes understanding Qfsimilarities (as well as differences), the small letters (a), (b), ... (x) in the statement by
analogy always suggests the situation of the capital letters (Al,
(B), - (e), ... (X) in the statement of proof. If we consider the
case of item 3 (titled "On fire") we see:
(A) Through his five groups,
(al Through
its
contact
with firewood and grass,
(B) the thus-gone exists.
(b) a fire is blazing (exists).
Thus the capital letter (B) based on the letter (A) is analogous
to the small letter (bl based on the letter (a), and the latter
(b+a) can be regarded as an important way to persuade people
that the former (B+A) is reasonahle. In this 'sense, we would
say that an analogy which agrees with the statement of proof
is, an analogy based on the method of agreement.
6.9 From the preceding discussions, we have found the
following points concerning one's attitude of mind in a dialogue
in early Buddhism:
1. For a further discussion of such questions, see BrahmajdltlSUlM (D.I,
146, T. 1,88 b94 . EJp. lee D.I, 27).
82
1. One must try hard not to evade the question by asking

another irrelevantly, not to carry the discussion away from
the point, and so on.
2. Bending one's mind always to the investigation of the
meaning of the Buddha's teachings, one must try to hold
the same idea consistently throughout discussion.
3. One should use similes in explaining the dhamma (doctrine).
6.10 Now, another important problem is how the debate ori

dhammas was developed. We introduced very briefly in chapter
6.2 the representative forms of a dialogue in the Nikdyas. Let us
examine again how the representative forms were explained in
the Nikdyas and Agamas. They would be clarified by showing
"four paiihabyakarar;as" and the mea~ing of them. They are: 1
1. Ekamsa-panhabyakara1Ja: to give a categorical reply to a
question requiring it or to give a direct answer in the
affirmative or in the negative.
2. Vibhajja-panhabYiikarar;a: to give a discriminating reply to a .
question requiring it or to give an analytical answer.
3. Patipucchd-panhabydkarar;a: to reply by a counter-question to
a q~estion requiring such or to reply by a counter-question
to ascertain what the question means.
4. Thapaniya-panhabyakarar;a: to waive a question which should
be waived or to keep silent.
,.
The Buddha says that one who knows how to use the four panhabyiikarar;as properly is competent to discuss the teaching of the
Buddha and convince a listener of what one has said:
The first is a direct. answer in the affirmative or negative; the
second, an analytical answer; the third, h counter-question;
and the fourth, keeping silent. A monk who ~nows how to
answer truly in conformity with the dhamma is called "skilled
in the fourfold question." Such a monk is hard to overcome,
hard to vanquish; profound and invincible. And he is skilled
in discrimina ting between the true meaning and the false one;
1. See D.III, 229, A.I, 197, II,46, T.
~,
51 b, 609 a, etc.
83
he avoids the false and grasps the true. He is called "sage in

the grasp of truth."
As far as the Nikilyas and Agamas are concerned, the first one
mentioned above means not only to give a direct answer in the
affirmative, but also to give it in the negative in some cases, as
indicated in chapter 4.3. It might be possible that the earliest
division was into (1) ekamsa-vyilkarar;fya-paiiha-, and (2) anekamsavytikaraT,liya-paiiha- corresponding to the two kinds of statements
(ekamsikii dham.mii and anekamsikti dhamma) mentioned in the
Potthapiidaiutta.1 The latter class was later subdivided into (a)
vibhajja-vyiikarar;iya~ and, (b) thapaniya-. Moreover, pa!ipucchilvyiikaraTJiya is, in fact, a sub-class of vibhajja-vytikarar;iya. 2 At any
rate, we can learn from the Nikayas that if a person on being
asked these sorts of questions gives the proper reply, then he is
competent to hold a dialogue.
6.11 AIthoughmost of the suttas are characterized by using

some of the four paiihabyakaraT,las and they are listed in the Nikilyas,
we cannot find explanations of them in the Nikilyas. In order to
grasp their main characteristic, we would like here to turn our
eyes to the klilindapaiiha (this work in its original form is considered to have been compiled between the Ist century B.C.
and the 1st century A.D. ), where they are explained; then
these explanations have been transmitted by the Sthaviravrtda
school, especially by the Prtli tradition;3
1. To the question "Is matter impermanent (rii/Jam aniccan

ti) ?," "Are feelings impermanent (vedana aniccii ti)?," "Is
perception impermanent (sqiiiidanicca ti)?," etc., the ansWer
is "Yes, it is," or "Yes, they are." In this case, it is called
ekamsa-paiihabyakarar;a.
2. To the question "Is matter really impermanent (aniccam
pana riipan ti)?," "Are feelings really impermanent (aniccca
pana vedanil ti) ?," etc., the answer is given analytically,
iii which the characteristic of rupa is displayed. This is
called vibhajja-paiihabytlkarar;a.
1. D. I, 191-2.
2. On this see K. N. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist T/j,ory of Know/'q" pp.
281-2.
.
3. Miln. pp. 144-5.
84
In other words, the questioner challenges the speaker and

demands more than a categorical answer. Therefore, an explanation is required from the speaker.
3. To a questioner an answerer returns a reply in the form of
a new question, or replies by a counter-question sue}l' as
"What then? Does one perceive everything by the eye (~in
nu kho cakkhund sabb(U!l vijondti)?"

The Milindapanha does not give a detailed explanation of this.
On this point, the Milindapanha- Tika states:'
The question "Does one perceive everything by the eye?" is
to ask whether man (puggala) perceives everything by the
eye. From this question, two kinds of questions are also
asked: "Does he perceive everything by either the eye of the
tathiigata (samantacakkhu) or the physical eye (ma7!lsacakkhu)?"
and "By the physical eye?" The answer to the former should
be "No," and the answer to the latter should be "Yes." This
is called patiPucchd-paiihabyakaTa~a.
What is called Ihapaniya-pa;;habydkaTa~a, this is said" in general

to have been laid down for the questions involving metaphysical
problems. For a certainty, the Buddha proclaims that there are
two different types of dhammas: one belongs to ekamsikii (definite)
dhammd and the other to anekarhsikii (indefinite) dhammii, and
that the latter are the subject of questions such as "Is the world
(loka) eternal or not?," "Is it finite or not?," "Are the soul and
the body the same or different?," "Does the thus-gone exist
after death or not?," etc. (strictly speaking, they comprise four
sets of questions and have four alternatives each, which will be
listed in chapter.7). The reason why the Buddha waived these
questions wa.s that they are not connected with the meaning
(n' atthasarhhita), are not the starting point of the best life, and
do not conduce to a version from worldly life ( nibbidd), to dispassion (viraga), to cessation (niTodha), to calm (upasama), to
insight (abhinn.s), to enlightenment (sambodhi), and to liberation from existence (nibblinG). a
I. Miln. T. p. 28.
2. M.1. 431. In the Chinese text, the words "These are not connected
with dh"mma (truth)" can be seen (T. 1,805 b).
':x:" '
'. ; The Method
tif Progress of a Dialogue
85
However, we must note here what the Buddha states in the

Brahmajiilasutta: "The opinion of those strivers and brahmans
who are eternalists (sassataviidas) and who in four ways maintain
that the soul (at/an) and the world (or universe: loka) are
eternal (sassata) is neither known, nor seen, is based merely on
sensation, on worry, on writhing, and is subject to craving."1
And finally, h~ rejects all the sixty-two opinions (dil/his) maintained by many strivers and brahmans at the time of the Buddha.
We must also note the discussions orl" metaphysical subjects between the Buddha and the wanderer Vacchagotta in the AggiVacchagottasutta, where the latter fires a hundred questions at
the Buddha about the permanence 'of the world, the existence
of the tathagata, etc., and then, Vacchagotta asks: "Do you have
any speculative opinion?" To his question, the Buddha answers:
"No, I have already got rid of it."2 And also, the Buddha says in
the "Anamatagga" chapter that transmigration (s6Tflsdr6: this world)
is beginningless (anamatagga),' which could be regarded as
'infinite', but not in the sense of the eternalists - thus a
distinction has been made. This is obviously a categorical
reply.
What we want to emphasize here is that the Buddha seems
to have denied all the speculations including ,the doctrines of
the soul, the world, etc., regarded as an entity, which nonBuddhists maintained. For "to deny," "to disregard" could be
substituted. The latter appea~s to have something in common
with "silence." To the Buddha, "silence" seems to be a kind
of negative expression. Metaphysical problems must be rejected
in which dependent origination is disregarded and, in this sense,
the objects maintained are not real, not existent. The Buddha
keeps silent only when he feels it a waste of time to explain
metaphysical problems. Consequently, in the process of a
dialogue he replies to them by using anyone of the four paiihabyiikaraT,Uls, especially, two of them: ekarnsa and /hapaniya. His
disciples must follow the same procedure.
I, D.I,I-46 (esp. 3942), T. I, ~~
2. M,I,483-9 (esp. 486), T. 2, 5"~4a.1
3. S.Il, 178-93, T. 2,24<J c-243 b.
Abhidlramma Philosophy
86
6.12 It is likely that, in the later period, Buddhists attached

importance to the four pailhabytikaraQas and made a special study
of them. The detailed explanations of the four pailhahytikarif1Jas
can be found in the Chinese Tripi/aka. Among the Chinese texts,
some explain the meaning of the four panhahyakaraQas individually; some explain them in relation to each other.' In the
Sangitiparyaya the following explanation can be seen:'
Ques.: Teach me (mental) dhommas.
Ans.: There are various dhammas. What kinds of dhammas do
you ask me about?
Inthis case, if the answerer makes clear that there are dhammas
in the past, present and future, this will be vibhajja-panhabytikaraQa.
Ques.: Teach me dhammas in the past.

Ans.: There are various dhammas in the past. What kinds of
dhammas do you ask me about P
In this case, if the answerer makes clear tha t there are good
(kusala), and bad (a/cusala) and neither-good-nor-bad (avyakata)
dhammas in the past, this will be vibhajja-panhabytikaraQa.
~es.:
Teach me kus.la dharnmas.
Ans. : There are various kusala dhammas. What kinds of kusala

dhammas do you ask me about?
Such answers are calJed pa/ipucchij-p.nhabyiJkaraQa.
6.13 For a certainty, the four panhahyiJkara~as are considered
to be a dialectical method. When trying to trace the development of Buddhism from N'ikiiya 'philosophy ,into Abhidhamma
1. Cf. Mahdparinirvo!14siitra (T.12.571 a), MandprajiJdpdTamilopadda(T. 25,.
222 c), DaJabhiimivibhii.ftisastra (T. 26. 80 c), BuddhabhiimisiltraJdslra (T. 26,320 c)
Abhidh_hdvibM,dSdsk. (T. 27,75 b), S"'Il)'llkldbhidharmahrdaY"""".(T. 28,
874 c), Abhidharmakolabhaf)'Q (T. 29, 103 a). AbhidharmanYt'l)!4f1usiiralastra(T. 29,.
618 c), etc.
'f'
2. T. 26,401 <.
The Metlwd /if Progress. of a LJlOlogue
u,
philosophy, we cannot overlook the examination of the forms of

the dialogue on dhammas, which were based on the four pankabytlkaraQilS. Therefore, we have to examine the style of argument
used by the early Buddhists-its characteristics. In this case, it
may be important to start by making clear the ways of thinking
of the Buddha and his disciples according to the evidence of
the Nikiiyas and A"gamas.
7
METAPHYSICAL QUESTIONS AND
TETRALEMMAS
7.1 To four kind. of metaphysical subjects dealing with
sixteen questions, Saiijaya Belatthiputta, one of the six heretical
teachers at the time of the Buddha, known as the leader of the
Agnostics, is said to have replied by means of four (or five)
types of ambiguous answer. The sixteen questions are :1
1. Does the other world exist (Althi paTo loko) ?
2. Does it not exist (N'althi paTo loko)?
3. Does it both exist and not exist (Atthi ca n' althi ca parD
loko )?
4. Does it neither e-.xist nor not exist (N'ev'atthi no n'atthi
paTo loko)'
II. 5. Do beings reborn exist (AI/hi sattd opapalika)?
6, Do they not exist?
7. Do they both exist and not exist?
8. Do they neither exist nor not exist?
III. 9. Does the result of good and bad karmas exist (Atthi
suka,aduJckaldn"", kamman"", pOOla,,, viPdko) ?
.
1.
I. D. 1,27,58-9.
2. Concerning item I, we see the following Sanskrit expression: If asti
para/oka iii . " nasti para/aka/.! asti co ndsti co naivasti
nOJti para/oka .. 0"
See The Gi/git Manuscript o/the S'21ighabhedavartu-Being the 17th and Last
Section of the Vinaya of the Maiasarvastivadin, Part II, ed. R. Gnoli with
the Assistance ofT. Venkatacharya, p. 226.
no
89
Metaphysical Questions and Tetra/emmas
Does it not exist?

Does it both exist and not exist?
Does it neither exist nor not exist?
Does the thus-gone exist after death (Hoti tathagato
param mara~a)?
14. Does he not exist after death (Na hoti tathagato param
mara1)a) ?
15. Does he both exist and not exist after death (Holi ca
na holi ca tathagato param mar~d)?
16. Does he neither exist nor not exist after death (N'eva
holi na na hoti tathagato param mar~il)?
10.
II.
12.
IV. 13.
The four (or five) types of ambiguous answers are :'

I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
I
I
I
I
I
do not do so (Evampi m4 no).

do not say it is true (Tath,; ti pi me no) .
do not say it is otherwise (AnnatM Ii pi me no).
do not say it is not so (No ti pi me no) .
do not say it is not not so (No no ti pi me no).
Th~refore} Sanjaya Belanhiputta was named "one who gets

into equivocation, into eel-wriggling" (vacavikkhepam apajjati
aniaravikkhepam). Or such a man may be called a skeptic. On the
1. D. I, 27, 59, M. 1,521, etc. Among scholars, there arc two different
opinions concerning these answers. The one is that which regards Safijaya's
answers as five answers. The other j, that which regards his answers as four
answers(from item 2 to 5). However, the commentator, Buddhaghosa
interprets this point in both ways (see SumangaltU.;ldsini. pp. 115-6).
As for the English translation of these answers. see A. K. Warder, Outline
of Indian Philosophy, p. 45.
In Chinese texts. We see the following expressions :
(I)
4.
tt.jp..
I.
"ilU.;r;ft:.
(II)
2.
5.
JltllJ.,.
JltllJl'JU';r;."
3. JIt....
(, T. 1.91
ttlllP&".
2. Jltll:;\l".
tt.~.",
5. (JIt'li) J~;r;l'i" (.ee
I.
c).
3. 'JIt.1('.
4.
T.I,I08c). We cannot
see in eith~r of items I and II the word!!! corresponding to me no in Pili.
Also, the mf'aning oCNo. 5 of item I is not the same as that of No.5 of
item II. The former could be translated into English: t'Neither is it not,
nOf is it not not."
90
other hand, the Buddha kept silent on the metaphysical subjects

involved in the. following sixteen questions in some cases (see
chapter 6.11). Concerning them, there is a difference between
the Pali and Chinese texts. So let us compare them first.
7.2 In the Dirghiigama, four subjects dealing with sixteen
questions are reckoned: 1
L
\. Are the soul and the world eternal?

2. Are they not eterrial?
3. Are they both eternal and not eternal?
4. Are they neither eternal nor not eternal?
II. 5. Are the soul and the world finite?
6. Are they not finite?
7. Are they both finite and not finite?
8. Are they neither finite nor not finite?
III. 9. Are the soul and the body the same?
10. Are they different?
II. Are they both the same and different?
12. Are they neither the same nor differnt?
IV. 13. Does the thus-gone exist after death?
14. Does he not exist after death?
IS. Does he both exist and not exist after death?
16. Does he neither exist nor not exist after death?
In the SOIpyuktdgamll, ~fourteen questions are reckoned, namely:

the above questions excluding Nos. 11 and 12. Also, in the first
and second, only the subject of the world is dealt with, not the
subject of the soul.
In the Nikdyas' and the Madhyamdgama,' ten questions are
reckoned, namely: the above questions excluding Nos. 3, 4, 7,
8, II and 12. Also, in the first and second only the subject of
the world is dealt with.
In the Milindapanha, twelve questions are reckoned.' But, as
T. 1.111 a, 75 c-76a,etc.
T. 2, 245 c, 246 a-b, etc.
3. S. III, 258, D. I, 18990, M. 1,426, 484, .tc.
4. T. 1,80S c, 804 ab, etc.
5. Miln. p. 145.
1.
2.
Metap!rJsica/ Questions and Tetralemmas
91
far as we can discover, th~ questions in the Milindapaiiha were

introduced from ten questions in the CQlam4lunkyasutta of the
Mqjjhimanikilya-also, its Chinese version deals with ten questions; therefore, we cannot but think that two questions in the
Milindapaiiha, namely: "Is the world both finite and not finite?"
and "Is it neither finite nor not finite?"l were added in the
huer period. Similarly, we would say that the larger number of
questions in the Dirghagama and in the Sa",ynkldgama developed
from the ten questions in the Nikdyas. What we are here concerned with is not to examine the number of metaphysical
questions, but to find out the ways of thinking of the early Buddhists by tbe use of pattern of questions.
7.3 We can learn tbat according to the metaphysical questions stated above, there are four kinds of pattern, namely:
I.
2.
3.
4.
Atthi (or hati) S?'

N' atthi S?
Allhi ca n'atlki ca S?
N'ev'atthi na n'atlhi S?
We' can also-learn that according to Sanjaya's replies" there are

four or five types of answers. Although it is said that the Buddha
avoided giving such answers as Salljaya did, itseerusto us that the
ways of thinking of the Buddha were substantially the same as
those of Sailjaya.
In the Aggi-Vacchagottasutta, the wanderer Vacchagotta crossexamined the Buddha on a metaphysical problem:'
Vaccha : My friend Gotama, where is a monk (whose thought

is released-vimuttacitta) reborn?
Gotama: "Reborn," Vaccha, does not apply.
V. : Wen then, my friend Gotama, is he not reborn?
G. : "Not reborn," Vaccha, does not apply.
1. Since -these questions can be found in the Brakmaj4/asUlla (D. I. 22-4).
we cannot disregard it in taking up metaphysical subjects.
2. Here '~. means 'the subject" such as the soul, the world. the latluigala,
etc.
3.
M.
r, 486-7, T. 2, 245 a-b. Cf A. IV, 67-98.
92
V.
Well then, my frind Gotama, is he both reborn and not
reborn?
G.
HBoth reborn and not reborn," Vaccha, does not apply.
V. : Well then, my friend Gotama, is he neither reborn nor
not reborn?
G.
"Neither reborn nor not reborn," Vaccha, does not
apply.
G. Such a doctrine (dhamma) , Vaccha, is profound
(gambhira) , difficult to see (duddasa), difficult to understand (duranubodha) , peaceful (santa), excellent (paQita) ,
beyond logic (atakMvacaTa), sublle (nipuQa), intelligible
to the wise (pa~(iitavedaniya); it is difficult for you" who
are of another view (annadil/hika), of another belief
(annakhantika) , pleased with another (annarucika), of
another discipline (tliifiatrayoga) and of another teacher
(annathacaTiyaka) .
Vaccha's question itself was that which should be waived
or undecided (avyakato) from the standpoint of Buddhism,
so that the Buddha did not meet it. If the Buddha, however,
replied to Vaccha's question by applying four kinds of possible
answer (Skt. catrqko/i, ~tetralemma' or 'fourfold formulation'),
namely: (I) It is, (2) It is not, (3) Both, and (4) Neither, the
Buddha's answers would be the same as Safijaya's, namely: (I)
It is not so (tatha ti pi me no), (2) It is not otherwise (annathit
Ii pi me no), (3) I do not say it is not (no Ii pi me no), and (4) I de>
not say it is not not (no no Ii pi me no). Why? Because we could
express Sai\jaya's answers in other words:
p) The word 'tatha t is contradictory to 'aii~athii'.
(2) The word 'aiinatha' is contradictory to 'tathti'. Therefore,
the relationship between them is: in case the one is "it is," the
other is 'it is not."
( 3) The words 'no Ii' are the negative proposition of each
of items (I) and (2). That is, if the one is denied, it becomes
"it is not." If the other is denied, it becomes "it is not not. ".
And if the words 'no ti' serve to negate simultaneously both
of items ( I) and (2), the relationship between the two can
be regarded as Hit neither is nor is not."
(4) The words 'no no ti' are the negative proposition of
item (3). Therefore, this is "it neither is not nor is not not."
Metaphysical Questions and Tetralemmas
93
Apart from item (4), it seems that Sailjaya's answers have

something in common with the tetralemma, which is used widely
in the Nikayas. For example, we see: Sariputta, one of the
Buddha's chief disciples, is asked by another of his followers
whether each condition in the sequence is made by oneself, by
another, by both oneself and another, or neither oneself nOf
another.! This is the same mode of question as the tetralemma.
According to A, L. Basham,' the Ajivaka (meaning 'way of
life') school (formed probably in B.C. 489 according to A. K.
Warder) 3 maintained three sets of possible statements (Skt.
trairiifika) , namely: (1) It is, (2) It is not, and (3) Both it is and
it is not. This may also be compared with the tetralemma.
From the four methods of asking, we can find out the ways
of thinking of the early Buddhists to some extent, and there is
no gainsaying the fact that the four kinds of possible answer
influenced the development of Buddhist doctrines, especially the
doctrine of voidness (sufinataJ in Buddhism. So let us try to
clarify further the ways of thinking of the early Buddhists.
1. S.I1, 112-3, T. 2,81 a.

2.
3.
History and Doctrints rif Ajivakas, pp. 175, 218, 274.

Outline of Indian Phil9S0Phy, p. 40.
8
TAKKA AND DHAMMATAKKA
8.1. We have to notice that certainwordsoccupyasignificant
position in the evolution of thought, and as time goes by,
changes in the meaning of the words came to produce changes
in meaning in the text. In the history of Indian thought, the
word 'talcka' is no exception to the rule. But the concept of the
word 'talcka' is not always clear. And as far as the Nikdyas are
concerned, it seetns that instead of takka, the words 'dhammatalcka' ate maintained. by the Buddha and his disciples. In this
chapter, we would like to trace the relationship between takka
and dhammatalcka, because both of them are important concepts
in clarifying the ways of thinking of the early Buddhists.
8.2. In the later period, the word 'takka' as well as ii<!JIa
came to be used with the meaning of 'logic" (e.g. the T arkahhdfd : The Language of Logic, written by Mok~akaragupta
some time between 1050-1202 A. D.'). As is well known, Indian
logic developed as the science of proof. For this reason, Indian
logic, according to Dignaga (either in the 4th century A.D. or
1. Beside we see the word t!utuuidy4' in the meaning of Ilogic' or
'logical ;casons', Hetuvidyd seemS to have been used mainly in Buddhist
texts, and was translated into Chincte.
2. See Y. Kajiyama, "An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy-An
Annotated Translation of the Tarlcahh4/4 of Mok,Akaragupta, II Mmzoirs qf
the Faculty 0/ LtlUrs, No. 10, p .. 1.
95
T akka and Dnammatakka
in the 5th century A.D.'), is characterized by inferring for

oneself and inferring for others. In this case, in order to prove
one's view validly it is naturally required that the proof be
based on valid ways of thinking. As far as we can tell of the
Nikdyas, logical principles a. the basis of modes of thinking can
be found in them. (This point will be discussed in Chapter 9.)
According to the Pdli-English Dictionary, the word 'takka'
means : a doubtful view, hairsplitting, reasoning, sophistry,
etc. B Apart from the two different words 'takka' and ';Joya',
having the same meaning 'logic'., we can see that the word
'ta/cka' has two or more different meanings. Let us exam'ine the
meanings of the word 'takka'.
8.3. Generally speaking, "sophistry" and "a doubtful view,'"
though there is a lack of clear-cut boundaries between the two,
are considered to be "false reasoning." "False reasoning" is
contradictory to "true reasoning."3 Both "false reasoning" and
"tru'e reasoning" include "reasoning." Therefore, the sense of
"reasoning" cannot be regarded in the same light as that of "a
doubtful view" or that of "sophistry.'; This can be, in a sense,
understood from the word and its associative field based on
connection between the senses :
reasoning (takka)
1
I'- - - '
"---'I
false reasoning
;--....J.I
I
I
sophistry
true reasonmg
1.1
~airsPlitting
1
doubtful view
1. On thil, see A. K. Warder, Indian Buddbism, pp. 444.46 (referring to

Vasubandhu) and pp. 447-62 (referring to Digniga).
2. AI we shan see below, the meanings of tatka in the Pdli.English
Dictiona,y Irem to be hardly authoritative.
3. AI to the concepti 'ttue' and 'falsc', lee R. Carnap, Til, Logical
Syntu qf Languagt, pp. 2147.
96
Abhidhamma Philosohpy
This kind of diagram was presented by F. de Saussure,' and

his disciple, C. Bally, introduced the useful concept of associative
fields. 2 In the above diagram, bold-faced lines indicate direct
relations and dotted lines indicate indirect relations. At this
point, we would like to see statements using the word 'takka'
in order to learn the meaning from the context. The Sutlanipata
runs :3
What some assert as very truth
Others assert as vanity and 'lies.
Thus, they indeed argue and dispute.
Why do not recluses agree in what they say ?(883 )
There is only one truth, nor is there two.
Why do those who understand it dispute with each other?
They praise the diverse truths as theirs,
Therefore, recluses do not agree in what they say. (884)
Why do they speak diverse truths
Those who bandy words by asserting their own truth?
Do they hear many diverse truths from others?
Or do they follow their own reasoning (takka) ? (885)
Indeed, there are not many diverse truths
Except for sunnise on 'permanence' in the world.
Formulating reasoning (takka) from their views,
They assert two dhammas : truth and lies. (886)'
And moreover, we see:
Those who explained to me their views

Before Gotama '5 doctrine:
"It was that, so it would be."
All that was tradition.
Al! that increases (false) reasoning (takka). (1084 and (135)
I.. Cours de linguistique g~nhak, p. 175.

2. "L' Arbitraire du signr'," Le Francais Mode,"" 8, pp. 193~206.
3. Abo, sec: T. 4, 182 b. cr. T. 25.60 c.
... In the Chinese text, lakka is translated into
~8111'
(lit. mean
ing 'discriminating and choosing', but from the context, meaning I( one's
own) judgement'.
T akka and Diulmmatakka
97
8.4 Our words are never completely homogeneous: even

the simplest and the most monolithic have a number of different facets depending on the context and situation in which they
are used, and also on the personality of the speaker using them.
Also, we must note that any word may acquire emotive over
tones in a suitable context; conversely, even words with a strong
emotional charge mayan occasion be employed in a purely
objective manner. 1 Therefore, as can be realized from Nos.
884 and 885 mentioned above, non-Buddhists thought of themselves as tru.e reasoners. But, from the standpoint of Buddhism,
Ihe reasoning stated by a reasoner (takkin) was contrary to
reason. - Because he was addicted to reasoning for the sake of
reasoning, he was also called sophist. (-takkin). With regard to
this matter, the Buddha says as follows :
He does not understand view (dillhi) , the cause ofview, the
extinction of view, and the ways of extinguishi.ng view. For
~ view increases; and he is not released from birth, decay,
death, grief (saka), lamentation (parideva), pain (dakkha),
depression (<lomanassa) , misery (upaydra); he is not released
from unhappiness. 2
After all, the paragraph "Formulating reasoning (takka) from
their views" mentioned in the Suttanipata becomes "Formulating
false reasoning (takka) from their views." False reasoning is no
other than the obsession of craving" of imagination (mannita) J
of differentiation (pap.mila), of grasping (uptldtinagala) and is
no "ther than a source of remorse (vippaJisdra). As the Buddha
points out also in the Brahmajdlasutta, a so-called reasoner
(takkin) or investigator (vfmamsaka) is a philosopher who is
possessed of false reasoning. The reason for this is that, being
addicted to reasoning, he gives utterance to the following conclusion of his own (sayampalibhdna) , beaten out by his argumentations ( takkapariydhata) and followed by his inv~stigation ( vimam-
1. On this, see S. Ullmann, Tile PTin,ipks of S,mantic'!:, pp. 9&-105 a.nd

Snnantiu, p. 52.
2. A.IV,68.
98
stlnucarita) : "the soul is eternal," Uthe world is eternal" and

so on. 1
It is recorded in the Vinaya that, one day, Safijaya's disciples,
Sariputta and Moggallana, who were renowned as reasoners,
listened to the theory of dependent origination introduced by

Assaji who was a disciple of the Buddha; consequently, they
became Buddhist monks. At that time, Assaji introduced to these
two the following verse:
Principles (dhammas) proceed from a cause,

This cause the thus-gone has told,
And also its cessation;
The great recluse teaches such a theory.'

By which arose in both Sari putt a and Moggallana the knowledge that everything which is having the principle of origination is also having the principle of cessation according to the
law of cause and effect. Especially from the fact that Sariputta,
after having become a monk, took an active part as a true
reasoner, we see that the reason why false reasoning arises is
ignorance of the causal law or the fourfold truth. This matter

ca'n be also realized from the fact that the word 'ariyaiiaya'
indicates "to understand

origination. "8
the
theory
of
the
dependent
8.5 Let us return to the subject. Since the same word may
be used i'n countless situations by millions of people, contexts
can go some way towards solving the vagueness of word-meanings. Another Sulta text states as follows:'
1. There are, Bharadvaja, some recluses and brahmans

who value tradition. Having attained to the accomplishment
of super-knowledge in this world through tradition, they
1. D. I, 16,21,23,29, etc. In the Chinese version of the Brahmajdlasutta (T. 1,88 b-94 a). the word corresponding to taUa cannot be seen.
2. Vin. I, 40, T. 22, 110 b, 798 c. etc.
3. See S. V, 388 and SA. II, 73.
4. M.II,211.
T akka and Dhamma takka
99
acknowledge the beginning of pure life-such as brahmans of

the Three Vedas.
2. There are, Bharadvaja, some recluses and brahmans.
Having attained to the accomplishment of super-knowledge in
this world by means of mere confidence, they acknowledge
the beginning of pure life-such as reasoners and investigators.
3. There are, Bhc1radvaja, some recluses and brahmans
who understand fully dhamma (truth), by themselves only,
which had not been heard before. Having attained to the
accomplishment of super-knowledge in this world by means
of u\lderstanding the truth, they acknowledge the beginning
of pure life. Now, I (the Buddha) am one of those recluses
and brahmans.
The above remark fits naturally the case we are arguing. That
is to say, there is a definite distinction between reasoning that
is based on the truth and reasoning that is based on mere confidence. The former is the standpoint of Buddhism and the latter
is false reasoning. In this case, what the reasoner states he is
unable to generalize. Nevertheless, he concludes by saying that
the world is eternal, the soul is eternal, and so on. This is said
to be merely false reasoning. As we have already mentioned in
chapter 8.4, words have a number of different facets depending
on the situation of the speaker (in the above case, the Buddha
and his disciples), so that the word 'takka' was used in the sense
of false reasoning, in spite of the fact that the word, 'takka' itself
did not contain the concept of 'false'. In other words, one who
does not understand the causal law or the dependent origination
is addicted to reasoning for the, sake of reasoning, and is called
a false reasoner or sophist: On the other hand, the Buddha
and some of his disciples are true reasoners, because they understand the causal law in Buddhism. In this sense, we would say
that the word 'talcka' had the neutral sense of 'reasoning', which
could be favourable or unfavourable according to the standpoint
of the speaker. As the Buddha and his disciples used it as "false
reasoning", the original sense fell into disuse particularly in
the eady Buddhist canon.
8.6
What kind of word, then, did Buddhists use in expressing
100
"true reasoning"? Prior to answering this question, let us

turn our eYes to the words 'tl,dtalckila' and 'sutakkita',
In Pali, the prefix su added to nouns, adjectives, etc. means
'well', 'good', and the prefix; du(r) , 'ill', 'bad' (and they cover
a wide range of similar conceptions : easy difficult, pleasant
unple.... ant, etc.'). Therefore, dutttJkkittJ; is used with the
meaning of 'badly reasoned', and sutakkita, with the meaning
of 'well reasoned'. For example, .
see: "He is a sophist
(takkin) and his view is badly reasoned (d~ltalckita)." On the
other hand, since it seems that 'well reasoned' means "skilfully
reasoned" rather than "reasoned correctly" from sound assumptions, we could say that 'well reasoned' does not always indicate
"true reasoning." In the SandaIcasutta, the following explanation
can be seen :2
we
(Ananda says :) Sand aka, there is some teacher who is a

reasoner and investigator; he teaches'dhamma on the basis of
his own understanding, beaten out by his argumentations
(takkapariyahata), followed by his investigation (vimamsanucarita). To the teacher who is a reasoner and investigator,
his view is well reasoned (sutakkitam pi hoti) and badly
reasoned (duttakkitam pi hoti); his view is well and badly
reasoned (taihii pi hoti annath4 pi hoti).
In reference to this, the commentator throws ,no light, so that
we cannot grasp the meaning (e.g. what the words 'sutakkittJm
pi hoti', :'ath4 pi hoti annalh4 pi hoti', etc. signify) in full. It is,
however, understood from the above that there was a neutral
reasoner as distinguished from a so-called reasoner (who is
possessed of fulsereasoning). The neutral reasoner can be
regarded as one who is possessed of neutral reasoning. Properly
speaking, such a case is unthinkable. But, judging from the
explanation in the Sandakasutla, the neutral case seems to be
partly true and partly false reasoning. On the whole, the Sandakasutla must have tried to give a description of this point.
1. The prefix
2. M.I, 520.
meaning 'very' may be prefixed to adjectives in poetry.

IntrodUdion to Pili. p. 414.
jU
S~e A. K. Warder,
T aleka and Dhammataleka
101
Regrettably, we cannot see many materials dealing with the

neutral case. Thus,
A neutral reasoner's view is well and badly reasoned.'"
8.7 Once again, let us consider the word 'takka" and its
associative field together with the meaning of the words Csutalekita' and'duttakkita':
From the preceding explanations, we have also learned the

two words 'taleka-pari}ahata' (beaten out by argumentations)
and 'vlmamsiinlk:arita' (followed by investigation). According to
S. C. Vidyabhusana, l the two words would suggest a Buddhist
disbelief in logical reasoning and its validity as a means of
knowledge. As we have already mentioned in chapter 8.4 and
also as pointed out by G. S. P. Misra, what is rejected by the
Buddha and his disciples is certainly not the logical method or
its- validity but a vicious and unnecessary dialectic. It is, there..
fore, said that non-Buddhists are false reasoners (takkins) or that
sophists (talekins) formulate false reasoning (takka).
From the standpoint of Buddhism, true reasoning. is called
dhamrnatakka or arvandya, which indicates the position of vimuttiii41)adarsana : the realm of newly discovered verbal expressions
and thinking. Dhammatakka is a compound word made up of two
independent words : dhamma and takka. Compounds, which are
occasionally formed to show which of two or more homonyms
is meant, may be regarded as borderline cases between words
1. History o/.:tJu M6ditUrJaJ &hool of Ittdi4n Logic, p. 59.
2. IlLogical and Scientific Method in Early Buddhist Text.," JRAS,
Part 1 and 2, p. 55.
102
and phrases. 1 The meaning of the compound word 'dhammatakka' can be understood without losing the respective sense of
both dhamma and takka. The word 'dhamma' means 'true' (of
course, dhamma includes various meanings, such as doctrine,
merit, principle, etc., see chapter 2.7), and the word 'takka'
means 'reasoning'. Therefore, dhammatakka can be considered
to be 'reasoning based on the truth'. Compounds are very freely
formed in Pali (much more freely than in English, except perhaps in some modern styles which many English speakers would
regard as jargon l ). They are not restricted to two members,
compounds of three or more members, variously related, being
quite common. In the Suttanipdta, the following verse can be
15een:
To be calm, to be pure in thought,

And to be supported by true reasoning (dhammatakka), 3
These are the result of the highest insight,
And the breaking up of ignorance. Thus, I teach. (1107)
According to the commentary, Cfi!aniddesa, 4 dhammatakka is
right intention (sammilsankappa) , right theory (sammddi/lhi), the
insight (vipassand) of the fourfold way (for recluse), and the
starting-point of release through the highest insight. The right
intention (also, the right theory) is reckoned as one of the eight
factors of the noble way. But whether the right intention or
the right theory, it will be accompanied by the other seven
factors. Also, the eight factors of the noble way are inseparable
from the fourfold truth. Therefore, the reasoning based on the
truth (dhammatakka) is no other than the reasoning that occurs
from the knowledge of the fourfold truth or dependent origination (which signifies intrinsically aTryandya). In the Majjhimanika)'a, the explanation of right intention can be seen as follows:
What, monks, is the right intention that' is noble, pa&sionless,
super-mundane, a factor of the way ? In one who, by culti1.
2.
,,. 3.
(T.2,
...
~',~
L. Bloomfield, Language, p. 180.

See A. K. Warder, Introduction 10 Pali, p. 78.
In the Chin~se version, the words "to see the truth" arc used
256 a).
Nd2. p. 176.
T akka and Dhammatakka
103
vating the noble way, is of noble thought, of passionless

thought and is conversant with the noble way, whatever is
reasoning (takka), reflective thought (vilakka), intention
(samkappa), the complete focussing (appandvyappanil), the
application of the mind (cetaso abhiniropanii), and an activity
of speech (viicilsarflkhiira) -this, monks, is the right thought
that is noble, passionless, super-mundane, a factor of the
way.!
There is no denying the fact that the Buddha'. line of argument was logical. According to Sunakkhata,' the son of a
Licchavi, the Buddha teaches dhamma (doctrine) s1<ilfully. To
be skilful is not always to be logical. But we see that in any
discourses given by the Buddha, there is a certain element
characterized by force and persuasiveness. On this point, the
Sthaviravada text states as Sunakkhata's words: The recluse
Gotama teaches dhamma on the basis of his own devising, beaten
out by his argumentations, followed by his investigation; and
the dhamma taught for the sake of something specific only leads
the doer of it to the cessation of unhappiness.'
The Buddha points out that it is important to attain to the
state of atakkiivacara 'beyond logic', i.e. 'the realm of a wellestablished conclusion which cannot' be controverted' or to the
position of vimutti 'the real~ of no verbal expression and no
thinking'. However, after his enlightenment .the Buddha did
not make light ofargument, but regarded it as the first principle.
In other words, his teachings are for a certainty expressed
logically and reasonably. If we think of the distinction between
true and false reasoners (or between those with understanding
and those with weak understanding), the true reasoner would
be, contrary to the false reasoner who was addicted to mere
reasoning, the person who not only attained to the state of
profound profitable dhamma which is beyond logic, but also
realized dhammalakka. In this context, the following explanation,
1. M. III, 73. But, in the Chinese version. there is no term corresponding to takka (see T. 1, 735 c).
2. T. 17,591 c.
3. M. I, 68, 71. 77.
104
Ahhidhamma Philo$ophy
as indicated in chapter 6.2, shows how rigorous methods of

argument were established:
A p~rson by discussing with another knows thus : judging
from this reverend's approach to a question, judging from
his intention, judging from his behaviour towards a question,
he has understanding, _.. As to the dhamma,,:,(teaching) the
reverend talks, he is competent both in brief and in detail,
is competent to explain its meaning, to expound it, to make
it clear, to lay it down, to open it up, to analyze it and to
make it plain. This reverend has understanding, he is not
weak in understanding.
From the latter part of the above, we can see in particular

some of the thiokiog actions (which are attended by the
functions of comparison, discrimination, analysis, synthesis, etc.)
of the penon called one with understanding.
B.B In spite of the fact that the Buddha was a man of profound thought, much was said in criticism of him, He was said
abusively to be unenlightened (e.g. there are no states ofenlightenment, excellent knowledge and insight suitable to the noble in
the recluse Gotama) .' He was also called "a juggler (maydvin)
who knows a trick of enticement (ava/lani mayO) by which he
entices away the followers of those holding other views."2: But
this does not express the truth. The reason why some recluses
and b"ahmins said such words to tlte Buddha is that they did
not understand completely what the dhamma (truth) taught by
the Buddha is, and that they were not possessed of great understanding (maha paiUill) , nor wide understanding (puthu panna) ,
nor profound understanding (gamhhira pa;;;ill) , nor incomparable
understanding (asamatta Pannll) , nor penetrating understandiog
(nihh.dhika paifiiii) . To those who spoke ill of the Buddha, he
explained his meaning to their satisfaction.' Yet, what the
I. M. 1,68.
2. A. II, 190, M. I, 375, T. 1,629 a, etc.
3. All one of the most representative sUltas, we see the
of the Sul/..iM'. (pp. 12-6).
Ktlsihlui,ad~jQsulla
T akka and Dhammatakka
105
Buddha was deeply concerned about must have been that,

among his disciples (especially novices) J there were some who
listened to the views of certain recluses and brahmin! (perhaps
known as reasoners) and yet could not discriminate truth from
falsity. Accordingly, the Buddlia probably protected such novices
from making an error in judgement. At this point, the following
explanation is worth noticing: 1
Do not accept these things (which certain reasoners spoke
to you) by tradition (anussava), nor by a succession (parampaTd, of teachers handing something down on their authority),
nor by history (itikiTd), nor by texts (pi/akasampadiina) , nor
by (mere) logic (takka) , nor by schemes (naya: a predetermined or a priori system of ideas, according to A. K.
Warder'), nor by reflection on peculiarities (ilkilrapaTivitakka
as merely superficial aspects of things which do not show !heir
real nature), nor by approving after considering (mere)
opinion (dillhj,,;jjhiinakkhanti)pecause (the person speaking)
appears to be capable (bhal!)lariipatd), and because the philosopher is our teacher (sama~o no gUTU, which may also Qe
translated: our teacher is a philosopher). If you know for
yourselves : these things (these non-reasOns) are unprofitable,
blameworthy, censured by those with understanding : these
things, when performed and undertaken, conduce to loss and
suffering, ... then, you indeed reject them.
The Buddha urges his disciple. Ie find things out by them,
selves, to have personal Imowledge of the conditions through
which things happeR, that i., to pursue a deep knowledge based
on the truth.
From the above discussion, we have learned that only the
person called one with understanding is a true reasoner, who
attained to the state of atakk4uacara which means "profound
profitable dhamma (truth) being beyond logic" and at the same
I. A. I, 189,193, II, 191, 193. cr. S.II, 115' and T. 2,98 c.
2. ONlline of bciian Phil()S()phy, p. 49. Later on, n.'l'ya was used in a good
sense as an instrument of logical analysis-a tetralemma, for example,
would be anaya, likewue a duka or a lika and so on.
106
time, who had a right understanding of dhammatakka which means

"reasoning based on the fourfold truth or dependent origination." The fourfold truth and dependent origination are two
teachings closely connected. In other words, the one is the
corollary of the other. And it is universally acknowledged that
all the Buddha's teachings are summarized in the formula of
the fourfold truth. However, in clarifying more thoroughly the
ways of thinking of the early Buddhists, we need to examine
the conclusions arrived at i~ the NikiIyas by means of true
reasoning.
8.9 As we have already mentioned at the very beginning of
this chapter, it is clear that certain words occupy a significant
position in the evolution of thought, and that as time goes by,
changes in the meaning of the words come to produce changes
in meaning in the text. We have learned that the word 'takka'
is no exception to the rule. This can be also said about the word
'anumana' (inference). For instance, we see the Anumanasutta in
the Majjhimanikaya1 and see "anumiinapaiiha" in the Milinda.
paiiha. 2 But the significance of anumtina used in both texts is
very different. In this sense, it is extremely important to
examine and to clarify the meaning of words which occupy a
special position in any field of philosophy. It is, therefore, said
that contemporary semantics is characterized by an absorbing
interest in relations between language and thinking; language
is no longer regarded as a mere instrument for expressing our
thoughts, but as an influence in its own right, which shapes and
predetermines them and directs them into specific channels, 3
though these ideas were already prominent in the theory of
'semantic field'.'
1. M. I, 95-100, T. 1,571 b-572 c, 842 b-843 b.

2. Miln. pp. 329-47.
3. On this, see S. Ullmann, Semantics, p.9. Also. refer to ed. L.
Linsky. Semantics and the Philosophy of language.
4. See S. Ullmann, The Principles qf Stmantirs, pp. 152-70. Also refer to
N. Chomsky, Syntactic Structure;, p. 15. pp. 92-105, and B. K. Matilal, TIM
Navya-7!>'dya Doctrine cif Negation, pp. 19-20.
9
FORMS OF REASONING AND ARGUMENT
'.'
9.1 The Buddha states in a discussion with the wanderer

Dighanakha that a discerning person (viiiilD purisa) does not
adhere to any of the three opinions: (1) I do approve of
everything (that annihilationists, eternalists and other heretics
assert), (2) I never approve of anything they assert, and
(3) I approve of some things they assert and not others. The
Buddha also states that he does not affirm : This alone is the
truth, any other view is false (idam eva saccat[> mogha aiiila'fl), for
by giving a categorical reply, there is a quarrel (viggaha)
between them; if there is a quarrel, there is a dispute (vivdda);
if there is f\ dispute, there is remorse (vighdta); if there is
remorse, there is trouble (vihesil),l His explanation similar in
essence to the above can also be found in the Mahiiviyii.hasulta of the Suttanipata (Nos. 895-914). Although the above
indicates the' Buddha's way of thinking to some extent, it
does not mean that the Buddha maintained a dubious or
uncertain attitude towards their assertions.
As mentioned in chapter 6.11, the Buddha regarded all the
metaphysical problems as meaningless because he thought that
the objects tnentioned are neither real nor existent. Nevertheless, he had to express his views and to exchange them with
his disciples and non-Buddhists; consequently, he used the four
paiihahyakartu;las properly and encouraged his disciples to learn
I.
M. I, 498-99, T. 2, 249 b-c, 449 a-b.
108
them. This point must be clarified further by examining the
ways of thinking of the Buddha and his disciples. In th~
chapter, we would like to make clear forms of reasoning arid
argument appearing in the Nikiiyas.
9.2 The Sarhyuttanikaya deals with vanet,es of synonym

denoting the conception of nibba.a, which is also called
(lsamklulea 'unactivated' or ~unsynthesized'.l When we classify
those synonyms, we find that there are negative expressions.
and positive expressions, as already mentioned in chapter 5.3.
In other places, nibbdna means the absence of kilesas represented
by three poisons, namely: I. passion (riiga), 2. aversion (dosa)
and 3. delusion (moha);' and also means the extinction of
desire for all the pleasant matter seen, heard, felt and known:
AIl that you do think, Mettagu,
Thus the Master said,
Above, below, transversely, tnidst-in such;
Eliminate pleasure (nandi) and attachment (.ivesana) ,
And consciousness (vin~a) will neverstay in transmigration
(bhava). (Sn. 1055)
And also, we see:
In this world, to get rid of desire and passion

For all the pleasant matter (piyarOpa) seen
And heard and felt and known, Hemaka,
Is the way to the stable enlightenment .. (Sn. 1086)
Yet, from the very beginning, nibbdna as the ultimate truth
seems to have been expressed by using negative prefixes or by
using nipdtas in the sense of negation. For example, we see
the following explanations of .ibbilna:
(I) Monks, there exists that condition wherein is neither

nor water, nor fire, nor ajr; wherein is neither the
sphere of infinite space, nor of infinite consciousness, J?or of
earth~
1. S. IV, 368-73, T. 2, 224 .

2. S. IV, 251, 261, etc.
3. Ud. pp. 80-1, ltv. p. 37.
Forms of Reasoning and Argument
109
nothingness nor of neither~consciousness-nor-unconsciousness;

wherein is neither this world, nor a world beyond, nor both
the moon and the sun. Monks, I declare it to be no coming;
no going; no standing; no vanishing; and no arising. It is
without help; without continuance; and without senseobject. This indeed is the end of unhappiness.
(2) It is hard to see non-ego; it is not easy to see truth;
one who penetrates knows craving; and there is nothing for
one who sees.
(3) Monks, there is a not-born; a not-become; a notmade; and an unactivated. Monks, if that not-born; notbecome; not-made; and unactivated are not, there will not
be apparent the departure from being born; becoming;
being made; and being activated. Monks, because there is a
not-born; a not-become; a not-made; and an unactivated,
there is the departure from being born; becoming; being
made; and being activated.
( 4) For one who clings, there is wavering; for one who
does not cling, there is no wavering; wavering not being,
there is calm; calm being, there is no attachment; attachment not being, there is no coming and going; coming and
going not being, there is no death and birth; death and
birth not being, there is neither 'here', nor 'yonder', nor
anything between the two. This indeed is the end of
unhappiness.
,.:,:"
The explanations mean that the ultimate tJ'uth cannot be
directly expressed in affirmative words. That is : the ultimate
truth is beyond all descriptions. Therefore, at the stage of
trying to explain what the ultimate truth is, there is no
method of doing so other than using a negative phrase such as
"this is not A", "not B", "not e", and so on.
9.3 However, a noteworthy matter at this point is that the
early Buddhists accepted such a dichotomising tendency not
only in the explanations of the ultimate truth, but also in those
of Buddhist doctrine; moreover, by means of a double negative
in statements, the early Buddhists must have attempted
advancing the theory of Buddhism. In other words, it was
110
probably not difficult for the early Buddhists to apply the

principle of contradiction in statements, because they had a
good supply of both upasaggas and nipatas expressing the
negative; The foIlowing affords a striking illustration of the
fact:
~
1. Example of na ahllTfl na jdniimi coming out in a dialogue
between Ananda and Kokanuda. That is, while the venerable Ananda was staying at Rajagaha in the Tapoda park,
the wanderer Kokanuda approached him, saying:'
K. : I would like to ask you a question on a certain point,

if you could give the opportunity for answering my
question.
A. : Ask on, friend. When we hear, we shaIl know.
K. : What about this, friend? Do you hold the view: The
world is eternal; this is the truth; any other view is
useless (mogha) ?
A. : No indeed, friend, I do not hold such a view.
K. Then, do you not know, not see?
A. : No indeed, friend, I am not one who knows not, sees
not, I know. I see (na kho ahaT{! dvnso na jiiniimi no
passami, jdniim' aha", dvuso passiiml' til .'
A. : As regards groundless view (ditlhigatii), friend, as

regards a tenet of speculative philosophy (difthiflhiina),
as regards self-determining view (adhilthiina), as regards
prejudiced view (pariyullhiina), as regards rising up
from view (samU/lMna), as regards rooting up view
(samuggMta), I am one who knows, who sees.
2.
Example of no a-manasikdra.'
Monks, these four conditions are to be understood by four
other conditions. What are the four? It is by association
I. A. V, 196-8, T. 2, 248 b-e, 448 a.

.~1'~.lL lim~Jl.,
2. We lee in the Chinese venion:
corresponding exactly to the statement in Pili (see T. 2, 248 b).
3. A.I1, 187, S. 1,78, T. 2, 305 e-306 a.
111
that (one's) virtue is to be understood, and that for a long

time, not shortly, by attention, not by inattention (no
amanasikllra),' by one who has understanding, not by one
who is weak in understanding. It is by living with (one)
that (one's) integrity is to be understood, and that for a long
time, . . . not by inattention, . . . It is in time of distress
that (one's) courage is to be understood and that for a long
time, ... not by inattention, . .. It is by discussion that
(ooe's) understanding is to be understood, and that for a
long time, ... not by inattention,
3.
Example of na an-attamana.'
Monks, a teacher teaches dhamma (doctrine) to disciples,
compassionate, seeking their welfare, out of compassion,
saying: "This is for your welfare, this is for your happiness.'"
Some of his disciples do not listen, do not lend ear, do not
prepare their minds for profound knowledge and, turning
aside, move away from the teacher's instruction. But some
disciples listen, lend ear, prepare their minds for profound
kno"!\,,ledge and, not turning aside, do not move away from
the teacher's instruction. Herein, monks, the thus-gone is
neither delighted nor does he experience delight and neither
is he not delighted (na anatlamano hoti), nor does he not
experience delight (na anattamanatam pa/isarhved.ti). Having
got rid of both delight and non-delight, he dwells with
equanimity, .mindful (sala), clearly conscious (sampajana).
This, monks, is the second base of self-possession (satipallhdna)
that a noble man practises and, practising it, is the~ noble
man who is a teacher competent to instruct a group.
The statements
1.
represented by the double negative in the
The:: Chinese venion states:
"~fliT'W
(literally, meaning 'not
by not understanding'). See T. 2, 306 a. In general,

'.
'understanding'. but in this place it should be regarded as
'pondering' or 'attention'.
2.
3.
means
meaning
M. III, 221, T.1, 693 c-694 a (esp.ee 693 c).

In the Chinese ver,sjon~ the second expression cannot be scen.
112
Nikayas are too numerous to mention. The statement "x is not

non-A" expressed by the double negative is logically equivalent
to the affinnative proposition "x is A. H Double negation in
statements can be a strong expression in some cases. And it
can also become a weak expression in the sense of the suggestion of uncertainty of expression in some cases. Except for
these two facts, we must realize that for those who form the
basis of negative thinking, the use of double negative is very
important, because they do not want to give apparently an
expression of dogmatic affirmative, though internally positive~
As a characteristic of the dialogue on dhammas, we can see that
there are four methods of answering questions, in which the
first method is to give a categorical reply or to answer directly
in the affirmative (see chapter 6.10). This method is generally

based on the principle of identity expressed by the formula of
"(AU) Sis S." Most of the discernible logical forms which we
find in the Nikayas seem to be statements founded on this
principle. However, at the same time we cannot fail to see
the fact that in the Niki!.yas there are statements which are
expressed according to the principle of contradiction. This
principle is that which forms the foundation of negative
thinking, whilst the principle of identity is what forms the basis
of affirn)ative thinking. However, in statements the former
reaches substantially the same result as the latter.
9.4 Throughout early Buddhism, "nothing is permanent in
this world" persists as a universal proposition. Furthermore, we
can find the following statement based on the principle of
contradiction: 1
He has not this view (na pi hevlUfl di/lhi hoti): That self,
after death, becomes permanent, lasting, eternal, and does
not have the principle of change (avipariniimadhammo)
In the Nikayas and Agamas, the three words 'anicca', 'dukkha',

and 'viporinamadhamma' (having the principle of change) are
dealt with together as a stereotyped expression', and the
1.
S. Ill. 98-9. T. 2, 13 c, in which the lame explanation as in Pili
cannot be seen.
2.
See M. III, 20, 272, 27-8, T. 2,14 c, 73 a, etc.
Forms
rif Reasoning and
113
Argument
subject of these words is the five khandhas or the six dyatanas,

which are also represented by the word 'sabba' (all, everything
in the world) .. Therefore, on' this basis the statement should be
expressed as follows :
Everything in the world is impermanent, unhappy and having
the principle of change.
However, when we look at the paragraph na pi heva", dit/hi

hoti and the words 'a-viparindmadhammo' (of which the subject
is of course "sabiJo") mentioned previously, the whole statement
becomes: "he has not indeed such a view: everything is not having
the principle of change." In other words, "Everything is not a. viparindmadhammo (not having the principle of change) ," which
is expressed by the formula of "S is not non-P". According
to the rules of the symbolism of modern logic, the above
statement might be changed into the following expression :
It is not the case that everything is not having the principle
of change.
We would say that the Nikdyas (especially, the "Khandhachapter'" in the Samyuttanikdya) teach uS both the statements
"Everything is having the principle of change" and "It is
not the case that everything i. not having the principle of
change." If we use the letter p to symbolize the statements, the
former isp, and the latter,--p. The latter is equivalent to the
former:
--p=p
And also we can learn from the statements: "It is not the case
that everything is having the principle of change and that everything is not having the principle of change." Symbolically:
~ (p. -P)
The principle of contradiction is used in general to defeat an
opponent rather than to assert emphatically one's own opinion.
"Having the principle of change," this is the _standpoint of
Buddhism and "not having the principle of change," this is the
viewpoint of eternalists. But the Buddha does not give a flat
I.
2.
S.IV,15.
S. III, 1.188.
114
denial to them. ,As he points out, if a Buddhist (or Buddhists)

affirms or adheres to the opinion: "I never approve of yours,"
there is a quarrel, ... a trouble. In this sense, .it might be considered that the Buddha gave an expression of passivity by the
use of the principle of double negation and tried to use the
principle of contradiction, though the latter is not expressed
yet in concrete form in the Nikayas.
The practical use of a double negation such as "I am not one
who knows not, sees not. I know. I see" can certainly be considered an expression of emphatic affirmation. But, in view of the
fact that the four types of ambiguous answers and the four kinds
of possible answer are applied widely in the Nikilyas (see
Chapter 7.1, 2 and 3), and the fact that the Buddha himself
mentions clearly to Dighanakha that a discerning person does
not adhere to anyone of the three opinions (chapter 9.1), the
practical use of a double negation seems to be an expression
lacking positive affirmation. This is also a very important point
when we come to consider the characteristics of the forms of
argument in the Nikiiyas. From the above, we can see to a
certain extent the principles of thinking appearing in the Nikdyas.
In order to clarify this point further, let us give another
example.
The example is from the Mahllparinibb4nOSlllta,
in which
the Buddha said the following words to a great disciple, Ananda,
who was in deep grief, having heard the news that the Buddha
was going to pass away:1
Enough, Ananda. Do not mourn; do not lament. Have I
not already told you that it is in the very nature of all things
most near and dear to us that we must separate from them,
leave them, sever ourselves from them? How, then, Ananda,
can this be possible, that whatever is born, existing, activated
and having the principle of breakage should not be
dissolved (yan la". jala". bh ilta". sa.khala". paloka-dhamma"., IIJ1fI
vala mO pal.jjili)? No such case can exist (n'eIIJ1flIMna". vijjali) .
The form of expression is entirely the same as in the first
example. Therefore, "Whatever is born, existing, activated and
1. D. II, 144, T. 1, 16c
Forms
I!f RelfSojling and Argument
115
having the principle of breakage should not be dissolved" is a

case which cannot exist. Although his exprc$sion might seem
an involved construction, it becomes :
It is not the case that whatever is born, existing, activated
and having the principle of breakage is not dissolved.
As pointed out before, it is understood that, with the help of
both upasaggas and nipdtas to express negation, the early
Buddhists probably tried to develop further a theory of
Buddhism. In this sense, if we disregard the negative way of
thinking appearing in the Nikiiyas, we cannot understand the
theory of dependent origination and the proce'Ss of its development. So we wQuld like to enlarge further upon this point with
the statements expressed in other logical forms.
9.5. As mentioned in chapter B.B, the whole doctrine of the
Buddha is summarized in the formula of the fourfold truth
(sacca), and from the standpoint of Buddhism, the true reasoning is that which was based on the knowledge of the. fourfold
truth or dependent origination (pa/iccasamuppdda )-which could
be displayed by the words 'dhammatakka' or 'arryaiidya'. A, is well
known, the formula of the fourfold truth is: '
l. This is the noble truth of unhappiness: birth (jati) is

unhappy, so is old age (jari1) , sickness (vyi1dhi) , death
(mara~a), (and grief, lamentation, pain, depression, and
misery are unhappy: sokaparid.vadukkhaoomanassupdyiisd pi
dukkhd'). Contact with unpleasant things (apprya-sampayoga) is
unhappy, separation from pleasant things (prya-vippayoga) is
unhappy, not getting what one wishes (yam iccha". na laMati)
is unhappy. In short, the five attachment groups (pancupddiinakkhandhd) are unhappy.
2. This is the noble truth of origination ofunhappiness :
desire which leads to rebirth, desire which is connected with
pleasure and passion, desire which finds pleasure here and
there, namely: the desire for passion, the desire for existence,
and the desire for non-existence.
1. S. V, 42C-24, T. 2.103 c-104a, T. 2.503 bC,etc.
2. These lIst omitt~d by the Yinaya text (see Yin. I, 10). cr.. T. 2, 103
c-104 a, T. 2, 503 b.
116
3. This is the noble truth of the cessation of unhappiness:

the absolute cessation in dispassion of, the abandonment of.
rejection of, freeing from, not clinging to, that same desire.
4. This is the noble truth of the way leading to the cessation of unhappiness: this is the noble eightfold way, namely:
I. right theory (sammlldillhi), 2. right intention (sammasa".kappa), 3. right speech (sammtll'dctl) , 4. right action (sammilkammanla); 5. right livelihood (somma-Il}lva), 6. right effort
(sammavayama) , 7. right self-possession (sammasali) and 8. right
concentration (sammasaml1dhi).
And as the extension of the fourfold truth, we see the theory of
the twelve~linked chain of causation in direct and reverse orders,
which is formulated in a scientific manner and contains strictly
logical deductions, as we shall see below. Also, from the Nikiiyas
and Agamas, we can learn the fact that the early Buddhists made
an effort to examine what unhappiness and its origination are.
For example, the first dhamma, kdydnupassiml1, in the four salipa//hdnas, Nos. 274, 276, 448-450, 453, 1093 in the Theragalhd, Nos.
205, 206 in the Sultanipdla, etc. are the most representative
doctrines which teach the impurity arid decrepitude of the
body, and also which lead to a comprehension of anicca, dukkha
and nnaltan in the world. Therefore, it may be that the following universal propositions can be formulated: 1
The five khandhas (or six ayalanas) are impermanent. What
is impermanent, that is unhappy (yad anicca". la". dukkha".).
What is unhappy, that is egoless (yo". dukkha". lad anatla) .
What is egoless, that is not mine (yad analttl 10". nelam mama):
I am not it (neso ham asmi); it is not my self (no meso alll1).
In dealing with the above, we must use discretion. That is,
according to western logic (strictly speaking, since Aristotle's
time), such a statement is regarded as a sorites, which is like
a categorical syllogisrp. in that all premisses are categorical
propositions; but the above statement is a sorites which is
composed of hypothetical judgments. On this point, we stand
in need of more detailed explanation.
I. S.llJ, 22,23,112,IV, 1, T.2,2 a,30c,ete.
I17
9.6. In connection with the fourfold truth, we see further

the generalization: "Whatever is having the principle of
~rigination is having the principle of cessation" (ylZ1fI kinei
samudayadhamma". sabba". ta". nirodha-dhamma".).l This proposition
can be expressed by:
1. "If anything is having the principle of origination,
then it is also. having the principle of cessation."
This must be viewed as affirming a bundle of individual conditionals: If a is having the principle of origination, a is
having the principle of cessation; if b is having the principle
of origination, h is having the principle of cessation; and so
on. In short:
2. "For all x, if x is having the principle of origination,
then x is having the principle of cessation."
This can also be rewri tten as :
3. For all x, it is not the case that x is both having the
principle of origination and not having the principle
of cessation.
Item I is called a "'generalized conditional."z At this point, we
must keep items I, 2 and 3 in mind.
Now, the statement UWhatever is having the principle of
origination is having the principle of cessation" teaches the
close relationship of anicca, dukkha and anattan. In contrast to
the penetration of aUan as a basic idea through Brahmanism,
"everything is impermanent (unhappy and egoless) in the
world" penetrated as a universal proposition through early
1. Yin. I, 40. Besides, we see the same expression in D. I, 110,
M. III. 280, S. IV, 47, 107, V, 423, etc, On the other hand, in Chinese
texts we see the words
.i!.I!IIIIJA:iJi*IRiJt,
which correspond to Pili :
virajatp t'ilatnaiaTfl dhamma-eakkhuTfI udapddi (secT. 22, 110 b, 798 c, 1.88 a, 2.
104 a, 503 c, 504 b, 26. 479 c, etc.), but we cannot see the words corresponding exactly to the "ords YIlf/I kifld . nirodhodhamma1p', Also, we see
another t'xpression '~aqI bhiitom ta",. tiiTodhadhammaTfl" (what has come to be
is having the principle of cessation). On this, see "nidana-samyultll" (8.11,48),
the Chinese versk:n of "niddna-sa7py"kta" (T. 2, 95 b), and E. Waldschmidt,
4Skt. fragments of Niddnasatpyukta," (ed. Tripathi. Berlin, DAWB, VIII.
1962) ,p. 201. ,From this, it is supposed that the words 'kine,' and 'sabbmp'
in YOTfl llirodhadhomma1p were added in the later period.
2. On this, see W. V. Quine, Methods af Logic, p . 14.
Ahhidhamma Philruophy
118
Buddhism. In this case, not only the Buddha, but also his
disciples must have been required to prove why everything is
impermanent, unhappy, and egoless. The Buddha postulates
that the fiye khandhas (or six ayatanas, which can be expressed
by sabba) are non~egoJ because they cannot be controlled, and
then he gives an apt illustration of 'matter' I one of the five
khandhas, as we have already seen in chapter 5.7:'
If matter (as physical principles) were ego, it would not be

involved in sickness, and one could say of matter: "Thus let
it be. Thus let it not be." But, inasmuch as matter is non-ego,
that is why matter is involved in sickness, one cannot say of
matter: "Thus let it be. Thus let it not be."
As can be realized from the above, the statement "matter is
non-ego" is actually conditional. In other words, the startingpoint in the Nikaya-Buddhism is in the observation that everything is anicca. In spite of the fact that everything in the world
is impermanent, one is possessed by the belief that everything is
permanent. From such an illusion, dukkha arises. And as one of
the four dukkhas, the above JuUa text deals with "sickness" and
tries to treat of the fact that nothing is substantial (anatlan) from
the standpoint of sickness. Therefore, it is understood that the
relationship of (A) anicca, (B) dukkha, and (C) analtan is that if
there is A, then there is B; if there is B, then there is C (or if there
is not A, then there is not B; if there is not B, then there is not
C). Such a case is a sorites which is composed of hypothetical
judgements. Concerning this, we see a more detailed explanation:2.
Whenever such subjects as matter, sensation, perception,

forces, or consciousness occur, one understands them wholly as
impermanent principles, as an ill, as a disease (roga) , a boil
(ga~Qa), a sting (satta), a hurt (agha), an affliction (abadha) , as
something alien (para), breakable (palaka), void, egoless.:'.<.
This explanation is what teaches fully a series of facts in the
world that begins from anicca and ends in analtan. The later work
1.
2.
S ..111,66, Vin. I. 13. T. 2, 7 c, etc.

A. IV, 422 -3, M. 1.435, 436, 500. etc.
Forms oj Reasoning and Argument
119
Patisambhidiimagga (which seems to be a supplement 'of the

Vihhanga) treats of these points as follows:'
What is impermanent, that is unhappy (ya/]! anieeO/]!, ta/]!
dukkha/]!); what is impermanent and unhappy, that is egoless
(y01Jl aniccan co dukkhai'i ca, taTfl. anattil) ; what is impermanent ...
and egoless, that is real (yaTfl aniccaii ca ... anatta ca, ta'll
tatha1]'l); what is impermanent ... and real, that is the truth
(yalJ! aniccaii ca ... lathan ca, ta1'{l saccaTfl) ; what is impennanent

. .. and the truth, that is included in ane 2 (yarp ~niccaii ca .. ,
saccan ca, taf!l ekasangahitaTfl).
The form of expressIon mentioned above is entirely the same
as in the explanation of anicca,dukkha and anaitan mentioned in
chapter 9.5. The statement "what is A, B, C ... and S, that is
P" is considered to be a kind of compound judgement (Das
Mehrheitsurteil), because it has many subjects such as "that which
is A, that which is B, that which is C ... and that which is S,
these are P." But this statement can also be understood from the
standpoint of-a variety of sorites indicating that if there is (not)
A, then there is (not) B; ifthere.is (not) B, then there is (not)
C and so on. Apart from the examination of the Pa/isamhhidamagga, what can be considered as the most basic sorites ex..
pressing hypothetical judgement in the Nikdyas is the fQrmula:
"This being, this is (imasmi1J1 sati idat]Z hoti) ; from the arising of
this, this arises ( imassuppada idam uppajjati) . This not being, this is
not (imasmi1'/l asati idil1fl na hoti) ; from the cessation of this, this
ceases (imassa nirodhii idarrz nirujjhati). "3 And such a sorites of the
most developed form is, we could say, the twelve palieea-
samuppMas. '
The twelve pa/ieeasamuppMas in direct order are:
1. Ptm. II. !O6.
2. Thi9 means that it is penetrated (or comprehended) by one knowledge (or one cognition). See Ptm. II, 105-6. Also, lee the Commentary,
p. 594 ; the 4 truths (or many truths) may be understood as one truth.
3. S. II, 28, M. II, 32. III. 63, T. I, 723 c, 2, 98 b, 100 a, etc.
4. S. II, 1-2,42-3, V, 338, M. III, 63-4, A. It 171, Vin.I, 1, T.2, 85
a-b, 216 a, 723 c, etc.
120
Conditioned by ignorance are the forces (avijjliPaccayii

saTflkhdrtl) ; conditioned by the forces is consdousness (sartlkharapaccaya viiiiianoT{l); conditioned by consciousness is a sentient
hody (viniili(lapaccayii nlimarupa",); conditioned by a sentient
body are the six spheres of the senses (niimarupapaccaya
sa/qyatanG'fl); conditioned by the six spheres of the senses is
contact (sa'liyatanapaeeayli phasso); conditioned by contact is
sensation (phassapaccaya vedana); conditioned by sensation is
desire (vedanapaeeay. taQhii); conditioned by desire is attachment (taQhapaceaya upMlJna",); conditioned by attachment is
existence (upMiinapaeeayiJ bhavo); conditioned by existence is
birth (bhavapaceaya jiiti) ; conditioned by birth there come into
being old age and death, grief, lamentation, pain, depression
and misery (jiJtipaeeayii jariimaraQa", sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupiiyiislJ sambhavanti).
Those in reverse order are:
From the absolute dispassion and cessation of ignorance is

the cessation of the forces (avijjaya aiesaviraganirodha sOTflkharanirodko); from the cessation of the forces is the cessation of
consciousness;
from the cessation of consciousness is
the~
cessation of a sentient body; from the cessation of a sentient

body is the cessation of the six spheres of the senses; from the
cessation of the six spheres of the senses is the cessation of
contact; from the cessation of contact is the cessation of
sensation; from the cessation of sensation is the cessation of
desire; from the cessation of desire is the cessation of attacha
ment; from the cessation of attachment is the cessation of
existence; from the cessation of existence is the cessation of
birtb; from the .cessation of birtb, old age and death, grief,
lamentation, pain, depression and misery cease.
Such are the twelve paeeayiikiirar (aspects of condition) in direct

and reverse orders, in which it is impoSsible in fact to indicate
which one is the first cause, because the twelve make a contia
nuous circle which is called the wheel of life. The wheel of life
is a circle with no beginning, but it is customary to begin its
exposition at "ignorance" (avijjd).
.'
121
Amollg the twelve, the former is always the cause of the

latter, so that the relationship between the former and the latter
is expressed by the term 'lifo .. then .... ", i.e. "ignorance is
the cause of the (blind) forces," "the (blind) forces are-the
cause of consciousness," ... and "birth is the cause of old
age and death"; in other words, "if there is A (ignorance) J
then there is B (the forces) ," "if there is B, then there is C
(consciousness) .... " We have stated the above from the stand, point of direct order, but it c-an be viewed as "if there is not A,
then there is not B," "if there is not B, then there is not C't
and so forth. This is no doubt a sorites, not in the form of a
categorical judgement, but in the form of a hypothetical
judgement.
In fact, a sorites itself can be viewed as a sort of shorthand
presentation of a chain of categorical syllogisms. For instance,
from two premisses: "All A's are B" and "All B's are C," we
can get as the conclusion ofa perfect syllogism: "All A's are C."
The latter, with the following premiss: "All e's are D," will
yield the perfect conclusion: All A's are D." This in turn, with
the following premiss: "All D's are rE," yields the conclusion of
the sorites: "All A's are E." However, in the sorites, the intermediate conclusions-HAll A's are C. H and "All A's are D"-are
left out.' The twelve paliceasam"ppMas are apt to be regarded
as a kind of argument called a sorites above. But as mentioned
already, the twelve as well as the fourfold truth can be viewed
as being based on a sorites which can be cast into the form of a
sequence of hypothetical statements.
I t is likely that in the Nikdyas and Jgamas the twelve
palieeasam"ppMas in direct and reverse orders arc the most
elaborate doctrine which teaches why the world is filled with
hardships, and at the same time, which teaches the way leading
to the cessation of them.' The central point of the twelve is
9.7.
l. On this, see R. B. Angell, Reasoning and Logic, pp. 111-3.

2. Besides the twelve pa/iccaso.muppadas. we can find in the Su. (Nos.
862-877) the different type of dependent origination, in which the actual
phases of human life are dealt with analytically on the basis of hypothetical
judgement.
122
A}.hidhamma Philosophy
that everything in the world consists of "existence depending

upon a series of causes," that is, only when there are causes, is
there existence;' -~ithout causes there can be no existence; no
existence is permanent nor conclusive. To obtain such a knowl~
edge, this is dhammatakka or arryaiidya from the st1l:ndpoint of
Buddhism (see chapter 8.7). In order to help a listener obtain
the knowledge, the Buddha and his disciples made an effort to
give a simile (which is represented by the word 'upamd' or
'opamma', see chapter 6.7 and 8).
We would say that the forms of argument in the Nikiiyas are
characterized by a sorites which is composed of hypothetical
statements, and afterwards, such a tendency did find acceptance
in one Abhidhamma text, the Kathavatthu, in which we see a
strictly formalized system of debate-especially, hypothetical
A' syllogisms, which will be discussed in another chapter.
9.8
Another style of argument appearing in the Nikilyas and
~Jgamas is that which is based on~~tive judgeme..!!.!. Alterna-
tive propositions are compound propositions in which the

~pon--;;~ts are connected by "or" or "either ... or ... n The
components are called alternants and there may be two or more
of them. As mentioned in chapter 5.4, the interpretation of
"either p or q" is treated as implying that one alternant or the
other -must be true. In other words, the most important thing
is that either p is true or q is true, but not both of them
together. The "or" has an exclusive sense. In the Nikdyas, the
following argument can be widely seen: 1
Ques. : Now, what do you think, monks? Is everything
permanent Of impermanent?
Ans._
Everything is impermanent, Sir.
Ques. What is impermanent, is that happy or unhappy?
That is unhappy, Sir.
Ans.
Ques. What is impermanent, unhappy, having the principle
of change, ... is it proper concerning that _to think
"This is mine. I am this. That is my self?"
No, indeed, Sir.
Ans.
1.
S. HI, 181, 182, IV. <i5. 47, 54.106, T. 2. 41 c. 42 a, etc.
Forms'!! Reasoning and Argument
123
The starting-point in the above is HEverything is either permanent or impermanent" (schematized by (x) (Fx v-Fx)-Whatever x may be, x is permanent or x is not permanent).. From
the standpoint of Buddhism, the answer is "Everything is impermanent." Therefore, the next point is "Everything is either happy
or unhappy" (i,e. (x) [(x is happy) v-ex is happy).]). In this
case, the answer is of course "Everything is unhappy." And the
last point is "Everything is either substantial or not ,substantial"
(i.e. (x) [(x is substantial) v - (x is substantial)]). The answer
is "Everything is not substantial." Such a style of argument is
one of the characteristics of the .Nikiiyas and Agamas. In this
case, if we replace "permanent" with P J "happy" with H, "substantial" with S, the above argument could be schematized as
follows:
(x)
(x)
(x)
(x)
(x)
(x)
Px or (x)-Px?
-P.,"
f':
(-Px:::> Hx) or (x) (-Px:;) -Hx)?

(-Px:;) -Hx)"
(-Px,-Hx:::> Sx) or (x) (-Px.-Hx:;) -Sx)?
(-Px.-Hx:::> -,Sx)*
Hence, (x) - Sx
According to the history of western logic, the Stoics, chiefly
Chrysippus (280-209 B.C.), developed a logic of hypothetical
and alternative arguments. And the logic called "traditional
logic" includes Aristotle's analysis of propositions, his treatment
of immediate inference, and especially, his theory of the
categorical syllogism, as well as the Stoics' analysis ofhypothetical and alternative syllogisms with related types of arguments.
On the other hand, in early Buddhism we cannot see such
definite classifications as in the history of western logic mentioned
above. HoweverL it must be noted that the, forms of ar~nt
of the earlyBuddhist-are ch;r~eri;':d by hypothetical and
-alternative state~~nts rather than categorlcalStatenieriis:'Let us
introduce from the Nikiiyas a~other example which is comp;;-;a~~ alter~~~ive judgements :1
"------.-------- I.
M. I, 500, D. 11.66. T. 1,61 c, 2, 249 c, etc.
124
There are three feelings, Aggivessana: (1) happy feeling,

(2) unhappy feeling, and (3) feeling that is neither unhappy
nor happy. Aggivessana, whenever one feels item 1, one feels
neither item 2 nor item 3. Whenever one feels item 2, one
feels neither item 1 nor item 3. Whenever one feels item 3,
one feels neither item 1 nor item 2. The three feelings,
Aggivessana, are -impermanent, synthesized (sankhata) , generated by the law of causation (pa(iteMamuppanna), having the
principle of destruction (kha)'adhamma). having the principle of
decay (va)'adhamma). having the principle of dispassion
(virdgadhamma) , having the principle of cessation (nirodhadhamma) ,
From the standpoint of Buddhism, there are two classes of
people, namely: one whose members are ignorant, and
whose members do not understand the fourfold truth (and
therefore, feel either happiness or unhappiness), and onc whose
members have understood the fourfold truth (arahaat: perfected
one), or whose members have attained to the ideal state of
emotional habits (and therefore, feel neither-happiness-norunhappiness). But, unless we discriminate between the tWO J
the above expression would be "AU men feel either happiness
or unhappiness or neither-happiness-nor-unhappiness." (On this
schematization, see chapter 5.5.)
9.9 We cannot deny the fact that the forms of argument ex. .
pressed, by alternative judgement exerted a great influence on the
- aeVeloEment of Abhidham".~philosol1LFor instance, all dhammas
(principles) in the early Abhidhamma, especially the Dhammasanga~i, were systematized according to the criteria of kusala (good)
akusala (bad) and avyakala (neither-good-nor-bad). Such criteria
cannot be seen in the NikiiyQJ and Agamas. The noteworthy point
here iS~~.lthat what the word 'akusala' means is not always
equi,,:,alent to that which is expressed by the negative of kU!ala,
namely: a-kusala, not good, although the word 'a-k ..sala' is philologically contradictory to kusala. In other words. because
a-kusala is not a member of the Matikas consisting of couplets.
(dukas), but of the Malikas consisting of triplets (Iikas). it should
be regarded as having the meaning of 'bad' which is contrary to
'good' (kusala). We must also realize that the usage of avydkala
125
in the Nikdyas and Agamas is not the same as that of al.!ytikata, one
of the tika-mdtikd, in the Dhammasanga~i. As we have already
pointed out (see chapter 6.11 and chapter 7.2), the Buddha did
not give any answer on rnetap~ysical questions in some cases,
because these were regarded as that which should be waived or
undetermined (avyakata). Therefore, in the Nikdyas the chapter
dealing with metaphysical subjects is named avydkata-samyutta1 or
avydkata-vagga.' On the other hand, the word 'avydkata' in the
DhammasangaQiis used in the meaning of "neither-good-nor-bad."
To illustrate;:: this, we can take the expression liThe root of one's
mind is either good or bad or neither-good-nor-bad." (On this
schematization, see chapter 5.5.)
Also, in one of the Abhidhamma texts, the ramaka, we see an
enormous number of pairs of questions formalize-d by alternative
statements and see the answers to these questions which are given
throughout. The main purpose of these exercises is, as pointed
out by A. K. Warder, to prepare Buddhists against the logical
traps inherent in conversion. In fact, we are inclined to say that
such exercises had been already conducted in early Buddhism,
and afterwards were transmitted to Abhidhamma Buddhism
by setting them in array systematically.
9.10 In considering the explanations above, we might make
the following points as the concl_usions which we have reached:
1. The methods of Sai'ijaya's answer must have influenced
more or less the early Buddhists. The reason for this is that in
a sense the four kinds of possible answer coming out in the
Nt'kayas are sitnilar to Saf'ijaya's answers.
2. This can be also demonstrated from the fact that the way
of thinking of the early Buddhists was mainly based on the
principle of contradiction. From a logical point of view the
principle of identity is equivalent to that of contradiction j however, it seems that the early Buddhists avoided the expression
I.
to
S. IV, 374403. In the Chinese text, there is no chapter corresponding
"al7dA:ata~samyutta."
2. A. IV, 67.98. In the Chine!e tt-xt, there is no chapter corresponding

to "avylkala-vagga."
3. OutUnt of Indian Philosop~'Y, p. 93.
126
of emphatic affirmatives; rather, they tried to give the

expression lacking positive affirmatives by the practical use of
double negative (see chapter 9.4).
3. From the above, we are inclined to think that the forms
of argument in the Nikiiyas were built up, i.e. the forms of
argument characterized by a sorites, being cast into the form
of a sequence of hypothetical statements. This point can also
be understood from the fact that the Buddha admonished his
disciples not to say "This alone is the truth, any other view
is false" {idam eva sacca". mogham aiiilDTfl)'-e.g. M.Il, 171,
A.V, 193, T.2, 245 c, etc.
4. In addition, as one of the styles of argument in the
.1Vikliyas and Agamas, we see a form of argument expressed by
alternative judgements. Such a style of argument must have
been important in discussing with non~Buddhists to decide
which doctrine is proper to Bllddhism, and also must have
been useful in arranging many doctrinal topics (miitikiis) in
Buddhism.
5. The tendency of item 3 was especially accepted in the
Kathdvatthu, in which a strictly formalized system of debate, in
particular hypothetical syllogisms, came to be developed.
6. The tendency of item 4 was in course of time accepted
in the .ohammasa;tga~i and the ramaka. Above all, in the latter'
an enormous number of pairs of questions came to be formalized by alternative propositions.
10
LOGICAL ARGUMENTS IN
THE DIALOGUES (SUTTAS)
10.1. On the hasis of what we have learned in chapter 9,
we would like to examine a few suttas (dialogues) and to derive
argument forms from them as clearly as possible.
10.2.
Let us start with the Kalahavivddasutta of the Suttanithe origin of contentions, disputes.
etc. l In the sutta the following subjects are treated:
I. Contentions (kalahas).
2. Disputes (viviidas).
3. Lamentation (parideva).
4. Griefs (sokas).
5. Stinginess (macchara).
6. Pride (miina).
7. Conceit (atimiina).
8. Slander (pesu~a).
9. Dear things (piyas).
10. Greed (lobha).
II. Hope (dsii)
12. Fulfilment (nillha).
13. Will (chanda).
14. Decision (vinicchaya).
15. Anger (kodha).
pUla, which deals with
I. See T. 4, 18t b-c.
128
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
'22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
Falsity (mosauajja).
Uncertainty (kalhaqlkalhd).
Principles declared by the red use (dhammd sama~ena vutld).
The pleasant (sala).
The unpleasant (asdla).
Existence (bhava of item. 19 and 20).
Non-existence (vibhaua of both items 19 and 20).
Contact (phassa).
Possessing (pariggaha).
Selfishness (mamalla).
Asentient body (ndma-rapa).
Wish (icchd).
The sutla states as follows:

From whence arise contentions, disputes, lamentation, griefs,
stinginess, pride, conceit and slander?
Whence arise these? Please tell me that. (862)
From dear things arise the above eight,
Contentions and disputes are connected with stinginess;
And slander is born amid disputes. (863)
From whence arises dear things in the world,
And arises greed in the world ?
From whence arise hope and fulfilment
Which bring man to the neXt world? (864)
Dear things and greed are caused by will.
From ,hat arise hope and fulfilment. (865)
From whence arise will and a decision in the world?
From whence arise anger, falsity, uncertainty and principles
declared by the recluse? (866)
The pleasant and the unpleasant, says the world;
From such conditions arises will.
Man seeS existence and non-existence in matter;
And shapes a decision about the world. (867)
Anger, falsity and uncertainty,
Principles arise when the state of the pleasant and the
unpleasant exist.
Let a man who depends on uncertainty train in the path of
knowledge.
Principles by the recluse are taught-he knows. (868)
Logical Arguments in the Dialogues
129
From whence arise the pleasant and the unpleasant?

What being absent, causes these not to be ?
Tell me the meaning of existence and non~existence
And from what reason the pleasant and the unplea.sant arise~
(869)
The pleasant and the unpleasant are caused by contact;
Contact being absent, causes these not to be.
r tell you the meaning and the reason of existence and non..
existence. (870)
From whence arises contact in the world?
And from whence arises possessing?
What -being absent, causes selfishness not to be ?
What being absent, do contacts no longer exist? (871)
Contact exists because of a sentient body;
Possessing is caused by wish,
When wish is absent, selfishness is not;
When a sentient body decays, contacts no longer exist. (872)
What state is his so matter decays for him?
How indeed do happiness and unhappiness decay?
Please teIl me as to the decay.
~ would like to know-this ever is my thought. (873)'
When there is no perceiving. of perceptions.
Nor not perceiving of perceptions,
And there is still no not~perceiving then,
Nor has perceiving ceased.
When thus his state, then matter decays for him.
From perceptions arise signs of obsession. (874)
You have declared to us all that we asked;
Bu t one thing more we ask; please teIl us this:
Say not some wise men that the highest thing
.,
Is e'en the cleansing of (human) beings there ?
Or say they there is something after that? (875)
Some wise men declare the highest thing
To be the cleansing of (human) beings here;
Again, some experts on 'the unattached
Where naught remains' say it's to pass away. (876)
The silent sage knows such as trusting still,
He studies and knol"S wher_e they put their trust;
130
Knowing, released, the wise seeks no dispute,

Seeks not about becoming this or that. (877)
The above is based on analytical questions and answers (vibhajjapaiihabyiikara(la). What we must note first concerning thissutta
is the explanations of Nos. 869 and 870, in which we see the
expression: "What being absent, causes these not to be?"
(i.e. items 19 and 20, kismiTfl asante na bhavanti hi etc), "Contact
being absent, causes these not to be" (phasse asante na bhavanti hi
ete) and the like. This is indicative of the close relationship
between the antecedent (i.e. "What being absent?" or "Contact being absent") and the consequent (i.e. "causes these not to
be"). In other words, the statement has something in common
with the negative formula expressing hypothetical judgement :
"This not being, this is not; from the cessation of this, this
ceases" (from the standpoint of bhava, this becomes the formula
affirmative: "This being, this is; from the arising of this, this
arises"). So, if by convention we use the letters p and q, the
statement above and the formula negative can be viewed as the
form ( or schema) - P-::J - q, which is called the reverse ofp-::J q.
In this connection, q-::J p is called converse and - q::) - P is called
contraposition. The form P-::J q is equivalent to - q-::J - P. but not
equivalent to - p-::J - q and q-::J p.
As we have learned already, a sorites which is composed of
hypothetical judgements is one of the characteristics in the
Nikdyas and Agamas. To the same effect, the sutta mentioned
above must be also viewed as such a sorites.
10.3. In order to understand the whole of the sutta with

ease, let us make the following table:'
A. Items 26, 27
B.
Items 23, 24, (25)
c.
Items 19, 20
-.(.-
.(.
D. Items ~15 ,16, !!,~,
21,22
I~
1. For the sake of brevity, numbers are used instead of words. For
meaning see the beginning of chapter 10.2.
131
E.
-I-
Items 9, 10, 11, 12

-I-
F. Items I, 2,3,4,5,6, 7, 8
(1,2 R 5. 2 R 8)
From the table, we can see without fail section A is related to

section B, B is related to C, ... and E is related to section F.
We could call such a relation "a direct relation." At the same
time, we cannot overlook that which is called an indired relation.
That is : section A is related indirectly to C, D, E and P, whilst
A is related directly to B. In other words, each section is related
to every other section both directly and indirectly. Concerning
this, we can make up the following diagram:
----r----~--
__. ___ ,
~-
'
,
B .....-+----r----~----
0'
'---t --- -i-----:
,
.....-!-----.
E
F
A bold-faced line indicates a direct relation,. and dotted lines

vertical and horizontal indicate indirect relations. The teachings
which the Buddha preached in regard to a sorites being composed
of hypothetical judgements can be, we wouW say, clarified only
by understanding clearly the direct and indirect relations. This
can be realized from the fact that the Buddha made use of the
words dhammacakkhu and yathabMtaTf/ in the explanation of his
doctrine. The former means 'the eye of truth', and the latter,
"as it really is' or 'in its true nature'. If one unders.tands. only
the direct relation indicated by a bold-faced line, one has just
.,
132
the divine eye (dibba-cakkhu, e.g. see D. 1,82). On the other

hand, if one understands the direct relation and at the same
time understands indirect relations, onc has the eye of truth
and can see everything as it really is. In the same way, we
would say that to realize truly the dependent origination which
is a central concept in Buddhism is in fact to realize systematically the fact that all principles (or phenomena) are composed
of involved relations. In this respect, the twelve (or nine)
pa/iccasamuppiidas are the most representative of the real logic of
relations, because they make clear the relationships between
the origination and the cessation of unhappiness.
The logic of relations in modern logic is complicated. For
example, in dyadic relations, to say that x bears the relation R
to y, or in other wor,c\s that the pair of" and y belongs to R,
we write 'xRy'. Also, by using the forms ex II! ex' and )I E fl' and
the like ex, y, etc. are ordinary variables, IX, {J, etc. are class
variables and. is a verb joining" and" or y and /3), not only
dyadic relations, but also triadic relations and tetradic relations
are treated symbolically. On the other hand, what we call here
the real logic of relations does not mean the logic of relations
in modern logic. As can be realized from the diagram above,
the characteristic of a sorites which is composed of hypothetical
judgements is that direct relations (a bold-faced line) and
indirect relations (dotted lines) are realized simultaneously.
The realization of such a sorites of course depends on the
individual. On this point, let us see the following illustration:'
To him who has discerned the elimination of the five
obstacles (nivara!U'S) , a great delight (pamujja) arises; to him
who is greatly delighted, joy (piti) arises; to him who is
joyous, the body becomes tranquil; to him who has a tranquil-body, happiness arises; to him who feels happy, his
thought (cilIa) comes to one-pointedness (samiidhiJIati).
This can be expressed by the "if... then ... " form, i.e. "if one
eliminates the five obstacles, then a great~ delight arises," and
"if one feels happy, then one's thought comes to one-pointed...
1. D. 1,182, T. 1, 110 a.
Logical Arguments in tM Dialogues
133
ness. n If using the letters p, q, T, S, etc. to symbolize the statements, and replacing section A of the diagram with p, section B
of it with q, section C of it with r, etc., we can see that p is
related directly to q, and at the same time p is related indirectly
to r and so forth. From such relations, it is possible to derive
at least a mixed hypothetical syllogism and a pure hypothetical
syllogism. In this case, the direct relation between p and q, or
the direct relation of p, q and r always becomes a premiss (or
premisses), and the indirect relations of them caD be regarded
as the conclusion.
10.4. Now, by using diagrams, let us demonstrate the above

fact. A mixed hypothetical syllogism is a syllogism in which one
premiss is hypothetical and the other asserts or denies one of the
components of the first. So a mixed hypothetical syllogism affirmative (traditionally, called modus ponens) is one ofthe most pervasive
of all valid argument forms: p~ q, p, hence, q. A mixed hypothetical syllogism negative (traditionally, called modus toliens) means
that if the consequent of a true hypothetical is found false, then
"the antecedent must be false also: pUq, -q, hence, -po In a
mixed hypothetical syllogism affirmative, the following diagram
could be drawn:
Diagram A:
p~ q (shown by a bold-faced line, because
it can be regarded as the "if ....
p
then ... " form on the basis of a
sorites being indicative hypothetical
judgement.)
q
p (a point of intersection between
dotted lines
horizontal
and
vertical. )1
-----r-
."
q (a point of intersection between a

dotted line vertical and a bold-faced
horizontaL)
A not~worthy point here is that the direction of the arrow is
always: as shown if the co~clusion is affirmative a<nd true, because
Hence,
I. -The direction ofthe arrow means that r can be obtained from p

without specifying q, .r can be obtained from p without specifying q and r,
and so forth.
134
Abhidhamma Philosopi!)'
the foJlowing fonn is invalid 10gicaJly: p ::J q, q, hence, p. In this

connection, we must know that the form p=:J q, - p, hence, - q is
also invalid. We have, however, learned that the form p=> g,
- q, hence, -pis valid. In such a case we could view it by
making a diagram as foJlows:

The left side means that any
conclusion is always negative and true.
-p ,,----_ ..
Diagram B:
The right side means that

any conclusion is always
affirmative and true.
l<------.!----.....
-q
I
I
In case the conclusion is negative and true, the direction of the

arrow always comes up.
According to the logic of propositions, the form p::J q becomes:
1
2
3
(p::Jq):: (-q;;:J -P):: (-p v q)::-(p.-q)
And from the above, we see the following syllogisms:
1. -q::J -p,p, hence, q
2. - P v q,p, hence, q
3. - (p.-q), p, hence, q
But it is unlikely that such syllogisms are found until the time
of Abhidhamma Buddhism.
Pure hypothetical syllogisms are arguments in which all three
propositions are hypotheticals. On this we could draw the
following diagram :
p
DiagramC:
---~--.,..-----
~--~---~-----r
':"
- - ,~--- ... -
p::J q
q ::J r
Hence, p::J r
135
In the same way as diagram A, the direction of the arrow must

alwa:ys come down; if it does not, the conclusion will be, even
though affirmative, 'false. For instance, the following forms are
invalid:
p~ q, r~
q, hence,
2.
q~p, q~
r, hence, p=:J T
3.
q~p, r~q,
I.
hence,
p~ r
p~r
In such syllogisms, underlined form's do not serve as obtaining

a valid syllogism with the conclusionp~ r, so that each conclusion could become false without inconsistency. From a logical
point of view, the pure hypothetical syllogism p~ q, q~ r, hence,
p~ r can be proved valid, because the following is regarded as
a truth-functionally valid proposition:'
[(P~q). (pr)l~ (p~r)
This is called the principle of transitivity of implication.

In connection with the most basic valid form ofpure hypothetical syllogism mentioned above, it would be possible to
enumerate additional forms of pure hypotheticals if we allow
each proposition to appear either affirmed or denied, and of
these some, like the following, will be valid:
I.
2.
3.
p~q, r~
pr,
q~ p,
-q, hence,
-q~p,
hence,
r~ q, hence, -
p~-r
-p~r
p~
But we must note that most additional forms of pure hypothetical syllogisms, in any exhaustive enumeration, will be invalid.
I t is therefore said that, in any case, traditional logic dealt
chiefly with the first valid form (which is indicated by diagram
C); it remained for mathematical logicians to provide a theory
which would systematically account for all possibilities. 2 This
can be also applied without modification in examining
statements
the Nikayas as well as of Ahhidhamma texts.
of
L Truth-functionally valid proposition is called tautology, and truth

functional equivalence and implication is called tautologqus equivalence and
implication. On this, see W. V. Quine, Ekmentary Logic, p. 35.
2.
R. B. Angell, iUasoning and Logic, p. 148.
~',
,136
Abhidhamma PhilosopkY
Moreover, from a sorites which consists of direct and indirect

relations, the forms such as p.q~ r, p.q.r~ s and the like can be
obtained. These forms are composed of a cotnpound proposition
(refer to chapter 9.6). But it must be noted that the form
p.q~ r is equivalent to the form p~ (q~ r), namely:
(p.p r) ,=[p (pr)]

This .is the tautology called the principle of, exportation.
Similarly we can make the following form:
(p.q.r~s) =[P~
(p (r~s]
On the whole, we would say that in a sorites composed of

hypothetical judgements various forms of argument are involved,
insofar as such a sorites is called the real logic of relations.
10.5 We have already learned that the Kalahaviviidasutta of

the Suttanipiita has many subjects of some interest. In the
Mahanidlinasutta, subjects in common with those in the Kalahavivlidasuttaare treated, such as 'decision' (vinicchaya), 'will' (chanda),
'possessing' (pariggaha), 'contention' (kalaha), 'dispute' (viviida),
'slander' (pesufifia) , etc. 1 The arrangement of these subjects on
the whole is dealt with at random, as compared with that in
the Kalahavivadasutta. Here let us pay attention once more to
No. 872 of the Kalahaviviidasutta:
Item 23 (contact) exists because of item 26 (a sentient body) ,
Item 24 (possessing) is caused by item 27 (wish),
When item 27 is absent, item 25 (selfishness) is not;
~en item 26 decays, contacts no longer exist.
Exclusive of items 26 and 23, the relationship of items 27, 25
~nd 24 is worth noticing. The statement "Item 24 is caused by
it~m 27" can be expressed in the form p=> q, and the. statement
"When item 27 is absent, im 25 it not" can pe expressed in
the form - p~ - r which is equivalent to the form T~ p. From
1.
D. II,58-9. We see fo":r Chinese recensions of the Mahiinidlmasutta,

subjects are treated. These may be compared with a great
~n which
parana
In,;''''',, "-k*,1J/J!II"
tlllllt!;;1;..a;"
Cr. i, 60 c } , A*lIl:!tfl"
(T. 1,884 0) and
",;I<;!;!lll"
(T.
1,242
(T. 2,579 a).
b),
137
the _above we see the form r::> q. Therefore, the arrangement

of the three items neither becomes:
Wish~
Possessing --+ Selfishness,
nor becomes:
Wish---+ Selfishness--->- Possessing,

but becomes:
Selfishness (25)
---+
Wish (27) ---+ Possessing (24)
This arrangement is, however, not always invariable. In another

context of theSuttanipata, we see the following expression:
Metagu: From whence arise these various kinds of unhappi-
ness which are so varied in the world? (1049)

Buddha: They are caused by attachments (upiidhis)
Which are so varied in the world. (1050)
From this we see the arrangement:
Attachment
-"to Unhappiness
According to the Mahaniddaa, wish is called thirst (ieeM vueeati

ta1jha), and thirst (taT}hii, which could be used as meaning 'desire',
~craving',
'thirst') is almost regarded as the synonym for attach-
ment.' Therefore, the following arrangetnent would be possible:

Selfishness --->- Attachment
Unhappiness
And in another context of the Suttanipiita, the following expression can be seeD:
Ajita: Covered by what is the world? (1032)

Buddha: Covered by ignorance (avijjd) is the world. (1033)
Furthermore, the Buddha explains: .
One who is ,ignorant forms atta<fnW,
And meets unhappiness again.

Therefore, we see here another
Ignorance --->- Attachment

1. Ndl. p.276.
(~.:n),,--arrang8IiQ~n" 1
Unhappiness.
138
. '.
The examination of such arrangements is of importance not only

from a logical point of view, but also in the sense of bringing
light on the development of the sequence of dependent
origination.
When we turn our eyes to Nos. 873 and 874 of the Suttanipata with item 26 (a sentient body) and item 23 (contact), we
can learn that there is the indication that item 26 is caused by
perception (sanna). Accordingly, the following arrangement can
be seen:
Perception ---+ Sentient body - .... Contact.
But in another place, the Buddha explains to Ajita about the

cessation of a sentient body:
A. : Understanding (Panna), self-possession (sati) and a
sentient body (nama-rflpa), in what case do these things
cease (uparujjhati)? (1036)
B. : When there is the cessation (nirodha) of consciousness
( viiinaQa ), these things cease. (1037)
-::
From this we see that a sentient body iscaus~ by consciousness:

Consciousness --+ Sentient body ----+ Contact.
The arrangement is that which can be seen in the twelve (or
nine) patieeasamuppMas. In this connection, there is a certain
problem to be discussed in detail, That is, in spite of the fact
that the Buddha claimed non-ego (or non-soul, anattan), not
only non-Buddhists, but also some of the Buddha's disciple.
maintained that "sensation is my self" (vedana me atta) , 1
"perception is the soul of a man" (sannii purisassa atta),a "this
consciousness passes on, transmigrates, not another" (idam vififta1}.Q1'[l sandMvati sorhsorate, anannarh) 3 and so on.4. It goes without
saying that the doctrinal topic anattan occupies an important
position througho;'t the whole of Buddhism. In the period of
Abhidhamma Buddhism, the Kathilvatthu and the Vijiianakiiya set
I.
2.
S.
/4.
lee H.
D. II, 66, T. 1, 61 c.
D. I, 180, T. 1, 110 c.
M. I, 256, T. 1, 766 c.
As to the collection of su#as in the NiktJyQJ which deal with "ego,'"
Saddhatissa, Upiisakajandlankara. pp. 19,20,25, 26, etc.
139
down the chapter of puggalakatM (discussion of the 'person') as

one of the controversial topics, in which heated discussions on
attan and anattan are recorded. We have referred briefly to
anattan in connection with anicca and dukkha in early Buddhism
(see chapter 9.6). But it is necessary here to examine a certain
sutta and to clarify the forms of argument in early Buddhism.
So let us scrutinize the MahataQhiisankhayasuUa (Greater Discourse on the Ending of Desire).1
10.6. In a word this suUa states that the Buddha refuted the
heresy of a monk, Sati by name, who thought that one and the
same consciousness transmigrated, not another. But the most
important thing is examining the sulta in how the Buddha
refuted the heresy of Sati. As we shall see later, the method of
the Buddha's refutation is quite logical. W!'~~.!1ld say that "to
~al"mean.. that whatw".'Ertnly es~ablished kJh~.
Buddha is critical, r"~!~!lJi.~!iJi,,,-_
sati's view is :
Insofar as I understand dhamma taught by the Buddha,

it is that this consciousness passes on, transmigrates, not
another. The reason for this is that the person who speaks
(vado),- the person who knows and feels (vedoyyo), experiences
the result of good and bad karmans (actions). 3
On the other hand, the Buddha's view is :
,'"
I indeed stated in various ways that consciousness arises

from a cause: There is no arising (sambhava) of consciousness
without a cause (annatra paccaya n'attht" vifiiiaQaSsa sambhavo ti).
And the proof of the above is established, then is followed by

taking an example.
The proof is :
Whatever consciousness arises due to a cause, it is identi..
fled (sankhaTil gacchati) by that name :
I. M. I, 256-71, T. 1,766 b-770 .
2. On this, see MA. I, 7 1, II, 305.
3. We see the same: expression in M. I, 8, T. 1, 432
etc.
a. 813
b, 2, 740 c.
140
I. Co";,ditioned by eye and sights (or visible objects), arises

consciousness. It is identified by 'eye~consciousness' (cakkhuvi ..
ii~a)
2. Conditioned by ear and sc,>unds, arises consciousness. It

is identified by 'ear-consciousness' (sotavinnat;za);
3. Conditioned by nose and odours, arises consciousness.
It itidentified by 'nose-consciousness' (ghanaviiifiiirJa);
4.' Conditioned by tongue and tastes, arises consciousness.
It is identified by 'tongue-consciousness' (jivluIvifina1JfJ) ;
5. Conditioned by body and tangible objects (phollhobba) ,
arises consciousness. It is identified by 'body-consciowness'
(kayavififiaua) ;
6. Conditioned by mind and principles (dhammas) , arises
consciousness.
It
is
identified
by
'tnind .. consciousness'
( manovififidua) .
And the example given is in the form of an analogy:
Just as (seyyathd) whenever fire burns due to a cause, it is
identified by that name.:
I. Conditioned by sticks, burns fire. It is identified by
'stick-fire' (kallhaggi);
2. Conditioned by chips, burns fire. It is identified by
'chip-fire' (sakalikaggi) ;
3. Conditioned by grass, burns fire. It is identified by
'grass-fire' (tiuaggi);
4. Conditioned by cow-dung, burns fire. It is identified
by 'cow-dung-fire' (gomayaggi);
. \- 5. Conditioned by chaff, burns fire. It is identified by
'chaff-fire' (thusaggi);
6. Conditioned by rubbish, burns fire. It is identified by
'rubbish-fire' (saflkiiraggi).
In the Chinese text we see only three kinds of statements,
namely: items 2, 3 and 4 mentioned above (see T. 1,767 a).
From a logical point of view, analogy is a form of reasoning

in which one thing is inferred to be similar to another thing in a
>cert;;tin respect, on .the .basis of the koown similarity between the
things in other respects. When one is trying to solve a problem
141
for which no answer is deducible from logical considerations or

available knowledge, it is sometimes helpful to look for suggestions in analogous situations in which similar problems of
analysis are found. Especially in modem logic, analogies afe
used in inductive arguments, and although the consideration of
analogies often leads investigators down wrong tracks, as well
as successful ones, the investigation of appropriate analogies has
an important role in the organon of good reasoning.l
On the other hand, an example called analogy which is found
in the Nikayas and Agamas is, as mentioned in chapter 6.7 and
8, always that which can be judged by general knowledge. In
other words, a statement by analogy is only one way to help a
listener (or listeners) understand an argument. Let us here
compare item 1 in the proof mentioned before and item 1 in
the statement by analogy. Both of them may be rephrased as
follows to bring out their form :
Statement
(A)
(B)
0/ proof
Conditioned by eye and

sights, arises consciousness.
It is identified by eyeconsciousness.
Analogy
(a) Conditioned by sticks,
burns fire.
(b) It is identified by
stick-fire.
We see from the above that the small letter (a) analogously
suggests the situation of the, capital letter (A), the small letter
(b) analogously suggests the situation of the capital letter (B) ;
consequently, the smaJlletters (a) and (b) analogously suggest
the situation of the capital letters (A) and (B), as mentioned in
chapte~ 6.8. Thus the form of the statements would be :
A B
Hence, B/A -
a
b
b/a
The form B/A - b/a means that the capital letter (B) based
on the letter (A) is similar tQ the small letter (b) based on the
letter (a). In other words, the small letters ( a) and (b) are
1.
On this, see R. B. Angell. RelUOning and Logic, p. 296.
142
important ways to help a listener understand that the capital

letters (A) and (B) are reasonable. We would say that an
analogy which agrees with the statement of proof ( or argumentation) is in a sense an analogy based on the method of agreement.
Mter the argument by analogy, the Buddha continues by
explaining to Sati four kinds of nutriment (ahara), which either
maintain living beings or help those seeking birth, and refutes
the objection raised against him by sati.
10.7. Prior to introducing the Buddha's further refutation,
we would like here to clarify to a certain extent how the
Buddha and his disciples argued and concluded by giving the
following verse: 1
..
Mara:
Sela:
Who made this (human) being (bimba",) ?'

Where is the maker of the human being?
From whence has it come to be (samuppanna) ?
Where will it cease (nirujjhati) ?
Neither self-made (attakata) the (human) being is,
Nor other-made (parakata) it is.
Because of a cause (hefu), it has arisen (sambhUta),
By the dissolution (bhanga) of the cause, it will cease.
Just as a certain seed sown in the field
Grows by depending on both the taste of earth and
moisture (sineha).
Thus the (five) groups, elements (dhiitus)
And these six spheres of the senses (<!yatanas)
Have arisen because of a cause,
And will cease by the dissolution of the cause.
The word mara imports 'Death' that is regarded as a temptation

or kilesas (defilements) disturbing one's mind, so that Mara's
questions above can be considered to be the suspicion which
.occurred to a nUD, Sela by name. Now, we can see that Sela '8
argumentation is composed of four steps. The first two paragraphs are propositions which deny Mara's questions. This may
L S. I, 134. T. I, 327 c.
2. The word himhat[l is applied to the individual being
R.efer to The Kindred Sayings, vol. 1, p. 168.
(aUahhava).
be called the first argument. The third and fourth paragraphs

are propositions that Sela supports to reach a conclusion. This
may be called the second argument (or premiss). The fifth and
sixth paragraphs are statements by example (or simile). The
last four paragraphs are regarded as a conclusion. Sela's argumentation seems to be inductive, because, by stating that one
of the five khandhas (which are represented by sabba) exists
because of a cause, it is stated in the conclusion that the five
khandhas exist because of a cause. Thus we see:
"Matter, rfipa, "exists
because of a cause.
(Sensation, vedana, exists because of a cause).
(Perception, saniill, exists because of a cause).
(Forces, sankhl1ra, exists because of a cause).
(ConsCiousness, vififiil1Ja', exists becaus'e of a cause) .
Mlc
(Sic)
(Pic)
(Fie)
(elc)
Hence, everything exists because of a cause. Hence, (x) (xlc)
'j
This is, however, not always a consistent argumentation in the

Nikiiyas, We also see the fact that the five khandhas or the six
ayatanas are explained by deductive reasoning, for example: 1
The Buddha said to his monks : Everything, monks, is on

fire (sabba". bhikkhave iiditta".). What everything is on fire?'
The eye is on fire, visible object (rilpa) is on fire, eye-consciousness is on fire, eye.contact (cakkhusamphassa) is on fire,
that which arises due to eye-contact, namely! feeling, either
happiness or unhappiness or neither-happiness-nor-unhappiness, is also on fire.
What is metaphorically called fire is said to be the fire of greed,
of aversion, of delusion, of old age and death, of grief, lamentation, pain, depression and misery. In the above, "everything"
means not only eye, but also the other five spheres of the senses.
It is, therefQre, possible to explain deductively as follows:
Everything is on fire.
Eye is on fire.
Ear is on fire.
1. S. VI, 19.
(x) (xis on fire)

E is on fire.
Ea is on fire.
144
Nose is on fire. -:~L

Tongue is on fire.
Body is on fire.
T is on fire.
B is on fire.
Hence, mind is on fire.
Hence, M is on fire.
N is on fire.
But what we want to emphasize here is that in any argumentation appearing in the Nikiiyas an example is always indicated.
Especially, an example in the form of analogy does not appear
to be felt as a weak form of argument. It is also, as pointed out
by A. K. Warder,' undoubtedly effective for propaganda
purposes. But we see no distinction actually recognized between
analogy and strict inference, although in some dialogues analogy
is apparently advanced as actual proof, as we have seen in
chapter 6.8. But we would say that the ~uddha's and his
disc!pl~s'J~L~B':lment is in a se~se.lo~~~-a;~'d--infor~~l.
We have already discussed the Buddha's first argument and
example in the Mahalar;hlisankhayasutta. But we see his more
logical . refutation in this sutta. So we would like to examine it
and to derive argument forms from it.
10.8 The Buddha points out that there are four kinds of
nutriment as follows: 2o
1. KabaJinkarahara: bodily nutriment) either o!iirika 'gross',
'solid' or sukhuma 'fine', 'minute'.
2. Phassahara : nutriment of contact.
3. Manosaficetaniiluira: nutriment of volition of the mind.
4. VifiMlj-aMra : nutriment of consciousness.
Then he asks the following points of his disciples'.including Sati:
(I)
1. Do you see, monks, that this has come to be? (BMlam idan
Ii hhikhave passalhiili.) (Ans. : Yes, Sir.)
2. Do you see that this is arising from nutriment? (Taddhiirasamhhavam Ii hhikkhave passalhiili.) (Ans. : Yes, Sir.)
3. From the fact that this is the cessation of nutriment, do you
see that what has come to be is having the principle of
1.
2.
"'The Earliest Indian Logic," _po 57.

Also, see S. II, 11-2, T. 2, 101 c--102 a
145
cessation? (Taddhiiranirodha yam bhUtam lam nirodhadhamman ti

bhikkhave passathati.) (Ans. : Yes, Sir.)
(II)
I. From doubt (karikhil), monks, does the uncertainty (vicikicchii) arise: This has come to be, might it not have? (Ans.:
Yes, Sir.)
2. From doubt, does the ,. uncertainty arise: This is arising
from nutriment, might it not be? (Ans.: Yes, Sir.)
3. From doubt, does the uncertainty arise: What has come
to be, from the cessation of nutriment, is having the principle
of cessation, might it not be? (Ans.: Yes, Sir.)
(III)
1. By seeing as it really is by means of right understanding
(sammappanniJ) , monks, that this has come to be, is an
uncertainty renounced (pahiyiiti)? (Ans. : Yes, Sir.)
that this is arising from nutriment, is an uncertainty renounced? (Ans. : Yes, Sir.)
that what has come to be) from the cessation of nutriment,
is having the principle of cessation, is an uncertainty
renounced? (Ans. : Yes, Sir.)
(IV)
1. For you, is there the absence of uncertainty: .This has
come to be? (Ans. : Yes, Sir.)
2. For you, is there the absence of uncertainty: This is.
arising from nutriment? (Ans. : Yes, Sir.)
3. For you, is there the absence of uncertainty: What ha~
come to be, from the cessation of nutriment, is having the
principle of cessation? (Ans. : Yes, Sir.)
(V)
1. This has come to be. Was this well seen by means of right
understanding as it reaUy is? (Ans. : Yes, Sir.)
2. This is arising from nutriment. Was this well seen by
means of right understanding as it really is? (Ans.: Yes, Sir.~
146
3. What has come to be, from the cessation of nutriment, is

having the principle of cessation. Was this well seen by means
of right understanding as it really is? (Ans. : Yes, Sir.)
It seems that the five sections above elucidate how to realize
accurately the relationship of "nutriment," "existence!) and
"cessation." The fifth section is as a matter of course the final
stage to which all Buddhists must reach. In the Chinese text we
cannot see the word corresponding to dhara. Instead, we see the
word. Pn*'UlI.
(tiithiigata's true words). A translator of this
text must have regarded ahara as araha. The word araha means
'to be worthy of'. In this sense, the translator presumably
imagined the relationship between "worthy" and tathiigata
(see T. 1,767 h-c).
Now, the relationship of nutriment, existence and cessation
can be viewed as (1) "nutriment is the cause of existence"
and (2) "existence is the cause of cessation." By using the
initial letters N, ji'. and C, the statements of nutriment, existence
and cessation could be expressed by the universal quantificational schemata :
(x) (Nx::JEx) (x) (Ex::J Cx) -
(I)
(2)
(x) (Nx::JCx) -
(3)
The statement of item (3) is "nutriment is the cause of

cessation. "
It is clear that the Buddha tried logically to inform his
disciples that as far as anyone depends on nutriment and is
having the principle of cessation, no one has soul (or ego). Rather
than refer to the discussion on non-soul, let us give attention
to the Buddha's further argument. He says:
The four kinds of nutriment have desire as sourCe (ta~hiini
dana), desire as origination (ta1}hasamudaya) , desire as birth
(ta~hiijiitika) and desire as provenance (ta1}hiipabhava). The
desire has sensation as source, ... sensation as provenance.
The sensation has contact as source, ... contact as
provenance. The contact has the six spheres of the senses
as source, .... the six spheres of the senses as provenance.
147
The six spheres of the senses have a sentient . body as

source, ... a sentient body as provenance. The sentient
body has consciousness as source, . . . consciousness as provenance. The consciousness has forces as source ... forces as
provenance. The forces have ignorance as source, ... ignorance
as provenance.
And the twelve paticcasamuppiidas in direct order (beginning

its exposition at "ignorance.") are mentioned. So we could
make the above clearer as follows:
I.. Ignorance
1. Ignorance
2. Forces
2. Forces
3. Consciousness
4. A sentient body
5. The six spheres of the
3. Consciousness
4. A sentient body
5. The six spheres of the senses
senses
6. Contact
7. Sensation
8. Desire
6. Contact
7. Sensation
8. Desire
9. Nutriment. ...
.....
. . ..
9.
10.
11.
12.
Attachment
Existence
Birth
Old age and death
....
We caD realize from the .above that item 9 in the first column
is related to items 10 and 12 (regarded as cessation) in the
second column. In other words, it is pointed out"that in the first
column "nutriment" itself does not exist independently and
that it is the direct cause of "existence" and the indirect cause
of "cessation." Furthermore, we see the analytical explanations
of the twelve paJiccasamuppadas. For instance, concerning the
relationship between birth and old age (also, death), the
following explanation can be seen:
It has been said: Conditioned by birth is old age and

death. Conditioned by birth, monks, is there old age and
death or is there not old age and death (jiltipaccqya nu kho
bhikkhave jarilmarfl1)llm no vii), how is it as to this (katham va
ettha hoti)? Conditioned by birth, Sir, is old age and death.
148
Thus it is for us as to this: Conditioned by birth is old age

and death.
In the same way, each paccayiikiira (the aspect of condition)
is analytically elucidated. The above explanation tempu. us to
try rephrasing into a mixed hypothetical syllogism (affirmative).
If we use the letters p, q to symbolize the statements between
the Buddha and monks.
B. : It is true that if there is birth, then
there is old age and death.
p~ q
B. : Is it true that if there is birth, then
there is old age and death or is it true
that if there is birth, then there is
not old age death?
(P q)? or (P - 9)?
M. : It is, Sir, true that if there is birth, /
then there is old age and death.
p~q
M. : Thus it is for us as to this: It is true
that if there is birth, then there is
old age and death.
p~ q
The last words of monks are regarded as the repetition of the
Buddha's first words. But we may be allowed to rephrase the
last words into two separate statements:
It is true that there is birth.

It is true that there is old age and death.
p
q
Consequently, the Buddha's question and monks' answers become:
B. : (fr;Jq)? or
M.: p~q
(P~
-q)?
At this point, it might be possible to think that from the above

answer of monks to the Buddha's question and the two separate
statements mentioned previously, the mixed hypothetical
syllogism (affirmative): p~ q, p, hence, q can be formed. In
other words, the repetition of the Buddha's words by his disciples
i. in a fair way to develop as mised hypothetical syllogisms
and as pure hypothetical syllogisms. These arguments of the
Logical ArgutflBnts in the Dialogues
149
Buddha aud his disciples are characterized by the use of double

negative, and by hypothetical and alternative judgements.
10.9 In connection with the above, we would like to
introduce the following expression which is recorded as the
Buddha's saying:1
I,~!'
1. Monks, renounce bad (akusala). It can be done. If it were

impossible to renounce bad (no ce lam sakkll aMavissa akusalam
pajahilum) , I would not say so (niiham eva". vadeyyam). But
since (yasmlJ) it can be done, therefore I say so (Iasmiih.m
ev.". vadami).
2. If (ca) this renouncing of bad conduced to disadvantage
(ahita) and unhappiness, I would not say "renounce bad."
But since it conduces to advantage (hila) and happiness,
therefore I say so,
3. Monks, cultivate good (leusal.". hhikkhave hMvetha) . It can
be done. If it were impossible to cultivate good, I would not
say so. But it can -be done, therefore I say so.
4. If this cultivating of good conduced to disadvantage and
unhappiness, I would not say "cultivate good." But since it
conduces to advantage and happiness, therefore I say so.
This is expressed by the conditional (killalipalti) tense, which

appears regularly when a false or impossible hypothesis (in the
view of a speaker, and usually of a hearer also) is stated. The
above could be rephrased as follows:
It is good to renounce bad if it can be done (obvious) .
If it could not be done it would be unreasonable to command
it, but if it can be done it is reasonable.
It can be done.
Therefore, I command it.
We must note here that sections 1 and 2 above are not
independent of each other, neither are sections 3 and 4. For
section 2 (also section 4) gives a second consideration that
would restrain the- Buddha from his commandment. Therefore,
1. A. I, 58.
'"
:', ~
'.
150
he is not arguing simply "It can be done, therefore I say so,'"

but rather "It can be done, and it conduces to advantage and
happiness, therefore I say so." In other words, each saying
presupposes the assumption, "If nothing else interferes." While
there is something like a mixed hypothetical syllogism in each
of these, the reasoning is a good deal more elaborate than that.
In this context, we must note that every statement in the
Anumiinasutta is expressed by the term "sace (if) .. tena (then)
... " It is recorded that this sutta was preached by Moggallana,
one of the chief disciples of the Buddha, and that there is no
reference to the Buddha throughout the whole of the sutta. But
since it deals with the admonishing of monks and with selfexamination, sentence verbs of the consequent in hypothetical
statements mostly have the suffix tabba, which is usually called
the future passive participle. The sense of the future passive
participle is generally not simply future but rather imperative
or optative: "this must be done," "this should be done,"
"this ought to be done, n also "this can be done. "1 Let us see
one example in the Anumiinasutta: 2
If, while a monk is reflecting (paccavekkhamiina), he knows

thus: "I aJIl one who is attached to this (mundane) life
(sanditthiparamiisl), who grasps it tightly (adhiinagiihi) and
who cannot abstain from it (duppatinissaggi)," then the monks
should strive (viiyamitabba: should"be strived in the strict
sense of the word) to get rid of ( these) evil bad principles
(piipakiikusala-dhammas) .
By contrast, we see the simile of the above in which a sentence

verb in the consequent has no suffix tabba:
Just as a young woman or a young man who is desirous of
ornaments reflects them in a mirror or in a bowl of water
which is so clear, so pure that his appearance is reflected; if
he sees dust of blemish there, he (will) strive (viiyamati) to
get rid ofit.
1. See A. K. Warder, Introduction 10 Pt'lli,
2. M. I, 99.100.
p:
104.
-:'.,'
151
It is clear that, among many disciples of the Buddha, some

really understood a logical explanation of his teachings and some
did not understand it. Therefore, as pointed out in the latter
half of chapter 10.7, "the Buddha's and his disciple.' line of
arg~ment is in a sense loose and informal" involves the fact that
the Buddha and his chief disciples avoided explaining Buddhist
teachings logically under certain circumstances. A main point
here is that the style of argument of the Buddha and his disciples
is characterized specifically by using double negatives, and by
hypothetical and alternative judgements. In other words, for
the Buddha's disciples who clearly understood the real logic of
relations in early Buddhism, it must have been not difficult to
develop mixed hypothetical syllogisms, pure hypothetical
syliogisms and the like.
10.10 Now, let us return to the Mahiitanhiisankh'!Yasutta.

After the explanation of the twelve paJiccasamuppadas in reverse
order, the Buddha states dialogically that if one really understands dependent origination, one does not have any suspiCion
of eternal existence, namely:
I. Now, monks, would you, knowing thus, seeing thus,
run back to (palidhavati) the past (puhbanta), thinking: Were
we in the past (atitam addluinam) , were we not in the past,
what were we in the past, how were we in the past; having
been what, what did we become in the past? (Ans. : No,
Sir.)
2. Now, monks, would you, knowing thus, seeing thus,
run forward to (iidhiivati) the future (aparanta), thinking:
Will we come to be in the future (aadgatam addhiinam), will
we not come to be in the future, what will we come to be
in the future,. how will we come to be in the future; having
.. been what, what will we come to be in the future? (Ans. :
No, Sir.)
3. Now, monks, would you, knowing thus, seeing thus,
colne to be internally doubtful now about the present
(paccuppannam addhiinam), thinking : Am I, am I not, what
am I, how am I; from whence bas this being come, where is
it going? (Ans. : No, Sir.)
. '.
152
AbhidluJmma PhilosopJrj
Moreover, the Buddha asks several questions, then brings interrogations to a close with the following question :
Do you not speak of that which of yourselves you have

known (fldta), seen (ditJluJ) and discerned (vidita)? (Ans.:
Yes, Sir.)
In the Chinese text, before the final question above, the Buddha
asks many questions which do not correspond to the Pali text,
e.g. on the five iinantarikakammas 'actions (that find retribution)
immediately' (namely, 1. killing one's father, 2. killing one's
mother, 3. killing an arahant, 4. causing disunity in the Buddhist
community and 5. injuring the body ofa buddha), on breaking
the Buddhistic precepts, and so on. 1 At any rate, "that which
-of yourselves you have known, seen and discerned" is as a
matter of course indicative of the dependent origination which
the Buddha has explained before in this suUa.
To the Buddha's questions, answering by saying HYes" or
~'No" is characteristic of dialogues in the Nikiiyas and }fgamas.
This is very important in the sense of preparing his disciples
against the logical traps inherent in conversion (see chapter
S.lO and chapter 9.9). For example.
I. Is all eye eye-sphere ('eye-sphere' is the sense of
sight) ?
2. Is all eye-sphere eye?
From the standpoint ofBllddhism, the answer to the first question
is "No," and the answer to the second question is "Yes".
Such questions and answers can be seen especially one of the
AbhidluJmma texts, the Yamaka. But it can be readily said that
these exercises were transmitted from early Buddhism to AMidhamma Buddhism.
The Mahata~Msankhayasutta is concluded with the explanation
of there being two classes of people in this world, namely: one
whose members are ignorant, and whose members do not realize
the origination of groups of unhappiness (dukkhakkluJndhasamudaya)
and the cessation of groups of unhappiness (dukkhakkhandluJnirodha), and one whose_ members-are ie'amed,' and whose members
1.
T. I, 769 a-b.
153
do realize both of them. In other words, what the Buddha

means in any case is that for each condition something is the
-cause (hetu), the source (nidana), the origination (samudaya) and
the condition (paceaya) for ea4IJ. thing; if the condition did not
occur, this thing would not ha~pen. This is emphasized not only
in the MahataQhiisankhayasulta, but also in any sulta in the Nikayas
and Agamas.
10.11 Laying stress on the Kalahavivadasutta and the MaMtaT)hiisaflkha.:vasutta, we have tried to make clear the style of
argument used by the early Buddhists and to find out its
characteristics. As a result, in the forms of the dialogue on
dhammas based on the four panhabydkaraQas we find certain
embryonic anticipations of formal logical procedures. It can be
understood from the Kathiivalthu and the Vijfianakaya that such
anticipations have greatly contributed to the growth of Abhidhamma philosophy.
In clarifying further the development of Nik4ya-Buddhism, it
may be necessary to look at not only the Kalahaviviidasutta and
the MahiitaQhiisankhayasutta, but also the following sultas :
I. POl/hapadasulta (D. I, 178-203, T. 1,\09 c-112 c).
2. Payasisulta (D. II, 316-358, T. I, 42 b-47 a, 525 a532 b, 831 a-835 c).
3. Piifikasutta (D. III, 1-35. T. I, 66 a-70 a).
4. Sammaditlhisutta (M. 1,46-56, T. 2, 797 b-798 a).
5. Rathavinitasulta (M. I, 145-151, T. 1,429 c-431 c, 2,
733 c-735b).
6. Culasaeeakasutta (M. I, 227-236, T. 2, 35 a-37b, 715 a717 b).
7. Maluivedallasutta (M. I, 292-298, T. I, 790 b-792 c, 2,
60 b-c)
8. Culaveda/lasulta (M. I, 299-305, T. I, 788 a-790 b).
9. Aggivaeehagottasutta (M. I, 483-489, T. 2,245 b-246 a,
444 c)
10. SuMasulta (M. II, 196-209, T. 1,666 c-670 a).
11
ADVANCED FORMS OF QUESTIONS AND
ANSWERS IN THE KATHAVATTHU
AND THE VIJNANAKAYA
11.1 The forms of questions and answers in the Abhidhammac
texts are, as compared with those in the Nikayas and Agamas,
quite improved. In this chapter, we would like to take up the
puggala (Skt. pudgala : person) chapter in both the KathiiJJatthu
and the Vi}iianakiiya and to see how questions and answers aretreated in it.
11.2 Compared with the VijnilnaMya which contains six
chapters, the Kathiivatthu is divided into twenty-three chapters.;'
We see in it a collection of more than 200 debates, which are
refutations in strict logical form of propositions maintained by
many schools of Buddhism.! Above all, in controversial topics
of the Kathilvatthu, such as "puggalakatha" (discussion of the
'person'), "brahmacariyakathti" (discussion of the best life),
''jahatileathii'' (discussion of renouncing), "sabbamatthitikathd"
(discussion of 'everything exists') and so forth, the Sthavir~vadin
refutes the views of other schools ofBuddliism by using a variety
of logical methods.
In clarifying below the forms of questions and answers in
"puggalakathii" (or "pudgalaskandha") and finding Abhidhammic
1. As to the names of different schools of Buddhism. See tr. _Shwe ZaD
Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids. Points of Controversy, pp. xviii-xxvii, and
NyanatiJoka Mahathera. Guide Through tlu A6hidhamma-Pilaka, pp. 60-2.
Advanced Forms of Questions and Answers
155-
differences in argument forms, first of all, we must know the

reason why the topic "puggala" was set down in the K athavatthu
and the Vijiiiinakdya. The concept of puggala appeared in the
third century B. C.1 The followers of an elder named Vajjiputta,
wh!, came to be known as Vajjiputtakas (Skt. Vatsiputriya)
probably maintained that the 'person' is in some sense real, even
though it is not an eternal soul such as non-Buddhists believed
in. All other Buddhists, however, maintained that the word
ipuggala', sometimes used by the Buddha himself, contained DC>
more meaning than a mere pronoun. Although the doctrinal
topic anattan (non-ego) occupies an important position throughout the'whole of Buddhism, even in the Niktiyas and Agamas, it
is recorded that for lack of a full understanding of anattan, some
disciples of the Buddha regard "sensation" as the soul or
"perception" as the soul (see chapter 10.5). It seems that from
the very beginning, some disciples were interested in meaningless problems such as "Who desires ?" or "Who is conscious ?',etc.- rather than the proper formulations qThrough what
condition is there desire?" or cCThrough what condition is
there consciousness?" etc. In this sense, it is natural that
a heated discussion was conducted between the Sthaviraviidin and the opponent, called the Pudgalava:din here (or
between the Sarvastivadin and the Pudgala school) and that
such an event was later recorded as Upuggalalcatha" (or C~udgala
skandha") in both the Kathiivatehu and the Vijiiiinakiiya.
The Pudgala school is subdivided into the Sammitiya.
(SaI)1mitiya), the Dhammuttariyas
(Dharmottariya), the
Bhadrayanikas (Bhadrayaniya), theChannagarikas (~al).naga
rika), all seceded from the Vajjiputtakas. In connection with
the word 'puggala', we see the Puggalapaniiatti (the Concept of
the 'Person') as one of the Pali Abhidhamma texts, and see
"pudgala" chapter in the Siiriputriibhidharma.liistra (T. 28, 584 c58ge). But neither of them treat of a positive entity as a person,
but deal with the brief definitions of various types of human
and a great number of important specifically doctrinal terms
J. On this, see E~ Lamotte. Hfstoire de Bouddhis"k [nt/un,
pp.673-4 and A.;K. Warder, Indian Buddhism. pp. 240-42.
pp. 575-606,.
156
Q)ncerning human types. Since the matter in hand is to see

the forms of questions and answers in the pugga/a chapter in
the Kathiivatthu and the Vijfianakaya, let us proceed to the main
subject.
11.3 In the sections below, we follow the lead of A. K.

Warder's study named "The Earliest -Indian Logic."1
The puggalakathii is composed of nineteen sections in which
eight possible sections, called niggaha (refutation) are given.
Again, each of these refutations, consists of five sub.sections,
calledpancaka (pentad), or catukka(tetrad). They are as follows:
1.
2.
S.
4.
5.
6.
_.7 .
8.
9.
10.
The first refutation. (Nos. 1-5 : pp. 1-4)

i. Affirmative pentad (anuloma-paiicakQ1fl).
ii. Rejoinder tetrad (patikamma-catukkQ1fl).
iii. Refutation tetrad (niggaha-catukka1!l).
iv. Application tetrad (upanayana-catukkQ1fl).
v. Conclusion tetrad (niggamana-catukkQ1fl).
The second refutation. (Nos. 6-10: pp.4-7)
i. Adverse controversy pentad (paccanika-paiicaka1!l).
ii. Rejoinder tetrad.
iii. Refutation tetrad.
iv. Application tetrad.
v. Conclusion tetrad.
The third refutation. (No. II : p. 8)
The fourth refutation. (No. 12 : pp. 8-9)
The fifth refutation. (No. 13 : p. 9)
The sixth refuta.tW1!' (No. 14 : pp. 9-10)
.The seventh refjItation. (No. 15 : p. 10)
'Theeighth refutation. (No. 16 : pp. 10-11)
Simple collation (suddhilca-sa1!lsandanii). (Nos. 17-129:
pp.II-4)
Comparison (opamma-sQ1flsandana1!l). (Nos. 130-37 : pp.
14-20)
1. Proc.edings of tIu 25th Inurnationtzl CongreSl of Orkntalists (1963), Vol.

4, pp. 5668. The statements of the puggalakathd in the Kathiivatthu are paraphrased and sometimes expanded from A. K. Warder's study, since his
article is not easily accessible and abo contains numerous printing errors, as
the author could not proofread it.
Advanced Forms
rif Questions
and Answers
157
Collating by the tetrad scheme (catukkanaya-sa7flSandanOf!'l).

(Nos. 138-45 : pp.20-4)
12. Definition-judgement-discussion (lakkha~dyuttikathii). (Nos_
146-7 : p. 24)
13. Clarification of terms (vacanasodhana"" here actually
indicating the distribution of terms). (Nos. 148-53:
pp. 24-5)
14. Examination of concepts (pafiiiallanuyogo). (Nos. 154-57 :
pp. 25-8)
15. Examination of future courses (galianuyogo). (Nos. 15870 : pp. 28-34)
16. Examination ofderivative concepts (upadapafiiiattlinuyogo).
(Nos. 171-99 : pp. 34-45)
17. The first section of ethical goodness (kaly~avaggo
pa/homo). (Nos. 200-16 : pp. 45-55)
18. Examination of supernormal power (abhififidnuyogo) . (Nos.
217-8: pp.55-6)
19. Adducing sutlas (suttlihara). (Nos. 219-45 : pp. 56-69)
II.
According to A. K. Warder, the pentad and tetrad in the

first refutation mentioned above are analyzed as follows on the
basis of statements in the puggalokalM:'

Pentad: normal (anuloma) consequent (pOpanO).
normal disproof (liropa~lJ) .
reverse (patiloma) antecedent (lhapanli).
reverse consequent.
reverse disproof.
Tetrad: normal consequent.
normal disproof.
reverse consequent.
reverse disproof.
.'
It may be expedient to examine the actual debates between the

Sthaviravadin and the Pudgala school.
11.4.
We would like to start with the debate comprising the

affirmative pentad in the first refutation:
1. "The Earliest Indian Logic," p. 61.
158
Abkidhamma Philosophy
St. : Does the person exist (upalabbhati) in the real, ultimate

sense (saccikatlhaparamattha)?l
Pu. : Yes.
St. : Does the person exist in the real, ultimate sense in the
same way (tato) as the real and ultimate things ?'
Pu. : No, that cannot indeed be said thus.
St. : Acknowledge the refutation:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
If (hafici) the person exists in the real, ultimate

sense, then (tena) indeed you should also say, the
person exists in the real, ultimate sense in the same
way as the real and ultimate things.
What you say here is wrong (micchd) , namely: You
say "Yes" in the former, and "No" in the latter.
If the latter cannot be admitted,
then the former should not be admitted.
What you say here is wrong, because the former is
affirmed and the latter is negated.
As pointed out in chapter 9, hypothetical (or conditional)

.statements arc most frequently identifiable by "if... then ... "
Those are two compoItent propositions: the "antecedent"
which comes between the "if" and the "then," and the "conse.quent" which comes after the "then", Unlike a conjunction,
the assertion of the "if... then ... " statement as a whole does
not imply that anyone of its component propositions is true.
What is asserted is not the truth of either components, separately
or together, but the relation of conditionality~ between them.3
Therefore, in the above debate the Sthaviravadin subdivides his
refutation of the opponent into the five steps and explains that
1. According to the Kv.C(Jmmentary (p. 8). the word 'saccikallha' is that
which is real (bhiitattho) and is that which cannot be grasped in a false
way (abhiiJakdrena agahetabbo) like a deceptive appearance (mq,a), a mirage
(marlci). etc.; and paramattha means 'highest' (uttamallha) and is that which
-cannot be grasped under the influence of report, etc. (anussauadwasena
.agahetabbo)
2. This means to ask whether or: no the perSOn exists in the same way
as the 57 principles (i.e. the 5 khandhas, the 12 dyatanas, the 18 dhatus and
the 22 indriyas) exist. On this, see the /(v.Comnuntary, p. 8.
3. See R. B. Angell, Reasoning and Logic, p. 144.
Advanced Forms qf Questions and Answers
159
if the antecedent should be true, then the consequent should

be also true, and if the consequent is false, then the antecedent
wiJl be also false, namely:
(i)
(ii)
(iii) & (iv)
(v)
p-=>q
- (p.-q)
-p-p
_ (p._q) 1
We must note here that the form p-=> q becomes
(p-=>q)=- (p.-q)=( -q-=> -p) =( -p v q)

Thus, in the affirmative pentad we see that the Pudgala school
is defeated by the Sthaviravadin. In other words, the Sthaviravadin points out that the forms-p-=> - q, p-=> - q, - p-=> q taken
together are inconsistent with the forms p=> q.
Now, let us see the rejoinder tetrad in which the opponent
takes the initiative:
Pu.: Does the person not exist in the real, ultimate sense?
St. : No.'
Pu.: Does the person not exist in the real, ultimate sense in
the same way as the real and ultimate things?
."~!!t.-:--:-;:--:---;,,"
1. As for the affirmative pentad mentioned above. a further attempt

would be made by paraphrasing the statements of items i, ii, iii, iv and v
as follows:
i. If the person exists in the real, ultimate sense, then indeed you
should also say, the person exists in the real, ultimate sense in the
same way as the real and ultimate things.
ii. What you say here is wrong, namely: You say "Yes" in the former,
and "No" in the latter.
iii. But the latter cannot be admitted.
iv. Therefore, the former should not be admitted.
v. The former is affirmed and therefore it is wrong to negate the
lauer. Symbolically:
i. p-=> q
ii. -(p.-q)
iii. _q
iv. Therefore, ~
v. p, tberefore~ _ -q
I;.-U
2. The word 'dmantij' meaning "Yci" is used according to PaIi idiom.

But the answer in this case actually means "Yes: it does not exist," so that
manta here should be rendered negatively in Englis~.
160
St. No, that cannot indeed be said thus (it does not exist).
Pu. : Acknowledge the rejoinder:
i.
If the person does not exist in the real, ultimate
sense, then indeed you should also say, the person,;
does not exist in the real, ultimate sense in the
same way as the real and ultimate things.
ii. What you say here is wrong, namely: You say
"No" in the former, and "It is not the case that
the person does not exist" in the latter. (That is,
"Yes.")
iii. If it is not the case that the latter cannot be
admitted, then it is not the case that the former
should not be admitted.
iv. What you say here is wrong, because the former
is negated and the latter is negated twice.
Thus, to sum up:
(i)
-p-q
(ii) -(-p.--q)
(iii) - - p --p
(iv) _ (_P,_.,_q)'
I t seemS that by showing the form - p=:J - q which is equivalent

to the form q=:J p, in the above the Pudgala school tries to
demonstrate sophistically p and - q, which are both the standpoint of the Pudgala school. This can be understood from the
fact that the Pudgala school shows the form - P=:J - q (item i
above) and the form - -q=:J - -p (item iii above). The form
- - q=:J - - p becomes the form q=:J p from a logical point of
view. The form q=:J p is called the converse of the form p=:J q,
and the latter is equivalent to the form - q=:J - P which i.
calledcontraposition, but not equivalent to the form- -q=:J - - p
(orpp).
Let us tum our eyes to the refutation tetrad, which is stated
by the Pudgala school :
1.
As for the rejoinder tetrad, we could see symbolically as followa :

i. -P=:J-q
ii, ~('-p. - -q), ,
Ul. - -q, therefore, --p
;<: iv. - P therefore, -I}
Advanced Forms
0/ Questions and Answers
161
i.
But if you think "We say 'No' in the former and CIt is
not the case that the person does not exist' in the latter,"
then, you who have assented to the propositions, should
indeed be refuted; let us then refute you, for you are well
refuted. If you say uNo" in the former, then you should
say "No" in the latter.
ii. What you say here is wrong, namely : You say "No" in
the former and "It is not the case that the person does
not exist" in the latter!
iii. If it is not the case that the latter cannot be admitted,
then it is not the case that the former should not be
admitted.
iv. What you say here is wrong, because the former is negated and the latter is negated twice.!
At this point, we see that the Pudgala school sophistically tries

to point out that the form - p~ - q is valid, hut the form - p
:J - -q is invalid.
...
Furthermore, the Pudgala school mentions in the application
tetrad as follows :
i.
If this (refutation tetrad) is a faulty refutation (dunniggaha) ,

see the affirmative pentad. We said there "Yes" in the
former, and "No" in the latter. We, who assented there
to these propositions, should not indeed be refuted. Then,.
(You perhaps say) you have refuted us, but we are not
well refuted. (Your argument) is "If the person exists in
the real, ultimate: sense, then indeed you should also say,
the person exists in the real, ultimate sense in the same
way as the real and ultimate things."
ii. What you say here is wrong, namely: You say. the person
exists in the real, ultimate sense, and the person does not
exist in the real, ultimate sense in the same way as the
real and ultimate things.
1. As for the refutation tetrad, we could see symbolically as follows:
i. -(-p.- -q)
ii. --q
_iii. --p
iv. - - p, therefore, - - q
.'
'
162
If it is not the ca~e that the person exists in the real, ultimate sense in the same way as the rea] and ultimate
things, then it is not the case that the person exists in the
real, ulti~ate sense.
iv. The same as item ii. Thus you are wrong ,I
'111.
And at the conclusion of the first refutation, the Pudgala school

mentions as follows :
i.
We are not to be refuted thus. What you refute us is "If

the person exists in the real, ultimate sense, then indeed
you should also say, the person exists in the real, ultimate
sense in the same way as the real and ultimate things."
ii. What you say here is wrong, namely: You say, it is the
case that the person exists in the former and it is not the
case that the person exists in the latter.
, Hi. If the latter cannot be admitted, then the former should
not be admitted.
iv. What you say here is wrong, because the former is
affirmed and the latter is negated. Therefore, what was
refuted (by you) was badly done. (Our) rejoinder was
well done. Our sequel to the argument (pa/ipadanll) was
well done.
If we sum up items i, ii, iii and iv above on the basis of what

die Pudgala school states, they become
i. p-::; q
ii. - (p.-q)
iii. -q-::;-p
iv. - (p.-q)'
1.
As for the application tetrad, we could see symbolically as follows :

i. 10 q
-.,.,
ii .. -iP.-q)
iii. ' -q, therefore, --':"p
iv. -Po therefore. -q
2. As for the conc1u,sion tetrad, we could see symboiicallyas follow. ,::-i. P::J q
ii. P. therefore. - - q
iii. -q, therefore,-p
iv. -(p.-q)
.'.-
Advanced Forms of Qpestions and Answers
163
These forms are apparently correct. According to the Pudgala

school, the refutation of the Sthaviravadin was badly done,
whilst the sequel to the argument by the Pudgala school was
well done. Nevertheless, we cannot see any true reasoning from
what the Pudgala school stated in the application tetrad and
the conclusion tetrad. Rather we see only the sophistical (or
equivocal) refutation by the Pudgala school. .From the debate
in the first r~utation between the two schools, therefore, we
can learn the followi ng fOfms:
St. :
p~q
- (p.:....q)
-q~-p
Pu.
-p~-q
~~;:
]=P.-q
--q
-(-p.---q)
-p~
--q~--p
11.5. The following is the adverse controversy pentad,in the

second refutation, where the Pudgala school takes the initiative
Pu. : Does the person not exist in the real, ultimate sense?
St. : No.1
.
Pu. : Does the person not exist in the real, ultimate sense. in the
same way as the real and ultimate things?
St. : No, that cannot indeed be said thus.
Pu. : Acknowledge the refutation:
i.
ii.
If the person does not exist in the real, ultimate

sense, then indeed you should also say, the person
does not exist in the real, ultimate sense in the
same way as the real and ultima te things.
What you say here is wrong, .namely : You say
"No" in the former and "It is not the case that
the person does not exist" in the latter. ,,:
1. This also means "Yes: it does not exist." So this should be rendered
negatively in English.
164
Abhidhamma PhIlosophy
iii.
If it is not the case that the latter cannot be

admitted,
iv. then it is not the case that the former cannot be
admitted.
v. What you say here is wrong, because the former
is negated and the latter is negated twice.
This is similar to the rejoinder tetrad in the first refutation.

Whilst the first refutation is in a word viewed as an affirmative
refutation, the second one is viewed as a negative refutation.
In order to simplify further the arguments between the two
schools, let us express them symbolically by using only the
letters p, q, etc.
In the rejoinder tetrad, which is similar to the affirmative
pentad in the first refutation, we see:
St. : p?
Pu. : Yes.
St. : q ?
Pu. :No.
St. : i. p~q
ii. -(p.-q)
iii. -q~ -p
iv. - (p.-q)
In the refutation tetrad we see :
St. : i. -(p.-q)=(P~q)
ii. - (p. -q)
iii. -q~-p
iv. - (p.-q)
The following is the application tetrad
St. : i. - (-p.- -q)= (-p~ -q)
ii. -(-p.--q)
iii. - -q~ --p
iv. -(-p.--q)
As the conclusion tetrad, the following can be seen
St. : i. -p~-q
ii. - (-p.--q)
iii. - -q~ --p
iv. - ( - p. - - q)
Advanced Forms of QJlestions and Answers
165
A3 we have seen already, the first and second refutations form

a complete debate in themselves, consisting of five subsections
or four subsections, called simply pentads (paflcaka) or tetrads
(catukka). Such a way of refutations is covered throughout the
Kathiivatthu. Therefore, we would like here to introduce only the
topics of questions and answers in the other six refutations.
In the third refutation affirmative, the Pudgala school is
defeated. The noteworthy point here is that the term 'every-
where' is used :
St. : Does the person exist in the real, ultimate sense?
Pu. : Yes.
St. : Does the person exist everywhere (sabbattha) in the real,
ultimate sense ?
In the fourth refutation affirmative, the Pudgala school is

defeated:
St. : Does the person exist in the real, ultimate sense?
Pu. : Yes.
St. : Does the person exist always (sabbadii) in the real, ultimate sense?
In the fifth refutation affirmative, the Pudgala school is

defeated:
St. : Does the person exist in the real, ulti~te sense?
Pu. : Yes.
'c
St. : Does the person exist in everything (sabbesu) in the
real, ultimate sense ?
In the sixth refutation negative, the Sthaviravadin is defeated:

St. : No.
Pu. : Does the person not exist everywhere in the real, u1ti~
mate sense?
166
In the seventh refutation negative, the Sthaviravadin is

defeated:
St. : No.
Pu. : Does the person not exist always in the real, ultimate
sense?
In the eighth
defeated:
refutation negative, the Sthaviravadin is
Pu. : Does the person not exist in the real, ultimate sense ?
St. : No.
Pu. : Does the person not exist in everything in the real,
ultimate sense?
St. : No, that cannot indeed be said thus ..
The terms 'everywhere,' 'always,' 'in everything' in the above
are important in examining the essential ~qualities of the word
'puggala' itself. 1 But what is more important here is the relationship between two different propositions, which are always
analyzed from a logical point of view by the respective schools.
As already stated, in the first refutation the Sthaviravadin hegins
by refuting the Pudgala school in the pentad which contains
the essential argument, but is defeated by sophistry or equivocation when the Pudgala school has the initiative in the four
tetrads (esp. refer to chapter 11.4); in the second refutation
the Pudgala school begins by repeating its rejoinder argument
as the pentad, but the Sthaviravadin then has the rejoinder
and in the four tetrads he develops his argument strictly,
eliminating the sophistry, and establishes his refutatio~ of the
Pudgala school.
,.,,;
Thus we can see from the above eight refutations that both
the Sthaviravadin and the Pudgala school conduct quite logical
investigations into the existence or non-existence of puggala in
the real sense. In other words, the first two refutations deal with
1. On this, see the Kv.-Commentary, p. 15 and the Ahhidhammattha-smigana,
Part VII.
167
what is called existential quantification and what is called universal

quantification. If we substitute "F" for Upuggala in the real,
ultimate sense," the Pudgala school maintains "There are F"
~r "F exist," symbolized by (:ilx) Fx. On the other hand, the
ISthavi~avadin maintains "There are no F" or "F do not exist,"
symbolized by - (:ilx)Fx. But to say that "there are no F" i.
the same as saying that "everything is non-F," symbolized by
(x) - Fx. Therefore, we come to know from the first two
refutations :
I.
2.
{:ilx )Fx (existential quantification).

- {:ilx)Fx (universal quantification).
And the last six refutations also indicate some kind of universal
quantification: 'everywhere', 'always', '10 everything', though
these are qualified in space, in time, and in particulars.
11.6 In the simple collation (suddhika-sa'llsandana) , the

Sthaviravadin takes the initiative in the following manner:
St. : Does the person exist in the real, ultimate sense, and
does matter (riipa as physical principles) exist in the
real, ultimate sense?
Pu. : Yes.
St. : Is matter different from the person (anna1]1 rflpam ~i'iiio
puggalo) ?
St. : Acknowledge the refutation:
i. If the person exists in the real, ultimate sense, and
matter exists in the real, ultimate sense, then you
should also say, matter is different from the person..
"Yes" in the first two propositions, and "No" in
the third proposition.
iii. If the third one cannot be admitted, then the first
two should not be admitted.
IV. What you say here is wrong, because the first two
are affirmed and the third is negated.
..
The same form of refutation kthen pursued concerning whether

or not the other. four khandhilS, the twelve ayatanas, the eighteen
168
dhiitus and the twenty-two indriyas (faculties) exist in the real,

ultimate sense. Hereon, we see that the above is an example I
of a compoll.nd propositional form, and that the argument fo~
is composed of the form p.q;:;) T which is equivalent to the form
[p;:;) (q;:;) T)], called the principle of exportation. Thus th~,
Sthaviravadin's statements above could be expressed symhoIi-'
cally as follows
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
p.q":;)
-(P.q.-T)
- T;:;) - (p.q)
- (p.q. - T)
The form p.q;:;) r is also equivalent to the form [q;:;) (P;:;) T)]. An
important thing in such a compound proposition is to see relation between terms in the sentences rather than to see relations
between the sentences and the way they are connected together.
In this respect, we must note that the word' saTflsandana' (or
-aTfi neuter) is used in debate (see chapter 11.3).
According to A. K. Warder (see "The Earliest Indian Logic,"
p. 60), the word saTflsandana means 'checking" 'collating',
'putting together', 'substitution', and the object of this is to see
.. whether a given term, concept, or entity is distinct from the other
terms, etc., used in Buddhist philosophy. So, suddhika~sa1JlSandanii
(simple checking) means setting the given term beside all the
terms of the Miitikll system in rotation and asking whether it is
different. If a is not different from b, then it cannot be said
that a exists in the real, ultimate sense; only b so exists and a is
just a name. In this sense, it is logically significant that in the
ninth section, called suddhika-saTflsandanii, each term (of the five
khandhas, the twelve iiyalanas and so on) is examined by asking
whether or no it is different from the person. Moreover, as
other forms of saTflsandanii we see opamma (section 10) and
catukkanaya (section 11). The former means 'comparison', in
which related but contrasted terms are substituted for some
terms of the disputed proposition. The latter means 'collating
by the tetrad scheme, in which the following ques.tions are given:
Is the term under discussion :
( I) identical with another term in the system,
169
(2) part of that other tenn,

(3) different from that other, or
(4) is that other part of it ?
In'the opamma-sa'f!lsandana1fZ, on the other hand, we can see
the following dialogue:
St. : Matter exists in the real, ultimate sense, and so does
feeling. Is matter different from feeling?
Pu. : Yes.
St. : Does the person exist in the real, ultimate sense, and
does matter exist in the real, ultimate sense ?
Pu. : Yes.
St. : Is matter different from the person?
St. : Acknowledge the refutation :
i. If matter and feeling exist in the real, ultimate
sense, matter is different from feeling, and the
person and matter exist in the real, ultimate sense,
then you should also say, matter is different from
the person.

"Yes" in the first three propositions, and "No" in
the fourth proposition.
iii. If the fourth one cannot be admitted, then the first
three should not be admitted.
iv. What you say here is wrong, because the first three
are affirmed and the fourth is negated.
,
This is also an example of a compound propositional form.
The above refutation could be schematized as follows:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
p.q.r-=:J s
- (p.q.r.-s)
- s-=:J - (p.q. r)
- (p.q.r. - s)
In this section, the same argument as the above is then

applied to the case of each of the other three khandhas, substituted for feeling, and the permutations of the five khandhas, the
twelve ayatanas, the eighteen dhiitus and the twenty-two indriyas
170
are proceeded with as the above. As pointed out in chapters 9and 10, the argument forms of early Buddhists are characterized
by a sorites, being composed of hypothetical statements and
from such a sorites various forms of argument can be derived.
Therefore, we are almost certain that the same tendency would
have been foilowed by Buddhists in the time of Abhidhamma,
Buddhism.
11.7 Besides the word 'sarflsandand', we see other important
words such as lakkha~liyuttikathii (definition-judgement-discussion), vacanasodhana1l1 (clarification of terms), paiinatlanuyog&
(examination of concepts) and so forth. Especially, in the
vacanasodhanaTfl (section 13) we see some arguments which are
known as simple conversion. These arguments can also be
expressed by "Some Fare G," symbolized by (gx) (Fx. Gx) and
"Some F are not G," symbolized by (:ilx) (Fx.-Gx). For
example,
St. : Does the person exist, (and) is that which exists the
person?
Pu. : The person exists, some (kehici) of what exists is the
person, and some is not the person.
St. : Does some of what is the person exist, and some nOL
exist?
But the most remarkable thing throughout the puggalakathli i&
that it can be divided into two kinds of debates. One belong&
to a primary debate, called vlidayutti (sections 1-8), and the
other, to a varying number of secondary discussions (sections.
9-19).' The word 'vlidayotti' is regarded as meaning 'judgement
of (the opponent's) statement', so that in the primary debate
(or theorem) eight refutations are, as mentioned already, set out
according to a logical a~alysis. On the other hand, in the
various secondary discussions the terms and propositions used,
or entities referred to, in the primary debate are examined and
are fully elaborated for the first debate. Accordingly, in the
secondary discussions we can see more logical arguments than
1.
On tbi,. see A. K. Warder, "The Earliest Indian Logic:- p. 64.
Advanced Forms of O;;estions and Answers
171
in the first debate. Therefore, let us examine some of the logical

arguments in the secondary discussions. In the uPddiipaiifiattanuyogo, (section 16), we see the following dialogue:
Pu. : Is it not the case that the person passes on (sandhavati)

from this world to the other world (para loka), and
from the other world to this world?
St. : No.
Pu. : Was the fbllowing not said by the Buddha? Transmigration (sa1flstira) is, monks, without a known
beginning (anamatagga); unthinkable (no pannayati) is
the beginning and the end of beings (saUas), who pass
on (sandhdoati) and who transmigrate (sa1/lSarati). Is the
mtta thus ?l
St. : Yes.
Pu. : Then the person indeed passes on from 'this world to
the other world, and from the other world to this world.
It is clear that the quotation from the early canon mentioned
above is misused by the Pudgala school. 2 But if we view only
the argument form of the Pudgala school, it is composed of a
mixed hypothetical syllogism (affirmative), namely:
If it is true that the Buddha preached:

"Transmigration is without a
known
beginning; unthit;lkable ... ," then it is true
that the person passes on from this world to
the other world, and from the other world
to this world.
It is true that the Buddha preached.
p-:::Jq
P
Hence, q
Hence, it is true that the person passes on.
As we have learned in chapter 10.4, this is named affirming the

antecedent because the second premiss affirms the antecedent of the
I. S. I II, 149, T. 2, 69 b.
2. Besides this slitta, we see on the same page the following quotation
from the early canon: Seven times at the most reborn. the person yet
passing on, through the destruction of all fetters, is relieved of unhappiness~
On this, see S. II, 185, T. 2, 242 b,ltv. p. 18. T. 17.662 c-663 a, etc.
172
hypothetical premiss to be true by itself; this, taken with the

hypothetical as a whole, necessitates the affirmation of the consequent. From the standpoint 'of the Sthaviravadin, however,
the antecedent must be false, for the consequent of a true
hypothetical is found false, namely:
p::J q, - q, hence, - p
This is called denying the consequent because in the second premiss
we hold the consequent of the hypothetical to be false when taken
alone; this, assuming that the hypothetical itself is true,
necessitates the denial of the antecedent.
Contrasted with these two valid forms, we must notice the
following two forms which are invalid:1
I. p::J q, q, hence, p (named affirming the consequent).

2. p::J q, - p, hence, - q (named de~ying the antecedent).
11.8 After all, the Sthaviraviidin defeats the Pudgala school

by using the mixed hypothetical syllogism denying the con'Sequent. It seems that in it the Sthaviravadin gives the most
conclusive proof that no person exists. To put it briefly (p. 65):
If the person exists in the real, ultimate sense,
then everything is [inferred to be] of soul (attan).
It is not the case that all principles
are of soul (sabbe dhammli anattli)
Hence, it is not the Case that the person exists.
r';'
p::Jq
- q
Hence, -
In spite of the fact that suchan argumentform cannot be found

in the Nikdyas, it is used widely in the puggalalcatM of the Katlu'Jvatth. (e.g. pA3, p.61, etc.) in order to defeat the opponent.
We would say that this marks the development of the Buddhists'
thinking of the time, as compared with that at the time of the
1. Moreover, we see the following four forms which
invalid:
J. P:J q. p, hence, -q
2. P:J q. -g. hence. P
3. P::J q. q. hence, -p
4. p=:J q, -Po hence, q
On this, see R. B. Angell, Rtastming and Logic, p. 149.
are obviously
Advanced Forms
'If Questions and Answers
173
Buddha. From a logical point of view, the proposition "(Ail)

S is P" has the status as "(All) S is not P." The former as well
as the latter can be true or false. Nevertheless, negative
judgement can be construed as 'nonbeing' as opposed to 'being',
though the problem of negation has perplexed thinkers of
different ages. In other words, in orderto furnish an irrefragable
proof that no person exists, the Sthaviravadin'seems to have
used the mixed hypothetical syllogism denying the consequent
in particular. But it must be noticed that the problem of
negation is nowadays receiving minute study, and that there is
a scholar who suggests that every significant negation "A is not
B" can be analyzed as "A is X, which excludes B" where X is
an unknown property which excludes the property B,' and also
that there is another who criticizes adversely such an analysis.'
Apart from the relationship between negation and ontology, it
is certain that by using negative statements the Sthaviravadin
made an effort to give full proof of the fact that the person
does not exist in the real, ultimate sense.
11.9 We have found various forms of argument in the
puggalakathii. These are all refutations of propositions maintained
by the school. Finally, let us introduce one more example in
which an analogy is used (p.4I):
St. : Is the concept (Pannatti) of the person:based on (upadlZya)

matter (rilpa), just as the concept of villager (gamika)
is based on village (gama)? And if that is so, is matter
different from the person; just as village is different
from villager?
St. : Acknowledge the refutation ....
It is clear that the above analogy is based on the method of
agreement, which was brought over from the Nikayas and Agamas
to the Abhidhamma texts, in the sense that the investigation of
1. B. Bosanquet, The Essentials cif Logic, p. 135.
2. On this, see Bimal K. Matilal, TIu Navya-nyaya Doctrin, of Negation,
pp.87-95.
1.74
.appropriate analogies has an important role in the organon of

good reasoning. Thus the Sthaviravadin points out:
It is not the case that the concept of villager is

based on village and that village is not different
from villager.
The concept of villager is based on village.
Hence, village is different from villager.
- (p.-g)
p
Hence, q
In quite the same way, we can see the relationship between

'person' and 'matter', stated by the Sthaviravadin. As mentioned
in chapter 11.4, the form - (p.-q) becomes:
=- (-
=- (-
(p q)
q:;J - p)
p v q)
Therefore, the following forms of argument are equivalent to one
.another:
I. -(p.-q),p, hence, q
2. p:;J q, p hence, q
3. - q:;J - p, p, hence, q
4. -p v q, p, hence, q
On the whole, the Katluivatthu is a polemical text, consisting
oaf refutations in -strict logical form, so that we have tried to
-elucidate this point in the first chapter, puggalakathii. According
to A. K. Warder, the Kathiivatthu is the earliest known Indian
-philosophical work which proceeds on the basis of a set of
-established logical techniques: definition, distribution of terms,
classification, relations between propositions as biconditionals or
ponentials, quantification, the use of logical words to give a
-standard formal p~esentation of all the arguments, and so on. 1
11.10 On the other hand, the pudgalaskandha in the Vijiiiina.kaya seems to be comppsed of nine sections. As we shall see
Jater, under the name of the 8unyataviidin, the Sarvastivada
'school which does not accept the existence of the person (pudgala)
refutes the Pudgala school, which asserts the existence of the
person. Let us begin by introducing the chapters of the
Vijfianakiiya. It was translated into Chinese by Hiuen-Tsang in
~49 A.D. and contains six chapters (skandhas) :
1.
Indian Buddhism, pp. 299-300.
,.;,
.Advanced Forms
if Questions and Answers
175
I. Maudgalyayana (T.26,531 a-537 a).

2. Pudgala (person) (T.26, 537 a-547 a).
3. Hetupratyaya (cause as condition) (T.26, 547 a-559 a).
4. Alambanapraryqya (mental object as condition) (T.26,559
a-582 b).
5. Sarrtyukta (conjoined) (T.26, 582 b-593 a).
6. Samanviigama (accomplishment) (T.26, 593 b-614 b).
As we have stated briefly in chapter 5.13, the first chapter
-deals with the knowing of three roots of bad (akusalamillas) :
greed (lobha), aversion (dafa) and delusion (moha) in the past,
present and future principles (dharmas) (see T.26, 513 a):
Maudgalyayana states thus : The past and future do not
exist, but the present and the unactivated (or the unsynthesized : asaTflSkrta) do exist.
Siinyatavadin : Do you recognize what was well taught, well
said and well stated by the Buddha, namely, there are three
roots of bad, which are greed, aversion and delusion?
Mau. : Yes.
Sun. : Do you recognize in the bad root of greed as follows:
It has been known that this is bad, it is known that
this is bad, and it will be known that this is bad?
Mau. : Yes.
Sun. : In which time are they known? In the past or in the

present or in the future?
If there is the bad root of greed known in the past,
you should say that there is the past. You should not
say that there is not the past.
If you say that there is not the past, this is
unreasonable.
If there is the bad root of greed known in the
future, you should say that there is future. You
should not say that there is not the future.
If you say that there is not the future, this is
unreasonable.
.present, you should say that there is the simultaneity
. of two kinds of thought (citta) at the same moment in
the person(pudgala).
176
'"

present, you should say that there is the simultaneity of
two kinds of thought at the same moment in the person;
one is the thought of the bad root of greed; the other is
the thought of seeing the bad root of greed.
This is unreasonable.
If you do not say that there is the simultaneity of two
kinds of thought at the same moment in the person; one
is the thought of the bad root of greed and the other is
the thought of seeing the bad root of greed, you should
not say that there is the bad root of greed known in the
present. It is unreasonable that there is the bad root of
greed known in the present.
If you say that there is not the bad root of greed known
in the past, present and future, then you do not have to
recognize concerning the bad root of greed as follows : It
has been known that this is bad, it is known that this is
bad, and it will be known that this is bad ....
Thus Maudgalyayana's view concerning the non~existence of
past and future principles is refuted.
The third chapter deals with the relations of many types of
thought (citta) , " which might be called mental (active)
phenomena, (as ~an be seen in the DhammasangafJi in which 89
cittas are distinguished). Also this chapter treats of four kinds of
praryaya (condition), namely: I. htu (cause), 2. samanantara
(quite immediate ), 3. alambana (mental object), and 4. adhipati
(dominant), whilst the Palthana operates with twenty-four kind.
of paccaya (praryaya) and the SiJ.riputriJ.bhidharmasiistra explains
thirty-three hetus including ten pratyayas and saraatraga
(universal) .
The fuurth chapter deals with the problem of cognition and
explains the six kinds of consciousness (vijnana) which are in
the past, present and future, and which are good, bad, and
neither~good~nor~badJ the interrelation of them, etc.
The fifth chapter is devoted to epistemological explanations
of the six_vijiianas, twelve ayatanas, eighteen dhatus, etc.
The sixth chapter deals with the mental functions of a person
under training and explains the mental phenomena of the arhant.
,~~
Advanced Forms qf Qj;estions and Answers
177
11.11 Now what we are concerned with here is the second

chapter named pudgalaskandha, so that we would like to see each
of the nine sections.
1. Discussion of the transmigration of the 'person' in the
five gatis (T.26,537 a-538 b), which may be compared
partly with section 15 of the puggalakatM (see chapter
11.3).
2. Discussion of eight types of person (T.26,538 b-540 c),
which may 'be compared in part with No. 164 of
section 15.
3. Discussion of the three ,!isis (heaps or classes) and the
person (T.26,540 c-542 a).
4. Discussion of the three trainings (.Iaiktas) and the person
(T.26,542 a-b).
5. Discussion of the three sensations, karmans and the person
(T.26,542 0-543 b), which may be compared partly with
No. 210 of section 17 and No. 229 of section 19.
6. Discussion of principles seen, heard, sensed and cognized
and the person (T.26, 543 b-c) .
7. Discussion of the cause of benevolence (maitni) and the
person (T.26,543 c-545 b).
8. Discussion of sa1'{lSkrta, asarrzskrta and the person (T. 26,
545 b), which may be compared partly with No. 225 of
section 19.
9. Discussion of the six kinds of consciousness (viJfi.ilna) and
the person (T.26,545 b-547 a).
Only in section 7, the Sarvastivadin's (strictly speaking, Siinya~
tavadin's, as stated in chapter 11.10) view is given at the
beginning, whilst the view of the Pudgala school is given in the
opening sentences of the other sections.
The following (Nos. I to 5)' is the argument of whether or
not the person transmigrates from niraya to tiryagyoni.
,"
-Translation of section I (T. 26,537 b-c)I. The Pudgala school states thus: The person is known,
recognized, and exists actually and exists in the real, ultimate
s~nse. Therefore~ the person certainly exists.
,,,"
1. The numbers are mine. The same thing follows below.
J78
Abhidhamma Phik!sophy
The Sunyatavadin' asks thus : Did the Buddha teach well,

say well and state well in the sutra: There are certainly five
kinds of future courses (gatis) and they are established as different, namely : 1. niraya 'purgatory', 2. tiryagyoni 'animals',
3. pitryavi$aya 'the dead', 4. deva 'gods', and 5. manuvii 'human
beings'; then nirqya, ... and manu,fya are certainly different?
Pud. : Yes.
Sun. : Does the (same) _person decease and is the (same)
person born from niraya into tiryagyoni ?
Pud : Yes.
Sun. : Acknowledge the refutation.
If you say that there are certainly five gatis and they
aTe established as different, namely, I. nir~ya, . .. and
5. manuVii; then niraya, ... and manu$.JiZ are certainly
different, then you should not say that the person
deceases and is born from niruya into tryagyoni.
What you say here is unreasonable.
If you say that the person deceases and is born from
niraya into tiryagyoni, then you should not say that there
are certainly five gatis and they are established as
different, namely, 1. niraya, ... and 5. manU$ya; then
nira)l.a, ... and manuVa are certainly different.
It is unreasonable that you say:.. There are certainly
five gatis and they are established as different, ... then
niraya, ... and manuva are certainly different.
2. The Pudgala school states thus : The person certainly
deceases and is born from niraya into tiryagyoni.
The Sunyatavadin questions, saying ; Is this (the same as)
that? (This means "Whether or not the person in niraya is the
same as the person in tiryagyoni.")
Pud. : No.
Sun. : Acknowledge the refutation._ ->
If the person certainly deceases and is born from
nirlfYa into tiryagyoni, then you should say that this
(person) is (the same as) that (person).
1. The Sunyatividin in this chapter indicates the Sarvastivadin.
Advanced Forms 'If Questions and Answers
179
If you do not say that this (person) is (the same as)

that (person), then you should not say that the person
certainly deceases and is born from niraya into tiryagyoni.
It is unreasonable that you say: The person certain ..
1y deceases and is born from niraya into tiryagyoni.
3. In the case that the Pudgala school says thus: This
(person) is (the same as) that (person), the Siinyatavadin will
question, saying : Is the niraya (the same as) the tiryagyoni ?
Pud. : No.
Siin. : Acknowledge the refutation.
If this (person) is (the same as) that (person), then
you should say that the niraya is (the same as) the
tiryagyoni.
If you do not say that the niraya is (the same as) the
tiryagyoni, then you should not say that this (pers;n)
is (the same as) that (person).
It is unreasonable that you say : This (person) is
(the sameas) that (person).
4. In the case that the Pudgala school says thus : This

(person in niraya) is different from that (person in tiryagyoni),
the Siinyatavadin will question, saying : Is this (person in
niraya) annihilated and is that (person) born in tiryagyoni
different?
Pud. : No.
If this (person in niraya) is different from that (person
in tiryagyoni), then you should say that this (person in
niraya) is annihilated and that (person) born in tiryagyoni
is different.
!fyou do not say that this (person in niraya) is annihilated and that (person) born in tiryagyoni is different,
then you should not say that this (person in niraya) is
different from that (person in tiryagyoni).
180
It is unreasonable that you say: This (person in
niTaya) is different from that (person in tiryagyoni).

5. In the case that the Pudgala school says thus: It cannot
be said that this (person) is either (the same as) that (person)
or different from that (person), the Sunyatavadin will question,
saying: Is it impossible to say that this (peJ:Son) is either (the
same as) that (person) or different from that (person) in the
case that the person deceases and is born from niraya into
tiryagyoni ?
Pud. : No. It is impossible to say so.
Sun. : Acknowledge the refutation
If it cannot be said that this (person) is either (the
same as) that (person) or different from that (person),
then you should say that it is impossible to say that this
(person) is either (the .same as) that (person) or
different from that (person) in the case that the person
deceases and is born from niraya into tiryagyoni.
If you do not say that it is impossible to say that
this (person) is either (the same as) that (person) or
deceases and is born from niraya into tiryagyoni, then you
should not say that it cannot be said that this (person)
is either (the same as) that (person) or different from
that (person).
It is unreasonable that you say: It cannot be said
that this (person) is either (the same as) that (person)
or different from that (person).
In the same way as the person deceases and is born from niraya
into tiryagyoni, the person dec~ases and is born from niraya into
pitryavi$aya.
The following (Nos. I to 6) is the argume'lt of whether or
not the person transmigrates from niraya to manuvtl.
-Translation of Section I, continued (T. 26, 537c-538 b)I. The Pudgala school states thus : The person is known,
sense. Therefore, the person certainly exists.
Advance~ Forms
of Questions and Answers
181
The Sunyatiiviidin asks thus: Did' the Buddha teach well,

. : ? '(This is the same as in No. I of the above.)
Pud'. ~ Yes,
Sun'. : Does the (same) person decease and is' the (same)
";:'~
person born from niraya in to tiryagyoni ?
Pud. :Yes.
Sun. : Acknowledge the refutation .
. . .the same as in No. I of the above.
t
2. The Pudgala school states thus : The person certainly

deceases and is born from niraya into. manuva.
Sun. : Is thiS (person) (the same as) that (person) ?
Pud. : No.
If the person certainly deceases and is born from
niraya into manu$yii, then you should say that this
If you do not say that this (person) is (the same as)
that (person), then you should not say that the person
certainly deceases and is born from niraya into manuvii.
It is unreasonable that you say : The person certainly
deceases and is born from niraya into manuvii.
(person) is (the same as) that (person), the Siinyatiiviidin will
question, saying : Is the niraya (the same as) the "",nuvli ?
Pud. : No.
Hthis (person) is (the same as) that (person), then
you should say that the niraya is (the same as) the
mauuvd .
If you do not say that the niraya is (the same as) the
manuVii, then you should not say that this (person) is
(the same as) that (person).
It is unreasonable that you say : This (person) is
182

(person) is (the same as) that (person), the Sunyatavadin will
question, saying : Is there no capacity of producing the five
faculties, the five strengths and. the seven factors of
enlightenment of 'without influence' (anllsrava) in niraya, and is
there a capacity in manuvii ?1
Pud. : Yes.
Siin. : Is that there is no capacity (the same as) that there
is a capacity?
Pud. : No.
you should say that that there: is no capacity is (the
Same as) that there is a cap'acity.
If you do not say that that there is no capacity is
(the same as) that there is a capacity, then you should
not say that this (person) is (the same as) that (person).
It is unreasonable that you say: This (person) is (the
same as) that (person).
(person) is different from that (person), the Sunyatavadin will
question, saying : Is this (person in niraya) annihilated and is
that (person) born in manu.ryd different?
Pud. : No.
If this (person) is different from that (person), then
you should say that this (person in niray.) is annihilated and that (person) born in manu,ryd is different.
If you do not say that this (person in niray.) is annihilated and that (person) born in manUl)!a is different,
"
then you should not say that this (person) is different
from that (person).
l.
At this point... A..@"
-Aim"
(meaning 'enter gati')
(meaning <manUj)'d). (See T. 26, 538'a.)
is
to be read as
Advanced Forms
<if Questions and Answers
183
It is unreasonable that you say: This (person) is

different from that (person).
6. In the case that the Pudgala school says thus: It cannot

be said that this (person) is either (the same as) that (person)
or different from that (person), the Sanyatavadin will question,
saying : Is it impossible to say that this (person) is either (the
case that the person deceases and is born from niraya into
manU$yii ?
San. : Acknowledge the refutation.
If it cannot be said that this (person) is either (the
same as) that (person) Or different from that (person),
then you should say that it is impossible to say that this
(person) is either (the same as) that (person) or different from that (person) in the case that the person
deceases and is born from niraya into manU$yd.
If you do not say that it is impossible to say that this
(person) is either (the same as) that (person) or
deceases and is born from niraya into manuva, then you
that (person).
It is unreasonable that you say! It cannot be said
In the same way as the person deceases and is born from niraya
into manuVii, the person deceases and is born from niraya into
devil.
Although it should not be said that in niraya, tiryagyoni and
pitryaviJaya there is a capacity, it should he said that in devil and
manuo9'ii there is a capacity.
Although it should not be said that in dtvlI and manuVlII there
is not a capacity, it should be said that in niraya, tiryagyoni and
pitryavi$aya there is not a capacity.
184
11.12. The second section treats of whether or not the person

can be recognized in eight types of person worth honouring.
-Translation of Section 2 (T. 26, 538 b-539 a)I. The Pudgala school states thus: The person is known,
sense. Therefore, the person certainly exists.
The Sunyatiwadin asks thus : Did the Buddha teach well,
say well and state well in the sutra : There are certainly eight
types of person and they are established as different, namely :
I. srota-iipatti-pratipannaka '( one who is) obtaining the realization
of the fruit of stream-attainment', 2. sTota-apanna' (one who has)
attained stream', ... 7. arhatpratipannaka '( one who is) obtaining
the realization of the fruit of Arahantship', and 8. arhat' (one
who is) Arahant'; then srQta-apatti-pratipannaka, sTota-dpanna, ...
4rhatpratipannaka and arhat are certainly different?
Pud. : Yes.
Sun. : Do persons of srota~apatti~pratipannaka become srota~
apanna?
Pud. : Yes.
If there are certainly eight types of person and they
are established as different, namely : I. srota-apatti-prati~
pannaka, .. and 8. arhat; then srota-apatti-pratipannaka,
srota~apanna, .. arhatpratipannaka and arhat are certainly
different, then you should not say that persons of srota~
iipatti-pratipannaka become srota-iipanna.
If you say that persons of srota-apatti-pratipannaka
become srota-iipanna, then you should not say that there
are certainly eight types of person and they are
established as different, namely: I. srota-apatti-pratipannaka, ... and 8. aroot; then srota-apatti-pratipannaka, srota;'
iipanna, .. .arhatpratipannaka and arhat are certainly
different.
It is unreasonable that you say : There are certainly
eight types of person and they are established as different, namely: 1. .rrota-apatti-pratipannaka, ... and 8. arhat;
Advanced FOTms 'If Questions and AnsweTs
185
then srota-apatti-pTotipannaka, STota-apanna ...aThatpTatj..

pannaka and arhat are certainly different.
2. The Pudgala school states thus : Persons of STOta-apattipratipannaka become srola-Ilpan;w.
The Sunyatavadin will quest jon, saying : Is this (the same
as) that ? (This means "Whether or not persons of STota-apattipratipannaka are the same as persons of srota-apanna.")
Pud. : No.
If. persons of srata-iipatti-pratipannaka become srataapanna, then you should say that this (person) is (the
same as) that (person).
If you do not say that this (person) is (the same
as) that (person), then you shquld not say that persons
of STota-iipatti-pratipannaka become srola-apanna.
It is unreasonable that you say : Persons of sTotalipatti-pratipannaka become srota-lipanna.
3. In the case that the Pudgala school states thus : This
(person) is (the same as) that (person), the Sunyatavadin will
question, saying: Is the pratipannaka '(one who is) obtaining'
(the same as) the phala-sthita '(one who is) established in the
fruit' ?
Pud. : No.
Soo. : Acknowledge the refutation.
you should say that the pratipannaka is (the same as)
the phala-sthita.
If you do not say that the pTatipannaka is (the same
as) the phala-sthita, then you should not say that this
4. In the case that .the Pudgala school states thus : This
(person) is (the same as) that (person), the Sunyatavaqin ~il'
186
question, saying: Do persons of srota-iipatti-pratipannaka not

accomplish the fruit and do persons of srota~iiPanna accomplish
the fruit?
Pud. : Yes.
Sun. : Then, the unaccomplishment is (the same as) theaccomplishment?
Pud. : No.
If persons of srota-ilpatti-pratipannaka do not accomplish
the fruit and persons of srota-lipanna do accomplish the
fruit, then you should say that the unaccomplishment
is (the same as) the accomplishment.
If you do not say that the unaccomplishment is (the
satne as) the accomplishment, then you shguld not say
that this (person) is (the same as) that (person).
"
5. In the case that the Pudgala school states thus: This

(person) is different from that (person), the Sunyatavadin will
question, saying : Are persons of srota~iiPatti-pratipannaka annihilated and are persons born as sTota-lipanna different ?
Pud. : No.
If this (person) is different from that (person), then
you should say that persons of srota-ilpatti.pTatipannaka
are annihilated and persons born as srota-dpanna are
different.
If you do not say that persons' of srota-lipatti-pTatipannaka are annihilated and persons born as srota-apanna
are different, then you should not say that this (person}
is different from that (person).
different from that (person).
6. In the case that the Pudgala school states thus : It cannot
be said that this (person) is either (the same as) that (person}
Advanced Forms rif Questions and Answers
187
or different from that (person), the Stinyatavadin will question,

saying: Is it impossible to say that this (person) is either (thO"
case that persons of srota-apatti-pratipannaka become sTota-apanna?
Stin. : Acknowledge the refutation.
If it cannot be said that this (person) is either (thO"
same as) that (person) or different from that (person),
then you should say that it is impossible to say that
different from that (person) in the case that persons of
srota-iipatti-pratipannaka become srota-apanna.
If you do not say that it is impossible to say that
different from that (person) in the case that persons of
srota-apatti-pratipannaka become sTota-apanna, then you
that (person).
It is unreasonable that you say : It cannot be said
In section 2 below (T.26,539 a-540 c), the discussion of

whether or not persons of anagamipratipannaka '(one who is)
obtaining the realization of the fruit of never-returning' become
aniigdmi ' (one who has) never returned' is recorded in the same
way as above.
Section 3 (T.26,540 c-542 a) deals with the person in three
rafis, namely:
1. mithyatvaniyatarasi 'heap of wrongness't
2. samyaktvaniyatara!i 'heap of rightness' and 3. aniyatariUi 'heap
of the undetermined'. This section is explained in the same way
as in sections I and 2.
11.13 The fourth section treats of whether or not three types
of person accomplish three kinds of training (Saik,as).
-Translation of Section 4 (T.26,542 a-b)-
188
A bhjdhamma Philosophy
The Pudgala school states thus: The person is known, recognized, and exists actually and exists in the real, ultimate sense.
Therefore, the person certainly exists.
The Sunyatiiviidin asks thus: Did the Buddha teach well, say
well and state well in the sUtra : There are certainly three types
of person and they are established as different, namely: I. the
person as a learner (faik~a), 2. the person as the learned
(afai~a), and 3. the person who is neither a learner nor the
learned (naivafaik~aniifaik~a) ?
Pud. : Yes.
Sun. : Are there also three dharmas (principles), namely
1. !aik$a, 2. aiaik$a, and 3. naivaiaik$anafaik$a ?
Pud. : Yes.
Siin. : Does the person who is neither a learner nor the learned
become the person as a learner, and does he become
the person as the learned after having become the
person as a learner, and then does he become the
person as a learner again after having become the
person as the learned ?
Pud. : Yes.
Sun. : Does the principle of naivafaik~aniifaik~a become the
principle of faik~a, and does. it become the principle of
afaik$a after having become the principle of faik,a, and
then does it become the principle of faik~a again after
having become the principle of asaik$a ?'
Pud. : No.
Sun. : Acknowledge th'-refutation.
If the person who is neither a learner nor the
learned becomes the person as a learner, and he becomes the person as the learnetl after having become
the person as a learner, and then he becomes the
person as a learner again after having become the
person as the learned, then you should say : the
principle of naivafaik~aniifaik~a becomes the principle of
!aik$a, and it becomes the principle of a!aik~a "after
having become the principle of saik$a, and then it becomes the principle of saik~a again after having become
the principle of afaik~a.
Advanced Forms of Q.uestiDns and Answers

If you do not say: the principle of naivaiaik,aniilaik,a
becomes the principle of !aik$a, and it becomes the
principle of aiaik,a after having become the principle
of iaik,a, and then it becomes the principle of iaik,.
again after having become the principle of aiaik,a,
then you should not say: the person who is neither
a learner nor the learned becomes the person as a
learner, and he becomes the person as the learned
after having become the person as a learner, and then
he becomes the person as a learner again after having
become the person as the learned.
It is unreasonable that you say : The person who is
neither a learner nOf the learned becomes the person
as a learner, and he becomes the person as the learned
after having become the person as a learner, and then
he becomes the person as a learner again after having
become the person as the learned.
11.14 The fifth section treats of how the person perform.
MTTTlans based on three sensations (vedaniis) .
-Translation of Section 5 (T.26,542 b-c)I. The Pudgala school states thus : There is dtman (ego),
sattva (being), jiva (the life principle), jantu (being), po,.
(man), puru,a (man), and pudgala. Because the person exists,
he perfonns karmans favouring either a happy sensation or an
unhappy sensation or the sensation that is neither unhappy nor
happy. He feels a happy sensation after having performed a
karman favouring a happy sensation, he feels an unhappy sensation after having performed a karman favouring an unhappy
sensation, and he feels the sensation that is neither unhappy
nor happy after having performed a karman favouring the
sensation that is neither unhappy nor happy.
The Siinyatiivadin asks thus : Are unhappiness and happiness
self-made?
Pud. : No.
If you say : there is iitman, sattva, jiva, jantu, PO$D,
pUTU,a, and pudgala; because the person exists, he per-
190
forms karmans favouring either a bappy sensation or an
unhappy sensation or the sensation that is neither
unhappy nor happy; he feels a happy sensation after
having performed a karman favouring a happy sensation, he feels an unhappy sensation after having performed a karman favouring an unhappy sensation, and
he feels the sensation that is neither unhappy nor
happy after having performed a karman favouring the
sensation that is neither unhappy nor happy, then you
should say that unhappiness and happiness are selfmade.
If you do not say that unhappiness and happiness
are self-made, then you should not say : there is atman,
sattva, ... and he feels the sensation that is neither UDhappy nor happy after having performed a karman
favouring the sensation that is neither unhappy nor
happy.
It is unreasonable that you say: There is atman,
sattva, ... and he feels the sensation that is neither
unhappy nor happy after having performed a karman
happy.
",.
2. In the case that the Pudgala school states thus: Unhappiness and happiness are self-made, the Siinyataviidin will
question, saying: Did the Buddha teach well, say well and
:state well to Timbaruka, a non-Buddhist in the slUra : "I have
never said that the sensation is the same as he that feels and
from the beginning beings make for themselves unhappiness and
happiness" ?
Pud. : Yes.
If unhappiness and happiness are self-made, then
you should not say : the Buddha taught Timbaruka :
"I have never said that the sensation is the same as
he that feels and that from the begirlning beings make
for themselves unhappiness and happiness."
191

If you say: the Buddha taught Timbaruka: "I have
never said that the sensation is the same as he that
feels and that from the beginning beings make for
themselves unhappiness and happiness," then you
should not say that unhappiness and happiness are
self-made.
It is unreasonable that you say : Unhappiness and

happiness are self-made.
3. In the case that the Pudgala school states thus: Unhappiness and happiness are made by another, the Siinyatavadin will
question, saying : Did the Buddha teach well, say well and state
well to Timbaruka in the sfltra : "I have never said that the
sensation is different from he that feels and that unhappiness
and happiness are made by another" ?
Pud. : Yes.
Ifunhappiness and happiness are made by another,
then you should not say : the Buddha taught Timbaruka : HI have never said that the sensation is different
from he that feels and that unhappiness and happiness
are made by another."
If you say : the Buddha taught Timbaruka : "I
have never said that the sensation is different from
he that feels and that unhappiness and happiness are
made by another," then you should not say that unhappiness and happiness are made by another.
It is unreasonable that you say: Unhappiness and
happiness are made by another.
-Translation of Section 5, continued (T.26,542 c-543 b)I. The Pudgala school states thus: There is iitma., sattva, jiva,
Jantu, P..Dfa, pUTU$a, and pudgala. Because the person exists, he
performs karmans favouring either a happy sensation or an unhappy sensation or the sensation that is neither unhappy nor
happy. He feels a happy sensation after having performed a
192
4'
karman favouring a happy sensation, he feels an unhappy sensation after having performed a karman favouring an unhappy
sensation, and he feels the sensation that is neither unhappy nor
happy after having performed a karman favouring the sensation
that is neither unhappy nor ,happy.
The Siinyataviidin asks thus : Is he that performs karman( s)
the same as he that feels ?
Pud. : No.
Ifyau say: there is atman, sativa, ... and he feels
the sensation that is neither unhappy nor happy after
having performed a karman favouring the sensation that
is neither unhappy nor happy, then you should not
say that he that performs karman (s) is the same as he
that feels.
If you do not say that he that performs karman( s) is
the same as he that feels, then you should not say :.
there is titman, sattva, ... and he feels the sensation
that is neither unhappy nor happy after having performed a karman favouring the sensation that is neither
unhappy nor happy.
It is unreasonable that you say: There is alman,
sattva, ... and he feels the sensation that is neither
unhappy nor happy after having performed a karman
happy.
2. In the case that the PudgaIa school states thus : He that
performs karman(s) is the same as he that feels, the Siinyatiiviidin will question, saying: Did the Buddha teach well, say
well and state well to a br~hman in the mtra: "He who performs karman (s) and feels (their results) falls into the extreme
of eternalism (iiJivata.anta) " ?
'
Pud. : Yes.
If you say that he that performs karman( s) is the
same a; he that feels, then you should not say : the
.~,
Advanced Forms
'If Questions and Answers
Buddha
taught a
brahman
193
"He who performs
karman(s) and feels (their results) falls into the extreme

of eternalism."
If you say : the Buddha taught a brahman : "He
who performs karman(s) and feels (their results) falls
into the extreme of eternalism," then you should not
say that he that performs karman(s) is the same as he
that feels.
It is unreasonable that you say : He that performs
karman (s) is the same as he that feels.
11.15. The sixth section treats of whether or not the person
exists in dharmas (principles) seen (dTfla), heard (frnta) , sensed
(mata), and cognized (vijnata).
-Translation of Section 6 (T. 26, 543 b-c)The Pudgala school states thus : There is litman, sattva, jiva,
jantu, pO$a, puru~a and pudgala. Because the person exists, among
dharmas seen, heard, sensed, cognized, what is obtained (priipta)
, (or) sought for (parye~ita) is pondered on (anuvicarita) by the
mind.
..
The Sunyatavadin asks thus: Did the Buddha teach well,
say well and state well to the monk Arinha in the satra : "Whatever is seen, heard, sensed, cognized, obtained, sought for,.
pondered on by the mind is regarded as : 'this is not mine; I
am not it; it is not my self'. This should be seen in its true
nature by means of right understanding" ?
Pud. : Yes.
If you say : there is litman, sattva, ... among
principles seen, heard, sensed, cognized, what is obtain..
ed (or) sought for is pondered on by the mind,
then you should not say: the Buddha taught the
mqnk Arittha: "Whatever is seen, heard, . .. this.
should be seen in its true nature by means of right.
understanding" .
If you say: the Buddha taught the monk Arit\ha :
"Whatever is seen, heard, ." this should be seen.
194
in its true nature by means of right understanding,"
then you should not say : there is iilman, sattva, ..
among principles seen, heard, sensed, cognized, what
is obtained (or) sought for is pondered on by the
mind.
It is unreasonable that you say : There is alman,
sattva, ... among principles seen, heard, sensed, cognized, what is obtained (or) sought for is pondered on
by the mind.
11.16. The seventh section treats of the relation between

the occurrence of benevolence (maitrii) and the pers~m.
-Translation of Section 7 (T. 26,543 c-544 c)I. The Sunyatavadin states thus : The person is not known
nor recognized and never exists actually and does not exist in
the real, ultimate sense. Therefore, the person does not exist.
The Pudgala school asks thus : Through what mental object
(alambana) is thel'e benevolence?
Sill. : Dharmas (principles) have a nature which exists. The
Pud.
'being' (sattua) is designated according to recognition

(saf/ljfUi) and recognizing (sa1Jljfiiinana).l In this sense,
through the continuance of skandhas (groups) there is
benevolence.
: Do you say: through the continuance of skandhas there
is benevolence ?
: Yes.
Siin.
Pud. : Did the Buddha teach wen, say wen and state wen in
the slitra : "In order to make beings happy, he enters
meditation ch;'rged with benevolence
(maitriisamaprapti) " ?
Siin. : Yes.
Pud. : Acknowledge the refutation.
If there is benevolence through the continuance of
skandhas, then you should not say: the Buddha taught:
1. It appears that the word 'smpjflti' here is used in the sense of
'recognition' rather than fperc~tion', in considering the following
eXplanation : "recognition (sanna) is the noting of objects such as bluegreen, yellow" (see Visuddhimagga, p. 437, p. 462, etc.).
195
"In order to make beings happy, he enters meditation

charged wi th benevolence."
If you say: the Buddha taught : "In order to make
beings happy, he enters meditation charged with benevolence," then you should not say that there is
benevolence through the continuance of skandhas.
It is unreasonable that you say: Through the continuance of skandhas, there is benevolence.
2. (The Siinyatavadin) asks thus: Did the Buddha teach

well, say well "and state well in the s utra : "There are six kinds
of consciousness, namely: I. eye-consciousness, 2. ear.consciousness, 3. nose-consciousness, 4. tongue-consciousness, 5. bodyconsciousness, and 6. mind-consciousness" ?
Pud. : Yes.
Sun. : Venerable onc, with what kinds of consciousness is
benevolence connected?
With 'eye-consciousness' ?
With 'ear-consciousness'? With (nose-consciousness' ?
With 'tongue-consciousness'? With 'mind-consciousness' ? If you say that benevolence is connected with
'eye-consciousness', then benevolence does not depend
on the being because 'eye-consciousness' depends only
On visible objects (rnpa). (This refers to "conditioned
by eye and visible objects, arises 'eye-consciousness.')
If you say that benevolence is connected with 'ear..
consciousness', then benevolence does not depend on
the being because 'ear-consciousness' depends only on
sound, ... if you say that benevolence is connected
with 'mind-consciousness', the~< benevolence does not
depend on the being because 'mind-consciousness'
depends only on mental objects.
If you say that benevolence is not connected with
'eye-consciousness', ... 'mind-consciousness', then there
would be a seventh consciousness of the being and
benevolence would be connected with it; but the
Buddha did not so understand it.
Venerable one, the Buddha explained with perfect
self-confidence (vailaradya) as follows :"1 was perfectly.
196
Abhidhamma PhilDSOP'"
enlightened as to dharmas (principles). In spite of the

fact that I was enlightened with perfect enlightenment,
if strivers, brahmans, its Devas, its Maras, its Brahmas
in this world said together that he was not enlightened,
I did not see any reason for doubt. l Beca~.se I was
enlightened, I was full of peace (k,ema), free from
fear (abhaya) and gained self-confidence; and I myself
established the great wheel of truth in the place called
the basis of a great man (iir,abha-sthiina) and roared
like a lion in the assembly." Venerable one, ifso, why
do you not blame the Buddha for his ignorance?
Pud. : Venerable one, I do not blame the Buddha for his
ignorance. He well understood it, but did not explain
it.
Sun. : Venerable one,'the Buddha taught venerable Ananda :
"I always explain the four smrtyupasthdnas, the four samyakpTadhiinas, the four rddhipiidas, the five indriyas, the five
balas, the seven saqlbodhyangas, and the eight aryamiirga....
ngas. Ananda, the tathiigata never keeps his hand closed
(iiciirya-mu,!i : teacher's fist) in teaching. If I
maintain reserve, another atman (may) be conscious
- . ~ of it. I am afraid of this." Venerable one, if so, why
do you not blame the Buddha for keeping his hand
closed?
Pud. : Venerable one, I do not blame the Buddha for hi.
ignorance. I do not blame the Buddha for keeping hi.
hand closed. He well understood it, but did not
explain it.
The Buddha explained in SiYflfapavanas Qlra : Monks,
although I realized completely and well understood
principles as innumerable as the sands on the earth
and leaves of a Sir{lfapa tree, I did not preach them to
others. Thus the Buddha did not explain such a consciousness, though he wen understood it.
Sun. : Is there not a further statement left out in the siitra !
Monks, however, such principles are not concerned
1. At this point, we follow a free tranllation, because the ChinlCle
version seems to make no .ense.
197
with the meaning, with good, with truth (dharma), do

not lead to the best life (brahmacarrya), do not conduce
to insight (abhijn4) , to enlightenment, to nirviiQa ?
If there is such a person (pudgala) , it is not concern.ed with' the meaning, with good, with truth, does not
lead to the best life, do not conduce to insight, to
enlightenment, to nirvdt;tQ.
That is to say, it is useless. Therefore, the person
does not exist.
In section 7 below (T. 26, 544 c-545 b), the relation between
the occurrence of benevolence in the four smrtyupasthllnas and the
seven sa1flbodhyangas and the person is discussed in the same way
as above.
11.17 The eighth section treats of the relation of the person

to the unsynthesized and the synthesized.
-Translation of Section 8 (T. 26,545 b)The Pudgala school states thus: The synthesized (Sa7Jlskrta)
is known, the unsynthesized (asamskrta) is known, and the
person is also known.
The 8iinyatavadin asks thus: Venerable one, is the person
the synthesized or the unsynthesized ?
If you say that the person is the synthesized, then the person
is established in the same way as the synthesized, and there is
jiiti (birth), aniryalii (impermanence), sthiti (persistence), and
anyathatva (difference).
If you say that the person is the unsynthesized, then the
person is established in the same way as the unsynthesized, and
there is no birth, nor impermanence, nor persistence, nor
difference.
Venerable one, the Buddha taught the monks : "There are
two classes, that is, 1. the synthesized and 2. the unsynthesized.
There is no other class
than the synthesized and the
unsynthesized. "
Therefore, it is not the case that the person exists.
11.18 The ninth section deals with the relation of the six
kinds of consciousness and the person.
198
-Translation of Sectioll 9 (T. 26,545 b-547 a) ~

I. There are six kinds of consciousness, namely: 1. eyeconsciousness, 2. ear.;consciousness, 3. nose-consciousness,.
4. tongue-consciousness, 5. body-consciousness, and 6. mindconsciousness. Conditioned by eye and visible objects, 'eyeconsciousness' arises. Such an 'eye-consciousness' presents (lit.
cognizes) only visible objects, and is not the person. The person
is not what is presented by 'eye-consciousness'. There are only
visible objects, which are presented by 'eye-consciousness'.
Therefore, the 'eye-consciousness' is not the consciousness of
the person.
And conditioned by eye and visible objects, 'eye-consciousness"
arises, and because of the connection of the three (eye, visible
objects and eye-consciousness), tbere is contact (sparia). Such
an 'eye-contact' presents (lit. touches) only visible objects,.
and does not present the person. The person is not what is
presented by 'eye-contace. There are only visible objects, which
are presented by 'eye-contact'. Therefore, the 'eye-contacC
is not the contact of -the person.
And cOI!ditioned by eye and visible objects, 'eye-consciousness' arises, and because of the connection of the three, there is
COntact. Conditioned by contact, sensation (vedanii) arises. Such
a sensation originating from 'eye-contact' presents (lit. feels)
only visible objects, and is not the person. The person is not
what is presented by sensation originating from 'eye-contact'.
There are only visible objects, which are presented by sensation
originating from 'eye-consciousness'. Therefore, the sensation
originating from 'eye-contact' is not the sensation originating
from 'the person-contact' .
And conditioned by eye and visible objects, 'eye-consciousness' arises, and because of the connection of the three, there
is contact. Conditioned by contact, perception (sa1Jljna) arises.
Such a perception originating from 'eye-contact' presents (lit.
perceives) only visible objects, and is not the person. The person
is not what is presented by perception originating from 'eye- ..
contact'. There are only visible objects, which are presented by ,
perception originating from 'eye-contact'. Therefore, the perception originating from 'eye-contact' is not the perception originating from 'the person-contact'.
199
And conditioned by eye and visible objects, 'eye-consciousness' arises, and because of the connection of the three, there is
contact. Conditioned by contact, volition (cetand) arises. Such
'a volition originating from 'eye-contact' presents (lit.wills)
only visible objects, and is not the person. The person is not
what is presented by volition originating from 'eye-contact".
There are only visible objects, which are presented by volition
originating from 'eye-contact'. Therefore, the volition originating from 'eye-contact' is not the volition originating from 'the
person-contact' .
Because the contact from which principles (dharmas) arise is
the fifth dharma (of consciousness, contact, sensation, perception
and volition, and there is no other dharma from which principles
arise than contact), the person is not known, nor recognized
and never exists actually and does not exist. Therefore, it is not
the case that the person exists.
In the same way as 'eye-consciousness', the other five kinds
of consciousness are also followed.
'I,,'
2. There are six kinds of consciousness, namely: 1. eyeconsciousness, ... and 6. mind-consciousness. Conditioned by
eye and visible objects, 'eye-consciousness' arises. Eye, visible
objects and eye-consciousness are not the person, and conditioned by only eye and visible objects, 'eye-consciousness' arises~
And conditioned by eye and visible objects, 'eye-consciousness'
arises, and because of the connection of the three (eye, visible
objects and eye-consciousness), there is contact. Eye, visible
objects, eye-consciousness and contact are not the person.
Conditioned by only eye and visible objects, 'eye-consciousness'
arises, and because of the connection of the three, there is
contact.
is contact. Conditioned by contact, sensation arises. Eye, viSible
objects, eye-consciousness, eye-contact and sensation originating
from 'eye-contact' are not the person. Conditioned by only eye
and visible objects, 'eye-consciousness' arises. Because of the
connection of the threp, there is contact. Conditioned by contact, se,nsation arises.
200
is contact. Conditioned by contact, there is perception. Eye,
visible objects, eye-consciousness, eye-contact and perception
originating from 'eye-contact' are not the person. Conditioned
by only eye and visible objects, 'eye-consciousness' arises, and
because of the connection of the three, there is contact. Conditioned by contact, perception arises.
And conditioned by eye and visible objects, 'eye-consciousness' arises, and because of the connection of the three, there is
contact. Conditioned by contact, volition arises. Eye, visible
objects, eye-consciousness, eye-contact and volition originating
from 'eye-contact' are not the person. Conditioned by only eye
and visible objects, 'eye-consciousness' arises, and because of
the connection of the three, there is contact. Conditioned by
contact, volition arises.
Because the contact from which principles arise. is the fifth
dharma (of consciousness, contact, sensation, perception and
volition, and there is no other dharma from which principles
arise than contact), the person is not known, nor recognized,
and never exists actually and does not exist. Therefore, it is
not the case that the person exists.
In the same way as 'eye-consciousness', the other five kinds of
consciousness are also followed.
3. There are six kinds of consciousness, namely: 1. eyeconsciousness, ., .and 6. mind-consciousness. Conditioned by
eye and visible objects, 'eye-consciousness' arises. It is impossible that eye and visible objects arise and 'eye-consciousness'
does not arise. It is possible that eye and visible objects arise
and 'eye-consciousness' also arises. It is impossible that eye and
visible objects cease and 'eye-consciousness' does not cease. It
is possible that eye and vjsible objects cease and 'eye-consciousness' also ceases.
arises, and because of the connection of the three, there is can ..
tact. It is impossible that eye, visible objects and 'eye-consciousness' arise and 'eye-contact' does not arise. It is possible that
eye, visible objects and 'eye-consciousness' arise and 'eye-con-
Advanced Forms of Qu.stwns and Answers
201
tact' also arises. It is impossible that eye, visible objects and

'eye-consciousness' cease and 'eye-contact' does not cease.
It is possible that eye, visible' objects and 'eye-consciousness'
ease and 'eye-contact' also ceases, ...The contact from which
principles arise is the fifth dharma, and (the eighteen dhiitus and
the six contacts) arise simultaneously, and persist simultaneously, and cease simultaneously. When one of them arises, the
other (principles) also arise; when one of them ceases, the
other (principles) also cease. Because the contact from which
principles arise is the fifth dharma, the person is not known, nor
recognized, and never exists actually and does not exist. Therefore, it is not the case that the person exists.
4. There are six kinds of consciousness, namely: I. eye.consciousness, ... and 6. mind-consciousness. Conditioned by
-eye and visible objects, 'eye-consciousness' arises. Such an 'eye ..
-consciousness' presents (lit. cognizes) visible objects, and is not
-contact nor sensation nor perception nor volition, because the
,characteristic (lak$a1Ja) of the activity of consciousness is 'eye-consciousness' .
arises, and because of the connection of the three, there is contact. Such an 'eye-contact' presents (lit. touches) visible objects,
and is not sensation nor perception nor volition nor consciousness, because the characteristic of the activity of contact is 'eye-contact', ...The contact from which principles arise is the fifth
dharma, and (the eighteen dhiltus and the six contacts) arise
.simultaneously, and persist simultaneously, and cease simultaneously. When one of them arises, the other (principles) also
arise; when one of them ceases, the other (principles) also
-cease. Having arisen already, each of them functions properly
.and does not function as to what is unrelated to one another.
Because the contact from which principles arise is the fifth
.dharma, the person is not known, nor recognized, and never
-exists actually and does not exist. Therefore, it is not the case
that the person exists.
5. There are six kinds of consciousness, namely
-consciousness, .. and 6. mind-consciousness.
I. eye-
202
i.
Ques.: What.::;, does 'eye.consciousness'

distinguish.
(vijnandti) ?
Am;.
It distinguishes visible objects.
Ques. : What does it not distinguish?
Ans. : The other eleven ayatanas (spheres).
ii. Ques.: What does 'ear-consciousness' distinguish?
Ans. : It distinguishes sounds. . t;:,
Ques. : What does it not distinguish?
Ans. : The other eleven ayatanas.
The six kinds of consciousness distinguish their own objects,.
and have the nature of distinguishing their own objects. It is
not the case that (they) have not the nature of distinguishing
their own objects. The person has not such a nature. Therefore
it is not the case that the person exists.
6. There are twelve ayatanas, namely : 1. eye and 2. visible
objects, 3. ear and 4. sound, 5. nose and 6. odour, 7. tongue
and 8. taste, 9. body and 10. tangible object, I I. mind and
12. principles.
Ques. : By how many kinds of consciousness are visible
objects presented (Iit. cognized), ... By how many
kinds of consciousness are principles presented ?
Ans.
: Visible objects are presented( Iit. cognized) by twokinds of consciousness, that is, 'eye-consciousness'
and 'mind-consciousness'. Sound is presented by
two kinds of consciousness, that is, 'ear-conscious ..
ness' and 'mind-consciousness'. Odour is presented
by two kinds of consciousness, that is, 'nose-consciousness' and 'mind-consciousness' . Taste is presented by two kinds of consciousness, that is, 'tongueconsciousness' and 'mind-consciousness'. Tangible
object is presented by two kinds of consciousness,.
that is, 'body-consciousness' and 'mind-consciousness'. The other seven iiyatanas (that is, eye, ear,
nose, tongue, body, mind and principles) are
presented by only 'mind-consciousness' .. The twelve
ayatanas are presented (lit. cognized) by one
Advanced Fonns of Questions and Answers
20$
another, and have the nature of being presented

by one another. It is not the case that (they)
have not the nature of being presented by one
another. The person has not such a nature.
Therefore, it is not the case that the person exists ..
7. There are six kinds of consciousness, namely : 1. eyeconsciousness, ... and 6. mind-consciousness. Conditioned by
eye and visible objects, (eye-~onsciousness' arises, and because
of the connection of the three, there is contact. There is sensation, perception and volition, which arise simultaneously with
contact. Because the contact from which principles arise is the
fifth dharma (of consciousness, contact, sensation, perception
and volition, and there is no other dharma from which principles
arise than contact), the person is not known, nor recognized,
and never exists actually and does not exist. Therefore, it is.
not the case that the person exists.
In the same way as 'eye-consciousness't the other five kinds
of consciousness are also followed.
11.19 From chapter 11.11 up to chapter 11.18, we have

tried to translate the pudgalaskandha of the Vijfiiinakiiya into
English. It may be said that throughout the pudgalaskandha the
Siinyatavadin (Sarvastivadin) maintains the non-existence of
the person and at the same ti~e, the existence of gatis, because
in each section the difference of gatis is emphasized by stating:
"There are certainly five kinds of gatis and they are established as different, ... ," "If there are certainly eight types of
person and they are established as different, then it must follow
that one person becomes another person, which is.
unreasonable, ... "
First of all, it must be noted that the Siinyatiiviidin begins by
informing the Pudgala school of what was taught by the Buddha
and tries to refute the Pudgala school by pointing out that the
existence of the person maintained by the Pudgala school is
inconsistent with what was taught by the Buddha. In the first
section, for example, the Siinyatavadin asks as follows (see No.
I of section I in chapter 11.11):
204
Is it true that the Buddha taught: "There are certainly

five kinds of gatis, and they are establisbed as different and
are certainly different" ?
To this question, the Pudgala school answers "Yes." Then the
5iinyatiiviidin asks as follows :
Does tbe (same) person decease and is the (same) person

born from niraya into tiryagyoni ?
Although the Pudgala school answers "Yes" to this question,
the Siinyatavadin points out that in order to be consistent with
what was taught by the Buddha, the answer to this question
'Should be "No". In other words, the Siinyatavadin maintains
the forms p;J - q and q;J - p, whilst the Pudgala school maintains the form p;J q. Such argument forms of the Siinyatiivadin
are also maintained in the beginning of the second and third
sections (e.g. see No. I of section 2 in chapter ll.1:,!). It seem.
that the Siinyatiwiidin cites the Buddha's teachings to lend
authority to his own statements.
Secondly, it is not a little remarkable to note that in demonstrating the non-existence of the person, the Siinyatavadin asks
the Pudgala school if ( I) the person is the same in the five
gatis, or (2) he is different in them, or (3) he is neither the
same nor different in them. Such questions are asked not -only
in the first section, but also in the second and third sections.
According to the Siinyatavadin, as far as the individuality of
the five gatis is taught by the Buddha and also as far as the
identity of the person is maintained by the Pudgala school; the
person in one of the five gatis must be the same as the person
in the other gatis. Thert?re, the Siinyatavadin points out two
matters. :
I. If the person certainly deceases and is born from niraya ,.
into tiryagyoni, then you should say that this (person) is (the
same as) that (person) (schematized by the formp;Jq).
If you do not say that this (person) is (the same as) that
(person), then you should not say that the person certainly
deceases and is born from niraya into tiryagyoni (schematized
Advanced Forms oj Questions and Answers

by the form -q;)
-pl.
20:'
(See No.2. of section I in chapter
11.11).1
2. If this (person) is (the same as) that (person), then
you should say that the niTaya is (the same as) the tiryagyoni
(schematized by the formp;)q).
If you do not say that the niTaya is (the Same as) the
tiryagyoni, then you should not say that this (person) is (the
same as) that (person) (schematized by the form '-q:::J -pl.
(See No.3 of section I in chapter 11.11).'
On this point, the Kathlivatthu states as follows (p. 30) :
If the same person transmigrates, without becoming different,

when deceasing to another world, there will then be no death;
the killing oflife will cease to take place. There is a karman;
there is its result; there is the result of karman done. But when
good and bad karmans are maturing as results, you say that
the same person transmigrates. This is wrong.
"
In the pudgalaskandha, the word 'karman' itself is not used in

explaining the transmigration from one gati into another, but
what is emphasized here seems to be the same essentially in both
the puggalakathli and the pudgalaskandha.
In the case that the proposition "the person is different in
the five gatis" is s tatoo by the Pudgala school, the identity of
the person cannot be maintained. The Siinyatavadin stresses.
1. What the Sunyatavadin points out in item 1 could be rephrased as.
follows : l. If ,the person certainly deceases and is born from niraya intotiryagyoni, then you should say that this (person) is (the same as) that
(person). 2. But it is not the case that this (person) is (the same as) that
(person). 3. Therefore, it is not the case that the person certainly deceases.
and is born from niraya into tiryal),oni.
Symbolically :
1. P:::Jq,
2. -q
3. Therefore,--p
2. In the same way as in item 1 above, what the 8unyatividin point..
out in item 2 could be schematized as follows:
1. P:::Jq
2. -q
3. Therefore, -fJ
~06
this point by asking: "Is this (person in niraya) annihilated and

is that (person) born in tiryagyoni different ?" And also, since
""'to be annihilated" means here that the person becomes free
from not only one gati, but also the other galis, the Pudgala
school cannot say "Yes" to the above question. Therefore, the
Siinyatavadin skilfully defeats the Pudgala school.
It goes without saying that the third proposition "the person
is neither the same nor different in the five gatis" is definitely
irrational or unreasonable.
The last half sections are especially devoted to the demonstra..
tion of non~existence of the person by quoting the teaching of
anatman (esp. section 6) and by explaining the relation of the
eighteen dhdtus and the six contacts (esp. section 9) .
To speak more precisely, in sections 5 and 6, in order to
maintain the existence of the person, the Pudgala school tries to
-express the person as litman, sattva, jiva, jantu, posa, purusa, etc.
and to explain that among dharmas (principles) seen, heard,
sensed, cognized, what is obtained (or) sought for is pondered
-On by the mind. On the other hand, the Siinyatavadin asks the
opponent if the Buddha taught the doctrine of anlitman :
""Whatever is seen, heard, sensed, cognized, obtained, sought
for, pondered on by the mind is regarded as : 'this is not mine;
I am not it; it is not my self'," and finally the Siinyatavadin
.argues down the Pudgala school. This may be compared in a
sense with the discussion between the Sthaviravadin and the
Pudgala school in the puggalakatha (see chapter 11.8), in which
~here is the mixed hypothetical syllogism denying the consequent :
If the person exists in the real, ultimat sense,
then everything is [inferred to be] of soul.
It is not the Case that all principles
~~~.
P=:l q
-q
Hence, it is not the case that the person exists. Hence, - p

Although the mixed hypothetical syllogism denying the con-sequent is not used in the pudgalaskandha, the method of setting
propositions is similar to that in the puggalakatM.
Then the Pudgala school tries to take up the problem of
dlenevolence as an act of the person (section 7) and to disregard
207.
the doctrine of aniitman. I t is, however, pointed out by, the

Siinyatavadin that the 'being' is designated according to recognition and recognizing, and that there is benevolence through the
<continuance of the five skandhas (groups).
11.20 About each section of the pudgalaskandha, there is

little need to talk at length. Our main ,discussion is to compare
the forms of argument in the puggalakathii with those in the
pudgalaskandha. A remarkable point here is that in the pudgaiaskandha the form P::J q and the form - q::J - P are always
used in their arguments.
As compared with the formulation of arguments in the
puggalakatM, that of arguments in the pudgalaskJndha is much
simpler. But we see that the method of setting propositions
side by side is similar to that in the puggalakathii. In other
words, the pudgalaskandha looks like a simpler version of the
debates in the puggalakathii. Logical techniques such as the
distribution of terms and the relations between propositions
are the same as those in the puggalakathii, though the distribution
{If terms in the pudgalaskandha can only very loosely be called a
logical technique. But it seems that the 8iinyatavada school has
picked out the essentials and recorded them in the pudgalaskandha,
and that the forms such as p::J q and - q::J - P have developed
with the relation of direct and reverse orders of the twelve
pratityasamutpddas, which are expressed in the words 'anuloma'
(normal) and 'patiloma' (reverse).
On the whole, we would say that the pudgalaskandha is directed
not only towards the demonstration of non-existence of the
person, but also towards the existence of dharmas (esp. sections
7 and 9), in which there seems to be an embryonic anticipation of setting up the existence of the past, present and the
future, especially in consideration of the first chapter named
Maudgalyayana.
The conclusion we arrived at is that the Sfi.nyatavada school
as well as the Sthaviravada school agreed on at least the followjng five P<Jints :
I. The structure of the Buddha's teachings.
2. The way of thinking of the early Buddhists.
3. The dialectic method of discussion.
208
Abhidhamma Phil"sophy
4. How to constitute a valid proof.

. 5. Logical techniques.
In view of the fact that public debating was an ancient custom
in India and that the Buddha stated the following words:
You should respect the elders and should not be envious

of them; you should know the time to look for teachings; you
should know the instant when dhammakatha (talk on doctrine)
begins; and you should listen to the goodly words with care
(Sn. 325),
it may safely be said tbat in their discussions the Buddhists and
afterwards the respective schools developed Buddhist pbilosopby
by assimilating fully the five points mentioned above.
It would also appear that these logical techniques, etc., were
understood at the time of the Pudgalaschism (B.C. 286?1) and
were consolidated in the Sifnyata-Sthaviravada school between
that date and the Sarvastivada schism (B.C. 237?'). Subsequently we see some further clarifications in the Sthaviravada
school (Kathiivatthu, etc.).
I. On this, see A. ~ Warder, Indian BuddhiJm, p. 240.

2. On this sec A. 1<.. Warder, Ibid., p. 273.
12
CONCLUSION
12.1. Since the Nikdyas as well as the Agamas cover various
fields of learning, they are required to be discussed from the
viewpoints of dogmatics, philosophy, psychology, literature,
linguistics, and the like. We have attempted to trace the development of the philosophical, and especially the logical aspects of
Buddhist thought from the Nikiiyas into the Abhidhamma texts.
12.2. In a sense, we could say that the Buddha teaches us
the negative way of thinking, on which Buddhist thought i.
founded. The problem of negation in philosophy and logic has
perplexed scholars of different ages. Apart from this scientifically intricate problem, it is certain that on the basis of the
negative way of thinking, Buddhists searched for the humanism
of the Nikiiyas, they explored freedom, they formulated the
social programme of non-violence, and they regarded everything
with gentle tolerance. At this point, it seems that some
Buddhists did not really understand the Buddha's negative way
of thinking and others regarded the word 'negative' as meaning
"characterized by the absence of distinguishing or marked
qualities or features". Therefore, it was alleged by non-Buddhists,
that Buddhists maintain an uncertain attitude towards life.
For a certainty, the Buddha (as well as his disciples) avoided
the expression of emphatic affirmative (or dogmatic) thinking;
rather, he tried to give an expression of passivity by the practical use of the double x:tegative, such as !
210
It is not the case that everything is not having the principle

of change.
Such an expression is, however, not an expression arising from

the Buddha's ambiguous thinking, but an expression originating
from the result ef seeking after the truth on the basis of his
negative thinking. As we have already learned, the Buddha
started with searching for what a human being is, and finally
grasped the non~existence of the self, called anattan. In other
words, the Buddha realized that a human being cannot be
grasped without the absence of the self (anattan). This does not
mean the mere "negation of the self", but means that he found
'not his ownness' (i.e. the absence of the self) through the
medium of his completely negative thinking. Therefore, he
points out that ultimate truth cannot be directly expressed in
affirmative words alone, and that at the stage or"trying to explain what the ultimate truth is, there is no method of doing
so other than using a negative phrase such as "this is not A",
"not B", "not e"
"not X". This negative phrase is denied
by the use of the double negative; and is negated again by the
practical use of the triple negative. In this sense, the recognition
of panna (understanding) originating from the real grasp of a
human being is deeply rooted in the completely negative thinking, which could be formalized by :
I
( "-A" ,
H __
"---B" ,
"
. ("-B" , "--B",
... ("-X""
,-X"
, "---X", ... )
A", "---A" , . . .)
).
Thus we understand the following words :

He who sees (passati) the truth (dhamma) sees me (the
Buddha) ; he who sees me (the Buddha) sees the truth.
He who sees dependent origination (palieeasamuppMa) sees
the truth; he who sees the truth sees dependent origination.
The verb passati (3rd person singular, present tense; the root of
this is pass, and the meaning 'see') is used in the teaching of
Buddhisql in the meaning of "to have an insight into inner
character or underlying truth through the medium of the
completely negative thinking," so that "to see the truth" mentioned above is to grasp the absence of the self, and "to see
Conclusion
211
dependent origination" is not only to have a scientific eye for

understanding the law of cause and effect, but also to have the
eye of truth (dhammacakkhu) to realize systematically the fact
that all phenomena are composed of involved relations. In this
respect, the twelve paccaydkaras (aspects of condition) in direct
and reverse orders teach us the real logic of relations.
12.3 Throughout the whole of Buddhism, we cannot disregard the relation of sacca, panna, analtan, paticcasamuppada, and
Qther principles. These are closely connected with the negative
thinking. If we overlook it, we fail to seize the characteristicsof all the principles in Buddhism. The reason why the Buddhists'
uncertain attitude towards life was alleged by non-Buddhist.
was, we may say, that Buddhists were far from following the
Buddha's completely negative thinking and made an effort only
to put constructions upon philosophical terms in Buddhism. In
this sense, we must get back to the Buddha. To get back to the
Buddha is to look at again the Buddha's way of thinking. This
is the only way to trace accurately the development of Buddhist
thought.
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INDEX
a (of abhi) 23
dbadha: affliction 118
Abbhutadhamma 9
abhaya : free from fear 196

abhi 19j, 22, 24, 26, 36
ahhideva : the peerless god 22
abhz'dhamma 7,171. 19,32, 33,34, 36,
37,39,41,42,43,44,46,66,71
AbhidJuzmma4, 6, 7, 8, 9,14, 16, 17!.

22, 23J, 36, 37, 40, 41, 45,46J, 53,
55,57,58,61, 62, 64/. 74, 86, 122,
124,125,134, 135, 138, 152, 154,
155,170,173,209
abhidhamma-bhdjaniya: analysis according to AbhidJuzmma 62
abhidhammaka'hQ 28, 31, 32,33, 34, 37
Abht"dhamma (or Mtitikd) Pilaka 4, 6,
18,19,20,21,37,42,44,45
Abhidhammamatikas 45
Abhidhammattha-sangha 166
Abhidhammavadin 24, 36
Abhidhamr(Ulvibhanga 26
Abhidharma 44
Ahhidharmamahavibhii#iSastra 23, 36, 86
AhhidharmakoJabhdsya 86
Abhidharmanyliyiinusarrddslra 86
,
abhiharati: to blame (one's opponent)
74
abhijflti : insight 197
abhika : excellent 21
abhikkamanti: attack, overwhelm 21,
22
abhikkanta: beautiful, eminent 21, 22
abhilakkkita : marked 21
abhimaddati : to beat down the questioner 74
abhimdna: self-conceit, undue estimate of oneself 23
abhinihiira : intention 72
abhifl.f1ii(s) : insight 58, 84
abhinfJiinuyogo : examination of supernormal power 157
abhifJfliipa#pada: way of knowledge 59
abhi fJiliilii : distinguished 21
abhirdja : great king, lord of men 21
abhisamaya -: insight 44abhivadana : salutation 23
abhivinaya 18,19,21,25,26,33,34, 43
abhivisillha-dhamma: very distinguished doctrine 22
a-bh uta: falsity 50
acarya-mui!i: teacher's fist 196
acei : flame 78
accomplishment
(samanvagama) 98
99, 175
acquisition of a personality (altapatilabha) 65
'V
actions (kammas) 59,63,139
actions (that find retribution) immediately (anantarikakammas) 152
activity of speech (vacasathkhtira) 103
adducing suttas (suttabiira) 157
adhamma : bad 10
.
adhamma: immorality, demerit 15
adhamma-raga: unlawful passion, noncustomary 15
ddMnagahf: one who grasps (something) tightly 150
adhDvati : to run forward to 151
adhikd : excellence 21
adhimutti: firm resolve, determination
23
adhipati : dominant 170adhillhdna : self-determining view 110
adhivacana: designation, expanded
metaphor 78
adukkhaT{lasukha : neither unhappiness.
nor happiness 52
.adukkMmasukha vedana: feeling. that is.
neither unhappy nor happy 52
advantage (hita) 149
adverse controversy pentad (paccanika-paFfcakatp) 156, 163
affirming the antecedent 171
affirming the consequent 172
affirmative pentad (anuloma-paiicakatp)
156, 157, 159, 161, 164
affliction (tibddha) 118
Agamas : traditions 5f, 13, 18, 19, 21~
25,29,31,36,42,44,45,53!. 57,.
61, 62, 67, 72, 73, 74, 76f, 81,
82,83,87,112,116, 121, 12~; 123~
1241,130, 141, 152j, 173,209
dgattigama : handed down by tradition 43
Aggi-Vacchagottasutta 80, 85, 91, 153
Aggivessana 124
aggregates (khandhas) 11
agka: hurt 118
Agnostics 7. 88
agreed usage (samaillld) 78
ahara: food, nutriment 23, 142, 146
ahita: disadvantage 149
air (vdYQ) 17
220
Angell, R. B. 51, 121, 135, 141, 158,

4-jajjara: unfading 49
172
Aji!a 137, 138
anger (kodha) 127
Ajivaka (way of life ) school 93
.ajjhattik4.vatanas: internal spheres 54 Atiguttara Nikdya 5, 35, 73
.akiiraparivitakka: reflection on peculia.. anitta 35, 56, 112, 116, 117, 118, 119,
139
rities 105
animals (tiryagyoni) 178J, 184, 203,
akusala: bad 50, 53,124
204, 205
akusa/a: (the) bad 15, 86,124,149
aniryatii: impermanence 197
o,kusalii dhammii 15
dkusala-miila(s): bad root(s) 59,64, aniyatardli: heap of the undetermined
187
175
.alagadda-upama: the simile of the afifiadillhika : (one who is) of another
view 92
water-snake 77
affflakhantika : (one who is)of another
iilambana : mental object 176, 194
belief 92
.alambanapratyaya: mental object as
afifiamaffffa : one another 32
condition 175
afJffarutika : pleased with another 92
all (,abba) 113
aftflathd 92
alms-gathering 32
aflflathdtariyaka: (one who is) of
.olternants 51,122
another teacher 92
alternation 51
afHfatrayoga : another discipline 92
alternative judgement(s) 122, 123, aflflenaifflalll pa/itarati: to evade the
124, 149, 151
question by asking another irrealternative propositions 122
levantly 74
.
.alternative syllogism (s) 123
another discipline (aflflatrayoga) 92
always (sabhada) 165, 167
antecedent (lhapand) 130, 133,157,
.amanasikdra : ina.ttention 11 I
171
dmantti: yes: it does not exist 159
anthill (vammika) 78
.a-mata: deathlessness 50
anuloma : normal 157, 207
anagatam addhanarh: in the future 151
anu'oma-pafitakarp : affirmative pentad
aniigiimi 187
156
.anagtimipratiparmaka 187
anumdna : inference 106
an-dlaya: non-attachment 50
anumanapafiha (in the Miln.) 106
analogies 76, 77,79, 80f, 141, 143, Anumdnasutta 106, 150
173
anuptlda : without attachment 2~
analysis according to Abkidkamma
anupajagghati: to laugh the questlOner
(abhidhamma-bhajaniya) 62
to scorn 74
analysis according to the teaching anupekkhati : to pore over 39
{suttanta-bhdjaniya} 62
Anuruddha 27
.
analytical answerer (vibkQjjaudda,- anusaya : tendency 23
'
in) 76
anussava : tradition 105
analytical questions and answers anuttanikata : obscure 43
(vibhajja-pafJhabyakaravas) 82, 83, anuuitdreti : to ponder on 39
86, 130
anuvicarita : pondered on 193
.anamatagga: beginning! css, without anuuitakketi : reflecting on 39
a known beginning 85, 171
anyathatva : difference 197
Ananda27, 34, 76,100,110,114,196 aparanta : the future 151
.dnantarikakammas : actions (that find tipo: water 17
retribution) immediately 152
appatcaya dhamma 50, 51
an-dsava: non-influence 49
appamafifia : boundlessness 54, 58,59,
.anasrava : without influence 182
62
Anathapil)c;iika 76
appaniivyappanll: complet~ focussing
anatman 206, 207
103
.an-attamana : not delighted III
appear to be capahle (bhavyarupatd)
anattan 35, 56, 66, 116, 117/,138,139,
105
155,210,211
appittha ~ wanting little 31
.
anekamsa-vyakara{liya-/Jafiha 83
appiya-sampayoga: contact With un.anekamsikti : indefinite 84
pleasant things 115
.
.anekarhsikd dhammd 83, 84
application of the mind (C8taso abhini.angas : types 4
ropana) 103
ltuk"
221
atirdjakumdra : the prince par excellence 22

atitam addhanam : in the past 151
dtman : ego 189, 190, 191], 196, 206
attabhdva: individual being 142
attachment (nivesana) 108
attachments (upddhis) 137
attack (abhikkamanti) 21
attainment of liberation from existence
(parinibbiina) 29
attalcata : self-made 142
altan : soul, ego, 65, 66, 85, 117, 139,
172
atta-pa/ildbha: acquisition of a personality 65
attha : meaning 28, 35
altha", vibhojali 35, 39, 41
atthapada : the meaning and words 72
Atthasalinf 15
attha-vddin : one who speaks what is.
significant 75
atthupaparikkhati: to investigate the
meaning 39
Aung, S. Z. 154
austere penance (sall'klla) 31
Avadanavadin 24
dvallanf mdyd : a trick of enticement
iirfahha-sthdna 196
ariipos : invisible object 54
104
aveccappasllda: complete confidence 59
aruppti : invisible object 59
iiryamargarigas 196
averSlon (dosa, dOla) 108, 175
lisa: hope 127
aversion (from worldly life) (nibbidd)
asaikfa : the learned 188, 189
84
asamalta palJFfa: incomparable under- avijjd: ignorance 59, 120, 137
standing 104
a-vtparindmadhammo : not having the
asamkhata: unactivated, Wlsynthesized
principle of change 112, 113
108
avivddamdna : without contention 28.
asamsagga : avoiding society 31
av;vala : unopened 43
asarilSkrta : unactivated, unsynthesized avoiding society (asarhsagga) 31
175, 177, 197
avyiikata: undecided, undetermined
auita : (the) unsweet 52, 128
15, 92, 125
a.savas : influences 80
avydkata: neither-good-nor-bad 53,.
as he speaks, so he acts: as he acts, so
86, 124, 125
he speaks (yathii-viidin taUha-karin, avyiikata-sa7nyutta 125
avyakata-vagga 125
yathii-kiJrin tathii-vadin) 75
dyatanas : spheres 11, 14, IS, 16,23,
as it really is (yathabh ata",) 131
ask for reasons (samanugahati) 73
40,48,53, 56, 58, 59,60,62[, 113,
AJokiivadiina 44, 57
116, 142, 143, 158, 167, 168, 169,
aspects of condition (Paccaydk/Jras) 35,
202
59, 120, 148, 211
Assaji 71, 98
B
associative fields 96, 101
atakkiJvacara: beyond logic 71, 92, 103, bad (akusala) 15,86, 149
105
bad (a-kusala) 50, 53, 124
ati 22
bad (du(,)) 100
atibrahmd: the supreme Brahma 22 bad root (akusala-miila) 59
atichatta", : the pre-eminent sunshade badly reasoned (duttakkita) 100, 101
22
bahiddkii katkam apaniimeti : to carry the
atideva : the peerless god 22
discussion away from the point 74atidhaja : the pre-eminent flag 22
biJhiriiyatanas: external spheres 54
atimdna : conceit 127
Bahusrutiya school 24, 66
application tetrad (upanayana-catukka",)

156, 161, 163, 164
approach to a question (ummagga) 72
approve after considering (mere)
opinion (dillhinijjhiinakkhanti) 105
Aprainoko : without question 63
a,aha : to be worthy of 146
arahanl : perfected one 66, 78, 124, 152
Arabant (arhat) 184
Arhantship 184
... artl(ladhamma: peacefulness 44
Iraffffaka : living in the forest 19, 25
DTkant : perfected one 66, 176
arbat 184, 185
arhatpratipannaka 184
arisen (samhhuta) 142
arising (sambhava) 139
Aristotelian logic 50
Aristotle 50, 123
Arittha 193
ar~andya98.101.102, 115, 122
Ariyapariy8sanasutta 30
ariya tut/hibhiiva : noble silence 31
ariyavamsas : noble lineages 55, 58, 59
dropaflii : disproof 157
arranging dhammas 41, 42
222
bahusuta : having much learning 43

balas: strengths 27, 44, 55, 57, 60, 61,
196
Bally, C. 96
Banerjee, A. C. 47
Bareau, A. 47
based on (upiiddya) 173
bases (dhatus) 11
bases of comprehension (palisambhi~
diis) 44,
bases of concentration (samiidhis)
44, 58
bases of power (iddhipdJas) 27,44,54,
59
bases of self~confidence (vIsdrqjjas) 44bases of self-possession (satipallhdnas)
16,27,44,54,55,57,59,111
bases of the doctrine (dhammapadas) 44
Basham, A. L. 93
basis (Prasthanq) 63
beat down the questioner (abhimaddati) 74
beaten out by one'S argumentations
(takkapariyahala) 97, 100, 101
beautiful (abhikkanta) 21
become contentious (kalahajiita) 73
become quarrelsome (bhat;l(lanajata) 73
beginningless (anamatagga) 85
behaviour toward a question (paRkasamudacara) 72
being (janta) 189
beings (sattas) 39, 171
being (sattva) 189. 194
Benares 32
benevolence (maitra) 177,194
best life (brahmacariya) 4,29,197
best treasure (dhanagga) 6
beyond logic (atakkavacara) 71. 72,
92, 103, 105
Bhadrayanikas (Bhadrayaniya) 155
bhagavant (Master, a title of the
Buddha) 29.
bha(l.r,lanajata: to become quarrelsome
73
bhanga : dissolution 142
Bharadvaja 98, 99
bhasa : language 5
bhava : existence, transmigration 14,
108, 128, 130
bhdvanii : development 59
bhavvarupatd : to appear to be capable
105
bhi (of abhi) 23
bhikkh,,(,) : monk (s) 18, 76
bhfita: truth 50
bh utattho : real 158
bhiita-viidin : one who speaks truth 75
bimba", : (human) being 142
birth (iiiti) 115,197
blame (abhiharati) 74
.\
Bloomfield, L. 102
bodhi : enlightenment 13
Bodhi-duma 14
bodhipakkhiyadhamma 4, 13, 58, 66
bodies of consciousness (viffffoQakayas)
54
bodies of perception (saffiidk4,Yas) 54
bodies of sensation (vedandkdyas) 54
bodies of thirst (ta~hdkdyas) 54
bodies of thought (safJcetandkdyas) 54
bodies of touch (phassakdyas) 54
bodily nutriment (kaba/inkdrahara) 144
body (kaya) 16,84
body-consclOusness (kdyauiillfti{la) 140
boil (gao<la) 118
bojjhangas : factors of enlightenment
23,27-8,44,55,57,59,60, 61
Bosanquet, B. 173
bottomless pit (piittila) 78
boundlessness (appamalffid) 54, 58,
59, 62
.
brahmacariya : best life 4, 29, 197
brahmacariyakathd : discussion of the
best life 154
Brahmajiilasutta 81, 85, 91, 97, 98
Brahman 78
brdhma~as : priests (brahmans) 15
brahman (s) 78, 80, 85, 98, 99, 192,
193, 196
Brahmanism 117
Brahmas 196
breakable (paloka) 118
breath (vittliara) 35
buddha 152
.~;.
Buddha: Perfected One 3, 7 (-'5 way
of thinking), 13f, 78 (-'5 preaching), 103 (-'s line of argument),
107 (-'8 way of thinking), 114f.
211 (-'s way of thinking)
BuddluzhhamisiitraJdstra 86
Buddhadatta, A. P. 48
Duddhadeva 23
Buddhaghosa 14. (in the 5th century),
21, 22, 32, 36, 63, 89
Buddharak~ita 23
Buddha's line of argument 144, 151
Buddhavarman 23
Buddhist community (sangha) 25,26
bundle of reeds (nalakal api) 79
Burma 5
.
b~afljana : letter 28
...
ca:ifl49
cakkhu : eye 16
cakkhusamphassa : eye-contact 143
cakkhuviflffdtla: eye-consciousness 140
calm (upasama) 84
Cambodia 5
223
Index
Candimaputta 76
Carnap. R. 95
-carry the discussion away from the
point (hahidtfhil katham apan4m,ti)
74
.
collections (nikayas) 5
come to be (samuppanna) 142
come to increase (vuddhiya) 21
come to one-pointedness (samtidhiyati)
,eoteglWical 50
-categorical judgement 121
-categorical proposition (5) 116
-categorical syllogism(s) 116,121,123
.catukka: tetrad(s) 156, 165
cotukkanO:.'JIo 168
-eatuJckanaya-sorpsandanarp : collating by
the tetrad scheme 157
.catufkoli: tetralemma, fourfold for.
mulation 92 .
.
-causation 65
-cause (lutus) 64, 142, 153, 176
cause as condition (hetuprotyaya) 175
-cease (nirujjhati) 142
cease (uparuj;hati) 138
-cessation (ni,odha) 13,31,84, 138
cessation of groups of unhappiness
common knowledge (sammutiMrza) 45

comparison (opamma) 77
comparison (opamma-stUfUandanatp)
(dukkhakkhandhanirodha) 152
-cessation of unhappiness 116
celonii : 'volition 199
-cetaso ahhiniropana: the application
of the mind 103
Ceylon 5
Chachakkasutta 54
cl1afffire (thusaggi) 140
.chanda : will 127, 136
Ch'ang ah hsien (Dirgha Agama) 5
Channagarikas ($ar;magarika) 155
chapters (skandhas) 174
characteristics (lakkhavas) 55
.characteristics (lak/a{IllS) 201
<:haracteristics (salakkhatlas) 21J, 24,
36
charity (dana) 31
-childish talk (tiracchanakatka) 29
Chinese Tripilaka 7, 86
chip-fire (sakalikaggi) 140
<Jhomsky, N. 106
Chrysippus 123
Chu Fu-nien 55
Chung ah hsien (Madhyama Agama) 5
Chu 1'0 chiaahhszFn (K/ud,aka Agama)5
Citta Hatthisariputta 32
cittas: thoughts 17,61,65,132,175,
176
cittardsuddhatta : the purity of thought
29
darification of terms (vac4nasodhanarp)
157, 170
-classes (rdJis) 177,187
clear (or pure) expression (parisuddha
vokara) 39
.cognized (vijlldta) 193
-collating by the tetrad scheme (catukkanaya-smpsandanatp) 157
132
156
compassion (karutJd) 3, 111
complete confidence (avlccappasiida)
59
complete focussing (appandvyappand)
103
compound judgement 119

compound propositions 122, 136, 168
comprehensions (patisambhidiis) 58,
59, 63
concealing (sammuti) 39
conceit (atimana) 127
concentration (yoga) 19, 25
concentration of mind (samiidhi) 31,
62
concept (paffnatti) 78, 173

conclusion of one's own (sayampaJibhana) 97
.
conclusion tetrad (niggamana-catukka'!') 156, 164
conditions (paccayas, pratyayas) 64,
153, 176
conditional statements 158
conditional (tense) (kii14tipatti) 149
conditioned by a sentient body is
consciousness (narnariipapaccaya vii!lId.am) 79
conditioned by consciousness is a
sentient body (viffMtzaPaccaya niimarup"",) 79
conjoined (samyukta) 175
conscious (sampajana) 111
consciousness (vijfJana 66, 176, 177~
195.f.
consciousness (vinffdtla) 17, 56, 65,
108, 138, 143

consequent (piipanii) 130, J33, 157,
172
contact (phassa) 128
contact (sparJa) 198
contentions (kalahas) 127, 136
contentment (santulthi) 31
contradictory concept 53
contradictory terms 49, 50, 52
contraposition 130, 160
contrary concept 49
contrary terms 52
controversial topics 48
conversation (sakacchd) 31
converse 130, 160
conversion 170
corruption (upakJciusa) 23
224
Abhidlwmma Philosophy
counter-question 84
couplets (dukaS) 48J, 105, 124
cou"., (gael,) 171, 178/
cow-dt1ng-fire (gomayaggi) 140
creator 13
criticize (samanubhdsati) 7g
cross-examine (samanugdhati) 73
cro!is-question (samanuyunjati) 73
Cil/ahatthipadopamasutta 3D, 75
Cula-Mdlunkyasultd 42, 91
Cil/aniddesa 102
cUjantaraduka: the short intermediate
set of couplets 49
Cit/asaccakasutta 153
Cit/asihaniidasutta 78
Cu/avedallasutta 54, 153
custom (dhamma) 11
D
dana: charity 31
DasabhiimivibM,asdstra 86
DasuttarlUutta 35, 41, 54

dead (Pitry.,i;aya) 178, 180/
dear things (pijas) 127
death (mara) 142
death (maralUl) 115
deathlessness (a-mata) 50
deceptive appearance (maya) 158
decision (vinicchaya} 127, 136
deductive reasoning 143
Deer Park 32
defilements (kilesas) 15,60,64, 142
defilements (kldas) 66
defined (paricchinna) 21
defining (pmicchinnii) 21
definite (ekamsikii) 84
definition-judgement-discussion (lakkhatWyuttikathii) 157, 170
definition of dhammas (defining
dhammas) 36, 39, 40, 42
delight (pamujja) 132
delighted (sampahamsita) 30
delight in dhamma (dhammakdma) 26
delusion (moha) 108, 175
demerit (adhamma) 15
denomination (smpkhii) 78
denying the antecedent 172
denying the consequent 1n
dependent origination (paticcasamup~
pMas) 11, 13, 14, 17, 31,35,54,
58, 85,98/,106,115, 132J, 151, 210
depression (domanassa) 97
designation (adhivacana) 78
desire (tariM) 80, 115, 137
desire as birth (tarz}ui;atika) 146
desire as origination (tatzhiisamudaya)
146
desire as provenance (tarthapabhava)
146
desire as source (tatzhiiniddfla) 146

detennination (adhimutti) 23
devii : gods 178, 183
Devas 196
Devasannan 47
development (bhdvanii) 59
deve~opment of concentration (samddhtbhdvanti) 44
DhantTfla 9, 19, 201
dhamma : discourse 26, 38, 74
dhammas: doctrines, teachings 3, 7,.
11, 12, 13, 14, 22J, 32, 34, 41/.
56,60,71J, 82J, 92, 103, 104, Ill.
139, 103
dhammas : principles 4,7,11,12, 16!"
20,22,27,31,34,40; 41, 53, 55,
57, 60J, 67, 98, 124, 140, 210
dhammas (theoretical doctrines) 14,.
60, 63, 64
.
dhamma : truth 12, 13, 71, 72, 84, 99,
102, 104J, 105, 210
dhamma : nature 10
dhamma: phenomenon, maintaining,.
element, custom or justice 11
dhamma: quality, predicate (as a_
logical term) 11
dhamma : virtue 11
dhamma : merit 15
dhamma : moral consciousness 15
dhamma : morality 15
dhamma : non-sensuous object 16
dhamma : mental object, state of mind,.
idea 16
dhamma : mind-object 16
dhammacakkhu : the eye of truth 131,.
211
dhammadhara : versed in the doctrine
43
dhammahadIJya : heart of the teaching
60, 63
dhammakiima : delight in dhamma 26
dhammakatha : talk on dectrine 28j, 208
dhammakkhandas :. groups of principles
45, 54
dhammatp vibha;ati: to divide dhamma (s)35, 39, 41
dhammapadas : bases of the doctrine 44dhammasakacchii 31
dhammii sama~ena vutM: principles de_
clared by the recluse 128
dhammasarigQ{1i: enumeration of prin~
ciples 45
Dhammasarigavi (Enumeration of Principles) 17, 40, 47, 48f, 53,124,126,
176
dhammatakka : logic 7
dhammatakka : reasoning based on the
truth 7, 94, 101, 102, 103, 106,
1lS, 120
225
Index
dhamma-vlidin : one who speaks according to the doctrine 75
Dhammuttariyas (Dharmottariya)
155
dhanagga : best treasure 6
dhanas : treasures 55
dlumna II
dharmas: principles 175, 188, 193,
194, 196, 199, 200, 201, 203, 206,
207
dharma: truth 197
DhaTmagupta (ka) school 5, 24f,
47, 54
Dharmaguptaka text 5
Dharmagupta Vin. 9
DMrmaskandha 42, 471, 54, 58, 59,
60, 61, 62 .
DhatukatM 47, 48J, 64
DMtukiiya 47, 63, 64
dhatus: bases 11
dhlitus : elements 11, 14, 17, 23, 48f,
53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 60!, 142. 158,
168,169,176,201,206
dhdtu saThyutta 56
dhr: to hold, to bear, to wear, to

have, to support, etc. 10
dialectic method of discussion 207
dialogues (sutlas) 7, 45, 76, 79, 127
dialogue (suttanta) 40
dibba-cakkhu : divine eye 132
difference (arryathatvli) 197
differentiation (papancita) 97
difficult (du(,)) 100,101
difficult to "see (duddasa) 92
difficult to understand (duranubodhi)
92
diffused (visala) 38
Dighanakha 107, 114
Dfgha Nika"ja 5, 35
Dignaga 94, 95
direct relation 131, 136
Dirgha Agama (Ch'ang ok_hsien) 5, 35,
90, 91
,disadvantage (akita) 149
discerned (vidita) 152
discerning person (viflflil purisa) 107
discipline j 7
discipline(vinaya) 9, 15,26,41
Discipline 20
discourse(dhamma) 26, 38, 74
discourses 17, 38, 103
discoverer 13
discussing (sakacca) 31, 72
discussion of the best life (brahmaca-o
,;YakatM) 154
discussion of 'everything exists' (salJ..
bamattkftikatka) 154
discussion of the 'person' (puggala..
katM) 193, 154J, 172, 207
discussion of renouncing 0'ahatikatha)
154
discussions (kathtis) 18, 29, 31, 37,
63, 66, 74
disease (roga) 118
dispassion (viraga) 84
dispel (pativinodeti) 43
disproof (aropa1)a) 157
disputes (viuadas) 107, 127, 136
dissolution (bhaitga) 142
distinguish (vijildnati) 202
distinguished (abhifUtatii) 21
distinguished (paricchinna) 21
distinguishing (paricchinn4) 21
dillha ~ seen 152
dillkigata : groundless view 110
di1lhinijjhiinakkkanti : to approve after
considering (mere) opinion 105
dinkis : opinions, views 85, 97
dillhillhiina: a tenet of speculative
philosophy 110
dillhilJisuddhatta : purity of view 29
diverse doubtful points of doctrine
(kankhdlln4niya dhamma) 43
divtde (vibha;ati) 35
divine eye (dibba-cakkhu) 132
division (vibho.riga) 35
doctrinal topics (mdtikd) 4, 45, 53~
64, 126, 138

Doctrine 20
doctrines(dhammas) 3, 7, II/, 26,27.
32,34,38, 41,56, 60, 71, 82,92,
103, III
domo.nassa: depression 97
dominant (adhipati) 176
d05a : aversion 108
dO$a : aversion 175
double negative(s) 109, 126, 151,210'
doubt (kaIlkM) 145
."
Dpvs, 9
:'
dUla : seen 193
duddaso' : difficult to see 92
dukas: couplets 4a, 49, 51, 53, 67.
105, 124
duka-Matikas 50, 51
.
dUkkha: unhappiness, pain 13, 35,.
52,56,97, 112, 116, 117J, 139
dukkhakkhandhanirodha: the cessation
of groups of unhappiness 152
dukkhakkhandhasamudaya: the origination of groups of unhappiness 152
dukkha vedand : unhappy feeling 52,
78
duppaiHfa : weak in understanding 72
duppatinissaggr: one who cannot abstain from something 150
dunniggaha: faulty refutation 161
du(r) (prefix): ill, bad, difficult, unpleasant, etc, 100, 101
duranubodha: difficult to understand 92,
"
226
Abhidhllmma Philosophy
duttakkita : badly reasoned 100, 101
uamination of supernormal power
dvadasa paticcasamuppiidan~as : twelvelinked chain of dependent origina..

tion 14, 24
dyadic relations 132
exceeding delight (uliro;amujja) 26

excellence (adhika} 21
excellent (ahhika) 21
(abhinfllJnuycg,) 157
excellent (Patlita) 92
exclusive sense
ear (so"') 16
ear-consciousness (sotaviilMtw) 140
earth (pa thavE) 11
easy (SI..-: prefix) 100, 101
ego (dtman) 189, 196f, 206
ego (atta.) 56(, 66, 146
eight factors orthe way 4, 35, 102
eightfold way 116
.
eighty-nine dltas 17
.ekamsa 85
~kamsa-pafi!wb'Vakarapa
62, 83, 86
~kamsavadc.!
one-sided answerer 76
~kamsa-vyiikara!1!ya-pafthll- 8S
ekathsiktl : definite 84
ekamsika dhamma 83, 84
Ekottara Agama (Yang chfleh to 10 ah

hsien) 5, 35
ekottaras : one tip 58
elder monks (theTa bhikkkfl) 33

clement (dhamma) 11
elements (dhiitlJs) 11,46,54,58, 59,
142
dephant's footprint (hattkipada) 30,
BO
eminent (abhikkanta) 22
emphatic affirmative thinking 209
enlightemnent (booki) 31 13, 23. 29,
31,42,71,73,80, 10" 10Bf
enlightenment (sambodhi) 84Enumeration of Principles 17

enumeration of principles (dhamma.sangatlf) 45
epithets of the Buddha 75
equivocal answers 74, 75
eternal (sassata) 85
eternalists (sassatavddas) 85
evade the Question by asking another
irrelevantly (aflllenanRaqa pa-,icorati)
74
~vam me suttam :
thus I have heard 4

everyday language 39
everything (sahba) 56, U3, 117, 143
~erywhel'e (sabbattha) 165, 167
evil bad principles (Piipakakusoladhammas) 150
examination of concepts (pailMttllnllyogo) 157, 170
examination of derivative concepts
(upad<lpa""'''nuy,g.) 157, 171
examination of future courses (gati.
sn'O'ago) 157
51
exist (upaklbbhati) 158

existence (bhava) 14, 128
e!(istential quantification }67

expanded metaphor (adhivacana) 78
expression (nirutti) 78
expression (savyanjana)38
expression of emphatiC affirmation
114
expression of passivity 114, 209
extended simile 17
external spheres (Mhirayatanas) 54
extinction (nibbiina) 14,49
extreme of eternalism (!a.svlda-anta)
192
ey< (cakkh,,) 16
eye-consciousness (cakkhuviflifa{la) 140,
143
eye...contact (ctJ!ckhwamphassa) 143
eye of the tathag4t4 (samantacalckhu) 84
eye of truth (dhmnmacakkhll) 131, 211
eye-sphere 152
F
factors of enlightenment (boJ;"hangas)
23,27-28,44, 55,57,59,182
factor of Obtaining the stream : soldpaltiyanga 59
factors of the way (maggangas) 28, 44,.
55, 57
faculties (intirfyas) 16, 27, 44, 55, 57,
58, 59, 65, 168, 182

fail (samsidati) 32
fall into dispute (vivadiipanna) 73
falsity 50
falsity (a-bhtita) 50
falsity (mosavajja) 128
faulty refutation (dunniggaka) 161
feelings (vedanas) 52, -61,143,189
feeling that is neither unhappy nor
happy (adulekhama",kha vedana) 52
fetter (gantha) 23
....
figurative analogY 81
figurative expressions 78
figures of speech _86
final extinction (parinibbana) 3find one's strength (nissayasampanna)
43
fine (sulehuma) 144
fire 143
firm resolve (adhimutti) 23
first Buddhist council 9
First Schism 46
227
Index
first section of ethical goodness (kal~
yiifl4VaggO palhamo) 157
five attachment groups (p4Ikupa~
nakklwndhd) 115
five division Vinaya of the MahiSasaka
school (thirty flUcicles) 6
five faculties 4
five galis 177, 178
five khandMs, 17,61,80, 113, 116, U3
five strengths 4
flame (oed) 78
followed by one's investigation (uimam ..
.stlnuccrita) 97, 100, 101
food (aMra) 23
footprints (padajdtas) 80
forces (sankhara) 56, 65, 143
forest (aToMia) 19, 25
four bases of power 4
four bases
ofself~pouession
4, 61
fourfold formulatton (catu$ko/i) 7, 92

fourfold truth 98, 106, 115, 124four noble truths 80
four panhabyGkarar:4s 82
foul" right exertion 4
Four Truths 3, 13,80
free from fear (abkaya) 196
freedom (vimokkha) 24
from the arising of this., this arises
(imassuPPdda idam uppajjati) 14, 119
from the cessation of a sentient body
is the cessation of consciousness
(niimarilpanirod)zd viflflii(lanirodho) 79
from the cessation of consciousness is
the cessation of a sentient body
(viflftdttanirodhd namart'ipanirodho) 79
from the cessation of this, this ceases
(imassa nirodha idam nirujjhati) 14,
garu/a': boil 118

gandha: odour 16
ganthas : fetters 23, 24
g".hd 18
Gatha 9
gatianuyogo: examination of future
courses 157
galis: courses 177, 178,203, 204, 205/.
Geiger, M. and W. 12, 19
Geiger, W. 5
glneralized conditional 117
generated by the law of causation
(pa#ccasamuppanna) 124Geyya 9
gM.R4: nose 16
ghanaviflfldfla : nose-consciousness 140
Ghosa 24, 36
Gnoli, R. 88
gods (d"d) 178, 183
go forward (pavattati) 32
gomayaggi : cow-dung-fire 140
good (k ....l.) 15, 50, 53, 86, 124
good (su-: prefix) 100, 101
good prinCiples (kusaladhamm4) 23
good q uali ty 17
good root (kUJala-mala) 59
Gosiilga sal-wood 27, 32
gossip about village-affairs (gdma~
fruits of striverhood
(sdmmalJllapMlas) 44, 58
fulfilment (nill/za) 127
full of peace (kiema) 196
Fu-to-yeh-she 55
(in the) futuTe (andgatam addhiinnm)
151
future (aparanta) 151
kalhd) 29
Gotama 30, 91, 92, 103, 104
grasping (updddnagata) 97
grass-fire (/iraoggi) 140
great elements (maMbhiUaJ) 78
great existents (mahAbhutas) 17, 59
great king <abhird;d} 21
great understanding (maMpaillJd) 104greed (lobha) 127, 175
griefs (sokas) 97, 127
gross (o/ama) 144
groundless view (ditthigata) 110
groups (khandhas) 11,48,54,58,59/
groups (skandhas) 194,207
groups of principles (dhammakkhand.,) 45, 54
Gulissani 25
Gulissattisutta 25
giima : village 173

gama-kathii: gossip about villageaffairs 29
gambhfTa : profound 24, 27, 29, 92
gamhhira ahhidhamma 29, 34
gambhira gambhira pafthii : very profound questions 29
gambhiTa "aiM: profound understanding 104
gamika : villager 173
gamma - vulgar 29
hall for debating on different views

(samayappavddaJca) 73
hance .. tena .. : if .. then .. 158
handed down by tradition (dgalS ..
gama) 43
happiness (sukha) 52, III
happy feeling (sukha v,danli) 52
119
Hare, E. M. 20
Harivarman 66
harvest ofbeHef (saddhdpadtlna) 26
hatthipada: elephant's footprint 80
226
.of
luztthipada-upama: the simile'

the
,
elephant's footpriI;lt 77
.:". Hatthisariputta 33
having much learning (bahussuta) 43
having the meaning drawn Qut
(n"attM) 40
having the meaning requiring to be
.drawn out (nl')'yattha) 40
having understand (paflMvant) 72
heap of the undetermined (antyat-rMi) 187
heaps (raUs) 177, 187
heard (iruta) 193
heat ('ej') 17
heart of the teaching (dhammahadaya)
60, 63
Hemaka 108
hetupratyaya : cause as condition 175

hetus : causes 64,142, 153, 176
hetuvidyd: logic, logical reasons 94
highest (uttamalfha) 138
highest doctrine (uttama-dhamma) 22
kina: low 29
history (itikira) 105

hUa: advantage 149
hope (lisa) 127
Horner, I. B. 20
Hsuan-chuang 23
human beings (manu!)Id) 178, 180f
hurt (dgha) 118
hyperbole 76
hypothetical judgements 116, 118,
119, 121, 133!, 149, 151
hypothetical statements 121, 122,
150f, 170
hypothetical syllogisms 122, 123, 126
1
ieeM : 'wish 128
ieeM vueeati tatlha: wish is called
thirst 137
idom eva saeearp mogham aRtJa1]'l: this
alone is the truth, any other view
is false 107, 126
iddhipadas: bases of power 27, 44,
54,57,59,60,61
if (co) 149
if... then ... (hance ... lena ) 158
if... then ... (sace .. tena . ) 150
ignorance (avvja) 53, 80,120,137,147
ill (du(r)) 100, 101
imagination (mafHiita) 97
imasmim asli idarp na lwei : this not
being; this is "not 14, 119
imasmitp sati idatp hoti : this being; this
is 14, 119
imassuppada idam uppajjati : from the
arising of this, this arises 14, 119
imassa nirodhii idarp nirujjhati : from the
cessation of this, this ceases 14, 119

immorality (adhamma) 15
impermanence (aniryatd) 197
in agreement (sammodamtlna) 28
inattention (amanasikara) 111
in brief (sankhitten-a) 34
incited (samutt~jita) 30
Inclusion and conjunction (SarpgrahasaTfI:yoga) 63
inclusive sense 51
incomparable understanding (asamatta panna) 104
.
increase (vuddhi) 21, 24
indeclinable particles (nipatas) 49,.
52, 108, 115

indefinite anekamsikd) 84
in detail ~vttthdrena) 34
indirect relation 131
individual being (attabhiiva) 142
indriyas: faculties 16, 27,35,44,55,
57!. 60, 61, 63, 65, 158, 168, 169,
196
inductive arguments 141
in everything (sabbesu) 165, 167
inference (anumana) 79, 106, 144
inferring for oneself 95
inferring for others 95
influences (asavas) 80
in harmony (samagga) 28
in it<! true nature (yatMbhiitaT{l) 131
~inquire (paripucehati) 43
insight 27
insight (abhijftii) 197
insight (abhifHla) 58, 84
insight (abhisamLI'Va) 44
insight (vipassanii) 102
instructed (sandassita) 30
intelligent persons (viliRii purisa) 77
intelligible to the wise {pa'(l4itaveda.1.
nfYa) 92
intention (abhinfhdra) 72
intention (sarhkappa) 103
internal spheres (ajjhattikiiyatanas) 54
interrogation (panhdpueeha) 62
in the same way (tato) 158
,
investigating the meaning (atthupapaikkhati) 39
investigator (vfmamraka) 97, 99, 100
invisible object (arfipas) 54
invisible object (aruppii) 59
Isipatana 32
itikira : history 105
IUvuttaka 9
J
Jahatikathii : discussion of renouncing
154
J ambukkhiidaka 76
Jantu : being 189, 191, 193, 206
229
Index
J<lJ;1ussoQi .30
jaTa : old age 115
Jd.aka 9
jati: birth 115, 197

JayatiIleke. K. N. 83
jhtInas : meditations 14, 54, 55, 58,
59, 60, 62
jfva! the life of principle J89, 191,
193, 206
jivha : tongue 16
jivlllivifllJo!la: tongue-consciousness
140
:JMnaprasthana 47
joy (piimujja) 18
joy (piti) 132
judgement of (the opponent's)
ment (vadayutti) 170
jugglar (m4Ytivin) 104
just as (seyyathd) 140
just as if (seyyathlipi) 79
justice (dhamma) 11
stat~
K
kaba/iflkdraluira: bodily nutriment 144
Kaccayana 27
Kajiyama, Y. 94
kakaca-upama: the simile of the saw
77
kalahajiita: to become contentious 73
kalahas: contentions 127, 136
Kalahavivadasutta : 127, 136, 153
kdltitipatti : conditional (tense) 149

kala-vadin: one who speaks at the
proper time 75
Ir:alydf/avaggo pa/hamo : the first section
of ethical goodness 157

kammas : actions 59, 63, 64
kankhti : doubt 145
kankhtitthaniya dhamma: diverse doubtful points of doctrine 43
karmans: 139, 177, 189, 190, 191,
192, 193; 205
karullii : compassion 3
Kasibhtiradvtijasutta 104
Kassapa 27
Kasyapiya school 5
/callhaggi: stick-fire 14:0
katharpkathd: uncertainty 128
kathds : discussions 18, 28, 31, 37,63,
66
Kathdvatthu (Ground for Discussion)
7, 47, 48, 65, 66, 122, 126, 138,
153ff, 165, 172, 174,205,208
Kiityayaniputta 47
kaya : body 16, 61
kdydnupassana: observing the body 116
kayaviiffUitul : body-consciousness 140
kehici : some 170
Ken-pen-shuo-i-ch' ieh-yu-pu.-p' i-nai-yeh of

the Miilasarvastivada school (fifty
fascicles) 6, 43
khalitatp ganhdti : to catch the questioner up when he falters 74
Khando-chapter 113
khandhaka 43
khandhas: aggregates, groups 11,14,
15, 17,23,40,48,53,54, 56, 60,
61, 62, 63, 64, 113, 158, 167, 168,
169
Khandhakas 43
khandha samyutta 56
khayadhamma : the principle of deg...
truction 124
:'.
Khuddaka Nikiiya 5, 18 "","
Khuddaka Pi/aka 18
khuddakavatthu : minor ground 59, 60
kilesas: defilements 15, 24, 60, 64,
108, 142
Kimura, T. 63
Kin'isutta 27
/cleJas : defilements 66
knowledge and in!li~ht of liberation
(vimuttilldfladassana 31
knowledges (Jldpas) 4, 59, 63
known (Sii'a) 152
kodna : anger 127
Kokanuda 110
kopaJl ca dosaJl co appaccayall co pdtukaroti : to display ill-temper, aversion and mistrust 74
Kosal. 29
Kosambiyasutta 73
kfema : full of peace 196
Kiudraka (Ghu
chia
hsiln) 5
k..,ala : (the) good 15, 50, 53, 86, 124
"0
an
k..,ald ( dhammd ) I 5
kusaladhammd : good principles 23

kusala-mUla: good root, root of the
good 59, 64
Kusinara 55
Kv.-Gommentary 158, 166
L
lakkhatzas : characteristics 55
lakkharulyuttikathd ': definition-judgement-discussion 157, 170
iakia(Ul : characteristic 201
lamentation (parideva) 97 J 127
Lamotte, E. 155
language (bhiisa) 5
la/ukitd-upamd : the simile of the quail
78
lay disciple (upasaka) 59
leading-question 73
learned (aJaik;a) 188
learner (Jaikja) 188
230
learning (sskha) 78
letter (byaftjana) 28, 34
liberation (vimutti) 31
liberation from elements (nissartztU.l~
dhatus) 55
liberation from existence (nibbdtu) 84
liberation from spheres (vimuUayatanas) 55
Licchavi 103
life of principle (jiua) 189
Limky, L. 106
lion's roar (sihaniida) 78
list of topics 45
little town (nigama) 30
l()bha: greed 127, 175
logic (dhammatakka) 7
logic (fIaya) 94, 95
logic (takka) 94,95, 105
logic or logical reasons (hetuvidya)
94
logical analogy 81
logical arguments 66
logical deductions 116
logical techniques 66, 71, 174, 207,
MahasaI!lghika Yin. 9
Mahasihanddasutta 78
Mahatatthiisankhayasutta 139, 144, lSI.
152, 153
mahiivagga (of the S.) 60
1vlahiivedallasutta 54, 65, 153
Mahaviyuhasutta 107
Mahayana 6
MahiSasaka school 6, 24
MahiSasaka Vin. 9
maintaining (dhamma) 11
maitra : benevolence 177, 194
maitrii-samapriipti 194
MajJhima Nikaya 5, 91, 102, 106
make clear (uUtlni karoti) 43
Malurikyaputta 42
mamatta: selfishness 128
maTflsacakkhu : physical eye 84
man (puggala) 84, 155, 166/
man (puru,a) 189,191//
man (po~a) 189, 191ff
mana: pride 127
mav.alamdia : round hall 32
maiUlita : imagination 97
mano: mind 16
208 .
manosaftcetanahtira : nutriment of volilogical traps 125, 152
tion of the mind 144
logic of propositions 134
logic of relations 132
manovifi.natta: mental consciousness,
mind-consciousness 65, 140
laka (universe, world) 39, 84, 85
lokiya dhamma; lQkuttara dhamma ~ Mantat)iputta 29
pnnciples that are mundane: supra~ manuiya : human beings 178, 18011
mundane 49
mara: death 142
mara{!a : death 115
lord of men (oiJhirdjd) 21
low (h;na) 29
M',a(,) 142,196
marici : mirage 158
marked (abhilakkhita) 21
M
Master (bhagavant) 29, 108
macchara : stringiness 127
mata : sensed 193
Madhyama Agama (Chung ah hsien) 5, mdtikddhara : versed in the doctrinal
90
topics 43
magga : the way 13, 59, 60
Mdtika PiJaka 4
maggangas : factors of the way 28, 44, matikt'Js.: doctrinal topics, matrix 4,
55, 60, 61
42,44.45,48,55,58,66,126
maggavagga 61
Miitikii(s) 6, 7,42,431,50,51,53,
Mahabhadanta 24, 36
55, 58, 67, 124, 168
mahiibh utas : great existents (elements) Matilal,-B. K. 106, 173
17, 59, 78
Ma trk ii44
matrix 42
Mahiigosingasutta 26, 27
matter (rflPa as physical principles)
Maha-Kaccana 38
14, 16, 56, 143, 167, 173
Mahakassapa 9
Maudga1yayana47, 65,175,176,207
MahakauHhila 47
maya: deceptive appearance 158
Mahakotthita 33, 65, 76
mdyavin : juggler 104
Mahiinidiinasutta 136
Mahiiniddesa 137
Mayeda, E. 4
meaning (auha) 28, 35
makd pafHWi : great understanding 104
Mahaparinibbiinasutta 3, 43, 55, 58, meaning (sattha) 38
meaning and words (atthapada) 72
114
meditations (jhilnas) 14, 54, 58, 59,
Makaparinirviittasfitra 86
MahaprajnapiiramitopadeJa 86
62
Mehrheitsurteil 119
Mahasrupghika school 6, 44
231
Index
mental classes 17
mental concentration (pantasomlJdJii)
44
naivaiaik~aniiJaik~a
188, 189
Nakula 76
mental consciousness (manovfilMlIa) 65

mental dhammas 17, 62, 64
mental object (dlambana) 176, 194
mental object as condition (alambanapratyaya) 175
merit (dhamma) 15,17
Metagu 137
metaphor 78
metaphysical subjects 85, 88, 90, 91,
125
methods of answering questions (pailhabyakaratuzs) 7, 76, 871, 107, 153
method of agreement 81, 142, 173
metonymy 76
Mettagu 108
micchii : wrong 158
Milindapaflha 83, 84, 90. 91, 106
Milindapailha- Tikd 84
mind (mano) 16
'mind-consciousness (manovi1hltttlo) 140
mindful (sata) III
minor ground (khuddakavatthu) 60
minute (sukhuma) 144
mirage (marici) 158

misery (upayasa) 97
Misra, G. S. P. 101
mithYiitvaniyataraJi 187
mixed hypothetical syllogism 133,
148,1501, 171, 172,173,206
modus ponens: a mixed hypothetical
syllogism affirmative 133
modus tollens: a mixed hypothetical
syllogism negative 133
modern logic 113, 132, 141
MoggalHina 27, 98, 150
mogha : useless 110
moha : delusion 108 175
Mohavicchedanf 48, '57, 66
Mo-Iw-seng-ckik-lu of the Mahasamghika school (forty fascicles) 6,
43-44
moisture (sineka) 142
Mok~akaragupta 94
monks (bhikkhu;) 18, 76JJ, 145, 1481,
171, 196
moral consciousness (dhamma) 15
morality (dhamma) 15, 17
moral practice (sila) 31
mosavajja : falsity 128
MUlasarvastivada Pi/aka 6
Miilasarvastivada school 6, 43, 57/
Miilasarvastivada Vinaya 44
Miilasarvastiva.din 88
N
Ita
na an.,atlamana III
ahaQJ na janilmi 110
nalakal upf : the bundle of reeds 79

ntima : sentience 14, 16
na,.rupa : sentient body 16, 128. 138
niimariipanirodhii vififliirzanirodho : from
the cessation of sentient body is the.
cessation of consciousness 79
namariipapaccayii viflfiiillam: conditioned.
by a sentient body is consciousness
79
Mrzas : knowledges 24, 59, 63, 64
nandi : pleasure 108
nata! known 152
nature (dhamma) 10
1~.'1"
n'atthasamhita: not connected with the
meaning 84
navanga sdsanas : nine types of scripture 4, 9
naya ; schemes 105
IJdya : logic 94, 95
negation 491, 94, 95, 173
negative expression 49
negative judgement 173
negative prefixes 49, 50, 53
negative statements 173
negative thinking 112, 210, 211
negative way of thinking 209
neither-good-nor-bad (avyakala) 53
86, ;'24
neither unhappiness nor happiness
(adukkhamasukha) 52
nekkhammasankappa: self-abnegation
31
neutral 52
neyyatha: having the meaning requiring to be drawn out 40
nibbiina : extinction 14, 23, 24, 49, 84,
108
nibbedhika panna : penetrating under.
standing 104
nibbida : aversion (from worldly life)
84
nidiina : source 153
nigama : little town 30
Nigat)tha Nathaputta 41
NigaQ.thas 41
niggaha : refutation 156
niggaha-catukkaJP: refutation tetrad
156
niggamana -catukkatp: conclusion tetrad
181
Nikayas: collections Sf, 12 lSI, 22,
25, 29, 31,33, 361, 42, 44, 451,
53, 54, 55, 57, 61, 62, 67, 72, 73,
74, 7e, 81, 82, 83,86!. 90, 91f,
106,108, 112JJ, 130,1351, 143,152,
153JJ,172, 173ff, 209
232
Abhidhamma Phiwsoplfy
nipatas : indeclinable particles 49, 52,

108, 110, 115
nipu(lQ : subtle 92
niraya: purgatory
181, 205, 206
177, 178J,
nirodha: cessation 13, 31, 84,
180,
138.
nirodhadhamma: the principle of cessation 124

niTujjhati : to cease 142
nirutti : expression 78
nirVtlllQ 197
nis-papai1ca: non-differentiation 49
nissara1;ladhatus: liberation from elements 55
1Iir. asamp4llna: to find one's strength
nitattha : having the meaning drawn

out 40
nillha : fulfilment 127
nivaravas : obstacles 132
nivesana : attachment lOB

no a-manasikiira 110, III
noble lineages (arb'avamsas) 55,58,59

noble silence (oriJa turzhibhava) 31
noble truths 24,
non-attachment (an-tilaya) 50
non-customary (adhamma-raga) 15
non-differentiati9n (nis-papafica) 49
non-ego 56, 66, 109, 138, 15.'
non-existence (vibhava) 128
n.on-influence (an-iisava) 49
non-sensuous object (dhamma) 16
n.on-soul 138, 146
normal (anuloma) 157,207
nose . (ghiina) 16 ,
nose-consciousne:;s (ghanaviflfliipa) 140
not connected with the meaning (n'atthasamhita) 84
not delighted. (an-attamana) 111
not having the principle of change
(a-viparindmadhammo) 112
nun 142
nutrime.nt (iihara) 142, 146
nutriment of contact (phassiihiira) 144
nutriment .of consciousness (viftniiQiiMra) 144
nutriment of volition of the mind
(marwsaflcetaniihiira) 144
Nyanatiloka 16,47,154
no
o
<>bject (visaya) 16
.objects (of the senses) 57
-old age (jara) 115
-obscure (atJuttiinikata) 43
_
.observing the body (kiiyanupassanii) 116
-obstacles (nivartl{las) 132
<>htained (prap'a) 193
<>dour (gandha) 16
olarika : gross, solid 144

one another (aftftamai'Hia) 32
one-sided answerer (ekamsaviida) 76
one up (ekottaros) 58
one who cannot abstain from something (duppali'lissaggf) 150
one who grasps tightly (iidhanagiihi)
150
one who is attached to this (mundane)
life (sanditthipariimiisi) 150
one who is emancipated in" season
(puggala samayavt"mutta) 48
one who is emancipated out of season
(puggala asamayavimutta) 48
one who is truly enlightened (sammasambuddha) 13
one who speaks according to the doctrine (dhamma-viidin) 75
one who speaks at the proper time
(kala-vddin) 75
one who speaks in accordance with
the discipline (vinaya-viidin) 75
one who speaks truth (bhUta-viidin) 75
one who speaks what is significant
(attha-viidin) 75
ontology 173
opamma: comparison 77, 122, 168
opamma-sat(lsandanarp: comparison 156,
169
open up (vivarati) 43
opinions (dit/his) 85
originatiQn (samudaya) 13, J 53
origination of groups of unhappiness
(dukkhakklumdhasamudaya) 152
origination of unhappiness 115
other-made (parakata) 142
other world (para loka) 171
overwhelm (abhikkamanti) 22
p
paccanfka-paflcakaf'J'/: adverse controversy pentad 156
paccavekkhamana : be reflecting 150
paccayrikdras : the aspects of condition
35, 59,60, 120, 148, 211
paccayas (pratyaya) : conditions 64,
153, 176
paccuppannam addhrinam: about the
present 151
padajiitas : footprints 80
pahiydti : to be renounced 145
pain (dukkha) 97
Pali : sacred 5, 8, 56f/, 102i!, 110~
112, 117, 159
Piilibhrisii : the Pali language 5
Pdli-English Dictionary 36, 95
paloka : breakable 118
Pdmujja : joy, delight 18, 132
paflcalea :pentad(s) 156, 165
1ndex
paf1cupiidiinakkhandha : the five attach~
ment groups liS
po.r&rjita tJura : wise elder 75
pa!litcwedaniya; intelligible to tke
wise 92
!:
pafJha : questions 29
;paffhabydkara(las : methods of answering questions 7, 76, 82, 83, 85,
233
Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga}
63
pa/iccasamupplJ.das: dependent origination 13, 14,23, 31, 54, 55, 58,
115,119,121,132,138,147, 151,
210,211
paticcasamuppanna : generated by the
law of causation 124
patidhdvati : to run back to 151
86,87, 107. 153
pa/ikamma-catukkarp. : rejoinder tetrad
.Paflhdpuccha : interrogation 62
156
Paffhapucchaka sections (in the Vibhanga)
48
Pd/ikasutta 153
jJaffharamudiictira : beh~viour toward a
pali/oma : reverse 157, 207
question 72
Piitimokkhasutta 26, 43
pa(lita: excellent 92
patiPddana : (our) sequel to the argupanM: understanding(s) 3, 31, 56,
ment 162
58,62,65,72, 138,210,211
patipuccha-paflhabyakaratla 82, 84, 86
pafliiattanuyogo ~ examination of con- patipucchii-l!)IakaratlfYa 83
cepts 157, 170
Pa/isambhiddmagga (Way of Comprepannatti : concept 78, 173
hension) 63, 119
paflfJavant : having understanding 72
pa/tsambhidas : bases of comprehension
pantasamadhi: mental concentration +444, 58. 59, 63
papakiikusaladhammas: evil bad prin- pa1ivinod~ti : to dispel 43
ciples 150
PaUhdna 47, 48,6; 176
jJiipana : consequent 157
pavattati : to go forward 32
papaficita: differentiation 97
paviveka : seclusion 31
para: something alien 118
Pdyasisutta 77, 153
parakata : other-made 142
peaceful (santa) 92
para laka : the other world 171
peacefulness (ararzadhamma~ 44
paramattha (parama/tha): ultimate peerless god (atideva or abhld~rJa) 22
highest 39, 158
penetrating understanding
(nibhlparamparlJ. : succession 105
dMka />a ,)104
pii.rdyana : the way across 78
pentad (.) (pa',""a) 156, 165
paricchinna : distinguished, defi'ned 21 perceptIOn (samjfld) 198
paricchifUld: distinguishing, defining perception (saIUM) 48, 54, 56, 65,
21
66, 138, 143
pant/eva: lamentation 97, 127
perfected one (arahant, arhant) 66, 78,
pariggaha : possessing 128, 136
124, 152, 176
parinibbii.na: final extinction, the
Perfected One (the Buddha) 13
attainment of liberation from exis~ perfect enlightenment 17
tence 3, 4, 29, 46, 65, 71
perfect self-confidence (vaifaradya)
paripaflhati : to question 43
195
paripucchati : to mquire 43
parisuddha vohlJ.ra: pure (or clear) ex- persistence (sthiti) 197
pe"on (pudgala) 65, 155, 175ff, 197
pression 39
persons (puggalas) 58,59,63,66, 154
parye#ta : sought for 193
pariyutthana : prepossession, prejudi- personality schism 66
pesut)a (pesufJfJa): slander 127, 136
ced view 23, 110
phala-sthita 185
Par';va 24
phassa : contact 128
particular affirmative 50
phassa : touch 48
particular negative 50
phassiiMra : nutriment of contact 144
Ptisddikasvtta 41
phas.rakdyas : bodies of touch 54
Pasenadi 29
phenomenon (dhamma) 11,64,66
passati : to see 210
philosophical language 39
passion (raga) 78, 80, 108
philosophical talk on doctrine 32
pass on (sandhii.vati) 171
phoUhabba: tangible object (s) 16,
(in the) past (atitam addMnam) 151
140
past (pubbanta) 151
physical eye (matpsacakkhu) 84
ydtdla : bottomless pit 78
physical principles (riipa) 56
pa/haoi : earth 17
234
Abhidhamma PhilosoPF!?
Pilotaka 30
Pi/akas 4, 18, 44
pilakasampadana : by texts 105
pfti : joy 132

pitryavilaya : the dead 178, 180, 183
piyarupa : pleasant matter 108
piyas : dear things 127
piya-'()ippayoga: separation from pleasan t things 115
pleasant (sata) 128
pleasant (su-: prefix) 100, 101
pleasant matter (piyariipa) lOB
pleasure (nandi) 108
poison (visa) 78
pondered on (anuvicarita) 193
pondering on (anuvic4T1ti) 39
poring over (anupekkhati) 39
POlO. : man 189, 191, 193,206
positive Idfirmation 114
positive affirmatives 126
possessing (pariggaha) 128, 136
Potthapada 65
POllhapiidasutta 65, 73, 83, 153
practical dhammas 45, 55, 60(, 67
Prajilaptisdstra 47
Prakarm.zapiida 47, 63
priipta : obtained 193
Prosthana : basis 63
pratipannaka 185
pratityasamutpddas 207 ,
pratyaya : condition 176
precepts (sikkhapadas) 58, 59
predicate (as a logical term) 11, 17
pre-eminent flag (atidhaja) 22
pre-eminent sunshade
(atichattarp)
22
prefixes (upasaggas) 19, 52, 108, 110,
115
prejudiced view (pariyutthana) 110
prepossession (pariyutthana) 23
(about the) present (paccupannam
addlulnarh) 151
pride (mdna) 127
priests (brdhmavas) 15
prince par excellence (atirdjakumara)
22
principle of cessation (nirodhadhamma)
124
principle ofchange (vipariniimadhamma)
112
principle of contradiction 110, 112,
113, 114, 125
principle of decay (vayadhamma) 124
principle ofdestruction (khayadhamma)
124
principle of dispassion (virtlgadhamma)
12,
principle of double negation 114
principle of exportation 136. 168
principle of identity 112, 125
principle of transitivity 135

principles (dJuunmas) 4, 11. 17,27, 34,.
40,41,53,56, 57,64, 98, 124, 140...
158, 175
principles (dharmas) 175. 188, 193,.
194, 196, 199f, 201, 206
principles declared by the recluse-
(dhamma samfltl-ena vutta) 128

principles pertaining to enlightenment
(bodhipakkMya dhamma) 4
profession of asceticism (samaillia},
23,59
profound (gambhrra) 24, 27, 92
profound understanding (gambhira
panna) 104
pubbanta : the past 151
public debates 73, 74
pudgala : person 65, 66,154,155, 175,.
189, 191, 193, 197
Pudgala schism 208
Pudgala school 155, 157, 159, 160ff,
171177, 179, 182ff, 190, 192,194,.
203ff, 206 :
pudgalaskandha 154, 155. 174, 177, 203"
205, 206, 207
Pudgalavadin 155
puggala: man 64, 84, 155, 166, 167
puggala asamayavimutta: one who is
emancipated out of season 48
puggala chapter (in the Kv. and theVij Mnakaya) 154, 156
puggalakathti: discussion of the 'person' 7, 139. 154, 155, 156, 157 170.
172, 173,174, 177, 205,206, 207
Puggalapaliifatti 47, 48, 63, 155
puggalas : persons 58, 59. 63, 66
puggala Jamayavimutta: one who isemancipated in season 48
p ujita: reverend 21
p ~jitd : respect 21
pure (or clear J expression (parisuddha
vohara)
~9
pure hypothetical syllogism (8), 133,

134,135,148,151
purgatory (nirl!)'a) 178, 183, 2Mf,.
206
purity of thought (cittavisuddhatta
29
purity of view (ditthivisuddhatta) 29
purity of virtue (srlavisuddhatta) 29
Piirl)a 47
pUfUia : man 189, 191, 193, 206
puthu pafJild : wide understanding 104
putting forth energy (viriyarambha}
31
Q
quality (dhama) 10, 11, 17
quarrel (viggaha) 107
235
Index
question (paripaffhati) 43
questions (/laMa) 29
Quine, W. V. 50, 117, 135
quite immediate (saman4!ilara) 176
R
ralta : passion 78, IDA
Rahuia 20
Rajagaha 9, 110
R8mmaka 30
rasa: taste 16
raJis : heaps', classes 177, 187
Rathavinftasutta 29, 153
rddhipadas 196
real (bh iltattho) 158

real logic of relations 132, 136, 151,
211
real, ultimate sense (soccikatlhaparamat/ka) 158
reasoners (eakkins) 97,98, 99,100, 101

reasoning (takka) 95, 96, 98, 99,
101, 103
reasoning ba,ed on the truth (dhamma'akka) 94, 102, 106/, 122
reborn (upapad) 39, 80
recognition (sarpjM) 194recognition (saliM) 194
recognizing (Jarpjlldnand) !94
reflecting (paccavekkhamllna) 130
reflecting on (anuvitakketi) 39
reflection on peculiarities (iikaraparivitakka) 105
reflective thought (vitakka) 103
refuge (saratlo) 55
refutation (niggaha) 156,
refutation tetrad (niggaha-catukkMfl)
156, 160, 164
refute (samanubhtisati) 73
rejoinder tetrad (patikamma-catukkam)
156, 159. 164
remorse (vighata) 107
remorse (vippatisdra) 97
(be) renounced (pahfydtit 145
respect (piijita) 21
respond (vissajjati) 32
- ;1:
reverend (p ajita) 21
reverse (patiloma) 157, 207
Revata 27
rhetorical devices 79
Rhys Davids, C. A. F. 16,20,53, 154
Rhys Davids, T. \II. 16, 20
right action (sammakammanta) 1I6
right concentration (sammdsamddhi)
lI6
right effort (sammdvdyama) 116
right exertions (sammappadhdnas)
27,
44, 54, 57, 59

right intention (sammasalikappa) 102,
lI6
right livelihood (sammd-djivd) 116

right self-possession (sammasati) 116
right speech (sammaviicd) 116
right theory (sammaditlhi) 102, 11&
right understanding (sammappaflfld)
145
rising up from view (samullhdna) tto
roga : disease 118
rooting up view (samugghdta) 110
root of the bad (akusala-mala) 64, 17$
root of the good (kusala~mula) 64
roused (samMapita) 30
round hall (marz4alamdla) 32
rubbish-fire (sankdraggi) 140
run back to (pa/idhiivati) 151
run forward to (ddhiivati) 151
rupa : matter (as physical principles)
14,16,56, 61fJ, 143, 167, 173
rupa : sight, visible object 16, 143, 195.
rapr dhamma; ariipr dhamma 49
s
sabba : all, everything (in the world}
56, 113, lI8, 143
sabbadd : always 165
sabbamatthftikathd: discussion of
'everything exists' 154
sabbattha : everywhere 165
sabbesu : in everything 165
saccas : truths 13, 23, 54, 55, 58, 59,
115,211
sace (if) ... tena (then) ... 150
saccikallha l!i8
saccikalfhaparamaUha: the real, ultimate sense 158
sadda : sound 16
sadhammo : true doctrine 58
saddhiipadana : the harvest of belief 2&
Saddhatissa, H. 138
seen (dr~/a) 193
saik~a: learner 188
saik~as : trainings 177, 187, 189
sakacchd: conversation, talking over.
discussing 31, 72
sakaliJr.aggi: chip-fire 140
Saketa 29
salakkhQ{l.a : characteristic 21J, 24,36
sdlavana : slU-wood 27
sa/dyatana sam)'utta 56
salla : sting 118
sallekha : austere penance 31
salutation (abhivddana) 23
sal-wood (sdlavana) 27
samiidapita : roused 30
samadhi : concentration of mind 31, 63
samadhibhdvand : development of concentration 44
samddhis: bases of concentration 44,
58
236
samadhiyati : to .come to one-pointedness 132
SamagdmasuUa 73
samagga : in harmony 28
SaTna!lamarz4ikasutta 73
samavas: strivers 3, 55, 71,80
samaitfid : agreed usage 78
sdmaff.fla : profession of asceti.yism 23,
59
siimaiHialakkMt;lo: universal characteristic 24
JiimafHiaphaJas: fruits of striverhood
44,58
samantacakkhu : the eye of the tathiigata
84
.
Samantapdsddikii 21, 22, 23
samanantara : quite immediate 176
samanubhiisati : to criticize, to refute 73
samanugiihati: to ask for reasons, to
cross-examine 73
samanvdgama: accomplishment 175
samanuyufljati: to cross-question, to
take up 73
samathavipassana
tranquility and
insight 45
samayappaviidaka : hall for debating on
different views 73
sambhava: arising 139
sambodhi : enlightenment 84
sQmhodhyangas 196, 197
sambhi1ta : arisen 142 *.
Sarpg--aha-saJTIJoga:
inclusion
and
conjunction 63
.smpjfiti : recognition, perception 194,
198
iii
smpjfJrinanri : recognizing 194
samkappa : intention 103
sarpkfll'! : denomination 78
samkhara : forces 62, 65
samma-riilvri : right livelihood 116
sammridi/thi : right theory 102. 116
Sammdditthisutta 153
.
sammdkammanta : right action 116
sdmmafiifaphafas : fruits of striverhood
44
sammappadhimas ~ right exertions 27,
44,54,57,59,60,61,63
sammappaiHfa: right understanding 145
.sammtisam~dhi : right concentration 116
sammd-sambuddha: one who .is truly
enlightened 1'3
sammdsailkappa: right intention 102,
116
sammrisati: right self-possession 116

sammdvdcd: right speech 116
sammtivdydma : right effort 116
Srup.mitiya school 24
Sammitya~ (Saqlmitiya) 155
.sammodamdna : in agreement 28
.sammuti: concealing 39
sammutilUituz : common knowledge 45
sampajana : conscious 111
sampahamsita : delighted 30
saquandanii (-atp: neuter) 168, 170
Sa1[lSapa tree 196
saqrsdra : transmigration 85, 171
saTJISarati : transmigrate 17 j
saril.sfdati : to fail 32
sar[tSh:ta ~ the synthesized 177. 197
samudaya : origination 13, 158
samugghata : rooting up view 110
samuppanna: (has) come to be 142
samuttejita: incited 30
samuliMna : rising up from view 110
samyakpradhdnas 196
sa~,.aktvaniyatardJi 187
Sa1liyukta: conjoined 175
Samyuktabhidharmahrdayaidstra 86
SmpyuJrta Agama (Sheng _yu to ah hsien)
5, 56, 61, 76, 90, 91
Sarhyutta Nikaya 5,49, 56, 60, 108, 113
saf1cetandkayas : bodies of thought 54
Sandaka 77, 100
Sandakasutta 100
sandassita : instructed 30
sandhiivati : to pass on 171
sandiUhiparamdsf: one who is atta~
ched to this (mundane) life 150
sangha : Buddhist community 25
Sanghabhedavastu 88
SangUiparyaya 42, 46, 47, 86
Sangitisiitra 42
Sangftisutta 35, 41f, 54
sanidassana dhamma; a-nidassana dhamma
49
Saiijaya BelaUhiputta 7. 88, 89, 9II,
98, 125
saflkdraggi : rubbish-fire 140
sankhdra: force(s) 56,61,65,143
sankhata : synthesized 124
sailkhata dhamma; a-saflkhata dhamma 49

sankhittena : in brief 34
saliM ~ perception 48, 54, 56, 61,
62,65, 138, 143
saPHid : recognition 194
saiffiakayas : bodies of perception 54
Sanskrit 6, 8
santa: peacef1l1 92
sarzthita : set 38
santutthi ! contentment 31
so-( p) paccaya dhamma; a- (p )paccaya
dhamma 49. 50, 51
sa-{ p)Pa/igha dhamma; a- (p )patigha
dfUunrna 49
Saprainaka ! with question 63
saratla : refuge' 55
sara-upama : the simile of the pith .17
Sariputra 47
SariputriJbhidharmaiiJstra 47,54,57,58,
63, 64, 155, 176
Index
Sariputta 25, 27J, 29, 32, 36, 41, 65,
I
76, 93, 98
Sarvastivada schism 208
Sarvastiviida school 5, 8, 10, 24, 42,
44, 45, 47, 54, 64, 65, 174
Sarvastivadin 155, 177, 178f, 203
Sarvastiviidin Abhidhamma 8
Sarvcistivada Vin. 9
sarvatraga : universal 176
sassata : eternal 85
sassatavadas: eternaJists 85
Idivala-anto : the extreme of eternalism
192
sala : mindful III
sata : sweet 52
silta : the pleasant 128
Sad 139, 142, 144
sali :, self-possession 138
satipallhanas : bases of sett:possession
16, 27, 35, 44, 54, 55, 57, 59, 60,
61f, Ill, 116
sattas: b~ings 39, 171
siittha : meaning 38
sattDa: being 189, 190,
191, 192f,
194, 206
savyafljana : expression 38
Saussure, F. de 96
sayampapbMna: the conclusion of one's
own 97
scheme (8) (naya) 105

seclu.sion (pavivtlka) 31
see (passaN) 210 ".',
seen (dil/ha) 152
seen (dnla) 193
Sela 142, 143
sekha : learning 78
self-abnegation (rukkhamma;ankappa) 31
self-conceit (abhimana) 23
self-determining view (adhilfhdna) 110
selfishness (mamatta) 128
self-made (attakata) 142
self-possession (sat;) 138
semantic field 106
sensations (vedanas) 48, 56, 65,143,
198
sensed (mata) 193
sense-organs 57
sentience (nama) 14, 16
sentient body (nama-rapa) 16, 128. 138
sequel to the argument (palipadantI)
162
(saCl/hita) 38
_
seven factors of enlightenment 4
seven headings 4, 45, 55
seyyathd : just as 140
seyyathiipi : just as if 79
Sheng_Vii to all hsien (Sa1Jl.vukta Agama) 5
Shih-sung-lii. of the Sarvastivada school
(sixty-one fascicles) 5
---set
237
short- intermediate sei: of couplet~
(cil/antaraduka) 49
should be strived (vayamitahha) 150
Siam 5
sickness (rryadhi) 115
sight(s) (rupa) 16, 140
sfhanada: lion's roar 78
sikkM : training 65
sikkhapadas : precepts 58, 59
sfla : moral practice _31
sela : virtue 15, 63, 65
silavisuddhatta : the purity of virtue 29simile of the cloth (vattha-upamd) 77
simile of the elephant's footprint
(hatthipada-upamii) 77
simile of the pith (sara-upamii) 77
simile of the quail (la/Ukitii-uPamd)
78
simile of the saw (kakaca-upamil) 77
simile of the water-snake (alagaddaupamil) 77
..
similes (lipam"'s) 76, 77, 79, 143
simple collation (or checking) (suddhika-sarpsandand) 156, 167, 168
simple simile 77
SirpJapdvanasDtra 196
since (conj.) (yasmd) 149
siruha : moisture 142
six indriva or flisaya dyatanas 16
six kinds of consciousness 195, 198/,.
20.1, 203
skandhas : chapters I 74skandhas: grol1ps, 194, 195, 207
skeptic 89
slander (pesutIQ or plSufilla) 127, 136
smrtyupasthdr/as 190, 197
sokas : griefs 97, 127
solid (ol.rika) 144
some (kehici) 170
something alien (para) 118
Sona 76
sophists (takkins) 97, 101
sorites 116, 118, 119, 126, 130, 132"
133f, FO
Jato : ear 16
sotdpattiyanga : faCtor of obtaining the
stream 59
sotaviflflli{Ul: earconsciousness 140
sought for (fJaryesita) 193
soul (attan) 65, 84, 85, 90, 91, 146.
172
sound (sadda) 16
source (nidana) 153
spaTia: contact 198
speak (vado) 139
specific dhamma 36
spheres (ayatanas) 11,48,58,59, 142,.
146, 147, 202
srota-iipanna 184, 185, 186, 187/
238
S10'a-iiPatti~pratipeumaka
187j
184, 185, 186,
iruta : heard 193

Ssu:pm-lii of the Dharmagupta school
(sixty fascicles) 5
Stcherbatsky, Th. 11, 12, 16, 65
Sthavirava.da school 5, 10, 17, 18,
24,40,42,44,45,47,54,64,65,103
207, 208
Sthaviravadin 155, 157, 158, 159,
163, 165f, 172, 173,206
'.!'
slhiti : persistence 197
stick-fire (kal/haggi) 140
sting (,alia) 118
stinginess (maechara) 127
Stoics 123
Story of the King Asoka (AJQkdvada'na)
44, 57
strengths (balas) 27,44,55,57
strive (vayamati) 150
-strivers (samaQas) 3, 55, 71, 80, 85
.su- (prefix): wdl, good, easy, plea-.
sant, very, etc. 100, 101
Subh.76
Subhasutta 76, 153
Subhiiti 26
subtle (nipu(la) 92
-succession (parampara) 105
suddhika-satpSam/arui : simple collation,
simple _checking 156, 167, 168
sukha : happiness 52
sukha v:danti : happy feeling 52
sukhuma : fine, minute 144
Sumangalavilasini 89
sumedha : the wise 78
'Summary of the Buddha's teachings
4,6
Sunakkhata 103
suilflatd : voidness 93
Sunyata-Sthaviravada school 208
Sunyatavada school 207
Sunyatavadin 174, 175ff, 181, 185,
186, 190j, 203, 206
supreme Brahma (atibrahma) 22
sutakkita : well-reasoned 100, 101
Sutra Pi/aka 6
siitras 5, 178, 184, 188, 190, 193f, 196
Sutta (one of the nille types of scripture) 9
Sulta 6, 22, 48, 54f, 98
suttahiira : adducing suttas 157
Suttanipata 78, 96, 97,102,104,107,
116, 127, 136, 138
sutlanta : dialogue 18, 40
Suttantika dukas 48
suttanta.-bhtJjaniya : analysis according
to the teaching 62
Sutta Pi/aka : the collection of suttas
4, 20
suttas! dialogues 4, 7, 18, 42,. 45,

76, 79, 83, 127, 128, 130, 139,153,
171
S.ttlavibhanga 26, 43
sweet (sata) 52
synthesized (sa'1'i$krta) 177. 197
synthesized (sankhata) 124
T
-labba (suffix) 150,

T aisho Et/itwtl of the Chinese Tripi/aka 8
take up (samam{),ufljat) 73
takka : logic, reasoning 7, 94f, 101,
103, 106
takkapariydhata : beaten out by one's
argumentations 97, 100, 101
takkins: reasoners, sophists 97, 101
talk on animals (tiracch4nakatha) 29
t talk on the highest doctrine (uttamadhammakatham) 32
tangible objects (phollhabba) 16, 140
taphti: desire, thirst liS, 1'37
tat;thiiiiitika : aestre as birth 146
tapMkiiyas ~ bodies of thirst 54
taphiinidiina: desire as source 146
taphapabhava: desire as provenance 146
tav/uisamudaya : desire as origination
146
Tapoda park 110
Tarkabhdid : The Language of Logic
94
taste (rasa) 16
tathtJ 92
tathiigala : thus-gone, i.e. the Buddha
40, 41J, 78, 80, 84, 85, 89, 91, 146,
196
tato : in the same way 158
Tattt'asiddhiiastra 66
tautology 135
teachings (dhammas) 3, 60, 71, 72, }04
teacher's fist (dcii~ya-mu~#) 196
ttio : heat 17
tendency (anusaya) 23
tenet of speculative philosophy (ditthitthana) 110
tetradic relations 132
tetrad(s) (catukka) 156,165
tetralemma (cattqko/i) 7, 92, 93, 105
thapaniJ : antecedent 157
Ihapan[ya-pafJhabyiikarapa 82, 84
theoretical doctrines (dhammas) 14,
58, 60, 63, 67
theory (dhamma) 17
theory of causation 57, 67
thUd bhikkhu : elder monks 33
Tlwagathtl 14, 116
thinkin.s actio:Qs 104
thirst (tat;thii) 137
239
Jndex
thirty~seven
bodhipakkhtva dhamma:
principles pertaining to enlightenment 4. 13, 66
thitty-seven (practical) dhammas 4, 6,
14ff, 67
this alone is the truth, any other view
is false (idam eva saccatp mogJzam
a"a",) 107, 126
"this being. this is (imasmitp sati idarp
/wti) 14, 119
this not being, this is not (imasmirp
IUli ida",. na holi) 14, JI9
thought is released (vimuttacitta) 91
thoughts (cittas) 17,65, 132, 175,176
three feelings 124
three ram 187
three sets of possible statements (trairaJika) 93
Three Vedas 99
ihllsaggi: chaff-fire 140
thus-gone (tathiigala) 40, 80, 81, 84,89,
90, 98ff, 196
.tika-Miitikds 52, 125
Jikar : triplets 48, 52, 53, 67, 105, 129

Timbaruka 190, 191
Tin, P. M. 22
.tiruzggi : gnw-fire 140
_./{"
Tipitaka : three kinds of collection 4

tiraccht'tnakathtl: talk on animals or
childish talk 29, 31
Jiryagwmi: animals 177, 178, -179,
IBO,ff, 204 205, 206
Titthlyas (-yib) 76
Todeyya 76
-tongue (jivha) 16
tongue~consciousness
(iivhavilllSd{za)
140
touch (phassa) 48
traditions (tigamas) 5
tradition (anussava) 105
traditional (Aristotelian) logic 123:
135
training (sikkhti) 65
trainings (Jamias) 177. 187
,trairriJika : three sets of possible statements 93
tranquillity 29
tranquillity and insight (samathavi/JaSsanri) 45
transmigrate (sa'!1sarati) 171
transmigration (bhaI)Q) 108
transmigration (sll1!lsara) 85, 171
treasures (dhanas) 55
triadic relations 132 '
trick of enticement (dva/tiini mtlYii) 104
\ triple negative 210
tdplets (tikas) 48, 50,52, 67f, 124
Tripi/aka 8, 44, 86
trouble (rJihesd) 107

true doctrine (sadkammo) 58
truth (hhata) 50
truth (dhamma) 12, 13, 17, 71, 99.
104, 105, 210
truth (dhafflla) 197
truths (saccas) 54, 58, 59
twelve (ii"atanas) 16, 202
twelve-linked chain of dependent
origination (dvddaJa pa/iccasamupPddangas) 14, 24, 58
twelve paccq"dkdras 120, 211
twelve paticcasamllppiid4f in direct and
reverse orders) 119,121,138, 147,
1St
twe1ve types of scripture 23-24
types (angas) 4
u
Udiina 9
Uddesavibhangasufta 38
ulii,apamujja : exceeding delight 26
UlIrnann, S. 97, 106
ultimate (paramaUha) 39
ummagga : approach to a question 72
unactivated (asarhkhata, asa1]'lSkrta) 108,
175
uncertainty (kathatpkatM) 128
uncertainty (vicikiccha) 145
undecided (avyiikata) 92
understandi.ngs. (paiffldr) 3, 29, 31,
56,58,62,65, 72, l3B, 210
undetermi.ned (avyakata) 15
undue estimate ofoneself(abhimdna) 23
unfading (a-Jajjara) 49
unhappiness (dukkha) 13,52,97,103,
115, 124
unhappy feeling (dukkha vedana) 78,
124
universal (sarvatraga) 176
universal affirmative 50
universal characteristic (samaililalakkh""a) 24
universal law 17
universal negative 50
universal quantification 167
universal quantificational schemata
146
universal quantifier 51
universe (loka) 39, 85
unlawful passion (adhamma-,dga) 15
unopened (aviva/a) 43
unpleasant (asola) 128
unpleasant (du (r) 100, 101
unsweet (astita) 52
unsynthesized (asathlfflata, asarpskrta)
108, 175, 197
uptiJdpaftllattdnuyogo: examination of
derivative concepts 157. 171
240
Abhidhamma Philosop1!r
upddanagata : grasping 97
upiidiiya : based on 173
upiidhis : attachments 137

upakkilesa : corruption 23
upalabbhati: to exist 158
upama : simile 77fl, 122
upanayana-catukkaf!l: application tetrad
156
upapad: reborn 39
uparuiJhati : to cease 138
ul!asaggas : prefixes 49, 52, 110, 115
upasaka : lay disciple 59
upasama : calm 84
upiiyiisa : misery 97
useless (mogha) 110
uttama-dhamma: the highest doctrine
22, 32
uttarnal/ka: nighest 158
uttiini karoti: to make clear 43
v
vacanasodhanarp: clarification of terms
(actually indicating the distribution
of terms) 157, 170
rJiiciisamkhdra: an activity of speech
103
Vacchagotta 85, 91, 92
viidayutti: judgement of the opponent's
statement 170
vado : to speak 139
vaiSaradya : perfect self-confidence 195
Vajjiputta 155
Vajjiputtakas 155
Vamalabdha 23
vammika : anthill 78
Vasubandhu 95
Vasumitra 23, 47
Vatsiputriya 155
VatsiputriyCll' doctrine 66
Vatsiputriya school 66
vattha-upamii: the simile of the doth 77
vayadhamma : the principle of decay
124
viiyamati : to strive 150
vayamitabba : should be strived 150
vayo : air 17
Vedalla 9
vedalla : style based on questions and
answers 32
vedallakatham : talk on vedalla 32
vedanas: feelings, sensations 48, 56,
61,65, 143, 189, 198
vedanakiiyas : bodies of sensation 54
vedeyyo : to know, to feel 139
Venkatacharya, T. 88
versed in the discipline (vinayadhara)
43
versed in the doctrinal topics (malmadhara) 43
versed in the doctrine (dhammadhara)

43
very (su-: prefix) 100, 101
very distinguished doctrine (abhivisiltha-dhamma) 22
very profound questions 29
Vesali 55
vesarajjas : bases of self-confidence 44
VO'yiikarapa 9
vibhqjati : to divide 35
vibhajja-pafJhabyiikaratuls: analytical
questions and answers 82, 83, 86,130vibhajjavada (-in): analytical answerer
76
vibkqj;a-vytikarllfliya- 83,
vibkanga : division 35, 43
Vibhanga 35
Vibhanga 40, 42,47, 48, 54, 58, 62f,..
119
Vibhangasuttas 38
vibhava: non-existence J 28
vicikicchii : uncertainty 145
vidita : discerned 152
views (di//his) 97
Vidyabhusana, S. C. 101
viggaha : quarrel 107
vigluita :, remorse 107 i<.i''':
vihesii : trouble 107 ci~'
vijtliitia : consciousness 66, 176, 177
VijfJanakaya (Body of Consciousness P7,47,65,66,138,153,154,150,156,
174, 203
vijnata : cognized i 93
vijniiniiti : distinguish 202
village (giima) 173
villager (gamika) 173
vfmathsaka: investigator 97
vimmizsiinucarita: followed by one's_
investigation 97-98, 100. 101
vimokkha : freedom 24vimuttacitta : thought is released 91
vimuttayatanas : liberation from spheres.
55
vimutti : liberation 31, 103
vimuttiffaQadassana: knowledge and
insight of liberation 31, 101
vinaya: discipline 15, 18,21, 26, 32,.
34,38,41,43
Vz'naya : Discipline 9, 18, 33, 56.. 57,.
98
vinayadhara : versed in the discipline
43
vinayakatha 31
Vinaya Pi/aka: the collection of the
discipline 4, 5, 6, 20, 43
Vinaya text 26, 31, 115
vin~ya-vddin: one who speaks in,
accordance with the discipline 75
Vinayavibhailga 26, 43
vinicchaya: decision 127, 136
Index
241
t'iiiilapa: consciousness 17,56,61,65,
108, 138, 143

viIJIJarW/zdra: nutriment of consciousness 144
viJllJdt'lakdyas : bodies of consciousness
54
vi7lfJa(1.anirodhd ndmariipanirodho: from
the cessation of consciousness is the
cessation of a set:ltient body 79
viflffiitzapaccayd ndmarapatp : conditioned
by consciousness is a sentient body
79
vilUleY,.va d"ammo; na vilfJbyya dhamma 49
105, 125, 144, 150, 15.1, 156, 157,

168, 170, 174, 208
water (apo) 17
way (magga) 13,59
way across (pardyana) 78
way leading to the cessation of unhappiness 116
Way of Comprehension (Patisambhidamagga) 63
way of knowledge (abhiniiapatipadd)
59
weak in understanding (duppam,a)
72
vililfu purisd : intelligent persons, dis_ . well (su-: prefix) 100, 101
cerning persons 77, 107
well-reasoned (sutakkita) 100
viparindmadhamma: the principle of western logic 116, 123
change 112
vippa/isara : remorse 97
vipassQna : insight 102
viraga : dispassion 84
virdgadhamma: the princi pIe of dis.
passion 124
viriyiirambha : putting forth energy 31
virtue (dhamma) 11, 17
virtue (sila) 15, 63, 65
visa: poison 78
visata! diffused 38
visqya : object 16
visible object (r;:,pa) 16, 140. 143, 195
uissajiati: to respond 32
Visuddhimag.l!a (Path of Purification)
63, 194
uitakka : reflective thought 103
vittlzara: breadth 35
vitthaTtna: in detail 34
vivdddpanna : to fall into dispute 73
vivddas: disputes 107, 127, 136
vivarati ! to open up 43
voidness (suiJIJatii) 93
volition (cetand) 199
vuddhi: increase 21
vUddhiya : to come to increase 21
vulgar (gamma) 29
v..Yddhi : sicklU:ss 115
W
Waldschmidt, E. 3, 41, 117

wanderer(s) 65,85,91, 107. llO
wanting little (app;ccha) 31
Wamer, A. K. 3, 5, 1Of, 19, 40, 44,
57.ff, 61,72J, 89,93, 95, 1ooff,
wheel of life 120

wide understanding (puthu pannd)
104
will (chanda) 127, 136
wise (sf/mldha) 78
wise elder (/Jafldita 'Iura) 75
wi~h
(iccM) 128
wish is called thint (iceM vuccati

,''''''_) 137
without a known beginning (anamalagga) 17l
without attachment (anuptJa4) 29
without contention (avivtJdamdna) 28
without influence (andsrava) 182
without question (Apralnaka) 63
with question (SafJralnaka) 63
Woodward. F. L. 20, 38
world (Ioka) 84,85,90,91,98
worthy of (araha) 146
wrong (micchii) 158
y
Yamaka (disciple of the Buddha) 76
Tamalea (Pair) 47, 48, 63, 125, 126.
152
Yang chi1eh to 10 ah hsien (Ekottara
Agama) 5
ya.mad: since (conj.) 149
yathdhh alatfl: as it really is, in its
true nature 131
yathd-vtJdin lathtJkdrin, ,aIMkdrin t4tMvddin: &. he Ipeab, ~o he actl: as he
acts, 10 he speak. ;.5
voga : concentration 19, 25

Philosophy and Its Development in The Nikayas and Abhidhamma

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Fumlmaro Watanabe

Philosophy and. its Development

The Nikayas and Abhidhamma

First Published In 1983

Published by Narendra Prakash Jain, for Motilai Banarsidass,

The Origin of Abhidhamma Philosophy

0';' the Tikas and Dukas

PART II The Development of the Dialogue Form

"doctrine', 'morality' and 'principle', forms the actual starting

Before studying the types of argument used in these dialogues

in detail, Professor Watanabe takes note of a different element

Professor Watanabe arrives at the logically stimulating

'completely negative thinking'. This, he argues, is the mode or

therefore decided to make a special study of the Nikiiyas and

My cordial thanks are likewise due to my colleague and able

Deutschen Akadefnie der Wissenschaften

THE ORIGIN OF ABHIDHAMMA

four right exertions,

3. four bas.. of power,

1.2 After the Buddha's parinibbIJ.na, a great number of dkammas

}. It is known in general that mUa is a sacred book (or scripture) be~

We also have the Miilasarvastivada Pitalea from Tibet in the

Mdtiklls, originating from the Nikl!Yas and Agamas. The title

1. Yin. II, 285. The

MahiSiisaka Yin. (T.22, 190 h-c). The Maha~

Gtithl1. Uddna, ltivuttakao;

study. Even the concept of dhamma used in the Xik;;y", is very

On the PolYsemy qfthe Word'Dhamma'

The definition of the term dhamma (Skt. dharma) fOrI}lulated by

1. Journal of Indian Philosophy. Vol. I, No.3, November 1971, pp. 272-95.

or inclusion of dhammas which we find in the Nikiiyas."

This decidedly shows the way to the simplification from the

On Ihe Polysemy of Ihe Word'Dhamma'

the 'truth' which is naturally derived from his doctrine (s) or

dhammd" were esteemed greatly as the dkammas of practice which

2.5 The Dhamma as Morality. In order to demonstrate

s. '11, 28, T.2, 98 b, 100., etc.

if the Word 'Dhamma'

Na hi dhammo adhammo ca uhha samaviptllcino; adhammo nirayam

The class of brahmans (briihmfJT)aS: priests) is not always the

The morality in Buddhism which is expressed by the term

2.6 Dhammas as the Principles of Matter and

3. D. III, 70, T.I,40 a.

etc. are impermanent, painful and egoless. 1 However, these

dhammesu dhammi!nupassi viharati.

as 'principle', because the term principle has a wide meaning,

truth, perfect enlightenment, dependent

doctrine, teaching, theory, discourse.

morality, merit, good quality, virtue, discipline.

However, when coming across the term abhidhamma in the

The Conception of Abhidhamma

2. Concentration (yoga) on ahhidhamma and abhivinaya

I. An attempt to interpret abhi-dhamma as a prepositional

I tern I is based merely on a philological point of view, so that

locative case, but is expressed in the accusative case in some

The Conception qf Abhidhamma

fluctuations before coming to stand as the title of the Abhidhamma

Herein what is meant by Abhidhamma ? That which exceeds