Rule 114

Sec1
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ- 03-1767

March 28, 2003

ROSALIA DOCENA-CASPE, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE ARNULFO O. BUGTAS, Regional Trial Court,
Branch II, Borongan, Eastern Samar, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The refusal or failure of the prosecution to adduce
evidence or to interpose objection to a petition for bail
will not dispense with the conduct of a bail
hearing.1 Neither may reliance to a previous order
granting bail justify the absence of a hearing in a
subsequent petition for bail,2 more so where said order
relied upon was issued without hearing and while the
accused was at large.3
The instant administrative case for gross ignorance of
the law and incompetence against respondent judge
stemmed from a murder case filed against accused
Celso Docil and Juan Docil for the death of Lucio
Docena. In her sworn complaint, complainant alleged
that on September 3, 1993, Judge Gorgonio T. Alvarez of
the Municipal Trial Court of Taft, Eastern Samar,
conducted a preliminary investigation on the said
murder case, and thereafter issued the corresponding
warrants of arrest. No bail was recommended for the
two (2) accused who were at large since the commission
of the offense on August 29, 1993.
Complainant further stated that the information for
murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch II, then presided by
Judge Paterno T. Alvarez. The latter allegedly granted a
P60,000.00 bailbond each to both accused without
conducting a hearing, and while the two were at large.
Meanwhile, accused Celso Docil was apprehended on
June 4, 2000.
Subsequently, Provincial Prosecutor Vicente Catudio
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Borongan,
Eastern Samar, Branch II, now presided by respondent
Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas, a motion praying that an alias
warrant of arrest be issued for the other accused, Juan
Docil; and that both accused be denied bail. Said motion
was granted by the respondent Judge. Thereafter,
accused Celso Docil filed a motion for reconsideration
praying that he be allowed to post bail on the grounds
that (1) he is entitled to bail as a matter of right
because he is charged with murder allegedly committed
at the time when the imposition of the death penalty
was suspended by the Constitution; and that (2) both
the investigating Judge and the First Assistant
Prosecutor recommended P60,000.00 bail for his
temporary liberty.
On August 11, 2000, the respondent Judge denied said
motion.4 He explained that notwithstanding the
suspension of the imposition of the death penalty at the
time the accused committed the offense, bail for the
crime of murder remains to be a matter of discretion. He
cited Section 13, Article III, of the Constitution which
explicitly provides that "(a)ll persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law."
The respondent Judge added that contrary to the
accuseds claim, there is nothing in the records which
show that bail was recommended for his temporary
liberty.
Accused Celso Docil filed a motion for reconsideration
reiterating his previous contentions. Then, he filed a

manifestation pointing out that on page 49 of the

records is an order granting him and his co-accused the
recommended bail of P60,000.00. The court gave the
prosecution five (5) days within which to file a comment
to the accuseds motion for reconsideration but the
former failed to do so.
On January 15, 2001, the respondent Judge issued a
Resolution granting the said motion for reconsideration
on the basis of a previous order granting bail to the
accused.5 He ratiocinated that on page 49 of the
records, there indeed appears a final and executory
order dated July 22, 1994 issued by his predecessor,
Judge Paterno T. Alvarez granting bail of P60,000.00 to
the accused, hence, the inevitable recourse is to grant
bail to accused Celso Docil.
On August 16, 2001, the complainant filed the instant
administrative case against the respondent Judge for
granting bail to accused Celso Docil without conducting
a bail hearing.
In his Comment,6 the respondent insisted that he
committed no gross ignorance of the law or
incompetence. He contended that the prosecution is
estopped from objecting to the grant of bail to accused
Celso Docil because it questioned the said order issued
by his predecessor Judge only on February 4, 2000, or
after six (6) years from the issuance thereof on July 22,
1994. He added that despite the five-day period given
to the prosecution, it failed to file a comment to the
motion for reconsideration of the accused, warranting
the presumption that it has no objection to the
accuseds petition for bail.
On the basis of its evaluation, the Office of the Court
Administrator recommended that the instant case be redocketed as a regular administrative matter and that
respondent Judge be fined in an amount equivalent to
one (1) month salary, with a warning that the
commission of the same or similar acts in the future will
be dealt with more severely.7
In a Resolution dated February 6, 2002, the Court
required the parties to manifest whether they are
submitting the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings filed.8 On April 24, 2002, the respondent Judge
manifested his conformity to the said Resolution. 9 The
complainants manifestation, on the other hand, was
dispensed with by the Court.
Jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the procedural
necessity of a hearing, whether summary or otherwise,
relative to the grant of bail especially in cases involving
offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, where bail is a matter of
discretion.10 Under the present rules, a hearing is
required in granting bail whether it is a matter of right
or discretion.11 It must be stressed that the grant or the
denial of bail in cases where bail is a matter of
discretion hinges on the issue of whether or not the
evidence on the guilt of the accused is strong, and the
determination of whether or not the evidence is strong
is a matter of judicial discretion which remains with the
judge. In order for the latter to properly exercise his
discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to determine
whether the evidence of guilt is strong.12
In Santos v. Ofilada,13 it was held that the failure to raise
or the absence of an objection on the part of the
prosecution in an application for bail does not dispense
with the requirement of a bail hearing. Thus
Even the alleged failure of the prosecution to
interpose an objection to the granting of bail to
the accused will not justify such grant without
hearing. This Court has uniformly ruled that
even if the prosecution refuses to adduce
evidence or fails to interpose any objection to
the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the
court to conduct a hearing or ask searching
and clarificatory questions from which it may
infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or
lack of it, against the accused. Where the
prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in
opposition to the application to grant and fix
bail, the court may ask the prosecution such
questions as would ascertain the strength of

the States evidence or judge the adequacy of

the amount of the bail. Irrespective of
respondent judges opinion that the evidence
of guilt against the accused is not strong, the
law and settled jurisprudence demand that a
hearing be conducted before bail may be fixed
for the temporary release of the accused, if bail
is at all justified.
Thus, although the provincial prosecutor had
interposed no objection to the grant of bail to
the accused, the respondent judge therein
should nevertheless have set the petition for
bail for hearing and diligently ascertain from
the prosecution whether the latter was not in
fact contesting the bail application. In addition,
a hearing was also necessary for the court to
take into consideration the guidelines set forth
in the then Section 6, Rule 114 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure for the fixing of the
amount of the bail. Only after respondent judge
had satisfied himself that these requirements
have been met could he then proceed to rule
on whether or not to grant bail.
Clearly therefore, the respondent Judge cannot seek
refuge on the alleged belated objection of the
prosecution to the order dated July 22, 1994 issued by
his predecessor, Judge Paterno T. Alvarez; nor on the
prosecutions failure to file a comment to the accuseds
motion for reconsideration of the August 11, 2000 order
denying the application for bail.
It is certainly erroneous for the respondent to rely on the
order of Judge Paterno T. Alvarez. As a responsible
judge, he should have looked into the real and hard
facts of the case before him and ascertained personally
whether the evidence of guilt is strong.14 To make things
worse, respondent Judge relied on the said July 22, 1994
order despite the fact that the same appears to have
been issued by his predecessor Judge also without a
hearing and while the accused was at large. In addition
to the requirement of a mandatory bail hearing,
respondent judge should have known the basic rule that
the right to bail can only be availed of by a person who
is in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his
liberty and it would be premature, not to say
incongruous, to file a petition for bail for someone
whose freedom has yet to be curtailed.15
In Basco v. Rapatalo,16 the Court laid down the following
rules which outlined the duties of a judge in case an
application for bail is filed:
(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation;
(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the
guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its discretion;
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the
accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;
(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong,
discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond. Otherwise, petition should be denied.
Based on the above-cited procedure and requirements,
after the hearing, the courts order granting or refusing
bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution.17 A summary is defined as a comprehensive
and usually brief abstract or digest of a text or
statement. Based on the summary of evidence, the
judge formulates his own conclusion on whether such
evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the
accused.18
In the instant case, it appears that when the respondent
judge initially granted the prosecutions motion praying
that the accused be denied bail, no hearing was
conducted. Irrespective of his opinion on the strength or
weakness of evidence of the accuseds guilt, he should

have conducted a hearing and thereafter made a

summary of the evidence for the prosecution. The
importance of a bail hearing and a summary of evidence
cannot be downplayed, these are considered aspects of
procedural due process for both the prosecution and the
defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or denial of
bail.19
The indispensable nature of a bail hearing in petitions
for bail has always been ardently and indefatigably
stressed by the Court. The Code of Judicial Conduct
enjoins judges to be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence. A judge is called upon to
exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be
conversant with basic legal principles and be aware of
well-settled authoritative doctrines. He should strive for
excellence exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the
end that he be the personification of justice and the
Rule of Law.20
In Dericto v. Bautista,21 the Court imposed a fine of
P5,000.00 on the respondent Judge for granting bail
without conducting a bail hearing. We explained therein
that although the Rules of Court authorize the
investigating judge to determine the amount of bail,
such authority does not include the outright granting of
bail without a preliminary hearing on the matter, more
so in cases where the crime charged is punishable with
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. And
while it may be true that the determination of whether
or not the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of
judicial discretion, this discretion lies not in the
determination of whether or not a hearing should be
held, but in the appreciation and evaluation of the
weight of the prosecutions evidence of guilt against the
accused.
In Goodman v. De La Victoria,22 the erring Judge was
found guilty of serious misconduct in office and ordered
to pay a fine of P5,000.00 for failing to conduct a bail
hearing in the manner required by law. It was held that
the brief inquiry conducted by the said Judge before
granting bail did not constitute the hearing mandated
by law, for such proceeding did not elicit evidence from
the prosecution to guide respondent in the proper
determination of the petition.
In Marzan-Gelacio v. Flores,23 the Court sustained the
recommendation of the OCA to impose the penalty of
fine in the amount of P10,000.00 on the erring judge for
granting bail without hearing to the accused in a rape
case.
In Cabatingan, Sr. v. Arcueno,24 the Court imposed the
penalty of fine of 15,000.00 on the investigating Judge
for denying bail on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. In
said case, the accused was arrested in the municipality
presided by the respondent judge. The Court ruled that
the latter had the authority to grant bail and to order
the release of the accused, even if the records of the
case had been transmitted for review to the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor. The Court further noted
therein that the respondent Judge was previously found
guilty of gross ignorance of the law and ordered to pay a
fine of P5,000.00, when without a hearing, he granted
bail to an accused charged with a capital offense.
In the following cases, the Court imposed a P20,000.00
fine on the Judges found to be grossly ignorant of the
rules and procedures in granting or denying bail, to wit:
(1) Manonggiring v. Ibrahim,25 where the
respondent Judge, in violation of Rule 114,
Section 17(b), of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, granted bail to the accused in a
criminal case which was then pending with
another branch involving an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death;
(2) Panganiban v. Cupin-Tesorero,26 where the
erring Municipal Trial Court Judge who
conducted the preliminary investigation
granted bail to the accused (a) without
jurisdiction and in violation of Rule 114, Section
17a, of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the corresponding Information
against the accused being pending with the

Regional Trial Court; (b) without notice to the

prosecutor of the request to approve the bail
bond in violation of Rule 114, Section 18; and
(c) without conducting a bail hearing;
(3) Tabao v. Barataman,27 and Comia v.
Antona,28 where the Judges concerned
entertained an application for bail even though
the court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the accused.
(4) Layola v. Gabo, Jr.,29 where a Regional Trial
Court Judge granted bail in a murder case
without the requisite bail hearing.
The record shows that this is not the first administrative
case of the respondent Judge. In a decision promulgated
on April 17, 2001, in RTJ-01-1627, he was found guilty of
gross inefficiency for failure to resolve a civil case within
the three-month reglementary period and consequently
ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00. For this second
infraction, respondent Judge deserves a heavier penalty.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent
Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas is ordered to pay a FINE in the
amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

With the foregoing events as backdrop, the

pertinent facts that led to the filing of this instant
petition are as follows:
On July 3, 1991, de la Pea executed an Extrajudicial Confession implicating therein Herodias and Go
in the conspiracy to kill and murder the victim.
On July 9, 1991, an Information was filed against
the three accused namely, de la Pea, Herodias and Go,
charging them with the murder of Galan, Sr. and the
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU22474. Judge Godardo Jacinto,[2] then the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, issued a
Warrant of Arrest against the accused.
On July 22, 1991 an Urgent Motion to Confine
private respondent Go in a hospital was filed.
On August 2, 1991, the hearing on said motion was
conducted with the prosecution reserving its right to
cross-examine Dr. Gonzales.
On August 6, 1991 an Order was issued to confine
private respondent Go in a hospital without the
prosecution having cross-examined Dr. Gonzales on his
medical report.
On July 15, 1992, a hearing was conducted where
de la Pea was presented as a witness for the
prosecution. Presiding Judge Agana sustained the
objections of the defense counsels each time that the
prosecution attempted to establish the conspiracy to kill
the victim. The prosecution filed a motion to inhibit
Judge Agana, which motion was denied.

THIRD DIVISION

On November 20, 1992, the Information against Go

and Herodias was dismissed with prejudice on the
ground that their right to a speedy trial had been
violated, leaving de la Pea to face trial.

[G.R. No. 135045. December 15, 2000]

The prosecution then challenged the Order of

Dismissal with Prejudice before the Court of Appeals in
CA-GR SP No. 32954. In its Decision dated April 18,
1994, the Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the
Order of Dismissal, ordered the inhibition of Judge
Agana, and ordered the raffle of the case to another
branch. With the dismissal of the appeal of private
respondent Go and co-accused Herodias by this Court in
a Minute Resolution dated June 26, 1995, the criminal
case was set anew for trial.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON.

IRENEO GAKO, JR. (Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region,
Branch 5, Cebu City) and VICENTE
GO, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45,
Rules of Court of the Resolution [1] of public respondent
Court of Appeals (Former Third Special Division) dated
August 12, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 47142, entitled
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES versus HON. IRENEO
GAKO, JR. ET. AL., dismissing the petition of the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), herein petitioner.
This instant petition stems from a murder case
filed against private respondent Vicente Go (Go) and
two co-accused Sonny Herodias (Herodias) and Leopoldo
dela Pea (de la Pea). The victim, Rafael Galan, Sr.
(Galan, Sr.), was shot dead on June 25, 1991.
Judge Priscila S. Agana (Judge Agana) originally
presided over the criminal case subject of this
petition. The prosecution sought to inhibit said judge for
her alleged collusion with the accused when she
repeatedly sustained the objections of the defense
every time the prosecution attempted to establish the
conspiracy to kill the victim. Judge Agana denied the
motion to inhibit and dismissed the case with prejudice
on the ground that the rights of the accused to a speedy
trial were violated. The prosecution challenged the
dismissal in the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 32954. In its Decision dated April 18, 1994, the
Court of Appeals set aside the order of dismissal,
granted the inhibition of the judge, and ordered the reraffle of the case. The decision of the Court of Appeals
gained finality when this Court dismissed the appeal of
private respondent Go and co-accused Herodias in a
Minute Resolution dated June 26, 1995. The criminal
case was thus set for retrial. A series of delays beset
the case when the judges to whom the case was raffled
inhibited themselves. The case was finally presided
over by public respondent Judge Ireneo Gako, Jr (Judge
Gako, Jr.).

The case was re-raffled to RTC-17 and on October

28, 1996, an Alias Warrant of Arrest was issued against
private respondent Go and co-accused Herodias.
On February 2, 1997, Dr. Matig-a, the physician of
Go, filed a Clinical Summary on the illness of Go and on
February 13, 1997 Go filed a Petition for Bail.
On March 7, 1997 and March 10, 1997, the
prosecution presented de la Pea who was acquitted in
1993. De la Pea testified on matters which he was not
allowed by then presiding Judge Agana to testify on.
On March 21, 1997, a Manifestation on the
Confinement of private respondent Vicente Go was filed
urging his arrest because he was out of the intensive
care unit.
The motion of the prosecution to transfer the
criminal case to a Special Heinous Crimes Court was
denied by then presiding Judge Jesus de la Pea (Judge
de la Pea). The case was finally assigned to Branch 5
with public respondent Judge Gako, Jr. as presiding
judge.
On September 16 and 17, 1997, the hearing was
resumed, now presided by public respondent Judge
Gako, Jr.
On September 26, 1997, an Urgent Motion to
Enforce the Alias Warrant of Arrest was filed praying for
the arrest of private respondent Go first before his
Clinical Summary Report could be heard.
On November 10, 1997, public respondent Judge
Gako, Jr. issued an Order granting the Petition for Bail of
private respondent Go.
On November 11, 1997, the prosecution filed a
Vehement Motion to Inhibit public respondent Judge
Gako, Jr. due to his alleged delay in resolving the
incidents in connection with the arrest of private
respondent Go.

On November 12, 1992, the prosecution moved for

the reconsideration of the Order of the court dated
November 10, 1997, the order which granted bail to
private respondent Go.

want of merit. Besides the accused was already

released on bail and the issue on the enforcement of the
Alias Warrants of Arrest is already moot and academic.

On November 14, 1997, a Supplemental Motion to

Inhibit public respondent Judge Gako, Jr. was filed by the
counsel of the offended party because Judge Gako, Jr.
allegedly pre-judged the evidence of the prosecution
without carefully evaluating why it is short of the
requirement to sustain a verdict of life imprisonment.

d) Order dated January 20, 1998, the dispositive portion

of which reads:

On November 15, 1997, a Supplemental Motion for

Reconsideration was filed from the Order dated
November 10, 1997 because the transcripts were
allegedly not read.
On December 1, 1997, a Motion for the Issuance
of Subpoena Duces Tecum to produce the records of Dr.
Matig-a was filed to determine if the medical findings on
private respondent Go were not exaggerated to prevent
his arrest.
On December 11, 1997, public respondent Judge
Gako, Jr. issued an Order in which he denied the
prosecutions Manifestation dated March 21, 1997 on
the confinement of private respondent Go, and the
Urgent Motion to Enforce the Alias Warrant of Arrest
dated September 26, 1997 against private respondent
Go.
On January 20, 1998, public respondent Judge
Gako, Jr. issued an Order denying the: (1) Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order dated November 10, 1997;
(2) Motion to Inhibit; and (3) Supplemental Motion to
Inhibit the Presiding Judge. The prosecution received
this order on February 10, 1998.
On March 20, 1998, private complainant
Guadalupe Galan (Galan), the widow of the victim, filed
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 471460 before public
respondent Court of Appeals. The petition sought to
annul or set aside the orders of public respondent Judge
Gako, Jr. and then acting Presiding Judge de la Pea, to
wit:
a) Order dated May 23, 1997, which set aside the
earlier order of the court that granted the re-raffle
of this case to a heinous crime court upon the
defenses motion for reconsideration.
b) Order dated November 10, 1997, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court hereby
grants bail to accused Vicente Go which is fixed
at P50,000.00, after taking into consideration, and this
fact has not been disputed, that said accused is
presently confined in the hospital and is suffering from
the following ailments:
a) Ischemic Heart Disease, S/P Coronary
Angiogram, Single Vessel Disease,
LAD, Chronic Stable Angina;
b) Essential Hypertension;
c) NIDDM

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Omnibus

Motions for Reconsideration on the order of the court
granting Bail to accused Vicente Go with Supplemental
pleading, xxx and thirdly, to disqualify the herein
Presiding Judge, are hereby denied for lack of
merit. xxx[3]
The petition was signed by the counsel of private
complainant, Atty. Antonio Guerrero with the conformity
of Vidal Gella, Prosecutor I of the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Cebu City.
On March 26, 1998, public respondent Court of
Appeals (Special Third Division) issued a Resolution
dismissing the said petition on these grounds: (1) that
the petition was not filed by the Solicitor General in
behalf of the People of the Philippines; and (2) that the
certification on non-forum shopping was signed by
counsel for petitioner Galan, not by petitioner herself. [4]
On April 14, 1998, private complainant Galan,
through counsel, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
said Resolution indicating that petitioner OSG was going
to adopt her petition. On the same date, petitioner OSG
manifested before public respondent Court of Appeals
that it was joining private complainant Galan in her
petition and was adopting her petition as its own.
On June 18, 1998, the Court of Appeals issued a
resolution that denied said motion for reconsideration of
private complainant Galan on the ground that the
certification on non-forum shopping was not signed by
therein petitioner Galan. The Court of Appeals also
reasoned that the fact that the OSG joined petitioner
Galan in her petition did not cure the above deficiency.
[5]
Petitioner OSG received copy of the resolution on June
29, 1998.
On August 3, 1998 petitioner OSG filed a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 47142.
On August 12, 1998, said petition of petitioner OSG
was dismissed by public respondent Court of Appeals,
the pertinent portions of the resolution read:
The Court notes that said petition is practically a
reproduction of the petition earlier filed by complainant
Guadalupe Galan, which was dismissed on March 26,
1998. The dismissal was reaffirmed by the Court in its
resolution dated June 18, 1998, copy of which was
received by the OSG on June 29, 1998.
Instead of seeking, on time, the amendment of the first
petition or a review of the resolution dismissing it, the
OSG has come to this Court through the instant petition
which not only raises the same matters ventilated in the
same petition but also was filed beyond the 60day period prescribed in Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition dated
July 17, 1998, is hereby DISMISSED.

d) Hypercholesterolemia; and
SO ORDERED.[6]
e) Respiratory Tract Infection
And, as per clerical summary report of Dr.
Generoso Matiga, dated February 4, 1997, the
confinement of accused Go in prison will cause his
disease to terminate fatally.
xxx
c) Order dated December 11, 1997, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Manifestation dated March 3, 1997 and the Motion to
Enforce the Alias Warrant of Arrest are hereby denied for

In seeking the allowance of this instant petition,

petitioner OSG relies upon the following grounds:
I.

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS

ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE COURSE TO
THE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF (sic)
CERTIORARI
FILED
BY
PETITIONER
DOCKETED AS CA-G.R. SP NO. 47142.

II. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS

ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SAID SPECIAL
CIVIL ACTION WAS FILED BEYOND THE
SIXTY-DAY
PERIOD
PRESCRIBED
IN
SECTION 4, RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

III.PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS

ERRED IN NOT TOUCHING ON THE MERITS
OF THE SAID PETITION.[7]
Public respondent Court of Appeals correctly ruled
that there was sufficient ground to dismiss the petition
filed by private complainant Galan since it was her
counsel who signed the certificate on non-forum
shopping and not private complainant herself. The
petition clearly failed to comply with the requirement
imposed by Section 1, Rule 65[8], in relation to Section 3,
Rule 46[9] of the 1997 Rules of Court. We also agree with
the Court of Appeals, that the mere fact that petitioner
OSG manifested that it was adopting the petition of
therein petitioner Galan did not cure the defective
petition considering that the certificate on non-forum
shopping was still not signed by petitioner Galan but by
her counsel. The manifestation of petitioner OSG also
did not contain a certification on non-forum
shopping. By the time that petitioner OSG filed its
petition for certiorari in behalf of the People of the
Philippines on August 3, 1998, the dismissal of the
petition of private complainant Galan had already been
reaffirmed and the 60-day period for petitioner OSG to
file its petition had already lapsed.
In dismissing the petition of petitioner OSG, public
respondent Court of Appeals pointed out that private
complainant Galan had no legal standing to file the
petition before it because only the Solicitor General can
represent the People before this Court (Court of
Appeals) and the Supreme Court. [10] On this point, we
differ.
In the recent case of Narciso vs. Romana-Cruz [11],
we reiterated the doctrine enunciated in People vs.
Calo[12] that:
While the rule is, as held by the Court of Appeals, only
the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent
the People or the State in criminal proceeding pending
in this Court and the Court of Appeals (Republic vs.
Partisala, 118 SCRA 320 [1982]), the ends of substantial
justice would be better served, and the issues in this
action could be determined in a more just, speedy and
inexpensive manner, by entertaining the petition at
bar. As an offended party in a criminal case, private
petitioner has sufficient personality and a valid
grievance against Judge Adaos order granting bail to
the alleged murderers of his (private petitioners) father.
In Paredes vs. Gopengco, 29 SCRA 688 (1969), this
Court ruled that the offended parties in criminal cases
have sufficient interest and personality as person(s)
aggrieved to file the special civil action of prohibition
and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 in line
with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of
the Rules of Court in order to promote their object, thus:
Furthermore, as offended parties in the pending
criminal case before petitioner judge, it cannot be
gainsaid that respondents have sufficient interest and
personality as person(s) aggrieved by petitioner
judges ruling on his non-disqualification to file the
special civil action under sections 1 and 2 of Rule
65. Recently in line with the underlying spirit of a liberal
construction of the Rules of Court in order to promote
their object, as against the literal application of Rule
110, section 2, we held, overruling the implication of an
earlier case, that a widow possesses the right as an
offended party to file a criminal complaint for the
murder of her deceased husband. (Id., p. 699)[13]
Hence, private complainant Galan had sufficient interest
and personality as the aggrieved party[14] in a criminal
case to file the special civil action for certiorari before
public respondent Court of Appeals. The proper ground
therefore for dismissing her petition is the fact that it
was her counsel who signed the certificate on nonforum shopping and not herself as petitioner.
Petitioner OSG submits that assuming that the
petition for certiorari it filed with public respondent
Court of Appeals was filed out of time, nonetheless the
following issues raised in said petition warranted
resolution:
I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DATED

NOVEMBER 10, 1997 GRANTING BAIL IS
PROPER WITHOUT EXPRESSING THE

COURTS FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE OF

GUILT OF THE ACCUSED IS NOT STRONG.
II. WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT
VICENTE GO IS CONSIDERED UNDER
LEGAL CUSTODY AS OF NOVEMBER 20,
1992 UNTIL THE PRESENT BECAUSE OF
HIS HOSPITAL CONFINEMENT BY ORDER
OF THE COURT DATED AUGUST 6, 1991.
III. WHETHER OR NOT IT IS NECESSARY THAT
CRIMINAL CASE NO. CBU-22474 SHOULD
BE TRIED BY THE SPECIAL HEINOUS
CRIMES COURT NOTWITHSTANDING THAT
THE MURDER WAS COMMITTED IN 1991
BEFORE THE PASSAGE OF THE LAW
CREATING THESE SPECIAL COURTS.
This instant petition also seeks to set aside the
following orders: (1) Order dated May 23, 1997 which
set aside the earlier order of the trial court that granted
the re-raffle of this case to a heinous crime court upon
the motion for reconsideration of the defense; (2) Order
dated November 10, 1997 that granted the bail of
accused Go in the amount of P 50,000.00; (3) Order
dated December 11, 1997 denying the Motion to
Enforce the Alias Warrants of arrest; and (4) Order dated
January 20, 1998 denying the Omnibus Motions for
Reconsideration of the order of the court granting bail to
accused Go and ruling against the disqualification of
respondent Judge Gako, Jr.
While the petition of private complainant Galan
was indeed defective in form and the petition of
petitioner OSG was demonstrably filed beyond the 60day period, we however resolve to grant this petition in
part in view of the primordial interest of substantial
justice.
The just cited issues in the petition before public
respondent Court of Appeals presented extenuating
circumstances that should have compelled the latter to
pass upon the merits of said petition. In a number of
cases,[15] we have set aside the strict application of
procedural technicalities in the higher interest of
justice. As we shall show hereunder, the issues raised
by petitioner OSG deserve disposition to avoid a
miscarriage of justice and to end the streaks of delay
which have saddled the criminal case subject of this
petition.
First, the assailed Order dated November 10, 1997
granting bail is legally infirm for failing to conform with
the requirement that in cases when the granting of bail
is not a matter of right, a hearing for that purpose must
first be conducted. Section 13, Article III of the
Constitution provides the instances when bail is a
matter of right or discretionary, to wit:
All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt
is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.
Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, reiterates that:
No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to
bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
Based on the foregoing, bail is not a matter of right
with respect to persons charged with a crime the
penalty
for
which
is reclusion
perpetua, life
imprisonment, or death, when the evidence of guilt is
strong. Private respondent Go, accused in the criminal
case, was charged with murder in 1991, before the
passage of RA 7659, the law that re-imposed the death
penalty. Murder then was a crime punishable
by reclusion perpetua. Thus, accused Gos right to bail
is merely discretionary.
We have consistently held that when bail is
discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise
in the discretion of the court, should first be conducted
to determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of

it, against the accused to enable the judge to make an

intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the
parties.[16] A summary hearing is defined as such brief
and speedy method of receiving and considering the
evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with
the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the
weight of evidence for the purposes of bail. On such
hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to
enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought
to be allowed to the evidence for or against the
accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial
or on what further evidence may be therein offered and
admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the
discretion of the court which may confine itself to
receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial
matters, avoiding unnecessary examination and cross
examination.[17]
It is inconceivable how Judge Gako, Jr. could have
appreciated the strength or weakness of the evidence of
guilt of the accused when he did not even bother to
hear the prosecution. The reliance of Judge Gako, Jr. on
the voluminous records of the case simply does not
suffice. As judge, he was mandated to conduct a
hearing on the petition for bail of the accused since he
knew that the crime charged is one that carries a
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and in that hearing, the
prosecution is entitled to present its evidence. It is
worth stressing that the prosecution is equally entitled
to due process.[18]
Another compelling reason why a hearing of a
petition for bail is necessary is to determine the amount
of bail based on the guidelines set forth in Section 6,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. [19] Without the required
hearing, the bail granted to accused Go in the amount
of P 50,000.00 is undoubtedly arbitrary and without
basis.
Second, the order granting bail issued by Judge
Gako, Jr. merely made a conclusion without a summary
of the evidence, a substantive and formal defect that
voids the grant of bail. Well settled is the rule that after
the hearing, whether the bail is granted or denied, the
presiding judge is mandated to prepare a summary of
the evidence for the prosecution. A summary is defined
as a comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest
of a text or statement. [20] Based on the summary of
evidence, the judge formulates his own conclusion on
whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the
guilt of the accused. The importance of a summary
cannot be downplayed, it is considered an aspect of
procedural due process for both the prosecution and the
defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or denial of
bail.[21]
Thus, we laid down the duties of a judge in case an
application for bail is filed, viz:
(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing for bail or
require him to submit his recommendation;
(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to
present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise
its discretion;
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused
is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution; (Italics supplied)
(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge
the accused upon the approval of the bail
bond. Otherwise, petition should be denied.[22]
In dispensing with the required hearing for bail,
Judge Gako, Jr. pointed out in the assailed order that the
accused was confined in the hospital, was suffering from
a number of ailments and that the eventual
confinement of accused Go in prison will allegedly
cause his disease to terminate fatally. [23] The
irregularity in the grant of bail however is not
attenuated since respondent judges findings were
based on the summary clinical report of Dr. Matiga
dated February 4, 1997 while the order granting bail
was issued on November 10, 1997. It could not
therefore be reasonably assumed that the actual state
of health of accused Go could still be accurately
reflected by the said medical report when nine months

had already passed from the time that said medical

report was prepared. It was therefore clear error for
Judge Gako, Jr. to depend solely on the dated medical
report in granting bail when the defense failed to
present a more recent one that would convincingly raise
strong grounds to apprehend that the imprisonment of
the accused would endanger his life.
Petitioner OSG advances the theory that the
accused, private respondent Go, is not entitled to bail
because he was allegedly not under the custody of the
law at the time that he applied for bail. Petitioner OSG
anchors this theory on the following arguments: that
the August 6, 1991order commanding the confinement
of accused Go in the hospital was void because the
prosecution was not able to cross-examine the doctor
who prepared the medical report pertaining to the
accused illnesses; that when the Information in this
case was ordered dismissed with prejudice on
November 20, 1992 by then presiding Judge Agana,
accused Go was bodily released from his confinement;
that at that point, the trial court had lost its jurisdiction
over the person of the accused; that before the
dismissal with prejudice was voided by the Court of
Appeals, accused traveled extensively abroad; that
when the case was re-raffled and finally presided by
Judge Gako, Jr. accused continued to be confined in the
hospital on the strength of the allegedly void order of
confinement dated August 6, 1991; that Judge Gako, Jr.
refused to enforce the alias warrant of arrest on the
ground that the order of confinement was still in effect;
and that accused Go voluntarily admitted himself to the
hospital, hence was not yet deprived of his liberty at the
time that he applied for bail.
We must first correct the perception that the trial
court was ousted of its jurisdiction over the person of
accused Go after Judge Agana erroneously dismissed
the case and upon the refusal of Judge Gako, Jr. to
enforce the alias warrant of arrest during the re-trial of
the case. Applicable to this issue is the basic principle
that the jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or
civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by
subsequent happenings or events although of a
character which would have prevented jurisdiction from
attaching in the first instance; and it retains jurisdiction
until it finally disposes of the case.[24]
Prior to the dismissal of the case by Judge Agana,
the court had already acquired its jurisdiction over
accused Go when he was duly arraigned on December
11, 1991.[25] The fact that this Court affirmed the
decision of the Court of Appeals that voided the order
dismissing the criminal case with prejudice is a clear
declaration that the jurisdiction of the trial court over
the criminal case and over the person of the accused
continued to subsist. With the nullification of the
dismissal of the case, it then became explicit that the
court should have tried the case to its end. The case
was ordered remanded and re-raffled because the
inhibition of then presiding Judge Agana was granted, in
no way was the jurisdiction of the trial court over the
case and over the person of the accused ever placed in
doubt.
We now discuss the theory of petitioner OSG that
the right of accused Go to bail did not accrue because
he was not under the custody of the law or deprived of
his liberty. Petitioner OSG rests this claim on the
allegations that accused Go voluntarily admitted himself
to the hospital during the re-trial of the case and that
Judge Gako, Jr. refused to enforce the alias warrant of
arrest as evidenced by the questioned Order dated
December 11, 1997.
By the very definition of bail in Section 1, Rule 114
of the Rules of Court[26], the person applying for bail
must be in the custody of the law. A person is
considered to be in the custody of the law (a) when he is
arrested either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or even without a
warrant under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section
7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court, or (b) when he
has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the court by surrendering to the proper authorities. [27]
We do not agree with petitioner OSG that accused
Go was not in custody of the law at the time that he
applied for bail. In the same assailed order, Judge Gako,
Jr. explained his refusal to enforce the alias warrant of
arrest in this manner:

Secondly, the movant wanted this court to order the

arrest of the accused in view of the Alias Warrant of
Arrest issued by Acting Judge Andres Garalza, Jr. on
October 28, 1996. For the information of the movant,
there is another Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by Judge
Jose Burgos on May 27, 1996 after he denied the
Investigation Report submitted by the Office of the Cebu
City Prosecutor which recommended the dismissal of
the case against Vicente Go.
The court believes honestly that these two (2) Alias
Warrants of Arrest were improvidently issued because at
that time the Warrant of Arrest issued by then Judge
Godardo Jacinto on July 9, 1991 was still valid and
subsisting. In fact it was this latter Warrant of Arrest
that handed to this court jurisdiction over the person of
the accused Go.
The Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by Judge Burgos has
no legal basis not only because the Warrant of Arrest
issued by Judge Jacinto is still valid and subsisting but
also for the fact that it was issued as an aftermath of
the courts denial of the Reinvestigation Report of the
Office of the Cebu City Prosecutor which recommended
the dismissal of Gos case. Under Section 6, Rule 112 of
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, the
Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant of arrest after a
preliminary investigation, not after reinvestigation when
one was already was (sic) issued.
Likewise, the Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by Judge
Garalza, which came about five months (5) later, had no
legal basis, firstly, because there was already an Alias
Warrant of Arrest issued by Judge Burgos on May 27,
1996, secondly, the Warrant of Arrest issued by Judge
Jacinto on July 9, 1991 is still valid and subsisting. But
what appears more funny is the Alias Warrant of Arrest
issued by Judge Garalza against accused Go who was at
that time lawfully confined in the hospital pursuant to
an Order of the court, dated August 6, 1991. When
Judge Garalza issued said alias (sic) Warrant of Arrest,
there was no showing that accused Go had escaped, or
refused to obey a lawful Order of the court.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Manifestation, dated March 21, 1997, and the Motion to
Enforce the Alias Warrant of Arrest are hereby denied for
want of merit. Besides, the accused was already
released on bail and the issue on the enforcement of the
Alias Warrants of Arrest is already moot and
academic.[28]
As pointed out by Judge Gako, Jr., accused Go had
already been arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest
issued by Judge Jacinto on July 9, 1991 which gave the
trial court jurisdiction over the accused. As mentioned
earlier, accused Go was duly arraigned before the case
was erroneously dismissed. From the time that accused
Go was arrested, he was already deprived of his liberty
and was in the custody of the law. At the re-trial of the
case, accused Gos confinement in the hospital was by
virtue of a court order dated August 6, 1991; the
restraint on the freedom of accused Go is
evident. There was therefore no more need to enforce
the alias warrant of arrest since accused Go was still
under the custody of the law, and there being no
evidence that accused Go had escaped or refused to
obey a lawful order of the court. At this point, the
setting aside of the questioned order dated December
11, 1997 that denied the enforcement of the alias
warrant of arrest against accused Go has become moot
and academic with the provisional freedom of accused
Go after his bail was erroneously granted by Judge
Gako, Jr.
We however find merit in the argument of
petitioner OSG that the order dated August 6, 1991
authorizing the confinement of accused Go in the
hospital was, in the words of petitioner OSG, a
continuing one and built-in license for the accused to
automatically confine himself as many times as he
likes. It may be true that said order subsisted for it
was never quashed, but at the re-trial of the case, the
prosecution through its motion to enforce the alias
warrant of arrest dated September 26, 1997 had already
put in issue the health of the accused. Yet, Judge Gako,
Jr. in an Order dated December 11, 1997 justified the
confinement of accused Go in the hospital on the basis
of the August 6, 1991 order of confinement.

The prosecution vigorously objected to the

confinement of accused Go in the hospital, questioning
the alleged ill health of the accused. Judge Gako, Jr. was
called upon to rule on this matter and instead of
ascertaining the true state of health of said accused,
Judge Gako, Jr. instead inexplicably relied on a court
order authorizing the confinement of accused Go in the
hospital, an order that was issued six years ago. The
proper course of action in this case should have been to
recall the order of confinement and to order the
detention of accused Go until the defense could prove
through competent evidence that the imprisonment of
said accused would imperil his health. The order to
arrest accused Go in such case would be the
consequence of the recall of the order of confinement,
not for the purpose of placing him under the custody of
the law since to repeat, he already was under the
custody of the law.
As discussed earlier, accused Go is currently
already out on bail,[29] the granting of which is void for
want of a hearing and summary of evidence. In cases
when the grant of bail is void, this Court will not hesitate
to set aside the order granting bail and order that the
accused be recommitted to jail pending his application
for bail,[30] as this Court now holds in the case at bar.
As to the issue of whether or not public respondent
Judge Gako, Jr. should be inhibited on the ground of
partiality, the relevant provision to consider is Section 1,
Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, it provides:
SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges.No judge or
judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his
wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,
creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either
party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of civil law, or in which
he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee
or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior
court when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review, without the written consent of all parties in
interest, signed by them and entered upon the records.
A judge, may in the exercise of his sound discretion,
disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid
reasons other than those mentioned above.
The ground of partiality is not one of the grounds
enumerated in the first paragraph of the just quoted
provision that would per se disqualify a judge from
sitting in a case. Jurisprudence is clear that partiality is
a recognized ground for the voluntary inhibition of the
judge under the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule
137.[31] In this case, Judge Gako, Jr. has already ruled in
the assailed Order dated January 20, 1998 that he will
not inhibit himself.
To overturn the ruling of Judge Gako, Jr. and rule for
his disqualification, there must be clear and convincing
evidence to prove the charge of partiality. Material to
this issue are the following parameters we have set in
disqualifying a judge: mere suspicion that a judge was
partial to a party is not enough; that there should be
adequate evidence to prove the charge; that there must
be showing that the judge had an interest, personal or
otherwise, in the prosecution of the case at bar; and
that to be disqualifying, the bias and prejudice must be
shown to have stemmed from an extra-judicial source
and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis
other than what the judge learned from his participation
in the case.[32]
Petitioner OSG accuses Judge Gako, Jr. of partiality
supposedly shown by the grant of bail without a hearing
and the alleged suppression of the hearing on the
Clinical Summary Report of the accused. Again, to
successfully disqualify a judge on the ground of bias or
partiality, there must be concrete proof that a judge has
a personal interest in the case and his bias is shown to
have stemmed from an extra-judicial source. This
precept springs from the presumption that a judge shall
decide on the merits of a case with an unclouded vision
of its facts.[33] Thus, we have held that an erroneous
ruling on the grant of bail alone does not constitute
evidence of bias.[34] Likewise, respondent judges
reliance on the order of confinement even if erroneous
is not sufficient to point to a conclusion that he was
manifestly partial to the defense. To allow the
disqualification of a judge on the mere allegation of

partiality with nothing more would open the floodgates

to forum shopping.[35]
Corollary to the foregoing, we do not find well
taken the recommendation of petitioner OSG that the
criminal case be raffled to a Special Heinous Crimes
Court. Even petitioner OSG concededly recognizes that
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 51-96 dated
May 3, 1996 creating the Special Heinous Crimes Court
provides that: All cases covered by this order where
trial has already been commenced shall continue to be
heard by the branches to which these were originally
assigned. Supreme Court Administrative Order No.
104-96 dated October 21, 1996 which amended
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 51-96, also
contains a similar provision, to wit: Where trial has
already begun, the same shall continue to be heard by
the respective branches to which they have been
originally assigned. For purposes hereof, a criminal
case is considered begun when the accused or any of
them has already been arraigned; in a civil case, it is
when pre-trial has already been conducted and a pretrial order issued.
We thus see no cogent reason to set aside the
order dated May 23, 1997 that denied the transfer of
Criminal Case No. CBU-22474 to a Special Heinous
Crimes Court when the trial of the case has already
begun and when the crime for which the accused is
being charged with occurred prior to the creation of the
Special Heinous Crimes Court. Furthermore, there are
no extraordinary circumstances that would compel this
Court to exercise its power under the Constitution to
order a change of venue or place of trial.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
assailed resolution of public respondent Court of
Appeals dated August 12, 1998 is SET ASIDE. The order
dated November 10, 1997 of the trial court in Criminal
Case No. CBU-22474 is SET ASIDE for being void in so
far as it grants bail to the accused and the accused is
ordered recommitted to jail pending the hearing on the
bail application. The order dated May 23, 1997 denying
the re-raffle of Criminal Case No. CBU-22474 to a
Special Heinous Crimes Court and the resolution dated
January 20, 1997 ruling against the inhibition of
presiding
Judge
Ireneo
Gako,
Jr.
are
hereby
AFFIRMED. The court a quo is ordered to proceed with
dispatch in the disposition of this case.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 99289-90 January 27, 1993

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman; GUALBERTO
J. DE LA LLANA, Special Prosecutor;
SANDIGANBAYAN and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA, respondents.
Marciano P. Defensor for petitioner.
Nestor P. Ifurong for Maria S. Tatoy.

Hearing." Despite the impropriety of the mode adopted

in elevating the issue to us, as will hereinafter be
discussed, we will disregard the procedural gaffe in the
interest of an early resolution hereof.
The chronology of events preceding the instant motion
is best summarized to readily provide a clear
understanding and perspective of our disposition of this
matter, thus:
1. On May 13, 1991, an information dated May 9, 1991
and docketed as Criminal Case No. 16698 was filed
against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for alleged
violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.
2. On May 14, 1991, an order of arrest was issued in
said case against herein petitioner by Presiding Justice
Francis E. Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, with bail
for the release of the accused fixed at P15,000.00. 1
3. On even date, petitioner filed an "Urgent Exparte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in
Behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago," 2 which
pertinently states in part:
xxx xxx xxx
3. As a result of the vehicular collision,
she suffered extensive physical
injuries which required surgical
intervention. As of this time, her
injuries, specifically in the jaw or gum
area of the mouth, prevents her to
speak (sic) because of extreme pain.
Further, she cannot for an extended
period be on her feet because she is
still in physical pain. . . . .
4. On the other hand, the accused
Miriam Defensor Santiago seeks leave
of this Honorable Court that she be
considered as having placed herself
under the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, for purposes of the
required trial and other proceedings
and further seeks leave of this
Honorable Court that the
recommended bail bond of P15,000.00
that she is posting in cash be
accepted.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed
of this Honorable Court that the bail
bond she is posting in the amount of
P15,000.00 be duly accepted, and that
by this motion, she be considered as
having placed herself under the
custody of this Honorable Court and
dispensing of her personal
appearance for now until such time
she will (sic) have recovered
sufficiently from her recent near fatal
accident.
Further, on the above basis, it is also
respectfully prayed that the warrant
for her arrest be immediately recalled.

Danilo C. Cunanan for respondents.

xxx xxx xxx
RESOLUTION

REGALADO, J.:
Filed directly with the Court, ostensibly as an incident in
the present special civil action, is petitioner's so-called
"Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing
its Hold Departure Order with Prayer for the Issuance of
a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction, with Motion to Set Pending Incident for

4. Also on the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued a

resolution 3 authorizing petitioner to post a cash bond
for her provisional liberty without need for her physical
appearance until June 5, 1991 at the latest, unless by
that time her condition does not yet permit her physical
appearance before said court. On May 15, 1991,
petitioner filed a cash bond in the amount of
P15,000.00, aside from the other legal fees. 4
5. On May 21, 1991, respondent Ombudsman Conrado
M. Vasquez filed with the Sandiganbayan a

manifestation "that accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago

appeared in his office in the second floor of the Old
NAWASA Building located in Arroceros Street, Ermita,
Manila at around 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon of May
20, 1991. She was accompanied by a brother who
represented himself to be Atty. Arthur Defensor and a
lady who is said to be a physician. She came and left
unaided, after staying for about fifteen minutes. 5
6. Acting on said manifestation, the Sandiganbayan
issued a resolution also on May 21, 1991, setting the
arraignment of the accused for May 27, 1991, and
setting aside the court's resolution of May 14, 1991
which ordered her appearance before the deputy clerk
of the First Division of said court on or before June 5,
1991. 6
7. In a motion dated May 22, 1991, petitioner asked that
her cash bond be cancelled and that she be allowed
provisional liberty upon a recognizance. She contended
that for her to continue remaining under bail bond may
imply to other people that she has intentions of fleeing,
an intention she would like to prove as baseless. 7
8. Likewise on May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with this
Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction, and a subsequent addendum
thereto, seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the
Regional Trial Court of Manila from proceeding with
Criminal Cases Nos. 12298 (for violation of Section 3[e]
of Republic Act No. 3019), 91-94555 (violation of
Presidential Decree No. 46), and 91-94897 (for libel),
respectively. Consequently, a temporary restraining
order was issued by this Court on May 24, 1991,
enjoining the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 3, from proceeding with the
criminal cases pending before them. This Court, in
issuing said order, took into consideration the fact that
according to petitioner, her arraignment, originally set
for June 5, 1991, was inexplicably advanced to May 27,
1991, hence the advisability of conserving and affording
her the opportunity to avail herself of any remedial right
to meet said contingency.
9. On May 27, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued an order
deferring: (a) the arraignment of petitioner until further
advice from the Supreme Court; and (b) the
consideration of herein petitioner's motion to cancel her
cash bond until further initiative from her through
counsel. 8
10. On January 18, 1992, this Court rendered a decision
dismissing the petition for certiorari and lifting and
setting aside the temporary restraining order previously
issued. 9 The motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner was eventually denied with finality in this
Court's resolution dated September 10, 1992.
11. Meanwhile, in a resolution adopted on July 6, 1992,
the Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order
against petitioner which reads as follows:
Considering the information in media
to the effect that accused Santiago
intends to leave the country soon for
an extended stay abroad for study
purposes, considering the recent
decision of the Supreme Court
dismissing her petition promulgated
on January 13, 1992, although the
same is still subject of a Motion for
Reconsideration from the accused,
considering that the accused has not
yet been arraigned, nor that she has
not (sic) even posted bail the same
having been by reason of her earlier
claim of being seriously indisposed, all
of which were overtaken by a
restraining order issued by the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 99289 and
No. 99290 dated May 24, 1991, the
accused is ordered not to leave the
country and the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation is
ordered not to allow the departure of
the accused unless authorized from
(sic) this Court. 10

The hold departure order was issued by reason of the

announcement made by petitioner, which was widely
publicized in both print and broadcast media, that she
would be leaving for the United States to accept a
fellowship supposedly offered by the John F. Kennedy
School of Government at Harvard University. Petitioner
likewise disclosed that she would be addressing Filipino
communities in the United States in line with her
crusade against election fraud and other aspects of
graft and corruption.
In the instant motion submitted for our resolution,
petitioner argues that:
1. The Sandiganbayan acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the hold departure order considering
that it had not acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the petitioner.
2. The Sandiganbayan blatantly
disregarded basic principles of judicial
comity and due deference owing to a
superior tribunal when it issued the
hold departure order despite the
pendency of petitioner's motion for
reconsideration with this Honorable
Court.
3. The right to due process of law, the
right to travel and the right to
freedom of speech are preferred, preeminent rights enshrined not only in
the Constitution but also in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
which can be validly impaired only
under stringent criteria which do not
obtain in the instant case.
4. The hold departure order in the
instant case was issued under
disturbing circumstances which
suggest political harassment and
persecution.
5. On the basis of petitioner's
creditable career in the bench and bar
and her characteristic transparency
and candor, there is no reasonable
ground to fear that petitioner will
surreptitiously flee the country to
evade judicial processes. 11
I. Petitioner initially postulates that respondent court
never acquired jurisdiction over her person considering
that she has neither been arrested nor has she
voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact that she has
not validly posted bail since she never personally
appeared before said court. We reject her thesis for
being factually and legally untenable.
It has been held that where after the filing of the
complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the
accused is issued by the trial court and the accused
either voluntarily submitted himself to the court or was
duly arrested, the court thereby acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the accused. 12 The voluntary
appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by
his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to
quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the
court's jurisdiction thereover, appearing for
arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the
matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the
provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same
cannot be posted before custody of the accused has
been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his
arrest or voluntary surrender. 13
In the case at bar, it becomes essential, therefore, to
determine whether respondent court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of herein petitioner and,
correlatively, whether there was a valid posting of bail
bond.

We find and so hold that petitioner is deemed to have

voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of
respondent court upon the filing of her aforequoted
"Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail
Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago"
wherein she expressly sought leave "that she be
considered as having placed herself under the
jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the
required trial and other proceedings," and categorically
prayed "that the bail bond she is posting in the amount
of P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that by said
motion "she be considered as having placed herself
under the custody" of said court. Petitioner cannot now
be heard to claim otherwise for, by her own
representations, she is effectively estopped from
asserting the contrary after she had earlier recognized
the jurisdiction of the court and caused it to exercise
that jurisdiction over the aforestated pleadings she filed
therein.
It cannot be denied that petitioner has posted a cash
bail bond of P15,000.00 for her provisional release as
evidenced by Official Receipt No. 4292925 dated May
15, 1991 and which is even attached as Annex C-2 to
her own motion now under consideration. This is further
buttressed by the fact that petitioner thereafter also
filed a motion for the cancellation of said cash bond and
for the court to allow her provisional liberty upon the
security of a recognizance. With the filing of the
foregoing motions, petitioner should accordingly and
necessarily admit her acquiescence to and
acknowledgment of the propriety of the cash bond she
posted, instead of adopting a stance which ignores the
injunction for candor and sincerity in dealing with the
courts of justice.
Petitioner would also like to make capital of the fact that
she did not personally appear before respondent court
to file her cash bond, thereby rendering the same
ineffectual. Suffice it to say that in this case, it was
petitioner herself, in her motion for the acceptance of
the cash bond, who requested respondent court to
dispense with her personal appearance until she shall
have recovered sufficiently from her vehicular accident.
It is distressing that petitioner should now turn around
and fault respondent court for taking a compassionate
stand on the matter and accommodating her own
request for acceptance of the cash bond posted in her
absence.
II. Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan disregarded
the rule of judicial comity when it issued the hold
departure order despite the pendency of her motion for
reconsideration of the decision of this Court which
dismissed her petition. She claims that if the principle of
judicial comity applies to prevent a court from
interfering with the proceedings undertaken by a
coordinate court, with more reason should it operate to
prevent an inferior court, such as the Sandiganbayan,
from interfering with the instant case where a motion
for reconsideration was still pending before this Court.
She contends further that the hold departure order
contravenes the temporary restraining order previously
issued by this court enjoining the Sandiganbayan from
proceeding with the criminal case pending before it.
It will be remembered that the Court rendered a
decision in the present case on January 18, 1992
dismissing the petition for certiorari filed in this case
and lifting and setting aside the temporary restraining
order it previously issued. It is petitioner's submission
that the filing of her motion for reconsideration stayed
the lifting of the temporary restraining order, hence
respondent court continued to be enjoined from acting
on and proceeding with the case during the pendency of
the motion for reconsideration. We likewise reject this
contention which is bereft of merit.
Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that,
unless otherwise ordered by the court, a judgment in an
action for injunction shall not be stayed after its
rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the
pendency of an appeal. And, the rule is that the
execution of a judgment decreeing the dissolution of a
writ of preliminary injunction shall not be stayed before
an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an
appeal, 14 and we see no reason why the foregoing
considerations should not apply to a temporary
restraining order. The rationale therefor is that even in

cases where an appeal is taken from a judgment

dismissing an action on the merits, the appeal does not
suspend the judgment, hence the general rule applies
that a temporary injunction terminates automatically on
the dismissal of the action. 15
It has similarly been held that an order of dissolution of
an injunction may be immediately effective, even
though it is not final. 16 A dismissal, discontinuance, or
non-suit of an action in which a restraining order or
temporary injunction has been granted operates as a
dissolution of the restraining order or temporary
injunction 17 and no formal order of dissolution is
necessary to effect such dissolution. 18 Consequently, a
special order of the court is necessary for the
reinstatement of an injunction. 19 There must be a new
exercise of .judicial power. 20
The reason advanced in support of the general rule has
long since been duly explained, to wit:
. . . The court of this State, relying
upon the last of the two clauses
quoted, held that an appeal from an
order dissolving an injunction
continued the injunction in force. The
evils which would result from such a
holding are forcibly pointed out by
Judge Mitchell in a dissenting opinion.
He said: "Although a plaintiff's papers
are so insufficient on their face or so
false in their allegations that if he
should apply on notice for an
injunction, any court would, on a
hearing, promptly refuse to grant one,
yet, if he can find anywhere in the
State a judge or court commissioner
who will improvidently grant one ex
parte, which the court on the first and
only hearing ever had dissolves, he
can, by appealing and filing a bond,
make the ex parte injunction
impervious to all judicial interference
until the appeal is determined in this
court." . . . Such a result is so unjust
and so utterly inconsistent with all
known rules of equity practice that no
court should adopt such a
construction unless absolutely shut up
to it by the clear and unequivocal
language of the statute. . . . . 21
This ruling has remained undisturbed over the decades
and was reiterated in a case squarely in point and of
more recent vintage:
The SEC's orders dated June 27, 1989
and July 21, 1989 (directing the
secretary of UDMC to call a
stockholders' meeting, etc.) are not
premature, despite the petitioners
then pending motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the
Court of Appeals. The lifting by the
Court of Appeals of its writ of
preliminary injunction in C.A.-G.R. SP
No. 17435 cleared the way for the
implementation by the SEC's en
banc resolution in SEC EB Case No.
191. The SEC need not wait for the
Court of Appeals to resolve the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration
for a judgment decreeing the
dissolution of a preliminary injunction
is immediately executory. It shall not
be stayed after its rendition and
before an appeal is taken or during
the pendency of an appeal. . . . .22
On the bases of the foregoing pronouncements, there is
no question that with the dismissal of the petition
forcertiorari and the lifting of the restraining order,
nothing stood to hinder the Sandiganbayan from acting
on and proceeding with the criminal cases filed against
herein petitioner. At any rate, as we have earlier
mentioned, the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner was denied with finality in our resolution
dated September 10, 1992.

Petitioner further posits, however, that the filing of the

instant special civil action for certiorari divested the
Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction over the case therein.
Whether generated by misconception or design, we
shall address this proposition which, in the first place,
had no reason for being and should not hereafter be
advanced under like or similar procedural scenarios.
The original and special civil action filed with this Court
is, for all intents and purposes, an invocation for the
exercise of its supervisory powers over the lower courts.
It does not have the effect of divesting the inferior
courts of jurisdiction validly acquired over the case
pending before them. It is elementary that the mere
pendency of a special civil action for certiorari,
commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower
court, does not even interrupt the course of the latter
when there is no writ of injunction restraining it. 23 The
inevitable conclusion is that for as long as no writ of
injunction or restraining order is issued in the special
civil action for certiorari, no impediment exists and
there is nothing to prevent the lower court from
exercising its jurisdiction and proceeding with the case
pending before it. And, even if such injunctive writ or
order is issued, the lower court nevertheless continues
to retain its jurisdiction over the principal action.
III. It is further submitted by petitioner that the hold
departure order violates her right to due process, right
to travel and freedom of speech.
First, it is averred that the hold departure order was
issued without notice and hearing. Much is made by
petitioner of the fact that there was no showing that a
motion to issue a hold departure order was filed by the
prosecution and, instead, the same was issued ex mero
motu by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner is in error.
Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be
said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in
addition to those expressly conferred on them. 24 These
inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for
the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; 25 or
essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the
courts, 26 as well as to the due administration of
justice; 27 or are directly appropriate, convenient and
suitable to the execution of their granted powers; 28 and
include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction
and render it effective in behalf of the litigants. 29
Therefore, while a court may be expressly granted the
incidental powers necessary to effectuate its
jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of
prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and usual
incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject
to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every
regularly constituted court has the power to do all
things that are reasonably necessary for the
administration of justice within the scope of its
jurisdiction. Hence, demands, matters, or questions
ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main
action, and coming within the above principles, may be
taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since
such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the
principal matter, even though the court may thus be
called on to consider and decide matters which, as
original causes of action, would not be within its
cognizance.
Furthermore, a court has the inherent power to make
interlocutory orders necessary to protect its
jurisdiction. 30Such being the case, with more reason
may a party litigant be subjected to proper coercive
measures where he disobeys a proper order, or commits
a fraud on the court or the opposing party, the result of
which is that the jurisdiction of the court would be
ineffectual. What ought to be done depends upon the
particular circumstances.31
Turning now to the case at bar, petitioner does not deny
and, as a matter of fact, even made a public statement
that she had every intention of leaving the country
allegedly to pursue higher studies abroad. We uphold
the course of action adopted by the Sandiganbayan in
taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioner's plan to
go abroad and in thereafter issuing sua sponte the hold
departure order, in justified consonance with our
preceding disquisition. To reiterate, the hold departure

order is but an exercise of respondent court's inherent

power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of
its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the
accused.
Second, petitioner asseverates that considering that she
is leaving for abroad to pursue further studies, there is
no sufficient justification for the impairment of her
constitutional right to travel; and that under Section 6,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the right to travel
may be impaired only when so required in the interest of
national security, public safety or public health, as may
be provided by law.
It will be recalled that petitioner has posted bail which
we have declared legally valid and complete despite the
absence of petitioner at the time of filing thereof, by
reason of the peculiar circumstances and grounds
hereinbefore enunciated and which warrant a relaxation
of the aforecited doctrine in Feliciano. Perforce, since
under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail
bond she holds herself amenable at all times to the
orders and processes of the court, she may legally be
prohibited from leaving the country during the
pendency of the case. This was the ruling we handed
down in Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 32 to the
effect that:
A court has the power to prohibit a
person admitted to bail from leaving
the Philippines. This is a necessary
consequence of the nature and
function of a bail bond.
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court defines bail as the security
required and given for the release of a
person who is in custody of the law,
that he will appear before any court in
which his appearance may be required
as stipulated in the bail bond or
recognizance.
Its object is to relieve the accused of
imprisonment and the state of the
burden of keeping him, pending the
trial, and at the same time, to put the
accused as much under the power of
the court as if he were in custody of
the proper officer, and to secure the
appearance of the accused so as to
answer the call of the court and do
what the law may require of him.
The condition imposed upon petitioner
to make himself available at all times
whenever the court requires his
presence operates as a valid
restriction on his right to travel. As we
have held in People vs. Uy Tuising, 61
Phil. 404 (1935):
. . . the result of the
obligation assumed
by appellee (surety)
to hold the accused
amenable at all
times to the orders
and processes of the
lower court, was to
prohibit said
accused from
leaving the
jurisdiction of the
Philippines, because,
otherwise, said
orders and
processes will be
nugatory, and
inasmuch as the
jurisdiction of the
courts from which
they issued does not
extend beyond that
of the Philippines
they would have no
binding force

outside of said
jurisdiction.
Indeed, if the accused were allowed to
leave the Philippines without sufficient
reason, he may be placed beyond the
reach of the courts.
This was reiterated in a more recent case where we
held:
Petitioner thus theorizes that under
the 1987 Constitution, Courts can
impair the right to travel only on the
grounds of "national security, public
safety, or public health."
The submission is not well taken.
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution should be interpreted to
mean that while the liberty of travel
may be impaired even without Court
Order, the appropriate executive
officers or administrative authorities
are not armed with arbitrary discretion
to impose limitations. They can
impose limits only on the basis of
"national security, public safety, or
public health" and "as may be
provided by law," a limitive phrase
which did not appear in the 1973 text
(The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin, G.,
S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 197, p. 263).
Apparently, the phraseology in the
1987 Constitution was a reaction to
the ban on international travel
imposed under the previous regime
when there was a Travel Processing
Center, which issued certificates of
eligibility to travel upon application of
an interested party (See Salonga v.
Hermoso & Travel Processing Center,
No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA
121).
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution should by no means be
construed as delimiting the inherent
power of the Courts to use all means
necessary to carry their orders into
effect in criminal cases pending before
them. When by law jurisdiction is
conferred on a Court or judicial officer,
all auxiliary writs, processes and other
means necessary to carry it into effect
may be employed by such Court or
officer (Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of
Court).
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Holding an accused in a criminal
case within the reach of the Courts by
preventing his departure from the
Philippines must be considered as a
valid restriction on his right to travel
so that he may be dealt with in
accordance with law. The offended
party in any criminal proceeding is the
People of the Philippines. It is to their
best interest that criminal
prosecutions should run their course
and proceed to finality without undue
delay, with an accused holding himself
amenable at all times to Court Orders
and processes. 33
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in
this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for
that matter, the same may be said of a number of
litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard
the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking
relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the
same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of
their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even
mandated bylaw to be sought therein. This practice

must be stopped, not only because of the imposition

upon the precious time of this Court but also because of
the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or
otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often
has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the
proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better
equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a
trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy
that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless
the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and
calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we elucidate
that such policy includes the matter of petitions or
motions involving hold departure orders of the trial or
lower courts. Parties with pending cases therein should
apply for permission to leave the country from the very
same courts which, in the first instance, are in the best
position to pass upon such applications and to impose
the appropriate conditions therefor since they are
conversant with the facts of the cases and the
ramifications or implications thereof. Where, as in the
present case, a hold departure order has been issued ex
parte or motu propio by said court, the party concerned
must first exhaust the appropriate remedies therein,
through a motion for reconsideration or other proper
submissions, or by the filing of the requisite application
for travel abroad. Only where all the conditions and
requirements for the issuance of the extraordinary writs
of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus indubitably obtain
against a disposition of the lower courts may our power
of supervision over said tribunals be invoked through
the appropriate petition assailing on jurisdictional or
clearly valid grounds their actuations therein.
WHEREFORE, with respect to and acting on the motion
now before us for resolution, the same is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
PADERANGA V. PEOPLE

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 79269 June 5, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PROCORO J. DONATO, in his official capacity
as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
XII, Manila; RODOLFO C. SALAS, alias Commander
Bilog, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Jose Suarez, Romeo Capulong, Efren Mercado and
Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity,
Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI) for Rodolfo Salas.

government and its laws, the

country's territory or part of it;
That from 1970 to the present, the
above-named accused in their
capacities as leaders of the
aforenamed organizations, in
conspiracy with, and in support of the
cause of, the organizations
aforementioned, engaged themselves
in war against the forces of the
government, destroying property or
committing serious violence, and
other acts in the pursuit of their
unlawful purpose, such as . . .
(then follows the enumeration of
specific acts committed before and
after February 1986).
At the time the Information was filed the private
respondent and his co-accused were in military custody
following their arrest on 29 September 1986 at the
Philippine General Hospital, Taft Ave., Manila; he had
earlier escaped from military detention and a cash
reward of P250,000.00 was offered for his
capture. 4

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

The People of the Philippines, through the Chief State
Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, the City Fiscal
of Manila and the Judge Advocate General, filed the
instant petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a
prayer for restraining order/preliminary injunction, to set
aside the order of respondent Judge dated July 7, 1987
granting bail to the accused Rodolfo
Salas alias "Commander Bilog" in Criminal Case No. 8648926 for Rebellion, 1 and the subsequent Order dated
July 30, 1987 granting the motion for reconsideration of
16 July 1987 by increasing the bail bond from
P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 but denying petitioner's
supplemental motion for reconsideration of July 17,
1987 which asked the court to allow petitioner to
present evidence in support of its prayer for a
reconsideration of the order of 7 July 1987.
The pivotal issues presented before Us are whether the
right to bail may, under certain circumstances, be
denied to a person who is charged with an otherwise
bailable offense, and whether such right may be waived.
The following are the antecedents of this petition:
In the original Information 2 filed on 2 October 1986 in
Criminal Case No. 86-48926 of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, later amended in an Amended
Information 3 which was filed on 24 October 1986,
private respondent Rodolfo Salas, alias "Commander
Bilog", and his co-accused were charged for the crime of
rebellion under Article 134, in relation to Article 135, of
the Revised Penal Code allegedly committed as follows:
That in or about 1968 and for some
time before said year and
continuously thereafter until the
present time, in the City of Manila and
elsewhere in the Philippines, the
Communist Party of the Philippines, its
military arm, the New People's Army,
its mass infiltration network, the
National Democratic Front with its
other subordinate organizations and
fronts, have, under the direction and
control of said organizations' leaders,
among whom are the aforenamed
accused, and with the aid,
participation or support of members
and followers whose whereabouts and
identities are still unknown, risen
publicly and taken arms throughout
the country against the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines for
the purpose of overthrowing the
present Government, the seat of
which is in the City of Manila, or of
removing from the allegiance to that

A day after the filing of the original information, or on 3

October 1986, a petition for habeas corpus for private
respondent and his co-accused was filed with this
Court 5 which, as shall hereafter be discussed in detail,
was dismissed in Our resolution of 16 October 1986 on
the basis of the agreement of the parties under which
herein private respondent "will remain in legal custody
and will face trial before the court having custody over
his person" and the warrants for the arrest of his coaccused are deemed recalled and they shall be
immediately released but shall submit themselves to
the court having jurisdiction over their person.
On November 7, 1986 , private respondent filed with the
court below a Motion to Quash the Information alleging
that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense;
(b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the
persons of the defendants; and (d) the criminal action or
liability has been extinguished, 6 to which petitioner
filed an Opposition 7 citing, among other grounds, the
fact that in the Joint Manifestation and Motion dated
October 14, 1986, in G.R. No. 76009, private respondent
categorically conceded that:
xxx xxx xxx
Par. 2 (B) Petitioner Rodolfo Salas
will remain in legal custody and face
trial before the court having custody
over his person.
In his Order of March 6, 1987, 8 respondent Judge denied
the motion to quash.
Instead of asking for a reconsideration of said Order,
private respondent filed on 9 May 1987 a petition for
bail, 9which herein petitioner opposed in an Opposition
filed on 27 May 1987 10 on the ground that since
rebellion became a capital offense under the provisions
of P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834, which amended Article
135 of the Revised Penal Code, by imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death on those who promote,
maintain, or head a rebellion the accused is no longer
entitled to bail as evidence of his guilt is strong.
On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No.
187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and
1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of
the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the
amendatory decrees. Thus, the original penalty for
rebellion, prision mayor and a fine not to exceed
P20,000.00, was restored.
Executive Order No. 187 was published in the Official
Gazette in its June 15, 1987 issue (Vol. 83, No. 24) which
was officially released for circulation on June 26, 1987.

In his Order of 7 July 1987 11 respondent Judge, taking

into consideration Executive Order No. 187, granted
private respondent's petition for bail, fixed the bail bond
at P30,000.00 and imposed upon private respondent the
additional condition that he shall report to the court
once every two (2) months within the first ten (10) days
of every period thereof. In granting the petition
respondent Judge stated:
. . . There is no more debate that with
the effectivity of Executive Order No.
187, the offense of rebellion, for which
accused Rodolfo Salas is herein
charged, is now punishable with the
penalty ofprision mayor and a fine not
exceeding P20,000.00, which makes it
now bailable pursuant to Section 13,
Article III, 1986 Constitution and
Section 3, Rule 114, 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Unlike the old
rule, bail is now a matter of right in
non-capital offenses before final
judgment. This is very evident upon a
reading of Section 3, Rule 114,
aforementioned, in relation to Section
21, same rule. In view, therefore, of
the present circumstances in this
case, said accused-applicant is now
entitled to bail as a matter of right
inasmuch as the crime of rebellion
ceased to be a capital offense.
As to the contention of herein petitioner that it would be
dangerous to grant bail to private respondent
considering his stature in the CPP-NPA hierarchy, whose
ultimate and overriding goal is to wipe out all vestiges
of our democracy and to replace it with their ideology,
and that his release would allow his return to his
organization to direct its armed struggle to topple the
government before whose courts he invokes his
constitutional right to bail, respondent Judge replied:
True, there now appears a clash
between the accused's constitutional
right to bail in a non-capital offense,
which right is guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights and, to quote again the
prosecution, "the existence of the
government that bestows the right,
the paramount interest of the state."
Suffice to state that the Bill of Rights,
one of which is the right to bail, is a
"declaration of the rights of the
individual, civil, political and social
and economic, guaranteed by the
Constitution against impairment or
intrusion by any form of governmental
action. Emphasis is placed on the
dignity of man and the worth of
individual. There is recognition of
certain inherent and inalienable rights
of the individual, which the
government is prohibited from
violating" (Quisumbing-Fernando,
Philippine Constitutional Law, 1984
Edition, p. 77). To this Court, in case of
such conflict as now pictured by the
prosecution, the same should be
resolved in favor of the individual who,
in the eyes of the law, is alone in the
assertion of his rights under the Bill of
Rights as against the State. Anyway,
the government is that powerful and
strong, having the resources,
manpower and the wherewithals to
fight those "who oppose, threathen
(sic) and destroy a just and orderly
society and its existing civil and
political institutions." The
prosecution's fear may or may not be
founded that the accused may later
on jump bail and rejoin his comrades
in the field to sow further disorders
and anarchy against the duly
constituted authorities. But, then,
such a fear can not be a reason to
deny him bail. For the law is very
explicit that when it comes to bailable
offenses an accused is entitled as a

matter of light to bail. Dura est lex

sed lex.
In a motion to reconsider 12 the above order filed on 16
July 1987, petitioner asked the court to increase the bail
from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00 alleging therein that
per Department of Justice Circular No. 10 dated 3 July
1987, the bail for the, provisional release of an accused
should be in an amount computed at P10,000.00 per
year of imprisonment based on the medium penalty
imposable for the offense and explaining that it is
recommending P100,000.00 because the private
respondent "had in the past escaped from the custody
of the military authorities and the offense for which he is
charged is not an ordinary crime, like murder, homicide
or robbery, where after the commission, the perpetrator
has achieved his end" and that "the rebellious acts are
not consummated until the well-organized plan to
overthrow the government through armed struggle and
replace it with an alien system based on a foreign
ideology is attained."
On 17 July 1987, petitioner filed a supplemental motion
for reconsideration 13 indirectly asking the court to deny
bail to the private respondent and to allow it to present
evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable
probability that the accused will not comply with this
main condition of his bail to appear in court for trial,"
a conclusion it claims to be buttressed "by the following
facts which are widely known by the People of the
Philippines and which this Honorable Court may have
judicial notice of:
1. The accused has evaded the
authorities for thirteen years and was
an escapee from detention when
arrested;
2. He was not arrested at his
residence as he had no known
address;
3. He was using the false name
"Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time
of his arrest and presented a Driver's
License to substantiate his false
identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan,
Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a
false address;
5. He and his companions were on
board a private vehicle with a
declared owner whose identity and
address were also found to be false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A
dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of
P250,000.00 was offered and paid for
his arrest,
which "clearly indicate that the accused does not
entertain the slightest intention to appear in court for
trial, if released." Petitioner further argues that the
accused, who is the Chairman of the Communist Party of
the Philippines and head of its military arm, the NPA,
together with his followers, are now engaged in an open
warfare and rebellion against this government and
threatens the existence of this very Court from which he
now seeks provisional release," and that while he is
entitled to bail as a matter of right in view of Executive
Order No. 187 which restored the original penalty for
rebellion under Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code,
yet, when the interest of the State conflicts with that of
an individual, that of the former prevails for "the right of
the State of self-preservation is paramount to any of the
rights of an individual enshrined in the Bill of Rights of
the Constitution." Petitioner further invokes precedents
in the United States of America holding "that there is no
absolute constitutional barrier to detention of potentially
dangerous resident aliens pending deportation
proceedings, 14and that an arrestee may be incarcerated
until trial as he presents a risk of flight; 15 and sustaining
a detention prior to trial of arrestee charged with serious
felonies who are found after an adversary hearing to

pose threat to the safety of individuals and to the

community which no condition of release can dispel.

16

On 30 July 1987 respondent Judge handed down the

Order 17 adverted to in the introductory portion of this
decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the
foregoing considerations, the Court
finds the "supplemental" motion for
reconsideration to be without merit
and hereby denies it but finds the first
motion for reconsideration to be
meritorious only insofar as the amount
of bail is concerned and hereby
reconsiders its Order of July 7, 1987
only to increase the amount of bail
from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00,
subject to the approval of this Court,
and with the additional condition that
accused Rodolfo Salas shall report to
the court once every two (2) months
within the first ten (10) days of every
period thereof (Almendras vs. Villaluz,
et al., L-31665, August 6, 1975, 66
SCRA 58).
In denying the supplemental motion for reconsideration
the respondent Judge took into account the "sudden
turn-about" on the part of the petitioner in that a day
earlier it filed a motion for reconsideration wherein it
conceded the right of the private respondent to bail but
merely asked to increase the amount of bail; observed
that it is only a reiteration of arguments in its opposition
to the petition for bail of 25 May 1987; asserted that the
American precedents are not applicable since the cases
involved deportation of aliens and, moreover, the U.S.
Federal Constitution does not contain a proviso on the
right of an accused to bail in bailable offenses, but only
an injunction against excessive bail; and quoted the
concurring opinion of the late Justice Pedro Tuason in the
cases of Nava, et al. vs. Gatmaitan, L-4853, Hernandez
vs. Montesa, L-4964 and Angeles vs. Abaya, L-5108,
October 11, 1951, 90 Phil, 172.
Unable to agree with said Order, petitioner commenced
this petition submitting therein the following issues:
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE
PROCORO J. DONATO ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN
EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION, AND IN
TOTAL DISREGARD OF THE
PREVAILING REALITIES, WHEN HE
DENIED PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITH
PRAYER TO BE GIVEN THE
OPPORTUNITY TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE
IN SUPPORT OF ITS OPPOSITION TO
THE GRANT OF BAIL TO THE
RESPONDENT RODOLFO SALAS.
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE
PROCORO J. DONATO ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN
EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION WHEN
HE GRANTED BAIL TO THE
RESPONDENT RODOLFO SALAS.
in support of which petitioner argues that private
respondent is estopped from invoking his right to bail,
having expressly waived it in G.R. No. 76009 when he
agreed to "remain in legal custody and face trial before
the court having custody of his person" in consideration
of the recall of the warrant of arrest for his copetitioners Josefina Cruz and Jose Concepcion; and the
right to bail, even in non-capital offenses, is not
absolute when there is prima facie evidence that the
accused is a serious threat to the very existence of the
State, in which case the prosecution must be allowed to
present evidence for the denial of bail. Consequently,
respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
when he did not allow petitioner to present all the
evidence it may desire to support its prayer for the
denial of bail and when he declared that the State has
forfeited its right to do so since during all the time that
the petition for bail was pending, it never manifested,
much less hinted, its intention to adduce such evidence.

And that even if release on bail may be allowed,

respondent judge, in fixing the amount of bail at
P50,000.00 (originally P30,000.00 only), failed to take
into account the lengthy record of private respondents'
criminal background, the gravity of the pending charge,
and the likelihood of flight. 18
In Our resolution of 11 August 1987 19 We required the
respondents to comment on the petition and issued a
Temporary Restraining Order ordering respondent Judge
to cease and desist from implementing his order of 30
July 1987 granting bail to private respondent in the
amount of P50,000.00.
In his Comment filed on 27 August 1987, 20 private
respondent asks for the outright dismissal of the petition
and immediate lifting of the temporary restraining order
on the following grounds:
I
RESPONDENT SALAS NEVER WAIVED
HIS RIGHT TO BAIL; NEITHER IS HE
ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING SAID
RIGHT. ON THE CONTRARY IT IS
PETITIONER WHO IS ESTOPPED FROM
RAISING THE SAID ISSUE FOR THE
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
II
RESPONDENT SALAS ENJOYS NOT
ONLY THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
BE PRESUMED INNOCENT BUT ALSO
THE RIGHT TO BAIL.
III
RESPONDENT SALAS IS NOT CHARGED
WITH A CAPITAL OFFENSE (RECLUSION
PERPETUA), HENCE HE HAS THE
RIGHT TO BAIL AS MANDATED BY THE
CONSTITUTION.
IV
THE ORDER OF JULY 30, 1987
DENYING PETITIONER OPPORTUNITY
TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IS CORRECT.
PETITIONER'S ALLEGED RIGHT TO
PRESENT EVIDENCE IS NON-EXISTENT
AND/OR HAD BEEN WAIVED.
V
THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER IN THIS CASE
VIOLATES NOT ONLY RESPONDENT
SALAS' RIGHT TO BAIL BUT ALSO HIS
OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS.
We required the petitioner to reply to the comment of
private respondent. 21 The reply was filed on 18
September 1987. 22
In Our resolution of 15 October 1987 23 We gave due
course to the petition and required the parties to file
simultaneously their memoranda within twenty days
from notice.
In their respective manifestations and motions dated 5
November 24 and 23 November 1987 25 petitioner and
private respondents asked to be excused from filing
their Memoranda and that the petition and reply be
considered as the Memorandum for petitioner and the
Comment as the Memorandum for private respondent,
which We granted in Our resolution of 19 November
1987 26 and 1 December 1987, 27 respectively.
In Our resolution of 14 September 1989 We required the
Solicitor General to express his stand on the issues
raised in this petitions, 28 which he complied with by
filing his Manifestation on 30 May 1990 29 wherein he

manifests that he supports the petition and submits that

the Order of respondent Judge of July 7, July 17 and July
30, 1987 should be annulled and set aside asserting
that private respondent had waived the light to bail in
view of the agreement in G.R. No. 76009; that granting
bail to him is accepting wide-eyed his undertaking which
he is sure to break; in determining bail, the primary
consideration is to insure the attendance of the accused
at the trial of the case against him which would be
frustrated by the "almost certainty that respondent
Salas will lump bail of whatever amount"; and
application of the guidelines provided for in Section 10
of Rule 114, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure on the
amount of bail dictates denial of bail to private
respondent. The Solicitor General likewise maintains
that the right of the petitioner to hearing on the
application of private respondent for bail cannot be
denied by respondent Judge.
And now on the issues presented in this case.
I.
Unquestionably, at the time the original and the
amended Informations for rebellion and the application
for bail were filed before the court below the penalty
imposable for the offense for which the private
respondent was charged was reclusion perpetua to
death. During the pendency of the application for bail
Executive Order No. 187 was issued by the President, by
virtue of which the penalty for rebellion as originally
provided for in Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code
was restored. The restored law was the governing law at
the time the respondent court resolved the petition for
bail.
We agree with the respondent court that bail cannot be
denied to the private respondent for he is charged with
the crime of rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code to which is attached the penalty
of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding
P20,000.00. 30 It is, therefore, a bailable offense under
Section 13 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution which
provides thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence
of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be prescribed by
law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.
Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
also provides:
Bail, a matter of right: exception.
All persons in custody shall, before
final conviction, be entitled to bail as a
matter of right, except those charged
with a capital offense or an offense
which, under the law at the time of its
commission and at the time of the
application for bail, is punishable
by reclusion perpetua, when evidence
of guilt is strong.
Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter of
right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the
offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower
than reclusion perpetua. 31 To that extent the right is
absolute. 32
And so, in a similar case for rebellion, People
vs. Hernandez, et al., 99 Phil. 515, despite the fact that
the accused was already convicted, although
erroneously, by the trial court for the complex crime of
rebellion with multiple murders, arsons and robberies,
and sentenced to life imprisonment, We granted bail in
the amount of P30,000.00 during the pendency of his
appeal from such conviction. To the vigorous stand of
the People that We must deny bail to the accused

because the security of the State so requires, and

because the judgment of conviction appealed from
indicates that the evidence of guilt of Hernandez is
strong, We held:
. . . Furthermore, individual freedom is
too basic, too transcendental and vital
in a republican state, like ours, to be
derived upon mere general principles
and abstract consideration of public
safety. Indeed, the preservation of
liberty is such a major preoccupation
of our political system that, not
satisfied with guaranteeing its
enjoyment in the very first paragraph
of section (1) of the Bill of Rights, the
framers of our Constitution devoted
paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8),
(11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17),
(18), and (21) of said section (1) to the
protection of several aspects of
freedom.
The 1987 Constitution strengthens further the right to
bail by explicitly providing that it shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. This overturns the Court's ruling in GarciaPadilla vs. Enrile, et al., supra., to wit:
The suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus must, indeed,
carry with it the suspension of the
right to bail, if the government's
campaign to suppress the rebellion is
to be enhanced and rendered
effective. If the right to bail may be
demanded during the continuance of
the rebellion, and those arrested,
captured and detained in the course
thereof will be released, they would,
without the least doubt, rejoin their
comrades in the field thereby
jeopardizing the success of
government efforts to bring to an end
the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.
Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is
punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter
of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is
strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining
whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. 33 But once it
is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong,
bail also becomes a matter of right. In Teehankee
vs. Director of Prisons, supra., We held:
The provision on bail in our
Constitution is patterned after similar
provisions contained in the
Constitution of the United States and
that of many states of the Union. And
it is said that:
The Constitution of
the United States
and the constitution
of the many states
provide that all
persons shall be
bailable by sufficient
sureties, except for
capital offenses,
where the proof is
evident or the
presumption of guilt
is great, and, under
such provisions, bail
is a matter of right
which no court or
judge can properly
refuse, in all cases
not embraced in the
exceptions. Under
such provisions bail
is a matter of right
even in cases of
capital offenses,
unless the proof of
guilt is evident or

the presumption
thereof is great! 34
Accordingly, the prosecution does not have the right to
present evidence for the denial of bail in the instances
where bail is a matter of right. However, in the cases
where the grant of bail is discretionary, due process
requires that the prosecution must be given an
opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the
evidence that it may desire to introduce before the
court should resolve the motion for bail. 35
We agree, however, with petitioner that it was error for
the respondent court to fix the bond at P30,000.00, then
later at P50,000.00 without hearing the prosecution. The
guidelines for the fixing of the amount of bail provided
for in Section 10 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court are
not matters left entirely to the discretion of the court. As
We stated in People vs. Dacudao, et al., 170 SCRA, 489,
495:
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a
bailbond call for the presentation of
evidence and reasonable opportunity
for the prosecution to refute it. Among
them are the nature and
circumstances of the crime, character
and reputation of the accused, the
weight of the evidence against him,
the probability of the accused
appearing at the trial, whether or not
the accused is a fugitive from justice,
and whether or not the accused is
under bond in other case. . . .
In the instant case petitioner has sufficiently made out
allegations which necessitate a grant of an opportunity
to be heard for the purpose of determining the amount
of bail, but not for the denial thereof because aforesaid
Section 10 of Rule 114 does not authorize any court to
deny bail.
II.
It must, however, be stressed that under the present
state of the law, rebellion is no longer punishable
by prision mayor and fine not exceeding P20,000.00.
Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990
and which took effect after publication in at least two
newspapers of general circulation, amended, among
others, Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code by
increasing the penalty for rebellion such that, as
amended, it now reads:
Article 135. Penalty for rebellion,
insurrection or coup d'etat. Any
person who promotes, maintains, or
heads a rebellion or insurrection shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Any person merely participating or
executing the commands of others in
a rebellion or insurrection shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
xxx xxx xxx
This amendatory law cannot apply to the private
respondent for acts allegedly committed prior to its
effectivity. It is not favorable to him. "Penal laws shall
have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal,
as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this
Code, although at the time of the publication of such
laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the
convict is serving the same. 36
III.
We agree with Petitioner that private respondent has,
however, waived his right to bail in G.R. No. 76009.
On 3 October 1986, or the day following the filing of the
original information in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 with

the trial court, a petition for habeas corpus for herein

private respondent, and his co-accused Josefina Cruz
and Jose Concepcion, was filed with this Court by Lucia
Cruz, Aida Concepcion Paniza and Beatriz Salas against
Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel Ramos, Brig. Gen. Renato
de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montao, and Col. Saldajeno
praying, among others, that the petition be given due
course and a writ of habeas corpus be issued requiring
respondents to produce the bodies of herein private
respondent and his co-accused before the Court and
explain by what authority they arrested and detained
them. The following proceedings took place thereafter in
said case:
1. In a resolution of 7 October 1986 We issued a writ
of habeas corpus, required respondents to make a
return of the writ on or before the close of office hours
on 13 October and set the petition for hearing on 14
October 1986 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning.
2. On 13 October 1986 respondents, through the Office
of the Solicitor General, filed a Return To The Writ
ofHabeas Corpus alleging therein that private
respondent and Josefina Cruz alias "Mrs. Mercado", and
Jose Milo Concepcion alias "Eugene Zamora" were
apprehended by the military on September 29, 1986 in
the evening at the Philippine General Hospital
Compound at Taft Ave., Mangga being leaders or
members of the Communist Party of the Philippines,
New People's Army and National Democratic Front,
organizations dedicated to the overthrow of the
Government through violent means, and having actually
committed acts of rebellion under Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. After their arrest they
were forthwith charged with rebellion before Branch XII
of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region in
Criminal Case No. 86-48926 and on 3 October warrants
for their arrest were issued and respondents continue to
detain them because of the warrants of arrest and the
pendency of the criminal cases against them.
Respondents further allege that, contrary to the
allegation in the petition, herein private respondent was
not a member of the NDF panel involved in peace
negotiations with the Government; neither is he and his
companions Cruz and Concepcion covered by any, safe
conduct pass issued by competent authorities.
3. At the hearing on 14 October 1986 the parties
informed the Court of certain agreements reached
between them. We issued a resolution reading as
follows:
When this case was called for hearing
this morning, Attorneys Romeo
Capulong, Arno V. Sanidad, Efren H.
Mercado, Edgardo Pamin-tuan,
Casiano Sabile, Ramon Cura, and
William Chua appeared for the
petitioners with Atty. Capulong
arguing for the petitioners. Solicitor
General Sedfrey Ordonez, Assistant
Solicitor General Romeo C. de la Cruz
and Trial Attorney Josue E. Villanueva
appeared for the respondents, with
Solicitor General Ordoez arguing for
the respondents.
Petitioners' counsel, Atty. Romeo
Capulong, manifested in open Court
that in conformity with the agreement
reached with the government, the
petition for habeas corpus will be
withdrawn with detainee Rodolfo Salas
to remain under custody, whereas his
co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose
Milo Concepcion will be released
immediately.
Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoez,
also in open Court, confirmed the
foregoing statement made by
petitioners' counsel regarding the
withdrawal of the petition for habeas
corpus, declaring that no objection will
be interposed to the immediate
release of detainees Josefina Cruz and
Jose Milo Concepcion, and that no
bond will be required of them, but
they will continue to face trial with

their co-accused, Rodolfo Salas;

further, that they will not be
rearrested on the basis of the
warrants issued by the trial court
provided that they manifest in open
Court their willingness to subject
themselves to the jurisdiction of the
Court and to appear in court when
their presence is required.
In addition, he stated that he is willing
to confer with petitioners' counsel
today relative to the compromise
agreement that they have previously
undertaken to submit.
Upon manifestation of petitioners'
counsel, Atty. Romeo Capulong, that
on his oath as member of the Bar, the
detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion have agreed to subject
themselves to the jurisdiction of the
trial court, the Court ordered their
immediate release.
Thereafter, the Court approved the
foregoing manifestations and
statements and required both parties
to SUBMIT to the Court their
compromise agreement by 4:00
o'clock this afternoon. Teehankee, C.J.,
is on official leave.
4. At 3:49 o'clock in the afternoon of 14 October 1986
the parties submitted a Joint Manifestation and Motion
duly signed by Atty. Romeo Capulong, counsel for
petitioners, and Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoez,
Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial
Attorney Josue S. Villanueva, counsel for respondents,
which reads as follows:
COME NOW petitioners and the
respondents, assisted by their
respective counsel, and to this
Honorable Tribunal respectfully
manifest:
1. That in the discussion between
Romeo Capulong, petitioners' counsel,
and Solicitor General Sedfrey A.
Ordoez on October 13, 1986
exploratory talks were conducted to
find out how the majesty of the law
may be preserved and human
considerations may be called into play.
2. That in the conference both counsel
agreed to the following terms of
agreement:
a. The petition
for habeas
corpus will be
withdrawn by
petitioners and
Josefina Cruz and
Jose Milo
Concepcion will be
immediately
released but shall
appear at the trial of
the criminal case for
rebellion (People v.
Rodolfo Salas, et al.,
Criminal Case No.
4886 [should be 8648926], Regional
Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial
Region) filed against
them under their
personal
recognizance.
b. Petitioner Rodolfo
Salas will remain in
legal custody and

face trial before the

court having
custody over his
person.
c. The warrant of
arrest for the
persons of Josefina
Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion is
hereby deemed
recalled in view of
formal manifestation
before the Supreme
Court that they will
submit themselves
to the court having
jurisdiction over
their person.
3. That on October 14, the Solicitor
General was able to obtain the
conformity of the Government to the
foregoing terms which were likewise
accepted by petitioner (sic) and their
counsel of record.
4. That the two counsel submitted
their oral manifestation during the
hearing on October 14 and the
present manifestation in compliance
with the resolution announced in court
this morning.
WHEREFORE, it is prayed that the
petition for habeas corpus be
dismissed.
5. On 16 October 1986 We issued the following
resolution:
G.R. No. 76009 [In the Matter of the
Petition for Habeas Corpus of Rodolfo
Salas, Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion, et al. v. Hon. Juan Ponce
Enrile, Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, Brig. Gen.
Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon
Montao and Col. Virgilio Saldajeno]
considering the Joint Manifestation
and Motion dated October 14, 1986
filed by Attorneys Romeo Capulong,
Arno V. Sanidad, Efren H. Mercado and
Ricardo Fernandez, Jr. as counsel for
petitioners and Solicitor General
Sedfrey A. Ordonez and Assistant
Solicitor General Romeo C. de la Cruz
and Trial Attorney Josue S. Villanueva
as counsel for respondents which
states that they have entered into an
agreement whereby: [a] the petition
for habeas corpus will be withdrawn
by petitioners, and Josefina Cruz and
Jose Milo Concepcion will be
immediately released but shall appear
at the trial of the criminal case for
rebellion [People vs. Rodolfo Salas, et
al., Criminal Case No. 4886, Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, Branch XII, Manila], filed
against them, on their personal
recognizance; [b] petitioner Rodolfo
Salas will remain in legal custody and
face trial before the court having
custody over his person; and [c] the
warrant of arrest for the person of
Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion is hereby deemed recalled
in view of the formal manifestation
before this Court that they will submit
themselves to the court having
jurisdiction over their person and in
view of the said agreement, the
petition for habeas corpus be
dismissed, the Court Resolved to
DISMISS the petition for habeas
corpus but subject to the condition
that petitioners' lead counsel, Atty.
Capulong, upon his oath as member of
the Bar, shall abide by his

commitment to ensure the

appearance of Josefina Cruz and Jose
Milo Concepcion at the trial of the
criminal case for rebellion filed against
them. Teehankee,C.J., is on official
leave.
It is the stand of the petitioner that private respondent,
"in agreeing to remain in legal custody even during the
pendency of the trial of his criminal case, [he] has
expressly waived his right to bail." 37 Upon the other
hand, private respondent asserts that this claim is
totally devoid of factual and legal basis, for in their
petition for habeas corpus they precisely questioned the
legality of the arrest and the continued detention of
Rodolfo Salas, Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion,
which was not resolved by this Court or by the
compromise agreement of the parties but left open for
further determination in another proceeding. Moreover,
the matter of the right to bail was neither raised by
either party nor resolved by this Court, and the legal
steps promptly taken by private respondent after the
agreement was reached, like the filing of the motion to
quash on 7 November 1986 and the petition for bail on
14 May 1987, were clear and positive assertions of his
statutory and constitutional rights to be granted not
only provisional but final and permanent liberty. Finally,
private respondent maintains that the term "legal
custody" as used in the Joint Manifestation and Motion
simply means that private respondent agreed to
continue to be in the custody of the law or in custodia
legis and nothing else; it is not to be interpreted as
waiver.
Interestingly, private respondent admits that:
"Custody" has been held to mean
nothing less than actual
imprisonment. It is also defined as the
detainer of a person by virtue of a
lawful authority, or the "care and
possession of a thing or person."
(Bouviers Law Dictionary, Third Ed,
Vol. I, pp. 741-742 citing Smith v.
Com. 59 Pa. 320 and Rolland v. Com.
82 Pa. 306)
He further admits that, in the light of Section 1 of Rule
114 of the Rules of Court and settled jurisprudence, the
"constitutional right to bail is subject to the limitation
that the person applying for admission to bail should be
in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his
liberty." 38
When the parties in G.R. No. 76009 stipulated that:
b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain
in legal custody and face trial before
the court having custody over his
person.
they simply meant that Rodolfo Salas, herein
respondent, will remain in actual physical custody of the
court, or in actual confinement or detention, as
distinguished from the stipulation concerning his copetitioners, who were to be released in view of
the recall of the warrants of arrest against them; they
agreed, however, "to submit themselves to the
court having jurisdiction over their persons." Note
should be made of the deliberate care of the parties in
making a fine distinction between legal
custody and court having custody over the person in
respect to Rodolfo Salas and court having jurisdiction
over the persons of his co-accused. Such a fine
distinction was precisely intended to emphasize the
agreement that Rodolfo Salas will not be released, but
should remain in custody. Had the parties intended
otherwise, or had this been unclear to private
respondent and his counsel, they should have insisted
on the use of a clearer language. It must be
remembered that at the time the parties orally
manifested before this Court on 14 October 1986 the
terms and conditions of their agreement and prepared
and signed the Joint Manifestation and Motion, a warrant
of arrest had already been issued by the trial court
against private respondent and his co-accused. The
stipulation that only the warrants of arrest for Josefina
Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion shall be recalled and that

only they shall be released, further confirmed the

agreement that herein petitioner shall remain in custody
of the law, or detention or confinement.
In defining bail as:
. . . the security given for the release
of a person in custody of the law, . . .
Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court
admits no other meaning or interpretation for the term
"in custody of the law" than that as above indicated.
The purpose of bail is to relieve an accused from
imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his
appearance at the trial. 39 It presupposes that the
person applying for it should be in the custody of the
law or otherwise deprived of liberty. 40
Consequently, having agreed in G.R. No. 76009 to
remain in legal custody, private respondent had
unequivocably waived his right to bail.
But, is such waiver valid?
Article 6 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless
the waiver is contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals, or good
customs, or prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law.
Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing
legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which
except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed;
the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable
person, of a right known by him to exist, with the intent
that such right shall be surrendered and such person
forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as
warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such
right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent with
claiming it." 41
As to what rights and privileges may be waived, the
authority is settled:
. . . the doctrine of waiver extends to
rights and privileges of any character,
and, since the word "waiver" covers
every conceivable right, it is the
general rule that a person may waive
any matter which affects his property,
and any alienable right or privilege of
which he is the owner or which
belongs to him or to which he is
legally entitled, whether secured by
contract, conferred with statute,or
guaranteed by constitution, provided
such rights and privileges rest in the
individual, are intended for his sole
benefit, do not infringe on the rights of
others, and further provided the
waiver of the right or privilege is not
forbidden by law, and does not
contravene public policy; and the
principle is recognized that everyone
has a right to waive, and agree to
waive, the advantage of a law or rule
made solely for the benefit and
protection of the individual in his
private capacity, if it can be dispensed
with and relinquished without
infringing on any public right, and
without detriment to the community
at large. . . .
Although the general rule is that any
right or privilege conferred by statute
or guaranteed by constitution may be
waived, a waiver in derogation of a
statutory right is not favored, and a
waiver will be inoperative and void if it
infringes on the rights of others, or
would be against public policy or

morals and the public interest may be

waived.
While it has been stated generally that
all personal rights conferred by
statute and guaranteed by
constitutionmay be waived, it has also
been said that constitutional
provisions intended to protect
property may be waived, and even
some of the constitutional rights
created to secure personal liberty are
subjects of waiver. 42
In Commonwealth vs. Petrillo,

43

it was held:

Rights guaranteed to one accused of a

crime fall naturally into two classes:
(a) those in which the state, as well as
the accused, is interested; and (b)
those which are personal to the
accused, which are in the nature of
personal privileges. Those of the first
class cannot be waived; those of the
second may be.
It is "competent for a person to waive a right
guaranteed by the Constitution, and to consent to action
which would be invalid if taken against his will." 44
This Court has recognized waivers of constitutional
rights such as, for example, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures; 45 the right to
counsel and to remain silent; 46 and the right to be
heard. 47
Even the 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes a
waiver of rights guaranteed by its Bill of Rights. Section
12(l) of Article III thereof on the right to remain silent
and to have a competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice states:
. . . These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence
of counsel.
This provision merely particularizes the form and
manner of the waiver; it, nevertheless, clearly suggests
that the other rights may be waived in some other form
or manner provided such waiver will not offend Article 6
of the Civil Code.
We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the
constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right
which is personal to the accused and whose waiver
would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person
with a right recognized by law.
The respondent Judge then clearly acted with grave
abuse of discretion in granting bail to the private
respondent.
WHEREFORE, the Orders of respondent Judge of July 7,
1987 and July 30, 1987 in Criminal Case No. 86-48926
entitled People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo C.
Salas alias Commander Bilog/Henry, Josefina
Cruz alias Mrs. Mercado, and Jose Milo
Concepcion alias Eugene Zamora, for Rebellion, are
hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 122737. February 17, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. SERGON MANES
and
RAMIL
MANES, accused-appellants.

DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is an appeal taken by
accused Sergon Manes and Ramil Manes from the
judgment[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25,
[2]
IloiloCity, convicting them of murder and sentencing
them to each "suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with the accessory penalties as provided in
Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code" and "to indemnify
the family of their victim in the amount of P50,000.00
plus P21,250.00 as expenses for the burial, wake and
other related matter and to pay the costs."
We affirm the conviction.
On July 12, 1991, the Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo
Province filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, an
information charging the accused with murder, as
follows:
x x x
"That on or about the 23rd of June, 1991, in the
Municipality of Badiangan, Province of Iloilo, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another to better realize their
purpose armed with a knife and a .38 caliber revolver
respectively, with treachery and/or evident
premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously assault, attack, stab and shot Nicanor
Tamorite with the knife and .38 caliber revolver with
which they were then provided, inflicting upon the said
Nicanor Tamorite stab wounds and gun shot wounds on
the different parts of his body which caused his death
immediately thereafter. [3]
The prosecution recommended no bail for the
provisional liberty of the accused.
On July 22, 1991, the trial court issued a warrant of
arrest against the accused. On October 18, 1991, the
trial court ordered the case archived for failure to locate
the two accused.
On June 24, 1992, or about a year after, accused
Sergon and Ramil Manes were arrested in Romblon,
Romblon. On July 6, 1992, they were brought to Iloilo
City.
Upon arraignment on September 17, 1992, both
accused pleaded not guilty to the information, and,
thereafter, the court proceeded to try the case.
Meantime, on August 25, 1992, the accused filed a
petition for bail, which was opposed by the
prosecution. The trial court, however, did not hear the
petition for bail. Neither did the accused invoke the
right to bail at any stage of the trial.
The prosecution presented six witnesses, [4] two of
whom were eyewitnesses to the crime, while the
defense presented three,[5] two of whom were the
accused themselves.
On January 13, 1995, the trial court rendered
judgment convicting the accused of murder, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
x x x
"Accordingly, finding the accused, Ramil Manes and
Sergon Manes, guilty of murder beyond reasonable
doubt, they are therefore sentenced to each suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with the accessory
penalties provided in Article 41 of the Revised Penal
Code and they are also ordered to indemnify the family
of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 plus P21,250.00
as expenses for the burial, wake and other related
matter and to pay the costs.[6]
On February 10, 1995, both accused appealed to
this Court.[7]
In the appeal, accused questioned the trial courts
failure (a) to hear the petition for bail; (b) to consider
defense of relative in favor of Ramil Manes; and (c) to
take note that Sergon Manes was a mere victim of
Tamorites unlawful aggression.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

(a) According to the prosecution

On June 23, 1991, at about 5:00 in the afternoon,

Alan Catequista together with Nicanor Tamorite and Jose
Cubita, went to see a basketball game at the barangay
plaza. When the game was over, Allan approached and
invited Nicanor Tamorite to go home; at the time, he
was still seated. Accused Ramil Manes approached
Nicanor Tamorite and pointed a .38 caliber revolver at
him, saying "It is a bad luck you did not kill me during
the fiesta in Barangay Cabayugan. Now I will be the one
to kill you." Nicanor Tamorite ran to Allan Catequista
and used him as a shield from Ramil.[8] At that point,
Alan Catequista heard a thud and as he looked back, he
saw accused Sergon Manes with a gory knife and he
also saw Nicanor Tamorite running away, with blood on
his back. Ramil Manes pursued Nicanor Tamorite and
shot him hitting him at the back, just above the
waistline. Both accused continued to chase Nicanor
Tamorite who ran towards the premises of the house of
Ading Ablado. Ramil Manes fired two more shots. It
could not be determined whether those shots hit
Nicanor Tamorite as he and the accused were already
inside the premises of the fence of Ading Ablado. [9] Jose
Cubita who was near Nicanor Tamorite when the two
accused chased him did not render assistance to him.
[10]
After Alan Catequista heard the two shots, he and
Jose Cubita ran home. Alan Catequista told his father
and uncle that Sergon Manes stabbed Nicanor Tamorite
and that Ramil Manes shot him. Alan Catequista, his
father, uncle, Jose Cubita and the mother of Nicanor
Tamorite then went to where the body of Nicanor was in
the downhill portion of the premises of the house of
Ading Ablado. Nicanor was lying on his back with two
(2) wounds on the breast, one (1) gunshot wound and
one (1) stab wound.[11]

(b) According to the accused

According to accused Ramil Manes, in the

afternoon of June 23, 1991, he was at home cooking. At
around 5:00 to 5:30, he heard shouts coming from the
direction of the barangay basketball court, which was
about ten (10) meters away from his house. He went to
the window to check what it was. He saw his younger
brother Sergon Manes lying on the concrete pavement
and several persons were ganging up on him, three of
whom he identified as Nicanor Tamorite, Alan Catequista
and Jose Cubita. They kept on boxing and kicking his
brother prompting him to come to the latters aid. On
his way out, he saw a gun on top of the table and
brought it with him to the basketball court.
While on his way to the basketball court, Ramil
fired a warning shot to prevent Nicanor Tamorite from
stabbing his brother, Sergon. Nicanor persisted in his
pursuit of Sergon, with a knife in his hand. Sergon was
about three meters ahead of Nicanor who was about ten
meters ahead of the pursuing Ramil. Ramil fired another
shot
which
hit
Nicanor
who
fell
to
the
ground. Meanwhile, Sergon managed to flee. Ramil
also fled to the direction of the sugarcane field as soon
as he fired the second shot because he saw the group of
Alan Catequista approaching, armed with guns. [12] Ramil
and his brother Sergon went into hiding and only
surfaced a year later when they were arrested in
Romblon.
We find the facts as those established by the
prosecutions evidence.
The appeal has no merit. The trial court did not err
in finding the appellants guilty of murder.
Appellants contend that the trial court committed
a serious error of law when it went on with the trial of
the case without hearing the petition for bail that was
set for hearing several times.
Under
the
law,[13] in
offenses
punishable
by reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death, the
accused has no right to bail when evidence of guilt is
strong. The court must hear a petition for bail to

determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong before

deciding to grant or deny bail to the accused.[14]
While the accused can apply for bail and have the
court hear his application summarily and promptly, such
right may be waived expressly or impliedly. [15]
In this case, the trial court proceeded to try the
case without resolving the petition for bail that
appellants filed. However, the latter did not call the
attention of the trial court to their unresolved
application for bail. It was only in the appeal that they
raise this issue. Thus, for failure to bring to the
attention of the trial court at the earliest opportune
time, appellants are deemed to have waived their right
to bail.
What is more, the issue has been rendered
academic by the conviction of the accused. When an
accused is charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment
or death, and evidence of guilt is strong, bail must be
denied, as it is neither a matter of right nor of
discretion.[16]
To exculpate himself, appellant Ramil claims
defense of relative. This must likewise fail. Article 11 of
the Revised Penal Code provides the requisites of
defense of relative.
The most essential of these elements is
unlawful aggression. Ramil Manes contends that he
came to the defense of his younger brother, Sergon,
who was being attacked by Nicanor Tamorite, Alan
Catequista and Jose Cubita, together with several
others. He claimed that these persons boxed and
kicked his brother in different parts of the body.
If, indeed, more than three persons attacked
Sergon Manes, he would have suffered injuries or even a
scratch on his body. But there was none. In fact,
prosecution witness Alan Catequista testified that in no
instance did he, Nicanor Tamorite and Jose Cubita attack
Sergon Manes.
The truth of the matter is that it was Ramil Manes
who approached the victim, pointed a .38 caliber
revolver at him and said "It is bad luck that you did not
kill me during the fiesta in Barangay Cabayugan. Now, I
will be the one to kill you." While Nicanor Tamorite tried
to hide from Ramil, Sergon suddenly appeared from
behind and stabbed Nicanor Tamorite at the back using
a fan knife. Unlawful aggression clearly came from
accused-appellants, not from the victim Nicanor
Tamorite.
Jose Cubita, another companion of the victim who
witnessed what transpired that fateful afternoon of June
23, 1991, corroborated the testimony of Alan Catequista
that
the
accused-appellants
were
the
aggressors. Despite the fact that Nicanor Tamorite was
unarmed and outnumbered, the brothers Ramil and
Sergon Manes persisted in executing their plan to the
point of chasing the fleeing victim.
Ramil Manes testified that while chasing Nicanor
Tamorite who was about ten meters away from him, he
fired only two shots; one in the air as warning shot and
another in the direction of Nicanor. The second shot hit
the victim who fell to the ground. Ramil fled the scene
right after the second shot. The autopsy report
revealed, however, that Nicanor Tamorite sustained not
only one but three gunshot wounds. There were also
stab wounds, one at the right side of the chest and
another at the upper left back of the victim. [17]
Assuming for the sake of argument that Nicanor
Tamorite was carrying a knife while pursuing Sergon,
who was allegedly unarmed, it is highly questionable
how the victim sustained those stab wounds considering
their location. The accused Ramil himself testified that
no one approached Nicanor Tamorite as soon as he fell
to the ground so as to account for the presence of the
stab wounds. Neither did the accused adduce evidence
to explain how the victim could have sustained those
stab wounds.
The behavior of accused Ramil Manes subsequent
to the killing further negates his claim of defense of
relative. If indeed he acted in defense of his younger
brother Sergon who was then under attack, he would
not harbor any fear in presenting himself to the proper
authorities. Instead, he made no such report. Persons
who act in legitimate defense of their persons or rights

invariably surrender themselves to the authorities and

describe fully and in all candor all that has happened
with a view to justify their acts. They lose no time in
going to the punong barangay, the municipal mayor or
the police and lay before them all the facts.[18]
As regards Sergon Manes, he claims that he should
not have been convicted of murder because he was an
innocent victim of the unlawful aggression of the
deceased. He denies that he stabbed the latter. This
denial must fail in light of the positive identification and
testimony of prosecution witnesses, Alan Catequista and
Jose Cubita, that the unlawful aggression came from
accused appellants. Moreover, the autopsy report
conducted by Dr. Leticia Austria-Tobias on June 24, 1991
supports the prosecutions theory that accused shot and
stabbed the victim.
We need not tackle the remaining assignments of
error which obviously must fail in light of the foregoing
discussion.
However, as pointed out by the solicitor general,
the prosecution failed to prove the aggravating
circumstance
of
evident
premeditation. Evident
premeditation exists when the following requisites are
present:
1. The time when the offender determined to
commit the crime;
2. An act manifestly indicating that the culprit
has clung to his determination; and
3. A sufficient lapse of time between the
determination and execution, to allow him
to reflect upon the consequences of his
act.[19]
Evident premeditation, like other circumstances
that would qualify the killing to murder, must be
established by clear and positive evidence. Mere
presumptions and inferences are insufficient no matter
how logical and probable they may be. [20] The
prosecution failed to satisfactorily establish the
existence of the requisites of evident premeditation. No
direct evidence was presented regarding the time the
accused planned to kill the victim. It was not
established that the appellants persistently and
continuously clung to this resolution despite the lapse of
sufficient time for them to clear their minds and
overcome their determination to commit the same.
The trial court correctly considered treachery as
qualifying the killing of the victim to murder.
Treachery exists when the offender commits any
of the crimes against person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to himself arising from any defense which the offended
party might make.[21] Where the victim was totally
unprepared for the unexpected attack from behind and
had no weapon to resist it, the stabbing could not but be
considered as treacherous.[22] In the instant case,
Nicanor Tamorite was seated when Ramil Manes
approached him with a .38 caliber revolver in his hand.
Sergon Manes took advantage of this preoccupation of
the victim with Ramil Manes by surreptitiously attacking
and stabbing him at the back, while he was not in a
position to defend himself against his aggressors.
The manner by which Nicanor Tamorite was
assaulted reveals a concerted action towards the
accomplishment of a single criminal intent. Conspiracy
may be inferred from the acts of the appellants before,
during and after the crime which are indicative of a joint
purpose, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments.[23]
On the other hand, the trial court must not have
appreciated the aggravating circumstances of abuse of
superior strength and aid of armed men because these
are absorbed in treachery. [24]
Consequently, we sustain the trial courts
conviction of the accused, including the civil liability
imposed against them. However, the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of
superior strength and aid of armed men are not to be
appreciated.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the judgment of the trial
court convicting accused-appellants Sergon Manes and
Ramil Manes of murder and sentencing each of them to

suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the

accessory penalties of the law and to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Nicanor Tamorite in the amount
of P50,000.00, plus P21,250.00, as actual damages.
Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 93177 August 2, 1991
B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN, MARIELO
BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, CAPT. MANUEL
ISON, COL. LUISITO SANCHEZ, LTC. ROMELINO
GOJO, LTC. ARSENIO TECSON, LTC. RAFAEL
GALVEZ, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO, LTC. ERICSON
AURELIO, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT LTC. FRANKLIN
BRAWNER, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS, MAJ. CESAR
DE LA PERA, MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA, CAPT.
FLORENCIO FLORES, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO, CAPT.
DANILO LIM, CAPT. ELMER AMON, CAPT. VERGEL
NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP,
THE PTI INVESTIGATING PANEL COMPOSED OF:
COL. MANUEL S. MENDIOLA, COL. VIRTUD
NORBERTO L. DAGZA MAJ. FELIX V. BALDONADO
and MAJ. ESTELITO L. PORNEA and GENERAL
COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14 COMPOSED OF: B/GEN.
DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA,
COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL.
WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA and
CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, respondents.
No. 95020 August 2, 1991
B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMIMO A.
MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO
ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A.
VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T.
MALLILLIN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge,
Branch 104, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Q.C., LTC.
JACINTO LIGOT PA., respondents.
No. 96948 August 2, 1991
B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN. MARCELO
BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO PN, CAPT.
MANUEL ISON PN, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO PN (M),
LTC. ARSENIO TECSON PA, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ
PA, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO PA, LTC. ERICSON
AURELIO PA, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA, LTC.
FRANKLIN BRAWNER PA, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS
PA, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PENA PN (M): MAJ. LEUVINO
VALENCIA PA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES PA, CAPT.
JAIME JUNIO PA, CAPT. DANILO LIM PA, CAPT.
ELMER AMON PAF CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT.
JOEY SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A.
MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI
COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA,
and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN PRESIDENT
AND MEMBERS OF GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO.
14, respondents.
No. 97454 August 2, 1991
AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RODOLFO BIAZON,
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GEN. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL MAJOR GEN.
CESAR NAZARENO and LT. COL. ALBERTO OLARIO,
Commanding Officer of the PNP/INP Detention
Center/Jail, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO P. SOLANO, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 86,
CAPTAIN REYNALDO S. RAFAEL, 1 LT SERVANDO A.
BAOANAN PN(M), 1 LT. WILFREDO JIMENEZ PAF 1

LT. ATANACIO T. MACALAN JR PMM 2LT ELISEO T.

RASCO PC, 2LT JONAS CALLEJA PC, 2LT JAIRUS JS
GELVEZON III PMM 2LT JOSELITO CABREROS PMM
2LT MEMEL ROJAS PN(M) and 2LT HERMINIO L.
CANTACO PC, respondents.

In G.R. No. 95020, the orders of the respondent judge of

the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City are assailed
oncertiorari on the ground that he has no jurisdiction
over GCM No. 14 and no authority either to set aside its
ruling denying bail to the private respondents.

Armando M. Marcelo and Rainier L. Madrid for

petitioners Luisito Sanchez, Tiburcio Fusillero, Ericson
Aurelio, Levino Valencia, Danilo Arnon Vergel Nacino,
Florencio Flores, Benigno Junio and Joey Sarroza.

In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also sought against the

decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in a
petition for habeas corpus directing the release of the
private respondents. Jurisdictional objections are
likewise raised as in G.R. No. 95020.

Manuel Q. Malvar for Rafael Galvez and Danny Lim.

Manuel E. Valenzuela for Arsenio Tecson

Mariano R. Santiago for Alfredo Oliveros.
Ricardo J.M. Rivera for Manuel Ison.
Castillo, Laman, Tan and Pantaleon for Danilo Pizarro.
Alfredo Lazaro for Romelino Gojo.
Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. for Jose Comendador.
Jonathan B.S. Rebong and Efren C. Carag for Marcelo
Blando.
Pablito V. Sanidad for Franklin Brawner and Ericson
Aurelio.
Efren C. Moncupa for All Tecson.
M.M. Lazaro & Associates for respondents Ligot and Ison
.
Baldomero S.P. Gatbonton, Jr. for Jacinto Ligot.
Salvador B. Britanico for Cesar de la Pena.

Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a PreTrial Investigation PTI Panel had been constituted
pursuant to Office Order No. 16 dated January 14, 1990,
to investigate the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and
96948. The PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena dated
January 30, 1990, individually addressed to the
petitioners, to wit:
You are hereby directed to appear in
person before the undersigned PreTrial Investigating Officers on 12 Feb
90 9:00 a.m. at Kiangan Hall, Camp
Crame Quezon City, then and there to
submit your counter-affidavit and the
affidavits of your witnesses, if any, in
the pre-trial investigation of the
charge/charges against you for
violence of AWs _______________. DO
NOT SUBMIT A MOTION TO DISMISS.
Failure to submit the aforementioned
counter-affidavits on the date above
specified shall be deemed a waiver of
your right to submit controverting
evidence.
On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt
of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn statements of
witnesses, and death and medical certificates of victims
of the rebellion.

Gilbert R.T. Reyes for Danilo Pizarro.

Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas for
petitioners in G.R. No. 93177.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:p
These four cases have been consolidated because they
involve practically the same parties and related issues
arising from the same incident.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the
private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 are
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing
prosecution for their alleged participation in the
failed coup d' etat that took place on December 1 to 9,
1989.
The charges against them are violation of Articles of War
(AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an
Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in
relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
(Murder).
In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, they are questioning the
conduct of the Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel
constituted to investigate the charges against them and
the creation of the General Court Martial GCM convened
to try them.
In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides challenging
the legality of GCM No. 14, seek certiorari against its
ruling denying them the right to peremptory challenge
as granted by Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408.

At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners

challenged the proceedings on various grounds,
prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days within
which to file their objections in writing This was done
through a Motion for Summary Dismissal dated February
21, 1990.
In a resolution dated February 27,1990, the PTI Panel
denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5 days from
notice to submit their respective counter-affidavits and
the affidavits of their witnesses.
On March 7, 1990, the petitioners verbally moved for
reconsideration of the foregoing denial and the PTI Panel
gave them 7 days within which to reduce their motion to
writing. This was done on March 14,1990.
The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial
investigation of the charges as mandated by Article of
War 71, which provides:
Art. 71. Charges Action upon.
Charges and specifications must be
signed by a person subject to military
law, and under the oath either that he
has personal knowledge of, or has
investigated, the matters set forth
therein and that the same are true in
fact, to the best of his knowledge and
belief.
No charge will be referred to a general
court-martial for trial until after a
thorough and impartial investigation
thereof shall have been made. This
investigation will include inquiries as
to the truth of the matter set forth in
said charges, form of charges, and
what disposition of the case should be
made in the interest of justice and
discipline. At such investigation full

opportunity shall be given to the

accused to cross-examine witnesses
against him if they are available and
to present anything he may desire in
his own behalf, either in defense or
mitigation, and the investigating
officer shall examine available
witnesses requested by the accused.
If the charges are forwarded after
such investigation, they shall be
accompanied by a statement of the
substance of the testimony taken on
both sides. (Emphasis supplied.)
They also allege that the initial hearing of the charges
consisted merely of a roll call and that no prosecution
witnesses were presented to reaffirm their affidavits.
while the motion for summary dismissal was denied, the
motion for reconsideration remains unresolved to date
and they have not been able to submit their counteraffidavits.
At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners in G.R.
No. 96948 manifested that they were exercising their
right to raise peremptory challenges against the
president and members of GCM No.14. They invoked
Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 for this purpose. GCM No.
14 ruled, however, that peremptory challenges had
been discontinued under P.D. No. 39.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on
June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by GCM
No.14. He thereupon filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City a petition
for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional
liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. After
considering the petition and the answer thereto filed by
the president and members of GCM No.14, Judge
Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an order granting
provisional liberty to Ligot.
On July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion
to enforce the order for his release and to declare in
contempt the commanding officer of the PC/INP Jail for
disobey 'ng the said order. He later also complained that
Generals De Villa and Aguirre had refused to release him
"pending final resolution of the appeal to be taken" to
this Court.
After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order for the
provisional liberty of Ligot, as well as of intervenors Ltc
Franklin Brawner, Lt/Col. Arsenio Tecson and Maj. Alfredo
Oliveros, and later of additional intervenors Ltc
Romelino Gojo and Capt. Manuel Ison.
On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered
judgment inter alia:
(a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article
III of the Constitution granting the
right to bail to all persons with the
defined exception is applicable and
covers all military men facing courtmartial proceedings. Accordingly, the
assailed orders of General CourtMartial No. 14 denying bail to
petitioner and intervenors on the
mistaken assumption that bail does
not apply to military men facing courtmartial proceedings on the ground
that there is no precedent, are hereby
set aside and declared null and void.
Respondent General Court-Martial No.
14 is hereby directed to conduct
proceedings on the applications of bail
of the petitioner, intervenors and
which may as well include other
persons facing charges before General
Court-Martial No. 14.
Pending the proceedings on the
applications for bail before General
Court-Martial No. 14, this Court
reiterates its orders of release on the
provisional liberty of petitioner Jacinto
Ligot as well as intervenors Franklin
Brawner and Arsenio Tecson.

On February 18, 1991, the private respondents in G.R.

No. 97454 filed with this Court a petition for habeas
corpuson the ground that they were being detained in
Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred
to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, where it was
raffled to respondent Judge Antonio P. Solano. Finding
after hearing that no formal charges had been filed
against the petitioners after more than a year after their
arrest, the trial court ordered their release.
II
The Court has examined the records of this case and
rules as follows.
It appears that the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and
96948 were given several opportunities to present their
side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled
hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the
denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they
were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counteraffidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal
motion for reconsideration which they were again asked
to submit in writing. This they did on March 13, 1990.
The motion was in effect denied when the PTI Panel
resolved to recommend that the charges be referred to
the General Court Martial for trial.
The said petitioners cannot now claim they have been
denied due process because the investigation was
resolved against them owing to their own failure to
submit their counter-affidavits. They had been expressly
warned In the subpoena sent them that "failure to
submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the
date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of (their)
right to submit controverting evidence." They chose not
to heed the warning. As their motions appeared to be
dilatory, the PTI Panel was justified in referring the
charges to GCM No. 14 without waiting for the
petitioners to submit their defense.
Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded
an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is
deemed waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill
of Rights.
There was in our view substantial compliance with
Article of War 71 by the PTI Panel. Moreover, it is now
settled that "even a failure to conduct a pre-trial
investigation does not deprive a general court- martial
of jurisdiction." We so held in Arula v. Espino, 1 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
But even a failure to conduct a pretrial investigation does not deprive a
general court-martial of jurisdiction.
The better accepted concept of pretrial investigation is that it is directory,
not mandatory, and in no way affects
the jurisdiction of a court-martial. In
Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 93 L
ed 986 (1949), the Court said:
We do not think that
the pre-trial
investigation
procedure by Article
70 (The Philippine
counter-part is
article of war 71,
Commonwealth Act
408) can properly be
construed as an
indispensable prerequisite to the
exercise of the Army
General court
martial jurisdiction..
The Article does
serve important
functions in the
administration of
court-martial
procedures and does
provide safeguards

to an accused. Its
language is clearly
such that a
defendant could
object to trial in the
absence of the
required
investigation. In that
event the courtmartial could itself
postpone trial
pending the
investigation. And
the military
reviewing
authorities could
consider the same
contention,
reversing a courtmartial conviction
where failure to
comply with Article
70 has substantially
injured an accused.
But we are not
persuaded that
Congress intended
to make otherwise
valid court-martial
judgments wholly
void because pretrial investigations
fall short of the
standards
prescribed by Article
70. That Congress
has not required
analogous pre-trial
procedure for Navy
court-martial is an
indication that the
investigatory plan
was not intended to
be exalted to the
jurisdictional level.
xxx xxx xxx
Shortly after
enactment of Article
70 in 1920 the Judge
Advocate General of
the Army did hold
that where there
had been no pretrial investigation,
court-martial
proceedings were
void ab initio. But
this holding has
been expressly
repudiated in later
holdings of the
Judge Advocate
General. This later
interpretation has
been that the pretrial requirements of
Article 70 are
directory, not
mandatory, and in
no way effect the
jurisdiction of a
court-martial. The
War Department's
interpretation was
pointedly called to
the attention of
Congress in 1947
after which
Congress amended
Article 70 but left
unchanged the
language here under
consideration.
compensable prerequisite to the
exercise of Army
general courtmartial jurisdiction

A trial before a general court-martial

convened without any pretrial
investigation under article of war 71
would of course be altogether
irregular but the court-martial might
nevertheless have jurisdiction.
Significantly, this rule is similar to the
one obtaining in criminal procedure in
the civil courts to the effect that
absence of preliminary investigation
does not go into the jurisdiction of the
court but merely to the regularity of
the proceedings.
As to what law should govern the conduct of the
preliminary investigation, that issue was resolved more
than two years ago in Kapunan v. De Villa, 2 where we
declared:
The Court finds that, contrary to the
contention of petitioners, there was
substantial compliance with the
requirements of law as provided in the
Articles of War and P.D. No. 77, as
amended by P.D. No. 911. The
amended charge sheets, charging
petitioners and their co-respondents
with mutiny and conduct unbecoming
an officer, were signed by Maj. Antonio
Ruiz, a person subject to military law,
after he had investigated the matter
through an evaluation of the pertinent
records, including the reports of
respondent AFP Board of Officers, and
was convinced of the truth of the
testimonies on record. The charge
sheets were sworn to by Maj. Ruiz, the
"accuser," in accordance with and in
the manner provided under Art. 71 of
the Articles of War. Considering that
P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No.
911, is only of suppletory application,
the fact that the charge sheets were
not certified in the manner provided
under said decrees, i.e., that the
officer administering the oath has
personally examined the affiant and
that he is satisfied that they
voluntarily executed and understood
its affidavit, does not invalidate said
charge sheets. Thereafter, a "pretrial
investigation" was conducted by
respondent Maj. Baldonado, wherein,
pursuant to P.D. No. 77, as amended
by P.D. No. 911, petitioners were
subpoenaed and required to file their
counter-affidavit. However, instead of
doing so, they filed an untitled
pleading seeking the dismissal of the
charges against them. That petitioners
were not able to confront the
witnesses against them was their own
doing, for they never even asked Maj.
Baldonado to subpoena said witnesses
so that they may be made to answer
clarificatory questions in accordance
with P. D, No. 77, as amended by P.D.
No. 911.
The petitioners also allege that GCM No. 14 has not
been constitute in accordance with Article 8 of the
Articles of War because General Order No. M-6, which
supposedly convened the body, was not signed by Gen.
Renato de Villa as Chief of Staff.
Article of War No. 8 reads:
Art. 8. General Courts-Martial. The
President of the Philippines, the Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the Chief of Constabulary
and, when empowered by the
President, the commanding officer of a
major command or task force, the
commanding officer of a division, the
commanding officer of a military area,
the superintendent of the Military
Academy, the commanding officer of a
separate brigade or body of troops

may appoint general courts-martial;

but when any such commander is the
accuser or the prosecutor of the
person or persons to be tried, the
court shall be appointed by superior
competent authority. ...
While it is true that General Order No. M-6 was not
signed by Gen. De Villa, there is no doubt that he
authorized it because the order itself said it was issued
"By Command of General De Villa" and it has not been
shown to be spurious. As observed by the Solicitor
General, the Summary Disposition Form showed that
Gen. De Villa, as Chief of Staff, AFP, actually constituted
GCM No. 14 and appointed its president and members.
It is significant that General De Villa has not
disauthorized or revoked or in any way disowned the
said order, as he would certainly have done if his
authority had been improperly invoked. On the contrary,
as the principal respondent in G.R. No. 93177, he
sustained General Order No. M 6 in the Comment filed
for him and the other respondents by the Solicitor
General.
Coming now to the right to peremptory challenge, we
note that this was originally provided for under Article
18 of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War), as amended by
Rep. Act No. 242, on June 12, 1948, to wit:
Art. 18. Challenges. Members of
general or special courts-martial may
be challenged by the accused or the
trial judge advocate for cause stated
to the court. The court shall determine
the relevancy and validity thereof, and
shall not receive a challenge to more
than one member at a time.
Challenges by the trial judge advocate
shall ordinarily be presented and
decided before those by the accused
are offered. Each side shall be entitled
to the peremptory challenge, but the
law member of the court shall not be
challenged except for cause.
The history of peremptory challenge was traced
in Martelino v. Alejandro, 3 thus:
In the early formative years of the
infant Philippine Army, after the
passage in 1935 of Commonwealth
Act No. 1 (otherwise known as the
National Defense Act), except for a
handful of Philippine Scout officers
and graduates of the United States
military and naval academies who
were on duty with the Philippine Army,
there was a complete dearth of
officers learned in military law, its
aside from the fact that the officer
corps of the developing army was
numerically made equate for the
demands of the strictly military
aspects of the national defense
program. Because of these
considerations it was then felt that
peremptory challenges should not in
the meanwhile be permitted and that
only challenges for cause, in any
number, would be allowed. Thus
Article 18 of the Articles of War
(Commonwealth Act No. 408), as
worded on September 14, 1938, the
date of the approval of the Act, made
no mention or reference to any
peremptory challenge by either the
trial judge advocate of a court- martial
or by the accused. After December
17,1958, when the Manual for CourtsMartial of the Philippine Army became
effective, the Judge Advocate
General's Service of the Philippine
Army conducted a continuing and
intensive program of training and
education in military law,
encompassing the length and breadth
of the Philippines. This program was
pursued until the outbreak of World
War 11 in the Pacific on December 7,

1941. After the formal surrender of

Japan to the allies in 1945, the officer
corps of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines had expanded to a very
large number, and a great many of
the officers had been indoctrinated in
military law. It was in these
environmental circumstances that
Article of War 18 was amended on
June 12,1948 to entitle "each side" to
one peremptory challenge, with the
sole proviso that "the law member of
court shall not be challenged except
for cause.
On September 27,1972, President Marcos issued
General Order No. 8, empowering the Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces to create military tribunals "to try and
decide cases of military personnel and such other cases
as may be referred to them.
On November 7,1972, he promulgated P.D. No. 39
(Governing the Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction,
Procedure, and other matters relevant to military
Tribunals). This decree disallowed the peremptory
challenge, thus:
No peremptory challenge shall be
allowed. Challenges for cause may be
entertained to insure impartiality and
good faith. Challenges shall
immediately be heard and determined
by a majority of the members
excluding the challenged member. A
tie vote does not disqualify the
challenged member. A successfully
challenged member shall be
immediately replaced.
On June 11, 1978, President Marcos promulgated P.D.
No. 1498, or the National Security Code, which was a
compilation and codification of decrees, general orders,
LOI and policies intended "to meet the continuing
threats to the existence, security and stability of the
State." The modified rule on challenges under P.D. No.
39 was embodied in this decree.
On January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No.
2045 proclaiming the termination of the state of martial
law throughout the Philippines. The proclamation
revoked General Order No. 8 and declared the
dissolution of the military tribunals created pursuant
thereto upon final determination of the cases pending
therein.
P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No.
8 and the other general orders mentioned therein. With
the termination of martial law and the dissolution of the
military tribunals created thereunder, the reason for the
existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when
the reason of the law ceases, the law itself
ceases.Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This
principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis est
anima: the reason of law is its soul.
Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the
right to peremptory challenge in L P.D. No. 39 became
ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was
dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No. 2045,
As a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com.
Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again
allows the right to peremptory challenge.
We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948
that the right to peremptory challenge remains
withdrawn under P.D. No. 39. To repeat for emphasis,
this decree was itself withdrawn when martial law was
lifted on January 17, 1981. Indeed, even if not so
withdrawn, it could still be considered no longer
operative, having been cast out under the new
dispensation as, in the words of the Freedom
Constitution, one of the "iniquitous vestiges of the
previous regime.

The military tribunal was one of the most oppressive

instruments of martial law. It is curious that the present
government should invoke the rules of that discredited
body to justify its action against the accused officers.

The unique structure of the military

should be enough reason to exempt
military men from the constitutional
coverage on the right to bail.

The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to

peremptory challenge may be exploited by a
respondent in a court-martial trial to delay the
proceedings and defer his deserved Punishment. It is
hoped that the accused officers in the cases at bar will
not be so motivated. At any rate, the wisdom of Com.
Act No. 408, in the light of present circumstances, is a
matter addressed to the law-makers and not to this
Court. The judiciary can only interpret and apply the
laws without regard to its own misgivings on their
adverse effects. This is a problem only the political
departments can resolve.

Aside from structural peculiarity, it is

vital to note that mutinous soldiers
operate within the framework of
democratic system, are allowed the
fiduciary use of firearms by the
government for the discharge of their
duties and responsibilities and are
paid out of revenues collected from
the people. All other insurgent
elements carry out their activities
outside of and against the existing
political system.

The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 question

the propriety of the petition for certiorari and
mandamus and the petition for habeas corpus filed by
the private respondents with the Regional Trial Courts of
Quezon City. It is argued that since the private
respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of
violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts
have no authority to order their release and otherwise
interfere with the court-martial proceedings.

xxx xxx xxx

The petitioners further contend that under Sec. 9(3) of

BP 1 29, the Court of Appeals is vested with "exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts
and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions." Rather irrelevantly, the petitioners also
cite the case of Yang v. Court of Appeals 4 where this
Court held that "appeals from the Professional
Regulation Commission are now exclusively cognizable
by the Court of Appeals.
It should be noted that the aforecited provision and the
case cited refer to ordinary appeals and not to the
remedies employed by the accused officers before the
respondent courts.
In Martelino, we observed as follows:
It is true that civil courts as a rule
exercise no supervision or correcting
power over the proceedings of courtsmartial, and that mere errors in their
proceedings are not open to
consideration. The single inquiry, the
test, is jurisdiction. But it is equally
true that in the exercise of their
undoubted discretion, courts-martial
may commit such an abuse of
discretion what in the language of
Rule 65 is referred to as "grave abuse
of discretion" as to give rise to a
defect in their jurisdiction. This is
precisely the point at issue in this
action suggested by its nature as one
for certiorari and prohibition ... .
The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against
inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions
forhabeas corpus and quo warranto. 5 In the absence of
a law providing that the decisions, orders and ruling of a
court-martial or the Office of the Chief of Staff can be
questioned only before the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court, we hold that the Regional Trial Court
can exercise similar jurisdiction.
We find that the right to bail invoked by the private
respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally not
been recognized and is not available in the military, as
an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of
Rights. This much was suggested in Arula, where we
observed that "the right to a speedy trial is given more
emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not
exist.
The justification for this exception was well explained by
the Solicitor General as follows:

National security considerations

should also impress upon this
Honorable Court that release on bail of
respondents constitutes a damaging
precedent. Imagine a scenario of say
1,000 putschists roaming the streets
of the Metropolis on bail, or if the
assailed July 25,1990 Order were
sustained, on "provisional" bail. The
sheer number alone is already
discomforting. But, the truly
disquieting thought is that they could
freely resume their heinous activity
which could very well result in the
overthrow of duly constituted
authorities, including this Honorable
Court, and replace the same with a
system consonant with their own
concept of government and justice.
The argument that denial from the military of the right
to bail would violate the equal protection clause is not
acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only
of persons or things similarly situated and does not
apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially
different from others. The accused officers can complain
if they are denied bail and other members of the
military are not. But they cannot say they have been
discriminated against because they are not allowed the
same right that is extended to civilians.
On the contention of the private respondents in G.R. No.
97454 that they had not been charged after more than
one year from their arrest, our finding is that there was
substantial compliance with the requirements of due
process and the right to a speedy trial.
The petition for habeas corpus was directly filed with
this Court on February 18, 1991, and was referred to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for raffle, hearing
and decision. It was heard on February 26, 1991, by the
respondent court, where the petitioners submitted the
charge memorandum and specifications against the
private respondents dated January 30, 1991. On
February 12, 1991, pursuant to Office Order No. 31-91,
the PTI panel was created and initial investigation was
scheduled on March 12, 1991 at 2:00 p.m. On March 20,
1991, the private respondents received the copies of
the charges, charge sheets and specifications and were
required to submit their counter-affidavits on or before
April 11, 1991. There was indeed a delay of more than
one year in the investigation and preparation of the
charges against the private respondents. However, this
was explained by the Solicitor General thus:
... The AFP Special Investigating
Committee was able to complete it
pre-charge investigation only after one
(1) year because hundreds of officers
and thousands of enlisted men were
involved in the failed coup. All of
them, as well as other witnesses, had
to be interviewed or investigated, and
these inevitably took months to finish.
The pre-charge investigation was
rendered doubly difficult by the fact
that those involved were dispersed
and scattered throughout the

Philippines. In some cases, command

units, such as the Scout Rangers, have
already been disbanded. After the
charges were completed, the same
still had to pass review and approval
by the AFP Chief of Staff.

War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are

also GRANTED, and the orders of the respondent courts
for the release of the private respondents are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

While accepting this explanation, the Court nevertheless

must reiterate the following admonition:
This Court as protector of the rights of
the people, must stress the point that
if the participation of petitioner in
several coup attempts for which he is
confined on orders of Adjutant General
Jorge Agcaoili cannot be established
and no charges can be filed against
him or the existence of a prima
facie case warranting trial before a
military commission is wanting, it
behooves respondent then Major
General Rodolfo Biazon (now General)
to release petitioner. Respondents
must also be reminded that even if a
military officer is arrested pursuant to
Article 70 of then Articles of War,
indefinite confinement is not
sanctioned, as Article 71 thereof
mandates that immediate steps must
be taken to try the person accused or
to dissmiss the charge and release
him. Any officer who is responsible for
unnecessary delay in investigating or
carrying the case to a final conclusion
may even be punished as a court
martial may direct. 6
It should be noted, finally, that after the decision was
rendered by Judge Solano on February 26, 1991, the
government filed a notice of appeal ad cautelam and a
motion for reconsideration, the latter was ultimately
denied, after hearing, on March 4, 1991. The 48- hour
period for appeal under Rule 41, Section 18, of the Rules
of Court did not run until after notice of such denial was
received by the petitioners on March 12, 1991. Contrary
to the private respondents' contention, therefore, the
decision had not yet become final and executory when
the special civil action in G.R. No. 97454 was filed with
this Court on March 12, 1991.
III
Regarding the propriety of the petitions at bar, it is well
to reiterate the following observations of the Court in
Arula:
The referral of charges to a courtmartial involves the exercise of
judgment and discretion (AW 71). A
petition for certiorari, in order to
prosper, must be based on
jurisdictional grounds because, as long
as the respondent acted with
jurisdiction, any error committed by
him or it in the exercise thereof will
amount to nothing more than an error
of judgment which may be reviewed
or corrected only by appeal. Even an
abuse of discretion is not sufficient by
itself to justify the issuance of a writ
ofcertiorari.
As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No.
93177 have not acted with grave abuse of discretion or
without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify the
intervention of the Court and the reversal of the acts
complained of by the petitioners. Such action is
indicated, however, in G.R. No. 96948, where we find
that the right to peremptory challenge should not have
been denied, and in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, where
the private respondents should not have been ordered
released.
ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the
petition is GRANTED, and the respondents are DIRECTED
to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of
peremptory challenge under Article 18 of the Articles of

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002]

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA, represented by the Philippine
Department of Justice, petitioner, vs. Hon.
GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, Morales, and
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 42; and MARK B. JIMENEZ
a.k.a.
MARIO
BATACAN
CRESPO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In extradition proceedings, are prospective
extraditees
entitled
to
notice
and
hearing before warrants for their arrest can be
issued? Equally important, are they entitled to the right
to bail and provisional liberty while the extradition
proceedings are pending? In general, the answer to
these two novel questions is No. The explanation of
and the reasons for, as well as the exceptions to, this
rule are laid out in this Decision.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65

of the Rules of Court, seeking to void and set aside the
Orders dated May 23, 2001[1] and July 3, 2001[2] issued
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42.
[3]
The first assailed Order set for hearing petitioners
application for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
The second challenged Order, on the other hand,
directed the issuance of a warrant, but at the same time
granted bail to Jimenez. The dispositive portion of the
Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the [Court]
finds probable cause against respondent Mark
Jimenez. Accordingly let a Warrant for the arrest of the
respondent be issued. Consequently and taking into
consideration Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, this Court fixes the reasonable
amount of bail for respondents temporary liberty at
ONE MILLION PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00), the same to be
paid in cash.
Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately
surrender to this Court his passport and the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation is likewise directed to
include the name of the respondent in its Hold
Departure List.[4]
Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the
bail Order, the cancellation of the bond, and the taking
of Jimenez into legal custody.

The Facts

This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465

entitled Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion.[5]
[6]

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty,

the United States Government, through diplomatic

channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note

Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by
Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied by
duly
authenticated
documents
requesting
the
extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario
Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and
documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA)
transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for
appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition
Law.

Petitioner presents the following issues for the

consideration of this Court:

Upon learning of the request for his extradition,

Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch
25.[7] The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice
(DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his
extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however,
assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in the
said GR No. 139465. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of
9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to
furnish private respondent copies of the extradition
request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter
a reasonable period within which to file a comment and
supporting evidence.[8]

II.

Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by

the SOJ, this Court issued its October 17, 2000
Resolution.[9] By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three
justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and
reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private
respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process. This Resolution has become final and
executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of
the United States of America, represented by the
Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the
appropriate Petition for Extradition which was docketed
as Extradition Case No. 01192061. The Petition
alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an
arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida on April 15,
1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with
the following charges in Indictment No. 99-00281 CRSEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and
to commit certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US
Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26
US Code Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of Title
18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false statements,
in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and
(5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation of Title 2
US Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18
US Code Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of
Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order
for his immediate arrest pursuant to Section 6 of PD
No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition,
Respondent Jimenez filed before it an Urgent
Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,[10] which prayed that
petitioners application for an arrest warrant be set for
hearing.
In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC
granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for
hearing on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner
manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted
by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition
case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of
arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his
Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer:
that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to
post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for
hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below
issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his
temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. [11] After
he had surrendered his passport and posted the
required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional
liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.[12]
Hence, this Petition. [13]

Issues

I.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure
of first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an
arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069.

The public respondent acted without or in excess of

jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for
bail and in allowing Jimenez to go on provisional liberty
because:
1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail,
in the absence of any law that provides for such power.
2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the
1987 Philippine Constitution and Section 4, Rule 114
(Bail) of the Rules of Court, as amended, which [were]
relied upon, cannot be used as bases for allowing bail in
extradition proceedings.
3. The presumption is against bail in extradition
proceedings or proceedings leading to extradition.
4. On the assumption that bail is available in
extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to
extradition, bail is not a matter of right but only of
discretion upon clear showing by the applicant of the
existence of special circumstances.
5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in
extradition proceedings, the public respondent received
no evidence of special circumstances which may justify
release on bail.
6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no special
circumstance exists that will engender a well-founded
belief that he will not flee.
7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are
ineffectual and do not ensure compliance by the
Philippines with its obligations under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty.
8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on
May 10, 2001 in the case entitled Eduardo T. Rodriguez
et al. vs. The Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 17,
Manila, CA-G.R. SP No. 64589, relied upon by the public
respondent in granting bail, had been recalled before
the issuance of the subject bail orders.[14]
In sum, the substantive questions that this Court
will address are: (1) whether Jimenez is entitled to
notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be
issued, and (2) whether he is entitled to bail and to
provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are
pending. Preliminarily, we shall take up the alleged
prematurity of the Petition for Certiorari arising from
petitioners failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration in
the RTC and to seek relief in the Court of Appeals (CA),
instead of in this Court.[15] We shall also preliminarily
discuss five extradition postulates that will guide us in
disposing of the substantive issues.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

Preliminary Matters

Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition

Petitioner submits the following justifications for

not filing a Motion for Reconsideration in the Extradition
Court: (1) the issues were fully considered by such
court after requiring the parties to submit their
respective memoranda and position papers on the
matter and thus, the filing of a reconsideration motion
would serve no useful purpose; (2) the assailed orders
are a patent nullity, absent factual and legal basis
therefor; and (3) the need for relief is extremely urgent,
as the passage of sufficient time would give Jimenez
ample opportunity to escape and avoid extradition; and
(4) the issues raised are purely of law. [16]
For resorting directly to this Court instead of the
CA, petitioner submits the following reasons: (1) even if
the petition is lodged with the Court of Appeals and
such appellate court takes cognizance of the issues and
decides them, the parties would still bring the matter to
this Honorable Court to have the issues resolved once
and for all [and] to have a binding precedent that all
lower courts ought to follow; (2) the Honorable Court of
Appeals had in one case[17] ruled on the issue by
disallowing bail but the court below refused to recognize
the decision as a judicial guide and all other courts
might likewise adopt the same attitude of refusal; and
(3) there are pending issues on bail both in the
extradition courts and the Court of Appeals, which,
unless guided by the decision that this Honorable Court
will render in this case, would resolve to grant bail in
favor of the potential extraditees and would give them
opportunity to flee and thus, cause adverse effect on
the ability of the Philippines to comply with its
obligations under existing extradition treaties. [18]
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a
higher court will not prosper unless the inferior court
has been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a
chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This rule,
though, has certain exceptions: (1) when the issue
raised is purely of law, (2) when public interest is
involved, or (3) in case of urgency. [19] As a fourth
exception, the Court has also ruled that the filing of a
motion for reconsideration before availment of the
remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua non, when the
questions raised are the same as those that have
already been squarely argued and exhaustively passed
upon by the lower court.[20] Aside from being of this
nature, the issues in the present case also involve pure
questions of law that are of public interest. Hence, a
motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with.
Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation
of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari when
there are special and important reasons therefor.
[21]
In Fortich v. Corona[22]we stated:
[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to
take cognizance of the petition filed directly [before] it if
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the
issues raised, warrant. This has been the judicial policy
to be observed and which has been reiterated in
subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et.
al., Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman,
and, Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al. As we have further
stated in Cuaresma:
x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts
original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is established policy. x x x.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take
primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the
interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations
so as to promptly put an end to the present controversy
which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked
national interest because of the magnitude of the
problem created by the issuance of the assailed
resolution. Moreover, x x x requiring the petitioners to
file their petition first with the Court of Appeals would
only result in a waste of time and money.

justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would

result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be
avoided. Time and again, this Court has suspended its
own rules and excepted a particular case from their
operation whenever the higher interests of justice so
require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy
disquisition of the proper procedure that should have
been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly
to the merits of the case.
In a number of other exceptional cases,[24] we held
as follows:
This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that
of Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto and habeas corpus, and we entertain direct
resort to us in cases where special and important
reasons or exceptional and compelling circumstances
justify the same.
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for
all the important issue of bail in extradition proceedings,
we deem it best to take cognizance of the present
case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first
impression over which there is, as yet, no local
jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
Five Postulates of Extradition
The substantive issues raised in this case require
an interpretation or construction of the treaty and the
law on extradition. A cardinal rule in the interpretation
of a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give effect to its
intent.[25] Since PD 1069 is intended as a guide for the
implementation of extradition treaties to which the
Philippines is a signatory,[26] understanding certain
postulates of extradition will aid us in properly deciding
the issues raised here.
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the
Suppression of Crime.
First, extradition treaties are entered into for the
purpose of suppressing crime[27] by facilitating the arrest
and the custodial transfer[28] of a fugitive[29] from one
state to the other.
With the advent of easier and faster means of
international travel, the flight of affluent criminals from
one country to another for the purpose of committing
crime and evading prosecution has become more
frequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting their
methods of dealing with criminals and crimes that
transcend international boundaries.
Today, a majority of nations in the world
community have come to look upon extradition as the
major effective instrument of international co-operation
in the suppression of crime.[30] It is the only regular
system that has been devised to return fugitives to the
jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in
accordance with municipal and international law. [31]
An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of
the principle that criminals should be restored to a
jurisdiction competent to try and punish them is that the
number of criminals seeking refuge abroad will be
reduced. For to the extent that efficient means of
detection and the threat of punishment play a
significant role in the deterrence of crime within the
territorial limits of a State, so the existence of effective
extradition arrangements and the consequent certainty
of return to the locus delicti commissi play a
corresponding role in the deterrence of flight abroad in
order to escape the consequence of crime. x x x. From
an absence of extradition arrangements flight abroad by
the ingenious criminal receives direct encouragement
and thus indirectly does the commission of crime
itself.[32]
In Secretary v. Lantion[33] we explained:

That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules
in the higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in
our jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon
vs. Court of Appeals:[23]
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere
tools designed to facilitate the attainment of

The Philippines also has a national interest to help in

suppressing crimes and one way to do it is to facilitate
the extradition of persons covered by treaties duly
entered [into] by our government. More and more,
crimes are becoming the concern of one world. Laws
involving crimes and crime prevention are undergoing

universalization. One manifest purpose of this trend

towards globalization is to deny easy refuge to a
criminal whose activities threaten the peace and
progress of civilized countries. It is to the great interest
of the Philippines to be part of this irreversible
movement in light of its vulnerability to crimes,
especially transnational crimes.

Fourth, our executive branch of government

voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty, and our
legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries
the presumption that its implementation will serve the
national interest.

Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and

faster international travel, and an expanding ring of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to
be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate with
other states in order to improve our chances of
suppressing crime in our own country.

Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition

Treaty promotes comity[40]with the requesting state. On
the other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations
thereunder paints a bad image of our country before the
world community. Such failure would discourage other
states from entering into treaties with us, particularly an
extradition treaty that hinges on reciprocity. [41]

2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due

Process to the Accused
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that
both parties thereto have examined, and that both
accept and trust, each others legal system and judicial
process.[34] More
pointedly,
our
duly
authorized
representatives signature on an extradition treaty
signifies our confidence in the capacity and the
willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights
of the person sought to be extradited. [35] That signature
signifies our full faith that the accused will be given,
upon extradition to the requesting state, all relevant and
basic rights in the criminal proceedings that will take
place therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have
been signed, or would have been directly attacked for
its unconstitutionality.
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v.
Lantion,[36] extradition proceedings are not criminal in
nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional
rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition which
is sui generis -- in a class by itself -- they are not.
An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a
criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the
rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does
not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence
of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged
in the court of the state where he will be
extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that
are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of
an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee x x x.
xxx xxx

xxx

There are other differences between an extradition

proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An extradition
proceeding is summary in nature while criminal
proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In
contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of
evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission
of evidence under less stringent standards. In terms of
the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case
requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction
while a fugitive may be ordered extradited upon
showing of the existence of a prima facie case. Finally,
unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes
executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition
proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual
extraditable but the President has the final discretion to
extradite him. The United States adheres to a similar
practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide
discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the
demands of the nations foreign relations before making
the ultimate decision to extradite.
Given the foregoing, it is evident that the
extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt
or the innocence of the person sought to be extradited.
[37]
Such
determination
during
the
extradition
proceedings will only result in needless duplication and
delay. Extradition is merely a measure of international
judicial assistance through which a person charged with
or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with
the best claim to try that person. It is not part of the
function of the assisting authorities to enter into
questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction.
[38]
The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in
court is only to determine whether the extradition
request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and
whether the person sought is extraditable.[39]

4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.

Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to

comply in good faith with our obligations under the
Treaty.[42] This principle requires that we deliver the
accused to the requesting country if the conditions
precedent to extradition, as set forth in the Treaty, are
satisfied. In
other
words,
[t]he
demanding
government, when it has done all that the treaty and
the law require it to do, is entitled to the delivery of the
accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the
other government is under obligation to make the
surrender.[43] Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready
and in a position to deliver the accused, should it be
found proper.
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be
flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds
reinforcement in the experience [44] of the executive
branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure that
the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the
requested state in order to thwart their extradition to
the requesting state.
The present extradition case further validates the
premise that persons sought to be extradited have a
propensity to flee. Indeed, extradition hearings would
not even begin, if only the accused were willing to
submit to trial in the requesting country. [45] Prior acts of
herein respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state
right before the conclusion of his indictment
proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested
state despite learning that the requesting state is
seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged
with are bailable -- eloquently speak of his aversion to
the processes in the requesting state, as well as his
predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These
circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high
risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has the
capacity and the will to flee. Having fled once, what is
there to stop him, given sufficient opportunity, from
fleeing a second time?

First Substantive Issue:

Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing
Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?

Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by

the RTC --informing the accused, a fugitive from justice,
that an Extradition Petition has been filed against him,
and that petitioner is seeking his arrest -- gives him
notice to escape and to avoid extradition. Moreover,
petitioner pleads that such procedure may set a
dangerous precedent, in that those sought to be
extradited -- including terrorists, mass murderers and
war criminals -- may invoke it in future extradition
cases.
On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues
that he should not be hurriedly and arbitrarily deprived
of his constitutional right to liberty without due
process. He further asserts that there is as yet no
specific law or rule setting forth the procedure prior to
the issuance of a warrant of arrest, after the petition for
extradition has been filed in court; ergo, the formulation
of that procedure is within the discretion of the presiding
judge.
Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of
their arguments. It states:
SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest;
Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1) Immediately upon
receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court

shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to

appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour
fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the
immediate arrest of the accused which may be
served any where within the Philippines if it
appears to the presiding judge that the
immediate arrest and temporary detention of the
accused will best serve the ends of justice. Upon
receipt of the answer, or should the accused after
having received the summons fail to answer within the
time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set
another date for the hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the
warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served
each upon the accused and the attorney having charge
of the case. (Emphasis ours)
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganans
act of immediately setting for hearing the issuance of a
warrant of arrest? We rule in the negative.
1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law
It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069,
our Extradition Law, uses the word immediate to
qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification
would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the
issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending
notices to the opposing parties, [46] receiving facts and
arguments[47] from them,[48] and giving them time to
prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest
subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered
immediate. The law could not have intended the word
as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of
imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the
determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued.
By using the phrase if it appears, the law further
conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at
such early stage. The trial court is not expected to
make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true
and actual situation, immediately upon the filing of the
petition. From the knowledge and the material then
available to it, the court is expected merely to get a
good first impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient
to make a speedy initial determination as regards the
arrest and detention of the accused.
Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a
Certificate of Authentication among others, were the
following: (1) Annex H, the Affidavit executed on May
26, 1999 by Mr. Michael E. Savage -- trial attorney in the
Campaign Financing Task Force of the Criminal Division
of the US Department of Justice; (2) Annexes H to G,
evidentiary Appendices of various exhibits that
constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the
Indictment, with Exhibits 1 to 120 (duly authenticated
exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes charged
in the Indictment); (3) Annex BB, the Exhibit I Appendix
of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the
Affidavit of Angela Byers and enclosed Statements in
two volumes; (4) Annex GG, the Exhibit J Table of
Contents for Supplemental Evidentiary Appendix with
enclosed Exhibits 121 to 132; and (5) Annex MM, the
Exhibit L Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements
Referenced in the Affidavit of Betty Steward and
enclosed Statements in two volumes.[49]
It is evident that respondent judge could have
already gotten an impression from these records
adequate for him to make an initial determination of
whether the accused was someone who should
immediately be arrested in order to best serve the
ends of justice. He could have determined whether
such facts and circumstances existed as would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that
the extradition request was prima facie meritorious. In
point of fact, he actually concluded from these
supporting
documents
that
probable
cause did exist. In the second questioned Order, he
stated:
In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US
Government in support of [its] request for extradition of
herein respondent are enough to convince the Court of
the existence of probable cause to proceed with the
hearing against the extraditee.[50]

We stress that the prima facie existence of

probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for
issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from the
Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence,
after having already determined therefrom that a prima
facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused
his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon
motion of Jimenez.[51]
Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a
hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon failure of the
accused to answer after receiving the summons. In
connection with the matter of immediate arrest,
however, the word hearing is notably absent from the
provision. Evidently, had the holding of a hearing at that
stage been intended, the law could have easily so
provided. It also bears emphasizing at this point that
extradition
proceedings
are
summary[52]in
nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty
leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is
no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step
in the entire proceedings.
It is taken for granted that the contracting parties
intend something reasonable and something not
inconsistent with generally recognized principles of
International Law, nor with previous treaty obligations
towards third States. If, therefore, the meaning of a
treaty is ambiguous, the reasonable meaning is to be
preferred to the unreasonable, the more reasonable to
the less reasonable x x x .[53]
Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons
sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their
arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date
would give them ample opportunity to prepare and
execute an escape. Neither the Treaty nor the Law could
have intended that consequence, for the very purpose
of both would have been defeated by the escape of the
accused from the requested state.
2. On the Basis of the Constitution
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution,
which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice
or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of
arrest. It provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
To determine probable cause for the issuance of
arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the
examination
-under
oath
or
affirmation
-of complainants and
the witnesses
they
may
produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear
the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
In Ho v. People[54] and in all the cases cited therein,
never was a judge required to go to the extent of
conducting a hearing just for the purpose of personally
determining probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. All we required was that the judge
must have sufficient supporting documents upon which
to make his independent judgment, or at the very least,
upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to
the existence of probable cause. [55]
In Webb v. De Leon,[56] the Court categorically
stated that a judge was not supposed to conduct a
hearing before issuing a warrant of arrest:
Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest,
judges merely determine personally the probability, not
the certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges
do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the
existence of probable cause. They just personally
review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding
a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial
evidence.

At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence

on
record,
judges
merely
further
examine complainants and their witnesses.[57] In
the
present case, validating the act of respondent judge and
instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his
witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with
the rationale for the entire system. If the accused were
allowed to be heard and necessarily to present evidence
during the prima facie determination for the issuance of
a warrant of arrest, what would stop him from
presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage
-- if he so desires -- in his effort to negate a prima facie
finding? Such
a
procedure
could
convert
the
determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial
of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the
main case superfluous. This scenario is also anathema
to the summary nature of extraditions.

We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use

of the word conviction, the constitutional provision on
bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been
arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal
laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings,
because extradition courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal.

That the case under consideration is an extradition

and not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify the
adoption of a set of procedures more protective of the
accused. If a different procedure were called for at all, a
more restrictive one -- not the opposite -- would be
justified in view of respondents demonstrated
predisposition to flee.

The provision in the Constitution stating that the

right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended
does not detract from the rule that the constitutional
right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It
must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus finds application only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent
in
or
directly
connected
with
invasion.[61] Hence, the second sentence in the
constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the
right to bail in criminal proceedings for the
aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean
that the right is available even in extradition
proceedings that are not criminal in nature.

Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem

it wise to restate the proper procedure:
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its
supporting documents, the judge must study them and
make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether
(a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they
show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law,
and (c) the person sought is extraditable. At his
discretion, the judge may require the submission of
further documentation or may personally examine the
affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of
this study and examination, no prima facie finding[58] is
possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion
of the judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie
case is determined, then the magistrate must
immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the
extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to
answer the petition and to appear at scheduled
summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant,
the judge must not inform or notify the potential
extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter
be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the
proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing procedure
will best serve the ends of justice in extradition cases.

Second Substantive Issue:

Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?

Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded

as follows:
Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required.
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this
constitutional provision secures the right to bail
of all persons,
including
those
sought
to
be
extradited. Supposedly, the only exceptions are the
ones charged with offenses punishable with reclusion
perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. He also
alleges the relevance to the present case of Section
4[59] of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which, insofar as
practicable and consistent with the summary nature of
extradition proceedings, shall also apply according to
Section 9 of PD 1069.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is
no provision in the Philippine Constitution granting the
right to bail to a person who is the subject of an
extradition request and arrest warrant.
Extradition Different
Proceedings

from

Ordinary

Criminal

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows

from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of
freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal,
unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable
doubt.[60] It follows that the constitutional provision on
bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue.

That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be

extradited are bailable in the United States is not an
argument to grant him one in the present case. To
stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct
from the trial for the offenses for which he is
charged. He should apply for bail before the courts
trying the criminal cases against him, not before the
extradition court.
No Violation of Due Process
Respondent
Jimenez
cites
the
foreign
case Paretti[62] in
arguing
that,
constitutionally,
[n]o one shall be deprived of x x x liberty x x x
without due process of law.
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to
the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not
amount to a violation of his right to due process. We
iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due
process is the opportunity to be heard [63] but, at the
same time, point out that the doctrine does not always
call for a prior opportunity to be heard.[64] Where the
circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition
case -- call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard
is enough.[65] In the present case, respondent will be
given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when
the
extradition
court
hears
the
Petition
for
Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to
due process and fundamental fairness.
Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no
arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation of his
liberty prior to his being heard. That his arrest and
detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by
(1) the DOJs filing in court the Petition with its
supporting documents after a determination that the
extradition request meets the requirements of the law
and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judges
independent prima facie determination that his arrest
will best serve the ends of justice before the issuance of
a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he
is under the courts custody, to apply for bail as an
exception to the no-initial-bail rule.
It is also worth noting that before the US
government requested the extradition of respondent,
proceedings had already been conducted in that
country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the
requesting state before those proceedings could be
completed, it was hindered from continuing with the due
processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of
due process now has thus become hollow. He already
had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet,
instead of taking it, he ran away.
In this light, would it be proper and just for the
government to increase the risk of violating its treaty
obligations in order to accord Respondent Jimenez his
personal liberty in the span of time that it takes to

resolve the Petition for Extradition? His supposed

immediate deprivation of liberty without the due
process that he had previously shunned pales against
the governments interest in fulfilling its Extradition
Treaty obligations and in cooperating with the world
community in the suppression of crime. Indeed,
[c]onstitutional liberties do not exist in a vacuum; the
due process rights accorded to individuals must be
carefully balanced against exigent and palpable
government interests. [66]
Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for
fugitives, cowards and weaklings who, instead of facing
the consequences of their actions, choose to run and
hide. Hence, it would not be good policy to increase the
risk of violating our treaty obligations if, through
overprotection or excessively liberal treatment, persons
sought to be extradited are able to evade arrest or
escape from our custody. In the absence of any
provision -- in the Constitution, the law or the treaty -expressly guaranteeing the right to bail in extradition
proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting them
bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards
deterring fugitives from coming to the Philippines to
hide from or evade their prosecutors.
The denial of bail as a matter of course in
extradition cases falls into place with and gives life to
Article 14[67] of the Treaty, since this practice would
encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the
requesting state to cut short their detention
here. Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of
extradition proceedings would fall into place with the
emphasis of the Extradition Law on the summary nature
of extradition cases and the need for their speedy
disposition.

Exceptions to the No Bail Rule

The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of

right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has
the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of
discretion[68] and tyranny, as well as the power to
promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional
rights.[69]Furthermore, we believe that the right to due
process is broad enough to include the grant of basic
fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due
process extends to the life, liberty or property
of every person. It is dynamic and resilient, adaptable
to every situation calling for its application. [70]
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice,
we believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee
has been arrested or placed under the custody of the
law, bail may be applied for and granted as
an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing
(1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a
flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that
there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances[71] including, as a matter of reciprocity,
those cited by the highest court in the requesting state
when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases
therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific
statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from
general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant
bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered
requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic
forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is
basically an executive, not a judicial, responsibility
arising from the presidential power to conduct foreign
relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature
of police assistance amongst states, which is not
normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by
the courts into the exercise of this power should be
characterized by caution, so that the vital international
and bilateral interests of our country will not be
unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short, while
this Court is ever protective of the sporting idea of fair
play, it also recognizes the limits of its own
prerogatives and the need to fulfill international
obligations.
Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are
special circumstances that are compelling enough for
the Court to grant his request for provisional release on
bail. We have carefully examined these circumstances
and shall now discuss them.

1. Alleged Disenfranchisement
While his extradition was pending, Respondent
Jimenez was elected as a member of the House of
Representatives. On that basis, he claims that his
detention will disenfranchise his Manila district of
600,000 residents. We are not persuaded. In People v.
Jalosjos,[72]the Court has already debunked the
disenfranchisement argument when it ruled thus:
When the voters of his district elected the accusedappellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of
the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so
with the knowledge that he could achieve only such
legislative results which he could accomplish within the
confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if
voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is
suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing
that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in
office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down
to a question of constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of laws. This
simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be
treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities
imposed. The organs of government may not show any
undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither
partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial
distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a
Congressman a substantial differentiation which
removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the
same class as all persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential
duties by public officers has never been an excuse to
free a person validly [from] prison. The duties imposed
by the mandate of the people are multifarious. The
accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate
ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The
accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the
House of Representatives, not to mention the 24
members of the Senate, charged with the duties of
legislation. Congress continues to function well in the
physical absence of one or a few of its
members. Depending on the exigency of Government
that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme
Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular
duty. The importance of a function depends on the need
for its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her
infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A
doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives
of those with a particular affliction. An elective
governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police
officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the
call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different
classification from those others who are validly
restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,]
wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are
made in favor of or against groups or types of
individuals.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The
necessities imposed by public welfare may justify
exercise of government authority to regulate even if
thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their
interests are disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of
Congressman is not a reasonable classification in
criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of
the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him
from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law
and apply to all those belonging to the same class. [73]
It must be noted that even before private
respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in
Manila, it was already of public knowledge that the
United States was requesting his extradition. Hence, his
constituents were or should have been prepared for the

consequences of the extradition case against their

representative, including his detention pending the final
resolution of the case. Premises considered and in line
with Jalosjos, we are constrained to rule against his
claim that his election to public office is by itself a
compelling reason to grant him bail.
2. Anticipated Delay
Respondent Jimenez further contends that because
the extradition proceedings are lengthy, it would be
unfair to confine him during the pendency of the
case. Again we are not convinced. We must emphasize
that extradition cases are summary in nature. They are
resorted to merely to determine whether the extradition
petition and its annexes conform to the Extradition
Treaty, not to determine guilt or innocence. Neither is it,
as a rule, intended to address issues relevant to the
constitutional rights available to the accused in a
criminal action.
We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner
may, in bad faith, unduly delay the proceedings. This is
quite another matter that is not at issue here. Thus, any
further discussion of this point would be merely
anticipatory and academic.
However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of
respondent, with all the more reason would the grant of
bail not be justified. Giving premium to delay by
considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of
bail would be tantamount to giving him the power to
grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him to
stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition
proceedings even more. This we cannot allow.
3. Not a Flight Risk?
Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight
risk. To support this claim, he stresses that he learned
of the extradition request in June 1999; yet, he has not
fled the country. True, he has not actually fled during
the preliminary stages of the request for his
extradition. Yet, this fact cannot be taken to mean that
he will not flee as the process moves forward to its
conclusion, as he hears the footsteps of the requesting
government inching closer and closer. That he has not
yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean
that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of
our government if and when it matters; that is, upon the
resolution of the Petition for Extradition.
In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied
for and granted by the trial court at anytime after the
applicant has been taken into custody and prior to
judgment, even after bail has been previously
denied. In the present case, the extradition court may
continue hearing evidence on the application for bail,
which may be granted in accordance with the guidelines
in this Decision.

Brief Refutation of Dissents

The proposal to remand this case to the extradition

court, we believe, is totally unnecessary; in fact, it is a
cop-out. The parties -- in particular, Respondent
Jimenez -- have been given more than sufficient
opportunity both by the trial court and this Court to
discuss fully and exhaustively private respondents
claim to bail. As already stated, the RTC set for hearing
not only petitioners application for an arrest warrant,
but also private respondents prayer for temporary
liberty. Thereafter
required
by
the
RTC
were
memoranda on the arrest, then position papers on the
application for bail, both of which were separately filed
by the parties.
This Court has meticulously pored over the
Petition, the Comment, the Reply, the lengthy
Memoranda and the Position Papers of both
parties. Additionally, it has patiently heard them in Oral
Arguments, a procedure not normally observed in the
great majority of cases in this Tribunal. Moreover, after
the Memos had been submitted, the parties -particularly the potential extraditee -- have bombarded
this Court with additional pleadings -- entitled
Manifestations by both parties and CounterManifestation by private respondent -- in which the
main topic was Mr. Jimenezs plea for bail.

A remand would mean that this long, tedious

process would be repeated in its entirety. The trial court
would again hear factual and evidentiary matters. Be it
noted, however, that, in all his voluminous pleadings
and verbal propositions, private respondent has not
asked for a remand. Evidently, even he realizes that
there is absolutely no need to rehear factual
matters. Indeed,
the
inadequacy
lies
not
in
the factual presentation of Mr. Jimenez. Rather, it lies in
his legal arguments. Remanding the case will not solve
this utter lack of persuasion and strength in his legal
reasoning.
In short, this Court -- as shown by this Decision and
the spirited Concurring, Separate and Dissenting
Opinions written by the learned justices themselves -has exhaustively deliberated and carefully passed
upon all relevant questions in this case. Thus, a remand
will not serve any useful purpose; it will only further
delay these already very delayed proceedings,[74] which
our Extradition Law requires to be summary in
character. What we need now is prudent and deliberate
speed, not unnecessary and convoluted delay. What is
needed is a firm decision on the merits, not a circuitous
cop-out.
Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is
allegedly disregarding basic freedoms when a case is
one of extradition. We believe that this charge is not
only baseless, but also unfair. Suffice it to say that, in
its length and breath, this Decision has taken special
cognizance of the rights to due process and
fundamental fairness of potential extraditees.

Summation

As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize

and stress these ten points:
1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings
is to determine whether the request expressed in the
petition, supported by its annexes and the evidence that
may be adduced during the hearing of the petition,
complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and
whether the person sought is extraditable. The
proceedings are intended merely to assist the
requesting state in bringing the accused -- or the
fugitive who has illegally escaped -- back to its territory,
so that the criminal process may proceed therein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the
Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust in the
reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system
of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the
willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the
accused in the pending criminal case therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not
equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or innocence
is determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not
one in which the constitutional rights of the accused are
necessarily available. It is more akin, if at all, to a
courts request to police authorities for the arrest of the
accused who is at large or has escaped detention or
jumped bail. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of
the requesting state, the reasonable prima facie
presumption is that the person would escape again if
given the opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for
extradition and its supporting documents, the judge
shall make a prima facie finding whether the petition is
sufficient in form and substance, whether it complies
with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and whether the
person sought is extraditable. The magistrate has
discretion to require the petitioner to submit further
documentation, or to personally examine the affiants or
witnesses. If convinced that a prima facie case exists,
the judge immediately issues a warrant for the arrest of
the potential extraditee and summons him or her to
answer and to appear at scheduled hearings on the
petition.
5. After being taken into custody, potential
extraditees may apply for bail. Since the applicants
have a history of absconding, they have the burden of
showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no danger to
the community; and (b) there exist special,
humanitarian
or
compelling
circumstances. The
grounds used by the highest court in the requesting

state for the grant of bail therein may be considered,

under the principle of reciprocity as a special
circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter
of right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context
of the peculiar facts of each case.
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to
due process and to fundamental fairness. Due process
does not always call for a prior opportunity to be
heard. A subsequent opportunity is sufficient due to the
flight risk involved. Indeed, available during the
hearings on the petition and the answer is the full
chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness
that is compatible with the summary nature of
extradition.
7. This Court will always remain a protector of
human rights, a bastion of liberty, a bulwark of
democracy and the conscience of society. But it is also
well aware of the limitations of its authority and of the
need for respect for the prerogatives of the other coequal and co-independent organs of government.
8. We realize that extradition is essentially an
executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of the
presidential power to conduct foreign relations and to
implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of
government has broad discretion in its duty and power
of implementation.
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform
oversight functions and exercise review authority to
prevent or excise grave abuse and tyranny. They should
not allow contortions, delays and over-due process
every
little
step
of
the
way,
lest
these summary extradition proceedings become not
only inutile but also sources of international
embarrassment due to our inability to comply in good
faith with a treaty partners simple request to return a
fugitive. Worse, our country should not be converted
into a dubious haven where fugitives and escapees can
unreasonably delay, mummify, mock, frustrate,
checkmate and defeat the quest for bilateral justice and
international cooperation.
10. At bottom, extradition proceedings
should be conducted with all deliberate speed to
determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty
and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual
rights,
to
avoid
the
legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities
that may negate that purpose.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The
assailed RTC Order dated May 23, 2001 is hereby
declared NULL and VOID, while the challenged Order
dated July 3, 2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as it granted bail
to Respondent Mark Jimenez. The bail bond posted by
private respondent is CANCELLED. The Regional Trial
Court of Manila is directed to conduct the extradition
proceedings before it, with all deliberate speed
pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our Extradition
Treaty with the United States as well as our Extradition
Law. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Manolet Lavides was arrested on April 3, 1997
for child abuse under R.A. No. 7610 (an act providing for
stronger deterrence and special protection against child
abuse, exploitation and discrimination, providing
penalties for its violation, and other purposes). His
arrest was made without a warrant as a result of an
entrapment conducted by the police. It appears that on
April 3, 1997, the parents of complainant Lorelie San
Miguel reported to the police that their daughter, then
16 years old, had been contacted by petitioner for an
assignation that night at petitioners room at the
Metropolitan Hotel in Diliman, Quezon City. Apparently,
this was not the first time the police received reports of
petitioners activities. An entrapment operation was
therefore set in motion. At around 8:20 in the evening of
April 3, 1997, the police knocked at the door of Room
308 of the Metropolitan Hotel where petitioner was
staying. When petitioner opened the door, the police
saw him with Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt and
an underwear, whereupon they arrested him. Based on
the sworn statement of complainant and the affidavits
of the arresting officers, which were submitted at the
inquest, an information for violation of Art. III, 5(b) of
R.A. No. 7610 was filed on April 7, 1997 against
petitioner in the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-9770550. Edp
On April 10, 1997, petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion
(1) For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause; (2) For
the Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully
Detained on an Unlawful Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In
the Event of Adverse Resolution of the A
bove Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a
Matter of Right under the Law on Which He is
Charged."[1]
On April 29, 1997, nine more informations for child
abuse were filed against petitioner by the same
complainant, Lorelie San Miguel, and by three other
minor children, Mary Ann Tardesilla, Jennifer Catarman,
and Annalyn Talingting. The cases were docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. Q-97-70866 to Q-97-70874. In all the
cases, it was alleged that, on various dates mentioned
in the informations, petitioner had sexual intercourse
with complainants who had been "exploited in
prostitution and . . . given money [by petitioner] as
payment for the said [acts of] sexual intercourse."
No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, petitioner filed
separate applications for bail in the nine cases.
On May 16, 1997, the trial court issued an order
resolving petitioners Omnibus Motion, as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, this Court finds that:
1. In Crim. Case No. Q-97-70550,
there is probable cause to hold the
accused under detention, his arrest
having been made in accordance with
the Rules. He must therefore remain
under detention until further order of
this Court;

Maggudatu vs. CA

2. The accused is entitled to bail in all

the above-entitled case. He is hereby
granted the right to post bail in the
amount of P80,000.00 for each case
or a total of P800,000.00 for all the
cases under the following conditions:
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129670. February 1, 2000]
MANOLET O. LAVIDES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ROSALINA L. LUNA
PISON, Judge Presiding over Branch 107, RTC,
Quezon City; and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION

a) The accused shall not be entitled to

a waiver of appearance during the
trial of these cases. He shall and must
always be present at the hearings of
these cases;
b) In the event that he shall not be
able to do so, his bail bonds shall be
automatically cancelled and forfeited,
warrants for his arrest shall be

immediately issued and the cases

shall proceed to trial in absentia;

to quash on appeal should the decision be adverse to

him.

c) The hold-departure Order of this

Court dated April 10, 1997 stands; and

Hence this petition. Petitioner contends that the Court of

Appeals erred[7] __

d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be

made only after the arraignment to
enable this Court to immediately
acquire jurisdiction over the accused;
3. Let these cases be set for
arraignment on May 23, 1997 at 8:30
oclock in the morning.[2]
On May 20, 1997, petitioner filed a motion to quash the
informations against him, except those filed in Criminal
Case No. Q-97-70550 or Q-97-70866. Pending resolution
of his motion, he asked the trial court to suspend the
arraignment scheduled on May 23, 1997.[3] Then on May
22, 1997, he filed a motion in which he prayed that the
amounts of bail bonds be reduced to P40,000.00 for
each case and that the same be done prior to his
arraignment.[4] Misedp
On May 23, 1997, the trial court, in separate orders,
denied petitioners motions to reduce bail bonds, to
quash the informations, and to suspend arraignment.
Accordingly, petitioner was arraigned during which he
pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and then
ordered him released upon posting bail bonds in the
total amount of P800,000.00, subject to the conditions
in the May 16, 1997 order and the "hold-departure"
order of April 10, 1997. The pre-trial conference was set
on June 7, 1997.
On June 2, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
(CA-G.R. SP No. 44316) in the Court of Appeals, assailing
the trial courts order, dated May 16, 1997, and its two
orders, dated May 23, 1997, denying his motion to
quash and maintaining the conditions set forth in its
order of May 16, 1997, respectively.
While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, two
more informations were filed against petitioner, bringing
the total number of cases against him to 12, which were
all consolidated.
On June 30, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, considering that the
conditions imposed under Nos. 2-a)
and 2-b),[5] of the May 23 (should be
May 16), 1997 Order, are separable,
and would not affect the cash bond
which petitioner posted for his
provisional liberty, with the sole
modification that those aforesaid
conditions are hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE, the May 16, May 23 and
May 23, 1997 Orders are MAINTAINED
in all other respects.[6] Misoedp
The appellate court invalidated the first two conditions
imposed in the May 16, 1997 order for the grant of bail
to petitioner but ruled that the issue concerning the
validity of the condition making arraignment a
prerequisite for the approval of petitioners bail bonds to
be moot and academic. It noted "that petitioner has
posted the cash bonds; that when arraigned,
represented by lawyers, he pleaded not guilty to each
offense; and that he has already been released from
detention." The Court of Appeals thought that the
aforesaid conditions in the May 16, 1997 order were
contrary to Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution which
provides that "[a]fter arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear
is unjustifiable."
With respect to the denial of petitioners motion to
quash the informations against him, the appellate court
held that petitioner could not question the same in a
petition for certiorari before it, but what he must do was
to go to trial and to reiterate the grounds of his motion

1.......In ruling that the condition

imposed by respondent Judge that the
approval of petitioners bail bonds
"shall be made only after his
arraignment" is of no moment and has
been rendered moot and academic by
the fact that he had already posted
the bail bonds and had pleaded not
guilty to all the offenses;
2.......In not resolving the submission
that the arraignment was void not
only because it was made under
compelling circumstance which left
petitioner no option to question the
respondent Judges arbitrary action
but also because it emanated from a
void Order;
3.......In ruling that the denial of
petitioners motion to quash may not
be impugned in a petition for
certiorari; and
4.......In not resolving the legal issue
of whether or not petitioner may be
validly charged for violation of Section
5(b) of RA No. 7610 under several
informations corresponding to the
number of alleged acts of child abuse
allegedly committed against each
private complainant by the petitioner.
We will deal with each of these contentions although not
in the order in which they are stated by petitioner.
First. As already stated, the trial courts order, dated
May 16, 1997, imposed four conditions for the grant of
bail to petitioner:
a) The accused shall not be entitled to
a waiver of appearance during the
trial of these cases. He shall and must
always be present at the hearings of
these cases;
b) In the event that he shall not be
able to do so, his bail bonds shall be
automatically cancelled and forfeited,
warrants for his arrest shall be
immediately issued and the cases
shall proceed to trial in absentia;
c) The hold-departure Order of this
Court dated April 10, 1997 stands;
and Edpmis
d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be
made only after the arraignment to
enable this Court to immediately
acquire jurisdiction over the accused;
The Court of Appeals declared conditions (a) and (b)
invalid but declined to pass upon the validity of
condition (d) on the ground that the issue had become
moot and academic. Petitioner takes issue with the
Court of Appeals with respect to its treatment of
condition (d) of the May 16, 1997 order of the trial court
which makes petitioners arraignment a prerequisite to
the approval of his bail bonds. His contention is that this
condition is void and that his arraignment was also
invalid because it was held pursuant to such invalid
condition.
We agree with petitioner that the appellate court should
have determined the validity of the conditions imposed
in the trial courts order of May 16, 1997 for the grant of
bail because petitioners contention is that his

arraignment was held in pursuance of these conditions

for bail.
In requiring that petitioner be first arraigned before he
could be granted bail, the trial court apprehended that if
petitioner were released on bail he could, by being
absent, prevent his early arraignment and thereby delay
his trial until the complainants got tired and lost interest
in their cases. Hence, to ensure his presence at the
arraignment, approval of petitioners bail bonds should
be deferred until he could be arraigned. After that, even
if petitioner does not appear, trial can proceed as long
as he is notified of the date of hearing and his failure to
appear is unjustified, since under Art. III, 14(2) of the
Constitution, trial in absentia is authorized. This seems
to be the theory of the trial court in its May 16, 1997
order conditioning the grant of bail to petitioner on his
arraignment.
This theory is mistaken. In the first place, as the trial
court itself acknowledged, in cases where it is
authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment,
otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a
motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and
the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for
the arraignment of the accused. In the second place, the
trial court could ensure the presence of petitioner at the
arraignment precisely by granting bail and ordering his
presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as
arraignment. Under Rule 114, 2(b) of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that
"the accused shall appear before the proper court
whenever so required by the court or these Rules," while
under Rule 116, 1(b) the presence of the accused at
the arraignment is required.
On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an
accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a
position where he has to choose between (1) filing a
motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail
because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his
arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing
of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at
once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios
certainly undermine the accuseds constitutional right
not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or
information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his
right to bail.[8]
It is the condition in the May 16, 1997 order of the trial
court that "approval of the bail bonds shall be made
only after arraignment," which the Court of Appeals
should instead have declared void. The condition
imposed in the trial courts order of May 16, 1997 that
the accused cannot waive his appearance at the trial
but that he must be present at the hearings of the case
is valid and is in accordance with Rule 114. For another
condition of bail under Rule 114, 2(c) is that "The
failure of the accused to appear at the trial without
justification despite due notice to him or his bondsman
shall be deemed an express waiver of his right to be
present on the date specified in the notice. In such case,
trial shall proceed in absentia." Jjsc
Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution authorizing trials in
absentia allows the accused to be absent at the trial but
not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at
arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt,
[9]
(b) during trial whenever necessary for identification
purposes,[10] and (c) at the promulgation of sentence,
unless it is for a light offense, in which case the accused
may appear by counsel or representative. [11] At such
stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and
cannot be waived. As pointed out in Borja v. Mendoza,
[12]
in an opinion by Justice, later Chief Justice, Enrique
Fernando, there can be no trial in absentia unless the
accused has been arraigned.
Undoubtedly, the trial court knew this. Petitioner could
delay the proceedings by absenting himself from the
arraignment. But once he is arraigned, trial could
proceed even in his absence. So it thought that to
ensure petitioners presence at the arraignment,
petitioner should be denied bail in the meantime. The
fly in the ointment, however, is that such court strategy
violates petitioners constitutional rights.

Second. Although this condition is invalid, it does not

follow that the arraignment of petitioner on May 23,
1997 was also invalid. Contrary to petitioners
contention, the arraignment did not emanate from the
invalid condition that "approval of the bail bonds shall
be made only after the arraignment." Even without such
a condition, the arraignment of petitioner could not be
omitted. In sum, although the condition for the grant of
bail to petitioner is invalid, his arraignment and the
subsequent proceedings against him are valid.
Third. Petitioner concedes that the rule is that the
remedy of an accused whose motion to quash is denied
is not to file a petition for certiorari but to proceed to
trial without prejudice to his right to reiterate the
grounds invoked in his motion to quash during trial on
the merits or on appeal if an adverse judgment is
rendered against him. However, he argues that this case
should be treated as an exception. He contends that the
Court of Appeals should not have evaded the issue of
whether he should be charged under several
informations corresponding to the number of acts of
child abuse allegedly committed by him against each of
the complainants.
In Tano v. Salvador,[13] the Court, while holding that
certiorari will not lie from a denial of a motion to quash,
nevertheless recognized that there may be cases where
there are special circumstances clearly demonstrating
the inadequacy of an appeal. In such cases, the accused
may resort to the appellate court to raise the issue
decided against him. This is such a case. Whether
petitioner is liable for just one crime regardless of the
number of sexual acts allegedly committed by him and
the number of children with whom he had sexual
intercourse, or whether each act of intercourse
constitutes one crime is a question that bears on the
presentation of evidence by either party. It is important
to petitioner as well as to the prosecution how many
crimes there are. For instance, if there is only one
offense of sexual abuse regardless of the number of
children involved, it will not matter much to the
prosecution whether it is able to present only one of the
complainants. On the other hand, if each act of sexual
intercourse with a child constitutes a separate offense,
it will matter whether the other children are presented
during the trial. Scjj
The issue then should have been decided by the Court
of Appeals. However, instead of remanding this case to
the appellate court for a determination of this issue, we
will decide the issue now so that the trial in the court
below can proceed without further delay.
Petitioners contention is that the 12 informations filed
against him allege only one offense of child abuse,
regardless of the number of alleged victims (four) and
the number of acts of sexual intercourse committed with
them (twelve). He argues that the act of sexual
intercourse is only a means of committing the offense
so that the acts of sexual intercourse/lasciviousness
with minors attributed to him should not be subject of
separate informations. He cites the affidavits of the
alleged victims which show that their involvement with
him constitutes an "unbroken chain of events," i.e., the
first victim was the one who introduced the second to
petitioner and so on. Petitioner says that child abuse is
similar to the crime of large-scale illegal recruitment
where there is only a single offense regardless of the
number of workers illegally recruited on different
occasions. In the alternative, he contends that, at the
most, only four informations, corresponding to the
number of alleged child victims, can be filed against
him.
Art. III, 5 of R.A. No. 7160 under which petitioner is
being prosecuted, provides:
Sec. 5 Child Prostitution and Other
Sexual Abuse. __ Children, whether
male or female, who for money, profit,
or any other consideration or due to
the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are
deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in

its medium period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon the
following:
....
(b) Those who commit the act of
sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse.
The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) the
accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct; (2) that said act is performed with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse; and (3) the child,[14] whether male or
female, is or is deemed under 18 years of age.
Exploitation in prostitution or other sexual abuse occurs
when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other
consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of
any adult, syndicate, or group.
Each incident of sexual intercourse and lascivious act
with a child under the circumstances mentioned in Art.
III, 5 of R.A. No. 7160 is thus a separate and distinct
offense. The offense is similar to rape or act of
lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code in which
each act of rape or lascivious conduct should be the
subject of a separate information. This conclusion is
confirmed by Art. III, 5(b) of R.A. No. 7160, which
provides:
[t]hat when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age, the perpetrators
shall be prosecuted under Article 335,
paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336
of Act No. 3815, as amended, the
Revised Penal Code, for rape or
lascivious conduct, as the case may
be: Provided, That the penalty for
lascivious conduct when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age shall
be reclusion temporal in its medium
period;
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
SET ASIDE and another one is RENDERED declaring the
orders dated May 16, 1997 and May 23, 1997 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City to be
valid, with the exception of condition (d) in the second
paragraph of the order of May 16, 1997 (making
arraignment a prerequisite to the grant of bail to
petitioner), which is hereby declared void.
SO ORDERED. Sjcj

RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:
This resolves petitioners' Motion for Clarification or
Partial Lifting of Temporary Restraining Order on the
Motion for Bail which was filed on May 25, 1998.
Herein petitioners are detention prisoners who were
arrested and charged with illegal possession of firearms,
ammunitions and explosives under Sections 1 and 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 before the Regional Trial
Court of Kalookan City, Branch 123, 1 as a consequence
of the search conducted pursuant to the search
warrants issued by the RTC of Kalookan City, Branch
125.
After their arrest, petitioners filed a motion for bail.
However, the resolution of the same was held in
abeyance by the trial court pending the presentation of
evidence by the prosecution to enable the court to
determine whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.
Upon formal offer by the prosecution of its evidence
consisting of Exhibits "A" to "UU", petitioners objected
to the same for being inadmissible. In its Order dated
February 7,
1996, 2 the trial court admitted all the exhibits being
offered by the prosecution for whatever purpose that it
may be worth. Subsequently, the trial court issued the
Order dated February 19, 1996 3 denying petitioners
motion for bail on the ground that the law under which
petitioners are charged prescribes a penalty of reclusion
perpetua and that the evidence of guilt is strong.
Thereafter, petitioners proceeded to file a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, 4 assailing the
aforementioned orders issued by the trial court
admitting the evidence of the prosecution and denying
petitioners' motion for bail. In its Decision dated
September 30, 1996 5 the Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition forcertiorari and affirmed the assailed
orders of trial court pursuant to Section 6 of Rule 114 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-94.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed before this Court the instant
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, seeking the
reversal of the September 30, 1996 decision of
respondent Court of Appeals for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of or in
excess of jurisdiction. Additionally, petitioners prayed
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
enjoining the trial court from proceeding with the trial of
the criminal cases.
On November 20, 1996, the Court, without giving due
course to the petition, resolved to require the
respondents to file its comment to the petition and at
the same time issued the temporary restraining order
prayed for, effective during the entire period that the
case is pending or until further orders from the Court. 6

Marcos v. Ruiz

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 126859 November 24, 1998

YOUSEF AL-GHOUL, ISAM MOHAMMAD
ABDULHADI, WAIL RASHID AL-KHATIB, NABEEL
NASSER AL-RIYAMI, ET AL, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

On October 30, 1997, petitioners filed a

Manifestation 7 alleging that with the enactment of
Republic Act No. 8294, amending P.D. 1866, the penalty
for the offenses under which petitioners are being
charged has been reduced from the penalty ranging
from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, to only
the penalty ranging from prision mayor to reclusion
temporal, hence, petitioners are now entitled to bail
regardless of the strength of evidence against them.
On May 25, 1998, petitioner, through a new counsel,
filed the instant Motion for Clarification or Partial Lifting
of TRO on the Matter of Bail, 8 seeking the partial lifting
of the temporary restraining order issued by this Court
to allow the trial court to proceed with the hearing on
petitioners' motion for bail in view of the amendment
introduced by RA 8294.
On July 6, 1998, the Court required the respondents to
file their Comment to petitioners' motion. 9 compliance
therewith, the Office of the Solicitor General manifested
that it is not interposing any objection to petitioners'

motion for the partial lifting of the temporary restraining

order issued by this Court to enable the trial court to
hear and resolve petitioners motion for bail, considering
the amendment introduced by RA 8294 which reduced
the penalties for illegal possession of firearms,
ammunitions and explosives, thereby entitling
petitioners to be admitted to bail a matter of right
before conviction by the trial court, in accordance with
Section 4 of SC Administrative Circular No. 12-94. 10
Consequent to the enactment of RA 8294, the penalty
prescribed in Section 1 and 3 of P.D. 1866 for illegal
possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives
under which petitioners were charged, has now been
reduced to prision mayor in its minimum
period 11 and prision mayor in its maximum period
to reclusion temporal, 12respectively. Evidently,
petitioners are now entitled to bail as a matter of right
prior to their conviction by the trial court pursuant to
Section 4 of SC Administrative Circular No. 12-94 which
provides as follows:
Sec. 4. Bail, a matter of right. . . .
(b) before conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment be
admitted to bail as a matter of right,
with sufficient sureties, or be released
on recognizance as prescribed by law
or this Rule.
WHEREFORE, the petitioners' motion is hereby
GRANTED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by
this Court in the Resolution of November 20, 1996 is
hereby PARTIALLY LIFTED in so far as petitioners'
pending motion for bail before the RTC of Kalookan City,
Branch 123 is concerned. The trial court is hereby
ordered to proceed with the hearing of the motion for
bail and resolve the same with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 114350 January 16, 1997

JOSE T. OBOSA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
The main issue in this case is whether petitioner Jose T.
Obosa, who was charged with two (2) counts
of murder (a capital offense) 1 for the ambush slaying of
former Secretary of Interior and Local Governments
Jaime N. Ferrer and his driver Jesus D. Calderon, but who
was convicted only of two (2) counts of homicide by the
trial court, may be granted bail after such conviction for
homicide, a non-capital offense. The Regional Trial Court
of Makati answered in the affirmative but the Court of
Appeals ruled otherwise.
Petitioner thus asks this Court to resolve said issue in
this petition under Rule 65 assailing the two
Resolutions 2 of the respondent Court 3 promulgated on
November 19, 1993 and March 9, 1994, respectively.
The first Resolution4 of November 19, 1993 disposed as
follows: 5
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Solicitor
General's motion to cancel accused-appellant
Jose T. Obosa's bailbond. The Court NULLIFIES
the lower court's order dated May 31, 1990,
granting bail to accused Obosa.

Let warrant issue for the arrest of the accusedappellant Jose T. Obosa.
On the same date, November 19, 1993, an Order of
Arrest against petitioner was issued under signature of
then Court of Appeals Associate Justice Bernardo P.
Pardo. 6
On December 7, 1993, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash
Warrant of Arrest and to Set Aside and Reconsider
Resolution of November 19,1993. 7 The second assailed
Resolution 8 promulgated on March 9, 1994 denied the
motion as follows:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court hereby DENIES
accused Obosa's "Motion to quash warrant of
arrest and to set aside and reconsider the
resolution of November 19, 1993" dated
December 4, 1993, for lack of merit.
Let a copy of this resolution be given to the
Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, Manila, so
that he may issue the appropriate directive to
the Director, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila, for the rectification of the prison
record of accused Jose T. Obosa.
The Facts
Aside from the disagreement as to the date when notice
of appeal was actually filed with the trial court, 9 the
facts precedent to this petition are undisputed as set
out in the first assailed Resolution, thus: 10
On December 4, 1987, Senior State Prosecutor
Aurelio C. Trampe charged the accused Jose T.
Obosa and three others with murder on two
counts, by separate amended informations
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 56, for the ambush-slaying of Secretary
of Local Governments Jaime N. Ferrer and his
driver Jesus D. Calderon, which occurred on
August 2, 1987, at about 6:30 in the evening,
at La Huerta, Para()aque, Metro Manila, as
Secretary Ferrer was riding in his car, going to
the St. Andrew Church near the plaza of La
Huerta, to hear Sunday mass.
Each information alleged that the killing was
with the attendance of the following
qualifying/aggravating circumstances, to wit:
treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of
superior strength, nighttime purposely sought,
disregard of the respect due to the victim on
account of his rank and age (as to Secretary
Ferrer), and by a band. The Prosecutor
recommended no bail, as the evidence of guilt
was strong.
During the trial of the two cases, which were
consolidated and tried jointly, the accused
Obosa was detained at Camp Bagong Diwa,
Taguig, Metro Manila.
At the time of the commission of the two
offenses, the accused Obosa was a virtual
"escapee" from the National Penitentiary at
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, particularly, at the
Sampaguita Detention Station, where he was
serving a prison term for robbery as a
maximum security prisoner.
Indeed, by virtue of a subpoena illegally issued
by a judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
Sariaya, Quezon, accused Obosa was escorted
out of prison to appear before said judge on the
pretext that the judge needed his presence so
that the judge could inquire about the
whereabouts of the accused therein. While
accused Obosa was out of prison, he was able
to participate in the commission of the double
murder now charged against him as principal
for the ambush-slaying of Secretary Ferrer and
his driver (Lorenzo vs. Marquez, 162 SCRA 546,
553).

Witnesses positively identified accused Jose T.

Obosa as one of three assassins firing at a car
near the canteen at the corner of Victor Medina
Street and Quirino Avenue, Para()aque, Metro
Manila. It was the car of Secretary Ferrer. He
sustained eight entrance gunshot wounds on
the right side of his head, neck and body, while
his driver sustained three entrance wounds on
the left temple, right side of the neck, right
arm, chest and right hip. They died on the spot.
In its decision dated May 25, 1990, the lower
court found the accused Obosa guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of homicide on two
counts. 11 In ruling that the crime committed
was homicide, not murder as charged in the
informations, the lower court declared that
there was no qualifying circumstance
attendant. In fact, however, the lower court
itself found that the accused shot the victims
while the latter were inside the car, unwary of
any danger to their lives, for unknown to them,
were the assassins lurking in the dark, firing
their guns from behind, a circumstance
indubitably showing treachery (People vs.
Tachado, 170 SCRA 611, People vs. Juanga, 189
SCRA 226). There is treachery when the victims
were attacked without warning and their backs
turned to the assailants, as in this case (People
vs. Tachado,supra). There is treachery when
the unarmed and unsuspecting victim was
ambushed in the dark, without any risk to his
assailants (People vs. Egaras, 163 SCRA 692).
Moreover, the crimes could be qualified by
taking advantage of superior strength and aid
of armed men (People vs. Baluyot, 170 SCRA
569). Where the attackers cooperated in such a
way to secure advantage of their combined
strength, there is present the qualifying
circumstance of taking advantage of superior
strength (People vs. Baluyot, supra; People vs.
Malinao, 184 SCRA 148).
On May 31, 1990, the lower court promulgated
its decision and on the same occasion, accused
Obosa manifested his intention to appeal and
asked the Court to allow him to post bail for his
provisional liberty. Immediately, the lower court
granted accused Obosa's motion and fixed bail
at P20,000.00, in each case.
On June 1, 1990, accused Obosa filed a written
notice of appeal, dated June 4, 1990, thereby
perfecting appeal from the decision (Alama vs.
Abbas, 124 Phil. 1465). By the perfection of the
appeal, the lower court thereby lost jurisdiction
over the case and this means both the record
and the person of the accused-appellant. The
sentencing court lost jurisdiction or power to do
anything or any matter in relation to the person
of the accused-appellant (Director of Prisons
vs. Teodoro, 97 Phil. 391, 395-396), except to
issue orders for the protection and preservation
of the rights of the parties, which do not
involve any matter litigated by the appeal
(People vs. Aranda, 106 Phil. 1008).
On June 4, 1990, accused Obosa filed a
bailbond in the amount of P40,000.00, through
Plaridel Surety and Assurance Company, which
the lower court approved. On the same day,
June 4, 1990, the lower court issued an order of
release. The prison authorities at the National
Penitentiary released accused Obosa also on
the same day notwithstanding that, as
hereinabove stated, at the time of the
commission of the double murder, accused
Obosa was serving a prison term for robbery.
The respondent Court likewise discoursed on the service
of sentence made by the accused. Thus, it extensively
discussed the following computation on the penalties
imposed upon the petitioner for his previous offenses,
which all the more convinced respondent Court that
petitioner was not entitled to bail on the date he applied
therefor on May 31, 1990 and filed his bailbond on June
4, 1990, as follows: 12

At the time the accused committed the crimes

charged, he was an inmate at the National
Penitentiary, New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila. He was in jail, but was able to
commit the Ferrer assassination. He was
serving imprisonment by final judgment in
each of three (3) cases, namely, (a) theft, for
which he was sentenced to eleven (11) months
and fifteen (15) days of prision correccional; (b)
robbery in band, for which he was sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to four (4) years, two (2) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional, as
maximum, and (c) evasion of service of
sentence, for which he was sentenced to six (6)
months of arresto mayor. These sentences are
to be served successively not simultaneously
(Article 70, Revised Penal Code; People vs.
Reyes, 52 Phil. 538; Gordon vs. Wolfe, 6 Phil.
76; People vs. Medina, 59 Phil. 134; United
States vs. Claravall, 31 Phil. 652; People vs.
Olfindo, 47 Phil. 1; People vs. Tan, 50 Phil. 660).
In successive service of sentences, the time of
the second sentence did not commence to run
until the expiration of the first (Gordon vs.
Wolfe, supra).
He commenced service of sentence on October
11,1979 (with credit for preventive
imprisonment) and was admitted to the New
Bilibid Prisons on January 5, 1980 (See prison
record attached to Supplement, dated January
31, 1994 of the Solicitor General; Cf. prison
record [incomplete] attached to Manifestation
dated February 2, 1994 of the Accused
Appellant).
On December 25, 1980, he escaped from
detention at Fort Del Pilar, Baguio City, where
he was temporarily working on a prison project
(See decision, Grim. Case No. 4159-R, Regional
Trial Court, Baguio City, People vs. Jose Obosa y
Tutaa). While a fugitive from justice, he
committed other crimes, in Quezon City,
Makati, and Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. The
cases are pending (See prison record, supra).
He was recaptured on August 27, 1986. Under
prison regulations, he forfeited his allowance
for good conduct prescribed by law (Article 97,
Revised Penal Code; Act 2489 of the Philippine
Legislature). In addition, he must serve the
time spent at large (TSAL) of five (5) years,
eight (8) months and two (2) days, and the
unserved portion of his successive sentences
for robbery in band, theft and evasion of
service of sentence aforementioned. In sum, he
has to serve the balance of his sentence for
robbery in band of four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prision
correccional the sentence for theft of eleven
(11) months and fifteen (15) days of prision
correccional; and the sentence for evasion of
service of sentence of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, reaching a total of five (5) years, seven
(7) months and sixteen (16) days. Since his
commitment to jail on October 11, 1979, to the
time he escaped on December 25, 1980, he
had served one (1) year, two (2) months, and
fourteen (14) days, which, deducted from the
totality of his prison term, would leave a
balance of four (4) years, five (5) months and
two (2) days. Thus, he must still serve this
unserved portion of his sentences in addition to
the time spent at large. Counting the time from
his re-arrest on August 27, 1986, and adding
thereto five (5) years, eight (8) months and two
(2) days (time spent at large), the result is that
he must serve up to April 29, 1992. To this shall
be added the remaining balance of his
successive sentences of four (4) years, five (5)
months and two (2) day(s). Consequently, he
has to serve sentence and remain in
confinement up to October 1, 1996. Of course,
he may be given allowance for good conduct.
But good conduct time allowance can not be
computed in advance (Frank vs. Wolfe, 11 Phil.
466). This is counted only during the time an
accused actually served with good conduct and

diligence (Frank vs. Wolfe, supra; See Aquino,

The Revised Penal Code, Vol. I, 1987 ed., pp.
803-804). However, accused Obosa can not
avail himself of this beneficent provision of the
law because, while he was at large, he
committed infraction of prison rules (escaping)
and other crimes, including the Ferrer
assassination, and for which he was placed
under preventive imprisonment commencing
on December 4, 1987, the date the
informations at bar were filed against him.
Because he was then under custody, no
warrant of arrest or commitment order need be
issued (Asuncion vs. Peralejo, G.R. No. 82915,
June 22, 1988, minute resolution; Cf. People vs.
Wilson, 4 Phil. 381; Umil vs. Ramos, 187 SCRA
311). Allowance for good conduct does not
apply to detention prisoners (Baking vs.
Director of Prisons, 28 SCRA 851).
Consequently, by all reckoning, accused Obosa
could not be released from prison on June 4,
1990, when he was admitted to bail. His
release was illegal. He still has to serve the
balance of his unserved sentences until
October 1, 1996.
On September 6, 1993, respondent People, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed with
respondent Court an urgent motion, 13 praying for
cancellation of petitioner's bail bond.
Petitioner promptly filed an opposition, 14 to which
respondent People submitted a reply. 15 Thereupon,
respondent Court issued its first questioned Resolution
dated November 19, 1993: 16 a) canceling petitioner's
bail bond, b) nullifying the trial court's order of May 31,
1990 which granted bail to petitioner, and c) issuing a
warrant for his immediate arrest.
Petitioner's twin motions for reconsideration 17 and
quashal of warrant of arrest proved futile as respondent
Court, on March 9, 1994, after the parties' additional
pleadings were submitted and after hearing the parties'
oral arguments, issued its second questioned Resolution
denying said motions for lack of merit.
The Issues
The petitioner worded the issue in this case as follows: 18
The principal constitutional and legal issues
involved in this petition is (sic) whether
petitioner as accused-appellant before the
respondent Honorable Court of Appeals is
entitled to bail as a matter of right and to enjoy
the bail granted by the Regional Trial Court, in
Makati, Metro Manila, pending appeal from the
judgment convicting him of Homicide on two
(2) counts though charged with Murder; and
assuming that bail is a matter of discretion, the
trial court had already exercised sound
discretion in granting bail to accused-appellant,
now petitioner in this case, and respondent
Court of Appeals is devoid of jurisdiction in
cancelling said bailbond.
The Solicitor General stated the issues more clearly,
thus: 19
I
Whether or not the trial court still have (sic)
jurisdiction over the case when it approved
petitioner's bail bond on June 4, 1990.
II
Considering that the murder charge against
petitioner still stands pending his appeal and
strong evidence of guilt actually exists based
on respondent Court of Appeals' own
preliminary determination and the lower court's
initial finding as well, is petitioner entitled to
bail as a matter of right pending review of his
conviction for homicide?

III
How does petitioner's prison record affect his
alleged right to bail?
The Court's Ruling
First Issue: Trial Court's Jurisdiction
To decide the issue of whether the cancellation of bail
bond by the respondent Court was correct, we deem it
necessary to determine first whether the trial court had
jurisdiction to grant bail under the circumstances of this
case.
Petitioner contends that the trial court was correct in
allowing him "to post bail for his provisional liberty on
the same day, May 31, 1990 when the judgment of
conviction of (sic) homicide was promulgated and the
accused-appellant (petitioner) manifested his intention
to appeal the judgment of conviction. At the time, the
lower court still had jurisdiction over the case as to
empower it to issue the order granting bail pending
appeal. Appellant filed his notice of appeal only on June
4, 1990, on which date his appeal was deemed
perfected and the lower court lost jurisdiction over the
case. Hence, the grant of bail on May 31, 1990 cannot
be validly attacked on jurisdictional grounds." 20
Through its counsel, the Solicitor General, respondent
People admits that petitioner manifested his intention to
appeal on May 31, 1990 and filed his written notice of
appeal on June 1, 1990. But the Solicitor General
nevertheless contends that ". . . it was only on June 4,
1990, or three (3) days after perfecting his appeal that
petitioner posted his bail bond in the amount of
P40,000.00 through Plaridel Surety and Assurance
Company. Clearly, when the lower court approved the
bail bond on the same day June 4, 1990), it no longer
had Jurisdiction over the case." 21
The respondent Court found that "(o)n June 1, 1990,
accused Obosa filed a written notice of appeal, dated
June 4, 1990, thereby perfecting appeal from the
decision . . ." 22
We reviewed the page 23 cited by respondent Court, and
found that indeed, the written notice of appeal, although
dated June 4, 1990, was made and actually served upon
the trial court on June 1, 1990. Such being the case, did
the trial court correctly approve the bail bond on June
4,1990? To answer this, there is a need to revisit Section
3, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. How appeal taken. (a) The appeal to
the Regional Trial Court, or to the Court of
Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction,
shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with
the court which rendered the judgment or
order appealed from, and by serving a copy
thereof upon the adverse party.
xxx xxx xxx
Since petitioner did file the written notice of appeal on
June 1, 1990, petitioner's appeal was, perforce,
perfected, without need of any further or other act, and
consequently and ineluctably, the trial court lost
jurisdiction over the case, both over the record and over
the subject of the case. 24 As has been ruled: 25
The question presented for our resolution is:
Did the Court of First Instance that convicted
respondent Lacson have the power and
authority to issue the writ of preliminary
injunction, prohibiting the transfer of said
Lacson from the provincial hospital of
Occidental Negros to the Insular Penitentiary at
Muntinglupa, Rizal? While there is no express
provision on this point, it is contrary to the
generally accepted principles of procedure for
said court to be invested with said power or
authority. A necessary regard for orderly
procedure demands that once a case, whether
civil or criminal, has been appealed from a trial

court to an appellate (sic) court and the appeal

therefrom perfected, the court a quo loses
jurisdiction over the case, both over the record
and over the subject of the case. Thus in civil
cases the rule is that after the appeal has been
perfected from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance, the trial court losses (sic) jurisdiction
over the case, except to issue orders for the
protection and preservation of the rights of the
parties which do not involve any matter
litigated by the appeal (Rule 41, Sec. 9). The
jurisdiction of the court over the matters
involved in the case is lost by the perfected
appeal, save in those cases which the rules
expressly except therefrom. (Emphasis
supplied).
But it should be noted that the bail was granted on May
31, 1990 by the trial Court. 26 The validity and effectivity
of the subsequent approval of the bail bond by the trial
court on June 4, 1990 is therefore the matter at issue.
We agree with respondent Court and respondent People
that, while bail was granted by the trial court when it
had jurisdiction, the approval of the bail bond was done
without authority, because by then, the appeal had
already been perfected and the trial court had lost
jurisdiction. Needless to say, the situation would have
been different had bail been granted and approval
thereof given before the notice of appeal was filed.
As the approval was decreed by the trial court in excess
of jurisdiction, then the bailbond was never validly
approved. On this basis alone, regardless of the
outcome of the other issues, it is indisputable that the
instant petition should be dismissed.
Second Issue: Is Petitioner Entitled To Bail
As A Matter of Right?
The second issue, while no longer critical to the
disposition of this case, will nevertheless be tackled, in
view of its importance. The Solicitor General argues that
"(f)or while petitioner was convicted of the lesser
offense of homicide, the fact that he has appealed
resultantly throws the whole case open for review and
reverts him back to his original situation as a person
charged with the capital offense of murder on two (2)
counts against whom a strong evidence of guilt exists as
initially found by the trial court during the bail
proceedings a quo." 27
Petitioner answers by saying that "once the accused
who is charged with a capital offense is convicted not of
the offense for which he is charged but for a lesser one
which is not capital or punished with reclusion perpetua,
he is entitled to bail as a matter of right because the
fact that the evidence of his guilt of a capital offense is
not strong is necessarily to be inferred from his
conviction of the lesser offense." 28
On this point, respondent Court ratiocinated: 29
In this case, although the accused is charged
with murder on two counts, and evidence of
guilt is strong, the lower court found him guilty
of homicide also on two (2) counts. He has
appealed. An appeal by the accused throws the
whole case open for review and this includes
the penalty, the indemnity and the damages
awarded by the trial court which may be
increased (Quemuel vs. Court of Appeals, 130
Phil. 33). The appellate court may find the
accused guilty of the original crime charged
and impose on him the proper penalty therefor
(Linatoc vs. People, 74 Phil. 586). By virtue of
the appeal, the conviction for the lesser offense
of homicide is stayed in the meantime. Hence,
the accused is back to the original situation as
he was before judgment (Cf . Peo vs. Bocar, 97
Phil. 398), that is, one charged with capital
offenses where evidence of guilt is strong. Bail
must be denied.
To resolve this issue, we refer to Section 13, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution which provides:

Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with

offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when
the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.
In the case of De la Camara vs. Enage, 30 we analyzed
the purpose of bail and why it should be denied to one
charge with a capital offense when evidence of guilt is
strong:
. . . Before conviction, every person is bailable
except if charged with capital offenses when
the evidence of guilt is strong. Such a right
flows from the presumption of innocence in
favor of every accused who should not be
subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter
he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his
guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Thereby a regime of liberty is honored in the
observance and not in the breach. It is not
beyond the realm of probability, however, that
a person charged with a crime, especially so
where his defense is weak, would just simply
make himself scarce and thus frustrate the
hearing of his case. A bail is intended as a
guarantee that such an intent would be
thwarted. It is, in the language of Cooley, a
"mode short of confinement which would, with
reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of
the accused" for the subsequent trial. Nor is
there anything unreasonable in denying this
right to one charged with a capital offense
when evidence of guilt is strong, as the
likelihood is, rather than await the outcome of
the proceeding against him with a death
sentence, an ever-present threat, temptation
to flee the jurisdiction would be too great to be
resisted. (Emphasis supplied).
The aforequoted rationale applies with equal force to an
appellant who, though convicted of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, was nevertheless originally charged with
a capital offense. Such appellant can hardly be
unmindful of the fact that, in the ordinary course of
things, there is a substantial likelihood of his conviction
(and the corresponding penalty) being affirmed on
appeal, or worse, the not insignificant possibility and
infinitely more unpleasant prospect of instead being
found guilty of the capital offense originally charged. In
such an instance, the appellant cannot but be sorely
tempted to flee.
Our Rules of Court, following the mandate of our
fundamental law, set the standard to be observed in
applications for bail. Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal procedure, 31 as amended, provides:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All
persons in custody shall, before final
conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of
right, except those charged with a capital
offense or an offense which, under the law at
the time of its commission and at the time of
the application for bail, is punishable
by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt
is strong. (Emphasis supplied).
In Borinaga vs. Tamin, 32 which was promulgated in
1993, this Court laid down the guidelines for the grant
of bail:
The 1987 Constitution provides that all
persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable byreclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties or
be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. Corollarily, the Rules of Court,
under Section 3, Rule 114 thereof, provides
that all persons in custody shall, before final
conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of

right, except those charged with a capital

offense or an offense which, under the law at
the time of its commission and at the time of
the application for bail, is punishable
by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt
is strong.
As now revised in the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure and provided in Rule 114 thereof,
the rules on availability of bail to an accused
may be restated as follows:
1. Admission to bail is a
matter of right at any stage
of the action where the
charge is not for a capital
offense or is not punishable
by reclusion perpetua; [Sec.
3, Rule 114, 1985 Rules on
Crim. Procedure].
2. Regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution, no
bail shall be allowed if the
accused is charged with a
capital offense or of an
offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua and
the evidence of guilt is
strong; [Idem].
3. Even if a capital offense is
charged and the evidence of
guilt is strong, the accused
may still be admitted to bail
in the discretion of the court
if there are strong grounds to
apprehend that his continued
confinement will endanger
his life or result in permanent
impairment of health, [De la
Rama vs. People's Court, 43
O.G. No. 10, 4107 (1947)] but
only before judgment in the
regional trial court; and
4. No bail shall be allowed
after final judgment, unless
the accused has applied for
probation and has not
commenced to serve
sentence, [Section 21, Rule
114, 1985 Rules of Court] the
penalty and offense being
within the purview of the
probation law.
However, the above guidelines, along with Rule 114
itself, have since been modified by Administrative
Circular No. 12-94, which was issued by this Court and
which came into effect on October 1, 1994. Verily, had
herein petitioner made application for bail after the
effectivity of said circular, this case would have been
readily and promptly resolved against petitioner. For,
quite recently, in Robin Cario Padilla vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 33 we held, making reference to said
administrative circular:
Bail is either a matter of right, or of discretion.
It is a matter of right when the offense charged
is not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other
hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
bail becomes a matter of discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not
more than twenty (20) years then bail is a
matter of discretion, except when any of the
enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3
of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall
be denied. But when the accused is charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and
evidence of guilt is strong, bail shall be denied,
as it is neither a matter of right nor a
discretion. If the evidence, however, is not

strong bail becomes a matter of right. (Citation

omitted; emphasis supplied).
And, as above adverted to, the circumstances
mentioned in paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 of the
1994 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure the
presence of any of which could preclude the grant of
bail are as follows:
(a) That the accused is a
recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or
habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime
aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found
to have previously escaped
from legal confinement,
evaded sentence, or has
violated the conditions of his
bail without valid
justification;
(c) That the accused
committed the offense while
on probation, parole, or
under conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of
the accused or his case
indicate the probability of
flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk
that during the pendency of
the appeal, the accused may
commit another crime.
It will be readily noted that, pursuant to the foregoing
amendments, not only does the conviction of petitioner
for two counts of homicide disqualify him from being
admitted to bail as a matter of right and subject his bail
application to the sound discretion of the court, but
more significantly, the circumstances enumerated in
paragraphs a, b, d and e above, which are present in
petitioner's situation, would have justified and
warranted thedenial of bail, except that a retroactive
application of the said circular in the instant case is
barred as it would obviously be unfavorable to
petitioner.
But be that as it may, the rules on bail at the time of
petitioner's conviction (i.e., prior to their amendment by
Adm. Circular 12-94) do not favor petitioner's cause
either. In Quemuel vs. CA, et al., 34 this Court held that
the appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for
review and this includes the penalty, which may be
increased. Thus, on appeal, as the entire case is
submitted for review, even factual questions may be
increased. Thus, on appeal, as the entire case is
submitted for review, even factual questions may once
more be weighed and evaluated. That being the
situation, the possibility of conviction upon the original
charge is ever present. Likewise, if the prosecution had
previously demonstrated that evidence of the accused's
guilt is strong, as it had done so in this case, such
determination subsists even on appeal, despite
conviction for a lesser offense, since such determination
is for the purpose of resolving whether to grant or deny
bail and does not have any bearing on whether
petitioner will ultimately be acquitted or convicted of
the charge.
We have previously held that, while the accused, after
conviction, may upon application be bailed at the
discretion of the court, that discretion particularly
with respect to extending the bail should be exercised
not with laxity, but with caution and only for strong
reasons, with the end in view of upholding the majesty
of the law and the administration of justice. 35
And the grave caution that must attend the exercise of
judicial discretion in granting bail to a convicted accused
is best illustrated and exemplified in Administrative
Circular No. 12-94 amending Rule 114, Section 5 which
now specifically provides that, although the grant of bail

is discretionary in non-capital offenses, nevertheless,

when imprisonment has been imposed on the convicted
accused in excess of six (6) year and circumstances
exist (inter alia, where the accused is found to have
previously escaped from legal confinement or evaded
sentence, or there is an undue risk that the accused
may commit another crime while his appeal is pending)
that point to a considerable likelihood that the accused
may flee if released on bail, then the accused must be
denied bail, or his bail previously granted should be
cancelled.
But the same rationale obtained even under the old
rules on bail (i.e., prior to their amendment by Adm.
Circular 12-94). Senator Vicente J.
Francisco's 36 eloquent explanation on why bail should
be denied as a matter of wise discretion after judgment
of conviction reflects that thinking, which remains valid
up to now:
The importance attached to conviction is due
to the underlying principle that bail should be
granted only where it is uncertain whether the
accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore,
where that uncertainty is removed by
conviction it would, generally speaking, be
absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been
tried and convicted the presumption of
innocence which may be relied upon in prior
applications is rebutted, and the burden is
upon the accused to show error in the
conviction. From another point of view it may
be properly argued that the probability of
ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the
conviction that the accused is much more likely
to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than
before conviction. . . .
Third Issue: Petitioner's Record
Petitioner claims that respondent Court of Appeals erred
in concluding "that at the time the bail was granted and
approved by His Honor of the trial court, he has still to
serve sentence and remain in confinement up to
October 1, 1996" and hence was not entitled to
bail. 37 Petitioner, citing Luis B. Reyes, 38 maintains that
the Bureau of Corrections properly released him from
prison on July 18, 1990.
We find it unnecessary to address this issue in the
resolution of the instant petition. Having already
determined that the bail bond was approved without
jurisdiction and that the Court of Appeals was correct in
issuing the two questioned Resolutions, we thus hold
that, petitioner cannot be released from confinement.
The determination of whether or not petitioner should
still be imprisoned up to October 1, 1996, and only
thereafter may possibly be released on bail is no longer
material for the disposition of this case. Thus, we shall
longer burden ourselves with the resolution of this
academic issue.
EPILOGUE
In sum, we rule that bail cannot be granted as a matter
of right even after an accused, who is charged with a
capital offense, appeals his conviction for a non-capital
crime. Courts must exercise utmost caution in deciding
applications for bail considering that the accused on
appeal may still be convicted of the original capital
offense charged and that thus the risk attendant to
jumping bail still subsists. In fact, trial courts would be
well advised to leave the matter of bail, after conviction
for a lesser crime than the capital offense originally
charged, to the appellate court's sound discretion.
We also hold that the trial court had failed to exercise
the degree of discretion and caution required under and
mandated by our statutes and rules, for, aside from
being too hasty in granting bail immediately after
promulgation of judgment, and acting without
jurisdiction in approving the bailbond, it inexplicably
ignored the undeniable fact of petitioner's previous
escape from legal confinement as well as his prior
convictions.

Upon the other hand, the respondent Court should be

commended for its vigilance, discretion and
steadfastness. In ruling against bail, it even scoured the
records and found that treachery attended the killing
thereby justifying its action. The trial court's literal
interpretation of the law on bail was forcefully debunked
by the appellate courts' excellent disquisition on the
rationale of the applicable rules. Truly, law must be
understood not by "the letter that killeth but by the
spirit that giveth life." Law should not be read and
interpreted in isolated academic abstraction nor even
for the sake of logical symmetry but always in context of
pulsating social realities and specific environmental
facts. Truly, "the real essence of justice does not
emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal
technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut
consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in
the ultimate development of the social edifice." 39
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is
hereby DENIED and the two assailed Resolutions
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-66939 January 10, 1987
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
ANGELITO ALIVIA Y ABALOS, respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision
of respondent Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) now
Court of Appeals (CA), in AC-G.R. No. SP-01320-22
promulgated January 24, 1984, granting the petition for
bail of accused Angelito Alivia y Abalos and nullifying
the Orders of the trial court, dated February 23, 1983
and May 13, 1983 in Criminal Cases Nos. 1272-74,
entitled People of the Philippines vs. Angelito Alivia y
Abalos. Said orders of the trial court denied accused's
application for bail holding that the accused Angelito
Alivia is charged with three (3) capital offenses, the
evidence of guilt of which, in each case, is strong.
Accused Angelito Alivia y Abalos was charged before the
then CFI of Isabela with the crimes of (1) assault upon
an agent of person in authority with murder with the use
of illegally possessed firearm, with respect to the killing
of Lt. Cesar Rumbaoa (Crim. Case No. 1272), (2) assault
upon an agent of person in authority with murder with
use of illegally possessed firearm (Crim. Case No. 1274)
and (3) murder of Atty. Norberto Maramba with the use
of illegally Possessed firearm, (Crim. Case No. 1273).
The trial court ordered the consolidation of the three (3)
criminal cases since they arose from the same incident.
The Provincial Fiscal recommended no bail for the
accused in the three aforementioned cases. Accused
filed an omnibus motion praying among other things
that he be allowed bail contending that the evidence of
his guilt is not strong, but said motion was denied by the
trial court. Upon denial of his Motion for
Reconsideration, accused filed with the IAC a petition for
certiorari questioning the decision of the trial court on
his motion for bail. After considering the records of the
criminal cases which were transmitted to it from the trial
court, the IAC promulgated a decision granting
petitioner bail and nullifying the Orders of the trial court
dated February 23, 1983 and May 13, 1983 and fixing
the amount of bail at Eighty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00). After denial of petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, the present petition was filed,
The facts as found by the trial court, which facts were
adopted by respondent IAC, 1 are as follows:

At the recently concluded barangay

elections for barangay Sarangay,
Cabatuan, Isabela, two candidates ran
for the position of Barangay Captain
thereat, namely accused Angelito
Alivia and one Antonio Bagauisan.
Herein accused lost in that election,
but he filed with the Municipal Circuit
Court of Cabatuan, an election
protest. Antonio Bagauisan was duly
proclaimed and he assumed office
accordingly. The late former Municipal
Judge of Cabatuan, Atty. Norberto
Maramba (Criminal Case No. 1273)
was counsel for the protestee. (tsn.,
pp. 27-28, November 16, 1982).
The hearing of the election protest
was set in the morning of June 4,
1982, but was postponed. After which,
at about 10:00 o'clock that same
morning, the late Atty. Maramba
invited witness Virgilio Yanuaria, the
late Police Lt. Cesar Rumbaoa
(Criminal Case No. 1272), Antonio
Bagauisan and others to play
bowling/billiards at the Cabatuan
Recreation Center. They played up to
2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the
same day with the bet that the loser
will pay the beer they will order. (tsn.,
pp. 28-29, Ibid).
Later, the late Atty. Maramba, Police
Lt. Rumbaoa and witness Virgilio
Yanuaria (Antonio Bagauisan did not
join them) proceeded to the Azarcon
Restaurant at the public market,
Cabatuan, Isabela, for lunch. They
occupied round table No. 2 (see
sketch). The late Police Lt. Rumbaoa
was seated on chair No. A, facing
west, the late Atty. Maramba, on chair
No. B, facing south and witness Virgilio
Yanuaria in chair No. C, facing east.
They ordered lunch and three (3)
bottles of beer, but Atty. Maramba did
not drink, because he joined the group
of accused Angelito Alivia. (tsn., pp.
20, 29- 34, Ibid)
It appears that the group of the
accused Angelito Alivia arrived at the
Azarcon Restaurant much earlier, and
those members of the group are (1)
Angelito Alivia, accused herein; (2)
Municipal Judge Estanislao Cudal; (3)
Feliciano Gaspar; (4) Pat. Elpidio
Sagun; (5) Pat. Danilo Rosario; (6)
Engr. Charlie Martin; (7-8) a newly
married couple, not Identified. The
late Patrolman Elpidio Sagun and
witness Pat. Danilo del Rosario also
went to the Azarcon Restaurant to buy
pansit noodles, but were invited by
the accused to join them in their
group while drinking beer with chaser
(pullutan).lwphl@it Accused Angelito
Alivia told Pat. del Rosario to drop by
his house and get ammunition for
pistol Cal. .38 and Pat. Elpidio Sagun
for the armalite magazine. (tsn., pp.
88- 93, November 17, 1982).
The relative positions and sitting
arrangements of the two groups as
found in the ocular inspection
conducted in the morning of
November 17, 1982, at the Azarcon
Restaurant, Cabatuan are the
following (pp. 130-131, record, Crim.
Case No. 1272)
The group of accused Angelito Alivia
was the first to arrive at the Azarcon
Restaurant, and this group joined two
small square tables, Identified as
square tables Nos. 5 and 6, to form a
rectangle. There are eight (8) of them,

namely: (1), accused Angelito Alivia,

who seated himself on a stool marked
(AA) north of square table No. 5; (2)
Pat. Danilo Rosario, was seated on a
stool marked (DR) left of accused
Alivia, who was facing south, square
table No. 5; (3) a man, unknown,
occupied a stool marked (UK); (4)
further left, by Feliciano Gaspar,
occupied a stool marked (EG); (5)
exactly opposite the accused, was
seated Municipal Judge Estanislao
Cudal marked (EC) on square table No.
6; (6) on his left, was seated the late
Pat. Elpidio Sagun, on a stool marked
(ES) in square table No. 6; (7) left of
Elpidio Sagun, was seated, Engr.
Charlie Martin, marked (CM) on table
No. 6, and (8) on his left, was the
woman, unknown, on square table No.
5, (tsn., pp. 24- 29 November 17,
1982).
The three member group of the late
Atty. Maramba, who arrived later,
occupied round table No. 2, namely: (l)
the late Police Lt. Cesar Rumbaoa,
facing west, occupied chair A; (2) the
late Atty. Maramba, facing south,
occupied chair B; and (3) witness
Virgilio Yanuaria, facing east, occupied
chair C. (tsn, pp. 22-23, November 17,
1982).
The distance from chair B, occupied
by the late Atty. Maramba, in round
table No. 2, to the tip of square table
No. 6, where Judge Cudal was seated
is 90 centimeters, and the distance
from the seat of accused Angelito
Alivia, north of square table No. 5, to
the stool of Judge Cudal, which was
later occupied by the late Atty.
Maramba is around 189 centimeters.
(tsn., pp. 19-21, Ibid)
Upon arrival at the Azarcon
restaurant, the late Atty. Maramba,
engaged Municipal Judge Estanislao
Cudal in a conversation on topics,
among which was about the barangay
election. Thereafter, Judge Cudal and
Feliciano Gaspar left and proceeded to
the municipal building. When Judge
Cudal and Gaspar left, the late Atty.
Maramba seated himself on the stool
formerly occupied by Judge Cudal and
engaged the accused Angelito Alivia
who was seated opposite north of
square table No. 5, at a distance of
189 centimeters facing each other, in
a conversation on matters the witness
can not remember. (tsn., pp. 30-31,
November 17, 1982; tsn., pp. 94- 97,
November 17, 1982)
Meanwhile, Pat. del Rosario noticed
accused Angelito Alivia go out from
the Azarcon Restaurant thru the main
door (No. 1) towards the west of the
restaurant, where his car was parked
three (3) meters from the main door,
east (west) side of the restaurant.
(Tsn., pp- 98-100, November 17,
1982).
Later, Angelito Alivia returned to his
former place. In a little while,
Patrolman Danilo del Rosario stood up
and went to the municipal building,
while the late Patrolman Elpidio Sagun
remained inside the restaurant. (tsn.,
pp. 103-104, November 17, 1982).
The lunch ordered by the group of the
late Atty. Maramba being ready, the
late Police Lt. Cesar Rumbaoa called
for Atty. Maramba to join them and eat
("kakain na tayo"). Hence, the late

Atty. Maramba stood up from where

he was then seated with the group of
accused Angelito Alivia. However, he
was not able to reach round table No.
2 to eat, because he was suddenly
shot on the chest (Dr. Angobung) by
accused Angelito Alivia using a firearm
Identified as Llama Automatic Pistol
Super 38, SN-532937 (Exh., "K")
causing him to fall the cemented floor.
( t.s.n., pp. 32-34, November 17,
1982)
While in that lying position, again he
was shot on the neck, Both gunshot
wounds caused his instantaneous
death. Before the second gun report
when Virgilio Yanuaria was about to
run, the late Patrolman Elpidio Sagun
who was on his left pushed Virgilio
Yanuaria to save him using his right
hand pressing the left shoulder of
Yanuaria. After which, Yanuaria walked
crouching passing thru the inside door
(No. 3) and went out thru door No. 2,
and proceeded to the municipal
building to report the incident, after
hearing successive gun reports, the
number he cannot remember. (tsn.,
pp. 20-22, 34-35, November 17, 1982)
Witness Virgilio Yanuaria reported the
incident to Cpl. Jose Pascual in the
presence of Pat. Danilo del Rosario
saying "Lito Alivia shot Atty.
Maramba." Immediately, four
policemen, namely, Pat. Danilo del
Rosario, Pat, Jose Pascual, Pat. Jose
Angangan and another one, went to
the crime scene. They were later
followed by Pat. Celestino Apaya and
Pat. Ricardo Pedro. Thereat, they saw
the body of the late Police Lt.
Rumbaoa (dead already) at the main
door (door No. 1) lying face upward,
and inside they saw the body of the
late Atty. Maramba (dead already)
face downward and that of the late
Pat. Sagun (still breathing) face
upward (tsn., pp. 45-49), November
17, 1982)
Meanwhile, Dr. Benedicto Acosta, the
incumbent Municipal Mayor of
Cabatuan, arrived from Ilagan, at
about 3:10, afternoon of June 4, 1982.
In front of his business residence at
Centro, Cabatuan, he was informed by
Dr. Rolando Dacuycuy, a brother-inlaw of the accused, about the shooting
incident. Because he was then riding
on his car, he invited him to see the
incident, but Dr. Dacuycuy did not get
inside the restaurant, while Mayor
Acosta went inside to investigate the
matter in his capacity as Chief
Executive of the town. (tsn., pp. 237238, September 21, 1982)
Inside the restaurant, he saw the
owner of the restaurant Mrs. Azarcon,
two maids and two dead bodies,
Identified as those of the late Atty.
Maramba and Police Lt. Rumbaoa. He
did not see the body of the late Pat.
Elpidio Sagun because he was
informed that he was then still alive
and was rushed to the emergency
hospital in Cauayan but died at the
junction at Luna, Isabela. In his ocular
inspection of the crime scene, he
picked up five (5) empty shells (Exhs.
"K-2", K- 3", "K.4", "K-5" and "K-6"), the
four inside the restaurant, while the
other one was recovered outside just
in front of the main door. He likewise
recovered inside the restaurant one
(1) deformed lead/slug (Exh. "K-8")
and two (2) lead cores (Exhs. "K-9"
and "K-10").lwphl@it He asked the

owner Mrs. Delia Azarcon who shot

and kill the late Atty. Maramba and
Police Lt. Cesar Rumbaoa and she said
it was Angelito Alivia who shot them.
Being a doctor himself, he examined
the two bodies and found that the late
Atty. Maramba suffered two gunshot
wounds, one at the left occipital
region on the head and one at the
interior surface of the scapula (chest)
with a bore at his T-shirt. In the case
of the late Police Lt. Cesar Rumbaoa,
he suffered a gunshot wound at the
left maxilla surrounded by blackening
discolorations and another wound at
the left lateral surface, both of the
neck and also a gunshot wound at the
right lateral root of the neck. (tsn., pp.
238-250, Ibid)
When Pat. Pedro Constancio arrived,
Mayor Acosta directed him to call for a
photographer and also Dr. Juan Rigor,
Jr., the Rural Health Officer of
Cabatuan. Photographer de la Cruz
took the pictures and Dr. Rigor
examined the cadavers of the two
bodies. The pictures taken were
developed and Mayor Acosta
Identified the pictures of the late
Police Lt. Cesar Rumbaoa, as Exhs.
"P", "P-1", "P-2", and "P-3", appearing
on Pages 35-36-A, record, in Criminal
Case No. 1272. Similarly, pictures
were taken of the dead body of the
late Atty. Maramba, duly Identified by
Mayor Acosta (Exh. "Q," p. 22, record,
Crim. Case No. 1273). Later Mayor
Acosta called for Pat. Miguel Orodio,
INP, Investigator, Cabatuan, Isabela.
lie also found inside the restaurant
one, revolver, inside a tuck in holster.
He likewise noticed three (3) bullet
marks, one beside the fallen body of
Atty. Maramba, another just beneath
the head of Police Lt. Rumbaoa and
the other at the left side wan of the
restaurant. (tsn., pp. 250-274, Ibid)
The empty shells and slugs were given
to Cpl. Jose Pascual and the latter
submitted them to the Police
Investigator. These empty shells,
cartridge and deformed slugs,
together with the Llama automatic
pistol Cal. 38 with magazine were
later submitted to the NBI, Manila, for
ballistic examination, which were
examined by Feliciano S. Lunasco,
NBI, Supervising Ballistician, and
testified in Court that the empty
shells, deformed slugs, cartridge and
lead cores were fired from the same
firearm (Exh. "K"). (tsn., pp. 285-288,
September 21, 1982; tsn., pp. 203210, December 15, 1982)
Dr. Ruben Angobung, NBI, Medico
Legal Officer, testified that he
conducted the autopsy examination
on the cadaver of the deceased Atty.
Norberto Maramba, Police Lt. Cesar
Rumbaoa and Pat. Elpidio Sagun upon
request of their relatives. The cause of
death of each of the three (3) victims
was hemorrhage due to gun shot
wounds. It was possible that deceased
Atty. Maramba and Police Lt. Cesar
Rumbaoa were likewise shot when
they have already fallen on the
cemented floor as evidenced by the,
gunshot wounds on their heads. He
found - and marks on the head of
Police Lt. Rumbaoa which shows that
the assailant ' was shot at close range
and the muzzle of the gun used was at
distance of not more than 24 inches
from the head. From the trajectory of
the gunshot wounds on the head of
the deceased Atty. Maramba and

Police Lt. Cesar Rumbaoa, it was

possible that the assailant was then at
the back of said victims (Testimony of
Dr. Angobung). (tsn., pp. 86-148,
December 1, 1982)
Immediately after the shooting, the
accused Angelito Alivia, accompanied
by his uncle and counsel de parte,
Atty. Artemio Alivia, voluntarily
surrendered to the Provincial
Commander, Col. Oscar M. Florendo,
at the PC Headquarters, Calamagui,
Ilagan, Isabela. The accused verbally
admitted to Col. Florendo that he shot
to death the late Atty. Maramba, Police
Lt. Cesar Rumbaoa and Pat. Elpidio
Sagun, at the Azarcon Restaurant,
located at the public market,
Cabatuan, Isabela. In the process, the
accused surrendered the firearm,
Llama automatic Pistol SN-532937
(Exh. "K") which he used in the killing
of the three (3) victims, (tsn., pp. 158167, December 15, 1982)
In addition to this, the accused
executed an extra-judicial confession
(Exhs. "J", "J-1" and "J-2"), taken by
M/Sgt Severino Goday ,Jr., PC, in that
same afternoon of June 4, 1982, at PC,
Headquarters in the presence of his
lawyer uncle. He freely and voluntarily
admitted having shot to death Atty.
Norberto Maramba at Centro,
Cabatuan, Isabela, Police Lt. Cesar
Rumbaoa and Pat. Elpidio Sagun, both
of INP, Cabatuan, at around 2:00
o'lock P.M. of June 4, 1982, inside the
Azarcon Restaurant, located inside the
public Market of Cabatuan, Isabela
with the use of Llama automatic pistol
Cal. 38, SN-532937 (Exh. "K").
(Testimonies of Col. Oscar M. Florendo
and M/Sgt. Severino Goday Jr., PC).
(tsn., pp. 218-225, September 21,
1982).
C. FACTUAL ANALYSIS
Counsel for the defense admits that
the offenses with which the accused
was charged are capital offences,
which carry the ;supreme penalty of
death.
Eyewitness Virgilio Yanuaria testified
that the accused Angelito Alivia
suddenly shot the late Atty. Norberto
Maramba, when the latter stood up, to
eat lunch upon call by the late Police
Lt. Cesar Rumbaoa. The first gun shot
wound was fatal and the victim Atty.
Maramba fen to the cemented floor.
There is evidence that the accused
again shot the victim while lying
down.
Meanwhile, the late Pat. ElpidioSagun
who was on his left side, bushed
Virgilio Yanuaria on the shoulders to
save him and the latter escaped
crouching towards the inside door
(door No. 3) and exited thru door No.
2, southern portion of the restaurant.
He heard several gun reports
thereafter, while he proceeded to the
municipal building to report the
incident to Cpl. Jose Pascual in the
presence of Pat. Danilo del Rosario,
both INP of Cabatuan, Isabela, and
based on this report, police
investigators repaired to the scene of
the crime immediately thereafter.
There is no eyewitness presented on
the shooting of the other two victims,
namely. the late Police Lt. Cesar

Rumbaoa and the late Pat. Elpidio

Sagun. However, there is evidence
that said two victims were likewise
shot by the accused Angelito Alivia.
The cadavers were examined and the
autopsy reports reveal that the cause
of death of said two victims was
hemorrhage due to gun shot wounds.
The five (5) empty shells (Exhs. "K.2",
"K-3", "K.4", "K.5", and "K-6") and the
two lead cores (Exhs. "K-9" and "K10"), an recovered at the crime scene
(Azarcon restaurant), were subjected
to ballistic examination at the NBI,
Manila. Witness Feliciano Lunasco,
NBI, Supervising Ballistician, Manila,
testified that the empty shells,
deformed slugs, cartridge and lead
cores were fired from the same gun,
Llama automatic pistol Cal. 38 (Exh.
"K").
Mrs. Delia Azarcon, the owner of the
restaurant, when interviewed by
Mayor Benedicto Acosta who arrived
at the restaurant upon being informed
of the incident that same afternoon
not long after the shooting, told the
Mayor, that it was the accused
Angelito Alivia who shot the three (3)
victims, whose bodies lay prostrate on
the cemented floor, There were three
(3) bullet marks on the cemented
floor, one beside the fallen body of the
late Atty. Maramba, another just
beneath the head of the late Police Lt.
Rumbaoa, and the other at the left
side wall of the restaurant. Pictures
were taken of the cadavers of the late
Atty. Maramba (Exh. "Q") and that of
the late Police Lt. Rumbaoa (Exhs. "P",
"P-1", "P-2" and "P-3", p. 2, and pp.
36-36-A, respectively, record, Crim.
Case No. 1272).
To top it all, accused Angelito Alivia,
duly assisted by his lawyer-uncle,
immediately after the incident, left for
Ilagan and voluntarily surrendered to
Col. Oscar M. Florendo, Provincial
Commander, PC, Ilagan In the process,
accused surrendered the firearm used,
Llama automatic pistol Cal. 38 (Exh.
"k"), and orally admitted to Col.
Florendo advised the accused in the
presence of his lawyer to have his oral
confession reduced in writing, which
the accused and counsel agreed.
M/Sgt. Severino Goday Jr., PC
Investigator, was tasked to get the
statement of the accused who, when
called to testify in Court told the story
that the extra-judicial confession (Exh.
"J", p. 7, record, Crim. Case No. 1272)
was freely and voluntarily given by the
accused duly assisted by his counsel.
There are present, two (2) mitigating
circumstances which may be credited
in favor of the accused, namely: (1)
voluntary surrender and (2)
drunkenness probably not habitual but
at this stage of the proceedings as
they relate to the legal incident in
question, such circumstances may not
sway to mitigate the question on bail
in favor of the accused. Persuasively,
said two mitigating circumstances
may have great weight after trial on
the merits. (pp. 10-20, Rollo)
Notwithstanding said finding of facts, the IAC ruled that
accused is entitled to bail in the amount of P80,000.00
thus nullifying the Orders of the trial court, dated
January 23, 1983 and May 15, 1983. Hence, this petition
with the following assigned alleged errors:
I. Respondent lntermediate Appellate
Court gravely erred in holding that the

evidence of guilt of accused is not

strong, contrary to the findings of the
trial court.
II. Respondent lntermediate Appellate
Court gravely erred in holding that Lt.
Cesar Rumbaoa and Pat. Elpidio Sagun
were not in the official performance of
their duties as peace officers at the
time of the incident and
III. Respondent Intermediate Appellate
Court gravely erred in relying on the
resolution in the case of"Montano vs.
Ocampo" which is not controlling. (p.
21. rollo)
The contentions of petitioner are well-taken. The crimes
charged are clearly capital offenses as the phrase is
defined in Sec. 5 Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. An
offense is capital, if it may be punished by death under
both the law prevailing at the time of its commission
and that prevailing at the time of the application for
bail, even if after conviction a penalty less than death
imposed. In its assailed decision, respondent (IAC)
concurred with the trial court that the charges against
accused are capital offenses and that the evidence of
guilt of the accused is strong. However, the respondent
Court ruled that while the evidence clearly established
that the petitioner 2 was responsible for the shooting of
Atty. Maramba, Lt. Rumbaoa and Patrolman Sagun and
he so admitted responsibility for their death in his
confession" the crime is ostensibly that of homicide
merely, not murder.

resistance and put up a defense due to the suddenness

and close succession of the shots. This is indicated by
the fact that a revolver still tucked in its holster was
found at the crime scene beside the bodies of the
victims showing that one of the victims was unable to
pull out his gun.
The commission of the crimes charged was attended by
treachery as established by the testimony of the
eyewitness Virgilio Yanuaria to the shooting of Atty.
Maramba and by strong evidence as to the treacherous
shooting of the two peace officers. Virgilio Yanuaria
testified that accused suddenly and without warning
shot the deceased Atty. Norberto Maramba when the
latter turned his back towards the accused and returned
to his table to eat. Atty. Maramba was fatally hit on the
back of his head and fell to the cement floor. Atty.
Maramba did not sense any danger that he would be
shot by the accused considering that he and the
accused knew each other personally and that, as
respondent admitted, there was no previous grudge or
misunderstanding between him (accused) and Atty.
Maramba. Successive shots hit the two peace officers
who were caught by surprise as a result of which they
died. The deceased had no inkling that the accused was
armed and that he would be carried by passion to resort
to violence considering his prominent stature in the
locality. On these issues the trial court ruled:
There is treachery although the
shooting was frontal, when the attack
was so sudden and unexpected that
the victim was not in a position to
offer an effective defense (People vs.
Cuadra, L-27973, October 23, 1978),
and when there was a deliberate
surprise attack upon an unarmed
victim the killing is murder qualified
by treachery (People ple vs. Alegria, L40792, August 18, 1978), and
furthermore, sudden, unexpected,
without warning, and without giving
the victim ,the opportunity to defend
himself or repel the initial attack, the
qualifying circumstance of treachery is
evident and the crane committed is
murder (People vs. Candado, L34089-90, August 9, 1979; People vs.
Pay-an, L-39089-90, July 31, 1978). (p.
171, rollo)

The criterion to determine whether the offense charged

is capital is the penalty provided by the law regardless
of the attendant circumstances. As pointed out by the
petitioner in its memorandum, The rationale of the
provision lies in the difficulty and impracticability of
determining the nature of the offense on the basis of
the penalty actually imposable. Otherwise, the test will
require consideration not only of evidence showing
commission of the crime but also evidence of the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Thus, there
has to be not only a complete trial, but the trial court
must also already render a decision in the case. This
defeats the purpose of bail, which is to entitle the
accused to provisional liberty pending trial. 3
The posture taken by the respondent Court in granting
bail to the accused and in disregarding the findings by
the trial court of the guilt of the accused (respondent
herein) is a clear deviation from Our ruling laid down in
the case of Bolanos vs. dela Cruz, to wit:
Under the Constitution, all persons
shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, except those
charged with capital offenses when
evidence of guilt is strong. It is the
trial court which is tasked to
determine whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong and it has
determined the affirmative in this
case after consideration of the
evidence already presented by the
prosecution, In the absence of
Manifest abuse of discretion We are
not prepared to substitute our
judgment for that of the trial
court. (Bolanos vs. Dela Cruz, supra)
(Emphasis supplied) (p. 164, rollo)
Anent the issue of whether or not the deceased Lt.
Rumbaoa and Pat. Sagun were killed while in the
performance of their duties, the evidence shows that
while both were admittedly in civilian clothes during the
incident in question they were in the performance of
their duties as police officers when fired upon and killed
by the bullets of the accused. As peace officers, their
initial reaction to the shooting was to assert their
authority in protecting and covering civilians from the
indiscriminate firing by the accused. Accused instead
suddenly and without warning, successively shot Lt.
Rumbaoa and Pat. Sagun to death knowing fully well
that they were peace officers. Although both were
armed with their service guns, they were unable to offer

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered giving due

course to the petition; the assailed decision of
respondent IAC is hereby SET ASIDE and the orders of
the lower court, denying the petition for bail are hereby
REINSTATED. If the accused is out on bail, his bail bond
is hereby cancelled and he is ordered committed to
prison. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
epublic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-65228 February 18, 1985
JOJO PASTOR BRAVO, JR., ETC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. MELECIO B. BORJA, ET AL., respondents.

PLANA, J.:
In the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, petitioner Jojo
Pastor Bravo, Jr., is charged with murder for the killing of
one Ramon Abiog (Criminal Case No. 83-184).
Detained in the city jail of Naga after his arrest,
petitioner filed a motion for bail based on two reasons:
(a) that the evidence against him is not strong in view of
the retraction by Ferdinand del Rosario, one of the
prosecution witnesses, of his previous statement

naming petitioner as the assailant; and (b) that he is a

minor of 16 years, entitled as such to a privileged
mitigating circumstance under Article 68 of the Revised
Penal Code which would make the murder charge
against him non-capital.
After a hearing during which the retracting witness (del
Rosario) presented by petitioner made another turnabout and declared against the latter, respondent Judge
Melecio B. Borja denied the motion for bail on the
finding that the evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong
and his minority was not proved. Petitioner then filed a
motion for reconsideration stating that his minority had
been proved by his birth certificate which was attached
to the memorandum in support of his motion for bail,
showing that he was born on February 26, 1967, that his
minority had never been challenged by the fiscal, and
that the offense charged, as regards petitioner, is not
capital because even if convicted, he could not be
sentenced to death because of his minority. Again,
attached to the motion for reconsideration was a duly
certified copy of petitioner's birth certificate. The Fiscal
opposed the motion on the ground that the evidence of
guilt is strong, but did not contest the minority of
petitioner.
In his order of September 21, 1983, respondent Judge
denied the motion for reconsideration.
Failing in his bid for bail, petitioner then filed a motion
with the lower court praying that he be placed in the
care and custody of the Ministry of Social Services and
Development (MSSD) pursuant to Article 191 of
Presidential Decree No. 603 (Child and Youth Welfare
Code) which provides:
Care of Youthful Offender Held for
Examination or Trial. A youthful
offender held for physical and mental
examination or trial or pending
appeal, if unable to furnish bail, shall
from time to time (sic) of his arrest be
committed to the care of the
Department of Social Welfare or the
local rehabilitation center or a
detention home in the province or city
which shall be responsible for his
appearance in court whenever
required: Provided, That in the
absence of any such center or agency
within a reasonable distance from the
venue of the trial, the provincial, city
and municipal jail shall provide
quarters for youthful offenders
separate from other detainees. The
court may, in its discretion upon
recommendation of the Department of
Social Welfare or other agency or
agencies authorized by the Court,
release a youthful offender on
recognizance. to the custody of his
parents or other suitable person who
shall be responsible for his
appearance whenever required.
On September 22, 1983, respondent judge denied the
motion for lack of merit. Explaining the denial later, he
said that the quoted Article 191 is not applicable since it
could be invoked only where the minor is charged with a
bailable offense, as could be gleaned from the phrase "if
unable to furnish bail."
On September 22, 1983, the NBI Regional Office at Naga
City submitted its report, copy of which was sent to the
City Fiscal of Naga. It found that it was the prosecution
witness, Ferdinand del Rosario, and not the petitioner,
who killed the deceased Ramon Abiog. When the
murder case was next called for hearing on October 19,
1983, the defense unilaterally moved orally that the trial
of petitioner be reset in order to give the City Fiscal
more time to study the NBI report, but the motion was
denied as dilatory. Again, on November 2, 1983,
petitioner unilaterally filed with the trial court a formal
Motion for Reinvestigation praying "that the proceedings
be suspended and that the City Fiscal of Naga be
ordered to reinvestigate this case." It does not appear
what action, if any, the court has taken on this motion.
Neither does it appear that the City Fiscal of Naga has
taken any move to reinvestigate the case.

Against this factual backdrop, petitioner has filed the

instant petition for certiorari and mandamus, with two
supplementary petitions, seeking the release of
petitioner on bail or his transfer to the custody of the
MSSD pending trial pursuant to Article 191 of PD No.
603. In view of the aforesaid NBI report, the petition also
seeks the issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding
respondent Judge to remand the case to the City Fiscal
of Naga for reinvestigation.
The first question to be resolved is whether petitioner is
entitled to bail as a matter of right.
Under the Constitution, "all persons, except those
charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties." (Article IV, Section 18.) Generally, therefore,
bail is a matter of right before conviction, unless the
accused is charged with a capital offense and the
evidence of guilt is strong.
The charge against petitioner is murder qualified by
treachery and attended by two aggravating
circumstances: evident premeditation and nocturnity.
Punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to death, the crime is therefore a capital offense.
The petitioner however submits that even assuming that
the evidence of guilt against him is strong, the charge of
murder, as to him who is only 16 years old, cannot be
capital because the death penalty cannot be imposed
on account of his minority which entitles him to a
penalty reduction of one degree. In effect, under
petitioner's submission, the test to determine whether
the offense charged is capital, is the penalty to
be actually imposed on him in view of the attendant
circumstances.
Petitioner's posture hardly finds support in the law.
Under Section 5 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, a
capital offense is "an offense which, under the
law existing at the time of its commission, and at the
time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be
punished by death." It is clear from this provision that
the capital nature of an offense is determined by the
penalty prescribed by law, with reference to which it is
relatively easy to ascertain whether the evidence of
guilt against the accused is strong. Moreover, when the
Constitution or the law speaks of evidence of guilt, it
evidently refers to a finding of innocence or culpability,
regardless of the modifying circumstances.
To allow bail on the basis of the penalty to
be actually imposed would require a consideration not
only of the evidence of the commission of the crime but
also evidence of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. There would then be a need for a
complete trial, after which the judge would be just about
ready to render a decision in the case. As perceptively
observed by the Solicitor General, such procedure would
defeat the purpose of bail, which is to entitle the
accused to provisional liberty pending trial.
Nevertheless, where it has been established without
objection that the accused is only 16 years old, it follows
that, if convicted, he would be given "the penalty next
lower than that prescribed by law," which effectively
rules out the death penalty.
The Constitution withholds the guaranty of bail from one
who is accused of a capital offense where the evidence
of guilt is strong. The obvious reason is that one who
faces a probable death sentence has a particularly
strong temptation to flee. This reason does not hold
where the accused has been established without
objection to be a minor who by law cannot be sentenced
to death.
But respondent judge claims that petitioner has not
proved his minority. This is inaccurate. In his motion for
bail, petitioner alleged that he was a minor of 16 and
this averment was never challenged by the prosecution.
Subsequently, in his memorandum in support of the
motion for bail, petitioner attached a copy of his birth
certificate. And finally, after respondent Judge had
denied the motion for bail, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, attaching thereto a certified true copy

of his birth certificate. Respondents Judge however

refused to take cognizance of petitioner's unchallenged
minority allegedly because the certificate of birth was
not offered in evidence. This was error because
evidence of petitioner's minority was already a part of
the record of the case. It was properly filed in support of
a motion. It would be a needless formality to offer it in
evidence. Respondent Judge therefore acted with grave
abuse of discretion in disregarding it.
Evidence on motion. When a motion
is based on facts not appearing of
record the court may hear the matter
on affidavits or depositions presented
by the respective parties, but the
court may direct that the matter be
heard wholly or partly on oral
testimony or depositions. (Rules of
Court, Rule 133, Section 7.)
It results that petitioner is entitled to bail as a matter of
right, which makes it unnecessary to decide whether he,
being a minor, is entitled to be placed pending trial in
the care and custody of the MSSD pursuant to Article
191 of P.D. No. 603.
Turning to the reinvestigation aspect of the petition, the
plea therefor must be addressed to the City Fiscal of
Naga, who has direction and control of the criminal
prosecution and who is the primary official called upon
to evaluate the evidence, ascertain the existence of
a prima facie case and determine who should be
criminally indicted. In case of unjustified refusal by the
City Fiscal to conduct a reinvestigation, the proper
recourse is to appeal to the Minister of Justice who
exercises control and supervision over fiscals.
WHEREFORE, the orders of respondent Judge denying
bail to petitioner are set aside. In the interest of
dispatch, bail for petitioner is fixed at P15,000.00 and
his release is ordered upon the posting thereof and its
approval by the trial judge, unless petitioner is held for
some other cause. The petition for mandamus to compel
reinvestigation of the case is denied. This decision is
immediately executory.

Assistant Prosecutor Levitico F. Salcedo recommended

bail in the amount of P200,000.00, but a copy of the
Information attached to the records of this case shows a
cancellation of the amount and the words "no bail" were
annotated therein.2 Judge Ernesto F. Pagayatan issued
an order of arrest on May 15, 1998, with the
recommended bail of P200,000.00 likewise canceled
and "no bail" written thereon.3 When the warrant was
returned unserved, Judge Pagayatan issued an alias
order of arrest on June 3, 1998.4 Private respondent was
arrested in Quezon City on June 8, 1998, and committed
to the Municipal Jail of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro on
the same day.5
Private respondent filed a Motion to Quash the
Information,6 and a Manifestation and Motion praying
that in the event the Motion to Quash is denied, the
same be treated as a motion to admit bail. 7 Hearing on
the motions was scheduled on June 26, 1998.8 On the
day of the scheduled hearing, Atty. Mario G. Aglipay filed
his entry of appearance for private complainant
Genevieve C. Pobre, the victims sister (herein
petitioner). Atty. Aglipay prayed that he be given ten
days within which to file his opposition to the motions,
and that the hearing be re-set to July 10, 1998. Judge
Pagayatan, however, pushed through with the hearing
on June 26, 1998 and treated private respondents
motions as one to fix bail. During the hearing, Fiscal
Salcedo informed the court that Atty. Aglipay was not
able to come to the hearing because he was left by the
boat going to Mindoro, and that Atty. Aglipay was asking
that the hearing be re-set to Friday. Counsel for the
defense, however, stated that it is the government
prosecutor who controls the prosecution of the case.
Judge Pagayatan then asked Fiscal Salcedo if he was
willing to submit the motions for resolution, to which the
latter acceded. The motions were then considered
submitted for resolution. On the same day, private
respondent posted a property bond.
It was on June 29, 1998, that Judge Pagayatan issued an
order granting private respondents motion to fix bail,
with the amount fixed at P40,000.00.9 Judge Pagayatan
also issued an order on the same day approving private
respondents property bond.10
On July 10, 1998, private respondent was arraigned and
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.11

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 141805. July 8, 2005
GENEVIEVE C. POBRE, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Regional Trial Court, Branch
45, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and ANDREW OVALLES, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In an Information dated May 8, 1998, private respondent
Andrew Ovalles was charged before the Regional Trial
Court of San Jose (Branch 46), Occidental Mindoro, with
the crime of Parricide, committed as follows:
That on or about the 18th day of October, 1997, at
around 1:46 oclock in the morning, in Barangay Pagasa, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill and with
abuse of superior strength and in the course of their
quarrel, did then and there pushed Alma CasaclangOvalles, his legitimate spouse, causing her to fall, her
head hitting the hard floor and thereby inflicting upon
her fatal injury, rendering her unconscious which caused
her death shortly thereafter.

Atty. Aglipay filed an Omnibus Motion on July 30, 1998,

contesting the Order dated June 29, 1998 granting bail,
which Order was received by Atty. Aglipay on July 17,
1998.12 Atty. Aglipay prayed for the inhibition of both
Judge Pagayatan and Fiscal Salcedo from the case; that
the case be re-raffled to another sala and prosecuted by
another public prosecutor; and that the Information be
amended.13 According to the private prosecutor, there is
a need to amend the Information to read, as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of October, 1997, at
around 11 oclock on the evening, or thereabouts, in
Barangay Pag-asa, San Jose, Occidental, Mindoro,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assaulted with intent
to kill and inflicted fatal head and brain injury upon her
legitimate spouse, Alma Casaclang-Ovalles, causing her
death shortly thereafter on October 18 1997 at around
1:46 oclock in the morning or thereabout.
CONTRARY TO LAW.14
Petitioner contends that the previous Information, which
states in part:
with intent to kill and with abuse of superior strength
and in the course of their quarrel, did then and there
pushed Alma Casaclang-Ovalles, his legitimate spouse,
causing her to fall, her head hitting the hard floor and
thereby inflicting upon her fatal injury, rendering her
unconscious which caused her death shortly thereafter.
limits the prosecution in presenting evidence that will
prove that private respondent had intent to kill his wife
by pushing her.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Hearing on the motion was held on August 28, 1998.

On September 28, 1998, Judge Pagayatan issued an

order granting the motion to inhibit and ordering the
raffle of the case to the other sala of the court, but the
motion to set aside the Order dated June 29, 1998 was
denied.15Consequently, the case was raffled to Branch
45 of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro. However, during the hearing on November 26,
1998, proceedings were temporarily deferred due to the
impending retirement of the judge assigned to Branch
45 in January 1999, to be resumed only after the
designation of a new judge.16
On December 11, 1998, herein petitioner filed a special
civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA),
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 49878, questioning the
Order dated June 29, 1998, issued by Judge Pagayatan.
The CA17 dismissed the petition per its Resolution dated
December 22, 1998, to wit:
Petition for review18 having been filed late, the appeal is
deemed ABANDONED and hereby ordered DISMISSED.19
A motion for reconsideration was filed but the
CA20 denied it in its Resolution dated February 7, 2000
for the reason that the petition was filed 83 days late. 21
Thereafter, petitioner filed the present petition
for certiorari, arguing that:
I
THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION SEEKING THE
ANNULMENT OF THE ORDER ADMITTING THE ACCUSED
ON BAIL IS A LEGAL ERROR IN THAT THE PETITION IS
NOT SUBJECT TO THE APPLICABLE REGLAMENTARY (sic)
PERIOD CONSIDERING THAT THE ACCUSED IS NOT
ENTITLED TO BAIL "REGARDLESS OF THE STAGE OF THE
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION."
II
THE ENTIRE RECORD SHOWS THAT THERE IS A GREAT
PRESUMPTION THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF THE
CRIME OF PARRICIDE.
III
THERE IS A NEED TO AMEND THE INFORMATION.
IV
THERE WAS MANIFEST PARTIALITY IN THE ACCUSEDS
FAVOR RENDERING ALL THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR AND THE TRIAL COURT NULL AND
VOID AB INITIO.22
The Court gave due course to the petition and required
the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
Accordingly, petitioner filed her Memorandum. The
Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of the People of
the Philippines, filed its Memorandum. However, private
respondent, despite several extensions granted by the
Court, failed to file his memorandum.
In a Resolution dated April 25, 2005, the Court declared
private respondents counsel guilty of contempt of court
under Rule 71, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, as
amended, and his arrest and detention were ordered
until he complies and pays the fine of P4,000.00.23 In a
Return of Order of Arrest dated May 25, 2005, the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Calapan District
Office informed the Court that private respondents
counsel, Atty. Crispin P. Perez, voluntarily surrendered at
the NBI Calapan District Office on May 24, 2005. Atty.
Perez likewise filed a Memorandum for private
respondent via courier on May 27, 2005, together with a
postal money order forP4,000.00, representing the fine
imposed on him.
Initially, the Court recognizes the legal standing of
herein petitioner as she is the victims sister. In Narcisco
vs. Romana-Cruz,24 involving the crime of parricide, the
Court sustained the legal standing of the sister of the
deceased to file a petition for certiorari as she is a

party-litigant who is akin to the "offended party," she

being a close relative of the deceased.
The Court also notes that petitioner filed a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
instead of a petition for review under Rule 45. A petition
for review under Rule 45 is the proper remedy in
assailing the CA Resolutions dated December 22, 1998
and dated September 7, 2000, considering that these
are final dispositions of the case before it. In any case,
the Court may disregard petitioners lapse and treat the
present petition as one for review under Rule 45. This is
in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules
of Court and in the interest of substantial justice,
especially (1) if the petition was filed within the
reglementary period for filing a petition for review; (2)
errors of judgment are averred; and (3) there is
sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the
rules.25 The petition in this case actually asserts errors
of judgment committed by the CA, which are proper in a
petition for review,26 and it is settled that it is the
allegations in the complaint or petition and the
character of the relief sought that determine the nature
of an action.27
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in dismissing her
petition for certiorari on the ground that it was filed out
of time. She believes that the filing thereof is not
subject to the period prescribed by Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court because of Rule 114, Sec. 7 thereof, which
states: "(N)o person charged with the capital offense, or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when the
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution." According to petitioner, a null and
void order granting bail cannot reach finality any time
during the stage of the criminal prosecution and may be
questioned on appeal or petition for review even if filed
beyond the reglementary period.28
The Court cannot sustain petitioners argument. It is
true that under Rule 114, Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court,
an accused charged with a capital offense is not entitled
to bail at any time during trial when the evidence of
guilt is strong. It does not mean however that since the
accused is not entitled to bail at any stage of the trial, a
grant thereof can be questioned any time and without
regard to the period of filing provided by the Rules of
Court.
An order granting bail is an interlocutory order. The
word interlocutory refers to something intervening
between the commencement and the end of a suit
which decides some point or matter but is not a final
decision of the whole controversy.29 In that sense, it
does not attain finality since there leaves something
else to be done by the trial court with respect to the
merits of the case. If and when the trial court issued
such interlocutory order without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and when
the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous,
then a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, as amended, can be considered an
appropriate remedy to assail the same.30
However, Rule 65, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, prescribes a period of 60 days within which to
file a special civil action for certiorari. The 60-day period
was specifically set to avoid any unreasonable delay
that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to
a speedy disposition of their case.31 Such right to a
speedy disposition of the case pertains not only to a
private complainant in a criminal case,32 but to an
accused as well.33While the periods set by law are
technical rules of procedure, these are not designed to
frustrate the ends of justice. These are provided to
effect the proper and orderly disposition of cases and
thus effectively prevent the clogging of court
dockets.34 Rules of procedure, especially those
prescribing the time within which certain acts must be
done, have oft been held as absolutely indispensable to
the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and
speedy discharge of business. The reason for rules of
this nature is because the dispatch of business by courts
would be impossible, and intolerable delays would
result, without rules governing practice. Such rules are a
necessary incident to the proper, efficient and orderly
discharge of judicial functions.35

It is noted that the petition was filed late by 13 days, not

83 days as computed by the CA. Petitioner received the
Order dated June 29, 1998 on July 17, 1998, and a
motion contesting, among others, the grant of bail, was
filed by her on July 30, 1998. During this period, 13 days
had already passed. Given that petitioner received a
copy of the Order dated September 28, 1998 denying
her motion for reconsideration on October 12, 1998, she
had 47 days therefrom, or until November 28, 1998
within which to file the petition. Since the petition was
filed with the CA only on December 11, 1998, 13 days
had lapsed.
Thus, strictly speaking, the CA did not err in dismissing
the special civil action for certiorari for having been filed
out of time. At the time the CA dismissed the petition
filed before it on December 22, 1998, Section 4, Rule
65, of the Rules of Court, as amended by Circular No.
39-98, provides that the 60-day period for filing a
petition forcertiorari shall be interrupted by the filing of
a motion for reconsideration or new trial. In the event
that the motion is denied, the petitioner had only the
remaining period within which to file the petition.
However, with the issuance of A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC on
September 1, 2000, amending Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition
shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice
of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion
for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether
such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period
shall be counted from notice of the denial of said
motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it
relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board or officer or person, in the Regional
Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area
as defined by the Supreme Court. In may also be filed in
the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts
or omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise
provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed
in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted
except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding
fifteen (15) days.
the petition filed before the CA should now be
considered as timely filed. In PCI Leasing and Finance,
Inc. vs. Emily Rose Go Ko,36 the Court, citing Narzoles
vs. NLRC,37 ruled that A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, being a
curative statute should be retroactively applied.
The Omnibus Motion filed by Atty. Aglipay contesting the
grant of bail, is, in effect, a motion for reconsideration of
the June 29, 1998 order of Judge Pagayatan. This was
denied by the trial court per Order dated September 28,
1998. Petitioner received a copy thereof on October 12,
1998. Taking into account A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, the
petition filed on December 11, 1998, or on the 60th day
should then be considered filed on time.
There is a need, therefore, to remand the case to the CA
for disposition of the issues raised by petitioner, which
were not resolved by it, namely: the propriety of the
grant of bail; the propriety of amending the Information;
and the alleged nullity of the proceedings before the
trial court due to the "manifest partiality" in favor of
private respondent.38
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals
dated December 22, 1998 and February 7, 2000 in CAG.R. SP No. 49878 are hereby SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings on matters indicated in the text of this
decision.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 121917 July 31, 1996

ROBIN CARIO PADILLA, accused-appellant,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees.
RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:p
On appellant Robin C. Padilla's application for bail.
In an information filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City, appellant was charged with violation of
P.D. No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms
punishable by reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion
perpetua. 1Pending trial, appellant was released on bail.
Thereafter, appellant was convicted as charged and
meted an indeterminate penalty of 17 years 4 months
and 1 day of reclusion temporal to 21 years of reclusion
perpetua. He appealed to public respondent Court of
Appeals, but judgment was rendered affirming his
conviction. Respondent court cancelled his bailbond and
ordered his arrest for confinement at the New Bilibid
Prison. Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied. Dissatisfied, appellant is now before us by
way of a petition for review on certiorari with an
application for bail praying, among others, to be allowed
to post bail for his temporary liberty. In his subsequent
pleading, 1 appellant moved for the separate resolution
of his bail application.
The threshold issue is whether or not appellant is
entitled to bail.
Bail is either a matter of right, or of discretion. It is a
matter of right when the offense charged is not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. 2 On the other hand, upon conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail
becomes a matter of discretion. 3Similarly, if the court
imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6)
years but not more than twenty (20) years then bail is a
matter of discretion, except when any of the
enumerated circumstances 4 under paragraph 3 of
Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied.
But when the accused is charged with a capital offense,
or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and evidence of guilt strong, bail shall be
denied, 5 as it is neither a matter of right nor of
discretion. If the evidence, however, is not strong bail
becomes a matter of
right. 6
In People v. Nitcha 7, the Court, reiterating established
jurisprudence, there said:
. . . if an accused who is charged with
a crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua is convicted by the trial
court and sentenced to suffer such a
penalty, bail is neither a matter of
right on the part of the accused nor of
discretion on the part of the court. In
such a situation, the court would not
have only determined that the
evidence of guilt is strong which
would have been sufficient to deny
bail even before conviction it would
have likewise ruled that the accused's
guilt has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Bail must not then
be granted to the accused during the

pendency of his appeal from the

judgment of conviction. Construing
Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure, as amended,
this Court, in the en banc Resolution
of 15 October 1991 in People
v.Ricardo Cortez, ruled that:
Pursuant to the
aforecited provision,
an accused who is
charged with a
capital offense or an
offense punishable
by reclusion
perpetua, shall no
longer be entitled to
bail as a matter of
right even if he
appeals the case to
this Court since his
conviction clearly
imports that the
evidence of his guilt
of the offense
charged is strong. 8
In this case, appellant was convicted of a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua. Applying the
aforequoted rule, we find appellant not entitled
to bail as his conviction clearly imports that the
evidence of his guilt is strong. And contrary to
appellant's asseveration, a summary hearing
for his bail application for the sole purpose of
determining whether or not evidence is strong
is unnecessary. Indeed, the extensive trial
before the lower court and the appeal before
respondent court are more than sufficient in
accomplishing the purpose for which a
summary hearing for bail application is
designed.
Rule 114, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, moreover, is
clear.

be denied bail, nevertheless, we cannot be indifferent to

his medical needs. And by granting appellant's request,
the Court is merely performing its supervisory powers
over detainees to safeguard, among others, their proper
accommodation and health pursuant to Section 25 of
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
ACCORDINGLY, the cancellation of appellant's bailbond
by public respondent court is AFFIRMED and the instant
application for bail is DENIED for lack of merit.
Appellant's request for an X-ray and MRI examinations
at St. Luke's Hospital is GRANTED which should be
conducted at the first opportune time to be arranged by
the Director of the New Bilibid Prison with the
responsible officers of the hospital, provided that
appellant shall be at all times subject to the security
conditions imposed by the prison's director. The
responsibility for the enforcement of the subject
request, as well as the security of the appellant,
devolves upon the Director of the New Bilibid Prison.
Upon termination of the medical examinations,
appellant shall be recommitted to prison without delay.
As much as possible, any unnecessary publicity should
be avoided.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.M. OCA No. 03-1800-RTJ
2004

November 26,

CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO R.

ZUO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ALEJADRINO C. CABEBE, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte, respondent.

Thus:
Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, not bailable. No
person charged with a capital offense,
or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetuaor life imprisonment, when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall be
admitted to bail regardless of the
stage of the criminal prosecution.
Administrative Circular No. 2-92, in addition,
applies in this case. The circular unequivocably
provides that when an accused is charged with
a capital offense or an offense which under the
law at the time of its commission and at the
time of the application for bail is punishable
by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail and
after trial is convicted by the trial court of the
offense charged, his bond shall be cancelled
and the accused shall be placed in confinement
pending resolution of his appeal. Appellant's
application must, perforce, fail as he is no
longer entitled to bail.
Be that as it may, we are not unwilling to accommodate
his request for an X-ray and Magnetic Resonance
Imaging (MRI) at St. Luke's Hospital as follow-up
examinations for his 1994 slipped-disc operation. It has
been said that while justice is the first virtue of the
court, yet admittedly, humanity is the second. Hence,
petitioner's request for the badly needed X-ray and MRI
examinations for which the New Bilibid Prison Hospital is
inadequately equipped, as certified to by its Chief
Officer, deserves attention. We recall that way back in
1946, we allowed in Dela Rama v.People's Court, 9 a
precedent on which appellant now anchors his
application, a prisoner to be released on bail when his
continued detention would be injurious to his health.
This trend, however, has changed with the development
of times. Besides, appellant's situation is not akin
to Dela Rama's factual milieu. While appellant now shall

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
The instant administrative case stemmed from the
sworn complaint1 dated January 15, 2003 of Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo of the Department of
Justice, against Judge Alejandrino C. Cabebe, 2 then
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Batac,
Ilocos Norte. The charges are knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment, gross ignorance of the law and
partiality.
In his complaint, Chief State Prosecutor Zuo alleged
that Criminal Case No. 3950-18 for illegal possession of
prohibited or regulated drugs was filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte against Rey
Daquep Arcangel, Victorino Gamet Malabed, William
Roxas Villanueva, all police officers, Jocelyn Malabed
Manuel and Pelagio Valencia Manuel. Upon arraignment,
all the accused, assisted by their counsel de parte,
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. On March 14,
2001, the prosecution filed with this Court a petition for
change of venue but was denied in a Resolution dated
August 13, 2001.3 On October 8, 2001, the accused filed
a motion for reconsideration.4 In the meantime, the
proceedings before respondent's court were suspended.
On May 6, 2002, the accused filed a motion to dismiss
invoking as ground the right of the accused to a speedy
trial. On November 5, 2002, respondent judge motu
propio issued an Order5 granting bail to the accused,
fixing the bail for each at P70,000.00 in cash or property
bond at P120,000.00, except for accused Evelyn Manuel
whose bail was fixed at P20,000.00 in cash. Respondent
judge issued the Order without the accused's
application or motion for bail.

The prosecution then filed a motion for

reconsideration.6 Instead of acting thereon, respondent
judge issued an order inhibiting himself from further
proceeding with the case, realizing that what he did was
patently irregular. Complainant thus prays that
respondent judge be dismissed from the service with
forfeiture of all benefits and be disbarred from the
practice of law.
7

In his comment, respondent denied the charges. While

admitting that he issued the Order dated November 5,
2002 granting bail to the accused without any hearing,
"the same was premised on the constitutional right of
the accused to a speedy trial." There was delay in the
proceedings due to complainant's frequent absences
and failure of the witnesses for the prosecution to
appear in court, resulting in the cancellation of the
hearings. The prosecution did not object to the grant of
bail to the accused.8 He added that the administrative
complaint filed against him is purely harassment. It is
not the appropriate remedy to question his alleged
erroneous Order. Accordingly, and considering his forty
(40) years of government service, he prays that the
administrative complaint be dismissed.
On March 26, 2003, respondent judge compulsorily
retired.
In his Report dated July 7, 2003, Deputy Court
Administrator Jose P. Perez found respondent judge
liable for gross ignorance of the law and recommended
that a fine of P20,000.00 be imposed upon him, with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.
In our Resolution9 dated August 25, 2003, we directed
that the complaint be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter and required the parties to
manifest whether they are submitting the case for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed. Both
parties submitted the required manifestations that they
are submitting the case for decision on the basis of the
records.
In Docena-Caspe vs. Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas,10 we held
that jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the
procedural necessity of a hearing, whether summary or
otherwise, relative to the grant of bail, especially in
cases involving offenses punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, where bail is a matter of
discretion. Under the present Rules, a hearing is
mandatory in granting bail whether it is a matter of right
or discretion.11 It must be stressed that the grant or the
denial of bail in cases where bail is a matter of
discretion, hinges on the issue of whether or not the
evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, and the
determination of whether or not the evidence is strong
is a matter of judicial discretion which remains with the
judge. In order for the latter to properly exercise his
discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to determine
whether the evidence of guilt is strong.12 In fact, even in
cases where there is no petition for bail, a hearing
should still be held.13
There is no question that respondent judge granted bail
to the accused without conducting a hearing, in
violation of Sections 8 and 18, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, quoted as follows:
"Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. At
the hearing of an application for bail filed by a
person who is in custody for the commission of
an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution
has the burden of showing that evidence of
guilt is strong. The evidence presented during
the bail hearing shall be considered
automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon
motion of either party, the court may recall any
witness for additional examination unless the
latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or
otherwise unable to testify."
"Sec. 18. Notice of application to prosecutor.
In the application for bail under section 8 of
this Rule, the court must give reasonable
notice of the hearing to the prosecutor or

require him to submit his recommendation.

(18a)"
In Cortes vs. Catral,14 we laid down the
following rules outlining the duties of the judge
in case an application for bail is filed:
1. In all cases whether bail is a matter
of right or discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation (Section
18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion,
conduct a hearing of the application
for bail regardless of whether or not
the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the
accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its
sound discretion (Section 7 and 8, id.);
3. Decide whether the guilt of the
accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not
strong, discharge the accused upon
the approval of the bail bond (Section
19, id.); otherwise the petition should
be denied.
Based on the above-cited procedure, after the hearing,
the court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a
summary of the evidence of the prosecution and based
thereon, the judge should formulate his own conclusion
as to whether the evidence so presented is strong
enough to indicate the guilt of the accused.15
Respondent judge did not follow the above Rules and
procedure enumerated in Cortes.16 He did not conduct a
hearing before he granted bail to the accused, thus
depriving the prosecution of an opportunity to interpose
objections to the grant of bail. Irrespective of his opinion
on the strength or weakness of evidence to prove the
guilt of the accused, he should have conducted a
hearing and thereafter made a summary of the
evidence of the prosecution. The importance of a bail
hearing and a summary of evidence cannot be
downplayed, these are considered aspects of procedural
due process for both the prosecution and the defense;
its absence will invalidate the grant or denial of bail. 17
Neither did respondent require the prosecution to
submit its recommendation on whether or not bail
should be granted.
He maintains that the prosecution did not object to the
grant of bail to the accused, hence, he cannot be held
administratively liable for not conducting a hearing.
In Santos vs. Ofilada,18 we held that the failure to raise
or the absence of an objection on the part of the
prosecution in an application for bail does not dispense
with the requirement of a bail hearing. Thus
"Even the alleged failure of the prosecution to
interpose an objection to the granting of bail to
the accused will not justify such grant without
hearing. This Court has uniformly ruled that
even if the prosecution refuses to adduce
evidence or fails to interpose any objection to
the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the
court to conduct a hearing or ask searching
and clarificatory questions from which it may
infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or
lack of it, against the accused. Where the
prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in
opposition to the application to grant and fix
bail, the court may ask the prosecution such
questions as would ascertain the strength of
the State's evidence or judge the adequacy of
the amount of bail. Irrespective of respondent

judge's opinion that the evidence of guilt

against the accused is not strong, the law and
settled jurisprudence demand that a hearing be
conducted before bail may be fixed for the
temporary release of the accused, if bail is at
all justified.
Thus, although the provincial prosecutor had
interposed no objection to the grant of bail to
the accused, the respondent judge therein
should nevertheless have set the petition for
bail for hearing and diligently ascertain from
the prosecution whether the latter was not in
fact contesting the bail application. In addition,
a hearing was also necessary for the court to
take into consideration the guidelines set forth
in the then Section, 6, Rule 114 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure for the fixing of the
amount of the bail, Only after respondent judge
had satisfied himself that these requirements
have been met could he then proceed to rule
on whether or not to grant bail."
Clearly, therefore, respondent judge cannot seek refuge
on the alleged absence of objection on the part of the
prosecution to the grant of bail to the accused.
Respondent judge contends that the accused were
entitled to their right to a speedy trial, hence, he
granted bail without a hearing. He blames the
prosecution for the delay.
Respondent's contention is bereft of merit. There is no
indication in the records of the criminal case that the
prosecution has intentionally delayed the trial of the
case. Even assuming there was delay, this does not
justify the grant of bail without a hearing. This is utter
disregard of the Rules. The requirement of a bail hearing
has been incessantly stressed by this Court. In the same
vein, the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be
conversant with the law and the Rules and maintain
professional competence; and by the very nature of his
office, should be circumspect in the performance of his
duties. He must render justice without resorting to
shortcuts clearly uncalled for. Obviously, respondent
failed to live up to these standards.

We thus find respondent judge guilty of violation of

Supreme Court Rules, specifically Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the grant of bail.
This administrative offense is considered a less serious
charge, punishable under Section 9(4) and Section 11(B2), Rule 140 of the same Rules, thus:
"Sec. 9. Less Serious Charges. Less serious
charges include:
x

"4. Violation of Supreme Court Rules,

directives, and circulars;
x

"Sec. 11. Sanctions. x x x

"B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious
charge, any of the following sanctions shall be
imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than one (1) nor
more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not
exceeding P20,000.00."
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Alejandrino C. Cabebe,
now retired, is found guilty of violation of Supreme Court
Rules and is hereby fined in the sum of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), the same to be deducted
from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. MTJ No. 04-1526. February 02, 2004]

It bears reiterating that respondent is being charged
with knowingly rendering unjust judgment, gross
ignorance of the law and partiality. We ruled that in
order to be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment or order, respondent judge must have acted in
bad faith, with malice or in willful disregard of the right
of a litigant.19 A perusal of the records, specifically the
assailed Order, hardly shows that any of these incidents
has been proven.
On the charge of gross ignorance of the law, suffice it to
say that to constitute such infraction, it is not enough
that the subject decision, order or actuation of the judge
in the performance of his official duties is contrary to
existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, he
must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or
corruption. 20 In Guillermo vs. Judge Reyes, Jr.21 we
categorically held that "good faith and absence of
malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are
sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with
ignorance of the law can find refuge." In VillanuevaFabella vs. Lee,22 we ruled that "a judge may not be held
administratively accountable for every erroneous order
he renders. For liability to attach for ignorance of the
law, the assailed order of a judge must not only be
erroneous; more important, it must be motivated by bad
faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other similar motive."
Complainant, having failed to present positive evidence
to show that respondent judge was so motivated in
granting bail without hearing, can not be held guilty of
gross ignorance of the law.
As to the charge of partiality, we find no evidence to
sustain the same. It is merely based on complainant's
speculation. Mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not
enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence
to prove this charge. The only exception to the rule is
when the error is so gross and patent as to produce an
ineluctable inference of bad faith and malice, 23 which
are not present here.

JOCELYN V. GRAGEDA, complainant, vs. JUDGE

NIETO T. TRESVALLES,* Municipal Trial
Court, Virac, Catanduanes, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The instant administrative case arose when Jocelyn
V. Grageda filed an Affidavit-Complaint[1] dated January
18, 2000 charging Judge Nieto T. Tresvalles, Municipal
Trial Court, Virac, Catanduanes, with gross ignorance of
the law and abuse of authority relative to Criminal Case
No. 5307 entitled People v. Bernardo Tablizo, Jr. for
murder.
The facts that led to the filing of the complaint as
summarized by Executive Judge Romulo P. Atencia, are
as follows:
The complainant in this administrative case was the wife
of Gil Grageda who died at about 8:30 in the evening
of November 24,
2000 in Constantino, Virac, Catanduanes due to multiple
stab wounds. On December 1, 2000, a complaint
charging Bernardo Tablizo, Jr. y Pitajen for the murder of
Gil Grageda was filed for preliminary investigation with
the Municipal Trial Court, 5th Judicial
Region, Virac, Catanduanes, presided by respondent
Judge Nieto T. Tresvalles, docketed therein as Criminal
Case No. 5307.
After Criminal Case No. 5307 was filed in his court for
preliminary investigation, Judge Nieto
T. Tresvalles conducted a preliminary examination
on December 5, 2000. On the same day, December 5,

2000, he issued an Order which textually reads, as

follows:
After conducting the preliminary investigation, the
Court believes that a prima facie case exists that the
crime charged has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof. Let therefore a
warrant of arrest issue for his arrest. The bail bond of
P30,000.00 is hereby fixed for his provisional liberty on
the ground that the evidence of guilt of the accused is
not strong.
SO ORDERED.
The corresponding warrant for the arrest of
Bernardo Tablizo, Jr. was issued on the same day, stating
that the bail for the accuseds temporary liberty was in
the amount of P30,000.00.
The accused surrendered on December 11, 2000. The
respondent Judge immediately issued an order
committing the person of the accused Bernardo Tablizo,
Jr. y Pitajen to the Municipal Jail Warden, Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology, Virac, Catanduanes. Also
on the same day, the accused, through counsel, filed a
motion to strike out the testimony of
witness Perlita Tablizo (wife of the accused) and to grant
accused bail.
The following day, December 12, 2000, the respondent
Judge issued an Order releasing accused Bernardo
P. Tablizo, Jr. from the custody of law after the latter
posted a personal bail bond in the amount of
P30,000.00.
In an Order dated February 28, 2001, the respondent
transmitted the records of the case to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, which contained a denial of
the accuseds motion to strike out the testimony
of Perlita Tablizo.
First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Antonio C.A. Ayo, Jr.
of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor thereafter
conducted preliminary investigation (I.S. No. 00-30),
ultimately recommending the filing of an information for
murder against Bernardo P. Tablizo, Jr. with the
aggravating circumstances of use of motor vehicle,
treachery and evident premeditation. No bail was
recommended for the temporary liberty of the accused.
Thereafter, an information charging Bernardo P. Tablizo,
Jr. for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 43, which is now awaiting decision.[2]
The respondent was, thereafter, charged with
gross ignorance of the law, conduct unbecoming of a
member of the Bench, failure to conduct himself in a
manner that would justify his continued stay in the
judiciary, and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
[3]
According to the complainant, the respondent judge
granted bail to the accused in Criminal Case No. 5307
without the requisite bail hearing, despite the fact that
there was an eyewitness to the murder who made a
positive identification of the accused. The complainant
also alleged that the amount of P30,000.00 printed on
the Warrant of Arrest issued by the respondent judge
appeared to be snowpaked, an indication that another
entry was previously made, possibly a no bail
recommendation. Furthermore, no counter-affidavit or
answer was filed by the accused during the preliminary
investigation conducted by the respondent judge, and it
took the police authorities seven days to arrest the
accused after the issuance of the warrant of
arrest. Thus:
16. I hereby execute this Affidavit to respond to the call
in (sic) to encouraging the public to report erring judges
to the Supreme Court and not to the media, as I am also
very much concerned, not only of being a victim of
injustice, but also of being prejudicial to [the]
governments interest as a consequence of
incompetence, gross ignorance, misconduct of the
Presiding Judge Nieto T. Tresvalles of the Municipal Trial
Court of Virac, Catanduanes in the granting of bail to the
accused, even when the evidence of his guilt was strong
and without an Application for Bail, considering that a
Complaint for Murder was filed, and without an Order, to

which the judge is to make as Summary of Evidence

filed by the complainant and her witnesses to
immediately cut short his membership in the Bench, be
terminated and dismissed from the judicial service with
forfeiture of all his benefits and leave credits with
prejudice to his re-employment in any public office. [4]
In his Comment, the respondent admitted that no
bail hearing was conducted in Criminal Case No. 5307,
but reasoned that the evidence of the guilt of the
accused was not strong. According to the respondent,
the matter of granting bail is an exercise of judgment,
and that the accused should not be denied his
constitutional right to bail.
It is true that a hearing is necessary before an accused
should be released on bail in cases where the granting
of bail is discretionary on the part of the
judge. However, it is also equally true that in the
exercise of his sound discretion and opinion, he is not
also precluded in seeing to it that the evidence of the
prosecution is adduced in support for the denial of bail
to the accused to guide the court on what to do on the
matter. But the public prosecutor failed during the
hearing.[5]
The respondent also explained that a judge issuing
a warrant of arrest is not an arresting officer. Thus, if it
took seven days for the accused to be arrested after the
issuance of the warrant, it was no longer his concern.
In its Report[6] dated June 19, 2003, the Office of
the Court Administrator opined that Sections 7 and 8 of
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court make it mandatory for the
court to conduct a hearing before an accused charged
with a capital offense is granted bail, and that failure to
do so amounts to gross ignorance of the law. It was
recommended that the complaint be re-docketed as a
regular administrative matter and that the respondent
judge be fined in the amount of P10,000.00 with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same act shall be dealt
with more severely.
In a Resolution dated July 28, 2003, the Court
referred
the
matter
to
Executive
Judge Romulo P. Atencia. Thereafter,
the
Executive
Judge submitted his Report and Recommendation
dated November 6, 2003.
According to the Executive Judge, the actual
implementation of a warrant of arrest is the
responsibility
of
other
functionaries
of
the
government. In fact, the respondent issued the warrant
of arrest on December 5, 2000, only four days after the
case was filed in his sala onDecember 1, 2000. Thus,
the respondent cannot be blamed in any wise if the
accused was not arrested or held in custody prior
to December 11, 2000.
According to the Executive Judge, the charge that
no bail was really granted for the provisional liberty of
the accused in the sum of P30,000 and that the said
amount was merely superimposed on the warrant of
arrest is not supported by the records. Since the
respondent issued an Order on December 5, 2000 fixing
the bail at P30,000, the contention that no such order
granting bail was issued is, likewise, devoid of
merit. Thus, the Executive Judge concluded, even
assuming that there was such a superimposition on the
warrant of arrest, the same was merely made to
conform to the said Order.
Anent the charge that the accused was not
required to file a comment on the complaint, the
Executive Judge found that no fault could be attributed
to the respondent on this regard, as it is the prerogative
of the accused to submit any pleading in his
defense. However, the respondent judge failed to make
any findings of facts and the law supporting his action
as mandated by Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court.
The Executive Judge also stated that at the time
the respondent judge granted bail to the accused
on December 5, 2000, no application for bail had as yet
been filed by the accused. Furthermore, no hearing was
held to determine whether the evidence of the
prosecution on the guilt of the accused was strong or
not.[7] According to the Executive Judge, a hearing is
required to afford the judge a basis for determining the
existence of the facts set forth under Section 6, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court in granting or rejecting a plea

of bail. Thus, the grant of bail without due hearing

deprives the prosecution of procedural due process, a
right to which it is equally entitled to as the
defense. Thus:
The respondent Judge seeks to justify his grant of bail
by claiming that the testimonies of the witnesses will
not warrant the charge of murder. This claim, however,
is belied by his own Order granting bail when he stated
that the Court believes that a prima facie case exists
that the crime charged has been committed and that
the accused is probably guilty thereof. The offense for
which he found the accused to be probably guilty of is
Murder, since it was the crime charged The
warrant of arrest issued by the respondent Judge
designated the offense as Murder. [8]
The Executive Judge agreed with the finding of the
Court Administrator that the respondent is guilty of
gross ignorance of the law.

We likewise agree with the finding of the Executive

Judge that the respondents claim of good faith will not
exonerate him from administrative liability.
The respondent Judge also argues in his Position Paper
submitted to the undersigned Executive Judge that
there is absolutely no evidence to show that he was
motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption
in granting bail. As such, he argues that his act which
was done in his official capacity is not subject to
disciplinary action. Unfortunately for the respondent
Judge, it is already settled that when a judge grants bail
to a person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
without conducting the required [bail] hearing, he is
considered guilty of ignorance or incompetence the
gravity of which cannot be excused by a claim of good
faith or excusable negligence. [12]

We agree that the respondent judge is

administratively liable for granting bail to an accused
charged with murder without conducting the requisite
bail hearing.

In the recent case of Rosalia Docena-Caspe v.

Judge Arnulfo O. Bagtas,[13] the
Court
stressed
the
indispensable nature of a hearing in petitions for bail,
citing a plethora of cases, [14] where judges were found to
be grossly ignorant of the rules and procedures and
were fined P20,000.00 therefor.

The importance of a hearing in applications for bail

should once more be emphasized. Section 8, Rule 114
provides as follows:

Moreover, the respondent judge failed to adhere to

the mandate of Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
which provides:

Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. - At the

hearing of an application for bail filed by a person who is
in custody for the commission of an offense punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the
prosecution has the burden of showing that the
evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented
during the bail hearing shall be considered
automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon motion
of either party, the court may recall any witness for
additional examination unless the latter is dead, or
otherwise, unable to testify.

Sec. 5. Resolution of investigating judge and its review.

Within ten (10) days after the preliminary
investigation, the investigating judge shall transmit the
resolution of the case to the provincial or city
prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases
of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction, for appropriate
action. The resolution shall state the findings of facts
and the law supporting his action, together with the
record of the case which shall include: (a) the warrant, if
the arrest is by virtue of a warrant; (b) the affidavits,
counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence of the
parties; (c) the undertaking or bail of the accused and
the order for his release; (d) the transcripts of the
proceedings during the preliminary investigation; and
(e) the order of cancellation of his bail bond, if the
resolution is for the dismissal of the complaint.

The importance of the Rule lies on the fact that on

the result of the bail hearing depends the right of an
accused to provisional liberty vis--vis the duty of the
State to protect the people against dangerous
elements. The resolution of the issue affects important
norms in our society: liberty on one hand, and order on
the other. To minimize, if not eliminate, error and
arbitrariness in a judges decision, the Rules require the
judge to hear the parties and then make an intelligent
assessment of their evidence.[9]
The respondents argument that a hearing is only
necessary if there is an application for admission to
bail is erroneous. As found by the Executive Judge:
[T]he fact that the accused has not even filed yet any
application for bail at the time bail was fixed
on December 5, 2000 aggravates matters. To state the
obvious, there was no occasion for the respondent Judge
to exercise any discretion on the matter of bail at that
point in time as the accused was not asking to be
released on temporary liberty. The respondent Judge
should have followed the straight and trodden path,
well-traveled by members of the bench, that bail should
not be allowed in cases of murder. It might also be
worth mentioning, in passing, that the right to bail may
be waived considering its personal nature. It arises from
the time one is placed in the custody of the law. The fact
that the respondent Judge already granted bail when the
accused has not been arrested yet compounds the
aggravation.[10]
Admission to bail presupposes the exercise thereof
in accordance with law and guided by the applicable
legal principles. The prosecution must first be accorded
an opportunity to present evidence because by the very
nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis
of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed
against in determining whether the guilt of the accused
is strong. In other words, discretion must be exercised
regularly, legally, and within the confines of due
process, that is, after the evaluation of the evidence
submitted by the prosecution.[11] In this case, the
respondent judge motu proprio granted bail to the
accused. The prosecution was not even afforded an
opportunity to present its evidence, in accordance with
the Rules.

No such report on the findings of fact and law was

made by the respondent. As found by the Executive
Judge, the December 5, 2000 Order of the respondent
finding probable cause that the crime of murder was
committed was made only for the purpose of issuing of
a warrant of arrest against the accused, thus:
It is apparent that the aforementioned finding was made
only for purposes of issuance of a warrant of arrest, as
at that time, the accused was still at large. Strictly
speaking, this was not yet a finding of any prima facie
case upon which an Information charging the proper
offense should be filed in court. The respondent Judge
was yet to issue a subpoena to the accused attaching to
it a copy of the complaint and its supporting affidavits
and documents as required under Sec. 3 (a), Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court. The accused has not yet submitted
any counter-affidavit or has waived the submission
thereof. In other words, preliminary investigation was
not yet terminated. Subsequently, however, the
respondent Judge never issued any other resolution on
the result of the preliminary investigation he conducted
up to the time he transmitted the records to the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor. The respondent Judge did
not make any findings of facts and the law supporting
his action as mandated by Sec. 5, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court. Therefore, his original, premature finding of
probable guilt made on December 5, 2000 was already
his verdict on the preliminary investigation yet to be
conducted. This cavalier disregard of procedural rules
leaves much to be desired.[15]
A judge owes it to himself and his office to know by
heart basic legal principles and to harness his legal
know-how correctly and justly anything less than that
is constitutive of the serious charge of gross ignorance
of
the
law,
perhaps,
grave
misconduct.
[16]
In Celestina B.Corpuz vs. Judge Orlando F. Siapno,
[17]
we had the occasion to state, thus:

When a judge displays an utter unfamiliarity with the

law and the rules, he erodes the confidence of the
public in the courts. A judge owes the public and the
court the duty to be proficient in the law and is
expected to keep abreast of laws and the prevailing
jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge can
easily be the mainspring of injustice.[18]
While the Executive Judge agreed that the
respondent should be held administratively liable, it was
recommended that he be merely reprimanded, as a
balancing of the equities involved should tilt the scales
in favor of the respondent for his loyalty, diligence and
reliability. Thus:
There are six (6) first level courts in
the Province of Catanduanes. Of these, five (5) do not
have incumbent judges. As the only judge in the first
level courts, respondent Judge Nieto T. Tresvalles has,
for many years, been Acting Judge of all the other
vacant courts which are scattered throughout the island
province, accessible only through dirt mountain
roads. This necessarily entailed great sacrifices on the
part of the respondent Judge, not to mention that the
extra remuneration given to Judges for sitting in
vacant salas is a mere pittance. Inasmuch as this
administrative matter concerns the official acts of the
respondent, equity demands that the bad be weighed
together with the good.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the undersigned is inclined to
adopt the recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator that the respondent Judge Nieto
T. Tresvalles be FINED in the amount of P10,000.00 with
a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same act
shall be dealt with more severely. However, considering
that the said respondent is in the twilight of his career
with the Judiciary, as his compulsory retirement is
scheduled in January of the coming year which is barely
two (2) months away, and considering further that the
respondent Judge did the yeomans job of singlehandedly operating the judicial machinery in the
Province of Catanduanes for many years as the only first
level court Judge in the entire province, it is the
respectful recommendation of the undersigned that
respondent Judge Nieto T. Tresvalles be instead only
REPRIMANDED. [19]
The records show that the respondent judge
compulsorily retired on January 22, 2004, having served
thirty-four
years
in
the
judiciary. Under
the
circumstances, the Court finds that a fine of P10,000.00
is just and reasonable.
WHEREFORE,
respondent
Judge
Nieto
T. Tresvalles is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the
law and is FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) to be deducted from his retirement
benefits.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 135045

December 15, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. IRENEO GAKO, JR. (Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch
5, Cebu City) and VICENTE GO, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, Rules
of Court of the Resolution1 of public respondent Court of
Appeals (Former Third Special Division) dated August
12, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 47142, entitled "PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES versus HON. IRENEO GAKO, JR. ET. AL.,"
dismissing the petition of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), herein petitioner.

This instant petition stems from a murder case filed

against private respondent Vicente Go (Go) and two coaccused Sonny Herodias (Herodias) and Leopoldo dela
Pea (de la Pea). The victim, Rafael Galan, Sr. (Galan,
Sr.), was shot dead on June 25, 1991.
Judge Priscila S. Agana (Judge Agana) originally presided
over the criminal case subject of this petition. The
prosecution sought to inhibit said judge for her alleged
collusion with the accused when she repeatedly
sustained the objections of the defense every time the
prosecution attempted to establish the conspiracy to kill
the victim. Judge Agana denied the motion to inhibit and
dismissed the case with prejudice on the ground that
the rights of the accused to a speedy trial were violated.
The prosecution challenged the dismissal in the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32954. In its
Decision dated April 18, 1994, the Court of Appeals set
aside the order of dismissal, granted the inhibition of
the judge, and ordered the re-raffle of the case. The
decision of the Court of Appeals gained finality when
this Court dismissed the appeal of private respondent
Go and co-accused Herodias in a Minute Resolution
dated June 26, 1995. The criminal case was thus set for
retrial. A series of delays beset the case when the
judges to whom the case was raffled inhibited
themselves. The case was finally presided over by
public respondent Judge Ireneo Gako, Jr (Judge Gako, Jr.).
With the foregoing events as backdrop, the pertinent
facts that led to the filing of this instant petition are as
follows:
On July 3, 1991, de la Pea executed an Extra-judicial
Confession implicating therein Herodias and Go in the
conspiracy to kill and murder the victim.
On July 9, 1991, an Information was filed against the
three accused namely, de la Pea, Herodias and Go,
charging them with the murder of Galan, Sr. and the
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-22474.
Judge Godardo Jacinto,2 then the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, issued a Warrant of
Arrest against the accused.
On July 22, 1991 an Urgent Motion to Confine private
respondent Go in a hospital was filed.
On August 2, 1991, the hearing on said motion was
conducted with the prosecution reserving its right to
cross-examine Dr. Gonzales.
On August 6, 1991 an Order was issued to confine
private respondent Go in a hospital without the
prosecution having cross-examined Dr. Gonzales on his
medical report.
On July 15, 1992, a hearing was conducted where de la
Pea was presented as a witness for the prosecution.
Presiding Judge Agana sustained the objections of the
defense counsels each time that the prosecution
attempted to establish the conspiracy to kill the victim.
The prosecution filed a motion to inhibit Judge Agana,
which motion was denied.
On November 20, 1992, the Information against Go and
Herodias was dismissed with prejudice on the ground
that their right to a speedy trial had been violated,
leaving de la Pea to face trial.
The prosecution then challenged the Order of Dismissal
with Prejudice before the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP
No. 32954. In its Decision dated April 18, 1994, the
Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the Order of
Dismissal, ordered the inhibition of Judge Agana, and
ordered the raffle of the case to another branch. With
the dismissal of the appeal of private respondent Go
and co-accused Herodias by this Court in a Minute
Resolution dated June 26, 1995, the criminal case was
set anew for trial.
The case was re-raffled to RTC-17 and on October 28,
1996, an Alias Warrant of Arrest was issued against
private respondent Go and co-accused Herodias.

On February 2, 1997, Dr. Matig-a, the physician of Go,

filed a Clinical Summary on the illness of Go and on
February 13, 1997 Go filed a Petition for Bail.
On March 7, 1997 and March 10, 1997, the prosecution
presented de la Pea who was acquitted in 1993. De la
Pea testified on matters which he was not allowed by
then presiding Judge Agana to testify on.
On March 21, 1997, a Manifestation on the Confinement
of private respondent Vicente Go was filed urging his
arrest because he was out of the intensive care unit.
The motion of the prosecution to transfer the criminal
case to a Special Heinous Crimes Court was denied by
then presiding Judge Jesus de la Pea (Judge de la Pea).
The case was finally assigned to Branch 5 with public
respondent Judge Gako, Jr. as presiding judge.

"a) Order dated May 23, 1997, which set aside the
earlier order of the court that granted the re-raffle of
this case to a heinous crime court upon the defenses
motion for reconsideration.
b) Order dated November 10, 1997, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court hereby
grants bail to accused Vicente Go which is fixed
atP50,000.00, after taking into consideration, and this
fact has not been disputed, that said accused is
presently confined in the hospital and is suffering from
the following ailments:
a) Ischemic Heart Disease, S/P Coronary Angiogram,
Single Vessel Disease, LAD, Chronic Stable Angina;
b) Essential Hypertension;

On September 16 and 17, 1997, the hearing was

resumed, now presided by public respondent Judge
Gako, Jr.
On September 26, 1997, an Urgent Motion to Enforce
the Alias Warrant of Arrest was filed praying for the
arrest of private respondent Go first before his Clinical
Summary Report could be heard.
On November 10, 1997, public respondent Judge Gako,
Jr. issued an Order granting the Petition for Bail of
private respondent Go.
On November 11, 1997, the prosecution filed a
Vehement Motion to Inhibit public respondent Judge
Gako, Jr. due to his alleged delay in resolving the
incidents in connection with the arrest of private
respondent Go.
On November 12, 1992, the prosecution moved for the
reconsideration of the Order of the court dated
November 10, 1997, the order which granted bail to
private respondent Go.
On November 14, 1997, a Supplemental Motion to
Inhibit public respondent Judge Gako, Jr. was filed by the
counsel of the offended party because Judge Gako, Jr.
allegedly pre-judged the evidence of the prosecution
without carefully evaluating why it is short of the
requirement to sustain a verdict of life imprisonment.
On November 15, 1997, a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration was filed from the Order dated
November 10, 1997 because the transcripts were
allegedly not read.
On December 1, 1997, a Motion for the Issuance
of Subpoena Duces Tecum to produce the records of Dr.
Matig-a was filed to determine if the medical findings on
private respondent Go were not exaggerated to prevent
his arrest.
On December 11, 1997, public respondent Judge Gako,
Jr. issued an Order in which he denied the prosecutions
Manifestation dated March 21, 1997 on the confinement
of private respondent Go, and the Urgent Motion to
Enforce the Alias Warrant of Arrest dated September 26,
1997 against private respondent Go.
On January 20, 1998, public respondent Judge Gako, Jr.
issued an Order denying the: (1) Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order dated November 10, 1997;
(2) Motion to Inhibit; and (3) Supplemental Motion to
Inhibit the Presiding Judge. The prosecution received
this order on February 10, 1998.
On March 20, 1998, private complainant Guadalupe
Galan (Galan), the widow of the victim, filed a petition
forcertiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 471460 before public
respondent Court of Appeals. The petition sought to
annul or set aside the orders of public respondent Judge
Gako, Jr. and then acting Presiding Judge de la Pea, to
wit:

c) NIDDM
d) Hypercholesterolemia; and
e) Respiratory Tract Infection
And, as per clerical summary report of Dr. Generoso
Matiga, dated February 4, 1997, the confinement of
accused Go in prison will cause his disease to terminate
fatally.
xxx
c) Order dated December 11, 1997, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Manifestation dated March 3, 1997 and the Motion to
Enforce the Alias Warrant of Arrest are hereby denied for
want of merit. Besides the accused was already
released on bail and the issue on the enforcement of the
Alias Warrants of Arrest is already moot and academic.
d) Order dated January 20, 1998, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Omnibus
Motions for Reconsideration on the order of the court
granting Bail to accused Vicente Go with Supplemental
pleading, xxx and thirdly, to disqualify the herein
Presiding Judge, are hereby denied for lack of merit.
xxx"3
The petition was signed by the counsel of private
complainant, Atty. Antonio Guerrero with the conformity
of Vidal Gella, Prosecutor I of the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Cebu City.
On March 26, 1998, public respondent Court of Appeals
(Special Third Division) issued a Resolution dismissing
the said petition on these grounds: (1) that the petition
was not filed by the Solicitor General in behalf of the
People of the Philippines; and (2) that the certification
on non-forum shopping was signed by counsel for
petitioner Galan, not by petitioner herself.4
On April 14, 1998, private complainant Galan, through
counsel, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said
Resolution indicating that petitioner OSG was going to
adopt her petition. On the same date, petitioner OSG
manifested before public respondent Court of Appeals
that it was joining private complainant Galan in her
petition and was adopting her petition as its own.
On June 18, 1998, the Court of Appeals issued a
resolution that denied said motion for reconsideration of
private complainant Galan on the ground that the
certification on non-forum shopping was not signed by
therein petitioner Galan. The Court of Appeals also
reasoned that "the fact that the OSG joined petitioner
Galan in her petition did not cure the above
deficiency".5 Petitioner OSG received copy of the
resolution on June 29, 1998.

On August 3, 1998 petitioner OSG filed a petition

for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 47142.
On August 12, 1998, said petition of petitioner OSG was
dismissed by public respondent Court of Appeals, the
pertinent portions of the resolution read:
"The Court notes that said petition is practically a
reproduction of the petition earlier filed by complainant
Guadalupe Galan, which was dismissed on March 26,
1998. The dismissal was reaffirmed by the Court in its
resolution dated June 18, 1998, copy of which was
received by the OSG on June 29, 1998.
Instead of seeking, on time, the amendment of the first
petition or a review of the resolution dismissing it, the
OSG has come to this Court through the instant petition
which not only raises the same matters ventilated in the
same petition but also was filed beyond the 60-day
period prescribed in Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition dated
July 17, 1998, is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED."6
In seeking the allowance of this instant petition,
petitioner OSG relies upon the following grounds:
I. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF (sic) CERTIORARI
FILED BY PETITIONER DOCKETED AS CA-G.R. SP
NO. 47142.
II. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SAID SPECIAL CIVIL
ACTION WAS FILED BEYOND THE SIXTY-DAY
PERIOD PRESCRIBED IN SECTION 4, RULE 65 OF
THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
III.PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN NOT TOUCHING ON THE MERITS OF
THE SAID PETITION.7
Public respondent Court of Appeals correctly ruled that
there was sufficient ground to dismiss the petition filed
by private complainant Galan since it was her counsel
who signed the certificate on non-forum shopping and
not private complainant herself. The petition clearly
failed to comply with the requirement imposed by
Section 1, Rule 658 , in relation to Section 3, Rule 469 of
the 1997 Rules of Court. We also agree with the Court of
Appeals, that the mere fact that petitioner OSG
manifested that it was adopting the petition of therein
petitioner Galan did not cure the defective petition
considering that the certificate on non-forum shopping
was still not signed by petitioner Galan but by her
counsel. The manifestation of petitioner OSG also did
not contain a certification on non-forum shopping. By
the time that petitioner OSG filed its petition
for certiorari in behalf of the People of the Philippines on
August 3, 1998, the dismissal of the petition of private
complainant Galan had already been reaffirmed and the
60-day period for petitioner OSG to file its petition had
already lapsed.
In dismissing the petition of petitioner OSG, public
respondent Court of Appeals pointed out that private
complainant Galan had no legal standing to file the
petition before it because "only the Solicitor General can
represent the People before this Court (Court of
Appeals) and the Supreme Court".10 On this point, we
differ.
In the recent case of Narciso vs. Romana-Cruz11 , we
reiterated the doctrine enunciated in People vs.
Calo12 that:
"While the rule is, as held by the Court of Appeals, only
the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent
the People or the State in criminal proceeding pending

in this Court and the Court of Appeals (Republic vs.

Partisala, 118 SCRA 320 [1982]), the ends of substantial
justice would be better served, and the issues in this
action could be determined in a more just, speedy and
inexpensive manner, by entertaining the petition at bar.
As an offended party in a criminal case, private
petitioner has sufficient personality and a valid
grievance against Judge Adaos order granting bail to
the alleged murderers of his (private petitioners) father.
In Paredes vs. Gopengco, 29 SCRA 688 (1969), this
Court ruled that the offended parties in criminal cases
have sufficient interest and personality as "person(s)
aggrieved" to file the special civil action of prohibition
and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 in line
with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of
the Rules of Court in order to promote their object, thus:
Furthermore, as offended parties in the pending
criminal case before petitioner judge, it cannot be
gainsaid that respondents have sufficient interest and
personality as person(s) aggrieved by petitioner
judges ruling on his non-disqualification to file the
special civil action under sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65.
Recently in line with the underlying spirit of a liberal
construction of the Rules of Court in order to promote
their object, as against the literal application of Rule
110, section 2, we held, overruling the implication of an
earlier case, that a widow possesses the right as an
offended party to file a criminal complaint for the
murder of her deceased husband. (Id., p. 699)"13
Hence, private complainant Galan had sufficient interest
and personality as the aggrieved party14 in a criminal
case to file the special civil action for certiorari before
public respondent Court of Appeals. The proper ground
therefore for dismissing her petition is the fact that it
was her counsel who signed the certificate on nonforum shopping and not herself as petitioner.
Petitioner OSG submits that assuming that the petition
for certiorari it filed with public respondent Court of
Appeals was filed out of time, nonetheless the following
issues raised in said petition warranted resolution:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DATED
NOVEMBER 10, 1997 GRANTING BAIL IS
PROPER WITHOUT EXPRESSING THE COURTS
FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE OF GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED IS NOT STRONG.
II. WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT
VICENTE GO IS CONSIDERED UNDER LEGAL
CUSTODY AS OF NOVEMBER 20, 1992 UNTIL
THE PRESENT BECAUSE OF HIS HOSPITAL
CONFINEMENT BY ORDER OF THE COURT
DATED AUGUST 6, 1991.
III. WHETHER OR NOT IT IS NECESSARY THAT
CRIMINAL CASE NO. CBU-22474 SHOULD BE
TRIED BY THE SPECIAL HEINOUS CRIMES
COURT NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE MURDER
WAS COMMITTED IN 1991 BEFORE THE
PASSAGE OF THE LAW CREATING THESE
SPECIAL COURTS.
This instant petition also seeks to set aside the following
orders: (1) Order dated May 23, 1997 which set aside
the earlier order of the trial court that granted the reraffle of this case to a heinous crime court upon the
motion for reconsideration of the defense; (2) Order
dated November 10, 1997 that granted the bail of
accused Go in the amount of P 50,000.00; (3) Order
dated December 11, 1997 denying the Motion to
Enforce the Alias Warrants of arrest; and (4) Order dated
January 20, 1998 denying the Omnibus Motions for
Reconsideration of the order of the court granting bail to
accused Go and ruling against the disqualification of
respondent Judge Gako, Jr.
While the petition of private complainant Galan was
indeed defective in form and the petition of petitioner
OSG was demonstrably filed beyond the 60-day period,
we however resolve to grant this petition in part in view
of the primordial interest of substantial justice.

The just cited issues in the petition before public

respondent Court of Appeals presented extenuating
circumstances that should have compelled the latter to
pass upon the merits of said petition. In a number of
cases,15 we have set aside the strict application of
procedural technicalities in the higher interest of justice.
As we shall show hereunder, the issues raised by
petitioner OSG deserve disposition to avoid a
miscarriage of justice and to end the streaks of delay
which have saddled the criminal case subject of this
petition.
First, the assailed Order dated November 10, 1997
granting bail is legally infirm for failing to conform with
the requirement that in cases when the granting of bail
is not a matter of right, a hearing for that purpose must
first be conducted. Section 13, Article III of the
Constitution provides the instances when bail is a
matter of right or discretionary, to wit:
"All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt
is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required."
Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
reiterates that:
"No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to
bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution."
Based on the foregoing, bail is not a matter of right with
respect to persons charged with a crime the penalty for
which is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death,
when the evidence of guilt is strong. Private respondent
Go, accused in the criminal case, was charged with
murder in 1991, before the passage of RA 7659, the law
that re-imposed the death penalty. Murder then was a
crime punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, accused
Gos right to bail is merely discretionary.
We have consistently held that when bail is
discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise
in the discretion of the court, should first be conducted
to determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of
it, against the accused to enable the judge to make an
intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the
parties.16 A summary hearing is defined as "such brief
and speedy method of receiving and considering the
evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with
the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the
weight of evidence for the purposes of bail. On such
hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to
enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought
to be allowed to the evidence for or against the
accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial
or on what further evidence may be therein offered and
admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the
discretion of the court which may confine itself to
receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial
matters, avoiding unnecessary examination and cross
examination".17
It is inconceivable how Judge Gako, Jr. could have
appreciated the strength or weakness of the evidence of
guilt of the accused when he did not even bother to
hear the prosecution. The reliance of Judge Gako, Jr. on
the "voluminous records" of the case simply does not
suffice. As judge, he was mandated to conduct a
hearing on the petition for bail of the accused since he
knew that the crime charged is one that carries a
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and in that hearing, the
prosecution is entitled to present its evidence. It is
worth stressing that the prosecution is equally entitled
to due process.18
Another compelling reason why a hearing of a petition
for bail is necessary is to determine the amount of bail
based on the guidelines set forth in Section 6, Rule 114
of the Rules of Court.19 Without the required hearing, the
bail granted to accused Go in the amount of P 50,000.00
is undoubtedly arbitrary and without basis.

Second, the order granting bail issued by Judge Gako, Jr.

merely made a conclusion without a summary of the
evidence, a substantive and formal defect that voids the
grant of bail. Well settled is the rule that after the
hearing, whether the bail is granted or denied, the
presiding judge is mandated to prepare a summary of
the evidence for the prosecution. A summary is defined
as "a comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest
of a text or statement".20 Based on the summary of
evidence, the judge formulates his own conclusion on
whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the
guilt of the accused. The importance of a summary
cannot be downplayed, it is considered an aspect of
procedural due process for both the prosecution and the
defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or denial of
bail.21
Thus, we laid down the duties of a judge in case an
application for bail is filed, viz:
"(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing for bail
or require him to submit his recommendation;
(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the
guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its discretion;
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the
accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution; (Italics supplied)
(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong,
discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bail bond. Otherwise, petition should be
denied."22
In dispensing with the required hearing for bail, Judge
Gako, Jr. pointed out in the assailed order that the
accused was confined in the hospital, was suffering from
a number of ailments and that the eventual
confinement of accused Go in prison will allegedly
"cause his disease to terminate fatally". 23 The
irregularity in the grant of bail however is not
attenuated since respondent judges findings were
based on the summary clinical report of Dr. Matiga
dated February 4, 1997 while the order granting bail
was issued on November 10, 1997. It could not
therefore be reasonably assumed that the actual state
of health of accused Go could still be accurately
reflected by the said medical report when nine months
had already passed from the time that said medical
report was prepared. It was therefore clear error for
Judge Gako, Jr. to depend solely on the dated medical
report in granting bail when the defense failed to
present a more recent one that would convincingly raise
strong grounds to apprehend that the imprisonment of
the accused would endanger his life.
Petitioner OSG advances the theory that the accused,
private respondent Go, is not entitled to bail because he
was allegedly not under the custody of the law at the
time that he applied for bail. Petitioner OSG anchors this
theory on the following arguments: that the August 6,
1991order commanding the confinement of accused Go
in the hospital was void because the prosecution was
not able to cross-examine the doctor who prepared the
medical report pertaining to the accused illnesses; that
when the Information in this case was ordered dismissed
with prejudice on November 20, 1992 by then presiding
Judge Agana, accused Go was bodily released from his
confinement; that at that point, the trial court had lost
its jurisdiction over the person of the accused; that
before the dismissal with prejudice was voided by the
Court of Appeals, accused traveled extensively abroad;
that when the case was re-raffled and finally presided
by Judge Gako, Jr. accused continued to be confined in
the hospital on the strength of the allegedly void order
of confinement dated August 6, 1991; that Judge Gako,
Jr. refused to enforce the alias warrant of arrest on the
ground that the order of confinement was still in effect;
and that accused Go voluntarily admitted himself to the
hospital, hence was not yet deprived of his liberty at the
time that he applied for bail.
We must first correct the perception that the trial court
was ousted of its jurisdiction over the person of accused

Go after Judge Agana erroneously dismissed the case

and upon the refusal of Judge Gako, Jr. to enforce the
alias warrant of arrest during the re-trial of the case.
Applicable to this issue is the basic principle that the
jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases,
once it attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent
happenings or events although of a character which
would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the
first instance; and it retains jurisdiction until it finally
disposes of the case.24
Prior to the dismissal of the case by Judge Agana, the
court had already acquired its jurisdiction over accused
Go when he was duly arraigned on December 11,
1991.25 The fact that this Court affirmed the decision of
the Court of Appeals that voided the order dismissing
the criminal case with prejudice is a clear declaration
that the jurisdiction of the trial court over the criminal
case and over the person of the accused continued to
subsist. With the nullification of the dismissal of the
case, it then became explicit that the court should have
tried the case to its end. The case was ordered
remanded and re-raffled because the inhibition of then
presiding Judge Agana was granted, in no way was the
jurisdiction of the trial court over the case and over the
person of the accused ever placed in doubt.
We now discuss the theory of petitioner OSG that the
right of accused Go to bail did not accrue because he
was not under the custody of the law or deprived of his
liberty. Petitioner OSG rests this claim on the allegations
that accused Go voluntarily admitted himself to the
hospital during the re-trial of the case and that Judge
Gako, Jr. refused to enforce the alias warrant of arrest as
evidenced by the questioned Order dated December 11,
1997.
By the very definition of bail in Section 1, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court26 , the person applying for bail must
be in the custody of the law. A person is considered to
be in the custody of the law (a) when he is arrested
either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to
Section 6, Rule 112, or even without a warrant under
Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules of Court, or (b) when he has
voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court by surrendering to the proper authorities. 27
We do not agree with petitioner OSG that accused Go
was not in custody of the law at the time that he applied
for bail. In the same assailed order, Judge Gako, Jr.
explained his refusal to enforce the alias warrant of
arrest in this manner:
"Secondly, the movant wanted this court to order the
arrest of the accused in view of the Alias Warrant of
Arrest issued by Acting Judge Andres Garalza, Jr. on
October 28, 1996. For the information of the movant,
there is another Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by Judge
Jose Burgos on May 27, 1996 after he denied the
Investigation Report submitted by the Office of the Cebu
City Prosecutor which recommended the dismissal of
the case against Vicente Go.
The court believes honestly that these two (2) Alias
Warrants of Arrest were improvidently issued because at
that time the Warrant of Arrest issued by then Judge
Godardo Jacinto on July 9, 1991 was still valid and
subsisting. In fact it was this latter Warrant of Arrest that
handed to this court jurisdiction over the person of the
accused Go.
The Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by Judge Burgos has
no legal basis not only because the Warrant of Arrest
issued by Judge Jacinto is still valid and subsisting but
also for the fact that it was issued as an aftermath of
the courts denial of the Reinvestigation Report of the
Office of the Cebu City Prosecutor which recommended
the dismissal of Gos case. Under Section 6, Rule 112 of
the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, the
Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant of arrest after a
preliminary investigation, not after reinvestigation when
one was already was (sic) issued.
Likewise, the Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by Judge
Garalza, which came about five months (5) later, had no
legal basis, firstly, because there was already an Alias
Warrant of Arrest issued by Judge Burgos on May 27,

1996, secondly, the Warrant of Arrest issued by Judge

Jacinto on July 9, 1991 is still valid and subsisting. But
what appears more funny is the Alias Warrant of Arrest
issued by Judge Garalza against accused Go who was at
that time lawfully confined in the hospital pursuant to
an Order of the court, dated August 6, 1991. When
Judge Garalza issued said alias (sic) Warrant of Arrest,
there was no showing that accused Go had escaped, or
refused to obey a lawful Order of the court.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Manifestation, dated March 21, 1997, and the Motion to
Enforce the Alias Warrant of Arrest are hereby denied for
want of merit. Besides, the accused was already
released on bail and the issue on the enforcement of the
Alias Warrants of Arrest is already moot and
academic."28
As pointed out by Judge Gako, Jr., accused Go had
already been arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest
issued by Judge Jacinto on July 9, 1991 which gave the
trial court jurisdiction over the accused. As mentioned
earlier, accused Go was duly arraigned before the case
was erroneously dismissed. From the time that accused
Go was arrested, he was already deprived of his liberty
and was in the custody of the law. At the re-trial of the
case, accused Gos confinement in the hospital was by
virtue of a court order dated August 6, 1991; the
restraint on the freedom of accused Go is evident. There
was therefore no more need to enforce the alias warrant
of arrest since accused Go was still under the custody of
the law, and there being no evidence that accused Go
had escaped or refused to obey a lawful order of the
court. At this point, the setting aside of the questioned
order dated December 11, 1997 that denied the
enforcement of the alias warrant of arrest against
accused Go has become moot and academic with the
provisional freedom of accused Go after his bail was
erroneously granted by Judge Gako, Jr.
We however find merit in the argument of petitioner
OSG that the order dated August 6, 1991 authorizing
the confinement of accused Go in the hospital was, in
the words of petitioner OSG, a "continuing one and builtin license for the accused to automatically confine
himself as many times as he likes".1wphi1 It may be
true that said order subsisted for it was never quashed,
but at the re-trial of the case, the prosecution through
its motion to enforce the alias warrant of arrest dated
September 26, 1997 had already put in issue the health
of the accused. Yet, Judge Gako, Jr. in an Order dated
December 11, 1997 justified the confinement of
accused Go in the hospital on the basis of the August 6,
1991 order of confinement.
The prosecution vigorously objected to the confinement
of accused Go in the hospital, questioning the alleged ill
health of the accused. Judge Gako, Jr. was called upon to
rule on this matter and instead of ascertaining the true
state of health of said accused, Judge Gako, Jr. instead
inexplicably relied on a court order authorizing the
confinement of accused Go in the hospital, an order that
was issued six years ago. The proper course of action in
this case should have been to recall the order of
confinement and to order the detention of accused Go
until the defense could prove through competent
evidence that the imprisonment of said accused would
imperil his health. The order to arrest accused Go in
such case would be the consequence of the recall of the
order of confinement, not for the purpose of placing him
under the custody of the law since to repeat, he already
was under the custody of the law.
As discussed earlier, accused Go is currently already out
on bail,29 the granting of which is void for want of a
hearing and summary of evidence. In cases when the
grant of bail is void, this Court will not hesitate to set
aside the order granting bail and order that the accused
be recommitted to jail pending his application for
bail,30 as this Court now holds in the case at bar.
As to the issue of whether or not public respondent
Judge Gako, Jr. should be inhibited on the ground of
partiality, the relevant provision to consider is Section 1,
Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, it provides:
"SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges.No judge or
judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his

wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,

creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either
party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of civil law, or in which
he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee
or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior
court when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review, without the written consent of all parties in
interest, signed by them and entered upon the records.
A judge, may in the exercise of his sound discretion,
disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid
reasons other than those mentioned above."
The ground of partiality is not one of the grounds
enumerated in the first paragraph of the just quoted
provision that would per se disqualify a judge from
sitting in a case. Jurisprudence is clear that partiality is a
recognized ground for the voluntary inhibition of the
judge under the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule
137.31 In this case, Judge Gako, Jr. has already ruled in
the assailed Order dated January 20, 1998 that he will
not inhibit himself.
To overturn the ruling of Judge Gako, Jr. and rule for his
disqualification, there must be clear and convincing
evidence to prove the charge of partiality. Material to
this issue are the following parameters we have set in
disqualifying a judge: mere suspicion that a judge was
partial to a party is not enough; that there should be
adequate evidence to prove the charge; that there must
be showing that the judge had an interest, personal or
otherwise, in the prosecution of the case at bar; and
that to be disqualifying, the bias and prejudice must be
shown to have stemmed from an extra-judicial source
and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis
other than what the judge learned from his participation
in the case.32
Petitioner OSG accuses Judge Gako, Jr. of partiality
supposedly shown by the grant of bail without a hearing
and the alleged suppression of the hearing on the
Clinical Summary Report of the accused. Again, to
successfully disqualify a judge on the ground of bias or
partiality, there must be concrete proof that a judge has
a personal interest in the case and his bias is shown to
have stemmed from an extra-judicial source. This
precept springs from the presumption that a judge shall
decide on the merits of a case with an unclouded vision
of its facts.33Thus, we have held that an erroneous ruling
on the grant of bail alone does not constitute evidence
of bias.34Likewise, respondent judges reliance on the
order of confinement even if erroneous is not sufficient
to point to a conclusion that he was manifestly partial to
the defense. To allow the disqualification of a judge on
the mere allegation of partiality with nothing more
would open the floodgates to forum shopping.35
Corollary to the foregoing, we do not find well taken the
recommendation of petitioner OSG that the criminal
case be raffled to a Special Heinous Crimes Court. Even
petitioner OSG concededly recognizes that Supreme
Court Administrative Order No. 51-96 dated May 3, 1996
creating the Special Heinous Crimes Court provides that:
"All cases covered by this order where trial has already
been commenced shall continue to be heard by the
branches to which these were originally assigned".
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 104-96 dated
October 21, 1996 which amended Supreme Court
Administrative Order No. 51-96, also contains a similar
provision, to wit: "Where trial has already begun, the
same shall continue to be heard by the respective
branches to which they have been originally assigned.
For purposes hereof, a criminal case is considered
begun when the accused or any of them has already
been arraigned; in a civil case, it is when pre-trial has
already been conducted and a pre-trial order issued."
We thus see no cogent reason to set aside the order
dated May 23, 1997 that denied the transfer of Criminal
Case No. CBU-22474 to a Special Heinous Crimes Court
when the trial of the case has already begun and when
the crime for which the accused is being charged with
occurred prior to the creation of the Special Heinous
Crimes Court. Furthermore, there are no extraordinary
circumstances that would compel this Court to exercise
its power under the Constitution to order a change of
venue or place of trial.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed

resolution of public respondent Court of Appeals dated
August 12, 1998 is SET ASIDE. The order dated
November 10, 1997 of the trial court in Criminal Case
No. CBU-22474 is SET ASIDE for being void in so far as it
grants bail to the accused and the accused is ordered
recommitted to jail pending the hearing on the bail
application. The order dated May 23, 1997 denying the
re-raffle of Criminal Case No. CBU-22474 to a Special
Heinous Crimes Court and the resolution dated January
20, 1997 ruling against the inhibition of presiding Judge
Ireneo Gako, Jr. are hereby AFFIRMED. The court a quo is
ordered to proceed with dispatch in the disposition of
this case.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 148468

January 28, 2003

ATTY. EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL LEANDRO
MENDOZA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 148769

January 28, 2003

EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 149116

January 28, 2003

EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION)
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed by
petitioner Edward Serapio, assailing the resolutions of
the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan denying his
petition for bail, motion for a reinvestigation and motion
to quash, and a petition for habeas corpus, all in relation
to Criminal Case No. 26558 for plunder wherein
petitioner is one of the accused together with former
President Joseph E. Estrada, Jose "Jinggoy" P. Estrada
and several others.
The records show that petitioner was a member of the
Board of Trustees and the Legal Counsel of the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation, a non-stock, non-profit
foundation established in February 2000 ostensibly for
the purpose of providing educational opportunities for
the poor and underprivileged but deserving Muslim
youth and students, and support to research and
advance studies of young Muslim educators and
scientists.
Sometime in April 2000, petitioner, as trustee of the
Foundation, received on its behalf a donation in the
amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200 Million) from
Ilocos Sur Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson through the
latter's assistant Mrs. Yolanda Ricaforte. Petitioner
received the donation and turned over the said amount
to the Foundation's treasurer who later deposited it in
the Foundation's account with the Equitable PCI Bank.
In the latter part of the year 2000, Gov. Singson publicly
accused then President Joseph E. Estrada and his
cohorts of engaging in several illegal activities, including

its operation on the illegal numbers game known

asjueteng. This triggered the filing with the Office of the
Ombudsman of several criminal complaints against
Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner, together
with other persons. Among such complaints
were: Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption, versus
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Edward Serapio, et al., docketed
as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1754; Graft Free
Philippines Foundation, Inc., versus Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, Edward Serapio, et al., docketed as OMB Crim.
Case No. 0-00-1755; and Leonardo De Vera, Romeo T.
Capulong and Dennis B. Funa, versus Joseph Estrada,
Yolanda Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, Raul De Guzman,
Danilo Reyes and Mila Reforma, docketed as OMB Crim.
Case No. 0-00-1757.

HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and

benefit public fund in the amount of
ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS
(P130,000,000.00), more or less,
representing a portion of the TWO
HUNDRED MILLION PESOS
[P200,000,000.00]) tobacco excise tax
share allocated for the Province of
Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with
co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma
Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan
OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and
Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND
OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;

Subsequently, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit dated

February 21, 2001. The other respondents likewise filed
their respective counter-affidavits. The Office of the
Ombudsman conducted a preliminary investigation of
the complaints and on April 4, 2001, issued a joint
resolution recommending, inter alia, that Joseph
Estrada, petitioner and several others be charged with
the criminal offense of plunder.

(c) by directing, ordering and

compelling FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN
AND BENEFIT, the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO
PURCHASE, 351,878,000 SHARES OF
STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the
Social Security System (SSS),
329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK,
MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE
CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF
MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE
HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE
HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY
CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND
MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED
FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED
TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR
HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
[P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR
A TOTAL OR MORE OR LESS ONE
BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY
SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY
SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
[P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY
COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY
OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR
IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES
AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR
PERCENTAGES OF SHARES OF STOCK
IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
[189,700,000.00] MORE OR LESS,
FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION
WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT
IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER
THE ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE";

On April 4, 2001, the Ombudsman filed with the

Sandiganbayan several Informations against former
President Estrada, who earlier had resigned from his
post as President of the Republic of the Philippines. One
of these Informations, docketed as Criminal Case No.
26558, charged Joseph Estrada with plunder. On April
18, 2001, the Ombudsman filed an amended
Information in said case charging Estrada and several
co-accused, including petitioner, with said crime. No bail
was recommended for the provisional release of all the
accused, including petitioner. The case was raffled to a
special division which was subsequently created by the
Supreme Court. The amended Information reads:
"That during the period from June, 1998 to
January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC
OFFICER BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself
AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his
co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS
FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR
CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES,
SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY
TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL
POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP,
CONNECTION OR INFLUENCE, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass,
accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY
OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR
BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less,
THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR
THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE
DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES through ANY OR
A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal
acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS,
described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly
or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES
MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT
OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE
MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00),
MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL
GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT,
SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR
ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with
co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG,
Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN
DOES AND JANE DOES in consideration
OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF
ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING,
misappropriating, converting OR
misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for

(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM

COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES,
PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS OR ANY
FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, the amount of MORE OR
LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED
THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED
FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
[P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING
THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT
NAME "JOSE VELARDE" AT THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW."1
On April 5, 2001, petitioner obtained a copy of the
Ombudsman's Joint Resolution finding probable cause
against him for plunder. The next day, April 6, 2001, he
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation.2 Petitioner
likewise filed on said date, this time with the
Sandiganbayan, an Urgent Omnibus Motion: (a) To Hold
in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and
Further Proceedings; (b) To Conduct a Determination of
Probable Cause; (c) For Leave to File Accused's Motion
for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation; and (d) To
Direct the Ombudsman to Conduct a Reinvestigation of
the Charges against accused Edward Serapio. 3

On April 10, 2001, the Ombudsman issued an order

denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and/or
reinvestigation on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since
the amended Information charging petitioner with
plunder had already been filed with the
Sandiganbayan.4
In a parallel development, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution on April 25, 2001 in Criminal Case No. 26558
finding probable cause to justify the issuance of
warrants of arrest for the accused, including petitioner.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order on the
same date for the arrest of petitioner.5 When apprised of
said order, petitioner voluntarily surrendered at 9:45
p.m. on the same day to Philippine National Police Chief
Gen. Leandro Mendoza. Petitioner has since been
detained at Camp Crame for said charge.
The Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused,
including petitioner, in Criminal Case No. 26558 on June
27, 2001. In the meantime, on April 27, 2001, petitioner
filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for Bail
which was set for hearing on May 4, 2001.6 For his part,
petitioner's co-accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada filed on
April 20, 2001 a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging
that he was entitled to bail as a matter of right.
During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioner's
Urgent Petition for Bail, the prosecution moved for the
resetting of the arraignment of the accused earlier than
the June 27, 2001 schedule. However, the
Sandiganbayan denied the motion of the prosecution
and issued an order declaring that the petition for bail
can and should be heardbefore petitioner's arraignment
on June 27, 2001 and even before the other accused in
Criminal Case No. 26558 filed their respective petitions
for bail. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan set the hearing
for the reception of evidence on petitioner's petition for
bail on May 21 to 25, 2001.
On May 17, 2001, four days before the hearing on
petitioner's petition for bail, the Ombudsman filed an
urgent motion for early arraignment of Joseph Estrada,
Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner and a motion for joint bail
hearings of Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and
petitioner. The following day, petitioner filed a
manifestation questioning the propriety of including
Joseph Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada in the hearing on his
(petitioner's) petition for bail.
The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution on May 18,
2001 resetting the hearings on petitioner's petition for
bail to June 18 to 28, 2001 to enable the court to resolve
the prosecution's pending motions as well as
petitioner's motion that his petition for bail be heard as
early as possible, which motion the prosecution
opposed.
On May 31, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution denying petitioner's April 6, 2001 Urgent
Omnibus Motion. The court ruled that the issues posed
by petitioner had already been resolved in its April 25,
2001 Resolution finding probable cause to hold
petitioner and his co-accused for trial.7 Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration of the said May 31, 2001
Resolution.
On June 1, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution
requiring the attendance of petitioner as well as all the
other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 during the
hearings on the petitions for bail under pain of waiver of
cross-examination. The Sandiganbayan, citing its
inherent powers to proceed with the trial of the case in
the manner it determines best conducive to orderly
proceedings and speedy termination of the case,
directed the other accused to participate in the said bail
hearing considering that under Section 8, Rule 114 of
the Revised Rules of Court, whatever evidence is
adduced during the bail hearing shall be considered
automatically reproduced at the trial.8
However, instead of proceeding with the bail hearing set
by it on June 18, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued an
Order on June 15, 2001 canceling the said bail hearing
due to pending incidents yet to be resolved and reset
anew the hearing to June 26, 2001.9

On the eve of said hearing, the Sandiganbayan issued a

resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of its May 31, 2001 Resolution. The bail
hearing on June 26, 2001 did not again proceed because
on said date petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a
motion to quash the amended Information on the
grounds that as against him, the amended Information
does not allege a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts constitutive of plunder; as against him, the
amended Information does not allege a pattern of
criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy; the money alleged in paragraph (a) of the
amended Information to have been illegally received or
collected does not constitute "ill-gotten wealth" as
defined in Section 1(d) of Republic Act No. 7080; and
the amended Information charges him of bribery and
illegal gambling.10 By way of riposte, the prosecution
objected to the holding of bail hearing until petitioner
agreed to withdraw his motion to quash. The
prosecution contended that petitioner's motion to quash
the amended Information was antithetical to his petition
for bail.
The Sandiganbayan reset the arraignment of accused
and the hearing on the petition for bail of petitioner in
Criminal Case No. 26558 for July 10, 2001 to enable it to
resolve the pending incidents and the motion to quash
of petitioner. However, even before the Sandiganbayan
could resolve the pending motions of petitioner and the
prosecution, petitioner filed with this Court on June 29,
2001 a Petition for Habeas Corpus and
Certiorari,docketed as G.R. No. 148468, praying that the
Court declare void the questioned orders, resolutions
and actions of the Sandiganbayan on his claim that he
was thereby effectively denied of his right to due
process. Petitioner likewise prayed for the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus; that the People be declared to
have waived their right to present evidence in
opposition to his petition for bail; and, premised on the
failure of the People to adduce strong evidence of
petitioner's guilt of plunder, that he be granted
provisional liberty on bail after due proceedings.11
Meanwhile, on June 28, 2001, Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada
filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion praying that said
court resolve his motion to fix his bail.
On July 9, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution
denying petitioner's motion to quash the amended
Information. Petitioner, through counsel, received on
said date a copy of said resolution.12 The motion to fix
bail filed by Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada was also resolved by
the Sandiganbayan.
On July 10, 2001, just before his arraignment in Criminal
Case No. 26558, petitioner manifested to the
Sandiganbayan that he was going to file a motion for
reconsideration of the July 9, 2001 Resolution denying
his motion to quash and for the deferment of his
arraignment. The Sandiganbayan, however, declared
that there was no provision in the Rules of Court or in
the Sandiganbayan's rules granting the right to
petitioner to file a motion for the reconsideration of an
interlocutory order issued by it and ordered petitioner to
orally argue his motion for reconsideration. When
petitioner refused, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with
his arraignment. Petitioner refused to plead, impelling
the court to enter a plea of not guilty for him.
On July 20, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court a
Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 148769,
alleging that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its
July 9, 2001 Resolution denying his motion to quash,
notwithstanding the fact that material inculpatory
allegations of the amended Information against him do
not constitute the crime of plunder; and that he is
charged, under the said amended Information, for more
than one offense. Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada likewise filed
petition for certiorari with the Court docketed as G.R.
No. 148965 for the nullification of a resolution of the
Sandiganbayan denying his motion to fix bail.
On August 9, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court
another Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
149116, assailing the Sandiganbayan's Resolution dated
31 May 2001 which denied his April 6, 2001 Urgent
Omnibus Motion and its June 25, 2001 Resolution

denying his motion for reconsideration of its May 31,

2001 Resolution.
Re: G.R. No. 148769
Petitioner avers that:
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION, IN DENYING PETITIONER
SERAPIO'SMOTION TO QUASH NOTWITHSTANDING THAT

I
THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE AMENDED INFORMATION AS
AGAINST PETITIONER SERAPIO DO NOT CONSTITUTE
THE CRIME OF PLUNDER.
A The Amended Information, as against
petitioner Serapio, does not allege a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts
constitutive of plunder.
B The Amended Information, as against
petitioner Serapio, does not allege a pattern of
criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy.
C The money described in paragraph (a) of
the Amended Information and alleged to have
been illegally received or collected does not
constitute 'ill-gotten wealth' as defined in
Section 1(d), Republic Act No. 7080, as
amended.
II
THE AMENDED INFORMATION CHARGES MORE THAN
ONE OFFENSE."13
Petitioner asserts that, on the face of the amended
Information, he is charged with plunder only in
paragraph (a) which reads:
"(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or
indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN
THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED
FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00),
MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN
THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE,
KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY
BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance
with co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose
'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward
Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in
consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION
OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;"14
Petitioner asserts that there is no allegation in
paragraph (a) of the amended Information of a
"combination or series of overt or criminal acts"
constituting plunder as described in Section 1(d) of R.A.
7080 as amended. Neither does the amended
Information allege "a pattern of criminal acts." He avers
that his single act of toleration or protection of illegal
gambling impelled by a single criminal resolution does
not constitute the requisite "combination or series of
acts" for plunder. He further claims that the
consideration consisting of gifts, percentages or
kickbacks in furtherance of said resolution turned over
to and received by former President Joseph E. Estrada
"on several occasions" does not cure the defect in the
amended information. Petitioner insists that on the face
of the amended Information he is charged only with
bribery or illegal gambling and not of plunder.
Petitioner argues that the P540 million which forms part
of the P4,097,804,173.17 amassed by former President
Joseph E. Estrada in confabulation with his co-accused is
not ill-gotten wealth as defined in Section 1(d) of R.A.
7080.

We do not agree with petitioner. Section 6, Rule 110 of

the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:
"Sec. 6 Sufficiency of complaint or information.
A complaint or information is sufficient if it
states the name of the accused, the
designation of the offense given by the statute;
the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed.
When the offense was committed by more than
one person, all of them shall be included in the
complaint or information."15
The acts or omissions complained or must be alleged in
such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged and enable the court to know the proper
judgment. The Information must allege clearly and
accurately the elements of the crime charged. What
facts and circumstances are necessary to be included
therein must be determined by reference to the
definition and elements of the specific crimes. The
purpose of the requirement of alleging all the elements
of the crime in the Information is to inform an accused
of the nature of the accusation against him so as to
enable him to suitably prepare for his defense.16 Another
purpose is to enable accused, if found guilty, to plead
his conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the same
offense.17 The use of derivatives or synonyms or
allegations of basic facts constituting the offense
charged is sufficient.18
In this case, the amended Information specifically
alleges that all the accused, including petitioner,
connived and conspired with former President Joseph E.
Estrada to commit plunder "through any or a
combination or a series of overt or criminal acts or
similar schemes or means." And in paragraph (a) of the
amended Information, petitioner and his co-accused are
charged with receiving or collecting, directly or
indirectly, on several instances money in the aggregate
amount of P545,000,000.00. In Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada
vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), et al.,19we held that
the word "series" is synonymous with the clause "on
several instances"; it refers to a repetition of the same
predicate act in any of the items in Section 1(d) of the
law. We further held that the word "combination"
contemplates the commission of at least any two
different predicate acts in any of the said items. We
ruled that "plainly, subparagraph (a) of the amended
information charges accused therein, including
petitioner, with plunder committed by a series of the
same predicate act under Section 1(d)(2) of the law"
and that:
"x x x Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate
act of receiving, on several instances, money
from illegal gambling, in consideration of
toleration or protection of illegal gambling, and
expressly names petitioner as one of those who
conspired with former President Estrada in
committing the offense. This predicate act
corresponds with the offense described in item
[2] of the enumeration in Section 1(d) of R.A.
No. 7080. x x x."20
It is not necessary to allege in the amended Information
a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy because as
Section 3 of R.A. 7080 specifically provides, the same is
evidentiary and the general rule is that matters of
evidence need not be alleged in the Information. 21
The Court also ruled in Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada vs.
Sandiganbayan22 that the aggregate amount of
P4,097,804,173.17 inclusive of the P545 million alleged
in paragraph (a) of the amended information is ill-gotten
wealth as contemplated in Section 1, paragraph 1(d) of
Republic Act 7080, as amended, and that all the
accused in paragraph (a) to (d) of the amended
information conspired and confederated with former
President Estrada to enable the latter to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate
amount of P4,097,804,173.17.

Under the amended Information, all the accused,

including petitioner, are charged of having conspired
and confabulated together in committing plunder. When
two or more persons conspire to commit a crime, each
is responsible for all the acts of others. In contemplation
of law, the act of the conspirator is the act of each of
them.23 Conspirators are one man, they breathe one
breath, they speak one voice, they wield one arm and
the law says that the acts, words and declarations of
each, while in the pursuit of the common design, are the
acts, words and declarations of all.24
Petitioner asserts that he is charged under the amended
information of bribery and illegal gambling and others.
The Sandiganbayan, for its part, held that petitioner is
not charged with the predicate acts of bribery and
illegal gambling but is charged only with one crime that
of plunder:
"THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE INFORMATION
CHARGES MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE
According to the accused Estradas and Edward
Serapio the information charges more than one
offense, namely, bribery (Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code), malversation of public
funds or property (Article 217, Revised Penal
Code) and violations of Sec. 3(e) of Republic
Act (RA No. 3019) and Section 7(d) of RA 6713.
This contention is patently unmeritorious. The
acts alleged in the information are not charged
as separate offenses but as predicate acts of
the crime of plunder.
It should be stressed that the Anti-Plunder law
specifically Section 1(d) thereof does not make
any express reference to any specific provision
of laws, other than R.A. No. 7080, as amended,
which coincidentally may penalize as a
separate crime any of the overt or criminal acts
enumerated therein. The said acts which form
part of the combination or series of act are
described in their generic sense. Thus, aside
from 'malversation' of public funds, the law
also uses the generic terms 'misappropriation',
'conversion' or 'misuse' of said fund. The fact
that the acts involved may likewise be
penalized under other laws is incidental. The
said acts are mentioned only as predicate acts
of the crime of plunder and the allegations
relative thereto are not to be taken or to be
understood as allegations charging separate
criminal offenses punished under the Revised
Penal Code, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees." 25
This Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan. It is clear on
the face of the amended Information that petitioner and
his co-accused are charged only with one crime of
plunder and not with the predicate acts or crimes of
plunder. It bears stressing that the predicate acts
merely constitute acts of plunder and are not crimes
separate and independent of the crime of plunder.
Resultantly then, the petition is dismissed.
Re: G.R. No. 149116
Petitioner assails the May 31, 2001 Joint Resolution of
the Sandiganbayan denying his April 4, 2001 Urgent
Omnibus Motion contending that:
"GROUNDS FOR THE PETITION
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN SUMMARILY DENYING PETITIONER
SERAPIO'S URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION AND MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION (RE: RESOLUTION DATED 31
MAY 2001), NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE OMBUDSMAN
HAD TOTALLY DISREGARDED EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
AND COMMITTED GRAVE AND MANIFEST ERRORS OF
LAW SERIOUSLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE RIGHTS AND
INTERESTS OF PETITIONER SERAPIO, AND THERE IS NO

PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUPPORT AN INDICTMENT FOR

PLUNDER AS AGAINST PETITIONER SERAPIO." 26
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying his omnibus motion
to hold in abeyance the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest as well as the proceedings in Criminal Case No.
26558; to conduct a determination of probable cause;
and to direct the Ombudsman to conduct a
reinvestigation of the charges him. Petitioner
asseverates that the Ombudsman had totally
disregarded exculpatory evidence and committed grave
abuse of discretion in charging him with plunder. He
further argues that there exists no probable cause to
support an indictment for plunder as against him. 27
Petitioner points out that the joint resolution of the
Ombudsman does not even mention him in relation to
the collection and receipt of jueteng money which
started in 199828 and that the Ombudsman inexplicably
arrived at the conclusion that the Erap Muslim Youth
Foundation was a money laundering front organization
put up by Joseph Estrada, assisted by petitioner, even
though the latter presented evidence that said
Foundation is a bona fide and legitimate private
foundation.29 More importantly, he claims, said joint
resolution does not indicate that he knew that the P200
million he received for the Foundation came
from jueteng.30
Petitioner insists that he cannot be charged with plunder
since: (1) the P200 million he received does not
constitute "ill-gotten wealth" as defined in Section 1(d)
of R.A. No. 7080;31 (2) there is no evidence linking him
to the collection and receipt of jueteng money;32 (3)
there was no showing that petitioner participated in a
pattern of criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire
ill-gotten wealth, or that his act of receiving the P200
million constitutes an overt criminal act of plunder. 33
Petitioner argues further that his motion for
reinvestigation is premised on the absolute lack of
evidence to support a finding of probable cause for
plunder as against him,34 and hence he should be
spared from the inconvenience, burden and expense of
a public trial.35
Petitioner also avers that the discretion of government
prosecutors is not beyond judicial scrutiny. He asserts
that while this Court does not ordinarily look into the
existence of probable cause to charge a person for an
offense in a given case, it may do so in exceptional
circumstances, which are present in this case: (1) to
afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of
the accused; (2) for the orderly administration of justice
or to avoid oppression; (3) when the acts of the officer
are without or in excess of authority; and (4) where the
charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust
for vengeance.36 Petitioner claims that he raised proper
grounds for a reinvestigation by asserting that in issuing
the questioned joint resolution, the Ombudsman
disregarded evidence exculpating petitioner from the
charge of plunder and committed errors of law or
irregularities which have been prejudicial to his
interest.37 He also states that during the joint
preliminary investigations for the various charges
against Joseph Estrada and his associates, of which the
plunder charge was only one of the eight charges
against Estrada et al., he was not furnished with copies
of the other complaints nor given the opportunity to
refute the evidence presented in relation to the other
seven cases, even though the evidence presented
therein were also used against him, although he was
only charged in the plunder case.38
The People maintain that the Sandiganbayan committed
no grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's
omnibus motion. They assert that since the Ombudsman
found probable cause to charge petitioner with the
crime of plunder, the Sandiganbayan is bound to
assume jurisdiction over the case and to proceed to try
the same. They further argue that "a finding of probable
cause is merely preliminary and prefatory of the
eventual determination of guilt or innocence of the
accused," and that petitioner still has the chance to
interpose his defenses in a full blown trial where his
guilt or innocence may finally be determined. 39

The People also point out that the Sandiganbayan did

not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner's omnibus motion asking for, among others, a
reinvestigation by the Ombudsman, because his motion
for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's joint resolution
did not raise the grounds of either newly discovered
evidence, or errors of law or irregularities, which under
Republic Act No. 6770 are the only grounds upon which
a motion for reconsideration may be filed.40
The People likewise insist that there exists probable
cause to charge petitioner with plunder as a coconspirator of Joseph Estrada.41
This Court does not agree with petitioner.
Case law has it that the Court does not interfere with
the Ombudsman's discretion in the conduct of
preliminary investigations. Thus, in Raro vs.
Sandiganbayan42 , the Court ruled:
"x x x. In the performance of his task to
determine probable cause, the Ombudsman's
discretion is paramount. Thus, in Camanag vs.
Guerrero, this Court said:
'x x x. (S)uffice it to state that this
Court has adopted a policy of noninterference in the conduct of
preliminary investigations, and leaves
to the investigating prosecutor
sufficient latitude of discretion in the
exercise of determination of what
constitutes sufficient evidence as will
establish 'probable cause' for filing of
information against the supposed
offender."
In Cruz, Jr. vs. People,43 the Court ruled thus:
"Furthermore, the Ombudsman's findings are
essentially factual in nature. Accordingly, in
assailing said findings on the contention that
the Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of
discretion in holding that petitioner is liable for
estafa through falsification of public
documents, petitioner is clearly raising
questions of fact here. His arguments are
anchored on the propriety or error in the
Ombudsman's appreciation of facts. Petitioner
cannot be unaware that the Supreme Court is
not a trier of facts, more so in the
consideration of the extraordinary writ of
certiorari where neither question of fact nor
even of law are entertained, but only questions
of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion. Insofar as the third issue is
concerned, we find that no grave abuse of
discretion has been committed by respondents
which would warrant the granting of the writ of
certiorari."
Petitioner is burdened to allege and establish that the
Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman for that matter
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing their
resolution and joint resolution, respectively. Petitioner
failed to discharge his burden. Indeed, the Court finds
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman in finding probable
cause against petitioner for plunder. Neither did the
Sandiganbayan abuse its discretion in denying
petitioner's motion for reinvestigation of the charges
against him in the amended Information. In its
Resolution of April 25, 2001, the Sandiganbayan
affirmed the finding of the Ombudsman that probable
cause exists against petitioner and his co-accused for
the crime of plunder, thus:
"In the light of the foregoing and considering
the allegations of the Amended Information
dated 18 April 2001 charging the accused with
the offense of PLUNDER and examining
carefully the evidence submitted in support
thereof consisting of the affidavits and sworn
statements and testimonies of prosecution
witnesses and several other pieces of
documentary evidence, as well as the

respective counter-affidavits of accused former

President Joseph Estrada dated March 20,
2001, Jose "Jinggoy" Pimentel Estrada dated
February 20, 2001, Yolanda T. Ricaforte dated
January 21, 2001 and Edward S. Serapio dated
February 21, 2001, the Court finds and so holds
that probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER
exists to justify issuance of warrants of arrest
of accused former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, Mayor Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie
"Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio
Tan or Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane
Doe a.k.a Delia Rajas."44
Likewise, in its Resolution dated May 31, 2001 of
petitioner's omnibus motion, the Sandiganbayan noted
that a preliminary investigation was fully conducted in
accordance with Rule II, Administrative Order No. 7 of
the Office of the Ombudsman, pursuant to Sections 18,
23 and 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman
Act of 1989); and that all the basic complaints and
evidence in support thereof were served upon all the
accused.45 It was in light of such findings that the
Sandiganbayan held that there was no basis for the
allegation that accused therein (including petitioner)
were deprived of the right to seek a reconsideration of
the Ombudsman's Resolution dated April 4, 2001 finding
probable cause to charge them with plunder after the
conduct of preliminary investigation in connection
therewith. In addition, the Sandiganbayan pointed out
that petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman's resolution, but failed to show in his
motion that there were newly discovered evidence, or
that the preliminary investigation was tainted by errors
of law or irregularities, which are the only grounds for
which a reconsideration of the Ombudsman's resolution
may be granted.46
It bears stressing that the right to a preliminary
investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely a
right conferred by statute.47 The absence of a
preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of
the Information or otherwise render the same defective
and neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court
over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the
Information.48 If the lack of a preliminary investigation
does not render the Information invalid nor affect the
jurisdiction of the court over the case, with more reason
can it be said that the denial of a motion for
reinvestigation cannot invalidate the Information or oust
the court of its jurisdiction over the case. Neither can it
be said that petitioner had been deprived of due
process. He was afforded the opportunity to refute the
charges against him during the preliminary
investigation.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to
determine whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the
person accused of the crime is probably guilty thereof
and should be held for trial.49 As the Court held in Webb
vs. De Leon, "[a] finding of probable cause needs only to
rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a
crime has been committed and was committed by the
suspect. Probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt.''50
Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the
prosecutor or any other officer authorized to conduct
preliminary investigation, courts as a rule must defer to
said officer's finding and determination of probable
cause, since the determination of the existence of
probable cause is the function of the prosecutor. 51 The
Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan that petitioner
failed to establish that the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman was tainted with
irregularity or that its findings stated in the joint
resolution dated April 4, 2001 are not supported by the
facts, and that a reinvestigation was necessary.
Certiorari will not lie to invalidate the Sandiganbayan's
resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reinvestigation since there is nothing to substantiate
petitioner's claim that it gravely abused its discretion in

ruling that there was no need to conduct a

reinvestigation of the case.52
The ruling in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals 53 that an
accused shall not be deemed to have waived his right to
ask for a preliminary investigation after he had been
arraigned over his objection and despite his insistence
on the conduct of said investigation prior to trial on the
merits does not apply in the instant case because
petitioner merely prayed for a reinvestigation on the
ground of a newly-discovered evidence. Irrefragably, a
preliminary investigation had been conducted by the
Ombudsman prior to the filing of the amended
Information, and that petitioner had participated therein
by filing his counter-affidavit. Furthermore, the
Sandiganbayan had already denied his motion for
reinvestigation as well as his motion for reconsideration
thereon prior to his arraignment.54In sum then, the
petition is dismissed.
Re: G.R. No. 148468
As synthesized by the Court from the petition and the
pleadings of the parties, the issues for resolution are:
(1) Whether or not petitioner should first be arraigned
before hearings of his petition for bail may be
conducted; (2) Whether petitioner may file a motion to
quash the amended Information during the pendency of
his petition for bail; (3) Whether a joint hearing of the
petition for bail of petitioner and those of the other
accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 is mandatory; (4)
Whether the People waived their right to adduce
evidence in opposition to the petition for bail of
petitioner and failed to adduce strong evidence of guilt
of petitioner for the crime charged; and (5) Whether
petitioner was deprived of his right to due process in
Criminal Case No. 26558 and should thus be released
from detention via a writ of habeas corpus.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the
Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
when it deferred the hearing of his petition for bail to
July 10, 2001, arraigned him on said date and entered a
plea of not guilty for him when he refused to be
arraigned. He insists that the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, does not require that he be
arraigned first prior to the conduct of bail hearings since
the latter can stand alone and must, of necessity, be
heard immediately.55 Petitioner maintains that his
arraignment before the bail hearings are set is not
necessary since he would not plead guilty to the offense
charged, as is evident in his earlier statements insisting
on his innocence during the Senate investigation of
the jueteng scandal and the preliminary investigation
before the Ombudsman.56 Neither would the prosecution
be prejudiced even if it would present all its evidence
before his arraignment because, under the Revised
Penal Code, a voluntary confession of guilt is mitigating
only if made prior to the presentation of evidence for
the prosecution,57 and petitioner admitted that he
cannot repudiate the evidence or proceedings taken
during the bail hearings because Rule 114, Section 8 of
the Revised Rules of Court expressly provides that
evidence present during bail hearings are automatically
reproduced during the trial.58 Petitioner likewise assures
the prosecution that he is willing to be arraigned prior to
the posting of a bail bond should he be granted bail. 59
The People insist that arraignment is necessary before
bail hearings may be commenced, because it is only
upon arraignment that the issues are joined. The People
stress that it is only when an accused pleads not guilty
may he file a petition for bail and if he pleads guilty to
the charge, there would be no more need for him to file
said petition. Moreover, since it is during arraignment
that the accused is first informed of the precise charge
against him, he must be arraigned prior to the bail
hearings to prevent him from later assailing the validity
of the bail hearings on the ground that he was not
properly informed of the charge against him, especially
considering that, under Section 8, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Court, evidence presented during such
proceedings are considered automatically reproduced at
the trial.60 Likewise, the arraignment of accused prior to
bail hearings diminishes the possibility of an accused's
flight from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
because trial in absentia may be had only if an accused
escapes after he has been arraigned.61 The People also

contend that the conduct of bail hearings prior to

arraignment would extend to an accused the
undeserved privilege of being appraised of the
prosecution's evidence before he pleads guilty for
purposes of penalty reduction.62
Although petitioner had already been arraigned on July
10, 2001 and a plea of not guilty had been entered by
the Sandiganbayan on his behalf, thereby rendering the
issue as to whether an arraignment is necessary before
the conduct of bail hearings in petitioner's case moot,
the Court takes this opportunity to discuss the
controlling precepts thereon pursuant to its symbolic
function of educating the bench and bar.63
The contention of petitioner is well-taken. The
arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the
conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A person is
allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of
his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary
surrender.64 An accused need not wait for his
arraignment before filing a petition for bail.
In Lavides vs. Court of Appeals,65 this Court ruled on the
issue of whether an accused must first be arraigned
before he may be granted bail. Lavides involved an
accused charged with violation of Section 5(b) Republic
Act No. 7610 (The Special Protection of Children Against
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act), an offense
punishable by reclusion temporal in its medium period
to reclusion perpetua. The accused therein
assailed, inter alia, the trial court's imposition of the
condition that he should first be arraigned before he is
allowed to post bail. We held therein that "in cases
where it is authorized, bail should be granted before
arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded
from filing a motion to quash." 66
However, the foregoing pronouncement should not be
taken to mean that the hearing on a petition for bail
should at all times precede arraignment, because the
rule is that a person deprived of his liberty by virtue of
his arrest or voluntary surrender may apply for bail as
soon as he is deprived of his liberty, even before a
complaint or information is filed against him.67 The
Court's pronouncement in Lavides should be understood
in light of the fact that the accused in said case filed a
petition for bail as well as a motion to quash the
informations filed against him. Hence, we explained
therein that to condition the grant of bail to an accused
on his arraignment would be to place him in a position
where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to
quash and thus delay his release on bail because until
his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment
cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion
to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and
thereafter be released on bail. This would undermine his
constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon a
valid complaint or Information sufficient to charge him
with a crime and his right to bail.68
It is therefore not necessary that an accused be first
arraigned before the conduct of hearings on his
application for bail. For when bail is a matter of right, an
accused may apply for and be granted bail even prior to
arraignment. The ruling in Lavides also implies that an
application for bail in a case involving an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death may also be
heard even before an accused is arraigned. Further, if
the court finds in such case that the accused is entitled
to bail because the evidence against him is not strong,
he may be granted provisional liberty even prior to
arraignment; for in such a situation, bail would be
"authorized" under the circumstances. In fine, the
Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in ordering
the arraignment of petitioner before proceeding with the
hearing of his petition for bail.
With respect to the second issue of whether petitioner
may file a motion to quash during the pendency of his
petition for bail, petitioner maintains that a motion to
quash and a petition for bail are not inconsistent, and
may proceed independently of each other. While he
agrees with the prosecution that a motion to quash may
in some instances result in the termination of the
criminal proceedings and in the release of the accused
therein, thus rendering the petition for bail moot and
academic, he opines that such is not always the case;

hence, an accused in detention cannot be forced to

speculate on the outcome of a motion to quash and
decide whether or not to file a petition for bail or to
withdraw one that has been filed.69 He also insists that
the grant of a motion to quash does not automatically
result in the discharge of an accused from detention nor
render moot an application for bail under Rule 117,
Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court.70
The Court finds that no such inconsistency exists
between an application of an accused for bail and his
filing of a motion to quash. Bail is the security given for
the release of a person in the custody of the law,
furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his
appearance before any court as required under the
conditions set forth under the Rules of Court.71 Its
purpose is to obtain the provisional liberty of a person
charged with an offense until his conviction while at the
same time securing his appearance at the trial. 72 As
stated earlier, a person may apply for bail from the
moment that he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his
arrest or voluntary surrender.73
On the other hand, a motion to quash an Information is
the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a
criminal complaint or Information filed against him for
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects
which are apparent in the face of the Information. 74 An
accused may file a motion to quash the Information, as
a general rule, before arraignment.75
These two reliefs have objectives which are not
necessarily antithetical to each other. Certainly, the
right of an accused right to seek provisional liberty
when charged with an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when
charged with an offense punishable by such penalties
but after due hearing, evidence of his guilt is found not
to be strong, does not preclude his right to assail the
validity of the Information charging him with such
offense. It must be conceded, however, that if a motion
to quash a criminal complaint or Information on the
ground that the same does not charge any offense is
granted and the case is dismissed and the accused is
ordered released, the petition for bail of an accused may
become moot and academic.
We now resolve the issue of whether or not it is
mandatory that the hearings on the petitions for bail of
petitioner and accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada in
Criminal Case No. 26558 and the trial of the said case
as against former President Joseph E. Estrada be heard
jointly.
Petitioner argues that the conduct of joint bail hearings
would negate his right to have his petition for bail
resolved in a summary proceeding since said hearings
might be converted into a full blown trial on the merits
by the prosecution.76
For their part, the People claim that joint bail hearings
will save the court from having to hear the same
witnesses and the parties from presenting the same
evidence where it would allow separate bail hearings for
the accused who are charged as co-conspirators in the
crime of plunder.77
In issuing its June 1, 2001 Order directing all accused in
Criminal Case No. 26558 to participate in the bail
hearings, the Sandiganbayan explained that the
directive was made was in the interest of the speedy
disposition of the case. It stated:
" x x x The obvious fact is, if the rest of the
accused other than the accused Serapio were
to be excused from participating in the hearing
on the motion for bail of accused Serapio,
under the pretext that the same does not
concern them and that they will participate in
any hearing where evidence is presented by
the prosecution only if and when they will
already have filed their petitions for bail, or
should they decide not to file any, that they will
participate only during the trial proper itself,
then everybody will be faced with the daunting
prospects of having to go through the process
of introducing the same witness and pieces of
evidence two times, three times or four times,

as many times as there are petitions for bail

filed. Obviously, such procedure is not
conducive to the speedy termination of a case.
Neither can such procedure be characterized
as an orderly proceeding."78
There is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure or the Rules of Procedure of the
Sandiganbayan governing the hearings of two or more
petitions for bail filed by different accused or that a
petition for bail of an accused be heard simultaneously
with the trial of the case against the other accused. The
matter of whether or not to conduct a joint hearing of
two or more petitions for bail filed by two different
accused or to conduct a hearing of said petition jointly
with the trial against another accused is addressed to
the sound discretion of the trial court. Unless grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction is shown, the Court will not interfere with the
exercise by the Sandiganbayan of its discretion.
It may be underscored that in the exercise of its
discretion, the Sandiganbayan must take into account
not only the convenience of the State, including the
prosecution, but also that of the accused and the
witnesses of both the prosecution and the accused and
the right of accused to a speedy trial. The
Sandiganbayan must also consider the complexities of
the cases and of the factual and legal issues involving
petitioner and the other accused. After all, if this Court
may echo the observation of the United States Supreme
Court, the State has a stake, with every citizen, in his
being afforded our historic individual protections,
including those surrounding criminal prosecutions.
About them, this Court dares not become careless or
complacent when that fashion has become rampant
over the earth.79
It must be borne in mind that in Ocampo vs.
Bernabe,80 this Court held that in a petition for bail
hearing, the court is to conduct only a summary
hearing, meaning such brief and speedy method of
receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of the
hearing which is merely to determine the weight of
evidence for purposes of bail. The court does not try the
merits or enter into any inquiry as to the weight that
ought to be given to the evidence against the accused,
nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on
what further evidence may be offered therein. It may
confine itself to receiving such evidence as has
reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination
of witnesses, and reducing to a reasonable minimum the
amount of corroboration particularly on details that are
not essential to the purpose of the hearing.
A joint hearing of two separate petitions for bail by two
accused will of course avoid duplication of time and
effort of both the prosecution and the courts and
minimizes the prejudice to the accused, especially so if
both movants for bail are charged of having conspired in
the commission of the same crime and the prosecution
adduces essentially the same evident against them.
However, in the cases at bar, the joinder of the hearings
of the petition for bail of petitioner with the trial of the
case against former President Joseph E. Estrada is an
entirely different matter. For, with the participation of
the former president in the hearing of petitioner's
petition for bail, the proceeding assumes a completely
different dimension. The proceedings will no longer be
summary. As against former President Joseph E. Estrada,
the proceedings will be a full-blown trial which is
antithetical to the nature of a bail hearing. Moreover,
following our ruling in Jose Estrada vs.
Sandiganbayan, supra where we stated that Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada can only be charged with conspiracy
to commit the acts alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the
amended Information since it is not clear from the latter
if the accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) thereof
conspired with each other to assist Joseph Estrada to
amass ill-gotten wealth, we hold that petitioner can only
be charged with having conspired with the other coaccused named in sub-paragraph (a) by "receiving or
collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances,
money x x x from illegal gambling, x x x in consideration
of toleration or protection of illegal gambling.81 Thus,
with respect to petitioner, all that the prosecution needs
to adduce to prove that the evidence against him for the
charge of plunder is strong are those related to the

alleged receipt or collection of money from illegal

gambling as described in sub-paragraph (a) of the
amended Information. With the joinder of the hearing of
petitioner's petition for bail and the trial of the former
President, the latter will have the right to cross-examine
intensively and extensively the witnesses for the
prosecution in opposition to the petition for bail of
petitioner. If petitioner will adduce evidence in support
of his petition after the prosecution shall have
concluded its evidence, the former President may insist
on cross-examining petitioner and his witnesses. The
joinder of the hearing of petitioner's bail petition with
the trial of former President Joseph E. Estrada will be
prejudicial to petitioner as it will unduly delay the
determination of the issue of the right of petitioner to
obtain provisional liberty and seek relief from this Court
if his petition is denied by the respondent court. The
indispensability of the speedy resolution of an
application for bail was succinctly explained by Cooley
in his treatiseConstitutional Limitations, thus:
"For, if there were any mode short of
confinement which would with reasonable
certainty insure the attendance of the accused
to answer the accusation, it would not be
justifiable to inflict upon him that indignity,
when the effect is to subject him in a greater or
lesser degree, to the punishment of a guilty
person, while as yet it is not determined that
he has not committed any crime." 82
While the Sandiganbayan, as the court trying Criminal
Case No. 26558, is empowered "to proceed with the trial
of the case in the manner it determines best conducive
to orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the
case,"83 the Court finds that it gravely abused its
discretion in ordering that the petition for bail of
petitioner and the trial of former President Joseph E.
Estrada be held jointly. It bears stressing that the
Sandiganbayan itself acknowledged in its May 4, 2001
Order the "pre-eminent position and superiority of the
rights of [petitioner] to have the matter of his
provisional liberty resolved . . . without unnecessary
delay,"84 only to make a volte face and declare that after
all the hearing of petition for bail of petitioner and Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada and the trial as against former
President Joseph E. Estrada should be held
simultaneously. In ordering that petitioner's petition for
bail to be heard jointly with the trial of the case against
his co-accused former President Joseph E. Estrada, the
Sandiganbayan in effect allowed further and
unnecessary delay in the resolution thereof to the
prejudice of petitioner. In fine then, the Sandiganbayan
committed a grave abuse of its discretion in ordering a
simultaneous hearing of petitioner's petition for bail with
the trial of the case against former President Joseph E.
Estrada on its merits.
With respect to petitioner's allegations that the
prosecution tried to delay the bail hearings by filing
dilatory motions, the People aver that it is petitioner and
his co-accused who caused the delay in the trial of
Criminal Case No. 26558 by their filing of numerous
manifestations and pleadings with the
Sandiganbayan.85 They assert that they filed the motion
for joint bail hearing and motion for earlier arraignment
around the original schedule for the bail hearings which
was on May 2125, 2001.86
They argue further that bail is not a matter of right in
capital offenses.87 In support thereof, they cite Article III,
Sec 13 of the Constitution, which states that
"All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before
conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpusis suspended. Excessive bail
shall not be required."88
The People also cited Rule 114, Secs. 7 and 4 of the
Revised Rules of Court which provide:
"Sec. 7 Capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment, not bailable. No person

charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the
stage of the criminal prosecution.
Sec. 4 Bail, a matter of right, exception. All
persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as
a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or
released on recognizance as prescribed by law
or this Rule x x x (b) and before conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment."89
Irrefragably, a person charged with a capital offense is
not absolutely denied the opportunity to obtain
provisional liberty on bail pending the judgment of his
case. However, as to such person, bail is not a matter of
right but is discretionary upon the court. 90 Had the rule
been otherwise, the Rules would not have provided for
an application for bail by a person charged with a
capital offense under Rule 114, Section 8 which states:
"Sec. 8 Burden of proof in bail application. At
the hearing of an application for bail filed by a
person who is in custody for the commission of
an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution
has the burden of showing that the evidence of
guilt is strong. The evidence presented during
the bail hearing shall be considered
automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon
motion of either party, the court may recall any
witness for additional examination unless the
latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or
otherwise unable to testify."91
Under the foregoing provision, there must be a showing
that the evidence of guilt against a person charged with
a capital offense is not strong for the court to grant him
bail. Thus, upon an application for bail by the person
charged with a capital offense, a hearing thereon must
be conducted, where the prosecution must be accorded
an opportunity to discharge its burden of proving that
the evidence of guilt against an accused is strong. 92 The
prosecution shall be accorded the opportunity to
present all the evidence it may deem necessary for this
purpose.93 When it is satisfactorily demonstrated that
the evidence of guilt is strong, it is the court's duty to
deny the application for bail. However, when the
evidence of guilt is not strong, bail becomes a matter of
right.94
In this case, petitioner is not entitled to bail as a matter
of right at this stage of the proceedings. Petitioner's
claim that the prosecution had refused to present
evidence to prove his guilt for purposes of his bail
application and that the Sandiganbayan has refused to
grant a hearing thereon is not borne by the records. The
prosecution did not waive, expressly or even impliedly,
its right to adduce evidence in opposition to the petition
for bail of petitioner. It must be noted that the
Sandiganbayan had already scheduled the hearing
dates for petitioner's application for bail but the same
were reset due to pending incidents raised in several
motions filed by the parties, which incidents had to be
resolved by the court prior to the bail hearings. The bail
hearing was eventually scheduled by the
Sandiganbayan on July 10, 2001 but the hearing did not
push through due to the filing of this petition on June 29,
2001.
The delay in the conduct of hearings on petitioner's
application for bail is therefore not imputable solely to
the Sandiganbayan or to the prosecution. Petitioner is
also partly to blame therefor, as is evident from the
following list of motions filed by him and by the
prosecution:
Motions filed by petitioner:

Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated April 6,

2001, for (1) leave to file motion for
reconsideration/reinvestigation and to direct
ombudsman to conduct reinvestigation; (2)
conduct a determination of probable cause as

would suggest the issuance of house arrest; (3)

hold in abeyance the issuance of warrant of
arrest and other proceedings pending
determination of probable cause;

Motion for Early Resolution, dated May

24, 2001;

Urgent Motion to Hold in Abeyance

Implementation or Service of Warrant of Arrest
for Immediate Grant of bail or For Release on
Recognizance, dated April 25, 2001;

Urgent Motion to allow Accused Serapio

to Vote at Obando, Bulacan, dated May 11,
2001;

Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,

dated May 22, 2001, praying for Resolution of
May 18, 2001 be set aside and bail hearings be
set at the earliest possible time;

Urgent Motion for Immediate Release on

Bail or Recognizance, dated May 27, 2001;

Motion for Reconsideration of denial of

Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated June 13, 2001,
praying that he be allowed to file a Motion for
Reinvestigation; and

Motion to Quash, dated June 26, 2001.95

Motions filed by the prosecution:

Motion for Earlier Arraignment, dated

May 8, 2001;96

Motion for Joint Bail Hearings of Accused

Joseph Estrada, Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and
Edward Serapio, dated May 8, 2001;97

Opposition to the Urgent Motion for

Reconsideration and Omnibus Motion to Adjust
Earlier Arraignment, dated May 25, 2001;98 and

Omnibus Motion for Examination,

Testimony and Transcription in Filipino, dated
June 19, 2001.99
The other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 also
contributed to the aforesaid delay by their filing of the
following motions:

Motion to Quash or Suspend, dated April

24, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, assailing the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080 and praying
that the Amended Information be quashed;

Very Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated

April 30, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, praying
that he be (1)excluded from the Amended
Information for lack of probable cause; (2)
released from custody; or in the alternative, (3)
be allowed to post bail;

Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Place on

House Arrest, dated April 25, 2001, filed by
Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying that they
be placed on house arrest during the pendency
of the case;

Position Paper [re: House Arrest], dated

May 2, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy
Estrada;

Supplemental Position Paper [re: House

Arrest], dated May 2, 2001, filed by Joseph and
Jinggoy Estrada;

Omnibus Motion, dated May 7, 2001,

filed by Joseph Estrada, praying by

reinvestigation of the case by the Ombudsman

or the outright dismissal of the case;

Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Extension,

dated May 2, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada,
requesting for five (5) days within which to
respond to the Opposition to Motion to Quash
in view of the holidays and election-related
distractions;

Opposition to Urgent Motion for Earlier

Arraignment, dated May 10, 2001, filed by
Joseph Estrada;

Omnibus Manifestation on voting and

custodial arrangement, dated May 11, 2001,
filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying
that they be placed on house arrest;

Manifestation regarding house arrest,

dated May 6, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy
Estrada;

Summation regarding house arrest,

dated May 23, 2001, filed by Joseph and
Jinggoy Estrada;

Urgent Manifestation & Motion, dated

May 6, 2001 filed by Jinggoy Estrada;

Manifestation, dated May 28, 2001, filed

by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying that
they be allowed to be confined in Tanay;

Motion to charge as Accused Luis

"Chavit" Singson, filed by Joseph Estrada;

Omnibus Motion, dated June 11, 2001,

filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, seeking
reconsideration of denial of requests for house
arrest, for detention in Tanay or Camp Crame;
motion for inhibition of Justice Badoy;

Urgent Motion to Allow Accused to Clear

His Desk as Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila,
dated June 28, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada;

Motion for Reconsideration, dated June

9, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada,
praying that the resolution compelling them to
be present at petitioner Serapio's hearing for
bail be reconsidered;

Motion to Quash, dated June 7, 2001,

filed by Joseph Estrada;

Still Another Manifestation, dated June

14, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada
stating that Bishop Teodoro Bacani favors their
house arrest;

Manifestation, dated June 15, 2001, filed

by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, waiving their
right to be present at the June 18 and 21, 2001
bail hearings and reserving their right to trial
with assessors;

Omnibus Motion for Instructions: 30-Day

House Arrest; Production, Inspection and
Copying of Documents; and Possible Trial with
Assessors, dated June 19, 2001, filed by Joseph
and Jinggoy Estrada;

Urgent Motion for Additional Time to

Wind Up Affairs, dated June 20, 2001, filed by
Jinggoy Estrada;

Manifestation, dated June 22, 2001, filed

by Jinggoy Estrada, asking for free dates for
parties, claiming that denial of bail is cruel and
inhuman, reiterating request for gag order of
prosecution witnesses, availing of production,

inspection and copying of documents,

requesting for status of alias case; and

Compliance, dated June 25, 2001, filed

by Jinggoy Estrada, requesting for permission
to attend some municipal affairs in San Juan,
Metro Manila.100
Furthermore, the Court has previously ruled that even in
cases where the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence
in opposition to an application for bail by an accused
charged with a capital offense, the trial court is still
under duty to conduct a hearing on said
application.101 The rationale for such requirement was
explained in Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz (supra),
citing Basco vs. Rapatalo:102
"When the grant of bail is discretionary, the
prosecution has the burden of showing that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
However, the determination of whether or not
the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter
of judicial discretion, remains with the judge.
This discretion by the very nature of things,
may rightly be exercised only after the
evidence is submitted to the court at the
hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the
weight of the evidence and since evidence
cannot properly be weighed if not duly
exhibited or produced before the court, it is
obvious that a proper exercise of judicial
discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be
submitted to the court, the petitioner having
the right of cross-examination and to introduce
his own evidence in rebuttal." 103
Accordingly, petitioner cannot be released from
detention until the Sandiganbayan conducts a hearing
of his application for bail and resolve the same in his
favor. Even then, there must first be a finding that the
evidence against petitioner is not strong before he may
be granted bail.
Anent the issue of the propriety of the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus for petitioner, he contends that he is
entitled to the issuance of said writ because the State,
through the prosecution's refusal to present evidence
and by the Sandiganbayan's refusal to grant a bail
hearing, has failed to discharge its burden of proving
that as against him, evidence of guilt for the capital
offense of plunder is strong. Petitioner contends that the
prosecution launched "a seemingly endless barrage of
obstructive and dilatory moves" to prevent the conduct
of bail hearings. Specifically, the prosecution moved for
petitioner's arraignment before the commencement of
bail hearings and insisted on joint bail hearings for
petitioner, Joseph Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada despite
the fact that it was only petitioner who asked for a bail
hearing; manifested that it would present its evidence
as if it is the presentation of the evidence in chief,
meaning that the bail hearings would be concluded only
after the prosecution presented its entire case upon the
accused; and argued that petitioner's motion to quash
and his petition for bail are inconsistent, and therefore,
petitioner should choose to pursue only one of these
two remedies.104 He further claims that the
Sandiganbayan, through its questioned orders and
resolutions postponing the bail hearings effectively
denied him of his right to bail and to due process of
law.105
Petitioner also maintains that the issuance by the
Sandiganbayan of new orders canceling the bail
hearings which it had earlier set did not render moot
and academic the petition for issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus, since said orders have resulted in a
continuing deprivation of petitioner's right to bail. 106 He
argues further that the fact that he was arrested and is
detained pursuant to valid process does not by itself
negate the efficacy of the remedy ofhabeas corpus. In
support of his contention, petitioner cites Moncupa vs.
Enrile,107 where the Court held thathabeas
corpus extends to instances where the detention, while
valid from its inception, has later become arbitrary. 108
However, the People insist that habeas corpus is not
proper because petitioner was arrested pursuant to the
amended information which was earlier filed in

court,109 the warrant of arrest issuant pursuant thereto

was valid, and petitioner voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities.110
As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not
issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty in custody of an officer under a process issued by
the court which jurisdiction to do so.111 In exceptional
circumstances, habeas corpus may be granted by the
courts even when the person concerned is detained
pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender, for
this writ of liberty is recognized as "the fundamental
instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against
arbitrary and lawless state action" due to "its ability to
cut through barriers of form and procedural
mazes."112 Thus, in previous cases, we issued the writ
where the deprivation of liberty, while initially valid
under the law, had later become invalid,113 and even
though the persons praying for its issuance were not
completely deprived of their liberty. 114
The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus in favor of petitioner. The general rule
thathabeas corpus does not lie where the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of
an officer under process issued by a court which had
jurisdiction to issue the same115 applies, because
petitioner is under detention pursuant to the order of
arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan on April 25, 2001
after the filing by the Ombudsman of the amended
information for plunder against petitioner and his coaccused. Petitioner had in fact voluntarily surrendered
himself to the authorities on April 25, 2001 upon
learning that a warrant for his arrest had been issued.
The ruling in Moncupa vs. Enrile116 that habeas
corpus will lie where the deprivation of liberty which was
initially valid has become arbitrary in view of
subsequent developments finds no application in the
present case because the hearing on petitioner's
application for bail has yet to commence. As stated
earlier, they delay in the hearing of petitioner's petition
for bail cannot be pinned solely on the Sandiganbayan
or on the prosecution for that matter. Petitioner himself
is partly to be blamed. Moreover, a petition for habeas
corpus is not the appropriate remedy for asserting one's
right to bail.117 It cannot be availed of where accused is
entitled to bail not as a matter of right but on the
discretion of the court and the latter has not abused
such discretion in refusing to grant bail,118 or has not
even exercised said discretion. The proper recourse is to
file an application for bail with the court where the
criminal case is pending and to allow hearings thereon
to proceed.
The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not only
be unjustified but would also preempt the
Sandiganbayan's resolution of the pending application
for bail of petitioner. The recourse of petitioner is to
forthwith proceed with the hearing on his application for
bail.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is
hereby rendered as follows:
1 In G.R. No. 148769 and G.R. No. 149116, the petitions
are DISMISSED. The resolutions of respondent
Sandiganbayan subject of said petitions are AFFIRMED;
and
2 In G.R. No. 148468, the petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan,
Annex "L" of the petition, ordering a joint hearing of
petitioner's petition for bail and the trial of Criminal
Case No. 26558 as against former President Joseph E.
Estrada is SET ASIDE; the arraignment of petitioner on
July 10, 2001 is also SET ASIDE.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 131946-47

February 8, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGELIO REYES GOMEZ a.k.a. PHILIP ROGER
LACSON and ROGER ELEAZAR GOMEZ, accusedappellant..
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 29 December 1995 an Information was filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque charging Rogelio
Gomez y Reyes a.k.a. Philip Roger Lacson or Roger
Eleazar Gomez with illegal recruitment in large scale
resulting in economic sabotage as defined and
penalized under the provisions of Art. 38, par. (a), in
relation to Arts. 13, par (b), 34 and 39 of PD 442
otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines,
as amended by PD Nos. 1920 and 2018,1 docketed as
Crim. Case No. 96-01. The Information alleged that
Rogelio Gomez, without the requisite license or
authority from the POEA, recruited seven (7) individuals,
namely, Rebecca M. Talavera, Herminia S. Antones,
Cynthia P. Castillo, Guillermo D. Gumabon Jr., Dionisio M.
de los Reyes, Ramil del Rosario and Ronnie Agpalo for
employment in Japan and charged them placement fees
ranging from P65,000.00 to P160,000.00 each.2
On 10 January 1996 eight (8) Informations were also
filed before the same court each charging Rogelio
Gomez with estafa under par. 2, subpar. (a), Art. 315, of
the Revised Penal Code, docketed as Crim. Cases Nos.
96-52 to 59.3 Analiza G. Santos was added to the list of
complainants as she also alleged that she was
defrauded by the same accused.4 The aforementioned
criminal cases were consolidated under Crim. Cases
Nos. 96-1 and 96-52 to 59.
Ronnie Agpalo, twenty-nine (29) years old, testified that
in September of 1995 his brother-in-law then working in
Japan called him up informing him that a certain Rogelio
Gomez recruited and sent workers there. 5 After talking
to Rogelio on the phone, Ronnie proceeded to the
former's house at No. 912 Allanigue St., Barangay
Village, Sucat, Paraaque, Metro Manila. At his house,
Rogelio promised Ronnie that for a placement fee of
P150,000.00 he could get him a job in Japan either as a
construction worker or a factory worker where he would
receive around 20 to 30 "lapad" per month.6 Ronnie took
the offer and paid P80,00.00 in cash while the balance
of P70,000.00 would be deducted from his first
salary.7 On 18 November 1995, the day of his departure,
Ronnie met with Rogelio and the latter handed him his
passport and plane ticket. Upon receipt Rogelio noticed
at once that his visa and plane ticket were both for
China. But his doubts were assuaged when Rogelio
promised that he would immediately follow him to China
for his visa and ticket for Japan.8
Upon his arrival in China, Ronnie and some of the other
complainants were billeted at the 21st Century Hotel in
Beijing where they were instructed by a certain Pat
Santos to wait for Rogelio's arrival. But Rogelio never
came. When their funds ran low, Ronnie and his
companions were forced to check-in at a cheaper
hotel.9 After a month-long wait without any news from
Rogelio, Ronnie decided to go back to the Philippines.
When became home, he learned that Rogelio was being
held at the NBI detention cell as he was facing charges
of illegal recruitment. On 23 December 1995 he
proceeded to the NBI to demand a refund but Rogelio
refused to repay him.10 Thus, on 27 December 1995
Ronnie filed an affidavit of complaint before the NBI.11
Herminia S. Antones, twenty-nine (29) years old,
testified that she was referred to Rogelio by her friend, a
certain Josie Bulacan.12 On 4 August 1995 Herminia went
to Rogelio's house where he promised to get her a job
as an entertainer for a placement fee of
P100,000.00.13 She agreed, and on 28 September 1995
she paid the fee in cash. On 18 November 1995
Herminia with some other applicants departed for China,
all of them relying on Rogelio's promise that he would
soon follow them there to issue their travel documents
for Japan. But Rogelio never fulfilled his promise. On 9
December 1995 her resources severely depleted, she

decided to come home, and on 11 December 1995 she

executed an affidavit of complaint before the NBI
charging Rogelio with illegal recruitment.14
Rebecca M. Talavera, thirty (30) years old, was another
victim who fell prey to Rogelio's cunning scheme. Like
the others she shelled out P100,000.00 as placement
fee hoping to secure employment abroad.15 Rogelio
promised her that she would leave any time from 18 to
22 November 1995 but he was unable to make her
depart on any of those dates prompting her to file a
complaint before the NBI on 23 November 1995.
However, due to accused's assurances that he would
deploy her soon, she desisted from pursuing the
case.16 Finally, on 7 December 1995 she was about to
leave for Japan when she noticed that the visa and
plane ticket handed to her by Rogelio were both for
China and that her passport bore the name Miriam
Baldos Afable. Suspicious of such dubious travel
arrangements, Rebecca opted to stay but the other
applicants still left. After a few days, she received a call
from one of them telling her that they were stranded in
China. On 10 December 1995 Rebecca revived her
previous complaint before the NBI.17
The other complainants, Guillermo D. Gumabon Jr.,
Dionisio M. de los Reyes, Cynthia P. Castillo and Ramil
del Rosario virtually suffered the same fate. After
learning from different sources that Rogelio deployed
workers to Japan they all sought his home/office at No.
912 Allanigue St., Barangay Village, Sucat, Paraaque.
There they met accused-appellant who promised them
various jobs in Japan for placement fees ranging from
P65,000.00 to P160,000.00. Except for Ramil del Rosario
who flew to China on 7 December 1995, all of the other
complainants left on 18 November 1995. On the day of
their departure Rogelio handed them their travel
documents whereupon they noticed that their visas and
plane tickets were all for China. However, due to the
haste of their upcoming flight and the assurances of the
accused that he would follow them there, they hesitated
to complain and reluctantly left for China. But true to
form, Rogelio never arrived in China for their travel
documents to Japan. One by one the complainants came
home as they used up their remaining pocket money.
Upon arrival, they learned that accused-appellant was
detained at the NBI prompting them to file their
separate affidavits of complaint.1wphi1.nt
NBI Special Investigator III Syrus Aluzan testified that on
23 November 1995 Rebecca M. Talavera filed an
initialpro-forma complaint for illegal recruitment and
estafa against Rogelio Gomez.18 Upon the filing of the
complaint he conducted a verification with the Records
Division of the NBI where he unearthed eight (8)
outstanding warrants of arrest against accused. 19 On 10
December 1995 Rebecca M. Talavera returned to the
NBI station to execute an affidavit of complaint. On the
morning of 13 December 1995 agent Aluzan with
elements of the NBI arrested Rogelio Gomez at his home
in Paraaque.20
Prosecution witness Graciano Ocos, Public Employment
Officer of the POEA, testified that Rogelio was not
licensed to recruit workers for Japan. He also verified the
authenticity of the certification executed by Salome
Mendoza,21 Manager of the POEA Licensing Branch, that
Rogelio Gomez was not authorized to recruit workers for
overseas employment.22
Accused Rogelio Gomez denied that he promised
employment to the complainants as he only worked as
their travel consultant.23 In reality, it was Herminia S.
Antones who pledged jobs in Japan to the complainants.
He claimed that Rebecca M. Talavera and Herminia S.
Antones went to his house seeking a packaged tour to
China for several people.24 Treating the complainants as
regular customers he arranged all their papers to China.
However, two (2) days before their scheduled departure
Herminia S. Antones and Josie Bulacan revealed their
intention of surreptitiously sneaking the complainants
into Japan on their way back from China. Their plan was
to disembark the complainants at the Narita Airport as
chance passengers during the stopover of the flight
from China to Manila.25 Upon learning this, Rogelio made
the complainants execute quitclaims to obtain evidence
that he was only involved as a travel consultant and
that he never participated in Herminia's illegal
Scheme.26However, according to him, when Herminia

failed to procure employment for the complainants they

all colluded with each other to file false charges against
him for illegal recruitment. He claimed that even NBI
agent Syrus Aluzan was a cohort of Herminia as he
attempted to exact P240,000.00 from him for the
immediate dismissal of his case.27 Thus, he was merely
a scapegoat, framed up by Herminia, the complainants
and NBI agent Aluzan.
The trial court did not give credence to Rogelio's
testimony. On 26 September 1997 he was convicted of
illegal recruitment in a large scale for which he was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and
to pay a fine of P100,000.00. He was also found guilty of
eight counts of estafa for which he was sentenced to
suffer a penalty of six (6) years eight (8) months and
twenty-one (21) days to eight (8) years for each count
and to indemnify the following: Guillermo D. Gumabon
Jr. P150,000.00, Rebecca M. Talavera P100,000.00,
Herminia S. Antones P100,000.00, Ramil del Rosario
P150,000.00, Cynthia P. Castillo P160,000.00,
Ronnie Agpalo P80,000.00, Dionisio M. de los Reyes
P65,000.00 and Analiza G. Santos P150,000.00,
less whatever amounts Rogelio incurred in securing
their passports/visas, transportation and miscellaneous
expenses.28
Rogelio Gomez now appeals the Decision of the RTC
arguing that (a) he was unlawfully arrested by the NBI
agents headed by NBI Special Investigator III Syrus
Aluzan; (b) the trial court erred in denying his
application for bail after his arraignment; and, (c) the
trial court erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.29
Anent the first issue, we have consistently ruled that
any objection to the warrant of arrest or the procedure
in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused must be made before he enters
his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed
waived.30 Thus, if he fails to move for the quashing of
the information against him before his arraignment he
may be estopped from assailing the illegality of his
arrest.31 Records show that accused-appellant was
arraigned on 31 January 1996 where he entered a plea
of not guilty.32 Prior to such date he did not file any
motion to quash the Information. Hence, it is now too
late for him to question the legality of his arrest.
Regarding the issue of bail, accused-appellant argues
that although his counsel was given the chance to crossexamine the prosecution witnesses at the bail hearings,
he was not given the opportunity to submit rebuttal
evidence to disprove that the evidence of his guilt was
strong. In such cases, where the prosecution was not
given the chance to present evidence to prove that the
guilt of the accused was strong, we held that the proper
remedy was for him to file a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65.33 This same principle must apply to cases
where the defense was not accorded a chance to
present any rebuttal evidence. When the trial court
denied his application for bail accused-appellant should
have filed a petition for certiorari before the appellate
court.34 Hence, it is also too late for him to question the
trial court's decision of denying his application for bail.
Besides, the conviction of accused-appellant
undoubtedly proves that the evidence of guilt against
him was strong.35
The more significant issue at hand is whether the
culpability of accused-appellant for illegal recruitment in
large scale and estafa has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
Under the Labor Code, there are three (3) elements
which constitute illegal recruitment in large scale. First,
the accused undertakes any recruitment activity defined
under Art. 13, par. (b), or any practice enumerated
under Art. 34 of the Labor Code; second, the accused
does not comply with the guidelines issued by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, particularly with
respect to the securing of a license or authority to
recruit and deploy workers, either locally or overseas;
and third, the accused commits the same against three
(3) or more persons, individually or as a group.36
Accused-appellant argues that the prosecution failed to
establish the first element since he never actively

enticed the applicants and neither did he advertise

himself as a recruiter. On the contrary, the complainants
were the ones who voluntarily went to him to procure
his services as a travel agent. Thus, he could not in any
way be considered as a recruiter.
On several occasions, this Court has held that there is
illegal recruitment when one purports to have the ability
to send a worker abroad although without the authority
or license to do so. He may merely give such an
impression in order to induce an applicant to tender
payment for fees.37 Although accused-appellant initially
might not have done anything to encourage individuals
to apply to him for employment abroad, such fact does
not in any way blot out his liability for illegal
recruitment. Recruitment is a legal term; its meaning
must be understood in the light of what the law
contemplates and not of common parlance.38 Thus, even
if Rogelio did not purposely seek out the complainants
to apply as workers in Japan, his subsequent false
misrepresentations that he had the capacity to procure
employment for them, without authority from the POEA,
made him liable for illegal recruitment.
Accused-appellant repeatedly stresses that the receipts
he issued to the complainants which contained the
words "in payment for travel services," prove that they
were well aware of the fact that he only worked as their
travel agent. Such contention is too shallow to exculpate
him from liability. It may be true that, as pointed out by
accused-appellant, all the complainants completely
understood the meaning of "in payment for travel
services." But it must be remembered that these people
were desperate for employment abroad. They would
blindly sign any document just to attain their dream of
securing a job in Japan.
Furthermore, such words written on the receipts cannot
undermine the testimony of the complainants that they
paid good money to accused-appellant in exchange for
his promise of employment overseas. As a matter of
fact, even the absence of receipts cannot defeat a
criminal prosecution for illegal recruitment.39 As long as
the witnesses can positively show through their
respective testimonies that the accused is the one
involved in prohibited recruitment, he may be convicted
of the offense despite the absence of receipts. 40
Accused-appellant also contends that the proforma quitclaims executed by the complainants
establish his innocence and thus exempts him from
culpability. Contrary to his argument we believe that the
existence of quitclaims only strengthens the
complainants' allegations. If accused-appellant was
merely a travel agent, then why would he require his
clients to sign quitclaims? Obviously, these documents
were executed to avoid any liability arising from his
fraudulent design.
Although it is true that quitclaims and waivers when
freely agreed upon are generally recognized, the law will
not hesitate to step in and annul these transactions if it
can be seen that they were obtained under duress.41 A
perusal of the quitclaims shows that they were signed
on the day the complainants departed for
China.42Accused-appellant made them sign the
documents amidst a setting filled with anxiety,
confusion and haste wherein the complainants would do
just about anything to be able to leave the Philippines.
Surely, there can be no other conclusion than that
accused-appellant carefully timed his move to prod
complainants into signing the quitclaims against their
better judgment.
We therefore see no compelling reason to overturn the
factual findings of the court a quo. Factual findings of
trial courts on credibility of witnesses deserve a high
degree of respect.43 Thus, unless there is a strong and
valid reason for overturning the factual assessment by
the trial court, this Court will not disturb its findings on
appeal.44
As for the conviction of accused-appellant for estafa on
eight (8) counts, we have ruled that the conviction of an
accused for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code will
not preclude punishment under the Revised Penal
Code.45 The elements of estafa under Art. 315, par. 2,
subpar. (a), of the Revised Penal Code are: (a) the

accused has defrauded another by abuse of confidence

or by means of deceit and (b) damage by pecuniary
estimation is caused to the offended party or third
person.46 Clearly it can be seen that both elements were
satisfied as accused-appellant, through deceit and
abuse of confidence, obtained money from the
complainants without fulfilling his promise of securing
employment for them in Japan.
However, we disagree that accused-appellant should be
convicted of eight (8) counts of estafa since the
allegations in the Information in behalf of Analiza Santos
were not adequately established. She was never
presented to testify and neither was there any
documentary evidence to prove that she was one of the
victims duped by accused-appellant. Thus, accusedappellant should be convicted of only seven (7) counts
of estafa.
In Crim. Cases Nos. 96-52 and 96-55, the amount
defrauded of each complainant was P150,000.00. In
consonance with Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, the
imposable penalty is prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, the range of which is four (4) years two (2)
months and one (1) day to five (5) years five (5) months
and ten (10) days as minimum while the medium period
is from five (5) years five (5) months and eleven (11)
days to six (6) years eight (8) months and (20) twenty
days, and the maximum is six (6) years eight (8) months
and twenty (21) days to eight (8) years. Since the
amount of P150,000.00 was defrauded in each case, the
maximum penalty should be taken from the maximum
period of the penalty prescribed, plus one (1) year for
every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 which in
these two (2) cases is equivalent to twelve (12)
additional years. Hence the maximum imposable
penalty should be eighteen (18) years eight (8) months
and twenty one (21) days to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal maximum. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law and the principle in People
v. Saley,47 the minimum penalty shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower in degree to that
prescribed in the Code, i.e., prision
correccional minimum to prision correcional medium in
any of its periods. Prision correccional minimum
to prision correccional medium ranges from (6) months
and one (1) day, to four (4) years and two (2) months.
Thus the maximum imposable penalty for Crim. Cases
Nos. 96-52 and 96-55 is from eighteen (18) years eight
(8) months and twenty-one (21) days to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporalwhile the minimum
imposable penalty is from six (6) months and one (1)
day to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional.
The same principle would apply to Crim. Cases Nos. 9653 and 96-54, where the amount defrauded in each
case was P100,000.00. Thus, the maximum range of the
imposable penalty is from thirteen (13) years eight (8)
months and twenty-one (21) days to fifteen (15) years
of reclusion temporal, while the minimum imposable
penalty is fromprision correccional minimum to prision
correcional medium.
In Crim. Case No. 96-56 where the amount defrauded
was P160,000.00, the range of the maximum imposable
penalty is from nineteen (19) years eight (8) months
and twenty-one (21) days to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal while the minimum imposable
penalty is from prision correccional minimum to prision
correccionalmedium.
In Crim. Case No. 96-57 involving the amount of
P80,000.00, the range of the maximum imposable
penalty is from eleven (11) years (8) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor to thirteen (13)
years of reclusion temporal while the minimum
imposable penalty is from prision correccional minimum
to prision correccionalmedium.
And finally, in Crim. Case No. 96-58 where the amount
involved is P65,000.00, the range of the maximum
imposable penalty is from ten (10) years eight (8)
months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor to
twelve (12) years of reclusion temporal while the
minimum imposable penalty is from prision
correccional minimum to prision correccional medium.

The trial court erred in deducting from the indemnities

granted the complainants the amounts accusedappellant reportedly spent in procuring their passports,
Chinese visas, plane tickets and other miscellaneous
expenses. Perhaps the lower court thought that the
complainants would be unjustly enriched if no
deductions were made since after all they were able to
get their visas and travel to China through the services
performed by accused-appellant. However, it is also
evident that the complainants had no intention of
spending their hard-earned money for a sidetrip to
China and incur unnecessary travel expenses. Their stay
in Beijing only caused deep regret and frustration. They
should therefore be fully reimbursed for whatever
amounts they paid to accused-appellant because of his
misrepresentations and false promises.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the trial court
insofar as it found accused-appellant Rogelio Gomez y
Reyes a.k.a. Philip Roger Lacson or Roger Eleazar
Gomez guilty of Illegal Recruitment in a Large Scale for
which he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00 is
AFFIRMED. It is however MODIFIED in that accusedappellant is found GUILTY of only seven (7) counts of
estafa, not eight (8), under par. 2, subpar. (a), Art. 315
of the Revised Penal Code and is accordingly sentenced
to suffer the following penalties:
In Crim. Cases Nos. 96-52 and 96-55 involving the
amount of P150,000.00, accused-appellant is sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate prison term of four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional medium as
minimum to eighteen (18) years eight (8) months and
twenty one (21) days of reclusion temporal maximum as
maximum.
In Crim. Cases Nos. 96-53 and 54 involving the amount
of P100,000.00, accused-appellant is sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional medium as
minimum to thirteen (13) years eight (8) months and
twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal minimum as
maximum.
In Crim. Case No. 96-56 involving the amount of
P160,000.00, accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional medium as minimum
to nineteen (19) years eight (8) months and twenty-one
(21) days of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum.
In Crim. Case No 96-57 involving the amount of
P80,000.00, accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional medium as minimum to
eleven (11) years (8) months and twenty-one (21) days
of prision mayor maximum as maximum.
And finally, in Crim. Case No. 96-58 involving the
amount of P65,000.00, accused-appellant is sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional medium as
minimum to ten (10) years eight (8) months and twentyone (21) days of prision mayor maximum as maximum.
Accused-appellant is further ordered to pay the
complaining witnesses the following amounts: Guillermo
D. Gumabon Jr. P150,000.00, Rebecca M. Talavera
P100,000.00, Herminia S. Antones P100,000.00,
Ramil del Rosario P150,000.00, Cynthia P. Castillo
P160,000.00, Ronnie Agpalo P80,000.00, and Dionisio
M. de los Reyes P65,000.00 without any deductions
whatsoever. Costs against accusedappellant.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1473

February 16, 2000

JESSICA GOODMAN, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE LORETO D. DE LA VICTORIA, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 06, Cebu
City,respondent.
RESOLUTION
PARDO, J.:
What is before the Court is a petition 1 for the dismissal
of Judge Loreto D. de la Victoria, presiding judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 06, Cebu City, for abuse of
authority, oppressive conduct and gross ignorance of
the law in relation to his handling of the application for
bail of Moalboal Mayor Abrenica and Adriano
Cabantugan in Special Proceedings No. 6204-CEB
entitled "In the Matter of the Application for Bail of
Mayor Marcelo Abrenica and Adriano Cabantugan."
On November 8, 1996, assassins gunned down Jerome
Goodman, an American national, and struck him with a
blunt instrument in Moalboal, Cebu. Before he died, he
identified his assailants as Marcelo Abrenica, Mayor of
Moalboal, and Mario Dumogho, bodyguard of the mayor.
On November 9, 1996, Mayor Abrenica and Adriano
Cabantugan presented themselves to the police
authorities. Mario Dumogho surrendered himself later.
On November 11, 1996, the Criminal Investigation
Command (CIC), after securing the sworn statements of
witnesses to the killing, filed with the Office- of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu the charge sheet for
murder against Mayor Abrenica, Adriano Cabantugan
and Mario Dumogho. A supplemental charge sheet was
later filed by the CIC for the inclusion of Tani Abrenica
and Ikay Gabales in the murder charge. Both Tany
Abrenica and Ikay Gabales are still at large.
Also, on November 11, 1996, Mayor Abrenica and
Cabantugan, assisted by their counsel, filed with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu a "Request
for Preliminary Investigation and Waiver of Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code." They agreed to remain under
police custody pending completion of the preliminary
investigation. The preliminary investigation was set for
November 18, 1996.1wphi1.nt
On November 15, 1996, Mayor Abrenica and coaccused, Adriano Cabantugan, filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Cebu City, an application for bail. 2 The
petition was raffled to two judges in succession, as one
after another voluntarily inhibited themselves in view of
their close association and friendship with the accused
mayor.
The case was re-raffled and assigned to respondent
Judge Loreto D. de la Victoria. On November 20, 1996,
respondent set the petition for bail for hearing on
November 25, 1996, and sent notices to the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman, counsel for the accused and
counsel of private complainant, Jessica Goodman.
However, on the day of the hearing, respondent did not
allow complainant's counsel, Atty. Cornelio Mercado, to
be heard, stating that counsel was "without standing"
before the court because he failed to secure the
authority of the public prosecutor to appear at the
hearing. After a brief inquiry as to the non-appearance
of the public prosecutor, the date when subpoena was
received by accused or counsel, and the fact that the
Office of the Ombudsman was conducting a preliminary
investigation, respondent granted the application for
bail and fixed bail for the temporary liberty of accused
mayor at sixty thousand pesos (P60,000.00).
Respondent likewise reiterated that the notice sent to
complainant's counsel did not signify that he had been
recognized by the court as possessing legal standing to
appear without authority of the public prosecutor.
Hence, this complaint.
Complainant alleged that respondent's uncommon bias
and patent abuse of authority to strip her counsel of any
standing in court deprived her of her day in court.
Complainant also stated that respondent exhibited

oppressive conduct in requiring the parties to attend the

hearing and thereafter embarrassed her and counsel by
declaring them to be without any standing in court.
Furthermore, respondent displayed ignorance of the law
for failing to comply with the provisions of the Rules of
Court, particularly those pertaining to denial or grant of
bail, considering the seriousness of the offense charged
against the accused.
In his Comment dated August 12, 1997,3 respondent
Judge denied the charges of abuse of authority and
oppressive conduct, alleging that the notice sent to
complainant's counsel to attend the hearing of the
petition for bail did not necessarily confer upon said
parties the legal standing to intervene in the
proceedings. He rationalized his position as follows:
. . . to allow the private complainant and/or her
counsel to intervene and entertain their
opposition which would then entail the
presentation of evidence by the private
complainant, the result would be to convert
this kind of proceeding into one of preliminary
investigation. I firmly believe that that would
then be anomalous and irregular as this Court
which has already been disenfranchised to
conduct a preliminary investigation under the
new rules would then be encroaching and
usurping upon the functions and duties of the
public prosecutor (the Ombudsman), and preempting the outcome of the investigation of
the latter.4
Respondent justified his decision to grant bail by citing
the failure of the Ombudsman or any of his prosecutors
to appear at the hearing for bail to inform the court of
any finding of strong evidence of guilt or that murder
had been committed, and in consonance with the
presumption of innocence.
Respondent judge maintained that his action found
support in the provisions of the Rules of Court,
particularly Section 7, paragraph 2, Rule 112, which
provides:
However, before the filing of such complaint or
information, the person arrested may ask for a
preliminary investigation by a proper officer in
accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a
waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the
assistance of a lawyer and in case of nonavailability of a lawyer, a responsible person of
his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he
may apply for bail as provided in the
corresponding rule and the investigation must
be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its
inception.
and Section 17 (c) of the Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 12-94, amending Rule 114 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, which provides:
Any person in custody who is not yet charged
in court may apply for bail with any court in the
province, city or municipality where he is held.
He asked this Court to reject the accusation of gross
ignorance of the law.
Respondent also alleged that the prosecution filed a
comment on the petition for bail, but failed to attend the
hearing. He attached a copy of the comment filed by the
graft investigation officer, Office of the Ombudsman,
Visayas, which stated as follows:
1) Mayor Marcelo Abrenica, et al. are charged
of the crime of Murder which carries a penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua to Death;
2) This being so, this crime is non-bailable;
3) At this stage of the proceedings, wherein
undersigned is still conducting the preliminary
investigation of this case, undersigned cannot

recommend bail for the temporary liberty of

the accused;
4) We leave this matter to the sound discretion
of the Honorable Court.

application for bail. There were no questions

propounded by respondent verifying the strength of the
prosecution's evidence. In fact, the prosecution was not
represented during the hearing. Thus, respondent judge
failed to comply substantially with the requirement of a
hearing in bail applications.

Cebu City, Philippines, 22 November 1996.

Respondent judge, therefore, must be held liable for

serious misconduct. However, on June 9, 1999,
respondent judge applied for optional retirement, which
the Court has approved.15 We may no longer impose the
Respectfully submitted:
appropriate penalty that could be dismissal from
office.16

However, complainant attached to her petition the order

issued by the Office of the Ombudsman dated
November 25, 1996, stating in part, to wit:
It is the undersigned investigator's assessment
that the evidence on record of the guilt of the
respondent, Marcelo Abrenica, is strong.6
In its Memorandum dated May 31, 1999, the Office of
the Court Administrator, through Deputy Court
Administrator Bernardo T. Ponferrada, recommended
that respondent judge be ordered to pay a fine of
P20,000.00 with stern warning that the commission of a
similar offense in the future will be dealt with more
severely.7
We find merit in this petition.
The respondent judge was wrong in refusing to hear
complainant's counsel at the hearing of the application
for bail.
There is no prohibition for counsel of complainant to
appear before the court during the hearing for
admission to bail of an accused. There is no need of any
special authority from the public prosecutor to do so.
Moreover, respondent is liable for precipitate haste in
granting bail.
The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended,
mandates that no person charged with a capital offense,
or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be
admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.8
The grant of bail to an accused charged with a capital
offense such as murder, which carries with it the penalty
ofreclusion perpetua to death, is discretionary, not a
matter of right.9 Thus, the judge must conduct a hearing
to determine whether evidence of guilt is strong.10
After hearing, the court's order granting or denying bail
must summarize the evidence for he prosecution. 11 On
the basis thereof, the judge shall formulate his own
conclusion as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is
strong. Otherwise, the order granting or denying the
application for bail may be arbitrary and hence,
invalid.12
The judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in
cases where the prosecution chooses to just file a
comment or leave the application for bail to the
discretion of the court.13 Irrespective of his opinion that
the evidence of guilt against the accused is not strong,
the law and settled jurisprudence require that an actual
hearing be conducted before bail may be granted.
The brief inquiry conducted by respondent judge before
granting bail did not constitute the hearing required by
law, for such proceeding "did not elicit evidence from
the prosecution to guide respondent in the proper
determination of the petition." 14 Respondent judge could
not have intelligently assessed the weight of the
evidence against accused before granting the

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Loreto D.

dela Victoria, Regional Trial Court, Branch 06, Cebu City,
guilty of serious misconduct in office and hereby
imposes upon him a FINE of five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00), to be deducted from the amount withheld
from his retirement benefits.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 151005

June 8, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and Heirs of

ESTEBAN LIM JR., petitioners,
vs.
The Honorable PRESIDING JUDGE of the REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT of MUNTINLUPA CITY (Branch 276)
and RICARDO TOBIAS, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
An order granting bail in a capital offense must contain
a summary showing the strength or the weakness of the
prosecution evidence, as well as the trial judges
assessment thereof. Absent such summary and
assessment, the order would not stand appellate
scrutiny and must be struck down.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari 1 under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, seeking to annul the September 26,
2001 Order,2 the September 27, 2001 Order of
Release,3 and the November 7, 2001 Order4 issued by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City (Branch
276) in Criminal Case No. 1605. The assailed September
26, 2001 Order reads as follows:
"This is a PETITION FOR BAIL.
"After the Court evaluated the evidence and
the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, it
was shown that the victim was gunned down
admittedly by Accused during a quarrel, or
immediately soon after, with the quarrel still
continuing.
"The Petition for Bail is therefore granted and
the same is set at FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00).
"The records show that Accused [Ricardo
Tobias] was sentenced for possession of a low
powered firearm for which he was meted a
penalty of life imprisonment. However, with the
amendment of the law on Illegal Possession of
Firearms, this Court granted Accused a
reduction of the penalty in a Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus to only 6 years imprisonment
because [a] 9MM caliber firearm is considered
a low caliber firearm, as provided by RA 8294.
Accused has been in jail for eight (8) years,
eleven (11) months and fifteen (15) days

already and has completed the service of his

sentence. He may now post bail for this
pending offense, in light of the evidence
adduced by the [p]rosecution."5
The assailed September 27, 2001 Order directed the
release from detention of herein private respondent. On
the other hand, the November 7, 2001 Order denied the
prosecutions Motion for Reconsideration of the two
earlier rulings.
The Facts
This case is intimately connected with the Decision of
this Court in GR No. 114185 penned by then Justice,
now Chief Justice, Hilario G. Davide Jr. In that earlier
proceeding before the RTC of Santiago, Isabela (Branch
21), herein private respondent was charged on January
10, 1991, with "qualified illegal possession of firearm
used in murder." The accusatory portion of the
Information was worded as follows:
"That on or about the 5th day of October, 1990, in the
[M]unicipality of Santiago, [P]rovince of Isabela,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, not being allowed or authorized
by law to keep, possess and carry firearms, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession and under his control and custody one (1)
Browning pistol, Caliber 9MM with Serial No. RPT
3221943 without first having obtained the necessary
permit and/or license therefor and on the occasion of
such possession, the said accused, with evident
premeditation and treachery, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill
suddenly and unexpectedly and without giving him
chance to defend himself, assault, attack and shoot with
the said illegally possessed firearm one Esteban Lim, Jr.
alias Jojo, inflicting upon him gunshot wounds on the
different parts of his body which directly caused his
death due to severe hemorrhage." 6

Decree (PD) No. 1866, for violation of which he had

been convicted earlier. Relying upon RA 8294, private
respondent filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus before the
RTC of Muntinlupa City. 10
On September 21, 2000, the trial court issued an Order
declaring private respondents Petition moot and
academic on the ground that he was being validly
detained for murder -- a non-bailable offense -- and no
longer for illegal possession of firearms. Nonetheless, on
the basis of the retroactive effect of the provisions of RA
8294 that were beneficial to the accused, the RTC
reduced the penalty for illegal possession of firearms
from reclusion perpetua to prisin correccionl. Having
already served the reduced penalty, he should have
been freed from detention were it not for the murder
charge.
On January 26, 2001, the murder trial commenced.
On August 9, 2001, private respondent filed a Petition
for Bail on the ground that evident premeditation had
not been proven. Moreover, no ballistic report was
submitted by the prosecution. Despite opposition to the
Petition, the trial court granted bail at P50,000 on
September 26, 2001.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court opined that private respondent had
already completed the service of his sentence in the
previous case for illegal possession of a low-powered
firearm. After evaluating the evidence and the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses in the pending
murder case, it ruled that he could post bail therein.
Thus, it ordered his release11 from custody after he had
posted the required bail bond12 through the Wellington
Insurance Company, Inc.13
Hence, this Petition.14

On January 11, 1994, the RTC rendered its Decision

finding private respondent guilty as charged and
sentencing him to life imprisonment.7
On appeal, this Court affirmed on January 30, 1997, the
lower courts Decision, with modifications consisting
mainly of a change in the penalty from life
imprisonment to reclusin perpetua. It also directed the
provincial prosecutor of Isabela to institute a criminal
action for murder against private respondent.
Without the knowledge of this Court, it turned out that
as early as October 15, 1993, private respondent had
already been charged with murder before the RTC of
Santiago, Isabela.8 We quote the Information therein as
follows:
"The undersigned Third Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Isabela accuses [RICARDO]
TOBIAS @ DING TOBIAS of the crime of
MURDER defined and penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as
follows:
That on or about October 5, 1990, in
the [M]unicipality of Santiago,
[P]rovince of Isabela, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill, armed with
Browning Pistol Cal. .9MM bearing No.
RPT-3221943, through treachery, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sho[o]t Esteban Lim, Jr.,
with the use of said firearm inflicting
upon the said Esteban Lim, Jr., several
gunshot wounds which directly
cause[d] his death."

Issues
Petitioners aver that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it granted bail to the accused.15 On the other
hand, private respondent counters that he cannot be
tried anew for a crime for which he has already been
convicted.16
Simply stated, the issues are as follows: first, whether
bail was validly granted; and second, whether the
accused may still be prosecuted for a crime for which he
has already been convicted.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Propriety of Bail
As a general rule, a person "in custody shall, before final
conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right." 17 Bail
is a security given for the release of a person under
custody of the law, as a guarantee for his or her
appearance before any court as required under
specified conditions.18 The right to bail flows from the
presumption of innocence.19 In the present case, private
respondent is undergoing trial for murder. Is he entitled
to bail?

He was arraigned, however, only on November 23,

1998.9

His case falls within the exception to the aforesaid

general rule on bail: When evidence of guilt is strong, a
person shall not be admitted to bail20 if charged with a
capital offense; or with an offense that -- under the law
-- is punishable with reclusion perpetua at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application for bail. 21

In the meantime, Republic Act (RA) No. 8294 was

approved on June 6, 1997. It amended Presidential

At the time private respondent allegedly committed the

felony in 1990, "[m]urder x x x was a crime punishable

byreclusion perpetua."22 With the passage of RA 7659,

murder is now punishable with reclusion perpetua to
death. Consequently, depending on the strength of the
evidence of the prosecution, bail is merely discretionary,
not a matter of right. In People v. Hon. Cabral23 the
Court explained:
"The grant or denial of an application for bail is,
therefore, dependent on whether the evidence
of guilt is strong which the lower court should
determine in a hearing called for the purpose.
The determination of whether the evidence of
guilt is strong, in this regard, is a matter of
judicial discretion. While the lower court would
never be deprived of its mandated prerogative
to exercise judicial discretion, this Court would
unhesitatingly reverse the trial court's findings
if found to be laced with grave abuse of
discretion.
Judicial discretion in granting bail may indeed be
exercised only after the evidence of guilt is submitted to
the court during the bail hearing.24 In the present case,
no separate bail hearing was conducted. The Petition for
Bail was filed on August 9, 2001. After the prosecution
filed its Opposition, private respondent submitted a
Reply. After the former had presented all its witnesses in
the regular course of trial, but before it had rested its
case, the Petition for Bail was deemed submitted for
resolution. On the same day, the assailed September
26, 2001 Order was issued.
On its face, the one-page Order demonstrates grave
abuse of discretion. "We have repeatedly stressed that
the order granting or refusing the bail must contain a
summary of the evidence presented by the
prosecution."25 The Court, as it had done many times,
patiently discussed the reasons for this requirement,
thus:
"There are two corollary reasons for the
summary. First, the summary of the evidence in
the order is an extension of the hearing proper,
thus, a part of procedural due process wherein
the evidence presented during the prior
hearing is formally recognized as having been
presented and most importantly, considered.
The failure to include every piece of evidence
in the summary presented by the prosecution
in their favor during the prior hearing would be
tantamount to not giving them the opportunity
to be heard in said hearing, for the inference
would be that they were not considered at all in
weighing the evidence of guilt. Such would be
a denial of due process, for due process means
not only giving every contending party the
opportunity to be heard but also for the Court
to consider every piece of evidence presented
in their favor. Second, the summary of the
evidence in the order is the basis for the
judge's exercising his judicial discretion. Only
after weighing the pieces of evidence as
contained in the summary will the judge
formulate his own conclusion as to whether the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong
based on his discretion. x x x.
"Based on the above-stated reasons, the
summary should necessarily be a complete
compilation or restatement of all the pieces of
evidence presented during the hearing
proper."26
The assailed September 26, 2001 Order was sorely
defective in both form and substance. It had no
summary of the evidence, but merely a curt onesentence description of the evidence for the
prosecution. Neither did the Order have a conclusion on
whether the evidence of guilt was strong. Without such
conclusion, there was no basis for granting bail. Thus,
the Order cannot be sustained, allowed to stand, or
given any semblance of validity. 27 It was patently a
product of whim, caprice, and outright
arbitrariness.28 For the same reasons, we cannot also
sustain the September 27, 2001 and the November 7,
2001 Orders, which are rooted in the invalid September
26, 2001 Order.

The arbitrariness of the trial judge is compounded by

her failure to take into account this Courts Decision in
GR No. 114185, which found the presence of treachery
and directed the filing of an information for murder, as
follows:
"Treachery is present in this case, as there was
a sudden attack against an unarmed victim.
That the attack was preceded by a scuffle, as
pointed out by the accused, is of no moment,
since treachery may still be appreciated even
when the victim was forewarned of danger to
his person. What is decisive is that the
execution of the attack made it impossible for
the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. In
the case at bench, the scuffle between Jojo Lim
and the accused had already ended; Jojo Lim
was chasing Giron, his attention was turned
towards the latter, and his back was against
the accused. Thus, the accuseds shots were a
complete surprise to Jojo Lim, and he could
neither defend himself nor retaliate against the
assault.
xxx

xxx

xxx

"WHEREFORE, x x x
"The Provincial Prosecutor for Isabela is hereby
directed to institute against the accused a
criminal action for the crime of murder, if none
has yet been made; x x x." 29
Aside from being unrebutted by the accused, the abovequoted ruling is reinforced by the clear and convincing
proof adduced by the prosecution through Eyewitnesses
Pacita Recto and Clarita Lim, who both affirmed that
private respondent had killed Esteban "Jojo" Lim Jr.
Clearly then, the evidence of private respondents guilt
was strong; hence, bail should not have been allowed.
Private respondent makes a mountain out of the
absence of a ballistic report, but thereby fails to make
even a molehill of an argument. The presentation of
such a report would have been a superfluity in the
determination of whether the evidence of guilt was
strong. Furthermore, contrary to his contention, there is
absolutely no need to adduce evidence to prove evident
premeditation. Since this circumstance was not alleged
in the Information, any offer of proof thereof would
neither qualify nor aggravate the offense under the
present Rules of Procedure.30
Second Issue:
Trial Valid for Another Crime
The crime for which private respondent was convicted
by the RTC was committed on October 5, 1990. The
applicable law at the time was PD 1866,31 which
prescribed the death penalty if homicide or murder was
committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm. The
death penalty was, however, suspended by the 1987
Constitution.32Thus, the penalty next lower in degree
-- reclusin perpetua33 -- was imposed by this Court in
GR No. 114185, when it affirmed private respondents
conviction for violation of Section 1 of PD 1866. 34
Under previous rulings of this Court, "one who kills
another with the use of an unlicensed firearm commits
two separate offenses of (1) x x x murder under the
[Revised Penal Code], and (2) aggravated illegal
possession of firearm under the [second] paragraph of
Section 1 of [PD] 1866 x x x."35 In the present case, the
filing of an Information for murder, after conviction for
violation of Section 1 of PD 1866 -- a special law -- was
in order. There was no violation of the constitutional rule
proscribing double jeopardy. 36
When RA 8294 took effect on July 6, 199737 -- nearly six
months after the affirmation of private respondents
conviction under PD 1866 -- the use of an unlicensed
firearm was considered merely an aggravating
circumstance,38 if murder or homicide or any other
crime was committed with it.39 Hence, the use of an
unlicensed firearm in killing a person "may no longer be

the source of a separate conviction for the crime of

illegal possession of a deadly weapon."40 Only one
felony may be charged -- murder in this instance. 41
Private respondent was convicted of qualified illegal
possession of firearms used in murder under PD 1866,
not of murder under the Revised Penal Code. To repeat,
under RA 8294, the use of an unlicensed firearm is a
mere aggravating circumstance in a charge for murder.
In the prosecution thereof, the illegal possession of
firearms has been explicitly decriminalized.42 Nullum
crimen, nulla poena sine lege.43
True, private respondent has been convicted of illegal
possession of firearm. But his sentence has been
effectively cancelled when the trial court reduced the
penalty therefor.44 Hence, he was effectively given the
benefit of the new law which decriminalized his offense.
However, private respondent may still be prosecuted for
murder -- a crime that has not been decriminalized and
is completely different from that for which he was
convicted earlier. Evidently, the requisites 45 of double
jeopardy, which are (1) a first jeopardy must have
attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must
have terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for
the same offense as that in the first, are not present
here.
In the interest of substantial justice and a speedy
disposition of this case, we now cancel his bail bond and
direct the proper authorities to effect his arrest as soon
as possible, so that he may continue to stand trial for
the crime charged.46
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The challenged
Orders are ANNULLED, and the bail bond of private
respondent is CANCELLED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the director of
the National Bureau of Investigation and the directorgeneral of the Philippine National Police. Both are
hereby DIRECTED to cause the immediate arrest of
Ricardo Tobias and to inform this Court of their
compliance within ten (10) days from notice. The trial
judge is likewiseDIRECTED to issue such other and
further orders to take the accused into custody and to
hasten the proceedings in the criminal prosecution for
murder. This Decision shall be immediately executory.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 88531 June 18, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and MARIANO
CORVERA, JR., petitioners,
vs.
TRANQUILINO CALO, JR., BELLARMINO ALLOCOD
and HON. NICOLAS LAPEA, JR., HON. EMETERIO
C. CUI and HON. JUSTO P. TORRES, JR., all Justices
of the Court of Appeals, Special Sixth
Division,respondents.

BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for a
restraining order seeking to set aside the decision,
dated May 16, 1989 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 17142, affirming the order, dated February 24, 1989
of respondent Judge Jose C. Adao issued in Criminal
Case No. 3464, entitled People vs. Pablo Macapas, Atty.
Tranquilino Calo, Jr. and Bellarmino Allocod for murder,
granting bail to accused-private respondents therein.
The antecedent facts are as follows:

On March 10, 1988, Mariano Corvera, Sr. (father of

private petitioner), was gunned down inside the
courtroom of the RTC of Butuan City, Br. II. The following
day, a complaint was filed before the Office of the City
Fiscal of Butuan City, charging the alleged assailant,
Pablo Macapas (at large), the herein private respondents
and two (2) unidentified persons, with murder.
Investigating City Fiscal Mariano Balansag found
a prima facie case and prepared the corresponding
Information for Murder against private respondents as
accused. Private respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration. On August 19, 1988, Fiscal Mariano
Balansag was gunned down near his residence as he
was about to report to his office. An information for
murder was eventually filed in connection with the
death of Mariano Corvera, Sr. on November 29, 1988,
before the Regional Trial Court, Butuan City, Branch IV,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 3464 recommending "no
bail" for the accused-respondents. On December 6,
1988, private petitioner moved for a re-raffle of the
case. On December 8, 1988, Executive Judge Rosarito
Dabalos issued an order directing a re-raffle, and at the
same time, fixing the amount of bail for private
respondents at P50,000.00 each.
On December 19, 1988, private petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari with prayer for a restraining order
in the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 16383, assailing the. December 8, 1988 order of
Judge Dabalos granting bail to the accused without
hearing. In a resolution dated January 31, 1989, the
Court of Appeals set aside the assailed order and
directed the trial court: "(a) to immediately issue and
serve new warrants of arrest against private
respondents as wen as the accused at-large Pablo
Macapas; (b) to determine without delay by conducting
the requisite hearing whether the evidence of guilt is
strong; and thereafter (e) to resolve whether or not bail
should be granted, and in the affirmative, to fix the
same in accordance with law."
On remand of the case, Judge Dabalos inhibited himself
from hearing the said case and referred it to Judge Jose
C. Adao. Marathon hearings were held on February 10,
14 and 15, 1989 to determine whether the evidence of
guilt was strong. On February 24, 1989, Judge Adao
issued an order, pertinent portions of which read:
The court honestly believes that the
quantum of evidence presented
during the summary hearing is not yet
sufficient to deny bail as to the
accused Tranquilino Calo, Jr. and
Bellarmino Allocod. The accused Pablo
Macapas should not be granted bail
since the evidence so far presented
points to him as the killer.
In view of the foregoing, pursuant to
the bail bond guidelines as provided
for in Sec. 6 of Rule 114 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended, the Court fixes the amount
of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) as bail for the
provisional liberty of the accused
Tranquilino Calo, Jr., and Sixty
Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) as bail
for the provisional liberty of the
accused Bellarmino Allocod.
SO ORDERED.
On March 8, 1989, private petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari with restraining order before this Court, Which
was docketed as G.R. No. 87194, seeking to annul the
February 24, 1989 order of Judge Adao granting bail to
accused-respondents. In a resolution dated March 15,
1989, this Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining Judge Adao from enforcing the questioned
order and to recommit private respondents to jail if they
have already been discharged. The Court further
referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (where it
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 17142).
On May 16, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision dismissing the petition (CA-G.R. SP No. 17142).

Hence, this petition for certiorari with prayer for a

restraining order.
On July 6, 1989, this Court issued a temporary
restraining order directing public respondents to cease
and desist from enforcing or from allowing further
enforcement of the May 16, 1989 decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 17142, and cancelling the order dated February 24,
1989 of Judge Adao.
Under date of August 9, 1989, private respondents filed
a Motion for Bail, but it was denied in the resolution
dated October 5, 1989.
The grounds relied upon in support of the petition are:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
GRAVELY AND/OR COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING
THE PETITION ON THE GROUND THAT
THE PETITIONER HAS NO CAPACITY TO
BRING THE PETITION WITHOUT THE
PRIOR IMPRIMATUR OF THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
GRAVELY AND/OR COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING
THAT THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL JUDGE
GRANTING BAIL TO THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS IS NOT TAINTED WITH
SERIOUS ARBITRARINESS.
Corollary to the first ground, private petitioner contends
that as stated in the petition, the said petition was filed
subject to the control of the Solicitor General; that in
deciding to bring the petition, he was impelled by an
extraordinary sense of urgency; and that the grant of
bail to private respondents engulfed him with an acute
demand for urgent relief.
As to the second ground, private petitioner maintains
that there was gross disregard of overwhelming
evidence of guilt and that private respondents did not
present even a single witness to rebut the facts
established by the prosecution.
This Court finds merit in the petition.
While the rule is, as held by the Court of Appeals, only
the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent
the People or the State in criminal proceedings pending
in this Court and the Court of Appeals (Republic vs.
Partisala, 118 SCRA 320 [1982]), the ends of substantial
justice would be better served, and the issues in this
action could be determined in a more just, speedy and
inexpensive manner, by entertaining the petition at bar.
As an offended party in a criminal case, private
petitioner has sufficient personality and a valid
grievance against Judge Adao's order granting bail to
the alleged murderers of his (private petitioner's) father.
In Parades vs. Gopengco, 29 SCRA 688 (1969), this
Court ruled that the offended parties in criminal cases
have sufficient interest and personality as "person(s)
aggrieved' to file the special civil action of prohibition
and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 in line
with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of
the Rules of Court in order to promote their object, thus:
Furthermore, as offended parties in
the pending criminal case before
petitioner judge, it cannot be gainsaid
that respondents have sufficient
interest and personality as person(s)
aggrieved' by petitioner judge's ruling
on his non-disqualification to file the
special civil action under sections 1
and 2 of Rule 65. Recently, in line with
the underlying spirit of a liberal
construction of the Rules of Court in
order to promote their object, as
against the literal interpretation of
Rule 110, section 2, we held,
overruling the implication of an earlier

case, that a widow possesses the right

as an offended party to file a criminal
complaint for the murder of her
deceased husband. (Id., p. 699)
Indeed, in a companion case (G.R. No. 87932)
entitled People, et al. vs. Hon. Zenaida P. Placer, et al.
promulgated July 20, 1989. We disqualified the therein
respondent Judge Zenaida P. Placer to whom Criminal
Case No. 3464 was subsequently raffled for trial on the
merits, from hearing the case and ordered a change of
venue from Butuan City to Cagayan de Oro City to avoid
a miscarriage of justice pursuant to Section V(4); Article
VIII of the constitution.
Coming back to the case at bar, the Court of Appeals
held that the issuance of the order dated February 24,
1989 granting bail to accused-respondents was neither
whimsical nor capricious because "formal hearings were
conducted on the petition for bail and the 24-page
assailed order includes a detailed summary of the
testimonies of the five (5) prosecution witnesses and
Exhibits "A" to "E" for the prosecution."
The mere fact that formal hearings were conducted
does not preclude a finding of arbitrariness and denial of
due process. As pointed out by private petitioner, the
evidence submitted by the prosecution to the effect that
private respondent Tranquilino Calo, Jr., slipped the fatal
gun to the alleged assailant. Pablo Macapas, and that
private respondent Bellarmino Allocod was the driver of
the get-away vehicle used by Macapas was not
considered by the appellate court. This is regrettable
because, as alleged by private petitioner, private
respondents did not deny such evidence by their failure
to present any witness to controvert it and that such
evidence established conspiracy among private
respondents and Macapas.
Be that as it may, the prosecution was scheduled to
present nine (9) witnesses, whose names were duly
submitted to the trial court, at the hearings held to
determine whether the evidence of guilt against private
respondents was strong, but after hearing the fifth
witness, Judge Adao insisted on terminating the
proceedings (pp. 11; 62, Rollo). In view thereof, private
petitioner contends that Judge Adao's order granting
bail to private respondents "smacked of grave and
patent abuse of discretion."
We agree. The order dated February 24, 1989 granting
bail to accused-respondents should have been declared
null and void and in violation of procedural due process.
The prosecution in the instant case was not given
adequate opportunity to prove that there is strong
evidence of guilt and to present within a reasonable
time all the evidence it desired to present.
In a similar case (People vs. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522
[1968]), this Court held:
The question presented before us is,
whether the prosecution was deprived
of procedural due process. The answer
is in the affirmative. We are of the
considered opinion that whether the
motion for bail of a defendant who is
in custody for a capital offense be
resolved in a summary proceeding or
in the course of a regular trial, the
prosecution must be given an
opportunity to present, within a
reasonable time, all the evidence that
it may desire to introduce before the
court should resolve the motion for
bail. If, as in the criminal case
involved in the instant special civil
action, the prosecution should be
denied such an opportunity, there
would be a violation of procedural due
process, and the order of the court
granting bail should be considered
void on that ground. The orders
complained of dated October 7, 9 and
12, 1968, having been issued in
violation of procedural due process,
must be considered null and void.

In the same vein, this Court held in People vs. Sola (103
SCRA 393 [19811), to wit:
The law, as we have seen, is sedulous
in maintaining for a defendant
charged with crime whatever forms of
procedure are of the essence of an
opportunity to defend. Privileges so
fundamental as to be inherent in
every concept of a fair trial that could
be acceptable to the thought of
reasonable men will be kept inviolate
and inviolable, however crushing may
be the pressure of incriminating proof.
But justice, though due to the
accused, is due to the accuser also.
The concept of fairness must not be
strained till it is narrowed to a
filament. We are to keep the balance
true.' This norm which is of the very
essence of due process as the
embodiment of justice requires that
the prosecution be given the
opportunity to prove that there is
strong evidence of guilt.
The failure of Judge Adao to observe the concept of
fairness which is the essence of due process in the case
at bar should not have been lost sight of.
Finally, the Court notes that in a resolution dated July
20, 1989 issued in G.R. No. 87932, the records of
Criminal Case No. 3464 subject of the instant petition
were ordered transmitted to Judge Alfredo Lagamon at
Cagayan de Oro City for change of venue and proper
disposition in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is Granted. The decision
dated May 16, 1989 of the Court of Appeals is Set Aside
and the temporary restraining order issued on July 6,
1989 is hereby made permanent.

Feratero y Encinares, Amador Espao y Ofalsa

and Conrado Entereso y Hapa, armed with
pointed bladed weapons conspiring,
confederating and confabulating with one
another, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and suddenly stab and
maul one Leoniso Hermo and inflicting on his
right chest a fatal stab wound, while they
(accused) were surrounding the victim in order
that he could not properly defend himself
thereby inflicting a fatal wound which resulted
to his instantaneous death, to the damage and
prejudice of his heirs.
"Contrary to law."3
Upon arraignment on August 8, 1978, all accused
entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. 4
On June 13, 1977, the people of Trece Martirez,
Casiguran, Sorsogon celebrated the town fiesta, which
culminated in a dance. Accused Francisco Hapa, Claro
Feratero, Amador Espao and Conrado Entereso
attended the dance.
At about 2:30 in the morning of June 14, 1977, the
people at the dance started to wane and head for home,
including prosecution witness Delfina Gratil. Upon arrival
at her house, which was fifteen (15) meters away from
the dance hall, Delfina proceeded to the kitchen for a
cup of coffee. She opened the window of the kitchen for
a breath of fresh air.
From the window of her house she saw Leoniso Hermo
being held in each arm by two (2) persons. Another
person, whom she later identified as accused Francisco,
was wearing a jacket and was standing in front of the
victim. The fourth person stood guard behind the
victim.5 Though it was dark outside, Delfina witnessed
what transpired because of light coming from a nearby
lamppost that illuminated the scene of the crime.6

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 125698

July 19, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO HAPA y EBASCO, CLARO FERATERO y
ENCINARES, AMADOR ESPAO y OFALSA and
CONRADO ENTERESO y HAPA, accused-appellants.
PARDO, J.:
Accused Francisco Hapa y Ebasco, Claro Feratero y
Encinares, Amador Espao y Ofalsa and Conrado
Entereso y Hapa1 appeal from the decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon
finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder
for the death of Leoniso Hermo, and sentencing each of
them to reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory
penalties provided therefor, and to indemnify jointly and
severally, the heirs of the deceased Leoniso Hermo in
the sum of P50,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, and to pay their proportionate
share of the costs.
On July 11, 1977, Sorsogon Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Manuel C. Genova filed with the Court of First Instance
of Sorsogon, Branch 3 an information for murder against
Francisco Hapa y Ebasco, Claro Feratero y Encinares,
Amador Espao y Ofalsa and Conrado Entereso y Hapa,
which reads:
"That on or about the 14th day of June, 1977, in
the Municipality of Casiguran, Province of
Sorsogon, Philippines, and with the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, Francisco Hapa y Ebasco, Claro

Delfina heard someone utter, "Where is your house, you

are our target?" The victim replied, "What is my fault?"
Then she heard the voice of the same person again:
"you are our target." Delfina identified the voice as that
of accused Francisco.7
Thereafter, accused dragged the victim toward the
fence of Delfina's house. Accused Francisco pulled a
bladed instrument from his jacket and made a
"downward and forward thrusts" against Leoniso Hermo
(hereafter Leoniso). All the while, Delfina thought that
what she witnessed was just a joke, until she saw blood
dripped from the bladed instrument held by accused
Francisco.
Delfina saw that Leoniso was in pain as he clutched his
breast. Thereafter, his assailants fled the scene. Delfina
witnessed the incident from the window of her house,
about two (2) meters or two and one-half (2 ) arms
length from the scene.
Thereafter, Delfina tried to go out of her house and
shout for help. Many people arrived, including special
police Jose Hadap who apprehended Conrado Entereso
and brought him to Delfina's house for interrogation. In
the course of the interrogation, a sharp instrument was
found in his possession. When asked why he had that in
his possession, Conrado replied that it was his "because
he has a target." He denied stabbing Leoniso and
pointed to Francisco as the one who stabbed the victim.
As soon as the questioning was over, Conrado was
brought outside Delfina's house and turned over to
police officer Edilberto Hicarte, PC soldier Jose Hular and
Brgy. Capt. Alberto Coderes.8
Benerando Hitosis, thirty (30) years old, farmer and a
resident of Trece Martires, Casiguran, Sorsogon
corroborated Delfina's testimony. At about 2:00 in the
morning of June 14, 1977, while on his way home
coming from the dance at the barangay hall, he met the
four (4) accused, Francisco, Claro, Amador and Conrado.
The dance hall was one hundred (100) meters from his

house. He walked barely fifteen (15) meters when he

heard shouts from behind him.
Benerando recognized the voice as that of Leoniso
Hermo, his neighbor who was tailing behind him at a
distance of ten (10) meters.9 Leoniso, who also attended
the dance, was carrying a bench, which he was about to
return to its owner. Leoniso had no shirt on, but was
carrying his white t-shirt on his shoulder.
As Benerando turned his back, he saw three (3) persons,
whom he recognized as Francisco, Amador, and
Conrado, running towards the house of Conrado Hadap.
Francisco was carrying a jacket and a five and one half
(5 ) inches bladed instrument, while Amador was
holding a fork and Conrado was armed with a dagger.
The other accused Claro was also armed with a bladed
instrument.
As soon as the three, Francisco, Amador and Conrado
reached the house of Conrado Hadap, they went up the
house and closed it. Meanwhile, Leoniso tried to walk
towards his house, which was beside the dance hall, but
he died before he could reach his house.
By this time, the people in the barrio had been alerted.
Upon learning that three (3) of the four (4) accused
were hiding at the house of Conrado Hadap, the barrio
people surrounded the Hadap residence to foil attempts
of the accused to escape. Many people were present
because the stabbing took place right after the dance.
With the help of the barrio people all the accused were
apprehended and turned over to Brgy. Capt. Alberto
Coderes and M/Sgt. Jose Hular of the Philippine
Constabulary.10
Benerando confirmed that the four (4) accused were not
natives of their place. Though it was dark when the
incident happened, he recognized the four (4) accused
because the place was illuminated by the light coming
from the dance hall. His barrio mates left the house of
Conrado Hadap only after the four (4) accused were
apprehended by the authorities. Failing to contain their
anger, the barrio people boxed the accused. 11
Evelyn Hadap, the daughter of Conrado Hadap
corroborated Benerando's testimony that three (3) of
the accused namely, Francisco, Claro and Amador
arrived at their house at about 2:30 in the morning of
June 14, 1977. She remembered that Francisco was
carrying a knife.
Upon arrival at their house, the three kept moving and
shouting "Are you still willing to fight?" The three (3)
stayed at their house for around two (2) hours. They
wanted to flee, but they could not because her parents
closed the door.12
Based on the autopsy report of Dr. Evanswinda Ansus
Demate, Municipal Health Officer, Casiguran, Sorsogon,
Leoniso was nineteen (19) years at the time of his
death. The cause of death was shock secondary to
severe hemorrhage due to the following:
"1. stab wound, right anterior chest, mammary
region; incised muscles and blood vessels
underneath.
"2. Laceration of the upper lobe of the right
lung.13
Aside from the stab wound on the anterior chest of the
victim, Dr. Demate also saw linear abrasion about
fourteen (14) inches long, located two (2) inches below
the stab wound. Moreover, she confirmed that a sharp
bladed instrument could have caused the stab wound
sustained by the victim. 14
Mrs. Fidela Hermo, mother of Leoniso testified that while
she was at home at about 2:00 in the morning of June
14, 1979, she heard that her nineteen (19) year old son,
Leoniso was stabbed. She immediately went out of the
house and proceeded to where her son was. The sight of
the lifeless body of her son lying by the road beside
Delfina's house made Fidela cry. She saw three (3)
persons running away, carrying deadly weapons. She

identified these people as accused Francisco, Claro, and

Amador. One of the four (4) accused, Conrado, went
inside Delfina's house.15 Although she did not witness
the stabbing incident, Fidela was positive that the three
(3) persons she saw scampering away from the scene
were responsible for the death of her son. The knife
Francisco was carrying was still dripping with blood.16
Because of the loss of her son, who was the sole
breadwinner of the family, her husband being a
paralytic, Fidela "felt much the loss of a son."17
All four (4) accused denied participation in the stabbing
of Leoniso Hermo. They admitted going to the barrio
fiesta of Trece Martirez, Casiguran, Sorsogon on the day
in question and attended the dance.
Accused Amador Espao testified that in the evening of
June 13, 1977, he and his three companions Francisco
Hapa, Claro Feratero and Conrado Entereso attended a
dance in Trece Martirez, Casiguran, Sorsogon. It was the
barrio fiesta of Trece Martirez and the dance at the
barangay hall was the highlight of the festivities. On
that day, they ate at the house of Conrado Hadap, the
wife of the latter being a relative of Amador. The four (4)
accused stayed at the Hadap household until around
8:00 in the evening when they decided to proceed to
the dance hall, five (5) meters away from the house.
About 12:00 midnight, Amador stepped out of the dance
hall to answer a call of nature at the nearby church.
While he was in the act of urinating, two (2) unknown
persons approached him. One of them tapped him on
the left shoulder and asked him: "You are about to
create something?" But he did not know what the
person was talking about.
At that precise moment, Francisco arrived and told him
to go home. It was already 1:00 in the morning of June
14, 1977. Amador did as he was told and proceeded
towards the Hadap residence. All this time, Amador was
alone. He left his three (3) companions, still dancing, at
the dance hall. When he arrived at the Hadap residence,
he saw Conrado Hadap and all the members of the
latter's family. His other companions, Francisco and
Claro, arrived at the house of Conrado Hadap at around
2:00 in the morning.
Amador further testified that while he was in the Hadap
residence, several people arrived and mauled them. He
could not remember the exact time it happened and the
identity of the persons who mauled them. He noticed
that Conrado Hadap and his family went out of the
house at that time. Amador could not tell why the barrio
people would maul them. Thereafter, they were brought
to the municipal hall of Casiguran, Sorsogon.
Though he sustained physical injuries, he did not submit
himself to any medical examination because they were
not serious. When asked about any plausible reason why
Evelyn Hadap, a relative of his, should testify against
him, he said that he did not know. Francisco Hapa and
Claro Feratero, his co-accused were his barrio mates, all
of them being from Onion, Gubat, Sorsogon.18
Conrado Entereso y Hapa partly corroborated Amador's
testimony. He said that all four (4) of them Francisco,
Claro, Amador and himself went to Trece Martirez,
Casiguran, Sorsogon and attended the barrio fiesta on
June 13, 1977. They left the Hadap residence and
proceeded to the dance hall at about 8:00 in the
evening.
Contrary to Amador's claim that Conrado remained at
the dance hall when he [Amador] left at 12:00 midnight,
accused Conrado alleged that he left the dance hall and
headed for home at about 12:00 midnight. He went
home alone and on foot. His three (3) companions,
Francisco, Claro and Amador were still dancing at the
dance hall. He headed for home to Sangat, Gubat,
Sorsogon, about ten (10) kilometers from Trece
Martirez.19 He went ahead of his three (3) companions
because he did not have a place to stay in Trece
Martirez. The others were sleeping over at the Hadap
residence.

Conrado Entereso y Hapa was not able to go home that

early morning of June 14, 1977. Ten (10) meters from
the dance hall, several persons assaulted him and he
lost consciousness. The scars on his left eyebrow and on
his upper lips were the reminders of the beatings that
he suffered that night. He did not recognize his
assailants because it was dark.
When he regained consciousness, Conrado Entereso y
Hapa went up a certain house, five (5) meters away and
sought help. He was bleeding profusely because he was
hit several times. He did not know who was the owner of
the house nor did he find out who it was. He stayed in
that house for two (2) hours until the police fetched him
and brought him to the police station of Casiguran,
Sorsogon. Several persons were present in that house,
but he did not recognize them. He could still hear the
music at the dance hall signifying that the dance was
still on going. He did not know what happened to his
three (3) companions. It was only at the police station of
Casiguran that he met them again.
Conrado was not aware of any reason why several
persons would cause him harm. It was the first time that
he had been to Trece Martirez, Casiguran, Sorsogon. He
was not investigated during his one (1) week stay at the
police station of Casiguran.20
For his part, Claro Feratero y Encinares admitted that he
and his three (3) co-accused went to Trece Martirez,
Casiguran, Sorsogon arriving there at around 5:00 in the
afternoon of June 13, 1977. They proceeded to the
house of Conrado Hadap and left at about 8:00 to
attend the dance at the nearby barangay hall. He,
Francisco and Amador stayed at the dance hall until
2:00 in the morning. Thereafter, they decided to go
home to the Hadap residence, five (5) meters from the
dance hall.21 When they arrived at the Hadap residence,
he noticed the presence of many people.
Claro said that they were awakened when policemen
fetched him and his two (2) companions, Francisco and
Amador, at the Hadap residence in the early morning of
June 14, 1977. It was only then that they found out that
somebody was killed, and they were suspected of being
responsible for such killing. Despite the fact that they
were his visitors, Conrado Hadap did not inquire from
the policemen why his visitors were being arrested.
Instead, Conrado Hadap and some members of his
family left when the policemen started manhandling
them.22
Afterwards, the policemen questioned them on their
involvement in the stabbing incident. They were tied
together and brought to the municipal building of
Casiguran, Sorsogon. Claro could not remember how
many policemen arrived, nor could he remember who
they were because of the darkness of the night.
On May 3, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision
finding accused Francisco, Claro, Amador and Conrado
guilty of murder qualified by treachery, without any
aggravating or mitigating circumstance. The decretal
portion of the decision reads, thus:
"WHEREFORE, accused Francisco Hapa y
Ebasco, Claro Feratero y Encinares, Amador
Espao y Ofalsa and Conrado Entereso y Hapa,
are all found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Murder penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code. Absent any
aggravating or mitigating circumstance
attendant to the commission of the offense,
they are hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA,
together with all the accessory penalties
provided therefor, to jointly and severally
indemnify the heirs of the victim Leoniso
Hermo the sum of P50,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to pay their proportionate share of the
costs.
"The immediate confinement of the accused in
the jail is hereby ordered pursuant to the
pertinent provisions of Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 12-94 dated August
16, 1994.

"SO ORDERED.
"Quezon City (for Sorsogon, Sorsogon)
"May 3, 1995.

"(SGD.) EUDARLIO B. VALENCIA

"Judge"23
On August 4, 1995, accused Hapa, Feratero, Espao and
Entereso filed a joint notice of appeal.24 Accusedappellants contend that the trial court erred in finding
them guilty of murder, instead of homicide only. They
argue that if indeed what they committed was murder,
the trial court would not have allowed them to post bail
for their temporary liberty. 25 Secondly, they questioned
the authority of the judge who penned the decision
because he was not the one who conducted the trial and
heard the proceedings of the case. Corollarily, they
claimed that the trial court erroneously condemned
them for murder without giving accused Francisco Hapa
the opportunity to testify on his behalf. Lastly, accusedappellants assailed the credibility of prosecution
witnesses Delfina Gratil and Fidela Hermo.
The appeal is without merit.
Before conviction, every person is bailable except if
charged with a capital offense,26 or an offense
punishable byreclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
when evidence of guilt is strong.27 A capital offense has
been defined as an offense which, under the law
existing at the time of its commission and of the
application for admission to bail, may be punished with
death.28 Consequently, when the accused is charged
with an offense punishable by death,reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the judge shall conduct a
hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the
discretion of the court, not only to take into account the
guidelines set forth in Rule 114, Section 9 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, but primarily to determine the
existence of strong evidence of guilt or lack of it, against
the accused.29 If the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail
becomes a matter of right.30
Accused-appellants alleged that since they were allowed
to post bail for their temporary liberty despite the
murder charge against them proved that the evidence
to convict them for such was not strong. At most, they
could be held guilty of the lesser offense of homicide.
This argument is manifestly flawed. It has no sound
basis in law or in jurisprudence. In a summary hearing
conducted for the purpose of determining whether the
evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of bail, what the
court does is to determine the weight of the evidence,
not the guilt or innocence of the accused. On such
hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to
enter into any inquiry as to the weight that ought to be
allowed to the evidence for or against the accused nor
will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what
further evidence may be therein offered and
admitted.31 Consequently we find that accusedappellants' argument has no basis to stand on.
Moreover, there were three (3) of the four (4) accused
who were minors at the time of the commission of the
crime. Their subsequent release and the transfer to the
custody of their biological parents was pursuant to
Article 189, Chapter 3 of the Presidential Decree No.
603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare
Code.32 The trial court took into consideration the
recommendation of the social worker who conducted a
case study on these minors that since it was their first
infraction, it would be better for them to be released on
recognizance to the custody of their parents pending
the prosecution of the criminal case against them.
With regard to the second assigned error, the fact that
Judge Valencia who decided the case was not the one
who heard the testimonies of the witnesses would not
automatically warrant a reversal of the decision. 33 Such
fact constitutes no compelling reason to jettison his
findings and conclusions, and does not per se render his

decision void. It may be true that the trial judge who

conducted the hearing would be in a better position to
ascertain the truth or falsity of the testimonies of the
witnesses. However, it does not necessarily follow that a
judge who was not present during the trial can not
render a valid and just decision. For the judge who was
not present during the trial can rely on the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during the trial as basis of his
decision. Such reliance does not violate substantive and
procedural due process of law.34
We have meticulously pored over the records, especially
the transcript of stenographic notes; we find no reason
to disturb the factual findings of Judge Valencia. 35
As regards the contention that the lower court did not
give accused-appellant Francisco Hapa an opportunity
to testify on his behalf, thus depriving him of the right to
due process, there is nothing that would support this
contention.
It is well settled that the right to be heard by himself
and counsel is one of the constitutional rights
guaranteed to an accused. Not only this but he likewise
has the right to present evidence in his defense. 36 Due
process of law in judicial proceedings requires that he
must be given an opportunity to be heard. He has the
right to be present and defend in person at every stage
of the proceedings.37 A decision would only be void for
lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of
the opportunity to be heard.38
In the case at bar, the last witness for the defense was
accused-appellant Claro Feratero, who took the witness
stand on February 18, 1985. From that time until the
defense rested its case on October 13, 1987, the
defense had sufficient time and opportunity to present
further evidence. Yet, every time that the case was set
for trial,39despite due notice to him, accused-appellant
Francisco Hapa never showed up. Hence, the trial would
be reset to another date. Because accused Francisco
jumped bail, his counsel had to rest the case and submit
it for decision.40 Obviously, accused-appellants were
given ample opportunity to present evidence to prove
their innocence.
As a last ditch effort to extricate themselves from
criminal liability, accused-appellants question the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses, particularly
eyewitness Delfina Gratil and the victim's mother, Fidela
Hermo. We find that the inconsistencies in the
testimonies of these witnesses merely dwell on
immaterial and insignificant details. They do not affect
their credibility as their testimonies jibe on material
points. The inconsistencies on minor details of the crime
are not earmarks of falsehoods. On the contrary, they
show that their testimonies are unrehearsed.41
It is well settled that immaterial and insignificant details
do not discredit a testimony on the very material and
significant point bearing on the very act of accusedappellants. As long as the testimonies of the witnesses
corroborate each other on material points, minor
inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their credibility.
Inconsistencies on minor details do not undermine the
integrity of a prosecution witness. The minor
inconsistencies and contradictions only serve to attest
to the truthfulness of the witnesses and the fact that
they had not been coached or rehearsed.42
Delfina Gratil's testimony was straightforward,
categorical and definite. She testified that accusedappellant Francisco Hapa stabbed the victim. Despite
the fact that the stabbing took place in the darkness of
the night, she clearly witnessed the whole incident from
the window of her house located 2 and arms length
from where it took place. The light coming from a
nearby lamppost provided sufficient illumination that
enabled her to recognize the assailants of her neighbor
Leoniso Hermo.
The testimony of a lone eyewitness, if positive and
credible, is sufficient to support a conviction especially
when the testimony bears the earmarks of truth and
sincerity and had been delivered spontaneously,
naturally and in a straightforward manner. Witnesses
are to be weighed, not numbered; hence, it is not at all

uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of

the testimony of a single witness.43
Accused-appellants contend that the testimony of Fidela
Hermo was not consistent with the testimony of the
other prosecution witness, Benerando Hitosis. Accusedappellants point out that Mrs. Hermo testified that her
son died within the premises of Delfina's house, which,
according to them, runs directly in contradiction with
the statement of Benerando that the victim ran to his
house and expired there.
We find nothing inconsistent with these testimonies.
Indeed, Benerando testified that Leoniso tried to go to
his house after he was stabbed. At the same time,
Benerando confirmed that Leoniso died before he could
reach his house. Instead of contradicting the testimony
of Benerando, Fidela's testimony confirmed what
Benerando testified to.
We affirm the findings of the trial court that the crime
committed was murder. The lower court correctly
concluded that treachery qualified the killing of Leoniso
Hermo. The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on
the part of the person attacked. Treachery exists when
any of the crimes against person is committed with the
employment of means, methods or forms that tend
directly and especially to insure its execution, such that
the offender faces no risk that may arise from the
defense which the offended party might make. 44
In the present case, the victim was caught off guard by
the suddenness of the attack. He was alone, innocently
walking, and was carrying a bench on his shoulder,
which he was about to return to its owner. Out of
nowhere, the four (4) accused appeared, all armed, and
took hold of Leoniso. Two of the four accused
immediately held his arms. One went behind Leoniso
and Francisco Hapa went in front and stabbed him. In
that condition and situation, it is very apparent that the
victim would not be able to ward off any attack against
him.
Moreover, the evidence clearly established the
existence of conspiracy. Conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct
proof of conspiracy is rarely found, for criminals do not
write down their lawless plans and plots. The agreement
to commit a crime, however, may be deduced from the
mode and manner of the commission of the offense or
inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action, and community of intent. It
did not matter if it was only accused-appellant Francisco
who inflicted the mortal wound, as the act of one was
the act of all, and each incurred the same criminal
liability.45
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code46 provides that the
penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death if committed with treachery. 47 As the
killing was not attended to by any aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance, accused-appellants shall suffer
the penalty prescribed by law in its medium
period,48 or reclusion perpetua.
We affirm the trial court's award of civil indemnity to the
heirs of the victim in the amount of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) as death indemnity.49
However, pursuant to current jurisprudence, we deem it
proper to give an additional award for moral damages to
the heirs of the victim.50 No proof of pecuniary loss is
required in the assessment of moral damages, and the
award is essentially by way of indemnity or
reparation.51 Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that
damages for death caused by a crime or quasidelict can be awarded to the heirs of the victim by proof
alone of such fact of death.52 Moral damages are not
awarded to punish the accused but to compensate for
the mental anguish, serious anxiety, and moral shock
suffered by the victim or his family as the proximate
result of the wrongful act and they are recoverable
where a criminal offense results in physical injuries
which culminate in the death of the victim. 53 Incapable
of exact pecuniary estimation, the assessment of such
damages is left to the discretion of the court. 54 The

award is not meant to enrich the victim at the expense

of the accused. An award of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) is commensurate to the emotional
suffering of the heirs of the victim.55
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the appealed
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Sorsogon, Sorsogon,
Branch 52 in Criminal Case No. 419, with modification.
The Court finds accused-appellants Francisco Hapa y
Ebasco, Claro Feratero y Encinares, Amador Espao y
Ofalsa and Conrado Entereso y Hapa guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of MURDER defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby
sentences each of them to reclusion perpetua, with all
the accessory penalties of the law; and to indemnify the
heirs of the victim in the amount of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) as death indemnity and fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, and to pay the
costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
epublic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 129782

June 29, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee,

vs.
BALWINDER SINGH, GURMOK SINGH, DALVIR
SINGH, DIAL SINGH, AMARJIT SINGH, MOHINDER
SINGH, MALKIT SINGH DHILLON, JOHINDER SINGH
and KULDIP SINGH, defendant,
BALWINDER SINGH, MALKIT, SINGH, MOHINDER
SINGH and DALVIR SINGH, defendants-appellants.
BUENA, J.:
Appellants Balwinder, Malkit, Mohinder and Dalvir, all
surnamed Singh, were convicted of the crime of Murder
in Criminal Case No. 8683 for killing Surinder Singh, and
Frustrated Murder in Criminal Cases No. 8682 for
stabbing Dilbag Singh. Each of them were sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for murder, and
the indeterminate penalty of 8 years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum for frustrated
murder.
It appears that these four (4) appellants, who are Indian
nationals, were charged with murder and frustrated
murder along with their six (6) compatriots, namely:
Gurmok, Dalvir, Dial, Johinder, Kuldip and Amarjit Singh.
Only these four (4) appellants were prosecuted because
the rest of their co-accused are at-large, except for Dial
Singh, who died while under detention.
Dilbag Singh, private complainant for frustrated murder
in Criminal Case No. 8682, recounts that on November
26, 1993, at around 7:30 in the morning while he was
cleaning his motorbike in front of the Mendiola
Apartment in Barangay Canlalay, Bian, Laguna, Dalvir,
Balwinder, Gurmok, Jarnail, Amarjit, Mohinder, Dial,
Kuldip- all surnamed Singh-Johander Singh Dhillon, and
Malkit Singh Dhillon arrived, shouting foul remarks in
their native language and demanding Surinder Singh to
come out of the apartment. When Surinder Singh came
out of his apartment, Dalvir Singh tried to stab him but
Surinder Singh was able to move away. Dalvir Singh told
his companions to hold Surinder Singh as he will kill
him. Thereafter, Dial Singh and Johinder Singh each held
the right and left arms of Surinder Singh, with Kuldip
Singh pushing Surinder Singh on his back. Dalvir Singh
then stabbed Surinder Singh, hitting him on the right
side of his stomach, and causing him to fall on the
ground. Dial Singh remarked that Surinder Singh failed
to give money and if others will likewise refuse, the
same fate will befall them. As Surinder Singh tried to get
up, Malkit Singh Dhillon and Jarnail Singh started hitting
him with lead pipes all over his body, while Johinder
Singh and Dial Singh punched and kicked Surinder.
Amarjit Singh, who was holding a gun, warned everyone
not to help Surinder Singh or else he will shoot. Thereat,
when all these things were going on, private

complainant Dilbag Singh tried to stop them but

Balwinder Singh stabbed him on the left side of his
back. Gurmok Singh likewise stabbed him with a bolo,
but he was not hit as he was able to move to one side.
After that, the ten (10) accused Indians left.
Dilbag Singh and Surinder Singh, both injured, were
brought to the Perpetual Help Hospital, Bian, Laguna,
by Jaswinder Singh, Johinder Singh Gill, Balwinder Singh
Gill and Alwan Singh, for treatment. There, Surinder
Singh was pronounced dead on arrival.
From the hospital, private complainant Dilbag Singh,
Jaswinder Singh, Balwinder Singh Gill, a lady named
Vilma, and other companions went to the police station
in Bian, Laguna, and reported the incident. Both Dilbag
Singh and Jaswinder Singh executed a sworn statement.
On the basis of the sworn statement, the Chief
Investigator of the Bian Police Station filed on
November 28, 1993, a complaint for the crime of
homicide with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bian,
Laguna for purposes of preliminary investigation.
On January 7, 1994,1 after finding probable cause, the
MTC recommended to upgrade the charges to "Murder"
and "Frustrated Murder", and forwarded the records of
the case to the Provincial Prosecutor. 2
On February 17, 1994, 3rd Assistant Prosecutor of
Laguna, Fernando V. Balinado, rendered a resolution
recommending that only Dalvir Singh be charged with
homicide, and that frustrated homicide be filed against
Balwinder and Gurmok Singh.3 Thereafter, the
Information for homicide was filed against Dalvir Singh,
and frustrated homicide against Balwinder and Gurmok
Singh4 with the Regional Trial Court of Laguna. Before
arraignment, private complainants Dilbag Singh and
their heirs of Surinder Singh, thru their counsel, moved
for reinvestigation.5
On June 30, 1994, a "resolution on
reinvestigation"6 resulted in the filing of two (2)
Informations for Murder and Frustrated Murder
against all ten (10) Indian nationals, to wit:
"CRIMINAL CASE No. 86837 For Murder
"That on or about November 26, 1993, in the
Municipality of Bian, Province of Laguna,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
with one another, and armed with a fan knife,
hand gun and lead pipes, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, stab and wound and hit with said knife
and lead pipes one SURINDER SINGH thereby
inflicting upon him fatal wounds, with abuse of
superior strength, treachery and with evident
premeditation, the said accused, having
inflicted the wounds upon SURINDER SINGH
while being held by the other accused, and as
a result thereof, the said wounds being
necessarily mortal/fatal, thereby causing the
direct and immediate death of said SURINDER
SINGH, to the damage and prejudice of his
surviving heirs.
"All contrary to law and with the
qualifying/aggravating circumstances of abuse
of superior strength, evident premeditation and
alevosia, and the generic aggravating
circumstance of known conspiracy.
"Criminal Case No. 86828 Frustrated Murder
"That on or about November 26, 1993 in the
Municipality of Bian, Province of Laguna,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
with one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with abuse of
superior strength, treachery and evident
premeditation, while armed with bolos, lead

pipes, fan knife and hand-gun, with the intent

of taking the life of DILBAG SINGH, attack,
assault thereby inflicting upon him mortal
wound on the left side of his body directly by
overt acts thus, performing all the acts of
execution which would have nevertheless did
not produce it, by reason of causes
independent of their will, that is: the able and
timely medical assistance given the said
DILBAG SINGH which prevented his death.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
Initially, the case was filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Bian, Laguna and was raffled to Branch 24. Both
cases were tried jointly.
Upon arraignment, on September 23, 1994, three (3)
appellants, Balwinder, Malkit and Mohinder Singh,
manifested that they are not entering any plea. Thus,
the court entered for them a plea of not guilty pursuant
to Section 1(c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court.9 The
arraignment of Dalvir and Dial Singh followed on
October 25, 1994.10
On October 6, 1994, appellants filed a petition for
bail.11 While hearing the petition for bail, appellants filed
a motion to inhibit and a petition for change of
venue.12 Subsequently, on May 30, 1995, the hearing on
the petition for bail was continued before the Regional
Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna. On December 13,
1995, RTC of San Pedro, Laguna denied the petition for
bail.13

of the Revised Penal Code, this Court hereby

sentences them (except Dial Singh who died
during the presentation of defense evidence on
the main case) as follows:
"Criminal Case No. 8682
"1. each to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of from eight (8) years and one
(1) day ofprision mayor as minimum, to twelve
(12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal maximum;
"2. jointly and severally, to pay private
complainant Dilbag Singh the amounts of
P16,000 representing his hospitalization and
medical expenses, and P30,000 for and as
attorneys fees; and
"3. jointly and severally, to pay the costs of
suit.
"Criminal Case No. 8683
"1. each to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua;
"2. jointly and severally, to pay the heirs of
Surinder Singh the following sums:
a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;

The evidence presented during the bail hearings were

automatically reproduced at the trial.

b) P41,500.00 representing funeral,

wake and transportation expenses;

The events, according to appellants, happened in this

wise. Appellant Dalvir Singh testified that on November
26, 1993, at around 7:30 in the morning, he was
conducting his buy and sell business along Brgy.
Canlalay, Bian, Laguna. While collecting from his
customers, he was accosted by Jaswinder, Dilbag and
Surinder Singh to stop at the corner of the street. When
he stopped, he alighted from his motorcycle. Jaswinder,
Dilbag and Surinder Singh accused him of squealing
their status to the immigration authorities. Then,
Jaswinder Singh punched him. Appellant Dalvir Singh
retaliated by slapping Jaswinder Singh afterwhich,
Jaswinder Singh, went inside his apartment to get a
pipe. When Surinder Singh was about to stab him, he
wrestled the knife from him and, in the process, private
complainant Dilbag Singh was stabbed on his back with
the same knife.14 As Dalvir Singh grappled for the
possession of the knife from Surinder Singh, both of
them fell down, with him landing on top of Surinder
Singh and that was the time when Surinder Singh was
stabbed on the right portion of his stomach. Then,
Surinder Singh lost his grip and appellant Dalvir Singh
was able to get hold of the knife. Appellant Dalvir Singh
was so nervous that he left the place on his motorcycle
while holding the knife. He threw the knife along the
highway of Bian, Laguna.15

c) P5,760,000.00 for lost

earnings/income;

To bolster this version, appellants offered the

testimonies of Wilfredo Rivera and SPO4 Manuel
Francisco. Wilfredo Rivera corroborated the testimonies
of appellant Dalvir Singh. According to him, he testified
in court in exchange for the favor extended to him by an
Indian national who is a friend of appellant Dalvir Singh.
With respect to the testimonies of SPO4 Manuel
Francisco, then chief investigator of the PNP, Bian,
Laguna, the same were confined to the fact that private
complainants Dilbag Singh and Jaswinder Singh
executed their respective sworn statements of the
incident.
After trial, appellants were convicted of the crime
charged, thus
"WHEREFORE, the guilt of accused Balwinder
Singh, Malkit Singh Dhillon, Mohinder Singh,
Dalvir Singh and Dial Singh having been
established beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of frustrated murder in Criminal Case
No. 8282 and murder in Criminal Case 8683
defined and penalized in Articles 248 and 250

d) P400.00 for hospitalization

expenses;
e) P50,000.00 for moral damages; and
f) P500,000.00 for and as attorneys
fees; and
"3. jointly and severally, to pay the costs of
suit.
"Since accused Jarnail Singh, Gurmok Singh,
Amarjit Singh, Johinder Singh and Kuldip Singh
have remained at-large to date, in order not to
clog the docket of this court, let the records of
these two cases be sent to the files and
warrant be issued for their immediate arrest.
"SO ORDERED."16
Due to the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed in
murder, the case is now before us on appeal.
Appellants challenge their conviction and interpose the
following errors allegedly committed by the trial court- 17
"1. The court a quo erred in sanctioning errors
and irregularities of procedure which resulted
in denial of due process to accused-appellants.
"2. The court a quo erred in accepting the
prosecutions version of the incident which
gave rise to these cases, overlooking the
testimonies of the three (3) unbiased witnesses
thereto.
"3. The court a quo erred in awarding excessive
damages against accused-appellants.
First error

According to appellants, an irregularity attended the

admission of the amended Informations. They claim that
the prosecution failed to conduct a preliminary
investigation for the upgraded crime of murder and
frustrated murder. This claim lacks basis.
Evidence on record reveals that when private
complainants filed a motion for re-investigation to
upgrade the charge to murder and frustrated murder, in
the course thereof, the prosecutor who handled the
reinvestigation18conducted another preliminary
investigation. "Subpoenas were issued and sent to both
contending parties requiring them to appear and be
present on the scheduled date and time for the said reinvestigation, and to present, or submit, their evidence
in support of their complaints and defense,
respectively." 19 The prosecutor propounded clarificatory
questions to the prosecution witnesses revealing the
necessity to raise the category of the criminal charge to
murder and frustrated murder.
Appellants likewise alleged that the procedure followed
by the trial court in resolving their petitions for bail
departed from the usual course of judicial proceedings,
because the prosecution presented its evidence ahead
of appellants, and the presentation of the prosecution
took 10 months from January 27 to October 30, 1995,
while the accused were afforded only two days to rebut
the prosecution evidence. This allegation is misplaced.
In hearing the petition for bail, the prosecution has the
burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong.
Section 8, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court specifically
provides that the burden of proof in bail application lies
in the prosecution, thus"Section 8, Burden of proof in bail application.At the hearing of an application for admission
to bail filed by any person who is in custody for
the commission of an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
the prosecution has the burden of showing that
evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence
presented during the bail hearings shall be
considered automatically reproduced at the
trial, but upon motion of either party, the court
may recall any witness for additional
examination unless the witness is dead,
outside of the Philippines or otherwise unable
to testify."
In bail proceedings, the prosecution must be given
ample opportunity to show that the evidence of guilt is
strong. While the proceeding is conducted as a regular
trial, it must be limited to the determination of the
bailability of the accused. It should be brief and speedy,
lest the purpose for which it is available is rendered
nugatory. Antecedents of this case show that the case
was initially raffled to Branch 24, RTC, Bian, Laguna,
and then transferred to RTC San Pedro, Laguna. From
the filing of the two (2) criminal Informations, several
motions and petitions were received by the trial court,
which include, among others, application for bail,
motion for re-investigation, motion to inhibit and change
of venue, motion to transfer appellants from the
municipal jail to Sta. Cruz provincial jail, petition for
review filed with the Department of Justice and motion
for postponements. In the course of hearing the petition
for bail, several petitions and motions cluttered the
records of the trial court. In fact, the records of the case
were not immediately forwarded to RTC San Pedro,
Laguna when the hearing was transferred. We have
scoured the records of this case and we found that the
delay was caused by these factors. These, however, did
not justify the length of time consumed by the
prosecution in the presentation of its evidence because
the trial court, exercising its discretion, ought to control
the course of bail proceedings, "avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination
of witnesses, and reducing to a reasonable minimum the
amount of corroboration particularly on details that are
not essential to the purpose of the hearing."20 While the
prosecution tarried too long, such fact did not amount to
a denial of due process because bail is granted only
"where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or
innocent,"21 which is not attendant in this case.
Appellants also challenge their transfer from the
municipal jail in Bian, Laguna, to the provincial jail in

Sta. Cruz, Laguna. The transfer of appellants to the Sta.

Cruz provincial jail was sought for because during the
scheduled hearings, appellants were always
late.22 Considering that the jail guards in the municipal
jail at Bian reasoned that they are undermanned, thus,
late in going to court, the trial court deemed it best to
transfer appellants to the provincial jail. Besides, the
trial court took cognizance of the fact that appellants
complained of poor jail facilities in Bian,
Laguna.23 Circumstances surrounding this case justify
appellants transfer to the provincial jail for the purpose
of insuring the speedy disposition of the case.
Appellants claim that no evidence was presented by the
prosecution to prove the allegations in the amended
information, and that "there is nothing in the records of
these cases which support the statement of the court a
quo that "the documentary evidence, as well as the
testimonies of the xxx witnesses presented by the
prosecution in a petition for bail, was considered as
automatically reproduced at the trial on the main
cases",24 is misleading.
On May 30, 1995, the trial court declared that the
evidence presented during the bail hearings are
considered automatically reproduced at the trial of the
main case.25 In fact, Section 8, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court specifically provides that "the evidence presented
during the bail hearings shall be considered
automatically reproduced at the trial." The mandate of
the Rules is clear and there is no need for the trial court
to issue an order so that the evidence presented in the
bail proceedings may be considered automatically
reproduced at the trial.
Appellants contend that they were deprived of their
rights to be heard and to present evidence with the
issuance of the trial court Order dated February 24,
1997. As culled from the records, appellants were
protracting the trial by filing motions for postponement
on scheduled hearings. On February 24,1997, the
scheduled date for appellants presentation of additional
evidence, appellants filed a motion for leave to file
demurrer to evidence and set the same for hearing on
that same day.26 It bears stressing that judicial action on
a motion to dismiss, or demurrer to evidence, is left to
the exercise of sound judicial discretion.27 The trial
court, mindful of the violation of the three-day notice
rule by appellants, declared that the trial court must be
given time to resolve the motion, and ordered the
parties to proceed with the hearing, without prejudice to
the outcome of the motion. The trial court emphasized
that there should be a limitation or an end to
unnecessary postponements. Thus, it disclosed that
when the Court of Appeals denied appellants "Petition
for Certiorari" with a prayer for temporary restraining
order,28 no legal hindrance existed to defer the
scheduled hearings. Appellants were given all the
opportunity to be heard and defend their cause but
opted not to utilize the same by its continued refusal to
proceed with the trial. Nevertheless, appellants were
given time to file their formal offer of exhibits to bolster
their defense.29 This negates the appellants claim of
denial of due process.
Second error
Appellants fault the trial court in accepting the
prosecutions version. This Court is convinced that
appellants are guilty of the crime charged. Appellants
Dalvir Singh admitted stabbing the deceased and
wounding Dilbag Singh, which was claimed to have been
caused while grappling for the possession of the knife.
This version invoking the justifying circumstance of selfdefense must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence.30 After invoking self-defense, for exculpation,
appellants have the burden of proving their allegation to
substantiate such assertion, which they failed to do so.
In addition, their imputation of alleged discrepancy
between the sworn statement executed by private
complainants Dilbag and Jaswinder Singh on November
26, 1993, and their joint sworn statement executed on
December 13, 1993,31 is not impressed with merit.
Reviews of both sworn statements negate any
inconsistency. Immediately after the incident, private
complainants Dilbag and Jaswinder Singh, reported the
circumstances surrounding the death of Surinder Singh,
and the stab wound sustained by Dilbag Singh to police
authorities.32 Both of them revealed the presence of all

the appellants and disclosed their participation in the

incident. On November 26, 1993, their narrations
collectively and individually demonstrate appellants
concerted action to inflict injury upon private
complainant Dilbag Singh and the deceased Surinder
Singh. In fine, we quote with approval, the trial courts
findings, holding all the appellants guilty of murder and
frustrated murder, thus" x x x prosecution evidence has established
that Surinder Singh was stabbed in the
stomach by accused Dalvir Singh while the
former was being held on his arms by accused
Dial Singh and Johinder Singh, and pushed on
his back by accused Kuldip Singh. At that
juncture, accused Malkit Singh Dhillon and
Jarnail Singh held lead pipes, accused
Balwinder Singh, a big bolo-like knife, accused
Gurmok Singh, a small bolo-like knife, and
Amarjit Singh, a hand gun. Also, accused
Mohinder Singh shouted kill him, Im
responsible, I will bring you out of trouble in
Punjabi and the rest of the accused remarked
come on, kill him, kill him also in Punjabi.
While all these acts were transpiring, accused
Amarjit Singh threatened to shoot anybody
who will help with the gun that he was holding.
After he was stabbed, Surinder Singh was still
hit with lead pipes by accused Malkit Singh
Dhillon and Jarnail Singh and boxed and kicked
by Johinder Singh and Dial Singh and pushed at
his back by Kuldip Singh. When Dilbag pleaded
with the accused not to hit anymore (sic)
Surinder Singh, he, too, was stabbed on his
back by Balwinder Singh followed by an
attempt to stab him also by Gurmok Singh.
Evidently, the foregoing concerted acts
sufficiently demonstrated a common purpose
or design to kill Surinder Singh and Dilbag
Singh with treachery. As held in a number of
cases, there is treachery when offender
commits any of the crimes against person,
employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof, without risk to himself from
the defense which the offended party might
make. xxx xxx xxx Thus, treachery which was
alleged in the informations, qualifies the killing
of Surinder Singh to murder and the inflicting
of a mortal wound on Dilbag Singh with intent
to kill to frustrated murder. Where criminal
conspiracy is shown to exist, all the
conspirators are liable as co-principals
regardless of the extent and character of their
participation, in contemplation of law, the act
of one conspirator is the act of all xxx xxx xxx
and the participation in all details of execution
of the crime is not necessary for such a finding.
xxx xxx xxx Although superior strength is
found to be attendant in the killing of Surinder
Singh and wounding of Dilbag Singh, it is
deemed absorbed in treachery and is not
appreciated as a separate aggravating
circumstances. As regards the circumstance of
evident premeditation, prosecution evidence
failed to show when accused meditated and
reflected upon their decision to kill their
victims. In short, it cannot also be appreciated
because there is wanting of any direct
evidence of the planning and the preparation
to kill."33

moral damages38 in the amount of P50,000.00 for the

suffering he endured from appellants felonious acts.
In Criminal Case No. 8683 for murder, the following
amount of actual damages were duly proven
P16,500.00 funeral expenses39 and air ticket/freight of
the cadaver $600.27.40 The amount of P400.00 for
hospitalization expenses should be deleted for not being
supported by evidence. The trial courts award of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 moral
damages are affirmed. The award of P500,000.00 as
attorneys fees41 and P5,760,000 as compensation for
loss of earning capacity, are likewise deleted for lack of
basis. Awards for loss of earning capacity partake of
damages which must be proven not only by credible and
satisfactory evidence, but also by unbiased proof. 42 The
testimony of Balwinder Singh Gill, first cousin of the
deceased, on the alleged income of the deceased while
in the Philippines, is not enough. The best evidence to
substantiate income earned by foreigners while in the
Philippines is the payment of taxes with the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. Absent such proof, bare allegation is
insufficient. Nevertheless, considering that the definite
proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered, and the fact
of loss has been established, appellants shall pay the
heirs of Surinder Singh temperate damages43 in the
amount of P200,000.00.
WHEREFORE, in accordance with the foregoing
disquisition, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed subject to the following modifications1. In Criminal Case No. 8682 for frustrated murder,
appellants shall only be liable to pay
a. P370.50 for hospitalization expenses;
b. P50,000.00, as moral damages, plus costs;
and,
2. In Criminal Case No. 8683 for murder, in addition to
the civil indemnity, moral damages and attorneys fees
awarded by the trial court, appellants shall paya. P16,500.00, as funeral expenses;
b. $600.27, as air ticket/freight of the cadaver,
to be computed at the prevailing rate of
exchange at the time of the promulgation of
this decision; and,
c. P200,000.00, as temperate damages, plus
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-93-796 August 2, 1996

The other errors allegedly committed by the trial court
call for the calibration of credibility of witnesses, which
we find no reason to disturb since it is best left to the
trial court to pass upon, having had the opportunity to
observe firsthand the demeanor and actuation of the
witnesses while on the witness stand.34

HON. ALFREDO Y. CHU, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE ANA MARIA I. DOLALAS, MCTC, KabasalanSiay-Payao, Zamboanga del Sur, respondent.
RESOLUTION

Third error
In Criminal Case No. 8682 for frustrated murder, the
trial court awarded private complainant Dilbag Singh
the amount of P16,000.00 representing his
hospitalization and medical expenses, and P 30,000.00
as attorneys fees. For his hospitalization and medical
expenses, the receipts submitted to support said claim
amounted only to P370.50.35 Hence, private complainant
Dilbag Singh is entitled only to the said amount. 36 The
award of attorneys fees is hereby
deleted.37 Nonetheless, private complaint is entitled to

KAPUNAN, J.:p
In a letter-complaint to the Court Administrator
dated December 4, 1992, complainant Alfredo
Chu, Municipal Mayor of Kabasalan,
Zamboanga del Sur, charged respondent Ana
Maria Dolalas, Municipal Circuit Trial Judge of

Kabasalan-Siay-Payao, Zamboanga del Sur,

with (a) tardiness and tolerating the habitual
tardiness of court personnel resulting in the
uncontrollable clogging of cases in
respondent's court and (b) grave abuse of
discretion in requiring bail of fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) each for all accused in
Criminal Case No. 6255 entitled "People of the
Philippines versus Yoga Guerrero, et al." for
Robbery with Violence Against or Intimidation
of Persons. 1
Required by the Deputy Court Administrator to
comment on the complaint, the respondent
judge in a latter to the Court dated January 22,
1993 alleged that the complaint was in
retaliation to an incident involving herein
complainant and respondent judge which
occurred on December 3, 1992. On that day,
complainant barged into the respondent
judge's chamber while she was conducting an
investigation and angrily protested as
excessive the bail required of all the accused in
Criminal Case No. 6255. She claimed to have
politely explained her action to complainant
and even suggested that the accused file
motions for reduction of bail. However,
complainant refused to be appeased. This led
to a heated exchange of words. Respondent
judge said that in order to uphold the dignity of
her court, she sternly chastised complainant for
his behavior and penchant for insulting people.
Thereafter, complainant left. In her comment,
respondent judge affixed a joint affidavit of
three witnesses to the incident, Fatima Ahmad,
Generosa Vesagas and Leticia Tamparong, who
corroborated her version of the incident.
Respondent judge, likewise, denied the charge
of habitual tardiness. She explained that the
nature of her assignments demanded flexibility
in her office hours and working days
considering that in addition to her regular
circuit, she was also designated to hear cases
coming from the municipalities of Siay, Payao,
Naga, Tilay, Ipil, Tungawan and R.T. Lim. She
claimed party litigants consulted with her not
only on working days and during office hours
but on numerous occasions, even on Saturdays
and Sundays and in some instances even while
she was on the road enroute to work. She also
explained that the court employees,
particularly the Clerk of Court and Process
Server, were usually out of the office because
of the nature of their work. Respondent judge
believed that the P50,000.00 bail is not
excessive. She justified her action by pointing
out that the robbery was committed at
nighttime, with violence and intimidation of
persons, use of force upon property, use of
water transport, bladed weapons and firearms.
She asseverated that she conducted the
required preliminary investigation, observed
the procedures required in Section 6 (b), Rule
112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure and
even dropped the charges against some of the
accused after finding that there was no
probable cause to warrant the charges. 2
On February 14, 1994, by resolution of this
Court, herein administrative case was referred
to Executive Judge Sergio Apostol of the
Regional Trial Court, Zamboanga del Sur, for
investigation, report and recommendation.
In his report and recommendation dated May
18, 1994, Executive Judge Apostol
recommended that the case against
respondent judge be dismissed after finding
the charges of tardiness and grave abuse of
discretion baseless and untenable. 3
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), to
which the case was referred for evaluation,
report and recommendation, found respondent
judge not guilty of tardiness but found that she
acted with grave abuse of discretion in
imposing the P50,000.00 on each of the
accused in Criminal Case No. 6255. In a

memorandum signed by Deputy Court

Administrator Juanito A. Bernad and approved
by Court Administrator Ernani Cruz Pao, the
OCA stated:
After a careful study of the records, we
conclude that the charge of tardiness
which caused the clogging of the
respondent's docket cannot be
established. The complainant failed to
present evidence to substantiate said
charge. On the other hand, the
respondent Judge's case disposal for
the year 1992, the year this
administrative complaint was filed, is
sufficient to belie the allegation that
she usually arrives late in the office
resulting in the clogging of her docket.
Per verification with the Statistics
Division, this Court, it was revealed
that the respondent Judge in the year
1992 had an average case disposal of
11.25 a month.
The allegation that the respondent
Judge tolerated the habitual tardiness
of her personnel is likewise
unsubstantiated. The investigating
Judge himself failed to show in his
report that the said complaint is
meritorious.
After a re-evaluation of the case, we
found that the charge against
respondent Judge for grave abuse of
discretion for imposing bail amounting
to fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
for each of the accused in the robbery
with violence and intimidation of
persons to be meritorious.
Under Section 6, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
the Judge who issued or granted the
application for bail shall fix a
reasonable amount of bail considering
primarily, but not limited to the
following guidelines:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to
give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the
offense;
(c) Penalty of the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the
accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) The weight of the evidence against
the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused
appearing for trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bonds;
(i) The fact that accused was a
fugitive from justice when arrested;
and
(j) The pendency of other cases in
which the accused is under bond.
Same provision likewise prohibits the
granting of excessive bail.
For fixing the same amount of bail of
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) for
eighteen (18) accused (Rollo, p. 213),
respondent Judge violated the above-

cited provision of the 1985 Rules on

Criminal Procedure. If the respondent
Judge, in determining the amount of
bail takes into consideration, among
others, the financial ability of the
accused to give bail, the character
and reputation of the accused, the age
and health of the accused and the
pendency of other cases in which the
accused is under bond, then, the bail
bond fixed should not be similar for
the 18 accused charged with the
crime of Robbery with violence and
intimidation of persons. Not all of the
18 accused are similarly situated so
the above-mentioned factors have to
be considered in fixing the amount of
bail for their provisional liberty.
Moreover, under Ministry Circular No.
8 issued by the Department of Justice
on April 29, 1985 (formerly the
applicable circular is Circular No. 10
but Circular 10-A [revising Circular No.
10] provides that the Bail Bond Guide
of 1981, as provided in Ministry
Circular No. 36, series of 1981, as
amended in Ministry Circular No. 8,
series of 1985, shall be used in fixing
the amount of bail for other offenses
not mentioned in Circular 10-A) the
bail bond fixed or recommended for
the provisional release of the accused
is computed at one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00) per year of imprisonment
based on themaximum penalty
imposable for the offense. The circular
though addressed to prosecutors
should also be observed by the courts
due to its significance in the
administration of criminal justice
(People vs. Resterio-Andrade G.R. No.
79827, July 31, 1989, Third Division,
175 SCRA 782).
As provided for in Article 294 (5) of
the Revised Penal Code the crime of
Robbery with Violence against or
intimidation of persons carries with it
a penalty of prison correccional in its
maximum period to prison mayor in
its medium period. Prison
correccional maximum is equivalent to
4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6
years, while prision mayor medium is
equivalent to 8 years and 1 day to 10
years. The maximum period of the
said penalty is 8 years, 21 days to 10
years. Therefore, if the maximum
imposable penalty for the said crime is
8 years, 21 days to 10 years the
maximum amount of bail that can be
imposed, based on guidelines laid
down in Ministry Circular No. 8, series
of 1985, is only ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00).
Though there are still other factors
stated in section 6, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
that have to be considered in fixing
the amount of bail, the bail amounting
to P50,000.00 is considerably high
taking into consideration the
P10,000.00 bail computed using the
guidelines provided for by the
Department of Justice. 4
We agree with the foregoing observations of
the OCA. In imposing the unreasonable
excessive amount of bail on the accused,
respondent judge disregarded the guidelines
laid down in Section 9 (formerly Section 6),
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court on Criminal
Procedure. Obviously, she failed to take into
consideration the penalty for the offense
charged, the financial ability of the accused to
give bail, the nature and circumstances of the
offense charged and the weight of evidence
against them. From the records, it is evident

that respondent judge herself was cognizant of

the facts surrounding Criminal Case No. 6255,
in that, Robert Roble, one of the accused in
said robbery case, is the son of Mrs. Emma
Vda. de Roble who was one of the claimants
and who was in actual possession of the
fishpond in question. In fact, respondent judge
even wrote to the Chief of Police of Kabasalan,
Zamboanga del Sur sometime in November,
1992 asking the latter to assist Mrs. Emma
Vda. de Roble in entering the fishpond in
question. 5 It appears that as a consequence of
the harvesting of fish from the fishpond by
Emma Vda. de Roble and her workers that the
case for Robbery with Violence Against or
Intimidation was filed against the accused in
Criminal Case No. 6255. If Mrs. Roble was a
claimant of the fishpond, this fact might negate
unlawful taking, which is an element of the
crime charged. Therefore, the weight of
evidence against the accused, which is one of
the factors to be considered in the fixing of the
amount of bail, should have been considered in
their favor. Notably, the maximum imposable
penalty for the crime charged is only 8 years
and 21 days to 10 years. Following Department
of Justice guidelines that the amount of bail
must be computed at P1,000.00 for every year
of the imposable maximum penalty, the
amount of bail in the case at bar should not
exceed P10,000.00. Finally, the records bear no
allegations of other circumstances adverse to
the accused that would warrant a higher bail
bond, i.e., character and reputation of the
accused, the probability of their appearing in
court, their being fugitives from justice when
arrested, and pendency of other cases against
them also under bond.
The aforesaid guidelines have been explained
and elaborated in Villaseor v. Abao 6 wherein
the Court declared that:
In the matter of bail fixing, courts
perforce are to be guided at all times
by the purpose for which bail is
required. The definition of bail in
Section 1, Rule 114, Rules of Court,
gives this purpose "the security
required and given for the release of a
person who is in the custody of the
law, that he will appear before any
court in which his appearance may be
required as stipulated in the bail bond
or recognizance." And, in amplification
thereof, Section 2 of the same rule
states that the condition of the bail is
that "defendant shall answer the
complaint or information in the court
in which it is filed or to which it may
be transferred for trial, and after
conviction, if the case is appealed to
the Court of First Instance upon
application supported by an
undertaking or bail, that he will
surrender himself in execution of such
judgment as the appellate court may
render, or that, in case cause is to be
tried anew or remanded for a new
trial, he will appear in the court to
which it may be remanded and submit
himself to the orders and processes
thereof."
Expressions in varying language spell
out in a general way the principles
governing bail fixing. One is that the
amount should be high enough to
assure the presence of defendant
when required but no higher than is
reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose. Another is that "the good of
the public as well as the rights of the
accused," and "the need for a tie to
the jurisdiction and the right to
freedom from unnecessary restraint
before conviction under the
circumstances surrounding each
particular accused", should all be
balanced in one equation.

We are not to consider solely the

inability of a defendant to secure bail
in a certain amount. This
circumstance by itself does not make
the amount excessive. For, where an
accused has no means of his own, no
one to bail him out, or none to turn to
for premium payments, any amount
fixed no matter how small would fall
into the category of excessive bail;
and, he "would be entitled to be
discharged on his own recognizance."
So it is, that experience has brought
forth certain guidelines in bail fixing,
which may be summarized as follows:
(1) ability of the accused to give bail;
(2) nature of the offense; (3) penalty
for the offense charged; (4) character
and reputation of the accused; (5)
health of the accused; (6) character
and strength of the evidence; (7)
probability of the accused appearing
in trial; (8) forfeiture of other bonds;
(9) whether the accused was a
fugitive from justice when arrested;
and (10) if the accused in under bond
for appearance at trial in other cases.
But, at bottom, in bail fixing, "the
principal factor considered, to the
determination of which most other
factors are directed, is the probability
of the appearance of the accused, or
of his flight to avoid punishment." Of
importance then is the possible
penalty that may be meted. Of course,
penalty depends to a great extent
upon the gravity of offense. 7
The Department of Justice has also issued
similar guidelines in its Circular No. 8 which
provides, thusly:
April 29, 1985
MINISTRY CIRCULAR NO. 8
TO: ALL PROVINCIAL/CITY FISCALS,
THEIR
ASSISTANTS AND STATE
PROSECUTORS
SUBJECT: FIXING THE AMOUNT OF BAIL
The amount of bail for various
offenses as fixed in the Bail Bond
Guide of 1981 which was issued
pursuant to Ministry Circular No. 36,
series of 1981, is no longer realistic
considering that the value of the peso
has undergone a marked depreciation
in the past years. In most instances,
the amount of bail provided in the Bail
Bond Guide of 1981 has become so
low that persons facing charges in
court forfeit their bail by intentionally
failing to appear in court when
required or by jumping bail.
To give more meaning and force to the
law on bail, therefore, you are hereby
directed to recommend bail for the
provisional release of an accused in an
amount computed at One Thousand
Pesos (P1,000.00) per year of
imprisonment based on
the maximum penalty imposable for
the offense. Thus, the amount of bail
in a case of homicide which is
punishable by reclusion temporal (12
years and 1 day to 20 years of
imprisonment) shall be P20,000.00.
In crime punishable with a penalty of
less than one (1) year of
imprisonment, the bail shall be

computed at P100.00 per month

based on the maximum of the
imposable penalty.
xxx xxx xxx
Ministry Circular No. 36, series of
1981, is hereby, modified accordingly.

ESTELIT
Minis
Though the above-cited circular is addressed to
fiscals, their assistants and state prosecutors,
the same is instructive to members of the
bench who are called upon by law to discharge
the important function of bail fixing. In People
v. Resterio-Andrade, 8 we said this about
another Department of Justice Circular on bail:
Although Circular No. 10 is addressed
to fiscals and prosecutors, courts must
not only be aware but should also
consider it due to its significance in
the administration of criminal justice. .
. . While technically not binding upon
the courts, Circular No. 10 merits
attention, being in a sense an
expression of policy of the Executive
Branch, through the Department of
Justice, in the enforcement of criminal
laws. 9
Indeed, discretion and latitude is given to a
court called upon to rule on the question of
bail. However, where conditions imposed upon
an accused or defendant seeking bail are so
rigid and prohibitive, i.e., when the amount of
bail is excessive, as to amount to a refusal
thereof, the constitutional right to bail is
rendered nugatory.
Consequently, respondent judge committed
grave abuse of discretion in fixing the amount
of P50,000.00 each as bail for the provisional
liberty of all the accused in Criminal Case No.
6255.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent judge is hereby
ADMONISHED to be more careful and
circumspect in the performance of her duties
and is warned that the commission of a similar
offense in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1427

February 27, 2003

MODESTO MAGSUCANG, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE ROLANDO V. BALGOS, MTC, Hinigaran,
Negros Occidental, respondent.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
In a letter-complaint dated November 18, 2000 and
addressed to the Secretary of the Department of Interior
and Local Government, complainant Modesto
Magsucang charged Judge Rolando Balgos, Presiding
Judge, MTC, Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, of bias and
partiality, grave abuse of discretion, requiring excessive
bail, and violation of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

It appears from the records that on May 10, 2000, a

certain Pepito Lim, owner of the Ace Fishing Corporation,
filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft against
complainant's daughter, Rosalie Magsucang, allegedly
for misappropriating cash amounting to P11,200, with
grave abuse of confidence. The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 1593. Subsequently, respondent
judge, before whom the preliminary investigation was
conducted, issued a warrant of arrest. Bail was set at
P30,000. On May 11, 2000, Rosalie was arrested.
Complainant posted bail for his daughter from the
proceeds of the sale of his banca and with money
borrowed from friends.
Meanwhile, more cases for qualified theft were filed by
Mr. Lim against Rosalie. These cases were docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 1608, 1609, 1610, 1611, 1612,
1613, 1634, and 1635. After preliminary investigations
were conducted in these cases, corresponding warrants
of arrest were issued by respondent judge. In Criminal
Case No. 1635, bail was set at P24,000. Neither Modesto
nor Rosalie had money to pay for bail so Rosalie
remained incarcerated.
Complainant faults respondent judge for allegedly
committing irregularities in the conduct of the
preliminary investigation when respondent judge
administered the oath to Pepito Lim and for having sent
Rosalie to prison without the benefit of a hearing.
According to complainant, when respondent judge
issued several subpoenas on June 2, 2000, requiring
Rosalie to file her counter-affidavit in Criminal Case Nos.
1608 to 1613, inclusive, he likewise committed grave
abuse of discretion since he failed to consider that
Rosalie was, at the time, locked in jail and incapable of
defending herself in court. Lastly, complainant states
that respondent judge violated applicable rules and
regulation when he required excessive bail.
On November 10, 2000, the letter-complaint was
referred to the Office of the Court Administrator. On
January 25, 2001, then Court Administrator Alfredo L.
Benipayo required respondent judge to file his
comment.
In his comment, respondent maintained that the rules of
procedure were followed in the filing of the criminal
complaints against Rosalie Magsucang. Criminal Cases
Nos. 1608, 1609, 1610, 1611, 1612, 1613, 1634 and
1635, all for qualified theft, were filed against Rosalie
after Criminal Case No. 1593. In all these later cases,
Rosalie filed her counter-affidavit and that of her witness
only after she was already arrested. There is, therefore,
no truth to the complainant's allegation that respondent
judge acted pursuant to a conscious effort to defeat the
bail posted in Criminal Case No. 1593. He added that
Rosalie virtually disappeared after posting bail in
Criminal Case No. 1593; she was only arrested after an
intensive police effort to find her.
Respondent further declared that, excluding Criminal
Cases Nos. 1634 and 1635, which were dismissed, he
found probable cause to hold Rosalie Magsucang liable
for eight (8) counts of qualified theft. The resolution and
the records of the case have been transmitted to the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Bacolod City for
review.1a\^/phi1.net
The incumbent Court Administrator, Justice Presbitero
Velasco, found respondent judge innocent of the
charges contained in the letter-complaint, except the
charge related to excessive bail. Justice Velasco
recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter and that the respondent judge be
fined in the amount of P2,000.
The parties were asked to manifest whether they agree
to submit the case for decision on the basis of the
pleadings on record. Respondent agreed. Complainant
did not respond and is deemed to have no objection
thereto. We shall now resolve the issues raised in the
complaint.1awphi1.nt
First, as to the charge that respondent judge acted with
bias and partiality, we find that complainant failed to
substantiate his claim. Other than the letter-complaint,
no evidence was introduced clearly pointing to an act
manifestly favoring private complainant Pepito Lim and

injuring the rights of accused Rosalie Magsucang.

In Araos vs. Luna-Pison,1 we held that the absence of
any evidence showing that the respondent judge acted
in bad faith, ill-will, or malice reduces the charges
against him into a mere indictment. Charges based on
mere suspicion and speculation cannot be given
credence.2
Well to remember as investigating officer the
respondent judge is given the latitude to determine if
there exists probable cause that would warrant either
the filing of the corresponding information or the
outright dismissal of the case. Although there is no
general formula or fixed rule for the determination of
probable cause since it must be decided in the light of
the conditions obtaining in a given case, its existence
depends to a large degree on the findings or opinion of
the judge conducting the investigation.
Mere allegations in the complaint must be supported by
evidence to prove that a judge has overstepped the
parameters of his official prerogative. Here, we find that
complainant has failed to present any evidence to
corroborate his assertion that respondent judge is guilty
of committing irregularities in the conduct of the
preliminary investigation.
Section 3 (a)3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
specifically provides that the complaint-affidavits shall
be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or
government official authorized to administer oaths. Said
section likewise provides that it is the duty of the
prosecutor or other government official to certify that he
personally examined the affiants and he is satisfied that
they voluntarily executed and understood their
affidavits. It is clear that respondent judge has
performed his duty pursuant to existing rules.
A judge enjoys the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his function no less than any other
public officer.4 The presumption of regularity of official
acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty.5 The
presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by
no less than clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary.6 Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it
becomes conclusive.7 Every reasonable intendment will
be made in support of the presumption and in case of
doubt as to an officer's act being lawful or unlawful,
construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.8
As to the charge of grave abuse of discretion in issuing
six (6) subpoenas on June 2, 2000, we find the charge
bereft of merit. There is nothing in the rules prohibiting
respondent judge from issuing subpoenas to Rosalie
requiring her to file her counter-affidavits to the
complaints filed against her. In fact the respondent
judge is bound to do so in the, course of processing the
complaints. The six (6) subpoenas correspond to the
number of complaints filed against her.
As to the remaining charge, we agree with the OCA.
Respondent judge required excessive bail in this case,
i.e., Criminal Case No. 1635.
Section 9 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides that
in fixing the amount of bail in criminal cases, judges
shall primarily consider the following factors: (a)
financial ability of the accused to give bail; (b) nature
and circumstances of the offense; (c) penalty for the
offense charged; (d) character and reputation of the
accused; (e) age and health of the accused; (f) weight of
the evidence against the accused; (g) probability of the
accused appearing at the trial; (h) forfeiture of other
bail; (i) the fact that the accused was a fugitive from
justice when arrested; and (j) pendency of other cases
where the accused is on bail.
The amount of bail should be 'reasonable at all times.
Excessive bail shall not be required.9 In implementing
this mandate, regard should be taken Of the prisoner's
pecuniary circumstances. That which is reasonable bail
to a man of wealth may be unreasonable to a poor man
charged with a like offense. Where the right to bail
exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a
sum that is excessive.10 The amount should be high
enough to assure the presence of defendant when

required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to

fulfill this purpose.11
In this case, the respondent judge failed to consider that
Rosalie Magsucang is illiterate, the daughter of a poor
fisherman. She had very limited financial ability to post
bail. In Criminal Case No. 1635, one of the nine cases
that came after Criminal Case No. 1593, Rosalie
Magsucang was accused of stealing only P4,300.
Indeed, each of the ten (10) cases carried separate
warrants of arrest, each with its own recommended
amount of bail. In fixing the unreasonably excessive
amount of bail at P24,000 in the last cited case, it is
clear that the respondent judge disregarded the
guidelines provided by the Rules of Court. In the same
breath that Rosalie was told she could be bailed out, she
was practically denied the means to do so. The
excessive amount required could only mean that her
provisional liberty would be beyond her reach. This is
ironic, like categorically telling her that she could not
avail of the right to bail. It appears respondent did not
pay heed to the admonition that the court should not
permit any act or omission which undermines public
faith and confidence in the judiciary. 12
Coming now to the recommended penalty by the OCA,
the amount ofP2,000 does not appear to be
commensurate with respondent's infraction. Setting
excessive bail evinces disregard of pertinent rules and
regulations. Considering that bail involves a basic right
of the accused, this Court finds that a higher penalty
should be imposed. Thus, the fine should be set at
P5,00013 as more appropriate in view of the violation
proved.
WHEREFORE, respondent Presiding Judge Rolando
Balgos, MTC, Hinigaran, Negros Occidental is found
liable for requiring excessive bail and is hereby FINED
the amount of P5,000.00, with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with
more severely.
Let this decision be made a part of the personnel record
of the respondent judge.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1321

March 10, 2004

VICTORY LINER, INC., represented by JOHNNY T.

HERNANDEZ, President, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE REYNALDO B. BELLOSILLO, respondent.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

For our resolution is the verified complaint of Victory
Liner, Inc. (VLI) against respondent Judge Reynaldo B.
Bellosillo, then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC) of Orani, Bataan, and Acting Presiding
Judge of the MCTC of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan, for
gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority,
oppression, and inaction on a pending motion.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On 2 March 2000, while a Victory Liner bus bearing Plate
No. CWF-935 was cruising along the National Highway of
Dinalupihan, Bataan, it accidentally hit and fatally
injured Marciana Bautista Morales. Marciana died the

following day. VLI shouldered all the funeral and burial

expenses of Marciana. Subsequently, on 6 March 2000,
VLI and the heirs of the victim entered into an
Agreement/Undertaking.1 On 14 March 2000, after
payment by VLI of the claims, Faustina M. Antonio, the
authorized and designated representative of the heirs of
the victim, executed aRelease of Claim2 and an Affidavit
of Desistance3 in favor of VLI and the driver Reino de la
Cruz.
However, earlier or on 3 March 2000, two of Marcianas
sons Rolando B. Soriano and Jimmy B. Morales, who
were also signatories to the Agreement/Undertaking,
executed a Pinagsamang Salaysay4 against Reino de la
Cruz. On the strength of that document, a criminal
complaint was filed with the MCTC of DinalupihanHermosa, Bataan, for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide,5 which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
10512.
After preliminary examination, or on 13 March 2000,
respondent Judge Bellosillo ordered the immediate
issuance of a warrant of arrest against De la Cruz and
fixed his bail at P50,000 to be posted in cash. He further
directed the Chief of Police of Dinalupihan, Bataan, to
immediately impound the bus involved in the accident,
which could be released only upon the posting of a cash
bond in the amount of P50,000.6
On 30 March 2000, VLI filed a Manifestation and
Motion7 manifesting that it was depositing to the court
under protest a cash bond of P50,000 for the release of
its bus. After making the deposit, VLIs counsel
presented the receipt issued by the Clerk of Court of
MCTC, Dinalupihan, to the Chief of Police of Dinalupihan,
Bataan, who then released the bus.
On 4 April 2000, VLI filed with respondents court a
petition8 to declare null and void the order directing it to
post bond for the release of its bus. This petition was,
however, dismissed for improper venue and lack of
jurisdiction.
On that same day also, respondent Judge Bellosillo
issued an order directing the Chief of Police of
Dinalupihan, Bataan, and his deputies and investigators
to explain in writing why they should not be held in
contempt of court for, and be administratively charged
with, having released without a court order the Victory
Liner bus involved in Criminal Case No. 10512. Thus, the
bus was re-impounded by the police authorities of
Dinalupihan, Bataan.
Subsequently, on 18 April 2000, respondent Judge acted
on VLIs Manifestation and Motion dated 30 March 2000
and issued an order9 for the release of the bus.
On 23 June 2000, VLI filed a verified complaint 10 with the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) claiming that the
respondent (a) is guilty of gross ignorance of the law in
impounding its bus and requiring it to post a cash bond
for the release of the bus; (b) gravely abused his
authority when it revoked the surety bond of one of
VLIs driver Edwin Serrano in Criminal Case No. 9373; (c)
knowingly rendered an unjust and oppressive order
when he increased the bond to P350,000 and required
that it be posted in cash; (d) gravely abused his
authority when he ordered the police authorities of
Dinalupihan, Bataan, to file a case against Reino de la
Cruz; and (e) is guilty of inaction or dereliction of duty in
failing to resolve, despite the lapse of two months, VLIs
petition for the nullification of the order requiring the
posting of a cash bond for the release of the bus
involved in the accident. Later, VLI filed with the Office
of the Chief Justice a verified supplemental complaint
against the respondent, which was forthwith indorsed to
the OCA.
In his comment,11 respondent Judge Bellosillo explains
that in the exercise of his sound discretion and in the
greater interest of justice and fair play, he required a
cash bond of P50,000 for the release of the policeimpounded vehicle to answer for damages by way of
subsidiary liability in case of accuseds insolvency. The
requirement of a bond for the release of impounded
vehicles involved in reckless imprudence cases is
practiced not only by him but by other judges
throughout the country.

As for his order for the re-impounding of the Victory

Liner bus, respondent Judge claims that it was just
under the circumstances considering that its prior
release was illegal. The payment of cash bond for the
release of the impounded vehicle was made by the VLI
when respondent Judge was at his official station in the
MCTC of Orani-Samal, Bataan. Thus, in his absence, no
order could have been issued for the release of the
impounded vehicle. If ever said vehicle had to be reimpounded, it was the fault of VLIs counsel, as he was
the one who misled the police authorities into believing
that with the payment of the bond, the bus could
already be released.
The respondent justifies the substitution of the surety
bond of accused Edwin Serrano in Criminal Case No.
9373 with a cash bond on the strength of the prayer of
the prosecutor that the bond be posted in cash in view
of the gravity of the offense. The Rules of Court leave to
the discretion of trial judges the question of whether a
bail should be posted in the form of a corporate surety
bond, property bond, cash deposit, or personal
recognizance. Having found that Serranos surety bond,
which was not even attached to the information but
merely noted on the third page thereof, was in a
minimal amount and had expired already, he required a
cash bond. He increased the bond after considering that
Serrano was a fugitive from justice.
Respondent Judge Bellosillo denies that he ordered the
police authorities of Dinalupihan to file the criminal case
against Reino de la Cruz. He points to (a)
the Pinagsamang Salaysay dated 3 March 2000 of
Rolando B. Soriano and Jimmy B. Morales, which was the
basis for the filing of the criminal complaint by the
police investigator and; (b) the fact that said criminal
complaint filed by the police investigator was duly
approved by the Chief of Police. Thus, with these
circumstances, it could not be said that he compelled
the police authorities into filing the criminal case.
As to the charge of dereliction of duty for failure to act
on the petition for the nullification of the order requiring
a bond for the release of VLIs bus, respondent Judge
avers that the same is baseless. Contrary to VLIs
contention, he acted on that petition as early as 10 April
2000, which was the date set by VLIs counsel for the
hearing of such petition.12 VLIs counsel did not appear
on that date and refused to accept or receive notices of
hearing and court orders from court personnel.
In his Report and Recommendation, retired Justice
Narciso T. Atienza, the OCA Consultant to whom this
case was referred by the Court, submits that Judge
Bellosillos resignation, which was accepted by the
Court En Banceffective 27 March 2002, does not render
moot and academic the instant administrative
complaint. He finds that the respondent Judge erred in
ordering the impounding of the Victory Liner bus and in
requiring a cash bond of P50,000 for its release; in fixing
an excessive bail bond for Reino de la Cruz in Criminal
Case No. 10512; and in increasing the bail bond of
Edwin Serrano in Criminal Case No. 9373
unconscionably from P60,000 to P350,000. He then
recommends that the respondent Judge be penalized
with a fine of P20,000. But for lack of evidence, he
exonerates respondent Judge from complainants charge
that he compelled the police authorities into filing the
criminal case against De la Cruz. As to respondents
alleged inaction on VLIs petition to declare null and void
the order requiring a bond for the release of the subject
bus, Justice Atienza finds that the said petition was
resolved on 10 April 2000, right on the day it was
submitted for resolution. Likewise, he disregards the
additional charges in the supplemental complaint, there
being no showing that the respondent received a copy
thereof.
Justice Atienza also notes that in A.M. No. 00-1293,
promulgated on 5 July 2000, respondent Judge was
reprimanded for issuing a policy action and an order
beyond the scope of his authority; and in MTJ No. 001308, promulgated on 16 December 2002, respondent
Judge was found guilty of undue delay in rendering a
decision and was ordered to pay a fine of P11,000 to be
taken from his retirement benefits. He further notes the
pending administrative cases against respondent Judge:
(1) OCA IPI No. 96-232-MTJ for conduct unbecoming a
judge; (2)OCA IPI No. 98-533-MTJ for ignorance of the

law, grave abuse of discretion, and gross misconduct;

(3) OCA IPI No. 96-203-MTJ for issuing an unjust
interlocutory order and gross ignorance of the law;
(4) A.M. No. 99-1222 for violation of the constitutional
rights to information and to speedy trial; and (5)
undocketed cases for unprofessional and ill-mannered
conduct, refusing to receive documents, and illegal
possession of firearms.
Verily, the resignation of respondent Judge Bellosillo
does not render moot and academic the instant
administrative case. The jurisdiction that the Court had
at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint
is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent judge
ceased to be in office during the pendency of this case.
The Court retains its jurisdiction to pronounce the
respondent official innocent or guilty of the charges
against him. A contrary rule would be fraught with
injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous
implications.13
We agree with Justice Atienza in exonerating the
respondent from the charges of inaction on a pending
motion and of compelling the police authorities to file a
criminal case against De la Cruz. We, however, hesitate
to hold the respondent administratively accountable for
gross ignorance of the law in ordering (1) the
impounding of the vehicle involved in the vehicular
accident and (2) the posting of a P50,000 bond for the
release of the vehicle, both of which were found by OCA
Consultant Atienza to be erroneous.
Notably, in its Motion to Resolve, VLI submits that this
case presents a good occasion for us to resolve, among
other issues, "the legality of the imposition by trial
judges on bus operators to post bail bond for their
impounded vehicles in accident cases, in addition to the
bail bond required for the provisional liberty of accuseddrivers." According to VLI, our ruling on this matter
would guide trial court judges nationwide in accident
cases so that bus operators and their personnel would
not be at the mercy of judges like the respondent in this
case, who during his incumbency had been requiring
vehicle owners involved in accidents to post cash bonds
for the release of impounded vehicles.
In Lacadin v. Mangino,14 the respondent Judge therein
was sought to be administratively liable for extending
the lifetime of a search warrant issued by him. We held
that even if he may have committed an error of
judgment or an abuse of discretion for such act, he
cannot be punished administratively therefor in the
absence of proof that he was motivated by ignominy or
ill-will. Moreover, we ruled that the administrative case
is not the right forum to determine whether the life of a
search warrant may be extended by the court upon
proper motion filed before the expiration of the 10-day
period.
Worth noting also is the case of Caas v. Castigador.15 In
that case, an Isuzu trailer truck involved in a vehicular
mishap was ordered impounded in an Order of 11
September 1996 of the trial court where the criminal
case against its driver was pending. That order was
addressed to the Chief of Police of General Trias, Cavite,
or any officer of the law. In an earlier order of 14 August
1996, the vehicle owner was required to surrender the
truck to the court. Subsequently, on motion of the
prosecutor, the trial court declared the vehicle owner
guilty of indirect contempt for continued defiance of the
11 September 1996 Order. However, upon the vehicle
owners petition, we found respondents order holding
the petitioner therein guilty of indirect contempt to be
highly improper for several reasons. But we did not pass
upon the issue of the legality of the impounding of the
vehicle involved in the vehicular accident. We did not
declare the order for the impounding of the vehicle to
be illegal or unauthorized. If it were so, it could have
been one of the several reasons for admonishing the
respondent Judge therein.
In the same vein, this administrative case is not the
right forum to determine the issue of the legality of
respondents order requiring VLI to post a cash bond for
the release of its impounded vehicle. VLI should have
raised that issue in the proper courts and not directly to
us, and much less by way of an administrative case.
There is after all a hierarchy of courts. As we have said
in Santiago v. Vasquez,16 the propensity of litigants and

lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our

judicial system by seeking a ruling directly from us must
be put to a halt.17

f) The weight of the evidence against the

accused;
g) Probability of the accused appearing in trial;

It must be recalled that on 4 April 2000, VLI filed with

respondent judges court a Petition to Declare Order
Directing Victory Liner, Inc., to Post Bond for the Release
of the Bus Null and Void.18 In that petition, VLI submitted
that there is no legal basis for the order directing the
impounding of the bus and the posting by the bus owner
of a cash bond for its release, and hence that order is
void ab initio.19 However, despite notice, VLIs counsel
Atty. Reynaldo R. Romero did not appear on 10 April
2000, the schedule20 for the hearing of that petition as
set by him.21 The respondent thereupon issued an
order22 dismissing the petition outright on grounds of
improper venue and lack of jurisdiction, and ordering
that a copy of the said order be furnished VLIs counsel
at his given address. However, VLIs counsel reportedly
refused to accept or receive from court personnel
notices of hearing and court orders. And, according to
respondent Judge, he (VLIs counsel) never appeared
and continued not to appear before the respondent for
reasons known only to him.23 VLI cannot, therefore,
resurrect that issue directly before us, and much less
through a mere verified administrative complaint or
motion to resolve.
To allow VLI to raise that issue before us and obtain a
ruling thereon directly from us through an
administrative case would be to countenance a
disregard of the established rules of procedure and of
the hierarchy of courts. VLI would thus be able to evade
compliance with the requirements inherent in the filing
of a proper petition, including the payment of docket
fees. Hence, we shall shun from passing upon that issue
in this case.
In any event, the absence of a ruling in Caas v.
Castigador on the legality of the impounding of vehicles
involved in an accident, as well as the foregoing
statements of VLI in its Motion to Resolve, implies that
there is yet no clear-cut policy or rule on the matter.
They would, therefore, negate a finding of gross
ignorance of the law or grave abuse of authority on the
part of respondent Judge. Moreover, even assuming that
the acts of the respondent in ordering the impounding
and subsequent re-impounding of the subject vehicle
and in requiring the posting of a cash bond for its
release were erroneous, as found by OCA Consultant
Atienza, such are errors of judgment that cannot be the
subject of a disciplinary action absent proof of fraud,
dishonesty, corruption, or bad faith.24 A judge may not
be held administratively liable for every erroneous order
or decision he renders. To hold otherwise would be to
render a judicial office unbearable, for no one called
upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process
of administering justice can be infallible in rendering a
judgment. For a judge to be held administratively liable
for ignorance of the law, it is necessary that the law be
sufficiently basic that all that the judge must do is to
simply apply it;25 or that the error must be gross or
patent, deliberate and malicious, or incurred with
evident bad faith.26
We, however, find respondent administratively liable for
imposing excessive cash bail bonds on accused Reino
de la Cruz in Criminal Case No. 10512 and Edwin
Serrano in Criminal Case No. 9373.
The Constitution guarantees to every person under legal
custody the right to bail except those charged with
offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong.27 Section 9, Rule 114 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended,28 provides that in fixing the amount of bail,
the judge must primarily consider the following factors:
a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
c) Penalty for the offense charged;
d) Character and reputation of the accused;
e) Age and health of the accused;

h) Forfeiture of the bonds;

i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from
justice when arrested; and
j) The pendency of other cases in which the
accused is under bond.
The amount of bail should, therefore, be reasonable at
all times. It should be high enough to assure the
presence of the accused when required, but no higher
than is reasonably calculated to serve this purpose.
Excessive bail shall not be required.29 In implementing
this mandate, the accuseds financial capability should
particularly be considered. What is reasonable to a
wealthy person may not be so to a man charged with a
like offense. Where the right to bail exists, it should not
be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is
excessive.30
Moreover, under the 2000 Bail Bond Guide of the
Department of Justice (DOJ), crimes of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and with violation of
the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, bail shall be
P30,000 regardless of the number of deaths. 31
De la Cruz and Serrano were both charged with the
offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
Although permanently employed as drivers of VLI, it
could not be said that each was capable of posting a
cash bail bond of P50,000 and P350,000, respectively. In
fixing such amounts, the respondent apparently did not
take into account the gravity of the offense charged and
the financial capability of the accused. He thereby
willfully disregarded the guidelines under Section 9, Rule
114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, and the 2000 Bail Bond Guide of the DOJ. In
effect, he violated the constitutional right of the accused
to bail, as well as the prohibition against excessive bail,
making the right, in the words of Justice Jackson, "a
teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a paupers
will."32
The bail fixed by the respondent is all the more
excessive because it was in the form of cash. The
posting of a cash bond would entail a transfer of assets
into the possession of the court, and its procurement
could work untold hardship on the part of the accused
as to have the effect of altogether denying the
accuseds constitutional right to bail. On the other hand,
a surety bond may be obtained by the accused upon the
payment of a relatively small premium. A surety or
property bond does not require an actual financial
outlay on the part of the bondsman or the property
owner. Only the reputation or credit standing of the
bondsman or the expectancy of the price at which the
property can be sold is placed in the hands of the court
to guarantee the production of the body of the accused
at the various proceedings leading to conviction or
acquittal.33
While cash bail is authorized under our rules, the option
to deposit cash in lieu of a surety bond primarily
belongs to the accused,34 as can be gleaned from the
language of Section 14, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended,35 which read:
SEC. 14. Deposit of cash as bail. The accused
or any person acting in his behalf may deposit
in cash with the nearest collector of internal
revenue or provincial, city, or municipal
treasurer the amount of bail fixed by the court
or recommended by the prosecutor who
investigated or filed the case, and upon
submission of a proper certificate of deposit
and of a written undertaking showing
compliance with the requirements of Section 2
hereof, the accused shall be discharged from
custody.

The respondent judge, therefore, grossly erred in

converting Serranos surety bond to cash bond and in
demanding that De la Cruz post a cash bond to obtain
their provisional liberty. 36
It bears repeating that judges should exhibit more than
cursory acquaintance with the basic legal norms and
precepts, as well as with statutes and procedural rules.
As advocates of justice and visible representations of
the law, they are expected to keep abreast with the law
and jurisprudence, and be proficient in the application
and interpretation thereof. When the law or rule is basic,
judges owe it to their office to simply apply it; anything
less than that is gross ignorance of the law. 37
In light of our current jurisprudence,38 the respondent
should be fined in the amount of P10,000 for his act of
imposing on accused De la Cruz and Serrano an
excessive bail to be posted in cash in violation of
pertinent rules and guidelines, as well as the
constitutional right of the accused to bail and the
proscription against excessive bail.
WHEREFORE, for gross ignorance of the law and
oppression in imposing excessive cash bail bonds on
Reino de la Cruz in Criminal Case No. 10512 and Edwin
Serrano in Criminal Case No. 9373, respondent Judge
Reynaldo B. Bellosillo is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine
of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) to be taken from his
retirement benefits.

The assailed resolution of the Court of Appeals4, issued

on October 6, 1999, upheld the recommendation of the
Solicitor General; thus, its dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the "Motion
to Fix Bail For Provisional Liberty of AccusedAppellant Pending Appeal" is hereby GRANTED.
Accused-appellant Francisco Yap, Jr., a.k.a.
Edwin Yap is hereby ALLOWED TO POST BAIL in
the amount of Five Million Five Hundred
Thousand (P5,500,000.00) Pesos, subject to the
following conditions, viz. :
(1) He (accused-appellant) secures a
certification/guaranty from the Mayor
of the place of his residence that he is
a resident of the area and that he will
remain to be a resident therein until
final judgment is rendered or in case
he transfers residence, it must be with
prior notice to the court;
(2) The Commission of lmmigration
and Deportation (CID) is hereby
directed to issue a hold departure
order against accused-appellant; and
(3) The accused-appellant shall
forthwith surrender his passport to the
Division Clerk of Court for safekeeping
until the court orders its return;

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 141529

(4) Any violation of the aforesaid

conditions shall cause the forfeiture of
accused-appellant's bail bond, the
dismissal of appeal and his immediate
arrest and confinement in jail.
SO ORDERED.5

June 6, 2001

FRANCISCO YAP, JR., aka EDWIN YAP, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

A motion for reconsideration was filed, seeking the

reduction of the amount of bail fixed by respondent
court, but was denied in a resolution issued on
November 25, 1999. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner sets out the following assignments of error:

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of
abode and travel, are being invoked to set aside two
resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at
P5,500,000.00 and imposed conditions on change of
residence and travel abroad.
For misappropriating amounts equivalent to
P5,500,000.00, petitioner was convicted of estafa by the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City1 and was sentenced to
four years and two months of prision correctional, as
minimum to eight years of prision mayor as maximum,
"in addition to one (1) year for each additional
P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall
it exceed twenty (20) years." 2 He filed a notice of
appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty
under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the
proceedings. The motion was denied by the trial court in
an order dated February 17,1999.
After the records of the case were transmitted to the
Court of Appeals, petitioner filed with the said court a
Motion to Fix Bail For the Provisional Liberty of Accused
Appellant Pending Appeal, invoking the last paragraph
of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Court. Asked to comment on this motion, the Solicitor
General opined that petitioner may be allowed to post
bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 and be required to
secure "a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the
place of his residence that he is a resident of the area
and that he will remain to be so until final judgment is
rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be
with prior notice to the court and private
complainant."3 Petitioner filed a Reply, contending that
the proposed bail ofP5,500,000.00 was violative of his
right against excessive bail.

The respondent Court of Appeals committed

grave abuse of discretion in fixing the bail of
the provisional liberty of petitioner pending
appeal in the amount of P5 .5 million.
The respondent Court of Appeals committed
grave abuse of discretion in basing the bail for
the provisional liberty of the petitioner on his
civil liability.
The respondent Court of Appeals unduly
restricted petitioner's constitutional liberty of
abode and travel in imposing the other
conditions for the grant of bail.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals, by setting
bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his
right to bail. He challenges the legal basis of respondent
court for fixing bail at P5,500,000.00, which is
equivalent to the amount of his civil liability to private
complainant Manila Mahogany Marketing Corporation,
and argues that the Rules of Court never intended for
the civil liability of the accused to be a guideline or basis
for determining the amount of bail. He prays that bail be
reduced to at least P40,000.00, citing the maximum
amount of bail that can be posted for the crime of estafa
under the 1996 Bail Bond Guide, or P20,000.00,
equivalent to the amount of bail he posted during the
trial of the case.6
On the other hand, the Solicitor General maintains that
no grave abuse of discretion could be ascribed to the
Court of Appeals for fixing the amount of bail at
P5,500,000.00 considering the severity of the penalty
imposed, the weight of the evidence against petitioner,
and the gravity of the offense of which petitioner was
convicted by the RTC. He asserted that the
P5,500,000.00 not only corresponded to civil liability but

also to the amount of fraud imputed to petitioner. The

Solicitor General further pointed out the probability of
flight in case petitioner is released on bail, it having
been established that petitioner was in possession of a
valid passport and visa and had in fact left the country
several times during the course of the proceedings in
the lower court. It was also shown that petitioner used
different names in his business transactions and had
several abodes in different parts of the country.
As for the conditions imposed by the bail bond, the
Solicitor General advanced that all that the Court of
Appeals requires is notice in case of change of address;
it does not in any way impair petitioner's right to change
abode for as long as the court is apprised of his change
of residence during the pendency of the appeal.
Petitioner's case falls within the provisions of Section 5,
Rule 114 of the 1997 Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. -- Upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on
application, may admit the accused to bail.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the
accused to continue on provisional liberty
under the same bail bond during the period to
appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment
exceeding six (6) years, but not more than
twenty (20) years, the accused shall be denied
bail, or his bail previously granted shall be
cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution,
with notice to the accused, of the following or
other similar circumstances:

deny the same by imposing a prohibitory sum or

exacting unreasonable conditions.
xxx There is grim irony in an accused being
told that he has a right to bail but at the same
time being required to post such an exorbitant
sum. What aggravates the situation is that the
lower court judge would apparently yield to the
command of the fundamental law. In reality,
such a sanctimonious avowal of respect for a
mandate of the Constitution was on a purely
verbal level. There is reason to believe that any
person in the position of petitioner would under
the circumstances be unable to resist thoughts
of escaping from confinement, reduced as he
must have been to a state of desperation. In
the same breath as he was told he could be
bailed out, the excessive amount required
could only mean that provisional liberty would
be beyond his reach. It would have been more
forthright if he were informed categorically that
such a right could not be availed of. There
would have been no disappointment of
expectations then. It does call to mind these
words of Justice Jackson, "a promise to the ear
to be broken to the hope, a teasing illusion like
a munificent bequest in a pauper's will." XXX11
At the same time, Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure advises courts to consider
the following factors in the setting of the amount of bail:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;

(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasirecidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has

committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;

(e) Age and health of the accused;

(b) That the accused is found to have

previously escaped from legal confinement,
evaded sentence, or has violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the

trial;

(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;

(h) Forfeiture of other bail;

(c) That the accused committed the offense
while on probation, parole, or under conditional
pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or
his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the
pendency of the appeal, the accused may
commit another crime.
The appellate court may review the resolution
of the Regional Trial Court, on motion and with
notice to the adverse party.7
There is no question that in the present case the Court
of Appeals exercised its discretion in favor of allowing
bail to petitioner on appeal. Respondent court stated
that it was doing so for "humanitarian reasons", and
despite a perceived high risk of flight, as by petitioner's
admission he went out of the country several times
during the pendency of the case, for which reason the
court deemed it necessary to peg the amount of bail at
P5,500,000.00.
The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is
enshrined in the Constitution.8 The obvious rationale, as
declared in the leading case of De la Camara vs.
Enage,9 is that imposing bail in an excessive amount
could render meaningless the right to bail. Thus,
in Villaseor vs. Abano,10 this Court made the
pronouncement that it will not hesitate to exercise its
supervisory powers over lower courts should the latter,
after holding the accused entitled to bail, effectively

(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive

from justice when arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused
is on bail.
Thus, the court has wide latitude in fixing the amount of
bail. Where it fears that the accused may jump bail, it is
certainly not precluded from installing devices to ensure
against the same. Options may include increasing the
bail bond to an appropriate level, or requiring the
person to report periodically to the court and to make
an accounting of his movements.12 In the present case,
where petitioner was found to have left the country
several times while the case was pending, the Court of
Appeals required the confiscation of his passport and
the issuance of a hold-departure order against him.
Under the circumstances of this case, we find that
appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail
bond to ensure against the risk of flight, particularly, the
combination of the hold-departure order and the
requirement that petitioner inform the court of any
change of residence and of his whereabouts. Although
an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on
appeal may be meritorious, we find that the setting of
the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable,
excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of
petitioner's right to bail.
The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of
the accused at the trial,13 or whenever so required by
the Court14. The amount should be high enough to
assure the presence of the accused when required but
no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this

purpose.15 To fix bail at an amount equivalent to the civil

liability of which petitioner is charged (in this case,
P5,500,000.00).is to permit the impression that the
amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability
that accused is charged of; this we cannot allow
because bail is not intended as a punishment, nor as a
satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily
await the judgment of the appellate court.
At the same time, we cannot yield to petitioner's
submission that bail in the instant case be set at
P40,000.00 based on the 1996 Bail Bond Guide. (The
current Bail Bond Guide, issued on August 29, 2000,
maintains recommended bail at P40,000.00 for estafa
where the amount of fraud is P142,000.00 or over and
the imposable penalty 20 years of reclusion
temporal). True, the Court has held that the Bail Bond
Guide, a circular of the Department of Justice for the
guidance of state prosecutors, although technically not
binding upon the courts, "merits attention, being in a
sense an expression of policy of the Executive Branch,
through the Department of Justice, in the enforcement
of criminal laws."16 Thus, courts are advised that they
must not only be aware but should also consider the Bail
Bond Guide due to its significance in the administration
of criminal justice.17 This notwithstanding, the Court is
not precluded from imposing in petitioner's case an
amount higher than P40,000.00 (based on the Bail Bond
Guide) where it perceives that an appropriate increase
is dictated by the circumstances.
It militates emphasis that petitioner is seeking bail on
appeal. Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure is clear that although the grant of
bail on appeal is non-capital offenses is discretionary,
when the penalty imposed on the convicted accused
exceeds six years and circumstances exist that point to
the probability of flight if released on bail, then the
accused must be denied bail, or his bail previously
granted should be cancelled.18 In the same vein, the
Court has held that the discretion to extend bail during
the course of the appeal should be exercised with grave
caution and for strong reasons, considering that the
accused had been in fact convicted by the trial
court.19 In an earlier case, the Court adopted Senator
Vicente J. Francisco's disquisition on why bail should be
denied after judgment of conviction as a matter of wise
discretion; thus:
The importance attached to conviction is due
to the underlying principle that bail should be
granted only where it is uncertain whether the
accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore,
where that uncertainty is removed by
conviction it would, generally speaking, be
absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been
tried and convicted the presumption of
innocence which may be relied upon in prior
applications is rebutted, and the burden is
upon the accused to show error in the
conviction. From another point of view it may
be properly argued that the probability of
ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the
conviction that the accused is much more likely
to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than
before conviction.xxx 20
Petitioner is seeking bail on appeal. He was in fact
declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the RTC,
and due to the serious amount of fraud involved,
sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years --the
maximum penalty for estafa by false pretenses or
fraudulent acts allowed by the Revised Penal Code.
Although it cannot be controverted that the Court of
Appeals, despite the foregoing considerations and the
possibility of flight still wielded its discretion to grant
petitioner bail, the setting of bail in the amount of
P5,500,000.00 is unjustified as having no legal nor
factual basis. Guided by the penalty imposed by the
lower court and the weight of the evidence against
petitioner, we believe that the amount of P200,000.00 is
more reasonable.
Petitioner also contests the condition imposed by the
Court of Appeals that he secure "a certification/guaranty
from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a
resident of the area and that he will remain to be a
resident therein until final judgment is rendered or in
case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice

to the court", claiming that the same violates his liberty

of abode and travel.
Notably, petitioner does not question the hold-departure
order which prevents him from leaving the Philippines
unless expressly permitted by the court which issued
the order.21 In fact, the petition submits that "the holddeparture order against petitioner is already sufficient
guarantee that he will not escape. Thus, to require him
to inform the court every time he changed his residence
is already unnecessary."22
The right to change abode and travel within the
Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are not
absolute rights. Section 6, Article III of the 1987
Constitution states:
The liberty of abode and of changing the same
within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security,
public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law.
The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on
bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by
the above provision.23 The condition imposed by the
Court of Appeals is simply consistent with the nature
and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that
petitioner will make himself available at all times
whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a
closer look at the questioned condition will show that
petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is
merely required to inform the court in case he does so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Petitioner's bail pending appeal is reduced from
P5,500,000.00 to P200,000.00. In all other respects, the
resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated October 6,
1999 and November 25, 1999, respectively,
are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 1wphi1.nt
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.M. No. MTJ-94-932 July 14, 1995

BRANCH CLERK OF COURT JESUS F.
MANGALINDAN, complainant,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CONRADO T.
DANAN (Presiding Judge, MTC, Branch II, Guagua,
Pampanga), and CRISANTO M. SUSI (Branch Clerk
of Court, MTC, Branch I, Guagua,
Pampanga),respondents.

PER CURIAM:
For grave misconduct, ignorance of law, neglect of duty,
and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of
the service, respondent Judge Conrado T. Danan must
be dismissed from the service.
For the same grounds, except ignorance of law, we can
do no less to respondent Crisanto M. Susi.
The discovery of their misdeeds was accidental and
were it not for the gimlet eye and high sense of duty of
Judge Hermin E. Arceo of Branch 43 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Fernando, Pampanga, they could
have remained hidden from us.

The pleadings disclose that in three informations filed

on 12 March 1993 and docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
6949-51 and assigned to Branch 43 of the RTC of San
Fernando, Pampanga, one Remedies Dapitan was
charged with estafa. Warrants for her arrest were issued
on 16 March 1993. Since she could not be arrested, the
cases were ordered archived on 9 June 1993.
However, on 19 July 1993, Dapitan was brought before
the court which, on 30 August 1993, granted her motion
for reinvestigation. On 25 November 1993, the
information in Criminal Case No. 6949 was amended to
change the name of the complaining witness. On 9
December 1993, the accused was arraigned and, on
motion, the court reduced the aggregate bail bond in
the three cases from P24,000.00 to P10,000.00. In the
meanwhile, the accused was detained at the Provincial
Jail at San Fernando, Pampanga.
At the hearing on 2 February 1994, Judge Arceo
gathered from Dapitan that she was out on bail
allegedly pursuant to an order of release issued on 20
December 1993 by Judge Conrado T. Danan of Branch 2
of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Guagua, Pampanga,
who had approved her bail bond on the same date.
Forthwith, Judge Arceo ordered the clerk of court of
Judge Danan's court to transmit to Branch 43 the bail
bond of the accused, together with the order of release
and other supporting papers pursuant to the second
paragraph of Section 16, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court. 1
In compliance with the said order, Mr. Jesus F.
Mangalindan, the clerk of court of Branch 2 of the MTC
of Guagua, Pampanga, sent to Judge Arceo the following
letter 2 dated 8 February 1994:
This is to acknowledge receipt of your
Order dated February 2, 1994 which
was received by our Court
Stenographer on February 7, 1994 at
2:00 o'clock in the afternoon directing
therein the Branch Clerk of Court of
Municipal Trial Court, Branch II,
Guagua, Pampanga to transmit to
your Court the bail bond of accused,
Remedios Dapitan including the Order
of Release and other supporting
papers within five (5) days from
receipt of a copy of said Order.
Your Honor, upon receipt of your
Order, I immediately inquired from
Judge Conrado T. Danan, Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Trial Court,
Branch II, Guagua, Pampanga if he
had approved a bail bond posted by
one Remedios Dapitan including the
Order of Release considering the
undersigned have not received any
copy from him of the said bailbond
and Order of Release dated December
20, 1993 duly signed by him. Judge
Danan told me that Crisanto M. Susi,
Branch Clerk of Court of Municipal Trial
Court, Branch I, Guagua, Pampanga
was the one who approached him for
approval of said bailbond and the
Order of Release dated December 20,
1993, xeroxed copy of which is hereto
attached. As a matter of fact, said
Order dated December 20, 1993 was
prepared and typewritten not in our
office which is very unusual and
irregular.
On February 8, 1994, at about 9:00 to
10:00 in the morning, I confronted Mr.
Crisanto M. Susi regarding said
bailbonds and for his failure to give
the undersigned the documents for
transmittal to your Court. Mr. Susi
admitted that he was the one who
caused the preparation and approval
of said bailbond to Judge Danan and
told me that he is still in the process
of procuring forms of bailbonds
subscribed by a solvent bonding
company and even promised the

undersigned that he will personally

bring to your court said bailbond until
February 9, 1994. When I inquired
from him the copies of the Order of
Release signed by Judge Danan the
same are still in his possession
including the original, which I
requested that the same be given to
me and have it zerox because that
was the first time I saw said Order
until I received your Order.
Your Honor, in view of the abovestated facts, I believe Mr. Susi
committed a grave misconduct in the
performance of his duties considering
the encroachment he made upon my
position as Br. Clerk of Court thereby
implicating and damaging my name
and reputation as employee of the
Court. Furthermore, it is common
knowledge that Court employees are
prohibited from engaging and
participating in any transactions
regarding of posting of bailbonds of
persons accused in Court pursuant to
the directive of the Supreme Court
which in this particular incident, Mr.
Susi has completely violated.
In view of the foregoing, may I
respectfully request your Honor the
issuance of an Order directing Mr.
Crisanto M. Susi to immediately
transmit the bailbonds posted by
Remedios Dapitan in Criminal Cases
Nos. 6949-6951 to your Court because
the undersigned has no knowledge
whatsoever about the transaction
made by Mr. Susi regarding the
approval of said bailbonds.
At any rate, Mr. Susi promised to the
undersigned that he will personally
deliver to your Court the documents
and the Order of Release as he was
the one responsible for the delay of
transmitting said bailbonds to the
prejudice of the complaining witness
in these cases.
In the event that he will fail to fulfill
his promise, kindly inform the
undersigned so that necessary actions
be taken to clear my name of all these
stupidities and shenanigans.
Upon receipt of this letter, Judge Arceo issued an order
directing Judge Danan and Mr. Crisanto Susi, clerk of
court of Branch 1 of the MTC of Guagua, Pampanga, to
appear before his court on 17 February 1994 to explain
why the bail bond of Dapitan could not be transmitted to
the court and for Mr. Mangalindan to affirm under oath
the contents of his letter of 8 February 1994.
Unfortunately, none of them appeared on the said date.
However, on 21 February 1994, Mangalindan appeared
before Judge Arceo and answered some questions
propounded by the latter. The proceeding was recorded
and the transcripts of the stenographic notes thereof
are attached to the letter of Judge Arceo of 21 February
1994 to Executive Judge Teodoro A. Bay. 3
Mangalindan disclosed to Judge Arceo that he received
neither the bail bond posted by Dapitan nor the order
for her release issued by Judge Danan; upon inquiry,
Judge Danan told him that it was Crisanto Susi who
caused the preparation of the bailbond; he saw the
release order signed by Judge Danan on 20 December
1993 4 only on 9 February 1994, a day after he received
Judge Arceo's order of 2 February 1994 and after he
confronted Susi; and when he (Mangalindan) asked Susi
for the bail bond, the latter told him that "he was still in
the process of procuring" it. Thus:
Q [Judge Arceo]

Did you not ask Mr.

Susi for a copy of
the bail bond on that
particular date when
you asked for a copy
of the Order of
Release?
A Yes, sir, I did.
Q What did he tell
you?
A He told me that
he was still in the
process of procuring
the bail bond for
Remedios Dapitan,
sir.
Q Would you please
tell me again when
was that date that
Mr. Susi told you
that he was in the
process of procuring
the bail bond for
Remedios Dapitan?
A On February 9,
one (1) day after I
received the Order,
sir.
Q From that date to
the present, were
you able to see a
bail bond of
Remedios Dapitan?
A No sir.

Judge Arceo thereupon issued an order declaring

Mangalindan's letter as an administrative matter since
the latter wished to bring to the attention of the court
"some irregularities committed in the issuance of the
bail bond of accused Remedios Dapitan in Criminal
Cases numbered 6949, 6950 and 6951" and then
formally referred it to Executive Judge Teodoro A. Bay for
appropriate action 6 in a letter dated 21 February
1994, 7 wherein after narrating the above incidents,
Judge Arceo stated:
This Court cannot help but observe
the following:
(a)
Ac
cu
se
d
wa
s
co
nfi
ne
d
at
th
e
Pr
ovi
nci
al
Jail
of
Pa
m
pa
ng
a
wh
ich
is
jus
ta
fe

w
dis
ta
nc
e
aw
ay
fro
m
th
e
Ha
ll
of
Jus
tic
e
of
Pa
m
pa
ng
a
wh
er
e
ei
gh
t
(8)
RT
C's
ar
e
sit
tin
g.
W
hy
an
d
ho
w
di
d
ac
cu
se
d
ha
pp
en
to
file
he
r
bai
l
bo
nd
in
Gu
ag
ua
,
Pa
m
pa
ng
a?
(b)
W
hy
is
th
er
e
an
Or
de
r
of
Re
lea
se
sig
ne
d
by
th

e
ju
dg
e
an
d
no
ba
il
bo
nd
ca
n
be
pr
od
uc
ed
?
(c)
Ju
dg
e
Co
nr
ad
o
T.
Da
na
n
is
th
e
Pr
esi
di
ng
Ju
dg
e
of
Br
an
ch
2.
W
hy
is
it
th
at
Jes
us
F.
Ma
ng
ali
nd
an
,
th
e
Br
an
ch
Cl
er
k
of
th
e
sai
d
Co
urt
do
es
no
t
kn
ow
an
yt
hi
ng
ab
ou
t
th

e
bai
l
bo
nd
of
th
e
ac
cu
se
d
in
thi
s
ca
se
?
(d)
Ha
s it
be
co
m
e
a
pr
ac
tic
e
a
m
on
g
so
m
e
Ju
dg
es
to
iss
ue
an
Or
de
r
of
Re
lea
se
wit
ho
ut
a
bai
l
bo
nd
an
d
wit
ho
ut
th
e
ac
cu
se
d
be
in
g
pr
es
en
te
d
to
hi
m
as
pr
ovi
de
d
by
th
e
rul

es
?
Today, Mr. Mangalindan appeared
before this Court pursuant to the
Order dated February 21, 1994 and
answered some questions by the
Presiding Judge of this Court; the
transcript of stenographic notes of the
questions and answers taken of Mr.
Jesus F. Mangalindan is hereto
attached and forms an integral part of
this referral.
Certainly, there are some matters that
need to be cleared out in this incident
for the better administration of justice.
FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND
INSTRUCTION.
In a 1st Indorsement dated 22 February 1994, 8 Judge
Bay forwarded the letter of Judge Arceo to the Office of
the Court Administrator recommending that the
Executive Judge of the RTC in Guagua, Pampanga, be
directed to conduct an investigation on the matter since
he (Judge Bay) had no administrative supervision over
Judge Danan.
In the resolution of 23 May 1994, this Court required
Judge Danan and Branch Clerk of Court Susi to file their
comment on the letter of Mangalindan dated 8 February
1994.
In his comment dated 16 June 1994, 9 Judge Danan
averred that since it was sufficient in form and
substance, he approved on 20 December 1993 the bail
bond posted by a solvent surety company which was
brought to him, together with the accused Dapitan, by
Susi; that he issued the order of release and instructed
Susi to deliver the approved bail bond and order to
Mangalindan for disposition and forwarding the proper
Regional Trial Court; that he approved the bail bond in
good faith and in the spirit of Christmas and because of
the momentary absence of the presiding judge of
Branch 1 of the MTC of Guagua, Pampanga; that he
learned later on about the loss of the record together
with the approved bail bond, which was, however,
replaced in due time with another approved bail bond
filed with Branch 43 of the RTC in San Fernando,
Pampanga; and that he merely extended a helping hand
to the needy Remedios M. Dapitan in the spirit of
Christmas. Attached to Judge Danan's comment is the
affidavit of Susi 10 whose substance is expressed in his
separate comment.
In his comment of 3 August 1994, 11 respondent Susi
states that on 20 December 1993, while he was in the
office, Dapitan, together with her husband and a jail
escort, came to see the presiding judge of Branch 1 of
the MTC of Guagua, Pampanga, to request the approval
of her bail bond issued by a surety firm stationed at
Guagua, Pampanga; since the presiding judge was out
for lunch, he (Susi) brought Dapitan, her husband, and
the jail escort to the office of Judge Conrado T. Danan of
Branch 2 to request the latter to approve the bail bond;
Judge Danan approved the bond and instructed him
(Susi) to deliver the record of the approved bail bond to
Mangalindan, Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 2, for the
latter to forward the same to the proper court; since
Mangalindan was not around at that time, he opted to
entrust the record to Dapitan for immediate personal
delivery to the proper court as she was the interested
party; and he learned later that the record together with
the approved bail bond was lost, but it was replaced in
due time with another approved bail bond which was
filed with Branch 43 of the RTC at San Fernando,
Pampanga.
He further claims that he merely extended a helping
hand to Dapitan in the spirit of Christmas. Attached to
his comment are the joint affidavit of Remedios Dapitan
and her husband Bromeo Dapitan 12 and a photocopy of
the alleged bail bond No. 14492 issued by Oriental
Assurance Corporation, signed by one Luz N. Cotoco, its
alleged SVP/General Manager, on 16 February 1994 in
Pasig, Metro Manila, 13 and purportedly approved by

Judge Danan. The date of the approval was not

indicated on the bail bond.
Issues having been joined, the parties were required to
inform the Court if they desired to submit the case on
the basis of the pleadings filed. In their separate
manifestations, the parties agreed that this case should
be decided on the basis of the pleadings.
In its Evaluation, Report, and Recommendation, the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) makes the
following evaluation:
Section 14, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court provides that "bail in the
amount fixed may be filed with the
Court where the case is pending, or in
the absence or unavailability of the
Judge thereof, with another branch of
the same court within the province or
city. If the accused is arrested in a
province, city or municipality other
than where the care is pending, bail
may be filed also with any regional
trial court of said place, or, if no judge
thereof is available, with any
metropolitan trial judge, municipal
trial judge or municipal circuit trial
judge therein".
In the affidavit of the accused
Remedios Dapitan, submitted as one
of the annexes in the present
administrative case, she alleges that
she was arrested and was detained at
the Provincial Jail of San Fernando,
Pampanga. However, she was allowed
to be escorted to secure a bailbond
from a bonding company holding
office in Guagua, Pampanga.
Therefore, she should have filed the
bond in RTC, San Fernando,
Pampanga, where the case is pending.
Granting that the bonding company
holds office in Guagua, Pampanga, she
could still file the bond in RTC, San
Fernando since Guagua is just a
nearby town of San Fernando, just
fifteen to twenty minutes travel time
separating the two towns. Granting
further that the accused wants her
immediate release from the custody of
the law, the bond should have been
filed in RTC, Guagua, Pampanga. It
could be mentioned that there are five
(5) RTC Branches in Guagua and it is
unlikely to believe that all the five (5)
RTC Judges were absent during the
time the accused filed her bail.
Section 16 of Rule 114 further
provides that "whenever bail is filed
other than where the case is pending,
the judge accepting the bail shall
forward the bail, the order of release
and other supporting papers to the
court where the case is pending, . . ."
The respondent Judge should not have
accepted the bailbond posted by the
accused. The abovementioned
provisions of law are too elementary
for the respondent Judge not to have
been so properly guided. Moreover,
having been officially and specifically
directed by the respondent Judge,
Branch Clerk of Court Susi should not
have entrusted Court orders and
documents to the accused for
transmittal in RTC, San Fernando,
Pampanga, not to mention that his
actuations are contrary to the
abovementioned provision of law.
Their desire to help the accused and
the spirit of Christmas are not
justifications to defy legal procedures.
The OCA then recommends that respondents Judge
Conrado T. Danan and Crisanto M. Susi be fined
P10,000.00 and P5,000.00, respectively, with a stern

warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will

be dealt with more severely.

act on a bail bond for accused Dapitan, the respondent

judge could not validly order her release without the
submission of a valid bail bond. In thus ordering the
release of Dapitan without the requisite bail bond, the
respondent judge violated the law and committed grave
misconduct.

The evaluation of the OCA is correct. But this case goes

farther than a mere violation of Section 14, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court. The OCA failed to see the more
serious misdeeds of the respondents which warrant the
imposition of the penalty of dismissal from the service.
This Court has every reason to believe that no bail bond
was, in fact, presented to respondent Judge Danan on
20 December 1993 and that he merely signed the order
of release which respondent Susi prepared and
presented for his signature. In the first place, when
Mangalindan asked Susi on 9 February 1994, a day after
the former received the order of Judge Arceo of 2
February 1994, for a copy of the bail bond, Susi told
Mangalindan that "he was still in the process of
procuring" it. 14 This simply means that no bail bond had
earlier been obtained. In the second place, the order of
release itself does not specifically mention the name of
the bonding company which issued the bond; it only
speaks of "a solvent bonding company." If, indeed, a bail
bond was shown to either Susi or to the respondent
judge, then simple diligence dictated that, for easy
reference and determination of liability, the name of the
bonding company be mentioned in the order.
Finally, a copy of the bail bond attached to Susi's
comment 15 clearly shows that it was acknowledged in
Pasig, Metro Manila, by one Luz N. Cotoco, SVP/General
Manager of Oriental Assurance Corporation, on 16
February 1994 or nearly two months after the
respondent judge issued the order of release. This bond
is fatally defective because it has no photograph of the
accused and no affidavit of justification that the surety
has no pending obligation demandable and outstanding
in any amount to the Government or any of its agencies
as of the last day of the month preceding the date the
bond was issued, and is not accompanied by a
clearance from this Court and a current certificate of
authority issued by the Insurance Commission. 16
The claim that accused Dapitan lost the bail bond which
was supposedly approved by the respondent judge on
20 December 1993 is incredible and clearly contrived. If
that were true, the respondents could have easily
procured from the bonding company or from the notary
public a certified true copy thereof. The former was
expected to keep a copy thereof, while the latter is
required to keep a correct copy of every contract
acknowledged before him.17
Nor is the Court persuaded by the insinuation that it
became necessary to submit the bail bond for approval
to a judge of a Municipal Trial Court in Guagua,
Pampanga, because it was issued by a bonding
company holding office there. The bail bond of the
Oriental Assurance Corporation acknowledged on 16
February 1994 contains the following note at its right
bottom corner:

thereby clearly showing that it has a branch office or

agent in San Fernando, Pampanga. If the respondents
had in mind another bonding company with a branch
office or agent in Guagua, Pampanga, then, to be fair to
this Court, they should have mentioned its name in their
comments. They chose not to, which bolsters the
conclusion that the only bail bond which Dapitan ever
had was the above-mentioned Oriental Assurance bond
acknowledged in Pasig, Metro Manila, on 16 February
1994.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that under the
first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, Branch 2 of the MTC of Guagua, Pampanga, could

The irregularity was compounded by his reckless

granting of the order of release despite his full
awareness that it was not the MTC of Guagua,
Pampanga, which could properly act on a bail of the
accused. Even if the MTC could so act, prudence
dictated that since Dapitan first approached Branch 1
and that its clerk of court Susi even prepared the order,
the respondent judge should have required the accused
and Susi to wait for the presiding judge of Branch 1 who
was merely out for lunch. If Dapitan could even leave
the Provincial Jail in San Fernando allegedly to secure a
bail bond in Guagua, then to wait for a few minutes for
the presiding judge of Branch 1 to finish his lunch would
not be an undue imposition upon her.
Further aggravating the irregularity was the respondent
judge's gross negligence in entrusting to Susi, who was
not the clerk of court of his court, the custody of the
alleged bail bond (if one, indeed, was presented) and
the original copy of his order of release. There is no
showing that at that time Mangalindan, the clerk of
court of Branch 2, was absent. Therefore, if the
respondent judge was in his office when he approved
the bail bond and issued the order of release, then he
could have immediately turned over these documents to
Mangalindan. That he did not do so merely confirms that
he did not approve the bail bond and issue the order of
release in his office.
In the per curiam decision of 9 August 1993 in
Administrative Matter No. MTJ-91-530, 19 this Court had
sentenced herein respondent judge to pay a fine of
P5,000.00 for grave abuse of authority in the
performance of his functions and warned him "that a
repetition of the same act or a commission of similar
acts would be dealt with more severely." He has not
heeded the warning; on the contrary, he committed
worse irregularities and misdeeds, thereby deliberately
ignoring the solemn injunctions in the Canons of Judicial
Ethics that he should administer his office with due
regard to the integrity of the system of the law of itself,
remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary
power, but a judge who should administer justice
according to law and should deal with the patronage of
the position as a public trust. 20 He ignored the mandate
of the Code of Judicial Conduct that he should behave at
all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary and that he should be
faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence. 21 The public-trust character of his office
imposes upon him the highest degree of responsibility
and efficiency. 22 He has thus failed in his solemn duty to
be the visible representation of the law and justice.

Respondent Crisanto Susi committed grave misconduct,

neglect of duty, and conduct prejudicial to the best
NOTE: Please
interest of the service. There is no doubt at all that he
address all
scandalously went out of his way for reasons only
orders, notices
known to him to effect, in connivance with the
to
respondent judge, the improper, if not illegal, release of
Mezzanine
San from her confinement at the Provincial Jail. He
Dapitan
Fernandowas
Rural
the one who prepared the order of release for the
Bank Bldg.
respondent judge's signature on the basis of a nonSan Fernando,
existing bail bond, and expecting that the presiding
Pampanga,
judge of his Branch (Branch 1) of the MTC of Guagua,
Tel. No. 61-55Pampanga, would not tolerate any irregularity, Susi
37 18
deliberately bypassed the latter and sought the
cooperation of the respondent judge.
That Susi's presiding judge was momentarily out for
lunch provided no excuse for his recourse to the
respondent judge. The presiding judge was expected to
return to his office, and must have, in fact, done so
since in their comments the respondents did not at all
allege that the presiding judge never returned to his
office after lunch.
Moreover, if Susi were not inspired by any improper
motive, he should have simply referred Dapitan to
complainant Mangalindan, the clerk of court of Branch 2
of the MTC, so that the latter could examine the bail
bond and its supporting documents. Susi knew or ought

to have known that in accepting a surety bond a clerk of

court should see to it that the following requisites are
complied with: (a) photographs of the accused, (b)
affidavit of justification, (c) clearance from this Court,
(d) certificate of compliance with Circular No. 66 [19
September 1966] of the Insurance Commissioner, (e)
authority of the agent, and (f) current certificate of
authority issued by the Insurance Commissioner with a
financial statement showing the maximum underwriting
capacity of the surety company. 23
Assuming that the respondent judge ordered Susi to
submit to Mangalindan the bail bond and the order of
release so that the latter could have in due course
forwarded these to Branch 43 of the RTC at San
Fernando, Pampanga, Susi should not have entrusted
these to Dapitan. If Mangalindan was not yet in his
office, Susi could have waited for him or returned to the
respondent judge to inform him of this fact. Entrusting
them to the accused was the height of recklessness,
imprudence, and irresponsibility. He forgot that the
nature of his work and of his office mandates that he be
an individual of competence, honesty, and integrity and
that in relation to the judge, he occupies a position of
confidence which should not be betrayed. 24 He was
remiss in his fidelity to the public-trust character of his
office.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Conrado T. Danan,
Presiding Judge, Branch 2, of the Municipal Trial Court of
Guagua, Pampanga, and respondent Crisanto M. Susi,
Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 1 of the said court, are
hereby ordered DISMISSED from the service with
forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of
the government, including government-owned and
controlled corporations. Their dismissal shall take effect
immediately upon receipt of a copy of this decision
which must be personally served by the Office of the
Court Administrator.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609 September 20, 2005
[OCA-IPI No. 03-1490-MTJ]
TRINIDAD O. LACHICA, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J:
In an Affidavit dated October 2, 2003,1 Trinidad O.
Lachica charged Judge Rosabella M. Tormis of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Cebu City, Branch IV,
with Abuse of Authority relative to Criminal Cases Nos.
57220-R to 57223-R.2 Complainant alleged that since
the filing of the information, accused Domugho has
remained at large. Thus, the cases were ordered
archived3 but an alias warrant of arrest4 was issued by
respondent judge on January 14, 2000.
On July 2, 2003, Domugho was apprehended by PO3
Epifanio G. Sanjorjo at around 8:45 p.m. and was
brought to the police station for booking and custody at
9:30 p.m.5
However, on July 3, 2003, at around 8:30 a.m.,
complainant was surprised to receive a call from the
accused informing her that she was released from
confinement on July 2, 2003 at 10:00 p.m. Complainant
inquired from the police station if an Order of Release
was issued by the court, but she was informed that the
accused was released because the respondent judge
called the police station and told the desk officer that

the accused had posted a cash bail bond and may

already be released.
Complainant checked the case records but the
expediente contained no copy of the release order. It
was only at 1:00 p.m. that she was shown a copy
thereof. Meanwhile, the case records could not be
located. It was only on 4:30 p.m. of July 3, 2003 that the
same was found.
The police blotter showed no entry that an order of
release was received by the police. Only a notation that
the accused had put up a cash bail bond was entered
therein.
Complainant also averred that it was improper for the
respondent judge to receive the cash bail bond as the
function belongs exclusively to the Office of the Clerk of
Court. She claimed that respondent judge committed an
act of impropriety when she called the police station to
verbally order the release of the accused. She claimed
that it was irregular that no copy of the release order
was found in the expediente in the morning of July 3,
2003 considering that it was supposedly issued on July
2, 2003.
In her Comment6 dated December 3, 2003 respondent
judge denied the charges of complainant. She
maintained that on July 2, 2003 at 7:00 p.m., she issued
the Order of Release after the accused posted a cash
bond. She claimed that the accused was released by
virtue of the Order of Release and not on the basis of
her alleged telephone call to the police station.
On August 2, 2004, the Court resolved to refer the case
to the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City
for investigation, report and recommendation. 7
The investigating judge submitted a Report8 dated
November 18, 2004 recommending that respondent
judge be fined in the amount of P20,000.00 or
suspended for three (3) months based on the following
findings:
1. The accused was arrested at 8:45 in the evening of
July 2, 200[4], was booked at the Waterfront Police
Station at 9:00 p.m., and released without a Release
Order at 10:00 that same night.
2. The arresting officer and the accused never appeared
before the respondent judge on the night of July 2,
200[4], as claimed by respondent judge. The accused
was arrested at 8:45 p.m., after her classes at
Southwestern University. She could not have appeared
before respondent judge prior to her arrest since she
was in school. Had it been true that the arresting officer
appeared before the judge that night, it would have
been highly improbable for the arresting officer not to
have asked for a copy of the Release Order.
3. No one saw the Release Order on July 2, 200[4],
except the respondent judge, as per testimony of the
complainant and Helen Mongoya, and as shown by the
police blotter, and the affidavit of the arresting officer
claiming that they were reprimanded by their Chief
because they released the accused without a Release
Order.
4. The accused was released without the Release Order,
and only upon the telephone call of respondent judge.
5. The Release Order was never issued on the night of
July 2, 200[4]. No judge in his right mind would issue a
Release Order without the record of the case, more so if
the case had been "archived".
5. The Release Order appeared only in the afternoon of
July 3, 200[4].
6. The record of the case was found by court aide, Juan
Aos, in the bodega of MTCC, Branch 4, together with
the records of other archived cases, at about 4:30 in the
afternoon of July 3, 200[4].

7. Respondent judge was in Manila early morning of July

3, 200[4].
8. It was physically impossible for the respondent judge
to have signed the Release Order before 1:00 p.m. of
July 3, 200[4], since she was in Manila. Questions may
be raised whether the Receipt for the Cash Bond and
the Release Order were signed by a person other than
the respondent judge. As can be gleaned from the
record, the signature appearing on the Receipt for the
Cash Bond, the Release Order and the signature of the
respondent judge on her Comment dated December 10,
2003, do not appear to be signed by the same person.
9. Respondent judge authenticated the Release Order
during the Investigation proper as the Release Order she
issued on July 2, 2003.9
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) agreed with
the findings of the investigating judge but
recommended that respondent judge be suspended for
three (3) months.10
We agree with the findings of the investigating judge
and the OCA except for the recommended penalty.
During the investigation, it was established that the
accused was arrested on July 2, 2003 at 8:45 p.m. and
was brought directly to the Waterfront Police Station
where she was booked at 9:00 p.m. At about 10:00 p.m.
the accused was set free without a release order. 11
Respondent judge, however, claimed that she issued the
Order of Release on July 2, 2003 at around 7:00 p.m.
after the accused and her counsel, together with the
arresting officer, came to her office and posted a cash
bond. It was by virtue of this order that the accused was
released.
A circumspect scrutiny of the testimonies given by
respondent judge reveals that she made several
untruthful statements possibly with the intent to
mislead the Court.
It was improbable that, as claimed by respondent judge,
she issued the Order of Release on July 2, 2003 at
around 7:00 p.m. considering that the accused was
apprehended at 8:45 p.m. The complainant and the
arresting officer, as well as the entry in the police blotter
all declared that the arrest was made at 8:45 p.m. and
not earlier. Verily, respondent judge could not have
issued the release order at around 7:00 p.m. as the
accused has not yet been arrested at that time.
She also insisted that on July 2, 2003, the accused and
her counsel, and the arresting officer went to her office
and posted a bond whereupon she issued the Order of
Release. However, this is belied by the testimonies of
the arresting officer and the complainant who both
claimed that the accused was brought directly to the
police station after the arrest. We agree with the
observation of the OCA that, it would be impossible for
complainant or the arresting officer not to have
mentioned anything regarding this incident if the same
actually transpired. Likewise, as pointed out by the
investigating judge, it is highly improbable for the
arresting officer not to have demanded a copy of the
release order if he really appeared before the
respondent.
Incidentally, the arresting officer denied receiving any
order of release from respondent judge on July 2, 2003.
In fact, he claimed that they were reprimanded by their
commanding officer for releasing from their custody the
person of the accused without any accompanying court
order. The following day, July 3, 2003, he went to the
court to secure a copy of the said order.
Respondent judge also averred that the Order of
Release was received by SP01 James Estrera, which
receipt was duly noted in the police blotter. An
examination of the records, however, discloses that
what SPO1 Estrera received was only a copy of the
Receipt of the Cash Bail Bond dated July 2, 2003 and not
the Order of Release. In fact, there was no mention of a
release order in the police blotter. 12

It is also undisputed that respondent judge personally

received the cash bail bond for the accused. For this act
alone, respondent is already administratively liable.
Section 14, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure specifies the persons with whom a cash bail
bond may be deposited, namely: the collector of internal
revenue or the provincial, city or municipal treasurer. A
judge is not authorized to receive the deposit of cash as
bail nor should such cash be kept in his office.
The respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct for
having abused her judicial authority when she
personally accepted the cash bail bond of the accused
and for deliberately making untruthful statements in her
comment and during the investigation of the instant
administrative case with intent to mislead this Court.
The foregoing acts not only seriously undermine and
adversely reflect on the honesty and integrity of
respondent judge as an officer of the court; they also
betray a character flaw which speaks ill of her person.
Making false representations is a vice which no judge
should imbibe. As the judge is the visible representation
of the law, and more importantly justice, he must
therefore, be the first to abide by the law and weave an
example for the others to follow.13
In the Judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal
virtue, it is a necessity. 14 Respondent must bear in mind
that the exacting standards of conduct demanded from
judges are designed to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 15 When the
judge himself becomes the transgressor of the law
which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in
disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and
impairs public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary
itself.16
Misconduct is defined as any unlawful conduct of a
person concerned in the administration of justice
prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the right
determination of the cause. It generally means wrongful,
improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a
premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. 17 To
justify the taking of drastic disciplinary action, as is what
is sought by complainant in this case, the law requires
that the error or mistake must be gross or patent,
malicious, deliberate or in bad faith.18
It need not be overemphasized that in receiving the
cash bond respondent judge ran afoul with Rule 114 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Indeed, in the case
of Office of the Court Administrator v. Fernandez,19 the
Court held that:
The rules specify the persons with whom a cash bail
bond may be deposited namely: the collector of internal
revenue, or the provincial, city or municipal treasurer.
Section 14 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure (effective December 1, 2000) provides:
SEC. 14. Deposit of Cash as bail The accused or any
person acting in his behalf may deposit in cash with the
nearest collector of internal revenue or provincial, city
or municipal treasurer the amount of the bail fixed by
the court, or recommended by the prosecutor who
investigated or filed the case. Upon submission of a
proper certificate of deposit and of a written
undertaking showing compliance with the requirements
of section 2 of this Rule, the accused shall be discharged
from custody. The money deposited shall be considered
as bail and applied to the payment of fine and costs
while the excess, if any, shall be returned to the
accused or to whoever made the deposit.
A judge is not one of those authorized to receive
the deposit of cash as bail, nor should such cash
be kept in the office of the judge.
Gross misconduct under Section 8(3), Rule 140 of the
Revised Rules of Court, as amended, is classified as a
serious offense punishable by any of the sanctions
enumerated in Section 11 of the same Rule which
provides that:

SEC. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a

serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be
imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of
the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to
any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued
leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six
(6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding
P40,000.00.
This is not the first time that respondent judge was
sanctioned by this Court. It appears that aside from this
case, respondent judge has been administratively
charged eight (8) other times.20 Of these cases three (3)
have been dismissed.21
On April 27, 2004 in Administrative Matter No. MTJ-001337,22 the Court found respondent guilty of improper
conduct for trying to influence the course of litigation in
Criminal Case No. 99796-12 and was accordingly
reprimanded. She was also admonished for conduct
unbecoming of a judge.
On December 17, 2004, respondent was fined in the
amount of P5,000.00 in Administrative Matters Nos. 047-373-RTC23 and 04-7-374-RTC,24 for gross violation of
Section 17, Rule 114, for having approved the bail of an
accused in Criminal Cases Nos. CEB-BRL-783 and 922
pending before the RTC, Branch 60, Barili, Cebu, absent
showing of unavailability of all RTC judges in Cebu City.
On March 16, 2005, respondent judge was admonished
in Administrative Matter No. 04-1554-MTJ and reminded
to be more circumspect in granting postponements.
Clearly, being chastised thrice has not reformed
respondent. For the foregoing considerations, we find
that the penalties recommended by the investigating
judge and the OCA are not commensurate to respondent
judges misconduct which is aggravated by her past
misdeeds. Respondent judges infraction merits
suspension from the service for six (6) months.
WHEREFORE, Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, Branch IV, is
found GUILTY of gross misconduct and
is SUSPENDED from office for six (6) months without
salary and other benefits and STERNLY WARNED that
a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt
with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

Respondent is judge of the 8th Municipal Circuit Trial

Court of Alcala-Bautista, Pangasinan. He is charged with
ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority, and
gross partiality in connection with the preliminary
investigation of Criminal Case No. 2346 for frustrated
murder which the herein complainant, Roberto Espiritu,
had filed against Weny Dumlao.
The facts are as follows:
In his affidavit 1 in Criminal Case No. 2346, Roberto
Espiritu, as complainant, alleged that at around 7:30 in
the evening of July 16, 1994, while he was with a group
which included Eulogio Pabunan, Arnel Guerra, Januario
Peregrino, and Marcelino Bautista, Weny Dumlao
approached him and fired at him three times, as a result
of which complainant was wounded; that complainant
was able to run away; and that Dumlao wanted to kill
complainant because the latter had filed a case against
Dumlao's brother, Victor, for the murder of
complainant's son Rolly. On the basis of this affidavit
and those or Arnel Guerra 2 and Eulogio Pabunan, 3 SPO
II Eduardo R. Yadao filed a criminal complaint for
frustrated murder on August 10, 1994 4 in respondent's
court.
After conducting a preliminary examination, respondent
judge ordered on August 18, 1994 the arrest of Dumlao
and fixed the amount of bail for his provisional liberty at
P20,000.00. 5 However, in an order dated September 7,
1994, he reduced the amount of the bail to P10,000.00,
stating that Dumlao's father had asked for the
reduction. On September 12, 1994, he ordered "any
peace officer under whose custody [Dumlao] may be
found" to release the latter in view of the fact that
Dumlao had posted bail for P10,000.00. 6 Then on
October 12, 1994 he dismissed the complaint, citing,
among other reasons, the fact that Dumlao had filed a
case against Roberto Espiritu and others as a result of
the same incident complained of in Criminal Case No.
2346.
It appears that Dumlao had filed on July 27, 1994 a
countercharge against complainant and others with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Villasis, Pangasinan
for attempted murder and illegal possession of firearm.
The case was docketed as I.S. No. V-94-30. Dumlao
claimed that as he approached Espiritu's group, Arnel
Guerra shot him, although Guerra missed him; that as
he ran towards his house, other members of the group
also fired at him; and that Espiritu's group challenged
him and his father to come out and fight.
Dumlao's complaint (I.S. No. V-94-30) was dismissed on
August 15, 1994 for insufficiency of evidence. 7 After a
reinvestigation of the two cases, however, Assistant City
Prosecutor Paz de G. Peralta directed the filing of an
information for attempted murder against complainant
Roberto Espiritu, Arnel Guerra, Andres Espiritu, Marlino
Bautista, Januario Peregrino, Abrillo Peregrino, Eulogio
Pabunan, Dario Pabunan, and Landio Pabunan even as
she affirmed the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 2346
against Dumlao. 8
Espiritu sought a review in the Department of Justice,
but his petition was denied 9 for having been filed late
and for his failure to attach the affidavits submitted
during the preliminary investigation.
Espiritu filed the complaint in this case, alleging
irregularities committed by respondent judge in the
conduct of the preliminary investigation of his complaint
against Dumlao. 10

A.M. No. MTJ-97-1139 October 16, 1997

ROBERTO ESPIRITU, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE EDUARDO JOVELLANOS, 8th Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Alcala-Bautista,
Pangasinan,respondent.

MENDOZA, J.:

Respondent judge filed a comment, 11 denying the

charges. Complainant, on the other hand, filed a reply.
Among other things, complainant claimed that this was
not the first time that respondent judge had shown
ignorance of the rules on criminal procedure, because
on September 29, 1994, in People of the Philippines
v. Cesario Sanchez, Criminal Case No. V-0092,
respondent judge had been reprimanded by the
Regional Trial Court of Villasis, Pangasinan (Branch 50)
for approving the bail bond of the accused when the
latter had not yet been arrested.

On June 26, 1995, the Court referred the case to Judge

Pedro C. Cacho of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, at
Tayug, Pangasinan for investigation, report, and
recommendation. On October 6, 1995, Judge Cacho
submitted his report, recommending that respondent
judge be fined in the amount of P3,000.00 and
reprimanded for "neglect of duty, partiality, and/or
inefficiency tantamount to grave ignorance of the law."
Except as to the amount of the fine recommended, the
Court concurs in the report of the investigating judge.
The charges against respondent judge relate to basically
two acts committed by him: (1) granting bail to Weny
Dumlao in the reduced amount of P10,000.00 and (2)
dismissing the criminal complaint against Dumlao.
I. With respect to the granting of bail to Weny Dumlao
and the reduction of its amount to P10,000.00,
complainant alleges:
2. The municipal courts are now courts of
records. Per order dated September 7, 1994. . .
. the Honorable Judge reduced the amount of
bail His Honor set in a previous order (Page
12, Ibid.), from P20,000.00 to P10,000.00
acting supposedly upon the request of the
father of the accused. However, there is no
such request for reduction of bail on file with
the records of the case;
3. At the time the Honorable Judge acted on
the "request" for reduction of bail, the accused
was not under detention as he was not arrested
nor had he voluntarily surrendered as borne by
the records. Accordingly, the Court has not yet
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, so the Honorable Judge cannot act on
such "request" for reduction of bail even if
interceded by the father of the accused;
4. The amount at which the bail was reduced:
P10,000.00 is not commensurate with the
gravity of the crime charged, an evident
manifestation of the Judge's injudiciousness in
the exercise of his authority and discretion. The
bail bond guide of 1981 provides for the
amount P12,500.00;
Simply stated, the complaint is that respondent judge is
guilty of ignorance of the law, bias, and partiality for
Dumlao as shown by the following: (a) respondent judge
granted bail and later reduced its amount when the fact
was that, at that time, Dumlao was not in the custody of
the court; (b) there was no written motion presented for
the reduction of bail, which is a necessity since MCTCs
are courts of record; and (c) pursuant to the 1981 Bail
Bond Guide the bail for frustrated murder should be
P12,500.00.
A. It is indeed true that, in general, bail presupposes
that the applicant is under arrest, detained, or otherwise
deprived of his liberty. 12 In this case, it appears that on
July 16, 1994, shortly after the incident, Weny Dumlao
surrendered to the police, but the next day (July 17,
1994) he was released to the custody of Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Emiliano Matro. 13
Prosecutor Matro testified that upon DECS Supervisor
Nuelito Dumlao's request, he agreed to take custody of
Dumlao for which reason Weny Dumlao was released by
the police. 14 According to Matro, this was not the first
time that he took custody of one who was under
investigation. 15
Apparently, therefore, when Dumlao applied for bail on
September 7, 1994 to respondent judge, Dumlao was
not in custody. Nor was his release to the custody of
Assistant City Prosecutor Matro in accordance with law.
Under Rule 114, 15 of the Rules of Court, the release
on recognizance of any person under detention may be
ordered only by a court and only in the following cases:
(a) when the offense charged is for violation of an
ordinance, a light felony, or a criminal offense, the
imposable penalty for which does not exceed 6 months
imprisonment and/or P2,000 fine, under the
circumstances provided in R.A. No. 6036; (b) where a

person has been in custody for a period equal to or

more than the minimum of the imposable principal
penalty, without application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law or any modifying circumstance, in which
case the court, in its discretion, may allow his release on
his own recognizance; (c) where the accused has
applied for probation, pending resolution of the case but
no bail was filed or the accused is incapable of filing
one; and (d) in case of a youthful offender held for
physical and mental examination, trial, or appeal, if he
is unable to furnish bail and under the circumstances
envisaged in P.D. No. 603, as amended (Art. 191). 16
But although then not in legal custody, Dumlao
subsequently submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court when on September 7, 1994 he personally asked
respondent judge to admit him to bail and reduce its
amount. InPaderanga v. Court of Appeals, 17 Miguel
Paderanga was one of the accused in a case for multiple
murder. Before the arrest warrant could be served on
him, he filed through counsel a motion for admission to
bail which the trial court set for hearing on November 5,
1992 with notice to both public and private prosecutors.
As Paderanga was then confined at a hospital, his
counsel manifested that they were submitting custody
over Paderanga's person to the chapter president of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and asked that, for
purposes of the hearing on his bail application, he be
considered as being in the custody of the law. On
November 5, 1992, the trial court admitted Paderanga
to bail in the amount of P200,000.00. The next day,
Paderanga in spite of his weak condition, managed to
personally appear before the clerk of court of the trial
court and posted bail. He was arraigned and thereafter
he attended the hearings. We held that the accused was
in the constructive custody of the law when he moved
for admission to bail through his lawyers (1) by filing the
application for bail with the trial court, (2) by furnishing
true information of his actual whereabouts, and (3) by
unequivocably recognizing the jurisdiction of said court.
Respondent judge thus correctly granted bail to Dumlao.
B. Respondent judge erred, however, in fixing the
amount of bail at P20,000.00 and reducing it to
P10,000.00 18and in doing so without a hearing.
Under the 1981 Bail Bond Guide (Ministry Circular No.
36, September 1, 1981), the amount of bail in cases of
frustrated murder is P12,500.00. 19 In its Circular No. 10
dated July 3, 1987, the Department of Justice noted that
the amounts fixed in the Bail Bond Guide had become
"unrealistic and impractical for the purpose of assuring
the presence and/or appearance of persons facing
charges in court" and accordingly directed that the
amount of bail be computed at the rate of P10,000.00
per year of imprisonment based on the medium penalty
imposable for the offense. Judged by this standard, the
P10,000.00 bail fixed in this case was inadequate. The
penalty for frustrated murder prior to R.A. No. 7659
is prision mayor in its maximum period (10 years and 1
day to 12 years) to reclusion temporal in its medium
period (14 years; 8 months, and 1 day to 17 years and 4
months). So that, applying Art. 50, in relation to Art. 248
of the Revised Penal Code, the medium penalty would
be reclusion temporal in its minimum period (12 years
and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months). Under Circular No.
10, the amount of tile bail should have been fixed
between P120,000.00 and P140,000.00.
Either respondent judge was grossly ignorant of the law
or he deliberately disregarded it to favor the accused.
Considering that part of his duties as a judge is
conducting preliminary investigations, it is his duty to
keep abreast of the laws, rulings, and jurisprudence
regarding this matter. It is apparent that he has not. In
failing to do so he failed to live up to the injunction of
the Code of Judicial Conduct to "maintain professional
competence." 20 The maxim ignorance of the law
excuses no one has special application to judges.
Further demonstrating either deliberate disregard of the
law of gross ignorance of the same, respondent judge
granted bail to Weny Dumlao without notice to the
prosecution, in violation of Rule 114, 18. In Chin
v. Gustilo, 21this Court ruled that notice of application for
bail to the prosecution is required even though no
charge has yet been filed in court and even though
under the circumstances bail is a matter of right. The

failure to observe the above requirement constitutes

ignorance or incompetence which cannot be excused by
any protestation of good faith. 22
In this case, the failure to give notice to the prosecution
may be due to the fact that there was no written motion
filed but only, as respondent judge himself admitted, an
oral request by Dumlao and his father that the amount
of the bail be reduced. What respondent judge should
have done was to have Dumlao put his request in
writing and then schedule the incident for hearing with
notice to the prosecution. Instead, he readily granted
the request, which indicates rather clearly respondent
judge's partiality. This partiality was nowhere more
evident than in the private conference which he had
with the Dumalaos in his chambers without the
presence of the opposing party, the complainant in this
case. Time and again we have admonished judges not
only to be impartial but also to appear to be so. For
appearance is an essential manifestation of
reality. 23 Departing from this established norm,
respondent judge signed his September 7, 1994 order
reducing the amount of bail to P10,000.00 and then told
Dumlao to inform the police about it so that he would be
released.
II. With respect to the charge that respondent judge,
with grave abuse of authority, dismissed the case filed
by complainant against Weny Dumlao, it is alleged that:
1. The Honorable Judge of the MCTC
subpoenaed Dr. Marcelo S. Patawaran, Jr. (Page
15, Records of the Case-Annex "A") and
conducted examination upon the doctor
without notice, nay presence, of the parties of
the case. . . . It is significant to note that the
"searching questions" propounded upon the
doctor tended to diminish the significance and
importance of the medical certificate (Page
5, Ibid.) which may have been achieved, but
the whole of the proceedings unmasked the
partiality of the Court towards the accused.
Moreover, it is unbelievable that the Honorable
Judge is not aware of the plenitude in our
jurisprudence of proceedings undertaken by
courts and tribunals without notice and
presence of the parties that were declared null
and void by the Supreme Court;
xxx xxx xxx
5. On September 12, 1994, the Honorable
Judge issued a subpoena upon the accused,
requiring the accused to submit his counteraffidavits of his witnesses and his other pieces
of evidence, if any. Under the rule, and as
contained in the subpoena, the accused was
given ten (10) days to do so, and the period
expired on September 22, 1994 as he received
copies of the subpoena and the complaint with
supporting affidavits on September 12, 1994 as
shown by the records, Annex "A". Without prior
motion for extension of period, the Honorable
Judge allowed the filing by the accused of his
counter-affidavit only on October 11, 1994,
some 29 days late [actually only 19 days].
Moreover, the Court did not require the
accused to furnish copy of his counter-affidavit
to the complainant prior to submitting the
same in Court, in violation of Section 2(c), Rule
112 of the Rules of Court;
6. In the resolution recommending the
dismissal of this
case . . . , the Honorable Judge cited as one
reason the existence of a counter-charge
pending preliminary investigation before the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Villasis,
Pangasinan concerning the same incident
which is the subject matter of this case,
referring to I.S. No. V-94-30, filed by accused as
complainant therein. That case (I.S. No. V-9430) was dismissed per Resolution dated August
15, 1994, copy of which is hereto attached and
marked as Annex "B". After the dismissal of
said case, the accused, as complainant,
endeavored to revive the case, but which
undertaking took him a long time, hence, the
delay of accused's counter-affidavit in Criminal

Case No. 2346. . . .The fact alone that accused

was allowed to delay the filing of his counteraffidavit to enable him to revive his countercharge is an evident gross partiality of the
Honorable Judge; and
7. The Honorable Judge, without any basis,
directly or impliedly, made a finding that the
wound sustained by herein complainant was
self-inflicted, totally disregarding the evidence
on record, as declared positively by eye
witnesses. Such actuation bespeaks of the
grave abuse of discretion by the Honorable
Judge.
A. With regard to the examination of Dr. Melecio S.
Patawaran, Jr. on September 1, 1994 respondent judge
admits that he did not give notice to the parties of the
same but claims that it was because he was only at that
time in the first stage of preliminary
investigation. 24 This is inconsistent with his later
testimony in which he admitted that when he ordered a
warrant of arrest to be issued against Dumlao on August
18, 1994, the first stage of preliminary examination had
already been terminated. 25
Respondent contends that Rule 112, 3(e) did not apply
to the examination of Dr. Patawaran on September 1,
1994 because at that time Dumlao had not yet
submitted his counteraffidavit. 26 This provision states:
If the investigating officer believes that there
are matters to be clarified, he may set a
hearing to propound clarificatory questions to
the parties or their witnesses, during which the
parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be
present but without the right to examine or
cross-examine. If the parties so desire, they
may submit questions to the investigating
officer which the latter may propound to the
parties or witnesses concerned.
If, as respondent judge claims, the holding of a hearing
for the purpose of asking "clarificatory" questions
presupposes the filing by the parties of their affidavits
but at the time he examined Dr. Patawaran he had not
yet received the counteraffidavit of Weny Dumlao, then
what he should have done was to wait until the
counteraffidavit was filed and in the meantime not
examine Dr. Patawaran. What is particularly
objectionable was the examination of Dr. Patawaran as a
witness without the presence of the parties.
B. Nor is there any excuse for respondent's
consideration of Dumlao's counteraffidavit despite the
fact that it had been filed several days late. Dumlao
received the order 27 requiring him to file his
counteraffidavit and that of his witnesses on September
12, 1994. As under Rule 112, 3(b) Dumlao had only 10
days from receipt of the subpoena within which to
comply, his counteraffidavit should have been filed not
later than September 22, 1994. However, it took him 19
more days after the reglementary period had expired
before he finally filed his counteraffidavit on October 11,
1994. Dumlao did not ask for an extension, yet
respondent judge allowed the counteraffidavit.
Respondent claims that 28
The acceptance of the Counter-Affidavit is not
my duty. It is my Clerk of Court who received
the Counter-Affidavit and when I look into the
records, the Counter-Affidavit was already there
in the record and I was also preparing a
Resolution to that case, so I have to take
cognizance of the Counter-Affidavit. After all,
there was no one month yet that lapsed so I
have to take cognizance of the Counter
Affidavit. And immediately after that, I issued a
Resolution.
The contention has no merit. The duty of the clerk of
court was to receive the counteraffidavit. 29 It was
respondent judge's responsibility to see to it that what
was received in his court had been filed on time. Nor is
it true that when respondent judge saw the
counteraffidavit, it had already been attached to the

records. Clerk of Court Adoracion Marcos testified that

upon receipt of the counteraffidavit, she showed it to
respondent judge. 30Respondent judge therefore knew
when the counteraffidavit was filed. At the very least, he
should have checked whether it was filed on time. That
respondent judge allowed the late filing of the
counteraffidavit can only be attributed to his desire to
enable Dumlao to revive his case against complainant in
the Prosecutor's Office because it was the linchpin for
his defense in Criminal Case No. 2346.

bullet as it does not have any

exit.

C. What has been just said applies as well to respondent

judge's claim that responsibility for furnishing
complainant a copy of the counteraffidavit was not the
court's responsibility but Dumlao's. The service of the
counteraffidavit on complainant should indeed be made
by Dumlao and not by the court, 31 but respondent judge
should have seen to it that this duty had been complied
with upon the filing of the counteraffidavit. The "serve
and file" rule is so basic for respondent judge not to
know it. It was not fair for respondent judge to consider
a pleading which the other party knew nothing about
because it had not been served on him.

xxx xxx xxx

D. In dismissing Criminal Case No. 2346, respondent

judge said: 32
For the weighing and evaluation of evidence of
both parties, the Court took the pain of issuing
a subpoena to Dr. Marcelo [actually Melecio] S.
Patawaran, Jr., a resident physician of Don
Amadeo Perez, Sr. Memorial Hospital at
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, who testified that the
bullet did not have any exit and there was no
bullet left in the body and it becomes only an
injury. That the patient was advised to be
referred to the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital
for x-ray purposes, instead he went to the
Sacred Heart Hospital at Urdaneta, Pangasinan
and went home after x-ray. That no x-ray result
was submitted to Don Amadeo J. Perez, Sr.
Hospital or to the Court to prove that it was
really a bullet wound. That he did not notice
any powder burns on the injury.
. . . [I]n the opinion of the Court, the injury is
self inflicted, this case should be
dismissed . . . .
Thus, based on alleged testimony of Dr. Patawaran,
respondent judge cast doubt on complainant's claim
that his wound was a gunshot wound and held that the
wound had been inflicted by complainant on himself.
This is contrary to Dr. Patawaran's testimony in the
preliminary investigation conducted by respondent
judge. Dr. Patawaran said in his testimony: 33
Q: Doctor, here in this
medical certificate in the
findings or diagnosis it says
"GSW" or gunshot wound,
was it really in your opinion a
gunshot wound?
A: Yes, Judge.
Q: Why do you say it is a
gunshot wound?
A: Because when I saw the
wound it manifested the
characteristic of a gunshot
wound like the inversion of
the skin edges.
Q: You said inversion of the
skin edges Doctor, did you
find any bullet in the injury?
A: That is why I referred the
patient to the Provincial
Hospital for x-ray because
when you see only the
entrance and no exit, it's a
must so as to locate the

Q: Do you know if the bullet

is inside the body of the
person?
A: That will be determined by
the x-ray, sir.

Q: In this medical certificate

Doctor below the findings
and diagnosis are the letters
"GSW" is in writing and not
typewritten as the injuries
and entries indicated, will
you please explain?
A: I initialed it to make it
authenticated, a
typographical error, sir.
Q: From the injury Doctor you
can not determine also how
far was the assailant?
A: Probably around more or
less 3 meters, sir.
Q: Did you talk to the patient
Roberto Espiritu when he was
taken to your hospital
Doctor?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did Roberto Espiritu ever
mention to you the name of
the assailant and that he
recognized him?
A: I just asked what
happened and he said
"pinaltogdac" I was shot, and
I did not ask the name of the
assailant any more.
It would seem respondent judge simply relied on the
counteraffidavit of Dumlao for his resolution, particularly
the following portion of Dumlao's counteraffidavit: 34
The medical certificate of private complainant
Roberto Espiritu doesn't categorically state that
the wound is a gun shot wound and if the
letters GSW in handwritten form in a ballpen
appear therein is an information coming from
and supplied by said complainant, other entries
are typewritten, it is not a gun shot wound as
ascertained and examined by the attending
doctor; the complainant was never confined in
the hospital; there is no exit of the bullet but no
finding whether said bullet is embedded and
found inside the body of the alleged victimcomplainant; if the private-complainant ever
sustained any wound, it is one that is selfinflicted in a vain effort to substantiate a false
charge of a serious offense of frustrated
murder making it appear as a consequence of
a gunshot; the medical certificate doesn't state
the healing period of the self-inflicted wound;
medical certificate is attached and marked as
Annex "E" to form part hereof.
The foregoing acts of respondent judge clearly
demonstrate partiality.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Eduardo U.
Jovellanos GUILTY of gross misconduct and imposes on
him a FINE of P20,000.00, with a WARNING that
repetition of the same or similar offenses will be dealt
with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1419

December 27, 2002

EDUARDO M. MARTINEZ, SR. and RUPERTO G.

MARCELO, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE ORLANDO C. PAGUIO, MTC, Branch 1,
Meycauayan, Bulacan, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The Meralco Village Homeowners Association, Inc.
(MVHAI) is composed of employees of the Meralco
Electric Company residing in Meralco Village Phase I, a
residential subdivision located in Lias, Marilao, Bulacan.
The MVHAI was the donee of a vacant lot located in the
periphery of Meycauayan, Bulacan and adjacent to
Marilao, Bulacan, identified as Lot 22, Block 16. The said
lot has an area of 7,504 square meters and is covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 225920. The MVHAI
used the said lot for basketball games of the
homeowners and their dependents and for other sports
activities. The MVHAI since then paid the realty taxes
thereon. Among the members of the MVHAI were
Ruperto Marcelo and his wife Lucita Marcelo, an
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and Engineer Eduardo
Martinez, Sr.
On April 10, 1998, at about 2:00 p.m., Bernabe Antonio,
his sister Lita Antonio and others caused the
construction of a barbed wire and coco lumber
perimeter fence on a portion of the lot. Martinez had the
incident recorded in the Meycauayan Police Station
blotter. Antonio and his sister continued the construction
in the morning of the next day. Martinez again reported
the incident to the police authorities. The MVHAI
secured a certification from the municipal engineer that
there was no building permit for the construction of the
fence. On April 14, 1999, Martinez, in behalf of MVHAI,
filed a criminal complaint, docketed as I.S. No. 99-1454,
against Bernabe Antonio, Lita Antonio, Ric Faustino and
Danilo Corteza for violation of Republic Act No. 7279
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan.
On April 22, 1999, the homeowners circulated open
letters calling the attention of the police authorities and
other municipal officials to and complaining against the
incursion of Bernabe Antonio, his sister and others into
the lot. Obtaining no immediate relief from the police
authorities and municipal officials, the homeowners
gathered together on May 6, 1999, at around 4:00 p.m.,
and confronted Antonio. They demanded that he
demolish his perimeter fence. Antonio refused, claiming
that he inherited the property where he constructed the
fence from his deceased grandfather, Ceferino Antonio.
Forthwith, the homeowners themselves demolished the
fence. Antonio reported the incident to the police
authorities and on May 10, 1999, he executed a sworn
statement complaining against Martinez, Marcelo and
the other homeowners for the demolition of his
perimeter fence. On the same day, a criminal complaint
for malicious mischief was filed by Antonio with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Meycauayan, Bulacan
presided by Judge Orlando C. Paguio. The case was
entitled People vs. Eduardo Martinez, Sr., et al. and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-28365. The complaint
therein reads:
"That on the 6th day of May 1999, at around 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon more or less in Brgy. Pandayan,
Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan,
Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, motivated by anger, with deliberate intent to
cause damage, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously strike and destroy the house and barb
wire owned by one CEFERINO ANTONIO represented by

BERNABE ANTONIO Y JURADO, which cause damages to

said house and barb wire in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) Philippine
Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the
undersigned complainant on the aforesaid amount." 1
The preliminary examination was set on June 2, 1999
but was reset to June 25, 1999 at 9:00 a.m. However,
before the examination commenced, Marcelo filed a
motion for inhibition alleging inter alia that, on several
occasions, Judge Paguio commented that the accused
before the MTC took the law unto their hands when the
perimeter fence of Antonio was demolished causing
damage to the latter. Martinez joined the motion of
Marcelo for the inhibition of Judge Paguio.
On June 3, 1999, the provincial prosecutor of Bulacan
issued a Resolution in I.S. No. 99-1454 finding probable
cause against Bernardo Antonio, et al. for violation of
Republic Act 7279 and filed an Information against
respondents therein with the MTC of Meycauayan,
Bulacan presided by Judge Paguio for said crime. The
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-52953.
On September 15, 1999, Judge Paguio issued an Order
denying the motion for inhibition filed by Marcelo and
Martinez in Criminal Case No. 99-28365. He denied
having declared during the proceedings on June 2, 1999
that Martinez, Marcelo and the other homeowners took
the law unto their own hands. Judge Paguio set the
arraignment and pre-trial on September 23, 1999 at
8:00 a.m. On September 21, 1999, subpoenae were
issued by the clerk of court for the arraignment of
Marcelo and Martinez and for pre-trial. Marcelo and
Martinez received their copies of the subpoenae only in
the afternoon of September 22, 1999.
The case was called on September 23, 1999 for the
arraignment of Martinez and Marcelo. Martinez
appeared without counsel and explained to the court
that because he received the subpoena only in the
afternoon of the previous day, he was unable to contact
his counsel. Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Lucita
Marcelo made a special appearance for her husband
Marcelo, praying that the arraignment of the accused be
cancelled. She insisted that in her copy of the court
calendar of cases for the day, Criminal Case No. 9928365 was not included. The judge denied the motion
for a resetting but allowed Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Marcelo to assist her husband during his
arraignment and appointed a counsel de oficio for
Martinez. The two (2) were arraigned and entered a plea
of not guilty. The court then called the case for pre-trial
but Martinez and Marcelo prayed for a continuance to
enable them to contact their respective counsels.
In the meantime, Martinez and Marcelo filed a petition
for injunction with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bulacan, entitled Eduardo Martinez, Sr., et al. vs. Hon.
Orlando C. Paguio, et al. and docketed as Civil Case No.
08-M-2000. They sought to enjoin Judge Paguio from
further taking cognizance of Criminal Case No. 9928365. However, on January 31, 2000, Martinez and
Marcelo filed a notice of withdrawal of petition. The RTC
issued an order on the same date, dismissing the
petition conformably with Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
In February 2000, the MVHAI filed a complaint against
Antonio and the Estate of Ceferino Antonio, docketed as
Civil Case No. 89-M-2000, for quieting of title with the
RTC of Bulacan, praying that after due proceedings
judgment be rendered in their favor as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully
prayed that the Honorable Court renders judgment:
1. Quieting the title or removing the cloud over
the title or interest of the plaintiff over property
covered by TCT No. T-225920 and the Deed of
Donation dated April 29, 1997.
2. Ordering the defendants to pay to the
plaintiff the sum of:
2.1 P320,000.00 by way of actual
compensatory damages;

2.2 P100,000.00 by way of exemplary

damages;
2.3 P100,000.00 by way of attorney's fees and
P1,000.00 per appearance as appearance fee.
3. Granting such other relief as may be just and
equitable."2
Martinez and Marcelo forthwith filed a motion to
suspend proceedings in Criminal Case No. 99-28365 on
the ground of a prejudicial question in Civil Case No. 89M-2000.
During the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 99-28365
before Judge Paguio on March 2, 2000, the private
prosecutor manifested to the court that accused
Martinez and Marcelo had not yet posted any bail bond
and prayed that the court fix the bail bond for each of
the said accused. On the same date, the court issued an
order fixing the bail bond at P10,000.00 each for
Martinez and Marcelo and gave them until 12:00 noon
on said date to post their respective bonds. The judge
also issued an addendum order denying the motion to
suspend proceedings filed by Martinez and Marcelo and
setting the trial of the case on its merits on March 23
and 30, 2000. When Martinez and Marcelo failed to post
their bail bonds, the court issued a warrant for their
arrest. On March 3, 2000, Martinez and Marcelo filed a
motion for the reconsideration of the March 2, 2000
Order of the MTC and for the quashal of the warrant of
arrest issued by said court. They contended that the
imposable penalty for the crime is arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum period and hence there was no
need for them to post bail bonds. Moreover, under the
Rules on Summary Procedure and Republic Act 6036,
they were not required to post bail.
On April 15, 2000, Martinez and Marcelo filed an
administrative complaint against Judge Paguio with the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), docketed as
A.M. MTJ-02-1419, charging him with gross ignorance of
the law, grave abuse of authority and gross partiality,
alleging inter alia that:
(a) Instead of requiring Antonio to establish a
prima facie case against Martinez and Marcelo
for malicious mischief as required by the Rules
on Summary Procedure, the Judge required
them to refute Antonio's baseless claim of
ownership over the property;
(b) Judge Paguio had prejudged the case
against them in favor of Antonio by declaring
during the proceedings that they took the law
unto their own hands, causing damage to
Antonio;
(c) Judge Paguio insisted on the arraignment of
Martinez and Marcelo on September 25, 1999
although the case was not scheduled on said
date; and they received the subpoenae only a
day before the said arraignment;
(d) Martinez and Marcelo were ordered by
Judge Paguio to post bail even though they
were not required to do the same under the
Rules on Summary Procedure.
In his unsigned comment, Judge Paguio averred that he
could not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law in
the absence of findings of bad faith, dishonesty or
corruption. He asserts that his actions in Criminal Case
No. 99-28365 were above board and in accordance with
the rules. According to him, for gross abuse of authority
to exist, the power must be exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner. He vehemently denied that he was
biased in favor of Mr. Antonio. He insists that all his
actuations were designed to render speedy and
inexpensive disposition of cases filed before his court.
The Court directed the OCA to conduct an investigation
of the complaint. The Court Administrator submitted his
report which states thus:
"EVALUATION:

xxx
A careful perusal of the records reveals that respondent
Judge manifested a lack of mastery of the provision of
the 1991 Rules on Summary Procedure. In an Order
dated 2 March 2000, he directed:
'It appearing from the record of this case that all the
accused have not yet posted their bail. In view thereof,
and upon manifestation by the private prosecutor Atty.
Ernesto Fernandez, let the amount of TEN THOUSAND
PESOS (P10,000.00) each be posted by the accused
EDUARDO MARTINEZ, ET AL. for their provisional liberty,
immediately until 12:00 noon.'
In a similar case, Agunda vs. Judge Tresvalles, AM No.
MTJ-99-1236, 25 November 1999, 319 SCRA 134, this
Court noted that the requirement for the accused to
post bail is part of the regular procedure, not the revised
rules on Summary Procedure. The Court declared:
We agree with the findings of the Office of the Court
Administrator. The records clearly show inefficiency,
gross ignorance of the law and impropriety on the part
of respondent judge.
First. He failed to determine that the criminal case
before him was governed by the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure, as a result of which he applied the
regular procedure and required the accused to post bail.
It took respondent judge four months from the date of
the filing of the information on September 25, 1997 to
January 26, 1998 to determine that, after all, the case
was subject to the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure
and order a copy of the complaint and the affidavits to
be served on the accused so that they could file their
counter affidavit. Meanwhile, he required them to post
bail when, under the Rules on Summary Procedure, this
is no longer necessary considering that the charge
against them was simply malicious mischief.
Sec. 2 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure
provides:
Sec. 2. Determination of applicability. Upon the filing of
a civil or criminal action, the court shall issue an order
declaring whether or not the case shall be governed by
this Rule.
A patently erroneous determination to avoid the
application of the Rules on Summary Procedure is a
ground for disciplinary action.
Although the said provision states that 'patently
erroneous determination to avoid the application of the
[Rule on Summary Procedure] is a ground for
disciplinary action,' the provision cannot be read as
applicable only where the failure to apply the rule is
deliberate or malicious. Otherwise, the policy of the law
to provide for the expeditious and summary disposition
of cases covered by it could easily be frustrated. Hence,
requiring judges to make the determination of the
applicability of the rules on summary procedure upon
the filing of the case is the only guarantee that the
policy of the law will be fully realized. "3
The Court Administrator further stated that
complainants failed to adduce sufficient evidence to
substantiate their other charges against Judge Paguio.
He noted that Judge Paguio could properly exercise his
discretion in deciding complainants' motion for inhibition
in Criminal Case No. 99-28365, since the grounds raised
by them did not automatically disqualify the judge from
sitting on the case, under the Revised Rules of Court.
The Court Administrator pointed out that with regard to
the motions/petitions submitted by complainants but
subsequently denied by Judge Paguio, complainants
may still avail themselves of judicial remedies other
than the filing of an administrative complaint for grave
abuse of authority against the judge.4
We agree with the findings of the Court Administrator.
Irrefragably, the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 9928365 were covered by the Rules on Summary
Procedure. Section 16, Rule 19 of said rule provides:

"SEC. 16. Arrest of accused. The court shall not order

the arrest of the accused except for failure to appear
whenever required. Release of the person arrested shall
either be on bail or recognizance by responsible citizen
acceptable to the court."5
In this case, there was never an instance when Martinez
and Marcelo failed to appear before the MTC when so
required by Judge Paguio. There was thus no legal basis
for Judge Paguio to require Martinez and Marcelo to post
bail and order their arrest when they failed to post bail.
Moreover, Republic Act No. 6036 provides that bail is not
generally required for violation of municipal or city
ordinances or for criminal offenses when the prescribed
penalty is not higher than arresto mayor and/or a fine of
P2,000.00 or both. In the recent case of Agunday vs.
Tresvalles,6 the Court held that in a charge of simple
malicious mischief which is covered by the Rules on
Summary Procedure, bail is no longer necessary.
While ordinarily, judges may not be administratively
sanctioned for mere errors of judgment absent any bad
faith or malice, they nonetheless have obligation to
keep abreast of all basic laws and principles.7 The claim
of good faith and absence of malice in glaring instances
of incompetence and ineptitude does not abate a
judge's consequent liability. When the law is sufficiently
basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and to simply
apply it; anything less than that would be constitutive of
gross ignorance of the law.8

SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348

JUDGE DOLORES L. ESPAOL and OPHELIA G.

SULUEN, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE LORINDA T. MUPAS, respondent.
x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1352

"Anent, the other charges, complainants failed to

provide sufficient evidence to hold respondent Judge
liable. The matter of inhibition of judges rests on his own
discretion and cannot be touched by the Court unless he
is disqualified in accordance with the Rules of Court. As
regards respondent Judge's denial of the other
motions/petitions submitted by complainants, there are
judicial remedies available for them and not the instant
administrative complaint.
There was not enough evidence to prove that
respondent Judge is biased in favor of the private
complainant and his counsel. As a general rule,
repeated rulings against a litigant, no matter how
erroneous and vigorously and consistently expressed,
are not basis for disqualification of a judge on grounds
of bias and prejudice (citation omitted)." 9
In Abdula vs. Guiani,10 we ruled that the Court has to be
shown acts and conduct of the judge clearly indicative
of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can declare
respondent judge to be biased and partial in favor of a
party. Mere suspicion that the judge is partial to a party
is not enough; there should be adequate evidence to
prove the charge.11
Parenthetically, Judge Paguio had been found
administratively guilty in A.M. No. MTJ-00-1335, entitled
Yolanda Floro, complainant, vs. Judge Orlando C. Paguio,
Municipal Trial Court, Branch 1, Meycauayan, Bulacan,
respondent,12 and fined in the amount of P5,000.00 for
his delay in deciding a case. Records also reveal that
respondent judge had compulsory retired last February
26, 2002.13
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court
finds Judge Orlando C. Paguio of Branch 1, Municipal
Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan GUILTY of gross
ignorance of the law and is hereby ordered to pay a fine
in the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P12,000.00) to be deducted from his withheld
retirement benefits. The charges of grave abuse of
authority and gross partiality are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

November 11, 2004

EMPLOYEES OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT,

DASMARIAS, CAVITE, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE LORINDA T. MUPAS, respondent.
x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x
A.M. No. 01-2-100-RTC

November 11, 2004

RE: REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT ON SEARCH

WARRANTS AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
DASMARIAS, CAVITE, BRANCH 90,
x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1358

As to the two other charges of grave abuse of authority

and gross partiality, this Court agrees with the findings
and adopts the recommendation of the OCA, thus:

November 11, 2004

November 11, 2004

RE: REPORT ON THE COMPLAINT OF JUDGE

DOLORES L. ESPAOL, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
DASMARIAS, CAVITE, BRANCH 90; WILMA GO
AMPOSTA; and MEDY M. PATRICIO AGAINST JUDGE
LORINDA T. MUPAS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT,
DASMARIAS, CAVITE,

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court are four consolidated administrative
cases: three involving Judge Lorinda T. Mupas, Municipal
Trial Court (MTC), Dasmarias, Cavite, docketed as A.M.
Nos. MTJ-01-1348, MTJ-01-1352 and MTJ-01-1358; and
one relating to the Report on the Judicial Audit on
Search Warrants at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dasmarias, Cavite, presided by Judge Dolores L.
Espaol, docketed as A.M. No. 01-2-100-RTC.
The charges are summarized as follows:
1) MTJ-01-1348 alleged irregularities in the
processing and approval of bailbonds (sic) in
the Municipal Trial Court of Dasmarias, Cavite
with the knowledge and tacit consent of the
respondent Judge Lorinda T. Mupas.
2) MTJ-01-1352 utilizing employees in
respondent Judge's court to perform domestic
chores in her household whenever she has no
house helps; corruption by demanding bribe
money before rendering her decisions, citing
the case of one Atty. Estrella Laysa to whom
respondent Judge sent her sheriff to ask for
"lagay" in connection with a simple case for
ejectment in her sala; dismissing a drug case
against Melvin Lasangue after receiving a
sizeable amount for the accused which was
later reviewed by Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor who did not succumb to respondent
Judge's offer of money and free plane ticket for
abroad.
3) MTJ-01-1358 irregular dismissal by
respondent Judge of Criminal Case No. 97-0038

against Marcelino Diana for violation of

Republic Act No. 6425, despite the fact that
shabu and drugs paraphernalia were seized
from the accused's residence pursuant to a
Search Warrant issued by Honorable Judge
Dolores L. Espaol, on the flimsy pretext that
glaring irregularities in the conduct of the
search rendered the prohibited drugs
confiscated totally inadmissible as evidence,
the amount of P500,000.00 in cash and a jeep
valued at P200,000.00 allegedly having
changed hands in consideration of the
dismissal of the case; allowing her clerk of
court to conduct preliminary investigations of
cases filed in her court; and unjustified refusal
to approve the surety bond of an applicant for
release from detention upon complaint of
Wilma Go Amposta and Medy Patricio.
4) 01-2-100-RTC irregular issuance by
Honorable Judge Dolores L. Espaol of search
warrants without attaching to the records of
the cases written depositions in the form of
searching questions and answers of the
complainants and their witnesses.1
The cases were initially assigned to Retired Justice
Romulo S. Quimbo, Consultant in the Office of the Court
Administrator for investigation. Justice Quimbo,
however, later voluntarily inhibited himself. Retired
Justice Conrado M. Molina, Consultant, Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA), was designated in his stead
in the Resolution2 of September 26, 2001.
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348
Judge Dolores L. Espaol
and Ophelia G. Suluen v.
Judge Lorinda T. Mupas
In her Letter3 dated May 24, 1999, Judge Espaol
updated a "confidential report" dated May 15, 1997
complaining of certain irregularities allegedly committed
by the respondent judge. The antecedents are
summarized by the Court Administrator as follows:
The complaint of Judge Espaol stemmed from
the dismissal by Judge Mupas of Criminal Case
No. 97-0038 entitled "People of the Philippines
v. Marcelino Diana" for Violation of Section 16,
Article II, Republic Act No. 6425. Diana was
apprehended on 16 January 1997 by virtue of
Search Warrant No. 334 issued by Judge
Espaol where the search yielded, among
others, 249.2 grams of shabu wrapped in
twenty-seven (27) plastic sachets, and two (2)
decks of shabu wrapped in aluminum foil
weighing 1.5 grams.
On 17 January 1997 a criminal complaint
against Diana was filed before the MTC of
Dasmarias. A preliminary investigation was
conducted by Judge Mupas on 22 and 30
January 1997 involving prosecution witnesses
PO2 Enrico Set, a member of the searching
party from the PNP Dasmarias, Cavite, and
Barangay Kagawad Joey Carungcong who was
invited to witness the search in the house of
Diana.
On 7 February 1997 Judge Mupas issued a
Resolution recommending the dismissal of the
case for lack of probable cause. She ruled that
there was a clear violation of the constitutional
right of the accused against unreasonable
searches and seizure; moreover, "glaring
irregularities" in the search rendered the
prohibited drugs confiscated from the house of
Diana totally inadmissible as evidence. The
judge pointed out that during the preliminary
investigation, Kagawad Joey Carungcong
testified that he never actually witnessed the
search; as a matter of fact, nobody witnessed
it. Carungcong narrated that on 16 January
1997 at about 4:45 in the afternoon, he was
fetched from his office by two policemen to
assist them in searching the house of Diana.
Carungcong said that no illegal drugs were
recovered therefrom. He was nevertheless

informed that several plastic sachets

containing shabu were found in one of the
rooms of the house. Carungcong also revealed
that he was informed that when he arrived at
the place, the police had already conducted the
search of the house without witnesses and that
he saw Diana outside his house already
handcuffed.4
In a verified Affidavit-Complaint5 dated May 27, 1999,
Judge Espaol alleged that the respondent was involved
in collecting "premiums" from detention prisoners who
apply for bail bonds in her sala. It was also alleged that
the respondent judge "readily acted on bailable offenses
but would leave out cases where the detention prisoners
could not afford to post bail or are charged with nonbailable offenses." The complainant judge continued,
thus:
[I]n her own terms, she [Judge Mupas]
claimed that detention prisoners left in the cell
are those who are already "pigang-piga na" and
one way of doing this is to threaten to transfer
them to the Provincial Jail in Trece Martires,
Cavite. This matter is corroborated when Judge
Mupas raised this issue in her letter to me
dated April 30, 1999, stating that "In one case,
in People vs. Marcel Morales, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 98-0726, I ordered his
commitment from the Municipal Jail of
Dasmarias, Cavite to the Provincial Jail of
Trece Martirez City only to find out later that
you have already approved his application for
bail and ordered his release from custody;"
12. Furthermore, while the above matters were
looked into personally by the undersigned and
in the presence of Mrs. Ophelia Suluen, Warden
Alejandra dela Cruz and JO1 Pabillar begged to
be excused from signing their sworn
statements for fear of retribution from Judge
Mupas, hence, efforts exerted by the
undersigned to present their sworn statements
failed;
13. Likewise, JO1 Pabillar alleged that they
were called by Judge Mupas last Friday, May
21, 1999, and emphasized to them that
thenceforth the money for the bailbond (sic)
premiums should not be given to Belen
[Seperedad Robles], but to one Erlinda Carreon,
a civilian employee of the Philippine National
Police of Dasmarias. This is a subtle admission
that, indeed, some of her staff were involved in
this nefarious activity prohibited under
Administrative Circular No. 5, dated October 4,
1998. This could be the reason why Judge
Mupas is emboldened to challenge that the
undersigned name names because she has
already prevailed upon these people not to
meddle in this matter and, with her clout and
even threats, she may have succeeded; 6
Attached to the complaint was an Affidavit7 executed by
Ophelia G. Suluen, Legal Researcher, Regional Trial
Court, Dasmarias, Cavite, Branch 90, where she
alleged that the respondent judge gave her a call and
told her "Pakisabi mo kay Judge Espaol na
magkakaproblema siya sa mga nirelease nya, kasi reject
sa akin dahil yung iba, maraming pending na kaso," and
"Malaki kasi ang kita sa piyansa."8
According to Suluen, between 10:00 to 10:30 a.m. of
April 27, 1999, Ricardo Pabillar, a jail guard at the
municipal jail of Dasmarias, Cavite, came to their court
to inquire about the bail bond of one Rogelio Drio, which
she had received the day before. Drio was detained for
a case pending in the MTC, Dasmarias, Cavite, in the
sala of the respondent judge. She then referred the
matter of Drio's bail bond to Judge Espaol, who, in turn,
called jail guard Pabillar to her chambers. Pabillar then
told Judge Espaol that detention prisoners applying for
bail preferred the jailers to process their bail bond
papers as the latter charged only 15% of the prescribed
bail, whereas the staff of the respondent judge would
ask for "processing fees" equivalent to 20% of the
recommended bail. Only 10%-11% would go to the
bonding company while the rest was pocketed by the

respondent's staff. Judge Espaol, thereafter, approved

the bailbond of Drio in an Order9 dated April 27, 1999.
During the hearing of the case, Suluen testified that
Judge Espaol acted on bail bond applications for cases
pending in other courts in Cavite, such as Criminal
Cases Nos. 99-0435, 01-2020 and 01-2022, all pending
in the respondent judge's sala. Suluen also admitted in
open court that persons following up bail bonds used to
give them P100 to P200 for snacks for the staff, which
included Judge Espaol. She explained on redirect
examination that although Judge Espaol was also given
snacks bought with the money in question, the latter
had not known the source of the money.
Ma. Lourdes M. Sapinoso, Court Clerk III, RTC, Branch 90,
in her Affidavit10 dated November 20, 2001, stated that
people who come to their court for approval of bail bond
applications often complained about employees of other
courts, particularly those from the sala of the
respondent judge, who asked for amounts equivalent to
30% of the required bond. This was apparently the
consideration for the approval of the bond and the
issuance of the order of release of the accused. There
were also instances when requests for copies of the
complaint were denied, allegedly for the purpose of
compelling people to post their bail bond before the
municipal trial court. Because of this and for
"humanitarian considerations," Judge Espaol approved
bailbond applications of cases pending before the sala
of the respondent judge.
Pilarica Baldejera also testified for the complainant
judge. In her Affidavit11 dated April 15, 2002, she
deposed that the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 990892, 99-1129 and 02-0609, Rodel Baldejera y Villo, was
her son, and that the said cases were pending before
the sala of the respondent judge. She testified that on
April 14, 2002, she went to the office of Judge Espaol
with a certain Eric from the Governor's Office. She
returned to the complainant judge the next day at about
1:00 to 1:30 p.m. and told her about her son's bail
problem. She was advised to see the respondent judge
at her office in Dasmarias. Baldejera arrived there at
about 3:00 p.m., and personally requested the
respondent judge to allow her son to post bail. The
respondent told her to raise a cash bond of P30,000 and
to deliver the money to her (the respondent's) office.
The latter subsequently told her to see one Inday
Carreon at the PNP station. The witness waited for two
hours but no one came.
12

In her Comment, the respondent judge denied the

charges against her, contending that they were
malicious imputations, hearsay and without factual and
legal basis. She stated that she received two letters
from Judge Espaol dated April 28, 1999 and May 5,
1999, respectively. She then sent her respective replies
thereto on April 30, 1999 and on May 12, 1999. The
respondent judge stated that she forwarded a query to
the Court in a Letter13dated April 28, 1999, where she
questioned the legality and propriety of the acts of
Judge Espaol in approving bail bonds and releasing the
accused under detention whose cases were filed before
her (respondent judge's) sala for preliminary
investigation. The respondent claimed that Judge
Espaol did so despite the fact that there was no
showing that she (the respondent) was absent or on
leave when the applications for bail were approved. The
respondent judge listed the cases adverted to, to wit:
For your reference, hereunder are (sic) the lists
(sic) of cases filed before my sala for
preliminary investigation whose applications
for bail were approved by Judge Espaol and
thereafter, upon her orders, the accused were
released from custody.
1. Crim. Case No. 98-0089
PP-vs-ORLANDO SANTIAGO
For: Viol. of Sec. 16, Art. III, R.A. 6425
2. Crim. Case No. 98-0725
PP-vs-MARCEL MORALES
For: Viol. of Sec. 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425

3. Crim. Case No. 98-1311

PP-vs-ALEXANDER PAJAROJA
For: Viol. of Sec. 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425
4. Crim. Case No. 98-1488
PP-vs-JULIETA EMPARWA
For: Viol. of Sec. 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425
5. Crim. Case No. 98-0844
PP-vs-EMMANUEL ENCOY, ET AL.
For: Viol. of Sec. 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425
6. Crim. Case No. 99-0289
PP-vs-FERDINAND NAVIDA
For: Viol. of Sec. 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425
7. Crim. Case No. 99-0435
PP vs. ALFREDO CASTILLO
For: Viol. of Sec. 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425
Hereunder are (sic) the lists (sic) of cases
under my exclusive jurisdiction whose bail and
release from custody were also approved and
ordered by Judge Espaol.
1. Crim. Cases Nos. 98-1068,
98-1069 and 98-1071
PP-vs-ESPERANZA AYOS
For: Estafa
2. Crim. Case No. 98-1715
PP-vs-WILFREDO ABANCIA, ET AL.
For: Viol. of P.D. 1619
3. Crim. Case No. 98-0893
PP-vs-LIWAYWAY CASTILLO
For: Estafa
4. Crim. Cases Nos. 99-0309 & 990324
PP-vs-DANILO ATANANTE, JR.
For: Theft
5. Crim. Case No. 98-0892
PP-vs-PAULA PETELO
For: Estafa14
The respondent judge went on to say that the instant
complaint was an apparent desperate move to support
Judge Espaol's firm stand that she had the power and
authority, as Executive Judge, to act on the application
of bail bonds of detention prisoners whose cases were
pending before the MTC, Dasmarias, Cavite and to
continue her personal crusade to embarrass and
humiliate the respondent before the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, a perusal of the complaint would readily
show that it was but a reiteration of the April 28, 1999
and May 5, 1999 Letters of Judge Espaol.
According to the respondent, as judge of the MTC,
Dasmarias, she is authorized under the Rules of Court
to conduct a preliminary investigation of any offense
committed within her territorial jurisdiction, and to
release, commit or bind any person charged with any
offense. She alleged that it was Judge Espaol who erred
whenever she acted on application for bail on criminal
complaints still pending preliminary investigation in her
(the respondent's) court, and every time she imposed
bail for offenses which did not require it, such as
violation of municipal ordinances. Moreover, when Judge
Espaol approved Drio's application for bail, she acted
in excess of jurisdiction in the guise that she had
administrative supervision over the MTC of the same
municipality.
The Findings of Justice Molina,
Hearing Officer-Designate of the OCA
In his Joint Report and Recommendation dated February
21, 2003, Justice Molina found that the testimonies of
the complainant and her three (3) witnesses on the
alleged irregularities in the respondent's approval of bail
bonds were pure hearsay. Not one of the affiants who
executed sworn statements against the respondent
judge complaining about alleged irregularities in her

sala was presented as witness during the investigation.

As far as Ms. Baldejera was concerned, Justice Molina
opined that she was "an eleventh-hour, perjured and
rewarded witness," and that her testimony was devoid
of any value. Thus, the charges in this case were not
substantiated. The only fact that was established was
Mrs. Suluen's admission that they used to receive P100
to P200 from persons following up bail bonds.15
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1352
Employees of MTC, Dasmarias, Cavite v. Judge Lorinda
B. Toledo-Mupas
On March 2, 1999, the Court, through the Court
Administrator, received an undated anonymous
letter16 written in the vernacular charging the
respondent with gross misconduct, conduct unbecoming
a judge and violation of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. The allegations were summarized by the OCA in its
Report17 dated December 26, 2000:
a) Whenever respondent Judge does not have a
maid, which happens most of the time, court
employees were ordered to report to her house
in Cavite City in order to do the laundry, to
cook and to watch over her children;
b) Whenever she is in the presence of lawyers,
respondent, in order to cover up her
incompetence (kahinaan ng ulo), would shout
at the Court employees pretending to be angry;
c) Respondent is very corrupt. She wants to
make money out of every case and she does
not decide cases without "grease money." On
one occasion she asked the sheriff of the court
to approach one practitioner, Atty. Estrella
Laysa of Cavite City to ask for grease money in
an ejectment case;
d) Respondent is branded the "Shabu Queen"
of Cavite for fixing/selling drug cases. In order
to prevent discovery of illegally disposed cases,
the records are not forwarded to the Provincial
Prosecutor's Office. For instance, the drug case
against Melvin Lasangue was dismissed by the
respondent in exchange for a considerable
amount of money. On review, she was reversed
by Prosecutor Rosemarie Duque. Respondent
offered the said Prosecutor grease money and
a plane ticket for abroad in exchange for the
case but the offer was not accepted; and
e) Before, respondent uses only an old
Mercedes Benz for her transportation, but now,
she has four (4) brand new cars. She also has a
newly built house in Tagaytay City worth ten
million pesos.18
The letter was signed, "Naghihirap na mga MTC
Dasmarias employees."19
In a 1st Indorsement20 dated August 17, 1999, the OCA
referred the Letter to Judge Espaol as Executive Judge
for discreet investigation and report. In compliance
thereto, Judge Espaol made the following report:
1. The subscribed Letter of Atty. Estrella O.
Laysa of Laysa Law Office, dated September
10, 1999, together with attachments, which is
self-explanatory.
2. Letter of one, Rosemarie Carmen PereyDuque, dated 14 September 1999, also with
pertinent attachment. On the side, Atty. PereyDuque admitted that a round trip ticket was
offered to her by Judge Mupas plus P30,000.00
as pocket money which according to the latter
is just the downpayment of the whole deal.
These offers were declined by Atty. PereyDuque who is an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
in Cavite.
3. Pictures taken of two (2) of the three (3)
residential places of Judge Mupas. One is

located at Brgy. Mataas na Burol, Silang, Cavite

and the other, which is very recently
completed, is at Brgy. San Jose, Tagaytay City.
The person who took the pictures promised to
complete his research and investigation
including the verification of titles and the cars
being used by the couple. Should additional
documents be submitted, they will likewise be
forwarded to your office.
4. Discreet investigation conducted of people
who may have some information regarding the
subject, indicated that some of the records of
some drug cases are indeed discarded in order
to hide the irregular dispositions thereof,
meaning they were never forwarded to the
Provincial Prosecutor's Office, nor the courts.
In this regard, it would be appropriate if a
management audit of the cases filed thereat
could be conducted by your office.
5. The allegations in the anonymous letter were
90% verified in the affirmative. 21
However, in a Verified Letter 22 dated April 4, 2001, the
employees23 of the MTC of Dasmarias, Cavite disowned
the "poison letter" against the respondent judge, and
alleged that they had never authorized any person to
file such a complaint. According to them, the respondent
judge was very competent and honest. As such, the
contents of the said letter were baseless and malicious,
intended for harassment purposes.
The respondent judge denied the allegations against
her. She explained that her father owns various tracts of
land in Silang, Cavite, while her mother has a threehectare property in Tagaytay City. She, however,
admitted that she owns a 1,500-square meter lot in
Tagaytay City, but pointed out that the said property
was donated to her by an aunt who died without any
children. She also explained that the properties alleged
to be hers were in fact owned by her father and aunt,
thus:
5. Contrary to the discreet and unverified
findings made by Special Police Officer 4
Rommel G. Macatlang, the houses that he took
photographs of are owned by my parents and
aunt. The house that SPO4 Macatlang saw in
Silang, Cavite is owned by my father who
acquired it through an exchange he made with
one of his sisters, the late Guadalupe Toledo.
The other house located in Tagaytay City is
owned and registered in the name of my aunt,
Ms. Corazon Bayas, as evidenced by Free
Patent No. (IV-2) 16747. The house located in
Cavite City where my family and I reside was
built in 1993 before I was appointed Judge of
the Municipal Trial Court, Dasmarias, Cavite
on a land that my husband and I purchased in
1988.
Attached as Annexes D and E are copies of Tax
Declaration No. 20942 consisting of 3,667
square meters and Free Patent No. (IV-2)
16747, respectively, and made as integral
parts hereof.
6. I never had the fortune of owning a
Mercedes Benz. It was my father who did along
(sic) time ago. The first car that I had was a
1977 Toyota Corolla that my father allowed me
to use until that old car was sold. Thereafter,
my father again gifted my husband and I in
1995 with a second-hand 1993 Nissan Vanette
that my family continue[s] to use. The only car
that my husband and I purchased was [a] 1997
Nissan Sentra.
7. Modesty aside, my father owns and operates
a coffee mill in Silang, Cavite that enables him
to be generous with his children which includes
me. He is presently one of the major suppliers
of coffee beans of Nestle Philippines. My father
shares with his children the income of the

coffee mill. In addition to my share from the

coffee mill, I also earn a modest income from
the sale of coffee beans, banana, pineapple
and coconut that my husband and I harvest
from an agricultural land that my father gave
us.24
On the allegations made by Atty. Miriam S. ClorinaRentoy in her Affidavit25 dated September 5, 2002
enumerating certain "practices"26 of the respondent
judge, the latter claimed that the charges were
completely false. She insisted that she could not
remember asking Atty. Clorina-Rentoy to submit a draft
decision in Criminal Case No. 99-0840, and that there
was no indication that she had any hand in its
preparation, or that she made such a request.

August 13, 2002 issued by Executive Judge Lucenito N.

Tagle, RTC Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, in SP. Proc. No. 98202, a petition31 for habeas corpus, Justice Molina also
found that the respondent judge grievously erred in
ordering the arrest and detention of the accused in six
criminal cases filed in her court.
Justice Molina concluded that the respondent judge was
liable for gross ignorance of the law.
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1358
Re: Report on the Complaint of Judge Dolores
L. Espaol,
RTC, Branch 90, Dasmarias, Cavite; Wilma Go
Amposta;
and Medy M. Patricio against Judge Lorinda T.
Mupas, MTC, Dasmarias, Cavite

The Findings of Justice Molina

According to Justice Molina, none of the employees
came forward during the investigation to affirm that the
respondent judge had required them to perform
domestic chores in her household. The charges of
alleged illegal and corrupt practices of the respondent
judge, particularly the alleged proclivity to ask for bribe
money before deciding cases, were based wholly on
incompetent and hearsay evidence. Furthermore, the
alleged ownership of the respondent judge of two
houses in Silang, Cavite, was not established. Thus:
Judge Espaol cited Atty. Estrella O. Laysa as
her source of information regarding the alleged
proclivity of respondent Judge to ask for "lagay"
before deciding her cases. Replying to Judge
Espaol's letter Atty. Laysa wrote back (Exh.
"F," pp. 116-118, Id.) that as counsel for the
plaintiff in an ejectment suit she prepared a
decision in favor of her client at the bidding of
the respondent Judge but the decision would
not come out because, as an employee of the
court told her, she has not given something to
the judge. Because her client would not agree
to bribing or entrapping the respondent she
just filed a motion to decide, and within fifteen
days the decision was promulgated which was
an adoption of the draft that she had prepared.
Obviously, the foregoing account of Judge
Espaol of the alleged illegal and corrupt
practices of the respondent judge is based
wholly on incompetent hearsay and double
hearsay evidence. It is on record that upon
application of the complainant two subpoenas
were issued and served on Atty. Laysa but the
lawyer shunned the investigation.
The ownership of Judge Mupas of the two
houses in Silang, Cavite, and another in
Tagaytay City photographed by SPO4 Rommel
G. Macatlang (Exhs. "I-1" to "J-3") has not been
established. Mr. Macatlang did not state his
basis for concluding that the houses in Silang
are owned by this respondent Judge; as to the
Tagaytay City residence, he merely mentioned
his interview of people in the vicinity who told
him the house belonged to the judge because
they used to see her and her husband oversee
its construction.27
Justice Molina found that Asst. Provincial Prosecutor
Duque was not a totally impartial witness, considering
that she and Judge Espaol had previously worked
together and was the latter's clerk of court for two
years.28However, Justice Molina found that the
respondent judge had, indeed, attempted to influence
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Duque to resolve
Criminal Case No. 98-0681 in favor of the accused,
albeit without a direct offer of bribe money. As such,
according to Justice Molina, the respondent judge
violated Canon 2.04 and Canon 3 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics.29
Justice Molina also made a finding that Atty. ClorinaRentoy was, likewise, less than an impartial witness,
considering that she decided to testify against the
respondent and executed her affidavit only after the
administrative case she filed against the latter was
dismissed by this Court. Relying on the Order30 dated

The charges of Wilma Go Amposta and Medy Patricio

relate to an incident where Amposta claims to have
tried to seek the approval of a surety bond for the
release of a relative from the sala of the respondent
judge. The respondent and her staff allegedly berated
Amposta, saying that the judge did not approve bonds
not issued through her court. She was instructed to
retrieve the surety bond that was earlier filed and to
apply for a new bond through her (the respondent's)
court instead.
Justice Molina reported that the complainants in this
case did not adduce evidence to prove their charge and
instead opted to adopt the evidence presented in A.M.
No. MTJ-01-1348 and A.M. No. MTJ-01-1352 as their
evidence. Justice Molina concluded that since the
evidence in the aforementioned cases failed to
substantiate the alleged anomalous practices of the
respondent judge in the processing and approval of bail
bonds in her court, the instant administrative matter
must, likewise, fail.32
Justice Molina concluded that the charges in the instant
complaint were not substantiated.
A.M. No. 01-2-100-RTC
Report on the Judicial Audit On Search
Warrants
at RTC, Branch 90, Dasmarias, Cavite
In the judicial audit on search warrants issued by Judge
Espaol, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Dasmarias, Cavite,
Branch 90, conducted by the OCA from February 16,
2000 to February 19, 2000, the OCA made the following
observation:
One of the requisites for a valid search warrant
is that the judge issuing the warrant must have
personally examined in the form of searching
questions and answers, the applicant and his
witness and take down their written
depositions.
Obviously, Judge Espaol failed to observe this
Rule when she issued Search Warrants Nos.
622, 607, 608, 609, 610, 612, 614, 580, and
582 but did not attach to the respective
records thereof the written depositions in the
form of searching questions and answers of the
complainants and their witnesses.33
Pursuant to the recommendation of the OCA, the Court
directed Judge Espaol to explain why she did not attach
the written depositions of the complainants to the
records of the search warrants issued by her in a
Resolution34dated March 14, 2001. Judge Espaol,
thereafter, submitted her Explanation35 which the Court
resolved to note and accept on August 8, 2001. 36
The Recommendation of Justice Molina
Thus, Justice Molina made the following
recommendation in his Joint Report and
Recommendation dated February 21, 2003:
1. MTJ-01-1348 be dismissed for lack of merit.

2. In MTJ-01-1352:
a) For violating Canon 2.04 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 3
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics by
attempting to influence Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Rosemarie
Carmen Perey-Duque to resolve
Criminal Case No. 98-0681 MTC,
Dasmarias, Cavite, against Melvin
Lesangue, in favor of the accused,
although without direct offer of
bribery, the respondent Judge Lorinda
T. Mupas be fined in the amount of
P30,000.00;
b) For gross ignorance of the law by
ordering the arrest of the accused in
criminal cases before the expiration of
the ten-day period she gave them to
file their counter-affidavits, before the
preliminary investigation was
concluded, and without any finding of
probable cause, as found by the RTC,
Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, in Special
Proceedings No. 982-02, Petition for
Habeas Corpus, the respondent Judge
Lorinda T. Mupas be fined in the
amount of P5,000.00.
3. MTJ-01-1358 be dismissed for lack of merit. 37
The Court's Ruling
The charges against
the respondent judge constituting
alleged corrupt practices were unsubstantiated
We agree with the finding of Justice Molina that the
charges against the respondent judge were not
supported by substantial proof. While the Court will
never tolerate or condone any conduct, act or omission
that would violate the norm of public accountability or
diminish the people's faith in the judiciary, nonetheless,
we have repeatedly stated that the quantum of proof
necessary for a finding of guilt in administrative cases is
substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. In the absence of contrary evidence, what
will prevail is the presumption that the respondent has
regularly performed his or her official duties.38 In
administrative proceedings, complainants have the
burden of proving by substantial evidence the
allegations in their complaints.39 Thus, when the
complainant relies mainly on second-hand information
to prove the charges against the respondent, the
complaint is reduced into a bare indictment or mere
speculation.40The Court cannot give credence to charges
based on mere credence or speculation.41 As we held in
a recent case:42
Any administrative complaint leveled against a
judge must always be examined with a
discriminating eye, for its consequential effects
are by their nature highly penal, such that the
respondent judge stands to face the sanction of
dismissal or disbarment. Mere imputation of
judicial misconduct in the absence of sufficient
proof to sustain the same will never be
countenanced. If a judge should be disciplined
for misconduct, the evidence against him
should be competent.43
As with factual findings of trial courts, credence should
be given to those of the investigating judge who had the
opportunity to hear witnesses and observe their
demeanor.44
In this case, Justice Molina found that the accusations of
Judge Espaol against the respondent were not
substantiated. While Judge Espaol claimed to have
"verified" the contents of the anonymous complaint
against the respondent, she admitted that she did not
talk to any of the MTC, Dasmarias court employees,
the supposed complainants therein.45 Aside from the
fact that the said employees executed an affidavit
denouncing authorship of the said complaint, not one of

them came forward to testify on the veracity of the

contents of the said complaint.
Anent Judge Espaol's Letter dated May 24, 1999 where
she reported the rather "hasty and suspicious dismissal"
by the respondent judge of Criminal Case No. 97-0038
for violation of Rep. Act No. 6425 against one Marcelino
Diana, Justice Molina echoed the findings of the Court
Administrator on this matter, to wit:
1. Judge Mupas issued a Resolution
recommending the dismissal of Criminal Case
No. 97-0038, against Marcelino Diana, for lack
of probable cause, the judge ruling that there
was a clear violation of the constitutional right
of the accused against unreasonable search
and seizure, and that the glaring irregularities
in the search rendered the prohibited drugs
confiscated from the house of the accused
inadmissible as evidence.
2. The Resolution of Judge Mupas was reviewed
by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Elmer C.
Madriaga who affirmed the recommendation of
Judge Mupas to dismiss the case for lack of
probable cause.

The letter-complaint of Judge Espaol was

forwarded on July 8, 1999 to the National
Bureau of Investigation for discreet
investigation on the alleged irregularities of
Judge Mupas. In its Report submitted to the
Office of the Court Administrator, the NBI
stated inter alia, that the result of the
investigation conducted by the NBI
investigators on the alleged P500,000.00 cash
and jeep valued at P200,000.00 was negative.
(pp. 1-3, 5, Rollo, Id.)46

In his Review of the Resolution of the

investigating court, Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Elmer C. Madriaga affirmed the
recommendation of Judge Mupas to dismiss the
case for lack of probable cause. He noted that
the search conducted by the PNP did not
conform to and was in flagrant violation of the
legal requirements of Section 7, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court providing that the search must
be conducted in the presence of the lawful
occupant thereof or any member of his family
or in the absence of the latter, in the presence
of two witnesses. Prosecutor Madriaga noted
that Kagawad Carungcong was merely asked to
sign the receipt of the property seized from the
house although he was not around when the
seized articles were found. This clearly reduced
the requirement into a mere token compliance
with the rules.47
Judge Espaol ought to have known that the best way to
verify the ownership of the houses in question was to
refer to the certificates of title in the Register of Deeds.
There was no need to resort to taking photographs of
the properties alleged to be owned by the respondent,
if, in the first place, the ownership thereof had not yet
been satisfactorily established.
Indeed, instead of substantiating the countless charges
against the respondent, Judge Espaol made further
allegations in a Supplemental Affidavit dated December
28, 2001, relying on mere affidavits of supposed
witnesses who did not, however, appear to support the
new charges:
2. Since the filing of the aforesaid Complaint
and the subsequent complaint filed earlier by
the "Employees of MTC-Dasmarias, Cavite
against the same Respondent Judge, under
Adm. Matter No. MTJ-01-1352, there were
additional instances of "gross misconduct,
conduct unbecoming a judge and violation of
R.A. 3019," showing the propensity of said
respondent thereby placing the judiciary and

the public interest in jeopardy. Considering that

the nature of the acts complained of are similar
but cumulative in nature, this Supplemental
affidavit is being submitted as evidence of the
unabated practices of the respondent.
3. To show that the respondent has
demonstrated without compunction, unlawful
practices, some of the Sworn Statements of the
complaining witnesses are enumerated
chronologically hereunder and copies thereof
are attached for the consideration of this
Honorable Tribunal.
a) Certified Photo Copy of the Original letter of
Perlita Auditor, Accused in Criminal Case No.
4856-97, dated August 20 1996, alleging that
she was only able to put together P6,000.00 for
her temporary liberty, while under detention
for preliminary investigation in the Municipal
Trial Court of Dasmarias, and praying that
Judge Lorinda T. Mupaz (sic) accept the said
amount, copy of which is attached as Annex
"A;"
b) A letter dated July 20, 2001, addressed to
the undersigned, enumerating the irregularities
being committed by the respondent and even
calling the same as "racket," copy of which is
attached as Annex "B;"
c) A Sinumpaang Salaysay of one, Berlin
Alberto, detailing the participation of the
respondent in fixing bail bond and imposing
unnecessary requirements in order to force the
applicant in coughing up cash amount for the
"premium of the bail bond," alleged on page
two thereof.
This document together with that of Perlita
Auditor, par a) above, were submitted in the
Comment to the answer of the respondent on
or abour August 17, 2001, and copies of both
are likewise attached for ready reference, as
Annex "C" and Annex "C-1," respectively;
d) Affidavit of one, Rolando Gadia, dated
August 3, 2001, showing that the respondent
has personal interest in the processing of bail
bond applications, copy of which is attached as
Annex "D;"
e) Hand-written letter of one, Jennifer D. Azala,
helping a relative in posting bail bond, alleged
that the respondent was asking for 30% of
P30,000.00 or P9,000.00 from the
representative of the accused (Annex "E");
f) Affidavit of Rosalinda B. Thompson, executed
on September 5, 2001, attesting to the practice
in the respondent's court and pointing to one,
"Belen" who made it clear that they will not
accept surety bond but only cash bond.
Respondent also made the remark to said
Affiant, that "Ganyan naman kayo talaga,
siguro mga tamad kayo kaya and pagbebenta
ng shabu and magaang na trabaho kahit
dalhin nyo pa lahat ng anak ninyo, hindi
bababa and piyansa ng asawa mo kaya kami
nandito ay para makinig sa mga
kasinungalingan ninyo" (Annex "F")
g) Sinumpaang Salaysay of Zenaida Legaspi
executed on 22 November 2001, attesting to
the fact that when she was working on the bail
bond for her husband, Rodel Legaspi y Reyes,
under Criminal Case No. 01-1138 before the
respondent's court, she was referred to a fixer
named "Inday" who was asking her for
P8,500.00, but on further inquiry she was
advised by some people that she should file a
Motion for the Reduction of Bail from
P60,000.00 to P40,000.00. She went to the
respondent's court and waited for the
respondent and as she was showing the
Motion, respondent asked "MAGKANO BA AT
PARA SAAN IYAN," and after reading it, she

remarked: "AYON SI INDAY. MAGKANO BA ANG

SINABI NI INDAY." When affiant mentioned
"EIGHT FIVE," respondent accordingly
answered, "EIGHT FIVE PALA, MAGKANO BA
ANG PERA MO," and when affiant replied "FIVE
LANG," respondent averred, "DUON NA
LAMANG SA IMUS AYUSIN AT ALAM NILA IYON"
(Annex "G");
h) Magkasamang Sinumpaang Salaysay of
Celia Gervacio and Narlyn Reyes, attesting to
the fact that they went to the respondent court
to inquire as to how much is the bond of Joel
Gervacio and Orly Reyes for alleged
"Carnapping" and they were told that it was
P180,000.00 while, for Robbery it was
P100,000.00. Since they could not afford the
quoted amounts, they decided to see a friend
who advised them to secure the services of a
lawyer. They were advised to get a copy of the
complaint which was not signed by the
respondent, hence, they went back and the
copy was stamped "Original Signed," by one of
the employees in said Court, but who refused
to indicate the amount of bail (Annex "H");
i) Subsequently, on November 19, 2001, based
on the surety bond presented to the Court for
both accused were approved under Criminal
Complaints Nos. 01-2020, 01-2021 and 012022 with the Complaints filed with the
respondent court on November 8, 2001, and
the space below the jurat was merely stamped
with "Original Signed" attached as Annex "H-1"
and Annex "H-2." The space "Noted by" for the
Prosecutor is unsigned and no amount of bail
recommended appears on the copy of the
Complaint, showing that the detention of the
respondent for preliminary investigation is
unlawful.
j) Order dated 13 December 2001 was issued
by the undersigned directing the release of the
accused, Ferdinand Sarreal y Magdangal, under
Criminal Complaint Nos. 01-1893 and 01-1894,
considering that the said accused had been
under detention for almost three (3) months
without preliminary examination nor
preliminary investigation having been
conducted by the respondent of the cases filed
before it (sic) on October 22, 2001, while the
arrest of the alleged respondent was on
October 19, 2001. While the Complaint is not
signed by the subscribing respondent judge,
the upper right hand corner bears a rubber
stamp of the respondent judge, dated October
22, 2001, copy of which Order is attached as
Annex "I," Criminal and the Complaint as Annex
"I-A," respectively;
k) Mrs. Ilaya who followed up the posting of
surety bond for her son, Michael Ilaya y Castro,
failed to come back for her Sworn Statement
which she promised to present on December
18, 2001, is attached as Annex "J." The Order
alleges the circumstances on how the accused
has been kept under detention without the
preliminary investigation conducted since he
was apprehended on June 18, 2001, while the
Criminal Complaint No. 01-1045 was filed with
the Municipal Trial Court of Dasmarias on June
19, 2001.
Mrs. Ilaya, a widow, hails from Cebu City and
came all the way to secure the release of her
son for the holidays. She alleged that she could
not immediately come to Manila, since she is a
single parent. However, she was made to go
back and forth in order to secure a copy of the
Criminal Complaint as a requirement for the
posting of the surety bond, which was finally
traced at respondent's residence. Copy of the
Order is attached as Annex "J."
4. Some of the statements above have already
been submitted and formed part of the cases
under investigation by the Hearing OfficerDesignate, but, due to the growing seriousness
of the unlawful practices committed by the

respondent judge, the Honorable Magistrates'

attention are (sic) invited to address the
depredation of the public in the judicial
processes.48
Patently then, the charges of irregularities in the
processing of approval of bail bonds, corruption, utilizing
employees as household help against the respondent
judge and attempting to influence the resolution of a
criminal case should be dismissed for lack of merit.
In ordering the arrest of the accused without
any finding of probable cause, the respondent
judge displayed gross ignorance of the law
However, Justice Molina found that the respondent
judge erred in ordering the arrest of the accused in
Criminal Cases Nos. 02-1123, 02-1125, 02-1127, 021124, 02-1126 and 02-1128 without conducting the
requisite preliminary investigation to determine
probable cause. The Order dated August 13, 2002
issued by Executive Judge Tagle in SP. Proc. No. 982-02,
as relied upon by Justice Molina, reads in part:
From the facts of the case, it is crystal clear
that detainees were given ten (10) days by
respondent Judge to file their counter-affidavits
from receipt of her Orders dated July 23, 2002.
But even before the expiration of the ten-day
period, another Order was issued by
respondent Judge ordering their arrest.
Evidently, the issuance of the warrants of
arrest was highly irregular and unwarranted. As
shown by the evidence, the preliminary
investigation of the cases against them has not
yet been concluded. Moreover, there is no
finding yet of "probable cause" against the
detainees.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Jail Warden of the Dasmarias PNP,
Dasmarias, Cavite, is directed to release Eden
Esplago and Rowena Esplago from detention.
Furnish copies hereof to respondent Judge
Lorinda T. Mupas and to petitioner's counsel.
SO ORDERED.49
A judge owes it to himself and his office to know by
heart basic legal principles and to harness his legal
know-how correctly and justly. When a judge displays an
utter unfamiliarity with the law and the rules, he erodes
the confidence of the public in the courts. Ignorance of
the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of
injustice.50As an advocate of justice and a visible
representation of the law, a judge is expected to be
proficient in the interpretation of our laws. When the law
is so elementary, not to know it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. 51Ignorance of the law, which
everyone is bound to know, excuses no one not even
judges. Ignorantia juris quod quisque scire tenetur non
excusat.52 As we held in Monterola v. Caoibes, Jr.: 53
Observance of the law, which respondent ought
to know, is required of every judge. When the
law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his
office to simply apply it; anything less than that
is either deliberate disregard thereof or gross
ignorance of the law. It is a continuing pressing
responsibility of judges to keep abreast with
the law and changes therein. Ignorance of the
law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses
no one not even judges from compliance
therewith. Canon 4 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics requires that the judge should be
studious in the principles of law. Canon 18
mandates that he should administer his office
with due regard to the integrity of the system
of the law itself, remembering that he is not a
depository of arbitrary power, but a judge
under sanction of law. Indeed, it has been said
that when the inefficiency springs from a
failure to consider a basic and elementary rule,
a law or principle in the discharge of his duties,
a judge is either too incompetent and

undeserving of the position and the title he

holds or is too vicious that the oversight or
omission was deliberately done in bad faith and
in grave abuse of judicial authority.54
Indeed, a judge should so behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.55 Furthermore, a judge
should be the embodiment of competence, integrity,
and independence,56and should uphold the integrity and
independence of the judiciary.57
Clearly then, the respondent judge displayed gross
ignorance of the law in failing to observe the
requirement of a finding of probable cause before
ordering the arrest of the accused in a criminal case.
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended, classifies administrative charges as serious,
less serious, or light. Gross ignorance of the law or
procedure and gross misconduct constituting violation of
the Code of Judicial Conduct are classified as serious
charges.
On the issue of approval of bail bonds
It is apparent from a perusal of the letters, complaints,
and the pleadings filed by Judge Espaol and the
respondent judge that the two have had some brewing
"personal differences" between them. As observed by
the OCA in its Report:
In her letters to Judge Espaol dated 30 April
1999 and 12 May 1999 (annexes "H" and "H-I")
Judge Mupas expressed her view on Mupas
regarding where the application for bail should
be made. According to the judge, the provision
of the rules on bail are clear in that the
accused can only file bail in a court where the
case concerned is pending. The Regional Trial
Court is prohibited from acting on applications
for bail of detention prisoners whose cases are
filed and pending before another court unless
the judge thereof is absent or unavailable.
Judge Mupas cited as her basis Section 17(a) of
Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
Judge Mupas counter-charged that Judge
Espaol herself acted on applications for bail
and ordered the release of the accused in some
cases pending before the sala of Mupas for
preliminary investigation although the latter
was not on leave of absence.

On the matter of where applications for bail

should be filed, Judge Espaol argued that
there is no law or rule prohibiting her from
approving bail even if the case is already
pending in other courts. She cited Section
17(c), Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, which
states that "any person in custody who is not
yet charged in court may apply for bail with
any court in the province, city or municipality
where he is held."
Judge Espaol mentioned in the case of People
v. Marcel Morales (Criminal Case No. 98-0726)
where Judge Mupas was upset when she
ordered the release of the accused despite the
fact that this case is for violation of anti-drug
law, well within the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court. Besides, the Regional Trial Courts
are not precluded from acting on applications
for bonds filed before them; neither are the RTC
judges required to check on the availability of
lower court judges for this is the essence of the
preference given to them.58
Justice Molina further found that
There appears a need for the Court to clarify
and settle the issue that has become an irritant
in the official relations between the
complainant and the respondent. Judge Mupas
questions the legality or propriety of Judge

Espaol's propensity in acting on applications

for bail and ordering the release of detention
prisoners whose cases are pending in and
falling under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of her court, the MTC of
Dasmarias, Cavite, even if she (Judge Mupas)
is present in her court. She further asserts that
Judge Espaol requires and approves bail even
for violations of municipal ordinances.
Judge Espaol, on the other hand, cites par. c,
Section 17, Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure which provides that "Any person who
is not yet charged in court may apply for bail
with any court in the province, city or
municipality where he is held" as her authority
to grant and approve bail to persons detained
in cases still pending preliminary investigation
in the municipal trial court. She maintains that
when a municipal judge conducts a preliminary
investigation he performs a non-judicial but
executive function; and that during the
preliminary investigation stage, although a
municipal judge may issue a warrant of arrest,
the case is not considered pending before him.
This apparently, is her justification for
considering the inapplicability of par. (a) of said
Section 17 of Rule 114.59
The Court shall thus settle the matter of the issuance of
bail bonds.
It is settled that a judge who conducted the preliminary
investigation, who has jurisdiction over the place where
the accused was arrested, has authority to grant bail
and to order the release of the accused even if the
records of the case had been transmitted for review to
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. 60 A municipal
judge conducting a preliminary examination and for
admission of the accused to bail is tasked to determine
whether there is probable cause against the accused
and, if so, whether the evidence of guilt is strong. 61 This
can, likewise, be gleaned from Section 5, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides as follows:
SEC. 5. Duty of investigating judge. Within
ten (10) days after the conclusion of the
preliminary investigation, the investigating
judge shall transmit to the provincial or city
fiscal, for appropriate action, the resolution of
the case stating briefly the findings of facts and
the law supporting his action, together with the
entire records of the case, which shall include:
(a) the warrant, if the arrest is by virtue of a
warrant; (b) the affidavits and the other
supporting evidence of the parties; (c) the
undertaking or bail of the accused; (d) the
order of release of the accused and
cancellation of his bailbond (sic), if the
resolution is for the dismissal of the complaint.
Should the provincial or city fiscal disagree with
the findings of the investigating judge on the
existence of probable cause, the fiscal's ruling
shall prevail, but he must explain his action in
writing furnishing the parties with copies of his
resolution, not later than thirty (30) days from
receipt of the records from the judge. If the
accused is detained, the fiscal shall order his
release.
Furthermore, according to Section 17(a), Rule 114
Sec. 17. Bail where filed.- (a) Bail in the amount
fixed may be filed with the court where the
case is pending, or, in the absence or
unavailability of the judge thereof, with another
branch of the same court within the province or
city. If the accused is arrested in a province,
city or municipality other than where the case
is pending, bail may be filed also with any
other regional trial court of said place, or, if no
judge thereof is available, with any
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge
or municipal circuit trial judge therein.
The scenarios envisioned in this provision were
enunciated in De los Santos v. Mangino:62

The foregoing provision anticipates two (2)

situations. First, the accused is arrested in the
same province, city or municipality where his
case is pending. Second, the accused is
arrested in the province, city or municipality
other than where his case is pending. In the
first situation, the accused may file bail in the
court where his case is pending or, in the
absence or unavailability of the judge thereof,
with another branch of the same court within
the province or city. In the second situation, the
accused has two options. First, he may file bail
in the court where his case is pending or,
second, he may file bail with any regional trial
court in the province, city or municipality
where he was arrested. When no regional trial
court judge is available, he may file bail with
any municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit
trial judge therein.63
If it happens for instance, that the accused was in
detention during the preliminary investigation
conducted by the municipal trial court but wished to put
up bail after the records of the investigation had been
forwarded to the fiscal, bail may be filed not in the
municipal trial court which fixed the amount of his bail
but with the Regional Trial Court of the place where he is
being held. Also, if no charge has as yet been filed but
the person under arrest would wish to go on temporary
liberty, he may apply for bail with any court in the
province, city or municipality where he is
held.64 However, when the preliminary investigation has
been concluded and the judge has recommended the
filing of the corresponding information against the
accused and had forwarded the records of the case to
the Provincial Prosecutor, the court loses its preliminary
jurisdiction over the said case. Having been divested of
jurisdiction over the case, the municipal trial court no
longer has any authority to issue any order or directive
in connection therewith, especially such as would
involve the liberty of the accused.65
Thus, a judge who approves applications for bail of
accused whose cases were not only pending in other
courts but who were, likewise, arrested and detained
outside his territorial jurisdiction is guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and violates Rule 3.01 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct.66 It must be emphasized that rules
of procedure have been formulated and promulgated by
this Court to ensure the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. Failure to abide by these rules
undermines the wisdom behind them and diminishes
respect for the law. Judges should ensure strict
compliance therewith at all times in their respective
jurisdictions.67
By her own admission, Judge Espaol acted on bail bond
applications of several accused whose cases were
pending before the respondent judge, and issued orders
of release thereon. The records are unclear, however, as
to whether the said accused were arrested within her
territorial jurisdiction. We note that in A.M. No. RTJ-041850,68 Judge Espaol was found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law for granting a hold-departure order
in a case not assigned to her sala, and was fined P5,000
therefor. We stated thus:
The powers of an executive judge relate only to
those necessary or incidental to the
performance of his/her functions in relation to
court administration.
Time and again the Court has adverted to the
solemn obligation of judges to be very zealous
in the discharge of their bounden duties.
Nonetheless, the earnest efforts of judges to
promote a speedy administration of justice
must at all times be exercised with due
recognition of the boundaries and limits of their
jurisdiction or authority. Respondent's ardent
determination to expedite the case and render
prompt justice may be a noble objective but
she did so in a manner which took away from
the complainant MTC judge the initiative which
by constitutional and legal mandates properly
belongs to her.69
However, considering that Judge Espaol compulsorily
retired from the service on January 9, 2004 after

fourteen (14) years of service in the judiciary, she can

no longer be charged for the aforesaid acts.

not formally charged in court, to apply for

bail.1awphi1.nt

Let this be a reminder to judges and executive judges

alike not to arrogate upon themselves the authority of
issuing orders which do not properly belong to their
respective jurisdictions. Such conflicts and hostilities
between judges serve no purpose but to put the Court in
a bad light, a situation we can ill afford during these
difficult and trying times.

Meanwhile, the OCA directed the Clerk of Court, Branch

272, RTC-Marikina City, Atty. Elvira Badillo-Adarlo, to
confirm whether a formal petition for admission to bail
was filed by Santos or her counsel and, whether
Executive Judge Reuben P. de la Cruz and Presiding
Judge Olga P. Enriquez were absent or unavailable on
May 30, 2000 when the release order was issued.8

WHEREFORE, conformably to Section 11(A) of Rule

14070 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, for
gross ignorance of the law and violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, respondent Judge Lorinda Mupas is
meted a FINE of Twenty-One Thousand Pesos (P21,000).

On June 18, 2002, Atty. Badillo-Adarlo informed the OCA

that the records of release orders and bailbonds in her
custody did not include the subject release order issued
by respondent Judge Beldia. As such, she could not tell
whether a formal petition for admission to bail was filed
by Santos. She likewise confirmed that Executive Judge
De la Cruz and Presiding Judge Enriquez were present
and available on the day that Judge Beldia issued the
release order.9

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-02-1731

February 16, 2005

SHIRLEY C. RUIZ, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE ROLINDO D. BELDIA, JR., Regional Trial
Court, Branch 57, San Carlos City, Negros
Occidental, [Assisting Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 272, Marikina City,] respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In an Affidavit-Complaint1 filed with the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA), complainant Shirley C. Ruiz
charged respondent Judge Rolindo D. Beldia, Jr. of
Branch 57, Regional Trial Court, San Carlos City, Negros
Occidental, with gross ignorance of the law and grave
abuse of authority in connection with the grant of bail
and issuance of a release order in favor of one Lourdes
Estrella Santos.
Ruiz is the private complainant in I.S. No. 2000-1031 for
violation of the Anti-Fencing Law2 pending before the
Department of Justice (DOJ). Santos, who was arrested
during entrapment operations relative to the carnapping
of Ruizs vehicle, was one of the respondents therein.
After her arrest on May 24, 2000, Santos was detained
in Camp Crame, Quezon City, pending the filing of
formal charges in court. Upon inquest, she executed a
waiver of the provisions of Article 1253 of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Rule 112, Section 74 of the then
applicable 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
Inquest Prosecutor thus set the hearing of the
preliminary investigation on May 31, 2000 at 2:00 PM.5
However, on May 30, 2000, Santos obtained an Order of
Release6 signed by respondent Judge Beldia who was
then detailed as assisting judge of Branch 272, Regional
Trial Court of Marikina City (RTC-Marikina
City).l^vvphi1.netRespondent Judge Beldia apparently
granted bail to Santos and approved the corresponding
bail bond without serving notice to the prosecutor.
Consequently, Ruiz filed the instant administrative
complaint contending that respondent Judge Beldia had
no authority to grant bail to Santos since the
Investigating Prosecutor has yet to conclude the
preliminary investigation. She claimed that for as long
as the information has not yet been filed in court, a
court has no power to grant bail to a detained person
since it has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the accused.
In his Comment7 dated August 14, 2000, respondent
Judge Beldia maintained that Section 1 (c), Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court allows any person in custody, even if

On November 20, 2002, the complaint was re-docketed

as a regular administrative matter. At the same time,
the parties were required to manifest whether they are
willing to submit the case for resolution based on the
pleadings filed.10 The parties failed to file their
manifestations, hence the filing thereof was deemed
waived.
In its report11 dated July 31, 2002, the OCA
recommended that respondent Judge Beldia be held
liable for gross ignorance of the law and fined in the
amount of P5,000.00. It opined that although a person
in custody and who is not formally charged in court
could apply for bail pursuant to Section 17 (c), Rule 114,
the grant thereof by Judge Beldia was nonetheless
irregular. It noted that no formal petition or application
for bail was filed by Santos, and even if one was filed,
the Marikina courts could not have properly taken
cognizance of the same since Santos was detained at
Camp Crame in Quezon City. There was also no showing
that the regular judge of Branch 272, RTC-Marikina City,
was unavailable to act on the application for bail.
We agree with the recommendation of the OCA.
Record shows that Executive Judge De la Cruz and
Presiding Judge Enriquez were present on May 30, 2000
to act on the bail application of Santos. When
respondent Judge Beldia acted on the bail application of
Santos on May 30, 2000, his designation was merely an
"assisting judge" in the RTC-Marikina City, his
permanent station being in Branch 57, RTC-San Carlos
City, Negros Occidental. As such, his authority in the
Marikina court is limited and he could only act on an
application for bail filed therewith in the absence or
unavailability of the regular judge.
Concededly, a person lawfully arrested and detained but
who has not yet been formally charged in court, can
seek his provisional release through the filing of an
application for bail. He need not wait for a formal
complaint or information to be filed since bail is
available to "all persons" where the offense is
bailable.12 Section 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that a judge could grant
bail to a person lawfully arrested but without a warrant,
upon waiver of his right under Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, as Santos had done upon her inquest.
Undeniably too, Santos was entitled to bail as a matter
of right since the offense with which she was charged
does not carry the penalty of life
imprisonment, reclusion perpetua or
death.13 Notwithstanding, it was incumbent upon
respondent Judge Beldia to grant bail to Santos in
accordance with established rules and procedure.
Respondent Judge Beldia failed in this respect and must
thus be held administratively liable.
Section 17, par. (c) of Rule 114 distinctly states:
SEC. 17. Bail, where filed.
(c) Any person in custody who is not yet charged in
court may apply for bail with any court in the

province, city, or municipality where he is

held. (Emphasis supplied)
The Certificate of Detention14 issued by the PNP-TMGSOD shows that Santos was detained at Camp Crame in
Quezon City. Thus, as correctly pointed out by the OCA,
the application for bail should have been filed before the
proper Quezon City court and not in Marikina
City.1awphi1.nt
In addition, it appears that no formal application or
petition for the grant of bail was filed before the RTCMarikina City. There were no records of the application
or the release order issued by respondent Judge Beldia.
Neither was there a hearing conducted thereon nor the
prosecutor notified of the bail application.
Under the present rules, a hearing on an application for
bail is mandatory.15 In Cortes v. Judge Catral,16 we ruled
that in all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of
discretion, reasonable notice of hearing must be given
to the prosecutor, or at least his recommendation on the
matter must be sought. The rationale for this was
explained in this wise:
Bail should be fixed according to the circumstances of
each case. The amount fixed should be sufficient to
ensure the presence of the accused at the trial yet
reasonable enough to comply with the constitutional
provision that bail should not be excessive. Therefore,
whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion,
reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to
the prosecutor or fiscal or at least he must be asked for
his recommendation because in fixing the amount of
bail, the judge is required to take into account a number
of factors such as the applicants character and
reputation, forfeiture of other bonds or whether he is a
fugitive from justice.17
Judge Beldia disregarded basic procedural rules when he
granted bail to Santos sans hearing and notice and
without the latter having filed a formal petition for bail.
Accordingly, the prosecution was deprived of procedural
due process for which respondent Judge Beldia must be
held accountable.18
There is no dearth of jurisprudence on the rules to be
applied in the grant of bail.19 These same rules have
been incorporated in the Rules of Court, of which a
judge must have more than just a superficial
understanding, if he were to discharge his functions
properly and competently. Indeed, everyone, especially
a judge, is presumed to know the law. When, as in this
case, the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 20
The Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be
faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than
just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant
with basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled
authoritative doctrines. He should strive for excellence
exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that
he be the personification of justice and the rule of law. 21
Under Section 8 of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC amending Rule
140 of the Rules of Court on the Discipline of Justices
and Judges, which took effect on October 1, 2001, gross
ignorance of the law is classified as a serious charge
punishable by either dismissal from service, suspension
or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding
P40,000.00. In this case, considering that the incident
took place on May 30, 2000 which is before the
effectivity of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, and malice or bad
faith on the part of respondent Judge Beldia not having
been established, and further, this being his first
administrative offense, we deem it just and reasonable
to impose upon him a fine of P5,000.00.22
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent
Judge Rolindo D. Beldia, Jr. of Branch 57, Regional Trial
Court, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental is found
GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law, and is FINED in the
amount of P5,000.00. He is further WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 150994

June 30, 2005

RELIANCE SURETY & INSURANCE CO.,

INC., Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANDRES R. AMANTE, JR., in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23,
Cabanatuan City, the HON. CITY PROSECUTOR,
Cabanatuan City and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,Respondents.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
This Petition for Review is the culmination of a wrongheaded approach by a bonding company to acquit itself
of liability on purportedly spurious bail bonds issued in
its name. Even if we concede the basic premise the
questioned bail bonds are indeed false, there are
prescribed remedies under our procedural rules which
the surety simply failed to avail of despite ample
opportunity. Hence, although the lower court decisions
under review are not free of flaws the Court is impelled
to deny the petition.
Petitioner Reliance Surety & Insurance Co., Inc.
(Reliance) is a duly organized insurance firm. On 5
October 1998, it filed a Special Appearance And Motion
to Set Aside Orders/Writs of Execution with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cabanatuan City, Branch 23,
presided over by Hon. Andres R. Amante, Jr. Reliance
pertinently alleged therein, thus:
1. On June 18, 1997, movant Reliance Surety &
Insurance Co., Inc. was surprised to receive a
letter from the Insurance Commission dated
June 11, 1997 enclosing copies of the
Orders/Judgments and Writs of Execution
against the bailbonds allegedly issued by
movant as follows:
Name of Accused & Crim.
Case No.

Date of Writs Orders

Rogelio Andres, et
al./3012 (A.F.)

Jan. 19, 1995

Adelina Vidal/5822 (A.F.)

Sept. 25, 1996

Naldy Jimenez &

Geminiano Roxas/6035
(A.F.)

Aug. 6, 1996

2. . . ;Movant replied to the aforesaid letter

dated June 11, 1997 of the Insurance
Commission stating that the bailbonds are false
and spurious. . .;
3. Again, on July 22, 1997 and May 14, 1998,
movant was surprised to receive letters from
the Insurance Commission dated July 11, 1997
and May 7, 1998 enclosing copies of the Orders
against the bailbonds allegedly issued by the
movant as follows:
Name of Accused & Crim.
Case No.

Date of Writs/ Orders

Dolores P. Posadas/6320
AF

June 25, 1997

Melania Dagdagan

Jan. 19, 1998

4. . . ; Movant replied to said letter dated July

11, 1997 and May 7, 1998 of the Insurance
Commission stating that the bonds mentioned
therein are false and spurious. . . ;1
Reliance entered its special appearance in each of the
above-cited criminal cases, at the same time seeking to
set aside the cited writs of execution. Reliance alleged
that the bonds in question were issued by one Evelyn
Tinio, against whom it had since lodged a criminal case. 2
Each of the criminal cases were prosecuted in behalf of
the People of the Philippines by the City Prosecutor, who
did not interpose any objection to Reliances motion.
Respondent judge conducted a hearing on the matter,
and Reliance submitted documentary evidence in
support of its motion.
On 21 April 1999, respondent judge issued
an Order denying Reliances motion. On the premise
that the controversy revolved on the "tri-sided (sic)
relationship of movant Reliance Surety; Alfredo Wy and
Evelyn Tinio and the Insurance Commission,"
the Order stressed that the controversy "could only be
resolved with authority and finality by the Insurance
Commission under its Administrative and Adjudicatory
Powers."3
As Reliance failed in its motion to reconsider the
said Order, on 15 June 1999, it seasonably filed a Notice
of Appeal. However, on 15 July 1999, respondent judge
issued an Order disallowing the Notice of Appeal on the
ground that Reliance failed "to pay the corresponding
appeal fee, pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 1 (c), Rule
50, in relation to Sec. 4, Rule 41."4
Reliance sought the reconsideration of the disallowance
of the appeal, stressing among others, that the rules
cited by the RTC were inapplicable, as they pertained to
civil actions and not to criminal cases, and that there
was nothing in the Rules of Criminal Procedure that
requires the payment of appeal fees in criminal
cases.5 However, Reliances Motion for
Reconsideration was denied in an Order6 dated 24
August 1999. Therein, the RTC characterized the
pending incident as having a "civil nature," which has
not been subsumed by the criminal nature of the cases
under which Reliances motion was captioned.7
Reliance then filed a Petition for Mandamus with the
Court of Appeals, praying that the orders disallowing
theNotice of Appeal be declared null and void, and that
respondent Judge be ordered to immediately transmit
the complete records, together with the Notice of
Appeal in accordance with Section 8, Rule 12 of the
Rules of Court.8
Before the appellate court, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) in representation of the People filed
aManifestation expressing concurrence with Reliances
position.9 Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals Twelfth
Division issued a D E C I S I O N10 dated 22 December
2000 dismissing the petition.
Casting the issue as whether docket fees should be paid
in appealing the order dismissing petitioners motion to
set aside order/writ of execution, the appellate court
cited Section 7, Rule 5 of the Revised Internal Rules of
the Court of Appeals (RIRCA), which provides that
"appeals from orders of confiscation or forfeiture of bail
bonds shall be treated as appeals in civil cases," and
Section 3, Rule 5 of the same Rules which ordains that
"no payment of docketing and other legal fees shall be
required in criminal cases except in petitions for review
of criminal cases and appeals from confiscation or
forfeiture of bail bond."11 With these rules as anchor, the
Court of Appeals concluded that Reliance was obligated
to pay the corresponding docket fees, and failure to do
so was ground to dismiss the appeal, as the RTC
properly did.
Before this Court, Reliance points out that nothing in the
Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the payment of
appeal fees in criminal cases. It notes as "obvious" that
respondent judge, petitioner, and the OSG were aware
of the provisions of the RIRCA cited by the Court of
Appeals, and that the RTC Clerk of Court had accepted

theNotice of Appeal without being required to pay the

appeal fee. Moreover, arguing that the RIRCA could not
supplant, amend or modify the Rules of Court, Reliance
asserts that the cited provisions of the RIRCA, which
operate towards that result, are clearly null and void.
Finally, Reliance submits that should the Court rule that
an appeal fee is required even in cases of the sort, it be
allowed instead to pay such appeal fee.12
Interestingly, the OSG has reversed its earlier
concurrence with Reliances stance, seeking this time
the dismissal of the present petition. Holding forth that
the Court of Appeals was within the bounds of its
discretion when it dismissed the petition, the
government counsel endorses the validity and
enforceability of the challenged provisions of the RIRCA,
as they were approved by this Court.13
The facts as presented by Reliance manifest
disconcerting aspects of the dismissal of the appeal as
decreed by the trial court. No disputation has been
made of Reliances claim that when it filed the Notice of
Appeal, it inquired with the Office of the Clerk of Court
and Cashiers Office in the RTC whether an appeal or
docket fee should be paid and was informed that none
was required.14 Moreover, the provisions cited by the
RTC in its dismissal of theNotice of Appeal, Sec. 1 (c),
Rule 50, in relation to Sec. 4, Rule 41, plainly apply only
to civil cases since appeals in criminal cases are
governed by Rules 122 to 125 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure. There is no provision in the Rules of Court
equivalent to that of the RIRCA providing that an appeal
from an order for the confiscation or forfeiture of bail
bonds should be treated as an appeal in a civil case.
Nonetheless, a review of the available record reveals a
more complex factual milieu. Reliance proceeds from
the premise that the twin denials of Reliances Motion to
Set Aside Orders/Writs of Execution and the
succeedingNotice of Appeal serve as the linchpin on
which its attempt to acquit itself of liability from the
bonds should hinge. However, it is evident from the
record that Reliance, long before it filed its motion in
October of 1998, was already afforded the opportunity
to timely challenge liability on these bonds, yet failed to
do so.
To best appreciate this case, it is essential to elaborate
on the procedure surrounding the confiscation or
forfeiture of a bail bond by the trial court, and the
proper remedies which may be undertaken by the
bondsmen adversely affected.
Any domestic or foreign corporation, licensed as a
surety in accordance with law and currently authorized
to act as such, may provide bail by a bond subscribed
jointly by the accused and an officer of the corporation
duly authorized by its board of directors.15 Once the
obligation of bail is assumed, the bondsman or surety
becomes in law the jailer of the accused and is
subrogated to all the rights and means which the
government possesses to make his control of him
effective.16
Section 21, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, in force at the time of the subject incidents,
provides for the procedure to be followed before a bail
bond may be forfeited, and judgment on the bond
rendered against the surety:
SEC. 21. Forfeiture of bailbond. When the presence of
the accused is required by the court, or these Rules, his
bondsman shall be notified to produce him before the
court on a given date. If the accused fails to appear in
person as required, the bond shall be declared forfeited
and the bondsman are given thirty (30) days within
which to produce their principal and to show cause why
judgment should not be rendered against them for the
amount of their bond. Within the said period, the
bondsmen:
(a) must produce the body of their principal or
give the reason for his non-production; and
(b) must explain satisfactorily why the accused
did not appear before the court when first
required to do so.

Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be

rendered against the bondsmen, jointly and severally,
for the amount of the bond, and the court shall not
reduce or otherwise mitigate the liability of the
bondsmen, except when the accused has been
surrendered or is acquitted.17
As evident in the provision, there are two occasions
upon which the trial court judge may rule adversely
against the bondsmen in cases when the accused fails
to appear in court. First, the non-appearance by the
accused is cause for the judge to summarily declare the
bond as forfeited. Second, the bondsmen, after the
summary forfeiture of the bond, are given thirty (30)
days within which to produce the principal and to show
cause why a judgment should not be rendered against
them for the amount of the bond. It is only after this
thirty (30)-day period, during which the bondsmen are
afforded the opportunity to be heard by the trial court,
that the trial court may render a judgment on the bond
against the bondsmen. Judgment against the bondsmen
cannot be entered unless such judgment is preceded by
the order of forfeiture and an opportunity given to the
bondsmen to produce the accused or to adduce
satisfactory reason for their inability to do so.18
The judgment against the bondsmen on the bond may
be construed as a final order, hence subject to appeal.
There is no reason to disturb the doctrine of long
standing that characterizes such judgment as a final
judgment or order19 or that such judgment may be
subject to appeal.20 A final order has been defined as
one which disposes of the whole subject matter or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving
nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has
been determined.21 Indeed, from a judgment on the
bond, a writ of execution may immediately issue, 22 and
need not be effected through a separate
action.23 Indeed, an appeal from a judgment on the bond
is subsumed under Section 1, Rule 122 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which provides that appeals in
criminal cases avail only from a judgment or final
order,24 and Section 6 of the same Rule which requires
that the appeal be taken within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the final order appealed from.25
Moreover, the special civil action of certiorari to assail a
judgment of forfeiture may be available under
exceptional circumstances,26 although the availability of
appeal as a remedy to such judgment greatly raises the
bar for the allowance of the certiorari action. The writ of
execution itself may, in theory, be assailed through the
special civil action for certiorari, though qualified again
by the limited circumstances under which certiorari may
avail.
Clearly then, under the procedure just elaborated, the
surety has ample opportunities to defend itself before
the trial court against the execution against a bond in its
name which it might not have actually issued. Assuming
that the provisions of Rule 122 were actually followed in
this case, the matter of the spuriousness of the subject
bonds could have very well been raised even before
judgment on the bond was rendered. But was such
procedure actually observed before the trial court?
Admittedly, the record is bereft of details as to the
particular proceedings in the five criminal cases wherein
the subject bonds were issued. However, Reliance itself
attached to its motion copies of the five writs of
execution issued against it respective to the five bonds
issued in its name. Presumably, these writs of execution
were issued only after a judgment of forfeiture had been
rendered, which in turn was promulgated only after the
bondsmen had been afforded the opportunity to explain
why it should not be held liable on the bail bond on
account of its failure to present the accused in court.
It is plainly stated on all of these writs of execution that
copies thereof were furnished to the Manager of
"Reliance Surety and Insurance Company, 8th Floor
Equitable Bank Bldg., 262 Juan Luna St., Manila," 27 which
pertinently, is the same business address used by Luisa
Agat, the Manager of the Marine and Bonds Department
of Reliance, in her affidavit attached to Reliances
motion.28 Such notices were served separately on those
given to Evelyn Tinio, whose authority to represent
Reliance the latter had subsequently disputed. Indeed,
while Reliance purported to be "surprised" to have

learned of these writs of execution from the Insurance

Commission,29 there is no express disavowal of receipt
of the copies of the writs of execution directly furnished
to its Manila office by the Cabanatuan City RTC. The
presumption is that official duty has been regularly
performed,30 and that these writs of execution were
indeed sent to the Manila office of Reliance, as stated
therein.
Crucially, these writs of execution were issued between
19 January 1995 and 19 January 1998. Reliances
motion itself was filed only on 5 October 1998, or nine
(9) months after the last of the writs of execution had
been issued.
The first assumption of course is that Reliance, in each
of the subject criminal cases, had been served notice of
the summary forfeiture of the bail bond and required to
show cause why it should not be held liable on the bond,
and later likewise served notice of the adverse
judgment on the bond. Reliance had the opportunity,
prior to the rendition of judgment on the bond, to argue
before the RTC that the bond was spurious, and such
argument could very well have been deemed
meritorious, considering the established rule of liberality
in acceptance of the bondsmens explanation. 31 Even if
the trial court had refused to admit such explanation
and rendered judgment against Reliance, the bonding
company still had the opportunity to file an appeal
within fifteen (15) days from the judgment on the bond.
This, Reliance failed to do. We certainly cannot construe
the "notice of appeal" which Reliance did file as that
taken from the five judgments on the bond, since such
appeal was undertaken more than a year after the last
of the five judgments had been rendered and more than
four years after the first, and also since said notice was
expressly made in respect to the writs of execution.
Still, given the paucity of the available record, let us
indulge the presupposition that, Reliance somehow was
unaware of the judgments rendered on the bond.
Considering the express statement on the writs of
execution attached by Reliance to its motion and to this
petition, the presumption arises that said writs of
execution were served on Reliance at its Manila office,
and such assumption must be sustained due to the
inability of Reliance to dispute such presumption.
Reliance then should have been expected to do
something within a reasonable period of time to
challenge the writs of execution if indeed there were
good reasons to assail them. Instead, upon receipt of
these writs of execution, Reliance did nothing, and its
failure to immediately respond to these writs militates
against their ultimate claim for relief.
Finally, Reliance filed the Motion to Set Aside
Orders/Writs of Execution only nine months after receipt
of the most recently dated writ of execution, and four
years after the first writ had been issued. Interestingly,
Reliance does not refer at all to the judgments on the
bail bonds that would have preceded the writs of
execution, thus apparently conceding the validity of
these judgments.
Certainly, courts have justifiable reason to view with
distaste a judgment obligor who begins to actively
participate in litigation only after the adverse judgment
has long become final. The RTC in this case could not be
faulted for its aversion to indulge in Reliances sudden
appearance in the criminal cases, considering that the
said criminal cases have apparently "been long
terminated."32 Nonetheless, Reliances motion, in itself,
is not abjectly bereft of merit, especially if it be
construed as a motion to quash a writ of execution.
While the Rules of Court deliberately makes no express
reference to a motion to quash a writ of execution, the
jurisdiction of courts to entertain such motions has long
been upheld, on the premise that every court has the
inherent power for the advancement of justice to correct
errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own
process.33
There are grounds entrenched in jurisprudence for the
quashal of a writ of execution,34 yet such quashal rests
largely in the discretion of the court, that will be
exercised in the furtherance of justice. 35 In this case,
had the RTC been sufficiently convinced that the
questioned bail bonds were indeed spurious, there
would be grounds in equity for the writs of execution to

be set aside. After all, the notion that an entity can be

held liable for an obligation it did not actually contract
offends basic principles of justice.
However, the RTC was not sufficiently convinced,
preferring instead to await definitive word from the
Insurance Commission on the revocation of Reliances
former agent. One can view the justification as a
measure of prudence, or disagree with it as an
abdication of the judicial duty to decide. Yet concededly,
the RTCs discretion in deciding the matter is entitled to
great respect, not only due to the fact that the matter
for consideration is the quashal of writs of execution,
but also because the trial court is normally deemed as
the most capable trier of facts under the circumstances.
Yet ultimately, this case does not pivot on whether the
RTC correctly refused to set aside the writs of execution.
At this stage, despite the numerous errors of procedure
already committed by Reliance, there still was leeway
for the allowance of its prayer for discharge, since the
quashal of writs of execution was obtainable as a
remedy against issuances of inequitable nature.
However, Reliance instead again committed another
fundamental procedural error, one that whisks away
whatever sympathy it may have acquired owing to its
basic position.
Simply put, appeal does not lie as the remedy from an
order denying a motion to set aside a writ of execution.
Appeal avails as a remedy only against judgments or
final orders, a general rule that holds true whether for
civil or criminal procedure.36 Appeal may have been
properly available from the five judgments on the bail
bonds in the five criminal cases, as such judgments
would have constituted as the final orders on the matter
whether Reliance should be held liable on these bonds.
However, appeal cannot be undertaken from the
RTCs Order, arising as it did, at the execution stage.
Reliances motion to set aside the writs of execution
cannot be deemed as having submitted a new incident
for resolution to the RTC. The motion had segued from
the earlier final judgments or orders which in turn were
sought to be satisfied through the challenged writs of
execution. Indeed, there can be no two independent
final judgments or orders in the same incident, except in
cases where multiple appeals are allowed. 37
Instead, from receipt of the Order denying its motion to
set aside the writs of execution, the only permissible
mode of review for Reliance was a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals,
wherein it could have alleged that the RTC acted without
or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
denying the said motion.38 Ultimately, thus, the RTC
could not be faulted for refusing to give cognizance to
the Notice of Appeal, as appeal was unavailing as a
remedy to Reliance in this case.
Similarly, the writ of mandamus which Reliance sought
from the Court of Appeals was not accessible from it in
the first place. Since appeal is not the proper remedy,
the RTC could not be compelled to transmit the records
to the higher court for review on appeal, especially
considering that the judgment on the bail bonds had
long lapsed into finality.
A brief comment on the remedy which Reliance did
pursue before the Court of Appeals, the special civil
action of mandamus. The writ of mandamus serves to
compel a respondent who fails to perform a legal duty
or unlawfully excludes another from the enjoyment of an
entitled right or office to do the act required to be done
to protect the rights of the petitioner. 39 As it was,
Reliance resorted to mandamus not as a direct mode of
judicial review by the Court of Appeals in respect to the
assailed RTC Order, but merely to petition the appellate
court to give due course to the appeal. It utilized
mandamus on the erroneous notion that the
RTC Order was appealable, or on the mistaken premise
that the RTC had the corresponding duty to elevate the
records to the appellate court. While Reliances
availment of mandamus is consistent with its premise
that the RTC Order was appealable, its ultimate efficacy
is questionable. After all, the end result of Reliances
mandamus petition is simply the elevation of the

records to the Court of Appeals, and not reversal of the

RTC Order on the merits.
There lies room for one more assumption in Reliances
favor that we can attempt to indulge in. Assuming for
the nonce that despite all these lapses, that the
RTC Order may be considered as a final judgment or
order reviewable by appeal, Reliance still could not be
deemed as having perfected the appeal, as it did not
pay the requisite docket fees.
Reliance invests all its energy in the present petition to
dispute the holding that the Court of Appeals can, as it
did, on the basis of the RIRCA, refuse to take cognizance
of its appeal for failure to pay the docket fee. Sadly for
Reliance, its arguments on this point lack merit.
The Court of Appeals is empowered to promulgate its
own rules or orders pertaining to its operations. 40 The
RIRCA is the by-product of this vested authority. The
provisions which Reliance assails, Sections 3 and 7 of
Rule 5, were in place as early as 1994, when the RIRCA
was amended, and retained in the 1999 revision of the
RIRCA.
Reliance cannot disavow knowledge of the provisions of
the RIRCA. That these rules are called "internal" does
not mean that they are secret. In fact, both the 1994
and 1999 editions of the RIRCA have been widely
disseminated, available upon demand from the Court of
Appeals, and even replicated in private collations or
annotations of our laws.41 Nor can Reliance validly assert
that the RIRCA provisions supplanted the Rules of Court.
The RIRCA necessitated the approval, which was
obtained, of the Supreme Court prior to its effectivity,
the very Supreme Court which promulgated or amended
our Rules of Court. Certainly, the Court cannot be
precluded from amending its own issuances, or issuing
supplementary or clarificatory procedural rules such as
the RIRCA. Indeed, the RIRCA, vested with the requisite
imprimatur of the Supreme Court, is effectively an
issuance of this Court. Challenge of the RIRCA is akin to
challenging one of the Courts very own issuances.
Moreover, the assailed provisions of the RIRCA are
ultimately correct in characterizing the appeal from a
judgment on the bail bond as inherently civil in nature.
The RTC correctly picked up on this point,42 and it is a
characterization that we can affirm. The liability of the
bondsmen on the bail bond arises not from the violation
of, or an obligation to comply with, a penal provision of
law. It emerges instead from a contract, the bond
subscribed jointly by the accused and the surety or
bondsmen. The obligation of the accused on the bond is
different from that of the surety in that the former can
be made to suffer a criminal penalty for failure to
comply with the obligations on the bail bond. However,
the surety is not under a similar pain of punishment, as
its liability on the bail bond would merely be civil in
character. Nothing in the Rules of Court authorizes the
imprisonment of the surety for the failure to produce the
accused when called for in court, his obligation being
contractual in source and character. In keeping with the
civil nature of the appeal from the judgment on the bail
bonds, the Court of Appeals acted properly in
prescribing the payment of docket fee for such appeal
as in appeal in civil cases.
Reliance apparently failed to show cause to the RTC why
it should not be held liable on the subject bail bonds, to
timely appeal the judgment rendered on the bail bonds,
or to move within a reasonable time to set aside the
writs of execution. When Reliance finally undertook
steps to acquit itself of liability on these bail bonds but
faced denial of its relief by the RTC, it failed to lodge the
correct mode of judicial review when it filed a notice of
appeal instead of a special civil action for certiorari.
From the disallowance of the Notice of Appeal, it
responded with a woefully insufficient petition for
mandamus. Even its arguments against the validity of
the questioned RIRCA provisions are erroneous.
In a long-distance race, the crowd would be charitably
disposed the first time a runner trips and falls. Neither
would the second fall exhaust the commiseration of the
spectators. However, if the runner stumbles every fifty
meters, observers have earned the right to heckle and
jeer, or more kindly, to question whether the racer is

qualified to run in the first place. Indeed, Reliances

consecutive procedural missteps, all of which could
have been avoided by easy reference to the established
rules and jurisprudence, have deprived it of the right to
seek relief before this Court.
Our final disposition is not the product of sheer pique,
and we have duly considered the fact that denial of the
petition would condemn Reliance to an obligation it
might not have contracted. Yet ultimately, it should
accept the consequences of its negligence in failing to
timely present its position, or in utilizing the proper
modes of judicial review. Equitable relief is not the
supremacy of pity but the entitlement of due process
previously denied the litigant. One who fails to avail of
the prescribed legal steps despite repeated
opportunities has no reason to expect anything other
than due condemnation.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1597
August 20, 2001
(formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-1043-RTJ)
WILSON ANDRES, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ORLANDO D. BELTRAN, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, TUGUEGARAO CITY, BRANCH 2, respondent.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Herein complainant Wilson Andres was charged with the
crime of murder and the case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 7155 before the Regional Trial Court of
Tuguegarao City, Branch 2. The trial court, then presided
by Judge Abraham Principe, granted bail upon motion of
the accused and ordered his release from detention.
After presentation of evidence for the prosecution,
accused Wilson Andres filed a "motion to dismiss by way
of demurrer to evidence". Respondent Judge Orlando
Beltran, in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of RTCTuguegarao, Branch 2 denied the motion in his Order of
November 25, 1999. On November 29, 1999, the court
issued a subpoena to accused Andres informing him
that the criminal case is set for initial hearing for
reception of evidence for the accused on January 31,
2000. Accused appeared at the scheduled hearing but
his counsel was not present. Respondent Judge then
issued an order cancelling the bail bond of accused
Andres and ordered his detention in his Order dated
January 31, 2000, to wit:
"In view of the absence of Atty. Joseph Alcid
and considering the fact that the presentation
of defense evidence in this case had been
delayed for almost one year from the time that
the prosecution rested its case, the bailbond
posted for the provisional liberty of the accused
Wilson Andres is hereby cancelled and is
ordered detained, specially since the accused
is not entitled to bail as a matter of right as the
offense charged is Murder."
Accused Andres was detained from January 31, 2000
until February 9, 20001 when an order for his release
was issued after the trial court found that no subpoena
or notice of hearing was sent to counsel of accused.2
Hence, the instant administrative case for conduct
unbecoming of a judge, serious misconduct, inefficiency
and gross ignorance of the law.
Herein complainant avers that the act of respondent
Judge is clearly an abuse of authority as the grounds
relied upon by him for cancellation of his bail bond are
not provided for under the rules.

Complainant alleges that there was no notice to his

counsel regarding the hearing for reception of evidence
for the defense set on January 31, 2000 and hence, his
counsel did not appear at the scheduled hearing.
Complainant further alleges that at the said hearing,
respondent Judge told him to secure the services of a
new counsel immediately so he could hear the case and
if accused could not secure one he (respondent judge)
would order his incarceration. The case was called again
and counsel for the accused was still not around.
Respondent Judge then allegedly ordered the
incarceration of the accused. Complainant argues that
he did not violate any conditions of the bail and the fact
that his counsel was not present during the scheduled
hearing is not a ground for the cancellation of his bail
bond.
In his Comment, respondent Judge contends that
accused is not entitled to bail as a matter of right since
he is charged with "a capital offense or at least one
punishable by reclusion perpetua." He argues that he
was not the one who granted accused bail during the
earlier stage of the proceedings and respondent Judge
was entitled to make his own assessment of the
evidence, which was not available at the time bail was
first granted, to determine whether evidence of guilt
was strong on the basis of the evidence. Respondent
Judge further contends that the order granting bail had
specifically reserved to the court the right to recall the
order granting bail if evidence of conspiracy would be
strong, and that he was convinced that there was
ground to recall the order granting bail as he took into
consideration certain facts and circumstances such as:
(1) the accused's co-accused has escaped and remained
at large; (2) either accused or his counsel would absent
themselves from the proceedings prompting
cancellation of scheduled hearings without advance
notice nor proper motion filed; (3) it was practically a
year since the prosecution had rested its case and the
defense had been scheduled to present its evidence;
and (4) the evidence presented by the prosecution
strongly pointed to the direction of the guilt of the
accused prompting respondent Judge to deny the
demurrer to evidence.
In his Reply to respondent's comment, complainant
argues that he should have been given his day in court
with respect to the cancellation of his bail bond. He
avers that in the Order of February 9, 2000, respondent
Judge ordered his release after finding that no subpoena
or notice of hearing was served upon his counsel.
After notice, both parties manifested that they are
submitting the case on the basis of the
pleadings/records already filed and submitted.
The Court Administrator recommended that respondent
Judge Beltran be fined in the amount of two thousand
(P2,000.00) pesos for grave abuse of authority with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
shall be dealt with more severely. The Court
Administrator opined that the failure of counsel to
appear during the scheduled hearing with due notice is
not a ground for cancellation of the bail bond of the
accused, more so if accused is present during the
hearing.
We agree with the Court Administrator.
Respondent's Order of January 31, 2000 for the
cancellation of bail actually cited the following grounds
therefor, namely: (1) that the counsel of the accused
failed to appear at the scheduled hearing; and (2) that
the presentation of evidence for the defense has been
delayed for almost a year from the time the prosecution
rested its case. Respondent Judge further stated that
the bail bond is cancelled "especially since the accused
is not entitled to bail as a matter of right as the offense
charged is Murder."
Herein complainant was charged with murder
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death3 and, under
the rules, he was not entitled to bail as "a matter of
right." Respondent Judge seems to impress upon the
Court that the accused, having been charged with the
crime of murder, is not entitled to bail at all or that the
crime of murder is non-bailable. This is a misconception.
The grant of bail to an accused charged with an offense

that carries with it the penalty of reclusion perpetua, as

in this case, is discretionary on the part of the trial
court.4 In other words, accused is still entitled to bail but
no longer "as a matter of right". Instead, it is
discretionary and calls for a judicial determination that
the evidence of guilt is not strong in order to grant bail.
The prosecution is accorded ample opportunity to
present evidence because by the very nature of
deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such
evidence that judicial discretion is weighed in
determining whether the guilt of the accused is
strong.5Accused was granted bail by then Presiding
Judge Principe and with such grant we assume that the
trial judge made a judicial determination that the
evidence of guilt is not strong.
Respondent Judge, in his Comment, argues that the
order granting bail had "specifically reserved to the
court the right to recall the order granting bail if
evidence of conspiracy would be strong." The record is
bereft of any copy of such order. Nonetheless,
respondent Judge, in effect, is of the view that since the
prosecution has rested its case and prosecution
evidence had been adduced, he can make his own
determination of whether or not the evidence adduced
strongly suggest the guilt of the accused and if so, he
can cancel the bail previously granted to the accused.
Section 206 of Rule 114 provides that after the accused
shall have been admitted to bail, the court may, "upon
good cause shown," either increase or decrease the
amount of the same. Needless to state, this would entail
a hearing for the purpose of showing "good cause" and
hence, would require not only the presence of the
accused but also of the latter's counsel. Neither can the
bail of the accused be forfeited pursuant to Section
21,7Rule 114 since it is not disputed that accused did
not violate the conditions of the bail8 as he was present
at the scheduled hearing.
Respondent Judge Beltran also cited the ground that the
counsel of the accused failed to appear at the scheduled
hearing and that the presentation of evidence for the
defense has been delayed for almost a year from the
time the prosecution rested its case.
The failure of counsel for the accused to appear at the
scheduled hearing is not a valid ground for cancellation
of bail. Nowhere in the provisions of Rule 114 does such
ground exist. Under Section 2 (Conditions of the bail),
the presence of counsel is not a condition of the bail.
Neither is it a reason for an increase or forfeiture of bail
under Sections 20 and 21. Section 229, which states the
instances when bail may be cancelled, i.e., surrender of
the accused, proof of his death, acquittal of the
accused, dismissal of the case or execution of the
judgment of conviction is not in point, aside from the
fact that it also requires an application of the bondsmen
and due notice to the prosecutor.
The alleged delay in the presentation of evidence by the
defense is likewise not substantiated. As pointed out by
herein complainant, while there were postponements,
the Supreme Court ordered a change of venue allegedly
upon request of the RTC-Judge of Roxas, Isabela and the
criminal case went from one judge to another and finally
it was transferred to RTC-Tuguegarao, Branch
2.10 Moreover, accused was ordered arrested on July 12,
1996 and was arraigned on September 17, 1996. His
motion for bail was favorably acted upon. From his
release on bail on September 18, 1996, the case was set
for several hearings on November 17, 1997, April 25,
1998, May 25, 1998, and September 24, 1998 but
respondent Judge allowed the postponements thereof
due to the absence of counsel for accused. On January
26, 1999, accused asked for the lifting of warrant of
arrest and reinstatement of bond. On March 18, 1999,
the prosecution made a formal offer of evidence. On July
14, 1999, accused asked for postponement which was
granted. After the prosecution rested its case, accused
filed on September 28, 1999 a motion to dismiss by
demurrer to evidence. Said motion was denied on
November 25, 1999 and the trial court set the hearing
for reception of evidence for the defense on January 31,
2000. It was on said date that the respondent Judge
ordered the cancellation of bail of the accused. Verily,
there was no "delay" in the presentation of evidence for
the defense since the respondent Judge scheduled the
hearing for reception of evidence only on January 31,
2000 from the time the motion to dismiss by demurrer
to evidence was denied. The alleged delay should not

be reckoned from the time the prosecution rested its

case because the motion to dismiss by demurrer to
evidence had to be resolved prior to presentation of
evidence for the defense.
In the case at bar, respondent Judge motu
proprio cancelled the bail bond in view of the absence of
counsel for the accused during the hearing initially
scheduled for the presentation of evidence for the
defense. This is censurable. Accused should not be
punished for the absence of his counsel by the
cancellation of his bail and his immediate detention.
The duty of a judge is not only to administer justice but
also to conduct himself in a manner that would avoid
any suspicion of irregularity. He has the avowed duty of
promoting confidence in the judicial
system.11 Admittedly, judges cannot be held to account
for an erroneous order or decision rendered in good
faith,12 but this defense is much too frequently cited. We
note that respondent Judge ordered the release of the
accused but only after finding that counsel for the
accused was not served a copy of the notice of hearing.
This is a procedural lapse on the part of the respondent.
Had he carefully searched the records, he could have
known the real reason for counsel's absence during the
scheduled hearing. Neither can he blame his staff for
the lack of notice to counsel. Proper and efficient court
management is the responsibility of the judge; he is the
one directly responsible for the proper discharge of the
official functions.13 Respondent Judge's precipitate order
cancelling the bail bond of the accused deprived
accused of his right to liberty, even if temporarily. This is
not excusable. A judge should administer his office with
due regard to integrity of the system of the law itself,
remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary
power, but a judge under the sanction of law. 14
WHEREFORE, finding the recommendation of the Court
Administrator to be well-taken, respondent Judge
Orlando D. Beltran of the Regional Trial Court of
Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, Branch 2 is hereby FINED in
the amount of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos for
grave abuse of authority, with a stern WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with
more severely by this Court.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 135012

September 7, 2004

ANITA ESTEBAN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. REYNALDO A. ALHAMBRA, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 39,
San Jose City,
and GERARDO ESTEBAN, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
In this present petition for certiorari,1 Anita Esteban
seeks to annul the Orders dated July 9, 1998 and August
20, 1998 issued by Judge Reynaldo A. Alhambra,
presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39,
San Jose City, in Criminal Cases Nos. SJC-88(95), SJC27(97), SJC-30(97) and SJC-31(97). The Orders denied
petitioners application for cancellation of the cash bail
posted in each case.
Gerardo Esteban is the accused in these criminal cases.
His sister-in-law, Anita Esteban, petitioner herein, posted
cash bail of P20,000.00 in each case for his temporary
liberty.
While out on bail and during the pendency of the four
criminal cases, Gerardo was again charged with another
crime for which he was arrested and detained.

"Fed up with Gerardos actuation," petitioner refused to

post another bail.2 Instead, on June 18, 1998, she filed
with the trial court an application for the cancellation of
the cash bonds she posted in the four criminal
cases.3 She alleged therein that she is "terminating the
cash bail by surrendering the accused who is now in jail
as certified to by the City Jail Warden." 4
In an Order dated July 9, 1998,5 respondent judge
denied petitioners application, thus:
xxx
"In these cases, accused was allowed
enjoyment of his provisional liberty after
money was deposited with the Clerk of Court
as cash bail. Applicant-movant (now petitioner)
did not voluntarily surrender the accused.
Instead, the accused was subsequently
charged with another crime for which he was
arrested and detained. His arrest and detention
for another criminal case does not affect the
character of the cash bail posted by applicantmovant in Criminal Cases Nos. SJC-88(95), SLC27(97), SJC-30(97) and SJC-31(97) as deposited
pending the trial of these cases. Money
deposited as bail even though made by a third
person is considered as the accuseds deposit
where there is no relationship of principal and
surety (State vs. Wilson, 65 Ohio L-Abs, 422,
115 NE 2d 193). Hence, the money so
deposited takes the nature of property in
custodia legis and is to be applied for payment
of fine and costs. And such application will be
made regardless of the fact that the money
was deposited by a third person.
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
application for cancellation of bail bonds is
hereby DENIED.
"SO ORDERED."
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration6 but was
denied in an Order dated August 20, 1998.7
Hence, the instant petition assailing the twin Orders as
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Petitioner states that she is constrained to bring this
matter directly to this Court as the issue is one of first
impression.8
Petitioner submits that by surrendering the accused who
is now in jail, her application for cancellation of bail in
the four criminal cases is allowed under Section 19, now
Section 22, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, which provides:
"Sec. 22. Cancellation of bail. Upon
application of the bondsmen, with due notice to
the prosecutor, the bail may
be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or
proof of his death.
The bail shall be deemed automatically
cancelled upon acquittal of the accused,
dismissal of the case, or execution of the
judgment of conviction.
In all instances, the cancellation shall be
without prejudice to any liability on the bail."
(Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners submission is misplaced.
The first paragraph of Section 22 contemplates of a
situation where, among others, the surety or bondsman
surrenders the accused to the court that ordered the
latters arrest. Thereafter, the court, upon application by
the surety or bondsman, cancels the bail bond.

We hold that the cash bail cannot be cancelled.

Petitioner did not surrender the accused, charged in the
four criminal cases, to the trial court. The accused was
arrested and detained because he was charged in a
subsequent criminal case.
Moreover, the bail bond posted for the accused was in
the form of cash deposit which, as mandated by Section
14 (formerly Section 11) of the same Rule 114, shall be
applied to the payment of fine and costs, and the
excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or to any
person who made the deposit. Section 14 provides:
"Section 14. Deposit of cash as bail. The
accused or any person acting in his behalf may
deposit in cash with the nearest collector of
internal revenue or provincial, city or municipal
treasurer the amount of bail fixed by the court,
or recommended by the prosecutor who
investigated or filed the case. Upon submission
of a proper certificate of deposit and a written
undertaking showing compliance with the
requirements of Section 2 of this Rule, the
accused shall be discharged from custody. The
money deposited shall be considered as bail
and applied to the payment of fine and costs,
while the excess, if any, shall be returned to
the accused or to whoever made the deposit."
(Underscoring supplied)
The Rule thus treats a cash bail differently from other
bail bonds. A cash bond may be posted either by the
accused or by any person in his behalf. However, as far
as the State is concerned, the money deposited is
regarded as the money of the accused. Consequently, it
can be applied in payment of any fine and costs that
may be imposed by the court. This was the ruling of this
Court as early as 1928 in Esler vs. Ledesma.9 Therein we
declared that "when a cash bail is allowed, the two
parties to the transaction are the State and the
defendant. Unlike other bail bonds, the money may then
be used in the payment of that in which the State is
concerned the fine and costs. The right of the
government is in the nature of a lien on the money
deposited." We further held in the same case that:
"x x x. Similar cases have frequently gained the
attention of the courts in the United States in
jurisdictions where statutes permit a deposit of
money to be made in lieu of bail in criminal
cases. The decisions are unanimous in holding
that a fine imposed on the accused may be
satisfied from the cash deposit; and this is true
although the money has been furnished by a
third person. This is so because the law
contemplates that the deposit shall be made
by the defendant. The money, x x x, must
accordingly be treated as the property of the
accused. As a result, the money could be
applied in payment of any fine imposed and of
the costs (People vs. Laidlaw [1886], Ct. of App.
Of New York, 7 N. E., 910, a case frequently
cited approvingly in other jurisdictions; State of
Iowa vs. Owens [1900], 112 Iowa, 403; Mundell
vs. Wells, supra.). But while as between the
State and the accused the money deposited by
a third person for the release of the accused is
regarded as the money of the accused, it is not
so regarded for any other purpose. As between
the accused and a third person, the residue of
the cash bail is not subject to the claim of a
creditor of property obtain (Wright & Taylor vs.
Dougherty [1908], 138 Iowa, 195; People vs.
Gould [1902], 78 N. Y. Sup., 279; Mundell vs.
Wells, supra.)."10
In fine, we fail to discern any taint of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent judge in denying
petitioners application for cancellation of the accuseds
cash bail.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-37707 March 9, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIQUITA J. CAPARAS, accused, MABINI
INSURANCE & FIDELITY CO., INC., bondsmenappellant.

impossible for the appellant to

produce the accused since it
authorized Mariquita Caparas to travel
to Hongkong as in fact she had been
issued a clearance certifying that she
had no pending case in the
Philippines. The court a quo, however,
said
"If it be true that the
accused was given
the necessary
clearance on the
ground that she had
no pending case,
these clearances
were obtained
through deceit and
misinterpretation by
the accused
Mariquita Caparas,
and therefore it can
not be said that the
government had
consented to the
departure of the
accused. Moreover,
a certification that
the accused had no
pending case in the
Philippines cannot
be construed as a
consent on the part
of the State for the
accused to leave the
jurisdiction of the
Philippines. Neither
this Court nor any
government
authority had given
its consent to the
departure of the
accused from the
jurisdiction of the
Philippines. By
virtue of the filing of
the bail bond by the
movant, technically
and legally it
assumed custody of
the accused
Mariquita Caparas
and is under
obligation to
produce the body of
the accused
whenever the Court
so requires. Failure
to do so is a
violation of a
condition of the
bond. That the is
now confined in jail
in Hongkong does
not excuse the
bondsmen from its
obligation as the
legal and technical
custodian of the
accused.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Francisco M. Gonzales III and Amador Garcia for
respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:
May an explanation given by a bondsman within a
reasonable period that the principal left the country
surreptitiously and was detained in a foreign jurisdiction
for the commission of a different offense in said
jurisdiction be considered a substantial compliance of
the duty imposed upon the bondsman under Section 13,
Rule 114 sufficient to exonerate the bondsman from
liability?
The facts of the case are not in dispute.
Mariquita Caparas having been
charged with the crime of estafa was
out on a bail bond in the amount of
Pl8,000.00 posted by the Mabini
Insurance and Fidelity Co., Inc.,
hereinafter referred to as appellant.
The trial of the case having been
scheduled for January 19,1968 at 9
o'clock a.m., the appellant on
December 14,1967, personally
notified the accused of the hearing.
On Jan. 12, 1968, the appellant filed a
manifestation and motion for
postponement of trial on the ground
that it lost effective control on the
person of the accused' inasmuch as
thru reliable information the person of
Mariquita Caparas is presently
confined at the City Jail of the Crown
Colony of Hongkong serving sentence
for three (3) years imprisonment after
she was convicted of smuggling into
Hongkong of nearly $200,000 in
forged US Travellers Check. (Record on
Appeal, pp. 6-7). Without acting on the
said motion for postponement, the
court a quo, on Jan. 19,1968, ordered
the confiscation of the bond and gave
the bondsmen 30 days within which to
show cause why judgment should not
be rendered against them due to the
non- appearance of the accused at the
scheduled date of hearing.
Accordingly, appellant filed a motion
to lift the order of confiscation of said
bond and the cancellation of the
same. To this motion, it attached a
statement from the secretary of
Foreign Affairs certifying that
Mariquita Caparas was indeed
confined in jail in Hongkong. The said
motion was however, denied on March
11, 1968 for lack of merit. On March
28, 1968, appellant filed a motion for
reconsideration followed by an
amended motion for reconsideration
on the same date reiterating its
appeal that the order dated March 11,
1968 be reconsidered and the bail
bond for the provisional liberty of the
accused be ordered cancelled, and the
appellant discharged and exonerated
on the ground that the non-production
of the accused is 'without the
knowledge, consent and/or negligence
of the bondsmen' adding this time
that the government made it

WHEREFORE, the
motion is hereby
denied for lack of
merit. " (pp. 16-18,
RA). 1
Dissatisfied with the lower court's decision petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the following
assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
ORDERING CONFISCATION OF THE
BOND, HAVING ALREADY BEEN
PREVIOUSLY NOTIFIED BY THE
BONDSMEN-APPELLANT OF THE FACT
THAT THE ACCUSED WAS ABLE TO

LEAVE THE PHILIPPINES AND WAS

DETAINED AT HONGKONG FOR
SMUGGLING.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
COMPLETELY EXONERATING THE
BONDSMEN-APPELLANT FROM
LIABILITY IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT
APPEARANCE OF THE ACCUSED AT
THE TRIAL WAS PRECISELY RENDERED
PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE BY THE
GOVERNMENT IN ISSUING
CLEARANCES TO HER TO LEAVE THE
COUNTRY NOTWITHSTANDING THE
PENDENCY OF ABOVE ENTITLED
CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST THE
ACCUSED. 2
In the Decision of September 20, 1973, 3 the Court of
Appeals certified the appeal to US on the ground that it
involves pure questions of law.
Hence this case.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Upon the assumption of the obligation of bail, the
sureties become in law the jailers of their
principal. 4 Their custody of the prisoner is the
continuance of the original imprisonment and though
they cannot actually confine him they are subrogated to
all the rights and means which the government
possesses to make their control effective. In a long line
of decisions it has been held that it is the bonding
company's responsibility to produce the accused before
the court whenever required. Failure to so produce is
undisputably a complete breach of guaranty. 5
In case of the surety's breach, the forfeiture of the bail
follows, Section 15, Rule 114 6 lays down the rule for
forfeiture of bail, thus:
When the appearance of the
defendant is required by the court, his
sureties shall be notified to produce
him before the court on a given date.
If the defendant fails to appear as
required, the bond is declared
forfeited and the bondsmen are given
thirty (30) days within which to
produce their principal and to show
cause why a judgment should not be
rendered against them for the amount
of their bond. Within the said period of
thirty (30) days, the bondsmen, (a)
must produce the body of their
principal or give the reason for its nonproduction; and (b) must explain
satisfactorily why the defendant did
not appear before the court when first
required to do so. Failing in these two
requisites, a judgment shall be
rendered against the bondsmen.
Under this cited provision, it is very clear that if after the
notice to produce the accused is served upon the
surety, the principal fails to appear at the time required
by the court, the bail shall be declared forfeited.
However, the bondsmen are given thirty (30) days
within which to produce the defendant and show cause
why a judgment should not be rendered against them to
the extent of their liability under the bond.
Petitioner contends that their act of notifying the court a
quo of the impossibility of the appearance of the
accused before the date scheduled for trial in that the
accused was able to leave the country surreptitiously
without their knowledge and consent should be
considered a substantial compliance of their duty as
bondsmen and hence they should be exonerated from
liability.
We do not agree.

The question whether the explanation is satisfactory lies

within the discretion of the court. 7 In the forfeiture of
bail bonds, courts are liberal in accepting the
explanation of the bondsmen provided the body of the
accused is produced. 8 Production of the body of the
accused should be made within the period of 30 days
required by the court. If so produced, forfeiture may be
discharged if a satisfactory explanation is given why he
neglected or failed to appear when first required to do
so. 9 To justify exemption from liability on a bail bond or
a reduction thereof, the accused must be surrendered to
the court and his non- appearance when first required
by the court must be satisfactorily explained. 10
Petitioner was of the erroneous impression that as long
as an explanation was given and provided it was made
timely a bondsman could be readily relieved of liability.
Thus, in an attempt to support this theory, petitioner
cited the case of People vs. Peczon. 11 The case is not in
point. In Peczon, the non-production of the accused was
satisfactorily explained by the surety within the 30-day
period alleging that it was due to the erroneous advise
of counsel that the accused need not appear in court for
it was only a preliminary investigation and that the body
of the principals cannot be produced as they have
already been arrested and are lodged in jail. Hence the
sureties were exonerated. 12
However, the case before Us is governed by an entirely
different set of facts. The principal here was not
prevented from appearing before the court a quo on like
grounds. She willfully, knowingly and intentionally
jumped bail. For such, petitioner was evidently remiss in
its duty as jailer of the accused.
The petitioner stresses that with the clearance issued by
the government agency concerned in favor of the
accused enabling the latter to leave the Philippines, the
government has consented to her departure, hence
petitioner should not be held liable. Or, otherwise, it was
the principal, Mariquita Caparas who defrauded the
government without petitioner's knowledge and
participation thus, their, exoneration from liability is
proper, citing the maxim of Res inter alios acta alteri
nocere non debet * as embodied in Section 25, Rule 130
of the Revised Rules of Court.
We agree with the court a quo, as it ruled against
petitioner. Petitioner itself noted that the act of the
accused Mariquita Caparas, was done surreptitiously.
Petitioner's allegation that the performance of its
obligation was rendered impossible by the act of the
obligee is untenable. It could have taken steps to
prevent the departure of Caparas. The error of the
government agency concerned in allowing Caparas to
leave must be because of her misrepresentation that
there was no pending case against her. Petitioner
cannot be relieved of liability on the ground that it had
not participated nor consented to the escape of the
principal. As the jailer or custodian of the accused its
obligation is to produce the body of the accused
whenever so required. Failure to do so is a violation of
the condition of the bond. Failing in this respect,
forfeiture of the bail bond is proper.
The case of Reese vs. U.S. Wall 13 cited by petitioner
which was decided by the Federal Supreme Court of the
United States is inapplicable. In the said case the U.S.
government directly consented that the accused leave
the United States which is not the situation in the case
before Us.
The case of U.S. vs. Bonoan 14 also invoked by petitioner
is likewise not in point. In said case the principal was
allowed bail while his case was on appeal from a
sentence for homicide. While at liberty, he committed
the crime ofbandolerismo in another province, for which
he was arrested and detained. His appeal in the
homicide case having been declared abandoned by this
Court the sentence was remanded for execution of the
judgment. At the precise time the lower court called
upon his bondsmen for his appearance, however, said
principal was under arrest in another province and the
authorities therein refused to surrender him. Thus,
under that set of facts, We ruled that the government
which is at the same time the obligee having caused the
arrest and confinement of the principal in another
province on a charge of bandolerismo and having
refused to deliver the principal to the surety, must

rightfully exonerate the surety. The performance of the

condition having been rendered impossible by the act of
the obligee. Thus, this Court ruled "It would be against
all principle and justice to allow the government to
recover against the sureties for not producing their
principal when it had itself placed the principal beyond
their reach and control. There was an implied covenant
on the part of the Government when the bond was
accepted that it would not in any way interfere with the
due compliance of the conditions in the bond or take
any proceeding against the principal which would affect
the rights of the sureties." 15
It is clear from the foregoing that the surety had not
shown sufficient cause to justify its exoneration. The
principal having escaped and is now beyond the
jurisdiction of the court, petitioner breached its
obligation to the government. Hence, it is liable under
the bond.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the petition is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Order of March 11,
1968 and April 1, 1968 denying petitioner's motion to
lift order of confiscation of bond are hereby affirmed in
toto.
This Decision is immediately executory and no
extension of time to file a motion for its reconsideration
shall be entertained.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-64157-58 April 29, 1987
PHILIPPINE PHOENIX SURETY and INSURANCE
INC., petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN [Third Division] respondent.
Renato C. Quintana for petitioner.

as legal basis for Castro's release. Judge Gregorio G.

Pineda of Branch 21 denied the motion, it appearing
that Castro was no longer in military custody as he had
escaped. 2
Judge Celso L. Magsino of Branch 20, however, granted
Phoenix Surety's motion and relieved the latter of any
responsibility on the personal bail bond, JCR [21 Bond
No. 0619, AAF 0 1065: 3 for the provisional liberty of
Castro. 4
In due time, the records of the four criminal cases
against Castro and Dulay were endorsed to the Office of
the Tanodbayan by the Ministry of Justice. The
Tanodbayan consolidated the cases and filed before the
Sandiganbayan two amended informations charging
Castro with two separate complex crimes of estafa
through falsification of public documents [Criminal
Cases Nos. 5556-5557].
It appears that the Sandiganbayan directed Phoenix
Surety to produce Castro and Dulay before the court.
Despite an extension of the deadline for complying with
the court order, Phoenix Surety was unable to do so. As
a result, on April 23, 1982, the Sandiganbayan
apparently declared the forfeiture of Dulay's bond and
required the petitioner surety to show cause why a
judgment should not be rendered against it for the
amount of the bond. 5That prompted Phoenix Surety to
file several motions with the Sandiganbayan seeking the
reconsideration of its order dated April 23, 1982 insofar
as accused Dulay was concerned, the cancellation of the
bond issued in favor of Castro, and the suspension of
the resolution of the prosecution's motion for judgment
on the bond.
The Sandiganbayan, in its challenged resolution of
December 27, 1982, denied the motion for
reconsideration in connection with Dulay and refused
the cancellation of Castro's bond as well as the
suspension of the resolution on the motion for
judgmenton the bond. Accordingly, it granted the
prosecution's motion for judgment on the bonds of
Castro and Dulay for their full amount in view of Phoenix
Surety's failure to procure their presence before the
court within the required period. Upon denial of its
motion for reconsideration on April 29, 1983, Phoenix
Surety filed the present petition praying that the
resolutions of December 27, 1982 and April 29, 1983 be
set aside and that the bail bonds in favor of Castro be
discharged.

FERNAN, J.:

'I'he petition is devoid of merit.

The issue in this special civil action for certiorari is

whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioner Philippine
Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc.'s motion for the
cancellation of the bail bonds issued to accused
Remberto F. Castro and Winston Dulay were detained at
the PC-INP jail in Camp Crame by virtue of an Arrest,
Search and Seizure Order [ASSO 4735] for alleged
economic sabotage.

Bail is defined by the Rules as the security required and

given for the release of a person who has been placed
under legal custody, that he will appear before any
court in which hisappearance may be required as
stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance. 6

On March 3, 1980, two informations for estafa against

Castro were separately filed in Branch 20 and 21 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal in Pasig [Criminal Cases
Nos. 34721 and 347221. On the same day, two
informations for falsification of public documents were
separately filed against him in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal in Pasay City.
On April 1, 1980, Phoenix Surety issued personal bail
bonds for Castro [AAF 01077, 01078, 01079 and
010801. 1Castro paid P9,832.00 for premiums.
On June 4, 1980, Castro escaped from the custody of his
military escorts while enroute to attend trial before
Branch 20 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Pasig.
He has reportedly left the country since then. Winston
Dulay, on the other hand, is still at large.
In June 1980, Phoenix Surety filed an urgent motion for
cancellation of bail bond before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch 20 and 21 in Pasig, on the
ground that the bonds posted for Castro were useless
because the military authorities did not recognize them

The purpose of the bail is to relieve an accused from

imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his
appearance at the trial. 7
To release on bail an arrested person "is to deliver him
in contemplation of law, yet not commonly in real fact,
to others who become entitled to his custody and
responsible for his appearance when and where
agreed." 8 Upon assumption of the obligation of bail, the
sureties become in law the jailers of their principal. 9
The conditions of the bail are: [1] If before conviction,
that the defendant shall answer the complaint or
information in the court in which it is filed or to which it
may be transferred for trial; [2] after conviction, that he
will surrender hiniself in execuLion of the judgment that
the appellate court may render; and [3] that in case the
cause is remanded for new trial, he will appear in the
court to which it may be remanded and submit himself
to the orders and processes thereof. For failure to
perform any of these conditions, the bond git,en in
security thereof nlay be forfeited. 10
The forfeiture of the bond rests upon the sound
discretion of the court, also dependent upon the court's
discretion is the question of discharge of the surety. As a
general principle, aside from the instances enumerated

in section 16 of Rule 114, the surety, upon application

filed with the court, may also be relieved from the nonappearance of the bond where its performance is
rendered impossible by the act of God, the act of the
obligee [the Government] or the act of the law. The
exoneration under the second category is predicated
upon the principle thatthe Government, as the obligee
in the bond, cannot by its own acts prevent the
fulfillment of the conditions of the bond by the sureties
and at the same time demand its forfeiture. 11
There is no question that in the present case petitioner
Phoenix Surety failed to produce the body of Remberto
F. Castro before the Sandiganbayan within the required
period. However, Phoenix Surety opted to wash its
hands off the matter by insisting that the bail bonds it
posted for Castro were null and void since Castro was
under military detention [by virtue of an ASSO issued by
the Minister of National Defense] at the time of his
escape. It argued that considering that the bail bonds
were intended primarily to obtain the provisional liberty
of the accused and this was rendered impossible by the
ASSO, then it would be more in accord with justice
and fairness for the Sandiganbayan to absolve the
surety from furthelliability on the bonds.
While the argument may be valid, we cannot fully
subscribe to it for the precise reason that Phoenix
Surety is in estoppel. As correctly observed by the
Solicitor General, Phoenix Surety issued the personal
bail bonds of Castro on April 1, 1980 when latter had
already been under detention for three 131 months.
Without question, Phoenix Surety had knowledge of
Castro's detention by the military when it issued the bail
bonds. As a matter of fact, Phoenix Surety attached as
Annex "F" to the present petition the letter [dated May
29, 1980] of Castro's counsel requesting petitioner
surety to seek the cancellation of said bc)nds. Said
letter reads in part:
It is unfortunate however that despite
the said bail bonds, the
representations and assurances of
your agent la certain Alice] to my
client that he woVId thereafter enjoy
his provisional liberty turned to be
false and untrue.
To the present, my client has not been
released from military custody [Camp
Cramel for the reason that the bail
bonds issued by your company are not
recognized as legal basis for his
release. Your agent [Alice] knew from
the beginning that my client is under
detention.at Camp Crame by virtue of
an ASSO ... 12
So, at the outset, Phoenix Surety had offered for a
valuable consideration, to assume the responsibility
under the bond despite knowledge of Castro's military
detention by reason of an ASSO. It must be presumed
that Phoenix Surety knew fully well that the existence of
the ASSO precluded provisional release by bail or by any
other means.
Under such circumstances and considering that when
the surety posts a bond for the temporary liberty of an
accused, it becomes its jailer and as such is at all times
charged with the duty to keep him under its
surveillance, which duty continues until the bond is
cancelled, or the surety is discharged. 13 Phoenix
Surety is likewise deemed to have assumed the
responsibility for Castro's escape and subsequent flight
to another country. It was incumbent upon the surety to
prohibit the accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the
Philippines and placing himself beyond the reach of its
orders and processes.
In conclusion, the principle of estoppel strongly militates
against the stand taken by Phoenix Surety. Although the
courts are usually liberal in accepting the explanations
of the surety regarding the cancellation of the bond,
such liberality must not be to the extent of totally
exonerating a surety from an undertaking it has freely
and voluntarily assumed with full awareness of all its
attendant risks.

WHEREFORE, finding no cogent reason to set aside the

resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated December 27,
1982 and April 29, 1983, the Court RESOLVED to
DISMISS the instant petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 99289-90 January 27, 1993

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman; GUALBERTO
J. DE LA LLANA, Special Prosecutor;
SANDIGANBAYAN and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA, respondents.
Marciano P. Defensor for petitioner.
Nestor P. Ifurong for Maria S. Tatoy.
Danilo C. Cunanan for respondents.
RESOLUTION

REGALADO, J.:
Filed directly with the Court, ostensibly as an incident in
the present special civil action, is petitioner's so-called
"Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing
its Hold Departure Order with Prayer for the Issuance of
a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction, with Motion to Set Pending Incident for
Hearing." Despite the impropriety of the mode adopted
in elevating the issue to us, as will hereinafter be
discussed, we will disregard the procedural gaffe in the
interest of an early resolution hereof.
The chronology of events preceding the instant motion
is best summarized to readily provide a clear
understanding and perspective of our disposition of this
matter, thus:
1. On May 13, 1991, an information dated May 9, 1991
and docketed as Criminal Case No. 16698 was filed
against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for alleged
violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.
2. On May 14, 1991, an order of arrest was issued in
said case against herein petitioner by Presiding Justice
Francis E. Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, with bail
for the release of the accused fixed at P15,000.00. 1
3. On even date, petitioner filed an "Urgent Exparte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in
Behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago," 2 which
pertinently states in part:
xxx xxx xxx
3. As a result of the vehicular collision,
she suffered extensive physical
injuries which required surgical
intervention. As of this time, her
injuries, specifically in the jaw or gum
area of the mouth, prevents her to
speak (sic) because of extreme pain.
Further, she cannot for an extended
period be on her feet because she is
still in physical pain. . . . .

4. On the other hand, the accused

Miriam Defensor Santiago seeks leave
of this Honorable Court that she be
considered as having placed herself
under the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, for purposes of the
required trial and other proceedings
and further seeks leave of this
Honorable Court that the
recommended bail bond of P15,000.00
that she is posting in cash be
accepted.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed
of this Honorable Court that the bail
bond she is posting in the amount of
P15,000.00 be duly accepted, and that
by this motion, she be considered as
having placed herself under the
custody of this Honorable Court and
dispensing of her personal
appearance for now until such time
she will (sic) have recovered
sufficiently from her recent near fatal
accident.
Further, on the above basis, it is also
respectfully prayed that the warrant
for her arrest be immediately recalled.
xxx xxx xxx
4. Also on the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution 3 authorizing petitioner to post a cash bond
for her provisional liberty without need for her physical
appearance until June 5, 1991 at the latest, unless by
that time her condition does not yet permit her physical
appearance before said court. On May 15, 1991,
petitioner filed a cash bond in the amount of
P15,000.00, aside from the other legal fees. 4
5. On May 21, 1991, respondent Ombudsman Conrado
M. Vasquez filed with the Sandiganbayan a
manifestation "that accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago
appeared in his office in the second floor of the Old
NAWASA Building located in Arroceros Street, Ermita,
Manila at around 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon of May
20, 1991. She was accompanied by a brother who
represented himself to be Atty. Arthur Defensor and a
lady who is said to be a physician. She came and left
unaided, after staying for about fifteen minutes. 5
6. Acting on said manifestation, the Sandiganbayan
issued a resolution also on May 21, 1991, setting the
arraignment of the accused for May 27, 1991, and
setting aside the court's resolution of May 14, 1991
which ordered her appearance before the deputy clerk
of the First Division of said court on or before June 5,
1991. 6
7. In a motion dated May 22, 1991, petitioner asked that
her cash bond be cancelled and that she be allowed
provisional liberty upon a recognizance. She contended
that for her to continue remaining under bail bond may
imply to other people that she has intentions of fleeing,
an intention she would like to prove as baseless. 7
8. Likewise on May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with this
Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction, and a subsequent addendum
thereto, seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the
Regional Trial Court of Manila from proceeding with
Criminal Cases Nos. 12298 (for violation of Section 3[e]
of Republic Act No. 3019), 91-94555 (violation of
Presidential Decree No. 46), and 91-94897 (for libel),
respectively. Consequently, a temporary restraining
order was issued by this Court on May 24, 1991,
enjoining the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 3, from proceeding with the
criminal cases pending before them. This Court, in
issuing said order, took into consideration the fact that
according to petitioner, her arraignment, originally set
for June 5, 1991, was inexplicably advanced to May 27,
1991, hence the advisability of conserving and affording

her the opportunity to avail herself of any remedial right

to meet said contingency.
9. On May 27, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued an order
deferring: (a) the arraignment of petitioner until further
advice from the Supreme Court; and (b) the
consideration of herein petitioner's motion to cancel her
cash bond until further initiative from her through
counsel. 8
10. On January 18, 1992, this Court rendered a decision
dismissing the petition for certiorari and lifting and
setting aside the temporary restraining order previously
issued. 9 The motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner was eventually denied with finality in this
Court's resolution dated September 10, 1992.
11. Meanwhile, in a resolution adopted on July 6, 1992,
the Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order
against petitioner which reads as follows:
Considering the information in media
to the effect that accused Santiago
intends to leave the country soon for
an extended stay abroad for study
purposes, considering the recent
decision of the Supreme Court
dismissing her petition promulgated
on January 13, 1992, although the
same is still subject of a Motion for
Reconsideration from the accused,
considering that the accused has not
yet been arraigned, nor that she has
not (sic) even posted bail the same
having been by reason of her earlier
claim of being seriously indisposed, all
of which were overtaken by a
restraining order issued by the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 99289 and
No. 99290 dated May 24, 1991, the
accused is ordered not to leave the
country and the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation is
ordered not to allow the departure of
the accused unless authorized from
(sic) this Court. 10
The hold departure order was issued by reason of the
announcement made by petitioner, which was widely
publicized in both print and broadcast media, that she
would be leaving for the United States to accept a
fellowship supposedly offered by the John F. Kennedy
School of Government at Harvard University. Petitioner
likewise disclosed that she would be addressing Filipino
communities in the United States in line with her
crusade against election fraud and other aspects of
graft and corruption.
In the instant motion submitted for our resolution,
petitioner argues that:
1. The Sandiganbayan acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the hold departure order considering
that it had not acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the petitioner.
2. The Sandiganbayan blatantly
disregarded basic principles of judicial
comity and due deference owing to a
superior tribunal when it issued the
hold departure order despite the
pendency of petitioner's motion for
reconsideration with this Honorable
Court.
3. The right to due process of law, the
right to travel and the right to
freedom of speech are preferred, preeminent rights enshrined not only in
the Constitution but also in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
which can be validly impaired only
under stringent criteria which do not
obtain in the instant case.

4. The hold departure order in the

instant case was issued under
disturbing circumstances which
suggest political harassment and
persecution.
5. On the basis of petitioner's
creditable career in the bench and bar
and her characteristic transparency
and candor, there is no reasonable
ground to fear that petitioner will
surreptitiously flee the country to
evade judicial processes. 11
I. Petitioner initially postulates that respondent court
never acquired jurisdiction over her person considering
that she has neither been arrested nor has she
voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact that she has
not validly posted bail since she never personally
appeared before said court. We reject her thesis for
being factually and legally untenable.
It has been held that where after the filing of the
complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the
accused is issued by the trial court and the accused
either voluntarily submitted himself to the court or was
duly arrested, the court thereby acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the accused. 12 The voluntary
appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by
his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to
quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the
court's jurisdiction thereover, appearing for
arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the
matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the
provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same
cannot be posted before custody of the accused has
been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his
arrest or voluntary surrender. 13
In the case at bar, it becomes essential, therefore, to
determine whether respondent court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of herein petitioner and,
correlatively, whether there was a valid posting of bail
bond.
We find and so hold that petitioner is deemed to have
voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of
respondent court upon the filing of her aforequoted
"Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail
Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago"
wherein she expressly sought leave "that she be
considered as having placed herself under the
jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the
required trial and other proceedings," and categorically
prayed "that the bail bond she is posting in the amount
of P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that by said
motion "she be considered as having placed herself
under the custody" of said court. Petitioner cannot now
be heard to claim otherwise for, by her own
representations, she is effectively estopped from
asserting the contrary after she had earlier recognized
the jurisdiction of the court and caused it to exercise
that jurisdiction over the aforestated pleadings she filed
therein.
It cannot be denied that petitioner has posted a cash
bail bond of P15,000.00 for her provisional release as
evidenced by Official Receipt No. 4292925 dated May
15, 1991 and which is even attached as Annex C-2 to
her own motion now under consideration. This is further
buttressed by the fact that petitioner thereafter also
filed a motion for the cancellation of said cash bond and
for the court to allow her provisional liberty upon the
security of a recognizance. With the filing of the
foregoing motions, petitioner should accordingly and
necessarily admit her acquiescence to and
acknowledgment of the propriety of the cash bond she
posted, instead of adopting a stance which ignores the
injunction for candor and sincerity in dealing with the
courts of justice.
Petitioner would also like to make capital of the fact that
she did not personally appear before respondent court
to file her cash bond, thereby rendering the same
ineffectual. Suffice it to say that in this case, it was
petitioner herself, in her motion for the acceptance of
the cash bond, who requested respondent court to

dispense with her personal appearance until she shall

have recovered sufficiently from her vehicular accident.
It is distressing that petitioner should now turn around
and fault respondent court for taking a compassionate
stand on the matter and accommodating her own
request for acceptance of the cash bond posted in her
absence.
II. Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan disregarded
the rule of judicial comity when it issued the hold
departure order despite the pendency of her motion for
reconsideration of the decision of this Court which
dismissed her petition. She claims that if the principle of
judicial comity applies to prevent a court from
interfering with the proceedings undertaken by a
coordinate court, with more reason should it operate to
prevent an inferior court, such as the Sandiganbayan,
from interfering with the instant case where a motion for
reconsideration was still pending before this Court. She
contends further that the hold departure order
contravenes the temporary restraining order previously
issued by this court enjoining the Sandiganbayan from
proceeding with the criminal case pending before it.
It will be remembered that the Court rendered a
decision in the present case on January 18, 1992
dismissing the petition for certiorari filed in this case
and lifting and setting aside the temporary restraining
order it previously issued. It is petitioner's submission
that the filing of her motion for reconsideration stayed
the lifting of the temporary restraining order, hence
respondent court continued to be enjoined from acting
on and proceeding with the case during the pendency of
the motion for reconsideration. We likewise reject this
contention which is bereft of merit.
Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that,
unless otherwise ordered by the court, a judgment in an
action for injunction shall not be stayed after its
rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the
pendency of an appeal. And, the rule is that the
execution of a judgment decreeing the dissolution of a
writ of preliminary injunction shall not be stayed before
an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an
appeal, 14 and we see no reason why the foregoing
considerations should not apply to a temporary
restraining order. The rationale therefor is that even in
cases where an appeal is taken from a judgment
dismissing an action on the merits, the appeal does not
suspend the judgment, hence the general rule applies
that a temporary injunction terminates automatically on
the dismissal of the action. 15
It has similarly been held that an order of dissolution of
an injunction may be immediately effective, even
though it is not final. 16 A dismissal, discontinuance, or
non-suit of an action in which a restraining order or
temporary injunction has been granted operates as a
dissolution of the restraining order or temporary
injunction 17 and no formal order of dissolution is
necessary to effect such dissolution. 18 Consequently, a
special order of the court is necessary for the
reinstatement of an injunction. 19 There must be a new
exercise of .judicial power. 20
The reason advanced in support of the general rule has
long since been duly explained, to wit:
. . . The court of this State, relying
upon the last of the two clauses
quoted, held that an appeal from an
order dissolving an injunction
continued the injunction in force. The
evils which would result from such a
holding are forcibly pointed out by
Judge Mitchell in a dissenting opinion.
He said: "Although a plaintiff's papers
are so insufficient on their face or so
false in their allegations that if he
should apply on notice for an
injunction, any court would, on a
hearing, promptly refuse to grant one,
yet, if he can find anywhere in the
State a judge or court commissioner
who will improvidently grant one ex
parte, which the court on the first and
only hearing ever had dissolves, he
can, by appealing and filing a bond,
make the ex parte injunction

impervious to all judicial interference

until the appeal is determined in this
court." . . . Such a result is so unjust
and so utterly inconsistent with all
known rules of equity practice that no
court should adopt such a
construction unless absolutely shut up
to it by the clear and unequivocal
language of the statute. . . . . 21
This ruling has remained undisturbed over the decades
and was reiterated in a case squarely in point and of
more recent vintage:
The SEC's orders dated June 27, 1989
and July 21, 1989 (directing the
secretary of UDMC to call a
stockholders' meeting, etc.) are not
premature, despite the petitioners
then pending motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the
Court of Appeals. The lifting by the
Court of Appeals of its writ of
preliminary injunction in C.A.-G.R. SP
No. 17435 cleared the way for the
implementation by the SEC's en
banc resolution in SEC EB Case No.
191. The SEC need not wait for the
Court of Appeals to resolve the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration
for a judgment decreeing the
dissolution of a preliminary injunction
is immediately executory. It shall not
be stayed after its rendition and
before an appeal is taken or during
the pendency of an appeal. . . . .22
On the bases of the foregoing pronouncements, there is
no question that with the dismissal of the petition
forcertiorari and the lifting of the restraining order,
nothing stood to hinder the Sandiganbayan from acting
on and proceeding with the criminal cases filed against
herein petitioner. At any rate, as we have earlier
mentioned, the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner was denied with finality in our resolution
dated September 10, 1992.
Petitioner further posits, however, that the filing of the
instant special civil action for certiorari divested the
Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction over the case therein.
Whether generated by misconception or design, we
shall address this proposition which, in the first place,
had no reason for being and should not hereafter be
advanced under like or similar procedural scenarios.
The original and special civil action filed with this Court
is, for all intents and purposes, an invocation for the
exercise of its supervisory powers over the lower courts.
It does not have the effect of divesting the inferior
courts of jurisdiction validly acquired over the case
pending before them. It is elementary that the mere
pendency of a special civil action for certiorari,
commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower
court, does not even interrupt the course of the latter
when there is no writ of injunction restraining it. 23 The
inevitable conclusion is that for as long as no writ of
injunction or restraining order is issued in the special
civil action for certiorari, no impediment exists and
there is nothing to prevent the lower court from
exercising its jurisdiction and proceeding with the case
pending before it. And, even if such injunctive writ or
order is issued, the lower court nevertheless continues
to retain its jurisdiction over the principal action.
III. It is further submitted by petitioner that the hold
departure order violates her right to due process, right
to travel and freedom of speech.
First, it is averred that the hold departure order was
issued without notice and hearing. Much is made by
petitioner of the fact that there was no showing that a
motion to issue a hold departure order was filed by the
prosecution and, instead, the same was issued ex mero
motu by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner is in error.
Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be
said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in
addition to those expressly conferred on them. 24 These

inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for

the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; 25 or
essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the
courts, 26 as well as to the due administration of
justice; 27 or are directly appropriate, convenient and
suitable to the execution of their granted powers; 28 and
include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction
and render it effective in behalf of the litigants. 29
Therefore, while a court may be expressly granted the
incidental powers necessary to effectuate its
jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of
prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and usual
incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject
to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every
regularly constituted court has the power to do all
things that are reasonably necessary for the
administration of justice within the scope of its
jurisdiction. Hence, demands, matters, or questions
ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main
action, and coming within the above principles, may be
taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since
such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the
principal matter, even though the court may thus be
called on to consider and decide matters which, as
original causes of action, would not be within its
cognizance.
Furthermore, a court has the inherent power to make
interlocutory orders necessary to protect its
jurisdiction. 30Such being the case, with more reason
may a party litigant be subjected to proper coercive
measures where he disobeys a proper order, or commits
a fraud on the court or the opposing party, the result of
which is that the jurisdiction of the court would be
ineffectual. What ought to be done depends upon the
particular circumstances.31
Turning now to the case at bar, petitioner does not deny
and, as a matter of fact, even made a public statement
that she had every intention of leaving the country
allegedly to pursue higher studies abroad. We uphold
the course of action adopted by the Sandiganbayan in
taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioner's plan to
go abroad and in thereafter issuing sua sponte the hold
departure order, in justified consonance with our
preceding disquisition. To reiterate, the hold departure
order is but an exercise of respondent court's inherent
power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of
its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the
accused.
Second, petitioner asseverates that considering that she
is leaving for abroad to pursue further studies, there is
no sufficient justification for the impairment of her
constitutional right to travel; and that under Section 6,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the right to travel
may be impaired only when so required in the interest of
national security, public safety or public health, as may
be provided by law.
It will be recalled that petitioner has posted bail which
we have declared legally valid and complete despite the
absence of petitioner at the time of filing thereof, by
reason of the peculiar circumstances and grounds
hereinbefore enunciated and which warrant a relaxation
of the aforecited doctrine in Feliciano. Perforce, since
under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail
bond she holds herself amenable at all times to the
orders and processes of the court, she may legally be
prohibited from leaving the country during the
pendency of the case. This was the ruling we handed
down in Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 32 to the
effect that:
A court has the power to prohibit a
person admitted to bail from leaving
the Philippines. This is a necessary
consequence of the nature and
function of a bail bond.
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court defines bail as the security
required and given for the release of a
person who is in custody of the law,
that he will appear before any court in
which his appearance may be required

as stipulated in the bail bond or

recognizance.

an interested party (See Salonga v.

Hermoso & Travel Processing Center,
No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA
121).

Its object is to relieve the accused of

imprisonment and the state of the
burden of keeping him, pending the
trial, and at the same time, to put the
accused as much under the power of
the court as if he were in custody of
the proper officer, and to secure the
appearance of the accused so as to
answer the call of the court and do
what the law may require of him.

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987

Constitution should by no means be
construed as delimiting the inherent
power of the Courts to use all means
necessary to carry their orders into
effect in criminal cases pending before
them. When by law jurisdiction is
conferred on a Court or judicial officer,
all auxiliary writs, processes and other
means necessary to carry it into effect
may be employed by such Court or
officer (Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of
Court).

The condition imposed upon petitioner

to make himself available at all times
whenever the court requires his
presence operates as a valid
restriction on his right to travel. As we
have held in People vs. Uy Tuising, 61
Phil. 404 (1935):
. . . the result of the
obligation assumed
by appellee (surety)
to hold the accused
amenable at all
times to the orders
and processes of the
lower court, was to
prohibit said
accused from
leaving the
jurisdiction of the
Philippines,
because, otherwise,
said orders and
processes will be
nugatory, and
inasmuch as the
jurisdiction of the
courts from which
they issued does not
extend beyond that
of the Philippines
they would have no
binding force
outside of said
jurisdiction.
Indeed, if the accused were allowed to
leave the Philippines without sufficient
reason, he may be placed beyond the
reach of the courts.
This was reiterated in a more recent case where we
held:
Petitioner thus theorizes that under
the 1987 Constitution, Courts can
impair the right to travel only on the
grounds of "national security, public
safety, or public health."
The submission is not well taken.
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution should be interpreted to
mean that while the liberty of travel
may be impaired even without Court
Order, the appropriate executive
officers or administrative authorities
are not armed with arbitrary discretion
to impose limitations. They can
impose limits only on the basis of
"national security, public safety, or
public health" and "as may be
provided by law," a limitive phrase
which did not appear in the 1973 text
(The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin, G.,
S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 197, p. 263).
Apparently, the phraseology in the
1987 Constitution was a reaction to
the ban on international travel
imposed under the previous regime
when there was a Travel Processing
Center, which issued certificates of
eligibility to travel upon application of

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Holding an accused in a criminal
case within the reach of the Courts by
preventing his departure from the
Philippines must be considered as a
valid restriction on his right to travel
so that he may be dealt with in
accordance with law. The offended
party in any criminal proceeding is the
People of the Philippines. It is to their
best interest that criminal
prosecutions should run their course
and proceed to finality without undue
delay, with an accused holding himself
amenable at all times to Court Orders
and processes. 33
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in
this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for
that matter, the same may be said of a number of
litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard
the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking
relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the
same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of
their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even
mandated bylaw to be sought therein. This practice
must be stopped, not only because of the imposition
upon the precious time of this Court but also because of
the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or
otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often
has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the
proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better
equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a
trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy
that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless
the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and
calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we elucidate
that such policy includes the matter of petitions or
motions involving hold departure orders of the trial or
lower courts. Parties with pending cases therein should
apply for permission to leave the country from the very
same courts which, in the first instance, are in the best
position to pass upon such applications and to impose
the appropriate conditions therefor since they are
conversant with the facts of the cases and the
ramifications or implications thereof. Where, as in the
present case, a hold departure order has been issued ex
parte or motu propio by said court, the party concerned
must first exhaust the appropriate remedies therein,
through a motion for reconsideration or other proper
submissions, or by the filing of the requisite application
for travel abroad. Only where all the conditions and
requirements for the issuance of the extraordinary writs
of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus indubitably obtain
against a disposition of the lower courts may our power
of supervision over said tribunals be invoked through
the appropriate petition assailing on jurisdictional or
clearly valid grounds their actuations therein.
WHEREFORE, with respect to and acting on the motion
now before us for resolution, the same is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1349

July 12, 2001

BERNADETTE MONDEJAR, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE MARINO S. BUBAN, MTCC, Tacloban City
Branch 1, respondent.
KAPUNAN, J.:

Hence, the same penalty should be imposed on

respondent judge.
WHEREFORE, Judge Marino S. Buban is
hereby REPRIMANDED with the warning that a
repetition of the same and similar acts in the future will
be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

RESOLUTION
A.M. No. RTJ-02-1698
In a sworn letter complaint dated May 31, 1999,
complainant Bernadette Mondejar charged Judge Marino
S. Buban, MTCC, Tacloban City, Branch 1, with gross
ignorance of the law, partiality, serious irregularity and
grave misconduct relative to Criminal Case No. 98-07CR-133 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Bernadette
Mondejar and Arlette Mondejar" for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22. She alleged that respondent judge
issued a "hold departure order" against her on October
23, 1998 in violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 3997 which provides that "hold departure orders" shall be
issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. She further
alleged that respondent judge did not give her an
opportunity to be heard before issuing the questioned
order.
When required to comment on the matter, respondent
judge admitted having issued said order because he
was not aware of the Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97.
He alleged that he was not furnished a copy of the
circular and managed to secure a copy only after he
instructed his legal researcher to get one from the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban
City. Accordingly, on April 14, 1997, he issued an order
lifting and setting aside the hold departure order dated
October 23, 1998. As regards the issue of denial of due
process, respondent judge averred that complainant and
her counsel were duly notified of the scheduled hearing
but neither appeared on said date.
The Court Administrator after finding that respondent
judge erred in issuing the assailed "hold departure
order," recommended that he be severely reprimanded
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
The recommendation of the Court Administrator is welltaken.
Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue holddeparture orders to criminal cases within the jurisdiction
of second level courts. Paragraph No. 1 of the said
circular specifically provides that "hold-departure orders
shall be issued only in criminal cases within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial courts." Clearly
then, criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of
first level courts do not fall within the ambit of the
circular, and it was an error on the part of respondent
judge to have issued one in the instant case.
Canon 3, Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
exhorts judges to be "faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence." The Court, in exercising
administrative supervision of all lower courts, has not
been remised in reminding the members of the bench to
exert due diligence in keeping abreast with the
development in law and jurisprudence. Besides, Circular
No. 39-97 is not a new circular. It was circularized in
1997 and violation of which has been accordingly dealt
with in numerous cases before the Court. Herein judge,
therefore, cannot be excused for his infraction. Judges
should always be vigilant in their quest for new
developments in the law so they could discharge their
duties and functions with zeal and fervor.1wphi1.nt
In recent cases,1 involving similar violations, this Court
imposed the penalty of reprimand on erring judges.

June 23, 2005

DANTE VICENTE, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE JOSE S. MAJADUCON, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In a letter-complaint dated July 21, 2000, addressed to
then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo, Dante
Vicente charged respondent Judge Jose S. Majaducon of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City,
Branch 23, with gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse
of authority and manifest partiality, praying that he be
administratively disciplined and terminated from the
service.
The instant administrative complaint stemmed from a
series of criminal cases involving a certain Evelyn Te of
General Santos City. The factual and procedural
antecedents leading to the instant administrative case
is summarized in this Courts Resolution of February 19,
2001, in G.R. Nos. 145715-18 entitled, People of the
Philippines vs. Evelyn Te, pertinent portions of which
read as follows:
In a joint decision dated May 31, 1995, the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 23, General Santos City, found Evelyn Te
guilty on four counts of violation of B. P. Blg. 22,
otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, and
sentenced her to two (2) months of imprisonment on
each count. The decision became final and executory
after this Court had denied Tes petition for review from
the affirmance of the trial courts decision by the Court
of Appeals.
On March 11, 2000, Te sought clarification from the trial
court whether she should serve her sentences
successively or simultaneously. In an order, dated May
25, 2000, the trial court clarified that she should serve
her sentences successively, but for humanitarian
reason and in accordance with Art. 70 of the Revised
Penal Code, it held that instead of serving
imprisonment of EIGHT months, the prisoner EVELYN TE
should serve only six months.
On June 2, 2000, Te filed a motion for reconsideration,
which she prayed be also considered as a petition for
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. Citing Vaca v.
Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 656 (1998), in which the
sentence of imprisonment of a party found guilty of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was reduced to a fine equal to
double the amount of the check involved, Te prayed that
her sentence be similarly modified and that she be
immediately released from detention. In a supplemental
motion, Te argued that she had been denied equal
protection of the law because the trial judge in another
case involving multiple counts of robbery directed the
accused to simultaneously serve his sentences.
On June 20, 2000, the trial court denied Tes petition for
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus on the ground that
Te was detained by virtue of a final judgment.
On June 22, 2000, Te filed an omnibus motion praying
for her release on the ground that she had been in jail

since March 15, 2000 and had fully served the three
months minimum of her total sentence under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. In the alternative, Te
prayed for release on recognizance.
On June 23, 2000, Te moved for reconsideration of the
trial courts order of June 20, 2000, alleging that the
finality of the joint decision against her did not bar her
application for the writ of habeas corpus. She prayed
that pending determination as to whether the Vaca
ruling applied to her, she also be allowed to post bail
pursuant to Rule 102, 14.
On July 5, 2000, the trial court allowed Te to post bail in
the amount of one million pesos, holding that it would
order her release upon the approval of her bail bond and
thereafter certify the proceedings to the Court as the
latter has concurrent jurisdiction over proceedings
for habeas corpus.
On July 7, 2000, the trial court approved Tes bail bonds
in the reduced amount of P500,000.00 and ordered her
release. The trial court also directed its clerk of court to
certify the proceedings to the Court.
On July 11, 2000, Assistant City Prosecutor Marie
Ellengred L. Baliguiat moved for reconsideration of the
trial courts resolution of July 5, 2000.
On July 18, 2000, Te filed a notice of appeal from the
order, dated June 20, 2000, and the resolution, dated
July 5, 2000, of the trial court.
On July 31, 2000, the trial court denied the motion for
reconsideration of the Assistant City Prosecutor. It also
denied due course to Tes notice of appeal on the
ground that there was no necessity for the appeal to the
Court of Appeals because it had already ordered that
the whole records be forwarded to this Court pursuant
to Rule 102, 14.1
In the present case, complainant, who claims to be the
station manager of Radyo Bombo, General Santos City,
alleges that while Te was in prison, respondent judge
allowed her to be released and confined at a local
hospital in the guise that she was suffering from certain
illnesses. Complainant further alleges that respondent
judge approved Tes application for bail as part
of habeas corpus proceedings even though no petition
for habeas corpus in favor of Te was filed and docketed.
As a result of respondent judges order allowing the
provisional liberty of Te, the local media in General
Santos City made an uproar and criticized respondent
judge for his action on the said case. In retaliation,
respondent judge cited for indirect contempt a group of
mediamen who published a critical article against him.
Complainant contends that respondent judge will not
hesitate to use his clout and power to stifle criticism and
dissent. In addition, complainant alleges that in a
separate case, respondent judge allowed the release of
the accused without the posting of the necessary bail.
On the basis of the above allegations, complainant
prays that respondent judge be investigated and if
warranted, be terminated and removed from service. 2
In his Comment, dated October 17, 2000, respondent
judge submitted the following contentions which we
quote verbatim:
1. The certified records of the above-mentioned
cases against Evelyn Te were forwarded to the
Supreme Court on August 5, 2000, upon the
order of undersigned by the Branch Clerk of
Court for review of our questioned Order
(attached as ANNEX 1 of letter Complaint);
2. On June 2, 2000, Evelyn Tes counsel filed
not only a motion for reconsideration denying
our previous order denying her motion for
release from detention but also a petition
for Habeas Corpus in the same cases;
3. In the exercise of sound discretion and after
hearing the comment of the public prosecutor,
we issued the questioned Order, which is selfexplanatory;

4. We believed then that we had the discretion

to allow her to be released on bail, based on
Sec. 14, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court;
5. We were thinking then that in such a
dilemma, whether or not to release her on bail,
it was a better judgment to release her from
bail on a writ of habeas corpus, because,
Evelyn Te might be right in her contention that
she is considered to have served her sentences
simultaneously. If we denied her petition
forHabeas Corpus, and on appeal, she could
get a favorable decision from the Supreme
Court, surely, she could return and charge us
with a graver offense of ignorance of the law
and abuse of discretion. She could even file
other cases against us under the Revised Penal
Code, such as rendering an unjust order, or
under the Civil Code for moral damages in
millions of pesos;
6. To obviate such a possible move on Tes part,
we opted to allow her release on bail through
the writ ofhabeas corpus proceedings. Anyway,
the Supreme Court has the last say on that
matter;
7. Therefore, we are of the view that the letter
complaint of Mr. Dante Vicente is legally
premature as it concerned cases which are
still sub judice;
8. Besides, we are of the opinion that Mr.
Vicente has no personality as a third party to
charge us with anything as he has not shown
any damage that he could have suffered
because of our Order;
9. We are convinced that Mr. Vicente is trying
to pre-empt our move to charge his radio
station for libel or cite the announcer for
indirect contempt of Court when his radio
station and announcer had been reviling and
attacking us for many days on the air for
having allowed Evelyn Te to be treated and
confined in a hospital upon recommendation of
a government doctor and for having allowed
her release from imprisonment on bail; a
certified Xerox copy of the letter of the
Regional Director of the Department of
Transportation and Communication (National
Telecommunications Commission) dated
August 9, 2000, in reply to our request for
copies of the broadcast tapes, is attached
herewith as ANNEX "1";
10. As to the charge that we are stifling
criticism by the print and broadcast media, we
are of the view that if media has the privilege
to criticize the Courts and the Judges, we have
also the right to charge them for indirect
contempt of Court and libel, because there are
laws regarding this matter. The article of a
certain Joseph Jubelag is now a subject of an
indirect contempt charge before us, which we
are about to resolve;
11. Regarding our Order in Criminal Case No.
14072 in the case of People vs. Jhoyche
Gersonin-Palma, RTC Br. 36, it was done with
sound discretion on our part because it was
already 6:30 in the evening and the offices
were closed and being a Friday, the accused
would be detained for two days and three
nights, unless we accepted and approved the
bail bond. Besides, the law requires judges to
approve bail even during the holidays.
Immediately, on Monday, the money in the
amount of P6,000.00 was deposited with the
Clerk of Court as shown in the official receipt
(ANNEX 6 of letter complaint);
12. Regarding our competence, honesty and
integrity, modesty aside, as a judge for the last
thirteen years in General Santos City, the
records of the Municipal Trial Court and RTC,
Branches 23 and 22 (being a pairing judge of
the latter court since October last year) show

that most of our decisions appealed to the

Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court have
been sustained or affirmed;
13. As to our reputation in the community, let
other members of the media and a member of
the Philippine Bar speak about it. We are
enclosing herewith a Xerox copy of a news
clipping of Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 8, 2000
issue (attached herewith as ANNEX 2), about
how we tried and decided the celebrated case
ofPeople vs. Castracion, et. al. when the
Supreme Court assigned us to hear the
evidence of the defense and decide the case.
We did our work in that case as best we could
as we have done in all cases being tried and
decided by us, mindful of our duty to do our
work with faithful diligence, honesty, and
integrity. We do not expect praises from others
as we do not also wish to be criticized or
attacked by Radio Bombo station in General
Santos City especially by its manager, Mr.
Dante Vicente, without basis or competent
proof and evidence. Atty. Rogelio Garcia, who
vouched for our honesty, competence and
integrity is a former assemblyman of South
Cotabato and General Santos City, and an exAssistant Minister of Labor. He has known us in
the community for almost twenty five years;
14. Complainant Dante Vicente is just a
newcomer to General Santos and he and his
radio station have a bad and notorious
reputation of attacking the character and good
name of some people here as shown by cases
for libel filed in our courts.3
In its Report dated March 11, 2002, the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) confirmed that Criminal
Cases Nos. 9456-9460 were indeed certified by
respondent to this Court.4 However, this Court in its
Resolution of February 19, 2001 in G.R. Nos. 145715-18,
resolved to return the records of the consolidated cases
to the RTC of General Santos City, Branch 23, and to
order the said court to give due course to Evelyn Tes
notice of appeal from the Order denying her petition for
habeas corpus and from the Order requiring her to post
bail in the amount of one million pesos for her release
from detention. This Court made the following
pronouncements:
Rule 102, 14 provides:
When person lawfully imprisoned recommitted, and
when let to bail. If it appears that the prisoner was
lawfully committed, and is plainly and specifically
charged in the warrant of commitment with an offense
punishable by death, he shall not be released,
discharged, or bailed. If he is lawfully imprisoned or
restrained on a charge of having committed an offense
not so punishable, he may be recommitted to
imprisonment or admitted to bail in the discretion of the
court or judge. If he be admitted to bail, he shall
forthwith file a bond in such sum as the court or judge
deems reasonable, considering the circumstances of the
prisoner and the nature of the offense charged,
conditioned for his appearance before the court where
the offense is properly cognizable to abide its order or
judgment; and the court or judge shall certify the
proceedings, together with the bond, forthwith to the
proper court. If such bond is not so filed, the prisoner
shall be recommitted to confinement.
The foregoing provision, however, applies to cases
where the applicant for the writ of habeas corpus is
restrained by virtue of a criminal charge against him,
not where, as here, he is serving sentence by reason of
a final judgment. Indeed, Rule 102, 4 disallows
issuance of the writ where the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment.
The certification of a case under Rule 102, 14,
moreover, refers to cases where the habeas
corpus court finds that the applicant is charged with the
noncapital offense in another court. Thus, the
certification of this case to this Court is clearly
erroneous.5

On the basis of the above-quoted Resolution and the

provisions of Section 24, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
the OCA, in its Report in the present case, found
respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law
and recommended that he be fined in the amount
of P20,000.00.6
The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA except for
the recommended penalty.
Section 24, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court is plain and
clear in prohibiting the grant of bail after conviction by
final judgment and after the convict has started to serve
sentence. It provides:
SEC. 24. No bail after final judgment; exception. An
accused shall not be allowed bail after the
judgment has become final, unless he has applied
for probation before commencing to serve
sentence, the penalty and the offense being
within the purview of the Probation Law. In case
the accused has applied for probation, he may be
allowed temporary liberty under his bail, but if no bail
was filed or the accused is incapable of filing one, the
court may allow his release on recognizance to the
custody of a responsible member of the community. In
no case shall bail be allowed after the accused
has commenced to serve sentence.(Emphasis
supplied)
The only exception to the above-cited provision of the
Rules of Court is when the convict has applied for
probation before he commences to serve sentence,
provided the penalty and the offense are within the
purview of the Probation Law.
In the case of Evelyn Te, the judgment finding her guilty
of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 on four counts and imposing
upon her the penalty of imprisonment for two months
on each count has already become final and executory.
She did not apply for probation. At the time respondent
judge granted her bail she was already serving her
sentence.
From the foregoing, it is evident that Te is not entitled to
bail. Respondent judge contends that under Section 14,
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, he has the discretion to
allow Te to be released on bail. However, the Court
reiterates its pronouncement in its Resolution of
February 19, 2001 in G.R. Nos. 145715-18 that Section
14, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court applies only to cases
where the applicant for the writ of habeas corpus is
restrained by virtue of a criminal charge against him
and not in an instance, as in the case involved in the
present controversy, where the applicant is serving
sentence by reason of a final judgment.
The Court agrees with the observation of the OCA that
respondent judges ignorance or disregard of the
provisions of Section 24, Rule 114 and Section 14, Rule
102 of the Rules of Court is tantamount to gross
ignorance of the law and procedure. A judge is called
upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance
with statutes and procedural rules.7 It is imperative that
he be conversant with basic legal principles and be
aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines. 8 He should
strive for excellence exceeded only by his passion for
truth, to the end that he be the personification of justice
and the Rule of Law.9 When the law is sufficiently basic,
a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything
less than that would be gross ignorance of the law. 10
In the present case, considering that the granting of bail
is common in the litigation of criminal cases before trial
courts, we are not impressed with the explanation of
respondent judge in granting bail to Te. Respondent
judge contends that he was caught in a dilemma
whether or not to grant bail in favor of Te. However, he
thought that it would be better for him to release Te on
bail rather than deny her application; for if such denial is
later found out by the appellate courts to be erroneous,
Te could charge him with gross ignorance of the law and
abuse of discretion, or hold him liable for rendering an
unjust order or for damages. Hence, to obviate such
possible move on Tes part, he simply allowed her to be
released on bail and relieved himself of any burden
brought about by the case of Te by certifying the same

to this Court contending that, "[a]nyway, the Supreme

Court has the last say on (the) matter."
The Court finds respondents reasoning shallow and
unjustified. He cannot simply shirk responsibility by
conveniently passing the buck, so to speak, to this Court
on the pretext that we have the final say on the matter.
This is hardly the kind of trait expected of a judge. Rule
3.02, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides
that in every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to
ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by
partisan interests, public opinion or fear of criticism.
In Dimatulac vs. Villon,11 we held that:
The judge, on the other hand, "should always be imbued
with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the
discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly
administer justice." He must view himself as a priest for
the administration of justice is akin to a religious
crusade. Thus, exerting the same devotion as a priest
"in the performance of the most sacred ceremonies of
religious liturgy," the judge must render service with
impartiality commensurate with public trust and
confidence reposed in him.12
In the present case, respondent judge fell short of the
above-cited ideals expected of a magistrate.
Complainants allegation that no petition for habeas
corpus was filed does not hold water. As borne by the
records, the Certification issued by one Atty. Elmer D.
Lastimosa, Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
General Santos City, shows that Evelyn Tes petition
for habeas corpus was incorporated in the pleadings she
filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 9456-9460, although no
docket fees and other charges were paid.13 There is no
showing that respondent should be held
administratively liable for the non-payment of docket
and other lawful fees. At any rate, the matter may be
considered in the appeal taken by Te, as earlier
adverted to in G.R. Nos. 145715-18.
Complainant further claims that on several occasions,
respondent judge allowed Te to be released and
confined at a local hospital on account of false illnesses.
However, the Court does not find sufficient evidence to
prove this charge. On the contrary, records on hand
show that the confinement of Te in the hospital is
recommended by a panel of government doctors and
that such confinement is made without the objection of
the public prosecutor. 14Hence, the Court finds
respondent judges act of allowing the temporary
confinement of Te in the hospital as justified. The Court
agrees with the observation of the OCA that in the
absence of contradictory evidence, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty should be
upheld in favor of respondent judge.15
The Court likewise finds no sufficient evidence to find
respondent judge guilty of the charge that he uses his
clout and power to stifle criticism and dissent. In the
present case, the Court finds nothing irregular or
arbitrary in his act of requiring a number of journalists
to show cause why they should not be cited for indirect
contempt. Freedom of speech and of expression, as
guaranteed by the Constitution, is not
absolute.16 Freedom of expression needs on occasion to
be adjusted to and accommodated with the
requirements of equally important public interests such
as the maintenance of the integrity of courts and orderly
functioning of the administration of justice.17 In the
instant case, the Court finds nothing whimsical or
despotic in respondent judges act of issuing the subject
show-cause order. Instead, respondent is merely
exercising his right to protect his honor and, more
importantly, the integrity of the court which he
represents.
As to the issue that respondent judge allowed the
release of an accused in Criminal Case No. 14072,
entitledPeople vs. Jhoyce Gersonin-Palma, without the
required bail bond being posted, it is not within the
jurisdiction of this Court to resolve the same on the
basis of the OCA Report as it is already the subject of a
separate administrative case against respondent.18

the proper imposable penalty. Section 8(9), Rule 140 of

the Rules of Court, as amended, classifies gross
ignorance of the law or procedure as a serious charge.
Under Section 11(A) of the same Rule, the imposable
penalties, in case the respondent is found culpable of a
serious charge, range from a fine of not less
than P20,000.00 but not more than P40,000.00 to
dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all or part of
the benefits as the Court may determine, except
accrued leaves, and disqualification from reinstatement
or appointment to any public office including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
However, on February 24, 2002, respondent retired
upon reaching the compulsory retirement age of
70.19Considering that respondent can no longer be
dismissed or suspended, the Court is left with no
recourse but to impose the penalty of fine.
Further, it is noted that on July 8, 2002, the Third
Division of this Court, in Administrative Matter
No.10874-Ret., concerning the compulsory retirement of
respondent, resolved to release his retirement benefits
but set asideP100,000.00 thereof in view of several
administrative cases still pending against him.20
In the administrative complaints filed against
respondent, two cases have, so far, resulted in his being
fined. InChan vs. Majaducon,21 respondent was found
guilty of violating among others, Rules 1.01 and 2.01
and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial conduct and was
meted the penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000.00.
In the more recent case of Alconera vs.
Majaducon,22 respondent was found guilty of gross
ignorance of procedure and was finedP40,000.00. In
view of the foregoing, it is proper to impose the
maximum fine of P40,000.00 to be deducted from
the P100,000.00 set aside from respondents retirement
benefits in A.M. No. 10874-Ret.
WHEREFORE, respondent judge is found GUILTY of
gross ignorance of the law or procedure. He is ordered
to pay a FINE of P40,000.00 to be deducted from
the P100,000.00 set aside from his retirement benefits
in A.M. No. 10874-Ret.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 138859-60

February 22, 2001

ALVAREZ ARO YUSOP, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division),
respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The right of a person to preliminary investigation is
recognized by the law and is governed by the Rules of
Court. However, the failure to accord this right does
not ipso facto result in the dismissal of the information;
the case is merely suspended, and the prosecutor
directed to conduct the proper investigation.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, assailing two Orders1 of the
Sandiganbayan,2 both dated February 15, 1999. The
first Order rejected the attempt of petitioner to stop his
arraignment in Criminal Case Nos. 24524-25, on the
ground that he had been denied the right to a
preliminary investigation. In the assailed second Order,
the Sandiganbayan directed that a plea of not guilty be
entered for all the accused, including herein petitioner.
The Facts

Having found respondent guilty of gross ignorance of

the law, as discussed earlier, the Court now determines

Acting on an Affidavit-Complaint3 filed by a certain

Erlinda Fadri, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
issued an Order4 dated September 19, 1995, naming the
following as respondents: benjamin Arao, Fredireck
Winters, Pelaez Pantaran, Eduardo Dablo, Efren Sissay
and the city jail warden of Pagadian City. The Order also
reqquired respondents, within ten days from receipt
thereof, to submit their counter-affidavits and other
pieces of controverting evidence.
The Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao issued a
Resolution dated January 15, 1998,5 recommending the
prosecution of "the aforenamed respondents" for
violation of Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code and
Section 3-a in relation to Section 3-e of Republic Act No.
3019 as amended. Significantly, the name of Petitioner
Alvarez A. Yusop was included as one of the persons to
be prosecuted, although he was not one of the original
respondents mentioned in the Order of September 19,
1995. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the
recommendation.1wphi1.nt
Accordingly, two Informations were filed with the
Sandiganbayan. They were docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 24524 (violation of Section 3-a of RA 3019) and
24525 (unlawful arrect under Article 269 of the Revised
Penal Code).
On April 16, 1998, an Order of Arrest was issued by the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24524. Petitioner,
however, posted a bail bond before the Regional Trial
Court of Dipolos City on May 20 of the same year. On
the same day, he filed a "Motion To Remand Case To The
Ombudsman - Mindanao For Preliminary Investigation."
In Resolution dated June 8, 1998, the Sandiganbayan
denied the Motion of petitioner for his alleged failure to
submit himself to the jurisdiction of the anti-graft court.
On August 8, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss,
grounded again on the lack of preliminary investigation.
In an Order dated September 22, 1998, the
Sandiganbayan resolved not to take action on the
Motion, because petitioner had not yet submitted
himself to its jurisdiction insofar as Criminal Case No.
24525 was concerned.
On the scheduled arraignment on February 15, 1999,
petitioner reiterated his claim that he had not been
accorded preliminary investigation. In its two assailed
Orders, the Sandigabayan rejected his claim and
proceeded with the arraignment.
Hence, this recourse.6
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandibayan rejected petitioner's plea for
preliminary investigation in this wise:
"This morning, the accused herein appeared for
arraignment duly represented by their counsel.
Before proceeding, Atty. Omar A. Rivera
appearing in behalf of accused Yusop informed
this court of his reservations about proceeding
with the arraignment this morning, primarily on
the ground that accused Yusop did not undergo
preliminary furnished any notice nor was he
informed of the proceedings before the
Ombudsman with respect to these cases. It
would appear that one of the reasons [therefor]
is that the accused despite notice of the
existence of the accusation against him in
Criminal Case No. 24525, had not given any
timely notice nor any statement of any alleged
inadequacy of the proceeding regarding the
filing of the Information herein; thus, the Court
is not persuaded that the claim of the accused
Yusop with regard to the inadequacy of the
proceedings as against him could still be validly
entertained at this time. This is more
particularly significant under Section 27 of
Republic Act 6770 and xxx Criminal Cases
24524 and 24525 refer to the same incident
although the prosecution, for its part, has filed
Infomations under different statutes covering
the same incident. Thus, the claim of accused

Yusop that he was not notified with respect to

one of the cases on an identical set of facts
herein is not [of] particular significance since
this would the be indulging in a superfluity.
xxx

xxx

xxx

"Thus, in view of all the following, the Court will

now proceed to the arraignment of the accused
herein."
The Issue
Although the parties did not specify the issue in this
case, it is clear from their submissions that they are
asking this Court to resolve this question: Whether the
Sanduganbayan, despite being informed of the lack of
preliminary investigation with respect to petitioner, In
Criminal Case No. 24524, committed grave abuse of
discretion in proceeding with his arraignment.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious in part. While petitioner is
entitled to preliminary investigation, the case against
him should not be dismissed.
Main Issue:
Preliminary Investigation
Preliminary investigation is "an inquiry or proceeding to
determine whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial." 7 The Court
explained that the rationable of preliminary
investigation is to "protect the accused from the
inconvenience, expense and burden of defending
himself in a formal trial unless the reasonable
probability of his guilt shall have been first ascertained
in a fairly summary proceeding by a competent officer." 8
The Rules of Court requires such investigation before an
information for an offense punishable by at least four
years, two months and one day may be filed in
court.9 The old Rules, on the other hand, mandates
preliminary investigation of an offense cognizable by
the regional trial court.10
Petitioner is charged in Criminal Case No. 24254 with
violation of Section 3-a of RA of 3019. Such offense is
punishable with, among other penalties, imprisonment
of six years and one month to fifteen years. 11 Under the
aforecited Rules, whether in the old or the revised
version, he is entitled to a preliminary investigation.
It is undisputed, however, that before the Information
against petitioner was filed, no preliminary invertigation
had been conducted. In fact, the Office of the
Ombudsman admitted that "petitioner was denied of his
right to preliminary investigation." 12
We find no basis for the Sandiganbayan's ruling that
petitioner "had not given timely notice nor any
statement of the alleged inadequacy of the proceeding
regarding the filing of the Information."
First, there was no showing that petitioner was notified
of the charges filed by Erlinda Fadri. As earlier noted, he
had not been named a s arepondent in the September
19, 1995 Order of the Office of the Ombudsman in
Mindanao. His name did not even appear in the caption
of its January 15, 1998 Resolution,13 which
recommended the filing of charges against the accused.
Indeed, in his Compliance with the August 26, 1998
Sandiganbayan Resolution,14 Special Prosecution Officer
Diosdado V. Calonge manifested that petitioner "was not
notified of the proceedings of the preliminary
investigation and was accordingly not given the
opportunity to be heard thereon."15
After learning of the filing of the Information against him
when he was served a Warrant of Arrest, petitioner did

not dally. He immediately informed the Sandiganbayan

that no preliminary investigation had been conducted in
regard to him. Several months later, moments before
his arraignment, he reiterated his prayer that the
preliminary investigation be conducted. In this light, the
Sandiganbayan erred in saying that he had not given
the court timely notice of this deficiency.

undergoing trial, because "[t]o reach any other

conclusion here, that is, to hold that petitioner's rights
to a preliminary investigation and to bail were
effectively obliterated to benefit from its own wrong or
culpable ommission and effectively to dilute important
rights of accused persons well-nigh to the vanishing
point."24

Even assuming that prior to the filing of the Information

petitioner had known that the proceedings and the
investigation against his co-accused were pending, he
cannot be expected to know of the investigator's
subsequent act of charging him. Precisely, he had not
been previously included therein and, consequently, he
had not been notified thereof.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is partially GRANTED. The

assailed Orders are REVERSED, and the Office of the
Ombudsman is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a
preliminary investigation of the charge of violation of
Section 3-a of RA 3019 against Petitioner Alvarez Aro
Yusop. The trial on the merits of Criminal Case No.
24524 shall be SUSPENDED in regard to petitioner until
the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. No
pronouncement as to costs.

In Go v. Court of Appeals,16 this Court held that "the

right to preliminary investigation is waived when the
accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of
entering a plea at arraignment." Conversely, if the
accused does invoke it before arraignment, as the
petitioner did in this case, the right is not waived.
Neither did the filing of a bail bond constitute a waiver
of petitioner's right to preliminary investigation. Under
Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, "[a]n application for or admission to bai;
shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity
of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued
therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning
the absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge
against him, provided that he raises them before
entering his plea. xxx."
We stress that the right to preliminary investigation is
substantive, not merely formal or technical. To deny it to
petitioner would deprive him of the full measure of his
right to due process.17 Hence, preliminary investigation
with regard to him must be conducted.
We desagree with the Sandiganbayan's reliance on
Section 27 of Republic Act 6770.18 This provision cannot
justify the evasion of the requirement set forth in the
Rules of Court for conducting preliminary investigation.
The law does not sanction such interpretation, for it
deals merely with the finality of orders, directives and
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman -- not the
deprivation of the substantive right to a preliminary
investigation. Moreover, petitioner cannot be bound by
the Ombudsman's January 15, 1998 Resolution, which
recommended the filing of charges. He was not a party
to the case and was not accorded any right to present
evidence on his behalf.
In any event, even the Ombudsman agrees that
petitioner was deprived of this right and believes that
the baisc rudiments of due process are complied
with."19 For its part, the Sandiganbayan opted to remain
silent when asked by this Court to comment on the
Petition.
Dismissal of the Charges
Not Justified
Petitioner also prays that the cases against him be
dismissed for lack of preliminary investigation. 20 We
disagree. In the first place, nowhere in the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, or even the old Rules, is there
any mention that this lack is a ground for a motion to
quash.21 Furthermore, it has been held that
responsibility for the "absence of preliminary
investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court
but merely to the regularity of the proceedings."22 We
reiterate the following ruling of the Court in People v.
Gomez:
"If there were no preliminary investigations and
the defendants, before entering their plea,
invite the attention of the court of their
absence, the court, instead of dismissing the
information, should conduct such investigation,
order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the
case to the inferior court so the the preliminary
investigation may be conducted." 23
In sum, Criminal Case No. 24524 must be suspended
with respect to petitioner even if the case is already

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 150185

May 27, 2004

TERESITA TANGHAL OKABE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PEDRO DE LEON GUTIERREZ, in his capacity
as Presiding Judge of RTC, Pasay City, Branch 119;
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; and CECILIA
MARUYAMA, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari, under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, that part of
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
60732 dismissing her petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, for the
nullification of the August 25 and 28, 2000 Orders of the
respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 00-0749.
The Antecedents
Cecilia Maruyama executed a fifteen-page affidavitcomplaint2 and filed the same with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Pasay City, on December 29, 1999,
charging Lorna Tanghal and petitioner Teresita Tanghal
Okabe, a.k.a. Shiela Okabe, with estafa. In her affidavit,
Maruyama alleged, inter alia, that on December 11,
1998, she entrusted Y11,410,000 with the peso
equivalent of P3,993,500 to the petitioner, who was
engaged in the business of "door-to-door delivery" from
Japan to the Philippines. It was alleged that the
petitioner failed to deliver the money as agreed upon,
and, at first, denied receiving the said amount but later
returned only US$1,000 through Lorna Tanghal.
During the preliminary investigation, the complainant,
respondent Maruyama, submitted the affidavit of her
witnesses, namely, Hermogena Santiago, Wilma Setsu
and Marilette G. Izumiya and other documentary
evidence. In her affidavit, Setsu alleged that the money
which was entrusted to the petitioner for delivery to the
Philippines belonged to her and her sister Annie
Hashimoto, and their mother Hermogena SanchezQuicho, who joined respondent Maruyama in her
complaint against petitioner Okabe and Tanghal.
Respondent Maruyama, likewise, submitted a reply 3 to
the petitioners counter-affidavit. After the requisite
preliminary investigation, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor
Joselito J. Vibandor came out with a resolution dated
March 30, 2000, finding probable cause
forestafa against the petitioner.4 Attached to the
resolution, which was submitted to the city prosecutor
for approval, was the Information5 against the petitioner
and Maruyamas affidavit-complaint. The city prosecutor
approved the resolution and the Information dated
March 30, 2000 attached thereto.6

On May 15, 2000, an Information against the petitioner

was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 00-0749. The case was
raffled to Branch 119 of the court presided by Judge
Pedro de Leon Gutierrez. 7 The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:
That on or about December 12, 1998 in Pasay
City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused defrauded Cecilia Maruyama
and Conchita Quicho, complainant herein, in
the following manner, to wit: said accused
received in trust from Cecilia Maruyama the
amount of Japanese Yen 1141 (sic) with peso
equivalent to P3,839,465.00 under obligation
to deliver the money to Conchita Quicho at the
NAIA International Airport, Pasay City,
immediately upon accused arrival from Japan,
but herein accused once in possession of the
same, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously misappropriate and convert to
her own personal benefit the said amount, and
despite demands accused failed and refused to
do so, to the damage and prejudice of the
complainants in the aforesaid amount.
Contrary to law.8
Appended to the Information was the affidavit-complaint
of respondent Maruyama and the resolution of
Investigating Prosecutor Vibandor. On May 19, 2000, the
trial court issued a warrant for the arrest of the
petitioner with a recommended bond of P40,000. On
June 15, 2000, the petitioner posted a personal bail
bond in the said amount, duly approved by Judge
Demetrio B. Macapagal, the Presiding Judge of Branch
79 of the RTC of Quezon City, who forthwith recalled the
said warrant. The approved personal bail bond of the
petitioner was transmitted to the RTC of Pasig City on
June 21, 2000. Upon her request, the petitioner was
furnished with a certified copy of the Information, the
resolution and the criminal complaint which formed part
of the records of the said case. The petitioner left the
Philippines for Japan on June 17, 2000 without the trial
courts permission, and returned to the Philippines on
June 28, 2000. She left the Philippines anew on July 1,
2000, and returned on July 12, 2000.
On July 14, 2000, the trial court issued an Order setting
the petitioners arraignment and pre-trial at 2:00 p.m. of
July 16, 2000. On the same day, the private prosecutor
filed an urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of the
hold departure order, alleging as follows:
3. It has come to the knowledge of private
complainant that there is an impending
marriage within the Philippines of either the
son or daughter of the above-named accused
and that the above-named accusedwho has
businesses in Japan, and is presently in Japan
will soon exit Japan and enter the Philippines to
precisely attend said wedding;
4. Given [a] the bail was fixed at
merely P40,000.00 and [b] the considerable
financial capability of the accused, it is a
foregone conclusion that the above-named
accused will, upon arrest, readily and
immediately post bond, and leave for Japan
thereby frustrating and rendering inutile the
administration of criminal justice in our country.
The speed with which accused Teresita Sheila
Tanghal Okabe can post bond and leave for
Japaneffectively evading arraignment and
pleathus necessitates the immediate
issuance of a Hold Departure Order even
before her arrival here in the Philippines;9
The trial court issued an order on the same day,
granting the motion of the private prosecutor for the
issuance of a hold departure order and ordering the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) to
hold and prevent any attempt on the part of the
petitioner to depart from the Philippines.10 For her part,
the petitioner filed on July 17, 2000 a verified motion for
judicial determination of probable cause and to defer
proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only

documents appended to the Information submitted by

the investigating prosecutor were respondent
Maruyamas affidavit-complaint for estafa and the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor; the affidavits
of the witnesses of the complainant, the respondents
counter-affidavit and the other evidence adduced by the
parties were not attached thereto. The petitioner further
alleged that the documents submitted by the
investigating prosecutor were not enough on which the
trial court could base a finding of probable cause
for estafaagainst her. She further averred that
conformably to the rulings of this Court in Lim v.
Felix11 and Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,12 it behooved
the investigating prosecutor to submit the following to
the trial court to enable it to determine the presence or
absence of probable cause: (a) copies of the affidavits of
the witnesses of the complainant; (b) the counteraffidavit of Okabe and those of her witnesses; (c) the
transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the
preliminary investigation; and, (d) other documents
presented during the said investigation.
On July 19, 2000, the petitioner filed a Very Urgent
Motion To Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order dated July 17,
2000 and/or allow her to regularly travel to Japan
alleging, thus:
3. Accused is (sic) widow and the legitimate
mother of three (3) children, two (2) of whom
are still minors, namely:
3.1. Okabe, Jeffrey-18 years old born
on 13 August 1981.
3.2. Okabe, Masatoshi-14 years old
and born on 16 October 1985, 3rd
year High School student at Hoshikuki,
Chiba City, Matsugaoka, High School,
residing at Chiba City, Chuo-Ku,
Yahagi-cho, 205, Telephone No. 043224-5804.
3.3. Okabe, Tomoki-13 years old and
born on 13 March 1986, 2nd year High
School student at Hoshikuki, Chiba
City, Matsugaoka, High School,
residing at Chiba City, Chuo-Ku,
Yahagi-cho, 205, Telephone No. 043224-5804.
3.4. The accused has to attend the
Parents Teachers Association (PTA) at
the Hoshikuki High School where her
two (2) minor sons aforesaid are
presently enrolled and studying
because Okabe, Masatoshis
graduation will take place on 26 July
2000.
3.5. The two (2) minor children of the
accused absolutely depend their
support (basic necessities) for foods,
clothings, medicines, rentals,
schooling and all other expenses for
their survival to their legitimate
mother who is the accused herein.
3.6. The issuance of the hold
departure order (HDO) will impair the
inherent custodial rights of the
accused as the legitimate mother over
these two (2) minor children which is
repugnant to law.
3.7. The issuance of the hold
departure order (HDO) will unduly
restrict the accused to her custodial
rights and visitation over her aforesaid
minor children who are permanently
living in Japan.
3.8. The issuance of the hold
departure order (HDO) will unduly
deprived (sic) these minor children to
their right to obtain education and
survival.

4. Accuseds only source of income and

livelihood is door-to-door delivery from Japan to
the Philippines and vice versa which has been
taking place for a very long period of time and
in the process she has been constantly
departing from the Philippines on a weekly
basis and arriving in Japan on the same
frequency, as evidenced by xerox copies of the
pages of her Philippine Passports which are
hereto attached as Annexes "A," "A-1," "A-2" up
to "A-30," respectively. To deprive her of this
only source of her livelihood to which the
aforesaid two (2) minor children are deriving
their very survival in a foreign land will (sic)
tantamount to oppression rather than
prosecution and depriving the said minor sons
of their right to live even before trial on the
merits of this case that will (sic) tantamount to
the destruction of the future of these minor
children.13
The private prosecutor opposed the petitioners motions
during the hearing on July 21, 2000 which was also the
date set for her arraignment. The hearing of the motions
as well as the arraignment was reset to 2:00 p.m. of July
26, 2000. On the said date, the petitioner filed a
manifestation objecting to her arraignment prior to the
resolution of her pending motions. She alleged that her
arraignment for the crime charged should not be made
a condition for the granting of her motion to recall the
hold departure order issued against her. The
arraignment of the petitioner was again reset to 2:00
p.m. of August 28, 2000, pending the resolution of her
two motions. On August 25, 2000, the petitioner filed a
motion for the postponement of her arraignment
alleging that, in case the trial court ruled adversely
thereon, she would refuse to enter a plea and seek relief
from the appellate court. The court denied the
petitioners motions on the following grounds:
(a) Based on its personal examination and
consideration of the Information, the affidavitcomplaint of respondent Maruyama and the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor duly
approved by the city prosecutor, the court
found probable cause for the petitioners
arrest. Since the petitioners motion for a
determination of probable cause was made
after the court had already found probable
cause and issued a warrant for the petitioners
arrest, and after the latter filed a personal bail
bond for her provisional liberty, such motion
was a mere surplusage;
(b) When the petitioner posted a personal bail
bond for her provisional liberty, she thereby
waived her right to question the courts finding
of the existence of probable cause for her
arrest and submitted herself to the jurisdiction
of the court, more so when she filed the motion
for the lifting of the hold departure order the
court issued, and the motion to defer the
proceedings and her arraignment; and
(c) The hold departure order issued by the trial
court was in accord with Supreme Court
Circular No. 39-97 dated June 19, 1997, as well
as the ruling of this Court in Manotoc, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals.14
When the case was called for the petitioners
arraignment at 2:00 p.m., on August 28, 2000, she
refused to plead.15 Her counsel advised her, in open
court, not to enter a plea and, with leave of court, left
the courtroom. The court then entered a not guilty plea
for the petitioner.16 It also issued an order, on the said
date, setting the pre-trial and initial presentation of the
evidence of the prosecution at 8:30 a.m. of September
20, 2000.17
The petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
with a plea for a writ of preliminary injunction. The case
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60732. The petitioner
ascribed the following errors to the trial court:
I

RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT

ISSUED WARRANT OF ARREST DESPITE OF (SIC)
LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE
II
RESPONDENT COURT HAS VIOLATED THE
RIGHT OF THE PETITIONER TO DUE PROCESS
III
RESPONDENT COURT HAS ALREADY PREJUDGED THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER
FOR ESTAFA
IV
RESPONDENT COURT HAS EXHIBITED ITS
APPARENT PARTIALITY TOWARDS THE
PROSECUTION AND AGAINST THE PETITIONER
V
RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
DENIES (SIC) THE MOTION FOR JUDICIAL
DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE
PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF ROBERTS, JR.
VI
RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
DENIES (SIC) THE LIFTING/RECALL OF THE HDO
AND/OR ALLOWING THE PETITIONER TO TRAVEL
TO JAPAN REGULARLY FOR HUMANITARIAN
CONSIDERATION
VII
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED THE
QUESTIONED ORDERS18
On January 31, 2001, the CA rendered a
Decision19 partially granting the petition in that the
assailed order of the trial court denying the petitioners
motion to lift/recall the hold departure order was set
aside. However, the petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the trial courts decision was denied
and her petition for the nullification of the August 25,
2000 Order of the respondent judge was dismissed. The
CA ruled that by posting bail and praying for reliefs from
the trial court, the petitioner waived her right to assail
the respondent judges finding of the existence of
probable cause. The appellate court cited the ruling of
this Court in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan.20 Thus,
the appellate court affirmed the assailed order of the
RTC, based on the respondent judges personal
examination of respondent Maruyamas affidavitcomplaint, the resolution of the investigating prosecutor
and the Information approved by the city prosecutor, a
finding of probable cause was in order. However, the
appellate court allowed the petitioner to travel to Japan
under the following conditions:
(1) That petitioner post a bond double the
amount of her alleged monetary liability under
the Information filed against her, as
recommended by the Office of the Solicitor
General;
(2) That petitioner inform respondent Court of
each and all of her travel itinerary prior to
leaving the country;
(3) That petitioner make periodic reports with
respondent Court;
(4) That petitioner furnish respondent Court
with all the addresses of her possible place of
residence, both here and in Japan; and

(5) Such other reasonable conditions which

respondent Court may deem appropriate under
the circumstances.21
The appellate court did not resolve the issue of whether
the trial court had prejudged the case and was partial to
the prosecution. The decretal portion of the decision of
the CA reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant special civil action for certiorari is
hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED insofar as the
denial of petitioners Motion to Lift/Recall Hold
Departure Order dated 14 July, 2000 and/or
Allow the accused to Regularly Travel to Japan
is concerned. In all other respect, the same is
hereby DENIED.

(g) Petitioner further prays for such

other reliefs just and equitable under
the premises.24
The petitioner asserts that the CA committed the
following reversible errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT COMPLETELY
DISREGARDED THE APPLICATION OF SECTION
26, RULE 114 OF THE REVISED RULES ON
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE WHICH TOOK EFFECT
ON 01 DECEMBER 2000 WHICH IS FAVORABLE
TO THE PETITIONER/ACCUSED.
II

SO ORDERED.22
On March 6, 2001, the petitioner filed a motion for a
partial reconsideration of the decision of the CA
contending that the appellate court erred in applying
the ruling of this court in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals23 instead of Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure. The petitioner posited that
the said rule, which took effect on December 1, 2000,
before the court rendered its decision, had superseded
the ruling of this Court in the Cojuangco case. However,
the appellate court held that Section 26, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure cannot be applied
retroactively, because the petitioner had posted bail on
June 15, 2000 before the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure took effect.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari for
the reversal of the decision and resolution of the CA and
praying that after due proceedings, judgment be
rendered in her favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this
Honorable Supreme Court that after due
proceedings judgment be rendered in favor of
the petitioner and against the respondents as
follows:
(a) GIVING DUE COURSE to the instant
petition;
(b) ORDERING the REVERSAL and
PARTIALLY SETTING ASIDE of the
Decision promulgated on 31 January
2001 (Annex "A" hereof) of the
Honorable Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 60732 as well as its Resolution
promulgated on 27 September 2001
(Annex "B" hereof);
(c) ORDERING the DISMISSAL of Crim.
Case No. 00-0749 for lack of probable
cause;
(d) DECLARING the entire proceedings
in Crim. Case No. 00-0749 as null and
void;
(e) ORDERING the private respondents
to pay the petitioners the following
amount:
(i) at least P1,000,000.00 as
moral damages;
(ii) at least P1,000,000.00 as
exemplary damages;
(iii) at least P500,000.00 as
attorneys fees and for other
expenses of litigation.
(f) ORDERING the private respondent
to pay the costs of this suit.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A

REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT
"WHATEVER INFIRMITY THERE WAS IN THE
ISSUANCE OF THE WARRANT OF ARREST, THE
SAME WAS CURED WHEN PETITIONER
VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE RESPONDENT
COURTS JURISDICTION WHEN SHE POSTED
BAIL AND FILED MOTIONS SEEKING
AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF SUCH AS MOTION TO
LIFT/RECALL HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER AND TO
ALLOW PETITIONER TO TRAVEL REGULARLY TO
JAPAN (Last paragraph, Page 9 DECISION dated
31 January 2001)."
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RELIED UPON
THE RULING IN THE CASE OF COJUANGCO, JR.
VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, [300 SCRA 367 (1998)]
WHEN IN FACT SAID RULING IS NOW OBSOLETE
AND NO LONGER APPLICABLE.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT
RESPONDENT COURT COMPLIED WITH THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ON THE
ISSUANCE OF WARRANT OF ARREST WITHOUT
PROBABLE CAUSE, WHEN THE RESPONDENT
COURT MERELY RELIED ON [THE] (i)
COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT OF CECILIA MARUYAMA;
(ii) RESOLUTION OF THE INVESTIGATING
PROSECUTOR; AND (iii) CRIMINAL
INFORMATION.
V
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE
ON THE PARTIALITY OF THE RESPONDENT
JUDGE IN HANDLING THE CASE BELOW WHICH
IS VIOLATIVE OF THE PETITIONERS RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS.
VI
THE FILING OF CRIM. CASE NO. 4297 (MTC,
ANGAT, BULACAN) FOR ESTAFA ENTITLED
"PEOPLE VS. SHEILA OKABE"; CIVIL CASE NO.
331-M-98 (RTC, MALOLOS, BULACAN) FOR SUM
OF MONEY WITH PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
ENTITLED "CONCHITA SANCHEZ-QUICHO VS.
SHEILA TERESITA TANGHAL OKABE"; AND CRIM.
CASE NO. 00-07-19 (RTC, PASAY CITY, BRANCH
119) ENTITLED "PEOPLE VS. TERESITA
TANGHAL OKABE" CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF
THE RULE ON NON-FORUM SHOPPING.25
By way of comment, the Office of the Solicitor General
refuted the petitioners assigned errors, contending as
follows:
I

The Court of Appeals did not commit a

reversible error in not applying Section 26, Rule
114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
II
The Court of Appeals did not commit a
reversible error in ruling that the infirmity, if
any, in the issuance by the respondent Judge of
the warrant of arrest against petitioner was
cured when petitioner voluntarily submitted to
the trial courts jurisdiction when she posted
bail and filed motions seeking for affirmative
reliefs from the trial court, such as the motion
to lift/recall Hold Departure Order (HDO) and to
allow petitioner to travel regularly to Japan.
III
The Court of Appeals did not commit a
reversible error in applying the ruling in
the Cojuangco case.
IV
The Court of Appeals did not commit a
reversible error in finding that respondent
Judge complied with the constitutional
requirements on the issuance of a warrant of
arrest.
V
The Court of Appeals did not commit a
reversible error when it did not rule on the
partiality of the respondent Judge in handling
Criminal Case No. 00-0749.
VI
The Honorable Court of Appeals did not commit
a reversible error when it did not rule on
petitioners claim of forum shopping.26
The Court shall resolve the assigned errors
simultaneously as they are interrelated.
The petitioner asserts that the respondent judge could
not have determined the existence of probable cause
for her arrest solely on the resolution of the
investigating prosecutor and the undated affidavitcomplaint of respondent Maruyama. She posits that the
respondent judge should have ordered the investigating
prosecutor to submit the affidavits of the witnesses of
respondent Maruyama and the latters documentary
evidence, as well as the counter-affidavit of the
petitioner and the transcripts of the stenographic notes,
if any, taken during the preliminary investigation. The
petitioner adds that the respondent judge should have
personally reviewed the said documents, conformably to
the rulings of this Court in Lim v. Felix,27 Roberts, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals28 and Ho v. People,29 before
determining the presence or absence of probable cause.
She posits that the respondent judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in denying her motion for a determination of
probable cause, and the alternative motion for a
dismissal of the case against her for lack of probable
cause.
The petitioner further asserts that the appellate court
erred in affirming the ruling of the respondent judge
that, by posting a personal bail bond for her provisional
liability and by filing several motions for relief, she
thereby voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction
of the trial court and waived her right to assail the
infirmities that infected the trial courts issuance of the
warrant for her arrest. She avers that the appellate
courts reliance on the ruling of this Court in Cojuangco,
Jr. v. Sandiganbayan30 is misplaced, and submits that the
appellate court should have applied Section 26, Rule
114 of the Revised Rules of Court retroactively, as it
rendered the ruling of this Court in the Cojuangco,
Jr. case obsolete.

The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand,

asserts that the respondent judge did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion when he found probable cause
against the petitioner for estafa, and thereafter issued a
warrant for her arrest. It argues that the respondent
judge personally determined the existence of probable
cause independently of the certification of the
investigating prosecutor, and only after examining the
Information, the resolution of the investigating
prosecutor, as well as the affidavit-complaint of the
private complainant. It asserts that such documents are
sufficient on which to anchor a finding of probable
cause. It insists that the appellate court correctly
applied the ruling of this Court in the Cojuangco, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals case, and that the respondent judge
complied with both the requirements of the constitution
and those set forth in the Rules of Court before issuing
the said warrant.31
We agree with the contention of the petitioner that the
appellate court erred in not applying Section 26, Rule
114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, viz:
SEC. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal
arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary
investigation. An application for or admission
to bail shall not bar the accused from
challenging the validity of his arrest or the
legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from
assailing the regularity or questioning the
absence of a preliminary investigation of the
charge against him, provided that he raises
them before entering his plea. The court shall
resolve the matter as early as practicable but
not later than the start of the trial of the case.
It bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is a new one,
intended to modify previous rulings of this Court that an
application for bail or the admission to bail by the
accused shall be considered as a waiver of his right to
assail the warrant issued for his arrest on the legalities
or irregularities thereon.32 The new rule has reverted to
the ruling of this Court in People v. Red.33 The new rule
is curative in nature because precisely, it was designed
to supply defects and curb evils in procedural rules.
Hence, the rules governing curative statutes are
applicable. Curative statutes are by their essence
retroactive in application.34Besides, procedural rules as
a general rule operate retroactively, even without
express provisions to that effect, to cases pending at
the time of their effectivity, in other words to actions yet
undetermined at the time of their effectivity. 35 Before
the appellate court rendered its decision on January 31,
2001, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure was
already in effect. It behooved the appellate court to
have applied the same in resolving the petitioners
petition for certiorari and her motion for partial
reconsideration.
Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner
after posting her personal bail bond, it cannot be argued
that she waived her right to question the finding of
probable cause and to assail the warrant of arrest issued
against her by the respondent judge. There must be
clear and convincing proof that the petitioner had an
actual intention to relinquish her right to question the
existence of probable cause.36 When the only proof of
intention rests on what a party does, his act should be
so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an
intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the
particular right that no other explanation of his conduct
is possible.37 In this case, the records show that a
warrant was issued by the respondent judge in Pasay
City for the arrest of the petitioner, a resident of
Guiguinto, Bulacan. When the petitioner learned of the
issuance of the said warrant, she posted a personal bail
bond to avert her arrest and secure her provisional
liberty. Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal of the RTC of
Quezon City approved the bond and issued an order
recalling the warrant of arrest against the petitioner.
Thus, the posting of a personal bail bond was a matter
of imperative necessity to avert her incarceration; it
should not be deemed as a waiver of her right to assail
her arrest. So this Court ruled in People v. Red:38
The present defendants were arrested
towards the end of January, 1929, on the Island
and Province of Marinduque by order of the

judge of the Court of First Instance of Lucena,

Tayabas, at a time when there were no court
sessions being held in Marinduque. In view of
these circumstances and the number of the
accused, it may properly be held that the
furnishing of the bond was prompted by the
sheer necessity of not remaining in detention,
and in no way implied their waiver of any right,
such as the summary examination of the case
before their detention. That they had no
intention of waiving this right is clear from their
motion of January 23, 1929, the same day on
which they furnished a bond, and the fact that
they renewed this petition on February 23,
1929, praying for the stay of their arrest for
lack of the summary examination; the first
motion being denied by the court on January
24, 1929 (G.R. No. 33708, page 8), and the
second remaining undecided, but with an order
to have it presented in Boac, Marinduque.
Therefore, the defendants herein cannot be
said to have waived the right granted to them
by section 13, General Order No. 58, as
amended by Act No. 3042.39
Moreover, the next day, or on June 16, 2000, the
petitioner, through counsel, received certified true
copies of the Information, the resolution of the
investigating prosecutor, the affidavit-complaint of the
private complainant, respondent Maruyama, and a
certification from the branch clerk of court that only the
Information, resolution and affidavit-complaint formed
part of the entire records of the case. The next day, June
17, 2000, the petitioner, through counsel, filed a verified
motion for judicial determination of probable cause and
to defer the proceedings and her arraignment. All the
foregoing are inconsistent with a waiver of her right to
assail the validity of her arrest and to question the
respondent judges determination of the existence of
probable cause for her arrest.
Neither can the petitioners filing of a motion for the
lifting of the hold departure order and for leave to go to
Japan be considered a waiver of her right to assail the
validity of the arrest warrant issued by the respondent
judge. It bears stressing that when the petitioner filed
the motion to lift the hold departure order issued
against her by the respondent judge, her motion for a
determination of probable cause was still unresolved.
She sought a lifting of the hold departure order on July
14, 2000 and filed a motion for leave to go to Japan, to
give the respondent judge an opportunity to reconsider
the said order, preparatory to assailing the same in the
appellate court in case her motion was denied.
The issue that now comes to fore is whether or not the
respondent judge committed a grave abuse of his
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
issuing his August 25, 2000 Order. By grave abuse of
discretion is meant such patent and gross abuse of
discretion as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reasons of passion or personal hostility. 40 Hence, when
the court has jurisdiction over the case, its questioned
acts, even if its findings are not correct, would at most
constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion
correctible by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. 41
We agree with the petitioner that before the RTC judge
issues a warrant of arrest under Section 6, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court42 in relation to Section 2, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution, the judge must make a personal
determination of the existence or non-existence of
probable cause for the arrest of the accused. The duty
to make such determination is personal and exclusive to
the issuing judge. He cannot abdicate his duty and rely
on the certification of the investigating prosecutor that
he had conducted a preliminary investigation in
accordance with law and the Rules of Court, as
amended, and found probable cause for the filing of the
Information.
Under Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the investigating prosecutor, in conducting a
preliminary investigation of a case cognizable by the
RTC, is tasked to determine whether there is sufficient

ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime

has been committed and the respondent therein is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. A
preliminary investigation is for the purpose of securing
the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public
accusation of a crime, from the trouble, expense and
anxiety of a public trial.43
If the investigating prosecutor finds probable cause for
the filing of the Information against the respondent, he
executes a certification at the bottom of the Information
that from the evidence presented, there is a reasonable
ground to believe that the offense charged has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof. Such certification of the investigating
prosecutor is, by itself, ineffective. It is not binding on
the trial court. Nor may the RTC rely on the said
certification as basis for a finding of the existence of
probable cause for the arrest of the accused.44
In contrast, the task of the presiding judge when the
Information is filed with the court is first and foremost to
determine the existence or non-existence of probable
cause for the arrest of the accused. Probable cause is
meant such set of facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that the offense charged in the Information or any
offense included therein has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested.45 In determining probable
cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances
without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of
evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He
relies on common sense.46 A finding of probable cause
needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely
than not a crime has been committed and that it was
committed by the accused. Probable cause demands
more than bare suspicion, it requires less than evidence
which would justify conviction.47
The purpose of the mandate of the judge to first
determine probable cause for the arrest of the accused
is to insulate from the very start those falsely charged of
crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a
public trial:
It must be stressed, however, that in these
exceptional cases, the Court took the
extraordinary step of annulling findings of
probable cause either to prevent the misuse of
the strong arm of the law or to protect the
orderly administration of justice. The
constitutional duty of this Court in criminal
litigations is not only to acquit the innocent
after trial but to insulate, from the start, the
innocent from unfounded charges. For the
Court is aware of the strains of a criminal
accusation and the stresses of litigation which
should not be suffered by the clearly innocent.
The filing of an unfounded criminal information
in court exposes the innocent to severe
distress especially when the crime is not
bailable. Even an acquittal of the innocent will
not fully bleach the dark and deep stains left by
a baseless accusation for reputation once
tarnished remains tarnished for a long length of
time. The expense to establish innocence may
also be prohibitive and can be more punishing
especially to the poor and the
powerless. Innocence ought to be enough and
the business of this Court is to shield the
innocent from senseless suits right from the
start.48
In determining the existence or non-existence of
probable cause for the arrest of the accused, the RTC
judge may rely on the findings and conclusions in the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor finding
probable cause for the filing of the Information. After all,
as the Court held in Webb v. De Leon,49 the judge just
personally reviews the initial determination of the
investigating prosecutor finding a probable cause to see
if it is supported by substantial evidence.50 However, in
determining the existence or non-existence of probable
cause for the arrest of the accused, the judge should not
rely solely on the said report.51 The judge should
consider not only the report of the investigating
prosecutor but also the affidavit/affidavits and the
documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-

affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well as the

transcript of stenographic notes taken during the
preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to the court
by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the
Information.52 Indeed, in Ho v. People,53 this Court held
that:
Lastly, it is not required that the complete or
entire records of the case during the
preliminary investigation be submitted to and
examined by the judge. We do not intend to
unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to
examine the complete records of every case all
the time simply for the purpose of ordering the
arrest of an accused. What is required, rather,
is that the judge must
have sufficient supporting documents (such as
the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits,
sworn statements of witnesses or transcripts of
stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make
his independent judgment or, at the very least,
upon which to verify the findings of the
prosecutor as to the existence of probable
cause. The point is: he cannot rely solely and
entirely on the prosecutors recommendation,
as Respondent Court did in this case. Although
the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of
regularity in the performance of his official
duties and functions, which in turn gives his
report the presumption of accuracy, the
Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge
to personally determine probable cause in the
issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court has
consistently held that a judge fails in his
bounden duty if he relies merely on the
certification or the report of the investigating
officer.54
The rulings of this Court are now embedded in Section
8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure which provides that an Information or
complaint filed in court shall be supported by the
affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and their
witnesses, together with the other supporting evidence
of the resolution:
SEC. 8. Records. (a) Records supporting the
information or complaint. An information or
complaint filed in court shall be supported by
the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the
parties and their witnesses, together with the
other supporting evidence and the resolution
on the case.
If the judge is able to determine the existence or nonexistence of probable cause on the basis of the records
submitted by the investigating prosecutor, there would
no longer be a need to order the elevation of the rest of
the records of the case. However, if the judge finds the
records and/or evidence submitted by the investigating
prosecutor to be insufficient, he may order the dismissal
of the case, or direct the investigating prosecutor either
to submit more evidence or to submit the entire records
of the preliminary investigation, to enable him to
discharge his duty. 55 The judge may even call the
complainant and his witness to themselves answer the
courts probing questions to determine the existence of
probable cause.56 The rulings of this Court in Soliven v.
Makasiar57 andLim v. Felix58 are now embodied in
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, with modifications, viz:
SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.
(a) By the Regional Trial Court. Within ten
(10) days from the filing of the complaint or
information, the judge shall personally evaluate
the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence. He may immediately
dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he
finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant
of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused
has already been arrested pursuant to a
warrant issued by the judge who conducted the
preliminary investigation or when the
complaint or information was filed pursuant to
section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the
existence of probable cause, the judge may
order the prosecutor to present additional

evidence within five (5) days from notice and

the issue must be resolved by the court within
thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint
of information.
In this case, the investigating prosecutor submitted to
the respondent judge only his resolution after his
preliminary investigation of the case and the affidavitcomplaint of the private complainant, and failed to
include the affidavits of the witnesses of the private
complainant, and the latters reply affidavit, the counteraffidavit of the petitioner, as well as the evidence
adduced by the private complainant as required by case
law, and now by Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure. The aforecited affidavits,
more specifically the fax message of Lorna Tanghal and
the document signed by her covering the amount of
US$1,000, are of vital importance, as they would enable
the respondent judge to properly determine the
existence or non-existence of probable cause.
First. When respondent Maruyama handed the money to
the petitioner, she did not require the latter to sign a
document acknowledging receipt of the amount. The
petitioner avers that it is incredible that Maruyama
would entrust P3,993,500 in Japanese Yen to her without
even requiring her to sign a receipt therefor, especially
since respondent Maruyama was not even the owner of
the money;
Second. The affidavit of Hermogena Santiago, a witness
of the respondent, is unreliable, because it is based on
information relayed to her by Lorna Tanghal that she
(Tanghal) saw the petitioner carrying a Louis Vuitton bag
while on board a Mitsubishi L300 van with the petitioner.
It appears that Tanghal failed to submit any counteraffidavit to the investigating prosecutor;
Third. The affidavit of Marilette G. Izumiya, another
witness of the respondent, is also unreliable, as it was
based on information relayed to her by Thelma Barbiran,
who used to work for the petitioner as a housemaid,
that she (Barbiran) had in her possession a fax message
from Lorna Tanghal, implicating the petitioner in the
crime charged. Barbiran did not execute any affidavit;
Fourth. There is no indication in the resolution of the
investigating prosecutor that the petitioner received the
fax message of Lorna Tanghal;
Fifth. The private complainant claims that the petitioner
tried to reimburse the P3,993,500 by remitting
US$1,000 to her. However, the latter admitted in her
affidavit-complaint that the document evidencing the
remittance was signed by Lorna Tanghal, not by the
petitioner. The petitioner claimed that Lorna Tanghal had
to remit US$1,000 to respondent Maruyama because
the latter made it appear to Tanghal that the police
authorities were about to arrest the petitioner, and
Tanghal was impelled to give the amount to respondent
Maruyama to avert her arrest and incarceration;
Sixth. In her counter-affidavit, the petitioner alleged that
respondent Maruyama had no case against her because
the crime charged in the latters affidavit-complaint was
the same as that filed against her in the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Bulacan, which was withdrawn by the
complainant herself;
Seventh. The investigating prosecutor stated in his
resolution that the private complainant established the
element of deceit. However, the crime charged against
the petitioner as alleged in the Information is estafa
with abuse of confidence.
In sum, then, we find and so declare that the
respondent judge committed a grave abuse of his
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
finding probable cause for the petitioners arrest in the
absence of copies of the affidavits of the witnesses of
the private complainant and her reply affidavit, the
counter-affidavit of the petitioner, and the evidence
adduced during the preliminary investigation before the
investigating prosecutor.
In view of the foregoing disquisitions, there is no more
need to resolve the other issues raised by the petitioner.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition

is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals isREVERSED and SET ASIDE. The assailed
Orders dated August 25 and 28, 2000 and the Warrant
of Arrest issued by the respondent judge in Criminal
Case No. 00-0749 are SET ASIDE. The records
are REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, Branch 119. The respondent judge is
hereby DIRECTED to determine the existence or nonexistence of probable cause for the arrest of the
petitioner based on the complete records, as required
under Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure.
SO ORDERED.