In the face of stiff resistance to their legislative

efforts in national and multilateral arenas, nongovernmental organizations, unions, and others are
engaging in marketplace politics to press their social
and environmental concerns. While important criticisms of market-based regulation abound, recent
research has suggested that this form of politics is not
restricted to simple market signals or a singular
market logic, so the question of what drives corporate responsiveness remains. Drawing on a statistical
analysis of a large data set of marketplace campaigns 285
and in-depth interviews with campaign proponents,
consultants, and targeted executives, this article proposes a relational framework for understanding marketplace politics, situating campaign strategies in
relation to targeted firms brand vulnerabilities and
corporate social responsibility (CSR) absorptive
capacity, on the one hand, and parallel actions of key
intermediariesincluding investment advisory firms
and pioneering competitorson the other hand. I
argue that it is influential minorities of consumers,
investors, and intermediariesoften in dialogue with
targeted executiveswho create change, rather than
majority, arms length market movements. Overall,
this research enhances the multiplicity of recent case
studies by identifying common opportunities and
barriers for marketplace politics and contributes to
the burgeoning literature within economic geography
that is redrawing the boundaries of corporate CSR
decision making and capacity building.

89(3):285307. 2013 Clark University.

Key words:
marketplace politics
corporate responsibility
socially responsible
investment
ethical consumption
stakeholders
nongovernmental
organizations
branding

abstract

Trina Hamilton
Department of Geography
University at Buffalo
(SUNY)
105 Wilkeson Quad
Buffalo, NY 14261
[email protected]

ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY

Beyond Market Signals: Negotiating

Marketplace Politics and Corporate
Responsibilities

www.economicgeography.org

ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY

Acknowledgements
I thank the National Science
Foundation (NSF) for
supporting this research
(award number 0327425)
and my interview subjects
for contributing their
valueable time and insights. I
also thank Henry Yeung and
three anonymous reviewers
for their very helpful
comments and suggestions.

286

A decade ago, the editors at The Economist

claimed it is consumers that dictate to companies
and ultimately decide their fate, rather than the other
way round, and Arrogance, greed, and hypocrisy are
swiftly punished (The Case for Brands, 2001, 11).
Taken to the extreme, this market populismthe
belief in markets as mediums of consent, rather
than simply exchange (Frank 2000)reduces regulation to market signals, to boycotting and buycotting. Yet empirical studies have shown that
boycotts have, at best, a slight measurable effect on
market value (Spar and La Mure 2003).1 Moreover,
while ethical consumption is on the rise, it remains a
niche market, limited to specific product categories
and demographics (Devinney, Auger, and Eckhardt
2011; Turcotte 2010; Dolliver 2008). In terms of
investor-led regulation, Emel (2002, 841) cautioned:
When the heat is on, corporations can simply repurchase shares, effectively containing negative market
signals. Despite these limitations and other important
criticism (e.g., the democratic deficit of a one dollar,
one vote model), geographers and others are uncovering a more complex marketplace politics that is
enacted in the marketplacethat is, the world of
commerce and trade (Oxford English Dictionary
Online 2012)but is not restricted to simple market
signals or a singular market logic.
In the face of stiff resistance to legislative efforts in
national and multilateral arenas, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), socially responsible investors,
unions, and other stakeholders have increasingly
turned to marketplace campaigns that target corporations directly over social and environmental issues
(Manheim 2001). Yet this transfer of regulatory
battles to the marketplace is only partially understood,
and the question of what drives corporate responsiveness remains. I define marketplace politics as the
leveraging of market actorsincluding not only consumers and investors but also analysts and
consultantswithin increasingly politicized market
spaces. Specifically, market politics targets relatively
public spaces that affect the reputations of brands and
consumers and investors decision making (retail
outlets and annual meetings, for instance), as well as
the behind-the-scenes corporate and analyst offices

At least when considered alone rather than as part of a multistrategy campaign. There are a few exceptional
cases. For instance, Wapner (1995, 327) described how activist and media reports about the potential health
effects of the chemical Alar led to a huge decrease in the demand for Alar-sprayed apples and ultimately
led the Uniroyal Chemical Company to stop producing the chemical.

Vol. 89 No. 3 2013

NEGOTIATING MARKETPLACE POLITICS

where strategies are developed and assessed. Well-known brands are thought to be
particularly vulnerable to marketplace politics because the impact of both activist attacks
and corporate responsibility initiatives on brand value is notoriously difficult to measure,
yet the management of brand value is increasingly important. This measurement problem
creates a context for the renegotiation of the boundaries of corporate social and environmental responsibilities to include changes whose direct benefits are often unquantifiable, but that may affect brand value or reputational capital.
Economic geographers are well positioned to investigate the drivers of this marketplace politics, having increasingly framed the firm as a potentially vulnerable institution,
subject to both internal and external contestation and driven by diverse strategic imperatives. As Yeung (2005, 309) argued, Instead of being a mechanistic production function
or an abstract capitalist imperative, it is a contested site for material and discursive
constructions at different organizational and spatial scales. . . . It is indeed a dynamic and
evolving organisation constructed through ongoing social relations and discursive
struggles among social actors. Upending the unified, singularly calculating firm allows
one to uncover the regulatory processes at work in the marketplace through corporate
interactions with stakeholders and in internal disputes over corporate strategy. Moreover, 287
research on the cultural circuit of capitalthe continuously reinvented discursive
apparatus created and deployed by business schools, management consultants, management gurus and the media (Thrift 2005, 6)has pointed to alternative circuits that
provide practical critiques, born out of actual attempts to produce new forms of economic institutions (Thrift 2005, 49). In other words, economic geography is already
attuned to corporate contestation, both internal and mediated by external gurus and
consultants, although the details of how these discursive struggles and practical
critiques play out through marketplace campaigns have not been fully uncovered.
Drawing on a statistical analysis of a large database of campaigns targeting U.S.headquartered multinational corporations (MNCs) and in-depth interviews with key
informants, I propose a relational framework for understanding corporate responsiveness
to marketplace politics. This framework situates campaign strategies in relation to targeted firms brand orientation and corporate social responsibility (CSR) absorptive
capacity2 (i.e., their ability to integrate social and environmental issues into their
decision-making and strategic development), and parallel actions of key intermediaries
(including investment advisory and research firms and pioneering competitors) that are
central to translating stakeholders concerns into legitimate business risks and actionable
business strategies. In contrast to market signals models, the research presented here
highlights the roles of influential minorities over majority market shifts and identifies
dialogue and negotiation as central determinants of the success of the campaigns.
Overall, the research contributes to and extends recent work in economic geography that
has examined the role of external stakeholders in driving the social and environmental
performance of corporations (e.g., Affolderbach 2011; Goodman 2010; Clark and Hebb
2005; Freidberg 2004; Emel 2002), and the development of alternative cultural circuits
of capital (e.g., Hughes 2006; Thrift 2005). It moves beyond the case-study approach and
provides a relational framework for future analyses of the intersections between marketplace campaigns and the burgeoning corporate responsibility consulting industry, and it
redraws the boundaries of corporate CSR decision making and capacity building.
In the first section of the article, I outline current theorizations of the drivers of
corporate social and environmental change, focusing in particular on brand management
2

I develop this concept later in the article, but it refers to the concept used in innovation studies to assess
companies ability to exploit external knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1990, 128).

ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY
and strategic diversity in the face of stakeholders demands in relation to social and
environmental issues. Then, I briefly describe the results of my statistical analysis and set
out the conceptual framework for the rest of the article. Finally, on the basis of my
interviews, I provide a detailed look at the processes of leverage-building and implementation that have shaped this new regulatory politics.

Reimagining the Firm: Vulnerability, Diversity, and Mediation

As I discussed earlier, economic geographers have come to conceptualize the firm as
a site of contestation, beset by internal contradictions and external influences, and recent
studies have addressed avenues of stakeholders influence on social and environmental
performance. For instance, Clark and Hebb (2005, 2023) argued that even slight
changes in consumer demand, captured by earnings declines and signaled to capital
markets, can affect investor and analyst expectations and managers own stock-tied
compensation. They contended that managers may yield on an issue preemptivelyas
risk managementand documented examples of successful behind-the-scenes pres288 sure from institutional investors (Clark and Hebb 2005, 2027). Freidberg (2004)
described a similar risk mitigation strategy by British supermarket managers who were
concerned about critical media coverage. She stated, NGOs political clout lies not in
any claim to represent the mass public but rather in their ability to convince the media
and retailers alike that they speak to and for the critical public, in the two senses of that
termthat is, the public that are both critical of retailers sourcing practices and as
consumers critical to their sales (Freidberg 2004, 528).
Clarke, Barnett, Cloke, and Malpass (2007) and Kortelainen (2008) described how
market researchers invoke potential or imagined ethical consumers to drive corporate
change, relying less on direct market signals and more on creating strategic possibilities for managers by generating information about consumers (Clarke et al. 2007,
238). In his study of the Russian forest sector, Kortelainen (2008, 1299) argued green
market surveys enabled [forest industry managers] to calculate the possible losses,
gains, and new opportunities of the greening process. In consequence, the industrialists
themselves started to perform green markets by speaking about environmentally conscious markets that had to be closely observed. This was not only talk, but it resulted
in material changes to forestry and forest management practices. Kortelainens
example highlighted executives agency in mediating stakeholders influence. Although
NGOs can provide scripts to justify CSR initiatives, the scripts need to be taken up and
interpreted by executives who are willing to integrate the demands of a campaign
rather than play defense.
Several factors affect executives cost-benefit calculations, including cash reserves
(Lenox and Eesley 2009), the costs of acquiescing to activists demands (Lenox and
Eesley 2009; Spar and La Mure 2003), and competitive position (Spar and La Mure
2003; Freidberg 2004). Yet there is additional evidence that managerial responses are
guided by more than strict cost-benefit analyses (Spar and La Mure 2003; Brown 2010).
For instance, Hughes (2005) identified a range of ethical trading strategies among
British food and clothing retailers, from ethically driven retailers to strictly minimalist
responses to ethical pressures. These differences in corporate culture affect firms decisions about joining the Ethical Trading Initiative and the types of factory auditing
systems to deploy, and Hughess analysis follows a poststructural tradition of dissecting
corporate strategies (e.g., ONeill and Gibson-Graham 1999; Schoenberger 1994).
Clearly, researchers need to move beyond market vulnerability to look at corporations
capacities and will to integrate social and environmental values.

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NEGOTIATING MARKETPLACE POLITICS

Finally, recent work turns our attention to influential intermediaries, including investment ratings firms, ethical training programs, market researchers, and NGOs. For
instance, Clark et al. (2007) pointed to the role of ratings firms in guiding investors
decision making on traditional corporate governance issues, as well as social and environmental concerns. Ratings firms act much like the market researchers described by
Clarke et al. (2007) and Kortelainen (2008). They provide a new context within which to
evaluate corporate strategy and a rationale for willing (or embattled) executives to
implement social and environmental initiatives. Sadler and Lloyd (2009, 616) argued that
the work of CSR consultancies is critical to developing and framing ways of measuring
(and thus managing) corporate responsibility programmes. Similarly, Hughes (2006,
1010) contended that an ethical learning economy is being constructed by a new set
of agents to the cultural circuit of capital described by Thrift.
This development of new CSR scripts for managers fits Kruegers (2002) conceptualization of discursive regulation. Kreuger explained that environmental activists introduced an ecological sensibility into the gold minepermitting process in Montana,
replacing an engineering paradigm that had prevailed previously, and effectively shutting down the industry. In the case of Hughess (2006, 1014) ethical learning economy, 289
ethical awareness-raising courses are pitched at the sometimes paralyzing gulf between
different corporate units, such as retail buyers and CSR staff. These courses focus on
engaging, inspiring and empowering the retail buyers to think and act in more ethically
sensitive ways themselves in their purchasing practices (Hughes 2006, 1016). Moreover,
social auditing training helps develop a completely new set of skills from those that are
generally held by retailers technical staffs (Hughes 2006, 1015).
As ORourke (2005, 124) noted, NGOs are now part of this ethical learning economy,
finding and promoting solutions in the marketplace, and Affolderbach (2011) documented this shift from confrontation to collaboration in her analysis of environmental
campaigns against the forest industry in British Columbia, Canada. Van Huijstee and
Glasbergen (2008, 301) identified two types of knowledge that executives can gain from
environmental NGOs: (1) expert knowledge about specific environmental issues and (2)
knowledge about market risks and opportunities. In addition to technical knowledge and
market insights, NGOs can also transfer credibility (Linton 2005; Tully 2004). These
examples suggest that the future of stakeholders campaigns may be in the (re)making as
much as the breaking of brands.
Overall, the literature on marketplace politics in economic geography and related
disciplines has evolved from an early focus on attacks on brands and market power to
more nuanced analyses of the mediating roles of corporate culture and capacities and
external consultants. This evolution reflects not only shifts in the strategies of social and
environmental campaigns but also an analytical shift toward poststructural and relational
approaches to the decision making of firms. While the main sphere of political activity
in these cases is the marketplace, the political process is conditioned by multiple acts of
narrative building and interpretation rather than by the direct market signaling and
corporate response one may imagine on the basis of orthodox economic theory.

Campaign Trends
This article is based on a broader study of social and environmental campaigns that
targeted publicly traded, U.S.-headquartered multinational corporations between 1990
and 2004. Most research on the dynamics of marketplace campaigns has been based on
case studies that may or may not reflect broader trends or on a single set of actors or
strategies (e.g., socially responsible investors or boycotts) that do not reflect the synergies

ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY
among parallel actions. The goal of the study was to identify underlying trends in the
determinants of successful campaigns and to gain a better understanding of the dynamics
of marketplace politics by studying the actions of multiple stakeholders and intermediaries that have targeted firms on the same social or environmental issue. The study
combined a quantitative analysis of 179 campaigns and in-depth interviews with 41 key
informants, including campaign proponents, consultants, and executives of targeted
firms.3
To identify common dynamics among the campaigns, I tried to develop as complete a
database of campaigns as possible. I started with lists of campaigns from academic work
(Manheim 2001) and proponents of campaigns such as the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility. Then, I developed a snowball strategy, starting with Google and news
searches for corporate campaigns and following up on links to additional campaigns and
campaigners. There are undoubtedly campaigns that were missed, yet it was as exhaustive
a survey of campaigns as I have found to date and provided a basis for generalizing the
trends that I identified.
Using publicly available secondary sources (e.g., annual reports and corporate and
290 campaign websites) and a proprietary database of corporate profiles developed for the
socially responsible investment (SRI) community,4 I collected data on the outcomes of
campaigns (corporate change related to each identifiable campaign demand) and possible
determinants of the success of campaigns, including (1) the characteristics of the stakeholders involved in the campaign and of the campaign itself; (2) the characteristics of the
corporation being targeted, including the companys brand value and strategic orientation; and (3) the characteristics of the sociopolitical climate or context. Table 1 presents
the independent variables that I used for the statistical analysis. Again, the goal was to
evaluate as wide a range of potential determinants of successful campaigns as possible
within practical limits. There were other variables I had intended to include (on the basis
of their identification as significant factors in the case-study literature) but was not able
to quantify appropriately. For instance, I had originally developed a series of variables to
measure media attention but found that too much variability was generated by different
search terms to provide comparable data, so I had to eliminate the variables from the
analysis, which could account for some of the unexplained variability in the final results.5
Table 2 presents some of the basic characteristics of the campaigns. In general, the
campaigns brought together multiple stakeholders, with the majority driven by large
NGOs and shareholder activists. They covered a broad range of social and environmental
concerns, including the protection of endangered ecosystems, the implementation of
living wages, and even the pricing of products. The campaigners deployed a diverse set
of strategies aimed at raising awareness of the companies activities (through protests at
retail sites and headquarters, for instance), cultivating and deploying powerful allies (via
consumer boycotts, letter-writing campaigns, and shareholder resolutions) and, in almost
half the cases, engaging in a direct dialogue with corporate executives. Although the state
3

The research methodology and statistical analysis are discussed in more detail in a previous article; see
Hamilton (2009).
I purchased a 1-year subscription to KLD Research & Analytics Socrates database, a compendium of
profiles of more than 3,000 corporations, including narrative coverage of 65 issues related to: community,
diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights, products, and controversial business lines
(gambling, tobacco, etc.). KLD was a corporate research firm serving socially responsible investment
managers and has since been bought out by MSCI. See http://www.msci.com/products/esg/global_
socrates/.
For instance, a search of Coca-Cola + recycling returned different results from Coca-Cola + bottle
deposit, making it impossible to create a single, comparable search for each campaign.

Vol. 89 No. 3 2013

Table 1
Independent Variables Used in the Statistical Analysis
Variables
Campaign characteristics
Types of stakeholders

Operationalization

Diversity of stakeholders
Strategies

Campaign issue
Location of concern

Campaign length

Corporate characteristics
Consumer brand
Size
Executive change

Internationalization
Corporate policy
CSR reputation
Contextual factors
Impending regulations
Competitor changes

Competing campaigns

Corporation sells products directly to end consumers

Current number of direct employees as reported by KLD
Change of chief executive officer during the campaign as reported in corporate
annual reports, on websites, in the media, or by KLD
The site of contestation is vertically integrated into the corporation (i.e., it is
not an arms length supplier)
Percentage of sales that are international as reported by KLD
Corporation has a specific corporate policy related to the campaign issue, as
reported in corporate annual reports, on websites, and/or by KLD data
Number of social indexes the corporation is listed on, as reported by KLD

Impending governmental regulation in relevant jurisdictions related to the

campaign issue, as reported by the media and/or the interviewees
One or more competitors have implemented changes related to the campaign
demands, as reported by interviewees, campaign material, industry associations,
and/or KLD data
Number of shareholder resolutions on other social and/or environmental issues
during the campaign as reported by KLD or the Interfaith Center for
Corporate Responsibility

was not absent from these campaignssome campaigns focused on regulatory violations, for example, the campaigns generally focused on engaging corporations directly by
targeting corporate branding, retailing, financing, and decision making.
Overall, these campaigns proved surprisingly successful; 74 percent elicited corporate
change on at least one demand, and 58 percent of the identifiable campaign demands
(including policy, reporting, and operational changes) were addressed. To try to identify
underlying patterns of influence, I conducted a stepwise discriminant analysis to identify
the variables that were the most significant discriminators between successful campaigns
(those that elicited change on at least one demand) and unsuccessful campaigns. Discriminant analysis is generally used to understand group differences (see Hair, Anderson,
Tatham, and Black 1998) and results in a function that can be used to predict group
membership. When I started this research, I had expected the determinants of this
success to be related to the hammer of the market (Affolderbach 2011)that is, that
consumers and shareholders would be the most influential stakeholders and that consumers and shareholders actions would be the most influential strategies. I also
expected, as hypothesized in much of the literature, that consumer brands would be more
vulnerable to market attacks because it would be easier to mobilize consumers against

291

NEGOTIATING MARKETPLACE POLITICS

Vertical integration

Types of stakeholders (e.g., large NGOs, labor, shareholders) involved, as

reported by media, campaign materials, and/or the interviewees
Total types of stakeholders involved in the campaign
Campaign strategies (e.g., protests, shareholder resolutions, ), as reported by
media, campaign materials, and/or the interviewees
Campaign issue of concern, as reported in campaign materials
General location of concern (i.e., location of the proposed changes), as reported
in the campaign materials
Total number of months (months to date for ongoing campaigns)
Total shareholder resolutions filed on the campaign issue

Campaign Issue

Campaign Strategies

Environment
Labor
Community welfare
Consumer protection

44
33
24
13

Percentage of Campaigns
(n = 179)

60
59
48
44
21
16

Shareholder resolution
Protests
Consumer action
Dialogue
Lawsuit
Government enforcement

General issue of Concern

Percentage of Campaigns
(n = 179)

84
67
48
21
15

Large NGO
Shareholders
Local organization
Labor
Strategist/consultant

Strategy

Percentage of Campaigns
(n = 179)

Types of Stakeholder
Groups

Annual meeting
Inside corporate offices
Retail outlet
Outside corporate headquarters
Public spaces
Community/location of operations
Production facilities
Conferences, trade fairs, sponsored events

Spaces of Engagement

1
2
3
4
5
6

Number of Stakeholder
Types Directly Involved

292

Campaign Proponents

Characteristics of the Campaigns

Table 2

66
39
27
19
18
16
15
12

Percentage of Campaigns
(n = 179)

15
29
33
18
5
1

Percentage of Campaigns
(n = 179)

ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY

Vol. 89 No. 3 2013

Table 3
Summary of Classification Rates for Discriminant Functions Generated by Stepwise Discriminant Analysis
(percentage)
Function
1
2
3
4

Variables Included

Correctly
Classified

Successful Correctly
Classified

Unsuccessful Correctly
Classified

Consumer brand
Corporate policy
Dialogue
Consumer brand, corporate policy, dialogue

71.9
59.8
57.0
66.9

85.5
53.0
50.8
64.1

34.0
78.7
74.5
74.5

A Relational Framework
To gain a more in-depth understanding of the dynamics of campaigns and add to the
explanatory power of the statistical results, I conducted interviews with key informants,
including campaign and corporate consultants and executives of targeted corporations. I
developed a purposive sample of interviewees by choosing six campaigns representing
different corporate targets, issues, and locations of concern.7 The goal was not to analyze
6

For a detailed discussion of the discriminant analysis, see Hamilton (2009); each of the variables identified
was statistically significant at least at the .004 level.
Because of practical constraints, I had to choose the campaigns for the qualitative sample before I
completed the campaign database; therefore the sample reflects my attempt to cover a broad range of
campaign issues and locations of concern. The campaigns included (1) a community health and environment campaign surrounding a manufacturing facility in the United States, (2) a global genetically modified

NEGOTIATING MARKETPLACE POLITICS

them. As is shown in Table 3, while campaigns against consumer brands were indeed
more likely to be successful, no specific stakeholder groups proved to be statistically
significant determinants of successful campaigns, and the only campaign strategy in the
resulting discriminant functions was direct dialogue between campaign proponents and 293
corporate executives. The third variable identified was corporate policy, or whether the
targeted corporation had a policy in place related to the campaign issue.
Since a stepwise discriminant analysis builds a final discriminant function variable by
variable, Table 3 shows the variables and classification rates for each individual variable
that I identified as a statistically significant discriminator, as well as the final combined
function.6 Although none of the functions can fully discriminate between successful and
unsuccessful campaigns, the classification rates hold some interesting insights. For
instance, the consumer brand variable produced the largest overall correct classification
rate, yet did a poor job of classifying unsuccessful campaigns. By contrast, the addition
of the corporate policy and direct dialogue variables resulted in much better predictions
of unsuccessful campaigns. In other words, consumer brands seemed to provide important foundations for campaign leverage, but the other significant discriminators pointed
to the potential mediating influence of corporate strategic orientation (corporate policy)
and the negotiation of new social and environmental responsibilities (dialogue), rather
than arms length signaling and response. Overall, the discriminant analysis and the
simple descriptive statistics that highlight a surprising amount of corporate-stakeholder
dialogue (44 percent of the campaigns), in addition to traditional oppositional tactics,
provide strong support for a relational conceptualization of marketplace politics, even
though they do not provide a complete predictive model.

ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY
Table 4
Interviewees by Stakeholder Group
Affiliation
Shareholders
Large NGO
Local organization
Strategists/consultants
Executives

Total
(n = 41)
13
10
7
7
4

specific case studies but, rather, to examine the experiences of as many different actors
and types of campaigns as possible. As Table 4 indicates, I interviewed 41 people from
a variety of stakeholder groups, broadly mirroring the stakeholder ratios of the larger
8
294 campaign database (see Table 2). Specific organizational affiliations are omitted to
maintain the anonymity of those who requested it, and campaign affiliations are not listed
because the interviews focused broadly on experiences across multiple campaigns. The
majority of the interviews were conducted in-person in 2004 in the Boston, New York,
Washington, D.C., San Francisco, Chicago, and Miami areas, and the rest were conducted by telephone. The interviews were semistructured and focused on the identification of campaign targets, development of campaign strategies, coordination with other
stakeholder groups, interactions with targeted corporations, and evaluation of outcomes.
I tape-recorded the majority of the interviews for transcription (in a few cases, I took
detailed notes instead at the interviewees request) and coded the responses, along with
background material provided by the interviewees and through secondary sources, into
key themes. While many themes and particularities of specific campaigns emerged from
the interviews, this article focuses on the brand, policy, and dialogue dynamics identified
as overarching trends.
Table 5 outlines the conceptual framework for the rest of the article. Drawing on my
interviews, as well as secondary source materials provided by the interviewees or uncovered during background research, it illustrates in more detail how branding, corporate
CSR policies, and dialogue shape corporate responsiveness to social and environmental
issues. What emerged from the interviews was the necessity of a relational framework
that highlights how campaign strategies are related to corporations strategic orientations
(specifically, their branding strategies) and CSR absorptive capacity (i.e., the type of
executive oversight, degree of background knowledge, and power within internal
decision-making structures). In addition to this interplay between corporate characteristics and campaign strategies, the interviewees highlighted time and again the role of key
intermediariesparticularly investment advisory professionals and competing firmsin

ingredient campaign against a food products company, (3) a global water pollution campaign against a
cruise line, (4) a U.S. farmworkers campaign against a restaurant chain, (5) a global recycled paper and
old-growth forest campaign against a retailer, and (6) a developing country toxics and community
compensation campaign against a manufacturing company.
This strategist-consultant category includes consultants working with shareholders, large NGOs, local
organizations, and unions. Compared to the stakeholder distribution in the large database, this sample
appears to underrepresent labor, although at least two of the strategists and consultants worked directly
with union campaigns, and several of the large NGOs and local organizations represented labor interests
or were nonunion worker organizations.

Vol. 89 No. 3 2013

Table 5
A Relational Framework for the Success of Marketplace Campaigns
Variable

Corporate Characteristics

Brand value is sustained by

cultural and reputational
capital.

CSR Policy

CSR policies increase the

potential reputational risks of
social and environmental
campaigns.

Dialogue

Broader CSR apparatus and

absorptive capacity
(executive oversight,
openness, knowledge, and
internal bargaining power)
facilitate dialogue and
implementation.

Campaigns leverage
influential minorities of
consumers and investors
with brand capital and/or an
interest in protecting brand
value.
Campaigns leverage
discrepancies between
policies and on-the-ground
realties.
Campaigners become
progressive brand
ambassadors following a
corporate change.
Campaigners engage in a
dialogue with corporate
executives on materiality,
branding, supply chain
reorganization, and other
issues.

Intermediary Roles

Investment intermediaries
provide analysis and advocacy
for the materiality of specific
campaigns and issues.

Pioneering firms provide

testing grounds for new
models of corporate
practice.

shaping the dialogue around the materiality of the campaigns concerns and the viability
of alternative practices. These intermediaries are an important element of marketplace
politics that were not captured by the statistical analysis but that correspond with recent
work in economic geography on the CSR consulting industry described earlier. What
emerged from this analysis, although not a complete model of successful campaigns, is
a compelling case for the potential impact of influential minorities of consumers and
investors, and the intersection between campaigning and an emerging CSR infrastructure
inside and outside targeted firms. While the sociopolitical context (e.g., impending
regulations and media interest) is highly variable from issue to issue and campaign to
campaign, this conceptual framework identifies some common dynamics of successful
marketplace campaigns. In the following sections, I describe this relational framework in
more detail, with comments from the interviewees and background material (including
recent campaign updates and CSR trends), highlighting successful leverage and capacity
building, as well as enduring obstacles.

Breaking the Brand

While my statistical analysis confirmed that consumer brands are generally more
responsive to stakeholder campaigns than are nonbrands, the relative power of attacks on
brands varies, with some hitting closer to the heart of a brands value than others. Jackson
(2002, 16) argued that a complex commodity politics requires us to identify the many
ways in which power is distributed along the chains and through the networks we
describe and analyse. Although campaigns cannot, in general, mobilize consumer
majorities, they can identify and attempt to mobilize key demographics, specifically,
those who are critical to a brands cultural capitalits unique consumer value based
on its relevance and popularity in culture (McKendrick 2011).

295

NEGOTIATING MARKETPLACE POLITICS

Brand

Campaign Strategies

ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY
Youth markets are the focus of much of the work on the cultural capital of brands (e.g.,
Klein 2000), as well as the successful campaigns identified by the interviewees. One
campaign that was able to mobilize a youth demographic was the farmworkers campaign against Taco Bell, which focused on improving conditions for workers in Floridas
tomato fields. The campaign directly challenged Taco Bells cultural capital with its
target 1824-year-old market9 by calling out Taco Bell market research about selfindulgence to mobilize students against the company: It is time to show Taco Bell that
we are more than just self-indulgent cash machines addicted to constant stimulation.
It is time to show Taco Bell that more than insatiable cravings go into our buying
decisionsthat human rights and the dignity of labor also enter into our thinking when
we decide where to spend our money (Coalition of Immokalee Workers [CIW] n.d.). The
campaign mobilized enough support to Boot the Bell (by removing or blocking contracts) from 25 colleges and high schools, with an additional 20 campaigns underway
when they declared victory in 2005 (Student/Farmworker Alliance n.d.). While the direct
hit may have been modest for a company with 5,600 outlets in the United States, it was
a symbolic hit as well, throwing into question one of Taco Bells expansion strategies
296 and one of its key demographics.
Such mobilizations of consumer minorities add a new twist to Freidbergs (2004)
concept of critical citizens. While Freidberg proposed that citizens may become more
powerful by leveraging their identities as consumers, one may extend the concept to think
of critical consumers who are not only critical of corporate practices, but are also
critical to the success of corporations beyond the sum total of their purchases (e.g., as
brand image-makers, growth markets). Not all campaigns are able to mobilize these
influential minorities, however. One organizer who was tasked specifically with mobilizing a broad base of college students explained that some proposed campaigns simply
did not align with or excite her organizations base (Interview, NGO representative, 1
June 2004).
This is not to say that youth markets are the only critical consumers. For instance, the
interviewees described conducting and publishing surveys and reports that were intended
to push firms to reassess consumers priorities. For instance, a report on the cruise
industry argued, The cruise industrys own customer base is appalled at the practice of
cruise ships dumping untreated sewage into the ocean and the lax laws that enable this
practice (Oceana 2004, 3), citing evidence that the respondents already assumed that
cruise ships were doing what the campaign was demanding. The underlying message is
that it is disingenuous to assume that current buying behavior is a vote of confidence in
a companys practices. Although their impact was not always clear, these actions mirror
the cases described earlier (e.g., Clarke et al. 2007; Kortelainen 2008) about the provision of new scripts for managers to use to justify changesthat is, putting the firm ahead
of broader shifts in public expectations.

Shareholder Diversity
Influential minorities can also be found within the broad SRI community. While some
social and environmental issues (such as climate change) have gone mainstream within
the investment community, investors who are driven by more than profit motives, such as
charitable foundations and religious organizations, represent another unique source of
minority influence. Indeed, foundations were identified by several interviewees as having
9

The significance of the youth market to Taco Bells brand is symbolized by the Taco Bell Foundation for
Teens launched in 1992. See http://www.tacobellfoundationforteens.org/.

Vol. 89 No. 3 2013

NEGOTIATING MARKETPLACE POLITICS

a lot of as yet-unrealized regulatory potential. This potential is best viewed in terms of

mandate, not money. As Stephen Viederman, a pioneer of foundation-led shareholder
activism and an interviewee, explained, they . . . have more leeway. [S]o long as you
meet the federally mandated pay-out requirements and are not funding terrorism . . . and
youre not paying your board members extraordinary amounts of money and things like
that, you can do almost anything. So foundations really have no restraints, institutionally,
in the broad sense (Interview, 17 May 2004). In other words, foundations investment
activities are less constricted by legal norms of fiduciary responsibility than are those of
public or private pension funds, and they may develop a broader CSR mandate that is
based on their dual roles as social change agents and investors. In some cases, they are
consciously protecting their own brand and reputation by aligning their mission and
investment activities.
Foundation executives and other influential shareholders often have direct access to
corporate executives. One foundation executive argued that when he shows up at annual
meetings, corporate executives have fewer assumptions about the motives of his foundation than about those of many NGOs. He posited that whereas representatives of NGOs
may be perceived as simply having an axe to grind, representatives of foundations are 297
viewed by executives as more public spirited. And since these foundation executives are
used to speaking the language of business, they have additional leverage to raise issues
that may be ignored coming from other messengers (Interview, 28 May 2004). For
instance, the Nathan Cummings Foundation got involved in marketplace politics when it
uncovered contradictions between its environmental grant making and its significant
investment in Smithfield Foods, the largest hog producer and pork processor in the
worldand one with a checkered environmental record (Emerson 2003, 38). As two
foundation executives explained, a number of the Foundations grantees had been
attempting to get the companys attention to talk about environmental issues, with little
success. With the submission of just one shareholder proposal, the Foundation suddenly
had access to the companys Vice President, Environmental and Corporate Affairs and its
Chief Legal Officer. In fact, they flew to New York to meet with us (Lindblom and
Campos 2010, 13).
Foundations and other influential shareholder minorities can be particularly important sources of leverage for campaigns that may otherwise be controlled through defensive public relations tactics or minimalist changes. Such responses may satisfy
mainstream shareholders concerns about reputational risk by burnishing the brand but
do not necessarily address the campaigns core social or environmental concerns.
There are significant obstacles to the broader diffusion of foundation-led activism,
however, including a gap in knowledge about even the most conventional strategies. As
Viederman explained, I spoke to the senior vice president [of a large foundation] . . .
and asked him if he would vote [in favor of our resolution] and he said, Well, our
managers vote on proxies. And I said, Well, you can tell your managers what to do,
you can! And a couple days later he called me back and he said they would. Now,
its great except for the fact that this is a highly sophisticated person and . . . there
was a lack of knowledge out there of the limits of the possible (Interview, 17 May
2004).
An even more significant barrier may be the fear of being ostracized from the very
professional communities that give foundations credibility and power with targeted
corporations. Again, Viederman explained, Since for many of them it might put them in
a situation of conflict with peers in the corporate world, is it worth it? Or, even worse,
there by the grace of god go I . . . As a result, such shareholder activism remains limited
to a small minority of foundations (18 percent according to the Council on Foundations

ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY
as reported by Emerson 2003, 41). Yet, in the same vein as the consumers discussed
earlier, foundations provide a unique source of leverage for select campaigns.

Negotiating Materiality
Although foundations have a material interest in social and environmental issues by
virtue of their dual roles as social change agents and investors, many of the interviewees
discussed attempts to renegotiate the boundaries of materiality more generally. Proponents of campaigns regularly engage corporate executives over the materiality of their
concerns, and these dialogues are influenced by numerous intermediaries within the
investment research and advisory industry, as well as the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).
For publicly traded corporations, a social or environmental issue is deemed materiala legitimate business concernif it is likely to affect shareholder value. While
some issues are unequivocally material (e.g., legal proceedings and fines for regulatory
violations), other issues are open to ongoing challenges. Over the past decade, the SEC
has issued a series of bulletins guiding companies on social and environmental report298 ing (Chan Fishel 2002). Despite these clarifications on the materiality of consumer
boycotts and other issues, companies still systematically underreport social and environmental issues (Chan Fishel 2002; Lewis 2002). This gap in disclosures provides an
opportunity for campaigns. For instance, a lawyer and campaign consultant explained
that while one petroleum companys disclosure said that their sales of gasoline had
gone down due to competitive factors, at the exact same time when their dip in sales
started to happen was the time when a boycott was launched. So he argued that they
should at least be mentioning to shareholders that there was a boycott in place (Interview, 21 May 2004).
Debates over materiality are often waged at corporate annual meetings through shareholder resolutions calling on corporations to disclose information, develop a policy, or
alter its practices on a specific social or environmental issue. Indeed, 60 percent of the
campaigns (see Table 2) in my study used shareholder resolutions. Although these
resolutions are nonbinding, they are believed by many campaigners to be an important
entry point for negotiation and, in some cases, are withdrawn following dialogue and
corporate action on the issue.
The audience for these arguments is not only other investors but also influential
intermediaries, such as proxy voting consultants. As one shareholder activist explained,
It is definitely sometimes an agonizing process, trying to figure out what is the text
because its also, . . . if we can get ISS [Institutional Shareholders Services] to see this in
our favor then they will support it and make a recommendation, and weve found theres
definitely a lift when you get ISS support, approximately like 20% (Interview, 27 May
2004). Proxy consultants provide recommendations on how to vote on shareholder
resolutions, and several interviewees discussed the role of ISS in particular. The agonizing process just described is symptomatic of the lack of a universal business case for
corporate responsibility. As one longtime shareholder activist noted, There are probably
good business reasons to be a rapacious exploiter, too, but you can make a case for good
business reasons to try to be ahead of the curve and be a responsible corporate citizen
(Interview, 21 February 2003). Another shareholder advocate shared his own laundry list
of potential investor-friendly framings: Is the company doing something illegal? Is there
government regulation? Is there new political pressure? Are they getting a lot of bad
media hits? How are their competitors doing? Are the shareholders upset? Are there
groups targeting them for a boycott? Or is there new technology that means they dont
have to do this bad practice any more? (Interview, 20 July 2004).

Vol. 89 No. 3 2013

Although the literature on the business case for CSR emphasizes both risks and new
cost-saving or market-development opportunities, risk is more pervasive in the materiality debate waged by these campaigns. Indeed, one CSR executive confirmed that when
speaking at a meeting of the New York Society of Security Analysts, he found an
emerging interest in CSR from a risk management perspective, but it was narrowly
focused on Is [Company X] in a position where their CSR profile is a business risk or
a material, financial risk? (Interview, 23 September 2004). In the petroleum case
mentioned earlier, consumer boycott activities represent a direct financial risk to sales.
In many other cases, the risks are less easily calculable, so the dialogue revolves around
the nebulous issue of reputational risk. One socially responsible investment manager
explained:
The only way were gonna get a good vote is to present the case such that institutional
shareholders will realize that its an issue, and this phrase has been very popular in the past four
years: reputational risk.. . . . A lot of times the resolutions early on make more of an ethical
or moral judgment, and the only way were gonna get a lot of the institutional investors to vote
in our favor is if they see this really could have an implication on shareholder value and how. 299
(Interview, 27 May 2004)

NEGOTIATING MARKETPLACE POLITICS

While the interviewees described some of their success stories, they were not able to
explain ISSs lack of support for other similar resolutions, although their interpretation
of the potential risk of a specific campaign is likely mediated by such issues as media
attention (including whether coverage is sustained over time) and the allies who are
leveraged (including the critical consumers discussed earlier). In the case of the farmworkers campaign against Taco Bell, ISS recommended a vote in favor of a 2003
resolution asking Yum! Brands, Inc. (the parent company of Taco Bell) to prepare a
sustainability report addressing its policies and practices related to social, environmental and economic sustainability throughout the supply chain (Yum! Brands, Inc., 2004).
The resolution received an almost unprecedented (for a social resolution) 39 percent vote
in 2003 and a 32.5 percent vote in 2004. Although Yum! Brands had been targeted for
several years, the resolutions sponsors suggested that the issue gained broader support
in 2003 when it was framed as a sustainability issue, rather than simply as a human rights
issue. Moreover, they specifically invoked the Dow Jones Sustainability Groups (DJSG)
definition of sustainability in the resolution, focusing on being responsive to a broad
array of stakeholders in order to secure a social license to operate and superior
customer loyalty and ultimately superior financial returns (Yum! Brands, Inc. 2004).
The DJSG can be seen as part of an increasingly significant alternative cultural circuit
of capital that is integrating social and environmental issues into its consulting and
advisory practices. Although the DJSG may be a minority voice, its strategic location
within the mainstream circuit (as part of the broader Dow Jones Indexes and Dow Jones
media families) provides significant symbolic leverage.
Multiple interviewees also highlighted the importance of investment research firms,
particularly Innovest Strategic Value Advisors. Innovests comparative analysis of corporate performance on social and environmental issues pays particular attention to their
impact on competitiveness, profitability, and share price performance (Innovest n.d.).
One shareholder advocate described his organizations attempt to reach Wall Street
analysts by holding roundtables on particular companies and specific social and environmental issues using Innovest reports. Referring to one particular meeting, he
explained: [T]he people that attended seemed interested. Weve had a couple of press
articles out of it, wire services that ran it in a bunch of places. So I think it raised some

ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY
questions, and the [Innovest] report was just really scathing [so it was hard to ignore]
(Interview, 20 July 2004). Moreover, he explained that some investment groups that
would generally not take information or would just kind of blow us off have now started
to ask questions, particularly in relation to issues of climate change. These dialogues
represent another example of the circulation of new scripts for corporate action on
social and environmental issues discussed earlier. The fact that Innovest, ISS, and other
SRI consulting and research firms were recently bought by more mainstream investment
advisory groups10 suggests that they are making some headway on Wall Street and are
being further integrated into the mainstream cultural circuit of capital. Future research is
needed to determine whether this development is good for stakeholders campaigns.
While integration will undoubtedly increase their influence over mainstream institutional
investors, it could also narrow their focus and/or affect NGOs and other stakeholders
access to dialogue with them, effectively closing off a significant negotiating space.
Indeed, new barriersas well as new opportunitiesfor these renegotiations of materiality are continuously created. For instance, the SEC has restricted shareholder resolutions that it believes address only standard business risks, rather than issues that
300 may affect society as a whole (Leone 2006). In general, resolutions are not to impede
on executives management of ordinary business. Some firms employ specialist
consultancies to choreograph potentially contentious annual meetings (Clark, Salo, and
Hebb 2008, 1387), while others slap shareholder activists with defamation suits (Kary
2006), or even take flight. One interviewee described a target company that repeatedly
moved its annual meeting, at one point moving to a town that was about three or four
hours away, starting the meeting at like seven in the morning, and [buying] up all the
hotels in the town so everyone had to drive for hours to get out there (Interview, 20 July
2004).

Progressive Risks and Opportunities

While the firms taking flight and filing suit play defense, some corporations try to gain
a competitive advantage by adopting progressive social and environmental policies.
Although these progressive pronouncements are seen by some as another means of
deflecting criticism rather than seriously engaging it, ambitious public commitments lend
legitimacy to stakeholders demands and provide fodder for public attacks and behindthe-scenes negotiations about the discrepancies between brand image and corporate
reality.
Recent surveys of public trust in institutions in the United States have shown that
NGOs and religious organizations have far greater public credentials than do big business, the government, or the media (see Edelman 2011; Pew Center 2010). This differential provides opportunities for campaigners to leverage their public trust to challenge
corporate image making, on the one hand, and to increase the reputational return from
corporations behavioral changes, on the other. In the case of an endangered forests
campaign against office products retailer Staples, the campaigners adopted a common
strategy of identifying a credibility gap and then positioning themselves to fill it, as
both brand ambassadors and supply chain consultants. In 2002, the campaign produced
an investigative report tracing Stapless supply chain back to old-growth forests in
Indonesia and Canada (Forest Ethics 2002a), specifically contrasting its findings with
Stapless claims that we have absolutely no evidence that there is old-growth fiber in any
10

RiskMetrics acquired ISS, Innovest, and KLD (a leading SRI firm) between 2006 and 2009 and then
subsequently merged with the global investment advisory firm MSCI in 2010.

Vol. 89 No. 3 2013

Absorptive Capacity
It is instructive that the Staples executive described being out of alignment with
industry colleagues in inviting NGOs into the C-suite, because it reflects the differences
that corporate CSR culture and capacities make. As I noted earlier, I use the term CSR
absorptive capacity to describe corporations ability to integrate social and environmental issues into their decision making, much like the economic geography literature on
innovation has referred to corporations ability to exploit external knowledge (Cohen
and Levinthal 1990, 128; see also Gertler 2003; Boschma 2005). Although my statistical
analysis identified corporate CSR policies as being significant determinants of successful
campaigns, my interviews focused on this broader CSR absorptive capacity (the policy
variable could also be a proxy for these broader factors), including outreach and access
points, preexisting knowledge of the campaigns issue of concern, and the CSR staffs
relative power within the corporation.
At the most fundamental level, a successful dialogue hinges on a clear point of contact
for CSR issues. An investment manager noted that one company she was engaging on
environmental issues didnt even have a person that was head of environment (Interview, 27 May 2004). Another shareholder advocate explained, Weve been talking to
[Company X] for years, but this is the first year Ive felt anyone was paying attention, and
theyve had three different directors of their corporate responsibility programs (Interview, 20 July 2004).
Beyond access points, CSR absorptive capacity is also a function of corporate expertise on social and environmental issues. One advocate of fair-trade coffee noted, the
conference calls we had with [Company X], they obviously did not understand the issues,
obviously did not understand the content [of the shareholder resolution] (Interview, 10
May 2004). The same advocate argued that the dialogue with a competitor was successful
because they were much more knowledgeable about the issue. . . . There are two things
you want when youre in dialogue with a company. One is that the people that youre
talking to have some power. The second thing is that you want them to be knowledgeable
about the issue.

NEGOTIATING MARKETPLACE POLITICS

of our products (Forest Ethics 2002b). After reaching an agreement with Staples, the
campaign took out a congratulatory ad in USA Today that read: Weve been calling
Staples names for years. Never thought treehugger would be one of them. It also noted
that it look[s] forward to spreading the word about Staples commitment to the dozens
of Fortune 500 companies, as well as colleges and universities all over the country, that
have made commitments to stop buying products from endangered forests and to
increase their purchases of recycled paper (Forest Ethics 2003).
Progressive corporate commitments and branding provide not only opportunities for
campaign attacks and arms-length brand ambassadorships (e.g., campaign sticks and
carrots) but also an entry for campaigners to become corporate consultants, providing
specialized expertise on defining and mapping endangered ecosystems and alternative
sourcing strategies, for instance. Indeed, in the Staples case, NGOs became part of the
ongoing implementation of Stapless new policy, partly because of the openness of the
Stapless executives. According to Mark Buckley, the vice president of environmental
affairs at Staples, despite protests from others within the industry, NGOs were given the
opportunity to make a presentation at Staples headquarters to the companys suppliers.
Moreover, they have since engaged in ongoing dialoguessome on the ground in the 301
forests of the Carolinas and the Canadian Borealto develop common definitions of
endangered forests and other details of Stapless environmental policy (Interview, 7
September 2004).

ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY
Recent evidence suggests that the number of C-level executives who are charged
with CSR oversight is on the rise (Whitehead n.d.), a signal that campaigns may, at the
very least, have more success making initial contact and perhaps cultivating internal
allies. Moreover, knowledge of social and environmental issues is also on the rise in the
MBA ranks. Indeed, one executive I interviewed graduated with an environmental MBA
and a campaign consultant was heading to business school to join his interests in CSR
with a better understanding of corporate strategy. And, according to an annual survey of
CSR content in business schools, between 2001 and 2009, the number of elective courses
with social, environmental, or ethical content had grown, and the percentage of schools
that required students to take courses dedicated to business and society issues
increased from 34 percent to 69 percent (Aspen Institute n.d.). Yet there is a long way to
go, with one study pointing out that less than 13 percent of Russell 1000 firms have an
executive-level committee with responsibility for corporate social responsibility (CSR)
or environmental, health, and safety (EHS) issues (Sustainable Enterprise Institute
2009, 10). While other companies may indeed have sub-C-level managers who are
responsible for CSR issues, they will necessarily have less bargaining power in internal
302 struggles over corporate resources and strategies.
The professional backgrounds of CSR executives and the firms CSR structures also
affect the executives strategic orientations and power within the broader corporate
hierarchy. For instance, Mark Buckley, vice president of environmental affairs at Staples,
explained that his background in procurement led him to define his role as that of an
internal consultant. This role is facilitated by the companys CSR structure, which
includes an Environmental Action Group with senior-level managers from every aspect
of the business (Interview, 7 September 2004). In contrast, many campaigners were
frustrated by public relations professionals whom they thought had neither the knowledge nor inclination to address their concerns seriously.

From Campaigning to Consulting

Once corporations agree to move on a specific campaign issue, my interviews revealed
an ongoing dialogue between corporate executives and NGOs around rebranding,
supply-chain research and management, and ongoing oversight. One may think of these
processes as campaigning or consulting beyond the win, with campaign proponents
often but not exclusively large NGOsswitching back and forth between campaign and
consultant roles. There has been significant interest in the emergence of this normalization process between corporations and NGOs (Zadek 2003), yet only limited empirical work has delved inside these negotiations and learning processes.
The Staples example provides evidence of campaign leveraging of its reputational
assets, as well as scientific knowledge about the geography of endangered forests and
supply-chain knowledge of common sources of different products. Another campaigner
explained that he had become a national expert on plastic lumber, allowing him to call
up any number of people and sit down with them and discuss some new idea we have for
them (Interview, 28 May 2004). The goal of these informal R&D relationships is to
develop models for products and processes that advocates can then market to other
companies via dialogue or campaigning. One shareholder advocate noted that some
executives reported that their new supply-chain knowledge makes them more efficient
all across the board. Now they can identify something quickly, so if someone says get out
of redwood, its like OK, how much do we really have? Wheres it coming from? What
are the alternatives? (Interview, 21 July 2004).
In some cases, however, campaigns have to partner with pioneering competitors
(sometimes smaller firms or governmental entities) that become campaign intermediar-

Vol. 89 No. 3 2013

ies, providing spaces for experimentation and a proving ground for alternative practices.
For instance, in 2005 CIW (a grassroots organization of immigrant farmworkers)
announced Taco Bells commitment to a penny per pound pass-through and cooperation with CIW to improve working conditions in Floridas tomato fields (CIW
2005), yet it took another five years to reach an accord with the tomato growers further
up the supply chain. To counter industrys attempts to implement a watered-down code
and prevent members from cooperating with the agreement, CIW reached individual
agreements with a number of small growers and partnered with these early adopters to
develop and test the new standards before rolling them out to the rest of the industry
(Brown 2010). Finally, on November 16, 2010, they celebrated a partnership agreement
to roll out CIWs fair food principles and monitoring system to over 90% of the Florida
tomato industry (CIW 2010).

Conclusion
NEGOTIATING MARKETPLACE POLITICS

Overall, my study revealed complex power-geometries (Massey 1993) behind the

success of marketplace campaigns. Rather than a strict hierarchy based on financial or 303
other forms of leverage, different stakeholder groups gain influence at different points
in the campaign (e.g., critical consumers during the leverage-building phase and NGOs
with supply-chain expertise during the strategy development and implementation
phase). In other words, power in marketplace campaigns is tied to specific spaces and
campaign moments, rather than to individuals or identities. Moreover, my research
found that marketplace politics is relational, hinging on corporations CSR absorptive
capacity, and mediated by an emerging alternative cultural circuit of capital within the
investment advisory and CSR consulting communities. Although important work within
the political science and geography literature has explored the specific opportunities
and barriers for marketplace politics in individual industries (e.g., Schurman and
Munro 2009; Kortelainen 2008; Wahlstrm and Peterson 2006; Hughes 2005; Freidberg
2004), my research has provided a broader perspective on the dynamics of this regulatory process. And it has contributed specifically to the broader economic geography
literature that is reimagining the firm and identifying the opportunities for renegotiating
corporate social and environmental performance in the marketplace. Specifically, it has
offered a unique peek into the alternative cultural circuits of capital that are being
developed (both inside and outside targeted corporations) and that facilitate marketplace strategies.
In light of the increasing importance of dialogue and corporate-stakeholder cooperation, important concerns about co-optation remain (see Trumpy 2008). Whereas CIW is
maintaining control over the monitoring of its new farmworker code in Florida (with help
from the University of Miami Law School), in other cases, this monitoring is privatized
and turned over to certification institutions with various standards (see Gereffi, GarciaJohnson, and Sasser 2001; Hamilton 2011). Perhaps most important is the question of
what issues and stakeholders are privileged by this new politics. Although I did not find
evidence of a strict stakeholder hierarchy, there is likely an uneven development to the
CSR initiatives resulting from this type of regulation, if only because of the heavy
reliance on shareholder activism by many (but not all) campaigns and the limited
involvement of smaller, resource-strapped organizations during the implementation
phase. While dialogue is clearly proving successful for many campaigns, the resources
that are necessary to sustain ongoing negotiations and to develop corporate strategies and
oversight mechanisms are often beyond the reach of smaller NGOs and community
organizations. The next frontiers for research on marketplace politics, then, are in further

ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY

References

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(see Angel, Hamilton, and Huber 2007).
Finally, it is important to highlight two significant developments since this research
was conducted, namely, the rise of social media and the global financial crisis-and
recession. The impact of social media on marketplace politics is unknown, although
one may expect it to add firepower and significant organizing capacity to attacks on
brands, particularly those that are aimed at leveraging youth markets. On the other
hand, while social media may indeed enhance the visibility of campaigns, they are not
central to the dialogue between corporate executives and campaign proponents that
secures the implementation of CSR initiatives. One of the key findings of my research
was that the success of campaigns is determined as much by these dialogues-and
negotiations as by oppositional power, and I would argue that these insights remain
relevant in light of the explosion of new protest and organizing platforms, although it
certainly deserves attention in future research. In terms of the global financial crisis,
research has suggested that CSR has not been taken off the corporate agenda, but that
CSR initiatives have been refocused and NGO finances have been compromised
304 (Hughes 2012). This potential diminishment of NGOs capacities to participate in dialogue and work with companies to develop new models of social and environmental
responsibility is also deserving of future research, as is the potential impact of the
crisis on the perceived materiality of specific social and environmental issues. These
developments remind one of the continuous reorientation of priorities and resources
that frustrates attempts to model marketplace politics. Although this article has not
offered a predictive solution, it has provided a guide for the ongoing analysis of the
potential synergies and overlaps among contentious politics, alternative elements
within the investment and advisory industries, and targeted corporations CSR absorptive capacities.

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