JavaScript security

or
JavaScript: the Good, the Bad,
the Strict and the Secure Parts
Tom Van Cutsem

Talk Outline
Part I: JavaScript, the Good and the Bad parts
Part II: ECMAScript 5 and Strict Mode
Part III: ECMAScript 6 Proxies
Part IV: Caja and Secure ECMAScript (SES)

Talk Outline
This talk is about:
The JavaScript language proper
Language dialects and features to enable or improve security

This talk is not about:

Security exploits in JavaScript, or how to avoid specific exploits
(e.g. XSS attacks)

About Me
Professor of Computer Science at Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium
Programming Languages, concurrent and distributed programming

ECMA TC39 (Javascript standardization committee)

Visiting Faculty at the Google Caja team (2010)

Part I: Javascript, the Good and the Bad parts

JavaScript
Lightning talk Gary Bernhardt at CodeMash 2012
https://www.destroyallsoftware.com/talks/wat

The worlds most misunderstood language

See also: JavaScript: The World's Most Misunderstood Programming Language

by Doug Crockford at http://www.crockford.com/javascript/javascript.html

Good Parts: Functions

Closures, higher-order, first-class

var add = function(a,b) {

return a+b;
}
add(2,3);

function makeAdder(a) {
return function(b) {
return a+b;
}
}
makeAdder(2)(3);

[1,2,3].map(function (x) { return x*x; })

node.addEventListener(click, function (e) { clicked++; })

Good Parts: Objects

No classes, literal syntax, arbitrary nesting
var bob = {
name: Bob,
dob: {
day: 15,
month: 03,
year: 1980
},
address: {
street: ...,
number: 5,
zip: 94040,
country: ...
}
};

function makePoint(i,j) {
return {
x: i,
y: j,
toString: function() {
return (+ this.x +,+ this.y +);
}
};
}
var p = makePoint(2,3);
var x = p.x;
var s = p.toString();

A dynamic language...
// computed property access and assignment
obj[foo]
obj[foo] = 42;
// dynamic method invocation
var f = obj.m;
f.apply(obj, [1,2,3]);
// enumerate an objects properties
for (var prop in obj) { console.log(prop); }
// dynamically add new properties to an object
obj.bar = baz;
// delete properties from an object
delete obj.foo;

Bad Parts: global variables

Scripts depend on global variables for linkage

Bad
<script>
var x; // global
var lib = {...};
</script>

<script>
... lib ...
</script>

Better
<script>
var lib = (function(){
var x; // local
return {...};
}())
</script>

Bad Parts: with statement

with-statement breaks static scoping

with (expr) {
... x ...
}

var x = 42;
var obj = {};
with (obj) {
print(x); // 42
obj.x = 24;
print(x); // 24
}

More Bad Parts

var hoisting: variables are not block-scoped but functionscoped
Implicit type coercions
No integers (all numbers are IEEE 754 floating point)
Automatic semicolon insertion
...

Delving Deeper
Some finer points about
Functions
Objects
Methods

Functions
Functions are objects

function add(x,y) { return x + y; }

add(1,2) // 3
add.apply(undefined, [1,2]) // 3

Objects
No classes.
Functions may act as object constructors.
All objects have a prototype: object-based inheritance

Objects

function Point(x, y) {
this.x = x;
this.y = y;
}

Point

Point.prototype

prototype
...

function

...

...

...

Point.prototype = {
toString: function() {
return "[Point "+this.x+","+this.y+"]";
}
}
var p = new Point(1,2);

toString

p
__proto__
x

Functions / Methods
Methods of objects are just functions
When a function is called as a method, this is bound to the receiver
object

var obj = {
offset: 10,
index: function(x) { return this.offset + x; }
}
obj.index(0); // 10

Functions / Methods
Methods may be extracted from objects and used as stand-alone
functions

var obj = {
offset: 10,
index: function(x) { return this.offset + x; }
}
var indexf = obj.index;
otherObj.index = indexf;
indexf(0) // error
indexf.apply(obj, [0]) // 10

Functions / Methods
Methods may be extracted from objects and used as stand-alone
functions

var obj = {
offset: 10,
index: function(x) { return this.offset + x; }
}
var indexf = obj.index.bind(obj); // new in ES5
indexf(0) // 10

Summary so far
Javascript: a Lisp in Cs clothing (D. Crockford)
Good parts: functions, object literals
Bad parts: global vars, lack of static scoping, var hoisting
No way to protect an object from modifications by its clients
Unsafe to share objects across trust boundaries

Part II: ECMAScript 5 and Strict Mode

ECMAScript
Standard Javascript
1st ed. 1997
2nd ed. 1998

ECMA-262
5th Edition / December 2009

3rd ed. 1999

ECMAScript Language
Specification

4th ed.
5th ed. 2009
6th ed. end of 2013 (tentative)

Reference number
ECMA-123:2009

Ecma International 2009

ECMAScript 5 Themes
New APIs
Array methods, JSON, bound functions, ...

More robust programming

Tamper-proof objects, strict mode, ...

Better emulation of host objects (e.g. the DOM)

Accessors (getter / setter properties), property attributes

ECMAScript 5 Themes
New APIs
Array methods, JSON, bound functions, ...

More robust programming

Tamper-proof objects, strict mode, ...

Better emulation of host objects (e.g. the DOM)

Accessors (getter / setter properties), property attributes

JSON
JavaScript Object Notation
A simple subset of Javascript (numbers, strings, arrays and objects
without methods)
Formal syntax literally fits in a margin. See http://json.org/

{ name : Bob,
age : 42,
address : {
street : main st
}
}

ECMAScript 5 and JSON

Before ES5, could either parse quickly or safely
Unsafe:

eval(jsonString)

In ES5: use JSON.parse, JSON.stringify

JSON.stringify

[1, a, {x:2}]
0
1
2

[1,\a\,{\x\:2}]

a
x

JSON.parse
2

ECMAScript 5 Themes
New APIs
Array methods, JSON, bound functions, ...

More robust programming

Tamper-proof objects, strict mode, ...

Better emulation of host objects (e.g. the DOM)

Accessors (getter / setter properties), property attributes

Tamper-proof Objects
var point =
{ x: 0,
y: 0 };

Object.preventExtensions(point);
point.z = 0; // error: cant add new properties

Object.seal(point);
delete point.x; // error: cant delete properties

Object.freeze(point);
point.x = 7; // error: cant assign properties

Ecmascript 5 Strict mode

Safer subset of the language
No silent errors
True static scoping rules
No global object leakage

Ecmascript 5 Strict mode

Explicit opt-in to avoid backwards compatibility constraints
How to opt-in
Per program (file, script tag, ...)
Per function

Strict and non-strict mode code can

interact (e.g. on the same web page)

<script>
"use strict";
...
</script>

function f() {
"use strict";
...
}

Strict-mode opt-in: gotchas

Beware: minification and deployment tools may concatenate scripts

<script>
"use strict";
// in strict mode
</script>

<script>
"use strict";
// in strict mode

<script>
// not in strict mode
function f(){...}
</script>

// f is now
// accidentally strict!
function f(){...}
</script>

Strict-mode opt-in: gotchas

Suggested refactoring is to wrap script blocks in function bodies

<script>
(function(){
"use strict";
// in strict mode
}())
</script>
<script>
// not in strict mode
function f(){...}
</script>

<script>
(function(){
"use strict";
// in strict mode
})

// not in strict mode

function f(){...}
</script>

Static scoping in ES5

ECMAScript 5 non-strict is not statically scoped
Four violations:
Assigning to a non-existent variable creates a new global variable
function f() { var xfoo; xFoo = 1; }

with (expr) { x } statement

delete x; // may delete a statically visible var
eval('var x=8'); // may add a statically visible var

Ecmascript 5 Strict: syntactic restrictions

The following are forbidden in strict mode (signaled as syntax errors):

with (expr) {
...
}

var x = 5;
...
delete x; // deleting a var

{ a: 1,
b: 2,
b: 3 } // duplicate property

var n = 023; // octal literal

function f(a,b,b) {
// repeated param name
}

function f(eval) {
// eval as variable name
}

Ecmascript 5 Strict
Runtime changes (fail silently outside of strict mode, throw an
exception in strict mode)
function f() {
// assigning to an undeclared variable
var xfoo;
xFoo = 1;
}

// deleting a non-configurable property

var pt = Object.freeze({x:0,y:0});
delete pt.x;

Ecmascript 5 Strict: avoid global object leakage

Runtime changes: default this bound to undefined instead of the
global object

function Point(x, y) {
this.x = x;
this.y = y;
}

use strict;
function Point(x, y) {
this.x = x;
this.y = y;
}

var p = new Point(1,2);

var p = new Point(1,2);

var p = Point(1,2);
// window.x = 1;
// window.y = 2;
print(x) // 1

var p = Point(1,2);
// undefined.x = 1;
// error!

Direct versus Indirect Eval

ES5 runtime changes to eval (both in strict and non-strict mode)
eval operator versus eval function

Direct
var x = 0;
eval(x = 5);
print(x); // 5

Indirect
var x = 0;
var f = eval;
f(x = 5);
print(x); // 0

ECMAScript 5 Themes
New APIs
Array methods, JSON, bound functions, ...

More robust programming

Tamper-proof objects, strict mode, ...

Better emulation of host objects (e.g. the DOM)

Accessors (getter / setter properties), property attributes

Host objects
Objects provided by the host platform
E.g. the DOM: a tree representation of the HTML document
look and feel like Javascript objects, but are not implemented in
Javascript (typically in C++)
Odd behavior not always easy to reproduce in JavaScript itself
ES5 provides APIs that partially solve this (accessors, property attributes)
ES6 goes further with proxies

Part III: ECMAScript 6 Proxies

Proxies
Objects that look and feel like normal objects, but whose
behavior is controlled by another Javascript object
Part of a new reflection API for ECMAScript 6
Think java.lang.reflect.Proxy on steroids

Why Proxies?
Generic access control wrappers:
E.g. revocable references, membranes (see later)
Emulating host objects
Ability to self-host the DOM
Could provide a virtual document to third-party scripts

Generic wrapper example: tracing

function makePoint(x, y) {
return {
x: x,
y: y
};
}

var p = makePoint(2,2);
var tp = makeTracer(p);
tp.x
// log(p, get, x);
// 2
tp.y = 3
// log(p, set, y, 3);
// 3

Generic wrapper example: tracing

function makeTracer(obj) {
var proxy = Proxy(obj, {
get: function(tgt, name) {
console.log(tgt, get, name);
return tgt[name];
},
set: function(tgt, name, val) {
console.log(tgt, set, name, val);
return tgt[name] = val;
},
});
return proxy;
}

Generic wrapper example: tracing

function makeTracer(obj) {
var proxy = Proxy(obj, {
get: function(tgt, name) {
console.log(tgt, get, name);
return tgt[name];
},
set: function(tgt, name, val) {
console.log(tgt, set, name, val);
return tgt[name] = val;
},
});
return proxy;
}

handler

meta
base

proxy

Generic wrapper example: tracing

function makeTracer(obj) {
var proxy = Proxy(obj, {
get: function(tgt, name) {
console.log(tgt, get, name);
return tgt[name];
},
set: function(tgt, name, val) {
console.log(tgt, set, name, val);
return tgt[name] = val;
},
});
return proxy;
}

handler

meta
base

proxy

target

Stratified API
var proxy = Proxy(target, handler);

handler

meta
base

proxy

target

Stratified API
var proxy = Proxy(target, handler);
handler.get(target, foo)
handler

meta
base
proxy.foo

proxy

target

Stratified API
var proxy = Proxy(target, handler);
handler.get(target, foo)
handler

handler.set(target, foo, 42)

meta
base
proxy.foo
proxy.foo = 42
proxy

target

Stratified API
var proxy = Proxy(target, handler);
handler.get(target, foo)
handler

handler.set(target, foo, 42)

handler.get(target, foo).apply(proxy,[1,2,3])

meta
base
proxy.foo
proxy.foo = 42
proxy.foo(1,2,3)

proxy

target

Stratified API
var proxy = Proxy(target, handler);
handler.get(target, foo)
handler

handler.set(target, foo, 42)

handler.get(target, foo).apply(proxy,[1,2,3])
handler.get(target, get)

meta

base
proxy.foo
proxy.foo = 42
proxy.foo(1,2,3)
proxy.get

proxy

target

Not just property access

var proxy = Proxy(target, handler);

handler

meta
base

proxy

target

Not just property access

var proxy = Proxy(target, handler);
handler.has(target,foo)

handler

meta
base
foo in proxy
proxy

target

Not just property access

var proxy = Proxy(target, handler);
handler.has(target,foo)
handler.deleteProperty(target,foo)
handler

meta
base
foo in proxy
delete proxy.foo

proxy

target

Not just property access

var proxy = Proxy(target, handler);
handler.has(target,foo)
handler.deleteProperty(target,foo)
handler

var props = handler.enumerate(target);

for (var p in props) { ... }

meta
base
foo in proxy
delete proxy.foo
for (var p in proxy) { ... }

proxy

target

Example: a revocable reference

revocable reference: limit the lifetime of an object reference

proxy

target

var ref = makeRevocable(target);

var proxy = ref.proxy;
// pass proxy to code
ref.revoke();

Example: a revocable reference

revocable reference: limit the lifetime of an object reference

proxy

target

var ref = makeRevocable(target);

var proxy = ref.proxy;
// pass proxy to code
ref.revoke();

Example: a revocable reference

function makeRevocable(target) {
var enabled = true;
return {
proxy: Proxy(target, {
get: function(target, name) {
if (enabled) { return target[name]; }
throw new Error(revoked);
}
}),
revoke: function() { enabled = false; };
}
}

Proxies: availability
Firefox
node --harmony

Chrome (enable experimental JS flag in chrome://flags )

Library that implements the latest API proposed for ES6

<script src=reflect.js></script>
Available on Github: https://github.com/tvcutsem/harmony-reflect

Part IV: Caja and Secure ECMAScript (SES)

Caja
Caja enables the safe embedding of third-party active content inside
your website
Secures Google Sites
Secures Google Apps Scripts

More generally: Gadgets, Mashups:

https://developers.google.com/caja/docs/about/

Caja
Not a traditional sandbox. Caja-compiled code is safe to inline directly
in a webpage <div>. No iframes.
Can put multiple third-party apps into the same page and allow them
to directly exchange JavaScript objects
Great for writing mash-ups

The host page is protected from the embedded apps

E.g. embedded app can't redirect the host page to phishing sites, or steal
cookies from the hosting page

Caja

: Taming

Caja proxies the DOM. Untrusted content interacts with a virtual DOM,
never with the real DOM.

https://developers.google.com/caja/docs/about/

Caja
Example: Caja Playground
http://caja.appspot.com

Caja
Caja consists of:
A capability-secure JavaScript subset (SES)
A safe DOM wrapper (Domado)
A HTML and CSS sanitizer

SES is the portion of Caja responsible for securing JavaScript

Secure ECMAScript

SES

adds confinement

ES5/strict

adds proper static scoping

ES5

adds tamper-proof objects

ES3

Secure ECMAScript
Implemented as a library on top of ES5/strict
Include as first script, before any other JavaScript code runs:

<script src=startSES.js></script>

Secure ECMAScript
<script src=startSES.js></script>

Deep-frozen global environment (incl. frozen global object)

Cant update properties of Object, Array, Function, Math, JSON, etc.

Whitelisted global environment

No powerful non-standard globals
(e.g. document, window, XMLHttpRequest, ...)
Code that spawns an SES environment may provide selective access to
these

Patches eval and Function to accept only ES5/strict code, that can
only name global variables on the whitelist

Proxies again
Caja uses object capabilities to express security policies
In the object-capability paradigm, an object is powerless unless
given a reference to other (more) powerful objects
Common to wrap objects with proxies that define a security policy
E.g. revocable reference: limit the lifetime of an object reference

proxy
target

untrusted code
trusted code

Membranes
Transitively revocable references
All within a single JavaScript context/frame

SES context

Membranes
Transitively revocable references
All within a single JavaScript context/frame

SES context

Membranes
Transitively revocable references
All within a single JavaScript context/frame

SES context

Membranes
Transitively revocable references
All within a single JavaScript context/frame

SES context

Membranes
Transitively revocable references
All within a single JavaScript context/frame

SES context

Membranes
Transitively revocable references
All within a single JavaScript context/frame

SES context

Membranes
Transitively revocable references
All within a single JavaScript context/frame

SES context

Membranes
Transitively revocable references
All within a single JavaScript context/frame

SES context

Membranes
Transitively revocable references
All within a single JavaScript context/frame

SES context

Membranes
Transitively revocable references
All within a single JavaScript context/frame

SES context

Membranes
Transitively revocable references
All within a single JavaScript context/frame

SES context

Membranes
Transitively revocable references
All within a single JavaScript context/frame

SES context

Membranes
Transitively revocable references
All within a single JavaScript context/frame

SES context

Membranes
Transitively revocable references
All within a single JavaScript context/frame

SES context

Wrap-up

Wrap-up
JavaScript:
ES3

the Good,
the Bad,

ES5
ECMA-262
5th Edition / December 2009

ECMAScript Language
Specification

the Strict,

ES5/strict
Reference number
ECMA-123:2009

Ecma International 2009

SES

and
the Secure parts.

Take-home messages
Secure ECMAScript (SES) builds on ES5 strict mode
If you want your code to be securable, opt into strict mode
Proxies are a power-tool to express fine-grained security policies
(e.g. membranes)

References
Warmly recommended: Doug Crockford on JavaScript
http://goo.gl/FGxmM (YouTube playlist)

References
ECMAScript 5:
Changes to JavaScript Part 1: EcmaScript 5 (Mark S. Miller, Waldemar
Horwat, Mike Samuel), Google Tech Talk (May 2009)
Secure Mashups in ECMAScript 5 (Mark S. Miller), QCon Talk
http://www.infoq.com/presentations/Secure-Mashups-in-ECMAScript-5

Caja: https://developers.google.com/caja
SES: http://code.google.com/p/google-caja/wiki/SES
Proxies: http://soft.vub.ac.be/~tvcutsem/invokedynamic/proxies_tutorial
ES6 latest developments: http://wiki.ecmascript.org and the
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