NOVEMBER 13, 2014

ARTICLE III: BILL OF RIGHTS

The Bill of Rights is a list of the most important rights of citizens. The purpose of putting them
in the Constitution is to protect these rights against infringement. The first coded Bill of Rights was
done in England in 1689, although England already had their Magna Carta as early as 1215. The
United States had its Bill of Rights only in 1776.
The Bill of Rights contains mandates against the State. The state is so powerful that it even has
inherent powers. The Bill of Rights was created to protect the citizens from the powers of the State.
Example of such powers of the State:

1. The emergency powers of the President to call upon the Armed Forces to suppress lawless
violence, declare the suspension of the privilege to the writ of habeas corpus, declare martial
law in the Country or any part thereof.
2. The over-all power of Government or the power of Government to protect itself.
To protect the citizens from being trampled upon, the Bill of Rights was created. The Bill of Rights is
always directed against the State, the people who violates the Bill of Rights are the people from
Government or the Government itself.
Example:

Illegal search principally, it is violated by police officers or people in Government, however,

private citizens likewise be charged for illegal search but not under the Bill of Rights, but under
the Civil Code.

The Bill of Rights may only be violated by people in Government or the Government itself, the Bill
of Rights is a tool for the private people for protection against the State.
The Bill of Rights applies to Filipino citizens and any person within the jurisdiction of the
Philippines, even to foreigners. All rights equally apply to both Filipinos and foreigners except Section
7 which is only enjoyed by Filipino Citizens. Section 7 is a political right to be informed of
Governmental transaction and right to get copies of documents of governmental transaction.
The three great powers of Government (inherent powers):
1. Police Power has been characterized as the most essential and the most insistent and the least
limitable power extending as it does to all public needs.
It is the inherent and plenary power of the State which enables it to prohibit all that is
hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.
It rest upon public necessity and upon the right of the State and the Public to selfprotection.
It is exercised by the Government through the Legislature but it may also be delegated,
within limits, to the Local Government.
It has been used to justify such public safety measures as in building regulations (it is
for the protection of the people that there must be building regulations), regulation on
the carrying of deadly weapons, regulation of gasoline stations, movie houses and
justify public health measures (as in compulsory connection of sewerage system),
regulation of cattle imports. In the field of public morals, police power has been used as

basis for judicial approval of legislation, punishing, vagrancy, prohibiting gambling,

regulating the operation of dance halls, motels and hotels and many others.

In the case of Dela Cruz vs. Judge Paras, where the Municpality refused
to give any permit for night clubs or any license for professional dancers, the
court declared the act as unconstitutional as going beyond mere regulation into
prohibition of a profession or calling which properly regulated can be legitimate.

In the case of Magtajas vs. Pryce, while gambling may be prohibited, it

may still be allowed (example PAGCOR), the Courts will not pass judgment on
the choice of Congress. Congress already said that gambling through PAGCOR is
legal, that is why there is a law that governs/regulates gambling. The morality of
gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se, although it is
generally inimical to the interest of the people. There is nothing in the
Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or for that matter,
even mentioning it all. Local Governments cannot, even when vested with local
autonomy, contravene the judgment of Congress not to prohibit gambling.
2. Power of Eminent Domain;
3. Power of Taxation.

Section 1:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
1st part no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law (due
process clause).
2nd part nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws (equal protection clause).
Question:
What are the rights protected under the due process clause of the Consitution?
o Life, liberty and property.
Is the exercise of police power subject to judicial inquiry/judicial review?
o The exercise of this power, in so far as it affects the life, liberty or property of any
person, is always subject to judicial inquiry.
When you go to court to question the powers of the State, what would be the principle yard
stick (standard or measure) to be used by the courts to regulate police power, power of eminent
domain and power of taxation and to declare an act unconstitutional?
o The practice of States powers may be considered unconstitutional when it is against the
due process clause and equal protection clause.
o The yard stick used is the consideration that it is in accordance with due process and
equal protection clauses of the Constitution. For so long as the procedural and
substantive due process together with the equal protection clause are observed or
complied with by an action of the State, then the act shall be considered
constitutional(U.S. vs. Toribio).
Police power must be exercised within the limits set by the Constitution, in the words of the
leading case of U.S. vs. Toribio, the legislative determination of what is proper exercise of police power
is not final or conclusive, but is always subject to the supervision of the courts, and the principle yard

stick against which such exercise must be measured are the due process clause and the equal
protection clause.
In Marcos vs. Manglapus, the Supreme Court said that the Constitution is a law for rulers and
people which cover with its shield of protection all classes of men at all times under all circumstances.
The reach of the due process and equal protection clauses touch all persons whether citizens or aliens,
natural or corporate.
Question:
What is the extent to the right to life that is protected by the Constitution?
o The Constitutional protection of the right to life is not just a protection of the right to be
alive or the security of ones limb against physical harm, the right to life is also the right
to a good life.
What is the extent to right to liberty? Is it only confined to the right not to be unlawfully
incarcerated or be put in jail?
o The right to liberty that is protected by the due process clause does not simply means
freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage
in any common occupation of life, to acquire useful knowledge to study, to marry, to
establish a home and bring up children, liberty to worship God according to the dictates
of ones conscience.
What is the extent of the right to property?
o Protected property includes all kind of property found in the Civil Code, it has been
deemed to include vested rights, rights that are already existed, rights to a perfected
mining claim, perfected homestead or a final judgement.
Is there a hierarchy of rights among the three rights protected among the due process clause
and of the equal protection clause under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights?
o Private property is placed as inferior to life and liberty. Between life and liberty, the
Supreme Court said that life is most important right protected by the Constitution.
In the case of Arroyo vs. De Lima, Arroyo intended to go abroad for medical
examinations but De Lima stopped them from leaving the court through a hold
departure order. Arroyo then filed a case against De Lima and the Supreme
Court, in issuing the Temporary Restraining Order to De Lima, adverted to the
right to life as the most important right protected by the Constitution. They
restrained De Lima from implementing the hold departure order against Arroryo.
Unfortunately for Arroyo, De Lima filed a case and in the next day, there was
already a case filed against Arroyo and there was already a Judicial Court Order
and not merely an administrative order preventing Arroyo from leaving the
Country. The one which was restrained by the Supreme Court was an
administrative Hold Departure Order which is within the power of the
Department of Justice.
In the case of the Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Association vs. Philippine Blooming
Mills Co., Inc., the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized said the decision. The
superiority of freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable relation
between the means employed by the law and the object or purpose that the law is neither arbitrary or
discriminatory or oppressive would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights.
In the case cited, the Court said that there are only a few restrictions of the right to property, on the
other hand, a constitutional or valid infringements of human rights requires a more stringent criterion,
namely, the existence of a great and immediate danger of a substantial evil which the state has the
right to prevent.

Question:
What are the two aspects of due process?
o Procedural due process and substantive due process.
Substantive due process is a prohibition of arbitrary laws. One must go into the substance of
the law or the subject matter of the law to ascertain if the law complies with the substantive due
process.
Where the procedural due process concentrates on the procedure laid down by the law for the
exercise of what the law contemplates in doing. If all that due process require is proper procedure,
then life, liberty and property could be destroyed arbitrarily, provided, proper formalities are observed.
Observing proper formalities are not enough, there has to be the substantive aspect of the law which
should be favorable to the citizens.
As a procedural requirement, it relates chiefly, to the mode or procedure which government
agency must follow in the enforcement and application of laws. It is a guarantee of procedural fairness.
Its essence was expressed by Daniel Webster as a law which hears before it condemns. Daniel Webster
became popular because he argued the Darth Mouth College Case before the Supreme Court
regarding due process, his definition of due process of due process in the oral arguments has always
been followed even by courts in the United States as well as in the Philippines. Daniel Webster said:
Due process is more clearly intended the general law, a law which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.
Due process of law depends on the circumstances, there could be a set of requirements for due
process depending on the situation/circumstances, that is why there is a set of procedural due process
in judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings and another set in student discipline cases.
Question:
What are the requirements in procedural due process in judicial proceedings?
o As held in Bangko Espanol Filipino vs. Palangka:
1. There must be court or a tribunal, clothed with judicial power to hear and
determine the matter brought before it.
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person/property of the
defendant which is the subject of the proceedings.
3. The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard.
4. Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
What are the requirements in procedural due process in administrative proceedings?
o In Angtibay vs. BIR:
1. The right to a hearing, which includes present ones case and submit evidence in
support thereof.
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
3. The decision must have something to support it.
4. The evidence must be substantial.
5. The decision must be based on the evidence presented during the hearing.
6. The tribunal or the body or any of its judges must act on his own judgment on
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy.
7. The board should render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceedings can know the various issues involved.
What are the requirements in procedural due process in Student discipline cases?
o In the case of Guzman vs. University:

1. The students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them.
2. They shall have the right to answer the charges against them and with the
assistance if counsel, if desired.
3. They shall be informed of the evidence against them.
4. They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf.
5. The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
o Bernas had cited two cases for this requirements which are:
1. Magtibay vs. Garcia happened in 1965, Magtibay was a cadet officer at the
University of the Philippines ROTC, Garcia was a commandant. Garcia imposed
disciplinary measures on Magtibay for being recalcitrant and thus he was given
a failing grade. Magtibay was graduating in the advance course of ROTC at the
time, Magtibay then failed to graduate due to the failing grade. He [Magtibay]
brought the case to court until it reached the Supreme Court. In 1983, the
Supreme Court decided and Magtibay still lost. In summary, this case dwelled on
the incident of a student commits a serious breach of discipline.
2. Ateneo vs. Court of Appeals mainly concerned with grades, when a student
fails to maintain the required academic standards of the school.
The due process clause under section 1 must be understood to guarantee not just forms of
procedure but also the very essence of life, liberty and property. It must be interpreted both as a
procedural and as a substantive guarantee. Due process must be a guarantee against the exercise of
arbitrary power even when that power is exercised according to the proper procedure. If one complies
with the procedure but the substance of what is being acted upon is arbitrary then it is still a violation
of the due process clause. Due process must be complied with in both aspects, procedural and
substantive.
Although it is frequently invoked in the protest against arbitrariness in legislation, substantive
due process was rarely invoked with success. The Supreme Court gives generous latitude to legislation
designed to promote public health, public safety or public welfare.
The requirement of substantive due process is not a rigid concept, the heart of substantive due
process is the requirement of reasonableness or absence of the exercise of arbitrary power.
In the case of U.S. vs. Toribio, 1910, is a case that regulated the slaughter of large cattle
(carabao and cows)(Executive Order 626). A measure designed to preserve work animals needed for
agriculture, it was challenged as a deprivation of private property. The Supreme Court sustained the
statute regulating the slaughter of large cattle because the public interest demands it. A large
discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine not only what the interest of the public
requires, but what measures are necessary for the protection of their interest.
In the case of Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, Marcos came up with an amendatory
executive order amending 626, it added a prohibition of the transportation of carabeef from one
province to another and that any carabeef so transported shall be confiscated. The Supreme Court then
ruled that the amended is not valid. Outright confiscation is not reasonably related to the purpose, it is
unduly oppressive.
Question:
Comparing the case of U.S. vs. Toribio and Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate court, why is it that
the first case was valid and the latter, which pertained to the same subject, considered invalid?

o Ruby vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, there was a law creating reservation for
Mangyanes of Mindoro. The members of the Mangyanes Tribes were herded to a
reservation for them to stay there (if you do this now, it will already be considered
unconstitutional). The Supreme Court (during this time) that the law was constitutional
because it was in accordance to public safety, welfare and interest.
o In Villavicencio vs. Lukban, was a case between a police in Manila and a Mayor
[Lukban], the mayor ordered all prostitutes to be gathered and was thrown to other
places. The Supreme Court ruled that the act is not allowed since no allowed such
actions and was against due process.
o In People vs. Fajardo, a building permit was denied the owner of the property because
when he constructs his house, it will obstruct the access from the highway to the town
plaza. The Supreme Court ruled that the act of denying the permit as a deprivation of
private property, it oversteps the bounds of police power and amounts to taking of
property without just compensation.
What is the principle of presumed constitutionality or validity of statutes?
o Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City of Manila this case
stemmed from a city ordinance of Manila designed to curb the rampant use of Hotels
and Motels as places of illicit assignation. It was contested by the Ermita-Malate Hotel
and Motel Operators Association, Inc., they sued the City of Manila, but because they
could not present evidence that would convince the Court to rebut the presumption of
the Constitutionality of the Law, there was no evidence presented, the Supreme Court
ruled that they cannot just decide the case without any evidence to rebut the
presumption. There being no evidence presented to rebut the presumption of
constitutionality of the statute then the statute remains to be constitutitonal.
What is the rule on the publication of laws as requirement of due process?
o In Tanada vs. Tuvera, 1986, under Article 2 of the Civil Code, provides, laws shall take
effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette
unless it is otherwise provided. The phrase unless it is otherwise provided refers to the
15-day period and not the requirement of publication. A statute that is not published
violates due process, it is a violation of due process if a statute which is supposed to be
published in the official gazette is not published, one may go to court to question if one
is sued for a law that is not published properly.
Is the rule requiring publication, for the effectivity of laws, apply only to laws passed by
Congress?
o No, it also applied to Presidential Decrees and Executive Orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers, whenever the same are validly delegated
by the Legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
Republic vs. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Co. requirement for publication before
the effectivity of laws.
What is void for vagueness rule?
o A law that is utterly vague is defective, because it fails to give notice of what it
commands (People vs. Nazario).
o In the case of Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, Josepth Estrada was sued for plunder, he
contends that the plunder law is vague and therefore it is against due process but the
Supreme Court disagreed. According to the Court, a statute or act is vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence guess as its meaning and
differ as to its application. In such an instance, the Statute is repugnant to the
Constitution in two (2) respects 1st, it violates due process for failure to accord
persons fair notice of what conduct to avoid and 2nd, it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the

Government muscle. In the case of Estrada, the Court ruled that the plunder law is not
vague.
o In People vs. Dela Piedra, 2001 a criminal statute that fails to give a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the
statute or is so indefinite that it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrest and convictions
is void for vagueness.
The equal protection clause is a specific constitutional guarantee of the equality of the person.
The equality it guarantees is legal equality or the equality of all persons before the law. The equality
guaranteed, however, does not deny to the State the power to recognize and act upon factual
differences between individuals and classes. It recognizes that inherent in the right to legislate is the
right to classify. The problem, thus, in equal protection cases is one of determining the validity of the
classification made by law.
Example:
There is a law that was enacted by Congress which would apply to women and men alike. In

that way the law enacted in Congress failed to recognize the difference or the classification, the
law recognizes the inherent right of the Legislature to classify.
The guarantee of equal protection simply means that no person or class of persons shall be
deprived of the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the
same place and in like circumstances.
In People vs. Cayat, it is an established principle in Constitutional Law that the guarantee of the
equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification.
Question:
What are the requirements of a reasonable classification?
o 1. It must rest on substantial distinction.
2. It must be germane to the purpose of the law.
3. Must not be limited to existing conditions only.
4. Must apply equally to all members of the same class.
In Farinas vs. Executive Secretary, 2003 the provisions in the Fair Elections Act providing that
elective officials are not deemed resigned was held by the Supreme Court not to be applicable to
appointive officials because they are not of the same class, Appointive against Elective.
RA 7227, The Subic Freeport Law, was challenged as violative of the equal protection clause
because it granted tax and duty incentives to businesses and residence within the secured area of the
Subic special economic zone and denied them to those who lived within the zone but outside the fence
area. In Subic, there is a fence area where those who are entitled. The residence of Subic outside the
fenced area complained, they questioned the unequal treatment to them. The Supreme Court said,
there is a classification therefore the statute is valid. The Court justified the classification, saying that
the Constitution does not require absolute equality.
International School Alliance of Educators vs. Quisumbing, Quisumbing was the Secretary of
Education before 2001. The practice of the International School of giving higher salary to foreign hires
than to local hires was question. Both the local and the foreign hires had the same circumstances but
the local hires were given less pay. The Supreme Court ruled that the practice is unconstitutional.
The Constitution as a general rule places the civil rights of aliens in equal footing with those of
citizens. Political rights are not applied equally between aliens and citizens.

In Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong, a law can offend against equal protection not only when it classifies
but also when it fails to classify. The Court invalidated a Manila Ordinance imposing uniform license
fee on all aliens as a pre-condition in accepting employment. The uniform fee was found unlawful
because it fails to consider valid differences in situation among individual aliens who were required to
pay.
Himagan vs. People, concerns with the provision of the National Police Law. Under the
National Police Law, suspension can continue beyond 90 days until after the case against the
policeman is terminated (other civil servants only the 90 days period applied). This was questioned
before the Supreme Court and the Court said: the Policemen are classified differently from other civil
service employee.
Question:
Does the equal protection clause prohibit the State from Institutionalizing inequality or does it
command the State to take positive measures to eradicate inequalities that has arisen, not
necessarily through State action?
o So far, under the equal protection clause of Section 1, the concerns mainly involved acts
of the legislative that is violative the equal protection clause. It indicates that the
Constitution is only proactive, that the violation against the equal protection clause is
there only to remedy a situation.
Does the Constitution have provisions that are not dependent on actual cases or remedial
measures but acts that would enhance equal protection?
o Yes, according to Bernas, they are the following:
1. No less than the preamble proclaims equality as an ideal.
2. Command to promote social justice in all face of development in Article II,
Section 10, further explicated in Article XIII, National Patrimony.
3. The Commission on Elections is given broad powers in order to implement laws
seeking to equalize political opportunities.
4. So is the command of the Constitution to prohibit political dynasties.
5. Article III section 11 expressly guarantees free access to the courts.
6. Article XIV commands the State to make quality education accessible to all.
o The above mentioned enumeration are the provisions of the Constitution that enhances
the equal protection of people, not necessarily as a result of a legislature that is being
corrected by the equal protection clause of section 1.

Section 2:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The command of section 2 reads: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable

Procedure on how a lawful warrant of arrest and search warrant shall be issued: no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon:
1. Probable cause
2. To be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce (not necessarily by the judge)
3. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized
Twin mandates of Section 2:
1. Protect the privacy and sanctity of the person and his house and other possessions against
arbitrary intrusions of the State.
2. It provides for conditions under which a valid intrusion may be made.
Question:
May a private person or an entity be made liable for illegal search?
o Yes, but not under the Constitution but under Article 32 of the Civil Code (Silahis
International Hotel, Inc. vs. Rogelio Soluta)
As earlier, the provisions of the Bill of Rights can only be violated by the State and not private
individuals, but it does not mean that the private individuals may go scotch free, they can be held
liable.
Question:
Is Section 2 a prohibition against all searches and seizures?
o No, only of unreasonable searches and seizures. As a general rule, searches and seizure
are unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant.
1. In Valmonte vs. Villa, People vs. Escano, the Court had the occasion to determine
when is there illegal search. This has something to do with checkpoints. The
Court held that there as yet no cause for the application of the Constitutional
when what are involved are routine checks consisting of a brief question or 2,
for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to
bodily search and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to visual search. Said
routine checks cannot be regarded as violative as an individuals right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
When may a search be conducted without a warrant?
o When there is probable cause. If there is reason to believe that a person is committing a
crime and the policeman believes that there is probable cause for the search then he
may undertake the search, but, there must be a good and serious reason that a crime
has been, will be or has been committed and that a person searched is involved in the
crime.
What are the essential requisites of a valid warrant?
o Essentials requisites are:
1. It must be issued upon probable cause.
2. Probable cause must be determined personally by the judge. Such judge must
examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses they may
produce but in the recent cases, the Supreme Court said that they examination
under oath of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce does not
necessarily be made by the judge, but, the result if the examination is done by
another person must be written and the result must be provided to the judge.

3. Warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched or the person or

thing to be seized.
No search warrant or warrant of arrest issue except upon probable cause.
Question:
What is probable cause?
o Is such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of a warrant that are in
themselves sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuance
thereof.
What is the probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest?
o Is such facts and circumstances which lead in a reasonably prudent man to believe that
an offense had been committed by the person sought to be arrested. The reasonably
prudent man is the judge.
What is the probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant?
o Facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection of the offense are
in the place sought to be searched.
What is the quantum of evidence needed to reach probable cause?
o Probability, only the probability that a crime has been committed is enough. Based on
the narration of the complainant and that of the witnesses which are before the judge,
he must determine probable cause. The standards of the judgment are those of a
reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibration of the judge after a full blown
trial.
Probable cause for a search warrant need not point to a specific offender but it must point to
some specific violation of our criminal law.
Probable cause for a warrant of arrest must point to a specific offender.
Under Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, it is not provided that a search warrant shall
not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense, and that no search warrant
shall issue for more than one specific offense. If there are several offenses, there must also be several
search warrants.
In the case of Stonehill vs. Diokno, the description of the offense was made in a general manner
[it merely stated it there is a violation of the Central Bank Laws, tariff and Customs Law, Internal
Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code], no specific act or provision was mentioned. The Supreme
Court then ruled that it [the description of the offense] does not provide enough basis for the issuing
judge to determine if there is probable cause.
Question:
Must there be personal knowledge of the specific illegal transactions with identified parties in
the issuance of a search warrant?
o In the case of Central Bank vs. Judge Morfe, the Court ruled and upheld that the
issuance of the search warrant and said that the failure of the witness to mention
particular individuals did not necessarily prove that he had no personal knowledge of
specific illegal transactions even if the names of the individuals involved where
unknown to him. This is only applicable in a search warrant.

In the 1935 Constitution, the probable cause may be determined by a judge alone, in the 1973
Constitution, probable cause may be determined by the judge or such other persons as may be
authorized by law, In the 1987 Constitution, the practice returned to the 1935 practice that only the
judge can determine probable cause.
It is a different scenario when a case is filed against a person and it is investigated by the
Fiscals office. The Fiscals office will determine probable cause before he files the case, the probable
cause here is not the same as the probable cause in the issuance of a warrant of arrest or a search
warrant because the probable cause that a Fiscal determines is an administrative determination, the
determination is an executive function for the purposes of filing and nothing more. If the case is filed
and is assigned to a judge, the judge will now issue a warrant which is issued only upon a judicial
probable cause (which has been defined earlier). Even if the Fiscal says that there is probable cause, it
is incumbent upon the judge when it issues the warrant to determine probable cause (judicial
probable cause).
Question:
What is the oft required for the complainants and witnesses when they appear before the judge
before the issuance of a warrant of arrest or search warrant (test of sufficiency)?
o Alvarez vs. CFI (Court of First Instance), as laid down in this case, the test is whether it
had been drawn in such manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affidavit be
held liable for damages caused.
What is meant by personally in Section 2 (to be determined personally by the judge)?
o In Soliven vs. Judge Makasiar, the judge need not be the one to examine the complaint
and his witnesses, it can be done by a commissioner (the Clerk of Court or some other
person), however, the report of the examination must be given or provided the judge
when he sits down to personally determine probable cause. What the judge would do is
personal determination and not personal examination, therefore, the word personally
in section 2 refers to the act of the judge in personally determining probable cause and
not personally examining the witnesses.
Lim vs. Felix, reiterated the Soliven vs. Makasiar.
What is the purpose of requiring particularity of description in a search warrant?
o The evident purpose of the requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those and
only those particularly described in a search warrant.
The rule that searchers and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute
rule, what the provision prohibits is unreasonable searches and seizure. A search or seizure not
supported by a warrant is not necessarily unreasonable because there may be warrantless searches
and seizures. These are the following circumstances where seizure and searches may be had even
without a warrant:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Search incidental to an arrest.

Search of moving vehicles.
Seizure of evidence in plain view.
Customs searches.
Where there is waiver of the right.
Rule on exigent circumstances.
Stop and frisk rule.

Moreno vs. Ago Chi is an example of a search incidental to an arrest, the officer making an
arrest may take from the person any money or property found in his person which was used in the

commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with a
means of committing violence or escaping or which may be used as an evidence of the trial of the case.
Question:
May a search incidental to an arrest be made in a place other than where the suspect is
arrested?
o In the case of Nolasco vs. Pano, the arrest was made in a jeepney, the search was made
in the house, the court ruled that the search was not proper. To quote Chief Justice
Teehankee in his concurring opinion he said: Such warrantless search obviously
cannot be made in a place other than the of arrest.
Search of moving vehicles, because it is not practical to secure a warrant because the vehicle
can move out of the locality or jurisdiction to which the warrant was sought, then search of a moving
vehicle can be done even without a warrant.
Anag vs. COMELEC, Anag was a Congressman of the 8th Congress, in the election of 1992, his
car was flagged down 20 meters away from the gate of the Batasan, when the search was done,
authorities found several firearms. The Supreme Court said that the search was unlawful because
there was no showing or evidence that the occupant of the car is a suspected person. There was no
showing likewise that a prior report was done that the car had contrabands. The search was
invalidated because there was no probable cause. There must be a determination of the Policeman of
probable cause before searching the vehicle. The search of the car made by police officers 20 meters
away from the entrance of the Batasan Complex was not justified by any earlier confidential report
nor by the behavior or appearance of the motorist. The court further held, an extensive search without
warrant could only be resorted to if the officers conducting the search had reasonable or probable
cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist was a law offender or that they would find
the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of the crime in the vehicle to be searched.
Requirements for evidence in plain view as an exception:
1. There must be a valid prior intrusion into a place the ingress of the authorities into a
place must be legal.
2. The evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where
they are. If the officers do not inadvertently discover evidence outside the place specified by
the warrant then the seizure or search is invalid.
3. Illegality of the evidence must be immediately apparent (e.g. shabu, guns and bullets).
4. It is noticed without further search.
In People vs. Tapar, where marijuana sticks fall before the eyes of the Police officer from the
object a person is carrying, seizure of the sticks will not require a warrant.
People vs. Musa, the evidence in plain, discovery must be inadvertent.
Customs Inspection since it is there duty then they may the right to inspect even without a
warrant.
Waiver of Constitutional Right People vs. Barros, 1994, and De Garcia vs. Locsin, the Court
ruled that the failure to object in an unlawful search is not an implied waiver of a persons right,
instead it is just a demonstration of the regard for the supremacy of the law.
In People vs. Comapacion, the military was allowed by the owner to enter the premises of his
home, his silence for the unreasonable search and seizure is not a waiver of voluntary submission or

implied acquiescence. The implied conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances is
considered no consent at all.
In Spouses Veroy vs. Layague, while it is true that the owners permitted the authorities to enter
their home, the consent given to the authorities to enter the home does not carry with it permission
given for them to search, go from one room to another to make a search.
Exigent Circumstances there is no time or opportunity anymore to go to court. This happened
during the time of Coup detat. The Police saw a cache of firearms, seen from the outside, inside a
bodega, because of the exigent circumstances (there was a coup and there was fighting all around) the
police can no longer go to court and file a warrant thus they seized the firearms then and there.
Stop and Frisk rule Posadas vs. Court of Appeals and Malacat vs. Court of Appeals
suspicious acts made by people may warrant a stop and frisk situation even if no arrest is made.
In Amarga vs. Abbas, 1956, the Supreme Court already said the requirements for the issuance
of a search warrant are the same as the requirements for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It is now
a constitutional provision. The 1987 Constitution does not provide for a different requirement for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest from that of the issuance of a search warrant.
Question:
Is a John Doe warrant of arrest valid?
o Yes, provided that the warrant contains a descriptio personae or a description of the
person such that the person can be easily identified.
Is a warrant of arrest for numerous John Doe?
o It cannot be done, a general warrant is clearly a violation of the requirement of
particularity of description.
There are valid searches without warrant or warrantless searches, there are also warrantless
arrests, this is summarized under rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, these are:
1. When in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is
about to commit an offense (this provision gives power not only to a police officer but also
to a private individual to make an arrest). This instance is also known as the Flagrante
delicto rule.
a. In People vs. Burgos and People vs. Jayson, the court said that the officer arresting a
person who has just committed, is committing, or about to commit an offense must
have personal knowledge of the fact. The offense must be committed in his presence
or within his view
2. When an offense has in fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
3. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment.
Question:
May a warrantless arrest be effected 3 month or 6 days after the commission of a crime?
o No, a warrantless arrest must be done on the spot.
Is entrapment legal?
o Entrapment is legal depending on the circumstances. The type of entrapment the law
forbids is the inducing of another to violate the law, the seduction of an otherwise
innocent person into a criminal career. Where the criminal intent originates from the
mind of entrapping person and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense

charged in order to prosecute him, there is entrapment and no conviction maybe had
(this entrapment is called instigation). In a buy-bust operation, the officers already
know who are the criminals, they merely engage with these criminals to catch them
red-handed and thus this kind of entrapment is legal (People vs. Doria).
Go vs. Court of Appeals is an instance where a crime had been committed and the peace officer
or the person making an arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it.
Question:
When must the validity of an arrest be challenged?
o It must be made before a person enters a plea in the arraignment otherwise the
objection is deemed waived. The Accused must move for the quashing of the
information against him before the arraignment otherwise he is estopped from
questioning the validity of the arrest.
Is an application for bail a waiver of the right of an accused to question the illegality of his
arrest?
o No, Section 26, Rule 112 and Okabe vs. Judge de Leon.

Section 3:
1. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order
of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
1st part of the section 3(1) general rule, the 2nd part is the exception.
The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable general rule.
Exceptions:
1. Upon lawful order of the court.
2. When public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
Question:
True or False: Is the privacy to communication and correspondence absolutely inviolable?
o False, it admits exceptions.
What type of communications and correspondents are covered in Section?
o The provisions covers letters and messages.
Does Section 3 allow intrusions into the privacy of communication and correspondence?
o Yes, the 2nd part of the 1st sentence of Section provides for them.
Upon what grounds may the courts allow intrusion? Section 3 prohibits intrusion into the
privacy of communication and correspondence but there is an exception: when the courts
allows it, when you apply for intrusion (e.g. wiretapping), what would be the yard stick of the
courts in providing for the exception?
o The Court may order intrusion based on the requirements of probable cause (section 2).
This is because intrusion into communication and correspondence is a form of a search.

 What is the meaning of the exclusionary rule under paragraph 2 of Section 3?

o The exclusionary rule bars admission of illegally obtained evidence for any purpose in
any proceeding.
How may evidence declared inadmissible be disposed of?
o The inadmissibility of evidence does not mean that it must be returned where it came
from pending determination of the legality of the seized articles. It must remain in
custoria legis or in the custody of the court. If the object is not a prohibited object, then
after the case is disposed of, it must be returned, but if it is a contraband it must be
confiscated (Ali vs. Castro).
In the absence of governmental interference, the constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure cannot be invoked against the State (People vs. Andre Marti).
Question:
May evidence that is unlawfully obtained by private individuals come under the exclusionary
rule?
o To come under the exclusionary rule, the evidence must be obtained by government
agents and not by individuals acting on their own.

NOVEMBER 27, 2014

Section 4:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
Two parts of Section 4:
1st No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press;
2nd The right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
Originally Section 4 does not include the freedom of expression. The phrase of expression is
a new addition in the 1987 Phil. Constitution. It was here that freedom of speech or of the press was
considered vague as to include other forms of expression, an example is pantomime (acting without
words coming out from a persons mouth). Freedom of speech includes other forms of expression, in
the 1987 Phil. Constitution, they made it explicit, it now reads as freedom of the press, of speech and
of expression which now includes different kinds of expression and not only speech.
The second part of Section 4 is an old provision carried by the 1987 Phil. Constitution.
Question:
What are the twin mandates of Section 4?
o 1st is the protection of the freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press; and
o 2nd the protection to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.
What does speech, expression, or press include?
o It includes every form of expression, whether oral, written, taped, disc-recorded,
movies, symbolic speech (wearing of arm bands) and peaceful picketing.

 What are the two prohibitions of the abridgement of the freedom of speech, expression, or of
the press?
o 1st, the prohibition on prior restraint it is restraint prior to the act. Official
government restriction on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual
publication or dissemination. Its most blatant form is a system of licensing administered
by an executive officer (movie censorship, although not placed on the same level as
press censorship, belongs to this type of prior restraint). In addition to the acts of prior
restraint is judicial prior restraint which takes the form of injunctions issued by the
courts against publication. Equally objectionable prior restraints are licensing taxes
measured by gross receipts for the privilege to engaging in the business of advertising in
any newspaper or flat license fees for privilege of selling religious books.
o 2nd, prohibition on subsequent punishment restraint of speech, expression, and of the
press after the act. The mere prohibition of government interference (prior restraint)
before words are spoken or published would be inadequate protection of the freedom of
expression if government could punish without restraint after publication. The
guarantee of freedom of expression also means a limitation in the power of the State to
impose subsequent punishment.
Is the warning against media against airing of the conversation between the President and
other personalities constitute constitutional prior restraint?
o Yes, it constitutes prior restraint and is unconstitutional as held in Chavez vs. Gonzales
(Hello Garci tapes).
When the right to free speech and the press collides with the right of the accused to a fair trial
how will the court dispose of the conflict?
o In the case of Secretary of Justice vs. Sandiganbayan during the hearing in the case of
President Estrada, the Supreme Court said the case involved a petition to allow live
television coverage of the trial of the Former-President. The case involved the weighing
out of the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of the press and the right of the
people to public information on the one hand and the fundamental rights of the accused
on the other hand. When these rights are raised against one another, jurisprudence tells
us that the rights of the accused must be preferred. In denying the petition, the Court
said that television coverage of judicial proceedings involves an inherent denial of due
process in the rights of a criminal-defendant.
o In the Maguindanao Massacre cases, a petition for radio and TV coverage was requested.
The Supreme Court said that the indication of serious risk posed by live coverage to the
accuseds right to due process left unexplained in the Estrada case has left a blow to the
exercise to press freedom and the right to public information. Apparent circumstance
makes the Maguindanao Massacre different from the Estrada cases, one of which is the
impossibility of accommodating all interested parties inside the courtroom (because
there are more than 150 accused). Initially the Supreme Court said, yes, live coverage
maybe done in the Maguindanao Massacre cases, however, on reconsideration, the
Supreme Court did not allow live coverage as reiterated by Chief Justice Sereno, the
members of the press must be allowed inside the courtroom but no live coverage is
allowed. While the Court recognizes the freedom of the press and the right to public
information (these rights belongs to non-direct parties) the rights of the direct parties
should not be forgotten. In a clash amongst these competing interests, jurisprudence
makes it clear that the balance should always be weighed in favor of the accused (the
decision went back to the justification on the Estrada case for live coverage).
Ayer Productions vs. Kapulong, the case involved the production of the 4-day revolution (a
movie-documentary on the EDSA revolution) and Senator Juan Ponce Enrile. Since Enrile was a crucial

player during this revolution the documentary included his persona in the film. Enrile went to court
and wanted to stop the production and the recording of his participation, he asserted his right to
privacy while the petitioners (producers) asserted their right of expression. The Court said that the
freedom of expression must be balanced to the right to privacy (which was recognized by law as the
right to be left alone). A limited intrusion into a persons privacy has long been regarded as
permissible where the person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or
to be published about him constitute matters of public character. In this case, there was no doubt that
the events of the 4-day revolution is of a public character. In addition, Enrile was a public figure
which meant that he had no right to prevent the publication of the story of his participation in the
event.
Question:
Is the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press absolute?
o No, the freedom of speech is not absolute.
May these rights be lawfully restrained?
o Yes, laws may be had for the restraint for the freedom of speech but there must be a
standard for the restraint.
What are the requirements for the lawful restraint of these rights?
o Dangerous tendency rule speech can be curtailed or punished when it creates a
dangerous tendency to bring about the evil which the state has the right to prevent. The
tendency alone for the evil to come about will justify the restraint these rights. All it
requires for speech to be punishable is that there be rational connection between the
speech and the evil sought to be apprehended.
o Clear and present danger rule is founded on whether the words used are used in such
circumstance and are of such nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of
proximity and degree in both instances. In the dangerous tendency rule, if the speech is
uttered in such a way that there is a tendency to bring about the evil sought to be
prevented then speech may be curtailed. Under the clear and present danger rule there
must already be a clear and present danger of the evil before the right to speech, to
expression, or of the press to be curtailed.
o Balancing of interest rule Courts have the duty to balance the evil sought to be
prevented as against the rights. If general welfare is the reason for the curtailment of
speech then speech may be prevented. But if the courts, in balancing this interest will
say that the speech does not bring about the evil sought to be avoided then the courts
will allow speech. Jurisprudence in this test uses the case of Gonzales vs. COMELEC.
Freedom of expression has never been understood to be an absolute right. Some forms of
speech are not protected by the Constitution.
Question:
What are the forms of speech not protected by the Constitution?
o Libel jurisprudence on libel has been developed around Article 353 of the revised
penal code. Libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, a vice, a defect, real
or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause
the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead.
Elements required to be liable for libel:
1. The allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another;
2. Publication of the charge;

3. Identity of the person defamed;

4. Existence of malice.
When is a speech libelous?
o When the imputation is public;
o When it is malicious.
When is imputation considered public?
o The imputation is public when the information is made known to anyone
other than the person to whom it is written.
When is speech/statement considered malicious?
o It is malicious when the author of the imputation is prompted by evil or
spite or speech not in response to duty but merely to injure the
reputation of the person who claims to have been defamed.
o Obscenity
If a speech is not malicious even if defamatory it is privileged, libel does not set in as stated in
the case of Alonzo vs. Court of Appeals.
In Alonzo vs. Court of Appeals, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious even
if it be untrue. If no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown.
Exceptions:
1. A private communication to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report made in good faith without any comments/remarks of any judicial,
legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature or of any
statement, report, or speech delivered in such proceedings or of any other act performed by
public officers in the exercise of their duties and functions.
Question:
Are pleadings filed in court privileged?
o The prevailing rule is that parties, counsels and witnesses are exempted from liability in
libel or slander, for words otherwise defamatory published in the course of judicial
proceedings, provided, the statements are relevant to the case (Armovit vs. Judge
Purisima).
Pleadings are privileged, but to be so, they must be relevant to the matter under
investigation (Gutierrez vs. Abila).
The case of People vs. Del Rosario defines who is injured in cases of libel. In
criminal law, in the commission of the crime, it is the State who is injured, in
libel, it is not the disturbance of public order coxed by defamatory language but
its tendency to injure the person defamed.
There are three objects of criticisms in the life of a public figure:
1. His public and official acts;
2. His mental, moral and physical fitness for office;
3. His strictly private life.
When the object of criticism is his strictly private life, defamatory implications are not
constitutionally protected expression. When object of criticism is his public or official acts then the
expression is constitutionally protected. True criticism of a persons mental, moral and physical fitness
for office is privilege but false criticism is not privilege if malicious (if used as a cloak for assaults for a
persons private life).

Fermin vs. People, Public figures are not unprotected, they are protected from criticisms.
Second part of Section 4:
The right of the people to peaceably assemble cannot and must not be impaired, but it may be
regulated (like the other rights).
Standards for allowing restraint or regulation:
1. Dangerous Tendency rule;
2. Clear and Present danger rule;
3. Balancing of interest rule.
Evangelista vs. Earnshaw Dangerous Tendency rule. Evangeslista was a Communist leader
(CPP) while Earnshaw was mayor of manila.
Primicias vs. Fugoso Clear and Present danger rule. Fugoso was a mayor and Primicias was a
communist leader.
Question:
Which rule is more in keeping with the spirit of the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly, and petition?
o Not answered.
o Opinion: The Clear and Present Danger rule gives more guarantee to the constitutional

right than the dangerous tendency rule.

Section 5:
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.
1st sentence meat of section 5 (non-establishment clause and free-exercise clause)
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 provides that Catholicism was the States religion. It was also
the State religion in the Philippines, but one of the immediate effects of the American constitutionalism
in the Philippines was the denial to the Catholic Church of the privilege position it held under the
Spanish Sovereignty. The free exercise of religion was first guaranteed under the 1935 Constitution.
Question:
How did this provision get into the 1935 Philippine Constitution?
o It was guaranteed under Section 10 of the Treaty of Paris, which guaranteed that the
territories ceded to the U.S. by Spain shall be secured of a free exercise of religion.
The non-establishment and the free-exercise clauses express an underlying relational concept
of separation between religion and secular government (related to this is Article II section 5).
Question:
What is the basis for the free exercise clause?

o It is the respect for the inviolability of human conscience. There must be free exercise of
religion because no law can be passed to regulate the free exercise of religion. The
exercise of religion is an exercise of human conscience. People must be free to exercise
their religion because their religion is a manifestation of their conscience.
o Cantwell vs. Connecticut, the constitutional inhibition on legislation on the subject of
religion has a double aspect. On the one hand it forestalls compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any forms of worship. Freedom of conscience
and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the
individual may choose cannot be restricted by law, on the hand; it safeguards the free
exercise of the chosen form of religion. Once a person has chosen his religion then the
government must ensure that this person has the freedom to exercise his chosen
religion. It safeguards the free exercise of the chosen religion thus the amendment
embraces two concepts, freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first, which is the
freedom to believe, is absolute but the second, the freedom to act, cannot be absolute.
Can the State impose civic obligations that might conflict with a persons religious beliefs?
o In Gerona vs. Secretary of Education the government said that religion must give way to
law, but in 1993 the Gerona case was abandoned in favor of Ebralinag vs. Division
Superintendent of Schools of Cebu were the Court held that the freedom of religion
requires that protesting members be exempt from the operation of the law. Ebralinag
and Gerona had something to do with Jevohas Witnesses not wanting to salute the
Philippine Flag.
What is the non-establishment clause?
o The non-establishment clause means that the State cannot establish or sponsor a State or
official religion. The non-establishment clause prohibits the State:
1. From passing laws which aid one religion;
2. Aid of religion; and
3. Prefer one religion over another.
o Austria vs. NLRC, a pastor who could not account for the tithes collected in his church
was dismissed by his church. The case reached the NLRC then the Supreme Court.
Austria claims that the NLRC does not have jurisdiction because the case concerned his
religion, the Court said no. The subject of the case had something to do with the
employer-employee relationship between Austria and his church and had nothing to do
with religion.
What is the condition for the exemption for realty taxes for religious property?
o The property should be used:
1. Actually;
2. Directly; and
3. Exclusively used for the purposes of religion, charity and/or education.
What is the purpose for prohibiting religious test?
o The purpose is to render the Government powerless to restore the policy of probing
religious beliefs by test or limiting public offices to persons who have or profess their
beliefs to some or particular kind of religious concept. To allow religious test would
have the effect of formal or practical establishment of a particular religious faith with
consequent burdens imposed on the free exercise of the faith of non-favored believers
(Torcaso vs. Watkins)
Can the State compel a person to bear arms in defense of the Country when bearing arms is
contrary to the persons beliefs?
o NOT ANSWERED
o Opinion: Yes, the urgency of the situation calls upon the citizens to defend their nation.

Section 6:
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by
law.
General rule = the liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall
not be impaired.
Exception = upon lawful order of the court.
Question:
Is the liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law absolute?
o No it is not, it admits of an exception which is the lawful order of the court.
2nd sentence deals with the right to travel.
Question:
Is the right to travel absolute?
o No, it may be impaired if it is for the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health as may be provided by law.
In both instances, the exceptions involve the judiciary. The first instance the liberty of abode
and changing the same may be restrained by lawful order of the court and the second instance of
traveling also includes national security, public safety and public health in accordance with an
existing law.
The freedom of movement involves two rights:
1. The liberty of abode includes the freedom to choose and change once place of abode within
the limits prescribed by law and maybe impaired only upon lawful order of the court (e.g. of
lawful order of the court would be a condition imposed in connection with the grant of bail. In
a bail, it is always imposed there that the accused cannot leave the jurisdiction of the court thus
it impairs the accuseds freedom of abode).
2. The liberty of travel include the freedom to travel within the country and outside the country.
It may be impaired even without a court order, but the appropriate executive officer can only
impose these limits on the basis of national security, public safety, and public health as maybe
provided by law (e.g. passports, passport officers, there is a law that you must have a passport
before you can leave the country).
a. Gloria Arroyo vs. De Lima, former president Arroyo wanted to leave the country but De
Lima stopped her, the Supreme Court issued a restraining order against De Lima and
DOJ.

Section 7:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,

as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The FOI (Freedom of Information Bill) is based on this Section. The restriction on the FOI bill
can be found on administrative issuances which are existing restrictions. Without the FOI bill there is
already a mandate on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern (this is the
subject matter of Section 7).
The two rights guaranteed by the provision are:
1. The right to information on matters of public concern and;
2. The corollary right to access to official records.
These rights are subject to limitations as may be provided by law.
These rights are political rights available only to citizens, and are the exception to the general rule that
the bill of rights are applicable to everyone within the Philippines, even foreigners.
Chavez vs. Pea-Amari (2002) answers the question on when a bid proposal may be accessed by
the public.
Recognized limitations on the exercise of the right to information that existed even before the FOI bill
are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

National Security matters;

Criminal Matter or classified law enforcement matters;
Diplomatic correspondence;
Close door Cabinet meetings;
Executive sessions of either houses of Congress and;
Internal Deliberations of the Supreme Court.

Section 8:
The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Deals with the rights of the people, including those employed in private and public sectors, to
form unions. Before the 1987 Phil Constitution, the right of government employees to form unions is
not specifically mandated/protected.
There is an exception, while the right of government employees to form unions and
associations, societies and organizations is protected/mandated, government employees still do not
have the right to strike. Only private employees are allowed to go on strike.
Section 8 means the right to form associations shall not be impaired without due process of law.
Question:
What if Section 8 was not included in the Constitution? Can employees in the private and
public sector form associations?
o Yes they can.
The right of association involves litigations on two areas of associational activity:

1. Labor unionism;
2. Communist organization.
In the case of Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions vs. Secretary of Labor, in contention in
this case is section 23 of the Labor Code, requiring the registration of Labor Unions. This was
challenged as a violation of the Constitutional provision to form associations. The Supreme Court ruled
that it (section 23) is not a violation of the constitutional provision. The particular provision is not
preventing the organization of associations and labor unions, it mere requires them to register.
In People vs. Hernandez (1956), the case revolved around the question of whether mere
membership in a communist organization is already punishable as a criminal offense. The Court said
no, mere membership is not criminal because there is no overt act committed yet. Membership in the
Communist party of the Philippines is not criminal but membership in the HMB is considered illegal
because the HMB has already announced that their purpose is to overthrow the Philippine
Government through radical means. This case gave way for Congress to enact RA 1700 (Antisubversion law), this law declared the Communist party as illegal. Section 4 of its provision provides
that whoever, knowingly, willfully, and by overt acts, affiliates himself with the Communist party of
the Philippines and becomes a member thereof shall be punished (this law is no longer in effect).

Section 9:
Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
Question:
Does Section 9 provide for the basis for the power of Eminent Domain?
o No, the power of eminent domain is inherent and exists even without the Constitution.
Section 9 merely regulates the power and does not provide for it.
Section 9 provides that for the exercise of eminent domain there are two constitutional requirements:
1. The land shall be used for public purpose;
2. Just compensation should be paid.
In Article XII (National Patrimony), public lands when declared alienable and disposable shall be
given to private person either by sale, by award or etc. and thus they become private property. This
private property is now the subject matter of eminent domain. The process is from an originally public
land to a private land to a public land.
The constitutional provisions on eminent domain:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Section 9, Article III;

Section 18, Article XIII;
Section 4 on Land Reform;
Section 22, Article XVIII (idle or abandoned agricultural lands);
Section 18, Article XII says if it entails expropriations it is, it is required that transfer of
ownership can only be upon payment of just compensation and;
6. Section 4, Article XIII deals with just distribution of agricultural lands subject to the payment of
just compensation.
The right of eminent domain is understood to be the ultimate right of the sovereign power to
appropriate not only for public but also for the private property of all citizens for public purposes.

The exercise of the power of eminent domain is by tradition lodge with the executive although the
power must be granted by the legislature. The executive cannot exercise this power without the
mandate from the legislature. Once authority is given to exercise the power of eminent domain the
matter ceases to be legislative, the executive may then decide whether the power will be invoked and
to what extent. The power of eminent domain may also be conferred upon municipal governments
and other government entities also to private entities operating public utilities. As to the legislature, the
power (eminent domain) is inherent, but for government agencies, local government and public
utilities it is only a delegated power. In the hands of congress the scope of the power is like the scope of
legislative power itself, it is plenary, it is as broad as the scope of police power, it can thus reach every
form of property which the State might need for public use. The delegated power of eminent domain
of local governments is not a power of eminent but of inferior domain, a share, merely in eminent
domain.
City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila, the city of manila wanted to expropriate the
Chinese cemetery to build the Rizal avenue extension. The Court reached the Supreme Court, the
Court said, it could not be expropriated because it had already been expropriated. The Court further
said that the City of Manila did not have any authority because there was no legislative mandate to
exercise the power of eminent domain. The City of Manila then went to Congress and secured an
authority to expropriate the Chinese Cemetery and thus it was expropriated.
The requisites for the exercise of the power of eminent domain are:
1. There is taking of private property;
2. The taking must be for public use public use does not mean or equate to use by the public, it
means public usefulness, utility or advantage or what is productive of the general benefit; The
concept of public use is as broad as public welfare, the scope of the power of eminent domain
has become broad as the expansive and ever expanding scope of police power. The taking of
private property for subdivision and resale for land reform is for public use because land
reform is mandated by the Constitution, that fact already establishes the public purpose of the
taking (Mataas na Lupa vs. Dimayuga). Expropriation for socialize housing is for public use
(Sumulong vs. Guerrero). Expropriation for the construction of irrigation canals (Cosculluela
vs. Court of Appeals).
a. In Manosca vs. Court of Appeals, the non-establishment clause of the Constitution came
into play.
3. There must be just compensation it is the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the
owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. It is the
compensation given to the owner is just if he receives for his property a sum equivalent to its
market value.
a. Market Value the price which the property will command if the seller is not bound to
sell and the buyer is not bound to buy. This is the definition of the deliberation of the
Constitutional Commission. A statutory determination (a determination of congress or a
legislative authority) of just compensation would only be prima facie assessment. In the
end, the final determination of just compensation will have to be made by the court.
Question:
Who are entitled to just compensation?
o Not only the owner of the land to be expropriated but also include all those who have
lawful interest in the property to be condemned including a mortgagee of a registered
mortgage, a lessee, a vendee, or every person having an interest at law or in equity in
the land taken is entitled to share in the award.
When may the expropriator enter into the property expropriated?

o Entry may be made by the expropriator even prior to actual payment of just
compensation. What is merely required is that a deposit is made of the provisional value
of the property.
As a general rule, the value of the property expropriated is determined during the time of the
taking of the property expropriated.
In Republic vs. Serabia, there may be instances that there will be taking before the filing of an
expropriation complaint. When both happen simultaneously then there is no problem. But when the
taking comes first before the filing then an issue rises. Compensation for property expropriated must
be determined as of the time the expropriating authority takes possession.
Question:
May just compensation and expropriation for land reform be less than the market value?
o Yes, because land reform is both an eminent domain act and a police power act. The
Guido(Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration)-Baylosis(Republic vs. Baylosis) cases
under the 1935 Phil Constitution (expropriation of large landed estates were guided by
the Guido-Baylosis cases). The guideline is that expropriation for housing to be resolved
to landless must be of big landed estates. This was amended in the case of Tuason vs.
Land Tenure Administration where the area test in the Guido-Baylosis cases was
rejecting in favor of the States quest for social justice and peace. The Tuason Doctrine
was carried in the 1973 and 1987 Phil Constitution. Therefore, even if it was not a
large landed estate even if it is lesser it can be expropriated for resale to the landless.
The exercise of the power of eminent domain is always subject to judicial review. There are two
cases/situations that may be reviewed by the courts.
Two Situations:
1. Compensation it must always be determined by the Court;
2. Exercise of eminent domain.
Question:

Is the exercise of eminent domain subject to judicial review?

o It depends. When expropriation is done not directly by Legislative authority but by
another government agency or by a municipal corporation in virtue of an authorizing
statute which neither specifies the purpose of the taking nor the property to be taken it
is always subject to judicial review. If it is an exercise of a delegated eminent domain
then it is always subject to judicial review. When the legislature itself specifies the
purpose of the taking and singles out the property to be taken, the judgment made by
the legislature is not reviewable by the Courts.

Res Judicata is a principle which says that once a case has become final it can never be
opened. It is a principle necessary to the judicial system so that there be end to litigations. The very
nature of eminent domain as an inherent power of the State dictates that the right to exercise the
power is absolute; it is unfettered by prior judgment or res judicata. Res judicata does not affect the
power to exercise eminent domain.
Difference between regulation and taking:
Regulation police power that is involved. In police power, property is regulated; there is no transfer
of ownership. Regulation is not compensable.

Taking with just compensation then it is eminent domain. In eminent domain, property is taken;
there is transfer of ownership. Taking must be compensated.

When a property interest is appropriated and applied to some public purpose there is
compensable taking.
When property interest is merely restricted, the cause continued on restricted use would be
injurious to public welfare or where the property is destroyed because continued existence to
the property would be injurious to public interest there is no compensable taking, it is the
exercise of police power.
When the entry into private property is not just a simple right of way, which is ordinarily
allowed by court under the civil code, but is for purposes of conducting mining activities such
as exploration and extraction, there is already compensable taking. All these will definitely oust
the owners or occupants of the affected areas (Didipio Earth Savers vs. Secretary).
When the right of way enforced by the State results in making the adjoining property unusable,
just compensation is due (Republic vs. Andaya)
Where the nature of an effect of an installation of a 230 kilovolts transmission line results in
the imposition of limitation against the use of the land for an indefinite period, there is
compensable taking (National Power Corporation vs. San Pedro)
When the Municipal property is taken by the State, compensation is required if:
o It is patrimonial property of the municipality (property acquired by it with its private
funds in its private capacity). If it is any other property such as public buildings, held
the Local Government for the State in trust for its inhabitants, the State is free to dispose
of it at will (Province of Zamboanga del Norte vs. City of Zamboanga).

The power of eminent domain under the Local Government Code has been given to Local
Governments.
Question:
What are the essential requisites for the practice of eminent domain for Local Governments?
o There must be an ordinance authorizing the expropriation. The power must be
exercised for public use;
o It must be with just compensation;
o There must be an offer previously made and the same was not accepted.

Section 10:
No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
This particular section of the Bill of Rights is directed to the Legislative bodies because of the
phrase: no law shall be passed.
Section 10 speaks of the obligation of the contract or the meat of the contract. The essence of a
contract is the obligation itself.
Not all changes are prohibited, just because a contract already exist does not mean that laws
can no longer be passed. To fall within the prohibition, the change must impair the obligation of the
existing contract and the impairment must be substantial and a remedy is provided for the impairment
of the contract then the law is not considered violative of Section10 (Manila Trading Company vs.
Reyes).

The power of the Legislature to change remedies and modes of procedure rest on police power,
meaning the obligation of contracts may be impaired.
Question:
On what basis may be the obligation of contracts be impaired?
o Through Police power. If it is for the general welfare that the obligation of a contract
must be impaired then it will be so using police power.

Jurisprudence has established that a valid exercise of police power is superior to obligation of
contracts. With the acceptance of the superiority of police power over contract, the contract clause has
very limited usefulness and may even be removed from the Constitution without substantial loss. The
non-impairment clause is a superfluity. It has accomplished nothing which the due process clause
could not have accomplished. It has prevented nothing which the due process clause could not have
prevented. There has been a distinct acknowledgement of the expansiveness of police power which the
contract clause alone cannot curtail Fr. Bernas.
Even if the non-impairment clause is removed contracts will still be protected under the due
process clause.
La Insular vs. Machuca, to come under the constitutional prohibition, the law must affect the
rights of the parties with reference to each other. Example, A and B entered into a contract of sale of
cigars. The government imposed additional taxes in the selling of cigars , therefore the transaction that
is covered by the contract has changed.
Question:
In the situation given, was it an impairment of the obligation of the contract?
o No, because the impairment of the obligation of contracts must affect the parties to the
contract and not by virtue of a third person that is coming in to the contract.
The non-impairment clause is a limit on the exercise of legislative power and not of judicial or
quasi-judicial power. It is a limit on the exercise by legislature, by Congress, of its legislative power. It
is not a limit on the exercise by the Courts of its power, so that when a court nullifies or interprets a
contract in such a way as to affect the contractual relation of the parties to the contract, there is no
impairment of the obligation of contracts in the Constitutional sense (Lim vs. Secretary).
There is a reservation clause (Section 11, Article XII) in the grant of franchises. When Congress
believes that general welfare dictates the need to change the franchise given then it shall do so.
Question:
What if there is no reservation clause for non-impairment? May Congress still pass a law that
would impair the franchises?
o Yes it may. Under the exercise of Police Power. With or without the reservation clause,
franchises are subject to alteration through a reasonable exercise of police power.

Section 11:
Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be
denied to any person by reason of poverty.

This section is the basis for legislative acts or statutes that provides for pauper litigants.
Although Statutes (RA 6033, RA 6034 and RA 6035) that are crafted on the basis of this provision is
being enforced, the efforts are not enough to meet the mandate of section 11.
It is heavily related to Article XIII, Social Justice, stating that those that have less in life must
have more in law.

JANUARY 15, 2015

Section 12:
1. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
2. No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will
shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms
of detention are prohibited.
3. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
4. The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this Section as well as
compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.
The United States Supreme Court decided the case of Escobeda vs. Illinois in 1964 (case that
held that criminal suspects have a right to counsel during police interrogation otherwise known as
custodial investigation).
In 1966 the case of Miranda vs. Arizona (landmark case which allowed inculpatory and
exculpatory statements made in response to interrogation by a defendant in police custody will be
admissible at trial only if the prosecution can show that the defendant was informed of the right to
consult with an attorney before and during questioning and of the right against self-incrimination
before police questioning, and that the defendant not only understood these rights, but voluntarily
waived them) was decided by the United States Supreme Court paved the way for the provision to be
created. The provision was first used in the 1973 Phil. Constitution and was adopted in the 1987 Phil.
Constitution under the rights of the person under investigation. Before the two cases enumerated
above there was no such rights vested upon the accused.
The Escobedo ruling spoke of the rights of the person under custodial investigation (example:
when the suspect has already been taken into police custody). While the Miranda case provided for
the duty of the police officers to inform the person being arrested of his rights (the so-called Miranda
rights).
Custodial investigation is the time when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody and
the police carry out the process of interrogation that leads itself to eliciting incriminating evidence.
Miranda rights:
1. The right to remain silent;

2.
3.
4.
5.

Saying that anything the accused shall say can and will be used against him in court;
The rights to have counsel;
Be told that in case the accused cannot afford a lawyer, he shall be provided with one;
Interrogation without counsel shall cease anytime when the accused request for an lawyer, the
interrogation shall continue only when the counsel has accused and;
6. Evidence acquired by means that does not follow the preceding rule shall not be used against
him.
Note: The Escobedo, the rights are available to a person in custody. In Philippine jurisprudence,
especially in the 1973 and 1987 Phil. Constitution and in the Supreme Court decisions as well as a
statutory right passed by Congress, these rights are available to a person even if the person is not
under custodial investigation.
Question:
Who may avail of the rights?
o The rights are available to any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense (the person, as noted, may avail the right even if he is not under custodial
investigation).
Note: The Constitutional rights of an accused (to remain silent, right to an attorney, etc.) extend
only to testimonial compulsion and not when the accused is proposed to be examined as when he is
made to undergo a paraffin test. However, the rights are available to a reenactment of a crime, the
reenactment of the crime is done when a suspect is allowed or instructed to reenact how a crime was
committed, although the rules says that these rights are limited only to testimonial compulsion, and
reenactment not being testimonial at all, movement and reenactment is still included in the application
of these rights. It (the rights) extends to any evidence communicative in nature acquired under
circumstances of duress. Thus an act, whether testimonial or passive, that would amount to disclosure
of incriminatory facts, is covered by the inhibition or prohibition of the Constitution. Photos of
reenactment are not admissible.
In People vs. Hugo, the accused was not provided counsel.
A person in a police lineup is not entitled to counsel (just a lineup). However, a person under
custody who is placed in a police lineup is entitled to the rights of Section 12.
In People vs. Ordono, the rights under section 12 do not cover the verbal confessions to a radio
announcer. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or
confessions. These rights are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the State as to
push the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the
truth. One thing more, the reason why it is not covered is because the confession is made to a private
person (the radio announcer) and not to the police officers.
An interview recorded on video, showing the accused unburdening his guild, talking about
how he executed the crime is admissible. Such confession does not form part of custodial investigation
as it was not given to police officers but to media men.
Question:
When do the rights begin to be available?
o In People vs. Marra 1994, it followed the Escobedo case, wherein the rights are said to
be available only when the person is in custody. Insofar as the case is concerned it

follows the Escobedo which requires custodial investigation before the rights are made
available to a person.
o In 1995, in an Obiter Dictum, Justice Davide (one of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission Commissioners) adverted to the view, in the Constitutional Commission,
that the rights are available even to one who is not yet in custody. As an Obiter Dictum,
it could not overturn the Courts earlier decision in People vs. Marra. However, In
People vs. Lumantay 1999 and People vs. Prinsipe 2002, the rights were extended to an
individual who has not been formally arrested but has merely been invited for
questioning. These two decisions were based on R.A. 7438, which clarifies that the
rights under section 12 are available even to persons not yet in custody.
o People vs. Rapesa, where appellant did not voluntarily surrender to the police but was
invited only. He was detained from 11 in the morning to the morning of the next day
before his extra-judicial confession was taken. The Supreme Court ruled that the
appellant should have been informed of his constitutional rights as he was already
considered a suspect.
o In 1985, in the Aquino-Galman murder case, there was a truth commission (the Agrava
commission created by the Marcos Administration to investigate the circumstances of
the killing of Aquino and Galman). In the hearing, many people were invited and asked
questions, one of those invited and inquired upon was General Ver. Later on, a case was
filed against Gen. Ver, in the trial, the transcript of General Ver from the Agrava
commission was requested to be used, Gen. Ver objected claiming that in the Agrava
commission he was not provided with counsel, which was, in his views, his right. The
Supreme Court agreed with Gen. Ver, saying that the provisions vesting the right to
counsel covered even persons not yet in custody but already under investigation
because the 1937 text of the Constitution did not speak of custodial investigation but
only of persons under investigation. The provision in the 1987 Constitutions wording
says: All persons under investigation there is nothing in the provision insinuating
custodial investigation.
o Bernas said that the 1986 Constitutional Commission debates manifest the intent to
expand the coverage the right to situations when a person under investigation is not yet
in custody. The intention was to extend the guarantee beyond mere strict custodial
investigation of the Escobedo variety to the time immediately after the commission of
the offense whether the policeman or the person making the investigation had any
suspect under custody. Moreover, like the 1973 Constitution, the text of the 1987
Constitution has preserved the phrase Person under investigation without the word
custodial.
What rights are made available?
o Right to remain silent
o Right to counsel
o Right to be informed of such rights
Section 12 rights of a person under investigation
Section 14 rights of a person under criminal prosecution
Section 17 right against self-incrimination
Right against self-incrimination under section 17, only an accused has the absolute right to
remain silent. Under Section 17, the accused need not even take the witness stand, however, a person
who is not an accused may assume the stance of silence only when asked an incriminating question.

Under Section 12, a person under investigation has the right to refuse to answer any question.
The counsel made available for a person under investigation must not only be competent and
independent but also preferably be of his (the person under investigations) own choice.
In People vs. Mojello (2004) a lawyer provided by the investigators in deemed engaged by the
accused when he (the accused) does not raise an objection against the counsels appointment during
the course of the investigation. In fact, he (the accused) subscribed to the statements; he swore to the
statements that he gave. If an accused does not have a counsel then he must be provided with one, the
one that will be provided must be, as much as practicable, be of his own choice. The person under
investigation under section 12, has the right to choose his lawyer.
There a loop in the Constitution concerning the right of the person under investigation to
choose a counsel of his choice. If a person will continually resist the person appointed as his counsel,
the agency will then have no choice but to appoint another. This right has no known limit thus
making it a gray area of the law.
Difference between the right of counsel in Section 12 with the right to counsel in Section 14:
-

In Section 12, the person under investigation may choose (he may reject the counsel given him
even if he cannot afford his own counsel). In Section 14, he may not choose (a counsel
appointed by the court cannot be rejected by the accused, if he cannot afford his own counsel).
a. In People vs. Mojello

The right of the person to be informed implies an obligation on the part of the police
investigator to explain to him his rights and should be done in practical terms. When explaining,
police should do it in a manner that the accused can understand.
Question:
When do the rights under Section 12 cease to be available?
o The rights under section 12 are available only when the inquiry is under the control of
the police officers. The criminal process before the filling of the charges. When the
charges are filed, the rights are no longer available. After the charges are filed, during
the preliminary investigation and during trial of the case Section 14 and 17 applies and
not Section 12.
o Even if the rights under Section12 ceases, the accused still has rights which are now
provided under Section 14 and Section 17.
o In People vs. Aison, Section 12 does not apply to persons under preliminary
investigation or those already charged in court.
Waiver of rights, the rights provided in Section 12 may be waived only in the following cases:
1. If the waiver is in writing AND;
2. Done in the presence of counsel
In People vs. Galit, there was no lawyer/counsel present during the waiver of the rights in
section 12 because there was no lawyer available in the locality. The implication is that the State must
bring the individual under investigation to a place where there is a lawyer. The requirement is
absolute, no waiver unless it is in writing and no waiver unless it is done in the presence of counsel.
Question:
If there is no counsel available in the locality, is the waiver valid?

o No, the State should bring the accused to a place where a lawyer is available and do the
waiver in the lawyers presence for the waiver to be valid.
Exclusionary rule:
-

Any confession or admission obtained in violation of Section 12 and 17 shall not be admissible
in evidence against him. Him in the preceding sentence refers to the person making the
admission, the accused alone can ask for the exclusion of the testimony. However, the
confession obtained may be used against the person who violated the Constitutional right of
persons under investigation. There is a criminal responsibility in extracting confessions by
force. When the case against the officer extracting the information goes to court, the confession
illegally obtained, may be used and is admissible against the officer.
In comparing the exclusionary rule under Section 12 with that of the rule in illegal searches
and seizures (Sections 2 and 3), the evidence obtained in Sections 2 and 3 shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.

In Gutang vs. People, urine samples are admissible, as mentioned, the constitutional protection
extends only to testimonial compulsion, thus, the urine sample is admissible. What the constitution
prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused but not
the exclusion of his body into evidence when it may be material.

Section 13:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
General rule: All persons charged with offenses, before conviction, has the right to bail.
Exception: bail is not available for persons charged with a crime whose punishment is reclusion
perpetua AND that the evidence is strong.
A court that requires 100 million of bail may run against the provision on bail, because it has
been contended that the bail, if it has become impossible for the accused to raise, then it is as if, the
court is not granting bail. Excessive bails then shall not be allowed.
Bail a mode, short of confinement, which will ensure the attendance of the accused at his trial.
The right to bail is corollary to the right to be presumed innocent. In cases where the accused is
charged with a crime whose penalty is the capital punishment/charge with a capital offense. A
hearing is required for the purposes of determining whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.
The cases of Jinggoy Estrada, Bong Revilla and Juan Ponce Enrile carries with it the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, inspite of this, they are still accorded the possibility of bail because of Section13.
The burden of proof lies with the prosecution to show that the evidence meets the required
quantum of evidence. The quantum of evidence needed in order to deny the accused bail must be
strong evidence.
Strong evidence presumption great.

Quantum of evidences:
1. For a case to be filed by a fiscal, there must be a probability (presumption of guilt) that the
accused committed the offense (same quantum of evidence the judge requires to test if a case
can go on trial or not);
2. Determination of whether the accused is entitled to bail or not, the quantum is strong evidence
(presumption great).
3. To convict a person in a criminal case then it should proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The person claiming the right to bail must be under actual detention or under the custody of
the law.
Under actual detention behind bars
Under the custody of the law a person is not inside a prison cell but is under the custody of the court.
In the case of Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals 1995, the accused was confined in the hospital,
the accused communicated to the court that he is submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
He is therefore considered under custody of the court.
Extradition proceedings of kicking out an undesirable alien and thus is sent out of the Country.
Usually the extradition of a person is by virtue of an extradition treaty with another state. That state
with which an extradition treaty is signed with may request an extradition of a particular person
because of reasons (example a crime in the State requesting extradition).
Question:
Is there a right to bail in extradition proceedings?
o In Government of Hong Kong vs. Olalia 2007, It ruled that an extradition proceeding,
while it may be considered as administrative case, bears all the ear marks of a criminal
process, therefore, Extradition proceedings have the benefit of bail.
o In Comendador vs. De Villa, the right to bail is traditionally not recognized and is not
available in court martial proceedings in the military.
Is a person on bail, who is convicted, continue with the bail?
o In People vs. Divina, when a person is already convicted, the presumption of innocence
terminates the constitutional right to bail should also terminate.
o In the case of one punishable by death or reclusion perpetua, the conviction of the
lower court is indication that the evidence of guilt is strong.

Section 14:
1. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
2. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and
the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustifiable.

Question:
What is the due process of law in Section 1 to that of Section 14?
o Due process of law clause in Section 1 is due process of law in general while the due
process of law in Section 14 paragraph 1 is due process of law in criminal cases. If at all,
it is to emphasize the strict adherence of law in criminal cases.
The rights of the accused of guaranteed in Section 14 paragraph 2 are rights in all criminal
prosecutions.
When do these rights become available to a person?
o Every step in the trial or in the criminal prosecution, from arraignment to the rendition
of judgment. These rights under Section 14 paragraph 2 are available.
Right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, it is merely required of the State to
establish a prima facie case after which the burden of proof shifts to the accused. The establishment of
a prima facie case is when the State is able to prove the elements of the crime.
In Malana vs. People 2008, the case came up with the equipoise rule. It provides that where the
evidence of the parties in a criminal case is evenly balanced the constitutional presumption of
innocence shall tilt the scales in favor of the accused.
In Gonzaga vs. Sandiganbayan, preventive suspension pendete lite does not violate the right to
be presumed innocent because preventive suspension is not a penalty. Preventive suspension has a
purpose especially under the anti-graft and corrupt practices act. It is to prevent the accused from
influencing or affecting the proceedings against him.
Right to be heard by himself or counsel (three specific rights molded in this right):
1. Right to present evidence and to be present at the trial includes the right to testify in ones
favor and to be given time to call witnesses;
2. Right to be assisted by counsel the accused has the absolute right to be personally present
during the entire proceeding, from arraignment to sentence, if he so decides and;
a. Trial in absentia allowed in the 1987 Constitution, the right of the accused to be
present may be waived except when his presence is needed for purposes of
identification. Trial in absentia may be had only when the accused admits that he is the
person named in the complaint.
b. Right to counsel guarantee of the right to counsel serves to minimize the imbalance in
the adversary system. The counsel under Section 14 paragraph 2 need not be one who
is the choice of the accused. The preference to the choice of counsel pertains more aptly
to a person under investigation under Section 12 paragraph rather than the one
accused in a criminal prosecution.
i. In Amion vs. Judge Chiongson, the accused cannot contend with the
appointment by the Trial court of a counsel de officio described him of his
constitutional right to be defended by a counsel of his own choice because that is
not his right under Section 14, under criminal prosecution, it pertains to a
person under investigation.
3. Right to compulsory process, to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf in the 1935 Phil Constitution, it merely speaks of compulsory process
for the attendance of witnesses on his behalf. In the 1973 and 1987 Phil Constitution the right
to have compulsory processes, secure the attendance of witnesses and to produce evidence on
his behalf.
a. Trial in absentia a situation where a trial may proceed even when the accused is
absent. The situation may occur in these two instances:
i. When the accused, despite notice, unjustifiably fails to appear and;
ii. When the accused voluntarily waives his right to be present (when waiving his
right to be present, the waiver must be made in the writing and in the presence

of counsel). In waiving his (the accused) right to be present, it is carried and

must be understood that the accused must appear in court when required by the
prosecution for the purposes of identification, if the accused shall not appear,
then he unqualifiedly admits that he is the person that is being identified.
In both instances, it is necessary that the accused had already been
arraigned. In addition, the accused is also required to be present at the
promulgation of judgment.
Question:
May the right to counsel be waived?
o According to Fr. Bernas, yes, right to counsel may be waived. The cases cited by Fr.
Bernas were from an antiquated age (early 1900s). It must be pointed out that in the
language of the provision, Section 14, right to counsel, like the other rights guaranteed
thereon, appears to be mandatory. If the right to counsel may be waived, may the right
to be heard, the right to be informed and the right to present evidence may also be
waived.
Will a waiver be practical, considering the adversarial nature of the criminal proceedings?
o No, justice could not be achieved if the right to counsel of an accused may be allowed to
be waived.
Why are the rights of the accused taking up so much (one article) in the Constitution, where
there are no rights indicated for the rights of the complainants?
o The accused must be given all these rights because of the adversarial nature of a
criminal proceeding where the adversary of the accused is the entire State itself.
At what point of the criminal proceedings is the accused entitled to counsel?
o The rights enumerated in Section 14 are rights in all criminal prosecution which covers
the period of arraignment to rendition of judgment. The right to counsel therefore exists
only during that period. Under the circumstances of Section 12 however, the right to
counsel exist before arraignment.
Purposes of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him:
1. The purpose is to inform the accused of the charge against him as will enable him to make his
defense;
2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection for a future prosecution for the
same cause (defense of double jeopardy) and;
3. To inform the courts of the facts alleged so that it may decide whether they have sufficient in
law to support a conviction if one should be had.
The accused must be informed of the facts that are imputed against him; the information must
describe the act with sufficient particularity. The right to assail the sufficiency of information may be
waived by the accused if he fails to object to it during the trial and the deficiency is cured by
competent evidence. If it so happens that in the information one element of the crime in which the
accused was charged is missing, the trial will sill continue until the attention of the court is called by
timely objection by the accused. IF there is no objection by the accused, and the fiscal succeeds in
presenting evidence to prove the element that was not alleged in the information then the information
is cured, it is as if the information has been alleged because there is already evidence on record that
the unalleged element does exist. The accused must raise the issue of defective information in a motion
to quash or in a motion for a bill of particulars.
The right to speedy, impartial and public trial this right exists in the trial phase, it prohibits
unreasonable delays. The right may be waived when the postponement of the trial has been sought
and obtained by the accused himself or by his counsel. It cannot be inferred from mere failure of the
accused to urge the trial of the case. The remedy of the accused for violation of this right to speedy
trial is dismissal of his case. Dismissal for violation of the right to speedy trial is equivalent to acquittal
and is a bar to subsequent prosecution for the same offense, double jeopardy sets in.

Section 14 merely provides that the accused has the right to speedy trial. To strengthen and
give more teeth to the constitutional protection of speedy trial, the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 (RA 8493)
provides that the arraignment of accused must be held within 30 days from the filling of the
information and after arraignment, trial shall commence within 30 days from arraignment. The
Supreme Court of late issued a new guideline implementing the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, under the
new guideline, a case must be raffled to a Trial Court 3 days after the filling of a criminal information.
The arraignment must take place within 10 days from the date of the raffle. The trial must take place
within 30 days after the pre-trial conference. The pre-trial conference must be scheduled after the
arraignment.
Under Section 13 of the Speedy Trial Act, if the accused is not brought to trial within the time
limit provided by the act, upon motion of the accused, the information shall be dismissed. Several cases
filed against Chavit Singson were dismissed due to these grounds.
Right to public trial a trial is public when anyone interested in observing a manner a judge
conducts a proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is no ban to such attendance. Being a
stranger to the litigant is of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown.
Right of confrontation right of the accused to meet the witnesses face-to-face. The right to
confrontation has two fold purposes. These purposes are:
1. It affords the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of the witnesses by cross
examination. The right to confrontation carries with it the right to cross-examination;
2. To allow the judge to observe the deportment of the witness (lets the judge study the
movement of the witness to assess whether he is lying or not).
Question:
What is the effect of a testimony not subjected to cross-examination?
o It is excluded from consideration.
The right of confrontation is not available during preliminary investigation. However, there is a
statutory right to confrontation during preliminary investigation proper but not during preliminary
examination.
Dying declaration is an exemption to the requisite of confrontation for admissibility.
Dying declaration declaration of a dying person which is presumed to be true, our rules of
court even exempts dying declaration from cross-examination. If this testimony is given in court then
it shall be exempt from cross-examination. Dying declaration must be given at a moment when death
was thought to be imminent.

Section 15:
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it.
(Note: Already discussed in Article VII, Section 18) additional info:
General rule: the writ of habeas corpus cannot be suspended
Exception: provided by Section 15.
Question:

 When may the writ of habeas corpus be suspended?

o In cases of invasion or rebellion, when public safety requires it.
The writ of habeas corpus is issued by the court as a matter of right. The writ is given to the
person who has custody of the one sought to be produced.
In Lansang vs. Garcia, during this case, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was
suspended and there was writ that was returned by the officer holding Lansang (due to the suspension
of the privilege). The Court suggested in the case that there must be a commission or commissioner to
accept evidence regarding the cause of the detention of the person. Under the 1987 Phil. Constitution
this is no longer applicable. Under Article VII, section 18, the suspension of the privilege to the writ
was greatly restricted.
In the view of Atty. Edgar Lara, the suggestion of the Supreme Court in Lansang is impractical
because it defeats the very purpose of the suspension of the privilege, which is to keep the person
under custody without judicial inquiry. Furthermore, the situation may never happen because of the
restrictive provisions in the 1987 Phil. Constitution on the suspension of the writ and of the
declaration of Martial Law. The suspension of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged.
During the suspension of the writ, any person who is arrested shall be judicially charged within 3
days, Section 18, Article VII.
The function of the writ of habeas corpus is to achieve the immediate determination of the
legality of the detention. The effect of the suspension of the privilege of the writ is to prevent courts,
temporarily, from inquiring into the legality of the detention.
Question:
Is the suspension of the writ subject to judicial review?
o Yes, Section 18, Article VII. Making the cases cited by Bernas on the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus is no longer applicable.
Is the person accused for an offense covered by the suspension of the writ entitled to be
released on bail?
o Yes, because of the express provision of Section 13 Article III in relation to Section 18
Article VII.
Notwithstanding that under Section 13 Article III, the right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. There is still a necessity for the filling of
the charges in court, conformal with Section 18, Article VII before bail can be granted.

Section 16:
All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasijudicial, or administrative bodies.
Question:
What is the difference between Section 16 with Section 14 paragraph 2 on the particular
provision on right to speedy trial?
o Section 14 paragraph 2 speaks of the trial of the case while Section 16 involves the
entire process of the case, be it criminal, administrative or quasi-judicial. Section 16
speaks of the speedy disposition of cases. It covers the periods before, during and after

trial. It gives broader protection compared to Section 14 paragraph 2. It is also broader

than the protection given by Article VIII Section 15 which covers the period after the
submission of a case. The right may be obtained through a petition for mandamus.
Speedy trial under section 14 covers only trials phase of criminal cases whereas Section
16 covers all phases of any cases be it criminal, administrative and quasi-judicial.

Section 17:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Right against self-incrimination the guarantee of the right against self-incrimination is

justified on grounds of public policy and humanity.
Two grounds for the justification of the guarantee of the right against self-incrimination:
1. It is justified on grounds of public policy because if the party is required to testify it would
place him under the greatest temptation to commit perjury.
2. It is justified under grounds of humanity because it would prevent the extorting of
confessions under duress.
The accused may not be compelled to take the witness stand, he may refuse to be a witness
altogether. A mere witness who is not an accused in order to avail himself of the right must wait for
incriminating questions to be asked before he can avail of the right.
The right is extended to respondents in administrative investigations, partaking of the nature of
a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal hearing. A proceeding for the forfeiture of property
under the Anti-graft law is deemed criminal and the respondent is accorded the right to refuse to take
the witness stand. To violate the right, it is not necessary that a categorical admission of a specific
offense be sought. The right includes refusal to testify to a fact which would be a necessary link in a
chain of evidence to prove the commission of a crime. Direct questions that solicits an admission of a
crime is not necessary, it is enough that the answer/s to a question provides for a link to a chain of
evidence.
In Beltran vs. Samson (1928), the witnesses in a preliminary investigation may not be
compelled to take a test in order to compare their handwriting with that found with a supposedly
falsified document.
When the accused voluntarily answers an incriminating question he is deemed to have waived
his right. Once the witness has already answered, the answer shall already be included on record thus
making an impression that may no longer be removed.

Section 18:
1. No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
2. No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted.
Paragraph 1 of Section 18 is anchored on Due process and freedom of speech and expression.

Paragraph 2 speaks of involuntary servitude: General rule involuntary servitude is not

allowed, exception unless it is a punishment for a crime committed.
Question:
May a return to work order be challenged be violative of the constitutional prohibition against
involuntary servitude?
o No it is not because it is allowed under the labor code. In addition, if the workers refuse
to return to work, then they may simply opt not to do so.
This provision is related to Article XIII Section 3, voluntary modes of settling disputes.
Aclaracion vs. Gatmaitan (1975), the case was about a retired court stenographer who was
ordered to transcribe the stenographic notes he failed to transcribe when he was still working. The
Court ruled that the retired stenographer may be compelled to transcribe the stenographic notes he
failed to transcribe while still in service. The Court further said that such act is not the involuntary
servitude described in the Constitution.

Section 19:
1. Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted.
Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes,
the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua.
2. The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or
detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall
be dealt with by law.
In People vs. Mercado, it was decided by the Supreme Court that lethal injection is not a cruel
and inhuman punishment. The death penalty per se, as held in the case, is not a cruel, degrading and
inhuman punishment. Punishment is inhuman, degrading and cruel if it involves torture or lingering
death but the punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of the Constitution.
The reason why penal institutions and States that still impose death penalty have done away
with the electric chair is that in many instances, the criminal does not immediately making the penalty
cruel. The lethal injection thus replaced it.
Unconstitutional punishment implies something inhuman and barbarous, something more
than mere extinguishment or death. The 1935 Phil Constitution prohibits cruel AND unusual
punishment. To be prohibited by the provision, punishment must only be unusual but it must also be
cruel. In the 1973 Phil Constitution, the phrase became cruel, degrading OR unusual punishment,
meaning it may either be cruel, degrading or unusual and not necessarily a punishment having all
three elements.
Congress defined capital punishment in 1993 under RA 7659, the Death Penalty Law. Recently,
under RA 9346, the imposition was disallowed again.
Question:
May confinement amount to cruel and unusual punishment?

o Yes, when it is characterized by conditions and practices to bad as to be shocking to the

conscience. Facilities must be to the level of Constitutional tolerability.
It is the Commission on Human rights that has visitation rights over prisons and other penal
facilities. It is the job of the Commission on Human Rights to see to it that detention places are not
substandard, otherwise the confinement shall amount to cruel and unusual punishment.

Section 20:
No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
Non-payment of poll tax was carried from an old administrative code (the old code is no longer
used today).
No person shall be imprisoned for debt. This simply means that no person shall be imprisoned
for debt in virtue of an order in a civil proceeding either as a substitute for a satisfaction of debt or as a
means of satisfaction of debt.
Question:
Is issuing a bouncing check tantamount to non-payment of debt thus prohibiting imprisonment
for offenders?
o No, the law on bouncing checks is by virtue of a contract ex delicto. It partakes of fraud.
A person may be imprisoned as a penalty of a crime arising from a contractual debt and
imposed in a proper criminal proceeding.

Section 21:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished
by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
Under Section 21, there are two sentences. 1st sentence double jeopardy based on the same
offense, 2nd paragraph double jeopardy based on the same act.
Jeopardy being placed in danger of punishment or annoyance of a criminal prosecution.
Double Jeopardy is a defense.
Three requisites to raise the defense of Double Jeopardy (1st paragraph):
1. A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second. This involves two vexations - ;
Question:
When will Jeopardy attach?
o It attaches upon the following situations:
Upon a good indictment means that there must be a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge, sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction (complete with the elements). Under a defective information, the

accused can never be convicted and hence cannot be said to be in jeopardy of

punishment;
Before a competent court means a court that has jurisdiction over the offense
charged. Jurisdiction has two parts, 1st over the offense charged and 2nd
territorial jurisdiction. A court that takes cognizance of the outside or without
jurisdiction, all proceedings in such court are void and the accused cannot be
convicted;
After arraignment and;
After plea together with arraignment are the final steps in the commencement
of jeopardy. It is then that the issues are joined.
2. The first jeopardy must have terminated and the termination may either be by conviction,
acquittal or by dismissal;
a. In Bulaong vs. People (1966), two information were filed on the same day against the
same accused. One complaint was filed in Laguna for rebellion and the other filed in
Manila for violation of the anti-subversion act. The accused appealed his case to the
Supreme Court, the Court then rejected his defense of double jeopardy because neither
of the two cases had been terminated, both were still pending.
b. Termination of jeopardy by conviction or acquittal or termination may also be by
dismissal.
i. There is acquittal when there is terminated upon the merits of the case, as when
there is pronouncement that the evidence does not show the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
ii. There is dismissal when the case is terminated on any ground that does not
decide the merits of the issue as to whether or not the accused is or is not guilty
of an offense charged. Dismissal, even if not on the merits if that without the
consent of the accused is bar to subsequent prosecution. It is as if there is
acquittal if there is no consent of the accused.
c. In People vs. Velasco demurrer of evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence
were considered dismissal on the merits and a bar to a motion for reconsideration by
the prosecution.
d. Even if the dismissal is definite if made with the consent of the accused it would not be a
bar to subsequent prosecution. The consent of the accused to the dismissal of his case
works as a waiver. It means that the dismissal is only definite and not a termination or
an acquittal but a temporary dismissal if there is consent of the accused. What
determine the effect of dismissal is its nature and not its label.
e. If the dismissal is predicated on the right of the accused to speedy trial, the dismissal is
on the merits. When the accused is not given a speedy trial there is failure to prosecute
(means failure of the prosecution to prove a case and therefore it is an acquittal.
3. The second jeopardy must be of the same offense as that of the first
Question:
How will it be known that the second jeopardy/vexation/case is for the same offense as the
first?
o Using the same evidence test, this test determines whether the 2nd case is of the same
offense as the first is whether the evidence needed in one case will support the
conviction of the other.
2nd sentence of Section 21 provides that the same single is punished by an ordinance and a
statute

In People vs. Romero, the accused was prosecuted in the justice of the peace court for violation
of ordinance prohibiting carrying of deadly weapons. The case was dismissed over the objections of
the accused. Subsequently, he was prosecuted for the same act under Section 26 of RA 1780. The
Supreme Court upheld the lower court ruling that the second prosecution would place the accused in
double jeopardy. Same act meaning same motive even if an act is punished or defined by two separate
sections of the same Act/Law or two separate Laws.
In Yap vs. Lutero, under the second clause of the jeopardy provision (2nd sentence of Section
21), there is double jeopardy even if the offenses charged are not the same. If the two charges are
based on one and the same act, conviction or acquittal under either law or ordinance shall bar the
prosecution under the other. One act means one physical act. The rule when one act violates two
different statutes or two different provisions in a statute, if the one act results in two distinct offenses,
the prosecution under one is a bar to prosecution under the other.
If the single criminal act is impelled by a single criminal intent, the resultant harm cannot be
split into different offenses.
In Melo vs. People, the accused was first charged with serious physical injuries. Before
conviction, the victim of Melo died. The State then proceeded to amend the information due to the
subsequent event of the victims death. The Supreme Court allowed such amendment because of
supervening fact. The Court ruled further that the amended complaint against Melo does not
constitute double jeopardy.
The protection against second jeopardy not only means that the accused cannot be prosecuted
for the second time for the same offense but also that the State cannot appeal the judgment of acquittal.
A judgment of acquittal rendered within the courts jurisdiction, for as long as there is jurisdiction,
even if erroneous ends the case finally. Provided that the judge considers the evidence even if his
appreciation of the evidence in leading to acquittal is erroneous, an appeal or motion for consideration
by the prosecution will not be allowed.
In Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, judgment of acquittal or dismissal of the merits is void for lack
of jurisdiction, the judgment cannot be a basis for a plea of double jeopardy.
The Aquino-Galman case was re-opened on the ground that the Court failed to give the
prosecution due process.
Question:
Can an accused appeal his case?
o When an accused appeals his conviction he waives his right to double jeopardy. If the
Appellate Court imposes a penalty higher than that of the Trial Courts, the accused
shall have to bear it.

Section 22:
No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
An ex post facto law is one which makes an action that, before the passing of the law, was
innocent when done, criminal and punishes such action. It aggravates the crime and makes it greater
then when it was committed. It changes the punishment or gives a greater punishment than what the
law had when the crime was committed. It alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less evidence

for conviction. It assumes to regulate civil rights but in effect it causes a penalty or deprivation of right
which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection (example: double jeopardy).
Ex post facto laws embrace only criminal or penal statutes. The prohibition only applies to
criminal or penal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused. It also applies in
criminal procedure of law prejudicial to the accused.
Deprivation of a right to follow ones profession enforce through civil proceeding must be less
considered a penalty covered with ex post facto legislation.
Question:
If a law is amended and applied retroactively to the accused, is it constitutional?
o Yes and no, it depends. If it is beneficial to the accused then it is allowed. If it is not
beneficial to the accused then it is not.
Bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial.