MANUEL LARA ET AL. ,petitioner, vs.

PETRONILO DEL
ROSARIO, respondent
No. L-6339. April 20, 1954

LORENZO M. TAADA, ET. AL., petitioners, v. HON. JUAN

C. TUVERA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT, ET. AL, respondents.
G.R. No. L-63915. April 24, 1985

Facts:
In 1950, defendant Petronilo Del Rosario, Jr., owner of
twenty-five taxi cabs, or cars, operated a taxi business under the
name of WAVAL TAXI. He employed among others three
mechanics and 49 chauffeurs or drivers, the latter having worked
forperiods ranging from 2 to 37 months. When the owner, Del
rosario, Jr., sold all of his vehicles on September 4, 1950, to La
Mallorca (a transportation he failed to continue them in their
employment. Because their employer did not give them one
months salary in lieu of the notice required in Article 302 of the
Code of Commerce, this action was instituted.
Issue:
Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to extra compensation
for work performed in excess of 8 hours a day. Sundays and
holidays included.
Ruling:
The services of the plaintiffs ended September 4, 1950,
when the new Civil Code was already in force, it having
becoming effective August 30, 1950 (one year after it ws released
for circulation). The New Civil Code on Article 2270 repealed the
provisions of the Code of Commerce, governing agency, one
provision of which was Article 302 (particularly one speaking of
salary corresponding to said month, commonly known as
mesada). Hence, the plaintiffs are no longer entitled to their one
month severance pay.

Facts:
The petitioners, Lorenzo M. Taada, Abraham F.
Sarmiento, and Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity
and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), were seeking a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause the publication of laws in the Official Gazette.
However, respondents through Solicitor General would have this
case dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no legal
personality or standing to bring the instant petition. Respondents
further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a
sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the
laws themselves provide for their own effectivity date.
They pleaded likewise that the date of publication is
material in determining the date of effectivity, that is, the fifteenth
day following the publication, as provided in Article 2 of the New
Civil Code, but not when the law itself provides its own date of
effectivity. Otherwise, there would be no room for the application
of the maxim ignorantia legis non excusat, for it prejudices the
right of due process since these presidential issuances are of
public nature or of general applicability.
Issue:
Whether or not the publication of presidential issuances in
the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity
Ruling:
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of
general application, which have not been published, shall have no
force and effect. The enforcement of presidential decrees prior to
their publication in the Official Gazette is an operative fact which
1

may have consequence which cannot be justly ignored.

Wherefore, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the
Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are
of general application.
LORENZO M. TAADA, ET. AL., petitioners, v. HON. JUAN
C. TUVERA. IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-63915. December 29, 1986.

publication has to be made. Thus, it has no other choice but to

pronounce that publication shall be made in the Official Gazette.
*(Executive Order 200, dated June 18, 1987, has modified Article
2 of the Civil Code, which provides for the publication of laws
either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines as a requirement for effectivity.)

Facts:
After the decision of the Court on 24 April 1985 affirming
the necessity for the publication of some of the decrees, Taada,
et. al., are before the Court again to suggest that there should be
no distinction between laws of general applicability and those
which are not; that publication should be complete; and the same
should be made in the Official Gazette.
Issue:
Whether or not the publication should be completed prior
to its enforcement in the Official Gazette
Ruling:
All statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. For the phrase unless
otherwise provided in Article 2 of the New Civil Code, it does
not dispense the need of publication rather it refers to the date of
effectivity of the law. Such publication of laws could be available
in a newspaper of general circulation for it is easily available, has
a wide readership, and comes out regularly. However, there is no
amendment in the said Code as to the publication of laws. And as
far as the Supreme Court is concerned, its function is limited to
interpret laws and cannot prescribed other rule on where the
2

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING

CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
ANGELES, respondent
G.R. No. 108461. October 21, 1996
Facts:
On August 30, 1989, the administrative order no. SOCPEC
89-08-01 was issued by the Philippine International Coporation
(PITC). The relevant provision therein was that organizations
which wanted to trade with the Peoples Republic of China
(PROC) had to do so under certain conditions: Imports must be
made with a corresponding number or percentage or exports.
Desiring to make importations form PROC, private respondents
Remington and Firestone, both domestic corporations,
individually applied for the deal and executed respective
undertaking to balance their imports and exports. After
importation, both private respondents failed to comply in
submitting corresponding export credits. The PITC subsequently
barred private respondents from future importation from PROC.
Eventually, private respondents came together came
together in a petition against PITC (petition for Prohibition and
Mandamus, with prater for issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order). The regional trial court rendered its decision on January 4,
1992. the court sided with herein private respondents citing
among a host of reasons that PITCs authority to create laws had
already been repealed by E.O. No. 133, issued on February 27,
1987. Another considerable point was that the administrative order
was null and void since the same was not published as was
required by Article 2 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner then came to the Supreme Court on petition for
review on certiorari. While the Supreme Court was deliberating,
President Fidel V. Ramos came to an agreement with PROC and
forged Executive Order No. 244. The executive order essentially
abrogated the administrative order. There however remained, the
matter of outstanding obligations of the respondents for the
charges relating to the 0.5%. Counter Export Development

Service in favor of PITC, for the period when the questioned

Administrative Order was still in effect.
Issues:
1. Are administrative orders subject to Article 2 of the
Civil Code?
2. Has legal authority of PITC emanating from LOI No.
444 and P.D. No. 244 ben repealed by E.O. No. 133?
3. Is the obligation still subsisting, or are the respondents
freed from it?
Ruling:
LOI No. 444 and P.D. No. 244 were not repealed by E.O.
No. 13 since the executive order itself, as worded, was silent as to
the abolition or limitation of the powers granted to the :PITC.
However, the Administrative Order is not exempt from Article 2
of regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce
or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
The administrative order issued by PITC dated on August
30, 1989 was not published in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation. Hence, the law was invalid
when obligations were supposed to take effect.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower
court, to the effect that judgment was hereby rendered in favor of
the private respondents.

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES UNIONN.U.B.E and PERFECTO B. FERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs.
HONORABLE BENJAMIN VEGA, respondents.
G.R. No. 105364. June 28, 2001
Facts:
On January 24, 1992, President Cory Aquino signed into
law An Act to Rehabilitate The Philippine Veterans Bank Created
Under Act. No. 3518 Providing The Mechanisms Therefor, And
For Other Purposes (RA 7169), which was published in the
Official Gazette on February 24, 1992 and provides in part for the
reopening of the Philippine Veterans Bank together with all its
branches within the period of three years from the date of the
reopening of the head office.
On June 3, 1992, the liquidator filed A Motion for the
Termination of the Liquidation Proceeding s of the Philippine
Veterans Bank with the respondent judge. And in a Resolution
dated June 8, 1992, the Court issued a temporary restraining order
in the instant case restraining respondent judge from further
proceeding with the liquidation of PVB. On the other hand, on
June 22, 1992, VOP Security and Detective Agency and its 162
security guards filed a Motion for Intervention with prayer that
they be excluded from the operation of the Temporary Restraining
Order issued by the Court. They alleged that they had filed a
motion before Branch 39 of the RTC Manila praying that the said
court order PVB to pay backwages and salary differentials by
authority of RA No. 6727, Wage Orders; and that said court in an
Order dated June 5, 1992, approved therein movants case and
directed the bank liquidator to pay backwages and differentials in
accordance with the computation incorporated in the order.
On August 3, 1992, the Philippine Veterans Bank
reopened.

Issue:
May a liquidation court continue with liquidation
proceedings of the Philippine Veterans Bank when Congress had
mandated its rehabilitation and reopening?
Ruling:
The concept of liquidation is diametrically opposed or
contrary to the concept of rehabilitation, such that both cannot be
undertaken at the same time. To allow the liquidation proceedings
to continue would seriously hinder the rehabilitation of the subject
bank. The enactment of the Republic Act No. 7169 has rendered
the liquidation court functus de officio which was signed into law
by President Corazon C. Aquino and became effective on the date
indicated. Therefore, liquidation cannot go further proceedings.

YAO KEE petitioner vs. SY-GONZALES respondent

L-55960 November 24, 1988
Facts:
Sy-Kiat, a Chinese national, died on Jan. 17, 1977 in
Caloocan City leaving behind real and personal properties here in
the Philippines worth P300, 000.00 more or less. Thereafter, Aida
Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy
filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration in said
petition, they alleged among others that a) they are the children of
the deceased with Asuncion Gillago; b) they do not acknowledge
Sy-Kiats marriage to Yao-Kee. The petition was opposed by YaoKee, Sze Sook Wan, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Kiat. After the
hearing, the probate court affirmed that Sy-Kiat was legally
married to Yao-Kee. On appeal, the CA held that respondents are
the acknowledged natural children of Sy-Kiat and that Sy-Kiats
marriage with Yao-Kee had not been proven to be valid in the both
the Philippine and Chinese laws. As testified by Yao-Kee, she was
married to Sy-Kiat on Jan. 19, 1931, in Fookien, China; that she is
not in possession of their marriage certificate; that their marriage
was an agreement of their parents who were as well the
signatories of the certificate; that they were wed by a village
leader; that she cannot provide the said document containing the
signatures of the couples parents and that she cannot provide any
legal document proving that their wedding was indeed part of
Chinas custom or Chinas laws.

Ruling:
Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They
must be alleged and proved as any other fact. Accordingly, in the
absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be
presumed that it is the same as ours. For failure to prove the
foreign law or custom, and consequently the validity of the
marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage
between Yao-Kee and Sy-Kiat cannot be recognized in this
jurisdiction.
Wherefore, the decision of the CA is hereby affirmed.

Issue:
Whether or not the fact of marriage in accordance with
Chinese law was duly proven?

MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED,
respondents.
G.R. No. 114776. February 2, 2000.
Facts:
In 1978, plaintiff Menandro B. Laureano, then Director of
Flight Operations and Chief Pilot of Air Manila, applied for
employment with defendant company through its Area Manager in
Manila. Plaintiffs appointment was confirmed effective July 21,
1979. On the said date, the defendant also offered plaintiff an
extension of his two-year contract to five (5) years effective
January 21, 1979 to January 20, 1984 subject to the terms and
conditions set forth in the contract of employment, which the
latter accepted.
Sometime in 1982, defendant initiated cost-cutting
measures due to recession. Seventeen (17) expatriate captains in
the Airbus fleet were found in excess of the defendants
requirements. Defendant informed its expatriate pilots including
plaintiff of the situation and advised them to take advance leaves.
It did not however immediately terminate A-300 pilots. It
reviewed their qualifications for possible promotion to the B-747
fleet. Among the 17 Airbus pilots reviewed, 12 were found
qualified. Unfortunately, plaintiff was not one of the 12. On
October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his termination
effective November 1, 1982 and that he will be paid three (3)
months salary in lieu of three months notice but defendant gave
only two (2) months notice and one (1) month salary.
Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for
illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. Defendant on February
11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds since
the plaintiff was employed in Singapore and all other aspects of
his employment contract were executed in Singapore, therefore,
Singapore laws should apply.

Issue:
Whether or not Singapore laws should be applied in this
case.
Ruling:
No.
The Philippines laws should be applied in this case
because the defendant that claims the applicability of the
Singapore laws has the burden of proof but defendant failed to do
so.
Therefore, the court decided to apply processual
presumption.

JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

respondent
G.R. No. 112193. March 13, 1996
Facts:
On March 7, 1983, a Complaint for Compulsary
Recognition and Enforcement of Successional Rights was filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila by the minors, Antonia
F. Aruego and her alleged sister Evelyn F. Aruego, born on
October 5, 1962 and September 3, 1963, respectively, represented
by their mother, Luz M. Fabian. The complaint prayed for an
order praying that Antonia and Evelyn be declared the illegitimate
children of Jose Aruego, Sr. who died on March 30, 1982; that the
petitioners be compelled to recognize and acknowledge them as
the compulsory heirs of the deceased; and that their share and
participation in the estate of their deceased father be determined
and ordered delivered to them. The main basis of the action for
compulsory recognition is their alleged open and continuous
possession of the status of illegitimate children.
On June 15, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment in
favor of Antonia Aruego, declaring her as the illegitimate daughter
of the deceased. Petitioners filed a motion for partial
reconsideration of the decision alleging loss of jurisdiction on the
part of the trial court over the complaint by virtue of the passage
of E.O. No. 209 or the Family Code of the Philippines. Said
motion was denied. Another petition to the Court of Appeals was
likewise denied. Hence, this petition.

Ruling:
No. The present law cannot be given retroactive effect
insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its application will
prejudice the vested right of the respondent, Antonia Aruego, to
have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The
right was vested to her by the fact that she filed her action under
the regime of the Civil Code.
The trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the case
by the filing of the complaint, never lost jurisdiction over the
same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209. The ruling reinforces
the principle that the jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or
civil cases, once attached cannot be ousted by subsequent
happenings or events. The Supreme Court denied the petition and
affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not the Family Code of the Philippines or E.O.
209 be given retroactive effect.

ERNESTO BERNABE, plaintiff vs. CAROLINA ALEJO,

defendant
G.R. No. 140500. January 21, 2002
Facts:
The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son
with his secretary of twenty-three(23) years, herein plaintiffappellant Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18,
1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on
August 13, 1993, while his wife Rosalina died on December 3 of
the same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir. On
May 16, 1994, Carolina on behalf of Adrian filed the aforesaid
complaint praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged
illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he be given his
share in Fiscal Bernabes estate, which is now being held by
Ernestine as the sole surviving heir.

Ruling:
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
hold that Article 285 of the civil Code is a substantive law, as it
gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within
four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family
Code cannot impair or take Adrians right to file an action for
recognition, because that right had already vested prior to its
enactment. Born in 1981, Adrian was only seven years old when
the Family Code took effect and only twelve when his alleged
father died in 1993. The minor must be given his day in court. The
failure of the petitioner to implead the Court of Appeal as a party
is not a reversible error; it is in fact the correct procedure.

Issue:
I
Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case
against petitioner, the legitimate daughter of the putative father,
for recognition and partition with accounting after the putative
fathers death in the absence of any written acknowledgement of
paternity by the latter.
II
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that respondents ha four years from the attainment of minority to
file an action for recognition as provided in Art. 285 of the Civil
Code, in complete disregard of its repeal by the provision of the
Family Code and the applicable jurisprudence as held by the
Honorable Court of Appeals.
III
Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner is
fatally defective for failure to implead the Court of Appeals as one
of the respondents.
8

GUY, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant

G.R. No. 163707. September 15, 2006
Facts:

Code requires judicial authorization of the said waiver which it

lacks. Since the affiliation of the private respondents as co heirs to
Sima Weis Estates, it would thus be inconsistent to rule that they
waived their hereditary rights when they do not have such right.

On June 13, 1997, private respondent minors Karen and

Kamille Oanes Wei represented by their mother Remedios Oanes,
filed a pertition for letters of administration before the Regional
trial court of Makati.
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly
acknowledge illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate
in Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at
10, 000, 000. 00 consisting of real and personal properties. His
known heirs are surviving spouse Guy, children Emy, Jeanne,
Cristina, George and Michael all surnamed Guy. Petitioners
argued that private respondents should have established their
status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei
pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code, they further alleged
that private respondents claim had been paid, waived, abandoned,
extinguished by reason of Remedios June 7, 1993 Release and
Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and
educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her
minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all
liabilities.
Issue:
Whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes
private respondents from claiming their hereditary rights?
Ruling:
Remedios Release and Waiver of claim does not bar
private respondents from claiming succession rights. To be valid
and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and equivocal
terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give
up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. Even assuming
that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of her children,
such waiver does not bar the latters claim. Article 104 of the Civil

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff vs. BENJAMIN

MORIAL, defendant
9

G.R. No. 129295. August 15, 2001

Facts:
On the 6th day of January 1996, the above named accused
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with
intent to kill and with intent to gain entered into the house of
Paula Bandipas and Benjamin Morial. Once inside did then and
there willfully and feloniously stab Paula Bandipas and Albert
Bandipas with the use of a pointed weapon and stones which was
used by the accused in inflicting mortal wounds which caused
their instantaneous death, said accused took and stole P11, 000.00
The next day, the accused went with the police officers to
the police station. There Leonardo Morial was forced to confess
about the death of Paula Bandipas and Albert Bandipas.
Leonardos statements were then reduced into writing. A
policeman informed him that they were going to contact the
lawyer to assist him during the investigation but in truth,
Leonardo was not informed of his rights even before the
investigation started.

Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the extra judicial

confession executed by Leonard Morial, the conviction of accused
is fully supported by other pieces of evidence. The accused is truly
guilty and nevertheless faces conviction.

Issue:
Whether or not the custodial investigation conducted to
Leonardo Morial without a counsel a valid waiver of
constitutional right?
Ruling:
A person under custodial investigation enjoys the right to
counsel from its inception so does he enjoy such right until its
termination. Even granting that accused consented to Atty. Aguilar
during the investigation and to answer questions during the
lawyers absence, such consent was an invalid waiver of his right
to counsel and his right to remain silent. The right cannot be
waived unless the same is made in writing and with the presence
of a counsel.
LORNA PESCA, petitioner vs. ZOSIMO PESCA, respondent
G.R. No. 136921. April 17, 2001
10

Facts:
Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and Zosimo A. Pesca got
married on March 1975. And their union begot four children. It
started in 1988, the petitioner said, when she noticed that
respondent surprisingly showed signs of psychological incapacity.
His true colors of emotionally immature and irresponsible
husband became apparent. The respondent allegedly would slap,
beat and kick her and one time with a loaded shotgun threatened
to kill her in the presence of their children. After some other
beating, a case was filed against the respondent for slight physical
injuries and was sentenced to eleven days of imprisonment. On
November 15, 1995, following hearings conducted by it, the trial
court rendered its decision declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the basis
of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent and
ordered a liquidation of conjugal partnership. The respondent
appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals, contending
that the trial court erred, and particularly in holding that there was
legal basis to declare the marriage null and void. The Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the
marriage between the petitioner and respondent valid and
subsisting.

contract, so as to warrant a declaration of marriage. Emotional

immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be equated with
psychological incapacity. The petitioner also failed to follow
procedural guidelines in trying cases for nullity of, that is the
necessity for medical and clinical identified sufficiently proven by
experts for both parties to determine the presence of psychological
incapacity.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage is null and void for the
ground of psychological incapacity?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the appellate
court thereby dismissing the petition. The petitioner has utterly
failed to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part
of the respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the

AYALA CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

11

ROSA-DIANA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, respondent.
December 1, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner Ayala Corporation (hereinafter referred to as
Ayala) was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in
Alfaro Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City with an area of 840
square meters, more or less and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 233435 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. Ayala
sold the lot to Manuel Sy married to Vilma Po and Sy Ka Kieng
married to Rosa Chan. The Deed of Sale executed between Ayala
and the buyers contained Special Conditions of Sale and Deed
Restrictions which then sell the lot to respondent Rosa-Diana
Realty and Development Corporation with Ayalas approval.
Thereafter, Rosa-Diana submitted to the building official of
Makati another set of building plans for The Peak which were
substantially different from those that it earlier submitted to Ayala
for approval.
During the construction of Rosa-Dianas condominium project,
Ayala filed an action with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati, Branch 139 for specific performance, with application for
a writ of preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order
against Rosa-Diana Realty seeking to compel the latter to comply
with the contractual obligations under the deed of restrictions. The
lower court denied Ayalas prayer for injunctive relief, thus
enabling Rosa-Diana to complete the construction of the building.
In the meantime, Ayala completed its presentation of
evidence before the trial court. Rosa-Diana filed a Demurrer to
Evidence averring that Ayala failed to establish its right to the
relief sought.
The Court of Appeals also cited C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 46488
entitled, Ayala Corporation vs. Ray Burton Development
Corporation which relied on C.A. G.R. S.P. No. 29157 in ruling
that Ayala is barred from enforcing the deed restrictions in
dispute. Upon a motion for reconsideration filed by herein

petitioner, the Court of Appeals clarified that the citation of the

decision in Ayala Corporation vs. Ray Burton Development
Corporation, C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 46488, February 27, 1996, was
made not because said decision is res judicata to the case at bar
but rather because it is precedential under the doctrine of stare
decisis.
Petitioner reiterates its contention that the trial courts
findings that Ayala has waived its right to enforce the deed of
restrictions is not supported by law and evidence.
In its assailed decision of February 4, 1994, the trial court, ruled in
favor of respondent Rosa-Diana Realty on the ground that Ayala
had not acted fairly when it did not institute an action against the
original vendees despite the latters violation of the Special
Conditions of Sale but chose instead to file an action against
herein respondent Rosa-Diana.
Respondent Rosa-Diana, however, misses the point
inasmuch as it has freely consented to be bound by the deed
restrictions when it entered into a contract of sale with spouses
Manuel Sy and Sy Ka Kieng.
Issue:
An examination of the decision in the said Rosa-Diana
case reveals that the sole issue raised before the appellate court
was the propriety of the lis pendens annotation. However, the
appellate court went beyond the sole issue and made factual
findings bereft of any basis in the record to inappropriately rule
that AYALA is in estoppel and has waived its right to enforce the
subject restrictions. Such ruling was immaterial to the resolution
of the issue of the propriety of the annotation of the lis pendens.
The finding of estoppel was thus improper and made in excess of
jurisdiction.
Ruling:
Exemplary damages in the sum of P2,500,000.00 as
prayed for by petitioner are also in order inasmuch as respondent
Rosa-Diana was in evident bad faith when it submitted a set of
12

building plans in conformity with the deed restrictions to

petitioner Ayala for the sole purpose of obtaining title to the
property. Petitioner Ayala is likewise entitled to an award of
attorneys fees in the sum of P250,000.00.
The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 4,
1997 and its Resolution dated June 19, 1998 , C.A. G.R. C.V. No.
4598, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA, JR., petitioner, vs.

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ROQUE
VILLADORES, respondents.
March 19, 2002
Facts:
Petitioner Villanueva, Jr. filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against several parties, among them, IBC 13. When the
labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner Villanueva, Jr., IBC 13
appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Thus, the two (2) complaints for falsification of public
document were filed before the Manila City Prosecutor's Office.
The charges against respondent Villadores and Atty. Eulalio Diaz
III were dismissed by the City Prosecutor's Office which,
however, found probable cause against the other respondents.
On April 12, 2000, the appellate court rendered its now
challenged decision which reversed and set aside the two (2)
Orders of the trial court dated August 27, 1998 and December 4,
1998. The appellate court directed that the name of petitioner
Villanueva, Jr., appearing as the offended party in Criminal Cases
Nos. 94-138744-45 be stricken out from the records.
What seems to be more crucial here is the fact that the
crime charged in the two information is falsification of public
document committed by a private individual defined and
penalized under Article 172, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal

Code. Apropos, the crime of falsification of public document does

not require for its essential elements damage or intent to cause
damage. In the final analysis. the inclusion of the name of
Francisco N. Villanueva. Jr. ould then be merely a superfluity in
the information, a meaningless surplusage therein. In fact. it is
even highly doubted if civil damages may be awarded in such
transgression of the law.
- Viewed from the above ratiocinations, We find no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the lower court in admitting the second
amended informations albeit such amendment is totally irrelevant
and unnecessary to the crime charged.
Issue:
Whether or not the pronouncement of the appellate court
in CA-G.R. SP No. 46103 to the effect that petitioner Villanueva,
Jr. is not an offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-138744-45
is obiter dictum.
Ruling:
It is significant to mention that the intervention of
petitioner Villanueva, Jr. in the criminal cases as an offended party
is apparently predicated on the reduction by the NLRC, in IBC's
appeal of the illegal dismissal case, of the monetary award to
which he is entitled, despite finding the appeal as not perfected
due to the posting of the spurious appeal bond. However, such
alleged error should have been brought by petitioner Villanueva,
Jr. to the appropriate forum, and not raised in criminal cases
before the trial court as a ground for his inclusion as a "prejudiced
party".
In view of all the foregoing, the instant petition, being
devoid of merit, must fail.
The instant petition is hereby DENIED, and the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated April 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 50235
is AFFIRMED. No costs.

13

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION, HENRY LAGARTO y
PETILLA and ERNESTO CORDERO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 119987-88 October 12, 1995
Facts:
On the basis of sworn statements of witnesses, booking
sheets, arrest reports and the necropsy report of the victim,
Abundio Lagunday, a.k.a. Jr. Jeofrey of no fixed address, and
Henry Lagarto y Petilla, of 288 Area H. Parola Compound, Tondo,
Manila were later charged with the crime of Rape with Homicide
in an Information dated August 8, 1994 filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, National Capital Judicial Region. Said
Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-138071. After trial
and presentation of the evidence of the prosecution and the
defense, the trial court rendered a decision on January 31, 1995
finding the defendants Henry Lagarto y Petilla and Ernesto
Cordero y Maristela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Rape with Homicide and sentenced both accused with the
"penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessories provided
for by law." Disagreeing with the sentence imposed, the City
Prosecutor of Manila on February 8, 1995, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, praying that the Decision be "modified in that
the penalty of death be imposed" against respondents Lagarto and
Cordero, in place of the original penalty (reclusion perpetua).
Refusing to act on the merits of the said Motion for
Reconsideration, respondent Judge, on February 10, 1995, issued
an Order denying the same for lack of jurisdiction.

allowed any discretion in imposing either the penalty of Reclusion

Perpetua or Death?
Ruling:
Finally, the Rules of Court mandates that after an
adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose "the proper penalty
and civil liability provided for by the law on the accused." This is
not a case of a magistrate ignorant of the law. This is a case in
which a judge, fully aware of the appropriate provisions of the
law, refuses to impose a penalty to which he disagrees. In so
doing, respondent judge acted without or in excess of his
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack
of jurisdiction in imposing the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
where the law clearly imposes the penalty of Death. The instant
petition is GRANTED. The case is hereby REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court for the imposition of the penalty of death
upon private respondents in consonance with respondent judge's
finding that the private respondents in the instant case had
committed the crime of Rape with Homicide under Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic
Act No. 7659, subject to automatic review by this Court of the
decision imposing the death penalty.

Issue:
The sole issue in the case at bench involves a question of
law. After finding that an accused individual in a criminal case
has, on the occasion of Rape, committed Homicide, is the judge

CESARIO URSUA petitioner v.

14

COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent
G.R. No. 112170. April 10,1996.
Facts:
Petitioner Cesario Ursua, a Community Environment and
Natural Resources Ofiicer assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato, had
a complaint against him for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority
and giving of unwarranted benefits.
On August 1 1987, Atty. Francis Palmores, counsel of the
petitioner requested to the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila
that he be furnished a copy of the complaint against petitioner. He
then asked his client Ursua to take his letter request to the office
of the Ombudsman because his law firms messenger, Oscar
Perez, had to attend to some personal matters.
When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman,
he wrote the name Oscar Perez on the visitors logbook and
upon receipt of the acknowledged by writing. Loida Kahulugan,
who handed the copy of complaint, learned that the person who
introduced himself as Oscar Perez was actually the petitioner,
Cesario Ursua. She reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman
who recommended that petitioner be charged.
The trial court found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A.
No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision on May 31, 1993. The petitioner asks for
review on his conviction in Supreme Court.

Ruling:
Cesario Ursua is acquitted of the crime charged. C.A No.
142, approved on November 7, 1936 entitled An Act to Regulate
the Use of Aliases, was amended by R.A. No. 6085on August 4
1969. C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to penalize
the act of using an alias name publicly and in business
transactions in addition to his real name unless such alias was duly
authorized by proper judicial proceeding.
The fact that the petitioner introduced himself in the Office
of the Ombudsman as Oscar Perez served only the request of his
lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which the petitioner
was a respondent. There is no evidence showing that he had used
or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition
to his real name. Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different
name belonging to another person in a single instance without any
sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name
in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall
within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended by
R.A. 6085. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable
consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and
that a construction of which the statue is fairly susceptible is
favored.

Issue:
Whether the petitioner violated C.A. No. 142 as amended
by R.A. No. 6085 otherwise known as An Act to Regulate the
Use of Alias.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO
V. PARCERO, petitioners,vs. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY
GROUP INC., respondent.
15

G.R. No. 162155. August 28,2007.

Facts:
On May 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent
Primetown Property Group Inc., applied for the refund or credit of
income tax respondent paid in 1997. He explained in his letter to
the petitioner Revenue District Officer Arturo Parcero of Revenue
District No. 049 (Makati) of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
that he suffered loses and caused industry to slow down.
On May 13, 1999, Revenue Officer Elizabeth Santos
required the respondent to submit additional documents to support
its claim. Respondents complied but its claim was not acted upon.
Thus on April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for review in the Court
of Tax Appeal (CTA) but was dismissed because it was filed
beyond two-year prescription period for filing a judicial claim for
tax refund based on Sec. 229 of the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC) and Art. 13 of the Civil Code.
Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
Hence, it filed an appeal in the Court of Appeal which reversed
the decision of Court of Tax Appeal because Art. 13 of the Civil
Code did not distinguish between a leap year and a regular year.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but was denied,
thus, petitioners ask for review on certiorari to Supreme Court.

when the law speaks of a year, it is understood to be equivalent to

365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year.
However, EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was
enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book 1 provides that year
shall be understood to be twelve calendar months. Both deal with
the same subject matter- the computation of legal periods. There
obviously exists incompatibility in the manner of computing legal
periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of
1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book
1 of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law,
governs the computation of legal periods.
Applying Section 31,Chapter VIII, Book 1 of
Administrative Code of 1987, the respondents petition (filed on
April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the 24 th calendar
month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return.
Hence, it was filed within the reglementary period.

Issue:
Whether the respondent filed its petition for review in the
CTA within the two-year prescriptive period provided in Sec. 229
of the NIRC.

Ruling:
The court affirms the decision of the CTA but the basis is
however not correct. Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that
16

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON.

LUDIVICO D. ARCIAGA, TAURINO SINGSON AND THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
No. L-29701. March 16,1987.
Facts:
On August 24, 1960, Taurino Singson filed a complaint
against Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc. for sustaining multiple
serious physical injuries when the bus crashed against an acacia
tree. The case was set for trial on December 25, 1965 but upon the
motion of both counsel, it was transferred to February 3 and 4
1966. No pre-trial has ever been conducted, until when April 29,
1967, only the defendant Philippine Rabbit appeared and upon
motion of its counsel, the court dismissed the case for nonappearance of plaintiff.
The order of dismissal of April 29, 1976 alluded to was
sent to Atty. Constante Pimentel, counsel for plaintiff, by
registered mail on May 3, 1967 and was received on May 6, 1967.
On July 6, 1967 (61 days from receipt of dismissal), counsel for
plaintiff filed a Petition for Relief accompanied by an affidavit
alleging that Taurino Singson upon attending the trial of his case
had encountered engine trouble causing him to be late. On August
16, 1967, lower court granted plaintiffs petition for relief and
denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner on November
28, 1967 on the ground that the petition for relief under Rule 38 is
premised on equity. On July 9, 1968, petitioner Philippine Rabbit
Bus Lines Inc, filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
preliminary injunction in the Court of Appeals but it was denied
on August 5, 1968. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was
denied on October 1, 1968. Hence, the instant petition for review
on certiorari.

Ruling:
The court found that the petition is impressed with merits.
Sec 3. of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides for a petition to
be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the
judgment and in this case the Petition for Relief was filed 61 days
after the receipt of the notice of the dismissal. Furthermore, the
counsel for private respondents did not move for reconsideration
of the Order for dismissal, nor for new trial. Neither did he appeal,
thereby allowing the decision to become final and executory.
The private respondent could have availed of the sixty day
period provided for by Rule 38 to file Petition for relief of
judgment but he allowed the opportunity to lapse, thus, the rule of
equity is not applicable in this case. Moreover, the petitioner did
not satisfactory showed that he has faithfully and strictly complied
with the provisions of the said Rule. He cannot invoke equity as a
ground for the reopening of the case. Indeed, to him is applicable,
the well known maxim that, equity aids the vigilant, not those
who slumber on their rights. The court, thus, ruled that the
decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed and set aside and
said Civil Case is declared terminated.

Issue:
Is the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Petition for
Relief under Rule 38 is premised on equity?
MA. VILMA S. LABAD, plaintiff, v.
17

THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHEASTERN PHILIPPINES,

defendant.
G. R. No. 139665. August 9, 2001.

1999. But it was denied on July 29, 1999 resolution issued by the
CA dated July 27, 1999.
Issue:

Facts:
Petitioner was a probationary faculty member of the
University of Southeastern Philippines (hereafter respondent)
Laboratory (high school) and designated as the adviser for the
schools yearbook TRAIL 95, the regular organ INSIGHTS
and the schools government known as the schools government
known as the LSOCSG.
On February 1, 1996, the officers and members of
respondent universitys Parents Teachers Association filed a lettercomplaint with the president of respondent university, charging
petitioner with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Unfitness
as a Teacher.
The respondents university Board of Regents
subsequently approved and adopted the report of the Investigating
Committee that it rendered a report recommending the penalty
of dismissal from service through the non-renewal of petitioners
probationary status on the ground of dishonesty and misconduct
as its decision.
The petitioner appealed said decision to Civil Service
Commission. However, the CSC, issued a resolution on April 14,
1998 affirming the decision of respondents university Board of
Regents. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration to CSC but
it was denied.
On December 28, 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals a Motion for extension of period to file petition for
Review asking for 15 days from December 28, 1998 until January
12, 1999 to do so. The petitioner filed her petition for Review with
the Court of Appeals on the latter date.
The counsel of the petitioner received a copy of resolution
dated February 24, 1999 on March 10, 1999, issued by the CA,
former 4th division, dismissing the petitioner for review. The
petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration on March 24,

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing

the review by petitioner before it on the ground that the petition
was filed late.
Ruling:
Based on Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court and as
applied in several cases, where the last day for doing any act
required or permitted by law falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a
legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not
run until the next working day. In this case, petitioner still had
until December 28, 1998, a Monday and the next business day to
move for a 15-day extension considering that December 26, 1998,
the last day for petitioner to file her petition for review fell on a
Saturday. The motion for extension filed on December 28, 1998
was thus filed on time since it was filed before the expiration of
the time sought to be extended.
As a rule, the extension should be attacked to the original
period and commence immediately after the expiration of such
period. However, in Moskowsky vs. Court of Appeals and Vda.
De Capulong vs. Workmens Insurance Co., Inc., the SC allowed
the extended period to commence from the specific time prayed
for in the motion for extension. In this case, the petitioner
specifically manifested that she be granted an extension of 15,
days from December 28, 1998 or until January 12, 1999 for her
petition for review. Hence, the period for reckoning the
commencement of the additional 15 days should have been from
December 28, 1998, and not December 26, 1998. thus, the petition
filed petitioner with the Court of Appeals on January 12, 1998,
exactly 15 days from December 28, 1998, was filed on time.

18

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner v.

PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 162155. August 28, 2007

Issue:
Whether Article 13 of the Civil Code is valid basis to
resolve the respondents petition for refund/tax credit.

Facts:
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent
Primetown Property Group, Inc. Apply for the refund or credit of
income tax respondent paid in 1997. Because the respondent
suffered losses (amounting to Php 71, 879, 228), due to some
factors that caused the industry to slowdown, it was not liable for
income taxes. Nevertheless, respondent paid its quarterly
corporate income tax and remitted credible withholding tax from
real estate sales to the BIR in the total amount of Php 26, 318,
398.32. Therefore, respondent was entitled to tax refund/ tax
credit.
On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Y. Santos
required respondent to submit additional documents to support.
Respondent complied but its claim was not acted upon. Thus, on
April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax
Appeals.
On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as
it was filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period for filling a
judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit. According to CTA, the
two-year prescriptive period under section 229 of the NIRC for
filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the
year 2000 was a leap year, respondents petition which was filed
731 days after respondent filed its final adjusted return, was filed
beyond the reglementary period.
Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
Thus, he filed an appeal in the Court of Appeals. On August 1,
2003, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA. It
ruled that Article 13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish between
a regular year and a leap year. A statute which is clear and explicit
shall be neither interpreted not construed. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration but it was denied. Thus this appeal.

Ruling:
The conclusion of the CA that respondent filed its petition
for review in the CTA within the two-year prescriptive period
provided in section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code is
correct. Its basis however is not.
A repealing clause section 27, Book VII of the
Administrative Code of 1987 is not an express repealing clause
because it fails to identify or designate the laws to be abolished.
Thus, the provision above only impliedly repealed all laws
inconsistent with the Administrative Code of 1987. Implied
repeals, however, are not favoured. An implied repeal must have
been clearly and unmistakably intended by the legislature. The test
is whether the subsequent law encompasses entirely the subject
matter of the former law and they cannot be logically or
reasonable reconciled.
The Supreme Court therefore hold that the respondents
petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the
24th calendar month from the day respondent filed its final
adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the reglementary
period.

19

ILLUH ASAALI, HATIB ABDURASID, INGKOH

BANTALA, BASOK INGKIN, and MOHAMMAD
BANTALA, petitioners, v. THE COMMISSIONER OF
CUSTOMS, respondent.
No. L-24170, December 16, 1968
Facts:
A customs patrol team on board Patrol Boat ST-23
intercepted the five sailing vessels in the high seas, between
British North Borneo and Sulu on September 10, 1950. These five
vessels, which were all of the Philippine registry, owned and
manned by Filipino residents of Sulu were heading towards TawiTawi, Sulu carrying cigarettes and some pieces of rattan chairs
without the require import license, hence smuggled.
Issue:
Whether or not the seizure can be made although the
vessel was on the high seas

1987. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly

dissolving a marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
The respondent became an Australian citizen on June 26, 1992
when the Australian government issued a Certificate of Australian
citizenship.
On January 12, 1994, the respondent, claiming that he is
single, married the petitioner, a Filipina, in Our Lady of Perpetual
Help Church in Cabanatuan City. On March 3, 1998, petitioner
filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the
ground of bigamy, believing that the respondents prior marriage
to Editha Samson still subsists. However, the respondent
contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been
validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in
1989; thus, he is legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
While the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending,
respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family
court in Sydney, Australia.
Issue:

Ruling:
Since the ship is registered in the Philippines, it is
subjected to our Revised Penal Code, even outside our territorial
jurisdiction. Likewise, in international law, it was agreed upon
that a state has the right to protect itself as well as its revenues, a
right not limited to its own territory but extending to the high seas
(Church v. Hubbart, 2 Cranch 187, 234).

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO,

petitioner, v. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.
G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001

Whether or not a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may

be recognized in our jurisdiction
Ruling:
The Court decided that a divorce obtained abroad by an
alien may be recognized in the Philippine jurisdiction, provided
such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
Thus, the Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia
and Rederick A. Recio, a naturalized Australian citizen,
solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved
and both parties can now remarry under existing and applicable
laws to any and/or both parties.

Facts:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to an
Australian citizen, Editha Samson, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1,
20

LORENZO LLORENTE, petitioner vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, respondent
G.R. NO. 124371. November 23, 2000

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, v. HON. MANUEL V.

ROMILLO, JR. AND RICHARD UPTON, respondents.
No. L-68470. October 8, 1985.

Facts:

Facts:

On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner

Paula Llorente were married in Nabua, Camarines Sur. On
November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States
citizenship and Certifiacte of Naturalization No. 5579816 was
issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern
District of New York. In 1945, he discovered that his wife Paula
was pregnant and was living in and having an adulterous
relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. On February 2,
1946, the couple drew a written agreement to the effect that
Llorente would not support Paula, the dissolution of their marital
union, and that Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her
adulterous act. On November 27, 1951, Lorenzo obtained a
divorce in California. On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree
became final. On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F.
Llorente in Manila and begot three children in his later years.

Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the

Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of
the United States. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and
established residence in the Philippines afterwards. The parties
were divorced in Nevada, United States in 1982. Petitioner remarried also in Nevada with Theodore Van Dorn. Dated June 8,
1983, private respondents filed suit against petitioner claiming
that the latters properties in Manila were conjugal and that private
respondent had a rightful claim to its management. Petitioner
moved to dismiss the suit claiming that the private respondent
acknowledged that he and petitioner had no community
property in the divorce proceedings. The Regional Trial Court
denied the dismissal on the ground that the property involved is
located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no
bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari
proceeding.

Issue:
Can foreign laws be made applicable in the Philippines?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court and recognized the validity of the divorce granted in
favor of Lorenzo. The Court also remanded the cases to the court
of origin for determination of successional rights allowing proof
of foreign law.

Issues:
a. When is a certiorari proceeding justifiable?
b. Can the Philippines recognize divorce?
Ruling:
a.
The petition was granted, and respondent judge
was hereby ordered to dismiss the complaint filed where
respondent judge denied her motion to dismiss said case, and her
motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order. When the lower
court acts in a manner equivalent to a lack of jurisdiction then it
devolves upon the Supreme Court in a certiorari proceeding to
exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error
committed.
21

b.
Owing to the nationality principle embodied in
article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippines nationals are covered
by the policy against absolute divorces. Aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. A divorce
decree granted by a U.S. Court between a Filipina and her
American husband is binding on the American husband. Since the
couple had obtained a divorced in Nevada, the husband is
estopped from asserting his rights over supposed conjugal
property. The American husband in this instance who was granted
absolute divorce with his Filipina wife is cut off from marital and
successional rights with the latter.

22

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF

EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED. ADOLFO C.
AZNAR, EXECUTOR AND LUCY CHRISTENSEN, HEIR
OF THE DECEASED, EXECUTOR AND HEIRAPPELLEES, vs. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA,
oppositor-appellant.
No. L-16749. January 31, 1963.

recognizing the calling for the application of International Law;

recognizing that the validity of the testamentary disposition of the
distribution of estate should be governed by the Philippine laws;
declaring the schedule of distribution was contrary to Philippine
laws.
Issue:

Facts:
Edward E. Christensen, the deceased, who domiciled in
the Philippines and/but a citizen of California, made a will
executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 stating that Maria Lucy
Christensen was his only child and that a certain Maria Helen
Christensen, though baptized as Christensen, was not in any way
related nor adopted by him. With this, Maria Helen Christensen
was just granted with 3,000 pesos, Philippine currency to be
deposited in trust with the Davao Branch of the Philippine
National Bank and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos,
Philippine currency per month until the principal thereof as well
as any interest which may have accrued thereon, was exhausted
while all that was left by the deceased be given to Maria Lucy
Christensen.
Since Maria Helen Christensen was declared by the Court
in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the
deceased Edward Christensen, opposition to the approval of the
project of partition was filed by Helen, insofar as it deprives her
legitime as an acknowledged natural child.
However, the court ruled that as Edward E. Christensen
was a citizen of the United States and of the Sate of California at
the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity
of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of
California. Oppositor Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed
various motions for reconsideration, but were denied. Some of
which claimed that the lower court erred in ignoring the decision
of the SC that Helen was acknowledged as a natural child;

What law will determine and recognize the validity of

testamentary provisions and the disposition of the bequeathed of
the deceased given that his domicile was the Philippines but his
citizenship is in California; the repercussion of which is the
determining factor of whether Maria Helen Christensens appeal
for share of the properties be granted or not.
Ruling:
Art. 16 of the Philippine Civil Code states that intestate
and testamentary successionsshall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the
country where said property may be found. Since Edward
Christensen was a California citizen, the Philippines where he
executed his testament referred back to the laws of which he was a
citizen of California, USA. However, no single American law
governing the validity of testamentary provisions was found,
therefore it referred to no other than the private law of the state of
which the decedent was a citizen State of California. Referring
then to California Civil Code, Article 946 authorizes the reference
or return of the question to the law of the testators domicile.
Finding therefore that Philippines is the domicile of the deceased,
the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by
the Philippine Law, pursuant to the Civil Code of California, not
by the internal law of California.
23

Judgment is therefore reversed and the case returned to the

lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the
Philippine Law on succession provides.

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLES
BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, executor. MARIA
CRISTINA
BELLIS AND MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositorsappellants, vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
No. L-23678. June 6, 1967.
Facts:
Amos G. Bellis was born in Texas and a citizen of the
State of Texas and of the United States. At the time of his death,
he was a resident thereof. Before he died, he made two wills, one
disposing of his Texas properties, the other, disposing of his
Philippine properties. In both wills, his recognized illegitimate
children were not given anything. Texas has no conflicts rule
rule of Private International Law governing successional rights.
Furthermore, under Texas Law, there are no compulsory heirs and
therefore no legitimes. The illegitimate children opposed the wills
on the ground that they have been denied of their right to inherit to
which they would be entitled if Philippine law were to be applied.

The renvoi doctrine, applied in Testate Estate of Edward

Christensen, Adolfo Aznar v. Christensen Garcia cannot be
applied. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a
national of one country and a domiciliary of Texas at the time of
his death. So that even assuming that Texas has a conflicts of law
rule providing that the law of the domicile should govern, the
same would not result in a renvoi to Philippine law, but would still
refer to Texas law because the deceased was both a citizen and a
domiciliary of Texas.
The contention that the national law of the deceased
should be disregarded because of Article 17 which in effect states
that our prohibitive laws should not be rendered nugatory by
foreign laws, is wrong. This is because Article 16 and Article 1039
are special provisions while Article 17 is merely a general
provision. Moreover, because Congress deleted the phrase
notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding
article when it incorporated Article 11 of the old Civil Code as
Article 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without
substantial change, the second paragraph of Article 10 of the old
Civil Code as Article 16 of the new.
Pointed out by the oppositor that the decedent, executing
two wills intended Philippine Law to govern his Philippine estate.
Assuming that such was the decedents intention, a provision in a
foreigners will in accordance with the Philippine law and not
with his national law is illegal and void for his national law.

Issue:
Are they entitled to their legitimes?
Ruling:
The said children are not entitled to their legitimes for
under Texas Law which must be applied because it is the
national law of the deceased there are no legitimes.
24

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK,

petitioner
vs. VENICIO ESCOLIN, ET AL., respondent
56 S 266
Facts:
On May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City
leaving a will. On May 27, 1957, her widower- Hodges, had been
appointed as SpecialAdministrator. Barely four months before his
death, he executed an affidavit wherein he ratified and confirmed
all that he stated in his estate tax returns as to his having
renounced what was given him bu his wifes will. Thereafter, Atty.
Leon Gellada, who had been previously acting as counsel for
Hodges in his capacity as special executor of his wifes estate, and
as such had filed the aforequoted motions and manifestations; that
the most trusted employee of both spouses Linnie Jane Hodges
and C.N Hodges, who had been employed for around 30 years, in
the person of Miss Avelina Magno, should be appointed as
administrator of the estate and at the same time, a special
administrator of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges.
On January 24, 1964, virtually al of the heirs of C.N
Hodges, who claim to be the sole beneficiaries of the estate of
Linnie Jane Hodges and various legal counsel representing the
aforementioned parties, entered into anamicablesettlement,
wherein the partied thereto agreed that certain sums of money
were to be paid in settlement of different claims against the 2
estates and that the asets of both estates would be administrered
jointly by the PCIB as administrator of the estate of Linnie Jane
Hodges, subject, however, that PCIBs claim to exclusive
possession and ownership of 100% of all assets owned by Charles
Newton Hodges or Linnie Jane Hodges situated here in the
Philippines.

Ruling:
Applying the renvoi doctrine, asenunciated and applied
by this honorable court in the case of In reChristensen, there can
be no question that Philippine law governs the testamentary
provisions in the Last Will and Testament of the deceased Linnie
Jane Hodges, as well as the successional rights to her estate, both
with respect to movables, as well as immovables in the
Philippines.

Issue:
Whether or not Philippine law should govern the
successional rights of the heris?
25

AMERICAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS,
HON. BERNARD L. SALAS and DEMOCRITO MENDOZA,
respondents
G.R No. 116044-45. March 9, 2000
Facts:
It is undisputed that the private respondent purchased from
Singapore Airlines in Manila conjunction tickets for ManilaSingapore-Athens-Larnaca-Rome-Turin-Geneva-CopenhagenNew York. American Airlines was not a participating airline in
any of the segments. In Geneva, private respondent decided to
forego his trip to Copenhagen and to go straight to New York and
in the absence of a direct flight under his conjunction tickets from
Geneva to New York; the private respondent on June 7, 1989
exchanged the unused portion of the conjunction ticket for a oneway ticket to New York from American Airlines. Am. Airlines
issued its own ticket to the private respondent in Geneva and
claimed the value of the unused portion of the conjunction ticket
from the clearing house in Geneva. In Sept. 1989, private
respondent filed an action for damages before the RTC of Cebu
for the alleged embarrassment and mental anguish he suffered at
the Geneva Airport when the Am. Airlines security officers
prevented him from boarding the plane only after all the other
passengers have boarded. The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction of Philippine courts to entertain the said
proceedings under Art. 28 of the Warsaw Convention. The
petitioner contends that since the Philippines is not the place
where the contract of carriage was made between the parties
herein, Philippine courts do not have jurisdiction over this action
for damages. Petitioner lays stress on the fact that the plane ticket
for a direct flight from Geneva to New York was purchased by the
private respondent from the petitioner by exchange and cash
which signifies that the contract of carriage with Singapore
Airlines was terminated and a second contract was perfected.
Moreover, the second contract of carriage cannot be deemed to

have been an extension of the first as the petitioner airline is not a

participating airline in any of the destinations under the first
contract. The RTC denied the motion. The order of denial was
elevated to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the ruling of the
RTC. Both RTC and CA held that the suit may be brought in the
Philippines under the pool partnership among the IATA
(International Air Transport Association) members, which include
Singapore Airlines and American Airlines, wherein the members
act as agents of each other in the issuance of tickets to those who
may need their services.
Issue:
Whether or not the Philippines has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the action for damages filed by the private
respondent against petitioner in view of Art 28 (1) of the Warsaw
Convention?
Ruling:
The Warsaw Convention to which the Philippines is a
party and which has the force and effect of law in this country
applies to all international transportation of persons, baggage, or
goods performed by an aircraft gratuitously or for hire. The
threshold issue of jurisdiction of Philippine courts under Art. 28
must first be resolved before any pronouncements may be made
on the liability of the carrier thereunder. Art. 3 of the Warsaw
Convention clearly states that a contract of air transportation is
taken as a single operation whether it is founded on a single
contract or a series of contracts. The number of tickets issued does
not detract from the oneness of the contract of carriage as long as
the parties regard the contract as a single operation. The third
option of the plaintiff under Art. 28 of the Warsaw Convention
e.g., to sue in the place of business of the carrier wherein the
contract was made, is therefore, Manila, and Philippine courts are
clothed with jurisdiction over this case. We note that while this
case was filed in Cebu, the issue of venue is no longer an issue.
Wherefore, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.
26

PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. ROSARIO

GANAC CHU respondent.
G.R. No. 14521. September 21, 2005

Thus the petitioner acted in bad faith in view of the destroyed

trees.

Facts:
A complaint for damages with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of injunction and temporary restraining order filed by
respondent against petitioner and the National Housing Authority
(NHA).
Sometime in June 1993, without notice and due process,
petitioner entered her property and bulldozed the land destroying
her black pepper plantation, causing damage to her operation and
depriving her of her means of livelihood. Respondent appeared
claiming that petitioner had encroached upon her property.
Respondent failed to prove her ownership thereof.
The partial decision of the trial court favored the
respondent. On the other hand, the petitioner filed an appeal to the
CA. the court sustained the factual findings of the trial court.
Issue:
Is the respondent entitled for the payment of damages?
Did the petitioner acted in bad faith?
Ruling:
It was held in the modified decision of the Supreme Court
that in lieu of the actual damages, temperate damages should have
been awarded by the trial court considering that respondent had
suffered some pecuniary loss but its amount cannot be proved
without certainty.
Respondents ownership of the property on which the
pepper tree stand is immaterial to the case. There is no dispute that
respondent owned the pepper trees that were destroyed by the
petitioner. Even assuming that petitioner owns the property or that
bulldozed the land with its boundaries, still, there was no reason
for the petitioner to disregard respondents right over her trees.
27

HERMINO C. PRINCIPIO, petitioner, vs. THE HON. OSCAR

BARRIENTOS, BANKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, and
HILARIO SORIANO, respondents
G.R. No. 167025. December 19, 2005

with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner acted in bad faith.

Facts:
On june 25, 2001, respondent Hilarion P. Soraino,
president and stock holder of the Rural Bank of San Miguel Inc.,
filed an affidavit-complaint against petitioner with the office of
the Ombudsman for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act
3019. Respondent alleged that petitioner, through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith and gross negligence, caused undue
injury to RBSMI by reporting that the bank incurred legal reserve
deficiencies, and by recommending the imposition of a fine which
was adopted by the Monetary Board.
On September 26, 2002, the Office of the Ombudsman
issued a resolution finding probable cause to indict petitioner for
violation of the said Republic Act. On November 12, 2002, and
information was filed against the petitioner with the RTC Manila.
On November 26, 2002, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the Office of the
Ombudsman on the ground that the information had been already
filed in the court.
The petitioner filed a motion with the trial court praying
that the motion for reconsideration filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman be given due course and thereafter, to rule that no
probable cause exist.
On December 3, 2003, the trial court denied petitioners
motion to give due course to his motion for reconsideration and to
defer proceedings until resolution of the pending issues. It also
suspended petitioner from office for a period of 60 days. His
motion for reconsideration was denied on January 27, 2004.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals praying for the annulment of respondent judges Orders
of December 3, 2003 and January 27, 2002 for having been issued

Ruling:
It was held that the Ombudsman cannot impute bad faith
on the part of the petitioner on the assumption that he, together
with other BSP officials, was part of the cabal to apply pressure on
RBSMI to sell out by subjecting it to many impositions through
the Monetary Board. Bad faith is never presumed, while good
faith is always presumed. The Ombudsman should have first
determined the facts indicating bad faith instead of relying on the
tenuous assumption that there was an orchestrated attempted to
force RBSMI to sell out.

28

WILLIAM GATCHALIAN, petitioner, vs. BOARD OF

COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION
AND DEPORTATION), et al., respondents.
MAY 31, 1991 G.R. Nos. 95612-13
Facts:
On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of
William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of immigration
as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his
mother, Marciana Gatchalian.
On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian, then a twelve year
old minor, arrived in Manila from Hong Kong together with
Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson, all surnamed Gatchalian. They
had with them Certificates of Registration and Identity issued by
the Philippine Cosulate in Hong kong and sought an admission as
Filipino citizens. Gloria and Francisco and daughter and son,
respectively, of Santiago; while William and Johnson are the sons
of Francisco.
After investigation, the board of Special Inquiry No. 1
rendered a decision dated July 6, 1961, admitting William
Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino citizens. As a
consequence thereof, William Gatchalian was issued Identification
Certificate by the immigration authorities on August 16, 1961.
On January 24, 1962, Memorandum No. 9 was issued by
the secretary of Justice setting aside all decisions purporting
rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal or review
motu propio of the Board of special Inquiry. The same
memorandum directed the Board of commissioners to review all
cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was
a Philippine citizen.
On July 6, 1962, the New Board of Commissioners after a
review motu propio of the proceedings in the Board of Special
Inquiry, reversed the decision of the latter and ordered the
exclusion of, among others, respondent Gatchalian. A warrant of
exclusion also dated July 6, 1962 was issued alleging the decision

of the Board of Commissioners dated July 6, 1962 has now

become final and executory.
Sometime in 1973, respondent Gatchalian, as well as the
others covered by July 6, 1962 warrant of exclusion, filed a
motion for re-hearing with the Board of special Inquiry where the
deportation case against them was assigned.
On March 14, 1973, the board of Special Inquiry
recommended to the then Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an
order reaffirming the July 6, 1961 decision of the Board of Special
Inquiry thereby admitting respondent Gatchalian as a Filipino
citizen and recalled the warrant of arrest issued against him.
On June 7, 1990, the acting director of the national Bureau
of Investigation wrote the Justice Secretary recommending that
respondent Gatchalian along with other applicants covered by the
warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 be charged with violation
of Com. Act No. 613, as amended, also known as the Immigration
Act of 1940.
On August 1, 1990, the Secretary of Justice indorsed the
recommendation of the NBI to the CI for investigation and
immediate action.
On August 15, 1990, petitioner Commissioner Domingo of
the Commission of Immigration and Deportation issued a mission
order commanding the arrest of William Gatchalian.
On August 29, 1990, William Gatchalian filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with injuction before the RTC of
Manila.
On September 4, 1990, petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss alleging that respondent judge has no jurisdiction over the
board of Commissioners. Nonetheless, respondent judge issued
the assailed order dated September 7, 1990, denying the motion to
dismiss.
In a counter-petition, William Gatchalian alleges among
others that: 1) assuming that the evidence on record is not
sufficient to declare him as Filipino citizen, petitioners have no
jurisdiction to proceed with the deportation case until the courts
have resolved the question of his citizenship; (2) petitioners can
29

no longer judiciously and fairly resolve respondents citizenship in

the deportation case because of their bias, pre-judgment and
prejudice against him; and (3) the ground for which he sought to
be deported has already prescribed.

Issues:
Whether or not the warrant of arrest issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration valid?
Whether or not William Gatchalian a Filipino citizen?
Held:
It was held that the warrant of arrest issued by the
Commissioner of immigration should be for investigation
purposes only. Thus, the warrant of arrest that was issued is null
and void for being unconstitutional. Based on the Immigration
Act, it is clear that the Commissioner of Immigration may issue
warrant of arrest only after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as
charged against the alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest
issued by the Commissioner of immigration, to be valid, must be
for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation.
As to the citizenship of William Gatchalian, it was held
that William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father
Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter. Francisco,
in turn, is likewise a Filipino being the legitimate child of
Santiago Gatchalian who is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose
Filipino citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration
in an order dated July 12, 1960. Thus, William gatchalian belongs
to the Filipino class of citizens as contemplated under Sec. 1
Article IV of the Constitution, which provides: Section 1. the
following are citizens of the Philippines; (1) Those who are
citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
30

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner, vs. ROMEO A.

JADER, respondent.
G.R. No. 132344. February 17, 2000.
Facts:
Plaintiff Romeo A. Jader was enrolled in the defendants
College of Law from 1984 up to 1988. In the first semester of his
last year (SY 1987-1988), he failed to take the regular final
examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an
incomplete grade. He enrolled fro the second semester as fourth
year law student and on February 1, 1988 he filed an application
for the removal of the incomplete grade given him by Professor
Carlos Ortega which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson.
He took the examination on March 28, 1988. On May 30, 1988,
his grade of five (5) was submitted by Professor Ortega.
In the deliberations conducted by the Dean and the Faculty
Members of the College of Law, the plaintiffs name appeared in
the Tentative List of Candidates for graduation for the Degree of
Bachelor of Laws. Plaintiffs name also appeared in the invitation
for the 35th Investitures and Commencement Ceremonies for the
candidates of Bachelor of Laws.
The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies on April
16, 1988. during the program of which he went up the stage, his
mother and brother placed his Hood, his Tassel turned from left to
right, and he was thereafter handed by Dean Celedonio a rolled
white sheet of paper symbolical of the Law Diploma.
He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He
took a leave of absence from his job from April 20, 1988 to
September 30, 1988 and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in Far
Eastern University. Having learned of the deficiency, he dropped
his review class and was not able to take the bar examination.
Plaintiff-appellee sued defendant-appellant for damages
alleging that he suffered moral shock, mental anguish, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless

nights when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations
arising from the latters negligence.
Issue:
Whether or not plaintiff-appellee can claim for moral and
exemplary damages for the abuse of rights under Article 19 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ordered that petitioner should pay
respondent the sum of Thirty-five Thousand Four Hundred
Seventy Pesos (P35, 470.00), with legal interest of 6% per annum
computed from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid
but not entitled to moral damages. The court does not believe that
respondent suffered shock, trauma and pain because he could not
graduate and could not take the bar examinations. The court stated
that it behooved on respondent to verify for himself whether he
has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar
examinations. Respondent should have been responsible enough
to ensure that all his affairs, specifically those pertaining to his
academic achievement, are in order.

31

VIOLA CRUZ, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION, NORKIS DISTRIBUTORS,
INC., JOSE RAMIRO A. CARPIO, JR., WESSIE
QUISUMBING, and ELIZALDE AMPALAYO, respondents.,
G.R. No. 116384, 2000 February 7, 2000.

answer, she received a termination latter dated November 2, 1990

citing health reasons as the cause for her dismissal.
On March 18, 1991, petitioner lodged a complaint for
illegal dismissal against private respondents before the Arbitration
Branch of the NLRC in Cagayan De Oro City. On May 28, 1993,
Labor Arbiter Leon P. Murillo rendered a decision but both parties
appealed to the NLRC.

Facts:
Respondent Norkis Distributor, Inc., a domestic
corporation with principal office and business address at A. S.
Fortuna Street, Mandaue City, Cebu, is engaged in the business of
selling motorcycles and household appliances, with branches all
over the country. One of the branches is in Valencia, Bukidnon
where petitioner Viola Cruz was employed as cashier/ bookkeeper.
For her loyalty and dedication to the company, petitioner Cruz
was given compensating salary adjustment of One Hundred
(P100.00) Pesos, effective July 1, 1990.
In October 14, 1990, while petitioner and her coemployees were busy packing up and making inventory of the
things to be moved because of a scheduled transfer of the Valencia
branch, the petitioner suddenly collapsed. She was rushed to the
Monsanto General Hospital in Valencia, Bukidnon and was later
on transferred to the Capitol College General Hospital in Cagayan
de Oro City on October 17, 1990. She was diagnosed to be
suffering from CNS Infection: TB Meningitis vs. Cryptococcal
Meningitis. She was later transferred to the Maria Reyna
Hospital, where she was confined from October 25 to December
5, 1990, and treated for Cryptococcal Meningitis, Potts Disease,
and Diabetes Mellitus Type II.
Starting October 15, 1990, the petitioner stopped reporting
for work. Two days after petitioners collapse, respondent Norkis
was able to recruit a replacement cashier/ bookkeeper in the
person of Hernando Juaman.
On December 28, 1990, petitioner sent a letter to
respondent Norkis to verify the status of her employment. As an

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed by
private respondents on ground of illness and so she was entitled to
recover moral and exemplary damages.
Ruling:
Private respondents illegally dismissed the petitioner
because they failed to comply with the requirement that an
employee to be dismissed should be given two written notices.
The first notice is to apprise the employee of the particular acts or
omissions by reason of which her dismissal has been decided
upon; and the second is to inform the employee of the employers
decision to dismiss him. Having failed to do the requirement,
respondents have not given the petitioner due process which
makes their act illegal and void. For this, petitioner is entitled to
recover moral and exemplary damages.

32

GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE & RADIO CORPORATION,

petitioner vs. GEORGE G. BARRIOS AND OLGA THERESA
CRUZ-BARRIOS, respondents
No. L-60859. December 27, 1982
Facts:
The petitioner cable company failed to deliver to
respondent-spouses, both physicians, a cablegram from Mercy
Hospital, Buffalo, New York, admitting respondent-wife for a
rotating internship in said hospital. As a consequence of which,
she was unable to signify her acceptance and the position was
given to someone else. The Trial Court and the Court of appeals
found that the petitioner was grossly negligent in having
admittedly failed to deliver the cablegram which caused
respondents financial difficulties in New York, due to loss of
earnings for approximately six months, serious anxiety, and
sleepless nights, for which the petitioner should be held liable, and
which should be corrected for the public good.
Issue:
Whether or not the award of damages is excessive.
Ruling:
Yes. A telegraph company is a public service corporation
owing duties to the general public ands is liable to any member of
the public whom it owes a duty for damages proximately flowing
from a violation of that duty. However, the petitioner is a quasipublic corporation also affected with public interest and the award
of damages made by the Trial Court and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals was found by the Supreme Court to be excessive. The
decision of the Supreme Court modified that of the lower courts
by reducing the award.

33

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.

(RCPI), petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND LORETO
DIONELA, respondents
No. L-44748. August 29, 1986
Facts:
The complaint against the defendant corporation is based
on a telegram sent through its Manila Office to the offended party,
Loreto Dionela. Plaintiff-respondent Dionela alleged that the
defamatory words (sa iyo walang pakinabang dumating-ka
diyan-wala kang padala ditto-kahit bulbul mo) on the telegram
sent to him not only wounded his feelings but also caused him
undue embarrassment and affected adversely his business as well
because other people have come to know of the said defamatory
words. Defendant-corporation as a defense, alleged that the
additional words in Tagalog was a private joke between the
sending and receiving operators and that they were not addressed
to or intended for plaintiff and therefore did not form part of the
telegram and that the Tagalog words are not defamatory.
The trial court ruled that the additional words in Tagalog
are libelous and that they clearly impute a vice or defect of the
plaintiff. Whether or not they were intended for the plaintiff, the
effect on the plaintiff is the same. There is sufficient publication of
the libelous Tagalog words for they are open to view and
inspection by third parties. The Court of Appeals affirmed with
modification the Trial Courts decision by reducing the award of
damages. A motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, the
petition.

Ruling:
Yes. In most cases, negligence must be proved in order
that plaintiff may recover. However, since negligence may be hard
to substantiate in some cases, we may apply the doctrine of RES
IPSA LOQUITUR or the thing speaks for itself, by considering
the presence of facts or circumstances surrounding the injury.

Issue:
Whether or not award of moral damages based on
documentary evidence without supporting oral testimonies is
proper.

34

FRANCISCO HERMOSSISIMA, plaintiff vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, et.al., defendant
No.L-14628. September 30, 1960
Facts:
Since 1950, Soledad Cagigas was then a teacher in the
Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and Francisco
Hermosima, who was almost 10 years younger than she was her
boyfriend. They were regarded as engaged although he had made
no promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up
teaching and became a life insurance underwriter in the City of
Cebu, where intimacy between them developed. One evening in
1953, after coming from the movie house, they had sexual
intercourse in his cabin on board M/V Escana to which he was
then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, she was in the
family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child
Chris Hermosima was born on June 17,1954, in a private
maternity and clinic. However on July24, 1954, Francisco married
Romanita Perez. Hence, the present action was commenced on or
about October 4 1954.

who was 10 years older, surrendered herself to him because

overwhelmed by her love for him; she wanted to bind him by
having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the
benefit of the clergy. He was, therefore, ordered to pay a monthly
pension of P30.00 for the support of the child; P4500.00
representing the income that complainant had allegedly failed to
earn during her pregnancy and shortly after the birth of the child
as actual compensatory damages; P5000.00 as moral damages;
and P500.00 as attorneys fees.

Issue:
Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our
laws for breach of promise to marry
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that under the Civil Code, there
can be no recovery of moral damages for a breach of promise to
marry, as such the omission in the Civil Code of the proposed
Chapter on breach of Promise Suits is a clear manifestation of
legislative intent not to sanction as such, suits for breach of
promise to marry, otherwise many innocent man may become the
victims of designing and unscrupulous females. However, if
there be seduction, moral damages may be recovered under Art.
2219, Par.3 of Civil Code of the Philippines. Francisco was
morally guilt of seduction in this case. Soledad, the complainant,
35

BEATRIZ GALANG, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

respondent
NO.L-17248.January 29, 1962
Facts:
Beatriz Galang and Rodrigo Quinit were both from the
same town of Sison, Pangasinan, and were engaged but Rodrigos
parents were strongly opposed to their marriage. He wanted the
marriage to take place after his graduation while the appellee was
impatient and wanted the marriage to be held at an earlier date. On
April 26, 1955, Rodrigos parents told him to leave the parental
home in view of his continued relations with Beatriz. On April 27,
1955, the couple lived as husband and wife in the house of Adolfo
Dagawan at Colorado Falls, Tuba, Mountain Province until May 9
when Rodrigo left and never returned.
Issue:
Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our
laws for breach of promise to marry
Held:
The Court of First Instance of Baguio, rendered a decision
sentencing the defendants jointly and severally to pay sums of
P275.00 by way of actual damages; P5000.00 as moral damages
and P500.00 as attorneys fees, apart fro the costs. On appeal
taken by the defendants, the Court of Appeals absolved Maximo
Quinit, and accordingly reversed said decision insofar as he is
concerned, and modified it as regards Rodrigo Quinit by
eliminating the awards for moral damages and attorneys fees. The
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Court of Appeals. Moral
damages for breach of promise to marry are not collectible.

GASHEEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT

OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents
36

G. R. No. 97336. February 19, 1993

Facts:
Marilou T. Gonzales, a 22 year old Filipina filed on
Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan in Lingayen for a complaint
for damages against the petitioner, Gashem Shookat Baksh (an
Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments in Guilig,
Dagupan City and is an exchnage student taking a medical course
at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges), for the alleged violation of
their agreement to get married. Before August 20, 1987, the latter
courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the
condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get
married after the end of the school semester, which was in
October of thar year; the petitioner visited to private respondents
hometown in Banaga, Bugallion, Pangasinan to secure their
approval to the marriage; sometimes in August 20, 1987, the
petitioner forced her to live with him in his apartment. Because of
the petitioners promise to marry the private respondent, the latter
surrendered her virginity. A week before the filing of the
complaint, the petitioners attitude towards her started to change;
he matreated and threatened to kill her. He said that he does not
want to marry her because he was already married to someone
living in Bacolod. The private respondent then prayed for
judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages,
reimbursements for actual expenses, and attorneys fees and costs.
On the other hand, the petitioner also filed a counter claim, of
course, denying and reversing the allegations against him by the
private respodent.
On October 16, 1989, the Regional Trial Court applied the
Article 21 of the Civil Code favoring the private respondent. The
petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals regarding the
decision of the trial court. On February 18, 1991, the CA affirmed
in toto the trial courts ruling. Thus, unfazed by his second defeat,
petitioner filed instant petition on March 26, 1991.
Issue:

Whether or nor damages may be recovered for a breach of

promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that, in the existing rule under our
Civil Law, a breach of promise to marry itself is not an actionable
wrong.
The Supreme Court found out the true character and
motive of the petitioner, that is, he used deception and took
advantage of the situation of the private respondent (a high school
graduate and financially unstable) by proposing to support and
marry her, just so he can satisfy his lust. Thus, he clearly violated
the Filipinos concept of morality and defied the traditional
respect was not going to marry her after all, she left him.
Therefore, finding no reversible error in the challenged
decision the instant petition hereby denied, with costs against the
petitioner.

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appeallant
No. L-20089. December 26, 1964
37

proven that the defendant clearly acted in a wanton, reckless and

oppressive manner.

Facts:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz, follwing their promise to
love, decided to get married. Two days before their marriage
Francisco wrote Beatriz telling her that their marriage had to be
postponed as his mother opposes it. A day before his marriage he
sent a telegram informing her nothing changed rest assured
returning soon. Despite the fact that everything was already
prepared, from invitations to matrimonial bed and other
accessories, and in fact bridal showers were given and gifts
already received, Francisco was never heard from again. Beatriz
sued for damages for breach of promise to marry.
Issue:
Is breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong?
Ruling:
The extent to which acts not contrary to law may be
perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of the
Civil Code provides that any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damages.
This is not a case of mere breach to marry. As stated, mere
breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to
formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and
publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different.
This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good
customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages
in accordance with Article 21 of the Civil Code.
When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under
Article 21 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be awarded
under Article 2219(10) of the said Code. Exemplary damages may
also be awarded under Article 2232 of said Code where it is

CAR COOL PHILIPPINES, INC., represented in this act by its

President and General Manager VIRGILIO DELA ROSA,
petitioner, vs. USHIO REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondent
G.R. No. 138088. January 23, 2006
38

Facts:
On December 19, 1995, Ushio Realty and Development
Corporations (Ushio Realty) filed an ejectment case against Car
Cool Philippines, Inc. (CAR COOL) to recover possession of a
parcel of land (property) located at No. 72 (137) Quezon Avenue
corner of Victory Avenue, Quezon City.
USHIO Realty alleges that the former owners of the
property, spouses Hector and Gloria Hizon Lopez (Spouses
Lopez), leased the property to CAR COOL since 1972. In 1990,
the Spouses Lopez and CAR COOL executed a written lease
agreement over the property for two years. On the expiration of
the agreement, the Spouses Lopez allowed CAR COOL to
continue renting the property. Thus, the agreement went on by a
verbal month-month agreement. Hector Lopez wrote CAR COOL
to inform of his intention to sell the property and te former gave
the latter the option to buy the property before offering it to other
prospective buyers. CAR COOL failed to respond to the offer.
Thus, the property was bought by USHIO.
USHIO gave CAR COOL a specific time to which to
vacate the property. But after three notice and failing, however, to
comply te demands of USHIO, filed a complaint for ejectment on
December 19, 1995. The Metropolitan Trial Court decided in
favor of USHIO REALTY. CAR COOL filed an appeal to the
Regional Trial Court, but still the latter affirm the decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court. Hence, the instant petition.

occupation of the property after USHIO Realtys agents enetered

the property on October 1, 1995 and unlawfully destroyed CAR
COOLs office, equipment and spare parts. Because of the
destruction of the equipment and spare parts needed to operate its
business, CAR COOL asserts that it was no longer possible to
continue its business operations. The Supreme Court, however,
was not convinced basing from the Rule 70 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, specifically under Sections 17 and 19.

Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages
by way of rentals and attorneys fees in favor of USHIO.
Ruling:
The petition is partly meritorious.
CAR COOL asserts that to award damages to USHIO
Realty would constitute unjust enrichment at the expense of CAR
COOL. CAR COOL claims that it never benefited from its

GIL MIGUEL T. PUYAT, petitioner, v. RON ZABARTE,

respondent.
G.R. No. 1411536. February 26, 2001
Facts:
39

On 24 January 1994, Ron Zabarte, the respondent,

commenced an action to enforce the money judgment rendered by
the Superior Court for the State of California, County of Contra
Costa, U.S.A.
On 1 August 1994, the respondent filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment under Rule 34 of the Rules of Court alleging
that the Answer filed by petitioner failed to tender any genuine
issue as to the material facts.
On 6 April 1995, the court a quo issued an Order granting
respondents Motion for Summary Judgment. Likewise, it granted
the petitioner ten (10) days to submit opposing affidavits. The
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above-stated
order and Motion to Dismiss on the ground that it lacks
jurisdiction over the subject matter. However, the lower dismissed
these two motions. The RTC then rendered its decision ordering
the petitioner to pay the respondent the amount of U$ 241,991.33
with the legal interest; P30, 000.00 as attorneys fees; and to pay
the costs suit. This later on, affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue
Whether or not the judgments conformity to Philippine
laws, public policy, canons of morality, and norms against unjust
enrichment
Ruling
This is not a case of unjust enrichment. Unjust enrichment
or solutio indebiti contemplates payment when there is no duty to
pay, and the person who receives the payment has no right to
receive it. The petitioner merely argues that the other two
defendants whom he represented were liable together with him.
Likewise, there is no foreign judgment that is contrary to law,
morals, public policy or the canons of morality obtaining in the
contrary. The petition, therefore, is hereby denied. Double costs
against petitioner.

SERGIO AMONOY, petitioner, v. SPOUSES JOSE

GUTIERREZ AND ANGELA FORNILDA, respondents.
G.R. No. 140420. February 15, 2001
40

Facts:
Amonoy, the petitioner, was the counsel of Francisca
Catolos,
Agnes Catolos, Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso
Formilda, for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Julio
Cantolos. Such estate involves six (6) parcels of land situated in
Tanay, Rizal. The Project of Partition was approved on 12 January
1965 and two of the said lots were adjudicated to Asuncion
Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda. With regard to the attorneys fees,
Amonoy charged P27, 600.00. To secure the payment of such, on
20 January 1965, Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda
executed a deed of real estate mortgage on the said two lots
adjudicated to them.
Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda passed away on
24 February 1969 and on 2 July 1969, respectively. Among the
heirs of Alfonso was his daughter, plaintiff-appellant Angela
Gutierrez.
On 21 January 1970, Amonoy filed for their foreclosure
before in the CFI of Pasig, Rizal, since his attorneys fees secured
by the two lots were not paid. The heirs opposed. However, on 28
September 1972 judgement, it was rendered in favour of Amonoy
requiring the heirs to pay the P27,600.00by the mortgage,
P11,880.00 as a value of the harvests, and P9,654.00 as another
round of attorneys fees within 90 days. Failing in that, the two (2)
lots would be sold at public auction.
On 25 July 1985, the CFI issued a Writ of Possession and a
pursuant to which a notice to vacate was made on 26 August 1985.
The land, where the house of Gutierrez spouses was situated, was
part of the said parcel of land to be possessed by Amonoy.
On 27 September 1985 a petition was filed by the
petitioners (including Angela Gutierrez) before the Supreme
Court. A Decision rendered setting aside the Writ of Possession
and the Temporary Restraining Order was made permanent, and
ordering that the six (6) parcels of land are returned to petitioners.
However, the said dwelling had already been destroyed. Thus, a
Complaint for damages for such was filed before the RTC; but it
was dismissed. On appeal the CA set aside the lower courts

decision, rather ordered petitioner Amonoy to pay P250, 000 as

actual damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in
deciding that the petitioner was liable to the respondents for
damages
Ruling:
The petition has no merit. The Latin phrase damnum
absque injuria that damage resulting from the legitimate
exercise of a persons rights is a loss without injury finds no
application to this case. Though petitioner, under the Writ of
Demolition issued by the RTC, commenced the demolition, there
was a continuation the same after the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order, enjoining the demolition of respondents house,
was issued by the Supreme Court. Thus, costs against petitioner.

RODRIGO CONCEPCION, petitioner, v. COURT OF

APPEALS and SPS. NESTOR NICOLAS and ALLEM
NICOLAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 120706. January 31, 2000
Facts:
41

The spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas, the

respondents, were residing in an apartment leased to them by the
owner Florence Bing Concepcion at Pasig City. Nestor Nicolas
was engaged in the business of supplying government agencies
and private entities with office equipment, appliances and other
fixtures. Florence Concepcion joined after contributing capital
with the condition that she will receive half of the profit earned.
Rodrigo Concepcion, the petitioner and brother of the
deceased husband of Florence, went to Nestors apartment and
accused him of committing adulterous relationship with Florence.
Nestor felt extreme embarrassment and shame. Florence
even ceased to do business with the spouses. The spouses started
to quarrel as Allem became doubtful of her husbands fidelity.
Nestor forced then Rodrigo demanding public apology and
payment of damages. The latter ignored that triggered the spouses
to file civil suit against Rodrigo for damages. He reasoned out that
he did such to protect the name and reputation of the Concepcion
family.
Issue:
Whether there is basis in law for the award of damages to
private respondents, spouses Nicolas
Ruling:
The petitioner's posture that there is no legal provision that
supports such award of damages has been rejected. Article 26 of
the new Civil Code stressed the sacredness of human personality,
which is a concomitant consideration of every plan for human
amelioration. The rights of persons are amply protected, and
damages are provided for violations of a persons dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind. Thus, the petitioner is
liable to the spouses for P50, 000 as moral damages, P25, 000 for
exemplary damages, P10, 000 for attorneys fees, plus costs of
suit.

PEOPLE OF TH E PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant
G.R. No. 102207. September 2, 1994
Facts:
42

Rogelio Bayotas was charged with rape and eventually

convicted thereof on June 19, 1991. Pending appeal of his
conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992. Consequently, the
Supreme Court dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal.
However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with
regard to Bayotas civil liability arising from his commission of
the offense charged. In his comment, the Solicitor General
expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not
extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the
offense charged. The counsel of Bayotas, however, opposed the
view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused
while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both
his criminal and civil penalties.
Issue:
Does death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguish his civil liability?
Ruling:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling
statute. It reads, in part:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished?
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties;
and as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly
arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives

notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157
of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation
from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act
or omission: a) Law; b) Contracts; c) Quasi-contracts; d) Quasidelicts.
Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number
2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only
by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on
the source of obligation upon which the same is based as
explained above.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal
action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party
instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted
during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code that should thereby
avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription.
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, the
Supreme Court held that the death of appellant Bayotas
extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based
solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the
appeal is dismissed without qualification.

MANSION BICUIT CORPORATION, represented by its

president, ANG CHO HONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, TY SECK SUAN, substituted by his heirs,
43

ROSENDA TY, ELIZABETH TY KOH, EDWARD TY,

EDMUND TY, EDGAR TY, EVELYN T. LIM, EDWIN TY
and EDISON TY, and SY GUI, respondents
G.R. No. 94713. November 23, 1995
Facts:
On or about and during the month of January, 1982, in the
municipality of Valenzuela, Philippines, Ty Teck Suan, knowing
fully well that he has no sufficient funds with the Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously prepare, issue and make out, for value
check with the total amount of P300,000.00 in payment of catrons
of Nutri-Wafer biscuits purchased from the Mansion Biscuit
Corporation, represented by Ang Cho Hong, president thereof, by
the Edward Ty Brothers Corporation thru Ty Teck Suan, but the
said checks upon presentation with the said bank for deposit and
verification of sufficiency of funds was dishonored and refused
payment on the ground of insufficient funds, and despite
repeated demands to make food said checks or redeem the same
within five banking days from demands, said accused failed and
refused to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the said Mansion
Biscuit Corporation.
On January 10, 1989, while the appeal of the Mansion
Biscuit Corporation assailing the trial courts ruling absolving Ty
Teck Suan and Sy Gui from civil liability was pending with the
Court of Appeals, Ty Teck Suan died.

contracted the agreement in behalf of Edward Ty Brothers

Corporation.
Ruling:
The civil liability for non-payment of the nutria-wafer
biscuits delivered by petitioner to the Edward Ty Brothers
Corporation cannot be enforced against the private respondents
because the said civil liability was not the personal liability of Ty
Teck Suan to Mansion Biscuit Corporation, rather, it was the
contractual liability of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation, of which
Ty Teck Suan was president. This is borne out by the records of
the case. Moreover, petitioner itself admitted that the contract was
executed by and between Edward Ty Brothers Corporation and
Mansion Biscuit Corporation.
With respect to the issue of tortious liability, the
respondent court state that any claim for tortious liability must be
ventilated in a separate action against the proper party.
In the case at bench, the acquittal of Ty Teck Suan and Siy
Gui extinguished both their criminal and civil liability as it is clear
from the order acquitting them that the issuance of the checks in
question did not constitute a violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

Issue::
Whether or not the petitioner can enforce civil liability for
non-payment of the nutria-wafer biscuits in question against
private respondents notwithstanding the fact that the latter

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, THE PHILIPPINE CHARITY
SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE
and FERNANDO O. CARRASCOSO, JR., respondents.
44

G.R. No. 119398. July 2, 1999

Facts:
Eduardo M Cojuangco, a known busenessman-sportsman,
won a total of P1,020,700.00 on various horse-racing. He then
sent a letter demanding to the defendants the collection of the
prizes due to him. However, the demanded prizes were being
withheld on advice of Commissioner Ramon Diaz of the
Presidential Commission on Good Governance heeding to then
President Corazon Aquinos Executive Order No. 2 freezing all
properties of former Presidet Marcos, his immediate families,
close associates and cronies, in which Cojuangco is a friend of the
former President Marcos. Finally, February 7, 1991, the PCGG
advised defendants that it poses no more objection to the
remittance of the prize winnings. Immediately, this was
communicated to Atty. Mendoza by Carrascoso, Jr.
As culled from the pleadings of the parties, Atty. Mendoza,
petitioners counsel, refused to accept the prizes at this point,
reasoning that the matter had already been brought to court.
Issue:
a) Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the
appeal of respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office;
b) Whether the appeal of respondent Carrascoso, Jr. should
have been dismissed for his failure to file an appeal brief;
c) Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review
and reverse the judgment on a cause of action which was
not appealed from by the respondents;
d) Whether the award for damages against respondent
Carrascoso, Jr. is warranted by evidence and the law
Ruling:
The appellate court committed no error in dismissing the
appeal since the representation of the OGCC on behalf of the

PCSO and Mr. Carrascoso is pursuant to its basic function to act

as principal law office of all government-owned or controlled
corporations.
With regards the alleged failure of Mr. Carrascoso to file
an appeal brief, his filing is not an absolute requirement for the
perfection of an appeal. What is important is that respondent
Carrascoso filed his notice of appeal on time and that his counsel
before the lower court had filed an appeal brief on his behalf.
As to the third issue, respondent court could not reverse
and set aside the RTC decision in its entirety and dismiss the
original complaint without trampling upon the rights that the
accused accrued to the petitioner from the unappealed portion of
the decision. It is well-settled that only the errors assigned and
properly argued in the brief, and those necessarily related thereto,
may be considered by the appellate court in resolving an appeal in
a civil case.
The controlling article regarding the fourth issue is Article
32 of the Civil Code which states that: Any public officer or
employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates, impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to
the latter for damages: xxx xxx xxx (6) The deprivationof property
without due process of law. To be liable, it is enough that there
was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner, even of
the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance
of ones duties. The withholding of the prize winnings of
petitioner without a properly issued seaquestration order clearly
spoke of a violation of his property rights without due process of
law. Mr. Carrascoso is thereby ordered to pay petitioner nominal
damages.
CATALINO P. ARAFILES, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE
JOURNALISTS, INC., ROMY MORALES, MAX BUAN,
JR., and MANUEL C. VILLAREAL JR., respondents
G.R No. 150256. March 25, 2004
45

Facts:

Issue:

About 2am on April 14, 1987, respondent Morales, a

reporter of Peoples Journal Tonight, was at the Western Police
District Headquarters where Emelita Despuig, and employee of
the National Institute at Atmospheric Sciences (NIAS), lodged a
complaint against petitioner, a NIAS director, for forcible
abduction with rape and forcible abduction with attempted rape.
In the presence of Morales, Despuig executed a sworn statement
narrating the events surrounding the reported offenses. She stated
that the first incident was on March 14, 1987 where she was
abducted and raped by the petitioner at Flamingo Hotel. The
second incident was an attempted rape on the night of April 14,
1987. Morales thereupon personally interviewed Despuig. After
the interview, Morales tried to contact Arafiled at the NIAS office
to verify Despuigs story but failed, the office having already
closed. That same day, April 14, 1987, Morales report appeared
as headline on Peoples Journal Tonight reading: GOVT EXEC
RAPES COED GIRL by Romy Morales.
On April 13, 1988, petitioner instituted a complaint before
the RTC of Quezon City. Petitioner alleged that on account of the
grossly malicious and overly sensationalized reporting in the
news item prepared by respondent Morales, edited by respondent
Buan Jr., allowed for publication by respondent Villareal Jr., as
president of the Philippine Journalists Inc., aspersions were cat on
his character; his reputation as a director of the NIAS at the
PAGASA was injured; he became the object of public contempt
and ridicule as he was depicted as a sex-crazed stalker and serial
rapist. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint
alleging that the news item, having been sourced out of the Police
Blotter which is an official public document and bolstered by a
personal interview is therefore privileged and falls within the
protective constitutional freedom of the press. RTC decided in
favor of the petitioner. The CA however found that petitioner was
not able to prove by that respondents were motivated to cause
harm or injury.

Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the

publication of the news item was not attended with malice to thus
free respondents of liability for damages?
Ruling:
Article 33 contemplates a civil action for the recovery of
damages that is entirely unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of
the case. A civil action for libel under this article shall be
instituted and prosecuted to final judgment and proved
preponderance of evidence separately from and entirely
independent of the institution, pendency or result of the criminal
action because it is governed by the provisions of the New Civil
Code and not by the Revised Penal Code governing the criminal
offense charged and the civil liability arising therefrom.
The presentation of the news item subject of petitioners
complaint may have been in a sensational manner, but it is not per
se illegal. Respondents could of course have been more
circumspect in their choice of words as the headline and first 7
paragraphs of the news item give the impression that a certain
director of the NIAS actually committed the crimes complained
by Despuig. The succeeding paragraphs sufficiently conveyed to
the readers, however, that the narration of events was only an
account of what Despuig had reported at the police headquarters.
In determining the manner in which a given event should be
presented as a news item and the importance to be attached
thereto, newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion.
In fine, this court finds that case against respondents has
not been sufficiently established by preponderance of evidence.

46

SOPHIA ALCUAZ, ET AL., petitioners vs. PHILIPPINE

SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION Quezon City
Branch ET AL, respondents
No. L-76353. May 2, 1988

that Severinon Cortes, also a faculty-intervenor, be granted nonrenewal of his semester appointment and that Asser Tamayo and
Rene Encarnacion, also faculty-intervenors, be terminated.
Respondents adopted the afrestated recommendations and prayed
that the case be dismissed.

Facts:
Petitioners are all bonafide students of the Philippine
School of Business Administration, Quezon City,
while
respondents are: Philippine Scholl of Business Administration
Quezon City Branch, a non-stock institution of higher learning
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, Juan D.
Lim, President and Chairman of the Board of PSBA; Benjamin P.
Paulino, Vice-president for admission and registration of PSBA;
Ruben Estrella, Officer-in-charge; and Ramon Agapay, director of
the Office of Student Affairs and Romeo Rafer, chief security of
PSBA.
As early as March 22, 1986, the students of the respondent
school and the respondent PSBA had already agreed on certain
matters which would govern their activities within the school. In
spite of the agreement, petitioners felt the need to hold dialogues.
Among others they demanded the negotiation of a new agreement,
which demand was turned down by the school, resulting in mass
assemblies and barricades of school entrances. During the regular
enrollment period, petitioners and other students similarly situated
were allegedly blacklisted and denied admission for the school
year 1986-1987. On Oct. 28, 1986, the president of the student
council filed a complaint against PSBA. Meanwhile, a motion for
intervention was filed on Nov. 10, 1986, by the PSBA Faculty
Union representing the faculty members hereinafter referred to as
intervenors on the ground of similarity of issues and cause with
that of the petitioners. Thereafter, an investigating committee was
established.
The
committee
submits
the
following
recommendation: that Renato Palma, Bernadette Ang, Rogelio
Taganas are to be exonerated of all charges; that Sophia Alcuaz be
honorable dismissed; that Florante Bagsic and Atenogenes
Bondoc, both faculty-intervenors, be reprimanded with a warning;

Issue:
Whether or not there has been deprivation of due process
for petitioners-students who have been barred from enrollment
and for intervenors-faculty whose services have been terminated?
Ruling:
It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the
school is considered enrolled for one semester. It is provided in
Par 137 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that when a
college student registers in a school, it is understood that he is
enrolling for the entire semester. Likewise, it is provided in the
manual that the written contracts required for college teachers
are for one semester. It is thus evident that after the close of the
first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract
either with the student or with thee intervening teachers. Such
being the case, the charge of denial of due process is untenable. It
is a time-honored principle that contracts are respected as the law
between the contracting parties. This court moreover stressed that
due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not
entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for
actions and proceedings in court. Furthermore, the court found out
that petitioners were academically deficient while the intervening
teachers apart from participating in acts of illegality against the
school committed various acts of misconduct. The right of the
school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic
delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulation has always
been recognized by this court.
Premises considered, the petition is hereby dismissed.

47

ARIEL NON ET.AL., petitioners. vs. HON. SANCHO DAMES

II, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the 5th Regional
Trail Court, Br. 38, and
MABINI COLLEGES, INC., respondents
G.R. No. 89317. May 20, 1990
Facts:
Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges
Inc., in Daet were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the
academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student
mass actions against the school in the preceding semester.
Petitioners filed a petition in the court seeking their re-admission
to the school, but the trail court dismissed the petition using the
ruling in the Alcuaz vs. PSBA as the basis. Hence, petitioners filed
the instant petition for certiorari. The case was assigned to the 3rd
division of the court, which then transferred it to the Court en
banc on Aug. 21, 1989 considering that the issues raised are
jurisdictional.
Respondent school justified their action of nonreadmission due to the fact that the petitioners incurred academic
deficiency. Petitioners used the following as defense: that 3 of
them were graduating; that their academic deficiencies do not
warrant re-admission; that their breach of discipline was not
serious; that the improper conduct attributed to them was during
the exercise of the cognate rights of free speech and peaceable
assembly; that there was no due investigation; that respondent
school is their choice institution near their places of residence
which they can afford to pay for tertiary education, of which they
have already lost one-and-a-half school-years-in itself punishment
enough.

The court in Alcuaz, anchored its decision on the

termination of contract theory. But it must be repeatedly
emphasized that the contract between the school and the student is
not an ordinary contract. Respondent school cannot justify its
actions by relying on Par. 137 of the manual of Regulations for
Private Schools. On the other hand, the manual recognizes the
right of the student to be enrolled in his course for the entire
period he is expected to complete it.
It is not denied that what incurred the ire of the school
authorities were the student mass actions conducted in Feb. 1988
and which led and/or participated by the petitioners. Certainly,
excluding students because of failing grades when the cause for
the action taken against them undeniably related to possible
breaches of discipline not only is a denial of due process but also
constitutes a violation of the basis tenets of fair play.
Petitioners, who have been refused readmission and who
have been effectively excluded from respondent school for 4
semesters, have already been more than sufficiently penalized for
any breach of discipline they might have committed when they led
and participated in the mass actions that, according to
respondents, resulted in the disruption of classes. To still subject
them to disciplinary proceedings would serve no useful purpose
and would only further aggravate the strained relations between
petitioners and the officials of the respondent school.
Wherefore, the petition is granted. The orders of
respondent judge are herby annulled. Respondent Mabini College
is ordered to re-admit and to allow the re-enrollment of
petitioners.

Issue:
Whether or not the ruling in the Alcuaz vs. PSBA be
binding in this case?
Ruling:
48

G. JESUS B. RUIZ, petitioner, vs. ENCARNACION UCOL

and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
No. L-45404. August 7, 1987
Facts:
Agustina Tagaca, laundry woman for petitioner Atty. Jesus
Ruiz filed an administrative charge against respondent
Encarnacion Ucol. In the answer of the respondent to the charge
filed against her, she alleged that Tagaca was merely used as a tool
by Ruiz who wanted to get back at the Ucols because of a case
filed by Encarnacion Ucols husband against Ruiz. She also
alleged to have made remarkds that Ruiz instigated the complaint
and fabricated the charge.
The administrative case was dismissed. Ruiz decided to
file his own criminal complaint for libel against Ucol on the
ground that her guilt was not established beyond reasonable
doubt. No pronouncement was made by the trial court as to the
civil liability of the accused.
Ruiz filed a separate complaint for damages based on the
same facts upon which the libel case was founded.
Ucol filed a motion to dismiss stating that the action had
prescribe and that the case of action was barred by the decision in
the criminal case for libel.
Issue:
Whether the civil case was barred by the decision in the
criminal case for libel.
Ruling:
It was held that the trial court dismissed the case filed by
Atty. Ruiz against Ucol because her guilt beyond reasonable doubt
was not established. And in the review of the findings by the
court, the disputed answer of Ucol in the administrative case
contains no libel. The court found the charges against Ucol, if not
malicious, at least reckless in the face of proven facts and
circumstances. The court dismissed the case filed by Atty. Ruiz.

INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES (PHIL)

INC., petitioner, vs. MERLIN J. ARGOS and JAJA C.
PINEDA, respondents
49

G.R. No. 130362. September 10, 2001

Facts:
IFFI is a corporation organized and existing under
Philippine laws. Argos and Pineda (respondents) are the general
manager and commercial director respectively of the Fragrance
Division of IFFI.
In 1992, the office of Managing Director was created to
head the corporations operations in the Philippines. Costa was
appointed as the Managing Director. Argos and Pineda as general
managers have to report directly to Costa.
Because of serious differences between the Managing
Director and the General Manager, the latter agreed to terminate
their services. They signed a Release Waiver and Quit Claim on
December 10, 1993. On the same date, Costa issued a Personnel
Announcement which described respondents as persona non
grata and urged employees not to have further dealings with
them.
The respondents filed a libel case in Metropolitan Trial
Court of Taguig, Metro Manila. On March 31, 1995, respondents
filed a civil case for damages at Regional Trial Court of Pasig
against Costa and IFFI in its subsidiary capacity as employer. IFFI
moved to dismiss the complaint.
On October 1995, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss
for the respondents failure to reserve right to institute a separate
civil case.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondents
and was granted the same court. IFFI on the other hand filed a
motion to reconsider the said order but was denied by the court.
The case was elevated by the IFFI to the Court of Appeals
reiterating the same ground for dismissal. However, the Ca
dismissed the case.
Issue:
Whether the private respondents can sue IFFI for civil case
for damages in its subsidiary capacity as employer.

Ruling:
It was held by the court, based on the case of Joaquin vs.
Aniceto, Article 33 of the New Civil Code contemplates an action
against the employee in his primary civil liability. It does not
apply against the employer to enforce its subsidiary liability,
because such liability arises only after conviction of the employee
in the criminal case or when the employee is adjudged guilty of
the wrongful act in a criminal action and found to have committed
the offense in the discharge of his duties. Any action brought
against the employer based on its subsidiary liability before
conviction of its employee is premature.
Having established that respondents did not based their
civil action on IFFIs primary liability under Article 33 but
claimed damages from IFFI based on its subsidiary liability as
employer of Costa is premature.
The court granted the petition and the decisions of the
RTC and Ca were reversed and set aside.

MAXIMO MARCIA, AMALIA MOJICA, TIRSO YAP,

DAMIANA MARCIA, EDGAR MARCIA, and RENATO
50

YAP, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPREALS, FELARDO

PAJE and VICTORY LINER, INC., respondents.
No. L-34529. January 27, 1983
Facts:
On December 23, 1956, in the municipality of Lubao
Pampanga, a bus operated by Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by
Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia,
resulting in the latters death and in physical injuries to petitioner
Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. Thereupon, an information for
homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence
was filed against Paje in RTC Pampanga.
On January 23, 1957 an action for damages was filed in
the RTC of Rizal by the petitioner against Victory and Paje,
alleging that the mishap due to the reckless imprudence and
negligence of the latter in driving.
While the civil case was in progress in Rizal, RTC
Pampanga rendered its decision and convicted the respondent.
However, in their appeal to the Ca they were acquitted.
As conducted by the CA, criminal negligence is wanting in
the case, and that Paje was not even guilty of Civil Negligence
because it was a case of mere accident.
Respondent Paje in the Civil Case in Rizal moved for
dismissal of the complaint invoking the decision of the CA for his
acquittal. However, the Rizal RTC dismissed the motion and
thereafter continued the trial. The RTC Rizal dismissed the
complaint against Victory and Paje based on the decision of the
CA.
The petitioner appealed to the CA invoking Article 33 of
the New Civil Code and Sec. 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
and not Sec. 3.
The CA held that private respondent cannot be held civilly
liable after it had ruled in the criminal action that negligence was
wanting and that the collision was pure accident.
Issue:

Whether the civil case filed separately be dismissed.

Ruling:
It was held by the court that Article 33 speaks only of
defamation, fraud and physical injuries. The injuries suffered by
the petitioners were alleged to be the result of criminal
negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no
independent civil action for damages maybe instituted in
connection therewith. Furthermore, Section 3 (c), Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court states that extinction of the penal action does not
carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds
from which the civil might arise did not exist. Otherwise stated,
unless the act from which the civil liability arises is declared to be
non-existent in the final judgment, the extinction of the criminal
liability will not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.

FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner, vs. SEVERINO GARCIA

and TIMOTEO ALMARIO, respondents
No. 48006. July 8, 1942
51

Facts:
On May 3, 1936, about half past one in the morning on the
road between Malabon and Navotas, Rizal, there was a head-on
collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro
Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis. The
carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old
boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two
days later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and
sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to
two years of prision coreccional but the court granted the petition
that the right to bring civil action be reserved. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the sentence given by the lower court in the
criminal case.
On the other hand, there arose two liabilities of Fausto
Barredo: (1) the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the
taxi driver arising from his criminal liability; and (2) Barredos
primary liability as an employer under Article 1903 of the Civil
Code.
The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take and
they preferred the second. On March 7, 1939, Severino Garcia and
Timoteo Almario, parents of the deceased, brought an action to the
Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo, as the
employer of Pedro Fontanilla.
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held
the petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in damages for the
death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro
Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.

Whether or not the plaintiffs may bring a separate civil

action based on cuasi delito or culpa aquiliana against Fausto
Barredo for the death of Faustino Garcia.
Ruling:
Yes.
The plaintiffs may bring a separate civil action against
Fausto Barredo because of the separate individuality of cuasi
delito or culpa aquiliana. The court held that this will make for
the better safeguarding of private rights and is more likely to
secure adequate and efficacious redress.
The court also found out that defendant-petitioner is
Fontanillas employer. There is no proof that he exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. It is
shown that he was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been
caught several times for violation of the Automobile Law and
speeding violations which appeared in the Records of the
Bureau of Public Works available to the public and to himself.
Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of
article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed
wherein the plaintiffs should be awarded for damages by
defendant-petitioner P1, 000 with legal interest from the time the
action was instituted.

Issue:

52

ARMANDO JOSE y PAZ and MANILA CENTRAL BUS

LINES (MCL), represented by its General Manager MR.
DANILO T. DE DIOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
ROMMEL ABRAHAM, represented by his father
FELIXBERTO ABRAHAM, JOSE MACARUBO and
MERCEDES MACARUBO, respondents.
G. R. Nos. 118441-42. January 18, 2000.

Issue/s:
(a) Whether it was the driver of Bus 203 who was at fault
for the collision of the two vehicles under Article 2176 of the New
Civil Code.
(b) Whether private respondent Juanita Macarubo, the
registered owner of the Ford Escort, is liable to petitioners based
on John Macarubos negligence.

Facts:

Ruling:
(a) No. Private respondents failed to prove their allegation
of negligence against the driver of Bus 203, neither are the
allegations of negligence against employer-employee relations, so
the two civil cases against Manila Central Bus Lines and driver
Armando Jose, are hereby dismissed. Article 2176 provides that
whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this chapter.
(b) No. The third-party complaint filed against Juanita
Macarubo was also dismissed on the ground that MCL only
alleged that John Macarubo is the authorized driver which is not
equivalent to an allegation that he was an employee of Juanita
Macarubo. Nor did MCL present any evidence to prove that
Juanita Macarubo was the employer of John Macarubo.

On February 22, 1985, at around six oclock in the

morning, Bus 203, being operated and leased by petitioner Manila
Central Bus Lines Corporation (MCL), collided with a red Ford
Escort. The bus is driven by Armando Jose while the Ford Escort
by John Macarubo. As a result of the collision, the left side of the
Ford Escorts hood was severely damaged while its driver, John
Macarubo, and its lone passenger, private respondent Rommel
Abraham, were seriously injured. The driver and conductress of
Bus 203 rushed Macarubo and Abraham to the nearby hospital but
after 5 days, Macarubo eventually died. Abraham survived but he
became blind and he also suffered multiple lacerations on the face
and a fracture on the forehead.
Rommel Abraham, represented by his father, Felixberto,
instituted a civil case against MCL and Armando Jose while
spouses Jose and Mercedes Macarubo, parents of the deceased,
filed their own suit for damages against MCL alone. On the other
hand, MCL filed a third-party case complaint against Juanita
Macarubo, registered owner of the Ford Escort. The latter, in turn,
filed a counterclaim for damages against MCL for the damage in
her car.
The trial court dismissed the two civil cases against MCL
and ruling favorably on its third-party complaint against Juanita
Macarubo. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court, ordering petitioners to pay damages for injuries to persons
and damage to property as a result of a vehicular accident, thus,
this petition for review on certiorari.

53

ARTURO ALANO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ENRICO A. LANZANAS,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Manila, Branch 37, and ROBERTO
CARLOS, respondents.
G. R. No. 111244. December 15, 1997

of sale, it follows that the criminal case for estafa would not
prosper.
On October 3, 1991, the trial court denied the petitioners
motion for the suspension of the proceeding of the criminal case
as well as his motion for reconsideration. The decision was
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.

Facts:

Issue:

On June 10, 1986, petitioner Arturo Alano, did then and

there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Roberto S.
Carlos whom he sold a parcel of land for P30, 000.00. Alano sold
the aforesaid property the second time to one Erlinda B. Dandoy
for P87, 900.00, thereby depriving the said Roberto S. Carlos of
his rightful ownership/possession of the said land, to the damage
and prejudice of the said Roberto S. Carlos in the aforesaid
amount of P30, 000.00. Alano was now charged of estafa in a
criminal case.
Petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal case
on the ground that there was a prejudicial question pending
resolution in another case being tried against him by Roberto
Carlos and Trinidad Carlos in the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Region, which concerns the nullity of the sale and
recovery of possession and damages. In the aforementioned civil
case, private respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner
seeking the annulment of the second sale of said parcel of land
made by the petitioner to a certain Erlinda Dandoy on the premise
that the said land was previously sold to them. In his answer,
petitioner contends that he never sold the property to the private
respondents and that his signature appearing in the deed of
absolute sale in favor of the latter was a forgery, hence, the alleged
sale was fictitious and inexistent. The civil case was filed on
March 1, 1985, five years before June 19, 1990 when the criminal
case for estafa was instituted. If the Court in the said Civil Case
rules that the first sale to herein private respondent was null and
void, due to the forgery of petitioners signature in the first deed

Whether or not the pendency of the Civil Case filed

against petitioner is a prejudicial question justifying the
suspension of the proceedings in the Criminal Case filed against
him.
Ruling:
The findings of the Court of Appeals are affirmed. The
pendency of the civil case against petitioner is not a prejudicial
question that would suspend the criminal proceedings.
Accordingly, petitioners admission in the stipulation of
facts during the pre-trial of the criminal amounts to a waiver of his
defense of forgery in the civil case. Hence, the courts have no
reason to nullify such waiver, it being not contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a
third person with a right recognized by law. Furthermore, it must
be emphasized that the pre-trial order was signed by the petitioner
himself. As such, the rule that no proof need be offered as to any
facts admitted at a pre-trial hearing applies.

54

MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON,
JR. being the Judge of the RTC, Branch 139, Makati City,
respondents
G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000

the latter case are not based on the former for the guilt of the
petitioner-accused to be determined.
CITY OF PASIG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE MUNICIPALITY
OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, respondents
G.R. No. 125646. September 10, 1999

Facts:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine Felix
were married on June 16, 1973. after twenty-four years of
marriage and four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioners
wife answered by alleging that it was petitioner who abandoned
the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named
Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal
complaint for concubinage against petitioner and his paramour
before the City Prosecutors office in Makati, who found probable
cause and ordered the filing of an Information against them on
September 16, 1997.
On March 20, 1998, petitioner filed a motion to Defer
Proceedings Including the Issuance of the warrant of Arrest in the
criminal case issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court. Petitioner
argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity
of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination
of the criminal case. Such motion and the motion for
reconsideration were denied.
Issue:
Is the petitioners contention tenable?
Ruling:
No. The Court averred that petitioners contention is
untenable. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial
question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. The pendency of
the case for declaration of nullity of petitioners marriage is not a
prejudicial question to the concubinage case because the facts in

MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL,

petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CITY OF
PASIG, respondent
G.R. No. 128663. September 10, 1999
Facts:
These are two petitions which question the propriety of the
suspension of plebiscite proceedings pending the resolution of the
issue of boundary disputes between the Municipality of Cainta
and the City of Pasig. The main problem is that, two barangays
namely Karangalan and Napico are claimed by both.
Issue:
Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of
Barangay Karangalan and Napico should be suspended or
cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between the
two local governments.
Ruling:
The COMELEC declared that the plebiscite held to ratify
the creation of the Barangays were null and void until after the
courts settle with finality the boundary dispute between the City
of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta.

55

ABUNDIO MERCED, petitioner, vs. HON. CLEMENTINO V.

DIEZ. ETC. ET AL., respondents
No. L-15315. August 26, 1960
Facts:
Abundio Merced was married to Eufriciana Tan and
without such marriage having been legally dissolved; he
contracted a second marriage with Elizabeth Ceasar. Facing
bigamy charges by the latter, petitioner alleged force and
intimidation by the relatives Elizabeth force him into marriage and
filed for annulment. He also raised the issue of prejudicial
question.
Issue:
Whether or not the action to annul the second marriage is a
prejudicial question to the prosecution for bigamy.
Ruling:
The civil action must be decided first before the
prosecution for bigamy can proceed (before the new Family Code
took effect).
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
No. L-16439. July 20, 1961
Facts:
Nita Villanueva came to know Antonio Geluz for the first
time in 1948 through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950, Nita
became pregnant by her present husband before they legally
married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and
acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the
again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the
Commission on elections and her pregnancy proved to be
inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant in
October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became

pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister and

the latters daughter, she again repaired to the defendants clinic.
Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in
consideration of the sum of P50.00. The plaintiff was at this time
in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the
provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the
abortion. It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiffs
basis in filing this action and award of damages. The Court of
Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages upon
the provision of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not fixing a minimum award for the death of a
person does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not
endowed with personality.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that both the lower court and
Court of Appeals erred in giving minimum award of damages to
the respondent. The two said courts have not found any basis for
an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellees
indifference to the previous abortion of his wife, also caused by
the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned
with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. Despite
the suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken
no steps to investigate and secure the punishment of the
practitioner. His only concern appears to have been directed at
obtaining from the doctor a large money payment. It is
unquestionable that the appellants act in provoking the abortion
of appellees wife, without medical necessary to warrant it, was a
criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too
severely condemned; and the consent of woman or that of her
husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the
act does not justify an award of damage that under the
circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.
56

Feliciano was sane and competent at the time he executed the

deed of donation in favor of Mercedes Catalan.
FELICIANO CATALAN, petitioners, vs. JESUS BASA,
respondents
G. R. No. 159567. July 31, 2007.
Facts:
On October 20, 1948, Feliciano Catalan was discharged
from active military service. The Board of Medical Officers of the
Department of Veteran Affairs found that he was unfit to render
military service due to his mental disorder (schizophrenia). On
September 28, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo. On June
16, 1951, Feliciano allegedly donated to his sister Mercedes onehalf of the real property through the execution of a document,
titled, Absolute deed of Donation. On December 11, 1953,
Peoples Bank and Trust Company filed Special Proceedings to
declare Feliciano incompetent. On December 22, 1953, the trial
court issued its Order of Adjudication of Incompetency for
Appointing Guardian for the Estate and Fixing Allowance of
Feliciano. Thus, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), which is
formerly the Peoples Bank and Trust Company, was appointed to
be his guardian by the trial court. On March 26, 1979, Mercedes
sold the property donated by Feliciano to her in issue in her
children Delia and Jesus Basa. On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as
Felicianos guardian filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of
Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, as well as
damages against herein respondents. BPI alleged that the Deed of
Absolute Donation of Mercedes was void ab initio, as Feliciano
never donated the property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred
that even if Feliciano had truly intended to give the property to
her, the donation would still be void, as he was not of sound mind
and was therefore incapable of giving valid consent. On August
14, 1997, Feliciano passed away. Both the lower court and Court
of Appeals dismissed the case because of insufficient evidence
presented by the complainants to overcome the presumption that

Issue:
Whether or not Feliciano has the capacity to execute the
donation
Whether or not the property donated to Mercedes and later
on sold to her children is legally in possession of the latter
Are laches and prescription should be considered in the
case?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower
court and the Court of Appeals and denied the petition. A donation
is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a
thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it. Like any other
contract, an agreement of the parties is essential. Consent in
contracts presupposes the following requisites: (1) it should be
intelligent or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers;
(2) it should be free; and (3) it should be spontaneous. The parties
intention must be clear and the attendance of a vice of consent,
like any contract, renders the donation voidable. A person
suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his
competence to intelligently dispose his property. By merely
alleging the existing of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show
substantial proof that at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951,
Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his mental facilities.
Thus, the lower court correctly held that Feliciano was of sound
mind at that time and this condition continued to exist until proof
to the contrary was adduced. Since the donation was valid.
Mercedes has the right to sell the property to whomever she
chose. Not a shred of evidence has been presented to prove the
claim that Mercedes sale of property to her children was tainted
with fraud or falsehood. Thus, the property in question belongs to
Delia and Jesus Basa. The Supreme Court notes the issue of
prescription and laches for the first time on appeal before the
57

court. It is sufficient for the Supreme Court to note that even if it

prospered, the deed of donation was still a voidable, not a void,
contract. As such, it remained binding as it was not annulled in a
proper action in court within four years.
LEONILO DONATO, petitioner, vs. HON ARTEMON LUNA
and
PAZ ABAYAN, respondents.
April 15, 1988
Facts:
On September 28, 1979, before the petitioners
arraignment, private respondent filed with the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court a civil action for declaration of nullity
of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978.
Said civil case was based on the ground that private respondent
consented to entering into the marriage, which was petitioner
Donatos second one, since she had no previous knowledge that
petitioner was already married to Rosalinda Maluping on June 30,
1978. Petitioners answer in the civil case for nullity interposed
the defense that his second marriage was void since it was
solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence,
intimidation, and undue influence were employed by private
respondent to obtain petitioners consent to the marriage. Prior to
the solemnization of the subsequent marriage, petitioner and
private respondent had lived together and deported themselves as
husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for a period of at
least five years as evidenced by a joint affidavit executed by them
on September 26, 1978, for which reason, the requisite marriage
license was dispensed with pursuant to Article76 of the New Civil
Code pertaining to marriages of exceptional character. Prior to the
date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case, petitioner
filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of said case contending
Civil Case seeking the annulment of his second marriage filed by

private respondent raises a prejudicial question which must first

be determined or decided before the criminal case can proceed.
Issue:
Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before
the Court of First Instance should be suspended in view of a civil
case for annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court on the ground that the latter constitutes
a prejudicial question
Ruling:
The respondent judge ruled in the negative and the
Supreme Court sustains him. A prejudicial question has been
defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of question
is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is based on a
fact distinct or separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear
not only in the said case involves facts intimately related to those
upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that
in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined. The issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relation
Court is not determinative of petitioners guilt or innocence in the
crime of bigamy. It was petitioners second wife, who filed the
complainant for annulment of the second marriage on the ground
that her consent was obtained through deceit. Pursuant to the
doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner cannot apply
the rule on prejudicial question since a case for annulment of
marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy
case against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioners
consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress,
violence, and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the
subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same
cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding elements do not
58

exist in case at bar. Another event which militates against

petitioners contentions is the fact that it was only when the civil
case was filed on September 28, 1979, or more than the lapse of
one year from the solemnization of the second marriage that
petitioner came up with the story that his consent to the marriage
was secured through the use of force, violence, intimidation, and
undue influence. Petitioner also continued to live with private
respondent until November 1978, when the latter left their abode
upon learning that Leonilo Donato was already previously
married.
EUGENIO DOMINGO, plaintiff vs. COURT OFAPPEALS,
defendant
October 17, 2001
Facts:
Paulina Rigonan, in her old age, owned 3 parcels of land
located at Batac and Espiritu, Ilocos Norte. She allegedly sold
them to private respondents, the spouses Felipe and Concepcion
Rigonan through a Deed of Sale executed by Paulina Rigonan on
January 28 1965. Respondents filed a reinvindication of said
parcels of land against petitioners Eugenio Domingo, Crispin
Mabagat and Samuel Capulungan, the closest living relatives of
Paulina Rigonan who aleegedly entered the properties illegally
and refuse to leave the same. Petitioners contested respondents
claim of the properties and alleged that the deed of sale of the
properties of Paulina Rigonan as null and void for lacking of
considerations. The Regional Trial court on March 23, 1994
decided in favor of the Petitioners declaring the Deed of Sale as
null and void. On appeal by the respondents, the Court of Appeals
set aside the decision of the Trial court.

Whether or not the Deed of Sale executed on January 28,

1965 by Paulina Rigonan valid?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of
Appeals and reinstated the decision rendered by the Regional Trial
Court.
At the time of the execution of the 0alleged Deed of Sale,
Paulina Rigonan was already of advanced age and senile. She died
on March 20, 1966, barely over a year when the deed was
allegedly executed on January 28, 1965. The General Rule is that,
a person is not incompetent to contract merely because of
advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities. However,
when such age or infirmities have impaired the mental faculties so
as to prevent the person from properly, intelligently, and firmly
protecting her property rights, then she is undeniably
incapacitated. According to testimony of Eugenios wife Zosima,
at the time of the alleged execution of deed, Paulina was already
incapacitated physically and mentally. Given these circumstances,
there is sufficient reason to seriously doubt that she consented to
the sale of her parcels of land. Thus, the Deed of Sale executed by
Paulina Rigonan on January 28, 1965 rendered null and void ab
initio.

Issue:
59

JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., SIMEONA SAN JUAN ARUEGO,

MA. IMMACULADA T. ALANON, ROBERTO A. TORRES,
CRISTINA A. TORRES, JUSTO JOSE TORRES and
AGUSTIN TORRES, petitioners, vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRTEENTH
DIVISION and ANTONIA ARUEGO, respondents.
G.R. No. 112193 March 13, 1996
Facts:
In essence, the complaint (Compulsory Recognition and
Enforcement of Successional Rights) avers that the late Jose M.
Aruego, Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with Luz
M. Fabian sometime in 1959 until his death on March 30, 1982.
Out of this relationship were born Antonia F. Aruego and Evelyn
F. Aruego on October 5, 1962 and September 3, 1963,
respectively. The complaint prayed for an Order praying that
herein private respondent and Evelyn be declared the illegitimate
children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego, Sr.; that herein
petitioners be compelled to recognize and acknowledge them as
the compulsory heirs of the deceased Jose M. Aruego; that their
share and participation in the estate of their deceased father be
determined and ordered delivered to them.
The main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is
their alleged "open and continuous possession of the status of
illegitimate children."
Issue:
Should the provisions of the Family Code be applied in the
instant case? As a corollary will the application of the Family
Code in this case prejudice or impair any vested right of the

private respondent such that it should not be given retroactive

effect in this particular case?
Ruling:
The action brought by private respondent Antonia Aruego
for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional
rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family Code,
must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by
Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The present law
cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is
concerned, as its application will prejudice the vested right of
private respondent to have her case decided under Article 285 of
the Civil Code. The right was vested to her by the fact that she
filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code. Prescinding
from this, the conclusion then ought to be that the action was not
yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the
putative father was already deceased, since private respondent was
then still a minor when it was filed, an exception to the general
rule provided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial
court, which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the
complaint, never lost jurisdiction over the same despite the
passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the Family Code of the
Philippines.
Our ruling herein reinforces the principle that the
jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once
attached cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events,
although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction
from attaching in the first instance, and it retains jurisdiction until
it finally disposes of the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision
of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1993 and its Resolution
dated October 13, 1993 are hereby AFFIRMED.
60

PRIMA G. CARRILLO and LORENZO LICUP, plaintiffs and

appellants, vs.
FRANCISCA SALAK DE PAZ and ERNESTO BAUTISTA,
defendants and appellees.
G.R. No. L-22601. October 28, 1966

And the Court of Appeals' decision affirming the existence

of reserva troncal, promulgated on June 8, 1950, rendered it all
the more doubtless that such right had accrued in their favor from
the time Agustina died. It is clear, therefore, that the right or cause
of action accrued in favor of the plaintiffs-reservatarios herein on
April 24, 1950.

Facts:

Issues:

Severino Salak and Petra Garcia were the owners

of Lot No. 221 of the Cadastral Survey of Tarlac, covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 41543, with an area of 1,334
square meters. Petra Garcia died on September 21, 1941. On
August 16, 1943, Severino Salak sold to Honoria Salak for
P812.00 his portion of said lot. A year later, on December 5, 1944,
Severino Salak died. Honoria Salak and other members of her
family died ? massacred by the Japanese.

Whether or not the cause of action is barred by prior

judgment and by the statute of limitations. Although the action
was dismissed by the lower court expressly upon the ground of
res judicata, it did not totally disregard the defense of
prescription.

On September 4, 1946, a Project of Partition was

submitted in Special Proceeding No. 3, which the court approved
on November 19, 1946. Said project adjudicated inter alia Lot No.
221, which was given thereunder to Francisca Salak de Paz (1/4 of
it in her capacity as heir, and the other 3/4 by purchase and/or
exchange with her co-heirs, Rita Sahagun, Aurea Sahagun and
Ernesto Bautista). From 1946 up to the present Francisca Salak
has possessed all of Lot No. 221. On November 9, 1948, Agustina
de Guzman Vda. de Carrillo filed an action in the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac (docketed therein as Case No. 351) against the
heirs in Special Proceeding No. 3 to recover Lot No. 221. On
December 20, 1960, the lower court dismissed Civil Case No.
351.

Ruling:
Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure fixes 10 years as
the period of prescription for actions to recover real property,
counted from the time the cause of action accrued. This is the
applicable law because Article 1116 of the New Civil Code
provides that "Prescription already running before the effectivity
of this Code [August 30, 1950] shall be governed by laws
previously in force." Plaintiffs-appellants' suit herein, having been
filed only on April 22, 1963, or more than ten (10) years from
April 24, 1950, has prescribed. And having reached such
conclusion, We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the question of
whether the suit is also barred on the ground of res judicata.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby
affirmed on the ground of prescription, with costs against
appellants.

Plaintiffs Prima Carrillo and Lorenzo Licup thereupon

appealed to CA upon questions of law. At any rate, this Court can
resolve this appeal on the issue of prescription.
61

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, plaintiff vs.

COMMISSION OF ELECTIONS, defendant
248 SCRA 300
Facts:
On 8 March 1995, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her
Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte, indicating that she was a resident of said
constituency for seven months. Faced with petition for
cancellation and disqualification by the incumbent representative
Cirilo Roy Montejo, Marcos filed an amended certificate changing
the entry seven months to since childhood. The Commission
on Elections, on 24 April, ordered the disqualification of Marcos
from running for the congressional seat of the First District of
Leyte. It appears however, that Marcos garnered the most votes in
the 8 May election. The Commission on Elections, thus,
suspended her proclamation.

candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate

to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of
candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification. A close
look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the
confusion: the entry for residence is followed immediately by the
entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks
election. Marcos merely committed an honest mistake in jotting
down the word seven, obviously resulting from the confusion
which prompted Marcos to write down the period of her actual
stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First
district, which was since childhood in the space provided. It
must be noted again that residence is used to indicate a place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary, while domicile denotes
a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the
intention of returning. Residence for election purposes is used
synonymously with domicile.

Issue:
Whether the statement in the certificate of candidacy
(seven) determines whether an individual satisfied the
constitutions residency qualification requirement, to warrant
Marcos disqualification.
Ruling:
It is the fact of residence, not a statement-in a certificate of
candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or
not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency
qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material
only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
62

ERNESTINA BERNABE v. CAROLINA ALEJO as guardian

ad litem for the minor, petitioner vs. ADRIAN BERNABE,
rspondent
G.R. No. 140500. January 21, 2002
Facts:
The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a
son with his secretary of twenty-three (23) years, herein plaintiffappellant Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18,
1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on
August 13, 1993, while his wife Rosalina died on December 3 of
the same year, leaving Ernestina, as the sole surviving heir, who
filed the complaint praying that Adrian be declared an
acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he
(Adrian) be given his share in Fiscal Bernabes estate, which is
now being held by Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint. The
Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of justice, Adrian should
be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal
Bernabe.

Indeed, our overriding consideration is to protect the

vested rights of minors who could not have filed suit, on their
own, during the lifetime of their putative parents. As respondent
aptly points out in his Memorandum, [24] the State as parens
patriae should protect a minors right. Born in 1981, Adrian was
only seven years old when the Family Code took effect and only
twelve when his alleged father died in 1993. The minor must be
given his day in court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the
assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a
case against petitioner, the legitimate daughter of the putative
father, for recognition and partition with accounting after the
putative fathers death in the absence of any written
acknowledgment of paternity by the latter.
Ruling:
To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still minors
at the time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent
died during their minority are thus given the right to seek
recognition (under Article 285 of the Civil Code) for a period of
up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested right was
not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.
63

ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, petitioner v.SOLEDAD S.

ESCRITOR, respondent
A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003
Facts:
Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F.
Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge of Branch 253, Regional Trial Court
of Las Pias City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that
respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in said court, is
living with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of
eighteen to twenty years old. Estrada is not personally related
either to Escritor or her partner and is a resident not of Las Pias
City but of Bacoor, Cavite. Nevertheless, he filed the charge
against Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral
act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be
allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the
court condones her act.
Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Lock stressed that
although Escritor had become capacitated to marry by the time
she joined the judiciary as her husband had died a year before, it is
due to her relationship with a married man, voluntarily carried on,
that respondent may still be subject to disciplinary action.

against religious liberty to determine which is more compelling

under the particular set of facts. The greater the state's interests,
the more central the religious belief would have to be to overcome
it.
Third, the court asks: "(h)as the state in achieving its
legitimate purposes used the least intrusive means possible so that
the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to
achieve the legitimate goal of the state?" The analysis requires the
state to show that the means in which it is achieving its legitimate
state objective is the least intrusive means, i.e., it has chosen a
way to achieve its legitimate state end that imposes as little as
possible on religious liberties.
In any event, even if the Court deems sufficient
respondent's evidence on the sincerity of her religious belief and
its centrality in her faith, the case at bar cannot still be decided
using the "compelling state interest" test. The case at bar is one of
first impression, thus the parties were not aware of the burdens of
proof they should discharge in the Court's use of the "compelling
state interest" test.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the
Office of the Court Administrator.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the
administrative charge of "gross and immoral conduct.
Ruling:
The Court has repeatedly declared that religious freedom
means government neutrality in religious matters and the Court
has also repeatedly interpreted this policy of neutrality to prohibit
government from acting except for secular purposes and in ways
that have primarily secular effects.
Second, the court asks: "(i)s there a sufficiently compelling
state interest to justify this infringement of religious liberty?" This
step involves balancing, i.e., weighing the interest of the state
64

MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, petitioner v. RODOLFO S.

ANCHETA, respondent
G.R. No. 145370. March 4, 2004
Facts:
After their marriage on March 5, 1959, the petitioner and
the respondent resided in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. They had
eight children during their coverture. The respondent left the
conjugal home and abandoned the petitioner and their children.
Petitioner Marietta Ancheta filed a petition with the RTC against
the respondent for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership and
judicial separation of property with a plea for support and support
pendente lite.
The parties executed a Compromise Agreement where
some of the conjugal properties were adjudicated to the petitioner
and her eight children. The respondent intended to marry again
and filed a petition with the RTC for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage with the petitioner on the ground of psychological
incapacity and subsequently granted by the court. The Court of
Appeals granted the decision.

and the amended petition for annulment of the assailed order

grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated July
13, 2000 and September 27, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 are
hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED. Let the records of CA-G.R.
SP No. 59550 be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings conformably with the Decision of this Court and Rule
47 of the Rules of Court, as amended.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
decision of trial court.
Ruling:
The original petition and the amended petition in the Court
of Appeals, in light of the material averments therein, were based
not only on extrinsic fraud, but also on lack of jurisdiction of the
trial court over the person of the petitioner because of the failure
of the sheriff to serve on her the summons and a copy of the
complaint. She claimed that the summons and complaint were
served on her son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, who,
however, failed to give her the said summons and complaint.
The Supreme Court, thus, rule that the Court of Appeals
acted arbitrarily in dismissing the original petition of the petitioner
65

TEODORO GUARING, plaintiff vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

defendant
G.R. No. 108395. March 7, 1997
Facts:
This case arose from an unfortunate vehicular accident
which happened on November 7, 1987, along the North
Expressway in San Rafael, Mexico, Pampanga. Involved in the
accident were a Mitsubishi Lancer car driven by Teodoro Guaring,
Jr., who died as a result of the mishap, Philippine Rabbit Bus No.
415, driven by Angeles Cuevas, and a Toyota Cressida car, driven
by Eligio Enriquez. The Mitsubishi Lancer was heading north, at
the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour. Following it was the
Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415, with Plate No. CVD-584. On the
other hand, the Toyota Cressida was cruising on the opposite lane,
bound for Manila.
Petitioners, heirs of Teodoro Guaring, Jr., brought this
action for damages, based on quasi delict, in the Regional Trial
Court of Manila. Their evidence tended to show that the Rabbit
bus tried to overtake Guarings car by passing on the right
shoulder of the road and that in so doing it hit the right rear
portion of Guarings Mitsubishi Lancer. The impact caused the
Lancer to swerve to the south-bound lane, as a result of which it
collided with the Toyota Cressida car coming from the opposite
direction.
The Regional Trial Court awarded the heirs with moral and
exemplary damages. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision
upon review. The appellate court held that since the basis of
petitioners action was the alleged negligence of the bus driver, the
latters acquittal in the criminal case rendered the civil case based
on quasi delict untenable.

Teodoro Guaring, Jr?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of
Appeals and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals for a
decision in accordance with law. The judgment of acquittal
extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it
includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might
arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by
acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB v.
Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence is
required in civil cases. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code
provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based
on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.

Issue:
Does judgment in the criminal case extinguished the
liability of private respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
and its driver, Angeles Cuevas, for damages for the death of
66

acquittal did not extinguish his civil liability?

GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, defendant
G.R. No. 107125. January 29, 2001
Facts:
On or about the 25th day of September 1982, the said
accused, being then the driver and person-in-charge of an
automobile, drove and operated the same while along the Daang
Maharlika at Barangay Malvar, in said municipality, in a
negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to
traffic laws, regulations and ordinances and without taking the
necessary precaution to prevent accident to person and damage to
property, causing by such negligence, carelessness and
imprudence said automobile driven and operated by him to
sideswipe a passenger jeepdriven by Charles Codamon, thereby
causing the said automobile to turn down (sic) resulting to the
death of Ruben Nicolas a passenger of said automobile.
Petitioner George Manantan was acquitted by the trial
court of homicide through reckless imprudence without a ruling
on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of the
judgment in Criminal Case No. 066, the appellate court found
petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify
private respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas
P104,400.00 representing loss of support, P50,000.00 as death
indemnity, and moral damages of P20,000.00 or a total of
P174,400.00 for the death of their son, Ruben Nicolas. The
petitioner then proceeded to the Supreme Court and held that he
would be subject to double jeopardy if he trial on his civil libility
would ensue.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of
merit. It should be noted that what was elevated to the Court of
Appeals by private respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal
Case No. 066. Petitioner was not charged anew in CA-G.R. CV
No. 19240 with a second criminal offense identical to the first
offense. The records clearly show that no second criminal offense
was being imputed to petitioner on appeal. In modifying the
lower courts judgment, the appellate court did not modify the
judgment of acquittal. Nor did it order the filing of a second
criminal case against petitioner for the same offense. Obviously,
therefore, there was no second jeopardy to speak of. Petitioners
claim of having been placed in double jeopardy is incorrect.
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different
effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on
the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission
complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability. The
second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the
guilt of the accused. Scrutiny of the lower courts decision in
Criminal Case No. 066 supports the conclusion of the appellate
court that the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt; hence,
petitioners civil liability was not extinguished by his discharge.

Issues:
a. Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further
inquiry by the Court of Appeals as to his negligence or reckless
imprudence?
b. Did the court a quo err in finding that petitioners
67

FLORENCIO BONITA, plaintiff vs Zosa, defendant

G.R. No. L-33772 June 20, 1988
Facts:
At about 2:00 P.M. of 24 September 1968, while Florencio
Bonite was working as "caminero" of the Bureau of Public
Highways in Barrio Vicente Alto (Dagatan), Oroquieta City, he
was hit by a truck driven by private respondent, as a result of
which, Bonite died on that same day. Consequently, a criminal
complaint for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed
by the surviving heirs of the deceased (now petitioners) against
the respondent Abamonga, with the City Court of Oroquieta City,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 9328. Petitioners through their
counsel Atty. Alberto Dulalas, as private prosecutor, actively
participated in the prosecution of the criminal case against the
accused. After trial on the merits, a decision was rendered by the
court in the criminal case, acquitting the accused Abamonga for
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
On 28 December 1970, petitioners filed an action for
recovery of damages against the same accused on account of the
death of Florencio Bonite, with the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Occidental, 16th Judicial District, Branch III, docketed
as Civil Case No. 2806. In an order dated 25 February 1971, the
court a quo dismissed the complaint for damages. THe petitioners
then moved for reconsideration of the said order.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the rulings of
the lower courts. It allowed the reinstatement of the case for
retrial. When the accused in a criminal case is acquitted on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may
still be instituted against him, and only a preponderance of
evidence is required to hold the accused liable. The civil liability
is not extinguished by acquittal of the accused, where the acquittal
is based on reasonable doubt. In the instant case, the criminal
complaint for homicide through reckless imprudence was
dismissed on the ground that the guilt of the accused (herein
private respondent) was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Clearly, herein petitioners have the right to file an independent
civil action for damages, the acquittal of the accused in the
criminal case notwithstanding.
Lastly, that petitioners actively participated in the
prosecution of the criminal case does not bar them from filing an
independent and separate civil action for damages under Article
29 of the Civil Code. The civil action based on criminal liability
and a civil action under Article 29 are two separate and
independent actions

Issue:
Is an independent civil action for damages, under Article
29 of the Civil Code deemed barred by petitioners' failure in the
criminal action to make a reservation to file a separate civil action
and by their active participation in the prosecution of such
criminal action?
68

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs.

JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996
Facts:
Rodolfo Navarro, Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte, filed an administrative complaint against respondent Judge
Hernando C. Domagtoy, Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge.
One of the two acts complained of was the fact that
respondent Judge performed a marriage ceremony between
Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside his
court's jurisdiction.
The judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del
Norte.
The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's
residence in the Municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within
his jurisdictional area
Respondent judge points out to Article 8 and its exceptions
as the justification for his having solemnized the marriage.
Issue:
Is a marriage solemnized outside of a court's jurisdiction
valid?
Held:
Article 8 of the Family Code provides that, a marriage can
be held outside of the judge's chamber or courtroom only in the
following instances: 1) at the point of death, 2) in remote places in
accordance with Article 29 or 3) upon request of both parties in
writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense
that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a
remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed
to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del
Rosario.

More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this

provision is the authority of the solemnizing officer. Under Article
3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the
solemnizing officer". Under Article 7, marriage may be
solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the
judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a
directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage
ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the
solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Noncompliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local
ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only within
the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An
appellate court Justice or a Justice of the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriage,
regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are
complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific
jurisdictions, may officiate in wedding only within said areas and
not beyond.
Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite
laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity
of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with
authority to solemnize a marriage in the Municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein
as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent
judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic
principles of civil law.

69

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO,
respondents.
G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994
Facts:
Respondent Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas
were married in a civil ceremony performed by a City Court Judge
of Pasig City and was celebrated without the knowledge of
Castro's parents.
Defendant Cardenas personally attended the procuring of
the documents required for the celebration of the marriage,
including the procurement of the marriage license.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband
and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro's parents.
They decided to live together when Castro discovered she was
pregnant. The cohabitation lasted only for four months.
Thereafter, the couple parted ways. Desiring to follow her
daughter in the U.S, Castro wanted to put in order he marital
status before leaving for the U.S. She then discovered that there
was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the
celebration of their marriage as certified by the Civil Registrar of
Pasig, Metro Manila.
Respondent then filed a petition with the RTC of Quezon
City seeking for the judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage
claiming that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to
the solemnization of their marriage.
The trial court denied the petition holding that the
certification was inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance
of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage
between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of the certifying
official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show
that there was no marriage license issued. On appeal, the decision
of the trial court was reversed.

a. Is the marriage valid?

b. Is there such a thing as a "secret marriage"?
Held:
a. At the time of the subject marriage was solemnized on
June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New
Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage license shall be
solemnized without a marriage license first issued by the local
civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid
marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab
initio.
b. It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a
civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The subject
marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil
marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or
friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The records
show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas as initially
unknown to the parents of the former.

Issue:
70

LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners, vs. HON. ARTEMON D.

LUNA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988
Facts:
Paz Abayan filed an information for Bigamy against
petitioner Leonilo Donato. She also filed with the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court a civil action for declaration of nullity
of marriage to petitioner because of a prior marriage of petitioner.
In his answer petitioner claimed that his 2nd marriage was void
because is was solemnized without a valid marriage license and
that violence, intimation and undue influence were employed by
Paz to obtain his consent.
Prior to the date set for the trial of the criminal case,
petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of the case
because the civil action raises a prejudicial question which must
first be determined before the criminal case can proceed.
Issue:
Does a criminal case for bigamy suspend the civil case of
annulment of marriage on the ground that the latter constitutes a
prejudicial question?
Held:
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the
case at bar. I must be noted that the issue before the JDRC
touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not
determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the
crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's 2nd wife, the
herein private respondent Paz Abayan who filed the complaint for
annulment of the 2nd marriage on the ground that her consent was
obtained through deceit.
He who contracts a 2nd marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.
71

SUSAN NICDAO CARINO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE

CARINO, respondent.
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
Facts:
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario,
he contracted two marriages. The first was on June 20, 1969, with
petitioner Susan Nicdao, with whom he had two offsprings; and
the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan
Yee, with whom he had no children in their almost 10 year
cohabitation starting way back 1982.
In 1988, Santiago became ill and bed ridden due to
diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away
on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent
for his medical and burial expenses.
Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary
benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from
various government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to
collect a total of P 146, 000 from MBAI, PCCUI, NAPOLCOM,
and Pag-Ibig; while respondent Susan Yee received a total of P
21,000.00 from GSIS life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS.)
Respondent filed a case for collection of sum of money
against petitioner praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to
return to her at least of the P 146, 000.00 death benefits.
Petitioner failed to file her answer prompting the trial court to
declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the
deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without first
obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between
petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no
knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of
it only at the funeral, where she met petitioner who introduced
herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for
collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because
the same was solemnized with the required marriage license.

The court ruled in favor or respondent. On appeal, the

decision of the Regional trial court was affirmed in toto. Hence
this petition.
Issue:
Who is entitled to half the death benefits?
Held:
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when
the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was
solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions,
renders the marriage void ab initio.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the marriage
exempt from the license requirement. . A marriage license,
therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This
notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of
petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and,
as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license.
It is beyond cavil, therefore that the marriage between
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being
one of the marriage exempt from the marriage license
requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow however, that since the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the death
benefits would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. ***
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the
previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao
does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with
respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was
solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the
marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void.
72

Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is,
likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage
is the separation of the property of the spouses according to the
applicable property regime. Considering that the two marriages
are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be
absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but
rather, be governed by the provisions of Article 147 and 148 of the
Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.

MARILOU NAMA MORENO, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE

C. BERNABE, respondent.
73

A.M. No. MTJ-94-963 July 14, 1995

Facts:
Marilou Nama Moreno and Marcelo Moreno were married
before the respondent Judge Jose Bernabe on October 4, 1993 but
did not process the papers for the marriage contract. The
complainant at that time was pregnant and begged to the judge to
have her and her husband to be married by him. The complainant
then filed a complaint allegedly for deceiving her that the
marriage is valid.
Issue:
Whether or not that a Judge who held a wedding without
issuing a marriage contract should be held liable even if the
complaint had expressly withdrawn by the complainant.

information, told the child to report the same to Geronimo

Taborada, Susanas brither who was then working at their mango
plantation. The latter, upon hearing the information, went to
inform his father. The two went to Susanas hut but the door was
closed. Geronimo could only peep through the bamboo slats at the
wall and saw her sister lying down, and motionless. Susanas
father called for the Mabolo police. Thereafter, police officer
Fernando C. Abella and three policemen arrived. They shouted
and ordered Elias to open the door. The latter opened the door
after he consumed one stick of cigarette. When questioned, he
could only mumble incoherent words.
The Regional Trial Court of Cebu held Elias Borromeo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide. Thus,
this appeal to the Supreme Court.
Issue:

Held:
Even with the withdrawal of the complainant against the
respondent the Supreme Court insisted that it should still be dealt
with accordingly as the accused was a member of the judiciary
and a conduct of a higher level were expected. The judge
displayed ignorance of the law which is unacceptable for his
position and is therefore fined with 10, 000.00 pesos and is sternly
warned that a repetition of a similar act should be punished
severely.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ELIAS BORROMEO, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-61873 October 3l, 1984
Facts:

Whether or not the crime committed by Elias is not

parricide but homicide because he and the deceased, Susana were
not legally married
Held:
There is no better of marriage than the admission of the
accused of the existence of such marriage. Person living together
in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. And, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exist in
the registry of marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as long
as in the celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are
present.
Thus, the decision of the trial court was affirmed, with
modification that the indemnity of PHP 12,000 was increased to
PHP 30,000.

At high noon of July 3, 1981, the four year old niece of

Elias and Susana Borromeo reported to Matilde Taborada, mother
of Susanna, that Susana was shouting frantically for help because
Elias was killing her. Matilde, upon reaching to her the
74

JOSE RIVERA petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE

COURT and
ADELAIDO J. RIVERA, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 75005-06 February 15, 1990
Facts:
On May 30, 1975, a prominent and wealthy resident of
Mabalacat, Pampanga named Venancio Rivera died. On July 28,
1975, Jose Rivera, claiming to be the only surviving legitimate
son of the deceased filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration over Venancios state. This was, apparently,
opposed by one Adelaido Rivera who denied Jose was the son of
the decedent. He avers that the decedent left 2 holographic wills.
The latter then filed for the probation of the said 2 holographic
wills. The two cases were then consolidated. Judge Eliodoro B.
Guinto found that Jose Rivera was not the son of the decedent but
of a different Venancio Rivera who was married to Maria Vital.
The Venancio Rivera whose estate was in question was married to
Maria Jocson, by whom he had seven children, including
Adelaido. Therefore, Jose had no right to claim to this estate
because the decedent was not his father. The Intermediate
Appellate Court affirmed this decision of the trial court. Hence,
Jose Rivera appealed to the Supreme Court.

Jocson lived together as husband and wife and for many years,
begetting seven children in all during that time.
Jose Rivera, on the other hand, although presented
necessary documents, his fathers parents were different of that
Venancio Riveras whose estate is in question. Moreover, if it was
true, the court said that Jose and her mother did not file any
appropriate proceedings to prosecute Venancio Rivera as they
were abandoned and neglected, considering also that they lived in
the same town.
When the authenticity of a will is not being questioned,
there is no necessity of presenting the three witnesses required
under Article 811; an opposition by a mere stranger did not have
the legal effect of requiring the three witnesses.
Thus, the petition was denied by the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not Jose Rivera was the only surviving
legitimate son of Venancio Rivera, whose estate was in question in
this case
Held:
It is true that Adelaido could not present his parents
marriage certificate because, as he explained it, the marriage
records for 1942 in the Mabalacat Civil Registry were burned
during the war. Even so, he could still rely on the presumption of
marriage, since it is not denied that Venancio Rivera and Maria
75

MA. BLYTH B. ABADILLA, complainant, vs.

JUDGE JOSE C. TABILIRAN, JR.,respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-716 October 25, 1995
Facts:
Ma. Blyth B. Abadilla, a clerk of Court assigned to the sala
of the respondent, Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr. of the 8 th Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Manukan, Zamboanga Del Norte. Respondent
stands charged with gross immorality for contracting a second
marriage to certain Priscilla Q. Baybayan as his legitimate child;
and corruption unbecoming of a judge for notarizing documents,
collected fees thereof, and used it for personal purposes.
The respondent judge denied all the allegations against
him. In the case of gross immorality, respondent claimed that his
marriage to Priscilla Q. Baybayan was valid because his first wife
Teresita Banzuela abandoned the conjugal home for seven years,
citing Article 310 of the Civil Code; on deceitful conduct, he
claimed that since there were only three words to choose from,
Single, Widow, or Divorced, he chose the word single as the most
appropriate since he had no knowledge of his first wife
whereabouts; on corruption, he claimed that there was no Notary
Public in Manukan, as attested by the Mayor of the place, and as
such, he may be allowed to notarize documents as ex-officio
notary. The fees collected were for the used to subsidize office
expenses since the funds he had been receiving from the
municipal government were not enough to cover expenses in
maintaining his office.

Held:
The Supreme Court held that the respondents actuation of
cohabiting with another when his marriage was valid and
subsisting his wife having been allegedly absent for four years
only constitutes grossly immoral conduct.
Children born prior to marriage can not be legitimated nor
in any way considered legitimate if at the time they were born
there was an existing valid marriage between the father and his
first wife.
The respondents failure to properly account and turn over
the fees collected by him as ex-officio notary to the municipal
government as required by law raises the presumption that he had
put such fund to his personal use.
Thus, the Supreme Court held that the respondent, Judge
C. Tabiliran, guilty of the three charges against him and was
dismissed from service, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement
benefits, and disqualification from re-employment in the
government service, all without prejudice to criminal or civil
liability.

Issue:
Whether or not respondents cohabitation with Priscilla
Baybayan is not and was neither bigamous nor immoral because,
as his contention, he started living with Priscilla Baybayan only
after his first wife had already left and abandoned the family home
in 1966 and until the present her whereabouts is not known and
respondent has had no news of her being alive
76

ZENAIDA S. BESO, complainant, vs. Judge JUAN

DAGUMAN, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211. January 28, 2000

with exercising extra care in ensuing that the records of the cases
and official documents in his custody are intact.

Facts:
Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with
solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and not
registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil
Registrar. On the other hand, the respondent claimed that he
solemnized their marriage (Zenaida S. Beso and Bernardito
Yman) due to the urgency of the situation, that Beso, on August
28, 1997, the day of the marriage, said that he will be leaving the
country for job purposes and considering her to be an Overseas
Filipino Worker and that if not solemnized that day, their marriage
license would lapse because she will be working abroad for a long
period. Thus, this would necessitate spouses for a new marriage
license. The necessary documents that was supposedly to be
forwarded by him to the Local Civil Registrar was missing and
claimed to be taken by someone.
The Office of the Court administration held that the
respondent Judge committed non-feasance in office and was fined
PHP 5,000 with stern warning.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Daguman really committed nonfeasance in office
Held:
The Supreme Court finds evaluation of the Office of the
Court Administration will taken. Marriage may only be
solemnized in a public place except in marriage in articulo mortis,
remote place, or upon request by both parties in writing a sworn
statement.
The Supreme Court also held that judges who are
appointed to specific jurisdiction may officiate in weddings only
within said areas and not beyond. Moreover, a judge is charged
77

LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant, vs.

JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995
Facts:
Lupo Almodiel Atienza filed an administrative case against
Judge Brillantes for Gross Immorality and Appearance of
Impropriety. Complainant alleges that he has two children with
Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at a subdivision in
Makati, which he purchased in 1987. One day, he caught the
respondent asleep in his bedroom. He asked the houseboy about
him and the latter said that the judge had been cohabiting with De
Castro. Atienza did not bother to wake up the respondent instead
asked the houseboy to take care of his two children.
After that, the respondent prevented him from visiting his
child and has alienated the affection of his children. The
Complainant also claims that the respondent is married to Zenaida
Ongkiko.
The judge denies having been married to Ongkiko because
their marriage was celebrated twice without marriage license,
therefore, his marriage to De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles,
California was because he believed in good faith and for all legal
purposes, that his first marriage was solemnized without marriage
license.
He further argues that Article 40 of the Family Code is not
applicable in his case because his first marriage in 1965 was
governed by the Civil Code and the 2nd relationship was 1991
under the Family Code. No retroactive Effect.

through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was

already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license. Any
law student would know that a marriage license is necessary
before one can get married. Respondent was given an opportunity
to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were
married for the second time. His failure to secure a marriage
license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and
bad faith.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after
the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of
the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the
Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it
does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly
true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has
not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of
Article 40 to his case.

Issue:
Whether or not the absence of marriage license of his
previous marriage justifi3es his act to cohabit with De Castro
Held:
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was
admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At the time he went
78

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004.

lack of merit. Hence, the petition was elevated to the Supreme

Court.
Issue:

Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the
house of one Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Bohol for four
years. Their communication was broken after school year 19771978. In 1984, Lucio received a letter from Lucia from Singapore.
After an exchange of letters, the two became sweethearts. Lucia
later returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work
there. Nonetheless, the sweethearts maintained a constant
communication. Lucia, later came back to the Philippines. The
two agreed to get married, thus, they were married at Iglesia de
Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. Lucia reported back
to her work in Canada leaving Lucio behind. Barely a year,
August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with Ontario Court a petition for
divorce which was granted and took effect in February of 1992.
On October that year Lucia married Maria Lumbago also in
Tagbilaran City. September 21, 1993, Lucio filed a complaint for
nullity of marriage in Regional Trial Court of Bohol on the ground
that there was no marriage ceremony actually took place. He was
later charge with Bigamy filed by City Prosecutor of the Regional
Trial Court of Bohol.
The petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal
case invoking prejudicial question. The civil case is a prejudicial
question to bigamy. The Court granted unfortunately denied by the
motion for reconsideration of the prosecution.
The Regional Trial Court of Bohol held Lucio guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
He filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. While the case
was pending in Court of Appeals, the trial court granted the
petition for nullty of marriage since no marriage ceremony took
place. No appeal was taken from this decision, thus, became final
and executory. But the Court of Appeals denied the petition for

Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so,

whether his defense of good faith is valid
Held:
The first element of Bigamy as laid down in Bobis v.
Bobis was not present.
No marriage ceremony. What transpired was a mere
signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence
of a solemnizing officer. The mere signing of the same bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial
declaration of nullity.
The Supreme Court need not tarry on the issue of the
validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent,
which is moot and academic.

79

LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986
Facts:
Karl Heinz Wiegel filed a petition for the declaration of his
marriage to the petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel before the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City. Their marriage
was celebrated in June 1978. The basis for such petition was that
Lilias previous marriage to Eduardo A. Maxion was still existing.
Lilia admitted the existence of her previous marriage, but as a
defense, he avers that it was initiated by force, therefore, the
previous marriage was null and void. So, a pre-trial ensued.
respondent judge ruled against Lilia.
Issue:
Whether or not the Lilias previous marriage was void or
merely voidable
Held:
There is no need to prove that Lilias previous marriage
was vitiated by force, because assuming that indeed it is vitiated
by force, it is not void but merely voidable (Aticle 85, Civil
Code). Therefore, since there is no annulment made, her marriage
to the respondent is void because the previous marriage is not yet
dissolved.

80

FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT

OF APPEALS, respondent.
G.R. No. 127263 April 12, 2000

same. It fell short of quantum of evidence. Thus, the petition for

certiorari.
Issue:

Facts:
Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy were married on November
15, 1973 at the church of Our Lady of Lourdes, Quezon City. Both
were 22 years old. the union was blessed with two children,
Frederick and Farrah Sheryl. They first resided at Singalong,
Manila, then in Apalit, Pampanga, and later I Sto. Tomas,
Pampanga were they operated their business, lumber and
hardware.
Later, Fernando left their Conjugal dwelling. Their two
children were under the custody of Filipina. But later, Frederick
transferred to his father in Tondo.
As a result, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation in
Regional Trial Court San Fernando, Pampanga. The case later
upgraded to separation of property on the ground that her husband
left her without cause for more than one year. Moreover, they have
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement. The trial court granted
the petition. She also sued her husband for attempted parricide.
One afternoon, she went to a dental clinic owned by her husband
and operated by her mistress. She went there to fetch her son
Frederick and to take him to San Fernando, Pampanga. But the
boy ignored her and continued playing the family computer. So
she spanked her, unfortunately Fernando pulled her and started
beating her like hell. Unfortunately, the Regional Trial Court of
Manila held Fernando liable only for slight physical injuries and
sentenced to 20 days of imprisonment.
She filed another legal separation on that ground and the
Regional trial Court of Pampanga granted the petition and giving
Sheryll in her custody, Frederick to the respondent.
She filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage to Fernando. But the Regional Trial Court denied for
lack of merit. She appealed to the Court of Appeals but denied the

Whether or not the marriage is void ab initio because of

the absence of marriage license at the time of the celebration of
marriage
Held:
The findings of the Supreme Court were:
a. The marriage was celebrated on November 15, 1973, but
the marriage license was issued on September 17, 1974.
Almost one year after the celebration of the marriage (120
days from the date of issue).
b. The marriage license was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet
neither the wife nor the husband ever resided the place.
Thus, the petition was granted.

81

ANTONIETTA GARCIA VDA. DE CHUA, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998
Facts:
During his lifetime, Roberto Lim Chua lived out of
wedlock with private respondent Florita A. Vallejo from 1970 up
to 1981. The union begot two illegitimate children, namely,
Roberto Rafson Alonso and Rudyard Pride Alonzo.
When Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City, Vallejo
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a petition for
Guardianship and Administration. The trial court issued an order
setting the hearing and directed the notice thereof be published in
a newspaper of general circulation in the province of
Maguindanao and Cotabato City and or Davao City.
Sometime in July 1992, Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua,
representing to be the surviving spouse of Roberto Chua, filed a
motion to dismiss, on the ground of improper venue. She alleged
that the decedents death was in Davao City, thus, the Regional
Trial Court of Davo City is the proper forum.
Vallejo filed a motion to dismiss mainly on the ground that
Antonietta de Chua has no personality to intervene in the petition
for guardianship and administration of Robert Chua; a pretender
because the deceased never contracted marriage with any woman
until he died.
The trial court, indeed, dismissed the petition of de Chua
for lack of merit. She was able only to present a Xerox copy of the
alleged marriage certificate. She was unable to produce the
original copy or authenticated copy. The alleged marriage was not
even registered to local civil registration. Moreover, the alleged
judge who solemnized the marriage denied that he solemnized
such marriage (Judge Augusto Banzali). The trial court issued an
order appointing Romulo Lim Uy, first cousin of the deceased,
and Florita Vallejo as guardian to the estate of Roberto and
Rudyard Alonzo.

Antonietta filed a motion to recall the letters of

administration of Vallejo and she also filed a petition to declare
the proceedings as mistrial but was denied.
She filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to the
Court of Appeals alleging the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion but it was denied, hence, the petition was elevated to
the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Antonietta has a personality to file a
motion to dismiss the petition for guardianship and administration
of Robert and Rudyard Alonzo, filed by Vallejo
Held:
Petitioner was not able to prove her status as the surviving
spouse of the decedent. The best proof of marriage between man
and wife is marriage contract which Antonietta failed to produce.
The lower court correctly disregarded the Photostat copy of the
marriage certificate which she presented, this being a violation of
the best evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces of
evidence.

82

MERCEDITA MATA ARANES, petitioner, vs.

JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002.
Facts:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Aranes charges respondent
Judge, the presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
Balatan, Camarines Sur, with Gross Ignorance of the law for
solemnizing her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia
(a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy) on February 17,
2000, without the requisite of marriage license and at Navua,
Camarines Sur which outside the respondents territorial
jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of
this marriage until her husband passed away. However, since the
marriage was a nullity, petitioners right to inherit the vast
properties left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise
deprived of receiving pensions from her late husbands job.
On the respondent judges comment dated July 5, 2001, he
solemnized the marriage because he was requested by a certain
Juan Arroyo; Orobia had a difficulty walking because he had a
physical condition that if aggravated could lead to a fatal end; due
to influx of visitors, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage;
assuming that all marriage requirements were present; petitioner
and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the
license to him in the afternoon on that same day, February 12,
2000.
However, after reading the Comment filed by respondent
judge, she realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered by
her conscience.
Reviewing from the records of the case, it appears that
petitioner filed application for marriage license on January 5,
2000. It was issued on January 17, 2000 but neither petitioner nor
Orobia claimed it.

On September 12, 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of

desistance dated August 28 2001 with the Office of the Court of a
marriage license.
The Office of the Court Administrator rendered a decision
penalizing respondent judge of a fine of PHP 5,000 in November
15, 2000.
Issue:
Whether or not the affidavit of desistance shall excuse the
judge from being penalized
Held:
No, because the Supreme Court has the authority to
discipline its members.
The act of the judge in solemnizing the marriage at Nabua,
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent judge is
contrary to the law of marriage. The marriage may still be
considered valid but the respondent judge in administratively
liable. However, this is not a gross ignorance of law (Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129).
The grounds that make the act grossly ignorance of the law
is the solemnization of the marriage without the marriage license,
which makes the marriage void under paragraph 2 Article 3 of the
Family Code, and the late issuance of such license did not prove
the validity of the marriage. Thus, the Supreme Court rendered a
decision requiring the respondent judge to pay the fine of PHP
5,000.

83

FE D. QUITA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

respondent.
G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998
Facts:
Quita and Padlan were married in the Philippines, but
Quita filed for divorce in California which was granted. She
remarried twice after the divorce. Upon Padlans death, Quita
made claims upon his estate as the surviving spouse and heir of
Padlan, alleging that since Padlan was a Filipino citizen, he
remained married to her in spite of the divorce decree.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was still entitled to inherit from
the decedent considering that she had secured a divorced in the
USA and in fact had twice remarried
Held:
Quitas right to inherit from Padlan depends on her
citizenship at the time the divorce was decreed. If she was no
longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, the divorce
would be valid as to her and will be recognized in the Philippines,
and she would lose her right to inherit.
Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may, be
reorganized in the Philippines, provided tahy are valid according
to their national law; once proved that a wife was no longer a
Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from her husband, then
she could very well lose her right to inherit from the latter.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v.

CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, respondent.
G.R. No. 154380. October 5, 2005.
Facts:
On May 24, 1981 Crpriano Orbecido III married Lady
Milagros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. The marriage was blessed
84

with two children, Kristoffer Simbortiz V, Orbecido and Lady

Kimberly B. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cprianos wife left for the United States bringing
his son, Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano was informed by
his son that his wife had been naturalized as Amrican citizen and
that she married certain Innocent Stanley.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court (Regional Trial
Court of Molave, Zamboanga Del Sur, Branch 73) a petition to
marry because of the situation. It was granted. However, the
Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor
General sought reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, this
appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent can remarry under Article 26 of
the Family Code
Held:
The Supreme Court is unanimous in holding that
paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209 as
amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a
Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.
However before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by
our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
In the case, it was not submitted as evidence.
Thus, the petition of the Republic of the Philippines was
granted.

JAIME O. SEVILLA, petitioner, vs. CARMELITA N.

CARDENAS, respondent.
G.R. No. 167684. July 31, 2006.
Facts:
Jaime O. Sevilla, herein petitioner, filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Carmelita N. Cardenas,
herein respondent, for their marriage was vitiated by machination,
duress, and intimidation employed by the respondents Carmelita
and her father. He was forced to sign a marriage contract with
Carmelita Cardenas before a minister of the Gospel, Rev. Cirilo D
Gonzales. Moreover, he alleged that there was no marriage license
presented before the solemnizing officer as certified by the Office
85

of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Manila. Actually, it was

certified 3 times on the following dates: March 11, September 20,
1994 and July 25, 2000 that marriage license no. 2770792 was
nowhere to be found.
On the other hand, the respondent, Carmelita N. Cardenas
refuted these allegations of Jaime and claims that they were first
civilly married on May 19, 1969 and thereafter married at a
church on May 31, 1969 at Most Holy Redeemer Parish in
Quezon City. Both were alleged to be recorded in Local Civil
Registrar and NSO. He is estopped from invoking the lack of
marriage license after having been married to her for 25 years.
The Regional Trial Court of Makati City declared the
nullity of marriage of the parties based on the petitioners
allegations that no marriage license was presented before a
solemnizing officer. And that without the said marriage license,
being one of the formal requisites of marriage, the marriage is
void from the beginning. This was based on the 3 certifications
issued by the Local Civil Registrar Manila that marriage license
number 220792 was fictitious.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which
reversed and set aside the decision of the trail court in favor of the
marriage, because the Local Civil Registrar failed to locate the
said license with due effort as testified by certain Perlita Mercader
because the former Local Civil registrar had already retired. The
petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied
by the Court of Appeals. thus, this case was elevated to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the certification made by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan that Marriage License No. 2770792, as
appearing in the marriage contract of the parties, sufficient to
declare the marriage void from the beginning
Held:

The presumption of regularity of official acts may be

rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to
perform a duty. The absence of logbook is not conclusive proof of
non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. In the absence of
showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we can
not easily accept that absence of the same also means nonexistence or falsity of entries therein.
The parties have comported themselves as husband and
wife and lived together for several years producing two offsprings,
now adult themselves. Thus, the instant petition was denied.

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO,

petitioner, vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001.
Facts:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha
Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1,
1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On
86

May 18, 1989, decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the

marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian
citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship"
issued by the Australian government. he then married the
petitioner on January 12, 1992.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the court a quo, on the
ground of bigamy respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting
marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She
claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha
Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as
1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its
subsequent dissolution. contended that his first marriage to an
Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree
obtained in Australian in 1989; thus, he was legally capacitated to
marry petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple's
wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was
pending respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a
family court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d]
irretrievably broken down.
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be
dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of action.14 The
Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.15 The
court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both
parties. After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case
was submitted for resolution. The trial court held the marriage
dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was
valid and recognized in the Philippines.
Issue:
a. Whether the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson was proven

b. Whether respondent was proven to be legally

capacitated to marry petitioner
Held:
a. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the
existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense
of an action. In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving
the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by
the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the
material allegations in their answer when they introduce new
matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the
burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls
squarely upon him.
b. The Supreme Court cannot conclude that respondent,
who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. The Supreme
Court agree to the petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred
in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent
with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce
sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing
his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to
contract the second marriage.
Thus, the case was remanded.

RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, petitioner, v.

ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
G.R. No. 167746. August 28, 2007
87

Facts:

Held:

A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by

petitioner against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that he
and respondent celebrated their marriage twice without securing
the required marriage license. The alleged marriage license,
procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract,
is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they
never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil
registrar of the said place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave
birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways
and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing,
judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the
Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract and
its entry on file.
Answering petitioners petition for annulment of marriage,
respondent asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that
there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification
from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. She had
actually gave birth to two children, one as stated by the petitioner
and the other was Rachel Ann Alcantara on October 27, 1992.
Moreover, petitioner filed the said case in order to evade
prosecution for concubinage for he had a mistress with whom he
had three children. The case for concubinage was actually filed
and that petitioner prays that the annulment case be dismissed for
lack of merit.
The Regional Trial Court of Makati City dismissed the
petition for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals dismissed also the
petitioners appeal. Hence, the appeal to the Supreme Court.

The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L.

Diaz of Carmona, Cavite enjoys the presumption that official duty
has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage
license was done in the regular conduct of official business. The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.
However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less
than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless
the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every
reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption
and, in case of doubt as to an officers act being lawful or
unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.
Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted
that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The
presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage.
Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of
the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with
great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the
presumption is of great weight.

Issue:
Whether or not The Honorable Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error when it ruled that the Petition for
Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite the evidence on
record that there was no marriage license at the precise moment of
the solemnization of the marriage

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner v. CRASUS L.

IYOY, respondent.
G.R. No. 152577. September 21, 2005
88

Facts:
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the
filing of a Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage by
respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. The respondent avers that
Fely hot-tempered, nagger, and extravagant, she abandoned him
for 13 years, and Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the
family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to
perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity,
being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to
Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.
On the other hand, Fely counterclaims that respondent was
an American citizen, thus, she is not subject to Philippine laws.
She avers she left that respondent because of the latters
drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find
employment and to contribute to the maintenance of their
household. She could not have been extravagant since the family
hardly had enough money for basic needs. Moreover, she avers
that respondent misused the amount of P90,000.00 which she
advanced to him to finance the brain operation of their son,
Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the
RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and
that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00
she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary
damages, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses.
The Regional Trial Court of Cebu City promulgated its
Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely
null and void ab initioon the gound of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner Republic believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of
the RTC was contrary to law and evidence, filed an appeal with
the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision,
dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC,
finding no reversible error therein. Hence the case to the Supreme
Court.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not applying

Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code
Held:
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special
situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino
citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said
provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and
his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she
was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not
established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the
RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus
sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which
she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer,
she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At
the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and
pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine
laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal
capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine
laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce
between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly
obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
Thus, the Petition was granted and the assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July
2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch
22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, was
reversed and set aside.

Issue:
89

EDGAR SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS,

respondent.
G.R. No. 133743. February 6, 2007.

Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject

petition for letters of administration
Held:

Facts:
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of
Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor
of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo
contracted three marriages. The first marriage was with Virginia
Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children,
namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On
August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. The second
was Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias; and
Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, with whom he had
no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from
the time of their marriage up to his death.
Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On
December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 146.
Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a
cause of action. But the trial court issued an order denying the two
motions to dismiss. On September 12, 1995, the trial court
dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at
the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor
and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition
should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati
City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to
file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage
with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. The Court of
Appeals reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court, and,
hence, the case before the Supreme Court.

Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has

a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their
cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners.
If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity
to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was
validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be
considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code.
This provision governs the property relations between parties who
live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage,
or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the
property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules
on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the
property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed
to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the
portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal,
unless the contrary is proven.
Morover, the Supreme Court founnd that respondents
legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of
Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code
or Article 148 of the Family Code.
The order of the Regional Trial Court which denied
petitioners motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order
which dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration is
affirmed. It was also REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.

Issue:
90

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE

DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO
RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA and
other HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO, petitioners, v. HEIRS OF
MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 155733. January 27, 2006.
Facts:
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and
Josefa Delgado may be divided into two groups: (1) the alleged
heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood
siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces.
Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were
never married. In support thereof, they assert that no evidence was
ever presented to establish it, not even so much as an allegation of
the date or place of the alleged marriage. (2) the alleged heirs of
Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters, his nephews and nieces,
his illegitimate child,9 and the de facto adopted child (ampunampunan) of the decedents. Respondents aver that like Josefa
Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived
by his sisters Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia
Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his predeceased brother
Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia
Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia and
Leticia Rustia Miranda. Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the
intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly
acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They contend that her right
to compulsory acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo died
in 1974 and that she cannot claim voluntary acknowledgement
since the documents she presented were not the authentic writings
prescribed by the new Civil Code.
The decision of the trial court states petitioner and her coclaimants to the estate of the late Josefa Delgado listed in the

Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby

declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado who
died intestate in the City of Manila on September 8, 1972, and
entitled to partition the same among themselves in accordance
with the proportions referred to in this Decision. Oppositors filed
an appeal which was denied on the ground that the record on
appeal was not filed on time. They then filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus, which was dismissed by the Court of
Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and gave
due course to oppositors appeal in the interest of substantial
justice. Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals partially set
aside the trial courts decision. Upon motion for reconsideration,
the Court of Appeals amended its earlier decision. The decision
was reconsidered and vacated. Consequently, the decision of the
trial court was reversed and set-aside. Hence, the case to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Held:
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the
presumption that a valid marriage existed between Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50
years cannot be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to
be married. Their reputed status as husband and wife was such
that even the original petition for letters of administration filed by
Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as
"spouses." Every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are
presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of things in
society and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to
be, they would be living in constant violation of the common rules
of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always
presume marriage.
91

Thus, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11,

1990 decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 55) was denied. The
assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals was
affirmed with modifications.

over petitioner who was merely a common law spouse, the latter
being himself legally married to another woman. Hence, the
appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not Tomas Eugenio is the rightful custodian of
Vitaliana's body as his common-law husband
Held:

TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. ALEJANDRO

M. VELEZ, respondent.
G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990.
Facts:
Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of (Vitaliana
Vargas, Vitaliana for brevity), her full blood brothers and sisters,
herein private respondents (Vargases', for brevity) filed on 27
September 1988, a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of
Misamis Oriental (Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City) alleging that
Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987
and confined by herein petitioner in his palacial residence in
Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana
was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority.
At the time the petition was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was
25 years of age, single, and living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio.
Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who
had died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff, reasoning
that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas corpus proceedings
and that he alleged that he had already a burial permit from the
Undersecretary of the Department of Health, authorizing the
burial at the palace quadrangle of the Philippine Benevolent
Christian Missionary, Inc. (PBCM), a registered religious sect, of
which he (petitioner) is the Supreme President and Founder.
The court a quo denied the motion to dismiss filed by
petitioner on the ground that there was no surviving spouse,
ascendants or descendants, the brothers and sisters were preferred

Philippine Law does not recognize common law

marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for
many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the
public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband
and wife in the community where they live may be considered
legally mauled in common law jurisdictions but not in the
Philippines. While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside
the fact that such relationships are present in our society, and that
they produce a community of properties and interests which is
governed by law, authority exists in case law to the effect that
such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman
living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract
marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage
with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him
from even legally marrying Vitaliana. The provisions of the Civil
Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144,
when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded
spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded
spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her
in her lifetime.
Hence, the decision appealed from was affirmed. Both
petitions were dismissed.

92

prescription against him had set in. Respondent Court denied

reconsideration, thus, the appeal.
Issue:
In the absence of a marriage contract and a birth
certificate, how may marriage and filiation be proven?
Held:
ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
respondent.
G.R. No. 118904 April 20, 1998
Facts:
On August 10, 1978, petitioner filed with the Court of First
Instance of Aklan, Kalibo, Aklan, an action for partition of four
(4) parcels of land, described therein, claiming that he was the son
of the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of three (3) children of Patricio
Trinidad, who was the original owner of the parcels of land.
Patricio Trinidad died in 1940, leaving the four (4) parcels of land
to his three (3) children, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. In 1970,
plaintiff demanded from the defendants to partition the land into
three (3) equal shares and to give him the one-third (1/3)
individual share of his late father, but the defendants refused and
alleged in their answer filed on September 07, 1978 that plaintiff
was not the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants
contended that Inocentes was single when he died in 1941 , before
plaintiff's birth. Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived
with them, and claimed that the parcels of land described in the
complaint had been in their possession since the death of their
father in 1940 and that they had not given plaintiff a share in the
produce of the land.
The trial court rendered in favor of the petitioner.
However, Respondent Court reversed the trial court on the ground
that petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that
his parents were legally married to each other and that acquisitive

According to Respondent Court, petitioner failed to

accomplish to prove that Inocentes and his mother (Felicidad)
were validly married, and that he was born during the subsistence
of their marriage. The Supreme Court disagrees citing the case of
Pugeda v. Trias when the question of whether a marriage has been
contracted arises in litigation, said marriage may be proven by
relevant evidence. To prove the fact of marriage, the following
would constitute competent evidence: the testimony of a witness
to the matrimony, the couple's public and open cohabitation as
husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the
baptismal certificates of children born during such union, and the
mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents.
In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification from
the Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan that all records of births,
deaths and marriages were either lost, burned or destroyed during
the Japanese occupation of said municipality. This fact, however,
is not fatal to petitioner's case. Although the marriage contract is
considered the primary evidence of the marital union, petitioner's
failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place, as
other forms of relevant evidence may take its place. In place of a
marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by petitioner,
Isabel Meren, who testified that she was present during the nuptial
of Felicidad and Inocentes on May 5, 1942 in New Washington,
Aklan; and Jovita Gerardo, who testified that the couple deported
themselves as husband and wife after the marriage. Gerardo, the
77-year old barangay captain of Tigayon and former board
member of the local parent-teachers' association, used to visit
93

Inocentes and Felicidad's house twice or thrice a week, as she

lived only thirty meters away.
Private respondents' thesis is that Inocentes died unwed
and without issue in March 1941. Private respondents' witness,
Pedro Briones, testified that Inocentes died in 1940 and was
buried in the estate of the Trinidads, because nobody was willing
to carry the coffin to the cemetery in Kalibo, which was then
occupied by the Japanese forces. Taking judicial notice that World
War II did not start until December 7, 1941 with the bombing of
Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, the trial court was not convinced that
Inocentes dies in March 1941. 35 The Japanese forces occupied
Manila only on January 2, 1942; thus, it stands to reason that
Aklan was not occupied until then. It was only then that local
residents were unwilling to bury their dead in the cemetery In
Kalibo, because of the Japanese soldiers who were roaming
around the area. Furthermore, petitioner consistently used
Inocentes' surname (Trinidad) without objection from private
respondents a presumptive proof of his status as Inocentes'
legitimate child.
The petition was granted and the assailed Decision and
Resolution were seversed and set aside. The trial court's decision
dated July 4, 1989 was reinstated.

94

TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the

Estate of the Deceased ALFREDO E. JACOB, petitioner,
vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 88602 April 6, 1990.
Facts:
Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob was the registered owner of a parcel
of land described under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1433 of
the Register of Deeds of Naga City. Because of the problem of
paying realty taxes, internal revenue taxes and unpaid wages of
farm laborers of the hacienda, Dr. Jacob asked Centenera to
negotiate for a loan. For this purpose, a special power of attorney
was executed and acknowledged by Dr. Jacob before notary
public Lorenzo Rosales.
The mortgage was annotated on the title and when the loan
was twice re-structured, the proceeds of the same were not
actually given by the bank to Centera since the transaction was
actually nothing but a renewal of the first or original loan and the
supposed proceeds were applied as payment for the loan. The
accrued interest for sixty (60) days was, however, paid by
Centenera.
On November 15, 1982 a definite deed of sale of the
property was executed in favor of the respondent bank as the sole
and highest bidder.
Tomasa Vda. de Jacob who was subsequently named
administratrix of the estate of Dr. Jacob and who claimed to be an
heir of the latter, conducted her own investigation and therefore
she filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur
alleging that the special power of attorney and the documents
therein indicated are forged and therefore the loan and/or real
estate mortgages and promissory notes are null and void. The trial
court dismissed the plaintiffs complaint for lack of a cause of
action and/or her failure to prove the causes of action alleged in

the complaint; and judgment was rendered against the Estate of

the late Dr. Alfredo Jacob in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff
appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed in toto the
decision of the lower court and dismissing the appeal for lack of
merit. Thus, the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not an extrajudicial foreclosure of a mortgage
may proceed even after the death of the mortgagor
Held:
A mortgagee has three remedies that may be alternately
availed of in case the mortgagor dies under Section 7, Rule 86 of
the Rules of Court:
a. to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate
of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim;
b. to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove the deficiency as
an ordinary claim; and;
c. to rely on the mortgage exclusively, or other security and
foreclose the same at anytime, before it is barred by prescription,
without the right to file a claim for any deficiency.
From this rule, it is clear that the mortgagee does not lose
its light to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage even after the
death of the mortgagor as a third alternative under Section 7, Rule
86 of the Rules of Court. The power to foreclose a mortgage is not
an ordinary agency that contemplated exclusively the
representation of the principal by the agent but is primarily an
authority conferred upon the mortgagee for the latter's own
protection. That power survives the death of the mortgagor. The
right of the mortgagee bank to extrajudicially foreclose the
mortgage after the death of the mortgagor, acting through his
attorney-in-fact, did not depend on the authority in the deed of
mortgage executed by the latter. That right existed independently
of said stipulation and is clearly recognized in Section 7, Rule 86
of the Rules of Court aforecited. Other issues were questions of
95

facts and can not be reviewed at the Supreme Court as only

questions of law are reviewed in the latter.
Thus, the case was dismissed for lack of merit.

TOMAS CORPUS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ADMINISTRATOR

and/or EXECUTOR of the Estate of Teodoro R. Yangco,
defendants-appellee.
G.R. No. L-22469 October 23, 1978
Facts:
Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 20, 1939 at the
age of seventy-seven years. His will dated August 29, 1934 was
probated in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Yangco had no
forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were (1)
his half brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco,
the wife of Miguel Ossorio (3) Amalia Corpus, Jose A. V. Corpus,
and Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo
Corpus, and (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half
brother Jose Corpus. Juanita died in October, 1944 at Palauig,
Zambales.
Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of
partition dated November 26, 1945 was submitted by the
administrator and the legatees named in the will. The Probate
court in its order of December 26, 1946 approved the project of
partition. From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro,
Juanita Corpus (deceased) and the estate of Luis R. Yangco aped
to this Court. Appellant Tomas Corpus signed that compromise
settlement as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus. The estate of Luis R.
Yangco entered into a similar compromise a ment A the resolution
dismissing the appeal became, final and executory on October 14
and November 4, 1947, entries of judgment were made on those
dates. On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of
Juanita corpus, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of

Manila to recover her supposed share in Yangco intestate estate.

He alleged in his complaint that the dispositions in his Yangcos
will sing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void
under article 785 of the old Civil Code and that the 1949 partition
is invalid and, therefore, the decedent's estate should be
distributed according to the rules on intestacy.
The trial court in its decision of July 2, 1956 dismissed the
action on the grounds of res judicata and laches. It held that the
intrinsic validity of Yangco's will was passed upon in its order
dated December 26, 1946 in Special Proceeding No. 54863
approving the project of partition for the testator's estate. The
Court of Appeals, however, certified the appeal to this Court
because it involves real property valued at more than fifty
thousand pesos.
Issue:
Has Tomas Corpus a cause of action to recover his
mother's supposed intestate share in Yangco's estate?
Held:
Under articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code, "if
an acknowledged natural or legitimated child should die without
issue, either legitimate or acknowledged, the father or mother who
acknowledged such child shall succeed to its entire estate; and if
both acknowledged it and are alive, they shall inherit from it share
and share alike. In default of natural ascendants, natural and
legitimated children shall be succeeded by their natural brothers
and sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate
brothers and sisters." Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco's half brothers on
the Corpus side, who were legitimate, had no right to succeed to
his estate under the rules of intestacy. Following the rule in article
992, formerly article 943, it was held that the legitimate relatives
of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child. The lower
court's judgment was affirmed.

96

The decree is binding on private respondent as an

American citizen. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided that they are valid
according to their national law. Likewise, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce. Thus,
pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the husband of
petitioner. Furthermore, he cannot be entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets.
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, v. HON. MANUEL V.
ROMILLO, JR. AND RICHARD UPTON, respondents.
No. L-68470. October 8, 1985.
Facts:
Alice Reyes Van-Dorn, petitioner, was a citizen of the
Philippines while Richard Upton, respondent, was a U.S. citizen.
The two got married in Hong Kong in 1972. They lived in the
Philippines and begot two children. They obtained divorce in
Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn.
The private respondent filed suit against petitioner stating
the business of the latter in Ermita, Manila is their conjugal
property. Thus, he claimed that he has the right to manage such
conjugal property.
Petitioner then filed a Motion to Dismiss since it was
already agreed upon in the divorce judgment that there is no
community property between her and the respondent.
The trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground
that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the
Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.
Issue:
Is the effect of the foreign divorce binding in the
Philippines on the matter of conjugal property?
Ruling:
97

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, v. HON.

CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, HON LUIS C. VICTOR AND
ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
G.R. No. 80116. June 30, 1989.
Facts:
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay
Pilapil (Filipino citizen) and respondent and respondent Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, German national, were married at Federal
Republic of Germany. They lived together in Malate, Manila and
had a child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling.
The private respondent initiated divorce proceeding
against petitioner in Germany. The local court in Germany
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of
marriage of the spouse.
On the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal
separation before a trial court in Manila.
After the issuance of the divorce decree, private
respondent filed the complaint for adultery before the prosecutor
of Manila alleging that the petitioner had an affair William Chia
and Jesus Chua while they were still married.
Petitioner filed a petition with the Justice Secretary asking
to set aside the cases filed against her and be dismissed.
Thereafter, petitioner moved to defer her arraignment and to
suspend further proceedings. Justice Secretary Ordoez issued a
resolution directing to move for the dismissal of the complaints
against petitioner.

Yes. The crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes

against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon sworn written
filed by the offended spouse. Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at
the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. This
is logical consequence since the raison detre of said provision of
law would be absent where the supposed offended party had
ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the
filing of the criminal case. It is indispensable that the status and
capacity of the complainant to commence the action be definitely
established and, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as
of the time he initiates the action. Thus, the divorce decree is valid
not only in his country, may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle under the Civil Code on the matter of civil
status of persons. Private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery
case. The criminal case filed against petitioner is dismissed.

Issue:
Is the action tenable?
Ruling:
98

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant, v. VICENTA F.

ESCAO, ET. AL., defendants-appellees.
No. L-19671. November 29, 1965.
Facts:
Vicenta Escao, 27 years of age and came from a
prominent family, exchanged marriage vows with Pastor
Tenchavez, 32 years of age, before Lt. Moises Lavares (a Catholic
Chaplain). She did not inform her parents about the marriage
rather she and Tenchavez decided to elope. It did not however
materialize rather she was forced to admit such secret marriage
to her parents. To avoid scandal, her parents decided to let their
daughter remarry Tenchavez for the first marriage was solemnized
by a priest who had lack of authority. However, it did not happen.
Subsequently, the couple did not live together.
Vicenta went to Mizamis Occidental to escape and filed a
petition therein to annul her marriage but it was dismissed for she
abandoned the same. She rather went to the United States of
America, without the knowledge of Tenchavez and indicating in
her passport that she is single, to study. She filed a divorce against
her husband on the ground of extreme cruelty, and entirely
mental in character, in Nevada. Such petition was approved by
the foreign court. She met an American citizen, Russell Moran,
and later on, they got married and had a child.
Tenchavez filed then a complaint against Vicentas parents
whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged her
from joining her husband and alienating her affection and asked
for legal separation.
The judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed
the plaintiff from supporting his wife and to acquire property to
the exclusion of his wife.
Issue:
Whether or not the action of Vicenta - filing a divorce
decree is proper

Ruling:
No. The marriage of Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta is
valid. The foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought and
decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code, is not
entitled to recognition as valid. Thus, neither is the marriage
contracted with another party by the divorced entitled to validity
in the country. The remarriage of the divorced wife and her
cohabitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitle
the latter to a decree of legal separation.

MARILOU NAMA MORENO, complainant, v. JUDGE JOSE

C. BERNABE, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-94-963. July 14, 1995.
99

Facts:
Marilou Nama Moreno filed this complainant against
Judge C. Bernabe for grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the
law.
On October 4, 1993, complainant alleges that she and
Marcelo Moreno were married before respondent Judge Bernabe.
She visited the office of the Respondent Judge on October 15,
1993 only to find out that she could not get the marriage contract
because the Office of the Local Civil Registrar failed to issue a
marriage license. She claims that respondent Judge connived with
the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to deceive her.
Respondent denied that he conspired with the relatives of
Marcelo Moreno to solemnize the marriage for the purpose of
deceiving the complainant.
Judge Villarama, Jr. recommended the dismissal of the
complaint against respondent for failure of complainant to appear
on any of the scheduled hearings. He, however, also
recommended that the respondent be issued a stern warning for
the latter solemnized a marriage without the requisites marriage
license.

the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity

shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. Thus,
respondent be held liable for misconduct for solemnizing a
marriage without a marriage license and that the appropriate
administrative sanctions be imposed against him.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage is void due to the lack of
marriage license
Ruling:
Respondent Judge displayed his ignorance of the law when
he solemnized the marriage without a marriage license. As a
judge, he is presumed to be aware of the existence of Article 3(2)
of the Family Code of the Philippines, which provides of a
marriage is a valid marriage license. Absence of said requisite will
make the marriage void from the beginning. Family Code declares
that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an
irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, v.

JUDGE HERNANDO DOMAGTOY, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996.
Facts:
On September 27, 1994, Judge Hernando Domagtoy
solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn
100

Borga despite the fact that the groom is merely separated from his
first wife.
Respondent judge, likewise, performed a marriage
ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma del
Rosario outside his jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Thus he
faced an administrative for gross misconduct as well as
inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law filed by Rodolfo
Navarro, the complainant.
Respondent seeks exculpation from his act by stating that
he merely relied on the affidavit issued by the municipal trial
court confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have
not seen each other for almost seven years. The certified true copy
of the marriage contract between Tagadan and Borga states that
the formers civil status is separated. Tagadan was civilly
married to Ida Pearanda; that after 13 years of cohabitation and
having borne five children, she left the conjugal dwelling and did
not return for almost seven years thereby giving rise to the
presumption that she is already dead.
In the marriage of Sumaylo and del Rosario, he maintained
that he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code.

request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this

effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was
at the point of death or in a remote area. The written request was
made by only one party. Under Article 3 of the Family Code, one
of the formal requisite is the authority of the solemnizing officer.
Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others,
any incumbent member of the judiciary within his or her courts
jurisdiction. Article 8 of the same Code refers only to the venue of
the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority
of the solemnizing officer. Non compliance of such will not
invalidate the marriage. Judges who are appointed to specific
jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas
otherwise there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite
and may subject the solemnizing officer to administrative liability.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge erred in solemnizing
the marriages
Ruling:
Yes. Should Tagadan institute a summary proceeding for
the declaration of his first wifes presumptive death otherwise he
remains married to Pearanda. Such negligence or ignorance of
the law has resulted is a bigamous, and therefore, void marriage.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is
considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage
between him and Ida Pearanda.
A marriage can be held outside of the judges chambers or
courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of
death; (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29; (3) upon

RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, petitioner, v. ROSITA A.

ALCANTARA AND
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 167746. August 28, 2007.
Facts:
Petitioner Restituto Alcantara filed a patition for
annulment of marriage against respondent Rosita Alcantara on the
101

ground that there was no marriage license secured before they get
married before Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a minister of the Gospel of
the CDCC on December 8, 1982. They got married again on
March 26, 1983 in San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo,
Manila without securing marriage license. It appeared in their
marriage contract that they obtained their alleged marriage license
in Carmona, Cavite when in fact neither party was a resident of
Carmona nor they never went to the same to apply for a license.
After the respondent gave birth to Rose Ann, the couple parted
ways.
In her defense, she contended that petitioner has a mistress
that is why he filed the annulment of marriage to evade
prosecution for concubinage. Respondent then filed a case for
concubinage against petitioner and prayed that the annulment of
marriage be denied for lack of merit.
The regional trial court rendered its decision that the
petition of petitioner is dismissed for lack of merit.
The Court of Appeals, likewise, dismissed the appeal of
petitioner for the marriage license is presumed to be regularly
issued and petitioner had not presented any evidence to overcome
the presumption.

affect the validity of marriage. Thus, decision of the Court of

Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court is hereby
affirmed.

Issue:
Is the decision of the Court of Appeals tenable?
Ruling:
Yes. Seper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption
is always in favor of the validity of the marriage. Such
certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was
done in the regular conduct. Under Article 53 of the new Civil
Code, which was in effect at the time of its celebration, no
marriage shall be solemnized unless all requisites are complied
with. In the contention that neither spouse is a resident of
Carmona, Cavite, it is not a sufficient basis or the Court to annul
their marriage because it is just a mere irregularity that does not

JAIME O. SEVILLA, petitioner, v. CARMELITA N.

CARDENAS, respondent.
G.R. No. 167684. July 31, 2006.
Facts:
Petitioner Jaime Sevilla filed a complaint to declare the
nullity of his marriage to Carmelita Cardenas on the ground that
there was no marriage license applied. He claimed that they got
married on May 19, 1969 through machinations, duress and
intimidations employed upon him by respondent and the latters
father who was a retired colonel of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.
102

In her defense, Carmelita refuted these allegations and

claimed that she and Jaime were married civilly on the said date in
a church ceremony thereafter. Both marriages were registered with
the local civil registrar of Manila and the National Statistics
Office. Likewise, the couple have been married for 25 years and
had begotten children.
The trial court rendered its decision that the absence of a
license, as one of the formal requisites, renders the marriage void
ab initio and that there was no marriage license no. 2770792
issued by the local civil registrar of the San Juan, Manila. This
was certified by the same that such marriage license number is
inexistent and fictitious. The marriage of Sevilla and Cardenas
solemnized at the Manila City Hall by Rev. Gonzales and under
religious rites by Rev. Velasco is null and void for the lack of
requisite marriage license.
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial courts
decision for the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no
less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

Thus, petition is denied, the decision of the Court of Appeals is

affirmed.

Issue:
Whether or not the allegation of the local civil registrar of
San Juan, that there was no license number 2770762 as appearing
in the marriage contract of the parties was issued, is sufficient to
declare the marriage as null and void ab initio
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals
decision that the marriage is not null and void ab initio because of
the absence of marriage license. The presumption of regularity of
performance of official function by the local civil registrar is
satisfactory if uncontradicted but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence. Eventhough the logbook cannot be
found, it is not conclusive proof by non-issuance of marriage
license number 2770792. The Court likewise protects the sanctity
of marriage for it is the foundation of family and conjugal life.

OSCAR P. MALLION, petitioner, v. EDITHA ALCANTARA,

respondent.
G.R. No. 141528. October 31, 2006.
Facts:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar Mallion filed with
the regional trial court seeking a declaration of nullity of his
marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
The trial court denied the petition. Likewise, it was
dismissed in the Court of Appeals.
103

After such decision, petitioner filed another petition for

declaration of nullity of marriage with the regional trial court
alleging that his marriage with respondent was null and void due
to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license.
Respondent filed an answer with motion to dismiss on the
ground of res judicata and forum shopping.
The trial court grated her petition.
Issue:
Is the action of the husband tenable?
Ruling:
No. Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
pertains as bar by prior judgment or estoppels by verdict,
which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of the
second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. In
Section 47(c) of the same rule, it pertains to res judicata in its
concept as conclusiveness of judgment or the rule of auter
action pendant which ordains that issues actually and directly
resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case
between the same parties involving a different cause of action.
Therefore, having expressly and impliedly concealed the validity
of their marriage celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have
waived any defects therein. The Court finds then that the present
action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack
of marriage license is barred. The petition is denied for lack of
merit.

EDUARDO M. COJUANCO, JR., complainant, v. ATTY. LEO

J. PALMA, respondent.
Adm. Case No. 2474. September 15, 2004.
Facts:
Complainant Eduardo Conjuanco, Jr. and Atty. Leo Palma,
respondent, met when the latter was assigned to handle the case of
the former. In other words, the respondent was hired by the
complainant has his personal counsel. Consequently, the
respondent got acquainted with the complainants family, most
especially with the latters daughter, Maria Luisa Cojuanco.
Later on, she, 22 years of age, and respondent got married
in Hong Kong without the formers family knowledge. It was only
after the marriage that respondent informed the complainant of the
said marriage and assured him that it is all legal. Complainant
knew that respondent is married to Elizabeth Hermosisima and
104

has two children; the former then sent his two sons to Hong Kong
to convince Luisa to go home to Manila. She was persuaded.
Thus, the complainant filed with the Court of First
Instance a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage
between the respondent and Luisa. The lower court declared the
same null and void ab initio.
Thereafter, complainant filed the instant complaint for
disbarment of the respondent.
It was found out that the first marriage with Elizabeth
Hermosisima was subsisting at the time the respondent contracted
second marriage.
Issue:
Is the second marriage null and void ab initio?
Ruling:
As to the validity of the second marriage, it has not yet
been determined by the Court with finality for the same poses a
prejudicial question to the present disbarment proceeding. If the
acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an
administrative case against him or if an affidavit of withdrawal of
a disbarment case does not affect its course, then the judgment of
annulment of respondents marriage does not also exonerate him
from a wrongdoing actually committed. Definitely, the second
marriage is null and void ab initio since respondent is married to
Elizabeth. First marriage is not yet annulled, thus second marriage
bigamous.

SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner, v. SUSAN YEE

CARIO, respondent.
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001.
Facts:
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario,
he contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with
petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario with whom he had two offsprings,
namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and the second was on
November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cario with
whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation
starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and
bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary
tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the
care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses.
Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits
and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various
government agencies.
105

On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the

instant case for collection of sum of money against petitioner
Susan Nicdao praying that petitioner be ordered to return to her at
least one-half of the money collectively denominated as death
benefits which she received.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the
deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without first
obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between
petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had
no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware
of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner
who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her
action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that
the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio
because the same was solemnized without the required marriage
license.
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of
respondent.
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
a.
Whether or not the marriage of the deceased and
petitioner is null and void ab initio because it was solemnized
without marriage license
b.
Whether or not the second marriage is valid
Ruling:
a.
Yes. Under the Civil Code, which was the law in
force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a
requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain
exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. There is no
question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not
fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A
marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of

their marriage. The marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao

and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary
marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from
the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
b.
No. The declaration in the instant case of nullity of
the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao
does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with
respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was
solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the
marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void.
Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is,
likewise, void ab initio. Hence, the petition is granted, and the
decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside.

ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS,

FELIX TRINIDAD (DECEASED) AND LOURDES
TRINIDAD, respondents.
G.R. No. 118904. April 20, 1998
Facts:
On August 10, 1978, petitioner Arturio Trinidad filed with
the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Kalibo, Aklan, an action for
partition of four parcels of land, described therein, claiming that
he was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of three children
of Patricio Trinidad, who was the original owner of the parcels of
land. Patricio Trinidad died in 1940, leaving the four parcels of
land to his three children, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix.
In 1970, petitoner demanded from the defendants to
partition the land into three equal shares and to give him the onethird individual share of his late father, but the defendants refused.
106

Defendants denied that plaintiff was the son of the late

Inocentes Trinidad. They contended that Inocentes was single
when he died in 1941, before plaintiffs birth.
Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the
legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Arturio got married
in 1966 to Candelaria Gaspar, at the age of twenty three.
The trial court rendered decision in favor of the petitioner
that he is entitled to inherit the property left by his deceased father
which is 1/3 of the 4 parcels of land subject matter of this case.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court on the
ground that petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove
that his parents were legally married to each other and that
acquisitive prescription against him had set in.

receiving from private respondents his share of the produce of the

land in dispute. Further, the titles of these pieces of land were still
in their fathers name. The petition is granted and the assailed
decision and resolution are reversed and set aside. The trial
courts decision dated July 4, 1989 is reinstated.

Issue:
Did petitioner present sufficient evidence of his parents
marriage and of his filiation?
Ruling:
Petitioners first burden is to prove that Inocentes and his
mother (Felicidad) were validly married, and that he was born
during the subsistence of their marriage. Petitioner secured a
certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan that
all records of births, deaths and marriages were lost, burned or
destroyed during the Japanese occupation of said municipality.
This fact, however, is not fatal to petitioners case. Although the
marriage contract is considered the primary evidence of the
marital union, petitioners failure to present it is not proof that no
marriage took place, as other forms of relevant evidence may take
its place. In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were
presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren, who testified that she was
present during the nuptial of Felicidad and Inocentes on May 5,
1942 in New Washington, Aklan; and Jovita Gerardo, who
testified that the couple deported themselves as husband and wife
after the marriage. It is undisputed then, that, prior to the action
for partition, petitioner, in the concept of a co-owner, was

LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant, v.

JUDGE FRANCISCO BRILLANTES, JR., respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706. March 29, 1995.
Facts:
Petitioner Lupo Atienza alleged that he was living Yolanda
De Castro and that they had two children.
In December 1991, he saw Judge Franciso Brillantes, Jr.,
the respondent, sleeping on his bed. He was informed by the
houseboy that he cohabited with De Castro. He did not bother on
what he saw; he simply left the house and told the houseboy to
take good care of his children.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him to visit his children.
The former likewise alienated the affection of his children for
him.
While cohabiting with De Castro, the respondent was
actually married to Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five
107

children. He alleged that while he and Ongkiko went through a

marriage ceremony before the mayor of a town in Nueva Ecija on
April 25, 1965, it was not valid for there was no marriage license.
Even when they had their second marriage ceremony, neither
party applied for marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned
respondent leaving their children to his care and custody.
Respondent then claimed that when he married De Castro
in civil rites in Los Angeles, California, he believed in all good
faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single
because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Judge Brillantes and
Zenaida Ongkiko is valid
Ruling:
No. However, there should be judicial declaration of the
nullity of the previous marriage before a party can enter into a
second marriage as provided in Article 40 of the Family Code.
The fact that he is already a lawyer, he then knew marriage license
is necessary or a formal requisite before one can get married. He
was given an opportunity to correct the flaw when he married
Ongkiko for the second time but he failed to secure motives and
bad faith.

HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, v.

JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001
Facts:
Complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano avers that she was
the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married
to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta
Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that
marriage. On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted
another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent
Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he
knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as
the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties
were "separated."
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his
Comment that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano
and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married.
What he knew was that the two had been living together as
husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of
marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. According to him,
had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have
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advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, Manzano could

be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to
harass him.
The Court Administrator recommended that respondent
Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent Judge alleges that he agreed to solemnize the
marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family
Code.
Issue:
Is the reason of the respondent Judge in solemnizing the
marriage valid?
Ruling:
No. In Article 34 of the Family Code provides No license
shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
without any legal impediment to marry each other. Respondent
Judge cannot take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano
and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as
husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and
voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years
does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital
cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals
who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground
for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a
justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent
marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.

ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of

the minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE
NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners, v. NORMA
BAYADOG, respondent.
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000
Facts:
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on
September 26, 1974. She was shot by Pepito resulting in her death
on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and
respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit
dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt
from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito
died in a car accident.
After their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging
that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The
case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity
of the second marriage would affect petitioners successional
rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the
persons who could file an action for annulment of marriage under
Article 47 of the Family Code.
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Issues:
(a)
Whether or not Pepito and Norma living together
as husband and wife for at least five years exempts them from
obtaining a marriage license under Article 34 of the Family Code
of the Philippines.
(b)
Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action
against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of
marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their
father Pepito G. Nial is already dead
Ruling:
(a)
On the assumption that Pepito and Norma have
lived together as husband and wife for five years without the
benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on
the basis of cohabitation as husband and wife where the only
missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the
union. In other words, the five-year common law cohabitation
period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. The five-year period should be the years
immediately before the day the marriage and it should be a period
of cohabitation characterized by exclusivitymeaning no third
party was involved at any time within the five years, and
continuitythat is, unbroken. Otherwise, if that five-year
cohabitation period is computed without any distinction as to
whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during
the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to have common law
relationships and placing them on the same footing with those
who lived faithfully with their spouse.
(b)
The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to
declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are
not identical. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned
even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be

assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death
of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left
as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.

FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT

OF APPEALS, respondent.
G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000.
Facts:
On November 15, 1973 Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy got
married at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.
After some time, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Two
children were born out of the marriage. Frederick, their son went
to his fathers residence. Filipina filed for legal separation.
The Trial Court dissolved their conjugal partnership of
gains and granted the custody of their children to her.
Later on, Filipina was punched at the different parts of her
body and was even choked by him when she started spanking their
son when the latter ignored her while she was talking to him.
The Trial Court convicted him for slight physical injuries
only. A new action for legal separation was granted by repeated
physical violence and sexual infidelity. Filipina then filed for the
declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage citing
psychological incapacity.
The Trial Court and Appellate Court denied her petition.
On her petition to this Court, she assailed for the first time that
there was no marriage license during their marriage.
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Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between the parties is void
from the beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the
ceremony?
Ruling:
Their marriage license was issued on September 17, 1974.
However, the celebration of their marriage was on Nov. 15, 1973.
It is obvious from the dates that the marriage was contracted by
the partners without a marriage license. They were not among the
exceptions that could avail of a valid marriage without marriage
license, thus, their marriage is void from the beginning for an
absence of a formal requisite of a marriage. Thus, the marriage
celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Yap
and private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab
initio for lack of marriage license at the time of celebration.

JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C.

SAMBO, and APOLLO A. VILLAMORA, complainants, v.
HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and
NELIA B. ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of Court II,
respondents.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721. September 30, 1994.
Facts:
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized
marriages even without the requisite marriage license. Thus, the
following couples were able to get married by the simple
expedient of paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy,
despite the absence of a marriage license. In addition, respondent
judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the
date of solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to
wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which
was usually several days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the
marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar.
Complainant Ramon Sambo, who prepares the marriage contracts,
called the attention of respondents to the lack of marriage licenses
and its effect on the marriages involved, but the latter opted to
proceed with the celebration of said marriages.
It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he
solemnized seven marriages in the month of July, 1992, when in
truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null and
void.
In view of the findings that the evidence presented by the
complainants sufficiently show that respondent Judge Lucio P.
Palaypayon, Jr. had solemnized marriages, particularly that of
Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte, without a marriage license.
Issue:
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Whether or not the marriages the respondent Judge

solemnized were valid
Ruling:
It declares that the absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio
and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not
affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible
for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively
liable. The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and
those affected by the illegal marriages, and what we are providing
for herein pertains to the administrative liability of respondents,
all without prejudice to their criminal responsibility.

FLORENCE TEVES MACARRUBO, the Minors JURIS

ALEXIS T. MACARRUBO and GABRIEL ENRICO T.
MACARRUBO as represented by their Mother/Guardian,
FLORENCE TEVES MACARRUBO, complainant, v. ATTY.
EDMUNDO L. MACARRUBO, respondent.
A.C. No. 6148. February 27, 2004.
Facts:
Florence Teves Macarrubo, complainant, filed on June 6,
2000 a verified complaint for disbarment against Atty. Edmundo
L. Macarubbo,respondent, with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines alleging that respondent deceived her into marrying
him despite his prior subsisting marriage with a certain Helen
Esparza. The complainant averred that he started courting her in
April 1991, he representing himself as a bachelor; that they
eventually contracted marriage which was celebrated on two
occasions administered by Rev. Rogelio J. Bolivar, the first on
December 18, 1991 in the latters Manila office, and the second
on December 28, 1991 at the Asian Institute of Tourism Hotel in
Quezon City; and that although respondent admitted that he was
married to Helen Esparza on June 16, 1982, he succeeded in
convincing complainant, her family and friends that his previous
marriage was void.
Complainant further averred that respondent entered into a
third marriage with one Josephine T. Constantino; and that he
abandoned complainant and their children without providing them
any regular support up to the present time, leaving them in
precarious living conditions.
Respondent denied employing deception in his marriage to
complainant, insisting instead that complainant was fully aware of
his prior subsisting marriage to Helen Esparza, but that she
dragged him against his will to a sham wedding to protect her
and her familys reputation since she was then three-months
pregnant. He submitted in evidence that in the civil case
Edmundo L. Macarubbo v. Florence J. Teves, it declared his
marriage to complainant void ab initio. He drew attention to the
112

trial courts findings on the basis of his evidence which was not
controverted, that the marriage was indeed a sham and make
believe one, vitiated by fraud, deceit, force and intimidation,
and further exacerbated by the existence of a legal impediment
and want of a valid marriage license. Respondent raised the
additional defenses that the judicial decree of annulment of his
marriage to complainant is res judicata upon the present
administrative case; that complainant is in estoppel for admitting
her status as mere live-in partner to respondent in her letter to
Josephine T. Constantino. Stressing that he had always been the
victim in his marital relations, respondent invoked the final and
executory August 21, 1998 in the case Edmundo L. Macarubbo v.
Helen C. Esparza, declaring his first marriage void on the ground
of his wifes psychological incapacity.
It is recommended that respondent Atty. Edmundo L.
Macarrubo be suspended for three months for gross misconduct
reflecting unfavorably on the moral norms of the profession. The
IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent should be suspended for
gross misconduct
Ruling:
While the marriage between complainant and respondent
has been annulled by final judgment, this does not cleanse his
conduct of every tinge of impropriety. He and complainant started
living as husband and wife in December 1991 when his first
marriage was still subsisting, as it was only on August 21, 1998
that such first marriage was annulled, rendering him liable for
concubinage. Such conduct is inconsistent with the good moral
character that is required for the continued right to practice law as
a member of the Philippine bar. Even assuming that respondent
was coerced by complainant to marry her, the duress, by his own
admission as the following transcript of his testimony reflects,

ceased after their wedding day, respondent having freely

cohabited with her and even begot a second child by her. Thus,
respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is found guilty of gross
immorality and is hereby disbarred from the practice of law.
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner, v.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
G.R. No. 150758. February 18, 2004.
Facts:
Petitioner Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with
private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two
were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of
Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously
and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when
Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to
a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed
Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and
Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter
left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating
that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another
marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge
German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch
15. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from
Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a
handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico
Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against
petitioner.
The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court.
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Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused
for the crime of bigamy despite clear proof that the marriage
between the accused and private complainant had been declared
null and void ab initio and without legal force and effect
Ruling:
As such, an individual who contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent
declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the
subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes,
petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio
completely regardless of petitioners psychological capacity or
incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a
valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
liability for bigamy.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was
celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid
first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been
consummated. Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not
an indicator that petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the
essential requisites for validity. In this case, all the essential and
formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by
petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and
they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required
license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court
of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses. The
decision of the Court of Appeals convicting petitioner Veronico
Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy is AFFIRMED.

FE D. QUITA, petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and

BLANDINA DANDAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 124862. December 22, 1998.
Facts:
Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were
married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. Somewhere along the
way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for
divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the
divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950
evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and
a settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she
obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three weeks thereafter she
married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their
relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she
married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31
August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of
administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the
Philippine Trust Company.
Respondent Blandina Dandan,
claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, opposed the
petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo
Cabasal, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion
of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by
Higino Castillon.
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The trial court disregarded the divorce between petitioner

and Arturo. Consequently, it expressed the view that their
marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, it declared null and
void the decision and order of the trial court.

Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of

Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto
Padlan, is likewise affirmed. The Court however emphasizes that
the reception of evidence by the trial court should be limited to the
hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo
Padlan.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Arturo and Fe still subsists
Ruling:
The Court noted that Arturo was a Filipino and as such
remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce they
obtained. However, petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at
the time of her divorce from Arturo. Significantly, the decree of
divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same year.
Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to
erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their
divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the
trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in
ordering the case returned to the trial court for further
proceedings. The Court emphasizes however that the question to
be determined by the trial court should be limited only to the right
of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse.
Private respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved by the
trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while
the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby
resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the
beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently,
she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this
status presupposes a legitimate relationship. The decision of
respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case to
the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and
void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T.
Padlan as intestate heirs is affirmed. The order of the appellate
court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half of the
net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro,

PRISCILLA CASTILLO VDA. DE MIJARES, complainant, v.

JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ (RETIRED), respondent.
Adm. Case No. 4431. June 19, 1997.
Facts:
Complainant Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. De Mijares is
the presiding judge in Pasay City while respondent Onofre A.
Villaluz, a retired Justice of the Court of Appeals, is a consult at
the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission.
Judge Mijares is actually widowed by the death of her first
husband, Primitivo Mijares. She obtained a decree declaring her
husband presumptively dead, after an absence of 16 years. Thus,
she got married to respondent in a civil wedding on January 7,
1994 before Judge Myrna Lim Verano.
They (complainant and respondent) knew each other when
the latter, who was at that time the Presiding Judge of the
Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig, was trying a murder case
involving the death of the son of Mijares.
During their marriage, complainant judge discovered that
respondent was having an illicit affair with another woman.
Respondent denied such rather he uttered harsh words to the
complainant judge. As a result, they lived separately and did not
115

get in touch with one another and the respondent did not bother to
apologize for what happened.
Through Judge Ramon Makasiar, complainant knew that
respondent married Lydia Geraldez. Complainant then filed a
complaint against respondent for disbarment for the latter
immorally and bigamously entered into a second marriage while
having a subsisting marriage and distorted the truth by stating his
civil status as single.
In his defense, he contended that his marriage to the
complainant judge was a sham marriage; that he voluntarily
signed the marriage contract to help her in the administrative case
for immorality filed against her by her legal researcher. Likewise,
he maintained that when he contracted his marriage with
complainant, he had a subsisting marriage with his first wife
because the decision declaring the annulment of such marriage
had not yet become final and executory or published.
Judge Purisima the found respondent guilty of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct and later on affirmed by the Court.

Onofre Villaluz is found guilty of immoral conduct in violation of

the Code of Professional Responsibility; he is hereby suspended
from practice of law for two years with the specific warning.

LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE

ALICIA V. SEMPIO- DIY AND KARL HEINZ WIEGEL,
respondents.
No. L-53703. August 19, 1986.
Facts:

Issue:
a. Whether or not marriage of complainant and
respondent valid
b. Whether or not the marriage of complainant and
respondent was a sham marriage
Ruling:
a.
Yes. It was a valid marriage. All the essential and
formal requisites of a valid marriage under Articles 2 and 3 of the
Family Code were satisfied and complied. Given the circumstance
that he was facing criminal case for bigamy and assuming for the
sake of argument that the judgment in civil case declaring the
annulment of marriage between respondent and the first wife had
not attained complete finality, the marriage between complainant
and respondent is not void but only voidable.
b.
As to the issue that it was a sham marriage is too
incredible to deserve serious consideration. Thus, former Justice

Karl Heinz Wiegel asked for the declaration of nullity of

his marriage, celebrated on July 1978 at the Holy Catholic
Apostolic Christian Church in Makati, with Lilia Oliva Wiegel on
the ground that she had a previous existing marriage to Eduardo
Maxion solemnized on June 25, 1972, at Our Lady of Lourdes
Church in Quezon City.
Lilia admitted she had prior subsisting marriage but it was
null and void that she and Eduardo have been allegedly forced to
enter said marital union and that he, at the time of the marriage in
1972, was already married to someone else.
The trial court ruled against Lilia because the existence of
force exerted in both parties of the first marriage had already been
agreed upon
Issue:
Was said prior marriage void or merely voidable?
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Ruling:
The prior marriage was voidable. A marriage vitiated by
force on both parties is not void but merely voidable and therefore
valid until annulled. Since there is no annulment yet, it is clear
that when she married respondent, she was validly married to her
first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is void.

LEONCIA BALOGBOG AND GAUDIOSO BALOGBOG,

petitioners, v.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 83598. March 7, 1997
Facts:
Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the
children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal who died
intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an older
brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935, predeceasing their parents.
In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and Generoso
Balogbog brought an action for partition and accounting against
petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of
Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such, they were entitled to
the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents.
Petitioners denied knowing private respondents. They
alleged that their brother Gavino died single and without issue in
their parents residence at Tag-amakan, Asturias, Cebu. In the
beginning they claimed that the properties of the estate had been
sold to them by their mother when she was still alive, but they
later withdrew this allegation.
Witnesses then testified that they attended the wedding of
Gavino and Catalina sometime in 1929, in which Rev. Father
Emiliano Jomao-as officiated in the Catholic Church of Asturias,
Cebu and and Egmidio Manuel, then a municipal councilor, acted
as one of the witnesses.
Catalina Ubas testified concerning her marriage to Gavino.
She testified that after the wedding, she was handed a receipt,
presumably the marriage certificate, by Fr. Jomao-as, but it was
burned during the war. She said that she and Gavino lived
together in Obogon and begot three children, namely, Ramonito,
Petronilo, and Generoso. Petronilo died after an illness at the age
of six. She stated that after the death of Gavino, she lived in
117

common law relation with a man for a year and then they
separated.
On the other hand, as defendant below, petitioner Leoncia
Balogbog testified that Gavino died single at the family residence
in Asturias. She denied that her brother had any legitimate
children and stated that she did not know private respondents
before this case was filed.
The Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered
judgment for private respondents ordering petitioners to partition
the estate and deliver to private respondents one-third of the estate
of Basilio and Genoveva.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that
private respondents failed to overcome the legal presumption that
a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are
in fact married, that a child is presumed to be legitimate, and that
things happen according to the ordinary course of nature and the
ordinary habits of life.
Issue:
Was the decision of the Court of Appeals tenable?
Ruling:
Yes. The Court finds no reversible error committed by the
Court of Appeals. Since this case was brought in the lower court
in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in
accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the
provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they related to
vested rights, and the rules on evidence. Under the Rules of Court,
the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting
themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This
presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary.
Neither is there merit in the argument that the existence of the
marriage cannot be presumed because there was no evidence
showing in particular that Gavino and Catalina, in the presence of
two witnesses, declared that they were taking each other as
husband and wife. An exchange of vows can be presumed to have

been made from the testimonies of the witnesses who state that a
wedding took place, since the very purpose for having a wedding
is to exchange vows of marital commitment. It would indeed be
unusual to have a wedding without an exchange of vows and quite
unnatural for people not to notice its absence. Wherefore, the
decision appealed from is affirmed.

ESTRELLITA J. TAMANO, petitioner, v. HON. RODOLFO A.

ORTIZ, respondent.
G.R. No. 126603. June 29, 1998.
Facts:
On May 31, 1958, Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano
married Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano, respondent, in civil rites.
Their marriage supposedly remained valid and subsisting until his
death on May 18, 1994. Prior to the death, he married petitioner
Estrelita Tamano on June 2, 1993 in civil rites in Malabang, Lanao
del Sur.
Upon knowing of such second marriage, Zorayda filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage of his husband
and Estrellita on the ground that it was bigamous. The entries in
the marriage contract of the second marriage were false and
fraudulent for Mamintal and Estrellita misrepresented themselves
as divorced and single, respectively.
Zorayda alleged that she and her husband never divorced
and that Estrellita was still married to Romeo Llave because the
decision on the annulment of their marriage never became final
and executor for the noncompliance with publication requirement.
Estrellita then filed a motion to dismiss for she alleged that
only a party to the marriage could file an action for annulment of
marriage against the other spouse. She even contented that since
Mamintal and Zorayda were Muslims and married in Muslim
rites, the jurisdiction to hear and try the case was vested in the
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sharia courts pursuant to Article 155 of the Code of mUslim

Personal Laws
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss. This is
because Mamintal and Estrellita were married in accordance with
the Civil Code and not exclusively in accordance with P.D. No.
1083 or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws.
The Court of Appeals ruled that it would fall under the
exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts.
Issue:
Whether or not the sharia court has jurisdiction over the
subject and nature of the action
Ruling:
No. Article 13 of P.D. 1083 does not provide for a situation
where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites. The
sharia courts are not vested with original and exclusive
jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated under both
civil and Muslim laws.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 159614. December 9, 2005.
Facts:
On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the
Regional Trial Courtbfor the declaration of presumptive death of
his wife, Rosalia Lea A. Julaton.
At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea
were married on January 20, 1995 in Catbalogan, Samar. He
testified that, on February 6, 1995, Lea arrived home late in the
evening and he berated her for being always out of their house.
He told her that if she enjoyed the life of a single person, it would
be better for her to go back to her parents. Lea did not reply. Alan
narrated that, when he reported for work the following day, Lea
was still in the house, but when he arrived home later in the day,
Lea was nowhere to be found. Alan thought that Lea merely went
to her parents house in Bliss, Sto. Nio, Catbalogan, Samar.
However, Lea did not return to their house anymore.
Alan further testified that, he inquired Leas whereabouts
but to no avail.
Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to look
for Lea, but his mother asked him to leave after the town fiesta of
Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home for the fiesta. Alan
agreed. However, Lea did not show up. Alan then left for Manila
on August 27, 1995. He went to a house in Navotas where Janeth,
Leas friend, was staying. When asked where Lea was, Janeth told
him that she had not seen her. He failed to find out Leas
whereabouts despite his repeated talks with Janeth. Alan decided
119

to work as a part-time taxi driver. On his free time, he would look

for Lea in the malls but still to no avail.
He returned to
Catbalogan in 1997 and again looked for his wife but failed.
On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Leas disappearance to
the local police station. The police authorities issued an Alarm
Notice on July 4, 2001. Alan also reported Leas disappearance to
the National Bureau of Investigation on July 9, 2001.
On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting
the petition.
The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals
which rendered judgment on August 4, 2003, affirming the
decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the declaration of presumptive death of the
wife is valid
Ruling:
No. In view of the summary nature of proceedings under
Article 41 of the Family Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of ones spouse, the degree of due diligence set by the Court
in locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly
complied with. It is the policy of the State to protect and
strengthen the family as a basic social institution. Marriage is the
foundation of the family. Since marriage is an inviolable social
institution that the 1987 Constitution seeks to protect from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. For respondents failure to
prove that he had a well-founded belief that his wife is already
dead and that he exerted the required amount of diligence in
searching for his missing wife, the petition for declaration of
presumptive death should have been denied by the trial court and
the Honorable Court of Appeals. For the purpose of contracting
the subsequent marriage, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. The spouse present is,

thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that
he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead
before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage.
The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief.
Cuello Callon writes that es menester que su creencia sea firme
se funde en motivos racionales. The Court finds and so holds that
the respondent failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief,
before he filed his petition in the trial court, that his spouse
Rosalia Lea Julaton was already dead. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v.

GLORIA BERMUDEZ-LORINO, respondent.
G.R. No. 160258. January 19, 2005
Facts:
Respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino, and her husband
were married on June 12, 1987. Out of this marriage, she begot
three children, namely: Francis Jeno, Fria Lou and Fatima. Before
they got married in 1987, Gloria was unaware that her husband
was a habitual drinker, possessed with violent character/attitude,
and had the propensity to go out with friends to the extent of being
unable to engage in any gainful work.
Because of her husbands violent character, Gloria found it
safer to leave him behind and decided to go back to her parents
together with her three children. In order to support the children,
Gloria was compelled to work abroad. From the time of her
physical separation from her husband in 1991, Gloria has not
heard of him at all. She had absolutely no communications with
him, or with any of his relatives.
On August 14, 2000, nine years after she left her husband,
Gloria filed a verified petition with the Regional Trial Court. The
same issued an order directing, the publication of the petition in a
newspaper of general circulation, on August 28, 2000; that after
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nine years, there was absolutely no news about him and she
believes that he is already dead and is now seeking through this
petition for a Court declaration that her husband is judicially
presumed dead for the purpose of remarriage.
Issue:
Whether or not the factual and legal bases for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code were duly established in this case
Ruling:
The Court rules against petitioner Republic. The Court,
therefore, finds in this case grave error on the part of both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals. To stress, the Court of Appeals
should have dismissed the appeal on ground of lack of
jurisdiction, and reiterated the fact that the trial court decision was
immediately final and executory. As it were, the Court of Appeals
committed grave reversible error when it failed to dismiss the
erroneous appeal of the Republic on ground of lack of jurisdiction
because, by express provision of law, the judgment was not
appealable. Thus, the instant petition is hereby denied for lack of
merit.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v.

GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.
G.R. No. 94053. March 17, 1993.
Facts:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed
before the Regional Trial Court a petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, involving
Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that
respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the
alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void.
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition
through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique who had been
deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The
Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did not possess a wellfounded belief that the absent spouse was already dead; and
second, Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage annulled in the
same proceeding was a cunning attempt to circumvent the law on
marriage.
Respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and
that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a
bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that
chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with
respondent Nolasco on his ship for six months until they returned
to respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November
1980 after his seaman's contract expired. On 15 January 1982,
respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in
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Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral

of San Jose.
He obtained another employment contract as a seaman and
left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in
January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a
letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had given
birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica
had left Antique.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her
himself whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless. He
also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at
No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of
the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to
him. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but
they too had no news of Janet Monica.
The trial court granted Nolasco's petition hereby declaring
the presumptively death of Janet Monica Parker Nolasco, without
prejudice to her reappearance.
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending
that the trial court erred in declaring Janet Monica Parker
presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to
show that there existed a well founded belief for such declaration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding
that respondent had sufficiently established a basis to form a belief
that his absent spouse had already died.
Issue:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his
wife is already dead.
Ruling:
No. The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct
a search for his missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to
a "well-founded belief" that she is dead. Pursuant to Article 41 of
the Family Code, a marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless

before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse

had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present
had a well founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded
belief required by law that his absent wife was already dead that
would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica
Parker presumptively dead. Thus, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the trial court's decision declaring Janet Monica
Parker presumptively dead is hereby reversed and both Decisions
are hereby nullified and set aside.

NENITA BIENVENIDO, petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF

APPEALS, respondent.
G.R. No. 111717. October 24, 1994.
Facts:
Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on
October 3, 1942. On February 6, 1962, without his marriage to
Consejo Velasco being dissolved, Aurelio P. Camacho contracted
another marriage with respondent Luisita C. Camacho with whom
he had been living since 1953 and by whom he begot a child,
respondent Aurelio Luis Chito Faustino C. Camacho, born on
May 22, 1961. The marriage was solemnized in Tokyo, Japan
where Aurelio and Luisita had been living since 1958.
Because of their quarrels, one or the other left the dwelling
place for long periods of time. In her case Luisita stayed on those
occasions at various times in Davao City, Hongkong or Japan.
In 1967 Aurelio met petitioner Nenita T. Bienvenido, who
had been estranged from her husband, Luis Rivera. Aurelio
courted her and apparently won her heart because from June 1968
until Aurelio's death on May 28, 1988, he lived with her, the last
time in a duplex apartment in Quezon City. Petitioner's daughter,
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Nanette, stayed with them as did Aurelio's son, Chito, who lived
with them for about a year in 1976.
On May 28, 1988, Aurelio died. Petitioner, using her
Loyola Life Plan and Aurelio's account in the PCI Bank, took care
of the funeral arrangements. Respondent Luisita was then in the
United States with respondent Chito, having gone there, according
to her, at the instance of Aurelio in order to look for a house in
San Francisco so that Aurelio could follow and rejoin them. Upon
learning of the death of Aurelio she and her son Chito came home
on May 31, 1988.
Respondent Luisita was granted death benefits by the
Armed Forces of the Philippines as the surviving spouse of
Aurelio. Soon she also claimed ownership of the house and lot on
Scout Delgado Street in which Nenita had been living.
On September 7, 1988, Luisita and her son Chito brought
this case in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, seeking the
annulment of the sale of the property to petitioner and the
payment to them of damages. Luisita alleged that the deed of sale
was a forgery and that in any event it was executed in fraud of her
as the legitimate wife of Aurelio.
On August 29,1989, the trial court rendered a decision
upholding the sale of the property to petitioner and dismissing the
complaint of Luisita. It found the deed of sale in favor of
petitioner to be genuine and respondents Luisita and Chito to be in
estoppel in not claiming the property until 1988 despite
knowledge of the sale by the late Aurelio who had represented
himself to be single.
On appeal the respondents prevailed. On June 4, 1993, the
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and
declared respondents to be the owners of the house and lot in
dispute.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in presuming the validity of
the marriage between Aurelio and Luisita

Ruling:
On the question of validity of Luisita's marriage to
Aurelio, there is no dispute on the fact of appellant Luisita's
marriage in 1962 to Aurelio. The Court finds that the presumption
of the validity of the marriage Aurelio and Luisita has not been
successfully assailed by appellee. The Court of Appeals thus
presumed the validity of Aurelio's second marriage from the
failure of petitioner to prove that at the time of such marriage
Aurelio's first wife, Consejo, had not been absent for at least seven
years and that Aurelio did not have news that his first wife we still
alive.
It was the burden of herein respondents to prove that, at the time
of his second marriage to respondent Luisita, Aurelio's first wife,
Consejo Velasco, had been absent for at least seven years and that
Aurelio had no news that she was alive. To assume these facts
because petitioner has not disproved them would be to stand the
principle on its head. Since Aurelio had a valid, subsisting
marriage to Consejo Velasco, his subsequent marriage to
respondent Luisita was void for being bigamous.
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, plaintiff vs COURT OF APPEALS,
defendant
GR No. 127358. March 31, 2005
Facts:
On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court, declared the
marriage between Noel A. Buenaventura and defendant Isabel
Lucia Singh Buenaventura (on July 4, 1979) null and void ab
initio. Noel was revealed to have been psychologically
incapacitated; that he had married out of parental pressure and not
out of love; that he had abandoned his family; that this caused
defendant to suffer moral damanges. The Regional Trial Court
awarded the defendant with damages based on Art. 2217 and Art.
21 of the New Civil Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
ruling. The plaintiff-appelle therefore filed for a petition of
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certiorari alleging that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding

damages.
Issue:
Can award for damages be provided when the alleged
offender is psychologically incapacitated?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court deleted the award for moral and
exemplary damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a
product of psychological incapacity and hence beyond the control
of the party because of an innate inability while at the same time
considering the same set of acts as willful. Psychological
incapacity therefore removes the basis for the contention that the
petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. Therefore,
the award of moral damages damages was without basis in law
and in fact. Since the award of moral and exemplary damages was
no longer justified, the award of attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation is left without basis.

EDUARDO MANUEL, plaintiff vs PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, defendants
G.R. No. 165842. November 29, 2005
Facts:
Petitioner Eduardo Manuel was married to Rubylus Gaa
on July 28, 1975. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and
thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three months
and never saw her again. On or about the 22nd day of April, 1996,
Eduardo contracted a second marriage with Tina GandaleraManuel. He assured her that he was single and was able to marry.
THey had lived together fruitfully for three years until Eduardo
became distant and came home only twice a year. One day he
packed up his things and left her. Aggrieved and curious, Tina
learned from the NSO that Eduardo was previously married, she
then filed a bigamy case against Eduardo. The Regional Trial
Court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
bigamy. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Eduardo then
filed a motion to the Supreme Court claiming that he had
contracted the second marriage in good faith since he had not been
able to see his first wife for over twenty years. He alleged that
under the Civil Code, no judicial decree of presumptive death is
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necesssary for remarriage.

Issue:
What constitutes a valid bigamous marriage?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals. Under the 1988 Family
Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may
exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must
concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must
have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where
there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article
391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse
present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already
dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse
present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that
declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance
with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent
marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of
the Family Code.
It should be noted that petitioner got married on 1996, way
past the time when the Family Code came into effect. The second
marriage is therefore governed by the provisions of the family
code.

SANTIAGO CARINO, petitioner vs. SUSAN CARINO,

defendant
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
Facts:
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario,
he contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with
petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan
Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and
Sandee Cario; and the second was on November 10, 1992, with
respondent Susan Yee Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee),
with whom he had no children in their almost ten year
cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
Upon his death, Susan Nicdao inherited petitioner Susan
Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from MBAI,
PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig, while
respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from GSIS
Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS). On December 14, 1993,
respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum
of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that
petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one
hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively
denominated as death benefits which she (petitioner) received
from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag125

ibig. Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file her

answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
Susan Nicdao's marriage was celebrated without the
requisite marriage license while the marriage of Susan Carino was
celebrated without having obtained the necessary judicial
declaration of nullity of the first void marriage. Both the Regional
Trial Court and the Court of Appeals favored granting the peitition
thus leaving Susan Nicdao to file a motion to the Supreme Court.

absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier

final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
The Court of Appeals relied on the decision of Vda. de
Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, which is
unfortunately premised on the requisite of having a judicial decree
of nullity of marriage and is therefore inapplicable to the case at
hand.

Issue:
a. How essential is the judicial decree of nullity of a void
marriage?
b. How must presumptive legitimes be delivered in this
instance?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and the initial
decision of the Regional Trial Court was dismissed. Under Article
40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning,
where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole
basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from
legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial
action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For
other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter,
the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the
death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. In such instances,
evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove
the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an

VINCENT MERCADO, petitioner vs. MA.CONSUELO TAN,

defendant
G.R. No. 137110. August 1, 2000
Facts:
The accused, Vincent Mercado was in lawful wedlock with
Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony solemnized on April
10, 1976. Despite the prior marriage he got married to
complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991. On October 5,
1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant
through counsel with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which
eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present case before
this Court against said accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on
March 1, 1993 in an Information dated January 22, 1993. On
November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case
was lodged in the Prosecutors Office, accused filed an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in
RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the
marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva
was declared null and void. Despite this, the Trial Court charged
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Vincent with bigamy since his prior marriage was still subsisting
at the time he had contracted his second marriage. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The petitioner then
filed a case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Is the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior marriage
necessary for remarriage?
RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the
assailed decision. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. But here, the final
judgment declaring null and void accuseds previous marriage
came not before the celebration of the second marriage, but after,
when the case for bigamy against accused was already tried in
court. And what constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act of any
person who shall contract a second subsequent marriage before
the former marriage has been legally dissolved.
It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void
from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. As with a
voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a marriage before contracting the second marriage.

LUPO ATIENZA, plaintiff vs HON. FRANCISCO

BRILLANTES, defendant
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995
Facts:
Respondent Judge Francisco Brillantes was married to one
Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children on April 25,
1965. The marriage was contracted without a marriage license. He
remarried Ongkiko again without the requisite marriage license on
June 5, 1965. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17 years ago,
leaving their children to his care and custody as a single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in
Los Angeles, California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all
good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single
because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.
The petitioner on the other hand alleges that he has two
children with Yolanda De Castro. In December 1991, upon
opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on
his (complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the
houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting with De Castro.
Complainant did not bother to wake up respondent and instead left
the house after giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of
his children. Lupo A. Atienza then filed a complaint for Gross
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Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge

Francisco Brillantes.
Issue:
Is the second marriage valid when celebrated without the
judicial decree of nullity of the prior marriage?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the respondent from
government service. Under the Family Code, there must be a
judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a
party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said
Code provides: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the
Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first
marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code
of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991
and governed by the Family Code.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after
the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of
the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the
Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it
does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly
true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has
not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of
Article 40 to his case.

ROBERT DOMINGO, petitioner vs COURT OF APPEALS,

defendant
GR No. 104818. September 17, 1993
Facts:
The petitioner Roberto Domingo married Emerlinda Paz
on April 25, 1969. Roberto had remarried again with the
respondent Delia Soledad on November 29, 1976. She worked
primarily in Saudi Arabia and filed for a case of bigamy against
Roberto. Her husband had been solely dependent on her earnings
and had been cohabiting with another woman. She filed a petition
for declaration of nullity and separation of property. Delia
appointed her brother Moises as her attorney-in-fact and for
assigned him to take care of the properties managed by Roberto.
Roberto filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the petition
stated no cause of action. The marriage being void ab initio, the
petition for the declaration of its nullity is therefore superfluous
and unneccessary. Roberto also claimed that private respondent
had no property in his possession. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the Trial Court to deny the motion.
Issues:
When does a void marriage require a judicial declaration
of nullity?
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Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the
ruling of the lower courts. A marriage though void still needs a
judicial declaration of such fact under the Family Code even for
purposes other than remarriage. The necessity of final judgment
however applies when the purpose of nullity is for remarriage.
The declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a
judgment for the liquidation of property/custody, and support of
children, etc. There is no need of filing a separate civil action for
such purpose. It should also be noted that the husband admitted to
possessing his properties based on the respondent wife's earnings.

MEYNARDO BELTRAN, petitioner vs PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix
were married on June 16, 1973. On February 7, 1997, after
twenty-four years of marriage and four children, petitioner filed a
petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. In her Answer to
the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it
was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a
certain woman named Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently
filed a criminal complaint for concubinage against petitioner and
his paramour before the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati who,
in a Resolution dated September 16, 1997, found probable cause
and ordered the filing of an Information against them. On March
20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant
for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the
Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner
argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity
of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination
of the criminal case. The Trial dismissed his petition. Undaunted,
the petitioner filed a motion to the higher courts.
Issue:
a. Is there a prejudicial question involved in the case
above?
b. Can a party judge for himself the nullity of his own
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marriage?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of
merit. In the case at bar it must be held that parties to the marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to judgment of the competent courts and
only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held
as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and
purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes
the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court
therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for
nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a
criminal case for concubinage.

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner vs COURT OF APPEALS,

defendant
GR No. 119190. January 16, 1997
Facts:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, Gina and Chi Ming Tsoi were
married as evidence by their marriage contract. From May 22,
1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no
sexual contact between them. Gina made attempts for sexual
activity to no avails. Medical examinations showed that both Gina
and Chi Ming Tsoi were capaple of sexual conduct. Gina was still
a virgin at the time of the medical examination. Gina filed a
motion for declaration of nullity and the Trial Court declared their
marriage as void. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision. Petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi subsequently filed a motion to
the Supreme Court citing that it was she and not he that had the
problem regarding sexual intimacy.
Issue:
a. What is psychological incapacity?
b. Can non-desire of sexual consumation be an indicator of
psychological incapacity?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court found the petition to be bereft of
merit. Since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed
by either party, the question of who refuses to have sex with the
other becomes immaterial. If a spouse, although physically
capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic
130

marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity

than to stubborn refusal. Aligned with this is the essential marital
obligation, "the procreate children based on the universal principle
that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the
basic end of marriage." Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation
will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage.
After ten months of marriage, the reluctance to perform
the sexual act was indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a
serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological
incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the
contemplation of the Family Code.

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner vs COURT OF APPEALS,

defendant
GR No. 112019. January 4, 1995
Facts:
Leouel and Julia exchanged vows on September 20, 1986.
A year after the marriage, the couple when quarreling over a
number of things including the interference of Julia's parents into
their marital affairs. On May 18, 1998, Julia finally left for the
United States. Leouel was then unable to communicate with her
for a period of five years and she had then virtually abandoned
their family. Leouel filed a case for nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
Issue:
What is psychological incapacity?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition. Psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed
by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support. The psychological condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated and must be incurable. Mere
abandonment cannot therefore qualify as psychological incapacity
on the part of Julia.

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After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity

and irresponsibility as a husband and a father. He depended on his
parents for aid and assistance, was never honest with her, was
habitually quarrelsome. He abandoned his family in the course of
their marriage. Roridel filed a case in the courts and Reynaldo's
claims were that she was inefficient in the discharge of her marital
duties. The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage as void ab
initio. The decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.
The Office of the Solicitor General challenged the decision, citing
that opposing personalities as was evinced is not equivalent to
psychological incapacity. The ground "is not simply the neglect by
the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but
a defect in their psychological nature."
Issue:
How must psychological incapacity be interpreted?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed and
set aside the rulings of the lower courts. What was shown was
more of a difficulty rather than psychological incapacity. Mere
showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities
in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. There had been no
showing of the gravity of the problem, neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability.
The Supreme Court also laid down the Molina guidelines
for future reference in interpreting psychological incapacity:

REPUBLIC, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant

GR No. 108763. February 13, 1997

"(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage

belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. x x x

Facts:
Roridel and Reynaldo were married on APril 14, 1985.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
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medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)

sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994),
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption
of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her
own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
"mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less in will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues
a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095."

133

married on June 4, 1970. The union did not produce any child. In
1972, private respondent left for the United States to work as a
nurse. She intermittently returned to the Philippines but also went
back to the United States. This contrinued until 1989, when she
was already a US citizen. Petitioner filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage alleging psychological
incapacity of private respondent, citing the grounds of
abandonment and non-desire to have children. Respondent
rejected the claim citing her experiences showing affection for
children and pointing out husband's infidelity as a source of her
abandonment. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition
owing to the fact that nothing in the evidence of plaintiff shows
that the defendant suffered from any psychological incapacity or
that she failed to comply with her essential marital obligations.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the Trial
Court and added that the petitioner failed to present any medical
expert to prove prsychological incapacity. Petitioner filed a
motion to the Supreme Court questioning the validity of that
requiment among other things.
Issues:
a. How must psychological incapacity be alleged?
b. Is the presence of a medical expert necessary to prove
incapacity?

BERNARDINO ZAMORA, petitioner vs COURT OF

APPEALS, defendant
GR No. 141917. February 7, 2007
Facts:
Bernardino S. Zamora and Norma Mercado Zamora were

Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition. Examination of
the person by a physician in order for the former to be declared
psychologically incapacitated is not considered a requirement in
Republic vs CA, 268 SCRA 198 [1997]. In Marcos vs Marcos, it
was held that if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity then medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. In
the case, there is proof as to the existence of psychological
incapacity nor was there proof that it had existed at the inception
of the marriage.
134

Appeals affirmed the decision and cited that the evidence on

record did not convincingly establish that respondent was
suffering from psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were
incurable and already presen t at the inception of the marriage. Dr
Dayan's testimony of the respondent's mixed-personality was
unsufficiently arrived at. It was alleged that he had Schizoid
characteristics in his persona. The testimony however failed to
establish how this was arrived at or that there was a natal or
supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral element in
respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from
accepting and complying with the essential marital obligations.
The petitioner then filed a motion to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Can epilepsy constitute psychological incapacity?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition with finality. The
Supreme Court found respondent's alleged mixed personality
disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they
quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the
sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his
preference to spend more time with his band mates than his
family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological
condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Article 36 of the Family Code
should not be confused with Divorce or with Legal Separation.
MA. ARMIDA-FERRARIS, petitioner vs BRIX FERRARIS,
defendant
G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006
Facts:
The Regiona Trial Court denied the petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage between petitioner Ma. Armida-Ferraris
with Brix Ferraris. It found that his "violence" during episodes of
epilepsy did not constitute psychological incapacity. The Court of
135

that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around

her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other
events or things. The Trial Court declared the marriage as null
and void since it found that respondent's propensity to lie rendered
her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.
The Church also annuled the Catholic marriage of the parties. The
Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence
presented was insufficient to establish respondents psychological
incapacity and thus reversed the decision of the trial court. The
petitioner then filed a motion to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Can pathological lying constitute psychological
incapacity?

ANTONIO, petitioner vs REYES, respondent

G.R. No. 155800. March 10, 2006
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when
petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years of age.
Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married on 6
December 1990. On 8 March 1993, petitioner filed a petition to
have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He
anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code
alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that
respondents incapacity existed at the time their marriage was
celebrated and still subsists up to the present. As manifestations of
respondents alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed

Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and reinstated the
decision of the Trial Court. The Molina guidelines did not
foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as
it raised the bar for its allowance. The guidelines are in fact used
to interpret incapacity in the present case. The decision of the
Church to nullify the marriage was given great weight in the
consideration of the case. The other guidelines were also satisfied
in affirming the psychological condition. The pathological lying
of the respondent shows a dangerous if not unhealthy inability to
distinguish reality from the fantasy world which makes the
fulfillment of marital obligations and duties impossible.

136

Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family
Code of the Philippines.
The Regional Trial rendered its decision in favor of the
respondent and declared the marriage as null and void ab initio.
The Court of Appeals upheld the decision also citing that under
Art. 26 of the Family Code, divorce was permissible since Fely
was already an American citizen. The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) then intervened claiming that mere abandonment
and sexual infidelity does not constitute psychological incapacity
and that there was error in applying Art. 26 of the Family Code.
The respondent questions the participation of the OSG.
Issues:
a. How is psychological incapacity properly alleged?
b. Is the divorce of Fely valid?
c. Can the OSG rightly intervene in the case cited above?
REPUBLIC, plaintiff vs. CRASUS IYOY, defendant
G.R. No. 152577. September 21, 2005
Facts:
Respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at
Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result
of their union, they had five children Crasus, Jr., Daphne,
Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos who are now all of legal ages. After
the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered
that Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984,
Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America
(U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children. In 1984, she filed for
divorce while in the United States. In 1985 respondent Fely
married an American citizen and became an American citizen
herself sometime in 1988. Respondent eventually filed a petition
to the courts alleging in his Complaint that Felys acts brought
danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of
marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing,
constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under

Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed and
set aside the decisions of the lower courts. The root cause of
psychological incapacity was not proven. According to the Molina
guidelines, psychological incapacity must be medically proven to
be existent. There was also improper application of Art. 26 of the
Family Code. Since Fely only acquired American citizenship in
1988, she was still a Filipino citizen when she acquired her
divorce in 1984. Filipinos cannot be granted divorce unless they
are within the context of a mixed marriage which was not the case
back then in 1984.
While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively
participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment
or declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the Office of
the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated to the
Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually
responsible for taking the case to the appellate courts when
circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and practical
that even while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC,
137

the Office of the Solicitor General can already exercise

supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection of the
interests of the State.

Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder with Casanova

Complex. A person afflicted with this disorder believes that he is
entitled to gratify his emotional and sexual feelings and thus
engages in serial infidelities. Likewise, a person with Casanova
Complex exhibits habitual adulterous behavior and goes from
one relationship to another. Respondent claimed that her husband
was a dutiful husband and father during their marriage and alleged
that his sexual infidelity was exhibited only on 2 occasions which
were 13 years apart which was not consistent with his supposed
psychological disorder. The Regional Trial Court decided in favor
the petitioner while the Court of Appeals reversed the earlier
decision and held the marriage as valid.
Issue:
What quantum of evidence must be present to properly
psychological incapacity?

JAIME VILLALON, petitioner vs. MA. CORAZON

VILLALON, respondent
G.R. No. 167206
Facts:
On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime F. Villalon filed a
petition for the annulment of his marriage to respondent Ma.
Corazon N. Villalon. As ground therefor, petitioner cited his
psychological incapacity which he claimed existed even prior to
his marriage. According to petitioner, the manifestations of his
psychological incapacity were: (a) his chronic refusal to maintain
harmonious family relations and his lack of interest in having a
normal married life; (b) his immaturity and irresponsibility in
refusing to accept the essential obligations of marriage as husband
to his wife; (c) his desire for other women and a life unchained
from any spousal obligation; and (d) his false assumption of the
fundamental obligations of companionship and consortium
towards respondent.
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical
psychologist, to testify on his alleged psychological disorder of

Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition for annulment of
the marriage. Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof
that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. It must
be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a
disordered personality which make petitioner completely unable
to discharge the essential obligations of marriage. The evidence at
record did not show the alleged gravity and incurability of the
husband's psychological incapacity. In fact the evidence shows
that the husband was a responsible husband and father. It appears
that petitioner has simply lost his love for respondent and has
consequently refused to stay married to her. Also, at the time of
respondents testimony, petitioners illicit relationship has been
going on for six years. This is not consistent with the symptoms of
a person suffering from Casanova Complex who, according to
Dr. Dayan, is one who jumps from one relationship to another. Dr.
Dayan also failed to provide vital links and the basis for her
findings. Hence the grounds for psychological incapacity were
betrayed by a lack of sufficient evidence indicating the same.
138

offender is psychologically incapacitated?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court deleted the award for moral and
exemplary damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a
product of psychological incapacity and hence beyond the control
of the party because of an innate inability while at the same time
considering the same set of acts as willful. Psychological
incapacity therefore removes the basis for the contention that the
petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. Therefore,
the award of moral damages damages was without basis in law
and in fact. Since the award of moral and exemplary damages was
no longer justified, the award of attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation is left without basis.
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, plaintiff vs COURT OF APPEALS,
defendant
GR No. 127358. March 31, 2005
Facts:
On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court, declared the
marriage between Noel A. Buenaventura and defendant Isabel
Lucia Singh Buenaventura (on July 4, 1979) null and void ab
initio. Noel was revealed to have been psychologically
incapacitated; that he had married out of parental pressure and not
out of love; that he had abandoned his family; that this caused
defendant to suffer moral damages. The Regional Trial Court
awarded the defendant with damages based on Art. 2217 and Art.
21 of the New Civil Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
ruling. The plaintiff-appellee therefore filed for a petition of
certiorari alleging that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding
damages.
Issue:
Can award for damages be provided when the alleged
139

DIANA BARCELONA, plaintiff vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

defendant
G.R. No. 130087. September 24, 2003
Facts:
On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon
(respondent Tadeo) filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage
against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona (petitioner Diana). On 9
May 1995, respondent Tadeo filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition
which the trial court granted in its Order dated 7 June 1995. On 21
July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition for Annulment
of Marriage against petitioner Diana.Petitioner Diana filed a
Motion to Dismiss the second petition on two grounds. First, the
second petition fails to state a cause of action. The root cause of
psychological incapacity was not properly alleged. Second, it
violates Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94
(Circular No. 04-94) on forum shopping. Respondent Tadeo
opposed the Motion to which petitioner Diana filed Additional
Arguments in Support of the Motion. The lower courts rejected
the petition, after which it was sent to the Supreme Court.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition. A petition under
Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties were
psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential
marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of
marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
celebration. Section 2, paragraph (d) of the new Rules also
provides that expert testimony need not be alleged. Since the new
Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the
psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to
allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological
incapacity.
In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are
sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind
that the complaint does not have to establish or allege the facts
proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will
have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case.
The first petition was dismissed without prejudice at the
instance of respondent Tadeo to keep the peace between him and
his grown up children. The dismissal happened before service of
answer or any responsive pleading. Clearly, there is no litis
pendentia since respondent Tadeo had already withdrawn and
caused the dismissal of the first petition when he subsequently
filed the second petition. Neither is there res judicata because the
dismissal order was not a decision on the merits but a dismissal
without prejudice. Thusly, forum shopping could not be
applicable in this case.

Issue:
a. Is a statement of a cause for action required in the
declaration of nullity of marriage?
b. Is there forum shopping constituted by respondent
Tadeo?
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Filipinos while this case involved a mixed marriage, the

husband being a Japanese national.The petitioner Republic
however forwarded the case to the Supreme Court for review.
Issue:
Are the Molina Guildelines inapplicable in the instance of
mixed marriages?
REPUBLIC, petitioner vs. TOSHIO HAMANO, defendant
G.R. No. 149498. May 20, 2004
Facts:
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano
filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her
husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio
started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in
the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to
Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987,
she gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by
Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor,
Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which
incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. Her husband
had sent them financial support for two months and had
abandoned ever since. He did not even visit them when he
returned to the Philippines. The wife filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage citing the the husband did
not fulfill any of his marital obligations. The Regional Trial Court
granted the petition which was affirmed by the Appellate
Court.The Court of Appeals also added that this case could not be
equated with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina and
Santos vs. Court of Appeals. In those cases, the spouses were

Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition. In proving
psychological incapacity, there is no distinction between an alien
spouse and a Filipino spouse. There cannot be leniency in the
application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national.
The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological
incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human
behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining
psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of
nationality.
In the case above, the Molina guildelines were not strictly
followed in that there was no medical illness that was properly
identified. As it is, mere abandonment by itself is insuffient to
prove psychological incapacity.

141

FLORENCE TEVES MACARUBBO, plaintiff vs. EDMUNDO

MACARUBBO, defendant
A.C. No. 6148. February 27, 2004
Facts:
Atty. Edmundo L. Macarrubo was married to Helen
Esparza on June 16, 1982. Despite this existing marriage, he
contracted a second one with Florence Teves Macarrubo, with
whom he had borne two children, on December 28, 1991. On
August 21, 1998 a decision was rendered by the courts declaring
his first marriage void on the basis of his wife's psychological
incapacity. Florence Teves Macarrubo (complainant), by herself
and on behalf of her two children, filed on June 6, 2000 a verified
complaint for disbarment against Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbo
(respondent) with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The
respondent had left his second wife and was married to another
woman, Josephine Constantino, with whom he had another
pending case of annulment. The respondent provided all relevant
documents showing that he had no mark of criminality or wrong
and that he had provided support for his family though sometimes
intermittent. The investigating body hence recommended that he
be suspended for a period of three months.

The Supreme Court disbarred the respondent from legal

practice. The respondent's actions show his disrespect for the
institution of marriage and the family. While a first shotgun
marriage may be excusable on the part of a lawyer respondent,
two consecutive claims of being the victim in marriage raises
some questions. The fact that another petition for annulment is
lodged against the respondent's third wife shows his non
commitment to the social institution. His intermittent support to
his children also does not compensate for the monthly support that
is needed in their sustenance. The respondent exhibited gross
immoral conduct in the instances mentioned above.
The decision, rendered in default of complainant, cannot
serve as res judicata on the final resolution of the present case. As
this Court held in In re Almacen, a disbarment case is sui generis
for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if
the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative
of an administrative case against him, or if an affidavit of
withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course, then
the judgment of annulment of respondents marriage does not also
exonerate him from a wrongdoing actually committed. So long as
the quantum of proof clear preponderance of evidence in
disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar is met, then
liability attaches.

Issue:
Can the respondent validly contract a second marriage
when the prior marriage was annulled on the basis of
psychological incapacity years after the second marriage was
solemnized?
Ruling:
142

of Appeals reversed the earlier ruling. The petitioner then filed a

motion to the Supreme Court alleging that there was error in the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
DAVID DEDEL, petitioner vs COURT OF APPEALS,
respondent
G.R. No. 151867. January 29, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner David B. Dedel married respondent Sharon L.
Corpuz Dedel on May 20, 1967. Petitioner avers that during the
marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature
wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a
dentist in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; a Lieutenant in the
Presidential Security Command and later a Jordanian national.
Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for
treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner
alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit
relationship with the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim,
whom she married and with whom she had two children.
However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned
to petitioner bringing along her two children by Ibrahim.
Petitioner accepted her back and even considered the two
illegitimate children as his own. Thereafter, on December 9,
1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with
their two children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the
country on special occasions. Finally the petitioner then filed a
motion for the declaration of nullity of the marriage based on
psychological incapacity. The petitioner presented Dr. Dayan
Natividad who alleged that Sharon suffered from Anti-Social
disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity and
abandonment. These characteristics render her unable to perform
essential marital obligations.
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage as null and
void. The Office of the Solicitor General appealed and the Court

Does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted

to by petitioner fall within the term psychological incapacity?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the
ruling the ruling of the Court of Appeals. In this case, respondents
sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the
obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given a valid assumption thereof. It appears that respondents
promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the
marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful
marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and
which produced four children. Respondents sexual infidelity or
perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family
Code.
Neither could her emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity.

143

REPUBLIC, petitioner vs. AVELINO DAGDAG, respondent

GR. No. 109975. February 9,2001

clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts. Expert

testimony should have also been presented to establish the precise
cause of private respondent's psychological incapacity. The
investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to
present controverting evidence since the trial court's decision was
prematurely rendered.

Facts:
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matis married Avelino
Parangan Dagdag. A week after the wedding signs of the
husband's immaturity began to manifest. He indulged in drinking
sprees and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to
submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict
physical injuries on her. On October 1993, he left his family again
and that was the last they heard from him. It was learned that
Avelino became an escaped convict and remained at-large to date.
On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed a petition for judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. Erlinda testified and
presented her sis-in-law, Virginia Dagdag, as her only witness.
The trial court rendered a decision declaring the marriage of
Erlinda and Averlino void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion for
reconsideration on the ground that the decision was not in
accordance with the evidence and the law.
Issue:
What properly constitutes psychological incapacity?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition of the OSG and
reversed and set aside the assailed decision. Since the Molina
guildelines were laid down, the courts were expected to better
understand how to facilitate cases of psychological incapacity.
Erlina failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that
the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or

LORNA PESCA, petitioner vs ZOSIMO PESCA, respondent

GR No. 136921. April 17, 2001
144

Civil Code. Jurisprudence would constitute part of that law as of

the date the statute is enacted.

Facts:
Petitioner Lorna G pesca and respondent Zosimo A . Pesca
were married on March 1975. In 1988, the petitioner started
noticing signs of respondent's "psychological incapacity" through
his habitual drinking and physical abuse. Eventually, petitioner
forwarded a case to the courts for the annulment of the said
marriage. On Nevember 15, 1995, the Regional Trial Court
rendered its decision, declaring the marriage between the
petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the basis
of psychologicl incapacity. The respondent appealed to the Court
of Appeals which rendered its decision in his favor. Based on
Article 68 of the Family Code, incapacity must be grave,
psychological no physical, etc. The Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court and declared the marriage as
valid. The petitioner filed a motion to the Supreme Court stating
that :
1) The doctrine laid down in Santos vs CA and Republic vs CA
and Molina should bear no retoractive effect.
2) The application of the Santos and Moiline dicta should warrant
only a remand of the case to the Trial Courts for further
proceedings and not dismissal.
Issues:
a. What constitutes psychological incapacity?
b. How should previous judicial decisions affect future
cases?
Ruling:
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit. It was held
that the clause "psychological incapacity" under Article 35 of the
Family Code has not been meant to encompass all possible
psychoses, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility involved.
The decisions from Santos and Molina has the force of law under
the doctrine of Stare Decisis, ordained in Article 8 of the New

BRENDA MARCOS, petitioner vs. WILSON MARCOS,

respondent
GR No. 136490. October 19,2000
Facts:
The marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and
respondent Wilson G. Marcos was solemnized on September 6,
145

1982. Wilson was a military man but left the service after the
downfall of Marcos in 1987. Thereafter, the couple began
experiencing marital problems. Wilson was unable to find gainful
employment over which they would quarrel. He would beat his
wife and children and force her to have sex with him. He would
also leave several times during their cohabitation. In 1992, they
were already living separately. The petitioner filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. The petitioner submitted herself to psychologist
Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D for psychologcal evaluation. The
Regional Trial Court found the marriage null and void. The Court
of Appeals reversed this and held that psychological incapacity
had not been established by the the totality of the evidence
presented. The appellant was not subjected to any psychological
or psychiatric evaluation either.
Issue:
Is psychological examination of the respondent required
for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and upheld the
decision of the Court of Appeals. Personal medical or
psychological examination of respondent was not a requirement
for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the
totality of the evidence she presented did not show such
incapacity. There was absolutely no showing that respondent's
"defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or
that they were incurable. The behavior of the respondent could be
attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully
employed for a period of not more than six years. At best, the
evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal
separation, not for declaring a marriage void.

LUCITA HERNANDEZ, petitioner vs COURT OF APPEALS,

respondent
GR No. 126010. December 8, 1999
Facts:
Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private
respondent Mario C. Hernandez were married on January 1, 1981.
On July 10, 1992 filed a petition seeking the annulment of her
marriage to private respondent on the ground of psychological
146

incapacity of the latter. It was alleged that he failed to support the

family and contribute to the management of the household. He
was a habitual drinker, cohabited with another woman with whom
he had an illegitemate child, and had transmitted to her a sexually
transmitted disease (STD) because of his promiscuity. He was
irresponsible, immature, unprepared for the duties of married life.
Ester Alfaro, petitioner's childhood friend testified during the
hearing on the petition for annulment. Ester testified that Lucita
was once hospitalized because she was beaten up by Mario. The
Trial Court dismissed the petition. It found the grounds alleged as
grounds for legal separation and not for a declaration of nullity of
marriages. The STD was also transmitted five years after marriage
and thusly could not constitute fraud. The Court of Appeals
upheld the decision which left petitioner to forward a motion to
the Supreme Court.
Isssue:
What constitutes psychological incapacity?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals. The petitioner failed to establish the fact that private
respondent was suffering from a psychological defect at the start
of their marriage. Private respondent's alleged habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or peversion, and abandonment do
not by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he was
suffering from a psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that the acts
are manifestations of a disrdered personality which make private
respondent completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to private
respondent's youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome.
Morever, expert testimony should have been presented to establish
the precise cause of private respondent's psychological incapacity,
if any, in order to show that it existed at the incaption of the
marriage.

VIRGILIO MAQUILAN, petitioner vs DITA MAQUILAN,

respondent
GR No. 155409. June 8, 2007
Facts:
Virgilio Maquilan and Dita Maquilan lived a blissful
married life and out of which were blessed to have a son.
However, the romance ended when the wife was found out to have
an extra-marital affair. She and her paramour were convicted of
adultery and were sentenced to suffer imprisonment. On June 15,
2001, private respondent, through counsel, filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage, dissolution and liquidation of
147

conjugal partnership of gains and damages. During pre-trial of the

said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a
compromise agreement. The compromise agreement was given
judical imprimatur, which was erroneously dated January 2, 2002.
However, petitioner filed an Omnibus motion dated January 15,
2002 praying for the repudiation of the said agreement. With the
lower courts continuously denying repudiation, petitioner
eventually came to the Supreme Court with the same motion
citing among his reasons that the agreement is void for having
failed to secure the presence of the State through the Office of the
Solicitor General duing its enactment.
Issue:
When is State presence required in Marital Cases (as
defined under Art. 48 of the Family Code)?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and validated the
compromise agreement. The purpose of the active participation of
the public prosecutor or the OSG is to ensure that the interest of
the state is represented and protected in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriage by preventing
collusion between the parties, or the fabrication, or suppression of
evidence. Nothing in the subject compromise agreement touched
into the very merits of the case of nullity of marriage. It merely
pertains to an agreement between petitioner and private
respondent to separate their conjugal properties partially.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CUISONMELGAR, respondent

G.R. No. 139676. March 31, 2006
Facts:
In 1965, Norma and Eulogio were married and their union
begot five children. In 1996, Norma filed for declaration of nullity
of her marriage on the ground of Eulogios psychological
incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations.
Summons were served to Eulogio, however, he failed to file an
answer within the reglementary period. The RTC ordered the
Public Prosecutor to conduct an investigation on the case to
determine whether or not there exists collusion between the
contending parties and with this, found none. Upon motion of
Normas counsel, the RTC allowed the presentation of evidence.
She testified that Eulogio was suffering from psychological
incapacity manifested by the latters immaturity, habitual
148

alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, constitutional

laziness, and abandonment of his family since 1985.On January
20, 1997 or twelve days after the reception of evidence, the RTC
rendered its decision nullifying the marriage of Norma and
Eulogio which the CA affirmed. Petitioner, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an appeal with the
CA, contending that the evidence presented are not sufficient to
declare the marriage void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it

that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within
fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court.

Issue:
a. Whether the alleged psychological incapacity of
respondent of respondent is in the nature contemplated
by Article 36 of the Family Code.
b. Whether defaults in actions for annulment of marriage
or for legal separation are accepted in courts.
Ruling:
a. The OSG submits that Normas comments are
irrelevant and not responsive to the arguments in the
petition. Nonetheless, the OSG reiterates that Normas
evidence fell short of the requirements of the law since
no competent evidence was presented during the trial
to prove that Eulogios inability to look for a job, his
resulting drunkenness, jealousy and other disagreeable
behavior are manifestations of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
b. Section 6 of Rule 18 of the 1985 Rules of Court,[23]
the
rule
then
applicable,
provides:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation. - If the defendant in
an action for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not
acollusion between the parties exists, and if there is no

In this case, the State did not actively participate in

the prosecution of the case at the trial level. Other than the
Public Prosecutors Manifestation that no collusion existed
between the contending parties and the brief crossexamination which had barely scratched the surface, no
pleading, motion, or position paper was filed by the Public
Prosecutor or the OSG. The State should have been given
the opportunity to present controverting evidence before
the judgment was rendered.
The decision of RTC and CA is reversed and set
aside.
MARGIE CORPUS, petitioner, vs. OCHOTORENA,
respondent
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1861. July 30, 2004
Facts:
In 2001, a verified complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage was filed against Mrs. Margie Corpus-Macias by
Mariano Joaquin S. Macias, her husband and incumbent presiding
judge of RTC, Branch 11, Liloy, Zamboanga Del Norte. The case
was raffled to the judge Ochotorenas court. On the same day the
149

complaint was filed, the respondent immediately issued summons

to Mrs. Macias. However, the summons was not served on Mrs.
Macias because her whereabouts were allegedly unknown.
Consequently, Mr. Macias filed a motion to serve summons by
publication. The respondent granted the motion in his order dated
March 7, 2001, with the directive that Mrs. Macias should file her
answer within 30 days after notice. Thereafter, Mr. Macias caused
the publication of the summons in the local weekly newspaper.
Within the 30-day period to file an answer, she filed a motion to
dismiss, which she set for hearing on April 20, 2001. However,
instead of first acting upon the motion, the respondent judge set
the hearing on the merits of the subject on April 19, 2001 or one
day before. On April 19, 2001, respondent judge denied the
Motion to Dismiss and re-set the hearing on the merits to April 30,
May 2 and 3, 2001. After the scheduled hearings and while
various motions by the petitioner were still pending, the
respondent judge terminated the proceedings and declared the
case submitted for decision. Thus, Mrs. Macias filed a complaint
against respondent before the Office of the Court Administrator.
Issue:
Whether Judge Ochotorena acted with gross ignorance of
the law and procedure which deprived of the petitioner her
fundamental right to due process with utmost bias and partiality
for Mr. Macias.
Ruling:
The respondent judge disregarded the provisions of
Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, which
states that: After the last pleading has been served and filed, it
shall be the duty of the plaintiff to promptly move ex-parte that
the case be set for pre-trial. Considering that the last pleading was
Mrs. Macias Motion to Dismiss, the respondent judge should
have first resolved the motion and then waited for Mr. Macias
motion
to
set
the
case
for
pre-trial.

What happened in the case is a classic example of railroading

or procedural short-cut.
It is also worth mentioning that even if Mrs. Macias failed
to file her answer to the complaint after the period therefor had
elapsed, the respondent judge was not authorized to conduct a
hearing of the case on its merits. The Rules of Court prohibits
default proceedings in cases involving declaration of nullity of
marriage.
Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
makes the report of the Public Prosecutor a condition sine qua
non for further proceedings to go on in the case. This was ignored
by respondent judge. While the record shows that the public
prosecutor had filed a Certification stating that he appeared in
behalf of the Solicitor General during the ex-parte presentation of
plaintiffs evidence and had no objection to the granting of the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, such Certification
does not suffice to comply with the mandatory requirement that
the court should order the investigating public prosecutor whether
a collusion exists between the parties. Such directive must be
made by the court before trial could proceed, not after the trial on
the merits of the case had already been had. Notably, said
Certification was filed after the respondent judge had ordered the
termination
of
the
case.
Respondent compulsorily retired from the service on June
04, 2001, thus, dismissal or suspension from the service is no
longer possible. Nonetheless, a penalty of fine worth P20,000.00
was imposed pursuant to Section 3 in relation to Section 10 of
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court which grants that gross ignorance
of the law is considered a serious offense, for which a penalty of
either dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits,
suspension from office for more than three (3) months but not
exceeding six (6) months or a fine of more than Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00) but not exceeding Forty Thousand Pesos
(P40,000.00)
may
be
imposed.

150

MARIANO MACIAS, petitioner, vs. MARGIE MACIAS,

respondent
G.R. No. 149617. September 3, 2003
Facts:
Judge Mariano Joaquin S. Macias (herein petitioner) filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Sindangan, Zamboanga
del Norte, a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against
Margie Corpus Macias (herein respondent) on February 6, 2001.
Summons was not served on Mrs. Macias because her
whereabouts were allegedly unknown. Consequently, Mr. Macias
filed a motion to serve summons by publication. The latter was
granted and in an order dated March 7, 2001 was a directive that
Mrs. Macias should file her answer within 30 days after
notice. Thereafter, Mr. Macias caused the publication of the
summons in the local weekly newspaper. Instead of filing an
answer, respondent, through counsel, on April 10, 2001, filed a
motion to dismiss the petition. On April 19, 2001, the trial court
issued an Order denying respondents motion to dismiss.
Incidentally, in the same Order, the trial court granted
respondents request (via long distance telephone call) to set the
hearing on April 30, 2001. The hearing set on April 30, 2001 was
cancelled for failure of respondent and counsel as well as the
expert witness to appear. On the same day, the trial court issued
an Order setting the hearing anew on May 2 and 3, 2001.
Respondent received a copy of this Order only on May 8, 2001.
Thus, when the case was called for hearing as scheduled,
respondent and counsel, not being duly notified, did not appear.
Surprisingly, the trial court allowed the petitioner to present his
evidence ex parte.
On May 5, 2001, respondent still unaware that the case
had been submitted for decision, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order dated April 19, 2001 denying her
motion to dismiss. The trial court merely noted the motion for
reconsideration in his Order dated May 16, 2001. Consequently,
on May 18, 2001, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a

petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary

restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction
challenging the trial courts Order dated April 19, 2001 which
denied her motion to dismiss. Acting thereon, the Court of
Appeals, in a Resolution dated May 23, 2001, enjoined the trial
court from conducting further proceedings.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner was deprived, by the Respondent
Court, of her right to due process enshrined in Article III, Section
1 of the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling:
The hearings of the complaint of the private respondent,
on its merits, were a blatant transgression by the respondent of the
fundamental right of the petitioner to due process. Petitioner
learned of the complaint and summons about the first week of
April, 2001 on the basis of the March 11-17, 2001 issue of the
Tingog Peninsula. Even if the thirty-day period fixed by the
Respondent Court was reckoned from the March 11-17, 2001
issue of the Tingog Peninsula, the Petitioner had until April 16,
2001 within which to file a Motion to Dismiss under Section 1,
Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure or file an Answer to
the complaint. However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a
Motion to Dismiss, instead of filing an Answer to the complaint.
The filing of said motion suspended the period for her to file her
Answer to the complaint. Until said motion is resolved by the
Respondent Court with finality, it behooved the Respondent Court
to suspend the hearings of the case on the merits.
The Petitioner may file a Motion for Reconsideration of
said Order conformably with Section 5, Rule 135 of the Rules of
Court. Until then, a hearing of the case on its merits is
impermissible and a travesty. However, even before the Petitioner
could be served with a copy of the order of the Respondent Court
denying her Motion to Dismiss, the Respondent Court proceeded
with the hearing of the case on its merits. In the case at bar, the
151

trial court did not observe the rudimentary principle of due

process enshrined in our Constitution. Neither did it comply with
pertinent procedural rules.

FLORENCE SIN, petitioner, vs. PHILLIP SIN, respondent

G.R. No. 137590. March 26, 2001
Facts:
On January 4, 1987, after a two-year courtship and
engagement, Florence and respondent Philipp T. Sin (hereafter
Philipp), a Portugese citizen, were married. In 1994, Florence
filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage against
Philipp. RTC dismissed the said petition which was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals despite motions for reconsideration.
Throughout the trial in the lower court, the State did not
participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jose Danilo C. Jabson
filed with the trial court a manifestation dated November 16,
1994, stating that he found no collusion between the parties, he
did not actively participate therein. Other than entering his
appearance at certain hearings of the case, nothing more was
heard from him. Neither did the presiding Judge take any step to
encourage the fiscal to contribute to the proceedings.
Issue:
What is the mandatory obligation of the State in the
procedures embodied within the prosecution of a case for the
declaration of nullity of marriage?
Ruling:
Article 48 of the Family Code states that in all cases of
annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the

Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it

to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. It can be argued that since the lower
court dismissed the petition, the evil sought to be prevented (i.e.,
dissolution of the marriage) did not come about, hence, the lack of
participation of the State was cured. Not so. The task of
protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires
vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma
compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution
requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the
exposure of an invalid one as well. In Republic vs. CA, it was
clearly stated that: The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The records are
bereft of any evidence that the State participated in the
prosecution of the case not just at the trial level but on appeal with
the Court of Appeals as well.
The Family Code emphasizes the permanent nature of
marriage, hailing it as the foundation of the family. However, this
inviolability depends on whether the marriage exists and is valid.
If it is void ab initio, the permanence of the union becomes
irrelevant, and the Court can step in to declare it so. Article 36 of
the Family Code is the justification. A declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code requires the
application of procedural and substantive guidelines. While
compliance with these requirements mostly devolves upon
petitioner, the State is likewise mandated to actively intervene in
the procedure. Because of non-compliance by the State with its
statutory duty, the case is therefore remanded to the lower court
for proper trial.

152

Is the decision granting the declaration of nullity of

marriage by default tenable?
Ruling:
No. The actuations of the trial court and the public
prosecutor are in defiance of Article 48 of the Family Code, which
reads:
MARIETTA ANCHETA, petitioner, vs. RODOLFO
ANCHETA, respondent
G.R. No. 145370. March 4, 2004
Facts:
Marietta, petitioner, together with their seven children,
after three years of marriage, was abandoned by her husband
Rodolfo. Thus the former filed an action for dissolution of their
conjugal partnership and judicial separation of property with a
plea for support and thereby executed a compromise agreement
which was granted by the court. The respondent, with his intention
to remarry, filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
from Marietta on the ground of psychological incapacity. With his
full knowledge that his wife already resided in Cavite, he entered
an address different from that of the formers where summons for
the trial be served. Corollary to this, summons was returned not
served resulting to petitioners inability to attend and participate.
Trial ensued and respondent presented pieces of evidence ex parte
which led to petitioners default and thereby granted the
annulment of their marriage. Marietta therefore filed a motion for
reconsideration for lack of jurisdiction which the Court of Appeals
denied.

Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of

absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
The trial court and the public prosecutor also ignored Rule
18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section
3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which provides:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or
for legal separation. If the defendant in an action for annulment
of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a
collusion between the parties exits, and if there is no collusion, to
intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated.

Issue:
153

intervene for the state because the law looks with disfavor upon
the haphazard declaration of annulment of marriages by default.
Issue:
Is the petitioners contention tenable?
Ruling:
EMILIO TUASON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
MARIA VICTORIA L. TUASON, respondent
G.R. No. 116607. April 10, 1996
Facts:
Maria Victoria Tuason filed a petition for annulment or
declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner Emilio R.
Tuason. She alleged that they were married in 1972 and from this
union, begot two children; that at the time of the marriage,
petitioner was already psychologically incapacitated to comply
with his essential marital obligations which became manifest
afterward and resulted in violent fights; that petitioner used
prohibited drugs, was a womanizer, left the conjugal home and
cohabited with three women in succession, gave minimal support
to the family, a spendthrift; that attempts at reconciliation were
made but they all failed because of petitioners refusal to reform.
Petitioner denied the imputations against him. The trial was reset
due to Emilios counsels petition for suspension of trial which the
court granted. However, during the agreed date of trial, petitioner
failed to appear thereby garnering a decision in default which is in
favor of private respondent. Petitioner, through new counsel, filed
with the trial court a petition for relief from judgment. Petitioner
also insisted that he has a valid and meritorious defense. He cited
the Family Code which provides that in actions for annulment of
marriage or legal separation, the prosecuting officer should

No. The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict
application of Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code. For one,
petitioner was not declared in default by the trial court for failure
to answer. Petitioner filed his answer to the complaint and
contested the cause of action alleged by private respondent. He
actively participated in the proceedings below by filing several
pleadings and cross-examining the witnesses of private
respondent. It is crystal clear that every stage of the litigation was
characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not by collusion.
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment
of marriage and legal separation proceedings is to determine
whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that
the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioners
vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the
conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no
allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or
fabricated by any of the parties. Under these circumstances, the
Court is convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting
attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties
is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial court.

154

Ruling:

CONCEPCION PACETE, petitioner, vs. HON. CARRIAGA,

JR., respondent
G.R. No. 53880. March 17, 1994
Facts:
Concepcion Alanis-Pacete filed a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of marriage between her husband Enrico
Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion whom he married when
his marriage with Concepcion Alanis was still subsisting, as well
as for legal separation, accounting and separation of properties.
Alanis averred that Pacete also ignored overtures for an amicable
settlement and that reconciliation between her and Pacete was
impossible since the latter evidently preferred to continue living
with Clarita. The defendants were each served summons and as
response, they filed for several motions for extension which the
court granted except for the last motion. The plaintiff thereupon
filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court
granted and consequently directed her to present evidence. As a
result thereof, a decree of legal separation of their marriage was
issued.

No. Under Article 60 of the Family Code, no decree of

legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a
confession of judgment. In any case, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is
not fabricated or suppresses. Also, in Article 58 of the same Code,
an action for legal separation shall in case be tried before six
months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition. The
significance of these substantive provisions of the law is
underscored in Section 6, Rule 18 of Rules of Court: No defaults
in action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation. If the
defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or legal
separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not
fabricated.

Issue:
Is the courts denial for the petitioners motion for
extension of time to file their answer and in declaring them in
default valid?
155

CARLITOS E. SILVA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF

APPEALS and
SUZANNE T. GONZALES, respondents
G.R. No. 114742. July 17, 1997
Facts:
Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T.
Gonzales, an unmarried local actress, cohabited without the
benefit of marriage and their union begat two children. However,
not long enough, the two eventually parted ways. The instant
petition started with the refusal of Gonzales to allow Silva, in
apparent contravention of a previous understanding, to have the
children in his company on weekends. Silva filed a petition for
custodial rights over the children but the petition was opposed by
Gonzales who averred that Silva often engaged in "gambling and
womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and social
values of the children. An order ordering herein respondent to
allow petitioner visitorial rights to her children during weekends.
However, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City reversed the
former decision thereby denying petitioner his visitorial rights.

The answer is in the negative. The Constitution itself

speaks in terms of the "natural and primary rights of parents in
the rearing of the youth. Article 209, in relation to Article 220, of
the Family Code states that it is the natural right and duty of
parents and those exercising parental authority to, among other
things, keep children in their company and to give them love and
affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding.
The allegations of respondent against the character of petitioner,
even assuming as true, cannot be taken as sufficient basis to
render petitioner an unfit father. The fears expressed by
respondent to the effect that petitioner shall be able to corrupt and
degrade their children once allowed to even temporarily associate
with petitioner is but the product of respondent's unfounded
imagination, for no man, bereft of all moral persuasions and
goodness, would ever take the trouble and expense in instituting a
legal action for the purpose of seeing his illegitimate children. It
can just be imagined the deep sorrows of a father who is deprived
of his children of tender ages. The Court appreciates the
apprehensions of private respondent and their well-meant concern
for the children; nevertheless, it seems unlikely that petitioner
would have ulterior motives or undue designs more than a parents
natural desire to be able to call on, even if it were only on brief
visits, his own children.

Issue:
Should petitioner be denied of his visitorial rights over his
children?
Ruling:

156

marriage license was not on record. RTC favored the petition,

granting her half of the P146,000.00.
Issue:
SUSAN CARIO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE CARIO,
respondent
G.R. No. 132529. March 4, 2004
Facts:
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario,
he contracted two marriages, the first was with petitioner Susan
Nicdao Cario (referred to as Susan Nicdao) and the second was
with respondent Susan Yee Cario (referred to as Susan Yee), with
whom cohabited with almost ten years. In 1988, SPO4 Cario
became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by
pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992
under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial
expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for
monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the
deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan
Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 while
respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00. Respondent
Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money
against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying that petitioner be ordered
to return to her at least one-half of the P146,000.00 collectively
denominated as death benefits. Susan Yee admitted that they
contracted the marriage while SPO4 Carios marriage with Susan
Nicdao was still subsisting. However, she claimed that the latters
marriage was void ab initio for lack of marriage license supported
by her presenting their marriage contract bearing no marriage
license number and a certification from the LCR that their

Whether Susan Yee is entitled to the collection of one-half

of the P146,000.00.
Ruling:
Susan Yee is not entitled to the said share. Considering that
the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a
bigamous marriage, the application of Article 148the properties
acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall
belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each
party belong to him or her exclusively is therefore in order. The
disputed P146,000 are clearly renumerations, incentives and
benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a
police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the
contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property
or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence,
they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased,
but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right
whatsoever to claim the same.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and
the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This
article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and
not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of
a marriage license. Under the foregoing article, wages and salaries
earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by
the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between
them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did
not contribute thereto. Conformably, even if the disputed death
157

benefits were earned by the deceased alone as a government

employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto,
entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no
allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first
marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the
subject death benefits under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as
her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to
the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs,
namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.

the matter on appeal to the Federal Court of Switzerland. In its

decision, the Federal Court affirmed the decision of the higher
Cantonal Civil Court. Mauricio, represented by his brother
Teodoro Leonor, filed a petition for the cancellation of the late
registration of marriage in the civil registry; given as grounds for
the cancellation were the tardiness of the registration and the
nullity of his marriage with Virginia due to the non-observance
of the legal requirements for a valid marriage. After several
hearings, the trial court rendered judgment declaring said marriage
null and void for being sham and fictitious.
Issue:

VIRGINIA A. LEONOR, petitioner, vs. BELDIA, JR. and

LEONOR, JR., respondent
G.R. No. 112597. April 2, 1996

Is the judgment rendered by the regional trial court voiding

a marriage under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court valid and proper?

Facts:

Ruling:

Virginia A. Leonor, herein petitioner, was married to the

private respondent, Mauricio D. Leonor, Jr., in San Carlos City.
They had been separated for a substantial part of their married life
for, while Mauricio resided in Switzerland studying and working,
Virginia stayed in the Philippines working as a nurse in Laguna.
Mauricio became unfaithful and lived with a certain Lynda Pond
abroad. This induced petitioner to institute a civil action in
Geneva, Switzerland for separation and alimony. Private
respondent counter-sued for divorce. Cantonal Civil Court of
Switzerland pronounced the divorce of the spouses Leonor but
reserved the liquidation of the matrimonial partnership. The said
Swiss Court denied alimony to petitioner. On appeal to the higher
Cantonal Civil Court, Mauricio asked for the cancellation of his
marriage in the Philippines. In 1992, the higher Cantonal Civil
Court granted petitioner alimony, prompting Mauricio to elevate

No. The summary procedure under Rule 108, and for that
matter under Art. 412 of the Civil Code, cannot be used by
Mauricio to change his and Virginias civil status from married to
single and of their three children from legitimate to illegitimate.
Neither does the trial court, under said Rule, have any jurisdiction
to declare their marriage null and void and as a result thereof, to
order the local civil registrar to cancel the marriage entry in the
civil registry. The only errors that can be cancelled or corrected
under this Rule are typographical or clerical errors, not material or
substantial ones like the validity or nullity of a marriage. Where
the effect of a correction in a civil registry will change the civil
status of petitioner and her children from legitimate to
illegitimate, the same cannot be granted except only in an
adversarial proceeding Clearly and unequivocally, the summary
procedure under Rule 108, and for that matter under.
158

LEONCIA BALOGBOG and GAUDIOSO BALOGBOG,

petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents
G.R. No. 83598. March 7, 1997
Facts:
Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of
Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal who died intestate.
Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition
and accounting against petitioners, claiming that they were the
legitimate children of Gavino and that they were entitled to the
one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents.
Petitioners denied knowing private respondents. Petitioners
presented two witnesses to fortify their claims. Catalina Ubas
testified concerning her marriage to Gavino. She testified that
after the wedding, she was handed a receipt, presumably the
marriage certificate but it was burned during the war. She said
that she and Gavino lived together in Obogon and begot three
children. Private respondents produced a certificate from the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar that the Register of Marriages
did not have a record of the marriage of Gavino and Catalina;

another certificate from the Office of the Treasurer that there was
no record of the birth of Ramonito in that office and, for this
reason, the record must be presumed to have been lost or
destroyed during the war, and a certificate by the Parish Priest of
Asturias that there was likewise no record of birth of Ramonito in
the church, the records of which were either lost or destroyed
during the war. Petitioner Leoncia Balogbog testified that Gavino
died single at the family residence in Asturias. She obtained a
certificate from the Local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the effect
that that office did not have a record of the names of Gavino and
Catalina. The Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered
judgment for private respondents, ordering petitioners to render an
accounting from 1960 until the finality of its judgment, to
partition the estate and deliver to private respondents one-third of
the estate of Basilio and Genoveva.
Issue:
Should the marriage of Gavino and Catalina be proven
under Articles 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 and that the
existence of their marriage cannot be presumed because there was
no evidence showing in particular that they declared that they take
each other as husband and wife during their marriage?
Ruling:
Articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 1889 of Spain did
not take effect, therefore, articles. 53 and 54 never came into
force. Since this case was brought in the lower court in 1968, the
existence of the marriage was to be determined in accordance with
the present Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights, and
the rules on evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption
is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and
wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only
by cogent proof to the contrary. Evidence consisting of the
159

testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the

marriage. Indeed, although a marriage contract is considered
primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not proof
that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to
prove marriage. The argument that the existence of the marriage
cannot be presumed because there was no evidence showing in
particular that Gavino and Catalina, in the presence of two
witnesses, declared that they were taking each other as husband
and wife is without merit. An exchange of vows can be presumed
to have been made from the testimonies of the witnesses who state
that a wedding took place, since the very purpose for having a
wedding is to exchange vows of marital commitment. It would
indeed be unusual to have a wedding without an exchange of
vows and quite unnatural for people not to notice its absence.

respectively, thus making the entries in the marriage contract false

and fraudulent.
Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the RTC
was without jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action.
She alleged that "only a party to the marriage" could file an action
for annulment of marriage against the other spouse, hence, it was
only Tamano who could file an action for annulment of their
marriage. Petitioner likewise contended that since Tamano and
Zorayda were both Muslims and married in Muslim rites the
jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case was vested in the
sharia courts pursuant to Art. 155 of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws.
Issue:
Is the marriage between Tamano and Zorayda under the
jurisdiction of sharia courts and not the civil courts?

ESTRELLITA TAMANO, petitioner, vs. HON. RODOLFO

ORTIZ, respondent
G.R. No. 126603. June 29, 1998
Facts:
Senator Mamintal Tamano married Zorayda A. Tamano in
civil rites. Their marriage supposedly remained valid and
subsisting until his death in 1994. Prior to his death, Tamano also
married petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano in civil rites. In 1994,
Zorayda joined by her son Adib A. Tamano filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the
ground that it was bigamous. They contended that Tamano and
Estrellita misrepresented themselves as divorced and single,

Ruling:
No. Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over all actions involving
the contract of marriage and marital relations. In the complaint
for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by private respondents
herein, it was alleged that Estrellita and Tamano were married in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Hence, contrary
to the position of petitioner, the Civil Code is applicable in the
instant case. Assuming that indeed petitioner and Tamano were
likewise married under Muslim laws, the same would still fall
under the general original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts.
Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation
where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites.
Consequently, the sharia courts are not vested with original and
exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated
under both civil and Muslim laws. Consequently, the Regional
160

Trial Courts are not divested of their general original jurisdiction

under Sec. 19, par. (6) of BP Blg. 129 which provides Sec. 19.
Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x (6) In all cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions x x x x

as the sole and exclusive owner. Petitioner filed a motion to

dismiss, with the contention that the marriage being void ab initio,
the petition for the declaration of its nullity is irrelevant.
Issue:
Whether a petition for judicial declaration of a void
marriage is necessary
Ruling:
A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for
defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void.

DELIA DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

respondent
G. R. No. 104818. September 17, 1993
Facts:
Delia Soledad A Domingo filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage and separation of property against petitioner
Roberto Domingo. She alleged that Roberto Domingo has a
previous marriage when their marriage was solemnized and came
to know of the prior marriage when petitioners wife, Emerlina
sued them for bigamy. Furthermore, petitioner who was
unemployed and completely dependent upon her has been
allegedly disposing some of her properties without the latters
consent. Delia thus prayed for their marriage to be declared null
and void and for all of her properties to be declared in favor of her
161

marriage based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of

the Family Code is a prejudicial question that should merit the
suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him
by his wife.
Issue:
Is the contention of the petitioner tenable?
Ruling:

MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON,
JR., respondents
G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix
were marriedafter twenty-four years of marriage and four
children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Cod petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was
petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a
certain woman named Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently
filed a criminal complaint for concubinage under Article 334 of
the Revised Penal Code against petitioner and his paramour
Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for
declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question
to the determination of the criminal case. Petitioner contends that
the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his

Petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the

charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and
void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that
his marriage is void from the beginning is not tenable. The
pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's
marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For
a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to
cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination
of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case
involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of
the accused would necessarily be determined. It must also be held
that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to judgment
of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage
is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no
such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all
intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman
not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage.

162

Issue:
Whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for
declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a
prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.
Ruling:

IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner, vs. ISAGANI D.

BOBIS, respondent
G. R. No. 138509. July 31, 2000
Facts:
Isagani Bobis, herein respondent contracted a first
marriage with Maria Dulce Javier. Without said marriage having
been annulled, nullified or terminated, respondent contracted a
second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis and
allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez.
Based on petitioners complaint-affidavit, an information for
bigamy was filed against respondent. Sometime thereafter,
respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was
celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a
motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy
invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as
a prejudicial question to the criminal case. The trial judge granted
the motion to suspend the criminal case. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration, but the same was denied.

The civil action for declaration of nullity of marriage does

not constitute a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of
celebration of the second marriage, requires a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may
remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the
parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity or
invalidity of the marriage. Whether or not the first marriage was
void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is
still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second
marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy
can successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements concur
two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage
which would have been valid had it not been for the existence at
the material time of the first marriage.
In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent,
without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into the
second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though
void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party
can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void.
The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the
first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar,
respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a
married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with
petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil
action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered
163

into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage.

Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the
determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a
prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent cannot be
permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action
against him.

averred that at the time he married petitioner, he was still married

to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he married petitioner the
decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been
issued. Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent,
pointed out that his claim that their marriage was contracted
without a valid license is untrue. Petitioner also submitted the
decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. These
documents were submitted as evidence during trial and, according
to petitioner, are therefore deemed sufficient proof of the facts
therein. In 1996, the appellate court affirmed the trial courts
decision. It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured before a
subsequent marriage could be validly contracted.
Issue:
Whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is
required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly?

OFELIA P. TY, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,

and
EDGARDO M. REYES, respondents.
G. R. No. 127406. November 27, 2000
Facts:
Edgardo Reyes, herein private respondent, married Anna
Maria Regina Villanueva on August 4, 1980. The Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court declared their marriage null and void
ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding
on was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of
the parties. Even before the decree was issued nullifying his
marriage to Anna Maria, private respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty,
herein petitioner. Private respondent filed a civil case praying that
his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void. He alleged
that they had no marriage license when they got married. He also

Ruling:
Private respondents first and second marriages contracted
in 1977 and 1979, respectively, are governed by the provisions of
the Civil Code. Pertinent to the present controversy, Article 83 of
the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any
person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with
any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance.
A declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for
defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
164

marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected

marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void. In the present case, the
second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979,
before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in
Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private
respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was
no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could
contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, the Court
concluded that private respondents second marriage to petitioner
is valid. Moreover, the provisions of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would
prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children.

of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice. Consuelo
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision
directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family
Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions
on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in
"unions without marriage." Parenthetically, during the hearing on
the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing their
desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdes, herein
petitioner.
Issue:
What property regime should govern in unions without
marriage?
Ruling:

ANTONIO A. S. VALDES, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL

COURT and
CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDES, respondents.
G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996
Facts:
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05
January 1971. Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of the
marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. After hearing
the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial court, in its
decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition. The petitioner and
respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of
their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family
Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52

Considering that this Court has already declared the

marriage between petitioner and respondent as null and void ab
initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and
respondent shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a
void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as
the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of
Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in
previous cases; it provides:
"ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated
to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares
and the property acquired by both of them through their work or
industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
165

with her in Palawan for almost a month after their marriage; that
petitioner wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila, during
which private respondent visited him personally; and that
petitioner knew about the progress of her pregnancy, which ended
in their son being born prematurely.
Issue:
Whether the marriage be annulled on the ground that the
consent of the petitioner, as he alleged, has been obtained by
fraud, intimidation and undue and improper pressure and
influence.
Ruling:

ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, respondent
G.R. No. 132955. October 27, 2006
Facts:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia
Canalita-Villanueva got married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto
Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with
the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging
that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia,
who was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior
to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the
marriage; and that he later learned that private respondent's child
died during delivery on August 29, 1988. In her counterclaim,
Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that
petitioner freely and voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed

The Court is not convinced that appellants apprehension

of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of
the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. Given that
at the time their marriage took place, his employment as a security
guard in a bank would at least enable him to know the rudiments
of self-defense. Neither did he inform the judge about his
predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage. Appellant also
invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by
appellee that the latter was pregnant with his child when they were
married. Appellants excuse that he could not have impregnated
the appellee because he did not have an erection during their tryst
is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is
bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the
appellee.

166

her reply, Anaya alleged, among others, that her husband secretly
intended from the very beginning not to perform his marital duties
and allegations appurtenance thereto and furthermore, he covertly
made up his mind not to live with her.
The court a quo dismissed the complaint for nondisclosure of a husbands pre-marital relationship with another
woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that would
constitute a ground for annulment. Anaya appealed the case
contending that the lower court erred in ignoring as cause of
action her allegations in her reply.
Issue:
Whether the allegation in the reply will constitute a cause
of action, which the court must adjudicate.
AURORA ANAYA, petitioner, vs. FERNANDO PALAROAN,
respondent
G.R. No. 27930. November 26, 1973
Facts:
Before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, a
complaint was brought by Aurora Anaya against her husband
Fernando Palaroan, praying for the annulment of their marriage.
Plaintiff contends that the marriage that was solemnized between
them constituted fraud in obtaining her consent. This contention
was premised in the allegation that her husband divulged to her
that several months prior to their marriage, he had pre-marital
relationship with a close relative of his and that the nondivulgement wrecked their marriage.

Ruling:
No. The averment made in the reply is an entirely new and
additional cause of action. According to the plaintiff herself, the
allegation is apart, distinct and separate from that earlier averred
in the complaint. . . Said allegation were, therefore, improperly
alleged in the reply, because if in a reply a party plaintiff is not
permitted to amend or charge the cause of action as set forth in his
complaint, there is more reason not to allow such party to allege a
new and additional cause of action in the reply. Otherwise, the
series of pleadings of the parties could become interminable.

Defendant in his answer denied the allegations and filed a

counterclaim for damages for the malicious filing of the suit. In
167

currency. Zaballero announced that the next day he would tender

the whole balance. Reyes, acting upon advice given by his
attorneys to whom he had meanwhile resorted for guidance,
received the money and executed the notarial deed of release of
the real estate mortgage. On the same day, he received payment,
the mortgagee (Reyes), executed an affidavit in secret, without
defendants knowledge, before a Notary Public stating that he had
accepted under protest the payment of P5,200 plus interest in the
sum of P612, and that he had deposited the whole amount paid by
the debtors.
ISSUE:
CESAR REYES, PETITIONER VS. AGRIPINO
ZABALLERO, RESPONDENT
89 PHIL 39
FACTS:
This case originated from a loan of P6,500 with interest at
10 per cent per annum payable in advance, made by Dr. Ceasar
Reyes to Agripino Zaballero on October 1, 1942. Zaballero
secured the payment with a first mortgage on ten parcels of land.
The installments due for 1942 and 1943 totaling the sum
of P1,300 plus interest were paid in Japanese Military Script and
the Payments were unreservedly accepted. On November 30,
1944, Zaballero offered to pay the third installments and its
interests which fell due on October of the same year, but Reyes
refused to accept on the ground that it was immoral and unjust
that the payment be made in Japanese Military notes which had
considerably devaluated, and that he had an option according to
the contract to have the payment in Philippine or United States

What constitutes Duress or Intimidation?

RULING:
According to the Civil Code, there is Duress or
intimidation when one of the contracting parties is inspired by a
rational and well-grounded fear or suffering an imminent and
serious injury to his person or property, of his spouse, descendants
and ascendants.
Mere reluctance does not detract from the voluntariness of
ones acts. There is a distinction between a case where a person
gives his consent reluctantly and even against his good sense and
judgment, and where he, in reality, gives no consent at all, as
where he executed a contract or performs an act against a pressure
which he cannot resist. It is clear that one acts as voluntarily and
independently in the eye of the law when he acts reluctantly and
with hesitation as when he acts spontaneously and joyously.
Legally speaking he acts as voluntarily and freely when he acts
wholly against his better sense and judgment as when he acts in
168

conformity with them. Between the two acts there is no difference

in law.

nine months, the 23 of February of 1939. From you are from this
event, the plaintiff abandonment to demanded and volvio not to
make marital life with her.
Issue:
Whether or not the was attended by fraud.
Ruling:

BUCCAT, plaintiff v BUCCAT, defendant

G.R. No 47101 April 25, 1941
Facts:
The 20 of March of 1939 the inico plaintiff
present/display cause, in which not comparecio the demanded
one, despite properly to be located. By that, allowed the plaintiff
to present/display its tests, the inferior Court failure the subject in
favor of the demanded one. The plaintiff requests the cancellation
of his marriage are been with the demanded Luida Mangonon de
Buccat the 26 of November of 1938, in the City of Baguio, being
based in which, when allowing in this marriage, she did because
demanded habia assured to him that she was virgin.The plaintiff
conocio to demanded the month of March of 1938. After several
interviews, both were it jeopardize the 19 of September of he
himself year. The 26 of November of equal year, the plaintiff
contracted marriage with the demanded one in catedrla catholic of
the City of Baguio. Desoues to coexist maritally by space of
eighty and nine days, the demanded one gave to light a boy of

Yes. The court does not see reason some to revoke the
appealed sentence. In effect, the allegation of the plaintiff and
apellant is improbable that nor followed habia suspected the
gravido state the demanded one, being this, as it is proven, in
pregnant condition very outpost. Reason why there is place no to
consider the fraud of which the apellant speaks. The alleged thing
by this in the sense that ses rare not to find people of developed
abdomen, seems to us pueril to deserve our consideration, as
much but whatever that the plaintiff was student of first year of
right.The marriage is an institution sacratisima: it is the
foundation in which the society rests. In order to annul it, they are
necessary clear and fehacientes tests. In this subject such tests do
not exist.

169

ENRICO L. PACETE, petitioner, vs. HON. GLICERIO V.

CARRIAGA, respondent
G.R. No. L-53880. March 17, 1994
Facts:
On 29 October 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint
for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between her husband
Enrico L. Pacete, as well as for legal separation (between Alanis
and Pacete), accounting and separation of property. In her
complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete on April 30,
1938 before the Justice of the Peace of Cotabato, Cotabato; that
they had a child named Consuelo who was born on 11 March
1943; that Pacete subsequently contracted in 1948 a second
marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion in Kidapawan, North
Cotabato; that she learned of such marriage only on August 1,
1979; that during her marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast
property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and several
motor vehicles; that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of
property either in his name and the name of Clarita or in the
names of his children with Clarita; that Pacete ignored overtures
for an amicable settlement; and that reconciliation between her
and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to
continue living with Clarita. The defendants were served with
summons on November 15, 1979. They filed a motion for an
extension of 20 days within which to file an answer. The court

granted the motion. On the due date, the defendants again asked
for a second extension which was again granted by the court.
Again, on the agreed due date, defendants asked for another 15day extension which was however denied by the court. Initial
proceedings using the evidence only of Concepcion followed
thereafter.
On 17 March 1980, the court through the Hon. Glicerio
Carriga promulgated the herein questioned decision namely: the
valid issuance of the legal separation between Concepcion and
Enrico Pacete; that the following properties namely the 10 parcels
of land, which were originally only named after Enrico Pacete, are
hereby declared as the conjugal properties of the partnership of
Concepcion and Enrico Pacete; ordering Enrico Pacete to pay
Concepcion the sum of P46,950.00 which is her share in the
unaccounted income of the rice mill and corn sheller from 1971 to
1973; and declaring the subsequent marriage between Enrico
Pacete and Clarita de la Concepcion to be void ab initio.
Because of this, Enrico Pacete filed a special action of
certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not appearance of the state is essential?
Ruling:
The Civil Code provides: "Art. 101. No decree of legal
separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the
defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire
whether or not collusion between the parties exists. If there is no
collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in
order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not
fabricated." Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the
Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation
must "in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed
since the filing of the petition," obviously in order to provide the
170

parties a "cooling-off" period. In this interim, the court should

take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.
It was found out that the aforequoted statutory
requirements were not followed by both Concepcion Alanis and
Hon. Glicerio Carriaga.
The special prescriptions on actions that can put the
integrity of marriage to an end are impelled by no less than the
State's interest in the marriage relation and its intention not to
leave the matter within the exclusive domain of the parties to
alone dictate, which was not present in this case since the decision
was only based on the evidence of Concepcion. It is clear that
Concepcion did, in fact, specifically pray for legal separation.
That other remedies which have likewise been sought in the same
action cannot excuse compliance, with any of the statutory
requirements aforequoted. Therefore, there is the need for the
intervention of the state.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari by Enrico Pacete
is hereby GRANTED and the Decision of 17 March 1980 are
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
EMILIO TUASON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents
G.R. No. 116607. April 10, 1996
Facts:
In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Makati a petition for
annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner
Emilio R. Tuason. In her complaint, private respondent alleged
that she and petitioner were married on June 3, 1972 and from this
union, begot two children; that at the time of the marriage,
petitioner was already psychologically incapacitated to comply
with his essential marital obligations which became manifest
afterward and resulted in violent fights between husband and wife;
that petitioner used prohibited drugs, was apprehended by the

authorities and sentenced to a one-year suspended penalty and has

not been rehabilitated; that petitioner was a womanizer; that after
he left the conjugal dwelling, petitioner gave minimal support to
the family and even refused to pay for the tuition fees of their
children compelling private respondent to accept donations and
dole-outs from her family and friends; that attempts at
reconciliation were made but they all failed because of petitioners
refusal to reform. In addition to her prayer for annulment, private
respondent prayed for powers of administration to save the
conjugal properties from further dissipation.
After the issues were joined, trial commenced on March
30, 1990. Private respondent presented her evidences. On the
scheduled reception of the petitioners evidences on May 11,
1990, petitioners counsel filed for postponement on the ground
that the principal counsel was out of the country. The court
granted the motion and reset the hearing on June 8, 1990. On the
said date, petitioner failed to appear. On oral motion of private
respondent, the court declared petitioner to have waived his right
to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision on
the basis of the evidence presented. On June 29, 1990, the trial
court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of private
respondents marriage to petitioner and awarding custody of the
children to private respondent.
The petitioner appealed but was again denied by the CA. at
the Supreme Court, petitioner alleges that the proper process for
annulment of marriage or legal separation was not properly
followed by the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in the process of
rendering the marriage null and void?
Ruling:
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by
default is fraught with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases
171

for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal

separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear
on behalf of the state for the purpose of preventing any collusion
between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant spouse fails to answer
the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but
instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if
collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or
fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or
annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his
opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated. Our
Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the
family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on the
policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution
in which the state is vitally interested.
The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict
application of Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code. For one,
petitioner was not declared in default by the trial court for failure
to answer. Petitioner actively participated in the proceedings
below by filing several pleadings and cross-examining the
witnesses of private respondent. It is crystal clear that every stage
of the litigation was characterized by a no-holds barred contest
and not by collusion. The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
in annulment of marriage and legal separation proceedings is to
determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take
care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioners
vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the
conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no
allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or
fabricated by any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we
are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney
to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not
fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial court.

172

reputation especially among the Filipino-Chinese community. He

further allege that what took place were mere disagreements. He
also argues that a decree for legal separation should not be granted
because Lucita abandoned the conjugal dwelling. Hence the
appeal to this court.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in disregarding clear evidence
repudiating respondents claim of repeated physical violence and
grossly abusive conduct on the part of petitioner?
Ruling:

ONG ENG KIAM, petitioner vs. LUCITA ONG, respondent

G.R No. 153206. October 23, 2006
Facts:
Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong and Lucita G.
Ong were married on July 13, 1975 at the San Agustin Church,
Manila. They have three children. On March 21, 1996, Lucita
filed a complaint for legal separation under Art. 55 (1) of the
family Code before the RTC-Dagupan alleging that her life with
William was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation
and grossly abusive conduct. The said abuses were repeated
almost everyday. William would also scold and beat the children
at different parts of their bodies using the buckle of his belt;
whenever she tried to stop William from hitting the children, he
would turn his ire on her and box her. There was even one time
when William pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the
house. Both the RTC and CA granted the petition for Legal
Separation. William claim that the only parties who will benefit
from a decree of legal separation are Lucitas parents and siblings
while such decree would condemn him as a violent and cruel
person, a wife-beater and a child-abuser and will taint his

As correctly observed by the RTC, William admitted that

there was no day that he did not quarrel with his wife, which made
his life miserable and he blames her for being negligent of her
wifely duties. Lucita and her sister also gave numerous accounts
of the instances when William displayed violent temper against
Lucita and their children. William claims that the witnesses of
Lucita are not credible because of their relationship with her. We
do not agree. Relationship alone is not enough reason to discredit
and label a witness testimony as biased and unworthy of
credence. William also posits that the real motive of Lucita in
filing the case is in order for her side of the family to gain control
of the conjugal properties. The court finds such reasoning hard to
believe. What is more probable is that there truly exists a ground
for legal separation, a cause so strong that Lucita had to seek
redress from the courts. Also without merit is the argument of
William that no decree should be granted because of the
abandonment done by Lucita. The abandonment referred to is
abandonment without justifiable cause for more than 1 year. As it
was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive
conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated by
the said provision.
Wherefore, the petition is denied.

173

AIDA BANEZ, petitioner vs. GABRIEL BANEZ, respondent

G.R No. 133628. January 23, 2002
Facts:
On September 23, 1996, the RTC-Cebu decreed the legal
separation between petitioner Aida Banez and respondent Gabrial
Banez on the ground of the latters sexual infidelity; the
dissolution of their conjugal property relations and the division of
the conjugal net assets; the forfeiture of respondents share in
the net conjugal assets in favor of the common children and an
order to respondent to leave the conjugal dwelling. In another
motion, petitioner sought moral and exemplary damages. The
RTC this time denied her petition. In turn, in a petition for
certiorari, Gabrial Banez elevated the case to the CA which
decided that the grant of execution by the RTC be set aside. The
CA also denied Aidas motion for reconsideration. Hence this
appeal.

Ruling:
In this case, considering the reasons cited by petitioner that
she and her children be allowed to occupy and enjoy the house
considering that during the entire proceedings before the RTC, she
did not have the chance to occupy it, we are in view that there is
no superior or urgent circumstances that outweighs the damage
which respondent would suffer if he were ordered to vacate the
house since even he was not given the chance to occupy the said
house.
Further, petitioner alleges that an action for legal
separation is one where multiple appeals are allowed. We do not
think so. The issues involved in the case will necessarily relate to
the same marital relationship between the parties. The effects of
legal separation such as entitlement to live separately, dissolution
and liquidation of the absolute community, and custody of the
minor children, follow from the decree of legal separation. They
are not separate or distinct matters that may be resolved by the
court and become final prior to or apart from the decree of legal
separation. Rather, they are mere incidents of legal separation.
Thus, they may not be subject to multiple appeals.
Wherefore, the petitions are denied. The decision of the
CA is affirmed.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in setting aside the decision
of the RTC ordering respondent to vacate their residential house?
174

acted in abuse of discretion in ordering him for payment of

support.
Issue:
Whether or not the ground is sufficient in this case?

FROILAN GAUDIONCO, petitioner, vs. HON. SENEN

PENARANDA, respondent
G.R No. 79284. November 27, 1987
Facts:
On 29 May 1986, Teresita Gaudionco, the legal wife of the
petitioner, Froilan Gaudionco, filed with the RTC-Misamis
Oriental, presided over by respondent Judge, Hon. Senen
Penaranda, a complaint against petitioner for legal separation, on
the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and
payment of damages. On 13 October 1986, Teresita Gaudionco
also filed with the MTC-General Santos City, a complaint against
petitioner for concubinage. On 14 November 1986, an application
for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite, pending a
decision in the action for legal separation, was filed by Teresita
Gaudionco in the civil case for legal separation. The respondent
judge then ordered the payment of support pendente lite.
The petitioner believes that the civil action for legal
separation is grounded on concubinage, so that all proceedings
related to legal separation will have to be suspended to await
conviction or acquittal for concubinage in the criminal case.
Petitioner also argues that his conviction for concubinage will
have to be first secured before the action for legal separation can
prosper or succeed, as the basis of the action for legal separation is
his alleged offense of concubinage. He also alleges that the judge

Ruling:
In view of the amendment under the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, a civil action for legal separation, based on
concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a
criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not
one "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" even if
both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the
same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right
to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as, the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of
offsprings support, and disqualification from inheriting from the
innocent spouse, among others. A decree of legal separation, on
the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by
preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No
criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.
Petitioner's attempt to resist payment of support pendente
lite to his wife must also fail, as we find no proof of grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge in ordering the
same. Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an
action for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the
judge. If petitioner finds the amount of support pendente lite
ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or
reduce the same.
Wherefore, the petition of petitioner is dismissed.

175

accused alleges the following: that they were into an illicit affair,
however, they denied that they had sexual intercourse on
November 2, 1982 which Dr. Neri claims; and finally, that a
pardon had been extended by Dr. Neri, and that he had later
contracted marriage with another woman with whom he is
presently co-habiting.
Issue:
Whether or not the pardon of Dr. Neri is tenable to free the
two accused of their criminal liability?
EDUARDO ARROYO J.R., petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 96602. Nov. 19, 1991
Facts:
On November 2, 1982, accused, Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri in
the company of Mrs. Linda Sare and witness Jabunan, took the
morning plane to Baguio. Arriving at around 11:00 a.m., they
dropped first at the house of Mrs. Vera, mother of Ruby Vera at
Crystal Cave, Baguio City then proceeded to the Mines View Park
Condominium owned by the Neri spouses. At around 7 pm,
accused Eduardo Arroyo arrived at the Neris' condominium.
Jabunan opened the door for Arroyo who immediately went
knocked at the master's bedroom where accused Ruby Neri and
her companion Linda Sare were. On accused Ruby Neri's request,
Linda Sare left the master's bedroom and went upstairs to the sala
leaving the two accused alone in the masters bedroom. About
forty-five minutes later, accused Arroyo Jr. came up and told
Linda Sare that she could already come down. The event was
made known to Dr. Jorge Neri, husband of Ruby Neri, who
thereafter, filed a criminal complaint for adultery before the RTCBenguet against his wife, Ruby Vera Neri, and Eduardo Arroyo.
Both the RTC and the CA found the two accused guilty of
adultery.
Ruby Vera Neri and Eduardo Arroyo filed for a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the CA. On appeal, both

Ruling:
The rule on pardon is found in Article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code which provides: "Art.344-The crime of adultery and
concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed
by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute
criminal prosecution without including both parties, if they are
both alive, or in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned
the offenders.
While there is a conceptual difference between consent
and pardon in the sense that consent is granted prior to the
adulterous act while pardon is given after the illicit affair,
nevertheless, for either consent or pardon to benefit the accused, it
must be given prior to the filing of a criminal complaint. In the
present case, the compromise agreement stating the pardon given
by Dr. Neri, was executed only on February 16, 1989, after the
trial court had already rendered its decision dated December 17,
1987 finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Because
of this, the said pardon is not sufficient to free the two accused
namely Ruby Vera Neri and Eduardo Arroyo of the crime adultery.

176

BENJAMIN BUGAYONG, plaintiff-appellant, vs.LEONILA

GINEZ, defendant-appellee.
G.R No. L-10033. December 28, 1956

left. After that and despite such belief, Benjamin still exerted
efforts to locate her and failing to find her, he went to Bacarra,
Ilocos Norte, "to soothe his wounded feelings". On November 18,
1952, Benjamin filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
a complaint for legal separation against his wife, Leonila who
filed an answer vehemently denying the averments of the
complaint and setting up affirmative defenses. After the issues
were joined and convinced that reconciliation was not possible,
the court set the case for hearing on June 9, 1953. Benjamin
presented his evidences, but the counsel of Leonila moved for the
dismissal of the complaint due to the fact that there was
condonation. Both the RTC and CA believed that there was
indeed condonation.

Facts:

Issue:

Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States

Navy, was married to defendant Leonila Ginez on August 27,
1949, at Asingan, Pangasinan. Immediately after their marriage,
the couple lived with their sisters who later moved to Sampaloc,
Manila. At about July, 1951, Leonila Ginez left the dwelling of
her sister-in-law and informed her husband by letter that she had
gone to reside with her mother in Asingan, Pangasinan.
As
early as July, 1951, Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters
from his sister-in-law and some from anonymous writers
informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. On crossexamination, Benjamin admitted that his wife also informed him
by letter, that a certain "Eliong" kissed her. All these
communications prompted him in to seek the advice of the navy
legal department. In August, 1952, Benjamin went to Asingan,
Pangasinan, and sought for his wife whom he met in the house of
Leonilas godmother. She came along with him and both
proceeded to the house of a cousin ofBenjamin, where they stayed
and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife. On the
second day, Benjamin tried to verify from his wife the truth of the
information he received that she had committed adultery but
Leonila, instead of answering his query, merely packed up and

Whether or not there has been condonation?

Ruling:
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense
constituting a ground for legal separation or, condonation is the
"conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or wife of a
matrimonial offense which the latter has committed". It is to be
noted, however, that in defendant's answer she vehemently and
vigorously denies having committed any act of infidelity against
her husband, and even if we were to give full weight to the
testimony of the plaintiff, who was the only one that had the
chance of testifying in Court and link such evidence with the
averments of the complaint, we would have to conclude that the
facts appearing on the record are far from sufficient to establish
the charge of adultery preferred against the defendant. Certainly,
the letter that plaintiff claims to have received from his sister-inlaw, must have been too vague and indefinite as to defendant's
infidelity to deserve its production in evidence; nor the
anonymous letters which plaintiff also failed to present; nor the
alleged letter that, according to plaintiff, his wife addressed to him
admitting that she had been kissed by one Eliong, whose identity
177

was not established, do not amount to anything that can be relied

upon.
The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent
spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to
the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders,
legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion
between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the
dismissal of the petition.
A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiffhusband clearly shows that there was a condonation on the part of
the husband for the supposed "acts of rank infidelity amounting to
adultery" committed by defendant-wife. Admitting for the sake of
argument that the infidelities amounting to adultery were
committed by the defendant-wife, reconciliation was effected
between her and the plaintiff. The act of the latter in persuading
her to come along with him, and the fact that she went with him
and consented to be brought to the house of his cousin and
together they slept there as husband and wife for one day and one
night, and the further fact that in the second night they again slept
together in their house likewise as husband and wife- all these
facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a
reconciliation between them was effected and that there was a
condonation of the wife by the husband. The reconciliation
occurred almost ten months after he came to know of the acts of
infidelity amounting to adultery. Although he believed that her
wife committed adultery, he still persuaded her wife.
It is important to note that a divorce suit will not be
granted for adultery where the parties continue to live together
after it was known, or there is sexual intercourse after knowledge
of adultery, or sleeping together for a single night, and many
others. The resumption of marital cohabitation as a basis of
condonation will generally be inferred, nothing appearing to the
contrary, from the fact of the living together as husband and wife,
especially as against the husband.
Because of this, the Supreme Court agreed with the RTC
and CAs findings that there was indeed condonation on the part of

Benjamin Bugayong, therefore, the foregoing case is hereby

dismissed.

178

that No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for

the same offense.
Issue:
Whether or not consent attended the case?

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs.

GUADALUPE ZAPATA and DALMACIO BONDOC,
defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-3047. May 161951
Facts:
In the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a complaint for
adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc against Guadalupe Zapata,
his wife, and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting and
having repeated sexual intercourse during the period from the year
1946 to March 14, 1947. The defendant-wife entered a plea of
guilty and was sentenced to suffer four months of arresto mayor
which penalty she served. In the same court, on September 17,
1948, the offended husband filed another complaint for adulterous
acts committed by his wife and her paramour from March 15,
1947 to September 17, 1948. On February 21, 1949, each of the
defendants filed a motion to quash the complaint on the ground
that they would be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. The trial court upheld the contention of the
defendants and quashed the second complaint.
The trial court held that the adulterous acts charged in the
first and second complaints must be deemed one continuous
offense, the defendants in both complaints being the same and
identical persons and the two sets of unlawful acts having taken
place continuously during the years 1946, 1947 and part of 1948
is within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision

Ruling:
Adultery is a crime of result and not of tendency; it is an
instantaneous crime which is consummated and exhausted or
completed at the moment of the carnal union. Each sexual
intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery. True, two or more
adulterous acts committed by the same defendants are against the
same person- the offended husband; the same status- the union of
the husband and wife by their marriage; and the same community
represented by the State for its interest in maintaining and
preserving such status. But this identity of the offended party,
status and society does not argue against the commission of the
crime of adultery as many times as there were carnal acts
consummated, for as long as the status remain unchanged, the
nexus undissolved and unbroken, an encroachment or trespass
upon that status constitutes a crime. There is no constitutional or
legal provision which bars the filing of as many complaints for
adultery as there were adulterous acts committed, each
constituting one crime.
In the instant case the last unity does not exist, because as
already stated the culprits perpetrate the crime in every sexual
intercourse and they need not do another or other adulterous acts
to consummate it. After the last act of adultery had been
committed as charged in the first complaint, the defendants again
committed adulterous acts not included in the first complaint and
for which the second complaint was filed.
Another reason why a second complaint charging the
commission of adulterous acts does not constitute a violation of
the double jeopardy clause of the constitution is that, at the time of
the commission of the crime charged in the second complaint, the
paramour already knew that his codefendant was a married
179

woman and yet he continued to have carnal knowledge of her.

Even if the husband should pardon his adulterous wife, such
pardon would not exempt the wife and her paramour from
criminal liability for adulterous acts committed after the pardon
was granted, because the pardon refers to previous and not to
subsequent adulterous acts
The order appealed from, which quashed the second
complaint for adultery, is hereby reversed and set aside, and the
trial court is directed to proceed with the trial of the defendants in
accordance with law.

JOSE DE OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. SERAFINA

FLORENCIANO, respondent.
G.R. No. L-13553. February 23, 1960
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938 by a
religious ceremony in Guimba, Nueva Ecija, and had lived
thereafter as husband and wife. They begot several children. In
March 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his
wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with
one Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant carrying marital
relations with another man, plaintiff sent her to Manila in June
1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year.
Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city, defendant
was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas.
Towards the end of June 1952, when defendant had finished
studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived
separately. On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act
of having illicit relations with another man by the name of Nelson
Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for

legal separation; to which defendant manifested her conformity

provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action.
Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal
separation.
The RTC and CA held that a legal separation could not be
decreed due to the confession of judgment by the defendant.
Issue:
Whether or not pardon attended the case at bar?
Ruling:
The mere circumstance that defendant told the Fiscal that
she "like also" to be legally separated from her husband, is no
obstacle to the successful prosecution of the action. When she
refused to answer the complaint, she indicated her willingness to
be separated. Yet, the law does not order the dismissal. Allowing
the proceeding to continue, it takes precautions against collusion,
which implies more than consent or lack of opposition to the
agreement. In this connection, it has been held that collusion may
not be inferred from the mere fact that the guilty party confesses
to the offense and thus enables the other party to procure evidence
necessary to prove it; and proof that the defendant desires the
divorce and makes no defense, is not by itself collusion. Here, the
offense of adultery had really taking place without collusion by
the parties, according to the evidence. The Supreme Court does
not think plaintiff's failure actively to search for defendant and
take her home constituted condonation or consent to her
adulterous relations with Orzame. It will be remembered that she
"left" him after having sinned with Arcalas and after he had
discovered her dates with other men. Consequently, it was not his
duty to search for her to bring her home. Hers was the obligation
to return.
Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband's
petition we hereby reverse the appealed decision and decree a
legal separation between this spouse. Costs of all instances against
Serafina Florenciano.
180

May 30, 1944 to the present when we made our verbal separation
into writing.
In January, 1955, defendant began cohabiting and
deporting themselves as husband and wife who were generally
reputed as such in the community with Asuncion Rebulado and on
September 1, 1955, said Asuncion gave birth to their child. On
April 24, 1956, plaintiff Socorro Matubis filed a complaint for
legal separation Alleging abandonment and concubinage on the
part of defendant. The RTC and CA dismissed the case due to the
presence of condonation on the part of the plaintiff.
Issue:
Whether or not condonation attended the case?

SOCORRO MATUBIS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ZOILO

PRAXEDES, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-11766. October 25, 1960
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were legally married on January
10, 1943 at Iriga, Camarines Sur. For failure to agree on how they
should live as husband and wife, the couple, on May 30, 1944,
agreed to live separately from each other, which status remained
unchanged until the present. On April 3, 1948, plaintiff and
defendant entered into an agreement,the significant portions of
which are hereunder reproduced: (a) That both of us relinquish
our right over the other as legal husband and wife; (b) That both
without any interference by any of us, nor either of us can
prosecute the other for adultery or concubinage or any other crime
or suit arising from our separation; (c) That I, the, wife, is no
longer entitled for any support from my husband or any benefits
he may received thereafter, nor I the husband is not entitled for
anything from my wife; (d) That neither of us can claim anything
from the other from the time we verbally separated, that is from

Ruling:
The very wording of the agreement gives no room for
interpretation other than that given by the trial judge. Counsel in
his brief submits that the agreement is divided in two parts. The
first part having to do with the act of living separately which he
claims to be legal, and the second part, that which becomes a
license to commit the ground for legal separation which is
admittedly illegal. We do not agree in appellants defense.
Condonation and consent on the part of plaintiff are the most vital
part in the said agreement. The condonation and consent here are
not only implied but expressed. The law (Art. 100 Civil Code)
specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed only by
the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or
consent to the adultery or concubinage. Having condoned and or
consented in writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of the
court's sympathy. Plaintiff's counsel even agrees that the
complaint should be dismissed. He claims however, that the
grounds for the dismissal should not be those stated in the
decision of the lower court, "but on the ground that plaintiff and
defendant have already been legally separated from each other,
but without the marital bond having been affected, long before the
181

effectivity of the new Civil Code." Again, we cannot subscribe to

counsel's contention, because it is contrary to the evidence.
Wherefore, the decisions of both RTC and CA are hereby
affirmed.

of the accused. On the trial of concubinage, accused interposed

the plea of double jeopardy, and the case was dismissed. But upon
appeal by the fiscal, accused was convicted of concubinage
through reckless imprudence. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in convicting accused in the
offense of concubinage?

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs.

RODOLFO SCHNCKENBERGER, defendant-appellant
No. 48183. November 10, 1941
Facts:
On Mach 16, 1926, the accused, Rodolfo Schneckenberger
married the complainant Elena Cartegena and after 7 years of
marital life, they agreed, for reason of alleged incompatibility of
character, to live separately from each other. And on May 25,
1935, they executed a document in which they agreed to live
separately and to choose who they want to live with. On June 15,
1935, the accused, without leaving the Philippines, secured a
divorce from the civil court of Juarez, Mexico. On May 11, 1936,
he contracted another marriage with his co-accused, Julia Medel.
Complainant herein instituted 2 actions for Bigamy in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal and the other for concubinage in the Court
of First Instance of Manila. The first culminated in the conviction

Ruling:
As to appellants plea for double jeopardy, it need only be
observed that the offense of bigamy for which he was convicted
and that of concubinage for which he stood trial are two distinct
offenses in law and in fact as well as the mode of their
prosecution. The celebration of the second marriage, with the first
still existing, characterizes bigamy; in the present case, mere
cohabitation by the husband with a woman who is not his wife
characterizes concubinage.
Upon the other hand, we believe and so hold that the
accused should be acquitted of the crime of concubinage. The
document executed by and between the accused clearly shows that
each party intended to forego the illicit acts of the other. As the
term pardon unquestionably refers to the offense after its
commission, consent must have been intended, agreeably with
its ordinary usage, to refer to the offense prior its commission. No
logical difference can indeed be perceived between prior and
subsequent consent, for in both instances as the offended party has
chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she becomes
unworthy to come to court and invoke its aid in the vindication of
the wrong. In arriving at this conclusion, we do not wish to be
misconstrued as legalizing an agreement to do an illicit act, in
violation of law. Our view must be taken only to mean that an
agreement of the tenor entered into between the parties herein,
operates, within the plain language and manifest policy of the law,
to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense.
182

Wherefore, judgment is reversed and the accused is hereby

acquitted in the crime of concubinage.

be a faithful wife if he would take her back. He refused to pardon

her or to live with her and said she could go where she wished,
that he would have nothing to do with her anymore and she could
do as she pleased. Abandoned for the second time, she and her
child went back to Marcelo Ramos. The husband, knowing that
she resumed living with her codefendant did nothing to interfere
with their relations or to assert his rights as husband. Thereafter,
he left foe Hawaii where he remained fro seven years completely
abandoning his wife and child. On his return to the Philippines, he
presented the second charge of adultery.
Issue:
Whether or not the second complaint would prosper?

PEOPLE OF THE PILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

URSULA SENSANO, defendant-appellant
No. 37720. March 7, 1933
Facts:
Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on
April 29, 1919. they had one child. Shortly after the birth of the
child, the husband left his wife to go to Cagayan where he
remained for three years without writing to his wife or sending her
anything for the support of herself and their son. Poor and
illiterate, she struggled for an existence of herself and her son
until the day she met the accused Marcelo Ramos who took her
and the child to live with him. On the return of the husband in
1924, he filed a charge against his wife and Marcelo Ramos for
adultery and both were sentenced to 4 months and 1 day. After
completing her sentence, the accused left her paramour.
Thereafter, she begged for the husbands pardon and promised to

Ruling:
We have come to the conclusion that the evidence in this
case and his conduct warrant the interference that he consented to
the adulterous relations existing between the accused and
therefore he is not authorized by law to institute this criminal
proceeding. We cannot accept the argument that the 7 years of
consent on his part in the adultery of his wife is explained by his
absence from the Philippines during which period it was
impossible for him to take any action against the accused. There is
not merit in the argument that it was impossible for him to take
any action against the accused during the said 7 years.
Wherefore, the judgment is reversed.

183

Respondent then filed for Legal Separation which was

given by the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the Legal Separating filed by the
respondent would prosper?

AGUEDA BENEDICTO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ESTEBAN

DELA RAMA, defendant
No. 1056. December 8, 1903

Ruling:
It is said that if the plaintiff is guilty, the defendant has
condoned the offense. The wife can defeat the husbands suit by
proving that he has pardoned her.
Our conclusion is that neither one of the parties is entitled
to Legal Separation. As conclusion of law from the foregoing
facts, we hold that neither party is entitled to judgment of Legal
Separation against the other. That judgment be entered that the
plaintiff take nothing by her action.

Facts:
From the affidavit of the plaintiff is the following: that
plaintiff and defendant had lived together from the time of their
marriage in July 1891 to August 1892. It is also admitted that the
defendant suddenly, without any previous warning, took his wife
to the house of her parents, left her there, and never lived with her
afterwards. She also charged defendant with having committed
concubinage with Gregoria Bermejo in 1982. She produced no
evidence to support this allegation. On the other hand, the
defendant presented his counter-affidavit where he agreed on the
time of their marriage. That on his return from an inspection of
one of his estates, his wifes maid gave him a letter in the own
handwriting of his wife which was directed to his lover, a Spanish
corporal of the civil guard named Zabal. She admitted the
genuineness of the letter, fell upon her knees, and implored him to
pardon her. That same day, he took her to the home of her parents,
told what had occurred, and left her there.
184

misconduct of similar nature that barred his right of action under

Article 100 of the new Civil Code that there had been consent and
connivance, and because Brown's action had prescribed under
Article 102 of the same Code since the evidence showed that the
learned of his wife's infidelity in 1945 but only filed action in
1955.
Issue:
Whether or not the prescription barred the success of the
WILLIAM H. BROWN, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JUANITA
YAMBAO, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-10699. October 18, 1957
Facts:
On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court
of First Instance of Manila to obtain legal separation from his
lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that while
interned by the Japanese invaders, from 1942-1945, his wife
engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom
she begot a baby girl; that Brown learned of his wifes misconduct
only in 1945, upon his release from internment; that thereafter the
spouse lived separately and later executed a document liquidating
their conjugal partnership and assigning certain properties to the
erring wife as her share, the complaint prayed for confirmation of
the liquidation agreement; for custody of the children issued of the
marriage and that the defendant be declared disqualified to
succeed the plaintiff; and for their remedy as might be just and
equitable. The court subsequently directed the City Fiscal to
investigate, in accordance with Article 101 of the Civil Code,
whether or not a collusion exists between the parties. As ordered,
Assistant City Fiscal Rafael Jose appeared at the trial, and crossexamined plaintiff Brown. His questions elicited the fact that after
liberation, Brown had lived maritally with another woman and
had begotten children by her. Thereafter, the court rendered
judgment denying the legal separation asked, on the ground that,
while the wife's adultery was established, Brown had incurred in a

case?
Ruling:
ART. 100 of the New Civil Code states that The legal
separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided
there has been no condonation or of consent to the adultery or
concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation
cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the
parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the
petition. It is clear in this court that the case should be dismissed
because of Browns illegal act of cohabiting with another woman.
This court also found, and correctly held that Browns
action was already barred, because he did not petition for legal
separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's
adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945.
Under Article 102 of the new Civil Code, action for legal
separation cannot be filed except within one 1 year from and after
the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause; and within five years
from and after the date when such cause occurred.
Hence, there being at least two well established statutory
grounds for denying the remedy sought, it becomes unnecessary
to delve further into the case and ascertain if Brown's inaction for
ten years also evidences condonation or connivance on his part.
The decision of the RTC dismissing the complaint is therefore
affirmed.

185

The RTC and CA held that a legal separation could not be

decreed due to the confession of judgment by the defendant.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition will not prosper?

JOSE DE OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. SERAFINA

FLORENCIANO, respondent.
G.R. No. L-13553. February 23, 1960
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938 by a
religious ceremony in Guimba, Nueva Ecija, and had lived
thereafter as husband and wife. They begot several children. In
March 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his
wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with
one Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant carrying marital
relations with another man, plaintiff sent her to Manila in June
1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for one year.
Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city, defendant
was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas.
Towards the end of June 1952, when defendant had finished
studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived
separately. On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act
of having illicit relations with another man by the name of Nelson
Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for
legal separation; to which defendant manifested her conformity
provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action.
Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal
separation.

Ruling:
Here, the offense of adultery had really taking place,
according to the evidence. The defendant could not have falsely
told the adulterous acts to the Fiscal, because her story might send
her to jail the moment her husband requests the Fiscal to
prosecute. She could not have practiced deception at such a
personal risk. In this connection, it has been held that collusion
may not be inferred from the mere fact that the guilty party
confesses to the offense and thus enables the other party to
procure evidence necessary to prove it. And proof that the
defendant desires the divorce and makes no defense, is not by
itself collusion.
Moreover, Art. 102 of the New Civil Code stating that an
action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one 1 year
from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause; and
within five years from and after the date when such cause
occurred. This court decided that the 1-year requirement was
followed. The instance when plaintiff caught his wife in 1955 with
another man was deemed to be start of the 1-year requirement
period. Since he filed on that same year-1955, he properly
followed the above stated provision.
Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband's
petition we hereby reverse the appealed decision and decree a
legal separation between this spouse. Costs of all instances against
Serafina Florenciano.

186

ELENA CONTRERAS, plaintiff-appellant, vs.

CESAR J. MACARAIG, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-29138 May 29, 1970
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were married on March 16, 1952 in
the Catholic Church of Quiapo, Manila. Out of their Marriage,
three children were born. Immediately before the election of 1961,
defendant was employed as manager of the printing establishment
owned by plaintiff's father known as the MICO Offset. In that
capacity, defendant met and came to know Lily Ann Alcala, who
place orders with MICO Offset for propaganda materials for Mr.
Sergio Osmea, who was then a Vice-Presidential candidate. After
the elections of 1961, defendant resigned from MICO Offset to be
a special agent at Malacaang. He began to be away so often and
to come home very late. Upon plaintiff's inquiry, defendant
explained that he was out on a series of confidential missions.
In September, 1962, Avelino Lubos, driver of the family
car, told plaintiff that defendant was living in Singalong with Lily
Ann Alcala. When defendant, the following October, returned to
the conjugal home, plaintiff refrained from verifying Lubos' report
from defendant in her desire not to anger nor drive defendant
away. Although plaintiff, in April 1963, also received rumors that
defendant was seen with a woman who was on the family way on

Dasmarias St., she was so happy that defendant again return to

the family home in May, 1963 that she once more desisted from
discussing the matter with him because she did not wish to
precipitate a quarrel and drive him away. All this while, defendant,
if and whenever he returned to the family fold, would only stay
for two or three days but would be gone for a period of about a
month. After plaintiff received reports that Lily Ann Alcala had
given birth to a baby, she sent Mrs. Felicisima Antioquia, her
father's employee, to verify the reports. The latter was driven by
Lubos to the house in Singalong and between 5:00 and 6:00
o'clock that afternoon, she saw defendant was carrying a baby in
his arms. Mrs. Antioquia then went to the parish priest of
Singalong where she inquired about the child of Cesar Macaraig
and Lily Ann Alcala and she was given a copy of the baptismal
certificate of Maria Vivien Mageline Macaraig which she gave to
plaintiff sometime in October 1963.
Plaintiff then entreated her father-in-law, Lucilo Macaraig,
to intercede with defendant and to convince him to return to his
family. Mr. Macaraig; however, Macaraig refused. In November
1963, plaintiff requested the cooperation of defendant's older
sister, Mrs. Enriqueta Majul, and the latter obliged and arranged a
meeting at her home in Buendia between plaintiff and Lily Ann
Alcala. Lily Ann said she was willing to give up defendant as she
had no desire to be accused criminally but it was defendant who
refused to break relationship with her. In the early part of
December 1963, plaintiff, accompanied by her two children went
to talk to defendant at his place of work. Plaintiff pleaded with
defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala and to return to the conjugal
home, assuring him that she was willing to forgive him. Defendant
informed plaintiff that he could no longer leave Lily Ann and
refused to return to his legitimate family.
On December 14, 1963, plaintiff instituted the present
action for legal separation. When defendant did not interpose any
answer after he was served summons, the case was referred to the
Office of the City Fiscal of Manila pursuant to the provisions of
Article 101 of the Civil Code. After a report was received from
187

Asst. Fiscal Primitivo M. Pearanda that he believed that there

was no collusion present, plaintiff was allowed to present her
evidence. Defendant has never appeared in this case.
The RTC and CA dismissed the complaints because it
failed to follow Article 102 of the New Civil Code providing that
an action for legal separation cannot be instituted except within
one year after plaintiff "became cognizant of the cause."
Issue:
Whether or not the rule on Prescription should be
followed?
Ruling:
The requirement of the law that a complaint for legal
separation be filed within one year after the date plaintiff become
cognizant of the cause is not of prescriptive nature, but is of the
essence of the cause of action. It is consonant with the philosophy
that marriage is an inviolable social institution so that the law
provides strict requirements before it will allow a disruption of its
status.
In the instant action, the Court has to find that plaintiff
became cognizant of defendant's infidelity in September, 1962.
Plaintiff made successive attempts to induce the husband to
amend his erring ways but failed. Her desire to bring defendant
back to the connubial fold and to preserve family solidarity
deterred her from taking timely legal action.
The only question to be resolved is whether the period of
one year provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code should be
counted, as far as the instant case is concerned from September
1962 or from December 1963. Computing the period of one year
from the former date, it is clear that plaintiff's complaint filed on
December 14, 1963 came a little too late.
The period of "five years from after the date when such
cause occurred" is not here involved.
Upon the undisputed facts it seems clear that, in the month
of September 1962, whatever knowledge appellant had acquired

regarding the infidelity of her husband, that is, of the fact that he
was then living in Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala, was only
through the information given to her by the driver of their family
car. Much as such hearsay information had pained and anguished
her, she apparently thought it best, and no reasonable person may
justifiably blame her for it, not to go deeper into the matter herself
because in all probability even up to that time, notwithstanding
her husband's obvious neglect of his entire family, appellant still
cherished the hope, however forlorn, of his coming back home to
them. Indeed, when her husband returned to the conjugal home
the following October, she purposely refrained from bringing up
the matter of his marital infidelity "in her desire not to anger nor
drive defendant away." True, appellant likewise heard in April
1963 rumors that her husband was seen with a woman on the
family way on Dasmarias Street, but failed again to either bring
up the matter with her husband or make attempts to verify the
truth of said rumors, but this was due, because "she was so happy
that defendant again returned to the family home in May 1963 that
she once more desisted from discussing the matter with him
because she did not wish to precipitate a quarrel and drive him
away." As a matter of fact, notwithstanding all these painful
information which would not have been legally sufficient to make
a case for legal separation, appellant still made brave, desperate
attempts to persuade her husband to come back home. In the
words of the lower court, she "entreated her father-in-law, Lucilo
Macaraig, to intercede with defendant and to convince him to
return to his family" and also "requested the cooperation of
defendant's older sister, Mrs. Enriqueta Majul" for the same
purpose, but all that was of no avail. Her husband remained
stubborn.
After a careful review of the record, We are persuaded
that, in the eyes of the law, the only time when appellant really
became cognizant of the infidelity of her husband was in the early
part of December 1963 when plaintiff, accompanied by their two
children went to talk to defendant where she pleaded but however
was refused by the defendant.
188

From all the foregoing We conclude that it was only on the

occasion mentioned in the preceding paragraph when her husband
admitted to her that he was living with and would no longer leave
Lily Ann to return to his legitimate family that appellant must be
deemed to be under obligation to decide whether to sue or not to
sue for legal separation, and it was only then that the legal period
of one year must be deemed to have commenced.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is set aside and
another is hereby rendered holding that appellant is entitled to
legal separation.

to educate her children, being unstable in her emotions and unable

to give the children the love, respect and care of a true mother and
without means to educate them.
The RTC granted the custody of the children to defendant.
The main reason given by the judge, for refusing plaintiffs
request that evidence be allowed to be introduced on the issues, is
the prohibition contained in Art. 103 of the Civil Code stating that
an action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six
months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition.
Issue:
Whether the cooling-off period is tenable in the case at
bar?

LUIS MA. ARANETA, petitioner vs.

HON. HERMOGENES CONCECPCION, respondent
G.R No. L-9667. July 31, 1956
Facts:
The main action was brought by petitioner against his wife
for legal separation on the ground of adultery. Defendant filed an
omnibus petition alleging that she was being molested and
harassed, to secure custody of their three minor children and a
monthly support of P5, 000.00. Plaintiff opposed the petition,
denying the allegation and further alleging that defendant has
abandoned the children; alleging that conjugal properties were
only worth P80,000.00, not 1 million pesos as alleged by
defendant; also alleging that defendant had abandoned them and
had committed adultery, that by her conduct she had become unfit

Ruling:
It is conceded that the period of six months fixed in Art.
103 is evidently intended as a cooling-off period to make possible
a reconciliation between the spouses. The recital of their
grievances against each other in court may only fan their already
inflamed passions against one another.
Take the case at bar for instance. Why should the court
ignore the claim of adultery supported by circumstantial evidence
the authenticity of which cannot be denied? And why assume that
the children are in the custody of the wife when it is precisely
alleged in the petition and affidavits that she has abandoned the
conjugal home?
Evidence of all these disputed allegations should be
allowed that the discretion of the court as to the custody and
alimony pendent elite may be lawfully exercised. The rule is that
all provisions of the law even if apparently contradictory, should
be allowed to stand and given effect by reconciling them if
necessary. Thus, the determination of the custody and alimony
should be given effect and force provided it does not go to the
extent of violating the policy of the cooling-off period.

189

ENRICO L. PACETE, CLARITA DE LA CONCEPCION,

petitioner, vs.
HON. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA, respondent
G.R. No. L-53880. March 17, 1994
Facts:
On 29 October 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint
for the declaration of nullity of the marriage as well as for legal
separation between her husband Enrico L. Pacete. In her
complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete on April 30,
1938 before the Justice of the Peace of Cotabato, Cotabato; that
they had a child named; that Pacete subsequently contracted in
1948 a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion in
Kidapawan, North Cotabato; that she learned of such marriage
only on August 1, 1979; that during her marriage to Pacete, the
latter acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of land,
fishponds and several motor vehicles; that he fraudulently placed
the several pieces of property either in his name and the name of

Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita; that Pacete

ignored overtures for an amicable settlement; and that
reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he
evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita. The defendants
were served with summons on November 15, 1979. They filed a
motion for an extension of 20 days within which to file an answer.
The court granted the motion. On the due date, the defendants
again asked for a second extension which was again granted by
the court. Again, on the agreed due date, defendants asked for
another 15-day extension which was however denied by the court.
Initial proceedings using the evidence only of Concepcion
followed thereafter.
On 17 March 1980, the court through the Hon. Glicerio
Carriga promulgated the herein questioned decision namely: the
valid issuance of the legal separation between Concepcion and
Enrico Pacete and declaring the subsequent marriage between
Enrico Pacete and Clarita de la Concepcion to be void ab initio.
Because of this, Enrico Pacete filed a special action of
certiorari questioning the period of trial by the Hon. Carriaga.
Issue:
Whether or not the cooling-off period is mandatory?
Ruling:
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the
Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation
must "in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed
since the filing of the petition," obviously in order to provide the
parties a "cooling-off" period. In this interim, the court should
take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile. The special
prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to
possible jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest
in the marriage relation and its avowed intention not to leave the
matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties
to alone dictate.
190

It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray

for legal separation. That other remedy, whether principal or
incidental, have likewise been sought in the same action cannot
dispense, nor excuse compliance, with any of the statutory
requirements aforequoted. The 6-months period is clear in this
court to have been followed by the RTC judge.
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted and
the proceedings are Nullified and Set Aside. No costs.

SAMSON T. SABALONES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF

APPEALS, respondents
G.R. No. 106169 February 14, 1994

old, very sick and living alone without any income. Private
respondent opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for
legal separation. She alleged that the house in Greenhills was
being occupied by her and their six children. She also informed
the court that despite her husband's retirement, he had not returned
to his legitimate family and was instead maintaining a separate
residence. In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the decree of
legal separation and order the liquidation of their conjugal
properties, with forfeiture of her husband's share. After trial, the
court decreed the legal separation of the spouses and the forfeiture
of the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, declaring as
well that he was not entitled to support from his respondent wife.
This decision was appealed to the CA. Pendente lite, the
respondent wife filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to command the petitioner from interfering
with the administration of their properties in Greenhills and
Forbes Park. After hearing, the CA granted the preliminary
injunction prayed for by his wife. The petitioner argues that since
the law provides for a joint administration of the conjugal
properties by the husband and wife, no injunctive relief can be
issued against one or the other.
Issue:
Whether or not the courts erred in their decision?

Facts:
As a member of our diplomatic service assigned to
different countries during his successive tours of duties, petitioner
Samson T. Sabalones left to his wife, respondent Remedios
Gaviola-Sabalones, the administration of some of their conjugal,
properties for fifteen years. Sabalones retired as ambassador in
1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his wife and
their children but to Thelma Cumareng whom he conducted a
second marriage on October 1981 and their three children. Four
years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a
building and lot located at Greenhills, Metro Manila, belonging to
the conjugal partnership. He claimed that he was sixty-eight years

Ruling:
The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint
administration over the conjugal properties as clearly provided in
the above-cited Article 124 of the Family Code. However, Article
61 states that after a petition for legal separation has been filed,
the trial court shall, in the absence of a written agreement between
the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a third person to
act as the administrator. While it is true that no formal designation
of the administrator has been made, such designation was implicit
in the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in
the conjugal properties. That designation was in effect approved
191

by the CA when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the

preliminary injunction now under challenge. The primary purpose
of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status
quo of the things subject of the action or the relations between the
parties and thus protect the rights of the plaintiff respecting these
matters during the pendency of the suit. Otherwise, the defendant
may, before final judgment, do or continue doing the act which the
plaintiff asks the court to restrain and thus make ineffectual the
final judgment that may be rendered afterwards in favor of the
plaintiff.
The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the
existence of a right and its actual or threatened violation.
Regardless of the outcome of the appeal, it cannot be denied that
as the petitioner's legitimate wife (and the complainant and injured
spouse in the action for legal separation), the private respondent
has a right to a share (if not the whole) of the conjugal estate.
There is also, in our view, enough evidence to raise the
apprehension that entrusting said estate to the petitioner may
result in its improvident disposition to the detriment of his wife
and children. We agree that inasmuch as the trial court had earlier
declared the forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal
properties, it would be prudent not to allow him in the meantime
to participate in its management. Let it be stressed that the
injunction has not permanently installed the respondent wife as
the administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets. It has
merely allowed her to continue administering the properties in the
meantime without interference from the petitioner, pending the
express designation of the administrator in accordance with
Article 61 of the Family Code.
Wherefore, the petition is denied.

192

was sent back to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his
sister, co-petitioner Guillerma Layug and her family. Teresita
claims that she did not immediately follow her children because
Reynaldo had filed a criminal case for bigamy against her and she
was afraid of being arrested. The judgment of conviction in the
bigamy case was actually rendered only on September 29, 1994.
Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and on
December 8, 1992 and filed the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus against the two petitioners to gain custody over the
children, thus starting the whole proceedings to gain custody over
the children.
The RTC suspended Teresita's parental authority and
declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority. On appeal, the
CA however gave custody to Teresita.
REYNALDO ESPIRITU, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 115640. March 15, 1995

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in suspending petitioners
parental authority?

Facts:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu who was employed by the
National Steel Corporation and respondent Teresita Masauding
who was a nurse, first met sometime in 1976 in Iligan. In 1977,
Teresita left for Los Angeles to work as a nurse. In 1984,
Reynaldo was sent by his employer, to Pennsylvania as its liaison
officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a
common law relationship of husband and wife. On August 16
1986, their daughter was born. On October 7, 1987, while they
were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita
got married, and upon their return to the United States, their
second child was born on January 12, 1988. The couple decided to
separate sometime in 1990. Instead of giving their marriage a
second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left
Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. She
claims however, the she keeps in constant touch with her children.
Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but
because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he

Ruling:
Herein lies the error of the Court of Appeals. Instead of
scrutinizing the records to discover the choice of the children and
rather than verifying whether that parent is fit or unfit, respondent
court simply followed statutory presumptions and general
propositions applicable to ordinary or common situations. A
scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita is
more intent on emphasizing the "torture and agony" of a mother
separated from her children and the humiliation she suffered as a
result of her character being made a key issue in court rather than
the feelings and future, the best interest and welfare of her
children. While the bonds between a mother and her children are
special in nature, either parent, whether father or mother, is bound
to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say
that his or her suffering, pride and other feelings of either parent
but the welfare of the child which is the paramount consideration.
The matter of custody is not permanent and unalterable. If the
193

parent who was given custody suffers a future character and

becomes unfit, the matter of custody can always be re-examined.
Decision should be based on the testimony of the daughter giving
all negative characteristics about her mother. Teresita. Moreover,
the court finds Teresita being as she entered into an illicit
relationship with Perdencio Gonzales right there in the house of
petitioner Reynaldo in Pennsylvania. The record shows that the
daughter suffered emotional disturbance caused by the traumatic
effect of seeing her mother hugging and kissing a boarder in their
house. The record also shows that it was Teresita who left the
conjugal home and the children.
The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial
court. The children are now both over seven years old. Their
choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear front
the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus
meeting the two requirements found in the First paragraph of
Article 213 of the Family Code. The presumption under the
second paragraph of said article no longer applies as the children
are over seven years. Assuming that the presumption should have
persuasive value for children only one or two years beyond the
age of seven years mentioned in the statute, there are compelling
reasons and relevant considerations not to grant custody to the
mother. The children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of
their mother and have been affected in their emotional growth by
her behavior.
CARMEN LAPUZ SY, petitioner-appellant, vs. EUFEMIO SY
UY, respondent-appellee.
G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972
Facts:
On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition
for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, in the
main, that they were married on September 30, 1934; that they
had lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943
when her husband abandoned her; that they had no child; that they
acquired properties during their marriage; and that she discovered

her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on

or about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of
legal separation, which, among others, would order that the
defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of
the conjugal partnership profits. Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged
affirmative and special defenses, and counter-claimed for the
declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen O.
Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage,
celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go
Hiok. But before the trial could be completed Carmen O. Lapuz
Sy died in a vehicular accident on May 31, 1969. On June 9, 1969,
Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for legal separation" on
two (2) grounds, namely: that the petition for legal separation was
filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article 102 of the
Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen abated the action for
legal separation. On June 26, 1969, counsel for deceased
petitioner moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father,
Macario Lapuz Both the RTC and CA denied the substitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the death of the plaintiff before final
decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action? If it
does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property
rights?
Ruling:
An action for legal separation which involves nothing
more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses is purely
personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its
Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse to claim legal
separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses
can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and
even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being
personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the
action causes the death of the action itself.
194

A further reason why an action for legal separation is

abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are
involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of
separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree
such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality
of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death
supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be
forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive
separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims
would necessarily remain unborn.
Accordingly, the decision of both the RTC and the CA are
hereby affirmed.

was Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country

Club. On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio
contracted matrimony and lived together for a period of 30 years.
In 1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed
reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium, Makati City
when he was in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country
Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda
lived in Antipolo City. Out of their marriage, the spouses had 6
children. On December 30, 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from
the United States, he stayed with Erlinda for about 5 months in
Antipolo City. The children alleged that during this time, their
mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg
Zoloft, an antidepressant drug. As a consequence, Potencianos
health deteriorated. On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate
meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to
Antipolo City and instead lived at Makati. On March 11, 1999,
Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the
custody of Potenciano Ilusorio due to his advanced age, frail
health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. She alleged that
respondents refused petitioners demands to see and visit her
husband. The CA denied petitioners motion.
Issue:
Whether or not a wife may secure a writ of habeas corpus
to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss?

POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER,

and SYLVIA ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.
G.R. No. 139808. May 12, 2000
Facts:
Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano
Ilusorio. Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of
extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many years, he

Ruling:
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. To justify the
grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The evidence shows
that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of
Potenciano Ilusorios liberty that would justify the issuance of the
writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of
age, or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally
195

incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or

medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern
his actions. Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the
capacity to make choices. In this case, the crucial choices revolve
on his residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The
choices he made may not appeal to some of his family members
but these are choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano. He
made it clear before the CA that he was not prevented from
leaving his house or seeing people. With that declaration, and
absent any true restraint on his liberty, we have no reason to
reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. With his full mental
capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may
not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice.
Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless to
say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right.
Wherefore, this court affirms the decision of the CA,
however, it nullifies the decision insofar as it gives visitation
rights to respondent Erlinda K. Ilusorio.

MARIANO ARROYO, plaintiff vs. DOLORES VAZQUEZ DE

ARROYO, defendant
G.R No. 17014. August 11, 1921
Facts:
Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vazquez de Arroyo were
united in the bonds of wedlock by marriage in 1910 and since that
date, with a few short intervals of separation, they lived together

as husband and wife until July 4, 1920, when the wife went away
from their common home with the intention to live separately
from her husband. After efforts had been made by the husband
without avail to induce her to resume marital relations, an action
was initiated by him to compel her to return to the matrimonial
home and live with him as a dutiful wife. The wife answered that
she had left her husbands home without his consent because of
the cruel treatment on the part of her husband. Upon hearing the
cause, the lower court gave judgment in favor of the wife,
authorizing her to live apart from her husband. They concluded
that the husband was more to blame than the wife and that his
continued ill-treatment was a sufficient justification for her
abandonment of the conjugal home.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in their judgment
favoring the wife?
Ruling:
To begin with, the obligation which the law imposes on the
husband to maintain the wife is a duty universally recognized in
civil society and is clearly expressed in Art. 142 and 143 of the
Civil Code. Accordingly, it has been determined that where the
wife is forced to leave the matrimonial abode, she can, compel
him to make provision for her separate maintenance.
Nevertheless, the interests of both parties and the society at large
require that the courts should move with caution in enforcing the
duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife. From
this consideration, it follows that provisions should be made for
separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that the
continued cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and
separation necessary from the fault of the husband.
We are therefore hold that Mariano Arroyo in this case is
entitled to the unconditional and absolute return of the wife to the
marital domicile. He is entitled to a judicial declaration that his
196

wife has absented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her
duty to return.
Therefore, reversing the judgment of the lower court, it is
declared that Dolores Vazquez de Arroyo has absented herself
from the marital home without sufficient cause; and that she is
admonished that it is her duty to return.

established residence at San Marcelino where they lived together

for one month because the wife returned to the home of her
parents due to the following reasons: that the husband demand
wife to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs;
that whenever wife rejected husbands indecorous demands,
husband would maltreat wife by words and inflict injuries on
wifes lips, face and different parts of her body; and that because
wife was unable to desist husbands repugnant desires and
maltreatment, she was obliged to leave the conjugal home. The
wife also seeks for support from his husband even if she lives
separately. The husband on the other hand, seeks the relief of the
courts in compelling his wife to return back to their conjugal
home.
Issue:
Whether or not the wife is compelled to return to the
marital dwelling?

ELOISA GOITIA Y DELA CAMARA, plaintiff vs. JOSE

CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant
No. 11263. November 2, 1916
Facts:
This is an action by the wife against the husband for
support outside of the conjugal domicile. Eloitia Goitia and Jose
Campos Rueda were legally married on January 7, 1915 and

Ruling:
Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a
new relation, the rights, duties and obligations of which rest not
upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law which
defines and prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When
the legal existence is merged into one by marriage, the new
relation is regulated and controlled by the government upon
principles of public policy for the benefit of the society as well as
the parties.
Marriage is an institution and its maintenance is in its
purity which the public is deeply interested. In the case at bar,
when the continuance of the marriage becomes intolerable to one
or both parties and gives no possible good to the community,
relief from the court should be attainable. The Supreme Court
made the observation that implied approval by the court of a
wifes separate residence from her husband doe not necessarily
violate the sacredness and inviolability of the marriage. Since
197

separation de-facto is allowed in this case, it is only due to the fact

that public peace and wifes purity must be preserved.
Lastly, the husband cannot, by his own wrongful acts,
relieve himself from the duty to support his wife imposed by law;
and where a husband, by wrongful, illegal and unbearable
conduct, drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot
take the advantage of her departure to abrogate his duty to still
support his wife. In law, the wife is legally still within the
conjugal domicile, even if living separately, thus he is entitled to
support and maintenance by the husband.

parents of Vicenta. The said marriage was solemnized by Lt.

Lavares, an Army Catholic Chaplain. Their marriage was the
culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with
the local civil registrar.
Upon the knowledge of the parents of Vicenta, they took
her to their house. Consequently, she admitted her marriage with
Tanchavez. Her parents were surprised because Tanchavez never
asked for the hand of Vicenta and were disgusted because of the
great scandal because of the clandestine marriage would provoke.
Thereafter, Vicenta continued to live with her parents,
while tanchavez returned to Manila to his job. As of June 1948,
the newlyweds were already estranged. Vicenta filed a petition to
annul her marriage; however, she did not sign the said document.
Thus, the case was dismissed because of her non- appearance at
the hearing.
In 1950, Vicenta left for United States. On 22 August
1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce. And on October
21, 1950, a decree of divorce, final and absolute was issued. In
1954, Vicenta married an American and she lived with him and
begotten children.
Issue:
Whether or not Vicenta failed to perform her wifely duties.
Ruling:
It was held that the refusal to perform her wifely duties
and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband
constitute in law a wrong caused through he fault. Thus, the
husband is entitled for indemnity.

PASTOR TANCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. VICENTA

ESCANO, defendant-appellee
No. L-19671. November 29, 1965
Facts:
On February 24, 1948, Vicenta Escano and Pastor
Tanchavez got married and the marriage was unknown to the
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properties are the conjugal property of Agrapino and Engracia,

second wife.
The trial court decided in favor of the second family.
However, the Court of Appeals decided otherwise and thus
favored the first family.
Issue:
Whether or not the said property of Maria is the conjugal
property of Agripino and Engracia.
Ruling:
The Court held that, the said property an exclusive
property of Maria which she inherited from her parents and
brought it to the marriage. Article 160 of the New Civil Code
provides that, all property of the marriage is presumed to belong
to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Thus, heirs of Maria
were able to prove that that said property is the exclusive property
of their mother Maria. On the other hand, Engracia failed to prove
otherwise.

DIOSDIDIT CUENCA, et al, petitioner, vs RESTITUTO

CUENCA, et al
No. L-72321. December 8, 1988
Facts:
Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon- Cuenca were
legally married, begotten two children, Restituto and Meladora as
their heirs. Maria Bangahon brought properties into her marriage.
Said property was inherited by her from her parents.
However, Agrapi had a second family who claimed to be
the legitimate family of Agrapino. Thus, they claimed that the said
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Issue:
Whether or not Alex Go be held liable.
Ruling:
The Court held that, Alex Go argues that when his wife
entered into the contract with Ong, she was acting alone for her
sole interest. Thus, they found it with merit. Under the law, a wife
may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in business
without the consent of the husband.
Thus, it was only Nancy Go who entered into the contract.
She is solely liable to the complainant for the damage awarded.

JANE GO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent

G.R. No. 114791. May 29, 1997
Facts:
Hermogenes and Jane Ong were married on June 7, 1987.
The video coverage of the wedding was provided by the petitioner
spouses Nancy and Alex Go. Spouses Ong claimed the video of
their wedding three times but they failed to have it. Because the
newlywed couple will be having their honeymoon in US, they
agreed to have the video tape upon their return.
When the couple came home, they found out that the said
tape had been erased by spouses Go.
Furious at the lost of the tape which suppose to be the only
record of their wedding. Thus, they filed a complaint. The RTC
rendered its decision making spouses Go liable to the said erased
tape. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
RTC.
200

Issue:
Whether or not the said donation is valid.

CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner vs. VDA. DE BATOCAEL,

respondent
G.R. No. 146683. November 22, 2001
Facts:
On January 16, 1956, Francisco Comille and his wife
Zozima Montallana are owners of several pieces of land.
However, when Zosima died Francisco and his mother-in-law
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights. On
June 27, 1961, Francisco registered those said lots in his name.
Having no children to take care of him after his retirement,
Francisco asked his niece Leticia and His cousin Luzveminda and
Cirila Abarca to take care of his house and the store as well.
There are however conflicting testimonies as to the
relationship of Francisco and Cirila. Niece of Francisco, Leticia
said that her uncle and Cirila were lovers and they slept in the
same room. Another niece of Fernando said that Francisco himself
told her that Cirila is her mistress. Cirila on the other hand
claimed that they are not lovers nor she is a mistress of Francisco.
She is just a mere helper of Francisco.
Few months before the death of Francisco, he executed an
instrument dominated Deed of Donation Inter Vivos in favor of
Cirila. Cirila on the other hand accepted the said donation.
A complaint was filed by the heirs of Francisco for the
declaration of nullity of the deed of donation inter vivos basing it
on Article 87 of the Family Code.
Thus, the said donation was nullified by the RTC and was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Ruling:
It was held by the Court that, Francisco and Cirila as
proved by evidences and testimonies, they actually lived together
as husband and wife without a valid marriage. Thus, the said
donation is invalid or void basing it on Article 87 of the Family
Code which provides: Every donation or grant of gratuitous
advantage, direct or indirect between the spouses during the
marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses
may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The
prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband
and wife without a valid marriage.

FELIX MATABUENA, plaintiff-appellant, vs.

201

PETRONILA CERVANTES, defendant-appellee vs.

FELIX MATABUENA, plaintiff-appellent
No. L-28771. March 31, 1971
Facts:
Felix Matabuena donated a parcel of land to Petronila
Cervantes while living martially without the benefit of marriage.
The Deed of Donation was executed by Felix in Favor of
Cervantes on February 20, 1956, which same donation was
accepted by Cervantes.
After six years, they got married on March 28, 1962. Felix
died on September 13, 1962. after the death of Felix, Cornelia
Matabuana, sister of Felix being the sole heir claimed that the
donation made by his brother is void for it was executed while her
brother and Cervantes were living together as husband and wife
without the benefit of valid marriage.
The RTC decided in favor of Cervantes on the ground that
the said prohibition is applied only for couples living together
with the benefit of a valid marriage.
Issue:
Whether or not the donation is valid.
Ruling:
The Court held that, while Article 133 of the Civil Code
considers as void a donation between the spouses during marriage,
policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as the
dictates of morality requires that the same prohibition should be
applied to a common-law relationship,
However, the lack of validity of the donation to Cervantes
does not necessarily result in Cornelias exclusive right to the
disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix, the relationship
between him and Cervantes was legitimated by their marriage.
Cervantes is therefore his widow. Thus she is entitled to one-half
of inheritance and Cornelia as the surviving sister, to the other
half.

HILARIO GERCIO, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

SUN LIFE CO. OF CANADA, defendant-appellant
No. 23703. September 28, 1925
Facts:
Andrea Zialcita was the lawful wife of Hilario Gercio.
Towards the end of the year 1919, she was convicted of the crime
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of adultery. On September 4, 1920, a decree of divorce was issued

which had the effect of completely dissolving the bonds of
matrimony contracted by Hilario Gercio and Andrea Zialcita.
On march 4, 1922, Gercio notified the Sun Life Assurance
Co. of Canada that he had revoked his donation in favor of
Zialcita, and he had designated in her stead his present wife, as the
beneficiary of the policy. Gercio requested the company to
eliminate Zialcita as beneficiary, however, the company refused.
Issue:
Whether or not Gercio can change the beneficiary of the
policy.
Ruling:
It was held by the Court that, the insured-the husband- has
no power to change the beneficiary- the former wife- and to name
the stead his actual wife, where the policy of the insurance does
not expressly reserve to the insured the right to change the
beneficiary.

HARDING, plaintiff-appellees vs.

COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY,
defendant-appellant
No. 12707. August 10, 1918
Facts:
A husband donated an automobile to his wife, who
subsequently insured it for P 3,000. When the car was later
completely destroyed, the wife sought to recover the insurance
indemnity, but the insurance pleaded in defense that the wife had
no insurable interest in the car, the donation by the husband being
void.
Issue:
Whether or not the insurance can raise the validity of the
donation as a defense.
Ruling:
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It was held by the Court that, the insurance company failed

to show that the gift was not a moderate one, considering the
circumstances of the parties. Furthermore, even if the gift had not
been a moderate one, the company cannot assail the validity of the
donation, because at the time of the transfer, it was not a creditor.

PACITA VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, respondent
G.R. No. 143286. April 14, 2004
Facts:
Eusebia Napisa and Nicolas Retuya were married on
October 7, 1926. out of the marriage, they begotten five children.
During their marriage, they acquired real properties.
In 1936, Nicolas started to cohabit with Pacita Villanueva
and out of wedlock they had an illegitimate child, Procopio
Villanueva.
Eusebia sought the reconveyance from Nicolas and Pacita
of several properties, claiming the subject properties are her
conjugal properties with Nicolas. On November 23, 1996, Eusebia
died.
The RTC ruled in favor of Eusebia represented by her son.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the said decision of the
RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not Eusebia has the right for the reconveyance
of the said properties.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that in the affirmative. Article
105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Code shall
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apply to conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code

to vest rights already acquired under the Civil Code. Thus, under
the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the
marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. This is
counter balanced by the requirement that properties must first be
proven to have been acquired during the marriage before it is
presumed to be conjugal.
Eusebia was able to prove that those properties were
acquired during their marriage. Though Nicolas and Pacita
cohabited, Nicolas and Eusebia were still married. Thus, any
property acquired during the period is considered conjugal, unless
it is proven that Pacita contributed in the acquisition of said
property. However, Pacita failed to prove the exception.

ALFREDO CHING, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

respondent
G.R. No. 124642. February 23, 2004
Facts:
On September 26, 1978, PBMCI obtained a loan of
P9,000,000 from Allied Banking Corporation. On December 28,
1978, ABC extended another loan to the PBMCI through its
Executive Vice President Alfredo Ching. However, PBMCI
defaulted in the payment of all its loans.
PBMCI and Alfredo Ching jointly filed a petition for
suspension of payments with the Securities and Exchange
Commission and at the same time seeking the PBMCIs
rehabilitation.
On July 9, 1982, the SEC issued an order placing
PBMCIs business, including its assets and liabilities under
rehabilitation. In the mean time, on July 21, 1983, the deputy
sheriff of the trial court levied on attachment the 100,000 common
shares of stocks in the name of Ching.
On November 16, 1993, Encarnacion Ching, wife of
Alfredo Ching filed a motion to set aside the levy on attachment.
She alleged that the 100,000 shares of stock levied on by the
sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their
marriage out of conjugal funds. Encarnacion showed to the court
copy of her marriage contract with Alfredo as an evidence.
The RTC ruled in her favor but the Court of Appeals
reversed the said decision of the RTC.
Issue:
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Whether or not the said 100,000 shares of stock be

excluded from the case.
Ruling:
It was held by the court that, for conjugal partnership to be
liable for a liability, that should appertain to the husband alone,
there must be showing that some advantages accrued to the
spouses. Certainly, to make conjugal partnership responsible for a
liability that should appertain alone to one of the spouses is to
frustrate the objective of the New Civil Code to show the utmost
concern for solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit. The
husband, therefore, is denied the power to assume unnecessary
and unwarranted risks to the financial stability of the conjugal
partnership. ABC failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of
Encarnacion and Alfredo was benefited by Alfredos act of
executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with
the respondents for and in behalf of PBMCI.

ETERIA TAN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

respondents
G.R. No. 120594. June 10, 1997
Facts:
On April 17,1989, a case for partition and accounting was
instituted by the spouses Alfonso and Eteria Tan against Alfonsos
brothers, Celestino and Maximo Tan.
Spouses claimed that 1/3 of the 906 square meter
residential lot was brought to their conjugal property during their
marriage. However, brothers of Alfonso objected the claim. They
claimed that the subject property was inherited by them from their
mother and was divided among them, Alfonso, Celestino and
Maximo.
Eteria, admitted that she is legally married to Alfonso but
they were now living separately by virtue of a decree of legal
separation.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Alfonso and
Eteria, however, the Court of Appeals decided otherwise.
Issue:
Whether or not the said 1/3 of the subject property is a
conjugal property of Eteria and Alfonso.
Ruling:
It was held by the Court that, the Husbands acquisition by
succession of a parcel of land during his marriage to his wife
simply means that the lot is his exclusive property because it was
acquired by him during the marriage by lucrative title.

206

Hermogenes and Jane Ong were married on June 7, 1987.

The video coverage of the wedding was provided by the petitioner
spouses Nancy and Alex Go. Spouses Ong claimed the video of
their wedding three times but they failed to have it. Because the
newlywed couple will be having their honeymoon in US, they
agreed to have the video tape upon their return.
When the couple came home, they found out that the said
tape had been erased by spouses Go.
Furious at the lost of the tape which suppose to be the only
record of their wedding. Thus, they filed a complaint. The RTC
rendered its decision making spouses Go liable to the said erased
tape. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not spouses Go be jointly held liable.
Ruling:
The Court held that, since the wife may exercise any
profession, occupation or engage in business without the consent
of the husband, the husband may not be held jointly and severally
liable with his wife for breach of a contract that the latter had
entered into.

JANE GO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent

G.R. No. 114791. May 29, 1997
Facts:
207

was executed, when she was in Germany and has no knowledge to

the said execution with is tantamount to not consent. The
defendants prayed that the share of Berlina in the parcel of land
sold to them be excluded and the share of Pedro be retained. Thus,
the RTC did not entertain the defendants prayer and ruled in favor
of Berlina. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the decision
rendered by the RTC in toto.
Issue:
Whether or not the share of Berlina in the parcel of land to
the defendants be excluded and the share of Pedro be retained.
Held:
The court ruled that, the nullity of the sale of conjugal
property contracted by the husband without the marital consent of
the wife affects the entire property not just the share of the wife.

BAUTISTA, plaintiff v. BERLINA SILVA, defendant

G.R. No.157434. September 19,2006
Facts:
A parcel of land was registered in the names of spouses
Berlina Silva and Pedro Silva. In 1988, Pedro Silva, for himself
and as attorney-in-fact of his wife Berlina, thru a Special Power of
Attorney executed by Berlina in his favor, signed and executed a
Deed of absolute sale over the said parcel of land in favor of
defendants-spouses Carlo and Nida Bautista.
The RTC found out that the said Special Power of
Attorney as signed by Berlina is a forgery. It appears that the SPA
208

and it ordered the reconveyance of the subject property. On

Appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial Courts decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the husband may sale the conjugal property
even without the consent of the wife.
Ruling:
The court ruled that, the sale of a conjugal property
requires the consent of both the husband and wife. In the absence
of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void,
including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the
husband who contracted the sale.
HOMEOWNER SAVINGS LOAN BANK, petitioner vs.
MARCELINO DAILO, respondent
G.R. No. 153802. March 11, 2005
Facts:
Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo Jr. are husband and
wife who bought a house and lot. The absolute deed of sale was
executed only in favor of Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to
the exclusion of the wife.
In 1993, Marcelino obtained a loan from petitioner
Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouse
house and lot. An amount of P300,000.00 was obtained as a loam
and a Real Estate Mortgage was executed on the subject property
in favor of the petitioner. That said transaction entered into took
place without the knowledge and consent of the wife.
Upon maturity the loan remained outstanding. As a result,
petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding on the
mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of the petitioner as the
highest bidder. In 1995, Marcelino died.
Miguela calimed that she had no knowledge of the
mortgaged constituted on the subject property which was conjugal
in nature. The trial court rendered its decision favoring Miguela,
209

ESTHER ABALOS, plaintiff v. MACATANGAY J.R.,

defendant
G.R. No.155043. September 30,2004
Facts:
Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the registered owner
of a parcel of land with improvements. Armed with Special Power
of Attorney, purportedly issued by his wife, Arturo executed a
Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement in Favor of respondent
Macatangay, binding himself to sell to respondent the subject
property ad not to offer the same to any other party with in thirty
days (30) from date.
Subsequently, Arturos wife, Esther, executed a Special
Power of Attorney appointing her sister Ramos, to act for and in
her behalf relative to the transfer of the property to respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not spouses can dispose their own share in the
conjugal property even without the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership.
Held:
The court held that, even on the supposition that the parties
only disposed of their respective shares in the property the sale.
Assuming that it exists, is still void because the right of the
husband and wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not rest
until the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Nemo dat qui non
habet. No one can give what he has not.
MELANIA ROXAS, plaintiff vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
defendant
210

G.R. No. 92245. June 26, 1991

Facts:
Melania Roxas and Antonio ROxas are husband and wife,
however, they were living separately. Plaintiff Petitioner Melania
discovered that her estranged husband entered into a contract of
lead covering a portion of their conjugal lot.
Melania filed a complaint, however, the Trial Court
Dismissed the same because the complaint fails to satisfy the test
of sufficiency of action. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, affirmed
the decision of the RTC in toto.
Issue:
Whether or not the husband may enter into a contract of
lease involving conjugal real property without the knowledge and
consent of his wife.
Ruling:
The court held that, in the contract of lease the leesor
transfers his rights of use in favor of the lessee. The lessors right is
impaired, therein. Therefore, lease is a burden o the land, it is an
emcoimferance on the land.
Thus, under Art.176 of the Civil Code, in care the wifes
consent is not secured by the husband as required by law, the was
has the remedy of filing an action for the annulment of the
contract.

NICOLAS, plaintiff vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant

No. L-37631. October 1987
Facts:
Anastacio Madlangsakay married to Lourdes Manuel
Brought parcels of land. At the time of purchase, petitioners were
occupying one of the lands as tenants. Anastacio sold that said
parcel of the land occupied by the tenants to them.
The controversy arose when criminal case of robbery was
filed by Anastacio against the petitioners when they allegedly cut
bamboos from the said land. On the other hand, petitioners filed a
211

criminal case of perjury against Anastacio in encroaching on their

rights by gathering the fruits on the subject land.
Anastacio claimed that the Deed of Absolute Sale that was
executed is a forgery, there being no marital consent from his wife
as required by law. Thus, the said sale is null and void.
The RTC rendered judgment favoring Anastacio was the
court of Appeals when the case was about for appeal by the
petitioners.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale of property being conjugal in
nature without marital consent from one is valid.
Ruling:
The court held that, the very conspicuous absence of the
wife conform to such ganancial property, there being no showing
that Lourdes Manuel- wife of Anastacio is legally incapacitatedrenders the scale void ab initio.

ELENA MULLER, petitioner vs. HELMUT MULLER,

respondent
G.R. No. 149615. August 29,2006
Facts:
Elena Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married
in Germany in 1989. they resided at the house owned by the
respondents parents but decided to move and reside in the
Philippines permanently in 1992. Helmut inherited the house in
Germany from his parents and sold it. He used the money to
purchase a parcel of land and to construct a house in the
Philippines.
Elena filed a petition from legal separation due to
incompatibilities. In 1996, the Regional Trial Court rendered its
judgment and terminated the regime of absolute community of
property of the spouses. It also decreed a legal separation of
properties located in the country but excluding those acquired by
gratuitous title during the marriage. However, respondent cannot
recover the funds because the property was purchased in violation
of Sec.7, Art. XII of the Constitution.
212

Respondent appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed

the decision of the regional Trial Court. It ruled that respondent
may claim reimbursement of the amount of the said property.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent can claim reimbursement of the
property in dispute.
Ruling:
The court ruled that, the respondent was aware of the
Constitutional Prohibition. He declared that he had the property
titled in the name of the Filipino wife because of the
Constitutional prohibition against aliens.
His claim a right in the said property cannot be sustained.
In cases of hereditary succession, respondents disqualification in
owning lands in the Philippine is absolute. Not even an ownership
in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in
isolation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express
provision, not trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of
fraud.

OPAZ OLIGORIO, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

respondent
G.R. No. 104892. November 14, 1994
Facts:
Aurelia and Marciliano Go owned a parcel of land. The
spouses were child less but reared and educated Rivera, Paz
Oligario and Socorro Teves- respondents. On the other hand,
Bonifacio Ologario is the brother of Marciliano and Adelaida is
the niece of Aurelia.
Aurelia died on March 19, 1986. To preclude the heirs of
his wife and to avoid the payment of tax, Marciliano sold the
property to the respondents. On 1988, Marciliano died intestate.
Issue:
1) Whether or not Bonifacio and Adeliada have the legal
right to inherit.
2) What is the proper liquidation of the said property?
Ruling:
1) The Court held that, the petitioners being the sole heir
of the deceased, have the legal right to inherit. The
unlawful motive of Marciliano in selling the property
rendered the sale null and void.
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2) The lot is presumed to be conjugal property. The death

of Aurelia dissolved the conjugal partnership. By
virtue of such dissolution, of the said property
should appertain to Marciliano as his share from the
conjugal partnership and representing his share as
surviving spouse. Adelaida as the surviving niece of
Aurelia is entitled to of the lot.

NABLE-JOSE, plaintiff-appellant vs. NABLE-JOSE,

respondent-appellee
41 P 713
Facts:
Couples were legally married, however, the marital bond
was dissolved when the wife died.
Issue:
Whether or not the surviving husband has the power to sell
or mortgage the community property after the death of his wife.
Held:
It was held by the court that, when a conjugal partnership
is dissolved by the death of the wife, the surviving husband and
not the judicial administrator appointed in the proceedings for the
settlement of the wifes estate, is entitled to the possession of the
property of the conjugal partnership until he has liquidated its
affairs; the husband is the administrator of the affairs of the
conjugal partnership until they are finally settled and liquidated;
and that the liquidation is to be conducted by him as administrator.
Thus, the husband has the power to dispose properties for
settlements of debts but not for his own interest if the said sale is
prior liquidation.

214

their heirs. Maria Bangahon brought properties into her marriage.

Said property was inherited by her from her parents.
However, Agrapi had a second family who claimed to be
the legitimate family of Agrapino. Thus, they claimed that the said
properties are the conjugal property of Agrapino and Engracia,
second wife.
The trial court decided in favor of the second family.
However, the Court of Appeals decided otherwise and thus
favored the first family.
Issue:
Whether or not the conjugal property be affected by the de
facto separation.
Ruling:
The Court held that, properties in the conjugal partnership
will still remain. There being no judicial declaration of legal
separation nor legal separation of conjugal properties.

DIOSDIDIT CUENCA, et al, petitioner, vs RESTITUTO

CUENCA, et al
No. L-72321. December 8, 1988
Facts:
Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon- Cuenca were
legally married, begotten two children, Restituto and Meladora as
215

Henson on the other hand objected the said decision

contending that, the said property is his exclusive property
because he bought it using his own fund and did not know
anything about the transactions entered into by her wife.
RTC favored him, so as the Court of Appeals who affirmed
the decision of the RTC in toto in his favor.
Issue:
Whether or not the said property be held liable for the
offense incurred by the wife.

WONG, petitioner vs. COURT OFAPPEALS, respondent

G.R. No. 70082. August 19, 1991
Facts:
Romarico Henson and Katrina Pineda got married in 1964,
out of their marriage they have three children, but during the early
age of their marriage, they had been living separately. Romarico
bought a parcel of land for PhP 11, 492 from his father and the
money he used was barrowed by him from his officemate.
Year later, a complaint was filed against Katrina holding
her civilly liable because of her debt from the jewelries she
purchased from Wong and for the issuance of check which was
dishonored for lack of fund.
The RTC rendered its decision and held Katrina liable for
those offenses incurred against Wong. Hence, said liability was
charged against the property bought by Henson.

Ruling:
The Court held that, on the matter of ownership of the
property involved, the Court disagrees with the appellate court
that the said property is exclusively owned by Henson. Having
been acquired during the marriage, they are still presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership even though Henson and
Katrina had been living separately.
The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property
subsists in the absence of clear satisfactory and convincing
evidence to overcome the presumption or to prove that the
property is exclusively owned by Henson. While there is proof
that Henson acquired the property with the money he loaned from
his officemate, if he paid out of his salaries, then the money is part
of the conjugal assets and not exclusively his.

216

Whether of not legal separation of conjugal properties be

declared.
Ruling:
The Court held that, abandonment implies a departure by
one spouse with the avowed intent never to return, followed by
prolonged absence without just cause and without in the meantime
providing in the least for ones family although able to do so.
There must be absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and
rights with the intent of perpetual separation.
As shown by evidences presented, Jo refused to accept
Pertosa-Jo in their conjugal dwelling without just cause and even
denied that they were married. Thus, such act is tantamount to
abandonment.
PRIMA PARTOSA-JO, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
respondent
G.R. No. 82606. December 18, 1992
Facts:
Jo having cohabited with three women and fathered fifteen
children. The first of those women is Partosa- Jo, his legal wife
whom he fathered one daughter.
Partosa-Jo filed a complaint for legal separation of
property and an action for support against his husband Jo. Thus,
based on the facts presented, the RTC rendered its decision in
favor of Partosa-Jo ordering Jo to support her and the child.
However, the trial court failed to provide in its depositive portion
as to its decision concerning the legal separation of conjugal
properties.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals denied the appeal
contending that the said complaint lacks merit because such claim
was based on their mutual agreement and thus there is no
abandonment.
Issue:
217

DOROTEA DE OCAMPO, petitioner-appellant vs.

NICOLAS DELIZO, respondent-appellee
Nos. L-32820-21. January 30, 1976

The Court held that, the decisive factor in the

determination of whether a parcel of land acquired by way of
homestead is conjugal property of the first or second marriage is
not necessary the time of the issuance of the homestead patent but
the time of the fulfillment of the requirements of the public land
law for the acquisition of such right to the patent.
There is the established facts that the produce of the lands
acquired homestead contributed considerably to the acquisition of
the properties acquired during the existence of the second
marriage. Also the children of the first marriage as a matter of
equity should share in the properties acquired by homestead.

Facts:
Nicolas Delizo contracted two marriages, first was in 1891
with Rosa Villasfer and their marriage ended in 1909 when
Villasfer died. In his first marriage, he had three children. His
second marriage was in 1911 with Dorotea de Ocampo and it
ended when Delizo died on May 3, 1957. Out of the second
marriage, he had nine children.
On April 15, 1957 before the death of Delizo, an action for
partition was instituted by his son and daughter in his first
marriage, all against him and de Ocampo. de Ocampo opposed the
said partition, claiming that the properties described in the
complaint were those of the second marriage.
Those subject properties were alleged to be acquired by
Nicolas as homestead during the first marriage, however, the
requirements for the patent were perfected on the second
marriage. Thus, improvements of the said property were
introduced during the second marriage through the joint effort of
Nicolas and de Ocampo.
Issue:
how should the subject properties be liquidated?
Ruling:
218

VDA. DE CONSEGRUA, petitioner-appellant vs.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM,
respondent-appellee
No. L-28093. January 30, 1971
Facts:
At the time of death of Jose Consuegra, he was an
employee of the Office of the District Engineer of Surigao del
Norte. In his life time, he contracted two marriages, the first with
Diaz whom he fathered two children but predeceased him; and the
second marriage in which he contracted in good faith, seven
children were born.
Being a member of GSIS, when he died the proceeds of
his life insurance were paid by GSIS to Berdin his second wife
and to seven children who were the beneficiaries of the said
policy. Having been in the government service for twenty years,
he was entitled to retirement insurance benefits in the sum of PhP
6, 304. 47. However, he did not designate any beneficiary who
would receive the retirement benefits due to him.
First wife Diaz filed a cliam with GSIS asking that the
retirement insurance benefits be paid to her as the only legal heir
of Jose. Berdin on the other hand claimed that the benefits be paid
to her and to their children being the designated beneficiaries of
the life insurance.
To solve the conflict, GSIS divided the said amount of
benefits equally to both parties. Dissatisfied with the
apportionment made by GSIS, petitioner filed a petition in the
Court of First Instance. The said court upheld the division made
by GSIS.

The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of First

Instance. Thus, the court held that, in construing the rights of two
women who were married to the same man since the deceased
first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void, the
conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased.
Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative
heir of her husband under the New Civil Code, entitled to share in
the estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently,
whether as conjugal partnership in a still subsisting marriage or as
such putative heir has an interest in the husbands share in the
property in dispute. And with respect to the second wife, the Court
observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be
void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still
subsisting, still there is a need for judicial declaration of nullity.
And in as much as the conjugal partnership formed by the second
marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity,
the only just and equitable solution is to recognize the right of
the second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired
by her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the
conjugal partnership of the first marriage.

Issue:
Whether or not the liquidation is proper.
Ruling:
219

REMEDIOS G. SALVADOR and MA. GRACIA G.

SALVADOR, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
ALBERTO and ELPIA YABO, FRANCISCA YABO, et al.,
respondents.
G.R. No. 109910. April 5, 1995.
Facts:
Alipio Yabo was the owner of Lot No. 6080 and Lot No.
6180. Title thereto devolved upon his nine children, namely,
Victoriano, Procopio, Lope, Jose, Pelagia, Baseliza, Francisca,
Maria, and Gaudencia, upon his death sometime before or during
the second world war.
On April 28, 1976, Pastor Makibalo, husband of Maria
Yabo, child of Alipio filed with the Court of First Instance a
complaint against the spouses Alberto and Elpia Yabo. In such
complaint, Pastor alleged that he owned a total of 8 shares of the
said lots having purchased the share of seven of Alipios children
and inherited the share of his wife Maria, and that except for the
portion corresponding to Gaudencias share which he did not buy,
he occupied, cultivated and possessed continuously, openly,
peacefully and exclusively the two parcels of land. He therefore
prayed that he be declared the absolute owner of 8/9 of the lots
questioned.
The trial court rendered judgment, finding Pastor, now
Eugelio Salvador and Remedios Salvador owners of eight shares
on Lot No.6080 and some shares on Lot No.6180.
On October 8, 1976, the grandchildren and great
grandchildren of the late Alipio Yabo lodged within the same court
a complaint for partition and quieting of title with damages
against Pastor, Enecia, Cristal, and the spouses Eulogio and
Remedios Salvador. They alleged that the aforesaid lots are
common properties of the heirs of Alipio and that the defendants
after Alipios death became the de facto administrators of the lots

and to their surprise discovered that the Salvadors have been

harvesting coconuts from the lots.
The plaintiffs prayed that they and the defendant be
declared as the owners of the lots and that the Salvador spouses be
declared as having no rights thereto. The two cases thereby were
consolidated and jointly heard. The trial court however ruled
against the plaintiffs.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that Maria did not
sell her share to Alberto and Elpia Yabo; that prescription and
laches have not ran against the private respondents with respect to
the 1/9 share of Maria Yabo in the estate of her father and to her
conjugal share in the portions acquired from her brother and
sisters and Procopio never sold his share in Lot. No. 6080 to
Pastor Makibalo.
Issue:
Whether or not, the shares of Jose, Victoriano, Lope,
Baseliza, Procopio and Francisca in Lot No.6180 and in Lot No.
6080 which had been purchased by Pastor during his marriage
with Maria is the husbands exclusive property.
Ruling:
No.
The Court ruled that all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to either of them. In the instant
case, the shares of Jose, Victoriano, Lope, Baseliza, Procopio and
Francisca in Lot No.6180 and in Lot No. 6080 had been purchased
by Pastor during his marriage with Maria. Such shares would have
been the exclusive property of Pastor had there been proof that the
properties were acquired or purchased by him with his exclusive
money. Thus, absent such proof the same was deemed by the
Court to belong to the conjugal partnership of Pastor and Maria.

220

Issue:
Whether or not the order of RTC Branch XXVII is proper
when it ordered the freeze of one-half (1/2) of the retirement
benefits of Cesar, as allegedly a conjugal property of the spouses.

CESAR SARMIENTO, petitioner, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT, HON. REGINA G. ORDOEZBENITEZ, as the Presiding Judge of Branch XLVII of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
BANK, NORMA SARMIENTO, LORNA SARMIENTO and
LERMA SARMIENTO, respondents.
G.R. No. 75409. August 17, 1987.
Facts:
Petitioner Cesar Sarmiento was married to private
respondent Norma Sarmiento. On May 10, 1977, private
respondent Norma sued her husband, Cesar, for support. The case
was filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and
later assigned to Regional Trial Court, Branch XLVII, presided
over by Judge Regina Ordoez-Benitez. On March 1, 1984, Judge
Ordoez-Benitez rendered a decision ordering the defendant,
Cesar, to pay his wife, Norma, the sum of Five Hundred Pesos
(P500.00) monthly as support.
On August 1, 1984, the private respondent brought another
action against the petitioner for a declaration that the retirement
benefits due the petitioner from the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) were conjugal and that 50% thereof belonged to the private
respondent as her share.
Branch XXVII of the RTC of Manila rendered a decision
ordering the PNB to desist and refrain from releasing to defendant
Cesar all monetary benefits and emoluments which may be due
him by reason of his retirement from service, but instead, to
deliver one-half (1/2) thereof to his wife.

Ruling:
No.
The default judgment dated February 20, 1986 which
ordered the PNB to desist and refrain from releasing to petitioner
all monetary benefits and emoluments due him as retirement
benefits and to deliver one-half thereof to private respondent
comes within the prohibition imposed by Sec. 26, as amended, of
the GSIS Charter which states: "Sec. 26. Exemption from legal
process and liens. No policy of life insurance issued under this
Act, or the proceeds thereof, when paid to any member
thereunder, nor any other benefit granted under this Act, shall be
liable to attachment, garnishment, or other process, or to be
seized, taken, appropriated, or applied by any legal or equitable
process or operation of law to pay any debt or liability of such
member, or his beneficiary, or any other person who may have a
right thereunder, either before or after payment; nor shall the
proceeds thereof; when not made payable to a named beneficiary,
constitute a part of the estate of the member for payment of his
debt: Provided, however, That this section shall not apply when
obligations or indebtedness to the System and the employer are
concerned, nor when the retirement annuity is assigned to any
person, corporation, association or bank or other financial
institution, which is hereby authorized." This, in effect, is a freeze
order which is illegal and improper.
The directive to deliver one-half (1/2) of the retirement
benefits to private respondent makes the default judgment doubly
illegal because retirement benefits have been adjudged as
gratuities or reward for lengthy and faithful service of the
recipient and should be treated as separate property of the retireespouse. Thus, if the monetary benefits are given gratis by the
221

government because of previous work, this is a gratuity and

should be considered separate property.

CONSOLACION VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. THE

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JESUS BERNAS
and REMEDIOS Q. BERNAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 74577. December 4, 1990.

spouse, Remedios Bernas. They alleged that they be declared as

co-owners of the land as stated in the will they have discovered
that was executed by Victoria Comorro.
The trial court declared the defendants spouses Jesus
Bernas and Remedios O. Bernas as legal owners of Lot No. 13-C
and including all the improvements thereon;
The plaintiffs appealed to the Intermediate Appellate
Court, where they succeeded only in having the award of actual
and moral damages deleted, the judgment of the trial court having
been otherwise affirmed in toto.
From this judgment of the Appellate Court, Consolacion
Villanueva appealed to the Supreme Court. Her co-plaintiff,
Raymundo Aranas, did not.
Issue:

Facts:
Spouses Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa were the
owners of a parcel of land identified as Lot 13. After they died,
their surviving children, Modesto Aranas and Federico Aranas,
adjudicated the land to themselves under a deed of extrajudicial
partition executed on May 2, 1952. The southern portion,
described as Lot 13-C, was thereby assigned to Modesto; the
northern, to Federico.
On March 21, 1953, Modesto Aranas obtained a Torrens
title in his name. He died on April 20, 1973 while his wife,
Victoria Comorro, predeceased him dying on July 16, 1971. They
had no children but Modesto was survived by two (2) illegitimate
children named Dorothea Aranas Ado and Teodoro C. Aranas.
These two borrowed P18,000.00 from Jesus Bernas. As security
therefor they mortgaged to Bernas their father's property, Lot 13C.
Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay their loan. As a result,
Bernas caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage over
Lot 13-C on June 29, 1977 and acquired the land.
On November 24, 1978, Consolacion Villanueva and
Raymundo Aranas filed a complaint against Jesus Bernas and his

Whether or not Lot 13-C is a conjugal property of spouses

Modesto Aranas and Victoria Comorro which gives Consolacion
Villanueva all of said Victoria's interests, rights and properties,
real and personal as her net share from the conjugal partnership
property with her husband, Modesto Aranas.
Ruling:
No.
Lot 13-C was not a conjugal partnership property of
Victoria Comorro and her husband, Modesto Aranas. It was the
latter's exclusive, private property, which he had inherited from
his parents Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa as provided in
Article 148 of the Civil Code that to be considered as the
exclusive property of each spouse is inter alia, that which is
brought to the marriage as his or her own, or that which each
acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title. Thus, even if it
be assumed that Modesto's acquisition by succession of Lot 13-C
took place during his marriage to Victoria Comorro, the lot would
nonetheless be his exclusive property because acquired by him,
during the marriage, by lucrative title.
222

Moreover, Victoria Comorro died on July 16, 1971, about

two years ahead of her husband, Modesto Aranas, exclusive owner
of Lot 13-C, who passed away on April 20, 1973. Victoria never
therefore inherited any part of Lot 13-C and hence, had nothing of
Lot 13-C to bequeath by will or otherwise to Consolacion
Villanueva.

ALFONSO TAN and ETERIA TEVES TAN, petitioners, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES CELESTINO U. TAN and
ROSARIO DY KUSHIN and SPOUSES MAXIMO U. TAN
and TERESITA SY TAN, respondents.
G. R. No. 120594. June 10, 1997.

whatsoever against his brothers insofar as the family business is

concerned.
On July 12, 1991, a decision was rendered after trial
finding that the 906-square meter lot with improvements was
acquired by the three (3) brothers by sale through installments and
so it should be partitioned equally among them and their
respective wives. Consequently, since the lot was acquired during
the marriage of petitioner and Alfonso, the former could not be
deprived of her share of the one-third portion which is the
conjugal property of the spouses.
Spouses Celestino and Rosario Tan and the spouses
Maximo and Teresita Tan, interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals which, in turn, reversed and set aside the said judgment.
Respondent court ruled that although the subject property was
acquired during the marriage of the spouses Eteria and Alfonso, it
was established by the Tan brothers that the same was inherited
from their mother, hence, their exclusive property.

Facts:

Issue:

Eteria Teves Tan was married to Alfonso U. Tan but they

were now living separately by virtue of a decree of legal
separation rendered by the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court on August 31, 1977.
On April 17, 1989, a case for partition and accounting was
instituted by the spouses Alfonso and Eteria Tan against herein
private respondents who are Alfonso's brothers, Celestino and
Maximo, and their respective wives, Rosario and Teresita. It was
alleged in the complaint that the parties are co-owners of a 906square meter residential lot with improvements thereon situated at
Banaue, Cebu City acquired sometime in 1970. Pursuant to the
provisions of Article 494 of the New Civil Code, the spouses
Alfonso and Eteria Tan, being co-owners to the extent of one-third
(1/3) portion of the aforesaid lot, sought partition of the same.
On January 16, 1990, Alfonso U. Tan filed a Manifestation
and Motion to Dismiss contending that the case was filed only at
the instance of his estranged wife, Eteria, and that he had no claim

Whether or not the property in dispute was inherited by

Alfonso, Celestino and Maximo from their late mother, Trinidad
Uy Tan, making one-third of the said portion an exclusive
property of Alfonso.
Ruling:
Yes.
Conclusive evidence points to the fact that the undivided
one-third (1/3) of the parcel of land in question is not the conjugal
partnership property of the spouses Alfonso Tan and Eteria Teves
Tan. It is the former's exclusive property which he had inherited
from his mother, Trinidad Uy, the original owner of the property.
Although acquired during Alfonso's marriage to Eteria, the
said property should be regarded as Alfonso's own exclusively, as
a matter of law pursuant to Article 148 of the Civil Code which
provides that: Article 148. The following shall be the exclusive
223

property of each spouse: xxx that which each acquires, during the
marriage, by lucrative title.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is then affirmed.

Clara Tambunting de Legarda. The lot in dispute was one of those

covered by the sale and private respondent was one of the many
occupants who refused to vacate the lots they were occupying, so
that on April 26, 1968, the petitioner filed an action to recover the
said lot.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the only right remaining to
the petitioner is to enforce the collection of the balance of
payment from private respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not the property sold by Vicente Legarda to
private respondent is conjugal making the sale valid, binding, and
enforceable against the petitioner.

MANOTOK REALTY, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HON.

COURT OF APPEALS and FELIPE MADLANGAWA,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-45038. April 30, 1987.
Facts:
Private respondent Felipe Madlangawa claims that he has
been occupying a parcel of land in the Clara de Tambunting de
Legarda Subdivision since 1949 upon permission being obtained
from Andres Ladores, then an overseer of the subdivision.
On April 2, 1950, the owner of the lot, Clara Tambunting,
died and her entire estate, including her paraphernal properties
which covered the lot occupied by the private respondent were
placed under custodia legis.
On April 22, 1950, the private respondent made a deposit
for the said lot in the sum of P1,500.00 which was received by
Vicente Legarda, husband of the late owner, which was appointed
as a special administrator of the estate on April 28, 1950.
Subsequently, petitioner Manotok Realty Inc., became the
successful bidder and vendee of the Tambunting-Legarda
Subdivision consisting of 44 parcels of land pursuant to the deeds
of sale executed in its favor by the Philippine Trust Company on
March 13 and 20, 1959, as administrator of the Testate Estate of

Ruling:
No.
Article 136 of the Civil Code provides that The wife
retains the ownership of the paraphernal property while Article
137 states that The wife shall have the administration of the
paraphernal property, unless she delivers the same to the husband
by means of a public instrument empowering him to administer it.
It is not proved that Vicente Legarda was the administrator
of the paraphernal properties of Clara Tambunting during the
lifetime of the latter. Vicente Legarda, therefore, could not have
validly disposed of the lot in dispute as a continuing administrator
of the paraphernal properties of Clara Tambunting. It is also
undisputed that the probate court appointed Vicente Legarda as
administrator of the estate only on August 28, 1950, more than
three months after the questioned sale had taken place.
Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed
and set aside. Private respondent is ordered to surrender the
material and physical possession of the lot to the petitioner
because the sale between Don Vicente Legarda and the private
respondent is void ab initio, the former being neither an owner nor
administrator of the subject property.
224

RAMON C. ONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

FRANCISCO BOIX and ARSENIO CAMINO AS DEPUTY
SHERIFF OF CAMARINES NORTE, respondents.
G.R. No. 63025. November 29, 1991.
Facts:
Teodora B. Ong conducted her own logging business in
Camarines Sur. In furtherance of her business operation, on
August 18, 1955, she secured from Francisco Boix a loan in the
amount of P2,827.83. Unfortunately, because of mismanagement,
Teodora defaulted in her obligation. This prompted Boix to file a
complaint against Teodora and Ramon Ong, the latter being joined
as husband of the former. Defendant-spouses were declared in
default and judgment was rendered, in favor of Boix. After the
decision became final and executory, Boix moved to execute the
judgment. The motion was granted and a corresponding writ of
execution was issued.
Accordingly, the Sheriff of Camarines Norte levied and
attached a parcel of land in the sole name of Teodora B. Ong. In a
notice of levy or Execution and notice of Public Auction sale,
auction sales was held on October 10, 1958 with defendant Boix
having adjudged as highest bidder.
On November 16, 1961, Ramon C. Ong filed a complaint
against defendants Arsenio Camino as Deputy Sheriff of
Camarines Norte and Francisco Boix, to annul the auction sale of

a parcel of land, allegedly owned conjugally by plaintiff and his

former wife Teodora B. Ong, awarded in favor of Boix, as highest
bidder, in an auction sale conducted by Deputy Sheriff Camino.
Petitioner contends that the auction sale of the property in
dispute is null and void; that the subject property is really conjugal
which the wife in the case at bar could not legally bind, and
considering that the indebtedness was contracted by the wife only,
the levy of the subject property not owned exclusively by the wife
but owned jointly with the husband is improper.
The subject property is paraphernal property, in view of
the fact that it was declared, under Tax No. 05378, in the name of
Teodora B. Ong while the house erected thereon was declared
under Tax No. 06022 in the name of Ramon C. Ong and Teodora
B. Ong is petitioner's claim that the subject property is conjugal.
Petitioner stresses heavily on the fact that since the surname
"Ong" (which is the surname of the husband Ramon C. Ong) was
carried by Teodora in the tax declaration, that indicates that the
subject property was acquired during the marriage. By reason
thereof, the property in dispute is presumed to be owned jointly by
both spouses.
Issue:
Whether or not the property in dispute was a conjugal
ownership of spouses Ramon and Teodora Ong.
Ruling:
No.
The mere use of the surname of the husband in the tax
declaration of the subject property is not sufficient proof that said
property was acquired during the marriage and is therefore
conjugal. It is undisputed that the subject parcel was declared
solely in the wife's name, but the house built thereon was declared
in the name of the spouses. Under such circumstances, coupled
with a careful scrutiny of the records of the present case, the
Supreme Court held that the lot in question is paraphernal, and is
therefore, liable for the personal debts of the wife.
225

ALFREDO CHING and ENCARNACION CHING,

petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 124642. February 23, 2004.
Facts:
On September 26, 1978, the Philippine Blooming Mills
Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a loan of P9,000,000.00 from
the Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). By virtue of this loan, the
PBMCI, through its Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching,
executed a promissory note for the said amount promising to pay
on December 22, 1978 at an interest rate of 14% per annum. As
added security for the said loan, on September 28, 1978, Alfredo
Ching, together with Emilio Taedo and Chung Kiat Hua,
executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC binding themselves
to jointly and severally guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI
obligations owing the ABC to the extent of P38,000,000.00. The
loan was subsequently renewed on various dates, the last renewal
having been made on December 4, 1980.
Earlier, on December 28, 1979, the ABC extended another
loan to the PBMCI in the amount of P13,000,000.00 payable in
eighteen months at 16% interest per annum. As in the previous
loan, the PBMCI, through Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory
note to evidence the loan maturing on June 29, 1981. This was
renewed once for a period of one month.

The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans.

Hence, on August 21, 1981, the ABC filed a complaint for sum of
money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against
the PBMCI to collect the P12,612,972.88 exclusive of interests,
penalties and other bank charges.
In the meantime, on July 26, 1983, the deputy sheriff of
the trial court levied on attachment the 100,000 common shares of
Citycorp stocks in the name of Alfredo Ching.
On November 16, 1993, Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by
her husband Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to set aside the levy on
attachment. She alleged inter alia that the 100,000 shares of
stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her
husband during their marriage out of conjugal funds after the
Citycorp Investment Philippines. Furthermore, the indebtedness
covered by the continuing guaranty/comprehensive suretyship
contract executed by petitioner Alfredo Ching for the account of
PBMCI did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Issue:
Whether or not the levy on attachment of the 100,000
shares of stocks in the name of petitioner-husband should be set
aside for the said shares of stocks were conjugal in nature; hence,
not liable for the account of her husband under his continuing
guaranty and suretyship agreement with the PBMCI.
Ruling:
Yes.
Article 161 (1) of the New Civil Code now Article 121 (2
and 3) of the Family Code of the Philippines provides: The
conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All debts and
obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for
the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the
partnership.
The Supreme Court held in this case that the private
respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the
226

petitioners was benefited by the petitioner-husbands act of

executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with
the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract
of loan was between the private respondent and the PBMCI,
solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumption can be inferred
from the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an
accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal
partnership would thereby be benefited.

SPOUSES VIRGILIO and MICHELLE CASTRO, MOISES

B. MIAT and ALEXANDER V. MIAT, petitioners, vs. ROMEO
V. MIAT, respondent.
G.R. No. 143297. February 11, 2003.
Facts:
Spouses Moises and Concordia Miat bought two parcels of
land during their coverture. The first is located in Paraaque,
Metro Manila and the second is located in Paco, Manila.
Concordia died on April 30, 1978. They had two children: Romeo
and Alexander.
While at Dubai, United Arab Emirates, Moises agreed that
the Paraaque and Paco properties would be given to Romeo and
Alexander. However, when Moises returned in 1984, he
renegotiated the agreement with Romeo and Alexander. He
wanted the Paraaque property for himself but would leave the
Paco property to his two sons. They agreed.
It appears that Moises and Concordia bought the Paco
property on installment basis on May 17, 1977. However, it was
only on December 14, 1984 that Moises was able to pay its
balance. He secured the title over the property in his name as a
widower. According to Romeo, Moises violated the agreement
that their (Romeos and Alexanders) names would be registered
in the title once the balance was paid.

Romeo and Alexander lived on the Paco property but in

April 1988, Alexander agreed to sell to Romeo his share in the
Paco property.
In February 1988, Romeo learned that Rosalina Castro,
mother of petitioner Virgilio Castro, had given Moises P30,
000.00 as down payment for the sale by Moises of the Paco
property to her son. Romeo was informed that the Paco property
had been sold to Castro by Moises by virtue of a deed of sale
dated December 5, 1988 for P95, 000.00. Alexander testified that
after the sale, his father got one-third of the proceeds while he
received two-thirds. Romeo did not get a single centavo.
Romeo then filed an action to nullify the sale between
Moises and the Castro spouses and to compel Moises and
Alexander to execute a deed of conveyance of the Paco property
to him upon payment of the balance of its agreed price.
The petitioners contend that the Paco property is the
capital property of Moises. They allege that the spouses Moises
and Concordia purchased the property on installment basis in
1977 but stress that it was Moises who paid the balance of P12,
000.00 pesos in 1984. At that time, Concordia had long been
dead.
Issue:
Whether or not the Paco property is the capital property of
Moises.
Ruling:
No.
The Paco property is a conjugal property of Moises and
Concordia. Since Moises and Concordia were married before the
effectivity of the Family Code, the provisions of the New Civil
Code apply. Article 153(1) of the New Civil Code provides that
The following are conjugal partnership property: (1) Those
acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of
the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership,
or for only one of the spouses; x x x. Moises and Concordia
227

bought the Paco property during their marriage Moises did not
bring it into their marriage, hence it has to be considered as
conjugal.
Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil
Code. It provides that all property of the marriage is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Petitioners-spouses Castro were not buyers in good faith.
A purchaser in good faith must be wary and should investigate the
rights of those in possession. It was proven that Romeo told
Virgilio in a meeting that Romeo has a right over the Paco
property by virtue of an oral partition and assignment. Virgilio
even admitted that he knew Romeo was in possession of the title
and Romeo then insisted that he is the owner of the property.
Petitioners-spouses therefore have no right in the property.

cancer, thereby, rendering him unfit to administer them. Petitioner

also claims that private respondents succeeded in convincing their
father to sign a general power of attorney which authorized
Conchita Evangelista to administer the house and lot together with
the apartments situated in Rodriguez, Rizal.
On August 31, 1988, petitioner filed a suit for damages
and for annulment of said general power of attorney. Petitioner
also sought to be declared as the administratrix of the properties in
dispute. In due course, the trial court rendered judgment in favor
of private respondents. It held that the petitioner failed to adduce
proof that said properties were acquired during the existence of
the second conjugal partnership, or that they pertained exclusively
to the petitioner. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject properties are conjugal
properties of the spouses.

TERESITA C. FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF

APPEALS; and CONCHITA EVANGELISTA and Her
Husband SIMEON EVANGELISTA; ARACELI F.
MARILLA and Her Husband FREDDY MARILLA;
ANTONIO V. FRANCISCO; and EUSEBIO FRANCISCO,
respondents.
G.R. No. 102330. November 25, 1998.
Facts:
Petitioner is the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio
Francisco by his second marriage. Private respondents Conchita
Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla and Antonio Francisco are children
of Eusebio by his first marriage.
Petitioner alleges that since their marriage on February 10,
1962, she and Eusebio have acquired the following: (1) a sari-sari
store, a residential house and lot, and an apartment house and; (2)
a house and lot located at Rodriguez, Rizal. Petitioner further
avers that these properties were administered by Eusebio until he
was invalidated on account of tuberculosis, heart disease and

Ruling:
No.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife". However, proof of acquisition during the
coverture is a condition sine qua non for the presumption in favor
of the conjugal partnership but petitioner failed to adduce ample
evidence to show that the properties which she claimed to be
conjugal were acquired during her marriage with Eusebio.
Property already owned by a spouse prior to the marriage,
and brought to the marriage, is considered his or her separate
property. As regards the house, apartment and sari-sari store,
petitioner relied on the building permits for the house and the
apartment, with her as the applicant although in the name of
Eusebio. She also invoked the business license for the sari-sari
store issued in her name alone. It must be emphasized that the
aforementioned documents in no way prove that the
228

improvements were acquired during the second marriage. And the

fact that one is the applicant or licensee is not determinative of the
issue as to whether or not the property is conjugal or not.
Regarding the property at San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal,
private respondents assert that their father purchased it during the
lifetime of their mother. In contrast, petitioner claims ownership
over said property inasmuch as the title thereto is registered in the
name of "Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco." It
must be stressed that the certificate of title upon which petitioner
anchors her claim is inadequate. The fact that the land was
registered in the name of "Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita
Francisco", is no proof that the property was acquired during the
spouses coverture.
Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed.

Register of Deeds of Isabela to issue the corresponding transfer

certificate of title of the land conveyed. The Register of Deeds in
turn wrote a letter to petitioner Conceso Diaz to surrender the
owner's duplicate certificate of title in order that the deed of sale
could be properly annotated. Due to the refusal of petitioner to
surrender the owner's duplicate certificate of title, de Guzman had
to file on April 5, 1972, in the Court of First Instance of Isabela, a
petition for the surrender of the owner's duplicate of Original
Certificate of Title in the name of the late Teodulo Diaz.
Among his contention, Diaz argued that the property sold
is part of the intestate estate of his late father, thus, Maria Espejo
did not have any judicial authority to sell the portion of the lot in
question.
Issue:
Whether or not the property of Teodulo Diaz and Maria
Espejo is conjugal giving her the authority to sell the lot in
question to Tomas De Guzman.

CONCESO DIAZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

TOMAS DE GUZMAN, respondents.
G.R. No. L-42180. November 10, 1986.
Facts:
The late Teodulo Diaz, who died intestate before the last
World War, was the registered owner of a tract of land located in
Ilagan, Isabela. He was survived by his wife Maria Espejo (now
also deceased) and five children, one of whom is the herein
petitioner Conceso Diaz.
On June 9, 1947, the widow, Maria Espejo sold a portion
of the land to herein private respondent Tomas de Guzman. The
transaction was evidenced by a Deed of Sale.
Tomas de Guzman declared the land he purchased for
taxation purposes, and he has been paying the taxes thereon. In a
letter dated September 22, 1971 private respondent requested the

Ruling:
Yes.
Upon a consideration of the established facts, it was shown
that the property was acquired during the existence of the conjugal
partnership. It is a settled rule that adjudication of real property to
one of the spouses only, does not necessarily mean that it is his or
her exclusive property, if said land was acquired during the
marriage.
Upon the death of Teodulo Diaz, the land was divided into
two, one-half became the conjugal share of Maria Espejo and the
other half became the hereditary share of the heirs of Teodulo
Diaz by operation of law.
When Maria Espejo Vda. de Diaz sold the lot to
respondent in 1947, she did not sell the same as an administratrix;
she sold it as owner of the other half. There was, therefore, no
need for any judicial authority for her to sell her own property or
share in the conjugal partnership.
229

AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and

ABELARDO MAGSAJO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and SPOUSES ALFREDO & ENCARNACION
CHING, respondents.
G.R. No. 118305. 12 February 1998.
Facts:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50, 300,000
loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development
Corporation (AIDC). As added security for the credit line
extended to PBM, respondents Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice
President of PBM, executes security agreements making himself
jointly and severally answerable with BMs indebtedness to
AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, AIDC filed a case for
sum of money against PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo
Ching with the Court of First Instance (CFI).
The CFI rendered judgment ordering PBM and
respondent-husband Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay
AIDC the principal amount of P 50,300,000 with interests.

Pending appeal of judgment in the civil case, upon motion

of AIDC, the lower court issued a writ of execution pending
appeal. Upon AIDCs putting up of an P8,000,000 bond, a writ
of execution was issued. Thereafter, petitioner Abelardo Magsajo,
Sr. appointed sheriff in the civil case caused the issuance and
service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of a sheriff sale on
three of their conjugal properties. Petitioner Magsajo then
scheduled the auction sale of the properties levied.
Upon application of private respondents, the lower court
issued a temporary restraining order to prevent petitioner Magsajo
from proceeding with the enforcement of the writ of execution
and with the sale of the said properties at public auction.
However, after filing of a petition for certiorari by AIDC,
the CA issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the lower
court from enforcing its order, thus paving the way for the
scheduled auction sale of respondents-spouses conjugal
properties.
The auction sale took place, AIDC being the only bidder,
was issued a Certificate of Sale by petitioner Magsajo which was
registered.
Eventually, the trial court promulgated its decision
declaring the sale on execution null and void. The CA
promulgated the assailed decision, affirming the decision of the
RTC which held that the loan procured from respondentappellant AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of the PBM
and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of petitionerappellees.
Issue:
Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by
respondent husband alone in this case are considered for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership which is chargeable against the
conjugal partnership.
Ruling:
No.
230

Where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the

family business, the law presumes and rightly so, that such
obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e.
he directly received money and services to be used in and for his
own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the
term obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the
benefit of the family in apparent at the time of the signing of the
contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services,
the family stands to benefit from the loan or services to be
rendered to the business or profession of the husband.

REMEDIOS G. SALVADOR and MA. GRACIA G.

SALVADOR, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
ALBERTO and ELPIA YABO, FRANCISCA YABO, et al.,
respondents.
G.R. No. 109910. April 5, 1995.
Facts:
Alipio Yabo was the owner of Lot No. 6080 and Lot No.
6180. Title thereto devolved upon his nine children, namely,
Victoriano, Procopio, Lope, Jose, Pelagia, Baseliza, Francisca,
Maria, and Gaudencia, upon his death sometime before or during
the second world war.
On April 28, 1976, Pastor Makibalo, husband of Maria
Yabo, child of Alipio filed with the Court of First Instance a
complaint against the spouses Alberto and Elpia Yabo. In such
complaint, Pastor alleged that he owned a total of 8 shares of the
said lots having purchased the share of seven of Alipios children

and inherited the share of his wife Maria, and that except for the
portion corresponding to Gaudencias share which he did not buy,
he occupied, cultivated and possessed continuously, openly,
peacefully and exclusively the two parcels of land. He therefore
prayed that he be declared the absolute owner of 8/9 of the lots
questioned.
The trial court rendered judgment, finding Pastor, now
Eugelio Salvador and Remedios Salvador owners of eight shares
on Lot No.6080 and some shares on Lot No.6180.
On October 8, 1976, the grandchildren and great
grandchildren of the late Alipio Yabo lodged within the same court
a complaint for partition and quieting of title with damages
against Pastor, Enecia, Cristal, and the spouses Eulogio and
Remedios Salvador. They alleged that the aforesaid lots are
common properties of the heirs of Alipio and that the defendants
after Alipios death became the de facto administrators of the lots
and to their surprise discovered that the Salvadors have been
harvesting coconuts from the lots.
The plaintiffs prayed that they and the defendant be
declared as the owners of the lots and that the Salvador spouses be
declared as having no rights thereto. The two cases thereby were
consolidated and jointly heard. The trial court however ruled
against the plaintiffs.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that Maria did not
sell her share to Alberto and Elpia Yabo; that prescription and
laches have not ran against the private respondents with respect to
the 1/9 share of Maria Yabo in the estate of her father and to her
conjugal share in the portions acquired from her brother and
sisters and Procopio never sold his share in Lot. No. 6080 to
Pastor Makibalo.
Issue:
Whether or not, the shares of Jose, Victoriano, Lope,
Baseliza, Procopio and Francisca in Lot No.6180 and in Lot No.
6080 which had been purchased by Pastor during his marriage
with Maria belong to their conjugal partnership.
231

Ruling:
Yes.
The Court ruled that all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to either of them. In the instant
case, the shares of Jose, Victoriano, Lope, Baseliza, Procopio and
Francisca in Lot No.6180 and in Lot No. 6080 had been purchased
by Pastor during his marriage with Maria. Such shares would have
been the exclusive property of Pastor had there been proof that the
properties were acquired or purchased by him with his exclusive
money. Thus, absent such proof the same was deemed by the
Court to belong to the conjugal partnership of Pastor and Maria.

property was issued by the Registry of Deeds in the name of

Lolita Reed, married to Guillermo Reed.
Guillermo had allowed his brother, Dominador, and the
latters wife, Luz, to stay in the house constructed on his property.
In December, 1991, Dominador and Luz Reed were
summoned to the barangay in connection with the complaint for
ejectment filed against them by Eduardo Quiteves and Alberta
Domingo, who claimed to be the owners of the lot where their
house stands. Guillermo denied having sold his property.
On March 8, 1994, Guillermo filed a complaint for
reconveyance of property against Lolita, spouses Ardaniel and
Natividad Villanera, spouses Danilo and Alberta Domingo, and
Eduardo Quiteves, alleging that his wife, Lolita Reed, from whom
he had been estranged, conspiring with the other petitioners,
caused the preparation of a special power of attorney wherein it
was made to appear that he authorized his wife to sell the subject
property; that he did not sign the special power of attorney nor
appear before the notary public because he was working abroad.
The trial court rendered judgment against Guillermo.
However, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.
Issue:

Spouses DANILO and ALBERTA DOMINGO, and

EDUARDO QUITEVES, Petitioners, vs. GUILLERMO
REED, Respondent.
G.R. No. 157701. December 9, 2005.
Facts:
Respondent Guillermo Reed was an overseas contract
worker from 1978 to 1986 and came home only for short
vacations. He purchased from the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) on installment basis a 166 square meter property.
Because he was working abroad, it was his wife, Lolita Reed, who
paid the consideration to the GSIS. The title covering said

Whether or not Lolita is justified in effecting a sale of the

subject property without her husbands consent for the
maintenance and support of the family.
Ruling:
No.
Lolitas rights over the property were merely inchoate
prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. There was also
absolutely no proof to her allegations that she used the proceeds of
the sale to purchase necessities for the maintenance and support of
the family. Having failed to establish any of these circumstances,
she may not unilaterally bind the conjugal assets.

232

On March 6, 1972, Eda Jimenez sold 65 square meters of

the said lot to Marcos Salimbagat for P 6,500.00. On August 1972,
the Torregianis spouses instituted an action for declaration of
nullity of contract, annulment of sales, reconveyance and damages
against the spouses Santiago and Eda Jimenez alleging that the
sail of said lot to Eda Jimenez was void not only for lack of
consideration but also because the husband of Lucia did not
consent to the sale, which consent is necessary because the lot was
a conjugal property.
The trial court held in favor of Lucia. However, the Court
of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the lot in question is paraphernal property
of Lucia.
LUCIA EMBRADO and ORESTE TORREGIANI, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PACIFICO CIMAFRANCA,
MARCOS SALIMBAGAT, EDA JIMENEZ and SANTIAGO
JIMENEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 51457. June 27, 1994.
Facts:
Lucia Embrado was married to Oreste Torregiani in 1943.
Prior to the marriage, there was a sale of Lot 564, a 366-square
meter lot to Lucia when she was still single. However, only on 2
July 1946 when a Venta Definitiva, a notarized document written
entirely in Spanish, was executed by the Carpitanos to Lucia.
The couples, after the marriage made their conjugal abode
on the lot and in 1958 constructed a residential commercial
building thereon.
On May 1, 1971 an absolute deed of sale was executed by
Lucia Embrado Torregiani of the said lot described as her own
paraphernal property to her adopted daughter, Eda Jimenez, for
the sum of P 1,000.00.

Ruling:
No.
While the Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals
that the property in question was originally a paraphernal property
of Lucia, the Supreme Court cannot adopt its conclusion that
because Lucia and the original owners agreed for its purchase and
sale, ownership was already acquired by Lucia at that moment.
Under Art. 1496 of the Civil Code, "ownership of the thing sold is
acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in
any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other
manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred
from the vendor to the vendee," and under Art. 1498, "when the
sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof
shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object
of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or
cannot clearly be inferred."
The Venta Definitiva over the lot in favor of Lucia
Embrado was executed by the Carpitanoses on 2 July 1946 when
her marriage to petitioner Oreste Torregiani was already
subsisting.
233

Another thing more, the second paragraph of Art. 158 of

the Civil Code (now Article 120, Family Code) provides that
"buildings constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during
the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses, also
pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be
reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same." Under this article,
the land becomes conjugal upon the construction of the building
without awaiting reimbursement before or at the liquidation of the
partnership upon the concurrence of two conditions, to wit: (a) the
construction of the building at the expense of the partnership; and,
(b) the ownership of the land by one of the spouses. 18 The
conditions have been fully met in the case at bench. Thus, even if
Lot 564 was originally the paraphernal property of Lucia as
evident from the "Venta Definitiva", the same became conjugal
upon the construction of the residential/commercial building in
1958.

When petitioner inquired from the spouses in July 1991 as

to the status of the amount he loaned to them, the latter
acknowledged their obligation but pleaded that they were not yet
in a position to make a definite settlement of the same. Thereafter,
respondent expressed violent resistance to petitioners inquiries on
the amount to the extent of making various death threats against
petitioner.
On August 24, 1994, petitioner made a formal demand for
the payment of the amount of US$25,000.00 but the spouses
failed to comply with their obligation. Thus, petitioner filed a
complaint for collection of a sum of money and damages against
respondent and his wife.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the loan by the husband and wife is the
liability of the conjugal property.

HONORIO L. CARLOS, petitioner, vs. MANUEL T.

ABELARDO, respondent.
G.R. No. 146504. April 9, 2002.
Facts:
Petitioner averred in his complaint filed on October 13,
1994 that in October 1989, respondent Manuel T Abelardo, his
son-in-law, and the latters wife, Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo
approached him and requested him to advance the amount of
US$25,000.00 for the purchase of a house and lot located at
#19952 Chestnut Street, Executive Heights Village, Paranaque,
Metro Manila. To enable and assist the spouses conduct their
married life independently and on their own, petitioner, in October
31, 1989, issued a check in the name of a certain Pura Vallejo,
seller of the property, who acknowledged receipt thereof.

Ruling:
Yes.
The loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership
pursuant to Article 121 of the Family Code. Notwithstanding the
alleged lack of consent of respondent husband, he shall be
solidarily liable for such loan together with his wife.
The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband
or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to
the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the
benefit of the family. The defendants never denied that the check
of US$25,000.00 was used to purchase the subject house and lot.
They do not deny that the same served as their conjugal home,
thus benefiting the family. On the same principle,
acknowledgment of the loan made by the defendant-wife binds the
conjugal partnership since its proceeds redounded to the benefit of
the family. Hence, defendant-husband and defendant-wife are
jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan.
234

Private respondent Lily filed her answer with

counterclaim, alleging that although Augusto and she are husband
and wife, the former had abandoned her and their children five
months before the filing of the complaint; that they were already
separated when the promissory note was executed; that her
signature in the special power of attorney was forged because she
had never authorized Augusto in any capacity to transact any
business for and in behalf of A & L Industries, which is owned by
her as a single proprietor, that she never got a single centavo from
the proceeds of the loan mentioned in the promissory note; and
that as a result of the illegal attachment of her properties, which
constituted the assets of the A & L Industries, the latter closed its
business and was taken over by the new owner.
The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the
petitioner's complaint against the private respondent Lily Yulo and
A & L Industries. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court.
BA FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AUGUSTO YULO,
LILY YULO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-61464. May 28, 1988.
Facts:
On July 1, 1975, private respondent Augusto Yulo secured
a loan from the petitioner in the amount of P591,003.59 as
evidenced by a promissory note he signed in his own behalf and
as representative of the A & L Industries. Respondent Yulo
presented an alleged special power of attorney executed by his
wife, respondent Lily Yulo, who manages A & L Industries and
under whose name the said business is registered, purportedly
authorizing Augusto to procure the loan and sign the promissory
note. About two months prior to the loan, however, Augusto had
already left Lily and their children and had abandoned their
conjugal home. When the obligation became due and demandable,
Augusto failed to pay the same.

Issue:
Whether or not the loan incurred by respondent Augusto is
a liability of the conjugal partnership.
Ruling:
No.
There is no dispute that A & L Industries was established
during the marriage of Augusto and Lily Yulo and therefore the
same is presumed conjugal and the fact that it was registered in
the name of only one of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal
nature. However, for the said property to be held liable, the
obligation contracted by the husband must have redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. In the present case, the
obligation which the petitioner is seeking to enforce against the
conjugal property managed by the private respondent Lily was
undoubtedly contracted by Augusto for his own benefit because at
the time he incurred the obligation he had already abandoned his
family and had left their conjugal home. Worse, he made it appear
235

that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf of A & L

Industries, to procure such loan from the petitioner.

Several demands thereafter for payment were to no avail,

despite the several extensions given to the defendant spouses to
settle the obligation. It was only on January 5, 1983 that the
defendants made a partial payment of Five Thousand (P5,000.00)
Pesos, thereby reducing their principal obligation to P230,880.89.
When no further payments were made to settle the obligation
despite repeated demands, Johnson & Johnson was constrained to
file a complaint on June 8, 1983 against defendant spouses
Vinluan, for collection of the principal obligation plus interest,
with damages.
Issue:
Whether or not Alejo Vinluan, as well as their conjugal
property, can be held liable for his wifes obligation to plaintiff
corporation.

JOHNSON & JOHNSON (PHILS.), INC., petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJO M. VINLUAN,
respondents.
G.R. No. 102692. September 23, 1996.
Facts:
Johnson & Johnson (Phils.), Incorporated is engaged in the
manufacturing and selling of various cosmetics, health, and body
care products, as well as medical drugs. On several occasions in
the year 1982, the defendant, Delilah Vinluan, purchased products
of the said corporation, as she was also engaged in the business of
retailing Johnson products. The defendants, under the name and
style of "Vinluan Enterprises," thus incurred an obligation of Two
Hundred Thirty-Five Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Pesos and
Eighty-Nine (P235,880.89) Centavos, for which she issued seven
(7) Philippine Banking Corporation checks of varying amounts
and due dates. When presented on their respective due dates,
however, the checks given in payment of the obligation bounced
and were dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient
funds.

Ruling:
No.
The Supreme Court ruled that the decision of the trial
court is final and executory. Thus, it affirmed the lower courts
decision when it charged defendant Delilah Vinluan alone to pay
the plaintiff corporation, having already declared that the
defendant-husband cannot be held legally liable for his wifes
obligation. Perhaps, when it was later discovered that the
defendant Delilah Vinluan did not have sufficient property of her
own to settle their obligation, the conjugal properties of the
defendant spouses became the object of levy. But in order to bind
the conjugal partnership and its properties, the New Civil Code
provides that the debts and obligations contracted by the husband
or the wife must be for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and
that the husband must consent to his wifes engaging in business.
However, in this case, the husband did not give his consent neither
did the obligation redounded to the benefit of the family. Hence,
the conjugal partnership as well as the defendant cannot be held
liable.
236

consequently, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Pedro in

favor of spouses Bautista is not authorized by Berlinda.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale made by Pedro is null and void.
Ruling:
Yes.
The sale of conjugal property by the husband without
marital consent of the wife affects the entire property, not just the
share of the wife and it is considered a nullity.
Petitioners are not buyers of good faith since they were
dealing with a seller (Pedro) who had title to and possession of the
land but whose capacity to sell was restricted, in that marital
consent of respondent is required before he could convey the
property.
SPOUSES CLARO AND NIDA BAUTISTA, petitioners, v.
BERLINDA F. SILVA, respondent.
G. R. No. 157434. September 19, 2006.
Facts:
On August 14, 1980, a Transfer Certificate of Title No. B37189 over a parcel of land was registered in the names of
Spouses Berlinda F. Silva and Pedro M. Silva.
On March 3, 1988, Pedro M. Silva, for himself and as
attorney-in-fact of his wife, Berlinda, thru a Special Power of
Attorney purportedly executed on November 18, 1987 by Berlinda
in his favor, signed and executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the
said parcel of land covered by TCT No. B-37189 in favor of
spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista.
As a consequence, TCT No. B-37189 was cancelled and in
lieu thereof, TCT No. V-2765 of the Registry of Deeds for the
Valenzuela Branch was issued in the names of spouses Claro
Bautista and Nida Bautista on March 4, 1988.
Evidence shows that the signature appearing on the
Special Power of Attorney as that of Berlinda is a forgery, and that
237

persons. Thus, Armando and Adelia filed a complaint for specific

performance.
The trial court ruled in favor of Armando and Adelia. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
Issue:
SPOUSES GODOFREDO ALFREDO and CARMEN LIMON
ALFREDO, et al., petitioners, vs. SPOUSES ARMANDO
BORRAS and ADELIA LOBATON BORRAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 144225. June 17, 2003.
Facts:
The registered owners of the Subject Land, which is the
subject of controversy in this case, were petitioner spouses,
Godofredo and Carmen Alfredo. The Subject Land is covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 284 issued to Godofredo and
Carmen.
On 7 March 1994, the private respondents, spouses
Armando Borras and Adelia Lobaton Borras, filed a complaint for
specific performance against Godofredo and Carmen before the
trial court. Armando and Adelia alleged in their complaint that
Godofredo and Carmen mortgaged the Subject Land for
P7,000.00 with the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).
To pay the debt, Carmen and Godofredo sold the Subject Land to
Armando and Adelia for P15,000.00, the buyers to pay the DBP
loan and its accumulated interest, and the balance to be paid in
cash to the sellers.
Armando and Adelia gave Godofredo and Carmen the
money to pay the loan to DBP. Godofredo and Carmen introduced
Armando and Adelia, as the new owners of the Subject Land, to
the old tenants of the same. Armando and Adelia then took
possession of the Subject Land.
Armando and Adelia discovered that Godofredo and
Carmen had re-sold portions of the Subject Land to several

Whether or not the contract of sale made by Carmen is

void because she did not obtain the consent and authority of her
husband, Godofredo.
Ruling:
No.
The Supreme Court ruled that the contract of sale was
voidable subject to annulment by the husband.
Following
petitioners argument that Carmen sold the land to Armando and
Adelia without the consent of Carmens husband, the sale would
only be voidable and not void.
The Family Code provides that any alienation or
encumbrance made by the husband of the conjugal partnership
property without the consent of the wife is void. However, when
the sale is made before the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law is the Civil Code. Article 173 of the Civil Code
provides that the disposition of conjugal property without the
wifes consent is not void but merely voidable. Article 173 reads:
The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the
transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any
contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when
such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband
which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal
partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right,
she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may
demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the
husband.
Godofredo can no longer question the sale either. Voidable
contracts are susceptible of ratification. Godofredo ratified the
sale when he introduced Armando and Adelia to his tenants as the
238

new owners of the Subject Land. If the sale was truly

unauthorized, then Godofredo should have filed an action to annul
the sale. He did not. The prescriptive period to annul the sale has
long lapsed. Godofredos conduct belies his claim that his wife
sold the Subject Land without his consent.
Moreover, Godofredo and Carmen used most of the
proceeds of the sale to pay their debt with the DBP. This shows
that the sale redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Hence, even if Carmen sold the land without the consent of her
husband, the sale still binds the conjugal partnership.
TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, petitioner, vs. GILDA L.
JARDELEZA, ERNESTO L. JARDELEZA, JR., MELECIO
GIL L. JARDELEZA, and GLENDA L. JARDELEZA,
respondents.
G.R. No. 112014. December 5, 2000.

only serve to duplicate the powers of the wife under the explicit
provisions of Article 124, second paragraph, of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 124 of the Family Code renders
superfluous the appointment of a judicial guardian over the person
and estate of an incompetent married person.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Article 124 of the Family
Code is not applicable to the situation of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.
and that the proper procedure was an application for appointment
of judicial guardian under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of
Court.
The Supreme Court remands the case to the trial court for
further proceedings consistent with this decision.

Facts:
Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and Gilda L. Jardeleza were
married long before 03 August 1988, when the Family Code took
effect. The union produced five children, namely: petitioner,
Ernesto, Jr., Melecio, Glenda and Rolando.
On 25 March 1991, Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. then 73
years old, suffered a stroke and lapsed into comatose condition.
On 3 July 1991, petitioner filed with the trial court a
motion for the issuance of letters of guardianship to him, rather
than to his mother, on the ground that she considered the property
acquired by Dr. Jardeleza as her own and did not want to be
appointed guardian.
On 09 August 1991, respondents filed with the trial court
an opposition to the petition for guardianship and the motion for
issuance of letters of guardianship to petitioner.
On 20 August 1993, the trial court issued an order
dismissing the petition for guardianship. The trial court concluded,
without explanation, that the petition is superfluous and would
239

ANTONIO and LUZVIMINDA GUIANG, petitioners, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and GILDA CORPUZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 125172. June 26, 1998.
Facts:
Gilda Corpuz and Judie Corpuz are legally married
spouses. They were married on December 24, 1968. The couple
has three children, namely: Junie, Harriet and Jodie.
On February 14, 1983, the couple Gilda and Judie, bought
a 421 sq. meter lot located from Manuel Callejo. Sometime on
April 22, 1988, the couple sold one-half portion of the said lot to
Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang.
However, in the absence of his wife Gilda, Judie pushed
through the sale of the remaining one-half portion of their lot on
March 1, 1990 to Luzviminda Guiang.
On May 28, 1990, Gilda filed an Amended Complaint
against her husband Judie and petitioners-spouses Antonio and
Luzviminda Guiang. The said Complaint sought the declaration of
a certain deed of sale, which involved the conjugal property of
private respondent and her husband, null and void.

took effect by the husband of the conjugal partnership property

without the consent of the wife is null and void.
The said contract properly falls within the ambit of Article
124 of the Family Code, which states: "Art. 124. The
administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be
availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall
be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

Issue:
Whether or not the sale of the remaining one-half portion
of the conjugal lot made by the husband is valid without the
consent of his wife.
Ruling:
No.
The Supreme Court held that any alienation or
encumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when the Family Code
240

SANTIAGO NICOLAS, et al., petitioners, vs.

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. L-37631. October 12, 1987.

Ruling:
No.
The land is a conjugal property and, as such, it could not
be alienated without the conformity of his wife. Moreover, it was
heavily mortgaged with the Philippine National Bank, Malolos
branch, and could not be transferred without the bank's consent.
As a matter of fact, the transfer certificate of title was then in the
possession of said bank.

Facts:
In 1951, respondent Anastacio Madlangsakay, a rice
dealer, married to Lourdes Manuel, bought from Felipe Garcia
three parcels of land. The Transfer Certificate of Title was issued
on October 19, 1951 in the name of Madlangsakay. At the time of
the purchase, petitioners were occupying Lot No. 8 as tenants.
Negotiations begun for the sale of Lot No. 8 to petitioner
tenants and in an affidavit dated August 26, 1958, Madlangsakay
promised to subdivide the land among them at P0.70 per square
meter. Nothing came out of the negotiations.
Soon thereafter, the relationship between the new owner
and the occupants soured and quickly deteriorated into a series of
legal squabbles which culminated in the present controversy.
On April 26, 1961, petitioners filed an amended complaint
against Madlangsakay to quiet title over Lot. No. 8.
In his answer, Madlangsakay averred that the deeds of sale
and the affidavits which he purportedly executed were all
forgeries and that the land in question, being conjugal property
and mortgaged with the Philippine National Bank, could not be
alienated without his wife's consent.
The trial court upheld Madlangsakay. It dismissed the
complaint, nullified the deeds of sale and the affidavits.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale of the conjugal property made by
Madlangsakay is valid.

JOSE UY and GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L. JARDELEZA,

petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO L. JARDELEZA,
respondents.
241

G.R. No. 109557. November 29, 2000.

Facts:
This case is a dispute between Teodoro L. Jardeleza,
against his mother Gilda L. Jardeleza, and sister and brother-inlaw, the spouses Jose Uy and Glenda Jardeleza. The controversy
came about as a result of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.s suffering of a
stroke on March 25, 1991, which left him comatose and bereft of
any motor or mental faculties. Said Ernesto, Sr. is the father of
herein Teodoro Jardeleza and husband of herein private
respondent Gilda Jardeleza.
On June 13, 1991, respondent Gilda herself filed a petition
regarding the declaration of incapacity of Ernesto, Sr., assumption
of sole powers of administration of conjugal properties, and
authorization to sell the same.
The trial court rendered its decision finding that it was
convinced that Ernesto, Sr. was truly incapacitated to participate
in the administration of the conjugal properties, and that the sale
of Lot No. 4291 and the improvements thereon was necessary to
defray the mounting expenses for treatment and hospitalization.
On June 24, 1991, Teodoro filed his Opposition to the
proceedings being unaware and not knowing that a decision has
already been rendered on the case by public respondent.
On July 3, 1991, Teodoro filed a motion for
reconsideration. He propounded the argument that the petition for
declaration of incapacity, assumption of sole powers of
administration, and authority to sell the conjugal properties was
essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and properties
of Ernesto, Sr. As such, it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with
the provisions on summary proceedings set out in Article 253 of
the Family Code. It should follow the rules governing special
proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court which require
procedural due process, particularly the need for notice and a
hearing on the merits
Issue:

Whether or not Gilda, as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.

may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal
property under Article 124 of the Family Code and dispose of a
parcel of land with its improvements, with the approval of the
court in a summary proceedings, to her co-petitioners, her own
daughter and son-in-law, for the amount of eight million pesos.
Ruling:
No.
In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial
proceedings under the Family Code govern the proceedings under
Article 124 of the Family Code. The situation contemplated is
one where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has
abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained.
Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse
is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, the
trial court found that the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who
was in comatose or semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke,
cerebrovascular accident, without motor and mental faculties, and
with a diagnosis of brain stem infarct. In such case, the proper
remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of
the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.

SAMSON T. SABALONES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF

APPEALS and
242

REMEDIOS GAVIOLA-SABALONES, respondents.

G.R. No. 106169. February 14, 1994.
Facts:
Petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to his wife, herein
respondent Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones, the administration of
some of their conjugal, properties for fifteen years having been
assigned to different countries during his successive tours of
duties as a member of the diplomatic service.
Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to
the Philippines but not to his wife and their children. Four years
later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building
and lot in Greenhills belonging to the conjugal partnership.
In her answer, the private respondent opposed the
authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation. She
alleged that the house in Greenhills was being occupied by her
and their six children and that they were depending for their
support on the rentals from another conjugal property in Forbes
Park. She also informed the court that despite her husband's
retirement, he had not returned to his legitimate family and was
instead maintaining a separate residence in Quezon City, with
Thelma Cumareng and their three children.
Remedios also asked the court to grant the decree of legal
separation and order the liquidation of their conjugal properties,
with forfeiture of her husband's share therein because of his
adultery.
The trial court found that the petitioner had indeed
contracted a bigamous marriage with Thelma Cumareng, to whom
he had returned upon his retirement at a separate residence. The
court thus decreed the legal separation of the spouses and the
forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties,
declaring as well that he was not entitled to support from his
respondent wife.

Whether or not private respondent should be the sole

administrator of the conjugal properties.
Ruling:
Yes.
The Supreme Court notes that the wife has been
administering the subject properties for almost nineteen years,
apparently without complaint on the part of the petitioner. He has
not alleged, much less shown, that her administration has caused
prejudice to the conjugal partnership.
Thus, it was held that pending the appointment of an
administrator over the whole mass of conjugal assets, private
respondent is allowed to continue with her administration; and
petitioner should be enjoined from interfering with his wife's
administration pending resolution of the appeal.
The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint
administration over the conjugal properties as provided in Article
124 of the Family Code. However, Article 61 states that after a
petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in
the absence of a written agreement between the couple, appoint
either one of the spouses or a third person to act as the
administrator.
While it is true that no formal designation of the
administrator has been made, such designation was implicit in the
decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the
conjugal properties (and thus also disqualifying him as
administrator thereof). That designation was in effect approved by
the Court of Appeals when it issued in favor of the respondent
wife the preliminary injunction.

Issue:
243

IMELDA RELUCIO, petitioner, vs. ANGELINA MEJIA

LOPEZ, respondent.
G.R. No. 138497. January 16, 2002.
Facts:
On September 15, 1993, Angelina Mejia Lopez filed a
petition for APPOINTMENT AS SOLE ADMINISTRATRIX OF
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES, FORFEITURE,
ETC., against Alberto Lopez and petitioner Imelda Relucio. In
the petition, Angelina alleged that sometime in 1968, Alberto, who
is legally married to the her, abandoned the latter and their four
legitimate children; that he arrogated unto himself full and
exclusive control and administration of the conjugal properties,
spending and using the same for his sole gain and benefit to the
total exclusion of the private respondent and their four children;
that defendant Lopez, after abandoning his family, maintained an
illicit relationship and cohabited with herein petitioner since 1976.
It was further alleged that Alberto and petitioner Relucio,
during their period of cohabitation since 1976, have amassed a
fortune consisting mainly of stockholdings in Lopez-owned or
controlled corporations, residential, agricultural, commercial lots,
houses, apartments and buildings, cars and other motor vehicles,
bank accounts and jewelry. These properties, which are in the
names of Alberto and petitioner Relucio singly or jointly or their
dummies and proxies, have been acquired principally if not solely
through the actual contribution of money, property and industry of
Alberto with minimal, if not nil, actual contribution from
petitioner Relucio.

(b) Whether or not there is a basis in law to forfeit

Albertos share in property co-owned by him with petitioner, and
a dissolution of the conjugal partnership with private respondent.
Ruling:
(a) No. The first cause of action is for judicial appointment
of respondent as administratrix of the conjugal partnership or
absolute community property arising from her marriage to
Alberto. Petitioner is a complete stranger to this cause of action.
There is no right-duty relation between petitioner and respondent
that can possibly support a cause of action.
(b) Yes. The Supreme Court upheld that the trial court can
issue a judgment ordering Alberto to make an accounting of his
conjugal partnership with respondent, and give support to
respondent and their children, and dissolve Albertos conjugal
partnership with respondent, and forfeit Albertos share in
property co-owned by him and petitioner. Such judgment would
be perfectly valid and enforceable against Alberto J. Lopez.

Issue/s:
(a) Whether respondents petition for appointment as sole
administratrix of the conjugal property, accounting, etc. against
her husband Alberto established a cause of action against
petitioner.

244

AMPARO NABLE-JOSE et al., STANDARD OIL COMPANY

OF NEW YORK and CARMEN CASTRO, plaintiffs and
appellants, vs. MARIANO NABLE-JOSE et al., defendants and
appellees.
No. 7397. December 11, 1916.

liquidation and settlement there appear to be assets in the

community partnership.
The contract executed by a person, who, according to the
registry has a right thereto, cannot be invalidated with regard to
third persons after it has been recorded. The mortgage is perfectly
valid and binding upon all parties.

Facts:
Macario Nable-Jose was married to Paz Borja in Dagupan,
Pangasinan. In the year 1897, Paz Borja passed away. On 31 July
1907, Mariano entered into a contract with Standard Oil Company
of New York. He executed as a mortgage a conjugal property and
a real estate, a house and a camarin situated in Dagupan,
Pangasinan measuring about 7,091 square meters.
On 24 October 1910, the Standard Oil Company of New York
through its lawyers presented its complaint to Mariano Nable
Jose. Said action was known as No. 833 of the Court of First
Instance of Dagupan, Pangasinan. The purpose of the action was
to recover from Mariano the sum of 633,191.244 pesos and the
foreclosure of the said mortgages given by Mariano to the plaintiff
upon certain property particularly described in the complaint to
secure the payment if the said sum of money.
Issue:
Whether or not Mariano Nable-Jose after the death of Paz
Borja has the power to sell or mortgage the community property
acquired during their coverture.
Ruling:
The husband has the exclusive right as the surviving
spouse to take the possession of the common property, and to
administer it, until the same is liquidated and he is entrusted to
make the liquidation upon the death of the wife. The interest of
the wife in the community property is an inchoate interest, a mere
expectancy, and after her death, her interest constitutes neither a
legal nor equitable estate, and only ripens into title when upon

ARTURO R. ABALOS, petitioner, vs.

DR. GALICANO S. MACATANGAY, JR., respondent.
G.R. No. 155043. September 30, 2004.
245

Facts:
Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the registered
owners of a parcel of land with improvements. On June 2, 1988,
armed with a Special Power of Attorney, purportedly issued by his
wife, Arturo executed a Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement
(RMOA) in favor of respondent, binding himself to sell to
respondent the subject property.
Subsequently, Arturos wife, Esther, executed a Special
Power of Attorney dated October 25, 1989, appointing her sister,
Bernadette Ramos, to act for and in her behalf relative to the
transfer of the property to respondent. Ostensibly, a marital
squabble was brewing between Arturo and Esther at the time and
to protect his interest, respondent caused the annotation of his
adverse claim on the title of the spouses to the property on
November 14, 1989.
On November 16, 1989, respondent sent a letter to Arturo
and Esther informing them of his readiness and willingness to pay
the full amount of the purchase price. The letter contained a
demand upon the spouses to comply with their obligation to turn
over possession of the property to him. Arturo and Esther failed to
deliver the property which prompted respondent to file a
complaint for specific performance with damages against
petitioners.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for specific
performance. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale of the conjugal property executed
by Arturo and Esther on separate documents is valid before the
dissolution of their marriage.
Ruling:
No.
Arturo and Esther appear to have been married before the
effectivity of the Family Code. There being no indication that

they have adopted a different property regime, their property

relations would automatically be governed by the regime of
conjugal partnership of gains. The subject land which had been
admittedly acquired during the marriage of the spouses forms part
of their conjugal partnership.
The husband, even if he is statutorily designated as
administrator of the conjugal partnership, cannot validly alienate
or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without
the wifes consent. Similarly, the wife cannot dispose of any
property belonging to the conjugal partnership without the
conformity of the husband.
More significantly, it has been held that prior to the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse
in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which
constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not
ripen into title until it appears that there are assets in the
community as a result of the liquidation and settlement. The
interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder or
remanente liquido (haber ganancial) resulting from the
liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution.
Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal
assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the
conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it
is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations,
there are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses
or their respective heirs.
The sale by the husband of property belonging to the
conjugal partnership without the consent of the wife when there is
no showing that the latter is incapacitated is void ab initio
because it is in contravention of the mandatory requirements
of Article 166 of the Civil Code. Since Article 166 of the Civil
Code requires the consent of the wife before the husband may
alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal
partnership, it follows that acts or transactions executed against
this mandatory provision are void except when the law itself
authorizes their validity.
246

As an exception, the husband may dispose of conjugal

property without the wifes consent if such sale is necessary to
answer for conjugal liabilities mentioned in Articles 161 and 162
of the Civil Code This is one instance where the wifes consent is
not required and, impliedly, no judicial intervention is necessary.
Inescapably, herein petitioners action for specific
performance must fail. Even on the supposition that the parties
only disposed of their respective shares in the property, the sale,
assuming that it exists, is still void for the right of the husband or
the wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Nemo dat qui non habet.
No one can give what he has not.

ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, respondent
G.R. No. 132955. October 27, 2006
Facts:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia
Canalita-Villanueva got married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto
Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with
the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging
247

that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia,
who was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior
to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the
marriage; and that he later learned that private respondent's child
died during delivery on August 29, 1988. In her counterclaim,
Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that
petitioner freely and voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed
with her in Palawan for almost a month after their marriage; that
petitioner wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila, during
which private respondent visited him personally; and that
petitioner knew about the progress of her pregnancy, which ended
in their son being born prematurely.
Issue:
Whether the marriage be annulled on the ground that they
did not cohabit during their marriage.
Ruling:
Appellant cannot claim that his marriage should be
annulled due to the absence of cohabitation between him and his
wife. Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a
marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend upon
the will of the spouses who can terminate the marital union by
refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit becomes relevant
only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds
for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent,
insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the
appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee
on any of those grounds, the validity of his marriage must be
upheld.

FLORENCE MACARRUBO, petitioner, vs. EDMUNDO

MACARRUBO, respondent
A.C. No. 6148. February 27, 2004
Facts:
Florence Teves-Maccarubo filed an administrative
complaint of disbarment against Atty. Edmundo Maccarubo,
respondent. Florence claimed that Atty. Maccarubo contracted
marriage with Florence while his first marriage with Helen
Espanza with whom he had two children was still subsisting.
According to Florence, her consent was gained by the respondent
with deception and that he adroitly convinced her family his
marriage with the first wife was void. While Florence and Atty.
248

Maccarubos marriage was still subsisting, the latter abandoned

their family and cohabited with Josephine Constantino whom he
married.
Respondent assailed the claims of Florence denying that
he employed deception and that he was the one whose consent
was vitiated because of the former and her familys threat, force
and intimidation. He said that it was a sham wedding and that he
was forced to marry Florence to save the familys reputation
because Florence was at that time three-months pregnant. He
submitted pieces of evidence to the Investigating Commission that
indicated final and executory decision of declaring his marriage
with Florence void ab initio; a certification that their marriage
license was not filed in the records of NSO; certification showing
he was a civic-spirited person; judicial decree of annulment to
complainant which was res judicata upon present administrative
case. He further claimed that his first marriage was also declared
void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity by his
wife, Helen.

character that is required for the continued right to practice law as

a member of the Philippine bar. It imports moral turpitude and is a
public assault upon the basic social institution of marriage. Even
assuming arguendo that respondent was coerced by complainant
to marry her, the duress, by his own admission as the following
transcript of his testimony reflects, ceased after their wedding day,
respondent having freely cohabited with her and even begot a
second child by her.
The decision, rendered in default of complainant, cannot
serve as res judicata on the final resolution of the present case. A
disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor
purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the Court into the
conduct of its officers. In sum, respondent has breached the
following precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Rule 1.01, CANON 7, and Rule 7.03. Respondent was found
guilty of gross immorality and therefore disbarred.

Issue:
Whether Atty. Maccarubo is guilty of gross misconduct in
his private affairs which warrant disciplinary action.
Ruling:
Upon the evidence on record, respondent is indeed guilty
of gross misconduct in his private affairs which warrant
disciplinary action. The incontrovertible facts show that while
respondent had a subsisting marriage with Helen Esparza with
whom he had two children, he entered into a second marriage with
complainant. While the marriage between complainant and
respondent has been annulled by final judgment, he and
complainant started living as husband and wife in 1991 when his
first marriage was still subsisting, rendering him liable for
concubinage. Such conduct is inconsistent with the good moral

PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. FELIPE

SANTIAGO, respondent
Facts:
Felipe Santiago, herein appellant, asked Felicita Masilang,
his niece, to accompany him across the river on some errand. The
girl agreed and after crossing the river, Santiago manifested a
desire to have sexual intercourse with the former, but
249

notwithstanding her resistance, accomplished his purposes by

force and against her will. After that deed, Santiago conducted
Felicita to his uncles house that brought in a protestant minister
who solemnized a marriage between the two. After the ceremony,
Santiago gave the girl a few pesos and sent her home. The father
of Felicita, having known of what transpired, filed a criminal case
of rape against the appellant, resulting to his conviction. The latter
now forwarded the defense of his marriage to Felicita.
Issue:
Is the appellants defense tenable?
Ruling:
No. the ceremony cannot be considered binding on her
because of duress. It is therefore void for lack of essential consent,
and it posed no impediment to the wrongdoers prosecution. The
marriage ceremony was a mere ruse to escape from the
consequences of his act. The manner in which appellant dealt with
the girl before and after the marriage shows that he had no bona
fide intention of making her his wife.

HEIRS OF IGNACIA AGUILAR-REYES, petitioners, vs.

SPOUSES CIPRIANO MIJARES and FLORENTINA
MIJARES, respondents
G.R. No. 143826. August 28, 2003
Facts:
Vicente and Ignacia were married in 1960, but had been
separated since 1974. Sometime in 1984, Ignacia learned that on
March 1, 1983, Vicente sold a lot belonging to the conjugal
properties to spouses Cipriano and Florentina Mijares on March 1,
2983, without her knowledge and consent. On August 9, 1984,
Ignacia, through her counsel, sent a letter to respondent spouses
demanding the return of her share in the lot. Failing to arrive at
an amicable settlement, she filed a complaint for annulment of
sale against respondent spouses. Respondent spouses claimed that
they are purchasers in good faith and that the sale was valid
because it was duly approved by the court.
On February 15, 1990, the trial court declared the sale of
the lot void with respect to the share of Ignacia. On May 31, 1990,
250

the trial court modified its decision by declaring the sale void in
its entirety and ordering Vicente Reyes to reimburse respondent
spouses the purchase price of P110,000.
Both Ignacia and respondent spouses appealed in the Court
of Appeals. Pending the appeal, Ignacia died and she was
substituted by her compulsory heirs.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale should be annulled in its entirety
or only with respect to the share of Ignacia
Ruling:
The husband could not alienate or encumber any conjugal
real property without the consent, express or implied, of the wife
otherwise, the contract is voidable. In the case, the contract is void
and not merely voidable. The trial court correctly annulled the sale
of the lot in its entirety. In Bucoy v. Paulino, a case involving the
annulment of sale with assumption of mortgages executed by the
husband without the consent of the wife, it was held that the
alienation or encumbrance must be annulled in its entirety and not
only insofar as the share of the wife in the conjugal property is
concerned.

Spouses VIRGILIO and MICHELLE CASTRO, MOISES

MIAT and ALEXANDER MIAT, petitioners, vs. ROMEO
MIAT, respondent
G.R. No. 143297. February 11, 2003
Facts:
Spouses Moises and Concordia Miat bought two parcels
of land during their coverture. On April 30, 1978, Concordia died.
Moises agreed that such properties would be given to his two
sons, Romeo and Alexander. However, when Moises returned, he
negotiated the agreement with his sons in which he kept the
Paranaque property for himself and would leave the Paco property
to his two sons. In February 1988, Romeo learned that the mother
of petitioner, Virgilio, have Moises P30,000.00 as down payment
for the sale by Moises of the Paco property.
Ceferino Miat, brother of Moises, testified that even
before the death of Concordia, there was already an agreement
that the Paco property would go to Romeo and Alexander. This
was reiterated at the deathbed of Concordia as well as to the
extended Miat family members.
Romeo filed an action to nullify the sale between Moises
and the Castro spouses, to compel Moises and Alexander to
execute a deed of conveyance or assignment of the Paco property
to him upon payment of the balance of its agreed price, and to
make them pay damages.
251

Issue:
Whether or not the Paco property is conjugal or capital
Ruling:
The property is conjugal. Article 160 of the New Civil
Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it is to be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. This article
does not require proof that the property was acquired with funds
of the partnership. The presumption applies even when the manner
in which the property was acquired does not appear.

NERISSA PEREZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

and
RAY PEREZ, respondents
G.R. No. 118870. March 29, 1996
Facts:
Private respondent Ray Perez, a doctor of medicine, is
married to petitioner, Nerissa Perez, a registered nurse. Nerissa
began working in the U.S. in October 1988 and she used a part of
her earning to build a modest house for her family in Mandaue
City, Cebu. She became a resident alien in February 1992. After 6
miscarriages and a high-risk pregnancy, Nerissa finally gave birth
to Ray Perez II in New York on July 20, 1992.
On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in
Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa returned to the U.S. She
alleged that they came home only for a five week vacation and
they all had roundtrip tickets. However, her husband stayed
behind to take care of his sick mother and promised to follow her
with their baby. According to Ray, they had agreed to stay
permanently in the Philippines but once Nerissa was in New York,
she changed her mind and continued working. She was supposed
to come back immediately after winding her affairs.
When Nerissa arrived home a few days before Ray IIs
first birthday, the couple was no longer in good terms. The
petitioner did not want to live near her in-laws. She only wanted
to be with her only child but he was being kept away from her by
his husband. On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here in the
Philippines and maintained that it would not be very difficult to
live here since they have their own home and car. Nerissa was
forced to move to her parents.
252

On July 26, 1993, Nerissa filed a petition for habeas

corpus asking respondent Ray to surrender the custody of their
child to her.
On August 27, 1993, the court issued an order awarding
custody of the one-year old child to his mother. Upon appeal by
Ray, the Court of Appeals, on September 27,1993, reversed the
decision of the court and awarded the custody of the child to his
father.
Issue:
Whether or not the custody of the child should be given to
his father.
Ruling:
The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall
not be separated from his mother finds its raison d'etre in the basic
need of a child for his mother's loving care. Only the most
compelling of reasons shall justify the court's awarding the
custody of such a child to someone other than his mother, such as
her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past the
following grounds have been considered ample justification to
deprive a mother of custody and parental authority: neglect,
abandonment, unemployment and immorality,
habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity
and being sick with a communicable disease.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set
aside. The custody of the child belongs to the mother, Nerissa
Perez.

VIRGILIO MAQUILAN, petitioner, vs. DITA MAQUILAN,

respondent
G.R. No. 155409. June 8, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent are spouses, having a son.
Respondent and her paramour was convicted for adultery. After
which, respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage, dissolution and liquidation of conjugal partnership of
gains, and damages, imputing psychological incapacity on the part
of the petitioner.
During the pre-trial of the case, the spouses entered into a
compromise agreement. The said agreement was given judicial
imprimatur. However, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the
repudiation of the compromise agreement and the reconsideration
of the same on the grounds that his previous lawyer did not
intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the consequential
effects of the compromise agreement. Such was denied by the
RTC.
On August 30, 2002, the CA dismissed the petition holding
that the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery does
not ipso facto disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal property.
Issue:
Whether or not the partial voluntary separation of property
by the spouses pending the petition of nullity of marriage is valid
Ruling:
253

Yes. The compromise agreement partially divided the

properties of the conjugal partnership of gains between the parties
and does not deal with the validity of a marriage or legal
separation. Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of
property may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause,
subject to judicial approval. The questioned compromise
agreement which was judicially approved is exactly such a
separation of property allowed under the law. This holds true even
if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was
still pending.

IN RE VOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION OF THE CONJUGAL

PARTNERSHIP OF JOSE BERMAS, SR. AND PILAR
MANUEL BERMAS, petitioners-appellants
No. L-20379. June 22, 1965
Facts:
On May 31, 1962, the spouses Jose and Pilar Bermasn
executed a deed entitled "Agreement for Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership and Separation of Property". Such contract pertains to
the voluntary dissolution of their conjugal partnership and the
establishment between them of the regime of separation of
property grounded on Article 191 of the civil code.
The trial court denied the petition upon the ground that,
under Article 191 of the Civil Code, a conjugal partnership shall
only be dissolved once a legal separation has been ordered.
Issue:
Whether or not a conjugal partnership may be dissolved
upon agreement of the spouses
Ruling:
Yes. The fourth paragraph of Article 191 of the Civil Code
provides that the husband and wife may agree upon the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage,
subject to judicial approval. However, in the case, the liquidation
cannot be effected without a liquidation of the conjugal
partnership between Jose Bermas, Sr. and his first wife, in which
the children by first marriage have an interest. The decision
appealed from is set aside and the case was remanded to the lower
court for further proceedings in conformity with this decision.

254

ALFONSO LACSON, petitioner vs. CARMEN SAN JOSELACSON and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents
No. L-23482. August 30, 1968
Facts:

On February 14, 1953, Alfonso Lacson and Carmen San

Jose-Lacson were married. To them were born four children.
On January 9, 1963 the respondent spouse left the conjugal
home in Santa Clara Subdivision, Bacolod City, and commenced
to reside in Manila. She filed on March 12, 1963 a complaint in
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (JDRC) of Manila for
custody of all their children as well as support for them and
herself.
However, the spouses, thru the assistance of their
respective attorneys, succeeded in reaching an amicable
settlement respecting custody of the children, support, and
separation of property. On April 27, 1963 they filed a joint petition
dated April 21, 1963, to which the CFI rendered judgment
approving and incorporating in toto their compromise agreement
On May 7, 1963 the respondent spouse filed in the JDRC a
motion wherein she alleged that she "entered into and signed the
Joint Petition as the only means by which she could have
immediate custody of the minor children who are all below the
age of 7," and thereafter prayed that she "be considered relieved of
the agreement pertaining to the custody and visitation of her
minor children and that since all the children are now in her
custody, the said custody in her favor be confirmed pendente lite."
On May 24, 1963 the petitioner spouse opposed the said motion
and moved to dismiss the complaint. The JDRC, on May 28,
1963, sustained the petitioner spouse's plea of bar by prior
judgment and lis pendens, and dismissed the case. After the denial
of her motion for reconsideration, the respondent spouse
interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals wherein she raised,
among others, the issue of validity or legality of the compromise
agreement in connection only with the custody of their minor
children. On October 14, 1964 the Court of Appeals certified the
said appeal to the Supreme Court, since "no hearing on the facts
was ever held in the court below no evidence, testimonial or
documentary, presented-only a question of law pending resolution
in the appeal."
255

Issue:

Facts:

Whether or not the compromise agreement entered into by

the parties and the judgment of CFI grounded on the said
agreement, are conformable to law

Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales were united

together in a marriage performed in a military fashion in 1903.
During their cohabitation, they had six children. The disputed
property involving a parcel of land was acquired in 1911 before
the church wedding in 1919.
Regina Morales died sometime after their marriage in
1919. The husband remarried Julia Pamatluan who sold the
properties using a power of attorney to spouses, Mr. and Mrs.
Beato C. Macarya.
Plaintiffs instituted the present case on January 26, 1962,
before the Court of First Instance of Davao, praying for the
annulment of the documents of sale covering the subject parcels
of land and to recover possession thereof with damages from the
herein defendant spouses, alleging that the realties were common
properties of their parents, having been acquired during their
lifetime and through their joint effort and capital; and that the
sales of the said lands in favor of the defendant spouses in 1953,
after the death of their mother, Regina Morales, was executed by
their father, Melbourne Maxey, without their knowledge and
consent; and that they came to know of the above-mentioned sales
only in 1961.
On the other hand, defendant-spouses deny the material
allegations of the complaint and assert by way of affirmative
defenses that they are the true and lawful owners and possessors
of the properties in question having purchased the same in good
faith and that since then, they have been in possession thereof
openly, exclusively and continuously in concept of owners.

Ruling:
It is valid with respect to the separation of property of the
spouses and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership. It is not
however, within the province of the court to attempt to compel
one of the spouses to cohabit, andrender conjugal rights to the
other.
The order dated April 27, 1963 of the CFI, in so far as it
awarded custody of the two older children who were 6 and 5 years
old, respectively, to the father, in effect sought to separate them
from their mother. To that extent therefore, it was null and void
because it is clearly violative of article 363 of the Civil Code.

Issue:
MARGARET, FLORENCE, AND LUCILLE MAXEY,
petitioners vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES BEATO
MACAYRA AND ALACOPUE MONDAY, respondents
No. L-45870. May 11, 1984

Whether or not the properties in question are the exclusive

properties of the late Melbourne Maxey, to the exclusion of his
wife Regina Morales.
Ruling:
256

No. Where a man and woman lived as common-law

partners in 1903, got married in 1919, and after the death of the
woman in 1919, the surviving spouse sold a parcel of land
acquired before they got legally married, article 144 of the new
civil code applies and their children entitled to recover from the
vendee.
The disputed properties were owned in common by
Melbourne Maxey and the estate of his late wife, Regina Morales,
when they were sold. Technically speaking, the petitioners should
return one-half of the P1, 300.00 purchase price of the land while
the private respondents should pay some form of rentals for their
use of one-half of the properties. Equitable considerations,
however, lead us to rule out rentals on one hand and return of
P650.00 on the other

After two years of cohabitation, Francisco and Erminda

got married on February 4, 1979. They begot four children from
the said union. On October 29, 1992, respondent filed a complaint
for annulment of their marriage on the ground that petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with his marital
obligations. Moreover, she prays for the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains.
On February 12, 1997, the trial court ruled in favor of
respondent. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, not
satisfied with the manner their properties were divided. He did not
contest the decision declaring his marriage to respondent void ab
initio.
The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the properties
should be divided equally between the parties
Ruling:
No. their property relations shall be governed by Article
147 of the Family Code which creates a presumption that
properties acquired during the cohabitation of the parties under a
void marriage, have been acquired through their joint efforts;
work or industry shall be owned by them in equal shares. It further
provides that a party who did not participate in the acquisition by
the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition if the formers efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.

FRANCISCO GONZALES, petitioner, vs. ERMINDA

GONZALES, respondent
G.R. No. 159521. December 16, 2005
Facts:
257

Tomas Calapatura, Sr., excuted on April 26, 1968 an Agreement of

Purchase and Sale whereby the former agreed to sell to the latter
the northern half portion of the property. Narcisa executed a Deed
of Absolute Sale in favor of Tomas over the said property. In
1976, Tomas daughter, Flordeliza Calpatura Flora, built a twostorey duplex on the northern part half portion of the property.
Likewise, Maximo Calpatura, son of Tomas cousin, built a small
house on the northern portion of theproperty.
On April 8, 1991, respondents filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of sale and delivery of possession of the
northern half portion of the subject property.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject property conjugal or
paraphernal

FLORDELIZA CALPATURA FLORA, DOMINADOR

CALPATURA, and TOMAS CALPATURA, JR., heirs of
TOMAS CALPATURA, SR., petitioners, vs. ROBERTO,
ERLINDA, DANIEL, GLORIA, PATRICIO, JR., EDNA, and
NARCISA PRADO, respondents
G.R. No. 156879. January 20, 2004

Ruling:
Article 160 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the
time the sale was entered into, provides that all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless
it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife. In the case, while Narcisa testified that she bought the
property with her own funds, she, however, admitted in the
contract that the property was her conjugal share with her first
husband. A verbal assertion that she bought the land with her own
funds is inadmissible to qualify the terms of a written agreement
under the parole evidence rule.

Facts:
After the death of Patricio Prado, Sr., Narcisa subsequently
married Bonifacio Calapatura. In order to support her minor
children with her first husband, Narcisa and her brother-in-law,
258

Issue:
Whether or not Article 147 of the Family Code applies in
the dissolution of their properties
Ruling:
Yes. All the elements required in Article 147 are present in
the case at bar. Considering, however, the merits of the case, the
Court believes that a blind adherence to the general rule will result
in miscarriage of justice as it will divest the petitioner of her just
share in their common property, and thus, deprive her of a
significant source of income to support their children whom the
court had entrusted to her care. The Court held that where a rigid
application of the rule that certiorari cannot be substitute for
appeal will result in a manifest failure of justice, the provisions of
the Rules of Court which are technical rules may be relaxed.

ELENA MERCADO-FEHR, petitioner, vs. BRUNO FEHR,

respondent
G.R. No. 152716. October 23, 2003
Facts:
The marriage between petitioner and respondent was
declared null and void ab initio by the trial court under Article 36
of the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of property.
On October 5, 2000, the trial court held that since the
marriage between petitioner and respondent was declared void ab
initio, the rules on co-ownership should apply in the liquidation
and partition of the properties they own in common pursuant to
Article 147 of the Family Code.
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioners motion
was dismissed for lack of merit.
259

Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the

deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without first
obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between
petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had
no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware
of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner
who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her
action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that
the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio
because the same was solemnized without the required marriage
license.
SUSAN NICDAO CARINO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE
CARINO, respondent
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
Facts:
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario,
he contracted two marriages, the first was with petitioner Susan
Nicdao Carino and the second was with respondent Susan Yee
Cario.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and
bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis.
He passed away under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his
medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed
claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to
the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan
Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 while
respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00. On
December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case
for collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao
praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at
least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos
(P146,000.00) collectively denominated as death benefits which
the petitioner received.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Susan Yee Carino should be entitled to one
half of the benefits received by Susan Nicdao Carino
HELD:
Since the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable
property regime would not be absolute or conjugal partnership of
property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Article 147
and 148 of the Family Code on Property Regime of Unions
Without Marriage. In this property regime, the properties
acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall
belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each
party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in
the form of care of the home, children, and household, ar excluded
in this regime.
One-half of the subject death benefits under scrutiny
shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and
the other half to the deceased legal heirs, his children with Susan
Nicdao.

260

Issue:
Whether the trial court failed to apply the correct law that
should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation
wherein a marriage is declared null and null and void because of
Psychological Incapacity on the part of either or both parties to the
contract.

ANTONIO VALDES, petitioner, vs. RTC, BR. 102 Q.C. AND

CONSUELO GOMEZ-VALDES, respondents
G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996
Facts:
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on
January 5, 1971. Begotten during their marriage were five
children. In a petition dated June 22, 1992, Valdes sought the
declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to article 36 of the
Family Code. After hearing the parties following the joinder of
issues, the marriage of Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez is
declared null and void under Art. 36 of the Family Code, on the
ground of their mutual Psychological Incapacity to comply with
their essential marital obligations. The three older children shall
choose which parent they would want to stay with, the younger
children shall be placed in the custody of their mother. The
petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the
liquidation of their common properties.
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification on that portion
directing compliance with Art. 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code.
She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the
procedure for the liquidation of common property in unions
without marriage. Parenthetically, during the hearing on the
motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire
to remain with their father Antonio Valdes.

Ruling:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void
marriage, regardless of cause thereof, the property relation of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the
provisions of Art. 137 or 148.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have obtained through their joint efforts.
The rules set up to govern liquidation of either the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property
regimes recognized for valid and viodable marriages are irrelevant
to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exist between commonlaw spouses.

261

presumed to be equal. There is thus co-ownership even if the

parties are incapacitated to marry.

EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN, JR., petitioner, vs. MA. ELVIRA

CASTILLO, respondent
G.R. No. 136803. June 16, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner, Eustaquio Mallilin Jr. and respondent Ma.
Elvira Castillo were both married and with children but are
separated from their respective spouses, they cohabited while their
respective marriages still subsisted. Petitioner and respondent
acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely
in respondents name. But due to irreconcilable differences the
couple separated. Petitioner the demanded his share in the subject
properties but respondent refused.
Issue:
Whether or not the parties be considered as co-owners of
the properties considering the present status of the parties as both
married and incapable of marrying each other even assuming that
they lived together as husband and wife.
Ruling:
The Family Code Provides that a co-ownership exists
between a man and a woman who live together as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage, likewise provides that if the
parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired
by them through their joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
contributions which, in the absence of proof to contrary, is
262

GUILLERMA TUMLOS, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES MARIO

FERNANDEZ and LOURDES FERNANDEZ, respondents
G.R. No. 137650. April 12, 2000
Facts:
Herein respondents were the plaintiffs in a Civil Case, an
action for ejectment filed before the MTC of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila against Guillerma Tumlos, Toto Tumlos, and Gina Tumlos.
In their complaint dated July 5, 1996.
Petitioner Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who filed an
answer to the complaint. She averred therein that the Fernandez
spouses had no cause of action against her, since she is a co-owner
of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein
it was stated that she is a co-vendee of the property in question
together with respondent Mario Fernandez. She then asked for the
dismissal of the complaint.
After an unfruitful preliminary conference on November
15, 1996, the MTC required the parties to submit their affidavits
and other evidence on the factual issues defined in their pleadings
within ten days from receipt of such order, pursuant to section 9 of
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Guillerma Tumlos
submitted her affidavit/position paper on November 29, 1996,
while the respondents filed their position paper on December 5,
1996, attaching thereto their marriage contract, letters of demand
to the defendants, and the Contract to Sell over the disputed
property.

over the property with respondent Mario Fernandez. At the first

instance before the MTC, she presented a Contract to Sell
indicating that she was his spouse. The MTC found this document
insufficient to support her claim. The RTC, however, after
considering her allegation that she had been cohabiting with
Mario Fernandez as shown by evidence presented before it, ruled
in her favor.
On the other hand, the CA held that the pieces of evidence
adduced before the RTC could no longer be considered because
they had not been submitted before the MTC. Hence, the appellate
court concluded that the claim of co-ownership was not
satisfactorily proven.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, a man and woman
who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who
nonetheless live together conjugally, may be deemed co-owners of
a property acquired during the cohabitation only upon proof that
each made an actual contribution to its acquisition. Hence, mere
cohabitation without proof of contribution will not result in a coownership.

Issue:
Whether or not the claim of co-ownership by Guillerma
Tumlos valid.
Ruling:
Petitioner's central theory and main defense against
respondents' action for ejectment is her claim of co-ownership
263

NENG MALANG, petitioner, vs. HON. COROCOY MOSON

et. al., respondents
G.R. No. 119064. August 22, 2000

marriage relations, including property relations between spouses,

whether Muslim or non-Muslim.

Facts:
The applicability of the regular rules of procedure and case
law in this jurisdiction. to civil cases before the District Shari'a
Courts is the issue in this petition.
On November 14, 1988, petitioner-spouses filed a
complaint against private respondents for "Quieting of Title to
Property, Annulment of Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-122
and P-138, and Damages, With Application for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction" with the Shari'a District Court, 6th Shari's
District at Cotabato City, Public respondent Register of Deeds of
the same city was impleaded as a nominal party. Private
respondents filed their answer dated December 1, 1988.
The case was set for trial on the merits on May 22, 1989
but it was postponed at the instance of private respondents. Other
settings were postponed for one reason or another. However, on
July 4, 1989, private respondents filed a pleading designated as
"Amplification of Affirmative or Special Defenses with Prayer for
Dismissal of Complaint on the Ground of Lack of Jurisdiction."
On the basis thereof, the trial court issued an order on November
7, 1989 dismissing the complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the Civil Code shall govern the property
relations of Muslim Marriages celebrated before the Muslim Code
Ruling:
Yes. Since it is the Civil Code which determines the
validity of the marriages contracted before P.D. 1083, it is the
same code that determines and governs the property relations of
the marriages, for the reason that at the time of the celebration of
the marriages in question, the Civil Code was the only law on

JOSEFINA FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. MASTER

IRON WORKS AND CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION
and ROBERTO ALEJO, respondents
G.R. No. 151967. February 16, 2005
Facts:
264

On August 31, 1984, the Imus Rural Bank, Inc. executed a

deed of absolute sale in favor of Josefina Castillo Francisco,
married to Eduardo Francisco, covering two parcels of residential
land with a house thereon. On February 15, 1985, the Register of
Deeds made a record entry of an Affidavit of Waiver executed by
Eduardo where he waived whatever claims he had over the
property. On June 11, 1990, Eduardo bought 7,500 bags of cement
from Master Iron Works and Construction Corporation (MIWCC)
but failed to pay for the same. On November 27, 1990, MIWCC
filed a complaint against him and was rule by the trial court in
favor of the respondent. Sheriff Roberto Alejo included the parcels
of land mentioned earlier at a public auction for the recovery of
the balance of the amount due.
On July 3, 1994, Josefina executed an Affidavit of Third
Party Claim over the two parcels of land in which she claimed that
they were her paraphernal property, and that her husband had no
propriety right or interest over them as evidenced by his affidavit
of waiver.
The trial court ruled in favor of Josefina. However, the CA
reversed the decision of the RTC.

and Carmelita, the same should be presumed to be the conjugal

property of Eduardo and Carmelita.

Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is the conjugal
property of Josefina Castillo and Eduardo Francisco
Ruling:
No. The petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the
property with her personal funds before the cohabitation with
Eduardo and that she is the sole owner of the property. The
petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that she
contributed money, property, or industry in the acquisition of the
subject property and hence, is not a co-owner of the property.
Petiitioner admitted that when she and Eduardo cohabited, the
latter was incapacitated to marry her. Since the subject property
was acquired during the subsistence of the marriage of Eduardo

MILAGROS JOAQUINO a.k.a. MILAGROS REYES,

petitioner, vs. LOURDES, MERCEDES, MANUEL, MIRIAM,
AND RODOLFO, JR.-all surnamed REYES, respondents
G.R. No. 154645. July 13, 2004
Facts:
Respondent Lourdes Reyes was legally married to Rodolfo
Reyes on January 3, 1947 in which they had four children. At the
time of the death of Rodolfo, he was living with his common-law
wife with whom they begot three children. During the common265

law relationship of Rodolfo and Milagros, they decided to buy a

house and lot in which a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in
favor of Milagros.
Petitioner, in order to secure finances with which to pay
the purchase price, executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor
of Rodolfo, as attorney-in-fact to secure a loan. The loan was
payable for ten years. After the death of Rodolfo, the balance was
fully paid by the Philam Life Insurance Co. as insurer of the
deceased.
Issue:
Whether or not the salaries and earnings of Rodolfo, which
were his and Lourdes conjugal funs, paid for the loan and, hence,
the disputed property was conjugal
Ruling:
Yes. Under Article 145 of the Civil Code, a conjugal
partnership of gains is created upon marriage and lasts until the
legal union is dissolved by death, annulment, legal separation, or
judicial separation of property. On the other hand, Article 144 of
the Civil Code mandates a co-ownership between a man and a
woman not legally married provided that the couple must not be
incapacitated to contract marriage.
Article 148 of the Family Code likewise finds application
to the case at bar, thus, when a common-law couple have legal
impediment to marriage, only the property acquired by them
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industryshall be owned by them in common and in proportion
to their respective contributions.
Respondents have shown that the property was bought
during the marriage of Rodolfo and Lourdes, a fact that gives rise
to the presumption that it is conjugal. Also, they have established
that the proceeds of the loan obtained by Rodolfo were used to
pay for the property.

JACINTO SAGUID, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF

APPEALS, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
MARINDUQUE, and GINA REY, respondents
G.R. No. 150611. June 10, 2003
Facts:
Seventeen-year old Gina Rey was married, but separated
de facto from her husband, when she met petitioner Jacinto Saguid
sometime in July 1987. After a brief courtship, they decided to
cohabit as husband and wife. When her relationship with Jacintos
relatives turned sour, she decided to work as an entertainer in
Japan. In 1996, the couple decided to separate and end their 9-year
cohabitation.
266

On January 9, 1997, respondent filed a complaint for

partition and recovery of personal property with receivership
against petitioner, alleging that she was able to contribute
P70,000.00 in the completion of their unfinished house from her
salary as entertainer in Japan. Also, she was able to acquire and
accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture, and household effects.
She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal
properties and that the amount of P70,000.00 be reimbursed to
her.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 148 of the Family Code applies
although the adulterous cohabitation commenced prior to the
effectivity of the same code
Ruling:
Yes. In the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by
parties to a bigamous marriage and adulterous relationship, a
proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is
essential. In the case at bar, although the adulterous cohabitation
of the parties commenced in 1987, which is before the date of the
effectivity of the Family Code on 1988, Article 148 applies
because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus
in Article 144 of the Civil Code. Respondent Gina Rey is declared
co-owner of petitioner Jacinto in the controverted house and
personal properties. Petitioner is ordered to reimburse the required
amount as determined by the Court.

TSHIATE UY and RAMON UY, petitioners, vs. THE COURT

OF APPEALS, NATIVIDAD CALAUNAN-UY, and THE
ESTATE OF MENILO UY, respondents
G.R. No. 102726. May 27, 1994
Facts:
Respondent Natividad was the common-law wife of the
late Menilo Uy, Sr. for about thirty-six years. Their union bore
four children. After the death of Menilo, Sr., petitioners initiated a
special proceeding entitled, In the Matter of the Petition for
Letters of Administration of the Estate of Menilo Uy, Sr.
Respondent filed a civil case for Partition of Properties Under
Co-ownership, against the estate of Menilo, Sr.
The parties, upon the suggestion of the RTC, submittes a
Compromise Agreement. On April 24, 1991, a judgment was
rendered based on such compromise. Petitioner Tshiate filed an
omnibus motion alleging that by virtue of Hong Kong marriage,
267

she was the surviving legal spouse of Menilo, Sr. Petitioners

contended that the compromise was a patent nullity.
Issue:
Whether or not the action for partition of property on
alleged co-ownership in the case at bar be governed by Articles
147 and 148 of the Family Code
Ruling:
Yes. The action for partition is predicated on an alleged coownership between private respondent Natividad and deceased
Menilo, Sr. of property evidently acquired during the period of
their common-law relationship. The governing provisions,
applicable to their case, are now found in Articles 147 and 148 of
the Family Code, considering that Menilo, Sr. died on September
27, 1990, well after the effectivity of Executive Order No. 209 or
the Family Code of the Philippines on August 3, 1988.

JOSEPHINE BELCODERA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, ET. AL., respondents
G.R. No. 89667. October 20, 1993
Facts:
Alayo D. Busing married Juliana Oday on 27 July 1927,
with whom he had three children, namely, Flora, Teresita, and
Gaido. In 1946, he left the conjugal home, and he forthwith
started to live instead with Josefa Rivera with whom he later
begot one child, named Josephine Bosing, now Josephine
Belcodero.
On 23 August 1949, Alayo purchased a parcel of land on
installment basis from the Magdalena Estate, Inc. In the deed, he
indicated his civil status as "married to Josefa R. Bosing," the
common-law wife. In a letter, dated 06 Dctober 1959, which he
addressed to Magdalena Estate, Inc., he authorized the latter to
transfer the lot in the name of his "wife Josefa R. Bosing." The
final deed of sale was executed by Magdalena Estate, Inc., on 24
October 1959. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 48790 was issued
in the name of "Josefa R. Rosing, married to Alayo Bosing, On 6
June 1958, Alayo married Josefa even while his prior marriage
with Juliana was still subsisting. Alayo died on 11 March 1967.
About three years later, or on 17 September 1970, Josefa and
Josephine executed a document of extrajudicial partition and sale
268

of the lot in question, which was there described as "conjugal

property" of Josefa and the deceased Alayo. The notice of
extrajudicial partition was published on 04, 05 and 06 November
1970 in the Evening Post; the inheritance and estate taxes were
paid; and a new Transfer Certificate of Title No. 198840 was
issued on 06 June 1974 in the name of Josephine.
On 30 October 1980, Juliana and her three legitimate
children filed with the court a quo an action for reconveyance of
the property. On the basis of the above facts, the trial court ruled
in favor of the plaintiffs, and it ordered that Josephine Bosing
execute a deed of reconveyance of the property in question to the
legal heirs of the deceased Alayo D. Bosing, and that both
defendants pay, jointly and severally, actual damages by way of
attorney's fees and expenses in litigation.
Issue:
Whether the property in question was acquired by Alayo in
1949 when an agreement for its purchase on installment basis was
entered into between him and Magdalena Estate, Inc., or in 1959
when a deed of sale was finally executed by Magdalena Estate,
Inc., the legal results would be the same.
Ruling:
Yes. The property remained as belonging to the conjugal
partnership of Alayo and his legitimate wife Juliana. Under both
the new Civil Code (Article 160) and the old Civil Code (Article
1407), "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
The applicable prescriptive period for an action seeking a
reconveyance of the properties by the beneficiaries is ten years
(Article 1144, civil code). The case has been initiated seasonably.

VICTOR JUANIZA, Heirs of Josefa Leus, etc., et al. plaintiffs

and appellees, vs. EUGENIO JOSE, THE ECONOMIC
INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., AND ROSALIA ARROYO,
defendants and appellants
Facts:
Eugenio was the registered owner and operator of a
passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a
freight train of the Philippine National Railways which resulted to
the death pf seven and physical injuries to five passengers.
Eugenio was legally married to Socorro Ramos but had
been cohabiting with defendant-appellant Rosalia Arroyo, for
sixteen years. The ruling of the case for damages held Eugenio
and Rosalia to pay the damages. The lower court based her
liability on the provision of Artcile 144 of the civil code.
Rosalia then appealed to the Court of Appeals which
reversed the ruling of the lower court.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 144 of the Civil Code is applicable
in a case where one of the parties in a common-law relationship is
incapacitated to marry
Ruling:
269

No. the co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the

Civil Code requires that the man and the woman living together
must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Since
Eugenio is legally married to Socorro, there is an impediment for
him to contract marriage with Rosalia, thus, Rosalia cannot be a
co-owner of the jeepney. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal
partnership of Eugenio and Socorro. There is therefore, no legal
basis for the liability of Rosalia for damages arising from the
death of, and physical injuries suffered, by the passengers of the
jeepney. Only the registered owner of the public service vehicle is
responsible for damages.

MARINO, RENATO, LETICIA, IMELDA, ALICIA,

LIGAYA, AND ZENAIDA, all surnamed ADRIANO,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CELESTINA,
MANOLO AND AIDA, all surnamed ADRIANO, respondents
G.R. No. 124118. March 27, 2000
Facts:
On October 29, 1933, Lucio Adriano married Gliceria
Dorado; they had three children, namely, Celestina, Manolo, and
Aida, private respondents in this case. On or before 1942, Lucio
and Gliceria separated. The latter settled in Laguna where she died
on June 11, 1968. After their separation Lucio cohabited with
Vicenta Villa and subsequently five months after the death of
Gliceria, Lucio married Vicenta with whom he had eight children:
Marino, Renato, Leticia, Imelda, Maria, Alicia, Ligaya, Jose
Vergel, and Zenaida. All were petitioners except to Jose Vergel
due to his death before the inception of the proceedings. In 1972
the spouses separated.
On October 10,1980, Lucio executed his last will and
testament disposing of all his properties, and assigning, among
others his second wife Vicenta and all his children by first and
second marriages as devisees and legatees therein. The properties
bequeathed in the will were a 45,000 sq. m. lot and the residential
house, rice mill, warehouse and with all the equipment situated
thereon in Candelaria, Quezon. On February 11, 1981, Lucio died
and Celestina Adriano, Lucios executrix, filed a petition for the
probate of the will immediately after the death and Vicenta
opposed the said petition, but still granted. Hence, the petitioner
filed an action for the annulment of Lucio Adrianos will.
Issue:
270

Whether or not the property bequeathed in the will of

Lucio Adriano were conjugal property of the latter and his second
wife, Vicenta Villa-Adriano.
Ruling:
No. The properties, which were under this issue, belong to
the conjugal property of Lucio and Gliceria. The co-ownership in
Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that a man and woman
living together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage must not in any way be in capacitated to marry.
Considering that the property was acquired in 1964, or while
Lucios marriage with Gloria subsisted, such property is presumed
to be conjugal unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife. Because it was clearly supported that
the properties was in fact purchased by Lucio with proceeds of the
conjugal fund from his first marriage.

271

GAUDENCIO GUERRERO, petitioner, vs. RTC OF ILOCOS NORTE, BR. XVI, JUDGE LUIS BELLO, AND
PEDRO HERNANDO, respondents G.R. No. 109068. January 10, 1994
Facts: There was a complaint filed by Gaudencio Guerrero against Pedro Hernando, respondent. On December 7, 1992, at
the pre-trial conference, the relationship of petitioner Gaudencio Guerrero and respondent Hernando was noted by
respondent Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr., they being married to half-sisters hence are brothers-in-law. This case was dismissed
by respondent Judge on the ground that the parties being brothers-in-law the complaint should have alleged that earnest
efforts were first exerted towards a compromise. Thus, the petitioner appealed.
Issue: Whether or not brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family.
Ruling: The court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private respondent Hernando
was required to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise before filing the present suit. The enumeration of brothers
and sisters as members of the same family does not comprehend brothers-in-law. In Gayon vs. Gayon it was
emphasized that sisters-in-law (hence, also brothers-in-law) are not listed under Article 217 of the New Civil Code as
members of the same family. Article 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially the same enumeration of members of the
family, then there is no reason to alter existing jurisprudence on the matter.
HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. EDMUNDO ACUNA and ALBERTO MORENO,
respondents G.R. No. 154132. August 31, 2006
Facts: On November 24, 2000, Alberto Moreno filed with the RTC a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank,
Inc., his wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds for cancellation of mortgage.
On May 17, 2001, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that private respondent failed to comply with Article
151 of the Family Code wherein it is provided that no suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it
should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that
the same have failed.
Issue: Whether or not Article 151 of the Family Code applies in the case at bar
Ruling: No. once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family, the law no longer makes it a
condition to precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise before an action can prosper.
APRIL MARTINEZ, FRITZ DANIEL MARTINEZ and MARIA OLIVIA MARTINEZ, petitioners, vs. RODOLFO
MARTINEZ, respondent G.R. No. 162084. June 28, 2005
Facts: On March 6, 1993, Daniel, Sr. executed a last will and testament directing the subdivision of the property owned
by him and his wife Natividad into three lots bequeathed to each of his sons.
On May 1995, Daniel, Sr. suffered a stroke which resulted in the paralysis of the right side of his body. On
October 26, 1996, Natividad died. Daniel, Sr. passed away on October 6, 1997.
On September 16, 1998, Rodolfo found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father on September 15, 1996,
where the latter appears to have sold the lot to Manolo and his wife Lucila. Rodolfo filed a complaint for annulment of
deed of sale against his brother Manolo and his sister-in-law before the RTC. He also filed a criminal complaint for estafa
through falsification of public document against Manolo.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the spouses holding that the spouses substantially complied with
Article 151 of the Family Code based on the allegations of the complaint and the appended certification to file action
issued by the barangay captain.
On November 27, 2003, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not Article 151 of the Family Code was duly complied with
Ruling: Yes. The petitioners were able to comply with the requirements of Article 151 of the Family Code because they
alleged in their complaint that they had initiated a proceeding against the respondent for unlawful detainer in the
Katarungang Pambarangay, in compliance with P.D. No. 1508; and that, after due proceedings, no amicable settlement
was arrived at, resulting in the barangay chairmans issuance of certificate to file action.
The petitioners petition is granted.

SPOUSES AUGUSTO HONTIVEROS and MARIA HONTIVEROS, petitioners, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
and TEODORA AYSON, respondents. G.R. No. 125465. June 29, 1999
Facts: On December 3, 1990, petitioners, the spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros, filed a complaint for damages
against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City. In said
complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land, in the town of Jamindan, Province of Capiz, in a
land registration case filed by private respondent Gregorio Hontiveros, brother of Augusto; that petitioners were deprived
of income from the land as a result of the filing of the land registration case; that such income consisted of rentals from
tenants of the land in the amount of P66,000.00 per year from 1968 to 1987, and P595,000.00 per year thereafter; and that
private respondents filed the land registration case and withheld possession of the land from petitioners in bad faith. The
respondents filed an answer denying all allegations by the petitioner. Private respondents prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint and for an order against petitioners to pay damages to private respondents by way of counterclaim, as well as
reconveyance of the subject land to private respondents.On November 23, 1995, the trial court denied petitioners motion.
At the same time, however, it dismissed the case on the ground that the complaint was not verified as required by Art. 151
of the Family Code and, therefore, it did not believe that earnest efforts had been made to arrive at a compromise.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 151 of the Family Code was attended in the case
Held:
Art. 151 provides, No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from
the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed.
It if is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed. This rule shall not apply to cases which
may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. Art. 151 of the Family Code do not apply in this case since
the suit is not exclusively among family members. The private respondent Ayson is admittedly a stranger to the
Hontiveros family, the case is not covered by the requirements of Art. 151 of the Family Code. The absence of the
verification required in Art. 151 do not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the complaint. The
verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are true and
correct. If the court doubted the veracity of the allegations regarding efforts made to settle the case among members of
the same family, it could simply have ordered petitioners to verify them.
PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO, and ISABELITA MANALO,
petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G.R. No. 129242. January 16, 2001
Facts: Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1966 died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S.
Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano,
Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo, and Imelda
Manalo, who are all of legal age. At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real
properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac. On November 26, 1992, the eight (8) of the surviving children
of the late Troadio Manalo, namely: Purita, Milagros, Belen, Rosalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a
petition with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father,
Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof. The order of general
default was set aside by the trial court upon motion of herein petitioners namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio,
Isabelita and Orlando who were granted ten (10) days within which to file their opposition to the petition.
Issue: Whether or not Article 222 of the Civil Code shall be applied
Held: Under Article 222 of the Civil Code, No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family
unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to
the limitations in Article 2035. This is clear from the term suit that it refers to an action by one person or persons against
another or others in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress
of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of
justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Besides, an
excerpt from the Report of the Code Commission unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code Commission to make
that legal provision applicable only to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of the same
family.

272

NICANOR T. SANTOS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS CONSUELO T. SANTOS-GUERRERO and

ANDRES GUERRERO, respondents. G.R. No. 134787. November 15, 2005
Facts: Petitioner Nicanor T. Santos and private respondent Consuelo T. Santos-Guerrero are brother and sister, born to
spouses Urbano Santos and Candelaria Santos, now both deceased. Sometime in 1956, Nicanor, Consuelo, and eight their
siblings, executed a Basic Agreement of Partition covering properties they inherited from their parents.Two years later,
Consuelo, joined by her husband, herein respondent Andres Guerrero, filed suit with the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal against petitioner and two other brothers, for recovery of inheritance. They sought for the judicial declaration of
validity in the 1956 Agreement of Partition. The Santos heirs executed on May 5, 1959 another document, denominated
Deed of Partition. Spouses Guerreros filed another complaint against Nicanor for the recovery of her share under the
1959 Deed of Partition. The Judge, in his decision, ordered Nicanor and others to comply with his part of the Deed of
Partition and deliver to the Guerreros the amount of P26,650.00 without prejudice to the right of reimbursement under the
same deed.Subsequently, the Guerreros instituted another complaint against Nicanor with the CFI at Pasig for recovery of
sums of money under the 1959 Deed of Partition. Thereat, Nicanor, as defendant a quo, filed a third party complaint
against brothers Ernesto et al. And albeit not touched upon in the basic pleadings, the issue of whether Nicanor was
obligated to pay Consuelo the amount stated in the 1959 partition. Nicanor was ordered by the Court to pay Consuelo the
amount due her under the May 5, 1959 deed of partition plus damages and attorneys fees. Nicanor appealed in the
Intermediate Appellate Court to reverse the decision of the trial court but the appellate court affirmed and modified the
decision of the lower court.Approximately six years later, the Guerreros filed a complaint for revival of the IACs decision
in the RTC of Malabon- Navotas but the said court dismissed the complaint. However, on motion for reconsideration and
following a new trial, the trial court reversed itself. Therefrom, Nicanor went on appeal to the Court of Appeals and the
court dismissed his appeal.
Issue:
(a) Whether or not Article 222 of the New Civil Code, now pursuant to 151 of the Family Code shall be applied
(b) Whether or not res judicata can barred the Courts decision
Held:
(a) A lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers; While a complaint in
ordinary civil actions involving members of the same family must contain an allegation that earnest efforts
towards a compromise have been made pursuant to Article 222of the Civil Code, now pursuant to Article 151
of the Family Code, a complaint otherwise defective on that score may be cured by introduction of evidence
effectively supplying the necessary averments of a defective complaint. The complaint filed in this case
contains no allegations. An action for revival of judgment of a dormant decision rendered in an original action
can hardly be the kind of suit contemplated in Article 222 of the Code. It cannot be over-emphasized in this
regard that the rationale of said provision is to obviate hatred and passion in the family likely to be spawned by
litigation between and among the members thereof.
(b) Res Judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment rendered by the court of a competent jurisdiction on the
merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar
to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of action. Res judicata is not a nullifying
factor, such that the final judgment in the former action works to nullify the proceeding in a subsequent action
where the doctrine is invoked.
CECILION MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and LUISA DE LA ROSA
MENDOZA, respondents.
No. L-23102. April 24, 1967
Facts:
Cecilio and Luisa were married on September 2, 1953 and lived together as husband and wife until July 14,
1954, when the husband departed for the United States to further his studies and practice his profession. Since then, the
husband without justifiable cause or reason deliberately abandoned and neglected the wife and despite repeated demands
from her, the husband failed and refused to provide for the maintenance and support of the wife who is pregnant sickly
and without source of revenue. Thus, she filed a complaint against her husband. The husband filed two motions of
dismissal consecutively but both were denied. Then he petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition with
preliminary injunction to stop to stop the Court of First Instance from further proceeding with the case. After the CA heard
and considered the merits, it d3enied the writ of prohibition and dissolved the injunction.
Issue: (a) Whether or not Article 222 of the Civil Code shall be applied
(b) Whether or not Article 2053 of the Civil Code shall be applied to claim future support

Held:
(a)

(b)

Article 222 of the Civil Code requires that before a suit between members of the family is filed or maintained,
it must appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made and the only way to make it so appear
when the suit is filed is by proper averment to that effect in the complaint. Since the law forbids a suit being
initiated unless such efforts at compromise appear, the showing that efforts in question were made is a
condition precedent to the existence of the cause of action. It follows that the failure of the complaint to plead
that plaintiff previously tried in earnest to reach a settlement out of court renders it assailable for lack of cause
of action and it may be so attacked at any stage of the case even on appeal.
A claim for future support that under Article 2053vof the Civil Code cannot be subject of a valid compromise,
therefore, outside the sphere of Article 222 of the Code upon which petitioner relies. The validity of marriage
is also a non-compromisable issue. Since no valid compromise is valid on these issues, a showing of previous
effects to compromise them would be superfluous.

MARGARET ANN WAINRIGHT VERSOZA, JOSE MARIA VERSOZA JR., CHARLES JOHN VERSOZA, and
VIRGINIA FELICE VERSOZA, petitioner-appellant, vs. JOSE MARIA VRERSOZA, defendant-respondent
No. L-25609. November 27, 1968
Facts: On March 4, 1964, a verified complaint later amended, for monthly support in arrears and damages and custody of
the children with a petition for support pendiente lite was lodged against Jose Maria Versoza by his wife and their three
minor children. Reason gives are that defendant has abandoned plaintiff without providing for their support and maintain
illicit relation with another woman.
Issue: Whether or not Article 222 of the Civil Code is applicable in the case
Ruling: Article 222 of the Civil Code , construed in relation of Section 1 (j) Rule 16, Rules of Court; Meaning of no suit
shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest effects toward a
compromise have been made but that the same have failed, subject to limitations in Article 2035. The right to support
cannot be: (1) removed; (2) transmitted to third persons; (3) nor compensated with what the receipients owes the obligor
(Article 301). The alleged defect is that the complaint does not state a cause of action. The proposed amendment seeks to
complete it. An amendment to the effect that the requirements of Article 222 have been complied with does not confer
jurisdiction upon the lower Court. The defect is curable.
JOSE MODEQUILLO, petitioner, vs. HON.AUGUSTO V. BREVA, respondents G.R. No. 86355. May 31, 1990
Facts: The debt was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident and the money judgment arising there from was
rendered by the Appellate Court on January 27, 1988 which ordering the petitioner to pay the Salinas spouses the due
damages. The said judgment having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the Court to satisfy the
said judgment on the goods and chattels of the defendants including the petitioner. On July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied on a
parcel of residential land registered in the name of Jose Modequillo. A motion to quash or set aside levy of execution was
filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land located is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the
commencement of this case and as such is exemt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of
the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in article 155 thereof; and that the judgment debt sought to be enforced
against the family home of the defendant is not one of those enumerated under article 155 of the Family Code. Both
preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
Issue: Whether or not the case fall under the exemption from the execution provided in the Family Code
Ruling: Case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.Under the Family Code, a
family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from time it is occupied as a family residence. Thus, the creditors
should take necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family
owes the home. Exemption is effective from the time of the Constitution of the Family home as such and lasts so long as
any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. The residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family
home whether judicial or extrajudicial under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under
Article 153 of the Family Code of the Philippines on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the
Manila Chronicles on August 4, 1987.

273

MARY JOSEPHINE GOMEZ and EUGENIA SOCORRO C. GOMEZ-SALCEDO, petitioners, vs. ROEL, NOEL
and JANNETTE BEVERLY STA. INES and HINAHON STA. INES, respondents.
G.R. No. 132537. October 14, 2005
Facts: On June 17, 1986, Mary Josephine C. Gomez and Eugenia Socorro C. Gomez- Salcedo filed a complaint for
damages before the RTC of Pasig against Marietta Dela Cruz Sta. Inez alleging that they are the children of the cdeceased
Purificacion Dela Cruz Gomez who, during her lifetime, entrusted her rice land located at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya to
Marietta together with the Transfer of Certificate of Title covering said land for the latter to manage and supervise. The
sisters further alleged that they have demanded for an accounting of the produce of the said rice land while under the
management of Marietta and for the return of the TCT to the property, but the latter refused. The trial court rendered
judgment against Marietta and after such judgment became final and executor, a writ of execution was issued by the Pasig
RTC, by virtue of which, a parcel of land located at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, registered in the name of Marietta Dela
Cruz Sta. Ines, was levied upon by Flaviano Balgos Jr., to satisfy the damages awarded in the civil case. Said property
was sold at a public auction to Mary Josephine as the highest bidder. The sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of
Nueva Vizcaya. A complaint for annulment of sale was filed by the husband and children of Marietta on the ground that
said house and lot sold during the public auction is their family residence, and is thus exempt from execution under
Section 12 (a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, and under Article 155 of the Family Code.
Issue: Whether or not Article 155 of the Family Code is applicable in the case
Ruling: Under Article 155 of the Family Code, the family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale, or
attachment except for, among other things, debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home. In the case, the
house and lots of Sta.Ines family was not constituted as a family home, whether judicially or extrajudicially, at the time
Marietta incurred her debts. Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as such only upon the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988, thus, the debts were incurred before the constitution before the family home.
FLORANTE F. MANACOP, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and E & L MERCANTILE, INC., respondents. G.R. No. 97898. August 11, 1997
Facts: Petitioner Florante F. Manacop and his wife Eulaceli purchased on March 10, 1972 a residential lot with a
bungalow, in consideration of P75,000.00. On March 17, 1986, Private Respondent E & L Mercantile, Inc. filed a
complaint against petitioner and F.F. Manacop Construction Co., Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro
Manila to collect an indebtedness of P3,359,218.45. Instead of filing an answer, petitioner and his company entered into a
compromise agreement with private respondent. On April 20, 1986, the trial court rendered judgment approving the
aforementioned compromise agreement. It enjoined the parties to comply with the agreement in good faith. On July 15,
1986, private respondent filed a motion for execution which the lower court granted on September 23, 1986. However,
execution of the judgment was delayed. Eventually, the sheriff levied on several vehicles and other personal properties of
petitioner. In partial satisfaction of the judgment debt, these chattels were sold at public auction for which certificates of
sale were correspondingly issued by the sheriff. On August 1, 1989, petitioner and his company filed a motion to quash
the alias writs of execution and to stop the sheriff from continuing to enforce them on the ground that the judgment was
not yet executory. On September 26, 1989, the lower court denied the motion to quash the writ of execution and the
prayers in the subsequent pleadings filed by petitioner and his company. Finding that petitioner and his company had not
paid their indebtedness even though they collected receivables amounting to P57,224,319.75, the lower court held that the
case had become final and executory. It also ruled that petitioners residence was not exempt from execution as it was not
duly constituted as a family home, pursuant to the Civil Code.
Issue: Whether or not a final and executory decision promulgated and a writ of execution issued before the effectivity of
the Family Code can be executed on a family home constituted under the provisions of the said Code.
Ruling: In that case, petitioner incurred the indebtedness in 1987 or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988. Hence, petitioners family home was not exempt from attachment by sheer force of exclusion embodied in
paragraph 2, Article 155 of the Family Code cited in Modequillo, where the Court categorically ruled:Under the Family
Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is
no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in
the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary
precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home.
Article 155 provides that the family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:(1) For
nonpayment of taxes;(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;(3) For debts secured by
mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects,
builders, material men and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.

The exemption provided is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so long as any
of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not
constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by
operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4,
1987 (1988 being a leap year).
PABLITO TANEO, JR., JOSE TANEO, NENA T. CATUBIG and HUSBAND, CILIA T. MORING and
HUSBAND, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ABDON GILIG, respondents.
G.R. No. 108532. March 9, 1999
Facts: As a result of a judgment for recovery of property in favor of private respondent , two of the petitioners properties
were levied to satisfy the judgment amount. The subject properties were sold to a public auction to the private respondent
as the highest bidder. Consequently, after petitioners failure to redeem the same, a final deed of conveyance was executed
definitely transferring, selling, and conveying said properties to the private respondent. The petitioners filed an action to
declare the deed of conveyance void and to quiet title over the land with a prayer to writ of preliminary injunction. The
petitioners alleged that they are the children of Pablo Taneo and Narcisa Valaceras, who are both dead and the subject
property has been acquired through free patent, such property is therefore inalienable and not subject to any
encumberance for the payment of debt.
Issue:
(a) Whether or not the conveyance made by way of the sheriffs sale pursuant to the writ of execution issued by
the trial court is prohibited
(b) Whether or not the family home is exempt from execution
Ruling:
(a) Court agrees with the respondent court that the conveyance made by way of the sheriffs sale was not violative
of the law. The final deed of conveyance ceding the subject property to Abdon Gilig was issued after the
petitioners failed to redeem the property after the reglementary period. The petitioners are not the owners of
the land and cannot claim to be such by invoking Commonwealth Act No. 141. The prohibition does not apply
since it is clear from the records that judgment debt and the execution sale took place prior to the approval of
the application for free patent.
(b) A family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable, and free from attachment constituted over the
dwelling place and the land on which it is situated. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special
cases. It may be constituted judicially and extrajudicially. Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the
family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as the family residence. The
article does not mean that it has a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have
been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.
Instances where the family home is not exempted from the execution, forced sale or attachment under the Civil
Code.
MANUEL DE ASIS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS respondent G.R. No. 127578. February 15, 1999
Facts: On October 14, 1988, Vircel D. Andres in her capacity as the legal guardian of the minor, Glen Camil Andres De
Asis, broght an action for maintenance and support against Manuel De Asis, alleging that the defendant is the father of the
subject minor and the former refused and/ or failed to provide for the maintenance of the latter, despite repeated demands.
Issue:
(a) Whether or not future support can be the subject of a compromise
(b) Whether or not a former dismissal predicated upon a compromise affecting the civil status of persons can
have force and effect
Ruling:
(a) The right to receive can neither renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Article 301 of the Civil Code
provides that future support cannot be the subject of a compromise. An agreement for the dismissal of a
complaint and support conditioned upon the dismissal of the counterclaim is in the nature of a
compromise which cannot be countenanced.
(b) A former dismissal predicated upon a compromise affecting the civil status of persons and future support
cannot have force and effect and cannot bar the filing of another action, asking for the same relief against
the same defendant.

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RODOLFO FERNANDEZ and MERCEDES CARANTO FERNANDEZ, HUSBAND and WIFE EDDIE C.
FERNANDEZ and LUZ FERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. ROMEO FERNANDEZ, respondent.
G.R. No. 143256. August 28, 2001
Facts: The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and Generosa A. de Venecia were the registered owners of a parcel of land
located at Dagupan City and the two storey building constructed thereon. It is undisputed that Generosa gave birth to
Rogelio who died when he was only 12 years old as paralytic. In the testimony of Romeo Fernandez, it was revealed that
the late Spouses being childless by the death of their son, purchased a one month baby boy, who was later on identified as
Rodolfo Fernandez. He was taken care of by the couple and was sent to school and became a dental technician. On July
20, 1982, Jose K. Fernandez died and left his wife and Rodolfo an estate. On August 31, 1989, appellant and Generosa
executed a Deed of extra-judicial Partition. On the same day, Generosa executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Eddie Fernandez, appellants son. After learning the transaction, the nephews and nieces of the deceased, their father
Genaro being a brother of Jose, filed an action to declare the Extra-Judicial Partition of Estate and Deed of Sale void ab
initio. They alleged that the appellants were motivated by unmitigated greed, deliberate and malicious acts of depriving
them and other heirs of the deceased their rights.
Issue: Whether or not Article 1105 of the New Civil Code is applicable
Ruling: Considering the foregoing findings, petitioner Rodolfo is not a child by nature of the spouses Fernandez and not a
legal heir of the deceased, thus the subject deed of extra-judicial settlement of the estate between Generosa and Rodolfo is
null and void insofar as Rodolfo is concerned pursuant to Article 1105 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines which
states; A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir but who is not shall be void only with respect to such
person. Moreover, While ones legitimacy be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, this
doctrine has no application in a case where the allegation by one party is that a person claiming to be a child of the
deceased spouses was not born to said deceased persons.
GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS MA. THERESA ALMONTE, respondent G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005
Facts: Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on December 29, 1989. After their marriage, they lived Ma. Theresas
parents. Almost a year later, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. The couples relationship turned out to be shortlived. On December 19, 1991, the husband filed a petition to have his marriage annulled on the ground of bigamy. He
alleged that nine years before he married Ma. Theresa, she had married one Mario Gopiao, which married was never
annulled. Gerardo also found out that Mario was still alive. The wife did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty
years old. She, however, averred that the marriage was a sham that she never lived with Mario at all. The trial court ruled
that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was valid and susbsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to
the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was
awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights.
Issue: Whether or not Articles 164, 166, 49 of the Family Code is applicable
Ruling: The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is
conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his
status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides: Article 167: The child shall be considered legitimate
although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The law
requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of the legitimacy. The presumption of legitimacy proceeds
from sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of conception. To overthrow this presumption on the basis of
Article 166(1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have
enable the husband to father the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless
such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary. The presumption is quasi-collective and may be refuted only by
the evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child. In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article 49
of the Family Code grants visitation rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his children. Such visitation rights
flow from the natural right of both parent and child to each others company. There being no such parent-child
relationship between them, Gerardo has no legally demandable rights to visit Jose Gerardo.

BELEN SAGAD ANGELES, petitioner, vs. ALELI ANGELES MAGLAYA, respondent.

G.R. No.153798. September 2, 2005
Facts: On March 25, 1998, the respondent filed a petition for letters of administration and her appointment as
administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco M. Angeles. She alleged that she is the sole legitimate child of the
deceased and Genoveva Mercado, and together with petitioner, decedents wife by his second marriage, are the surviving
heirs of the decedent. Petitioner opposed the petition of the respondent. She averred that respondent could not be the
daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Franciscos legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth
certificate was not signed by him. Furthermore, the respondent failed to present the marriage contract between her
supposed parents or produce any acceptable document to prove such union.
Issue:
(a) Whether or not the presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code may be availed by the
respondent
(b) Whether or not birth certificate may use as proof of paternity and recognition
Ruling:
(a) A party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely on and invoke such legal presumption to
establish a fact in issue. He need not introduce evidence to prove that fact. For, a presumption is prima facie
proof of the fact presumed. However, it cannot be over-emphasized, that while a fact overthrown, stand as
proved, the presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code may be availed only upon
convinvcing proof of the factual basis. Else, the presumption of law that a child is legitimate does not arise. A
legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the elements of
the lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and children.
(b) Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as validating proof of paternity and as an
instrument of recognition, must be signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the mother if the father
refuses. In this case, the Birth Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco against whom legitimate
filiation is asserted. Not even by Genoveva, instead by the attending physician, who certified to having
attended the birth of a child. Thus, the birth certificate presented is not valid to prove the paternity.
ARTURO R. ABALOS, petitioner, vs. DR. GALICIANO S. MACATANGAY, respondent
G.R. No. 155043. September 30, 2004
Facts: Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the registered owner of a parcel of land with improvements. Armed with
Special Power of Attorney (SPA), Arturo executed a Receipt and Memorandum Agreement (RMOA) dated October 17,
1989 in favor of the respondent, binding himself to sell to respondent the subject property and not to offer the same to any
other party within thirty (30) days from date. Arturo acknowledged receipt of a check from the respondent in certain
amount, representing earnest money for the subject property, the amount of which would be deducted from the purchase
price. Further, the RMOA stated that full payment would be effected as soon as possession of the property shall have been
turned over to respondent. Subsequently, Esther executed a SPA dated on October 25, 1989, appointing her sister to act for
and in her behalf relative to the transfer of the property to respondent. Ostensibly, a marital squabble was brewing
between the spouses at the time and to protect is interest, respondent caused the annotation of his adverse claim on the
title of the spouses to the property. On November 16, 1989, the respondent sends a demand letter informing the spouses of
his readiness and willingness to pay the full amount of the purchase price. The letter contained a demand upon the spouses
to comply with their obligation to turn over possession of the property to him. Arturo and Esther failed to deliver the
property which prompted the respondent to cause the annotation of another adverse claim. On January 12, 1990,
respondent filed a complaint against petitioners for specific performance with damages. Arturo filed his answer to the
complaint while his wife was declared in default.
Issues:
(a) Whether or not the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership
(b) Whether or not the consent of both spouses is needed in the sale of property under conjugal partnership
(c) Whether or not a written consent of the other spouse is required in selling property under conjugal partnership
Ruling:
(a) Under the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. This right is clearly granted
to him by law. More, the husband is the sole administrator. The wife is not entitled as of right to joint
administration. The right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the
dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal
obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their respective heirs.

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(b)

(c)

The sale by the husband of the property belonging the conjugal partnership without the consent of the wife
when there is no showing that the latter is incapacitated is void ab initio because it is in contravention of the
mandatory requirements of Article 166 of the Civil Code. This Article requires the consent of the wife before
the husband may alienate encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership, it follows that acts or
transactions executed against this mandatory provision are void except when the law itself authorize their
validity.
The Family Code now requires the written consent of the other spouse, or authority of the court for the
disposition or encumberance of conjugal partnership property without which, the disposition or encumberance
shall be void.

JANICE MARIE JAO, petitioner vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO,
respondents. No. L-49162 July 28, 1987
Facts: On October 28, 1968, petitioner Janice Marue Jao, then minor, represented by her mother and guardian ad-litem,
filed a case for recognition and support with respondent Perico V. Jao. The latter denied paternity so the parties agreed to a
blood grouping test which was in due course conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon order of the trial
court. The result of the said test indicated that Janice could not have been the possible offspring by Perico and Arlene.
Issue: Whether or not the result of blood grouping test may use as an evidence for filiation
Ruling: The findings of such blood tests are not admissible to prove the fact of paternity as they show only a possiblility
that the alleged father or any one of many others with the same blood type may have been the father of the child. But the
Uniform Act recognizes the tests have some probative value to establish paternity where the blood type and the
combination in the child is shown to be rare, in which case the judge is given discretion to let it in.
ANDAL, petitioner, vs. MACARAIG, respondent No. L-2474. May 30, 1951
Facts: The husband was suffering from tuberculosis in such a condition that he could hardly move and get up from his
bed, with feet swollen and voice hoarse. The wife had carnal intercourse with a man other than her husband during the
first 120 days of the 300 days immediately preceding the birth of the child. The husband soon died, but within 300 days
following dissolution of the marriage, a child was born to the wife.
Issue: Whether or not the late husband is the father of the child
Ruling: The Court held that the child is still his legitimate child. The fact that the husband was seriously sick is not
sufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy. There are cases where persons suffering from such illness can do
carnal act even in the most crucial stage of his health because then they seem to be more inclined to sexual intercourse.
This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his
wife during the first 120 days of the 300 days next preceding the birth of the child. Impossibility of access by husband to
wife would include absence during the initial period of conception, impotence which is patent, continuing and incurable;
and imprisonment, unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison regulation. The
fact that the wife had illicit intercourse with a man other than her husband during the initial period, do not preclude
cohabitation between said husband and wife.
TEOFISTO BABIERA, petitioner, vs. PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL, respondent G.R. No. 138493. June 15, 2000
Facts: Presentacion B. Catotal filed a petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera in the Civil
Registry of Ilagan City. She asserted that she is the only surviving child of the late Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera. She
alleged that Teofista is not her sister because she is the daughter of Flora Guinto who is the housemaid of the spouses and
gave birth through hilot at the house of the spouses without their knowledge. This caused the registration of the facts of
birth of her child, by simulating that the child was the child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and Hemogena,
then 54 years old, and made her to be the mother of the child. Due to lack of evidence presented that Hermogena became
pregnant and was already 54 at the alleged time of Teofistas birth, both the trial and appellate court declared the
certificate of birth of Teofista as null and void ab initio and ordering her Local Civil Registrar of Iligan to cancel from the
registry of live birth of Iligan City BIRTH CERTIFICATE.
Issues:
(a) Whether or not Article 171 of the Family Code shall be applied
(b) Whether or not Article 170 of the Family Code shall be applied
Ruling:
(a) A legitimate child has the requisite standing to initiate an action to cancel the birth certificate of one claiming
to be the child of the formers mother. Article 171 of the Family Code states that the childs filiation can be

(b)

impugned only by the father or in special circumstances, his heirs. It applies to instances in which the father
impugns the legitimacy of his wifes child. This Article is not applicable in the present case because it does not
impugn petitioners filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera since there is no blood relation to
impugn in the first place. In Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that a real party in interest is one
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit.
The prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply. An action to cancel a
persons Birth Certificate for being allegedly void ab initio does not prescribe.

MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA BENITEZ- LIRIO AND
FEODOR BENITEZ AGUILAR, respondents G.R. No. 105625. January 24, 1994
Facts: Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties especially in Laguna. Isabel died and
followed her in the grave, seven years after. He died intestate. The fight for administration of Vicentes estate ensued on
September 24, 1990, private respondent Victoria Benitez- Lirio and Feodor Benitez- Aguilar, Vicentes sister and nephew,
respectively. They prayed for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicentes favor of private respondent Aguilar. On
November 2, 1990, petitioner opposed the petition. She alleged that she is the sole heir of the deceased and capable of
administering his estate.
Issue: Whether or not Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code shall be contemplated
Ruling: Articles 164, 166, 170, and 171 of the Family Code do contemplate a situation where a child is alleged not be the
child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. The instant case does not contemplated by these articles. These
articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it
is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (a) it was physically impossible for him to have
sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the
child; (b) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (c) that in case of children
conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either spouse was obtained through
mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence.
WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon Garcia, petitioner, vs. JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO,
PEARL MARGARET L. TAN, TITA ROSE L. TAN AND LINDA CHRISTINA LIYAO, respondents.
G.R. No. 138961. March 7, 2002
Facts: Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for more than ten (10) years at
the time of the institution of the civil case filed by her in favor to her son. Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao
from 1965 up to the time of Williams untimely demise on December 2, 1975. They lived together in the company of
Corazons two (2) children from her subsisting marriage. This was with the knowledge of William Liyaos legitimate
children, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga, from his subsisting marriage with Juanita Tanhoti Liyao. Tita
Rose and Christina were both employed at the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. of which Corazon and William were then
vice president and president, respectively. On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal
Santos Memorial Hospital. During her three (3) day stay at the hospital, William Liyao visited and stayed with her and the
new born baby, William, Jr. (Billy). All the medical and hospital expenses, food and clothing were paid under the account
of William Liyao. William Liyao even asked his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez, to secure a copy of
Billys birth certificate. He likewise instructed Corazon to open a bank account for Billy with the Consolidated Bank and
Trust Company and gave weekly amounts to be deposited therein. William Liyao would bring Billy to the office,
introduce him as his good looking son and had their pictures taken together. During the lifetime of William Liyao, several
pictures were taken showing, among others, William Liyao and Corazon together with Billys godfather, Fr. Julian Ruiz,
William Liyaos legal staff and their wives while on vacation in Baguio. Corazon also presented pictures in court to prove
that that she usually accompanied William Liyao while attending various social gatherings and other important meetings.
Issue: Who shall invoke the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code
Ruling: Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. The
presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but is based on
the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to
protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not
conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code
provides: Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and
before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.

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Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband having
access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:1) By the impotence of the husband;2) By the fact that husband and wife were
living separately in such a way that access was not possible;3) By the serious illness of the husband. The fact that Corazon
Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born is of no
moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for
impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child
mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the
conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code.
JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS, minors, represented by their mother,
CAROLINA A. DE JESUS, petitioners, vs.
THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, respondent.
G.R. No. 142877. October 2, 2001
Facts:
The petition involves the case of two illegitimate children who, having been born in lawful wedlock, claim to
be the illegitimate scions of the decedent in order to enforce their respective shares in the latters estate under the rules on
succession. Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was during this marriage
that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, were born, the former on 01 March 1979 and the latter on 06
July 1982. In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as
being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving
behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and some real property. It was on the
strength of his notarized acknowledgment that petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for Partition with Inventory
and Accounting of the Dizon estate. Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G.
Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that
the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of
petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the
illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon.
Issue:
Whether or not Articles 170 and 171 shall be observed in the case
Ruling:
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and
more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed
becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the
first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such a way
that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse.
Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the
Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be
legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.

EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R. TIJING, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
ANGELITA DIAMANTE, respondents
G.R. No. 125901. March 8, 2001
Facts:
Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children and the youngest is Edgardo Tijing Jr., who was born
on April 27, 1989 at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse Lourdes- Vasquez. Bienvenida served as the
laundrywoman of angelita, the respondent. On August, 1989, angelita went to her house to fetch for an urgent laundry job.
Since Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her
four-month old son, Edgardo Jr. under the care of Aangelita as she usually let her take care of the child while Bienvenida
was doing laundry. When she came back from the market, the two were gone already. She went to Angelitas home but
she was informed that Angelita already moved to other place. Bienvenida and her husband searched for their missing son
in other places. Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they saw no traces of his whereabouts. Four years later, Bienvenida
read in the tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common husband of Angelita. They went to the place
and saw her son. She claims that the boy was already named John Thomas Lopez. The spouses filed their petition for
habeas corpus with the trial court in order to recover their son. The petitioners presented two witnesses, Lourdes Vasquez,
the midwife and Benjamin Lopez, the brother of Tomas. Benjamin Lopez declared that his brother could not have possibly
fathered John Thomas Lopez as he was sterile. The trial court granted the petition while in the appellate court, it reversed
the decision of the lower court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Edgardo Jr. and John Thomas is the same person
Ruling:
Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance of birth should cause the recognition of such
birth and only is default of the physician or midwife can the parent register the birth of his child. A false entry in the birth
certificate regarding the alleged marriage between the parents of the child puts to doubt the other data in said birth
certificate. Moreover, resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish
parentage. Bienvenida and the subject child have a common resemblance. Thus, the court considered this in the decision.
Parentage will shall be resolved using conventional methods unless adopt the modern and scientific ways available like
Deoxyrebonuclei Acid (DNA) test.

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family member because petitioners real father was close friend of the decedent.
His real parents were Gaw Gee and Ng Kee appearing in his landing certificate.
He denied any relation with petitioner ad declares that the grant of petition for
change of name from Gaw Piak to William Go Kim Huy did not make petitioner
a member of the family of Bonifacio Go Kim.
Issue:
Whether or not William Go Kim Huy established his filiation with the
deceased
Ruling:
From the time of death of Bonifacio Go Kim in 1974, his heirs acquired a
definite right to inheritance. By provision of will or operation of law, his heirs are
called to succeed. Nevertheless, the burden of proof is on petitioner to establish
his affirmative allegation that Bonifacio is his father. Under our legal system,
filiation is established by any of the following: (a) the record of birth appearing
in the civil register or a fial judgment; (b) an admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall
be proved by the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws.
WILLIAM GO KIM HUY, petitioner, vs. SANTIAGO GO KIM HUY,
BONIFACIO GO KIM & SONS, SANTIAGO GO KIM & SONS, Co.,
respondents.
G.R. No. 137674. September 20, 2001
Facts:
Bonifacio Go Kim died on February 26, 1974. William Go Kim Huy
claims hereditary rights over the mass of property, rights, and assets belonging to
his estate. Heard by six RTC judges of Quezon City, this 2 decade-old
controversy started on June 18, 1980 when petitioner filed a complaint against
the respondents to declare the properties and businesses held by them as part of
the estate of Bonifacio Go Kim and compel them to render an accounting.
Respondent Santiago avers that he is the only son of Bonifacio Go Kim. He
maintains that petitioner has lived and worked with them and was treated as a
278

Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two

assertions- first, Allan Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez
before his marriage to Bessie Kelley, and second, even if no such prior marriage
had existed, His parents got married only a year after the birth of respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not FPJ is a legitimate child
Ruling:
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR.,
petitioners, vs.
The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE
(a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.), respondents.
G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004
Facts:
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known
as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng
Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his
certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his
date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Petitioner
initiated a petition to disqualify the respondent and to deny due course or to
cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born
Filipino citizen when in truth his parents were foreigners. His mother was Bessie
Kelley Poe, an American and his father was Allan Poe, a Spanish national, being
the son of Lorenzo Poe, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated that
Allan Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino
citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother.

Under Article 172 of the Family Code, The filiation of legitimate children
is established by any of the following:(1) The record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall
be proved by: (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2 any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Under Article 173, the action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child
during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die
during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a
period of five years within which to institute the action. The action already
commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both
of the parties; Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.,
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173,
except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which
case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. The
provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code
reads: "Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws. The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or
recognition of illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or compulsory.
Voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal
279

acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an

illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially declared as natural.
Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when the
child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim
legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass
exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment,
however, could only be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent. In
case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to
jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses. In
the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the
name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any
information by which such father could be identified. In order that the birth
certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation
or paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or sworn to by the father.
The failure of such requirement rendered the same useless as being an
authoritative document of recognition.

CAMELO CABATANIA, petitioner vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and

CAMELO REGODOS, respondents
G.R. No. 124814. October 21, 2004
280

Facts:
This controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and support
filed by Florencia Regodos in behalf of her son, Camelo Regodos. Camelo was
born on September 9, 1982. In 1981, Florencia was hired as petitioners
household help. During the course of her employment, she often went home to
her husband in the afternoon and return to work for the morning. This displeased
petitioners wife, hench, she was told to look for another job. One time, petitioner
and Florencia accidentally saw each other in a bus. They went for a dinner and
spent the night in a Hotel, where they had sexual intercourse. In that time, the
woman confessed that she was pregnant with the child of her husband. They went
home following that day. Florencia went to petitioners house hoping to be reemployed as servant. Since petitioners wife was in need one that time, she was
re-hired. However, petitioners wife noticed her pregnancy and she disclosed that
the father was her husband. Thus, she was again told to go home and after that
they did not see each other anymore.
Issue:
Whether or not paternity or filiation was duly established
Ruling:
An order for recognition and support may create a wholesome situation or
may be on irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued
only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence. A
certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father
was in the preparation of the said certificate. The presumption of legitimacy does
not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but it is based on the broad
principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The
presumption is grounded on the policy to protect innocent offspring from the
odium of illegitimacy. The fact that Florencias husband is living and there is a
valid subsistence marriage between them gives rise to presumption that a child
born within that marriage is legitimate even though the matter may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

ROSALINA P. ECETA, petitioner vs.

MA. THERESA VELL LAGURA ECETA, respondent.
G.R. No. 157037. May 20, 2004
Facts:
Rosalina P. Vda. De Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta sometime in 1962.
During the subsistence of their marriage, they begot a son, Vicente. The couple
acquired several property located at Starford, Cubao, Quezon City. Isaac died in
1967, leaving behind Rosalina and Vicente as his compulsory heirs. In 1977,
Vicente died. During his lifetime however he sired Maria Theresa an illegitimate
daughter. Thus, at the time of his death his compulsory heirs are his mother and
illegitimate daughter. In 1991, Maria Theresa filed a case before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City for Partition and Accounting with Damages against
Rosalina alleging by virtue of her fathers death, she became Rosalinas co-heir
281

and co-owner of the Cubao property. Trial, Appellate, and Supreme Court
granted Maria Theresas prayers.
Issue:
Whether or not Maria Theresa successfully established her filiation
Held:
Maria Theresa successfully established her filiation with Vicente by
presenting a duly authenticated birth certificate. Vicente himself signed the birth
certificate thereby acknowledging that she is his daughter. By this act alone,
Vicente is deemed to have acknowledged his paternity over Maria Theresa. Thus,
the filiation of illegitimate children like legitimate children is established by: (a)
the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (b)
admission of legitimate filiation is public document or private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation
shall be proved by: (a) the open and continuous possession of the status of the
legitimate child; or (b) only other means allowed by the Rule of the Court and
special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is in itself a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child and no further court action is
required.

MA. THERESA R. ALBERTO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

INTESTATE ESTATE OF JUAN M.ALBERTO YOLANDA R.ALBERTO,
respondents.
G.R. No. 86639. June 2, 1994
Facts:
On September 18, 1953, Ma. Theresa Alberto was born out of wedlock to
Aurora Reniva with Juan Alberto as the father. She used Alberto as surname in
all her School records and correspondences. On September 18, 1967, Juan died
intestate. His widow, Yolanda Alberto, filed a petition for the administration of
his estate. After the publication of notices, she was appointed as the
administratrix of the estate. After the Inventory and Appraisal and the
Administratrix Accounting were approved, the proceedings were ordered closed
and terminated. On September 15, 1978, Ma. Theresa filed a motion for leave to
intervene as oppositor and to re-open the proceedings praying that she be
declared to have acquired the status of a natural child and as such, entitled to
share in the estate of the deceased. The motion was granted by the probate court.
The Court was convinced that the petitioner had been in continuous possession of
the status of a natural child. Thus, it compelled the decedents heirs and estate to
recognize her as a natural daughter and allow her to participate in the estate
proceedings.
Issues:
282

(a) Whether or not the natural child occupies the highest position under the
old Civil Code
(b) Whether or not the petitioner is barred to file an action
Ruling:
(a) While he did contract marriage subsequently with another woman, it was
only too clear that he had no intentions of closing definitively that chapter
in his life when he begat his first-born. Of the different categories of
illegitimate children under the old Civil Code, the natural child occupies
the highest position, she being the child of parents who, at the time of her
conception, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other
and could, therefore, have contracted a valid marriage.
(b) An illegitimate child whose father or mother dies during her minority has
four (4) years from the attainment of her majority within which to file an
action for the recognition. The motion of the petitioner was seasonably
filed three days before the expiration of the four-year period. Hence, the
said motion is valid.

JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS,

minors, represented by their mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS, petitioners,
vs.
THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, respondent.
G.R. No. 142877. October 2, 2001
Facts:
The petition involves the case of two illegitimate children who, having
been born in lawful wedlock, claim to be the illegitimate scions of the decedent
in order to enforce their respective shares in the latters estate under the rules on
succession. Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23
August 1964. It was during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie
Christie A. de Jesus, were born, the former on 01 March 1979 and the latter on 06
July 1982. In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon
acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate
children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March
1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various
corporations and some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized
acknowledgment that petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for Partition
with Inventory and Accounting of the Dizon estate. Respondents, the surviving
spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the
corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the
case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for
partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being
the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to
instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan
Dizon.
Issue:
283

Whether or not voluntary recognition of illegitimate children is present

Ruling:
The rule that the written acknowledgment made by the deceased Juan G.
Dizon establishes petitioners alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot
be validly invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. Jurisprudence is
strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be
attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit
specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock
shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress. The
filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation
shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself,
a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action
is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for
compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not
require a separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for
recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity,
i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an
authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is
essential in order to establish the childs acknowledgment. A scrutiny of the
records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their
parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as
being their father.

be aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children
conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of
legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father,
or in exceptional instances the latters heirs, can contest in an appropriate action
the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of
a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be
rejected.

Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late

Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as
being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot
284

Trinidad gave birth to Consolacion Lumain. As shown by her birth certificate her
registered parents are Trinidad and Anastacio. On October 31, 1986, Fr. Lumain
died but he left a last will and testament wherein he acknowledge Consolacion
his daughter and instituted her as the sole and universal heir of all property rights
and interests. This was duly probated by the Court of First Instance of Bohol and
on appeal it was affirmed by Court of appeals. Soon afterreachung the age of
majority, Consolacion filed an action against Hipolito for the recovery of certain
parcel of lands she claim to have inherited from Fr. Lumain and for damages.
Issue:
Whether or not Consolacion is the lawful heir
Ruling:
One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will all his estate or
any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed; Determination of
paternity not even necessary. In the last will anjd testament of Fr. Lumain, he not
only acknowledged appellee, Consolacion as his natural daughter but designated
her as his only heir. Thus, Consolacion is the lawful heir.

CONSOLACION LUMAIN DE APARICIO accompanied by the husband

BENITO APARICIO, petitioner-appellant, vs. HIPOLITO PARAGUYA,
defendant-respondent
March 29, 1987
Facts:
Trinidad Montilde, a young lass had a love affair with a priest, Fr. Felipe
Lumain and in the process she conceived. When she almost four-months
pregnant and in order to conceal her disgrace in the public, she decided to marry
Anastacio Mamburao. Fr. Lumain solemnized their marriage. They never lived
together as man and wife. On September 12, 1924, 192 days after the marriage,
285

JOSE RIVERO, plaintiff vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant

G.R. No. 141273. May 17, 2005
Facts:

Ruling:
The petitioners claims that there was no factual basis for the appellate
courts finding that the respondents were incompetent cannot prevail. It must be
stressed that the CA conducted a hearing before arriving at the conclusion that
respondent Benito, Jr. was incompetent. More importantly, such claim involves a
factual issue which cannot be raised before this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. The contention of the petitioners is bereft of merit. The Court finds and
so holds that the decision of the RTC based on the compromise agreement
executed by Mary Jane is null and void. , the Court is convinced that the
compromise agreement signed by Mary Jane and Benedick was a compromise
relating to the latters filiation. Mary Jane recognized Benedick as the
illegitimate son of her deceased father, the consideration for which was the
amount of P6, 000,000.00 to be taken from the estate, the waiver of other claims
from the estate of the deceased, and the waiver by the Dy Chiao siblings of their
counterclaims against Benedick. This is readily apparent, considering that the
compromise agreement was executed despite the siblings unequivocal
allegations in their answer to the complaint filed only two months earlier, that
Benedick was merely an imposto

On August 27, 1996, Benedick Arevalo filed a Complaint[2] against Mary

Jane Dy Chiao-De Guzman, Benito Dy Chiao, Jr., and Benson Dy Chiao, in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, for compulsory recognition as the
illegitimate child of their father, Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., and for the administration
and partition of his estate as he had died intestate on July 27, 1995. Since
Benedick was a minor, his natural mother and guardian ad litem, Shirley Arevalo,
filed the complaint on his behalf. Concepcion, Benito Sr.s wife, was not
impleaded as she had died on July 7, 1995. The CA nullified the decision of the
RTC on the ground, inter alia, that the filiation of Benedick could not be the
subject of a compromise, and that Mary Jane had no authority to execute the
compromise agreement for and in behalf of her brothers.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of Benedick
Arevalo for recognition as the illegitimate son of the deceased Benito Dy Chiao,
Sr
286

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff v. MORENO BAYANI,

defendant
OCT. 8, 1996

the prohibition against acknowledgment of the offspring by an offender who is

married, which would vest parental authority in him. Therefore, under Article
345 of the Revised Penal Code, the offender in a rape case who is married can
only be sentenced to indemnify the victim and support the offspring, if there be
any. In the instant case then, the accused should also be ordered to support his
illegitimate offspring, Tracy Jhuen Nieto, 72 with Marie Elena Nieto, but in light
of Article 20173 of the Family Code, the amount and terms thereof to be
determined by the trial court only after due notice and hearing.

Facts:
Sgt. Moreno Bayani, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP),
seeks the reversal of the 28 April 1995 decision1 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, in Criminal Case No. 6433, finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided by law; to
indemnify complainant Maria Elena Nieto in the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,
000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay
the costs.
In her sworn complaint dated 22 February 1993 and filed on 24 February 1993
with the court below, the complainant charged the accused with the crime of rape
allegedly committed.
Issue:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A JUDGMENT IN
THIS CASE ON A SWORN STATEMENT OF THE COMPLAINANT
CHARGING THE APPELLANT THE CRIME OF RAPE, FOR THE
REASON THAT THE SIGNATURE APPEARING THEREON WAS
NOT IDENTIFIED BY COMPLAINANT AND NOT PRESENTED AS
EVIDENCE IN COURT BY THE PROSECUTION.
Ruling:
Article 176 of the Family Code confers parental authority over
illegitimate children on the mother, and likewise provides for their entitlement to
support in conformity with the Family Code. As such, there is no further need for

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff vs. MANUEL MANAHAN,

defendant
September 29, 1999
287

Facts:
Complainant Teresita Tibigar, 16 years old, worked at the Espiritu
Canteen in Dagupan City. On 5 January 1995, at about two o'clock in the
morning, Teresita who was asleep was suddenly awakened when she felt
someone beside her. Upon opening her eyes she saw accused Manuel Manahan
as he immediately placed himself on top of her. . He succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of her. Within the month Teresita left the canteen and returned home
to her parents in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. The sexual encounter resulted in her
pregnancy. From there they proceeded to the police station where a statement of
Teresita was taken by SPO1 Isagani L. Ico. Police Chief Inspector Wendy G.
Rosario later endorsed the complaining witness to the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Dagupan City for appropriate legal action. Thereafter, with the
assistance of her mother, Teresita filed a criminal complaint accusing Manuel
Manahan alias Maning of rape. Meanwhile, on 2 October 1995, she gave birth to
a healthy baby girl and christened her Melanie Tibigar. The accused banks
heavily on his "sweetheart theory," a usual defense in alleged rape, but the
accused miserably failed to prove that he and the complaining witness indeed had
a romantic liaison as this claim was categorically denied by her. In September
1995, the accused was arrested in connection with the case filed by Teresita. On
review ofthe records and the court sustain the conviction of the accused. The
prosecution for rape almost always involves sharply contrasting and
irreconcilable declarations of the victim and the accused.

provides that persons guilty of rape shall also be sentenced to "acknowledge the
offspring, unless the law should prevent him from doing so," and "in every case
to support the offspring." In the case before us, compulsory acknowledgment of
the child Melanie Tibigar is not proper there being a legal impediment in doing
so as it appears that the accused is a married man. As pronounced by this Court in
People v. Guerrero, 16 the rule is that if the rapist is a married man, he cannot be
compelled to recognize the offspring of the crime, should there be any, as his
child, whether legitimate or illegitimate." Consequently, that portion of the
judgment under review is accordingly deleted. In any case, the court sustains that
part ordering the accused to support the child as it is in accordance with law.

Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused of rape
Ruling:
In the instant case, the complaining witness may not have even filed the
rape charge had she not become pregnant. This Court has taken cognizance of the
fact that many of the victims of rape never complain or file criminal charges
against the rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy in painful silence rather than
reveal their shame to the world and risk the rapists' making good their threats to
kill or hurt their victims.
On the matter of acknowledgment and support of the child, a correction
of the view of the court a quo is in order. Article 345 of The Revised Penal Code

ELINO RIVERA, plaintiff vs. HEIRS OF ROMUALDO

VILLANUEVA, defendant
G.R. No. 14150 July 21, 2006
Facts:
Petitioners are allegedly the half-brothers (Elino and Dominador),
the half-sister-in-law (Soledad), and the children of a half-brother (Teofila and
Cecilia) of the deceased Pacita Gonzales (hereinafter Gonzales). Respondents
Catalino, Lucia, Purificacion and Melchor, all surnamed Villanueva, and Arnaldo
V. Avendano are allegedly the siblings, full and half-blood of Romualdo
Villanueva (hereinafter Villanueva).They are denominated as the heirs of
288

Villanueva and are represented by Melchor. They were allowed to substitute for
Villanueva upon his death. The remaining respondents, Angelina Villanueva
(hereinafter respondent Angelina) and husband Victoriano de Luna, are allegedly
the daughter and the son-in-law, respectively, of the late Villanueva. Petitioners
(Gonzales' half-brothers, etc.) filed a case for partition of Gonzales' estate and
annulment of titles and damages, with the Regional Trial Court. In dismissing the
complaint, the RTC made two findings: (1) Gonzales was never married to
Villanueva and (2) respondent Angelina was her illegitimate child by Villanueva
and therefore her sole heir, to the exclusion of petitioners.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in finding that respondent Angelina
was Gonzales' illegitimate daughter
Ruling:
Both the trial court and the CA ruled that respondent Angelina was the
illegitimate daughter of the decedent, based solely on her birth certificate.
According to the assailed decision, "the birth certificate clearly discloses that
Pacita Gonzales was the mother of Angelina Villanueva while municipal
treasurer Romualdo Villanueva was denominated therein as her father."13 The
CA found this to be adequate proof that respondent Angelina was Gonzales'
illegitimate child.
However, a closer examination of the birth certificate14 reveals that
respondent Angelina was listed as "adopted" by both Villanueva and Gonzales. A
record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein.
Because the cohabitation of Villanueva and Gonzales from 1927 to 1963
was adulterous, their property relations during those 36 years were not governed
by Article 144 of the Civil Code which applies only if the couple living together
is not in any way incapacitated from getting married.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals are reversed and set aside, and a new one entered
ANNULLING the deed of extrajudicial partition with sale and REMANDING
the case to the court of origin for the determination and identification of Pacita
Gonzales' heirs and the corresponding partition of her estate.

MERCEDES CRISTOBAL CRUZ, et.al., petitioners v.

EUFROSINA CRISTOBAL, respondent
G.R. No. 140422
Facts:
Petitioners (Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the
deceased Socorro Cristobal, and Elisa Cristobal-Sikat) claim that they are the
legitimate children of Buenaventura Cristobal during his first marriage to Ignacia
Cristobal. On the other hand, private respondents (Norberto, Florencio,
Eufrosina and Jose, all surnamed Cristobal) are also the children of Buenaventura
Cristobal resulting from his second marriage to Donata Enriquez. Sometime in
the year 1930, Buenaventura Cristobal died intestate. More than six decades
later, petitioners learned that private respondents had executed an extrajudicial
partition of the subject property and transferred its title to their names.
To prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal, the
baptismal certificates of Elisa, [3] Anselmo, [4] and the late Socorro [5] were
presented. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a judgment [8] on 11
July 1997, dismissing the case, ruling that petitioners failed to prove their
filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal as the baptismal and birth
certificates presented have scant evidentiary value and that petitioners inaction
for a long period of time amounts to laches.
289

Not satisfied, petitioners sought recourse in the Court of Appeals which, in its
Decision [9] dated 22 July 1999, ruled that they were able to prove their filiation
with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal thru other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws, but affirmed the ruling of the trial court barring
their right to recover their share of the subject property because of laches.

CAMELO CABATANIA, petitioner VS. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent

G.R. No. 124814, October 21, 2004

Issue:
Whether or not filiation was properly proven by the respondents with the
deceased Buenaventura Cristobal
Ruling:
The foregoing evidence thus suffice to convince this Court that petitioners
are, indeed, children of the late Buenaventura Cristobal during the first marriage.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court rules as follows:
(1) The Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
(2) Petitioners are RECOGNIZED and DECLARED as children of the late
Buenaventura Cristobal from his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal;
(3) The Deed of Partition executed by private respondents is DECLARED not
binding upon petitioners who were not notified or did not participate in the
execution thereof;
(4) The subject property, covered by TCTs No. 165132, No. 165133, 165134, and
No. 165135, in the name of private respondents consisting of 535 square meters
is ORDERED to be partitioned and distributed in accordance with this Decision
and appropriate certificates of title be issued in favor of each of the recognized
heirs of the late Cristobal Buenaventura, and
(5) Petitioners are AWARDED the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P100,000.00) PESOS as damages, to be paid by private respondents.

Fatcs:
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the March 15, 1996 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
36708 which in turn affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz
City, Branch 60 in Spec. Proc. No. 88-C which compelled petitioner Camelo
Cabatania to acknowledge private respondent Camelo Regodos as his illegitimate
son and to give support to the latter in the amount of P 500 per month.
This controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and support filed by
Florencia Regodos in behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo
Regodos.
After trial, the court a quo gave more probative weight to the testimony of
Florencia. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC.
Issue:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF
ARTICLE 283 OF THE CIVIL CODE ON THE COMPULSORY
RECOGNITION AND AWARD OF SUPPORT IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTAPPELLEE CAMELO REGODOS
Ruling:
Both the trial court and the appellate court brushed aside the
misrepresentation of Florencia in the petition for recognition that she was a
widow. Both courts dismissed the lie as minor which did not affect the rest of her
testimony. We disagree. The fact that Florencias husband is living and there is a
valid subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that a child
born within that marriage is legitimate even though the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.[11]
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the
290

statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed
virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect
innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.[12]
In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
analysis, the extremely subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of
features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation before the
courts of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals in dated March 15, 1996, affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City is reversed and set aside.

reversed and set aside the judgment dated October 17, 1990, Of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54, in Civil Case No.87-41515, finding herein
petitioner to be the owner of 1/3 pro indiviso share in a parcel of land. Jose T.
Santiago owned a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 64729, located in Rizal
Avenue Extension, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Alleging that Jose had fraudulently
registered it in his name alone, his sisters Nicolasa and Amanda (now
respondents herein) sued Jose for recovery of 2/3 share of the property. On April
20, 1981, the trial court in that case decided in favor of the sisters, recognizing
their right of ownership over portions of the property covered by TCT No.
64729. The Register of Deeds of Manila was required to include the names of
Nicolasa and Amanda in the certificate of title to said property. Jose died
intestate on February 6, 1984. On August 5, 1987, respondents filed a complaint
for recovery of title, ownership, and possession against herein petitioner, Ida C.
Labagala, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, to, recover from her the 1/3
portion of said property pertaining to Jose but which came into petitioner's sole
possession upon Jose's death.
Respondents alleged that Jose's share in the property belongs to them by
operation of law, because they are the only legal heirs of their brother, who died
intestate and without issue. They claimed that the purported sale of the property
made by their brother to petitioner sometime in March 1979 was executed
through petitioner's machinations and with malicious intent, to enable her to
secure the corresponding transfer certificate of title (TCT No. 172334) in
petitioner's name alone.
On October 17, 1990, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner. Ida C.
Labagala, thus affecting their credibility. Respondents appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which reversed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:

Facts:

Hence, the present petition wherein the following issues are raised for
consideration:
1. Whether or not petitioner has adduced preponderant evidence to prove that she
is the daughter of the late Jose T. Santiago, and
2. Whether or not respondents could still impugn the filiation of the petitioner as
the daughter of the late Jose T. Santiago.

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the decision dated
March 4, 1997, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 32817, which

Ruling:

IDA LAGABALA, plaintiff v. JOSE SANTIAGO, defendant

DECEMBER 4, 2001

291

Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to

assert and prove that a person is not a mans child by his wife. However, the
present case is not one impugning a petitioners legitimacy. Respondents are
asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is
not a child of Jose at all. Moreover, the present action is one for recovery of title
and possession, and thus outside the scope of Article 263 on prescriptive periods.
Article 263 should be read in conjunction with the other articles in the same
chapter on paternity and filiations in the Civil Code. A careful reading of said
chapter would reveal that it contemplates situations where a doubt exists that a
child is indeed a mans child by his wife, and the husband (or, in proper cases, his
heirs) denies the childs filiations. It does not refer to situations where a child is
alleged not to be the child at all of a particular couple. Article 263 should be read
in conjunction with the other articles in the same chapter on paternity and
filiations in the civil code. A careful reading of said chapter would reveal that it
contemplates situations where a doubt exists that a child is indeed a mans child
by his wife, and the husband denies the childs filiation. It does not refer to
situations where a child is alleged not to be the child at all of a particular
couple.A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof of
filiation. More so are the entries made in an income tax return, which only shows
that income tax has been paid and the amount thereof. The Supreme Court is
constrained to agree with the factual finding of the court of Appeals that
petitioner is in reality the child of Leon Labagala and Cornelia abrigas, and
contrary to her averment, not of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Not
being a child of Jose, it follows that petitioner cannot inherit from him through
intestate succession. It now remains to be seen whether the property in dispute
was validly transferred to petitioner through sale or donation.

292

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are entitled to recognition and support from
private respondent?
Ruling:

CARLITO FERNANDEZ, PETITIONER VS. COURT OF APPEALS,

RESPONDENT
230 SCRA 130

It is the Courts findings that that petitioners evidence failed to

substantiate their cause of action. Respondent appellate court was correct in
applying the doctrine of res judicata as additional reason for dismissing the case.

Facts:
In 1983,Violeta Esguerra, single, met Carlito S. Fernandez, married, at
the Meralco Compound tennis courts where Violetas father worked as a tennis
instructor. The two then started an illicit sexual relationship six months after their
first meeting. The tryst allegedly gave birth to herein petitioners Carlo Antonio
and John Paul Fernandez.
Petitioners filed a civil case for support against Carlito in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City. The case however, was dismissed on the basis of
immateriality, and insufficiency and incompetence of evidence.
Another action for recognition and support was filed on February 19,
1987 at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 87. Eventually, the decision
was rendered in favor of the petitioners.
On appeal, the decision was set aside and the complaint was dismissed by
respondent appellate court on October 20, 1992. Their motion for reconsideration
was also denied in December 22, 1922.

FRANCISCO JISON, PETITIONER VS. COURT OF APPEALS,

RESPONDENT

Hence this appeal.

293

286 SCRA 495

Facts:
Francisco Jison married Lilia Lopez in 1940. At the end of 1945 or at the
beginning of 1946, Francisco impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar, who was a
nanny for Franciscos daughter, Lourdes. As a result, Monina Jison was born on
August 6, 1946. Petitioner alleges she enjoyed continuous implied recognition as
an illegitimate child of Francisco. Monina further alleges that Francisco has
always given her support and support for her education.
On March 15, 195, Monina Jison, praying for a judicial declaration of her
illegitimate status and for Francisco to recognize her as such, filed a complaint
against Francisco L. Jison in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City. A decision
was rendered dismissing the complaint with costs against Monina Jison.
On appeal by Monina, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court in April 25, 1995.
Hence this appeal.
Issue:

EDGARDO A. TIJING, plaintiff vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent

G.R. No. 125901, March 8, 2001
Whether or not the action for recognition is of merit?

Ruling:
Monina Jisons evidence hurdled the high standard of proof required
for the success of an action to establish ones illegitimate filiation when relying
upon the provisions regarding open and continuous possession or any other
means allowed the by the Rules of Court and special laws; moreover, Monina
proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.

Facts:
Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is
Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and
registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila. Petitioner Bienvenida
served as the laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita Diamante, then a
resident of Tondo, Manila.
When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were
gone. Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to Angelita's house in Tondo, Manila, but
did not find them there. Angelita's maid told Bienvenida that her employer went
out for a stroll and told Bienvenida to come back later. She returned to Angelita's
294

house after three days, only to discover that Angelita had moved to another place.
Bienvenida then complained to her barangay chairman and also to the police who
seemed unmoved by her pleas for assistance Four years later or in October 1993,
Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the
common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in
Hagonoy, Bulacan.
Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the
trial court in order to recover their son. On March 10, 1995, the trial court
concluded that since Angelita and her common-law husband could not have
children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility.5 The trial
court also held that the minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the
trial court. The appellate court expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas
corpus. In its view, the evidence adduced by Bienvenida was not sufficient to
establish that she was the mother of the minor. It ruled that the lower court erred
in declaring that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the
same person
Issue:
Whether or not Eduardo Tijing Jr. is the same person as John Tomas
Lopez?
Ruling:
A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence
presented by Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is
actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
There is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no
longer capable of siring a son. The trial court observed several times that when
the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong similarities in
their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and
his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage. All
these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed the son
of petitioners.

ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

respondent
G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005
Facts:
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992,
after which they entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly
impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on November 10, 1999. Despite Arnels
insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth to their child out of
wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital in Quezon
City. The babys birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father.
Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fes
repeated requests for Martins support despite his adequate financial capacity and
even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied
having fathered the child. In his pre-trial brief filed on May 17, 2002, Arnel
vehemently denied having sired Martin but expressed willingness to consider any
proposal to settle the case.On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the
issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA
paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. Arnel opposed said
motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the
parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the
applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
295

Issue:
Whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for
support without violating petitioners constitutional right to privacy and right
against self-incrimination
Ruling:
For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who
choose to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing
technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and
abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and
have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time
when DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form
of evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate
our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity.
Although the instant case deals with support rather than inheritance, as in
Tayag, the basis or rationale for integrating them remains the same. Whether or
not respondent Martin is entitled to support depends completely on the
determination of filiation.
Given that this is the very first time that the admissibility of DNA testing as a
means for determining paternity has actually been the focal issue in a
controversy, a brief historical sketch of our past decisions featuring or
mentioning DNA testing is called for.

ROSENDO HERRERA, petitioner vs. ROSENDO ALBA,

represented by his mother ARMI A. ALBA, respondent
460 S 197
Facts:
On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba (respondent),
represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for
compulsory recognition, support and damages against petitioner. On 7 August
1998, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim where he denied that he is the
biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with
respondents mother.
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to
abbreviate the proceedings. To support the motion, respondent presented the
testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D. When she testified, Dr. Halos was an
Associate Professor at De La Salle University where she taught Cell Biology. She
was also head of the University of the Philippines Natural Sciences Research
Institute (UP-NSRI), a DNA analysis laboratory. She was a former professor
at the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, where she
developed the Molecular Biology Program and taught Molecular Biology. In her
testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted
that the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.[4]
Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained
acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his
right against self-incrimination.
In an Order dated 3 February 2000, the trial court granted respondents
motion to conduct DNA paternity testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi
Alba.
Issue:
296

Whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to

determine filiation
Ruling:
The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation
of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children, is
without prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim his or her own
defenses.[57] Where the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through
the facilities of modern science and technology, such evidence should be
considered subject to the limits established by the law, rules, and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the court AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 29 November 2000.

Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia CanalitaVillanueva got married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On
November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with the trial court a petition for annulment of
his marriage alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying
Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior to the
marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he later
learned that private respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988.
In her counterclaim, Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that
petitioner freely and voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in
Palawan for almost a month after their marriage; that petitioner wrote letters to
her after he returned to Manila, during which private respondent visited him
personally; and that petitioner knew about the progress of her pregnancy, which
ended in their son being born prematurely.
Issue:
Whether the marriage be annulled on the ground that the defendant
allegedly concealed her pregnancy at the time of the celebration of marriage.
Ruling:

ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

respondent
G.R. No. 132955. October 27, 2006

The appellants contention that his wifes concealment of her pregnancy

during the solemnization of their marriage constitutes a ground to annul his
marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with
his child when they were married, is untenable. Appellants excuse that he could
not have impregnated the appellee because he did not have an erection during
their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft
of any reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee. In the light of
appellants admission that he had a sexual intercourse with his wife in January
1988, and his failure to attribute the latters pregnancy to any other man,
appellant cannot complain that he was deceived by the appellee into marrying
her.

Facts:
297

Issue:
Whether the marriage may be annulled which is grounded solely of the
lone testimony of the husband who claimed that his wife as impotent.
Ruling:
The answer is in the negative. The law specifically enumerates the legal
grounds that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence to annul a marriage.
The annulment of the marriage in question forwarded in this case, was decreed
upon the sole testimony of the husband. The impotence of the wife has not been
satisfactorily established because from the commencement until the entry of the
decree, she had abstained from participating. Furthermore, as to be noted, the
husband left the home two nights and one day after they had married for the
reason already stated. Said duration would not be enough to fortify her claim that
the wife was impotent.

JOEL JIMENEZ, petitioner, vs. REMEDIOS CAIZARES, respondent

No. L-12790. August 31, 1960
Facts:
Joel Jimenez, herein petitioner, filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
his marriage to the defendant, Remedios Caizares on the ground that the orifice
of her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the penetration of a male organ
or penis for copulation and that this condition of her genitals existed at the time
of marriage and continues to exist. Remedios was summoned but failed to
answer. Thereupon, pursuant to Article 88 of the Civil Code, the court directed
the city attorney to inquire whether there was collusion between the parties or if
otherwise, to see that the evidence for the plaintiff is nor fabricated. The court
further directed defendant to undergo physical examination and t submit a
medical certification. Still, defendant failed to participate and comply. Hearing of
the case ensued and a decree annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and the
defendant was issued.
298

husband left the home two nights and one day after they had married for the
reason already stated. Said duration would not be enough to fortify her claim that
the wife was impotent.

JOEL JIMENEZ, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC, respondent

No. L-12790. August 31, 1960
Facts:
Joel Jimenez, herein petitioner, filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
his marriage to the defendant, Remedios Caizares on the ground that the orifice
of her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the penetration of a male organ
or penis for copulation and that this condition of her genitals existed at the time
of marriage and continues to exist. Remedios was summoned but failed to
answer. Thereupon, pursuant to Article 88 of the Civil Code, the court directed
the city attorney to inquire whether there was collusion between the parties or if
otherwise, to see that the evidence for the plaintiff is nor fabricated. The court
further directed defendant to undergo physical examination and t submit a
medical certification. Still, defendant failed to participate and comply. Hearing of
the case ensued and a decree annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and the
defendant was issued.
Issue:
Whether the marriage may be annulled which is grounded solely of the
lone testimony of the husband who claimed that his wife as impotent.
Ruling:
The answer is in the negative. The law specifically enumerates the legal
grounds that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence to annul a marriage.
The annulment of the marriage in question forwarded in this case, was decreed
upon the sole testimony of the husband. The impotence of the wife has not been
satisfactorily established because from the commencement until the entry of the
decree, she had abstained from participating. Furthermore, as to be noted, the

JOSE RIVERO, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent

G.R. No. 141273. May 17, 2005
Facts:
299

On August 27, 1996, Benedick Arevalo filed a Complaint against Mary

Jane Dy Chiao-De Guzman, Benito Dy Chiao, Jr., and Benson Dy Chiao, in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, for compulsory recognition as the
illegitimate child of their father, Benito Dy Chiao, Sr., and for the administration
and partition of his estate as he had died intestate on July 27, 1995. Since
Benedick was a minor, his natural mother and guardian ad litem, Shirley Arevalo,
filed the complaint on his behalf. Concepcion, Benito Sr.s wife, was not
impleaded as she had died on July 7, 1995. The CA nullified the decision of the
RTC on the ground, inter alia, that the filiation of Benedick could not be the
subject of a compromise, and that Mary Jane had no authority to execute the
compromise agreement for and in behalf of her brothers.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of Benedick
Arevalo for recognition as the illegitimate son of the deceased Benito Dy Chiao,
Sr
Ruling:
The petitioners claims that there was no factual basis for the appellate
courts finding that the respondents were incompetent cannot prevail. It must be
stressed that the CA conducted a hearing before arriving at the conclusion that
respondent Benito, Jr. was incompetent. More importantly, such claim involves a
factual issue which cannot be raised before this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. The contention of the petitioners is bereft of merit. The Court finds and
so holds that the decision of the RTC based on the compromise agreement
executed by Mary Jane is null and void. , the Court is convinced that the
compromise agreement signed by Mary Jane and Benedick was a compromise
relating to the latters filiation. Mary Jane recognized Benedick as the
illegitimate son of her deceased father, the consideration for which was the
amount of P6, 000,000.00 to be taken from the estate, the waiver of other claims
from the estate of the deceased, and the waiver by the Dy Chiao siblings of their
counterclaims against Benedick. This is readily apparent, considering that the
compromise agreement was executed despite the siblings unequivocal
allegations in their answer to the complaint filed only two months earlier, that
Benedick was merely an imposto

ELINO RIVERA, plaintiff vs. HEIRS OF ROMUALDO

VILLANUEVA, respondent
G.R. No. 14150 July 21, 2006
Facts:
Petitioners are allegedly the half-brothers (Elino and Dominador),
the half-sister-in-law (Soledad), and the children of a half-brother (Teofila and
Cecilia) of the deceased Pacita Gonzales (hereinafter Gonzales). Respondents
Catalino, Lucia, Purificacion and Melchor, all surnamed Villanueva, and Arnaldo
V. Avendano are allegedly the siblings, full and half-blood of Romualdo
Villanueva (hereinafter Villanueva).They are denominated as the heirs of
Villanueva and are represented by Melchor. They were allowed to substitute for
Villanueva upon his death. The remaining respondents, Angelina Villanueva
300

(hereinafter respondent Angelina) and husband Victoriano de Luna, are allegedly

the daughter and the son-in-law, respectively, of the late Villanueva. Petitioners
(Gonzales' half-brothers, etc.) filed a case for partition of Gonzales' estate and
annulment of titles and damages, with the Regional Trial Court. In dismissing the
complaint, the RTC made two findings: (1) Gonzales was never married to
Villanueva and (2) respondent Angelina was her illegitimate child by Villanueva
and therefore her sole heir, to the exclusion of petitioners.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in finding that respondent Angelina
was Gonzales' illegitimate daughter
Ruling:
Both the trial court and the CA ruled that respondent Angelina was the
illegitimate daughter of the decedent, based solely on her birth certificate.
According to the assailed decision, "the birth certificate clearly discloses that
Pacita Gonzales was the mother of Angelina Villanueva while municipal
treasurer Romualdo Villanueva was denominated therein as her father."13 The
CA found this to be adequate proof that respondent Angelina was Gonzales'
illegitimate child.
However, a closer examination of the birth certificate14 reveals that
respondent Angelina was listed as "adopted" by both Villanueva and Gonzales. A
record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein.
Because the cohabitation of Villanueva and Gonzales from 1927 to 1963
was adulterous, their property relations during those 36 years were not governed
by Article 144 of the Civil Code which applies only if the couple living together
is not in any way incapacitated from getting married.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals are reversed and set aside, and a new one entered
ANNULLING the deed of extrajudicial partition with sale and REMANDING
the case to the court of origin for the determination and identification of Pacita
Gonzales' heirs and the corresponding partition of her estate.

MERCEDES CRISTOBAL CRUZ, petitioner v. EUFROSINA

CRISTOBAL, respondent
G.R. No. 140422
Facts:
Petitioners (Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the
deceased Socorro Cristobal, and Elisa Cristobal-Sikat) claim that they are the
legitimate children of Buenaventura Cristobal during his first marriage to Ignacia
Cristobal. On the other hand, private respondents (Norberto, Florencio,
Eufrosina and Jose, all surnamed Cristobal) are also the children of Buenaventura
Cristobal resulting from his second marriage to Donata Enriquez. Sometime in
the year 1930, Buenaventura Cristobal died intestate. More than six decades
later, petitioners learned that private respondents had executed an extrajudicial
partition of the subject property and transferred its title to their names.
To prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal, the
baptismal certificates of Elisa, [3] Anselmo, [4] and the late Socorro [5] were
presented. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a judgment [8] on 11
July 1997, dismissing the case, ruling that petitioners failed to prove their
filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal as the baptismal and birth
certificates presented have scant evidentiary value and that petitioners inaction
for a long period of time amounts to laches.

301

Not satisfied, petitioners sought recourse in the Court of Appeals which, in its
Decision [9] dated 22 July 1999, ruled that they were able to prove their filiation
with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal thru other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws, but affirmed the ruling of the trial court barring
their right to recover their share of the subject property because of laches.

CAMELO CABATANIA, plaintiff vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant

G.R. No. 124814, October 21, 2004

Issue:
Whether or not filiation was properly proven by the respondents with the
deceased Buenaventura Cristobal
Ruling:
The foregoing evidence thus suffice to convince this Court that petitioners
are, indeed, children of the late Buenaventura Cristobal during the first marriage.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court rules as follows:
(1) The Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
(2) Petitioners are RECOGNIZED and DECLARED as children of the late
Buenaventura Cristobal from his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal;
(3) The Deed of Partition executed by private respondents is DECLARED not
binding upon petitioners who were not notified or did not participate in the
execution thereof;
(4) The subject property, covered by TCTs No. 165132, No. 165133, 165134, and
No. 165135, in the name of private respondents consisting of 535 square meters
is ORDERED to be partitioned and distributed in accordance with this Decision
and appropriate certificates of title be issued in favor of each of the recognized
heirs of the late Cristobal Buenaventura, and
(5) Petitioners are AWARDED the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P100,000.00) PESOS as damages, to be paid by private respondents.

Fatcs:
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the March 15, 1996 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
36708 which in turn affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz
City, Branch 60 in Spec. Proc. No. 88-C which compelled petitioner Camelo
Cabatania to acknowledge private respondent Camelo Regodos as his illegitimate
son and to give support to the latter in the amount of P 500 per month. This
controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and support filed by
Florencia Regodos in behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo
Regodos.
After trial, the court a quo gave more probative weight to the testimony of
Florencia. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its decision.
Held:
Both the trial court and the appellate court brushed aside the
misrepresentation of Florencia in the petition for recognition that she was a
widow. Both courts dismissed the lie as minor which did not affect the rest of her
testimony. We disagree. The fact that Florencias husband is living and there is a
valid subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the presumption that a child
born within that marriage is legitimate even though the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.[11]
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the
statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed
virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect
innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.[12]

302

In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)

analysis, the extremely subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of
features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation before the
courts of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals in dated March 15, 1996, affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City is reversed and set aside.

In 1983,Violeta Esguerra, single, met Carlito S. Fernandez, married, at

the Meralco Compound tennis courts where Violetas father worked as a tennis
instructor. The two then started an illicit sexual relationship six months after their
first meeting. The tryst allegedly gave birth to herein petitioners Carlo Antonio
and John Paul Fernandez.
Petitioners filed a civil case for support against Carlito in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City. The case however, was dismissed on the basis of
immateriality, and insufficiency and incompetence of evidence.
Another action for recognition and support was filed on February 19,
1987 at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 87. Eventually, the decision
was rendered in favor of the petitioners. On appeal, the decision was set aside
and the complaint was dismissed by respondent appellate court on October 20,
1992. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied in December 22, 1922.
Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are entitled to recognition and support from
private respondent?
Ruling:
It is the Courts findings that that petitioners evidence failed to
substantiate their cause of action. Respondent appellate court was correct in
applying the doctrine of res judicata as additional reason for dismissing the case.

JOHN PAUL FERNANDEZ, plaintiff vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant

230 S 130
Facts:
303

Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the action for compulsory recognition is deserves merit?
Ruling:
In view in Art. 172 of the Family Code, with respect to Art. 283 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, filiation may be proven by any evidence or proof
that the defendant is his father.

BIENVENIDO RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff VS. COURT OF APPEALS,

defendant
245 SCRA 150
Facts:
On October 15, 1986, an action for compulsory recognition and support
was brought before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio-Benguet, Br. 9, by herein
respondent Clarito Agbulos against Bienvenido Rodriguez, petitioner herein. At
the trial, the plaintiff presented his mother, Felecitas Agbulos Haber, as first
witness. In the course of her direct examination, she was asked by counsel t
reveal the identity of the plaintiffs father but the defendants counsel raised a
timely objection, which the court sustained. The plaintiff file before the Supreme
Court a petition for review on certiorari questioning the said order in UDK 8516
entitled Clarito Agbulos vs. Hon. Romeo A. Brawner and Bienvenido
Rodriguez. On March 18, 1988, the Supreme Court referred the petition to the
Court of Appeals, which promulgated the questioned decision dated November 2,
1988.
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Ruling:
Petitioner has never controverted the evidence on record. His love letters
to Maribel vowing to be a good father to Joanna Rose; pictures of himself on
various occasions cuddling Joanna Rose and Certificate of Live Birth say it all.
The rule in Art. 283 of the Civil Code that filiation may be proven by any
evidence or proof that the defendant is his father shall govern.
RAYMOND PE LIM, Petitioner VS. COURT OF APPEALS, Defendant
270 SCRA 1
Facts:
In 1978, Maribel Cruz, then 16, was a part-time student at the same time a
receptionist at the Tonights Club and Resthouse. It was here where she met
Raymond Pe Lim on her first night on the job. Lim allegedly wooed Maribel and
the latter reciprocated. They soon lived together with Lim paying the apartment
rentals. Maribel left for Japan, already pregnant, in July 1981 and returned to
Manila in October of the same year.
On January 17, 1982, Maribel gave birth to a girl and was named Joanna
Rose C. Lim. Lim paid the bills for Maribels confinement.
Towards the latter part of 1983, petitioner abandoned the mother and
child. Unfortunately, various jobs and he from relatives were not enough to meet
their needs. Maribel asked Lim for support but, despite promises, were never
given. Maribel then filed a complaint for support in the Regional Trial Court on
Manila. The trial court rendered its decision enjoining Lim to provide support for
Joanna Rose and pay litigation expenses.
Lim elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which in turn affirmed the
ruling of the Regional Trial Court.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the action for compulsory recognition is of merit?

EDGARDO A. TIJING, Plaintiff vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Defendant

G.R. No. 125901, March 8, 2001

305

Facts:
Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is
Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and
registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila. Petitioner Bienvenida
served as the laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita Diamante, then a
resident of Tondo, Manila.
When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr.,
were gone. Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to Angelita's house in Tondo,
Manila, but did not find them there. Angelita's maid told Bienvenida that her
employer went out for a stroll and told Bienvenida to come back later. She
returned to Angelita's house after three days, only to discover that Angelita had
moved to another place. Bienvenida then complained to her barangay chairman
and also to the police who seemed unmoved by her pleas for assistance Four
years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of
Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law husband of Angelita, and whose
remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan.
Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the
trial court in order to recover their son. On March 10, 1995, the trial court
concluded that since Angelita and her common-law husband could not have
children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility.5 The trial
court also held that the minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the
trial court. The appellate court expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas
corpus. In its view, the evidence adduced by Bienvenida was not sufficient to
establish that she was the mother of the minor. It ruled that the lower court erred
in declaring that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the
same person
Issue:
Whether or not Eduardo Tijing Jr. is the same person as John Tomas
Lopez?
Ruling:
A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence
presented by Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is
actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.

There is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no

longer capable of siring a son. The trial court observed several times that when
the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong similarities in
their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and
his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage. All
these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed the son
of petitioners.

ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

respondent
G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005
Facts:
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992,
after which they entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly
impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on November 10, 1999. Despite Arnels
insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth to their child out of
wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital in Quezon
City. The babys birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father.
Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fes
repeated requests for Martins support despite his adequate financial capacity and
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even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied
having fathered the child. In his pre-trial brief filed on May 17, 2002, Arnel
vehemently denied having sired Martin but expressed willingness to consider any
proposal to settle the case.On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the
issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA
paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. Arnel opposed said
motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the
parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the
applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
Issue:
Whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for
support without violating petitioners constitutional right to privacy and right
against self-incrimination
Ruling:
For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who
choose to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing
technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and
abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and
have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time
when DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form
of evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate
our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity.
Although the instant case deals with support rather than inheritance, as in
Tayag, the basis or rationale for integrating them remains the same. Whether or
not respondent Martin is entitled to support depends completely on the
determination of filiation.
Given that this is the very first time that the admissibility of DNA testing as a
means for determining paternity has actually been the focal issue in a
controversy, a brief historical sketch of our past decisions featuring or
mentioning DNA testing is called for.

ROSENDO HERRERA, plaintiff vs.

ROSENDO ALBA, represented by his mother ARMI A. ALBA, defendant
460 S 197
Facts:
On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba (respondent),
represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for
compulsory recognition, support and damages against petitioner. On 7 August
1998, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim where he denied that he is the
biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with
respondents mother.
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to
abbreviate the proceedings. To support the motion, respondent presented the
testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D. When she testified, Dr. Halos was an
Associate Professor at De La Salle University where she taught Cell Biology. She
was also head of the University of the Philippines Natural Sciences Research
Institute (UP-NSRI), a DNA analysis laboratory. She was a former professor
at the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, where she
developed the Molecular Biology Program and taught Molecular Biology. In her
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testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted
that the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.[4]
Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained
acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his
right against self-incrimination.
In an Order dated 3 February 2000, the trial court granted respondents
motion to conduct DNA paternity testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi
Alba.
Issue:
Whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to
determine filiation
Ruling:
The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation
of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children, is
without prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim his or her own
defenses.[57] Where the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through
the facilities of modern science and technology, such evidence should be
considered subject to the limits established by the law, rules, and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the court AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 29 November 2000.

RULE ON DNA EVIDENCE

A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC
(2 October 2007)
SECTION 1. Scope. This Rule shall apply whenever DNA evidence, as defined
in Section 3 hereof, is offered, used, or proposed to be offered or used as
evidence in all criminal and civil actions as well as special proceedings.
DNA analysis is found to have several uses for forensic investigation,
including, but not limited to the 1) Identification of potential suspects whose
DNA may match evidence left at crime scene; 2) Exoneration of persons wrongly
accused of crimes; 3) Identification of crime and catastrophe victims; 4)
Establish paternity and other family relationships, through its variable number
tandem repeats (VNTR) patterns; 5) Identification of endangered and protected
species as an aid to wildlife officials (could be used for prosecuting poachers; 6)
Detection of bacteria and other organism that may pollute air, water, soil and
food; 7)Match organ donors with recipients in transplant programs; and 8)
Determination of pedigree for seed or livestock breeds.
DNA is now being used as evidence in trial courts especially in various criminal
cases. In A. M. No. 06-11-5-SC, the Supreme Court has approved has approved
on October 2, 2007 the Rules on DNA Evidence to apply in civil, criminal and
special proceedings whenever DNA is offered or used as evidence.
The said rules defined DNA (acronym for deoxyribonucleic) as the chain of
molecules found in every nucleated cell of the body. The totality of an
individuals DNA is unique for the individual, except identical twins. DNA
profile refers to the genetic information derived from DNA testing of a
biological sample obtained from a person, which biological sample is clearly
identifiable as originating from that person. DNA evidence, on the other hand,
constitutes the totality of the DNA profiles, results and other genetic information
directly generated from DNA testing of biological samples.
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While the Supreme Court provides for DNA Evidence Rules, it is

important therefore that Congress shall immediately pass the present bill
centering on the capacity of forensic DNA technology to contribute to the
criminal justice system. Specifically, this bill will provide the statutory authority
for the creation of the National DNA Index System (NADIS) in the country.
The greatest role of DNA analysis lies in its capability to accelerate
criminal investigations by identifying perpetrators and excluding individuals
right at the onset of the criminal investigation. With the aid of DNA analysis, a
fair and swift administration of justice system in the country can be expected.
The 2002 case of People v. Vallejo discussed DNA analysis as evidence.
This may be considered a 180 degree turn from the Courts wary attitude towards
DNA testing in the 1997 Pe Lim case, where we stated that DNA, being a
relatively new science, xxx has not yet been accorded official recognition by our
courts. In Vallejo, the DNA profile from the vaginal swabs taken from the rape
victim matched the accuseds DNA profile. By 2002, there was no longer any
question on the validity of the use of DNA analysis as evidence.

On June 13, 1997, private respondent minors Karen and Kamille Oanes
Wei represented by their mother Remedios Oanes, filed a pertition for letters of
administration before the Regional trial court of Makati.
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledge
illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati City on October
29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at 10, 000, 000. 00 consisting of real and
personal properties. His known heirs are surviving spouse Guy, children Emy,
Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael all surnamed Guy. Petitioners argued that
private respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children
during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code, they
further alleged that private respondents claim had been paid, waived, abandoned,
extinguished by reason of Remedios June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim
stating that in exchange for the financial and educational assistance received
from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of Sima
Wei from any and all liabilities.
Issue:
Whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents
from claiming their hereditary rights?
Ruling:
Remedios Release and Waiver of claim does not bar private respondents
from claiming succession rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be
couched in clear and equivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of
a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. Even assuming
that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of her children, such waiver
does not bar the latters claim. Article 104 of the Civil Code requires judicial
authorization of the said waiver which it lacks. Since the affiliation of the private
respondents as co heirs to Sima Weis Estates, it would thus be inconsistent to
rule that they waived their hereditary rights when they do not have such right.

GUY, plaintiff vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant

G.R. No. 163707. September 15, 2006
Facts:
309

found no compelling reason to separate the minor from his mother. Petitioner,
however, was granted visitorial rights.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner, as the natural father, may be denied the custody
and parental care of his own child in the absence of the mother who is away
Ruling:

JOEY D. BRIONES, petitioner vs. MARICEL P. MIGUEL, respondent

Facts:
On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas
Corpus against respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel,
to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda. The petitioner alleges
that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent
Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996 as evidenced by
his Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a
Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan. The petitioner prays that the
custody of his son Michael Kevin Pineda be given to him as his biological father
and [as] he has demonstrated his capability to support and educate him.
The said case was withdrawn ex-parte. Applying Article 213 (paragraph
2) of the Family Code, the CA awarded the custody of Michael Kevin Pineda
Miguel to his mother, Respondent Loreta P. Miguel. While acknowledging that
petitioner truly loved and cared for his son and considering the trouble and
expense he had spent in instituting the legal action for custody, it nevertheless

Bearing in mind the welfare and the best interest of the minor as the
controlling factor, Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mothers
unfitness to exercise sole parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of
parental authority and the award of custody to someone else.In the past, the
following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother
of custody and parental authority: neglect or abandonment, unemployment,
immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child,
insanity, and affliction with a communicable disease. Parental authority over
recognized natural children who were under the age of majority was vested in the
father or the mother recognizing them. If both acknowledge the child, authority
was to be exercised by the one to whom it was awarded by the courts; if it was
awarded to both, the rule as to legitimate children applied. In other words, in the
latter case, parental authority resided jointly in the father and the mother.
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children
have been eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of
children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of
legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a
valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status.
Under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are
generally placed under one category, without any distinction between natural and
spurious. The concept of natural child is important only for purposes of
legitimation. Without the subsequent marriage, a natural child remains an
illegitimate child.

310

Obviously, Michael is a natural (illegitimate, under the Family Code)

child, as there is nothing in the records showing that his parents were suffering
from a legal impediment to marry at the time of his birth. Both acknowledge that
Michael is their son. As earlier explained and pursuant to Article 176, parental
authority over him resides in his mother, Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his
fathers recognition of him.

17, 1895, the appellate court decided in favor of the heirs of Romano-Pagadora
reversing the decision of the trial court.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
a) Whether or not the death of the natural child during the pendency of
her action for recognition is transmissible to the heirs?
b) Whether or not the death of the putative parent also during the
pendency of the case is transmissible to the heirs?
Ruling:

EUTIQUIO MARQUINO, PETITIONER VS.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, RESPONDENT
233 SCRA 348
FACTS:
On January 10, 1971,Bibiana Romano-Pagadora brought a civil action for
the Judicial Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of Partition, Support, and
Damages against Eutiquio Marquino. Also included, as defendants were Maria
Terenal-Marquino, Eutiquios wife, and their children, Luz, Ana, and Eva.
Romano-Pagadora was born on December 2, 1926 by Gegoria Romano and
allegedly by Eutiquio, who was single then. The Marquinos personally knew
romano-Pagadora for she was hired as a helper in their household. She claims she
has always enjoyed continuous possession of the status of an acknowledged
natural child by direct acts of the Marquinos. The Marquinos, on the other hand,
denied the allegations.
During the pendency of the trial, Bibiana died on March 17, 1979. Six
days later, her heirs were ordered to substitute for her. On May 17, 1983, the
Marquinos filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that an action for recognition
is intransmissible to the heirs, the same being a personal act. The case was
dismissed.

Art. 173 is the governing provision wherein the child can bring the action
during his or her entire lifetime and even after the death of the parents. In other
words, the action does not prescribe as long as he lives. The article cannot be
given any retroactivity for it will prejudice vested rights transmitted to them at
the time of the death of their father.

The heirs of the deceased interposed an appeal before the Intermediate

Appellate Court. On August 20, 1983 however, Eutiquio Marquino died. On June
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Issue:
OCAMPO TAYAG, PETITIONER VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
RESPONDENT
209 SCRA 665
Facts:
On April 9, 1987, Emilei Dayrit Cuyugan, as other and legal guardian of
minor Chad D. Cuyugan, filed a complaint for Claim of Inheritance against
Corito Ocampo Tayag, the administatrix of the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo.
Emilei D. Cuyugan, petitioner therein, alleged that several years before Atty.
Ocampo died, they had an illicit relationship, which later brought about Chad on
October 5, 1980, therefore Chad is entitled to a share of the estate of Atty.
Ocampo as one of the surviving heirs.

Whether or not the right of a minor child to file an action for recognition
is a vested right?
Ruling:
Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application
to this case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent
and, consequently, of the minor child she represents, both of which has been
vested with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court, therefore, was
correct in applying Article 285 of the Civil Code and holding that private
respondents cause of action has not yet prescribed.

Petitioner Tayag, respondent therein, filed a counterclaim and a Motion to

Dismiss. The motion was denied on October 12, 1987. Likewise her Motion for
Reconsideration was also denied on November 19, 1987.
Tayag proceeded to the Court of Appeals on December 10, 1987 and filed
a petition praying for certiorari and prohibition, which was granted on August 2,
1989 and enjoined the trial court judge to resolve petitioners motion to dismiss.
In compliance with the order, the trial court acted on and denied motion to
dismiss the complaint. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied on
January 30, 1990.
As a consequence, petitioner filed another petition for certiorari and
prohibition on March 12, 1990 with the Court of Appeals, praying to set aside the
orders of the Regional Trial Court. On May 10, 1990, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition and on September 5,1990, denied motion for
reconsideration
Hence this petition

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff v. MORENO BAYANI, defendant

OCT. 8, 1996
Facts:
Sgt. Moreno Bayani, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP),
seeks the reversal of the 28 April 1995 decision1 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, in Criminal Case No. 6433, finding him guilty
312

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided by law; to
indemnify complainant Maria Elena Nieto in the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,
000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay
the costs.
In her sworn complaint dated 22 February 1993 and filed on 24 February 1993
with the court below, the complainant charged the accused with the crime of rape
allegedly committed.
Issue:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A JUDGMENT IN
THIS CASE ON A SWORN STATEMENT OF THE COMPLAINANT
CHARGING THE APPELLANT THE CRIME OF RAPE, FOR THE
REASON THAT THE SIGNATURE APPEARING THEREON WAS
NOT IDENTIFIED BY COMPLAINANT AND NOT PRESENTED AS
EVIDENCE IN COURT BY THE PROSECUTION.
Ruling:
Article 176 of the Family Code confers parental authority over
illegitimate children on the mother, and likewise provides for their entitlement to
support in conformity with the Family Code. As such, there is no further need for
the prohibition against acknowledgment of the offspring by an offender who is
married, which would vest parental authority in him. Therefore, under Article
345 of the Revised Penal Code, the offender in a rape case who is married can
only be sentenced to indemnify the victim and support the offspring, if there be
any. In the instant case then, the accused should also be ordered to support his
illegitimate offspring, Tracy Jhuen Nieto, 72 with Marie Elena Nieto, but in light
of Article 20173 of the Family Code, the amount and terms thereof to be
determined by the trial court only after due notice and hearing.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

GERSON R. ABADILLA, respondent
G.R. No. 133054 January 28, 1999
Facts:
Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino have been living together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. During their cohabitation,
Luzviminda begot two children, Emerson and Rafael. In the Certificates of
Birth of these two children, they were registered with the surname "Abadilla" and
the name of their father was entered as "Herson" Abadilia. Moreover, the entry in
the date and place of marriage of the children's parents appeared as June 19, 1987
at Dingras, Ilocos Norte.
Thereafter, an Amended Petition for Correction/Cancellation of Entries
dated February 5, 1997 3 was filed by Gerson Abadilla, Luzviminda Celestino
and their two minor children, Emerson and Rafael, with the Regional Trial Court
of Laoag City. During the hearing of the petition, both Gerson Abadilla and
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Luzviminda Celestino testified that they are not yet married to each other despite
bearing two children.
In a decision dated February 17, 1998, the trial court granted the petition
and ordered the corresponding correction to be made. the Civil Registrar of San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte is hereby ordered to issue an Amended Birth Certificate
and Change an Entry therein by deleting the first name HERSON in the column
"Name of Father" and substitute it with GERSON, and also to delete the entry
appearing the column "Date of Marriage of Parents" and "Place of Marriage of
Parents. The instant petition for review on certiorari has been interposed by the
Office of the Solicitor General on the ground that the trial court committed a
reversible error when it allowed the deletion of the "date and place of marriage of
parents" from the birth certificates of minors Emerson C. Abadilla and Rafael C.
Abadilla but failed to order the change of the minors' surname from "Abadilla" to
"Celestino.

TEOFISTO I. VERCELES, plaintiff vs. MARIA CLARISSA POSADA,

defendant
G.R. No. 159785 April 27, 2007

Issue:
Whether or not illegitimate children can use surname of biological father
Ruling:
Emerson C. Abadilla and Rafael C. Abadilla are illegitimate children,
their parents, Spouses Herson and Luzviminda not being married to each other
even up to now.
During the birth of Emerson and Rafael, the Family Code was already the
governing law and Article 176 of which explicitly provides as follows:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity
with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one half of
the legitime of a legitimate child.
Thus, as illegitimate children, Emerson and Rafael should bear the surname of
their mother, Luzviminda Celestino. Resultingly, with the correction of the
entries in their birth certificates which deleted the entry in the date and place of
marriage of parents, the corresponding correction with respect to their surname
should have also been made and changed to Celestino, their mother's surname.

Facts:
Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada (Clarissa), a young lass from the
barrio of Pandan, Catanduanes, sometime in 1986 met a close family friend,
petitioner Teofisto I. Verceles, mayor of Pandan. He then called on the Posadas
and at the end of the visit, offered Clarissa a job. On December 22, 1986, on
orders of petitioner, she went to Virac, Catanduanes, to follow up funds for
barangay projects. At around 11:00 a.m. the same day, she went to Catanduanes
Hotel on instructions of petitioner who asked to be briefed on the progress of her
mission. They met at the lobby and he led her upstairs because he said he wanted
the briefing done at the restaurant at the upper floor. Instead, however, petitioner
opened a hotel room door, led her in, and suddenly embraced her, as he told her
that he was unhappy with his wife and would "divorce" her anytime. He also
claimed he could appoint her as a municipal development coordinator. She
succumbed to his advances.
Clarissa avers that on March 3, 1987, petitioner, aware of her pregnancy,
handed her a letter and P2,000 pocket money to go to Manila and to tell her
parents that she would enroll in a CPA review course or look for a job. In June
1987, petitioner went to see her in Manila and gave her another P2,000 for her
delivery. When her parents learned of her pregnancy, sometime in July, her father
fetched her and brought her back to Pandan. On September 23, 1987,7 she gave
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birth to a baby girl, Verna Aiza Posada. The Posadas filed a Complaint for
Damages coupled with Support Pendente Lite before the RTC, Virac,
Catanduanes against petitioner on October 23, 1987. On January 4, 1995, the trial
court issued a judgment in their favor.
Verceles appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment with
modification, specifying the party to whom the damages was awarded.
Issue:
Whether or not the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada as the illegitimate child
of petitioner was proven
Ruling:
Petitioner argues he never signed the birth certificate of Verna Aiza
Posada as father and that it was respondent Clarissa who placed his name on the
birth certificate as father without his consent. He further contends the alleged
love letters he sent to Clarissa are not admissions of paternity but mere
expressions of concern and advice. As to the award for damages, petitioner
argues Clarissa could not have suffered moral damages because she was in pari
delicto, being a willing participant in the "consensual carnal act" between
them.13 In support of his argument that the issue on filiation should have been
resolved in a separate action, petitioner cited the case of Rosales v. Castillo
Rosales14 where we held that the legitimacy of a child which is controversial can
only be resolved in a direct action.
Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he himself
presented no evidence of his own. His bare denials are telling. Well-settled is the
rule that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are
negative and self-serving which merit no weight in law and cannot be given
greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY

ASTORGA GARCIA
454 S 541
Facts:
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a
petition[1] to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia.
He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;[2]
that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her
mothers middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified
to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be
changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia be
changed to Catindig, his surname.
On March 23, 2001,[3] the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the
adoption.
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or
reconsideration[5] praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname
of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name and on May 28, 2001,[6]
the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration holding that there is
no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his
biological mother as his middle name.
Issue:
Whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her
middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father
Ruling:
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees
with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the
surname of her natural mother. The Court said that, it is necessary to preserve and
maintain Stephanies filiation with her natural mother becuse under Article 189
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of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of athe latter. Thus, to
prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or
proof of that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained and that ,
there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by
her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers surname,
we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is
partly MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her
mothers surname GARCIA as her middle name.

On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas

Corpus against respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel,
to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda. The petitioner alleges
that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent
Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996 as evidenced by
his Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a
Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan. The petitioner prays that the
custody of his son Michael Kevin Pineda be given to him as his biological father
and [as] he has demonstrated his capability to support and educate him.
The said case was withdrawn ex-parte. Applying Article 213 (paragraph
2) of the Family Code, the CA awarded the custody of Michael Kevin Pineda
Miguel to his mother, Respondent Loreta P. Miguel. While acknowledging that
petitioner truly loved and cared for his son and considering the trouble and
expense he had spent in instituting the legal action for custody, it nevertheless
found no compelling reason to separate the minor from his mother. Petitioner,
however, was granted visitorial rights.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner, as the natural father, may be denied the custody
and parental care of his own child in the absence of the mother who is away
Ruling:

JOEY D. BRIONES, petitioner vs. MARICEL P. MIGUEL, respondent

Facts:

Bearing in mind the welfare and the best interest of the minor as the
controlling factor, Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mothers
unfitness to exercise sole parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of
parental authority and the award of custody to someone else.In the past, the
following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother
of custody and parental authority: neglect or abandonment, unemployment,
immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child,
insanity, and affliction with a communicable disease. Parental authority over
recognized natural children who were under the age of majority was vested in the
father or the mother recognizing them. If both acknowledge the child, authority
was to be exercised by the one to whom it was awarded by the courts; if it was
awarded to both, the rule as to legitimate children applied. In other words, in the
latter case, parental authority resided jointly in the father and the mother.
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The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children

have been eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of
children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of
legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a
valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status.
Under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are
generally placed under one category, without any distinction between natural and
spurious. The concept of natural child is important only for purposes of
legitimation. Without the subsequent marriage, a natural child remains an
illegitimate child.
Obviously, Michael is a natural (illegitimate, under the Family Code)
child, as there is nothing in the records showing that his parents were suffering
from a legal impediment to marry at the time of his birth. Both acknowledge that
Michael is their son. As earlier explained and pursuant to Article 176, parental
authority over him resides in his mother, Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his
fathers recognition of him.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUSTINIANO
GLABO alias TOTO BUGOY, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 129248. December 7, 2001
Facts:
That on or about the month of October, 1991, at Sitio Siniaran, Bgy.
Banbanan, in the Municipality of Taytay, Province of Palawan, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with lewd design
and by means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one Mila Lobrico against
her will and consent to the damage and prejudice of said Mila Lobrico in such
amount as may be awarded her by the court.

for the defense. She stated that she wanted the case to be settled to restore her
good relationship with accused-appellant, who is her brother.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is further obliged to provide support to
the victims child born out of the rape, subject to the amount and terms to be
determined by the trial court in a proper proceeding?
Ruling:
Concerning the acknowledgement and support of the offspring of rape,
Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil liability
that may be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgement
of the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every
case to support the offspring. With the passage of the Family Code, the
classification of acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal
fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate children.
Since parental authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the
mother and considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua
automatically loses the power to exercise parental authority over his children, no
further positive act is required of the parent as the law itself provides for the
childs status. Hence, accused-appellant should only be ordered to indemnify
and support the victims child. However, the amount and terms of support shall
be determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with
Article 201 of the Family Code.

In his defense, accused-appellant alleged that during the entire month of

October 1991, he was plowing the field of one of his sisters in Sitio Yakal, new
Guinto, Taytay, Palawan. The victims mother, Gloria Glabo-Lobrico, testified
317

Ruling:
In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the
minor, Gardin Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before
the trial court have not been terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as
to who should have final custody of the minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare
of the said minor as the controlling factor, we find that the appellate court did not
err in allowing her father (private respondent herein) to retain in the meantime
parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from
her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the
people and places to which she had apparently formed an attachment.
DINAH B. TONOG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
EDGAR V. DAGUIMOL, respondents.
G.R. No. 122906. February 7, 2002
Facts:
On September 23, 1989, petitioner Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin
Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with private respondent Edgar V.
Daguimol. Petitioner was then a nursing student while private respondent was a
licensed physician. They cohabited for a time and lived with private
respondents parents and sister in the latters house in Quezon City where the
infant, Gardin Faith, was a welcome addition to the family.

A word of caution: our pronouncement here should not be interpreted to

imply a preference toward the father (herein private respondent) relative to the
final custody of the minor, Gardin Faith. Nor should it be taken to mean as a
statement against petitioners fitness to have final custody of her said minor
daughter. It shall be only understood that, for the present and until finally
adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor should remain with her father,
the private respondent herein pending final judgment of the trial court in Sp.
Proc. No. Q-92-11053.

A year after the birth of Gardin Faith, petitioner left for the United States of
America where she found work as a registered nurse. Gardin Faith was left in
the care of her father (private respondent herein) and paternal grandparents.
On January 10, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for guardianship
over Gardin Faith, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053, in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. On March 9, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment
appointing private respondent as legal guardian of the minor, Gardin Faith.
Issue:
With regard to guardianship, who is entitled over Gardin Faith, an
illegitimate child, would it be the father or the mother?
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. GERSON R.

ABADILLA, LUZVIMINDA M. CELESTINO, and THE MINORS
EMERSON C. ABADILLA AND RAFAEL C. ABADILLA,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR GUARDIAN AD LITEM LUZVIMINDA M.
CELESTINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 133054. January 28, 1999

Thus, as illegitimate children, Emerson and Rafael should bear the surname
of their mother, Luzviminda Celestino. Resultingly, with the correction of the
entries in their birth certificates which deleted the entry in the date and place of
marriage of parents, the corresponding correction with respect to their surname
should have also been made and changed to Celestino, their mothers surname.

Facts:
Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino have been living together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. During their cohabitation,
Luzviminda begot two children, Emerson and Rafael. In the Certificates of Birth
of these two children, they were registered with the surname Abadilla and the
name of their father was entered as Herson Abadilla. Moreover, the entry in
the date and place of marriage of the childrens parents appeared as June 19,
1987 at Dingras, Ilocos Norte.
Thereafter, an Amended Petition for Correction/Cancellation of Entries dated
February 5, 1997 was filed by Gerson Abadilla, Luzviminda Celestino and their
two minor children, Emerson and Rafael, with the Regional Trial Court of Laoag
City, Branch 65.
Issue:
Whose surname will be followed with regard to illegitimate children, that of
the fathers or of the mothers?
Ruling:
There is no dispute that Emerson C. Abadilla and Rafael C. Abadilla are
illegitimate children, their parents, Spouses Herson and Luzviminda not being
married to each other even up to now.
During the birth of Emerson and Rafael, the Family Code was already the
governing law and Article 176.

MARISSA A. MOSSESGELD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL, respondents.
G.R. No. 111455. December 23, 1998
Facts:
On December 2, 1989, petitioner Marissa Alfaro Mossesgeld, single, 31
years of age, gave birth to a baby boy at the Medical City General Hospital,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. It was the third time that she delivered a child. The
presumed father, one Eleazar Siriban Calasan, 42 years old, a lawyer, married,
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and a resident of 8632 San Jose St. Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati, Metro Manila,
signed the birth certificate of the child as the informant, indicating therein the
childs first name as Jonathan, middle name as Mossesgeld, and last name as
Calasan. Both the presumed father, Eleazar S. Calasan and the mother Marissa
A. Mossesgeld, accomplished the dorsal side of the certificate of live birth
stating that the information contained therein were true and correct. In addition,
lawyer Calasan executed an affidavit admitting paternity of the child.
On December 6, 1989, due to the refusal of the person in charge at the
hospital to placing the presumed fathers surname as the childs surname in the
certificate of live birth, petitioner himself submitted the certificate to the office of
the local civil registrar of Mandaluyong, for registration.
On December 28, 1989, the municipal treasurer of Mandaluyong, as officer
in charge of the office of the local civil registrar, rejected the registration on the
basis of Circular No. 4, dated October 11, 1988, of the Civil Registrar General,
providing that under Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines,
illegitimate children born on or after August 3, 1988, shall use the surname of
their mother.
Issue:
The issue raised is whether mandamus lies to compel the Local Civil
Registrar to register a certificate of live birth of an illegitimate child using the
alleged fathers surname where the latter admitted paternity.
Ruling:
Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that
illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this
Code. This is the rule regardless of whether or not the father admits paternity.
Consequently, the Local Civil Registrar correctly refused to register the
certificate of live birth of petitioners illegitimate child using the surname of the
alleged father, even with the latters consent. Of course, the putative father,
though a much married man, may legally adopt his own illegitimate child. In
case of adoption, the child shall be considered a legitimate child of the adopter,
entitled to use his surname.

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT,

complainant, vs. JUDGE ANTONIO M. BELEN, respondent
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1362. July 18, 1997
Facts:
In this administrative complaint initiated by Corazon M. Layug, Social
Welfare Officer IV of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD), Field Office No. 1 stationed in San Fernando, La Union, respondent
Judge Antonio M. Belen of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, is charged with rendering an erroneous decree of adoption in
violation of Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as The
Child and Youth Welfare Code, and the corresponding Supreme Court circular
thereon, namely, Circular No. 12 dated October 2, 1986.
Respondent Elma P. Vedaa, Social Welfare Officer II, Office of the Clerk of
Court, Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan is charged with
disregarding the provisions of the same Circular No. 12 of this Court in
connection with the aforementioned special proceeding.
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As appears from the records, the spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora
Bernardo-Soriano, both of whom are naturalized American citizens, filed a
verified petition for adoption of their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea,
which was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 5830 of the Regional Trial Court
of Lingayen, Pangasinan, and assigned to Branch 38 thereof. In due time,
respondent Judge Belen granted the petition in a decision dated June 25, 1992,
after finding that petitioner spouses were highly qualified to adopt the child as
their own.
Issue:
Is there a violation of Article 33 of PD 603 in dispensing with the procedure
of adopting a child?
Ruling:
We are, however, persuaded that respondent judge acted in good faith when
he stated in his decision that the DSWD submitted the required reports to his
court through respondent Vedaa, presumably in the belief that it was standard
procedure for the Social Welfare Officer II of a Regional Trial Court to do so in
coordination with the DSWD. We also agree with the findings of the OCA that
there is no evidence whatsoever that respondent Vedaa sought to obtain any
amount from the adopting parents. In fact, this is belied by the affidavit of the
childs natural mother, Loreta Ibea. We are, therefore, inclined to adopt a liberal
view on the charges against respondents.

DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN petitioner, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 164948, June 27, 2006
Facts:
On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United
States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA,
filed a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos who was born on
August 31, 1986; Elma Dizon Ramos, who was born on September 7, 1987; and
Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on August 5, 1989. The minors are the
natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioner's brother, and Amelia Ramos.
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on
May 19, 1990, the children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc
Ramos; their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now
has two children by her second marriage and no longer communicated with her
children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time she left up to the
institution of the adoption; the minors are being financially supported by the
petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad; as Maria passed away on
November 23, 2000, petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors have
given their written consent to the adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown by
the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own who are already
married, gainfully employed and have their respective families; she lives alone in
her own home in Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and works as a
restaurant server. She came back to the Philippines to spend time with the
minors; her children gave their written consent to the adoption of the minors.
Petitioner's brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income, signified his
willingness and commitment to support the minors while in petitioner's custody.
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Issue/s:
The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings are the following: (a)
whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent
of their biological mother, Amelia Ramos; (b) whether or not the affidavit of
consent purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopter's children sufficiently
complies with the law; and (c) whether or not petitioner is financially capable of
supporting the adoptees.
Ruling:
While petitioner claims that she has the financial support and backing of her
children and siblings, the OSG is correct in stating that the ability to support the
adoptees is personal to the adopter, as adoption only creates a legal relation
between the former and the latter. Moreover, the records do not prove nor
support petitioner's allegation that her siblings and her children are financially
able and that they are willing to support the minors herein. The Court, therefore,
again sustains the ruling of the CA on this issue.
While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best of intentions
for her nieces and nephew, there are legal infirmities that militate against
reversing the ruling of the CA. In any case, petitioner is not prevented from
filing a new petition for adoption of the herein minors.

HERBERT CANG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses

RONALD V. CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 105308. September 25, 1998
Facts:
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on
January 27, 1973, begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973;
Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3,
1981.
During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couples relationship was
undisturbed. Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her husbands
alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos.
Upon learning of her husbands alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition
for legal separation with alimony pendente lite with the then Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Cebu which rendered a decision approving the joint
manifestation of the Cang spouses providing that they agreed to live separately
and apart or from bed and board.
Issue:
Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a
natural parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them?
Ruling:
As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent
of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption.
Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the
parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is insane or hopelessly
intemperate. The court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even without the
written consent of the parents or one of the parents provided that the petition for
adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance
therewith. This is in consonance with the liberality with which this Court treats
the procedural aspect of adoption.
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioners conduct did not
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manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental
claims over his children as to constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement
alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.
While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United
States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and
support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and
children through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and
catered to their whims.
The Court ruled that the liberality with which this Court treats matters
leading to adoption insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of the law to
ensure the rights and privileges of the adopted child arising therefrom, ever
mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the
adopted child, should be understood in its proper context and perspective. The
Court's position should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend to
inferences beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence. Thus, the
discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best
interests of the child but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the
parents
over
the
child.

On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent spouses, Van Munson y

Navarro and Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a petition to adopt the minor Kevin
Earl Bartolome Moran, duly alleging therein the jurisdictional facts required by
Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, their qualifications as and fitness to
be adoptive parents, as well as the circumstances under and by reason of which
the adoption of the aforenamed minor was sought. In the very same petition,
private respondents prayed for the change of the first name of said minor adoptee
to Aaron Joseph, the same being the name with which he was baptized in keeping
with religious tradition, and by which he has been called by his adoptive family,
relatives and friends since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at private respondents
residence.
Issue/s:
The only legal issues that need to be resolved may then be synthesized
mainly as follows: (1) whether or not the court a quo erred in granting the prayer
for the change of the registered proper or given name of the minor adoptee
embodied in the petition for adoption; and (2) whether or not there was lawful
ground for the change of name.
Ruling:
The situation presented in this case does not warrant exception from the
Rules under the policy of liberal construction thereof in general, and for change
of name in particular, as proposed by private respondents and adopted by
respondent judge. Liberal construction of the Rules may be invoked in situations
wherein there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading,
provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and
connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. Utter
disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of
liberal construction.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE R.

HERNANDEZ, and SPOUSES VAN MUNSON y NAVARRO and
REGINA MUNSON y ANDRADE, respondents.
G.R. No. 117209. February 9, 1996
Facts:

By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a persons birth must be entered in the civil
register. The official name of a person is that given him in the civil register. That
is his name in the eyes of the law. And once the name of a person is officially
entered in the civil register, Article 376 of the same Code seals that identity with
its precise mandate: no person can change his name or surname without judicial
323

authority. This statutory restriction is premised on the interest of the State in

names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the assailed order of respondent
judge is hereby MODIFIED. The legally adopted child of private respondents
shall henceforth be officially known as Kevin Earl Munson y Andrade unless a
change thereof is hereafter effected in accordance with law. In all other respects,
the order is AFFIRMED.

Roberto lived a luxurious lifestyle (5 luxury cars, 1 big house in Ayala,

frequently travels abroad, sends his children to expensive schools; stock shares
worth P 750,000). Despite the obvious luxury, Roberto maintains that he is
financially incapable of supporting Robby. Hence, Shirley filed a criminal case
for NEGLECT of CHILD under Art. 59(4) of PD 603 in relation to Section 10(a)
of RA 7610.
Issue:
Is Shirleys criminal case for neglect of child against Roberto tenable?
Ruling:
Roberto can be charged with NEGLECT OF CHILD. That the Secretary of
Justice didnt err in its decision.

ROBERTO DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. HERNANDO PEREZ, SEC. OF

JUSTICE; SHIRLEY ABERDE, respondents.
496 S 474
Facts:
Roberto and Shriley became sweethearts while studying law at Sto. Tomas.
This resulted to Shirleys giving birth to Robby. They never got married. They
lived separate lives. Roberto married another woman and had children with her.
Roberto gave support twice only (1992 & 1993); in 1994, he gave money for
medical expenses because Robby was sick. He desisted in giving support hence.
Due to financial difficulties, Shirley worked as a factory worker in Taiwan for a
brief period. When Robby about to enter high school, Shirley demanded support
from Roberto who merely ignored her. While Shirley was in financial distress,
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States of America (USA) where petitioner, together with her daughters and
second husband, had moved to and finally settled in. Rica was admitted to the
University of Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the Long
Island University and Western New England College. Despite their admissions to
said universities, Rica and Rina were, however, financially incapable of pursuing
collegiate education.
Issue:
MA. BELEN B. MANGONON, for and in behalf of her minor children
REBECCA ANGELA DELGADO and REGINA ISABEL DELGADO,
petitioner, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARASALONGA, FEDERICO C. DELGADO and FRANCISCO C. DELGADO,
respondents.
G.R. No. 125041.
June 30, 2006
Facts:
On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her
then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and
Support, with application for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati. In said
petition, it was alleged that on 16 February 1975, petitioner and respondent
Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo
in Legaspi City, Albay. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while
respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was solemnized
without the required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was
annulled on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court.

As legitimate children and grandchildren, are Rica and Rina entitled to

general and educational support under Articles 174 and 195(b) in relation to
Articles 194(1 and 2) and 199(c) of the Family Code?
Ruling:
Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, we take our bearings from
the provision of the law mandating the amount of support to be proportionate to
the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. Guided
by this principle, we hold respondent Francisco liable for half of the amount of
school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as support pendente lite. As
established by petitioner, respondent Francisco has the financial resources to pay
this amount given his various business endeavors.
Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have already been done with
their education by the time of the promulgation of this decision, we deem it
proper to award support pendente lite in arrears to be computed from the time
they entered college until they had finished their respective studies.

On 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their

marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to petitioner,
she, with the assistance of her second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin
daughters as private respondents had totally abandoned them. At the time of the
institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the United
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monthly commencing June 1976 and in lieu thereof to allow such support only to
the extent of P1,000.00 a month.
MANUEL J. C. REYES, petitioner, vs.
HON. LEONOR INES-LUCIANO, COURT OF APPEALS and
CELIA ILUSTRE-REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. L-48219 February 28, 1979
Facts:
The private petitioner, Celia Ilustre-Reyes, filed in the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City a complaint dated June 3, 1976 against
her husband, Manuel J. C. Reyes, for legal separation on the ground that the
defendant had attempted to kill plaintiff.
The plaintiff asked for support pendente lite for her and her three children.
The defendant, petitioner herein, opposed the application for support pendente
lite on the ground that his wife had committed adultery with her physician.

Later the petitioner was required to pay the support at the rate of P1,000.00 a
month which had accumulated since June 1976 within ten (10) days from notice
of the resolution:
The private respondent acknowledged on November 20, 1978 having
received from the petitioner, through his counsel a check in the amount of
P30,000.00 as payment of support for the period from June 1976 to November
1978 or thirty (30) months at P1,000.00 a month in compliance with the
resolution of this Court dated October 9, 1978.
In view of the foregoing, the support of P4,000.00 should be made to
commence or, March 1, 1979.

Issue:
In actions for legal separation, is the wife entitled to support from the
husband despite the fact that a case for adultery had been filed by the husband
against her?
Ruling:
In the instant case, at the hearing of the application for support pendente lite
before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court presided by the respondent
Judge, Hon. Leonor Ines-Luciano the petitioner did not present any evidence to
prove the allegation that his wife, private respondent Celia Ilustre-Reyes, had
committed adultery with any person.
In a resolution dated July 31, 1978, this Court issued a temporary restraining
order effective immediately against the enforcement of the lower court's order
giving support pendente lite to private respondent in the sum of P4,000.00

PRINCESITA SANTERO, FEDERICO SANTERO and WILLIE

SANTERO, petitioners, vs.
HON. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, ANSELMA DIAZ,
VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA, MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-61700 September 14, 1987
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Facts:
In the Motion For Allowance in question guardian-movant Anselma Diaz
only followed the precedent of the Court which granted a similar motion last year
to be spent for the school expenses of her wards. In their opposition the
oppositors contend that the wards for whom allowance is sought are no longer
schooling and have attained majority age so that they are no longer under
guardianship. They likewise allege that the administrator does not have sufficient
funds to cover the said allowance because whatever funds are in the hands of the
administrator, they constitute funds held in trust for the benefit of whoever will
be adjudged as owners of the Kawit property from which said administrator
derives the only income of the intestate estate of Pablo Santero, et al.

the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil
Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction. Hence,
the private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed
Santero are entitled to allowances as advances from their shares in the
inheritance from their father Pablo Santero. Since the provision of the Civil
Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to the children the right
to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right
cannot be impaired by Rule 83 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural
rule. Be it noted however that with respect to "spouse," the same must be the
"legitimate spouse" (not common-law spouses who are the mothers of the
children here).

Issues:
a. Whether or not respondent court acted with abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in granting the allowance to the respondents Victor,
Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel-P2,000.00 each despite the fact that all of them
are not minors and all are gainfully employed with the exception of Miguel.
b. Whether or not respondent Court acted with abuse of discretion in
granting the allowance based on the allegations of the said respondents that the
abovenamed wards are still schooling and they are in actual need of money to
defray their school expenses for 1982-83 when the truth is that they are no longer
schooling.
c. Whether or not respondent Court acted with abuse of discretion in granting
the motion for allowance without conducting a hearing thereon, to determine the
truth of allegations of the private respondents.
Ruling:
The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married
is of no moment and should not be regarded as the determining factor of their
right to allowance under Art. 188. While the Rules of Court limit allowances to

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

HON. CONCEPCION S. ALARCON VERGARA and SPOUSES SAMUEL
ROBERT DYE, JR. and ROSALINA D. DYE, respondents.
G.R. No. 95551. March 20, 1997
Facts:
On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye
filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City to adopt Maricel
R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and 12 years old, respectively, younger
siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr. a member of the United States Air Force,
is an American citizen who resided at the Clark Air Base in Pampanga. His wife
Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a naturalized American. They have

327

two children. Both Maricel and Alvin Due, as well as their natural parents, gave
their consent to the adoption.
After trial, the lower court rendered its decision on September 10, 1990
granting the petition and declaring Alvin and Maricel to be the children of the
spouses Dye by adoption. Respondent Regional Trial Court disregarded the
sixteen-year age gap requirement of the law, the spouses being only fifteen years
and three months and fifteen years and nine months older than Maricel Due, on
the ground that a literal implementation of the law would defeat the very
philosophy behind adoption statutes, namely, to promote the welfare of a child.
The court also found that the petitioning spouses are mentally and physically fit
to adopt, possess good moral character, sufficient financial capability and love
and affection for the intended adoptees.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, JAIME B. CARANTO, and
ZENAIDA P. CARANTO, respondents.
G.R. No. 103695. March 15, 1996

Issue:
The Republic filed this petition for review on a pure question of law, is
contention of the petitioner that the spouses Dye are not qualified under the law
to adopt Maricel and Alvin Due correct?
Ruling:
As a general rule, aliens cannot adopt Filipino citizens as this is proscribed
under Article 184 of the Family Code.
We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the
promotion of the welfare of children. Accordingly, the law should be construed
liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law
must also be applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of
the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care and education for less
fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial
court's decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it
cannot be modified without violating the proscription against judicial legislation.
Until such time however, that the law on the matter is amended, we cannot
sustain the respondent-spouses' petition for adoption.

Facts:
The petition below was filed on September 21 1988 by private respondents
spouses Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto for the adoption of Midael C.
Mazon, then fifteen years old, who had been living with private respondent Jaime
B. Caranto since he was seven years old. When private respondents were married
on January 19, 1986, the minor Midael C. Mazon stayed with them under their
care and custody. Private respondents prayed that judgment be rendered:
a) Declaring the child Michael C. Mazon the child of petitioners
for all intents and purposes;
b.) Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the
child; and
c) That the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the
petitioners and that the first name which was mistakenly
registered as "MIDAEL" be corrected to "MICHAEL."
328

Issue:
The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction
of the name of the child from "Midael" to "Michael." He argued that although the
correction sought concerned only a clerical and innocuous error, it could not be
granted because the petition was basically for adoption, not the correction of an
entry in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Is he correct?
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals
is MODIFIED by deleting from the decision of the Regional Trial Court the order
to the local civil registrar to change the name "MIDAEL" to "MICHAEL" in the
birth certificate of the child. In other respects relating to the adoption of Midael
C. Mazon, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

HONORABLE RODOLFO TOLEDANO, and SPOUSES ALVIN A.
CLOUSE and EVELYN A. CLOUSE, respondents.
G.R. No. 94147. June 8, 1994
Facts:
On February 21, 1990, in a verified petition filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Iba, Zambales, private respondents spouses Clouse sought to adopt the
minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger brother of private respondent Evelyn
A. Clouse. In an Order issued on March 12, 1990, the petition was set for hearing
on April 18, 1990. The said Order was published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province of Zambales and City of Olongapo for three (3)
consecutive weeks.
The principal evidence disclose that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is a
natural born citizen of the United States of America. He married Evelyn, a
Filipino on June 4, 1981 at Olongapo City. On August 19, 1988, Evelyn became
a naturalized citizen of the United States of America in Guam. They are
physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of adopting Solomon, a
twelve (12) year old minor.
Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present, Solomon
Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and custody of private
respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala,
a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to
support and educate her son.
Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to conduct the Home
and Child Study, favorably recommended the granting of the petition for
adoption.
Issue:

329

The sole issue for determination concerns the right of private respondents
spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are aliens to adopt under
Philippine Law.

On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the
will before the Court of First Instance of Manila which was set for hearing on
September 3, 1955 after the requisite publication and service to all parties
concerned.

Ruling:
We are not unaware that the modern trend is to encourage adoption and
every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote that objective.
Adoption is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and
enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life. It is not the
bureaucratic technicalities but the interest of the child that should be the principal
criterion in adoption cases. Executive Order 209 likewise upholds that the
interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be the paramount
consideration. These considerations notwithstanding, the records of the case do
not evince any fact as would justify us in allowing the adoption of the minor,
Solomon Joseph Alcala, by private respondents who are aliens.

Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a

deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose
Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed on September 2, 1955 an
opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds: (1) said will
was not executed as required by law; (2) the testatrix was physically and
mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution; and (3) the
will was executed under duress, threat or influence of fear.
Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the
oppositor had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, after due
hearing, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisca
Mortera, and on June 17, 1959, the oppositor amended her opposition by
alleging, the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr.
Rene Teotico because the latter was the physician who took care of the testatrix
during her last illness.
Issue:
Has oppositor any interest in any of the provisions of the will, and, in the
negative, would she acquire any right to the estate in the event that the will is
denied probate?
Ruling:

VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant, vs.

ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor-appellant.
G.R. No. L-18753. March 26, 1965
Facts:

Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a

quo declaring invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will Exhibit A
must be set aside as having been made in excess of its jurisdiction. Another
reason why said pronouncement should be set aside is that the legatee was not
given an opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for he was not allowed
to intervene in this proceeding. As a corollary, the other pronouncements
330

touching on the disposition of the estate in favor of some relatives of the

deceased should also be set aside for the same reason.
WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which
declares that the will in question has been duly executed and admitted the same
to probate, the rest of the decision is hereby set aside. This case is ordered
remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings.

adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed to

Garcia, her mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to
Catindig, his surname.
Issue:
Whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her
middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father?
Ruling:
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees
with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the
surname of her natural mother for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies filiation with
her natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to
be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless
hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with her
natural mother should be maintained.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY

ASTORGA GARCIA
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
Facts:
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a
petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia.
He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that
her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mothers
middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her

Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the

surname of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not
prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is
ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the
Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that
the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of
the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the
mother.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is
partly MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her
mothers surname GARCIA as her middle name.
331

Issue:
Is the act of the judge legitimating his illegitimate child valid?
Ruling:
The applicable legal provision in the case at bar is Article 269 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines (R.A. 386 as amended) which provides:

MA. BLYTH B. ABADILLA, complainant, vs.

JUDGE JOSE C. TABILIRAN, JR., respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-716. October 25, 1995
Facts:
In her verified complaint, complainant Abadilla, in respect to the charge of
gross immorality on the part of the respondent, contends that respondent had
scandalously and publicly cohabited with a certain Priscilla Q. Baybayan during
the existence of his legitimate marriage with Teresita Banzuela. Adding ignominy
to an ignominious situation, respondent allegedly shamefacedly contracted
marriage with the said Priscilla Baybayan on May 23, 1986. Complainant claims
that this was a bigamous union because of the fact that the respondent was then
still very much married to Teresita Banzuela.
In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct, complainant claims that
respondent caused to be registered as "legitimate", his three illegitimate children
with Priscilla Baybayan, by falsely executing separate affidavits stating that the
delayed registration was due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight,
when in truth and in fact, respondent knew that these children cannot be legally
registered as legitimate.

Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born

outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception
of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry
each other, are natural.
Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of
adulterous relations (Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855). The Family Code:
(Executive Order, No. 209), which took effect on August 3, 1988, reiterated the
above-mentioned provision thus:
Art. 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of
parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be
legitimated.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr. guilty
of gross immorality, deceitful conduct and corruption and, consequently, orders
his dismissal from the service. Such dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of
eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification
from re-employment in the government-service, all without prejudice to criminal
or civil liability.

332

On November 14, 1991, after approval of private respondent's account of her

administration, the court a quo passed upon petitioner's motion. The court, citing
the case of Francisco H. Tongoy, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (23 SCRA 99
[1983]), declared private respondent's ten children legitimated and thereupon
instituted and declared them, along with petitioner and private respondent, as the
heirs of Antonio de Santos.
MARIA ROSARIO DE SANTOS, petitioner, vs.
HON. ADORACION G. ANGELES, and CONCHITA TALAG DE
SANTOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 105619. December 12, 1995

Issue:
Can natural children by legal fiction be legitimized?

Facts:

Ruling:

On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which

union was blessed with a daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos.
After some time, their relationship became strained to the breaking point.
Thereafter, Antonio fell in love with a fellow doctor, Conchita Talag, private
respondent herein. Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first marriage by
obtaining a divorce decree from a Nevada court in 1949.

A legal fiction had to be resorted to, that device contrived by law to simulate
a fact or condition which, strictly and technically speaking, is not what it purports
to be. In this case, the term "natural children by legal fiction" was invented, thus
giving rise to another category of illegitimate children, clearly not to be confused
with "natural children" as defined under Art. 269 but by fiction of law to be
equated with acknowledged natural children and, consequently, enjoying the
status, rights and obligations of the latter.

Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in 1951 to marry private respondent,

with whom he had been cohabiting since his de facto separation from Sofia. This
union produced eleven children. On March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala.
Less than a month later, on April 23, 1967, Antonio and private respondent
contracted a marriage in Tagaytay City celebrated under Philippine laws. On
March 8, 1981, Antonio died intestate leaving properties with an estimated value
of P15,000,000.00.
On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court asking for the issuance
of letters of administration in her favor in connection with the settlement of her
late husband's estate. She alleged, among other things, that the decedent was
survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely, herself, their ten surviving children,
and petitioner. There being no opposition, her petition was granted.

Finally, attention must be drawn to the fact that this case has been decided
under the provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code which now
recognizes only two classes of children: legitimate and illegitimate. "Natural
children by legal fiction" are nothing if not pure fiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
orders of the court a quo dated November 14, 1991 and January 9, 1992, are
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos is hereby
declared the SOLE LEGITIMATE CHILD of the decedent Antonio de Santos
and, as such, entitled to all the rights accorded to her by law.

333

DAISIE T. DAVID, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R. VILLAR, respondents.
G.R. No. 111180. November 16, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon
R. Villar, a businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and
the father of four children, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship between
petitioner and private respondent developed into an intimate one, as a result of
which a son, Christopher J., was born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher J.
was followed by two more children, both girls, namely Christine, born on June 9,
1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.
The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie
took Christopher J, to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in
1986 and introduced him to Villar's legal wife.
After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as
they were eventually accepted by his legal family.

Ruling:
In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of
his conception, his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to
another woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the
Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother, the
herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have
custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful
custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ
of habeas corpus.
Indeed, Rule 102.1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is
separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of
a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental
authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a
ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him
custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise."

In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six
years of age, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip,
Villar refused to give back the child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at
the Holy Family Academy for the next school year.
On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of
Christopher J.
Issue:
Is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner
of the custody of her children, especially considering that she has been able to
rear and support them on her own since they were born?

CARLITOS E. SILVA, petitioner, vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and SUZANNE T. GONZALES, respondents.
G.R. No. 114742. July 17, 1997
Facts:
Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an
unmarried local actress, cohabited without the benefit of marriage. The union
saw the birth of two children: Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Not very long
after, a rift in their relationship surfaced. It began, according to Silva, when
334

Gonzales decided to resume her acting career over his vigorous objections. The
assertion was quickly refuted by Gonzales who claimed that she, in fact, had
never stopped working throughout their relationship. At any rate, the two
eventually parted ways.
The instant controversy was spawned, in February 1986, by the refusal of
Gonzales to allow Silva, in apparent contravention of a previous understanding,
to have the children in his company on weekends. Silva filed a petition for
custodial rights over the children before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 78, of Quezon City. The petition was opposed by Gonzales who averred
that Silva often engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which she feared could
affect the moral and social values of the children.
Issue:
The issue is not really a question of child custody; instead, the case merely
concerns the visitation right of a parent over his children which the trial court
has adjudged in favor of petitioner by holding that he shall have visitorial rights
to his children during Saturdays and/or Sundays, but in no case (could) he take
out the children without the written consent of the mother x x x." The visitation
right referred to is the right of access of a noncustodial parent to his or her child
or children.
Ruling:
The Court appreciates the apprehensions of private respondent and their
well-meant concern for the children; nevertheless, it seems unlikely that
petitioner would have ulterior motives or undue designs more than a parents
natural desire to be able to call on, even if it were only on brief visits, his own
children. The trial court, in any case, has seen it fit to understandably provide
this precautionary measure, i.e., "in no case (can petitioner) take out the children
without the written consent of the mother."

ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner, vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously

referred to as DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM), respondent.
G.R. No. 143989. July 14, 2003
Facts:
The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less than complete
without children. The realization could have likely prodded the spouses Dr.
Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom to take into their care Isabelitas nephew
Jose Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up as their own. At the tender age of two,
Jose Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and support of the couple who treated the
child like their own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally
adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided to file a petition for
adoption. On 05 May 1972, an order granting the petition was issued that made
all the more intense than before the feeling of affection of the spouses for
Melvin. In keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City
changed the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom.
A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of
1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City.
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Issue:
Can the adopter rescind the decree of adoption?
Ruling:
Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect.
The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of
adoption.
Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads:
SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. Upon petition of
the adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a minor or if over
eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the
adoption may be rescinded on any of the following grounds committed
by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the
adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the life
of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and
failure to comply with parental obligations.
Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be
subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may
disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil
Code.
It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing
the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of
certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon
the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his
legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a
share in the disposable portion of his estate.

JOEY D. BRIONES, petitioner, vs. MARICEL P. MIGUEL,

FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and LORETA P. MIGUEL, respondents.
G.R. No. 156343. October 18, 2004
Facts:
On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for
Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca
Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda.
On April 25, 2002, the petitioner filed an Amended Petition to include
Loreta P. Miguel, the mother of the minor, as one of the respondents.
A Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by this Court on March 11, 2002
ordering the respondents to produce before this Court the living body of the
minor Michael Kevin Pineda on March 21, 2002 at 2:00 oclock in the
afternoon.
The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his
illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on
September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent
Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and is presently
residing in Japan.
Issue:
Whether or not [he], as the natural father, may be denied the custody and
parental care of his own child in the absence of the mother who is away?
Ruling:
Obviously, Michael is a natural (illegitimate, under the Family Code)
child, as there is nothing in the records showing that his parents were suffering
336

from a legal impediment to marry at the time of his birth. Both acknowledge that
Michael is their son. As earlier explained and pursuant to Article 176, parental
authority over him resides in his mother, Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his
fathers recognition of him.
There is thus no question that Respondent Loreta, being the mother of and having
sole parental authority over the minor, is entitled to have custody of him. She has
the right to keep him in her company. She cannot be deprived of that right, and
she may not even renounce or transfer it except in the cases authorized by law.
In the present case, it has been established that petitioner and Respondent Loreta
were never married. Hence, that portion of the CA Decision allowing the child to
choose which parent to live with is deleted, but without disregarding the
obligation of petitioner to support the child.

The facts show that on June 27, 1987, Hilario M. Ruiz executed a
holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted
daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three
granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria
Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to his heirs
substantial cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor
of his estate.
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash
component of his estate was distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private
respondents in accordance with the decedents will. For unbeknown reasons,
Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his
fathers holographic will.
On June 29, 1992, four years after the testators death, it was private
respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruizs will
and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz. Surprisingly,
Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will was executed under
undue influence.
Issue:
The issue for resolution is whether the probate court, after admitting the will
to probate but before payment of the estates debts and obligations, has the
authority: (1) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of
the testators grandchildren; (2) to order the release of the titles to certain heirs;
and (3) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the
will.
Ruling:

THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, Executor,

petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
G.R. No. 118671. January 29, 1996
Facts:

Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties
of his father is merely inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and
partitioned. As executor, he is a mere trustee of his fathers estate. The funds of
the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to the duties and
responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order. He cannot unilaterally assign to
himself and possess all his parents properties and the fruits thereof without first
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submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the
deceased, rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses of
administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of which are
subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety and justness.

shuttled from one dwelling place to another not their own. As things turned out,
however, Edward reneged on his promise of support, despite Lea's efforts
towards having him fulfill the same. Lea would admit, though, that Edward
occasionally gave their children meager amounts for school expenses. Through
the years and up to the middle part of 1992, Edward's mother, Alicia Lacson, also
gave small amounts to help in the schooling of Maowee and Maonaa, both of
whom eventually took up nursing at St. Paul's College in Iloilo City. In the early
part of 1995 when Lea, in behalf of her two daughters, filed a complaint against
Edward for support before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33,
Maowee was about to graduate.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor for the plaintiff sisters, as
represented by their mother. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
Issue:
Whether the appellate court erred when it affirmwd the grant of supoort in
arrears from 1976 to 1994.

EDWARD V. LACSON, petitioner v. MAOWEE DABAN LACSON,

respondent
G.R. No. 150644, August 28, 2006
Facts:
The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are
legitimate daughters of petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban
Lacson. Maowee was born on December 4, 1974, while Maonaa, a little less than
a year later. Not long after the birth of Maonaa, petitioner left the conjugal home,
virtually forcing mother and children to seek, apparently for financial reason,
shelter somewhere else. After some time, they rented an apartment only to return
later to the house of Lea's mother. As the trial court aptly observed, the sisters
and their mother, from 1976 to 1994, or for a period of eighteen (18) years,

Ruling:
The Court finds no adequate reason to disturb the factual determination of
the CA confirmatory of that of the trial court respecting the demand Lea made on
the petitioner to secure support for the respondents. As a matter of long and
sound appellate practice, factual findings of the CA are accorded respect, if not
finality, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons.
Furthermore, the respondents appeared to have stayed longest with their
uncle, Noel Daban. Logically, the sisters would, thru their mother, turn to their
uncle (Noel Daban) for their sustenance and education when petitioner failed to
give the same, a failing which stretched from their pre-schooling days to their
college years. Pursuant to Article 207 of the Family Code, Noel Daban can
rightfully exact reimbursement from the petitioner. As for the amount of support
in arrears, there is also no reason to disturb the absolute figures arrived at by the
two courts below, appearing as they do to be reasonable and proper. As a matter
of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family
relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient. Petitioner,
unlike any good father of a family, has been remiss in his duty to provide
respondents with support practically all throughout their growing years. At
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bottom, the sisters have been deprived by a neglectful father of the basic
necessities in life as if it is their fault to have been born. This disposition is thus
nothing more than a belated measure to right a wrong done the herein
respondents who are no less petitioner's daughters.

ROBERTO DE GUZMAN, petitioner v. PEREZ, respondent

496 S 474

Whether the court acted with grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the
City Prosecutors resolution.
Ruling:
The assailed resolution of private respondent was used as an evidence o
record and grounded in law.
Petitioners position goes against the intent of the law. To allow the
neglectful parent to shield himself from criminal liability by defeating the
proscription that in all intent regarding the care, custody, education, and property
of the child and his welfare shall be paramount consideration.
There is prima facie evidence showing from the evidence that petitioner is
in fact financially capable of supporting the childs education. The notarized GIS
of RNCD Development Corporations indicated that petitioner owns 750,000
pesos worth of paid-up shares in the company.
The neglect of child punished under Art. 59 (4) of PD 603 is also a
crime. Thus, petitioners guilt should still be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Petition is denied.

Facts:
Petitioner Roberto de Guzman and respondent Shirley Aberde begot a
child when they were pursuing their studies but the two subsequently got
married. In 1991, private respondent demanded support for their child who was
entering high school but petitioner ignored the respondents demand. She thus
filed a criminal complaint for abandonment and neglect of child under Art. 52 (2)
and (4) of PD 603 before the Office of the City Prosecutor.
In his counter-affidavit, petitioner averred that he never abandoned or
neglected the child whom he readily acknowledged as his son and pointed out
that respondent was the financially capable parent while he had no fixed job and
merely depended on the charity of his father.
The City Prosecutor issued his resolution dismissing the complaint for
abandonment but charged the petitioner with neglect of child punishable under
Art. 59 (4) of PD 603 in relation to Sec. 10 (a) of RA 7610. The resolution was
filed before the RTC which subsequently affirmed such.
Issue:
339

DINA TONOG, petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent

7 February 2002
Facts:
On September 23 1989, petitioner Dina Tonog gave birth to a child, her
illegitimate daughter with the respondent Edgar Daguimol. A year after the birth
of Gardin Faith, petitioner, left for the United States where she found work as a
nurse. The child was left in the care of his father and paternal grandparents. On
January 1990, respondent filed a petition for guardianship, on which a month
later, he was appointed as the legal guardian. Petitioner avers that she only
learned of the decision a month later, and accordingly filed for relief of judgment,
on which she was then granted to file her opposition to private respondent
petitions, as well as a motion to remand the custody of the child to her.
The Court of Appeals decided over the issue of guardianship and custody
over the child that such custody shall then be awarded to the respondent
temporarily pending the resolution of the main case.

specially evident in Article 213 where it may be said that the law presumes that
the mother is the best custodian.
The exception allowed by the rule has to be for compelling reasons for
the good of the child; those cases must indeed be rare, if the mothers heart is not
to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of
imprisonment and the divorce decree (relative divorce) will ordinarily be
sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction will not have any
effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand her situation.
Bearing in mind the welfare of the minor is the controlling factor; the
court finds that the Court of Appeals did not err in the allowing the father to
retain in the meantime parental custody over the child.

Issue:
Who shall hold custody over the child pending the resolution of the
guardianship proceeding, on who shall have the final custody over the child.
Ruling:
In custody disputes, it is the axiomatic that the criteria are the welfare and
well being of the child. Incurring at its decisions, the court must take into the
account the respective resources and the social and moral situations of the
contending party.
Statute sets certain rules to assist the court in making an informed
decision. Insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the
Family Code provides that illegitimate children shall be under the parental
authority of their mother. Likewise, Article 213 of the Family Code provides that
[n]o child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless
the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. It will be observed that
in both provisions, a strong bias is created in favor of the mother. This is

BONIFACIA VANCIL, petitioner v. HELEN BELMES, respondent

19 JUNE 2001
Facts:
Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil is the mother of Reeder Vancil, a navy
serviceman of the United States of America who had died in the said country.
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During his lifetime, he had two children from his common law wife, Helen
Belmas.
Sometime in May 1987, petitioner filed guardianship proceedings over
the persons and properties of the children. A month after, petitioner was
appointed legal guardian over the persons and properties of her grandchildren.
Helen, natural mother of the two children, however submitted an opposition to
the said proceedings, and concurrently, she had filed a similar petition for
guardianship.
RTC decided in favor of Bonifacia. CA reversed and favored Helen.
Hence, this petition by Bonifacia.

Lastly, the Court emphasized that jurisprudence shows that guardianship is not
allowed where the guardian is outside the jurisdiction of Philippine courts.

Issue:
Who is the legal guardian of the minors?
Ruling:
Parents are placed first in the rank of priority in matters of parental
authority. The children illegitimacy does not in any way affect the order of
priority. Respondent, being the natural mother of the minors, has the preferential
right over that of the petitioner in issue of guardianship. Petitioner as the
surviving grandparent can exercise substitute parental authority only if in case of
death, absence of unsuitability of respondent.
This follows the provision of article 212 which qualify that the parents
exercise parental authority jointly. Article 214, which provides for the
substitution of the parental authority by the grandparents, applies only when the
abovementioned conditions exist.
The case regarding the daughter Valerie is moot and academic since she
had reached the age of majority. In the case of Vincent, parental authority is
vested on the father and mother (Art. 211 of FC). It is only in the cases of death,
absence, or unsuitability of the parents wherein the parental authority is bested on
the surviving grandparents (Art. 214 of FC). There is no showing of unsuitability
of the mother. Moreover, the grandmother is a naturalized American citizen
whose residence is in America. She will find it difficult to perform her rights and
duties as a guardian. Furthermore, the grandmother has not set foot in the
Philippines for more than a decade. She is old. She has a conviction of libel in a
criminal case which would make her think twice coming here to the Philippines.

SABRINA BONDAGIY, petitioner v. FUOZI BONDAJGIY, respondent

7 DECEMBER 2001
Facts:
Respondent Fuozi and Sabrina were married in Manila under Islamic
rites. Four months prior to such marriage, Sabina became a Muslim by
conversion. . The conversion however was not duly registered. Out of such
union, they begot two children.
Sometime in 1995, the children lived in the house of Sabrinas mother.
Fouzi alleged that he could not see his children until he got an order from the
court. One year thereafter Sabrina had the children baptized as Christian and had
their names changed too.
Respondent alleged also that on various occasions, Sabrina was seen with
different men at odd hours in Manila and wearing outfits detestable under the
Islamic law on culture.
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Respondent then filed with the Shari a court an action to obtain custody
of his minor children now ages 10 and 9 respectively. The judgment rendered by
the Shari a Court awarded the custody of the minors to their father finding their
mother unworthy to care for her children.
Issue:
Whether or not a Christian who converted to Islam before her marriage to
a Muslim and converted back to Catholicism upon their separation, still bounded
by the moral laws of Islam in the determination of her fitness to be the custodian
of their children.
Ruling:
The court applies the civil law in the best interest of the children. The
standard in the determination of sufficiency of proof to establish the unfitness of
a mother who had converted to Muslim before marriage but had converted back
to Catholicism in relation to custody of her children is not restricted to Muslim
laws. The family code shall also be taken in consideration in deciding whether
she is incompetent. The burden is upon the respondent to prove that the petitioner
is not worthy to have the custody of her children.
The Court found that the evidence presented by the respondent was not
sufficient to establish her unfitness according to Muslim laws or the Family
Code. However the award of custody to the wife does not deprive the husband of
parental authority and visitation rights over the children.

TERESITA SAGALA-ESLAO, petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS and

MARIA PAZ CORDERO-OUYE, respondents
G.R. No. 116773. January, 16,1997
Facts:
On June 22, 1984, petitioner Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo
Eslao were married after their marriage, the couple stayed with respondent
Teresita Eslao, mother of the husband. Out of their marriage, two children were
begotten, namely, Leslie Eslao and Angelica Eslao. In the meantime, Leslie was
entrusted to the care and custody of petitioner's mother while Angelica stayed
with her parents at respondent's house. On August 6, 1990, petitioner's husband
Reynaldo Eslao died, petitioner intended to bring Angelica with her to Pampanga
but the respondent prevailed upon her to entrust the custody of Angelica to her,
respondent reasoning out that her son just died and to assuage her grief therefore,
she needed the company of the child to at least compensate for the loss of her late
son. In the meantime, the petitioner returned to her mother's house in Pampanga
where she stayed with Leslie.
Subsequently, petitioner was introduced by her auntie to Dr. James
Manabu-Ouye, a Japanese-American, whom she became her husband. On June
24, 1993, the petitioner returned to the Philippines then informed the respondent
about her desire to take informed the respondent about her desire to take custody
of Angelica and explained that her present husband, Dr. James Ouye, expressed
his willingness to adopt Leslie and Angelica and to provide for their support and
education, however, respondent resisted the idea by way of explaining that the
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child was entrusted to her when she was ten days old and accused the petitioner
of having abandoned Angelica. The RTC grants the petition in favor of petitioner
and the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto.
Issue:
Whether the court erred in not finding the petitioner fit to be given of
minor, Angelica Eslao.
Ruling:
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be
transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to
parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental
authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's
home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to
another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is
merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental
authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the
same.
Hence, when private respondent entrusted the custody of her minor child
to the petitioner, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it
did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. For the
right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a
waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and
surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution which do not appear in the
case at bar. The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

CRISANTO GUALBERTO, petitioner v. JOYCELYN GUALBERTO,

respondent
28 June 2005
Facts:
On March 2002, Crisanto Gualberto filed a motion before the lower court
a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage of his marriage to Joycelyn
Gualberto, with an ancillary prayer for the custody pendente lite of their almost
four year old son, whom Joycelyn allegedly took away with her from the
conjugal home when she decided to abandon him sometime in the early February
of the same year.
The trial court heard the ancillary prayer of Crisanto for
custody pendente lite. Because Joycelyn allegedly failed to appear despite notice,
and in the face of witnesses and evidence presented, the court awarded such
temporary custody to Crisanto.
Such was affirmed by the Court of Appeals pending the resolution of the
other issue raised.
Issue:
Whether or not a child less than seven years of age, and without
compelling reasons not to, be separated from the mother, and that such custody
be awarded to the father.
Ruling:
The general rule that children under seven years of age shall not be
separated from their mother finds its raison detre in the basic need of the minor
children for the their mother loving care. In explaining the rationale for Article
213, the Code Commission said that The general rule is recommended in order
to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her.
No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of
tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for compelling reasons
for the good of the child; those cases must indeed be rare, if the mothers heart is
not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of
343

imprisonment and the divorce decree (relative divorce) will ordinarily be

sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction will not have any
effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand her situation.
Exception allowed by the court has to be for compelling reasons for the
good of the child, which she had erred, like in the cases of adultery when
awarded a penalty of imprisonment.
The Court found no sufficient proof of any compelling reason to separate
the minor from his mother, custody should remain with her.

Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse
by profession, were married and beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. From
the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had
been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents
herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place
Leouel Jr. in the temporary custody of the latter's parents, the respondent spouses
Bedia.
Julia Bedia-Santos, left for the United States to work. Petitioner alleged
that he is not aware of her whereabouts but private respondents claim that
although abroad, their daughter Julia had been sending financial support to them
for her son. The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and
Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," before the RTC, with Santos, Sr. as
respondent, which was subsequently granted and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in awarding custody of the boy to his
grandparents.

LEOUEL SANTOS, SR., petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES

LEOPOLDO and OFELIA BEDIA, respondents
G.R. No. 113054 March 16, 1995
Facts:

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the fact that petitioner was unable to
provide financial support for his minor son from birth up to over three years
when he took the boy from his in-laws without permission, should not be
sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent right to the child's custody. While
petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only the severest
criticism, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable
decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be
regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody
would help enhance the bond between parent and son. It would also give the
father a chance to prove his love for his son and for the son to experience the
warmth and support which a father can give.
The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of
parental authority. Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is the
juridical institution whereby parents rightfully assume control and protection of
their unemancipated children to the extent required by the latter' s needs. It is a
mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of
344

the children's physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of

their intellect and the education of their heart and senses. As regards parental
authority, "there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of
duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor." The law
vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their
common children.
The petition is GRANTED.

petition and instead affirmed the order of the trial court. Not contented, Rene
appealed the resolution of the Court of Appeals affirming the order dated July 21,
1994 before this court, and the case was docketed as G.R. No. 120831. On July
17, 1995, the Court resolved to dismiss the petition for failure of petitioner Rene
to show that grave abuse of discretion had been committeds by the appellate
court.
On August 15, 1995, Lucia filed with the trial court a motion for
reconsideration with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
because she alleged that her estranged husband physically abused their son
Justin. Due to the incident, a criminal complaint for slight physical injuries was
filed. The trial court granted the writ of preliminary injunction restraining Rene
from seeing his children. Rene Filed a petition for certiorari, however, the court
of appeals dismissed the petition for violation for on non-forum shopping. Hence,
this petition.
Issue:
Whether Rene should be prohibited from seeing his children.

RENE UY GOLANGCO, petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent

283 SCRA 493
Facts:
A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by private respondent
Lucia Carlos Golangco against petitioner Rene Uy Golangco before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 144. The couple had two children, Justin Rene and
Stefan Rafael. During the proceedings of the case, a hearing for custody pendente
lite of the two children was held. In an order dated July 21, 1994, the trial court
awarded the two children to Lucia while Rene was given visitation rights of at
least one week in a month. Therafter Rene questioned the order dated July 21,
1994 with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, however dismissed the

Ruling:
It is a fundamental and settled rule that conclusions and findings of fact
by the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on
appeal, unless strong and cogent reasons dictate otherwise. This is because the
trial court is in a better position to examine the real evidence, as well as to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case. The court,
therefore, finds no justifiable reason or exception sufficient to cause the reversal
of the trial courts declaration in granting the writ of preliminary injunction
against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. No. 38866 dated January 10,
1996, is SET ASIDE. The order dated October 4, 1995, issued by the court a quo
is hereby affirmed in toto.

345

case (could) he takes out the children without the written consent of the mother.
The visitation right referred to is the right of access of a noncustodial parent to
his or her child or children.
Silva appeared somehow satisfied with the judgment for only Gonzales
interposed an appeal from the RTCs order to the Court of Appeals.
For the meantime, Gonzales got married to a Dutch national. The
newlyweds emigrated to Holland with Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia.
Issue:
Whether or not trial court erred in awarding the petitioner visitation
rights.

CARLITO SILVA, plaintiff v. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant

G.R. No. 114742. July 17, 1997
Facts:
Carlito E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an
unmarried local actress, cohabited without the benefit of marriage. The union
saw the birth of two children: Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Not very long
after, a rift ion their relationship surfaced. It began, according to Silva, when
Gonzales decided to resume her acting career over his vigorous objections. The
assertion was quickly refuted by Gonzale who claimed that she, in fact, had never
stopped working throughout their relationship. At any rate, the two eventually
parted ways.
The instant controversy was spawned, in February 1986, by the refusal of
Gonzales to allow Silva, in apparent contravention of a previous understanding,
to have the children in his company on weekends. Silva filed a petition for
custodial rights over the children before the RTC. The petition was opposed by
Gonzales who averred that Silva often engaged in gambling and womanizing
which she feared could affect the moral and social values of the children.
The trial court has adjudged in favor of petitioner by holding that he shall
have visitorial rights to his children during Saturdays and/or Sundays, but in no

Ruling:
The court appreciates the apprehensions of private respondent and their
well-meant concern for the children; nevertheless, it seems unlikely that
petitioner would have ulterior motives or undue designs more than a parents
natural desire to be able to call on, even if it were only on brief visits, his own
children. The trial court, in any case, has seen it fit to understandably provide this
precautionary measure, i.e., in no case (can petitioner) take out the children
without the written consent of the mother.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is REINSTATED, reversing
thereby the judgment of the appellate court which is herby SET ASIDE. No
costs.

346

Whether or not the mother is the rightful parent to the custody of her
child.

DAISIE DAVID, plaintiff v. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant

G.R. No. 111180. November 16, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent
Ramon R. Villar, a businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married
man and the father of four children, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship
between petitioner and private respondent developed into an intimate ionic, as a
result of which a son, Christopher J. was followed by two more children, both
girls, namely Christine.
The relationship became known to private respondents wife when Daisie
took Christopher J. to Villars house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in
1986 and introduced him to Villars legal wife. After this, the children of Daisie
were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were eventually accepted by
his legal family.
In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J. then
six years of age, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the
trip, Villar refused to give back the child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher
J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year.
Pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher j. is under the parental
authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such
authority, is entitled to have custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has
been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is
entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.

Ruling:
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being
less than seven years of age at least at the time the case was decided by the RTC,
cannot be taken from the mothers custody. Even now that the child is over seven
years of age, the mothers custody over him will have to be upheld because the
child categorically expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213
of the family code, courts must respect the choice of the child over seven years
of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit and here it has not been shown that the
mother is in any way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, if private
respondent loves his child, he should not condition the grant of support for him
on the award of his custody to him (private respondent)
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and
private respondent is ORDERED to deliver the minor Christopher J. T. David to
the custody of his mother, the herein petitioner, and to give him temporary
support in the amount of P3,000.00 pending the fixing of the amount of support
in an appropriate action.
.

Issue:
347

REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG, petitioners v. COURT

OF APPEALS and TERESITA MASAUDING, respondents
G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995
Facts:
Petitoner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding tbegan to
maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife when petitioner was
sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
as its liaison officer while respondent worked as a nurse in Los Angeles,
California. On August 16, 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born.
While they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got
married, and upon their return to the United States, their second child, a son, this
time, and given the name Reginald Vince.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate
and Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California.
Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his
assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his
company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, co-petitioner
Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children,
however, the trial court dismissed the petition and suspended Teresita's parental
authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole
parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the
parties and to be approved by the Court. The Court of Appeals, however,
reversed the decision and gave the Teresita the custody to her children.

the Family Code to take into account all relevant considerations. If a child is
under seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian.
It can be overcome by "compelling reasons". If a child is over seven, his choice
is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion,
the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent,
or even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances.
The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The
children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with
whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo
is a fit person, thus meeting the two requirements found in the first paragraph of
Article 213 of the Family Code. The presumption under the second paragraph of
said article no longer applies as the children are over seven years. Assuming that
the presumption should have persuasive value for children only one or two years
beyond the age of seven years mentioned in the statute, there are compelling
reasons and relevant considerations not to grant custody to the mother. The
children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been
affected in their emotional growth by her behavior.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals disregarded the factual findings of
the trial court.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court is inclined to sustain the findings and conclusions of
the regional trial court because it gave greater attention to the choice of Rosalind
and considered in detail all the relevant factors bearing on the issue of custody. In
ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by

NERISSA Z. PEREZ, plaintiff v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and

RAY C. PEREZ, defendant
G.R. No. 118870. March 29, 1996
Facts:
Ray Perez, private respondent, is a doctor of medicine practicing in Cebu
while Nerissa, his wife who is petitioner herein, is a registered nurse. They were
married and after six miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy,
348

petitioner finally gave birth to Ray Perez II in New York. The couple and their
baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa returned to the U.S.
because the respondent has to take care of his mother and promised to her with
the baby.
When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray IIs first birthday, the
couple was no longer on good terms. On July 26, 1993, Nerissa Z. Perez filed a
petition for habeas corpus asking respondent Ray C. Perez to surrender the
custody of their son, Ray Z. Perez II, to her and the court a quo issued an Order
awarding custody of the one-year old child to his mother, Nerissa Perez. The
Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts order and awarded custody of the boy
to his father.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in awarding the custody of the child
to his father.
Ruling:
When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of the Family
Code is the applicable law. It provides: ART. 213. In case of separation of the
parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the
Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially
the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
Since the Code does not qualify the word separation to mean legal
separation decreed by a court, couples who are separated in fact, such as
petitioner and private respondent, are covered within its terms.
The petition for review is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals dated September 27, 1994 as well as its Resolution dated January 24,
1995 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the trial court
dated August 27, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED. Custody over the minor Ray Z.
Perez II is awarded to his mother, herein petitioner Nerissa Z. Perez. This
decision is immediately executory.

TERESITA SAGALA-ESLAO, petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS and

MARIA PAZ CORDERO-OUYE, respondent
G.R. No. 116773. January, 16,1997
Facts:
On June 22, 1984, petitioner Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo
Eslao were married; after their marriage, the couple stayed with respondent
Teresita Eslao, mother of the husband. Out of their marriage, two children were
begotten, namely, Leslie Eslao and Angelica Eslao. In the meantime, Leslie was
entrusted to the care and custody of petitioners mother in Sta. Ana, Pamapanga,
while Angelica stayed with their parents at respondents house. On August 6,
1990, petitioners husband Reynaldo Eslao died petitioner intended to bring
Angelica with her to Pampanga but the respondent prevailed upon her to entrust
the custody of Angelica to her, respondent reasoning out that her son just died
and to assuage her grief therefore, she needed the company of the child to at least
compensate for the loss of her late son. In the meantime, the petitioner returned
to her mothers house in Pampanga where she stayed with Leslie.
349

Subsequently, petitioner was introduced by her auntie to Dr. James

Manabu-Ouye, a Japanese-American, who is an orthodontist practicing in the
United States; their acquaintance blossomed into a meaningful relationship where
on March 18, 1992, the petitioner and Dr. James Ouye decided to get married and
migrated to USA to join her new husband. On June 24, 1993, the petitioner
returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her children and bring them to the
United States. The petitioner then informed the respondent about her desire to
take custody of Angelica and explained that her present husband, Dr, James
Ouye, expressed his willingness to adopt Leslie and Angelica and to provide for
the support and education; however, respondent resisted the idea by way of
explaining that the child was entrusted to her when she was ten years old and
accused the petitioner of having abandoned Angelica. Because of the adamant
attitude of the respondent, the petitioner then sought the assistance of a lawyer,
Atty. Mariano de Joya, Jr., who wrote a letter to the respondent demanding for
the return of the custody of Angelica to her natural mother and when the demand
remain[ed] unheeded, the petitioner instituted the present action.
Issue:
Whether or not Parental Authority and Responsibility are inalienable and
may not be transferred or removed.
Ruling:
When private respondent entrusted the custody of her minor child to the
petitioner, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did
not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. For the right
attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of
parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a
children's home or an orphan institution which do not appear in the case at bar.
Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that
"the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural
rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy.
The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the
courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship.

ST. MARYS ACADEMY, petitioner v. SHERWIN CARPITANOS,

respondent
February. 6, 2002
Facts:
St. Marys Academy conducted an enrollment drive for the school year. A
facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools where prospective
enrollees were studying. Defendant-appellant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog
City concluded an enrolment drive for the school year 1995-1996. As a student
of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group.
Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep
owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva, were on their way to an elementary
school. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then fifteen years old and a
student of the same school. The jeep was owned by Vivicencio. The driver, James
II, drove the jeep in a reckless manner which cause it to turn turtle. Allegedly, the
latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle.
Sherwin died as a consequence. The trial court then awarded damages to
the parents of Sherwin against the petitioner by virtue of Art. 218 and 219 of the
family code.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is liable for damages for the death of Sherwin.
Ruling:
Article 218 of the Family code enumerates those who have special
parental authority over a minor child and article 219 of the same code provides
350

that those exercising special parental authority are principally and subsidiary
liable for damages caused by the acts or omission of the emancipated minor
under their supervision, instruction or custody.
However, for the persons and institutions enumerated therein are to be
held liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as
negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence
must have a causal connection to the accident. Thus, injury for which recovery is
sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done.
The negligence of the petitioner was only a remote cause of the accident.
There was the intervention of the negligence of the minors parents who drove
the jeep and the detachment of the steering wheel of the jeep was the one which
caused the accident.
The Court held that for the school to be liable there must be a finding that
the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury
caused because of negligence, must have causal connection to the accident. There
is no showing of such. The immediate cause was the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep. Also, there was no evidence that the school allowed the
James II to drive the jeep. The one primarily liable is the registered owner of the
vehicle.

ALFREDO AMADORA, petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent

160 SCRA 315
Facts:
Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the commencement exercises
where he would a stand the stage and in the presence of his relatives and friends
receive his high school diploma. These ceremonies were scheduled on April 16,
1972. As it turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that awaited
experience. On April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of their school,
the Collegio de San Jose-Recoletes, a classmate, Pablito Daffon, bared a gun that
mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well. The victim
was only seventeen years old.
Pablito was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence.
Additionally, the parents of the victim filed this petition for civil damages against
the accused with two other students (thru their parents) together with the College,
its rector, the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher,
under Art. 2180. After Trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu has convicted the
remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs. On appeal of the respondent court,
however, the decision was reversed in all the defendants were completely
absolved.
In its decision, which is now the subject of this petition for criteriorai
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the respondent court found that Article 2180
was not applicable as the Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of
Arts and Trades but an academic institution of learning.
Issue:
Whether or not school may be held liable under diligence of bonus pater
families.
Ruling:
The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question (Art.
2180) should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Following
the canon of reddendo singular singuli: Where the school is academic,
responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in
charge of such student. This is the general rule. [Teachers to pupils/students]
351

Reason: Old academic schools, the heads just supervise the teachers who are the
ones directly involved with the students. Where the school is for arts and trades,
it is the head and only he who shall be held liable as am exception to the general
rule. [Heads to apprentices] Reason: Old schools of arts and trades saw the
masters (or heads of the school) personally and directly instructed the
apprentices. Therefore, the heads are not liable. The teacher-in-charge is not also
liable because theres no showing that he was negligent in enforcing discipline
against the accused or that he waived observance of the rules and regulations of
the school, or condoned their non-observance. Also, the fact that he wasnt
present cant be considered against him because he wasnt required to report on
that day. Classes had already ceased.
.

own evidence shows. Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit, the
Baguio Colleges Foundation Reserve Office Training Corps (ROTC), Half,
which is under the full control of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF,
Jimmy B. Abon, appointed armorer of ROTC, shot Napoleon Castro a student of
the University of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which the armor took from
the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a result, Napoleon Castro died and
Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime of Homicide by
Military Commision No. 30, AFP.
Subsequently, the heirs of napoleon Castro sued for damage, Impleading
Jimmy B. Abon, Roberto C. Ungos (ROTC, commandant), Benjamin Salvosa
(President and Chairman of the Borad of BCF), Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice
President of BCF), Libertad D. Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and
Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation, Inc. as party
defendants. After hearing, the Trial Court rendered a decision, (1) sentencing
defendants Jimmy B. Abon, Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation,
Inc., jointly and severally, to pay private respondents, as heirs of Napoleon
Castro.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner can be held solidarily liable with Jimy B. Abon
for damages under Art. 2180 of the civil code, as a consequences of the tortious
act of Jimmy B. Abon.

JESUS SALVOSA, petitioner V. INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT,

respondent
166 SCRA 275
Facts:
Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF, hereafter) is an academic institution.
However, it is also an institution of arts and trade. It has so advertised itself, as its

Ruling:
Under Art. 2180 that the petition should apply to all schools, academic as
well as non-academic. Following the canon of reddendo singular singuli: Where
the school is academic, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will
attach to the teacher in charge of such student. The teacher-in-charge is not also
liable because theres no showing that he was negligent in enforcing discipline
against the accused or that he waived observance of the rules and regulations of
the school, or condoned their non-observance. Also, the fact that he wasnt
present cant be considered against him because he wasnt required to report on
that day. Classes had already ceased.
352

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED in so

far as it holds petitioners solidarily liable with Jimmy B. Abon for his tortious act
in killing of Napoleon Castro. No costs.

and after the attack on the victim. During the proceedings a quo, Lt. M. Soriano
terminated his relationship with the other petitioners by resigning from his
position in the school.
The defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed,
alleging that since they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, the complaint states no cause of action against them, as jurisprudence on
the subject is to the effect that academic institutions, such as the PSBA.
The respondent trial courtoverruled petitioners contention and denied
their motion to dismiss. the respondent appellate court affirmed the trial courts
orders.
Issue:
Whether or not an academic institution has a bilateral obligation upon
students which both parents are bound to comply.

PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, Plaintiff v.

COURT OF APPEALS, Defendant
205 SCRA 729

Ruling:
As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence on the substance of the
private respondents complaint, the record is bereft of all the material facts.
Obviously, at this stage, only the trial court can make such a determination from
the evidence still to unfold.
WHERFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is
DENIED. The court of origin (RTC, Manila, Br. 47) is hereby ordered to
continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the court. Costs against the
petitioners.

Facts:
A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos
Bautista, a student of PSBA while on the second-floor premises of the Philippine
School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased
to file suit in the Regional Trial Court. Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA
and the following school authorities: Juan D. Lim (President), Benjamin P.
Paulino (Vice-President), Antonio M Magtalas ( Treasurer/Cashier) Col. Pedro
Sacro (Chief of Security) and a Lt. M. Soriano (Assistant Chief of Security).
Substantially, the plaintiffs (now private respondents) sought to adjudge them
liable for the victims untimely demise due to their alleged negligence,
recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during
353

WENDELL LIBI, plaintiff v. INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT,

defendant
214 SCRA 16
Facts:
Deceased Julie Ann Gotiong (18 y.o.) and deceased Wendell Libi (bet. 18
and 19 y.o.) were sweethearts for two years prior to the incident. After the girl
decided to end the relationship (finding the guy sadistic and irresponsible), the
boy incessantly pursued her and prayed that they be together again (which made
the guy resort to threats). But, the girl hold steadfast to her decision. In order to
avoid the guy, the girl lived with her best friend. On the day of the incident, the
two were found shot dead with a Smith and Wesson revolver. The parents of the
girl instituted this case against the parents of the guy for damages. The Regional
Trial Court dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. In the Court of
Appeals the RTC decision was reversed and ordered the Libi spouses to pay
,moral and exemplary damages.The court found out by convincing evidence that
Wendell Libi shot Gotiong before committing suicide. Subsequently, the Libi
spouses filed an appeal contending that they should only assume subsidiary
liability for damages cause by their minor child.

Ruling:
The parents of Wendel Libi are held liable for not exercising due
diligence, diligentissimi patris familias, (Art. 2180). The father of the guy owns a
gun which he kept in a safety deposit box. The father and the mother each had a
key. The guy knew of it. The key must have been negligently left lying around or
he had free access to it, such as the bag of his mother. The said gun was missing.
The parents were also unable to explain the photograph of their son holding a
gun. The said photograph was dedicated to the girl. Moreover, they were remiss
in their duties as parents as not being able to know that their son was a
Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unite (CANU) agent involved in a dangerous work
of as either a drug informer or drug user. The damages is based on Art. 2180 of
the Civil Code. Art. 101 of RPC doesnt apply since the guy is or above 18 y.o.
already.
The Supreme Court believes that the civil liability of parents for quasi
delicts of their minor children as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code
is primary and not subsidiary. Accordingly, just like the rule in 2194 of the Civil
Code the civil liability of the parents for crimes committed by their minor
children is likewise direct and primary and also subject to the defense of lack of
fault or negligence on their part, that is the exercise of the diligence of a good
father of the family.

Issue:
Whether or not parental liability for damages cause by the minor child is
subsidiary.
354

JENNIFER TAMARGO, plaintiff v. COURT OF APPEALS, Defendant

G.R. No. 85044. June 3, 1992
Facts:
On August 20, 1982 Adelberto Bundoc, a monor of 10 years of age shot
Jennifer Tamargo. A complaint for civil and criminal action was filed by the
deceased adopting parent and natural parents against the natural parents of
Bundoc. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the case ruling that respondents
were not indespensible parties to the action. On petition for review, respondents
contend that the adopting parents namely the Rapisura spouses were the
indespensible parties to the action since parental authority have shifted to them
from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed on November 18,
1982.
Issue:
Whether or not the effects of adoption insofar as parental authority is
concern maybe given retroactive effect.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court did not consider the retroactive effect that may be
given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting
parents accruing at the time when the adopting parents had no actual custody
over the adopted child. This is consistent wit the doctrine of vicarious liability.
No presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the
Rapisura spouses could have arisen since Adelberto Bundoc was not in fact
subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.

DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN, appellant v.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee
G.R. No. 164948. June 27, 2006
Facts:
On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United
States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA,
filed a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon
Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos. The minors are the natural children of Manuel
Ramos, petitioners brother, and Amelia Ramos.
355

Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on

May 19, 1990, the children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc
Ramos; their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there. The
minors are being financially supported by the petitioner and her children, and
relatives abroad. Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered
in her favor.
The court, finding merit in the petition for adoption, rendered a decision
granting said petition. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision reversing the
ruling of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written
consent of their biological mother, Amelia Ramos.
Ruling:
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is
intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted
interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best
interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for
the validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his
child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and
duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. In this case,
petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
When she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was
already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the
biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of
the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of
the minors had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the
written consent of their legal guardian.
The petition is hereby DENIED.

JOHANNA SOMBONG, petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant

252 SCRA 663
Facts:
Johanna Sombong allegedly brought her daughter to the clinic of spouses
Ty. After medication Doctor Vicente Ty refused to give back the child since
herein petitioner Johanna Sombong failed to pay the cost of P300.00. The
petitioner, allegedly tried to seek help from public officers to recover her child
but he availed of nothing. Subsequently, she filed a petition in the Regional Trial
Court for kidnapping of minor against the spouse Ty. The spouses disclosed that
the baby was given to their staff to act as guardian. The Court of Appeals set
aside the said decision and give to Marieta Neri Alviar, the staff of the spouses in
their clinic the custody of the said child. This is because the persons concerned
cannot ascertain whether the said child really belongs to the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the custody of the child shall be given to Miss Neri Alviar.
Ruling:
356

The Supreme Court states that the custody of the child shall be given to
Miss Neri Alviar citing the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which provides that
all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his
welfare shall be the paramount consideration. In the same nein, the Family Code
authorizes the courts to, the welfare of the child so demands, deprived the parents
concern of authority over the child or adopt such measures as maybe proper
under the circumstances.

HATIMA C. YASIN, petitioner v. THE HONORABLE JUDGE SHARI'A

DISTRICT COURT THIRD SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, defendant
G.R. No. 94986 February 23, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Hatima Yasin is. of legal age, a divorcee, a Muslin Filipino and
a resident of Suterville, Zamboanga City, Philippines. She was formerly married
to a certain Hadji Idris Yasin, also a Muslim Filipino in accordance with Muslim
rites and customs, and who is now residing at Barangay Recodo, Zamboanga
City, but sometime on March 13, 1984, they were granted a decree of divorce by
the Mindanao Islamic Center Foundation, Inc., in accordance with Islamic Law.
The former husband Hadji Idris Yasin contracted another marriage to another
woman and the petitioner prayed to resume the use of her maiden name Hatima
Centi y Saul in accordance with the provisions of Rules 103, Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not a petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is
also a petition for change of name.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name
filed by petitioner before the respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary
proceeding since the law requires her to do so as her former husband is already
married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from her in
accordance with Muslim laws.
Although there is no legal prohibition against obtaining a judicial
confirmation of a legal right, nevertheless, no law or rule provides for the
procedure by which such confirmation may be obtained. In view of such
circumstances, the onerous requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on
change of name should not be applied to judicial confirmation of the right of a
divorced woman to resume her maiden name and surname. In the absence of a
specific rule or provision governing such a proceeding, where sufficient facts
have been alleged supported by competent proof as annexes, which appear to be
357

satisfactory to the court, such petition for confirmation of change of civil status
and/or to resume the use of maiden name must be given due course and
summarily granted as in fact it is a right conferred by law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the orders of respondent
court dated July 4, 1990 and August 10, 1990 are hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner
is authorized to resume her maiden name and surname.

On August 1 1987, Atty. Francis Palmores, counsel of the petitioner

requested to the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila that he be furnished a copy
of the complaint against petitioner. He then asked his client Ursua to take his
letter request to the office of the Ombudsman because his law firms messenger,
Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal matters.
When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman, he wrote the
name Oscar Perez on the visitors logbook and upon receipt of the
acknowledged by writing. Loida Kahulugan, who handed the copy of complaint,
learned that the person who introduced himself as Oscar Perez was actually the
petitioner, Cesario Ursua. She reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman
who recommended that petitioner be charged.
The trial court found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as
amended by R.A. No. 6085. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision on May
31, 1993. The petitioner asks for review on his conviction in Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner violated C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No.
6085 otherwise known as An Act to Regulate the Use of Alias.
Held:

CESARIO URSUA, petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS AND

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents
G.R. No. 112170. April 10,1996.
Facts:
Petitioner Cesario Ursua, a Community Environment and Natural
Resources Ofiicer assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato, had a complaint against him
for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of unwarranted benefits.

Cesario Ursua is acquitted of the crime charged. C.A No. 142, approved
on November 7, 1936 entitled An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases, was
amended by R.A. No. 6085on August 4 1969. C.A. No. 142 as amended was
made primarily to penalize the act of using an alias name publicly and in
business transactions in addition to his real name unless such alias was duly
authorized by proper judicial proceeding.
The fact that the petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the
Ombudsman as Oscar Perez served only the request of his lawyer to obtain a
copy of the complaint in which the petitioner was a respondent. There is no
evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as his
second name in addition to his real name. Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a
different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign
or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real
name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A.
No. 142 as amended by R.A. 6085. There exists a valid presumption that
358

undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that

a construction of which the statue is fairly susceptible is favored.

Judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the

Civil Registrar to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of
petitioner, specifically for petitioners first name from Rommel Jacinto to
MELY and petitioners gender from Male to FEMALE.The Court of Appeals
rendered a decision in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial courts decision
lacked legal basis.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.

ROMMEL JACINTO and DANTES SILVERIO, petitioners v.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
G.R. 174689. October 22, 1997
Facts:
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed
a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in RTC
Manila. His name was registered as Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio in his
certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as male. He
further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, anatomically male but feels,
thinks and acts as a female and that he had always identified himself with girls
since childhood. His attempts to transform himself to a woman culminated on
January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok,
Thailand. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to
be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from
Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to female.

Ruling:
The petition lacks merit. Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On the
Ground of Sex Reassignment. The State has an interest in the names borne by
individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a
privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. In
this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that No person can
change his name or surname without judicial authority.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex
On the Ground of Sex Reassignment. The determination of a persons sex
appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the
statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that No entry
in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. For
these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the
change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no
legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth
certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be
Changed on the Ground of Equity. The trial court opined that its grant of the
petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It believed
that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone.
This is wrong.
The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and
orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social
convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the
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remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed

solely by the legislature, not by the courts.

NENITA BIENVENIDO, petitioner v.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LUISITA CAMACHO and
LUIS FAUSTINO C. CAMACHO, respondents.
G.R. No. 111717. October 24, 1994.
Facts:
Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3,
1942. On February 6, 1962, without his marriage to Consejo Velasco being
dissolved, Aurelio P. Camacho contracted another marriage with respondent
Luisita C. Camacho with whom he had been living since 1953 and by whom he
begot a child, respondent Aurelio Luis Chito Faustino C. Camacho, born on
May 22, 1961. The marriage was solemnized in Tokyo, Japan where Aurelio and
Luisita had been living since 1958.
Because of their quarrels, one or the other left the dwelling place for long
periods of time. In her case Luisita stayed on those occasions at various times in
Davao City, Hongkong or Japan.
In 1967 Aurelio met petitioner Nenita T. Bienvenido, who had been
estranged from her husband, Luis Rivera. Aurelio courted her and apparently
won her heart because from June 1968 until Aurelio's death on May 28, 1988, he
lived with her, the last time in a duplex apartment in Quezon City. Petitioner's
daughter, Nanette, stayed with them as did Aurelio's son, Chito, who lived with
them for about a year in 1976.
On May 28, 1988, Aurelio died. Petitioner, using her Loyola Life Plan
and Aurelio's account in the PCI Bank, took care of the funeral arrangements.

Respondent Luisita was then in the United States with respondent Chito, having
gone there, according to her, at the instance of Aurelio in order to look for a
house in San Francisco so that Aurelio could follow and rejoin them. Upon
learning of the death of Aurelio she and her son Chito came home on May 31,
1988.
Respondent Luisita was granted death benefits by the Armed Forces of
the Philippines as the surviving spouse of Aurelio. Soon she also claimed
ownership of the house and lot on Scout Delgado Street in which Nenita had
been living.
On September 7, 1988, Luisita and her son Chito brought this case in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, seeking the annulment of the sale of the
property to petitioner and the payment to them of damages. Luisita alleged that
the deed of sale was a forgery and that in any event it was executed in fraud of
her as the legitimate wife of Aurelio.
On August 29,1989, the trial court rendered a decision upholding the sale
of the property to petitioner and dismissing the complaint of Luisita. It found the
deed of sale in favor of petitioner to be genuine and respondents Luisita and
Chito to be in estoppel in not claiming the property until 1988 despite knowledge
of the sale by the late Aurelio who had represented himself to be single.
On appeal the respondents prevailed. On June 4, 1993, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared respondents to be
the owners of the house and lot in dispute.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in presuming the validity of the marriage
between Aurelio and Luisita
Held:
On the question of validity of Luisita's marriage to Aurelio, there is no
dispute on the fact of appellant Luisita's marriage in 1962 to Aurelio. The Court
finds that the presumption of the validity of the marriage Aurelio and Luisita has
not been successfully assailed by appellee. The Court of Appeals thus presumed
the validity of Aurelio's second marriage from the failure of petitioner to prove
that at the time of such marriage Aurelio's first wife, Consejo, had not been
absent for at least seven years and that Aurelio did not have news that his first
wife we still alive.
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It was the burden of herein respondents to prove that, at the time of his second
marriage to respondent Luisita, Aurelio's first wife, Consejo Velasco, had been
absent for at least seven years and that Aurelio had no news that she was alive.
To assume these facts because petitioner has not disproved them would be to
stand the principle on its head. Since Aurelio had a valid, subsisting marriage to
Consejo Velasco, his subsequent marriage to respondent Luisita was void for
being bigamous.
IN THE RE: CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN WANG
G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005
Facts
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born to parents Anaa Lisa Wang and
Sing-Foe Wang. The parents married some time after. They executed a deed of
legitimation in favor of Julian. The legitimation prayed for the dropping of the
middle name for two reasons: (1) possible confusion and discrimination, and (2)
best interest of the child. The parents planned to send their son to Singapore to
study. They alleged that in there the middle name is disregarded. As such, people
might get confused and discriminate Julian and his sister who is already studying
there. Likewise, the Singaporean Mandarin language dont have the letter R,
instead they pronounce it as L. In effect, the name of Julian will sound funny.
The Lower Courts denied the petition. The Office of the Solicitor General
also pointed out that the cause of change was only for mere convenience and not
one of necessity. The link between the change/dropping of the middle name and
the child's welfare were not well substantiated?

and reasonable cause for which the change is sought. To justify a request for
change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason
therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are:
(a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in
legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was
unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and
(f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the
desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name
would prejudice public interest.

Issue:
When can a person avail of a name change?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition. The reasons are insufficient.
There is no proper and reasonable cause for a change of name. There is no
showing of Singaporean laws regarding names, and the possible effects of
confusion and discrimination are imaginary than real. Philippine law dictates that
the legitimate and legitimated children shall carry the surnames of the father and
the mother.
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper

LEE TEK SHENG, plaintiff vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant

G.R. No. 118387. October 11, 2001
Facts:
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This is a story of two (2) sets of children sired by one and the same man
but begotten of two (2) different mothers. One set, the private respondents
herein, are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his lawful wife, Keh Shiok Cheng.
The other set, the petitioners herein, are allegedly children of Lee Tek Sheng and
his concubine, Tiu Chuan. Rita K. Lee, Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng, Rosa K. LeeVanderlek, Melody K. Lee-Chin, Lucia K. Lee Tek Sheng-Ong, Julian K. Lee,
Henry K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Victoriano K. Lee, Natividad K. Lee-Miguel and
Thomas K. Lee (hereinafter referred to as private respondents) filed two (2)
separate petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records
of birth of Marcelo Lee, Albina Lee-Young, Mariano Lee, Pablo Lee, Helen Lee,
Catalino K. Lee, Eusebio Lee, and Emma Lee (hereinafter referred to as
petitioners). On December 2, 1992, the petition against all petitioners, with the
exception of Emma Lee, was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). On
February 3, 1993, a similar petition against Emma Lee. Both petitions sought to
cancel and/or correct the false and erroneous entries in all pertinent records of
birth of petitioners by deleting and/or canceling therein the name of Keh Shiok
Cheng as their mother, and by substituting the same with the name Tiu Chuan,
who is allegedly the petitioners true birth mother.
The Regional Trial Court allowed itself to take cognizance of the case for
the cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of petitioners.
The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Petitioners
Marcelo, Mariano, Pablo, Helen, Catalino and Eusebio, all surnamed Lee, and
Albina Lee-Young then filed a motion to the Supreme Court alleging that no
change can be effected because the change would affect their civil status contrary
to previous doctrine.

be gleaned therefrom that the procedure contemplated for obtaining such judicial
order is summary in nature.
Article 412 uses both the terms corrected and changed. In its ordinary
sense, to correct means to make or set right; to remove the faults or errors
from while to change means to replace something with something else of the
same kind or with something that serves as a substitute. The provision neither
qualifies as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected nor does it distinguish
on the basis of the effect that the correction or change may have. Hence, it is
proper to conclude that all entries in the civil register may be changed or
corrected under Article 412. It is beyond doubt that the specific matters covered
by the preceding provisions include not only status but also nationality.
Therefore, the Ty Kong Tin pronouncement that Article 412 does not contemplate
matters that may affect civil status, nationality or citizenship is erroneous.

Issue:
What entries in a civil register shall be changed or corrected? Is a judicial
order necessary in order to do so?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals. Article 412 is a substantive law that provides as follows: No
entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order. It
does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed except to say that
the corrections or changes must be effected by judicial order. As such, it cannot
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