G.R. No.

159517-18

June 30, 2009

HILARIO P. SORIANO and ROSALINDA ILAGAN, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS (BSP), and PHILIPPINE
DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC), Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Petitioners Hilario P. Soriano and Rosalinda Ilagan (petitioners) appeal by certiorari the August 5,
2003 Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA) in the consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP. Nos. 64648 and
64649.
The antecedents.
Hilario P. Soriano (Soriano) and Rosalinda Ilagan (Ilagan) were the President and General Manager,
respectively, of the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. (RBSM). Allegedly, on June 27, 1997
and August 21, 1997, during their incumbency as president and manager of the bank, petitioners
indirectly obtained loans from RBSM. They falsified the loan applications and other bank records,
and made it appear that Virgilio J. Malang and Rogelio Maaol obtained loans of P15,000,000.00
each, when in fact they did not.
Accordingly, on May 4, 2000, State Prosecutor Josefino A. Subia charged Soriano in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, with violation of Section 83 of Republic Act No. 337 (R.A. No.
337) or the General Banking Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1795, or Violation of the
Director, Officer, Stockholder or Related Interest (DOSRI) Rules (DOSRI Rules). The inculpatory
portion of the Information reads:
That on or about June 27, 1997 and thereafter, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, in his capacity as President of the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. did
then and there, unlawfully, feloniously, and indirectly borrow or secure a loan with Rural Bank of San
Miguel-San Miguel Branch amounting to Php15 million, without the consent and written approval of
the majority of the directors of the bank, by using the name of one depositor VIRGILIO J. MALANG
of San Miguel Bulacan who have no knowledge of the said loan, and once in possession of the said
amount of Php14,775,000.00, net of interest converted the same to his own personal use and
benefit, in flagrant violation of the said law.2
On the same date, an information for estafa thru falsification of commercial document was also filed
against Soriano and Ilagan, viz.:
That on or about June 27, 1997 and thereafter, in San Miguel, Bulacan and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused HILARIO P. SORIANO and ROSALINDA ILAGAN, as
principals by direct participation, with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence and taking advantage of
their position as President of Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. and Manager of Rural Bank

of San Miguel-San Miguel Branch, a duly organized banking institutions under Philippine Laws,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully and
feloniously falsify loan documents consisting of loan application/information sheet, and promissory
note dated June 27, 1997, disclosure statement on loan/credit transaction, credit proposal report,
managers check no. 06514 dated June 27, 1997 and undated RBSM-San Miguel Branch check
voucher, by making it appear that one VIRGILIO J. MALANG filed the aforementioned documents
when in truth and in fact, VIRGILIO J. MALANG did not participate in the execution of said loan
document and that by virtue of said falsification and with deceit and intent to cause damage, the
accused credited the loan proceeds of the loan amounting to Php14,775,000.00, net of interest, to
the account of VIRGILIO J. MALANG with the RBSM and thereafter converted the same amount to
their own personal gain and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the Rural Bank of San MiguelSan Miguel Branch, its creditors and the Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas in the amount of
Php14,775,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The informations were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 1719-M-2000 and 1720-M-2000,
respectively, and were raffled to Branch 14, presided by Judge Petrita Braga Dime.
Another information for violation of Section 83 of R.A. No. 337, as amended, was filed against
Soriano, this time, covering the P15,000,000.00 loan obtained in the name of Rogelio Maaol. The
information reads:
That on or about August 21, 1997 and thereafter, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, in his capacity as President of the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. did
then and there, unlawfully, feloniously, and indirectly borrow or secure a loan with Rural Bank of San
Miguel-San Miguel Branch, a domestic rural ba[n]king institution created, organized and existing
under Philippine laws, amounting to Php15.0 million, knowing fully well that the same has been done
by him without the written approval of the majority of [the] board of directors of the said bank and
which consent and approval the said accused deliberately failed to obtain and enter the same upon
the record of said banking institution and to transmit a copy of which to the supervising department
of the said bank, as required by the General Banking Act, by using the name of one depositor
ROGELIO MAAOL of San Jose, San Miguel Bulacan who have no knowledge of the said loan, and
once in possession of the said amount of Php 15.0 million, converted the same to his own personal
use and benefit, in flagrant violation of the said law.4
Soriano and Ilagan were also indicted for estafa thru falsification of commercial document for
obtaining said loan. Thus:
That on or about August 21, 1997 and thereafter, in San Miguel, Bulacan and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused HILARIO P. SORIANO and ROSALINDA ILAGAN, as
principals by direct participation, with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence and taking advantage of
their position as President of Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. and Manager of Rural Bank
of San Miguel-San Miguel Branch, a duly organized banking institutions under Philippine Laws,
conspiring confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully and
feloniously falsify loan documents consisting of loan application/information sheet and promissory

note dated August 21, 1997, by making it appear that one ROGELIO MAAOL filled up the
application/information sheet and filed the aforementioned loan documents when in truth and in fact,
ROGELIO MAAOL did not participate in the execution of said loan document and that by virtue of
said falsification and with deceit and intent to cause damage, the accused succeeded in securing a
loan in the amount of Php15.0 million, from Rural Bank of San Miguel-San Miguel Branch in the
name of ROGELIO MAAOL, which amount of Php 15.0 million representing loan proceeds the
accused deposited to the account of ROGELIO MAAOL maintained with Rural Bank of San Miguel
and thereafter converted the same amount to their own personal gain and benefit, to the damage
and prejudice of the Rural Bank of San Miguel-San Miguel Branch, its creditors, the Bangko Sentral
Ng Pilipinas and the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation in the amount of Php 15.0 million.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
The cases were docketed as 1980-M-2000 and 1981-M-2000, respectively, and were raffled to
Branch 77, presided by Judge Aurora Santiago-Lagman.
Petitioners moved to quash the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 1719-M-2000 and 1720-M-2000
(pending before Branch 14), and also in Criminal Case Nos. 1980-M-2000 and 1981-M-2000
(pending with Branch 77), on grounds that: (i) more than one (1) offense is charged; and (ii) the facts
charged do not constitute an offense. Specifically, petitioners argued that the prosecutor charged
more than one offense for a single act. Soriano was charged with violation of DOSRI rules and
estafa thru falsification of commercial document for allegedly securing fictitious loans. They further
argued that the facts as alleged in the information do not constitute an offense.
In an Order6 dated November 15, 2000, RTC Branch 77 denied the motion to quash. Rejecting
petitioners arguments, it held:
Section 13 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the complaint or
information must charge but only one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws
prescribe a single punishment for various offenses. Under this Rule, the Information is defective
when it charges two (2) or more offenses. The rule enjoining the charging of two (2) or more
offenses in one information has for its aim to give the defendant the necessary knowledge of the
charge to enable him to prove his defense (People vs. Ferrer, 101 Phil. 234, cited in Herrera
Remedial Law IV., p. 72). While Section 3 (e) of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court provides as
one of the grounds where the accused may move to quash the complaint or information, considering
Sec. 13 of Rule 110 of the Rules as aforestated, it is apparent that the said ground refers to a
situation where the accused is being charged in one information or criminal complaint for more than
one offense. The record shows that two (2) Informations were filed against the herein accused, one
in Criminal Case No. 1980-M-2000 against accused Hilario P. Soriano for Violation of Sec. 83 of R.A.
No. 337, as amended by PD 1795, and another one in Criminal Case No. 1981-M-2000 against
accused Hilario P. Soriano and Rosalinda Ilagan for Estafa Thru Falsification of Commercial
Documents. Thus, each Information charges only one offense.
Even assuming that the two (2) cases arose from the same facts, if they violate two (2) or more
provisions of the law, a prosecution under one will not bar a prosecution under another (Pp. vs. Tac-

an, 182 SCRA 601; Lamera v. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 186, cited in Herrera Criminal Procedure,
Vol. 4, p. 453).
Upon the foregoing, this Court finds that there is no basis to quash the Informations filed in these two
(2) cases as the accused are being charged therein with only one offense in each Information. As to
the assertion of the accused that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, this Court finds that
the allegations of both parties are evidentiary and the same can only be determined after a full blown
trial on the merits of these cases where both parties will be given a chance to present their evidence
in support of their respective positions.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is DISMISSED and the arraignment of both accused and the pretrial of these cases scheduled on December 4, 2000 at 10:00 o clock in the morning, shall proceed
as scheduled.7
Petitioners motion to quash informations in Criminal Case Nos. 1719-M-2000 and 1720-M-2000
before Branch 14 likewise suffered the same fate, as Judge Braga Dime denied the same in an
Order8 dated November 27, 2000, holding that:
Duplicity in criminal pleading is the joinder of two or more distinct and separate offenses in the same
court of an indictment or information. (41 Am. Jur. 2d 1011). Whether two offenses are charged in an
information, or otherwise, must not be made to depend upon the evidence presented at the trial
court but upon the facts alleged in the information (Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Ecija vs. CFI, 79 Phil.
165). Where an offense may be committed in any of the different modes provided by law and the
offense is alleged to have been committed in two or more modes specified, the indictment is
sufficient. The allegations in the information of the various ways of committing the offense should be
considered as a description of only one offense and the information cannot be dismissed on the
ground of multifariousness (Jurado v. Suy Yan, L-30714, April 30, 1971)
A perusal of the criminal information filed in the above-entitled cases indubitably show that each
information charges only but one offense. Thus, in Criminal Case No. 1719-M-2000, Accused Hilario
P. Soriano is charged only with violation of Sec. 83 of RA 337, as amended by PD 1796, while in
Criminal Case No. 1720-M-2000, Accused Hilario P. Soriano and Rosalinda Ilagan are charged only
with Estafa thru falsification of commercial document.
On the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense xxx xxx xxx
[b]y simply reading the information filed against the Accused Hilario P. Soriano, in Crim. Case No.
1719-M-2000 it is clear that the allegations, which is hypothetically admitted by said accused, in the
same information set out an offense for violation of Sec. 83 of RA 337 as amended by PD No. 1795.
Finally, Accused, in addition to the two (2) grounds aforesaid, cited prematurity and lack of probable
cause which would warrant the quashal of the two (2) informations.
These additional grounds relied upon by the Accused for the quashal of the two (2) informations
must necessarily fail because they are not one of the grounds enumerated in Sec. 3, Rule 117 of the

Revised Rules of Court which this Court shall not consider, in accordance with Sec. 2, Rule 117 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Quash, dated September 1, 2000 filed by both
Accused is hereby DENIED, for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.9
Petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals via certiorari, assailing the Orders of Branch 77 and
Branch 14. The petitions were docketed as CA-G.R. SP. Nos. 64648 and 64649. By decision 10 of
August 5, 2003, the CA, which priorly consolidated the petitions, sustained the denial of petitioners
separate motions to quash:
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, these petitions are DENIED DUE
COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED. The assailed Orders dated November 15, 2000 and
February 12, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case Nos.
1980-M-2000 and 1981-M-2000, entitled, "People of the Philippines vs. Hilario P. Soriano and
People of the Philippines vs. Hilario P. Soriano and Rosalinda Ilagan", respectively, in CA-G.R. SP.
No. 64648 and the Orders dated November 27, 2000 and March 9, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 14, Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case Nos. 1719-M-2000 and 1720-M-2000, entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Hilario P. Soriano and People of the Philippines vs. Hilario P. Soriano
and Rosalinda Ilagan", respectively, in CA-G.R. SP. No. 64649 are affirmed. 11
Petitioners are now before this Court, submitting for resolution the same matters argued before the
RTC and the CA. They insist that RTC Branch 14 and Branch 77 abused their discretion in denying
their motions to quash informations. Thus, they posit that the CA committed reversible error in
dismissing their petitions for certiorari.
The appeal should be denied.
The term grave abuse of discretion, in its juridical sense, connotes capricious, despotic, oppressive
or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be of such
degree as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and capricious manner by reason of passion and
hostility. The word capricious, usually used in tandem with the term arbitrary, conveys the notion of
willful and unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the corrective hand of certiorari, a clear showing
of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion is imperative. 12
We reviewed the records before us, and we discerned no caprice or arbitrariness on the part of the
RTC in denying the motions.
Petitioners assail the validity of the informations against them on the ground that more than one (1)
offense is charged. They point that Soriano was charged with violation of DOSRI Rules and with
estafa thru falsification of commercial document for allegedly obtaining loans from RBSM. Thus, they
claim that the informations were duplicitous; hence, they should be quashed.
1avvphi1

Indisputably, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information under
Section 3(e), Rule 11713 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Rules prohibit the filing of a
duplicitous information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense. 14
By duplicity of charges is meant a single complaint or information that charges more than one
offense.15 Section 13 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure clearly states:
Duplicity of Offense. A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those
cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses.
Otherwise stated, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges
more than one offense.16
In this case, however, Soriano was faced not with one information charging more than one offense,
but with more than one information, each charging a different offense - violation of DOSRI rules in
one, and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents in the others. Ilagan, on the other hand,
was charged with estafa thru falsification of commercial documents in separate informations. Thus,
petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations.
Petitioners also contend that Soriano should be charged with one offense only, because all the
charges filed against him proceed from and are based on a single act of obtaining fictitious loans.
Thus, Soriano argues that he cannot be charged with estafa thru falsification of commercial
document, considering that he is already being prosecuted for obtaining a DOSRI loan.
The contention has no merit.
Jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that a single act or incident might offend two or more
entirely distinct and unrelated provisions
of law,17 thus justifying the filing of several charges against the accused.
In Loney v. People,18 this Court, in upholding the filing of multiple charges against the accused, held:
As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single act or incident might offend
against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of
the accused for more than one offense. The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that
no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense." In People v. Doriquez,
we held that two (or more) offenses arising from the same act are not "the same"
x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not,
x x x. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes,
prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses
arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential
element of the other.
xxx xxx xxx

Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although based on the same
incident, is consistent with settled doctrine.
As aptly pointed out by the BSP in its memorandum, there are differences between the two (2)
offenses. A DOSRI violation consists in the failure to observe and comply with procedural, reportorial
or ceiling requirements prescribed by law in the grant of a loan to a director, officer, stockholder and
other related interests in the bank, i.e. lack of written approval of the majority of the directors of the
bank and failure to enter such approval into corporate records and to transmit a copy thereof to the
BSP supervising department. The elements of abuse of confidence, deceit, fraud or false pretenses,
and damage, which are essential to the prosecution for estafa, are not elements of a DOSRI
violation. The filing of several charges against Soriano was, therefore, proper.
Petitioners next question the sufficiency of the allegations in the informations, contending that the
same do not constitute an offense.
The fundamental test in considering a motion to quash anchored on Section 3 (a), 19 Rule 117 of
the1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, is the sufficiency of the averments in the information; that is,
whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the
offense charged as defined by law.20 The trial court may not consider a situation contrary to that set
forth in the criminal complaint or information. Facts that constitute the defense of the petitioners
against the charge under the information must be proved by them during trial. Such facts or
circumstances do not constitute proper grounds for a motion to quash the information on the ground
that the material averments do not constitute the offense. 21
We have reviewed the informations and find that they contain material allegations charging Soriano
with violation of DOSRI rules and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents.
In Criminal Case Nos. 1719 & 1980 for violation of DOSRI rules, the informations alleged that
Soriano was the president of RBSMI, while Ilagan was then its general manager; that during their
tenure, Soriano, with the direct participation of Ilagan, and by using the names of Virgilio Malang and
Rogelio Maaol, was able to indirectly obtain loans without complying with the requisite board
approval, reportorial and ceiling requirements, in violation of Section 83 of R.A. No. 377 22 as
amended.
Similarly, the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 1720 & 1981 charge petitioners with estafa thru
falsification of commercial document. They allege that petitioners made it appear that Virgilio J.
Malang and Rogelio Maaol obtained loans and received the proceeds thereof when they did not in
fact secure said loans or receive the amounts reflected in the promissory notes and other bank
records.
The information in Criminal Case No. 1720 further alleges the elements of estafa under Article 315
(1)(b)23 of the RPC to wit: (i) that money, goods or other personal property be received by the
offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (ii) that there be misappropriation or conversion of
such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (iii) that such

misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (iv) that there is demand
made by the offended party to the offender.
The information in Criminal Case No. 1981, on the other hand, further alleged the following essential
elements of estafa under Article 315 (2) (a)24 of the RPC: (i) that there must be a false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (ii) that such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means
must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (iii) that the
offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent meansthat is,
he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or
fraudulent means; and (iv) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. The
informations in Criminal Case Nos. 1720 & 1981, thus, charge petitioners with the complex crime of
estafa thru falsification of commercial documents.
Verily, there is no justification for the quashal of the Information filed against petitioners. The RTC
committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the motions.
In fine, the Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper
remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The proper procedure in such a
case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special
defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is
rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.25 Thus, petitioners should not have
forthwith filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA and instead, they should have gone to
trial and reiterated the special defenses contained in their motion to quash. There are no special or
exceptional circumstances in the present case that would justify immediate resort to a filing of a
petition for certiorari. Clearly, the CA did not commit any reversible error, much less, grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice