The maxims of equity evolved, in Latin and eventually translated into English, as the

principles applied by courts of equity in deciding cases before them.[1] An English

authority states about the maxims of equity: "The Maxims do not cover the whole
ground, and moreover they overlap, one maxim contains by implication what belongs to
another. Indeed it would not be difficult to reduce all under two: 'Equity will not suffer a
wrong to be without a remedy' and 'Equity acts on the person'".[2]
The headings of this article list the traditional maxims.

Contents

1 Equity sees that as done what ought to be done

2 Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy
3 Equity delights in equality
4 One who seeks equity must do equity
5 Equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights
6 Equity imputes an intent to fulfill an obligation
7 Equity acts in personam
8 Equity abhors a forfeiture
9 Equity does not require an idle gesture
10 He who comes into equity must come with clean hands
11 Equity delights to do justice and not by halves
12 Equity will take jurisdiction to avoid a multiplicity of suits
13 Equity follows the law
14 Equity will not aid a volunteer
15 Where equities are equal, the law will prevail
16 Between equal equities the first in order of time shall prevail
17 Equity will not complete an imperfect gift
18 Equity will not allow a statute to be used as a cloak for fraud
19 Equity will not allow a trust to fail for want of a trustee
20 See also
21 References

Equity sees that as done what ought to be done

This maxim means that when individuals are required, by their agreements or by law, to
perform some act of legal significance, equity will regard that act as having been done as
it ought to have been done, even before it has actually happened. This makes possible the
legal phenomenon of equitable conversion. Sometime this is phrased as "equity regards
as done what should have been done".
The consequences of this maxim, and of equitable conversion, are significant in their
bearing on the risk of loss in transactions. When parties enter a contract for a sale of real
property, the buyer is deemed to have obtained an equitable right that becomes a legal
right only after the deal is completed.

Due to his equitable interest in the outcome of the transaction, the buyer who suffers a
breach may be entitled to the equitable remedy of specific performance (although not
always, see below). If he is successful in seeking a remedy at law, he is entitled to the
value of the property at the time of breach regardless of whether it has appreciated or
depreciated.
The fact that the buyer may be forced to suffer a depreciation in the value of the property
means that he bears the risk of loss if, for example, the improvements on the property he
bought burn down while he is still in escrow.
Problems may sometimes arise because, through some lapse or omission, insurance
coverage is not in force at the time a claim is made. If the policyholder has clearly been at
fault in this connection, because, for example, he has not paid premiums when he should
have, then it will normally be quite reasonable for an insurer to decline to meet the claim.
However, it gets more difficult if the policyholder is no more at fault than the insurer.
The fair solution in the circumstances may be arrived at by applying the principle that
equity regards that as done that ought to be done. In other words, what would the position
have been if what should have been done had been done?
Thus, in one case, premiums on a life insurance policy were overdue. The insurer's letter
to the policyholder warning him of this fact was never received by the policyholder, who
died shortly after the policy consequently lapsed. It was clear that if the notice had been
received by the policyholder, he or his wife would have taken steps to ensure the policy
continued in force, because the policyholder was terminally ill at the time and the
coverage provided by the policy was something his wife was plainly going to require in
the foreseeable future. Since the policyholder would have been fully entitled to pay the
outstanding premium at that stage, regardless of his physical condition, the insurer (with
some persuasion from the Bureau) agreed that the matter should be dealt with as if the
policyholder had done so. In other words, his widow was entitled to the sum assured less
the outstanding premium. In other similar cases, however, it has not been possible to
follow the same principle because there has not been sufficiently clear evidence that the
policy would have been renewed.
Another illustration of the application of this equitable principle was in connection with
motor vehicle insurance. A policyholder was provided with coverage on the basis that she
was entitled to a "no claims" discount from her previous insurer. Confirmation to this
effect from the previous insurer was required. When that was not forthcoming, her
coverage was cancelled by the brokers who had issued the initial coverage note. This was
done without reference to the insurer concerned whose normal practice in such
circumstances would have been to maintain coverage and to require payment of the full
premium until proof of the no claims discount was forthcoming. Such proof was
eventually obtained by the policyholder, but only after she had been involved in an
accident after the cancellation by the brokers of the policy. Here again, the fair outcome
was to look at what would have happened if the insurer's normal practice had been
followed. In such circumstances, the policyholder would plainly have still had a policy at

the time of the accident. The insurer itself had not acted incorrectly at any stage.
However, in the circumstances, it was equitable for it to meet the claim.

Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy

When seeking an equitable relief, the one that has been wronged has the stronger hand.
The stronger hand is the one that has the capacity to ask for a legal remedy (judicial
relief). In equity, this form of remedy is usually one of specific performance or an
injunction (injunctive relief). These are superior remedies to those administered at
common law such as damages. The Latin legal maxim is ubi jus ibi remedium ("where
there is a right, there must be a remedy"), sometimes cited as ubi jus ibi remediam.
The maxim is necessarily subordinate to positive principles and cannot be applied either
to subvert established rules of law or to give the courts a jurisdiction hitherto unknown,
and it is only in a general not in a literal sense that the maxim has force.
Case law dealing with principle of this maxim at law include Ashby v White[3] and Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents.[4] The application of this principle at law was key in the
decision of Marbury v. Madison,[5] wherein it was necessary to establish that Marbury
had a right to his commission in the first place in order for Chief Justice Marshall to
make his more wide-ranging decision.

Equity delights in equality

Where two persons have an equal right, the property will be divided equally. Thus equity
will presume joint owners to be tenants in common unless the parties have expressly
agreed otherwise. Equity also favours partition, if requested, of jointly held property.

One who seeks equity must do equity

To receive equitable relief, the petitioning party must be willing to complete all of its
own obligations as well. The applicant to a court of equity is just as much subject to the
power of that court as the defendant. This maxim may also overlap with the clean hands
maxim (see below).

Equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their

rights
Vigilantibus non dormientibus aequitas subvenit.
A person who has been wronged must act relatively swiftly to preserve their rights.
Otherwise, they are guilty of laches, an untoward delay in litigation with the presumed
intent of denying claims. This differs from a statute of limitations, in that a delay is
particularized to individual situations, rather than a general prescribed legal amount of

time. In addition, even where a limitation period has not yet run, laches may still occur.
The equitable rule of laches and acquiescence was first introduced in Chief Young Dede
v. African Association Ltd.[6]
Alternatives:

Delay defeats equity

Equity aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights

Equity imputes an intent to fulfill an obligation

Generally speaking, near performance of a general obligation will be treated as sufficient
unless the law requires perfect performance, such as in the exercise of an option. Text
writers give an example of a debtor leaving a legacy to his creditor equal or greater to his
obligation. Equity regards such a gift as performance of the obligation so the creditor
cannot claim both the legacy and payment of the debt.

Equity acts in personam

In England, there was a distinction drawn between the jurisdiction of the law courts and
that of the chancery court. Courts of law had jurisdiction over property as well as persons
and their coercive power arose out of their ability to adjust ownership rights. Courts of
equity had power over persons. Their coercive power arose from the ability, on authority
of the crown, to hold a violator in contempt, and take away his or her freedom (or money)
until he or she purged himself or herself of his or her contumacious behavior. This
distinction helped preserve a separation of powers between the two courts.
Nevertheless, courts of equity also developed a doctrine that an applicant must assert a
"property interest". This was a limitation on their own power to issue relief. This does not
mean that the courts of equity had taken jurisdiction over property. Rather, it means that
they came to require that the applicant assert a right of some significant substance as
opposed to a claim for relief based on an injury to mere emotional or dignitary interests.

Equity abhors a forfeiture

Today, a mortgagor refers to his interest in the property as his "equity". The origin of the
concept, however, was actually a mirror-image of the current practice.
At common law, a mortgage was a conveyance of the property, with a condition
subsequent, that if the grantor paid the secured indebtedness to the grantee on or before a
date certain (the "law" day) then the conveyance would be void, otherwise to remain in
full force and effect. As was inevitable, debtors would be unable to pay on the law day,
and if they tendered the debt after the time had passed, the creditor owed no duty to give
the land back. So then the debtor would run to the court of equity, plead that there was an
unconscionable forfeiture about to occur, and beg the court to grant an equitable decree

requiring the lender to surrender the property upon payment of the secured debt with
interest to date. And the equity courts granted these petitions quite regularly and often
without regard for the amount of time that had lapsed since the law day had passed. The
lender could interpose a defense of laches, saying that so much time had gone by (and so
much improvement and betterment had taken place) that it would be inequitable to
require undoing the finality of the mortgage conveyance. Other defenses, including
equitable estoppel, were used to bar redemption as well.
This unsettling system had a negative impact on the willingness of lenders to accept real
estate as collateral security for loans. Since a lender could not re-sell the property until it
had been in uncontested possession for years, or unless it could show changed
circumstances, the value of real estate collateral was significantly impaired. Impaired,
that is, until lawyers concocted the bill of foreclosure, whereby a mortgagee could
request a decree that unless the mortgagor paid the debt by a date certain (and after the
law date set in the mortgage), the mortgagor would thereafter be barred and foreclosed of
all right, title and equity of redemption in and to the mortgaged premises.
To complete the circle, one needs to understand that when a mortgagor fails to pay an
installment when due, and the mortgagee accelerates the mortgage, requiring immediate
repayment of the entire mortgage indebtedness, the mortgagor does not have a right to
pay the past-due installment(s) and have the mortgage reinstated. In Graf v. Hope
Building Corp.,[7] the New York Court of Appeals observed that in such a case, there was
no forfeiture, only the operation of a clause fair on its face, to which the mortgagor had
freely assented. In the latter 20th Century, New York's lower courts eroded the Graf
doctrine to such a degree that it appears that it is no longer the law, and that a court of
conscience has the power to mandate that a default be excused if it is equitable to do so.
Of course, now that the pendulum is swinging in the opposite direction, we can expect
courts to explain where the limits on the newly expanded equity of redemption lie...and it
is probably not a coincidence that the cases that have eroded Graf v. Hope Building Corp.
have been accompanied by the rise of arbitration as a means for enforcing mortgages.[8]

Equity does not require an idle gesture

Also: Equity will not compel a court to do a vain and useless thing. It would be an idle
gesture for the court to grant reformation of a contract and then to deny to the prevailing
party an opportunity to perform it as modified.

He who comes into equity must come with clean hands

It is often stated that one who comes into equity must come with clean hands (or
alternatively, equity will not permit a party to profit by his own wrong). In other words, if
you ask for help about the actions of someone else but have acted wrongly, then you do
not have clean hands and you may not receive the help you seek. For example, if you
desire your tenant to vacate, you must have not violated the tenant's rights.

However, the requirement of clean hands does not mean that a "bad person" cannot
obtain the aid of equity. "Equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless
lives."[9] The defense of unclean hands only applies if there is a nexus between the
applicant's wrongful act and the rights he wishes to enforce.
For instance, in Riggs v. Palmer,[10] a man who had killed his grandfather to receive his
inheritance more quickly (and for fear that his grandfather may change his will) lost all
right to the inheritance.
In D & C Builders Ltd v Rees,[11] a small building firm did some work on the house of a
couple named Rees. The bill came to 732, of which the Rees had already paid 250.
When the builders asked for the balance of 482, the Rees announced that the work was
defective, and they were only prepared to pay 300. As the builders were in serious
financial difficulties (as the Rees knew), they reluctantly accepted the 300 "in
completion of the account". The decision to accept the money would not normally be
binding in contract law, and afterwards the builders sued the Rees for the outstanding
amount. The Rees claimed that the court should apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel,
which can make promises binding when they would normally not be. However, Lord
Denning refused to apply the doctrine, on the grounds that the Rees had taken unfair
advantage of the builders' financial difficulties, and therefore had not come "with clean
hands".

Equity delights to do justice and not by halves

When a court of equity is presented with a good claim to equitable relief, and it is clear
that the plaintiff also sustained monetary damages, the court of equity has jurisdiction to
render legal relief, e.g., monetary damages. Hence equity does not stop at granting
equitable relief, but goes on to render a full and complete collection of remedies.

Equity will take jurisdiction to avoid a multiplicity of

suits
Thus, "where a court of equity has all the parties before it, it will adjudicate upon all of
the rights of the parties connected with the subject matter of the action, so as to avoid a
multiplicity of suits."[12] This is the basis for the procedures of interpleader, class action,
and the more rarely used Bill of Peace.

Equity follows the law

Aequitas sequitur legem
Equity will not allow a remedy that is contrary to law.

The court of Chancery never claimed to override the courts of common law. Story states
"where a rule, either of the common or the statute law is direct, and governs the case with
all its circumstances, or the particular point, a court of equity is as much bound by it as a
court of law, and can as little justify a departure from it."[13] According to Edmund Henry
Turner Snell, It is only when there is some important circumstance disregarded by the
common law rules that equity interferes.[14] Cardozo wrote in his dissent in Graf v. Hope
Building Corporation, 254 N.Y 1 at 9 (1930), "Equity works as a supplement for law and
does not supersede the prevailing law."
Maitland says, We ought not to think of common law and equity as of two rival
systems."[15] "Equity had come not to destroy the law, but to fulfil it. Every jot and every
tittle of law was to be obeyed, but when all this had been done yet something might be
needful, something that equity would require."[16][full citation needed] The goal of law and
equity was the same but due to historical reason they chose a different path. Equity
respected every word of law and every right at law but where the law was defective, in
those cases, equity provides equitable right and remedies.

Equity will not aid a volunteer

Equity cannot be used to take back a benefit that was voluntarily but mistakenly
conferred without consultation of the receiver. This maxim protects the doctrine of
choice.
This maxim is very important in restitution. Restitution developed as a series of writs
called special assumpsit, which were later additions in the courts of law, and were more
flexible tools of recovery, based on equity. Restitution could provide means of recovery
when people bestowed benefits on one another (such as giving money or providing
services) according to contracts that would have been legally unenforceable.
However, pursuant to the equitable maxim, restitution does not allow a volunteer or
"officious intermeddler" to recover. A volunteer is not merely someone who acts
selflessly. In the legal (and equitable) context, it refers to someone who provides a benefit
regardless of whether the recipient wants it. For example, when someone mistakenly
builds an improvement on a home, neither equity nor restitution will allow the improver
to recover from the homeowner.
An exception to this maxim can be seen in cases where the doctrine of estoppel applies.

Where equities are equal, the law will prevail

Equity will provide no specific remedies where the parties are equal, or where neither has
been wronged.
The significance of this maxim is that applicants to the chancellors often did so because
of the formal pleading of the law courts, and the lack of flexibility they offered to

litigants. Law courts and legislature, as lawmakers, through the limits of the substantive
law they had created, thus inculcated a certain status quo that affected private conduct,
and private ordering of disputes. Equity, in theory, had the power to alter that status quo,
ignoring the limits of legal relief, or legal defenses. But courts of equity were hesitant to
do so. This maxim reflects the hesitancy to upset the legal status quo. If in such a case,
the law created no cause of action, equity would provide no relief; if the law did provide
relief, then the applicant would be obligated to bring a legal, rather than equitable action.
This maxim overlaps with the previously mentioned "equity follows the law."

Between equal equities the first in order of time shall

prevail
This maxim operates where there are two or more competing equitable interests; when
two equities are equal the original interest (i.e., the first in time) will succeed.

Equity will not complete an imperfect gift

If a donor has made an imperfect gift, i.e. lacking the formalities required at common
law, equity will not assist the intended donee. This maxim is a subset of equity will not
assist a volunteer .
Note the exception in Strong v Bird (1874) LR 18 Eq 315. If the donor appoints the
intended donee as executor of his/her will, and the donor subsequently dies, equity will
perfect the imperfect gift.

Equity will not allow a statute to be used as a cloak for

fraud
Equity prevents a party from relying upon an absence of a statutory formality if to do so
would be unconscionable and unfair. This can occur in secret trusts and also constructive
trusts and so on.

Equity will not allow a trust to fail for want of a trustee

If there is no trustee, whoever has legal title to the trust property will be considered the
trustee. Otherwise, a court may appoint a trustee. In Ireland, the trustee may be any
administrator of a charity to which the trust is related.