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A Theoretical Evaluation of Different Faces of

Power: US-Turkey Relations Towards Iraq
Ahmet Szen
Assoc. Prof. Dr., Eastern Mediterranean University,
Department of International Relations
To cite this article: Szen, Ahmet, A Theoretical
Evaluation of Different Faces of Power: US-Turkey
Relations Towards Iraq, Uluslararas likiler, Volume 6,
No 24 (Winter 2010), p. 55-78.

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A Theoretical Evaluation of Different Faces of Power:

US-Turkey Relations Towards Iraq
Ahmet SZEN
1

ABSTRACT
This paper focuses on the use of dierent forms of power by a (leader/patron/hegemonic)
state to get the other (non-leader/client) states to cooperate with its policies. Most of
the literature on cooperation operates on the level of bargaining power where the policy
changes are directly visible. This article aims to show how the bargaining power model
is not adequate in capturing the complete picture of the relationship between Turkey (a
non-leader/client state) and the United States (leader/patron state) in their cooperation
with regard to Iraq during the Gulf Crisis (1990) and the War against Iraq (2003). Hence, I attempt to show that the three levels of power as discussed by Krause is a better and
more comprehensive framework for understanding and explaining the power relationship
between Turkey and the US.
Keywords: Turkey, Iraq, Bargaining Power, Structural Power, Hegemonic Power.

Gcn Farkl Dzeylerde Teorik bir Deerlendirmesi:

Irak Konusunda ABD-Trkiye likileri
ZET
Bu makalede bir lider(patron/hegemon) lke tarafndan lider-olmayan (mteri) bir lkeyi kendi siyaseti dorultusunda ibirliine ekme ynnde gcn farkl formlarda (dzeylerde) nasl kullanld aratrlmaktadr. Literatrde ibirlii zerine yazlm eserler
ounluu siyasetin dorudan gzlemlenebildii pazarlk gc zerinde younlamaktadr. Bu makale lider-olmayan bir lke olan Trkiye ile lider lke olan Amerika arasndaki Krfez Krizi (1990) ve Irak Sava (2003) dnemlerindeki ilikilerinin tam olarak
anlalmasnda pazarlk gc modelinin yeterli olmadn gstermektedir. Bu makalede
Karauseun dzeyli g modelinin Trkiye ve Amerika Birleik Devletleri arasndaki
g ilikisini en kapsaml ekilde anlamak ve aklamak iin ok daha iyi bir model olduu
iddia edilmektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Trkiye, Irak, Pazarlk/Mzakere Gc, Yapsal G, Hege-

monyac G.

Assoc. Prof. Dr., Department of International Relations, Eastern Mediterranean University, Gazimausa, TRNC. E-mail: [email protected].

ULUSLARARASIiLiKiLER, Cilt 6, Say 24, K 2010, s. 55 - 78

ULUSLARARASILKLER / INTERNATIONALRELATIONS

Introduction
Scholars are sometimes not very quick in incorporating new understandings of certain
theoretical concepts into their research. One such concept is power.1 Any student of
power should be able to have a sound understanding of what power is and related arguments about how power is exercised. Understanding power in its full dimensions gives
the scholar the opportunity to survey the behavior of states in their attempts to exercise
inuence over others through the use of various tools of foreign policy.
This paper focuses on the use of dierent forms of power by a (leader/patron/hegemonic) state to get the other (non-leader/client) states cooperation with its policies. Most of the
literature on cooperation operates on the level of bargaining power2 where the policy changes
are directly visible to or observable by the researcher. In this paper, I attempt to show how the
bargaining power model is not adequate in capturing the complete picture of the relationship
between Turkey (a non-leader/client state) and the Untied States (leader/patron state) in their
cooperation with regard to Iraq. In that regard, I attempt to show that the three levels of power
put forth by Krause is a much better and more comprehensive framework for understanding
and explaining the power relationship between Turkey and the US.3
There are three main objectives of this study: (1) To shed more light on the cooperation process; (2) To challenge the conventional wisdom in the area of cooperation that
states cooperative or non-cooperative behaviors are best understood or explained on the
bargaining level, and; (3) To challenge the utility of paradigms, in this case the rational
choice paradigm, in the discipline.
This study aims to show why a client state cooperates with a patron state even
when it appears not to be in the best interest of that state, i.e., the client states rst
preference is not to cooperate or the client state does not have a dominant strategy to
cooperate. Simultaneously, this study also aims to show why a client state does not
cooperate with a patron state even though cooperation seems to be in the best interest
of the client state.
For this study, I attempt to explain why Turkey cooperated with the US during
the Gulf Crisis by sanctioning Iraq in 1990s and in turn, why Turkey did not cooperate
with the US in the War Against Iraq and rejected the stationing of American soldiers in
Turkey to open the northern front against Iraq in 2003.4 Directly observable empirical
1

3
4

56

Keith Krause, Military Statecraft: Power and Inuence in Soviet and American Arms Transfer
Relations, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35, 1991, p. 314.
Ibid., p. 314, Keith Krause divides power into three dierent forms or levels: 1. bargaining power, 2. structural power, and 3. hegemonic power.
Ibid.
For a background account on the US foreign policy and the post Iraq war world liberal paradigm, see
Gltekin Smer, Amerikan D Politikasnn Kkenleri ve Amerikan D Politik Kltr [The Roots
of American Foreign Policy and The American Foreign Political Culture], International Relations, Vol.
5, No 19, Autumn 2008, p.119-144; and lkim zdikmenli and evket Oval., Irak Sava Sonrasnda
Liberal Dnyann Yapay kilii [Pseudo Split of the Liberal World in the Aftermath of the Iraqi
War], International Relations, Vol. 5, No 19, Autumn 2008, p.89-118.

A Theoretical Evaluation of Dierent Faces of Power

data on the US-Turkey talks with regard to the cooperation on the Iraq issue are analyzed at the bargaining level. Of course, non-quantiable directly observable data in the
form of policy changes are also used at this level.
My working hypothesis is that Turkeys cooperation (or non-cooperation) with
the US with regard to the Iraq issue can not be fully understood or explained by using
solely a bargaining model which focuses on directly observable (visible) results of a
policy or an observable policy change that, for example, could be utilized by either
empirical non-quantiable, or empirical quantiable data. Lisa Martins game theoretical model is a good framework to examine the relationship between the two states
on the bargaining level5. But it does not take into consideration the two other levels
of power, i.e., it focuses on bargaining power, and omits structural power and hegemonic
power. A comprehensive framework of dierent forms of power relationship between
a patron state and a client state is needed to explain cooperative/non-cooperative behavior.

Research Model
This study falls under the category of literature where, by using a comparative case study, it
focuses on a relationship between the patron state and a client state. Thus, my comparative
case study specically focuses on the relationship between Turkey (client) and the US (patron), and the question Why did Turkey not cooperate with the US in the War Against Iraq
in 2003, while Turkey did cooperate with the US during the Gulf Crisis in 1990?
The literature on international cooperation comes handy for this study. Most of
the literature on international cooperation draws its main arguments from Martins understandings of the collective-goods problem.6 For example, hegemonic stability theory
argues that cooperation is a public good which can be produced only by a single dominant
state - the hegemon.7 The institutionalist approach, on the other hand, comes as a reaction
to the hegemonic stability theory. This approach claims that both formal and informal
institutions can facilitate international cooperation, especially in the absence or the decline
of a hegemon.8
When Iraq invaded Kuwait, there was widespread agreement among many states
that there should be economic sanctions against Iraq. However, the leader state - the US found out that it required some eort to organize support for economic sanctions against
Iraq. Basically, this is a collective action problem or cooperation problem, which is widely,

6
7

Lisa L. Martin, Coercive Diplomacy: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions, New Jersey,
Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 16.
Ibid., p. 294.
Robert O. Keohane, The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Regimes, 1967-1977, O. Holsti et al. (ed.), Change in the International System, Boulder, Westview
Press, 1980, p. 131-162.
Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1989, p. 204.

57

ULUSLARARASILKLER / INTERNATIONALRELATIONS

studied using only the bargaining level of power in the literature.9 Lisa Martins model is
a good example of the bargaining level studies10.
Figure 1 is the general payo matrix in a bilateral sanction game that Lisa Martin
uses.11 The relevant episode of Lisa Martins game theory in this study is the case of a
strong leader state (the US) and a sanctioning non-leader state (Turkey). Several equilibria
can be found in this relationship. For example, equilibrium when both countries have a
dominant strategy to sanction (cooperate), neither has a dominant strategy, or when only
one of the sanctioners has a dominant strategy. Here, the role of coercion and coincidence bring a more comprehensive dimension to the cooperative behavior of the two
sanctioners - however, the model is still inadequate in covering the power relationship
between the sanctioning leader state and the cooperating non-leader state in its entirety.

Figure 1:
Player 2
(Non-leader)
y=0

y=1

x=0

(n1, n2)

(f1, u2)

x=1

(u1, f2)

(m1, m2)

Player 1
(Leader)

- General Payos in a Bilateral Sanction Game Players Strategies

X=0 or Y=0 : players impose no sanction
(not cooperate).
X=1 or Y=1 : players impose full sanctions
(cooperate).
Payos
(n1, n2)
: both players impose NO sanctions.
(f1, u2)
: player 1 free rides while player 2
unilaterally sanctions.
(u1, f2)
: player 1 unilaterally sanctions while
player 2 free rides.
(m1, m2) : both players impose full sanctions.

9 Martin, Coercive Diplomacy, p. 26. The literature on economic sanctions can be classied in three major
categories: Firstly, major part of the literature is comprised of case studies which focus on the impact
of sanctions on the policies of their target. As examples, for the sanctions on Rhodesia see Margaret
Doxey, Economic Sanctions: Benets and Costs, World Today, No 36, 1980, p.488; Donald L. Losman, International Economic Sanctions, New Mexico, New Mexico Press, 1979; and for South Africa
see Margaret Doxey, International Sanctions : A Framework for Analysis with Special Reference to
the UN and Southern Africa, International Organization, Vol.26, No.3, 1972, p.527-550; Richard
C. Porter, International Trade and Investment Sanctions: Potential Impact on the South African
Economy, Journal of Conict Resolution, Vol. 23, 1979, p. 579-612. The second sets of studies are the
comparative case studies focusing on the impact of sanctions by using a broader denition of success
of sanctions than the rst category. See, Gary C. Hufbauer and Je rey J. Schott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, Washington, Institute for International Economics, 1985; David
Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1985. Finally, the smallest group
of work is in the areas where studies focus on the dimensions of economic sanctions other than their
success, such as international cooperation. See, Lisa L. Martin, Coercive Diplomacy: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992; see also Robert O. Keohane,
After Hegemony:Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984 and Joseph M. Grieco Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique
of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, International Organization, Vol. 42, 1988.
10
Martin, Coercive Diplomacy, p. 16.
11
Ibid., p. 17.

58

A Theoretical Evaluation of Dierent Faces of Power

A modied12 model of Krauses three forms of power is utilized as a better approach

to the game theory. This helps to understand why Turkey employed sanctions against Iraq
in 1990 while; for example, Jordan (another neighbor and trading partner of Iraq) did not.
In other words, it provides a rich detailed analysis of the client-patron relationship between Turkey and the US, and why Turkey cooperated with the US. Such a model is also
useful in explaining why Turkey did not cooperate with the US in the War Against Iraq
in 2003. In that regard, the US, being a hegemonic power, can utilize three dimensions of
power in inuencing the other sanctioner (Turkey) to cooperate.
Krause, in his 1991 article Military Statecraft: Power and Inuence in Soviet and
American Arms Transfer Relations, criticizes the literature on arms transfer arguing that
most of the studies are done on the bargaining level. He instead proposes that the three
forms of power model is much more comprehensive in capturing the arms transfer relations
between the patron states (i.e., Soviet Union and the US) and the client (recipient) states.
This is the model whose modied form I use in this study. The following table (Table 1)
is my modied model of Krauses three forms of power that will be utilized in this study
on cooperation of Turkey with the US in economic sanctions against Iraq.

Bargaining Power
Bargaining power is dened by Krause as gaining leverage over specic issues of immediate concern to the patron.13 Other names, such as relational power and interactional
power are also used for bargaining power in the literature.
In this study, bargaining power involves actions where a specic goal, such as cooperation is achieved via threats of punishment and/or promises of rewards as a direct
means.14 In that regard, bargaining power is relational and situational between two or
more actors in a given context.15
The leader states goal is to get the non-leader state to comply with the leader states
decision, such as to cooperate with the leader state in sanctioning a specic target state. Bargaining power is used here by the leader state to achieve this immediate goal: to get the non-leader
state to cooperate with the leader-state in the short run. In this context, the non-leader state has
two immediate courses of action as a response: (1) to comply with the leader states decision or
(2) to resist it directly; both of these actions are directly visible to the observer.

Structural Power
The focus on situations with an observable conict between patrons and clients over
specic goals can miss the interactions between two actors in which a conict over shortterm goals is avoided because power is exercised at a prior level.16
12

13
14
15
16

Krause, Military Statecraft, p. 314. Krause uses this framework for his study of arms transfers
from a patron state to its client states. I modied his framework in order to make it applicable
to the issue of cooperation.
Ibid., 316.
Ibid., p. 316.
Ibid., p. 317.
Ibid., p. 321.

59

ULUSLARARASILKLER / INTERNATIONALRELATIONS

Keohane argues that the establishment of a context of power relation has to be

considered separately from rational choice considerations, which normally operates at
the bargaining level.17
An actors policy choices emerge in a structure, which prescribes the limits of a
states behavior. Structural power is exercised when a patron [leader] alters the range of
options open to the client [non-leader] or makes it more or less costly for the client to
change these options.18 In that sense, exercising structural power is the exploitation by
the leader state of the non-leaders certain vulnerabilities. Simply the existence of these
structural parameters is not always, at least initially, evident to the non-leader (nor to the
observer), but they usually become evident over time.
Structural power is used by the leader state on a medium term (of time). Here,
the goal of the leader state is to possess the general means to foster the achievement of its
desired objective, which in this case, is to obtain cooperation from the non-leader state,
for example to sanction a specic target state. In such a context, the non-leader states
response is to try to reduce or eliminate its dependency or vulnerability to the leader state.

Hegemonic Power
Behind both bargaining power and structural power, there remains another level where
power is exercised. In this level, the exercise of power is not readily observable to the
observer. This level of power is called the hegemonic power. According to Krause:
It (hegemonic power) involves inuence over the concepts (or rules of the game)
that govern military statecraft and security policies; the nature of the threat faced
by a state, the understanding of the best means to achieve security, and even the
denition of security itself. Its exercise involves coopting the decision-making elites
and/or legitimating a certain understanding of security (and threats to it) to win
continued willing acceptance of the denition of these concepts established by the
patron. It therefore suspends the remaining assumptions that analysts use to detect
exercises of bargaining or structural power: that decision making is autonomous and
that rational calculations of costs and benets are made (of course, decision making
does not become nonrational, but what is considered rational is in part determined
by choices made at the level of hegemonic power).19

Here, the goal of the leader (patron) state is not to get cooperation of the nonleader state on only specic or situational issues or objectives, but to get the non-leader
state to accept the rules of the game and the denitions of security goals and threats that
the leader state itself has established. Krause argues that:
Hegemonic power is created and exercised by altering the composition or views
of the ruling elite so its perceived interests converge with those of the patron.
This occurs crudely when a patron supplies a group that takes power, or more
subtly through the socialization of the ruling elite.20
17
18
19
20

60

Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 70.

Krause, Military Statecraft, p. 322.
Ibid., p. 325.
Ibid., p. 325.

A Theoretical Evaluation of Dierent Faces of Power

The US is regarded as the hegemon of the post-WW II era, although some scholars
claim that its hegemony started to decline in the 1970s.21 Whether its power is currently
declining or not, the US played a major role in the establishment of many important
international institutions such as the UN and NATO. These institutions were created
under US leadership during a time when US power was truly hegemonic. So, the norms
and the rules of these institutions pretty much reected those rules and denitions of
security issues that were in line with US interests. These institutions play a major role in
the socialization of the ruling elites whose countries are the members of these institutions.
However, it should be emphasized that the US acted together with the other great powers
in establishing these institutions. In other words, the US provided leadership but the
decisions were taken multilaterally with the other great powers.
Having emerged as the victorious side during the Cold War superpower competition, the US in a way consolidated the already established rules and norms of the
game after the end of the Cold War. In that sense, power of the debatable US hegemony
and power of the rules and norms of important international institutions are somewhat
intertwined.22 In this study, that intertwined power is treated broadly as the exercise of
hegemonic power, since I assume that the already established rules and norms are predominantly the creation of a hegemonic power - the US.
In the post-9/11 era, however, there is a debate that the credibility of the international institutions and the widely observed international norms established by
the US leadership in the post-WW II era have been challenged and even damaged
by the very unilateral actions of the US in its war against terrorism. It seems like the
hegemon (i.e., the US) is modifying the rules of the game according to the new realities in the international aairs. This time, however, unlike the post-WW II era, the
US leadership is not been much appreciated by the large portion of the international
community.

Analysis in the Bargaining Level

The Gulf Crisis
The Iraqi army invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. This action resulted in a widespread
protest by almost all nation states. Beyond posing a severe economic challenge by consolidating control over vast oil reserves, Iraqs action violated one of the most important
international norms and international law: invasion and occupation of a territory under a
sovereign state by use of force.23

21
22

23

Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 186.

It is very dicult to claim whether the US is a hegemon or not. In addition, it is dicult to
make a clear-cut distinction between the rules and the norms of international institutions and
those that were established by a hegemonic state (most of the institutions were established by the
leadership of a hegemon). Therefore, I broadly categorized these rules and norms as the elements
of hegemonic power.
Martin, Coercive Diplomacy, p. 3.

61

ULUSLARARASILKLER / INTERNATIONALRELATIONS

During the beginning of the Gulf Crises, the widespread opinion of many states
was the need to take some sort of action - probably some form of economic sanctions or
maybe more severe measures - against Saddams ruthless behavior. But, who would take
the initiative? The general perception based on the historical paradigm on economic
sanctions is that economic sanctions usually do not work due mainly to the collective action
problem: how to come up with a common action which is usually a result of the convergence
of interests among the potential sanctioning states? This was even more dicult during
the bi-polar Cold War era when the world was divided between two major competing
camps - the democratic, free market supporting, capitalist West versus an authoritarian
socialist East. In this superpower competition context, a target state could easily nd a
way to avoid economic sanctions by aligning itself with one of the competing camps.
The Gulf Crises, however, took place in such a period when the Cold War and the
bi-polar world were coming to an end, and the dierences between the two major camps
were not pronounced as strongly as before. The US took the initiative (leadership) in
organizing a common response against Iraqs invasion of Kuwait by imposing stringent
economic sanctions against Iraq. According to Martin:
In spite of the widespread common interests in responding to Saddams aggression,
the United States found that organizing support for sanctions required some eort.
States faced a collective-action problem, since the potential economic and, in some
cases, domestic political costs to potential sanctioners from joint action were high.24

Turkey and Jordan, for example, were among the few states in the region that would face high economic and political costs in sanctioning Iraq due to their close trade and
neighborly relations with Iraq. In that regard, Jordan was one of the very few states, which
opposed to the economic sanctions against Iraq. Jordan preferred facing a widespread
condemnation from many nation states, instead of imposing sanctions against Iraq.
Turkey, on the other hand, imposed full sanctions against Iraq from the very beginning
of the US organized response to Iraq. In that regard, Turkey preferred having economic and
political losses rather than opposing the economic sanctions against Iraq which would probably result in widespread condemnation of this action, and maybe more severe consequences,
such as being isolated in many international platforms. However, the visible consequences of
Turkeys sanctioning Iraq are two fold: 1) Turkeys massive economic loss25 due to the terminated trade with Iraq who was one of Turkeys major trading partners before the crises 26, and
2) gaining a hostile neighbor, which could host and provide logistics to the separatist PKK in
its territories.27 Later, this can be used (and actually was used) as a weapon against Turkey to
adjust its foreign policies according to Iraqs wishes.
24

Ibid., p. 3.

25

Iraq owed Turkey about $750 million in trade debts. In addition, Turkish-Iraqi trade
had been around $2 billion a year. For further details, Skr S. Grel et al., Turkey in
a Changing World -with special reference to Central Asia and the Caucasus- Institute
of Developing Economies, Middle East Studies Series, Vol. 33, 1993, p. 1-44.

26

Gerd Hohler, Turkiye Irakta Gaza Basiyor, Frankfurter Rundschau, Berlin, 29 June 2008.
Graham E. Fuller, Turkeys New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China, Oxford, Westview Press, 1993, p. 22.

27

62

A Theoretical Evaluation of Dierent Faces of Power

Let us try to analyze (through Martins game theoretical model28) on the bargaining level why Turkey cooperated with the US in sanctioning Iraq, despite the above
mentioned visible economic and political losses that Turkey has incurred.

Bargaining Power
Cooperation on economic sanctions in this case study involves the relationship between
the main sender of the sanctions - the US - and a prospective nonleader sanctioner -Turkey. Here, I use directly observable quantiable and non-quantiable date to see if this
model can explain Turkeys cooperative behavior in sanctioning Iraq.29
If one looks at Table 2 on the Turkish exports to Iraq before the Gulf Crisis and Table 3
through Table 6 on the economic and military relations between the US and Turkey in gures,
it is obvious that directly visible quantiable data does not show any evidence in the form of
side payments from the US to Turkey for Turkeys cooperative behavior. Turkeys cooperative
behavior at this level (i.e., bargaining) then can only be explained - at least partially by means of
directly observable non-quantiable data. Some suggestions might be listed as follows:
1. The US had supported30 Turkey in its struggle to become a EU member and
more specically the US had supported and lobbied for Turkeys customs union with the EU. Turkey has always received support from the US in its EU
aairs. Closer integration with the EU is Turkeys one of the main foreign
policy goals if not the primary policy which has always been supported by the
US and has been compatible with the USs national interests. So, there is no
visible US policy change on this issue after the Gulf War.
2. The US had handled Turkeys human rights record in a more exible manner
than the other democratic countries, such as the EU countries. The US has
always supported Turkey in its major problem - the war against the PKK.31
3. The US had been impartial32 in the Cyprus conict, which was one of Turkeys
major obstacles in international platforms. The US has always played a balancing and an impartial role in the Cyprus issue, at least more impartial than the
pro-Greek EU states, since its rst serious involvement in Cyprus in the 1960s.
Therefore, there is no visible change in US policy towards Cyprus.
As can be seen from the above bargaining model analysis, the directly observable
non-quantiable data gives no (or maybe only a weak) support for the coopera28

29
30
31
32

In a previous study (Ahmet Szen, Cooperation on Economic Sanctions: A Case Study on the
Cooperation of Turkey and the US in Sanctioning Iraq, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Midwest St. Louis, MO, 1996) I used Martins
game theoretic model in the bargaining level. See the appendix for the game theoretical analysis of the TurkeyUS cooperation during the Gulf Crisis.
See the appendix.
Fuller, Turkeys New Geopolitics, p. 29.
Ibid, p. 29.
Ibid, p. 29.

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ULUSLARARASILKLER / INTERNATIONALRELATIONS

tive behavior of Turkey. In addition, as mentioned above, quantiable empirical

data (see Table 2 through Table 5) do not give any support on the bargaining level. In other words, there is no evidence of possible US side payments to Turkey
in the quantiable date to explain Turkeys cooperative behavior.

The War Against Iraq

The US rst informed Turkey about its intention to change the political regime through
force in Iraq on November 6, 1998.33 It was, however, 9/11 that gave the pretext to the US
to put its Iraq plan into action. In mid January 2002 the Turkish Embassy in Washington
DC sent a encrypted message to the Turkish Foreign Ministry stating that:
1. The US will denitely strike Iraq,
2. The military operation will take place with or without UN Security Council
resolution,
3. The US shall want Turkey by its side,
4. However, the US will strike Iraq even without Turkeys support.34
During the summer of 2002 the diplomatic trac between the US and the Turkish
ocials intensied with regard to Iraq. In September 2002 the US Oce of Defense Cooperation in Ankara sent a message directly to the Oce of Chief of Sta requesting permission
to deploy US combat troops in Turkey and use certain bases in the framework of full and
complete cooperation.35 What was odd here is that the US tried to negotiate its demands with
the Turkish military whereas it was clear that it should be done through the diplomatic and
political channels. This is because the decision to permit foreign troop deployment in Turkey
belongs to the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). This was clearly told to the US
ocials in many dierent occasions by the Turkish military and foreign ministry ocials.36
The Turkish military was supporting the Turkish cooperation with the US. In that regard, it recommended the government that Turkey should be actively involved in an operation
in order to be able to control the developments in northern Iraq. The military was particularly
interested in preventing the PKK to use the vacuum in northern Iraq as well as preventing the
Kurds in establishing an independent state in northern Iraq. However, the military left the
decision and the responsibility to the Turkish government. The Turkish foreign ministry was
also recommending the Turkish government that it was Turkeys national interest to be involved
in the Iraq operation. Moreover, the AKP government came to believe that whether involved
in the Iraq operation or not Turkey would be negatively inuenced from the Iraq situation.37
Eventually, the Turkish government decided to negotiate a memorandum of understanding
33

34
35
36
37

64

Murat Yetkin, Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerek yks [The Bill: The Real Story of the Iraq Crisis],
stanbul, Remzi Kitabevi, 2004, p. 14.
Ibid., p. 51.
Ibid., p. 45.
Ibid., p. 85.
Ibid., p. 109.

A Theoretical Evaluation of Dierent Faces of Power

(MOU), which would include the terms of Turkish involvement in the Iraq operation. Through
the MOU the AKP government wanted to minimize its losses and maximize its gains in Iraq
for its cooperation with the US.38

Bargaining Power
The internal debate in Turkey whether to cooperate with the US or not in the Iraq
operation focused on rational calculations at the highest decision producing circles.
On December 23, 2002, a summit meeting took place at the Prime Ministry after the
recommendation of the Foreign Ministry and the Turkish military. Here, the Iraq
issue was rationally calculated by the top decision makers and the consequences of
cooperation and non-cooperation with the US regarding the Iraq operation were put
on the table.
In case of Turkeys non-involvement in the Iraq operation:39
after the war, Turkey will not be able to take a share from the reconstruction
activities conducted by the US in Iraq,
Turkey will be left out of the events taking place in northern Iraq. Therefore,
it will either have to act alone when faced with fait accomplis of the Kurdish
groups and will have to confront the US or it will have to keep silent when
faced with adverse situations,
Turkey will not be able to take American support to compensate for her economic losses,
Turkey will be faced with American hostility. The US will have to look for
another strategic partner in the region,
American support for Turkey during IMF and World Bank meetings will be
weakened,
Turkey will be left without American support during the Cyprus negotiations
that will last until 28th of February,
On the issue of immigrants (Kurds from northern Iraq) Turkey will have to
accept the weak support of the UN and other international organizations on
migration.
In case of Turkeys cooperation with the US in the Iraq operation:40
Turkey will be able to get the support of Washington for its economic losses.
The quantity and the terms of that support will depend on the negotiations
conducted by the government,

38
39
40

See Fikret Bilas four-day column for the details of the MOU, Milliyet, 22-25 August 2003.
Yetkin, Tezkere, p. 16.
Ibid., p. 117.

65

ULUSLARARASILKLER / INTERNATIONALRELATIONS

US administration will be sensitive to the red lines41 of Turkey. In other

words, Turkish control in northern Iraq will increase, Iraqi Kurds will not be
able to oppress the Turkomen and other groups in the area, and it will be possible to deal more eectively with the PKK/KADEK militants in the area,
In return for those gains, Turkey will lose credibility in the eyes of some European and Muslim states, and the AKP government will lose credibility both in
the eyes of those countries and its own constituency,
Turkey may appear on the target list of international terrorist organizations,
If American operation in Iraq fails, Turkey will be having troubled relations
with the Baghdad administration and may be directly aected from the uncertainties in the region.
Hence, after rational calculations Turkey decided to negotiate the terms of its involvement in Iraq. Turkey decided that if it could satisfy its demands in the negotiations
with the US, then Turkey would cooperate with the US in the Iraq operation. On December 27, 2002, the National Security Council (NSC), the top security policy designing
body in Turkey, recommended that there should be three separate committees negotiating
with the US for the MOU. Hence, the Oce of Chief of Sta would be negotiating the
military issues; the Foreign Ministry will be conducting the negotiations on the political
issues and the Ministry of Treasury would be negotiating the economic issues.
On December, 28 2002, the US delegation headed by Undersecretary of State
Marc Grossman and the Deputy Secretary of Treasury John Taylor accepted the Turks
proposal that the method of negotiations be conducted on three separate committees. The
same day Grossman put the US demands on the table:42
1. Inspection of the bases,
2. Modernization of the bases,
3. Authorization of use of the airports and sea ports,
4. Permission to the US land forces to enter Turkey,
5. Giving overight rights to the US.
After several weeks of tough negotiations in all three committees, Turkey got almost all of its demands satised and put in the MOU.43
41

42
43

66

It was at the 27 December 2002 NSC that the Turks also decided on what was later appeared
in the press as Turkeys red lines regarding Iraq. Kirkuk and Mosul falling under Kurdish
control; oppression of the Turkomen in Kirkuk and Mosul; and the creation of an independent
(Kurdish) state in northern Iraq were regarded as Turkeys red lights. The crossing of these red
lines would trigger a Turkish military intervention (see Jon Gorvett, Turkeys red lines, U.S.
raid in Northern Iraq Cause Further Strain in Relations, The Washington Report on Middle East
Aairs, 2003, p. 36.
Yetkin, Tezkere, p. 122.
For the details of the MOU see Fikret Bilas four-day column on the MOU, Milliyet, 22-25
August 2003.

A Theoretical Evaluation of Dierent Faces of Power

1. Turkish troops would enter northern Iraq under Turkish command,

2. Turkish red lines would be observed by the US,
3. Turkey would receive nancial compensations for its losses.
On March 1, 2003, to the great surprise of many countries, the Turkish parliament
voted down the resolution that would authorize the US forces to enter Turkey. This was a
clear message from the Turkish MPs, despite the support of the resolution by the government, the military and the Foreign Ministry that Turkey would not be a part of the dirty
war. This was an unexpected situation because, as the above analysis showed, Turkey obtained almost all of its demands in the MOU and that there was a strong backing of the
MOU by the government, the military and the Foreign Ministry. In other words, on the
bargaining level, all signals were in the direction of the Turkish cooperation.
So, similar to the Gulf Crisis (1990) where Turkeys cooperation with the US
could not be explained on the bargaining level, the Turkish non-cooperation with the US
in the War Against Iraq can not be explained on the bargaining level. In other words, on
the bargaining level one rationally expected Turkey not to have cooperated with the US
during the Gulf Crisis, while one rationally expected Turkey to have cooperated with the
US in the War Against Iraq. However, just the opposite happened in both cases. How
do we explain this? Obviously, one has to turn to other levels of analysis (of power) for
possible explanations that the bargaining level fails give.

Analysis Through Structural Power

In this study, it is also a possibility to explain Turkeys cooperative and non-cooperative
behavior (Gulf Crisis and the War Against Iraq, respectively) by looking at the structural
power relationship between Turkey and the US: Turkey imports major chunk of its arms
from the US. In that sense, Turkey is dependent (vulnerable) on US military supplies,
and military parts that Turkey uses, say, in manufacturing F16s. Turkey also needs certain
arms from the US in its attempt to modernize the Turkish military, such as KC-135 tanker aircraft that refuels Turkish F16s in the air. 44 Turkey is also dependent on the US in
attracting US investors and businessmen.45
Moreover, during the 1990s Turkey needed US support in its human rights issues
and its war with the PKK - which Turkey has received so far. For example, the Turkish Daily
News46 quotes Wendy R. Sherman, assistant secretary of state for legislative aairs, saying:
The PKK has stated that its primary goal is to create a separate Kurdish state in part of
what is now Turkey. In the course of its operations, the PKK has frequently targeted Turkish civilians. It has not hesitated to attack Western - including American - interests. The
Turkish government has the right to defend itself militarily from this terrorist threat.47
44

45

46

47

Metehan Demir, Turkish KC-135 refuels F-16s on ight from US to Turkey, Turkish Daily
News, 7 March 1996.
US commerce secretary plans trip to Turkey to promote business, Turkish Daily News, 14
March 1996.
Uur Aknc, State department defends Turkeys right to ght PKK, Turkish Daily News, 3
April 1996.
Ibid.

67

ULUSLARARASILKLER / INTERNATIONALRELATIONS

Sherman also stated that the US did not support negotiations between several
exiled Turkish Kurdish parliamentarians and the Turkish government. Unlike many European countries, she argued that [t]he Kurdistan parliament in exile is nanced and
controlled by the PKK.48 On the human rights issues in Turkey, Sherman supported
Turkey by stating that the Turkish constitutional amendments of summer 1995, and the
amendment of Article 8 of the Anti-Terrorism Act in October 1995 resulted in the release of 130 prisoners.49 Similar support especially on the most recent Turkish constitutional
reforms in the 2000s has continued to be provided by the US.
It is also known that the US has been impartial with regard to the Cyprus issue
compared to the mostly pro-Greek position of the many European countries. Last but
not least, the US has been a rm supporter of Turkeys EU accession.
In short, keeping in mind the Turkish dependency to the US military supplies,
Turkey has received very valuable support from the US in most of its international problems such as the human rights record, the Cyprus issue and Turkeys aspiration to become a EU member. In that regard, Turkey has to take its dependency to the US and the
support from the US it receives for many issues into consideration when it has to make a
decision on an issue which is related to whether to cooperate or not with the US.
In the 2000s, and especially after the US unilateral actions in the post-September
11 era, many Turkish intellectuals and policy makers started to question the Turkish dependency to the US and the need to decrease this dependency. It is also believed that
the Turkish dependency to the US had been damaging the Turkey-EU relations in an era
where there was a rift in the trans-Atlantic alliance and Turkey was very close to start the
accession talks with the EU.50

Analysis Through Hegemonic Power

Turkey has been a member of many important international institutions from their very
beginning, such as NATO. In addition, Turkey had been a close ally with the US during
the Cold War. Especially since the early 1980s, Turkey became closer to the US while
moving away from Europe.51 However, after 1986 the European Community normalized
its relations with Turkey due to the return of the civil government in power in 1983. In
fact, the EU agreed to establish a customs union with Turkey (which came to eect since
January 1996).
48
49
50

51

68

Ibid.
Ibid.
For more details, see the interview of Grkan Zengin with Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogans
chief advisor for foreign relations Prof. Ahmet Davutolu in CNN TURK, 17 February 2004.
After the 1980 military coup detat in Turkey, European Community froze its relations with
Turkey until a democratic civil regime was established again. In that sense, the US moved in
and Turkey moved closer to the US in order to ll the vacuum that was created due to the freeze in the relations between the European Community and Turkey. For further details, see the
introduction in Balkr, Canan, and Allen M. Williams, (eds.), Turkey and Europe, London and
New York, Pinter Publishers, 1993.

A Theoretical Evaluation of Dierent Faces of Power

Having been an important member of NATO and establishing such a close relationship with the US (and its Western European allies) in security issues, led Turkey to
internalize the rules and norms of the hegemon and the international institutions, especially on security issues.
Although Turkey visibly suered huge economic and political losses due to its
sanctioning of Iraq, it would have been very unlikely (or naive) for Turkey to follow a
noncooperative behavior in sanctioning Iraq if we take into consideration Turkeys relations with the US and its membership in many Western international institutions, such as
NATO - whose members were the rst to follow the US lead (International Coalition) in
sanctioning Iraq.
However, in the case of the US War Against Iraq the international conjuncture
was quite dierent from the one in the Gulf Crisis. While the international community
(including the EC members) followed the US leadership in sanctioning Iraq during the
Gulf Crisis, the same international community was very skeptic about the US unilateralism in the post-September 11 era. Most of the members of the international community
believed that the reasons, such as the existence of WMD in Iraq, do not justify the US
operation in Iraq and that the US unilateralism has been damaging the already established
international norms and the credibility of the international institutions created since WW
II (ironically, under the leadership of the US).

Conclusion
Rational models (such as Lisa Martins game theoretical model) on the level of bargaining power fail to provide a comprehensive framework for understanding and explaining
Turkeys both cooperative behavior in sanctioning Iraq and noncooperative behavior in
the War Against Iraq. Empirical quantiable data on the bargaining level does not show
any signicant evidence on why Turkey cooperated with the US in sanctioning Iraq. In
other words, there is no dramatic increase either in the amount of Turkish exports to the
US or in the amount of the US military and economic aid to Turkey after the Gulf Crises,
which could be seen as the US side payments for Turkeys cooperative behavior. In addition, directly observable non-quantiable data gives no (or maybe only a partial) explanation for Turkeys cooperative behavior in sanctioning Iraq in the Gulf Crisis. On the other
hand, empirical data on the bargaining level shows that it was rationally in Turkeys best
interest to be involved in the War Against Iraq in cooperation with the US. In that sense,
the bargaining level explanations fail to explain both the Turkish cooperation with the US
in the Gulf Crisis and the Turkish noncooperation with the US in the War Against Iraq.
However, utilizing the model of three faces of power as a complimentary approach
makes the whole study much more comprehensive, i.e., it provides a more ne-tuned framework. In other words, using a well-designed model of three faces of power minimizes
the likely hasty and ad hoc conclusions of the rational (game theoretical) model.
According to the rational (game theoretical) model of cooperation problem, Turkey cooperated with the US in sanctioning Iraq because either

69

ULUSLARARASILKLER / INTERNATIONALRELATIONS

(1) Turkey was coerced (i.e., either threatened or persuaded by promise of reward) by the US to do so (due to their having conicting interests), or
(2) Turkeys interests coincided with those of the US.
The model of three faces of power opens up the above conclusions, which emerged from the game theoretical model, and allows the researcher to understand
and explain why those conclusions were reached, i.e.,
Turkey was coerced because the US utilized its
-

bargaining power

structural power

hegemonic power, where each one suited for the US interests.

Turkey was coerced by the US to cooperate due to US promise of rewards for cooperative action (on the bargaining level). Turkey cooperated with the US, because the US
manipulated the structural relationship between Turkey and itself (i.e., certain Turkish
vulnerabilities) to trigger a cooperative behavior from Turkey (on the structural level).
Finally, Turkeys interests coincided with the US since the US is a hegemon and Turkey
(similar to the majority of the international community) internalized and took for granted
the rules of the game that the US has established globally.
According to the rational (game theoretical) model of cooperation problem, Turkey
did not cooperate with the US in the War Against Iraq because, although Turkey was coerced (i.e., either threatened or persuaded by promise of reward) by the US, Turkeys interests
did not coincide with those of the US (on the bargaining level). Turkey did not cooperate
with the US, because Turkey was trying to decrease its dependency on the US in order not
to damage its relations with the EU (on the structural level). Finally, Turkey (similar to the
majority of the international community) believed that the reasons, such as the existence
of WMD in Iraq, do not justify the US operation in Iraq and that the US unilateralism
has been damaging the already established international norms and the credibility of the
international institutions created since WW II. Hence, the US unilateral actions and the
attempt to unilaterally change the international norms (the rules of the game) in the postSeptember 11 era, were not internalized by Turkey (on the hegemonic level).

70

A Theoretical Evaluation of Dierent Faces of Power

TABLES

HEGEMONIC

STRUCTURAL BARGAINING

Form of
Power

Table 1: Three Faces of Power*

Goal of the Leader/
(Patron)

Time Frame

Visibility of the
Exercise

Clients Response

Compliance of the client

Immediate,
with the decision of
short-term
cooperation

Direct resistance or
compliance

Directly visible to
observer

Possessing general
means to facilitate the
attainment of he desired
objective=cooperation

Medium term

Eorts to reduce
or eliminate the
dependency/
(vulnerability) to
the leader (patron)

Indirectly visible to
observer

Acceptance by the client

of the rules of the game,
which are established
globally by the leader
(patron) - including the
decision of cooperation

Long-term

No resistance or
eorts to alter the
situation

Not readily visible or

accessible to observer

* The above table is a modied version of Krauses Characteristics of dierent forms of power in Krause, Military Statecraft, p. 321.

Table 2: Turkish Exports to Iraq (in millions of US $) before the Gulf Crises (1990).
Year

Amount

IFS World Total

% (100 x Amount/IFS World Total)

1980

134.8

2,910.1

4.626

1981

558.8

4,702.9

11.901

1982

610.4

5,746.0

10.595

1983

319.6

5,727.9

5.580

1984

934.4

7,133.7

13.100

1985

961.4

7,957.9

12.081

1986

555.3

7,465.7

7.448

1987

946.2

10,190.0

9.287

1988

986.0

11,662.0

8.389

1989

445.0

11,625.0

3.764

Source: Directions of Trade Statistics Yearbook. International Monetary Fund (1985, 1989, 1995).

71

ULUSLARARASILKLER / INTERNATIONALRELATIONS

Table 3: Turkish Exports to the US (in millions of US $) before the Gulf Crises (1990).
Year

Amount

IFS World Total

% (100 x Amount/IFS World Total)

1980

127.4

2,910.1

4.372

1981

268.1

4,702.9

5.710

1982

251.6

5,746.0

4.367

1983

231.7

5,727.9

4.045

1984

368.2

7,133.7

5.162

1985

506.0

7,957.9

6.358

1986

549.3

7,465.7

7.367

1987

713.3

10,190.0

7.001

1988

761.0

11,662.0

6.475

1989

971.0

11,625.0

8.178

1990

968.0

12,959.0

7.213

Source: Directions of Trade Statistics Yearbook. International Monetary Fund (1985, 1989, 1995).

Table 4: US Military and Economic Assistance to Turkey (1991-97)

(millions of US $)
Military

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

Grants

500

475

Loans

50

25

450

405

364

320

175

Economic

250

75

125

120

50

33

22

Source on Military gures: Federation of American Scientists, U.S. Military Aid and Arms Sales to Turkey Fiscal Years 19801999, available at http://www.fas.org/asmp/proles/turkey_fmschart.htm (accessed on May 15, 2009).
Source on Economic gures: Federation of American Scientists, U.S. Security Assistance to Turkey, FY 1984 to 1999, available
at http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/reports/turkeyrep.htm (accessed on May 15, 2009).

Table 5: Purchase of Weapons from the US (1991-99)

1991
697

1992
741

1993
878

1994
951

1995
536

1996
547

1997
1.270

1998
642

1999
803

Source: Federation of American Scientists, Total Dollar Value of U.S. Arms Deliveries to Turkey through the Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Programs from FY 1950 to 1998, available at http://www.fas.org/asmp/
library/reports/turkeyrep.htm (accessed on May 15, 2009).

Table 6: Turkey-US Trade (1991-2000)

(millions of US $)
1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Imports

2.467

2.734

3.428

2.752

2.768

2.846

3.539

3.505

3.217

3.720

Exports

1.005

1.109

1.197

1.574

1.797

1.778

2.120

2.542

2.629

3.041

Source: US Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics, available at http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4890.html

(accessed on May 15, 2009).

72

A Theoretical Evaluation of Dierent Faces of Power

APPENDIX
In Lisa Martins (1992) original model there are four basic types of sanctioning episodes:
1) Player 1 is a strong leader with a dominant strategy,
2) Player 1 is a strong leader without a dominant strategy,
3) Player 1 is a weak leader with a dominant strategy, and
4) Player 1 is a weak leader without a dominant strategy.
In this study, Episode 3 and 4 are omitted, since the leader - the US - is strong, i.e.,
Episodes 3 and 4 are not relevant to our case study.

1) Strong Leader without Dominant Strategy

If the leader state has no dominant strategy to sanction, the outcome depends on whether
the non-leader state has a dominant strategy. This case has three possibilities:
a) The non-leader state has a dominant strategy not to sanction at all,
b) The non-leader state has a dominant strategy to sanction fully, or
c) The non-leader state has no dominant strategy.
Figure 2: Non-leader has a dominant strategy not to sanction at all.
Player 2
(Non-leader)
y=0
y=1

Player 1
(Leader)

x=0

(1, 2)

(4, 1)

x=1

(2, 4)

(3, 3)

- Coercion (1) Players Strategies

X=0 or Y=0

: players impose no sanction.

X=1 or Y=1

: players impose full sanctions.

73

ULUSLARARASILKLER / INTERNATIONALRELATIONS

Figure 3: Non-leader has a dominant strategy to sanction fully.

Player 2
(Non-leader)
y=0
y=1
x=0

(1, 1)

(4, 2)

x=1

(2, 3)

(3, 4)

Player 1
(Leader)

- Coercion (2) Players Strategies

X=0 or Y=0 : players impose no sanction.
X=1 or Y=1 : players impose full sanctions.
Figure 4: Non-leader has no dominant strategy.
Player 2
(Non-leader)
y=0
y=1
x=0

(1, 1)

(4, 2)

x=1

(2, 4)

(3, 3)

Player 1
(Leader)

- Coercion Players Strategies

X=0 or Y=0 : players impose no sanction.
X=1 or Y=1 : players impose full sanctions.

2) Strong Leader with Dominant Strategy

In this case, the outcome depends on whether Player 2, too, is strong with a dominant
strategy. Only if she is will she impose sanctions; otherwise Player1 (leader) will be stuck
with unilateral sanctions (Martin 1992: 20). This can be seen in the gures below. In
Figure 5, both states are strong with dominant strategies. In Figure 6, however, the nonleader state does not have a dominant strategy.
Figure 5: Non-leader is strong with a dominant strategy.

74

A Theoretical Evaluation of Dierent Faces of Power

Player 2
(Non-leader)
y=0
y=1
x=0

(1, 1)

(3, 2)

x=1

(2, 3)

(4, 4)

Player 1
(Leader)

- Coercion Players Strategies

X=0 or Y=0 : players impose no sanction.
X=1 or Y=1 : players impose full sanctions.
Figure 6: Non-leader is strong without a dominant strategy.
Player 2
(Non-leader)
y=0
y=1
x=0

(1, 1)

(3, 2)

x=1

(2, 4)

(4, 3)

Player 1
(Leader)

- Coercion Players Strategies

X=0 or Y=0

: players impose no sanction.

X=1 or Y=1

: players impose full sanctions.

Episode 1, Strong Leader without Dominant Strategy, is not a realistic situation in our study.
It is clear that the US took the initiative in sanctioning Iraq and even consolidated this commitment with the Desert Storm. Therefore, the Strong Leader without Dominant Strategy sanctioning
episode does not provide the correct model for our specic study on the bargaining level.

Episode 2, Strong Leader with Dominant Strategy, is the most suitable model (on the
bargaining level, of course) for our study. It gives a more accurate description of the relationship between the strong leader state - the US - and the non-leader state Turkey.

75

ULUSLARARASILKLER / INTERNATIONALRELATIONS

Figure 5 shows the situation of coincidence, where both states have a dominant strategy to sanction. Here, the equilibrium is where both states fully sanction.
However, Turkeys economic (see Table 2: Turkish Exports to Iraq Before the Gulf
Crises) and political costs52 from possible sanctions give the researcher the doubt
that Turkey might not have a dominant strategy to sanction Iraq. Therefore, there
is a big doubt whether Figure 5 could actually explain Turkeys cooperative behavior (even merely on the bargaining level). Figure 6, on the other hand, is a much
more realistic description of the relationship between the two sanctioners and
their preference orderings than Figure 5. Here, the equilibrium is where the US
unilaterally sanctions while Turkey free rides. Through the use of coercion53 the
strong leader (the US) could induce the other state (Turkey) to change its policy
(towards cooperation on sanctioning Iraq).

52
53

76

See also Grel, Turkey in a Changing World, p. 1-44.

I dene coercion broadly as the persuasion of a state by another to follow a certain course of
action by use of either threats or promises of reward. In this study, I found no evidence to any
visible threats that the US might have used against Turkey. However, there are certain promises
of reward that the US used to gain Turkeys cooperation in sanctioning Iraq. The only visible
threat against Turkey could be the international condemnation that Turkey might have got if it
had not cooperated.

A Theoretical Evaluation of Dierent Faces of Power

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