Mariano vs Comelec

G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995

Facts:
Two (2) petitions assail sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 entitled
An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized
City to be known as the City of Makati as unconstitutional.
They contend that section 51 collides with section 8, Article X and
section 7, Article VI of the Constitution where elective local officials,
including Members of the House of Representative, have a term of
three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more than
three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the new
city shall acquire a new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854
restarts the term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati
and disregards the terms previously served by them. In particular,
petitioners point that section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor,
respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already served for two (2)
consecutive terms. They further argue that should Mayor Binay decide
to run and eventually win as city mayor in the coming elections, he can
still run for the same position in 1998 and seek another three-year
consecutive term since his previous three-year consecutive term
as municipal mayor would not be counted. Thus, petitioners conclude
that said section 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the political
ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.
Issue:
Whether petitioners arguments are tenable for litigation
Held:
No. The court dismissed the petitions.
The court cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of
section 51. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the
constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be
an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must
be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the
constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the
case itself.
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The
petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e.,
that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that
he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek reelection for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that
these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a
hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano)
are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they
hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which
this Court has no jurisdiction.

MMDA vs Bel-Air Village Assoc.

March 27, 2000Puno, J.

Facts
Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of
basic services in Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air Village Association,
Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are
homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City.
Respondent BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road
inside Bel-Air Village. On December 30, 1995, respondent received from
petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated December22, 1995
requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic
starting January 2, 1996.Actions
Filed:
1.BAVA applied for injunction; trial court issued temporary restraining
order but after due hearing, trial court denied the issuance of a
preliminary injunction.
2. BAVA appealed to CA which issued preliminary injunction and later
ruled that MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune
Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its
perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of
Makati by ordinance.
3. MMDAfiled motion for reconsideration but was denied by CA; hence
the current recourse.
Issues
1.Has the MM DA the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic
pursuant to its regulatory and police powers?
2. Is the passage of an ordinance a condition precedent before the
MMDA may order the opening of subdivision roads to public traffic?
Held
The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development authority."
All its functions are administrative in nature.
The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management,
monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and
administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the
MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.

The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community. It is the local government units, acting through their
respective legislative councils that possess legislative power and police
power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City
did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of
Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is
illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling.
The MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan
transportation system but unfortunately the powers granted by its
charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for
public use of aprivate street in a private subdivision without any legal
warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is notantithetical to the
preservation of the rule of law.
Dispositive
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals are affirmed.

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC

Facts:

During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law RA 9009

amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the
annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city
from P20 million to P100 million to restrain the mad rush of
municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the
Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of
fiscal independence.
Prior to its enactment, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills
pending in Congress. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during
the 11th Congress.
During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted
Joint Resolution No. 29. This Resolution reached the Senate. However,
the 12th Congress adjourned without the Senate approving Joint
Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in
the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed between November and
December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress,
individual cityhood bills containing a common provision, as follows:
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009 - The City of x x x shall be
exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic
Act No. 9009.
These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates from March to
July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,
as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also
lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will
reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment
because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set
aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution and the equal protection clause
Held:
Yes, the Cityhood Laws violate both the Constitution and the equal
protection clause
Ratio:Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided,
merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must
follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and

not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The
Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government
Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the
conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such
criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.
MIRANDA VS AGUIRRE

G.R. No. 133064 September 16 1999

FACTS:
1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of
Santiago, Isabela, into an independent component city. July 4th, RA No.
7720 was approved by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite. 1998, RA
No. 8528 was enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that practically
downgraded the City of Santiago from an independent component city
to a component city. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No.
8528 for the lack of provision to submit the law for the approval of the
people of Santiago in a proper plebiscite.
Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that
the said act merely reclassified the City of Santiago from an independent
component city into a component city. It allegedly did not involve any
creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units, therefore, a plebiscite of the
people of Santiago is unnecessary. They also questioned the standing of
petitioners to file the petition and argued that the petition raises a
political question over which the Court lacks jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at
bar.
RULING:
Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court has
the jurisdiction over said petition because it involves not a political
question but a justiciable issue, and of which only the court could decide
whether or not a law passed by the Congress is unconstitutional.
That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government
units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is mandatory.
Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No. 8528.
Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City, Afiado was the President of the
Sangguniang Liga, together with 3 other petitioners were all residents
and voters in the City of Santiago. It is their right to be heard in the
conversion of their city through a plebiscite to be conducted by the
COMELEC. Thus, denial of their right in RA No. 8528 gives them proper
standing to strike down the law as unconstitutional.
Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall
be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of

justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally

demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instru-mentality of the
Government.

Padilla vs. COMELEC

GR 103328, October 19,1992 (214 SCRA 735)
Summary: A plebiscite for a newly created municipality was conducted
and the voters rejected its creation. The governor questioned the result
and challenged the inclusion of the voters of the mother municipality in
the
plebiscite.
Rule of Law: No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to the approval by the majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected
Section
10,
Article
X,
1987
Constitution.
Facts: Republic Act No. 7155 created the new municipality of Tulay-NaLupa in the Province of Camarines Norte and pursuant to this law, the
COMELEC (D) conducted a plebiscite for its approval. In its resolution
for the conduct of the plebiscite, the COMELEC (D) included all the
voters of the Municipality of Labothe parent unit of the new
municipality.
The result of the plebiscite showed that the majority rejected the
creation of the new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. The governor, Hon.
Roy Padilla, Jr. (P), petitioned the court to set aside the result arguing
that the phrase "political units directly affected" in Section 10, Article
X of the 1987 Constitution does not include the parent political unit
the Municipality of Labo.
Thus, petitioner as Governor of Camarines Norte, seeks to set aside
the plebiscite conducted throughout the Municipality of Labo and prays
that a new plebiscite be undertaken. It is the contention of petitioner
that the plebiscite was a complete failure and that the results obtained
were invalid and illegal because the plebiscite, as mandated by
COMELEC, should have been conducted only in the political unit or units
affected, i.e. the 12barangays comprising the new Municipality of TulayNa-Lupa namely Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I,Napaod,
Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa. Petitioner
stresses that the plebiscite should not have included the remaining area
of the mother unit of the Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. In
support of his stand, petitioner argues that where a local unit is to be
segregated from a parent unit, only the voters of the unit to be
segregated should be included in the plebiscite.

Issues: Is the result of the plebiscite valid?

Ruling: Yes. When the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted
"in the political units directly affected," it means that residents of the
political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation
thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. What is contemplated by
the phrase "political units directly affected," is the plurality of political
units which would participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be
included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the proposed
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in the the parent
Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.