Fracture Mechanics
Fracture Mechanics
Fracture Mechanics
In the rst instance, existing procedures are sufcient to avoid f ailure, but are
not followed by one or more of the parties involved, due to human error,
ignorance, or willful misconduct. Poorworkmanship, inappropriate or
substandard materials, errors in stress analysis, and operator error are
examples of where the appropriate technology and experience are available,
but not applied.
One of the most famous Type 2 failures is the brittle fracture of World War II
Liberty ships (see Section 1.2.2). These ships, which were the rst to have allwelded hulls, could be fabricated much faster and cheaper than earlier riveted
designs, but a signicant number of these vessels sustained serious fractures
as a result of the design change. Today, virtually all steel ships are welded, but
sufcient knowledge was gained from the Liberty ship fai lures to avoid similar
problems in present structures.
In 1983, a section of a 4-in. diameter PE pipe developed a major leak. The gas
collected beneath a residence where it ignited, resulting in severe damage to
the house. Maintenance records and a visual inspection of the pipe indicated
that it had been pinch clamped 6 years earlier in the regin where the leak
developed. A failure investigation [3] concluded that the pinch clamping
operation was responsible for the failure. Microscopic examination of the pipe
revealed that a small aw apparently initiated on the inner surface of the pipe
and grew through the wall. Figure 1.2 shows a low-magnication photograph of
the fracture surface. Laboratory tests simulated the pinch clamping operation on
sections of PE pipes; small thumbnail-shaped aws (Figure 1.3) formed on the
inner wall of the pipes, as a result of the severe strains that were applied.
Fracture mechanics tests and analyses [3, 4] indicated that stresses in the
pressurized pipe were sufcient to cause the observed time-dependent crack
growth, i.e., growth from a small thumbnail aw to a throughthickness crack
over a period of 6 years.
Some catastrophic events include elements both of Type 1 and Type 2 failures.
On January 28, 1986, the Challenger Space Shuttle exploded because an Oring seal in one of the main boosters did not respond well to cold weather. The
shuttle represents relatively new technology, where service experience is
limited (Type 2), but engineers from the booster manufacturer suspected a
potential problem with the O-ring seals and recommended that the launch be
delayed (Type 1).Unfortunately, these engineers had little or no data to support
their position and were unable to convince their managers or NASA ofcials.
The tragic results of the decision to launch are well known.
On February 1, 2003, almost exactly 17 years after the Challenger accident, the
Space Shuttle On February 1, 2003, almost exactly 17 years after the
Challenger accident, the Space Shuttle Columbia was destroyed during reentry.
The apparent cause of the incident was foam insulation from the external tank
striking the left wing during launch. This debris damaged insulation tiles on the
underside of the wing, making the orbiter vulnerable to reentry temperaturas
that can reach 3000F. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) was
highly critical of NASA management for cultural traits and organizational
practices that, according to the board, were detrimental to safety.
Over the past few decades, the eld of fracture mechanics has undoubtedly
prevented a Over the past few decades, the eld of fracture mechan ics has
undoubtedly prevented a substantial number of structural failures. We will never
know how many lives have been saved or how much property damage has
been avoided by applying this technology, because it is imposible to quantify
disasters that happen. When applied correctly, fracture mechanics not only
helps to prevent Type 1 failures but also reduces the frequency of Type 2
failures, because designers can rely on rational analysis rather than trial and
error.
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