Marx and Simmel Revisited: Reassessing the Foundations of Conflict Theory

Author(s): Jonathan H. Turner

Source: Social Forces, Vol. 53, No. 4 (Jun., 1975), pp. 618-627
Published by: Oxford University Press
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618 / SOCIALFORCES / vol. 53:4, june 1975

FACTOR VI: INTELLECTUAL-ESTHETIC

.28797
.32563
.33747
.32612

-How frequently a short story or novel on a Jewish topic or about a Jewish person
is read.
-Proportion of paintings, decorations, and other objects in home which are Jewish
in character.
-Proportion of books in home which are Jewish in character.
-Proportion of records in home which are Jewish in character.

FACTOR VII: AFFILIATIONAL (FRATERNAL)

.57303
.57303

-Proportion
-Proportion

of present neighborhood that is Jewish.

of neighbors who visit home that are Jewish.

FACTOR VIII: AFFILIATIONAL

.51469
.51469

(ASSOCIATIONAL)

-Proportion of meetings attended last year at the one Jewish organization in which
respondent was most active.
-Whether respondent was an officer in a Jewish organization last year.

FACTOR IX: ETHICAL-MORAL

.39351
.49008
.48596

-Agrees that a person should give some money to poor no matter what his own
financial situation is.
-Amount of money given to charity last year.
-Percentage of last year's charity given to Jewish causes.

Marx and Simmel Revisited:Reassessing the

Foundations of Conflict Theory
JONATHAN

H. TURNER,

University of California, Riverside

ABSTRACT

An examination of Karl Marx's and Georg Simmel's theories of conflict is undertakenwith an eye toward assessing what they offer contemporary theorizing. The contrasting purposes, metaphysical assumptions, conceptualizations of variables, and propositions of Marx and Simmel are presented and
compared. While there is some overlap in their formulations, the complementary differences in their
schemes provide the broadest foundation for the sociology of conflict.

Over the last thirty years a number of impressive attempts at uncovering the "laws" of
social conflict have been made.' This steady
progress in developing theoretical formulations
has been possible because of the formative
' The list of theoretical efforts is long, but
representative examples would include the works
of Williams (1947; 1970), Mack and Snyder
(1957), Schelling (1960), Boulding (1962), and
Blalock (1967).

efforts of previous generations of scholars.

For indeed the sociology of conflict has stood,
to borrow Newton's famous acknowledgement,
"on the shoulders of giants," including Hobbes,
Bodin, Smith, Mill, Malthus, Marx, and Simmel. It would be foolish, of course, to ignore
the significance of an expanding research literature on the development of these theories,
but perhaps more than any other theoretical
tradition, conflict sociology is indebted to the
conceptual accomplishments of its forefathers.

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Marx& Simmel / 619

Nowhere is this historical debt more evident

than in the contemporary conflict theories of
Ralf Dahrendorf (1957; 1958) and Lewis
Coser (1956; 1967), who have sought to expand, respectively, the Marxian and Simmelian
traditions into a more viable theoretical perspective (Turner, 1975). In a less explicit but
no less profound way, Marx and Simmel have
exerted an enormous influence on other conflict theorists. And it is probably not too much
of an exaggeration to maintain that Marx's and
Simmel's work has been the most influential on
the sociology of conflict. In light of this influence on contemporary theory, therefore, I
think it appropriate to re-examine Marx's and
Simmel's contributions to the theory of conflict
processes and determine if their schemes can
still inform a sociology of conflict.
CONTRASTING ORIENTATIONS TO THE STUDY
OF CONFLICT

While there are points of convergence in Marx's

and Simmel's theoretical approach to the study
of conflict, much more prominent are the
sharp differences. Part of the explanation for
these differences resides in the diverging purposes of Marx's and Simmel's analyses. Simmel
(1908; 1950) was concerned primarily with
abstracting the "forms" of social reality from
ongoing social processes, whereas Marx (1848;
1867) was committed to changing social structures by altering the course of social processes.
Thus, Simmel's analytical scheme was the product of a more passive and less passionate
assessment of conflict, while Marx's scheme
reflected political commitment to activating
conflicts which would change the structure of
society.
These differences in the purposes of Marx's
and Simmel's study of conflict are reflected in
the assumptions they held about the nature
of the social world. Marx's commitment to
social change led him to visualize social systems as rife with change-producing conflict.
While most of his theoretical work was concerned with revolutionary class conflicts in
industrial societies, the basic assumptions underlying this substantive concern can be stated
more abstractly (Turner, 1973; 1974): (1)
Although social systems reveal interdependence of units, these interrelations always reveal conflicts of interest. (2) These conflicts
of interest are the result of the inequal distribution in all social systems of scarce resources,
particularly power. (3) Latent conflicts of interest will eventually lead to overt and violent

conflict among social groupings in a system.

(4) Such conflicts will tend to become bi-polar,
since the unmasking of true interests reveals
that a small minority holds power and exploits
the large majority. (5) The eruption of conflict leads to social re-organization of power
relations within a system. (6) This reorganization creates once again conditions of conflicting interests which set into motion inevitable
processes of bi-polar conflict and system reorganization.
In contrast to these assumptions are those
developed by Georg Simmel who, like Marx,
saw conflict as a pervasive feature of social
systems but also, unlike Marx, failed to perceive that systems could be typified solely by
conflicting interests inherent in relations of
domination and subjugation. Rather, social systems were viewed as a mingling of "associative
and dissociative processes" which were more
easily separated in abstract analysis than in
For
empirical fact (Simmel, 1956:23-24).
whatever the actual nature of social structure,
"we put it together, post factum, out of two
tendencies, one monistic, the other antagonistic." Furthermore, Simmel viewed conflict as a
reflection of more than just conflicts of interests,
but also, of conflicts arising from hostile
"instincts." Such instincts can be exacerbated
by conflicts of interest, or mitigated by harmonious social relations and counteracting
instincts for love, but in the end, Simmel still
saw one of the ultimate sources of conflict
as residing in the biological make-up of humans.
For Simmel, then, systems without conflict
would show "no life process," and the central
theoretical task lay in discovering the basic
forms of this "life process."
A concern with the forms of social interaction led Simmel to study the interplay between "associative" and "dissociative" processes
and how they operate to create and maintain social patterns. Such a concern with assessing the consequences of conflict on social
forms apparently dictated a set of assumptions
about the nature of conflict which differed
markedly from Marx's: (1) The systemic features of social systems can be typified as an
organic intermingling of associative and dissociative processes. (2) These processes arise
out of the instinctual impulses of actors and
the imperatives dictated by various types of
social relationships. (3) Conflict is thus a reflection of instinctual impulses and conflicts of
interest as these are mitigated by other associative instincts and social processes. (4)

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620 / SOCIALFORCES / vol. 53:4, june 1975

While conflict is inevitable and pervasive, it

does not always lead to change in social forms.
(5) In fact, conflict can operate to maintain
the basis of integration in social systems.
The contrasting purposes of their analysis,
coupled with their diverging assumptions about
the nature of conflict, are reflected in Marx's
and Simmel's diverging conceptualizations of
the variables in their respective theoretical
schemes. Since Simmel was looking for the
basic forms of interaction, it is more likely that
he would perceive the variable properties of
conflict. On the other hand, by virtue of his
political commitment to rapid social change,
Marx would be more likely to focus on violent
conflict processes that could initiate desired
social changes. Thus, while Simmel did not
follow his carefully drawn analytical distinctions, he formally conceptualized the variable
properties of conflict phenomena in terms of
(a) the degree of regulation, (b) the degree of
direct confrontation, and (c) the degree of
violence between conflict parties. The end
states of the ensuing variable continuum were
"competition" and the "fight," with competition involving the more regulated strivings of
parties toward a mutually exclusive end and
with the fight denoting the more violent and
unregulated combative activities of parties directly toward one another (Simmel, 1908:58).
On the other hand, Marx paid little analytical
attention to the variable properties of conflict
processes and focussed primarily upon its violent manifestations as social classes directly
confront one another.
Perhaps the most significant contrast between Marx's and Simmel's orientations as they
bear on the development of conflict theory is
the position of conflict variables in their respective causal schemes. For Simmel, conflict
was considered to "cause" various outcomes for
both the social whole and its sub-parts. The
kind of outcome or function of conflict for
the systemic whole or its parts was seen by
Simmel to vary with the degree of violence
and the nature of the social context. Marx was
also concerned with how conflict causes certain
outcomes for social wholes, but unlike Simmel,
he fixed attention largely on the causes of the
conflict itself. Thus, for Simmel, the sources
of conflict remain unanalyzed with emphasis
being placed on conflict intensity and its outcomes for different social referents, while for
Marx, the variables involved in the emergence
of conflict groups are given considerably more
analytical attention than the variables affecting

its outcomes. These differences in the position

of the variables in their schemes reflect Marx's
and Simmel's contrasting assumptions and
purposes. Simmel perceived the source of conflict to be buried in a constellation of "associative and dissociative" processes, as well as in
human "instincts of hate." Apparently, the
variability and complexity of these sources of
conflict made analysis too formidable. Hence,
Simmel considered it more prudent to focus on
the consequences of conflict once it was initiated. For in the end, what was most important
for Simmel was discovering the consequences
of variations on the basic forms of social
interaction-a task which he apparently felt
could be accomplished without delving far into
human instincts. On the other hand, Marx's
commitment to dialectical assumptions about
conflict and change made questions of the
consequences of conflict on social forms easy
to answer: radical alteration of the social
order. The more important issue for Marx was
documenting how such change-producing conflict could emerge in the first place, with the
result that Marx's conceptualization of variables
focused almost exclusively on the causes of
violent conflict.
These contrasts in Marx's and Simmel's
purposes of analysis, assumptions about the
nature of conflict, and conceptualization of
conflict variables are but necessary groundwork for what is theoretically most important:
comparing their propositions on conflict processes. For in the end, a theory is only as good
as the testable propositions it can generate.
Analysis of theoretical orientations of scholars
such as Marx and Simmel is thus useful only
in that it provides information on why certain
propositions are developed and why others are
given little attention.
CONTRASTING THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS

The extent to which the propositions of both

Marx and Simmel underlie many current attempts at building conflict theory becomes
most evident when they are stated abstractly
and thereby divorced from either their polemic
or discursive context. While much of the substantive flavor of each author's discussion is
lost in such an exercise, the theoretical significance of their more abstract ideas for a sociology of conflict can be made more explicit.
For the Marxian scheme in particular, I
think it advisable to abstract above Marx's
polemics and pull out only the most basic
propositions. While this approach may offend

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Marx& Simmel / 621

Marxian scholars,2 it is necessary to supplement

their exhaustive and fascinating scholarship
with a more succinct summary of Marx's contribution to the theory-as opposed to philosconflict. Thus, the
ophy and polemics-of
first basic proposition in his scheme can be
briefly stated as follows:
I. The more unequal the distribution of scarce
resources in a system, the greater will be the
conflict of interest between dominant and
subordinate segments in a system.
In this proposition, Marx viewed the degree
of inequality in the distribution of scarce resources, most notably power, as determining
the objective conflict of interests between those
with, and those without, power. This proposition follows directly from Marx's assumption
that in all social structures, the unequal distribution of power inevitably creates a conflict
of interests between those with, and those without, power. This proposition follows directly
from Marx's assumption that in all social
structures, the unequal distribution of power
inevitably creates a conflict of interests between superordinates holding power and subordinates lacking power. Marx's next theoretical task then involved a documentation of conditions under which a sufficiently high level
of awareness of this inherent conflict of interests can cause subordinates to begin questioning the legitimacy of current patterns of resource distribution. The conditions translating
awareness into a questioning of legitimacy are
summarized in propositions II, IIA, IIB, IIC,
and IID below:
II. The more subordinate segments become
aware of their true collective interests, the
more likely they are to question the legitimnacyof the unequal distribution of scarce
resources.

A. The more social changes wrought by

dominant segments disrupt existing relations among subordinates, the more
likely are the latter to become aware
of their true collective interests.
B. The more practices of dominant segments create alienative dispositions
among subordinates, the more likely are
the latter to become aware of their
true collective interests.
C. The more members of subordinate segments can communicate their grievances
to each other, the more likely they are
to become aware of their true collective interests.
1. The more spatial concentration of
members of subordinate groups, the
more likely are they to communicate their grievances.
2. The more subordinates have access
to educational media, the more diverse the means of their comMinication, and the more likely are they
to communicate their grievances.
D. The more subordinate segments can develop unifying systems of beliefs, the
more likely they are to become aware
of their true collective interests.
1. The greater the capacity to recruit
or generate ideological spokesmen,
the more likely ideological unification.
2. The less the ability of dominant
groups to regulate the socialization
processes and communication networks in a system, the more likely
ideological unification.

In these basic propositions, Marx indicated

that the more dominant groups disrupt the
existing relations of subordinates, thereby
breaking down the very patterns of social
organization which have limited the vision of
2 Probably more offensive to Marxian scholars
subordinates, the more likely are subordinates
is my firm conviction, after my own intense readto
perceive objectively their actual situation
ing of Marx over a number of years, that Marx's
theory is most explicit in his polemical essays. And and alternatives to their continued subordinafurther, the best statement of his theory came tion. For as long as social relations remain
early in The Communist Manifesto (1848). Alstable, it is difficult for subordinates to see
though Marx was to have second thoughts near beyond the immediate exigencies of their
the end of his career on some of the hypotheses
contained in this work, these thoughts were never existence. Disruption of life situations is likely
formulated into clear theoretical statements. For to lead to increased awareness, especially when
those who would be shocked at boiling down the activities of subordinates are highly alienatMarx's thought to a few propositions, I think that ing, allowing little emotional involvement and
they can take solace in the fact that these few satisfaction.
However, disruptive change in,
propositions have been sufficiently profound to
and
alienation
from, current social relations
shape the course of conflict theory in contempoare insufficient to cause widespread awareness
rary sociology.

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622 / SOCIALFORCES / vol. 53:4, june 1975

of true interests: it is also necessary for subordinates to communicate, and mutually reinforce, their grievances. Such communication is
more likely to occur when subordinates are in
close proximity to each other and when they
can become exposed to educational media,
thereby liberating them from traditional means
of socialization and communication. But in
Marx's theory, mere communication of grievances is insufficient, to cause intense questioning of legitimacy. It is also necessary for these
grievances to become codified in a unifying
belief system which can emphasize the common plight and interests of subordinates. The
codification of such a belief system is most
likely when ideological spokesmen, who can
present a consistent viewpoint in an appealing
Imanner, can be recruited. These spokesmen,
and the emerging belief system, can be most
effective when dominant groups are unable to
regulate and control completely socialization
processes and communication networks.
With awareness of their common interests,
Marx then saw the next stage in the conflict
process as involving political organization to
pursue conflict. These organizational processes
are summarized in propositions III, IIIA, IIIB,
IIIC below:
III. The mnoresubordinate segments of a system are aware of their collective interests,
the greater their questioning of the legitimacy of the distribution of scarce resources, and the more likely they are to
organize and initiate overt conflict against
dominant segments of a system.
A. The more the deprivations of subordinates move from an absolute to relative
basis, the more likely they are to
organize and initiate conflict.
B. The less the ability of dominant groups
to make manifest their collective interests, the more likely are subordinate
groups to organize and initiate conflict.
C. The greater the ability of subordinate
groups to develop a leadership structure, the more likely they are to organize and initiate conflict.
In these propositions, Marx summarized
some of the conditions leading to those forms
of political organization which, in turn, will
result in overt conflict. The first key question
in addressing this issue is why an awareness of
conflicting interests and a questioning of legitimacy of the system would lead to organization
and the initiation of conflict. Seemingly, aware-

ness would have to be accompanied by intense

emotions if people are to run the risks of opposing those holding power. Presumably Marx's
proposition on alienation would indicate one
source of emotional arousal, since for Marx,
alienation goes against men's basic needs.
Further, ideological spokesmen would, as
Marx's own career and works testify, arouse
emotions through their prose and polemics.
But the key variable in the Marxian scheme
is "relative deprivation." The emotions aroused
by alienation and ideological spokesmen are
necessary but insufficient conditions for taking
the risks of organizing and initiating conflict
against those with power. Only when these
conditions are accompanied by rapidly escalating perceptions of deprivations by subordinates
is the level of emotional arousal sufficient to
prompt political organization and open conflict
with superordinates. Such organization, however, is not likely to be successful unless dominant groups fail to organize around their interests and unless political leaders among the
subordinates can emerge to mobilize and channel aroused emotional energies.
Thus, while Marx assumed that conflict is
inevitable, his theory of its causes was elaborate
and set down a series of necessary and sufficient conditions for its occurrence. It is in these
propositions that Marx's great contribution to
a theory of conflict lies, for his subsequent
propositions appear to be simple translations
of his dialectical assumptions into statements
of co-variance without the careful documentation of the necessary and sufficient conditions
which would cause these conflict processes to
occur.
In his next propositions, Marx attempted
to account for the degree of violence in the
conflict between politically organized subordinates. The key variable was polarization, a
somewhat vague concept denoting the increasing partitioning of a system into two conflict
organizations:
IV. The more subordinate segments are unified
by a common belief and the mnoredeveloped their political leadership structure,
the more dominant and subjugated segments of a system will become polarized.
V. The more polarized the dominant and
subjugated, the more violent will the ensuing conflict be.
In contrast to his previous propositions,
propositions IV and V do not specify any con-

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Marx& Simmel / 623

ditions under which polarization will occur,

nor do they indicate when polarized groups
will engage in violent conflict. Marx just assumed that such would be the case as the
dialectic mechanically unfolds. Presumably,
highly organized subordinates in a state of
emotional arousal will engage in violent conflict, but as only a cursory review of actual
events underscores, such a state often results
in just the opposite: less violent conflicts with
a considerable degree of negotiation and compromise. This fact points to the Marxian
scheme's failure to specify the conditions under
which polarization first occurs and leads to
violent conflict. And it is not just coincidental
that at this point in his scheme, Marx's predictions about class revolutions begin to go
wrong. Thus, the Marxian legacy points rather
dramatically to a needed area of theoretical
and empirical research: Under what condition
is conflict likely to be violent? And more
specifically, under what conditions is conflict
involving highly organized and mobilized subordinates likely to be violent and under what
conditions are less combative forms of conflict
likely to occur?
The final proposition in the Marxian inventory also appears to follow more from a philosophical commitment to the dialectic than
carefully reasoned conclusions:
VI. The more violent the conflict, the greater
will be the structural change of the system
and the redistribution of scarce resources.
This proposition reveals Marx's faith in the
success of the revolution as well as his assertion that new sets of super-subordinate relations of power would be established by these
successful revolutionaries. As such, the proposition is ideology rephrased in the language of
theory, especially since no conditional statements are offered on just when violent conflict
leads to change and redistribution and just
when it does not. Had Marx not assumed conflicts to become polarized and violent, then
he would have paid more attention to the degrees of violence and non-violence in the conflict process, and this in turn, would have
alerted him to the variable outcomes of conflict
for social systems. In fact, as suggestive as
Marx's propositions are, the entire scheme
suffers from a failure to specify clearly the
interaction of variables. For example, the
scheme begs questions like: What kinds or
types of inequality create what types of conflict
of interest?; or what types of awareness and

questioning actually lead to what degrees of

overt violence and what types of ideological
unification and political leadership producing
what types of polarization leading to what
types of violent conflict cause what types of
structural change? It is to answering these
questions in Marx's theory that contemporary
social theorists must address their efforts.
In contrast to Marx's inventory of basic
propositions, Simmel's had no propositions on
the ultimate causes of conflict. Rather, Simmel's propositions focus on the intensity or
degree of violence or combativeness of conflict
once initiated and on the consequences of
conflicts for the parties to the conflict and for
the systemic whole. While it is regrettable that
Simmel chose not to examine the causes of
conflict, his emphasis on the varying outcomes
of conflict does provide some necessary corrections for Marx's scheme. For I think it is clear
that Marx's inventory begins to break down at
just this point in his analysis, since for Marx,
conflict among organized groups pursuing divergent interests will be violent and lead to
dramatic social reorganization. Simmel's propositions offer some clues as to where Marx
went wrong in these presumptions; and in so
doing, they helped recast the foundations of
conflict sociology.
Simmel's propositions are not always easy
to abstract from his rambling prose, especially
since he tends to argue by example and analogy. As a result of this type of exposition, he
constantly shifts the units and levels of analintra-family conflict to wars beysis-from
tween nation-states. To appreciate Simmel's
significance for a theory of conflict, then, I
think it best to abstract above his discursive
prose and thereby present only what appear to
be the most generic propositions.3 Simmel's
primary concern in analyzing the forms of
dissociation in social systems was with the degree of combativeness or violence conflict. I
3These propositions are abstracted from Simmel's essay on conflict in Kurt H. Wolff's translation of Conflict and the Web of Groulp Affiliations

(1956). The propositional inventory presented

here and elsewhere differs considerably from
Coser's, primarily because many of what Coser
(1956) chose to call "propositions" are, in my
view, definitions or assumptions. I have also taken
more liberty than Coser to re-phrase and state
more generically Simmel's propositions. Further,
in some instances I have omitted propositions
which are not critical to the basic argument. For
a complete listing of Simmel's propositions, see
Coser (1956) and Turner (1974).

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624 / SOCIALFORCES / vol. 53:4, june 1975

have summarized these basic propositions below:

now limited objectives of the group. Thus for

Simmel, consciousness of common interests
I. The greater the degree of emotional in- (Simmel's proposition II above) can, under
volvement of parties to a conflict, the mnore unspecified conditions, lead to highly instrumental and non-violent conflict. Marx's analylikely is the conflict to be violent.
A. The greater the respective solidarity sis precludes this possibility;4 and while Simamong members of conflict parties, the mel's propositions leave many questions ungreater is the degree of their emo- answered, they do provide a corrective to the
Marxian analysis: Conflict among highly orgational involvement.
B. The greater the previous harmony be- nized groups of emotionally aroused actors
tween members of conflict parties, the pursuing collective goals can, under conditions
which need to be specified, lead to using viogreater is the degree of their emolent conflict as only one means to an end
tional involvement.
which, under other conditions which need to
II. The mnoreconflict is perceived by miiemiibers
be specified, can actually lower the probability
of conflict groulps to transcend individuial
of violent conflict. In the context of laboraims and interests, the msore likely is the
management relations, for example, Simmel's
conflict to be violent.
proposition appears to have been more accurate
III. The more conflict is a mneansto an end, than Marx's since violence has more often acthe less likely is the conflict to be violent. companied labor-management disputes, especially in the initial formation of unions, when
Propositions I, IA, IB overlap somewhat
interests and goals are not well articulated. As
with those developed by Marx. In a vein simi- interests become clarified, violent conflict has
lar to Marx, Simmel emphasized that violent been increasingly replaced by less violent forms
conflict is the result of emotional arousal. of social interaction.
Such arousal is particularly likely when conThus, both Simmel and Marx provided an
flict groups possess a great deal of internal interesting set of propositions on how conflict
solidarity and when these conflict groups groups become organized and mobilized to
emerge out of previously harmonious relations. pursue violent conflict, but as Simmel seemed
Marx postulated a similar process in his con- to be pointing out, this very process of mobilitention that polarization of groups previously zation and organization can, in the end, cause
involved in social relations (albeit exploitive less violent forms of conflict. Violence appears
ones) leads to violent conflict. In proposition to be an interim result of initial organization
II Simmel indicated that, coupled with emo- and mobilization, but as groups become highly
tional arousal, the extent to which members organized, they become more instrumental,
see the conflict as transcending their individual thereby decreasing the probability of violent
aims conditions the likelihood of violent conflict. conflict.
Marx analyzed, of course, in considerably more
The curvilinear nature of the conflict process
detail just how such a state of consciousness is further clarified by Simmel's subsequent atis created, since his concern with erasing false tention to the consequences or functions of
consciousness through communication and confiict for the conflict parties and for the
creation of a common belief system represents systemic whole within which the conflict occurs.
a more precise way of stating Simmel's propo- For Simmel first analyzed how violent conflicts
sition.
increase solidarity and internal organization
Proposition III is Simmel's most important, of the conflict parties, but when he shifted to
because it appears to contradict Marx's hy- an analysis of the functions of conflict for the
pothesis that objective consciousness of inter- social whole, he drew attention primarily to the
ests will lead to organization for violent con- fact that conflict promotes system integration
flict. In this proposition, Simmel argued that and adaptation. How can violent conflicts prothe more clearly articulated their interests, the moting increasing organization and solidarity
more focused are the goals of conflict groups. of the conflict groups suddenly have these posiWith clearly articulated goals, it becomes possible to view violent conflict as only one of
4 Admittedly, Marx's late awarenessof the union
many means for their achievement, since other
movement in the United States forced him to
less combative conflicts, such as bargaining begin pondering this possibility, but he did not
and compromise, can often serve to meet the incorporatethis insight into his theoretical scheme.

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Marx& Simmel / 625

tive functions for the systemic whole in which

the conflict occurs? For Marx, such a process
was seen to lead to polarization of conflict
groups and then to the violent conflicts which
would radically alter the systemic whole. But
for Simmel, the organization of conflict groups
enables them to realize many of their goals
without overt violence (but perhaps with a
covert threat of violence) and such partial
realization of clearly defined goals cuts down
internal system tension, and hence, promotes
integration.
To document this argument, I have first
listed below Simmel's key propositions on how
violent conflicts can increase the organization
of conflict parties:
I. The nmoreviolent intergroup hostilities and
the more frequent conflict among groups,
the less likely are group boundaries to
disappear.
II. The more violent the conflict, and the
less integrated the group, the mnorelikely
is despotic centralization of conflict
groups.
III. The more violent the conflict, the greater
will be the internal solidarity of conflict
groups.
A. The more violent the conflict, and the
smaller the conflict groups, the greater
will be their internal solidarity.
1. The more violent the conflict and
the smaller the conflict groups, the
less will be the tolerance of deviance and dissent in each group.
B. The more violent the conflict, and the
more a group represents a minority
position in a system, the greater will
be the internal solidarity of the group.
C. The more violent the conflict, and the
more a group is engaged in purely
self defense, the greater will be the
internal solidarity.
In these propositions, violent conflict, under
varying conditions, will lead to clearer definition of the boundaries of the conflict groups,
centralization of the groups, and increases in
internal solidarity of the groups. When viewed
in the narrow context, most of these propositions overlap with Marx's, but they diverge
considerably when their place in Simmel's overall propositional inventory is examined. Unlike
Marx's inventory, Simmel's does not assume
that conflict begets increasingly violent conflicts between increasingly polarized segments

in a system which, in the end, will cause radical change in the system. This difference between Marx's and Simmel's analyses is dramatically exposed when Simmel's propositions
on the consequences of conflict for the
systemic whole are reviewed. The most notable feature of several key propositions, listed
below, is that Simmel was concerned with less
violent conflicts and with their integrative functions for the social whole:
I. The less violent the conflict between grouips
of different degrees of power in a system,
the motre likely is the conflict to have integrative consequiences for the social whole.
A. The less violent and more frequent the
conflict, the more likely is the conflict to
have integrative consequences for the
social whole.
1. The less violent and more frequent
the conflict, the more members of
subordinate groups can release hostilities and have a sense of control
over their destiny, and thereby maintain the integration of the social
whole.
2. The less violent and more frequent
the conflict, the more likely are
norms regularizing the conflict to be
created by the conflict parties.
B. The less violent the conflict, and the more
the social whole is based on functional
interdependence, the more likely is the
conflict to have integrative consequences
for the social whole.
1. The less violent the conflict in systems with high degrees of functional
interdependence, the more likely it is
to encourage the creation of norms
regularizing the conflict.
These propositions provide an important
qualification to Marx's analysis, since Marx
visualized mild conflicts between super- and
subordinate as intensifying as the conflict
groups become increasingly polarized; and in
the end, the resulting violent conflict would
lead to radical social change in the system.
In contrast, Simmel argued that conflicts of
low intensity and high frequency in systems of
high degrees of interdependence do not necessarily intensify, or lead to radical social change.
On the contrary, they release tensions and
become normatively regulated, thereby promoting stability in social systems. Further, Simmel's previous propositions on violent conflicts
present the possibility that with the increasing

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626 / SOCIALFORCES/ vol. 53:4, june 1975

organization of the conflicting groups, the degree of violence of their conflict will decrease
as their goals become better articulated. The
end result of such organization and articulation
of interests will be a greater disposition to
initiate milder forms of conflict, involving
competition, bargaining and compromise. What
is critical for developing a sociology of conflict
is that Simmel's analysis provides more options
than Marx's propositions on conflict outcomes.
First, conflicts do not necessarily intensify to
the point of violence, and when they do not,
they can have, under conditions which need
to be further explored, integrative outcomes
for the social whole. Marx's analysis precludes
exploration of these processes. Second, Simmel's propositions allow for inquiry into the
conditions under which initially violent conflicts can become less intense and thereby have
integrative consequences for the social whole.
This insight dictates a search for the conditions
under which the level of conflict violence and
its consequences for system parts and the social
whole can shift and change over the course
of the conflict process. This expansion of options represents a much broader, and I suspect
firmer, foundation for building a theory of
conflict.
Finally, Simmel presents two basic propositions on the positive functions of violent conflict for expanding the basis of integration of
systemic wholes:

Should violent conflict no longer be seen as

necessary, with increasing articulation of interests and the initiation of bargaining relations,
then Simmel's propositions IA and IB on the
consequences of conflict for the social whole
would become operative. Thus once again,
Simmel's analysis on conflict offers more options in developing a theory of how varying
types of conflict can have diverse outcomes
for different system referents at different points
in the conflict process.
CONCLUDING COMMENT

In this paper, I have tried to present the key

elements in Marx's and Simmel's theories of
conflict. These theories are most useful when
stated at their most abstract level, for it is in
this form that the debt of contemporary theorizing to these two German scholars becomes
most evident. For those who would resent
such a brief and concise overview, I can only
offer the belief that it is time to pull from
these and other scholars what is theoretically
most useful and move on with the job of
theory building.
Such an exercise as this only becomes possible with the intellectual perspective provided
by the previous scholarship of others. Yet,
theory cannot be the history of ideas, nor
should it only involve debates as to what
scholar said what. In the end, theory must be
bodies of interrelated and abstract statements
relating clearly defined variables. And thus,
III. The mnoreviolent and the more prolonged while this paper lacks the typical scholarship
the conflict relations between groups, the of commentaries on these thinkers, it does take
more likely is the formation of coalitions Marx and Simmel seriously as social theorists
amnong previoutsly unrelated groups in a and therefore asks: What are the interrelated
systemii.
and abstract propositions of their theories?
I
have sought to provide my tentative answer
IV. The more prolonged the threat of violent
to
this most important question and would
conflict between groups, the more endutring
encourage
corrections to my interpretation of
are the coalitions of each of the conflict
Marx's and Simmel's concepts and proposiparties.
tions. For in this way, we can begin to apThese propositions could represent a some- preciate the significance of these intellectual
what different way to state Marx's polarization giants as true theorists in the science of sohypothesis, since conflict was seen by Simmel ciology.
as drawing together diverse elements in a system as their respective interests become more
clearly recognized. But Simmel was not com- REFERENCES
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Professionalization, Bureaucratizationand
Rationalization: The Views of Max Weber*
GEORGE RITZER,

University of Maryland

ABSTRACT

Although it has not been recognized, Max Weber had a great deal to say about the professions and
the relationship between professionalization, bureaucratizationand rationalization. His ideas are very
contemporary. He recognized that professionalization, like bureaucratization,is an aspect of the rationalization of society. Unlike some contemporary sociologists, Weber saw that professionalizationand
bureaucratizationare not antithetical. Finally, Weber understood that a profession must be viewed
from the structural, processual, and power perspectives. Weber's rich understandingof the professions
is attributed to two factors. First, he saw them as part of the rationalization process. Second, his
thinking was not distorted, as was the case with American sociologists, by the aberrant case of the
physician in private practice as the prototype of the professions.

This paper deals with the heretofore unrecognized significance of the concept of a
profession in the work of Max Weber. My
analysis is divided into three sections. First,
there is the place of the professions in Weber's
general analysis of the rationalization of the
Occident and the corresponding failure to develop similar rationality in the rest of the
* This is a revised version of a paper entitled
"Max Weber and the Sociological Study of the
Professions" presented at the annual meeting of
the American Sociological Association, 1974. I
would like to thank Kenneth C. 'V. Kammeyer for
his help with this paper.

world. Second, I develop Weber's concept of

a profession from his widely scattered thoughts
on the subject and relate it to current conceptions of a profession. Finally, I take up
Weber's ideas on the relationship between professions and bureaucracies. I believe that
Weber's thoughts on the professions, and their
relationship to the issues of bureaucratization
and rationalization are extremely significant for
contemporary sociology.
Although Weber's thoughts on the professions have had little effect on the sociology of
occupations, it is ironic that his intimately related work on bureaucracies has been the

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