FM 34-3

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

MARCH 1990

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release: distribution is unlimited

 *FM 34-3
FIELD MANUAL HEADQUARTERS
NO 34-3 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Washington, DC, 15 March 1990

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
,
Table of Contents
Page

Preface iv

CHAPTER 1 - T h e I n t e l l i g e n c e M i s s i o n 1-1
The AirLand Battle 1-1
The Battlefield Area 1-4
The Intelligence Analysis System 1-6

CHAPTER 2 - T h e I n t e l l i g e n c e C y c l e 2-1
Directing 2-1
Collecting 2-2
Processing 2-3
Dissemination 2-18

CHAPTER 3 - O r d e r o f B a t t l e 3-1
Order of Battle Factors 3-1
Order of Battle References 3-6
Order of Battle Records 3-11
Enemy Combat Effectiveness 3-28
Arbitrary Unit Designators 3-28

CHAPTER 4 - Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield 4-1

Purpose of Intelligence Preparation of the 4-3
Battlefield
Development and Use of Intelligence 4-5
Preparation of the Battlefield Products
Weather Analysis 4-21
Threat Evaluation 4-24
Threat Integration 4-26
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield 4-34
During Peacetime

Distribution restriction: Approved for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

*This publication supersedes FM 34-3, 13 January 1986.

 Page

CHAPTER 5 - A n a l y s i s i n D e p t h 5-1
Meeting User Requirements 5-1
Determining the Risk Factor 5-3
The Threat Model 5-5
B i ases 5-11

CHAPTER 6 - Situation Development 6-1

Enemy Capabilities 6-1
Enemy Courses of Action 6-3
Working Situation Map 6-4
Factors of Analysis 6-7
Techniques of Analysis 6-9

CHAPTER 7 - Target Development 7-1

Decide 7-4
Detect 7-8
Del iver 7-12

CHAPTER 8 - Intelligence Support of Electronic 8-1

Warfare Operations
Intelligence Collection to Support 8-1
Electronic Warfare
The Effects of Terrain and Weather on 8-2
Electronic Warfare
Intelligence Required for Electronic 8-2
Warfare Support Measures
Intelligence Required for Electronic 8-2
Countermeasures
●
Intelligence Required for Electronic Counter- 8-3
Countermeasures

CHAPTER 9 - C o u n t e r i n t e l l i g e n c e A n a l y s i s 9-1
Counter Human Intelligence Collection 9-2
Counter Signals Intelligence Collection 9-3
Counter Imagery Intelligence Collection 9-3
Other Intelligence Support to Cl Analysis 9-3
Multidiscipline Counterintelligence 9-13
IntelIigence Support to Combatting Terrorism 9-13

CHAPTER 10 Intelligence Support to Counterinsurgency 1o-1

Support of Counterinsurgency Operations 10-2
Intelligence Estimate 10-2
Processing Information 10-3
Dissemination 10-12
Order of Battle 10-12

ii
 Page

APPENDIX A - Report Formats A-1

APPENDIX B - Automation Support to Intelligence Analysis B-1

APPEND x c - Indicators of Enemy Courses of Action c-1

APPEND X D - Enemy Strength Computations D-1

APPEND X E - T e r r a i n A n a l y s i s i n Intelligence Preparation E-1

of the Battlefield

GLOSSARY Glossary -1

REFERENCES References -1

1 NDEX Index -1

iii
 PREFACE

This publication describes the processes. procedures. and techniques

used to produce all-source intelligence. It focuses on intelligence
production at echelons at corps and below and amplifies the doctrine
contained in FM 34-1. It provides guidance for intelligence staff
officers, warrant officers. NCOs, and intelligence analysts at all skill
levels. it is designed for use by the active Army and reserve components
(RC).

This publ c a t i o n i m p l e m e n t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n a g r e e m e n t
(STANAG) 2077 and quadripartite agreement 511. it is in compliance with
STANAGS 1059, 2033, 2044, 2149, 6004, and 6010: quadripartite agreements
170, 295, 354 492, 523, 528, and 593; and air agreement 101/3D. The
proponent of h i s p u b l i c a t i o n i s H e a d q u a r t e r s , United States Army Training
and Doctrine Command (HQ TRADOC), Submit changes for improving this
publication on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank
Forms) and forward it to the Commander, US Army Intelligence Center and
School (USAICS), ATTN: ATSI-TD-PAL, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613-7000.

iv
 CHAPTER 1

THE INTELLIGENCE MISSION

Intelligence is a key element of combined arms operations. It enables

commanders to use their combat power effectively to win the decisive
battles and it helps them identify and attack high payoff targets (HPTs).
Intelligence is an important part of every combat decision.

The dramatic improvements in intelligence collection systems have

greatly enhanced the availability of battlefield information from many
different sources. Battlefield information, however, is of limited value
until it has been analyzed, Through analysis, this information becomes
i n t e l I i g e n c e . The intelligence analyst integrates the seemingly
insignificant bits of information from multiple sources to produce an
o v e r a l l p i c t u r e o f t h e b a t t l e f i e l d . This picture reduces the
u n c e r t a i n t i e s a b o u t t h e b a t t l e f i e l d a n d t h e s i t u a t i o n . Analysis generates
the intelligence the commander needs to successfully fight on the modern
battlefield.

This chapter describes the commander’s intelligence requirements. It

describes how these requirements are generated and the factors that affect
them. It addresses those elements within the intelligence and electronic
warfare (IEW) system that plan, coordinate, and execute intelligence
analysis operations.
THE AIRLAND BATTLE

Intelligence is a vital part of the AirLand Battle AirLand Battle is

the current US Army doctrine for fighting in a mid- to h i g h - i n t e n s i t y
conflict. It is an extended, i n t e g r a t e d b a t t l e i n v o l v ng the use of all
available air and land forces. It is extended because t h e b a t t l e i s
fought from the forward edge of the area of operation (AO) to the rear
boundary as a single, continuous battle (deep, close, and rear
operations) . It is integrated in that nuclear and chemical weapons, when
released by the national command authority, are merged with electronic and
conventional weapons in all operations.

AirLand Battle Doctrine is offensively oriented. Its success depends

on the ability of friendly forces to take the initiative from the enemy
and to carry the fight into the enemy’s rear. The simultaneous attack of
forward enemy forces and the deep attack of follow-on echelons is inherent
in the battle. Its objectives include the diversion, delay, destruction,
or attrition of enemy fol low-on echelon forces before they can take part
in the close operation. Figure 1-1 shows a sample deep attack.

The commander orchestrates a combination of offensive and defensive

operations to defeat the enemy and gain the initiative. The commander
uses defensive and offensive operations to destroy enemy first-echelon
forces and deep-attack to s i m u l t a n e o u s l y d e l a y , d i s r u p t , a n d m a n i p u l a t e
enemy follow-on forces. The commander anticipates, creates, and exploits
windows of opportunity, using flexible battle planning, to gain the
initiative through offensive operations. By effectively employing
maneuver and fire support assets, manipulating the enemy, and expertly

1-1
 Figure 1-1. Deep attack.

using the weather and the terrain, the friendly commander can successfully
defeat a superior enemy force.

To gain the initiative, the commander must--

0 See the enemy early and determine the capabilities and intentions
of the enemy.

0 Find and track enemy follow-on echelons.

0 Identify enemy high-value targets (HVTs), targets which if

successfully attacked, wilI contribute to the degradation of
important enemy battlefield functions,

0 I d e n t i f y , l o c a t e , and develop the required targeting data for the

attack of HPTs, which if successfully attacked, will contribute to
the success of friendly plans.

0 Detect enemy weaknesses and develop the necessary data to support

the exploitation of these weaknesses.

1-2
 0
Effectively use electronic warfare (EW) to support the AirLand
Battle while protecting friendly use of the electromagnetic
spectrum.

0
Determine the enemy’s capability and guard against that
capability.

0
Protect friendly forces and operations from enemy intelIigence
colIection operations.

0
Use the weather and terrain to friendly advantage.

IEW support is vital to the successful planning and execution of the

AirLand Battle at all echelons. Intelligence support at brigade and
battalion levels focuses primarily on the close operation, while at
division it focuses on both close and deep operations. Corps is the focal
point for intelligence operations that support rear and deep operations.

Intelligence support of close operations supports the commander’s risk

analysis and consideration of mission, e n e m y , t e r r a i n , t r o o p s a v a i l a b l e ,
and time (METT-T). As such it must be the first step in planning.
Intelligence operations reduce risk by identifying the enemy’s most likely
c o u r s e s o f a c t i o n , and so al low the commander to concentrate or disDerse
forces as appropriate. Intelligence also provides administrative and
logistic personnel, engineers, air detense artillery (ADA) staffs, and
other planners with guidelines about the expected situations and enemy so
they may make the best use of scarce assets.

To conduct deep operations the intelligence system supports the . .

commander’s need to look deep, find and follow enemy follow-on forces, and
d e t a r m i n e t h e i r c a p a b i l i t i e s , v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s , a n d i n t e n t i o n s . The
commander must designate the HPTs and decide where and when to attack them
to achieve the greatest benefit to the operation. The commander conducts
deep attacks against designated HPTs to ‘“shape’” t h e b a t t l e f i e l d b y f o r c i n g
the enemy commander to deviate from established plans and to create
favorable conditions for friendly commanders conducting close operations.
To facilitate deep operations, corps-level intelligence planning must
focus its attention on analyzing and estimating enemy capabilities,
intentions, and Iikely courses of action at least 72 hours in advance. At
d i v i s i o n - l e v e l , intelIigence planners must perform this same function at
least 24 hours in advance.

Intelligence support of rear operations supports the commander’s need

to identify enemy capabilities, intentions, and Iikely courses of action
to interdict friendly combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS)
functions, and to inhibit the ability of the friendly commander to
flexibly employ the reserves. The intelligence planner must consider all
means and measures avaiIable to tha enemy, to include sabotage,
unconventional warfare, a i r m o b i l e o r a i r b o r n e a s s a u l t s , n u c l e a r , c h e m i c a l ,
and conventional long-range strikes, deception, and the employment of
maneuver forces in deep exploitation or raiding operations.

1-3
 THE BATTLEFIELD AREA

Commanders consider the battlefield in terms of the time and space

necessary to defeat an enemy force or complete an operation before the
enemy can reinforce. They view the battlefield as having two distinct
areas: the AO and the area of interest (Al).

The AO is that portion of an area of conflict necessary for military

operations. The AO is assigned by the next higher commander and
designated by lateral and rear boundaries. It carries with it the
authority and responsibility to conduct operations therein. The commander
must coordinate with adjacent commanders before conducting maneuver and
fire support (FS) activities outside the designated AO.

The Al is that area of concern to the commander which includes the AO

and areas adjacent thereto. It includes areas forward of, and to the
flanks and rear of the AO. It encompasses areas either occupied by enemv
forces that could jeopardize friendly mission accomplishment and/or which
includes the objectives of friendly current or planned operations.

Each commander determines his own Al. The commander generally relies
on higher headquarters and adjacent units to provide information and
intelIigence about enemy forces in that area. Figure 1-2 shows the
battlefield areas of division.

Battlefield areas are important to the intelligence analyst because

they help focus the information requirements of commanders concerning the
w e a t h e r , t e r r a i n , and enemy forces from battalion to echelons above corps
(EAC) . Specific information requirements are dependent on the mission and
the tactical situation. UsualIy, in conventional operations, information
requirements (IR) on enemv forces are based on the one-up and two-down
formula. Commanders require detailed information about enemy forces at
their equivalent levels of command as well as at one level above and two
levels below their own. For example, brigade commanders need information
about enemy regiments (equivalent level), enemy divisions (one-up), and
enemy battalions and companies (two-down). G e n e r a l l y , the enemy forces of
concern to each commander are found within the command’s AO and Al.

The IEW mission includes four major tasks: situation development,

target development, EW, and counterintelligence (Cl).

Situation development (discussed in Chapter 6) provides commanders

with the intelIigence they need to m ke sound tactical decisions. It is a
continuing estimate of the situation that projects enemy intentions and
the effects of the weather and terra n. Situation development helps
cormnanders--

0 Find and follow enemv forces.

0 Determine enemy capabilities, vulnerability es. a n d i n t e n t i o n s .

0 Identify the enemy main effort.

1-4
 0
Determine how the weather and terrain will affect friendly and
enemy operations.

0
Detect opportunities to exploit enemy weaknesses and seize or
retain the initiative.

0
Assess the relative value of enemy combat systems, which serves as
a basis for selecting HVTs.

Target development (discussed in Chapter 7) provides combat

information, targeting data, and correlated target information which
support the commander’s tactical plans. It focuses on HPTs which have
been selected, through the targeting efforts of the G2 or S2, the G3 or
S3, and the fire support element (FSE), and approved by the commander.
Target development identifies, locates, and tracks HPTs until thev are
neutralized. Target development operations must provide sufficiently
a c c u r a t e t a r g e t i n g d a t a t o a t t a c k b y f i r e , m a n e u v e r , o r electronic means.

Situation and target development provide the intelli gence required to

fight the AirLand Battle. Both are distinct tasks, but are interrelated
and totally integrated to provide an accurate picture of t h e b a t t l e f i e l d .

1-5
 EW (discussed in Chapter 8) exploits, disrupts, and deceives the enemy
c o m m a n d a n d c o n t r o l ( C 2 ) system while protecting friendly use of
communications and non-communications systems. It is a significant force
multiplier when integrated and employed with fire and maneuver. EW
consists of the following functions:

0
EW support measures (ESM), which provide commanders the capability
to intercept, identify, and locate enemy emitters.

0
Electronic countermeasures (ECM), which provide commanders the
capability to disrupt enemy use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

0
Electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM), which are used to
p r o t e c t f r i e n d l y c o m m a n d , c o n t r o l , and communications (C 3) systems
against enemy radioelectronic combat (REC) activities.

Cl (discussed in Chapter 9) includes specific actions which support

the protection of the friendly force. Enemy commanders, to succeed
against friendly forces, must employ all-source intelligence systems to
collect information about friendly forces. Depriving enemy commanders of
vital information about friendly forces is crucial to friendly success on
the battlefield. Cl enhances the operations security (OPSEC) of the
command by supporting the following actions:

0
Countering the hostiIe intelIigence threat.

° Safeguarding the command from surprise.

0
Deceiving the enemy commander.

0
Countering enemy sabotage, subversion, and t e r r o r i s m .
0
Developing essential elements of friendly nformation (EEFI).

THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS SYSTEM

T h e i n t e l l i g e n c e a n a l y s i s s y s t e m IS a s i n g l e , i n t e g r a t e d system that
extends from battalion level to national agencies. Figure 1-3 shows the
all-source intelligence system.

The system includes the directors, coordinators, producers, and

executors. All are linked together both laterally and vertically to
ensure a coordinated and effective effort. Figure 1-4 shows the common
IEW structure.

Ana I ys s e l e m e n t s a r e t h e h e a r t o f t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e s y s t e m . They
include--

0
I n t e Iigence officers and their staff sections.

0
E c h e ons above corps intelligence centers (EACICs).

1-6
Figure 1-3. All-source intelligence system.

EXECUTORS
PRODUCERS UNIT COMMANDERS
Ml, CAVALRY,
ARTILLERY,
G2 SECTIONS MANEUVER,
EACIC ENGINEER,
TOC SUPPORT ELEMENTS AVIATION AND
B ALL OTHERS.

Figure 1-4. Common IEW structure.

1-7
 0
Tactical operations center (TOC) support elements at division and
corps levels.

0
Technical control and analysis elements (TCAEs) organic to
military intelIigence (Ml) combat electronic warfare and
intelligence (CEWI) battalions at division-level and Ml CEWI
brigades at corps-level.

0
Battlefield information coordination centers (BICCs) at maneuver
and artillery battalions and brigades.

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR, COORDINATORS, AND PRODUCERS

The intelligence director (commander), coordinators (staff), and

producers (such as EACICS, TOC support elements, TCAEs, and BICCs) play
the major roles in intelligence analysis.

Commander

The commander plays a critical role in intelligence analysis. The

commander determines what intelligence is needed to plan and execute an
operation. The commander provides guidance to the staff to ensure that
the analysis effort is integrated with the other functional systems of the
command and that it is focused on critical requirements and priorities.
The commander, with the intelligence and operations staffs, accomplishes
the planning, directing, guiding, and decision making that generate
intelligence analysis and keep it going. The commander approves or
modifies the priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) recommended by the
G2 .

Staffs

While the commander approves the PIR for the command, every staff
officer in the command needs intelligence to support the functions under
their staff responsibilities. However, t h e s t a f f o f f i c e r s t h a t a r e m o s t
invoived with intelligence requirements are the G2 or S2, the G3 or S3,
and the FS coordinator (FSCOORD).

G2 or S2. The G2 or S2 manages intelligence operations. This officer is

responsible for intelligence production and for determining the enemy’s
i n t e n t i o n s . The G2 or S2 recommends PIR, based on the commander’s
guidance and concept of the operation. The officer manages the collection
effort, supervises al i-source analysis, and ensures that combat
information and intelligence are disseminated rapidiy. The G2 or S2
deveiops the intelligence estimate. The officer ensures a team effort in
planning, supervising, and executing iEW operations within the command.

G3 or S3. Second only to the commander, the G3 or S3 is the primary user

o f i n t e l l i g e n c e . As the principal planner and coordinator of unit
operations, this officer relies heavily on intelligence support. The
operations officer compietes the estimate of the situation and recommends
which friendly courses of action are feasible and which should be
adopted. These estimates are based on the METT-T, of which a major part

1-8
is provided by intelligence. The G3 or S3 IRs are the same as, only more
d e t a i l e d t h a n , those of the commander. The operations officer plays
a k e y r o l e , in conjunction with G2 or S2, in developing and recommending
the PIR.

The G3 or S3 also has staff responsibility for EW, OPSEC, and

battlefield deception (BAT-D). This officer relies on intelligence ‘ o
plan and coordinate each of these functions.

Fire Support Coordinator. The FSCOORD plans and coordinates FS. Th s

officer needs intelligence for FS targeting and target development. The
FSCOORD, G2 or S2, and G3 or S3 coordinate very closely in selecting HPTs
and developing targeting data for attacking HPTs.

Tactical Operations Center Support Elements

The TOC support elements provide dedicated intelligence support to the

G2 or S2. TOC support elements, which are assigned to the headquarters
and headquarters company (HHC) of the division, or the operations
battalion of the corps Ml brigade, perform intelligence collection
management (CM), a n a l y s i s , a n d d i s s e m i n a t i o n f u n c t i o n s . The all-source
production section (ASPS) or equivalent element within the TOC support
element performs intelligence analysis. Other TOC support element
sections are collection management and dissemination (CM&D) and Cl
analysis, which support the G2: and the EW and OPSEC staff elements, which
support the G3. There is also an informal targeting team formed in the
DTOCSE and CTOCSE to assist in the targeting effort.

The ASPS works under the staff supervision of the G2 or S2. It

develops and maintains the intelligence data base. It develops
intelligence from unprocessed information and other intelligence
products. It performs IPB, assists the G2 or S2 in developing the
intelIigence estimate, and develops the analysis of the battlefield area.
It also develops situation and targeting data to support maneuver, fire,
and other battlefield functions. Each ASPS coordinates with other TOC
support elements to ensure that all available data is evaluated and to
exchange analysis approaches, techniques, and ideas for solving common
intelligence problems.

Technical Control and Analysis E eme n t

The TCAE, in addition to managing the signals n t e l l i g e n c e ( S I G I N T )

collection and EW assets, performs SIGINT analysis f o r t h e c o m m a n d . I t
mainta ns the enemy electronic order of battie (EEOB) and technical data
bases. It analyzes and correlates ESM and SIGINT data from all sources o
update the EEOB and technical data bases needed to produce SIGINT. It
passes SIGINT data to the ASPS for correlation with information and
i n t e l l gence from other sources.

Battlefield Information Coordination Centers

The BICCs are organic to maneuver brigades, battalions, and other

support units. They consist of analysts who operate within their unit

1-9
TOCS as an integral part of the S2 section. They provide an organic
inte Iigence management, production, and dissemination capability. B I CCs
vary in the size and type of support they provide, For example, maneuver
unit BICCs concentrate on both situation and target development, while
arti Iery unit BICCs are almost exclusively interested in target
acqu sition (1A) and development.

INTERACTION OF ANALYSIS ELEMENTS

Close coordination and interaction between analysis elements make the
system function effectively. Analysis elements at all echelons exchange
requirements, information, and intelligence both laterally and vertically
throughout the system. At the same time they disseminate combat
information and intelIigence to maneuver, FS, a n d o t h e r u n i t s t h a t need
it.

1-1o
 CHAPTER 2

THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

Intelligence operations follow a four-phase process known as the

intelligence cycle. The intelligence cycle is oriented to the commander’s
mission. Supervising and planning are inherent in all phases of the
cycle. Figure 2-1 shows the intelligence cycle.

The intelligence cycle is continuous. Even though the four phases are
conducted in sequence, all are conducted concurrently. While available
information is processed, additional information is collected, and the
intelligence staff is planning and directing the coIIection effort to meat
new demands. Previously collected and processed information
(intelligence) is disseminated as soon as it is available or needed.

This chapter describes the procedures outlined above and the

processing phase of the intelligence cycle.

DIRECTING

T h e i n t e l l i g e n c e e f f o r t b e g i n s by determining requirements,
e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e i r p r i o r i t i e s , a n d communicating information or
i n t e l l i g e n c e c o l l e c t i o n o r d e r s ( t o subordinate elements) and requests (to

2-1
 higher and adjacent units). This is accomplished by the commander and the
intelligence and operations staff. Sources of information or intelligence
requirements include the following:

0
Commander’s planning guidance, concept of the operation, and
stated requirements.

0
METT-T analysis by intelIigence and operations staffs.

0
Requests for intelIigence information (RIIs) from higher,
adjacent, allied, and subordinate units and elements, and from other
staff elements within the command.

The highest or most important IRs are designated as PIRs. The

commander chooses PIRs based in part on the recommendation of the G2 or
S2. PIRs are those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an
anticipated and stated priority in the task of planning and decision
mak i ng. However, an excessive number of PIRs degrades efforts to focus
relatively scarce intelligence collection resources on the most essential
intelIigence requirements.

IRs are those items of information regarding the enemy and the
environment needing collection and processing to meet the intelligence
requirements of the commander. IRs can either support PIRs or be
stand-alone requirements of a lesser priority than PIRs. Both PIRs and
IRs serve as the basis for collection and intelligence efforts.

Intelligence analysts in the ASPS advise the G2 regarding the PIRs and
. IRs. They analyze METT-T factors and the commander’s guidance and concept
of the operation to determine what intelligence and information is
needed. The ASPS reviewa the existing data base to identify information
that is already available and that which must be acquired. They pass
requirements for new information to the CM&D section as additional
collection requirements. Figure 2-2 shows the directing phase from the
commander’s intent to the commander’s requirements.

COLLECTING

Based on requirements, the CM&D section manages the collection effort.

The CM&D section develops a collection plan that is keyed to the PIRs and
IRs. It continuously updates the collection plan as the situation
changes.

The ASPS assists the CM&D section in planning and supervising the
collection effort. The ASPS helps convart intelligence requirements into
specific information requirements (SIR). SIR are keyed to indicators (see
Appendix C) which when integrated with other indicators and factors
present on the battlefield may provide clues to the enemy’s most probable
course of action. The ASPS monitors incoming reports, advises the CM&D
s e c t i o n w h e n P I R o r I R a r e s a t i s f i e d , identifies naw requirements, and
determines when previously requested information is no longer needed.

2-2
 Figure 2-2. Commander’s requirements and guidance.
Collection operations generate information from various sources. This
information is fed into the ASPS. The ASPS--

0
Reports combat information immediately.

0
Processes information to develop the intelIigence needed for
tactical decisions and targeting.

PROCESSING

Processing is the phase in the intelligence cycle in which information

becomes intelligence. It consists of three operations:

0
Recording. Recording is the reduction of information to writing
or some other form of graphical representation and the arranging of
this information into groups of related items.

2-3
 o Evaluation. Evaluation is the determination of the pertinence of
i n f o r m a t i o n t o t h e o p e r a t i o n . reliabiIity of the source or agency,
and accuracy of the information.

0 Analysis. Analysis is the determination of the significance of

the information. relative to information and intelIigence already
known, and drawing deductions about the probable meaning of the
evaluated information.

Processing is a continuous operation. The analyst processes new

information as it is received without waiting for additional information.
Intelligence derived from fragmentary information is essential,
particularly during fast-moving operations or when the information
concerns an HPT. Normally there is a time lag between the time an enemy
target presents itself and the time the information becomes available to
a n e l e m e n t t h a t c a n r e a c t t o i t . Complete information about a target or a
situation is seldom available. The analyst continuously identifies
information gaps and attempts to acquire information to complete, confirm,
o r r e f u t e f r a g m e n t a r y i n f o r m a t i o n . This information must assist the
corrmander to generate and apply combat power. It helps the commander to
strike critical units or areas, and to achieve and retain the initiative.
Figure 2-3 shows information processing.

Figure 2-3. information processing.

2-4
 The sequence for processing varies with the nature and urgency of the
information. Information is normally recorded first: however, if it
contributes to the development of urgent intelIigence, it is recorded
simultaneously with or after evaluation and analysis. Combat information
or partially developed intelIigence that is needed immediately is
disseminated before it is completely processed. Information that is not
of immediate value is processed before it is disseminated.

Evaluation and analysis may occur simultaneously followed by immediate

dissemination. For example, information from a reliable source may
indicate that the enemy is about to launch a major attack, In this case,
recording is of secondary importance, and the intelligence report that an
attack is imminent is disseminated as soon after receipt as possible.

Reporting of information to higher and lower echelons occurs

concurrently with processing, For example, to speed target execution
time of HPTs, a commander orders lower headquarters to report all
information concerning specified enemy units, areas, or activities before
the processing cycle is complete. Lower headquarters make similar
requests of higher headquarters,

A sound collection program that effectively uses collection assets

results in a heavy volume of information. Some information may be of no
use to the collecting unit, but of great value to adjacent, higher, or
lower units. This includes many reports which may appear insignificant
and unrelated to other information. However, when these reports are
analyzed along with other available information, definitive and
predictable patterns of enemy activity often emerge.

Today, most information is processed manually. Emerging automatic

data processing (ADP) systems help the analyst process greater volumes of
information faster and mors accurately. Appendix B describes ADP support
to intelligence analysis. Developing and maintaining an intelligence data
base is essential to processing. The data base is the basis for analyzing
new information neaded for situation and target development as well as CM,
EW , and Cl operations. When possible, intelIigence data bases are created
f o r contingency areas during peacetime. Initially, data base information
and intelIigence are c o I I e c t e d b y r e s e a r c h i n g a v a i l a b l e I i t e r a t u r e
pub ished by various agencies and sources, i n c l u d i n g t h e f o l l o w i n g :

0
Central I n t e l l gence Agency (CIA).

0
D e f e n s e I n t e l l gence Agency (DIA).

0
N a t i o n a l S e c u r ty Agency (NSA).

0
US Army Intelligence Agency (USAIA),

° Unified and specified commands.

0
Theater commands.

2-5
 0
Allies.

0
Open sources.

The analyst identifies gaps in the data base and passes requirements
to the collection manager. As information is received from t h e v a r i o u s
collection agencies, it is correlated with existing information in the
data base to assess its significance. Combat information, often highly
perishable in nature, is disseminated immediately.

RECORDING

Recording information into the data base makes evaluation and analysis
easier and more accurate and facilitates preparation of intelligence
reports by conveniently drawing together all available information on a
s p e c i f i c s u b j e c t . The recording means used must be adequate to handle the
volume of information and intelligence received and to serve the needs of
those who must have access to it. Means and techniques of recording must
permit timely dissemination of information and intelligence.

Recording is more complex at higher command echelons. At division

level and above, ADP systems assist in the recording function. Some of
the more common recording devices are listed below. Others are used when
required.

0
I n t e Iigence journal.

0
I n t e Iigence files.

0
Situation map (SITMAP).
0
IntelIigence workbook.

0
Coordinate register.

0
Order of battle (OB) records.

Intelligence Journal

T h e j o u r n a l i s a n o f f i c i a l , p e r m a n e n t , and chronological record of

reports and messages that have been received and transmitted, important
events that have occurred, and actions taken in response. Accuracy and
completeness are essential , since various elements of the headquarters
will refer to it later. It covers a specified time period, usually 24
hours. Journal entries should reflect--

0
An accurate and concise statement of the message, report, or
event.

0
A notation about the sender or individual making the report, to
include unit duty position and section: for example, S3 1/60
Infantry Battalion.

2-6
 0
The time of receipt or dispatch and method of transmission.

0
A c t i o n t a k e n a s a r e s u l t , to include dissemination given to
r e p o r t s , o t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n r e c e i v e d , and other internal G2 recording
(workbook, SITMAP),

Journal entries are concise and record the time and essential facts.
As a minimum the journal entries include--

0
P u r p o s e , subject, and conclusions of conferences.

0
Command decisions and summarizations of plans.

0
Movements of enemy units, one echelon above and two echelons below
your own level,

0
Significant messages (radio, radio teletypewriter (RATT),
h a r d - c o p y , o v e r l a y s , p h o t o s , and any other verbal or written
reports) transmitted and received.

0
Incidents of enemy activity.

0
Friendly patrol activity.

0
Liaison activities.

0
C h a n g e s i n p e r s o n n e l w i t h i n t h e s t a f f s e e ” ion.

0
Summaries of written messages and orders.

0
Summaries of action based on enemy and fr e n d l y activity.

Figure 2-4 shows a partially completed intelligence journal

(DA Form 1594).

Intelligence Files

Intelligence files permit ready access to all ava Iable information.

The files most commonly maintained are the journal fil e , r e f e r e n c e f i l e ,
and OB file.

Journal File. T h e j o u r n a l f i l e c o n t a i n s a l l p r e v i o u s y recorded journal

sheets and supporting materials. Supporting material referenced on the
j o u r n a l s h e e t i s f i l e d i n c h r o n o l o g i c a l s e q u e n c e . I t includes copies of
orders, periodic reports, messages, memoranda, conference notes, map
overlays, and other material required to support the journal entries. The
journal number is annotated on the supporting document. The unit SOP
normally describes procedures for maintaining a journal. One good method
is to begin the annotation with the letter “J,” followed by the date and
an entry number. The fifth entry on June 23d would read “’J-23-05.”

2-7
Figure 2-4. Intelligence journal sample page.

2-8
 Reference File. The reference file includes all information that is not
of immediate interest but may be of future value. Information is
cross-indexed to permit easy retrieval.

OB File. The OB file is discussed in Chapter 3.

Working Situation Map

The working situation map (SITMAP) is the primary analytic tool at all
echelons. It is a temporary graphic display of the current dispositions
and major activities of the enemy. Information about friendly forces on
t h i s m a p u s u a l l y i s l i m i t e d t o b o u n d a r i e s ; locations of command posts
( C P s ) o f h i g h e r , l o w e r , a n d a d j a c e n t u n i t s ; reconnaissance units; the
forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), and forward line of own troops
(FLOT) . The level of detail of the working SITMAP will be proportionate
to the echelon at which it is maintained.

Generally, enemy maneuver units are posted which are two echelons
below that of the friendly unit. Enemy units, regardless of size, in our
rear area are always posted because of the amount of damage they can do to
administrative and logistical nodes.

Enemy headquarters (especially regimental and higher levels) and CS

and CSS asset locations are also posted. The SITMAP reflects enemy unit
identification, disposition, and boundaries; major roads or trails for
movement of personnel, weapons, and equipment; and locations of, for
example--

0
Automatic weapons (battalion SITMAP only).
●

0
S u p p o r t i n g m o r t a r s ( b a t t a l on SITMAP only).
0
A n t i t a n k g u n s ( b a t t a l i o n S TMAP only).

0
Artillery,

0
Air defense artilIery.

0
Minefields.

0
Roadblocks.

0
Entrenchments.
0
Obstacles.

0
Defensive positions.

0
Logistics and command facilities.
0
Aircraft and helicopter staging areas.

0
Nuclear, b i o l o g i c a l , and chemical (NBC) contaminated areas.

2-9
 0
Ground surveiIlance devices.

0
Smoke screens.

When plotting enemy activities and dispositions, indicate the latest

time at which the activity was observed or the disposition confirmed. The
S2 ensures that the working SITMAP and supporting overlays are maintained
as simply as possible and that authorized conventional signs, mil itary
symbols and abbreviations are used. See FM 101-5-1 for authorized
abbreviations and map symbols. Explain any deviations from these symbols
in the marginal data on the map or overlay, Necessary classification
markings also must appear in the margins of maps and overlays.

Rather than attempting to plot all entries on a map by means of

conventional or Improvised military symbols, the S2 uses a number or
letter to plot the area where the activity was observed. A corresponding
letter or number then is entered into a space alongside the map and a
notation entered as to the activity observed. Use a number or letter that
is easily cross-indexed to the journal or message file for a complete
report. Ensure that the number or letter indicating an activity in the
journal file matches that on the working SITMAP (see “action taken” column
in Figure 2-4).

Care must be taken to prevent overcrowding the map, One method of

doing this is to group entries by categories on a series of acetate
overlays. Use separate overlays to display separate categories of
information. A typical separate overlay might show fortifications or
p o t e n t i a l t a r g e t s o r d e t a i l s o f O B . An enlarged sketch map also is
prepared to cover overcrowded areas. This allows the presentation of
additional details.

The working SITMAP (discussed in this chapter) and the OB SITMAP

(discussed in Chapter 3) are two separate items. Although the same types
of information are recorded on each, their functions differ. The G2 or S2
uses the working SITMAP for recording and analyzing. The OB SITMAP
normally is less cluttered than the working SITMAP.

Maintenance of the OB SITMAP at brigade and battalion levels usually

is a joint S2 and S3 action. A t h i g h e r l e v e l s , each section maintains a
separate SITMAP. Plotting the friendly situation is the responsibility of
the S3, while the enemy situation is the responsibility of the S 2 . Dur ing
operations, personnel from either section map or plot friendly or enemy
entries on the SITMAP and perform other processing functions.

When the intelligence and operations staffs use separate maps, ensure
that acetate overlays are readily interchangeable between these maps.
This permits easy comparison of the current enemy situation (G2 or S2 map)
with the disposition of friendly forces (G3 or S3 map), and easy
comparison of enemy obstacles, barriers, a n d m i n e f i e l d w i t h p l a n n e d
routes of march.

Examples of separate SITMAP overlays are--

2-10
 0
Enemy fortifications.

0
High value targets.

0
Obstacles.

0
OB data.

0
Friendly reconnaissance patrols.

0
SurveiIlance activities (include the ground coverage of each
system).

The maintenance of the working SITMAP takes precedence over ail other
recording means during combat operations. In a fast-moving situation,
particularly at the maneuver battalion level, it is the oniy recording
device used.

The working SiTMAP is continually purged of information that is not

current or otherwise no longer needed. Purging keeps it neat and
u n c l u t t e r e d , m a k i n g i t m o r e u s e f u l a s a n a n a l y s i s t o o l . Map overlay
tracings or periodic photographs of the SITMAP provide a permanent record
of the situation. These records provide a reference to past enemy
activity and help determine patterns of enemy movement and dispositions.

Use the working SITMAP to make sound tactical decisions; its primary
intelligence uses are to--

0
Display the enemy disposition and situation.

0
Provide a basis for comparison to determine the significance of
newly received data about enemy forces. IPB situation and event
templates provide a basis for comparison.

0
Provide a background and basis for briefings and other required
intelligence reports.

0
Provide the basis for overlays which graphicalIy portray the enemy
situation.

0
Assist in the determination of movement patterns of guerrilla or
insurgent forces.

0
Show possible intelligence gaps which require redirection of the
collection effort. For example, the need to locate and identify
enemy units reported for the first time.

F o r s e c o n d a r y i n t e l l i g e n c e u s e , post the following information in the

margin of the working SITMAP or on charts or cards nearby:

0
Computations of enemy personnel and weapon strengths and
weaknesses.

2-11
 0
Organization charts of specified enemv units.

0
Summaries of weather and terrain data.

0
A listing of PIR and IR.

0
Notations about the current patrol plan.

0
Movement computations.

0
A listing of friendly attachments.

° A l i s t ng of unlocated enemy units be eved to be in the AO.

0
P r o b a b e courses of action.

0
B a t t l e damage assessment (BDA).

Chapter 6 describes how the SITMAP is used in situation development.

Intelligence Workbook

The intelligence workbook contains information arranged by subject

heading. This arrangement helps to sort, evaluate, interpret information,
and prepare intelIigence reports. It is not a permanent record and it is
not distributed to an outside agency. The workbook is kept current with
o b s o l e t e e n t r i e s d e l e t e d . At higher echelons, a n a l y s t s m a i n t a i n s e p a r a t e
workbooks on various subjects.

There is no prescribed format for the workbook. At division and lower

headquarters, u s e i n d e x t a b s t o l a b e l i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e
summary (lNTSUM). At corps and higher levels, use index tabs to label
information in the periodic intelligence report (PERINTREP).

Record incoming messages and reports; f o r e x a m p l e , i n f o r m a t i o n

concerning a newly identified armor unit could be recorded under index tab
3A, NEW UNITS, as well as index tab 2B, ARMOR. A message that furnishes
information on different subjects results in several entries: each entry
contains only that subject information. For example, a message containing
information on the locations of a reserve armor unit and an artilIery unit
results in extracts under item 2B, ARMOR and under 2C, ARTILLERY. Base
each entry in the workbook on an incoming message and include a reference
to the journal serial number of that message. For example, J2, 091200
April, from 20th Engr Cbt Bn: “Bridge at LINDEN AB 910246 destroyed by
bombing. Estimated out of action for 30 hours.”’ The J2 refers to the
journal serial number and the date-time group (DTG) entered refers to the
time of occurrence of the event. The intelligence officer makes written
comments on the evaluation of the information and its possible
significance following the appropriate entry.

Figure 2-5 shows a sample intelligence workbook which might be used at

corps and higher levels.

2-12
 I

* m.. . . .

EVALUAT 10N

Evaluation includes determining the pertinence of information, the

reliability of the source or agency through which the information was
derived, a n d i t s c r e d i b i l i t y . Evaluation of information at the lower
echelon is a simple step compared to the procedures employed at higher
echelons. From the viewpoint of the brigade or battalion S2, information
which relates to the unit’s AO and Al is pertinent; information relating
to areas outside the area of interest may or may not be pertinent. The
brigade or battalion S2 may not be able to judge the reliability of a
source because the S2 may not have repetitive contact with that source.
This difference between higher and lower echelons is because information
received from higher headquarters normalIy has been processed, evaluated,
and interpreted and the information coIIected by organic agencies at lower

2-13
eche o n s g e n e r a l l y i s a c q u i r e d b y d i r e c t o b s e r v a t i o n o r a c t u a l c o n t a c t
w i t h the enemy.

Pertinence

pertinence is the examination of information to determine whether or

n o t t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i s --

0
Pertinent with regard to the enemy or to the battlefield area.
Information that relates to a unit’s AO or Al normally is pertinent.

0
Needed immediately, and if so, by whom? Of possible present or
f u t u r e v a l u e , a n d i f so , to whom?

Reliability

The source of nformat on and the agency by which it was collected are
both evaluated for r e l i a b i l i t y . The principal basis for judging the
reliability of a source or an agency, other than troop units, is previous
experience with the source. C r i t e r i a f o r e v a l u a t i n g t r o o p u n i t s include a
knowledge of their training, experience, and past performance.

The headquarters closest to the source or agency is ordinarily the

best judge of its reliability. Consequently, a higher headquarters
normally accepts the reliability evaluation performed by a reporting
headquarters. It does, however, consider the reliability of the reporting
headquarters itself.

Credibility ..

Credibility means the probable truth of the information. Judgment of

credibility is based on the answers to the following questions:

0
Is it possible for the reported fact or event to have taken place?

0
Is the report consistent within itself?

0
I s t h e r e p o r t c o n f i r m e d o r corroborated by information from
d i f f e r e n t s o u r c e s o r a g e n t es?

0
D o e s t h e r e p o r t a g r e e o r d sagree in any way with other available
information?

0
If the report does not agree with information from other sources
or agencies, which one is more Iikely to be true?

The most reliable method of judging the accuracy of a report is by

comparing it with similar information which already may be available in an
intelIigence file or workbook. When possible, t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e o f f i c e r
obtains confirming or refuting information through different agencies and
from other sources.

2-14
 M a r k e d d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e a c c u r a c y o f i n f o r m a t on
may occur between higher and lower echelons. The reason for this
difference is because higher echelons, which have more sources of
information and intelIigence than lower echelons, have a greater
opportunity to confirm, corroborate, or refute the accuracy of repor
data. Regardless of the source, reevaluate the accuracy of incoming
information and intelligence at each echelon. Thus, the role of higher
echelons in evaluating the credibility (or probable truth) of information
differs somewhat from its role in evaluating the reliability of the source
(again, usually done best by the echelon closest to the source),

The evaluation rating of each item of information is indicated by a

standard system. Reliability is shown by a letter; accuracy by a
numeral . The lowest headquarters possible assigns the evaluation ratings.

Indicate the reliability of the source and agency as follows:

A - comp e t e l y reliable.

B - usua I y reliable.

c - f a i r y reliable.

D - not sually reliable.

E - unreliable.

F - reliability cannot be judged.

A rating of “A” indicates only the most unusual circumstances. For

example, this evaluation is given when it is known that the source has
long experience and extensive background with the type of information
reported. A rating of “B” indicates a source of known integrity. A
rating of “’F” indicates there is no basis for estimating the reliability
of the source.

Agencies ordinarily are rated A, B, or C. However, when the source

and the collecting-reporting agency are evaluated differently, only the
lower degree of reliability is indicated.

Indicate the credibility of information as follows:

1 - confirmed by other sources.

2 - probably true.

3 - possibly true.

4 - doubtfully true.

5 - improbable.

6 - truth cannot be judged.

2-15
 If it can be stated with certainty that the reportsd information
originates from a source other than that for already existing information
on the same subject, it is classified as “confirmed by other sources” and
is rated “’l.’”

If no proof in the above paragraph can be established, and if no

reason exists to suspect that the reported information comes from the same
source as the information already avaiIable, it is classified as “’probably
true” and is rated “2.’

If the report is confirmed in essential parts by information already

a v a i l a b l e , it is classified as “probably true”’ and is rated “2.”

If the investigation reveals that the raported facts, on which no

f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n i s y e t a v a i l a b l e , are compatible with the previously
observed behavior of the target, or if the known background of a person
leads to the deduction that the person might have acted as reported, the
i n f o r m a t i o n r a c e i v e d i s c l a s s i f i e d a s “possibly true”’ and is rated “3.”

Reported but unconfirmed information, which c o n t r a d i c t s t h e e s t i m a t e

of the development or the known behavior of the t a r g e t , i s c l a s s i f i e d a s
“doubtful” and is rated “’4’” if this information cannot be disproved by
available facts.

Reported information which is not confirmed by available data and

contradicts the experience hitherto assumed to be reliable with regard to
the development of a target or issue is classified as “improbable” and is
rated "5.” The same classification is given to reported information that
contradicts existing data on a subject originally given the rating “’l” or
“2.”

If the investigation of a report reveals that a basis for rating 1 to

5 is not given, the reported information is classified as “truth cannot be
judged”’ a n d i s r a t e d “ 6 . ”

The statement “truth cannot be judged” is always preferred ovar the

inaccurate use of ratings 1 to 5. If there is no sound basis for rating
1 to 5 because of the complete absence of other information on the same
t a r g e t , it must be rated 6.

The scale 1 to 6 does not represent progressive degrees of accuracy.

Recognition must be given to the rating represented by the numeric symbol.

Although both letters and numerals are used to indicate the evaluation
of an item of information, they are independent of each other. A
completely reliable agency may report information obtained from a
completely reliable source which, o n t h e b a s i s o f o t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n , i s
judged to be improbable. In such a case, the evaluation of the
i n f o r m a t i o n i s A - 5 . A source known to be unreliable may provide raw
information that is accepted as accurate information, when confirmed by
reliable sources. In this case, a report is evaluated E-1. A report
evaluated F-6 may be accurate and should not be arbitrarily discarded.

2-16
 A r e p o r t d i s s e m i n a t e d t o h i g h e r , l o w e r , a n d a d j a c e n t units should
c o n t a i n t h e e v a l u a t i o n f o r e a c h i t e m o f i n f o r m a t i o n ; f o r example, ‘“The
d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y o f t h e e n e m y 4 6 t h T k D i v c a n f i r e n u c ear rounds of
0.5 kt yield (C-3).”

T h e e v a l u a t i o n a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f i n f o r m a t i o n a t he brigade and
battalion is a simplified mental process: thus, the standard evaluation
rating has little if any application. This system assists the G2 or S2 in
processing information received from other headquarters and in evaluating
information disseminated to other headquarters.

ANALYSIS

The processing of information continues with analysis, which cons S t s

of three steps: assessment, integration, and deduction. It is during t h i s
phase of the intelligence cycle that information becomes intelligence

Assessment

Assessment is the sifting and sorting of evaluated information to

update significant elements with respect-to the mission and operations of
the unit. The first and most important step towards proper assessment is
a clear understanding of the unit’s mission and the commander’s intent.
All information gathered is viewed in relation to what the commander wants
to accomplish. Assessment also requires judgement and a thorough
knowledge of military principles, the characteristics of tha AO, and the
e n e m y s i t u a t i o n , to include enemy doctrine and past practices.

Assessment at headquarters above division level often involves

detailed research with greater difficulty caused by the increased volume
of information. Regardless of the level individuals who assess
information must relate their efforts to the unit’s mission to avo d
wasted time and effort.

I n t e g r a t on

I n t e g r a t i o n i s t h e c o m b i n a t i o n o f t h e elements isolated in asse ssment

with other known information to form a logical picture or hypothesis of
enemy activities or the influence of operational area characteristics on
the mission of the command. In the process, more than one hypothesis may
be formulated based upon existing intelligence.

I n t e g r a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f h y p o t h e s e s , r e q u i r e s the
same good judgment and thorough background knowledge essential to mak ng a
good assessment. In formulating hypotheses, the intelligence officer
avoids preconceived opinions and hypotheses based solely on personal
experience or preference. T h e o f f i c e r a t t e m p t s t o a d o p t t h e r o l e o f he
enemy commander in the development of these hypotheses.

A f t e r t h e y a r e f o r m u l a t e d , all hypotheses are analyzed and tested.

Analysis of an hypothesis includes determining the indications that should
exist if the hypothesis is a valid one. Testing includes verifying the

2-17
existence or nonexistence of these indications within the Iimitations of
available time and means.

Integration may be a mental process completed in a few moments or it

may be a lengthy process involving the collection of a large volume of
additional information.

Deduction

The last step in the analysis of information is deduction. Meaning is

deduced from the hypotheses developed; these are than tested and
considered valid as a result of integration. Deduction answers the
q u e s t i o n : “What does this information mean in relation to the area of
operations, the enemy situation, and the friendly commander’s intent?” The
answer provides a useful conclusion which can serve as a basis for
determining future enemy courses of action and for keeping the
intelIigence estimate current. Deduction should also answer the question:
“What does this information mean in relation to the enemy’s use of
t a c t i c a l d e c e p t i o n o r c o u n t e r d e c e p t i o n ? " ‘The resulting answer reduces
friendly vulnerability to being deceived and the false belief that
battlefield deception operations are being believed by the enemy.

DISSEMINATION

The final step is to disseminate intelligence or information.

Dissemination is not limited to regular reports. Critical Pieces of
information are passed quickly to those who can use them. The G2 or S2
always is aware of this and prepares to use any form of communication,
from RATT to courier, to pass vital reports. Intelligence is of no value
on the battlefield when it becomes history.

2-18
 CHAPTER 3

ORDER OF BATTLE

OB intelligence is an integral part of intel gence analysis at all

levels. Intelligence analysts consider OB intel gence. They integrate
it with other intelIigence pertaining to weather, t e r r a i n , and other
METT-T factors to determine Threat capabilities, vulnerabilities, and
probable courses of action.

This chapter describes the OB analysis process and the tools used to
develop and integrate OB.

O B i s t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , strength, command structure, and disposition

of the personnel, u n i t s , a n d e q u i p m e n t o f a n y f o r e i g n m i l i t a r y force.
During counterinsurgency operations, or whenever they become militarily
s i g n i f i c a n t , include guerilla and insurgent forces, associated agent nets,
and the insurgent auxiliary and support structure in the Threat data base,

Data is developed in many fields outeide the scope of 0B, but all
intelligence is related ultimately to it. For example, technical
intelligence (Tl) produces intelligence on the capabilities of weapons
systems, but OB intelligence determines the effect of weapon capabilities
and characteristics on enemy tactics, combat effectiveness, and
organization.

ORDER OF BATTLE FACTORS

The OB consists of evaluated information on enemy, allied and neutral

forces, including--

0 Composition.

0 Disposition.

0 Strength.

0 Tactics.

0 Training.

0 Logistics.

0 Combat effectiveness.

0 Electronic technical data.

0 Miscellaneous data.

COMPOSITION

Composition is the identification and organization of units. It

appl ies to specific units or commands as opposed to type units. Unit

3-1
identification often is called the key to 0B intelIigence because it leads
to the answers to many questions concerning the enemy, Unit
identification consists of the complete designation of a specific unit by
name or number, t y p e , r e l a t i v e s i z e o r s t r e n g t h , a n d ( u s u a l l y )
subordination. Through identification, the OB analyst develops a history
of the composition, training, tactics, and combat effectiveness of an
enemy unit. T h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f a s p e c i f i c u n i t w i t h i n a n organization
alerts the analyst to the possible presence of other unident fied or
unlocated units of the sama organization.

Organization is the physical structure of a unit and the relationship

of the various elements within the structure. Knowledge of he
o r g a n i z a t i o n o f a u n i t o r m i l i t a r y f o r c e a i d s i n developing accurate
intelligence on current strength, and combat eff ciency. Further Threat
c a p a b i l i t i e s a s t h e y r e l a t e t o t a c t i c s , t r a i n i n g and logistics are
difficult to assess accurately without knowledge of the current
organizat ion.

T h e b a s i c s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t t a c t i c a l u n i t ( n o r . .a l l y a c o m b a t d i v i s i o n )
is considered when developing intelligence concerning composition. In
some countries, t h e f i e l d a r m y i s c o n s i d e r e d t h e b a s i c s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t
tactical unit. In others, it is the regiment. The importance of this
concept I ies in the term “’self-sufficient.’” Units subordinate to
s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t t a c t i c a l u n i t s , although capable of limited independent
action, cannot sustain themselves over relatively long periods of time.
Subordinate units seldom are employed independently or separately from the
basic self-sufficient tactical unit. For example, a new Soviet motorized
rifle regiment (MRR) is reported in the AO, Knowing that the division is
the Soviets’ basic self-sufficient tactical unit and the three MRRs of a
motorized rifle division (MRD) seldom are employed independently, the
presence not only of a new regiment but of a new MRD is given tentative
acceptance. When one of these regiments is located, suspect that the
remaining elements of the division also are in the area.

DISPOSITION

Disposition consists of the location of Threat units and the manner in

which these units are deployed tactically (or administratively in times of
peace) . In addition, disposition includes the recent, current, and
projected (or probable) movements of Threat units.

Location refers to a geographical area or position occupied by a unit

or units. Knowledge of the strength and location of a Thraat force
assists the intelligence officer in determining the capabilities of the
force and its effect upon the accomplishment of the friendly mission.
Data of this type is collected during peacetime and form the basis for
assessing capabilities during the initial period of hostilities.

Tactical deployment is the relative position of units with raspect to

one another or to the terrain. Tactical formations are designed for
executing the various tactical maneuvers and usually are based upon
doctrine. If this deployment is predetermined, it leads to an accurate
appraisal of probable Threat courses of action. The knowledge of how

3-2
units are arranged in echelon indicates (if the Threat assumes the
offensive) which units are used in the initial attack and which units are
employed in supporting and reserve roles. Tactical deployment with
respect to terrain also is important. A study of disposition with an
analysis of the terrain leads to conclusions concerning Threat
c a p a b i l i t i e s , v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s , and probable courses of action. Accomplish
this through the IPB process detailed in FM 34-130.

Movement of units is part of disposition. Movement is the physical

relocation of a unit from one geographical point to another. Patrol
activity may be an indication of planned movement but, in itself, is not
movement. Movement is significant because it automatically changes the
tactical deployment of the opposing forces. When a Threat unit has moved,
is moving, or possibly wiII move in the future, it becomes capable of
executing a number of actions which affect the conduct of the battle (or
the current political situation). Such a unit moves into an attack
position, moves to reinforce or to replace a unit, or performs other
missions. In view of these possibilities, movement of a unit becomes
important. The 06 analyst must continually monitor unit movements in
order to provide correct and detailed data on Threat dispositions.

STRENGTH

Strength describes a unit in terms of personnel, weapons, and

equipment. Information concerning strength provides the commander with an
indication of enemy capabilities and helps determine the probable courses
of action or options open to Threat commanders. A lack of strength or a
preponderance of strength has the effect of lowering or raising the
estimate of the capabilities of an opposing force. Likewise, a marked
concentration or buiIdup of units in an area gives the commander certain
indications of enemy objectives and probable courses of action. During
peacetime, c h a n g e s i n t h e s t r e n g t h o f p o t e n t i a l T h r e a t f o r c e s a r e
important factors which may indicate changes in the enemy’s intention.
Appendix D describes enemy strength computations.

TACT I CS

Tactics in OB intelligence include tactical doctrine as well as

tactics employed by specific units. Tactical doctrine refers to the
Threat’s accepted principles of organization and employment of forces for
the conduct of operations. Tactics, on the other hand, describe the
manner in which units conduct an operation. From a knowledge of tactical
d o c t r i n e , the OB analyst knows how the Threat may employ forces under
various conditions and in certain type situations or special operations.
Units normally are expected to perform according to certain patterns
within the framework of their tactical doctrine. Ail Armies establish
basic principles and patterns for the employment of infantry, motorized
rifle (MR), tank, and artilIery units in the offense and defense. Of a
more specific nature, special ized tactical doctrine a certain unit employs
in given situations during combat or training activities is analyzed,
because it indicates possible changes in Threat doctrine. Doctrinal
t e m p l a t i n g , a s d e t a i l e d i n F M 3 4 - 1 3 0 , is one method of graphically
portraying enemy tactics.

3-3
 TRAINING

Individual and unit training contribute significantly to the combat

effectiveness of any military organization. The thoroughness, degree, and
quality of individual training which the recruit, specialist,
noncommissioned officer (NCO) , and officer receive are major factors in
determining the overall efficiency of an armed force. Unit training,
normalIy conducted in seasonal cycles from small unit exercises to
large-scale maneuvers, is an essential part of the training necessary for
a unit to operate at its full potential. Each type or phase of training a
unit accomplishes adds to its capabilities and effectiveness.

Specialized training that a unit receives may point to its ability to

undertake certain missions beyond its normal doctrinal capabilities or
responsibilities. Therefore, it is easier to appraise the combat
effectiveness of a unit when the degree and quality of its training are
known, as well as a n y s p e c i a l i z e d t r a i n i n g i t u n d e r t a k e s .

LOGISTICS

Logistics closely relates to combat effectiveness. The adoption of a

course of action depends on the abil ity of the logistical system to
support that action. With knowledge of the current capabilities of a
unit’s logistical support structure, make a more accurate evaluation of
its capabiIities, strengths, and combat effectiveness. Also, the
locations of elements of a unit’s logistical support structure indicate
the disposition of maneuver formations and CS elements. Categories of
logistical information include--
°
All classes and types of supply.

0 Supply lines of communication.

0 Logistical requirements.

0 Procurement methods.

0 Distribution priorities a n d procedures.

0 Transportation networks and modes.

0 Installations and Iogistica control points.

0 Terminals.

0 Evacuation and salvage procedures.

0 Maintenance.

3-4
 COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS

Combat effectiveness describes the abilities and fighting quality of a

unit. Numerous tangible and intangible factors affect it. Combat
effectiveness affects the capabilities of a unit or army and is predicted
by analyzing--

0
Personnel strength.

0
Amount and condition of weapons and equipment.

0
Status of training.

0
Efficiency of the officer and NCO corps.

0
Quality of leadership.

0
Length of time a unit has been committed in combat.

0
Traditions and past performance.

0
Personality traits of the unit commanders.

0
Geographical area in which committed.

0
M o r a l e , esprit, health, discipline, and political reliability (or
belief in the cause for which they fight).

. 0
Status of technical and logistical support of the unit.

0
Adequacy of military schooling at all levels.

0
National characteristics of the people.

ELECTRONIC ORDER OF BATTLE

Electronic OB information is required to conduct EW. This data

includes communications and noncommunications equipment parameters, such
as emitter type and nomenclature (including encoding equipment),
modulation, multiplex capability, pulse duration, pulse repetition
frequency, bandwidth, associated weapons systems, and other technical
characteristics of electronic emissions. They also include critical
communications nodes such as CPS and logistical control points. They
s u p p o r t T h r e a t e l e c t r o n i c o r d e r o f b a t t l e ( E O B ) t e m p l a t i n g . With
electronic technical data, a more accurate evaluation of the enemy’s
v u l n e r a b i l i t y t o e l e c t r o n i c c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s (ECM) and deception is made;
signals intercept and direction finding (DF) for the production of SIGINT
is made easier; and support is given to electronic counter-countermeasures
(ECCM) by assessing the threat EW capabilities.

3-5
 MISCELLANEOUS DATA

Miscellaneous data includes supporting information needed by an

analyst to develop other OB elements. Miscellaneous data includes basic
intelligence described as "know your enemy.”

Personality files contain information on certain characteristics and

attributes which describe individual members of a military force. A
knowledge of personalities is important in identifying units and, in some
cases, predicting the course of action the unit wilI take. Personality
d a t a , t h e r e f o r e , is valuable because the tactics and combat efficiency of
particular units are often closely related to key individuals within its
command structure.

Unit history includes information and intelligence on the elements of

a specific unit; on present and past parent units; personalities who have
commanded the unit; a n d o t h e r d e t a i l s I i k e p a s t p e r f o r m a n c e a n d a c t i v i t i e s
which describe, l i m i t , o r c l a r i f y t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s o f t h e u n i t c o n c e r n e d .
The development of unit history is important in determining the
capabilities and limitations of a unit. Military or paramilitary units,
like individuals, develop characteristics which distinguish them from
other units. Just as they consider the various qualifications and traits
of threat personalities, OB personnel also must consider a Threat unit as
a personality in analyzing its capabilities and limitations. Information
on uniforms and insignias is an important part of “’know your enemy”
i n t e l I i g e n c e . This information assists in establishing unit
identification and organization and in determining morale and esprit de
corps.

Some foreign armies use systems of code numbers, names or false

tactical markings to conceal true designations (or affiliations) of units,
field post numbers (FPNs) (unit mailing address), and vehicle
identification or side numbers. These systems, when properly analyzed,
are valuable sources of information that are related to unit composition
and disposition.

The OB analyst is able to recognize and appreciate the capabilities

and Iimitations of foreign weapons and equipment. Although technical
intelligence agencies are primarily concerned with the determination of
weapons and equipment characteristics and capabiIities, the analyst uses
this intelligence to analyze the effects of these items on the
organization, disposition, tactics, and combat effectiveness of the
mil itary force.

ORDER OF BATTLE REFERENCES

THIS SECTION IMPLEMENTS STANAG 2077 1

Standard OB references are published by higher echelons during

peacetime. They form the basis for lower echelon OB efforts.

3-6
 ORDER OF BATTLE BOOK

An OB book is a summary of all basic intelligence concerning the

composition, d s p o s i t i o n , i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , subordination, and strength of a
foreign nation s m i l i t a r y f o r c e s . It includes all units from the var ous
s e r v i c e s t h a t unction in a ground or ground support role. It normal y is
published at EAC by the service departments and by the DIA. Allied
n a t i o n s , particularly the NATO nations, also publish OB books. The level
or echelon of units shown depends on the level of command for the intended
u s e r . Generally, this is at least one echelon above and two echelons
below that of the intended user. During peacetime, units which form only
on mobilization are identified as such.

The OB book includes the following information for each unit:

0
Identification, to include:

-- Numerical designator and type of unit.

-- Nationality (if more than one nation’s forces are included in

the OB).

0
FPN.

0
Subordination (parent unit) .

0
Subordinate units.

0
Location, to include:

-- Place name (and country if deployed abroad).

-- Installation number or name (if applicable).

-- Military geographic region (if applicable).

-- Universal transverse mercator (UTM) coordinates (supplement

with geographic coordinates whenever possible).

0
Category and effective strength.

The following data also is included:

0
Code name or code number (enemy assigns official name or number).

0
Nickname (unofficial popular name).
0
Honors or honor titles.

0
Unit insignia.
0
Latitude and longitude of subject (in addition to UTM
coordinates) .

3-7
 0
Commander’s name, rank, initials and specialty, and those of other
key personnel.

0
Combat effectiveness (including any data on special ized training).

0
Signature equipment.

0
Turret numbers, vehicle registration numbers, or other tactica
identification signs.

0
Any other data at the discretion of the originator for example
basic encyclopedia (BE) or target data inventory (TDI) numbers

The structure of an OB book varies, However, it normalIy contains

three sections:

Section 1. General

Section I contains the table of contents, explanatory notes and

glossary of terms, acronyms, and abbreviations used in the document,
summary Iist of major changes since the document was last issued, and
sumrnary chart of current dispositions.

S e c t i o n I I0 D e t a i l e d Order of Battle

S e c t i o n I I c o n t a i n s f o r m a t i o n s o r u n ts grouped according to their

subordination and echelon. For example, m i l i t a r y d i s t r i c t , r e g i o n , f r o n t
l e v e l f o r m a t i o n s , and units follow immed a t e l y a f t e r t h e d i s t r i c t , r e g i o n ,
and front headquarters to which they are s u b o r d i n a t e . While the same
m e t h o d o l o g y i s a p p l i e d a t a l I o t h e r I e v e s of command within a district,
region, or front formation, the nclusion of units subordinate to
regiments is optional. U n i t s o f unknown subordination are included at the
end of each district, region, or front and are identified clearly as such.

Section Ill. S u m n e r es or Supporting Documentation

S e c t i o n I I I c o n t a i n s a n y a d d tional summaries or supporting

documentation, such as maps. The use of orientation maps of the nations
dealt with in the OB book is an important visual aid, especially when the
units being dealt with are superimposed. For a large country like the
USSR, include an orientation map for each military district.

Annually issue or emend OB books. While the timing and degree of

amendment are left to the discretion of the originators, an amendment
normally is published when substantial changes to publ ished OB holdings
are detected. The date of information (DOI) for the contents of the OB
b o o k i s t a k e n t o b e t h e i n f o r m a t i o n c u t - o f f d a t e . Any amendments to the
OB book should indicate their own 001.

ORDER OF BATTLE HANDBOOK

The OB handbook, which is often referred to as a “handbook of military

forces,”’ is a summary of basic intelligence on a foreign nation’s

3-8
political or governmental structure and military establishment, including
its tactics and doctrine. It includes more technical data, such as the
logistical system used and the characteristics of weapons and equipment.
Like the OB book, higher US and allied commands publish the handbook.

The OB handbook normally deals with only one country. It deals with
two or more countries in separate parts, especially when these countries
are closely associated with each other by pact, geographicalIy, or in some
other way. As a minimum it contains--

0
History, governmental, and political structure. A short history
of the nation and a comprehensive description of its governmental
and political structure.

0
Armed forces organization. A description of the nation’s military
establishment (including paramilitary and an expl anation of how C2
of the ground forces is affected).

0
Ground forces organization. A complete explanat on of the
organization and composition of all the various types of ground
force units and formations. The organization and composition of a
nonground force unit also is included if that unit is likely to be
placed under command or in support of the ground forces in time of
war .

0
Logistical support organization. A n e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e I o g i s t ca I
system the ground forces employs from ministerial level to the
lowest echelon.

° Strategic and tactical doctrine. An explanation of the nation s

strategic and tactical military doctrine, especially at combat
levels of command.

o
Reserve forces or mobi I z a t i o n . A description of reserve forces,
the mobilization system a n d t i m e s r e q u i r e d f o r m o b i l i z a t i o n .

In a d d i t i o n , the OB handbook ncludes--

0
Military education and training. A description of the military
education and training system and an explanation of the personnel
recruitment and selection process.

0
Uniforms and insignia. A full description of all armed forces
uniforms, ranks, and insignia.

0
Weapons and equipment. A listing and brief description including
characteristics of the various types of weapons and equipment found
in the ground forces. The list includes weapon and equipment’s
country of origin, availability of technical expertise, and
likelihood of resupply of equipment and spares.

3-9
 ° A lies. A list of likely military and political allies, and type
o’ support each may render.

The contents of the OB handbook are organized in the sequence shown

above. When included, organizational and tabular data are presented as
follows

0
Armed forces organization, governmental and political structure.
Organizational charts are to support the narrative description of
these subjects where P O S S b l e . There is no format for such charts.

0
Organizational structure. Depict organizational structure for
e a c h t y p e o f u n i t , Within NATO, the-symbols depicted in STANAG 2019
r a p r e s e n t t h e v a r i o u s u n i t s , f o r m a t i o n s , o r i n s t a l I a t i o n s . Arrange
the organizational diagrams in the following sequence: headquarters,
combat units, CS units, service support units.
0
Tables of personnel , weapons, and equipment. Produce the tables
according to STANAG 2077. Figure 3-1 shows a sample equipment list.

Amend OB handbooks periodically. The timing and degree of amendment

are left to the discretion of the originator. They should, however,
initiate amendment action whenever you detect a substantial change to
intelIigence contained in the handbook or whenever you have a number of
minor amendments.

INSTALLATION HANDBOOKS

Ideally, installation handbooks contain complete information

concerning every military installation in every city in the county or Al.
They are useful, p a r t i c u l a r l y d u r i n g p e a c e t i m e , f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g w h i c h
forces are already in place. During wartime, the usefulness of
installation handbooks decreases somewhat. However, t h e y s t i l l i n d i c a t e
likely reserve mobilization and training centers. Two particularly useful
h a n d b o o k s a r e t h e A u t o m a t e d I n s t a l l a t i o n I n t e l l i g e n c e F i l e ( A l F) and the
Contingency Planning Facilities List (CPFL).

MISCELLANEOUS REFERENCES

O t h e r p u b l i c a t i o n s a n d p e r i o d i c a l s p r e p a r e d a t d e p a r t m e n t and area
command levels are of value to the OB analyst. These references may deal
specifically with 0B or with any or all phases of tactical, operational,
and strategic intelligence. Specialized technical intelligence agencies
provide detailed evaluations of equipment. The Soviet Battlefield
Development Plan provides current and projected Soviet battlefield
capabilities. The CIA produces studies on general mil itary capabilities,
and economic factors which impact on military capabilities. Civilian
organizations under contract to the Department of Defense (DOD) make
special studies on various subjects concerning foreign and enemy military
forces. These studies usually are detailed, technical in nature, and
provide a wealth of special information not otherwise available.

3-1o
 NATO Original or
Serial short Description Remarks
No NATO Title

Equipment lists are to conform to the format shown above. The sequence and numbering of
equipment are to be established by Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)
according to STANAG 2077.

Figure 3-1. Equipment list.

ORDER OF BATTLE RECORDS

The OB anaIyst uses various recording aids in organizing and

c a t a l o g i n g O B i n f o r m a t i o n . The OB analyst creates OB records and files
through a compilation of information available in the references discussed
above. Subsequently, they are used continuously to produce current
intelIigence and to update other intelIigence records, Iike the SITMAP and
IPB products. OB files facilitate easy reference and comparison of OB
information coIIected at various times from various sources. Each
intelIigence processing element decides which aids to maintain. The type
used depends on the echelon of command and the local situation. Some
common recording aids are:

3-11
 0
U n t workbook.

0
0 B workbook.

0
O B S I TMAP .

0
0 B card file.

0
Personal ity fi e.

0
Military insta Iation file.

° Organizational worksheet.

0
Strength worksheet.

Other file systems or forms are deve oped localIy for spec al
situations.

UNIT WORKBOOK

The format of the unit workbook depends upon the structure of the
foreign army being monitored. Typically, it consists of a collection of
OB cards supplemented by supporting documentation and is arranged by type
of unit or in numerical sequence. Minimally this documentation includes
organization and strength worksheets with the workbook being updated as
new information is received. The enemy parent unit listed on the unit
worksheet should agree with the analyst’s level of command.
.
The analyst normally maintains records for enemy units one level above
and two levels below the command’s. In some special purpose units, three
levels or more down are followed as well. Review information from units
three levels down to develop identities on units two levels down. List
personalities on the worksheet as a ready reference to the personalities
of the enemy unit. Note and use unit, postal, and vehicle numbers on the
worksheet to determine 0B changes or to confirm current data. Note
details which may reveal any facet of the enemy unit’s 0B or indicate the
source of information in the remarks column. Enter reports of branch
insignia, number and type of weapons, and statements of local residents in
this column in abbreviated form. Include the data and the source of
i n f o r m a t i o n f o r e a c h e n t r y . The installation column of the worksheet
shows the numerical designation assigned to a particular enemy
installation when plotted on a sketch, map sheet, or town plan attached to
the workbook. For consistency and to facilitate exchange of information
between headquarters, use installation numbers Previously assigned by
theater or MACOM, Figure 3-2 shows a sample unit workbook. Figure 3-3
shows a sample page from the unit workbook.

ORDER OF BATTLE WORKBOOK

The OB workbook aids the analyst in sorting, evaluating, and

interpreting information and in preparing intelIigence reports.

3-12
 Figure 3-2. Sample unit workbook.

There is no prescribed format for the OB workbook. At corps IeveI and

higher, the OB workbook is tabbed to conform with paragraphs of the OB
annex of the PERINTREP (see Appendix A). This makes it easier to extract
needed information for the production of intelIigence reports.

Information is entered under the appropriate haading or headings as

either a complete report or a digest of the original report. A l l e n t r i e s
contain a journal date and number in addition to identification of the
source. Comments added after each entry show the significance of tha
report when compared with the overall tactical situation. Figure 3-4
showa how information is organized in an OB workbook.

3-13
 Parent Unit

ORDER OF BATTLE S I TUAT 10N MAP

The 06 SITMAP is a graphic portrayal of current threat OB, either

confirmed or unconfirmed. It shows identification and disposition of the
opposing units and any other information which will assist in developing
the threat 06.

As a general rule, threat units one echelon above and two echelons
below the analyst’s own Ievel of command are plotted by using the
appropriate symbols in FM 101-5-1. For example, division plots maneuver
regiments and battalions; corps plots maneuver divisions and regiments.
Plot higher units to tha extent practicable. The foregoing information is
only a guide. Analysts at theater level who are responsible for
publication of OB books may plot separata battalions. Peculiarities of
unit organization, the tactical situation, and time and personnel
available within the analysis section determines more precisely what is
plotted and what is omitted on OB maps. Enter the time and date of the
information to the left of each symbol or plot. During counterinsurgency
operations, however, it may be necessary to plot guerilla or insurgent
units down to the squad level, since, depending on the situation and the

3-14
 ORDER OF BATTLE
WORKBOOK

ASPS, X CORPS

FROM:
(HOUR AND DATE)

TO:
(HOUR AND DATE)

— . . .
Figure 3-4. Order of battle workbook.

area, there may be no larger units operating against friendly forces.

Figure 3-5 shows the OB SITMAP. The OB SITMAP contains the same types of
information as the working SITMAP (described in Chapter 2), except it is
kept in a less cluttered state so it is better integrated with G3 or S3
operational maps and for briefing purposes. At battalion and brigade
levels, S2 and BICC officers often do not keep separate working and
briefing OB SITMAPS.

Prepare the OB SITMAP as an overlay. Like other overlays, the OB

SITMAP contains titling data. This data includes:

0
Overlay title.

3-15
Figure 3-5. Order of battle situation map with caption box.

3-16
 0
Map sheet name.

0
Map sheet number.

0
Map series.
0
Map scale.

0
Prepared by .

A caption box on the OB SITMAP is an annotation containing information

which helps to identify and explain the OB situation graphics. Although
any number of caption boxes are used, normalIy three types are necessary:
strength, unlocated units, and legend.

The entries in the strength caption box usually consist of strength

computations in numbers of personnel, types of units, and weapons and
equipment categorized as committed forces, FS, and avaiIable
reinforcements. Reconnaissance elements which are part of an opposing
maneuver unit are considered as reinforcements, if uncommitted.
Assumptions like these are made to portray probable enemy capabilities.

The OB analyst must be aware of what is not known about the enemy.
The unlocated units caption box lists existing unlocated units. These
units pose a threat to the accomplishment of the friendly mission, and
maximum effort must be directed toward establishing the disposition of
unlocated units in the AO.

When it becomes necessary to improvise symbols for enemy units,

include a legend caption box on the OB SITMAP. Within this caption box,
explain the exact meaning of each, improvised symbol.

ORDER OF BATTLE CARD

The analyst uses OB cards to maintain complete and accurate data on

enemy units. The format of the card is standardized within NATO to
facilitate the exchange of information and intelligence among allied
forces. The standard recording system (whether manual or automated) is
based on a card entitled “’Order of Battle Card.”’ Such cards are
maintained in wartime, at all levels including division and lower when
directed by higher headquarters or when desired. Normally, keep one card
for each enemy regiment and independent battalion within a friendly unit’s
Al.

Information on the OB card includes--

0
Identification (numerics designat on, type of unit, and
national ity) .

0
FPN.

0
S u b o r d i n a t i o n ( p a r e n t u n t) .

3-17
 0
Subordinate formations or units.

0 Location (place name and UTM coordinates).

0 Table of major equipment (including war establishment and current

effective strength).

0 Combat effectiveness and category (where applicable).

The OB card contains the following optional information:

0
Code name (offical name assigned by the enemy for convenience or
as a cover) .

0
Honorific title.

o Nickname (unofficial popular name).

0 Insignia.

0 Commander.

0 Unit history.

0 Signature equipment (including significant quantities).

o Turret numbers, vehicle registration numbers or other tactical

identification signs.

0
MiscelIaneous.

Record validity dates and source references on the back of the card.
Also record information subject to frequent changes on the back of the
card. This includes--
*
0
Unit locations.

0
Strength.

0
Combat effectiveness.

Figure 3-6 shows the front and back sides of the 08 card.

PERSONALITY FILE

A personality file records personality data on designated categories

of individuals. The development of the personality file is probably one
of the most difficult analytic functions, particularly for the personnel
in Threat units at division level and below.’ However, much information is
available through open-source I iterature and intelligence information
reports (IIRs). This file provides reference material used in the
development of other OB intelligence. Information on key military figures

3-18
 d
..

(Front)

BASIC COMPOSITION OVERALL LIST

cd
I
lD
Figure 3-6. Order of baffle cards (continued).

3-20
is of significant value in the establishment of unit identification,
t a c t i c s , and combat effectiveness. Keep the file in alphabetical order.

The card (or sheet) contains information concerning the individual’s

name, rank, c u r r e n t a s s i g n m e n t , d a t e a n d p l a c e o f b i r t h , c i v i l i a n
education, political affiliation, nicknames, and physical peculiarities.
The file also contains the individual’s schools, qualifications, awards,
d e c o r a t i o n s , chronology of assignments, campaigns, engagements,
demonstrated performance in leadership assignments, and important
a c t i v i t i e s p a r t i c i p a t e d i n , as welI as character traits I ike morals,
reputation, appearance, and mannerisms, published articles (which may
identify areas of concentration and expertise), and cliques with which the
individual is associated (may indicate influences and upward mobiIity
prospects). Each entry records the source and date of the information.

The personality file also includes information which aids the friendly
commander, G2, and G3 in deception planning and operations. This includes
habits that make the opposing comrnander and staff vulnerable to deception,
t h e m o s t l i k e l y d e c e p t i o n t a r g e t s , the degree of freedom the cormmander
allows subordinates, how the commander reacts to new situations, and how
the fear of the unknown influences the commander’s actions. Figure 3-7
shows a suggested format for biographies used in personality files
required by STANAG 2077. Similar files may be maintained for key staff
officers and other categories of key personnel.

Figure 3-7. Biography.

3-21
 MILITARY INSTALLATION FILE

During peace time, higher echelons maintain military installation

files normally to facilitate publication of installation handbooks. A
collation or explanatory sheet contains all information that has bean
coIIected on each installation to include the number and types of
buildings and their capacities, personnel uniforms and insignia, and major
items of unit equipment. Maps, town plans, or sketches showing the
location of each installation within the city supplement this file.
Figure 3-8 shows a sample military installation file.

ORGANIZATIONAL WORKSHEET

The organizational worksheet provides a convenient method of showing

types of units within an armed force. Organizational worksheets depict
the complete breakdown of all units from the highest type headquarters to
t h e l o w e s t u n i t , including personnel and major wsapon strengths. S i nce
this is rarely possible on a single sheet of paper, prepare a chart
showing the general organization of the major unit and individual charts
for each of its subordinate units. Prepare principal weapons and
equipment charts to supplement organizational charts. Figure 3-9 shows a
sample MRR organizational worksheet.

STRENGTH WORKSHEET

Use the strength worksheet to maintain a running numerical tabulation

of the enemy’s personnel and equipmant strengths. This information is
recorded on committed units, FS units, and reinforcements. Figure 3-10
shows a sample strength worksheet.

COORDINATE REGISTER

When personnel and time are available, the brigade and battalion BICCs
maintain a coordinate register. The coordinate register provides the
lower echelon intelligence officer with a workable counterpart to the
extensive intelligence files and workbooks that are maintained at higher
echelons. It graphically illustrates the situation over a small
geographical area. It is compact enough to be carried with ease for ready
access.

The register is usually a looseleaf notebook. Each page represents a

single grid square on the operational map which covers the geographical AO
and Al. This geographical area should include the enemy area, friendly
area, and areas of concern on both flanks.

The coordinate register contains two types of pages. One type is for
written entries which describe enemy activities, locations, weapons, and
similar items. The DTG and map coordinates precede these entries. The S2
adds personal comments or notations to any entry. Figure 3-11 shows a
coordinate register page with written entries.

3-22
3-23
Figure 3-9. Organization worksheet motorized rifle regiment.

3-24
.

Figure 3-11. Coordinate register with written entries.

The second type schematicaIIy represents a singIe grid square.

Entries are plotted on the square in the same manner used to plot the
enemy S I TMAP. This page shows graphically any data applicable to a single
grid square. Figure 3-12 shows how an enlarged grid square is drawn and
entries are made.

The coordinate register is used to--

0
Determine enemy dispositions and routes of movement.

0
Predict enemy intentions and main effort.

0
Plan reconnaissance and surveiIlance (R&S) operations.

0
Brief and debrief patrols.

3-26
 Figure 3-12. Coordinate register with schematic entry.

0
Plans FS.

0
Brief the commander and staff.

0
Assist in IPB.

0
Reveal enemy perceptions of how the terrain wilI sup port maneuver
against them.

Data from the coordinate register is plotted on a vert ical aerial

photograph that has been annotated with grid lines. A sca le of 1:25,000

3-27
or larger is desirable. By plotting selected OB information on the photo,
an analysis of the terrain is conducted simultaneously with a correlation
of information on the enemy. The photo provides an excellent means of
briefing commanders down to platoon level on the AO and the enemy
situation. Targeting is accomplished in a more precise manner by using a
photo instead of the traditional 1:50,000 map. While not common in mid-
to high-intentsity conflict these photos are especially useful in LIC.

The coordinate register is reviewed when the unit moves to a new area,
when new data is added, and when obsolete data is deleted. Timely
maintenance of the coordinate register is not practical in fast-moving
high-intensity situations like pursuit, delay, and exploitation. The
coordinate register would, however, b e v e r y v a l u a b l e i n a r e l a t i v e l y
static situation or in a low-intensity conflict (LIC).

Whenever possible, maintain the register on strong semitransparent

bond paper. The transparency of bond paper is sufficient to allow the use
of a grid scale underneath the schematic page. This allows a more
accurate and rapid plotting of, or reference to, the entries.

The scale of the schematic page normally is a matter of SOP. Such

standardization assists in dissemination of intelIigence data from higher
to lower echelons. For security reasons, t h e f r i e n d l y s i t u a t i o n n o r m a l l y
is not plotted in the coordinate register.

ENEMY COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS

A number of factors, some tangible, others not, determines the combat

effectiveness of enemy units. O f t h e s e f a c t o r s , only the personnel and
equipment strength Iend themselves to factual analysis, and only major
items of equipment, like tanks, armored personnel carriers (APCs), and
artillery weapons lend themselves to detailed quantifiable analysis. This
is because personnel strength fluctuations are extremely difficult to
assess accurately. Appendix D describes procedures for computing
personnel and equipment strength. The following states the combat
effectiveness of a unit:

“The 133 MRR is estimated to be at 80 percent effective

strength. Evidence of low morale suggests that the unit is
less combat effective than the estimated effective strength
may indicate.”

ARBITRARY UNIT DESIGNATORS

The identification, by title, of a particular unit or formation on the

battlefield is difficult during war. Although it is argued that such
precise identification is not important and that one enemy division is as
much of a threat as another, t h i s i g n o r e s t h e p r o b l e m s o f c o l l a t i o n ,
dangers of double counting, and con f u s i o n . To deal with this problem,
NATO and national formations apply a u n i q u e a r b i t r a r y u n i t d e s i g n a t o r
(AUD) to unidentified enemy format ens.

There are two types of unident fied enemy formations:

3-28
 0
Formations which are well known except for their actual title.

0
Formations seen on the battlefield whose history, background, and
title are unknown.

SHAPE allocates the AUDs. They appear in NATO and national OB

summaries in peacetime in the columns normally filled by unit title. Use
these AUDs in war also.

The AUDS consist of a prefix, a number, and a suffix.

The prefix consists of a three-digit alphanumeric distinguishing code

that indicates the number and nationality of the corps that originates the
AUD . The following are examples:

0
The 1st British Corps uses lUK.

0
The 2d German Corps uses 2GE.

0
The 7th US Corps uses 7US.

A two-letter distinguishing code indicating the NATO formation and

allocating the AUD is an optional method of establishing prefixes.
Figure 3-13 shows these AUD prefixes.

Each national corps allocates blocks of numbers between 000 and 999 to
the r own headquarters and subordinate formations. Similarly, divisions
may if they wish, suballocate numbers to their subordinate formations.
Al I formations of a corps and corps headquarters, however, use the same
pre i x .

After the prefix and number is a suffix indicating--

0
The nationality of the enemy formation.

0
The type of formation.

Do not change the actual numbers allocated by a particular national or

NATO formation normally unless an unidentified enemy is recognized
separately by two formations, each of which allocates its own AUD. Under
such circumstances, the relevant superior headquarters, having agreed that
an unidentified enemy formation is present, will either--

0
Accept one of the already allotted AUDs, but replace the prefix
with its own.

0
Allocate a new AUD.

In either case, inform both of the originating formations.

As an example of an unidentified enemy with two allotted AUDs, a

division of the 2d German Corps and a division of the 1st British Corps
separately detect the presence of an unidentified Soviet MRD in the area

3-29
 SHAPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .SH

AFNORTH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AN

COMNON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .NN

LANDSOUTHEAST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SE

AMF(L) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AM

Figure 3-13. Arbitrary unit designator.

of the intercorps boundary and each gives it an AUD using the block of
numbers al located to them by their own corps (2GE369 UR MRD and 1UK473 UR
MRD, respectively). Each corps adopts the AUD allocated by its division.

The corps HQ knows from which division the AUD originated by the
number appl ied. HQ NORTHAG agrees that an UI UR MRD is present and
decides to retain the German (GE) number but allocates it a NORTHAG
prefix. From then on, u n t i l p o s i t i v e l y i d e n t i f i e d o r c h a n g e d b y A l l i e d
Forces, Central Europe (AFCENT), or SHAPE, the unidentified formation is
known as NG369 UR MRD. If for some reason it is changed by AFCENT or
SHAPE, apply an AFCENT or SHAPE prefix.

3-30
 CHAPTER 4

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

IPB is a tool to aid the commander and staff in determining where and
when to use Iimited resources to achieve decisive results. IPB applies to
a l l p h a s e s o f t h e A i r L a n d B a t t l e f i e l d ; c l o s e - i n , deep, and rear operations
synchronization are all supported by the IPB process.

For planning the close-in phase of the operations, IPB provides a

guide for the initial allocation and employment of combat power. Through
event templating, it is possible to identify where the enemy probably wilI
t h r u s t i f a t t a c k i n g , or where the enemy wiII concentrate forces if
defending. Through terrain and weather analysis and templating
techniques, i t i s p o s s i b l e t o d e t e r m i n e w h e r e f r i e n d l y f o r c e s c a n b e s t
move, shoot , and communicate, and where to place friendly strength against
enemy weakness. D u r i n g t a c t i c a l o p e r a t i o n s , IPB supports the use of fire
and maneuver to achieve a tactical advantage. Event templating
facilitates following enemy forces and determining their probable course
of action. Decision support templates (DSTs) enable the commander to
apply combat power in a timely manner.

IPB is especially useful as a tool for planning and fighting the deep
operations. T h r o u g h t h r e a t e v a l u a t i o n , enemy critical nodes and HVTS are
identified readily. Event templating determines the optimum time and
place to interdict the enemy to achieve maximum delay, disruption,
d e s t r u c t i o n , and when and where to achieve decisive exploitation of
identified weakness. it facilitates the identification and location of
deep targets in time to strike them at the optimum time and place in a
manner which constrains and causes the collapse of close-in enemy actions.
AirLand Battle concepts were introduced in Chapter 1 of this manual, and
an application of IPB and coIIection in deep operations and maneuver plans
is further explained in FM 34-130.

When planning rear operations, IPB allows the commander to efficiently

focus friendly efforts. Capacity and trafficability of supply routes are
identified. Avenues for the commitment of reserves become apparent, as do
the choke points which the enemy will attempt to target. The analyst
studies drop zones (DZs) and landing zones (LZs) and the air approaches to
them, and provides the commander information about the rear area threat.
The most advantageous locations for support areas can also be found. Al I
of this permits the commander to use friendly forces in the most
economical method possible, which frees assets for the close-in and deep
operations.

IPB is an essential part of staff planning. I n i t i a l l y , the G2 uses it

to develop intelligence about the enemy, weather, and terrain that the
commander and staff need to complete their planning. The analysis of the
AO and the intelligence estimate primarily embody this intelligence.
While IPB does not replace these documents totally, use it as an aid to
their development. It aleo converts much of the written material into

4-1
graphics which are understood easily, analyzed, and appl ied to the
planning process.

The intelligence estimate is a key to the decisionmaking process.

Through IPB, the estimate is presented in a graphic format. This enables
the commander and staff to see, rather than visualize mentally, where both
friendly and enemy forces can move, shoot, and communicate. It provides a
graphic data base for comparing friendly and enemy courses of action.
Weather and terrain overlays tell us not only where the enemy moves,
shoots , and communicates but where friendly units accomplish these
functions as well. Just as the G2 uses templating to determine enemy
c o u r s e s o f a c t i o n , the G3 uses templating techniques to compare friendly
courses of action.

IPB helps the G2 determine--

0
Where to look.

0
When to look.

0
What to look for.

0
What to look with.
0
What to expect to see.

IPB helps the G3 determine--

0
Where to maneuver, shoot, jam, and communicate.

0
When to maneuver, shoot, jam, and communicate.

0
What friendly resources to maneuver, shoot, jam, and Communicate
with.

0
What enemy assets to maneuver, shoot, and jam.
0
What results to expect.

IPB is vital to the commander’s estimate and tactical decisions

regarding the concept of the operation because it produces an accurate
comparison of friendly and enemy capabilities and courses of action. It
enables the commander to see friendly and enemy vulnerabilities and
opportunities and to determine where, when and how to support forces to
ensure success.

S u c c e s s f u l p r e p a r a t i o n a n d a p p l i c a t i o n of IPB products depend on the

intelligence analyst’s ability. T h e i n t e l igence analyst must know both
enemy and friendly maneuver doctrine; must understand what a mission
statement involves; and must focus efforts to support the mission. To
provide the commander with the intelligence required to make a high
quality decision, the analyst must also coordinate extensively with other
staff sections. These include the G3 or S3, the FSE, AD, engineers,

4-2
 battlefield deception elements, and USAF weather teams. Other sections,
such as the G5 and G4 or S4 become involved in rear area IPB. Each of
these sections and others have data which are vital to IPB. Each of these
sections also has requirements which are filled by IPB. Use of this
manual and FM 34-130 helps the analyst succeed in supporting the commander
effectively.

IPB influences every stage of an operation and is continuous. It

begins with a staff estimate process, which involves interaction from all
the staff sections.. Because battlefield conditions and tactical
s i t u a t i o n s c h a n g e , IPB must be dynamic. The products which result from
IPB are often perishable, and must be updated to remain val id. Figure 4-1
shows how the staff sections interact during the IPB process. Chapter 4
of FM 101-5 describes in detail why IPB is conducted prior to an
operation.

Conducting IPB and knowing how to apply its products, are two
different processes. This chapter explains how the intelligence analyst
utilizes IPB to assist the commander and staff in the successful planning
and execution of AirLand Battle. A more detailed description of the IPB
process is available in FM 34-130.

PURPOSE OF INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

The key to effective IPB application centers around the G2 or S2 staff

understanding what can be accomplished with it. Much time and effort is
expended without purpose if IPB is conducted in a vacuum.

. The ana yst’s objective when applying the IPB process is to reduce
b a t t l e f i e l d uncertainties as they relate to terrain, weather, and enemy.
During the PB process, the graphics produced aid the commander and staff
in planning and synchronizing more effective operations. IPB focuses the
S 2 ’ s i n t e l l gence collection effort where it is most effective. IPB also
a s s i s t s t h e commander in the decision-making process. For a d e t a i l e d
d e s c r i p t i o n of how IPB assists in decision making read Chapter 4,
FM 101-5. IPB helps the commander control the battle by describing what
the enemy’s most likely course of action is, including when and where it
will occur and how the enemy’s follow-on forces affect the battle.

In situation and target development, the IPB product shows the

commander when to most effectively attack enemy forces by fire and
maneuver and when to seize the initiative. Using the IPB graphics, the
intell igence analyst can identify and prepare the attack of HPTs as they
move onto the battlefield. This reduces the effectiveness of the enemy’s
forces, causing them to be disrupted and delayed, and presenting further
targets for maneuver or FS missions. In threat integration of IPB, the
analyst uses analysis models to forecast events on the battlefield.

The IPB process, i f a p p l i e d p r o p e r l y a n d w i t h p u r p o s e , c o n t r i b u t e s

immeasurably to mission accomplishment. However, a s w i t h a n y p r e d i c t i v e
instrument, IPB will never achieve 100 percent accuracy.

4-3
4-4
 DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION
OF THE BATTLEFIELD PRODUCTS

Graphics a r e b a s i c t o I P B a n a l y s i s . Often intelligence is

communicated b e s t w i t h p i c t u r e s . The analysis of the battlefield and the
i n t e l I i g e n c e estimate are not replaced, but merely assisted by graphics.
These graphics become the basis for i n t e l I i g e n c e a n d o p e r a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g .
Currency is maintained through graphic renewal or update. Right now most
aspects of IPB analysis are prepared manually. Preparing graphics by hand
is slow and time-consuming. Properly prepared, graphics are relatively
simple and inexpensive to maintain. The benefits of graphic analysis and
display of intelligence are worth the initial investment of time a n d
resources. It is therefore incumbent upon the G2 or S2 to make maximum
use of available time and personnel to produce those graphics which are
most beneficial to the commander. Particularly at brigade and battalion
l e v e l , alI personnel must be capable of conducting the IPB process.
Additionally G2s or S2s at each echelon should provide subordinate unit
S2s as many IPB products as p o s s i b l e . This saves time and permits the
subordinate level S2 to expand on higher level IPB products or produce
others unique to the unit mission.

The graphics produced during the IPB process have numerous purposes
a n d f u n c t i o n s . A good analyst knows what to accomplish from each.
Terrain and weather factor overlays, for example, help depict the effects
of terrain and weather on potential friendly and enemy courses of action.

Further on in the IPB process, analysts produce four

templates--doctrinal, situation, event. and decision support. Figure 4-2
gives the description and purpose of each template. These templates help
the analyst to deduce and analyze enemy capabilities, predict their most
Iikely courses of action, identify information gaps, and determine TAIs.
In other words, the graphics produced during the IPB process help in
conducting analysis.

APPLICATION OF INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

The IPB process begins with the mission. Upon receipt of a mission,
the commander analyzes the situation and has the staff present a situation
update. F r o m t h i s i n i t i a l i n f o r m a t i o n , the commander conducts mission
analysis and restates the mission. The commander then sets the staff
planning process in motion by providing planning guidance and intent. The
commander also determines initial PIRs.

Using the commander’s guidance, t h e s t a f f b e g i n s t o p r e p a r e t h e i r

estimates. The IPB process primarily takes place during the estimate
process.

The intelligence analyst considers the amount of available time and

the number of soldiers on staff who can conduct IPB. Giving due
consideration to resources, the analyst initiates the IPB process with the
intent to produce sufficient graphic products to assist the commander and
staff in their planning.

4-5
 As a minimum, the analyst prepares a modified combined obstacle
overlay (MCOO), a situation template depicting how the enemy looks at the
most critical moment on the battlefield, an event template from which to
develop the R&S plan, and a DST.

The G2 or S2 applies IPB to assist the analytical process and

accomplish as much of the process as possible to support the commander in
what little time is available. Time is the analyst’s greatest enemy as
there is never enough of it. If there is time for only one situation
template, the analyst prepares the one most critical to the commander’s
mission. This is why it is so important for the G2 or S2 staff to
understand the commander’s intent. Time spent initially providing
guidance and establishing specific tasks for each member of the G2 or S2
staff who conducts IPB, goes a long way towards a more complete IPB
product which contributes to the commander’s successful mission
accomplishment.

Figure 4-2. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield templates.

4-6
 BATTLEFIELD AREA EVALUATION

Battlefield area evaluation (BAE) as the first step in the IPB process
sets the stage for the rest of the process.

During the conduct of BAE, the intelligence analyst studies the

battlefield area to focus the IPB effort. The analyst studies the
battlefield to obtain a general feel for how terrain and weather affect
operations. The AO has been provided.

Delineation of the Al is done to direct a portion of the collection

effort (with support from higher headquarters) against enemy forces which
c a n d i r e c t l y i n f l u e n c e t h e u n i t ’ s m i s s i o n . The G2 and G3 or S2 and S3
determine the Al based on how much time the commander needs to react to a
threat. For example, if the enemy has the potential to enter the
battalion AO via one of the flanks, and the battalion reserve needs two
hours to move to most areas on the flanks, then based on an enemy
doctrinal advance rate of 6 kilometers per hour (kph), the analyst would
probably extend the Al on the flanks to at least 12 kilometers (kms). The
analyst must understand the mission, the commander’s intent, and both
friendly and enemy capabilities.

METT-T and the commander’s concept of the operation determine the Al.
Once the Al is established, the analyst informs higher command of the area
it covers so they can assist in colIection.

During the BAE phase the analyst studies the battlefield to determine
significant areas and considerations to be studied in more depth during
the remaining IPB phases.

Terrain Analysis

The intelligence analyst has one primary objective when conducting

t e r r a i n a n a l y s i s -- to r e d u c e t h e c o m m a n d e r ’ s b a t t l e f i e l d u n c e r t a i n t i e s a s
they relate to terrain. Terrain analysis emphasizes the use of graphics
to portray the effects of terrain on operations.

The G2 or S2 depicts via graphic products--

0
Terrain which impedes or hinders maneuver and mobility.

0
Terrain which does not restrict maneuver and mobility.

0
Avenues of approach (AAs) and mobility corridors (MCs).

The lower the level at which the analyst works, the less time the
analyst may have to prepare terrain factor overlays. The analyst must
prepare those overlays which support the commander’s mission and intent.
This requires the G2 or S2 to prioritize and set time lines as to what the
analyst should accomplish.

4-7
 Modified Combined Obstacle Overlays

The intelligence analyst prepares a MCOO. This overlay is a

combination of various overlays or if done as one overlay, then simply is
a graphic representation of what should be highlighted about the terrain.
It is based on OCOKA (observation and fields of fire (FofF), concealment
and cover, obstacles, key terrain, and AA and MCs).

Terrain analysis at division level and higher benefits from engineer

terrain teams or detachments attached to G2 staffs assisting in terrain
analysis. Time constraints may not permit receipt of engineer terrain
products by brigade and battalion S2s. The intelligence staff must train
in the conduct of terrain analysis to be capable of producing their own
t e r r a i n g r a p h i c s . Appendix E of this manual, Terrain Analysis in IPB,
provides the analyst basic guidelines for conducting terrain analysis.
For a detailed description of how to conduct terrain analysis refer to
FM 34-130.

Terrain analysis focuses on the military aspects of terrain known as

OCOKA . Chapter 4 of FM 34-130 provides a detailed description of OCOKA.

The following guidelines are important to the analyst when applying

OCOKA .

Observation and Fields of Fire. Observation involves the type of units

(both friendly and enemy) which are on the ground. The analyst asks
questions such as:
0
To what degree does vegetation or relief obscure tha observation
of friendly or enemy units?
0
How wiII the ground unit be observed from the air?

The analyst focuses on the time of attack or expected tima of enemy

penetration into the main battle area (MBA). Also the analyst considers
what night observation devices both forces possess. These factors impact
on the conduct of the battle.

Another important factor is how the friendly force looks from the
enemy’s perspective. This principal applies to all other OCOKA factors as
well. The distinction is made clear to the commander by providing details
versus generalities.

Observation also influences the capability for R&S and TA. In the IPB
context, this refers to optical and electronic line of sight (LOS). Many
battlefield systems require LOS to function effectively. These include
radios, radar, intercept and direction finders, jammers, direct fire
weapons, human vision, and binoculars.

Air defense (AD) TA and weapons require LOS from their positions to
air targets. The analyst considers the anticipated flight altitude
relative to the elevation of adjacent terrain.

4-8
 The effects of terrain and weather on these systems influence the
commander’s view of the battlefield. What is important for the analyst to
consider when studying the terrain is to study it based on the battlefield
systems avaiIable to the commander and the threat. Again, because time is
limited, the analyst prioritizes those battlefield systems most critical
to the mission.

LOS overlays graphically illustrate the effects of terrain on friendly

and enemy observation and FofF. The horizontal visibility or FofF overlay
combines the LOS effects of vegetation and elevation features. The
relative capabilities of direct fire weapons, communications, and
collection and TA systems become apparent. This overlay assists in
identifying key terrain with greater precision. Figure 4-3 shows
horizontal LOS FofFs. This is the type of overlay that the engineer
terrain team prepares at division or higher. If assigned to brigade or
b a t t a l i o n l e v e l , the analyst requests this overlay for the Al.

Concealment and Cover. Concealment is protection from observation or

surveiIlance. Cover is shelter or protection from fire either natural or
artificial. The analyst discerns the difference between concealment and
cover . The two are not combined when examining the terrain for their
effects. The analyst examines concealment to distinguish it from ground
and aerial observation.

4-9
 The analyst decides the type forces which concealment may or may not
impact; for example, concealment may be good for soldiers on foot, yet
poor if riding in tracked vehicles.

The analyst addresses cover from direct and indirect fires. The
analyst identifies (particularly important at battalion level) points
within the AO where concealment and cover are critical to successful
mission accomplishment.

Obstacles. Obstacles, whether artificial or natural, are very important

considerations in the conduct of terrain analysis. Obstacles
significantly impact on a force’s ability to maneuver or move rapidly
through an area. The analyst should not assume that an obstacle for
friendly force units is an obstacle for threat units also. The wise
analyst examines obstacles separately from the point of view of both enemy
and friendly force units and acknowledges that obstacles are different and
impact differently depending on the type of battlefield operating system
that is used.

Key Terrain. Key terrain is any point or area on the ground whose control
or seizure provides an important tactical advantage. Any terrain which
increases a unit’s abil ity to apply combat power or decreases the
opponent’s abil ity to apply theirs is considered key terrain.

Decisive terrain is that terrain which, if not controlled or if

controlled by the opponent, significantly degrades the commander’s ability
to successfully accomplish the mission. For example: The Fulda River in
West Germany, and in particular the crossing sites on it, is considered
. decisive terrain for US forces defending against Threat forces approaching
from the east. On the other hand, the Harm River, 6 km east of the Fulda
River, while it is considered key terrain for a unit in the defense,
probably is not considered decisive terrain because--
0
The Harm River hinders enemy movement across it (particularly if
c o v e r e d b y f i r e ) ; but it does not prevent movement because it is
narrower and easier to cross than the Fulda.

0
It is not an obstacle to movement because it is narrower and much
easier to cross.

Avenues of Approach and Mobility Corridors. AAs are routes by which a

force reaches key terrain or an objective. AAs are evaluated in the
following terms:

0
Maneuver support potential .
0
Access to key terrain and adjacent AAs.

0
Degree of canalization.

0
Concealment and cover.

0
Observation and FofF.

4-1o
 0
Obstacles.

MCS are subsets of AAs. MCS are areas within the AA which permit
movement and maneuver. They permit friendly and enemy forces to advance
or withdraw in doctrinal configuration, and to capital ize on the
principles of mass, momentum, shock, and speed.

The intelligence officer or analyst should not get caught up on

whether a piece of terrain is an MC. It is important that the analyst
identify, based on knowledge of friendly and enemy assets, routes which
either force will most likely use. Later in IPB, the analyst focuses
coIIection resources on them.

When determining AAs and MCs, the analyst uses the one-up, two-down
rule. The analyst determines AAs for enemy forces one echelon above and
MCS for forces two echelons below the level of command conducting the
analysis.

In determining AAs and MCS, the analyst keeps in mind the type force
for which they are developed, the unit mission, and the potential enemy
force mission. If an air threat exists the analyst develops air AAs. If
t i m e i s s h o r t , the analyst seeks assistance from higher commands. The
analyst may even involve the unit air defense artillery (ADA) officer.

The analyst carries the AA through the enemy’s immediate and

subsequent objectives. When on the offense, t h e a n a l y s t i d e n t i f i e s
potential enemy counterattack AAs and if possible AAs within the AO for
friendly force units. The analyst also identifies MCS for friendly units.
In determining friendly AAs and MCS the one-down, two-down rule applies;
t h a t i s , the analyst identifies potential AAs for subordinate elements one
echelon below the command conducting the analysis and MCS for subordinate
elements two levels below. The battalion S2, for example, identifies
company size AAs and platoon size MCS.

TERRAIN DATA BASE DEVELOPMENT

The analyst compares terrain product requirements with the terrain

data base to identify gaps. In addition to standard topographic maps
covering the Al, the following sources are helpful:

0
Current intelIigence estimate and analysis of the AO from higher
headquarters.

0
Special terrain studies and products prepared by US or
host-country agencies, special maps, charts, and geodetic studies.

0
Current photography.

0
Actual terrain reconnaissance.

TERRAIN FACTOR MATRIX DEVELOPMENT

The terrain factor matrix provides a guide for terrain analysis. The
matrix develops from an analysis process whereby terrain factors are

4-11
identified and correlated with specific types of combat operations and
battlefield functions. The terrain factor matrix assists the intelligence
analyst in identifying the types of terrain products needed. Figure 4-4
shows the terrain factor matrix.

COMBINED OBSTACLE OVERLAY DEVELOPMENT

When the terrain factor overlays are stacked and registered, the
uncolored portion represents areas in which a force moves unimpeded. Also
highlighted are areas which facilitate a maneuver element’s ability to
shoot and communicate. The overlays show significant terrain features
that are further developed in the analysis process. Through graphic
t e r r a i n f a c t o r a n a l y s i s , the terrain team and the S2 section focus on
terrain areas that are significant for further analysis.

Figure 4-4. Terrain factor matrix.

4-12
 The combined obstacle overlay incorporates all pertinent terrain
factors which assist the analyst in identifying mobility areas and
deducing trafficability rates for AA analysis.

Figure 4-5 is an example of a combined obstacle overlay. The overlay

is particularly important because it integrates al 1 obstacles into one
graphic display. This greatly simplifies further analysis of AAs and MCS.
Crosshatching indicates the obstacles and the blank areas indicate freedom
of movement.

Hydrology (rivers)

Figure 4-5. Combined obstacles overlay.

The effects of weather on mobility should not be ignored Through the

c o o p e r a t i v e e f f o r t s o f t e r r a i n a n d w e a t h e r t e a m s , w e a t h e r e f f ects are
i n t e g r a t e d w i t h t h e t e r r a i n a n a l y s i s . As a result, the comb ned obstacles
overlay reflects average weather-induced terrain conditions. Excessive
precipitation affects soil density, slope, river stage, and visibility.

Cloud cover (CC) prolongs the drying period. Normal SLOW-GO traffic
conditions may convert to NO-GO conditions which impact on both friendly
and enemy force movements. The intelligence analyst prepares combined
obstacles overlays that reflect at least normal weather effects on
mobility. Based on a review of historic weather patterns, the analyst
associates specific weather factors with specific time periods.

Figures 4-6 through 4-8 show--

0
Obstacles with dry soil.

4-13
 0
Obstacles created by wet soil.

0
Combined obstacles w ith wet soil.

The combined obstacles o v e r l a y p r o v i d e s a b a s i s f o r i d e n t i f y i n g A A s

and MCs. Having determined where the enemy cannot move without
d i f f i c u l t y , the analyst focuses attention on those areas where the
opposing force can move. Figure 4-9 shows normal requirements for
identifying AAs and MCS.

Figure 4-6. Obstacles with dry soil.

The combined obstacles overlay usually reveals one or more MC. Since
regiments normalIy advance along separate MCS, each division AA should
contain regimental MCS. The start point of an attack begins at enemy
assembly areas and terminates at their objective.

A convenient technique for identifying AAs is to place a doctrinal

template over a potential AA and visualize the enemy force moving through.
Ask : Is there sufficient maneuver space? How does the enemy look while
approaching critical points on the battlefield, such as the FEBA? How
does the enemy look when considering attrition? An enemy force fighting
through a covering force takes losses. To the attrition add the fact that
the enemy has a narrower front when attempting a breakthrough. The
a n a l y s t u s e s t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n t o d e p i c t a m o r e r e a l i s t i c A A . When
briefing on the AAs, the S2 or analyst must “talk” the commander through a
visualization of the enemy force fighting along the AA. Figure 4-10 shows
what the commander needs to see.

4-14
 The analyst moves the template along the avenue from projected enemy
assembly areas to the objective. An AA is never completely free of
obstacles. but it provides for relatively free movament. Obstacles
generally parallel the direction of movement.

The analyst selects alternative AAs. If they partially overlap, the

analyst should not be concerned. The most direct route to the objective
normally is a viable option.

LINE OF SIGHT ANALYSIS

In terrain and weather analysis, the terrain team determines LOS for
weapons, communications, TA, intelIigence colIection, and R&S systems.
Direct fire weapon systems like the antitank guided missile (ATGM), the
s e l f - p r o p e l l e d a n t i a i r c r a f t g u n , and the tank need good FofF to
successfulIy engage the enemy forces at maximum range. FM radio
communications, forward observers, TA and surveillance radar systems, and
SIGINT need optical or electronic LOS to the target. Terrain and weather
factor overlays assist in analyzing LOS limitations. LOS analysis helps
determine where ground forces can best shoot and communicate and the most
likely low altitude air approaches into the AO. In LOS analysis, the
analyst considers the following factors:
0
Terrain elevation.

4-15
 Figure 4-8. Combined obstacles with wet soil.

Figure 4-9. Avenues of approach and mobility corridors matrix.

0
Tree and vegetat ion he ight above elevat ion.

0
Height of buiIt-up areas.
0
Density of ground vegetation at fulI growth.
0
T e r r a i n f a c t o r s , s u c h a s d e f i l e s , which are not apparent because
of contour spacing.

4-16
 0
E f f e c t s o f w e a t h e r , such as fog or precipitation that obscure
observation.

The effects of seasonal changes on LOS should be readily apparent.

Winter vegetation compared to summer full growth alters LOS significantly.
The limitations of the standard military map is overcome through imagery
analysis (1A) and ground reconnaissance. Imagery analysts and terrain
specialists are trained in LOS analysis.

Direct fire weapons systems require horizontal or ground LOS. As a

rule, 4,000 meters (m) is considered the maximum range for unaided direct
fire weapons. Horizontal LOS overlays also depict friendly LOS.

Figure 4-10. Selecting avenues of approach.

4-17
Figure 4-11 is a horizontal LOS overlay depicting FofF. Areas of maximum
LOS are color-coded to aid analysis. Other range parameters are colored
for easy identification. Heavily forested areas would not necessarily
obscure LOS. Depending on the density of vegetation, LOS might penetrate
100 m or might penetrate 100 m or more of the forest. The height of
ground vegetation and the seasonal density (taller than 1 m) might degrade
LOS . This illustrates why an analyst must know the terrain of each
battlefield system that is being analyzed.

Figure 4-11. Horizontal visibility (fields of fire).

While ground-based systems need horizontal LOS, airborne systems use

oblique or vertical LOS. An attack helicopter armed with machine guns and
rockets rel ies on LOS from the aircraft to the target. Standoff weapon
systems that pop up from behind masking terrain require accurate LOS and
positioning data. Airborne R&S systems, such as the side-looking airborne
radar (SLAR), have similar needs for LOS data. Analysis of vertical and
oblique LOS from an enemy AD and target perspective helps identify the
best air avenues of approach (AAAs) into enemy airspace.

Determining how terrain and weather conditions along each AA affects

radio and other means of field communications is probably the area least
considered by most analysts because of their general lack of knowledge of
communications systems. The corps or division signal officer assists in
determining the advantages and Iimitations of each AA to enemy
communications systems. The SIGINT analyst also assists in this effort.

Most AAs do not offer unlimited options for the employment of

communications and noncommunications systems. The intelligence analyst
prepares a communication-noncommunication overlay of potential sites for

4-18
each MC. Having done this, the analyst compares each and makes some
initial determinations as to which is most favorable. LOS information
also is essential to electronic deception since this operation requires
knowledge of where friendly signatures are observed. Figure 4-12 shows
terrain masking and horizontal LOS.

RANGE
3000

2000

1000

Figure 4-12. Horizontal line of sight.

4-19
 AVENUES OF APPROACH ANALYSIS

In AA analysis, the intelligence analyst selects the AAs and AAAs that
best support the capabilities to move, shoot, and communicate. The
analyst considers each avenue in relation to each friendly or enemy
capabiIity, and then Iists and compares the advantages and disadvantages
of each. This is not merely a matter of counting advantages and
disadvantages, but requires detai lad analysis and sound judgment.

This analysis is not to determine which AAs the enemy selects, but
rather to determine which best supports the capability to move, shoot, and
communicate. Figure 4-13 shows how an analyst depicts AAs on an overlay.

Once the most viable AAs are selected, the analyst prepares an overlay
depicting each AA and MC. MCS are subsets of AAs and both are shown
t o g e t h e r . When weather is a consideration, the analyst prepares an
overlay for each season.

Figure 4-13. Avenues of approach.

4-20
 APPLICATION OF WEATHER FACTORS OVERLAYS TO ANALYSIS

S i m i l a r t o t e r r a i n a n a l y s i s , the G2 or S2 produces graphic weather

overlays to help facilitate analysis of weather effects on friendly and
enemy battlefield operations.

The analyst prioritizes which military effects of weather generally

have the greatest impact on the unit and threat force. Time does not
al low the analyst to cover alI aspects nor to depend solely on the weather
teams. Prioritizing becomes critical when operating at battalion or
brigade level because there is little time available.

The analyst focuses on each weather factor, examining its effects

separately for both friendly and enemy forces. Using weather factor
analysis, the analyst identifies specific vulnerabil ities and significant
benefits which contribute to the command’s successful accomplishment of
the mission.

The analyst should not generalize weather effects. The analyst should
seek details which are useful . The best way to be successful at this is
to track weather effects on unit operations during training exercises,
catalog these for future reference, and discuss with subordinate
commanders what critical weather effects are needed to operate
successfulIy. By doing this, the weather analysis supports operations and
the ana yst m a x i m i z e s w h a t I i t t l e t i m e e x i s t s f o r o t h e r I P B r e q u i r e m e n t s .

WEATHER ANALYSIS

Ana yz ng the cl imate and weather in the AO helps to determine their

e f f e c t s on friendly and enemy operations. Terrain and weather analysis
are inse p a a b l e , b e c a u s e t h e t a c t i c a l e n v i r o n m e n t r e q u i r e s t h a t c l i m a t e .
weather, a n d t e r r a i n i n f o r m a t i o n b e c o n s i d e r e d c o n c u r r e n t l y . The products
of weather analysis are applied in terrain and threat integration.

Weather has a significant impact on both friendly and enemy

operations. The weather is analyzed in detail to determine how it affects
both friendly and enemy capabilities to move, shoot, and commnunicate. A
detailed discussion of weather analysis is found in Chapter 4, FM 34-130.

Weather factor overlays are integrated with the terrain overlays to

predict the battlefield araas where friendly and enemy forces can
maneuver.

The weather team analyzes climatic data to determine the

characteristics of weather in the AO. The terrain team analyzes the
effect of weather on tactical operations and, together, the teams
integrate weather data and overlays with the terrain analysis and
overlays.

The weather analysis team prepares a matrix to define the required

analysis and specific weather requirements and determine which overlays
are required to support the operation. The matrix isolates militarily
significant weather factors and provides the capabi I ity to correlate

4-21
weather effects with specific combat operations. Examples of weather
subfactor overlays produced by the weather analysis team include fog,
cloud coverage (summer or winter), rain and snow, and weather effects on
slopes. The overlays, along with the combined obstacle overlay, identify
where forces maneuver on the battlefield.

A t b r i g a d e a n d b a t t a l i o n evel the S2 requests those IPB products

which address weather effects for their AO from higher headquarters.

Commanders and staffs mus understand and consider weather factors in

tactical planning. They must r e c o g n i z e t h e t a c t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e o f
w e a t h e r e f f e c t s a n d t h e r i s k s o r o p p o r t u n i t i e s t h e y p r e s e n t . While
considering the effect of weather on alI aspects of a mission, the S2
concentrates on weather impact on mobility and LOS. The effects of
weather are integrated with the enemy and terrain through IPB; this
integration is described in FM 34-81 and FM 34-130. A detailed
description of weather effects is in the Weather Effects and Information
Handbook (Draft) July 88, USAICS.

Low visibility is beneficial to offensive and retrograde operations

and detrimental to defensive operations. I n t h e o f f e n s e , it conceals the
concentration and maneuver of friendly forces, e n h a n c i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y
of achieving surprise. Low visibility hinders the defense because
c o h e s i o n a n d c o n t r o l a r e d i f f i c u l t t o a c h i e v e , R&S are impeded, and TA is
less accurate. These disadvantages are offset partially by extensive use
of ilIuminants, radar, sound detection, and IR devices. In some
instances, using smoke and obscurant aerosols locally reduces visibility.
When examining effects of visibility keep in mind friendly and enemy
capabilities. ..

I n a l l o p e r a t i o n s , restricted visibility prevents or Iimits the use of

aerial systems. The analyst must explain how visibility affects aerial
systems.

Wind speed and direction, b o t h o n t h e s u r f a c e a n d a l o f t , u s u a l l y f a v o r

the upwind force. Wind favors the use of either NBC or conventional
weapons by the upwind force. Wind of sufficient speed reduces the combat
effectiveness of the downwind force by blowing dust, smoke, sand, rain, or
snow on personnel and equipment. The upwind force has better visibility
and advances easier and faster. Strong winds limit airborne and aviation
operations.

Strong surface winds and gusts cause injury to personnel (especially

paratroopers in their descent), damage to materiel and structures, false
radar returns, and restrictions on visibility by blowing sand, dust, and
other materials. Generally, winds above 20 knots create such effects.
Smoke operations generally are ineffective at wind speeds greater than 7
knots, As the surface wind increases at low temperatures, either
naturalIy or enhanced by vehicle movement, windchiII becomes a critical
consideration The windchill factor adversely affects improperly clothed
personnel and impedes activity in unsheltered areas. Wind speed also
a f f e c t s t h e d s t a n c e t h a t s o u n d t r a v e l s . Winds are beneficial because

4-22
they improve trafficability by helping dry the soil. A windchill index is
available in FM 34-81.

The primary significance of precipitation is its effect on the state

of the ground, visibiIity, personnel effectiveness, and the functioning of
some equipment. Ground status affects trafficability; heavy rain makes
some unsurfaced roads and off-road areas impassible. Heavy rains make all
roads in low-lying areas impassible. Both rain and snow drastically
reduce personnel effectiveness by Iimiting visibility (causing discomfort,
increasing fatigue, and creating other physical and psychological
problems) and the persistence of chemical weapons thus creating NBC hot
spots . Precipitation also adversely degrades the quality of some supplies
in storage. Snow accumulation of one inch degrades trafficability and
reduces the effectiveness of mines. Generally, more than one inch (2.54
centimeters (cm)) per hour or 2 inches ( 5 . 0 8 cm) in 12 hours of
precipitation is considered critical for tactical operations. Snow fall
exceeding 2 inches (5.08 cm) in 12 hours, 6 inches (about 15 cm)
accumulated on the ground, o r d r i f t s o f a b o u t 2 f e e t ( . 6 m ) a l s o h a v e a
significant effect on operations requiring mobility.

The type and amount of CC, as well as the height of cloud bases and
tops, influence both friendly and enemy aviation operations. Extensive CC
reduces the effectiveness of air support. This effect becomes more
pronounced as CC increases, as cloud bases lower, and as conditions that
are frequently associated with clouds, such as icing, turbulence, and poor
visibility aloft increase. In relatively unstable air, clouds are
associated with strong vertical currents, turbulence, and restricted
visibility aloft. Generally, close air support (CAS) and aerial resupply
operations require a ceiIing of 1,000 feet (305 m) or more.

Clouds affect ground operations by limiting illumination and

visibility, They also determine the types, intensities, and amounts of
precipitation. Clouds, since they trap incoming heat from the sun and
r i s i n g h e a t f r o m t h e e a r t h , tend to make temperatures near the earth more
homogeneous. Temperature and humidity both affect air density. Air
density decreases as the temperature or humidity increases; thus,
efficiency of aircraft propulsion reduces in areas of high temperature or
high humidity. Although temperature and humidity may not directly affect
a p a r t i c u l a r t a c t i c a l o p e r a t i o n , extremes reduce personnel and equipment
capabilities, and may necessitate a reduction of aircraft payloads.

Tactics that are effective in one climatic zone may be ineffective if

used in another. The high temperatures and humidity found in the tropics
are conducive to the growth of dense fol iage, which drastically affects
operations. In arctic climates, cold weather periods--

0 Create an almost constant need for heated shelters.

0 Cause difficulty in constructing fortifications.

0 Increase the dependence on logistic support.

0 Necessitate special clothing, equipment, and combat skills.

4-23
 A combination of temperature and wind speed produces a windchill
factor . A windchill factor of -26°F (-32°C) is considered the
critical value for personnel and equipment operating in cold weather, The
opposite extreme, 120°F (49°C), i s c o n s i d e r e d t h e c r i t i c a l v a l u e f o r
personnel and equipment operating in hot weather, Similar restrictions
occur in the desert where temperature difference of over 50°F (lO°C)
occur between night and day in shelters without air conditioning or
heaters.

At division and corps, updating the weather data base is continuous,

particularly during periods of increased tension or combat. During these
periods, the intelligence analyst compares current and forecasted weather
with historic patterns to determine deviations. Updates are forwarded to
subordinate commands.

The analyst uses the weather data base as the foundation for analyzing
the effects of weather on combat operations. This analysis begins with an
evaluation of the mission, threat, Al, and friendly capabilities. While
the analyst considers the effects of the weather on personnel and
equipment, t h e p r i m a r y c o n c e r n i s w i t h t h e i r impact on mobility and LOS.

WEATHER FACTOR ANALYSIS MATRIX DEVELOPMENT

The weather factor analysis matrix (see Chapter 4, FM 34-130) assists

the analyst in organizing the analysis task, defining Specific weather
requirements, and determining what weather factor overlays are required to
support mission planning. The matrix isolates those weather factors that
are militarily significant and correlates their effects with specific
. combat operations and supporting functions.

THREAT EVALUATION

During the threat evaluation phase, the intelligence analyst examines

enemy forces utilizing the nine OB factors.

The objective for the intelligence analyst during this phase is to

determine enemy capabilties, vulnerabiIities, and strengths. Also the
analyst determines how the enemy would operate doctrinalIy If not
restricted by terrain and weather. The G2 or S2 analyzes the enemy based
on known information maintained in the enemy OB file. Information gaps
identified are translated into RIIs and sent up the intelIigence chain to
be answered. Maintaining a detailed enemy OB file is a continuous
process. The S2 section maintains one for each of the unit’s contingency
and normal operating areas. The intelligence analyst uses the enemy OB
together with current information and the mission to develop an HVT list.

The S2 and staff develop an HVT list by imagining how the enemy would
fight, relative to the friendly force mission. The S2’s or analyst’s goal
is to identify enemy assets an enemy commander would consider valuable or
critical for the accomplishment of the mission. In thinking through the
enemy plan an analyst considers how the friendly element’s mission and
intent affects the enemy mission.

4-24
 For example, if an analyst is thinking through an enemy attack and
knows that the friendly force is in prepared positions with extensive
obstacles and barriers throughout the perimeter, it is a logical
assumption that the enemy commander will want substantial engineer support
to breach friendly obstacles. The enemy commander may not be aware of the
obstacles, yet engineer assets in fact are critical to the enemy battle
plan. Enemy engineer units therefore become HVTS. The G2 or S2 provides
this and other HVTS in the form of a HVT list to the G3 or S3 and the FSE
so target priorities are established and planned for.

By analyzing probable enemy actions, the analyst enhances the

probability of mission success by determining HVTS which can become enemy
vulnerabilities if acted on by the G3 or S3 and the FSE.

The analyst develops doctrinal templates during the threat evaluation

phase. Before creating doctrinal templates, the analyst determines which
enemy echelon is the focal point for analysis. US commanders are
interested in enemy echelons one level above their own because that is the
enemy echelon that directs a battle against them. Enemy maneuver elements
are templated for units two echelons below that of the US commander,
because those are the ground force units in direct contact with the unit.

Knowledge of enemy doctrine provides a starting point for doctrinal

templates. For example, doctrinal templates may be required to reflect
the sequential order of an enemy unit in the attack from its assembly area
to the ultimate objective. The sequence may be as follows:
0
Tactical march formations.

o
River crossing (hasty, deliberate) .

0
Breakthrough.

0
Envelopment.

0
Exploitation.

0
Pursuit.

One method of determining which operations and units should be

templated is to develop a m a t r i x . The matrix shows which types of
operations and units that are expected to be encountered and provides a
clear record of what has been determined. Figure 4-14 showa an operations
or unit matrix,

It is also important to prepare doctrinal templates of battlefield

functional systems. The functional system templates generally expand
information that is reflected in the primary doctrinal templates. For
example, a template depicting an enemy division in a river crossing is
expanded by a subset depicting the deployment of engineer bridging and
pontoon equipment.

Again, not every possible enemy action and subset is templated.

4-25
 Figure 4-14. Operations or unit matrlx.

A matrix is an easy way to lay out the information to be analyzed and

recorded, Using a matrix, t h e a n a l y s t l o o k s f o r t h o s e b a t t l e f i e l d
functional systems in certain types of operations that tell the most about
how the enemy operates in relation to the mission. Figure 4-15 shows the
types of operations on a battlefield functional systems matrix.

THREAT INTEGRATION

The objective of threat integration is to integrate enemy doctrine

with the terrain and weather analysis done in previous IPB phases. This
further reduces uncertainty as to how the enemy fights. Members of the
staff analyze potential courses of action during this phase to advise the
commander of the best course of action to accomplish the mission.

T o a s s i s t t h e s t a f f , the G2 or S2 produces situation, event, and

decision support templates. FM 34-130 provides a detailed description on
how to prepare these templates. This chapter discusses how the analyst
should apply these templates in order t o s u p p o r t t h e s t a f f p l a n n i n g
process.

SITUATION TEMPLATE

The situation template depicts how the enemy adjusts doctrine to

terrain and weather effects throughout the battlefield. Knowledge of
enemy doctrine is critical to developing and using situation templates for
analysis.

4-26
 Figure 4-15. Battlefield functional systems matrix.

During this phase the analyst takes doctrinal templates and visualizes
where the enemy force will place assets on a particular point on the
ground. By doing this, MCS within each AA become apparent.

As enemy forces move along AAs and MCs, they do so sequentially. The
analyst follows the enemy by sequentialIy and situationally templating
their movement.

Because of time constraints, a p p l y s i t u a t i o n t e m p l a t i n g i n i t i a l l y t o

critical areas on the battlefield. These are based on the friendly force
mission and what the commander feels are critical battlefield points and
areas. By applying situation templates the analyst usually depicts
expected enemy movements along an AA for the commander and staff. This
contributes to the planning process by allowing the commander to get a
“ v i s u a l f e e l ” for the enemy’s plan.

PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

PIRs are the expression of the commander’s information needs. When

recommending PIRs, the intelligence analyst keeps in mind the commander’s
intent. The analyst limits the PIR to a few questions. These PIR S m u s t
seek answers to questions critical to the successful accomplishment of the
unit’s mission.

4-27
 While PIRs are general in nature, they must be specific enough to
identify the critical information required. For example if the brigade is
preparing defensive positions in anticipation of an attack, then a PIR
could be: When will the enemy attack? A more specific PIR would be:
When will the enemy attack and where is the main effort? This PIR, if
answered, helps the commander prepare a more effective defense
particularly if time is short. Knowing where the main effort is helps the
commander prioritize defensive preparations.

EVENT TEMPLATE

Situation templating is the basis for event templating. Event

templating is the identification and analysis of significant battlefield
events which provide indicators of an enemy course of action. It is a
projection of what most likely will occur if the enemy adopts a particular
course of action. By knowing what the enemy can do and comparing it with
what the enemy is doing, it is possible to predict what the enemy will do
next. Because there are normally several courses of action which lead to
the enemy’s objective, each must be identified. Event templates are then
developed for each course of action. This is because the enemy course of
action which the analyst identifies as the most probable may not be
selected for reasons of deception or other factors known only to the
enemy. The analyst must be able to shift attention quickly between
courses of action during the battle.

The event template is a critical analytical tool for determining the

enemy’s posture and movement. Knowledge of when and where enemy activity
is likely to occur on the battlefield provides indicators of enemy
intentions. Indicators may be negative (that is, things that do not
happen may be just as critical as what does happen). The projection of
battlefield events occurs through situation development during the
prehostility or predeployment phase of the IPB process and is verified or
refuted during combat operations.

While visualizing the enemy force moving along an AA or MC, critical

areas become apparent. These areas are significant because they are where
significant events and activities should occur. If the analyst’s
hypothesis is correct, it is within these areas that targete appear. The
intelligence analyst designates these areas as named areas of interest
(NAIs) .

An NAI is a point or area, often along an identified MC, where enemy

activity (or inactivity) confirms or denies a particular enemy course of
action. NAIs also fall outside of a MC. For example, there may be
a c t i v i t y o n k e y t e r r a i n , s u c h a s h i g h g r o u n d , in support of movement on an
adjacent MC.

The event template and its NAIs are the basis for intelligence
collection, R&S, and analysis because they--

o
Focus attention on areas where the enemy force must appear if it
uses a particular MC.

4-28
 o Frame militarily significant events by time and ocation within
an NAI.

0 Compare events in one NAI with events occurring n the NAI of

other MCs to determine enemy intentions.

It is important to develop event templates as quickly as possible.

Refine them further as time permits. Early preparation permits quick
development of an R&S plan. R&S assets are focused on NAIs to obtain the
greatest payoff in relation to limited assets. The primary goal of an
analysis is to apply the event template to the collection of information
which supports the mission planning effort.

EVENT ANALYSIS MATRIX

The event analysis matrix (EAM) supports the event template. It

correlates the expected events and activities within each NAI and adds the
dimension of time. Through analysis of enemy doctrinal movement rates and
the effects of the terrain and weather on their mobility, estimate the
time required for the enemy to move between NAIs.

The analyst prepares an EAM for the primary AA and each MC within it.
Figure 4-16 shows a sample EAM. Due to time limitations and staff size,
most EAMs are prepared at division level or higher.

Before combat, the EAM and event template illustrate possible enemy
courses of action as a basis for comparing friendly courses of action.
During combat operations, they focus on enemy probable courses of action.

Event templating enables the G2 to develop precise collection

requirements, maximizing the effectiveness of I imited resources over
extended areas against a vast array of enemy targets. It assists the
intelIigence analyst in determining where to look, when to look, and what
to look for. Situation and event templates enable the collection manager
to establish collection priorities based on those courses of action the
enemy is most Iikely to adopt. Framing movers and emitters, the primary
indicators of events and activities, in time and location, allows the
coIIection manager to determine the optimum mix of coIIection sensors.

Event templating also serves the G3 by tell ing--

0
Where and when to shoot, jam, and maneuver.

0
What to shoot, jam, and maneuver against.

Event templating is the vital link between the success of the

commander’s tactical concept and intelIigence requirements and the
c o l l e c t i o n , planning, and execution needed to fulfill those requirements.

DECISION SUPPORT TEMPLATE

The DST is a logical extension of event templating; it relates events

of the event template to the commander’s decision raquirements. The DST

4-29
is not the sole responsibility of the G2 or S2. Production of the DST and
synchronization matrix is a shared responsibility, involving the entire
staff or their representatives. The G2 or S2 provides information about
the enemy. The G3 or S3 guides the effort and ensures that it supports
the commander’s intent.

A properly prepared DST portrays the enemy’s most likely course of

action and possible target areas of interest (TAIs) along with time phase
lines (TPLs). It also depicts decision points (DPs) which relate to the
use of fire, maneuver, and CSS.

COORDINATES

AVENUE OF APPROACH II

4-30
 Target Areas of Interest

Areas along each AA and MC where the comnander influences the enemy
through fire and maneuver are TAIs. The TAIs are normally areas which
were earl ier identified as NAI. They are areas where we delay, disrupt,
destroy, or manipulate the enemy force. They are also areas suitable for
attacking HVTS.

A TAI is an engagement area or point, usually a ong an MC, where the

i n t e r d i c t i o n o f e n e m y f o r c e s b y m a n e u v e r , f i r e s , o r jamming deprives or
reduces a particular enemy capability. It also may cause enemy forces to
abandon or require the use of unusual support to co t i n u e o p e r a t i o n s . I n
the latter option, TAIs are terrain-dependent to inhibit or deny movement.

Sample TAIs include--

o
Key bridges.

0
Road junctions.

0
Choke points.

0
DZS and LZS.

o
Known fording sites.

The TAIs are significant because they constitute a basis for

allocation of attack resources. The identification of TAIs is a joint
. effort of the intelligence, operations, and FSE staffs. The intelligence
staff evaluates enemy forces and the effect of interdiction on their
capabilities. The operations staff and FSE consider the availability of
interdiction resources, the effects of interdiction on the accomplishment
of friendly missions, and priorities for the use of available resources.

Part of determining TAIs involves target value analysis (TVA). TVA is

a joint activity of intelligence, operations, and FSE personnel. Through
analysis of enemy doctrine, TVA names and provides the basis for locating
enemy elements which are key to the enemy’s success. These enemy elements
are known HVTS.

A second category of targets is the HPT. Destruction of an HPT is

advantageous to friendly operations. The commander designates the HPTs.
For example, suppose the enemy must cross a wide, deep river in a friendly
sector as part of a probable attack. Enemy engineer assets are very
important to the enemy commander’s success. The engineer units and
e q u i p m e n t a r e H V T S , because without them the river crossing is impossible.
The friendly commander, briefed on this HVT, designates the enemy engineer
assets as HPTs because their destruction is of great value to the friendly
defense plan. This particular HPT is prioritized among other HPTs for
location by intelligence personnel and subsequent attack by lethal and
nonlethal means.

4-31
 An analyst must have an in-depth knowledge of enemy doctrine to
determine potential HVTS, CPS, missile units, and logistics points on
situation and event templates. This knowledge helps in cueing collection
assets to possible HVT locations designated as TAI for the DST.

Decision Points

Following the selection of TAI, the analyst identifies DPs. The

availability and capability of friendly fire and maneuver systems largely
influence the location of DPs; therefore, their selection is primarily a
G3 or S3 function. However, t h i s t a s k r e q u i r e s t h e e f f o r t s o f b o t h t h e G 3
or S3, t h e G 2 o r S 2 , a n d t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e s t a f f s .

DPs identify those battlefield events which may require tactical

decisions and the no-later-than time when these decisions are made for the
commander to retain avaiIable options. Decisions are made early enough to
ensure implementation in time to achieve the desired effects; however,
they cannot be made until there are indications that particular
b a t t l e f i e l d e v e n t s w i l l o c c u r a n d t h e i r I o c a t ons determined with a high
degree of confidence.

DPs associate projected enemy locations w t h s p e c i f i c p o i n t s o n t h e

battlefield. Comparing times required to imp ement decisions, enemy
movement rates, and distances determine DPs. For example, i f i t r e q u i r e s
two hours to implement a decision, it must be made while the enemy is at
least two hours from the TAI where the event will occur. These decisions
include more than fire and maneuver; they also include decisions such as
donning mission oriented protective posture (MOPP) gear, and employing
smoke. Enemy doctrinal movement rates that the analyst develops are
adjusted to compensate for the effects of the terrain, weather, and
friendly action on mobility. They provide the basis for computation.

The DST depicts the TAI and DPs. Figure 4-17 shows a sample offensive
DST with synchronization matrix.

Decision Support Matrix

A decision support matrix supplements the DST. This matrix relates

each DP to the event or associated TAI or NAI requiring a friendly
reaction. Decisions are made by the time enemy forces pass DPs or a set
of options which were available are negated. Other information from the
IPB data base, like enemy composition and probable deployment, supports
the DST.

Intelligence provides a basis for tactical planning and execution

Detailed planning is accomplished during the static period, as an 8- o
10-day battlefield scenario does not allow time for detailed planning
Event and decision support templates are the results of detailed
intelIigence planning that is accomplished during static conditions. They
are the basis for all tactical planning. These templates are the filters
through which all information and intelligence are directed to the
commander. They are relevant to the commander’s needs, as expressed in
PIR and IR, because they are keyed to important battlefield events and

4-32
time and space factors known to be of interest to the commander. The DST
is the vital Iink between the conmmander’s intelIigence needs and the
resultant actions the commander and staff require.

The commander is vitally concerned with wresting the initiative from

the enemy commander; that is, forcing the enemy commander to choose a less
desirable course of action through design rather than chance. The DST
frames the commander’s opportunities and options and ensures timely and
accurate decisions. This provides the means to influence enemy actions
rather than just react to them.

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD DURING PEACETIME

This chapter has emphasized the vital role that IPB plays in preparing
for the next battle. During peacetime, IPB builds an extensive data base
for each potential area in which a unit is required to operate. It
a n a l y z e s this intelligence data base in detail to determine the impact of
the enemy, weather, and terrain on operations and presents this
information graphically. IPB is initiated any time the commander faces a
new enemy or receives a new mission. It is a continuous process which
supports planning and execution for all operations.

4-34
 CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS IN DEPTH

Analysts do not find intelligence. Analysts develop intelligence

through evaluating, assessing, integrating, and interpreting information.
This intelligence focuses on the commander’s needs. It must support the
commander’s decision to concentrate or disperse forces on the
battlefield. It must provide information to assist the commander in
targeting and defeating the enemy. This chapter addresses some of the
techniques and tools which the intelligence analyst uses to manage
intelIigence production.

Analysts face daily problems. These challenges vary from the simple,
such as finding information, to the complex, such as predicting specific
enemy courses of action. The analyst makes decisions regarding what, how,
and when the commander can use information to support the battle. This
information often means the difference between winning and losing on the
battlefield, so it is vital that analysis be both accurate and timely.
This information and analysis influences decision making. Although the
analyst does not make decisions for the commander, the commander cannot
make qual ity decisions without’ the information that analysts provide.

MEETING USER REQUIREMENTS

The ultimate user of intelligence is the commander. The analyst

produces intelligence that the user specifically needs. Through stated
PIRs and IRs, the commander drives intelligence production and focuses
efforts. The commander’s IRs often pertain to varied areas on the
battlefield. For example, intelIigence required to support the rear
battle is different from that required for the deep battle. Different
staff sections require different information, yet all of this supports the
commander’s needs on the battlefield.

It follows then, that to satisfy user requirements, the analyst must

understand what those needs are. Figure 5-1 lists some of the factors
which an analyst should consider in developing an intelIigence product.
If the analyst and the user do not look at information or problems from
the same perspective, the intelligence will not support requirements.

As a simple example, suppose the user asks for a list of locations

where a river may be bridged. The analyst considers the enemy’s tanks,
which weigh about 40 tons, and provides such a Iist. If the user plans to
cross these bridges with American tanks, which weigh about 60 tons, the
list of locations is useless. Clearly, the analyst has failed to
understand the user’s needs.

In the tactical environment, the analyst and the user see the mission
as fighting the same enemy in a specific geographic area. From the
k n o w l e d g e e a c h h a s a b o u t t h e t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n , both develop conceptual
mode Is, The analyst and the user create some type of theoretical

5-1
 Figure 5-1. Developing an intelligence product.

representation of the tactical situation. These conceptuaI mode Is have

common factors wh ich both anal yst and user share. These common factors
are termed “a shared conceptual model .“

Without a shared conceptual model, the user and analyst cannot

communicate. Effective communication allows the analyst to understand the
user’s requirements and to tailor the product to them. ..

Communication allows analysts to interpret what the user wants and

fill in any missing intelligence pieces. This is easily done through
feedback.

Feedback greatly improves the quality of any intelligence product. If

user and analyst communicate during the development of a product, the
shared conceptual model is refined. This allows the analyst to orient on
those areas important to the user and to eliminate nonessentials.
Refinement of the “model’” s e n s i t i z e s t h e a n a l y s t t o a r e a s o f u n c e r t a i n t y
and the criticality of time in a given situation. The analyst, in turn,
al lows the user to understand the risk inherent in any estimate and the
basis for assumptions made.

Face-to-face communication is the best form of feedback. It is also

the best way to develop a shared conceptual model. Ambiguous words or
ideas can be instantly clarified, pictures or sketches can be drawn, and
maps consulted, When face-to-face communication is not possible, the
analyst speaks with staff officers or other representatives of the user.
If a standard of performance has been established or is described in SOP,
t h e a n a l y s t u s e s t h i s as a m e a s u r e o f c u r r e n t e f f o r t s .

5-2
 DETERMINING THE RISK FACTOR

Uncertainty is what the job of intelligence is all about. To succeed,

the analyst handles uncertainty from a number of sources. While objective
ground truth is found in the laboratory, it is not part of analysis of the
battlefield. The analyst frequently deals with ambiguous or even
misleading information.

The analyst’s greatest concern is uncertainty, the commander’s is

risk. Good analysts translate uncertainty into risk. Figure 5-2 shows a
graph of risk functions to consider. Risk increases as enemy lethality
moves from low to high. When a range of uncertainty is added to the
e s t i m a t e o f l e t h a l i t y , the potential danger becomes even greater. The
degree of risk a commander will accept governs the amount of uncertainty
the analyst reports.

For example, under a very high level of uncertainty, the commander

faces between one and three enemy tank divisions. The analyst admits the
l e v e l o f u n c e r t a i n t y i n v o l v e d , while colIecting and processing information
to reduce the uncertainty. The level of uncertainty that the analyst

HIGH

RISK

Figure 5-2. Translating uncertainty to risk.

5-3
 accepts is driven by the degree of risk the commander accepts. The
commander is unable to properly plan for battle knowing only that friendly
forces face “between one and three enemy tank divisions”. The same
commander is not concerned about facing 10 or 12 enemy tank battal ions;
the commander employs the same plan regardless, in facing 10, 11, or 12
battalions. The analyst does not waste time reducing the level of
u n c e r t a i n t y b e y o n d r e p o r t i n g “1O to 12 tank battalions" because the
commander is satisfied with the given degree of risk.

Risk is a voluntary exposure to danger, however unavoidable it might

be under the circumstances. In combat, t h e r e i s a l w a y s r i s k i n n o t
preparing response to a potential enemy action whether or not that action
has a high possibility of execution. Risk increases in response to
potential danger and decreases when the enemy threat credibility goes
down.

Risk increases when--

0
Enemy force lethality increases.

0
Warning time decreases. (Crises occur when warning time s less
t h a n t h e r e q u i r e d p r e p a r a t i o n t i m e ; t h e w o r s t - c a s e s i t u a t on is
when there is total surprise and no warning.)

0
The number of enemy options increases. ( I f t h e enemy’s p ans
are ambiguous, then friendly forces might not p a n e f f e c t i v e
responses to all of the enemy opt ions.)

*
0
The number of friendly options decreases. ( I f ewer options are
a v a i l a b l e f o r c o u n t e r i n g t h e t h r e a t , t h e r e i s a greater chance
that the available options will not work.)
0
The enemy’s knowledge of the battlefield environment, including
friendly forces increases.

Risk decreases when--

0
The enemy force lethal ity decreases.

0
There is greater warning time.

0
The enemy has fewer options.

0
The number of friendly force options increases.

0
The friendly force knowledge of the battlefield environment,
including enemy forces, increases. Knowing how the environment
affects combat operations allows the commander to exclude
unworkable courses of action and to gain maximum effectiveness
from others.

The analyst’s uncertainty plays a key role in the evaluation of the

enemy and the amount of risk accepted. Uncertainty may arise for many

5-4
reasons. F i r s t , there is uncertainty about the enemy’s intent: “What is
the enemy’s real objective? What are the various means of achieving this
objective?”’ Second, there is uncertainty in evaluating the capabilities
of the enemy force to achieve these objectives. Third, there is
uncertainty in other factors (lethal ity, warning time, enemy and friendly
options, and environmental conditions). Fourth, there is uncertainty that
the method of response will produce the desired outcome.

THE THREAT MODEL

The threat model is a portrayal of the enemy. It allows the analyst

to piece together information, identify information gaps, speculate and
predict, and do problem solving. Most importantly the threat model
allows some of the risk in a given situation to be quantified. There will
always be inaccuracy in a model, and so there will always be uncertainty.
S t i l l , based on the model, an analyst can look for changes in a real-world
situation to identify patterns, trends, and activi y levels. Creating
such a model requires a knowledge of--

0
Physical objects such as weapons, vehicles, and radar.

0
Organizational structures of enemy and friendly forces.

0
Battlefield environment, including terrain, hydrology, and
weather.

Once developed the model is refined and maintained, or t will lose its
validity.

T h r e a t m o d e l s i n c o r p o r a t e w h i t e e l e m e n t s ( b a t t l e f i e d geography and
environment conditions) , red elements (the enemy force ( r t h r e a t ) , a n d
blue elements (the friendly force). The three elements o f w h i t e , r e d , a n d
blue form an organizational structure from which the analyst can mentally
picture the battlefield. Figure 5-3 illustrates elements of the threat
model .

Thinking white is understanding the elements of the environment as

they affect the battle. In threat modeling, development of the white
framework comes first. It is the white framework that anchors the threat
model to the real world. The white framework is made up of space and
time.

Developing the geographic framework of the battlefield is as simple as

plotting the battlefield on a map. The dimensions of the battlefield
encompass the unit’s AO and Al.

The map is a model of the real world. The topographic map contains a
wealth of information about the battlefield environment, including
descriptions of terrain, roads, and population centers. The highly
detailed military map contributes more information to the threat model.

Time in the threat model is a sequence of time-period snapshots (or

windows) within which events occur. The analyst compresses threat model

5-5
 Figure 5-3. Elements of the threat model.

time to bring events closer together or expand it to make individual

events more distinguishable. Overlaying time windows helps in seeing
patterns of events or distinguishing changes. In the threat model snapshot
sequence, one of the snapshots represents the current time frame. A
sequence of snapshots al lows the analyst to fol low courses of action from
the current time frame to the eventual outcome of the battle. Each
snapshot represents an overlay of information on the battlefield
geography. Figure 5-4 shows this.

Thinking red is seeing the battle from the enemy’s viewpoint. The red
element of the threat model is anchored in the real world. Enemy forces
use the political and military policies of the foreign nations involved.
The enemy combat force is an extension of political policies that are the
source of the conflict that creates the battlefield situation.

N e x t , in threat model ing, p l o t t h e r e d e l e m e n t , i n c l u d i n g l o c a t i o n s

a n d I i k a g e s o f t h e p o l i t i c a l , m i l i t a r y , and combat organizations on the
battlefield. The highest echelon of enemy organization plotted depends on
the echelon of interest to the friendly force commander. For example, the
strategic-level threat model has all aspects of the civil ian and mil itary

5-6
 c THINK
WHITE f

Figure 5-4. Seeing the battlefield.

force structure, whereas a division-level threat model shows only the

locations of the red forces up to army level.

The organization of red elements follows some form of hierarchical

structure, connected by Iines of communication (LOC). The LOC shows the
relationships between units for command, control, and coordination. The
LOC is overlaid on the geographic structure and relates to physical
communication paths Iike roads, transmission Iines, or electromagnetic
transmission paths. Figure 5-5 shows the three techniques.

Thinking blue refers to seeing the battle from the friendly

commander’s point of view. The threat model takes on its full meaning
when the blue element is introduced along with white and red. The targets
o f r e d t h r e a t a r e b l u e e l e m e n t s ; the components of the friendly force are
blue elements.

5-7
 Figure 5-5. Red elements three techniques.

The most common failing of analysts is their inability to “think

blue”. Analysts become extremely knowledgeable about the enemy, knowing
nearly exact numbers of equipment, biographies of commanders, and unit
histories, but they cannot see how friendly forces operate. It does
little good to understand enemy aviation without understanding some of the
characteristics of friendly air defense. While there are staff officers
who are experts in friendly systems and tactics, the analyst must stilI
have a familiarity with blue doctrine and tactics. This returns to the
need for a shared conceptual model.

In plotting the location of units in the white framework, the analyst

is concerned with the location of those combat units that information from
the threat model supports. Figure 5-6 lists some information sources for
developing the blue element of the threat model.

Figure 5-5. lnformation sources for developing the blue element.

F i g u r e s 5 - 7 , 5 - 8 , a n d 5 - 9 show checkl ists of white, red, and blue

questions that are asked when c r e a t i n g t h e t h r e a t m o d e l .

5-8
 Figure 5-7. Checklist of white questions.

What is the enemy’s doctrfne? What are the enemy’s tactics?

How does the enemy prepare war plans? How does the enemy train?

What are the enemy’s objectives? How is the enemy equipped?

What is the enemy’s strategy? How is the enemy force sustained?

What are the enemy’s operational plans? How is the enemy force structured?

What are the enemy’s courses of actions?

Figure 5-8. Checklist of red questions.

5-9
 Figure 5-9. Checklist of blue questions.

Given a model of how the battlefield should appear in a certain

s i t u a t i o n , the analyst develops and tests hypotheses of how the enemy may
act. An hypothesis is an explanation that accounts for a set of facts and
that can be tested by further investigation. It is a set of logically
related propositions and an outcome. An hypothesis can be proven false
based on evidence, but it can never be proven correct in advance. The
best that the analyst can do is rank order several hypotheses or assign
r o u g h p r o b a b i l i t i e s t o t h e m , Whan seeking evidence to support or reject a
hypothesis there are several considerations for the analyst:

o The enemy can be engaged in deception. The course of action

selected by the enemy does not have to be the best, but only
adequate. Deception efforts then can be mounted which support
the most obvious course of action.

0 Sensors can collect only in the areas where they look. If

t a r g e t e d a t o n e s p e c i f i c a r e a , they may not collect information
in another. This information not collected may have confirmed or
denied a particular course of action.

0 Indicators may be redundant to several hypotheses,

0 Several sensors may collect the same piece of information. This

can give undue weight to a hypothesis.

0 Some small indicator may be vital to a certain course of action.

Large scale river crossings, for example, require engineer support.
If that support is conclusively absent, a river crossing cannot
occur, no matter what else supports that hypothesis.

0 The evidence gathered in one area may not be representative of the

whole battlefield. For example, the enemy has 15 battalions of
artillery available. Sensors report 4 battalions in the north and 2
in the south. This does not conclusively indicate a total of 10
battalions in the north and 5 in the south. The true disposition
may be 4 in the north and 11 well camouflaged battalions in the
south .

5-1o
 When selecting an hypothesis as “most likely” or rejecting it out of
hand, all of the above issues come into play. These errors in thinking
may lead to false alarms or rejecting perfectly good ideas. Other errors
also exist which affect analysis. They are called biases.

B I ASES.
—

If a single term best describes the factors that interfere with

successful analytic thinking, it is bias. A bias is a subjective
viewpoint. It indicates a preconceived notion about something or someone.
Analysts must recognize biases and be aware of the potential influence
they can have on judgment.

Biases can have a positive influence on analysis. With a iack of

information, a preconceived notion gives a starting point for thinking
about a situation. However, biases are generally bad because they obscure
the true nature of the information. The analyst must recognize several
categories of biases so as not to be misled or drawn into the wrong
conclusions during the analysis process. Biases are cultural,
organizational , p e r s o n a l , a n d c o g n i t i v e ( p e r c e p t i o n ) .

CULTURAL BIASES

Cultural biases begin forming at an early age and continue throughout

a lifetime. They interfere with the ability to think in the same manner
as t h e e n e m y ( t h i n k r e d ) . Analysts need considerable background
information on culture and social mores to perceive a situation In the
same way the enemy perceives it. If analysts do not have this experience
. or information and decide to depend upon their own values when looking at
a situation, the analysis is likely to be wrong. The reason for this is
that different cultures tend to view similar situations differently.

ORGANIZATIONAL BIASES

Most organizations have specific policy goals. Any analysis done

within these organizations may not be as objective as the same type of
analysis done outside the organization. Some of the problems that occur
from a subjective internal analysis range from an unconscious altering of
judgment because of exposure to selective information and common
viewpoints held among individuals, t o d e l i b e r a t e l y a l t e r i n g a j u d g m e n t t o
provide what the commander wants to hear. “Best case” analysis is a good
example.

“Best case’” is where an analyst preeents the situation in the most

optimistic Iight so as not to anger the commander. This frequently
underestimates the enemy’s capability while overestimating friendly
capability.

PERSONAL BIASES

Personal biases come from past experiences. If a thought pattern

previously led to success, analysts may continue to follow this pattern.

5-11
Even if the situations have nothing in common, the tendency to follow the
methods that were successful in the past is very strong.

COGNITIVE BIASES

The all-source analyst evaluates information from a variety of sources

(including HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, and open sources). Each source has
strengths and weaknesses. The degree of reliability, completeness, and
consistency varies from source-to-source and even from message-to-message.
This variance often creates doubt about the reliability of some sources.

The cognitive biases that cause analysts the most problems are
v i v i d n e s s , absence of evidence, o v e r s e n s i t i v i t y t o c o n s i s t e n c y ,
persistence of impressions based on discredited evidence, and
availability.

Vividness

Clear and concise information has a greater impact on thinking than

abstract and vague information. Even if the vague piece of information
has more value as evidence, the tendency is to disregard faster than you
would eliminate a clear piece of information.

Absence of Evidence

Lack of information is by far the most common problem, especially in a

tactical environment. This does not mean that analysts should be content
with the information on hand; they always want more. Analysts shouldn’t
hold back information because it is not conclusive. It rarely is.
Instead the analyst should--
0
Realize that information sometimes is missing.

0
Identify areas where information is lacking and consider
alternative hypotheses.

o
Adapt and adjust judgments as more information comes in.

0
C o n s i d e r w h e t h e r a l a c k o f informs” ion is normal in those areas
or whether the absence of nformat o n i s i t s e l f a n i n d i c a t o r .

Oversensit v i t y t o Consistency

Consistent evidence is a major factor for confidence in the analyst’s

judgment. On the one hand, c o n s i s t e n t i n f o r m a t i o n i s a p p r o p r i a t e . On the
other hand, information may be consistent because it’s redundant, or it
may come from a small or biased sample. The analyst considers if the
evidence is representative of the total potentially available information.
If it is not, o r i f i t i s n o t k n o w n , t h e n t h e c o n f i e n c e l e v e l i s l o w ,
regardless of the consistency. The analyst must be r e c e p t i v e t o
information that comes in from other sources regard e s s o f w h e t h e r i t
supports the hypothesis or not.

5-12
 Persistence of Impressions Based on Discredited Evidence

Whenever the analyst receives evidence, there is a tendency to th nk

of things that explain the evidence. These connections create
impressions. Although the analyst discredits the evidence, the conne t i o n
remains, and so do the impressions. An example is a clandestine source
under hostile control. If the source has a record of passing accurate
information, the analyst tends to judge all information that is passed
according to previous accuracy. The analyst may doubt the validity of the
report claiming that the source is under hostile control or may
rational ize the inaccuracy in some other way. Either way, the evidence is
based on previous information and not on current indicators. This is one
way an enemy could launch a deception operation. This is important. An
analyst who “reasons away” information contrary to pet hypotheses does the
commander a disservice. Analysts must be professional and capable of
s a y i n g , “I was wrong,” b e f o r e t h e s i t u a t i o n i s l o s t .

Availability

The ability to recall past events influences judgment concerning

future events. Since memory is more readily available, and is more
a c c e p t a b l e , i t is easy to rely upon memory instead of seeking a proper
sample to pred c t e v e n t s .

Overcoming b i a s i s a v i t a l s t e p t o p r o p e r a n a l y s i s . Any of the above

biasas reduces t h e q u a l i t y o f a n a l y s i s p e r f o r m e d .

5-13
 CHAPTER 6

SITUATION DEVELOPMENT

Situation development enables commanders to see and understand the

battlefield in sufficient time and detail to make sound tactical
decisions. It helps locate and identify enemy forces; determine their
strength, capabilities, and significant activities; and predict their
probable courses of action. Situation development helps the commander to
effectively employ available combat resources where and when the decisive
b a t t l e s w i l l b e f o u g h t . A l s o , it helps prevent the commander from being
surprised.

This chapter describes the analysis phase of situation development.

It also describes how information is converted to intelligence to satisfy
the commander’s PIR. Analysis in support of situation development
continues the IPB process and portrays significant aspects of the enemy,
w e a t h e r , and terrain in support of the decision-making process. This
portrayal is baeed on the analysis of information from all sources that
previously has been recorded, cataloged, and evaluated in a manner to
f a c i l i t a t e e f f e c t i v e a n a l y s i s . This intelligence data base is
continuously updated to ensure the information in it is current and
accurate.

Automation increases the capability to manipulate large volumes of

information from many sources and assist in the analysis process.
However, analysis continues to be a human function. Information is
interpreted by an analyst who adds the element of judgment, which is
essential “to effective intelligence analysis.

History provides many examples of intelligence failures that are

directly attributable to faulty analysis by people. In some cases, the
indicators were present, but were either not recognized or were
misinterpreted due to the analyst’s preconceptions of the situation. In
o t h e r s , the analysis was correct, but was not presented in such a way that
decision makers would accept it.

The primary product of intelligence analysis is the intelligence

estimate. The estimate provides the best possible answer to the
commander’s PIR that is available at the time. The estimate is dynamic,
constantly changing with the situation. Thus, analysis is conducted
continuously with the information available. The available information
almost always is incomplete. The analyst uses what is known about the
enemy, weather, and terrain from the IPB to estimate what is not known.
In addition, the analyst determines the enemy’s capabilities, which are
the basis for predicting probable courses of action.

ENEMY CAPABILITIES

Enemy capabilities are courses of action which the enemy can take to
influence the accomplishment of the friendly mission. They indicate--

0
What the enemy can do.

6-1
 0
When the enemy can do it.

0
Where the enemy can do it.

0
In what strength the enemy can do it.

The PIR normally are about enemy capabilities. Estimates of enemy

capabilities and their probability of adoption impact significantly on the
friendly commander’s scheme of fire and maneuver for accomplishing the
mission. By integrating the enemy’s tactical doctrine, characteristics of
the AO, and time and space factors as developed through IPB, the analyst
estimates enemy capabilities with a reasonable degree of confidence.
Enemy actions that would have little effect on friendly operations, would
not benefit the enemy, o r a r e n o t t a c t i c a l l y f e a s i b l e a r e n o t c o n s i d e r e d
enemy capabilities. For example, an enemy force normally disengages its
troops in an adjacent area to free these for commitment within our sector
or zone. However, in some circumstances, this is not a viable enemy
option. Therefore, in those circumstances this capability normalIy is not
considered as an option.

Generally, there are four tactical courses of action open to the enemy
in conventional operations: attack, defend, reinforce, or conduct a
retrograde movement. These are divided into a variety of more specific
courses of action. For example, an attack may be a penetration, an
envelopment, o r o t h e r v a r i a t i o n s o f a n a t t a c k . A retrograde movement may
be a delaying action, a withdrawal, or a retirement.

Some enemy capabilities refer spec fically to the support of combat

f o r c e s r a t h e r t h a n t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s o f the combat forces themselves.
Support capabilities include--
0
Use o NBC weapons.

0
EW.

Support capabilities always are considered, especially when enemy

implemental o n o f t h e m w i l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t t h e a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o f t h e
friendly mission.

The analyst considers when the enemy can implement a capability. Time
is a critical factor in the Air Land Battle; the friendly commander relies
on time to defeat enemy first-echelon forces before follow-on echelon
forces are committed to the battle. The friendly commander needs an
accurate estimate of when enemy forces are employed to decide how to fight
the battle. The analyst considers the following factors in estimating
when an enemy force will be employed:
0
Mobility capabilities.

0
Disposition.

0
Doctrinal rates of movement.

6-2
 0
Characteristics of the terrain, LOC, trafficabiIity, and
obstacles.

0
Time required for displacement, assembly, emplacement, and closing
on the battle area.

Integrating information on the enemy and the battlefield environment

determines where the enemy implements a capability. The enemy
c o m p o s i t i o n , d i s p o s i t i o n , and weapons and equipment dictate how well the
enemy moves, shoots, and communicates-- t h e a c t i v i t i e s v i t a l t o m o s t e n e m y
courses of action. Analysis of existing and forecasted weather conditions
and military aspects of the terrain reveals how they affect enemy
capabilities in various parts of the AO. AAs and MCS determine where the
enemy moves on the ground. LZS and DZS determine where the enemy employs
airmobile, air assault, or airborne forces. Suitable beaches determine
where the enemy launches an amphibious assault. The location of suitable
a s s e m b l y a r e a s , f i r i n g p o s i t i o n s , and targets determines where the enemy
launches NBC weapons. A l s o , t h e l o c a t i o n o f s u i t a b l e d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s
determines where the enemy defends. Terrain factor overlays, which are
developed during I P B , i d e n t i f y s p e c i f i e d a s p e c t s o f t h e t e r r a i n . They
h e l p t h e a n a l y s t determine where the enemy implements various
capabilities.

The strength in which an enemy implements a capability depends

p r i m a r i l y o n t h e composition d i s p o s i t i o n , a n d s t r e n g t h o f a v a i l a b l e
forces. Chapter 3 describes the 06 files which provide the necessary data
for computation. Appendix D describes how to compute enemy strength.

The IPB data base is the k e y i n d e t e r m i n i n g e n e m y c a p a b i l i t i e s .

D o c t r i n a l a n d s i t u a t i o n t e m p ates assist the analyst in estimating enemvr
capabilities. The avent template and EAM help the analyst determine when
and where the enemy can implement a capability. Using the working SITMAP,
the analyst continuously monitors the enemy situation. The analyst
compares the working SITMAP with IPB templates and adjusts the
capabilities accordingly. The analyst also follows the friendly operation
to determine which enemy capabilities have the greatest effect on the
friendly operation.

ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

The ultimate objective of intelligence analysis is to answer the PIR

with an acceptable degree of confidence. This normally involves a
determination of the enemy’s most likely courses of action and the
probability the enemy adopts those courses of action. Like capabilities,
the analyst determines the enemy’s probable courses of action in terms of
what, when, where, and in what strength. The probable courses of action
provide the basis for predicting enemy intentions. By accurately
estimating the enemy’s intentions, the analyst provides the answers to
c r i t i c a l u n c e r t a i n t i e s w h i c h i m p a c t o n he commander’s tactical decisions.

i n d i c a t o r s a r e t h e b a s i s f o r s i t u a t on development. The analyst

i n t e g r a t e s i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m a l I s o u r c e s to confirm indicators of enemy

6-3
activities. As indicators are detected and confirmed, PIRs are answered.
Appendix C lists common indicators.

WORKING SITUATION MAP

The working SITMAP is the basic analytical tool at all evels. I t

provides a graphic presentation of the battlefield for the analyst,
commander, and staff. The working SITMAP integrates significant
information from al I sources in a graphic representation that is easy to
comprehend. All intelligence records are used with the working SITMAP to
develop the enemy situation and intelligence estimate. The analyst posts
all practical information to the working SITMAP. Such information may
include strength, activity, or last known location. An “as of” time must
always accompany map information. This allows outdated intelligence to be
removed and assists in monitoring enemy progress. The analyst maintains
separate records of information that cannot be posted and uses them to
back up and expand the information on the working SITMAP. Other records
normally are more permanent than the working SITMAP. The significant
information about the enemy and the terrain becomes apparent when posted.
The analyst uses the working SITMAP to--

0 Identify critical relationships.

0
Evaluate, compare, and integrate information and intelIigence from
all sources.

0 Track enemy forces.

0
Identify indicators.

0
Wargame opposing courses of action.

0 Identify uncertainties.

Critical relationships help to determine the composition of enemy

u n i t s , assess their capabiIities and probable courses of action, and
identify exploitable weaknesses. The analyst identifies critical
relationships by comparing separate items of information on the working
SITMAP and by comparing the working SITMAP with other intelligence
records.

By comparing known information about an enemy unit (posted on the

working SITMAP) with the appropriate doctrinal template and the OB book,
the analyst identifies unknown elements of an enemy unit. For example, if
two motorized rifle battal ions (MRBs) of an MRR have been identified,
l o c a t e d , and posted on the working SITMAP, the third MRB is most likely
deployed nearby. The doctrinal template helps the analyst determine the
most likely location of the third MRB. This comparison also helps the
analyst identify and locate enemy HVTS I ike CPS and AD weapon sites.
Figure 6-1 shows an example of a doctrinal template. Critical
relationships become more apparent when the doctrinal templates are
compared with known unit locations plotted on the working SITMAP. Further
doctrinal templates of Soviet-style forces are available in GTA 30-1-24.

6-4
 m
m

Figure 6-1. Doctrinal template tank regiment main attack (div slice).

6-5
 The working SITMAP makes it easier to evaluate and compare informat on
from different sources. The analyst compares incoming information with
the information previously posted to the working SITMAP for compatibili Y
with existing data. This comparison also helps to integrate new
information with existing information and to determine its significance

The working SITMAP provides a record of the latest location of enemy

forces. As new information on enemy locations is received, the analyst
compares it with information on the old location. This indicates the
direction and rate of enemy movement. It also helps determine the
accuracy of reports. For example, if the time a unit is observed in a new
location (compared with the location and time the unit was last observed)
indicates unusually rapid movement that significantly exceeds the
doctrinal rates, the analyst is alerted to a problem. Either the old or
t h e n e w r e p o r t i s i n a c c u r a t e , or the two reports may not concern the same
unit. It might alert the analyst to the possibility of an enemy deception
operation. The analyst uses the IPB event template and EAM to project
enemy movement. By comparing these with actual enemy movement as
indicated on the working SITMAP, the analyst predicts the enemy’s probable
course of action and predicts when and where the enemy implements it.

The working SITMAP is vital i n r e c o g n i z i n g a n d e v a l u a t i n g i n d i c a t o r s .

Most indicators are associated with patterns of enemy activity, which
become apparent on the working SITMAP. For example, a n i n d i c a t o r o f
attack is the massing of artillery well forward. The working SITMAP
r e v e a l s t h e l o c a t i o n , d e n s i t y , a n d m o v e m e n t o f e n e m y a r t i l l e r y . A careful
analysis of the working SITMAP helps the analyst identify artillery
groups, their composition, disposition, and location in relation to the
F LOT. By comparing the working SITMAP with doctrinal and situation
templates, the analyst better identifies significant patterns of enemy
activity and associates them with specific indicators.

The working SITMAP is well-suited for wargaming opposing courses of

action. Wargaming integrates friendly and enemy capabilities and possible
courses of action with the weather and terrain. It helps both the
operations and the intelIigence staffs to analyze opposing courses of
action. This is vital to preparing the estimate of the situation and the
intelIigence estimate. It also helps the analyst predict the enemy
reaction to friendly courses of action.

The analyst uses the working SITMAP to clarify uncertainties. For

example, if the analyst identifies two MRBs that are subordinate to a
particular MRR, further knowledge of the enemy’s organization tells the
analyst that there is a third MRB that has not been located.

The IPB templates are important analytical tools when used with the
working SITMAP. Comparison of templates and the working SITMAP
systematizes analysis and increases the accuracy of the estimate.
Situation and event templates depict projected enemy activities while the
working SITMAP depicts the actual observed enemy activities. By comparing
and integrating the two, t h e a n a l y s t p r e d i c t s f u t u r e e n e m y a c tivities with
greater accuracy.

6-6
 FACTORS OF ANALYSIS

The analyst must understand the dynamics of the AirLand Battle to

accurately analyze the forces that occupy it and the impact of the
environment on those forces.

The analyst understands the enemy’s tactical doctrine and the other
forces that impact on the execution of that doctrine. The following
suggestions are some techniques for developing enemy capabilities and the
relative probability of their adoption. These techniques help the analyst
use available information effectively to find the right answers to
critical uncertainties.

The analyst considers the enemy’s use of mass and economy of force.
The enemy commander, Iike the friendly commander, has Iimited combat
resources. The enemy commander uses mass and economy of force at the
optimum times and places to accomplish the mission. Rather than dissipate
t h e f o r c e s a c r o s s t h e e n t i r e b a t t l e f i e l d , the enemy commander weights the
main effort to ensure combat superiority at the decisive time and place.
Once the analyst determines how the enemy commander uses mass and economy
of force on the battlefield, the enemy’s most probable course of action
becomes more apparent. The enemy uses follow-on echelons to mass combat
power at decisive times and places on the battlefield. In the AirLand
Battle, the analyst locates and tracks these enemy follow-on echelons and
predicts where and when they will be committed. Situation and event
templates used with the working SITMAP help the analyst predict where the
enemy wiIl mass.

On a nuclear battlefield, massing presents new opportunities and

dangers. Nuclear weapons are substituted for massing of other forms of
combat power, yet some concentration of enemy forces is required to
successfulIy exploit strikes.

Analysts identify the composition of enemy force at least one echelon

above their own. The mass and economy of force problem is resolved at
each enemy echelon. The higher echelon commander’s decision on a maneuver
scheme and the allocation of combat power and support impacts directly on
enemy capabilities within the analyst’s unit’s zone or sector.

Identifying the enemy composition facilitates construction of a

composite picture of the total enemy force structure, including
information on identified and unidentified units, located and unlocated
u n i t s , t o t a l r e i n f o r c e m e n t s , types and amounts of CS or CSS, and the
availability of special capabilities (river crossing, EW, intelIigence
collection). In addition, detailed analysis of enemy composition assists
in quantifying the degree of uncertainty that stilI exists. This judgment
affects the degree of confidence an analyst has in estimating. Most
intelIigence judgments are inductive generalizations based on fragmentary
evidence. By comparing available information with the composition and
o r g a n i z a t on of the enemy force, the analyst determines what percentage of
t h e t o t a l picture of the enemy force is known, and what percentage remains
uncertain For example, a g e n c i e s r e p o r t t h a t f o u r e n e m y a r t i I I e r y
b a t t e r i e s have displaced forward. The analyst generalizes that enemy

6-7
artillery is displacing forward, an indicator of attack. However, if the
composition of the enemy force indicates a total of 40 available
b a t t e r i e s , the analyst must recognize that the judgment is based on only
10 percent of the picture. Ninety percent is still uncertain. It is
vital that analysts be conscious of the degree of uncertainty remaining in
the situation.

Analyze the significance of enemy activity outside your zone or

sector . Consider the big picture when assessing the meaning and
significance of enemy activity in your AO. Enemy boundaries are not
identical to friendly boundaries. Events outside your boundaries may be
part of the enemy commander’s scheme of maneuver. Analysis of events
outside a unit’s AO provides indicators or helps focus the collection and
analysis efforts within that unit’s AO. Events that occur within a
friendly unit’s AO require correlation with events outside the AO if they
are to be correctly interpreted. This is related to and facilitated by
the determined composition of the opposing enemy force.

Review enemy tactical doctrine. Enemy commanders are trained to

follow their own tactical doctrine. Though some enemy commanders are more
o r l e s s i n n o v a t i v e , most consciously or unconsciously apply doctrine when
confronted with a specific mission, threat, and AO.

Enemy tactical doctrine presents many of the indicators of enemy

capabiIities and probable courses of action. It relates directly to how
the enemy uses mass and economy of force in operations.

The enemy’s tactical doctrine is depicted on doctrinal templates when

possible. Doctrinal templates depict unit formations; frontages and
depths for attack, defense, and other operations; characteristic
dispositions associated with particular courses of action; allocations of
CS and CSS; and information on specialized military operations like river
crossings and air assault operations. Event templates depict the
doctrinal sequence in which the enemy conducts operations. The IPB
templates and the working SITMAP are the basis for comparing the enemy’s
tactical doctrine with actual events.

Consider how the weather and terrain affect enemy capabilities and the
enemy commander’s choice of a course of action. Weather and terrain are
physical constraints which facilitate or alleviate the adoption of
specific courses of action. These constraints have a major impact on how
the enemy commander allocates resources. Weather and terrain force enemy
commanders to apply special methods of operations. They may require
changes in weapons and equipment or in the way they are used. The weather
and terrain may give rise to new force structures and organizations.

Paragraph two of the intelligence estimate addresses the effects of

the weather and terrain on friendly and enemy operations (see Appendix A).
Through continuous IPB and analysis, the analyst relates the enemy force
structure and tactical doctrine to the constraints imposed by the weather
and terrain, particularly on the AAs.

6-8
 To relate enemy dispositions and physical constraints of the weather
and terrain, there are four specific techniques used to determine how the
enemy appl ies mass and economy of force.

The first technique is to determine the enemy unit boundaries and

relate them to AAs. Boundaries frequently are identified through the
location of enemy reconnaissance and cavalry units (which often have
d i s t i n c t i v e , easily identified equipment), terrain and doctrinal analysis
of enemy prisoner of war (EPW) capture locations, and other techniques.
This technique helps determine mass and economy of force and the enemy
commander’s perceptions of AAs.

The second technique is to compute enemy strength in terms of

c o m m i t t e d f o r c e s , r e i n f o r c e m e n t s , and supporting weapons for the entire
AO, then recompute for each AA. Determine whether enemy combat power and
support are distributed evenly or whether one option is weighted.
Appendix D describes how to compute enemy strength.

The third technique is to analyze enemy allocations of available LOC.

Military forces usually allocate roads to tactical units for logistical
support and tactical movement. If this allocation is determined through
analysis of enemy boundaries and traffic patterns, it indicates the
enemy’s probable course of action and assists in identifying enemy support
priorities.

The final technique is to identify potential enemy objectives and

relate them to enemy dispositions and AAs. Determine which avenue is
weighted by locating unit boundaries, computing unit strength, identifying
a l l o c a t i o n o f L O C , a n d i d e n t i f y i n g t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f combat power.

TECHNIQUES OF ANALYSIS

The following techn q u e s o f a n a l y s i s h e l p s t h e a n a y s t i d e n t i f y t h e

presence of indicators.

PATTERN ANALYSIS

Pattern analysis helps the analyst identify indicators of enemy

activity. Pattern analysis is based on the premise that the enemy’s
course of action results in certain characteristic patterns that are
identified and correctly interpreted. Ideally, paragraph 3d of the
intelIigence estimate (Appendix A) should identify the presence of these
indicators. The analyst is faced with the problem of organizing and
recording incoming information and adding it to existing information so
that meaningful relationships are clarified. The working SITMAP and IPB
templates are the primary tools used to organize information. Indicators
can be ambiguous and incomplete. The analyst identifies the patterns of
activity or tip-offs which characterize the operations of specific enemy
units.

6-9
 WEIGHTING INDICATORS

Weighting indicators helps resolve ambiguity. In combat, i n t e l I i g e n c e

analysts usually are confronted with conflicting indicators. Enemy forces
may portray patterns associated with attack, defense, and delay
simultaneously. Conflicting indicators result from--

0 D e l i b e r a t e d e c e p t on.

0
Bad execution.

0
Temporary indecis on.

0 Transition between missions.

0 Random activity.

0 Incomplete or inaccurate information.

0
Ambiguity of the indicator itself.

When confronted with ambiguous or conflicting indicators, analysts

weigh some indicators more heavily than others to determine the enemy’s
actual intent. This is not a problem of simple mathematics. The enemy’s
actual course of action may not have the most indicators. Analysts
develop a methodology for identifying those indicators which are most
highly characteristic of a course of action. There are several techniques
which, i n d i v i d u a l l y o r i n c o m b i n a t i o n , a s s i s t i n t h i s p r o c e s s .

0rigin of the Indicator

One technique of determining the enemy’s intent is to consider the

o r i g i n o f t h e i n d i c a t o r ; t h a t i s , the reason why the enemy force presents
a particular pattern or tip-off. I n b r i e f , al I indicators stem from
either military logic, doctrinal training, organizational constraints,
b u r e a u c r a t i c c o n s t r a i n t s , or the personal ity of the enemy commander.

M i l i t a r y Logic. Mi itary logic implies, and military experts agree, that

solutions to many m Iitary problems are obvious. For example, all modern
armies employ artil ery forward for attack and echeloned in-depth for
defense. Violation of military logic usually implies the loss of combat
power or support at some critical point during an operation.

Doctrinal Training. A nation’s tactical doctrine includes military logic

and much more. M o s t d o c t r i n e b e g i n s w h e r e m i l i t a r y l o g i c e n d s . M i l i t a r y
experts sometimes disagree on the ideal solution to a specific military
problem. For example, US and Soviet doctrine agree on deploying artillery
forward in the attack, while they disagree on using artillery in a direct
fire role. Just as terrain and weather are physical constraints on the
enemy’s adoption of a course of action, enemy doctrine and training are
mental constraints. Soviet emphasis on detailed, repetitive training is
designed to inbreed a sort of reflex action which enhances the value of
doctrinal indicators. Though individual commanders display more or less

6-10
imagination and creativity in its application, indicators based on
doctrine and training are generally reliable.

Organizational Constraints. Organizational structure represents a special

case of doctrine. The ideal composition of a division (size,
o r g a n i z a t i o n , weapons, and organic support) is debatable. The military
experts have resolved this issue in radically different ways.
Organization influences include a nation’s strategic commitments, economic
resources, geography, threat perceptions, historical experience,
alliances, personnel and equipment resources, and a myriad of other
factors. The tactical organization resulting from these factors causes
identifiable patterns to develop when employed. A US division generally
has three subordinate maneuver headquarters contrasted with four in a
S o v i e t d i v i s i o n , and differences in the composition and structure of the
division base imposes distinct patterns concerning US and Soviet
operations.

Bureaucratic Constraints. Identifying bureaucratic constraints as a

source of indicators shows that military units are large organizations and
must establish routines and SOPS to function efficiently. This imposes
patterns in planning, execution, logistics support, and other activities,
though there are general similarities in routines and procedures of
comparable units, there are likely to be significant variations which can
be identified and exploited locally.

P e r s o n a l i t y of the Commander. The enemy commander is the final source of

indicators. Each commander has a unique history of personal training,
experience, success, f a i l u r e , a n d i d i o s y n c r a s i e s . Many are creatures of
habit, prone to repeat what has worked in the past; others are creative
and innovative. All are captives of their experience to some degree. It
is the commander who must apply. and mix military logic, doctrine, and
organization to accomplish the mission. The commander’s personality is
one major source of deviation from established doctrinal norms, The
importance of personality is recognized in that biographic intelIigence is
a major component of strategic intelIigence. US tactical OB doctrine
classifies personality as a subcategory under miscelIaneous factors.

I n g e n e r a l , indicators are weighed, with the role of the commander

being considered a variable. In the case of a strong, innovative, or
eccentric commander (Patton or Rommel), personality is more important than
doctrine or training; while the personality of a methodical, traditional
commander ranks last.

Principle of Mass Indicators

Another technique is to weigh the indicators which reflect or are

based on the principle of mass. Military units normally conduct deception
operations with the same force constraints in which they accomplish their
actual mission. The enemy commander often conducts deception with the
least outlay of scarce resources. Indicators based on a major confirmed
commitment of combat resources are more Iikely to reflect the true
situation. In a nuclear environment, massing is not required to achieve a
favorable combat power ratio; t h u s , m a s s i s n o t a r e l i a b l e i n d i c a t o r .

6-11
 Analysts identify the enemy’s capability to concentrate fires of potential
nuclear del ivery systems.

Other Indicators

The last technique is to weight those indicators which are most

difficult to fake.

Quantify Probable Relationship. Quantify the probable relationship

between the presence of specific indicators and the enemy’s adoption of a
particular course of action. If the enemy commander intends to adopt a
particular course of action, what is the probability that a specific
indicator is present? The answer is subjective, but it is based on the
analyst’s knowledge of and experience with the enemy, the analyst’s
professional judgment, and to some degree, t h e m a t h e m a t i c a l p r o b a b i l i t y o f
specific indicators associated with enemy courses of action.

Analyze the Time Sequence of Events. It takes time for an enemy force to
prepare, move, and execute an operation. Time, mass, and space
relationships are a major tool in exposing deception. Since deception is
often conducted with the least outlay of combat resources, close analysis
of information from different sources which report on the same location,
at the same time, or concerning the same enemy unit may reveal significant
discrepancies.

Assess the Enemy’s Combat Effectiveness. Such assessments are based on an

analysis of both tangible and intangible factors. Tangible factors
include personnel and equipment strength. Intangible factors include
. morale, t r a i n i n g , p o l i t i c a l r e l i a b i l i t y , a n d o t h e r f a c t o r s . While combat
effectiveness bears directly on a unit’s capabilities and probable courses
of action, there is no scientific method of determining it. It requires
the analyst’s subjective judgment of the impact of both the tangible and
intangible factors.

WARGAMING FRIENDLY AND ENEMY CAPABILITIES

Consider the enemy G2’s perception of the friendly force. Though

enemy capabilities exist independently of their assessment of friendly
f o r c e s , the enemy’s choice of alternative courses of action does not.
Determine the enemy’s perception of friendly capabilities through analysis
of the collection capabilities, known collection activities, and
inadvertent disclosures by friendly forces which might have been monitored
by enemy intelligence. Detailed analysis of potential disclosure enables
the analyst to partially reconstruct the enemy G2’s working SITMAP.

Mentally wargame advantages and disadvantages of identified enemy

capabilities from the enemy commander’s point of view. This is a valuable
analytical technique, but potentially dangerous if it becomes
mirror-imaging.

Avoid preconcert ons. The analyst must remember that the objective is
not to prove a prior judgment. Experience suggests that preconceptions
a r e t h e a n a l y s t ’ s p r ncipal nemesis. Even if the techniques recontnended

6-12
above are creatively employed, there is a danger that the analyst who has
reached and expressed a preliminary judgment unconsciously begins to seek
and weigh evidence which confirms the initial estimate and dismisses or
passes over i n c o n s i s t e n t o r c o n f l i c t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n . The analyst should
not be concerned about the answer, a s l o n g a s i t i s t h e r i g h t a n s w e r . The
analyst reserves judgment, maintains objectivity, remains aware of
u n c e r t a i n t i e s , t o l e r a t e s d i s s e n t , and constantly tests working theory
a g a i n s t a v a i l a b l e e v i d e n c e . W h e r e p r a c t i c a l , the analyst considers
-
establishing a “devil’s advocate’ system to test, challenge, and think the
unthinkable.

6-13
 CHAPTER 7

TARGET DEVELOPMENT

Targeting is the process of selecting targets and match ng the

appropriate response to them taking into a count operationa requiremen s
and capabilities. A n e f f i c i e n t , o r g a n i z e d t a r g e t i n g e f f o r t i s c r i t i c a l to
the success of AirLand Battle operations. A target is a geographical
a r e a , complex, or instalIation planned for capture or destruction by
miIitary forces. Attacking HPTs that are e a s t a f f o r d a b l e t o l o s e , s t r ps
t h e e n e m y o f t h e i n i t i a t i v e a n d f o r c e s t h e enemy to conform to friendly
battle plans.

Targeting has always been a complex effort. Large numbars of sensors

under the control of different agencies are closely coordinated to be
efficient and must rapidly report fleeting or dangerous targets. The wide
variety of attack means and munitions are compared to the particular
vulnerabilities of many different types of targets. Targeting is a
m u l t i d i s c i p l i n e d e f f o r t , requiring interaction between FS, intelligence,
EW, operations, and plans cells.

T h e o b j e c t o f t a r g e t i n g i s t o d i s r u p t , delay, or limit those enemy

capabilities which could interfere with the achievement of friendly
objectives. Do not confuse disrupt, delay, and limit with suppress,
neutral ize, and destroy. The latter relate to the amount of damage
inflicted upon a target. Disrupt, delay, and limit apply to the effect
that the damage has upon the target as it pursues a course of action. A
further clarification of disrupt, delay, and limit is available in Annex A
to FM 6-20-10. The staff recommends how a target is engaged.

Targeting is based on the friendly scheme of maneuver and tactical

plans. It includes an assessment of the weather, terrain, and enemy to
identify those enemy formations, equipment, facilities, and terrain which
are attacked or control led to ensure success. Targeting is an integral
part of the planning process which begins with the receipt of a mission
and continues through the development of the approved plan. The targeting
process includes the development of a prioritized list specifying what
targets are to be attacked, and what is required to defeat the target.
Figure 7-1 shows the staff functions during the targeting process.

This process supports the commander’s decision on which broad attack

option to use to engage the targets: maneuver, EW, FS, or a combination
t h e r e o f ; and the determination of the echelons that engage the target. An
assessment of the attack is then conducted to determine the effectiveness
of the targeting process. Although the targeting process is more cornnonly
associated with high and medium intensity conflicts, it also appl ies to
LIC. While spread sheets and target sheets currently do not exist for
LIC, the concept of key personnel meeting together to determine the most
important targets to strike in support of the friendly maneuver commander
HVTS and to detect and attack those targets still applies. The targeting
methodology is characterized by three functions: decide, detect, and
deliver. These three functions are inherently intertwined. Figure 7-2
shows the three functions of the targeting process.

7-1
Figure 7-1. The targeting process checklist.

7-2
 Figure 7-2. Targeting process.
The DECIDE function is the planning associated with a successful
targeting effort. It requires close interaction between the commander,
i n t e l l i g e n c e a n d o p e r a t i n g s t a f f s , F S p e r s o n n e l , and various other CS
agencies. The staffs must have a clear understanding of the unit’s
m i s s i o n , the commander’s concept of the operation and intent, and the
commander’s initial planning guidance with respect to target priorities.
With this information, the staff officers prepare their respective
estimates. From the standpoint of targeting, the FS, intelligence, and
maneuver estimates are interrelated and require close coordination between
the respective elements. The DECIDE function provides a clear picture of
the targeting priorities applicable to the tasking of TA assets,
information processing, the selection of an attack means, and the
requirement for post attack assessment. S p e c i f i c a l l y , the DECIDE function
is designed to answer the questions:

o What is it we need to look for?

0 Where and when can it be found?

0 Who can locate and identify it?

0 Which attack option should be used?

0
Will target damage assessment (TDA) be required or possible?

In the DETECT function, the priorities developed in the DECIDE

function are translated into the TA taskings found in the subordinate
unit’s portion of the OPORD and in intelIigence and FS annexes. All TA
assets available to the commander are fully utilized. As the TA assets
gather information, they report their findings back to their controlling
headquarters which in turn pass pertinent information to the tasking

7-3
agency. The information gathered is processed to produce valid targets.
Not all the information reported benefits the targeting effort, but it may
be valuable to the development of the overall situation. The target
priorities developed in the DECIDE function help to expedite the
processing of targets. As these targets are developed, appropriate attack
systems are tasked in accordance with the commander’s guidance and
requirements of the attack system managers.

The DELIVER function is the execution portion of the targeting

process. It consists of the selection of the appropriate attack means for
a g i v e n t a r g e t , the tasking of that attack system, and the execution of
the attack by the specified means. If TDA reveals that the commander’s
guidance has not been met, then the entire targeting process continues
focusing on this target.

The targeting effort is continuous. The intelligence, operations, and

FS officers comprise the core of the effort at all echelons. Other staff
officers that are involved with planning and controlling of firepower and
TA also participate. The other staff officers that assist in the process
include representatives of the Air Force (AF), the staff weather officer
(SWO), the aviation officer, the chemical officer, the Army airspace
c o n t r o l o f f i c e r , the EW staff officers, and the engineer.

The rest of this chapter describes, in detail, the functions required

to plan and engage targets successfully using the DECIDE-DETECT-DELIVER
methodology.

DECIDE

Decisions are critical to the targeting process. They create the

guidelines for the acquisition and engagement of targets. Establishing
these guidelines at the beginning of the DECIDE function allows for a
unity of effort and efficiency that would otherwise not be achieved.

The decisions that are made are reflected in visual products. The
decisions made are what targets should be acquired and attacked, where and
when wiII the targets Iikely be found and who can locate them, how the
targets should be attacked, and is TDA required. The products are the HPT
matrix (what targets should be acquired and attacked), target selection
standards (TSS) (what assets can produce targets), the collection plan
(where and when should targets be found and who can find them), and the
attack guidance matrix (how targets should be attacked). The collection
plan is a G2 or S2 product that is important to the targeting process but
is not discussed in detail in this chapter. See FM 34-2 for discussion of
collection plans.

The commander and staff plan for future operations by projecting one
or more alternative courses of action based upon a mission analysis, the
current and projected battle situation, and anticipated opportunities. IPB
is an important process that assists the commander and staff in developing
courses of action.

7-4
 The process begins with the receipt of a mission, which higher
headquarters assigns or the commander deduces. The mission statement
directs the focus toward a course of action, in a particular area, against
a specific enemy. The commander then, e i t h e r w i t h o r w i t h o u t i n p u t f r o m
the staff, performs mission analysis. This analysis considers tasks that
are performed, the purpose behind the tasks, and the constraints on the
u n i t , resulting in a restated mission.

The restated mission provides the basis from which to start the staff
estimate process. The intelligence estimate provides key support to
target development. Target development is one of the four IEW tasks:
situation development, target development, EW, and Cl.

IPB AND TARGET DEVELOPMENT

IPB provides most of the information for the intelligence estimate

which impacts on the target development process. IPB is a continuous,
systematic approach to analyzing the enemy, weather, and terrain in a
specific geographical area. This approach evaluates enemy capabilities
and predicts enemy courses of action with respect to specific battlefield
conditions.

It is important for the analyst to understand the effects of

battlefield conditions, especially obscurants, on targeting. Such
conditions drive the need for remote sensors and redundant systems to
ensure proper coverage. T h e a n a l y s t m u s t “ s e e ” t h e b a t t l e f i e d as it is,
and not just as it appears on a map.

T h e i n i t i a l I P B e f f o r t p r o d u c e s d o c t r i n a l t e m p l a t e s w h i c h convert
enemy OB into graphics and aids in the initial identification of potential
HVTS . HVTS are those assets that the enemy commander feels a e c r i t i c a l
to the successful accomplishment of the mission.

Situation templates assist the refinement of HVTS for specific

battlefield and courses of action. Concurrent with situation template
development is an examination of enemy decision and logic trees associated
with each potential course of action. This identifies likely “fail paths”
that provide indications of what might happen if the enemy commander’s
plan fails and what actions comprise the enemy commander’s failure
options. The “fail path” evaluation leads to an identification of
critical enemy functions associated with each enamy course of action and
general HVTS associated with each function. Through BAE, terrain
e v a l u a t i o n , and weather analysis, the enemy course of action is associated
with a specific battlefield. S i t u a t i o n , e v e n t , and decision support
templates are developed to identify critical enemy activities and any NAIs
where specific enemy activities or events or lack therefore wil 1 help to
confirm or deny the enemy’s adoption of a particular course of action.
Additionally, DPs or decision phase lines, TAIs, and HPTs are identified.
HPTs are those HVTS that are acquired and successfully attacked to ensure
the success of the friendly commander’s mission.

7-5
 TARGET VALUE ANALYSIS

I P B a n a l y s i s c o n s i d e r s t e r r a i n , w e a t h e r , e n e m y d o c t r i n e , and current
enemy actions to arrive at conclusions of what the enemy wi I do; the
courses of action. Target value analysis (TVA) is a methodo ogy which
i d e n t i f i e s p o t e n t i a l H V T s e t s w i t h i n a g i v e n t a c t i c a l s i t u a t on. If
successfully countered, they provide a tactical opportunity. This
methodology provides a relative ranking of worth of target sets. TVA
begins when the analyst adopts the place of the enemy commander. The
a n a l y s t , in coordination with the G3 or S3, FSO, and other staff members,
wargames the operation. The purpose of wargaming is to finalize
individual staff estimates and to develop a friendly and enemy DST. A
by-product of this is the determination of the enemy assets that are
critical to the success of the enemy mission --HVTS. Target spread sheets
and target sheets are tools used in identifying HVTS. The information
found on these documents is produced during the IPB and wargaming
process. More information on the development and use of these targeting
tools is available in Annex A of FM 6-20-10.

HVTS and HPTs

An HVT is a target whose loss to the enemy can be expected to

contribute to substantial degradation of an important battlefield
function. HPTs are HVTs which, i f s u c c e s s f u l I y a t t a c k e d , c o n t r i b u t e
substantialIy to the success of friendly plans. The G2 or S2 section,
together with the FSO and other staff, nominate HVTS to be HPTs. The key
to HPTs is that they are based on the friendly concept of the operation
and support the friendly force commander’s scheme of maneuver. The
development of HPTs from HVTS is done during the wargaming process. As
.
the different options are fought by the staff, the G2 or S2 identifies
specific HVTS. The staff discusses or wargames different courses of
action to develop the HPTs. The HPTs for a specific phase of a battle are
recorded on the DST as are the means decided on to deliver the attack.
HVTS include enemy C 2 p o i n t s , a i r d e f e n s e a r t i I I e r y ( A D A ) a s s e t s , a n d
engineering equipment. If friendly forces were planning an air attack the
enemy C 2 and ADA might be HPTs, while engineers probably would not.
Discussion on templating and IPB is available in Chapter 4 and FM 34-13

The process of designating an HVT as an HPT requires careful staff

coordination. The G2 and collection manager evaluate HVTs at different
points in the battle to determine if collection assets are capable of
detecting them and providing the necessary target resolution, for examp e ,
t i m e , l o c a t i o n , and so forth, t o p e r m i t e f f e c t i v e a c t i o n ( D E L I V E R ) . H P s .
because of their importance, r e c e i v e p r i o r i t y i n t h e a l l o c a t i o n o f
detection systems. This priority is weighed against the same systems for
situation development.

The FSO uses target sheets and the knowledge of friendly weapons
systems to determine if there exists a capability to attack the HVT with
lethal assets. The EW officer and others assist the FSO with regard to
non-lethal systems. Availability of a weapon system should not affect the
attack since HPTs have precedence over other targets. Using the
capabilities of the systems to attack the targets, the G2 or S2 analyzes

7-6
and predicts the enemy’s response to each. This analysis determines if
the attack of the HVT is necessary to ensure the success of friendly
operations. The commander uses it in developing attack guidance. The
HVTs that meet the criteria of being acquirable, attachable, and capable
of ensuring friendly success are designated HPTs. In most instances, the
analyst chooses to target enemy elements that have been designated
“critical nodes.”’ A critical node is an element, position, or
corrrnunications entity whose disruption or destruction immediately degrades
t h e a b i l i t y o f a f o r c e t o c o m m a n d , c o n t r o l , or effectively conduct combat
operations. HPTs are formatted for easy reference in an HPT matrix. The
G3 or FSO prepares this matrix and gives it to the commander for
approval . The s e l e c t i o n o f H P T s , w h i c h a l s o a r e c r i t i c a l n o d e s , a r e
facilitated by a number of already existing enemy studies. Selection of
t h e s e c r i t i c a l nodes, coupled with other TVA efforts, al lows friendly
forces to best determine those enemy elements which are HVTS or HPTs.

TARGET SELECTION STANDARDS

TSS are criteria by which personnel determine which systems produce

v a l i d t a r g e t s , and which require some form of confirmation before their
t a r g e t s a r e c o n s i d e r e d f o r a t t a c k . The development of TSS is a joint
function of the G2 and G3 sections and requires that the capabilities and
Iimitations of collection assets be known. The CM section of the G2
provides the majority of these capabilities and limitations.

TSS do not determine that the information that the sensor receives is,
in fact, a target. The analyst determines that. TSS reflect the system’s
capabilities to produce targets. TSS are dynamic. The effects of weather
and terrain on both the ColIection assets and enemy equipment are taken
into account. TSS are keyed to the tactical situation. Great care is
taken to deal with potential enemy deception, and to ensure the
reliability of the source or agency that is reporting. TSS are designed
t o a l l o w t a r g e t i n g p e r s o n n e l in the TOC to readiIy distinguish between
targets and suspect reports. TSS are developed for all TA systems
available.

Target location errors (TLEs) are the accuracies to which the assets
can locate various targets. The source’s TLE and the timeliness of
information are considered. It is an inherent responsibility for the FSE
to decide which systems have acceptable TLEs for targeting purposes in a
specific tactical situation.

ATTACK OPTIONS

Knowing target vulnerabil ities and the effect an attack on them has on
an enemy operation al lows a staff to propose the most efficient available
attack option. A primary decision here is whether to disrupt, delay, or
limit the enemy.

The opportunity to disrupt, delay, or limit is annotated next to the

target sets on the target spread sheet. It is emphasized that these are
guidelines and each target is attacked based on its own merits.

7-7
 Once the staff decides whether a target is best disrupted, delayed, or
limited, they select attack options. Utilizing the situation template and
MCOO, the risk to an asset versus its effectiveness is assessed. The
decision on what attack option to use is made at the same time as the
decision when to acquire and attack the target. Coordination is required
when an attack with two different means, for example, EW and CAS, is
decided upon. These decisions are recorded on the DST and are made during
the wargaming process. This requires that the proper coordination be
performed in a timely manner.

ATTACK GUIDANCE

The commander approves the attack guidance, as recommended by the

staff. This guidance details the specific HPTs to attack, when and how
they should be attacked, a n d a n y a t t a c k r e s t r i c t i o n s , The staff developed
and defined all this information during wargaming. Figure 7-3, the attack
guidance matrix, s h o w s a f o r m a t t h a t t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n i s p u t i n . The
matrix consists of a column for target categories, specific HPTs, how
targets should be attacked, when they should be attacked, any
restrictions. For a detailed explanation on using the attack gu dance
matrix, refer to FM 6-20-10.

DETECT

DETECT is the next critical function in the targeting proces . This

function is perhaps the most important area for future planning. The G2
or S2 is the principal figure in directing the CM effort to detect the
targets identified in the DECIDE phase. The G2 or S2 works closely with
the FAIOs and FSOS to determine requirements for accuracy, identification,
and timeliness for collection systems. The intelligence section is
responsible for ensuring that the collection system asset managers
understand these requirements.

TARGET DETECTION MEANS

The detection of targets is accomplished using all available assets.

Key to the detect function is a focus on the HPTs designated during the
DECIDE phase of the targeting process. This is accomplished by the CM
section of the G2. Every targeting asset is aware of what the commander
designates as HPTs.

Field Artillery Target Acquisition Means

Several detection assets are presently organic to the FA at both corps

and division.

Field Artillery Battalions. FA battalions in DS of maneuver brigades

provide each maneuver battalion headquarters with a FSE to help plan,
direct, and coordinate FS operations. The FSE provides fire support teams
(FIST) to each of the maneuver battalion companies. Forward observers
(FOs) from each FIST are deployed at both company and platoon levels and
may accompany reconnaissance patrols or help to man observation posts

7-8
 Figure 7-3. Sample attack guidance matrix.

(OPs) . They are the grass roots of the FA’s TA effort. They observe the
b a t t l e f i e l d t o d e t e c t , i d e n t i f y , l o c a t e , and laser designate targets for
suppression, neutralization, or destruction. They report both target ing
data and combat in formation to the maneuver battalion FSO and S2 using
either organic or supporting communications means. The capability of the
F1ST to provide real time combat information cannot be emphasized enough.
The battalion FSO receives in formation from and passes information to the
FIST. The FSO continualIy exchanges targeting data and combat information
with the brigade FSO and elements from the DS FA battalion. The FSO
coordinates with the battalion S2 and S3 to identify and verify targeting
data and combat information derived from the overall collection effort.
The FSO is both a producer and a consumer of combat information.

7-9
Radar Assets. FA TA assets are the principle means for locating active
indirect fire weapons.

Moving target-locating radar (MTLR) detects, locates, and identifies

wheeled vehicles (light or heavy), tracked vehicles, and dismounted
personnel . MTLR is used for surveillance of critical areas such as AAs.
Mortar locating radar detects and locates enemy mortars and artillery
quickly and accurately enough for immediate engagement.

The DS FA battalion S2 has staff supervision responsibility for the

radar. This officer coordinates with the division artillery (DIVARTY)
t a r g e t i n g o f f i c e r , the DS FA battalion S3, and the FSO at the maneuver
brigade to ensure that both FS and maneuver coverage requirements are
met. Cueing instructions are required. Ml sources provide specific
guidance to orient radar assets before the enemy fires.

Combat Observation Laser Teams (COLTS). COLTS organic to each heavy and
light division provide a TA capability previously not available on the
battlefield. They are equipped to direct the engagement of targets.

A e r i a l F i r e S u p p o r t O f f i c e r s . Aerial FSOS and TA aircraft are organic to

the division and the corps. These assets are highly mobile and cover a
much larger area than ground observers. AS such, they are particularly
good target detection assets. Targeting data and combat information are
reported to the FSO at the maneuver brigade or battalion, the DIVARTY TOC,
or the fire direction center of the DS artillery battalion.

Air Defense Artillery TA Assets

The forward area alerting radar (FAAR) of the AD units provides a deep
look capability that can detect the location and movement of enemy air
assets. The integration of corps and theater AD efforts enable friendly
forces to obtain an air picture that can potentially cover the entire area
of interest for the echelon in question. Future concepts allow input
directly from theater AD assets into division air situation updates.
Collation of this AD information with other combat information enables us
t o l o c a t e m a j o r e n e m y a i r a s s e t s , a i r f i e l d s , and refuel ing and rearming
points. Many of these become HPTs in support of the friendly scheme of
maneuver.

DETECTION PROCEDURES

The collection of combat information is integral to the entire DETECT

process. It is essential that all TA assets be used in the most effective
a n d e f f i c i e n t m a n n e r p o s s i b l e . Avoid duplication of effort among the
various assets unless such duplication is desired to confirm the location
o r n a t u r e o f a t a r g e t . At corps and division, the CM&D section develops
and actively manages the coIIection plan to avoid such duplication. At
the same time, the CM&D section ensures that no gaps in planning
collection exist. This allows timely combat information to be co I ected
to answer the commander’s intelligence and TA requirements. This combat
information enables analysts to develop the enemy situation as we I as
conduct target development.

7-1o
 To detect the desired HPTs in a timely, accurate manner, clear and
concise taskings are given to those TA systems capable of detecting a
given target. The FS personnel provide the G2 or S2 with the degree of
accuracy that the targets must be located with to be eligible for attack.
The G2 or S2 matches accuracy requirements to the TLEs of the collection
systems. This matching allows the G2 or S2 to develop a more detailed set
of TSS based not only on the acquisition system but also upon the HPTs’
acceptable TLEs that the G2 or S2 gives. These acceptable TLEs cannot be
placed in an SOP as they depend on the situation. Collection efforts
focus on those NAI and TAI that the IPB process identifies during the
DECIDE phase. Knowledge of the target type and its associated signatures
( e l e c t r o n i c , v i s u a l , thermal) enable friendly forces to direct the most
capable coIIection asset to be tasked for coIIection against a given
target. The asset is positioned in the most advantageous location based
on friendly estimates of when and where the enemy target is located.

The decision to limit, disrupt, or delay a given HPT results in a

requirement to detect that target. Information needs, to support the
detection of the target, are expressed as PIR and IR. Their relative
priority is dependent on the importance of the target to the friendly
scheme of maneuver coupled with the commander’s intent. The PIR and IR
that support detection of a target are incorporated into the unit’s
overall collection plan. The collection manager translates the PIR and IR
into SIRS. The collection manager considers the availability and
capabilities of all collection assets within their echelon as well as
those assets available to subordinate, higher, and adjacent units (to
include joint or combined force assets).

As various assets collect the combat information to support target

development, this information is forwarded through the IEW system to the
intelligence analyst at the G2 or S2 staff. The analyst uses this combat
information to perform both situation and target development. When the
analyst detects a target, the target is passed immediately to the FS
element to determine if the target is an HPT, its priority, and if it
meets the TSS. Close coordination among the intelligence staff and the
FSCOORD is essential to ensure that these targets are passed to an attack
system which engages the target. To ensure that this occurs in a timely
manner the FAIO must have access to the ASPS. One technique is for the
FAIO to be physically located in the ASPS or CM&D. Procedures are
establ ished for cueing the FAIO as the predesignated HPTs are identified.
ASPS personnel are aware of HPT. When an HPT is discovered it is passed
without delay to FSE personnel . Usually, a member of the ASPS
hand-carries the intelligence. This allows for consultation at a map and
for intelligence to be placed into context with the overall situation.
The FAIOs coordinate with their respective G2s and FSES to paes the
targets directly to the fire control element at the DIVARTY TOC or, if the
commander approves, directly to a firing unit. This results in the most
efficient and timely engagement of those targets which the FS has
designated in advance for engagement.

7-11
 The passing of targets and suspect targets to the staff is
accomplished by a number of means. It is important that essential.
Information that is passed for proper analysis and attack takes place. As
a minimum, the target report includes:

0
Date-time group (DTG) of acquisition by the sensor.

0
Description of the target.

0
Size of the target.
0
Target location.

0
TLE.

The spec fic forms and formats for passing target informat on are
s p e c i f i e d i n the unit SOP.

The DTG s i m p o r t a n t a s t h e t a r g e t ’ s p e r i s h a b i I i t y o r v u l n e r a b i l i t y
window is analyzed. This impacts on the urgency of the attack or the
denial of attack based upon the likelihood of the target having moved.

The target description and target size are required to determine

attack means, i n t e n s i t y o f a t t a c k , number of assets to be corrrnitted, plus
other technical considerations. They are used to compare with the attack
guidance matrix. The target’s location is given as accurately as possible
within the confines of timeliness.

DELIVER

The DELIVER portion of the targeting process executes the target

attack guidance and supports the commander’s battle plan once the HPTs
have been located and identified. This portion of the process has two key
elements--the attack of targets and the TDA of those targets.

ATTACK OF THE TARGETS

The attack of the targets satisfies the attack guidance that was
developed in the DECIDE portion of the targeting process. The attack of
targets requires a number of decisions and actions. The decisions are
described as a set of tactical and technical decisions. Determining the
t i m e f o r t h e a t t a c k , t h e a t t a c k s y s t e m , and the required effects on the
target are the tactical decisions to make. Based upon these tactical
d e c i s i o n s , the technical decisions describe the precise attack means, the
unit to conduct the attack, the time of the attack, and in the case of FS
a s s e t s , the number and type of munition. The actions in the attack of the
targets are the actual physical attack of the targets by lethal or
non-lethal means. The time of attack of the target is planned or by
opportunity.

Planned Targets

Planned targets are evaluated initially to determine if the DF has

been reached or a trigger event has occurred. If either of these has
7-12
 occurred and the resources that were identified to be used against the
target are available, the target is attacked. If the decision is to
attack now, a check is made to determine if the attack system, that we
earlier allocated for the attack of that target, is available. If so, the
attack is conducted with that system. If the allocated attack system is
n o t a v a i l a b l e , a decision is made on which other attack asset to use. If
the decision is made to defer the attack, the staff identifies the new DP
to the intelligence or acquisition system.

Targets of Opportun t y

T a r g e t s o f o p p o r t u n i t y a r e e v a l u a t e d i n i t ally as to when they should

be attacked. This decision is based on a numb er of factors such as the
a c t i v i t y o f t h e t a r g e t , how long the target can be expected to stay in its
current location (target perishability) and the target’s payoff, relative
to the payoff of the other targets currently being processed for
engagement. If the decision is made to attack now, the target is
processed further. If required, additional information is requested from
the intell igence or acquisition systems. If the decision is made to defer
t h e a t t a c k , then a DP is determined and described to intelligence or
acquisitions systems. A d d i t i o n a l l y , an assessment of the avai IabiIity and
capabiIities of attack systems to engage the target is made. If the
target exceeds either availability or capability of the unit’s attack
systems, then the target should be nominated to a higher headquarters for
attack.

DESIRED EFFECTS

. The desired effects on the target are determined. As mentioned

e a r l i e r , we either delay, disrupt, or limit the target, based either on
time or terrain, This determination was made earlier in the case of
planned targets. For targets of opportunity, the staff makes the
determination. This decision is made based on the payoff of the target
and the constraints on availabiIity of attack systems and munitions. The
determination of the desired effects is required before selecting an
attack system.

TARGET DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

Assessment of the effects of an attack always is desirable and is

required for certain important targets. The same assets that acquire
targets often provide data on the effectiveness of the attack. The
decision on which targets require assessment is made in the DECIDE
function of the targeting process. Assessment may take many forms besides
the determination of the number of casualties or equipment destroyed.
Other information of use includes whether the targets are moving or
hardening in response to the attack, changes in deception efforts and
techniques, increased communications efforts as the result of jamming, and
whether the damage achieved is having the expected effect on the enemy’s
combat effectiveness.

Assessments also are made passively through the compilation of

information regarding a particular target or area. An example is the

7-13
cessation of fires from an area. If an assessment is to be made of an
a t t a c k , the key personnel ensure that the intelligence or acquisition
systems must receive adequate warning so the necessary sensors are
directed at the target at the appropriate time. The assessment results
cause battle plans and earl ier decisions to be changed. If necessary, the
decisions made during the DECIDE portion of the process are reexamined.
IPB products, the HPT matrix, the TSS, the attack guidance matrix, and the
entire battle plan are updated. Assessment allows friendly forces to tune
our efforts to achieve the greatest result with the least amount of
expenditure or risk.

7-14
 CHAPTER 8

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE OPERATIONS

EW is an IEW function that plays a critical role in the AirLand

Battle. Intelligence support is essential to maximize the effectiveness
of EW operations. This chapter describes how intelligence supports EW
operations.

There is a special relationship between EW operations and

intel I igence. EW, situation development, target development, and Cl are
the four major tasks of the IEW mission. ESM, one of the three EW
f u n c t i o n s , supports both situation and target development. EW operations
are not unique, however, b e c a u s e t h e y r e q u i r e i n t e l l i g e n c e t o b e
successful and also result in the acquisition of additional intelligence.
Both maneuver and FS operations share this characteristic. EW is most
effective when integrated and employed with FS and maneuver. Planning
this integrated employment requires information that permits a comparison
of the courses of action open to the commander. Sources of intelligence
that provide support to EW operations and describe the intelligence used
for specific EW functions are outlined below.

EW requires careful staff coordination to be effective. This includes

coordination within the staff as well as coordination with the Ml unit
executing the plan. The interactions involved are very similar to those
seen in target development. The G3, in coordination with the G2 and the
Ml unit, is responsible for the integration of ECM into the fire and
maneuver scheme. The synchronized use of ECM and lethal attack requires
the electronic warfare section of the G3 to coordinate closely and
constantly with the FSE. To do this, the EWS and the FSO will often be
coIlocated. ESM are also carefully coordinated between the G2 and the Ml
battalion. The G2 ensures the ESM efforts are matched to the commander’s
PIR and targeting requirements. As these requirements change, the G2
coordinates with the Ml unit to update coIIection efforts.

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION TO SUPPORT ELECTRONIC WARFARE

The collection of intelligence to support EW is a multidiscipline

effort. HUM I NT, IMINT, and SIGINT all contribute to the support of EW
operations. HUMINT provides invaluable information, such as captured
enemy communications-electron ics (C-E) operation instructions or an
agent’s photograph of an enemy code book contents.

IMINT provides location information important to jamming or intercept

attempts and accurate data on the probable frequency ranges of enemy
emitters. The size and shape of emitter antennas obtained from imagery
provide indications concerning frequency data and other technical
characteristics. A picture of an enemy CP or operational weapons site
provides information about which types of emitter signals, both
communications and noncommunications emissions, are associated with each
other and with specific enemy deployments or weapon systems employment.

8-1
T h i s i n f o r m a t on permits complex node analysis and parametric analysis of
intercepted s g n a l s . This type analysis contributes to SIGINT support of
EW .

Since SIG N T d e a l s d i r e c t l y w i t h i n f o r m a t i o n o b t a i n e d f r o m i n t e r c e p t e d
enemy signals it provides the greatest volume of intelIigence support to
EW operations. SIGINT include the same functions as ESM. The D r i m a r y
difference between ESM and SIGINT is how the information is used’,
Generally, ESM produces combat information that can be used for target
development (jamming and FS), maneuver, o r t h r e a t a v o i d a n c e w i t h I i t t l e
systematic analysis or processing. SIGINT requires more extensive
processing to produce intelligence. ESM and SIGINT are mutually
supporting. Information collected through ESM is processed to produce
SIGINT, which is essential to support EW. See FM 34-40, Electronic
Warfare Operations, for a complete discussion on conducting EW operations.

THE EFFECTS OF TERRAIN AND WEATHER ON ELECTRONIC WARFARE

Signal propagation is affected significantly by terrain and

atmospheric conditions. An analysis of these effects is included in any
successful EW planning. The IPB techniques described in Chapter 4 of
this manual and further discussed in FM 34-130, Annex F, provide a useful
tool for evaluating and graphically displaying the effects of the terrain
on EW operations. The analyst creates templates to depict possible enemy
deployment of electronic systems for C 3 , reconnaissance, TA, and REC.
The analyst then compares the effects of the terrain on the employment of
these assets based on a knowledge of signal propagation principles.
Templates depicting locations of friendly ECM and ESM assets and knowledge
of their capabilities also are used to help select friendly EW assets for
employment against specific targets and indicate potential future
deployment sites.

INTELLIGENCE REQUIRED FOR ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT MEASURES

The requirement to intercept, identify, and locate the sources of

Threat electromagnetic emissions demands an extensive Threat electronic OB
data base. Intercept operations require detailed intelligence on enemy
frequency allocation and signal operating procedures. Identification is
assisted by a knowledge of operating procedures; language recognition, to
include special ized jargon, dialects, and code words; technical parameters
of signals associated with specific functions or echelons; and the
collocation of several types of emitters in a recognizable pattern which
can be associated with a type of function or deployment. DF provides
location data for ESM. As information is collected through ESM and used
to support ECM, it also is compared with and integrated into data base
information to be used for future ESM coIIection.

INTELLIGENCE REQUIRED FOR ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES

Jamrning and electronic deception operations depend on current ESM data

and alI the intelIigence required for successful ESM operations. Target
receivers are jammed if LOS considerations permit it and the known
frequency on which it is operating is capable of being jammed by friendly

8-2
ECM assets. However, indiscriminate jamming of target receivers is not
the most efficient use of ECM assets. The most effective jamming
requires information on the enemy’s C 3 system so that the effects of
disrupting a particular communications link is anticipated. This expected
effect then is integrated into the commander’s scheme of fire and
maneuver.

Electronic deception operations depend heavily on intelligence. Both

manipulative and simulative electronic deception require intelIigence on
the Threat SIGINT and ESM capabilities and a knowledge of friendly
emission patterns and profiles. It would serve no purpose to simulate a
f r i e n d l y C2 n e t o r r a d a r s u r v e i l l a n c e s y s t e m i f t h e o p p o s i n g f o r c e
cannot intercept or recognize these transmissions. Even the most simple
imitative communications deception attempt, one designed to fool the
operator of a clear voice net for only a few minutes, requires some
knowledge of the target station’s identity and the purpose of the net. A
m o r e s o p h i s t i c a t e d e f f o r t , one designed to confuse an enemy decision
maker, requires not only detai led knowledge of the enemy communications
system but also intelIigence concerning the enemy decision-making process.
If the deception effort involves intrusion into or imitation of an
e n c r y p t e d s i g n a l , the intelIigence support may require an extensive
multidiscipline effort. See FM 90-2A (C), Electronic Deception, for
detailed discussion on electronic deception operations.

INTELLIGENCE REQUIRED ELECTRONIC COUNTER-COUNTERMEASURES

ECCM is divided into those measures designed to counter both ESM and
ECM . The anti-ESM effort requires much of the same intelligence support
required by manipulative and simulative electronic deception. The primary
intelIigence required concerns the enemy SIGINT and ESM capability
evaluated in terms of the assessed vulnerabilities of friendly systems to
such efforts. The counter-SIGINT effort requires technical information
on the capabilities of enemy jammers and any intelIigence on the
capabiIity of opposing forces to accomplish electronic deception.
FM 34-60 provides detailed doctrine on counter-SIGINT operations. Threat
doctrine on deception and information on the availability of the equipment
necessary for Threat forces to implement deception activities is
important. Multidiscipline intelligence efforts to obtain information on
enemy ECM equipment before it is deployed is necessary if effective
counter-countermeasures are to be established.

8-3
 CHAPTER !3

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Because the hostile intelligence collection threat arraved against US

F o r c e s a n d a g e n c i e s i s m u l t i d i s c i p l i n e , Countering tnat threat aiso must
be multidiscipline. Such an approach recognizes the need for a single
program which counters all Foreign Intelligence Services collection as
well as an analysis capability to bring it all together. The
multidiscipline counter intelIigence (MDCI) analytical effort is dependent
upon information provided by the all-source intelIigence system. It is
found at various echelons of command. Spec i f c a l l y - -

0
T h e C l a n a l y s i s s e c t i o n ( C I A S ) a t d i v i s on and corps,

0
T h e C l a n a l y s t s w i t h i n E A C I C a t t h e a t e r Armv commands.
0
The intelligence and threat analysis center (ITAC) at DA.

MDCI analysis is by no means exclusive to Army agencies, but is a

crucial activity of DOD. MDCI analysis operates through the DIA, and
other federal agencies such as the CIA and the FBI. Highly trained,
experienced, a n d s k i l l e d s p e c i a l i s t s p e r f o r m M D C I a n a l y s i s u s i n g t h e
latest technology and modern methods of directing, processing, and
disseminating.

The Cl analyst uses the tools and skills identified in this chapter
and Chapter 4, and as described in detail in FM 34-60. The intelligence
analyst focuses on “how we see the enemy”; the Cl analyst focuses on this
and “how the enemy sees us.” The Cl analyst must also focus on how to
c o u n t e r t h e e n e m y ’ s c o I I e c t i o n e f f o r t s . Where the intelligence analyst is
a subject matter expert on the enemy, the Cl analyst, i n a d d i t i o n t o
having an in-depth understanding and expertise on foreign intelligence
c o l l e c t i o n c a p a b i l i t i e s , must have a good working knowledge of the
friendly force.

The CIAS must be collocated to integrate information fully with the

ASPS . It must have access to all-source data that can be screened for Cl
use.

The CIAS is under the staff supervision of the Assistant Chief of

Staff G2 and is found in the table of organization and equipment (TOE) of
the EACIC at theater level; the corps tactical operations center support
element (CTOCSE) at corps level; a n d t h e d i v i s i o n t a c t i c a l o p e r a t i o n s
center support element (DTOCSE) at division level . An all-source mix of
special ists is assigned t o t h e C I A S t o i n t e g r a t e t h e i r v a r i o u s s k i l l s a n d
produce the MDCI analyt cal products required by the commander at each
echelon. CIAS products are critical to the function of the G3 OPSEC and
deception cells,

The CIAS mission is a diverse and all-encompassing MDCI analytical

effort. The ClAS:

9-1
 0
Analyzes the multidiscipline intelligence collection threat
targeted against friendly forces.

0
Assesses enemy intelIigence colIection threat vulnerabiIities and
susceptibiIity to friendly deception efforts.

0
Supports friendly vulnerability assessment.

0
Along with the G3 OPSEC staff element, develops, evaluates, and
recommends countermeasures to the commander. These countermeasures
reduce. e l i m i n a t e , o r t a k e a d v a n t a g e o f f r i e n d l y f o r c e
vulnerabilties.

0
Supports rear operations by identifying coIIection threats to rear
area units and instalIations, to include low level agents
responsible for sabotage and subversion.

0
Nominates targets for exploitation, neutralization, or
d e s t r u c t on.
0
D e v e l o p s and maintains a comprehensive and current MDCI data base.

0
T a s k s f r end y intelligence c o l l e c t i o n resources through the CM&D
section.

The CIAS focuses on hostile HUMINT, SIGINT, and IMINT collection.

COUNTER HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

Working in a concerted MDCI environment, counter human intelIigence

(C-HUMINT) analysts incorporate their efforts into the overall CIAS MDCI
analysis product. C-HUMINT analysis includes:

o Analyzing and assessing the espionage, terrorism, subversion,

t r e a s o n , s e d i t i o n , and sabotage threat.

0 Analyzing enemy HUMINT collection capabilities and activities, and

further analyzing how those collection capabilities can affect the
friendly command.

0
Analyzing level I (enemy controlled agents or partisan collection)
and level II (diversionary and sabotage operations conducted by
unconventional forces) threats.

0
Recommending countermeasures and deception.

0
N o m i n a t i n g t a r g e t s f o r e x p l o i t a t on, neutralization, or
elimination.

9-2
 COUNTER SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

Working in a concerted MDCI environment, c o u n t e r s i g n a l s i n t e l I i g e n c e

( C - S I G I N T ) a n a l y s t s i n c o r p o r a t e t h e i r e f f o r t s i n t o the overall CIAS MDCI
analysis product. C-SIGINT analysis includes:

0
Analyzing and assessing enemy SIGINT coI Iect on capabilities and
activities.

0
Comparing enemy colIection systems c a p a b i l i e s a g a i n s t f r i e n d l y
targets.

0
I d e n t i f y i n g , a n a yzing, and assess ng friendly electronic patterns
and signatures.

0
Analyzing f r i e n d y vulnerabilities against enemy SIGINT collection
efforts.

0
Subsequently recommending countermeasures and deception.

0
Nominating enemy SIGINT targets for exploitation, neutral ization,
or destruction.

COUNTER IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

Working in a concerted MDCI environment, c o u n t e r i m a g e r y i n t e l I i g e n c e

(C-IMINT) analysts incorporate their efforts into the overall CIAS MDCI
product. C-IMINT analysis includes:
.
0
Analyzing and assessing enemy imagery colIection capabiIities and
a c t i v i t i e s , t o i n c u d e - g r o u na idr , -and space threat systems.
Threat systems inc ude anything from hand-held cameras, to satelIite
platforms or fixed. or rotary-wing aircraft and unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAV).

0
Measuring enemy co Iection systems against friendly targets.

0
Identifying, analyzing, and assessing friendly patterns,
s i g n a t u r e s , and vulnerabiIities for subsequent development and
recommendation of countermeasures and deception.

0
Nominating enemy IMINT systems for exploitation, neutralization,
o destruction.

OTHER INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO Cl ANALYSIS.

MDC c a n n o t b e c o n d u c t e d w i t h o u t t h e s u p p o r t o f a l I t h r e e i n t e l I i g e n c e
d i s c i p l nes--SlGlNT, HUMINT, and IMINT. These disciplines are used to
c o l I e c t critical information on enemy collection, analysis, and
dissemination systems. Analysts extract the information from the
al l-source data base within the CIAS to determine enemy coIIection
capabilities and operations. These systems, c o i n c i d e n t a l l y , c o l l e c t a
great deal of intelligence on friendly forces. This intelligence is vital

9-3
in evaluating friendly profiles and thereby determining their
vulnerabilities. If the situation warrants, Cl analysts can task friendly
coIIection systems to specificalIy collect intelIigence on friendly forces
for the CIAS through the CM section.

The Cl mission mandates a wide range of functions and tasks that are
accomplished in peace and at all intensities of conflict. Cl operat ona I
activities perform such functions as investigations, operations, and
collection. Their products are of great value to the MDCI analyst. To
get the Cl operational reports, the CIAS closely interfaces with the CM&D
section to identify those items of Cl interest coming into the CM&D r om
operational Cl personnel . The CIAS must task and receive answers to those
taskings through the CM&D section.

ANALYTICAL PRODUCTS

Each of the spec alties assigned to the CIAS has individual

responsibilities and skilIs which enable the production of
single-discipline analysis products. When these products are combined
into a comprehensive product, an MDCI product emerges. The CIAS then uses
the MDCI product to nominate targets for exploitation, neutralization,
destruction, or elimination. The MDCI products also provide OPSEC or
deception planners with critical information required for their
operations. Various specialists within the CIAS create the products
discussed in the following paragraphs.

Counter Human Intell gence Products

C-HUMINT analysts maintain the C-HUM NT data base. Us ng this data

base, they produce:

0
Association matrixes.

0
Activities matrixes.
0
Time event charting.

0
HUMINT communication diagrams.

0
L i n k agrams.

0
HUMINT s i t u a t i o n o v e r l a y s .

0
HUMINT-related portions of the threat assessment.

0
Black, gray, and white lists.

The analytical techniques used in HUMINT analysis enable the analyst

to visualize large amounts of data in graphic form. These analytical
techniques, however, a r e o n l y t o o l s u s e d t o a r r i v e a t a l o g i c a l a n d
correct solution to a complex problem; the techniques themselves are not
the solution.

9-4
 There are three basic techniques (tools.) used as aids in analyzing
HUMINT-re ated problems. They are time event charting, matrix
manipulat on, a n d l i n k d i a g r a m i n g . Used together, these techniques are
c r i t i c a l o the process of transforming diverse and incomplete bits of
seemingly unrelated data into an understandable overview of an exceedingly
complex s t u a t i o n . See FM 34-60 for detailed discussion on these
techniques.

Counter Signals Intel igence Products

C-SIGINT analysts maintain the C-SIG NT data base. Using this data
base, they produce:

0
Threat fixed-base SIGINT matrixes. These are developed from the
enemy coIIector characteristics data base and the threat fixed
station data record.

0
Mobile SIGINT matrixes. These are developed from enemy collector
characteristics data base and threat OB and location data records.

0
A system quick-reference matrix, providing a quick-reference of
capabilities and Iimitations of those SIGINT systems which will most
likely threaten that portion of the friendly command for which the
analyst is responsible. This matrix is developed through
manipulation of the data base to gain quick access to information
concerning those systems which are the most Iikely threats to the
corrrnand.

0
SIGINT direction charts, portraying areas or targets of threat
SIGINT concentrations. This is accomplished through integrating the
EEOB overlay with the friendly electromagnetic overlay to determine
areas susceptible to coIIection.
0
SIGINT situation overlays. These are a continuous graphic update
of the EEOB which depicts known or suspected threat SIGINT or REC
positions. These overlays are continuously compared with the
friendly electromagnetic overlay to identify susceptibility to
collection.
0
SIGINT-related portions of the threat assessment.

Counter Imagery Intelligence Products

C-IMINT analysts maintain the C-IMINT data base. Using his data base
they produce:

0
Threat SATRAN matrixes. (The definition for SATRAN is c l a s s i f i e d .
See FM 34-60A for explanation.) These are designed to identify when
and where a system is active and also show the coIIect on
characteristics of the system.

9-5
 0
Threat intelIigence coIIection flight matrixes. These are similar
to the SATRAN matrix, but are concerned “with other platforms used by
the threat. Tracking these collection systems continuously allows
the analyst to analyze threat IMINT collection patterns.
0
System component quick-reference matrixes, i n c l u d i n g t h r e a t
system’s capabiIities and processing times. This file is a part of
the data base which equates to an OB file on threat IMINT systems.

0
IMINT situation overlays. These overlays are the paths from the
SATRAN and threat intelligence collection flight matrixes depicted
on the friendly operations graphics. This identifies areas
susceptible to collection.

0
lMINT-related portions of the threat assessment.

COLLECTIVE CIAS PRODUCTS

The CIAS collectively prepares MDCI analytical products, nc ud ng:

0
Rear operations IPB (ROIPB) products.

0
MDCI graphic summaries (MDCISUM).

0
MDCI threat assessments.

0
MDCI situation overlays.

0
MDCI estimate.

Chapter 3 of FM 34-60 includes a detailed description on how a CIAS

functions and details how to prepare single discipline and MDCI products.

The individual products of C-HUMINT, C-SIGINT, and C-IMINT analysts

become the analytical tools used to produce the MDCI collective products.
A brief description of each collective product follows.

Rear Operations Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

IPB is an analytical tool used throughout the Ml community. When a

greater need for intelligence support to rear operations surfaced, the IPB
process evolved into a new dimension and ROIPB surfaced. However, ROIPB
is not confined to the geographical boundaries of the rear area alone. In
addition to analyzing information of the enemy coIIection threat located
above and beyond the FLOT, i t l o o k s a t t h e t o t a l f r i e n d l y A O f r o m t h e F L O T
back. It does not dupl icate the IPB efforts of the ASPS, but rather
complements their efforts. T o a v o i d d u p l i c a t i o n , the CIAS must closely
interface with the ASPS.

Like IPB, R O I P B i s k e y i n p r e p a r i n g f o r t h e n e x t b a t t l e . Dur ing

peacetime, RO PB builds an extensive data base for each potential area in
w h i c h t h r e a t ntelIigence colIectors or battalion size or smalIer units
might operate It analyzes this intelligence base in detail to determine

9-6
the impact of enemy, weather, a n d t e r r a i n o n o p e r a t i o n s a n d p r e s e n t s i t i n
graphic form. It has the added ingredient of assisting in the assessment
of friendly courses of action from the enemy’s perspective.

Like IPB, ROIPB graphics can assist the commander in identifying

targets as they enter the battle area. ROIPB and IPB threat evaluation
and integration use the same analytical technique: templating. RO I PB
templates are similar to IPB templates in the MBA. ROIPB templates
provide a comparative intelligence data base that enables the Cl analyst
to graphically portray enemy intelligence collection and small unit
capabilities; depict probable courses of action before and during the
battle; and confirm or refute predictions. Like IPB templates, ROIPB
templates are dynamic and require continual review. For additional
details concerning RIOPB see FMs 34-130 and 34-60.

Multidiscipline Counterintelligence Summary

The MDCISUM is a graphic portrayal of the current enemy situation from

a Cl point of view. It graphically displays known enemy collection units,
as well as level I and II threats within the friendly area. The MDCISUM
ordinarily covers events within a 12-hour period. It portrays friendly
targets which have been identified as potential enemy objective during the
specified time frame. A clear and concise legend appears on each MDCISUM
which contains: time period covered by the MDCISUM, map reference
i n f o r m a t i o n , and symbols clearly identifying friendly and enemy
information. Figure 9-1 shows a sample MDCISUM.
,
The use of-colors enhances an MDCISUM: but once reproduced, the
disseminated product is black and white. Therefore, use dots, dashes, and
slashes to ensure consumer understanding; explain these symbols in the
Iegend. Subsequent MDCISUMs will not repeat information contained on
previous MDCISUMs unless that information is critical to the current
MDCISUM.

Multidiscipline Counterintelligence Threat Assessment

The MDCI threat assessment is a four-paragraph statement which is

publ ished as often as necessary and when significantly changed, depending
on the situation and the needs of the commander. As a general rule, the
MDCI threat assessment is disseminated through CM&D with every third or
fourth MDCISUM. The MDCI threat assessment provides justification for
MDCI target nominations, a primary goal of MDCI analysis. Figure 9-2
shows an example of the format and substance of an MDCI threat assessment.

Multidiscipline Counterintelligence Situation Overlay

The MDCI situation overlay is a composite of the functional area

overlays prepared by the subject matter experts assigned to the ClAS. The
MDCI situation overlay incorporates the most important information from
each of the other overlays. The functional area overlays serve as
‘<working” overlays, while the MDCI overlay is the master overlay and
serves as the briefing overlay. It should be ready for briefings at all

9-7
9-8
Figure 9-2. MDCl threat assessment.
9-9
 .

Figure 9-3. MDCl estimate.

9-1o
Figure 9-3. MDCl estimate (continued).
9-11
t e r r o r i s t , paramilitary, or other unconventional threats, discuss such
pertinent information as leadership (key personalities), equipment,
finances, and relations with the local populace.

Figure 9-3. MDCI estimate (continued).

9-12
times. O r d i n a r i l y , t h e C AS operations NCO is responsible for maintaining
the overlay; however, its preparation is a collective effort of all
members of the ClAS.

MULTIDISCIPLINE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

The C A S i d e n t i f i e s t h e m u l t i t u d e o f i n t e l l i g e n c e c o l l e c t i o n
c a p a b i l i t es of adversaries on the battlefield. it then narrows the
c a p a b i I i t es as accurately as possible to the actual coIIectors within an
area, the r targets, and the coIIectors technical characteristics. The
CIAS also p r o v i d e s i n f o r m a t i o n t o t h e b a t t l e f i e l d d e c e p t i o n ( B A T - D ) s t a f f
on the characteristics of friendly equipment so that an “as close as
possible”’ r e p l i c a t i o n o f a f r i e n d l y f o r c e i s d i s p l a y e d t o e n e m y
coIIectors. This is done during the development of the deception story in
the planning process.

O n t o d a y ’ s t e c h n i c a l b a t t l e f i e l d , the friendly force assumes that

hostile collectors are analyzing friendly patterns of C3 to find HVTS.
In friendly communications, mostly secure, the enemy must locate the
communications externals that identify specific units or nodes. In
e l e c t r o n i c d e c e p t i o n , these communications externals are replicated down
to and including specific anomalies in friendly transmissions. Currently,
analysis of such signals parameters is extremely difficult. C-SIGINT
a n a l y s t s r e s e a r c h t e c h n i c a l b u l l e t i n s , coordinate with C-E staff members
and maintenance personnel to coIIect this information as accurately as
possible for the deception staff. As friendly deception equipment evolves
into the future and becomes more sophisticated, friendly capabiIity to
provide the needed detail of support also must expand.

BAT-D elements become one of the main consumers of the integrated MDCl
products. They use the MDCI estimate and graphic summary to determine
where best to execute deception based on the coIIection effort.

Specific needs and requirements for BAT-D are passed through G3

channels to the CM&D at each echelon. The CIAS researches its data base
to satisfy these needs with existing intelligence information. If the
CIAS cannot satisfy the requirement immediately, it is validated and
returned to the CM&D for appropriate tasking and requirements management.
W h e n t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i s f i n a l l y c o l l e c t e d , it is passed through the CM&D
to the CIAS for analysis and product development. It is then passed to
deception planners so they can develop deception plans or execute the
deception mission.

Since adversaries change the focus of intelligence collection as often

as necessary, the CIAS analyzes its efforts continuously and passes the
changes to the deception celI rapidly. This enables deception personnel
to change focus and evaluate their effectiveness.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO COMBATTING TERRORISM

Terrorist activities are an ever-increasing threat to Army units.

personnel, equipment, and operations, in peacetime and during conflict.
Cl personnel play a major role in supporting the force protection mission

9-13
through investigation, operation, and intelligence collection directed at
terrorist groups and activities. The CIAS has an additional analytical
r o l e , using C-HUMINT techniques in this manual and fully explained in
FM 34-60.

The MDCI threat assessment is an effective product for providing

information to support the command force protection mission. The process
includes educating the force on the threat, e v a l u a t i n g p a s t a c t i v i t i e s o f
t e r r o r i s t s , m a i n t a i n i n g a current data base, u s i n g p a t t e r n a n a l y s i s , a n d
p r e d i c t i n g f u t u r e a c t i v t i e s a n d i n c i d e n t s . The CIAS also recommends
offensive and defensive measures that may be effective in combatting
terrorism.

Combatting terrorism is a shared mission among all members of the

Army. The relationships between the operations staff, intelligence staff,
and miIitary police must be “locked in” c o m p l e t e l y t o b e e f f e c t i v e . There
are many other players who provide information to the process and to the
intelligence analysis mission. Using the techniques of C-HUMINT analysis,
the friendly goal is to track activities and associations, to predict the
n e x t t e r r o r i s m a c t , to determine who is performing the act, when and
where, and to get the information to decision makers who can do something
about it.

9-14
 CHAPTER 10

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

Recent h story is characterized by the occurrence of numerous

i n s u r g e n c e s in developing nations. The US government has taken the
r e s p o n s i b i l i . y t o a s s i s t , upon request, selected emerging nations in
developing political stability, economic strength, and social progress.
Thus, the US may become involved in a LIC, either in an advisory and
assistance capacity or as a combatant. The analyst plays an important
role in alI LIC operations including foreign internal defense and peace
keeping. T h e f o c u s i n o p e r a t i o n s s u c h as t h e s e i s d i f f e r e n t t h a n i n
counterinsurgency. Here the analyst is concerned with political questions
such as, “How can the people be made to support tha government?” and ’Who
is the enemy?”’

This chapter describes how information from all sources is analyzed to

produce intelligence to support counterinsurgency. LIC includes
counterinsurgency, but also foreign internal defense, peacetime
contingence ies, a n d t e r r o r i s m c o u n t e r a c t i o n . These last three areas are
beyond the scope of this FM.

When the level of US participation with a host nation is sufficient to

be considered a combined activity, a combined intelIigence operation is
carried out. Combined intelligence operations facilitate more effective
collection and production capabilities. The host country provides
detailed knowledge and access to the populace, while the US Army provides
technical expertise, management, and advice. There are often varying
degrees of US and host nation cooperation. ..

The primary responsibility of intelligence personnel engaged in LIC is

to produce intelligence to support the prevention or defeat of an
insurgency. To defeat an insurgency, information is collected and
intelIigence produced on virtualIy alI aspects of the internal defense
environment. When insurgents are known to be receiving aid from an
external power, i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o o b t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n o n t h e r o l e o f t h e
external power in the insurgency.

The target of the intelligence collection cycle (described in Chapters

1 and 2) for LIC differs from mid- to high-intensity conflicts only in its
application to the production of specific intelIigence required for
counterinsurgency operations. In planning, for example, information is
not only needed on the armed insurgents but also on their underground
organization and their relations with the populace as well. In collecting
information, the local population represents one of the most lucrative
sources of information. In processing information into intelligence,
sociological, economical, and political requirements have equal or even
higher priority than conventional military needs. In addition to military
users, US, h o s t n a t i o n , and allied governmental, law enforcement, and
intelligence agencies are valid users of intelligence products.

1o-1
 SUPPORT OF COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

A sound collection program and proper use of the various collection

agencies and information sources result in a very heavy volume of
information which flows into the intelIigence production element. The
insurgent environment and its base area system and political and military
tactics dictate that intelligence requirements can only be met by
reporting minute detai Is on a great variety of subject areas. Each one of
these details appear unrelated to others and insignificant by itself; but
when mapped and chronologicalIy recorded over long periods of time and
analyzed with other details reported, they lead to definitive and
predictable patterns of insurgent activity.

For example, a s i n a c o n v e n t i o n a l c o n f l i c t , I P B i s c o n d u c t e d b e f o r e
and continues throughout a LIC. IPB not only helps identify patterns of
insurgent activity, but helps use these patterns to predict future
a c t i o n s . Appendix E, FM 34-130 fully addresses IPB in support of LIC.

Insurgents usually recognize their shortcomings in military posture.

The insurgent makes maximum use of the weather, the terrain, and the
population, employing secrecy, surprise, and simplicity. Combat plans and
orders are usualIy simple, comprehensive, a n d r e p e t i t i v e i n o r d e r t o b e
executed by widely separated forces. Therefore, the insurgent’s solution
to a problem is composed of a system or systems which together are
complex, but apart are independent, having simple, logical, and uniform
characteristics. In developing a pattern analysis or IPB products, it is
important to chart insurgent and friendly tactical actions. As actions of
friendly forces disturb the ’environment and patterns of insurgent
a c t i v i t i e s , it forces the insurgent into unanticipated and unrehearsed
situations which can be exploited tactically. Comrnunications intelligence
(COMINT) is used to obtain direct insights into insurgent operations and
plans. IPB helps the intelligence analyst answer two basic questions:

0
Where can we expect to find the enemy?

0
Where can we expect not to find the enemy?

The data to be developed and compiled by subject matter varies

considerably with the intensity of the insurgent’s operations. The types
of overlays and categories of subjects plotted, therefore, vary
extensively according to the needs. Using a graphic keying system and
color schemes on large-scale maps greatly facilitate data analysis when
superimposing transparent overlays.

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

IPB provides a basis for the intelligence estimate. As with mid- and
h i g h - i n t e n s i t y o p e r a t i o n s , IPB products are used extensively in the
estimate. There are, however, s o m e s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s f r o m t h e s e t o
estimates that support LIC in general and counterinsurgency specifically:

10-2
 0
Emphasis is placed on different parts of the estimate. The
mission statement, for example, may be more difficult to compose
because of the wide scope of low-intensity operations and their
relationships with the internal defense program.

0
E m p h a s i s is accorded nontactical considerations, such as
psychological, political, sociological, and economic factors.

0
Factors are to be compared during the deliberative process.
Advantages and disadvantages of various courses of action may be
more complicated than when terrain, weather, and a visible, tangible
enemy are the chief factors to be considered.

The intelligence estimate for a LIC operation, as in any situation, is

based on all available intelligence and considers everything of
operational significance. See Appendix A for an example of a LIC
intelIigence estimate.

The initial intelligence estimate helps to point out gaps in the

intelIigence data base. These gaps are a basis for determining
requirements.

A basic requirement in low-intensity operations is a thorough

understanding of the target area. Knowledge of the target society
requires a complete understanding of the internal and external forces at
work, those supporting the integrity of the society, and those engaged in
subverting it. Only when these factors are t h o r o u g h l y u n d e r s t o o d c a n
. actions be effected. All available assets are used to provide this
intelIigence.

Commanders, intelIigence staffs, and analysts recognize the impact

that political, economic, and sociological factors have on tactical
operations of the insurgent and friendly forces. This applies even to a
very narrow, confined, a n d l o c a l i z e d s i t u a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e , an intense and
continuing study of local history and developments, contemporary
personal ities, aspirations, and motivations is made. Because political,
sociological, and economic factors are overlapping and interdependent,
coIIation and interpretation of this data are extremely intricate and
seldom are reduced to a formula similar to OB for mid- and high-intensity
conflicts.

PROCESSING INFORMATION

Processing is the step in the intelligence cycle whereby information

becomes intelligence. It consists of recording, evaluating, integrating,
and interpreting. Chapter 2 describes information processing. Certain
considerations are unique to the internal defense environment. To
determine insurgent capabilities and courses of action and to provide the
intelligence needed for all facets of LIC, t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e a n a l y s t i s
guided by an awareness of these considerations.

10-3
 RECORDING

As in mid- a n d h i g h - i n t e n s t y s i t u a t i o n s , L I C r e q u i r e s l a r g e a m o u n t s
of information on a continuous basis which are promptly compared with
existing information and intel igence to determine their significance. To
a large-degree, the extent of the recording effort depends upon the
insurgent activity in the area and the analysts available to maintain and
a n a l y z e t h e r e c o r d e d i n f o r m a t i o n . All of the recording aids mentioned
below, however, serve a unique and useful purpose in the overalI
intelligence production effort. Chapter 2 provides a detailed description
of the journal, journal file, intelligence files, and intelligence
workbook. Variations in recording devices which are unique to LIC occur
in the use of annotated overlays and working fiIes.

Annotated Maps

Depending on the echelon of responsibility, the state of insurgent

a c t i v i t y i n t h e a r e a , and the degree of knowledge of the enemy, the
intelIigence analyst requires at least two annotated maps: the incident
map and the insurgent SITMAP. Each of these recording devices normally is
a transparent overlay covering a large-scale topographic map of the area.
Unlike the workbook, which is maintained for individual use, the incident
and insurgent SITMAPS provide a ready guide for briefing the commander,
the civil authorities, or other interested parties. If activity in a
particular area is limited, consideration is given to the combination of
the two maps. Other annotated maps are valuable aids for recording
information, depending on the needs in a particular headquarters’ tactical
area of responsibility. These special purpose overlays include records
of--
0
Mining and booby trap incidents.

0
Insurgent names or codes for local terrain features, such as
villages, areas, and trails.

0
Insurgent assassination or resource colIection attempts.

0
Other significant activity.

It may be necessary to enlarge, with s g n i f i c a n t d e t a i l , c e r t a n A l s ,

either by drawing portions of the map to a l a r g e r s c a l e , or by mak ng a
mosaic from aerial photos. Past, present, and potential insurgent
a c t i v i t y m u s t b e v i s i b l e w i t h a d e t a i l e d a l d thorough understanding{ of the
environment. Comparison of the several annotated maps maintained often
assist the intelligence officer in estimating the enemy’s intentions and
capabilities or to establish trends.

Incident Map. The incident map or overlay provides historical cumulative

information on trends and patterns of insurgent activity. Properly
maintained, the entries enable the intelligence officer to make judgments
about the natu r e a n d l o c a t i o n o f i n s u r g e n t t a r g e t s , t h e r e l a t i v e i n t e n s i t y
o f i n s u r g e n t n t e r e s t i n s p e c i f i c a r e a s , insurgent control over or support
from the popu a t i o n , a n d p o t e n t i a l a r e a s o f i n s u r g e n t o p e r a t i o n s .

10-4
Judgments concerning insurgent operations also require knowledge of
terrain factors and insurgent limitations.

insurgent Situation MaQ. The SITMAP or overlay is prepared as part of the

IPB process, and is modified as necessary by information from the incident
map. It is difficult to pinpoint insurgent installations and dispositions
with the same degree of confidence as in a conventional tactical
situation. The insurgents can displace on short notice, making a report
o u t d a t e d b e f o r e i t i s c o n f i r m e d . While the SITMAP presents an uncertain
a n d h y p o t h e t i c a l p i c t u r e , composed less of firm information than of
reports of fleeting targets, estimates, and abstractions, it graphicalIy
substantiates the trends or patterns derived from the incident map. The
analyst can then improve the economy and effectiveness of the R&S effort.

Trap Map. The trap map or overlay is used if the insurgent has a
capability for sabotage or terrorist action. Data is directly annotated
on the map on which the situation overlay is placed, or it can be kept
separately. This map portrays particularly attractive target locations
f o r i n s u r g e n t s a b o t a g e o r t e r r o r i s m , such as road and railroad bridges,
communications centers, theaters and assembly halls, and places where the
terrain favors ambushes and raids. Such areas are identified and analyzed
as part of the area study. They are plainly marked on this map with
attention directed to possible insurgent access and escape routes.
Photographs which are keyed to the map also supplement this effort.

Population Status Map. This consists simply of an overlay to the SITMAP.

Essentially, this map portrays the attitudes of the population, whether
disaffected, loyal, or doubtful. Colors are used effectively to designate
these conditions.

Personalities and Contacts Map. What is known initially about the

i n s u r g e n t s i t u a t i o n p r i m a r i I y i s information concerning locations and
activities of individual agents of espionage, agitation, organization, and
liaison. The appearances, movements, meetings, and disappearances of
these agents are recorded on a personalities and contacts map or overlay.
A large-scale map is required (a city street map or town plan if an urban
area is involved). Deviations from regular patterns of movement are
detected in this manner. Depending upon the number of personalities under
s u r v e i I l a n c e , the regularity of their habits, and the variety of reports
received on them, it is necessary to maintain a separate overlay for each
subject. Old overlays are filed for comparison. Each agent’s route is
portrayed in a different color, and regularly traveled routes
distinguished from new routes. Observations are dated and incidents noted
by symbol. Depending upon the amount of insurgent activity, this map is
combined with the incident map.

Working Files

The intelligence worksheet and the annotated maps serve to isolate

problem areas and formulate relationships between items of information and
intelIigence coIIected. Extensive research material is required, however,
to analyze these problem areas. in the early phase of an insurgency, the
insurgent leader is buiIding an organization. The leader’s organizational

10-5
procedures and tactics, therefore, are unique, and familiarization
requires the intelligence officer to study personal ities and incident
analysis. E x t e n s i v e w o r k i n g f i l e s , such as the insurgency analysis
worksheet, hot files, current propaganda and psychological operations
(PSYOP) file, personality and organization files, area study files,
c i v i l - m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s f i l e , and resource reference fiIes are
established and maintained. Figure 10-1 shows an insurgency analysis
worksheet.

Figure IO-l. insurgency analysis worksheet.

10-6
Insurgency Analysis Worksheet. The insurgency analysis worksheet helps
identify information and intelligence needed to satisfy the PIR and IR. It
also provides a guide for analysis of a LIC environment.

Hot File. The hot file is the most important working file. It includes
all available material pertaining to an incident or groups of possibly
related incidents that are of current interest. This file contains
material on persons or places Iikely to be involved in insurgent activity,
together with material on agents or suspects who may be involved. A
reported sabotage plot, for example, could initiate a hot file. The hot
file remains active until the report is refuted, the incident occurs, the
attention of the insurgent is diverted elsewhere, or friendly interest
priorities change.

Current Propaganda and PSYOP File. If propaganda constitutes a major part

o f t h e i n s u r g e n t e f f o r t i n t h e a r e a , a current propaganda and PSYOP file
should contain alI pertinent Iiterature, background material, and analyses,
to include copies of propaganda speeches and analyses of local grievances
being exploited or subject to exploitation by the nsurgents.

Personality and Organization Files. A l o c a l f i l e s maintained on each

insurgent personality. I f s u r v e i l l a n c e i s c a r r i e d out by the Ioca police,
b a s i c i d e n t i f y i n g a n d b i o g r a p h i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n c a n b e t r a n s f e r r e d r om
police dossiers to a card file. This card file he p s t r a i n f r i e n d Y
surveillant to recognize key personal ities on sigl t . The organizi t i o n
section of this file includes information on the history and activities of
t h e i n s u r g e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n ’ s f r o n t s , other subversive or suspected groups,
a n d t h e i r o f f i c e r s , o v e r l a p p i n g d i r e c t o r a t e s , memberships, and Iiaison
among these organizations. Figure 10-2 shows the format for a personality
card file.

Area Study Files. Area study files contain up-to-date and pertinent data
in the geographic, political, sociological, economic, and cultural fields.
I n l o w - i n t e n s i t y o p e r a t i o n s , even the lower echelon tactical commander,
particularly when operating in the same general operational
area over extended periods of time, has a definite requirement for such
information. The intelligence staff officer should, therefore, have ready
access to such data. The topical breakdown of such files concerns events
and activities of continuing significance. Thus, for example, if rice is
the basic staple in an economy, the topical breakdown includes files on
rice production, distribution and marketing, price levels, and black
marketeering and pilferage activities. Since this key economic indicator
has continuing influence on friendly military operations as well as on the
insurgent forces who depend on this staple for survival, careful analysis
of this data over a period of time provides patterns based on which
insurgent actions are anticipated and their capabilities predicted.

Resource File. A resource file includes all material which is of

importance but are not of immediate value. It includes inactive incident
f i l e s , i nact v e p e r s o n a l i t y a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n f i I e s , a n d p h o t o g r a p h y . The
l a t t e r m a t e r a l i s p a r t i c u l a r l y u s e f u l . Air or ground photographs of
p l a c e s o f i n erest are arranged chronologicalIy by location and made
r e a d i l y a v a i a b l e f o r u s e w i t h h o t f i l e s , incident maps, and trap maps.

10-7
10-8
Reference Material. A Iibrary is maintained of reference publications,
such as manuals on doctrine, tactics, and methods; books on the area and
o n t h e i n s u r g e n t t h r e a t ; files of newspaper and magazine clippings; and
any other material which is of use. This material is kept at a central
library serving the entire staff or located at an area coordination
center.

Coordinate Register. The coordinate register is a valuable analytical

tool , a n d m e t h o d t o s t o r e i n f o r m a t i o n d u r i n g L I C s i t u a t i o n s . I t
illustrates activity in a particular area over a period of time, and is
compact enough to be carried with ease. Each page represents a specific
geographic area or town that the S2 determined. The coordinate register
has two types of pages. One has written entries to record insurgent
activity with space for the S2 to add comments. Figure 10-3 shows a
sample written-entry coordinate register, applicable to a LIC.

Figure 10-3. Written-entry coordinate register.

The second type of coordinate register is visual. Entries are plotted
on the overlay square as they appear on the incident map.

The coordinate register assists in trend and pattern analysis and is a

good way to store data, in an easiIy retrievable manner, for long periods
of time. The written register allows easy evaluation of enemy activity by
type action while the visual one allows rapid comparisons of activity
between several time periods.

Civil-Military Operations File. A civil-military operations file includes

all material and information concerning civil-military operations, their
r e s u l t s , e f f e c t i v e n e s s , and any countermeasures the insurgents take.

10-9
 EVALUATION

Evaluation is the determination of the pertinence of information to

t h e o p e r a t i o n , reliability of the source or agency, and accuracy of the
information. I n e v a l u a t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n , the knowledge and judgment of the
intelligence analyst plays a major role. In determining the validity of a
fact or whether a reported activity is at all possible, it must be
realized that certain events are possible despite the fact that they did
not previously occur and have been deemed by past analysis as unlikely to
occur. Confirmation of information by other sources and agencies is
always desirable, but it is not always possible to obtain. Initially,
intelIigence analysis commences with unconfirmed information which is
subsequently supported, confirmed, o r d e n i e d b y t h e c o l l e c t i o n o f
additional and related information. As more information is obtained, the
i n s u r g e n t s i t u a t i o n , c a p a b i I i t i e s , and probable courses of action become
increasingly clear. As the body of intelligence expands, information that
is not compatible with the current insurgent situation and is not
consistent with the recent pattern of insurgent activity is suspect.
Chapter 2 describes evaluation in detail. Procedures governing the
assignment of evaluation ratings to sources and agencies have equal
application in the internal ‘defense environment.

INTEGRATION

Evaluated information becomes intelligence only after it has been

integrated with other information and interpreted to determine its
significance. Integration involves the combining of selected data to form
a pattern which will have meaning and establish a basis for
interpretation. It is important that the intelligence analyst is
sufficiently alert to recognize all the possible patterns that may be
formed. The following example illustrates the mental process of
integration: The intelligence section of the area coordination center
receives information that a prominent labor leader has been murdered. In
a search for related information, the intelligence analyst checks the
i n c i d e n t f i l e , the friendly and suspect personality files, and the
organization file.

The incident file reveals a series of murders that have been linked
with the insurgent, with the primary victims being government officials,
prosperous merchants, and large landholders who opposed insurgent
objectives.

The suspect personality file reveals the labor leader’s controlling

position within a union that has recently intensified its criticism of the
government. The personality file also reveals the labor leader’s close
association with several government officials and recent extensive travel
throughout the nation.

The organization file indicates that the union has recently begun to
disseminate antigovernment leaflets and has threatened to call a strike
if demands for representation in the current government are not met. The
other primary contender for union leadership is a relatively unknown
newcomer.

1o-1o
 Once all related items of information from the intelligence files are
obtained, the intelligence analyst begins to assemble the available
information to form as many logical pictures or hypotheses as possible.
Alternative methods of assembly are an essential prerequisite to any valid
interpretation.

Assembly of information to develop logical hypotheses requires good

judgment and considerable background knowledge. In formulating
hypotheses, t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e a n a l y s t a v o i d s t h e l i m i t a t i o n s w h i c h r e s u l t
from preconceived opinions. In the example of the murdered union leader,
the new information is integrated with existing intelligence in several
different ways. By combining the murder with one set of facts, the labor
leader is pictured as a loyal supporter of the government who became the
victim of a campaign of selective terror undertaken by the insurgents. On
the other hand, by combining the murder with another set of acts, the
labor leader is portrayed as a member of the insurgent organization who
was murdered for reasons not connected with the insurgency. As a third
possibility, the labor leader may have been a member of the insurgent
organization who was eliminated by the insurgents. Finally, there is a
fourth possibility that the labor leader and the murder are not connected
with the insurgency.

INTERPRETATION

Interpretation is the resu t of making deductions as to the probable

meaning of new information and determining its implications with respect
to future insurgent activity. The meaning of the information is
determined in relation to the nsurgent situation and the insurgents’
probable courses of action.

For example, in the case mentioned above, if the labor leader was
loyal to the government and was murdered for opposing insurgent control of
the union, i t r e a s o n a b l y i s e x p e c t e d t h a t f u r t h e r c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f
insurgent control over the union, increased antigovernment agitation by
the union, a n d p o s s i b l y , a n e x t e n s i o n o f i n s u r g e n t t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t i e s
will take place.

However, if the labor leader was a member of the insurgent

organization and was murdered by the insurgents, i t i s c o n j e c t u r e d t h a t
the elimination was due to considerable unreliability or slow progression
toward the achievement of insurgent objectives. In this case, the prompt
emergence of another insurgent union leader who ensures more rapid
progress toward insurgent objectives is expected. It also is inferred,
however, that the labor leader was murdered as a result of a struggle for
power within the insurgent organization. I n t h i s c a s e , weaker insurgent
control of the union is expected due to the dissension among the
insurgents.

FinalIy, if the labor leader had no connection with the insurgent

organization and was murdered for reasons unconnected with the insurgency,
this event has no significance from an intelligence standpoint.

10-11
 DISSEMINATION

One of the more critical aspects of intelligence is the rapid

dissemination of the information to personnel and units that nead
information. Each information report is looked at immediately to see if
it is of immediate concern. I f s o , it needs to be disseminated to
affected units or personnel without delay. Successful intelligence
reporting communicates the results of analysis and combat information to
the right people, at the right time, and in the right format. It provides
the commander with tha information and intelligence needed to raduce risk
and uncertainty. The dissemination channel in a LIC varies IIttle from
the conventional environment but often there are more agencies and
individuals to consider: police, potential terrorist targets, and other
civilian agencies operating in the AO. Also, intelIigence is disseminated
to host nation military units.

Local SOP and guidance from higher headquarters dictate the amount and
type of information that is given to civilian agencies and host
national miIitary forces. This question of releasability is resolved
before effective dissemination can exist.

ORDER OF BATTLE

Chapter 3 describes the production of OB intelligence. There are

certain OB considerations, however, which are unique to the insurgent
enemy. OB intelligence is equally as important in an insurgency as in
conventional combat operations. However, some differences in nomenclature
and approach must be recognized. The applicability of the various OB
factors differs in an insurgency from conventional operations, and there
also are differences in applicability between phase I and phase II
insurgency situations,

The elements of OB intelligence (OB factors) are not independent of

each other; they are closely related and are considered as a whole,
Information on one of the elements often leads to a reevaluation or
alteration of information previously received on another element.
Furthermore, t h e g e n e r a l r u l e , whereby OB intelIigence is
developed and maintained down to and including two echelons below the
analyst’s own level of command, d o e s n o t a p p l y t o l o w - i n t e n s i t y
operations. Due to the nature of the insurgency and the phased
development of the insurgent forces, OB intelligence is produced in much
greater detail and pertains to much lower echelons (even down to squad)
than in conventional combat operations.

During phase I of an insurgency, subversive activities range from

being only a potential threat to frequently occurring activities along an
organized pattern. No major outbreak of violence or uncontrolled
insurgent activity exists. The insurgent is primarily concerned with
o r g a n i z i n g i n f r a s t r u c t u r e d u r i n g t h i s p h a s e , along with conducting PSYOP
and terrorist attacks.

10-12
 Phase II of an insurgency begins when the insurgent has gained
sufficient local or external support to initiate organized guerrilla
warfare against the government.

A phase Ill insurgency occurs when the insurgent has transitioned from
a guerriIla-oriented force to a primariIy conventional-oriented force.
FM 100-20 describes, in detail, the goals and activities of insurgent
forces during all three phases. An important point to remember is that
the insurgent may be operating from areas outside the host country during
alI three phases. Therefore, geographic boundaries cannot limit
intelligence collection and analysis.

A listing of the OB factors follows, together with a brief explanation

of their applicability and means in the context of insurgency situations.

COMPOSITION

In some insurgent movements, military force is only one of several

instruments through which the insurgent movement seeks power. Development
of a military force often has the lowest priority during the early stages
of an insurgency. As long as the party core and civil organizations are
establ ished and move effectively toward the goal of the insurgency, the
military arm either Iies dormant or simply exists in cadre form until
needed as a supporting force. Even after military organizations are
fielded, the infrastructure never loses its importance. A
counterinsurgency operation is never over until the infrastructure is
neutralized.

Phase I Considerations

Rather than collecting information on the identification and

o r g a n i z a t i o n o f s p e c i f i c e n e m y u n i t s , we are concerned with the internal
workings of insurgent activity groups. Knowledge of the composition of
insurgent groups is a key to the entire planned course of the insurgency.
Details of composition include the appearance of new organizations, the
relative amount of enemy effort expended in rural and urban operations,
the internal chain of C2 and the manner in which insurgent groups are
organized for operations

Phase II Considerations

T h e i n t e l igence ana yst is concerned here with determining the

composition o insurgent combat units, i n c l u d i n g t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d
chain of command. The degree of sophistication encountered indicates
other factors, such as training, logistics, and strength. Armed platoons
or small terrorist cells indicate that the overt military portion of the
insurgents’ plan is just beginning, and armed battalions and large urban
terrorist groups indicate that there is a serious menace to the current
government.

10-13
 POLITICAL STRUCTURE

A tightly disciplined party organization, formally structured to

parallel the existing government hierarchy in the country, is found at the
center of some insurgent movements. In most instances, this
organizational structure consists of comrnitted organizations at the
v i l l a g e , d i s t r i c t , p r o v i n c e , i n t e r p r o v i n c i a l , a n d n a t i o n a l l e v e l s . Within
major divisions and sections of an insurgent military headquarters,
t o t a l l y d i s t i n c t , but parallel, command channels exist. These are the
military chain of command and the political channels of control. Whether
it is through a political division of an insurgent military headquarters,
a party cell or group in an insurgent military unit, or a unit political
o f f i c e r , the party ensures complete domination over the military structure
by use of its own parallel organization. These party organizations fuel
mil itary action. Should the military arm be eliminated, and the party
l e f t i n t a c t , only short-term security is achieved. The party begins
construction of a new miIitary organization. The population only is safe
when the insurgent’s political structure is rendered ineffective.

COMBAT FORCES

The organization of insurgent combat forces is dependent upon the

need, the tactics to be employed, a n d t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f p e r s o n n e l a n d
equipment. Frequently, subordinate elements of insurgent units are
employed independently. The intelligence analyst who receives a confirmed
report of a subordinate element of an insurgent unit operating in the area
cannot, t h e r e f o r e , assume that the parent unit is also present.

Identification of insurgent units are by--

0
Number.
0
Commander’s name.

0
Nickname.

0
Code designation.

0
Name of the area in which it operates.

Unit designations are frequently changed and multiple designations are

often used to confuse friendly intelligence. It follows that the
intelIigence analyst is not able to determine the size and strength of an
insurgent unit merely by obtaining a unit identification.

DISPOSITION

Determination of the disposition of the insurgent involves the

location of operational training and supply bases, LOC, and areas of
political control. The intelligence analyst arrives at potential
dispositions of the insurgent combat forces by developing patterns of
activity based upon map study and knowledge of insurgent tactics.
Insurgent base areas, for instance, normally are located near areas that

10-14
t h e i n s u r g e n t s p o l i t i c a l l y c o n t r o l , thereby providing an early warning
system. By plotting insurgent sightings and combining this information
with weather conditions, time factors, detailed investigation of insurgent
incidents, and after action reports, the analyst best selects possible
enemy dispositions as well as possible areas of tactical deployment.
Consideration should also be given to areas where no insurgent activity is
reported. These areas, while appearing to be under the control of
internal defense forces, may be under the political control of the
insurgents.

Phase I Considerations

The location, deployment within this location, and any movements of

insurgent organizations or personnel are of concern here. The enemy’s
strength and tactics are revealed, to some extent, by discovering whether
this effort is concentrated in a few places or dispersed throughout the
target country and neighboring nations. If the enemy’s effort is
initialIy concentrated in one city or in one rural area, then the extent
and spread of the insurgent organizations are a key to how long the enemy
has been operational and how successful the enemy has been, and is an
indication of the enemy’s appraisal of friendly strength. In a nation
considered a relatively easy conquest, the enemy begins with many
o p e r a t i o n s , rather than a few. By studying the other available elements
o f 0 6 i n t e l l i g e n c e , the intelligence analyst determines such things as
whether the movement of an enemy cadre or group is an advance toward new
goals or a retreat from an unprofitable operation.

Phase II Considerations

How the insurgent forces are deployed indicates whether the enemy is
making a widespread show of strength, with units scattered about the
country, or is concentrating forces around a few key targets. It also
shows whether the enemy s going to concentrate on such activities as
i n t e r d i c t i n g t r a n s p o r t a t on or actively seeking battle with government
forces.

STRENGTH

The strength of the nsurgent forces is thought of in terms of the

c o m b a t f o r c e s , p o l i t i c a l cadres, and popular support. Conventional
methods of strength computation are appl ied in determining insurgent
combat forces strength. The analyst should be aware, however, that the
insurgent wilI attempt to have strengths overestimated by low-intensity
operations forces. To give this false impression, the insurgent employs
rapid unit movement and uses multiple designations for a single element.
Reports from the populace concerning the strength of the insurgent forces
should be viewed with caution and the importance of actual counts of enemy
personnel stressed. Certain insurgent-initiated incidents provide useful
indicators of the strength of the insurgents in a particular area. An
example of these is an increase in raids with subsequent loss of weapons
by friendly forces. The determination of popular support for the
insurgents is a more difficult task and is stated best in terms of the

10-15
percentage of an area under government control, as opposed to the
percentage under insurgent control, with both viewed together in terms of
population density. A useful indicator of the extent of insurgent
political control is the willingness of the populace to report information
concerning the insurgents.

Phase I Considerations

The cadre who organize and activate the movement usually are h ghly
t r a i n e d , aggressive professionals who exercise an influence
disproportionate to their actual numbers. The analyst also is concerned
with the number of enemy units in existence, which in phase I means
identifying and evaluating new groups and organizations which have either
appeared in the host nation or in neighboring countries and any changes in
the size of existent groups. Other types of equipment, besides weapons,
are of paramount interest. A printing press in phase I is a deadlier
weapon than a battalion of artillery in phase Ill.

Phase II Considerations

The actual number of personnel available to the insurgent now assumes

the importance it lacked, to some degree, in phase 1. By knowing also the
amount of weapons and equipment available, e s t i m a t e s o f c a p a b i l i t i e s
against friendly forces are formulated. The degree of popular support for
the insurgent manifests itself in such areas as recruiting for forces, tax
or resource coIIection, and degree of population support for friendly
forces.

TACT I CS

T a c t i c s nclude both enemy doctrine and the conduct of operations

according to t h a t d o c t r i n e . Insurgent forces are more flexible in their
application [ f doctrine than regular military organizations. The doctrine
which guides the insurgent must be known and understood by friendly forces
i f t h e y a r e t o e f f e c t i v e l y c o u n t e r i n s u r g e n t e f f o r t s . The careful
examination of the tactics, or actual operational techniques, reveals
changes in doctrine as welI as indications of the personality and
competence of the insurgent leader. Again, the choice and application of
tactics is a reflection of insurgent appraisal of friendly strength as
well as of personnel strength. A continuing estimate of relative
strengths is a very basic part of insurgent operational planning and has
an immediate effect on tactics. Tactics of the insurgent involve
p o l i t i c a l , m i l i t a r y , p s y c h o l o g i c a l , and economic considerations, alI
closely integrated. They vary with the phase of the insurgency. The
political goal of the insurgents is to undermine and discredit the
established government.

Phase I Considerations

Phase I insurgency s c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y a r e l a t i v e a b s e n c e o f s t r c t l y
military operations and an emphasis on subversion and organizational
development. Although nstances of terrorism begin to occur in the later

10-16
 stages of phase 1, m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t y i s u s u a l l y l i m i t e d t o r e c r u i t i n g a n d
establishment of military cadres.

Phase II Considerations

An increased emphasis on the study and evaluation of insurgent

military tactics is required. Tactics during phase II are generally
Iimited to ambushes, raids, sabotage, and terrorism. These activities
provide the insurgent with supplies, experience, and self-confidence,
while at the same time they erode friendly morale and reduce friendly
economic and military capabilities.

TRAINING

Insurgent training is closely related to the tactics being employed

and includes vigorous indoctrination in political affairs. Both the
combat forces and the people within an area under the political domination
of the insurgents receive training. Insurgents carefully plan and train
for individual operations and phases of movement. A careful analysis of
an area with respect to the type of training taking place provides a
useful indicator of the probable courses of action that are employed
against friendly forces.

Phase I Considerations

During phase I, t h e i n s u r g e n t t r a i n s a n d i n d o c t r i n a t e s e x i s t i n g c a d r e
as welI as newly accepted or recruited indigenous personnel. Training
consists of a great deal of political indoctrination along with techniques
. of propaganda, communications, a n d i n t e l l i g e n c e c o l l e c t i o n . Training and
effectiveness go hand in hand; the type, amount, and val idity of training
received by the insurgents is determined, to some degree, by any observed
increase in the effectiveness or size of the insurgent movement. Some
training normally is conducted in another country and is indicated by a
change in number and type of personnel travel ing to that country.

Phase II Considerations

Much attention now is devoted to locating training camps and areas,

i d e n t i f y i n g t r a i n i n g c a d r e s , and interdicting the movement of insurgents
to and from out-of-country training areas. Some insurgent units are
identifiable as having been trained for special missions, such as
r e c o n n a i s s a n c e , d e m o l i t i o n , or even suicide attack missions.

LOGISTICS

In an insurgency, as in a conventional warfare situation, the

effectiveness of the insurgent is very much dependent on the logistical
support. In the early stages of an insurgency, the requirements for
miIitary equipment and supplies are less than in the later s ages.
Accurate intelligence on the insurgent’s sources and availab I i t y o f
supplies and equipment is essential to determine the capabil ty to
maintain and expand the insurgency.

10-17
 Phase I Considerations

Two particular items always are essential to the phase I

insurgent--money and a printing press. If highly successful in the
establishment and motivation of the power base, t h e i n s u r g e n t n e v e r r e a l l y
h a s a r e q u i r e m e n t f o r t h e u s u a l i t e m s o f m i l i t a r y s u p p l y . Money is often
supplied from abroad, but such occurrences as bank robberies, unusual or
excessive fund drives, payroll deduction requests, or sudden affluence
among suspect government officials are cause for suspicion. Equipment for
the production and dissemination of propaganda, like printing presses and
radio sets, is of a special nature, and its acquisition by insurgent
forces indicates an increasing level of sophistication in propaganda
efforts.

Phase II Considerations

Logistics is now a larger and more elaborate requirement for the

insurgent, who must now procure, store, transport, and maintain weapons,
ammunition, explosives, signal equipment, and medical supplies. A much
larger number of people are required to operate the logistical system.
Insurgent supply caches or supply Iines become items of critical concern
to friendly forces. Borders and coastlines are controlled and aerial
surveillance of remote areas or areas known to be used by the insurgents
must be instituted to detect or deter the movement of suppIies.

EFFECTIVENESS

E f f e c t veness describes the qualitative ability of the nsurgent to

achieve P O itical or military purposes.

Phase I Considerations

In phase I, the term “combat effectiveness’” is usualIy not

applicable. While the insurgent uses words like “struggle’” and “front,”’
they do not connote the use of armed force. The overall effectiveness of
the insurgent effort is sometimes made very obvious by spectacular
successes (antigovernment victory in an important election) or failures
(collapse of a new factory-worker organization known to have been backed
by the insurgent), A continuing decline of governmental influence in a
certain area or among a certain group of people may well indicate a
corresponding increase in insurgent influence. The leaders forbid overt
or easiIy detectable actions until they feel that their movement is in
position to make a serious bid for power. In this case, the insurgent’s
real effectiveness remains unknown until it is too late for anything but a
historical account of it. There usually is overt indication of the
effectiveness of the insurgent operation, and information on it is
gathered by careful observation of organizations, movements, and elections
at all levels. Penetration of these activities by government agents is
very desirable and makes a significant contribution to the OB picture.

10-18
 Phase II Considerations

The factor of effectiveness now expands to include combat efficiency

of insurgent military forces. By carefully evaluating the other OB
f a c t o r s , and taking note of actual combat experience, we evaluate the
i n s u r g e n t ’ s c o m b a t e f f e c t i v e n e s s o r l a c k t h e r e o f . We determine the
insurgent’s strengths and weaknesses and, from this, calculate the
capability to follow various courses of action.

PERSONALITIES

Personalities are not listed as a separate OB factor in Chapter 3. In

an insurgency, personal ities often assume a greater importance than in
mid- and high-intensity conflicts.

Phase I Considerations

In phase I, p e r s o n a l i t i e s a r e a n e x t r e m e l y i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r . During
this phase, when the insurgency is just beginning to organize, function,
a n d a t t e m p t t o s p r e a d i t s i n f l u e n c e , the loss of a comparatively small
number of personnel practicalIy destroys it or at least sets back its
progress. Unfavorable publicity attached to the movement, as a result of
exposure, renders its success less Iikely. The apprehension, compromise,
or exposure of its leaders destroy the insurgency completely. Knowing who
the insurgent leaders are also furnishes a valuable indication of how
tactics and training are conducted and how effective the overall effort
is.

Phase II Considerations

As in phase I, p e r s o n a l i t i e s r e m a i n a c r i t i c a l c o n c e r n . Many
insurgent units are cat led by their commander’s name, rather than having a
conventional designation.

ELECTRONIC TECHNICAL DATA

I n t h e e a r l y s t a g e s , there is often a lack of uniform communications

procedures, preventing the development of an extensive enemy electronic
order of battle (EEOB) and electronic technical data base. There is very
little use of noncommunications equipment, such as radar. The insurgents
often use HF shortwave or ham radio sets to serve the initial “Committee
of Correspondence’' function. VHF citizen band sets play a role in early
terrorist operations. Equipment available to the insurgent ranges from
the most primitive to the most modern. Even equipment not generally
available in the armed forces of major world powers, I ike spread spectrum
and frequency hoppers, is easily obtained.

Phase I Considerations

The propaganda requirements result in insurgent-sponsored medium

frequency or commercial radio AM broadcasts. Transmitters are located
outside the national boundaries or in remote, inaccessible areas. These
broadcasts frequently use code words to control and coordinate insurgent

10-19
operations. L a t e r , there is some increased use of VHF transmissions and
more organized communications procedures. The standardization of
communications practices reflects the level of communications training
expertise.
Phase II Considerations

Much more extensive use of communications equipment characterizes this

phase. Equipment is captured from government sources, purchased or stolen
from commercial sources, provided by external sponsors, or locally
manufactured. Communications procedures reflect doctrine and training
practices of an external sponsor. Insurgents use repeater transmitters,
set to receive and rebroadcast on the same frequency, to degrade VHF DF
efforts against them.

MISCELLANEOUS

Any other items which contribute to knowledge of the insurgent, such

as goals and methods, are considered here.

Phase I Considerations

This category includes such items as historical studies of people and

parties involved in the insurgency, code names or numbers, and any’ other
information which does not fit under the other eight categories. “This
type of nformation should not be siighted, as seem ngly superfluous items
may wel I become useful and important.

Phase II Considerations

Several miscellaneous items now become vital adjuncts to the other

factors. Weapons, insignia, code names and numbers, types and colors of
uniforms and flags - - a l l t h e s e t h i n g s a i d i n t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f
i n s u r g e n t u n i t s , the source of outside aid, the source of weapons and
equipment smuggled into or purchased in the target nations, and the morale
and effectiveness of the insurgent armed forces,

OB FACTORS SUMMARY

There are three points to remember in the app cation of OB factors to

an insurgency:
0
The nine OB factors previously discussed are ic l o s e l y interrelated
and cannot be analyzed separately.

0
When an insurgency escalates from a phase I to a phase II
s i t u a t i o n , the OB effort is expanded considerably. The enemy combat
units must now be considered in addition to the various
phase I organizations and activities, which still are active.

o
When al insurgency escalates from a phase II to a p h a s e I I I
s i t u a t on, t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e O B f a c t o r s t o t h e i n s u r g e n t ’ s
combat units is the same as for other conventional forces.

10-20
 APPENDIX A

REPORT FORMATS

The report formats described are standard formats used to report

intelligence or information to task assets, or to receive information,
intelligence orders, or instructions. These formats are echelon-specific,
like the patrol report usually prepared at battalion level, or are general
reports used at alI echelons, Iike spot reports.

This appendix provides a brief description of the most common

intelIigence-related formats, including those formats used to pass
information of immediate potential intelIigence value from one echelon to
another. It also identifies the echelon or echelons where each format is
most used and the element or individual responsible for preparing it. An
example of each format is also provided. Additional information about
report formats is in Chapter 8.

SPOT REPORT

The SALUTE mnemonic requires users to report enemy size, activity,

l o c a t i o n , u n i t ( o r u n i f o r m ) , time, and equipment. Figure A-1 shows a spot
report using a SALUTE message format.

Figure A-l. SALUTE messageformat.

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The intelligence estimate consists of five paragraphs. The first

paragraph is a restatement of the mission. The remaining paragraphs
outline an analysis of the battlefield area based on IPB; an estimate of
enemy strengths, capabilities, and Iimitations; and the intelIigence
officer’s conclusions about the total effects of the AO on friendly
courses of action, the courses of action meet likely to be adopted by the
enemy, and the effects of exploitable enemy vulnerabil ities. The five
paragraphs are--

o
Mission.
o
Area of operations.

A-1
 o
Enemy situation.

o
Enemy capabilities.

0
Conclusions.

MISSION

Paragraph 1. Describe the mission in a short, clear, and concise

restatement of the assigned or assumed mission of the command.

AREA OF OPERATIONS

Paragraph 2. Discuss what influence the AO has on probable enemy

courses of action, based on facts and conclusions derived from IPB and an
analysis of the AO if one has been prepared. A previously prepared
analysis of the AO also is referenced. However, i f p r e v i o u s l y p r e p a r e d
o r o t h e r r e f e r e n c e m a t e r i a l i s n o t c o n t a i n e d i n t h i s p a r a g r a p h , it must
contain enough information to support the conclusions.

Weather and terrain analysis derived from IPB are always included in
the characteristics of the AO. Other characteristics are included if they
are important to either force in selecting courses of action to carry out
their assigned or assumed mission. These other characteristics are of
greater importance In AO S w h i c h h a v e l a r g e c i v i l i a n p o p u l a t i o n s a n d t o
commands with extensive territorial or CSS responsibilities. Detailed or
s u p p o r t i n g t e r r a i n a n d w e a t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n is included in an appendix to
the intelligence estimate. .,

Weather or terrain effects on the use of nuclear weapons and chemical

and biological agents are discussed when either combatant has the
capabiIity to use them. Each description of enemy courses of action
includes the possible enemy or friendly use of these weapons, including
the impact that weather or terrain conditions has on weapons systems and
delivery means.

Weather

Weather conditions are those factors that impact on current and

planned operations. This includes appropriate light data and either a
w e a t h e r f o r e c a s t o r c l i m a t i c i n f o r m a t i o n . When operations cover a long
period or are programed for a future operation, climatic information
replaces weather data forecasts. Light data, in tabular form, includes
the beginning of morning nautical twilight (BMNT) and beginning of morning
civil twilight (BMCT), ending of evening civil twilight (EECT), and the
ending of evening nautical twilight (EENT), moonrise, moonset, phases of
the moon, a n d o t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n a s r e q u i r e d .

Terrain

The existing terrain situation includes the tactical aspects of the

area: observation and f r e , concealment and cover, obstacles, key terra n
features, and AAs. Each of these aspects is oriented based on its

A-2
influence on selected courses of action by either force. For example, in
a CSS unit, the discussion of concealment and cover is oriented toward
influence on CSS courses of action, i n c l u d i n g i n s t a l l a t i o n l o c a t i o n s
required to accomplish the CSS mission and on enemy forces which
interfere with the accomplishment of the mission. In CSS unit
intelligence estimates, key terrain features are omitted unless the enemy
has the capability to seize or control terrain features which materially
affect the accomplishment of the mission.

Other Considerations

Other characteristics which are considered pertinent are sociology,

politics, economics, and psychology, science, materiel, transportation,
manpower, and hydrography.

The effects of each characteristic of the AO on possible enemy courses

of action normally include consideration of weather, terrain, and NBC
capabilities, the effects of these on other possible enemy courses of
a c t i o n , and the possible use of particular weapons, methods, techniques,
or forces.

The extent of consideration for the factors is limited by the mission.

For example, when the mission is offensive, the discussion does not
include defensive courses of action. It does, however, include security
considerations.

ENEMY SITUATION

Paragraph 3. Provide information on the enemy which permits later

development of enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities. Establish the
basis for refining these capabilities into a specific course of action and
for determining the probability that the enemy will adopt this course of
action.

Paragraph 3 provides the following data on the enemy:

0
Disposition,

0
Composition.

0
Strength.

0
Recent and present s g n i f i c a n t activities.

0
Peculiarities and weaknesses.

Disposition

Enemy dispositions are the known or estimated locations and sizes of

enemy units. References are made to overlays, enemy SITMAPS, or
previously published documents when discussing enemy disposit ens.
However, i f t h e s e r e f e r e n c e s a r e n o t r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e , t h e y or a copy of
them) are attached as appendixes to the intelIigence estimate

A-3
 Composition

Compos t i o n IS 0 6 d a t a t h a t i s u s e d t o d e t e r m i n e t h e s t r e n g t h t h e
enemy uses to prevent the accomplishment of the mission. List all the
u n i t s , i nc u d i n g i n s u r g e n t a n d g u e r r i l l a - t y p e f o r c e s t h a t c o n t r i b u t e t o
this. I nc ude such supporting units as air, nuclear delivery, and REC
u n i t s t h a t also affect the accomplishment of the mission. In determining
which enemy units affect mission accomplishment, time and space factors
are also considered.

Strength

Strength is all opposing enemy forces which are logically employed

against the command in time to affect the accomplishment of the mission.
T h e t o t a l f o r c e s I i s t e d c a n n o t e x c e e d , but is equal to or less than the
total forces Iisted under composition.
Enemy strength includes committed forces, reinforcements, air assets,
and NBC operations. Air or NBC operations units are omitted when the
enemy lacks such capabiIitles.

Committed Forces, Committed forces are those enemy ground maneuver units
currently in contact and those ground maneuver units with which imminent
contact is expected, regardless of the specific friendly course of action
implemented. Designation of enemy forces as committed forces depends on
disposition, location, controlIing headquarters, and doctrine. For more
information on computing enemy strength, see Appendix D.
.
Reinforcements. Reinforcements are those enemy maneuver u n i t s t h a t a r e
not committed in or out of the friendly sector, but reac to the friendly
course of action in time to influence the accomplishment of the mission.
Contact with these units is not expected. Disposition, ocation, level of
control , or other factors are considered in determining which enemy forces
are reinforcements.

Enemy Air Capability. The enemy air capability is based upon numbers of
enemy aircraft within operational radius, maintenance facilities, expected
attrition, ground tactical situation, and other factors. The supporting
tactical air force furnishes intelligence on the number of sorties, by
type, which the enemy is expected to make within the field army or
comparable areas. The estimate is not usually prorated below the
field army level. Also, no attempt is made to calculate the number of
sorties the enemy can or may make against a subordinate command of the
field army or the communications zone (COMMZ). Corps, division, and COMMZ
command intelIigence officers usually quote the estimate furnished by the
higher headquarters in stating enemy air capabilities. For example, a
corps or division G2 might state: “30th Army estimates that the enemy can
be expected to attack within the army area with as many as 150 fighter,
100 attack, and 75 bomber sorties daily. By massing all aircraft within
operational radius, the enemy can make a maximum of 250 fighter, 300
a t t a c k , and 250 bomber sorties daily.”

A-4
Nuclear Weapons and Chemical and Biological Agents. Estimates of enemy
NBC capabilities usually are prepared at field army and hlglner
headquarters. Units below field army level usually lack the means to
gather the information to make such estimates. They use the estimates of
the higher headquarters and modify them with available information.

The determination of enemy NBC operation capabilities is based

primarily on estimates of numbers and types of weapons and amount and
t y p e s o f a g e n t s a v a i l a b l e , knowledge of enemy doctrine, past experience,
and estimates of enemy capabilities involving the employment of ground
troops. As with the enemy air capability, it is rarely feasible to
estimate what portion of the available enemy NBC effort is used against a
division or corps within a field army or a command in the COMMZ. It is
also rarely feasible to estimate the number of nuclear weapons the enemy
is capable of using within a period as short as one day. The period
selected is a month or other period depending on the avaiIable information
and past experience.

The statement of the enemy’s capability to use chem cal and b i o l o g i c a

agents ncludes the amount, typa, and delivery means of avai lab e chemica
and bio o g i c a l a g e n t s .

R e c e n t a n d P r e s e n t S i g n i f i c a n t A c t i v i t es

This is a summary of recent and current enemy activ ties wh ch serve

as indicators of future enemy actions. Significant enemy failures to take
action also are Iisted. For example, if the enemy is apparently defending
behind a river obstacle but has failed to destroy certain bridges, the
omission is listed as a significant activity. Any basis for a belief that
the enemy has specific knowledge of the friendly situation or intentions
also is listed. For example, a capture by the enemy of an OPORD or a
compromise of current signal operating instructions would be noted. For
more information on enemy indicators, see Appendix C.

Peculiarities and Weaknesses

Briefly discuss each enemy peculiarity and weakness, indicating the

extent to which it is a vulnerability and how it affects the selection of
broad friendly courses of action. For example, if the enemy has an open
flank, the fact is stated under operations. Discuss the extent to which
the open flank constitutes an exploitable vulnerability. If enemy
reserves are small and poorly positioned to extend the flank, the
vulnerability may be great. If the enemy reserves are large and in
position to extend the flank or counterattack an enveloping force, the
vulnerability is probably insignificant. The G2 might state it as: “The
enemy north flank is open. Available reserves are adequate to extend this
flank a distance of only about 3,000 m. poSit ions to extend the flank
have not been prepared. The enemy is vulnerable to a flank attack,”
Conversely, it might be stated as: “The enemy north flank is open.
However, a v a i l a b l e r e s e r v e s a r e a d e q u a t e e i t h e r t o e x t e n d t h i s f l a n k
beyond our zone, or to counterattack an enveloping force. Positions
suitable to block an attempted envelopment have been prepared as shown on
‘the enemy situation map.” In the first statement, the enemy’s

A-5
vulnerability to a flank attack is carried forward to conclusions of the
intelIigence estimate. In the second statement, the open flank apparently
is not a vulnerability and is not carried any further. Another example:
If the guerrilla forces are poorly equipped with antitank means of all
t y p e s , t h e f a c t i s s t a t e d u n d e r l o g i s t i c s , and the extent ‘to which this is
an exploitable vulnerability is discussed briefly. The intelligence
o f f i c e r m i g h t s t a t e : “The guerrilla forces in our area are poorly equipped
with antitank means. They cannot effectively defend against armored
vehicles” The inability to defend against armored vehicles is carried
forward as a vulnerability to conclusions of the intelligence estimate.
Figure A-2 shows some examples of enemy peculiarities and weaknesses.

PERSONNEL

-- Replacement situation (shortages or overages, particularly in

specialists) .

-- Morale less than excellent, or exceptionally high.

-- Disproportionate number of very young or very old men.

-- High rate of sickness.

-- Percentage of authorized strength, if less than 80 percent.

INTELLIGENCE

-- Susceptibility to deception or neutralization of certain enemy

information collection agencies.

-- Overdependence on one or more categories of information sources.

-- Ineffectiveness of enemy intelligence.

OPERATIONS

-- Habitual repetition of certain schemes of maneuver, or

unconventional patterns of operations.

-- Faulty organization of the terrain.

-- Faulty disposition of reserves.

-- Susceptibility to electronic countermeasures.

-- Inadequate troop training, especially in defense against nuclear

weapons or chemical agents.

-- Lack of adequate mobility.

..
Figure A-2. Example sof typical enemy peculiarities and weaknesses.

A-6
 - - I n a d e q u a t e a i r o r a r t i l l e r y s u p p o r t , or nuclear weapon del ivery
systems.

-- Pronounced failure to disperse and dig in.

-- Habitual failure to attack certain types of targets.

LOGISTICS

-- Shortages or inadequacies of particular supplies and materiel,

including nuclear weapons.

-- Status of equipment, if less than 80 percent.

-- Large concentrations of supplies.

-- Location of vulnerable points and bottlenecks in the logistics

system or Iines of communications.

-- Inability to resupply during action.

-- Failure to equip troops with protective masks or protective

clothing.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

-- Hostile attitude toward the civil populace, or of the civil

populace toward the enemy.

-- Inadequacies in the control of civil communications, to include

movement of civilians.

PERSONALITIES

-- Peculiarities or weaknesses of the enemy commander, major

subordinate commanders, o r p r i n c i p a l s t a f f o f f i c e r s a s d i s c l o s e d b y
or deduced from their past performance, education, politics,
experience, or other basis.
.
Figure A-2. Examples of typical enemy peculiarities and weaknesses (continued).
ENEMY CAPABILITIES

Paragraph 4. List the enemy courses of action which tha enemy adopts
and which influences the accomplishment of the friendly mission, either
favorably or unfavorably. A properly stated enemy capability indicates
what the enemy can do, when and where the enemy can do it, and in what
strength. For example, “Attack (what) now (when) along our front (where)
with five motorized battalions supported by alI available nuclear weapons,
a r t i l l e r y a n d a i r ( s t r e n g t h ) . ” Another example: “Conduct harassing
operations (what) at any time (when) in our area (where) with about 200
guerrillas equipped only with small arms (strength).”’

A-7
 The evidence considered in the analysis and discussion of enemy
capabiIities includes characteristics of the AO and positive or negative
evidence of enemy activity, listed under recent and present significant
activities. A major obstacle across part of the friendly area is evidence
that attack elsewhere is more likely. Low ceilings and Iow visibility are
evidence that the enemy is not using all available aircraft. Open, flat
areas without any appreciable cover are evidence that the enemy does not
use guerrilla or infiltration forces.

In analyzing and discussing each enemy capability or appropriate

combination, t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e o f f i c e r j u d g e s f r o m t h e e n e m y p o i n t o f v i e w
the advantage or disadvantage of adopting the capability. In making this
judgment, the G2 or S2 also considers enemy doctrine and practices and the
ultimate results of adopting or rejecting the particular capability. For
example: “Employment of the unidentified tank division at TNOMYEH
deprives the enemy of the reserves needed to counterattack a penetration
by either of the two friendly divisions to our south. Commitment of this
tank division too early will result in the later defeat of the enemy.”

If there is no evidence of the enemy’s possible adoption of a

particular capability and the capability does not represent a major threat
to the accomplishment of the mission, t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e o f f i c e r d o e s n o t
judge it. For example, the enemy usually withdraws beyond our objective.
O r d i n a r i l y , such withdrawal is not a threat to the accomplishment of the
mission. If there is no evidence that the enemy withdraws, a statement
of conclusions is omitted. The intelligence officer states: “There is no
indication of withdrawal. ”

CONCLUSIONS

Paragraph 5. State the intelligence officer’s estimate of the--

0
Total effects of the AO on friendly courses of action.

0
Courses of action most Iikely to be adopted by the enemy,
including their relative probability of adoption.

0
Effects of enemy vulnerabil ities that can be exploited.

For a defensive mission, conclusions identify the best defense areas

and the best AAs into the defense sector. For an offensive mission, the
conclusion describes the best AA to the objectives.

Determine the enemy probable courses of action by the previous

analysis and discussion of enemy capabilities. Consider how the enemy
views the vulnerabiIities as indicated by doctrine, past experiences, and
the personality of the enemy commander. Consider previous enemy courses
of action selected under similar circumstances. The determination is
objective and not an unsubstantiated guess at what the enemy wilI do.

In determining the relative probability of adoption of enemy courses

of action, the intelligence officer avoids conclusions based on friendly
doctrine and practices. The officer considers the available evidence, to

A-8
include the enemy doctrine and practices, a s w e l l a s p o s i t i v e o r n e g a t i v e
enemy activity, If enemy activity is not definitive enough to justify
selection of the enemy’s most probable course of action, the officer
determines the most probable one based on the characteristics of the AO,
e n e m y d o c t r i n e , p r a c t i c e s , and previous experiences.

In the statement of the courses of action most likely to be adopted by

the enemy, s e v e r a l c a p a b i I i t i e s a r e c o m b i n e d f o r b r e v i t y a n d c l a r i t y .
However, alI of the enemy capabiIities combined in one statement are
capable of being implemented at the same time. For example, the most
probable enemy course of action is to: “Attack to envelop our northern
flank, reinforced by corps reserve and using alI avaiIable nuclear
w e a p o n s , a r t i l I e r y , a n d a i r s u p p o r t ; and conduct harassing operations in
our rear areas with guerrilIas and infiltrating forces. ”

If more than one enemy course of action is stated, they are Iisted in
the order of their probability of adoption.

An enemy vulnerability is any condition or circumstance of the enemy

situation or the AO which makes the enemy especialIy Iiable to damage,
d e c e p t i o n , o r d e f e a t . Only those enemy weaknesses which are exploited are
considered. In studying the enemy peculiarities and weaknesses to
determine such vulnerabilities, the characteristics of the AO, all aspects
of the enemy situation, and the enemy’s doctrine and practices are
considered. Only actual vulnerabilities are presented. An open northern
flank which the enemy cannot, with available forces, extend or defend, is
a vulnerability. I f , h o w e v e r , the enemy has reserves which readily extend
the flank to an impassable obstacle or counterattack to pin enveloping
t r o o p s a g a i n s t t h a t o b s t a c l e , the open flank is mentioned as a possible
v u l n e r a b i l i t y , although the vulnerability may be eliminated by commitment
of the enemy reserves. However, the commitment of reserves creates
another vulnerabiIity.

Each exploitable enemy vulnerability is listed as a brief statement of

the effect of the vulnerability rather than a repetition of the
peculiarity or weakness. For example: “Shortage of antitank means” is not
stated. Instead, t h e e f f e c t o f t h a t w e a k n e s s i s g i v e n b y s t a t i n g :
“Limited capability to oppose armored vehicles. ” If the enemy’s north
f l a n k i s v u l n e r a b l e , it could be stated as: “’Enemy northern flank open to
envelopment subject to destruction of enemy reserves at . . . .“

In determining enemy vulnerabilities, the G2 or S2 considers the

feasibility of their exploitation and makes appropriate recommendations to
the G3 or S3. All enemy vulnerabilities are not exploited at the same
time. The exploitation of one vulnerability precludes the exploitation of
another vulnerability.

For example, the enemy is vulnerable to both a night penetration and a

daytime flank envelopment. The G3 or S3, in coordination with the G2 or
S2, recommends to the commander the priority of vulnerabilities to be
exploited. Based on the information in this appendix and in Chapter B,
Figures A-3 through A-5 show the formats for the annotated intelligence
estimate, sample intelIigence estimate for a division, and an annotated
intelIigence estimate for stabiIity operations.

A-9
 (Classification)

(2) Effect on enemy courses of action. Describe the effects of

weather on each broad course of action (such as attack or defend). Each
description concludes with a statement of whether the weather favors the
c o u r s e o f a c t i o n . Among the courses of action, include use of chemical
agents, nuclear weapons, and special methods, techniques, equipment,
procedures, or forces.

(3) Effect on own courses of action. Describe in the same manner as

f o r ( 2 ) a b o v e , except that the estimate excludes the use of biological
agents.

b. Terrain.

(1) Existing situation. Use graphic representations, such as IPB

templates, where possible. Use annexes for detailed material. Include as
much information as necessary for an understanding of observation and fire,
concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain features, and AAs. Include
effects of nuclear fires, enemy biological and chemical agents, and any
other pertinent considerations on each of these factors as appropriate.

(Classification)

Figure A-3. Annotated intelligence estimate.

A-10
 (Classification)

(Short title identification)

(2) Effect on enemy courses of action. Describe in the same manner

as for the effects of weather in a(2) above. For defensive courses of
a c t i o n , state the best defense area and the best AAs leading to it. For
attack courses of action, state the best AAs.

(3) Effect on own courses of action. Describe in the same manner

as for effects of weather in a(3) above.

c. Other Characteristics. The following additional characteristics

considered pertinent are included in separate subparagraphs: sociology,
politics, economics, psychology, and other factors. Other factors may
include such items as science and technology, materiel, transportation,
manpower , and hydrography. These factors are analyzed using the same
subheadings as weather and terrain.

3. ENEMY SITUATION. This paragraph gives information on the enemy which

will permit later development of enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities and
refire ment of these capabilities into a specific c urse of action and its
r e l a t ve probability of adoption.

a Disposition. Reference may be made to over ays, enemy situation

maps, or previously publ ished documents.
*
b Composition. Summarize enemy OB that can influence accomplishment
of the mission. Reference may be made to previously published documents.
Special mention is made of units capable of EW, l o w - i n t e n s i t y o p e r a t i o n s ,
and other special operations, as appropriate.

c. Strength. Enemy strength is listed as committed forces,

r e i n f o r c e m e n t s , a i r a s s e t s , n u c l e a r w e a p o n s , and chemical and biological
agents. The purpose of this listing is to assist in developing enemy
capabilities and vulnerabilities for use by the commander and staff in
selecting courses of action. The unit mission, location of the enemy,
enemy doctrine, and the level of command at which the estimate is being
prepared are factors to be considered.

(Classification)

Figure A-3. Annotated intelligence estimate (continued).

A-n
 (Classification)

(Short title identification)

(1) Committed forces. List those enemy ground maneuver units

currently in contact and those ground maneuver units with which imminent
contact can be expected, r e g a r d l e s s o f t h e s p e c i f i c f r i e n d l y c o u r s e o f
action implemented. Designation of enemy forces as committed forces
depends on disposition, location, controlIing headquarters and doctrine.
The intelligence officer usually accounts for committed forces based on
the size unit doctrinally used to oppose the friendly unit. GeneralIy,
enemy units are counted in terms of units two echelons below the friendly
u n i t ’ s s i z e ( f o r e x a m p l e , a brigade S2 normalIy considers committed forces
in terms of companies; a division G2, in terms of battalions; and a corps
G2, in terms of regiments). If there is doubt whether a unit is a
committed force or a reinforcement, i t i s c o n s i d e r e d a r e i n f o r c e m e n t .

This attributes to the enemy the maximum capability to reinforce forces to

oppose a given friendly course of action.

(2) Reinforcements. Include designation and location.

Reinforcements are those enemy maneuver units that may or may not be
employed against us, depending on our choice of a specific course of
action and enemy plans. Reinforcements are enemy units not committed in
o r o u t o f t h e f r i e n d l y s e c t o r , but which can react to the friendly course
of action, subject to time and distance considerations, in time to
influence the accomplishment of the mission. Imminent contact is not
expected. Disposition, location, level of control, or other factors at
the time of the estimate are considered in determining which enemy forces
are reinforcements.

(3) Air. List the number of enemy aircraft by type within

operational radius. Include the number of possible sorties per day by
type of aircraft, if known.

(4) Nuclear weapons and chemical and biological agents.

E s t i m a t e , as appropriate, the number, type, yield, and delivery means of
enemy nuclear weapons and chemical and biological munitions or agents
available to the enemy.

d. Recent and Present Significant Activities. List selected items of

information to provide bases for analyses to determine relative
probability of adoption of specific courses of action and enemy
vulnerabil ities. Enemy failures to take expected actions are listed, as
well as positive information.

(Classification)
Figure A-3. Annotated intelligence estimate (continued).

A-12
 (Classification)

(Short title identification)

e. Peculiarities and Weaknesses. Based on knowledge of enemy

tactical doctrine, practices, the principles of war, the AO, and the enemy
situation previously described and discussed, Iist peculiarities and
weaknesses, and briefly describe each, indicating the extent to which they
may be vulnerable and how they influence possible friendly courses of
action. The items listed are grouped under the headings indicated below.
Only pertinent headings are used.

(1) Personnel. An estimate of strength usually is included if less

than 80 percent of authorized strength. Status of morale is included, i f
known.

(2) Intelligence. An estimate of enemy intell igence success,

i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s , a n d s u s c e p t i b i l i t y t o d e c e p t i o n a n d detection is usual Iy
included.

(3) Operations. An estimate of combat effecti veness is usualIy

included if less than excellent.

( 4 ) L o g i s t i c s . An estimate of the enemy’s capability to support

their forces logistically is included if there are apparent weaknesses.

(5) Civil-military operations. An estimate of the attitudes of the

enemy and the civilian populace and the status of food supply, medical
f a c i l i t i e s , communications, a n d o t h e r c r i t i c a l r e s o u r c e s i s u s u a l l y
included.

( 6 ) P e r s o n a l i t i e s . An estimate of the capabilities and or

weaknesses of the enemy commander and principal staff officers usualIy is
included.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES. Based on all the previous information and

analyses, develop and Iist enemy capabilities. The listing provides a
basis for analyzing the available information to arrive at those
capabiIities the enemy can adopt as specific courses of action and their
relative probability of adoption.

a. Enumeration. State what, when, where, and in what strength for

each capability.

(Classification)
Figure A-3. Annotated inteiiigence estimate (continued).

A-13
 (Classification)

(Short title identification)

b. Analysis and Discussion. To provide a basis for conclusions of

enemy capabilities and their relative probability of adoption, each
c a p a b i l i t y , o r a p p r o p r i a t e c o m b i n a t i o n t h e r e o f , is discussed in a separate
subparagraph. Consideration of enemy deception measures is included. All
the pertinent previous information and conclusions are tabulated as either
supporting or rejecting the adoption of the capability. After listing all
the evidence, each capability is judged from the enemy point of view of
whether the adoption of the capabiIity is advantageous to the enemy. Such
judgments need not be made if the conclusion is obvious or if there is no
evidence that the enemy wilI adopt the capability, except when the
capability is one that will make the accomplishment of the friendly
mission highly doubtful or impossible. This exception is to focus
attention on dangerous threats.

5. CONCLUSIONS. Based on all the previous information and analyses,

conclusions are stated concerning the total effects of the AO on friendly
courses of action; the courses of action most likely to be adopted by the
enemy, including their relative probabiIity of adoption; and the effects
of enemy vulnerabilities that can be exploited. These conditions assist
in the selection of a friendly course of action.

a. Effects of Intelligence Consideration on Operations. Indicate

whether the mission set forth in paragraph 1, above, can be supported from
the intelligence standpoint. Indicate which courses of action can best be
supported.

b. Effects of the AO on Own Courses of Action. For attack courses of

a c t i o n , indicate the best AAs. For defensive courses of action, indicate
the best defense areas and the best AAs leading to and into the defense
areas. (This subparagraph is omitted if the discussion of the effects of
the area on own courses of action in paragraph 2 has been omitted because
of the availability of a current analysis of the AO.)

c. Probable Enemy Courses of Action. List courses of action in order

of relative probability of adoption. A listed course of action may
include several subordinate courses of action that can be executed
concurrently. Usually, no more than two or three courses of action, in
order of probability of adoption, can be justified by the available
evidence.

(Classification)

Figure A-3. Annotated intelligence estimate (continued).

A-14
 (Classification)

(Short title identification)

d. Enemy Vulnerabil ities. List the effects of peculiarities and

weaknesses that result in vulnerabilities that are exploitable at own,
h i g h e r , o r lower levels of command. The order in listing these
vulnerabil ities has no significance.

/s/ (Designation of staff officer)

OFFICIAL:
G2’s Signature Block

Annexes (as required)

Distribution:

(Classification)

Figure A-3. Annotated intelligence estimate (continued).

A-15
 (Classification)

Copy --- of --- Copies

G2 Section, 52d Division (Mech)
GLENVILLE (NF3277), EASTLAND
2308302 June 19
—
Msg Ref No.

INTELLIGENCE EST MATE NO 20

Reference: Map, s e r i e s E a s t a n d , s h e e t s D e l t a t h r o u g h K i l o , e d i t i o n 2 ,
1:50,000 Time Z O n e Used Throu ghout the Estimate: Zulu.

1. MISSION. 52d Div defends along Dry Creek and prepares to attack on
order.

2. AREA OF OPERATIONS.

a. Weather.

( 1 ) E x i s t i n g s i t u a t i o n . Weather for the period 23 to 28 June

#ill be rainy and cool, gradually warming and clearing as a high pressure
system moves through the AO from the south. Temperatures from 40 to
65°F . V i s i b i l i t y w i l l r a n g e f r o m 1 6 t o 2 5 k i l o m e t e r s , e x c e p t d u r i n g
precipitation and in morning fog in low drainage areas. Surface winds
from the south at 8 to 10 knots.

BM- BM- EE- EE- Moon- Moon-

Date NT CT CT NT rise set

23 June 0331 0419 2029 2130 1746 0125

25 June 0339 0422 2025 2124 1907 0214
27 June 0344 0425 2022 2118 2001 0518
28 June 0349 0428 2018 2112 2022 0820

(2) Effects on enemy courses of action:

(a) P r e c i p i t a t i o n w i l l n o t h i n d e r c r o s s c o u n t r y m o v e m e n t
except in the low drainage areas of Minertown.

(b) Southerly winds will not affect enemy employment of NBC.

(c) Low visibility during precipitation and morning fog will

favor enemy attack.

(3) Effects on friendly courses of action:

(Classification)

Figure A-4. Sample division intelligence estimate.

A-16
 (Classification)

(a) Precipitation will not hinder cross country movement

except in the low drainage areas of Minertown.

(b) Southerly wind direction will not affect friendly use of

chemical or nuclear weapons.

(c) Low visibility during precipitation and morning fog will

not favor friendly defense.

b. Terrain.

(1) Existing si tuation.

( a ) C o v e r and concealment. Wooded areas around Midway offer

good concealment. Numer ous ravines in drainage areas of Minertown offer
limited cover and concealment.

(b) Observation and fire. There are good observation points

along bluffs above Gringo River. Fields of fire are excellent throughout
plains areas north of Mud Creek but limited moderately in populated and
vegetated areas near Glenville.

(c) Obstacles.

1 Swift River (fordable 1 km east of Glenville).

2 Bluffs above Gringo River.

3 City of Glenville. Routes around city are passable;

routes through city impassable.

(d) Key terrain. Hill mass Jackson and Hill 333.

(e) AAs.

1 Available to the enemy into our sector:

a AA 1 is from Largo through gap around the

northeast end of HILL 702, 34 km southwest to Minertown and south to Dry
Creek.

b AA 2 is from Largo southeast through Midway to

river crossing east of Glenville.

(Classification)

Figure A-4. Sample division intelligence estimate (continued).

A-17
 (Classification)

2 AA available for US movament into the enemy’s area is

generally the same as those I isted for enemy into our sector.

(2) Effect on enemy courses of action. Terrain favors the enemy

attack using AA 1.

(3) Effect on friendly courses of action. Terrain favors our

defense of the srea around Dry Creek.

c. Other Characteristics.

(1) Existing situation. Local nationals throughout the area

favor friendly military operations. Large numbers of refugees can be
expected to pass through friendly Iines.

(2) Effect on enemy courses of action. The enemy can be

expected to insert infiItrators as refugees.

(3) Effect on friendly courses of action. Refugees can be

expected to provide valuable inteliigence.

3. ENEMY SITUATION.

a. Disposition. Annex A, Situation Overlay.

. b. Composition. Enemy forces opposing 52d Div consist of elements of

the 4th Combined Arms Army.

(1) Identified units are--

(a) 10th MRD consisting of--

--27th MRR.
--30th MRR.
--31st MRR.
--121st Tk Regt (unlocated).

(b) 19th Mech Div consisting of--

--23d MRR.
--37th Tk Regt.

(2) Unidentified units are: 2 x U/l MRR of 19th MRD.

(Classification)
—. . —... . . . . . . ..
Figure A-4. Sample division inteiilgence estimate (Continued).

A-18
 (Classification)

c. Strength.

(1) Committed forces. 52d Div (Mech) is opposed immediately by

four mechanized battalions and one tank battalion. These units are
supported by normal divisional and regimental artillery groups.

(2) Reinforcements. Reinforcements available to the enemy for

commitment in our zone are a total of five MRB and four tank battalions
from the 27th MRR, 121st Tk Regt, and the second-echelon battalions of the
30th and 31st MRRs and the 37th Tk Regt. Also, the 23d MRR can totally
reinforce within 8 hours from start of movement.

(3) Air. Enemy is supported by the 3d Air Army consisting of

unidentified numbers of fighter-bomber aircraft, ground attack aircraft,
and reconnaissance aircraft. Air parity currently exists with either
force capable of obtaining air superiority for limited periods of time.
Up to now enemy has used a maximum of 60 fighter-bomber sorties in a
12-hour period.

(4) Nuclear. No estimate of the enemy’s nuclear support for the

next 30 days is available. Enemy currently has 152mm Gun-Hows with
nuclear rounds and SSMS which can del iver rounds of 10-50 kt yield within
range of our division.

d. Recent and Present Significant Activities.

(1) Air reconnaissance and photo reports indicate increased enemy

movement along axis Bravo to Limo. Movement indicates reinforcement of
forward element of 4th CAA.

(2) Enemy’s aerial recon and tactical air flights have increased
in the last 36 hours, particularly along the I ine of contact.

(3) For the past 36 hours, volume of vehicular traffic has

increased in southerly direction.

(4) Artillery fire from the enemy has become more intensive in
the last 24 hours.

(5) Reliable source reports large tracked, amphibious vehicles

mov n g i n t o a r e a v i c i n i t y H i l l 8 0 5 .

(Classification)

Figure A-4. Sample division intelligence estimate (continued).

A-19
 (Classification)

(6) Enemy has begun to employ smoke along the forward slope of
Hill 702.

e. Peculiarities and Weaknesses.

(1) Personnel. Enemy units are currently estimated to be at 85

t o 9 0 p e r c e n t a u t h o r i z e d s t r e n g t h . Morale is high, although replacements
may not be highly trained.

(2) Intelligence. Enemy stresses communications security and

subordinate units of the 4th CAA have recently initiated intensive radio
security and procedures training.

(3) Operations.

(a) Enemy is susceptible to mine warfare and antitank

weapons.

(b) Enemy has trained heavily on attack formations and has

been told offensive action is the only way to victory.

(c) Enemy is vulnerable to nuclear weapons due to massed

forces and canalization by further advancement.

(4) Logistics. Supplies are adequate for the enemy’s conduct of

either the offense or defense. The enemy had previously stockpiled
supplies wel I f o r w a r d i n d i v i s i o n a r e a s .

(5) Personal ities. GD Masonski, CG of the 10th MRD, is an

advocate of penetration type offense on a narrow front with subsequent
widening of the gaps to split enemy forces.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. Enumeration:

( 1 ) A t t a c k a t a n y t i m e along AA 1 with four MRBs and one tank

battalion supported by normal d v i s i o n a l a n d r e g i m e n t a l a r t i l l e r y g r o u p s .

(2) Attack at any time along AA 2 with four MRBs and one tank
battalion supported by normal divisional and regimental artillery groups.

(Classification)

Figure A-4. Sample division intelligence estimate (continued).

A-20
 (Classification)

(3) Defend at any time with forces in contact supported by all

available divisional and regimental artillery groups.

(4) Reinforce the attack or defense with all or part of the

following units at the places and times indicated:

UNIT PLACE TIME

(a) 30th MRR(-) AA2 immediately

(b) 31st MRR(-) AA 1 immediately

(c) 37th Tk Regt AA 1 immediately

(-)

(d) 27th MRR AA 1 2 hr after

or 2 start of
movement

(e) 23d MRR vic Little 8 hr after

start of
movement

(f) 121st Tk Unlocated Unknown

Regt

(g) U/l MRR of vic Bravo 9 hr after

19th MRD start of
movement

(5) Delay in successive positions to the east of Little.

(6) Employ chemical agents within our sector at any time.

(7) Employ nuclear weapons of a 0.5-50 kt yield with delivery by

artillery or SSM.

(8) Employ guerrilla forces in our rear area either alone or in

communication with the capabilities enumerated below.

(9) The enemy can attack our area with an undetermined number of
fighter, ground attack, and bomb sorties daily. The maximum number of
daily sorties mounted in our area has been 60.

(Classification)

Figure A-4. Sample division intelligence estimate (continued).

A-21
 (Classification)

b. Analysis and Discussion.

(1) Attack along AA 1.

(a) The following indicate adoption of this capability:

1 Uses a good AA.

2 The enemy is massing mechanized elements, tanks,

artillery and logistic support along this avenue.

3 Forward elements disposed on a relatively narrow

front.

4 Extensive artillery preparation along approach.

(b) The scant cover presented along this AA is a limiting

factor but does not preclude adoption of this capability.

(2) Attack along AA 2.

(a) The following indicate adoption of this capability:

1 The enemy is massing mechanized elements, tanks,

artillery and logistic support along this avenue.

2 Forward elements disposed on a relatively narrow

front.

3 Extensive artillery preparation along this avenue.

(b) The following indicate rejection of this capability:

1 This AA accommodates only one deployed regiment and

offers limited cover and concealment.

2 The limited obstacle presented by Glenville.

(3) Defend. The following indicate rejection of this capability:

(a) The enemy is massing forces along the line of contact.

(b) Enemy has followed known doctrine for attack.

(Classification)

Figure A-4. Sampie division intelligence estimate (continued).

A-22
 (Classification)

(c) Terrain favors attack.

(4) Reinforce. The following indicates adoption of this

capability:

(a) Movement of additional troops toward the front.

(b) New units identified in the combat zone.

(c) Forward logistical buildup.

(5) Delay. There are no indications of the enemy’s adoption of

this capability.

(6) Employ chemical agents. There is no indication the enemy

will employ chemical agents other than smoke.

(7) Employ nuclear weapons. There is no indication the enemy

wilI employ nuclear weapons.

(8) Employ guerrilla forces. The following indicates adoption of

this capability:

(a) Doctrine calls for use of guerrilla force.

(b) Use would enhance enemy advance by creating panic and

confusion.

(9) Air attack. Indications are that enemy will continue to

employ this capability as referenced in paragraph (9) above.

5. CONCLUSIONS.

a. Intelligence. Available intelligence indicates that the division

can accomplish its mission. Intelligence supports adoption of the
division course of action.

b. Weather and Terrain. The weather and terrain favors our defense.
The beat defensive area is the high ground east of Dry Creek. The best AA
into our defensive sector is AA 1.

c. Probable Enemy Courses of Action.

(Classification)

Figure A-4. Sample division intelligence estimate (continued).

A-23
 (Classification)

(1) Attack with forces in contact supported by air and artillery

with the main attack of one mechanized regiment along AA 1. Will
reinforce w t h e l e m e n t s a s i n d i c a t e d i n p a r a 4 a ( 4 ) .

(2) Conduct secondary attack with forces in contact supported by

air and arti Ilery with one mechanized regiment along AA 2.

(3) Employ guerrilla or special forces in our rear areas in

conjunction with the above courses of action.

d. Enemy Vulnerabilities.

(1) The enemy is vulnerable to counterattack due to slowness to

exploit potential penetrations.

(2) Vulnerable to nuclear attack due to massing of troops and

concentrated logistics depots.

(3) Mine warfare will be effective against mechanized elements.

KROOK

BG

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Bagger

BAGGER

GS

Annex: A - - S i t u a t i on Overlay ( o m i t t e d )
Distribution: A

(Classification)

Figure A-4. Sample division intelligence estimate (continued).

A-24
 (Classification)

Copy --- of --- Copies

Preparing Staff Element
Organization
Location
Date-Time Group
Msg Ref No

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NO _.
References: maps, charts, or other documents.
Time Zone Used Throughout the Estimate: Zulu

1. MISSION. (States the current or proposed mission of the force

designated for stability operations.)

2. THE AREA OF OPERATIONS. (This paragraph discusses characteristics of

t h e h o s t c o u n t r y , t h e a r e a , and their probable effect upon both insurgent
and government courses of act ion.)

a. Geography. (Includes climate and topography.)

(1) Existing situation.

(2) Effect on insurgent courses of action.

(3) Effect on government courses of action.

.
b. Politics. (Includes governmental organization, political parties,
and interest groups.)

(1) Existing situation.

(2) Effect on insurgent courses of action.

(3) Effect on government courses of action.

c. Economy. (Includes private enterprise and publ ic facilities.)

(1) Existing situation.

(2) Effect on insurgent courses of action.

(3) Effect on government courses of action.

(Classification)

Figure A-5. Annotated inteIIigence estimate for stability operations.

A-25
 (Classification)

d. Sociology (Includes minority groups and social programs.)

(1) Existing situation.

(2) Effect on insurgent courses of action.

(3) Effect on government courses of action.

e. Psychology. (Includes behavior patterns and motivating factors.)

(1) Existing situation.

(2) Effect on insurgent courses of action.

(3) Effect on government courses of action.

3. THE INSURGENT SITUATION. (This paragraph discusses the insurgent

organization and its activities.)

a. Organization and Leadership. (Includes composition.)

(1) Nonmilitary. (Includes the underground.)

(2) Military. (Includes all insurgent armed elements.)

b. Strength and Disposition.

(1) Nonmilitary.

(2) Military.

c. Recent and Present Significant Activities.

(1) Nonviolent action. (Includes political, economic,

sociological, and psychological action.)

(2) Terrorist action. (Includes murder, torture, extortion,

kidnapp ing, and sabotage.)

(3) Guerrilla operations. (Includes harassment, destruction,

i nterdi c t i o n , a n d d i s p e r s i o n . )

(Classification)

Figure A-5. Annotated Intelligence estimate for stability operations [continued).

A-26
 (Classification)

(4) Conventional tactical operations. (Includes attack, defense,

clay, and withdrawal.)

d. Strengths and Weaknesses.

(1) Recruitment and retention.

(2) Intelligence and security.

(3) Organization and training.

(4) Finance and logistics.

(5) Communications.

4. INSURGENT CAPABILITIES. (This paragraph l i s t s c u r r e n t i n s u r g e n t

capabiIities and discusses them in regard to p r o b a b i l i t y o f a d o p t i o n . )

a. Enumeration. (Includes what, where, when, and how for each

capability.)

(1) Basic capabilities.

(a) Nonviolent action.

(b) Terrorist action.

(c) Guerrilla operations.

(d) Conventional tactical operations.

(e) Employment of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.

(2 Supporting capabilities.

(a) Intelligence and security.

(b) Recruitment and retention.

(c) Organization and training.

(d) Finance and logistics.

(Classification)

Figure A-5. Annotated intelligence estimate for stability operations (continued).

A-27
 (Classification)

(e) Reinforcement capabilities.

b. Analysis and Discussion. (Includes all evidence supporting or

rejecting the adoption of each capability.)

5. CONCLUSIONS. (This paragraph draws conclusions from the content of

:he preceding paragraphs and furnishes a basis for selection of courses of
action to accomplish the assigned miss ion.)

a. Effects of the Operational Environment. (States the total effect

of the AO upon courses of action.)

b. Probable Insurgent Courses of Action. (Lists probable insurgent

courses of action in order of relative probability of adoption.)

c. Insurgent Vulnerabilities, (Lists exploitable insurgent

vulnerabilities.)

/s/
G2 or S2
(Commander if distributed
outside headquarters)

ANNEXES:
Distribution: (If distributed only.)
Authentication: (G2 or S2 authenticates if commander signs estimate.)

(Classification)

Figure A-5. Annotated intelligence estimate for stability operations (continued).

A-28
 INTELLIGENCE ANNEX TO THE OPORD OR OPLAN

The intelligence annex disseminates information about enemy forces

which is essential to the conduct of the operation and to give any other
necessary intelIigence orders or guidance for the operation(s) in
question. It also serves as a medium for instructing subordinate
commanders to acquire information necessary for the conduct of the
operation but which can only be obtained immediately before or when the
operation itself has begun. The intelligence annex is not a substitute
f o r a n i n t e l l i g e n c e c o l l e c t i o n p l a n ; rather it is a way to communicate the
taskings and requests of the coIIection plan.

T h e i n t e l l i g e n c e a n n e x i s a f o r m a l intelIigence tasking document that

accompanies an OPLAN or OPORD. It should be as brief as possible
consistent with clarity. Its first paragraph is a summary of the enemy
situation required to understand the OPLAN or OPORD and refers to
annotated maps, enemy situation overlays, or current intelIigence reports.
Subsequent paragraphs contain specific collection requirements and
instructions. SOP information should not be repeated in the intelligence
annex. Figures A-6 and A-7 show a general intelIigence annex format and
division intelligence annex example.

(Classification)

(Change from oral orders, if any)

Copy no — of —Copies
Issuing headquarters
Place of issue (may be in code)
Date-time group of signature
Message reference number

ANNEX (INTELLIGENCE) to OPERATION ORDER NO _.

References: Maps, charts, and other relevant documents.
Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: Zulu

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION. Information about enemy forces essential

in implementing the operation plan. When the amount of detail makes it
appropriate, a brief summary and reference to the appropriate intelligence
document, or appendix to the annex, may be used. Reference to documents
not included in the annex should not be made when they ara not available
to all recipients of the annex.

(Classification)

Figure A-6. Intelligence annex format.

A-29
 (Classification)

2. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS. List each PIR in a separate subparagraph.

If a priority has been assigned to the PIR list in order, so state. In a
final subparagraph, list IRs, if any. If an intelligence annex is not
prepared or is distributed separately from the basic order, PIR should be
listed in the coordinating instructions subparagraph of the OPORD.

3. INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS.

a. Orders to Subordinate and Attached Units. List, by unit, in

separate numbered subparagraph, d e t a i l e d i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r r e p o r t s r e q u i r e d
by the issuing headquarters. Units are listed in the same order as they
are I isted in the OPORD.

b. Requests to Higher, Adjacent, and Cooperating Units. List in a

separate numbered subparagraph requests for information from units not
organic or attached.

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIEL. This

paragraph contains instructions about the operation that are not contained
in SOP or that modify or amplify SOP for the current operation. Examples
include--

a. E P WS , Deserters, Repatriates, Inhabitants, and Other Persons,

Special handling and segregation instructions. Location of EPW collection
point as provided by the provost marshal.
..
b. Captured Documents. Instructions for handling and processing of
captured documents from time of capture to receipt by specified
intelIigence personnel .

c. Captured Materiel. Designation of items or categories of enemy

materiel for examination, and specific instructions for their processing
and disposition.

5. DOCUMENTS OR EQUIPMENT REQUIRED. This paragraph lists, in each

category, the conditions under which certain documents or equipment
required by or allocated to units can be obtained or requested. Items may
include air photographs and maps.

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

a. This paragraph is covered largely by SOP. Many special

operational instructions having Cl aspects are I isted in the OPORD or in
other annexes.

(Classification)

Figure A-6. Intelligence annex format (continued).

A-30
 (Classification)

b. Certain instructions and procedures on the conduct of special

personnel in the operation may require limited dissemination on a
n e e d - t o - k n o w b a s i s ; t h e r e f o r e , a special Cl measures appendix may be
prepared for a limited and specified number of addresses.

7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION. This paragraph may be covered largely by

SOP . It stipulates the conditions (for example, dates, number of copies,
issue) regulating the issue of intelIigence reports to the originating
command for the duration of the operation. Any or all of the following
items may be covered in this paragraph:

a. Period to be covered by routine reports a n d d i s t r i b u t i o n .

b. R o u t i n e a n d s p e c i a l r e p o r t s t h a t d i f f e r from SOP required from

subordinate units.

c. Periodic or special conferences of inte lIigence officers.

d. Distribution of special intelligence studies, such as defense

overprints, photointelligence reports, and OB overlays.

em Special intelligence liaison, when indicated.

8. MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUCTIONS (if required). L i s t h e r e , under separate

subparagraphs, necessary items that are not covered above or in SOPS, or
which require action different from that detailed in SOPS.

Acknowledge

Last name of commander

Rank

Authentication:
Appendixes:
Distribution:

(Classification)

Figure A-6. Intelligence annex format (continued).

A-31
 (Classification)

(Change from oral orders, if any)

Copy 4 of 5 Copies
20th Inf Div
Zelle (4671), Buttano
1019OOZ Sep 45
BQ 13

Annex A (Intelligence) to Operations Order 24

Reference: Map, Buttano, Edition 2, 1:50,000 sheets 204 (Zelle-Pagt).
Zulu Time

10 SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION. See INTSUM, this HQ, 1018OOZ

September, and Appendix 1, Situation Overlay.

2. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS.

a. PIR.

(1) Will enemy reinforce the forces along the Flood River before
the time of attack? If so, when, where, and with what forces? Special
attention to the mechanized regiment and the medium tank regiment in
vicinity of Burg.
.
(2) Will enemy employ nuclear weapons against us? If so, when,
where, how many, of what yields, and by what delivery means?

b. IR.

(1) Will enemy continue to defend in the present position? if

so, how will forces on the ground be organized, and with what troops?
Special attention to locations and activities of reserves and
vulnerability to nuclear attack.

(2) Will enemy attack prior to 1105OOZ September? If so, when,

where, a n d i n w h a t s t r e n g t h ? S p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n t o t h e a x i s H i l l 5 3 6 - - H i l l
524--CR9841.

(3) Will enemy use CB agents? If so, what agents, when, how, and
where?

(Classification)

Figure A-7. Sample of a division intelligence annex.

A-32
 (CLASSIFICATION)

‘. INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS.

a. Orders to Attached and Subordinate Units.

(1) Ist Bale.

(2) 2d Bale.

(a) Report as obtained.

1 Status of construction of defensive positions and

minef ields on and to the east of the Flood River.

2 Location and size of ammunition storage sites and

I ocat ion. s i z e , and content of engineer equipment parks.

3 Clearing of lanes through obstacles within enemy

position n division zone.

4 Number, size, and composition of enemy patrols, and

time they were observed.

5 Activity and size of units blocking our patrolling in

forward areas.

6 The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB

activity.

7 The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks

or wearing protective clothing.

(b) Report as obtained. Negative reports by 1104OOZ

September.

1 Activity in medium tank regiment (-) and tank battalion

assembly area in vicinity of Burg.

2 Location and activity of mechanized regiment in

vicinity of Burg.

(3) 3d Bale.

(a) Report as obtained--

(Classification)

Figure A-7. Sample of a division intelligence annex (continued)

A-33
 (Classification)

1 Activity of mechanized battalion north and east of

CR9847.

2 Activity of mechanized battalion on Hill 503.

3 Status of construction of defensive positions and

ninefields on and to the east of Flood River.

4 Location and size of ammunition storage sites and

location, s i z e , and content of engineer equipment parks.

5 Clearing of lanes through obstacles within enemy

position in division zone.

6 Number , size, and composition of enemy patrols and i me

they were observed or contacted.

7 Activity and size of units blocking our patrolling n

forward areas.

8 The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB

activity.

9 The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks

or wearing protective clothing.

(b) Report as obtained--Negative reports by 1104OOZ

September.

1 Activity in medium tank regiment (-) and tank battalion

assembly area in vicinity of Burg.

2 Location and activity of mechanized regiment in

vicinity o f Burg.

(4) 1/21 Cav report as obtained--

(a) Activity of mechanized battalion on Hill 503.

(b) Status of construction of defensive positions and

minefield on and to the east of the Flood River.

(c) Location and size of ammunition storage sites and

l o c a t i o n , size, and content of engineer equipment parks.

(Classification)

Figure A-7. Sample of a division intelligence annex (continued).

A-34
 (Classification)

(d) Clearing of lanes through obstacles within enemy

position in division zone.

( e ) N u m b e r , s i z e , and composition of enemy patrols, and time

they were observed.

(f) Activity and size of units blocking our patrolling in

forward areas.

(g) The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB

activity.

(h) The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks or

wearing protective clothing.

(5) Div Arty.

(a) Report as obtained--

1 Status of construction of defensive positions and

minefield on and to the east of Flood River.

2 Clearing of lanes through obstacles within enemy

position in division zone.

3 Number, size, and composition of enemy patrols, and

time they were observed or contacted.

4 Activity and size of units blocking our patrolling in

forward areas.

5 The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB

activity.

(b) Report as obtained--Negative reports by 110400Z

September. L o c a t i o n s o f a r t i l l e r y p o s i t i o n s , including number of weapons,
c a l i b e r , and state of preparation of position.

(6) 20 Avn.

(a) Report as obtained--

1 Activity of mechanized battalion north and east of

CR9847 .

Classification

Figure A-7. Sample of a division Intelligence annex (continued).

A-35
 (Classification)

2 Activity of mechanized battalion on Hill 503.

3 Location, size, a n d t y p e o f u n i t i n v i c i n i t y o f H i l l
536 (north of Burg) .

4 Status of construction of defensive positions and

n i n e f i e l d s o n and to the east of Flood River.

5 Location and size of ammunition sites, location, size,

and content of engineer equipment parks.

6 Preparation of emplacements suitable for, and presence

of equipment appropriate to, atomic demolition munitions (ADM).

7 The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB

activity.

(b) Report as obtained--Negative reports by 1104OOZ

September.

1 Movement on the following roads:

a North on Highway 25.

b West on Highway 2.

c West on Highway 4.

2 Activity in medium tank regiment (-) and tank battalion

assembly area in vicinity of Burg.

3 Location and activity of mechanized regiment in

vicinity of Burg.

4 Location of artillery positions, including number of

weapons, ca i ber , a n d s t a t e o f p r e p a r a t i o n o f p o s i t i o n s .

(7) 20 Engr report as obtained--

(a) S t a t u s o f c o n s t r u c t i o n o f d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s a n d
m i n e f i elds on and to the east of Flood River.

(b) The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB

a c t i v ty .

(Classification)

Figure A-7. Sample of a division intelligence annex (continued).

A-36
 (Classification)

b. Requests to Higher, Adjacent, and Cooperating Units.

(1) Ist Corps is requested to provide:

(a) A s obtained--

1 Location, size, and type of unit in vicinity of Hill

536 (north of Burg).

2 Number, types, direction of movement, and time of

movement of air or surface vehicular traffic within the division zone,
with special attention to Highway 2.

3 Troop concentrations, i n c l u d i n g t y p e s o f v e h i c l e s , e a s t
of Highway 25 within the divisional area of interest.

4 Evidence of field fortifications and troop

concentrations along the following Iines:

a Hill 503--CR9847.

b Hill 518--Hill 536--Hill 499.

5 Location and size of ammunition storage sites and

locations, size, and content of engineer equipment parks.
..
6 Instances of heavily guarded vehicular movement.
Special attention to Highway 2 from Zilch to Burg.

7 Areas under unusual security restrictions in the

divisional area of interest.

8 Presence of special security troop units in any area

east of Highway 25.

9 Any location in the divisional area of interest from

which civilians have been evacuated.

1 0 Launcher sites for guided missiles or rockets within

divisional area of interest.

11 Preparation of emplacements suitable for, and presence

—
of equipment appropriate to, ADM.

(Classification)

Figure A-7. Sample of a division intelligence annex (continued).

A-37
 (Classification)

12 The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB

—
activity.

13 All CB supply movement and dumping in zone.

—

14 The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks

—
or wearing protective clothing.

(b) As obtained--Negative reports by 1104OOZ September.

1 Movement on the following roads:

a North on Highway 25.

b West on Highway 2.

c West on Highway 4.

2 Activity in medium tank regiment (-) and tank battalion

assembly area in vicinity of Burg.

3 Location and activity of mechanized regiment in

vicinity of Burg.

4 , Location and activity of mechanized regiment southwest

of CR9944.

5 Locations of artillery positions, including number of

weapons, caliber and state o f p r e p a r a t i o n o f p o s i t i o n s .

6 Command p o s t s , s u p p l y p o i n t s , a n d m e d i c a l f a c i l i t i e s
east of Highway 25.

(2) 18 Inf Div is r e q u e s t e d t o p r o v i d e - -

(a) As obtained--

1 Troop concentrations, i n c l u d i n g t y p e s o f v e h i c l e s , e a s t
of Highway 25 within the divisional area of interest.

2 Instances of heavily guarded vehicular movement;

special attention to Highway 2 from Zilch to Burg.

(Classification)

Figure A-7. Sample of a division intelligence annex (continued).

A-38
 (Classification)

3 Areas under unusual security restrictions in the

divisional area of interest.

4 Presence of special security troop units in any area

east of Highway 25.

5 Any location in the divisional area of interest from

which civilians have been evacuated.

6 Launcher sites for guided missiles or rockets within

divisional area of interest.

7 Locations of heavy artillery positions, including

number of weapons, caliber, a n d s t a t e o f p r e p a r a t i o n o f p o s i t i o n s .

8 Preparation of emplacements suitable for, and presence

of equipment appropriate to, atomic demolition munitions (ADM).

9 The interception of enemy patrols equipped for chemical

biological (CB) activity.

10 All CB supply movement and dumping in zone.

—

1 1 The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks

or wearing protective clothing.
.
(b) As obtained--Negative reports by 1104OOZ September.

1 Movement on the following roads:

a North on Highway 25.

b West on Highway 2.

c West on Highway 4.

2 Location and activity of mechanized regiment in

vicinity of Burg.

(3) 52 Mech Inf Div is requested to provide as obtained--

(a) Troop concentrations, including types of vehicles, east

of Highway 25 within the divisional area of interest.

(Classification)

Figure A-7. Sample of a division intelligence annex (continued).

A-39
 (Classification)

(b) Instances of heavily guarded vehicular movement, special

attention to Highway 2 from Zilch to Burg.

(c) Areas under unusual security restrictions in the

divisional area of interest.

(d) Presence of special security troop units in any area east

of Highway 25.

(e) Any location in the divisional area of interest from

which civiIians have been evacuated.

(f) Launcher sites for guided missiles or rockets within

divisional area of interest.

(g) Locations of heavy artillery positions, including number

of weapons, caliber, and state of preparation of positions.

(h) Preparation of emplacements suitable for, and presence of

equipment appropriate to, ADM.

(i) The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB

activity.

(j) All CB supply movement and dumping in zone.

(k) The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks or

wearing protective clothing.

(4) Supporting Ml units provide information obtainable from

SIGINT and ESM and will respond to specific tasking as described in
separate instructions.

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIEL (see division

SOP) .
5. DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT REQUIRED.

a. Maps. SOP distribution of map, Buttano, 1:50,000, Zelle-Pagt.

b. Photographic. Following aerial photographs will be furnished:

(Classification)

Figure A-7. Sample of a division intelligence annex (continued).

A-40
 (Classification)

(1) Basic cover of division zone (1:10,000 approximate), six

copies of each brigade and division artillery; one copy each tank
battalion, mechanized infantry battalion, 1/21 Cav, division engineer,
aviation battalion or group, and division signal officer.

(2) Annotated air photographs distributed automatically, as

available.

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE .

a. Appendix 2, Cl.

b. All units coordinate use of Army aircraft through division

tactical operations center (DTOC) to minimize number of aircraft in air
over division zone prior to attack.

7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION. Effective 1108OOZ September units will

submit INTSUM at 0800, 1200, 1600, 2000, 2400, and 0400 hours daily in
lieu of times prescribed in division SOP.

8. MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUCTIONS (as required),

None.

Acknowledge.

POWERS
MG

Append xes: 1 --s ituation Overlay

2--c

Distribution: Same as OPORD

OFFICIAL:

/s/AUSTIN

AUSTIN

G2

NOTE : This format may also be used in Joint Service Operations.

(Classification)

Figure A-7. Sample of a division intelligence annex (continued).

A-4 1
 SITUATION REPORT

Preparation and submission of the SITREP is a staff responsibility of

the S3; however, the S2 prepares paragraph 1, Enemy, of the SITREP and
furnishes it to the S3 in usable form. Figure A-8 shows the prescribed
format for preparing a SITREP.

ENEMY .

Committed forces (overlay).

Forces committed against TF 2-80 are--

(1) Four mechanized platoons.

(2) Two medium tank platoons.
(3) Normal regimental artillery.
(4) Six 160mm mortars.
(5) Ten 122mm howitzers.
(6) Four 100mm artillery guns self-propelled (SP).
(7) Two 122mm multiple rocket launchers.
(8) One 152mm gun SP.
(9) Air and nuclear weapons.

Reinforcements (overlay). Reinforcements currently capable of being”

employed in sector now total: U/l Medium tk plt vic BD4156, MRC of 281st
MRR vic BD4867, MRC of 282d MRR vic BD4873, MRC of 281st MRR vic AB4673,
MRB (-) of 281st MRR vic AB4650, MRB of 282d MRR vic CD5060, U/l tk co vic
DE5265 .

Enemy Activity During Period IOO6OOZ-1018OOZ.

(1) Occupation of previously unoccupied positions vic BG3531, NT3633,

MT3734, DT4239 .
(2) Movement of combat units fwd vic MN4036.
(3) D i s p e r s a l of tanks to fwd units vic CG3136.
(4) Movement of assault boats into vic GM3338.
(5) Two 100mm AT guns (SP) vic MT3737, two 120mm AT guns (SP) vic
ER3833 .
(6) Six additional 122mm how vic DT3731.
(7) Increased enemy counterbattery fire in bde sector.
(8) Clearing lanes through minefield BC2937.
(9) Mech regimental aid station vic CD3339.
(1 o) Increased enemy air activity vic FN2836, RB2437.
(11) Suspected jamming of VHF communications (intel net) at 100745Z
a n d 013252.

Concl usions. Enemy’s most probable courses of action--

(1) Continue defense now.

(2) Attack along our front within 8 hours.

Figure A-8. Sample situation report.

A-42
 INTELLIGENCE REPORT

The INTREP is a standardized report which, based on its importance, is

disseminated without regard to a specific schedule. It is prepared at all
echelons when facts influencing the enemy capabilities have been observed,
or when a change in enemy capabilities has taken place. It is passed to
h i g h e r , l o w e r , and adjacent units at the discretion of the commander
producing the report. It is sent as quickly as possible following receipt
o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n . Whenever time permits, the INTREP includes the
originating office’s interpretation of the information or intelligence
being reported. The first word of the report is INTREP. Otherwise, there
is no prescribed format for this report. It is not used in lieu of the
critical INTREP. Figure A-9 shows a message format for INTREPs that has
been developed for joint operations.

C110: Message Identification Number.

INTREP: The first word of the report must be “lNTREP. -’

HEADING: Addressee information and meg ctr data.

TEXT : Intelligence or information to be reported. Should answer

Who, What, Where, When and How Questions.

CONCLUSIONS: Whenever possible the INTREP should include the

originating office’s interpretation of the information
intelligence being reported.

Figure A-9. Sample lNTREP message format.

Figure A-10 shows the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) INTREP format.

MESSAGE HEADING
ORIGINATING AGENCY
ACTION ADDRESSEES
INFORMATION ADDRESSEES
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AND CODE WORD OR NICKNAME
INTREP (number) AS OF DATE-TIME GROUP (GMT)/MO/YR
BODY Installation, Event, and Sighting Format
Reference to previous message, if any.
Source reliability evaluation.
Concise narrative description.
REMARKS: Any other information not covered in
the body of the report.

Figure A-IO. Sample JCS INTREP message format.

A-43
 INTELLIGENCE SUMMRY

The INTSUM provides a summary of the intelligence situation covering a

specific period of time dictated by the commander. Figures A-II and A-12
show INTSUM formats. There is no specified format for the INTSUM, except
for joint service operations (see the format in Figure A-12).

Figure A-11. Format and sampie of an intelligence summary.

A-44
 NOTE: In joint service operations, use the format in Figure A-12.

Figure A-Il. Format and sample of an intelligence summary (continued).

HEAD I NG

PRECEDENCE

ORIGINATING AGENCY

ACTION ADDRESSEES

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION, CODE WORD, OR NICKNAME

INTSUM (Number) FOR PERIOD ENDING DATE-TIME GROUP-MONTH-YEAR

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY FOR THE PERIOD. Is a summary of those that

occurred during the period of the report. It contains but not be limited
to the following:

a. GROUND ACTIVITY. Summarize major movements and activities of

enemy ground forces. Indicate estimated strength, composition,
d i s p o s i t i o n , and any other items of significance.

b. TRACE OF FORWARD ELEMENTS. The most forward location or main

location of the enemy force will be shown as a pinpoint position, area
boundary, or a series of connected points, as applicable. The following
methods for reporting locations is used and stated in the intelIigence
annex.

Figure A-12. Intelligence summary for joint service operations.

A-45
 (1) Operations Involving Ground Forces. For unified or joint
operations in which ground forces are directly participating, not
specifically provided for in the subparagraph below, the UTM system
prescribed for the area concerned is used to the maximum extent
practicable in communications between ground forces and other forces
j o i n t l y e n g a g e d . When the use of the UTM system is impractical, latitude
and longitude is used.

(2) Operations Not Involving Ground Forces, The World Geographic

Reference System (GEOREF) is used in joint operations which do not
directly involve ground forces.

(3) For Close Air Support of Ground Forces. When air forces
(including naval aviation) are acting in close air support of ground
f o r c e s , the UTM system prescribed for use by ground forces in the area
concerned is used.

(4) For Joint Amphibious Operations. The UTM system prescribed

for use by landing forces within the amphibious objective area is used for
support of landing force operations by alI supporting forces.

(5) For Joint Air Defense Operations. GEOREF is used in joint

air defense operations. When there is a possibility of confusing which
s y s t e m t o u s e i n r e p o r t i n g p o s i t i o n s , the reference system should be
indicated in the report. GEOREF is not used by air forces (including
naval aviation) when reporting positions to ground forces, except in air
defense operations. GEOREF is used by ground forces when reporting
.
positions to air forces in air defense operations.

(6) in joint operations not using procedures specified in the

above paragraphs, latitude and longitude is used.

c. POTENTIAL TARGETS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS. List all potential nuclear

targets, such as concentrations of troops or equipment observed during
period. Include location, date, and time (Zulu) of observation.

d. NUCLEAR ACTIVITY. Enemy nuclear capability observed during the

period is reported. Include any changes to previously reported
capabilities. Indicate location, date, and time (Zulu) of observation of
a r t i l l e r y , m i s s i l e , or air nuclear capability.

e. NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL ACTIVITY. Indicate NBC weapons

(agents) employed or capability by type, l o c a t i o n , d a t e , a n d t i m e ( Z u l u )
of occurrence.

f . AIR ACTIVITY. All enemy air activity that has occurred during the
p e r i o d ( C A S , a i r i n t e r d i c t i o n , AD, and reconnaissance affecting the
-
Figure A-12. Intelligence summary for joint service operations (continued).

A-46
operation is summarized, including location, date and time (Zulu), and
type of aircraft involved.

g. NAVAL ACTIVITY. Summarize all enemy naval activity that has

occurred during the period. include location, date and time (Zulu), and
types of ships and craft.

h. OTHER . New tactics observed are summarized. Cl measures of

significance, including active and passive measures, are Iisted. Any item
not properly reported in any other paragraph also may be included.

2. ENEMY PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT LOSSES.

a. PERSONNEL. List in separate categories confirmed KI A (body

count) , estimated KIA, estimated wounded in act on (WIA), and c a p t u r e d .

b. EQUIPMENT AND MATERIEL. List by number and type the enemv

,
equipment and materiel losses during the period. Include damaged enemy
equipment separately.

3. NEW OBSTACLES AND BARRIERS. List those identified during the period
by type and location.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITIES. Summarize enemy activities pertaining to

personnel replacements, supply buildup, or other unusual logistic activity
but not information or intelligence reported elsewhere in the INTSUM.

5. NEW IDENTIFICATIONS.

a. UNITS. List new units identified during the period. I nc I ude

location, date and time (Zulu), and unit making the identification.

b. PERSONALITIES. List significant individuals identified during the

period by name, rank or title, and organization.

6. ENEMY MOVEMENTS. Summarize significant enemy movements by type,

activity, location, and unit designation, if known.

7. ESTIMATED NUMBER AND TYPES OF VEHICLES, SHIPS, AIRCRAFT. Summarize by

type the estimated number of vehicles, ships, and aircraft available to
the enemy.

8 . WEATHER AND TERRAIN CONDITIONS. A summary of the weather and terrain

conditions during the period that would have an effect on subsequent
operations.

Figure A-12. Intelligence summary for joint service operations (continued).

A-47
9. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF GAPABILITIES AND VULNERABILITIES. (Always
included.) State courses of action which the enemy most probably will
adopt.

NOTE : Paragraphs and subparagraphs for which no information has been

obtained are omitted in the preparation of the INTSUM. E a c h t o p i c
reported upon retains the numerical (and letter) designation outl ined
above.

Figure A-12. Intelligence summary for joint service operations (continued).

PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT

The PERINTREP is a summary of the intelligence situation covering a

longer period than the INTSUM. It is a means of disseminating detailed
information and intelIigence. Other intelligence documents Iike technical
intelligence summaries, EPW interrogation reports, translations of captured
documents, and weather and climate summaries are disseminated as appendixes
to the PERINTREP. The PERINTREP is concise--but complete--and makes
maximum use of sketches, overlays, marked maps, and annexes.

Although not normally prepared by intelligence officers at division

a n d l o w e r l e v e l s , PERINTREPs provide detailed information and intelligence.
T h e r e f o r e , intelIigence officers at these levels should be familiar with
the format and content of PERINTREPs.

The PERINTREP is normally published every 24 hours. The beginning and

end of the period is selected to permit dissemination of the PERINTREP in
time for its use in daily planning. It is disseminated by the most
suitable means consistent with its volume and urgency. Figure A-13 shows
the PERINTREP format.

The Supplementary Intelligence Report (SUPINTREP) is a comprehensive

analysis of one or more specific subjects. This report is formatted like a
PERINTREP and usually contains selected intelligence data collected over an
extended period of time. It includes additional details on items contained
in other reports. The report is disseminated based on the intell igence
contained in the report and the desires of the commander. It
is normalIy produced as the result of a request or in support of a
particular operation.

A-48
 (Classification)

copy No
Unit
Location
Date-time group
Message reference number

PERINTREP NO
Period Covered: (date and time to date and time).
References: Maps or charts.
Disposal instructions: (if any).

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION. This paragraph contains a brief summary of

enemy operations during the period. Amplifying details are furnished in
the paragraphs that follow and in appropriate annexes, or both. This
paragraph provides brief highlights of the anemy situation and the
s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e e n e m y ’ s m a j o r a c t i v i t i e s , to include marked changes in
morale, strengths, dispositions, tactics, combat effectiveness, and
equipment. Data that is langthy or can conveniently be shown graphically
are presented in annexes.

2. ENEMY ACTIVITIES. This paragraph, in conjunction with those following,

providas the details of the situation summarized in paragraph 1. Detailed
intelIigence provided in this paragraph covers alI operational activities.
Information may be presented graphically by overlays, printed maps, sketch
maps, and annexes. Subparagraphs are omitted when appropriate intelligence
is not available or is adequately covered by othar portions of this report,

a. Ground. (Primarily includes activities of combat arms, raserves,

and reinforcements; a l s o i n c l u d e s e n e m y d e f e n s a s , m i n e f i e l d ,
f o r t i f i c a t i o n s , b a r r i e r s , obstacles, and other defensive works.)

b. Air. ( I n c l u d e s A i r F o r c e a c t i v i t i e s , such as bombing, close air

support, tactical aerial reconnaissance, air surveillance, and
air-supported operations.)

c. Airborne.

d. Irregular.

e. NBC operations.

f. EW.

(Classification)

Figure A-13. Sample format for a periodic intelligence report.

A-49
 g. O t h e r . (Normally includes other than combat arms; includes
appropriate comments not covered in other subparagraphs on reserves,
r e i n f o r c e m e n t s , new tactics, weapons and equipment, administrative
installations, combat service support, and technical intelligence.)

3. ORDER OF BATTLE, Frequently, this paragraph will consist only of

references to the enemy SITMAP (or overlay) and to the OB annex, which is
developed using the format shown below. When desired by the commander,
p a r t i c u l a r l y s i g n i f i c a n t 0 6 c h a n g e s m a y be summarized in addition to being
discussed in detail in the 06 annex.

a. Composition and Disposition.

b. Strength. (Personnel and major weapons and items of equipment.)

(1) Losses.

(2) Current strength.

c. Tactics,

d. Training.

e. Css .

f. Combat Effectiveness.

g. Miscellaneous Data.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. This paragraph, o r p a r t s t h e r e o f , s h o u l d b e

issued as an annex if a limited distribution is required.

a. General. (A short summary of the Cl situation during the period.)

b. Espionage.

c. Sabotage.

d. Subversion.

e. Communication and Noncommunication Security.

f. MiscelIaneous.

5 . WEATHER. This paragraph gives a summary of the effect of weather on

operations during the period.

(Classification)

Figure A-13. Sample format for a period intelligence report (continued).

A-50
 (Classification)

6. TERRAIN. Use an annex, special maps, and overlays, when possible.

Include impact on future operations, if appropriate.

7. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION. This paragraph lists and discusses briefly

enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities. The conclusions present the
commander’s assessment of the most probable courses of action available to
the enemy, probability of their adoption, and vulnerabilities that are
exploitable by own, higher, or lower levels of command.

a. Enemy Capabilities.

b. Enemy Vulnerabilities.

c. Conclusions.

Authentication:

Annexes: (Any intelligence document may be distributed as an annex to a

PERINTREP. Although annexes are a means of distributing detailed
intelIigence and information, care is exercised to avoid unnecessary bulk
and duplication.)

DISTRIBUTION:
..

(Classification)

Figure A-13. Sample format for a periodic intelligence report (continued).

PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

The periodic intelligence summary (PERINTSUM) is a detailed hard copy

summary of the intelIigence situation covering a period of time specified
by the force commander (normally 24 hours or more). The PERINTSUM is a
means of disseminating concise and complete detailed information and
intelIigence and makes maximum use of sketches, overlays, annotated maps,
and annexes. Normally, this report is prepared at corps level and higher.
It is disseminated two echelons higher, two echelons lower, and to
adjacent units; however, subordinate units also may be tasked to prepare a
PERINTSUM. Figure A-14 shows a JCS message format for the PERINTSUM,
structured to faciIitate updating the intelligence estimate.

A-51
HEAD I NG

PRECEDENCE

ORIGINATING AGENCY

ACTION ADDRESSEES

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES

SECURI TY CLASSIFICATION, CODE WORD, OR NICKNAME

PERINT SUM (Number) FOR PERIOD ENDING DATE-TIME GROUP-MONTH-YEAR

BODY

1. AREA OF OPERATIONS. State conditions which exist and indicate the

effect of these conditions on enemy capabilities and the assigned
mission. The characteristics of the area are based on the facts and
conclusions of an analysis of the AO, as follows:

a. TOPOGRAPHY. Include information available on observation and

f i e l d s o f f i r e , concealment and cover, o b s t a c l e s , k e y t e r r a i n f e a t u r e s ,
AAs, nuclear fires, biological and chemical agents, and so forth. Graphic
representation may be included, if necessary.

b. HYDROGRAPHY. Include general relief of beaches and beach

approaches, surf conditions, tides and currents, navigational aids,
i d e n t i f y i n g f e a t u r e s , channels, water depths, rocks and shoals, obstacles,
anchorages, beach trafficability, coastline, contiguous islands, and
compartmentation, as each affects operations.

c. CLIMATE AND WEATHER. Discuss weather during the period which will
affect operations.

d. TRANSPORTATION . Include status of beaches, beach airways,

pipelines, and inland waterways. The following should be included:
capacities, surface conditions, bridges, amount and condition of rolling
stock, motor and air transport, barges, freighters, and other inland
waterways craft. Vulnerabilities are reported in as much detail as
possible.

e. ELECTRONICS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Report existing electronic

telecommunications systems and equipment, both military and civil.

f. POLITICS, The extent of civil control of the region, the

amenability of the civilian population to political control, the political
organizations, and the key political figures.

Figure A-14. Sample periodic intelligence summary.

A-52
 g. ECONOMICS. Include only that specific economic information which
may be necessary for conduct of the current operation.

h. SOCIOLOGY. The sociological factors dealing with customs,

characterist its, religions, the minority or dissident groups, and the
allegiance of the population.

i. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. S c i e n t i f i c a n d t e c h n i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n o n

enemy weapons, equipment, and techniques as wel I as the employment of new
capabilities during the course of the operations.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD.

a. GROUND FORCES.

(1) Strength and Dispositions. (By overlay, if possible.)

Summary of enemy units and locations.

(2) Committed Forces. Report those enemy ground units, including

guerrillas, together with their supporting ground fire units which are
within the AO.

(3) Reinforcements. Include the designation and location of

reinforcements which may or may not be employed.

(4) Activity. (Discuss by arm of service.) Include a description

. of alI significant enemy movements which may affect the friendly mission.

(5) Other Order of Battle Factors. Reference may be made to

overlays, enemy SITMAPS, or previously published documents.

(6) New Tactics, Weapons, and Equipment. List new tactics and
equipment which may affect the mission and enemy capabilities.

(7) Nuclear-Capable Artillery and Launchers. Describe the

operational capability to launch missiles by numbers and types of
missiles; guidance systems; ranges; types of warheads; type of launching
s i t e s ( i f f i x e d , w h e t h e r h a r d e n e d o r n o t ) ; and for mobile launchers state
mobility, rate of fire, and readiness.

(8) Nuclear, Biological, and Nuclear Activity. These weapons

should be reported by type, yield, number, method of delivery or
application, and enemy doctrine’ concerning their use.

b. AIR FORCES.

(1) Strength and Dispositions. Summary of enemy units and

locations.

(2) Order of Battle. Summary of opposing forces and other enemy

forces that can affect accomplishment of mission.

Figure A-14. Sample periodic intelligence summary (continued).

A-53
 (3) New Tactics, Weapons, and Equipment. List new tactics,
weapons, and equipment which may affect the mission and enemy
capabilities.

c. NAVAL FORCES (Including amphibious forces).

(1) Strength and Dispositions. Summary of enemy units and

locations.

(2) Order of Battle. Summary of opposing forces and other enemy

forces that can affect accomplishment of mission.

(3) New Tactics, Weapons, and Equipment. List new tactics,

weapons, and equipment which may affect the mission and enemy
capabilities.

d. MISSILE FORCES (Excluding SAMs).

(1) Strength and Dispositions. Summary of enemy units and

locations.

(2) Order of Battle. Summary of opposing forces and other enemy

forces that can affect accomplishment of mission.

(3) New Tactics, Weapons, and Equipment. List new tactics,

weapons, and equipment which may affect the mission and enemy
capabilities.

e. ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSES (including SAM).

(1) Strength and Dispositions. Summary of enemy units and

locations.

(2) Order of Battle. Summary of opposing forces and other enemy

forces that can affect accomplishment of mission.

(3) New Tactics, Weapons, and Equipment. List new tactics,

weapons, and equipment which may affect the mission and enemy
capabilities.

f. AIRBORNE UNITS.

(1) Strength and Dispositions. Summary of enemy units and

locations.

(2) Order of Battle. Summary of opposing forces and other enemy

forces that can affect accomplishment of mission.

Figure A-14. Sample periodic intelligence summary (continued).

A-54
 (3) New Tactics Weapons, and Equipment. List new tactics,
weapons, and equipment which may affect the mission and enemy
capabilities.

3.. ENEMY MILITARY SITUATION.

a. IDENTIFICATION OF COMMITTED GROUND FORCES.

(1) Movement and Locations. Report disposition, location, and

echelon of control of enemy ground forces.

(2) Reinforcements. Report disposition, location, and echelon of

control of enemy ground force reinforcements.

(3) Logistics. Report the following elements of the enemy’s

logistic system: transportation, storage distribution, levels of supply,
critical shortages.

(4) Equipment. Report weapons systems and equipment used by

committed enemy ground forces.

(5) Personalities. Report significant individuals operating for

the enemy ground forces.

(6) Morale. Report any significant breakdown or buildup of enemy

norale.

(7) Personnel and Materiel Losses.

(a) KIA.

1 Body count.

2 Estimates.

(b) WIA (estimated).

(c) Captured.

(d) Materiel losses.

(8) Analysis of Capabilities. Analyze each capability of

e n e m y - c o m m i t t e d g r o u n d f o r c e s , c o n s i d e r i n g all applicable factors in item
3a above.

..
Figure A-14. Sample periodic intelligence summary (continued).

A-55
 b. IDENTIFICATION OF AIR FORCES.

(1) Operational Capability (aircraft and airfields). Report

observed aircraft operational capability, including numbers of aircraft,
fuel status, weapons, and status of the airfield.

(2) Movements and Locations. Report movements and locations of

al I observed a i r c r a f t a n d a i r f i e l d s ,

(3) Materiel and Personnel Losses,

(a) Aircraft.

1 Confirmed destroyed in the air.

2 Confirmed destroyed on the ground,

3 Confirmed damaged in t h e a i r .

4 Confirmed damaged on the ground.

5 Probable destroyed.

6 Probable damaged.

(b) Ground equipment.

1 Destroyed.

2 Damaged.

(c) Personnel.

1 KIA.

a Confirmed.

b Estimated.

2 WIA (estimated).

3 Captured.

(4) Morale. Report any significant breakdown or buildup of enemy

morale.

(5) Electronic Warfare Capability. Report enemy ECM, ECCM, and

ESM capabilities and activities.

Figure A-14. Sample periodic intelligence summary (continued).

A-56
 (6) Nuclear Capability. Report nuclear weapons observed,
i n c l u d i n g t y p e , y i e l d , numbers, method of del ivery, and enemy doctrine
concerning their use.

(7) Analysis of Capabilities. Analyze each capability of enemy

air forces, considering all applicable factors in item 3b above.

c. IDENTIFICATION OF NAVAL FORCES.

(1) Operational Capability. Report observed naval forces’

operational capabiIity, including numbers of ships, operational weapons,
and problems which could affect their successful employment.

(2) Movements and Locations. Report movement and location of all

observed naval forces.

(3) Ships, Materiel, and Personnel Losses.

(a) Ships (identification by name, class, type).

1 Confirmed sunk.

2 Probable sunk.

3 Damaged.

(b) Shore-based equipment and facilities.

1 Destroyed.

2 Damaged.

(c) Personnel .

1 KIA.

a Confirmed.

b Estimated.

2 WIA (estimated).

3 Captured.

(4) Morale. R e p o r t any significant breakdown or buildup of enemy

morale.

(5) Electronic Warfare Capability. Report enemy ECM, ECCM, and

ESM capabilities and activities.

Figure A-14. Sample periodic intelligence summary (continued).

A-57
 ( 6 ) A n a l y s i s o f C a p a b i l i t i e s . Analyze each capability of enemy
naval forces, considering all applicable factors in item 3C a b o v e ,

4. ENEMY UNCONVENTIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE.

a. IDENTIFICATION OF GUERRILLA FORCES. Identify guerrilla forces

being used in friendly areas or areas newly seized from the enemy.

b. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. Discuss psychological warfare, including

enemy methods and facilities observed for the conduct of propaganda, the
susceptibility of the population of the target area, and the major or main
focus of the enemy’s psychological warfare efforts.

5. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

a. SABOTAGE. Report enemy sabotage effects observed, including

information concerning his methods, t a r g e t s , s e n s i t i v e t a r g e t s i n t h e A O ,
and successes or fai lures.

b. ESPIONAGE. Report enemy efforts to collect information by types

of espionage: designation (trained agents) or saturation (mass use of
citizenry) and include methods of pressure, coercion, and enforcing the
saturation-type espionage.

6. CONCLUSIONS. State conclusions derived from item 3 above, and

include, when possible, a concise statement of the effects of each enemy
capability on the accomplishment of the assigned mission. Cite enemy
vulnerabilities, where possible.
—. . . .. ..

RECONNAISSANCE EXPLOITATION REPORT

The RECCEXREP disseminates results obtained from the first rapid

interpretation of imagery and debriefing of the aircrew. The report
addresses those targets requested in the original tasking with each target
addressed separately. The RECCEXREP is submitted as rapidly as possible,
but not later than 45 minutes after engine shutdown. If review of the
imagery results in information contradictory to that in an earl ier
RECCEXREP, the new information is to be reported promptly in another
RECCEXREP. Table A-1 shows an annotated format for the RECCEXREP.

A-58
 Table A-1. Sample reconnassance exploitation report annotated format.

Standard Message Heading Standard Message Heading

RECCEXREP RECCEXREP
Air Reconnaissance Mission
Number: 2/R/501
A. Location identifier: A. PB088195
B. Time on target; time B. 24161OZ
of sighting.
C. Results: C. CAT 06
1. Type: M o t o r r i f l e
and tank.
2. Status: Moving northwest
on road from Rotterode to
Asbach.
3 . A c t i v i t y : 24xT-62, 9xBMP.
4. Defenses: 2xZSU-23-4 moving
with and defending target.
D. Other information D. None.
1. TARWI: 1. TARWI 1234X
2. Imagery confirmed: 2. Yes
E. *Type sensor, exposures: E. Good, large
F. *Percentage of coverage: F. 100 percent.

* To be completed if significant or requested.

NOTE: Target category codes are found in STANAG 3596. Standard

message headings are noted in AR 105-31. The RECCEXREP replaces
the hot (high priority) photographic report (HOTPHOTOREP) and
mission report (MISREP) (except that the MISREP is used for
negative mission results) in USAREUR. It may soon be accepted
for use by US forces worldwide.

INITIAL AND SUPPLEMENTAL PROGRAMMED INTERPRETATION REPORT

The initial programed interpretation report (IPIR) and the

supplemental programmed interpretation report (SUPIR) are used to report
intelIigence obtained from imagery which has not been reported through
previous reports. The format for both reports is the same and should be
used to report data acquired from a systematic review of imagery or to
report more detailed information than is provided in other reports. These
reports are prepared in either manual or ADP formats.

The IPIR is no t completed on all missions and must be requested. It

is disseminated w thin four hours of engine shut-down. The IPIR reports
on programed miss on objectives or other vital intelIigence information
which is readily dentified in reasonable proximity to these objectives
and which has not been reported in earlier reports.

A-59
 The SUPIR reports on all significant targets covered by the mission
and not included in other reports or when supplemental information is
required. The SUPIR is completed at higher headquarters only if they
decide it is necessary.

Table A-2 shows the format used for both the IPIR and the SUPIR. This
format also is used for joint service operations.

Table A-2. Initiai and supplemental programmed interpretation reports.

Standard Message Heading Standard Message Heading

IPIR (or SUPIR) IPIR
Air Task or Mission Number: 2/R/501
PART I: Mission highlights: PART I: One new SA-2 site observed
PART II: Significant results: PART II:
A. Perishable items: A. Target 1: CAT 06/PB088195/
241610Z/LOOll-0113
1. Motorized rifle and tanks
2. Moving northwest on
Road Rotterrode-Asbach.
3. 24xT-62, 9xn intelligence annex.
4. Two occupied air warning
(AW) positions approx 200m
west of site.
5. One FAN SONG E radar in
center of site.
6. Six transporters; two van
trucks, four cargo trucks.
B. Change and OB items: B. Air order of battle (AOB)
Target 3: CAT 01/PB4056
241644Z/POO27.
3. Update: AOB: 6 Flagons
21 Fishbed
4 Hook
C. Bonus items: D. (Not used.)
D. Damage assessment: E. (Not used.)
PART III: Other results: P A R T I l l : (Not used.)
A. Additional items: A. NTR (nothing to report.)
B. Identification only items: B. NTR
PART IV: Mission collection PART IV:
results:
A. Collector’s objectives A. NTR
satisfied:
B. Collector’s objectives B. CAT 4/PB1437/241653Z/
not satisfied: camera malfunction.

(When issued separately from an O P O R D )

A-60
 INTERROGATION AND TRANSLATION REPORTS

Interrogation reports summarize the results of interrogations of EPW,

civil ian detainees, or refugees, and the translations of summaries of
enemy documents. Information of immediate value is disseminated in spot
reports.

The initial interrogation report serves as a written summary of the

initial interrogation of each prisoner. Figure A-15 shows the format of
this report. Emphasis is placed on completing as much of the tactical
interrogation as possible at the lowest level and supplementing this with
further interrogation at higher echelons. The primary purpose of this
report is to preclude duplication of effort in subsequent interrogations.

The detailed interrogation report is used to record information

obtained in the course of subsequent interrogations of selected
interrogees. Figure A-16 shows its format. A more detailed interrogation
and screening report format is available in FM 34-52.

During joint service operations, interrogation information of

immediate tactical interest (obtained at the brigade or regimental level)
is generally reported in the INTREP. Follow-on interrogation reports, the
i n i t i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n r e p o r t , and the detailed interrogation report
disseminate more complete and comprehensive information. It is essential
that these follow-on reports reference the INTREP where the information
first appeared to ensure that the information contained in these reports
is not used to confirm the preliminary information contained in the
I NTREP .

Joint services use the document translation report to report

information gained through the translation of documents which contain
information of tactical value. Figures A-17 and A-18 show the format and
s a m, p–l e o f a t r a n s l a t i o n r e p o r t . Full or extract translations are
accomplished as the intelligence officer directs. All translations are
prepared in triplicate, unless otherwise directed, and each translation s
conspicuously annotated with the word “Draft.’”

T h e o r i g i n a l o f t h e t r a n s l a t i o n i s a p p e n d e d t o the document when it s

forwarded to the next higher headquarters. Copies o f t h e o r i g i n a l
d o c u m e n t a r e p r o v i d e d t o t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e o f f i c e r s at echelons which
contain translation sections to support their journal entries. The
document translation report format also is used for joint service
operations. Figures A-19 and A-20 show sample screening reports. Figures
A-21 and A-22 show sample tactical interrogation reports. These reports
are used to record information on interrogees.

A-61
 (Classification)

REPORT NO CY NO _ DATE-TIME(Zulu)
(Numbered sequentially)

SOURCE I NTG UNIT

(last name only) (attached to interrogator)

CATEGORY A B C D MAPS USED

(see detailed report) (1 ist sheet name, number, and scale of maps)

LANGUAGE USED

PART I INTELLIGENCE POTENTIAL OF ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR

(rank) (last name, first name) (Ml) (service or serial number)

DOB BIRTHPLACE
(day, mo, yr) (city, county, or country)

NATIONALITY RACE

LANGUAGES UNIT
(list and include (interrogees’ parent unit listed
proficiency) completely to highest headquarters)

CIVILIAN CAREER
(summarize prisoner’s premilitary career)

MILITARY CAREER
(summarize)

ASSESSMENT
(intelligence, experience, cooperation, and reliability of the
i n t e r r o g e e , NOT the information)

SPECIALIST KNOWLEDGE
(knowledge of technical subjects or equipment)

DOCUMENTS
(carried at time of capture; include money or valuables)

EQUIPMENT
(of intelligence interest) (personal equipment or weapons)

PART II - INFORMATION OBTAINED

(sumrnarize)

(Classification)

Figure A-15. Initial interrogation report.

A-62
 (CLASSIFICATION)

INTG TEAM

UNIT
(place and coordinates)

DATE AND TIME

(Zulu)

Detailed Interrogation Report No

(number reports sequentially)

Maps
(list all maps used and indicate sheet name, number, and scale)

PART I

1. RANK NAME SER NO

(last name, first name, Ml)

(interrogees’ parent unit listed completely; for example, 1st

Pit, A company, 103 Recon Bn, 3d Rifle Div)

CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE
(summary of details of capture, including
date and time, location or coordinates, and
capturing unit)

ASSESSMENT
( i n t e l l i g e n c e , e x p e r i e n c e , reliabiIity) (Concise statement
of the interrogator’s assessment of the prisoner--not of
the information acquired)

CATEGORY: A B C D
(circle one to describe prisoner’s intelligence potential, as
indicated) :

A High-level prisoner whose broad and specific knowledge of the war

effort makes interrogation necessary without delay by specialIy
qualified interrogators at the highest level; that is general
officers, scientists, political and intelligence officers, and so
forth.

(CLASSIFICATION)

Figure A-16. Detailed interrgation report.

A-63
 (CLASSIFICATION)
B Prisoner who has enough information about the enemy or any subject of
value to intelligence, in addition to information of tactical value,
to warrant a second interrogation.

c Prisoner with information of immediate tactical value who will not

warrant further interrogation.

D Prisoner of no intelligence value.

DOCU MENTS
(list documents of intelligence value taken from the prisoner)

EQUI PMENT
(list equipment of intelligence value taken from the prisoner)

PART II

2. ORGAN!ZATI ON, STRENGTH, AND DISPOSITION.

a. Organ ization
(summarize the enemy organization as stated by the
p r i s o n e r , including equipment authorized and on hand)

i). Strength
(personnel strength, o f f i c e r a n d e n l i s t e d , a u t h o r i z e d a n d
assigned!

c. Disposition
(location of enemy units known to the prisoner)

3. MISSION
(statement of enemy missions, beginning with the lowest unit)

4. OTHER ENEMY FORCES

(information of enemy forces other than the
prisoner’s own immediate organization; include and
annotate fact and rumor)

5. SUPPLY, LOSSES, REPLACEMENT.

a. supply
(information concerning status of SUPPI ies, known shortages
and deficiencies)

(CLASSIFICATION)

Figure A-16. Detailed interrogation report (continued).

A-64
 (CLASSIFICATION)
b. Losses
(statement of personnel and equipment losses known to
prisoner)

c. Replacements
(number and date received, sufficiency, and so forth)

6. PERSONALITIES
(list by name, rank, organization, duties, and
characteristics)

7. MISCELLANEOUS .

a. Morale

b. Tact i cs
(new or unusual tactics)

c. Obstacles
(location, coordinates, type)

d. Other Information
( o t h e r information of intelIigence value not
covered above)

8. REMARKS

NAME
(of Interrogator)

GRADE

TRANSLATOR
(if used)

Figure A-16 Detailed interrogation report (continued).

A-65
 (CLASSIFICATION)

DATE :
-0:

‘ROM : REPORT NUMBER:

1. CONTROL DATA.

1. DOCUMENT NUMBER,

2. DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: (type of document, o r i g i n a t i n g headquarters,

language, and number of pages),

3. DOCUMENTS ORIGINAL LANGUAGE.

4. DATE AND TIME RECEIVED.

5. DATE AND TIME OF CAPTURE: (date and time (Zulu) and place,
including coordinates; i f o b t a i n e d f r o m a n i n d i v i d u a l , i d e n t i f y ) .

6, PLACE OF CAPTURE.

7. CAPTURING UNIT: (unit initially obtaining document).

8. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE.

9. TRANSLATOR.

10. TYPE OF TRANSLATION: (state whether extract or complete

translation) .

.2 .TEXT OF TRANSLATION (Translation typed in here, using the format of

the document. Use continuation sheets as needed).

(CLASSIFICATION)

Figure A-17. Documen translation report.

A-66
 (CLASSIFICATION)

DATE : 231500ZAug88
TO: G2, X Corps

FROM : Team 1, IPW Section REPORT NUMBER: 08-0356

441st Ml Bn, 23 Div (Armd)
X Corps

PART 1: CONTROL DATA

1. DOCUMENT NUMBER: US-WAIBVC-03093

2. DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: P e r s o n a l l e t t e r , 1 page, handwritten,
mentions a tank factory disguised as a sugar processing plant, and school
teachers and elderly people working in factories.
3. DOCUMENT’S ORIGINAL LANGUAGE: Russ i an
4. DATE AND TIME RECEIVED: 240847ZAug88
5. DATE AND TIME OF CAPTURE: 230923ZAug88
6. PLACE OF CAPTURE: NB640320
7. CAPTURING UNIT: A/1-41/23 AD
8. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE: Found in an abandoned enerny CP,
9. TRANSLATOR: SSG Bennett
10. TYPE OF TRANSLATION: Full

PART 2. TEXT OF TRANSLATION

My dear Serzhen’ka:
.
It has been a long time since I received a letter from you. How are
and where are you? The last time you wrote that fighting was going on
around you all the time, and this worries me a lot. Take care of
yourself. There have been many changes at home. Your mother, despite her
age, had to go to work in the factory. They make tanks there, but the
sign over the entrance says this is a sugar plant. I don’t know why they
do this. At the school where I work, we were also told to go and work at
the same plant. They are going to close the school. Everyone has either
to go to the front or work in the war industry. This is necessary in
order to speed up the victory over the enemy of our country. I would be
more at ease if I knew that you are alive and well. Please write as soon
as you can.

Your KATHY.

(CLASSIFICATION)

Figure A-18. Sample translation report.

A-67
 (CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

1st Brigade IPW Team, 123d Ml
APO New York, New York 09166

IPW TEAM REPORT NUMBER:

SCREENING REPORT

PART I . INFORMATION CONCERNING CAPTIVE:

A. PREVIOUS SCREENING OR INTERROGATION REPORTS (Unit or Report No!

B. CAPTURE INFORMATION:

1. CAPTIVE TAG NUMBER:

2 . CAPTURING UNIT:

3 . DATE-TIME OF CAPTURE:

4 . PLACE OF CAPTURE:

5. Documents Captured (Disposition):

6 . Equipment Captured (Disposition):

7. Circumstances of Capture:

c. BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

1. Full Name, Rank, Service Number:

2. Date, Place of Birth:

3. Sex, Marital Status, Religion:

4. Full Unit Designation or Unit Code:

(CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS

Figure A-19. Sample blank screening report.

A-68
 (CLASSIFICATION;
WORKING PAPERS

5. Duty Position:

6 . Military Education and Experience:

7. Civilian Education and Experience:

8 . Languages Spoken (Proficiency) :

D.

.! .
Physical Condition of Captive:

‘7
.-. Uniform, !nsignia (type and condition):

3 . Assessment of Attitude and Behavior:

4 . Assessment of Knowledgeability:

PARTII. SCREENING RECOMMENDAT!ONS

A. SCREENER’S RECOMMENDATIONS:

1 Screener’s and Interpreter’s Names:

2 . Place of Screening:

3. Screening Code:

9. SENIOR INTERROGATOR’S RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. . Senior interrogator’s Name:

2. Interrogate:

3. A c t i o n :

(CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS

Figure A-19. Sample blank screening report (continued).

A-69
 (CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Ist Brigade IPW Team, 123d Ml
APO New York, New York 09166

IPW TEAM REPORT NUMBER: 007 DATE-TIME: 181530 AUG 99

SCREENING REPORT

PART I . INFORMATION CONCERNING CAPTIVE:

A. PREVIOUS SCREENING OR INTERROGATION REPORTS (Unit or Report No)

3. CAPTURE INFORMATION:

1. CAPTIVE TAG NUMBER: P-4A

2. CAPTURING UNIT: C Trp, Ist Sqdn, 8 ACR

3. DATE-TIME OF CAPTURE: 181300 AUG 99

4. PLACE OF CAPTURE: NB621108

5. Documents Captured (Disposition): lx ID card no 1350412 (retained

by EPW); lx personal letter (evac with EPW); lx map section (evac
with EPW).

6. Equipment Captured (Disposition): lx ShM protective mask (retained

by EPW); lx standard web gear, l x i n d i v i d u a l f i r s t a i d k i t ( b o t h
destroyed in place). lx 5.45rnn AK-74 w/4x mag (129x rds)
(evacuated through supply channels).

7. Circumstances of Capture: Surrendered to US Patrol

C. BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

1. Full Name, Rank, Service Number: Boris Petrovich BARONOV, JrSGT,

No 0951046

2. Date, Place of Birth: 16 JAN 78, BRYANSK, BySSR, USSR

3. Sex, Marital Status, Religion: Male, Single, None

(CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS

Figure A-20. Sample completed screening report.

A-70
 (CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS

4. Full Unit Designation or Unit Code: Would Not Answer (WNA);

QKN-854

5. Duty Position: WNA

6. Military Education and Experience: WNA

7. Civil ian Education and Experience: 10 yrs compulsory civil an

education

8. Languages Spoken (Proficiency): Ukrainian (N) , Russian (FL

D. OBSERVATIONS

1. Physical Condition of Captive: Good

2. Uniform, Insignia (type and condition): Standard Soviet uniform,

with JrSgt rank tabs and MR insignia, dirty and torn.

3. Assessment of Attitude and Behavior: Calm, cooperative.

4. Assessment of Knowledgeability: UNK

PART Il. SCREENING RECOMMENDATIONS

A. SCREENER’S RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Screener’s and Interpreter’s Names: SSG BROWN, None

2. Place of Screening: IPW See, 123d Ml Bn Ml, 23d Inf Div (Mech

3. Screening Code: A-2

B. SENIOR INTERROGATOR’S RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Senior Interrogator’s Name: MSG MOSCHETTI

2. Interrogate: YES

3. Action: None

(CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS

Figure A-20. Sample completed screening report (continued).

A-71
Figure A-21. Sample blank tactical interrogation report.

A-72
 (CLASSIFICATION)
Working Papers Date

D. DOCUMENTS CARRIED AT TIME OF CAPTUJRE:

1. . List of documents:

-’l
L . Details of money and valuables:

E. EQUIPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE INTEREST CARRIED AT TIME OF CAPTURE:

1. Personal Equipment:

2. Weapons:

PART II - INFORMATION OBTAINED

A. SUMMARY:

DOI is Time of Capture (TOC) unless otherwise indicated in the

body of this report.

B. TEXT:

i. MISSIONS

a. EPW (or) EPW and

(i) TOC:

(2) Fut:

(3) Past:

b. Unit:

(1) Pres:

(2) Fut:

(3) Past:

(CLASSIFICATION)
Working Papers

Figure A-21. Sample blank tactical interrogation report (continued).

A-73
 (CLASSIFICATION)
Working Papers Date

c. Unit:

(1) Pres:

(2) Fut:

(3) Past:

2. COMPOSITION:

a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

3. STRENGTH:

a. Personnel :
.
(1)

(2)

(3)

b. Weapons and Equipment:

(1) individual Weapons:

(a)

(b)

(2) Crew-served Weapons:

(a)

(b)

(CLASSIFICATION)
Working Papers

Figure A-21. Sample blank tactical interrogation report (continued).

A-74
 (CLASSIFICATION)
Working Papers Date

(CLASSIFICATION)
I Working Papers

Figure A-21. Sample blank tactical interrogation report (continued).

A-75
 (CLASSIFICATION)
Working Papers Date

4. DISPOSITIONS

a, Activity, FUD, 6 digit grid coordinate, physical description,

coIlocated units: , scty measures: : DOI.

b.

5. TACTICS:

a. Offensive:

b. Defensive:

c. Special Operations:

6 TRAINING:

a. Individual:

b. Unit:

c. Specialized:

7 COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS:

a. Losses:

(1) Personnel :

(2) Equipment:

b) Replacements:

(1) Personne!:

(2) Equipment:

c Reinforcements:

(1) Personnel:

(2) Equipment:

(CLASSIFICATION)
Working Papers

Figure A-21. Sample blank tactical interrogation report (continued).

A-76
 (CLASSIFICATION)
Working Papers Date

d. Combat Experience:

e. Morale:

8. LOGISTICS:

a. Weapons and Ammunition:

(1) Weapons:

(2) Ammunition:

b. Vehicles and POL:

(1) Vehicles:

(2) POL:

c. Food and Water:

(1) Food:

(2) Water :

d. Communications Equipment:

e. Medical:

(1) Individual Equipment:

(2) Vehicular Equipment:

(3) Personnel:

(4) Facilities:

(5) Evacuation Procedures:

f. NBC Equipment:

(1) Individual:

(2) Vehicular:

(CLASSIFICATION)
Working Papers

A-77
 (CLASSIF!CATION)
Working Papers Date

g. Specialized Equipment: (NOTE: If para 3.b. (8) was Unk or None,

D0 NOT write t h i s s u b - p a r a a t a l ! )

3 MISCELLANEOUS :

a. Personal ities:

Last name First name MN/I Rank

b. Code Names and Numbers:

(1) Code Names:

(2) Code Numbers:

c. Radio Frequencies and Call Signs:

(1) Radio Frequencies:

Rad i o Pr imary Alternate

(2) Call Signs:

Unit Primary Alternate

d. Passwords:

ChalIenge: Countersign:

(NOTE: If more than one password is known, use the following chart.!

Unit Challenge Countersign

e. Obstacles:

(1) Enemy:

(2) NATO:

f. PSYOPS :

(1) Enemy:

(2) NATO:

(CLASSIFICATION)’
Working Papers

Figure A-21. Sample blank tactical interrogation report (continued).

A-78
 (CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS

TACTICAL
INTERROGATION REPORT

NAME OF PRISONER: BARANOV INTERROGATOR:

CATEGORY: A (B) C D UNIT OR FORMATION TO WHICH INTG

ATTACHED: IPW See, 123d MI Bn
23d Inf Div (Mech)

INTG SERIAL NO: US-AR-2235-4A MAPS USED: GERMANY, 1 : 5 0 , 0 0 0 ,

EISENACH-HUNFELD, USACGSC 50-242

DTG OF INTG: 181500 AUG 99 LANGUAGE USED: RUSSIAN

INTG REPORT NO: 104 INTERPRETER: NONE

PART I - INTELLIGENCE POTENTIAL OF ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR (EPW)

A. PERSONAL PARTICULARS:

1. Rank, full name, service number, and position:

JrSGT Boris Petrovich BARONOV, No, 0951046, driver

2. Date and place of birth: 16 JAN 78, BRYANSK, BySSR, USSR

3. Nationality: Soviet Ethnic: Ukrainian Religion: None

4. Knowledge of languages and proficiency: Ukrainian (N), Russian

(FL) .

5. Unit, formation or organization: Regt HQ, 61MRR, 56MRD

(HQ, 61MRR, 56MRD)

6. Date-time, place or grid references, capturing unit, and

circumstances of capture: 181300 AUG 99; NB621108; C Trp,
1st Sqdn, 8 ACR; surrendered to US Border Patrol .

B. CAREER :

1. Pre-miIitary: Civilian Education: 10 yrs compulsory. No

vocational training. No civilian job. Paramilitary training:
Standard preinduction training.

(CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS
Figure A-22. Sample completed tactical interrogation report.

A-79
 (CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS

2. Military: 21 months conscripted service. Military schools:

None. Previous job: None. Previous unit: None.

c. ASSESSMENT OF INTELLIGENCE VALUE:

1. Intelligence, experience, cooperation, reliability: Average, 3

y e a r s e x p e r i e n c e , c o o p e r a t i v e , information checked against OB
holdings.

2. Specialist knowledge: None.

3. Discussion of approach techniques: Direction approach failed but

incentive approach was successful .

D. DOCUMENTS CARRIED AT TIME OF CAPTURE:

1. List of documents: lx ID card no 0951046 (retained by EPW), lx

p e r s o n a l l e t t e r ( r e t u r n e d t o E P W ) , lx map section (evac to G-2)

2. Details of money and valuables: None

E. EQUIPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE INTEREST CARRIED AT TIME OF CAPTURE:

1. Personal Equipment: lx standard web gear, l x i n d i v f i r s t a i d k i t

( b o t h d e s t r o y e d i n . p l a c e ) , lx SHM protective mask (retained by
EPW)

2. Weapons: lx 5.45rnn AK-74 assault rifle with 4x full mags

(120xrds) (all evac thru supply channels)

PART II - INFORMATION OBTAINED

A. SUMMARY:

DOI is 181300 AUG 99 unless otherwise indicated in the body of this

report.

B. TEXT :

1. MISSIONS

a. EPW

(CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS
Figure A-22. Sample completed tactical interrogation report (continued).

A-80
 (CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS

(1) TOC : Waiting outside of gasthaus S of Spahl (NB6412) for PO,

61MRR, 56MRD and PO, 1MRB, 61MRR, 56MRD (lMRB, 61MRR, 56MRD)
for over an hour.

(2) FUT : At 181330 AUG 99, was to drive PO, 61MRR, 56MRD and
PO , 1MRB, 61MRR, 56MRD to a U/l unit 61MRR, 56MRD.
(Hearsay: PO, 61MRR, 56MRD. DOI: 181130 AUG 99).

(3) PAST : Left CDP, 61MRR, 56MRD, located SE of Geismar (NB6515)

180800) AUG 99 and drove PO, 61MRR. 56MRD to CP, 1MRB, 61MRR,
56MRD. Waited for PO, 61MRR, 56MRD about 3 hrs and at 181130
AUG 99 drove PO, 61MRR, 56MRD and PO, IMRB, 61, 56MRD to
gasthaus S of Spahl (NB6412). At 172330 AUG 99, left
assembly area, 61MRR, 56MRD and drove CO, 61MRR, 56MRD to CP,
61MRR, 56MRD arriving at 172345 AUG 99.

b. Unit: 61MRR, 56MRD

(1) PRES : Preparing men and equipment to advance W to Nusttal

(NB6010).

(2) FUT : Cross international Border and attack Nusttal (NB6010)

N LT 190530 AUG 99. (Hearsay: PO 61MRR to PO 1MRB, 61MRR;
DOI: 181130 AUG 99).
.
(3)- PAST: Moved into assembly area (exact locatlon unk). 61MRR,
16 AUG 99.

c. Unit: 1MRB, 61MRR, 56MRD

(1) ?RES : UNK

(2) FUT: U/I e!ement MRB to secure road junction somewhere N of

N u s t t a l ( N B 6 0 1 O ) ( e x a c lO C u n k ) . Road junction to be secured
NLT 190430 AUG 99. (Hearsay: PO 1MRB to PO 61MRR; DOI
181130 AUG 99).

(3) PAST : UNK

2. COMPOSITION: (61MRR, 56MRD)

a. 61MRR had one HQ; three MRBs, dsg 1,2,3; one tk bn; one 122mm how
bn; one engr co; one recon co; one supply and svc pit; one med co;
one signal co
(Classification)
WORKING PAPERS
-.
Figure A-22. Sample completed tactical interrogation report (continued).

A-81
 (CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS

b. Each MRB, 61MRR had one HQ; three MRC dsg 1,2,3; one mortar btry;
one commo pit

3. STRENGTH: (HQ, 61MRR, 56MRD)

a. Personnel : (HQ, 61MRR) - HQ, 61MRR had approx 65 pers

(UNK no off and EM)

b. Weapons and Equipment: (HQ, 61MRR)

(1) Individual Weapons: (HQ, 61MRR)

(a) UNK No x 9mm PM pistols (at least one ea off, HQ, 61MRR)

(b) UNK NO X 5.45rrrn A K - 7 4 a s s a u l t r i f l e s ( a t l e a s t o n e e a

UAZ-469 driver, HQ, 61MRR)

(2) Crew-Served Weapons: LINK

(3) Other Weapons: UNK

(4 Armored Vehicles: (HQ, 61MRR) - 2xBTR-70, armament UNK

(HQ, 61MRR)

(5 Other Vehicles: (HQ, 61MRR) - 3xUAZ-469 trk (one ea Regt

driver, HQ, 61MRR)

(6 Communications Equipment: (HQ, 61MRR)

( a ) 3 x R - 1 3 0 t r a n s c e i v e r ( t r a n s ) ( o n e e a U A Z - 4 6 9 , HQ, 61MRR)

(b) 2xR-123 VHF trans (one ea BTR-70, HQ, 61MRR ‘)

(7) NBC Equipment: (HQ, 61MRR)

(a) Individual: (HQ, 61MRR)

((I)) UNK no.xShM prot masks (lx ea lower EM, HQ,

61MRR)

. ((2) UNK no.xShMK prot masks (lx ea off, lx ea NCO,

HQ, 61MRR)

(cLASSIFICATION)
wORKING PAPERS

Figure A-22. Sample completed tactical interrogation report (continued).

A-82
 (cLAsSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS

((3)) UNK no.xOP-l prot clothing (one ea member, HQ,

61MRR)

((4)) UNK no.xlPP indiv decon kits (one ea member, HQ,

61MRR)

(b) Vehicular: (HQ, 61MRR) - 3xDK-4K portable

decontamination sets (one ea UAZ-469 Trk, HQ, 61MRR)

(8) Specialized Equipment: UNK

4. DISPOSITIONS

a. CP, 61MRR, 56MRD Ioc vic NB665139 at intersection of 2xfarm roads

in forest SE of Geismar (NB6515). Collocated units: UNK.
Security measures: UNK no.x perimeter guards (FUD UNK). DOI:
180800 AUG 99.

b. Assembly area, 61MRR, 56MRD Ioc vic NB696163 (center of mass, and
measures lkm N to S and E to W) SW of Kranlucken (NB7017).
Collocated units: None. Scty measures: UNK No x perimeter
guards (FUD UNK). DOI: 172330 AUG 99.

c. CP, 1MRB, 61MRR, F6MRD Ioc vic NB666156 at intersection of 2x farm

roads E of Geismar (NB6515). Collocated units: None. Security
measures: UNK. DOI: 181130 AUG 99.

d. DEPL, tk co (FUD UNK) l OC vic from NB631104 to NB626104, along

farm road S of Reinhards (NB621O). Tanks engines were running
and were facing S. Collocate units and security measures: UNK.
cot: 181245 AUG 99

5. TACTICS: UNK

6. TRAINING: (61MRR, 56MRD)

a. I n d i v i d u a l : (HQ, 61MRR) - The 3x regt drivers have been practicing

OPSEC (silence and no lights) while driving.

b. Unit: (61 MRR) - Extensive political training in the 61MRR for

the last month. (Hearsay: PO, 61MRR to PO, 1MRB, 61MRR. DOI:
181130 AUG 99.)

c. Specialized: UNK

(CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS

Flgure A-22 Sample completed tactical interrogation report (continued).

A-83
 (CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS

7. COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: (61MRR, 56MRD)

a. Losses : (61MRR)

(1) Personnel: (61MRR) - S i n c e a r r i v i n g i n t h e b o r d e r a r e a

on 16 AUG 99, approx 20 training casualties have been evac to
the rear, (Hearsay: PO, 61MRR to PO, 1MRB, 61MRR. Dot:
181130 AUG 99).

(2) Equipment: (61MRR) - None

b. Replacements: (61MRR) None, but there was a replacement center

(FUD UNK) in “some large city”. (Hearsay: PO, 61MRR to PO, 1MRB,
61MRR. DOI: 181130 AUG 99).

c. Reinforcements: UNK

d. Combat Experience: (HQ, 61MRR) - M o s t o f t h e o f f i c e r s i n H Q ,

61MRR have had experience in Afghanistan, but it is always
stressed that they were advisors and not fighters.

e. Morale: (HQ, 61MRR) - O f f i c e r m o r a l e i s r e l a t i v e l y h i g h a s t h e y

enjoy field duty and are anxious to show CO, 61MRR that they are
proficient. Officers sometimes take their frustrations out on
lower EM, causing them to become angry and despondent.

8. LOGISTICS: (HQ, 61MRR, 56MRD)

a. ‘Weapons and Ammunit ion: (HQ, 61MRR)

(1) Weapons: (HQ, 61MRR) - AlI weapons are in good condition

due to recondit ioning in JUL 99 by maint unit (FUD UNK).
There are miscellaneous spare parts stored in each BTR-70.
Hearsay: BTR-70 driver, HQ, 61MRR. DOI: 171400 AUG 99.)

(2 Ammunition: (HQ, 61MRR) - No problems with any ammo. 300xrds

were issued for each AK-74 and 2 full mags (16xrds) for PM
pistol on 171400 AUG 99 at assembly area, 61 MRR U/l officer,
HQ, 61MRR.

b. Vehicles and POL: (HQ, 61MRR)

(CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS
Figure A-22. Sample completed tactical Interrogation report (continued).

A-84
 (CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS
(1) Vehicles: (HQ, 61MRR) - All vehicles are in good condition,
Drivers are constantly working on vehicles. Spare parts are
available from chief of Motor Transport, HQ, 61MRR on an as
needed basis, but all drivers steal parts from each other
occasionalIy. Tool kits are stored in each vehicle.

(2 POL: (HQ, 61MRR) - All vehicles were refueled at assembly

area, 61MRR 17 AUG 99, Additional fuel will be obtained ‘
from U/l tanker trucks, 61MRR after reaching Nusttal
(NB601O) (Hearsay: chief of Motor Transport, HQ, 61MRR.
DOI: 171800 AUG 99.)

c. Food and Water: (HQ, 61MRR)

(1) Food: (HQ, 61MRR) - 9 canned rations were issued to each

member , HQ, 61MRR at assembly area, 61MRR 171700 by chief of
Food Supply, HQ, 61MRR. After reaching NUSTTAL (NB601O),
members wiII be receiving more canned rations. CO and PO,
61MRR keep their canned rations and eat at gasthauses in
Spahl (NB6412).

(2) Water-: (HQ, 61MRR) - U/l Water trailer (FUD UNK) at HQ,
61MRR supplies water as needed.

d. Communications Equipment: (HQ, 61MRR) - All commo equip was in

good condition as it was inspected by technical officer, 61MRR
171600 AUG 99 at assembly area, 61MRR.

e. Medical: (HQ, 61MRR)

(1) Individual Equipment: (HQ, 61MRR) - Each member was issued

lx U/l indiv first aid kit around the first week of AUG
(still sealed).

(2) Vehicular Equipment: (HQ, 61MRR) - Each vehicle had lx U/l

first aid kit.

(3) Personnel: UNK

(4) Facilities: UNK

(5) Evacuation Procedures: UNK

f. NBC Equipment: (HQ, 61MRR) - All NBC equip was in good condition
due to inspection by technical officer, 61MRR first week of
Aug 99.

(CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS

Figure A-22. Sample completed tactical Interrogation report (continued).

A-85
3. MISCELLANEOUS : (61MRR, 56MRD)

a. Personalities: (61MRR)

LAST NAME FIRST NAME MN I RANK PSN FUD

OREKHOV Nikolai MNU COL CO 61MRR

MILENOVICH Svetoslav MNU LTC PO 61 MRR
GABOVICH Vladimir MNU MAJ TO 61 MRR

b. Code Names and Numbers: (61MRR)

(1) Code Name: (61MRR) - NOVY GOD

(2) Code Number: (61MRR) - QKN-854

cm Radio Frequencies and Call Signs: (61MRR)

(1) Radio Frequencies: (61MRR)

RAD 10 PR I MARY ALTERNATE

R- 130 1.84 MHz 9.01 MHz

Radio frequencies are in effect 18 AUG 99 and are changed

daily at 2400 hrs IAW 56MRD CEOI.

(2) Call Signs: (61MRR) ..

UNIT PR I MARY ALTERNATE

Regt HQ, 61MRR ZHOLTAYA GORA UNK

PO. 61MRR ZHOLTAYA GORA-2 UNK

Call signs are in effect 18 AUG 99 and are changed daily at

2400 hrs AW 56MRD CEOI.

d. Passwords (61MRR) - Challenge: ZNAMYA Countersign: VPERYOD

Passwords are in effect 18 AUG 99 and are changed daily at
2400 hrs AW 56MRD CEOI.

e. Obstacles UNK

f. PSYOPS : UNK

(CLASSIFICATION)
WORKING PAPERS

Figure A-22. Sample completed tactical interrogation report (continued).

A-86
 BOMBING. SHELLING. AND MORTARING REPORTS

Bombing reports (BOMREPS), shell reports (SHELREP S ), and mortar

bombing reports (MORTREPs) supply information on enemy bombing, shelling,
or mortaring activity. Submission is the responsibility of the affected
unit. Reports are handled as normal messages and are transmitted by the
fastest means available. Each transmission is preceded by the code word
“SHELREP” in the case of enemy artillery, by the code word “MORTREP” in
the case of enemy mortar or rocket fire, and by the code word “BOMREP” in
the case of an enemy air attack. The text of the message is transmitted
in the clear except for the unit identification and position of the
observer. A call sign is used in place of unit identification. The
observer’s position is encoded if it discloses the location of a
headquarters or an important OP. Figure A-23 shows the bombing, shell ing,
and mortaring report format.

A-87
 (CLASSIFICATION)

A. UNIT OF ORIGIN. (use current call sign, address group or code name) .

B. POSITION OF OBSERVER (grid reference preferred--encode if this

discloses the location of a headquarters or important OP, or i f
subparagraph F2, below, is used to give information on location).

c. DIRECT}ON AND ANGLE OF FALL OR DESCENT. (direction and bearing of

flash, sound, or groove of shelI (state which) is measured clockwise from
grId north in mils, unless otherwise specified, The angle of fall or
descent may be determined by placing a stick or rod in the fuze tunnel and
measuring in roils, Unless otherwise specified, the angle formed by the
stick or rod in relation to the horizontal plane).

D- . TIME FROM.

E. TIME TO.

F. AREA BOMBED, SHELLED, ROCKETED, OR MORTARED. (may be sent either as--

1.Grid reference (clear reference is to be used).

OR
2. Direction measures clockwise from grid north to impact points
(degrees or rnils - - s t a t e w h i c h ) a n d d i s t a n c e i n y a r d s o r m e t e r s ( s t a t e
which) from observer. This information must be encoded. When this method
is used, maximum possible accuracy is essential) .
.
G. NUMBER AND NATURE OF GUNS, MORTARS, ROCKET LAUNCHERS, AIRCRAFT, OR
OTHER METHODS OF DELIVERY.

H. NATURE OF FIRE. (adjustment, bombardment, harassing) (may be omitted

for aircraft) .

1. NUMBER, TYPE AND CALIBER. (state whether measured or assumed) of

s h e l l s , rockets (or missi!es) , and bombs.

J. TIME FROM FLASH TO BANG. (omit for aircraft).

F. DAMAGE . (encode if required).

NOTE : JCS Publication 12, page 14, requires an additional message

i n d i c a t o r item. This item identifies the report being sent as a shell,
bomb, or mortar report. It generally follows the unit of origin item in
the message format.

(CLASSIFICATION)

Figure A-23. Format for BOMREP, SHELREP, or MORTREP reports.

A-88
 NBC ATTACK REPORTS

NBC attack report formats are used according to the provisions of

STANAGS 2103 and 2104 and FM 3-3 to report NBC attacks and the resulting
NBC hazardous areas. Chemical and radiological hazardous areas resulting
from nuclear and chemical attack by friendly forces are also reported
using t h e s e f o r m a t s . T h e s e r e p o r t s a r e - -

o NBC-1. Report used by the observing u n i t t o g i v e i n i t i a l a n d

subsequent data of an enemy chemica , b i o l o g i c a l , o r n u c l e a r
attack.

0 NBC-2. Report used for passing evaluated data of a chemical,

b i o l o g i c a l , or nuclear attack.

0 NBC-3. Report used for immediate warning of expected NBC

contamination or hazardous area.

0 NBC-4 . Report used for radiation dose-rate measurements and

d e t e c t on of chemical or biological contamination.

0 NBC-5 . Report used to locate the area of NBC contamination or

hazard

0 NBC-6 . R e p o r t u s e d t o d e t a i l i n f o r m a t i o n o n c h e m i c a l o r b i o l o g i c a l
attacks.

NBC-1 and -4 reports are prepared by the unit under attack or a unit
observing an attack. These reports are submitted through cormmand,
i n t e l I i g e n c e , or FA communications channels to the designated headquarters
TOC by the fastest means available. Initial enemy use of NBC weapons is
always reported to the theater commander, through the chain of command, by
the fastest means with a FLASH message precedence.

The information source for nuclear attack reports is normally the

headquarters of an FA or AD unit (other units may also be designated as
collection and reporting agencies). These units submit--

0
An initial NBC-1 nuclear report to the unit’s next higher
headquarters with a FLASH message precedence.

0
Subsequent NBC-1 nuclear reports, which are transmitted to the
unit’s next higher headquarters, with an IMMEDIATE message
precedence, giving follow-up data.

The information source for chemical and biological attack reports is

normally the headquarters of a company or independent platoon. It
submits--

A-89
 0
An initial NBC-1 chemical or biological report, to its next higher
headquarters, with a FLASH message precedence. The next higher
headquarters forwards the initial NBC-1 chemical or biological
report through command channels, to the NBC coIIection center, with
the same message precedence.

0
Subsequent NBC-1 chemical or biological reports, to the unit’s
next higher headquarters, with an IMMEDIATE message precedence,
giving follow-up data. The next higher headquarters forwards
subsequent NBC-1 chemical or biological reports through command
channels, to the NBC collection center, with the same message
precedence.

NBC COLLECTION CENTER

The NBC collection center is normally the nuclear, biological, and

chemical element (NBCE) of the TOC at division. It consolidates NBC-1
n u c l e a r , b i o l o g i c a l , or chemical reports of the same attack received from
its various information sources and transmits an NBC-1 report to the NBC
c o n t r o l c e n t e r , normalIy the TOC at field army headquarters. It transmits
appropriate NBC-2, - 3 , a n d - 5 r e p o r t s t o s u b o r d i n a t e , a d j a c e n t , a n d h i g h e r
commands. If there is no NBCE, the G3 assumes these responsibilities.

NBC CONTROL CENTER

The NBC control center is normally the NBCE of the tactical operations
center at field army. It consolidates and evaluates NBC reports received
from subordinate commands and USAF, Marine Corps, and civilian
instalIations and agencies. It directs reconnaissance and survey efforts;
transmits evaluated NBC data to subordinate commands and adjacent area
commands; and submits appropriate reports to higher headquarters, adjacent
commands, and national agencies. If there is no NBCE, the G3 assumes
these responsibilities.
NBC-1 REPORTS
NBC-1 reports follow the same format as SHELLREPs, MORTREPS, and
BOMBREPs. The words “Type of Report,” and the letters “B,” “’D,” “’H,” or
either “C or “F" always are reported. Other items are optional. Tab I e
A-3 shows the letter explanation for NBC-1 reports. Table A-21 shows the
master Iist of available letters.

A-90
A-91
Table A-4. Initial nuclear report example.

(CLASSIFICATION)

(CLASSIFICATION)

Table A-5. Initial chemical report example.

(CLASSIFICATION)

A-92
Table A-6. Subsequent NBC-1 nuclear report example.

(CLASSIFICATION)

(CLASSIFICATION)

Table A-7. Subsequent NBC-l chemical report example.

(CLASSIFICATION) ..

(CLASSIFICATION)

A-93
 NBC-2 REPORTS

NBC-2 reports are used for passing evaluated data of an NBC attack.
They are normally based on two or more NBC-1 reports and include an attack
location and in the case of a nuclear detonation, an evaluated yield.
Tables A-8 and A-9 show examples of NBC-2 (nuclear) and NBC-2 (chemical)
report messages.

Table A-8. NBC-2 nuclear report example.

(CLASSIFICATION)

(CLASSIFICATION)

(CLASSIFICATION)

NBC-2 reports include the attack time, location, and, in the case of a
nuclear detonation, an evaluated yield. Letters “A,’” “D,”’ “F,” “H,” and
“N”” are repeated as often as necessary to produce a summary report. Other
letters may be added; however, the letters mentioned must be included in
the report. Table A-10 shows the letter explanation for NBC-2 reports.

A-94
 Table A-10. Letter explanation for NBC-2 report.
LETTER MEAN I NG EXAMPLE EXAMPLE
NUCLEAR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL

Precedence
Date-time (local or Zulu
t i m e , state which)
Security Classification
From
To
Type of Report NBC-2 (NUCLEAR) NBC-2 (CHEMICAL)

A. Strike serial number 24 i

D. Date-time of detonation 201405 Z U l U 200945 (local)

or date-time attack
started (local or Zulu
time, state which).

F. Location of attack (UTM LB 187486 LB 126456 actual

or place) or area actuaI
attacked (actual or
e s t i m a t e d , state which) .

G. Means of delivery, if known.

H. Type of burst--air, surface, Surface Nerve

or unknown (state which)--
including height, if known;
type of agent, if known;
(chemical or biological);
or type of attack (chemical
or biological).

N. Estimated yield (kt). 50

A-95
 NBC-3 REPORTS

NBC-3 reports provide irrmediate warning of expected NBC contamination

or hazardous areas. Tables A-11 and A-12 show examples of NBC-3

(chemical) and NBC-3 (nuclear) messages.

TableA-Il. NBC-3 nuclear report example.

(CLASSIFICATION)

(CLASSIFICATION)

Table A-12. NBC-3 chemical report example.

(CLASSIFICATION)

(CLASSIFICATION)

A-96
 Table A-13 explains the letters in the NBC-3 nuclear and chemical
report examples, Other letters from the master list, are added at the
users’ discretion.

NOTE: When the effective windspeed is less than 8 kph, the NBC-3 report
consists of the letters “D,’” “F,’ and “Z.” “Z” contains three digits
only, (the radial distance of zone l).

Table A-13. Letter explanation for NBC-3 reports.

A-97
 NBC-4 REPORTS

NBC-4 reports are used to transmit radiation dose-rate measurements.

Tables A-14 and A-15 show examples of NBC-4 radiation dose-rate messages.

TabIe A-14. NBC-4 report example 1.

(CLASSIFICATION)

(CLASSIFICATION)

Table A-15. NBC-4 report exampIe 2.

(CLASSIFICATION)

(CLASSIFICATION)

A-98
 Table A-16 explains the items in the examples for NBC-4 nuclear and
chemical report formats. The letters “Q,”’ “R,” and “S” are repeated as
often as necessary. Users of NBC-4 reports are not confined solely to the
use of the letters shown in the examples; other letters from the master
list, (see table A-21), are added at the users’ discretion.
NOTE: Radiation dose-rates are measured in the open, one meter above the
ground. Other conditions are specified in the message as part of line
ROMEO .

Table A-16. ExpIanation of letters for NBC reports.

LETTER MEAN I NG EXAMPLE

Precedence
Date-time (local or Zulu time, state
which)
Security Classification
From
To
Type of Report NBC-4 (NUCLEAR)

Q. Location of reading (UTM) Q. LB 123987

R. Dose-rate (cGy/hr)
(this is NOT normalized
to H + 1 hour). The words
“ i n i t i a l , ’ ” ‘ increasing, ”
“peak,”’ or “decreasing,”
may be added (correlation
factor information is
included if shielded dose-
rate readings are reported).

s. Date-time of reading S. 201735 (local)

(local or Zulu, state which) Q. LB 129965
R. 60
S. 201650 (local)
Q. LB 146808
R. 27 INCREASING
S. 201710 (local)

A-99
 NBC-5 REPORTS
N B C - 5 r e p o r t s i d e n t i f y t h e area of contamination or hazard. Tab I es
A-17 and A-18 show examples of an NBC-5 report messages.

Table A-17. NBC-5 nuclear report example.

(CLASSIFICATION)

WHISKEY NOVEMBER DELTA

(CLASSIFICATION)

Table A-18. NBC-5 chemical report example.

(CLASSIFICATION)

A-1OO
 The NBC-5 report is most useful when sent as a map trace or overlay
( i f t i m e a n d d i s t a n c e p e r m i t ) . When the contamination arises from a
single threat or unidentified nuclear burst, the dose-rate always refers
to H+1 hour, and the letter “’T” is used. When there have been several
nuclear detonations at different times or on different days and no single
H+1 hour is possible, the dose rates are reported as a specified item
using the letter “’O.” Letters “O” and “T” are, therefore, alternatives;
both cannot be used in the same report. Table A-19 explains the letter
designations used in NBC-5 reports.
NOTE : When requested decay rates are to be transmitted, use the letter
“R. “

Table A-19. Letter explanation for NBC-5 reports.

LETTER EXAMPLE EXAMPLE

NUCLEAR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL

Precedence
Date-time (local or
Zulu time, state
w h i c h )
Security Classification
From
To
Type of Report NBC-5 (NUCLEAR) NBC-5 (CHEMICAL and
BIOLOGICAL)

A. Strike serial A. 24 A. 1
numbers causing
contamination
(if known)

o. Reference date-time
for estimated contours
(see note (2) above)
when not H+1 hour

s. Date-time contamination S. 200800 (local)

initially detected
(chemical or biological
(local or Zulu time,
state which)

A-101
 Table A-19. Letter explanation for NBC-5 reports (continued).

T. H+1 date-time or T. 201505 ZULU T. 201045 (local)

date-time of latest
reconnaissance of
contamination in the
area (chemical or
biological). State
whether local or Zulu time.

u. 1,000 cGy/hr
contour I ine coordinates

v. 300 cGy/hr contour V. ND 651455

Iine coordinates ND 810510
ND 821459
ND 651455

w. 100 cGy/hr contour W. ND 604718

Iine coordinates ND 991686
ND 114420
ND 595007

. x. 20 cGy/hr contour X. CHEMICAL

line coordinates, ND 206991
or located area of ND 201575
contaminant ion ND 200787
(chemical or biological) ND 206991

Figure A-24 shows a current example of the estimated radiological

contamination trace (dose-rate type) format. It is not necessary, or even
desirable, to report all four of the contours for different dose rates.
Four are given to provide flexibility. (In the example, only two are
reported.) When a contour closes to form a complete ring, the first
coordinate is reported at the end. The following are colors used for
plotting and sending the report as a trace:

0
Red for 1 ,000 cGy/hr.

0
Green for 300 cGy/hr.

0
Blue for 100 cGy/hr.

0
Black for 20 cGy/hr,

A-102
Yellow is used for chemical and biological contamination or hazardous
a r e a s . A d d i t i o n a l l e t t e r s , including those shown in the examples in Table
A-19, are used. Letters from the master list in Table A-21 are added at
the users’ discretion.

72

Figure A-24. Radiological contamination trace.

A-103
 NBC-6 REPORT

NBC-6 reports are used to summarize information concerning a chemical

or biolog ical attack. Table A-20 shows an NBC-6 biological report.

Table A-20. NBC-6 biological report.

ALFA coo I
DELTA 200430Z
ECHO 200435Z
FOXTROT LBZO0300 to LB208304 Actual
GOLF Aerial spray
HOTEL Toxin
INDIA 2 Aircraft
KILO Rolling hills, mostly open
MIKE Enemy broke contact just before the
a t t a c k , then bypassed on right
f I ank
QUEBEC Soil sample taken at LB200300
YANKEE Downwind direction 270 degrees, wind
speed 015 kph
ZULU BRAVO This is the only biological attack
in our area

The NBC-6 report is a narrative description of chemical and

biological attacks that have occurred in a unit’s AO. It is designed to
be developed at battalion level and above. It contains as much
information as is known about the attacks. It is submitted only when
requested and is usualIy sent in hard copy.

A- 104
 MASTER LIST

Table A-21 shows the master list of letters that is applicable to

all types of NBC reports. Each letter is annotated. Care should be taken
to ensure that letters mandatory for each NBC report are incorporated
before adding letters to the reports, overlays, or traces.

Table A-21. Master list of letters.

LETTER MEANING MEANING

NUCLEAR REPORTS CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL REPORTS

A. Strike serial number(s). Strike serial number(s).

B. Position of observer (UTM or position of observer (UTM) or
place) . place) .
c. Direction measured clockwise Direction measured clockwise from
from grid or magnetic north grid or magnetic north (state
(state which) of the attack which) of the attack from
from observer (degrees or observer (degrees or roils, state
roils, state which). which) .
D. Date-time of detonation (local Date-time attack started (!ocal
or Zulu time, state which) . or Zulu time, state which). If
If local time is used, give local time is used, give the
the letter of the local time letter of the local time zone,
zone, i f -known. See if known. See FM 101-10-1 for
FM 101-10-1 for time-zone charts. time-zone charts. If the
If the local time is used and local time is used and the
the time-zone letter is not time-zone letter is not known,
known, t h e w o r d “ l o c a l ” w i l l the word ‘“local, ” will be
be transmitted with this transmitted with this item.
i tern.
E. Illumination time. (Report Time attack ended (local or Zulu,
only when other data are not state which).
available. Report in
seconds.)
F. Location of attack (UTM or Area attacked (actual or
place) (actual or estimated, estimated, s t a t e w h i c h ) .
state which).
G. Means of delivery, if known. Means of delivery, if known.
H. Type of burst--air, surface, Type of agent, if known (chemical
or unknown, s t a t e w h i c h - - or biological). Type of attack
including height, if known. (chemical or biological).
1. (This letter item is not used Type and number of munitions or
for nuclear report.) aircraft (state which).
J. Flash-to-bang time (seconds).
K. Crater present or absent and
d i a m e t e r , if known (meters) .

A-105
 Table A-21. Master list of letters (continued).
LETTER MEAN I NG MEAN I NG

NUCLEAR REPORTS CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL REPORTS

L. Nuclear burst angular cloud

width measured at 5 minutes
after the detonation
(degrees or roils, state which).
(Do not report if data is
obtained more than 5 minutes
after the detonation.)
M. Stabilized cloud-top angle
and cloud-bottom angle
(state which) or cloud-top
height and cloud-bottom
height (state which)
measured at H+1O minutes
(degrees, roils, meters, or
feet--state which).
N. Estimated yield (kt).
0. Reference date-time for
estimated contours when
not H+l hour.
P. For radar purposes only: Area of expected contamination
P.A. UTM coordinates of points (UTM) .
to outline external
contours of radioactive
clouds.
P.B. Effective wind direction
(direction from which the
wind is blowing) in
degrees or roils (state
which) .
Q. Location of reading (UTM).
R. D o s e - r a t e ( c G y / h r ) . The
words “ i n i t i a l , ”
“ increasing,”’ “peak.”
or “decreasing” may
be added.
s. Date-time of reading (local or Date-time contamination initially
Zulu time, state which). detected (local or Zulu time,
state which).
T. H+l date-time (local or Zulu Date-time of latest reconnaissance
time, state which). of contamination in the area
(local or Zulu time, state which).
u. 1,000 cGy/hr contour line
coordinates (UTM) (red).
v. 300 cGy/hr contour line
coordinates (UTM) (green).

A- 106
 Table A-21. Master list of letters (continued).

LETTER MEAN I NG MEAN I NG

NUCLEAR REPORTS CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL REPORTS

w. 100 cGy/hr contour line

coordinates (UTM) (blue).
x. 20 cGy/hr contour line Located area of contamination (UTM)
coordinates (UTM) (black). (yellow).
Y. Direction measured clockwise
from grid north to the left
and then to the right radial
lines (degrees or roils, state
which--4 digits each).
z. Effective windspeed (kph), 3
digits; downwind distance of
zone I (km), 3 digits; cloud
radius (km), 2 digits. (When
effective windspeed is less
than 8 kph, the NBC-3 report
will contain only three
significant digits, that is,
the radial distance of zone l.)

A-107
 ANALYSIS OF AREA OF OPERATIONS

Figure A-25 shows a completed sample and explanation of analysis of

the area of operations. The following paragraphs are keyed to paragraphs
in the sample.

1. PURPOSE AND LIMITING CONSIDERATIONS. State the purpose of the

analysis and define the area that is being analyzed. Include a statement
of the mission of the command and other considerations that Iimit the
applicability of the analysis. Include the commander’s plan of action and
enemy capabiIities.

2. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE AREA.

a. Climatic or Weather Conditions. This paragraph lists items of

weather information that have miIitary significance. Throughout the
remainder of the analysis, weather information is interpreted as to its
operational effects. For example, winds at low temperatures are
interpreted in terms of the wind chiII factor and the resulting effects on
o p e r a t i o n s , such as attack or defense which must face the prevailing
winds, o r t h e u s e o f o p e n o r c l o s e d s t o r a g e f a c i l i t i e s .

Light data is always reported to assist in selecting courses of action

and the conduct of mil itary activities.

The BMNT and the EENT are the beginning and end, respectively, of
enough light for limited visibility. The BMCT and the EECT are the
beginning and end, r e s p e c t i v e l y , o f a d e q u a t e I i g h t f o r l a r g e - s c a l e
operations.

Moon phases and other phenomena, like atmospheric conditions and star
b r i l l i a n c e , also influence night operations. During full moonlight,
conditions of visibility sometimes approach those of daylight. Such
conditions need to be anticipated as they influence friendly and enemy
courses of action such as attacks, p a t r o l l i n g , a n d c h a n g e s i n
dispositions.

b. Terrain.

(1) Relief and Drainage System, Drainage and ridge lines are
b a s i c e l e m e n t s i n s t u d y i n g t e r r a i n , as t h e y c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e t h e g e n e r a l
shape of the ground. A complete study of relief and drainage includes
detailed information about slope, configuration, elevation of ground
forms; and depth, width, tide data, and conditions of banks and bottoms of
streams and rivers. These items are portrayed graphically on maps.

(2) Vegetation. Vegetation studies are best presented in the

f o r m o f t i n t e d , or otherwise marked, overlays. Considerations include
l o c a t i o n s o f t r e e s , d i a m e t e r s o f t r u n k s , density, ground cover or canopy,
undergrowth, and types of natural and cultivated vegetation in nonwooded
areas.

A-108
 (3) Surface Materials. Surface materials are best presented on
colored or marked overlays. Soil maps made by the agricultural services
of various countries are particularly valuable. The information contained
in soil maps frequently is translated into a trafficability map and a map
of areas susceptible to high levels of induced radioactivity. A
trafficability map based on weather forecasts are colored or marked to
indicate degrees of trafficability effectively shows areas suitable for
cross-country movement.

(4) Artificial Features, Artificial features of potential

military significance include roads, railroads, bridges, tunnels, mines,
towns, i n d u s t r i a l a r e a s , a n d f o r t i f i c a t i o n s . The features are best
represented on maps or marked overlays.

c. Additional Characteristics. Only those characteristics--

sociology, politics, economics, transportation, manpower--which influence
the choice of a course of action by either force are included. Lengthy
data is presented in an annex, p r e f e r a b l y i n t a b u l a r f o r m .

3. MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE AREA. The facts listed in paragraph 2 are

analyzed and their influence on tactical and CSS factors that are
considered in the selection of a course of action by either force are
determined. In the analysis of these factors, the effects of and on
n u c l e a r f i r e s , chemical and biological agents, and important devices and
equipment used in implementing courses of action are integrated, as
appropriate. The tactical aspects of observation and fire, concealment
a n d c o v e r , o b s t a c l e s , k e y t e r r a i n f e a t u r e s , A A s , and the CSS aspects are
discussed in the following paragraphs.

a. Tactical Aspects.

(1) Observation and Fire.

(a) Observation depends on condit ons of terrain which

p e r m i t a f o r c e t o l o c a t e t h e e n e m y , e i t h e r v i s u a Iy or through the use of
surveiIlance devices. T h e h i g h e s t t e r r a i n i n a n area usually provides the
best observation. The increased use of equipment with LOS characteristics
requires the availability of suitable terrain features for sighting
purposes; while at same time, t h e c a p a b i l i t y o f e m p l o y i n g o r g a n i c a e r i a l
platforms reduces the requirement to use such terrain. Dust clouds caused
by nuclear blast reduce electronic LOS. Other limits to observation
include darkness and tall vegetation (woods and jungle canopy). The
effects of visibility on observation are analyzed along with weather
conditions.

A-109
 (b) F i r e , as used in the analysis of the battlefield area,
includes the FofFs of all weapons and characteristics of weapons del ivery
systems affected by weather and terrain. For example, gusty surface winds
affect the use of projectiles. High, irregular terrain features or the
absence of overhead mass clearance limit FofFs. A FofF is an area that
weapons can cover effectively with fire from given positions. Although
observation is essential to effective control of fire, the best
observation does not always guarantee the best FofF. An ideal FofF for
flat-trajectory weapons is an open area in which the enemy can both be
seen and has no protection weapons fire.

(2) Concealment and Cover.

(a) Concealment is protection from observation. It is

provided by woods, underbrush, snowdrifts, tall grass, cultivated
vegetation, darkness, smoke, dust, fog, ground haze, rain, or falling
snow.

(b) Cover is protection from the effects of direct and

indirect fires. It is provided by ditches, quarries, caves, riverbanks,
folds in the ground, shell craters, buildings, walls, railroad embankments
and cuts, sunken roads, and highway fills. Defiladed areas which provide
protection against some types of weapons do not necessarily protect
against effects of nuclear fires. Unless the forward slopes of a t e r r a i n
mass are very steep, nuclear blast will affect personnel and material on
the reverse slope because the blast wave follows the configuration of all
but the most rugged terrain. When a nuclear weapon is fired over a deep
val ley, or the valley axis points toward ground zero, the blast effects
are canal ized, increasing the damage. Irregular terrain provides some
cover from thermal radiation of nuclear fires. Few buildings are
sufficiently strong to withstand all effects of blast or, if not damaged
or destroyed by blast, to be unaffected by thermal radiation. Foxholes,
bunkers, a n d t u n n e l - t y p e s h e l t e r s o f f e r t h e s i m p l e s t f o r m s o f e f f e c t i v e
cover.

(c) Concealment and cover are desirable for both the attack
and the defense. If troops move forward under the concealment of woods,
fog, or a moonless night, the chances of achieving surprise are greater.
If troops move protected from the enemy’s fire by ditches, embankments, or
walls, the attack is more effective. In a defensive situation, friendly
forces seek to defend in an area which offers both concealment and cover
but does not provide covered approaches for the enemy.

(d) The mobility of the command is considered in determining

avai Iable concealment and cover. Concealment and cover are desirable
during troop movements by any means. Routes which afford good concealment
and cover reduce the vulnerability of a moving force to detection and to
destruction by fire.

A-11O
 (3) Obstacles.

(a) An obstacle is any natural or artificial terrain feature

which stops, impedes, or diverts miIitary movement. Natural obstacles
include rivers, streams, canals, lakes, swamps, cliffs, steep slopes,
dense woods, j u n g l e s , d e s e r t s , m o u n t a i n s , c i t i e s , a n d c e r t a i n t y p e s o f
unstable soiI . Artificial obstacles are works of construction and
destruction executed to stop or impede military movement. They include
m i n e f i e l d , craters, antitank ditches, trenches, abatises, roadblocks,
d e l i b e r a t e l y f l o o d e d a r e a s , areas contaminated with chemical and
biological agents, extensive rubble, forest fires, trees blown down, and
areas contaminated with residual nuclear radiation.

(b) To be fully effective, obstacles are covered by

observation and fire. However, even undefended obstacles may canal ize an
attacker into concentrations which are easier to detect and which are
suitable for nuclear attack. Obstacles perpendicular to a direction of
attack favor the defender by slowing the enemy, forcing the enemy into
concentrations that tend to occur while crossing obstacles, and holding
the attacker for a longer time under the effective fires of the defense.
Obstacles parallel to an axis of advance give the attacker flank
protection. However, parallel obstacles interfere with lateral movement
and coordination.

(c) The mission of the command influences consideration of

obstacles. In the defense, the intelligence officer identifies as
obstacles those features of the terrain which stop, impede, or divert
military movement into, out of, or within the area encompassed by the
FEBA, lateral boundaries, and the rear boundary (prescribed or assumed).
In the attack, the intelligence officer considers the obstacles from the
line of departure to the objective (both inclusive) bounded laterally by
the ass gned or assumed operational zone.

(4) Key Terrain Features.

( a ) A k e y t e r r a i n f e a t u r e i s a n y l o c a ity or area whose

seizure or control affords a marked advantage to ei her opposing force.
K e y t e r r a i n f e a t u r e s a r e s e l e c t e d t o i n d i c a t e a r e a s and local ities whose
seizure or control are considered in formulating and selecting courses of
action. The selection is based on the level of command, type of unit, and
mission of the command. Key terrain which would give us a marked
advantage in the accomplishment of our mission is selected. If it is
seized or control led by the enemy, it would delay the accomplishment of
our mission. For example, a bridge over an unfoldable river gives access
to the opposite shore without requiring an assault crossing, Control of a
road or raiI center reduces the enemy’s ability to resist our advance. A
level clearing in rough terrain is the only accessible landing field for
airmobile operations.

A-III
 (b) Key terrain varies with the level of command. For
example, to an army commander, a large city affords marked advantages as a
communications center. To a division commander, the high ground which
dominates the city is more important, a n d t h e c i t y i t s e l f i s a n o b s t a c l e ,

(c) Obstacles are rarely key terrain features. The high

ground dominating a river, r a t h e r t h a n t h e r i v e r i t s e l f , i s u s u a l I y t h e
key terrain feature for the lower unit commander. An exception is an
o b s t a c l e I i k e a b u i l t - u p a r e a , which is assigned as an objective to a
f o r c e ; the obstacle then becomes key terrain to the force ordered to
capture it.

( d ) K e y t e r r a i n , in addition to influencing mission

accomplishment, is also highly significant in applying combat power.
Control is not ensured only by seizure and occupation. Seizure and
physical occupancy of key terrain features by relatively large forces may
not be desirable, Destructive fires delivered by long-range means can
destroy forces physically occupying key terrain. The commander controls
key terrain to avoid destruction of force while keeping the enemy from
gaining control. Control includes maneuver, s u r v e i l l a n c e , s e c u r i t y , a n d
use of fires. Terrain which permits or denies maneuver is key terrain.
Tactical use of terrain often is directed at increasing the capability for
applying combat power and, at the same time, forcing the enemy into areas
which result in reduction of the enemy’s abil ity to apply combat power.
Terrain which permits this also is key terrain. The effects of terrain on
maneuver, appl ication of combat power, and preservation of force integrity
are considerations in selecting and controlling key terrain and its
tactical use.

(e) In the offense, key terrain features are usually forward

of the friendly dispositions and are often assigned as objectives.
However, t e r r a i n f e a t u r e s i n a d j a c e n t s e c t o r s a r e k e y t e r r a i n i f t h e i r
control is necessary for the continuation of the attack or the
accomplishment of the mission. If the mission is to destroy enemy forces,
terrain is selected whose seizure helps ensure the required destruction.
Terrain which gives the enemy effective observation along an axis of
advance to be used by the friendly forces is key terrain if the enemy must
be denied its possession or control. Key terrain is within friendly
territory when its control is essential to the success of an offensive
operation. For example, if the enemy attacks before friendly forces
a t t a c k , the control of this terrain is essential because it affords a
marked advantage. Thus , i t i s a k e y t e r r a i n f e a t u r e .

In the defense, key terrain is usually within the assigned sector and
within or behind the selected defensive area. Some examples of key
terrain are--

0
T e r r a i n w h i c h gives good observation over AAs to and into the
defensive P O S t i o n .
0
Terrain w h i c h permits the defender to cover an obstacle by fire.

A-112
 o
Important communication centers which affect command
communications and the use of reserves.

K e y t e r r a i n a l s o i s f o r w a r d o f t h e d e f e n s i v e a r e a or i n a d j a c e n t
sectors. For example, a terrain feature along the FLOT or in an adjacent
sector which gives the enemy good observation over defended localities,
corrrnunication routes, or enemy AAs is key terrain when active measures are
taken to reduce the enemy advantage. The defender moves positions forward
to include the feature or take action to minimize the enemy advantage by
the use of fire, chemicals, smoke, concealment, and cover.

(5) Avenues of Approach. An AA is a route for a force of a

particular size to reach an objective or key terrain. To be considered an
AA, a route provides some ease of movement and enough width for dispersion
of a force of a sufficient size to significantly affect the outcome of the
operation. The division G2 usually considers AAs adequate for the type
brigade of the particular division. The corps and higher G2s usually
consider AAs adequate for at least a division. In determining the width
o f d i s p e r s i o n , consideration is given to the deployment patterns, mobi I ity
means, and area required for maneuver to prevent presenting lucrative
targets for nuclear fires.

(a) Ground Avenues of Approach. A valley approach gives the

advancing force some cover from enemy direct fire and some concealment
from enemy observation. A valley approach includes the floor of the
valley, the slopes of the ridges, and the military crests. Control of the
military crests on each side of the valley is essential. In a valley
approach, the best AA is that which offers the best observation,
cross-country trafficabiIity, road net, FofF, concealment and cover, and
dispersion, In evaluating the use of deep valley approach, the possible
intensification of nuclear effects and resulting greater casualties on the
valley floor are considered. At times, the best avenue is along the
slopes of a ridge below the military crests, rather than along the valley
floor.

The use of a ridge approach depends upon the width and shape of the
ridge, the size and deployment of the units involved, and the distance to
t h e e l e v a t i o n o f a d j a c e n t r i d g e s . A ridge approach usually has the
advantage of good observation; however, t h e r e i s l i t t l e p r o t e c t i o n f r o m
enemy fire on the ridge. The best AA on a ridge is often slightly below
the topographical crest, with sufficient force on the crest to control it.

(b) Air Avenues of Approach. An AAA is a route which

provides a suitable path for a particular number of aircraft to reach a
LZ . The aviation officer or the aviation mission commander assists in
evaluating the effect of density altitude, wind, turbulence, and
visibility on selected AAAs. In selecting AAAs, t h e f o l l o w i n g f a c t o r s a r e
considered:
0
Sufficient air space.
0
Concealment from ground observation.

A-113
 ° EaaiIy recognized terrain features.

0
Length of flight paths.

1 Sufficient air space is required for rapid movement of

the aircraft to the LZS. FS requirements involving art I l e r y a n d t a c t i c a l
air support may restrict the availability of air space. Consideration is
given to gun-target lines and to restrictive fire plans that are in effect
during the air movement phase. The size of the air assault force involved
in the operation also is considered; however, no paramsters are given as
to width concerning AAA. Depending on the flight formation, a large
number of helicopters are flown over a relatively narrow AAA. Another
consideration in relation to adequate air space is the desirability of
having multiple flight routes available. Generally, in situations with
concentrated enemy forces along the LOC, multiple flight routes from the
pickup zone to the objective area and back are desirable.

2 Heavily forested and swamp areas provide good routes and

concealment from ground level because ground troops have Iittle
opportunity to see and fire on helicopters passing overhead at tree-top
level. Low-altitude operations over heavy foliage distort the acoustic
wave from aircraft and decrease the distance at which the sound is
detected. They also hamper determination of the direction of the noise
source by ground observers. AAAs are in defi lade with respect to enemy AD
radar and weapon locations. Ridge lines are crossed as infrequently as
possible to reduce exposure time to radar detection. Steep defiles or
canyons are avoided, especially when there ie an appreciable amount of
surface wind that can cause momentary loss of aircraft control because of
downdrafts.
3 Navigation at low altitudes is extremely difficult.
The presence of easily recognized terrain features, such as rivers or
roads, significantly improves the pilot’s abil ity to navigate by reference
to ground features. Terrain corridors are usually desirable because they
afford both ease of navigation and defilade. Linear features that
parallel the direction of flight are the most valuable in assisting
navigation.
4 In the interest of minimizing the exposure of aircraft
enroute to the objective area, the shortest possible flight paths that
afford sufficient air space, concealment from ground observation, and
easily recognized terrain features are usually preferred. However, longer
flight paths are selected for purposes of deception.

(6) Combat Service Support Aspects. The analyses of the facts

and subconclusions developed in the preceding parts of the analysis are
used as a basis for further studies of the effects of CSS activities on
friendly and enemy units. This paragraph determines the effects of the
characteristics of the battlefield area on CSS that influence the
selection of a course of action by either force.

A-114
 In studying the influence of the area, consideration is given to
effects cm matters such as availability of adequate routes for LOC,
facilities for maintenance and storage, construction resources, public
health situation, required shelter for administrative facilities,
a v a i l a b i l i t y o f l a b o r , m a i n t e n a n c e o f d i s c i p l i n e , law a n d o r d e r , a n d
control of refugees.

4. EFFECTS OF CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA. This paragraph contains the

conc usions reached on the basis of the facts and subconclusions
prev ously developed. The effects of the characteristics of the AO on
each significant course of action which the enemy is physically oapable of
adop ing and which, if adopted, could adversely affect the accomplishment
of our mission are discussed. Usually, the discussion includes effects on
the enemy’s ability to defend or attack. It also includes, a s
appropriate, the effects on the enemy’s ability to delay; to use reserves,
amphibious or airborne forces, nuclear fires, guerrilla forces, chemical
and biological agents, cover a n d d e c e p t i o n , sensor devices; or to conduct
special operations and support the enemy’s forces administratively. The
discussion of the effects on our courses of action is limited to those
required for the accomplishment of the mission.

A-115
*

Figure A-25. Example and explanation of analysis of the AO.

A-116
C I ass if i cat ion is centered at the top and bottom of each page,

Copy number assignad by issuing headquarters. Official designation of unit. Physical

I ocat ion of command post by coordinates, state or county.

Date-time roup when the analysis is signed followed by the message reference number
(example: SB2) used when the analy sis is distributed outside the adquarters for the purpose
of acknowledgment in the clear. All appended material analysis having the suns
distribution bears the sane reference number.

The title Iine identifies the analyses by number (consecutive throughout the calendar year).

Reference I ist maps, charts, or other documents requ i red to understand the analy s is.
References to maps inc I ude the map series number (country or geograph ic area, ifrequired),
sheet number (and name, if required, edition and scale (if required).

Paragraph 1a states the exact I imi ts of the area being studied.

Paragraph 1b states the mission and any other I imi t ing considerat ions such as t ime
limitations, the commander’s plan of action, and enemy capabilities.

Paragraph 2 is Iisting of pertinent facts for use as a basis for the succeeding paragraphs.

Paragraph 2a lists or.refers tO other docunments containing (for the period under study)
meteorlogical conditions to, Include precipitation, fog, cloud condltlons, temperature,
relative humidity, surface winds, effective winds (or winds aloft), atmospheric pressure,
I ight data to inc Iude moon phases, moonrise and moonset, and other geodetIC data as
appropriate. When appropriate, include magnetic phenomena.

Paragraph 2a(2) I ists data to be considered by aviation units. It is used in calculating

aircraft performance and altimeter setting. Light data are always given, as they are
necessary for the set ect ion of courses of action. The BMNT and the EENT are the be inning
C! are the
and end, respectively, of enough I ight for Iimited visibi I ity. The BMCT and the EECT
beginning and end, respectively of adequate Iight for large scale operat ions.

Paragraph 2b(l ) describes conf igurat ion of the ground, including slopes, for personnel and
vehicles and critical relief for equipmnt dependent on configuration and conditions of
streams, including depth, slope, and condition of banks and bottom, and location of crossing
sites. Named localities are located by grid coordinates the first time they appear in the
anal ysis. Grid coordinates are repeated onIy if requ i red for ease of reference.

Paragraph 2b(l) also makes maximum use of special colored maps or overlays. Under each
characteristic include facts to assist in subsequent determination of the effects of the
character ist i c on the use of nuc I ear weapons, chemical agents, and important devices and
equipment used implement ing courses of action (do not include here the interpretation of
these effect on friendly or enemy possible courses of action).

Paragraph 2b(2) indicates wooded areas, including type, location, size, and shape of trees,
diameter of trunks, density, crown cover, and undergrowth incIude types of natural and
cuItivated vegatation of norwooded areas.

A-117
Figure A-25. Example and explanation of analysis of the AO (continued).
A-116
Paragraph 2b(3) indicates the type and distribution of soils and subsoils in the area and
soil trafficability. Include soiI content as it affects induced radiation, Use overlay if
material is extensive.

Paragraph 2b(4) indicates roads, raiIroads, bridges, tunnels, mines, towns, industial areas,
fortifications, and other features of miIitary significance; include type of construction.

Paragraph 2C (1), (2) consider as pert inent in separate subparagraphs sociology,

pol i t ics, economics, psychology, and other character i st ics. Other character i st ics may
i nc I ude such items as sc ience, mater iel, transportat i on, manpower, hydrography , etc. Under
each of these characteristics considered, Iist alI facts as the pertain to the area of study
and which may influence friendly and enemy courses of action. The degree of coverage
required of these characteristics varied with the mission and other aspects of the
operat ional env iroment. These characteristics infIuence, to some extent, the decisions of
alI commanders and become increasingly important as the area of interest of a command
increases.

Paragraph 3 anal yzea the facts in the previous paragraph to determine their infIuence on
factors affecting tactical and activities that are considered in the development of specific
courses of action. The axtent of the analysis depends on the mission, the means available to
accomplish the mission, and the possible means the enemy can use to prevent the
accomplishment of the mission. {n considering the factors under each aspect, include the
affects, as appropriate, of and on nuclear fires, chemical and enemy biological agents, and
important devices and equipment used in implement ing courses of action.

Paragraph 3a considers the effect that the .aerea wiII have on observation, fire, concealment
and obstacles; and deterimines key tarrain features and AAs.

A-119
Figure A-25. Example and explanation of analysis of the AO (continued).
A- 120
A-121
 (CLASSIFICATION)
(e) HilI 326 (1199), This hilI dominates favorable terrain leading directly to tha eastarn
part of the division object iva.
(f) Hi I Is 305 (0490) and 322 (1394). This terrain system constitutes the division objactive.
‘he mission cannot be eccompl ishad without securing it. Control of this ridge is also neceeaary to
iont inuat ion of the attack to the south,
(5) Avenues of Approach. Annax N (Avenues of Approach Overlay).
(a) Availabla to anwny into our position.
!. Axis Hill 351 (9607)-Hill 361 (9709),
2. Axis Hill 339 (9206)-Hill 356 (9310).
3. Axis Hill 230 (0010)-Paris (9811)-Hill 364 (9613).
(b) Available to us into the enwey’s position.
1. Axis Hill 356 (9310)-Hill 339 (9206)-Hill 334 (9400)-Hill 306 (9997)-Hill 305
0490)-r idgs east thereof (Avenue A).
2. Axis Hi I I 361 (9709)-Hi I I 351 (9607)-Hi I I 359 (0004)-Auburn (0495)-ridge Hi I I 305
10460) to Hi I I 322 (1394) (Avenua B).
3. AXiS Hil I 361 (9709)-Hill 351 (9807)-Hill 359 (0004)-Hil I 271 (0702)-Hill 326
[1199)- Hi i i 322 (1394)-ridge west thereof (Avenue C).
4, Axis Hill 280 (0010)-Hill 262 (0803)-Hill 326 (1199)-Hill 322 (1394)-ridge west
[hereof (Avenue 9).
b. Conbat services Support Aspects.
(1) Personnal. Character ietisa of the aociaty are such that only unskilled civil ian labor wil I be
wai Iabla at any tisw. E@oymmt of civi I ian labor to mat ehort-tarw objactivas mst be balanced careful Iy
]ga inat the long-term needs of harvesting rams in ing crops.
(2) Logistics. Lack of civilian food and SUPPI ias may impose added logistic burdana on our forces.
hw pi I ferage can be axpected. FM resources beyond basic natural resources ara avai I able for mi I i tary use.
(3) Civil-mii itary operationa. Displscmmnt of civil ians through the impressing of civil ian labor
II the enemy and lack of food and supplies wil I creete problwna which, if not sontrol lad, can impact on
III I i tar operations. The existence of civil agencies capable of aaawsing the functions of gcvermwnt wi I I
help alf aviate the problsm. Hcwsver, these aganciaa wil I raquira guidanoe.
4. EFFECTS OF CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA.
a. Ef feet on Enemy Couraaa of Action.
(1) Effect on enemy defense.
(a) Tarrain now held by the enemy favors defanaa in depth from praasnt positions to the
division objective. The anwsy has axcal lent observation over al I Ms, and tha anwny’s f Ianke ara protected
by the rivers and canal on the west and artificial obeteclaa on the asst. The enwny’s beet dafenaa araae are
the enamy%cupiad forward PCS i t ions.

(b) The excel lent weather cond it ions favor anamy dafensa and parwi t tha enary to use
supporting firea with waximen effectiveness.
(2) Effects on anamy attack.
(a) The anawy’s beat M is the axis Hill 260 (0100) -Peris (BBll)-Hill 364 (9613),
(b) Uaathar cond it ions are such that the enuay wi I I not k able to maneuver tmrd our
poe it ions without being observed axcept during tha hours of darkness. Tha lack of prec ipitat ion favors
cross-country awbi I itv. (CIASSIFICATlfM)
Figurs A-25. Example and explanation of analysis of the AO (continued).
A-122
.

A-123
 (CLASSIFICATION)
(3) Effect on enemy air,
(a) Weather and terrain favor enemy employment of air in the division AO.
(b) Terrain favors enemy delivery of nuclear weapons by Iow-level air attack.
(4) Effect on enemy use of nucIear weapons. Weather cond i t ions are favorable for enemy use of
nucIear weapons. Ef fect ive winds do not favor use of fallout. Rol I ing terrain, numerous folds in the
ground, and foliage wiII reduce thermal effects. Obstacles wiII be created by forest and tree blowdown.
(5) Effect on enemy chemical operations. Weather does not favor enemy use of chemicals. Terrain
favors use of persistent chemicals in the valIey forward of the enemy’s present defensive positions.
b. Effect on Own Courses of Action.
(1) The best natural AA into the enemy area is axis HiII 280 (0010)-Hill 232 (0803)-HiII 326
(1199)-HiII 322 (1394)-ridge west thereof (Avenue D). It is blocked by extensive minefields.
(2) The second best AA is axis Hill 361 (97091-Hill 351 (9607)-Hill 359 (0004)-HilI 271
(0702)- Hi I I 326 (1199)-Hi I I 322 (1394)-ridge west thereof (Avenue A).
(3) Weather and terrain do not favor our attack. We wiII not be able to maneuver toward enemy
posit i one without being observed except during the hours of darkness. The lack of precipitation wiII favor
cross-country mobi I ity except beIow 200 meters eIevation. Forest f ires end tree blowdown caused by use of
nuclear weapons in Nationel Forest will restrict mobiIity, observation, and FofFs.
(4) Effect on nuclear weapons. Weather conditions are favorable for the employment of nuclear
weapon. The rolIing nature of the terrain, numerous folds in the round, and foliage wiII reduce effects on
nuclear bursts. The wooded areas are dry and subject to extensive burning. Soil composition does not favor
the production of high intensities of radioactivity. Winds generally favor employment by our forces of
radiation effects of fallout from nuclear weapons.
(5) Effect of chemical agents. Weather conditions are favorable for our use of chemicals.
Ackncwledge.

MANN

OFFICIAL:
/s/ Foster
FOSTER
G2

Distribution: A
(CLASSIFICATION)
Figure A-25. Example and explanation of analysis of the AO (continued).
A-124
A-125
 PATROL REPORT

A patrol report is a written copy of verbal information reported

following a reconnaissance or combat patrol mission. The battalion S2
generally prepares this report. Figure A-26 showa the patrol report
format,

(DESIGNATION OF PATROL)

TO:

MAPS :

A. Size and composition of patrol.

B. Mission.

c. Time of departure.

D. Time of return.

E. Routes out and back.

F. Terrain. ( d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e t e r r a i n - -dry, swampy, jungle, thickly

wooded, high brush, rocky, deepness of ravines and draws: condition of
bridges as to type, size, and strength; effect on armor and wheeled
vehicles).

G. Enemy. (strength, disposition, condition of defense, equipment,

w e a p o n s , a t t i t u d e , m o r a l e , e x a c t l o c a t i o n , movements, and any shift in
disposition; time activity was observed, coordinates where activity
occurred) .

H. Any map corrections.

1. (Not used.)

J. Miscellaneous information (include aspects of NBC warfare).

K. Results of encounters with e n e m y ( e n e m y p r i s o n e r s a n d d i s p o s i t i o n ;

i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s , enemy casualties, captured documents and equipment).

L. Condition of patrol (including disposition of any dead or wounded).

M. Conclusions and recommendations (include to what extent the task was

accomplished and recommendations as to patrol equipment and tactics).

Signature Grade or Rank Org Unit of Patrol Leader

Figure A-26. Patrol report format.

A-126
N. Additional remarks by interrogator.

Signature Grade or R a n k Org Unit of Patrol Leader Time

o. Distribution.

Figure A-26. Patrol report format (continued).

FRAGMENTARY ORDER

FRAGOs are extracts from more detailed orders or are issued to change
previous orders. Like warning orders, these are usually brief oral or
written messages. Mission orders are a form of FRAGOs which provide
experienced commanders with the essentials of an order (such as a new
mission or change to a peavious mission).

FRAGOs do not have a specified format; howaver, to ansure

understanding, the OPORD format is useful. A FRAGO is issued orally or in
writing. Those elements found in a complete order are omitted when they
have not changed, are not essential, or are incomplete at the time of
issue. As a general rule, a FRAGO--

0 Is addressed to each commandar required to take action.

0 Is addressed to higher and adjacent headquarters for information.

0 Refers to a previous order. Indicates task organization changes.

0 When necessary for clarity, includes a brief outline of the

situation that generated the requirement for a FRAGO, to include a
statement of the mission, if changed.

0 Provides brief and specific instructions without loss of clarity.

0 Requests acknowledgment.

0 Contains proper classification.

With command approval, FRAGOs are prepared and issued by either

coordinating or special staff officers with command approval. Figure A-27
shows an example of a FRAGO.

A-127
 (CLASS IF I CAT ION)
COPY NO OF COP I ES
52d Mech Div
Xrayville (6271), Missouri
141300 5 January 1980
Frag Order YZ55
Reference. OPORD 7
Map, Series V661, Sheet 7061,
Edition 1, Scale 1:50,000
TASK ORGANIZATION. C/52 Avn OPCON 3d Bde
Eff 141400 5 Jan
1. SITUATION. Estimated enemy tank regt
delaying advance of 1st Ode
2 . MISSION. No change.
3. EXECUTION:
a. Div continues attack, 3d Bde bypasses
1st Bde in north and attacks in zone to
secure division objective. tst Bde becomes
reserve, follows 3d Bale. Priority of fires
to 3d Bale.
b. 1-42 FA 0S 3d Bale.
c. 1-40 FA GSR 1-42 FA.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT. No change.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.
Tac CP currently at 3067.
ACKNOWLEDGE.

VON STEUBEN
MG

OFFICIAL:

YOUNG
G3

DISTRIBUTION: C

(Classification)

Figure A-27. Example of a fragmentary order.

A-128
 The MISREP is used by all a i r u n i t s - - s t r i k e o r a t t a c k , r e c o n n a i s s a n c e
o r s u r v e i l l a n c e , airlift, observation, and helicopter--to report the
results of all missions and significant sightings along the route of the
flight. The MISREP amplifies the inflight report and is normally
submitted within 30 minutes after aircraft landing to the tasking agency,
the requesting unit or agency, and to other interested organizations.
Upon completion of a tactical EW air task or mission, a debriefing is
conducted by intelligence personnel, and a MISREP is submitted.
Figure A-28 shows the MISREP format.

HEAD I NG

PRECEDENCE

ORIGINATING AGENCY

ACTION ADDRESSEES

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION, CODE WORD, OR NICKNAME

MISREP (Number) DATE-TIME GROUP (GMT)-MONTH-YEAR

BODY

1. AIR TASK OR MISSION NUMBER OR NICKNAME. Reference the request number,

FRAGO number, o r d i r e c t i v e c a u s i n g i n i t i a t i o n o f t h e m i s s i o n .

2. LOCATION IDENTIFIER. Target number, line number, approved target

designator or identifier, or coordinates of the target or sighting being
reported.

3. TIME ON TARGET OR TIME OF SIGHTING. R e p o r t all t i m e s b y d a t e - t i m e

group, using Zulu time unless otherwise directed.

4 . RESULTS AND SIGHTING INFORMATION. T h i s i t e m s h o u l d c o n t a i n t h e p i l o t

or aircrew evaluation of expected results (for example, percent destroyed,
number and type destroyed, or percent of coverage) and concise narrative
information on significant sightings (for example. unusual or new enemy
equipment or concentrations of enemy forces observed to include number,
spead, and direction (if applicable)).

5 . REMARKS . Includes information not specifically mentioned in above

items (for example, enemy defenses encountered, weather data, hostile MIJI
attempts, and so forth).

.-. . . - .
Figure A-28. Mission report format.

A-129
 ORDER OF BATTLE ANNEX TO THE PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Figure A-29 showa the format for an OB annex to the PERINTREP. Omit
items not applicable and renumber the remaining paragraphs.

All remaining entries are completed, and each entry contains an

evaluation of the source and information, to include the type of source.
Figure A-30 shows a completed sample of the OB annex.

(CLASSIFICATION)

ORDER OF BATTLE

Annex _ ( O B ) t o P E R I N T R E P N O _ _ _ Corps,

1. COMPOSITION AND DISPOSITION (see appendix 1, overlay). An overlay is

usually attached to present the graphic display of enemy units. The
initial subparagraphs always contain information pertaining to
organization. Information concerning identification and disposition is
listed by mentioning the highest echelons first, followed by subordinate
units from Ieft to right or top to bottom, as displayed on the overlay.
Related items may be combined and presented in a single entry.

2. STRENGTH. Report information pertaining to enemy personnel, weapons,

and equipment losses during the period. Replacement rates and strength
.
figures of individual units may be listed.

3. TACTICS. Report only new tactics and deviations from prescribed

tactical doctrine.

4. TRAINING. Report new developments and recent changes in training

programs or methods of special training undertaken by the enemy since the
initiation of hostilities.

5. LOGISTICS. Report those items which will affect current enemy

operations, such as supply status, supply systems, and locations of supply
facilities.

6. COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS. Report data on the combat effectiveness of

enemy units, either of the entire force or of a major tactical unit., L i s t
i t e m s i n d i c a t i n g m o r a l e , e s p r i t , and quality of troops and commanders.
Describe the ability of the enemy unit to accomplish its expected mission.

(CLASSIFICATION)

Figure A-29. OB annex to PERINTREP format

A-130
 (CLASSIFICATION)

7 . MISCELLANEOUS DATA. List personalities, unit history, FPO, code

numbers and names, 06 changes, and any other item of 06 intelligence that
cannot be properly inserted in preceding paragraphs.

Acknowledge.

(SIGNATURE)

Appendixes:
Distribution:
OFFICIAL
(NAME OF G2)

Figure A-29. OB annex to PERINTREP format (continued).

A-131
Annex B (OB) to PERINTREP 29, 3 Corps, 201800 August 1985

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. COMPOSITION AND DISPOSITION (see appendix 1 overlay).

a . All EPW captured during period are from the enemy 2d Combined Arms
Army. Unit identification include--(C-l)

17 MRD 30 MRD 32 MRD

283 MRR 141 MRR 132d Med Tk Regt
290 MRR 142 MRR
130 Tk Regt
130 Recon Bn

COMMENT . 32 MRD accepted as being organic to 2d CAA. 52 Tk Div

previously accepted, completing organization of 2d CAA.

b. Two large missile-type weapons mounted on large amphibious armored

carriers and several smaller vehicles identified in position vicinity MP
420513. (8-2) .

COMMENT . Probably elements of Free Rocket Regt, 2d CAA, previously

unlocated.

c. Captured enemy field order reveals plan to attach 40 Tk Div to 2d

CAA effective 22 Aug. (B-l).

COMMENT . EPW previously reported 40th Tk Div moving to reinforce 2d

CAA . Enemy main effort probably planned for this area.

2. STRENGTH.

Enemy losses reported during period:

EPW KIA ARTY ARMOR AIR VEH

16 MRD 37 302 2 4 1 21
30 MRD 16 52 8 1 --- 16
32 MRD 8 12 --- --- --- 4
Total 111 US Corps Sector 61 366 10 5 1 41

COMMENT . The marked increase in personnel losses during the period

have been sustained primarily by enemy combat patrols. Aircraft loss was
Hl, observation helicopter, equipped with aeronautics radar. OveraIl
strength of 2d CAA is generally not affected.

(CLASSIFICATION)

Figure A-30. Sample OB annex.

A-132
 (CLASSIFICATION)

3. TACTICS.

a. EPW from 16 MRD and 30 MRD state they have been instructed, in the
event their units are cut off, to continue fighting as guerilla units or
in small groups, live off the land, and destroy as much US Army property
as possible before gradually infiltrating back to friendly lines. (C-6) .

COMMENT . Intensive guerrilla activity in our rear aress can be

expected if elements of these units are cut off.

b. Enemy documents captured 07 Aug included a training pamphlet for

b a t t a l i o n , company, and platoon commanders, written by GD Griboyedov
entitled “Tanks Out Front,”’ (appendix 3). It advocates tactics permitting
US patrols and advancing forces to pass through aggressor lines. A
coordinated tank-infantry attack is then made on open flanks and rear
elements with tanks continuing momentum of attack to destroy remaining US
forces. (B-2) .

COMMENT . Considering enemy doctrine that tanks are the decisive arm,
the above tactic is possible, particular y in review of reports of
probable employment of 40 Tk Div (para 1 .

4. TRAINING.

a. Reference paragraph 3b.

b. Indications of enemy concern for communications security (COMSEC)

is noted in document captured from 2d CAA dated 10 Aug, directing all
subordinate units to immediately initiate intensive training in radio
security and communications procedures. (B-2) .

COMMENT . Ml units confirm enemy lack of radio discipline and states

that security violations increase during reinforcement and relief
operations. Numerous enemy security violations have been noted since
17 Aug, further substantiating reinforcement or relief of 2d CAA units.

5. LOGISTICS.

a. EPW state enemy supply personnel have recently contacted local

merchants, farmers, and fishermen for supplies of most class I items.
(C-6) .

(CLASSIFICATION)

Figure A-30. Sample OB annex (continued).

A-133
 (CLASSIFICATION)

COMMENT : Enemy either has critical shortage of class I items or has a

bottleneck in the supply system requiring local p r o c u r e m e n t o f t h e s e i t e m s .

b. Air and ground reconnaissance patrols have reported enemy

stockpiling large quantities of supplies and equipment in rear areas of
frontline divisions. (B-2) .

COMMENT . Not normal supply procedures. Significance as yet

undetermined. Would indicate enemy may be planning major offensive soon.

6. COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS.

a. EPW from 16 MRD and 30 MRD state morale is high but senior officers
are disgruntled because their units always receive difficult missions while
the 32 MRD and 56 Tk Div have, until recently, been assigned lass hazardous
missions. (F-6) .

COMMENT. Analysis of unit history and recent operations of enemy 2d

CAA indicates it has usually been highly successful in combat. This, and
the fact that 2d CAA has always had fine commanders, would account for high
morale in units. This is first indication of dissatisfaction among officer
personnel. Report seems cogent, however, since 32 Mech Div has not baen
engaged in combat with US Forces in this campaign.

b. EPW reports 30 MRD to be redesignated 30 “Fusilier” Mech Div for

superior combat record. (F-6) .

COMMENT . Ill US Corps rates combat effectiveness of 30 MRD from

excellent to outstanding in comparison to other enemy divisions in same
sector. 30 MRD casualties have been comparatively small; no deserters have
been apprehended and its operations have been executed with determination.

7. MISCELLANEOUS DATA.

a. Personalities identified by EPW: (c-l).

CG, 40th Tk Div GD GRIBOYEDOV, Semyon P. (Ref 3b)

CO, 282 MRR Col CARDUCCI, Gherardo S.
CO, 283 MRR Col UNDSET, Bjornstjerna (Acting CO)
CO, 130 Med Tk Regt Col STEENWYK, Martin J.
CO, 132 Med Tk Regt Cot MATTEZ, Mario

(CLASSIFICATION)

Figure A-30. Sample OB annex (continued).

A- 134
 (CLASSIFICATION)

COMMENT . Confirms p r e v i o u s l y o b t a i n e d i n f o r m a t i o n .

b. Unit history. Officer EPW stated that unit (32 MRR) trained
extensively in special tactics for assault of river lines. (F-6) .

COMMENT . Special training received by 32 MRD should increase its

overall effectiveness when employed in river-crossing operations. No
evidence of other units so trained.

c. Field post numbers: Captured document reveals enemy FPN being

used as identification symbols on documents and messages. First two and
last three digits are transposed. FPN of 46 MRD will appear as 75031
instead of 31750. (B-1) .

COMMENT . Enemy has employed this system previously as a security

measure. Expect this system of transposing digits will occur in different
patterns during future operations.

Acknowledge.

LEE
LTG

Appendixes: l--Enemy Disp Overlay

2--Enemy Army Organization Chart
3--Enemy Training Pamphlet

Distribution: Same as PERINTREP 29

OFFICIAL

GRANT
G2

(CLASSIFICATION)

Figure A-30. Sample OB annex (continued).

A-135
 STANDARD COLLECTION ASSET REQUEST FORMAT

The standard collection asset request format (SCARF) is used for

intelligence requirements tasking and for requesting information from
higher or adjacent headquarters. At corps and division, intelligence
requirements tasking is directed toward Ml commanders and commanders of
other elements of the combat force capable of collecting the information.

Intelligence requirements tasking provides the selected unit with a

specific requirement, but not with specific instructions for carrying out
the mission. The SCARF specifies--

0
The information needed.

0
Where to look for the movers, shooters, sitters, and emitters.

0
When to look.
0
When the information is needed.
0
What to look with, in some cases.

Figure A-31 showa the SCARF format.

A- 136
 A. Requester number.

B. Originator priority.

c. Activity or target type (area emitter and size (point, area, or

unit)).

o. BE number, ELINT notation or case.

E. Location (if known or last known).

F. Ouration--

0
Start date-time.
0
Frequency.

0
Stop date-time.
0
Latest acceptable date-time for information utility.

G. Location accuracy--

0
Required.

0
Acceptable.

H. PIR and information desired.

1. Justification.

J. Remarks (to include disciplines and collectors recommended).

Figure A-31. SCARF basic format.

A-137
 AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE REQUEST

The aerial R&S request is used to request a tactical air

reconnaissance or surveiIlance mission. The form states requirements,
identifies needs, and, occasionally, specifies the actual air asset to
perform the mission.

Any echelon initiates the request. It is used for both immediate and
preplanned mission requirements. The requester oompletes section I of the
request for each s p e c i f i c m i s s i o n . Normally, these requests a r e
transmitted by electrical means. The headquarters receiving the request
adds information required to val idate or complete the request.
Figure A-32 shows the aerial R&S request form. This format is the same as
the format used for joint service operations.

A- 138
Figure A-32. Aerial reconnaissance and surveillance request form.

A-139
 Figure A-33 shows an air reconnaissance request and task format that

is keyed to letter designators of message elements. An explanation of

each of these letter designators follows in Figure A-34.

Air Reconnaissance Task AIR RECON TASK

(Format-not transmitted) (Example message)

L. Originators request and L. HQOC 468/82.

task number.

M. Type of recon. M. PHOTOGRAPHIC, VERTICAL.

N. Map series, sheet no and N. M745 SHEET 4102 EDITION 2.

edition.

o. Location and description o. 32U ND 747866 (UTM) TIARA

of target. AIRFIELD

P. Purpose of request and P. CAT OID ITEMS 2, 3, 6, 7.

reporting codes.

Q. Photo scale or limits. Q. BEST POSSIBLE.

. R. Products required. R. lPIR/2SETS PRINTS PROVIDING

STEREO COVER OF TIARA
AIRFIELD.

s. Delivery address. s. IPIR TO HQOC, DEFAIR INFO 27

SO PRINTS HQOC/TGTS-1,
DEFAIR/DAFIS.

T. Date-time limitation. T. TOT NOT BEFORE 0706002 JUN

83 BUT NOT LATER THAN
0708002 JUN 83. PRINTS
REQUIRED NOT LATER THAN
0912002 JUN 83.

u. Special instructions. u. INFLIGHTREP CAT 01 ITEMS 3,

v. Tasking and mission data. v. 14 SON, 1 X R4FC.

Figure A-33. Alr reconnaissance request and task format.

A- 140
 Explanation of letter designators.

L. ORIGINATOR’S REQUEST NUMBER. The originator’s request number usually

c o n s i s t s o f a u n i t i d e n t i f i e r a n d a s e q u e n t i a l n u m b e r i n g s y s t e m . Commands
may assign blocks of numbers to subordinate units to prevent confusion.
if necessary to assist the tasking agency, commands also may establish a
system of priorities for reconnaissance tasking and promulgate priority
designators to be used in the originator’s request number.

M. TYPE OF RECONNAISSANCE. Visual, electronic, weather, photographic,

and so forth. Additionally, if the requester requires a specific type of
sensor, system, or format to be used for some reason (such as a vertical
photograph for briefing purposes), it is specified. Such detail generally
should be omitted, however, t o a l l o w f l e x i b i l i t y i n p l a n n i n g a n d t a s k i n g .

N, MAP SERIES Z SHEET NUMBER. AND EDITION. Self-explanatory.

o. LOCATION AND DESCRIPTION OF TARGET. The target location or areas to

be searched is indicated by the appropriate coordinate reference. The
coordinate reference system used (for example, UTM grid, latitude or
longitude) is identified clearly. Predetermined search areas or LOC
segments can be nominated by relevant designators. A brief description of
t h e t a r g e t , its name and BE number (where known) should be included.

P. PURPOSE OF REQUEST AND REPORTING CODES. It is most important that

tasking agencies and reconnaissance units understand the exact purpose of
t h e r e q u e s t . Where possible, the code statements in appropriate reference
books are used to identify the target category, reconnaissance purpose,
and items to be reported. Otherwise, a plain language statement of
purpose is provided.

Q. PHOTOGRAPHIC SCALE OR LIMITS. The photographic scale or limits should

not be specified unless there is a specific reason for doing so; for
example, survey photography or imagery is to be used for a particular task
that requires it to be at a nominated scale or physical dimension. If the
scale is nominated, c a r e m u s t b e t a k e n t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e w h e t h e r t h e s c a l e
appl ies to the original film or to the end product requested (item R).

R. PRODUCTS REQUIRED. Specify the reports (RECCEXREP, IPIR, and any

other end product) required. If photographs are required, specify
quantities and the size or scale desired. Photographs should be requested
only when essential and a report will not suffice. Quantities must be
kept to an absolute minimum.

s. DELlVERY ADDRESS. State clearly where the report is to be delivered.

F o r r e p o r t s , nominate both action and information addressees.

Figure A-34. Explanation of letter designators.

A-141
T. DATE AND TIME LIMITATIONS. Specify any time constraints on the
mission and follow-up actions. I n p a r t i c u l a r , specify the date and time
after which the information will no longer be of value. If the task
cannot be accomplished by this date, i t w i l l b e c a n c e l l e d a u t o m a t i c a l l y .

u. SPECiAL INSTRUCTIONS. G i v e i n s t r u c t i o n s o r i n f o r m a t i o n n o t p r o v i d e d
elsewhere that will aid in the planning or accomplishing of the mission.
This includes control arrangements, communications, security instructions,
details of own forces, or other pertinent entries.

v. TASKING AND MISSION DATA. This is completed by the mission tasking

agency. It generally details the unit and number and type of aircraft.
The mission number for the task is the originator’s request number,
abbreviated if necessary.

Figure A-34. Explanation of letter designators (continued).

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE TACTICAL REPORT

The purpose of the SIGINT TACREP is to transmit combat information to

fire and maneuver elements. It also is used to transmit technical data to
traffic and analysis teams or to the TCAE. It is normally sent by
electrical message or by secure FM voice radio means. it is designed to
present highly perishable information in a clear, concise, and
easy-to-read format. Distribution is made according to local guidance or
as directed by higher commands. An annotated format is available in the
classified appendix to FM 34-80.

A- 142
 MEACONING, INTRUSION, JAMMING, AND INTERFERENCE REPORT

The MIJI report is used to pass information from operators to their

units about actual or suspected enemy attempts to interfere with, jam, or

deceive voice, teletypewriter, or MC signals. The report is submitted by

the operator whose communications means is affected, through the net

control station (in the case of FM voice), to the unit’s C-E officer. The

C-E off i c e r c o o r d i n a t e s t h i s r e p o r t w i t h t h e E W o f f i c e r , t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e

off icer and the supporting Ml unit.

MIJI reports are transmitted; however, if they are transmitted over

nonsecure equipment, reports are encrypted using the brevity Iist. See

FM 34-40 for additional information about MIJI reports and brevity lists.

Figure A-35 shows the MIJI report format.

LINE 1 - Type of report

LINE 2 - Affected station

LINE 3 - Station’s location or. grid coordinates

LINE 4 - Frequency or channels affected

LINE 5 - Type of equipment affected

LINE 6 - Type emission or audio characteristics of interference

LINE 7 - Strength of interference

LINE 8 - Time interference started

LINE 9 - Interference effectiveness

LINE 10 - Operator’s name and rank

LINE 11 - Remarks

Figure A-35. Meaconlng, intrusion, jamming, and interference report.

A-143
 ORAL REPORTS

Briefings are oral reports that present information to commanders,

staffs, or other designated audiences. The techniques employed are
determined by the purpose of the briefing, the desired response, and the
role of the briefer. There are four types of military briefings:

0
I n f o r m a t o n b r i e f ng.

0
Decision briefing

0
Staff b r efing.

0
Mission briefing.

The two most important briefing formats to intelligence officers and

analysts at the tactical level are the information and decision
b r i e f i n g s . An explanation of these two briefings follows.

INFORMATION BRIEFING

The information briefing is intended to inform and gain the listener’s

understanding. The briefing does not include conclusions or
recommendations, o r r e q u i r e d e c i s i o n s . The briefing deals primarily with
facts. The briefer states that the purpose of the briefing is to provide
information and that no decision is required. The briefer provides a
short introduction to define the subject and to orient the listener and
then presents the information. Figure A-36 shows the information briefing
format.

DECISION BRIEFING

Decision briefings are intended to obtain an answer or a d e c i s i o n .

They are used to present a staff officer’s or intelligence analyst’s
recommended solution resulting from analysis or study of a problem or
problem araa. They vary as to formality and detail depend ng on the level
of command and the-decision maker’s knowledge of the problem or problem
area. In situations where the person receiving the briefing has” prior
knowledge of the problem and some information relating to it, the briefing
normalIy is Iimited to a statement of the problem, essential background
information, and a recommended solution. However, t h e b r i e f e r i s p r e p a r e d
to present the assumptions, f a c t s , a l t e r n a t i v e s o l u t i o n s , o r r e a s o n ( s ) f o r
choosing the recommended solution, and any coordination required. If the
person who is being briefed is unfamiliar with the problem or the facts
surrounding it, then a more detailed briefing is necessary. In this case,
the briefing includes any assumptions used in analyzing the problem, facts
bearing on the problem, discussion of the alternatives, conclusions, and
the coordination involved.

A- 144
1. INTRODUCTION.

a . Greeting. Use military courtesy, address the person(s) being

briefed, and identify self.

b. Classification. Announce the classification of your briefing.

c. Purpose. Explain the purpose and scope.

d. Procedure. Explain any special procedures such as demonstrations,

displays, or tours.

2. BODY .

a. Arrange main ideas in logical sequence.

b. Use visual aids correctly.

c. Plan for effective transitions.

d. Be prepared to answer questions at any time.

3. CLOSE .

a. Ask for questions.

b. Concluding statement.
.
c. Announce the next briefer, if any.

Figure A-36. Information briefing format.

In the introduction, it is stated that the briefer is seeking a

decision. At the conclusion, i f t h e b r i e f e r d o e s n o t r e c e i v e a d e c i s i o n ,
the briefer asks for it. The briefer should understand the decision
thoroughly. If there is uncertainty, the briefer asks for clarification.
In this regard, a precisely worded recommendation that is used as a
decision statement, once approved by the commander, assists in eliminating
possible ambiguities. Following the briefing, if the executive officer is
not present, the briefer informs the next highest ranking officer or the
staff secretary of the decision. Figure A-37 shows the decision briefing
format.

A- 145
1. INTRODUCTION,

a. Greeting. Use military courtesy, address persons being briefed,

and identify self.

b. Classification. Announce the classification of the briefing,

c. Purpose. State that the purpose of the briefing is to obtain a

dec sion and announce the problem statement.

d. Procedure. Explain any special procedures to be used, such as

add i t i o n a l b r i e f e r s . Omit if not required.

e. Coordination. Indicate what coordination has been accomplished,

2. BODY .

a. Assumptions. M u s t b e v a l i d , r e l e v a n t , a n d e s s e n t i a l t o a s o l u t i o n
to the problem. Omit i f t h e r e a r e n o n e .

b. Facts Bearing on the Problem. Must be supportable, relevant, and

necessary.

c. Discussion. Analyze courses of action. Use smooth transitions

between discussions of each course of action.

d. Conclusions. Degree of acceptance or order-of-merit for each

course of action.

e. Recommendations. State actions recommended. Must be specific,

not a solicitation of opinion.

3. CLOSE.

a. Ask for Questions.

b. Request a Decision.

Figure A-37. Decision briefing format.

A- 146
 APPENDIX B

AUTOMATION SUPPORT TO INTELL GENCE ANALYSIS

D u r i n g t h e p a s t f o r t y y e a r s , t h e b a t t l e f eld has evolved from a

relatively simple environment to one that is increasingly sophisticated in
terms of colIection systems and communications capabilities. Current
coIIection systems incorporate state-of-the-art components and advanced
technology. Deployed using Army-approved doctrine against known enemy
c a p a b i l i t i e s , they exhibit the ability to collect vast amounts of
information from a battlefield environment rich in enemy targets.
Parallel advances in communications capabilities complement sensor system
advances and provide the abiIity to transmit information faster and more
efficiently than at any other time in history.

A s t h e i n f o r m a t i o n f l o w i n c r e a s e s , progressively more time is needed

t o i d e n t i f y , verify, and organize the information needed to produce
intelIigence. Y e t , intelIigence production methods and procedures have
not kept pace with the advances made in coIIection systems and
communications. Information collected by technologically advanced sensor
systems and sent and received over high-speed communications equipment is
still processed individually as it is received by manually sorting,
recording, and filing it. Clearly, to produce the intelligence the
commander needs, when it’s needed, these manual processing functions must
be updated and expanded.

This appendix describes how current and emerging automated systems

support intelligence analysis. It will--
.
° Describe general computer system configuration and basic tactical
miIitary computer system capabilities and Iimitations.

0
Discuss two current tactical semiautomated systems: MICROFIX and
Intelligence Data Processing Set.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS SUPPORT

ADP systems support efficient and timely intelligence production.

This support upgrades the ability of analysts to deal with the vast
amounts of information produced during the course of a battle. These
systems are designed to supplement, not replace, existing manual analysis
support systems. They provide expanded capabilities during the storage;
access, r e t r i e v a l , and manipulation; recording and record-keeping; and
dissemination portions of the intelligence production process. These
capabilities provide the analyst with substantially more time to devote to
intelligence analysis.

Using ADP systems, the analyst not only stores more information in
less space but the information is consolidated with other information and
with previously produced intelIigence. With this additional storage
capacity, the analyst accesses data bases such as IPB or ground OB data
from the same system. Consolidating this data onto one system lets the

B-1
analyst quickly and easily retrieve and manipulate the data and
information needed to support the intelIigence analysis process. W i h
more information to work from, the analyst develops a better picture o f
the battlefield environment. This reduces risk and uncertainty.

ADP systems also provide the means to access this information qu c k l y

and easily. Data is accessed in seconds, rather than minutes or hours.
By retrieving various types of information and using the computer
capabiIities to arrange this information in different patterns,
information is manipulated to test previously established hypotheses or to
create a new hypotheses based upon new or emerging patterns. Through this
process of electronic comparison and contrast, the computer helps the
analyst determine unit identifications, strengths, and enemy commanders’
intent.

Computer system capabilities is used to facilitate and complement

manual methods and procedures. For example, computers are programed to
automatically record message header information into a separate file which
subsequently is printed and placed in a three-ring binder. This provides
a duplicate fiIe that is easy to maintain and keep current and requires a
minimum of time and effort. A record of all intelligence messages and
products is printed. This establishes a record of all outgoing
intel 1 igence products and messages, i n c l u d i n g a l i s t o f a l l u s e r s
receiving that message or product. When manual recording is kept to a
minimum, i t l e a v e s m o r e t i m e f o r t h e a n a l y s t t o d e v e l o p i n t e l l i g e n c e .

Another example of a manual system being eased with ADP is recording

and storing preprogrammed formats. The computer assists the analyst in
preparing a variety of reports, summaries, and other intelligence
documents and message formats electronically. Once correctly formatted,
previously created lists of addresses and users are selected and
automaticalIy printed. If electronic message sending capabilities exist,
messages are sent directly from the terminal. This capability
significantly reduces the amount of time necessary to prepare, route, and
transmit products to users, and the amount of time the intelIigence
analyst spends preparing and disseminating them.

These tasks are continuous and require time and the ability to
assimilate large amounts of data quickly and accurately. The use of ADP
enhances the analyst’s abil ity to perform these tasks. It is a tool which
provides the analyst with the ability to access and use more information
and resources than manual processes provide.

COMPUTER SYSTEM CONFIGURATION

Every computer system is composed of hardware and software. Hardware

is the actual physical equipment--or components--that make up the total
ADP system. Software is a series of commands, recognized by the computer.
It tells the computer how to perform a variety of functions.

B-2
 Hardware

Typical system hardware consists of a keyboard; central processing

unit; storage device (disk drive); display or monitor; and printer. These
basic hardware components access files, input new information, manipulate
data and information, and display or print data of information which the
analyst selects to perform analysis and produce intelIigence. Figure B-1
shows the basic computer components.

computer. Normally, the keyboard contains the same letters, numbers, and
punctuation keys as a standard typewriter. The computer keyboard also
contains special function keys which are used to initiate various computer
functions.

B-3
Processor. The processor is the component that executes the commands from
the programs. It controls the flow of information into, within, and out of
the computer. It also contains a limited amount of the computer’s memory.

Storage Devices. Information is stored inside the processor in special

memory locations or in a separate storage device. Examples of storege
devices are floppy or removable disks, magnetic tape, large capacity hard
c a r t r i d g e o r f i x e d d i s k s , and cassette tapes, or cartridges. The computer
periodically reads these devices during each computing session in order to
perform programs selected by the analyst. Conversely at the end of the
computing session, data is saved to these devices if it is to be
permanently retained. Information solely left displayed on the monitor or
in the processor is lost when the system’s power is shut off.

Display, The display is a cathode ray tube (CRT) (commonly referred to as

a m o n i t o r ) . The monitor displays text, charts, graphs, or maps (depending
upon system configuration and capabilities). It is similar to a television
screen and is monochromatic or color.

Printer. Printers are similar to high-speed typewriters. Information from

the processor is read and the output is printed on computer paper or bond
paper. This provides the analyst with a permanent record (hard copy] of
the information.

Peripherals

Other components are integrated into the basic ADP system to provide
s p e c i a l i z e d o r e x p a n d e d c a p a b i l i t i e s . Whether or not components are added
to a system depends upon several factors. First, the original system is
designed so that it can be expanded. Second, expansion modules, add-on
components, o r p e r i p h e r a l s a r e c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e e x i s t i n g s y s t e m . Third,
software Iimitations and design constraints are considered. Depending upon
t h e s e f a c t o r s , some of the following components are integrated into a
tactical ADP system:

0
Video disk players (VDPs). VDPS al low map, text, photographs, or
any information that can be stored on video disks to be displayed on
a monitor.

0
Modems and communications networks. This equipment allows
information to be passed directly from one computer to another. The
modem connects directly to the telephone jack and transmits and
receives data through telephone Iines. Provides interface between
data processing systems over communications lines. Paper tape
reader/punch (PTR/P) devices provide the capability to generate and
read tactical RATT messages via paper tape.
0
Video cassette recorders (VCRs). Identical to VCRs used for home
e n t e r t a i n m e n t , some systems have programs that al low a VCR to be
connected to the processor for use as a back-up and restore device.

B-4
 Software

Software provides the instructions, tools, and basic programing

required f o r c o m p u t e r s y s t e m f u n c t i o n s . There are many types of software;
however, every system must have an operating system to be able to
function.

Operating System Software. This software enables the computer to run

applications. T h i s o p e r a t i n g s y s t e m , which also is referred to as a
control program, is thought of as a traffic cop. It regulates all actions
within the processor and determines when any of the peripherals are
activated. Another vital function performed by the operating system is to
act as a translator between the users’ language (English, German, Spanish)
and the computer’s language (binary).

Data Base Management Systems (DBMS) Software. DBMS software turns the
computer into a high-powered, automated filing cabinet. This data base
file is sorted on nearly any variable in the file’s structure. The
computer also extracts records in the file that match a very exacting
c r i t e r i a , or extract just selected bits of information (fields) about all
the records in the file. This allows the analyst to manipulate data in
varying ways to get a clearer picture of the battlefield and perhaps
identify previously unrecognized patterns.

Word Processing Software. A word processing program turns the computer

into a high-powered, automated typewriter. This software gives the
analyst the abiIity to compose briefings, reports, and messages, and to
perform editing functions for storage, printing, and display.

Applications Programs. These programs are the actual commands that

perform the automated operations the analyst requires. These are written
in a DBMS or computer language. Some common languages are BASIC, PASCAL,
and FORTRAN.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES

Advantages and disadvantages depend on the system, software, and

training. The analyst uses the ADP system to store and manipulate facts
o r d a t a t h a t , when analyzed, produce intel I igence.

Advantages

In general, for any system, the advantages of automated support to

intelIigence analysis Iie primarily in the areas of information management
and dissemination. ADP systems help the analyst disseminate information
with speed and increased accuracy.

Speed. ADP support is particularly useful to the analyst because of the

speed at which computers can perform calculations and assemble specific
data from a large body of information. Given accurate data input, the
computer produces a faster, more accurate output than is obtained through
human calculation. Stress or pressure do not degrade ADP operations.
T h e y c a r r y o u t p r e s p e c i f i e d t a s k s a l m o s t i n d e f i n i t e l y . A caution about

B-5
computers being more accurate than humans working in a purely manual
mode. Humans respond almost instantly to questions requiring a
judgmental response: “’What are the 10 most significant actions in the
last 12 hours?”’ The computer cannot make such a response. To a computer,
a report about the movement of the independent tank battalion carries the
same weight as a report about three wheeled vehicles moving along an
unidentified road.

Report Generation. When ADP systems are equipped with word processing
c a p a b i l i t y , t h e a n a l y s t c r e a t e s r e p o r t s , messages, summaries, or other
intelIigence-related documents quickly and easily.

Electronic Communication. If ADP systems are netted, that is, linked

together, data is transmitted directly from terminal to terminal. If they
are not netted, a messenger sends correctly formatted diskettes, as well
as hard copy reports. However, diskettes offer the advantage of being
able to be loaded into the receiving person’s computer. In any case,
copies of the message are produced and then transmitted over established
tactical communications channels. In either event, the ability to
disseminate intelligence products is substantially improved over more
traditional methods of dissemination.

Disadvantages

Understanding the System. Most of the disadvantages of ADP support to

intelligence analysis result from a lack of computer Iiteracy or an
understanding of specific ADP system Iimitations and capabilities.
Analysts and commanders tend to assign capabilities to the system that it
does not possess. This results in an unrealistic view of the support ADP
provides to the commander and creates a false reliance on the computer
system by the analyst.

Computers perform only those functions they are explicitly told to do.
They do not learn from mistakes, n o r w i l l t h e y c o r r e c t i m p r o p e r i n p u t .
Therefore, the data stored in the computer is only as accurate as the data
t h a t i s e n t e r e d . Computers also have a finite capacity to store data.
Design parameters establish this capacity. While additional storage
capacity is provided by add-on component storage equipment, when maximum
storage Iimits are reached, old data is deleted to make room for new
input. Dual record-keeping procedures, both manual and automated, are
established and kept in an updated status. If ADP capabilities are
interrupted or lost, this ensures that intelIigence production continues.

Multi-Processing. Another disadvantage is that some tactical systems

cannot input, process, and output data simultaneously. Others only al Ow
access to a shared data base on a one-by-one basis. Therefore, the
analyst determines which data is most important and balances input,
output, or access functions to best support the mission. T h i s i s c r i t caI
to appropriate and maximum use of the ADP system.

Environment. Computers also are vulnerable to environmental conditions

and influences Iike temperature extremes, weather conditions, power
f l u c t u a t i o n s , and power outages. Terrain constraints also may affect ADP
access, s y s t e m m o b i l i t y , o r s y s t e m c a p a b i l i t i e s .

B-6
 T e m p e r a t u r e e x t r e m e s , like alternating very hot and very cold weather
cause condensation. Condensation inhibits the read and write ability of
the system. Extreme temperatures also result in partial or complete loss
of previously input data. For example, rain, fog, and high or low
humidity cause partial or even complete system failure.

Static electricity also results in partial or complete loss of data.

Planned power outages require shutdown of all computer functions
immediately before and during the length of the outage. Unplanned power
outages or power surges not only shut down computer functions, but also
result in varying degrees of hardware or software damage or data loss.

Severe weather conditions, like Iightn ng or dust storms, produce the

same effects as unplanned power outages or power surges. Dust in the read
and write heads of hard and floppy disk dr ves result in inaccurate input,
output, data loss, or total destruction of disk capability.

Terrain also is a factor in ADP system survivabi I ity and use. Each
time the system is moved, leveling is requ red before the system is
operational . Crossing rough terrain under highly mobile conditions
partially damages or completely destroys the ADP system. Also, while
mobile, current systems are inoperative. Data accumulated while the
computer system is down or inoperative must be saved and input when
circumstances permit. This means that when the system initially returns
t o a n o p e r a t i o n a l s t a t u s , it does not provide data for irrrnediate analysis
until the data base has been updated. If the accumulation of data is such
that input requires a substantial amount of time, the analyst finds that
manual systems and data bases support the commander’s intelIigence needs
more efficiently.

Many of these disadvantages apply, in whole or in part, to all

t a c t i c a l b a t t l e f i e l d e l e c t r o n i c a n d a u t o m a t e d s y s t e m s . When the
capabiIities and Iimitations of ADP systems are thoroughly understood,
measures are taken to protect the system while making maximum use of ADP
support to intelIigence analysis. By taking these factors into account,
ADP support to intelligence analysis is a viable tool which the analyst
uses to give the commander a more complete, accurate, and timely picture
of the battlefield.

CURRENT AUTOMATED SUPPORT SYSTEMS

The US Army currently has two systems deployed specifically to support

tactical SIGINT and all-source intelligence analysis functions: the
MICROFIX and the TCAC. The MICROFIX assists the analyst in fulfilling the
commander’s need for information and intelligence on the AirLand
Battlefield. The TCAC provides a variety of SIGINT and EW asset mission
management functions, a s w e l I a s t o a s s i s t t h e a n a l y s t . Both of these
systems are designed to enhance the analyst’s ability to manipulate large
quantities of unprocessed or partially processed data. Information is
quickly and easily added, deleted, or moved. Historical enemy locations,
enemy strengths, equipment, and unit designations, and specific enemy
equipment capabiIities and Iimitations are accessed from previously stored
data base information. In fact, the analyst accesses data that is limited

B-7
 only by storage capability, the data bases available for review, and the
information or data the analyst elects to input into the system during the
course of the battle.

Since the TCAC system is found only in USAREUR and XVIII Airborne
Corps, (and is a non-TOE--table of organization and equipment--item) this
manual does not address it in detail.

MICROFIX

MICROFIX was introduced into the Army as a training device The

system exists to provide Ml soldiers an opportunity to become a m i l i a r
with computers before future automated systems, such as the al -source
analysis system (ASAS), are introduced. The purpose of MICROFIX also is
t o s u p p o r t t h e t a c t i c a l a n a l y s t , as OB analyst (96B), SIGINT analyst
(98C), counter-SIGINT analyst (97G), Cl agent (97B), or a terrain analyst
(12 CMF). The MICROFIX gives the analyst the capability to input data
into complex data bases. The analyst manipulates this data to provide a
source of accurate and frequently updated knowledge about past and present
enemy activities. This information assists the analyst in determining
enemy courses of action and developing counter-strategy. The MICROFIX
system also produces various reports and data files which are generated by
the analyst. The system is menu-driven (all the user’s options are on the
screen at all times) and quite easy to use. Figure B-2 shows the MICROFIX
system.

The system is based on the Apple II Pulse Microcomputer and

incorporates other off-the-shelf components. TEMPEST engineering provides
. emission security between components of the system. Expansion cards
provide the capability to control a large amount of peripheral equipment
in the field environment. Figure B-3 outlines the hardware components of
the MICROFIX system.

Figure B-4 shows further details regarding the eight basic components
of the MICROFIX system. The MICROFIX is mounted in an AN/TYQ-5 data
analysis center or in any shelter, tent, or building the G2 considers
appropriate. Since both power boxes, the power conditioner, and the
standby power supply, have surge protectors, the system is powered by
either commercial power or a filed generator. Both styles of VDP and
power box are shown, but only one VDP and one power box comes with each
system.

In addition to the eight basic components shown in Figure B-4, two

special components are available. The VCR and PTR/P are issued on a 1:3
t o 1 : 4 r a t i o ; one component for every three or four MICROFIX systems. The
VCR is used to backup and restore the entire 20 megabyte memory of the
hard disk. The PTR/P is used to cut a five or seven band of paper tape.
The message is generated in the system’s word processor (Wordstar) and,
once properly edited, the MICROFIX system cuts the tape. Figure B-5
provides details on these two components.

B-8
View with Front-Loading Video Disk Player
and Standby Power Supply

Figure B-2. MICROFIX system.

B-9
1. HARD DISK SYSTEM. The Corvus 20 megabyte hard disk drive assembly stores and
mantains system software and the master data base.

2. MONOCHROME MONITOR. The monochrome monitor displays MICROFIX TEXT on a

screen in green or black.

3. COLOR MONITOR. The amdck color monitor displays color graphic data. This includes
video disk maps and military symbology.

4. PRINTING. The Apple Dot Matrix Printer operates at 120 characters per second (CPS) and has
graphics capability.

5. VIDEO DISK PLAYER. The VDP reads photos or map sheets from a laser disk, using the same
technology as used on a compact disk player. The photos of the map sheets are displayed on
the color monitor.

6. APPLE II PLUS MICROCOMPUTER. The microcomputer is capable of controlling a large

complement of peripheral equipment while operating in a field environment.

7. KEYBOARD. The keyboard assembly uses a full 128 ASCI character set, joystick and
enhancer board. This equipment provides upper and lower case letter and number capability, in
addition to auto-repeat keying.

8. POWER BOX. The older grey power conditioner has eight outlets on its top, assure protector
and the capability to work with 110 or 220 volts. The newer green standby power supply has six
outlets in the rear panel, a surge protector, a built-in battery pack capable of providing 20-25
minutes of uninterrupted power but works only with 110 volts.

9. VIDEO CASSETTE RECORDER. (Not shown in Figure B-2.) The VCR is used to initialize
the system (hard disk) and acts as a backup or restore device for the hard disk drive assembly.
This expands the potential data base capability of MICRO FIX. The VCR initiatea hard disks and
backups which are quicker and easier to use than floppy disks. VCRs are issued with every three
to four systems, or one per installation.

10. PAPER TAPE READER/PUNCH. (Not shown in Figure B-2.) The paper tape reader/punch
(PTR/P) punches a paper tape coPy of messages prepared on the MICROFIX for transmission
over tactical RATT systems. It also reads paper tape. PTR/P equipment is issued with every
three to four systems, or one per installation.

Figure B-3. MICROFIX hardware components.

8-10
Figure B-4. Eight components of MICROFIX.

Figure B-5. Additional MICRO FIX components.

B-II
 MICROFIX SOFTWARE

MICROFIX software provides analysts with the ability to collect,

consolidate, and retrieve information in the area of all-source
production, SIGINT, counter-SIGINT, OPSEC, and topographic analysis.
The analyst uses MICROFIX software to organize information into
categories which facilitate rapid and meaningful analysis. The MICROFIX
software provides the ability to manipulate records in various data
bases, display tactical overlays on the color monitor, cross-correlate
data from different data bases, and print reports. Figure B-6 shows the
baseline software (those files which are found on all MICROFIX systems).

I DATABASEAPPLICATIONS

B-12
 The primary advantage of the MICROFIX system is that it provides the
tools to manipulate and retrieve data quickly and accurately. It gives
the analyst the ability to access a much larger collection of data with
more speed than manual systems provide. New information is added to
e x i s t i n g d a t a b a s e s , new data bases are created, and old or inaccurate
data are deleted. Graphic overlays allow the analyst to visually test
theories and develop or discard hypotheses. Hard-copy printouts of text
i n f o r m a t i o n , produced at each developmental stage of the analysis process,
provide verification of the logic used to develop the final intelligence
products and also serve as source documents for historical record-keeping
purposes.

Figure B-6 shows all the applications that constitute the software
package known as the all-source production system (ASPS). The baseline
software package forms the foundation for alI the other configurations.
The additional software packages are explained in the order in which they
were released.

Topographic Workstation

Members of the terra n analysis team use the topographic workstation.

The topographic software h a s a l l t h e a p p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e b a s e l i n e p l u s t w o
topographic-specific app ications: Topo and Topows. These applications
al low the user to use digital terrain mapping features (tinted elevation,
s l o p e , o r s p e e d o v e r l a y s ; L O S p r o f i I e ; oblique view; perspective view and
v i s i b l e a r e a p l o t ) ; weather and environment features (sun rise and set,
phases of the moon; NBC and smoke calculations; affect of weather on n i g h t
v i s i o n d e v i c e s , e e c t r o - o p t i c s e n s o r s , a n d d e n s i t y a l t i t u d e c a l c u l a t ons) ;
and a mobility ca culator for friendly and enemy wheeled and tracked .,
vehicles.

Techn cal Control and Analysis Element Workstation

SIGINT analysts use the TCAE workstation. TCAE software has all the
applications of baseline so t w a r e P I U S f i v e S I G I N T - s p e c i f i c a p p l i c a t ens:
0
Fix. Allows the user to input and plot lines of bear ng and s t e
locations. The program will calculate and plot the e I i p s e o f the
intercepts.

0
Place. The automated gazetteer.

0
COMINT working aid. A collection of four data bases (frequency,
call sign, code word, and case notation) that al lows correlation
across each other.

0
ELINT working aid. An automated ELINT parameters list (EPL).

0
DATEXT. The data extract (DATEXT) program allows the user to
create a subset from a fiIe of messages. DATEXT allows the user to
identify several key words, phrases, and numbers to cuII the entire
file down to a subset of messages which deal with the topic of
interest.

B-13
 Counterintelligence Workstation

The counter-SIGINT analyst uses the Cl workstation. The name of the

workstation is a misnomer as the Cl workstation is appropriate only for
the 97G. Cl workstation software has all the applications of the baseline
software plus 11 counter-SIGINT-specific applications:

0
F r i e n d y and enemy antenna systems.

0
F r i e n d y and enemy SIGINT and REC unit OB.

0
F r i e n d y and enemy SIGINT and REC unit location.

0
Friendly and enemy SIGINT and REC organization by doctrine.
0
Friendly and enemy emitter and coIIector’s characteristics.

0
Enemy fixed station location.

OPSEC Workstation

The OPSEC workstation is designed for use by the intelligence analyst

and supporting the OPSEC staff element. Specific characteristics of the
OPSEC workstation are uncertain.

DISTRIBUTION OF MICROFIX CONFIGURATIONS

Tables B-1 and B-2 depict the number of systems at each echelon. Also
shown is a recommended distribution of the various workstation
configurations.

Table B-1. Workstation distribution (mid- to high-intensity conflict).

B-14
 Table B-2. Workstation distribution (low- to mid-intensity conflict).

TOTAL ASPS TCAE cl OPSEC TOPO

Theater
Corps
Division 7 2 1 lor2 2or3 1
SEP BDE or ACR 2 Oorl Oorl 1

The G2 determines specifi c al location of workstations for a given

exercise or requirement.

UT ILIZATION OF MICROFIX

Methods of using the MICROFIX system are limited only by the user’s
imagination. Several units are innovators in their use of the system.
Some examples are--

0 Printing the entire OB file (or selected enemy units) for use as
an OB book. Updating the OB book is easier by doing the additions,
deletions, or changes on the computer and then printing the updated
or added records.

0 Printing the unit hierarchy report for the enemy units your unit
is facing. This report includes unit name, parent unit name,
l o c a t i o n , and DTG of Iast ’siting. Gaps in your intelligence
holdings become very evident since the computer prints a blank space
for missing data. This report provides guidance to CM&D, provides a
quick reference for RlIs from adjacent and higher units and, by
posting a copy beside the SITMAP, acts as a quick reference guide
for locating enemy units.

0
Using the location history function to plot the location histories
of key enemy units (that is, independent tank battal ions, RAGs,
DAGs, BMP-equipped MRRs) on the color map screen. Plotting the
movement history of these units provides an indication or
confirmation of enemy commander’s intent. Location history also
indicates variances to doctrinal rates of march. This alone
provides key indications to the enemy commander’s intent or the
terrain and weather influenced limitations not previously identified
in the IPB.

0 A f t e r d o i n g y o u r I P B i n g a r r i s o n , various options of enemy attack

are conjectured. These various options are then templated over the
terrain. Each option then is drawn on the color map using the
sketch function and saved for immediate recalI . When the exercise
s c e n a r i o (or r e a l c o m b a t ) c o n f i r m s o n e o f y o u r t e m p l a t e d o p t i o n s ,
considerable time is saved in analyzing the AAs.

B-15
 APPENDIX C

INDICATORS OF ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

Indicators are any positive or negative evidence of enemy activity or

any characteristic of the AO that points toward enemy capabilities,
vulnerabil ities, or intentions. Individual indicators cannot stand
alone. Each indicator is integrated with other factors and indicators
before patterns are detected and enemy intentions established. Indicators
are developed by the ASPS analysts who are assisted by other TOC elements
in the G2 or S2 section. All indicators are developed to answer the
commander’s PIR and IR. The analyst uses indicators to correlate
particular events or activities with probable enemy courses of action.

Indicators are also used to determine what events or activities occur

for an enemy to follow a particular course of action. The ability to read
indicators (including recognition of enemy deception indicators)
contributes to the success of friendly operations.

Enemy deception operations provide indicators in an attempt to create

false or misleading patterns of enemy intentions. Analysts detect these
false indicators and then determine what actual courses of action the
enemy is attempting to initiate. Enemy attempts at deception are
d i s c o v e r e d b y c o m p a r i n g i n d i c a t o r s , i n t e l l i g e n c e , and combat information
from all sources to arrive at an accurate picture of the battlefield.

INTELLIGENCE INDICATORS

Tables C-1 through C-7 show different types of intelligence

indicators. These lists of indicators are b y n o m e a n s c o m p l e t e , n o r a r e
t h e y i n t e n d e d t o a p p l y t o a l l s i t u a t i o n s or alI types of enemy forces.
They give some types of indicators which when incorporated with other
i n d i c a t o r s , creates patterns or suggests a s e r i e s o f a c t i v i t i e s w h i c h
p o i n t t o t y p i c a l e n e m y a c t i v i t i e s o r C O Ur s e s o f a c t i o n . A n a l y s t s a r e
prepared to develop their own indicator ists for the specific situations
which confront them.

TableC-l. Enemy offensive indicators.

ACTIVITY EXPLANATION

Massing of motorized elements, Areas of secondary importance are often

tanks, artillery, and logistical denuded to mass maximum strength for the
support. main effort.

Deployment of combat element Normal attack formation provides for

(motorized rifle, armor, the second echelon of the regiment to
antitank (AT)) echelons on a be located 5-15 km in the rear of the
relatively narrow frontage. first echelon, on-line; and the
division second echelon 15-30 km in the
rear of the first echelon.

c-1
 Table C-1. Enemy offensive Indicators (continued).
ACTIVITY EXPLANAT10N

Forward units disposed on A MRR breakthrough zone is from 2-4 km

relatively narrow fronts and within an assigned attack frontage,
depths. which varies from 3-8 km. MRR
headquarters located approximately 4 km
from the FLOT during normal attack
posture.

Concentration of mass toward Single or double envelopment normally

e ther or both flanks within is attempted in the offense. Tanks and
f rst echelon defensive area. m o t o r i z e d u n i t s o n e i t h e r o r b o t h f anks
may indicate single or double
envelopment.

Demonstrations and feints. Loca I , s m a l l - s c a l e a t t a c k s o r

demonstrations involving motorized rifle
units, tanks, and artillery frequently
precede a general attack.

Establishment and strengthening Counterreconnaissance screens are

counterreconna issance screen. used to cover possible assembly areas,
routes of troop movement, or regrouping
of forces to be used in the attack.

Forward movement of hostile Before launching an attack, troops

units. may be moved to assembly areas from
which they can deploy.

Increased patrolling (ground Patrolling by motorized rifle units

reconnaissance) . usually is more active before an attack.

Forward CPS located Preceding an attack, an auxiliary CP

close to the FLOT. Other is establ ished, if needed, by Army or
CPS move forward. front. The division main CP is located
5-15 km from the FLOT; the division
forward CP is located 5 km from the
FLOT; the regiment main CP is located
2-3 km from the FLOT; and the battalion
CP or OP is located 500-1,000 m from the
F LOT.

Locating a division-sized OMGS are formed preceding an offensive

operation maneuver group operation. They are generally committed
(OMG) at Army; Army-sized OMG before the conclusion of the first
at front. echelon battle and operate independently
of the main forces. OMGS use a separate
axis of advance from the main body.

c-2
 Table C-1. Enemy offensive Indicators (continued).

ACTIVITY EXPLANAT 10N

Massing of artillery units. Large RAGs, DAGs, and Army artillery

groups (AAGs) indicate initiation of
main attack. Enemy norms are 60-100
tubes per kilometer of frontage against
wel l-prepared defenses for main attack;
60-80 tubes per kilometer of frontage
against hasty defenses for main attack;
and 40 tubes per kilometer frontage for
secondary attack. The RAG is usually
located 1-4 km from the FLOT; the DAG
usually 3-6 km from the FLOT; and the
AAG is usually more than 6 km from the
FLOT . AAGs are formed only in the
offense and only to support the main
attack. TMS-65 are within 4 km of the
FLOT for smoke operations.

Extensive artillery preparation The offense is built around the

of up to 50 minutes in duration. striking power and shock of massed
artillery. Preparations of 1/2 to 1
hour normally precede an offensive.

Dispersal of tanks and self- Tanks accompanying leading waves of

propelled howitzers to units. assault motorized units--with motorized
self-propelled howitzers following the
tanks closely, by bounds.

Movement of fire and missile Enemy SAM control radars

forward. require time to be set up and oriented.
The enemy prefers to establish SAM
capability before moving other forces
forward. In the event of the arrival of
the second echelon, control radars are
establ ished to allow for an overlap of
coverage as the first echelon moves
their SAM radars forward in the offense.

FROG, SS-21, SS-23, and SCUD Enemy offensive operations also occur
units located forward. in-depth. Forward movement of SSMS puts
friendly airfields and depots in
jeopardy.

2 to 4 ZSU-23-4S located in Medium AD guns are displaced before

forward areas. attack to protect assault forces and to
facilitate forward displacement during
the attack. ZSU 23-4s protecting the
leading battalions are approximately
1.25 km to the rear of the FLOT.

c-3
 Table C-1. Enemy offensive indicators (continued).
ACTIVITY EXPLANAT 10N

Increased air reconnaissance, Air reconnaissance usually is more active

before an attack.

Systematic air bombardment. B e f o r e t h e a t t a c k , the enemy may engage

in the systematic “softening up” of key
positions by bombardment,

Establishment of auxiliary Buildup of logistics and maintenance

airfields or activation of capabiIity indicates increased
inactive air fields. capabiIity to support offense.

Clearing lanes through Lanes are cleared and marked through

obstacles within own position. mined areas, and ramps and bridges
prepared over ditches and trenches within
enemy’s own position. This is done
before attack to facilitate forward
movement and grouping, particularly at
night.

Reconnaissance and destruction Usually on the night preceding an attack,

of obstacles that are part of enemy patrols reconnoiter friendly
our defenses. obstacles to determine a plan for
clearing lanes. The patrol destroys only
such obstacles that wiII not disclose the
direction of the main attack.

River assault crossing units Amphibious, bridge, and other engineer

located forward (providing there units with water-crossing capabilities
is a water obstacle) . are located near the FLOT and also
echeloned to the rear. They are also
collocated with other tactical units of
the attacking force.

Airborne, airmobile, and air The enemy conducts offensive operations

a s s a u l t a t t a c k s o n o u r r e a r a r e a . throughout the depth of the defense.
Heliborne attacks are also made to
facilitate difficult operations, like
river crossings.

Increased enemy agent activity The enemy attempts to prevent or disrupt

in rear area. the forward movement of friendly
supplies, equipment, maintenance, and
reinforcements.

Extensive efforts to destroy Enemy doctrine calls for the

nuclear storage areas and elimination of friendly nuclear weapons
delivery systems by air, by any means. The enemy considers that
a r t i l l e r y , and sabotage. we are more Iikely to use nuclear weapons
when we are in the defense.

c-4
 Table C-1. Enemy offensive indicators (continua).

ACTIVITY EXPLANAT 10N

Movement of noncombatants out Noncombatants hinder rapid forward

of the combat zone. movement of follow-on forces.

Conducting drills and rehearsals Major attacks may be preceded by drills

in rear areas. or rehearsals. This is particularly
true of attacks against fortified
positions or strongly defended river
lines.

Increased activity in rear Before an attack, supply and

areas. administrative activities increase in
the rear areas.

Traffic control units marking Traffic control points are employed

routes to the FLOT. throughout the march routes to
facilitate march formations. Allied
border guards assist by controlling
traffic through the barrier areas of the
borders.

Forward placement of supply Supply and evacuation installations

and evacuation instalIations. usualIy are located welI forward for an
attack, Technical observation points
are established close to the FLOT.
Repair and evacuation groups are located
at assembly points close to the FLOT to
repair or evacuate damaged vehicles.
The division supply point (ammunition,
p e t r o l e u m , o i l , and lubricants (POL),
rations) is located 25-30 km from FLOT.
The regimental amrnunition supply point
is located 10-15 km from the FLOT; the
regimental repair point is located
10-15 km from the FLOT; the regimental
POL point is located 10-15 km from the
FLOT, and the regimental rations point
is located 10-15 km from the FLOT.
Battalion ammunition and rations supply
points are located 5 km from the FLOT.
The division repair point for tanks and
weapons is located 2-4 km from the
F LOT. The division repair point for
wheeled vehicles is located 10-14 km
from the FLOT. Rear control points for
the front are located 150-200 km from
the FLOT; for the Army are 25-40 km from
the FLOT; for the division is 20 km from
the FLOT; and for the regiment are 20 km
from the FLOT.

c-5
 Table C-1. Enemy offensive indicators (continued).
ACTIVITY EXPLANAT 10N

Location of maintenance parties When the enemy conducts a march, the

on lateral routes. enemy establishes several maintenance
parties on lateral routes to facilitate
march operations.

Medical points and stations Medical units move forward before an

move forward. offensive operation to support
anticipated medical and evacuation
requirements. Division medical points
and stations are located 10-14 km from
the FLOT; the regimental medical points
and station at 10-14 km from the FLOT;
and the battalion medical points and
station at 1.5-3 km from the FLOT.

Radio sil ence on nets organ c The enemy attempts to deny us

to the d v i s i o n . information which can be developed from
intercepting radio traffic.

Abnormal l o g i s t i c s t r a f f i c o n To expedite supplies to units about to

command nets. conduct a main attack, commanders may
get personally involved.

Dummy traffic in radio nets to The enemy will attempt to deceive us

cover unit moves. about the location of enemy forces.

Deception operations to cover Same as above.

unit movement.

Extensive smoke operations. Smoke operations mask the movement of

units during the period immediately
preceding an attack.

SIGINT and jamming assets SIGINT and jamming assets will move well
located forward. forward to within 2-4 km of the FEBA
before attack.

Extensive spot a n d b a r r a g e Extensive jamming will precede an

jamming of our f r o n t l i n e u n i t s ’ offense to cause the maximum disruption
communications n e t s , a s w e l l a s of our C 2 communications. However,
communications s y s t e m s jamming will cease when enemy forces
associated with tactical air reach our main defense area to prevent
control systems. interference with their own
communications systems.

C-6
 Table C-2. Enemy defensive indicators.

ACTIVITY EXPLANAT 10N

Preparation of battalion and Defense is based on holding prepared

company defense areas consisting of defensive areas and counterattacks by
company and platoon strong points. tank-heavy f o r c e s .

Extensive preparation of field The enemy makes extensive use of

fortifications. trenches, prepared positions, and
overhead cover in defensive
operations.

Formation of AT strongpoints AT strongpoints are formed in

in depth along avenues of depth along logical avenues of
logical approach. approach for armor. These are made
up of motorized rifle, engineer, and
AT gun and missile units with
positions strengthened by mines,
ditches, and other obstac es.

A t t a c h m e n t o f a d d i t i o n a l AT units In areas where there is a serious

to frontline defensive positions. armored threat, the enemy w i l l
concentrate as many as 25 AT guns for
every 1,000 m of front.

Preparation of alternate In normal defensive operations, three

artillery positions. positions are prepared for each
. firing battery.

Employment of roving artillery. Roving guns and batteries are part of

normal defensive operations.

Large tank heavy units located Tank units are held in assembly areas
in assembly areas to the rear. for employment in counterattacks.

P r e p a r a t i o n a n d o c c u p a t i o n of In the defense, a security zone and

defensive positions. main defense area are prepared and
occupied.

Presence of d e m o l i t i o n s , Demolitions, minefield, and other

contaminated areas, obstacl es, obstacles are placed to cover AA
minefield. to the position.

Deployment of motorized rif e Dominating terrain that has good

units on good defensive P O Si t i o n s . FofFs and is relatively inaccessible
Preparation of company to tanks usually is selected for a
strongpoints on key terrain defensive position.

c-7
 Table C-2. Enemy defensive indicators (continued).
ACTIVITY EXPLANATION

Prestocking ammunition and Prestocking ammunition reduces the

engineer supplies and equipment load on logistics throughout the
and fortification of buildings. system once the battle begins,
Engineer tools and equipment may be
used to dig trenches and to erect
obstacles.

Entrenching and erecting bands Digging of trenches and the erection

of wire. of wire indicate preparations to hold
the position.

Presence of dummy artillery Dummy artillery observation points

observation points. preserve the effectiveness of the
actual artillery positions by
deceiving us as to their location.

Presence of dummy CPS. Same as above.

Increased activity of SIGINT and Increased activity is an attempt to

ESM units but decreased activity gain information about us before the
of ECM units. attack.

Early warning sites hardened. When early warning sites are hardened,
it indicates the intention of those
forces to remain in place and to
protect an important facility.

CPS placed in hardened facili ty . Same as above.

Additional AT u n i t s a t t a c h e d The enemy puts great emphasis on

t o f i r s t e c h e on maneuver uni ts . killing tanks early. The enemy
believes that if the tanks can be
stopped, the attack will fail.

Establishment o f a s e c u r i t y A security zone is established to

zone. enable fortifications to be
constructed away from immediate danger
from our artillery and direct-fire
weapons.

Forward units disposed on The defense zone of an MRR varies

relatively wide fronts and depths from 10 to 15 km depending upon
compared to offensive posture. terrain and the combat availability of
forces. MRR depth varies from 7 t o
10 km.

C-8
 Table C-2. Enemy defensive indicators (continued).
ACTIVITY EXPLANATION

Displacement of logistics and Logistics and medical units are

units towards the rear. displaced to the rear to facilitate
combat force defense and counterattack
operations.

Displacement of artillery and SSM Artillery units are displaced toward

units towards the rear, the rear to reduce the chance that these
units wilI be lost or destroyed during
the preliminary stages of the battle.
During the defense, deep fires are not
as critical as during the offense.

Presence of large AT reserves Large AT reserves are established (with

with mobile obstacle MOD) to provide a quick reaction AT
detachments (MODS). capability.

Decreased communications The enemy places increased reliance on

intercepts (due to wire in the defense to increase security.
increased use of wire).

AD systems located in rear Destruction of logistics, command,

areas. and artillery units are high-priority
missions for our deep attacks,

Table C-3. Meeting engagement (movement to contact) indicators.

INDICATORS
ACTIVITY EXPLANATION
Increased air and ground Accurate information about routes
reconnaissance along MCS. speeds the advance.

Road junctions, bridges, and The enemy wants to control high-speed

other key features are occupied armor AAs into our key areas.
by either airborne forces or
forward detachments.

Increased counterreconnaissance Counterreconnaissance is an attempt to

activity. prevent us from gaining information about
enemy dispositions and movements.

Forward movement of columns The enemy prefers to use march

dispersed laterally in two or formation when moving to contact.
more MCS.

c-9
 Table C-4. Reinforcement indicators.
ACTIVITY EXPLANATION
Movement of additional troops This action increases enemy’s present
toward the front. strength.

Increased traffic toward Increased traffic brings up additional

present position. troops, equipment, and supplies.

Identification of new units in The presence of new units--in addition

in the combat zone. to units already present--increases
enemy’s strength.

Additional CPS and supply and Presence of additional units causes an

evacuation instalIations. increase in the number of these
installations.

Logistical installations indicates preparation for the

moved welI forward. resumption of the offensive after
reinforcement.

Table C-5. Delaying action indicators.

ACTIVITY EXPLANATION
Withdrawal from defensive In delaying actions, units avoid
position(s) before becoming becoming decisively engaged.
heavily engaged.

Successive local counterattacks Counterattacks are employed o assist

with Iimited objectives. in disengaging first echelon units,
r a t h e r t h a n t o r e s t o r e p o s i t on.

Counterattacks broken off before Same as above.

position is restored.

Maximum firepower positioned Long-range fires facilitate the

forward; f i r i n g i n i t i a t e d a t l o n g delaying action.
ranges.

Frontages up to four times that Forces conducting a delaying action

normalIy assigned to units on the are normalIy assigned frontages in
defensive. excess of that normal for enemy units
on the defense.

Prepositioni ng of nuclear Prepositioning nuclear weapons

weapons. facilitates the delaying action.

Discovery of dummy minefield. Dummy minefield are easier and faster

to prepare than active fields but
cause approximately the same delay to
advancing pursuers.

C-l0
 Table C-6. Withdrawal indicators.
Indications for withdrawal are generalIy the same as those for delaying
action with the addition of the following indicators,

ACTIVITY EXPLANATION

Systematic destruction of bridges, Deliberate demolition and scorched

communication faciIities and other earth tactics may be employed in
assets in enemy-held territory. military withdrawals.

Establishment of a covering force Cover movement or withdrawal of

and rear guard. main body. The rear guard fights
delaying action, if required,

Increased use of night-driving The enemy will attempt to withdraw at

devices in all areas. night, if possible.

Minimum logistical and medical Nonessential logistics and medical

services. services are withdrawn first.

Marking withdrawal routes. Movement and location of traffic

control units or parties to the rear
along the LOCS that are to be used by
major units.

Use of contaminated areas to Contamination hinders reconnaissance

camouflage forces and cover and pursuit.
withdrawal .

Presence of rear guard and Minimizes losses and permits main body
covering force. more freedom of movement.

Preparation of future defensive If the withdrawal is deliberate, the

lines behind main defensive enemy wilI want new positions ready
structure. before withdrawing.

Jamming or destruction of Battlefield surveillance radars are

friendly air and ground capable of detecting withdrawals at
battlefield surveillance radars. night or during conditions of poor
visibility.

Engineer reconnaissance and Withdrawing forces will begin to

MOD detected along LOCs, tunnels, systematically destroy alI crossings
b u i l t - u p a r e a s , dams, and dikes. and implement obstacles as they
withdraw.

C-II
 Table C-6. Withdrawal Indicators (continued).
ACTIVITY EXPLANAT 10N
Stockpiling of explosives at Wit h d r a w i n g f o r c e s w i l l a t t e m p t t o
central points. Distribution of, de a y p u r s u i t w i t h o b s t a c l e s ,
and the establishment of, smalI
dumps of explosives and Iandmines
near bridges, possible abatis
s i t e s , and other demolition target
sites.

Preparation of target for Same as above.

systematic or hasty destruction.

Deception operations, such as Withdrawing units will attempt to

dummy radio traffic. portray a normal defense.

Smoke operations to cover Withdrawals must be unobserved to be

withdrawal operations. effective.

Rearward movement of long-range Long-range artillery will be moved

artillery. back to new positions before the
withdrawal takes place

Movement of small reconnai ssance Withdrawing units need c u r r e n t

parties to the rear. reconnaissance along w thdrawa
routes.

Displacement to the rear of Logistics are withdrawn first to avoid

emitters associated with being overrun during a possible
logistics units. Destruction pursuit.
or removal of logistic material
from existing depot and dump
locations to the rear.

C-12
 Table C-7. Nuclear weapons indicators.

ACTIVITY EXPLANAT 10N

Heavily guarded movement of Movement of supplies, equipment, and

supplies, equipment, and material . material of nuclear nature requires
special security measures.

Heavily guarded installations. Sites for storage of nuclear supplies

and the locations of del ivery units
are heavily guarded.

Preparation of heavy artillery Primary and alternate positions for

positions. nuclear del ivery artilIery are
prepared before movement of the units.

Movement of small, heavily guarded Nuclear warheads are moved under heavy
convoys, including closed vans, security, usualIy in closed vans.
with a high percentage of Escort vehicles are equipped with
automatic weapons. machine guns.

Light aircraft circling over Nuclear warhead convoys often use

moving convoy. aerial radio relays to maintain
communication.

Movement of small groups of Nuclear warheads may be moved by

heavily armed hel icopters h e l i c o p t e r s , with guards and armed
escorted by tact c a t f i g h t e r s . helicopters as escort, Tactical
aircraft may provide air cover.

Movement of trai e r s w i t h r o c k e t s Trailers are used to resupply missile

or missile bodies. and rocket units.

Identification of tall, slender Ballistic missiles may be camouflaged

objects, like towers, chimneys, as towers, chimneys, or narrow trees,
or narrow trees, not previously such as poplars.
,
in the area.

Large, well-guarded complexes, SSM units require extensive ground

including tanks, trucks, radars, handling equipment.
electronic equipment, generators,
and maintenance tents, located
wel I to the rear.

Evacuation or exclusion of Civilians may be evacuated from

civilians from specific areas areas selected for nuclear storage or
suitable for nuclear storage or delivery sites.
delivery sites.

C-13
 Table C-7. Nuclear weapons indicators (continued).
ACTIVITY EXPLANAT 10N
Presence of meteorological radars. An END TRAY radar is part of the
organic equipment of both the free
rocket over ground (FROG) and SS-1c
SCUD systems, as wel 1 as other
nuclear-capable systems. (END TRAYS
also are found with conventional
artillery and AF units.)

Construction of FROG, SCUD, or All of these systems have confirmed

SCALEBOARD, SS-21 or SS-23 n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t i e s . A survey-
launch positions. controlled launch position is
constructed for each
transporter-erector-launcher (TEL)
before occupation.

Movement of SSM TELs to a launch SSM TELs remain in camouflaged

site within 1/3 to 1/2 maximum positions until movement to the launch
range from the FLOT. area.

Passage of wind data from Enemy SSM accuracy is heavily

mid-range position to a command dependent on wind data.
or technical element.

Passage of a nonsense word over May be a code word relative to

command and selected fire preparation for or execution of a
control nets. nuclear fire mission.

Volume of traffic on command nets May reflect passage of strike warnings

suddenly increasing then dropping followed by preparation for electro-
to a low level or standdown. magnetic pulse protective measures.

Identification of SSM Presence of nuclear-capable systems.

unit-peculiar equipment.

Limited withdrawal of frontline Frontline units may withdraw for a

units without apparent tactical limited distance to avoid casualties
reason. from close-in nuclear explosives.

Sudden and energetic digging Prior to use of nuclear weapons,

in enemy areas. frontline units may be ordered to dig
deeper foxholes or take other
individual protective measures.

C-14
 Table C-7. Nuclear weapons indicators (continued).

ACTIVITY EXPLANAT 10N

Large concentrations of radios, Concentration of equipment is

radars, and other electronic necessary to guide and control guided
equipment located in the vicinity m i s s i l e s , which must be located in
of suitable sites for guided close proximity of the launching site.
missile launching.

Sudden increase in commun c a t i o n s Increase may be incident to del very

and electronic activity. of nuclear weapons, for example I ast
minute orders and warnings, and use of
electronic guidance and control

Use of smoke cover on front-line Smoke may be used to protect troops

troops. against thermal effects of weapons
used in close support.

Disappearance of known enemy Prior to nuclear attack of an area

agents from specific areas. agents may be ordered to leave the
area.

Increased or unusual air activity. Delivery of nuclear weapons by air ma Y

require a temporary degree of Iota
air superiority, special photo
mission, o r p r a c t i c e f l i g h t p a t t e r n
runs by the del ivery aircraft.

Additional AT elements Enemy will expect friendly forces

with first echelon units. to react to indications of a nuclear
strike with an attack of tank-heavy
forces. Also, tanks have greater
survivability under nuclear
conditions.

Movement of small convoys from Warheads being moved to be mated to

the warhead storage areas. missiles.

Removal of antennas and other To prevent blast damage.

equipment mounted on the
exterior of vehicles

Lowering of windshie ds on See above.

vehicles.

Removal of camouflage nets. See above.

Movement of vehicles to reverse See above.

slopes.

C-15
 Table C-7. Nuclear weapons indicators (continued).

ACTIVITY EXPLANAT 10N

Location of missile and free Missile and free rocket units are
rocket units within striking located within one third of the
distances. maximum range from the I ine of contact
on the offense, and one half of the
maximum range on the defense.

Use of missiles or rockets Missiles or free rockets may be used

with high-explosive warheads. to deliver high-explosive warheads
either in a normal support role or in
a registration.

Location of very heavy artillery Nuclear delivery artillery is located

within supporting distance of within one third of its maximum range
front lines. from the line of contract on the
o f f e n s e , and one half of the maximum
range on the defense.

Registration of very heavy Registration may be conducted using

artillery. smoke and low charge or high explosive
projectiles prior to firing a nuclear
projectile.

Special or unusual activity by Frontline troops may construct

frontline troops. special positions, usually deep or
covered foxholes, before enemy use of
nuclear weapons.

AD weapons are deployed to Enemy expects friendly air to attempt

cover possible warhead storage to destroy nuclear warheads in
areas. storage.

Use of high-explosive warheads Indicates presence of nuclear-capable

from SSMs-or heavy art iIlery in systems.
a normal support role.

Use of missile-associat ed terms See above.

on selected radio nets

Preparation of future launching See above.

positions.

Inability to locate previous Y May be moving to f i r i n g p o s i t i o n s .

identified missile units.

Additional administrative, If these nets can b e i d e n t i f i e d a s

command, f i r e c o n t r o l , a n d n u c l e a r - r e l a t e d , they indicate the
logistics nets identified in presence of nuclear-capable units.
the area of interest.

C-16
 Table C-7. Nuclear weapons Indicator (continued).
ACTIVITY EXPLANATION
Presence of heavy artillery, 203 mm SP gun, 240 mm SP mortar, and
towed 203 and 240 have nuclear
delivery capabilities, as do 152 mm SP
guns.

Deployment of jamming assets. Jammers are deployed to protect

critical targets like nuclear units.

C-17
 INSURGENT ACTIVITY INDICATORS

Anything that insurgents do to influence and direct a society toward

overthrowing its government is reflected by some action or indication, no
matter how subtle. These occurrences are referred to as insurgent
activity indicators. By recognizing these indicators, it is possible to
obtain the first clues to insurgent existence and then evidence of the
growth of the insurgent movement. Because there is a great deal of
legitimate activity, there is a requirement to determine which of the
various sociological, economical, political, and other activities
represent insurgent activity.

It is not possible to provide an all-inclusive listing of insurgency

indicators because there are too many possibiIities existing in the many
nations of the world. The following indicators, however, do provide a
beginning framework for a detailed analysis of any particular country.
The greater the perception of an insurgency situation within a particular
country and the greater the knowledge of the insurgent involved, the
easier it is to identify the insurgent activity indicators.

These indicators serve as a guide for intelligence officers and

analysts in developing appropriate clues to insurgent activity in a
particular area. Isolated actions of seemingly little significance in one
area show a pattern of an emerging insurgency when coordinated with
reports of indicators from other areas. In developing indicators, or
using these suggested ones, it is important to remember that insurgent
strategy suddenly changes. The insurgent threat unfolds along altogether
different lines simultaneously or suddenly switches from use of military
force, for example, to a political example, to a political offensive.
Such a development is dangerous if it makes the general situation appear
to be much less critical than it” really is. The development o f
appropriate indicators not only indicates that an insurgency or potential
i n s u r g e n t s i t u a t i o n e x i s t s , b u t a l s o i d e n t i f i e s a n y p r o b l e m s and
dissatisfaction of the people. The elimination or effective control of
insurgency is based on coordinated internal defense and deve opment (IDAD
programs which address identified problems or potential prob ems. Before
these programs are developed, the threat is defined. To def ne the
threat, you first establish insurgent activity indicators.

RURAL INSURGENT ACTIVITY

A r u r a l a r e a i n c l u d e s a l l f a r m i n g a r e a s , any town or village up to

5,000 people, and any town or village up to 20,000 people with a
farm-based economy where the townspeople, if not engaged in farming, earn
their livelihood in agricultural service industries. In such areas, where
t h e i n t e r e s t s a r e s o i n t e r d e p e n d e n t , insurgency indicators would be
simi Iar in both the town and countryside. This is not to say that rural
insurgency is not directed by urban insurgents and coordinated with urban
i ns( rgency; however, some theorists emphasize that the key to success is
the c o u n t r y s i d e a n d t h e r u r a l p o p u l a t i o n . I n such cases, early insurgency
i nd caters are found in the rural areas where the subvers ve insurgents
are c o n c e n t r a t i n g t h e i r i n i t i a l e f f o r t s .

C-18
 During the development of a subversive insurgency, some of the first
indicators of latent or incipient insurgency appear in the rural areas.
While some of these indicators are rather obvious, some are not. For the
sake of simplicity, these indicators of insurgency are placed into four
categories: population, propaganda, commodity, and environmental.

Population

Population indicators are broken down further into subcategories of

general activity, insurgent-promoted activity, and activity directed
against the government.

General Activity. This includes--

0
Identification of insurgents, their supporters, and sympathizers
who suddenly appear in, or move out of, an area.

0
New faces in the community.

0
Unusual gatherings among the population.

0
Disruption of normal social patterns.

Insurgent-Promoted Activities. This includes--

0
R e f u s a l o f p e a s a n t s t o p a y r e n t , taxes, or loan payments or
unusual difficulty in the collection of same.
0
Trends of demonstrated hosti I ity on the part of the local
population toward government forces.
0
Occurrence of actions previously considered taboo by the POPU ace.

0
Disappearance of the population from or avoidance by the peep e of
certain areas.

0
Unexplained disappearance or dislocation of young people.

Activity Directed Against the Government. This includes--

0
Strangers attempting to join local security forces.

0
Reports of the people being approached for purposes of
intelIigence recruitment.

0
Unusual short absences of government employees.
0
Failure of police and informant nets to report properly.

0
Growth of general hostiIity toward the government.

C-19
 0
U n e x p l a i n e d d e s t r u c t i o n or l o s s o f g o v e r n m e n t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n
papers or passports and increased forgeries thereof,

° Closing of rural schools.

o
Murder and kidnapping of local government officials.

Propaganda

Propaganda indicators are broken down further into subcategories of

general activity and activity directed against the established government,
n a t i o n a l m i l i t a r y f o r c e s , and the educational system:

General Propaganda Indicators. This includes--

0
Dissident propaganda from unidentified sources.

0
Increase in the number of entertainers with a political message.

0
Increasing religious unrest.

0
Increased agitation on issues for which there is no identified
movement or organization.

0
Renewed activity by insurgent organizations thought to be dormant.

0
Circulation of petitions advocating usual insurgent demands.

0
Reports from other countries that the country is ready for

revolution.

Directed Against the Established Government. This includes--

0
Attempts to discredit and ridicule national or public officials.

0
Attempts to discredit the judicial system and POI ice
organizations.

0
Characterization of government leaders as puppets and tools of a
foreign government.

0
Movement to remove strong anti insurgency leaders.

0
A g i t a t i o n a g a i n s t g o v e r n m e n t p r o j e c t s a n d p ans.

0
Rumors designed to gain public acceptance o’ untruths about the
government or governmental leaders.

0
Advocacy of popular front government.

C-20
 Directed Against the National Military Forces. This includes--

0
Attacks which embarrass or ridicule military officials.

0 Characterization of military leaders as puppets and tools of a

foreign government.

Q Movement to remove strong anti insurgency leaders from the

military.

0
Propaganda directed toward youth to refrain them from joining the
military service or propaganda directed at soldiers to desert.

0
Characterization of the armed forces as the enemy of the people.

0
Civilian avoidance of and reluctance to cooperate with the
military.

Directed Against the Educational System. This includes--

0
Appearance of questionable doctrine in the educational system.
0
Charges by students and others that the educational system is not
adequate and is only training the youth of the nation to do the
government’s bidding.

Commodity

. Commodity indicators are broken down further into crops, animals, arms
and ammunition, clothing, drugs and medicine, and communication activity
subcategories.

Crops. This includes--

0 Diversion of crops from the market.

0 Unexplained decrease in the marketing of a given crop.

0 Increased reports of pilfering foodstuffs.

0 Strangers attempting to purchase crops or produce.

0 Farmers marketing a crop that is smaller than usual, yet showing

no signs of subsequent financial difficulty.

0 Discovery of caches of staple foodstuffs.

0 Increase in crop prices indicating the existence of an insurgent

taxing authority in the area.

Animals. This includes--

0
Diversion of animals or meat from the market.

c-2 1
 0
Reports of loss of hides or diversion of hides from the market.

o
Disappearance of wild game from an area in which it was previously
plentiful.

o
Disappearance of pack animals or the appearance of unusual numbers
of pack animals in certain areas.

Arms and Ammunition. This includes--

0
increased loss of weapons by miIitary and poIice forces.

0
Increased thefts of weapons.

0
Discovery of arms caches.

0
Attacks on patrols resulting in loss of weapons and ammunition.

The above factors could be applied not only to weapons but also to any
similarly essential military goods.

Clothing. This includes--

0
Unusual scarcity of any type of material that could be used for
footwear. This could include such items as hides of animals and old
tires, in addition to manufactured footwear.

0
Discovery of caches of clothing or of materials which may be used
in the manufacture of clothing or uniforms.

Drugs and Medicine. This includes--

0
Scarcity of herbs and plants used in or for drugs and medicine.

0
Large-scale purchasing or theft of drugs and medicine and of the
herbs used in their manufacture.

Communications. This includes--

0
increases in purchase and use of radios.

0
D i s c o v e r y of caches of communications equipment.

0
Unusual increase in communications traffic in amateur radio
operations.

Environmental

The environmental indicators include--

0
Evidence of increased foot traffic in the a r e a .
0
Increased travel within and into remote or isolated areas.

c-22
 0
U n e x p l a i n e d t r a i l s a n d c o l d campsites.

e
Establishment of new, unexp a i n e d agricultural areas, or recently
cleared fields.

0
Unusual smoke, possibly indicating the presence of a campsite or
a form of communication.

0
Concentration of dead foliage in an area, possibly indicating use
of camouflage.

0
P r e s e n c e o f f o o t t r a p s , s p kes, and the ke.

0
P r e s e n c e o f o b s t a c l e s s u c h as those used n roadblocks and canal
blocks.

URBAN INSURGENT ACTIVITY

I nd caters of urban n s u r g e n t a c t i v i t y a l s o a r e p l a c e d i n t h e f o u r
categor es of population propaganda, commodity, and environmental
indicato r s . Many of the same or simiIar indicators appear for both rural
and urban areas.

Popu ation

Populat on indicators are broken down further into subcategories of

general act vity, insurgent-promoted activity, and activity directed
a g a i n s t t h e government.

General Activity. This includes--

0
I n c r e a s e i n s i z e o f e m b a s s y o r consulate staffs from a country or
countries which support insurgent groups.

0
Increase in staff and activities in pro insurgency-oriented
embassies or consulates in neighboring countries, including unusual
patterns in nature and volume of external communications (both
in-country and out-of-country).

0
I n c r e a s e d t r a v e l b y s u s p e c t e d subversives to
pro insurgency-oriented countr es or to countr es notably under
insurgent influence.

0
Influx of insurgent eaders, both foreign and domestic, into the
urban area.

0
R e p o r t s o f l o c a l s b e ng trained in pro insurgency-oriented
countries.

0
Increase in visitors from pro insurgency-oriented countries
(tourists, technicians, businessmen, and officials).

C-23
0
C l o s e c o n n e c t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e d i p l o m a t i c r e p r e s e n t a t ves of
pro insurgency-oriented countries and the insurgents.

0
Disappearance of known or suspected insurgents and d ss ident
elements.

0
Increase in insurgent youth gatherings.

0
H o s t i n g o f t r a d e f a i r s o r s i m i l a r a c t i v i t es by pro insurgency-
oriented countries.

0
Return of nationals from travel or study n pro insurgency-oriented
countries.

0
I n c r e a s e i n v sits t o u r b a n c e n t e r s b y r u r a l o f f i c i a l s a n d l e a d e r s
from areas of u n r e s t .

0
E s t a b l i s h m e n t of organizations (even very smal ) of unexplained
o r i g i n a n d o f unclear or nebulous aims.

0
E s t a b l i s h m e n t of a new organization to replace an exist ng
organizationa structure with identical aims.

0
A p p e a r a n c e o f many new members in established organizat ons I ke
labor unions,

o
Attempts by new groups to obtain control of established
organizations.

0
InfiItration of student organizations and unions by known
agitators.

0
Appearance of new organizations with titles stressing patriotism,
grievances, or interests of underprivileged or minority groups.

0
Reports of large donations to new or revamped organizations.

0
Reports of payments to locals for engaging in subversive
activities.

0
Reports of the formation of subversive paramilitary
organizations.

0
Use of grenades or other explosives in terrorist acts.

0
R e p o r t s o f i n s u r g e n t I i s t s of t a r g e t s f o r p l a n n e d t e r r o r i s t i c
acts.

0
Appearance of professional agitators in demonstrations that result
in violence.

0
E v i d e n c e o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t on of paid and armed demonstrators in
riots.

C-24
Insurgent-Promoted Activities. This includes--

0
Reported incidents of attempted recruitment of people to join new
movements or underground organizations.

0
Unexplained unavailabiIity or disappearance of doctors, printers,
and other special ists who may be working with and for the
insurgents.
0
Habitual criminals and unruly youths who seem to be acting with
and for the insurgents.

0
Increased unrest and agitation among laborers.

0
Inability or refusal of people to pay taxes.

0
Reports of extortion and other coercion by the insurgents to
obtain financial “donations” from the people.

0
Disappearance of young men from the city.

Activity Directed Against the Government. This inc u d e s - -

0
Failure of pol ice and informant nets to repor properly,
i n d i c a t i n g sources a r e s u p p o r t i n g t h e i n s u r g e n t s o r a r e a f r a i d o f
them.

0
Decreasing success of government agents in infiItrating subversive
organizations.

0
Assessination or disappearance of government agents.
0
Reports of increased attempts by insurgent representatives or
suspected subversives to make contact with local leaders or
government officials.

0
Reports of attempts to bribe or blackmail government and law
enforcement employees.
0
Reports of attempts to get classified information from government
officials or documents from government offices.

0
Leakage of classified information to news media.

0
Sudden improvement in financial status of certain government and
law enforcement employees.

0
Fai lure of government raids on suspected subversive meetings or
headquarters apparently because of forewarning.

0
Increased activity against the government and ts police, m nor ity
groups, foreigners, or similar groups.

C-25
 0
Demonstrate ons against government forces, scapegoat minority
g r o u p s , o r foreigners, designed to goad government forces into
a c t i n g a g a nst crowds.

o More artic es or advertisements in newspapers criticizing the

government

0 Growth of general hostility toward the government and law

enforcement agencies.

0 Occurrence of strikes in critical areas casting doubt upon the

ability of the government to maintain order and provide for the
needs of the people.

0 Unusual and unsatisfactorily explained absences of government

employees from their offices.

0 Sporadic, unexplained destruction, loss, or forgery of government

identification cards and passports.

0 Unexplained disruptions of public utilities.

0 Reports of extortion attempts on local leaders and businessmen.

0 Terrorist acts and threats against government and business

leaders.

0 Murder or kidnapping of government officials.

Propaganda

Propaganda categories are broken down further into categories of

general activity, and activity directed against the established
government, m i l i t a r y a n d p o l i c e , and educational systems.

General Activity. This includes--

0
Worldwide propaganda by proinsurgency-or iented countries
denouncing conditions and blaming the government of the targeted
country.

0
Appearance in-country of antigovernment slogans and pronouncements
by word of mouth, wall scribbling, posters, and leaflets.

o
Letter writing campaigns to newspapers and government officials
deploring undesirable conditions and blaming individuals in power.
0
Increased use of slogans pinpointing specific grievances.

0
Increased use of petitions demanding government redress of
grievances.

C-26
 o Circulation of petitions and pamphlets which appear to follow the
beliefs and policies of a foreign power.

0 More rumors, publications, or leaders from areas occupied by

migrants which focus upon lack of official concern about poor
conditions.

0 More agitation and unrest within the urban population for which
there is no logical explanation,

0 Appearance of committees and organizations whose leaders do not

seem to be from the urban area, yet who purport to speak for the
citizens of that area.

0 increased appeals directed at intensifying general religious

unrest in countries where reiigious competition exists.

0
Mass demonstrations where participants voice standard Communist
demands.

0
Announcements by foreign countries that the concerned country is
r i p e f o r “war of national iiteration, ” or words to that effect,

0 Propaganda linking local ethnic groups with those in neighboring

countries.

0 Clandestine in-country radio broadcasts worded to appeai to those

with special grievances or to underprivileged ethnic groups.

0 Use of bullhorns, truck-mounted loudspeakers, and other

sophisticated equipment in “spontaneous”’ demonstrations.

0 Presence of photographers other than newsmen among demonstrators.

0 Widespread propaganda which appeals for sympathetic reception or

participation in strikes or demonstrations.

0 R a l l i e s t o h o n o r “martyred” insurgents. Mass demonstrations

honoring revolutionary heroes or dates significant to insurgency.

0 Nationwide strikes tailed to demonstrate the strength of the

insurgent movement.

0 Sympathy strikes or demonstrations taking place outside the

country concerned.

Activity Directed Against the Established Government. This includes--

0
Radio propaganda from foreign countries, aimed at the target
country, accusing its government of failure to meet the needs and
desires of its people.

C-27
 0
Propaganda from foreign countries, aimed at the target country,
denouncing imperialism.
0
Demonstrations and violence in foreign countries against
e m b a s s i e s , o f f i c e s , and consulates of the target country or
countries which support its government.

0
Spreading accusations that the government is corrupt and
completely out of touch with the people.

0
Agitation against existing or proposed government projects and
plans.

0
Accusations that the government is a pawn of a foreign government.

0
C a l l s f o r a p o p u l a r f r o n t g o v e r n m e n t , i n c l u d ng new parties.

0
Character assassinations of top government o f i c i a l s .

0
Movement to remove strong anti insurgency leaders from office.

0
Strikes or work stoppages called to protect government actions.

Activity Directed Against the Military and Police. This includes--

0
S p r e a d i n g a c c u s a t i o n s t h a t t h e m i I i t a r y a n d p o l ce are corrupt and
completely out of touch with the people.

0
Character assassinations of miIitary and police o f f i c i a l s .

0
Movement to remove strong anti insurgency mi i ta y and police
leaders from the office.

0
Calling on the people to stop cooperating w th the military and
police.

0
D e l i b e r a t e a c t s t o p r o v o k e p o l i c e r e p r i s a l s during demonstrations
or strikes.

0
Accusations of police brutality or ineffectiveness or claims that
government forces initiated violence when demonstrations end in
riots.

0
Publication of photographs purporting to show repressive pol ice
practices.

Activity Directed Against the Educational System. This includes--

0
Student unrest manifested by new organizations, proclamations,
demonstrations, and strikes against authority.

0
Charges by students and others that the educational system is not
adequate and is only training youth to do the government’s bidding.

C-28

‘ \
\.\
 0
A p p e a r a n c e o f q u e s t enable doctrine in the educational system.

0
Clamor for personne changes in the educat onal system.

Commodity

Commodity indicators are broken down further into subcategories of

foods, arms and ammunition, clothing, and drugs.

Foods .
— This includes--

0
Scarce food supplies when there is no report of natural
impediments to agriculture
0
D e c l i n e o f f o o d s t u f f s i n a country or province where there is a
tolerated black market, wh ch indicates that the food is being
diverted.

0
Sudden shortages of preserved foods or items of food requiring
minimal storage facilities.

0
Failure of farmers to transport their products to the city,
indicating a fear of travel on the highways.

0
Large-scale purchasing of foodstuffs which may be by purchasing
agents for an insurgent movement.

Arms and Ammunition. This includes--

0
Increase in assaults on police and miIitary personnel which
results in thefts of weapons.
0
Increase in thefts and purchases of arms, ammunition, and
explosives.

0
Discovery of arms, ammunition, and explosives being c andest nely
manufactured, transported, or cached.

0
Increased purchase and theft from salvage yards of metal products
like pipe, casings, wire, spikes, snd nails.

0
Increased purchase of surplus miIitary goods.

0
Increase in demand for smalI arms and ammunition on the open
market.

0
Reports of large-scale purchasing of weapons, ammunition, and
material used in their manufacture.

0
Increase in piIfering of arms and ammunition from the government.
0
Increase in the number of armed robberies.

C-29
 0
Reports of theft or sudden shortages of chemicals which could be
used in the clandestine manufacture of explosives.

0
Appearance of arms manufactured in pro insurgency-oriented
countries.

Clothing. This includes--

o
Unusual systematic purchase of clothing materials which could be
used for the manufacture of insurgent uniforms or footwear.
0
Unusual scarcity of clothing or material used in the manufacture
of clothing and footwear.

0
Distribution of clothing to underprivileged classes by
organizations of recent or suspect origin.

9
Discovery of caches of uniform clothing.

Drugs. This includes--

o
Scarcity of drugs and medical supplies on the market or black
market.

0
Large-scale purchase or theft of drugs and other medical supplies,
0
Diversion of shipments of drugs.

Environmental

The environmental indicators include--

0
Apartments and housing being rented, but not Iived in as homes.

0
Slogans written on walIs, bridges, and streets.

0
Defacement of government and police information signs.

0
Disappearance of electrical Iines. Pollution of the urban area’s
water supply.
0
Terror ist acts against physical targets Iike bridges, dams,
airports, or buildings.

0
Changes in residence of suspected subversives.

0
Discovery of message drops.

0
A p a r t m e n t s and houses being used for purchases other than
residences.

0
Increased smuggling of currency, gold, gems, narcotics, medical
supplies, and arms into urban centers.

C-30
o
Reports that local currency is being bought up in world markets by
pro insurgency-oriented countries.

0
Appearance of abnormal amounts of counterfeit currency.

0
Increase in bank robberies.

0
Work stoppages or slowdowns in essential industries.

0
Marked decline in product quality in essential industries.

0
Marked increases in equipment f a i l u r e s i n e s s e n t i a l i n d u s t r i e s .

0
Mass strikes and sympathy str k e s i n e s s e n t i a l i n d u s t r i e s .

0
A p p e a r a n c e o f k n o w n a g i t a t o r s or suspected subversives in picket
lines.

0
Escalation of peaceful strikes to violence against property and
nonstriking personnel.

0
Explosions in essential utilities and industries,
0
Roadblocks and mines on main lines of communication.

0
Malicious damage to ndustrial products or factory math nery.

C-31
 APPENDIX D

ENEMY STRENGTH COMPUTATIONS

Enemy strength undergoes a continuous fluctuation between TOE-type

strengths and varying levels of force, unit, equipment, and personnel
strengths during the course of a battle, campaign, or war. These
f l u c t u a t i o n s a r e a r e s u l t o f u n i t , p e r s o n n e l , and equipment losses and the
enemy’s ability or inability to provide suitable replacements quickly and
consistently.

Enemy strength computations provide a method for estimating the level

of combat effectiveness of enemy forces. It is computed in terms of
committed forces, reinforcing and supporting units, and the number of
nuclear weapons and chemical and biological delivery systems suspected or
identified as being deployed within the friendly commandar’s AOS or Als.

Based on the analyst’s knowledge of enemy doctrine, OB, and current

information and intelIigence on enemy dispositions, locations, and
c a p a b i l i t i e s , the numbers of committed, r e i n f o r c i n g , a n d s u p p o r t i n g f o r c e s
is c o m p u t e d .

Once these enemy forces are determined, individual enemy units can be
identified or located and enemy strength computed. Personnel and
equipment strengths are described as percentages of known TOE-type
strengths, based upon reported enemy personnel and equipment losses and
known or estimated rates of replacement.

COMMITTED FORCES AND REINFORCEMENTS

C o m m i t t e d forces are those enemy ground units, currently in contact or

with which imminent contact is expected, whose area of employment is not
expected to change to counter the specific course of action selected by
the friendly commander. Committed forces may change disposition within
their area of employment, but no significant delay is involved in their
employment. Designation of enemy forces as committed forces depends
primarily upon their disposition, location at the time of the estimate,
the echelon at which the estimate is being prepared, and enemy doctrine.
Committed forces are either located, unlocated, identified, or
unidentified units.

Reinforcements are those enemy forces whose area of possible

employment against the friendly force depends on the friendly selection of
a specific course of action and on enemy capabilities. Reinforcements
include all known enemy forces which are neither committed against a
friendly force nor committed outside the friendly zone or sector, but
which reasonably are considered capable of closing with the friendly force
in time to affect the accomplishment of the mission.

Estimates of enemy NBC capabilities usually are prepared at field army

and higher headquarters. Units below field army level usually lack the
means to gather the information to make such estimates. They use the

D-1
estimates of the higher headquarters and modify them with available
information.

The determination of enemy NBC operation capabilities is based

primarily on estimates of numbers and types of weapons and amount and
types of agents available, knowledge of enemy doctrine, past experience,
and estimates of enemy capabilities involving the employment of ground
troops. It is rarely possible to estimate what portion of the available
enemy NBC effort may be used against a division or corps within a field
army or a command in the COMMZ. It is also rarely possible to estimate
the number of nuclear weapons the enemy is capable of using within a
period as short as one day. The period selected is a month or longer,
depending on the available information and past experience. The statement
of the enemy’s capability of using chemical and biological agents includes
the amount, type, and delivery means of available agents.

COMPUTING COMMITTED ENEMY UNITS

The commander and the operations officer use the information the G2 or
S2 provides on enemy comnitted forces and reinforcements for planning and
conducting tactical operations. Accurate information is particularly
important during the commander’s analysis of opposing courses of action.
For example, i n p l a n n i n g f o r a n a t t a c k , an overestimation of committed
enemy forces and an underestimation of enemy reinforcements could cause
the friendly commander to attack with a small reserve. The intelligence
officer’s error in computing committed and reinforcing forces could al low
the enemy to counterattack with an unexpectedly strong force, inflicting
unacceptable casualties upon the friendly force.
..
All uncommitted enemy forces are considered as reinforcements if they
are committed in time to affect the accomplishment of the mission. If
there is doubt as to whether an enemy unit is committed or reinforcing, it
is considered as a reinforcement. This reduces the risk of surprise.

Expressing strength in number of units, by type, within an enemy force

is stressed because it is a simple, reliable, and readily understood
method of computing enemy strength. At the same time, the OB analyst
cannot ignore individual unit strength computations. This is particularly
important in arriving at a true picture of the enemy’s strength.

Strength by type of unit includes the total number of enemy units

listed by category and type. Normally, enemy units are counted down to
and including two echelons below the friendly force’s level of command.
Some special purpose units three echelons below may also be counted.

Usually, an intelligence officer accounts for committed enemy forces

by the size of the enemy unit which is opposing the friendly elements. At
the most basic level, state the actual number of weapons systems. Against
an enemy army. a division G2 usually counts committed forces in terms of
b a t t a l i o n s ;a corps G2 in terms of regiments; and field army and higher
headquarters, i n t e r m s o f d i v i s i o n s . At headquarters above field army, a
statement of the number of armies and army groups is included. For

D-2
example, “The committed forces facing this army group consist of one army
group (3 combined arms armies with a total of 11 MRDs and 3 tank
d i v i s i o n s ) . . . . “ When committed forces, such as guerrillas, do not have
a known organization, t h e i r s t r e n g t h i s s t a t e d i n t o t a l n u m b e r s . All FS
weapons systems avai table to the guerriIIas, including tanks, infantry
f i g h t i n g v e h i c l e s ( I F V s ) , a n d a r t i l l e r y , also are Iisted and expressed in
terms of total numbers.

The brigade S2 considers as committed forces the first and second

echelon companies of enemy MR, t a n k , o r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e b a t t a l i o n s i n
contact with the brigade. Although the enemy company is the basic sized
unit used by the brigade S2 in accounting for committed forces, the S2
also accounts for smaller units which have been located as separately
employed.

The battalion S2 considers as committed forces the first and second

echelon platoons of the enemy MR, tank, or reconnaissance companies in
contact with the battalion. Although the enemy platoon is the basic unit
used by the battalion S2 in accounting for committed forces, avaiIable
intelIigence frequently does not enable the individual platoons composing
the enemy company to be located. Therefore, the battalion S2 considers
that a located enemy company normally consists of three platoons; a
company (-) consists of two platoons. Table D-1 shows the process of
counting committed forces in the defense and in the offense.

The designation of enemy units as committed forces depends primarily

on their disposition and location at the time the estimate is made. Enemy
unit identification facilitates determining if a particular unit is the
reserve of elements in contact with the brigade or battal ion.

When an enemy unit of the size used in accounting for committed forces
is in contact with two adjacent friendly units, the entire enemy unit is
considered to be committed by the G2 or S2 of both friendly units. For
example, if an enemy battalion is in contact with elements of two adjacent
US divisions, both division G2s consider the entire battalion as committed
against their respective divisions. This points up the need for correct
identification and accurate strength computation at each echelon.

All ground FS weapons organic to the enemy MRB or MRR are usually
referred to as normal regimental artilIery and are always considered to be
in support of committed forces. T h a t i s , each committed unit is assumed
to have available to it its normal proportion of the available supporting
weapons organic to the regiment. These weapons, therefore, need not be
enumerated unless desired. FS weapons not organic to enemy motorized
battalions or regiments which are identified as within supporting range
are enumerated as if in support of committed forces. In the event that
the forces committed against the brigade or battalion have no known TOE
(that is, volunteer or irregular-type units), all FS weapons which are
identified are enumerated.

D-3
 Table D-1. Counting committed forces in the defense and offense.
When the US is in the defense,

LOOKS FOR
THE LOOKS AT MR TK RECON

Battalion S2 Ist Echelon Bns Pits Pits Pits

Brigade S2 1st Echelon Regts Cos Cos Cos

Division G2 Ist Echelon Divs Bns Bns Cos

When the US is in the offense,

LOOKS FOR
THE LOOKS MR TK RECON

Battalion S2 Between LD, LC and Pits Pits Pits

the objective

Brigade S2 Between LD, LC and Cos Cos Cos

the objective

Division S2 Between LD, LC and Bns Bns Cos

. the objective

*Reinforcing units do not need to be expressed in the same units as

committed forces; they should be expressed in the simplest possible
terms.

*supporting artillery may be expressed as “a RAG (or DAG)” of

battalions”, battery or battalion equivalents (by type). However, if
artillery has been located which is not a normal RAG or DAG asset, the
type and size unit must be expressed. For example, “supported by
a battalions, RAG or DAG,” artillery assets, augmented by
one battery of 203 mm guns and one battery of 240 mm mortars.

When enumerating enemy forces in a defensive posture, enemy security

elements forward of the combat outpost I ine are normally considered
reinforcements of the main defensive position until contact with these
security elements is made. The intelligence officer correctly identifies
the enemy’s main defensive positions and is not deceived by security
forces. The security forces normally become reinforcements for the main
defense after completing their security mission.

D-4
 In addition to determining the enemy’s ground combat unit strength in
terms of committed forces and reinforcements, the G2 or S2 also considers
the enemy’s air and nuclear weapons strength, However, as estimates of
enemy air NBC warfare strength are usually prepared only at field army
l e v e l a n d h i g h e r , t h e G 2 o r S 2 s i m p l y r e s t a t e s t h e s e c a p a b i l i t i e s in the
estimate.

Reinforcements are stated conveniently and meaningfully. For example,

if the opposing division has an MRR in reserve, this reinforcemen t< i s
referred to as a motorized regiment rather than three motorized
battalions. When enemy units - - e i t h e r c o m m i t t e d f o r c e s o r
r e i n f o r c e m e n t s --are very much understrength, the estimated remain ng
strength is expressed. Two divisions, e a c h a t h a l f s t r e n g t h , a r e usual Iv
more formidable than a single division at full strength because of the
added flexibility of employment and the additional CS probably available.
A half-strength field artillery battalion is more than half as effective
as a f u l I s t r e n g t h b a t t a l i o n ,

When only two elements of a unit are located, they are counted as they
appear. By templating, it is possible to determine the approximate
location of the third element. Although this unit should not be counted,
the commander is advised as to its possible location. An exception to
t h i s r u l e o c c u r s , h o w e v e r , in situations where enemy doctrine normalIy
precludes elements of a unit operating independently of each other. For
example, if a US brigade S2 detects the presence of one MR company of a
Soviet MRB, then the remain ng elements of the MRB are counted as
committed, a l b e i t u n l o c a t e d enemy forces. This is because Soviet
d o c t r i n e n o r m a l l y p r e c l u d e s the MR companies of an MRB from operating
independently of each other

COMPU ING ENEMY REINFORCEMENTS

Factors derived from analysis of past similar enemy movements

determine the time required for an enemy to move troops from one place to
another and commit them. The considerations described below are
applicable in training and as a point of departure for the development of
experience factors in operations against an enemy force.

To determine the time when the enemy employ an uncommitted unit, the
travel time from the unit location to a logical point where the unit can
be committed is calculated. To the travel time, add the closing time
(pass time of a column). Except when observation of enemy units is
continuous, it is assumed that any unit could have started to move
immediately after its last reported location. T h e r e f o r e , to determine the
earl iest time at which the enemy can reinforce, add the travel plus
closing time to the time last observed. For example, if an enemy
reinforcement was last observed at 0800 hours, and it can deploy to
envelop the northern flank in one hour, it is assumed that the attack can
be launched as early as 0900 hours (0800 plus one hour). In the
exceptional case involving piecemeal commitment of enemy reinforcements,
consider only travel time. Forces which are committed piecemeal do not
close into an assembly area or attack position.

D-5
 Because observation of reinforcements is rarely continuous, statements
of enemy reinforcing capabilities should include both the earliest time
and that time after starting movement when the reinforcement is
accomplished. For example, “’the enemy reinforces the attack with the 45th
MRR at 0900 hours, or one hour after starting movement. ” When the time
since the last report is greater than the time after starting movement,
only the time after starting movement is given. For example, “the enemy
reinforces the attack with the 45th MRR now or one hour after starting
movement. “ When the number of reinforcements is large or the enemy is
capable of reinforcing in several areas, reinforcing capabilities are
presented in tabular form. Table D-2 is an example of this. It shows the
enemy reinforcing the attack or defense with all or part of the following
units at the places and times indicated.

Table D-2. Examples of estimating reinforcements.

UNIT PLACE MOTOR FOOT

45th MRR RJ 6382 Now or 1 hr after 091205 Jun or 4 hr

starting. 5 min starting
movement.

RJ 8884 090930 Jun or 1 hr 091605 Jun or 8 hr 5

30 min after min after starting
starting movement. movement.

37th MRR RJ 6382 091000 Jun or 2 hr 100740 Jun or 23 hr 40

after starting min after starting
movement. movement.

RJ 8884 090920 Jun 1 hr 091430 Jun or 6 hr 30

20 min after starting min after starting
movement. movement.

In selecting a logical point for reinforcement, consider the effects

o f A O c h a r a c t e r i s t cs , such as AAs and logical enemy reactions to friendly
courses of action. For reinforcement of an attack capability, select
locations for comm tment of second echelon and reserve forces for enemy
b a t t a l i o n s a n d r e g ments and forward assembly areas for enemy divisions
and larger units. For enemy units moving to reinforce a defense, select
defense or counterattack positions. For movements by aircraft, select
logical LZS or’ DZS from which the enemy forces can materially affect the
accomplishment of the mission.

The time required by the enemy to issue extra ammunition, make

d e t a i l e d r e c o n n a i s s a n c e , i s s u e o r d e r s , and deploy to a Iine of departure
is not normalIy considered because alI these actions are completed before
starting the operation or simultaneously with movement.

T h e f o l l o w i n g guidance is applicable until you deve op experience

f a c t o r s a g a i n s t a particular enemy:

D-6
 o Compute foot marching time for all appropriate reinforcements.
Compute motor movement time only for distances greater than 10
kilometers (6 miles). If a unit is observed in trucks, compute only
the motor movement time.

0
Consider a foot march of more than 32 kilometers (20 miles) as a
forced march. Consider a motor movement of more than 280 kilometers
(175 miles) as a forced march for motorized units and a movement of
more than 224 kiIometers (140 miIes) as a forced march for tank
units.

0 Compute closing time at the night rate of march if a column begins

t o c l o s e b e f o r e t h e B M N T c l o s i n g t i m e ; if a column begins to close
at or shortly after BMNT, use the day rate of march. If a column
begins to close before the EENT, use the day rate of march; if a
column begins to close at or shortly after EENT, use the night rate
of march.

0
Move and close the entire unit to move an enemy infantry
battalion. To move a unit of regimental or larger size, move and
close two-thirds of the combat elements; that is, two battal ions of
an infantry regiment, two regiments of an infantry division.

COMPUTING COMBAT STRENGTH

The following three situations illustrate the method for computing

combat strength, as discussed in the preceding paragraphs.

SITUATION 1

The 20th Infantry Division is advancing to the south. The advance of

the division is stopped by elements of two MRRs (8th and 12th) of the
enemy 16th MRD. Each of these MRRs has two MRBs in contact and one MRB in
the second echelon. The third MRR (96th) is in contact with the 72d
Infantry Division on the flank of the 20th Infantry Division. About 40
kilometers (25 miles) in rear of the 16th MRD and in the area of the 20th
I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n o b j e c t i v e , two MRRs (43d and 75th) o f t h e e n e m y 1 2 t h M R D
are preparing field fortifications.

The four battalions of the 8th and 12th MRRs in contact with the 20th
Infantry Division are considered as committed forces by the 20th Infantry
Division G2. Regardless of the specific courses of action selected by the
commander of the 20th Infantry Division to continue the advance, the area
of employment of these four battalions in contact does not change
appreciably. The second echelon battalions of the 8th and 12th MRRs are
not considered committed since they are not in contact and are employed in
other areas. The 96th MRR is considered committed and mentioned in the
composition subparagraph of the OPORD, but only its second echelon
battalion is listed as a reinforcement by the 20th Division.
The other two battalions are committed against the 72d Division and are
not avaiIable as reinforcements against the 20th Division. The 43d and
75th MRRs of the 12th MRD are considered as reinforcements because these
units are not committed against the friendly force and are committed in

D-7
t i m e t o a f f e c t t h e m i s s i o n o f t h e 2 0 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n . Although the
two MRRs of the 12th MRD are digging field fortifications in the vicinity
o f t h e d i v i s i o n o b j e c t i v e , the enemy commander employs these units against
either the 20th Infantry Division or adjacent divisions. Figure D-1 shows
this situation in a schematic sketch.

Figura D-1. Schematic sketch, situation 1.

SITUATION 2

The 20th Infantry Division is attacking to the east. Enemy committed

forces are the 3d MRB, 3d GMRR, the Ist and 3d battalions of the 5th MRR,
and the 1st Battal ion, 7th MRR; the 2d Battalion, 33d GMRR, 2d Battalion,
3d GMRR, and the 3d Battalion, 7th MRR are committed against units on the
20th Infantry Division flanks. The 1st and 2d Battalion, 3d GMRR, 2d
Battalion, 5th MRR, and the 2d Battalion, 7th MRR are not in contact and
are second-echelon battalions which are employed against the 20th Infantry
Division. They are considered as reinforcements. The two enemy regiments
in the assembly area astride the 20th Infantry Division north boundary and
the enemy MRR south of the south boundary are also possible

D-8
reinforcements. From their locations and dispositions, it is apparent
that they are the 2d echelon regiments of the divisions committed against
the 20th Infantry Division. Depending on the course of action selected by
the commander of the 20th Infantry Division and plans of the enemy
commander, all or part of these enemy elements are employed against the
20th Infantry Division, at various times and places, in time to affect the
accomplishment of the division mission. Figure D-2 depicts this
situation.

25
xx
20

Figure D-2. Schematic sketch, situation 2.

SITUATION 3

This example discusses the determination of enemy strength opposing

the Ist Brigade, 21st Infantry Division, and each of its composite units:
the 1st Battalion, 69th Infantry; and the 1st Battalion, 70th Infantry.

Figure D-3 shows the Ist Brigade, 21st Infantry Division, with the 1st
Battalion, 69th Infantry, and the Ist Battalion, 70th Infantry forward
defending positions as indicated in a schematic sketch. Reports from the

D-9
 Figure D-3. Schematic sketch, situation 3.

21st Infantry Division indicate the enemy has an unknown number of air and
nuclear weapons available.
The S2, 1st Brigade, determines enemy strength as follows:
0
Committed Forces: Ist Brigade is opposed by elements of three
MR companies, one reconnaissance platoon, and one medium tank
company (13 tanks) supported by normal regimental artiIIery, plus
six 120mm mortars, six 122mm howitzers, six loom AT guns, and all
available air and nuclear weapons.

0
Reinforcements: Enemy reinforcements available for commitment in
the sector of 1st Brigade are an unidentified MRB located in the
vicinity of Hill 250.

The three MR platoons northwest of the Highway 82 bridge are disposed

so that they logicalIy constitute one MR company in contact with, and
committed against, the 1st Brigade. The reconnaissance platoon southwest
of HiII 200 and the MR company northeast of the Highway 82 Bridge are in

D-10
 contact with, and committed against, t h e 1 s t B r i g a d e a n d i t s r e s p e c t i v e
b a t t a l i o n s . All three platoons of the company northeast of the Highway 82
bridge are considered as one company committed against 1st Brigade, since
brigades account for committed forces in terms of companies. The MR
company south of Chigger Woods is located so that it is, logicalIy, the
reserve company of an enemy battalion in contact with 1st Brigade and is
therefore considered committed. The MR companies of the 25th and 23d
Regiments, located to the east and west of the 1st Brigade sector, are
totally committed against adjacent brigades and are, therefore, neither
committed nor available as reinforcements against 1st Brigade, 21st
Infantry Division. Twelve medium tanks are located in the vicinity of the
MR companies committed against 1st Brigade and are, therefore, also
committed. The S2, 1st Brigade is equally correct to account for these
committed medium tanks as three medium tank platoons or one medium tank
company. In addition to the 120mm mortars (organic) and the 100mm AT guns
and 122mm howitzer battery (both attached), the enemy MRB is supported by
the artillery group of its parent regiment. The enemy also has an unknown
number of air and nuclear weapons, which are employed in support of
committed forces.

The S2, 1-69 Infantry, determines enemy strength now opposing the
battalion as follows:

0
C o m m i t t e d F o r c e s : 1-69 Infantry is opposed by two MR platoons, one
reconnaissance platoon, and one medium tank platoon, supported by
n o r m a l r e g i m e n t a l a r t i l l e r y plus six 120mm mortars, six 122mm
h o w i t z e r s , six loom AT guns a n d a l l a v a i l a b l e a i r a n d n u c l e a r
weapons.
.
0
Reinforcements: Enemy rein orcements avaiIable for commitment in
t h e s e c t o r o f 1 - 6 9 I n f a n t r y are an unidentified MRB located in the
v i c i n i t y o f H i l l 2 5 0 a n d a n unidentified MR company and medium tank
platoon located in the vicinity of Chigger Woods.

One MR platoon is in sole contact with, and therefore committed

against, 1-69 Infantry. The MR platoon north of boundary 1-69 and 1-70
Infantry is counted as committed against both 1-69 Infantry and 1-70
Infantry. The medium tank platoon in the same vicinity is also in contact
with and therefore committed against both 1-69 Infantry and 1-70 Infantry.
The MR company and tank platoon located in the vicinity of Chigger Woods
which are considered as committed by S2, 1 s t B r i g a d e c o u l d l o g i c a l l y b e
employed against 1-69 Infantry in time to affect the accomplishment of the
battalion mission and are therefore considered as reinforcements. The
discussion above concerning the battalion vicinity Hill 250, the normal
regimental artiIIery and nonorganic weapons in support of committed
forces, applies also to the determination by S2, 1-69 Infantry.

The S2, 1-70 Infantry, determines enemy strength now opposing the
battalion as follows:

D-II
 0
Committed Forces: 1-70 Infantry is opposed by four MR platoons and
two medium tank platoons supported by normal regimental artilIery,
plus six 120mm mortars, six 122mm howitzers, six 100mm AT guns and
all available air and nuclear weapons.

0
Reinforcements: Enemy reinforcements available for commitment in
the sector of 1-70 Infantry are an unidentified MRB located in the
vicinity of Hill 250 and an unidentified MR company and medium tank
platoon located vicinity Chigger Woods.

The S2, 1-70 Infantry, considers the individually located MR platoons

vicinity boundary 1-69 Infantry and 1-70 Infantry in the same manner as
does S2, 1 - 6 9 I n f a n t r y . Two platoons of the motorized company northeast
of Highway 82 bridge are considered committed against 1-70 Infantry. S2,
4-80 Mechanized, could also consider two platoons of this company
committed against the battalion. The discussion concerning reinforcements
and supporting fires applies also in the determination by S2, 1-70
Infantry. (See Figure D-3).

D-12
 APPENDIX E

TERRAIN ANALYSIS IN INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

The funct o n o f t e r r a i n a n a l y s i s i s t o r e d u c e t h e u n c e r t a i n t i e s
regarding the e f f e c t s o f t e r r a i n o n c o m b a t o p e r a t i o n s . It allows the
commander to s e e t h e b a t t l e f i e l d ” a n d t h e e f f e c t s o f w e a t h e r o n t h e
terrain in the AO. In order to accomplish terrain analysis, the
intelIigence staff receives support from the engineer terrain teams or
detachments. To effectively use the terrain information developed by the
t e r r a i n t e a m , intelIigence personnel must understand basic terrain
analysis and its applications to the IPB process. In units where terrain
analyst assets are not available, the intelligence staff collects,
a n a l y z e s , and integrates terrain information into the commander’s
decision-making process.

TERRAIN ANALYSIS PROCESS

The terrain analysis process is paramount in prebattle support. Early

in the IPB process planners determine the terrain information required to
support the operations at alI levels. Terrain analysis emphasizes the use
of graphics to depict the effects of the terrain on ground and air
operations. It considers the effects of weather on the terrain and how
weather influences operations. The Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) prepares
much of the data base that terrain analysts use. This DMA data is
produced in two standard formats: a planning terrain analysis data base
(PTADB) at 1:250,000 scale and a tactical terrain analysis data base
(TTADB) at 1:50,000 scale. These scales coincide with the planning and
tactical maps used by the US forces. DMA standard factor overlays
produced include--

0
Surface configuration (slope).

0
Surface drainage.

0
Vegetation.

0
Surface materials (soils).

Overlays produced depicting factors related to military aspects of

terrain (OCOKA) are--

0
Concealment from aerial detection (summer and winter seasons) .

0
Obstacles (microrelief).

0
Bui It-up areas.
0
Transportation.

0
Key terrain.
0
Cross-country movement (wet and dry conditions) .

E-1
 These products have a wide dissemination, b u t a r e p r i m a r i l y i n t e n d e d
for u s e b y t h e t e r r a i n t e a m s i n s u p p o r t o f t h e I P B p r o c e s s .

TERRAIN FACTOR MATRIX AND TERRAIN ANALYSIS SUPPORT GUIDE

The terrain factor matrix and terrain analysis support guide are tools
f o r t h e a n a l y s t . They were developed through an analysis process whereby
terrain factors that impact on combat operations are identified and
correlated with specific types of combat operations and battlefield
functions. Figure E-1 shows a terrain analysis support guide. The
terrain factor matrix was introduced in Chapter 4 (see Figure 4-4).

THE TERRAIN DATA BASE

The focus of terrain analysis support in the prebattle is on providing

the combat commander with detailed planning graphics of various terrain
factors. These graphics are expedient, tailored to the mission, and
updated with the changing combat and weather situations. Information
concerning the types and sizes of units involved (both friendly and
enemy), number and types of vehicles and equipment, and type of operation
is needed in this developmental stage.

The process begins with the analyses of the basic terrain factors
( s u r f a c e c o n f i g u r a t i o n , surface drainage, vegetation and surface
materials, built-up areas, and transportation nets). These products are
used to assess the existing situation and further used in combination to
develop the factors of OCOKA and other special purpose graphics. The
analyst produces overlays depicting terrain factors not found on
topographic maps. These factors include, but are not limited to, fording
s i t e s , t r e e h e i g h t , stem spacing, stem diameter and canopy closure,
m i c r o - r e l i e f , and the effects of weather on soil . This information is
necessary in the development of the OCOKA graphics. The information is
gathered through on-site collection, aerial reconnaissance, photographic
interpretation and analysis, and other coIlateral sources.

Surface Configuration

Surface configuration portrays and describes the landforms and the

i r r e g u l a r i t i e s o f t h e e a r t h ’ s s u r f a c e . Maneuver commanders need accurate
intelIigence on the surface configuration of the terrain. The aspects of
the various Iandforms and surface irregularities affect movement of
troops, equipment, and materials from one point to another. Therefore, it
is necessary that the analyst prepare an accurate surface configuration
overlay.

There are three principal Iandform groups’

0
P l a i n s ( l e s s t h a n 1 5 0 m d i f f e r e n c e i n e evation between the high
point and the low point and having more t h a t 5 0 p e r c e n t o f t h e a r e a
with slope less than 4 p e r c e n t ) .

0
H i l l s ( 1 5 0 t o 6 0 0 m - - w th low hills of 150 to 300 m and high hills
of 300 to 600 m).

E-2
 0
Mountains (greater than 600 m with low mountains of 600 to 1500 m
and h igh mountains greater than 1500 m) .

Major I and forms, n a t u r a l I y a n d c u l t u r a l I y d i s s e c t e d l a n d a r e a s , a n d

micro-relief are depicted. Micro-relief includes escarpments,
embankments, c u t s a n d f i l l s , a n d d i t c h e s l e s s t h a n 2 m i n h e i g h t .

E-3
Relief is the difference i n e l e v a t i o n s r e p r e s e n t e d b y c o n t o u r l i n e s ,
hypsometric tints, shading, or spot elevations. Slope is the inclined
surface of a hill, mountain, or any other part of the earth’s surface.
Slope is shown in three basic categories:

0
Map unit A equals 0-30 percent slope, where the distances between
contour Iines can be as narrow as the Iines for 30 percent or
wider. Movement and maneuverability are generally unrestricted
except in local areas.

0
Map unit B equals 30-45 percent slope, where the distances can be
as narrow as 30 percent or narrower to 45 percent. Movement for
vehicles in these areas is very slow. Maneuverability is difficult
for tracks and large-wheeled vehicles.

0
Map unit C equals greater than 45 percent slope, where the
distances between contour lines are narrower than those for 45
p e r c e n t . Movement is generally precluded and maneuverability is
extremely I imited. These areas are usually designated as NO-GO
areas for most vehicles.

Figure E-2 shows the three basic categories of slope on a terrain and
weather factor combined overlay. These categories may be further divided
to obtain a more descriptive analysis.

E-4
Slope can be expressed in three ways: first as a slope ratio (sometimes
called gradient) represented as a fraction; second, as a degree of slope
labeled in degrees; and third, as percent of slope. The best method of
representation is the percent of slope. Figure E-3 shows how to calculate
percent of slope.

Figure E-3. Percent of slope.

E-5
 Percent of slope is represented in the three categories described.
Use a slope template or slope calculator to assist in determining slope
categories.

A slope template or slope calculator is a device used for finding

areas within a given class or slope on a topographic map. Many slope
calculators have been made by various terrain detachments. These
calculators show different contour densities to be used on maps at various
scales with various contour intervals. They are usually reproduced by the
photo lab on transparent plastic. Figure E-4 shows examples of six
different slope calculators combined into one.

There are no signif c a n t w e a t h e r e f f e c t s o n s u r f a c e c o n f i g u r a t i o n .

Most changes to surface configuration occur over long periods of time or
as a result of a natura or artificial catastrophic event.

Surface Drainage

With the concept of r a p i d m o b i l i t y , it is vital for commanders to know

what watercourses exist in their AO. Surface drainage is not just
i d e n t i f y i n g r i v e r s o n a m a p . Military planners need to know types of
watercourses, w a t e r c o u r s e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , conditions of the surrounding
area, and artificial features along the watercourse. Figure E-5 shows a
sample watercourse and water body data card. It is essential to military
operations that analysts consider seasonal and short-term weather effects.

Watercourses are classified into four types: perennial , i n t e r m i t t e n t ,

ephemeral , and tidal . There are also 7 drainage patterns. These are
dendr itic, trellis, radial, annular, rectangular, parallel, and pinnate.
Drainage patterns provide information on surface materials (soil types and
geologic structure) and surface configuration. Figures E-6 through E-12
show the different drainage patterns.

Detailing is important in the preparation of the surface drainage

overlay. Include a stream regime in the marginal information. This is a
brief descriptive analysis of the prevalent drainage system(s) in the
area. Rivers are identified as having a gap width greater than 2.84 mm
and a length greater than 20 mm. Streams and canals are classified by
type (perennial, intermittent, ephemeral or tidal) and by size. There are
three sizes of streams:
0
Less than .09 mm gap width.

0
Greater than .09 mm-less than .36 mm gap width.

o
Greater than .36 mm gap width.

E-6
Figure E-4. Slope calculator examples.

E-7
■

7
 !
Figure E-7. Trellis drainage pattern.

E-9
Figure E-8. Radial drainage pattern.

Figure E-9. Annular drainage pattern.

E-10
Figure E-10. Rectangular drainage pattern.

Figure E-11. Parallel drianage pattern.

E-II
 An important consideration of streams and rivers are crossing sites
for fording, swimming, and bridging, and bank conditions. Most trucks can
ford depths up to three feet, most tanks up to four feet. Velocity should
be less than five feet per second. Vertical banks greater than one foot
stop trucks and greater than four feet stop tanks. Figure E-13 shows a
sample surface drainage overlay. See terrain matrix (Figure 4-4) for
surface drainage applicability.
..
Precipitation has a tremendous effect on hydrologic features and
adjacent areas. It affects watercourse depths, velocities, and bank slope
conditions. Evaluate flood plains and areas subject to inundation. The
lack of precipitation also plays an important role in the evaluation of
rivers and streams. The absence of water in various channels and flats
provides concealed movement routes, however, use caution and give
attention to weather forecasting when considering these routes. Wind
affects velocity and surface turbulence on the larger watercourses.

Vegetation

Vegetation has a significant effect on many types of military

activities and is considered carefulIy in planning operations. There are
many ways vegetation affect miIitary tactics, decisions, and operations.
Perhaps the most important is concealment. Concealment is the ability to
move troops, vehicles, and equipment without being detected from the
ground or air.

Vegetation is defined as the natural plant cover characteristic of an

area. There are four types of vegetation:

E-12
 /

Figure E-13. Built-up areas, LOC and hydrology overlay.

0
Trees are greater than 3.05 m talI, perennial wood plants, single
sterrrned, with a definite crown shape. They are either of the
deciduous or coniferous variety.

0
Scrub and shrub. Scrub is vegetation noted by its stunted growth
d u e t o p o o r s o i l o r c l i m a t i c c o n d i t i o n s . Shrub is the undergrowth
of the forested areas, normalIy the dominant vegetation. It is
either deciduous or coniferous.

0
Grasses are alI non-woody plants (grasses and forbs) . hey are
classified as tall or short grasses depending on height (less t h a n
one meter is short, greater than one meter is tall).

0
Crops are defined as cultivated vegetation (vineyards, arms,
plantations, orchards, and fields).

Ground reconnaissance of vegetation provides the analyst with the

necessary vegetation information to determine concealment possibiIities.
Reconnaissance allows the analyst to take precise measurements, thus
producing a graphic or greater accuracy. Current aerial photography is

E-13
essential to accurate analysis of vegetation. The best altitude for
photography for this analysis is less than 12,500 feet for accuracy within
10 percent. Altitude should not exceed 16,000 feet.

Areas are at least one square kilometer in size to be depicted on the

overlay. It is important to check the surface drainage overlay to ensure
the v e g e t a t i o n coincides on both overlays.

V e g e t a t i o n annotated are those areas marked or those areas greater

than 5 mm in s z e . Stands with more than 60 percent coniferous vegetation
are designated as coniferous (C), with more than 60 percent deciduous
v e g e t a t i o n a r e labeled as deciduous (D), and stands with mixed vegetation
(C+D)) in 40-60 percent combinations are marked with an E. Use standard
symbology for other vegetation types (orchards, vineyards, and swamps).
Indicate height and canopy closure for each vegetation type.

Figure E-14 shows mapping capabilities for vegetation data elements in

the US, USSR, and Federal Republic of Germany. Figure E-15 shows a sample
vegetation overlay. See terrain matrix (Figure 4-4) for vegetation
applicability.

Concealment from aerial detection is determined rom vegetation type,

percent of canopy closure, stem spacing, and vegetat on height. Canopy
closure is normally computed for forested areas and s defined as the
percentage of ground area covered by the tree crown i rea. Canopy c l o s u r e
has four categories:

0
Category 1 - 0-25 percent closure (poorest concealment).

0
Category 2 - 25-50 percent closure.
0
C a t e g o r y 3 - 50-75 percent closure.

0
C a t e g o r y 4 - 75-100 percent closure (best concealment)

In categories two and three, concealment depends on the o r e s t m i x t u r e

of coniferous and deciduous trees. Tree height and canopy c osure hinder
visibility, while stem diameter and vegetation density (stem spacing)
impede movement and maneuverability. Intervals less than 20 feet in
spacing greatly restrict maneuverability. Forested areas with stem
diameters greater than 2 inches stop wheeled vehicles (6-8 inches for
tracks). The vehicles are able to knock down the trees; however, the
brush pileup forms a significant obstacle.

Precipitation and wind affects vegetation by limiting or increasing

visibility. Precipitation also impacts on the effects of vegetation on
trafficability. Consider the fire potential of extremely high
temperatures in conjunction with the lack of precipitation.

Surface Materials

The ana y s i s o f s o i l s f o r m i l i t a r y p l a n n e r s h a s t w o p u r p o s e s : first

for the eng neering and construction uses and second, for military

E-14
operations, specifically, trafficability. Surface material s are i m p o r t a n t
because of their influence on drainage, vegetation, field f o r t i f i c a t i o n s ,
and trafficability.

Surface materials are broken down into two groups, soi s and r o c k s .
Soils are of unconsolidated parent materials and are often c a l l e d d e p o s i t s
or materials. Rocks are from consolidated parent material.

The Unified Soils Classification System is the system used in

determining soil types and characteristics. There are several

E-15
Figure E-15. Terrain factor overlay Vegetation Height.

E-16
characteristics needed to produce a surface materials (soils) overlay.
The analyst identifies soil composition as either fine-grained,
coarse-grained, or organic soils. Figure E-16 shows a sample soil
classification chart. Figure E-17 shows a surface material overlay that
further explains the classification designations. The first digit is the
predominant soil, the second digit is a characteristic description.
S u r f a c e r o u g h n e s s i s d e p i c t e d i n t h e t h i r d d i g i t . T h e f o l l o w ng example
further depicts the classification system.

GW1 : W e l l - g r a d e d g r a v e l s , g r a v e l - s a n d m i x t u r e s w i t h I t t l e
or no fines. S o i l h a s n o r o u g h n e s s e f f e c t . T h i s s o i l is
generally free of moisture. Soil depth is less than 5 meters.

Note: The subscript character indicates moisture and soil depth.

. . . indicates soil is normally moist.
— - - indicates soil is normally wet.
indicates soil depth is less than 5 meters.

Other characteristics needed are an analysis of remo d a b i l i t y , s o i l

depth in meters, m o i s t u r e c o n t e n t , a n d s o i l h o r i z o n a t i o n Remoldability
is the tendency for a soil to change strength with traff c . Soil depth is
measured in meters and is classified as--

0
Class 1 - 0 - .5 meters deep,

0
Class 2 - .5 - 1.5 meters deep.

‘Class 3- 1 . 5 - 3.0 meters deep.

0
C l a s s 4 - more than 3.0 meters deep.

Soil moisture content (the ability of the soil to retain moisture)

must consider daiIy and seasonal changes. Soil horizonation (or layering)
is the natural division of the unconsolidated material into three basic
layers. The three layers are: layer A - s u r f a c e m a t e r i a l s ; l a y e r B -
subsurface materials; and layer C - materials of the consolidated parent
material . Other sublayers may be present.

A surface materials overlay breaks down the most probable soil types,
characteristics, and distribution. Depicted on a soils overlay (surface
configuration) are comrnon soil types along with exposed rock outcrops (R),
peat (PT), evaporates (E) and permanent snowfields (PS).

SOIL TRAFFICABILITY

The capability of a soil to withstand traffic is referred to as the

soil strength or soil trafficability. Factors affecting soil
trafficability are soil type, characteristics and conditions (wet or dry),
vehicle type and vehicle cone index, a n d t h e s o i l s r a t i n g c o n e i n d e x . A
rating cone index is the product of the measured cone index and the
remolding index. The vehicle cone index is the minimum soil strength that
permits a given vehicle to complete 1 pass and 50 passes over a section of
terrain. See TM 5-330 for the various vehicles and tables. The analysis

E-17
Figure E-16. Unified soil classification chart.

E-18
 GC1

SOIL 11’PE

MAP UNil

w / fl ST TwO O IG ITS )

GW
DESCRIPTION

GP

SPO

Figure E-17. Surface material (soils) overlay.

E-19
 of soil trafficability is used in determining cross-country movement and
vehicle maneuverability. (See Figures 4-5 and 4-6 for examples of
over lays.)

Precipitation affects trafficability by changing the physical

properties and characteristics of the soil and the consolidated parent
material . Wind also is important because it decreases the drying time of
inundated areas. Wind reduces visibility by creating dust plumes in
exceptionally dry areas.

MILITARY ASPECTS OF TERRAIN - OCOKA

Terrain analysis focuses on the military aspects of the terrain known

collectively as OCOKA. Military aspects of the terrain are observation
and fields o f f i r e , concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain, and
avenues of approach and mobility corridors.

Observation and Fields of Fire

Observation involves the influence of the terrain on reconnaissance,

surveillance (optical and electronic LOS), a n d T A . lntervisibility is
extremely important. Intervisibility is the unobstructed view from point
A to point B. It is the ability to see from one station to another
station. Vegetation is particularly effective in limiting observation on
plains and plateaus. Prominences that could provide a commanding position
are generalIy lacking. I n a r e a s b a r e o f t r e e s , long distance observation
is good. The rugged topography of hills and mountains offers variable
observation. Terrain masking is the concealment of areas from direct
. horizontal optical and electronic LOS by terrain features. Masking plays
an important role in communications and surveillance techniques and
systems emplacement. Consider LOS ( intervisibility and masking effects)
for various electronic and optical systems. (See Figure 4-12.)

FofF is the effect that the terrain has on weapons and weapons systems
effectiveness. LOS is considered for LOS direct fire weapons. Indirect
fire should consider surface configuration at the target site. It is
important to indicate distance and direction of observation. For FofF
indicate direction, trajectory angle for indirect fire to clear vegetation
(or other obstructions) from a specific point, and the extent of the
firing fan. (See Figure 4-11.)

Concealment and Cover

Concealment is protection from air and ground observation. Cover is

protection from the effects of fire, both direct and indirect.
Concealment and cover is derived from the surface configuration,
vegetation, and built-up area overlays. Slopes greater than 30 percent,
dense forested areas, and large bui It-up areas offer good cover. Fair
cover is outl ined by slopes 10-30 percent, medium forest density, and
medium built-up a r e a s . A medium built-up area is equal to nine square
kiIometers. It is important to accurately calculate percent of roof
coverage of a built-up area when determining concealment. The best

E-20
concealment is described as O-25 percent chance of detection Concealment
is evaluated for summer and winter seasons.

Cover , concealment, or defilade in the plains regions is g e n e r a l I y

poor . Those areas having low topographic features (micro-re i e f ) , such as
escarpments, c u t s a n d f i l l s , and embankments afford some pro e c t i o n . The
rugged terrain of the hilIs and mountainous regions provide abundant
opportunity for concealment and cover. Above the timberline movement
across most slopes or crests is exposed to view in many directions.

Obstacles

Obstac es are natural or artificial features that stop, impede, or

d i v e r t m i l tary movement and maneuverabil ity. Obstacles occur on the
ground and in the air. The effects of removing, overcoming, or bypassing
t h e o b s t a c es must be considered in the planning of the overall
operation, Hills and mountains usually are considered obstacles to
movement and generalIy favor the defense. History records many cases in
which forces inferior in numbers and equipment have held off superior
attackers in mountainous areas. There have been many instances in which
such obstacles have been effectively achieved by moving over the hilIy and
mountainous terrain instead of through adjacent corridors where the enemy
was prepared. However, factors unfavorable to troop movement must be
considered. These conditions include difficulty in movement, lack of
maneuvering space, and the vulnerability of the LOC. Consider vegetation,
b u i l t - u p a r e a s , and surface drainage, i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e s u r f a c e
configuration and micro-relief features in determining obstacles.

Key Terrain

Key terrain is any feature or area, natural or artificial, that the

seizure or control of offers a marked tactical advantage to the occupant
over the opposing force. Examples of natural key terrain features include
DZS, high ground, r o u t e c o n s t r i c t i o n s o r c h o k e p o i n t s , a n d f o r d i n g s i t e s .
Manmade key terrain features are a Iittle harder to define. These include
key bridges, c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a n d l o g i s t i c s s i t e s , m a j o r b u i I t - u p a r e a s
(urban, industrial , o r c o m m e r c i a l ) , m a j o r t r a n s p o r t a t i o n c e n t e r s
( a i r p o r t s , rail facilities, ports and harbors, and roadway networks).
Significant military, political, or governmental facilities and
instalIations are considered key terrain.

It is important to be selective in determining what features are key.

Selective criteria includes the following questions: Will control of this
feature provide me with a tactical advantage over the enemy? Is control
of this feature crucial to the success of the mission? Is this feature
along a major LOC or in a major MC? H o w w i l l w e a t h e r a f f e c t t h i s
feature? What size force can this feature accommodate and are there r e a d y
access routes? A d d i t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n s e l e c t i n g k e y t e r r a i n
includes concealment and cover and observation and FofFs. It is important
to indicate why the selected features are considered key terrain and what
effect control has on friendly and enemy forces.

E-21
 Avenues of Approach and Mobility Corridors

AAs and MCS are routes by which a force may reach key terrain or an
objective. AAs and MCs address maneuver support potential, degree of
canal ization, concealment and cover, observation and FofFs, obstacles, and
the access to key terrain and adjacent avenues or corridors. There are
three types of AAs: g r o u n d , a i r , and rear area AAs.

Ground Avenues of Approach. A ground AA is broad enough and contains

sufficient MCs to support rapid movement and maneuver of forces along its
entire course. It should be free of obstacles. If obstacles are present
they should be few in number and require reasonable engineer support to
remove them. The avenue also affords good to excellent concealment and
cover.

Air Avenues of Approach. These are much the same as ground avenues. They
should be free of obstructions or have adjacent corridors to permit bypass
of obstructions. It is important to consider avenues and corridors in
layers as to reflect different altitudes of approach. This considerate on
would depend on the level and size of the operation.

Rear Area Avenues of Approach. These are avenues that provide the rap d
movement of rear threat elements and the additional service support
elements to the front I ines.
Note: I t i s e x t r e m e l y i m p o r t a n t t o i n d i c a t e t h e w i d t h o f t h e a v e n u e s nd
corridors and what size element can pass through. Note any major choke
points that canalize movement along the AA into designated MCs as key
terrain. (See Figure 4-13 for examples of AAs and MCs.)

THE MODIFIED COMBINED OBSTACLES OVERLAY

The MCOO is the graphic terrain analysis on which all other IPB
products are based. It is one of the two templates (the other being the
DST) that is always prepared at all echelons. At echelons where the IPB
process is more formal, the terrain analyst produces detailed combined
obstacles overlays and AA overlays that may be combined or modified to
form the basis of the MCOO. At lower echelons however, the MCOO is
normalIy prepared by the intelligence staff as a single graphic.

A combined obstacles overlay is made up of built-up areas, LOCS,

surface drainage, surface configuration (including micro-relief), surface
m a t e r i a l s , and vegetation. These component factors reflect average
weather effects for wet and dry conditions. These features are outlined,
h i g h l i g h t e d , or marked to show their significance to movement and
maneuverability. There are three movement categories: NO-GO, SLOW-GO,
and GO.

A MCOO is produced for the IPB process when key terrain features, AAs
and MCs for air and ground forces, and a friendly operations graphic are
added to the combined obstacles overlay. Detail depends on the level and
type of operation. The MCOO contains at a minimum registration marks,
classification, titling data, and a legend. As a general rule the
following information is depicted:

E-22
 Weather and terrain have more impact on the battle than any other
p h y s i c a l f a c t o r , including weapons, equipment, or supplies. The terrain
on which battles are fought presents opportunities to both sides. Most
battles are won by the forces that use the terrain and weather to their
advantage in both offensive and defensive operations. The resurgence of
terrain analysis in today’s Army and the recognition of terrain as a
potent multiplier of combat power makes each of us responsible for terrain
information.

E-23
 GLOSSARY

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Glossary-1
BMP designation of a type of Soviet armored personnel carrier
bn battalion
BOMREP bombing report
BTF battalion task force
btrv battery

c2 coniferous
C3 command and control
c command, control , and communications
C3=CM command, control , and cormnunications countermeasures
CAA combined arms army
ca I caliber
CARVE criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability,
and effect
CAS close air support
cav cavalry
CB chemical biological
cc cloud cover
CDP company distributing point
cd r commander
C-E Communications-Electron ics
CEW I combat electronic warfare and ntell gence
CFA covering force area
CG commanding general
cGy/hr centiGray hour
C-HUMINT counter human intelligence
cl counter inte I I igence
CIA Central Intelligence Agency ..
CIAS counterintelligence analysis section
CID Criminal Investigation Division
C-IMINT counter imagery inteligence
centimeter
cm countermeasures
CM&D colIection management and dissemination
CML chemical
COA course of action
co company
COL colonel
COLT combat observation and laser team
comd command
COM I NT communications intelligence
COMMZ communications zone
COMSEC communications security
COMZEALAND Commander, Allied Land Forces, Zealand
CONUS Continental United States
coord coordinate
COP command observation post
COSCOM corps support command
CP command post
CPA collection planning aid
CPFL Contingency Planning Facilities List
CPS characters per second

Glossary-2
CPT capta i n
CRT cathode-ray tube
CRTA commander rocket troop artillery
CS combat support
CSA corps support activity
CSG corps support group
C-SIGINT counter signals intelligence
Css combat service support
CTL critical task list
CTOC corps tactical operations center
CTOCSE corps tactical operations center support element
CTT commander’s tactical terminal
CUBIC Commnon Users Baseline for the Intelligence Commnunity
CUCV commercial utility cargo vehicle
CW continuous wave

D deciduous
DA Department of the Army
DAG division artillery group
DATEXT data extract
DBMS data base management system
DCS Defense Communications System
def defense
deg degrees
DF direction finding
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
div division
D 1 VARTY division artillery
DMA Defense Mapping Agency
DMz demilitarized zone
DOD Department of Defense
DO I date of information
DP decision points
DS direct support
DST decision support template
DTG date-time group
DTOC division tactical operations center
DTOCSE division tactical operations center support element
DZ drop zone

E evaporates (soil type)

ea each
EAC echelons above corps
EAC I C echelons above corps intelIigence center
EAM event analysis matrix
ECB echelons corps and below
ECCM electronic counter-countermeasures
ECM electronic countermeasures
EECT end of evening civil twilight
EEF I essential elements of friendly information
EE I essential element of information

Glossary-3
EENT end of evening nautical twilight
EEOB enemy electronic order of battle
elm e I ement
EMCON emission control orders
en enemy
engr engineer
EOB electronic order of battle
EPL ELINT parameters list
EPW enemy prisoner of war
ESM electronic warfare support measures
est estimated
EW electronic warfare

F Fahrenheit
FA field artillery
FAC forward air controller
FAIO field artillery intelligence officer
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEBA forward edge of the battle area
FIST fire support team
FLOT forward line of own troops
FM field manual
FO forward observer
Fof F field of fire
FP field post
FPN field post number
FRAGO fragmentary order
FRG Federal Republic of Germany
FROG free rocket over ground
FS fire support
FSCOORD fire support coordinator
FSE fire support element
FSO fire support officer
ft feet
FVD full unit designation
fvdfwd forward

G1 Assistant Chief of Staff, G1 (Personnel)

G2 Assistant Chief of Staff, G2 (Intelligence)
G3 Assistant Chief of Staff, G3 (Operations and Plans)
G4 Assistant Chief of Staff, G4 (Logistics)
G5 Assistant Chief of Staff, G5 (Civil Affairs)
GE Germany
GEOREF Geographic Reference System
GMT Greenwich Mean Time (Zulu)
GPS grid producing source
GS general support or general staff
GSR ground surveillance radar
GTA government training aid

Glossary-4
HB high burst
HD horizontal ground distance
HF high frequency
HHC headquarters and headquarters company
HOTPHOTOREP hot (high priority) photographic report
how howitzer
HPT high payoff target
HQ headquarters
hr hour
HUMINT human intelligence
hv heavy
HVT high value target
hwy h i ghway

1A imagery analysis
ID identification
I DAD internal defense and development
I ED imitative electronic deception
I EW intelIigence and electronic warfare
I FV infantry fighting vehicles
IIR intelIigence information report
IMINT imagery intelIigence
inf infantry
I NSCOM Intelligence and Security Command
i nst I installation
intg interrogation
I NTREP intelligence report
I NTSUM intelligence summary
I PB intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IPIR initial programmad interpretation report
IR information requirements
I TAC Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

J2 Intelligence Directorate
J3 Operations Directorate

KIA killed in action

km kilometer
kph kilometers per hour

LIC low-intensity conflict

LOC lines of communication
LOS line of sight
LP listening post
LTG lieutenant general
LZ landing zone

Glossary-5
m meter
maint maintenance
MAJ major
MAS [ NT measurement and signature intelIigence
ma x max i mum
MBA main battle area
MC mobility corridor
MCOO modified combined obstacles overlay
MD map distance
MDC I multidiscipline counterintelligence
MDC I SUM multidiscipline counterintelligence summary
mech mechanized
MED manipulative electronic deception
METT-T mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available
MG machinegun; major general
Ml military intelligence
MIJI m e a c o n i n g , i n t r u s i o n , jamming, and interference
MIJIFEEDER meaconing, intrusion, jamming, and interference report
feeder
min minute or minimum
MISREP mission report
mm miIIimeter
MOD mobile obstacle detachment
mort mor tar
MOPP mission oriented protective posture
MORTREP mortar bombing report
MOV military owned vehicle
MP military police
MR motorized rifle
MRB motorized rifle battalion
MRC motorized rifle company
MRD motorized rifle division
MRR motorized rifle regiment
m/s meters per second
msg message
mat missile
MSR main supply route
MTLR moving target-locating radar
mtr motor
maneuver

NA I named areas of interest

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical
NBCE n u c l e a r , b i o l o g i c a l , and chemical element
NCO noncommissioned officer
NLT no later than
number
&A National Security Agency
NTR nothing to report
NW northwest

Glossary-6
06 order of battle
obj object
OCOKA observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover,
obstacles, key terrain, avenues of approach, and mobility
corridors
off officer
OlC officer in charge
OMG operational maneuver group
OP observation post
OPLAN operations plan
OPORD operations order
OPSEC operations security
org o r g a n i z a t on

PERINTREP periodic ntelligence report

PERINTSUM periodic ntelIigence summary
PIR priority ntelIigence requirement
PL phase line
PLL prescribed load list
plt platoon
PM provost marshal
POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants
pos position
ps permanent snowfields
Psns positions
PSYOP psychological operations
pt peat
PTADB planning terrain analysis data base
pt I patrol
PTR/P paper tape reader/punch

R rock outcrops
R&D research and development
R&S reconnaissance and surveiIlance
RAG regimental artilIery group
RATT radio teletypewriter
RC reserve component
RD road
REC radioelectronic combat (not a US term)
RECCEXREP reconnaissance exploitation report
recon reconnaissar ce
regt regiment
res reserve
RF representat ve fraction
Rll r e q u e s t f o r intelIigence information
RO I PB rear operat ons intelligence preparation of the battlefield
rpt report
RRII response to r e q u e s t f o r i n t e l I i g e n c e i n f o r m a t i o n
RSTA reconnaissance, surveiIlance, and target acquisition

Glossary-7
/s/ signature
S2 Intelligence Officer (US Army)
S3 Operations and Training Officer (US Army)
SA special agent
SALUTE s i z e , a c t i v i t y , location, unit, time, equipment
(spot report format)
SAM surface-to-air-missiIe
SATRAN definition is classified (see FM34-60A (S-NFD))
SCARF standard coIIection asset request format
Sc I sensitive compartmented information
SCUD nickname of a missile system
SEAD suppression of enemy air defenses
SED simulated electronic deception
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SHELREP shell report
sig signal
SIGINT signals intelligence
S I GSEC signal security
SIR specific information requirements
S I TDEV situation development
S I TMAP situation map
S I TREP situation report
SLAR side-looking airborne radar
SOP standing operating procedures
SP self-propel led
SSM surface-to-surface missile
STANAG standardization agreement
str strength
SUPINTREP supplementary intelligence report
SUPIR supplemental programed interpretation report
Swo Staff Weather Officer

TA target acquisition
TAC-D tactical deception
TACREP tactical report
TA I target areas of interest
TARDEV target development
TCAC technical control and analysis center
TCAE technical control and analysis element
TDA target damage assessment
TD I target data inventory
TEL transporter-erector- launcher
TEMPEST an unclassified name for studies and investigations of
compromising emanations
TF task force
tgt target
TI technical intelligence
tk tank
TLE target location error
tng training
TOC tactical operations center

Glossary-8
TOE table of organization and equipment
TPL time phase line
trp troops
TSS target selection standards
TTADB tactical terrain analysis data base
TTY teletypewriter
TVA target value analysis

UAV unmanned air vehicle

UHF Ultra-high frequency
UI unidentified
UNCLAS unclassified
Unk Unknown
us United States
USAF United States Air Force
USAIA United States Army Intelligence A g e n c y
USA I CS United States Army Intelligence Center and School
USAREUR United States Army Europe
Uses Unified Soils Classification System
USS I D United States Signals Intelligence Directive
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union)
UTM universal transverse mercator (grid)

VCR videocassette recorder

VDP video disk player
veh vehicle
VHF very high frequency
vic vicinity

WETM weather team

WIA wounded in action
WNA would not answer
wpn weapon

yr year

Glossary-9
 References

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS

Required publications are sources that users must read in order to

understand or to comply with this publication.

Field Manuals (FMs)

FM 34-1 Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations

FM 100-5 Operations

RELATED PUBLICATIONS

Rslated publications are sources of additional information. They are

not required in order to understand this publication.

Army Regulation (AR)

105-31 Message Preparation and Processing

Field Manuals (FMs)

3-3 NBC Contamination Avoidance

3-12 Operational Aspects of Radiological Defense

3-22 Fallout Prediction

5-26 Emp oyment of Atomic D e m o l i t i o n M u n i t i o n s

21-26 Map R e a d i n g a n d L a n d N a v i g a t i o n

34-10 Div s i o n I n t e l I i g e n c e a n d E l e c t r o n i c W a r f a r e
Operations

34-25 Corps Intelligence and Electronic Warfare

Operations

34-37 Echelons Above Corps Intelligence and Electronic Warfare

Operations

34-40 (U) Electronic Warfare, Secret

34-60 Counter intelIigence

34-60A (U) Counterintelligence Operations, Secret

34-80 Brigade and Battalion Intelligence and

Electronic Warfare Operations.

References-1
 34-81 Weather Support for Army Tactical Operations

34-130 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

90-2 Battlefield Deception

101-5 Staff Organization and Operations

101-5-1 Operational Terms and Graphics

101-10-1 Staff Officers Field Manual: Organizational ,

Technical , a n d L o g i s t i c a l D a t a

101-31-1 Staff Officers’ Field Manual: Nuclear Weapons

Employment Doctrine and Procedures

Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications (JCS Pubs)

JCS - Pub 1 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and

Associated Terms

JCS - Pub 25 Title Unavailable, Top Secret.

Training Circulars (TCs)

34-41 Jamming Handbook

34-52 Intelligence interrogation

.
34-55 Imagery intelligence

F i e i d C rcular (FC)

1oo-15- Corps Deep Battle

Standardization Agreements (STANAGs)

1059 National Distinguishing Letters for Use by NATO Forces

2003 Patrol Reports

2008 Bombing, Shelling, and Mortaring Reports

2014 Operation Orders, Annexes to Operation Orders, and

Administration and Logistic Orders

2020 Operational Situation Reports

2022 intelligence Reports

2019 Military Symbols

References-2
2029 Method of Describing Ground Locations, Areas and
Boundaries

2033 Interrogation of Prisoners of War (PW)

2073 NATO Intelligence Subject Code

2077 Order of Battle (Non-NATO Troops)

2084 Handling and Reporting of Captured Enemy Equipment and

Documents

2097 Nomenclature for Soviet Bloc Army Weapons and

Equipment

2103 Raporting Nuclear Detonations, Biological and Chemical

Attacks, and Predicting and Warning of Associated
Hazards and Hazard Areas

2104 Friendly Nuclear Strike Warning

2112 Radiological Survey

2118 Intelligence Estimate

2134 Offensive Air Support Operations

2149 Intelligence Request

3277 Air Reconnaissance Request and Task Form

3377 Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Report Forms

3596 Air Reconnaissance Target Reporting Guide

6004 M e a c o n i n g , I n t r u s i o n , Jamming, and Interference Report

STANAGs can be obtained from: Naval Publications and Forms Center,

5801 Tabor Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19120.

References-3
Al. See area of interest
ADP. See automatic data processing
aerial fire support officers (FSO), 7-10
AirLand Battle, 1-1
area of operation (AO), 1 - 1
deep attack, sample of, 1-2
HVT, 1-2
IPT, 1-2
intelligence support to
close operations, 1-3
daep operations, 1-3
rear operations, 1-3
all-source production section (ASPS), 2-2
analysis, 2-4, 2-17
area of operations, A-108
pattern, 6-9
annotated jntelljgence estimate, A-10
for stability operations, 1-4, A-26
applications programs, B-6
arbitrary unit designators, 3-28, 3-30
area of jnterest (Al), 1-4, 4-7
area of operations, 1-1, 1-4, A-108
area study files, 10-7
ASPS. See all-source production section
assessment, 2-17
attack options, 7-7
delay, 7-7
disrupt, 7-7
limit, 7-7
automatic data processing (ADP), B-1
automation support to intelligence analysis, B-1, B-4
current automated support systems, B-7
MICROFIX, B-7
TCAC, B-7
hardware, B-2
keyboard, B-3
modems, B-4
monitor, B-4
peripherals, B-4
printer, B-4
processor, B-4
storage device, B-4
video cassette recorders, B-4
video disk players, B-4
software, B-2
applications program, B-S
data base management system, B-6
operating system, B-5
word processing, B-S
avenues of approach and mobility corridors, 4-10, 4-16, E-22
Index- 1
BAE. See battlefield area evaluation
battlefield area, 1-4
Al, 1-4
AO, 1-4
cl, 1-4
Ew, 1-4
ECCM, 1-6
ECM, 1-6
ESM, 1-6
lEW mission, 1-4
one-up and two-down formula, 1-4
situation development, 1-4
make sound tactical decisions, 1-4
target development, 1-4
battlefield area evaluation (BAE), 1-4, 4-7, 7-6
battlefield information coordination center (BICC), 1-8, 1-9
biases, S-11
BICC. See battlefield information coordination center
blue element, 5-7
bombing, shelling, and mortaring report, A-87

canopy closure, E-14

capabilities, 6-1
cathode ray tube (CRT), B-4
CC. See cloud cover
checklists of white, red, and blue questions, 5-8
ClAS. See counterintelligence analysis section
civil-military operationa file, 10-9
close operations, 1-3
cloud cover (CC), 4-13, 4-22
CM&D. See collection management and dissemination
COA. See course of action
collecting, 2-2
collection management and dissemination (CM&D), 2-2
COLT. See combat observation and laser team
combat
effectiveness, 3-1, 3-5, D-1
forces, 10-14
observation and laser team (COLT), 7-10
combined
intelligence operation, 10-1
obstacle overlay, 4-6, 4-8, 4-12, 4-22, E-22
commander, 1-8
intent of, 4-6, 4-27, 4-30
committed forces, D-1
composition, 3-1, 10-13
concealment and cover, 4-8, E-20
conceptual model, 6-1
contents of an OB book, 3-9

Index-2
coordinate register, 3-22, 10-9
counter-human intelligence (C-HUMiNT), 9-2
counter-imagery intelligence (C-IMINT), 9-3
counterinsurgency, 10-1
counterintelligence (Cl), 1-4
analysis, 9-1
a n a l y s i s s e c t on (CIAS), 9-1
C-HUMINT CO I e c t i o n , 9 - 2
C-IMINT coi l e c t i o n , 9 - 3
C-SiGINT co l e c t i o n , 9 - 2
EACIC, 9-1
ITAC, 9-1
rear operations, 9-2
counter-signals intelligence (C-SIGINT), 9-2
workstation, B-14
course of action (COA), 6-3
credibility, 2-14
of information, 2-15
critical nodes, 7-7
CRT. See cathode ray tube
current automated support systems, B-7
current propaganda and PSYOP file, 10-7

data base management system (DBMS) software, B-5

DBMS. See data base management system
decide. See targeting process
decision
briefing, A-144
points (DP), 4-30, 4-32, 7-5
supper t
matrix, 4-32
templates (DST), 4-1, 4-5, 4-26, 4-29, 4-32
decisive terrain, 4-10
deduction, 2-17, 2-18
deep attack, 1-1
sample of, 1-2
delay. See targeting process
deliver. See targeting process
planned target, 7-12
target damage assessment, 7-13
targets of opportunity, 7-13
destroy, 7-1
detect, 7-3, 7-8
aerial FSO, 7-10
COLT, 7-10
FIST, 7-8
forward area a l e r t i n g r a d a r , 7 - 1 0
moving targe’ - l o c a t i n g r a d a r , 7 - ’ 0
target Iocat on errors (TLE), 7-’ 1

ndex-3
 target selection standards (TSS), 7-11
directing, 2-1
disposition, 3-1, 3-2, 10-14
dissemination, 2-18, 10-12
disrupt, 1-1, 7-1, 7-7
doctrinal, 4-7, 4-11, 4-24, 4-32
templates, 4-5, 4-14, 4-25, 4-27, 6-4
OP. See decision point

EACIC. Sea echelons above corps intelligence center

echelons above corps intelligence center (EACIC), 1-6, 9 - 1
effectiveness, 10-18
effects of weather, E - 1
on mobility, 4-13
electronic
counter-countermeasures (ECCM), 1-6
countermeasures (ECM), 1-6
order of battle (EOB), 3-5
technical data, 3-1, 10-19
electronic warfare (EW), 1-4, 6-1
intelligence required for ECCM, 8-3
intelligence required for ECM, 6-2
intelligence required for ESM, 8-2
electronic warfare support measures (ESM), 1-6
enemy
combat effectiveness, 3-28
strength computations, D-1
combat effectiveness, D-1
committed forces, D-1
reinforcements, D-1, D-5
EOB. See electronic order of battle
evaluation, 2-4, 2-13, 10-10
event, 4-3, 4-29
analysis matrix, 4-14
template, 4-1, 4-5, 4-26, 4-28, 4-32
EW. See electronic warfare

factors analysts should consider, 5-1

feedback, 5-2
fire support team (FIST), 7-8
FIST. See fire support team
formats, A-1
analysis of area of o p e r a t i o n s , A - 1 0 8
annotated intelligence estimate, A-10
for stability operations, A-25
bombing, shelling, and mortaring reports, A-87
fragmentary order, A-127
initial and supplemental programmed interpretation report, A-59

Index-4
 intelligence annex, A-29
intelligence estimate, A-1
intelligence report, A-43
intelligence summary, A-44
interrogation and translation report, A-61
meaconing, intrusion, jamming, and interference report, A-143
mlsslon report, A-129
NBC attack reports, A-09
oral reports, A-144
decislon briefing, A-144
information briefing, A-144
patrol report, A-126
periodic intelligence report, A-48
periodic intelligence summary, A-51
reconnaissance exploitation report, A-68
SIGINT tactical report, A-142
situation report, A-42
spot report, A-1
standard collection asset request format, A-136
forward area alerting radar, 7-10
fragmentary order, A-127
FSO. See aerial fire support officer

G2/S2, 1-8
G3/S3, 1-8

handbook of military forces, 3-8

hardware, B-2
high payoff target (HPT), 1-2, 4-31, 7-4, 7-6
high value target (HVT), 1-2, 4-24, 4-32, 7-6
historical studies, 10-20
hot file, 10-7
HPT. See high payoff target
WT. See high value target

identify enemy HVTs, 1-2

IEW. See intelligence and electronic warfare
incident map, 10-4
indicators, 6-3
information briefing, A-144
information requirements (lR), 2-2
initial and supplemental programmed interpretation report, A-59
installation handbook, 3-10
insurgency analysis worksheet, 10-7
insurgent situation map (SITMAP), 10-4, 10-5
integration, 2-17, 10-10
intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) mission, 1-4

Index-5
intelIigence
analysis, B-1
ADP, B-1
automation support to, B-1
CRT, B-4
hardware, B-2
keyboard, B-3
modems, B-4
monitor, B-4
peripherals, B-4
printer, B-4
processor, B-4
software, B-2
applications program, B-5
DBMS, B-6
operating system, B-6
word processing, B-5
storage device, B-4
video cassette recorders, B-4
video disk players, B-4
annex, A-29
director, coordinators, and producers, 1-8
estimate, 10-2
dissemination, 1o-I2
evaluation, 1 0 - 1 0
integration, 1O-10
interpretation, 10-11
recording, 10-4
area study files, 10-7
civil-military operations file, 10-9
coordinate register, 10-9
current propaganda and PSYOP file, 10-7
hot file, 10-7
incident map, 10-4
insurgency analysis worksheet, 10-7
insurgent SITMAP, 10-4
personalities and contracts map, 10-5
personality and organization file, 10-7
population status map, 10-5
r e s o u r c e file, 10-7
trap map, 10-6
file, 2-7
journal, 2-6
report, A-43
required for ECCM, 8-3
required for E(X, 8-2
required for ESM, 8-2
support to
combatting terrorism, 9-14
counterinsurgency, 10-1

Index-6
 summary, A-44
workbook, 2-12
intelligence analysis system, !-6
BICC, 1-9
duties of, 1-8
commander, 1-8
coordinator, 1-8
director, 1-8
producers, 1-8
staffs, 1-8
G2/S2, 1-8
G3/S3, 1-8
TCAE, 1-9
TOC support element, 1-9
Intelligence cycle, 2-1
collecting, 2-2
CM&D section, 2-2
directing, 2-1
ASPS, 2-2
IR, 2-2
PIR, 2-2
dissemination, 2-18
processing, 2-3
analysis, 2-4
assessment, 2-17
deduction, 2-18
integration, 2-17
evaluation, 2-4, 2-13
credibility, 2-14, 2-16
pertinence, 2-14
reliability, 2-14
of source and agency, 2-1S
recording, 2-3, 2-6
intelligence journal, 2-6, 2-8
intelligence file, 2-7
intelligence workbook, 2-12
OB SITMAP, 2-10
working SITMAP, 2-9
intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), 4-3, 4-34
application of, 4-5
commander’s intent, 4-6, 4-27, 4-30
event template, 4-6, 4-28, 4-32
MCOO, 4-6, 4-8
template, 4-6
battlefield area evaluation (BAE), 4-7
Al, 4 - 7
METT-T, 4-7
MCOO, 4-6, 4-8
avenues of approach and mobility corridors, 4-16
one-down, two-down rule, 4-11

Index-7
 one-up, two-down rule 4-11
concealment and cover, 4 - 8
key terrain, 4-8, 4-28
decisive, 4-10
observation and fields o f f i r e , 4 - 8
obstacle, 4-6, 4-8, 4- 0, 4-22, 4-25
OCOKA, 4-8
combined obstacle overlay, 4-6, 4-8, 4-12, 4-22
effects of weather on mobility, 4-13
in support of LIC, 10-2
line of sight analysis, 4-15
process, 4-1, 4-11, 4-24, 4-26, 4-34
decision support, 4-1, 4-5, 4-26, 4-29
doctrinal template, 4-14, 4-25, 4-27
event, 4-3, 4-29, 4-32
situation, 4-3, 4-5, 4-26, 4-32
products, 4-2, 4-5, 4-7, 4-11, 4-21
templates
decision support, 4-1, 4-26, 4-32
doctrinal, 4-14, 4-25, 4-27
event, 4-6, 4-28, 4-32
situation, 4-6, 4-26
terrain factor matrix, 4-11
threat evaluation, 4-1, 4-24
doctrinal template, 4-25
threat integration, 4-3, 4-21, 4-26
decision support template, 4-1, 4-26, 4-29, 4-32
decision points, 4-30, 4-32
decision support matrix, 4-32
TAI, 4-31
time phase lines, 4 - 3 0
event analysis matrix, 4-29
event template, 4-6, 4-28, 4-32
PIR, 4-27, 4-32
situation templates, 4-26
weather analysis, 4-1, 4-15, 4-21, 4-26
cloud cover (CC), 4-13, 4-22
precipitation, 4-13, 4-17, 4-23
visibility, 4-9, 4-13, 4-18
wind speed and direction, 4-22
weather factor analysis matrix, 4-24
intelligence support
of close operations, 1-3
of rear operations, 1-3
to combatting terrorism, 9-14
to deep operations, 1-3
interpretation, 10-11
interrogation and translation report, A-61
ITAC. See intelligence and threat analysis c e n t e r

Index-8
keyboard, B-3
Key terra n, 4-8, 4-28, E-21

l i m i t , 7 -< , 7-7
line of s ght analysis, 4-16
logistics, 3-1, 3-4, 10-17

make sound tactical declsions, 1-4

MCOO. See modified combined obstacle overlay
MOCl. See multidiscipljne counterintelligence
MDCISUM. See multidiscipline counterintelligence summary
meaconing, intrusion, jamming, and interference report, A-143
METT-T. See mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available.
MICROFIX, B-7, B-8
CI workstation, B-14
OPSEC workstation, B-14
TCAE workstation, B-13
topographic workstation, B-13
military installation file, 3-22
miscellaneous data, 3-1, 3-6
mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T), 4-7
mission report, A-129
modems, B-4
modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO), 4-6, 4-8, E-22
monitor, B-4
moving target-locating radar, 7-10
multidiscipline counterintelligence (MDCI)
estimate, 9-10
situation overlay, 9-7
summary (MODCISUM), 9-7
threat assessment, 9-7, 9-14

named areas of Interest (NAl), 4-32

neutralize, 7-1
nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) attack raports, A-89

observation and fields of fire, 4-8, E-20

observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key
terrain, avenues of approach, and mobility corridors (OCOKA), 4-8, E-1
obstacles, 4-8, 4-10, 4-13, 4-25, E-21
one-down, two-down rule, 4-11
one-up and two-down formula, 1-4
one-up, two-down rule, 4-11
operating system software, B-5
operations security (OPSEC) workstation, B-14

Index-9
oral r e p o r t , B - 1 4 4
decision briefing, A-144
information briefing, A-144
order of battle, 10-12
combat forces, 10-14
composition, 10-13
disposition, 10-14
effectiveness, 10-18
electronic technical data, 10-19
factors, 3-1
combat effectiveness, 3-1, 3-6
composition, 3-1, 3-2
disposition, 3-1, 3-2
electronic technical data, 3-1, 3-5
logistics, 3-1, 3-4
miscellaneous data, 3-1, 3-6
personality file, 3-6
unit history, 3-6
strength, 3-1, 3-3
tactics, 3-1, 3-3
training, 3-1, 3-4
historical studies, 10-20
logistics, 10-17
personalities, 10-19
Phase I of an insurgency, 10-12
Phase II of an insurgency, 10-13
Phase Ill of an insurgency, 10-13
political structure, 10-14
records, 3-11
card, 3-17
coordinate register, 3-22”
military installation file, 3-22
organizational worksheet, 3-22
p e r s o n a l i t y file, 3-18
SITMAP, 2-10, 3-14
strength worksheet, 3-22
unit workbook, 3-12
workbook, 3-12
references, 3-6
book, structure of, 3-7, 3-8
handbook of military forces, 3-8, 3-9
Installation handbooks, 3-10
miscellaneous, 3-10
STANAG 2077, 3-6
strength, 10-15
tactics, 10-16
training, 10-17
patrol report, A-126
pattern analysis, 6-9
patterns and signatures, 9-3

index-10
periodic
intelligence report, A-48
intelligence summary, A-51
peripherals, B-4
personalities, 10-19
and contacts map, 10-5
fries, 3-6, 3-18
pertinence, 2-14
Phase I of an insurgency, 10-12
Phase Il of an insurgency, 10-13
Phase Ill of an insurgency, 10-13
PIR. See priority intelligence requirements
planned targets, 7-12
planning terrain analysis data base, 7-12
population status map, 10-5
precipitation, 4-13, 4-17, 4-23, E-12
printer, B-4
priority intelligence requirements (PIR), 2-2, 4-27, 4-32
processing, 2-3, 10-3
processor, B-4

rear and deep operations, 1-3

rear operations, 9-2
reconnaissance exploitation report, A-58
recording, 2-3, 2-6, 10-4
area study file, 10-7
civil-military operations file, 10-9
coordinate register, 10-9
current propaganda and PSYOP file, 10-7
hot file, 10-7
incident map, 10-4
insurgency analysis worksheet, 10-7
insurgent SITMAP, 10-4, 10-5
personalities and contacts map, 10-5
population status map, 10-5
resource file, 10-7
trap map, 10-5
red element, 5-6
reinforcements, D-1, D-5
reliability, 2-14
of the source and agency, 2-15
relief, E-4
report formats, A-1
intelligence estimate, A-1
spot report, A-1
resource file, 10-7
risk, 5-3

index-n
S2/G2, 1-8
S3/G3, 1-8
SIGINT. See signals intelligence
signals intelligence (SIGINT) tactical report, A-142
situation
development, 1-4, 6-1
capabilities, 6-1
courses of action, 6-3
indicators, 6-3
pattern analysis, 6-9
weighting indicators, 6-10
working SITMAP, 6-4
doctrinal templata, 6-4
report, A-42
template, 4-6, 4-26, 4-32, 7-5
software, B-2
spot report, A-1
staffs, 1-8
STANAG 2077, 3-6
standard collection asset request format, A-136
storage devices, B-4
strength, 3-1, 3-3, 10-15
computations, D-1
worksheet, 3-22
structure of an OB book, 3-8
suppress, 7-1
surface materials, E-14

tactical
operations center (TOC) support elements, 1-8, 1-9
terrain analysis data base, E-1
tactics, 3-1, 3-3, 10-16
target
damage assessment, 7-13
development, 1-4, 1-5, 7-1
attack options, 7-7
delay or limit, 7-7
disrupt, 7-7
decide function, 7-3
HPT matrix, 7-4
target selection standards, 7-4
detect function, 7-3, 7-8
aerial fire support officers, 7-10
combat observation laser teams (COLT), 7-10
first support teams (FIST), 7-8
forward area alerting radar (FAAR), 7-10
moving target locating radar (MTLR), 7-10
target location errors ( T L E ) , 7 - 1 1
target selection standards (TSS), 7-11

index-12
 deliver function, 7-4
IPB, 7-5
and BAE, 7-5
decision point, 7-5
situation template, 7-5
TAI, 7-5
terrain evaluation, 7-5
weather analysis, 7-5
location errors (TLE), 7-7
of opportunity, 7-12, 7-13
planned, 7-12
selection standards (TSS), 7-4, 7-7
value analysis, 7-6
critical nodes, 7-7
HPT, 7-6
HVT, 7-6
target areas of interest (TAI), 4-30, 7-5
targeting process, 7-1
functions, 7-1
decide, 7-3
HPT matrix, 7-4
target selection standards (TSS), 7-4
deliver, 7-4
detect, 7-3
objective of, 7-1
delay, 7-1
disrupt, 7-1
limit, 7-1
. destroy, 7-1
neutralize, 7-1
suppress, 7-1
target location error (TLE), 7-11
target selection standards (TSS), 7-7, 7-11
TCAC. See technical control and analysis center
TCAE. See technical control and analysis element
technical
control and analysis center (TCAC), B-7
control and analysis element (TCAE), 1-8, 1-9
workstation, B-13
templates, 4-5
decision support, 4-1, 4-26, 4-20, 4-32
doctrinal, 4-14, 4-25, 4-27, 6-4
event, 4-6, 4-28, 4-32
situation, 4-6, 4-26, 7-5
terrain
analysis, E-1
avenues of approach and mobility corridors, E-22
combined obstacles overlay, E-22
concealment and cover, E-20
effects of weather, D-1

lndex-13
 key terrain, E-21
modified combined obstacles overlay (MCOO), E-22
observation and fields of fire, E-2o
observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles,
key terrain, avenues of approach, and mobility corridors (OCOKA), E-1
obstacles, E-21
p l a n n i n g t e r r a i n d a t a b a s al E - 1
precipitation, E-12
tactical terrain data base, E-1
vegetation, E-12
evaluation, 7-5
factor matrix, 4-11
masking, E-20
military aspects of, E-20
avenues of approach and mobility corridors, E-22
concealment and cover, E-20
key terrain, E-21
observation and fields of fire, E-20
terrain masking, E-20
obstacles, E-21
threat
evaluation, 4-1, 4-24
doctrinal templates, 4-25, 4-27
integration, 4-3, 4-21, 4-26
decision support matrix, 4-32
event analysis matrix, 4-29
PIR, 4-27, 4-32
templates
decision support, 4-1, 4-26, 4-29, 4-32
decision points, 4-30, 4-32
TAI, 4-31
HPT, 4-3, 4-31
HVT, 4-1, 4-24, 4-31
time phase lines, 4-30
event, 4-6, 4-28, 4-32
NAI, 4-28, 4-32
situation, 4-26
model, 5-5
checkist of white, red, and blue questions, 5-8
blue element, 5-7
red element, 5-6
white elements, 5-5
time phase lines, 4-30
TLE. See target location error
TOC. See tactical operations center
topographic workstatlon, B-13
training, 3-1, 3-4, 10-17
trap map, 10-5
TSS. See target selection standard

index-14
unit workbook, 3~-12
unit history, 3-6
user of intelligence, 5-1

vegetation, E-12
video cassette recorders, B-4
video disk players, B-4
visibility, 4-9, 4-13, 4-18, 4-22

weather analysis, 4-1, 4-15, 4-21, 4-26, 7 - 5

cloud cover, 4-13, 4-22
precipitation, 4-13, 4-17, 4-23
v i s i b i l i t y , 4-9, 4-13, 4-18, 4-22
weather factor analysis matrix, 4-24
wind speed and direction, 4-22
weighting indicators, 6-10
white elements, 5-5
word processing software, B-5
working SITMAP, 2-9, 6-4

index-15
 FM 34-3
15 MARCH 1990

B Y Order of the Secretary of the Army:

CARL E. VUONO
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

WILLIAM J. MEEHAN II
Brigadier General, United States Armv
The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, USAR, and ARNG: To be distributed in accordance with

DA Form 12-llE, requirements for FM 34-3, Intelligence Analysis
(Qty rqr block no. 1119).

*U.S.GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:1996 406-421/62005