Gregory of Nyssa: Contra Eunomium II

Supplements
to
Vigiliae Christianae
Formerly Philosophia Patrum
Texts and Studies of Early
Christian Life and Language

Editors

J. den Boeft J. van Oort W. L. Petersen

D. T. Runia C. Scholten J. C. M. van Winden

VOLUME 82

Andreas Spira in memoriam

Gregory of Nyssa:
Contra Eunomium II
An English Version with Supporting Studies
Proceedings of the 10th International
Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa
(Olomouc, September 1518, 2004)

Edited by

Lenka Karfkov, Scot Douglass and

Johannes Zachhuber
With the assistance of

Vt Huek and Ladislav Chvtal

LEIDEN BOSTON
2007

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa (10th : 2004 : Olomouc,
Czech Republic)
Gregory of Nyssa : Contra Eunomium II : an English version with
supporting studies : proceedings of the 10th International Colloquium on Gregory
of Nyssa (Olomouc, September 1518, 2004) / edited by Lenka Karfkov . . .
[et al.] with the assistance of Vt Huek and Ladislav Chvtal.
p. cm. (Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, ISSN 0920-623X ; v. 82)
English, French, and German.
Contra Eunomium II translated from the Greek by Stuart George Hall.
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
ISBN-13: 978-90-04-15518-3
ISBN-10: 90-04-15518-X (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Gregory, of Nyssa, Saint,
ca. 335-ca. 394Congresses. 2. Eunomius, Bp. of Cyzicus, ca. 335-ca. 394
Congresses. 3. EunomianismCongresses. 4. Church historyPrimitive and
early church, ca. 30-600Congresses. I. Karfkov, Lenka. II. Hall, Stuart
George. III. Gregory, of Nyssa, Saint, ca. 335-ca. 394. Contra Eunomium.
Book II. English. IV. Title. V. Title: Contra Eunomium II. VI. Series.
BR65.G75C666
273'.4dc22

2004

ISSN
0920-623x
ISBN-13 978 90 04 15518 3
ISBN-10 90 04 15518 X
Copyright 2007 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.
Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC
Publishers, Martinus Nijho Publishers and VSP.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated,
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printed in the netherlands

CONTENTS

Preface ........................................................................................
List of Participants ....................................................................
Andreas Spira (29.12.192918.5.2004) zum Gedenken ..........
Adolf Martin Ritter

xi
xv
xvii

PART I

INTRODUCTION
Die Epinoia Das menschliche Bewusstsein in der antiken
Philosophie ..............................................................................
Theo Kobusch

Der theologiegeschichtliche Hintergrund der Epinoiai-Lehre

Gregors von Nyssa ................................................................
Basil Studer

21

PART II

TRANSLATION

The Second Book against Eunomius. An Introduction to

the Translation ......................................................................
Stuart George Hall
The Second Book against Eunomuis (Translation) ................

53
59

viii

contents
PART III

COMMENTARY
Gregors Zusammenfassung der eunomianischen Position im
Vergleich zum Ansatz des Eunomius (CE II 166) ............
Thomas Bhm
Divine Innity and Eschatology: the Limits and Dynamics
of Human Knowledge according to Gregory of Nyssa
(CE II 67170) ........................................................................
Morwenna Ludlow
Die Rolle der Epinoia nach Eunomius und Gregor und
die theologisch-philosophischen Hintergrnde
(CE II 171195) ......................................................................
Charalambos Apostolopoulos

205

217

239

The Language of God and Human Language

(CE II 195293) ......................................................................
Anthony Meredith

247

Christological Titles Conceptually Applied?

(CE II 294358) ....................................................................
Johannes Zachhuber

257

Der Ursprung der Sprache nach Eunomius und Gregor

vor dem Hintergrund der antiken Sprachtheorien
(CE II 387444; 543553) ....................................................
Lenka Karfkov
Divine Simplicity and the Plurality of Attributes
(CE II 359386; 445560) ....................................................
Joseph S. OLeary
Gottesbezeichnungen und Unsterblichkeit (CE II 561627) ....
Volker H. Drecoll

279

307

339

contents

ix

PART IV

SUPPORTING STUDIES
IV.1. Philosophical questions
pinoia et imaginaire chez Grgoire de Nysse
(CE II 172195) ......................................................................
Evanghlos Moutsopoulos

363

Limites du monde, limites du langage dans le CE II du

Grgoire de Nysse ..................................................................
Georges Arabatzis

377

Glossogony or Epistemology? The Stoic Character of

Basil of Caesareas and Eunomius Epistemological
Notion of pnoia and its Misinterpretation by Gregory
of Nyssa ..................................................................................
John A. Demetracopoulos
He Brandishes over Us This Aristotelian Weapon
(CE II 620). An Example of (Mis)use of Aristotles Name
in Controversy over Unbegottenness ....................................
Ladislav Chvtal

387

399

Gregor von Nyssa und Plotin zum Problem der

Gottesprdikationen ein Vergleich ....................................
Theodoros Alexopoulos

411

Simplicit et caractre inengendr de Dieu selon Plotin,

Eunome et Grgoire de Nysse ..............................................
Georgios Lekkas

423

Essence and Activity (Energeia) in St. Gregorys

anti-Eunomian Polemic ..........................................................
Torstein Th. Tollefsen

433

contents

IV.2. Theological motives

The Cognitive Function of Epinoia in CE II and its
Meaning for Gregory of Nyssas Theory of Theological
Language ................................................................................
Tina Dolidze
Gregory of Nyssa and Theological Imagination ....................
Scot Douglass

445

461

Service or Mastery? Theology in Gregory of Nyssas

Contra Eunomium II ..................................................................
Ari Ojell

473

Eunomius Apologia and Basil of Caesareas

Adversus Eunomium ....................................................................
Anne-Gordon Keidel

485

Die Allegorese in der Schrift Leben des Mose Gregors von

Nyssa im Kontext seiner Epinoia-Theorie ..........................
Tamara Aptsiauri

495

Die Bedeutung der Epinoiai in den Predigten Gregors

von Nyssa ................................................................................
Jochen Rexer

505

Abbreviations ..............................................................................
Indices ........................................................................................

515
517

PREFACE

This volume contains the contributions presented during the 10th

International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium II,
held in Olomouc, the Czech Republic, on September 1518, 2004.
It is organized into four major sections. The rst oers two papers
(Th. Kobusch, B. Studer) that contextualize the main problematic
of the Second Book Against Eunomius the theory of language and the
problem of naming God from a broader philosophical and theological perspective. The next three sections follow what has become
the customary pattern for the proceedings of the recent Gregory of
Nyssa Colloquiums: a new English translation of the text (S. G. Hall),
a series of main papers providing commentary on its passages and
numerous short essays discussing related issues. The CE II has a
complex and layered structure. It is a polemic against Eunomius
polemic that followed Basils polemic against Eunomius (see the structure of CE II given by S. G. Hall in the introduction to his translation). As a result, the commentaries (Th. Bhm, M. Ludlow, Ch.
Apostolopoulos, A. Meredith, J. Zachhuber, L. Karfkov, J. S.
OLeary, V. H. Drecoll) focus not only on specic passages but
also on the main topics found throughout the text and the larger
debate regarding language between Gregory, his brother Basil
and their Neo-Arian opponent. The short essays develop a range of
related themes: various philosophical questions raised by the text
(E. Moutsopoulos, G. Arabatzis, J. Demetracopoulos, L. Chvtal, Th.
Alexopoulos, G. Lekkas, T. Tollefsen), as well as theological motives
connected with the CE II (T. Dolidze, S. Douglass, A. Ojell, A.-G.
Keidel, T. Aptsiauri, J. Rexer).
This gathering was the tenth in a series of international colloquia
on Gregory of Nyssa dating back to 1969 in Chevetogne (M. Harl,
ed., criture et culture philosophique dans la pense de Grgoire de Nysse,
Leiden 1971). This initial eort began a long and rich tradition
of scholarly interaction and production: the 2nd, Freckenhorst bei
Mnster 1972 (H. Drrie M. Altenburger U. Schramm, eds.,
Gregor von Nyssa und die Philosophie, Leiden 1976); the 3rd, Leiden 1974
( J. C. M. van Winden A. van Heck, eds., De infantibus praemature

xii

preface

abreptis. Colloquii Gregoriani III Leidensis 18/23IX1974 Acta, Leiden

1976, pro manuscripto), the 4th, Cambridge, England 1978 (A. Spira
Ch. Klock, eds., The Easter Sermons of Gregory of Nyssa, introduction
by G. Ch. Stead, Cambridge, Mass., 1981), the 5th, Mainz 1982
(A. Spira Ch. Klock, eds., The Biographical Works of Gregory of Nyssa,
Cambridge, Mass., 1984), the 6th, Pamplona 1986 (L. F. MateoSeco J. L. Bastero, eds., El Contra Eunomium I en la produccion literaria de Gregorio de Nisa, Pamplona 1988), the 7th, St. Andrews 1990
(S. G. Hall, ed., Gregory of Nyssa, Homilies on Ecclesiastes, Berlin New
York 1993), the 8th, Paderborn 1998 (H. R. Drobner A. Viciano,
eds., Gregory of Nyssa, Homilies on the Beatitudes, Leiden Boston
Kln 2000), the 9th, Athens 2000 ( Jesus Christ in the Theology of St.
Gregory of Nyssa, yet unpublished).
The Olomouc Colloquium was organized by the Centre for Patristic,
Medieval and Renaissance Texts at the Palack University Olomouc, a
project sponsored by the Ministry of Education of the Czech Republic
from 2000 to 2004. We are particularly grateful for the kind and
generous support of the Olomouc Region, the City of Olomouc, the
St. Cyril and Methodius Faculty of Theology (Palack University
Olomouc) and the OK Design Ltd. (Olomouc). The Colloquium was
convened under the auspices of His Magnicence the Rector of
the Palack University Olomouc, Jana Makov; His Excellency the
Archbishop of Olomouc, Mons. Jan Graubner; His Excellency the
Ambassador of Greece in the Czech Republic, Vassilios Eikosipentarchos; and the Mayor of Olomouc, Martin Tesak.
The editors would like to express their warmest thanks to Vt
Huek and Ladislav Chvtal from the Centre for Patristic, Medieval and
Renaissance Texts in Olomouc who graciously took on the responsibility for the technical preparation of the proceedings. Without their
help, this publication would have never been completed. We are also
very grateful to Johan Leemans from Leuven for looking at the
French papers included in the volume.
At this time I would like to remember the initiative of Andreas
Spira and Friedhelm Mann who, during the Gregory of Nyssa
Congress in Athens 2000, encouraged me to organize the next
Colloquium in the Czech Republic and who, together with my friends
and co-editors Thomas Bhm, Scot Douglass and Johannes Zachhuber,
were actively involved in its preparation.
The death of Andreas Spira on May 18th, 2004, only a few months
before the Olomouc Colloquium, was and continues to be a source

preface

xiii

of deep grief for all the participants in our Colloquium and the wider
world of Gregory of Nyssa scholarship. This volume is dedicated to
his memory.
Lenka Karfkov

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Theodoros Alexopoulos, Heidelberg, Germany

Charalambos Apostolopoulos, Ioannina, Greece
Tamara Aptsiauri, Tbilisi, Georgia
Georges Arabatzis, Athenes, Greece
David Barton, Praha, Czech Republic
Thomas Bhm, Freiburg i.B., Germany
Konstantinos Bozinis, Athens, Greece
Sibbele de Boer, Castricum, The Netherlands
Ladislav Chvtal, Olomouc, Czech Republic
Tina Dolidze, Tbilisi, Georgia
Scot Douglass, Boulder, Colorado, USA
Volker Henning Drecoll, Tbingen, Germany
Pavel Dudzik, Brno, Czech Republic
Christopher Graham, Dallas, Texas, USA
Stuart G. Hall, Elie, Leven (Fife), Scotland
Filip Karfk, Praha, Czech Republic
Lenka Karfkov, Praha Olomouc, Czech Republic
Anne-Gordon Keidel, West Newton, Massachusetts, USA
Theo Kobusch, Bonn, Germany
Morwenna Ludlow, Oxford, England
Giulio Maspero, Roma, Italy
Lucas Francisco Mateo-Seco, Pamplona, Spain
Anthony Meredith, London, England
Edgars Narkevics, Riga, Latvija
Joseph S. OLeary, Tokyo, Japan
Ari Ojell, Mntsl, Finland
Jana Pltov, Olomouc, Czech Republic
Jochen Rexer, Tbingen, Germany
Adolf Martin Ritter, Heidelberg, Germany
Ekaterina Scodra, Kalamata, Greece
Louise Schouten, Leiden, The Netherlands
Heleni Skoumpou, Byronas, Greece
Basil Studer, Engelberg, Switzerland
Abraham Thomas, London, England

xvi

list of participants

Torstein Tollefsen, Oslo, Norway

Judit Toth, Debrecen, Hungary
Antonia Varkintzoglou, Athens, Greece
Sandra Wenger, Zrich, Switzerland
Johannes Zachhuber, Oxford, England
Nektarios Zarras, Athens, Greece
Written contributions by:
John Demetracopoulos, Patras, Greece
Georgios Lekkas, Athenes, Greece
Evanghlos Moutsopoulos, Athens, Greece

ANDREAS SPIRA (29.12.192918.5.2004) ZUM GEDENKEN1

Adolf Martin Ritter

Am 18. Mai dieses Jahres ist, fr die meisten, die ihn kannten, vllig berraschend, unser Kollege Prof. Dr. Andreas Spira in Mainz
verstorben. Da er sich noch im unmittelbaren Vorfeld dieses Symposiums, bis in die letzten Wochen seines Lebens hinein, als Ratgeber
groe Verdienste erworben hat, ist es nur billig, ehe wir mit unserer Arbeit beginnen, seiner zu gedenken.
Ich bin verschiedentlich gefragt worden: Woran ist er gestorben?
Ich wei es nicht genau. Nur dass es eine schwere Erkrankung war,
die rasch fortschritt und ihm keine Chance zum berleben lie.
Umso sicherer wei ich, wie er gestorben ist: In groer Tapferkeit.
Er hat auch nahe Freunde nichts von seiner schweren Erkrankung
wissen und spren lassen und stattdessen, in aller Stille, das Haus
bestellt. Es hat ihn auch in dieser schweren Zeit sein wohlbekannter Humor nicht verlassen. In Gedanken entwarf und versandte er,
wie er einem nahen Freund wenige Tage vor seinem Ableben gestand,
selbst die Todesanzeigen, einige von ihnen mit persnlichen Notizen
versehend. So war einem Mathematikerfreund die Bemerkung zugedacht: Einer von uns musste ohnehin als Erster gehen. Vor allem
aber ist zu sagen: Andreas Spira ist die letzte Strecke seines Erdenweges
als glubiger katholischer Christ gegangen. Er hat alles gerichtet und
bis ins einzelne geplant: wo das Requiem stattnden (in St. Stephan,
Mainz-Gonsenheim) und wer es leiten solle (die Freunde Hubertus
Drobner und Christoph Klock), wer die Orgel spielen (Christoph
Riedweg) und was er musizieren solle. Auf dem Waldfriedhof in
Mainz-Gonsenheim ist er zur letzten Ruhe bestattet worden.
Wer war Andreas Spira? In Ostpreuen geboren und nach der
Flucht im Raum Frankfurt-Wiesbaden aufgewachsen, hat er u.a. in
Freiburg, Mnster und Frankfurt a.M. studiert; bei Harald Patzer
1
Gedenkwort, gesprochen am 16. September 2004, zu Beginn des 1. Arbeitstages
des Olomoucer Kolloquiums. Ich verdanke wesentliche Informationen ber Andreas
Spira, seine Ttigkeit in Mainz und seine letzten Lebenstage meinem und seinem
Freund Christoph Riedweg sowie seinem Schler und Christoph Riedwegs Doktoranden
Wolfram Brinker.

xviii

adolf martin ritter

verfasste er eine Dissertation ber Sophokles und Euripides,2 aufgrund deren er 1957 in Frankfurt a.M. zum Dr. phil. promoviert
wurde. Anschlieend an einen Oxford-Aufenthalt bernahm er eine
Assistentur in Mainz bei Andreas Thierfelder und Walter Marg und
wurde ebendort 1967 mit einer Arbeit ber Die Grabrede Gregors
von Nyssa auf Meletios von Antiochien3 habilitiert. Ab 1972 war
er dann bis zum Eintritt in den Ruhestand (1995) in Mainz als
Professor fr Klassische Philologie ttig und hat in dieser Zeit zahlreiche Staatsexamens- und Magisterarbeiten sowie mehrere Doktorarbeiten (u.a. von Henriette Meissner, Jrgen-Andr Rder, Kristijan
Domiter und Christoph Klock) betreut.
In der Traueranzeige der Familie (Allgemeine Zeitung Mainz,
22.5.2004) heit es: Sein Leben war geprgt von groer Frsorge
fr seine Familie; aber nicht nur fr sie. Sondern: Allen Menschen,
die sich in ihren Anliegen an ihn wandten, begegnete er mit freundlicher Zuwendung und Hilfsbereitschaft. Das haben, wie ich wei,
auch manche unter uns dankbar erfahren. Selbst ihm bis dahin
nahezu Unbekannten hat er in seinem Haus Gastfreundschaft gewhren
knnen, aus dem einzigen Grund, dass sie dessen bedrftig waren.
In der Anzeige der Mainzer Universitt (vier Tage spter in derselben Zeitung) werden als Schwerpunkte seiner Forschung die
griechische Tragdie und die griechische Patristik hervorgehoben
und heit es zur Kennzeichnung des Lehrers Andreas Spira: Er
war ein akademischer Lehrer aus Leidenschaft, insbesondere seine
Rhetorikvorlesungen wurden weit ber die Fachgrenzen hinaus
gerhmt. Die Anzeige des Mainzer Seminars (ebenda) bercksichtigt im Hinblick auf den Lehrer noch mehr das Persnliche und
Atmosphrische und sagt: Als akademischer Lehrer hat er am
Seminar persnliche Tutorien nach englischem Vorbild eingefhrt,
seine Studenten unermdlich und in vielfltigster Weise gefrdert . . .
Andreas Spira war gleichsam der verbindende Mittelpunkt des
Seminars, sein soziales Gewissen und sein arbiter dignitatis et elegantiae.

2
Untersuchungen zum Deus ex machina bei Sophokles und Euripides, Kallmnz 1960
(= Diss. Frankfurt 1957).
3
Vgl. Nachrichten des Gnomon 40 (1968) 112; die Habilitationsschrift liegt auch
der Edition der Leichenrede auf Meletius in der Jaegerschen Ausgabe der Gregorius
Nyssenus. Opera (GNO IX/1, Leiden 1967) zugrunde, in der A. Spira auch fr die
kritische Ausgabe der Trauerrede auf Kaiserin Flacilla und die Trostrede fr Pulcheria
verantwortlich zeichnete (Praefationes, 345; Text, 441 ).

andreas spira zum gedenken

xix

Wo es die Interessen der Wissenschaft und der Lehre zu verteidigen galt, scheute er auch nicht vor dem Konikt mit bergeordneten Instanzen zurck . . .
Viele unter uns, meine Damen und Herren, die Andreas Spira
als Teilnehmer an den Gregor von Nyssa-Kolloquien (seit Cambridge
[11.15.9.1978]) erlebt haben, knnen das unmittelbar nachvollziehen. Genau so haben sie ihn erlebt: als arbiter dignitatis et elegantiae,
auch wenn er sie gelegentlich nicht ohne Schrfe kritisieren zu
mssen meinte.
Was bedeutet der in den zitierten Anzeigen genannte 2. Schwerpunkt
in der Forschung Andreas Spiras (griechische Patristik) konkret?
Er bedeutet, wenn man sich die Themen seiner Verentlichungen
vergegenwrtigt, zuerst und zuletzt und auch dazwischen immer
wieder : Gregor von Nyssa; dessen Grabreden war der (auf einem paper
vor der Oxforder internationalen Patristikerkonferenz basierende) erste
patristische Aufsatz4 und dessen beiden Reden ber die Liebe zu den
Armen war die erste (ebenso kritische wie sachkundige) Rezension5
gewidmet, die im Druck erschienen. Es folgten u.a. die Herausgabe
der Akten des 4. internationalen Gregor von Nyssa-Kolloquiums in
Cambridge (11.15. Sept. 1978) ber die Osterpredigten des Nysseners
(Mitherausgeber: Chr. Klock),6 mit einem eigenen Beitrag ber den
Descensus ad Inferos in der Osterpredigt Gregors von Nyssa De tridui spatio,7 und die Herausgabe der Akten des nchsten, 5., von ihm
in Mainz organisierten Kolloquiums ber die biographischen Werke
Gregors von Nyssa,8 mit einer eigenen, langen Einleitung zum Thema.
Schaut man sich jedoch zumal die letzte Verentlichung, den im
Jahre 2000 erschienenen berarbeiteten und mit umfangreichen
Anmerkungen und einer langen Bibliographie versehenen Text seines Vortrages bei dem 8. Colloquium Gregorianum in Paderborn
(14.18. Sept. 1998) ber Gregors Reden ber die Seligpreisungen
4
Rhetorik und Theologie in den Grabreden Gregors von Nyssa, StPatr 9 (=
TU 94, Berlin) (1966) 106114.
5
A. v. Heck (ed.), Gregorii Nysseni De pauperibus amandis orationes duo (1964),
Gnomon 38 (1966) 666671.
6
Cambridge 1981 (Patristic Monographs Ser. IX).
7
Samt einem textkritischen Anhang, in dem er sich recht kritisch mit der Ausgabe
dieser Predigt in den GNO IX (s.o., Anm. 3) auseinandersetzt, bezeichnend fr die
Skrupulositt, mit der er zu Werke zu gehen pegte.
8
A. Spira (Hrsg.), The Biographical Works of Gregory of Nyssa. Proceedings of the Fifth
International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa (Mainz, 610 September 1982), Cambridge
1984.

xx

adolf martin ritter

der Bergpredigt,9 der der Interpretation und Kommentierung der 2.

Seligpreisung (Selig sind die Sanftmtigen; denn sie werden das
Erdreich besitzen) gewidmet ist, nher an, so zeigt sich, welches
Ma an Vertrautheit der Verstorbene sich nicht nur mit klassischantiker Rhetorik und Philosophie und dem Werk Gregors, sondern
auch mit der griechischen (Clemens Alexandrinus und Origenes vor
allem) und lateinischen Patristik (Augustin) berhaupt erworben hat.
Es ist so eine nahezu vollkommene Kommentierung gelungen, die
dem auszulegenden Text nach Form und Inhalt wie seiner geistesund theologiegeschichtlichen Einordnung gleichermaen gerecht wird;
und das war es oenbar, worum es ihm stets zu tun war.
Man kann sagen: Andreas Spira ist in den letzten anderthalb
bis zwei Jahrzehnten immer mehr zum philologischen Gewissen im
Kreis der Gregorianer geworden und hat die Lcke schlieen helfen, die zuletzt der Tod H. Drries gerissen hatte. Es bedarf ernster Anstrengung, dass dieser Platz nicht allzu lange leer bleibt,
sondern sich Kolleginnen und Kollegen vergleichbarer Kompetenz
und Sensibilitt nden und als Gesprchspartner den Gregorianern
aller Schattierungen, nicht zuletzt den Theologen unter ihnen, zur
Verfgung stellen; sie haben es bitter ntig. Ich werde allerdings von
Olomouc scheiden knnen in dem Gefhl, dass man sich in dieser
Hinsicht ber die Zukunft der Studia Gregoriana nicht zu viel Sorgen
machen muss!
Andreas Spira war, wie wir hrten, bereits in seiner ersten patristischen Verentlichung fr ihn bezeichnenderweise Rhetorik
und Theologie bei seinem geliebten Gregor auf der Spur, hat sich
also von Anfang an auch fr dessen Theologie interessiert und auf
diesem Feld immer sicherer zu bewegen verstanden. Er hat deshalb
auch, mehr als H. Drrie, zu vershnen gesucht und vermocht,
was sonst in der Gregorforschung seit langem eher auseinanderstrebt
und in Konkurrenz zueinander tritt: eine eher philosophische und
eine eher mystische Gregordeutung, reprsentiert zum einen durch
die Schule W. Jaegers, zum andern durch Hans Urs von Balthasar,
Jean Danilou und Henri de Lubac samt deren zahlreicher Schlerschaft. Dieser auf Vershnung statt auf Polarisierung bedachte Ansatz
kommt in der verentlichten Fassung seiner Paderborner Interpretation
9
H. R. Drobner A. Viciano (Hrsg.), Gregory of Nyssa: Homilies on the Beatitudes.
An English Version with Commentary and Supporting Studies. Proceedings of the Eighth International
Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa (Paderborn, 1418 September 1998), Leiden 2000, 111
138.

andreas spira zum gedenken

xxi

der zweiten Seligpreisung Jesu (Mt 5,4) in der homiletischen Auslegung

durch Gregor eindrucksvoll zum Ausdruck. So kann diese Interpretation
nun nachtrglich gleichsam als Vermchtnis unseres verstorbenen
Kollegen gelten.
Man htte es sich, nicht zuletzt um seinetwillen, sehr gewnscht,
dieses Vermchtnis htte die von vielen sehnlich erwartete Edition
von Gregors De anima et resurrectione sein knnen, an der er so lange
gearbeitet hatte und deren Abschluss er schon vor mindestens zwei
Jahren als unmittelbar bevorstehend anzukndigen sich getraute. Sie
zu vollenden aber ist ihm nicht mehr vergnnt gewesen. Wer ihn
in den vergangenen Jahren nach dem Stand dieses Projektes fragte,
der konnte ihn, vor allem wenn sich auch nur ein Anug von Spott
in die Frage mischte, auer sich geraten sehen. D.h. man hatte
unbeabsichtigt eine Wunde getroen; Andreas Spira wusste um
seine Grenzen und litt darunter. Seine meisterhafte Interpretation
von Gregors De beatitudinibus, hom. 2, mit der stupenden Quellenkenntnis, die sich darin niedergeschlagen hat, auch ihren zahlreichen
Ergnzungsvorschlgen fr den Testimonienapparat der Textausgabe
in den GNO, aber auch ltere Rezensionen verraten etwas von dem
enorm hohen Anspruch, den Andreas Spira an andere und, mehr
noch, an sich selbst stellte. Das ist schwerlich der einzige, aller
Wahrscheinlichkeit nach aber ein wichtiger Grund, weshalb wir so
lange auf die genannte Edition haben warten mssen, am Ende vergeblich. Denn diese ungewhnliche Skrupulositt wirkte sich ersichtlich auch hemmend auf seine eigene Arbeit aus.
Vor ein paar Tagen habe ich an der Beisetzung eines aus
Siebenbrgen stammenden schsischen Pfarrers teilgenommen und
etwas erlebt, das mich dermaen beeindruckte, dass ich es Ihnen
gern weitererzhlen mchte. Zum Abschluss der Beerdigung, am
noch oenen Grab, trat ein Freund des Verstorbenen auf, wie es
unter den Lutherischen Siebenbrgens der Brauch war, und bat im
Namen des Verstorbenen alle Anwesenden von Herzen um Verzeihung,
wo sie sich von diesem ungerecht behandelt oder gar verletzt fhlten, so wie dieser allen seinen Schuldigern von Herzen vergeben
habe. Das geht, nde ich, noch einen wesentlichen Schritt weiter
als das gewiss ehrenwerte Prinzip: De mortuis nil nisi bene, zumal, wenn
ein ssanter Unterton kaum zu berhren ist, mit dem man sich
darauf beruft.
REQUIEM AETERNAM DONA, DOMINE,
ET LUX AETERNA LUCEAT EI ET LUCEAT NOBIS.

PART I

INTRODUCTION

DIE EPINOIA DAS MENSCHLICHE BEWUSSTSEIN

IN DER ANTIKEN PHILOSOPHIE
Theo Kobusch

Die Griechen hatten lange Zeit kein Bewusstsein von dem, was wir
heute dabei der Terminologie des Deutschen Idealismus folgend
das endliche Bewusstsein als den Inbegri aller intellektiven Ttigkeiten
nennen, die als das Subjektive einer objektiven Wirklichkeit gegenberstehen. Dafr gibt es einen sicheren Hinweis: Lange Zeit gibt
es im Griechischen keinen terminologisch gebrauchten Begri fr
das spezisch menschliche, d.h. endliche Bewusstsein. Der Begri der
Seele kann dafr nicht in Anspruch genommen werden, denn in seiner Bedeutung als Lebensprinzip kann er alles Lebendige, von der
Panze bis zur Weltseele, bezeichnen. Auch der Geist (now) entspricht nicht dem, was wir das menschliche Bewusstsein nennen, ja
sogar er gerade nicht, denn er bezeichnet das gttliche Prinzip, sei
es im Menschen, sei es als separate Wesenheit. Am nchsten scheint
dem noch der Begri der Dianoia zu stehen, denn er drckt in der
Tat per se etwas dem endlichen Bewusstsein Eigentmliches aus, nmlich die Diskursivitt des Denkens. Allerdings kommt gerade auch in
der spteren neuplatonischen Diskussion, in der die Dianoia neben
dem Nus und der Phantasie u.a. genannt wird, deutlich zum Ausdruck,
als was sie im Griechentum schon immer angesehen wurde: nmlich als ein Vermgen der Seele neben anderen. Hier aber soll die
Rede sein von dem der Wirklichkeit gegenberstehenden, spezisch
menschlichen Bewusstsein. Die Stoiker haben dafr den Terminus
Epinoia geprgt.1 Zwar scheint auf den ersten Blick schon Antisthenes
in seiner berhmten Kritik an der platonischen Ideenlehre ein
Pferd sehe ich zwar, aber eine Pferdheit sehe ich nicht das
Allgemeine als das charakterisiert zu haben, was blo im Denken
(n cilaw pinoaiw) ist, aber oenkundig ist es Ammonius selbst,
der die Deutung des Antisthenischen Fragmentes in stoischen Termini

1
Zur Geschichte des Begris vgl. T. Kobusch, Sein und Sprache. Historische Grundlegung
einer Ontologie der Sprache, Leiden 1987, 23, 33.

theo kobusch

und besonders mit dem erst spt belegbaren Ausdruck des bloen
Denkens vorgenommen hat. 2 Die Stoiker waren es und nicht
Aristoteles, die das menschliche Denken mitsamt seinem Inhalt unter
dem Titel der Epinoia philosophisch oenbar ausfhrlich diskutierten, wie aus den wenigen Fragmenten ber dieses Thema geschlossen werden kann. Danach mssen verschiedene Bewusstseinsweisen,
Modi des Denkens (trpoi nosevw), auseinandergehalten werden.
Alles Gedachte kommt nmlich zustande entweder durch eine
Annherung an das sinnlich Evidente oder durch eine Entfernung
von ihm, die sich in Form einer Metabasis vollzieht. Der unmittelbaren Berhrung mit dem sinnlich Manifesten verdanken sich solche Begrie wie das Weie und Schwarze, das Se und Bittere.
Denn dieses wird, auch wenn es sinnlich wahrnehmbar ist, trotzdem gedacht. Dieser bergang von einem zum anderen kann wiederum verschiedene Formen annehmen, z.B. die Form der hnlichkeit,
wenn der abwesende Sokrates aufgrund eines Bildes von ihm erkannt
wird, oder die Form der Zusammensetzung, indem der Begri des
Bockhirsches aus dem Menschen und dem Pferd zusammengesetzt
wird. Schlielich stellt auch die Analogie einen Modus des bergangs von einem zum anderen dar, und das in zweifacher Form:
Das menschliche Bewusstsein kann vergrern und verkleinern, es
kann, wenn es einen mittelmig groen Menschen wahrgenommen
hat, sich einen Riesen vom Schlage des Zyklopen vorstellen, aber
auch einen Pygmen, die als solche beide nicht sinnfllig sind.3 Der
Skeptiker Sextus Empiricus, der uns diese Lehre berliefert, sagt uns
auch, gegen wen das gesagt ist. Platon und Demokrit waren es nmlich, die die sinnlichen Wahrnehmungen praktisch ausgeklammert
haben und nur dem Intelligiblen gefolgt sind. Dadurch haben sie
aber nicht nur die Wahrheit der Dinge auf den Kopf gestellt, sondern auch das Bewusstsein von ihnen, ihre Epinoia. Denn jedes
Denken beruht auf sinnlicher Erfahrung oder ist doch nicht ohne
sie mglich, und alle Modi des Bewusstseins bis hin zu den falschesten Einbildungen der Phantasie, ob sie gleich Traumgebilde oder

Ammonius, In Porphyrii Isagogen (CAG IV/3 40,68): tonun Antisynhw lege

t gnh ka t edh n cilaw pinoaiw enai lgvn ti ppon mn r, ppthta
d ox r ka plin nyrvpon mn r, nyrvpthta d ox r . Vgl.
2

Antisthenes, Fr. 50C (Caizzi 42).

3
Vgl. Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos IX 393402 (Mutschmann II 293
294). hnlich auch Adversus Mathematicos III 4049 (Mau III 115117).

die epinoia

Wahnvorstellungen sind, hngen von den sinnlichen Erfahrungen ab.

Daher gilt ganz allgemein, dass nichts im Bewusstsein zu nden ist,
was einer nicht als von ihm durch sinnliche Erfahrung Erkanntes
htte. Und ein weiteres Mal zhlt Sextus an dieser Stelle die schon
erluterten Modi des Bewusstseins auf,4 denen Diogenes Laertius
noch weitere hinzufgt, nmlich die Metapher, wenn wir von den
Augen der Brust sprechen, und die kontrre Entgegensetzung, aufgrund derer wir z.B. den Tod denken knnen, bevor wir ihn erfahren. Zuletzt ist das menschliche Bewusstsein in der Lage, etwas auf
natrliche Weise zu denken, wie z.B. das Gute und das Gerechte,
oder auch Fehlendes zu bemerken, also etwas wie das, dem eine Hand
fehlt, im Sinne einer Privation zu erkennen.5 Die stoische Position
scheint in dieser Frage der Bewusstseinsweisen nicht einheitlich gewesen zu sein, denn in dem zitierten Fragment bei Diogenes Laertius
wird das kat metbasin Erkannte nicht im Sinne eines schlichten
bergangs von einem zum anderen verstanden, sondern als das, was
die Stoiker das Unkrperliche nennen, wie z.B. die Lekta, d.h. die
gedachten Sachverhalte als solche, oder der Raum, die neben der
Zeit und dem Leeren die Arten der Gedankendinge darstellen, denen
eine nur gedankliche Existenz (fistnai) zukommt.6 Wir haben es
hier also mit Begrien zu tun, die als transzendente bezeichnet werden knnten, weil sie gewonnen werden, indem die Welt der empirischen Erfahrung im Ganzen berschritten wird. Auf diese Weise
entwickelte sich zuerst in der Stoa ein Bewusstsein von den verschiedenen Modi des menschlichen Denkens und seiner Begrie. Die
epikureische Philosophie scheint davon nicht sehr weit entfernt gewesen zu sein.7 Was als bedeutsames Resultat dieser innergriechischen
Entwicklung festgehalten werden muss, ist die Etablierung eines
Begris des menschlichen Bewusstseins als einer festen Gre, als
eines eigenen Bereichs gegenber einer objektiven (sinnlichen oder
intelligiblen) Wirklichkeit. Etwas ist entweder nur bewusstseinsmig
(n pinoaiw) oder auerhalb des Bewutseins, entweder nur ein
Begri oder etwas Wirkliches. Das hat sich auch terminologisch in
dem Gegensatz von Epinoia und Hypostasis niedergeschlagen, die

Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos VIII 5660 (SVF II 88).

Vgl. Diogenes Laertius VII 52 (SVF II 87).
6
Vgl. dazu T. Kobusch, Sein und Sprache, 30 und 362.
7
Vgl. Vita Epicuri (= Diogenes Laertius X 32) (Laks 30,2 ) und Epicurus, Epistula
ad Herodotum I 40 (Arrighetti 39).
5

theo kobusch

der im mittelalterlichen Denken gngigen Unterscheidung zwischen

ens rationis und ens naturae oder ens reale entspricht. In diesem Sinne
hat oenbar Poseidonios als erster, aber beileibe nicht als letzter
wenn wir an Avicennas und R. Bacons Regenbogentheorie, an Teile
der mittelalterlichen Farbenlehre bis hin zur Goetheschen Denken
im Bereich des Sinnlichen eine rein phnomenale Existenz (kat
mfasin) der metarsischen Erscheinungen wie z.B. des Regenbogens
von dem wirklichen Vorhandensein eines Dinges (kay pstasin)
unterschieden.8 Es scheint auch Poseidonios oder doch jedenfalls die
stoische Philosophie gewesen zu sein, die den Gegensatz zwischen
objektiver Realitt und menschlichem Bewusstsein terminologisch als
Hypostasis und Epinoia zuerst festgelegt hat.9 Doch wirkt sich dieser Gegensatz zwischen bewusstseinsabhngiger und bewusstseinsunabhngiger Existenz nicht nur in besonderen Fragen der Meteorologie
aus. Vielmehr wird er im weiteren Verlaufe der paganen sptantiken Philosophie zu einem tragenden Element. Plotins Zahlenschrift
(Enn. VI 6 [34]), die gerade auch diese Terminologie aufgenommen
hat und den Begri der Epinoia terminologisch fr das endliche,
menschliche Bewusstsein im Unterschied zum Nus gebraucht, lebt
in ihrer Kritik an der stoischen Vorstellung doch von diesem Gegensatz
zwischen pnoia und osa. Auch wenn wir allgemein von der
Hypostasenlehre des Plotin sprechen, muss dieser begriiche Gegensatz zur Epinoia beachtet werden. Es ist ein weitverbreitetes Vorurteil
in der Forschung, das mglicherweise durch eine einussreiche
Abhandlung von H. Drrie festgeschrieben und untersttzt wurde,10
dass die Rede von den drei Hypostasen des Einen, des Nus und der
Seele die nicht dem Sprachgebrauch Plotins selbst entspricht die
Vorstellung von einer Stufung notwendig impliziere. H. G. Thmmel
hat mit Recht diese Verknpfung kritisiert und darauf hingewiesen,
dass im Hintergrund des neuplatonischen Hypostasis-Begris Origenes
stehe.11 Ob es wirklich Origenes ist wer wei das schon? Aber

Vgl. T. Kobusch, Sein und Sprache, 304327.

Vgl. R. E. Witt, UPOSTASIS, in: H. G. Wood (Hrsg.), Amicitiae Corolla,
London 1933, 319343, hier 325: The contrast between objective actuality and
purely mind-dependent existence very often appears in the verbal form kay pstasin, kat pnoian, an antithesis rst formulated, it seems, by Posidonius.
10
H. Drrie, Hypostasis. Wort- und Bedeutungsgeschichte, Nachrichten der Akademie
der Wissenschaften zu Gttingen, Philologisch-historische Klasse 3 (1955) 3592.
11
H. G. Thmmel, Logos und Hypostasis, in: D. Wyrwa (Hrsg.), Weltlichkeit
des Glaubens in der Alten Kirche. FS fr U. Wickert zum 70. Geb., Berlin New York
1997, 347398, hier 383394.
9

die epinoia

eines scheint ganz sicher zu sein: Immer, wenn in dieser Zeit der
Begri der Hypostasis gebraucht wird, ist auch der Gegenbegri der
Epinoia, und damit das stoische Begrispaar prsent. Hypostasis
bezeichnet daher in der Tat, wie H. G. Thmmel, wenngleich ohne
den Gegenbegri der Epinoia zu nennen, das dargelegt hat, das
selbstndige Sein oder das, was spter die Subsistenz genannt wird
im Unterschied zum vom menschlichen Bewusstsein abhngigen
Sein.12 Von Alexander von Aphrodisias an, bei Porphyrios und den
spteren Aristoteleskommentatoren, hat diese Disjunktion zudem bei
den Errterungen ber den ontologischen Charakter des Allgemeinen
den Charakter einer Bifurkation, an der sich die Geister scheiden.13
Die mathematische Existenz kann, wie ein Blick auf Alexander von
Aphrodisias, Proklos und andere sptantike Autoren zeigt, ohne diese
Unterscheidung gar nicht verstndlich gemacht werden.14 Kurzum:
Die Unterscheidung von Bewusstsein und Realitt, von Gedachtsein
und Wirklichsein, von Begri und Sache ist von universaler philosophischer Bedeutung, denn sie wird bei der Gelegenheit verschiedener Probleme zur Geltung gebracht.15 Ganz am Ende der Antike
bringt sie zudem eine Problematik in den Blick, die so noch nicht
vorher gedacht worden war und geradezu schon hinberweist in eine
scholastische Dimension: Bei David, der zur Enkelgeneration der
Ammoniusschule gehrt, wird die in dieser Schule bliche Unterscheidung zwischen der Epinoia und der bloen Epinoia noch einmal thematisch behandelt. Was ist jenes, was ist dieses? David sagt,
was in der Natur zusammenhngend ist, aber durch unser Denken
getrennt wird, wie z.B. die Farbe eines Krpers, das ist unsere
Epinoia. Wir knnten also sagen, was durch eine Form der Abstraktion
12
Sehr gut erkannt hat den stoischen Gegensatz als Grundlage des plotinischen
Hypostasenverstndnisses C. Rutten, UPARJIS et UPOSTASIS chez Plotin, in:
F. Romano D. P. Taormina (Hrsg.), HYPARXIS e HYPOSTASIS nel Neoplatonismo
(Atti del I Colloquio Internazionale del Centro di Ricerca sul Neoplatonismo), Firenze 1994,
2532.
13
Vgl. z.B. Alexander von Aphrodisias, In Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentarius (CAG
I 483,2328): legon gr ti mn kaylou nyrvpow, n now mterow p
tn kay kasta peslhse ka t enai at pexarsato, movma tn kat

mrow nyrpvn st ka atw sti tow kay kasta ka n pino& mn t

enai xei, d atonyrvpow da, tiw kay atn sti ka n prjei, ok
stin atw tow kay kasta nyrpoiw.

14
Alexander von Aphrodisias, In Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentarius (CAG I 52,13
16): t d mayhmatik tn n tow pollow, toutsti tow asyhtow ka tow kay
kasta, dhlon moithta, nuprxonta totoiw. o gr stin at kay at
festta, ll pino&.
15
Vgl. T. Kobusch, Sein und Sprache, s.v. Gedachtes.

theo kobusch

hervorgebracht wird, das ist in der Epinoia. Was dagegen berhaupt nicht ist, wie z.B. der Bockhirsch, dessen Teile in der Natur
zwar gegeben sind, aber doch willkrlich von unserer Phantasie
zusammengesetzt werden, das ist in der bloen Epinoia.16 Doch
damit nicht genug. David berichtet davon, dass diese Ansicht der
aristotelischen entspreche. Danach ist also das ganz und gar Nichtseiende dasjenige, was keine aktuelle Existenz haben kann, aber
wie der Bockhirsch als Begri im Bewusstsein sein kann. Nach der
platonischen Ansicht dagegen ist das eigentlich Nichtseiende dasjenige, was weder eine gedankliche noch eine aktuelle Existenz haben
kann.17 Wie man leicht sehen kann, fhren so schon die antiken
Errterungen ber das menschliche Bewusstsein hin zu jenen Fragen,
die die Grenzen der Mglichkeit desselben und damit das Denkmgliche und das Realmgliche und schlielich die Negation dieser
Mglichkeit betreen. Es sind die modalontologischen Probleme, die
dann im Mittelalter, bei Abaelard und besonders im Scotismus, bei
Suarez und in der Jesuitentradition auf je eigene Weise einer Lsung
zugefhrt werden.
Die christliche Philosophie hat sich in die Diskussionen um die
Epinoia, ihren ontologischen Status, ihre Rolle bei der Bewltigung
der ueren Realitt (von der Namengebung bis zur Technik) und
ihre Mglichkeiten der Erkenntnis eingemischt und sich die (auch
terminologische) Entdeckung der Stoiker auf breiter Front zu eigen
gemacht. Das kommt zunchst am deutlichsten im Zusammenhang
theologischer Probleme im engeren Sinne zum Ausdruck. So haben
Origenes und die Origenesschule (Didymus der Blinde), Athanasius
und die Kappadozier, also vor allem auch das 4. Jahrhundert, die

David, In Porphyrii Isagogen Commentarius (CAG XVIII 2, 119,1724): Ajin sti

zhtsai t diafrei pnoia tw cilw pinoaw. pnoia mn stin, tan diaxvrzein
t lg tolmmen t sunhmmnon k tw fsevw dhmiorghma: oon fsiw mo
t sma ka t xrma dhmiourge, ka ok sti sma m xon xrma. toto on
t mo sunhmmnon, fhm d t leukn ka t sma, diaxvrzomen lgontew t
mn leukn xrma diakritikn cevw, t d sma trix diastatn. ath on stin
pnoia. ciln d pnoin famen, tan t mhdam mhdamw n t metr&
diano& okodommen, tn traglafon ka t moia.
17
David, In Porphyrii Isagogen Commentarius (CAG XVIII 2, 189,611): ston d
w llo mn fhsin Pltvn t mhdam mhdamw, llo d Aristotlhw: mn
gr Pltvn lege t mhdam t mhdamw mte pino& mte nerge& prxon
(mlei tn traglafon o fhsi mhdam mhdamw, peid xei t enai n pino&),
Aristotlhw d mhdam mhdamw lege t t mn pino& fistmenon, nerge&
d okti, oon tn traglafon ka t toiata.
16

die epinoia

Lehre der Sabellianer und Monarchianer kritisiert, nach der zwischen den gttlichen Personen ein nur begriicher Unterschied
(pnoia) anzunehmen sei. Vielmehr entsprechen den Dierenzierungen
unseres Bewusstseins auch bestimmte Formen der Wirklichkeit (pstasiw). So kommt der ursprnglich stoische Gegensatz von pnoia und
pstasiw in der christlichen Trinittslehre zur Geltung. Man kann
deswegen davon ausgehen, dass die Formulierung von den trew postseiw, die schon bei Origenes belegbar ist, ein Resultat der
Auseinandersetzungen um den ontologischen Status der drei gttlichen Personen sind.18 hnlich wichtig ist der Begri der Epinoia
auch in der Lehre von den gttlichen Attributen bzw. in der
Christologie, in der es ebenfalls Origenes war, der die entscheidenden Anste gab. Mit Hilfe der stoischen Unterscheidung von pnoia
und pstasiw kann erklrt werden, wie Jesus, diese eine, reale historische Person, durch viele Namen wie z.B. Licht der Welt, Wahrheit
oder Tr bezeichnet werden kann. hnliches gilt auch fr die dritte
gttliche Person oder fr das eine, gttliche Wesen selbst.19 Den

18
Origenes, Johanneskommentar II 75 (GCS 10, 65,16). Dazu R. E. Witt, UPOSTASIS, 335. Vgl. auch Pseudo-Athanasius, De sancta Trinitate dialogus 1 (PG 28, 1144d
1145a): All at pstasiw ka yanasa st: ka o mnon yanasa, ll
ka fyarsa, ka dikaiosnh, ka giasmw, ka poltrvsiw, ka kurithw, ka
dnamiw. Ka ok sti kat snyesin tata Yew, ll kat diafrouw pinoaw
legmenow: . . . ka di toto do mn postseiw lgomen Patrw ka Uo, man
d yethta, dnamin, kurithta, ka yanasan, ka fyarsan, ka sa . . .
Athanasius, Oratio quarta contra Arianos (Stegmann 2,2429): lgetai, kat pnoian
ka plw legmena. E d feukton t k tw pinoaw topon, ra lhyw lgow
osidhw stn. Vsper gr lhyw patr, otvw lhyw sofa. Kat toto on
do mn, ti m kat Sabllion atw patr ka uw, ll patr patr, ka
uw uw, n d, ti uw tw osaw to patrw sti fsei, diow prxvn lgow
ato.

Basilius muss quasi entschuldigend darauf hinweisen (Ep. 210,5,911, Courtonne

II 195), dass Gregor Thaumaturgos im Disput mit einem Gegner die sabellianische
Formel verwendet habe: w ra Grhgorou epntow n kysei pstevw Patra
ka Un pino& mn enai do, postsei d n, um im Sinne der christlich richtigen Lehre hinzuzufgen: ll xr kaston prsvpon n postsei lhyin
prxon mologen.
Cyrill, Thesaurus de sancta consubstantiali Trinitate (PG 75, 141c): Okon pl tiw
osa ka snyetow tw yethtow fsiw, ok n tmyh pot taw pinoaiw ew
duda Patrw ka Uo, e m tiw edkei prokesyai diafor, o kat tn osan
fhm, ll jvyen pinooumnh, di w t katrou prsvpon esfretai n diazos mn postsei kemenon, ew nthta d yethtow di tautthtow fusikw
sfiggmenon, na m tiw nxusiw ka oone furmw gnhtai Patrw ka Uo, ew
mnhn nda trexoshw tw postsevw, tw pollw lan moithtow ok shw
fanesyai duda.
19
Vgl. z.B. Didymus, Commentarius in Psalmos 109,1620 (Gronewald II 230232):

10

theo kobusch

vielen Namen entspricht jeweils etwas in der bezeichneten, realen

Person. Sie sind die vielen, durch die Begrenztheit des menschlichen
Bewusstseins bedingten Aspekte des einen realen Wesens. Origenes
hat so in der Lehre von den Christusprdikaten die stoische Unterscheidung zwischen den Seinsbereichen des wesenhaften, hypostatischen Seins einerseits und des menschlichen Bewusstseins bzw. des
gedachten Seins (cum et sine fundamento in re) in die christliche Philosophie
als Fundamentalunterscheidung eingefhrt.20
Die Kappadozier, allen voran Basilius und sein Bruder Gregor
von Nyssa, haben vollendet, was Origenes durch die Rezeption der
stoischen Lehre von der Epinoia innerhalb der christlichen Philosophie
begonnen hatte, indem sie in der Auseinandersetzung mit Eunomius,
dem philosophisch gebildeten Vertreter der Jungarianer, diese Lehre
zu einer Sprachphilosophie ausbauten und damit gewissermaen auch
die Anstze der antiken Theorie vom menschlichen Bewusstsein
vollendeten. Genauer gesagt haben sie den Begri der Epinoia innerhalb der christlichen Philosophie rehabilitiert, indem sie das
kulturstiftende, ernderische, methodisch vorgehende Element der
endlichen Vernunft und damit ihre Kompetenz fr den Bereich der
endlichen Dinge unterstrichen. Sie haben damit epochal bedeutungsvoll der Diskreditierung des menschlichen Bewusstseins entgegengewirkt, die nicht nur im Arianismus, sondern durchaus auch bei
Athanasius zu spren ist. Der dogmatische Streit mit den Neuarianern
ist in einer literarischen Kontroverse dokumentiert, die weder nur
einen provinziellen Charakter hatte noch blo eine Wiederauage
des alten arianischen Streits darstellt. Vielmehr sind die bedeutendsten Autoren des 4. Jh. in diesen Streit involviert, der obendrein
auch philosophisch neue bedeutsame philosophische Entwrfe, wie
z.B. die Sprachphilosophie, zutage gefrdert hat.21 Neben dem 359
entstandenen Syntagmation des Aetios sind es besonders die Schriften
seines Schlers Eunomius gewesen, die die Antwort der Groen, des
t pnema d n n kat t difora ato xarsmata plyow gayn stin
gr t gion pnema xvn xei t xarsmata to pnematow gay nta pleona.
ka t mn os& n stin, taw d pinoaiw poll gay. w ka yew ew stin
kat osan. lgetai d ka kat diafrouw pinoaw poll gayw, treptow,
nallovtow, phg, fw ka plin svtr satvw ew n kat pokemenon
lgetai zv, lyeia.
20
Zur genaueren Bedeutung der Epinoia bei Origenes vgl. meinen Aufsatz Die
philosophische Bedeutung des Kirchenvaters Origenes, ThQ 165 (1985) 94105,
hier 9597.
21
Vgl. A. M. Ritter, Arianismus, TRE III, 1978, 692719.

die epinoia

11

Basilius, des Gregor von Nyssa, Theodors von Mopsuestia, Johannes

Chrysostomus u.a. herausforderten. Der Auftakt dieser Auseinandersetzung war die wohl um das Jahr 360 zu datierende Apologie des
Eunomius, auf die Basilius mit seinem Anatreptikos oder Adversus
Eunomium kritisch antwortete. Eunomius lie darauf hin seine Apologia
apologiae zunchst in drei Bchern von 377 bis 381 peu peu erscheinen, auf die Gregor von Nyssa mit seinem monumentalen Werk
Contra Eunomium (381383) reagierte. Schlielich legte Eunomius im
Jahre 383 sein Glaubensbekenntnis (kyesiw pstevw) vor, das wiederum
Gregor im selben Jahr einer eingehenden Kritik unterzog in der
Schrift Refutatio confessionis Eunomii.22 In der Auseinandersetzung zwischen Eunomius einerseits und Basilius und Gregor andererseits geht
es eigentlich und zuletzt und vor allem um das Problem der Epinoia.
Basilius stellt die entscheidende Frage, was denn eigentlich die
Epinoia sei. Wie man es mit der menschlichen Vernunft, d.h. mit
dem endlichen Bewusstsein und seinen inneren Resultaten, den
Begrien halte, das war die sprachphilosophische Gretchenfrage, die
das vierte Jahrhundert in Atem hlt. Eunomius Antwort lsst an
Klarheit nichts zu wnschen brig: Das, was durch das menschliche Denken ausgesagt wird, hat sein Sein nur in den Namen und
in der uerung und verschwindet naturgem zusammen mit den
Lauten der Stimme.23 Hier ist deutlich erkennbar, als was die Epinoia
von Eunomius angesehen wird: Sie ist in ihrer uerung nichts weiter als ein atus vocis, die chtige Gestalt einer ueren Bezeichnung. Sie ist nicht konstitutiv fr den Wesensbegri einer Sache.
Was sie hervorbringt, hat keine Bedeutung (im Wortsinne), ist Falsches,
Trgerisches, Fiktionales und hat mit der wahren Erkenntnis der
Dinge nichts zu tun. Die Produkte des menschlichen Bewusstseins
sind nach dieser Ansicht per se Verkehrungen der Wahrheit. In diesem Sinne sind alle uerungen der endlichen Vernunft entweder
nur bedeutungslose Ausdrcke, bei denen man sich nichts denken
kann, wie z.B. Skindapsos oder Blityri, jene aus der Stoa stammenden Standardbeispiele fr die sog. voces non signicativae, oder sie
beruhen, wie im Falle des Kolossalen, auf einer knstlichen Vergrerung oder auch einer Verkleinerung, wie beim Begri des
22
Zu diesen Angaben und mehr Details vgl. die zuverlssige Studie von J.-A.
Rder, Gregor von Nyssa, Contra Eunomium I 1146, eingel., bers. und kommentiert,
Frankfurt a.M. u.a. 1993, Einleitung 4072.
23
Eunomius, Apologia 8,4 (SC 305, 248). Vgl. auch CE II 44 (GNO I 238,26 ).

12

theo kobusch

Pygmen, oder sie gehen auf eine Art der Hinzufgung zurck, z.B.
wenn wir die Polykephalen denken, oder auf eine Zusammensetzung
wie bei den Mischtieren.24 Die hnlichkeit dieses Beispielkatalogs mit
stoischen oder epikureischen Texten darf nicht darber hinwegtuschen, dass die Funktion der Epinoia hier bei Eunomius von anderer Art ist als in den Philosophenschulen. Wollten die Stoiker die
Epinoia als schpferische Potenz, als das bei jedem Erkenntnisakt
konstitutiv beteiligte endliche Bewusstsein charakterisieren, so wird
sie bei Eunomius zum Urheber des Nichtigen, Phantastischen und
Fiktiven, d.h. des blo zufllig Gedachten. Auch nach Gregor verbindet Eunomius die Epinoia immer nur mit der leeren Phantasie.25
Der philosophiegeschichtliche Hintergrund dieser Depotenzierung der
menschlichen Vernunft ist schwer auszumachen. Man hat auf Zusammenhnge mit dem Neuplatonismus hingewiesen. In der Tat hat
Plotin die stoische Epinoia hnlich scharf kritisiert. Aber Terminologie
und Gedanken haben sonst nicht viel mit dem Neuplatonismus zu
tun.26 Ob nicht doch Epikureisches im Hintergrund steht? Die Tatsache,
dass die stoische Lehre von den shmainmena, die ja fr Basilius und
Gregor sehr wichtig ist, von Eunomius implizit abgelehnt wird, indem
der Name das individuelle wirkliche Wesen der Sache unmittelbar
bezeichne,27 knnte ein Hinweis sein. Zudem verdchtigt auch Gregor
die eunomianische Lehre von der Epinoia des Epikureismus.28

24
Vgl. Eunomius bei Gregor von Nyssa, CE II 179 (GNO I 276,22 ). Zu dem
Beispielkatalog vgl. bes. Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos IX 393394
(Mutschmann II 293) und VIII 58 (Mutschmann II 115 ), ferner SVF II 87.88
und Epicurus, Fr. 36 (Usener 105106). Als Beispiele der bei Eunomius genannten
voces non signicativae nennt Gregor von Nyssa, CE III/V 44 (GNO II 176,6f ) selbst
die stoischen Ausdrcke Skindapsos und das bis Leibniz gebruchliche Blityri.
Vgl. SVF II 149; III 20. Gregor hat solche sinnlosen Ausdrcke in In Ecclesiasten 1
(GNO V 281,4 ) beschrieben als das Nichtexistierende, das allein im Hervorbringen
des Wortes sein Sein hat, also genau so wie Eunomius.
25
Vgl. CE II 11 (GNO I, 229,29 ).
26
Kritisch zur Neuplatonismusthese J. M. Rist, Basils Neoplatonism. Its Background and Nature, in: P. J. Fedwick (Hrsg.), Basil of Caesarea. Christian, Humanist,
Ascetic. A Sixteen-hundredth Anniversary Symposium, Toronto 1981, 137220. Vgl. auch
die Errterungen bei L. Abramowski, Eunomius, RAC VI, 943f und A. M. Ritter,
Eunomius, TRE X, 1982, 527.
27
Eunomius, Apologia 12,9 (SC 305, 258).
28
Vgl. CE II 410 (GNO I 345,25 ). Zum epikureischen (und arianischen)
Hintergrund der Lehre von der Epinoia des Eunomius vgl. auch Th. Kobusch, Name
und Sein. Zu den sprachphilosophischen Grundlagen in der Schrift Contra Eunomium

die epinoia

13

Basilius und Gregor versuchen die durch diesen arianischen Generalangri beschdigte Wrde des menschlichen Bewusstseins wiederherzustellen, indem sie es als eine schpferische, sprachbegabte,
bedeutungskonstitutive und methodisch disziplinierte Vernunft darstellen. Basilius macht in seiner gegen Eunomius gerichteten Schrift,
sobald die Rede auf die Epinoia kommt, auf die tiefe Kluft, die sie
trennt, aufmerksam.29 Wre die Epinoia wie Eunomius behauptet
nur ein Schall, nur ein atus vocis, dann msste man sie viel eher
Unsinn (parnoia) nennen und knnte sie nicht als eine Form der
Sinnndung begreifen. Gibt man aber zu, dass die Epinoia eine
semantische Funktion hat, dass sie also etwas bezeichnet, dann mu,
so schliet der in der stoischen Philosophie wohlbewanderte
Kirchenvater, zwischen dem Bezeichnenden und dem Bezeichneten
unterschieden werden, und das Bezeichnete ist nicht identisch mit
dem bezeichneten zuflligen Gegenstand, sondern stellt eine eigene
Ebene dar. Wie aber soll dann gedacht werden knnen, was Eunomius
auch gesagt hatte, nmlich dass das durch die Epinoia bezeichnete
Falsche und Nichtige mit dem Schall des Wortes verschwinde? Selbst
wenn es wirklich immer falsch wre, so bliebe doch dieses Falsche
auch nach dem Verklingen des lautlichen Wortes als ein Gedachtes
(nhma) im Bewusstsein. Die Epinoia kann nmlich sowohl den Akt
des Bewusstseins wie auch sein inneres Resultat, eben das Noema
bezeichnen.30 Mit anderen Worten: Wenn die Epinoia eine bezeichnende Funktion hat, muss immer die Ebene des lautlichen Sprechens
von der Ebene der Bedeutung, die etwas Gedachtes in der Seele
darstellt, unterschieden werden. Ein Hauptanliegen sowohl des Basilius
wie Gregors liegt darin, die Ebene der Bedeutung eines Wortes zur
Geltung zu bringen. Die Bedeutung, die bei beiden Autoren mit den
stoischen Ausdrcken des shmainmenon oder auch der mfasiw bezeichnet wird, ist das durch die Epinoia Konstituierte, das niemals mit
einem anderen austauschbar ist und so einem Erkannten erst eigentlich Bestimmtheit verleiht.31 Im Reich der Bedeutung allein gibt es

des Gregor von Nyssa, in: L. F. Mateo-Seco J. L. Bastero (Hrsg.), El Contra

Eunomium I en la Produccion Literaria De Gregorio De Nisa. VI. Coloquio Internacional sobre
Gregorio de Nisa, Pamplona 1988, 247268, hier 252254.
29
Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 67 (SC 299, 182192).
30
Vgl. Th. Dams (zitiert in SC 299, 182): Le mot pnoia peut signier lacte
mental et le resultat de cet acte, le nhma en nous.
31
Vgl. z.B. CE II 24 (GNO I 233,1722): prw ow tot famen, ti teron to

14

theo kobusch

Eindeutigkeit. Wre eine Konfusion unter den Bedeutungen mglich, dann verlre die Bezeichnung der Dinge, besonders die vielheitliche Benennung desselben Dinges ihr Recht.32 Wrde man die
Epinoia aber, wie Eunomius das ja in Wirklichkeit auch tut, als
eine bedeutungslose Bezeichnung (shmon noma) verstehen, die ausschlielich in der Pronunciation ihr Sein htte, dann wren die
Begrie nicht mehr von den sinnlosen Ausdrcken unterscheidbar.
Die eunomianische Beschreibung der Epinoia greift nach Basilius zu
kurz. Sie begreift sie ausschlielich als die Urheberin des blo Fiktiven,
Nichtigen und Phantasierten. Eine solche Auassung wird der wahren Rolle des menschlichen Bewusstseins nicht gerecht. Sie verkennt
auch vllig die positiv-konstitutive Funktion der menschlichen Vernunft
bei jeder Art von Erkenntnis. Deswegen sind die Begrie des endlichen Bewusstseins nach Basilius eher als die subtileren und przisierenden Besttigungen (penyumseiw) des sinnlichkeitsbedingt gebildeten
allgemeinen Begris anzusehen. So kann z.B. der Weizen je nach
seinen verschiedenen Eigentmlichkeiten mal als Same, mal als
Frucht oder auch als Nahrung verstanden werden. Was Basilius
wie auch sein Bruder durch dieses Beispiel verdeutlichen wollen, ist
die Aspektgebundenheit und insofern die Begrenztheit des menschlichen Denkens. Was immer vom Menschen gedacht wird, es ist aus
einer bestimmten Sicht, d.h. im Hinblick auf ein bestimmtes Bezeichnetes oder in einer bestimmten Bedeutung erfasst.33 In diesem Sinne
oenbaren auch die vielen Epinoiai Christi (wie z.B. Wahrheit, Tr,
Weinstock usw.), die schon Origenes so nachhaltig beschftigt hatten, je verschiedene Aspekte oder Bedeutungen der einen Realitt.34

sunytou ka teron to genntou t shmainmenon. t mn gr tn plthta

to pokeimnou, t d t m j ataw enai parsthsi, ka ok pallssontai
prw lllaw a tn nomtvn mfseiw, kn per t n mftera lghtai. Vgl.
CE I 560 (GNO I 188,15): otow tn pantel to shmainomnou metlhcin p
tw sunyouw tn nomtvn mfsevw poihsmenow ew topon dyen kbllei tn
lgon. Zur gewhnlichen Bedeutung s. auch CE I 643 (GNO I 211,16).
32

CE II 474 (GNO I 364,26 ).

Vgl. Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 6,5154 (SC 299, 186): Totvn d kaston
tn legomnvn ka kat pnoian yevretai, ka t cf tw glsshw o sunaprxetai: ll t cux to nenohktow ndrutai t nomata. Vgl. auch CE I 560
(GNO I 188,13: kat ti shmainmenon) und CE I 599 (GNO I 199,1).
34
Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 7,10 (SC 299, 188): Allo gr t shmainmenon
fvtw, ka llo mplou, ka llo do, ka llo poimnow. Vgl. auch Basilius,
Ep. 8,8,6 (Courtonne I 32).
33

die epinoia

15

Gregors gegen Eunomius gerichtete Schrift ist ein einziger Protest

gegen die Verunglimpfung der menschlichen Vernunft. Eine solche
Geringschtzung der Epinoia nimmt uns alle Mglichkeit, so wendet Gregor ein, das Menschliche des menschlichen Lebens zu begreifen. Woher haben wir denn, so fragt Gregor in seinem hohen Lied
auf die endliche Vernunft, die Errungenschaften der Geometrie, der
Arithmetik, der Logik und der Physik, woher die Erndungen der
Maschinen, woher kommt so etwas wie die Metaphysik in beiderlei
Gestalt, als Ontologie und als philosophische Theologie? Was ist
zudem mit den spter sog. knechtischen Knsten, was ist mit Ackerbau
und Schifahrt? Wie konnte das Meer dem Menschen zugnglich
werden, wie die wildesten Tiere gezhmt? Wurde das nicht alles
durch die Epinoia im Dienste des menschlichen Lebens erfunden?
Indem Gregor auf diese Weise die menschliche Vernunft als die
Stifterin der Kultur berhaupt prsentiert, setzt er einerseits die hellenistische Tradition der Kulturentstehungslehren fort, andererseits
avanciert er dadurch zum vielgelesenen Vorbild in der Aufklrungszeit,
ja sogar zum Aufklrer der Sptantike. Denn das II. Buch von Contra
Eunomium (zitiert als Buch XII), in dem dieses Loblied steht, war
es ausschlielich, was in der Renaissance und in der Aufklrungszeit
von dieser Schrift bekannt war und rezipiert wurde.35 Im Sinne der
kulturstiftenden Funktion deniert Gregor die Epinoia durchaus nicht
ohne bestimmte Anklnge an Aristoteles als die inventive Annherung
an das Unbekannte, die von intuitiv erfassten ersten Gedanken ausgeht und das daraus Folgende mit dem Ersten zusammenfgt.36 Der
in diesem Zusammenhang verwendete Ausdruck der fodow eretik
verweist auf die aristotelische Methode der via inventionis in der Topik
oder, wie aus einer spteren Stelle deutlich wird,37 allgemein auf die
syllogistische Methode des Aristoteles. Wie immer es damit im Detail
stehen mag, fest steht doch dies, dass das hohe Lied Gregors auf
die Epinoia die Glorizierung der aristotelisch verstandenen menschlichen Vernunft darstellt. Das ist umso bemerkenswerter, als Gregor
im Zusammenhang mit dem Problem der Gotteserkenntnis eben diesen Vernunftbegri einer unbarmherzigen Kritik unterzieht. Weswegen
Gregor die Epinoia gleichwohl zu den hchsten Gtern zhlt, liegt

35
36
37

Vgl. dazu T. Kobusch, Name und Sein, 248 und Anm. 42.
CE II 182 (GNO I 277,21).
CE III/V 5 (GNO II 162,10).

16

theo kobusch

in einem Element begrndet, das in der patristischen Zeit allgemein

ein hohes Bewertungskriterium darstellte. Die Epinoia ist nmlich
auch die lebensdienliche Vernunft. Alles, was die Zeit an Lebensntzlichem und -dienlichem . . . erfand, ist nur durch die Epinoia
erfunden worden.38 Die Knste und technischen Disziplinen helfen
in diesem Sinne, leichter zu leben. So erfand sich das Leben auch
die Medizin, die gleichwohl ein Geschenk Gottes genannt werden
kann, denn der Geist ist ein Werk Gottes. Wenn eben dieser selbe
Geist in menschlicher Gestalt, eben die Epinoia, auch Trgerisches
und Falsches hervorbringt wie ja Eunomius hervorzuheben nicht
mde wird , dann ist dieser Hinweis nach Gregor durchaus ein
Beitrag auch im Hinblick auf unser Ziel. Denn auch wir behaupten, dass die Epinoia wie auch die anderen Wissenschaften sowohl
zum Dienst an der Wahrheit gebraucht wie auch in den Dienst der
Lge und der Falschheit gestellt werden knnen. Doch ist die Epinoia
eigentlich zu einem guten Zweck von Gott der menschlichen Natur
verliehen worden. Es steht mit ihr so hnlich wie mit der Freiheit
selbst: Zu einem guten Zweck gegeben kann sie doch jederzeit
missbraucht werden.39 Hier ist zugleich jene markante Stelle des
Gedankengangs, wo sich die Wege des Eunomius und Gregors am
deutlichsten trennen. Denn Gregor nimmt ausdrcklich den Grundgedanken des Eunomius auf, um ihn zu zerstren. Der Grundgedanke
des Eunomius ist aber, dass Gott der Urheber der Sprache ist, indem
er, bevor der Mensch existierte, den Dingen die Namen gab. Das
ist Grund genug fr Gregor, auf die absurden Implikationen einer
solchen Annahme hinzuweisen. Oenbar hat Gott dieser Annahme
gem ganz anthropomorph gedacht eine diskursive Begriichkeit
benutzt und mit Stimme und Laut die einzelnen Begrie geprgt.
Wenn das aber richtig ist, dann muss sein Logos, wie der menschliche auch, bestimmte sinnliche Teile zur uerung benutzt haben,
wie z.B. die Luftrhren, die Zunge, die Zhne, den Mund. Ja, sogar
die Wangen sind nach Gregors hhnischer Gedankenfhrung, bei
der er die stoische Lehre von den Stimmwerkzeugen heranzieht,
Mitarbeiter am Werk des Logos.40 Was Gregor somit Eunomius

38

CE II 183 (GNO I 277,30).

CE II 185192 (GNO I 278280).
40
CE II 198203 (GNO I 282284). Vgl. De hominis opicio IX (PG 44, 149b ).
Zur stoischen Lehre vgl. SVF II 836.
39

die epinoia

17

These von der gttlichen Setzung der Sprache entgegenhlt, sind die
notwendigen Implikationen krperlicher Vorstellungen, die die Grundvoraussetzung der Geistigkeit des gttlichen Wesens desavouieren.
Deswegen kann es nach Gregor darber keinen Zweifel geben, dass
die lautliche Sprache eine Eigentmlichkeit einer inkarnierten Natur
ist, die in artikulierten Worten die Gedanken des Herzens uert.41
hnliches gilt fr die physischen Verhltnisse des Redens und
Zuhrens, ber die Gregor feine phnomenologische Beobachtungen
macht. Fr die nicht allzu weit Entfernten benutzen wir die Stimme,
um uns Gehr zu verschaen. Sind die Adressaten weit entfernt,
dann uern wir unsere Meinung in der Schrift. Gegenber den
Anwesenden erheben wir entweder die Stimmlage oder, je nach der
Distanz, senken sie. Bisweilen bedeuten wir den in der Nhe Stehenden
nur durch einen Wink im Mittelalter nach einigen Theorien die
wortlose Sprache der Engel , was zu tun ist, wir uern ohne Worte
einen Willensentschluss, wir geben durch eine Augenbewegung oder
Handbewegung unser Ge- oder Missfallen kund. Kurzum, wenn
schon die inkarnierte menschliche Existenz den Nchststehenden die
geheimen Bewegungen des Herzens ohne Stimme, Wort und Schrift
kundtun kann, sollte dann jene immaterielle, unberhrbare oberste
und erste Wesenheit, von der Eunomius spricht, auf Worte angewiesen sein von denen Eunomius obendrein sagt, sie vergingen mit
der Stimme , um sich mitzuteilen? Auch wer, wie Eunomius, vom
Hren Gottes spricht, setzt unweigerlich sinnliche Verhltnisse voraus, die dem angenommenen Wesen Gottes nicht gerecht werden.
Nicht nur, weil eine Stimme immer nur durch ein Vermittelndes,
wie z.B. die Luft, zu dem Hrenden gelangt, sondern vor allem, weil
die Trennung der fnf Sinne mit ihren jeweiligen eigenen, unvertauschbaren Gegenstandsbereichen ein besonderer Ausdruck der
Endlichkeit des menschlichen Bewusstseins ist, whrend das gttliche
als ganzes Sehen, als ganzes Hren, als ganzes Erkennen ist oder
mit dem Ausdruck aus der stoischen Mischungslehre: lon di lou.
Diese intelligible Mischung ist eine zwar in sich unterschiedene, aber
distanzlose, ganz und gar miteinander verbundene Einheit, die durch
die Identitt des Willens garantiert wird.42

41
CE II 207 (GNO I 285,18f ): dion gr tw nsvmtou fsevw t di =hmtvn
jaggllein t tw kardaw nomata. Vgl. auch CE II 391 (GNO I 340,21 ).
42

CE II 208214 (GNO I 285288).

18

theo kobusch

Wenn aus diesen und anderen Grnden die eunomianische Vorstellung aufgegeben werden muss, dass Gott der Ursprung der Sprache
sei und als Pdagoge und Schulmeister die ersten Menschen unmittelbar gelehrt habe, fragt es sich, wie sonst die Sprache in diese Welt
gekommen sein sollte. Um diese Frage beantworten zu knnen, muss
man sich nach Gregor zunchst die Funktion der Sprache klarmachen. Wie die dargelegte Argumentation gezeigt hat, bedarf Gott
selbst nicht der Worte und Bezeichnungen, um sich mitteilen zu knnen. Die Erndung der einzelnen Worte gengte vielmehr dem
menschlichen Bedrfnis nach der Bezeichnung der Dinge. Die Sprache
wurde deswegen allein von uns selbst erdacht (penoyh).43 Gott ist
der Schpfer der Dinge, nicht der Sprache. Das hat er der menschlichen Vernunft selbst berlassen.44 Sprache und Vernunft das ist
dasselbe. Die Rede von der Erschaung des Menschen meint notwendig immer auch die Verleihung dieser sprachbegabten Vernunft.
Es ist keine Epoche denkbar, in der es Menschen ohne Sprache,
ohne Vernunft, ohne Kultur gegeben htte. Eunomius hatte dagegen die These vertreten, dass die ersten Menschen in Unvernunft
und Sprachlosigkeit zusammengelebt htten, wenn Gott sie nicht
die Namen der Dinge gelehrt htte.45 Seitdem aber ist es nach
Eunomius ein von Gott in die Natur gelegtes Gesetz, dass aus den
Dingen selbst die Namen hervorgehen. Namen und Begrie sind in
diesem Sinne fr Eunomius natrlich.46 Das ist fr Gregor die
eigentliche Crux des Gedankengangs. Wenn Eunomius recht htte,
mssten doch alle Menschen dieselbe Sprache sprechen. Die Sprache
kann daher nicht die Sache der Natur sein. Vielmehr ist sie nach
Gregor Ausdruck der Freiheit.47 Gott hat ja auch nicht von oben
die Lebewesen mit bestimmten Bezeichnungen belegt, sondern Adam
die Freiheit der Namensgebung gegeben. Diese Freiheit, das Erkannte

43

CE II 237 (GNO I 295,27).

CE II 246 (GNO I 298,10 ). Vgl. auch CE II 281 (GNO I 309,13 ): ti yew
pragmtvn st dhmiourgw, o =hmtvn ciln. od gr kenou xrin, ll mn
neken pkeitai tow prgmasi t nmata.
45
CE II 398 (GNO I 342,22 ). Vgl. auch CE II 549 (GNO I 386,30 ).
46
Zu Eunomius Lehre von der nnoia fusik vgl. bes. L. Abramowski, Eunomius, RAC VI, 943; 946.
47
CE II 546 (GNO I 385,28386,2): e on nmow tw fsevw k tn prag44

mtvn mn nafesyai tw proshgoraw poei sper k tn spermtvn tn

=izn t blastmata, ka m t proairsei tn dhlontvn t prgmata tw
shmantikw tn pokeimnvn pvnumaw ptrepe, pntew n men o nyrvpoi prw
lllouw mglvssoi.

die epinoia

19

so oder anders zu nennen, liegt in der Natur. Wenn man das Bewusstsein (pnoia) nennen will Gregor kmmert sich nicht um austauschbare Namen.48 Wenn es aber bei Gregor mit den schnen
Worten Wilhelm von Humboldts, aber durchaus im Sinne Gregors
die Untrennbarkeit des menschlichen Bewusstseins und der menschlichen Sprache gibt, dann gilt auch fr die Epinoia, dass sie auf
Freiheit beruht, oder mit den eigenen Worten Gregors: Die Epinoia
ist eine Ttigkeit unserer diskursiven Vernunft und hngt von dem
Entschlu (proaresiw) der Sprechenden ab, nicht in sich subsistierend, sondern aufgrund des Antriebs der Mitunterredner seiend.49
Man muss sich vergegenwrtigen, was hier, in den wunderbaren
Texten eines groen Geistes des 4. Jh. geschieht. Da wird zum ersten
Mal expressis verbis das menschliche Sprechen und Denken, Bewusstsein
berhaupt, wenn man so sagen kann, als die Sache der Freiheit
bezeichnet. Vernunft aber ist in allen Menschen. Gregor sagt es ausdrcklich: Da das Vernnftige in allen Menschen ist, mssen je nach
den Unterschieden der Vlker auch die Verschiedenheiten der Namen,
d.h. der Sprachen betrachtet werden.50 Die Vielheit der Sprachen
und die durch das menschliche Bewusstsein konstituierten verschiedenen Bedeutungen der Wrter sind nicht mehr als Abfall von einer
Ursprache zu verstehen, sondern als Ausdruck der von Gott geschenkten Freiheit. A. Borst hat in seiner bewundernswerten Arbeit dieses
Verstndnis von Sprache und Bewusstsein des Menschen mit Recht
revolutionr genannt. Wird es jemanden noch wundern, dass gerade
das II. Buch von Contra Eunomium eine entscheidende Auseinandersetzung der neuzeitlichen Sprachphilosophie, in die berhmte Autoren
wie Maupertuis, Smilch, Herder, Humboldt u.a. involviert waren,
mitbestimmt hat?51 Die Aufklrung hat ihn als Bundesgenossen im
Kampf gegen falsche Vorurteile betrachtet. Sie hat ihn sogar in den
Rang des ersten christlichen Aufklrers erhoben, der auf dem Gebiet
der Sprachphilosophie die Sache der autonomen Vernunft vertreten
hat. Aber Aufklrer haben es schwer, zumal dann, wenn sie so
dierenziert argumentieren wie Gregor von Nyssa, dessen hohes Lied

48
CE II 396 (GNO I 342,10 ): d jousa to t nohynta pnta toisde
w trvw katonomzein n t fsei ketai n ete tiw pnoian ete llo ti
boloito lgein, o dioismeya. Vgl. auch CE II 304305 (GNO I 315,27 ).
49
50
51

CE II 334 (GNO I 323,29).

CE II 246 (GNO I 298,17).
Vgl. T. Kobusch, Name und Sein, 247268.

20

theo kobusch

auf die Epinoia nur die eine Seite der Medaille ist. Die andere besteht
in einer unverwechselbaren Kritik an jener Theorie, nach der diese
Epinoia, d.h. die endliche, nach einer bestimmten Methode erforschende, neugierige, menschliche Vernunft auch die gttliche Wesenheit
wie ein Ding unter anderen ergrnden knne.52 Doch das ist ein
weites Feld.

52
Vgl. dazu T. Kobusch, Zeit und Grenze. Zur Kritik des Gregor von Nyssa
an der Einseitigkeit der Naturphilosophie, in: S. G. Hall (Hrsg.), Gregory of Nyssa,
Homelies on Ecclesiastes. An English Version with Supporting Studies. Proceedings of the Seventh
International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa, Berlin New York 1993, 299317; ferner
Metaphysik als Lebensform bei Gregor von Nyssa, in: H. R. Drobner A. Viciano
(Hrsg.), Gregory of Nyssa: Homilies on the Beatitudes. An English Version with Commentary
and Supporting Studies, Proceedings of the Eighth International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa,
Leiden Boston Kln 2000, 467485, hier 467471.

DER THEOLOGIEGESCHICHTLICHE HINTERGRUND

DER EPINOIAI-LEHRE GREGORS VON NYSSA
Basil Studer

Einleitung
In einem bemerkenswerten Aufsatz geht H. J. Sieben der Frage nach,
in welchem Sinn Gregor von Nyssa in seiner Schrift De perfectione die
Epinoiai-Lehre des Origenes bernommen hat.1 Er zeigt dabei auf,
dass bei ihm die Namen Jesu zu Vorbildern des christlichen Lebens
geworden sind. Wer bedenkt, welchen Wert die pnoiai des Origenes
in der Frmmigkeit Gregors bekommen haben, wird nicht berrascht
sein, dass die Erwgungen ber sie auch in seiner Polemik gegen
Eunomius weiten Raum einnehmen.2
Gewiss steht im zweiten Buch Contra Eunomium, das uns hier beschftigt, die Inkarnation nicht im Vordergrund.3 Im Anschluss an die
Kontroverse zwischen seinem Bruder Basilius und dem Bischof von
Cyzicus diskutiert Gregor darin vielmehr die Fragen der damaligen
Trinittstheologie und im Zusammenhang damit im besonderen jene
der Gotteserkenntnis. Weil dabei jedoch der Gebrauch der Gottesnamen mit dem der Christusnamen verglichen wird, kommt die
Epinoiai-Lehre des Origenes dennoch voll zur Geltung.4 Sieben selbst
weist denn auch im Abschnitt Beiluges Vorkommen der EpinoiaiLehre bei den Kappadoziern auf Stellen im ersten Buch Adversus
Eunomium des Basilius und auf Stellen im zweiten und dritten Buch
Contra Eunomium Gregors hin.5 Dabei ist er von seiner Fragestellung

1
H. J. Sieben, Vom Heil in den vielen Namen Christi zur Nachahmung derselben. Zur Rezeption der Epinoiai-Lehre des Origenes durch die kappadokischen
Vter, ThPh 73 (1998) 128.
2
Vgl. H. J. Sieben, Zur Rezeption der Epinoiai-Lehre, 1821.
3
Vgl. R. P. C. Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God: The Arian
Controversy 318381, Edinburgh 1988, 627.
4
Origenes bernimmt, wie sich zeigen wird, von der berlieferung die Lehre
von den vielen Namen Gottes. Aber er entfaltet vor allem die Auassungen von
den vielen Bezeichnungen und Titeln Christi.
5
Vgl. H. J. Sieben, Zur Rezeption der Epinoiai-Lehre, 12f, mit Basilius, Adversus

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her nicht gentigt, genauer auf die theologische Problematik des

Origenes und des Nysseners einzugehen.
Tatschlich erscheint in der Entfaltung der origenischen EpinoiaiLehre, wie sie in der eunomianischen Kontroverse geschehen ist, viel
strker als zuvor eine doppelte Spannung. Einerseits ist die Aufmerksamkeit darin sehr stark auf die Gottesaussagen gerichtet, welche mit
der Kosmologie zusammenhngen und darum einen philosophischen
Charakter besitzen. Die biblischen Ansatzpunkte treten demgem,
besonders im Vergleich zum Johanneskommentar des Origenes, zurck.
Auf der anderen Seite fhrt die Diskussion ber die Erkenntnis der
gttlichen Natur zu einer Betonung des gttlichen Wirkens in der
Geschichte und damit, wenn vielleicht auch nicht sehr ausdrcklich,
zu einer greren Beachtung des Verhltnisses der yeologa zur
okonoma.6 Wer auf diese zweifache Spannung zwischen den mehr
kosmologischen und den mehr soteriologischen Aussagen sowie zwischen dem ewigen Sein Gottes und dessen Wirken in der Zeit achtet, muss sich zudem fragen, welche Bedeutung Gregor dem Glauben
und der Geschichte zumisst. Oensichtlich hilft eine solche Betrachtungsweise die theologische Eigenart des zweiten Buches Contra Eunomium Gregors klarer zu begreifen.
Um den Fragestand noch etwas besser zu erklren, sei mir erlaubt,
an den Vortrag zu erinnern, den ich am Gregor-Symposion in Pamplona gehalten habe.7 Unter dem Titel Der geschichtliche Hintergrund
des ersten Buches Contra Eunomium Gregors von Nyssa behandelte
ich im ersten Abschnitt die kirchengeschichtliche Lage um 380. Im
zweiten Abschnitt hingegen ging ich auf die damalige Rezeption des
niznischen Glaubens sowie auf die dabei verwendete theologische
Methode ein. In den folgenden Ausfhrungen werde ich nicht mehr
so weit ausholen. Ich mchte mich vielmehr allein mit der Frage
befassen, in welcher Weise Gregor sich in seinem zweiten Buch Contra
Eunomium an die Kontroverse zwischen Eunomius und Basilius angeschlossen und dabei die aus einer breiten Tradition herausgewach-

Eunomium I 57 (SC 299, 180188), sowie 18; CE II 179; 182 (GNO I 276; 277);
CE II 344; 347; 350 (GNO I 326; 327; 328).
6
Vgl. G. Maspero, Theologia, Oikonomia e Historia: La teologia della storia di Gregorio
di Nissa, Diss. Pamplona 2003.
7
B. Studer, Der geschichtliche Hintergrund des ersten Buches Contra Eunomium
Gregors von Nyssa, in: L. F. Mateo-Seco J. Bastero (Hrsg.), El Contra Eunomium
I en la Produccion Literaria De Gregorio De Nisa. VI Coloquio Internacional sobre Gregorio de
Nisa, Pamplona 1988, 139171.

der theologiegeschichtliche hintergrund

23

sene Epinoiai-Lehre des Origenes bernommen hat. Aus diesem

Fragestand ergibt sich die Einteilung meiner Darlegungen. In diesen
geht es zuerst um die Epinoiai-Lehre Gregors selbst, weiter um ihr
Verhltnis zu den Auassungen des Basilius, ferner um ihre origenische Herkunft und schlielich um ihre Verwurzelung in der biblischen und kirchlichen berlieferung.

I. Die Epinoiai-Lehre im zweiten Buch Contra Eunomium Gregors

Im zweiten Buch Contra Eunomium, in dem Gregor sich im Anschluss
an die vorausgehende Kontroverse zwischen Basilius und Eunomius
mit diesem auseinandersetzt, stehen zwei Thesen im Vordergrund.
Nach der ersten identiziert Eunomius das Wesen Gottes mit der
gttlichen gennhsa.8 Laut der zweiten These hingegen entsprechen
die Namen sosehr dem Wesen einer Sache, dass verschiedene Namen
auf verschiedene Wesen verweisen.9 In den Augen seiner kappadozischen Gegner vertritt Eunomius diese beiden Thesen, um damit
die niznische Lehre von der Gleichheit von Vater und Sohn abzulehnen.10 Weil nmlich der Sohn nicht gnnhtow ist wie der Vater,
ist er dem Wesen nach von ihm verschieden.11 Er steht zwar ber
allen Geschpfen, ist aber dennoch geworden und damit mit dem
Vater nicht vergleichbar.12

8
Vgl. besonders CE II 1223 (GNO I 230233, mit einem Zitat aus Eunomius);
CE II 141 (GNO I 266); CE II 158 (GNO I 271); CE II 177 (GNO I 276); CE II
377B-386 (GNO I 336339); CE II 504523A (GNO I 373379, mit Zitaten des
Eunomius); CE II 623f (GNO I 408). Vgl. ausserdem Eunomius, Apologia 711 (SC
305, 244256), zit. bei Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 5 (SC 299, 176); Basilius, Adversus
Eunomium I 4 (SC 299, 164, mit der Formel, welche nach B. Sesbo die Hauptthese
des Atius zusammenfasst). Dazu R. P. C. Hanson, The Search, 619622.
9
Vgl. CE II 177 (GNO I 276); CE II 481 (GNO I 366); CE II 487 (GNO I
368). Vgl. ferner Basilius, Adversus Eunomium II 34 (SC 305, 18); II 9 (SC 305, 36).
Dazu R. P. C. Hanson, The Search, 630.
10
Vgl. CE II 5060 (GNO I 240243), bes. CE II 54 (GNO I 241); CE II 125
(GNO I 262, mit einem Hinweis auf Basilius).
11
Vgl. CE II 21 (GNO I 232).
12
Vgl. Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 22 (SC 299, 250 ), mit den Hinweisen auf
Eunomius, Apologia 11,113 und 1719 (SC 305, 254256). Hinsichtlich dieses Textes
stellt sich die Frage, ob Eunomius wie Atius als Anhomer zu betrachten ist.
R. P. C. Hanson, The Search, 613 und 627 verneint diese Frage und betrachtet
Eunomius, gesttzt auf Philostorgius, als Homer. B. Sesbo, in SC 299, 19, bejaht
die Frage, betont aber in SC 299, 27, mit E. Cavalcanti, Eunomius htte es vermieden, von der Unhnlichkeit des Sohnes zu sprechen.

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basil studer

Basilius hatte die beiden Thesen und ihre negativen Konsequenzen

in der Widerlegung der ersten Apologie vor allem mit der Lehre
von den pnoiai zurckzuweisen versucht.13 Eunomius hatte in seiner Replik speziell diese Auassung bekmpft.14 Darum legt Gregor
bei der Verteidigung seines Bruders groes Gewicht auf die genaue
Umschreibung des Begries pnoia und weist damit seinerseits die
beiden Hauptthesen des Eunomius zurck.15
Es ist nicht leicht den Gedankengngen Gregors zu folgen. Sie
sind allzu sehr von der recht subtilen Beweisfhrung des Gegners
bestimmt und deswegen selbst gewunden und schwer nachzuvollziehen. Allein schon der Umstand, dass Gregor sich oft auf Basilius
sttzt, wie ihn Eunomius verstanden hatte, erschwert das Verstndnis
ungemein. Es sei dennoch versucht, seine Meinung von den pnoiai
Gottes kurz zu umreien.
Wie sonst in den Diskussionen um den niznischen Glauben geht
es auch in CE II vorrangig um die Weise, im Anschluss an die Bibel
und die kirchliche Lehre von Vater und Sohn sowie auch vom
Heiligen Geist zu sprechen. Im Vordergrund stehen darum die Namen
(nmata) und Benennungen (proshgorai). Diese charakterisierenden
Aussagen beruhen auf einer tieferen berlegung, auf der pnoia im
aktiven Sinn.16 Wer nmlich eine Sache vordergrndig erfasst hat,
mht sich, ihre verschiedenen Aspekte, die pnoiai in der passiven
Bedeutung, herauszubringen.17 Im Falle Gottes grndet diese vertiefte Erkenntnis auf der Oenbarung seiner Werke.18 Die Namen
und die von ihnen ausgedrckten Begrie bestimmen jedoch nicht
die Natur einer Sache.19

13

Vgl. CE II 4250 (GNO I 238 ).

Vgl. CE II 4250 (GNO I 238 ); CE II 66 (GNO I 245); CE II 125 (GNO
I 262).
15
Vgl. die Texte in Lexicon Gregorianum III 791793: pinov; III 793799: pnoia.
Dazu E. Mhlenberg, Die Unendlichkeit Gottes bei Gregor von Nyssa, Gttingen 1966,
183196, bes. 192, mit CE II 94105; 119124 (GNO I 254257; 260262).
16
Vgl. CE II 192 (GNO I 280); CE II 194 (GNO I 281). Dazu Lexikon Gregorianum
III 795f, II.C: pnoiai als Aspekte dierenzierendes Denken.
17
CE II 182 (GNO I 277).
18
CE II 13 (GNO I 230): analoge Erkenntnis aus der Schnheit der Schpfung;
CE II 298f (GNO I 314), mit einer Denition von pnoia; CE II 304 (GNO I
315); CE II 353 (GNO I 329); CE II 148158 (GNO I 268271); CE II 581587
(GNO I 395397), besonders 583584 (GNO I 396397).
19
Vgl. CE II 386 (GNO I 338f ): nicht die osa, sondern t pw oder t poin
werden erkannt. Dazu Basilius, Adversus Eunomium II 9 (SC 305, 38); II 28 (SC 305,
120).
14

der theologiegeschichtliche hintergrund

25

Gregor kommt immer wieder auf diese These zurck. Um sie zu

erhrten, entfaltet er seine Auassung von dem alle Erkenntnis bersteigenden Gott.20 Ergnzend dazu spricht er vom Glauben Abrahams,21
uert seine Bedenken gegenber der Neugierde22 und betont die
Unmglichkeit, die eigene Seele zu erkennen.23 Ohne eine eigene
Existenz zu besitzen,24 verweisen die Namen und Begrie auf ihr
Subjekt, auf die osa sofern sie pokemenon ist. Dabei sind es
gewhnlich ihrer viele.25 Aber sie sind nicht zerstreut, sondern kommen einem einzigen pokemenon zu.26
Gregor wendet nun den so verstandenen Begri der pnoia auf
das Verhltnis Gottes zu seinem Sohn an. Die gennhsa ist nicht
mit dem Wesen Gottes gleichzusetzen.27 Sie ist nur eine pnoia
Gottes und nicht einmal die einzige.28 Wie die anderen gttlichen
Attribute lsst sie nicht das Wesen Gottes als solches verstehen, selbst
wenn sie auf das eine pokemenon verweist. Um sich dazu weiter
abzusichern,29 unterscheidet Gregor fortwhrend zwischen den pnoiai
oder nomata und den nmata, welche sich auf die prgmata und
besonders auf die nrgeiai beziehen.30 Dazu verteidigt er die Berechtigung ber eine Sache weiter nachzudenken und so ihre verschiedenen Aspekte herauszuschlen.31 Vor allem ndet er eine Besttigung

20

CE II 6383 (GNO I 244251), besonders CE II 71 (GNO I 248f ).

CE II 8496 (GNO I 251254), besonders CE II 93 (GNO I 254), mit einer
Denition des Glaubens.
22
CE II 97105 (GNO I 255257).
23
CE II 106120 (GNO I 257261).
24
Vgl. CE II 589 (GNO I 398).
25
Vgl. CE II 133 (GNO I 264).
26
Vgl. CE II 353356 (GNO I 329f ); CE II 469479 (GNO I 363366), besonders 473 und 475. Dazu CE III/V 56 (GNO II 180).
27
Vgl. CE II 270 (GNO I 305); CE II 612 (GNO I 404f ), mit einem Basiliuszitat.
28
CE II 137141 (GNO I 265f ); CE II 271 (GNO I 305f ); CE II 473 (GNO I
364) (Ablehnung der Auassung des Eunomius).
29
Zu beachten ist, dass Gregor die dinoia, die begriiche Deutung der von
den biblischen Namen bezeichneten Wirklichkeiten als Aufgabe der Theologie
betrachtet. Vgl. CE II 136 (GNO I 265).
30
Die Dreiheit von Name oder Bezeichnung von eingehender berlegung oder
Hinsicht von Sache oder Krfte ndet sich in zahlreichen Texten. Vgl. CE II 12
(GNO I 230); CE II 125195 (GNO I 262281); ber das Benennen und Erdenken
Gottes, besonders CE II 160 (GNO I 271) und CE II 174 (GNO I 275); CE II
513 (GNO I 376); CE II 515 (GNO I 377); CE II 589 (GNO I 398).
31
Vgl. die in Anm. 18 zitierten Texte ber die Oenbarung Gottes aus den
Werken. Dazu CE II 391f (GNO I 340), wo es heisst, dass der Mensch seine
Gedanken wegen seiner krperlichen Verfassung den anderen nicht ohne Worte
vermitteln kann.
21

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seines theologischen Vorgehens in der Christologie, in der Christus

verschiedene Namen zugesprochen werden, seien es Namen, die in
den Heiligen Schriften vorkommen,32 oder seien es Namen, mit denen
sich der Herr selbst benannt hat.33
Eunomius hingegen stellt sich gegen die Vielfalt der Namen Gottes.34
Er lehnt es im Besonderen ab, den Begri gennhsa und den damit
oft verbundenen Begri fyarsa als pnoia zu verstehen.35 Fr ihn
ist Gott wesenhaft ohne Anfang und ohne Ende.36 Oenbar frchtet er, dass bei einer Verwendung von pnoia die gttliche Wirklichkeit
in Frage gestellt wird. Vielleicht im Hinblick auf die Antithese kat
pnoian kay pstasin betrachtet er die pnoia als reines Gedankending.37 Jedenfalls weist er das Beispiel des Weizenkornes ab, in
dem verschiedene Aspekte unterschieden werden knnen.38 Er zeigt
sich selbst sehr skeptisch gegenber der Meinung von den verschiedenen pnoiai Christi.39 Er lsst sich also in seinen Auassungen
ber die gennhsa Gottes nicht erschttern. Nach seiner Meinung
teilt Basilius mit seinen pnoiai das Wesen Gottes auf.40 Whrend
er die Wirklichkeit der pnoia ablehnt, hlt er am Realismus der
Namen im allgemeinen und der Aussagen ber Gott im besonderen
fest.41 Laut seinem Sprachverstndnis stammen diese Namen wie alle
Namen von Gott und nicht von den Menschen.42 Im brigen geht
es Eunomius letztlich nicht einfach um die Ablehnung der Epinoiai32

CE II 343358 (GNO I 326331).

CE II 294332 (GNO I 313323); Ausgangspunkt der Diskussion: Basilius,
Adversus Eunomium I 12 (SC 299, 212 ); CE II 350358 (GNO I 328331).
34
CE II 359365 (GNO I 331 ); CE II 469479 (GNO I 363366), besonders
CE II 475 (GNO I 364f ).
35
Vgl. besonders CE II 4250 (GNO I 238240). Dazu Eunomius, Apologia 68
(SC 305, 242250). Weiter, CE II 66 (GNO I 245); CE II 350370 (GNO I 331
334).
36
Vgl. CE II 125 (GNO I 262); CE II 336339 (GNO I 324f ); CE II 377386
(GNO I 336339).
37
CE II 4549 (GNO I 239f ); CE II 180 (GNO I 276f ); CE II 387 (GNO I
339); CE II 492503 (GNO I 370373). Dazu Eunomius, Apologia 8,16 (SC 305,
246248), zitiert von Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 5 (SC 299, 180).
38
CE II 195 (GNO I 282); CE II 364f (GNO I 332f ); CE II 387f (GNO I 339).
39
CE II 310 (GNO I 317); CE II 347350 (GNO I 327f ).
40
CE II 462468 (GNO I 361 ).
41
CE II 4250 (GNO I 238 ); CE II 334 (GNO I 323f ); CE II 589 (GNO I
389). Dazu Eunomius, Apologia 18 (SC 305, 268270).
42
CE II 195204 (GNO I 281284); CE II 246293 (GNO I 298313, ber den
Ursprung der menschlichen Sprache); CE II 281288 (GNO I 309, Gegenargument:
die menschliche Sprache ist nicht gegen die Vorsehung); CE II 389394 (GNO I
339 ); CE II 413422 (GNO I 346350).
33

der theologiegeschichtliche hintergrund

27

Lehre. Entscheidend ist fr ihn, selbst wenn er dies vielleicht ungengend zum Ausdruck bringt, die Ordnung (tjiw) zu wahren, in welcher die real verschiedenen Personen der Dreifaltigkeit aufeinander
bezogen sind.43
Um die Stellung Gregors noch besser zu verstehen, mag es ntzlich sein, nher auf seinen methodologischen Ansatz zu achten. Er
hlt sich einerseits an die Bibel und die kirchliche Tradition und
gebraucht andererseits die Dialektik seiner Zeit. Dieses zweifache
Vorgehen ist im Grunde genommen von dem des Eunomius nicht
verschieden.44 Auf jeden Fall ist die doppelte Orientierung der theologischen Methode Gregors oensichtlich.45 Auf der einen Seite sttzt
er sich auf die Heilige Schrift und auf die kirchliche Tradition. Die
biblische Autoritt erscheint vor allem in der Verwendung der
Christusnamen, die grtenteils auf die Heiligen Schriften zurckgehen.46 Auf Grund seiner Einstellung zur Bibel lehnt er den Verweis
des Eunomius auf die Heiligen, d.h. auf die Propheten und die
Apostel, nicht ab.47 Er kritisiert nur die Art und Weise seines Gegners,
sich auf die Heiligen zu berufen. Dasselbe gilt auch fr die Art des
Eunomius, sich auf das Glaubensbekenntnis zu sttzen.48 Gregor
selbst stellt dem Symbol des Eunomius nicht das der Vter von Niza
entgegen. Auf der anderen Seite ist die theologische Methode des
Gregor von der Dialektik seiner Zeit geprgt. Darin unterscheidet
er sich jedoch kaum von Eunomius, selbst wenn er diesen als

43
Vgl. die Darstellung der trinitarischen Aussagen bei Eunomius, Apologia 27 (SC
305,290294). Dazu Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 20 (SC 299, 244246).
44
Vgl. CE II 11 (GNO I 229f ): Basilius, der Vorkmpfer der Wahrheit, fhrt
den Kampf gegen Eunomius mit Hilfe der nnoiai koina und der Zeugnisse der
Schrift; CE II 49 (GNO I 240). Dazu B. Sesbo, in SC 305, 179, mit Eunomius,
Apologia 16 (SC 305, 234244), sowie die Polemik dagegen in Basilius, Adversus
Eunomium I 4 (SC 299, 166 gegen das Glaubensbekenntnis des Eunomius) und
Adversus Eunomium I 5 (SC 299, 170) gegen Apologia 7 (SC 305, 244).
45
Vgl. CE II 98 (GNO I 255); CE II 319 (GNO I 319). Dazu die verschiedenen Studien in M. Harl (Hrsg.), criture et culture philosophique dans la pense de Grgoire
de Nysse. Actes de Chevetogne, 1969, Leiden 1971; B. Studer, Schola Christiana. Die Theologie
zwischen Niza und Chalzedon, Paderborn 1998, 158f; 180186.
46
Vgl. CE II 293358 (GNO I 312331).
47
Vgl. CE II 310 (GNO I 317), sowie Basilius, Adversus Eunomium II 18 (SC 305,
70 ). Dazu R. P. C. Hanson, The Search, 624f, wo es heisst, dass Eunomius viele
Schrifttexte anfhrte.
48
Vgl. CE II 11 (GNO I 229 ). Dazu Basilius, Adversus Eunomium II 45 (SC
299, 162170), der den Hinweis des Eunomius auf das alte Glaubensbekenntnis
stark kritisiert.

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Technologen abzufertigen sucht.49 Inhaltlich gesehen, hlt sich Gregor

an die stoische Kategorienlehre.50 Danach existieren die pnoiai wie
die nmata nicht fr sich selbst. Zusammen mit den Namen verweisen sie aber auf etwas, was in den Dingen wirklich existiert.51 Sie
kommen einem pokemenon zu, wie Gregor fter betont.52 Sie bringen damit zum Ausdruck, auf welche Weise die fragliche osa sich
verwirklicht. Gregor unterscheidet also mit der stoischen Dialektik
das, was ist (t stin) und wie es ist (pvw stn). B. Sesbo deckt
in seiner Einleitung zum Adversus Eunomium des Basilius diesen Zusammenhang klar auf.53 Es kann jedoch nicht bersehen werden, dass
die Kappadozier die gemeinsamen und individuellen poithtew nicht
klar unterscheiden. Sie haben vielmehr die Tendenz, die gemeinsamen Eigentmlichkeiten, die koin oder das koinn, von den dimata
zu unterscheiden und auf die osa zu reduzieren.54
Wer dieses doppelte Vorgehen beurteilen will, muss sicher zugeben, dass der dialektischen Bestimmung der Begrie ein sehr wichtiger Platz zukommt. Die Widerlegung des Eunomius spielt sich vor
allem auf der Ebene der philosophischen Analyse ab. In dieser
Einschtzung ist der Rckgri auf die gttlichen Attribute, die sich
aus der Kosmologie ergeben, mit eingeschlossen. Immer und immer
wieder ist vom Schpfer die Rede. Die gennhsa bezieht sich nach
Eunomius und demgem weitgehend auch nach seinen Gegnern
weniger auf die Herkunft des Sohnes als auf den Ursprung der Welt.
Agennhsa bedeutet vor allem, dass Gott keinen Anfang hat.55 Doch
der erste Eindruck darf nicht tuschen. Die Geschichte in der
Bedeutung von Erzhlung des Handelns Gottes ist in keiner Weise

49
Vgl. CE I 282 (GNO I 109); CE II 65 (GNO I 244); CE III/I 63 (GNO II
26,711). Dazu Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 9 (SC 299, 200 ), mit der Erklrung
von B. Sesbo in SC 299, 3538, mit der frheren Literatur und den Texten.
50
Vgl. R. M. Hbner, Gregor von Nyssa als Verfasser der sog. ep. 38 des
Basilius, in: J. Fontaine C. Kannengiesser (Hrsg.), Epektasis, Paris 1972, 463
490, besonders 476482. Ausserdem B. Sesbo in SC 299, 7882, zur stoischen
Kategorienlehre bei Basilius, sowie L. I. Scipioni, Ricerche sulla cristologia del Libro di
Eraclide di Nestorio, Friburgo 1956, 98106.
51
Vgl. CE II 334 (GNO I 232f ); CE II 589 (GNO I 398).
52
Vgl. CE II 334 (GNO I 323f ); CE II 354 (GNO I 329); CE II 356 (GNO I
330); CE II 448 (GNO I 357).
53
Vgl. B. Sesbo in SC 299, 7882.
54
Vgl. Basilius, Adversus Eunomium II 28 (SC 305, 118); Basilius, Ep. 38,45
(Courtonne I 8489).
55
Vgl. Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 5 (SC 299, 174); CE II 174177 (GNO I
275f ), und fters.

der theologiegeschichtliche hintergrund

29

zu unterschtzen. Aus der biblischen Geschichte kennt der Theologe

die Taten, die Krafterweise Gottes (nrgeiai), aus denen er dessen
pnoiai ableitet.56 Die okonoma, von der in der Geschichte oder
in den Geschichten die Rede ist, bleibt fr Gregor die Grundlage
der Erkenntnis der Trinitt.57 Wie sehr dies zutrit, wird durch die
hugen Hinweise auf die stora, auf die storai oder auf die
stora eaggelik besttigt.58 Obwohl Gregor die Oenbarung Gottes
in der Schpfung von der in der Heiligen Schrift erzhlten geschichtlichen Oenbarung Gottes nicht streng unterscheidet,59 besteht also
kein Zweifel darber, dass nach seiner Auassung die pnoiai, welche das Verhltnis des Vaters zum Sohn zum Ausdruck bringen,
letztlich auf dem Glauben an das menschgewordene Wort Gottes
beruhen.

II. Die Epinoiai-Lehre des Meisters

Wie bereits betont, schliet sich Gregor an die Kontroverse zwischen
seinem Bruder Basilius und Eunomius an. Er bekmpft in CE II die
ersten zwei Bcher der Apologia Apologiae des Eunomius. Darin setzt
sich dieser mit dem ersten Buch von Adversus Eunomium des Basilius
auseinander, in dem dieser seine erste Apologie diskutiert.60
56

Vgl. CE II 581587 (GNO I 359 ).

Vgl. zum Thema der okonoma als Oenbarung der yeologa J. Rexer, Die
Festtheologie Gregors von Nyssa, Frankfurt 2002, 262272 (Lit.); G. Maspero, Theologia,
97300; V. Corbellini, La dottrina dellincarnazione del Verbo nellAdversus Eunomium di
Gregorio di Nissa, Diss. Augustinianum, Roma, 2003.
58
Vgl. u.a. CE II 8496 (GNO I 251254, Geschichte Abrahams mit Hinweisen
auf Glaube und Houng); CE II 119 (GNO I 260f: eaggelik stora, mit dem
Hinweis auf Joh 21,25); CE II 226 (GNO I 291); CE II 255 (GNO I 300); CE II
269281 (GNO I 305309, Diskussion des Schpfungsberichtes); CE II 426 (GNO
I 351); CE II 434 (GNO I 353, Hinweis auf die Mythen). Weiter Texte in Lexikon
Gregorianum III 487491. Dazu G. Maspero, Theologia, 301447: Historia.
59
Wie wichtig fr Gregor die okonoma der Schpfung ist, zeigt sich auch in
der Oratio catechetica magna, in der dieser Begri vor allem mit der Schpfung verbunden wird. Vgl. Gregor von Nyssa, Oratio catechetica magna (GNO III/4 6,14
14,13).
60
Zum Zusammenhang der Schriften der drei Autoren vgl. E. Cavalcanti, Studi
Eunomiani, Roma 1976, besonders 67105, sowie die Angaben ber die Schriften
des Eunomius in CPG II 34553460. Zur Bedeutung der Polemik des Basilius vgl.
B. Sesbo, in SC 299, 1549, und A. Smets und M. Van Esbroeck in SC 160,
99115, sowie vor allem M. V. Anastos, Basils Kata Eunomiou. A Critical Analysis,
in: P. J. Fedwick (Hrsg.), Basil of Caesarea, Christian, Humanist, Ascetic, Toronto 1981,
67136; G. L. Kustas, Saint Basil and the Rhetorical Tradition, in: P. J. Fedwick
57

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Wie weit Gregor in CE II die Auseinandersetzung zwischen Basilius

und Eunomius weiterfhrt, erscheint allein schon darin, dass er sich
fortwhrend auf seinen Lehrer und Meister bezieht.61 Basilius ist fr
ihn der Vorkmpfer (prmaxow) im Streit fr den rechten Glauben.62
Er ist der Lehrer der Orthodoxie (esbeia).63 Folglich unterlsst es
Gregor nicht, die Stellungnahme seines Bruders gegenber seinem
Gegner zu umschreiben.64 Bemerkenswert sind auerdem die Zitate,
in denen Gregor Basilius zu Wort kommen lsst.65 Soweit man aus
der kritischen Ausgabe von Jaeger schlieen kann, sind es nicht sehr
viele. Sie sind auch nicht immer ganz wrtlich angefhrt. Dazu stammen sie zum Teil aus der Apologia Apologiae des Eunomius, sind also
bereits interpretiert und gewertet.66 Auallenderweise beziehen sich
diese Verweise auf Basilius zu einem groen Teil auf dessen EpinoiaiLehre.67 Darin kommt sicher klar zum Ausdruck, dass sich in der
ganzen Diskussion der Streit vorwiegend um die pnoiai dreht. Um
diese Auseinandersetzung zu verstehen, muss man sich ohne Zweifel
vor Augen halten, dass die Ausdrucksweise des Basilius von der stoischen Tradition abhngt. Wie B. Sesbo aufzeigt, sind dabei drei
Punkte zu beachten.68 Basilius setzt an der stoischen Erkenntnislehre
an. Dazu nimmt auch er an, dass die Namen von den Menschen
erfunden sind. Schlielich rezipiert er die stoische Kategorienlehre,
welche zwischen dem Wesen (osa) und den Qualitten (poithtew)
unterscheidet.
Bei der Weiterfhrung der Diskussion um die Berechtigung des
Begries pnoia ist grundlegend, dass Gregor von Basilius dessen

(Hrsg.), Basil of Caesarea, 221279. Die Untersuchung von J. M. Rist im gleichen

Band beschrnkt sich auf das Verhltnis des Basilius zu Plotin.
61
Vgl. z.B. CE II 66 (GNO I 245); CE II 130 (GNO I 263); CE II 141 (GNO
I 266); CE II 195 (GNO I 281).
62
CE II 10f (GNO I 229f ).
63
CE II 197 (GNO I 282).
64
Vgl. CE II 125 (GNO I 262).
65
Vgl. CE II 6566 (GNO I 244245); Eunomius, Apologia 8 (SC 305, 250; zit.
auch von Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 11, SC 299, 208); CE II 446 (GNO I 356f;
Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 7, SC 299, 192); CE II 506 (GNO I 374; Basilius,
Adversus Eunomium I 7, SC 299, 192).
66
Vgl. CE II 294 (GNO I 313), mit der Anmerkung von Jaeger: Basilius, Adversus
Eunomium I 7 (SC 299, 188), aus Eunomius; CE II 344 (GNO I 326: ungenaue
Zitation aus Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 6, SC 299, 186); CE II 351 (GNO I
328f; Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 6, SC 299, 186f ).
67
Vgl. CE II 65f (GNO I 244f ).
68
B. Sesbo, in SC 299, 7683.

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31

Denition gegenber Eunomius przisiert.69 Ebenso macht er sich

die Beweisfhrung fr die Geltung dieses Begries zu eigen. Er deutet darauf hin, dass Basilius dazu ein Beispiel aus der krperlichen
Welt heranzieht.70 Er erklrt, wie man in einer vertieften Reexion
dazu kommt, die verschiedenen Aspekte eines Weizenkornes zu unterscheiden. Den Hauptbeweis liefert ihm die Art, wie Basilius aus der
Verwendung der vielen Namen des einen Christus, die in der Bibel71
und im besonderen in den Worten des Herrn selbst vorkommen.72
Aus diesen berlegungen schliet Gregor zusammen mit Basilius,
dass die gennhsa weder als einziges Attribut Gottes betrachtet noch
mit dem Wesen Gottes identiziert werden darf.73
Es stellt sich indes die Frage, wie weit sich Gregor an die Auassungen des Basilius ber den Begri pnoia und seine Anwendung
auf die Diskussion der gennhsa Gottes und der Bedeutung der
Gottesnamen hlt und wie weit er ber ihn hinausgeht. Fr die
Beantwortung dieser entscheidenden Frage sind die berlegungen
hilfreich, die M. V. Anastos in seiner Darstellung von Basilius Contra
Eunomium vorlegt.74 Sie sind sicher nicht endgltig. Ihr Autor betont
selbst, wie schwierig ein Vergleich zwischen Basilius und Gregor ist.
Aber er mchte sich dennoch wenigstens einige knappe Bemerkungen
erlauben. Danach schliet sich Gregor ziemlich eng an die Widerlegung
seines Bruders an.75 Dabei ist er jedoch ausfhrlicher als dieser und
erweitert dessen Argumente und Beispiele. Im Grossen und Ganzen
ist seine Dialektik schrfer. In Bezug auf die Einzelheiten hebt Anastos
69

CE II 345 (GNO I 326). Vgl. Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 6 (SC 299, 186).
CE II 352 (GNO I 328f ).
71
CE II 343349 (GNO I 326 ).
72
CE II 350358 (GNO I 328331), besonders 353 (GNO I 329), sowie CE II
356 (GNO I 330): der Herr ist eins kat t pokemenon, hat aber verschiedene
Namen entsprechend seinen nrgeiai.
73
Vgl. vor allem CE II 475 (GNO I 364f ). Dazu Basilius, Adversus Eunomium II
4 (SC 305, 1823): Unterscheidung von osa und dimata.
74
M. V. Anastos, Basils Kata Eunomiou, 121f. Vgl. auch M. Van Esbroeck, in
SC 160, 109114.
75
Im besonderen ist zu beachten, dass Gregor wie Basilius sich auf die kirchliche Tradition und auf die Philosophie seiner Zeit, speziell auf die stoische
Kategorienlehre sttzt und wie dieser die Epinoiai-Lehre im Anschluss an die antimonarchianische berlieferung theologisch auswertet. Ferner ist zu bedenken, dass
Basilius in Ep. 210,34 (Courtonne II 191194), ausdrcklich nicht nur gegen die
Anhomer, sondern auch gegen die Sabellianer Stellung nimmt. Dabei diskutiert er
die Meinung, nach welcher der Vater und der Sohn pino& zwei, hingegen postsei eins seien, und stellt ihr seine Auassung von t koinn tw osaw und t
dizon tn postsevn entgegen.
70

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im besonderen hervor, dass Gregor die Kritik des Eunomius an der

Auassung des Basilius von der osa ernst nimmt. Es ist nicht richtig, die Gleichwesentlichkeit von Vater und Sohn mit der gemeinsamen osa zu vergleichen, die alle Menschen als likn pokemenon
vereint.76 Die Einheit des Wesens, das die Einheit der Menschheit
begrndet, darf nicht als materielles Substrat verstanden werden.
In diesem Zusammenhang mag es am Platz sein, darauf hinzuweisen, dass Anastos in seiner Gegenberstellung von Basilius und
Gregor von einer unhaltbaren Voraussetzung ausgeht.77 Nach seiner
Meinung macht Basilius keinen Gebrauch des Glaubens von Niza
um seine Stellungnahme zu festigen. Das sei umso bemerkenswerter, als das Bekenntnis des Eunomius, dem Basilius skeptisch gegenberstehe, dem niznischen Credo und seinem eigenen Taufbekenntnis
hnlich sei. Diese Zurckhaltung gegenber dem niznischen Glauben
erklrt Anastos vor allem im Anschluss an die uerungen des Gregor
von Nazianz als Rcksichtnahme auf die damaligen kirchenpolitischen
Verhltnisse. Aber er setzt dabei voraus, dass das moosiow die
Hauptaussage des Credo von 325 bildet. Diese Voraussetzung muss
jedoch als bertrieben betrachtet werden. Omoosiow ist nmlich nur
eine Przisierung von gennhynta o poihynta. Wenn Basilius in
seiner Auseinandersetzung mit Eunomius so wenig Gewicht auf die
Autoritt des moosiow legt, das von Athanasius und anderen als
Schlsselwort angesehen wird, dann tut er dies oenbar aus der
berzeugung heraus, dass es in erster Linie auf den richtigen Begri
der Sohnschaft Christi ankommt. Die Aussage Licht vom Licht,
gezeugt, nicht geschaen ist ihm wichtiger als das moosiow. Wie
die westlichen Theologen, Ambrosius und Augustinus miteingeschlossen, vertritt er den niznischen Glauben, ohne deswegen dem
moosiow einen groen Wert beizumessen.78 Im brigen stehen hier
die Unterschiede in der Pneumatologie nicht in Frage. Gregor diskutiert in CE II nur die Kritik, die Eunomius im Hinblick auf Adv.
Eun. I und nicht jene von Adv. Eun. III des Basilius angestellt hat.

76
Vgl. Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 15 (SC 299, 226); II 4 (SC 305, 20). Die gegenteiligen Texte Gregors, die Anastos in der Anmerkung 185, S. 121 nach D. Balas
zitiert, sind allerdings dem dritten Buch CE entnommen, das hier direkt nicht zur
Diskussion steht.
77
M. V. Anastos, Basils Kata Eunomiou, 128f.
78
Vgl. dazu meine Kritik der Theorie des Neuniznismus in Una valutazione
critica del neonicenismo, in: Mysterium Caritatis, Roma 1999, 425444, sowie in
Adamantius 8 (2002), 152159.

der theologiegeschichtliche hintergrund

33

Immerhin muss bei der Beurteilung des Umstandes, dass Basilius das
Wort yew nicht auf den Heiligen Geist anwenden will, auch bedacht
werden, wie sehr der neutestamentliche Sprachgebrauch, nach welchem yew ein Eigenname des Vaters ist, nachwirkt und in Konkurrenz
mit yew als der gemeinsamen Bezeichnung der drei Personen und
der ganzen Trinitt steht.
In einem Vergleich der Epinoiai-Lehre des Basilius mit derjenigen Gregors darf die Feststellung nicht fehlen, dass beide in einer
berlieferung stehen, welche auf Origenes zurckgeht. Natrlich folgt
Gregor dem Meister von Alexandrien nicht allein in dem Mae, wie
es Basilius zuvor getan hat. Er kannte Origenes nicht weniger gut
als sein Bruder. Er konnte sich dessen origenischen Ansichten gerade
deswegen zu eigen machen, weil er Origenes selber kannte. Ebenso
ist zu beachten, dass sowohl Basilius als auch Gregor nicht einfach
auf die Schriften des Origenes zurckgehen. Sie schlieen sich vielmehr weitgehend an eine Tradition an, die sich im Anschluss an
den Johanneskommentar und an De principiis gebildet hat. Vor allem ist
die Vermittlung des Eusebius von Csarea nicht zu bersehen, der
schon vor den Kappadoziern im Blick auf die origenische EpinoiaiLehre theologisch argumentiert hat. Doch das alles ist noch genauer
aufzuzeigen.

III. Die origenische Herkunft der Epinoiai-Lehre

Wie schon in frheren Studien betont worden ist, verweist auch die
neueste Forschung darauf hin, dass Basilius und damit auch Gregor
in ihrer Epinoiai-Lehre von Origenes abhngen.79 Wenn es angeht,
weiterhin in Basilius den Mitverfasser der Philokalie anzusehen,80 dann
drngt sich dieser Zusammenhang geradezu auf. Allerdings ist nicht

79
Vgl. H. J. Sieben, Zur Rezeption der Epinoiai-Lehre, 1f, mit den bibliographischen Angaben. Dazu im besonderen, B. Sesbo, in SC 299, 6574;
J. Wolinski, Le recours aux pnoiai du Christ dans le Commentaire de Jean
dOrigne, in: G. Dorival A. Le Boulluec (Hrsg.), Origeniana Sexta, Leuven 1995,
465492.
80
Whrend M. Harl, in SC 302, 24. 3741, in Bezug auf die kappadozische
Verfasserschaft der Philokalie eher skeptisch bleibt, verteidigt sie E. Prinzivalli, in:
A. Monaci Castagno (Hrsg.), Origene. Dizionario, La cultura, il pensiero, le opere, Roma
2000, 326. Vgl. B. Sesbo, in SC 299, 39, der die vielfach angenommene
Abfassungszeit von 358 vertritt.

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zu bersehen, dass die Philokalisten die trinitarischen und christologischen Darlegungen in De principiis nicht bercksichtigt81 und auch
die ersten Bcher des Johanneskommentars bergangen haben.82 Jedenfalls
ist es besser, nicht einfach von einer Abhngigkeit der Kappadozier
seitens des Origenes als vielmehr von der Rezeption der origenischen
berlieferung zu sprechen.83 Vor allem darf die Rolle des Eusebius
von Csarea, den man als Tor zur Theologie des vierten Jahrhunderts
ansehen kann, nicht Aueracht gelassen werden.84
Origenes selbst entfaltet seine Epinoiai-Lehre im ersten Buch seines Johanneskommentars, das er vor 226 noch in Alexandrien abgefasst
hat.85 Er kommt nur wenig spter in De principiis im nur lateinisch
berlieferten Kapitel ber den Sohn auf seine Auassung von den
pnoiai Christi zurck.86 Mehr nebenbei berhrt er diese Frage an
zahlreichen Stellen seiner Schriften. Er tut dies in bemerkenswerter
Weise in den anderen Bchern seiner Erklrungen des Johannesevangeliums,87
in der um 234/5 verfassten Schrift ber das Gebet,88 in den spt verfassten Homilien zum Propheten Jeremias,89 im Kommentar zu Matthus90 und
in der Apologie Contra Celsum.91 Diese zum Teil nur chtigen Hinweise
erlauben es vielfach, die Hauptzeugnisse besser zu verstehen.92

81

Vgl. M. Harl, in SC 302, 35.

Vgl. die Bemerkungen von M. Harl, in SC 303, 263 u. 283.
83
Vgl. E. Prinzivalli, Origenismo (in Oriente, secc. IIIIV), in: A. Monaci
Castagno (Hrsg.), Origene. Dizionario, 322329.
84
Vgl. B. Studer, Die historische Theologie des Eusebius von Csarea, Adamantius
10 (2004) 138166. Dazu auch die zahlreichen Verweise auf Origenes in H. Strutwolf,
Die Trinittslehre und Christologie des Euseb von Caesarea, Gttingen 1999. Welche Rolle
Eusebius in der Vermittlung origenischen Gedankengutes spielte, msste jedoch
systematisch untersucht werden. Es gibt diesbezglich nur sporadische Hinweise.
B. Sesbo, in SC 299, 73, hlt etwa fest, dass Basilius durch die Vermittlung des
Eusebius die Hexapla des Origenes kannte. Sicher ist zudem, wie gezeigt werden
soll, dass Eusebius in der kontroverstheologischen Verwendung der Epinoiai-Lehre
des Origenes den Kappadoziern vorangegangen ist.
85
Origenes, Comm. in Io. I 21,12539,292 (SC 120, 126206).
86
Origenes, De principiis I 2 (SC 252, 110142).
87
Vgl. besonders Origenes, Comm. in Io. XIX 5,2628 (SC 290, 6064).
88
Vgl. Origenes, Or. 24 (PG 11, 492a496b): Erklrung der Bitte: Geheiligt
werde dein Name.
89
Vgl. Origenes, Hom. in Ier. VIII 2 (SC 232, 356362).
90
Vgl. Origenes, Comm. in Mt. XIV 7 (PG 13, 1197cd).
91
Vgl. Origenes, Contra Celsum II 64 (SC 132, 434 ): ber die vielen pnoiai
Jesu.
92
Vgl. H. J. Sieben, Zur Rezeption der Epinoiai-Lehre, 28: Zusammenstellung
und Beurteilung der wichtigsten Texte.
82

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35

Im ersten Buch von Johanneskommentar macht sich Origenes zur

Aufgabe, die ersten Worte des vierten Evangeliums zu erklren.93 Im
ersten Teil befasst er sich mit den Worten Im Anfang war das
Wort ( Joh 1,1).94 Er gebraucht dabei den Paralleltext im Buch der
Sprche (8,22): Der Herr hat mich gebildet als Anfang seiner Wege
im Hinblick auf seine Werke.95 Der Vergleich von Joh 1,1 mit dieser Stelle fhrt ihn dazu, in der Weisheit, die Gott am Anfang gebildet hat, den Anfang zu sehen, in dem der Logos immer war. Die
Weisheit ist danach vor dem Logos. Der Sohn Gottes ist nicht als
Logos Anfang der Dinge, sondern als Weisheit. Als Weisheit enthlt
er alle pnoiai, welche in seinen Namen oenbart werden. In der
vielfltigen Weisheit sind die unzhligen Titel des Sohnes verwurzelt, welche durch den Logos den geistigen Wesen mitgeteilt werden.96 Die Weisheit und der Logos selbst sind verschiedene Aspekte
des einen Sohnes. Wie sehr sie eins sind, kommt allerdings erst am
Ende des ersten Buches zur Sprache, wo es heit: Christus ist ein
Logos, der im Anfang, in der Weisheit eine eigene Existenz (pstasiw) besitzt.97 Damit unterscheidet Origenes den ganz einfachen Gott
und den vielfltigen Erlser: den Gott, der ist, und den Erlser, der
wird.98 Im Hinblick auf diese grundstzliche Feststellung sammelt
Origenes eine ganze Reihe von Aussagen, welche an jene von Weisheit
und Wort anschlieen: Licht, Erstgeborener von den Toten, Hirt
und andere Titel. Dabei unterscheidet er die Namen, die auch auerhalb der Erlsungsordnung anzunehmen sind: Weisheit, Wort, Leben
und Wahrheit, von jenen, welche von der Rckkehr zur ursprnglichen Seligkeit erfordert sind.99 Auerdem unterscheidet er die Titel
Christi hinsichtlich der Gottheit und der Menschheit.100 Dabei gibt
er klar zu verstehen, dass die Mittel, welche mit der Menschwerdung

93
Die folgenden Ausfhrungen sttzen sich weitgehend auf J. Wolinski, Le
Recours, 465492. Vgl. auch D. Pazzini, Il prologo di Giovanni in Origene e in
Gregorio di Nissa, in: W. A. Bienert L. Perrone e. a. (Hrsg.), Origeniana Septima,
Leuven 1999, 497504.
94
Origenes, Comm. in Io. I 16,9020,124 (SC 120, 106124).
95
Origenes, Comm. in Io. I 17,101 (SC 120, 112).
96
Vgl. Origenes, Comm. in Io. I 19,10920,14 (SC 120, 118124).
97
Vgl. Origenes, Comm. in Io. I 39,291f (SC 120, 206).
98
Vgl. J. Wolinski, Le Recours, 471f, mit Origenes, Comm. in Io. I 20,119 (SC
120, 122).
99
Origenes, Comm. in Io. I 20,123f (SC 120, 124).
100
Vgl. Origenes, Comm. in Io. I 18,107 (SC 120, 116).

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des Wortes verbunden sind, beim Aufstieg zu Gott den Anfang bilden
mssen. Durch sie gelangt der Christ zu den hheren Titeln: zur Weisheit, zum Logos, zum Leben, zur Wahrheit und zur Gerechtigkeit.101
Im zweiten Teil des ersten Buches stellt Origenes die pnoia
Logos den anderen pnoiai gegenber.102 Er wendet sich dabei
gegen Leute, welche nur den Titel Logos annehmen und auerdem
vielleicht die anderen Aussagen im bertragenen Sinn verstehen.103
In dieser Polemik handelt es sich oenbar um eine Auseinandersetzung
mit den Monarchianern, welche die Einheit von Vater und Sohn
berbetonen und mit denen Origenes auch in seinem Dialog mit
Heraklides zu tun hat.104 Origenes legt ihnen gegenber eine Liste von
vierzig anderen Titeln vor.105 Im Anschluss daran sucht er zu erklren,
in welchem Sinn der Sohn Logos genannt werden kann. Paulus,
der von der Macht und der Weisheit spricht und zudem hervorhebt, was Christus fr uns geworden ist, veranlasst ihn, zwischen fr
uns und fr sich (plw) zu unterscheiden.106 So stellt er wiederum
zwei Reihen von Aussagen auf, solche, welche im Hinblick auf uns
gemacht werden und demgem die Menschwerdung betreen, und
solche, die einfach vom Logos gemacht werden, aber auch fr uns
Bedeutung haben. Dabei schliet er nicht aus, dass der Sohn den
Vater erkennt und dass auch der Mensch an der Gottheit des Vaters
teilhaben kann.107 Es geht ihm vielmehr darum, die Eigenstndigkeit
jeder der beiden Personen zu wahren. Im brigen bringt er die berlegungen ber die pnoiai auch mit der Auslegung der Bibel in
Verbindung. Was den Logos im besonderen angeht, sucht Origenes,
seine Eigenart im Zusammenhang mit seiner Kosmologie nher zu
bestimmen. Er stellt dabei fest, dass der Logos fest umschrieben ist
(perigraf) und eine eigene Wirklichkeit (pstasiw) besitzt.108 Auerdem betont er, dass der Sohn als Logos aus den geistigen Geschpfen
logische Wesen macht, indem er ihnen die Fhigkeit schenkt, ihre

101

Vgl. Origenes, Comm. in Io. I 20,124 (SC 120, 124).

Origenes, Comm. in Io. I 21,12539,292 (SC 120, 126206).
103
Origenes, Comm. in Io. I 21,125 (SC 120, 126).
104
Vgl. Origenes, Dial. 4,610 (SC 67, 6076).
105
Origenes, Comm. in Io. I 21,12623,150 (SC 120,126136).
106
Vgl. J. Wolinski, Le Recours, 476, mit Origenes, Comm. in Io. I 34,251 (SC
120, 184).
107
Vgl.. Origenes, Comm. in Io. II 2,16f (SC 120, 216 ).
108
Origenes, Comm. in Io. I 39,291 (SC 120, 206).
102

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37

Verantwortung wahrzunehmen und sich voll zu entfalten.109 Diese

Mglichkeiten verwirklichen sich auf Grund der Menschwerdung des
Wortes.110
Um voll zu begreifen, wie wichtig es fr Origenes ist, das Verhltnis
des Logos zur Weisheit und zu den anderen pnoiai zu klren, ist
es hilfreich, die Einleitung zum erstem Buch des Johanneskommentars
genauer ins Auge zu fassen.111 Origenes behandelt darin weit ausholend die Bedeutung von Evangelium.112 Dabei bezieht er sich auf
eine Stelle im Buch Jesaja, an der steht: Wie schn sind die Fe
derer, welche die guten Dinge verknden ( Jes 52,7).113 Er setzt diese
guten Dinge (gay) mit Jesus gleich und schliet darin die Wirklichkeiten (prgmata) ein, welche in den ihm gegebenen Namen zu
erkennen sind.114 Als pnoiai zhlt er ausdrcklich auf: das Leben
das Licht die Wahrheit, welche sich kat pnoian vom Leben und
vom Licht unterscheidet der Weg die Auferstehung die Tre
die Weisheit die Kraft Gottes das Wort.115 Er unterlsst es jedoch
nicht hinzuzufgen, dass all diese Gter nur denen zugnglich sind,
welche Jesus als den Gekreuzigten annehmen. Allein sie begreifen,
dass Jesus fr uns Gerechtigkeit, Heiligkeit und Erlsung geworden
ist.116 Auf Grund zahlreicher einschlgiger Schriftstellen also ist es
mglich aufzuzeigen, was Jesus alles ist, und den Reichtum zu erahnen, den kein Buch zum Ausdruck bringen kann.117 In diesen einleitenden Gedanken gibt Origenes nicht nur zu verstehen, was er
mit pnoiai meint. Es sind Aspekte einer Sache, welche man mit
Hilfe einer berlegung aus den vorgegebenen Namen ableitet.118
Darin ist vor allem ausgesprochen, dass sie die guten Dinge sind,
die uns fr den Weg zu Gott gegeben sind.119
Im ersten Buch von De principiis entwickelt Origenes im Kapitel
ber den Sohn seine Gedanken ber die pnoiai Christi in krzerer

109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116

Origenes,
Origenes,
Origenes,
Origenes,
Origenes,
Origenes,
Origenes,
Origenes,

Comm.
Comm.
Comm.
Comm.
Comm.
Comm.
Comm.
Comm.

in Io. I 37,273 (SC 120, 196).

in Io. I 37,276 (SC 120, 198).
in Io. I 1,115,89 (SC 120, 56104).
in Io. I 5,2715,89 (SC 120, 74104).
in Io. I 8,51 (SC 120, 86).
in Io. I 9,52 (SC 120, 88).
in Io. I 9,5357 (SC 120, 88 ).
in Io. I 9,58f (SC 120,90), mit 1 Kor 1,22, u. 1,30 sowie Rm

6,10.
117
118
119

Origenes, Comm. in Io. I 9,60f (SC 120, 90).

Origenes, Comm. in Io. I 9,52 (SC 120, 88).
Vgl. Origenes, Comm. in Io. I 8,51 (SC 120, 86).

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Form.120 Er geht dabei von der Unterscheidung zwischen der Gottheit

und der menschlichen Natur aus. Dazu, so meint er, ist zu untersuchen, was der eingeborene Sohn Gottes ist, der ja mit vielen verschiedenen Namen benannt wird, die entweder in der Sache oder
in den Ansichten derer begrndet sind, die sie gebrauchen (n. 1).
Unter Hinweis auf die entsprechenden Schrifttexte befasst er sich
zuerst eingehend mit dem Namen Gottes Weisheit. Dabei betont
er vor allem, dass die Weisheit eine eigene Wirklichkeit ist (sapientia,
substantialiter subsistens) und seit Ewigkeit alle Krfte und Gestalten fr
die Schpfung in sich enthlt (n. 2). Diese ewige Weisheit heit auch
Wort Gottes, weil sie das Verstndnis fr die Geheimnisse ernet,
die in ihr enthalten sind (n. 3). Origenes erklrt weiter, in welchem
Sinn der Sohn auch Wahrheit und Leben sowie Weg ist. Dabei
unterstreicht er, dass diese Benennungen von den Wirkungen und
Krften des Sohnes genommen sind (n. 4). Er vertieft seine Darlegungen
mit einer Erklrung der Zeugung des Sohnes, indem er die Bibeltexte
heranzieht, in denen der Sohn als Bild Gottes und als Abglanz der
gttlichen Herrlichkeit bezeichnet wird (nn. 413, vor allem mit Kol
1,15; Hebr 1,3; Weish 7,25f ). Dabei stellt er heraus, dass es keine
Zeit gibt, zu der die Weisheit nicht war (n. 9). Von Interesse ist in
diesen Ausfhrungen ber die Ewigkeit der gttlichen Zeugung und
der eigenen Wirklichkeit der Weisheit besonders die Art und Weise,
wie Origenes die fnf in Weish 7,25f enthaltenen Gottesbezeichnungen: Macht, Herrlichkeit, Licht, Ttigkeit und Gte auf die Weisheit Gottes bertrgt.121 Er geht selbst soweit, dass man von einem
Austausch der Namen sprechen kann. Origenes deutet nmlich einen
solchen an, wenn er sagt: Wie niemand daran Ansto nehmen darf,
dass, nachdem der Vater Gott ist, auch der Erlser Gott ist, so darf
auch, sofern der Vater allmchtig heit, niemand daran Ansto nehmen, dass der Gottes Sohn allmchtig genannt wird.122 Abschlieend
stellt Origenes fest, dass es zu weit fhren wrde, alle Benennungen
des Sohnes Gottes zu sammeln und dabei darzulegen, aus welchen
Grnden, Krften und Eigenheiten ein jeder dieser Ausdrcke
gebraucht wird:

120
Origenes, De principiis I 2 (SC 252, 110142 = Grgemanns-Karpp 122156
fr die deutsche bersetzung der Zitate).
121
Origenes, De principiis I 2,9 (SC 252, 128).
122
Origenes, De principiis I 2,10 (SC 252, 134).

der theologiegeschichtliche hintergrund

39

Multum autem est et alterius vel operis vel temporis, congregare omnes lii dei
appellationes, verbi causa, quomodo vel lumen verum est vel ostium vel iustitia vel
sancticatio vel redemptio et alia innumera, et quibus ex causis vel virtutibus vel
aectibus unumquodque horum nominetur, exponere.123

Ohne jeden Zweifel steht im Hintergrund dieser Darlegungen ber

die pnoiai des Sohnes im Johanneskommentar und in De principiis die
antike Problematik des Einen und des Vielen.124 Origenes selbst stellt
die Einfachheit Gottes der Vielfalt des Sohnes gegenber. Er macht
zudem deutlich, dass der Sohn als Weisheit, in der alle Gedanken
Gottes enthalten sind, und als dem oenbarenden Wort zwischen
dem transzendenten, ungewordenen Gott und der vielfltigen, gewordenen Schpfung vermittelt.125 In diesem Zusammenhang nimmt er
oensichtlich gegen die onenlehre der Valentinianer Stellung.126
Dabei stellt er gewiss Gedanken ber die Erkenntnis der vielen
Aussagen ber Gott und den Logos an.127 Doch will er oensichtlich
mit seinen berlegungen ber die Namen Christi, des eingeborenen
Sohnes Gottes, nicht so sehr eine philosophische Frage beantworten,
als vor allem ein pastorales Ziel verfolgen. Es geht ihm nicht sosehr
um die Frage des Einen und des Vielen als vielmehr um die Anpassung
Gottes an seine Geschpfe sowie um den fortschreitenden Aufstieg
des Menschen zur Flle der Gottheit.128 Die pnoiai Christi sind,
wie es in den spteren Bchern des Johanneskommentars heit, die
Tugenden, welche stufenweise zu Gott zurckfhren.129 Die pastorale
Ausrichtung der Epinoiai-Lehre kennzeichnet sicher in erster Linie

123

Origenes, De principiis I 2,13 (SC 252, 142).

Vgl. M. Harl, Origne et la fonction rvlatrice du Verbe incarn, Paris 1958, 334.
Dazu Origenes, Hom. in Ier. VIII 2 (SC 232, 358).
125
Vgl. B. Studer, Gott und unsere Erlsung im Glauben der Alten Kirche, Dsseldorf
1985, 105f.
126
Vgl. J. Wolinski, Le Recours, 266f; H. J. Sieben, Zur Rezeption der
Epinoiai-Lehre, 35.
127
Vgl. dazu besonders Or. 24 (PG 11, 492b493b), wo Origenes die Namen als
umfassende Aussage ber die Eigenart des Benannten deniert und betont, dass in
Bezug auf Gott der Hinweis auf seine Eigenart nur zutrit, wenn die betreende
aus der Bibel bernommene nnoia ihm in richtiger Weise zugesprochen wird. Zu
den an dieser Stelle vorgetragenen Gedanken ber den Ursprung der Sprache und
die Magie, vgl. unten.
128
Vgl. M. Harl, Origne et la fonction rvlatrice, 234243; J. Wolinski, Le Recours,
468.
129
Vgl. Origenes, Comm. in Io. XIX 6,3339 (SC 290, 6670), sowie auch Comm.
in Mt. 14,7 (PG 13,1197c). Dazu M. Harl, Origne et la fonction rvlatrice, 290;
D. Pazzini, Virt, in: A. Monaci Castagno (Hrsg.), Origene. Dizionario, 468f.
124

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die Erklrungen des vierten Evangeliums. Sie liegt aber ebenso De

principiis zugrunde, in welchem es darum geht aufzuzeigen, wie jene,
welche an die Christus-Wahrheit glauben, diesen Glauben mit Hilfe
der Worte Christi vertiefen und in ihr Leben umsetzen knnen.130
Vielleicht weniger wichtig, aber kaum weniger entscheidend ist die
eigentlich theologische Ausrichtung der Epinoiai-Lehre des Origenes.
Sowohl in De principiis, seinem theologischsten Werk, als auch im
Johanneskommentar nimmt er gegenber der Tendenz Stellung, den
Sohn mit dem Vater zu identizieren, den Logos Gottes nur als ein
Attribut oder eine Ttigkeit des Vaters zu betrachten. Die Polemik
gegen die so genannten Monarchianer, welche zur Zeit des Origenes
auch bei anderen Autoren, dem Verfasser des Contra Noetum, bei
Tertullian und Hippolyt anzutreen ist,131 beherrscht oensichtlich
das erste Buch von De principiis. Auch wenn die lateinische bersetzung diese Storichtung etwas verstrken mag, scheint sie in allen
Texten auf, in denen von der substantia oder der subsistentia des Sohnes
oder der Weisheit oder des Wortes die Rede ist.132 Die Betonung
der eigenen Wirklichkeit des Wortes macht sich jedoch auch im
ersten Buch des Johanneskommentars geltend. Sie zeigt sich speziell an
seinem Ende, wo von der Umgrenzung (perigraf) und von der
Eigenstndigkeit (pstasiw) des Logos die Rede ist. Wie sehr Origenes
daran interessiert ist, besttigt sich in anderen Texten des Kommentars.
So spricht er an einer Stelle, in der es um die durch den Sohn vermittelte Herkunft des Heiligen Geistes geht, von den drei Hypostasen.133
Ebenso kritisiert er anderswo Leute, welche die Eigenheit des Sohnes
nicht von derjenigen des Vaters unterscheiden und dem Sohn die
Eigenheit (dithw) und die individuelle Wesenheit (osa kat
perigrafn) absprechen.134 Noch entschiedener bezeugt Origenes im
Dialog mit Heraklides seine Ablehnung der Monarchianer. In Aussagen

130
Origenes, De principiis I prol. 1 (SC 252, 76): Omnes qui credunt et certi sunt quod
gratia et veritas per Iesum Christum facta sit, et Christum esse veritatem norunt, secundum quod
ipse dixit: Ego sum veritas, scientiam quae provocat homines ad bene beateque vivendum non aliunde quam ab ipsis Christi verbis doctrinaque suscipiunt.
131
Vgl. B. Studer, Gott und unsere Erlsung, 99.
132
Vgl. D. Pazzini, Cristo Logos e Cristo Dynamis nel I Libro del Commentario
a Giovanni di Origene, in: R. J. Daly (Hrsg.), Origeniana Quinta, Leuven 1992, 424
429, besonders 427, mit Comm. in Io. I 24,151 (SC 120, 136 ).
133
Origenes, Comm. in Io. II 10,75 (SC 120, 234).
134
Origenes, Comm. in Io. II 2,16 (SC 120, 216). Dazu Comm. in Io. X 37,246
(SC 157, 528 ), mit der Anmerkung von E. Corsini in der italienischen bersetzung: 436, Anm. 51.

der theologiegeschichtliche hintergrund

41

(fvna) wie Jes 43,10 und Joh 10,30 darf man die Einheit Gottes
nicht ohne Christus auf den Gott des Alls anwenden.135
Wie nicht eigens betont werden muss, ist in unserem Zusammenhang
die theologische Orientierung der origenischen Auassung von den
pnoiai Christi von besonderer Wichtigkeit. In seiner Auseinandersetzung mit den monarchianischen Tendenzen seiner Zeit hat Origenes
der Methode vorgearbeitet, die Basilius und Gregor gegen Eunomius
anwenden werden. Die Kappadozier sind allerdings und das ist
ebenso bemerkenswert nicht die ersten gewesen, welche das Vorgehen
des Origenes rezipiert haben. Vor ihnen hatte schon Eusebius in
hnlicher Weise wie dieser gegenber Marcellus die eigene Wirklichkeit
des Logos verteidigt.136 Wenn man die vor 360 verfassten Schriften
durchgehen wrde, knnte man vielleicht noch andere Beispiele
ausndig machen.
Um den Einuss der Epinoiai-Lehre des Origenes auf Basilius und
Gregor noch genauer abzuschtzen, mag es hilfreich sein, nochmals
an ihre Hauptelemente zu erinnern. Es ist gewiss zuzugeben, dass
Origenes weder ber die Berechtigung der pnoiai noch ber ihr
Verhltnis zu den Namen und zu den Trgern der Namen weiter
nachdenkt. Doch erscheinen bei ihm dennoch Anstze zu einer solchen Reexion.137 So betont er ausdrcklich die Unterschiede der
pnoiai. Der Logos muss von der Weisheit unterschieden werden.
Brot und Weinstock sind nicht dasselbe.138 Ebenso hebt Origenes die
Unterschiede hervor, welche sich aus den verschiedenen Namen ergeben.139 Die Unterscheidungen selbst beruhen nach seiner Meinung
auf berlegungen.140 Solche Reexionen beziehen sich vor allem auf

135
Origenes, Dialogus cum Heraclide 4 (SC 67, 62). Vgl. Comm. in Mt. XVII 14
(PG 13, 1517b1520b).
136
Eusebius, De ecclesiastica theologia I 8 (PG 24, 837ad), I 1920 (PG 24, 864c
896c): mit dreissig Titeln Christi wird bewiesen, dass dieser eine eigene Existenz
hat. Vgl. bes. PG 24, 864c u. 893, wo die Abhngigkeit von Origenes oensichtlich
ist.
137
Vgl. C. Blanc in SC 120, 841, die fr den Comm. in Io., unter Angabe von
Texten, eine zweifache Bedeutung von pnoia unterscheidet: aspect, attribut de
lobjet pens und notion, point de vue du sujet pensant.
138
Origenes, Comm. in Io. I 30,207 (SC 120, 162).
139
Vgl. M. Harl, in SC 302, 275279: zur Unterscheidung der fvna, shmainmena
(pnoiai), prgmata.
140
Vgl. den Ausdruck in Origenes, Comm. in Io. I 9,53 (SC 120, 88). Vgl. Origenes,
De principiis IV 4,1 (SC 268, 402). Die Idee der berlegung kommt auch mit den
Worten nohtn und katanoen zum Ausdruck. Vgl. Origenes, Comm. in Io. I 9,55
(SC 120, 88).

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die Wirkungen, welche das benannte Subjekt hervorbringt.141 Vor

allem sollten nach seiner fortwhrend wiederholten berzeugung die
verschiedenen Aspekte, welche in den verschiedenen Namen zum
Ausdruck kommen, nicht dazufhren, die Einheit des Substrates (pokemenon) in Frage zu stellen.142 Sehr klar drckt er dies im Johanneskommentar aus, wenn er meint: Niemand soll sich daran stoen, dass
wir die dem Erlser zugeschriebenen pnoiai unterscheiden, in der
Meinung wir wrden dasselbe fr seine osa tun.143 Noch ausdrcklicher uert er sich in einer Jeremiahomilie, in welcher er nach
der Aufzhlung einer Reihe von Attributen Christi erklrt: Das
Substrat ist eines; die vielen Namen jedoch beziehen sich aufgrund
der pnoiai auf verschiedenes. Du verstehst in Bezug auf Christus
nicht dasselbe, wenn du ihn als Weisheit oder wenn du ihn als
Gerechtigkeit denkst.144 Es ist nicht zu bersehen, dass in solchen
Erklrungen das eine Subjekt als pokemenon, als osa oder auch
als pstasiw bezeichnet wird. Schlielich bringt Origenes seine
Auassungen von den pnoiai nicht nur in der Erklrung der biblischen Titel Christi zur Anwendung. Er tut es auch, obgleich weniger oft und mehr nebenbei, wenn Gott oder die Erkenntnis Gottes
in Frage stehen.145 Aus diesen Hinweisen sollte es klar geworden sein,
dass Origenes und seine Schler sicher Eusebius die theologische Diskussion ber die pnoiai, die Basilius und Gregor mit
Eunomius fhrten, vorbereitet hatten. Doch muss diese Rezeption
der origenischen Epinoiai-Lehre sicher in einem weiteren geistesgeschichtlichen Zusammenhang gesehen werden. Wie sehr dies zutrit,
soll im Folgenden nher erklrt werden.

141

Vgl. Origenes, Comm. in Io. I 37,267 (SC 120, 192).

Vgl. die Texthinweise in M. Harl, Origne et la fonction rvlatrice, 236, Anm. 63.
143
Origenes, Comm. in Io. I 28,200 (SC 136, 158).
144
Origenes, Hom. in Ier. VIII 2 (SC 232, 358). Dazu Contra Celsum III 41 (SC
136, 96), mit der Anmerkung, in welcher M. Borret die Ausdrcke: atolgow,
atosofa und atalyeia erklrt.
145
Vgl. Origenes, Comm. in Io. XIX 5,26f (SC 290, 60 ), mit dem Hinweis auf
die verschiedenen pnoiai von Gott und Vater. Ausserdem ist zu beachten, dass
die Vielfalt der Namen, wie sie schon in der hellenistischen Kultur vertreten wurde,
gerade auch vom Vater gilt. Vgl. Origenes, Contra Celsum I 24 (SC 132, 134140),
mit den Anmerkungen von M. Borret. Weiteres dazu unten.
142

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43

IV. Die Wurzeln der origenischen berlieferung

In seiner bemerkenswerten Studie ber die pnoiai Christi im Johanneskommentar des Origenes, schickt J. Wolinski einen Abschnitt ber die
Vorgeschichte voraus.146 Nach einer vorlugen Erklrung des Begris
pnoia spricht er von seinen ersten christlichen Verwendungen, vom
Namen in der Bibel, von Justin und Irenus. Die Tatsache, dass
das Wort pnoia im einzigen Text des Neuen Testamentes im Zusammenhang mit Simon Magus vorkommt, fhrt ihn dazu von seinem
Gebrauch bei den Gnostikern und bei Plotin zu sprechen. Damit
berhrt er, wie zu erwarten, die Problematik des Einen und des
Vielen. Bei Plotin kommen die pnoiai bei der Unterscheidung zwischen der Erkenntnis in der Ruhe und der Erkenntnis in der
Bewegung zur Sprache.147 Die Valentinianer wiederum stellen eine
Hierarchie der onen auf, welche eine gewisse hnlichkeit mit den
Klassizierungen der pnoiai bei Origenes besitzen.148 Ohne jeden
Zweifel wird dieser selbst weitgehend von der fundamentalen Fragestellung des Einen und Vielen der antiken Philosophie bestimmt.
Manche seiner Formulierungen und vor allem die Unterscheidung
der zum Vater hingewendeten Weisheit und des die Gedanken des
Vaters oenbarenden Logos hngen damit zusammen. Doch dieser
mehr philosophische Hintergrund war fr Origenes bei weitem nicht
allein entscheidend.
Wichtig war ebenso, wenn nicht wichtiger, die Auassung des
Namens in der Bibel.149 In den Schriften des Alten Testamentes
sind die Oenbarung und die Heiligung des Namens Gottes grundlegend. In den apostolischen Schriften ist fortwhrend die Rede vom
Namen Jesu. Dabei wird vorausgesetzt, wie immer wieder betont
wird, dass der Name mit dem Wesen einer Sache zu tun hat, fr
die Person steht, die benannt wird, die Aufgabe betrit, zu der Gott
einen Menschen erwhlt. Origenes selbst bernimmt die biblische
Theologie des Namens in besonders eindrcklicher Weise in seiner
Erklrung der Vaterunser-Bitte Geheiligt werde dein Name.150 Die

146

J. Wolinski, Le Recours, 466471.

Plotin, Enn. II 9 [33] 1,4044.
148
Vgl. Ireneus, Adversus haereses II 13,9 (SC 294, 126).
149
Vgl. J. Wolinski, Le Recours, 467f, sowie R. Ggler, Zur Theologie des biblischen Wortes bei Origenes, Dsseldorf 1963, 211217.
150
Origenes, Or. 24 (PG 11, 492a496b).
147

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biblische Auassung von der Wirksamkeit der Namen spielt bei ihm
eine wichtige Rolle. In der Auseinandersetzung mit der heidnischen
Umwelt passt er sich selbst weitgehend deren berzeugung an, man
knne mit der Anrufung eines geheimnisvollen, von oben stammenden Namens eine besondere Gunst der hheren Mchte erreichen.
Er vertritt diese Meinung vor allem in seiner Apologie Contra Celsum151
sowie in einer zum Teil griechisch erhaltenen Homilie zum Buch Josua.152
Interessanterweise zieht er bei der Umschreibung des Wertes von
Namensanrufungen und Beschwrungen auch die antiken Diskussionen
ber die menschliche Sprache heran.153 Weil ihm das dient, hlt er
sich dabei an die stoische berlieferung, nach welcher die Namen
nicht aus der menschlichen Konvention, sondern aus der Natur stammen.154 Bei der Anrufung von mysterisen Namen handelt es sich
allerdings um ein spezielles, wenn auch huges Phnomen. Wenn
Origenes dazu in einer Art Stellung bezieht, die uns heute befremdet, will er damit nicht die allgemeine Frage nach dem Ursprung
der menschlichen Sprache beantworten.155 Jedenfalls betont er immer
wieder den menschlichen Charakter der biblischen Redeweise.156
Darum steht er den Kappadoziern, die gegenber Eunomius den
menschlichen Ursprung der Namen Gottes und der Namen Christi
verteidigen, viel nher als es auf den ersten Blick erscheint. Wie sehr
dies zutrit, wird durch die Art und Weise besttigt, wie Origenes
die Vielfltigkeit der gttlichen Namen begrndet, welche mit der
christlichen wie mit der heidnischen Anrufung Gottes eng verbunden ist. Er betont indes, dass die Namen der Wahrheit entsprechen
mssen und von den glubigen Christen auf die Bibel zurckgefhrt
werden.157 Nach seiner Auassung beruht die Anerkennung der vielen Namen letztlich auf zwei Grnden. Auf der einen Seite kann
der Mensch als vielfltiges Geschpf den ganz einfachen Gott nur
mit vielen Namen bekennen. Auf der anderen Seite hat Gott sich
151

Origenes, Contra Celsum I 24 (SC 132, 134140).

Origenes, Hom. in Iesu N., fragm. (SC 302, 388392), mit der Analyse von
M. Harl, in SC 302, 394397.
153
Vgl. R. Ggler, Zur Theologie, 218229: Wort und Wirklichkeit; W. Gessel,
Die Theologie des Gebetes, Paderborn 1975, 233, Anm. 96.
154
Vgl. R. Ggler, Zur Theologie, 275281: Das Urwort und die Worte.
155
Vgl. M. Harl, in SC 302, 131f.
156
Vgl. R. Ggler, Zur Theologie, 307319.
157
Vgl. R. Ggler, Zur Theologie, 216f; W. Gessel, Die Theologie, 233236, der
den Zusammenhang des Gebetes mit der liturgischen Verlesung der historia Iesu
hervorhebt.
152

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45

den Menschen angepasst, in dem er sich durch die vielen Namen

Christi oenbart.158 Damit wird von neuem besttigt, wie grundlegend die Bibel fr die Theorie von den pnoiai gewesen ist.
Es ist sicher hilfreich, in der Vorgeschichte der origenischen EpinoiaiLehre auf Justinus und Irenus zu verweisen. Der erste fgt in den
Dialog mit Tryphon ganze Reihen von Christus-Titeln ein.159 Er legt
besonderen Wert auf den Logos-Titel, mit dem er die Prexistenz
Christi zu beweisen sucht. Auerdem geht es nach seiner berzeugung nicht an, dem Vater des Alls, der ungezeugt ist, einen Namen
zulegen zu wollen. Vater, Gott, Schpfer, Herr, Meister seien keine
Namen, sondern Aussagen, welche ihren Grund in den Wohltaten
und Werken Gottes haben.160 Schlielich ist bemerkenswert, dass
Justinus sich sowohl mit den Namen Gottes wie mit jenen des Sohnes
befasst. Der Namen Christus hat einen verborgenen Sinn, so gut
wie die Aussage Gott eigentlich kein Name ist, sondern eine dem
Menschen angepasste Weise, eine unsagbare Wirklichkeit zu umschreiben.161 Was Irenus betrit, sind zwei Gedanken festzuhalten.162 Gott
kann nicht in seiner Gre, sondern nur in seiner Liebe, mit der er
sich mitteilen will, erfasst werden. Seine Natur bleibt verborgen, in
seinen Werken hingegen macht er sich sichtbar.163 Andererseits nimmt
Irenus einen Fortschritt in der Gotteserkenntnis an,164 welcher der
Fhigkeit des einzelnen Menschen entspricht,165 und bereitet damit
die Auassung des Origenes von der Herablassung Gottes vor.166
J. Wolinski bercksichtigt leider in seiner Vorgeschichte zwei einussreiche Autoren nicht: Philo und Klemens von Alexandrien. Die
Schriften des ersten besttigen den Zusammenhang der origenischen
Epinoiai-Lehre mit der Interpretation der Bibel. Die beiden Vorlufer
des Origenes geben zudem klar zu verstehen, dass dessen Lehre, wie
schon oben betont wurde, einen stoischen Hintergrund besitzt. Wie
M. Harl mit Recht bemerkt hat, sind die fragmentarischen Hinweise,
158

Vgl. M. Harl, Origne et la fonction rvlatrice, 234238.

Vgl. J. Wolinski, Le Recours, 468.
160
Iustinus Martyr, Apologia secunda 6,12 (Wartelle 204).
161
Iustinus Martyr, Apologia secunda 6,34 (Wartelle 204). Vgl. Apologia secunda 6,6
(Wartelle 204), wo von der Beschwrung im Namen des Gekreuzigten die Rede ist.
162
Vgl. J. Wolinski, Le Recours, 470f.
163
Ireneus, Adversus haereses IV 20,4 (SC 100, 634).
164
Ireneus, Adversus haereses IV 20,7 (SC 100, 646 ).
165
Ireneus, Adversus haereses IV 38,2 (SC 100,948 ).
166
Vgl. Origenes, Comm. in Io. XIII 34,203225 (SC 222,145153), mit dem
Thema von Milch und fester Speise.
159

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die gewhnlich in Bezug auf den stoischen Hintergrund zitiert werden, zu einem groen Teil Schriften des Philo und des Klemens entnommen.167 Zu beachten ist im besonderen Philos Traktat Quis rerum
divinarum heres, der oensichtlich auf die wichtige, oben zitierte Stelle
in Origenes Homilien ber Jeremias eingewirkt hat.168
In der Darstellung, in der J. Wolinski die frheren Anstze zur
Lehre von den pnoiai des Origenes kurz zusammenfasst, fehlt weiter ein ganz wichtiger Gesichtspunkt. Wer bercksichtigt, wie sehr
diese Lehre mit der Exegese zusammenhngt, wird sich sogleich
daran erinnern, dass in der antiken Hermeneutik die Deutung der
Wrter grundlegend gewesen ist. Die eigentliche Texterklrung die
enarratio, wie es in der lateinischen Tradition heit umfasste bekanntlich die cognitio verborum und die cognitio rerum.169 Die Worterklrung
bestand in einer Art Etymologie und vor allem in der Beachtung
der verschiedenen Bedeutungen der Wrter. Das trit auch fr Origenes zu, wie aus den Studien von M. Harl und B. Neuschfer entnommen werden kann.170 Bemerkenswert ist besonders ein Abschnitt
der Philokalie, in dem Origenes betont, dass es bei der Behandlung
sowohl ethischer als auch physischer und theologischer Fragen darauf ankommt, die Begrie (shmainmena) genau zu bestimmen. Ohne
die Kenntnis der Sprache wrde man die Schwierigkeiten nicht lsen
knnen, welche die Homonymie, die Mehrdeutigkeit, der bertragene und der eigentliche Sinn der Wrter mit sich bringen.171 Ebenso
ist beachtlich, wie Origenes bei der Erklrung der biblischen Texte,
besonders der Gleichnisse, Wort fr Wort genauer zu verstehen
sucht.172 Oensichtlich verdankt er dieses philologische Vorgehen der
Schule seiner Zeit.173 Wie bedeutend dieser exegetische Rahmen anzusehen ist, illustriert allein schon die Erklrung des Wortes rx, die
im Hinblick auf Gen 1,1 und Joh 1,1 immer wieder vorgelegt wird.174

167
M. Harl, in SC 302, 276. Vgl. P. Nautin, in SC 232, 358f, Anm. 3 zu
Origenes, Hom. in Ier. VIII 2.
168
Vgl. Philo, Quis rerum 2223 (Wendland III 67), und Origenes, Hom. in Ier.
VIII 2 (SC 232, 356 ).
169
Vgl. B. Studer, Schola Christiana, 131.
170
Vgl. M. Harl, in SC 302, 414426, und B. Neuschfer, Origenes als Philologe,
Basel 1987, 140202.
171
Philocalia 14,2 (SC 302, 408 ).
172
Vgl. M. Harl, in SC 302, 135140.
173
Vgl. besonders B. Neuschfer, Origenes als Philologe, wo auch die Frage der
Verwendung von etymologischen und semantischen Lexika besprochen wird (vgl.
besonders 154f ).
174
Vgl. Origenes, Comm. in Io. I 16,9018,108 (SC 120, 106118).

der theologiegeschichtliche hintergrund

47

Zweifelsohne ist die Epinoiai-Lehre des Origenes unter dem Einuss

mannigfaltiger geschichtlicher Faktoren entstanden. Wer sie begreifen will, muss sich darum ber ihre Vorgeschichte Rechenschaft
geben. Die verschiedenen Einsse bestimmten nicht allein das Denken
des Origenes und dann die Rezeption seiner Schriften durch seine
Freunde und Feinde. Sofern sie auch spter aktuell blieben, wirkten
sie vielmehr oft unmittelbar auf diese selbst ein.175 Es seien dazu drei
Beispiele angefhrt. Die Schrifterklrung im allgemeinen, die auch
die eunomianische Kontroverse bestimmt, wurde nicht allein von den
exegetischen Schriften des Origenes und der darin befolgten Auslegungsmethode beeinusst. Die berlieferungen der antiken Schule,
welche hinter der Bibelarbeit des Origenes stehen, wurden auch nach
ihm von den Grammatikern und Rhetoren vertreten.176 Zudem dreht
sich die Diskussion zwischen Eunomius und Basilius oensichtlich
weitgehend um die Interpretation der ersten Kapitel der Genesis.177
Diese exegetische Auseinandersetzung ist natrlich nicht allein von
Origenes her zu verstehen. Es sind auch andere Autoren, vor allem
Philo zu bercksichtigen. Ferner sind die Fragen ber den Ursprung
der menschlichen Sprache und ber die verschiedenen Formen der
Aussagen in einen breiten Rahmen hineinzustellen.178 Gewiss bte,
wie vor allem die Philokalie nahe legt, Origenes selbst in dieser Hinsicht
einen direkten Einuss auf die Kappadozier aus. Aber auch in diesem Bereich blieben die selbst im vierten Jahrhundert nachhaltig wirkenden Schultraditionen der Antike eine nichtversiegende Quelle. Im
brigen sind, wie zu erwarten, in der Rezeption des Origenes, sofern
sie von neuen Fragestellungen bestimmt wurde, manche Gegebenheiten
neu berdacht worden.179

Rckblick und Ausblick

Im zweiten Buch Contra Eunomium befasst sich Gregor von Nyssa, wie
aus vielen Stellen hervorgeht, in besonderer Weise mit den Ansichten,
175
Vgl. B. Sesbo, in SC 299, 7595: Philosophische Einsse. Dazu J. M. Rist,
Basils Neoplatonism. Its Background and Nature, in: P. J. Fedwick (Hrsg.), Basil
of Caesarea, 137220.
176
Vgl. B. Studer, Schola Christiana, 198229.
177
Vgl. M. Van Esbroeck, in SC 160, 99115, mit CE I 151f (GNO I 71 );
CE II 198205 (GNO I 282285); CE II 226 (GNO I 291f ).
178
CE II 246293 (GNO I 298313); CE II 403445 (GNO I 344356).
179
Vgl. B. Sesbo, in SC 299, 6595.

48

basil studer

welche sein Gegner in Bezug auf die Ungezeugtheit Gottes und den
Zusammenhang der Namen und der von ihnen bezeichneten Wesen
vertritt. Um diese Auassungen und damit die (an)homische Stellungnahme des Bischofs von Cyzicus zu erschttern, greift er auf die
Lehre von den pnoiai zurck. Dabei lsst er sich oensichtlich von
den berlegungen leiten, die schon sein Bruder Basilius gegenber
Eunomius vertreten hatte. Er geht indes in zweifacher Hinsicht darber hinaus. Er benutzt eine noch subtilere Dialektik an. Zudem
gibt er sich eingehender ber die Berechtigung der Reexion Rechenschaft, welche der Unterscheidung der pnoiai zugrunde liegt. Basilius
selbst schliet sich eindeutig der origenischen Tradition an. Origenes
selbst hatte keine eigentliche Theorie ber die Frage vorgelegt. Aber
in seinen Schriften nden sich wichtige Anstze zur Epinoiai-Lehre,
mit der Basilius und nach ihm Gregor Eunomius bekmpfen. Zu
beachten sind vor allem das dreifache Schema: Laute Begrie
Sachen sowie die Betonung der Einheit des Subjektes, dem verschiedene Aspekte zugeschrieben werden. Auerdem hat Origenes
die Epinoiai-Lehre nicht allein in einer eher spirituellen Weise, sondern auch eigentlich theologisch verwendet. In seiner Polemik gegenber den Monarchianern hat er den Weg gezeigt, wie die pnoiai in
der trinitarischen Kontroverse gebraucht werden knnen. Vor den
Kappadoziern hatte schon Eusebius diese Anregung verstanden. Die
Art und Weise wie Origenes von den pnoiai sowohl Christi als
auch Gottes spricht, muss indes in einen greren geistesgeschichtlichen Zusammenhang gestellt werden. Dabei sind vor allem drei
Dinge gut zu beachten: die Namenstheologie der Bibel, die alexandrinische Erklrung der Wrter sowie die stoische Dialektik, wie
sie schon Philo und Klemens von Alexandrien bernommen hatten.
Methodologisch gesehen verdient festgehalten zu werden, dass die
Kappadozier wie schon Origenes exegetisch und dialektisch vorgehen.180 Dabei wurden sie von der Storichtung der Polemik dazu
gebracht, weniger historisch vorzugehen, als dieser und Eusebius es
getan hatten. Aber sie geben dennoch zu verstehen, dass der Taufglaube letztlich in der okonoma verwurzelt ist und darum ber die
koina nnoiai hinausgeht.
Um die Auseinandersetzung zwischen Eunomius und den beiden
Kappadoziern voll zu verstehen, mag es hilfreich sein, sie auch einer

180

Vgl. Origenes, Contra Celsum IV 9 (SC 136, 206).

der theologiegeschichtliche hintergrund

49

kritischen berlegung zu unterziehen. In der Diskussion ber die

Art und Weise, von der Eigenheit des Vaters zu sprechen, halten
Basilius und Gregor auseinander, was dem Vater und dem Sohn
gemeinsam und was ihnen eigentlich zukommt.181 In Bezug auf die
Aussagen, die sowohl den Vater als auch den Sohn bezeichnen,
machen sie mit den stoischen Denkformen: was etwas und wie
etwas ist zu wenig ernst. Sie beschrnken das Gemeinsame auf die
osa, das Eigene beziehen sie auf die Hypostasen.182 In der stoischen Dialektik ndet sich aber auch die Unterscheidung zwischen
den gemeinsamen und eigenen poithtew. Augustinus wird sich in
dieser Hinsicht klarer ausdrcken. Er unterscheidet ber das gemeinsame Substrat hinaus zwischen gemeinsamen und individuellen Zuweisungen. Darum schreibt er die Weisheit, die Liebe, die Geistigkeit
sowohl communiter allen drei Personen zusammen als auch proprie den
einzelnen Personen zu.183 Wenn die Kappadozier nicht so weit gelangt
sind, scheint mir der Hauptgrund darin zu liegen, dass Eunomius
sie dazu gedrngt hat, in Gott vor allem den Schpfer und Herrn
des Alls zu sehen. Die Anfanglosigkeit und Endlosigkeit, auf die sie
immer wieder zurckkommen, trit auch fr den Sohn zu. Die
Kappadozier bersehen zwar nicht, dass diese zwei Attribute dem
Vater und Sohn auf eine andere Weise zugesprochen werden, aber
sie bringen das nicht eindeutig zum Ausdruck. Nach meiner Meinung
ist es jedenfalls nicht unwichtig mit Augustinus herauszustellen, dass
der Vater principium sine principio, der Sohn hingegen principium de principio ist. Damit wird die einseitig kosmologische Sicht berwunden,
welche die Diskussion mit Eunomius kennzeichnet. Die heilsgeschichtliche Orientierung, ohne welche ein Taufglauben undenkbar
ist, kommt damit zum Tragen.

181
Vgl. Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 19 (SC 299, 242); Ep. 210,5 (Courtonne II
195f ); Ep. 38,5 (Courtonne I 8487).
182
Vgl. Basilius, Adversus Eunomium II 28 (SC 305, 118122).
183
Augustinus, De Trinitate VII 1,13,6 (CCL 50, 244254). Vgl. B. Studer, Gratia
Christi Gratia Dei bei Augustinus von Hippo, Roma 1993, 194.

PART II

TRANSLATION

THE SECOND BOOK AGAINST EUNOMIUS.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSLATION
Stuart George Hall

Translating Gregory is never easy. I must acknowledge with thanks

my debt to members of the Gregory of Nyssa Colloquium, and especially Lenka Karfkov, Joseph S. OLeary and Johannes Zachhuber,
all of whom corrected errors and made useful suggestions.
The text presented by Jaeger in GNO has been followed with
rare exceptions, all of which are indicated in the footnotes. Most of
them are matters of punctuation, such as the exact location of a
question mark, or a dierence of opinion as to whether Gregory is
quoting from Eunomius or representing his opponents views in his
own words.
Technical terms are sometimes dicult to translate consistently. I
have generally followed the practice adopted in translating Contra
Eunomium I.1 The principles are usually discussed in the footnotes
when a word rst occurs, e.g. being for osa and concept for
pnoia. Eunomius key term, gennhsa and its cognates are not so
discussed, but I have as before used unbegotten and unbegottenness, which are in English so ugly and unusual that they correspond
well to the Eunomian use which Gregory criticizes.
The general aim has been to present all the thoughts of Gregory
as he might have written them, had he been using modern, philosophically informed, English. Nothing can make him easy to read,
but we have done our best.
An important problem is the structure of the work. Older editions
and translations are unhelpful. Jaeger introduced numbered sections,
which are here treated as basic, and larger paragraphs which are
generally, but not always, followed. Since some scholars habitually
refer to lines and pages, the page-turns in GNO I are indicated by
numbers in square brackets.
1
L. F. Mateo-Seco J. L. Bastero (eds.), El Contra Eunomium I en la produccin
literaria de Gregorio de Nisa. VI Coloquio Internacional sobre Gregorio de Nisa, Pamplona
1988, esp. 3133.

54

stuart george hall

I have also added fteen main headings and numerous subheadings to Gregorys text in order to help in understanding. The reader
must not suppose that this is part of what Gregory himself wrote.
The headings are an hermeneutic tool. Arriving at them is not easy,
and colleagues in the Colloquium had dierent opinions of the structure of the work. What we oer is my own analysis, altered in the
light of Lenka Karfkovs independent proposals, Joseph S. OLearys
penetrating criticisms, and the published scheme of Bernard Pottier.2
The result cannot be regarded as infallible, but is oered to help
the reader understand what Gregory is trying to say.

B. Pottier, Dieu et le Christ selon Grgoire de Nysse, Namur 1996, 425430.

the second book against eunomius

55

I. Introduction (111)
1.9.
Eunomius, the headless Goliath
10.11.
Basil, our champion
II. Unbegottenness (1266)
12.22a.
Orthodox faith and Eunomius attack on it
22b.43. Unbegottenness, simplicity and being
44.50a. Eunomius on unbegotten not being a concept
50b.66. Eunomius true aim: degrading Christ
III. Limitations of human knowledge (67124)
67.83.
The impossibility of knowing divine things
84.96.
The example of Abrahams faith
97.105. Curiosity beyond what scripture says leads to error
106.124. We lack essential knowledge of soul, body and universe
IV. Naming and conceiving God (125195a)
125.147. Positive and negative words for God
148.158. God is named for his actions, not for his being
159.176. Gods being is prior to human conceptions of him
177.195a. The power and limits of conceptual thought.
V. Words spoken by God (195b236)
195b.204. Eunomius makes God speak physically
205.218. To whom does Eunomius think God speaks?
219.236. Speech without sound in a Psalm
VI. Human language (237293a)
237.246a. God gives man the power to create words
246b.261. The varieties of human language
262.268. Eunomius falsely claims Moses in his support
269.281a. Evidence from the creation narrative in Genesis
281b.288. Words are invented for mans benet, not Gods
289.293a. Human invention of words does not impugn divine
providence
VII. Conceptual thought and Christological titles (293b366a)
293b.332. Basil and Eunomius on names given to Christ
333.342. Contradictions and evasions in Eunomius
343.350a. Words applied to the Lord by the scriptures
350b.358. Words applied to the Lord by himself
359.366a. Eunomius alleges that applying concepts to God is
blasphemous

stuart george hall

56

VIII. Divine indestructibility (366b386)

366b.377a. Eunomius makes indestructible part of Gods Being,
Father a mere activity
377b.386. Eunomius identies Gods indestructibility and unbegottenness with his being
IX. Divine attributes and human concepts (387402)
387.394.
The naming of God is a function of human corporeality
395.402.
The power to name by conceptual thought is Gods
gift to Man
X. Further arguments on the alleged divine origin of words (403444)
403.422.
Philosophical and literary aspects of the arguments
about the origin of speech
423.442.
A Psalm-verse about counting and naming
443.444.
Eunomius misuses Pauls interpretation of Adam
XI. Eunomius charges against Basil (445468)
445.454a. The charge that Basil denies God is by nature indestructible
454b.461. The charge that Basil denies that God is by nature
unbegotten
462.468.
The charge that Basil divides the being of God
XII. Eunomius
469.479.
480.485.
486.491.
492.503.
504.523a.
523b.536.
537.542.

reduces all divine attributes to one (469542)

God is one, but has various attributes
The claim that dierent attributes divide Gods being
Eunomius arguments apply equally to the Son
The absurdity of making divine attributes all identical
The syllogism: indestructibility and unbegottenness
are incompatible unless identical
Logical games with the endless and the unbegun
Eunomius nonsensically identies unbegotten with
endless

XIII. Eunomius claim that words for God originate in God (543560)
543.553.
The claim that words for God are prior to mans
concepts
554.560.
A dilemma for Eunomius, who identies Gods attributes with his being

the second book against eunomius

57

XIV. Privative and negative words for God (561610)

561.570. On abbreviating a response to nonsense, especially that
about privation
571.580. Words, ideas, and the transcendence of God
581.587. Titles of God based on his activities
588.595. Eunomius claim that privative titles demean God
596.604. Negative terms make divine attributes distinct
605.610. If immortality is being, that applies also to the Son
XV. Eunomius nal fraud, and Gregorys response (611627)
611.624. Is the Father from non-being? A misrepresentation
exposed
625.627. Conclusion: Eunomius himself exposed by Basil and
Gregory

GREGORY, BISHOP OF NYSSA

THE SECOND BOOK AGAINST EUNOMIUS
Translated by Stuart George Hall

I. Introduction (111)
1.9. Eunomius, the headless Goliath
1. Our rst disputes with Eunomius were with Gods help adequately
dealt with in our previous eorts, as those who wish may discover
from our works: in our previous book the fraud is forcefully exposed,
and in the topics then considered the lie has no more power against
the truth, save for those who are fanatically shameless in opposing
the truth. 2. Since, however, a second work has been assembled by
him against true religion, like a bandits ambush, once again with
Gods aid Truth is being armed by us to resist the array of her foes,
marching ahead of our words like a commanding ocer, and directing them as she sees t against the enemy. Following her steps we
shall boldly commit ourselves to the second contest, quite undeterred
by the onslaught of falsehood, displayed though it is in a host of
words; 3. for faithful is he who promised that thousands would be
put to ight by one, and tens of thousands dislodged by two,3 because
true religion, not numerical superiority, prevails in war.
4. In the case of the huge gure of Goliath, brandishing that massive spear of his at the Israelites, he struck no fear in a shepherd,
a man with no training in [227] military arts, but when he tangled
with him he came out of the battle headless, contrary to his expectation.4 In the same way our Goliath, the imparter of Philistine
knowledge, brandishing his blasphemy at his opponents unsheathed
and bare like a sword, and glittering also with newly whetted tricks,

3
4

Deut 32,30.
1 Sam 17,2351.

60

gregory of nyssa

did not seem frightening or formidable to us simpletons so as to

leave him able to boast a eld clear of resistance; rather he found
that we, the impromptu warriors of the Lords ock, who were never
trained to ght with words and do not reckon that want of training a disadvantage, have shot at him the Word of Truth, simple
and rustic. 5. Furthermore, that shepherd we mentioned, when he
had knocked down the Philistine with his sling, and when the stone
had pierced the helmet and by the force of the shot penetrated
inside, did not limit his valour merely to seeing his adversary dead,
but ran up and beheaded the foeman, and then went back to his
own people parading that loud-mouthed head in the camp of his
compatriots. We too therefore have a duty, following his example,
not to quail at the prospect of a second task, but so far as possible
to imitate the heroic act of David, and like him follow up the rst
blow with an attack on the fallen, so that the enemy of the truth
may be shown to be totally headless. 6. One who is cut o from
faith is more decapitated than the Philistine was; for since the head
of every man is Christ, as the Apostle says,5 and the believer is
presumably what is meant by man (for Christ would not also be
the head of unbelievers), then surely [228] the one cut o from saving faith would be as headless as Goliath: by his own sword, which
he whetted against the truth, he is parted from his true Head; it is
not our task to cut it o from him, but to demonstrate that it is cut
o already.
7. Let none suppose that it is out of a sort of ambition and desire
for human glory that I set out readily on this war without truce
or parley,6 and engage the enemy. If it were possible in leisurely
silence to spend our life in peace, it would be out of character deliberately to disturb that silence, of our own accord stirring up war
against ourselves by a challenge. 8. But when siege is laid to the
Church, the City of God, and the great wall of Faith shudders,
pounded all round by the siege-engines of heresy, and there is no
small danger that the Word of the Lord might be seized by the
onslaught of the demons and be taken away captive, I reckoned it
a dreadful thing not to engage in the Christian struggle, and did

5
6

1 Cor 11,3.
A rhetorical clich at least as old as Demosthenes XVIII 262 (Dindorf I 324).

the second book against eunomius

61

not retreat into silence. I reckoned the sweat of labour much to be

preferred to the ease which silence brings, knowing very well that,
just as every one will get his reward, in the Apostles words, in accordance with his own work,7 so he will certainly also get his punishment for neglecting labours he is capable of. 9. That was also the
reason why I readily undertook the rst verbal battle, using missiles
from the shepherds wallet, that is those uncut and natural words
from the Churchs formularies, for the defeat of blasphemy, and
[229] in need of no outsiders verbal weapons for the fray. Now also
I do not draw back from the second battle, but set my hope as great
David did on one who trains hands for battle and ngers for war,8
hoping we may be vouchsafed by the divine Power a writing hand
directed to the destruction of heretical teachings, and ngers serviceable to overthrow the army of evil, skilful and masterful in deploying argument against the foe.
10.11. Basil, our champion
10. In wars among men there are those superior to the rest in
courage and strength, who are protected by armour and have acquired
skill in warfare by practice in dealing with its dangers; these stand
at the head of the formation, exposed to danger ahead of those
drawn up deeper, while the rest of the troops try to give the appearance of large numbers and thus to make some contribution to the
common eort. Such in our battles is Christs noble soldier and frequent protagonist against the Philistines, that great spiritual man-atarms Basil, wearing the full apostolic armour, protected by the shield
of faith, and ever wielding his ghting weapon the sword, I mean,
of the Spirit.9 He leads the Lords army in battle, living and ghting
and performing valiantly against the enemy in the work he painfully
wrote, while we, the multitude, sheltering behind the shield of our
champions faith, inasmuch as our commander has advanced against
the foe, shall not inch from such combat as we can sustain. 11. In
refuting, therefore, the erroneous and insubstantial illusion of heresy,
[230] he asserts that the title unbegotten is applied to God only

7
8
9

1 Cor 3,8.
Ps 143/144,1.
Eph 6,1617.

62

gregory of nyssa

conceptually,10 and he puts forward arguments based on general principles and on scriptural proofs. Eunomius, however, the inventor of
error, neither concurs with his arguments, nor is able to refute them.
Pressed towards the truth, the clearer the light of orthodox doctrine
shines, the more, being dazzled by the light in the manner of nocturnal animals, and unable even to nd his usual sophistic bolt-holes,
he wanders aimlessly, gets into the impenetrable tangle of falsehood,
and is trapped in a circle of repetition: nearly all his second work
is devoted to this nonsense. Consequently it is right that we too
should do battle with our opponents on this ground, where our
champion himself led the way in his own book.

II. Unbegottenness (1266)

12.22a. Orthodox faith and Eunomius attack on it
12. I suggest that we ought rst of all to summarize briey our
whole understanding of dogmatic principles and the disagreement of
our opponents with us, so that our treatment of the subject may be
methodical. The chief point, then, of the Christian religion is the
belief that the Only-begotten God, who is Truth, and true Light,
and Power of God, and Life, truly is all that he is said to be; and
especially and supremely this, that he is God and Truth, which
means God in truth, being always what the thought and word imply,
never not being, and never ceasing to be, one whose Being,11 what
he essentially is, eludes all attempt at comprehension and investigation. 13. For us, as the word of Wisdom somewhere says, from the
greatness and beauty of created things, by some analogy based on
what we do know, he comes to be known as existing,12 by means
of his activities bestowing only faith, not the knowledge of what he

10
The central term pnoia is rendered by variations on concept, conception,
conceptual, or conceptual thought. It can be used both of the mental activity
which conceives, and the thought or attribute which is conceived. Similarly the verb
pinoen is rendered conceive, with or without an adverb such as mentally.
11
Parts of the verb enai, to be, and the cognate noun osa, being, are here
regularly rendered with parts of be and being in English. Other terms, such as
substance and exist, are generally reserved for other Greek words.
12
Wis 13,5.

the second book against eunomius

63

is. 14. Whereas this view has come [231] to prevail generally among
Christians, at least among those who really deserve the name, those
(I mean) who have learnt from the Law13 not to worship any thing
that is not True God, confessing by their very worship that the Onlybegotten God is in truth and not falsely called God, there has come
the corrosion of church-rust, which corrupts the devout seeds of faith;
it advocates Judaistic fraud and has something also of Greek godlessness. 15. By fashioning a created God it becomes an advocate
of Greek fraud, and by not accepting the Son it establishes the error
of the Jews. This heresy therefore, which abolishes the true godhead
of the Lord, and makes out a case that he ought to be understood
as a created thing, and not that which in essence and power and
rank the Father is; since, with truth shining all about, these opaque
notions have no substance, and they have despised all the titles for
a proper expression of divine praise found in the scriptures, which
are applied alike to Father and Son, they have arrived at the term
unbegottenness, itself manufactured by these very people in order
to deny the majesty of the Only-begotten God.
16. Whereas the orthodox confession stipulates faith in the Onlybegotten God, so that all may honour the Son as they honour the
Father,14 these people reject the orthodox words, in which the
majesty of the Son is declared to be as honourable as the rank of
the Father, and then conceive for themselves the principles and
propositions of godless doctrinal criminality. 17. Whereas, as the
Gospel language teaches, the Only-begotten God came forth out of
the Father and is from him,15 they replace this idea with other terminology, and use it [232] to tear up the true faith. 18. Whereas
truth teaches that the Father is not from some superior cause, these
have named that thought unbegottenness, and the constitution
(pstasiw) of the Only-begotten from the Father they call begetting; then they put together the two words, unbegottenness and
begetting, as directly contradicting each other, and proceed to lead
their silly followers astray.

13
14
15

That is, Scripture.

Jn 5,23.
Jn 8,42 etc.

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To make the matter clear with an example, was begotten and

was not begotten are just like is seated and is not seated and
any other expression of the same kind. 19. These people however,
separating these expressions from the natural meaning of the terms,
strive to attach to them another sense in order to get rid of orthodoxy. The terms is seated and is not seated have indeed, as already
stated, not the same force, for the meaning of the one is negated
by the other. They therefore argue that this contrast in the mode
of origin denotes a dierence of being: they dene the being of one
as begotten and that of the other as not begotten. 20. One may
not reckon, however, that the being of a man is that he is seated
or not seated, for one would not give the same denition of a mans
sitting posture as of the man himself; in the same way, the being
which has not been begotten, on the analogy of the example we
have used, is surely something dierent in its proper denition from
what is meant by not having been begotten.
21. Yet our opponents, eyes xed on their wicked aim of securing
as far as possible the denial of the godhead of the Only-begotten,
do not say that the being of the Father is in fact unbegotten, but
by a perversion of language dene unbegottenness as being, in
order to use the contrast with begotten [233] to demonstrate a
dierence of nature from the contradiction in the words. 22. For
seeing wickedness they have ten thousand eyes, but for the uselessness of this eort they are blind; the eyes of their mind are shut.
Who is there, unless his minds senses are totally blunted, that does
not perceive that the foundation of their doctrine is weak and imsy,
and that their argument is based on nothing, when it makes unbegottenness into being? for that is how their lie is concocted.
22b.43. Unbegottenness, simplicity and being
I shall, however, state my opponents argument for them in my own
words as strongly as I can. 23. They assert: God is called Unbegotten;
but the Divinity is by nature simple; and what is simple admits of
no composition. If therefore God is by nature uncompounded, and
the name Unbegotten applies to him, then Unbegotten is the name
of his very nature, and his nature is nothing else than unbegottenness. 24. In response to this we assert that uncompounded means
one thing and unbegotten another: one expresses the simplicity of

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65

the subject, the other the fact that it derives from no cause; the connotations of the terms do not overlap, even though both are used
of the one subject. Rather, we learn from the adjective unbegotten
that what is so described has no causal origin, from simple that it
is free from composition; neither term is used as substitute for the
other. 25. So it does not necessarily follow that, because the Divinity
is by nature simple, his nature is dened as unbegottenness; rather,
inasmuch as he is without parts and uncompounded, he is said to
be simple, and inasmuch as he has not been begotten, unbegotten.
If the word unbegotten did not mean that he is without a cause,
but simplicity were to intrude into the connotation of such a word,
and if he were for that reason (following the heretical argument)
called unbegotten, merely because [234] he is simple and uncompounded, and if the connotation of simple and unbegotten is one
and the same, then surely the simplicity of the Son must also be
called unbegottenness. 26. They will not deny that the Only-begotten God is also simple by nature, unless indeed they would also deny
that he is God. Simplicity therefore will have no shared meaning
with unbegotten, such that the nature, because it is uncompounded,
must be unbegottenness. Otherwise, they bring on themselves one
of two absurdities: either they deny the godhead of the Only-begotten or they attribute unbegottenness to him too. 27. For, since the
Divinity is by nature simple, and unbegotten is in their view a word
for simplicity, they are either arguing that the Son is compounded,
by which it is at the same time implied that he is not God either,
or else, if they confess his godhead, and the Divinity is (as has been
said) simple, they will surely be arguing that the same person is also
unbegotten because of his simplicity, if indeed simplicity is deemed
to be the same as unbegottenness.
To make what we are saying clearer, I will repeat the argument.
28. What we assert is this: each of the words has its own connotation, and indivisible is not implied by unbegotten, nor unbegotten by simple. Rather, by simple we understand uncompounded,
and by unbegotten we learn that something has no originating
cause. 29. We think that we should believe that the Son, being God
from God, is himself also simple, because the Divine is free from
any composition; and similarly in his case, too, that we neither signify simplicity of being by the title Son, nor conversely do we
express the meaning of Son by simplicity; but that by the one
word his existence deriving from the Father is expressed, and by

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simplicity just what that word connotes. Since then the phrase [235]
simplicity of being is exactly the same, whether it is applied to
Father or Son, diering neither by subtraction nor by addition, while
begotten is very dierent from unbegotten, because in each word
there is a meaning which is absent in the other, we therefore claim
that there is no necessity, the Father being unbegotten, just because
his Being is simple, for his Being to be called unbegottenness. 30.
In the Sons case too we do not, because his being is simple, and
the same person is also believed to be begotten, call his being simplicity. Rather, just as the <Fathers>16 being is simple and not simplicity, so too the being is unbegotten and not unbegottenness. In
the same way, if the Son is also begotten, it is quite unnecessary to
conclude that, because his being is simple, his being is dened as
begottenness. Rather, in this case too each word has its own meaning: the term begotten points you to a source, and simple to
absence of composition.
31. This however does not satisfy our opponents. They insist that,
because the Fathers being is simple, it must be reckoned nothing
else but unbegottenness, since it is also said to be unbegotten. To
them we may also reply that, because the Father is also called Creator
and Designer,17 and the one so called is also simple in being, it is
time these clever people announced that the Being of the Father is
creation and design, since no doubt the argument from simplicity attaches to his being the meaning of every word which applies
to him. 32. So they should either separate unbegottenness from their
denition of the divine being, letting it retain its own proper meaning, or, if, because of the simplicity of the Subject, they do dene
the being by unbegottenness, [236] they should on the same grounds
envisage both creation and design in the Fathers being, not as though
the potency in the being were what creates and designs, but as
though that potency itself were seen as creation and design. 33. If

16

This word is not in the Greek, but is added to make the meaning clear.
Dhmiourgw is commonly used in Greek philosophy and patristic theology for
the one who skilfully or intelligently creates the world. It may be rendered by various words such as craftsman, articer, artisan, or transliterated as Demiurge.
We have opted for Designer, a word with a notable history in English natural
theology, which is inexact because design is not quite the same as product: but it
comes close enough.
17

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67

however they reject this as wicked and wrong, let them be persuaded
by the logic to reject that other argument with it: as the being of
the Designer is not design, so the being of the Unbegotten is not
unbegottenness. To be concise and clear I will again repeat the same
argument: If it is not as a function of being begotten, but because
the Father is a simple and uncompounded being, that he is described
as unbegotten, for the same reason the Son too will be called unbegotten; for he too is a being uniform and uncompounded. 34. If
however, because the Son has been begotten, we are obliged to confess him as begotten, then plainly, because the Father has not been
begotten, we shall also address him as unbegotten. If truth and the
logic of the case require this conclusion, then unbegotten is not a
word for being, but points to a dierence of idea, which distinguishes
what has been begotten from what has not.
35. There is another point we should add to what has been said.
If they allege that the word unbegotten signies the Being, and not
existence without prior cause, what word will they use to denote the
fact that the Father has no prior cause, since they have given unbegottenness the function of indicating his being? 36. If we do not
learn from the word unbegotten the dierence which distinguishes
the Individuals (postseiw),18 but are to understand that this word
indicates the Nature itself, as though it emerged immediately from
the subject-matter and [237] revealed what we want to know by the
enunciation of the syllables, then it must follow that God is either
not unbegotten, or is not so described, there being no word specically
to provide such a connotation. 37. Since, by their account, unbegottenness does not connote the absence of originating cause, but
indicates the nature itself, the logical trick will surely backre against
them, and unbegotten as a word for God will end up escaping
from their doctrine. In the absence of any other word or expression
to indicate that the Father has not been begotten, and with unbegotten by their ingenuity made to mean something else, and not
that he was not begotten, their argument fails, slides into Sabellianism19

18
Individual is the term used in modern Anglophone philosophy for what the
Greeks meant by a personal pstasiw.
19
Sabellius, who wrote in the late second or early third century, so stated his
understanding of God that he is widely viewed as teaching that there is only one
person in God, who manifests himself in dierent ways, especially as Father and

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and collapses. 38. By this logic it must follow that the Father is
deemed the same as the Son, once their doctrine is robbed of the
distinction of begotten and unbegotten. So it is one or the other:
either they must withdraw their opinion about this word, because it
connotes a dierence in the character of each and not the nature,
or else they must abide by their judgments about the word and agree
with Sabellius; for there is no way that the dierence between the
Individuals can avoid confusion without the distinction of begotten
from unbegotten. 39. If therefore the word indicates a dierence,
then the being is not what that term will indicate: there is one word
for the dierence, another for the being; but if they force the meaning of the term to apply to the nature, they will as a consequence
be dragged into the error of the so-called Sonfatherists, the distinction between Individuals having been removed from the account.
40. If however they are saying that there is nothing to prevent both
the contrast with begotten being expressed by unbegottenness, and
the same term denoting the being, they must distinguish for us the
additional connotations of the word, so that we can eectively connect with each other [238] the distinct senses of unbegotten. 41.
The clear indication of dierence given by this term is beyond doubt,
as is conrmed by the verbal contrast: we ourselves agree that instead
of, The Son was begotten, and, The Father was not begotten,
the one is by a verbal equivalence called unbegotten and the other
begotten; but to tell us on what interpretation the being is denoted
by this use of the word is apparently beyond them.
42. This is something our New Theologian says nothing about, but
as his writing advances he takes us deceitfully through fresh nonsense. Because God, being simple, he says, is unbegotten, therefore God is unbegottenness. What has the thought of simplicity to
do with the idea of unbegotten? The Only-begotten, after all, is
undoubtedly both begotten and simple. But also without parts, he
says, and uncompounded. What has that got to do with the question? The Son is not pluriform and composite either, but that does
not make him unbegotten. 43. But he is utterly without quantity,
he says, and magnitude. That too may be granted: and the Son

Son. What he actually taught was probably more subtle. The term Son-father
(uoptvr), which Gregory refers to in 39, was attributed to him.

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69

too is unrestricted by size and without quantity, and still Son. But
that also is not the question. The object is to show which meaning
of unbegotten describes being. Just as the idea of dierence of characteristics is understood in this word, so they claim the connotation
being is unambiguously present as one of the meanings of exactly
the same expression.
44.50a. Eunomius on unbegotten not being a concept
44. He says nothing about that, but tells us that we should not
apply unbegotten to God conceptually. For what is so spoken, he
says, is as eeting as the words themselves. But what [239] word
is not eeting as soon as it is spoken? We are not like potters or
brick-makers; when the words have once been formed in our mouth,
we do not keep intact what is expressed in speech, but as soon as
the word is uttered, what is said is no more. 45. When the breath
of speech is uttered and returns to the air no trace of the words is
left imprinted on the place where the sound was uttered. If therefore what makes him characterize the word as a concept is that it
does not remain a word but vanishes together with the sound of the
voice, he cannot avoid calling every word a concept, since no substance remains to any word once it is uttered. 46. He will not be
able to prove that even unbegottenness, which he exempts from
the status of concept, is indissoluble and solid once it is uttered, since
the word uttered from the mouth in the sound does not remain
intact. The insubstantiality of spoken words may also be observed
by this: if we write down in silence the thoughts of the mind, it is
not the case that the substantial thoughts will be those denoted by
the written letters, while the insubstantial will fail to share that written denotation. 47. It is possible, whatever the thought may be that
comes into the mind, whether it is understood as substantial or has
some other status, to record it in writing at will, and for exhibiting
meaning the voice is the same as the written record, for we express
our thought equally by either. 48. What his case is therefore for
making the concept dissolve along with the mere utterance,20 I fail
to understand. When any word is orally expressed, the breath that

20

Cf. below, 159.

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conveys the sound is assimilated to its kind, yet the sense of what
is said is impressed through the hearing on that part of the hearers
mind which remembers, whether [240] it be true or illusory. 49. It
is therefore a feeble interpretation of this concept which our wordsmith produces, when he characterizes and denes it in terms of dissolving sound. Hence that shrewd listener (in Isaiahs phrase)21
rejects this unintelligible account of the nature of a concept, demonstrating it to be, on Eunomius argument, incoherent and insubstantial; and he discusses scientically the connotation contained in
the term, using familiar examples to apply the argument to doctrinal ideas. 50. In opposition to him Eunomius, elevating himself with
this noble work of literature, tries in this way to undo what has been
so clearly articulated on the subject of concept.
50b.66. Eunomius true aim: degrading Christ
It would perhaps be best, however, before refuting what has been
written, to consider the object of the exercise, why he is anxious to
prevent unbegotten being applied to God as a concept. The doctrine prevails among all those who have received the Word of true
religion that we should set all our hope of salvation on Christ, because
there is no other possibility of enjoying good things unless faith in
Christ provides what we desire. 51. Whereas this thought is rmly
xed in the minds of believers, and all honour, worship and glory
oered up by all to the Only-begotten God as the Prince of Life
who does all his Fathers works, as the Lord himself in the Gospel
says,22 who falls short of no excellence in things that can be thought
of as good, these people, provoked by malice and jealousy of the
Lords honour, reckoning the [241] worship oered by believers to
the Only-begotten God an injury to themselves, they rise against his
divine honours and try to persuade us that none of the things said
about them is said in truth. 52. Though he be named God by scripture, he is not true God, nor when called Son does he have the
nature which truly corresponds to the title, nor is there any sharing
of rank or nature between him and his Father; for, they say, it is

21
Is 3,3; the reference is to Basil: cf. Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 5 (PG 29,
520c ).
22
Jn 10,3738.

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71

impossible for the one begotten to be of like honour with his Maker
in rank or power or nature, since the one has innite life and
existence from eternity, while the Sons life is somehow restricted,
because the beginning at which he was made marks o his emergence at the start of his life, and precludes an extension equal to
the Fathers eternity. 53. Thus even the life of the latter is to be
deemed defective, and he is not always the Father, as he actually is
and is called, but when he was formerly something else he afterwards decided to become Father, or rather, not to become, but
to be called, Father, since he is not even named in truth the Father
of the Son, but Creature has been substituted for the title Son.
54. And surely, says he, the one begotten Junior by the Senior,
the Finite by the Eternal, the Intended by his Maker, is necessarily
inferior to the Maker himself in power, rank and nature, in temporal precedence and all honours. 55. When someone is far from
perfection in divine attributes, how can any one properly venerate
him with the honours due to the true God? On this basis it is
argued by them that the one imperfect in power, decient in life,
subject to his Sovereign, doing nothing of himself but only what is
laid down by his Governors command, that he [242] must be held
to be devoid of divine honour and recognition, entitled God, but
aunting the title devoid of all majestic meaning.
56. Put like that, not dressed up in syllogisms, these things rouse
the hearer to anger and make him shudder at their outlandishness.
How can any one accept, naked and unadorned, evil advice which
directs to the abolition of the majesty of Christ? For this reason they
have hidden this pernicious logical trap in plausible twists and deceits,
and use alien concepts to pervert unsophisticated hearers. Having
presented the rest of the case by which it might be possible to set
the mind of hearers moving by itself in this direction, they leave it
to the listener to draw the nal conclusion. 57. Having said that the
Only-begotten God is not the same in being as the true Father, and
having reached that conclusion through the cunning contrast of unbegotten and begotten, they are silent as they work out the consequence: impiety wins by a spontaneous logic. It is like the druggist
who makes the poison acceptable by sweetening the fatal dose for
the victim with honey; he only has to administer it, and the mixture gets into the organs and without further intervention by the
druggists works destruction. These people do something similar:

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58. rst they honey-avour their poisonous dogma with clever tricks,
then when they pour into the mind of the hearer their lie that the
Only-begotten is not true God, they achieve everything else at the
same time without another word. From the conviction that he is not
truly God it follows that none of the other words implying his divinity are truly [243] spoken of him; for if he is in truth neither Son
nor God, and each of those names is inexact, then surely all the
other titles accorded to him by divine scripture are far from true.
59. It is not a matter of one being truly spoken of him and another
being void of truth; rather, surely, all belong together, so that if he
is truly God, then Judge and King and his other titles mean what
they say, whereas if the godhead is a lie, nothing else is true about
him. Thus when those deceived have been convinced that the title
of godhead is falsely applied to the Only-begotten, the case is made
at the same time that worship should not be oered, nor veneration, nor anything else at all which we owe to God.
60. To make eective their attack on the Saviour, the method of
slander they have adopted is this. They recommend that we should
not observe what is common to the other titles by which the equality of rank between the Son and the Father is indicated, but to take
account only of the dierence of nature implied by the contradictory titles unbegotten and begotten, on the ground that the divine
nature is what the word unbegottenness connotes. 61. Then, whereas
all men of sense reckon it is impossible for the ineable nature to
be expressed in the meaning of any words, and our knowledge cannot extend so far as to reach things transcending knowledge, and
our competence with words has not been endowed with such power
as to describe what is being thought of when something utterly sublime and divine comes to mind, then these sophisticates condemn
the rest for stupidity and ignorance in the science of logic, and claim
that they themselves know these things and are able to [244] impart
that knowledge to whomsoever they please. 62. That is why they
say that the divine nature is nothing other than unbegottenness
itself, and naming it the supreme and highest title they restrict the
majesty of the Godhead to this word. Thus they can argue that, if
unbegottenness is supreme in the being, and the remainder of the
divine titles, godhead, immortality, power, and the rest, depend upon
this one; so if these and the like are unbegottenness, then surely,
if something is not called the one, it will not be the others. 63. In

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73

the case of a man, reason, sense of humour, and capacity to learn

are all characteristic properties, and if something is not a man, it
will certainly not have those properties in its nature; just so, if unbegottenness is indeed true godhead, then one to whom that name
does not belong will surely have none of the other characteristics of
godhead applied to him. Therefore, if unbegottenness is not attributed to the Son, it is proved that none of the other sublime and
divine titles is properly used of him either. 64. This then is how
they dene what it is to apprehend the secrets of divinity: it is to
set aside the deity of the Son. They come near to shouting aloud
to any who will lend an ear, You can be perfect in knowledge, if
you do not believe in the Only-begotten God, that he is truly God;
if you do not honour the Son as the Father is honoured; if you
reckon that he is not Son, but creature by nature, not Lord, not
Sovereign, but slave and subject. That is the direction in which
their counsel points, even if their slander is wrapped up in other
words.
65. That is why, in his former publication, as he twists about multifariously through the ingenious convolutions of his logic-chopping,
and in various ways artfully discusses unbegotten, he deceives the
mind of those easily led astray [245] by saying, Therefore, if it is
neither conceptual nor privative, nor partial (since he has no parts),
nor in him as something alien {(since he is simple and uncompounded), nor something alien outside him}23 (since he is one and
only unbegotten), it must itself be unbegotten being. 66. Our
Instructor24 is aware of the damage inicted by this fraud on those
perverted by it, because to concede that he is not truly God contravenes the very confession of the Lord, and that is indeed the end
to which the logic of these words bends the argument. For this reason, while he does not deny that unbegottenness cannot be applied
to God as a part, since he also agrees that the divine is simple and
has no quantity, size, or composition, nevertheless, that this designation should not be applied to him as a concept, he does deny,
and proves it. Our wordsmith does not leave the matter there, but

23
24

The words bracketed {. . . .} are missing in the MSS, restored by Jaeger.

Basil is meant.

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once more opposes us with his own subtlety in his second book, and
resisting what had been written about conceptual thought.

III. Limitations of human knowledge (67124)

67.83. The impossibility of knowing divine things
67. It is time now to consider the case for this, with just this preliminary argument: human nature has not the potential in it to understand precisely the being of God. It may perhaps not be enough to
make that declaration only about human potential, and it might not
be wrong to say that even the incorporeal order of creation falls
short of taking in and embracing with knowledge the innite nature.
68. One might understand this from examples near to hand. There
are many and various eshly creatures in existence, some with wings
and some earth-bound, and what [246] rises above the clouds by
the power of wings, and what crawls on the belly and burrows, if
they were compared with each other, they would appear considerably dierent, the aerial from the earth-bound; if however the comparison were with the stars and the xed sphere, the high-yers with
wings would be reckoned just as far from heaven as the animals on
the ground. 69. Similarly, the potential of the angels when compared with ours would seem to be vastly superior, because with no
intervening sense-organs it seeks out sublime things by sheer unimpeded power of knowledge; but even their comprehension, if it is
looked at alongside the majesty of him who really is, one might dare
say that their ability also falls almost as far short of understanding
the divine as does ours, and not be far wrong. The barrier which
separates uncreated nature from created being is great and impenetrable. 70. One is nite, the other innite; the one is conned
within its proper measure as the wisdom of its Maker determined,
the limit of the other is innity. The one stretches out in measurable extension, being bounded by time and space, the other transcends any notion of measure, eluding investigation however far one
casts the mind. In this life one may perceive both a beginning and
an end of what exists, but the Blessedness transcending creation
approaches neither beginning nor end, but is by nature beyond the
meaning of both, always remaining the same and self-consistent, with
no measurable progress from one state of life to another. It does not

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come to life by partaking of the life of another, which might lead

to the thought of the beginning and end of that participation, but
what it actually is, is life acting in itself; [247] it becomes neither
greater nor less by addition or subtraction. There is no room for
increase by growth in the innite, and what is by nature invulnerable cannot suer what we conceive as diminution.
71. As we look at the sky, and somehow grasp with our visual senses
its exalted beauty, we have no doubt that what we see exists; yet if
we are asked what it is, we cannot explain its nature in words. We
can only marvel as we see the revolving orb of the universe, the
harmonious contrary movement of the planets and what is called a
bestiary cycle or zodiac incised on the ecliptic round the pole, by
which those skilled in these things observe the annual revolutions,
and the dierent magnitudes and peculiar radiance of heavenly bodies, their appearances and settings, which always occur at the same
season without fail in accordance with their annual cycle, the conjunctions of the planets, the inferior courses of those which pass
below, the eclipses of those set above, the overshadowing of the
earth, the restoration of eclipsed bodies, the pluriform phases of the
moon, the middle course of the sun between the poles, and how full
he is with his own light, ringed with his radiant corona, and totally
enveloped in his luminous power when he is himself eclipsed, the
body of the moon, they say, covering him, and how in accordance
with the decree of its Disposer it always follows the same path in
revolving through its appointed rising and decline, thereby unfolding the four seasons of the year; seeing all this, we do not doubt
the existence of things apparent to our sight, but we are as far from
being able to account for the being of each of them as if [248] we
had never in the rst place known what is apparent to perception.
So with the Maker of the world: we know that he Is, but admit we
are unable to understand his Being.
72. The people who boast of knowing these things should rst tell
us about the lower movements what they think is the material of
the sky, and what the mechanism is which revolves continuously,
and wherein its movement has its origin. Whatever reasoning the
mind may apply, when rational thought approaches the impossible
and incomprehensible, it will surely fail. 73. For if one were to suggest that another body of exactly the same shape, tted round its

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exterior, controls its impetus, so that its movement is continually

turned back to repeat the same revolution around itself, and is
restrained by the strength of its container from ying o at a tangent, how could one explain how these material bodies persist, and
are not worn out by their constant friction against each other? 74.
How, furthermore, is the motion stimulated, if two bodies of the
same kind t exactly together, when one remains unmoved? What
is inside is gripped tight by the immobility of what holds it in, and
will surely not be able to achieve its proper impetus. What, too, is
the frame that gives that container its stability, so that it remains
solid, and is not shaken up by the movement tted inside it. 75. If
one were to speculate mentally and suppose that this too has a frame
which ensures that it stays rmly in place, then surely the argument
must logically go on to postulate a framework for that framework,
and for that another, and for the next yet another, so that the
enquiry repeats itself and goes on in an innite regress, ending up
in perplexity; it will always be looking yet again for what lies beyond
that material body which gives the universe stability, since the argument can at no point stop [249] searching for what goes round the
next container. 76. Alternatively, according to the vain theory of the
astronomers, a void is spread over the top of the sky, and because
it slips on this the rotation of the universe revolves upon itself, meeting no solid corresponding structure which could cause resistance
and reduce its circular motion. What then is that void, which they
say is neither material not mental, how far does it extend, and what
lies beyond it? What is the relation between the solid, resistant matter and that insubstantial void? What is the link between things of
contrary nature?
77. And how can such an harmonious system of the universe consist of beings so diverse? What might one say the sky itself to be?
a mixture of the surrounding elements, or one of the whole range,
or something distinct from them? what the stars themselves are, or
whence their shining radiance? what that is, and how constituted?
or what the reason is for their dierence in beauty and magnitude?
or the seven inner circles, which revolve contrary to the movement
of the universe, what they are and by what force impelled? or that
immaterial and ethereal empyrean and the air that is spread between,
like a barrier separating the heat-making and consuming element
from the soft and combustible? how the earth is set at the bottom

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77

of the whole? what it is that keeps it rmly in place? what prevents

its downward fall? 78. If some one were to examine us on these
and similar questions, will there be any of such high intelligence as
to guarantee knowledge of such things? No other answer can be
given by right-minded people but this: he who made all things by
wisdom, alone knows how to account for the [250] universe; and
for our part, By faith we perceive that the worlds were made by
the word of God, as the Apostle says.25
79. If then the lower creation, which is within range of our perceptive faculties, lies beyond the limits of human knowledge, how
can the one who by his mere will constituted the universe be within
the grasp of our mind? It is mere futility and delusion, in the
Prophets words,26 to suppose it possible for any one to hold in
thought the incomprehensible. It is like infants, who may be seen in
the ignorance of childhood playing and quite serious at the same
time. 80. Often, when a sunbeam streams in upon them through a
window, they are delighted by its beauty and pounce on what they
see, and try to take the sunbeam in their hand, and compete with
each other, and grasp the light, catching the ray, as they suppose,
in clasped ngers; but when the clasped ngers are opened, the
handful of sunbeam makes the children laugh and clap because it
has slipped from their hands. 81. So too the children of our generation, as the parable says,27 play as they sit in the market place.
They see the divine power illuminating their minds through the
words of providence and the wonders in creation, like the radiance
and warmth issuing from the physical sun; yet rather than marvelling at the divine generosity, and revering the one thereby made
known, they overstep the minds limitations and clutch with logical
tricks at the intangible to catch it, and suppose that they can get
hold of it with syllogisms, if they really do suppose so; when reason
has disentangled and unwound the web of their sophistries, what
they have caught appears to men of sense to be nothing at all. 82.
In this petty and infantile way they toy vainly with the impossible,
and with childish hand [251] lock up the incomprehensible nature

25
26
27

Heb 11,3.
Ps 39/40,5.
Mt 11,16.

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of God in the few syllables of unbegottenness; they advocate insanity, and think that the divine is of such size and kind that they could
by human logic contain it in a single term. They pretend to follow
the words of the saints, but are not afraid to elevate themselves
above them; 83. for things which none of those blessed men of
whom there is even a mention recorded in the sacred books, can
be shown to have said, these people, to quote the Apostle, knowing not what they are saying,28 nor what they are arming, say
they know those things, and claim to be able to direct others in that
knowledge. On this ground they insist that they have concluded that
the Only-begotten God is not truly what he is called: the logic of
their syllogisms demands it.
84.96. The example of Abrahams faith
84. What mean-minded pedantry! How disastrous and destructive to
them their abstruse and exact philosophy! Who would ever so purposely side with Hell, as they have laboriously and deliberately dug
themselves a pit of blasphemy? How far they have distanced themselves from Christian hope! By what a gap they have debarred themselves from saving faith! How far away they have settled from the
bosom of Abraham, the father of faith! 85. If we are to follow
the great mind of the Apostle with his change of wording, and take
the meaning of the story allegorically (though the historical truth of
course remains), Abraham went out at Gods command from his
own land and his own kindred, on a journey appropriate for a
prophetic man pressing on towards the apprehension of God. 86. It
is not, I think, a geographical move that [252] achieves the understanding of intelligible realities. Rather, Abraham left his own native
land, I mean the lowly and earthly way of thinking, and so far as
possible lifted his mind above its ordinary material limits, forsaking
the souls anity with the physical senses, so that he might not,
obstructed by any thing immediately apparent to sense, be impaired
in his perception of invisible things. With no sound resonating, no
vision distracting his mind with physical appearances, as the Apostle
puts it, walking by faith and not by sight,29 he rose up so far in

28
29

1 Tim 1,7.
2 Cor 5,7.

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79

his breadth of knowledge as to be reckoned the measure of human

perfection, knowing God as far as was possible for this little, mortal power to reach out to and achieve. 87. As a result the very Lord
of all creation, as though discovered by the patriarch, is named personally, The God of Abraham. Nevertheless, what does the Word
say about him? that he went forth not knowing where he was
going,30 and even without being allowed to learn the name of the
one he loved, yet neither resentful nor ashamed at such ignorance.
88. It was also a sure guide towards his goal, that in thinking about
God he was not led to an understanding by anything material, nor
did his thought ever get stuck in anything comprehensible and desist
from the journey towards things beyond knowing. 89. Having by
the use of reason transcended the wisdom of his nation I mean
the Chaldean philosophy which reaches only visible things, and
rising above those known to sense, from the beauty of things observed
and the harmony of the heavenly wonders [253] he yearned to see
the original model of beauty. In just the same way, all the rest of
what he grasped as his reasoning advanced whether power, or
goodness, or existence without beginning, or being bounded by no
end, or whatever similar idea we may have for the divine nature
using all these as means and staircase for his upward journey, always
standing on what he had discovered and reaching out to what lay
ahead, setting up in his heart, as the prophet says, the beautiful
rising stairs,31 and rising above all that his own power could grasp,
as being less than what he sought, when he had surpassed every
verbal description of his nature which might be applied to God, having cleansed his mind of such notions, he resorted to faith, pure and
unadulterated by any ratiocination, and he took as his indicator,
infallible and manifest, of the knowledge of God just this that he
believed God to be greater and higher than any epistemological
indicator.
90. This is in fact the reason why, after that ecstasy which came
over him, from sublime visions Abraham resiled once more into
human feebleness, and said, But I am earth and ashes,32 that is,
30
31
32

Cf. Heb 11,8.

Ps 83/84,6.
Gen 18,27.

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speechless and impotent when it comes to recounting the good he

had mentally envisaged. 91. Earth and cinders seem to me together
to signify what is at once lifeless and sterile, and thus a law of faith
is generated for subsequent history, using Abrahams story to teach
those who approach God that there is no way to come near to God,
unless faith interposes and of itself joins the enquiring mind to the
incomprehensible nature. 92. He gave up scientic investigation, and
Abraham believed God, it says, and it was credited to him as
righteousness.33 Yet it was not [254] for his sake that it was written, the Apostle tells us, but for ours,34 because it is faith, not knowledge, which God credits to men as righteousness. 93. Knowledge
adopts a sort of experiential35 approach, assenting only to what is
learnt, whereas Christian faith is dierent: its assurance is not of
things learnt, but of things hoped for.36 What is possessed is not
hoped for: Why should one hope, it says, for what he has?37
What eludes our understanding, faith makes ours, by its own assurance guaranteeing the unseen. That is how the Apostle writes of the
faithful one, that, He endured as seeing the invisible.38 It is therefore futile to claim that knowledge vainly pued up39 is able to know
the divine Being. 94. Neither is man so great as to equal the Lord
in his power of comprehension for Who among the clouds shall
be equal to the Lord? says David40 , nor is the object of the quest
so small as to be grasped by the reasonings of human littleness.
Listen to the counsel of the Ecclesiast, not to utter a word in the
presence of God, For God, he says, is in heaven above, and you
on earth beneath.41 95. He shows, I believe, from the relation of
these elements to each other, or rather the distance between them,
how far superior the divine nature is to being managed by human
reason. As far above the touch of the ngers as the stars may be,
so far, or rather much further, the nature which transcends mind

33
34

Gen 15,6.
Rom 4,23.

35
mpeirikn. It is perhaps better, following the majority of the manuscripts, to
read mporikn, commercial.
36
Heb 11,1.
37
Rom 8,24.
38
Heb 11,27.
39
Cf. 1 Cor 8,1.
40
Ps 88,7/89,6.
41
Eccles 5,1/2.

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rises above terrestrial reason. 96. Having learnt, therefore, how great
the dierence of nature is, we should quietly stay within our proper
limits. It is safer and at the same time more reverent to believe that
the divine majesty is more than can be thought of, than to restrict
his glory by certain ideas and think there is nothing beyond that.
97.105. Curiosity beyond what scripture says leads to error
[255] 97. In another way, too, one might argue that safety lies in
leaving the divine nature unexplored, as being inexpressible and
beyond the reach of human reasoning. Speculating about the obscure,
and using the concepts of human reason to search for some kind of
knowledge of things hidden, allows admission and currency also to
false ideas, since speculation about the unknown accepts as true not
only what is true, but often also what is false. 98. The student of
the Gospels and of Prophecy believes that the One who Is exists,
from both what he has heard from the saints and from the harmony
of visible things and from the works of Providence. By refraining
from enquiry into what he is or how he exists, as being both
unprotable and unachievable, he will allow no entry of falsehood
against the truth. 99. By over-curiosity room is made also for false
arguments, and if all curiosity is stilled, then surely the inevitability
of error is excluded with it.
The truth of this argument may also be learned from this: how
is it that the parties in the churches have wandered o into their
manifold and varied ideas about God, each deceiving itself with some
new current of opinion? How did these very people we are considering slither into this pit of iniquity? 100. Would it not be safer for
them all to follow the counsel of Wisdom, and not enquire into
things too deep,42 but calmly to take the simple deposit of faith as
their sure refuge? But once insignicant human beings made a start
on treading vainly among unthinkable things, and on mastering with
propositions the inventions of their own empty mind, thence began
the long [256] list of warriors against the truth; and these very dogmaticians of fraud, with whom our work is concerned, have appeared,
those who want to bring divinity within a prescribed limit: all but
openly they make an idol of their own theory, making this notion

42

Sir 3,21.

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expressed by unbegottenness into a god, not as being by some rational process attributed to the divine nature, but as being itself God
or the Being of God.
101. Perhaps they should have looked instead to the chorus of
the saints the prophets, I mean, and the patriarchs, in whose time
the Word of truth spoke in diverse parts and diverse ways,43 and
thereafter those who became the eyewitnesses and servants of the
Word;44 they should have respected the trustworthiness of those
attested by the Spirit himself, and should have stayed within the limitations of those writers learning and knowledge, and not have dared
to tackle things which the intelligence of the saints did not attain.
102. When God was yet unknown to the human race because of
the idolatrous error which then prevailed, those saints made him
manifest and known to men, both by the miracles which are revealed
in the works done by him, and from the titles by which the various aspects of divine power are perceived. Thus they are guides
towards the understanding of the divine nature by making known
to mankind merely the grandeur of their thoughts about God; the
account of his being they left undiscussed and unexamined, as impossible to approach and unrewarding to those who investigate it. 103.
Where everything else is concerned, they indeed explained that it
came to be, heaven, earth, sea, times, ages, and the created order
within them, but what each of them is, and how and whence, they
did not say. So also with God, that he is, and is a rewarder of
those who seek him,45 they urge us to believe, but his nature itself,
[257] as being above every name, they neither named it nor were
likely to. 104. Whatever names we have learned to clarify the way
we apprehend God, all such have something in common with and
analogous to the kind of names which indicate the individuality of
a particular man. Those who describe the unknown person by some
recognisable characteristics say that he is (it may be) of noble birth
and good breeding, famous for wealth, respected for his rank, in the
bloom of youth and of such-and-such bodily stature. In saying such
things they do not describe the inward nature of the one described,
but some of the characteristics known about him; neither high birth
nor riches nor notable status nor famous rank nor admirable youth
43
44
45

Heb 1,1.
Lk 1,2.
Heb 11,6.

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83

is humanity itself, but each of these is a feature of the particular

person. 105. Similarly, all the words found in holy scripture to indicate Gods glory describe some feature of God, each providing its
particular emphasis, whereby we learn that he is powerful, or not
susceptible to evil, that he is without cause, or comes to no nite
end, that he has control of the universe, or anything else about him.
His being itself, however, scripture leaves uninvestigated, as beyond
the reach of mind and inexpressible in word, decreeing that it should
be honoured in silence by prohibiting enquiry into the deepest things
and by saying that one ought not to utter a word in the presence
of God.46
106.124. We lack essential knowledge of soul, body and universe
106. For this reason one may explore every divinely inspired word,
and not nd teaching about the divine nature, nor indeed about the
essential existence of anything. Hence, we humans live in total ignorance, in the rst place about ourselves, [258] and then about everything else. 107. Who is in a position to understand his own soul?
Who knows its inner being? whether it is material or immaterial;
whether it is to be seen as purely incorporeal or as having something of a corporeal kind about it; how it comes to be, how it is
composed; whence it enters, how it departs; what bonding and interface it has with what constitutes the body; how the intangible and
formless is conned in its own prescribed limit; what distinguishes
its operations; how the same being both reaches up above the heaven
in enquiring into invisible things, and also slides towards material
passions, dragged down by the weight of the body, towards wrath
and fear, pain and pleasure, pity and hardheartedness, expectation
and memory, cowardice and daring, love and hatred, and all those
things which produce contradiction in the souls powers. 108. Would
not one who observes this reckon that he had a crowd of souls gathered within him, every one of those mentioned being quite dierent
from the rest, and, insofar as any predominates, holding sway over
all the rest, so that even reason itself may bend and submit to such
dominant inclinations, and add its own cooperation to such impulses,
like tribute to a tyrannical despot? 109. This multiplicity and pluriformity of what is to be observed in the soul, does any word of
46

Eccles 5,1.

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gregory of nyssa

inspired scripture tell us whether there is a single thing compounded

from them all, and what is the mingling and conation of opposites
with each other, so that the many become a single entity? 110. Yet
each of these distinctly identied is conned in the soul as it were
in a capacious jar. How is it we are not always aware of them as
present within, feeling courage and cowardice at the same time,
resenting and enjoying the same thing, [259] moved inwardly by the
confusion and mixture of all the other emotions, though we recognize their partial dominance whenever one of them prevails and the
rest are subdued? 111. What in fact is this assembling and ordering, and the large vacant space within us, such that each has its
own appointed place, kept apart by some sort of partitions from
mixing with its neighbours? The question, too, whether wrath or
fear or the rest of the feelings mentioned have substantial being, or
are just insubstantial movements what explanation is there of that?
112. If they subsist, there is not one soul enclosed in us, as we have
said, but a crowd of souls, with each of them distinguished as a
proper and dened soul. Yet if we are to think of these as an insubstantial movement, how can the insubstantial control and dominate
us, enslaving us like a tyrant, whichever of them happens to take
control? 113. Further, if the soul is in the intelligible order, how
can multiplicity and composition be attributed to the intelligible,
when such a notion applies specically to these physical characteristics? The souls capacity for growth, for appetite and nourishment
and change, and the fact that every part of the body is nourished,
while sensation does not penetrate every part, but some parts of us
are as insensitive as lifeless things, since bones and cartilage, nails
and hair, both grow and lack sensation, 114. who is there that understands even half the souls function in these respects? You tell me!
115. Why speak of the soul? Not even in the physical being itself,
in which the bodily qualities inhere, has so far been captured by
clear comprehension; for if one mentally analyses the phenomenon
into its constituent parts and attempts to envisage the subject by
itself, stripping it of its qualities, what will be left to reect upon, I
fail to see. 116. When you remove from the body its colour, shape,
solidity, [260] weight, size, spatial location, movement, its passive
and active capacity, its relation to other things, none of which is in
itself the body, but all belong to the body, what will then be left to
which the thought of a body applies? that is something we can

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85

neither perceive by ourselves, nor do we learn it from scripture. 117.

Someone then who does not know himself, how is he to get to know
any thing beyond himself? And the person who has got used to his
own ignorance about himself, does he not plainly learn from this
not to meddle with the hidden things which lie outside him? For
the same reason we learn by the senses just enough about the elements of the world to be able to make use of each for our life, but
as to a denition of their being, we have not understood it, nor do
we regard our ignorance as a disadvantage. 118. Why be concerned
about the nature of re, how it is kindled, how it ares up, how it
takes hold on neighbouring fuel, and does not go out till it has burnt
up and destroyed the material, how the spark lies hidden in the int,
how, though cold to the touch, the steel generates the ame, how
sticks rubbed together produce re, or how, brilliant with sunlight,
water makes a ame? Leaving aside the reason for its upward surge
and its power of continual movement and all such questions, we
have learned to concern ourselves with and investigate only its useful eects for our life, knowing that one who accepts its benets
without such concern is no worse o than the concerned.
119. For this reason Scripture avoids dwelling on the being of created things as a pointless waste of time. It seems to me that the Son
of Thunder, John, having loudly resounded with the preceding proclamations of the doctrines within him, had this in mind when at the
end of his Gospel history [261] he said that these were many things
done by the Lord, which (in his words) if they were written one
by one, the whole world could not contain the books that would be
written.47 He was not of course referring to those healing miracles;
120. for of them the history left none unrecorded, even if it did not
keep a record of all those healed by name. When it says that dead
are raised, blind see again, deaf hear, lame walk, and again that
every ill is healed,48 by these words it leaves no tale of miracles
untold, since it includes in the general terms every single event.
Rather, with his deep knowledge the Evangelist perhaps means this:
the majesty of the Son of God is to be learnt not only from his miracles done in the esh, 121. for these are small compared with the

47
48

Jn 21,25.
Cf. Mt 11,5; Lk 7,22.

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rest of his mighty work. Look up at the sky, and see for yourself
the beauty in it; apply your mind to the breadth of the earth, to
the depths of the water, apprehending with your mind the whole
world, observing by reason what exists beyond the world, and recognize these as the true works of him who visited you in the esh,
works which, he says, if they were written one by one, the what and
the how and the whence and the how much of each, the quantity
of information about the world would exceed the size of the world
itself. 122. Since God made the universe by wisdom, and the wisdom of God has no limit Of his understanding, it says, there
is no reckoning,49 the world which is contained in its own proper
limits will not have room in itself for an account of the innite wisdom. If then the whole world is too small to contain the information about the works of the Lord, how many worlds will contain an
account of the God of the universe? 123. Perhaps even the tongue
of blasphemy will not deny the innity of the [262] Maker of all
things that were brought into being by his mere will! If then all creation cannot contain the account of itself, which is what great John
testies on our interpretation, how could little humanity possibly contain an account of the Sovereign Lord of creation? 124. Let the bigmouths tell us, what is man, when compared with the universe?
What geometric mark is so indivisibly small, what atom so rened
and near to non-existence in that futile Epicurean theory, as the littleness of man is next to nothing compared with the universe? As
great David also put it, having observed well our insignicance, My
substance is as nothing in your presence;50 he does not say nothing at all, but like nothing, using the comparison with the nonexistent to indicate extreme littleness.

IV. Naming and conceiving God (125195)

125.147. Positive and negative words for God
125. Nevertheless, beginning from such a negligible nature, they
open their mouths against the ineable Power, and measure the

49
50

Ps 146/147,5.
Ps 38,6/39,5.

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innite nature with a single title, squeezing the being of God into
the word unbegottenness, intending thereby to advance their slander against the Only-begotten. When great Basil corrected their misguided idea, and gave some explanations about the words, as not
derived from the natures, but applied conceptually to their subjects,
so much do they avoid escaping back to the truth, that they stick,
glued with lime, to what they said before, and do not shift from
their sophistry, but decree that unbegotten is not said conceptually,
but expresses the nature. 126. To go through the whole argument,
[263] to present that silly, long-winded nonsense and to attempt a
refutation point by point would involve long application, much time,
and great diculty, 127. just as I hear that Eunomius himself spent
a number of years, more than the Trojan War, laboriously hidden
in silent retreat, in his deep sleep composing this long dream for
himself. He was trying laboriously, not to interpret an idea, but to
impose forced meanings on the texts, collecting ne-sounding words
from certain writings. 128. Just as the poor, for want of clothing,
sew the edges of rags and stitch together tunics for themselves, so
he gathers one expression here, another there, and thereby sews
together his patchwork of a book, not without diculty sticking
together and reconciling the assemblage of words; his shabby, juvenile eort at competition is just as unsuitable for a man who aims
at the truth, as the eeminacy of luxurious make-up would be for
a tough, veteran athlete. 129. I think it is better, after reviewing
briey the theme of the whole undertaking, to say Goodbye to
the long chapters.
130. Our position therefore I am adopting my masters teaching
is that we have a faint and slight apprehension of the divine Nature
through reasoning, but we still gather knowledge enough for our
slight capacity through the words which are reverently used of it.
131. We claim that the meaning of all these names is not uniform,
but some denote things that appertain to God, others those that are
absent. So we call him just and indestructible,51 [264] by just indicating that justice appertains to him, and by indestructible, that
destruction does not. It is also possible by reversing the terminology
Indestructible and indestructibility are used to render fyartow, fyarsa.
There is no satisfactory term in English: alternatives might be incorruptible, -ility,
imperishable, -ility, immortal, -ity.
51

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to attach epithets to God as appertaining, so as to express what is

his by what is denied, and what is alien by what appertains. 132.
So, since injustice contradicts justice, and destructibility is the opposite of eternity, it is possible to apply the contradictions correctly to
God, and to be in no error about what is tting, when we say that
he eternally is, and that he is not unjust, which is the same as saying that he is just and not liable to be destroyed. 133. So we claim
that the other titles also, by a reversal of meaning, may be suitably
applied in each sense, as with good and immortal and all other
expressions of the same kind. Each one of them can, in one or other
of the alternative forms, indicate what applies, and what does not
apply, to the divine nature; so that while the form of the name
changes, the devout understanding of the Subject remains consistent.
134. To say that God has no evil in him is the same as calling him
good, to confess him as immortal as to say that he lives for ever.
We perceive no dierence of meaning between these, but mean the
same thing by each expression, even though one appears to express
a positive thing, the other a negative. 135. Similarly, if we say that
God is the beginning of all things, and if we also name him Unbegun,
we are not in dispute about the thoughts, since by either expression
we declare him Author and Cause of the universe. So whether we
call him Unbegun or Author of all things, we describe him rst
by what does not apply, secondly by what does apply, it being possible, as we said, by the exchange of descriptions to reverse the
meaning of the words, and for what does apply, by a shift of form,
to be [265] understood from the title that was formerly denied, and
vice versa. 136. It is legitimate, instead of saying he has no beginning, to dene him as the Beginning of every thing, and instead of
this again to confess that he alone exists unbegotten. Thus the words
may seem, because of the change of form, to be dierent from one
another, but the meaning of what is said remains one and the same.
The purpose in speaking of God is not to think up resounding and
harmonious verbal beauty, but to identify a reverent notion by which
what bets the thought of God may be kept intact.
137. Since therefore it is reverent to reckon that the Cause of all
has himself no transcendent cause, if we have this thought rmly
xed and established in us, what dispute still remains for the intelligent person over the terminology, when every word by which such
an idea is expressed says the same thing? Whether you say that he

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is Beginning and Cause of all, whether you call him Unbegun, or

Existing unbegotten, or Being from eternity, or Cause of all, or
Alone without cause, all such are equivalent to each other where
the meaning of the terms is concerned, and the words are of equal
value; to quarrel about this kind of verbal sound is a waste if time,
as if true religion lay not in the meaning, but in the syllables and
sounds. 138. Such then was the thought elaborated by our Teacher.
It enables any one, whose vision is not obstructed by the screen of
heresy, to perceive quite clearly that the manner of existence of the
essential nature of the Divinity is intangible, inconceivable, and beyond
all rational comprehension. Human thought, investigating and searching by such reasoning as is possible, reaches out and touches the
unapproachable and sublime Nature, neither seeing so clearly as distinctly to [266] glimpse the Invisible, nor so totally debarred from
approaching as to be unable to form any impression of what it seeks.
139. By the reach of reason its goal is to discover what that is which
it seeks, and in a sense it does understand it by the very fact that
it cannot perceive it, inasmuch as it acquires clear knowledge that
what it seeks is beyond all knowledge. 140. It detects things which
are incompatible with the divine nature, and is not unaware of those
which it is proper to attribute to it; yet it cannot perceive what that
nature itself is, to which these thoughts apply, but, from the knowledge of the things which are and are not attributed, it sees all that
can be seen that that which rests beyond every evil, and is perceived as possessing every good, must surely be such as is unutterable in word and inaccessible to thought. 141. So when our Teacher
has cleared away all unsuitable ideas in the way we understand the
divine Being, and has urged and taught us to attribute to it everything ne and betting divinity, because the First Cause is neither
a destructible being nor one that came to be by generative process,
but is deemed to be free of any such notion, and from the denial
of what does not apply, and from the armation of what is reverently attributed to him comes the apprehension that he exists, the
constant battler against truth resists his words, and wants that verbal noise, I mean the word unbegottenness, to indicate unequivocally the being of God.
142. Yet it is obvious to any one with a slight training in the use
of words, that indestructibility and unbegottenness by their privative
prex mean that neither of these things applies to God, that is,

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destruction and origin. There are many other synonymous words

which [267] indicate the absence of what does not apply, rather
than the statement of what is: innocent, unpained, harmless, undisturbed, and wrathless, unsleeping, immune to infection, impassible,
inviolable, and so on. 143. These are truly said and represent a kind
of catalogue and listing of the bad ideas from which the Divinity is
free, yet the statement does not by the words provide information
about what is spoken of. What it is not, we learn from the sounds;
what it is, the meaning of the words used does not show. 144. It
is as if one wanting to give a description of the nature of Man were
to say he is not inanimate, nor insensible, nor winged, nor fourfooted, nor aquatic; he would not indicate what is, but explain what
is not, and would neither be lying in listing these features of Man
nor would he plainly describe the subject. On exactly the same principle, though many such things are said of the divine Nature, by
which we learn what we must understand God to be; but what in
itself it essentially is, the words do not teach us. While avoiding every
kind of concurrence with any wrong notion in our views about God,
we make use of a great variety of names for him, adapting our terminology to various concepts. 145. Since no one title has been discovered to embrace the divine Nature by applying directly to the
subject itself, we therefore use many titles, each person in accordance with various interests achieving some particular idea about
him, to name the Divinity, as we hunt amid the pluriform variety
of terms applying to him for sparks to light up our understanding
of the object of our quest. 146. When we ask ourselves and enquire
about what the Divinity is, we give various answers, such as, [268]
that which transcends the constitution and ordering of things, that
which has its existence from no prior cause, but constitutes the cause
of being to all else, that to which generation and beginning, destruction and end do not apply, nor turning into its contrary, nor lessening of superiority, so that no evil nds place in it, and no good
is lacking. 147. If any one wants to put such thoughts into words,
he must certainly describe what is immune to change for the worse
as unchangeable and unalterable, and speak of the rst Cause of
the universe as unbegotten, of that which admits no destruction as
indestructible, of that which declines to no end as immortal and
unending, of him who governs the universe as almighty; and thus,
putting words to all the other reverent ideas, we use a variety of
concepts to speak of him in one way and another, indicating by the

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names his power, his sovereignty, his goodness, his existing without
prior cause or his everlasting continuance.
148.158. God is named for his actions, not for his being
148. I claim therefore that people are entitled to use such nomenclature, adapting the appellations to their subject as each sees t,
and that what our author holds up as a terrible, scary bogey is no
absurdity, that the application of names is more recent in every case
than the actual thing, and also in the case of God. God is not a
word, nor does his being consist of speech or sound. 149. God is
in himself whatever in faith he is deemed to be, but what is named
by those who speak of him is not what he actually is, for the nature
of him who Is is ineable; but he gets his titles from the actions he
is believed to perform for our lives. So in this particular case, the
word just used: God, [269] we say, thinking as we give him the
title of one who supervises, observes, and with his vision penetrates
hidden things.52 150. If however the Being exists prior to the actions,
and we know the actions through the perceptions of sense, and if
we describe these in such words as may be possible, what still remains
so terrible about saying that the names are more recent than the
things? If we cannot rst explain what is being said about God before
we think it, and if we think it by means of what we learn from his
actions, and if before the act there exists the potency, and the potency
depends on the divine will, and the will resides in the authority of
the divine Nature does that not make it clear to us that it is a
matter of applying to the realities the terms we use to indicate what
happens, and the words are a kind of shadow of the realities, matching the movements of things which exist?
151. That this is so, is clearly conrmed by divine scripture through
great David, who refers to the divine Nature as it were by special
and apt names which are suggested to him by the divine action:
Pitiful, he says, and merciful is the Lord, patient and rich in mercies.53 What do these words mean? Do they refer to action or to

52
Gregory thinks of yew, God, as derived from the verb yesyai, gaze at,
or view. This false etymology was widely believed in ancient times.
53
Ps 102/103,8.

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nature? Every one will agree, it can only be to the action. 152.
When then did God perform his acts of pity and mercy and get the
name from the action? Was it before mankind existed? But who then
was in need of mercy? No, it surely came after sin, and sin after
man. So after man came both the act of showing mercy and the
title of mercy. 153. Well, now, is our higher thinker than the prophets
going to condemn even David, because he used his impressions of
God to give him names? Or will he do battle with him on the pretext of that noble, quasi-tragic line, [270] Do you glorify with words
from conceptual thought the most blessed life of God, which glories
in itself alone and before conceptual thinkers are born? 154. In
defence of the prophet it will surely be said, that while it is true
that the divine Nature is gloried in itself alone and before the birth
of conceptual thinkers, yet the human mind utters only as much as
it is able to learn from the activities. From the greatness and beauty
of created things, reasoning backwards, says Wisdom, the generative Source of all things is perceived.54 We utter such titles for
the divine Being which transcends all thought, not to glorify it by the
names we use, but to guide ourselves by what is said towards the
understanding of hidden things.
155. I have said to the Lord, says the prophet, You are my God;
for of my goods you have no need.55 How then do we thus, as
Eunomius puts it, glorify the most blessed life of God, which the
prophet declares to be in no need of human goods? Or does he
suppose that glorify stands for name? 156. We are indeed informed
by those who use language correctly and are expertly trained in the
use of words, that the word glorify (gllein) is not used of mere
denotation; that would be expressed with make known (gnvrzein),
denote (dhlon), indicate (shmanein), or some other such term,
157. whereas glorify is the same as glory in (pikauxsyai) and
rejoice in (peufranesyai) and any other terms of the same meaning. He however alleges that we glorify with words from conceptual thought the most blessed life. We do indeed reckon that to
add any honour to the divine Nature, which transcends every honour, is more than human weakness can manage, but we do not

54
55

Wis 13,5.
Ps 15/16,2.

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refuse to try to make something known about him through words

and titles reverently conceived. 158. For this reason, so far as we
are able, [271] in pursuing what is reverent we apprehend that the
rst Cause has his existence from no superior cause. If any one
accepts this, that is praiseworthy simply on grounds of truth. If however one judges such a statement to be more important than the
rest of our notions of the divine Nature, and therefore says that God,
exulting and rejoicing in this idea alone, glories in it as in something supremely excellent, that would be the work of the Muse of
Eunomius, who says that Unbegottenness is gloried in itself alone,
Unbegottenness which he says is Being and which he calls the blessed
and divine Life.
159.176. Gods being is prior to human conceptions of him
159. Now, in accordance with the manner to present use conformed, and the pattern by precedent informed56 (for so he again
charms us with his play upon words!), let us hear how he thereby
claims to dissipate the opinion about him recently received, and to
constrain the ignorance of those who are deceived; I shall use
the very rhymes of our dithyrambic poet. Having said, he tells us,
that conceptual statements by their nature dissolve along with their
utterance, we have gone on to add: But God, when they are silent,
and when they utter sound, when they have been made, and before
the things which are were made, both was and is, Unbegotten. 160.
So let us nd out what there is in common between the conceiving
of words or the giving of names, and the actual things which we
indicate through this or that utterance of names and words; so that
if God exists unbegotten before mankind is constituted, we judge it
wrong to put such an idea into intelligent speech, because it is dispersed together with the sound if it is just by human conceptual
thought that the name is given. 161. To be spoken of is not the
same as to be. In fact, [272] God is what he is by nature, but is
spoken of by us, insofar as it is possible to speak of him, given the
poverty of our nature, which keeps the workings of the mind undisclosed, unless they are brought into the open by voice and word.
56
This is an attempt to suggest the word-play of Eunomius Greek, which Gregory
derides. tn pibllonta t xre& trpon ka tn prolabnta tpon means more
literally: usage-tting manner and previously existing form.

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Consequently, when we perceive that he is from no prior cause, we

express that perception by using a concept with the word unbegotten. 162. What harm is suered by him who essentially Is, if we
use a word to say how he exists? His unbegotten existence does not
derive from his being called Unbegotten, but because he is such,
he has the word attached to him. This is something our man of little brain has failed to observe, nor did he understand what he himself had proposed. Otherwise he would have stopped abusing those
who conceptually create the term unbegotten.
163. Look at what he says: Conceptual statements dissolve along
with their utterance; but God, both when they have been made, and
before things which are were made, both was and is, Unbegotten.
You can see that to be what he in fact is belongs to him before the
existence of all things, being no less what he is, whether they are
silent or whether they utter sound; while the use of words and names
was rst known when men were created, because they were endowed
by God with the power of speech. 164. If then creation is later than
its Maker, and Man is last in the whole creation, and speech is a
peculiarity of Man, and words and names are parts of speech, and
unbegottenness is a word then why does he not realize that he
is ghting against his own argument? Our assertion is that the names
of existing things are invented for existing things by the human mind,
and he himself concedes that those who use words are demonstrably later than the divine Life, and that the divine Nature exists, as
it exists now and always existed, unbegotten. 165. If therefore he
himself concedes that the blessed Life precedes mankind (again [273]
I go back and use the same argument), and we also do not dispute
that it was later in time that men came into existence, and if we
say that we have used words and names, from the moment we were
created and received from our Maker articulate speech, and if unbegottenness is a word denoting a particular idea, and every word is
a part of human speech; then one who concedes that the divine
Nature exists before mankind must agree that the title invented for
that Nature is of later origin. 166. It was not likely that the use of
the word operated before the creation of its users, just as farming
did not operate before there were farmers, nor navigation before
navigators, nor any other human activities before human life was
constituted. Why then does he quarrel with us, when he cannot follow the logic of his own words?

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God was what he is, he says, before Man came to be. We

ourselves do not deny that. Every thing whatsoever that may be
thought about God, existed before the world was constituted. 167.
But we assert that he is named after the one who names him was
made. If the purpose of using names is that we should receive information from them about real things, and it is only ignorance that
requires one to give information, and the divine Nature, because it
is all-encompassing, is superior to all information, that proves that
it is not for Gods sake, but for ours, that names are applied to
describe him who Is. 168. It is not so that God may learn about
himself, that the word unbegottenness has become attached to his
Nature. He who knows all things, and himself before all things, needs
no syllables and words to learn what are his nature and rank; it is
rather in order that we may ourselves get some understanding of
what may be devoutly thought about him, that we have labelled our
various thoughts with words and syllables, [274] stamping verbal
shapes as signs and markers on our mental processes, so as to get
clear and distinct pointers to our psychic processes by the sounds
we attach to the ideas. 169. So when we assert that the term unbegottenness is a concept applied to indicate that God exists without
beginning, what refutation is it of our argument, if it is said that,
when they are speaking and silent and thinking, and before any
concept of created beings, God was and is unbegotten? 170. If
however his existence before both word and thought is universally
agreed, and if the giving of the name, by which our understanding is
stated, is held to be invented by our conceiving it, and if his object
in his dispute with us is to show that the title is not just conceived
by human beings, but that it exists even before our creation, I do not
understand what it is said about, and what it has to do with his set
purpose of saying that God exists unbegotten before there are beings,
and his struggle to arm that a concept is a later existent than God.
171. Is there any one who asserts that God is a concept, that
Eunomius should attack him with words such as these, and say, as
he has said, It is madness to reckon the concept older than those
who conceive it? Or as he goes on a little lower to add, As if
then their opinion were not this either, that human beings, although
they are the latest of the creatures designed by God, precede their
own concept. [275] The argument would have much force, if madness or folly led someone to say that God is a concept. 172. If

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however this argument does not exist, nor ever has for who would
ever reach such a pitch of insanity as to say that he who truly Is,
who brought into being all that exists, does not exist in a substantial being of his own, but would describe him as the conception of
a title? why this pointless shadow-boxing attack on assertions not
made? 173. Or is the reason for this mindless quarrelling obvious?
ashamed to face those who have been deceived by his logical trick
over unbegottenness, once it was conclusively proved that the name
is totally distinct from any meaning connected with being, he deliberately makes a muddle of what is being said, shifting the battle
from the word to the things, so that he can easily knock down the
unwary by this sort of muddle, if they think we have said that God
is either a concept, or secondary to the invention of words by men;
and that is why he leaves our position unrefuted and shifts the battle to other ground.
174. Our position was, as we have said, that the word unbegottenness does not denote the Nature, but attaches to the Nature by
being conceived, and that by it his existence without prior cause is
indicated. The position they argued was that the word denotes the
Being itself. Where then are the arguments that such is the meaning of the title? 175. Yet while these things can certainly be dealt
with in other words, all his eort is devoted to Gods unbegotten
existence; as though someone were to ask him plainly about this
matter, what understanding he had of the word unbegottenness,
whether as conceived to denote that the First Cause is without beginning, or whether it indicates the Being itself, and he were [276]
solemnly and learnedly to answer that he has no doubt God is the
maker of heaven and earth. 176. Just as this word is irrelevant to
the topic and not connected, in the same way you will nd that in
the case of his elegantly composed attack on us there is no connexion with his purpose. Let us look next at this.
177.195a. The power and limits of conceptual thought
177. Eunomius says that God is unbegotten, with which we too
agree; furthermore, that unbegottenness is Being, which we deny.
We say that this is a name denoting Gods unbegotten existence,
not that unbegottenness is God. He promises to refute our argument; so what is his refutation? It is, he says, that before the cre-

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ation of mankind he existed unbegotten. 178. How does that aect

the question? Eunomius promises to demonstrate that the name is
the same as its bearer, since he denes unbegottenness as Being.
Where then is his proof? To demonstrate that God preexists the
users of speech? What an incontrovertible and amazing proof! That
is a rened piece of logic based on dialectical science, which none
could envisage if he were not initiated in the abstruse skill. 179. Yet
in his enumeration to us of kinds of concept, he solemnly pokes
fun at the word concept: Of things thus said by way of concept,
he says, some have existence solely as uttered, as those meaning
nothing, others have a proper meaning. Of these, some are for
enlargement, as in the case of gigantic gures, others for diminution, as in the case of pygmies, some for attachment, as in the case
of the many-headed, or for combination, as in the case of animals
with mixed features. 180. You see what our philosopher [277]
chopped up our concept into, before he would let its meaning get
any further. Concept is meaningless, he says, nonsensical, playing
unnatural tricks, whether by foreshortening or by stretching the size
prescribed by nature, by combining dierent beings or by making a
monster with incongruous attachments. By these means he ridicules
the word concept, and proves it is useless and of no benet to any
one. 181. So where do we get the higher studies from? Where do
we get the sciences of geometry and arithmetic, the disciplines of
logic and natural philosophy, researches in mechanics, marvellous
clocks of copper and water, the very philosophy of being itself, metaphysical speculation, and in sum the whole scholarly consideration
of the great and sublime purusuits of the mind? What about agriculture? What about navigation? What about any of the business we
do in life? 182. How did the sea become passable to man? How
was the airborne forced to serve the earth-bound? How is the wild
beast tamed? How is the fearsome domesticated? Why does the
stronger not refuse? Was it not through conceptual thought that all
these discoveries were made for mankind? As I see it, mental conception is the way we nd out things we do not know, using what
is connected and consequent upon our rst idea of a subject to discover what lies beyond. Having formed an idea about a matter in
hand, we attach the next thing to our initial apprehension by adding
new ideas, until we bring our research into the subject to its
conclusion.

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183. Why should I list the greater, more sublime achievements of

conceptual thought? Any one not disposed to be contentious can see
that every benecial thing useful to mankind which time has invented,
was not found out except by the use of conceptual thought. It seems
to me that of all the [278] good things eected in us in this life,
which are by divine providence present in our minds, to reckon
conceptual thought the most precious would not contradict sound
judgment.
184. This statement is something I have learned from Job, where
in the story God is portrayed as making a pronouncement through
storm and clouds, and among other things appropriate for God to
say, he says that it is he who instructs mankind in crafts and who
granted to women the art of weaving and embroidery.57 That it is
not by direct action that he taught us such skills, himself sitting over
the exercise, as one may see in the case of those being taught in
the physical world, is surely undeniable, except to the carnal and
bestial person. 185. Nevertheless, it says that instruction in such skills
came to us from him. It was therefore by giving our race the ability of conceptual thought and invention that he himself brought us
to the knowledge of these skills. In terms of causation, every discovery and achievement is to be referred to the Author of this ability: thus mankind has produced medical science, but it would not
be wrong to say that medical science is a gift of God. 186. Every
single discovery in the course of human history, whatever it may be,
which fulls some useful purpose in peace or war, has never come
to us from any other source than the intelligent thought which thinks
up and discovers one thing after another; and intelligence is a work
of God. From God therefore comes all that is produced for us by
our intelligence.
187. If it is said by our opponents that mythical forms and unreal
monsters are ctions imagined by conceptual thought, I do not deny
it. [279] Even their argument ts our theme. We ourselves agree
that the science of opposite things is just the same, of useful things
and those which are not so, as in the case of medicine and navi-

57
In the Greek Bible Job 38,36 reads: Who gave to women the art of weaving or skill in embroidery?

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gation and any similar skill. One who knows how to help the sick
with a drug would also be able, if he put his skill to evil use, to
administer poison to the healthy. 188. The one who steers the ship
into harbour with the rudder could also steer it on to reefs and
promontories, if he were minded to destroy those aboard by treachery. The painter uses the same skill to paint the most beautiful gure
on a picture, and turns openly to copy the most disgusting. The
physiotherapist uses his manipulation technique to correct the dislocated limb and, if so inclined, by the same skill puts the healthy one
out of joint. 189. There is no need to clutter up the argument by
mentioning every case. In those described no one could deny that
a person who has learned to exercise any skill for good ends could
also use it for improper purposes; similarly we also say that the ability to think conceptually was implanted by God in human nature,
but that some have misused the inventive power to make it serve
and support undesirable ctions. 190. So just because conceptual
thought can plausibly invent falsehoods and non-existents, that does
not mean it cannot investigate things that really are and truly exist;
rather, to generous minds its suitability for such a purpose is evidence of its power in that regard. The fact that attempts to produce thrills or amusement in the spectators does not fail to nd the
conceptual thought necessary for the purpose, but that portraying
people with many arms or many heads, breathing re or miscegenated with serpents coils, or increasing their size above normal
or reducing [280] their natural proportions to make them ridiculous,
relating how people were transformed into springs and trees and
birds, whereby those who enjoy such things are able to nd entertainment this is, I would say, plain evidence that conceptual thought
could by its inventive power apprehend higher aspects of learning
too. 191. It is not the case that perfect intelligence was xed in us
by the Giver for making up imaginary beings, while it is endowed
with no power to produce things useful for the discovery of what
enhances life. Rather, while the power of our soul to take initiatives
and to choose is implanted in our nature to lead us on towards the
attainment of beautiful and good things, some may also use such a
drive for improper purposes; and yet no one would say that having
sometimes the tendency to bad things demonstrates that the power
to choose leads to no good. In just the same way, for conceptual
thought to occupy itself with futile and unprotable things does not
condemn it as unable to be of use, but demonstrates that it is not

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ineectual for life-enhancing and needful purposes. As in the one

case it invents things for pleasure or thrills, so in the other it does
not fail to provide means to approach the truth.
192. One question was, whether the First Cause, that is God, exists
without beginning, or has his being dependent upon some beginning. Understanding with the intellect that what is perceived to derive
from another cannot be First, we conceived a word denoting that
idea, and say that the one who Is without superior cause exists unbegun, or if you like, without being begotten. We entitled the one who
so exists Unbegun and Unbegotten, indicating by the title not
what he is, but what he is not. 193. To make the thought as plain
as possible, I will try to give a very clear illustration. Suppose the
question is, whether a particular tree is planted or [281] self-sown.
If it came about by planting, we shall of course say that the tree is
planted, and if self-sown, unplanted. Such a title both states the truth
(since the tree will certainly be the one or the other), and fails to
indicate the trees specic nature: we learn from unplanted that the
tree is self-sown, but whether it is a vine or a plane or some other
such plant that is denoted, is not made known to us by the use of
such a term. 194. If the illustration is understood, we may now
apply the principle to the subject which it illustrates. That the First
Cause has his being from no superior cause, we understand. The
God who exists without a begetter we name Unbegotten, converting the same idea into the form of a title. We make clear by the
meaning of the title that he exists without being generated, but as
to the Being that exists without begetting, what it is in its own nature,
we are led to no insight by this designation. 195. One would not
expect conceptual thought to have such power as to overstep the
limits of our nature, to attain the intangible, and to include in our
knowledge things which there is no way to comprehend.

V. Words spoken by God (195b236)

195b.204. Eunomius makes God speak physically
Nevertheless Eunomius violently attacks our Master, and parades the
argument which Basil puts about concept, and dances triumphantly
on his words, as usual satirizing what is said with his own verbal

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jingles, and saying, Their thought he takes over, their support he

blushes over.58 196. He reports some part of the ideas of the Master
about conceptual thought, in which Basil claimed that the use of
conceptual thought is not only eective for futile purposes, [282] but
also has some potential for greater things. Then he brings in Basils
statements based on the consideration of corn and seed and food,
accusing him of following secular philosophy, and alleges that Basil
is restricting the providential care of God, because he will not concede that names are applied to realities by him. Basil is said to ally
himself with the atheists by taking up arms against Providence; it is
their opinion he admires above the laws, and to them he gives more
credit for wisdom, because he does not observe those rst words,
which say that, when mankind had not yet been brought into being,
the names of fruit and seed are used by scripture.59,60 197. These
are Eunomius charges against us, though the ideas are not copied
in his exact words, but with the phraseology slightly changed by us,
enough to correct the harsh and disagreeable resonance of his verbal syntax. What is our answer? How do we respond to his concern for divine Providence? We are wrong, he says, because we do
not deny that Man was made rational by God, yet we trace the
invention of words to the rational power implanted in human nature
by God. And that is the very grave charge on which the Teacher
of true religion is accused of going over to the opinion of the atheists, and is called inheritor and advocate of unlawful practices, and
all the most terrible names!
198. Let this corrector of our faults tell us, then, was it God who
attached titles to existing things? For what our new expounder of
spiritual doctrines tells us is this: [283] before Man was formed, God
gave names to bud and vegetation and grass and tree and the like,
as he brought his creatures into being by his command. 199. Now
if he sticks to the mere letter, and to that extent follows the Jewish

58
Literally, those whose interpretation he appropriates, their testimony he is
ashamed of . It is the use of secular Philosophy which Eunomius is alleging against
Basil.
59
Cf. Gen 1,1112.
60
Much of section 196 is printed in spread Greek text by Jaeger, indicating that
the words are those of Eunomius. In view of Gregorys statement in 197 that he
has compressed and selected from Eunomius and improved the style, it seems better to present it as indirect reportage, rather than direct quotation.

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opinion, and has yet to learn that the Christian is not a disciple to
the letter, but to the spirit (for The letter, it says, kills, but the
Spirit gives life,)61 and if he is oering us the bare, literal reading
of the text, as though God had spoken these sentences, and if this
is his belief, he will simply be arguing that God also uses just the
same spoken sentences as people use, and spells out his thoughts in
sound and speech.
200. If that is his view, then, he will surely not reject the consequences. Our speech is expressed through the organs of speech, windpipe, tongue, teeth, mouth, together operating to generate speech,
and the pressure of air and the breath from within. Our windpipe
resounds from underneath rather like a ute tted inside the throat.
Meanwhile the palate, by means of the cavity which opens through
the nostrils, acts like the bridge on top of a stringed instrument and
further increases the volume of the sound. 201. The cheeks also
make their contribution to speech, contracting and expanding as
shapes are formed by various facial muscles, and further produce
the voice through a narrow passage in accordance with the various
twists and turns of the tongue, which it achieves with one part or
another of itself by somehow roughening and compressing on the
teeth or palate the breath that passes through it. 202. The lips make
a useful contribution too, as they manage the voice in various ways
by their dierent movements and [284] play their part in completing the shape of the words. If therefore God applies names to things
in the way our new exegete of the divine history stipulates, naming
shoot and leaf and tree and fruit, he must certainly have spoken
each name exactly as it is said, using, I mean, the concatenation of
syllables, which are shaped either by lips or tongue or both together.
203. If there is no other way for the name to be expressed than
for the speech-generating bodily parts to produce the syllables and
words by their various movements, they are surely attributing these
things to God, and base their portrait of the divine on his need to
speak. The kind of framing of bodily parts which generates speech
surely constitutes shape; shape means bodily outline; and body cannot avoid being composite. 204. But where composition is recognized, there surely dissolution of components is also implied; and

61

2 Cor 3,6.

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dissolution is the same in meaning as destruction. This then is the

outcome of our wordsmiths triumph over us, that this private god
of his, which he contrived by the use of the word unbegottenness,
speaks so as not to be deprived of the invention of words, but is
shaped by the vocalizing organs in order to speak the names, and
is not without bodily nature because of his need for shapes for
surely no shape could be observed independently, unless it were
imprinted upon a body and will soon go on to suering the eects
implicit in corporeality, as he declines through composition to dissolution, and through that to destruction.
205.218. To whom does Eunomius think God speaks?
205. Such is revealed to be the nature of the fresh god by the logic
of what our new god-maker has said. But he takes up the cause of
the scriptural words and claims that, Moses explicitly proclaims that
God said these things; and he adds the actual words, Let there be
light, and, Let there be a rmament, [285] and, Let the waters
be gathered, and, Let the dry land appear, and, Let earth bring
forth plants, and, Let the waters bring forth, and all that is written thereafter.62 So let us consider the meaning of the words. 206.
Even those quite naif are aware that there is a natural mutual connexion between listening and speaking: just as listening cannot function if no one speaks, so speaking cannot be eective unless it is
directed to a listener. If therefore it says that God spoke, we need
an indication also of the audience to which he spoke.
Will he tell us that he says these things to himself ? Then in giving these orders, he is commanding himself. Who is going to accept
this, that God sits giving himself instructions about what to do, and
using himself as minister and agent in what he commands? 207.
Even if one were to allow the religious propriety of such a suggestion, would anybody, if he were by himself, need words and sentences, though he be merely human? It is enough for each that the
stirring of the mind causes the intended action to begin.
Eunomius may of course say that it is a conversation with the
Son. But what need was there of speech for that purpose? It is the
mark of a corporeal nature to express the thoughts of the heart by

62

Cf. Gen 1,320.

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speech. That is why, as an equivalent to the use of the voice, communication through concepts expressed in writing was invented. 208.
We express our thoughts equally by the use of speech or in writing;
for those not far away we approach within ear-shot, for those further o we make our thoughts plain by writing, while for those who
are near we raise or lower the pitch of the voice. There are occasions when by simply nodding we make it clear to others what needs
to be done, and even the eye glancing in a particular manner indicates the purpose we have in mind, and a hand moving in a certain way either forbids something or allows it to be done. 209. If
then those conned in the body [286] often make known to those
around them the motions of the mind, even without voice or word
or written message, and silence causes no impediment to the intended
action, is there a need in the case of the immaterial and intangible
highest and rst being, as Eunomius puts it,63 for words to make
clear the mind of the Father and to make known his purpose to the
Only-begotten? words which, as he himself says, by their nature
dissolve along with their utterance.64
I know not whether any person of intelligence will accept the truth
of this, especially when every sound is certainly uttered into air; no
speech is possible unless it consists of air. Even my opponents are
bound to suppose some medium between the speaker and the person being addressed. 210. If there were no such medium, how would
the sound travel from the speaker to the hearer? What then will
they call the medium by which they separate the Son from the
Father? With bodies, aerial space lies between them, which is something in its proper nature distinct from the being of human bodies.
God however, being intangible, having no shape, free from taint of
composition, if, in communicating his purposes to the Only-begotten God in a similar, indeed the same, immaterial and incorporeal
manner he did make the communication in speech, what medium
had he, through which the word owed and was carried to its home
in the ears of the Only-begotten?
211. Perhaps we should not pass unnoticed the matter that the
Divinity is not divided in its receptive activities, as in our case each

63
64

Cf. 62 above.
Cf. 48 and 159 above.

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of the sense-organs deals separately with what is proper to it, sight

with what is seen, but the faculty of hearing with what is heard;
touch does not taste, nor has hearing any sense of smell or of avour,
but each abides by the one activity for which it was appointed by
[287] nature, remaining somehow insensitive to what is not in its
nature, unaware of the harvest enjoyed by the neighbouring sense.
212. This case is however dierent: through and through, the Divinity
is sight and hearing and knowledge. It would be quite wrong also
to attach the more animal senses to the stainless Nature. Yet if we
are going to suppose the Divinity a mean thing and reduce it to
earthbound ideas, so as to think that the Father speaks words through
a mouth, aecting the hearing of the Son, what is the medium that
we suppose intervenes between the Fathers voice and the Sons ear?
213. This must be created or uncreated.65 We cannot say it is created, for the word was uttered before the creation was constituted.
Yet there is nothing uncreated except the divine Nature. If then
there was no creation, and the word mentioned in the creation narrative was earlier, then when some one claims that speech and an
audible voice are meant by the account, what will he suggest goes
between the Son and the Father, on which the sound of speech is
imprinted? If there is something between, it exists, surely, in its own
proper nature, so as not to be identical with the Father nor to coincide in nature with the Son, but as something quite distinct it separates from each other the Father and the Son, pushing itself in
between the two. 214. What is the result? It is not created, for the
creation is more recent than the word. We are taught that the Onlybegotten is begotten; nothing is unbegotten except the Father. Therefore
of necessity the word of truth compels us to hold that there is nothing between the Father and the Son. But where no separation is
conceived, close conjunction is surely acknowledged; and what is
totally conjoined is not mediated by voice and speech. By conjoined
I mean that which is totally inseparable; for the word [288] conjunction (sunfeia) does not imply a kind of bodily anity in what
is essentially intelligent, but the union and commingling of wills
between one intelligent being and another.

65

Jaeger punctuates as a question: must this be created or uncreated?

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215. For indeed, there is no dierence in will between the Son and
the Father: as is the primary Beauty of goodness, so too is the Image
of goodness. It is as when one looks in a mirror (there can be no
objection to using physical models to present the idea); the image
will reect in every aspect the original object, so that the gure looking in is the cause of the gure in the mirror, and the image neither moves nor bends by itself, unless the original initiates the
movement or inclination; only if the rst gure moves, then of course
the reection in the mirror also moves with it. In just the same way,
we would say, the Image of the unseen God,66 the Lord, is disposed immediately and directly like the Father in every movement.
216. The Father wills something, and the Son who is in the Father
has the Fathers will or rather becomes himself the Fathers will.
He who has in himself all that is the Fathers67 there is nothing
of the Fathers he has not. If indeed he has in himself all that belongs
to the Father, or rather the Father himself, then surely with the
Father and all that the Father has, he also has in himself the whole
will of the Father. 217. He therefore needs no word to learn the
Fathers will, since he is himself the Fathers Word according to the
higher meaning of word. What then is that word which is addressed
to the real Word? And how does the real Word come to be in need
of yet another word for instruction?
Perhaps someone will say that the voice of the Father came to
the Holy Spirit. [289] 218. But the Holy Spirit does not need verbal instruction either, since he is in God, as the Apostle says, and,
searches even the depths of God.68
If therefore God utters speech, and every word works on a hearer,
then those who declare that God makes a speech in uttered words,
must explain to us what is the audience for the divine words. He
had no need to talk to himself, the Son was in no want of verbal
instruction, the Holy Spirit, it says, searches out every thing, even
the depths of God, and the creation did not yet exist: to whom is
the word addressed?

66
67
68

Col 1,15.
Cf. Jn 16,15.
1 Cor 2,1011.

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219.232. Speech without sound in a Psalm

219. But the text of Moses does not lie, he says, where God is
declared to have said something. Neither is great David a liar, when
he clearly says in so many words, The heavens tell Gods glory,
and the rmament proclaims his handiwork; day to day brings forth
word, and night proclaims knowledge to night.69 220. Having said
that the heavens and the rmament tell a tale, and knowledge and
words are announced by the day and the night, he goes on to add
to his statements that these things are not speech nor words, nor
are their voices heard.70 How is it that tales and proclamations
and words are not speech, nor a voice that enters through the sense
of hearing? 221. Is the prophet contradicting himself ? Is he giving
an impossible account, in telling of voiceless speech and unspoken
tale and announcement without sound? Or is the prophecy above
all true when by its words it teaches just this, that the celestial story
and the word cried aloud by the day are not articulate speech or
something spoken through the [290] mouth, but become a lesson in
divine power to those who know how to understand when the voice
is silent.
222. What conclusions can we draw about this? Perhaps if we understand that, we shall also have understood what Moses wrote. Sometimes
the Scripture, to clarify the meaning of the subject under discussion,
presents its account of intellectual matters in a somewhat physical
way. For example, the doctrine which David seems to me to be setting out, what he taught by the words in question,71 is this: nothing
that is gets its existence from some spontaneous concurrence, as some
have thought that our world and all that is in it was engineered by
fortuitous and irrational combinations of primary elements with no
providence penetrating existing things;72 rather, there is a Cause of
the whole system and structure, on which the whole nature of intelligible things depends, from which it gets its origins and causes, to
which it looks and returns, and by which it abides. 223. And because,

69
70
71
72

Ps 18/19,23.
Ps 18/19,4.
See 219 above.
Epicurean doctrine; cf. 410 below.

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as the Apostle says, His eternal power and divinity is seen, perceived from the creation of the world,73 therefore the whole creation, and above all the ordered display in the heavens, by the skill
revealed in generated things demonstrates the wisdom of their Maker.
What he seems to me to want to explain to us is the evidence of
visible realities that what exists has been wisely and skilfully prepared and abides for ever by the power of the Governor of the universe. 224. The very heavens themselves, he says, by displaying the
wisdom of their Maker, all but utter sound as they cry out and proclaim the wisdom of their Designer, though without sound. One may
hear them instructing us as if in speech, As you look to us, you
men, [291], to the beauty and the greatness in us, and to this perpetually revolving movement, the orderly and harmonious motion,
always in the same paths and invariable, contemplate the one who
presides over our design, and through the visible beauty let your
mind rise to the original and invisible Beauty. For nothing in us is
ungoverned or self-moving or self-sucient, but every visible thing
about us, every perceptible thing, depends upon the sublime and
ineable Power. 225. This is not articulate speech, but through the
visible things it imparts to our minds the knowledge of the divine
power more than if speech proclaimed it in sound. The heaven,
then, tells a tale but does not speak, and the rmament announces
Gods creation without the need of a voice, the day puts forth a
word and there is no speech, and no one would say the prophecy
is false;74 in just the same way, since Moses and David have the
same Instructor, I mean the Holy Spirit, the one who says that the
command directed the act of creation is not suggesting to us that
God is the Designer of words, but of things which are denoted by
what the words mean. So that we might not think the creation to
be something ungoverned and self-generating, he says that from the
divine Nature it both originated and is constituted in an order and
sequence.
226. It would be a large task to study closely the order of the doctrinal statements about the creation of the world made by Moses
under the guise of narrative. To be sure, the error and futility of

73
74

Rom 1,20.
See 219 above.

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our opponents position would be ever more manifestly refuted by

every thing he wrote. Any one interested may [292] examine in
fuller detail our own and our opponents arguments by looking at
our works on Genesis.75 227. We ought, however, to get back to
discussing the topic before us, that in the case of God the verb say
does not of course connote voice and speech, but, by declaring the
power of God coincident with his will, it indicates the intellectual
notion in a manner more acceptable to our senses. 228. The universe was constituted by the will of God, and it is the human habit
to indicate our purpose rst in a word, and thus to add the deed
to match the purpose; the scriptural creation narrative, however, is
a sort of introduction to theology for beginners, presenting the power
of the divine Nature by things more easily understood, and easiest
to take in for learning ideas is sense-perception. That is why, by
putting rst, God said this should be, Moses presents the power
of his initiating will, and by adding, And it was so, he indicates
that in the case of the divine Nature there is no dierence between
will and act. He is teaching that in Gods case the thought leads
straight to the act, and that the action does not follow after the
thought, but the two are to be reckoned simultaneous and of a piece,
the mental act and the power which completes the deed. 229. The
account allows no thought of anything between the purpose and the
execution, but just as the light shines together with the kindling of
the ame, coming from it and shining simultaneously with it, in the
same way, while the existence of things created is the work of the
divine will, yet it does not come after the decision in second place.
[293] 230. It is not like other beings whose nature includes the
power to act, where one observes both the potential and the accomplished action. We say for instance that the one who is skilled in
the science of shipbuilding is potentially a shipbuilder, but he is
eective only when he displays his science in practice. It is not however like that with the blessed Life: rather, in that Life what is
thought is in its entirety action and performance, the will passing
instantly to its intended goal. 231. As then the heavenly array attests
the glory of its Designer and confesses its Maker, and needs no voice,
so I think one might again go on to infer from the scripture of
Moses that God, who gave being to the universe by his command,

75

Apologia in Hexaemeron and De opicio hominis.

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both says that the world is his own creation, and is in need of no
words to express this thought. 232. As therefore one who hears
heaven telling does not look for articulate speech to the man of
intelligence the world speaks through the things that are made, without recourse to verbal expression , so too if one hears Moses speaking as if God gives directions and orders about each part of the
world distinctly named, he should neither assume that the prophet
is lying, nor diminish his view of sublime things to small and earthbound thoughts, so as to reduce the Divinity in this way to human
standards, supposing that he articulates his commands in speech as
is our habit; rather, the command should represent the will, and the
names of the created things should signify the coming into existence
of things which are made. He will thereby learn two lessons from
the text: that by merely willing it God constructed the universe, and
that without trouble and eort the divine will became reality.
233. If any one interprets, God said, more physically, so as [294]
to argue on this ground that articulate speech was produced by him,
that person will surely have to understand, God saw,76 along the
lines of our sense-perception through the operation of his eyes, and,
The Lord heard and pitied me,77 and, smelled an odour of sweetness,78 and all the stories which scripture relates in a physical fashion about Gods head, foot, hand, nostril, eyelids, ngers or sandal,
taking all these in a direct sense he will describe the Divinity to us
in human shape just like the things apparent in ourselves. 234. If,
when one hears of the heavens as the works of his ngers,79 and a
mighty hand, uplifted arm, eye, eyelids, foot and sandals, one rises
mentally by means of each expression to ideas proper to God, and
does not spoil the account of the pure Nature by sullying it with
corporeal notions, it would follow that one should consider the utterance of words also as representing the divine will. Yet one should
not understand them as verbal utterances, but rather bear in mind
that the Designer of intelligent nature has bestowed on us articulate
speech in accordance to the limit imposed by nature, so that by it

76
77
78
79

Gen 1,4.
Ps 29,11/30,10.
Gen 8,21.
Ps 8,3.

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we might be able to express the movements of the mind. 235. The

distinction of nature from nature, of the divine, I mean, from our
own, is exactly matched by the dierence which separates every
thought of ours about the divine nature from what is far greater
and more appropriate to God. As our power, compared with that
of God, is as nothing, and our life compared with his life, and everything else about us with what is in him, is as nothing [295] in his
sight, as the prophecy says,80 so our word compared with the Word
that truly Is, is nothing. 236. In the beginning it was not,81 but
was devised at the same time as our nature, nor is it seen as having an existence of its own, but as our Master says somewhere,82
vanishes with the click of the tongue, nor is any eect of it to be
observed, but it has its existence only in speech and writing. The
Word from God, however, is God, a Word that in the beginning is
and for ever abides, through whom all things are and consist, and
he presides over the universe and wields all authority over things in
heaven and things on earth, being Life and Truth and Righteousness
and Light and every good thing, and upholding everything that is
in being.

VI. Human language (237293)

237.246a. God gives man the power to create words
237. Such and so great, then, is the Word attributed to God; but
Eunomius graciously allows God, as if it were something great, the
word that is composed of nouns, verbs and conjunctions. He is not
aware of the following comparison. The one who bestowed practical skill on our race is not credited with every single artefact, yet
while it was he who gave our race the ability, it is by us that a
house is produced, or a pedestal, a sword, a plough, or whatever
else our life requires, and taken individually these are our works,
but they point beyond to our own Cause, who designed our race
to be receptive of every skill. In the same way the power of speech

80
81
82

Ps 38,6/39,5.
Cf. Jn 1,1.
Cf. Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 6 (PG 29, 524c).

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gregory of nyssa

is a work of him who made our race thus, but the invention of particular words for the purpose of describing objects was for us ourselves to contrive. 238. Evidence of this is the fact that many things
said are [296] generally thought to be thoroughly disgraceful and
indecent, and no intelligent person would suppose God to be their
inventor. So although some words familiar to us are in the divine
scripture spoken personally by God, we should be aware that the
Holy Spirit communicates with us in our own terms, just as in the
story in Acts we learn that each person heard the teaching in his
own native language, understanding the meaning of what was said
in words he recognized.83
239. The truth of this may be more fully conrmed by a careful
examination of the Levitical code. There baking pan and cake and
wheat-our and other such items are mentioned84 as the Spirit uses
the sacred rituals to suggest by symbols and riddles lessons benecial
to the soul, and he names certain measures in accordance with the
custom of the time as hyphi, nebel and in85 and many such. 240.
Had he made these names and titles? Or did he so direct in the
beginning that they should be made and named, so to call a certain seed wheat, to name its ground-up kernel our, and to speak
of the pastry in cooked dishes as topping, llo and pancake,86
and to command the kind of vessel in which the moist dough is
baked and hardened to be called a baking pan, and a certain quantity of liquid to be given the name in or nebel , and the drier foods
to be measured by the gomor.87 241. It is nonsense and Jewish futility, falling far short of the splendour of Christianity, to suggest that
the great, supreme God who transcends every title and thought, who
upholds the universe by the mere power of his will, both bringing
it to be and keeping it in being that he [297] sits like some schoolmaster detailing the application of names. 242. Rather, just as we

83

Acts 2,6.
Lev 2,45 etc.
85
1 Sam 1,24 etc. and Lev 23,13 etc.
86
These English words are meant to represent particular culinary items known
to Gregory which we cannot with certainty identify. Literally, his terms mean
supercial/top surface, membranaceous/membrane, and unfolded/at; llo (or
phyllo) is the very thin Greek pastry, which is popularly used for all kinds of savoury
and sweet dishes.
87
Ex 16,16 etc.
84

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signal to deaf people what has to be done by using gestures and

hand-signals, not because we ourselves have no voice of our own
when we do this, but because it is quite useless to give verbal instructions to those who cannot hear, so, the human race being in a way
deaf and unable to understand anything sublime, we hold that the
grace of God, which speaks in diverse parts and manners in the
prophets,88 and frames the verbal expressions of the holy prophets
to suit our mental grasp and habit, by these means leads us on to
the apprehension of sublime things, not giving instructions in accordance with his own majesty how should the great be conned in
the little? but in a form which comes down to the level of our
small capacity. 243. Just as God, in giving motive power to an animal does not go on to devise every single step (for once it has got
its start from the Maker the creature moves itself, and goes o using
its mobility as occasion oers, save that it is said of a man that his
steps are directed by the Lord),89 so also our race, having received
from God the ability to talk and speak and announce our purpose,
makes its way through things, applying signs to realities in the form
of varieties of sound.
244. These then are the verbs and nouns which we use, and by
which we indicate the meaning of things; and if before there are
fruits, fruit is mentioned by Moses, and before there are seeds, seeds,
[298] that does not refute our argument, nor is the intended meaning of the law-giver at variance with what we said about conceptual
thought. 245. That which as the end of past cultivation we call by
the name of fruit, but which as the beginning of the future cultivation we call seed, that reality which underlies the names, whether
it is wheat or some other crop that multiplies with sowing, tells us
that it is not spontaneously generated, but that it grows up with this
potential by the will of its Maker, so that the same becomes fruit,
reproduces itself by becoming seed, and nourishes mankind with its
superabundance. 246. What springs up at Gods will is the reality,
not the name, so that the reality which substantively exists is the
work of the Makers power, but the sounds which identify things,

88
89

Heb 1,1.
Ps 36/37,23.

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by which verbal reasoning90 distinguishes things individually for accurate and distinct reference, these are the product and invention of
the faculty of verbal reasoning, whereas this verbally rational faculty
and nature itself is the work of God.
246b.261. The varieties of human language
Furthermore, since rational speech belongs to all men, dierent words
are inevitably used in accordance with dierences between nations.
247. If any one claims that light, heaven, earth or seeds were
addressed by God in human fashion, he must surely go on to argue
that it happened in one particular language. Which one it was, he
must show us. If someone knows the rst point, it is surely reasonable that he should know the second. 248. At the Jordan after the
descent of the Spirit,91 and again in the hearing of the Jews,92 and
at the Transguration,93 a voice is heard from above teaching mankind
a certain lesson, not to set the mind on visible things alone, but also
to believe that he is in truth the only-beloved Son of God. 249. To
enable the hearers to understand, such a voice [299] was imprinted
by God upon the material air, couched in terms of the then prevailing linguistic practice. God, who desires all to be saved and to
come to the knowledge of the truth,94 to the end that those who
heard might reach salvation, articulated the word in air; as the Lord
says also to the Jews who thought, because the sound was physically in the air, that it had thundered It was not for my sake
this voice came, but for yours.95 250. Before the constitution of the
universe, however, when there was nothing to receive the word, or
any physical element capable of shaping articulate speech, how will
the one who claims that God used words make sense of the account?
He was incorporeal, the creation was not, the account allows no
attribution of anything material to him, and those who might be

90
lgow, word, in Greek means the rational faculty which is also the faculty
of articulate speech, what distinguishes men from dumb animals (loga). Gregory
in this passage uses both senses, speech and rationality, and we have chosen to
cover this by doubling the translation as rational speech.
91
Mt 3,17 par.
92
Jn 12,28.
93
Mt 17,5 par.
94
1 Tim 2,4.
95
Jn 12,2930.

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helped by hearing had not yet been fashioned; and when men did
not exist, neither, surely, had any language characteristic of a particular nation been formed. By what logic then does the one who
looks to the mere letter, on this interpretation sustain such a view,
as if God were uttering these verbs and nouns.
251. There is yet another way by which one might recognize the
futility of this kind of claim. Just as the natures of the elements,
being a work of their Maker, appear the same to all, and there is
no dierence as far as human perception is concerned in the part
contributed by re or air or water, but the nature is single and
invariable in every case, operating in the same way and not aected
by the dierences between participating objects, so also the giving
of names, if they had been applied to the realities by God, would
be the same for all. 252. As it is, the nature of things, being xed
by God, remains constant, whereas the words which denote them
are divided into such a multitude of languages as [300] to make
even counting them not easy. If any one brings up the confusion at
the Tower as contradicting what has been said, not even there is it
said that God made human languages, but that he confused the
existing one, so that not all could understand every one else.96 253.
As long as life was the same for all, and was not yet divided into
many dierent nations, the human population all lived with one language. But once by divine purpose the whole earth had to be occupied by human beings, they were pulled apart and scattered this
way and that in accordance with their language-groups, and became
adapted to this or that manner of speech and language, taking the
common language as making a bond of common mind with each
other; they were not at variance in their knowledge of realities, but
they diered in the framing of words. 254. Stone and wood do not
appear dierent to dierent people, but the names used for wood
do vary in each group; thus our argument holds rm, when it classes
human words as inventions of our own conceptual thought. Neither
in the beginning, while all mankind shared the same language, do
we learn from scripture that any instruction about divine words was
given to men, nor over those divided into various dierent languages
does a divine law prescribe the way each person speaks. Rather,

96

Gen 11,18.

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having decided that men should speak in other tongues, God sent
our race to make its way articulating sounds as each group pleased
for the denition of names.
255. Moses therefore, born many generations after the Tower-building, uses one of the languages which arose thereafter in his historical account of the creation, and [301] attributes certain words to
God, relating them in his own language which he had been reared
in and was used to, not altering the words of God in some alien
way and using a foreign form of speech, as if to argue by the foreign use and varied vocabulary that the words were Gods own, but
he uses his ordinary language to spell out his own words and those
of God alike. 256. Some of those who have studied the divine scriptures most carefully say that the Hebrew language is not even ancient
in the way that the others are, but that after the other miracles this
was the last performed for the Israelites, that this language was suddenly improvised for the nation after Egypt. There is a prophetic
word which gives this credibility: When he went out of Egypt, it
says, then he heard a language he did not know.97 257. If then
Moses was a Hebrew-speaker, and Hebrew is the latest of all languages, the one born so many thousand years after the creation of
the world, who relates in his own language the speeches of God, is
he not clearly teaching us not to ascribe to God any such language
as is humanly formed, but to say these things because it is quite
impossible to express ones thought otherwise than in human language, and to signify by what is said an understanding worthy of
God and of a superior order? 258. As to the notion that God used
the Hebrew tongue when there was no one to understand such language, if one has thought seriously about it, I do not know how he
can agree. In Acts we read that the reason why the divine power
was divided into many languages, was so that no foreign-speaker
should be deprived of its help.98 But if God before creation conversed in human fashion, [302] whom did he intend to help with
that language? 259. To accommodate speech to the ability of the
hearers in order to help them one might suppose to be not unworthy of the divine charity, when Paul too, the imitator of the Lord,
97
Ps 80,6/81,5; the same story and Psalm-verse appear in Origenes, Contra Celsum
III 7 (SC 136, 26).
98
Acts 2,6.

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knew how to adapt his speech appropriately to the capacity of his

hearers, becoming milk to the infants and solid food for the adults.99
But then to argue that, with no goal to be achieved by such a use
of speech, God recites soliloquies with words of this sort, I cannot
see how such a thought is not both ridiculous and blasphemous.
260. The language of God is neither Hebrew nor spoken after any
other fashion customary among the nations; but whatever words of
God are recorded by Moses or the prophets, they are indications of
the divine will, illuminating in one way and another the purity and
intelligence of the saints with such share of the grace as their status merits. 261. Thus Moses speech accorded with his upbringing
and education, but he attributes these words to God, as has often
been said, because of the infancy of those recently brought to the
knowledge of God, to present the divine will clearly, and in order
to make the hearers readier to believe, once persuaded of the reliability of the account.
262.268. Eunomius falsely claims Moses in his support
262. Eunomius does not agree, he who attacks us with such insults,
the heir and advocate of the lawful practice I shall turn abuse
into courtesy and greet him in his own words but [303] he arms
that Moses himself gives evidence for him, that the use of things
named and of names was bestowed upon men by the one who
designed their nature, and that the entitling of the things given is
older than the generation of their users. He says as much, word
for word. 263. If indeed he has acquired a private Moses, by whom
these wise things are taught, and starting from there he boldly makes
statements such as, God appoints in detail (these are Eunomius
words) the vocabulary of mankind, here commanding, there forbidding, words to be applied to things, let him use the absurdities
as he pleases, with the secret Moses as his ally. If however the only
Moses is the one whose writing is the common knowledge of those
trained in the divine word, then we shall accept our condemnation,
should we be refuted by the words of Moses. 264. Where then has
he found the law of nouns and verbs? let him quote from the

99

Cf. Heb 5,12.

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scriptures themselves. The creation story, the subsequent account of

the origin of mankind, the history of certain events and the various
legislation about observances religious and secular, these are the chief
heads of Moses book. If he says there is some legislation about
words, let him show me the law, and I will be silent; but he cannot answer. 265. Otherwise he would not leave out the more obvious proofs and then produce those statements which make him appear
ridiculous rather than persuasive to his audience. To think that it is
the cardinal point of true religion to attest Gods invention of words,
when to him the world [304] and the marvels in it are but slight
praise, is it not the ultimate idiocy, to set aside the great things
and worship the Divinity for human things? A creative command
took precedence, spoken in human words by Moses, but divinely
done. 266. So the creative will behind what was by divine power
constructed is claimed by our shrewd biblical scholar to be instruction about words, and as if God had said, Let there be word, or,
Let speech be constituted, or, Let such-and-such be called soand-so, this fellow puts forward in support of his own arguments
the movement in the divine will which brought creation into existence.
For all his study and learning in the Bible he had not even realized that a mental impulse is often called by scripture a voice.
267. A witness of this is Moses himself, whom he often parades, but
does not know in this respect. What person ever so slightly familiar
with the book does not know that the people of Israel were often
perplexed about their route through the Egyptian desert, when they
had only just escaped from Egypt; with horrors threatening them on
every side, the sea shutting o their advance in one direction, and
behind them their foes trying to prevent their ight, they assembled
and blamed that prophet himself for their plight.100 As he comforted
those stricken with terror and exhorted them to courage, there comes
a voice from God addressing the prophet by name: Why do you
cry to me?101 268. Yet before those words the story mentions no
word of Moses, but the God-ward thought of the prophet is called
a voice, by implication uttered in the secret thinking of the heart.

100
101

Ex 14,212.
Ex 14,15.

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If Moses then, on the testimony of him who hears unspoken groanings,102 cries out without a sound, what is so strange if the prophet
too, knowing the divine will, insofar as [305] he was able to speak
and we to hear, made it plain to us in known and familiar words,
describing a discourse of God in somewhat physical terms, though
it did not happen in spoken words, but was proclaimed by the works
themselves.
269.281a. Evidence from the creation narrative in Genesis
269. In the beginning, he says, God made, not, the names for
heaven and earth, but, the heaven and the earth.103 And he
said, Let there be light, not, the word light.104 And having
divided the light from the darkness, he says, God called the light
Day, and the darkness he called Night.105 Our opponents will
probably nd support in this passage. I will present their case for
them, and make good what they have omitted by logical extension
of their position, so that our own doctrine may be rmly established
by leaving no objection unconsidered. God, he says, called the
rmament Heaven, and the dry land he called Earth, and the
light, Day, and the darkness, Light.106 270. How, then, they
may say, when the scripture testies that the names were given to
these things by God, do you say that the terms are of human conception? How do we answer this? Once again we take refuge in
the simple explanation, and say that he who brought all creation
from not-being into being is the Designer of real things viewed in
their substance, not of names without substance consisting of the
sound of a voice and the clicking of a tongue. Real things get their
names by some signicant sound in accordance with the nature and
potential inherent in each, in keeping with the local manner in each
nation of attaching designations to objects.
271. Most of the things we see in the creation, however, have no
simple nature, such that it might be possible to include the [306]

102
103
104
105
106

Rom 8,26.
Gen 1,1.
Gen 1,3.
Gen 1,5.
Combining Gen 1,8; 1,10; 1,5.

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object under one term, as in the case of re there is by nature one

underlying reality, whereas the name which denotes the reality is
dierent: the one is luminous and burning, dry and hot and consuming the material it seizes, the name is a short sound pronounced
in a single syllable. For this reason an account which distinguishes
the potencies and properties observed in re names each one separately, as we did just now; one could not say that a single term has
been applied to re, when one terms it bright or consuming or by
some other of its observed features; such words are indicative of the
potencies naturally inherent in it. 272. It is just the same with
the heaven and the rmament: one entity is denoted by each of the
names, but the dierence of the names indicates one feature of what
is known in this creation, so that when we look at it we learn one
thing from the term heaven, another from rmament. 273. When
the account is outlining the limit of the visible creation, beyond
which the mental and supernatural realm takes over, the beginning
and end of all material existence is called, in contrast to the intangible, immaterial and invisible, the rmament. When we study the
circumference of existing things, by which all material existence is
contained, we designate this, which is the boundary (row) of all visibles (rat), the heaven (oranw).107 274. The same applies to the
earth and the dry land. When the heavy and dense stu was divided
into these two elements, the earth, I mean, and the waters, the designation dry land [307] distinguishes it from the opposite property:
dry land got its name in contrast to what is wet, when drained at
the divine command of the encircling water it appeared in its own
proper quality. 275. The term earth, however, no longer connotes
the designation of just one of its properties, but includes in its intrinsic meaning every feature of the element, such as solidity, compactness, gravity, resistance, suitability for nourishing all kinds of
plants and animals. The dry land therefore in the account did not
change its name into that nally given it, for it did not cease by the
second name to be and to be called dry land; but while each of
the titles remains, a particular meaning underlies each of the terms,

107
Gregorys dubious argument here depends upon a word-play which cannot
be represented in English. Even in transliteration, the similarity of row and rat
to oranw is less obvious than it would be in Greek, where h is not written and
hardly heard.

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the one making a distinct contrast with the contrary nature and
property, the other embracing all the potency observed in it.
276. So too in the case of light and day, and in that of night and
darkness, we do not nd the Maker of the universe manufacturing
the sound of syllables in these cases. Rather, by these titles we recognize concrete realities. 277. By the will of God the darkness is
dissolved with the entrance of the light at the rst act of creation.
As the earth at the centre, enclosed on every hand by enveloping
alien elements, held itself up (as Job says, Suspending the earth
upon nothing,)108 it was inevitable that, with the light coming through
on one side, because the earth facing it formed a barrier by its own
mass, there should be left over some part of the darkness as the
eect of shadow; and that, as the ever-moving revolution of the pole
necessarily carried round with it the [308] gloom which accompanied the shadow, God should appoint this period of movement to
be the measure of passing time. This measure is day and night. 278.
For this reason when Moses in his wisdom explained such doctrines
to us in story-form, he referred to the gloom coming in as a result
of the barrier of the earth as the separation of light from darkness,
and spoke of the perpetual measurable succession of light and darkness around the circle of earth as day and night.109 So the naming
of the light as day was not merely nominal, but just as the light
came to be, and not just the name light, so too the measure of
time came to be, and the name was consequent on the measure: it
was not brought into being by its Maker as the sound of words, but
the actual reality attracted to itself the indicating sign of the word.
279. If it had been plainly said by the lawgiver, that every visible
and named thing is not self-generating or without a maker, but has
its existence from God, we would have spontaneously agreed that
the whole world, its parts, its observed order, and the power to recognize what is, are all made by God; in the same way he leads us,
by what he has said, to this thought, that we should believe no existing thing to be without a beginning. Looking to this end he makes
his way on an orderly path through events one by one, spelling out

108
109

Job 26,7.
Gen 1,45.

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the sequence of things made. 280. There was no other way to present this in his book, except by [309] adopting the meaning of specic
names. Therefore, when it is written that God called the light,
Day,110 we are to understand that God made the day out of the
light as something in its proper sense distinct. You would not give
the same denition of light and of day, but light is thought of as
the opposite of dark, while day is a quantitative measure of a period
in the light. 281. Similarly you will also understand night and darkness, using the same distinction of meaning, dening darkness as the
opposite of what is thought of as light, and calling night the prescribed measure of darkness. Thus our explanation is valid in every
respect, even if it is not set out strictly according to the formal
premises of logic, demonstrating that God is the Designer of real
things, not of mere words.
281b.288. Words are invented for mans benet, not Gods
It was not for his benet, either, that names are applied to things,
but for our sake. 282. Because we cannot all the time keep in view
everything that is, while we acknowledge a thing that is always there,
we consign another to memory. Our memory cannot be kept unconfused, unless the connotation of words distinguishes from each other
the things stored in the mind. To God all things are present, and
he has no need of memory, since all are embraced and observed by
the power of his vision. 283. What need has he then of verb or
noun, when the wisdom and power within him embraces unconfused and distinct the nature of things that are? All that is and that
exists is from God, and for our guidance there are attached to beings
the names which denote real things. If one were to say that these
came into existence to suit the habits of men, he [310] would be in
no way infringing on the armation of Providence, for we do not
say that the being of things that are comes from us, but just the
names.
284. The Hebrew has one word for the sky, the Canaanite another,
but both have the same idea, the dierence of language causing no

110

Gen 1,5.

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doubt between them as to the understanding of the object. The ultrapious, self-conscious reverence of these wise fellows, whereby, if it
be conceded that the words for things are of human origin, that
argues that men are more primordial than God, is confuted as
being futile and insubstantial by the very example recorded of Moses
himself. 285. Who gave the name to Moses himself ? Was it not
Pharaohs daughter, naming him after what happened? Moses in
the Egyptian language means Water. At the tyrants command, his
parents put the baby in a box and committed him to the stream
so some historians have told his tale and by Gods will, after being
swept o by the swirl of the waters it was deposited on the bank,
and was there for the princess to nd where she was washing her
body by bathing; then, because the boy had been got for her from
the water, it is said that she gave the boy the name as a reminder
of what had happened,111 a name which God himself did not decline
to use for his servant,112 nor did he judge it improper to let the
name given to the prophet by the barbarian woman remain valid.
286. So before him Jacob, having grasped the heel of his twin,
because of the manner of his joint birth was called heelgrabber;113
that is the meaning of Jacob when it is translated into the Greek
tongue according to the teaching of those informed about such things.
287. In the case of [311] Phares too, again the midwife named him
because of the circumstances of his birth, and no one has, Eunomiuslike, asserted her claim to be more primordial than the authority of
God.114 The mothers gave names to the other patriarchs, too, Reuben,
Symeon, Levi and all the rest alike, and no one arose at that time,
like the present wordsmith, in solicitous care for the divine Providence, to stop the girls becoming more primordial than God by giving names. 288. Why mention the examples one by one from the
history? Contradiction Water, Mourning Place, Foreskins Hill,
Grape-bunch Cleft, Blood Field,115 and all the similar names given
by men, but often mentioned even with God as speaker, by which
we may learn that it is neither beyond human competence to generate designations of real things through words, nor is the power of
the divine Nature attested by these words.
111
112
113
114
115

Ex 2,110.
Num 12,78.
Gen 25,26.
Gen 38,29.
Num 20,13; Gen 50,11 (Mourning of Egypt); Josh 5,3; Num 13,24; Mt 27,8.

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289.293a. Human invention of words does not impugn divine providence

289. The rest of the babblings of his wild attacks on the truth I
shall pass over, as having no power to hurt its doctrines; I deem it
superuous to dwell upon futilities. Who is so unminding about more
serious matters of mind as to waste eort on unintelligent statements,
and to argue with those who say that we claim the human mind
to be more primordial and sovereign than the solicitous care of God,
while we attribute to his Providence a negligence that would disturb the most indierent? 290. The voice of our accuser utters
these exact words. For my part I reckon that putting eort into such
things is like wasting time on old hags dreams. [312] To imagine
that one can by a form of words secure for the divine Nature its
rank of primacy and sovereignty, and thereby demonstrate the great,
solicitous care of God, while we in turn despise God and are indierent
to his proper providence, and to abuse us because, when men had
received the power of speech from God, they used words on their
own authority to designate things, can such a thing be other than
an old wives tale or a drunkards dream? 291. The true power and
authority, primacy and sovereignty of God, at least on our reckoning, do not consist of syllables, or all and every inventor of words
would come to be equal with God, but endless ages, cosmic beauties, radiance of heavenly bodies, and the marvels on land and sea,
hosts of angels and supermundane powers, and whatever else in the
higher realm we hear hinted at by the scripture, these are what
claim for God the power over all things; 292. and to claim an audible voice for those naturally endowed with speech is no impiety
against the Giver of the voice.
We do not regard this as a great matter, this discovering of indicators for things. He to whom the scripture gives the name Man
in the creation story,116 the one formed like us, is named Mortal
by Job,117 Human by some secular writers,118 and Vocal by others,119 not to mention the dierences in the word used in various
nations. 293. Are we making their status also equal to Gods, because
they too have invented words of the same meaning as the title Man,

116
117
118
119

Gen 1,26: nyrvpow.

Job 14,1: brotw.
A Homeric word: fw.
The poetic word mroc means articulate, hence human.

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by which they indicate the same subject? We ought to dismiss this

futile discussion, as I said before; and the subsequent insults deserve
no place, where he says that [313] we tell lies against the divine
oracles, and with utter audacity make problems about everything
else, and God himself .

VII. Conceptual thought and Christological titles (293b366a)

293b.332. Basil and Eunomius on names given to Christ
Our discussion should now turn to the remaining topics. 294.
Eunomius again puts forward this quotation from our Master: Similarly
and with no alteration we have learned the usage of concept from
the divine word. Our Lord Jesus Christ, in revealing to mankind the
nature of the Godhead, indicates it by various features to be observed
in himself, calling himself Door, Bread, Way, Vine, Shepherd,
and Light.120 295. As to the abusive words against us added by
him (for so his dialectical art has taught him to argue with his opponents), I think we should overlook them, and not be disturbed by
his juvenile follies. We should however deal with one sharp and
unavoidable question which he puts forward in refutation of our
argument. Who, he asks, is there among the holy ones who attests
that these titles are applied to the Lord as concepts? 296. Which
of them, I might reply to him, expressly condemns it, considering
as blasphemous the view that the use of names is conceptual? If he
claims that not having been mentioned is a sign of prohibition, then
he must surely allow that not having been prohibited is an indication of permission. The Lord is called by these names; or do Eunomius
denials apply even to them? If he does deny that these words are
used of Christ, we have won without a ght: 297. what more obvious victory could there be than to show our opponent an open
enemy of God by his prohibiting the divine titles of the Gospel? If
however [314] he truly confesses that these names are applied to
Christ, let him state the manner in which the titles are in reverence

120
Jaeger notes that these words are apparently quoted from Eunomius text,
since they do not agree with the text of Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 67 (PG 29,
524cd) (cap. 7 init.). For the divine titles, cf. Jn 10,7; 6,35; 14,6; 15,1; 10,11; 8.12.

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tting for the Only-begotten. Does he designate stone121 an indicator of his Nature? Has he perceived his Being by use of an axe?122
Is the identity of the deity of the Only-begotten signalled by the
door, or by each of the other titles, not to clutter up our argument
by listing all of them? 298. Each one of these titles is not the nature
of the Only-begotten, not his deity, not the character of his being.
Nevertheless he is so named, and the naming is valid; for it is right
to consider that there is nothing idle or meaningless among the divine
words. So let him give the explanation, if he rejects their being
applied conceptually, how these names are tting for God.
What we say is this: as the Lord in various ways provides for
human life, each variety of benet is identied in turn by one or
other such title, the foresight and action therein observed becoming
a particular kind of name; 299. such a title is on our view applied
conceptually. If that does not please our gainsayers, let each have
it as he likes. Only it is the one who is ignorant of the scriptural
mysteries who will oppose what we say. 300. If he were educated
in the divine words, he would surely know that Curse, Sin, Frantic
heifer, Lion cub, Robbed she-bear, Leopard and similar names
are applied to the Lord by the scriptures123 in accordance with various concepts, as saints and divinely inspired men elucidated precisely with these titles the object at which their thinking aimed, even
though at rst sight these titles seem somewhat slanderous. If every
one of these were not allowed to be correctly applied [315] to God
in some conceptual way, the wording could not avoid suspicion of
impiety. 301. It would take a long time to argue and demonstrate
how in every case these names are both slanderous in their ordinary understanding based on their rst meaning, and that the conceptual explanation reconciles them with true reverence for God.
302. Let us proceed, however, in the logical order, and resume again
our argument. Such names are used of the Lord, and no one familiar with the divinely inspired scriptures would deny that they are so
used. What then? Does he assert that the words denote the Nature
itself ? then he says that the divine Nature is manifold in form and
121
The title stone is given to Christ in such passages as Mt 21,42 and 1 Pet
2,4, following Ps 117/118,22.
122
Perhaps taking the axe of Mt 3,10 / Lk 3,9 as referring to Jesus Christ.
123
Gal 3,13; 2 Cor 5,21; Hos 4,16; Gen 49,9; Hos 13,78.

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in composition, declaring its complexity by the variety of meanings

in the words. 303. Bread is not the same in connotation as Lion,
nor Door as Heifer, nor Axe as Water, but for each title one
may give a particular denition which has nothing in common with
the others. Therefore they do not signify the Nature; but none would
dare claim that the application of the titles is improper and meaningless. 304. If then he is so called, yet not so by nature, and every
thing said by the scripture is assuredly valid and is appropriately
applied, what account remains to be given of such words being
ttingly applied to the Only-begotten God, other than the conceptual way? It is clear that the Divinity is given names with various
connotations in accordance with the variety of his activities, named
in such a way as we may understand. What then is the damage
done to devout thoughts by the cooperation of our own intelligence
in interpreting the things that are done? We ourselves call this conceptual thought, but if someone wants to call it something else, we
shall not object.
305. Nevertheless, as with erce wrestlers, he will not release his
unbreakable hold on us, but says in so many words, That these
[316] are names from conceptual thought, and are spoken through
the conceptualization of certain persons, are things which none of
the apostles or evangelists taught. After that invincible eort he
raises that sanctimonious voice, using the tongue trained in such
things to spit oensive vituperation at us again. 306. To put forward equivocity based on analogy, he says, as the basis of human
conceptualization, is the work of a mind which has discarded the
valid, correct meaning, and considers the words of the Lord to have
an invalid meaning and a sort of debased usage. Well, well! What
a logical demonstration! How skilfully the argument draws towards
its conclusion! 307. Who would still stand by the argument for conceptualization with such a stench pouring from his mouth upon those
who try to say anything? Then must even we on this ground give
up our part in the pursuit of the argument with him, in case he
launches this sour vituperation against us too? 308. Or is it smallminded to be exasperated in reaction to such childish follies? We
must therefore allow the abuser to use whatever style he likes.
We must however again take up his argument, in case there is
even there some support for the truth. 309. He mentions Analogy,
and notes the Equivocity based on it. Where did he learn these

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words, and from whom? Moses did not say them; he has not heard
them from prophets and apostles; evangelists do not use such expressions; these things are to be learned from no teaching of scripture.
Where then does he get such talk? Is it not an invention of the
mind, this kind of language, which uses the name analogy to denote
the specic meaning of the idea? How does he not realize that [317]
he is using to support his attack the actual targets of his attack? 310.
He attacks the conceptual account, while himself using conceptual
words to argue that one should not say anything conceptually.
But none of the saints, he says, taught this. But are you able
to nd a reference in any of the ancient writers to the word unbegottenness, or to its being used as the name of the actual Being of
God, or rather that the Unbegotten is itself the Being? 311. Or
have you the right, whenever some wicked conclusion is not immediately reached, to innovate and invent whatever words you like, but
if anything be said by someone else in order to demolish wickedness, to forbid your opponent the right? You will have seized a great
tyranny, if you forcefully obtain for yourself this right, so that the
very things you ban for others you yourself have the right to do,
and the things you claim the right to attempt, you exclude other
people from. 312. You peremptorily reject the assumption that these
titles are applied to Christ by conceptual thought, because none of
the saints has declared that he should be so called. Why then do
you decree that the divine Being should be identied by the name
Unbegottenness, which none of the saints can be shown to have
passed down to us? If this rule of verbal correctness, that only those
words should be used which are taught by the divinely inspired text
of scripture, then unbegotten must be deleted from your own writings, since none of the saints has authorized it. 313. Nevertheless
you accept the word because of the meaning inherent in this term;
and we in the same way have accepted the word concept because
of its inherent sense. Therefore we shall either take both out of use,
or neither; and whichever of these is done, we shall win either way.
Without any mention at all of unbegottenness, every word of our
opponents against the truth is stied, and the [318] glory that bets
the Only-begotten God will outshine them all, no word being left
which diminishes the majesty of the Lord by contradiction. 314. If
however both words stand, even so the truth will prevail, and we
with it, since the word unbegottenness will have shifted from the
Being to the concept. But as long as he does not remove the word

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unbegotten from his own writings, then our contemporary Pharisee

would be well advised not to attend to our splinter till he has got
rid of the log stuck in his own eyes.124
315. God, on the other hand, he says, has accorded a share of
the most honourable names even to the most fragile of terrestrial
beings without conferring on them equality of dignity, and of the
meanest to the most potent without their naturally mean status being
simultaneously removed by the names. He says these things word
for word; it stands written by them, just as by us. If this has some
deeply hidden meaning which escapes us, let those who have understood things beyond our ken tell us, those initiated by him into the
inward and ineable mystery. 316. If however they oer no interpretation more than what can be immediately understood, I know
not which of the two one would reckon the more pitiable, those who
say such things, or those who give such things a hearing. He has
accorded, he says, a share of the most honoured names even to
the most fragile of terrestrial beings without conferring on them
equality of dignity. Let us see therefore what these words mean.
317. The most fragile things, he says, are granted the title belonging to the honourable, though they are not in their nature what they
are called, and this, he claims, is Gods doing, falsely to give [319]
the inferior nature the more honourable designation. On the other
hand he claims that God attaches words of low esteem to things
naturally excellent, without their nature being simultaneously removed
by the designation. 318. To make our argument as clear as possible, the absurdity will be demonstrated with concrete examples. If
someone were to call wicked the man famous for every virtue, or
conversely were to say that the one with a reputation for equal evil
is good and respectable, would such a person be considered by reasonable people to be in his right mind or to have any notion of the
truth, when he exchanges contrary designations for each other, and
the nature fails to attest what the names denote? I think not. 319.
These things this Eunomius says are done by God, which agrees
neither with common sense nor with the testimony of scripture. In
our everyday life it is the mark only of those out of their mind
through drink or inammation of the brain to be totally wrong about

124

Mt 7,35.

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names, and to use words for things without regard to their meaning, to call a dog, for example, a human being, and to apply the
title human to a dog.
320. So far is divine scripture distant from concurring in such confusion, that one may hear prophecy manifestly in bitter complaint
at these things: . . . who calls the light darkness, and the darkness
light, it says, who treats the sour as sweet and the sweet as sour.125
What then has he in mind when he thinks he ought to ascribe this
absurdity to his God? Let those initiated into the mysteries by him
tell us, which is in their judgment the most fragile of terrestrial
beings, which is adorned with the most honourable titles by God?
321. The most fragile of beings are such animals as are constituted
by birth from the rotting of damp things, the most honourable of
beings [320] are virtue and holiness and whatever is dear to God.
Are then ies and grubs and frogs, and things which originate in
dung, honoured with the title of holiness and virtue, so that they
are adorned with honourable names, but do not participate in equality of dignity, as Eunomius puts it? 322. We have never before
heard such a thing, as that these fragile things have been called by
the most magnicent titles, or that the naturally great and honourable has been insulted with the name of one of these. Noah was
righteous, says the scripture, Abraham faithful, Moses meek, Daniel
wise, Joseph chaste, Job blameless, and David perfect in patience.
323. Let them tell us, then, whether somewhere each of these acquired
titles from their opposites; or perhaps in the case of those with bad
reports, like Nabal the Carmelite and Pharaoh the Egyptian and
Abimelech the Philistine, and all those mentioned for their wickedness, whether they were honoured with more favourable names by
the divine voice. These things are not so; but as they are in truth
and nature, so are things judged and named by God, not named in
contradiction to what they are, but described by their proper denotations in whatever way they may be most clearly displayed.
324. These are the things our mighty intellect, who alleges debased
usage, who cavils at those who have discarded the valid, correct

125

Is 5,20.

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131

meaning, claims to know about the divine Nature, these are the
glorious things he puts forward on the subject of God, who makes
a mockery of real things by using false words, and accords the most
honourable titles even to the most fragile things, where the nature
contradicts titles, and [321] who insults the honourable with the
same names as the meanest of beings. 325. A man who makes virtue
his goal may often be quite involuntarily diverted from the truth,
and be oppressed with shame, but does he think that it bets the
honour of God that he should appear to tell lies about the names
given to things? That is not how the prophecies attest the divine
Nature. Longsuering, plenteous in mercy and true, says David.126
How is he true, who lies about realities and displaces the truth in
the meanings given to names? Straightforward is the Lord God,
is another epithet applied by the same writer.127 326. Is it straightforwardness to grace dishonourable things with the most honourable
of titles, and by giving a bare name, void of the dignity indicated
by the word, to deceive the recipient of the title? Such is the testimony of these theologians to their new god: the result of their muchvaunted logical precision is just this, to demonstrate that God himself
both takes pleasure in deceitful tricks and is not free from feelings
of jealousy. 327. It is the eect of deceit to give names to fragile
things which do not correspond to their nature and worth, but to
bestow on them empty titles belonging to superior things, not conveying with the designation the real meaning the names given; and
it is the eect of jealousy for one who is able to bestow the more
honourable place on those given superior names to withhold that
gift, as if he reckoned the promotion of fragile things were to his
own hurt. 328. My own advice to the intelligent would be, that even
if the god of these Gnostics128 were obliged to be such as that by
the force of the syllogisms, they should still not think of the true God,
the Only-begotten God, in that way, but look to the real truth of
objects, to [322] attest the true worth of each, and to give names on
the basis of facts. Come, it says, ye blessed, and Go ye accursed,129
126

Ps 85/86.15.
Ps 91,16/92,15.
128
An abusive term assimilating Eunomius to the longstanding heresies dubbed
Gnosticism by orthodox critics. The only basis for such a comparison is the
Eunomian claim to denite knowledge (gnsiw) of the nature of God as unbegottenness.
129
Mt 25,34 and 41.
127

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without honouring the one who deserves a curse with the word of
blessing, nor conversely dismissing the one who has stored up the
blessing for himself along with the utterly damned.
329. The purpose of our authors words, however, and the goal to
which his argument points, what are they? No one should suppose
that it is for want of words, so that he might be thought best able
to extend the length of his book, that he extends his verbiage with
unintelligible stutterings. Even his senseless words carry the suspicion
of heresy. 330. To say that the most honourable names are applied
even to the most fragile, even though by nature they do not happen to share in the dignity, is an argument which for him covertly
facilitates the blasphemous conclusion: in order that those who learn
his doctrine may know from him that, though the Only-begotten is
called God,130 Wisdom, Power,131 Light,132 Truth,133 Judge134
and King,135 God over all,136 Great God, Prince of Peace, Father
of the Age to Come137 and such-like, the honour extends only to
the name, 331. for the meaning of the names does not also include
the dignity it describes. Consider what the wise Daniel did for the
Babylonians: to correct their idolatrous error, so that they should
not worship the bronze gure or the serpent, revering the title of
god which was ascribed to them by empty minds, he quite plainly
demonstrated by his actions that the sublime name of God ts neither the reptile nor the shape on which the bronze was modelled.138
That, in reverse, is what the enemy of God [323] endeavours to
argue in the case of the Only-begotten God by his teaching, proclaiming this through every prepared statement: Take no notice of
the titles of the Lord which have been bestowed on him, as if from
them you could deduce the ineability and sublimity of his being;
for many other very fragile things are honoured with superior names,

130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138

Jn 1,18 etc.
1 Cor 1,24.
Jn 8,12 etc.
Jn 14,6.
Acts 10,42 etc.
Mt 25,34 etc.
Rom 9,5.
Is 9,5/6 (varia lectio).
Bel and the Dragon 326.

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133

where the word may have a sublime meaning, but the nature is not
aected by the majesty of the designation. 332. The reason why
he says that participation in honour extends only to mere names for
things so classied, without any equality of dignity accompanying
the title, is that when they learn all those things about the Son which
are of sublime connotation, they may think that the honour attested
of him by the words is titular only, and that he has no share in the
equality of dignity, in accordance with the articial logic in what
has been written.
333.342. Contradictions and evasions in Eunomius
333. Nevertheless, in delaying over absurdities I seem inadvertently
to have favoured our adversaries. By setting the truth against futile
propositions I think I may bore those who apply themselves to the
argument before getting to grips with more relevant material. So we
must leave these topics as they now stand to those of our audience
more concerned with detail, and move the argument on to our
intended ground. 334. A statement which touches closely on the
matters discussed should also be passed over in silence: These things
are however arranged in this way, because human conceptual thought
enjoys no power over the giving of names. Who says this, that what
is not deemed to have concrete subsistence could have power over
any real thing? It is only those who manage matters by their own
free choice who have the power actually to do anything, whereas
conceptual thinking is an activity of our mind and is dependent upon
the free choice of those who speak; it has no subsistence of its own,
but [324] exists by the initiative of the speakers.
335. But, he goes on, God himself, who designed the universe,
adjusts the designations of every named thing appropriately to the
limits and rules of relation, action and analogy. This is either totally
meaningless, or is contrary to his previous statements. If he now
claims for God that he ts names appropriately to beings, why does
he argue earlier that God bestows more sublime names on less honourable beings, without at the same time giving the dignity signied
by the meaning of the names, and again that he insults things naturally great with words of dishonour, their nature not participating
in the lowliness of the terms? 336. Yet we may perhaps be wronging this unintelligible concatenation of words by subjecting it to these

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accusations. These things are far from making any sense, and I mean
not only the right sense of true devotion, but they appear to be
quite without intelligibility of any kind to people who know how to
examine words correctly. 337. So, as in the case of jelly-sh the
appearance seems to have solid bulk, but its bulk is slime, disgusting to see and even more disgusting to handle, I deem silence over
empty words the most decent thing, and pass over what he says,
undiscussed. For this reason the question, by what law action, analogy and relation are determined, or who lays down for God the
rules and principles of proportion and relation, it is perhaps better
to leave unasked, rather than make our audience feel sick with our
eorts to deal with these things and divert our argument from more
important things.
338. I fear however that what we turn to from the writings of
Eunomius are all alike lumps of slime and jelly-sh, so that inevitably
our study [325] ends up as we have said, nding no solid material
to work on in what he has written. Just as smoke or fog thickens
and darkens the air, in which it has its consistency, stopping vision
from working normally, but nevertheless does not have such density
in itself that one who wishes to grasp it or hold it in his hands, or
to resist an impact, so one might speak of this noble piece of writing and not be far from a true estimate. 339. The prattle is plentiful, elaborated in an apparently weighty but inated text, and to
the not too perceptive mind, like a mist to one who sees it afar o,
it appears to have some substance and shape; but if one gets close
to it and applies the investigative mind to what is said, the ideas
disperse like smoke as it is grasped, and scatter to nothing, and it
does not oer any solidity or resistance to the impact of reasoned
argument. 340. What we should do is a problem. Either choice is
exposed to criticism by the argumentative: whether we skip over the
nonsense as if it were a crevasse and direct the argument towards
at and easy routes, engaging in our refutation those points which
seem to have some force against the truth, or whether we extend
the line of our battle against inanity to match the whole nonsense.
In the latter case the eort will be a burden to those not disposed
to hard work, and it will be useless as it stretches to many thousands of words to no purpose; 341. if on the other hand we tackle
only those points which seem to have some force against the truth,
we shall give our opponents opportunity to accuse us of passing over

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135

matters which admit no refutation. Since therefore, of the two courses

open to us, that of going through the whole work, and that of tackling only the most important points, the one is burdensome to the
audience, the other liable to malicious misrepresentation, I would
say that it is best to take a middle course, avoiding both [326]
charges as far as possible. 342. What way is this? By cutting down
so far as possible the vast heap of all his futile eorts, we shall chiey
tackle the ideas, so as neither to plunge ineectually into nonsense
nor to leave uninvestigated any of what has been written.
343.350a. Words applied to the Lord by the Scriptures
343. Eunomius whole case, then, is dedicated to this one purpose,
trying to prove that the Divinity speaks in human fashion, and that
the words which denote real things are matched to entities by the
Designer of the things himself. Therefore, in an attack on the one
who said that such titles belong to the articulate rational nature
which we received from God, he alleges that he is both mistaken as
to the truth and does not hold to his own proposition; and in bringing this charge against him he uses as proof arguments like these:
344. Basil said, he tells us, that, after our rst idea is formed of
the thing in question, the more rened and more precise consideration of what is in mind is called a concept.139 He supposedly
refutes this statement with the following argument: In cases where
there is no rst or second idea, none either more rened or
more precise than another, there can be no room, he says, for
what is conceptual.
345. In the rst place, this point too will be detected by attentive
hearers as a fallacious argument. Our teacher did not propose this
as the denition of every concept, but, having proposed a specic
subdivision between objects of conceptual thought, in order not to
admit a great deal of clutter into his argument, once he had stated
this part clearly he left it to the intelligent to think out the whole
from the part. 346. Just as a person, having said that the animal is
classied under many and varied species, [327] would not be convicted

139
An inexact quotation by Eunomius of Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 6 (PG 29,
524b).

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gregory of nyssa

of error if he put forward Man as a particular example, nor would

any one correct him for getting his subject wrong, provided he did
not oer the same account of birds and beasts and sh as he used
to describe Man in the same way, since much detailed division
and diversity are involved in a rational account of the concept, it
would not be an objection to say that one thing is not, strictly speaking, a concept because it is also something else; consequently, if some
other kind of concept is perceived, the earlier denition is not mistaken. 347. If then, he says, one of the apostles or prophets were
shown to have used these names of Christ, falsehood would have
something to commend it. So much industry in Gods scriptures
do the words quoted attest in our author! Did none of the prophets
or apostles call the Lord Bread, Stone, Well, Axe, Light, or
Shepherd? 348. What about David? Of whom then does he say,
The Lord shepherds me, or Hear, thou who dost shepherd Israel?
is there any dierence between shepherd as noun and shepherd
as verb?140 or With thee is the Well of life?141 Does he accept
that the Lord is called Well, and The Stone which the builders
rejected?142 When John uses the word Axe to indicate the power
of the Lord to destroy evil, and says, Now is the Axe laid to the
root of the trees,143 does he not appear by his words to be a reliable witness to this? 349. Moses, seeing the Lord in the light,144 and
John, calling him the true Light,145 and in the same way Paul,
when at the rst manifestation of God to him he was surrounded
by light and afterwards he heard the words from the light, I am
Jesus whom you persecute146 was he not sucient as a witness?
And as to Bread, let him read the [328] gospel, which says that the
nourishment supplied to Israel from heaven by Moses was turned
by the Lord himself into a gurative type of the Lord: 350. It was
not Moses who gave you the bread, but my Father who gives the

140
Jaegers punctuation appears to be wrong here. The Psalm-verses are 22/23,1;
79,2/80,1.
141
Ps 35,10/36,9.
142
Ps 117/118,22; cf. Mt 21,42 par.
143
Attributed to John the Baptist in Mt 3,10; Lk 3,9.
144
Probably alluding to the pillar of re, which is the presence of the Lord in
Ex 13,21 etc., which gives light (Ps 104/105,39 etc.), rather than Ex 3,2 (the burning bush).
145
Jn 1,9.
146
Acts 9,5.

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137

true Bread, referring to himself as the one who came down from
heaven and gives life to the world.147 Yet our genuine hearer of
the Law says that none of the prophets or apostles applied these
titles to Christ.
350b.358. Words applied to the Lord by himself
What follows next? If the Lord himself used these names of himself, since the names of the Saviour cannot be either rst or second,
either more rened or more precise than one another, and he acknowledges all alike and with equal exactitude, it is impossible to reconcile the argument Basil uses about the concept148 with any of them.
351. I have admitted a ood of nonsense from this source into my
book; I crave the indulgence of my readers, if we do not leave unconsidered even the most obvious nonsense. This is not to take delight
in the discomture of the author what do we gain if our opponents are convicted of absurdity? but so that the truth may advance
conrmed at every point. Since, he says, the Lord applied these
appellations to himself without reckoning one rst or second or more
rened or more precise, it is not possible that these names should
come from conceptual thought. 352. What a memory for his own
objective! Where is his knowledge of the words with which the dispute arose? Our Instructor referred to something generally familiar
in order to explain concept, [329] and having claried his meaning by the use of lowlier examples he then compares what he observes

147

Jn 6,3233.
The Greek does not name Basil, but says, . . . the argument spoken by him
about the concept. There are diculties in ordering the text here: (1) The rendering given in the middle of 350 (p. 328,89) agrees with Migne PG 45,1028bc
and with William Moore, translating in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series, V
285, against Jaeger, in putting the question mark after fejw, follows next, rather
than later, following these names of himself . This also agrees with Jaegers own
punctuation of the parallel passage in 351 (pp. 328,2122). (2) I have followed
Moore in treating the last sentence of 350 (pp. 328,914) as a direct quotation of
Eunomius by Gregory; this has the advantage that the word at, by him, is
more readily taken as Eunomius reference to Basil, rather than as Gregorys to
Eunomius. (3) Jaeger agrees with Migne and Moore in starting a new paragraph
at 351. If the end of 350 is quotation, however, it can be seen as beginning a new
discussion. (4) Unlike Moore and Jaeger, I have taken the second half of 351 (pp.
328,2025) as Gregorys own paraphrase of the passage of Eunomius just quoted,
rather than (as marked by both Moore and Jaeger) itself a direct quotation.
148

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in the study to the things above.149 What he said was that corn by
itself appears to be essentially a single reality, but it changes its designations according to the various properties envisaged in it: as it
becomes seed, fruit, food, and whatever else it becomes, so many
are its names. 353. In a similar way, he says, the Lord also is by
himself whatever he is in nature, and when he is simultaneously
named in accordance with his various activities, he does not possess
a single title covering them all, but is accorded the name in accordance with each idea which arises in us from those activities. Why
then should our argument be refuted by this statement, the argument which said it is possible to use ttingly many titles of the Son
of God, who is single in his actual being, in accordance with the
variety of actions and his relation to the things performed, in the
same way that corn, though a single thing, enjoys various appellations derived from various ideas about it? 354. How then are our
words refuted if it is said that Christ uses these titles of himself ?
The question was not about who used the titles; our purpose was
rather to consider what the titles mean, whether they denote the
nature, or whether they are applied conceptually on the basis of action.
Acute and wide-ranging in his intelligence, however, Eunomius
takes the published statement, to the eect that it is possible to discover many designations150 to express the meaning of the activities,
and apply them to a single being, and he uses it powerfully in the
argument against us, saying that such terms are not applied to the
Lord by some one else. 355. What has that got to do with our
present purpose? Is it that, when the titles are spoken by the Lord,
he will not allow these to be titles or designations or [330] words
which indicate ideas? If he does not accept that these are titles, then
the concept is indeed wiped out when the designations are wiped
out. If on the other hand he does not deny that these words are
titles, how is the case for the concept damaged by demonstrating
that such names are applied, not by another person, but by the Lord
himself ? 356. The argument was that, in the same way as in the
example of corn, the Lord is one in his own substance, but has also
the titles suitable to his actions. As the corn by common consent

149

This passage refers to Basilius, Adversus Eunomium. I 6 (PG 29, 524bc).

Many designations: a phrase from Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 6 (PG 29,
524b).
150

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139

has the appellations matching the conceptual thought applied to it,

it was also argued that these words do not in the Lords case denote
the nature, but are constituted on the conceptual principle in our
thoughts about him. 357. Our opponent with great care avoids
engaging in dispute with what was actually proposed, but says that
he is given these titles by himself; it is as if one were investigating
the meaning of the name given to Isaac, whether it means Laughter
as some say,151 or something else, and some Eunomian were learnedly
to reply that the name was given to the boy by his mother. But the
question was not, one might say, by whom the appellation was produced, but what is the meaning of the name when translated into
our language. 358. Since then the subject of the debate is whether
the various terms applied to the Lord are spoken as concepts, and
not as indicating his nature, one who undertakes thus to demonstrate, from the fact that these titles are used of the Lord by himself, that they are not envisaged conceptually, how can one be counted
sane, who both attacks the truth and [331] uses to support his attack
such means as show the one he attacks to be superior?
359.366a. Eunomius alleges that applying concepts to God is blasphemous
359. Next, as though the argument had reached the conclusion which
he had intended, Eunomius goes on to put forward other charges
against us, more serious, he claims, than those already stated. He
expresses outrage and condemnation in advance about the book, and
gets the audience very excited about the things he is going to say,
in which he alleges that very wicked things are argued on our side,
such that not only do we seize upon the titles bestowed by God as
our own concepts (though he does not say what the bestowal of titles
is, or when and how it came about), but that we also confuse every
thing and treat as identical the being and the activity of the Onlybegotten (though he does not discuss or give proofs about the question, how on our argument the activity is the same as the being).
He brings the charges to their end and climax, using these words:
360. And now, he says, turning from these topics he even inicts
on the supreme God outrageous blasphemies, using both fragmenting words and totally detached examples. For my part, even before

151

Cf. Gen 21,36.

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the topics discussed, I expected to be told what things our words

are fragmenting from, and what our examples are detached from
not of course looking for an answer to these questions so much as
to demonstrate how jumbled up and muddled our authors words
are, in which he wins resonance from the old wives among virile
humanity, and ingratiates himself by his bombastic vocabulary in the
ears of those who admire such things, without realizing that for the
educated reader he is setting up in this book a monument to his
own discredit. 361. [332] This however is not at all to our purpose.
I wish the charges against him went no further than this, and that
he were deemed to be not in error about the faith, but only at fault
about the use of words, so that it were of no consequence for praise
or blame whether it were expressed in this way or that.
362. At any event, the sequel in what he says against us continues
as follows: Having exposed the dierent use of concepts, he says,
applied in various ways to corn and to the Lord, Basil says that
similarly the most holy Being of God is subject in various ways to
concepts. This is the most serious of his charges, and on it are
based those earlier dramatic speeches against us, as in his text he
alleges wickedness and evil absurdity. What then is the evidence for
impiety? 363. Eunomius says some things about corn, carefully distinguishing these as general and immediately apparent, how it germinates, and how, when it is ripe, it nourishes with its harvest,
shooting, growing and governed by certain natural powers. Having
said that, it is reasonable, he says, to suppose that the Only-begotten God is in various ways subject to concepts because of the variety of his actions and certain analogies and relationships: he spells
out at length these titles applied to him. How, he nevertheless goes
on, is it not wrong, or rather wicked, to compare the Unbegotten
with these things? 364. With what things? With corn, he says, and
the Only-begotten God. Do you observe his devout reverence? He
argues an equal separation from the dignity of Unbegotten God of
humble corn and the Only-begotten God! And to show that we are
not misrepresenting the case, one may learn his meaning from the
very words he has written: How, he says, is it not wrong, or
rather wicked, [333] to compare the Unbegotten with these? By
saying this he reduces to parity of esteem our ideas of corn and of
the Lord, judging it equally absurd to compare God with either one
of them. 365. Every one must surely be aware that things which

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141

are equally distant from something else are themselves equal with
each other. Thus, according to our wise theologian, the Maker of
the ages, who also holds in his embrace the whole of natural existence, is shown to be of equal standing with the humblest of seeds,
if in fact he and the humblest corn fall equally short of comparability with God. 366. Yet so great is the wickedness of the book.

VIII. Divine indestructibility (366b386)

366b.377a. Eunomius makes indestructible part of Gods Being, Father
a mere activity
It is perhaps time however to consider the actual argumentation
which leads to the blasphemy, in what respect it is consistent with
itself in its logic. After saying that it is absurd to compare God with
corn and with Christ, Eunomius says that God is not, like them,
susceptible of change; where the Only-begotten is concerned however, having failed to say that he is not susceptible of change, thus
clearly indicating his inferior dignity, he leaves the case in suspense
at the point where, like the corn, he must not be compared with
God. He oers no argument in this part to prove that the Son may
not be set alongside the Father, as if his observations about the seed
were enough to demonstrate at the same time the inferiority of the
Son in relation to the Father.
367. Yet he speaks about the indestructibility152 of the Father, belonging to him not on the basis of activity.153 For my part, if true Life
acting is an activity, and if to live for ever, and never to suer
destruction, mean the same thing, for the time being I add nothing

152
As indicated at CE II 131 (GNO I 263,29), indestructible and indestructibility are used to render fyartow, fyarsa. There is no satisfactory term in
English: alternatives might be incorruptible, -ility, imperishable, -ility, immortal,
-ity. At this point Jaeger prints the words, indestructibility is not on the basis of
his activity, as a quotation from Eunomius. It is better to see them as Gregorys
paraphrase of the words quoted at CE II 371 (GNO I 334,23f ), where see the
note.
153
In this passage and elsewhere activity, active, action, act are used to render
nrgeia and its cognate terms; alternatives would be operate, operations, (to)
eect, eects.

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to the debate, but shall reserve it for its proper place. 368. However,
that the idea of indestructibility is single, being attributed alike to
Father and Son, and for the Father to be indestructible [334] diers
not at all from the indestructibility of the Son, since no dierence
is possible in indestructibility, whether by increase or diminution or
by any other kind of distinction that is something I would claim
is timely said both now and always, so that his argument may thereby
leave no room to assert that the Son does not participate with the
Father in the idea of indestructibility. 369. As indestructibility is
understood of the Father, so it undoubtedly applies also to the Onlybegotten. To be not liable to destruction what both is, and is
called, indestructibility has the equivalent, or rather identical, meaning, whatever it is applied to. What then leads him to assert that
only in the case of the Unbegotten God is his indestructibility not
on the basis of his activity, as if to show by this the dierence
between the Father and the Only-begotten? 370. If he suggests that
his own created god is destructible, he can certainly demonstrate the
dierence of nature from the distinction between destructible and
indestructible. If however both alike are not susceptible of destruction, and no thought of more or less is intelligible in indestructibility of nature, how does he prove that the Father is not comparable
with the Only-begotten Son? Or what point is there in asserting that
the Fathers indestructibility is not on the basis of activity.
371. He reveals his purpose, however, in the argument that follows.
Not on the basis of activities, he says, is he indestructible and
unbegotten, but as Father and Designer.154 I ask the audience to
pay particular attention to this. How does he suppose that the connotation of these two attributes is the same, creative design, I mean,
154
Translating as though the Migne edition were right to read d rather than
te. As the text stands, read . . . unbegotten, as both Father and Designer. If

Gregorys following argument is not totally false, the point Eunomius is making is
precisely that indestructible is an aspect of Gods being, whereas Father and
Designer relate to his actions and not to his essential being.
An alternative, with no support in manuscripts, would be to read j nergeaw
instead of gnnhtow w, translating: Not on the basis of activities is he indestructible, and on the basis of activity both Father and Creator. This would account
for the fact that none of the following passage CE II 371378 (GNO I 334337)
mentions unbegotten until a further quotation is introduced at the end of 378
(GNO I 337,12); Gregory writes as though indestructible stands alone in the text
here.

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143

and fatherhood? He designates each of these equally as an activity

when he clearly explains in his book that he is not by activity indestructible, while he is named Father and Designer on the basis of
activities. 372. If then it is the same thing for him to be called
Father and Designer, because [335] activity is the reason why he
acquires both names, it is bound to follow that the eects of the
actions should also be all of the same kind, inasmuch as they have
the same basis in activity. The kind of blasphemy to which this logically leads is plain for any to see who knows how to observe the
consequence. I would like however to add my personal thoughts on
these matters while these words are under discussion. An activity
that brings something into eect cannot subsist simply by itself, without any recipient of the movement which action causes, as when we
say that the smith is active in some way, and that the material supplied is acted upon by his craft. 373. These must therefore have a
relation to each other, being the active and the passive potency, and
if either of them is removed by the argument, the remaining one
could not subsist by itself. If there is no passive, there will be no
active. What follows from this? If the activity which produces some
eect does not subsist by itself, unless the passive exists, and if the
Father, as they tell us, is nothing but an activity, then the Onlybegotten Son is shown thereby to be passive, shaped in accordance
with the active motion which constitutes him. 374. The Designer of
all, we say, having laid out a passive and malleable stu, put into
action his own creative Being, in the case of perceptible things skilfully attaching the varied and manifold properties to his material in
order to produce each of the things being made, and in the case of
the intelligible beings shaping the [336] material in another way, not
with properties, but with certain powers of choice; just so, if one
denes the fatherhood as an activity, of necessity one may not describe
the being of the Son except as a passive material thoroughly worked
upon. 375. If he is reckoned impassible, then impassibility will certainly be what responds to the active agent, and with action precluded there will surely be no product of action. So it is one of the
two: either they will make the Being of the Only-begotten passible
by these means, in order to be acted upon, or by shying away from
that because of the manifest impiety, they will be arguing that it
does not exist at all! 376. What escapes passivity surely of itself admits
no creative action upon it either. Therefore one who calls the Son
the eect of some action also designates him as one of those passible

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things which had their origin in activity; or if he does deny the passibility, he will, with his passibility, deny also his existence. Since
however with either horn of the dilemma we have described the
impiety is apparent, whether saying he does not exist, or thinking
him to be passible, the truth is apparent, exposed by the elimination of the absurdities. 377. For if he truly is, and if he is not passible, then plainly he is not derived from an activity, but presumably
he is true God, impassibly and eternally radiated and shining forth
from the true God, the Father.
377b.386. Eunomius identies Gods indestructibility and unbegottenness
with his being
It is in his very Being, he nevertheless says, that God is indestructible. But which other divine attribute does not belong to the
very Being of the Son justice, goodness, eternity, absence of everything evil, boundless possession of every conceivable good? 378.
Would any one say that any thing ne155 is an acquisition of the
divine Nature, and not that whatever is ne begins there, and is to
be considered as in it? The prophet says, Whatever is ne is his,
and [337] whatever is good is from him.156
Eunomius links with this the claim that he is unbegotten in his
Nature. 379. For my part, if he is saying this in the sense that the
Fathers Being exists unbegotten, I agree with what he says and do
not oppose his assertion; no religious person at all would suggest
that the Father of the Only-begotten is begotten. If however he
makes this point in the light of the design of his book, and is arguing that unbegottenness itself is Being, I would say that this ought
not to be passed by unquestioned, lest unobserved he inveigle the
gullible into consenting to his blasphemy. 380. That the idea of
unbegottenness is one thing, and the meaning of the divine Being
another, can be proved from what he has actually said himself: It
is in his very Being, he says, that he is indestructible and unbegotten, a Being unmixed and free from any otherness and dierence.
He says this of God, whose Being is, he claims, Indestructibility and
Unbegottenness. So three words apply to God: Being, Indestructible

155
156

Rendering Greek kalw which can mean either good or beautiful.

Zech 9,17, reversing ne and good.

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145

and Unbegotten. 381. If the sense of these three words applied to

God is all one, then these three surely are Deity. It is as if someone wanted to dene Man and called him articulate, apt to laugh
and at-clawed. Where these are concerned, because there is no
dierence of nature in each person, we say that the three words are
all equally important, and as applied to their subject are a single
thing, the humanity indicated by these words. 382. If then Deity is
just this, Unbegottenness, Indestructibility and Being, we say that157
when any one of these is removed, by every necessity the Godhead
is also removed with it. Just as one who is not rational nor apt to
laugh would also not be called [338] human, so in the case of these
three words, I mean Unbegotten, Indestructible, and Being, if
Deity is so characterized, when one of the three is not present, then
surely the idea of Deity must be removed from what remains.
383. Let him answer therefore, and say what view he takes of the
Only-begotten God. Does he deem him begotten or unbegotten? He
will of course say begotten, unless he is going to contradict his own
words. If then the Being and Indestructible, by which Deity is recognized, are the same as Unbegotten, the one who does not also
have Unbegotten will surely at the same time lose the Being and
Indestructible, and in their absence Deity also must necessarily be
taken away. Thus the argument comes to a double conclusion to
their blasphemous logic: 384. if the words Being, Indestructibility
and Unbegotten have the same meaning when applied to God, this
new godmaker is plainly shown to acknowledge that the Son he has
created is destructible, since he does not acknowledge him unbegotten; and not only that, he is also totally non-existent, since it is
impossible to see him as possessing deity when Unbegotten and
Indestructible are not to be envisaged, if it is really supposed that
Unbegotten and Indestructible are the same as the Being.
385. Since however the disastrous eects of these arguments is obvious, someone should advise those who hesitate to change their mind
towards the alternative, and not to resist the compulsion of the

157

Jaeger marks an apparent anacoluthon here, and suggests the text might be
amended to correct it. I have assumed that the sense of lgomen, we say that, is
carried over from a few lines above, and have repeated those words here for clarity. No emendation is therefore required.

gregory of nyssa

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obvious towards the truth, but to concede that each of these words
has its proper meaning, which one may most readily identify by their
contraries. 386. The unbegotten we discover from its contradiction
of the begotten, the indestructible is recognized by comparison with
the destructible, and being is understood by contrast with the nonexistent. Just as what has not been begotten is spoken of as unbegotten, and what is not destroyed is called indestructible, so too
we call being that which is not non-existent; and on the other hand,
as [339] we say that the begotten is not unbegotten and the destructible we designate not indestructible, so too we do not say that being
is non-existent. A being therefore is recognized by the existence of
something, the destructible or indestructible by what sort of thing it
is, the begotten or unbegotten by how it exists. The idea that it is,
is one thing, the idea which by its meaning explains how or of what
kind it is, is another.

IX. Divine attributes and human concepts (387402)

387.394. The naming of God is a function of human corporeality
387. It seems to me to be a good idea to skip over the nauseous
intervening passage (that is how in my view we should speak of his
senseless attacks on conceptual thought), and concentrate on our
intended purpose. The many things spewed up like an issue of phlegm
by our wordsmith to refute the Masters158 views on conceptual thinking, are of such a kind that they cause no danger to those who
come across them, however inexpert and gullible they may be. 388.
For who is so senseless as to take the things said by the Master,
using corn as an illustration, by which he suggested to the hearer a
certain method and approach to the thought of sublime things, and
then to suppose that, when Eunomius attaches them exclusively to
the words about the being of the God of the universe, he may be
thought to be saying something and elaborating it with precision
against the truth?

158

I.e. Basils.

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389. For him to allege that the most tting reason for God to beget
the Son is his absolute authority and unsurpassable power (which in
fact may be said not only of the world and the elements in it, but
also of the reptiles and beasts), and for the grave theologian to propose this as the right way to understand the Only-begotten God; or
to say that even before the creation of those who name things, God
is addressed as Unbegotten or as Father or by his other titles, as if
he were afraid that, should [340] his name not be uttered among
those not yet created, he might not know himself, or lapse into forgetting himself, not knowing what he is if his name were not mentioned; and his mocking assault on our words, in its acute and astute
extent: by all this he argues the case, that it is absurd to say that
the Father, existing before all ages and times and every perceptible
and intelligible being, was waiting for mankind, so that he could be
named by their conceptual thinking. 390. Not named, as he himself says, either by the Son, or by any of the intelligent beings made
through him. No one, I believe, is so stued up with choking snivel
as to be unaware that the Only-begotten Son, who is in the Father,
and perceives the Father in himself,159 has no need of noun or verb
for the knowledge of the Subject, nor does the Holy Spirit, who
searches the depths of God,160 arrive at the knowledge sought by the
pronunciation of names, nor does the disembodied race of the supernatural powers name the Divinity with voice and tongue; 391. for
where the immaterial and intelligent nature is concerned, the action
of the mind is a word which has nothing to do with the physical
use of organs. Even in the case of human nature we should have
no need to use verbs and nouns, if it were possible to express clearly
to each other the processes of the mind. As it is, since the thoughts
which arise in us are unable to make themselves apparent because
our nature is enclosed in its eshly garment, we are obliged to attach
various names to things as signs, and thereby to make the processes
of the mind accessible to other people. 392. If it were somehow possible to reveal the processes of the intellect in some other way, [341]
we could do without the recurrent use of words, and we would more
clearly and immediately deal with each other, exposing by intellectual impulses the very essence of the topics which the mind is engaged

159
160

Jn 14,11 is nearer than the verses cited by Jaeger.

1 Cor 2,10.

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upon. As it is, the reason we give the name heaven to one existent, earth to another, and other names to other things, and that
being related somehow to something and performing and suering
actions are all distinguished by us with particular words, is to prevent the mental process remaining in us uncommunicated and
unknown. 393. That supernatural and immaterial Nature, however,
being free and unchecked by bodily connement, needs no nouns
or verbs either for itself or for the transcendent order; rather, if
sometimes a word originating from the spiritual order of nature is
recorded in the holy books, it is for our sake, for the hearers, that
such a thing is said, because we are unable to understand what is
meant in any other way, if it is not openly stated in names and
verbs. 394. If David by inspiration says that something is said to
the Lord by the Lord,161 it is David the speaker who could not otherwise express for us the doctrine he has in mind, unless he interpret in sounds and words that understanding of the mysteries which
was put in him by God.
395.402. The power to name by conceptual thought is Gods gift to Man
395. It would be as well, therefore, in my opinion, to pass over all
his philosophical talk against conceptual thought, even if he accuses
of madness those who suppose that the word for Deity is spoken
conceptually by human beings to describe the Supreme Being. His
purpose in thinking it necessary to disparage conceptual thought may
be learnt from his own words by those who so wish. Our own understanding of the use of words we stated in what followed, that whereas
[342] things have their own nature, whatever it is, it was the linguistic ability implanted in us by God that invented the interpretative sounds of their names.162 396. If one were to attribute the cause
of these things to the One who gave that ability, we ourselves do
not disagree, just as we say that movement and sight and using our
other senses also originate with him from whom we have been given
such ability. So therefore the cause of our giving names to God,

161

Ps 109/110,1 (cf. Mk 12,3537 par.).

See the whole discussion in CE II 177293 (GNO I 276313), especially CE
II 189195a (GNO I 279281).
162

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149

who is by his nature what he is, is by general consent attributable

to God himself; but the power of giving names of one sort and
another to all the things that come into our mind, lies in our nature,
and whether one chooses to call it conceptual thought or something
else, we shall not dissent.
397. We claim as evidence for this position the fact that the Divinity
is not given the same titles among all, but the thought is interpreted
dierently as each group decides. We shall therefore ignore his cheap
prattle about conceptual thought, and stick to the teachings, taking
account of just one point which he put in the middle of his ramblings, where he thinks that God sat down with his rst creatures
like some schoolmaster or teacher of letters and gave them a lesson
in nouns and verbs. 398. There he says that those who were rst
created by God, or those immediately born from them, if they had
not been taught how each thing is spoken of and named, would
have lived together speechless and dumb, And they would, he says,
have achieved nothing to help them survive, since the thought of
each would be obscure for want of the signiers, verbs, that is, and
nouns. 399. So great is the wild folly of the author, that he reckons the [343] ability implanted by God is not sucient for every
kind of verbal activity, but unless they learned things one by one,
like people learning Hebrew or Latin word by word, they would not
know what things are, recognizing neither re, nor water, nor air,
nor anything else that exists, unless they obtained the knowledge of
these things through the names applied to them. 400. Our own
claim is that he who made all things by wisdom, and who gave living form to this rationally articulate creature, merely by bestowing
reason on the species added the whole capacity to speak articulately.
401. To make a comparison: because we have in our nature the
power of our senses from him that formed the eye and planted the
ear, of ourselves we use each of our sensory organs for the purpose
for which it exists, and have no need for any one to name the
colours which our sight is able to grasp, for it is enough for the eye
to become our teacher in such things; nor where things we perceive
by hearing or taste or touch are concerned, have we need of other
people to give us the information, since we possess in ourselves the
power to judge each thing that arrives in our sense-organs. In the
same way, we claim, the thinking power of the mind, having been

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gregory of nyssa

made such by God, thereafter operates of itself and observes things,

and to prevent the information falling into confusion, attaches signals in the form of words as labels to every thing. 402. Such a doctrine was conrmed by great Moses when he said that names were
attached to the dumb animals by Adam, writing in these words:
And God formed from the earth all the beasts of the eld and all
the birds of the air, and brought them to Adam to see what he
would call them; and [344], whatever Adam called the living animal, that was its name; and Adam called out names for all the cattle and all the beasts of the eld.163

X. Further arguments on the alleged divine origin of words (403444)

403.422. Philosophical and literary aspects of the arguments about the origin of speech
403. It appears however that the nonsensical attack Eunomius has
composed against conceptual thought has held us back like sticky,
glutinous mud, and will not let us get to grips with more useful topics. How could one pass over that earnest and carefully reasoned
philosophy, where he says that not only in the things made is the
majesty of the Designer expressed, but also in their names is the
wisdom of God displayed, he having tted the appellations individually appropriately to each thing made. 404. He may have read
this himself, or learnt it from someone who had read it, in Platos
dialogue Cratylus,164 and because of his dearth of ideas, I suppose,
has stitched together his own nonsense with the rubbish he found
there, doing the same as those who collect food by begging. 405.
Just as they get a little bit from each of their benefactors and gather
their food of many dierent kinds, so Eunomius book, for want of
the true bread, laboriously gathers together scraps of verbs and nouns
from all over the place, and for that reason, resonating with the literary beauty of the Platonic style, he thinks it right to adopt his philosophy as the Churchs doctrine.

163
164

Gen 2,1920.
Jaeger suggests Cratylus 390de as the passage in mind.

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151

406. How many words, please tell me, are used to name the created rmament among dierent nations? We call it ouranos, the
Hebrew shamaim, the Latin caelum, and other names the Syrian, the
Mede, the Cappadocian, the Moor, the Thracian and the Egyptian,
nor would it be easy to count [345] the dierent names which occur
in use nation by nation for the sky and other things. 407. Which
of these, tell me, is the naturally tting name, by which the magnicent
wisdom of God is displayed? If you promote the Greek above the
rest, the Egyptian may object and propose his own; if you give priority to the Hebrew, the Syrian will put forward his own word
against it; the Roman will not yield priority to these, nor will the
Mede accept that his own should not come rst, and every one of
the other nations will demand that his own should have priority over
the rest. 408. What follows? The theory will not convince, when it
is divided between so many words by the disputants.165
But from these things, he says, as it were from laws publicly
established, it is apparent that God appointed suitable and particular names for the natures. 409. What a grand doctrine! What privileges the theologian bestows on the divine teachings! People would
not begrudge them to the bath-men. In their case we let them make
up words for the operations they are engaged in, and no one has
dignied them with godlike honours, when they invent names for
many things they produce, like foot-baths, hair-strippers, hand-towels, and many more of the same, names which by tting naturally
reveal the object by the meaning of the words.
410. Nevertheless, I shall pass over these things, and also the immediately following account of Epicurean physics, which will there be
claimed as having the same meaning as conceptual thought by one
who says that the void, the atom, and the fortuitous generation of
beings have a family likeness to what is meant by concept. How
well he has understood Epicurus! If [346] we attribute the words
which denote things to the rational ability in our nature, we are
thereby convicted of talking about indivisible particles and entanglements of atoms, collisions, repulsations and the like, as Epicurus

165

Jaeger punctuates dierently, giving a meaning something like, What then

will the theory not convince, when it is divided between so many words by the disputants? This is very dicult to understand, and I have moved the question mark
and made the main sentence a statement.

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does.166 411. Let us not discuss, either, his champion and ally in
doctrines, Aristotle, whose view, he says in the subsequent discussion, agrees with the account of concept. The doctrine, he says, is
his, that Providence does not extend through all beings, nor reach
as far as earthly things;167 and that is what Eunomius insists is in
harmony with the analysis of conceptual thought. Thus one may
judge how carefully his doctrines are researched. He goes on, however, to say that one must either not concede to God the making
of beings, or else allow it and not take away the giving of names.
412. And yet where the dumb beasts are concerned, as we have
just said,168 we learn the opposite from scripture: Adam did not make
the animals, and God did not name them; rather, the creation was
Gods, the naming of the creatures Mans, just as the story is told
by Moses.
413. Eunomius goes on to produce for us in his own words a praise
of words, as though someone were trying to devalue the power of
speech, and after this rash and bombastic assemblage of verbiage he
claims that on the principle of providence and in perfect measure
he conjoins with the knowledge and use of necessities the distribution of [347] names. Many such things he babbles while fast asleep
and then in his work brings them to invincible and irresistible logical certainty. 414. I will quote not word for word, but setting out
his case simply in terms of what he means: the invention of words,
he says, is not to be attributed to poets who are deceived in their
ideas about God. What credit the ne fellow gives God, attributing
to God things invented by the skill of poets, so that thereby God
may seem to men to be more revered, more exalted, when the disciples of Eunomius come to believe that likriphis, karkaire, eurax, keraire,
phy cheiri, size, doupese, arabese, kanachize, smerdaleon konabize, linxe, iache,

166
Jaeger refers to Epicurus, Ep. ad Herodotum 4344 (Arrighetti 4143), where
atoms, collisions, repulsations appear in the identical, and entanglements with similar words (for the exact term, cf. Marcus Aurelius, Meditationes VII 50, Trannoy
77).
167
This doctrine is compatible with Aristotles general view that God does not
concern himself with matters below himself. Jaeger notes that there is no exact parallel in Aristotle, but that the doxographic tradition attributes it to him, as Gregory
does (cf. H. Diels, Doxographi graeci, Berlin 41976, 130f ).
168
See CE II 402 (GNO I 343f ).

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mermerixe,169 and all such words are not through some skill recited by
poets at their discretion, but they are mysteriously initiated in these
words by God himself when they insert them in their verses.
415. This should be ignored, and so should that wise and irrefutable
claim, that we cannot point to the saints among men in the biblical history inventing further new words. If the human race had
been unnished before the appearance of those men, and not yet
fully endowed with the gift of articulate speech, it would be right to
expect from them the supply of what was lacking. 416. If however,
right at the beginning, the race existed entire and complete in its
verbal and intellectual functioning, how could any one reasonably
[348] require the saints to have initiated sounds or words in order
to constitute conceptual thinking? or, if we are unable to show
this, judge that to be sucient evidence that God himself gave us
the rules for such syllables and words as these?
417. He says however, Since God does not refuse conversation with
his own servants, it is consistent to think that from the beginning
he has appointed appellations tting the reality. What then are we
to say about that? We assert that the reason why God allows himself to converse with man is his kindness. 418. Because it is not possible for our natural littleness to rise above its own limitations and
to reach out to the exalted status of the Transcendent, he himself
therefore brings down to the level of our weakness his kindly power,
and in accordance with our capacity to receive it, he dispenses his
generosity and aid. 419. Compare the way in which by divine dispensation the sun, moderating the severity and directness of his rays
by dilution with the intervening air, accommodates his brilliance and
heat to the recipients, though in himself he is unapproachable by
the feebleness of our nature; so the divine Power also, in the same
way as in the illustration we have used, though it to an innite
degree transcends our nature and is unapproachable for immediate
presence, like a compassionate mother joining in the baby-talk with
the inarticulate whimperings of her babies, passes on to the human
169

Jaeger supplies Homeric references for all these, mostly rare, poetic words.
Translation does not seem helpful, but the list might read in English: cross-wise,
quaked, sideways, mingled, e hand!, hissed, thudded, clashed, rang, resounded horrid, twanged,
cry out, cogitated.

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race that which they are capable of receiving. Consequently, in the

various divine manifestations to human beings he both appears in
human form and speaks in human manner, and puts on the mask
of wrath and pity and similar emotions, in order that by all the
things suitable for us our childish life may be taken in hand, [349]
coming into contact with the divine Being through providential words.
420. That it is reverent to suppose that the Divinity is subject to
no emotion corresponding to pleasure or pity or wrath, no one even
modestly instructed in the truth of things would deny. Yet the Lord
is said nevertheless to rejoice over his servants,170 to be furiously
angry with his fallen people,171 and conversely, to show mercy to
those to whom he shows mercy and likewise to pity them,172 where
the text informs us in every word of this kind, I believe, that the
divine Providence deals with our feebleness by means of our own
characteristics, so that those inclining to sin may restrain themselves
from evils through fear of punishment, those convicted may not
despair when they perceive the opportunity of gaining mercy by
change of heart, and those who live rightly may by strictness of conduct take more delight in their virtues, as by their own way of life
they give joy to the one who becomes the provider of good things.
421. Just as it is not possible, however, for a deaf mute to name
one conversing with him in sign language such as he is able to
understand, so it is not possible for human speech to encompass
God, since he has used it towards human beings dispensationally.
We ourselves habitually use clucking, lip-smacking or whistling to
direct dumb animals, yet that by which we address the hearing of
the animals is not to us speech: rather, to each other we behave
naturally, while for the beasts the suitable noise and sign-language
suces for our needs. 422. In his piety however Eunomius does not
want God to use our words because of our propensity for evil, our
good friend being unaware that for our sake God did not shrink
from becoming either curse or sin;173 [350] so far does God excel
in kindness that he willingly took upon him the experience not only
of our good things, but of our evils. One who accepted a share of

170
171
172
173

Is 62,5; 65,19; etc.

Ps 105/106,40; Is 5,25 etc.
Ex 33,19 etc.
Gal 3,13; 2 Cor 5,21.

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our evils, why should he avoid intercourse with our noblest part, I
mean our rational speech?
423.442. A Psalm-verse about counting and naming
423. However, Eunomius claims David as a supporter, and alleges
that he says that names were given to things by God, because it
is written in this manner, Who counts the number of the stars, and
calls them all by their names. 174 I myself think it is obvious to any
reasonable person that the discussion of these words has nothing to
do with the subject. But since some people might incautiously allow
the argument, we shall deal briey with them. 424. The divine scripture often describes God in such terms as would seem to be not
unsuitable for us, like, The Lord was furiously angry,175 and, He
repented of the evil against them,176 He changed his mind over
having anointed Saul as king,177 and, The Lord arose like one
asleep;178 and furthermore it describes him as sitting, standing, moving and many such things, which do not naturally belong to God,
but have their uses in meeting the needs of those being educated.
425. In the loose living the threat of wrath induces fear; to those
in need of the medicine of repentance it speaks of the Lord repenting of evil with them; for those swept towards pride by successes of
some kind it uses the change of mind over Saul to warn that prosperity might not continue for them, even though it seem to come
from God; and to those not plunged deep in sin, but who rise up
from an empty way of life as if from sleep, it says that God rises
up and wakes up with them, that he stands with those who walk
undeviatingly towards the good, and sits with those who have settled upon the good, [351] and conversely moves and walks in the
case of those removed from their steadfastness in the good. 426. So
in Adams case the narrative depicts God walking in the evening in
the garden,179 indicating by the evening the inclination of the rstformed man towards dark things, and by the movement the unsteadiness and instability of mankind about what is good.
174
175
176
177
178
179

Ps 146/147,4.
Ps 105/106,40.
Jon 3,10.
1 Sam 15,35.
Ps 77/78,65.
Gen 3,8.

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427. These matters may perhaps seem to be far removed from our
intended topic. One thing however no one would say is irrelevant
to our purpose: many people think that what they cannot grasp,
God cannot grasp either, and if something eludes their own understanding, they imagine it is beyond the divine power too. 428. We
reckon number to be the measure of quantity, and number is nothing but the combination of units, the unit being increased in various ways into a multitude: thus the number ten is also a unit by
the adding together of units to reach this number, and the hundred
is in turn a unit composed of tens, the thousand is another unit and
so is ten thousand by multiplication, the latter basing its sum on
thousands, the former on hundreds. All these we distribute among
objects, and use as signs of the quantity of the things being counted.
429. It is therefore so that we may learn from the divine scripture
that nothing is unknown to God, that the number of the stars is
said to be counted by him, not as though the adding up were done
literally who would be so naive as to suppose that God manages
reality with odd and even numbers, and calculates the number by
adding units together to reach the sum of the grand total? rather,
because exact knowledge of quantity comes to us from number, it
is in order that [352] we might learn that in Gods case too all
things are embraced by what his wisdom knows, and nothing escapes
his exact reckoning, that it declares that God counts the stars. By
these words it counsels us to believe, that God is not thought to be
aected by the limitations of our own knowledge in managing reality, but that things incomprehensible and inconceivable to us are all
embraced in knowledge by the divine wisdom. 430. The stars are
so many they are beyond number where human concepts are concerned, but the word of scripture, using the part to teach the whole,
by saying that they have been counted by God, testies that none
of the things unknown to us is beyond the knowledge of God. That
is why it says, Who counts the number of the stars though manifestly not ignorant of the quantity of stars before he counted them;
for how could he be ignorant of what he had made? 431. The
Governor of the universe could not be ignorant of what is embraced
by his power to hold all things together. Then why ever should he
count what he knows? It is for the ignorant to measure greatness
by numbers, and he that knows all things before they exist needs
no informant of the number in order to know objects. Nevertheless,
he is said by David to count the number: it is obvious that for our

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instruction, as the word comes down to make things plain in accordance with our own capacity, David has declared by his use of words
about number that God knows in detail things unknown to us.
432. So, just as he is said to count, though he needs no arithmetical survey to know the state of things, so too the prophecy speaks
of his calling them all by names, but not thereby suggesting, I believe,
calling with the voice; for surely the course of the argument would
end up in something absurd and unworthy of the idea of God, if it
really said that these names, [353] which are in regular use among
us, were given to the stars by God. 433. If any one allows that these
were given by God, inevitably he must reckon that the names of
Greek idols are attributed to them by the same source, and to suppose that all the mythic tales told about the naming of stars are
true, since God validates the use of such terms for them. Thus the
Seven who encircle the whole axis, which are shared out among the
Greek idols,180 will relieve from blame those in error in this regard,
if indeed it is believed that this is appointed by God. 434. So the
myth of Orion and of Scorpio, and the stories of the Argo, become
credible, so do the Swan, the Eagle, the Dog, and the legend about
the Crown of Ariadne,181 and he will be arguing that God is to be
held to be the inventor of the names conceived to t the pattern of
constellations in the signs of the Zodiac, if Eunomius is really right
in believing David to say that God attaches these names to them.
435. Since therefore it is absurd to think of God as the inventor of
such names, so that the names of the idols may not appear to have
got their origin from that source, it would be as well not to accept
what is said without careful scrutiny, but to understand the same
sense in this as we did in thinking about number. Because among
us it is evidence of thorough knowledge if we are able to address
the one known by name, it teaches us by these words that [354]
the One who holds all things together nor only exercises knowledge
upon the mass of the whole assembled total, but knows perfectly the

180

The planets are all named after gods in the pantheon.

Jaeger cites for Orion and these other stars and constellations Ps-Eratoshenes
Catasterismi (Olivieri [= Mythographi graeci III/1] pp. 37, 9, 41, 30, 36, 39 and 5).
181

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individual parts. 436. That is why the word says, not only that he
has counted up the numbers of the stars, but that he addresses each
one by name, which shows that his perfect knowledge reaches the
tiniest, and that he knows them one by one as perfectly as a man
knows someone known to him by name.
If any one says that the names applied by God to the stars are
dierent ones, names which human practice is unaware of, and supposes that David was referring to these, then such a person is mistaken and far from the truth. 437. If there had been other names
for the stars, the divine scripture would not have made reference to
those names which are in regular use among the Greeks: Isaiah says,
He made the Pleiades and Hesperus and Arcturus and the Treasuries
of the South;182 Job names Orion and Asheroth.183 From this it is
clear that divine scripture has used for our instruction the names in
every-day use. Similarly we hear in Job of Amaltheas horn, and
in Isaiah of Sirens, the former thus using the Greek idea to suggest the universal supply of good things,184 and Isaiah using the name
of the Sirens to indicate what is pleasing to the ear.185 438. So just
as in those cases the divinely inspired word has used names taken
from mythological tales, with a view to beneting the hearers, so in
the other case the word has unashamedly spoken of the stars in
terms conceived by human beings, teaching us that every [355] real
thing whatsoever that is named by men has its being from God, the
thing and not the name. 439. It does not say that he named, but
that he made the Pleiades and Hesperus and Arcturus. I think
therefore that it has been suciently demonstrated in what has been
said that David too is a supporter of our interpretation, since what
he teaches in the prophecy is not that God names the stars, but that
he knows perfectly, as is the way with men who know most perfectly those persons whom through frequent familiarity they can also
address by name.

182

Not Is, but Job 9,9.

Job 38,3132, where the text has Mazuroth, not Asheroth (which is a placename, cf. Num 11,35).
184
In the Greek of Job 32,14 this is the name of Jobs third daughter. While
originating in the myth of the goat Amalthea, which suckled the infant Zeus, the
phrase was proverbial for a horn of plenty. There is no astronomical connexion.
185
Is 13,21 includes the mythical Sirens among the demonic occupants of the
future ruins of Babylon. Gregorys interpretation is wide of the mark.
183

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440. If one might also present the interpretation given by most people for these words from the Psalm, the absurdity of Eunomius opinion about them would be much more convincingly proved. Those
who have studied the sense of the divine scripture most thoroughly
say that not every existing thing is worthy of being counted by
God;186 for in the shared meals of the Gospels, which took place in
the desert, neither the children nor the women were thought worth
counting, and in the exodus of the people of Israel only those already
able to bear arms and do valiantly against the enemy were included
in the list.187 441. Not all the names of things are such as to be
uttered by the divine mouth, but what is counted is the pure and
heavenly, which because of its sublime conduct abiding uncontaminated with any mixture with the dark is called a star, while a name
is given to whatever on the same principle is worthy of being inscribed
on the divine tablets. Of things contrary in kind he says, I will not
mention their names with my lips.188 442. The kind of names which
the Lord gives to such stars, [356] we learn plainly from the prophecy
of Isaiah, which says, I have called you by name; you are mine;189
so if one makes himself Gods possession, his work becomes his name.
But the reader can decide that for himself.
443.444. Eunomius misuses Pauls interpretation of Adam
443. As to his further argument, that the rst events of the creation
story are evidence that names were put on beings by God, these
matters have been discussed enough already, and I reckon repetition would be superuous. The name of Adam, which the Apostle
says is prophetically applied to Christ and the church,190 let Eunomius
be free to interpret that as he will. 444. No one would be so stupid, when Paul reveals to us hidden mysteries in the power of the
Spirit, as to take as a more reliable interpreter Eunomius, the open
enemy of the words of the divinely inspired testimony, who uses perverse exegesis of this passage to make a forced argument that the
animal species were not named by Adam.

186
187
188
189
190

Jaeger suggests a reference to Origenes, In Matthaeum XI 3 (GCS 38, 37,21 ).

Cf. Mt 14,21; Ex 12,37.
Ps 15/16,4.
Is 43,1.
Eph 5,3132; cf. 1 Cor 15,45.

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XI. Eunomius charges against Basil (445468)

445.454a. The charge that Basil denies God is by nature indestructible

445. Let us ignore Eunomius insulting words, his mean uncultured
style, and the stinking heap of vocal dung that with characteristic
uency emerges against our Master: The sower of weeds and presence of the harvest,191 and the corruption of Valentinus and the
harvest from him, which he says is heaped up in the soul of our
Master. Let the rest of his disgusting remarks be veiled in silence,
just as we bury putrefying corpses in the ground, so that the stench
may not become oensive to many people.
446. We must now move our argument on to the passage that follows. Once more he sets out a statement of the Master, which goes
as follows: [357] We call the God of the Universe indestructible
and unbegotten, using these names according to dierent apprehensions: when we look at the ages192 past, we nd the life of God
transcending every limit, and call him unbegotten; but when we
turn our mind to the coming ages, his innity and boundlessness
and his being constrained by no limit we designate indestructible.
447. So just as the endlessness of his Life is called indestructible,
its lack of a beginning is called unbegotten, as we apply our conceptual thought to these things.193 The verbal abuse, which he produces to preface his discussion of these words, we shall again pass
over, substitute seed, sowing-instructor, the irrationality of his censure, and the other stu he airily trots out with his insatiable tongue;
but inasmuch as he tries deceitfully to misrepresent the argument,
we too shall turn our attention to that. 448. He promises to convict us of saying that it is not by nature that the Divinity is indestructible. In our view only those things are alien to the nature which

191
Jaeger suggests the Greek text is here corrupt. If it is not, Eunomius perhaps
used prsocin (aspect) in the sense of presence, representing Basil as both the
sower of evil weeds (ziznia, darnel), and himself the product of such sowing.
192
Here and in what follows, the ambiguous Greek word an,-now is invariably translated age, ages, because the discussion is about very long, but nite, periods of time. An alternative would be the transliteration (a)eon(s). The same word is
rightly rendered world in some contexts, and to the age(s) is a common biblical
idiom for for ever or even eternally.
193
Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 7 (PG 29, 525bc).

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may be acquired or discarded; but as for those without which it is

impossible to think of the underlying nature, how could any one be
accused of separating the nature from them, itself from itself ? If our
argument gave the message that indestructibility were an additional
growth upon God, as though it once did not belong to him or at
some time will not, there would be occasion to bring these charges
against us. 449. If however our argument stipulates that the Divinity
is always the same, and that what he is now he everlastingly is, and
that nothing that he has not comes to be his by any sort of growth
or addition, but that he exists everlastingly with every good that can
be thought of or spoken, why are we accused of alleging that his
indestructibility is not by nature?
[358] 450. He pretends, however, to have based such a charge
against our position on an exact reading of the Masters text: we
supply God with indestructibility by adding the ages. If it were we
that produced our text for ourselves, the argument might perhaps
be a proper subject for defence, as if we were now correcting and
removing errors from the words in question; but since our words
are quoted by our opponent, what stronger proof of their truth could
there be than our adversarys testimony? 451. How does our argument run, which Eunomius assembles to lay his charge against us?
When, he says,194 we turn our mind to the coming ages, his innity
and boundlessness and never ceasing at an end we designate indestructible. Does Eunomius think that designate is the same as supply? Who is so out of his mind that he does not know the proper
meaning of these words? 452. To supply is to get for him what does
not belong, to designate is to give a name to denote what is. Why
in these circumstances is our thinker of truth not ashamed to draw
up his charge with open fraud? It is like those who because of some
disability cannot see, and behave badly in the eyes of those who see,
because they think that what is invisible to them is also unknown
to those who are healthy; something similar has happened to our
sharp-sighted Eunomius, and, quick of wit, he supposes his own
impaired grasp of the truth is the same in his audience. 453. Who
is so stupid he will not put side by side the fraudulent text and the

194

Apparently Basil is the speaker, quoted or summarized by Eunomius.

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charge, and by reading the two convict our wordsmith of his crime?
Our text designates indestructibility, he accuses one who supplies
indestructibility. What [359] has supply to do with speech? Each
person has the right to be tested by his own words; he is not liable
to blame for those of others. As it is, he accuses us and looks daggers at us, but according to the truth of the matter he condemns none
but himself. 454. If supplying God with indestructibility is the charge,
and that is said by no one but himself alone, then he himself becomes
his own smart accuser, criticizing what is his, not what is ours.
454b.461. The charge that Basil denies that God is by nature unbegotten
Where the word unbegotten is concerned, we claim that just as
innity of existence is called indestructibility, so its being without
beginning is called unbegottenness. Our opponent alleges that on
the basis of ages we advocate his prerogatives in relation to all
things begotten. 455. I will not mention the slander whereby he
classes the Only-begotten God with every begotten thing, reducing
the Son of God by the inclusive term to the same level of esteem
as everything that exists by creation. In my argument, however, I
will present to my better-informed readers his senseless villainy: On
the basis of ages Basil advocates Gods prerogatives in relation to
all things begotten. What is this senseless empty talk? A man becomes
an advocate of God, and claims his prerogatives on the basis of
ages? What is the empty airy ight of these insubstantial words?195
456. If the Master said that the divine Beings transcendence, in
both directions, of the measurable extension of ages is signied by
his having (as the Apostle put it) neither beginning of days nor end
of life,196 so that the dierence of idea is signied by the dierent
words, and for that reason what precedes all beginning is called
unbegun and unbegotten, while what [360] is limited by no end
is named immortal and indestructible, is he not ashamed to write
that these things are supply and advocacy.
457. He also says that the ages are cut into pieces by us, as if he
had not read what he had presented, or was composing his work
195
Jaeger does not divide the sentence here, but defers the question mark till
p. 360,1, following indestructible.
196
Heb 7,3.

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without remembering what he was saying. What does the Master

say? If we think about what was before creation, and, crossing over
the ages with our mind, contemplate the innity of everlasting life,
we denote such a thought by using the word unbegotten, and if
we turn our attention to the hereafter, and apprehend the life of
God which exceeds the ages, then we explain this idea with the terminology of unending and indestructible. 458. Where in the passage does the argument cut the ages, when to the best of our ability
we proclaim in verbs and nouns the eternity of God revealed as in
every respect constant, remaining the same from every point of view,
and beyond any measure of time? 459. Human life moves in measurable time, and proceeds by advancing from a beginning to an
end, and our life here is divided into past and future, the latter being
expected, the former remembered. For this reason, just as with our
own condition we observe the past and future of temporal extension, so we speak of it also, by an improper usage, in the case of
the transcendent Nature; not as though God in his own life has left
behind him a period of time, and conversely moves on to what lies
ahead in his life, but because our own understanding, observing the
facts relating to our own nature, measures out the eternal in past
and future, [361] when the past does not restrict the mind as it goes
further back into the boundlessness of innity, nor does the future
promise any stop or limit to innity.
460. If that is what we both hold and say, why all the noise about
our cutting up ages? unless Eunomius is going to say that the holy
scripture also cuts into pieces the ages, when it uses the same idea
to denote the innity of the divine Life: David praised the kingdom
before the ages, and Moses showed the kingdom of God extending
beyond the ages, so that we may learn from both of them that any
thought of measure of time is enclosed within the divine Being,
delimited by the innity of the one who contains the universe on
every side. 461. Moses, looking to the hereafter, says that he reigns
for the age, the further age, and beyond.197 Great David, leading
the mind backwards, said, God is our king before the age,198 and
again, God shall hear, who exists before the ages.199
197
198
199

Ex 15,18.
Ps 73/74,12.
Ps 54,20/55,19.

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462.468. The charge that Basil divides the being of God

462. Yet our wise Eunomius has said Goodbye to teachers like those,
and claims we speak of one life as unbegun, and another one as
unending, and of dierences and distinctions between certain ages,
which by their dierences tear apart even our picture of God. 463.
However, so that our quarrel with what he has said may not be
over-long, we shall present untried and unexamined the actual laborious eort of Eunomius on these topics, since there is enough in
his eorts at falsehood to make the truth quite clear to the intelligent. As his work proceeds he asks us what we think the ages are.
Yet it would have been fairer for that sort of question to be put by
us to him; for who is it that [362] says that he knows the being of
God, who claims that things inaccessible to us are within the grasp
of his own understanding? Let him therefore give us the natural history of the essence of the ages, since he boasts he has understood
transcendent things, and not so badly scare us simple folk by threatening us with these twin precipices of alternative answers, making
out that if we think the ages are one thing, one absurdity meets us,
and if something else, another. 464. If you call them eternal, he
says, you will be Greeks and Valentinians and Barbarians; but if
you call them begotten, he says, you will no longer be confessing
the unbegottenness of God. What an invincible and irresistible argument! Listen, Eunomius: if something is acknowledged as begotten,
acknowledging it as unbegotten is ruled out. And what of the collapse of your own artful arguments, contrasting begotten with unbegotten, by which the unlikeness of the Sons being to his Begetter
was being demonstrated? 465. It appears from what we now learn
that the Father is not unlike in being when compared with the begotten, but by the confession of his unbegottenness is utterly dissolved
into non-being if indeed calling the ages begotten means we are
obliged no longer to confess the Unbegotten.
Let us consider the logical necessity by which he compels us to
this combination of absurdities. 466. Whatever by their juxtaposition, he says enables unbegun to be attached to God, if they do
not exist, there will be no attachment. What a strong and inescapable
grip! He has got us out of the way, has strangled us like a wrestler
in holds we cannot break. He says that by the juxtaposition of the
ages unbegotten is attached to God. By whom attached? Who says
that unbegotten is attached to the one who exists without begin-

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ning, by juxtaposition with certain things? Neither the words nor the
thought of this absurdity can be proved to be in our own statements.
467. The text [363] is its own advocate, since it contains nothing
of the kind that he alleges against us; and as to the meaning of what
has been said, who could be reckoned a more reliable exponent than
those who fathered the book? We ourselves therefore have more
right to say what we mean, when we stipulate that the life of God
transcends the ages; and we say what we have said just now. 468.
Nevertheless he says that if there is no juxtaposition of ages, it is
not possible to attach the results to God, and he tells us that unbegottenness is so attached. Let him also tell us by whom such a thing
is attached to God. If it is his own doing, he would be ridiculously
accusing our writings of his own folly; if it is ours, let him cite the
passage, and we shall admit the charge.

XII. Eunomius reduces all divine attributes to one (469542)

469.479. God is one, but has various attributes
469. We ought, I think, nevertheless to pass over these matters and
those which follow them. They are simply the games of children
building castles in sand. He puts together one section of a paragraph, and barely reaches the end when he demonstrates that the
same Life is both unbegun and endless, fullling our own prayers
by this eort. Nothing else is said by us than that the divine Life is
one and self-consistent, innite, eternal and unrestricted in its innity
by any limit on any side. 470. So far our wordsmith bestows his
labour and sweat on the truth, showing that the same Life is in no
part limited, whether one considers what is before the ages, or thinks
of the hereafter. In what follows, however, he reverts again to his
own confusion. Having said that the same Life is both unbegun and
endless, he removes the thought of life, compounds all the notions
used to describe the divine life into a single idea, [364] and makes
them all one: 471. If the Life, he says, is unbegun and endless,
indestructible and unbegotten, then indestructibility will be the same
as unbegotten, unbegun as endless. To this he adds the support of
syllogisms: It is impossible, he says, for the Life to be one, while
the idea of indestructible is not the same as that of unbegotten.
Well added by our noble friend! 472. It appears that the idea of

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justice is not dierent from those stated either, nor that of wisdom,
power, goodness, and every other divine title, and no word must
have its specic meaning, but with the whole list of titles the underlying connotation will be one, and one dening notion must supply
the standard meaning of every one of the expressions. If you are
asked the meaning of Judge, you must answer with the interpretation unbegottenness; if you are required to give a denition of justice, then incorporeal should give you a convenient answer; and
what does indestructibility mean? surely you will be able to say
pity, or the meaning judgement is to hand. 473. Thus all the individual ideas may change places with each other, with no particular
meaning separating one from another. If Eunomius decrees this, why
do the scriptures waste time referring to the divine Nature by many
names, giving God the titles judge, just, mighty, patient, true,
pitiful, and many more of the same? 474. If none of the words is
taken in a specic sense, and all are mixed up with each other by
the confusion of meaning, it will be pointless to use many titles for
the same subject, when there is no dierence of meaning to separate the names from each other. 475. But who is so mentally paralysed he does not know that the divine [365] Nature, whatever it
may be in essence, is one, understood as something simple, uniform,
uncompounded, and by no means a manifold composite, whereas
the human mind, prostrate on the ground, and buried deep in this
earthly life, because it cannot see clearly what it seeks, reaches out
to the ineable Nature with many thoughts in many and varied
ways, and does not hunt for what is hidden with any one idea? 476.
Understanding would be easy, if one single approach to the knowledge of God had been made distinct to us. As it is, we have perceived through the wisdom manifested in the universe that he who
governs the universe is wise, and we have received an impression of
power from the mighty works of wonder, and the belief that every
thing depends upon that source becomes evidence that there is no
prior cause of his existence.
477. Again, perceiving the abhorrence of evil, we apprehend his
invariability and unmixed character where evil is concerned; and
reckoning destruction by death to be the ultimate evil, we name
immortal and indestructible the one who is alien to any such notion.
We do not split up the Subject with these notions, but, whatever he
may essentially be, believing it to be one, we assume that the object

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of our thinking is cognate with all such attributes. 478. The titles
do not conict with each other as is the nature of opposites, so that
if one exists, the other could not be attributed to him at the same
time, as it is not possible for life and death to be attributed to the
same person; but such is the meaning of each of the things we
attribute to the divine Nature, that, though it may be distinctive in
meaning, it in no way contradicts other names given at the same
time. 479. What contradiction is there between just and incorporeal, even though the words do not coincide with each other in
meaning? [366] How does goodness clash with invisible? No more
is the eternity of the divine Life, though known by two words and
two thoughts, endless and unbegun, cut apart by the dierence of
the words. Neither is the one the same in meaning as the other (for
the one points to the absence of beginning, the other to the absence
of end), nor does the dierence between the properties attributed to
him produce any division in the Subject.
480.485. The claim that dierent attributes divide Gods being
480. Such then are our views. Those of our opponent, however,
according to the actual way he compiles the text, are such that they
get no support from the arguments, since he otherwise spits out at
random such pompous and senseless verbiage under the guise of sentences and paragraphs; but the purpose of his words is this, that
there be no dierence in meaning between the various names. 481.
It seems that we are obliged to present his statement word for word,
to avoid any appearance of fraudulently attributing to him something which does not belong. He says: Since true words derive their
designation from the real subjects denoted, and where they are
dierent they t dierent realities, and conversely the same t the
same, one or the other must be the case: either the reality denoted
is quite dierent, or the denoting word is not dierent either.200
482. These things and many more like them he produces to argue
his intended case, excluding from his consideration certain relations,
comparisons, shape, size, part, time and place, as if by their removal
unbegottenness would come to denote the Being. The [367] argument goes like this (I shall express the thought in my own words):

200

This obscure passage is more fully quoted at CE II 487 (GNO I 368,618).

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483. The Life, he says, is nothing but the Being, or else some element of composition might be attributed to the simple Nature, which
would thus be divided into the attribute and the subject of the attribution. Rather, he says, what the Life is, the Being is. He does well
to philosophize in this way; no reasonable person would deny that
these things are so.
484. Yet how does he bring the argument to its conclusion? If in
denoting the unbegun, he says, we denote the Life, and if true
reason requires that we call that Life Being, the divine Being itself
is, he says, denoted by unbegotten. We ourselves agree that the
divine Life is not begotten by something else, which is indeed the
meaning of the idea of unbegun; but that the Being is what is
meant by the words about not being begotten is in our view the
thinking only of raving lunatics. 485. For who is so mad as to claim
that the denition of being is non-begetting? Just as begetting is
cognate with begotten, so obviously non-begetting is closely connected to unbegotten. Since unbegottenness indicates what is not
true about the Father, how can we construe the indication of what
does not belong as being?201 Yet he awards himself something which
agrees neither with our view nor with the logic of his own premises,
and concludes that what denotes the divine Life is the unbegottenness of God.
486.491. Eunomius arguments apply equally to the Son
486. So that [368] his nonsense on this subject may be thoroughly
exposed, let us consider the text in this way: by means of the arguments about the Father by which he turns the denition of being
into that of unbegottenness, let us inquire whether we can equally,
using the same arguments, bring the being of the Son also to unbegottenness. 487. There must be, he says, one and the same idea
for the same Life, which is absolutely one, even if in titles and man-

201
Wilamowitz suspected some words are missing here. Our rendering is in keeping with Jaegers own interpretation: Unbegottenness has just been shown to have
a negative import, i.e. the Father has no prior generative agent; how can we then
take this negation, He has no prior generative cause, as dening his essential
Being?

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ner and order it appear diverse. Since true words derive their designation from the real subjects denoted, and where they are dierent
they t dierent realities, as conversely the same t the same, one
or the other must be the case: either the reality denoted is quite
dierent, or the denoting word is not dierent either, since there is
no underlying reality beside the Life of the Son,202 on which one
might either stamp the thought or impose the other word. 488. Is
there any incoherence in that text, so that such things should not
be said or written of the Only-begotten? Is not the Son also life
absolutely one? Is it not appropriate that one and the same idea
should apply to him, even if in titles and manner and order it
appear diverse? Will it not be established where he is concerned,
that one or the other must be the case: either the reality denoted
is quite dierent, or the denoting word is not dierent either, since
there is no underlying reality besides his Life, on which one might
either [369] stamp the thought or impose the other word. 489.
Nothing of our own has been added to Eunomius words about the
Father, but we have adopted his actual premise and logic, only substituting the name Son. If then he too is one absolute Life devoid
of all composition and reduplication, and there is no underlying reality beside the life of the Son (for how could any admixture of alien
reality be suspected in what is simple? what is perceived as so associated would no longer be simple), and if the being of the Father is
also a simple life, and according to the principle of life and simplicity there is no diversity in the simple life, no addition, no subtraction, no variation of quantity or quality generating change, it
must follow that those things which coincide in the same thoughts
should also be named with the same appellations. 490. If then the
reality evincing the simplicity of life in Father and Son is understood as one, and since, as has been said, the principle of simplicity admits no variation, it necessarily follows that the title which ts
one belongs naturally to the other. If therefore the simplicity of the
Fathers life is signied by the appellation unbegottenness, that word
will not be unsuitably applied to the Son as well. 491. As man is
referred to as that which is rational, mortal, and receptive of thought
and knowledge in the same way in the case of Adam as in that of
Abel, and in no way is the name given to the nature changed by

202

Eunomius wrote Father; see CE II 489 (GNO I 369,25).

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coming to life whether by being begotten in the case of Abel, or

not by being begotten in the case of Adam, so, if the designation
of the Fathers life as simple and uncompounded implies unbegottenness, so also in the case of the life of the Son the same thought
must of necessity be attached to the same word; if it is true, as
Eunomius asserts, that one or the other must be the case: either
the reality denoted [370] is quite dierent, or the denoting word is
not dierent either.
492.503. The absurdity of making divine attributes all identical
492. Why, however, do we waste time dwelling on futile matters,
when we ought to oer Eunomius book itself to those keen on hard
work to expose the folly of his arguments, and, without any one correcting him on that score, to demonstrate to the educated not only
the blasphemy of the doctrine, but also the spineless morality. In
many ways he misinterprets the word concept not in accordance
with our thinking, but as he chooses, and as in a night-battle when
no one can discern friend from foe, with weapons he thinks he is
directing against us he stabs his own doctrine unawares. 493. The
point at which he thinks he ought to separate himself furthest from
the devout members of the church is this, the argument that later
on God became a Father, and the title of fatherhood is more recent
than his other titles which are attributed to him: he has been called
Father ever since he decided to become a Father, and did so.203 494.
Now in this present book he argues that all the appellations attributed to the divine Nature coincide with each other in meaning and
there is no dierence between them;204 but one of the names attributed is Father, for he is called Father in the same way as he is
called indestructible and everlasting. He may therefore conrm in
the case of this word too his view about the other titles, and drop
his earlier opinion, if indeed the idea of fatherhood is also to be
included with all the other appellations; 495. for it is clear that if
the meaning of indestructible and Father are the same, then, as

203
Jaeger prints this description of Eunomius past views in spread type as if it
were a quotation. In the absence of direct evidence to the contrary, it is better to
see it as Gregorys own summary of Eunomian teaching.
204
Again, against Jaeger, I regard this as Gregorys summary, not Eunomius
words.

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171

he is confessed as for ever indestructible, so he must be as for ever

Father, since, so he says, all the names have one meaning. Alternatively
[371] if he is scared of acknowledging Gods fatherhood as eternal,
he must necessarily destroy his present case, and confess that a particular meaning inheres in each title, and all his great nonsense about
the titles has burst like a bubble and vanishes.
496. He may defend himself from this dilemma on the ground that
only the titles of Father and Designer are attached to God as
additional developments, because on the basis of activity, as he
himself says,205 both these words are applied to God. If he does, that
will cut down the great trouble we have in achieving our goal, admitting things which would need a good deal of work from us to prove
conclusively. If the meaning of the words for Father and Designer
is one for each is on the basis of activity then what is meant
by the words must surely be the same in both cases; for where what
is meant is the same, the subject can surely not be dierent either.
497. So if it is on the basis of activity that he is called both Father
and Designer, then it is surely possible also to use the names the
other way round, and say that God is Designer of the Son and
Father of the stone, if the title Father plays no part in the permanent description of his nature. That what is argued by this means
is absurd can no longer be doubted by men of sense. 498. Just as
it is absurd to think of a stone as God, or any other thing that exists
by creation, so it will be conceded that one ought not to arm the
godhead of the Only-begotten God, if one and the same description
arms both names for God in accordance with his activity, as
Eunomius argues, the description by which he is named both Father
and Designer.
499. Let us stick to our task, however. In his criticism of our argument, which says that the knowledge of God is acquired by us
through various apprehensions, he says that [372] as presented by
us he is no longer simple, since he participates in the notions indicated by each title, and by participation in those nally achieves his
perfection of being. I write this in my own words, abbreviating his

205

See the quotation at CE II 371 (GNO I 334,23f ).

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long ramble. 500. Faced with this empty-headed and feeble splurge
I do not think that any sane person would acquit even the response
to it of folly. If there were anything like it in what we have said,
we would certainly either have to retract the errors, or else bring to
the obscurity of the thought the corrective of interpretation. Since
however nothing of the kind has been said by us, nor does the logic
of what we have said force the mind to such a necessary conclusion, what need is there to dwell on matters generally agreed, and
bore the reader with the length of our discourse? 501. Who is so
far out of his mind that, having heard that devout notions of God
are gathered by us through many ideas, he supposes that the Divinity
is composed of diverse elements, or that he assembles his own perfection by acquiring things? Someone, for instance, discovered geometry, and let it be assumed that this same person is the inventor also
of astronomy, as well as medicine, grammar and geometry and some
other such skills: because the names of the skills attributed to the
one mind are many and varied, is his mind for that reason to be
regarded as composite? 502. Yet what is meant by medicine diers
widely from astronomical science, and grammar has nothing in common with geometry as far as meaning is concerned, nor again navigation with agriculture. Nevertheless it is possible to combine the
idea of each of these in a single mind, without the mind as a result
becoming a manifold synthesis, or [373] all the names of the skills
being amalgamated in a single meaning. 503. If therefore the human
intellect suers no loss of simplicity through having so many names
applied to it, why should one think that, if God is called wise, just,
good, eternal, and all the divine epithets, unless a single connotation is envisaged for all the names, he either becomes manifold, or
else by participation in these accumulates the perfection of his nature?
504.523a. The syllogism: indestructibility and unbegottenness are incompatible unless identical
504. We must now consider also his gravest charge against us. It is
as follows: To put the argument at its most concise, he says, he
does not even preserve the Being itself uncontaminated and pure of
things evil and alien. So great is the charge; but what is the proof ?
Let us examine his vehement oratorical argument against us. If it
is by endlessness of life alone, he says, that he is indestructible,

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and by absence of beginning alone that he is unbegotten, insofar as

he is not indestructible, he will be destructible, and insofar as he is
not unbegotten, he will be begotten. 505. He repeats the same
thing and again says: So he will be in respect of having no beginning unbegotten and also destructible, and in respect of his endlessness indestructible and also begotten. That then is his most
concise argument, which he threatens to produce against us to prove
that we say the being of God is contaminated with alien and evil
things! I would think it would be obvious to those who have in them
a healthy ability to judge the truth, that, because the Master has
given no handle in his actual words for misrepresentation, Eunomius
has twisted those words to his liking and concluded with this childish game of logic-chopping. [374] 506. However, to make it as clear
as possible to every reader, I will spell it out again word for word,206
and set beside it the words of Eunomius. We claim, our Master
says, that the God of the Universe is indestructible and unbegotten, using these terms with distinct notions. When we look back to
past ages, we nd the life of God surpassing every limit and call
him unbegotten; when we turn our minds to the future ages, then
what is boundless and innite and stops at no end we name indestructible. 507. Thus as the endlessness of life is called indestructible, so its want of a beginning is called unbegotten, as we envisage
these things by conceptual thought. That is the argument of the
Master. He teaches us by his words that the divine Life, being by
nature one and self-consistent, neither begins from any beginning
nor is restricted by any end, and that it is possible to arm clearly
by certain words the properties envisaged in this Life. 508. We assert
that something derives from no prior cause by using the words unbegun and unbegotten, and that it is limited by no ending, nor dissolves into destruction, is indicated by the terms indestructible and
endless. By this it is established that, in the case of the divine Life,
we ought to say that what has no beginning exists unbegotten, and
that unending existence we ought to call indestructible, because
everything that ceases to exist vanishes utterly, and when we hear
of the vanishing of what is, we understand the destruction of what

206
To be taken with a pinch of salt, as Jaeger notes; cf. CE II 527528 (GNO I
380,1523). The text derives from Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 7 (PG 29, 525bc).

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existed before. He says therefore that the one who never ceases to
be, and is immune to destructive dissolution is called indestructible.
509. [375] What does Eunomius make of this? If it is by endlessness of life alone, he says, that he is indestructible, and by absence
of beginning alone that he is unbegotten, insofar as he is not indestructible, he will be destructible, and insofar as he is not unbegotten, he will be begotten. Who gave you this notion, Eunomius, that
indestructibility is not envisaged as within the whole life of God?
Who cut the divine life in two, and gave particular names to each
half, so as to say that whichever part one adjective belongs to, the
other does not belong to it? 510. This is the acuity of your own
logic, to say that the Life which exists unbegun is destructible, and
that the unbegun cannot be combined in thought with the indestructible Life. It is the same as if someone said that Man is articulate and receptive of understanding and knowledge, attaching both
these designations together to the subject with distinct intention and
meaning, and then he were ridiculed by someone like this saying
the same sort of thing: If Man is receptive of thought and knowledge, for that reason he cannot be articulate, but inasmuch as he
is receptive of knowledge, he will be only that, and his nature has
no room for the other; conversely, if he decides that Man is articulate, it will no longer be possible for him to be receptive of understanding, 511. for inasmuch as he is articulate, he will be proven
to have no part in intelligence. If the folly and absurdity in this
case is obvious to all, there can surely be no doubt about the other.
When you read what the Master said, you will nd that the logical
game is a phantom: in the human illustration being receptive of
knowledge is not ruled out by being articulate, nor being articulate
by being receptive of understanding; nor does the eternity of the
divine Life either lack indestructibility, if it is unbegun, nor, if indestructibility is attributed to it, will it forfeit its status as unbegun.
512. The one who with the [376] precision of exact logic looks for
the truth, having interpolated what he liked from his own material
into our text, contradicts himself and refutes himself, without touching our case. Our position was nothing other than this: to claim that
the Life which exists unbegun is named unbegotten conceptually
named, not made , and to designate that which extends into innity
by the term indestructible, not to make it indestructible, but to signify that it is such; 513. hence it is a property of the Subject that

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the divine Life is innite in both directions, but whether this or that
attribute is applied to the Subject in speech concerns only the word
used to indicate the attribute designated. It is one feature of the
divine Life that it exists without prior cause: this is indicated by the
term unbegotten. It is another feature of the divine Life that it is
innite and has no end: this is stated by the use of the word indestructible; hence what the Subject actually is, is above every name
and thought; but that it has no prior cause, and never turns into
the non-existent, those are the meanings of the conceptual thought
behind these words.
514. What then is it in our views that drives him to this senseless
game, so that he reverts to the topic and says the same thing again?
These are his words: So in respect of having no beginning he will
be unbegotten and also destructible, and in respect of his endlessness indestructible and also begotten.207 Though this may not be
dealt with in detail in our book, for the person who has any kind
of intelligence it is obvious how ridiculous and nonsensical it is, or
rather wicked and damnable. 515. The argument by which he
deduces the link between corruptible and unbegun, in the same
way [377] makes a mockery of every orthodox divine title. These
are not the only two applied to the divine Life, unbegun existence
and immunity from destruction, but it is called immaterial and wrathless, changeless and incorporeal, invisible and uncongured, true and
just, and there are ten thousand other attributes of the divine Life,
every one of which by itself is described in some particular sense by
the words which indicate it. 516. With every one of these words
every one, I mean, which indicates an idea appropriate to God
it is possible to tie up the alien linkage conceived by Eunomius.
Thus immaterial and wrathless are both applied to the divine Life,
but not both with the same meaning. We understand by the term
immaterial that the Divinity is free from contamination with matter, while wrathless means that the passion of anger is alien to him.
517. Eunomius will presumably attack these too, and dance to the
same tune as in the quotation. He will say, tying up the absurdity
in the same knot, If he is called immaterial inasmuch as he is
untouched by contamination of matter, to that extent he will not be

207

Cf. CE II 504 (GNO I 373,2123).

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wrathless, and if he is wrathless inasmuch as anger is absent, it is

not possible for immaterial to be confessed of him, but of necessity by being free from matter he will be shown to be immaterial
and also wrathful, and by the absence of anger he will be found to
be wrathless and material at the same time. So he will also do with
all the other words.
518. If we may, we would propose another similar pair of words: I
refer to changeless and incorporeal. Since these two words are
used of the divine Life each with its own particular meaning, the
wisdom of Eunomius will again argue absurdity in their case too: if
[378] what is always the same is what is meant by the term unchanging, and the adjective incorporeal refers to intellectual being,
Eunomius will surely say the same in their case too, that the attributes envisaged in the words are incompatible with each other, alien
and incommunicable. 519. In being for ever the same the divine
will be only changeless, and not incorporeal, while because it is an
intellectual being with no bodily gure it possesses incorporeality,
but is removed from changelessness. Thus it comes about, that when
immutability is attributed to the divine Life, that proves it is not
only changeless but corporeal, but when its intellectual state is considered, it is rmly ruled to be at once incorporeal and changeable.
520. These are Eunomius clever contrivances against the truth! What
need is there to extend the argument with verbiage by going into
everything?
One can see how this illogicality can be argued similarly in every
case. Certainly true and just will, according to the preceding logical nexus, in the same way conict with each other: one thing is
meant by truth, another by justice. 521. So Eunomius might logically say of these too, that the true is incompatible with the just,
justice is lacking in truth, and as a result when any one considers
the freedom from injustice in God, the Divinity will be shown to be
at the same time just and false, while if we consider his freedom
from falsehood, we argue that the Divinity is at once true and unjust.
522. It is the same with invisible and uncongured. It would be
possible208 using the same ingenuity as already explained to say that

208
Omitting di tn, which is Jaegers alternative to supposing some words to
have fallen out.

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there is no invisibility in what is uncongured, and no absence of

guration in the invisible, but that [379] gure is involved in invisibility and visibility conversely will argue absence of gure, applying
the same syllogistic skill to these matters as he did with indestructible and unbegun: that when we consider the uncompounded state
of the divine Life, we speak of its being without gure, not however
invisibility; and when we observe that it is not possible to see God
with bodily eyes, while allowing invisibility we shall not also concede that he exists uncongured. 523. If these things seem alike
ridiculous and senseless to everybody, how much more will the intelligent person condemn the absurdity of those statements on which
the argument was based, when it logically produced the absurdity
in these cases!
523b.536. Logical games with the endless and the unbegun
However, he attacks the saying of the Master, as improperly seeing
indestructibility in the endless and perceiving endlessness in the indestructible. So let us have the same sort of fun with Eunomius meticulousness too. Let us consider his own judgment in the same way
about these words, and nd out what it is. 524. Will he say that
the endless is something dierent in meaning from the indestructible, or conclude that they are one?209 If he says they are both one,
he will be agreeing with our argument; if he says that the meaning
of indestructible is one thing, that of endless another, it follows
that where things are dierent from one another they are not the
same as one another in meaning. 525. Therefore if the sense of
indestructible is one and that of endless quite another, and each
of these is what the other is not, the conclusion follows that the
indestructible is not endless, nor is the endless indestructible, but the
endless will be destructible, the indestructible liable to end. I implore
my readers not to turn their scorn for this absurdity against us.
526. This is the game we ourselves have been compelled to play
against the buoon, in order to disentangle by a like childishness his
infantile web of syllogism. If however it [380] does not seem too
ponderous and irritating to my readers, it might not be a bad time

209

Jaeger punctuates as a statement: He will either . . ..

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to quote again word for word what Eunomius says: If it is by endlessness of life alone, he says, that he is indestructible, and by
absence of beginning alone that he is unbegotten, insofar as he is
not indestructible, he will be destructible, and insofar as he is not
unbegotten, he will be begotten. He repeats the same thing, and
again says: So in respect of having no beginning he will be unbegotten and also destructible, and in respect of his endlessness, indestructible and also begotten. 527. The irrelevant and superuous
material inserted in between I pass over, as making no further contribution to the course of the argument; but that the meaning of
our own writings, from which he himself has quoted, has nothing
to do with the charges urged against us by him, is in my view easy
for everyone to observe. We claim, our Master says, that the God
of the Universe is indestructible and unbegotten, using these terms
with distinct connotations. 528. By his surpassing the boundary of
the ages by any measure of temporal extension, he says, whether
we consider what is from the beginning or what lies ahead, that
either aspect of the everlasting Life is innite and unbounded, we
indicate the one by the word indestructibility, the other by unbegottenness.210 Eunomius however asserts that we say that the unbegun is being and the endless another being, as if to combine two
sections of beings spoken of in contradiction. And so he argues the
absurdity, posing his own premises, and tying them together with
his own logic; having pressed his own conclusions to the point of
absurdity he nowhere touches our position. 529. The idea that only
with regard to endlessness of life is God indestructible is his, and
not ours. Similarly, that the indestructible [381] is not unbegun is
also the invention of his strict logic, which places what does not
belong in the category of essential being. We ourselves would allow
nothing as essential being which does not belong. 530. It is not
proper to God for his life either to end in destruction, or to have
begun with a generative act: this is what is expressed by the two
words indestructibility and unbegottenness.
He however makes a great fuss about our doctrines with his own
nonsense, and by his accusation against us condemns himself unawares.
531. By stipulating that unbegottenness is being, he ends up logically in the very absurdity which he alleges against our doctrines.

210

Very loosely repeating the loose quotation in CE II 506507 (GNO I 374,313).

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Since it is held that in measuring time beginning is one thing and

end another, if anyone were to claim that absence of the one was
essential being, he would suppose that his Life, being bisected, existed
only as unbegun, and that it did not by nature extend further towards
endlessness, if unbegottenness really is to be reckoned the Nature.
532. If however one insists that both are Being, then it necessarily
follows, according to the argument produced by Eunomius, that each
of the designations with its own connotation also has its existence
in the notion of the Being, existing only to the extent declared by
the meaning of the term. Eunomius reasoning will prevail, precisely
if neither the unbegun possesses endlessness, nor is the endless without beginning, because on his reasoning each of the things stated is
Being, and the two are incompatible in sense with each other: neither does beginning have the same meaning as end, nor can the
words for these, which negate each other, come together in what
they denote.
533. So that he may himself acknowledge his own folly, the proof
will be taken from his own words. He says in his attack on us that
God by being endless [382] is unbegotten, and by being unbegotten is endless, the connotation of the two words being one. If then
in endlessness he is unbegotten, and endlessness and unbegottenness
are the same in meaning, and if he allows that the Son is endless,
on this logic he will be obliged to allow that the Son is also unbegotten, if indeed the endless is, as he has said, the same as the unbegun. 534. Just as he sees the endless in the unbegotten, so he professes
also to have observed the unbegun in the endless. He would not
regard the interchangeability of names as in doubt, but, By nature
and not by addition of ages, he says, God is unbegotten. Who
is going to quarrel with saying that God is by nature all that is
attributed to him? 535. It is not by juxtaposition of the ages that
we say God is just, mighty, Father and indestructible, nor with reference to anything else that exists, but we apply every piously conceived attribute to the Subject itself, whatever that may by nature
be. So if we suppose neither age nor any other conceivable work of
creation had been devised, God would still be no less than he is
now believed to be, in need of no ages to make him what he is.
536. But he has a life, says Eunomius, not externally derived,
nor composite, nor diverse: he himself is the everlasting Life, immortal
because of his very life, indestructible because of his very immortality.

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These things we also learn about the Only-begotten, which no one

will deny, unless he will openly contradict the words of John. Life
is not externally derived for the Son, for, I am the life, he says;211
nor [383] is his life composite, nor diverse, but he is because of his
very life immortal, for where else could one acknowledge immortality if not in life? and indestructible because of his very immortality. What is stronger than death and destruction is surely not
externally derived.
537.542. Eunomius nonsensically identies unbegotten with endless
537. Our own understanding has followed so far; but the puzzle
composed in what he says is for those trained in the art of stenography212 to interpret. From that art the words seem to me to have
originated. What does he say? Being indestructible without beginning he is unbegotten without end, being so called in no other
respect, for no other reason, to no other end.213 One with a rened
ear and a perceptive mind knows already before I comment that,
apart from the din of the words, which hammer out their dissonant
juxtaposition, there is no trace of intelligible meaning in the sentence. 538. If even a shadow of sense should turn up amid the verbal clatter, what turns up is sure to be wicked or ridiculous. What
have you in mind, do tell me, when you say that he is indestructible without beginning and unbegotten without end? Do you suppose that the beginning is the same as the end, and that the two
words apply to the one idea, as the names Peter and Simon both
point to the one subject? And for this reason, as you reckon the
beginning is the same as the end, have you similarly linked in one
connotation the two mutually contradictory words, beginning, I
mean, and end, and conversely you thought endless the same as
unbegun and made the two words one by blending them together?

211

Jn 11,25.
Literally the wisdom of Prunicos. The allusion is obscure, but Gregory uses
the phrase in the same sense at CE I 50 (GNO I 39,17). According to Lampe in
PGL, pronikow, normally meaning bath-attendant, is ( jocularly?) applied to stenographers.
213
This sentence, which Gregory professes to nd unintelligible, could be otherwise translated. The last word, here rendered so called, might equally well be
rendered spoken of or named.
212

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[384] Is that the purpose of the mixing of the words when you say
that he is endlessly unbegotten and unbegottenly endless?
539. And how is it you do not see the wickedness in what you say
as well as the absurdity? If because of this novel mixture the reversal of names makes no dierence, so that the unbegotten is endlessly
unbegotten and the endless unbegottenly endless, then it must follow that everything endless cannot exist without being unbegotten;
and so you will nd, dear Sir, that the much vaunted unbegottenness, which alone, according to you, characterizes the Fathers being,
becomes the common property of every immortal thing, and makes
them all consubstantial with the Father,214 because it denotes in the
same way all things whose life through immortality goes on indenitely,
archangels, angels, human souls, and perhaps even the rebellious
Power itself, the devil and the demons. 540. If the endless and the
indestructible on your argument certainly exists unbegotten, the unbegottenness must certainly be attributed to every unending and indestructible thing. Such is the fate of those who, before they have
learnt what they ought to learn, by what they try to teach expose
to public gaze their own want of learning. 541. If he had any critical judgment, he would not have failed to recognize the specic
sense inhering in unbegun and endless, and that, while endlessness is common to all things that are held to continue in life to
innity, unbegun applies only to that which has no prior cause.
542. How then is it possible to think of what is common to them
all as having that same meaning for them, as is universally held to
be the singular property of God alone, and thereby either to make
unbegottenness common property of all things that possess immortality, or else to allow that none is immortal, if endless existence
belongs only to the unbegotten, and conversely unbegotten existence
belongs only to the endless. This way, all things endless might be
thought to be unbegotten.

214
One cannot avoid the regular translation consubstantial, but it obscures
slightly the argument about being: immortals all become the-same-in-being as the
Father.

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XIII. Eunomius claim that words for God originate in God (543560)
543.553. The claim that words for God are prior to mans concepts
543. [385] Let us set aside this topic, and thereafter also keep silent
about the usual vituperation, which he pours generously into his text,
and let us go on to read what follows next. I think that it might be
right to leave most of the subsequent passage too without comment.
In all this material he is just the same, not engaging with what we
wrote, but providing his own occasions for refutation from what is
ostensibly ours. One trained in criticism might say detailed rebuttal
is a waste of time, when every intelligent person reading his215 book
can convict him of deceit from his very words. 544. The dignity
of God, he says, is older that the conceptual thought of our
Teacher. We do not deny it. The dignity of God, whatever one
ought to consider that to be, is not only prior to our race, but also
transcends the whole creation and the ages themselves. How then
does this aect the argument, if the dignity of God is acknowledged
not only older than Basil, but older than all that is?
Yes, he says, but the name is the dignity. 545. And who has
demonstrated that the appellation is the same thing as the dignity,
so that we too may agree with his proposition? A solemn law of a
nature, he says, tells us that with named things the dignity of the
name does not lie within the power of those who name. What is
this law of the nature, and why is it not universally valid? If a
nature216 in fact decreed such a thing, it must have had the power
over all those who share the nature, as with all other things that
are proper to their own nature. 546. If then the law of our nature
made the names spring up for us from things, like plants from seeds
or bulbs, and did not [386] leave the imposition of signicant designations to the discretion of those who point the things out, all of
us men would have had the same language as each other. If the
words applied to things were not diverse, we presumably would not
dier from each other about the form of speech. He says that it is

Reading ato, as in Lexicon gregorianum III 274 at ntugxnv A,5,b. Jaegers

atn is apparently a misprint.
216
Jaegers proposed addition of the denite article <> obscures Gregorys allu215

sion to Eunomius own wording just above at p. 385,21, and is here ignored.

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holy and very tting to the law of Providence that words are applied
to things from on high. 547. Why then did not the prophets know
what is holy, and had not learned the law of Providence, when they
never on your principles made a god of unbegottenness? Why does
even God himself not know this kind of holiness, when he does not
from on high attach the names to the animals shaped by him, but
grants to Adam the right of name-giving? If it is appropriate to the
law of Providence and holy, as Eunomius says, for words to be
applied to things from on high, it is surely unholy and untting that
names should be attached to things by those below.
548. But the Minder of all things, he says, by a law of creative
design saw t to sow seeds in our souls. Even if these things were
sown in the souls of men, how is it that from Adam until you stepped
forward217 no crop grew from this vacuity (though planted, so you
say, in the souls of men), so that unbegottenness should be the title
given to the Fathers being? It would have been spoken by Adam
and all his descendants, if God had really planted such a seed in
his nature. 549. Just as things which now grow out of the ground
persist from the rst creation for ever in their seminal succession,
and there is no departure from their nature in the present seed, so
this word, according to what you say, sown in their nature by God,
would have germinated at the same time as the rst speech in the
rst-formed pair, and [387] would have continued alongside the succession of their descendants. Since however that was not there at
the rst, for none of the earlier people, down to the present, uttered
such a thing before you, clearly a rogue and deviant seed has sprung
up of a kind of darnel, not one of those good seeds which, as the
Gospel says, God cast into the eld of our nature.218 550. Whatever
is entirely in the common nature cannot have its origin of existence
now, but made its appearance with the nature at its rst constitution, such as the activity of the senses, the relation of desire or rejection towards various human concerns, and whatever else of this kind
is recognized as a common part of their nature; history has changed
none of these in those who have come after, but humanity has been

217
parbasiw is apparently a metaphor from the theatre, where an actor or chorus steps forward to address the audience.
218
Mt 13,2430.

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preserved continuously with the same features from the rst people
to the most recent, the nature having lost nothing of what belonged
to it at the start, nor acquiring what did not belong. 551. To make
a comparison, seeing is recognized as common to the nature, but
specialist seeing is acquired with practice by those who study sciences; for not everybody can understand what is learned by use of
mathematical instruments, or appreciate the demonstrations of geometrical diagrams, and other such things, where it is not vision, but
the use of vision for a purpose that is discovered by the science.
Similarly one might say that rational speech is common to human
nature, and is a property brought into existence at the same time
as the nature, but that inventing terms to indicate realities comes
from human beings who have acquired the power of speech in themselves from God, and who always, as seems to them best for the
[388] identication of things being pointed out, invent words which
denote the realities.
552. But if these prevail, he says, one of the two is logically
implied: either the concept is older than its conceiver, or the titles
naturally proper to God and preexisting the universe are later than
the creation of men. Must we really do battle with this kind of
thing, and engage in rational debate with such obvious nonsense?
Who is so naive as to be stung by such things, and to suppose, if
he believes that the words come from the rational faculty, that he
must either allow that spoken words are older than those who speak
them, or must think he oends the Deity, because men name the
Deity as best they can manage after they come to be. 553. That
the transcendent Nature has no need of words resounding from voice
and tongue has already been said, and it would be superuous to
clutter up our argument by repetition. What is by nature both complete and without excess neither lacks anything it needs nor possesses anything it does not need. Since therefore it has been demonstrated
in the words already written, and it is agreed by the general consensus of intelligent persons, that he has no need to call things by
name, no one is likely to deny that claiming for God things he does
not need is utterly wicked.

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554.560. A dilemma for Eunomius, who identies Gods attributes with his
being
554. I do not believe however that we should spend time on these
and similar topics, nor refute in detail the passage which follows.
For those better informed the work composed by our opponent will
itself appear advocate enough of the doctrines of true religion. He
says that the Being is itself indestructibility and likewise immortality. 555. For my part, whether these belong to the divine Nature
or whether [389] the Being is by connotation these very things, I
do not think it is anything I need quarrel with him about. Whichever
of the propositions prevails, it will certainly strengthen our case. If
it is a property of the essential being that it is not destroyed, so it
is certainly a property of it that it does not originate from being
begotten; and thus the idea of unbegottenness will be placed outside
the connotation of Being. 556. If however, because God is not
destroyed, one were to say his Being is indestructibility, and because
he is stronger than death, were to stipulate that for this reason his
very Nature is immortality, and the Son is indestructible and immortal, then the being of the Only-begotten will be indestructibility and
immortality. If then the Father is indestructibility, and the Son is
indestructibility, and each of these is a being, and no dierence is
conceived in the meaning of indestructibility, then one being will
surely be in no way dierent from the other, if the nature is in both
cases equally free from destructibility.
557. Although by repeating the same arguments he binds us, or so
he thinks, in inexorable dilemmas, saying that if we decide for what
is a property of the Being, the Deity is proved to be composite, but
if the simplicity is allowed, then indestructibility and unbegottenness
will surely be proved to connote the essential being itself, once more
we shall demonstrate that he himself supports our own claims. 558.
If he makes the divine Being utterly composite by attributing any
property to it, then surely he will remove not even fatherhood from
outside the essential being, but will concede that he is Father by
nature as he is indestructible and immortal, and thus even unwillingly will accept the Son into communion with his Nature. It will
not be possible, if the other is by nature Father, to separate the Son
from a relationship of essential nature with him. 559. If however he
says that fatherhood is a property of God outside his nature, he

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must also surely allow us the right to attribute a property to the

Father, [390] so that his simplicity is in no way negated if the property of unbegottenness is identied as outside his essential being. But
if he says that indestructible and unbegotten connote the being
itself, and insists that both the words have the same meaning as each
other, there being no dierence between them, because the connotation inherent in both is the same, and claims that the meaning of
indestructible and unbegotten is one, he who is one of these is
surely also the other. 560. Yet that the Son is indestructible even
they do not dispute; so on Eunomius argument he too is unbegotten, if indestructibility really has the same meaning as unbegottenness. So it is one thing or the other: he must either agree that
unbegotten signies something other than indestructibility, or he
will stick to his opinions and utter many blasphemies about the Onlybegotten, either making him destructible to avoid saying he is unbegotten, or arguing he is unbegotten to avoid proving him not
destructible.

XIV. Privative and negative words for God (561610)

561.570. On abbreviating a response to nonsense, especially that about
privation
561. I do not know what I should now do, whether to proceed step
by step through all the material, or whether here too to rule out
debate with empty words. One might compare the case of traders
in poisons, where the experiment with a small dose guarantees to
the buyers the deadly eect of the whole drug, and no one doubts,
once having learnt the poisonous eect from the part, that the whole
thing oered for sale is a deadly drug. In the same way I think,
now that this poisonous dosage in his book has been displayed by
our scrutiny, reasonable people will no longer be in doubt that the
whole thing is the same kind of drug as has been already demonstrated, and for this reason I reckon it undesirable to go to any
lengths in devoting time to vanities. 562. Nevertheless, because the
champions of deceit nd something persuasive from any source, and
there is a fear that not to cast an eye over some of their labours
might become a specious excuse for attacking us, on the grounds
that their strongest arguments are left out, [391] for this reason we

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beg those who support our eort, without condemning any idle chatter, to follow seriously our argument which everywhere of necessity
extends itself in opposition to the endeavours of falsehood. 563.
When he had scarcely nished dreaming up in deep sleep his fantasy about conceptual thought, equipping himself with those feeble
and senseless endeavours he moves his work on to another illusion
far more witless than his earlier fantasy. One may learn the futility
of his eort by looking carefully at his analysis of privation. 564.
Getting involved with all his rubbish I would leave to Eunomius and
those like him who have no experience of reecting on the most
important subjects. We shall tackle briey the main headings of what
he has said, so that none of the charges made may be left out, nor
any nonsense extend our work to unprotable length.
565. When he is about to include his analysis of privative words,
he promises that he will demonstrate the incurable absurdity, as
he himself puts it, of our doctrines, and an aected and culpable
piety. Such is his promise. What is his proof of the allegations?
When they say, he replies, that God is unbegotten by being
deprived of begottenness, we refute this by saying that neither this
word nor this thought are at all tting for God. 566. Let him tell
us who is the champion of this argument, whether anyone from the
time mankind came into existence until now, whether among
Barbarians or Greeks, can be shown to have uttered such a thing,
and we shall shut up. Of all human beings ever born there is none
could be proved to have said such a thing, unless he were mad. For
who is so far [392] beside himself with liquor, who so far out of his
mind with insanity or brain-fever, as to put this thought into words,
that begottenness is natural to the unbegotten God, and that, deprived
of his natural former state of being begotten, he afterwards became
unbegotten? 567. These things are devices of rhetoric, when they
are proved wrong, to evade the disgrace of being proved wrong by
bringing forward other persons. Just such is his defence of that Defence
of his, attributing the reason for his title219 to judges and accusers,
but able to point to no accusers, no seat of judgment, no court.
Now too, as if he were correcting the stupidity of others, he says he
has come to the necessity of speaking like this. 568. This is his

219

Eunomius is quoted to this eect in CE I 65 (GNO I 44,1545,1).

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proof of our incurable absurdity and aected and culpable piety.

But, he says, we are at a loss as to how to deal with the situation, and try to hide our perplexity by attacking him for his worldly
philosophy, and claiming personal communication with the Holy
Spirit. 569. This is another illusion, to suppose that he possesses
so much secular philosophy as to frighten Basil because of it. That
is the way some people often imagine they are enthroned among
kings and enjoy the supreme dignity, the deceitful visions seen in
dreams inducing this illusion as a result of their waking desire. 570.
Basil, he says, not being able to deal with the written text, attacks
Eunomius for his worldly philosophy. Mind you, he would have
taken such a charge seriously, that he was thought to have alarmed
some of his readers through the surfeit of words, not to mention
Basil or any of those like [393] him (if there is or ever has been
any one quite like him).
571.580. Words, ideas, and the transcendence of God
571. The argument in between if indeed it is an argument, his
servile abuse and the tasteless jibes with which he thinks he can run
down our own argument all that I leave out, regarding it as
oensive and disgusting to contaminate our book with so many blemishes, like those who are disgusted by swollen, stinking boils, and
scarce can bear the sight of those who from plethoric thickening of
the bodily humours have their appearance altered by warts and pimples. His opinion I shall briey set out, while avoiding the great
stench made by his words. The argument will in the rst instance
be freely presented by me, with no falling back into insolent distortion of what is said. 572. Every word, or every word properly so
called, is a sound which denotes some movement of thought; and
every activity and motion of the healthy mind aims, so far as it is
able, at the knowledge and consideration of existent things. The
nature of existents is twofold, being divided into what is intelligible
and what is sensible. The knowledge of things apparent to sensation, however, because they are readily observable, is available commonly to all, since identication by the senses engenders no ambiguity
about the object. 573. Dierences of colours and of the other qualities which we identify by hearing, smell, or the sense of touch or
taste, all of us who share the same nature recognize them and name
them with one voice, as we do also those remaining ones which

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seem to have a more supercial relevance to the aairs which occupy

our life, those which deal with the political and moral sphere of life.
574. On the other hand, in contemplating intelligible nature, because
it transcends sense-perception, as the mind [394] reaches out speculatively towards things which elude sensation, we behave in various ways about the object of our quest, and in accordance with the
impression made on the mind of each of us about the subject, we
express our understanding as best we can, approximating as nearly
as possible to the meaning of our thoughts through the connotation
of the words. 575. In these matters it is often possible to succeed
in ones goal on both counts, the mind not missing the mark and
the voice directly expressing the thought through the correct interpretation. But it can also happen that one is wrong on both counts,
or on one or other of them, with either the apprehending mind or
the interpretative faculty missing the mark.
576. There are thus two ways in which every word is made correct, the certainty of the idea and the verbal expression, and it would
be best to pass the examination on both counts; but it is none the
less good not to be mistaken about the correct understanding, even
if the word falls short of the idea. Therefore when the mind is exercised upon high and invisible subjects, which the senses cannot reach
and I am speaking about the divine and ineable Nature, on which
it is rash to seize on anything hastily with the mind, and still rasher
to commit the interpretation of the idea engendered in us to casual
words , then we dismiss the sound of words, which is expressed in
this way or that, according to the meaning of the sounds uttered,
and we take into account only the idea expressed in the words, in
accordance with its soundness or otherwise, leaving these details of
verbal and linguistic questions to the scholarship of grammarians.
577. Since then we denote through the application of names only
things that are known, and it is not possible to deal with things
beyond knowledge by calling them by names for how could anyone denote the unknowable? , no suitable appellations being available for these which [395] might adequately represent the subject,
we are obliged to reveal the idea of the Deity engendered in us by
many and various titles, in whatever way we can.
578. However, the things which come into our comprehension are
surely such that the realities either are observed within measurable

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time, or produce the notion of extension in space, in which each

particular is apprehended, or else come within our purview as delimited by beginning and end, being limited at either end by non-being;
for every thing that has beginning and end of existence begins from
non-being and ends in non-being. Or else, we understand the end
of all things by combining physical characteristics as what appears
when destruction and passion and change and transformation and
such things are compounded together. 579. For this reason, so that
the transcendent Nature may not appear to have anything in common with lowly things, we use of the divine Nature words and ideas
which negate such things, calling what is beyond the origin of the
ages preeternal, what is beyond origination unbegun, what does
not end endless, and what exists without body incorporeal, what
is not destroyed indestructible, and what is not liable to change,
passion or variation impassible, changeless, and invariable. 580.
Those who wish may make what linguistic analysis they please of
such words, and may add other words to these, calling them privative or negative words or what they please; for our part let us
leave such things to those anxious to teach or learn, and let us apply
ourselves solely to the sense, whether it falls within a devout understanding worthy of God, or outside it.
581.587. Titles of God based on his activities
581. If then God once was not, or at some time will not be, he
would not properly be called either unending or unbegun. Similarly
he would not be immutable, incorporeal or [396] indestructible, if
there were any suspicion about him of material body, destructibility, change or anything like that. If however it is reverent to attribute
none of these to him, then it would surely be religiously correct to
use of him words which separate from incongruities, and to say those
things which we have mentioned many times already, that he is indestructible, endless, unbegotten and so forth, the meaning inherent in
each of these titles informing us only of his separation from the
things immediately observed, not explaining the actual nature which
is separated from the incongruities.
582. What the Divinity is not, the connotation of all these titles rst
makes plain, while what that is by nature, which is not those things,
remains obscure. The rest of the terms too, the connotation of which

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indicates something positive and real, give an indication not of the

actual divine Nature, but of what can in true reverence be thought
about it. 583. When we perceive that no existing thing, whether visible or intelligible, is constituted by self-generation and chance, but
that everything which is understood as existing depends upon the
Nature which transcends the whole universe, and has its cause of
existence in that source, and when we observe the beauty and greatness of the wonders in creation, from all these things and their like
we get other ideas about the Divinity, and explain each of the ideas
generated in us by particular words, following the counsel of Wisdom,
who says that we should from the greatness and beauty of the creatures contemplate by analogy the Originator of all.220 584. We call
Designer the Maker of all, and Mighty the one who controls so
great a creation, whose might suced to bring what he willed into
being. Considering the good in our life [397] we are logical in naming the source of that life with the designation Good, and having
learnt from the divine scripture the impartiality of the coming judgment, we thereby name him Judge and Righteous. To sum up
briey, the ideas which arise in us about the divine Nature we carry
over into the form of names, such that no epithet is used of the
divine Nature without some specic idea. 585. Even the word God
(yew) we understand to have become prevalent because of the activity of oversight. Because we believe that the Divinity (yeon) is present to all things and watches (yesyai) all things and penetrates all
things, we indicate such an idea with this title,221 led in this direction by the word of scripture. The one who says, My God, look
at me,222 and, See, O God,223 and God knows the secrets of the
heart,224 is plainly interpreting the sense inherent in this title, that
God (yew) is so called from his watching (yesyai). 586. It makes
no dierence whether you say, Look, or See, or Watch.
Therefore, because he who watches (yemenow) sees what is watched
(t yeatn), he who watches is rightly called the God (yew) of what
is seen. So again, having by this means learnt some partial activity

220

Wis 13,5.
This false etymology of yew already appears in Irenaeus and Clement, according to PGL, s.v.
222
Ps 21,2 LXX (rather than 54/55,3 indicated by Jaeger).
223
Ps 83/84,10(9); this phrase is not frequent in scripture, as Jaeger suggests.
224
Ps 43,22/44,21.
221

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of the divine Nature, we have not by this word come to hold in

mind the divine Being itself. Yet we do not, because we are at a
loss for the proper word, reckon that the Divinity forfeits any of his
glory. 587. The inability to express unutterable things, while convicting us of the poverty of our nature, has more power to demonstrate the glory of God, when it teaches us, as the Apostle says, that
to believe him to be above every name is the only tting way to
name God.225 That he transcends every eort of thought, and is
found to be beyond the reach of naming, stands as a testimony to
mankind of his ineable majesty.
588.595. Eunomius claim that privative titles demean God
[398] 588. As far as the titles applied to God are concerned and
the mode in which they are expressed, these are the principles we
recognize. We have presented them to the more kindly of our hearers in a form lacking elaboration and simple, having judged it both
indecent and improper for us ourselves to oppose vigorously the feeble attacks of Eunomius about these subjects. What is one to say to
one who claims that we make the form of names superior to the
dignity of those named, bestowing on the names precedence over
the realities, and equality on things unequal? 589. This is quoted
in his own words. Let him who is qualied to judge decide whether
there is anything near the mark, for which a defence would be merited, in the vehement allegation of the slanderer that we bestow on
the names precedence over the realities, when it is obvious to all
that no name has of itself a substantial existence, but that every
name is a sign and indicator of some substantial being and idea, by
itself existing neither in being nor in thought. 590. How it is possible to bestow gifts on what does not exist, let him tell the disciples of his fraud, since he claims to use nouns and verbs properly!
I would not have mentioned these matters at all, if it had not been
necessary through them to provide a demonstration of the weakness
of our wordsmith on the subject of meaning and verbal expression.
As to what he drags in, incompatible with inspired scripture and
not to the point, articially arguing a dierence in immortality between
angels and men, I do not know what his purpose is or what he is

225

Phil 2,9.

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trying to prove by this, so I shall leave that out also. What is immortal, qua immortal, admits no comparison of more or less.226 591. For
if in comparison one member of the pair falls short where immortality is concerned, inevitably [399] that one will not be called immortal at all: how could something be correctly termed immortal if
comparison with another proved it mortal? I also pass over his subtle suggestion, that one should not bid the idea of privation to be
indierent or neutral, but should call privation the removal of what
is good, and that one ought not to denote distance from evil things
by this word as if, should these views prevail, the word of the
Apostle about him were no longer true, when it says that he alone
possesses immortality and gives it to others.227 592. What the statement now introduced by him has to do with the preceding argument, is impossible either for us or for any other intelligent person
to understand, and because we cannot penetrate these clever subtleties he calls us unskilled both in discernment of realities and conferment of verbalities.228 These are his actual written words. 593.
All such things are powerless against the truth, and I pass them by
without detailed consideration.
So too with his attacks on the interpretation we have proposed
of indestructible and incorporeal, that these two epithets denote
in the one case that he is non-dimensional, whereby the three-fold
measurement of physical bodies does not apply, and in the other
immunity to destruction. So too with his statement, in these terms,
We do not approve of the form of names diverting to unsuitable
ideas, and his supposition that these two terms refer, not to not
being or not belonging, but to the actual being, these too we deem
to deserve silence and deep oblivion, and I shall leave it to readers
to detect for themselves [400] the combination of wickedness with
nonsense. He claims that the destructible is not the opposite of indestructible, and that privative denotation does not denote removal of
evil, but that being itself is denoted by the subject. 594. If it is

226
Jaeger compares Aristotle, Categories 3b33, It seems that being does not admit
of more or less.
227
1 Tim 6,16.
228
This is a clumsy attempt to represent a play on words, which Gregory perhaps remarks on in the next few words. Eunomius writes more literally, . . . discernment of realities and usage of words (tn pragmtvn krsevw ka tn nomtvn
xrsevw).

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reckoned by the one who puts these empty arguments together that
the term indestructible does not rule out destruction, it must surely
follow that such a form of title indicates the opposite. If indestructibility is not freedom from destruction, there is surely the simultaneous assertion of what is negated, for it is the nature of opposites
that when one is negated the statement of its contrary replaces it.
595. That other acute argument we also dismiss, that God is by
nature immune to death, as though there were any one who held
the contrary opinion on the subject. Our view is that where opposites are concerned it makes no dierence whether you say that the
one is, or that the other is not: so in the present discussion, when
we say that God is Life, it means that by this confession we refuse
to envisage his death, though that may not be expressly said; and
when we confess him immune to death, by its very wording our
statement implies that he is Life.
596.604. Negative terms make divine attributes distinct
596. But I do not see, he says, how on the basis of what is missing God could transcend his own creatures; and on the basis of
this shrewd argument he calls great Basil silly, and wicked with it,
because he is brave enough to use such words. I would advise him
not to be too generous in using insults against those who say these
things, or he may nd himself insulting himself too with the same
words unawares. For perhaps he would not himself deny that the
majesty of the divine Nature is made known in the fact that it has
nothing in common with those things in which the lower nature is
shown to participate. 597. If he possessed any of these, he would
not be superior, but would surely be the same as everything that
participates in the characteristic. If [401] however he is above these
things, it is exactly by not having these qualities that he excels those
who have them, just as we say the sinless is superior to those with
sins. Separation from evil is proof of being rich in the best things.
Let the oensive person live according to his nature, but for ourselves, having briey noted what is said in this part, we shall apply
the argument to our present task. 598. He says that he likewise
surpasses mortal things as immortal, destructible things as indestructible, and begotten things as unbegotten. Is the logic of impiety in Gods enemy obvious to all, or must we expose it by what
we say? Who does not know that things which are surpassed in equal

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measure must be equal to each other? If then the destructible and

the begotten are likewise surpassed by God, and the Lord is begotten, let Eunomius draw the impious conclusion which emerges from
his statement. 599. It is clear that he considers being begotten is
the same as destruction and death, just as in his earlier words he
declared the unbegotten to be the same as the indestructible. If then
he sees destruction and being begotten as equal, and says that God
is likewise distant from both, and if the Lord is begotten, no one
should demand that we add what follows from the logic, but let him
work out the conclusion by himself, if equally and in the same degree
the divine Nature is distant from the begotten and the destructible.
But it is impossible, he says, to call him indestructible and
immortal by the absence of death and destruction. 600. Let those
who are dragged by the nose be convinced by the words, and those
who are led about as each pleases, and let them say that destruction and death are present in God so that he may be called immortal and indestructible. For if it is not the absence of death and
destruction, as [402] Eunomius says, that the titles negating these
things indicate, then surely it is their antitheses and opposites that
are argued by this rened logic. 601. Each one of the ideas, surely,
is either absent or not absent, as with light and darkness, life and
death, health and sickness, and so on. In these cases, if the one idea
were said to be absent, the presence of the other would certainly be
implied. So if he says that it is not by absence of death that God
is called immortal, he would appear to be clearly arguing that death
is present with him, and thereby denying the immortality of the God
of the universe. 602. For how could one still be truly immortal and
indestructible, of whom he says that destruction and death are not
absent from him? But perhaps someone will say that we are seizing
too malignantly on the argument, for no one would be so mad as
to argue that God is not immortal. No person however knows what
goes on secretly in anyones mind, and our guess as to what lies
hidden is derived from what is actually said. 603. Let us therefore
repeat the statement: It is not by absence of death, he says, that
God is called immortal. How are we to take this claim, that death
is not absent from God, though he be called immortal? If therefore
he bids us think this, then surely Eunomius god is mortal and subject to destruction. Where death is not absent from someone, it is
not his nature to be immortal. Yet if the terms do not connote the
absence of either death or destruction, they are either applied pointlessly

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to the God over all, or they contain within them some other sense.
604. What that might be, is for our subtle logician to explain. We,
however, who are, as Eunomius says, unskilled both in discernment
of realities and conferment of verbalities,229 have learnt to call undiseased not the one who is free from power, but the one who is free
from disease, and unmaimed not the one removed from [403] drinking parties, but the one who has no maiming injury in him; and we
use names for everything in the same way, manly and unmanly,
sleepy and sleepless, and whenever this practice applies.
605.610. If immortality is being, that applies also to the Son
605. What benet there is, however, in allowing the serious study
of this nonsense, I do not know. For a man of grey-haired age who
looks to the truth it is no small cause for blame if he allows himself to utter with his mouth the ridiculous and frivolous words of his
adversarys contentiousness. I shall therefore pass over those remarks,
and those which follow immediately upon them, which are these:
Neither does the truth attest anything, he says, co-natured with
God . . . .230 606. (If he had not said this, who would have said that
God is double-natured, except you who say that every named attribute
is co-natured with the essential being of the Father, and nothing
attaches to him from without, but you embed every divine title in
the being of God?) He goes on, . . . nor indeed enshrining in the
laws of true religion such an attribute from without and formed by
us. I again crave pardon for the words: it is not to make a joke
that I have set these ridiculous words before my readers, but so as
to persuade my audience what sort of verbal equipment he starts
from, this man who besmirches our simplemindedness and then
launches himself against the truth. 607. What he is as a writer, and
what sort of things he utters as he plumes himself and parades before
insensitive hearers, who acclaim him ill-composedly advancing through
these bombastic rhetorical aridities, as though he had conquered all
by the power of his words.231

229

Repeated from CE II 592 (GNO I 399,1416), where see note.

This is an incomplete sentence. Even when CE II 606 (GNO I 403,1719)
is added, it remains a genitive absolute without a main clause.
231
Gregory appears to be ironically imitating the verbosity he criticizes.
230

the second book against eunomius

197

But, he says, the being itself is immortality. I would say to him,

What then do you say about the being of the Only-begotten?
Immortality or not? For in this case too, Simplicity, as you put it,
[404] admits no co-naturing. 608. If he denies that the being of
the Son is immortality, then his purpose is obvious. The opposite of
immortal does not need a subtle intellect to understand it. Just as
the logic of dichotomy proves what is nor indestructible to be destructible, and what is not immutable to be mutable, so surely what is
not immortal is mortal. What then will our exponent of new doctrines decide about the being of the Only-begotten? 609. Again I
will put the same question to our wordsmith. Will he grant that this
too is immortality, or will he not agree? If he will not accept that
the being of the Son is immortality, he will be obliged to concede
the opposite, proving that by the negation of the positive it is actually death. 610. If on the other hand he avoids the absurdity by
giving the name immortality also to the being of the Only-begotten, he must because of this necessarily concede that there is no
dierence in essential being. For if the nature of the Father and that
of the Son is equally immortality, and immortality is by no conceivable dierence divided against itself, then even our adversaries
themselves confess that no conceivable dierence is to be found
between the being of the Father and that of the Son.
XV. Eunomius nal fraud, and Gregorys response (611627)
611.624. Is the Father from non-being? A misrepresentation exposed
611. Now it is time to describe the grave charge, which he makes
at the end of his work, alleging that we say that the Father is from
total non-being. Stealing an expression from its context, and dragging it stripped and disconnected from the remaining body of text,
he tries to bite into it, tearing at it with his ineectual teeth, or
rather slobbering over the book. I will rst state the meaning of the
careful judgments made on the subject by the Master, then I will
set out the argument itself word for word, so that the one who introduces damaging corruptions into the works of the truly religious may
be exposed for all to see. 612. Introducing us to the [405] connotation of unbegotten in his own words, our Master suggested an
approach to understanding the problem by showing that the

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gregory of nyssa

connotation of unbegotten is dierent from the meaning of being.

When, he says, the evangelist began his genealogy of our Lord with
Joseph, and then went back always to the earlier person and made
Adam the end of the genealogy,232 and because it was not possible
for a physical father to precede the rst-formed, called him son of
God, it is obvious for every one to accept with the mind, he says,
this point about God: God, whose son is Adam, does not himself
have his existence from another in the same way as those listed in
the human genealogy. 613. When, having gone through them all,
we accept God into our thought after all the rest, we are thinking
of the beginning of all. Every beginning, if it depends upon something else, is not the beginning. Therefore, if God is the beginning
of all, there can be nothing whatever preceding the beginning of all
things. This is the Masters account of the meaning of unbegotten.
To show that nothing untrue has been attributed to him by us,
I will quote verbatim his statement on the subject: 614. The Evangelist
Luke, he says, in giving his account of the eshly genealogy of
our God and Saviour Jesus Christ, and working his way backwards
from the last to the rst, began with Joseph, saying that he was the
son of Eli, and he of Mattath, and thus going backwards he traced
his account as far as Adam; coming to the earliest, and saying that
Seth was from Adam and Adam from God, there he stopped going
backwards. In the same way as the Evangelist said that Adam is
from God, we are to ask ourselves, From whom is God? 615. Is
it not obvious [406] to the understanding of all that he is from no
one? Clearly, what is from no one is unbegun, and what is unbegun is the unbegotten. Just as in the case of men it is not their
essential being to be from someone, so also in the case of the God
of the universe one may not say that to be unbegotten is his essential being.233 With what eyes now do you look to your captain?
I address you, the ock of those who are perishing. Why do you
still give ear to one who has by his words put up such a monument
to his own villainy? Are you not ashamed, at least now if not before,
to use such a guide to the truth? 616. Will you not take this as a
sign of his lunacy about doctrines, when he so shamelessly goes

232
233

Lk 3,2337.
Jaeger cites this passage as Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 15 (PG 29, 545b548a).

the second book against eunomius

199

against the truth of what is actually written? Is this how he also

interprets to you the words of Scripture? Is this how he champions
the truth of his doctrines, in order to convict Basil of tracing the
genealogy of the God over all from total non-being?
617. Am I to utter what he has said? Am I to quote his shameless
words? I pass over the insults, I complain not at the vituperation; I
do not blame one with bad breath because he stinks, nor the one
with a crippled body because he is crippled. Such things are natural misfortunes which are not liable to blame by reasonable people. The urge to insult is a weakness of mind, a misfortune of the
soul with its healthy intelligence crippled. I have no discussion of his
vituperation. But that vehement and irresistible web of syllogism,
with which he brings his allegation against us to his own conclusion, that I will write down expressly, word for word: 618. So that
he may not be prevented, he says, from saying that the Son derives
from participation in him who is, he has inadvertently said that the
God over all is from total non-being. For if nothing is the same
[407] in meaning as total non-being, and the substitution of synonyms is unavoidable, one who says that God is from no one is saying that God is from total non-being.
Which of these words shall we consider rst? That he thinks the
Son derives from participation in God,234 and spreads the foul smell
from his mouth on those who do not accept this? Or shall we recount
in full the feeble illusion of his sophistic syllogism? That the thought
of sons belonging to the divine being by participation comes from
poets and myth-makers, is something everyone knows who has even
the slightest good sense. 619. So it is that those who string together
myths in verse depict people such as Dionysus, Heracles, Minos and
others like them from the bonding of spirits with human bodies, and
elevate such people above the rest of men by reason of the superiority which comes from participation in the higher nature. This word
234
This formula, that the Son is from metousa of the being of God, is misleadingly attributed to Basil by Eunomius. metousa is a word for the participation
of particular instances in universal ideas. It is used by the Fathers of the participation of believers in the life of God, but generally rejected as too weak and subordinate a relation of the Son to the Father, which is regarded as essential: the
one being of God is possessed by the Son as well as the Father, and he is not just
one instance of some higher idea of godhead. Gregorys critique here is typical. See
PGL, s.v. metousa.

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gregory of nyssa

therefore should be passed over in silence, as originally a proof of

folly and impiety, and we should rather put forward that irresistible
syllogism, so that the simple-minded among us may learn what is
lost by those not trained in logical method.
620. For if nothing, he says, is the same in meaning as total
non-being, and the substitution of synonyms is unavoidable, one who
says that God is from no one is saying that God is from total nonbeing. Who agreed with the one threatening us with the Aristotelian
spear,235 that to say someone has no father is the same as saying
that he has come to exist from total non-being? Any one who counts
those listed by the scripture in the genealogy one by one can obviously see always a father preceding the person mentioned. 621. What
was Eli of Joseph? What was Mattath of Eli? What was Adam of
Seth? [408] Is it not quite clear even to the most naive that the list
of these names that are mentioned is a catalogue of fathers? If Seth
is Adams son, then surely Adam is the father of the one begotten
by him. So tell me, who then is the father of the God over all?
Answer the question, say something, give a reply, put all your logical skill into operation to deal with this enquiry. Can you nd an
explanation which escapes the grip of your syllogism? 622. Who is
the father of the Unbegotten? Can you say who? Is he after all not
unbegotten? If pressed, you will surely say, what indeed absolutely
must be said, No one. Why then, my friend, is that soggy web of
your syllogism not yet invalidated? Do you realize you have dribbled all over your own chest? What did great Basil say? that the
Unbegotten is from no father, for from the fathers listed in the
genealogy the sequence permits the addition of father to be understood unexpressed. 623. You turned from no father into nothing,
and again by changing nothing into total non-being you reached
the conclusion of that invalid syllogism. These ingenuities of your
logical precision will therefore be turned against you. Who is the
father of the Unbegotten, I ask? No one, you will be obliged to say.
The Unbegotten certainly has no father. 624. If then no one is
father of the Unbegotten, and nothing is substituted for no one
by you, and nothing on your account is the same in meaning as

235

A jocular reference to Aristotles logical prowess.

the second book against eunomius

201

total non-being, and the substitution of synonyms is unavoidable,

as you claim, then the one who says that no one is the father of
the Unbegotten is saying that the God over all is from total nonbeing.
625.627. Conclusion: Eunomius himself exposed by Basil and Gregory
625. Such an evil it is apparently, Eunomius I shall quote your
own words not, [409] to honour seeming above being wise, for
that is perhaps a minor misfortune, but to be ignorant of yourself
and not to know how great is the dierence between the heightseeking Basil and the earth-bound beast. 626. If that sharp, divine
eye were to survey our life, if it were to traverse human history on
the wing of wisdom, it would swoop down on you and show with
his sweep of words what a pot full of folly you have turned into,
and who it is against whom you have raised yourself up with lying
deceit, using insults and abuse against him in your eorts to look
important to old crones and castrati. 627. Nevertheless, you should
not stop expecting his talons. Compared with him, our work may
be judged a small part of a big claw, but against you it is so big
that it will be enough to tear apart your shell of deceit and reveal
the muck hidden inside the jar.

PART III

COMMENTARY

GREGORS ZUSAMMENFASSUNG DER EUNOMIANISCHEN

POSITION IM VERGLEICH ZUM ANSATZ DES
EUNOMIUS (CE II 166)
Thomas Bhm

I. Einleitung
Die Kirche ist umgeben von den Belagerungsmaschinen der Hresie,
so dass die Notwendigkeit besteht, in den Kampf einzugreifen.1 In
der Eingangspassage zum zweiten Buch seiner Schrift gegen Eunomius
wendet sich Gregor von Nyssa aus seiner Perspektive einer der
Hauptthesen des Eunomius zu, wonach die Ungezeugtheit oder
Agennesie (gennhsa) mit der osa bzw. dem Sein Gottes gleichgesetzt ist, wie dies Eunomius in seiner Apologie entfaltet hatte.2
Dabei geht Gregor so vor, dass er in einem Promium den Leser auf
die Bedeutung des Sachverhaltes hinweisen will, indem er wie dies
Basilius in Adversus Eunomium I 12 entsprechend ausgefhrt hatte3
dem Leser vor Augen hlt, dass Eunomius von der wahren Gottesverehrung abweicht4 und sich als Feind der Wahrheit, worunter
meist der Teufel verstanden wird, in Gegensatz zur berlieferung
der Kirche setzt. Damit wird Gregor der rhetorischen Aufgabe des
attentum parare gerecht. Die Aufmerksamkeit des Lesers erreicht Gregor
auch dadurch, dass die Kirche durch die Hresie des Eunomius
bedroht ist wie in einem Kampf durch die Belagerung.5 Wohlwollend
gestimmt werden die Leser dadurch, dass Eunomius in der Gestalt
des Goliath auftritt, der sich als kopos erweist6 und der mit 1 Kor
11,3 das Haupt, nmlich Christus, bereits verloren hat,7 whrend

Vgl. CE II 8 (GNO I 228,1224).

Vgl. Eunomius, Apologia 78 (Vaggione 4042).
3
Vgl. Basilius von Caesarea, Adversus Eunomium I 12 (SC 299, 140156); zu
Adversus Eunomium des Basilius bereite ich eine eigene editio maior vor, die bei GCS
erscheinen wird, sowie eine deutsche bersetzung bei BGL.
4
Vgl. CE II 3 (GNO I 226,1821).
5
Vgl. CE II 8 (GNO I 228,1224).
6
Vgl. CE II 56 (GNO I 227,13228,5).
7
Vgl. CE II 6 (GNO I 227,27228,5).
2

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thomas bhm

Gregor den Kampf gegen den bermchtigen Goliath (nmlich

Eunomius) wie David aufnimmt8 in der Honung auf die gttliche
Macht, die sich gndig zuwendet.9 Mit diesem ersten Anlauf hat es
Gregor entsprechend der promialen Topoi erreicht, die Aufmerksamkeit und das Wohlwollen der Leser hervorzurufen. Das docilem
parare gelingt Gregor dadurch, dass er darauf verweist, sein Bruder
Basilius habe sich bereits damit auseinandergesetzt, wie der Begri
des Ungezeugtseins zu verwenden sei, worauf aber Eunomius nicht
weiter eingegangen sei.10
Die folgenden Ausfhrungen behandeln zunchst die Grundthese
des Eunomius, um von hier aus die Reaktion Gregors darzustellen.

II. Die Position des Eunomius

Eunomius zufolge gibt es entsprechend der allgemeinen berzeugung und der Lehre der Vter nur einen Gott, der weder durch
sich selbst noch durch einen anderen geworden ist. Wenn er also
weder frher als er selbst noch etwas anderes frher sein kann, so
folge daraus das unerzeugt (gnnhtow) oder besser: er ist unerzeugte
osa, ein Begri, der weder der menschlichen Erndung entspringt
noch als Privation verstehbar ist. Dies bedeutet fr Eunomius, dass
das Sein Gottes notwendig als unerzeugt bestimmt werden muss. Weil
demgegenber der Einziggeborene gezeugt ist und diese Bestimmung
seine osa betrit, besteht zwischen dem Unerzeugten und dem
Erzeugten keine Gemeinsamkeit; folglich sind sie seins- oder wesensmig dierent.11
Diese Bestimmung Gottes ergibt sich fr Eunomius zunchst aus
dem Argument, dass das Erste (Gott) nicht frher oder spter als es
selbst sein kann und dass nichts anderes das Erste vor dem Ersten
sein knne.12 Mit der Frage nach dem Vorher- oder Spter-Sein
8

Vgl. CE II 5 (GNO I 227,2226).

Vgl. CE II 9 (GNO I 229,29).
10
Vgl. CE II 1011 (GNO I 229,18230,14).
11
Vgl. Eunomius, Apologia 78 (Vaggione 4042); zum Ansatz des Eunomius vgl.
z.B. Th. Bhm, Theoria Unendlichkeit Aufstieg. Philosophische Implikationen zu De vita
Moysis von Gregor von Nyssa, Leiden New York Kln 1996, 108122 (dort weitere Lit.); R. M. Hbner, Zur Genese der trinitarischen Formel bei Basilius von
Caesarea, in: M. Weitlau P. Neuner (Hrsg.), Fr euch Bischof, mit euch Christ. FS
fr Friedrich Kardinal Wetter zum siebzigsten Geburtstag, St. Ottilien 1998, 150f.
12
Vgl. Eunomius, Apologia 7 (Vaggione 40).
9

zusammenfassung der eunomianischen position

207

Gottes in seiner Einheit greift Eunomius auf eine Diskussion zurck,

die sich aus der ersten Hypothesis des platonischen Parmenides ergibt,
nmlich die Frage, ob das Eine gleichaltrig mit sich selbst, jnger
und/oder lter als es selbst und das andere als es selbst sein knne,
und zwar unter dem Gesichtspunkt der ersten Hypothesis des platonischen Parmenides: wenn Eines ist.13 Nhme man an, dass das
Eine das gleiche Alter wie es selbst oder wie anderes htte, msste
es auch an der Zeit hinsichtlich der Gleichheit oder hnlichkeit teilhaben, Prdikate, die nach Platon aber nicht auf das Eine zutreen.14
Im Sinne Platons wrde dies implizieren, dass das Eine an der Zeit
teilhaben msste. Daraus ergbe sich jedoch, dass aufgrund der
Teilhabe dem Einen etwas hinzukme, woran es teilhat, so dass das
Eine qua Eines nicht mehr es selbst wre, sondern zusammengesetzt,
also nicht mehr Eines als Eines an und fr sich selbst.15
Diese Ausfhrungen Platons (Parm. 140e) wurden in den antiken
Kommentaren prinzipientheoretisch gedeutet. Speziell fr die Frage
nach dem lter- und Jngersein bzw. dem Gleichaltrig-Sein berichtet Proklos von Ansichten der Neuplatoniker, die das lter und
Jnger als eine Folgeordnung deuteten.16 Nach deren Interpretation,
allen voran derjenigen des Jamblich, sei lter die einfachere und
allgemeinere Bestimmung, wodurch ein ontologischer Status ausgedrckt werde.17 Zudem behauptet Aristoteles, Platon habe die Begrie
frher und spter in dem Sinne verstanden, dass etwas, das frher
ist, ohne anderes existieren knne.18 Das Allgemeinere und in der
gedanklichen Ableitung Ursprnglichere kann somit einerseits als das
ontologisch Vorgeordnete gedacht werden, dieses Ursprngliche aber
zugleich nicht-reziprok bestimmt werden, weil das Vorgeordnete ohne
das ihm Folgende sein kann. Einheit bzw. das Eine kann folglich als
von der Vielheit unabhngig und zugleich als Grund der Vielheit
gedacht, somit hinsichtlich einer verursachenden und begrndenden
13
14
15

Platon, Parm. 137c und 140e.

Platon, Parm. 139e140b.
Diese Ausfhrungen sind hier modiziert entnommen aus Th. Bhm, Theoria,

110f.
16

Vgl. Proklos, In Parm. (Cousin 1216,371217,13).

Vgl. B. Dalsgaard Larsen, Jamblique de Chalcis. Exgte et philosophe, Aarhus 1972,
423428; E. Sonderegger, Simplikios: ber die Zeit. Ein Kommentar zum Corollarium de
tempore, Gttingen 1982, 124; zu Proklos vgl. W. Beierwaltes, Proklos: Grundzge seiner Metaphysik, Frankfurt 21979, 227229.
18
Vgl. Aristoteles, Met. 1019a24; ferner Alexander von Aphrodisias, In Met.
(CAG I 55,2223); Plotin, Enn. V 5 [32] 4,1316.
17

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thomas bhm

Prioritt verstanden werden. Weil das Eine (Gott) weder frher noch
spter als es selbst ist, ist es selbst vor allem und dementsprechend
auch nicht durch etwas anderes erzeugt.19 In diesem Sinne kann es
Grund von allem sein, folglich im Kontext der eunomianischen
Theologie auch die Ursache des Sohnes, sofern dieser einzigerzeugt
ist.20
In einem weiteren Schritt muss Eunomius aufweisen, wie der Begri
gnnhtow im Hinblick auf die osa verstanden werden kann, d.h.
wie die Form der Negation zu deuten ist, wenn ausgeschlossen ist,
dass die Aussagen epinoetisch zu deuten sind, also u.a. von der
menschlichen Aussprache unabhngig sein sollen. Dabei wehrt sich
Eunomius dagegen, diese Negation im Sinne einer Privation zu verstehen. Denn Privationen sind nur dann Privationen, wenn eine
zugrundeliegende Natur als positive Bestimmung angenommen wird,
auf die hin die Abwesenheit dieser Bestimmung ausgesagt wird; in
diesem Fall ist die Privation eine sekundre Aussage.21 Dies hiee:
Wre der Begri gnnhtow privativ zu verstehen, msste auch angenommen werden, dass Gott zunchst eine gnesiw zukme, so dass
er erst unerzeugt geworden wre. Daraus ergibt sich, dass dem Begri
gnnhtow zwar sprachlich ein negativer Charakter zukommt, der
aber nicht pejorativ gedacht sein soll.22 Ein solches Verstndnis verweist auf den Diskussionszusammenhang von Negation und Privation,
wie sich dies etwa bei Alexander von Aphrodisias zeigt: Die Privation
unterscheidet sich nmlich von der Negation (. . .), dass die Negation
fr das Seiende und Nichtseiende prdiziert wird, die Privation aber
fr eine zugrundeliegende Natur.23 Eine Privation wird von etwas
prdiziert, was prinzipiell die von Natur aus vorhandene Mglichkeit
zu einer Leistung besitzt, die im Falle der Privation aktuell nicht
vorhanden ist, wie etwa bei der Blindheit oder Taubheit. Eunomius
knnte demnach den Begri gnnhtow so verstehen, dass er ihn im
Sinne einer Negation gebraucht, die selbst keine Privation impliziert.

19
Zu diesen Ausfhrungen vgl. grundlegend J. Halfwassen, Der Aufstieg zum Einen.
Untersuchungen zu Platon und Plotin, Stuttgart 1991, 374376.
20
Vgl. dazu Th. Bhm, Theoria, 112f.
21
Vgl. Eunomius, Apologia 8 (Vaggione 4042).
22
Dazu Th. Bhm, Theoria, 114.
23
Alexander von Aphrodisias, In Met. (CAG I 327,2224); vgl. auch Proklos,
Theol. Plat. II 5 (Sarey-Westerink 3739); dazu R. Mortley, From Word to Silence I:
The Rise and Fall of Logos, Bonn 1986, 137139.

zusammenfassung der eunomianischen position

209

Eunomius kann also den Begri gnnhtow als strikte Negation im

Sinne des Ausschlusses von Endlichem aus dem Unendlichen (d.h.
Gott) ausweisen und dies in einem weiteren Schritt auf die osa
Gottes anwenden.24
Dies stellt jedoch ein Problem dar, das sich im Anschluss an Plotin
ergibt und bei Dexipp diskutiert wird.25 Denn Plotin betont, dass man
von der osa sagen knne: ok stin.26 Man knne so Seleukos,
der Gesprchspartner des Dexipp also nur behaupten, was die
osa nicht ist, aber das gebe keine Information darber, was die
osa sei. Dexipp hebt in seiner Antwort hervor, dass man in diesem
Falle keine strikte Denition liefere, sondern eine Beschreibung
(pograf). Aber auch im Falle von Denitionen verwende man
Negationen, so z.B., wenn man das Indierente zwischen gut und
schlecht bestimmen wolle. In diesem Fall sage man, es sei weder gut
noch schlecht. So knne man in positivem Sinne fr die osa die
Negation verwenden, um die osa im eigentlichsten Sinn (kurivtth) anzuzeigen. Es sei folglich mglich, die Armation durch die
Negation (pfasiw) zu erkennen.27 Diese Weiterfhrung durch Dexipp
kann also zeigen, dass die Negation in neuplatonischen Gedankengngen nicht nur von der Privation getrennt wurde, sondern die
Negation auf die Armation verweisen kann, wie im Falle der osa.
In diesem Sinne kann Eunomius m.E. auch betonen, dass man bei
Gott von der unerzeugten osa sprechen knne, die sich von derjenigen des Sohnes wesentlich unterscheidet.28
Daraus ergibt sich, dass im Hinblick auf Gott das unerzeugt im
Zusammenhang mit Gottes Einheit als Bestimmung der osa prdiziert wird, so dass wie Eunomius am Ende von Apol. 8 betont
das unerzeugt auch nicht auf einen Teil Gottes angewandt werden,
nicht in ihm als Getrenntes existieren und auch nicht als von ihm
dierent gedacht werden knne.29 Damit ist die osa dahingehend
bestimmt, dass sie eins, unzusammengesetzt und unerzeugt ist. Auffllig ist an der Argumentation des Eunomius, dass er Gott (nicht den
Vater) in diesem Kontext als die Ursache, die selbst nicht verursacht

24
25
26
27
28
29

Vgl. Th. Bhm, Theoria, 115117.

Vgl. Dexipp, In Cat. (CAG IV/2 44).
Plotin, Enn. VI 1 [42] 2,15.
Vgl. Dexipp, In Cat. (CAG IV/2 44).
So Th. Bhm, Theoria, 117 mit leichten Modikationen.
Vgl. Eunomius, Apologia 8 (Vaggione 42).

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thomas bhm

ist, versteht, die aufgrund ihrer Einheit nicht zusammengesetzt und

nicht erzeugt sein kann. Diese Bestimmungen betreen das Sein
(die osa) Gottes, sind also als wesenhafte Prdikationen aufzufassen, die trotz ihrer Negation auf die Position verweisen. Dabei spricht
Eunomius in der Apologie jedoch nicht davon, dass die osa Gottes
die Unerzeugtheit (gennhsa) sei.

III. Die Argumentation des Gregor von Nyssa

Um die Position des Eunomius zu widerlegen, geht Gregor von Nyssa
zunchst auf den Zusammenhang von gennhsa und osa ein.30
Dabei whlt Gregor einen Weg, der ganz pointiert nicht mit der gegnerischen Argumentation einsetzt, sondern auf der biblischen Grundlage
Aussagen ber den einzigerzeugten Gott (den Sohn) anfhrt: Er sei
Wahrheit, wahres Licht, Kraft Gottes und Leben.31 Damit greift
Gregor bereits seine Sicht der pnoia-Lehre auf, dass nmlich die
unterschiedlichen Begrisbestimmungen nicht die osa betreen, um
damit die eunomianische Position, wie Gregor sie versteht, eines atus
vocis auer Kraft zu setzen.32 Dem dient auch das zustzliche Argument
Gregors, das seiner Erkenntnis- und Sprachtheorie entstammt, dass
die menschlichen Mglichkeiten einer konzeptuellen Bildung das Sein
selbst (die osa) nicht erreichen,33 weil einerseits entsprechend der
stoischen Sprachtheorie die semantische Reprsentation (Laut und
Bedeutung) vom im Zeichen reprsentierten Objekt unterschieden
sind34 und weil andererseits diskursives Denken und Sprache durch
Abstndigkeit (disthma, distasiw) charakteriert sind und stets Etwas,
nmlich etwas Bestimmtes im Verhltnis zum Anderen, benennen
und so die in sich nicht dierenzierte osa (Gottes) nicht gedacht
und ausgesagt werden kann.35 Man erreicht also ein Wissen, dass
etwas ist, nicht was es ist hinsichtlich der osa,36 ein Thema, das
30

Vgl. CE II 1222 (GNO I 230,15233,10).

Vgl. CE II 12 (GNO I 230,1921).
32
Zur Position des Eunomius vgl. Th. Bhm, Theoria, 176178; zur Problematik
des atus vocis vgl. ebd., bes. 177; zu Gregor ebd., 187198, jeweils mit den entsprechenden Nachweisen.
33
Vgl. CE II 12 (GNO I 230,2226).
34
Vgl. Th. Bhm, Theoria, 189190 mit Nachweisen.
35
Vgl. Th. Bhm, Theoria, 193197 mit den entsprechenden Hinweisen sowie
den neuplatonischen Konnotationen dieser Theorie.
36
Vgl. CE II 13 (GNO I 230,2630).
31

zusammenfassung der eunomianischen position

211

seit Philo von Alexandrien breit errtert ist u.a. auch bei Basilius
in Adversus Eunomium , das aber bereits in der zweiten Analytik des
Aristoteles vorbereitet ist.37
Immer wieder kontrastiert Gregor in dieser Eingangspassage die
Lehre der Schrift und den orthodoxen Glauben mit der Position des
Eunomius: Whrend nach der Schrift dem Vater und dem Sohn
die gleiche Ehre zukommen,38 weicht Eunomius davon durch die
Konzeption der Ungezeugtheit (gennhsa) ab.39 Dies spitzt Gregor
dann auch in CE II 1819 dahingehend zu: Die Wahrheit lehre,
dass der Vater nicht von einer hheren Ursache stamme; die Eunomianer nennen dies Ungezeugtheit. Dem Einziggezeugten komme
das Gezeugtsein zu; beides stehe im Widerspruch. Dies bedeute eine
Dierenz im Sein (osa), so dass die eine osa gezeugt, die andere
ungezeugt sei.40
Mit dieser Zusammenfassung der eunomianischen Lehre, nmlich
dass die gennhsa die osa sei und sich daraus eine Dierenz der
Natur von Vater und Sohn ergebe,41 ist die Grundlage der weiteren
Diskussion geschaen. Gegenber der Position des Eunomius ist
jedoch ein Wandel eingetreten: Dieser hatte nmlich als Ausgangspunkt Gott gewhlt, sofern er einer ist. Fr Eunomius ist die Prdikationsstruktur von Gott und Vater dierent. Die Aussage Vater auer
bei Schriftzitaten wie Joh 14,28 (der Vater ist grer als der Sohn)
setzt er beim willentlichen und energetischen Hervorgang des Sohnes
an.42 Ferner hatte Eunomius in der ersten Apologie den Begri
gnnhtow, nicht den Abstraktbegri gennhsa eingefhrt, um einerseits die Ursprungslosigkeit Gottes zu betonen, andererseits wie
sich dies aus dem zuvor erwhnten philosophischen Diskussionszusammenhang nahelegt damit die Nicht-Reziprozitt fr Gott aussagen
zu knnen. Aufgrund der Einheit kann Gott die unverursachte Ursache
sein, so dass die nhere Bestimmung durch eine Prdikation (nmlich das Adjektiv gnnhtow) keinerlei Dierenz in Gott impliziert.
37
Vgl. Philo von Alexandrien, De mutatione nominum 1138 (Wendland III 158
163); Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 14 (SC 299, 224); Aristoteles, Anal. Post. 71a11
17; dazu Th. Bhm, Theoria, 135, Anm. 73 mit weiteren Belegen.
38
Vgl. CE II 1617 (GNO I 231,27232,1).
39
Vgl. CE II 1517 (GNO I 231,8232,1).
40
Vgl. CE II 1819 (GNO I 232,119).
41
Vgl. CE II 21 (GNO I 232,26233,1).
42
Vgl. Eunomius, Apologia 12,1112 (Vaggione 48); dazu besonders K.-H. Uthemann,
Die Sprache der Theologie nach Eunomius von Cyzicus, ZKG 104 (1993) 143
175, hier 151f.

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thomas bhm

Somit muss eine notwendige Koextensivitt bestehen, die in dem einen

Gott keinen Unterschied setzt. Erst aufgrund der Tatsache, dass
Gregor wie zuvor schon Basilius z.B. in Adversus Eunomium I 5 die
gennhsa aus dem Begri gnnhtow ableitet und diese wiederum
mit der osa gleichsetzt (als interpretative Darstellung der Position
des Eunomius),43 werden die folgenden berlegungen Gregors auch
nachvollziehbar.
Denn Gregor wiederholt in CE II 23 genau noch einmal die eunomianische Position in dieser Form, indem er betont, dass sie, d.h.
die Eunomianer, folgendes lehren: Gott wird ungezeugt genannt; das
Gttliche ist seiner Natur nach einfach; was einfach ist, ist unzusammengesetzt. Folglich ist Gott der Natur nach unzusammengesetzt
und ungezeugt, beides gehrt zu seiner Natur, die selbst die Ungezeugtheit
ist.44 Werner Jaeger gibt diese Passage zwar als Zitat aus der zweiten Apologie des Eunomius aus.45 Da Gregor allerdings oensichtlich
eine zusammenfassende Pointierung der eunomianischen Position liefern will, dieser Abschnitt auch durch die Pluralform (sie sagen . . .)
eingeleitet wird und die folgenden Passagen lediglich Paraphrasen
sind, scheint es besonders aufgrund der sonstigen Ausfhrungen des
Eunomius plausibler zu sein, hier eher von einem zugespitzten Referat
der gegnerischen Meinung auszugehen als von einem Zitat. 46
Dementsprechend wre es auch nicht zwingend, dass Eunomius das
Sein Gottes als Ungezeugtheit bezeichnet htte, was dann auch mit
den Ausfhrungen der ersten Apologie kompatibel wre.
Im Gegensatz dazu berdecken sich aber fr Gregor diese Prdikate
nicht, weil das Unzusammengesetzte auf die Einheit bezogen ist, der
Begri gnnhtow jedoch auf das Unverursachtsein. Obwohl beides
von einem Subjekt ausgesagt wird, werden unterschiedliche (epinoetische) Bestimmungen vorgenommen. Daraus ergibt sich fr Gregor
gerade weil diese Dierenz in der Bezogenheit der Bestimmung
besteht , dass aus dem Begri der Einheit gerade die Ungezeugtheit
nicht abgeleitet werden kann.47

43

Vgl. Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 5,132 (SC 299, 180).

Vgl. CE II 23 (GNO I 233,1117).
45
Vgl. den Kursivdruck in CE II 23 (GNO I 233,1117).
46
Vorsichtig in dieser Richtung auch R. P. Vaggione, Eunomius. The Extant Works,
Oxford 1987, 105, Anm. 3.
47
Vgl. CE II 2425 (GNO I 233,17234,3).
44

zusammenfassung der eunomianischen position

213

Aus der Ineinssetzung von Einheit und Ungezeugtheit versucht

Gregor das Argument ad absurdum zu fhren: sollten einfach und
ungezeugt ein und dasselbe meinen und folglich ungezeugt auch
nicht bedeuten, ohne Ursache zu sein, sondern dass Gott deshalb
ungezeugt genannt wird, weil er einfach und unzusammengesetzt ist,
msste daraus folgen: Weil der Sohn einfach ist was Eunomius
zugestehe48 msste der Sohn aufgrund der Einheit Ungezeugtheit
sein. Oder sie mssten sonst seine Gottheit leugnen. Dieses Argument
ergibt sich daraus: Wenn die Gottheit notwendig bestimmt ist durch
die Einheit, die Einheit jedoch Ungezeugtheit bedeuten soll, dann
msste der Einziggezeugte (d.h. der Sohn), weil er gezeugt ist, nicht
eines sein und folglich zusammengesetzt. Ist er jedoch zusammengesetzt, ist er nicht Gott, weil Gott notwendig einer ist.49
Nach einem Zwischenargument, auf das hier nicht eingegangen
werden soll,50 fasst Gregor seine eigene Sicht zusammen: Das Sein
des Vaters ist einfach und nicht Einfachheit, seine osa ist ungezeugt und nicht Ungezeugtheit. Gleiches gelte fr den Sohn hinsichtlich der Begrie einfach und gezeugt.51 Genau dies wrde sich
jedoch mit dem Ansatz des Eunomius decken, nicht aber mit den
Konsequenzen, die daraus gezogen werden.
Eunomius hatte aus der Bestimmung ew im Zusammenhang mit
dem steron -prteron-Argument abgeleitet, dass Gott auch gnnhtow
ist das sieht Gregor zurecht. Eunomius hatte dies auf die osa
bezogen und betont, Gott msse als gnnhtow osa bestimmt werden, d.h. osa und ungezeugt korrelieren notwendig miteinander
auch das sieht Gregor zurecht. Aber Eunomius hatte daraus nicht
gefolgert, dass dann die osa auch gennhsa sei. Das ist die conclusio Gregors. Die Dierenz ergibt sich m.E. u.a. aus der unterschiedlichen Einschtzung der pnoia: Eunomius wollte oensichtlich
verhindern, dass Prdikationen beim Transzendenten von der menschlichen Sprachleistung abhngen, whrend Gregor den inventiven
Charakter der Sprache betont, dann aber eine klare Dierenz von
absolutem Bereich und Sprache setzen muss, die ihren Ausdruck in
der Unerkennbarkeit und Unsagbarkeit der osa an und fr sich selbst
ndet.
48
49
50
51

Vgl.
Vgl.
Vgl.
Vgl.

CE
CE
CE
CE

II
II
II
II

26 (GNO I 234,34).
2627 (GNO I 234,318).
2829 (GNO I 234,19235,8).
30 (GNO I 235,818).

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thomas bhm

Aus demselben Grundduktus heraus, dass aus der Einheit die

Unerzeugtheit abgeleitet wird, msste laut Gregor auch angenommen werden, dass der Vater, weil er Schpfer ist, in seiner osa ferner so bestimmt wird, dass er Schpfung ist.52 Resmierend ergibt
sich fr Gregor, dass der Begri gnnhtow nicht auf die osa bezogen werden kann, sondern lediglich die Dierenz zwischen ungezeugt und gezeugt, also von Vater und Sohn anzeigt.
Dasselbe lsst sich im folgenden Abschnitt zeigen (CE II 3541):53
Nach Eunomius bezeichnet der Begri gnnhtow die osa, folglich
werde fr Gregor auch nicht der Existenzmodus ausgesagt, wonach
der Begri ungezeugt besage, dass eine frhere Ursache ausgeschlossen sei. Denn so Gregor die gennhsa sei die osa.54
Darum gebe es keine Mglichkeit, diesen Sachverhalt auszudrcken,55
wenn die Ungezeugtheit nicht die Abwesenheit einer hervorbringenden Ursache meint, sondern das Sein selbst. Folglich bezeichne ungezeugt gar nicht mehr ungezeugt, sondern dass Vater und Sohn
dasselbe sind, wenn die Dierenz von gezeugt und ungezeugt entfllt.56 Daraus folge, dass gnnhtow nicht die osa bezeichne.
Eunomius hatte jedoch argumentativ genau zu zeigen versucht,
dass aus der Einheit die Ursachelosigkeit folge, somit Gott als unerzeugt zu betrachten sei. Lediglich aus der Aussage, Gott sei ungezeugte osa, um eine Dierenz in Gott zu vermeiden, lsst sich der
Schluss Gregors fr die eunomianische Theologie nicht ziehen, somit
auch nicht der Sabellianismusvorwurf.57
Aus der von ihm zugespitzten eunomianischen Position zieht
Gregor aus seiner Sicht zurecht den Schluss, dass Vater und
Sohn nicht denselben Rang haben, wenn angenommen wird, dass
die osa oder Natur des Vaters in der Ungezeugtheit besteht, die
des Sohnes jedoch in der Gezeugtheit.58 Dies ergibt sich aus der

52

Vgl. CE II 3133 (GNO I 235,18236,14).

Vgl. CE II 3541 (GNO I 236,21238,8).
54
Vgl. CE II 35 (GNO I 236,2125).
55
Vgl. CE II 36 (GNO I 236,25237,4).
56
Vgl. CE II 3739 (GNO I 237,427).
57
Vgl. CE II 3739 (GNO I 237,427). Zur pnoia (CE II 4250, GNO I
238,12240,20) vgl. die Beitrge von Theo Kobusch und Basil Studer in diesem
Band. Auf eine Analyse sei hier verzichtet, zumal dieses Thema an dieser Stelle
von Gregor nicht umfassend errtert wird. Die Passage zeigt jedoch, dass gerade
die Frage der pnoia oensichtlich fr Gregor zentral ist.
58
Vgl. CE II 52 (GNO I 241,313).
53

zusammenfassung der eunomianischen position

215

Restriktion des Lebens des Sohnes, weil dieser in seiner Gezeugtheit

einen Anfang hat und nicht ewig ist wie der Vater59 und der Titel
Geschpf zudem den des Sohnes ersetzt.60 Demnach ergibt sich eine
Unterordnung des Sohnes/Geschpfes unter Gott.61 Folglich knne
er auch nicht verehrt werden,62 was jedoch der Schrift widerspreche.63 Wenn Ungezeugtheit die wahre Gottheit ausdrcke und diese
dem Sohn nicht zukomme, knnen andere Eigentmlichkeiten Gottes
auch nicht vom Sohn ausgesagt werden, wenn diese nicht dem
gehren, der nicht Ungezeugtheit ist.64 Dies ist aufgrund der Annahme
des Eunomius, dass osa und gnnhtow korrelieren, durchaus schlssig. Es zeigt sich, dass Eunomius gerade hier zum Stachel im Fleisch
wurde, nmlich bei der Rolle des Sohnes hinsichtlich der Gottesverehrung. Die Lsung durch Basilius und Gregor bestand jedoch
nicht nur in ihrer auch unterschiedlichen pnoia-Lehre mit dem origenistischen und biblischen Hintergrund65 und den philosophischen
Konnotationen,66 mit der Erkenntnis- und Sprachrestriktion im Hinblick
auf die gttliche osa, sondern die eunomianische Position war auch
der Anlass fr die Dissoziierung von osa und der Weise der Realisierung (trpow tw prjevw bzw. postsevw), die sich bei Basilius
und den pseudo-basilianischen Bchern Adversus Eunomium IVV zeigt,
Texte, die selbst wenn dies umstritten ist von Apolinarius stammen knnten.67 Ein Textvergleich zwischen Basilius, Adversus Eunomium
III und Pseudo-Basilius, Adversus Eunomium IVV zeigt m.E., dass
die pseudo-basilianischen Bcher IVV vor Adversus Eunomium III
geschrieben sind.68 Eine nochmalige berprfung der Chronologie
hat in diesem Zusammenhang ergeben, dass die Apologie des Eunomius
vermutlich erst Ende 360 vorgetragen und Mitte 361 publiziert wurde,
dass also die ursprngliche Diskussion in den Jahren 361 bis 364

59

Vgl. CE II 52 (GNO I 241,1113).

Vgl. CE II 53 (GNO I 241,1719).
61
Vgl. CE II 54 (GNO I 241,1924); dazu auch CE II 57 (GNO I 242,1424).
62
Vgl. CE II 59 (GNO I 243,413).
63
Vgl. CE II 5051 (GNO I 240,10241,3).
64
Vgl. CE II 63 (GNO I 244,1018).
65
Vgl. dazu den Beitrag von B. Studer.
66
Dazu die Ausfhrungen von Th. Kobusch in diesem Band.
67
Vgl. R. M. Hbner, Zur Genese, 148f. 153.
68
Vgl. Th. Bhm, Basilius von Caesarea, Adversus Eunomium IIII. Edition, bersetzung, Textgeschichte, Chronologie (Habilitationsschrift), Mnchen 2003, 5276;
ferner Th. Bhm, Basil of Caesarea, Adversus Eunomium IIII, and Ps. Basil, Adversus
Eunomium IVV, StPatr 37 (2001) 2026.
60

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thomas bhm

stattfand.69 Meines Erachtens gab Eunomius den Ansto fr zahlreiche theologische, aber auch philosophische Reaktionen, die wie
der Fall Gregors zeigt zu Formulierungen gefhrt haben, die dem
Anliegen des Eunomius nicht immer gerecht werden.

69

Vgl. Th. Bhm, Basilius, 796.

DIVINE INFINITY AND ESCHATOLOGY:

THE LIMITS AND DYNAMICS OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE,
ACCORDING TO GREGORY OF NYSSA (CE II 67170)
Morwenna Ludlow

I. Introduction
In paragraphs 67170 of the second book of Gregory of Nyssas
treatise against Eunomius, one nds several theological themes, philosophical ideas and literary images which are typical of Gregorys
writing. Indeed, one might almost argue that this extract encapsulates some of his most central ideas. In it Gregory states that we
cannot fully know God. He justies this by arguing that nite human
reason cannot comprehend the innite God; this argument is reinforced by analogies which emphasise how dicult it is to know things
even within the created realm (even our own selves). Gregory uses
Abraham as an example of a man who exemplies the correct attitude to God that is, faith, rather than knowledge and he emphasises that one should not stray beyond the bounds of Scripture. This
is both a warning to his readers and an attack on his Arian opponents, whom he accuses of being thoroughly unscriptural in their
theology. Gregory then develops his arguments about knowledge in
a specically linguistic direction, which brings him to the main preoccupations of the CE II as a whole: Eunomius denition of God
as gnnhtow, the proper character of theological language and the
role of pnoia.
This paper will not focus on these last three themes, which are
treated expertly and in detail by other contributions to this volume.
Rather, I wish to examine Gregorys ideas about human knowledge
of God by focussing on his use of imagery in particular, the symbol
of the ladder which occurs briey in the middle of Gregorys interpretation of the Abraham story. By looking at some of the forbears
of this image, and by examining how ladder imagery functions both
in this extract and in some other of Gregorys works, I wish to
demonstrate how Gregory has developed a very sophisticated literary technique, which combines and alludes to symbols from several

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morwenna ludlow

dierent sources, whilst weaving them together into an original literary creation. However, I want to argue further that this is not just
a literary technique, but is also a theological method. That is, although
the origins of the image of the ladder may lie both in the Old
Testament and in Plato, the key to Gregorys interpretation and use of
the image lies in the New Testament. He takes his method from the
writer of Hebrews who takes Abrahams journey to the promised land
to mean a journey to the city . . . whose architect and builder is
God.1 Thus, Gregory takes on images from both Hebrew and Greek
thinkers and sees them as anticipating a meaning which is only fully
realised in Christ.
To a certain extent, of course, this is merely to re-examine Gregorys
use of allegorical interpretation. As he says in CE II 85, we should
follow the great mind of the Apostle . . . and take the meaning of
the story [of Abraham] allegorically. Many scholars have already
examined how Gregory chooses images and stories from the Old
Testament and reads them in the light of the New Testament, and
there have been debates over to what extent Gregory depends on,
or goes beyond, or diers from Origen in this respect. However, this
paper will attempt to move the discussion of allegory and images
beyond a discussion of Gregorys biblical hermeneutics into a discussion of how he reads other, secular, texts.
Again, much work has been done on Gregorys philosophical
inuences; most, however, has concentrated on asking which ideas or
arguments Gregory takes from his classical forbears, rather than on
seeking out also the symbols or images which he borrows from them.
Whilst it is undoubtedly true that Gregory is inuenced by the arguments of Greek philosophy, his work also draws on images (especially visual ones), in an extremely imaginative way. It is precisely
because Gregory sometimes leans on the imagery and symbolism of,
for example, Plato, and not always on Platos arguments or ideas,
that the exact nature of Gregorys inuence by Plato is so hard to
pin down.
In this way, then, I am hoping to bring together two areas of discussion in studies of Gregory that are so often held apart: that is,
the allegorical interpretation of the Old Testament and the inuence
of Greek philosophy. It is through the mingling of images from both

Heb 11,10.

divine infinity and eschatology

219

Hebrew and Greek cultures in the creative womb of Gregorys Christian mind that we come to what one might call a rebirth of images.2
My point is that the reborn image does not merely echo or mirror
previous uses of the same image; rather it is something new and one
should attend carefully to the changes the author has made in its
use. This paper will also emphasise the fact that Gregorys literary
reappropriation of images occurs even in texts like the CE which
have tended to be studied from a more philosophical angle.
Thus, besides attempting to demonstrate Gregorys method in
action, this paper will also propose that an understanding of this
method can help our understanding of his text. As a consequence
of this analysis, it will also suggest a development in Gregorys use
of one particular image a development which may perhaps parallel a more profound theological development. First, however, the
next part of this paper will discuss the structure and context of CE
II 67170, in order to set the scene for the analysis of the image of
the ladder.

II. Context and structure

In both his rst and his second books against Eunomius, Gregorys
arguments alternate between discussion of the wider theological issues
and discussion of Eunomius precise terminology particularly, of
course, his use of the words gnnhtow and pnoia. From a theological point-of-view, this enables Gregory to use his attack on
Eunomius to make some wide-ranging theological claims, whilst always
returning to the very words of Eunomius text. In doing so, Gregory
tacitly claims for himself a scholarly precision which contrasts with
the false precision which Eunomius himself asserts.3 Furthermore, in
claiming that Eunomius reduces all the divine attributes to one (i.e.
gnnhtow), as Gregory does in CE II 62, for example, Gregory is
not only making a theological point, but is also making a rhetorical
move, contrasting Eunomius allegedly mealy-mouthed approach to
talking about God, with Gregorys own more expansive, imaginative

2
To borrow an expression from Austin Farrer: see his Rebirth of Images: the Making
of St. Johns Apocalypse, Westminster 1949.
3
Gregory attacks this precision in e.g. CE II 61 and 84.

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morwenna ludlow

approach.4 In other parts of the text, however, this perspective is

shifted: Eunomius is the one with too broad an outlook; he is the
one who wanders beyond the straight and narrow range of description
justied by Scripture, while Gregory sticks within the limits of the
language of the biblical canon.5 Eunomius language is all over the
place: and the result of this indiscipline is a false condence in
the ability of his purportedly precise language to dene God. On
the other hand, Gregory paradoxically asserts both that his own language is limited by Scripture, but draws attention to what he sees as
the limitless nature of Scriptural language.6
This switch in focus from the large scale to the small and back
again, can be somewhat bewildering for the reader, and means that
Gregorys arguments are not constructed with the sort of rigour one
would demand of a modern philosopher. But it would be foolish to
claim that there is no reason behind Gregorys method. Whatever
one may feel at times about the success of either Gregorys arguments
or his rhetorical strategy, one can certainly be condent in asserting that this is a highly-crafted work by an author who is extremely
self-conscious of his art. Whenever Gregory criticises his opponents
for their artice and over-rhetorical approach, one cannot help feeling that he is being disingenuous. Although the structure of the CE
is loose, in the sense that there is no systematic building-up of a
cumulative argument, it can be argued that the work as a whole
does have other, less obvious, structures, one of which is the use of
a shifting focus as a conscious literary or rhetorical strategy.
The work is perhaps more obviously structured within each of its
parts. (These are indicated by Roman numerals in Prof. Halls translation.) Usually Gregory will begin with an idea from Eunomius,
often quoted in his opponents own words. Sometimes (particularly
in the latter half of CE II) this will be followed by an opposing quotation from Basil. Gregory will then proceed to refute Eunomius
claim, with a mixture of logical argument, analogy, illustration, and
reductio ad absurdum. Frequently, a passage will conclude with an insult
directed at his opponent, which will recall the original idea which

4
See also CE II 125 (all quotations from CE II are from the translation by
S. G. Hall): [our opponents] measure the innite nature with a single title, squeezing the being of God into unbegottenness; cf. CE II 82.472.
5
E.g. CE II 96105.
6
CE II 101.

divine infinity and eschatology

221

began the section. This is sometimes coupled with a warning to his

audience not to repeat the same errors. Within each passage there
is much repetition for emphasis and sometimes a slightly more formal circular form of composition in which Gregory successively
returns to various themes and ideas with which he started.
In the section under consideration by this paper (CE II 67170),
Gregory is countering the accusation that is found in the preceding
part:
Whereas all men of sense reckon it is impossible for the ineable nature
to be expressed in the meaning of any words, and our knowledge cannot extend so far as to reach things transcending knowledge, and our
competence with words has not been endowed with such power as to
describe what is being thought of when something utterly sublime and
divine comes to mind, then these sophisticates condemn the rest for
stupidity and ignorance in the science of logic, and claim that they
themselves know these things and are able to impart that knowledge
to whomsoever they please.7

Consequently, Gregory begins the next part with his claim against
Eunomius: human nature has not the capacity in it to understand
precisely the being of God (CE II 67). He then goes on to explain
the reason for this: the gap between the innite creator and the
nite creation. The explanation proceeds in various ways: rst, with
an analogy from the respective natures of earthbound animals, birds,
humans and angels (CE II 6869); next with a philosophical argument from the nature of nite and innite (CE II 6970); and then
with a further illustration from the natural world, this time focussing
on astronomical phenomena (CE II 7178). These last paragraphs
result in the conclusion that only the maker, God, can know the
mysteries of the heavens, and that (quoting Heb 11,3), it is by faith
[that] we perceive that the worlds were made by the word of God.
Next follows the analogy of children who think they can catch a
sun-beam (CE II 7981), which functions both as a warning to his
audience not to think that they can know God, and as a useful way
to draw attention to the childishness of his opponents (a common
tactic in the CE ).8 The image of light, which frequently symbolises

CE II 61.
See, e.g. CE I 675 (tr. Hall 133): Now I broach these ridiculously childish
suggestions as to children sitting in the market-place and playing; for when one
looks into the grovelling earthliness of their heretical teaching it is impossible to
8

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morwenna ludlow

revelation in both Christian and pagan writings, is used in such a

way as to emphasise that the light descends to or is given to those
on earth. The Arians error is then summarised as going beyond or
misusing the text of Scripture and as restricting God by applying to
him terms which cannot hope properly to describe him (CE II 8283).
Thus, in these sections, Gregory proceeds by alternating plain
statement and argument with imaginative illustration. Moreover, his
illustrations themselves echo one another (moving upwards from the
birds of the air to astronomical phenomena in the heavens themselves and then returning just as the beams of the sun descend to
earth). Finally, he uses a quotation from Hebrews about faith which
not only anticipates his use of Hebrews, and in particular the notion
of faith, to interpret Abrahams journey, but also demonstrates his
own loyalty to Scripture in contrast to the attitude of his opponents.
In the next few sections (CE II 8489) Gregory brings in the
example of Abraham. The illustration is introduced by an explanation of the cause of Gregorys opponents error: they have separated
knowledge from faith. By contrast, Gregory refers to Hebrews 11 and
argues that if one takes the story of Abraham allegorically as a journey towards God, it is clear that Abraham knew God so far as is
humanly possible, but then transcended this by faith, which brought
him to the realisation that God was above all human knowledge.
Within the Abraham example is embedded the further illustration
of the ladder, which will be analysed further in a moment. Gregory
concludes his use of the Abraham story and Hebrews 11, by stressing that it was faith, not knowledge which was credited to Abraham
as righteousness.
This leads us to a passage in which the faith/knowledge contrast
is further elaborated, again with reference to Hebrews 11 (CE II
9094). Finally, in CE II 9596 Gregory brings several of his themes
together: he recapitulates the idea of the gap between creator and
created, but expressing it in terms of heaven and earth which recalls
his earlier heavenly analogies. He repeats the content of the statement with which he started in CE II 67 that human nature cannot understand God but subtly recasts it in the light of his discussion

help falling into a sort of sportive childishness; and CE II 469: They are simply
childrens games, building castles in the sand.

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of faith (pstiw), as a statement which we are instructed not to know,

but to believe (pisteein).9
In the next few sections (CE II 97105) Gregory further elaborates the idea that one should keep human knowledge within limits
by adding to it the idea that speculation leads to error (CE II 97).
He sets o against each other the positive example of Scripture and
the negative example of Eunomius and his supporters, and it is here
that Gregory elaborates the paradoxes which separate him from these
opponents. They have wandered o into their manifold and varied ideas about God; yet their error is that they want to bring the
divinity within a prescribed limit.10 Contrasted with this double fault
of undisciplined plenitude and overly-rigorous exactitude is Scripture
(and, by implication, Gregorys own method):
Perhaps they should have looked to the choir of the saints, the
prophets, I mean, and the patriarchs, in whose time the Word of truth
spoke in diverse parts and in diverse ways . . . they should have
respected the reliability of those attested by the Spirit himself, and
should have stayed within the limitations of those writers learning and
knowledge.11

This comment is typical of Gregorys hermeneutics which sees Scripture

both as having immense (perhaps innite) depth and as limiting
excessive readings.12 In paragraphs 104105 the general principle of
the unity and diversity of Scripture is applied specically to the names
of God (they apply to the one God, but their multiplicity is explained
in terms of the fact that they apply not to his being but to his attributes). These two paragraphs thus anticipate the more linguistic focus
of CE II 125170.
In CE II 106124 Gregory argues that humans are ignorant not
only about God, but also of the created world even of themselves.
This proposition is examined from the point-of-view of knowledge
of body and soul, and Gregorys obvious display of erudition (recounting dierent theories about the passions and about the nature of
9
CE II 96: It is safer and more reverent to believe [pisteein] that the divine
majesty is more than can be thought of . . . [oesyai].
10
CE II 99100.
11
CE II 101 (my emphasis).
12
For a more thorough treatment of this, see M. Ludlow, Origen and Gregory
of Nyssa on the Unity and Diversity of Scripture, International Journal of Systematic
Theology 4, 1 (2002) 63.

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body and soul) echoes his similar display in CE II 71. The passages are also clearly linked by their common theme how can one
know the innite God if one does not know the nite world?13 yet
their message is subtly dierent. Whereas one might expect not to
be able to understand the wonders of the heavens, one might at
least expect to be able to know oneself indeed, famously, many
Greek philosophers commanded it. In a clever move, then, Gregory
brings together a large section of the CE II (paragraphs 67124),
framing them with these two discussions of our knowledge of the
created world, the second not so much repeating the rst as being
its mirror-image, the focus on the earthly individual contrasting with
the earlier focus on the distant heavens.
In paragraphs 125170 the themes of CE II 67124 are repeated
with a specic linguistic focus. The error of Eunomius is stated in
CE II 82 and 100 as falsely claiming to know that God is unbegottenness (gennhsa). In CE II 125 this error is expressed in more
linguistic terms: Eunomius false claim is about the title unbegotten
(agnnhtow). Gregory repeats the idea that reasoning is not completely
inappropriate in respect of God14 it gives a faint and slight apprehension (ntlhciw) of the divine nature but adds to this the claim
that such knowledge (gnsiw) of God as humans have comes through
the names used of him (CE II 130). Similarly, the claim that the goal
of human reasoning is to understand that what it seeks is beyond
all knowledge (CE II 139) echoes the claim made earlier about
Abraham (CE II 89), but is supplemented by a comment about which
names are therefore appropriate and which are inappropriate to apply
to God (CE II 140). Eunomius error is then satirised using the symbolism of noise in contrast with the light/sunbeam metaphor used
for the same purpose earlier on (CE II 141). Corrections of Eunomius
errors are then set out clearly: negative words applied to God say
what he is not (not what he is); words for God refer to his actions
(not his being); by allowing a plethora of words to be applied to
God the Cappadocians are not seeking to glorify him, but to guide
the reader/speaker to what is hidden (CE II 142158). The treatise
then moves to the more technical discussion of pnoia.

13
14

Compare, for example, CE II 6970 and CE II 122124.

Cf. CE II 89.98.100.

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225

Throughout CE II 67170, there is evidence of Gregorys careful

composition. The studied return to various ideas, their recapitulation and elaboration may owe something to Gregorys rhetorical
training not in the sense that he is here producing a formal speech
rigidly structured according to the principles of the Second Sophistic,
but in the more general sense that Gregory has learnt how to speak
well: how to emphasise his main themes with constant repetition,
how to recapture drifting attention with vivid analogies, familiar
images and the occasional bout of vituperative insult. Like a jazz
pianist improvising, Gregory wanders: sometimes he appears to have
lost the plot, but he always returns to the same key. This does not
always make for an argument which is systematically presented and
easy to follow: it is more impressionistic than systematic, more poetic
than scientic.15 One may question its eectiveness, but one should
have sympathy for the eects Gregory was trying to achieve, even if
one nds the style ultimately rather unsatisfying or confusing.
However, it is the rst two parts of CE II 67170 that is the
statement and explanation of the claim that we cannot know God,
and its illustration by the character of Abraham that are the primary focus of this paper. These illustrate the way in which Gregorys
composition can sometimes be extraordinarily detailed, with its circling back to certain themes (faith and Hebrews 11) and ranges of
imagery (analogies concerning the heavens). This technique highlights several key themes: rst, the idea of the gap between God/
heaven and earth; secondly, the importance of Hebrews 11, and thirdly
the ambiguity of human knowledge and language. All of these will
play a part in my interpretation of Gregorys ladder image, to which
the next part of this paper now turns.

III. The ladder

Having by the use of reason transcended the wisdom of his nation
I mean the Chaldean philosophy which reaches only visible things,
and rising above those known to sense, from the beauty of things
observed and the harmony of the heavenly wonders he yearned to see
the original model of beauty. In the same manner, all the rest of what
he grasped as his reasoning advanced, whether power or goodness,

15

Remember that Gregory criticises Eunomius pseudo-scientic rigour.

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226

or existence without beginning, or being bounded by no end, or whatever similar idea we may have for the divine nature, using all these
as means and staircase for his upward journey, always stepping upon what he had
discovered and reaching out to what lay ahead, setting up in his heart, as the
prophet says, the beautiful rising stairs, and rising above all that his own power
could grasp, as being less than what he sought, when he had surpassed
every verbal description of his nature which might be applied to God,
having cleansed his mind of such notions, he resorted to faith, pure
and unadulterated by any ratiocination, and he took as his indicator,
infallible and manifest, of the knowledge of God just this, that he
believed God to be greater and higher than any epistemological
indicator.16

The image of the ladder, or steps, or staircase, does not occupy

much space in Gregorys interpretation of the Abraham story. However,
it is one important focal point for his argument about divine innity
and the pursuit of God. Particularly as it is elaborated in Gregorys
later works, the ladder becomes an eschatological as well as an epistemological image. But this paper will argue that the seeds of this
use of ladder imagery are apparent, even in this passage from CE,
particularly if one pays attention to its immediate context and the
themes highlighted above.
Firstly, Gregory seems to be alluding not just to any staircase, but
specically to Jacobs ladder. This is, admittedly, an implicit reference which Gregory does not make explicit, but elsewhere in his
works (as will be shown below) he connects talk of staircases and
steps specically with Jacobs ladder. Furthermore, the stories of
Abraham and Jacob have much that connect them: Jacobs vision
of the staircase took place at Bethel; Bethel was the rst place Abram
is said to have pitched his tent after having left Ur.17 Both patriarchs were on a journey from home; both have a vision of or from
God; both receive a promise from God about their ospring and
land. The fact that Abraham is moving on from the Chaldean study
of heavenly wonders, not only recalls the astronomical illustrations
earlier on, but perhaps reminds us that Jacobs ladder reached between
the earth and the true heavens.
Indeed, it is perhaps not too far-fetched to suggest that Gregory
has in a sense collapsed the stories of all three patriarchs into that
of Abraham. This may have been encouraged by the recollection of
16
17

CE II 89 (my emphasis).
Gen 28,19; Gen 12,8.

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227

Hebrews 11, which is constantly running through Gregorys mind

here, and which closely binds the three patriarchs together. According
to Hebrews, Isaac and Jacob were heirs with [Abraham] of the same
promise, that is the promise of the city of God (Heb 11,9). Furthermore, all died without having received the physical land they were
promised, which indicates to the author that their real desire for a
better country, that is a heavenly one (Heb 11,1316). Furthermore,
there are signs that Gregory has melded together the signication of
Abraham, Isaac and Jacob in Alexandrian theology. In Origen, for
example, we nd Abraham as the symbol of faith, Isaac of science
and Jacob of contemplation.18 In our passage from Gregory, the
overall theme is obviously faith, but it is also Abraham who transcends the wisdom of his nation, Chaldean philosophy being seen
as the science of observing the stars. There is good reason to see
this natural philosophy as one of the steps Abraham ascended, not
something he merely turned his back on: in the passage quoted
above, reason leads him from the things known to sense, that is,
from the beauty of things observed and the harmony of the heavenly wonders to the original model of beauty. The clear implication is that without the earthly beauty he would not have been
led by reason to the idea of beauty; thus it is reasonable to assume
that earthly beauties, as well as the abstract ideas of power or goodness, etc. are resources and [a] staircase for his upward journey.
Finally, of course Abraham is a man of vision, who through faith
received the wisdom that God is higher than all knowledge. The signicance of Jacobs ladder, rather than a set of merely epistemological
steps, is that it stretches from earth to heaven, and that, in the
Septuagint version, the Lord stood on it.19 Thus the steps traversed
by Abraham, Isaac and Jacob respectively in Origens reading, are
taken in succession by the one person of Abraham, in Gregorys.
Of course, while the image in this passage might recall Jacobs
ladder, it is also clearly calling to mind another most famous set of
steps that is those in Platos Symposium. At the climax of Diotimas
speech she says:
This is the right way of approaching or being initiated into the mysteries of love, to begin with examples of beauty in the world, and

18
19

Origen, Commentary on the Song of Songs, Preface 3,1819 (tr. Greer 235).
Gen 28,13 (LXX): d kriow pestrikto p atw.

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using them as steps (panabasmow) to ascend continually with that
absolute beauty as ones aim, from one instance of physical beauty to
two and from two to all, then from physical beauty to moral beauty,
and from moral beauty to the beauty of knowledge, until from knowledge of various kinds one arrives at the supreme knowledge whose
sole object is that absolute beauty, and knows at last what absolute
beauty is.20

This idea (both as it is expressed here and as it is expressed elsewhere in Platos works) is echoed fairly closely by Gregorys comment that Abraham moved from the beauty of things observed
but yearned to see the original model of beauty (CE II 89).21 It is
also clear that Abraham, like Diotimas ideal soul, moves from the
particular to the general. However, beyond this initial immediate
resemblance there are several dierences: Abrahams movement is
impelled by faith, not love, for example. But most importantly,
Abraham moves beyond general ideas of absolute power or goodness
to a state in which he believes that God himself cannot be known.
This contrasts with Diotimas supreme knowledge.22
It seems likely, then, that Gregory has in mind both the Platonic
image of steps and the Genesis story of Jacobs ladder. The fact that
he does not refer to either very closely is not the point: he is refracting the original image, not copying it. (His allusive and sometimes
vague method of referring to earlier texts is illustrated nicely by the
fact that his recollection of Psalm 83/84 the reference to beautiful
Plato, Symp. 211b (tr. Hamilton 94).
Gen 28,12 uses the word klmaj (LXX), and Plato panabasmw but Gregory
is not consistent in the Greek words he uses for steps, or ladder (this point is illustrated in the quotations cited below). My point is that one should look for the
images or ideas underlying the words and not become too dependent on the
precise coincidences of vocabulary in which Gregory himself appears not to be
interested.
22
It is possible that Gregory also has in mind a passage from Plotinus treatise
on beauty Enneads I 6 [1] 1,820 which uses the step image in a recapitulation of
several themes from Plato. What is it which makes us imagine that bodies are
beautiful and attracts our hearing to sounds because of their beauty?. . . . What is
this principle then which is present in bodies? We ought to consider this rst. What
is it that attracts the gaze of those who look at something, and turns and draws
them to it and makes them enjoy the sight? If we can nd this perhaps we can
use it as a stepping-stone and get a sight of the rest (tr. Armstrong 2334). However,
I think it most likely that it is the general Platonic image of steps, or the original
image in the Symposium that Gregory is recalling. That is not to say that Gregory
might not be inuenced by other imagery in Plotinus treatise on beauty, particularly his use of light symbolism and an interesting analogy with journeying home
an interesting contrast with the patriarchs being called away from home. See Plotinus,
Enneads I 6 [1] 8,2223 (tr. Armstrong 257).
20
21

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229

rising stairs [nabseiw] is itself only a very approximate quotation of the Septuagint.)
Let us turn now to the way in which Gregory uses the image of
the ladder in some of his other works. In his treatise De virginitate,
one nds the image used in perhaps its most closely Platonic sense.23
Here Gregory advocates an ascent from outer to inner beauty, using
the material as a step (pobyra) to the intellectual. Although the
emphasis seems in some places to be on an intellectual or epistemological ascent, nevertheless, Gregory does stress that the Beauty
which is invisible and formless is an object of our love, not just of
knowledge.24 Although there are hints that the archetype is ultimately
unknowable, in this treatise Gregory tends to evade the issue, talking of participation but not analysing what that participation consists in.
Gregorys homilies De beatitudinibus use the image of steps and the
ladder several times, in parallel with the motif of an ascent of a
mountain. Both are used to convey to the reader the idea that the
text of the Beatitudes in Scripture indicates a spiritual ascent: that
is, the text if read allegorically describes an ascent of the soul
from material to heavenly things, but furthermore it will facilitate such
an ascent for the soul of its reader if it is interpreted in such a way.
Thus the text of Scripture is in itself a metaphorical ladder for the
soul.
Gregory begins by describing this ladder-like quality of the Beatitudes
in Homily II 1. Even if they do not appear to be written in a sequence,
Gregory argues that:
I think the arrangement of the Beatitudes is like a series of rungs
(baymdvn), and it makes it possible for the mind to ascend by climbing from one to another . . . If our thought could take wing, and we
could stand above the vaults of heaven, we should nd there the
supercelestial land which is in store as the inheritance for those who
have lived virtuous lives. . . . The phenomenal world, insofar as it relates
to physical perception, is wholly akin to itself. Even though one thing
may seem to be high in terms of location in space, yet it is below the
level of intelligible being, which it is impossible for the mind to scale,
unless it rst transcends by thought those things which the senses can
reach.25

23
24
25

De virginitate (GNO VIII/1 291,15292,15).

E.g. De virginitate (GNO VIII/1 293,23294,1; 296,1415).
De beatitudinibus II 1 (tr. Hall 32).

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Here we nd some familiar themes: the ascent by steps; the use of

knowledge by sense perception to rise higher; the idea that the goal
of such knowledge is, or dwells in, a heavenly realm. (This last is
even emphasised by an allusion to the soul in Platos Phaedrus rising
on wings to heaven for a Gods eye view.) Interesting is Gregorys
mention of the gap between even the highest things in the material
world and the intellectual realm a theme very prominent in CE II.
Another important development lies in Gregorys claim that the ladder is not only a philosophical process (carried out, for example, by
the process of epistemological abstraction) but is also a theological
one, undertaken by and in the reading of Scripture.
In subsequent Homilies the theme of the ladder is recapitulated:
for example, in IV 1 the Word of God leads us by the hand up the
ladder (klmaj).26 This reminds us that the Beatitudes are the words
of Jesus Christ, and anticipates the declaration in Homily V 1 that
the ladder is indeed like Jacobs ladder (klmaj), with God standing rmly on it.27 This explicit connection of the ladder theme with
Jacob asserts that just as the ladder vision was intended to teach
Jacob about the way to God, so the text of Scripture performs the
same function for its readers. Furthermore, Gregory makes an ontological point: the fact that God stands on, or at the top of Jacobs
ladder, is read together with the idea that the Beatitudes are an
ascending study of blessedness. Consequently, what is at the top of
the ladder is the summit of blessedness, the archetype of blessedness,
the origin from which all other blessedness ows.28 Most importantly,
however, in Homily V on the Beatitudes, Gregory establishes the idea
that the ascent of the ladder is not purely towards knowledge of,
but also towards participation in God: To participate in the Beatitudes
is nothing less than sharing in deity, towards which the Lord leads
us up by his words.29
The treatise De virginitate and De beatitudinibus are both probably
earlier than CE; by contrast, the next two instances of ladder imagery

26
De beatitudinibus IV 1 (tr. Hall 4748). As in CE II 89, Gregory quotes Ps
83/84,6.
27
See also De beatitudinibus VI 5 (tr. Hall 7172) for another reference to Jacobs
ladder raising the soul up (compared also to Elijahs ery chariot).
28
De beatitudinibus V 1 (tr. Hall 57): The elevation of the Beatitudes, one above
another, prepares us to approach God himself, the truly blessed one who stands
rmly above all blessedness.
29
De beatitudinibus V 1 (tr. Hall 57).

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231

to be examined come from the two famous works written towards

the end of Gregorys life: De vita Moysis and In Canticum canticorum.
In the latter, the ladder image comes in the context of an exegesis
of the verse: Arise, come my companion, my fair one, my dove!
On this, Gregory writes that we now see the bride being led up
by the Word up a staircase (n baymn nabsei) by the steps (nodoi)
of virtue to the heights of perfection.30 In this sentence and the passage surrounding it, Gregory conveys several ideas which have already
become familiar: the Word leading the soul up the staircase, the
ascent being associated with beauty (in this case the bride becomes
more beautiful), and the summit being participation in God/Beauty.
The staircase itself is partly composed of Scripture (the Word sends
her a ray of light through the windows of the prophets and the lattices of the Law),31 but Gregory also says that the steps are those
of virtue just as he does throughout the Beatitudes. But there are
two vital novelties in the use of the ladder motif here. First, Gregory
is more willing to connect the ascent of the soul to beauty with the
idea of desire.32 Secondly, he explicitly connects the idea of God
being at the summit of the ladder with the idea of divine innity
and this then leads him to the conclusion that the ascent of the soul
up the ladder that is the participation of the soul in God must
be a perpetual progress.33
A similar development in the use of the ladder image is observable in De vita Moysis (II 220239, tr. Ferguson-Malherbe 112116).
Again we have some standard elements from Gregorys earlier writings: a rise towards beauty, a rise from image to archetype, the idea
that God attracts the soul and the connection of ladder with mountain imagery. But there are also the new elements we saw in the
work In Canticum canticorum: a willingness to express the impetus of
the soul in terms of desire (albeit in combination with the virtue of
hope), and the idea of divine innity leading directly to the idea that
the ascent of the soul is perpetual.34 In addition to these, Gregory
30

In Canticum canticorum V (GNO VI 158,1921).

In Canticum canticorum V (GNO VI 158,21159,2).
32
In Canticum canticorum V (GNO VI 159,8): piyuma.
33
In Canticum canticorum V (tr. McCambley 119): The soul continually grows
through participation in what is beyond it and never stops growing.
34
De vita Moysis II 238239 (tr. Ferguson-Malherbe 116): But every desire
(piyuma) for the Good which is attracted to that ascent constantly expands as one
progresses in pressing on to the Good. This truly is the vision of God: never to be
satised in the desire to see him. But one must always, by looking at what he can
31

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connects his ladder image to his much-quoted verse from Philippians

which describes the believer as straining ahead (pekteinmenow) for
things to come (Phil 3,13). Thus we read:
The soul rises ever higher and will always make its ight yet higher
by its desire of the heavenly things straining ahead (sunepekteinomnh)
for what is still to come, as the Apostle says. . . . For this reason we
also say that the great Moses, as he was becoming ever greater, at no
time stopped in his ascent, nor did he set a limit for himself in his
upward course. Once, having set foot on the ladder (klmaj) which
God set up (as Jacob says), he continually climbed to the step (baymw)
above and never ceased to reach higher, because he always found a
step higher than the one he had attained.35

IV. Conclusions: perpetual progress and eschatology

One can, therefore, see a development in Gregorys use of the ladder
image. He moves from a fairly basic epistemological use in De virginitate, to the connection of Platos epistemological steps with Jacobs
ladder in the De beatitudinibus. It is in these homilies that the image
rst begins to be reborn as a symbol new to Gregory. In them, the
ladder symbolises not merely an epistemological ascent, nor merely
a journey in faith (or virtue), but the fusing of these two climbs
upwards into one ascent which involves every aspect of the soul,
moral and intellectual. Crucially, Gregory also connects the ladder
with Scriptures role in facilitating almost embodying that ascent.
In the works In Canticum canticorum and De vita Moysis, Gregorys ladder image is further amplied to include the notions of desire (adding
to the moral and intellectual dimensions of the souls ascent) and of
a perpetual progress.
The latter is justied not only by the idea of divine innity, which
according to Gregorys logical argument must mean that the soul
can never fully grasp God, but also by the general eschatological
impetus of the two works in which the ladder image is found. In
Canticum canticorum ends with an eschatological vision in which all
rational creation joins together in the eternal praise of God. De vita
see, rekindle his desire to see more. Thus no limit would interrupt growth in the
ascent to God, since no limit to the Good can be found nor is the increasing of
desire for the Good brought to an end because it is satised.
35
De vita Moysis II 225.227 (tr. Ferguson-Malherbe 113114).

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233

Moysis ends with Moses seeing, but not reaching the promised land:
this leads to a slightly odd ending to De vita Moysis from a dramatic
point-of-view a gentle diminuendo rather than a grand nale however, it ts with Gregorys belief that knowing and loving God is a
journey to be travelled eternally. In both cases, this eschatological
dimension perhaps indicates that when Gregory talks of the ascent
of the soul to God, he is not just meaning the vertical relation of
the soul to God as experienced timelessly, for example, in a moment
of prayer. Rather, he also means (perhaps he mainly means) the
temporal pilgrimage of a soul to God, a pilgrimage which nishes
not in the possession of God ( just as Moses never possessed the promised
land), but in the eternally growing participation in God (the language
of participation is found associated with the ladder image in Gregorys
works De beatitudinibus, In Canticum canticorum and De vita Moysis).36
On rst sight, given the wider subject-matter of the treatise as a
whole, and given that the echo of Platos steps is rather more obvious than the connection with Jacobs ladder, one might think that
in CE II Gregory is using the ladder image in a straightforwardly
epistemological way. The lesson appears to be that one must, like
Abraham, move on from our intellectual attachment to material
things and, by faith, come to the realisation that God is beyond
comprehension. In this case, one might assume that Gregory is more
concerned with the vertical, epistemological relation between soul
and God and that the temporal eschatological aspect to the image
has not yet appeared as it does in his later works.
However, is there more to it than that? especially if one grants
the connection with Jacobs ladder and allows for the possibility that
Gregory is creating a new ladder image out of its Platonic and Old
Testamental forbears? In particular there is the underlying inuence
of Hebrews 11. In vv. 1316, the biblical writer declares:
All of these [Abraham, Isaac and Jacob] died in faith without having
received the promises, but from a distance they saw and greeted them.
They confessed that they were strangers and foreigners on the earth,
for people who speak in this way make it clear that they are seeking
a homeland. If they had been thinking of the land that they had left
behind, they would have had opportunity to return. But, as it is, they
desire a better country, that is, a heavenly one. Therefore God is not

36
De beatitudinibus V 1 (tr. Hall 57); In Canticum canticorum V (GNO VI 158,1219);
De vita Moysis II 230 (tr. Ferguson-Malherbe 114).

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ashamed to be called their God; indeed, he has prepared a city for
them.

At the end of chapter 11 and the beginning of chapter 12, the author
of Hebrews then draws a conclusion for his readers:
All these, though they were commended for their faith, did not receive
what was promised, since God had provided something better so that
they would not, apart from us, be made perfect. Therefore . . . let
us . . . run with perseverance the race that has been set before us, looking to Jesus the pioneer and perfecter of our faith.

The idea of the race recalls the Philippians passage much beloved by
Gregory; the image of the patriarchs seeing but not reaching the
promised land chimes in with the way in which Gregory closes De
vita Moysis.
When Origen read the story of the patriarchs through the lens of
Hebrews 11, he observed that the patriarchs lived in tents so that
through this they might make it clear that whoever is eager for the
divine philosophy must not have any place of his own on earth and
must always move on, not so much from place to place as from the
knowledge of lower things to the knowledge of higher things.37
Gregory develops this by reference to his doctrine of divine innity,
to come to the conclusion that Abraham moved from lower to
higher things, but ultimately came to the realisation that he could
never know God.
However, in this passage in the CE Gregory does not apparently
draw the further, eschatological conclusion of the souls perpetual progress
in God which we nd in later works. This is surely because Gregory
in CE II is naturally interested more in epistemological questions and
not in the fate of the soul. From the premise of divine innity he
draws the conclusion that one can never know God, but he is not
concerned to answer the theological and spiritual questions: what
does that mean for the fate of the soul after the resurrection? what
does that mean for our concept of beatitude?
Nevertheless, two important theological aspects of Gregorys use
of the Abraham story in the CE should be noted. Firstly, it is I think
possible to show that there are in this passage of CE II the seeds of
this later, eschatological, development of the ladder metaphor. These

37

Origen, Commentary on the Song of Songs, Preface 3,20 (tr. Geer 235).

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235

seeds consist in several things: rst, the idea of divine innity is highlighted; secondly, Abrahams story is focussed around the idea of a
journey, that is, a pilgrimage. This journey is understood in both a
literal and a spiritual sense. The faithful realisation that God is
unknowable is revealed to Abraham (God names himself ), but
Abraham has had to make himself ready for it through a gradual
progress in faith. This progress took time a fact which is emphasised in the account by the fact that the historical Abraham had to
progress in a spatial sense too. It is this idea of pilgrimage which
the stories of Abraham and Jacobs ladder add to the otherwise
Platonic imagery of the steps. By combining the two, Gregory has
added to the vertical image of the epistemological ascent a horizontal dimension which gives the ascent to God in Gregory its characteristic dynamic. Gregory seems to be pointing not towards a
timeless moment of ecstatic contemplation, but towards an earthly
life of faith. Implicitly, another attack on Eunomius lies beneath the
surface here: on the one hand, Eunomius works too hard on his
philosophy; on the other, he does not work hard enough at faith.
Secondly, this idea of pilgrimage helps Gregory to emphasise the
positive aspects of the earlier parts of the journey. One of the problems with the Platonic epistemological ascent is that it leaves the status of the material very ambiguous: on the one hand, the ascent
must start with material examples of beautiful things; on the other,
the soul must rise above them in order to grasp true Beauty. Beautiful
things should be steps in the ascent, but to the unwary they can
become traps, holding the soul back. Very quickly, then, the ascent
tends to be portrayed not so much as transcending the material as
rejecting it. The idea of pilgrimage, on the other hand, has the
advantage of suggesting that the earlier stages are important and
necessary stages through which one must travel. Indeed, the idea of
a three-fold journey of faith, science and contemplation suggests that
the ascent for Gregory is cumulative: faith is not left behind in the
quest for knowledge and contemplation of God ( just as in Origens
threefold scheme for reading Scripture, the spiritual reading is dependent on and does not replace the literal and moral readings). This
is not to say that the ambiguity of the rst material stages of the
journey is entirely absent in Gregory: particularly in De virginitate,
where the emphasis is epistemological, there is a strong sense that
the soul is being asked to leave material things behind. This is much
less the case in the later, more eschatological works, where the focus

236

morwenna ludlow

is on the transformation, not the rejection, of the material. By contrast, in CE II we nd the ambiguity expressed almost bluntly: on
the one hand, Gregory writes, in thinking about God [Abraham]
was led to an understanding by nothing material and by the use
of reason he transcended the wisdom of his nation; on the other
hand, he did use his earthly power of reasoning (which is presumably dependent on material perception) to grasp various ideas (such
as power or goodness) which were the very steps of his ascent.38 This
ambiguity runs throughout Gregorys theology: he seems more fully
aware of it towards the end of his life, where the ascent to God is
described in ever more lusciously material ways; here in the CE II
it is perhaps in the marrying of Platos steps with Jacobs ladder
in the process of being resolved.
What we nd, then, in the CE II is indeed an image which has
been reborn, but one which is still in a process of growth in Gregorys
mind. However, one must avoid the temptation to read back into
the CE II (and, indeed, the De virginitate) eschatological themes that
are not yet present. This study of Gregorys use of the image of the
ladder thus has some useful implications for the study of his writings. Firstly, it has stressed that Gregory uses similar images in
dierent ways in dierent contexts. Sometimes the dierences can
be explained in terms of a development in his thought; but this is
not necessarily always the case. Consequently, as new images are
reborn from the fertile womb of Gregorys mind, one should neither
expect these images to have the same meaning as their pagan, Jewish
and Christian forbears, nor should one expect each of these similar
images to have exactly the same meaning or function as the other.
They have a family resemblance; they are not twins. Secondly, in
drawing attention to the varied way in which Gregory uses these
images, this paper suggests that in order to assess Gregory the theologian, one needs to look not only at Gregory the philosopher and
Gregory the Scriptural exegete, but also at Gregory the writer: to
what eect and with what aim is he using the images in these varied ways?
My conclusion, with regard to CE II 8496, then, is that although
Gregory has not ruled out a temporal dimension to our progress

38
For other positive references to reasoning (logismw) in the ascent see CE II
89.100; even sense-perception is given a positive role: CE II 82.

divine infinity and eschatology

237

through knowledge to a faithful recognition of divine incomprehensibility, his interpretation of the story of Abraham does not have so
strong an eschatological dimension as his later uses of the ladder
image. This is not to say that his use of the image here is unskilled
as we have seen his composition of this part shows much eort, and
the image of the ladder is both evocative and conveys well what
Gregory has to say. Nevertheless, one must confess that it is in his
later works, that the combination of Platonic and biblical associations is fused with ever greater condence into an image of the
souls eschatological destiny which becomes truly and unforgettably
Gregorys own.

DIE ROLLE DER EPINOIA NACH EUNOMIUS UND

GREGOR UND DIE THEOLOGISCH-PHILOSOPHISCHEN
HINTERGRNDE (CE II 171195)
Charalambos Apostolopoulos

I. Einleitung: Die verschiedenen sprachphilosophischen Thesen der beiden

Autoren (CE II 171178)
In diesem Passus tritt die sprachphilosophische Gewissensfrage der
Zeit explizit auf, ob der Name das wirkliche Wesen der Dinge selbst
bezeichnet oder nicht.1 Diese Frage, die bekanntlich auf Platons
Kratylos zurckgefhrt werden kann,2 stellt Gregor in unserem Text
folgendermaen dar: Was verbindet das Ersinnen der Wrter (=hmtvn
pnoia) bzw. das Setzen der Namen mit den Dingen selbst, die wir
durch den einen oder anderen Klang der Namen und Wrter bezeichnen?3 Im Abschnitt, den ich vorzustellen habe, gibt es einen deutlichen Hinweis auf die Hauptthese des Eunomius im Bereich der
Gotteserkenntnis, dass der Name Ungezeugtsein (gennhsa) das
Wesen Gottes bezeichnet sowie die Gegenthese Gregors, dass dieser
Name sich nicht in eigentlicher Weise auf das Wesen bezieht, sondern lediglich auf die Anfangslosigkeit und Unendlichkeit des ersten
Grundes hinweist.
Den verschiedenen sprachphilosophischen Thesen der beiden
Autoren knnen wir nherkommen, wenn wir nur darauf bedacht
sind, die polemisch bedingten gegenseitigen Parodien ihrer Behauptungen einigermaen zur Seite zu schieben. Wenn Gregor etwa gleich
am Anfang4 sich ber die einmalige Verzerrung seiner These beschwert,
er habe angeblich Gott mit pnoia gleichgesetzt, sollte man ernstlich

Vgl. vor allem CE II 173 (GNO I 275).

Vgl. Platon, Crat. 390de: ka Kratlow lhy lgei lgvn fsei t nmata
enai tow prgmasi, ka o pnta dhmiourgn nomtvn enai, ll mnon kenon
2

tn poblponta ew t t fsei noma n kst ka dunmenon ato t edow

tiynai ew te t grmmata ka tw sullabw.
3
4

CE II 160 (GNO I 271).

Vgl. CE II 171f (GNO I 274f ).

240

charalambos apostolopoulos

versuchen, den ursprnglichen Vorwurf des Eunomius bzw. dessen

eigenen Epinoia-Begri zu rekonstruieren. Denn es sieht tatschlich
wie ein Wahnsinn aus, Gott, dem seiend-seienden (ntvw nta), dem
Urgrund alles Existierens, das eigene wirkliche Wesen (pstasiw)
absprechen zu wollen, ja ihn mit einem bloen Namen in unserem
Kopf gleichzusetzen.5
Und wenn Eunomius darauf beharrt, dass das Wort (Ungezeugtsein)
das Wesen selbst oenbart, woher schpft diese Behauptung ihre
berzeugungskraft? Gregor stellt selbst die Frage auf,6 doch sehr
bequem wirft er gleich seinem Gegner vor, er spreche Unsinn, verwirrendes, zusammenhangsloses Zeug (prw tn skopn sunrthton).7
Und zum Thema Ungezeugtsein fgt er hinzu: Wir behaupten
dies sei ein Name, der lediglich darauf hinweist, dass Gott ist ohne
jeglichen vorausgegangenen Geburtsakt (genntvw tn yen festnai), [wir behaupten] nicht, das Ungezeugtsein sei selbst Gott.8
Hat aber Eunomius das so gemeint? Hat er berhaupt jemals das
Selbstbewusstsein Gottes fr sich beansprucht, wie seine Gegner es
ihm vorzuwerfen scheinen? Mit seiner Emphase auf der gennhsa
als dem Hauptmerkmal Gottes wollte er vielleicht lediglich dessen
Wesen in seiner Einfachheit denken und bewahren, dass Er ist was
er ist: O Vn (Exodus 3,14).9

II. Der Epinoia-Begri des Eunomius nach der Darstellung Gregors

(CE II 179180)
Von dem durch die menschliche Vernunft (i.e. pnoia) Gesagten
gilt, dass es entweder nur in der lautlichen uerung (kat tn proforn) Existenz besitze wie z.B. Wrter, die nichts bezeichnen,
d.h. die voces non signicativae oder in einem eigenen Denkakt (kat
dan dinoian). Und davon ist das eine durch Vergrerung entstanden, wie z.B. alles Kolossale, anderes durch Verkleinerung, z.B.
die Pygmen, oder durch Hinzufgung, wie die Polykephalen, oder
5

Vgl. CE II 172f (GNO I 275).

Vgl. CE II 175 (GNO I 275f ).
7
CE II 176 (GNO I 276).
8
CE II 177 (GNO I 276).
9
Vgl. M. Wiles, Eunomius: hair-splitting dialectician or defender of the accessibility of salvation?, in: R. Williams (Hrsg.), The making of orthodoxy. Essays in honour
of Henry Chadwick, Cambridge 22002, 157172, bes. 164.
6

die rolle der epinoia nach eunomius und gregor

241

durch Zusammensetzung, wie z.B. die Mischtiere.10 Diese in epikureischer Sicht dargelegte Auassung der pnoia als einer bedeutungslosen, gedankenlosen, blo das Widernatrliche sich ausdenkenden
Ttigkeit oder als eines blo phantasierenden Vermgens, degradiert
oenbar die Vernunftttigkeit zu etwas Nutzlosem fr das Leben.
ber die theologisch-philosophischen Hintergrnde der eunomianischen Deutung der pnoia hat bereits Theo Kobusch bei seiner
Analyse der sprachphilosophischen Grundlagen unserer Schrift auf
dem VI. Kongress in Pamplona (1986) Erleuchtendes berichtet.11

III. Gregor von Nyssa: Das Hohelied auf die

(als menschliche Vernunft konzipierte) Epinoia (CE II 181191)
Wenn aber die pnoia wie von Eunomius als etwas fr das Leben
Nutzloses abgetan wird, ist so wendet Gregor ein das spezisch
Menschliche am menschlichen Leben gar nicht zu begreifen. Woher
haben wir denn die Errungenschaften der Geometrie, der Arithmetik,
der Logik und Physik, aber auch die Erndungen der Maschinen
und schlielich die Metaphysik in Form der Ontologie und der philosophischen Theologie? Sie alle beruhen auf der Ttigkeit menschlicher Vernunft ebenso wie auch die Knste Ackerbau und Schiahrt.
Ist das alles nicht durch die Epinoia zugunsten des menschlichen
Lebens erfunden worden? stellt Gregor die rhetorische Frage, um
gleich zur Denition der pnoia berzugehen:
Denn nach meiner Denition ist die pnoia Zugri auf das Unbekannte
mit dem Zweck es zu erfassen (fodow eretik tn gnooumnvn), der
von einem ersten (intuitiven) Verstndnis des Forschungsobjekts ausgeht und das daraus Folgende schrittweise entwickelt (bzw. entdeckt).
Denn indem wir etwas vom Objekt unserer Untersuchung (im voraus)
verstehen und zu dieser Art des Vorgreifens ber die nomata die
wir mittlerweile entdecken das Nachfolgende zusammenpassen, fhren
wir das Unternehmen unserer (diesbezglichen) Forschung zu seinem
Ziel (Ende).12

10

Vgl. SVF II 87; 88; Epicurus, Fr. 36 (Usener 105106).

Vgl. Th. Kobusch, Name und Sein. Zu den sprachphilosophischen Grundlagen
in der Schrift Contra Eunomium des Gregor von Nyssa, in: L. F. Mateo-Seco
J. L. Bastero (Hrsg.), El Contra Eunomium I en la produccion literaria de Gregorio de Nisa.
VI. Coloquio Internacional sobre Gregorio de Nisa, Pamplona 1988, 247267, bes. 253.
12
CE II 182 (GNO I 277). Die bersetzung von Theo Kobusch, Name und
11

242

charalambos apostolopoulos

Die in diesem Sinne denierte pnoia erscheint also als Stifterin der
Kultur berhaupt.13 Diese Fhigkeit des Verstehens und Erndens,
die Vernunft im weitesten Sinne, die von Gott dem Menschen nicht
blo gegeben, sondern wie es auch in der Rede von der Erschaung
des Menschen (Per kataskeuw nyrpou) ganz ausdrcklich gesagt
wird bergeben worden ist (vom Seinigen als Eigentum gegeben,
[metdvken]),14 hat dennoch einen durchaus ambivalenten Charakter.
Denn sie kann sich verfehlen. Wie Theo Kobusch bei seiner erwhnten Analyse des Epinoia-Begris Gregors zu Recht betont hat, macht
Gregor sich hier die These des Eunomius von der Nichtigkeit menschlicher Vernunft zunutze: Gerade die Fhigkeit, das Wider- und
Unnatrliche, das Phantastische und Unwahre auszusinnen, zeigt,
dass die pnoia uns eigentlich zu einem guten Zweck von Gott gegeben wurde. Sie ist wie die Entscheidungsfreiheit des Menschen
(proaresiw) selbst:15 der jeweilige Missbrauch ist ein Beweis dafr,
dass sie beide, die Vernunft wie die Freiheit, eigentlich notwendig

Sein, 255, pnoia sei das inventive methodisch gesicherte Wissen des Unbekannten
halte ich fr nicht richtig. Efodow bedeutet doch Angri, Anrcken, hchstens
Fortschritt und diese Bedeutung hat der Terminus auch bei Aristoteles, Topik I
12, 105a1314, wenn er in technischem Sinne in der Denition des induktiven
Schlusses begegnet: pagvg (sc. die Induktion) d p tn kay kaston p t
kaylou fodow . . . Auch die englische bersetzung der Epinoia-Denition von
Stuart George Hall (As I see it, mental conception is the way we nd out things
we do not know, using what is connected and consequent upon our rst idea of a
subject to discover what lies beyond) halte ich fr nicht ganz geglckt.
13
Ganz hnlich preist schon Isokrates in seiner Andidosisrede (Per ntidsevw)
(Or. 15,253257, Mandilaras III 130131), den Logos als Kulturmacht. Im Logos
sieht Isokrates den Inbegri des Menschseins: Die Redegabe, so heit es da, unterscheidet den Menschen vom Tier. Die Fhigkeit zu berzeugen und mitzuteilen
(peyein ka dhlon), also die Kommunikation, hat Gemeinschaftsleben und Zivilisation
mglich gemacht. Auf dem Logos beruhen die sittlichen Normen und die Mglichkeit
der Erziehung. Die Redeweise ist ein Abbild (edvlon) der Sinnesart der Seele.
Auch das Denken und berlegen ist ein Sprechen mit sich selbst. So ist der Logos
unser Fhrer bei jedem Tun und Denken. Dieser Text ist feierlich-sakral stilisiert.
Er ist ein Manifest und eine Grndungsurkunde dessen, was man in einem bestimmten Sinne Humanismus nennt: nmlich der Vorstellung dass das Sprachvermgen
im Zentrum der menschlichen Existenz stehe und deshalb die Ausbildung der sprachlichen Ausdrucks- und Kommunikationsfhigkeit in die Mitte des Bildungsprozesses
gestellt werden msse. Die ursprngliche Bedeutung der Rhetorik, fr das entliche
Leben einer Demokratie handlungsfhig zu machen, ist damit weit berschritten.
14
Gregor von Nyssa, De hominis opicio (PG 44, 149bc).
15
Siehe dazu Ch. Apostolopoulos, Phaedo Christianus. Studien zur Verbindung und
Abwgung des Verhltnisses zwischen dem platonischen Phaidon und dem Dialog Gregors von
Nyssa ber die Seele und die Auferstehung, Frankfurt a.M. Bern New York 1986,
257.

die rolle der epinoia nach eunomius und gregor

243

und von unendlichem Nutzen fr die Seele sind. Die Bewegung der
pnoia auf das Vergebliche und Nutzlose kann ihre Fhigkeit zum
Guten und Ntzlichen kaum in Zweifel ziehen: So wie sie dort dasjenige erfand, was Lust oder berraschung hervorbringt, so wird sie
auch hier ihren Angri auf das Wahre nicht verfehlen.

IV. Das Ungezeugtsein Gottes als Beispiel negativer Theologie

(CE II 192195)
Das Ungezeugtsein (gnnhton) bzw. das Anfanglose (narxon) ist
ein Name, der lediglich die Tatsache bezeichnet, dass der erste
Grund, d.h. Gott, ohne Anfang ist.16 Dieser Name verweist nur auf
das, was Gott nicht ist, nmlich abhngig durch die Geburt von
einem anderen. Er sagt nichts darber, was Gott ist. Das unbestimmtunendliche (riston) gttliche Wesen entzieht sich schlechterdings
allen Benennungen durch die menschliche pnoia.17 Wie schon oft
hervorgehoben wurde (E. von Ivnka, Paul Tillich), ist Gott fr
Gregor jenseits aller Namen und aller Begrie, unerreichbar, undenkbar und unaussprechbar. Er ist nicht gut, sondern jenseits des Guten,
ja sogar ein ganz khner Gedanke nicht Gott, sondern jenseits
Gottes, sofern der Name Gott schon irgendeinen Begri, einen
Gedanken, eine Bestimmung bedeutet. Diese radikale Auassung der
Unendlichkeit Gottes, welche Gott im Unbestimmbaren und Unaussprechbaren verschwinden lsst, wird freilich auch Eunomius Reaktion
hervorrufen, der seinen Gegnern polemisierend vorwirft, sie wissen

16
Die Lehre von der Anfangslosigkeit Gottes tritt im allgemein christlichen und
jdischen Denken gelegentlich in der Polemik gegen heidnische Gtter auf. Erst in
der Christologie treten Probleme auf, sofern die biblische Redeweise von der Zeugung
des Sohnes an mythische Theogonien erinnern konnte. Zu einer Kontroverse ber
die Agennesie des Sohnes kam es aber erst durch Arius und seine Nachfolger wie
Eunomius. Sie beschrnkten bekanntlich das Prdikat streng auf Gott den Vater
und folgerten, dass der Sohn einen zeitlichen Anfang haben msse: n pote te ok
n (bei Athanasius Or. contra Arianos I 5, PG 26, 21a). Siehe hiezu den informativen Artikel Anfang von Herwig Grgemanns, in RAC Suppl., Bd. I (2001), Sp.
401448, bes. Teil E. Anfang oder Anfangslosigkeit Gottes (der Gtter), 442 (mit weiterfhrender Literatur).
17
Das griechische Wort riston hat bei Gregor eine Bedeutung, die sich nicht
mit einem deutschen Wort angemessen wiedergeben lsst. Sie changiert zwischen
unendlich, unbestimmt und unbegrenzt. Der Einfachheit halber steht hier immer:
unbestimmt-unendlich.

244

charalambos apostolopoulos

eigentlich nicht, was sie anbeten, wie die Samariter der alten Zeiten
( Joh 4,22).18
Dennoch scheint Gregor von Nyssa mit seiner Vorstellung vom
Unbestimmt-Unendlichen der gttlichen Natur es philosophisch ernst
zu meinen. Wie ich bei anderer Gelegenheit gezeigt habe, gelangt
der spte Gregor, in seinem Versuch, beide Aspekte, das In- und
zugleich ber-Sein des gttlichen Wesens als eine paradoxe Einheit
zu denken, zu einer merkwrdigen Konzeption des Gttlichen als
eines Unbestimmt-Unendlichen, einer Konzeption, die sich weder
mit der griechisch-philosophischen noch mit der christlichen Tradition
deckt.19 Das Wesen des Gttlichen, das fr Gregor im Grunde das
wahrhaft Seiende, den als Realitt erfahrenen Bestand des seinsmchtigeren Geistigen bedeutet, ist hier so radikal negativ formuliert, dass es sich tatschlich nicht blo als das unbegreifbare
Geheimnis hinstellt, das, sich gegen jede weitere Aussage ber sein
Wesen sperrend, jegliche Konturen, auch die des Guten oder Gottes
oder die des Etwas zersprengt, sondern auch, ganz berraschend
ins Positive schlagend, ein sich selbst transzendierendes UnbestimmtUnendliches (riston) suggeriert: Das gttliche Wesen bersteigt
dauernd sich selbst!20 Dieser khne Gedanke, der das Erkenntnisund Lebensziel im Unerkennbaren und Unbestimmbaren, ja Unberechenbaren verschwinden lsst, vertrgt sich oenbar kaum mit der
auf Berechenbarkeit, Umfassbarkeit, Bestndigkeit und Ma angelegten Seinsordnung der griechischen Metaphysik.
Auch der Christ aber drfte ohne unausgewiesene Hypothesen
mit den Unendlichkeitsbegrien des Kirchenvaters wenig anfangen knnen! Meine Interpretationsthese, dass der Unendlichkeitsbegri bei
Gregor tendenziell auf das Unbegrenzt-Unbestimmte Gottes abzielt,
habe ich ja in der Auseinandersetzung gerade mit der christlich-theologischen Deutung des gregorianischen Unendlichkeitsbegries gewonnen. Dieser zufolge bezeichnet dieser Begri die spezische Dierenz
des Schpfers gegenber dem Geschpf. Nach meinem Urteil jedoch
ist die Unendlichkeit keine eigentmliche christliche Aussage. Selbst

18
Gregor von Nyssa, CE III/I 105 (GNO II 39,1314); Basilius, Ep. 234,1
(Courtonne III 41).
19
Siehe dazu Ch. Apostolopoulos, AORISTON. Anmerkungen zur Vorstellung
vom Unbestimmten-Unendlichen der gttlichen Natur bei Gregor von Nyssa,
StPatr 37 (2001) 311.
20
Ch. Apostolopoulos, AORISTON, 5f, Anm. 3.

die rolle der epinoia nach eunomius und gregor

245

in seinem frher verfassten Dialog Per cuxw ka nastsevw,

diesem Phaedo Christianus aus dem vierten nachchristlichen Jahrhundert wo unser Thema als Problem der Ewigkeit und insbesondere der Gttlichkeit des gewordenen bzw. gezeugten Geistes
wiederkehrt und das riston sich bereits als ein hervorragender
Begri des Gttlichen erweist liegt der Schwerpunkt der Darstellung
nicht auf der radikalen Unterscheidung zwischen Erschaenem und
Unerschaenem, vielmehr auf ihrer wesenhaften (origenistisch anmutenden) Gemeinschaft, wie sie sich aus der der Welt transzendenten
nicht ganz bestimmbaren Natur des Logos (now tiw) ergibt, an
dem beide, Gott21 und Mensch, teilhaben.22

21
22

Vgl. bes. De anima et resurrectione (PG 46, 57b).

Siehe dazu Ch. Apostolopoulos, Phaedo Christianus, 306f, Anm. 15.

THE LANGUAGE OF GOD AND HUMAN LANGUAGE

(CE II 195293)
Anthony Meredith

Overview
With the help of Stuart Halls translation and the discussion concerning the diculty of oering a totally satisfactory account of the
structure of the piece before us it may still be helpful to isolate certain basic issues from the text before us.
Gregory spends sections 198204 (GNO I 282284) in attacking
the absurdity of the literalism of Eunomius approach to scripture
which leads him to argue that God has vocal chords. 205214 (GNO
I 284288) God has no need to use language anyway, above all in
communicating with his Son, 215221 (GNO I 288290).
Scripture has more than a merely literal meaning (222226, GNO
I 290292), it has also a deeper yevra. Gregorys own allegorical
method is here under defence. Then from 227238 (GNO I 292296)
Gregory attacks any physicalist view of God. Instead, 239250 (GNO
I 296299) God gave us the power to name things for ourselves with
the help of our rational intelligences (269, GNO I 305). At 261
(GNO I 302) God did not speak Hebrew. Words dier, things do
not; there never was a primitive language, even before Babel. Again
and again Gregory insists at 269275 (GNO I 305307) that God
created things not names . . . a point repeated at 276281 (GNO I
307309). 282293 (GNO I 309313) God does not need names,
we do. This is not a denial of providence as Eunomius suggests. Our
ability to name things is a divine gift and far below the wonder of
the things that God created.

Preliminary observations
The central issue Gregory faces throughout the whole of this section 195293 (GNO I 281313) is in eect a defence of Basil as
indeed is the whole of the Contra Eunomium and by implication of

248

anthony meredith

Gregory himself against the accusation made by Eunomius that their

understanding of the nature of language and of Gods relationship
to it amounted in eect to a denial of divine providence and indeed
of the divine availability as a result of an excessive insistence on the
divine unknowability. For if God is in and of himself inaccessible to
the human mind what is the point or the possibility of intelligible
discourse about God? This is very clear from the extract of Eunomius
cited in section 196, where reads as follows: He accuses him [that
is Basil] of following pagan (jvyen) philosophy and so of circumcising the divine providence (khdemona).1

I. The secular nature of Eunomius approach

Gregory begins by oering what he himself admits is less a straight
statement than a paraphrase of the Eunomian position. Eunomius
had accused Basil of following secular philosophy, jvyen filosofa,2
and consequently of limiting or denying any sense of divine providence. Both sides can use this type of argument. Later in this book
(sections 405, 410 and 411, GNO I 344346) Gregory accuses
Eunomius in turn of allowing himself to be misled by Plato, Epicurus
and Aristotle. Similarly Origen in Contra Celsum had sought to discredit the position of Celsus by suggesting he was an Epicurean
because of his supposed denial of providence.3 In the eld of controversy it was quite possible for orthodox and heretics alike to
accuse each other of being too dependent on the arguments of secular philosophy. So, too, Tertullian the zealous African, as Gibbon
terms him, despite his opposition to secular philosophy towards
the close of his Apology, is capable of describing the Stoic Seneca, as
our Seneca.
1
CE II 196 (GNO I 282,37). It is instructive to see that Eunomius was as capable as were both Basil and Gregory of attributing the errors, as they saw them, of
the Cappadocians to the mischievous inuence of alien philosophy, above all the
atheistic followers of Aristotle and Epicurus. Basil at Adversus Eunomium I 9 (SC 299,
198) accuses Eunomius of deriving his views k tw ksmou sofaw. Likewise Gregory
at CE I 88 (GNO I 52). Again both sides were quite capable of accusing the other
of a denial of divine providence. Eunomius does this at CE II 196 (GNO I 282);
Gregory does the same and associates Eunomius in so doing with the teaching of
Epicurus at CE II 410 (GNO I 345346). Origen levels a like accusation against
Celsus at Contra Celsum I 8; I 9; I 20 (SC 132, 9496; 96100; 126128).
2
Cf. Basil, Adversus Eunomium I 7 (SC 299, 188192).
3
Cf. Origen, Contra Celsum IV 99 (SC 136, 430434).

the language of god and human language

249

II. Theories of the origin and nature of language

Basil in his Adversus Eunomium I 6 had given attention to the precise
meaning of the central expression pnoia, which was his preferred
way of categorising the language we employ in our attempts to understand and dene the divine nature.4 For Basil the word expresses,
as it does for Gregory, a human expression or rather invention,
enabled in us by the power of God. It is not, therefore, as Eunomius
supposes, a fanciful expression, but rather our own reection on the
concepts we form through the reective power we have from God.
To use more modern terminology, for Gregory and Basil language is
neither purely conventional, nor natural the Anomoean position
but in between. As has been pointed out the diculty with the
Cappadocian position is that it lacks the idea of analogy. For Eunomius
the position of Basil makes all language purely human and therefore both arbitrary and ctional.
It is perhaps worth remarking that although in this treatise Gregory,
following Basil assigns to the expression pnoia a precise linguistic
sense, it is by no means the case that this is the only sense the word
bears. It is worth noting that it appears on several occasions in De
vita Moysis II 95 and 113, and it simply means device or stratagem
for dealing with a diculty.5 The use of the expression is also to be
found in Oratio catechetica on at least ve occasions.6 It is this way,
meaning faculty rather than meaning, that Gregory denes his usage
of the expression at CE II 182 (GNO I 277,21) as a fodow eretik,
a way of nding things out rather than the actual result, not unlike
Basil in Adversus Eunomium I 6.7
This being so, there is a marked dierence between the Cappadocian
usage and that of Origen, where in the Commentary on John I 28,200
and in Contra Celsum II 64, as we have seen, the word is applied to
aspects of Christ, like word, wisdom and shepherd and so on, rather
than either to the divine nature itself or to the way we discover

Cf. Basil, Adversus Eunomium I 6 (SC 299, 182188).

Cf. Gregory, De vita Moysis II 95; 113 (GNO VII/1 62,6; 68,1).
6
Oratio catechetica (GNO III/4 7,7; 26,2; 60,22; 66,4; 87,15). On the rst two of
these occurrences Srawley (Oratio catechetica magna. The Catechetical Oration of Gregory of
Nyssa, Cambridge 1903, 4) compares Gregorys usage with that to be found in the
Contra Eunomium, In his view, he writes, it is an inventive faculty and at the same
time more trustworthy than fancy.
7
Cf. Basil, Adversus Eunomium I 6 (SC 299, 182188).
5

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anthony meredith

truth.8 So also in Contra Celsum II 64, Origen can write: Although

Jesus was one he had many aspects.9
Eunomius indicts Basil for reducing, if not denying altogether, the
notion of divine providence, by an unwillingness to accept the divine
origin of language. This, so Eunomius urges, results from a refusal
to take seriously the words of Genesis, which insist that the naming
of plants took place before the creation of mankind. In other words
Eunomius accusation is both that Basil is anti-providential and that
he denies the clear sense of Genesis 1,5: And called the light day
and the darkness he called (klesen) night.
The philosophical provenance of Eunomius theory is almost certainly Platos Cratylus 391de, as is suggested by Gregory at CE II
404 (GNO I 344). In that passage Socrates is reported as saying:
He [that is Homer] distinguishes between the names by which gods
and men call the same things. Do you not think that he gives in
those passages great and wonderful information about the correctness of names? For clearly the gods call things by names that are
naturally right (yeo at kalosin prw rythta per sti fsei
nmata) (my emphasis). As far as I am aware this discussion of the
nature of language above all of the language we apply to God, or
to anything else, is quite new in Christian circles. Marcion had indeed
adopted a literal approach to the bible, but not in deference to a
philosophical view of the nature of language. Origen seems nowhere
to discuss the issue of the nature of language as such, and defends
the biblical texts impugned by Marcion by the use of allegory and
by appeal in De principiis IV 2,6,10 to the practice of Saint Paul in
1 Corinthians 910 and in Galatians 4. If indeed Gregory is correct
in attributing Eunomius ideas to Platos Cratylus, Eunomius was the
rst to do so.
What is not altogether clear is whether the Eunomian adoption
of Platos theory of language proceeded solely from controversial
motives or rose independently, from a genuine interest in philosophy. Was he a sophistic logician or a genuine philosopher? For our
purposes it hardly matters.11 The immediate motive for Eunomius

8
Cf. Origen, Commentary on John I 28,200 (GCS 10, 37); Contra Celsum II 64 (SC
132, 434436).
9
Origen, Contra Celsum II 64 (SC 132, 434436).
10
Origen, De principiis IV 2,6 (Grgemanns-Karpp 714720).
11
Jean Danilou in two celebrated articles both in Revue des tudes grecques

the language of god and human language

251

insistence on the sacred character of language, is clear enough.

Eunomius wishes to argue that God has a name given by God to
himself and that name is gnnhtow. If this argument is accepted it
would automatically exclude the Son from the divine nature. The
central argument, therefore, of Eunomius is dual. He hopes to disprove the deity of the Son, by dening the divine nature in such a
way as to exclude from it the idea of derivation; the denition of
God does this by the single expression gnnhtow. No son can be
unbegotten.
The Cappadocian position that the attribution of names belongs
to our own human intelligences to our logik dnamiw12 by means
of human conceptions, pnoiai, labours according to Eunomius,
under two serious defects. (1) It is against the ciln grmma of scripture,13 which expressly asserts at several points the fact that God
himself named things. At Genesis 1,5 we read God called the light
day the LXX reads klese at this point similarly at verses 8
and 10 a point insisted upon by Eunomius at sections 269, 280
and 281 (GNO I 305; 308309). The attribution of the power of
naming things to merely human agency is taken by Eunomius, as
we have seen, to be a denial of divine providence. At section 197
Gregory refers somewhat ironically to Eunomius as the great protector of divine providence.14 Such an argument assumes an understanding of providence of a strongly Stoic/Platonic kind. It is perhaps
worth noting that Gregory of Nazianzus deplores the Aristotelian/
Epicurean denial of providence in section 10 of his First Theological
Oration and invites Eunomius to attack that rather than Christian
doctrine.15

Eunome lArien et lexgse no-platonicenne du Cratyle, REG 69 (1956) 412432,

and Grgoire de Nysse et le no-platonisme de lcole dAthnes, REG 80 (1967)
395401 argued that Eunomius linguistic ideas derived from the Neoplatonism
of Iamblichus. But the actual commitment of Eunomius to any sort of philosophy
has been hotly disputed by other scholars and even Gregory accuses him of devotion to Aristotle, as at CE II 411 and 620 (GNO I 346; 407), and Epicurus, as in
note 1, as well as to Plato. It is doubtful whether we should treat Eunomius as a
philosopher at all.
12
Cf. CE II 246; 270; 290 (GNO I 298,15; 305,24; 312,5).
13
Cf. CE II 250 (GNO I 299,16).
14
Cf. CE II 197 (GNO I 282,19).
15
Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. 27,10,69 (SC 250, 9496).

252

anthony meredith
III. Defence of Basil

Gregorys initial reply to this attack on his master Basil,16 is to insist

that the argument he and his brother use, that God handed over
to men the power to name things does not in practice amount to
a denial or diminution of the providence of God. Indeed both here
and elsewhere it is a constant argument of Gregory that the language we employ with the help of pnoiai with which to discourse
is Gods gift to us which enables us to understand and as it were
label the universe. This has already emerged at CE II 182 and 185
(GNO I 277278). In the latter passage he terms it an pinohtik
ka eretik dnamiw (so also 228, GNO I 292). In an important
passage, 243 (GNO I 297), Gregory argues that once Gods initial
work was at an end, God gave mankind the power to think and
express thoughts by speech and so to confer words on things in order
to designate them.

IV. The language of God

A. Gregory attacks the implied literalism of Eunomius treatment of scripture
This second and more extensive argument is, that to claim that God
himself uses language is to adopt a literal approach to Holy Scripture
and to avoid going deeper in a search for the spiritual truths that
lie concealed under the bare letter (222, GNO I 290). Such a manner of argument is not unlike that employed by Origen in book 4
of De principiis in order to deal with Marcions attack on scripture,
which attack, so Origen argued, rested upon an ignorance of or
refusal to go deeper in understanding the meaning of scripture on
the pattern of Saint Paul. It is worth mentioning at this juncture the
interesting fact that Marcion, Arius and Eunomius all appeal in their
16
Gregory often terms his brother Basil didskalow a term he also applies to
his sister Macrina, though less frequently both here in sections 195, 196, 197
(GNO I 281282), where he is termed master of piety, and 236 (GNO I 295)
and above all in his funeral oration on Basil. Mann Lexicon Gregorianum II 398 lists
30 examples from the Contra Eunomium I and II alone. The expression our teacher
can be found at CE I 61, 81, 126, 144, 535, 601, 653, 655 (GNO I 43,6; 50,1415;
65,6; 70,11; 181,1617; 199,13; 214,11; 214,2223), and CE II 66, 141, 345, 445
(GNO I 245,6; 266,16; 326,25; 356,20).

the language of god and human language

253

diering ways to a literal understanding, the ciln grmma of scripture as Gregory twice terms it (at 199 and 250, GNO I 283; 299),
in order to further their views. By contrast the approaches of Origen
and Gregory are far from being literal.
B. God does not need language to communicate, He has no body
But Gregory oers another argument. To assume that God actually
uses language implies on the part of God certain physical ideas that
are quite absurd. First of all God has no vocal chords, simply because
he is without a body (200202, GNO I 283284) indeed he is
also eyeless, for the same reason. This is made very clear at 233
(GNO I 293294), where Gregory also ridicules the notion of God
either hearing or smelling despite the apparent witness of in turn
Genesis 1,4, Psalm 29,11, The Lord heard and had pity and Genesis
8,21, When the Lord smelled the pleasing odour of Noahs sacrice.
There Gregory argues that if you insist on understanding said in
a bodily manner, why not seeing and hearing and smelling as well,
with reference to the words of Genesis 1,4, God saw that it was
good. Any suggestion that God has a body or parts oends the
spiritual idea of God.
C. The Father needs no language to communicate with the Son
He goes on to argue that before the creation of the universe whom
would God have to address anyway. At 207 (GNO I 285) Gregory
argues that only bodily natures require either pnoiai or language
with which to communicate their ideas. The divine nature, Father
and Son being bodiless require neither. The precise sense in which
Gregory (and Basil) understand the term pnoia will be addressed
in the passage following directly on this one, beginning at section
294 (GNO I 313). The only person(s) He could have addressed were
the Son and Spirit; but the divine nature is shared by all three, principally by the Father and the Son and they need no language to
communicate, so close are they to each other (213, GNO I 287)
there is no distasiw between them. The Son is aware of the designs
of the Father without needing the medium of speech with which to
discover them.
In section 214 (GNO I 287288) Gregory insists on the close connexion existing between Father and Son by means of the use of the

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anthony meredith

language of sunfeia and its various sources, all derived from the
root of sunptv. Slightly earlier in the same section he argues that
where no distasiw is envisaged, there all is closely related sunhmmnon.
Such language is no stranger in Gregory, as witness CE I 224 and
279 (GNO I 92; 108) and also appears not infrequently in Basil, for
example in On the Holy Spirit 24, 40, 60 and 63.17 In his Theological
Orations, interestingly, Gregory of Nazianzus appears not to use the
word or its relatives, except for sunafw at 4,20.18
But not only do they share the same nature, they also share the
same ylhma (216, GNO I 288). The former point is insisted upon
by Gregory in his treatment of John 10,30, The Father and I are
one at CE I 498503 (GNO I 170172) where Gregory denes his
position against Arius and Sabellius alike. For the identity of wills
Gregory appeals in section 216 (GNO I 288,1921) to John 16,15,
All that the Father has is mine. Unity of both nature and will
preclude the need for any form of external verbal communication.
But the most powerful positive argument urged by Gregory against
Eunomius is the strong relationship he insists upon between word
and action in God. So at 229 (GNO I 292293) he urges that in
the divine nature there is no distinction between will and activity,
(228, GNO I 292), between choice (proaresiw) and action (prjiw).
They are as closely connected as the ame and the shining that
comes from it. At 246 (GNO I 298) he writes that the consequence
of the divine will is not a name (noma) but a reality (prgma). A little later (251254, GNO I 299300) he argues that although things
do indeed depend for their existence upon Gods design and will,
the diering names are the discoveries of human intelligence,
nyrpinai fvna tw metraw dianoaw. This is a frequent refrain,
as we have already seen. God, by contrast, as we have also seen,
needs no language with which to communicate; his words are actions.
On several occasions at 225, 270, 278 and 281 (GNO I 291; 305;
308; 309) he repeats the aphorism that God is the immediate author
not of =mata or nmata but of prgmata. Eunomius, by contrast,
Gregory insists in a forceful passage in section 290 (GNO I 311312),
is really being exceedingly childish in arguing that Basils proposal

17

Basil, De spiritu sancto 24, 40, 60, 63 (FC 12, 142144; 194198; 256258;
266268).
18
Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. 30,20,7 (SC 250, 266).

the language of god and human language

255

to attribute the discovery of language to our logik dnamiw is in

eect to deny or seriously to diminish the divine prnoia. The true
power of God is to be found not in words but in action.

Conclusions
The following issues therefore emerge as the primary theses of Gregory,
in his defence of the power of the God-given human mind to name
things and so by implication of the wrongness of dening the divine
nature by the solitary title of the unbegotten only one.
1. God has provided all rational beings with the power of thought
and language (logik dnamiw) with the help of which we are
enabled to give names to things (237, 246, 290, GNO I 295; 298;
311312). This power we possess does not mean a denial or
diminution of the providence of God.
2. God is a spiritual being and has no need of human or indeed
any sort of language with which to communicate his thoughts
and wishes, either absolutely or by way of communication with
the Son, between whom and the Father there exists the closest
possible sunfeia. In him, as is often repeated, word and action
coincide. This means that there is no gap between design and
performance, nor is there any distance between nmata and prgmata. Whatever he has in his mind takes place (281, 283, GNO
I 309310).
3. Gregory protests against the literal interpretation of scripture
invoked by Eunomius and expressed by the phrase ciln grmma
at 199, 250 (GNO I 283; 299). The general point seems to be
that a literal approach to scripture goes hand in hand with a
materialistic view of the nature of God.
4. It ought to be stressed that in his whole approach, above all in
his attitude to the term pnoia, Gregory is on the one hand
remarkably free from the usages from Hellenistic philosophy outlined by Theo Kobusch. Further there is little to connect him
with the particular sense given to the word with reference to the
nature of Christ, and outlined by Origen in his Commentary on
John I 28,200 (GCS 10, 37). Gregorys dependence on Basil is
the most salient feature of his whole approach.
5. How might or did Eunomius reply to the critique of his Apology?
In a later passage of his Apology Gregory at CE III/I 105 (GNO

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anthony meredith

II 39) reports that he was accused along with Basil of advocating agnosticism on the basis of John 4,22, You worship what you
know not a jibe Basil had already dealt with in his Letter 23419
with the help of a distinction between osa and nrgeia.
6. One simple conclusion to be drawn tentatively from this whole
discussion is that neither Eunomius nor the two brothers can be
discovered at least within the context of their disagreement to be
under the inuence of any particular philosophical system, though
as we have seen both were happy to accuse the other of being
seduced by secular philosophy.

19

Basil, Ep. 234 (Courtonne III 4144).

CHRISTOLOGICAL TITLES CONCEPTUALLY APPLIED?

(CE II 294358)
Johannes Zachhuber

Gregory of Nyssa entered the Eunomian controversy late. In his

Contra Eunomium he rebuts a lengthy writing by Eunomius which in
its turn was an answer to a book Basil had written some twenty
years earlier against a (yet again) previous book by the sometime
bishop of Cyzicus. In many ways, Gregorys Contra Eunomium is, more
than anything else, an apology for his elder brother against the
attacks levelled against him by his anomoian foe. For us this means
that reconstructing Gregorys argument is impossible without some
glance at what Basil had said. Eunomius had, in his second book,
largely conned himself to a refusal of Basils position pointing out
mistaken assumptions, wrong conclusions and weak demonstrations
in the Adversus Eunomium. Gregorys primary task is it to counter this
attack by showing that, far from being mistaken, wrong and weak,
Basils arguments were valid refutations of Eunomius heretical distortions of the Christian faith and powerful demonstrations of the
orthodox truths of the Church.
After some preliminary remarks about relevance and diculty of
the problem broached here (1) I shall, therefore, start from a consideration of some relevant passages in Basils Adversus Eunomium (2)
to proceed with a tentative reconstruction of Eunomius counterarguments (3). This will be followed in turn by a discussion of
Gregorys apology for his brother (4). Some concluding remarks bring
this paper to an end (5).

I. Eunomius challenge and the problem of divine attributes:

some preliminary remarks
The
sion
tion
that

passage in Gregorys Contra Eunomium II that is under discusin this article takes its starting point essentially from one secof Basils Adversus Eunomium the main idea of which is to urge
the titles applied to Christ by scripture have their origin in

258

johannes zachhuber

human conception.1 Why would that be so? The answer is not as

straightforward as one may expect.
The immediately apparent reason, of course, is that Eunomius, in
his Apology, had claimed that the name unbegotten was Gods real
name, not one applied according to human conception but according to truth:
When we say Unbegotten, then, we do not imagine that we ought
to honour God only in name, according to human conception; rather
according to truth, we ought to repay him the debt which above all
others is most due to God: the acknowledgement that he is what he is.2

What Eunomius means to say here is fairly obvious: God is unbegotten whether human beings think of him in this way or not, whether
they employ this term or not, whether they exist or not:
Expressions based on conception have their existence in name and
utterance only, and by their nature are dissolved along with the sounds
[which make them up]; but God, whether these sounds are silent,
sounding or have even come into existence, and before anything was
created, both was and is unbegotten.3

It appears that Eunomius does not here wish to enunciate a specic

theory of pnoia disregarding the possibilities of the human mind.
He seems to take it for granted that there is a dierence between
what later thinkers would call in intellectu and in re. The ascription
of unbegotten to God expresses what God really is and not only
what people think of him. Is this objectionable from an Orthodox
point of view? I doubt it.4 It seems evident that, when church fathers
1

Basil, Adversus Eunomium I 5,1247,49 (SC 229, 180192).

Eunomius, Apologia 8 (Vaggione 40,1642,1): gnnhton d lgontew, ok nmati
mnon, kat pnoian nyrvpnhn, semnnein omeya den, potinnnai d kat
lyeian t pntvn nagkaitaton flhma t ye tn to enai stin mologan.
ET: Vaggione (with changes). In the following, translations are mine unless otherwise indicated.
3
Eunomius, Apologia 8 (Vaggione 42,17): t kat pnoian legmena n nmasi
mnoiw ka profor t enai xonta taw fvnaw sundialesyai pfuken. d yew
ka sivpntvn ka fyeggomnvn ka gegontvn ka pr to gensyai t nta, n
te ka stin gnnhtow. ET: Vaggione.
4
Gregory, in fact, conrms it at CE II 161163 (GNO I 271f ). Eunomius wording evokes the frequent claim in early Christian thought that, what in the human
mind is transitory, in God is real. Historically this is one of the roots of the use of
hypostasis-terminology with regard to God. Cf. e.g. Basil, De spiritu sancto 17,41,1721
(SC 17bis, 394): ll ok n pistesaimi ew tosoton atow paraplhjaw lanein,
ste fnai tn yen tn lvn, sper kointht tina, lg mn yevrhtn, n
odemi d postsei t enai xousan, ew t pokemena diairesyai.
2

christological titles conceptually applied?

259

as well as later theologians speak of Gods attributes, they normally

assume that those predicates correspond with real properties of God.
Eunomius position on divine names becomes more problematic
as he goes on to argue that, as Gods being is absolutely simple,
every name said of God either means unbegotten too or is wrongly
applied to the Supreme Being:
. . . every word used to signify the essence of the Father is equivalent
in force of meaning to the Unbegotten because the Father is without parts and uncomposed.5

Intuitively this contention seems implausible enough. To nd the

right argument against it is less easy. Gods simplicity in itself was
universally acknowledged. It is equally clear that this makes the
assumption of divine properties as such problematic. Speaking of
properties appears to imply necessarily some kind of multiplicity
which, by denition, must be absent from divine substance. Eunomius
doctrine of God as the unbegotten (gnnhtow) is his characteristically sweeping solution to that problem: there is one and only one
attribute of God. Saying that God is unbegotten substance tells us
everything about him; other attributes would then add no extra information about his being. If we use them, we do so on precisely that
understanding: they mean exactly the same as unbegotten.
The question, then, is not whether human usage, employing a
variety of concepts for the description of divine substance, is as such
ultimately accurate. It cannot be. The question is whether it is acceptable that all attributes customarily employed are reduced to just one,
which is thought to capture the true essence of God. Eunomius
apparently thinks this works for unbegotten. The alternative would
be to argue that all attributes used by human beings are not exhausting the fullness of divine being and that, therefore, their multiplicity expresses the limits of human cognition more than the actual
being of God. One might also urge that there is, within divinity, a
level that is not pure simplicity, and that it is this level to which
our thoughts about God refer.
These are, in fact, two strategies: one, aiming at epistemology and
philosophy of language, addresses the question of how our thoughts
5
Eunomius, Apologia 19 (Vaggione 58,168): e tonun pn per lgetai tw to
patrw osaw shmantikn, son st kat tw shmasaw dnamin t gennt di
t merw ka snyeton . . . ET: Vaggione.

260

johannes zachhuber

and words are formed and applied. The other, directed ultimately
at metaphysics, asks what those thoughts and words are applied to.
These strategies are not, of course, totally dierent. Both to some
extent aim at explaining how human beings can know something of
God without knowing him as they know things within the created
world. Basil and Gregory probed both approaches: we nd them
arguing that human cognition never reaches divine substance as such
but remains in the sphere of properties expressing Gods activities.
They also claim, in particular in their anti-Eunomian polemic, that
due to the origin of human language in human pnoia the Eunomian
assumptions are excluded.
It is not dicult to understand why they did so. The problem
posed by Eunomius is a dicult one to tackle. In fact, the question
of whether there is any ultimately successful strategy against Eunomius
position must be regarded as open, and this paper, which shall leave
it to one side, certainly does not presume otherwise.6 The problem
with Basils and Gregorys argument is not, then, that they used both
strategies, the problem is, or so I shall argue, that they were not
careful holding them apart. There is a subtle but vital distinction to
be made between the object of which names are signicant and the
capacity by means of which they are imposed. They may be indicative of (dhlvtik) substance or nature (osaw/fsevw), of activity or
properties (nergeaw/divmtvn); they are said (lgontai) by nature
(fsei) or by conception (pino&). It seems that both, Basil and
Gregory have more, and more interesting, things to say about the
former, but they do it often under the disguise of the latter, which
makes their argument less convincing than it might otherwise have
been.

II. Basil on the epinoetic character of Christological titles

As is well known the elaboration about pnoia and its consequences
for divine names lls large parts of Basils Adversus Eunomium and

6
One only has to recall the more modern argument of rationalists like Spinoza
or Hegel to realise the diculties inherent in the epistemic claims of negative theology. What do we mean by saying we know that we do not know the divine
essence? How is it to be understood, e.g., that we know that it is simple but then
pretend not to know it as such?

christological titles conceptually applied?

261

almost the entirety of Gregorys Contra Eunomium II. For practical

reasons my comments are largely restricted to those sections prescribed for this paper. Basil takes the remarks from Eunomius Apology
for an all-out assault on the human capacity of discursive reasoning.
He therefore proposes a closer look at this capacity: What pnoia
as such is, this I would like to investigate.7
The reason why Basil takes this approach becomes clear as he
goes along. Eunomius, he charges, reduces pnoia to cases of misapprehension, of empty fantasy, in brief, of paranoia. What other
uses are there of pnoia which Eunomis ignores? Basil sees pnoia
primarily and most properly as the analytical capacity so vital for
human cognition. We perceive something as simple when we rst
become aware of it. It is then the work of pnoia to further dierentiate
this initial impression by an act of analytical division. This division,
we say, is done by conception only.8 Thus we may perceive something rst only as a body. It then is reason (lgow) by means of
pnoia which subsequently analyses it into the constituents of which
it is made up: colour, shape, size etc. Similarly with corn: while as
such a simple reality we nd that we employ a variety of terms for
its more accurate description: fruit if we look at its end; seed if
we consider it as the origin of what is to come; food insofar as it
is appropriated to the body that is to consume it.9 What we thus
perceive to be simple by substance is conceptualised as being quite
complex.
These examples should be sucient to show the general drift of
Basils interest in pnoia. His precise understanding of pnoia, however, remains as shadowy as the problems of his approach are apparent. Does Basil wish to draw a distinction between a reality that as

Basil, Adversus Eunomium I 6,12 (SC 299, 182): at d toto, t pot stin

pnoia, dvw n rvtsaimi.

8
Basil, Adversus Eunomium I 6,2125 (SC 299, 184): rmen tonun, ti n mn t
koin xrsei t taw yraiw pibolaw to no pl dokonta enai ka monax, taw d kat leptn jetsesi poikla fainmena, ka poll tata t n
diairomena, pino& mn diairet lgetai.
9
Basil, Adversus Eunomium I 6,4451 (SC 299, 186): Oon to stou nhma mn
plon nuprxei psi, kay fannta gnvrzomen: n d t kribe per ato
jetsei, yevra te pleinvn prosrxetai, ka proshgorai diforoi tn nohyntvn
shmantika. tn gr atn ston nn mn karpn lgomen, nn d sprma, ka
plin trofn: karpn mn, w tlow tw parelyoshw gevrgaw: sprma d, w
rxn tw melloshw: trofn d, w katllhlon ew prosykhn t to prosferomnou smati.

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johannes zachhuber

such is simple and only becomes multiple on account of our mental operations? If we remember that his eventual interest is to defend
conceptual thought of God, we may be inclined to understand him
so. Such an argument would do little, however, to allay Eunomius
confrontation of by conception and in truth. In fact it would
conrm it. Alternatively one might propose that Basils intent is to
rehabilitate pnoia by arguing that it discovers the more complex
structure inherent in being and therefore is not as empty as Eunomius
had charged. Such a reading would be supported by the impression
in some formulations that the rst notion of a single and simple
thing is somehow rough and unrened and for this reason in need
of the work of pnoia. But while such a reading would help explain
Basils interest in salvaging pnoia from Eunomius disdain for it, it
would at the same time inevitably lead to disastrous consequences
once the object under investigation is neither body nor corn, but
God, a being which is assumed to be pure simplicity.
Problems abound, then, whichever way we look at Basils argument. If anything they become even more obvious once we consider
the central example with which he illustrates his theory, Christological
titles. Basil takes the various designations Jesus gives to himself such
as door, vine, way and shepherd as expressive of varying conceptions (pnoiai) of what is evidently and essentially one single reality (n kat t pokemenon, ma osa).10 These titles, he says, indicate
to human beings Gods love of men and the grace of divine dispensation (tn filanyrvpan tw yethtow ka tn j okonomaw
xrin)11 by means of some properties that are seen around the saviour (dimas tisi tow yevroumnoiw per atn).12 This example
may appear to tilt the balance between the two possible interpretations, which have been suggested above, in favour of the former:
what is one (by nature or substance) appears to be manifold from
the perspective of human beings. In spite of his protestations, Basil
would, then, seem to be not so far away from Eunomius position
on pnoia.
It appears most unlikely, however, that Basil takes the pnoiai of
Christ to be subjective constructions of the human mind. In fact,
the example of the Christological titles shows, I think, that Basils
10
11
12

Basil, Adversus Eunomium I 7,125 (SC 299, 18890).

Basil, Adversus Eunomium I 7,56 (SC 299, 188).
Basil, Adversus Eunomium I 7,7 (SC 299, 188).

christological titles conceptually applied?

263

understanding of pnoia diers from both readings that were suggested initially. Basil must assume that Christ is both one (in substance, that is) and many the latter with regard to his soteriological
activity. Epnoia then relates to this aspect of him, it refers to the
saviour in so far as he is or better becomes multiple as part of the
divine dispensation.
If this is accepted, as I think it must, then this has two not quite
negligible consequences for Basils argument. The rst is that it clearly
is not concerned with anything like a conceptualist theory of language. Basil may doubt that we know and are able to express precisely that and how Christ is one (although he does not here dwell
on this point).13 He does certainly not doubt that we know and
express ourselves, due to our conceptual capacity, with some precision about his nrgeiai. His point, then is not by what capacity we
apply names, but what names apply to. Epnoia teaches us about
the various aspects of a body or the multiple notions we have of
corn: in both cases it helps us distinguish between their several properties which exist. The titles of Christ are equally said of his soteriological functions. They are not applied to his single and simple
nature. Whether or not those titles, or any other names, are applied
by nature or by conception seems rather irrelevant for the present
issue.
The other consequence is this: in all the examples Basil has considered so far, it appears that the force of his argument depends
heavily on the co-existence of unity and diversity in the same object
of cognition. It is not dicult to predict that this line of argument
creates tremendous diculties once it is applied to God. Basil has
entirely forsaken the opportunity to argue for disanalogies between
created being and God, disanalogies that may be the central cause
of our inability to grasp divine substance in its essential simplicity.
If Basil shows anything then it is this: that our knowledge of Christ
extends only to his dispensational properties, not to his nature. Why,
then, would he have thought that those titles are applied conceptually? What is more, why would he have assumed that such a fact

13
He elsewhere expresses his conviction that any things substance is inscrutable
because human cognition always knows properties that are around the substance
(Basil, Adversus Eunomium I 12,3048, SC 299, 214216; cf. my: Stoic substance,
non-existent matter? Some passages in Basil of Caesarea reconsidered, in: StPatr
forthcoming).

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johannes zachhuber

(if true) would have a bearing on the dispute with Eunomius? I

would suggest two inuences that may help explain why he expected
to nd here an answer to the anomoian challenge.
a) Basil probably knew the usage encountered frequently in the
commentary literature of late ancient philosophy that something
is one in reality/substance (postsei) but many by conception
(pino&).14 Its intention is to mark a distinction in the way our mind
divides being. It is one thing to divide a forest into single trees or
humankind into its individuals, quite another to divide a tree into
root, stem and leaves, or to speak of the outer end of one of its
twigs. The forest is divided into things that continue to exist separately (postsei), the tree is divided only in our thought.15 The point
was not either to say or to deny that all division is done conceptually, but to mark a distinction with regard to the kind of parts resulting from such a division.
We can perceive, I think, why Basil thought it useful to apply this
distinction to the problem he was facing but also why it could not
work for that purpose. Basils premise is this: God is one, single
being and yet we employ legitimately a variety of terms for him. So
he too is one in substance but many according to our conception
of him. Eunomius argument, however, had been that one specic
term, unbegotten, was used of God properly denoting him in his
singularity and simplicity. What Basil needs to counter this contention
is a theory explaining that all names have their origin in human
conception, that no exception can be made for any term, such as
Eunomius requests for unbegotten. But from the fact that what is
one in substance, is many according to our conception, this does
not follow. The force of the juxtaposition Basil employs thus leads
him into quite a dierent direction from the one intended.
b) Next to this philosophical I would suggest a theological inuence.
Origen, in the second book of his Contra Celsum, advanced a theory
according to which Christological titles were applied conceptually.
His wording resembles closely that of Basil when he writes that Jesus

14
Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Met. B 5 (CAG I 229,31230,1): Surface, line
and point can be without a liquid by conception, but not hypostasei. R. E. Witt has
argued that the origin of that juxtaposition lies with Posidonius: UPOSTASIS, in:
H. G. Wood (ed.), Amicitiae Corolla for J. R. Harris, London 1933, 319343, here 325.
15
From Basils wording at Adversus Eunomium I 6,25 (SC 299, 184) (. . . pino&
mn diairet lgetai) it appears that he was aware precisely of this usage.

christological titles conceptually applied?

265

being one was many things by conception.16 Origen clearly means

what he says for the point of his elaboration is that Jesus is dierent
things to various kinds of people. In this way he seeks to counter
Celsus charge that Jesus ought to have appeared to all men universally if he were God, a charge Origen takes seriously. He argues
that Jesus, in his earthly life and after, appeared to people according to their capacity of recognising the divine.
There is no place here to enter into a thorough investigation of
this theory, but it ought to be instantly clear what many by conception means for Origen and that it is plausible for him to employ
this terminology. There actually is a subjective element to the kind
of cognition envisaged here. The varying degree of perfection amongst
human beings is the reason that, what is essentially one, appears in
various ways.
It is generally accepted that Origens theory of the pnoiai of
Christ has inuenced Basils elaboration in his Adversus Eunomium
whether directly or via some mediator, such as Eusebius of Caesarea.17
Any of those authors, however, would have had a theological
justication for this kind of theory which for Basil did no longer
exist. Origen, in the rst book of his Commentary on the Gospel of John,
makes it quite certain what the ontological background of the many
and various titles of Christ is:
Now God is altogether one and simple; but our Saviour, for many
reasons, since God set him forth a propitiation (cf. Rom 3,25) and a
rst fruits of the whole creation (cf. Col 1,15), is made many things,
or perhaps all these things, the whole creation, so far as capable of
redemption, stands in need of him.18

This is the ultimate reason for the existence of the many titles which
Origen in the same passage calls pnoiai.19 His intention here is to

16

Origen, Contra Celsum II 64 (GCS 3, 185,26): O Ihsow ew n pleona t

pino& n.
17

Cf. Basil Studer, Der theologiegeschichtliche Hintergrund der Epinoiai-Lehre

Gregors von Nyssa in this volume, esp. section III. Die origenische Herkunft der
Epinoiai-Lehre and the references given there.
18
Origen, In Iohannem I 20,119 (GCS 10, 24,236): yew mn on pnth n sti
ka plon: d svtr mn di t poll, pe proyeto atn yew
lastrion ka parxn pshw tw ktsevw, poll gnetai ka txa pnta
tata, kay xrzei ato leuyerosyai dunamnh psa ktsiw. English translation: ANF.
19
Origen, In Iohannem I 19,118 (GCS 10, 24,1722).

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johannes zachhuber

oer a vision in which Christ mediates between the absolute simplicity of God and the utter multiplicity of the created world. The
fact that he is the redeemer is inextricably intertwined with this mediating role. He is one, but becomes many in his soteriological activity. Again, he can become many because he is not as simple as God
is. For Origen, Christ is the rst in a world characterised by unityin-multiplicity. The variety of epinoetic names applied to Christ mirrors that fact as much as the diering ontological position of those
contemplating him.
Both, Basil and Eunomius reject this kind of reasoning, and yet
one may perceive an echo of Origens theory where Basil mentions
specically Christs love of men and the divine dispensation in connection with his various titles. Christ is one in substance, but his
various activities and the relation (sxsiw) towards his soteriological
benevolence make him receptive of many names. Whatever Basils
precise position in the Adversus Eunomium is towards the Christological
problem,20 fundamentally it seems indubitable that the theological
background, once again, may help explain, but hardly justies, the
use Basil makes here of pnoia. For Origen, the application of titles
to Christ is based precisely on his dierence from the father in ontological rank.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to subject Basils argument
to minute scrutiny, but what has been said should have suced to
clarify the main outlines of my initial thesis. Basil rightly aims at the
central and most controversial point of Eunomius theory, which is
the assumption that the simplicity of God means that all predicates
are to mean unbegotten or be falsely said of God. While he pretends to counter it with a theory of pnoia, his actual illustrations
demonstrate more his awareness that the dierentiation of osa and
nrgeia is what really provides an answer to Eunomius challenge.
As far as I can see for most of what Basil says the required conceptual framework is marked by what names signify, not how they

20
Generally, the Cappadocian position is to transfer to Christs humanity what
Origen and others had said of his divine nature. How this works with the doctrine
of Christs pnoiai is shown by H.-J. Sieben. Cf. id. Vom Heil in den vielen
Namen Christ zur Nachahmung derselben. Zur Rezeption der Epinoia-Lehre des
Origenes durch die kappadokischen Vter, ThPh 73 (1998), 128. While this removes
one problem it creates another: those pnoiai can not help solve the diculty of
dierent divine attributes.

christological titles conceptually applied?

267

are applied, by distinctions like one in substance many in activity;

or again: one in nature many in properties. Gregory too, as we
shall see, is using them, but they are not the same as the distinction between natural and conceptual imposition of names.

III. Eunomius reply attempt of a reconstruction

Given this situation we need not be surprised that Eunomius was
not immediately silenced by Basils reply to his Apology. What exactly
his arguments were against Basils theory of Christological titles we
cannot fully ascertain. Gregorys rendering of Eunomius words in
this passage is so selective and to all appearance distorting that
their reasonable reconstruction seems all but impossible.21 Gregory
hardly ever quotes more than a single statement at a time. Sometimes,
therefore, even its literal meaning is far from clear in the rendering
we have. But even where we may be reasonably certain about this
we lack crucial information with regard to context, information that
would be necessary for a satisfactory interpretation. Eunomius intent
regularly remains as unclear as the precise status of a particular argument: was it meant to be directed against a specic statement of
Basils? Was it meant as a general truth? Was it meant as a reductio
ad absurdum? Was it ironic? From the evidence we have we often
can only guess. Consequently, what is oered here remains to some
extent fraught with speculation.
Essentially, I take it, Eunomius oers four arguments against Basils
contentions in the passage under investigation. The rst seems straightforward enough: there is no evidence that any biblical author (any
of the saints;22 the apostles and evangelists)23 ever claimed that these
titles were applied conceptually. We know that it was a staple of
fourth-century polemical literature that whatever your opponent said
was rst submitted to the tradition test which of course it regularly
failed. Strangely though, all those writers quite freely admitted nonbiblical, non-traditional vocabulary to their own language. Gregory

21
Cf. R. P. Vaggione
Gregorys citations from
22
CE II 295 (GNO I
23
CE II 305 (GNO I

(ed.), Eunomius. The Extant Works, Oxford 1987, 8994 on

Eunomius second apology.
313,16).
316,23).

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johannes zachhuber

was not without a point retorting: if pnoia is not used by the saints,
what about gennhsa?24
It is less easy to reconstruct the second argument. Gregory quotes
it as saying that
to cite [a case of] homonymy based on analogy as human conceptualization, is the work of a mind which has discarded what is valid,
correct meaning, and considers the words of the Lord in an invalid
sense and a sort of debased usage.25

For Eunomius, the analogous application of names is a case of equivocation (mvnuma). This is in line with the standard distinction as,
for example, in Porphyrys Commentary on the Categories.26 Eunomius
simply applies this general principle here arguing that the analogical application of words like vine to Christ is a case of homonymy:
the two things have nothing in common, except the predicate said
of them. According to Eunomius, such use of terms for Christ is
not, however, a good example for a general theory of naming. Why
not?27 The use of a metaphor always presupposes a primary understanding of both terms meaning. We must know what vine as well
as Jesus Christ normally signify in order to appreciate the force of
the word I am the vine. In other words, while it might be granted
that metaphorical use of terms is conceptional (actually Eunomius
appears not to grant it at all),28 the primary signication on which
it rests is an entirely dierent matter. Eunomius, then, accuses Basil
of discarding this primary signication, the valid, correct understanding where he takes metaphorical usage as evidence for the
notional application of names.
24
CE II 310 (GNO I 317,47). Eunomius apparently does not speak of gennhsa,
but of God as osa gnnhtow. He deduces this term, as we have seen, from Ex
3,14.
25
CE II 306 (GNO I 316,611): t gr toi, fhs, tn j nalogaw mvnuman
profrein ew nyrvpnhn pnoian, cuxw rgon tn mn rrvmnon non kat
dkhn parrhmnhw, rrst d diano& ka pefvrhmn tin sunhye& tow to
kurou lgouw piskoposhw. ET: Hall (with changes).
26
Porphyry, In Cat. (CAG IV/1 65,1820.3166,2). I leave aside the problem
posed by Porphyrys sharp distinction of analogy and metaphor according to which
Christological titles would probably not be allowed to be counted as homonyma.
Others, like Atticus, lumped the two together, and so does Eunomius (op. cit., CAG
IV/1 66,2967,32).
27
I take it that Eunomius understands analogy broadly in the sense of Aristotles
denition of metaphor as the application of an alien name by transference (Poetics
21, 1457b6f: metafor d stin nmatow llotrou pifor).
28
See below at n. 32.

christological titles conceptually applied?

269

Eunomius third argument runs like this:

God on the other hand has accorded a share of the most honourable
names even to the most fragile of terrestrial beings without bestowing
on them equality of dignity, and of the meanest to the most potent
without the naturally mean status being simultaneously conferred by
the names.29

On the face of it this statement seems quite clear. While Gregory

rages against it pretending that Eunomius thinks of virtue and holiness being said mendaciously of bad things,30 it would appear that
Eunomius thought of a term like osa which at once denotes most
properly the supreme being and is said of any, even the most modest part of Gods creation. He might also have thought of goodness
which the creator himself applied to his handiwork in its entirety
(Gen 1,31). The converse, then, seems to apply in the case of the
Christological titles which apply to the Only-Begotten words from
the terrestrial sphere. In both cases, Eunomius seems to urge, the
use of those names teaches us nothing about what these things are.
So why are they employed?
Their use, apparently, is not a human fancy: God is expressly said
to be its originator. But why would God bestow on a thing a name
that does not express its being? Leaving to one side Gregorys charge
that God is thus made lying,31 the question of what Eunomius thinks
remains open. Is this part of a more complex theory of naming, or
is Eunomius just pointing to the obvious fact that names do not
always fully reect a things ontological status to dismiss Basils musings about Christological titles? The answer may lie in a fragment
which appears to continue the present argument and is adduced by
Gregory somewhat further down in his refutation:
It has been arranged in this way, however; human conception enjoys
no power over the giving of names. But God himself, who designed
the universe, adjusts the designations of every named thing appropriately to the limits and rules of relation, activity and analogy.32
29
CE II 315 (GNO I 318,1015): All yew, fhs, ka tow syenesttoiw
tn per gn tn timivttvn metaddvken nomtvn, m summetadow tw tn
jivmtvn somoiraiw, ka tow kurivttoiw tn etelesttvn, m summetaferomnhw
p tn nomtvn tw fusikw eteleaw. ET: Hall (with changes).
30

CE II 321 (GNO I 319,28320,6).

Vgl. CE II 317 (GNO I 318,30319,1): ka toto rgon enai lgei yeo, t
diacedesyai t timivtr& klsei tn xeirna fsin.
32
CE II 334335 (GNO I 323,2326; 324,15): tata mntoi toton diattaktai
31

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johannes zachhuber

Eunomius thus arms that naming originates with God. This naming activity of God, however, knows of more rules than the conformity of name and substance. There are names accorded by God to
apply to a things activity. Even for the metaphorical use of names
God, in this reading, would have provided.
This is still a far shot from a satisfactory theory, but due to our
lack of further information I leave this claim here to move on to
the fourth and last argument Gregory ascribes to Eunomius in the
present context. He quotes it as follows:
Since, he says, the Lord applied these appellations to himself without
reckoning one rst or second or more rened or more precise, it is
not possible that these names should come from conceptual thought.33

Here at last we have a train of thought that seems straightforward

enough. Eunomius line of reasoning starts from Basils declaration
that pnoia is the human faculty that renes our cognition by
analysing the cruder impressions produced by sense perception. But
if the titles of Christ are used by himself, this model is not applicable. It is crucial to see that Eunomius here refers back to Basils
own statement. The author of the Apologia Apologiae would not have
been ignorant of the fact that Paul, John and other biblical writers
used those titles of Christ, but Basil himself had pointed out that
Jesus employed them rst.34 In whatever way, then, these names
apply to divine, soteriological activities, whatever analogies they produce, they are not due to the inventive nature of any theologian as
long as we believe what the Bible tells us.
*

tn trpon, o tw pinoaw tn nyrpvn laxoshw tn jousan tn nomtvn

[. . .] ll ato, fhs, to t pnta dhmiourgsantow yeo sxsevw te ka nergeaw
ka nalogaw mtroiw ka nmoiw prosfuw kst tn nomazomnvn tw proshgoraw sunarmzontow. ET: Hall (with changes).
33
CE II 351 (GNO I 328,2125): peid, fhsn, aut tataw pyhke tw
proshgoraw kriow ote ti prton non ote deteron ote lepttern ti
kribsteron, ok stin j pinoaw enai tata epen t nmata. ET: Hall. It

is not altogether clear whether this is the actual quotation from Eunomius and how
it relates to a similar statement in II 350. For the present argument this philological detail is irrelevant.
34
Basil, Adversus Eunomium I 7,46 (SC 299, 188): O kriow mn Ihsow Xristw
n tow per auto lgoiw, tn filanyrvpan tw yethtow ka tn j okonomaw
xrin tow nyrpoiw paradhln . . .

christological titles conceptually applied?

271

Overall, Eunomius appears to have largely restricted himself in this

section to a refutation of Basils elaboration in Adversus Eunomium I
7. Thus, not much of excitement is produced by an analysis of his
statements. There are indications though that he extended his linguistic theory to the remarkable claim that God provides for any
legitimate use of language, including even the use of metaphors.

IV. Gregorys apology for Basil

Gregory, in the section prescribed for this paper, chiey seeks to
refute the aforesaid arguments adduced by Eunomius and thus to
defend Basils original contentions against the heresiarch. The more
polemical replies that cover great parts of Gregorys text I propose
to gloss over. They hardly seem to give an answer to Eunomius
objections, presenting instead much rhetorical tit for tat. More interesting is the way Gregory positions himself vis--vis the principal
question Basil had raised. Basil, while claiming to argue for a conceptual theory of naming had, in fact, sought to establish that names
refer to activities or properties, certainly not to substances. We shall
presently see that the same tendency in Gregory is even more apparent. While keeping up the claim of an epinoetic theory of naming
in principle, his actual argument draws crucially on the distinction
of what is signied.
Near the outset of our section, having quoted both Basils original contention35 and Eunomius rst counterargument, Gregory nds
himself prompted to lay out his position in principle:
35
Gregorys rendering of Basils argument poses a riddle. Apart from more negligible changes, which I here ignore, it diers substantially from the original by saying that Christ revealed to men through his titles tn fsin tw yethtow instead
of tn filanyrvpan tw yethtow ka tn j okonomaw xrin, the reading we
nd in Basils book (I 7,56, SC 299, 188). Jaeger takes this as evidence that
Gregory quotes from Eunomius text (note ad locum; GNO I 313). One might imagine that Eunomius changed the wording, as the stronger claim (the titles denote
divine nature) might appear to facilitate his criticism. From what is left in Gregorys
treatise, however, there is little evidence that he in any way drew on this supposed
reading. Gregory, on the other hand, should have been alerted by this distortion
of Basils text (whether or not he had a chance to check its accuracy at once). Only
a little later he states explicitly that those titles cannot refer to the nature of the
Only-begotten, but must indicate his activities (II 298, GNO I 314). This corresponds well enough to Basils original text, but contradicts the version he quotes.
As far as I see, an explanation is not forthcoming.

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johannes zachhuber
What we say is this: As the Lord in various ways provides for human
life, each variety of benet is identied in turn by one or other such
title, the foresight and action therein observed becoming a particular
kind of name. Such a title is in our view applied by concept (pnoia).36

The argument continues thus: Evidently all these titles are used by
scripture. They therefore must be accepted as valid predicates of
Christ and cannot be empty notions. On the other hand, they do
not denote Christs divine nature. Gregory concludes:
If then he is so called, yet not by nature, and every thing said of the
Lord by the scripture he assuredly is and is properly so designated,
what principle remains for such words being ttingly applied to the
Only-begotten God, other than the conceptual way?37

Why do the titles not refer to the nature? The reason given is this:
as divine nature is absolutely simple it cannot be receptive of a variety of names. Or, to put it the other way around, if those titles were
indicative of divine nature or substance, this would make the latter
multiple (polueidw) and composite (polusnyetow).38
Gregory here argues very much along the lines of Origen and
Basil. He does not dispute that various names can only be applied
to an object which itself is manifold. This, clearly, is not the case
for divine nature. Consequently, Christological titles refer to him in
so far as he is part of the history of salvation. Gregory, it may be
observed, is more careful than Basil to mark out the dierence to
Origen: in his divine nature, Christ is as little receptive of various
names as the Father. The dierence, then, is no longer primarily
that between God who is absolutely simple and the Son who is not
(as had been the case with Origen),39 but between divine substance
or nature, which is absolutely simple and therefore not the object
of reference for human predication, and divine activity (nrgeia).

36
CE II 298299 (GNO I 314,1419): mew mn gr tot famen, ti polueidw
to kurou tw nyrvpnhw pronoontow zvw kaston eergesaw edow di kstou tn toiotvn nomtvn katalllvw gnvrzetai, tw nyevroumnhw at
pronoaw te ka nergeaw ew nmatow tpon metabainoshw. t d toioton noma
par mn pino& lgetai nomzesyai. ET: Hall.
37
CE II 304 (GNO I 315,1923): e tonun lgetai mn, o kat fsin d, pn
d t par tw grafw legmenon krion pntvw st ka prosfuw pilgetai,
tw terow polepetai lgow to rmozntvw t monogene ye tw toiataw tetxyai
fvnw pln to kat pnoian trpou; ET: Hall (with changes).
38
39

CE II 302 (GNO I 315,103).

Cf. Origen, In Iohannem I 20,119 (see n. 18 above).

christological titles conceptually applied?

273

Everything in this chain of thought seems more plausible than the

claim that it leads to conceptual application of names. Gregory clearly
uses the juxtaposition of nature and energy to urge that Christological
titles are said of the latter, not the former. Needless to say, this is
not implying anything about the way they are imposed. On the contrary, his contention that a variety of names would violate divine
simplicity (incidentally, quite in agreement with Eunomius on this
particular point) would seem to make more sense on the basis of a
realistic theory.
Gregorys tacitly realistic credentials come out even more distinctly
in his reply to what I counted above as Eunomius third argument.40
Against the claim that exalted names may signify things and vice
versa, Gregory stresses as unequivocally as one would wish the correspondence of names and things. He all but subscribes to Eunomius
theory of divine imposition of names where he claims:
As they are in truth and nature, so are things judged and named by
God, not named in contradiction to what they are, but described by
their proper denotations in whatever way they may be most clearly
displayed.41

Is this a statement by Eunomius putting forth his notorious naturalistic theory of language? No, it is a verbatim quotation from
Gregory of Nyssa, the great champion of later conventionalist theories,42 replying to Eunomius claim that God has apportioned a
share of honourable names to ordinary things and similarly allocates
more modest terms to Christ. Gregory does not here take exception
to the assertion that God gives names. The idea, however, that those
names might not correspond to a things substance seems outrageous
to him: It is the work of deceit to give names to fragile things
which do not correspond to their nature and worth.43 But the true

40

Cf. at n. 29 above.
CE II 323 (GNO I 320,1922): w xei fsevw te ka lhyeaw, otv t nta
par to yeo krnetai te ka lgetai, ok nantvw tow osin nomazmena, ll
41

w n mlista katafan gnoito t shmainmena taw okeaiw proshgoraiw

jaggellmena. ET: Hall.

42
Cf. Th. Kobusch, Zu den sprachphilosophischen Grundlagen in der Schrift
Contra Eunomium des Gregor von Nyssa, in: L. F. Mateo-Seco J. L. Bastero (eds.),
El Contra Eunomium I en la produccin literaria de Grigorio de Nisa, Pamplona 1988,
24768.
43
CE II 327 (GNO I 320,189): pthw mn gr sti t m w xei fsew te
ka jaw t syen tn pragmtvn katonomzein . . . ET: Hall (with changes).

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johannes zachhuber

God is free from deceit and jealousy and therefore looks to the real
truth of objects, attests the true worth of each and gives names on
the basis of facts.44
Later, while dealing with what I counted as Eunomius fourth
argument,45 Gregory returns to the subject proper of Christological
titles. In his view, the question of whether Christ employed these
titles of himself or not is irrelevant. Why would that be so? Gregory
summarises Basils position as follows:
The Lord is by himself whatever he is by nature, and when he is
simultaneously named after his various activities (nrgeiai), he does
not possess a single title which is applied to them all, but is accorded
the name in accordance with the idea which arises in us from that
activity. . . .
How then are our words refuted if it is said that Christ uses these
titles of himself? The question was not about who uses these titles; our
purpose was rather to consider what these titles mean, whether they
denote the nature, or whether they are applied conceptually (pinohtikw) on the basis of activities.46

To be sure, Gregory does not forget to mention that our mind plays
a role in the application of those titles, but the general tendency of
his argument, once again, goes in a dierent direction. The Christological titles, this is the bottom line of what Gregory tells us, are
applied not to his divine nature, but to his providential and redeeming function. While this is in line with what Basil had said, it is in
no way a rebuttal of Eunomius contention by means of conceptual
semantics. Gregory here continues precisely with the wavering and
the confusion that we had observed in Basil with regard to this distinction. Like his elder brother, Gregory confounds the issue of the
object of a names signication with that of the mode or origin of
signication.
44
CE II 328 (GNO I 321,28322,1): ll prw tn lyeian tn pokeimnvn
rn ka t kat jan kst prosmarturen ka k tn pragmtvn katonomzein.

ET: Hall (with changes).

45
Cf. at n. 33 above.
46
CE II 353354 (GNO I 329,812.1723): kriow st mn kay autn ti
pot kat tn fsin st, taw d tn nergevn diaforaw sunonomazmenow o
man p pntvn sxei proshgoran, ll kay ksthn nnoian tn j nergeaw
gginomnhn mn metalambnei t noma . . . pw on natrpei t erhmna
lgvn per auto tata tn Xristn t nmata lgein; o gr stiw katonomsaw t zhtomenon n, ll per tw tn nomtvn nnoaw yevra prokeito
pteron fsin ndeknutai pinohtikw k tn nergein nomzetai. ET: Hall
(with changes).

christological titles conceptually applied?

275

That Gregory pretends not to understand (or actually does not

understand) the relevance of Eunomius hint to Christs application
of these titles to himself is perhaps the best evidence for the general
direction of his mind on this particular question. The issue is not,
for him, who has made up those titles, but whether they apply to
divine nature or to properties, energies or whatever is around (per)
it. This, indubitably, is an important point, but clearly distinct from
the question of whether these names are provided for by God himself or whether they are produced by our conceptual capacity. For
the latter question the fact that the god-man uses them of himself
would perhaps at least demand an explanation.

V. Conclusion
Three nal considerations bring this communication to a close:
a) In what sense can Gregory be said to have oered a successful apology for his brother Basil? Gregory, as has been seen, in the
particular question under enquiry here quite faithfully follows the
path trodden by Basil. He answers Eunomius criticism by rearming
the arguments his brother had used. To some extent he improves
on them. It appears that the more prevalent, as well as more promising, line of argument in Basil is given even more prominence in
Gregory, who appears to draw primarily on the distinction between
cognition of nature and cognition of energy. One may thus read his
elaboration as a slight emendation of Basils argument, but this is
perhaps too strong a statement given Gregorys full-scale identication
with his brothers authority. It must not be forgotten, however, that
Gregorys self-assigned task in the Contra Eunomium gave him practically no room for even modest, explicit criticism of Basil.
That Gregory himself found the osa-nrgeia distinction more
helpful for the theological problem he was facing becomes clearer
from other writings of his. Without the specic task of defending
an early book by Basil he almost inevitably approached the problem of divine names by means of that distinction the classic example being the Ad Ablabium, where Gregory is more conspicuous and
at the same time more consistent with regard to that question.47 The

47

Cf. G. Maspero, La Trinit e luomo, Rom 2004, 11447.

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johannes zachhuber

crucial passage there48 draws a distinction between the way our mind
deals with created being and the way it approaches God. In the former case, Gregory says, we can normally see with ease how the
names we employ t a things being. In the latter case this is dierent.
While every term tells us something that is around divine nature,
they do so by means of properties which are indicative of the specic,
providential activities of God towards men.
Against too much enthusiasm, however, we should guard ourselves:
Gregorys argument in the Ad Ablabium leads to the conclusion that
divine nrgeia too is unied.49 A satisfactory clarication of the relation of this unity on the one hand, and the multiple divine attributes that we employ on the other, is not an achievement with which
either of the Cappadocians should be credited.
b) The comparison of the Ad Ablabium at the same time brings
out what is in my view the main deciency of the present argument
while proving as well that Gregory could do better. Not only is
Gregory there focussing on the juxtaposition of essence and energies, he also constructs his argument as a disanalogy between the
created and the uncreated realm, an element that is almost entirely
lacking from Basils line of reasoning in the Adversus Eunomium and
consequently from Gregorys Contra Eunomium. Failure to emphasise
the dierence between cognition within the created world and cognition of God, however, invites quite unwelcome conclusions.
This can be seen from a text which admittedly is remote, but nevertheless fascinatingly similar. In his work Christianity not mysterious
(1696) John Toland employs an argument that is (with all its Lockean
overtones) into its very wording strikingly close in particular to Basils
line of thought.50 Toland there bashes the claim that God would be
a mystery because we cannot fully comprehend his being. If this
were so, he argues, everything around us would be a mystery as
well: we know
nothing of Bodies but their Properties; God has wisely provided we
should understand no more of these than are useful and necessary for
us. [. . .] Thus our Eyes are not given us to see all Quantities, nor
perhaps any thing as it is in it self, but it bears from Relation to us.51

48
49
50
51

Gregory of Nyssa, Ad Ablabium (GNO III/1 42,13 44,16).

Op. cit. (GNO III/1 44,716).
J. Toland, Christianity not Mysterious, London 21696 (repr. London 1995).
Op. cit., 756.

christological titles conceptually applied?

277

We understand the things around us in so far as we comprehend

their properties which make an impact on us. Similarly we understand God suciently if we know his activities towards man. Toland
concludes:
That [. . .] when we do as familiarly explain such Doctrines, as what
is known of natural things, (which I pretend we can) we may then be
as properly said to comprehend the one as the other.52

If knowledge of God is as mysterious as any knowledge, then it is

only a matter of taste or perspective whether all, or none, cognition
is seen as being beyond reason. Toland is quite right to press home
this point. It is not, of course, a necessary conclusion that, in fact,
the latter of the two options is right, and neither Basil nor Gregory
would be obliged to subscribe to Tolands view. It is, however, a
possible conclusion demonstrating that Basils reasoning is dangerous in so far as it could be used for results quite dierent from the
ones he had intended.
c) On a nal note I return to the concept of pnoia. The analysis oered here has led to the conclusion that the topic of conceptual application of names is much less important for the Cappadocian
argument against Eunomius than is often claimed. In particular, it
is doubtful that in Basils and Gregorys version it is a successful
argument against Eunomius. Why is this so? Basils argument about
pnoia, I think, went o to a wrong start with his insistence on the
theological relevance specically of its analytic capacity. Thinking,
however, and in particular thinking of God, the human mind inevitably
proceeds synthetically. Attributes like good or life do not impose
a mental division on some object which, apart from this intellectual
act appears to us as simple and unied. They rather bring conceptions the mind has of the world into as comprehensive a unity as
possible, but still fall short of the absolute simplicity thought to be
encountered in God.
The epistemic approach, which, if my argument is accepted, is
rather unsuccessful in the Cappadocians, is not of course devoid of
theological signicance. The example of Thomas Aquinas should
suce to evidence the opposite.53 At the same time it is interesting
52

Op. cit., 79.

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae Ia, qu. XIII, art. 2, resp.: Et ideo aliter dicendum est quod huiusmodi quidem nomina signicant substantiam divinam, et praedicantur de Deo
substantialiter, sed deciunt a repraesentatione ipsius. The eventual upshot of this line of
argument is, of course, the theory of analogy.
53

278

johannes zachhuber

to observe that Thomas follows the epistemic line of thought not

least to fend o the assumption that no name is signicant of Gods
essence. Of the two approaches found in the Cappadocians he thus
employs one while criticising the other. This may at least be an indication that a decision must be made between the two. The choice
need not be Aquinas one, but to pursue this question would be the
task of a further paper.

DER URSPRUNG DER SPRACHE NACH EUNOMIUS UND

GREGOR VOR DEM HINTERGRUND DER ANTIKEN
SPRACHTHEORIEN (CE II 387444; 543553)
Lenka Karfkov

In diesem Beitrag soll ein Aspekt der Sprachauassung bei Eunomius

und Gregor dargelegt werden, und zwar die Vorstellungen der beiden Gegner vom Ursprung der Sprache.1 Ich gehe dabei von der
Passage CE II 387444 (GNO I 339,8356,16) und 543553 (GNO
I 385,1388,24) aus,2 die sich mit dieser Problematik beschftigt.
Zugleich sind in diesen Paragraphen (als ein ironisches Mittel) mehrere Berufungen auf die antiken Sprachtheorien konzentriert, denen
ich den abschlieenden Teil meiner Ausfhrungen widme.

I. Eunomius
Unsere Passage die die Reaktionen des Eunomius auf Basilius
Polemik Adversus Eunomium I 58 (=PG 29, 520c529c),3 hchstwahrscheinlich v.a. an I 8 (=PG 29, 528ab), enthlt bringt mehrere sprachtheoretisch interessante Eunomius-Zitate. ber den Ursprung
der Sprache lesen wir da:
Htte (Gott) den ersten Menschen oder ihren unmittelbaren Nachkommen
nicht beigebracht, wie die einzelnen Dinge genannt werden und heien,
mssten sie ganz verstand- und sprachlos zusammen leben. Und sie

1
Zu der Sprachproblematik in der ganzen Polemik vgl. B. Pottier, Dieu et le Christ
selon Grgoire de Nysse. Etude systmatique du Contre Eunome avec traduction indite des extraits
dEunome, Paris Turnhout 1994, 143206; M. S. Troiano, I Cappadoci e la questione dellorigine dei nomi nella polemica contro Eunomio, Vetera Christianorum 17
(1980) 313346.
2
Die Passage wird durch Gregors Errterung der Ungezeugtheit und Unsterblichkeit
als verschiedener Gottesattribute in CE II 445542 (GNO I 356,17384,32) unterbrochen.
3
Vgl. die Rekonstruktion durch R. P. Vaggione, Eunomius. The Extant Works,
Oxford 1987, 106113.

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lenka karfkov
knnten auch nichts von dem, was sie zum Leben ntig haben, verwirklichen, da ihr Denken ohne Kenntnis der bezeichnenden Worte,
d.h. der Verben und Namen, ganz dunkel wre.4

Die bezeichnenden Worte (shmanonta), so entnehmen wir dieser

Stelle, haben fr das Denken des Menschen und sogar fr sein Leben
eine konstitutive Bedeutung. Ohne diese Worte wre das Denken
(dinoia) dunkel (dhlow) und knnte keineswegs eine Grundlage
der Handlung sein. Die bezeichnenden Worte sind dabei nach
Eunomius die Verben und Namen (=mata ka nmata),5 es handelt sich also nicht so sehr um die Sprache in ihrer syntaktischen
Struktur, sondern vielmehr um eine Nomenklatur, die bestimmt, wie
die einzelnen Dinge genannt werden (lgetai) und heien (nomzetai). Gott selber musste diese Nomenklatur dem Menschen gleich
am Anfang des Menschengeschlechts bekannt machen, d.h. bevor
der Mensch zu sprechen begann, war schon klar, wie die einzelnen Dinge genannt werden und heien.
Diese Auskunft scheint fr das Verstehen der Sprachauassung
nach Eunomius eine entscheidende Bedeutung zu haben. Wir erfahren drei Grundeinsichten, die durch andere Eunomius-Zitate in
unserer Passage nur weiter erhellt werden: (1) die Benennungen
(die Namen) gehren zu den Dingen selbst, (2) der Mensch kann sie
mit gttlicher Hilfe ablesen, (3) sie werden im Menschengeschlecht
tradiert.

CE II 398 (GNO I 342,2229).

Die Kategorien noma (fr die prttontew = die Handelnden) und =ma (fr
die prjeiw = Handlungen) gehen auf Platon zurck (Soph. 262a; vgl. auch Crat.
399ab; 425a; 431b), von dem sie auch Aristoteles bernahm (Int. 16a1. 19; Poet.
1457a1018). Es handelte sich jedoch weder eindeutig um die Bezeichnungen
der Wortarten Name und Verb, noch der Satzteile Subjekt und Prdikat; vgl.
T. Borsche, Platon, in: P. Schmitter (Hrsg.), Sprachtheorien der abendlndischen Antike,
Tbingen 1991, 140169, bes. 153. Erst die Stoa mit ihrem Interesse fr die
Grammatik benutzte diese Begrie fr die Wortarten, deren sie ursprnglich wahrscheinlich vier, spter fnf bzw. sechs unterschied: Name (spter dierenziert in allgemeinen Name, proshgora, und Eigenname, noma), Verb (=ma), Konjunktion
(sndesmow), Artikel (ryron) (bzw. noch Adverb, mesthw), vgl. Diogenes Lartius
VII 58 (Marcovich 479); s. dazu A. C. Lloyd, Grammar and Metaphysics in the
Stoa, in: A. A. Long (Hrsg.), Problems in Stoicism, London 1971, 5874; M. Baratin,
Aperu de la linguistique stocienne, in: P. Schmitter (Hrsg.), Sprachtheorien, 193
216, bes. 196f.
5

der ursprung der sprache nach eunomius und gregor 281

I.1. Die Namen gehren zu den Dingen selbst
Die Namen, so Eunomius, sind nicht nur eine menschliche Zutat,
der fr die Dinge keine Bedeutung htte, sondern gehren konstitutiv zu den Dingen selbst und sind ursprnglich Gott allein bekannt.
Die Benennungen (knnte man vielleicht paraphrasieren) sagen eine
intelligible Struktur aus, die den Dingen bei ihrer Schpfung auferlegt wurde. Gott hat jedem der erschaenen Dinge seinen eigenen
und angemessenen Namen angepasst.6 Schpfung und Namensgebung
stellen fr Eunomius eine untrennbare Einheit dar: Entweder sollen wir Gott nicht einmal die Entstehung der Dinge zuschreiben,
oder wenn wir das tun drfen wir ihm auch die Namensgebung
(tn tn nomtvn ysin) nicht absprechen.7
Fr diese Vorstellung beruft sich Eunomius auf die biblische
Erzhlung in Gen 1,8 nach der Gott die Welt durch sein Wort erschuf
und selbst dem Licht und der Dunkelheit ihre Namen gab, sowie
auf eine andere biblische Stelle (Ps 146/147,4), wo es von Gott heit,
dass er die Menge der Sterne zhlt und einen jeden mit seinem
Namen ruft.9 Durch eine typologische Deutung versucht er umgekehrt zu zeigen, dass der biblische Bericht von der Benennung der
Tiere, die Adam anvertraut wurde (Gen 2,1920), keine Auskunft
ber die Namensgebung, sondern eine Botschaft ber Christus und
die Kirche enthlt.10 Fr Eunomius ist es sogar nach dem Gesetz
der Vorsehung und gttlich festgelegt (sion), dass die Dinge von
oben (nvyen) benannt werden.11
I.2. In die Seele des Menschen wurden Keime der Namen eingegeben
Die Namen der Dinge sind jedoch fr den Menschen nicht ganz
unlesbar. Die Nomenklatur des Schpfers stellt eine entlich bekannte
Gesetzgebung (nmoi mfanw kemenoi)12 dar, die der Mensch, dank

CE II 403 (GNO I 344,1113).

CE II 411 (GNO I 346,1315).
8
Vgl. CE II 443 (GNO I 356,47) mit Hinweis auf CE II 262 (GNO I 303,
16) und 269 (GNO I 305,1315).
9
CE II 423 (GNO I 350,89).
10
Vgl. CE II 443444 (GNO I 356,716). Gregor lsst die Interpretation von
Gen 2,1920 durch Eunomius wahrscheinlich absichtlich aus (vgl. B. Pottier, Dieu et
le Christ, 169).
11
CE II 546 (GNO I 386,57).
12
CE II 408 (GNO I 345,1314).
7

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lenka karfkov

einer gttlichen Belehrung, ablesen kann. Es geht wahrscheinlich

nicht so sehr darum, wie Gregor spottet, dass sich Gott wie ein
Erzieher oder Schulmeister zu den ersten Menschen niedergesetzt
htte, um ihnen einen Unterricht ber die Verben und Namen zu
geben.13 Gott hat, so Eunomius, in die Seele des Menschen Samen
eingepanzt (taw metraiw gkatasperai cuxaw),14 dank derer die
wesensbestimmenden Namen (und mit ihnen die Struktur der Dinge)
erkennbar sind. Der Mensch erhielt also etwas diesen Namen
Entsprechendes oder mit ihnen Kompatibles, vielleicht eine Art ihrer
Keime. Aus den Eunomius-Stellen geht nicht eindeutig hervor, ob
die gttliche Saat in den menschlichen Seelen mit dem Unterricht
durch Gott identisch ist. Aus seiner Bemerkung, nach der die gttliche Belehrung nur den ersten Menschen galt, drfen wir jedoch
deduzieren, dass Eunomius neben der keimhaften Nomenklatur in
den menschlichen Seelen auch noch ihre Aktivierung durch ein
Eingreifen Gottes am Anfang des Menschengeschlechts voraussetzt.
Das menschliche Nachbilden oder Ablesen der Namen hat jedenfalls, so Eunomius, eine grundstzliche Bedeutung fr die Orientierung
und Handlungsfhigkeit des Menschen. Ohne die Namen zu kennen, wren die Menschen unfhig die Dinge zu identizieren und
zu gebrauchen.15 Auch knnten sie sich nichts einander mitteilen und
die menschliche Gemeinschaft wrde auf ein tierisches Niveau sinken: die Menschen mssten vernunft- und sprachlos zusammen leben
(log& ka fvn& suzn).16
I.3. Die Namen der Dinge werden tradiert
Die gttliche Belehrung ber die Namen der Dinge war, wie gesagt,
nur fr die ersten Menschen (oder ihre unmittelbare Nachkommen)
notwendig,17 in den spteren Generationen werden die Namen schon
tradiert. Sobald also die Menschen die Namen der Dinge abgelesen
haben, geben sie diese Kenntnis weiter, ohne jedoch die Benennungen
spontan zu erdenken. Wir erfahren ja nirgendwo in der Bibel, argumentiert Eunomius, dass die heiligen Menschen die Namen aus-

13
14
15
16
17

CE II 397 (GNO I 342,1921).

CE II 548 (GNO I 386,1920).
Vgl. CE II 413 (GNO I 346,23347,1).
CE II 398 (GNO I 342,2526).
Vgl. CE II 398 (GNO I 342,2223).

der ursprung der sprache nach eunomius und gregor 283

denken wrden.18 Die Namen werden von oben gegeben, wie wir
schon wissen,19 und sie grnden in den benannten Dingen selbst,
nicht in der Autoritt derjenigen, welche die Namen aussprechen.20
Nicht einmal die heidnischen Dichter ernden die Namen, meint
Eunomius. Einerseits haben die Dinge schon ihre Namen, andererseits lesen sie die Dichter nicht einmal richtig ab, sondern produzieren vielmehr ihre eigenen Fiktionen (sie lgen, diacesyai).21
Eunomius kennt also auch eine menschliche Sprache, die nicht in
den Dingen selbst, sondern nur in der Phantasie, Denkkraft oder
Begrisbildung (pnoia) des Menschen grndet, und daher ein bloer
atus vocis ist.22

18

Vgl. CE II 415 (GNO I 347,1821).

Vgl. CE II 546 (GNO I 386,67).
20
CE II 545 (GNO I 385,2224); hnlich auch Eunomius, Apol. 18 (Vaggione
54 ).
21
CE II 414 (GNO I 347,46).
22
Vgl. CE II 179 (GNO I 276,2230); hnlich auch Eunomius, Apol. 8 (Vaggione
42). Es wre jedoch vorschnell daraus zu schlieen, dass Eunomius die menschliche Begrisbildung nur in diesem Sinne versteht, wie ihm die Kappadokier (CE II
179180, GNO I 276,20277,7; hnlich schon Basilius AE I 6; SC 299, 182) und
nach ihnen einige der modernen Interpreten vorwerfen, als wre er eine Art
Nominalist avant la lettre (vgl. E. Cavalcanti, Studi eunomiani, Roma 1976, 117; auch
Th. Kobusch ndet in der Epinoia-Auassung des Eunomius ein nominalistisches
Element, da hier dem Bezeichneten oder dem Gedachten, mit dem es Kobusch
identiziert kein selbstndiger ontologischer Status eignet, vgl. Th. Kobusch, Sein
und Sprache. Historische Begrndung einer Ontologie der Sprache, Leiden 1987, 53). In seiner ersten Apologie fhrt Eunomius an, man msse die Begrie der benannten Dinge
beachten (taw tn pokeimnvn nnoaiw) und ihnen die Benennungen folgen lassen (koloyvw farmttein tw proshgoraw) (Apol. 18; Vaggione 54). Eunomius
scheint damit einerseits die Begrie (nnoiai) der Dinge zu unterscheiden, deren
keimhafte Kenntnis dem Menschen eingeboren ist und nach denen die Benennungen
gebildet werden sollen, andererseits scheint er jedoch auch solche Namen zu kennen, die nur durch die menschliche pnoia gebildet, nicht die Dinge selbst, sondern lediglich eine Fiktion zum Ausdruck bringen. B. Pottier unterscheidet daher
zwischen der pnoia als der Quelle reiner Fiktionen und der nnoia als einer in
der Natur der Dinge verwurzelten Vorstellung (vgl. B. Pottier, Dieu et le Christ, 152).
K.-H. Uthemann versucht dagegen die Epinoia-Auassung des Eunomius zu rehabilitieren: die Fiktionen werden zwar nur durch die pnoia gebildet, dies heit
jedoch nicht, dass die pnoia immer nur die Fiktionen produziert und sich nie nach
den Dingen selbst orientieren kann (vgl. K.-H. Uthemann, Die Sprache der Theologie
nach Eunomius von Cyzicus, ZKG 104 (1993) 143175, bes. 151154; hnlich
ders., Die Sprachtheorie des Eunomios von Kyzikos und Severianos von Gabala.
Theologie im Reex kirchlicher Predigt, StPatr 24 (1993) 336344, bes. 339; in
einem hnlichen Sinne auch Th. Bhm, Theoria Unendlichkeit Aufstieg. Philosophische
Implikationen zu De vita Moysis von Gregor von Nyssa, Leiden 1996, 179, Anm. 52).
Eunomius scheint tatschlich auch eine andere Begrisbildung als das Produzieren
von Fiktionen zu kennen, es lsst sich jedoch aus den bestehenden Texten nicht
19

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lenka karfkov

I.4. Die Benennung Gottes geht dem Menschen voraus

In der Sprachauassung des Eunomius, wie in unserer Passage dargelegt, kommt eine entscheidende Bedeutung der Benennung Gottes
zu. Eunomius Lehre ber die Namen, die dem Menschen vorausgehen, grndet vor allem in seiner berzeugung, dass ein solcher
Name, der dem Menschen vorausgeht und den der Mensch aufgrund einer von Gott geschenkten Fhigkeit ablesen kann, die
Benennung Gottes als ungezeugt = ungeschaen (gn[n]htow) ist.23
Diese Bezeichnung gehrt ja Gott frher, als er mit ihr vom Menschen
bezeichnet wird. Seine Ungezeugtheit hngt ja nicht davon ab, ob
er so vom Menschen genannt wird.24 Die Wrde Gottes (ja) kommt
nmlich nach Eunomius gerade in seinem Namen zum Ausdruck
oder ist sogar mit ihm identisch: Der Name ist (das Gleiche wie)
die Wrde.25 Und da diese Wrde natrlich lter ist als die menschliche pnoia (die Begrisbildung oder ein durch sie gebildeter Begri ),
muss auch der gttliche Name lter sein als diese Fhigkeit. Das
Gegenteil vorauszusetzen msste absurde Folgerungen mit sich bringen, meint Eunomius: Dann ist entweder die pnoia lter als ihre
Benutzer (tn pinoontvn), oder die Benennungen (proshgorai), die
Gott nach seiner Natur gehren und die allem vorausgehen, sind
spter als die Erschaung des Menschen.26
Den Namen Gottes zu benutzen (auszusprechen) kommt dabei
ausschlielich dem Menschen zu, nicht den geistigen Wesen oder
sogar dem Sohn: Weder der Sohn, meint Eunomius, noch die
durch ihn geschaenen geistigen Wesen sprechen Gott mit Namen
an (nomzesyai).27
Nur den Menschen ist es vorbehalten, dass sie dank der von Gott
geschenkten Fhigkeit die Struktur der Dinge (in der gttlichen
Nomenklatur ausgesprochen) ablesen und durch die Sprache nachsagen knnen. Diese Kompatibilitt zwischen der menschlichen
Sprache und der Struktur der Dinge (wie in der gttlichen Nomenklatur
ausgedrckt) macht es auch mglich, dass Gott zu seinen Dienern
beweisen, ob er sie auch pnoia nennen wrde (dies gibt auch Th. Bhm, Theoria,
176, zu).
23
Vgl. CE II 44 (GNO I 238,2629); hnlich Eunomius, Apol. 8 (Vaggione
4042).
24
Vgl. CE II 389 (GNO I 339,28340,4).
25
CE II 544 (GNO I 385,19).
26
CE II 552 (GNO I 388,37).
27
CE II 390 (GNO I 340,911).

der ursprung der sprache nach eunomius und gregor 285

spricht, wie in der Bibel berichtet. Diese Rede (mila) Gottes ist fr
Eunomius sogar ein Beweis der Kompatibilitt zwischen der gttlichen Nomenklatur und der menschlichen Sprache: Lehnt es Gott
nicht ab zu seinen Dienern zu reden, dann mssen wir daraus
schlieen, dass er auch von Anfang an den Dingen entsprechende
Bezeichnungen gab.28
Eunomius unterscheidet damit eigentlich drei Arten der Sprache
(wie wir deduzieren knnen): (a) Die gttliche Nomenklatur, die
unmittelbar zu Gottes Schpfung gehrt, (b) die Fhigkeit des Menschen
diese Nomenklatur dank der Samen in seiner Seele abzulesen und
sich dadurch in den erschaenen Dingen zu orientieren, (c) die Lge
der Dichter, d.h. eine menschliche Sprache, die nicht die Struktur
der Dinge selbst wiedergibt, sondern in der Phantasie des Menschen
wurzelt.

II. Gregor
Warum ist nun Gregor mit dieser Lehre des Eunomius nicht
zufrieden?
II.1. Die Namen gehren nicht zu den Dingen selbst
hnlich wie vor ihm schon Basilius,29 ist Gregor vor allem berzeugt, dass die Namensgebung nicht ein Teil der schpferischen
Aktivitt Gottes ist, sondern erst einen nachtrglichen Versuch des
Menschen darstellt, die erschaenen Dinge zu erkennen. Diese Sprachfhigkeit ( logik dnamiw = die Fhigkeit des Denkens und der
Sprache), nicht die Namen, wurde dem Menschen von Gott geschenkt:
Die Dinge sind geordnet, wie es ihrer Natur entspricht, jedoch die
Namen, durch die sie ausgedrckt werden, wurden durch die
Sprachfhigkeit erfunden, die Gott in unsere Natur eingegeben hat.30

28

CE II 417 (GNO I 348,610).

Basilius befasste sich mit der Begrisbildung bzw. Namensgebung in AE I
56 (SC 299, 180188); bzw. AE II 4 (SC 305, 1822); II 9 (SC 305, 3638).
Zu seiner originellen Auassung der Eigennamen, die nicht das Wesen, sondern
eine einmalige Verbindung der charakteristischen Zge zum Ausdruck bringen, vgl.
P. Kalligas, Basil of Caesarea on the Semantics of Proper Names, in: K. Ierodiakonou
(Hrsg.), Byzantine Philosophy and its Ancient Sources, Oxford 2002, 3148.
30
CE II 395 (GNO I 341,29342,3).
29

286

lenka karfkov

Einen eindeutigen biblischen Beleg fr diese Vorstellung ndet

Gregor in der Rollenteilung zwischen Gott und Adam bei der
Erschaung und Benennung der Tiere (Gen 2,1920):31 Weder hat
Adam die Tiere geschaen, noch ihnen Gott die Namen gegeben,
sondern nach der Erzhlung des Mose geht ihre Entstehung auf Gott
zurck, die Benennung des Entstandenen jedoch auf den Menschen.32
Gott bertritt also die heilige Satzung des Eunomius, nach der die
Namen von oben verteilt werden mssen:
Wie kommt es, dass Gott selber diese heilige Satzung nicht kennt, und
dass er die Tiere, die er schuf, nicht von oben benannte, sondern die
Macht (jousa) der Namensgebung dem Menschen anvertraute? Entspricht es dem Gesetz der Vorsehung und ist es gttlich gesetzt, dass
die Namen von oben gegeben werden, wie Eunomius behauptet, dann
widerspricht es der heiligen Satzung und ist vllig unangemessen, dass
jemand von unten die Benennungen gibt.33

Wie nach Gregors berzeugung die kosmogenetische Rede Gottes

in Gen 1 zu interpretieren ist, wurde an einer anderen Stelle der
ganzen Polemik geklrt34 nmlich als die Konstitution der Dinge
selbst und die Festlegung ihrer Funktion (das Licht als Tag, die
Dunkelheit als Nacht). In unserer Passage konzentriert sich Gregor
daher auf die Deutung eines anderen biblischen Arguments des
Eunomius (Ps 146/147,4), wo es von Gott heit, dass er die Menge
der Sterne zhlt und einen jeden mit seinem Namen nennt.35 Gottes
Zhlen der unzhlbar vielen Sterne deutet nmlich an, so Gregor,
dass Gott auch das fr den Menschen Unbegreiiche kennt. Es ziemt
sich ja nicht von Gott vorauszusetzen, dass er die Sterne durch das
Verbinden der Einheiten in eine Summe zhlt, um festzustellen, wie
viele sie sind. Durch dieses Bild bringt die Heilige Schrift zum
Ausdruck, dass Gott die Sterne gut kennt da ja die Anfhrung der
Zahl fr den Menschen eine genaue Kenntnis bedeutet.36 Und hnlich, wenn die Schrift sagt, dass Gott die Sterne mit den Namen
31
Auf diese Szene hat sich mehrmals auch Philo berufen, der jedoch den ersten,
mit einer besonderen Kraft ausgestatteten Menschen fr die Namensgebung verantwortlich machte (vgl. z.B. De opicio mundi 148, Cohn I 5152; Legum allegoriarum
II 1415, Cohn I 9394; De mutatione nominum 6364, Wendland III 168; anders
jedoch De decalogo 23, Cohn IV 273274).
32
CE II 412 (GNO I 346,1720).
33
CE II 547 (GNO I 386,1017).
34
Vgl. CE II 263281 (GNO I 303,7309,15).
35
Vgl. CE II 423440 (GNO I 350,5355,21), hier CE II 423 (GNO I 350,89).
36
Vgl. CE II 429 (GNO I 351,29352,3).

der ursprung der sprache nach eunomius und gregor 287

ruft, wird nicht gemeint, dass er den Sternen ihre Bezeichnungen
zuteilte, wie sie uns bekannt sind, und dass er sie laut hervorriefe37
diese Vorstellung ist fr Gregor schon deswegen ganz unakzeptabel,
weil die Bezeichnungen der Sterne mit den Namen der heidnischen
Gtter zusammenhngen.38 Es wird vielmehr angedeutet, dass Gott
auch die Einzelheiten der ganzen Schpfung kennt mit dem Namen
anzusprechen gilt ja unter den Menschen als ein Zeichen einer nheren Bekanntschaft.39
II.2. Dem Menschen wurde die Sprachfhigkeit, nicht die Namen geschenkt
Wie Eunomius, ist auch Gregor berzeugt, dass die Sprache dem
Menschen von Gott geschenkt wurde. Er stellt sich jedoch nicht vor,
dass der Mensch dank der Samen in seiner Seele die Namen der
gttlichen Nomenklatur ablese, sondern dass er selber aufgrund seiner Sprachfhigkeit die Namen ausdenkt. Nur in einem abgeleiteten
Sinne lsst sich sagen, dass die Namen von Gott stammen da nmlich die Fhigkeit der Namensbildung von ihm stammt. Der Ursprung
oder die Ursache (ata) der Namen ist also in Gott, die Vollmacht
oder Ausbung (jousa) der Namensgebung wurde jedoch dem
Menschen anvertraut, und zwar seiner Sprachfhigkeit ( logik
dnamiw) oder Begrisbildung (pnoia).40
Gott, so Gregor, gab in die menschliche Seele nicht die Samen
der einzelnen Worte ein, die aus den Dingen erwachsen wrden
wie die Sprosse aus den Samen oder Wurzeln,41 sondern lediglich
die formale Sprachfhigkeit, die schon selbst die Namen erndet.42
Wie Gott dem Menschen die Augen gab, die schon von sich aus
die Farben unterscheiden, hat er auch die Verstandeskraft ( dianohtik dnamiw) so geschaen, dass sie sich selbst in Bewegung setzt
und den Dingen zuwendet, und damit die Erkenntnis keine Konfusion erleidet (w n mhdeman sgxusin gnsiw pyoi), gibt sie
jeder Sache ihre eigene sprachliche Bezeichnung wie ein unterscheidendes Zeichen.43
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

Vgl. CE II 432 (GNO I 352,2428).

Vgl. CE II 433 (GNO I 353,110).
Vgl. CE II 435436 (GNO I 353,23354,7).
Vgl. CE II 396 (GNO I 342,312).
CE II 546 (GNO I 385,2931).
Vgl. CE II 400 (GNO I 343,710).
CE II 401 (GNO I 343,2025).

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lenka karfkov

Die Verstandeskraft des Menschen hat also nach Gregor ihre eigene
Spontaneitt, die sich den Dingen zuwendet und das Chaos der
Erfahrungen durch sprachliche Bezeichnungen (a di tn fvnn
pishmeiseiw) wie unterscheidende Zeichen (smantra) ordnet. In
diesen beiden Aspekten besteht nach dieser Stelle die Erkenntnis
(gnsiw) des Menschen.44
An einer anderen Stelle unserer Passage erfahren wir jedoch, dass
die Worte unsere Gedanken (nomata) zum Ausdruck bringen, d.h.
die Bewegungen unseres Denkens (tw to no kinseiw), die der
Mensch als ein krperliches Wesen den anderen nicht direkt, sondern nur durch Vermittlung der Namen (nmata) als Zeichen (shmea)
der Dinge zeigen kann.45
Die Notwendigkeit Worte zu benutzen wird an den beiden Stellen
jeweils anders begrndet: Einerseits soll ein Chaos in der Erkenntnis
beseitigt und jede Sache durch ihre Bezeichnung bestimmt werden,
andererseits ist es nur durch die Worte mglich eigene Gedanken
den anderen mitzuteilen. Sollen wir versuchen, die beiden Aussagen
zu verbinden, dann wrde die Sprachfhigkeit des Menschen wie
folgt vorgehen: Die Verstandeskraft ( dianohtik dnamiw) wendet
sich spontan den Dingen zu und organisiert die Erfahrungen durch
sprachliche Bezeichnungen (a di tn fvnn pishmeiseiw); die so
entstandenen Gedanken (nomata) oder Geistesbewegungen (a to
no kinseiw) teilt sie den anderen mit dank der Sprachfhigkeit (
logik dnamiw), nmlich durch Vertretung der Dinge durch Namen
(nmata) als sprachliche Zeichen (shmea).
In seinen Ausfhrungen ber die unkrperlichen Wesen nennt
Gregor die geistige Aktivitt ( kat tn non nrgeia) dieser reinen Geister auch Sprache (lgow), die keine krperlichen Organe
gebraucht. Er bemerkt jedoch zugleich, dass die Sprache eigentlich
mit der Krperlichkeit zusammenhngt: Wren die Menschen nicht
krperlich, knnten sie sich die Bewegungen ihres Denkens (t tw
dianoaw kinmata) direkt, ohne die ausfhrliche Vermittlung der
Worte (=mata) einander mitteilen. Stattdessen mssen sie nicht nur
die Namen der einzelnen Dinge (wie der Himmel oder die Erde),

44

Ibid. An einer anderen Stelle schildert Gregor den heuristischen Vorgang der

pnoia, in dem das Denken durch die Worte eine Sache immer prziser zu fas-

sen versucht (vgl. CE II 181182, GNO I 277,726). hnlich auch Basilius, AE I

6 (SC 299, 184188).
45
Vgl. CE II 391 (GNO I 340,2428).

der ursprung der sprache nach eunomius und gregor 289

sondern auch die sprachlichen Bezeichnungen fr die anderen
Kategorien einfhren, wie fr die Relation (t prw t pvw xein),
das Wirken (t nergen) und das Erfahren des Wirkens (t psxein).46
Gregor setzt damit wahrscheinlich einerseits die Bewegungen des
Denkens voraus, die dem Geist angehren, andererseits das Organisieren der Erfahrungen in die Worte und die sprachliche Mitteilung
der Gedanken. Die Worte hngen jedenfalls mit der Sinnlichkeit
zusammen: sie organisieren die (Sinnes)erfahrungen und durch die
sinnliche Vermittlung machen sie die Geistesbewegungen bekannt.
Die geistige Aktivitt der unkrperlichen Wesen kann nur in einem
bertragenen Sinne als Sprache bezeichnet werden (da diese Wesen
miteinander kommunizieren), und nicht einmal das menschliche
Denken versteht Gregor als eine innere Rede, sondern als Geistesbewegungen.47 Schon deswegen ist es fr ihn vllig unvorstellbar,
dass der unkrperliche Gott Sprache benutzen oder die Namen geben
sollte. Der innergttliche Austausch zwischen den einzelnen gttlichen
Personen darf keineswegs als eine Sprache verstanden werden.48
II.3. Der Mensch denkt die Namen aus, und die Namen der gleichen Dinge
sind verschieden
Die Namensgebung ist nun nach Gregor kein Ablesen der gttlich
auferlegten Struktur der Dinge und keine Entwicklung einer keimhaften Nomenklatur, die in die Seele des Menschen eingegeben wrde,
sondern sie ist der menschlichen Wahl (proaresiw) vorbehalten.49
Anders wren ja und dies ist ein wichtiges Argument Gregors
gegen die Konzeption seines Gegners die Namen der gleichen
Dinge in den einzelnen Sprachen nicht unterschiedlich, sondern alle
Menschen mssten eine gemeinsame, aus der Natur selbst hervorgegangene Sprache sprechen.50 Ein solches Naturgesetz ( tw fsevw
nmow) gibt es jedoch nach Gregor nicht: Was sich nmlich in der
Zeit ndert und nicht dem Menschengeschlecht als ganzem zukommt,

46

Vgl. CE II 391392 (GNO I 340,19341,9).

Vgl. CE II 207 (GNO I 285,1319). In der Schrift wird manchmal als eine
Benennung (fvn) das Denken, d.h. ein Impuls des Denkens (rm dianoaw)
Gottes bezeichnet, dies darf jedoch, so Gregor, nicht zu einer anthropomorphen
Gottesvorstellung verfhren (CE II 266268, GNO I 304,12305,4).
48
Vgl. CE II 212218 (GNO I 287,6289,10).
49
Vgl. CE II 546 (GNO I 385,28386,2).
50
Vgl. CE II 546 (GNO I 385,25).
47

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lenka karfkov

kann nicht ein Teil der Natur sein.51 Die Namen gehren also nicht
zur Natur. Zur Natur gehrt jedoch die Sprachfhigkeit, die die
Namen bildet, hnlich wie zu ihr das Sehen gehrt, nicht jedoch
seine spezialisierte Form (z.B. das Sehen durch optische Gerte oder
das Einsehen der geometrischen Beweise), die zur Natur dank der
Mhe des Menschen hinzutritt (prosgnetai).52
Die Namensgebung, die zur Natur hinzutritt, richtet sich jedoch
danach, so Gregor in unserer Passage, wie es dem Menschen geeignet (rskon) scheint fr die Deutlichkeit des zu erklrenden Gegenstandes (prw tn tn dhloummvn safneian).53
Die Sprache orientiert sich damit zwar an den auszusprechenden
Dingen, sie folgt jedoch auch (oder vor allem) den Kommunikationsbedrfnissen. Daher, fhrt Gregor fort, lsst sich auch die Pluralitt
der Sprachen erklren, die der Pluralitt der Nationen entspricht.
Welche dieser Sprachen, so fragt Gregor, wrde die gttliche Nomenklatur zum Ausdruck bringen, wie sie Eunomius voraussetzt? Die
Theorie des Eunomius scheint durch diese Pluralitt allein schon
zerrissen zu sein.54

51

Vgl. CE II 545 (GNO I 385,2428); CE II 550 (GNO I 387,616).

Vgl. CE II 551 (GNO I 387,1619).
53
CE II 551 (GNO I 387,28388,2). An einer anderen Stelle erfahren wir zwar,
dass die Namen der Natur und Macht der Dinge entsprechen (kat tn gkeimnhn
kst fsin ka dnamin), diese Namen werden jedoch den Dingen von einzelnen Nationen gegeben nach ihren gewohnten Bruchen (kat tn pixvrizousan n kst ynei sunyeian, CE II 270, GNO I 305,2326). Diese Namen
bringen dabei immer nur einen Aspekt der Dinge zum Ausdruck (z.B. Erde und
trockenes Land, CE II 274275, GNO I 306,25307,16), nmlich die Art und
Weise, wie die Dinge in ihren Verhltnissen untereinander und in ihrer Macht
(dnamiw, CE II 275, GNO I 307,1516) dem Menschen erscheinen (kat t fann,
CE II 148, GNO I 268,19). hnlich lesen wir, dass die Benennungen (fvna) wie
Schatten der Dinge (skia tn pragmtvn) seien, nach den Bewegungen dessen,
worber sie sprechen, gebildet. Dies heit jedoch nach Gregor kein Ablesen einer
gttlichen Nomenklatur, die mit den Dingen verbunden wre, sondern eben eine
Wiedergabe der Bewegungen der Dinge, d.h. eine Beschreibung dessen, was geschieht:
den Ereignissen (tow prgmasin) werden die Aussagen hinzugefgt, die beschreiben, was passiert (a shmantika tn ginomnvn proshgorai) (CE II 150, GNO I
269,1114). Zum stoischen Hintergrund dieser letzten Vorstellung vgl. G. C. Stead,
Logic and the Application of Names to God, in: L. F. Mateo-Seco J. L. Bastero
(Hrsg.), El Contra Eunomium I en la produccion literaria de Gregorio de Nisa. VI. Coloquio
internacional sobre Gregorio de Nisa, Pamplona 1988, 303320, bes. 309.
54
Vgl. CE II 406408 (GNO I 344,25345,12). Die Erzhlung vom Turm in
Babylon (Gen 11) sagt ja nicht, meint Gregor, dass Gott verschiedene Sprachen
52

der ursprung der sprache nach eunomius und gregor 291

Dazu tritt noch der Umstand, dass die Menschen stets (e) neue
Bezeichnungen ernden.55 Die Namen wurden nicht am Anfang des
Menschengeschlechts bekannt gemacht, sondern werden alle Zeit neu
gegeben, sobald neue Dinge erscheinen. Passende Namen fr sie einzufhren ist keineswegs Gott allein vorbehalten, sondern so machen
es, wie Gregor spottet, auch die Bader:
Auch ihnen steht es ja frei die Namen fr die Ttigkeiten auszudenken, die sie ausben. Und niemand hat sie gttlich gepriesen, wenn
sie ihre Erndungen Fuwaschbecken, Enthaarungsmittel, Handtcher
usw. nennen, obwohl diese Namen durch ihre Bedeutung angemessen
die Dinge bekannt machen, denen sie gegeben werden.56

II.4. Auch die Gottesnamen gehen auf den Menschen zurck

Die Menschen geben jedoch nicht nur den neu konstruierten
Fuwaschbecken ihre Namen, sondern suchen auch eine Benennung
fr Gott. Es ist zwar unmglich sein Wesen auszudrcken, jeder
kann aber nach seiner Vermutung (kat t dokon) sagen, was er
eingesehen hat (t nohyn). Deswegen sind auch die Gottesnamen
unterschiedlich.57 Die Ehre Gottes geht bestimmt dem Menschen und
seiner Sprache voraus, ohne vom Menschen abhngig zu sein. Diese
Ehre ist jedoch nicht mit der Benennung (proshgora) Gottes identisch, wie Eunomius behauptet.58 Die Menschen versuchen von Anfang
des Menschengeschlechts an Gott zu benennen, ohne ihn je fassen
zu knnen. Die Unangemessenheit dieser Versuche ist jedoch keine
Lsterung, da von der Sprache gar nicht zu erwarten ist mehr als
die Gedanken des Menschen zu fassen.59

grndete, sondern dass er die Menschheit zur Strafe verstreute. Jede Nation hat
dann ihre eigene Sprache entwickelt, hnlich wie die noch ungeteilte Menschheit
ihre ursprngliche Sprache gebildet hatte. Keine dieser Sprachen stammt jedoch in
ihren konkreten Namensgebungen von Gott (CE II 252254, GNO I 299,28300,26).
Diese Theorie bezeichnet A. Borst im Rahmen seiner Untersuchung der patristischen Sprachvorstellungen als revolutionr (vgl. A. Borst, Der Turmbau von Babel.
Geschichte der Meinungen ber Ursprung und Vielfalt der Sprachen und Vlker, Bd. I, Stuttgart
1957, 244).
55
Vgl. CE II 551 (GNO I 387,27388,2).
56
CE II 409 (GNO I 345,1824).
57
Vgl. CE II 397 (GNO I 342,1315).
58
Vgl. CE II 545 (GNO I 385,1921).
59
Vgl. CE II 552 (GNO I 388,914). An einer anderen Stelle fhrt Gregor an,

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lenka karfkov

Dies gilt, so Gregor, auch fr den Gottesnamen Ungezeugtheit.

Nicht einmal dieser Name wurde von Gott in die Menschennatur
keimhaft eingegeben, wie Eunomius glaubt wre dem so, dann
msste ja dieser Name von Anfang an im Gebrauch sein, was
oensichtlich nicht der Fall ist.60
Es ist nach Gregor berhaupt vllig abwegig die menschliche
Sprache Gott zuzuschreiben. Er braucht sie nicht, wie sie die unkrperlichen Wesen allgemein nicht brauchen.61 Und es wre unangemessen zu glauben, Gott habe etwas berssiges, da dadurch seine
Vollkommenheit vermindert wre.62 Nur um der Menschen willen,
die ihn anders nicht verstehen knnten, gebraucht Gott manchmal
die menschliche Sprache, wie in der Schrift belegt. Das ist jedoch
ein Zeugnis seiner Menschenliebe (filanyrvpa), die auf das Niveau
des Menschen herabsteigt, nicht ein Beweis seiner Sprachbedrftigkeit.63
Wie die Sonne nach der gttlichen konomie ihre Strahlen mit der
Luft vermischt sendet, damit wir ihr Licht und ihre Wrme genieen
knnen, whrend die Sonne selbst uns unerreichbar bleibt, so oenbart
sich auch der unzugngliche Gott den Menschen in ihnen angemessenen Gestalten (yeofneiai), nimmt menschliche Emotionen
des Mitleids oder Zornes an und spricht die menschliche Sprache.64
Es sind jedoch Akte seiner Kondeszendenz, nicht uerungen
seiner Natur selbst, hnlich wie sich die Mutter dem Lallen ihrer
Kinder anpasst,65 wie die Menschen im Umgang mit den Tieren ihre
Stimmen nachahmen oder wie sich jemand mit dem Taubstummen
in seinen Zeichen verstndigt. Wie jedoch nicht zu erwarten ist, dass
uns der Taubstumme anders als mit seinen Zeichen anspricht, so ist

dass die Namen, die Gott von den Menschen gegeben werden, nicht sein unaussprechliches Wesen (wie es Eunomius fr den Namen Ungezeugtheit beansprucht),
sondern nur sein Wirken (nergen) fassen knnen (CE II 149, GNO I 268,
2530; hnlich Basilius, AE I 8, SC 299, 194196). Gregor will damit in seiner
Theologie nicht vom Wesen, sondern vom Wirken Gottes ausgehen. Dadurch bekennt
er sich zu einer anderen theologischen Methode als Eunomius, die Eunomius zwar
auch kennt (Apol. 20, Vaggione 58; vgl. dazu K.-H. Uthemann, Die Sprache,
145149), jedoch fr weniger zuverlssig hlt (vgl. Apol. 23, Vaggione 62 ).
60
Vgl. CE II 548549 (GNO I 386,18387,6).
61
Vgl. CE II 390 (GNO I 340,1118); CE II 393394 (GNO I 341,921).
62
Vgl. CE II 553 (GNO I 388,1724).
63
Vgl. CE II 417418 (GNO I 348,1017).
64
Vgl. CE II 419 (GNO I 348,17349,1); vgl. auch CE II 424426 (GNO I
350,13351,6) ber die anthropomorphen biblischen Stellen, wo von Gott die
Emotionen des Zornes, Mitleids usw. ausgesagt werden.
65
Vgl. CE II 419 (GNO I 348,2425).

der ursprung der sprache nach eunomius und gregor 293

auch nicht zu erwarten, dass die menschliche Sprache Gott nennen
kann. Nach seiner konomie benutzt daher Gott die Sprache des
Menschen:66
Die Menschenliebe (filanyrvpa) Gottes ist so gro, dass er freiwillig
nicht nur unsere guten Dinge, sondern auch die schlechten erfahren
wollte. Nahm er jedoch sogar an den schlechten teil, warum sollte er
sich weigern an dem Besten, was wir haben, teilzunehmen, nmlich
an der Sprache?67

Gregor und Eunomius unterscheiden sich damit nicht so sehr in

ihrer Meinung vom Ursprung der Sprache, die fr beide eine gttliche Gabe ist. Unterschiedlich sind jedoch ihre Vorstellungen von
der Form dieser Gabe. Whrend nach Eunomius Gott selber den
Dingen ihre Namen als einen konstitutiven Teil gab und dem
Menschen eine Fhigkeit diese Namen aufgrund der Samen in seiner Seele abzulesen schenkte, versteht Gregor die Gabe der Sprache
als eine formale Fhigkeit die Namen zu bilden und zu gebrauchen
nach eigener Erwgung und eigenem Nutzen. In beiden Fllen
erscheint die Sprache als eine unentbehrliche Voraussetzung der
Orientierung des Menschen unter den Dingen und der menschlichen
Gemeinschaft; fr Gregor ist sie jedoch rein eine Funktion dieser
Zwecke, nicht ein Ablesen der gttlichen Benennungen, die mit den
Dingen verbunden wren. Die Namen der Dinge wurden daher nach
Gregor nicht am Anfang des Menschengeschlechts entdeckt, wie
Eunomius behauptet, sondern werden immer wieder neu gebildet fr
die neu erscheinenden Dinge. Diese Namen sind in verschiedenen
Sprachen unterschiedlich nach dem Belieben der Benutzer, die vor
allem ihre Gedanken einander mitteilen und sich mit anderen verstndigen wollen. Nicht einmal die Namen, die von den Menschen
Gott gegeben werden, knnen als ein adquater Ausdruck seiner
Ehre gelten, wie Eunomius das fr den Namen Ungezeugtheit beansprucht, sondern sie stellen einen menschlichen Versuch dar eigene
Gotteserkenntnis zum Ausdruck zu bringen.

66
67

Vgl. CE II 421 (GNO I 349,1726).

CE II 422 (GNO I 350,15).

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lenka karfkov

III. Zwischen Platonismus und Aristotelismus, Epikureismus und Stoa

Unsere Passage, wie schon erwhnt, ist besonders reich an verspottenden und abschtzigen Urteilen ber eine antike philosophische
Inspiration der beiden Gegner. Einen Hhepunkt erreicht diese Ironie
in Gregors Vorwurf, dass sich Eunomius vom platonischen Dialog
Kratylos beeinussen lie:
Vielleicht hat er das im platonischen Dialog Kratylos gelesen oder von
einem gehrt, der das dort las, und wegen einer ungeheueren Armut
an eigenen Gedanken hat er diesen Quatsch an sein eigenes Geschwtz
genht, gleich wie die Menschen, die sich ihre Nahrung durch Betteln
besorgen. Wie nmlich die Bettler aus den kleinen Mengen von den
einzelnen Wohlttern ein buntes und verschiedenartiges Essen zusammenstellen, so treiben auch die Ausfhrungen des Eunomius, unter
einem Mangel an wirklicher Speise leidend, von allen Seiten Brosamen
der Verben und Namen zusammen. Und daher, wenn er sich die
Schnheit der platonischen Sprache aneignete, hlt er es fr gut, seine
Philosophie zur Lehre der Kirche zu machen.68

Durch diese Invektiven reagiert Gregor auf die Behauptung des

Eunomius, dass sich in den Namen die Weisheit Gottes zeigt, da
Gott jedem geschaenen Ding seine eigene und angemessene Benennung anpasste (okevw ka prosfuw kst tn genomnvn tw
proshgoraw rmsantow).69 Diese Vorstellung kommt tatschlich der
im Kratylos errterten Meinung nahe, dass die Namen (z.B. durch
ihre Etymologie, 393d) die Dinge nachahmen.70
Im zitierten Absatz erwgt Gregor auch die Mglichkeit, Eunomius
schpfe nicht direkt aus dem Dialog des Platon, sondern aus seinen
Interpreten, und er fgt zugleich ironisch hinzu, dass er sich die
Schnheit der platonischen Sprache aneignete (periktuphyew t kallifvn& tw Platvnikw ljevw).71 Dieses letzte Schmeicheln betrit
wahrscheinlich die erhabene Ausdruckweise des Eunomius, die Gregor
an einer anderen Stelle als arrogant und bombastisch (sfhlon
ka stomfdh) verspottet.72

68

CE II 404405 (GNO I 344,1325).

CE II 403 (GNO I 344,1013).
70
Wir haben jedoch keinen Beleg dafr, dass Eunomius die Angemessenheit der
Benennungen nach ihrer Etymologie suchte. Dies treibt eher Gregor selber, wenn
er einige hebrische Eigennahmen erklrt (vgl. CE II 285288, GNO I 310,11
311,17).
71
Vgl. CE II 405 (GNO I 344,2223).
72
Vgl. CE II 413 (GNO I 346,2223).
69

der ursprung der sprache nach eunomius und gregor 295

Diese Ausknfte fhrten Jean Danilou zu seiner interessanten
Hypothese, dass Eunomius wahrscheinlich durch seinen Lehrer
Atius mit dem mysterienfreundlichen Neuplatonismus der Schler
des Jamblichos (und mit ihrer erhabenen Sprache) bekannt gemacht
wurde und von ihnen (hchstwahrscheinlich aus ihren KratylosKommentaren) auch seine Vorstellung vom gttlichen Ursprung der
Sprache bernahm.73 Auch die Chaldischen Orakel, diese Bibel einiger
Neuplatoniker, sprechen ja vom heiligen Charakter der barbarischen
Namen.74 Danilou zitiert als seinen Hauptbeleg einen Kommentar
des Jamblichos (nach Danilou Ps.-Jamblichos) zu diesem Werk, wo
es heit, dass die Namen nicht auf eine menschliche Konvention
zurckgehen (kat sunykhn), sondern der Natur der Dinge selbst
entsprechen (t fsei sunrthtai tn ntvn) und tradiert werden.
Die gttlichen Namen drfen nmlich nicht als menschliche Begrie
(pnoiai) ausgedacht oder kraft des Verstandes gesucht (logika
dijodoi), sondern nur aus einer gttlichen Gabe verstanden werden.75 Eine hnliche Theorie vom gttlichen Ursprung der Namen
nden wir auch im spteren Kratylos-Kommentar von Proklos,76 der
sicherlich, so Danilou, auf die Kommentare seiner Vorgnger zurckgeht, aus denen auch Eunomius schpfte.
Diese Hypothese, die sich auch auf die subordinationistische, neuplatonisierende Theologie des Eunomius beruft,77 hat u.a. J. M. Rist
einer Kritik unterworfen. Er sucht einen mglichen Ursprung der
Sprachvorstellungen des Eunomius eher im Kratylos selbst und in den
Grammatikmanualen stoischer Prgung als in den angeblichen von
Jamblichos abhngenden Kratylos-Kommentaren, deren Existenz sogar
unsicher erscheint.78
73
Vgl. J. Danilou, Eunome lArien et lexgse noplatonicienne du Cratyle,
REG 69 (1956) 412432.
74
Vgl. Oratia Chaldaica 150 (Des Places 103).
75
Vgl. Jamblichos, De oraculis VII 45 (Des Places 191,12195,3).
76
Vgl. Proklos Diadochos, In Platonis Cratylum 51 (Pasquali 1820). Im Zusammenhang mit der Sprachauassung des Eunomius untersuchte diesen Kommentar
Th. Bhm, Theoria, 181.
77
Gegen die Vorstellung des J. Danilou von Eunomius als einem Neuplatoniker
polemisierte schon im Jahr 1964 Alfred Schindler, ohne jedoch einen neuplatonischen Einuss an seine Sprachauassung zu leugnen (vgl. A. Schindler, Die Begrndung
der Trinittslehre in der eunomianischen Kontroverse. Eine Untersuchung zu den Apologien des
Eunomius, zu Basilius des Grossen Schrift gegen Eunomius und zu Gregors von Nyssa trinitarischen Schriften, unpublizierte Dissertation, Zurch 1964, 137150).
78
Vgl. J. M. Rist, Basils Neoplatonism: Its Background and Nature, in:
P. J. Fedwick (Hrsg.), Basil of Caesarea: Christian, Humanist, Ascetic. A Sixteen-Hundreth
Anniversary Symposium, Bd. I, Toronto 1981, 137220, bes. 185188.

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lenka karfkov

Es besteht tatschlich keine berzeugende hnlichkeit zwischen

den magischen Namen der Chaldischen Orakel und dem syllogistischen
Verfahren des Eunomius, der traditionell einer sophistischen oder
aristotelischen Technologie verdchtig war.79 Seine Position enthlt
trotzdem platonische Implikationen,80 vor allem in seiner berzeugung von der eingeborenen Fhigkeit der menschlichen Seele die
Strukturen der Dinge zu erkennen. Nach dem platonischen Kratylos
darf jedoch die Sprache nicht automatisch als ein treues Abbild der
Dinge gelten, sondern muss als das Werk eines Gesetzgebers
(nomoythw) der Sprache immer wieder nach den Verhltnissen zwischen den Ideen berprft werden, zu denen die Worte ausgerichtet sind. Und gerade die Verhltnisse zwischen den Ideen ( lllvn
tn edn sumplok), die die Sprache begrnden (Soph. 259e), kann
der Mensch in seinem Denken und seiner Sprache (lgow) als ein
Dialektiker untersuchen und dadurch am Werk des Gesetzgebers
der Sprache eine Kritik ben.81
Diese Vorstellung enthlt jedoch ein Paradox, das die Position
Platons prekr macht oder ihr ihre Dynamik verleiht: die Verhltnisse
zwischen den Ideen, die fr die Sprache normativ sein sollen, werden zugleich durch die Sprache selbst untersucht. Vielleicht ist es
gerade diese Paradoxie, die in der Sprachtheorie des Eunomius zu
kurz kommt. Die gttliche Nomenklatur spricht nach seiner berzeugung ganz treu die Dinge aus und die Sprache des Menschen
kann diese Nomenklatur entweder ablesen, oder an ihr vorbeigehen,

79
Vgl. z.B. CE II 604 (GNO I 402,28). Zu dieser Anklage s. E. Vandenbussche,
La part de la dialectique dans la thologie dEunomius le technologue, RHE 40
(1944/45) 4772. Nach der berzeugung des Verfassers war jedoch Eunomius nicht
nur ein Technologe (ein aristotelisch inspirierter Sophist), sondern in seiner hierarchischen Metaphysik kam er eher dem Platonismus nahe (vgl. E. Vandenbussche,
La part, 7072). Eunomius als einen logic chopper zeigt auch R. P. Vaggione,
Eunomius of Cyzicus and the Nicene Revolution, Oxford 2000, 93.
80
Vgl. Th. Bhm, Theoria, 185. Auch R. P. Vaggione (Eunomius of Cyzicus, 239,
Anm. 262) hlt es in einem breiteren Sinne fr richtig, die Inspiration der
Sprachauassung des Eunomius im platonischen Kratylos zu sehen. Die berzeugung des Eunomius, dass das Denken die Struktur der Realitt wiederspiegelt,
bezeichnet er als eine contentual logic (vgl. R. P. Vaggione, Eunomius of Cyzicus, 245).
P. Kalligas vermutet als eine mgliche Quelle die verschollene Abhandlung ber die
Namen des Theodor von Asine (vgl. P. Kalligas, Basil of Caesarea, 41, Anm. 35).
81
Vgl. Ch. Kahn, Les mots et les formes dans le Cratyle de Platon, in:
Philosophie du language et grammaire dans lantiquit (Cahiers de Philosophie Ancienne, N. 5;
Cahiers du Groupe de Recherches sur la Philosophie et le Langage, N. 67), Bruxelles 1986,
91103. Im Zusammenhang mit unserer Polemik befassten sich mit dem Dialog
G. C. Stead, Logic, 303305; Th. Bhm, Theoria, 179f.

der ursprung der sprache nach eunomius und gregor 297

sie ist jedoch nicht ein deklariertes stndiges berprfen dieser
Nomenklatur.
Trotzdem bt Eunomius selber ein solches berprfen der Sprache,
wie ich an einem Beispiel zeigen mchte. In seiner ersten Apologie
heit es, dass die gleichen Benennungen (proshgora) die gleichen
Wesen (osa) und die unterschiedlichen Namen (nmata) dagegen
unterschiedliche Wesen bezeichnen.82 Die Sprache scheint also ein
treuer Spiegel der Dinge selbst zu sein. Zugleich entwickelt da jedoch
Eunomius einerseits seine Lehre von der Konvertibilitt der gttlichen Prdikate (die alle, obwohl einander unterschiedlich, die gleiche Bedeutung haben, z.B. der Seiende und der einzig wahre Gott),
andererseits seine Vorstellung vom metaphorischen Gebrauch der
gleichen Worte, die anders von Gott, anders vom Menschen ausgesagt werden (z.B. das Auge oder die Vaterschaft).83 Wie diese Flle
bezeugen, mssen die gleichen Worte nicht immer die gleichen Dinge
und die unterschiedlichen Worte die unterschiedlichen Dinge bezeichnen. Fr den Gebrauch und fr das Verstehen der Sprache ist also
die Kenntnis der Verhltnisse zwischen den Dingen entscheidend
und nicht umgekehrt, obwohl zugleich auch die Anwendung der gleichen, bzw. unterschiedlichen Worte etwas Wichtiges von den Dingen
andeutet und zu einem Ausgangspunkt ihrer Erkenntnis werden kann.
Wenn Eunomius selber mit dieser Dialektik auch arbeitet, hat er sie
nicht (soweit wir wissen) zu einem Teil seiner Sprachtheorie gemacht,
wodurch sein Platonismus etwas rigid erscheint.
Seine berzeugung vom gttlichen Ursprung der Namen, die
Eunomius in die Nhe einiger Neuplatoniker fhrt, muss jedoch nicht
seine Abhngigkeit von ihnen in diesem Punkt beweisen. Wie Danilou
selbst anfhrt, nden wir auch bei Klemens von Alexandrien und
Origenes Passagen vom gttlichen Ursprung (oder auch der Macht)
der Namen, bei Origenes sogar eine Klassizierung der antiken
Sprachvorstellungen nach dem Kriterium des Ursprungs der Namen
fsei oder ysei.84 Origenes glaubt jedoch, dass die einzelnen Sprachen

82

Vgl. Eunomius, Apol. 9 (Vaggione 44); Apol. 18 (Vaggione 56).

Vgl. Eunomius, Apol. 1617 (Vaggione 5254); Apol. 18 (Vaggione 56).
84
Vgl. Klemens von Alexandrien unter Berufung auf Kratylos (Strom. I 143,67,
GCS 15, 89); Origenes, C. Cels. I 2425 (SC 132, 136144; zu dieser Passage, die
teilweise in die Philokalie eingenommen wurde, vgl. M. Harl, in: SC 302, 447457);
C. Cels. V 4546 (SC 147, 130134). Origenes erwhnt die aristotelische Vorstellung
der konventionalen Namensgebung (ysei), die stoische berzeugung, dass die Namen
83

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lenka karfkov

nicht durch menschliche Konvention entstanden, sondern von Gott

geschenkt wurden, und daher sind auch die Namen (besonders die
gttlichen Namen) unwechselbar und unbertragbar.85
Wie die Analysen des Antonio Orbe zeigten, war Origenes sehr
wahrscheinlich eine entscheidende Inspiration fr die beiden Gegner
unserer Polemik in ihrer Lehre von den Benennungen Gottes und
den christologischen Titeln (pnoiai, d.h. verschiedene Namen, die
die Einzelaspekte des gttlichen Logos und seines Wirkens zum
Ausdruck bringen).86 Whrend jedoch Eunomius aus dieser Christologie
eine Regel beibehielt, dass nur der Logos als vom Vater abgeleitet
und als der Mittler der Schpfung mehrere epinoetische Bezeichnungen
trgt, haben die Kappadokier die epinoetischen Benennungen auch
auf Gott angewendet.87 Ich halte es fr sehr wahrscheinlich, dass
Origenes auch fr die Vorstellungen der beiden Gegner vom Ursprung
der Sprache eine wichtige Rolle spielte. Whrend jedoch Eunomius
seinen Glauben an die gttliche Herkunft der Namen bernahm,

der Natur (fsei) entsprechen, da sie nach den ersten die Dinge nachahmenden
Lauten gebildet werden, und die epikureische Anschauung, dass die Namen sogar
diese Laute selbst sind (srv. Origenes, C. Cels. I 24, SC 132, 136). Zur Vorstellung
des Origenes, dass die Namen das Wesen der Dinge knden, vgl. R. Ggler, Zur
Theologie des biblischen Wortes bei Origenes, Dsseldorf 1963, 217211.
85
Der Einuss des Origenes auf die Sprachvorstellungen des Eunomius mag
direkt wie auch indirekt, durch die Bibelexegese des Lukian von Antiochien vermittelt wirken, die fr Atius magebend erscheint. Vgl. A. Schindler, Die Begrndung,
150153. Zu Atius s. auch L. R. Wickham, The Syntagmation of Aetius the
Anomoean, JThS 19 (1968) 532569, bes. 558, Anm. 1. Zu der Formation des
Atius, die wahrscheinlich das Studium der aristotelischen Kategorien mit dem
Kommentar des Porphyrius und die lukianische Exegese umfasste, vgl. R. P. Vaggione,
Eunomius of Cyzicus, 1623; zu seinem Einuss auf Eunomius vgl. 35.
86
Vgl. Origenes, C. Cels. II 64 (SC 132, 434); In Ioh. I 21,125 I 39,292 (SC
120, 126206); In Ioh. II 18,125128 (SC 120, 290292); Hom. Gen. 14,1 (SC 7bis,
334); De princ. IV 4,1 (SC 268, 402404); s. dazu H. Crouzel, Le contenu spirituel des dnominations du Christ selon le livre I du Commentaire sur Jean dOrigne,
in: ders. A. Quacquarelli (Hrsg.), Origeniana Secunda, Roma 1980, 131150; zur
Theorie der pnoiai als den gedachten Bedeutungen in ihrem Zusammenhang mit
dem Freiheitsgedanken bei Origenes s. Th. Kobusch, Die philosophische Bedeutung
des Kirchenvaters Origenes. Zur christlichen Kritik an der Einseitigkeit der griechischen Wesensphilosophie, ThQ 165 (1985) 94105.
87
Vgl. A. Orbe, La epinoia. Algunos preliminares histricos de la distincin katepinoian.
En torno a la Filosofa de Leoncio Bizantino, Roma 1955, 1722 und 4245). Von den
Ausfhrungen des Origenes ber die verschiedenen biblischen Aussagen von Gott
bzw. Christus (pnoiai), die nicht das Wesen, sondern nur die Einzelaspekte fassen, behielt Eunomius besonders die Anwendung der Bezeichnung pnoia fr diejenigen Benennungen, die nicht das Wesen Gottes fassen (vgl. R. P. Vaggione,
Eunomius of Cyzicus, 242f ).

der ursprung der sprache nach eunomius und gregor 299

haben die Kappadokier seine Epinoia-Lehre in eine ganze Sprachtheorie
entwickelt, in der mehrere parallele Ausdrcke nach der Mglichkeit
der menschlichen Erkenntnis die unterschiedlichen Aspekte der erkannten Dinge bezeichnen.
Diese Theorie der Kappadokier grndet hchstwahrscheinlich letztlich auf der stoischen Unterscheidung von pino& und kat tn
pstasin (die auch Origenes kannte).88 So sind z.B. (nach Poseidonios)
osa und lh das Gleiche kat tn pstasin und unterscheiden
sich pino& mnon, d.h. ihre Referenz ist die gleiche, die bezeichneten Aspekte jedoch unterschiedlich.89 Die Epinoia, ein Begri, der
in unserer Polemik so wichtig war, bedeutete dabei fr die Stoiker
so viel wie ein Sediment des Denkens (napokeimnh nhsiw),90 das
weitere Kombinationen der aus der Sinneserfahrung abgeleiteten
Vorstellungen ermglichte und dadurch fr die Bildung der neuen,
in der Sinneserfahrung nicht direkt verankerten Begrie verantwortlich war.91 Diese Erzeugnisse der logischen Phantasie haben jedoch
als immateriell keine Existenz im eigentlichen Sinne (prxein), sondern nur eine Subsistenz im Denken (festnai).92 Dieser Status
gehrt damit nach den Stoikern der immateriellen Bedeutung der
Worte an, d.h. dem Bezeichneten oder dem durch die Sprache
Gemeinten (t lektn oder t shmainmenon), das sie einerseits von
dem bezeichnenden Laut (t shmanon), andererseits von der auersprachlichen Referenz (t tugxnon) unterschieden, die beide materiell sind.93 Dieses durch die Sprache Gemeinte (shmainmenon) spielt
bekanntlich auch in der kappadokischen Sprachauassung einen wichtigen Part, wo es jedoch manchmal mit dem aristotelischen Begri

88
Zur Unterscheidung des einen pokemenon in Christus und den mehreren
Namen (nmata), die sich auf ihn taw pinoaiw (als gedachte Unterscheidung der
einzelnen Aspekte) beziehen vgl. Origenes, Hom. Jerem. VIII 2 (SC 232, 358).
89
Vgl. Poseidonios, Fr. 92 (Edelstein-Kidd 99). S. dazu G. C. Stead, Logic,
309311.
90
Vgl. Galenus, Den. medicae 126 (SVF II 89).
91
Vgl. Sextus Empiricus, Adv. math. VIII 56 (SVF II 88).
92
Vgl. Diogenes Lartius VII 63 (SVF II 181). Zur Unterscheidung zwischen
der Existenz des Materiellen (prxein) und der Subsistenz im Denken (festnai)
vgl. Chrysippus, Phys., Fr. 26 aus Arius Didymus (SVF II 509), wo zwar als subsistent die knftige und vergangene Zeit bezeichnet wird; die Zeit als immateriell hat
jedoch den gleichen Status wie die lekt (vgl. Sextus Empiricus, Adv. math. X,218 =
SVF II 331).
93
Vgl. Sextus Empiricus, Adv. math. VIII 11 (SVF II 166). S. dazu A. A. Long,
Language and Thought in Stoicism, in: ders. (Hrsg.), Problems, 75113; Th.
Kobusch, Sein und Sprache, 2535.

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lenka karfkov

(nhma) des Denkens als der Bedeutung (mfasiw) der Worte in eins
fllt,94 was in der stoischen Auassung eigentlich nicht mglich wre.95
Die Position Gregors in unserer Passage erscheint berhaupt am
ehesten der Auassung des Aristoteles hnlich, nach der die Sprache
(lgow) ihre Bedeutung nicht von Natur aus (fsei) oder organisch
(w rganon), sondern aufgrund einer Vereinbarung (kat sunykhn)
trgt. Die Sprache ist also fr Aristoteles nicht ein natrliches Organ
des Menschen, sondern ein Ergebnis seiner berlegung, dazu noch
einer gemeinsamen, zwischenmenschlichen Vereinbarung. Der phonetische Ausdruck (t n t fvn) sind dabei Symbole (smbola)
oder Zeichen (shmea) des in der Seele Erfahrenen (tn n t cux
payhmtvn), nmlich der Gleichnisse (moimata) von Dingen selbst.
Whrend die Dinge fr alle Menschen dieselben (tata) sind, und
sogar ihre Abbilder oder Erfahrungen in der Seele dieselben (tata)
sind, ist ihr phonetischer (und von ihm abgeleiteter schriftlicher)
Ausdruck unterschiedlich (Int. 16a117a7).96
Dieser Vorstellung kommt Gregor in seiner Sprachauassung sehr
nahe, obwohl er sie nicht ganz bernimmt (es wre verfhrerisch
seine Inspirationsquelle im verschollenen Kommentar zu De interpretatione des Porphyrius zu suchen, wie einige Forscher die Inspiration
fr Basilius Theorie der Eigennamen im Kategorienkommentar des
Porphyrius nden).97 Auch fr ihn ist die Sprache sicherlich keine

94
Vgl. Th. Kobusch, Name und Sein. Zu den sprachlichphilosophischen
Grundlagen in der Schrift Contra Eunomium des Gregor von Nyssa, in: L. F.
Mateo-Seco J. L. Bastero (Hrsg.), El Contra Eunomium I, 256258.
95
Vgl. A. C. Lloyd, Grammar, 65.
96
Es ist nicht vllig klar, was hier Aristoteles mit den paymata n t cux
meint, die er als Abbilder der Dinge darstellt. Vielleicht geht es um Abdrcke der
Dinge in der Seele, aus denen durch die Abstraktion die Begrie (nomata) gebildet werden: Diese Abdrcke sind in allen Seelen gleich, da sie von den gleichen
Dingen abgeleitet werden, und daher sind auch die von ihnen abstrahierten Begrie
einerseits eine adquate Auassung der Dinge selbst, andererseits fr alle Menschen
gemeinsam, obwohl in verschiedenen Sprachen mit unterschiedlichen Worten ausgedrckt (so interpretiert die Passage H. Arens, Aristotles Theory of Language and Its
Tradition. Texts from 5001750, Amsterdam Philadelphia 1984, 2457). Oder meint
hier Aristoteles mit den paymata gleich die Begrie, wie die Mehrheit der Interpreten
meint (vgl. schon Ammonios Hermiou, In Int., CAG IV/5 22,9f; 22,19f; 24,11;
vielleicht auch Boethius, Comm. Int. I 1, Meiser II 43; gegen Arens in diesem Sinne
H. Weidemann, Grundzge der Aristotelischen Sprachtheorie, in: P. Schmitter
(Hrsg.), Sprachtheorien, 170192; ders., in: Aristoteles, Peri hermeneias, Berlin 1994, 140f;
hnlich auch A. A. Long, Language, 79).
97
Vgl. P. Kalligas, Basil of Caesarea, 46f.

der ursprung der sprache nach eunomius und gregor 301

natrliche Funktion, sondern eine gesellschaftliche Konvention.98 Er
wrde wahrscheinlich auch zustimmen, dass die Sprache die Abbilder
der Dinge in der Seele zum Ausdruck bringt und dass diese Ausdrcke
unterschiedlich, whrend die Dinge dieselben sind. Sogar die Abdrcke
der Dinge in der Seele oder die Begrie von ihnen sind fr Gregor
teilweise die gleichen,99 diese Vorstellungen oder Begrie entsprechen
jedoch nicht den Dingen selbst als ihre treuen Abbilder, weil die
Dinge fr den Menschen teilweise unerkennbar bleiben.100 Wie wir
in unserer Passage erfahren, bleibt auch (und vor allem) die Gottheit
fr den Menschen in ihrem Wesen unbegreiich und unerreichbar,
und ein jeder kann nur dasjenige, was es ihm scheint und was er
einsah zum Ausdruck bringen.101
Die Sprache bringt damit auf verschiedene Art und Weise die
menschliche Erkenntnis von den Dingen zum Ausdruck, die zum
Teil gemeinsam, nach den Aspekten jedoch unterschiedlich ist und
die nicht ganz den Dingen selbst, sondern ihrem Erscheinen entspricht. Die Sprache enthlt dazu fr Gregor einen kommunikativen
und pragmatischen Aspekt: Jeder Sprechende bringt zum Ausdruck,
was er einsehen konnte, durch ein Interesse gefhrt seine Gedanken
den anderen mitzuteilen, und nach dieser Absicht wird auch seine
Sprache gestaltet.
Die Position Gregors knnte daher als eine Art Aristotelismus charakterisiert werden, zu dem jedoch die Unerkennbarkeit der Dinge
selbst hinzutritt. Eunomius macht auch auf eine hnlichkeit der kappadokischen Vorstellung mit dem Aristotelismus aufmerksam, den er
in dieser Hinsicht als gottlos tadelt. Er macht es jedoch sehr ungeschickt, weil er sich (soweit wir wissen) nicht auf die konventionale

98
Auf die konventionalistische Sprachvorstellung des Gregor macht auch
A. Viciano aufmerksam, vgl. A. Viciano, Algunas leyes lgicas del lenguaje, segn
Gregorio de Nisa: A prposito de dos pasajes de Contra Eunomium I, in: L. F.
Mateo-Seco J. L. Bastero (Hrsg.), El Contra Eunomium I, 321327.
99
Die Elemente erscheinen, so Gregor, allen Menschen gleich (satvw fanontai) (CE II 251, GNO I 299,21). hnlich der Stein oder das Holz scheinen (doke)
nicht als etwas je anderes, obwohl sie von den verschiedenen Nationen unterschiedlich bezeichnet werden (CE II 254, GNO I 300,1518). An einer anderen
Stelle erfahren wir, dass die verschiedenen Nationen den Himmel zwar unterschiedlich nennen (nomzein), sie verstehen (noen) ihn jedoch alle gleich (CE II
284, GNO I 310,25).
100
Vgl. CE II 79 (GNO I 250,310); CE II 106118 (GNO I 257,26260,25);
hnlich schon Basilius, AE I 1213 (SC 299, 214218).
101
CE II 397 (GNO I 342,1415).

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lenka karfkov

Namenauassung beruft, sondern die Vorstellung des Basilius direkt

mit einer Ablehnung der Vorsehung in der sublunaren Sphre gleichsetzt: Es ist nmlich seine Lehre (scil. des Aristoteles), schreibt
Eunomius, dass die Vorsehung nicht alles Seiende umgreift und
dass sie die irdischen Angelegenheiten nicht betrit.102
In dieser Form kann Gregor den Aristotelismus-Verdacht schnell
ablehnen (er leugnet ja die Vorsehung nicht fr die Dinge, sondern
fr ihre Namen) und ihn auf Eunomius selber fallen lassen.103 Was
genau Gregor durch diese Anklage meint, leuchtet von dem ganzen
Kontext nicht eindeutig ein, vielleicht verspottet er den Anspruch
des Eunomius die Dinge mit den Begrien fassen zu knnen oder
einfach seinen Gebrauch des syllogistischen Verfahrens. Soviel ist
jedoch klar, dass Gregor den Vergleich der kappadokischen Position
mit dem Aristotelismus in der Frage der Vorsehung als unangemessen und unbegrndet abweist.104 Die Vorstellung vom konventionalen Ursprung der Namen bleibt dabei (leider) ganz beiseite.
Neben dem Vorwurf des Aristotelismus parodiert Eunomius die
Epinoia-Vorstellung des Basilius auch durch ihren Vergleich zur epikureischen Physik mit ihrer Lehre von der zuflligen Entstehung der
Dinge (a txaiai tn ntvn genseiw). Die Begrisbildung, die nicht
das Wesen der Dinge zum Ausdruck bringt, erscheint nmlich
Eunomius gleich zufllig wie die Entstehung der Dinge durch die
zufllige Gruppierungen der Atome.105
Diese Anklage der kappadokischen Position erscheint zuerst paradox, besonders wenn man bedenkt, dass die epikureische Sprachvorstellung die Worte als einen natrlichen Widerhall der Dinge
verstand. Auch diese Lehre rechnete jedoch mit einer gedanklichen
Durchdringung der ersten spontanen Laute und einer allmhlichen
Beseitigung der Mehrdeutigkeiten, einer wachsenden Prgnanz sowie

102
CE II 411 (GNO I 346,69). W. Jaeger, ad loc., ndet diese aristotelische
Vorstellung in der doxographischen Tradition bezeugt, die sich auf die verlorengegangenen Dialoge des Aristoteles sttzte (vgl. H. Diels, Doxographi graeci, Berlin
Leipzig 1929, 130f ).
103
Schon Basilius hat die aristotelischen Neigungen des Eunomius getadelt, besonders den unkritischen Gebrauch, den er von den aristotelisch-stoischen Syllogismen
und der Kategorien-Schrift macht. Vgl. Basilius, AE I 5,4345 (SC 299, 172174);
AE I 9 (SC 299, 200).
104
Vgl. CE II 411 (GNO I 346,412).
105
Vgl. CE II 410 (GNO I 345,25346,4); vgl. Epikur, Ep. ad Herodotum (Arrighetti
4344); Marcus Aurelius, Meditationes VII 50 (Trannoy 77).

der ursprung der sprache nach eunomius und gregor 303

einer Bereicherung um Fachausdrcke fr das neu Entdeckte.106 Die
Worte bringen zuerst spontan die Erlebnisse (pyh) und Wahrnehmungen (asyseiw) zum Ausdruck, die allmhlich in die antizipierenden Vorstellungen (prolceiw) sedimentieren, aufgrund derer die
Dinge benannt werden.107 Zwischen dem bezeichneten Ding und dem
bezeichnenden Wort steht damit fr die Epikureer in dieser zweiten
Phase der Sprache eine antizipierende Vorstellung wie eine Art
Universalie, die (wieder auf einem natrlichen Weg) die Benennungen
der Dinge durch die Lautorgane hervorruft.
Wie bekannt, wurden die Epikureer schon in der Antike angeklagt, dass sie ein selbstndiges Bestehen der Bedeutung (lekt) leugnen und nur den bezeichnenden Laut (fvn oder shmanon) und das
bezeichnete Ding (t tugxnon) in Betracht ziehen.108 Dieser Vorwurf
gilt jedoch im strengen Sinne nur fr die erste Phase der Sprache
nach den Epikureern, oder es spiegelt sich in ihm vielleicht ihre
Verweigerung fr die antizipierenden Vorstellungen (als eine Art
konstant gewordener Abdrcke der Dinge in der materiellen Seele)
einen besonderen immaterialen Status einzufhren, wie es die Stoiker
fr ihre lekt taten (die anders in dem materiellen Universum der
Stoa keinen Platz htten).109
Unter dem Eindruck dieser Anklagen verstehen jedenfalls einige
Forscher die Position des Eunomius als in diesem Punkt dem
Epikureismus nahekommend.110 Um eine wirkliche hnlichkeit der
beiden Sprachtheorien kann es sich jedoch natrlich nicht handeln.111

106

Vgl. Epikur, Ep. ad Herodotum (Arrighetti 7576).

Vgl. Diogenes Lartius, X 33 (Arrighetti 33).
108
Vgl. Plutarchos, Adv. Colotem 22, 1119f (Arrighetti 146), Sextus Empiricus,
Adv. dogm. II 13 (Arrighetti 147).
109
In diesem Sinne interpretieren die Anklage A. A. Long, Aisthesis, Prolepsis
and Linguistic Theory in Epicurus, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies of the
University of London, 1971, 114133 (bes. 120121) und nach ihm M. Hossenfelder,
Epikureer, in: P. Schmitter (Hrsg.), Sprachtheorien, 217237 (bes. 232233).
110
Vgl. Th. Kobusch, Name und Sein, 253254; zum Epikureismus auch ders.,
Sein und Sprache, 3233.
111
Die Epikureer wollen um jeden Preis vermeiden, dass ein Gott die Worte ausdenken msse (und dadurch in seiner Seligkeit verkrzt wre). Die Worte entstehen nach ihrer Vorstellung durch eine Kombination der natrlichen vokalen Reaktion
und ihrer Przisierung durch das Denken, sie sprechen nicht die Struktur der Dinge
aus, sondern die unmittelbaren menschlichen Eindrcke, bzw. die antizipierenden
Vorstellungen von den Dingen. Die Sprache ist damit in ihrer ersten Phase ein
spontaner Ausdruck der menschlichen Reaktionen, in ihrer zweiten Phase enthlt
sie ein konventionalistisches Element (die ursprngliche Sprachvorstellung Epikurs
107

304

lenka karfkov

Durch die berzeugung, dass die Sprache die menschlichen Eindrcke

von den Dingen aussagt und allmhlich zur Przisierung gelangt,
kommt die epikureische Sprachvorstellung tatschlich eher den
Kappadokiern nahe, ein wesentlicher Unterschied liegt jedoch darin,
dass fr die Kappadokier die Worte ursprnglich nicht eine natrliche vokale Reaktion, sondern eine durchdachte Konvention darstellen, die sich an der Beschaenheit und Wirkung der Dinge
orientiert.
Die Polemik zwischen den Kappadokiern und Eunomius ist damit
nicht ein bloer Widerhall der Divergenzen zwischen den Stoikern
und Epikureern oder der aristotelischen und der platonischen Sprachauassung oder letztlich zwischen Kratylos und Hermogenes im platonischen Dialog selbst, sondern erscheint auf beiden Seiten als ein
kompliziertes Gewebe der antiken Elemente. Eunomius setzt eine
gttliche Nomenklatur voraus, in der die Struktur der Dinge selbst zum
Ausdruck kommt, und diese berzeugung unterscheidet ihn deutlich
von den Epikureern und rckt ihn in die Nhe der Schler des Platon.
Mit einigen Neuplatonikern teilt er gegen Platon selbst den Glauben
an einen gttlichen Ursprung der Worte. Daher versteht er die stndige kritische Selbstberprfung aufgrund der Verhltnisse zwischen
den Dingen selbst nicht als eine wichtige Funktion der Sprache
(obwohl er solche kritische berprfung durchfhrt). In seiner berzeugung, dass die Dinge durch ihre Begrie aufgefasst werden knnen, kommt Eunomius Aristoteles nahe.
Gregor versteht die Worte als eine Struktur, durch welche die
Erkenntnisse des Menschen organisiert und seine Gedanken mitgeteilt werden, was an die stoische Auassung denken lsst. Die stellvertretenden Benennungen sprechen die Eindrcke und Erkenntnisse
des Menschen von den Dingen unter verschiedenen Aspekten aus.
Diese Benennungen richten sich dabei nach dem Willen des Menschen
die Dinge so zu beschreiben, wie sie ihm erscheinen, und sie dienen der Verstndigung und der Kommunikation. Dadurch tritt in
die Sprachvorstellung Gregors ein konventionalistisches oder pragmatisches Element ein, das sich den Konventionalismus des Aristoteles

soll sogar durchaus konventionalistisch gewesen sein und mit der Sprache als
einer knstlich eingefhrten Fachterminologie gerechnet haben diese letzte Hypothese entwickelt A. A. Long, Aisthesis, 125126, aufgrund der Fragmente aus der
Schrift De natura, XXVIII von Epikur; hnlich auch M. Hossenfelder, Epikureer,
234235). Alle diese Motive sind Eunomius ganz fremd.

der ursprung der sprache nach eunomius und gregor 305

nicht nur zu eigen macht, sondern ihn durch seine Skepsis gegenber der Erkenntnis der Dinge selbst sogar berbietet.
Eine wichtige Inspirationsquelle scheint fr beide Seiten der Polemik
auch die Sprachvorstellung des Origenes zu sein. Whrend jedoch
fr Eunomius der Glaube an die gttliche Herkunft der Worte entscheidend war, wurde fr die kappadokischen Brder die Pluralitt
der christologischen Titel bei Origenes zu einem Musterbeispiel, wie
sich die Mehrheit der verschiedenen Bedeutungen zu einem einzigen Referenten verhlt, wobei diese Bedeutungen die menschliche
Erkenntnis von den Dingen, nicht die Dinge selbst zum Ausdruck
bringen.

DIVINE SIMPLICITY AND THE PLURALITY

OF ATTRIBUTES (CE II 359386; 445560)
Joseph S. OLeary

In CE II 67358 and again in 387444 Gregory claries the status

of human knowledge, conceptuality and language in regard to the
divine. In the sections I shall study here, he turns to a defence of
Basils account of the attributes unbegotten and imperishable, which
Eunomius had impugned. Tracking this phase of the discussion, I
hope to gain a more precise understanding of Gregorys thought on
the nature of divine attributes and perhaps to sight some signicant
weaknesses and blind spots in his argumentation. The wider questions of how Gregorys argumentation is to be placed in regard to
later reection on these issues, notably in Augustine and the Scholastics,
or how a critique of it can contribute to an overcoming of metaphysics in theology, in the wake of Harnack and Heidegger, can
only be lightly touched on here.

I. Inconclusive anti-Arian arguments in CE II 359 378

At CE II 362 Eunomius accuses Basil of teaching that the most
holy essence of God receives pnoiai in various ways.1 It is implied
that Basil compromises the divine unity by introducing diversity,
undermines the divine simplicity, and subjects the divine to human
conceptualization. Aetius had claimed that if unbegotten does not
present the pstasiw of God, but the incomparable name is of
human conceiving (pinoaw), God is obliged to the conceivers, because
of the conception unbegotten, not bearing the excellence of the
name in essence (prop. 12). If unbegotten is merely a name, then
the human utterance is greater than the divine being (prop. 26).2

CE II 362 (GNO I 332).

See L. R. Wickham, The Syntagmation of Aetius the Anomean, JThS 19 (1968)
532569.
2

308

joseph s. oleary

These objections are not sudden innovations. Long before, Justin

had said: No name is to be ascribed to the Father of all, since he
is unbegotten (gennt nti). To whatever a name is ascribed the
one ascribing the name is elder. So Father and God and Creator
and Lord and Master are not names, but are applied from the
benets and works.3 It may be that in this case, as in others, those
branded as heretics are simply persisting too rigidly in an older
orthodoxy.
For Basil: after the rst idea coming to us from sensation, the
subtler and more exact consideration of the object of thought is
called pnoia.4 His view, as illustrated by the example of the corn
3

Justin Martyr, Apologia secunda 6,12 (Wartelle 204).

Basil, Adversus Eunomium I 6 (PG 29, 524b). Petavius calls this quasi secunda et
repetita notio vel cogitatio (Dionysius Petavius, Opus de theologicis dogmatibus I 9,2, Thomas
120). Sesbo calls it le temps second de la connaissance intellectuelle (B. Sesbo,
Saint Basile et la Trinit, Paris 1998, 71), a reective pilogismw supervening on the
rst global and spontaneous apprehension (pibol). The terminology is Stoic (cf.
B. Pottier, Dieu et le Christ selon Grgoire de Nysse, Namur 1994, 159). Gregory concedes to Eunomius that Basils denition was incomplete (see CE II 345f, GNO I
326f ); his own pnoia is less analytical, more dynamic and heuristic; he has less
faith in the reliability of pnoiai, except as pedagogical devices leading us on the
spiritual path to God (CE II 154.242, GNO I 270.297). Even in the case of Basil,
Pottier speaks of a linguistic quasi-Kantianism: For Basil, the names designate
with a certain precision all that surrounds the substance, but they never penetrate to
the hard metaphysical core (B. Pottier, Dieu et le Christ, 164). In sharpening the
opposition between kat pnoian and kat fsin (CE II 304, GNO I 315), Gregory
tends to make pnoiai more imsy and conjectural than they were in Basil. He
sees naming God as a kind of game or hunt. His theology is so dominated by a
sense of the unknowability of the divine essence that the attributes might seem to
be no more than human guesswork, leaving the divine essence utterly elusive (while
the trinitarian dierentiations as well are condemned to epiphenomenal status or
imperfectly integrated with the conception of the essence). The substance of God
is not to be touched and known; it is an abstraction and, in a sense, a fantasy;
there is no core of the divine being to be grasped as the nal, essential quality of
God, only the divine works, God willing to relate to the world in love (R. Williams,
The Wound of Knowledge, London 1990, 62). A similar objection is voiced in Karl
Barth, Kirchliche Dogmatik, II/1, Zollikon Zrich 1940, 364. Holl had pointed out
that Gregory seeks a derivation of the Trinity from the one activity of God as
zvopoiw dnamiw, expressed in lgow and pnema: But if Gregory thereby attained
a more vivid presentation of the threefold ordering in the divinity, the leap from
this initial deployment to a doctrine of the hypostases is all the greater for him. So
far Gregory has produced in reality only modes of the one divinity (K. Holl,
Amphilochius von Ikonium in seinem Verhltnis zu den grossen Kappadoziern, Tbingen 1904,
210). For Stead, likewise: the undivided Godhead which they share is not so much
manifested in three personal beings or modes as contradicted by the imposed characteristics by which they are distinguished (Ch. Stead, Divine Simplicity as a
problem for orthodoxy, in R. Williams, ed., The Making of Orthodoxy, Cambridge
1989, 267). Bergjan thinks that Gregory presupposes the trinitarian persons, but
4

divine simplicity and the plurality of attributes

309

in its dierent stages of growth, is robustly realistic. For the theological usage of pnoia, he cites rst the pnoiai of Christ, thus
linking his thought to the famous use of pnoia in Origens Commentary
on John, and only then turns to the divine attributes as such, placing
fyarsa alongside Eunomiuss favoured gennhsa. Origen generally conned pnoiai to the Son, whom he regarded as compound,
and was wary of multiplying attributes of the ultimate, simple God.
Basil corrects this by stressing that the Son, too, is n pokemenon,
ma osa.5 This Christological point of departure creates confusion
about the strictly theological use of pnoia, which itself, as we shall
see, harbours ambiguities.6
Following Origen, Eunomius agrees that Christ, unlike the unbegotten God, can receive pnoiai, in virtue of the diversity of the
activities and certain analogies and relations.7 Gregory is indignant
that here Eunomius puts the Son on the same level as corn, over
against the unbegotten God. He points out that Eunomius fails to
mention that the Son, too, is incapable of change.8 Eunomius wants
to see the imperishability of the Son as dierent from that of the
Father, since it is not on the basis of activities, as Father and
then denes the deity in such a way that no possibility of dierentiation in God
can be named (S.-P. Bergjan, Theoderet von Cyrus und der Neuniznismus, Berlin 1994,
83). For Drecoll, the Neo-Nicene distinction of ma osa and trew postseiw
does not surreptitiously solve the problem that the notion of God is inaccessible to
human reason, but upholds two basic coordinates of the Christian confession, namely,
that one must speak of the existence of one God, yet can only speak of this God as
Father, Son or Spirit (V. H. Drecoll, Die Entwicklung der Trinittslehre des Basilius von
Csarea, Gttingen 1996, 285f ). Maspero attempts to nd a nexus between the
ineability of the divine essence and the positive revelatory function of the divine
persons (G. Maspero, La Trinit e luomo, Rome 2004, 220).
5
Cf. B. Pottier, Dieu et le Christ, 160.
6
Basils Christological illustration of pnoia continues to create confusion in
modern scholarship. Bergjan refers to the simple pokemenon to which dierent
names are related as their object of reference (S.-P. Bergjan, Theoderet von Cyrus,
39), speaking of Christ in a way that suggests confusion with the simple divine
essence. Drecoll point out that there is no polynymy here, since the dierent designations correspond to the dierent energeiai of Christ (V. H. Drecoll, Die Entwicklung
der Trinittslehre, 78). Pottier contrasts the plurality based on nrgeiai in the names
of Christ with a plurality based on a variety of nite intellectual considerations
reaching toward the contemplation of God in the divine attributes (B. Pottier,
Dieu et le Christ, 163). He admires Basils strategy of coupling imperishability and
unbegottenness, in order to prove the subjectivity of these two negative concepts,
and thus bring them close to the names of Christ (ibid., 162), but does not bring
into view the lurking theological diculty.
7
CE II 363 (GNO I 332).
8
CE II 366 (GNO I 333).

310

joseph s. oleary

Creator, that he is imperishable and unbegotten, but it is according

to the essence that God is imperishable and unbegotten, being
unmixed and pure of every otherness and dierence.9 The meaning is that Father and Creator are names given on the basis of
activities, whereas imperishable and unbegotten are the names of
the essence, eternally valid. Gregory oers a provisional demurral,
which is something of a red herring: the true Life acting (autn
nergosa) is an activity, and to live for ever and never to suer
perishing mean the same thing.10 He then argues that there is no
greater or less in imperishability, so that the Son too should be recognized to share divine imperishability.11 This is a question-begging
argument when addressed to an Arian. Both premises, that there is
no greater or less in the concept of imperishability, and that the
Son, being immune to corruption, is just as imperishable as the
Father, would be rejected by Eunomius. He would say that the name
imperishable can be used as a synonym of unbegotten when applied
to God, but that as applied the Son it is merely a homonym; the
Sons imperishability is not even analogous to the Fathers, but is a
created or merely titular quality. The pattern of Gregorys argument
here recurs in regard to the attributes of eternity at the end of CE I
and simplicity earlier in CE II. His claim at CE II 29 that simplicity is the same for Father and Son connects with his commonsense scepticism about talk of greater and lesser degrees of being: a
thing either is or is not12 and with the idea that the divine nature,
being innite, cannot receive addition.13 Eunomius probably made a
slip when he wrote: If, then, all expressions used to signify the
essence of the Father are equivalent in force of meaning to the
unbegotten, because he is without parts and uncomposed, following
the same reasoning, also in the case of the Only-begotten, all names
are identical with the begotten.14 If the Son is not absolutely simple,
there is no need to posit such a synonymity among his attributes.15

CE II 371.377.380 (GNO I 334.336.337).

CE II 367 (GNO I 333).
11
Cf. CE II 368370 (GNO I 333f ).
12
Cf. CE I 162.180182 (GNO I 75.79f ). See Aristotle, Categories 5, 3b334a9;
J. Zachhuber, Human Nature in Gregory of Nyssa, Leiden 2000, 97.
13
Cf. CE I 169 (GNO I 77).
14
Eunomius, Apol. 19 (Vaggione 5658).
15
A similar mistake is his talk of three simple essences (CE I 151154, GNO I
7173); see B. Pottier, Dieu et le Christ, 125128, who unnecessarily supposes Plotinian
10

divine simplicity and the plurality of attributes

311

Finally, Gregory comes to a crucial point, Eunomiuss equiparation of fatherhood and creatorhood. He vamps up the implications:
An activity that brings something into eect cannot subsist simply
by itself . . . If the Father, as they tell us, is nothing but an activity,
then the only-begotten Son is shown thereby to be passive, shaped
in accordance with the active motion which constitutes him.16 The
sxsiw of Father and Son (in contrast to how the term is used in
trinitarian theory) becomes that of maker and thing made, which
Gregory, playing on the anti-Arian convictions of the faithful, makes
sound monstrous in this context. If one denes the fatherhood as
an activity, of necessity one may not describe the being of the Son
except as a passive material thoroughly worked upon.17 If the opponents still want to call the Son impassible, shying away from the
impiety of denying it, that would make it impossible for the Father
to exert his activity, so they would end up saying that the Son does
not exist at all!18 Again a question-begging argument, since Arians
would no doubt admit the Son to be passible. In fact, Gregory has

inuence. In the argument from divine simplicity, Eunomius has said that if God
is by nature uncompounded, and the epithet unbegotten applies to him, then to
be unbegotten must belong to his nature, and his nature is nothing else than unbegottenness (CE II 23; see also 22; 31, GNO I 233; 233; 235). Gregory replies by
attacking a straw man, the idea that simplicity in itself must be unbegottenness (CE
II 25. 29. 42, GNO I 233234. 234235. 238). He argues that if simplicity and
unbegottenness are the same, the Son would either have to be called unbegotten
because of the simplicity of his essence or one would have to deny his simplicity
and therefore his divinity. Petavius objects that this argument non satis ad rem pertinet, neque Eunomii argumentationi satisfacit. Non enim ille ex eo quod agenntos esset et
innascibilis Deus, etiam haploun et asyntheton, incompositum esse pugnabat et simplicem,
neque ut dialectici loquuntur, in formali sensu id esse verum asserebat. Sed cum et innascibilis
sit Deus, et idem, quamlibet diversa notione, sit simplex, eumdem concludebat non solum innascibiliem et simplicem esse, sed innascibilitatem ipsam et simplicitatem (Dionysius Petavius, Opus
de theologicis dogmatibus I 7,5, Thomas 111). Also problematic is Gregorys statement
that the essence is simple but not simplicity and in the same way it is unbegotten and not unbegottenness (CE II 30, GNO I 235). Later logic would say that
absolute attributes of God do indeed name the essence; thus God is not just good
but Goodness, not just simple but Simplicity, as opposed to relative attributes like
Creator, which Gregory conates with the absolute ones (CE II 31, GNO I 235):
non solum simplex est, sed etiam simplicitas, sicut non tantum bonus et justus et verus est, set
etiam bonitas et justitia et veritas et quidquid aliud secundum essentiae proprietatem dicitur, and
if the divine nature could be called unbegotten it could also be called unbegottenness
(Dionysius Petavius, Opus de theologicis dogmatibus I 7,6, Thomas 112; see F. Diekamp,
Die Gotteslehre des heiligen Gregor von Nyssa, Mnster 1896, 167f ).
16
CE II 372f (GNO I 334f ).
17
CE II 374 (GNO I 335f ).
18
Cf. CE II 375 (GNO I 336).

312

joseph s. oleary

dismissed, not refuted, the idea of a passible Son, in order to arm

the Son in Nicene style as true God, impassibly and eternally radiated and shining forth from the true God, the Father.19
Which other of the conceptions tting to God does not belong
to the very essence of the Son: justice, goodness, eternity, absence
of all evil, boundlessness in every conceivable good?20 This would
make better sense if he wrote God instead of the Son. All the
divine attributes have the status Eunomius claims for imperishability and unbegottenness. In the next sentence Gregory indeed returns
to speaking of the divine nature: The prophet says that Every ne
thing is his, and every good thing, from him (Zech 9,17). He
[Eunomius] appends to this the claim that he is unbegotten according to essence.21 Gregory agrees that the Father is unbegotten, denies
that unbegottenness is the divine essence.
Like Basil, Gregory muddies the argument by equiparating the
pnoiai applied to the Son in his incarnate mission with the attributes of God: Every one of these titles is not the nature of the Onlybegotten, not his deity, not the character of his being. Nevertheless
he is so named, and the naming is valid; for it is right to consider
that there is nothing idle or meaningless among the divine words.
So let him give the explanation, if he rejects their being applied conceptually, how these names are tting for God.22 Eunomius would
not accept the premise that the Son is truly God. But Gregory
assumes throughout that his opponents will not dare deny the divinity of the Son, and produces these question-begging arguments at
every turn.23 Yet he also points out that the Eunomians believe the
Son to be God in a merely titular sense.24 He plays on an apparent weakness in Eunomiuss system, the necessity of admitting two
senses to such titles as light as applied to Father and Son, one sense
in which light is synonymous with unbegotten and a lesser sense
tted to the Son: as great as the dierence is between unbegotten
and begotten, so great must be that between light and light, life and

19

CE II 377 (GNO I 336).

CE II 377 (GNO I 336).
21
CE II 378 (GNO I 336f ).
22
CE II 298 (GNO I 314).
23
Cf. CE II 26f. 29f. 33. 3739. 42. 294298. 368377. 383385. 455. 464f.
486490. 497f. 533. 536. 556. 560 (GNO I 234. 234f. 236. 237. 238. 313f. 333336.
338. 359. 362. 367369. 371. 381f. 382f. 389. 390).
24
Cf. CE II 5159. 331f (GNO I 240243. 322f ).
20

divine simplicity and the plurality of attributes

313

life, power and power.25 There is an interesting psychology here:

one argues against heretics, but the authority of the Church can be
invoked at any point as a self-evident premise preempting their arguments and consigning them to futility. This is primarily a lesson in
belief to the already converted faithful. The gap between the heresy
and truth is glaringly revealed, arousing horror and wrath.26 But the
appeal to authority can intimidate the heterodox as well, convicting
their quibblings of baselessness by dashing them against the rock of
truth. This gesture lies beneath the surface of the detailed refutations and gives them their fundamental orientation. Neither Basil nor
Gregory take seriously the fact that Eunomius thinks in a radically
dierent framework, for they keep speaking as if he really agrees
with their own linguistic presuppositions (for instance, their use of
commonsense analogy between human and divine names,27 or their
application of divine names to the Son).

II. The logic of unbegotten

The substantive identity of any divine attribute with the divine essence
itself will be accepted in later theology, and Basil and Gregory occasionally recognize that they are not at odds with Eunomius on this
point. Aquinas reconciled the diversity of divine attributes with the
unity, and the simplicity, of the divine subject by seeing God as the

25
Apol. 19 (Vaggione 5658). See B. Sesbo, Saint Basile et la Trinit, 42f;
J. Zachhuber, Human Nature, 46f. Eunomius thus immunizes the properly divine
attributes from contamination by their lower, merely homonymous senses. I do not
quite see how this involves him in a series of increasingly inextricable contradictions or is a confession of weakness, for the gap is no longer located between the
language of substances and that of the sensible world, but insinuates itself into the
consideration of the substances itself (B. Sesbo, Saint Basile et la Trinit, 43).
Pottier believes that in conceding that one cannot have unbegottenness without
imperishability, Eunomius jeopardized his own system by softening the xed idea
that gnnhtow alone expresses the entire substance of God? (B. Pottier, Dieu et le
Christ, 162, followed by B. Sesbo, Saint Basile et la Trinit, 74), but this concession,
if it is such, is perfectly consistent with his premises; predicates properly applying
to the divine nature are synonymous. It is Basil who runs into diculty by treating the two attributes as names of the divine essence; he does feel that unbegotten belongs more to the register of the personal properties but the discourse is
not yet at the height of the insight (B. Sesbo, Saint Basile et la Trinit, 75).
26
CE II 56 (GNO I 242).
27
See B. Sesbo, Saint Basile et la Trinit, 80.

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joseph s. oleary

pure act of being. There is no place for potentiality or any kind of

composition in the divine nature. His attributes are identical with
his essence, in the sense that already for Augustine God is his goodness, his justice etc., and these attributes are identical with one
another in God: quae iustitia ipsa bonitas, et quae bonitas ipsa beatitudo.28
Furthermore, God is his own essence, and his own being, and there
is no room in God for a dierentiation of essence and existence,
such as underlies causa sui theories that would ground Gods existence in his essence.
How much of this later clarity is already present in Gregory? His
understanding of divine simplicity can sound rather rough and ready,
without the renements of Plotinus or Aquinas: How could anyone
take that to be pluriform and composite which has neither form nor
shape, and to which no concepts of size and magnitude apply?29
However, he does grasp the identity of the divine essence and its
attributes: life and truth and justice and goodness and light and
power these the only-begotten God both is and is said to be, under
dierent apprehensions (kat diafrouw pibolw), being simple, without parts or composition.30 The divine essence, being simple, is not
one thing through its own nature and another through the possession of its attributes.31
The agreement between Eunomius and the Cappadocians would
have been more evident if Eunomius had chosen to illustrate his
view of theological language with an attribute that applied less problematically to the divine essence. Unfortunately, unbegottenness has
a confusing amphibolous status. It names the divine essence if taken
in the sense of uncausedness (gnhtow) though its negative character makes this dicult to grasp, and Gregory sometimes errs through
the commonsense reaction of saying how can something merely
negative name the divine essence whereas in its trinitarian sense
(gnnhtow) as signifying the unbegottenness of the Father, it has a
special status which Basil and Gregory do not always suciently distinguish. The debate with Eunomius may have set o on the wrong
foot. When Eunomius undertook to demonstrate what seemed this

28

Augustinus, De Trinitate XV 7 (CCL 50a, 469f ).

CE I 231 (GNO I 94); cf. Gregory of Nyssa, De mortuis 3 (PG 46, 509c).
30
Gregory of Nyssa, Adv. Apollinar. 5 (GNO III/1 136,2730); see CE II 483
(GNO I 367).
31
Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Adv. Macedonianos 5 (PG 45, 1305d).
29

divine simplicity and the plurality of attributes

315

obvious truth of divine gennhsa, Basil taunted him as one that

would prove the suns brightness at midday. For Basil, the pnoia
unbegotten tells us not what God is, but how he is without beginning.32 No one, Basil exclaims, has ever contended that the unbegotten has been begotten of himself or of another; no one has been
so mentally unsound as to question the unbegottenness of the unbegotten.33 In his condent precipitation, Basil is misled by the residual confusion between gnhtow, not being brought into being, not
caused, and gnnhtow, not begotten. It will become clear that the
Son is gnhtow, but not gnnhtow, and that gnhtow is an absolute
predicate, so that genhsa is identical with the divine essence. This
result is quite counter-intuitive. That God is his own goodness has
a certain plausibility, that he is supreme imperishability is rather less
convincing, for the term imperishable seems merely negative and
rather abstract, and that God is supreme uncausedness hardly seems
to refer to any substantial reality. But gnhtow should be understood
as a negation of a negation, denying a limit proper to becoming or
to caused being: The negative modality of language conceals a positivity, and the particularity of the attribution says something essential about God. Since the attributes in God are identical with the
substance, the concepts expressing them eectively envisage the substance,34 as Basil only dimly senses.
Eunomiuss at stin osa gnnhtow could have been dealt with
by a simple clarication: the Father alone is unbegotten, the divine
essence is not unbegotten, but uncreated. Basil instead argued: If
unbegottenness follows God, then it clearly comes to God from outside, and what is external to God is not his essence.35 He constructed a specious contradiction: How can unbegottenness follow
God and again not follow him but be embraced in the denition of
his substance?36 The implication that the names we attribute to God
come from outside and do not constitute Gods essence gives a basis
to Eunomiuss accusation of a subjection of God to human notions.

32
This Stoic distinction is taken up by Gregory, Ad Ablabium (PG 45, 133c) and
CE II 386 (GNO I 338f ).
33
Basil, Adversus Eunomium I 5 (PG 29, 516b).
34
B. Sesbo, Saint Basile et la Trinit, 78.
35
Basil, Adversus Eunomium I 5 (PG 29, 517bc).
36
Basil, Adversus Eunomium I 5 (PG 29, 517c520a).

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joseph s. oleary

Instead of keeping the distinction between divine uncausednesss

and the unbegottenness of the Father rmly in focus, Basil tackles
Eunomius on the status of divine attributes in general, launching an
immense quarrel that is tangential to the anti-Arian battle. The real
question was not whether unbegottenness is predicated kat pnoian
or kat fsin of God, but what unbegottenness means and how it
is properly used in speaking of God. Basil wants to keep unbegottenness outside God, as a human pnoia about God, and he fails
to clarify exactly how the term applies to God.
Eunomius thought that unbegotten was a divinely given name;
his attitude is perhaps comparable to that of Judaism toward the
inscrutable Tetragrammaton: When we say unbegotten, we do not
think to give honour by a name or according to human pnoia
only, but to accomplish according to truth the most necessary of
duties, the ascription to God of his being what he is. For what is
said according to pnoia has its being only in names and enunciation, and its nature is to be dissolved with the sounds of the voice.37
This passage merely suggests that unbegottenness was the only name
of God.38 In stressing the simplicity of the divine essence, Eunomius
gives the plurality of the attributes a merely nominal status. They
serve only to express the divine essence over and over again, and
the variety of their signications is illusory. For Basil and Gregory,
erring in the other direction, the attributes do not name the essence,
but represent our human conceptions concerning it. Later theology
would correct them by stressing the fundamentum in re of the attributes: their objective reality is grounded in the divine essence where
they are one.
If Eunomius really claimed to understand Gods essence as well
as God himself understands it,39 he might have meant that it is an
unnameable mystery to both God and us. The Cappadocians play
the apophatic card against Eunomius, but perhaps Eunomius himself is close to the apophatic. All the names of the divine essence
are synonymous, and if a name, such as light, is shared by God
and creatures (including the Son, rst of creatures and creator of all
the rest), it is in a purely equivocal sense. To confess God as unbe37
Eunomius, Apol. 8 (Vaggione 4042); see Basil, Adversus Eunomium I 6 (PG 29,
521ab; 524a); Gregory, CE II 44; 159; 209 (GNO I 238f; 271; 285f ).
38
R. Williams, The Wound of Knowledge, 53.
39
Cf. Socrates Scholasticus, Historia ecclesiastica IV 7 (PG 67, 472b475c).

divine simplicity and the plurality of attributes

317

gotten could be to put a fence around the divine transcendence, in

a naming that lies beyond any ordinary naming. Origen (De orat.
4,2) also argues that since God is unchanging, so must his name
be. He allows that there might be more than one name, provided
that they all carry the same signication, but the one name that he
selects to give (recalling its scriptural source) is vn being or beingitself . . . For Eunomius, insistence on gnnhtow as characterizing the
divine osa is a way of spelling out what is implicit in the fact that
Gods name is vn.40 We may read the Eunomian watchword gnnhtow
osa dierently if we place the accent on osa.
The unclaried status of unbegotten generates murkiness. Eunomius
set up a tricky target in identifying Gods unbegottenness with his
essence, and this was compounded when Basil added imperishability as an attribute enjoying the same status as unbegottenness; but
as an absolute predicate imperishability is indeed one with the divine
essence, whereas as a relative predicate unbegottenness is not. Basil
oered an initial clarication: The term Father has the same
signicance as unbegotten, in addition to introducing as well the
conception of the Son which it implied by the relation. For the true
Father alone is from no other, and from no other is the same as
unbegotten.41 Eunomius, in response, points to three paradoxes
arising from treating fatherhood and unbegottenness as synonymous.
Gregory replies that Basil claims no such synonymity;42 Father
denotes both the Fathers unbegottenness and his begetting of another;
no contradiction arises in this clear situation. He glides from this
trinitarian sense of unbegottenness to the divine transcendence of
any beginning, treating Father as a relative name and unbegotten
as an absolute one.43 Later he isolates the specically trinitarian sense
more clearly: If we do not learn from the word unbegotten the
dierence which distinguishes the postseiw, but are to understand
that this word indicates the nature itself . . . then it must follow that
God is either not unbegotten, or not so described, there being no

40
M. Wiles, Eunomius: hair-splitting dialectician or defender of the accessibility of salvation?, in R. Williams (ed.), The Making of Orthodoxy, Cambridge 1989,
166. In his student years in Alexandria, Eunomius must have absorbed Origenian
thought; see R. P. Vaggione, Eunomius of Cyzicus and the Nicene Revolution, Oxford
2000, 35.
41
Basil, Adversus Eunomium I 5 (PG 29, 517a).
42
Cf. CE I 549611 (GNO I 386404).
43
CE I 575f (GNO I 394).

318

joseph s. oleary

word specically to provide that kind of connotation.44 He challenges Eunomius to distinguish the dierent senses of unbegotten if
he wishes to apply it both to the divine nature and to the dierence
of the hypostases.45 On the negative point, that unbegottenness is
not a name of essence, Gregory is right. Petavius supplies him with
the answer he needed: When Eunomius says God is unbegotten,
he may refer to the divine nature or to one of the Persons; only in
the latter application is the statement true.46 Gregory speaks of relative predicates (t sxetik), both trinitarian and in reference to creation, but does not consistently dene gennhsa as a relative predicate.
Confusion about the status of unbegotten is particularly evident
in CE II 379386. Gregory writes: If he is saying this in the sense
that the Fathers essence (osa) exists unbegotten, I agree with what
he says. What he rejects is the idea that unbegottenness itself is
the essence (atn tn gennhsan osan enai).47 Gregory wants
to keep gennhsa kat pnoian but not kat osan (see 314), but
in practice has he not just slipped into using the word kat osan?
If he argues that the Father exists unbegottenly, but is not unbegottenness, he is heading for trouble with the logic of divine attributes.
The notion of unbegottenness is one thing, the denition of
the divine essence another.48 Gregory intends to show this from
Eunomiuss own words. Quoting Eunomius, He is unbegotten and
imperishable according to the essence itself, since it is unmixed and
pure of every otherness and dierence, Gregory notes that Eunomius
uses three words in speaking of God: essence, imperishable and

44

CE II 36 (GNO I 236f ).
Cf. CE II 40.43 (GNO I 237f ).
46
Quocirca eunomianam istam calumniam hoc modo licet refellere. Deum cum ait innascibilem esse, id ambiguum est ac distinctione opus habet. Aut enim divinitatem ipsam naturamque
Dei vox signicant hoc sensu, ut ejus proprietas ista sit quae in divinitatis consortes omnes transeat:
aut Dei vocabulum certam de tribus personam exprimit, cujus id sit proprium. Atque hoc posteriore modo verum illud est quod dicitur, innascibilem esse Deum, qui sit Pater; priore, falsum
(Dionysius Petavius, Opus de theologicis dogmatibus I 7,5, Thomas 111). Unbegottenness,
innascibilitas, in Thomist Trinitarian theology is not one of the two processions, the
three persons, or the four relations, but one of the ve notions or notional acts
in God, alongside paternity, liation, active and passive spiration. The phrase
notional act is intended perhaps to exclude the idea that these are notions applied
to God from the outside. Everything in God is itself God, so like the processions
and relations, the notions must be identical in being with the divine essence.
47
CE II 379 (GNO I 337).
48
CE II 380 (GNO I 337).
45

divine simplicity and the plurality of attributes

319

unbegotten49 which already implies a certain otherness and

dierence. If the conception of God these three words convey is
one, then the deity is identical with these three,50 and if any is lacking its absence destroys the denition of divinity.51 Then an antiArian twist: if Eunomius calls the Son begotten, then the Son loses
by the same token his imperishability, his being and his divinity.52
Again, it is hard to see why this should be a problem for Eunomius.
The problem would rather seem to be Gregorys, who has not yet
established clearly why unbegotten is not an essential divine attribute,
unlike imperishability. Since the co-essentiality of the three terms has
such disastrous Christological consequences, he undertakes to show
Eunomius that they have distinct signicances: The unbegotten we
discover from its opposition to the begotten, the imperishable is recognized by comparison with the perishable, and the essence is understood by contrast with the non-existent (t nupstaton).53 The terms
to which the three words are opposed what is begotten, what perishes, what is non-existent are clearly distinct, so presumably this,
for Gregory, claries the distinctness of the three words themselves.
As he continues, he seems to turn in circles: Just as what has not
been begotten is spoken of as unbegotten, and what is not destroyed
is called imperishable, so too we call being what is not non-existent; and on the other hand, as we say that the begotten is not
unbegotten and the perishable we designate not imperishable, so too
we do not say that the essence is non-existent. Then the distinction between a things existence and its mode of existence comes
into play, without reection on the possible non-applicability of this
logic to the divine: Essence therefore is recognized by the existence
of something, the perishable or imperishable by what sort of thing it
is, the begotten or unbegotten by how it exists. The account (lgow)
of being is one thing, another that which indicates the manner or
the quality.54 Here Gregory is trying to put a distance between
attributes like imperishability and unbegottenness on the one hand
and the divine essence on the other. The former have to do with

49
50
51
52
53
54

CE
CE
CE
CE
CE
CE

II
II
II
II
II
II

380
381
382
383
386
386

(GNO
(GNO
(GNO
(GNO
(GNO
(GNO

I
I
I
I
I
I

337).
337).
337f ).
338).
338f ).
338f ).

320

joseph s. oleary

modes of being, the latter with being itself. But he misses the special quality of divine attributes here, and he fails to dierentiate the
attribute of imperishability, which applies to the divine essence as
such, and the attribute of unbegottenness which applies only to the
Father.

III. Defending Basils approach to divine attributes (CE II 445 468)

In CE II 387444 we have a general discussion of pnoiai, going
back to Basils illustration of the corn. Then Gregory returns to the
question of the attributes at CE II 446, as he undertakes to defend
a passage of Basil impugned by Eunomius: We call the God of the
Universe imperishable and unbegotten, using these names according
to dierent apprehensions (pibolw): when we look at the ages past,
nding the life of God transcending every limit, we call him unbegotten; but when we cast (piblvmen) our mind to the coming ages,
the innity and boundlessness and never being comprehended by
any end we designate imperishable. So just as the endlessness of
the life is called imperishable, its lack of a beginning is called unbegotten, as we apply our conceptual thought to these things.55 This
discussion is anticipated in CE II 130147.
The polemic context of this discussion does not make for clarity.
Today we can regret that Basil and Gregory did not interpret
Eunomius more generously. He had, after all, posed a reasonable
objection: if it is of the essence of God to be unbegotten, how can
a begotten Son be truly God? We can suspect that the heat of their
indignation is in proportion to their inability to answer the objection clearly. The current phenomenon of amers and ranters on
rowdy internet forums sheds an unattering light on the history of
theological disputation, and makes us prize the level-headed rationality of the more scholastic writers. Even if Eunomius at times was
guilty of what Gregory describes as a stinking heap of vocal dung,
all this should have been set aside in the interests of clarifying the
basic issues.56

55

CE II 446f (GNO I 356f ), quoting Basil, Adversus Eunomium I 7 (PG 29, 525b).
Cf. CE II 445 (GNO I 356). B. Pottier (Dieu et le Christ, 39) thinks that
the aridity of CE II 390560 is due to its being a reprise of Eunomiuss major
56

divine simplicity and the plurality of attributes

321

III.1. The charge that Basil supplied imperishability from outside, on the
basis of ages, and not as of the essence (CE II 445 456 )
Eunomius objects that Basil grounds the meaning of the divine attributes in a temporal perspective rather than in a logical necessity based
on the very nature of the divine. It associates imperishability with
mere endlessness and unbegottenness with beginninglessness in a way
that suggests that we can think of God only in temporal categories.
Such thought would have little logical or ontological force, being
chiey an exercise in imagination, issuing in the discovery that temporal categories fail to grasp the divine innity and boundlessness.
Eunomius promises to convict us of saying that not by nature is
the divinity imperishable.57 Gregory might have conceded that Basils
utterance as it stands fails to locate the necessity of this attribute,
and tends to reduce imperishability to the phenomenological realization that we cannot imagine divine life coming to an end. But
Eunomius had pounced on an interpretation of Basils language that
is belied by the wider theological vision of both Basil and Gregory.
Since of course they see imperishability as an attribute without
which it is impossible to think of the underlying nature, and as a
quality God never lacks, never suggesting that imperishability is an
additional growth (pigennhmatikn) upon God,58 there is no basis
for Eunomiuss allegation. Still, Eunomius may have sensed a weak
point in the Cappadocians attitude to divine attributes, their readiness to distinguish qualities of the essence from the inconceivable
essence itself, failing to think through the implications of the identity of Gods attributes with Gods essence.
Gregory also sees Eunomius as captious in objecting that we supply God with imperishability by adding the ages.59 Eunomius is
perhaps objecting not to an addition but to a subtraction to make
imperishability a matter of ages falls short of its full sense as a necessary attribute of the divine nature. Gregory in turn pounces on an
inaccuracy in Eunomiuss characterization of Basils view. There is
no need to defend Basils text against the accusation of supplying

theses (a reprise he sees, unconvincingly, as announced in 387389). But most of

this section is a tit-for-tat defence of Basils statement, which Eunomius had impugned.
Such discussion is almost bound to be arid.
57
CE II 448 (GNO I 357).
58
CE II 448 (GNO I 357).
59
CE II 450 (GNO I 357f ).

322

joseph s. oleary

qualities on God, since he did not use that word at all. Basil wrote:
When we turn our mind to the coming ages, his innity and boundlessness and never ceasing at an end we designate imperishable.
Gregory asks: Does Eunomius think that designate is the same as
supply (porsai)?60 To supply is to give someone what he has not,
to designate is to give a name to what he already has.61 Eunomius
probably took the word supply from Aetius: if God is envisaged
from outside as unbegotten, the ones envisaging (piyevrhyntew)
are superior to what is envisaged, supplying (porismenoi) him a
name greater than his nature (prop. 13). The word implies that
something is added to God from outside. Gregory waxes indignant
at Eunomiuss misrepresentation and portrays him as condemning
only an invention of his own.62
Gregory makes Basils language his own: We claim that just as
the endlessness of life is named imperishable, so its beginninglessness
is named unbegotten,63 and points out its biblical warrant: neither
beginning of days nor end of life (Heb 7,3; quoted CE II 456). Basil
was loth to move beyond biblical language, which could make his
representations of the divine rather simplistic. While defending him
against Eunomius, Gregory tends to add subtle touches to Basils
language that nudge it in a more metaphysical direction.64
III.2. The charge that Basil divides the divine being (CE II 457 468)
Eunomius further claimed that Basil divides the ages into two parts,
placing God in an endless future or endless past. Gregory resumes
Basil Adversus Eunomium I 7 (PG 29, 525c): If we think about what
was before creation, and, transcending the ages with our thought,
apply our minds (logismeya) to the innity (t pergrapton) of

60

CE II 451 (GNO I 358).

CE II 452 (GNO I 358).
62
CE II 452454 (GNO I 358f ).
63
CE II 454 (GNO I 359).
64
Basil sometimes connects gnnhtow with absence of cause: When our mind
(now) inquires if the God above all has a cause superior to him (atan perkeimnhn),
and can conceive (pinoen) of none, it calls the beginningless (t nargon) of his
life gnnhton (Basil, Adversus Eunomium I 15, PG 29, 545b). Gregory regularly paraphrases gnnhtow as without a cause (see CE I 557580, GNO I 187193; CE
II 18. 24f. 28. 35. 37. 136f. 146f. 158. 161. 175. 192, GNO I 232. 233. 234.
236. 237. 265. 267f. 270f. 271f. 275f. 280f ). On Gregorys metaphysical correction
of Basils rigid biblicism, see K. Holl, Amphilochius von Ikonium, 197.
61

divine simplicity and the plurality of attributes

323

everlasting life, we denote such a notion (nhma) by using the word

unbegotten; if we turn our attention to the hereafter, and apprehend
the life of God which exceeds the ages, then we explain this idea
with the terminology of unending and imperishable.65 A single
phenomenon of everlasting divine life is the terminus at which both
projections arrive. We proclaim the eternity of God emerging the
same under every apprehension (kat psan piboln).66 He admits
that a licence of language is involved: just as with our own condition we observe the past and future of temporal extension, so we
speak of it also, by an improper usage (k kataxrsevw), in the case
of the transcendent nature.67 But our human temporal condition
means that we can approach eternity only through projections of
endless past or future, as Scripture does (Ps 44,4; 48,14; 74,12), and
what we discover in the process is that any thought of measure of
time (diasthmatikn nhma) is enclosed within the divine nature,
delimited by the innity (t peir&) of the one who contains the
universe on every side.68
The charge of cutting up the ages implies the charge of cutting
up the divine being itself: we speak of one life as unbegun, and
another one as unending, and of dierences and distinctions between
certain ages, which by their dierences tear apart even our picture
of God.69 Eunomius wants to abolish the diversity of pictures of
God that a diversity of attributes entails; his single naming of the
divine essence would no doubt exclude any imagining of God at all.
A reference to past and future makes language about God far too
complex and colourful. Eunomius asks us what we think the ages
are. Yet it would have been fairer for that sort of question to be
put by us to him; for who is it who says that he knows the being
of God, who claims that things inaccessible to us are within the
grasp of his own understanding?70 The apophatic note makes a
strength out of Basils and Gregorys apparent weakness, a weakness
shared by the biblical teachers to whom Eunomius has blithely said
Begone!.71 Eunomius poses a dilemma: if the ages are eternal, then
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

CE
CE
CE
CE
CE
CE
CE

II
II
II
II
II
II
II

457
458
459
460
462
463
462

(GNO
(GNO
(GNO
(GNO
(GNO
(GNO
(GNO

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

360).
360).
360).
361).
361).
361f ).
361).

joseph s. oleary

324

Basil is subscribing to something like the Valentinian aeons, but if

they are begotten, he is no longer confessing God as unbegotten.
Gregory mocks this non-sequitur: If we hold something to be begotten, we no longer uphold divine unbegottenness!72 The argument
of Eunomius is that if we confess the Father as unbegotten, on the
basis of ages, we dissolve him into non-being. How so? The addition of ages compromises divine unbegottenness, making it contingent on something created; if the ages cease to exist, so does the
beginninglessness predicated of God by reference to them.73 Gregory
asks who talks of adding unbegottenness to God by reference to
the ages; this is a quibble, for Eunomius may be using the verb
prosggnomai in the innocuous sense of to predicate. He says that
if there is no addition of ages, it is not possible to attribute what
results therefrom to God, and he tells us that unbegottenness is so
added. Let him also tell us by whom such an addition is made. If
by himself, he would be ridiculously accusing our writings of his own
folly.74 But as in the case of the quarrel about porsai above, the
real target of Eunomiuss objection is less the attribution as such
than its inadequate basis. Eunomius seeks to apprehend the divine
nature on its own terms, with no reference to creatures; he thinks
that to characterize God by reference to the created realm is to
make God dependent on the latter.
III.3. Divine unity and the plurality of attributes (CE II 469 479)
Gregory rejoices that Eunomius agrees that the same Life is both
unbegun and endless,75 but deplores his further remark that if the
life is unbegun and endless, imperishable and unbegotten, then imperishability will be the same as unbegottenness, unbegun as endless.76
The life of God is one, but, Gregory insists, the two attributes in
question cannot be treated as synonyms. Gregory easily draws an
absurd consequence: all the scriptural names of God would then
have the same meaning, so that if asked to dene imperishability
you can reply compassion or judgment.77 How does Gregory rec72
73
74
75
76
77

CE
Cf.
Cf.
Cf.
Cf.
Cf.

II 464 (GNO I 362).

CE II 466 (GNO I 362).
CE II 468 (GNO I 363).
CE II 469 (GNO I 363).
CE II 471 (GNO I 364).
CE II 473 (GNO I 364).

divine simplicity and the plurality of attributes

325

oncile the unity and simplicity of the divine nature with a variety
of distinct attributes? (a) Does he see the attributes as merely negative, removing various unsuitable attributes from the divine? (b) Or
does he see them as subjective apprehensions of our minds, while
the divine remains intrinsically ungraspable by our minds? (c) Or
does he see the divine as precontaining all perfections in a supreme
degree, where they are entirely one, whereas they exist only in a
dispersed and partial form in creatures, so that our language can
attribute them to God in an analogical way? Gregorys view is that
the divine nature, whatever it may be kat osan, is one, understood as simple, uniform, uncompounded, and by no means a manifold composite, whereas the human mind, prostrate on the ground,
and buried deep in this earthly life, because it cannot see clearly
what it seeks, reaches out to the ineable nature with many thoughts
in many and varied ways, and does not hunt for what is hidden
with just one idea.78 This is closest to (b) above. Our conceptions
do not amount to a rm analogical discourse about God, but are
rather a hit and miss aair; but insofar as they can sometimes hit
the mark, they are not merely subjective. The idea of hunting, reminiscent of the Sophist, suggests that the concepts used are a net to
be deployed skilfully, and that there is no standard, systematic set
of concepts that could determine the divine. Unbegottenness means:
the belief that everything depends on him becomes our evidence
that there is no prior cause of his existence.79 Creation also tells us
of Gods wisdom and power. Moreover, we apprehend his invariability and unmixed character where evil is concerned, and considering the corruption of death the last of evils, we call immortal and
imperishable the one who is alien to any such notion. We do not
split up the subject (t pokemenon) with these conceptions, but,

78
CE II 475 (GNO I 364f ). Citing this text, Petavius notes: Armabat Eunomius
proprietatum divinarum notiones sic implicatas invicem involutasque esse, ut cum unam intelligimus,
necessario intelligamus et alteram. Hoc Gregorius Nyssenus absurdum, imo nefarium judicat ac
plenissima disputatione confutat: negat, inquam, hoc quod Eunomius putabat verum esse, in unius
consideratione ac notione proprietatis contineri involvique notionem alterius (Dionysius Petavius,
Opus de theologicis dogmatibus I 9,8, Thomas 125). Compare: Since not one title has
been discovered to embrace the divine nature by applying directly to the subject
itself, we therefore use many titles, each person in accordance with various apprehensions (pibolw) achieving some particular idea about him, to name the divinity, as we hunt amid the pluriform variety of terms applying to him for sparks to
light up our understanding of the object of our quest (CE II 145, GNO I 267).
79
Cf. CE II 476 (GNO I 365).

joseph s. oleary

326

whatever it is katosan, believing it to be one, we assume that the

object of our thinking has an anity with all such attributes,80 attributes which are in no contradiction with one another.
III.4. The claim that dierent attributes divide Gods essence (CE II 480491)
Eunomius supposes that the unity of the divine nature implies the
synonymity of the words referring to it: either the reality denoted
is quite dierent, or the denoting word is not dierent either.81
Gregory approves of the following Eunomian statement: The life is
not other than the essence, so that nothing of composition may be
conceived of the simple nature, divided into the attribute and the
subject of the attribution. Rather, what the life is, the essence is.82
But when Eunomius adds that the divine essence itself is denoted
by unbegotten,83 Gregory objects: Who is so mad as to claim
that non-generation is a denition of essence? . . . Since unbegottenness indicates what is not true about the Father, how can we construe the indication of what does not belong as being?84 But this
is not suciently reected. One cannot class only positive attributes
as essential while leaving negative ones accidental or extrinsic. For
Basil, there are a variety of valid names of God, some pointing to
what is present in him, others to what is not present.85 Gregory also
distinguishes two sets of divine attributes, the negative (CE II 579581)
and the positive, which give an indication not of the actual divine
nature but of what can in true reverence be thought about it.86
However, he admits that the same attribute may take both a positive and a negative form, e.g. good and absence of evil; author
(rx) of all things and unbegun (narxow).87
Gregory oers a question-begging reductio: By means of the very
arguments by which, for the Father, he has brought the denition
of the essence around to unbegottenness, let us investigate whether

80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

Cf.
Cf.
Cf.
Cf.
Cf.
Cf.
Cf.
CE

CE II 477 (GNO I 365).

CE II 481 (GNO I 366).
CE II 483 (GNO I 367).
CE II 484 (GNO I 367).
CE II 485 (GNO I 367).
Basil, Adversus Eunomium I 10 (PG 29, 533c).
CE II 582 (GNO I 396).
II 134 (GNO I 264 ).

divine simplicity and the plurality of attributes

327

we can equally, using the same arguments, refer the essence of the
Son too to unbegottenness.88 The application of Eunomiuss argument to the Son hardly helps the anti-Arian cause, because the
premise of the argument, the idea that dierent attributes naming
the same thing must be identical, is so clearly wrong; so the argument merely serves to expose the absurdity of the premise. Eunomiuss
linguistic theory distinguishes clearly between the properly divine
attributes, all synonymous with unbegottenness, and other attributes,
so any transference of the argument to the Son falls at. If then
he too is one absolute life devoid of all composition and reduplication, and there is no underlying reality beside the life of the Son,
how could any admixture of alien reality be suspected in what is
simple?89 This sentence seems to lose its way, as if conscious of its
strained, question-begging quality. Gregory argues that if the Son is
true God, he too will be unbegotten, according to Eunomiuss logic.
Ironically, Eunomius himself had argued that the orthodox doctrine
of consubstantiality would force its adherents to maintain that the
Son too is unbegotten.90 But Eunomius by no means holds that the
Son is true God or has the simplicity of the divine nature (despite
what he says at CE I 231). Moreover, Gregory risks proving too
much in proving the Son to be unbegotten.
III.5. Against the synonymity of divine attributes (CE II 492503 )
He drops the argument quickly, referring to it as futility91 as he
returns to the absurdity of making divine attributes all identical.
Eunomius holds that God has been called Father ever since he
decided to become a Father.92 But on his own theory all the divine
attributes are identical, so that as he is confessed as for ever imperishable, so he must be as for ever Father.93 This is not really an
anti-Arian argument, but merely another piece of jousting to overturn the theory that all titles of God are synonymous and make
Eunomius admit that a particular meaning inheres in each title.94
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

Cf. CE II 486 (GNO I 367f ).

Cf. CE II 489 (GNO I 369).
Eunomius, Apol. 14 (Vaggione 50). See B. Sesbo, Saint Basile et la Trinit, 37.
Cf. CE II 492 (GNO I 370).
Cf. CE II 493 (GNO I 370).
Cf. CE II 495 (GNO I 370f ).
Cf. CE II 495 (GNO I 370f ).

328

joseph s. oleary

It is again question-begging, since Eunomius has another set of titles

for God that are on the basis of activity in other words, he gives
Father a status similar to Creator, as Gregory belatedly notices.95
It is hard to see that Gregorys argumentation does anything to invalidate this choice.96 Arguing now from the claims Eunomius actually
makes for the terms Father and Designer, he again draws absurd
consequences: If the connotation of the words for Father and
Designer is one . . . it is surely possible also to use the names the
other way round, and say that God is Designer of the Son and
Father of the stone.97 So Eunomius must deny the divinity of the
Son or assert the divinity of a stone, a point that would hardly
embarrass him, since he does deny the former.98 Again Gregory
seems to sense a imsiness in his argumentation for he proceeds:
Let us stick to our purpose, however,99 as if the preceding were
nothing to the purpose. He reasserts that a diversity of attributes
does not impugn divine simplicity. If one mind can retain a variety
of sciences, with no loss of simplicity, what is to prevent God having many attributes?100 But he glosses over the problem of the absolute
simplicity of the divine essence.101 We may see him gesturing here
toward Leonard Hodgsons idea of organic unity: approximation to
the ideal of organic unity is measured by a scale of intensity of unifying power.102
95

Cf. CE II 496 (GNO I 371).

Pottier sees the status given to Father and demiurge as a glaring exception
to Eunomiuss theory of synonyms, and notes that Gregory seizes on this incoherence, revelatory of a deeper malaise (B. Pottier, Dieu et le Christ, 174). The alleged
malaise consists in the way the theory of synonymity attens the sense of individual attributes, doing violence to language, and forcing Eunomius to make an
exception for Father and demiurge because they resist the attening better than
the other attributes, and are thus excluded from their family (ibid., 175). This is
unconvincing: since Eunomius never counted these two terms among the absolute
divine attributes there is no incoherence in his theory.
97
CE II 496f (GNO I 371).
98
CE II 498 (GNO I 371). Sed neque multum hoc argumentum moveretur Eunomius, et
opicem creatoremve Filii non minus quam Patrem appellari Deum pateretur ut et lapidis. He
might have rejected the locution Father of the stone, but only because fatherhood
implies imitationem quamdam rationis et intelligentiae ac virtutis (Dionysius Petavius, Opus
de theologicis dogmatibus I 7,7, Thomas 112).
99
CE II 499 (GNO I 371f ).
100
Cf. CE II 503 (GNO I 373).
101
Sed hoc exemplum minus in Deo valet, siquidem hoc omne quod in Deo est, Deus est ac
divina ipsa substantia, nec est in eo accidens ullum (Dionysius Petavius, Opus de theologicis
dogmatibus I 7,9, Thomas 113).
102
Cited, Ch. Stead, Divine Simplicity, 265.
96

divine simplicity and the plurality of attributes

329

III.6. The claim that imperishability and unbegottenness are incompatible

unless identical (CE II 504523a)
Eunomius charges that Basil does not even preserve the essence
itself uncontaminated and pure of things evil and alien, for in making unbegottenness a matter of absence of beginning, he leaves an
aspect of God that is not unbegotten. If it is by endlessness of life
alone, he says, that he is imperishable, and by absence of beginning alone that he is unbegotten, insofar as he is not imperishable,
he will be perishable, and insofar as he is not unbegotten, he will
be begotten.103 Gregory replies that just as man is both articulate
and receptive of knowledge, and it would be absurd to say that he
is not one insofar as he is the other, so neither does the eternity
of the divine life lack imperishability, if it is unbegun, nor, if imperishability is attributed to it, will it forfeit its status as unbegun.104
Petavius nds the root of Eunomiuss mistake in a confusion between
conceiving or naming something, and being that thing. To conceive
or name imperishability is not to conceive or name unbegottenness,
yet to be imperishable is to be unbegotten. Eunomius transfers the
separations that are intrinsic to our thoughts and notions to the thing
itself that is known and reected on.105 The earlier quarrel about
whether language supplies or designates106 also turned on this confusion, which Gregory clears up when he writes: Our position was
nothing other than this: to claim that the life which exists unbegun
is named unbegotten conceptually, named, not made, and to
designate that which extends into innity by the term imperishable,
not to make it imperishable, but to signify that it is such.107 Both

103

CE II 504 (GNO I 373).

CE II 511 (GNO I 375).
105
Huic sophisticae calumniae Gregorius accurate respondet, qua ex ejus disputatione istud
ecitur, in eo sitam esse fallaciam, quod haec invicem permiscet, concipi animo vel appellari rem
aliquam, et in se ac reipsa quippiam esse. Ac verum id quidem est, quatenus immortalis a nobis
Deus intelligitur, eo ipso conceptu non intelligi principii expertem. At Eunomius non de intelligentia conceptuque loquitur, sed esse ipsum assumit . . . Quoniam diversa illa Dei attributa re
unum idemque sunt, sed variis notionibus intelligentiisque subjici possunt, quarum una non est
altera. Quod discrimen non in ipsa re, sed in cognitione nostra consistit. Nam subjectum ipsum
totum, quantum est, ingenitum pariter et incorruptum est, etsi alia sit atque alia pnoia sive
notio quae diversis itidem vocabulis explicatur. Neque ut in mente nostra, sic in re cognita, divisio ac separatio proprietatum est ulla (Dionysius Petavius, Opus de theologicis dogmatibus
I 7,8, Thomas 113).
106
CE II 450454 (GNO I 357 ).
107
CE II 512 (GNO I 376).
104

joseph s. oleary

330

words denote divine innity; their diversity resides in the nite perspectives of the subject who uses them. It is one idea about the
divine life that it is without cause; this is indicated by the term unbegotten. It is another idea about the divine life that it is boundless
(riston) and endless; this the designation imperishable presents.
Hence whereas the subject (pokemenon), whatever it may be, is
above every name and thought, that it neither is from a cause, nor
ever comes round to non-existence, those are the pnoiai signied
by these words.108 Again it is implied that the words have a merely
negative meaning, not providing a grasp of the unknowable divine
essence. Eunomiuss eort to make out that diverse attributes imply
a division in God, who cannot be one insofar as he is the other
So in respect of having no beginning he will be unbegotten and
also destructible, and in respect of his endlessness imperishable and
also begotten109 is again dispatched in a long series of reductions
ad absurdum: In respect of being immaterial he will not be wrathless, etc.
III.7. Imperishability and endlessness (CE II 523b542)
Eunomius accuses Basil of improperly seeing imperishability in the
endless and endlessness in the imperishable,110 no doubt in the sense
that imperishability is an attribute of the divine essence whereas endlessness is merely a human pnoia based on experience of time.
Gregory nds Eunomius to contradict his claim that all divine attributes are synonymous, since he refuses to identify endlessness and
imperishability. But Eunomius would distinguish between the attributes of the essence and attributes derived from Gods nrgeiai, such
as Father and Creator or from human pnoiai, such as beginningless and endless, so that Gregorys argument again misses its
target.
Basils statement on the pnoiai of unbegottenness and imperishability111 was quoted almost verbatim in 446f and 506f, although
transcending every beginning became transcending every limit,
thus orienting the statement more toward a unitary concept of divine

108
109
110
111

CE
CE
CE
Cf.

II 513 (GNO
II 514 (GNO
II 523 (GNO
Basil, Adversus

I 376).
I 376).
I 377).
Eunomium I 7 (PG 29, 525bc).

divine simplicity and the plurality of attributes

331

innity that could be reached both by the forward and the backward searching of the mind. Now the statement is refashioned in a
more unitary style: By his surpassing the boundary of the ages
according to every measure of temporal extension, whether we consider what is from the beginning or what lies ahead, we indicate the
innity and unboundedness of the everlasting life according to either
conception, now by the word imperishability, now by unbegottenness.112 The dierent pibola toward past and future are united
in the idea of transcending tw tn anvn perigrafw kat pn
disthma tw xronikw paratsevw. Beginningless and endless fade
from view, sublated into the concept of innity. Both attributes are
required to bring out the full notion of eternity, as we know from
CE I 666684, and if either were preferred, why should it not be
the one that looks to the future rather than the one that looks to
the past? If, however, they are determined thus to divide the thought
of eternity, and to make the one fall within the realm of that being,
and to reckon the other with the non-realities of deity . . . I would
advise them to reverse their teaching, and to count the unending as
being, overlooking the unoriginate rather, and assigning the palm to
that which is future and excites hope, rather than to that which is
past and stale.113 The issue is the unity and simplicity of God, which
Eunomius sees as compromised by the contrasting pnoiai. Gregory
resolves it by recalling the two, fyarsa and gennhsa, to the same
underlying reality of divine innity. This answer would not work so
well for the other divine attributes, and thus fails to address thoroughly the question of how the plurality of attributes are united in
the divine essence.
The idea that only with regard to endlessness of life is God imperishable is his, and not ours this clears away a misunderstanding
that Basils language courted. Similarly that the imperishable is not
unbegun is the invention of his strict logic, which inserts in the
denition of essence what does not belong. We ourselves shall ascribe
to the essence nothing that does not belong.114 That is, it is Eunomius
only who connes the divine essence to the most limited sense of
the conceptions we bring into play, whereas we use them to point

112
113
114

CE II 528 (GNO I 380).

CE I 672 (GNO I 219f ).
CE II 529 (GNO I 380f ).

joseph s. oleary

332

to a single, simple, innite essence. Unbegottenness signies that it

is not proper to God for his life . . . to have begun in a generative
act.115 Gregory holds to the representations of beginning and end,
as if to stress a necessary supplementarity between the two notions,
unbegottenness and imperishability, thus dislodging the former from
the supreme position conferred on it in Eunomiuss theology.
Is it the fetishism about unbegottenness that leads Eunomius into
his baseless quibbles? He suspects that in adding endlessness to unbegottenness, Basil misses the full sense of unbegotten, and leaves the
divine nature partly unbegotten. Gregory argues that it is Eunomiuss
own logic that leads to this absurd idea: Since it is held that in
measurement of time beginning is one thing and end another, if
anyone were to claim that lack of the former is the essence, he would
suppose that its life, being bisected, exists only as unbegun, and that
it does not by nature extend any longer towards endlessness, if unbegottenness is to be deemed the nature.116 But this seems to be an
incorrect argument, for Eunomius refuses to connect unbegottenness
to any notion of temporal beginning. More reduction follows: If,
however, one insists that both [privation of beginning and of end]
are essence, then it necessarily follows according to the argument
produced by Eunomius, that each of the designations with its own
connotation has its existence in the notion of the essence (n t tw
osaw lg), existing only to the extent declared by the meaning
of the term.117 If the attributes are the essence, rather than mere
designations, then dierent attributes, especially if regarded as contradictory, split the essence in two. But this is not entailed by Basils
more modest theory of language. Note Gregorys shyness about giving his pnoiai the status of names of the essence, even as he upholds
their valid application, as far as they go, to the essence.
Eunomius had distinguished between imperishability as a name of
essence and endlessness as a mere pnoia. But he spoils that potential riposte when he says that God in his endlessness is unbegotten
and in his unbegottenness endless, the connotation of the two words
being one.118 This would be more tenable if he had written imperishability instead of endlessness. Gregory again brings in the Son:
115
116
117
118

CE
CE
CE
CE

II
II
II
II

530
531
532
533

(GNO
(GNO
(GNO
(GNO

I
I
I
I

381).
381).
381).
381f ).

divine simplicity and the plurality of attributes

333

it would follow that if the Son is endless he is unbegotten. This is

not an anti-Arian argument, since the unbegottenness of the Son is
not an orthodox tenet. A further consequence, that the immortality
of angels would also assure their unbegottenness,119 conrms that the
argument has no bearing on Arian issues. Meanwhile, Gregory fully
agrees with Eunomius on the status of the divine attributes: Who
is going to quarrel with saying that God is by nature all that is
attributed to him? . . . Concerning the underlying reality (pokemenon),
whatever that may be by nature, we entertain every piously conceived notion.120
Eunomius has one further statement, which Gregory mocks as
nonsensical: Being imperishable without beginning he is unbegotten without end, and is said to be so neither according to something else, nor because of something else, nor in regard to something
else.121 The last phrases here I take to mean that Gods essence is
not dened with reference to temporal realities. The statement seeks
to make the synonymity of the attributes vivid, which is rather
counter-productive and should have been unnecessary. Gregory presents Eunomius as saying the beginningless and endless are the same
thing, or even that beginning and end are the same thing.122 He
attempts to convict Eunomius of impiety and absurdity, rst by foisting on him the conclusion that what is endless cannot exist without being unbegotten ignoring that the synonymity of attributes
applies only to God; then by arguing that if imperishability and
unbegottenness are synonymous, imperishable beings such as angels,
the human soul and even demons are unbegotten and consequently
consubstantial with the Father, whose dening trait is unbegottenness.123 Needless to say, Eunomius would reject such an equiparation of divine imperishability with mere immortality. He would not
be impressed by Gregorys oer to clarify his thinking for him: While
endlessness is common to all things that are held to continue in life
to innity, unbegun applies only to that which is without cause.124
Note that in breaking the Eunomian identity of unbegottenness and

119
120
121
122
123
124

Cf.
CE
CE
Cf.
CE
CE

CE II 539 (GNO I 384).

II 534f (GNO I 382).
II 537 (GNO I 383).
CE II 538 (GNO I 383f ).
II 539 (GNO I 384).
II 541 (GNO I 384).

joseph s. oleary

334

imperishability, and in ascribing only the former exclusively to God,

Gregory also undermines the Basilian symmetry between beginningless and endless.
III.8. A dilemma for Eunomius (CE II 554 560)
After another discussion of the status of language (543553), Gregory
takes up Eunomiuss statement that the essence itself is imperishability and, by the same token, immortality.125 He sees no need to
quarrel about whether (a) these belong to the divine essence or
whether (b) in virtue of what they signify, they are the essence.126
He is ready to admit that the attributes not only belong to God by
nature but are identical with the divine nature. Whichever of these
utterances prevails, it will completely support our argument.127 The
idea that the attributes accrue to the essence without being identical with them seems to reect the general tenour of Gregorys commonsense thinking on the pnoiai. But even if he adopts wholeheartedly
Eunomiuss stress on the identity of attributes and essence a view
that would prevail in later orthodox theology it only strengthens
the case he is making. For, if (a) is right, then the attribute of unbegottenness merely belongs to the essence and does not signify the
essence.128 If (b) is accepted, Eunomiuss claim that unbegottenness
is identical with the divine essence, is granted; since Gregory is ready
to accept (b) it is rather pointless to celebrate an advantage granted
by (a) that (b) undoes.
If (b) is right, incorruptibility and immortality are the very essence
of God, and it follows that since the Son enjoys these attributes they
will be his very essence.129 For Eunomius, however, the convertibility of attributes with essence applies only to God, so that to apply
it to the Son is to beg the question, by presuming that the Son is
God. Gregory does not quite do this here. Instead he claims to nd
a divine attribute in the Son, and uses Eunomiuss logic to identify
that attribute with the Sons essence, thereby proving the Sons divinity. Eunomius would reject this argument, for he would see the Son

125
126
127
128
129

CE
CE
CE
CE
Cf.

II 554 (GNO I 388).

II 555 (GNO I 388f ).
II 555 (GNO I 388f ).
II 556 (GNO I 389).
CE II 556 (GNO I 389).

divine simplicity and the plurality of attributes

335

as immortal and imperishable only in a homonymous, titular sense.

Gregory says that God is said to be imperishable since he is not
subject to perishing and to be immortal because he is stronger than
death. Eunomius would nd this commonsense account inadequate,
claiming a far stronger sense for these statements when based in the
divine essence than when applied to Christ. Concluding the argument from (b), Gregory says that since both the Father and the Son
are imperishability, which in both cases is their essence, and since
no dierence can be found between the two imperishabilities, there
is no dierence between the two essences (556). This is close to the
argument of 368370; Eunomius would deny the identity and the
claim that there can be no greater and less in imperishability.
Gregory imagines Eunomius presenting him with a dilemma: if
we distinguish that which accrues from that which is, we make the
deity composite, whereas if we acknowledge his simplicity, then the
imperishability and unbegottenness are seen at once to signify his
very essence.130 In other words, the doctrine of divine simplicity
obliges the rejection of (a) and the adoption of (b). Instead of saying which of the two he subscribes to, Gregory claims that such a
dilemma again helps his argument. First Gregory argues from (b):
For if he will have it that God is made composite by our saying
that anything accrues to him, then he certainly cannot eject the
fatherhood either from the essence, but will confess Father by nature,
as in the case of imperishable and unbegotten, and thus albeit
unwillingly receive the Son into the proper realm of the nature.131
This is weak, since Eunomius would not accept Father as one of
the essential names of God, consigning it rather to the status of a
name based on divine activity, like Creator. Moreover, as he echoes
Athanasiuss arguments that the Sonship of the Logos is natural and
not merely titular, Gregory risks equiparating Father with the attributes of the divine essence (further compounding the confusion caused
when unbegottenness is treated as an attribute of the essence). Then
Gregory argues from (a): If however he says that fatherhood appertains to God outside the nature, he will allow us the right to say
that things appertain to the Father, in such wise that the simplicity
is not at all negated if predication according to unbegottenness is

130
131

CE II 557 (GNO I 389).

CE II 558 (GNO I 389).

joseph s. oleary

336

located outside the essence.132 Here Gregory seems to refer to unbegottenness as a specic attribute of the Father. If so, his argument
no longer directly engages Eunomius on the question whether attributes of the divine essence as such are pnoiai from the outside or
identical with the essence. Returning to (b), Gregory says that if the
attributes are identical with the essence and with one another, then
in the Sons case, since he is imperishable he will be unbegotten as
well. Thus Eunomius must either admit that unbegottenness signies
something other than incorruptibility or else say that the Son is unbegotten, or else, in order to avoid this, say that the Son is corruptible.133 Eunomius would deny that the Son has any divine attribute
or that the logic of divine attributes applies to him, so Gregorys
argument again falls at. In reducing Eunomiuss view of the identity of attributes to absurdity (an unbegotten Son) or blasphemy (a
perishable Son), Gregory seeks to prove that the attributes are not
synonymous, in their modus signicandi; this does not necessarily exclude
their ultimate identity in the divine essence itself.

IV. Envoi
To espouse the mobile contours of Gregorys rhetoric and logic, and
to bring out the overall shape of his thought, whether as translator
or commentator, is no easy task. The prole I have sketched is no
doubt, as in dealing with any complex text, innitely revisable. I
retain the impression that there is an oscillation in his thought between
a commonsense view that treats the divine attributes as if they were
items of ordinary language and a more reective awareness of their
peculiar character. The status of endlessness, the least glamourous
of the attributes dealt with, perhaps best indicates this. God is by
nature all that is attributed to him,134 so he is by nature endless,
yet his imperishability is more than mere endlessness,135 and endlessness is a quality shared by all things that will live for ever.136
Commonsense application of endless to God is justiable only at
the basis of imaginative groping, and indeed Gregory is ever ready
132
133
134
135
136

CE
Cf.
CE
Cf.
Cf.

II 559 (GNO I 389f ).

CE II 560 (GNO I 390).
II 524 (GNO I 379).
CE II 529 (GNO I 380f ).
CE II 541 (GNO I 384).

divine simplicity and the plurality of attributes

337

to admit that the divine essence lies far beyond the grasp of any
concepts. But there is a specic inadequacy in Basils language which
he fails to correct. There was a need to fashion an attribute for God
that could unhesitatingly be applied as a name of the divine essence.
Neverendingness was not such an attribute. Innity or eternity was
what was required. Gregory does provide this, but he keeps neverendingness going alongside it, instead of sublating it without remainder in the idea of innity. The basic aw is that both Basil and
Gregory are too fond of simple, biblically warranted ways of referring to God and too suspicious of Eunomiuss technology, and this
impedes them in striving forward to integral lucidity. Their elaborate development of apophatic ideas is largely tangential to the problem Eunomius raised and seems to compensate for the instability
inherent in their treatment of the attributes as human notions of an
inconceivable divine essence.
Reading the Fathers in the spirit of metaphysical consolidation,
one attempts to assess the Cappadocian project in light of the trinitarian discourses of Origen and Athanasius, which it corrects or completes, and in light of later theology that pushed for a rmer grounding
of theological language in objective ontological reference. A countermetaphysical reading, questioning back to the original events of which
patristic theology oers a Hellenistic systematization, will treasure in
Gregory his keen sense of the straw-like character of his argumentation, measured not against some hyper-essential transcendence in
the manner of Pseudo-Dionysius, but against the reality of the revealed
God of Scripture.137 The inconsistency we detected in Basils and
Gregorys entire argumentative strategy could indeed be read as a
symptom of their sense of being torn between opposing currents
between the irresistible onward march of metaphysical reason, on
the one hand, and on the other their conviction that the biblical
realities remained irreducible to any metaphysics, and that even the
most orthodox dogmatic clarications had chiey a negative role, to
keep our limited human thinking within its proper bounds. The
extent to which their grasp of the biblical realities is itself already
inltrated with metaphysical, Platonist habits of thought and perception is a further topic for deconstructive analysis.
137
See J. S. OLeary, Questioning Back: The Overcoming of Metaphysics in Christian
Tradition, Minneapolis 1985; ibid., Where all the ladders start: Apophasis as
Awareness, Archivio di Filosoa 70 (2002) 375405.

GOTTESBEZEICHNUNGEN UND UNSTERBLICHKEIT

IN GREGOR VON NYSSA (CE II 561627)
Volker Henning Drecoll

I. Gliederung von CE II 5616271

I) Eunomius Ablehnung von strhsiw auf die
Gotteslehre (390,17398,24)
CE II 561564
Ia: Polemischer Abschnitt (390,17391,17)
CE II 565571
Ib: Referat bzw. Darstellung der eunomianischen Position und vorluge Bekmpfung
(391,18393,13)
CE II 572576a
Ic: Dihrese der tn ntvn gnsw te ka
yevra (Ankndigung 393,1113, Dihrese
393,14394,17)
CE II 576b587
Id: Anwendung auf die Gotteslehre, und zwar
a) allg. (394,17395,3), b) auf die poxvristik (395,3396,13) und c) auf die positiven Bezeichnungen (396,13397,31)
CE II 588590a
Ie: Eunomius Argument, Basilius mache die
Namen wichtiger als die zugehrige ja
bzw. die prgmata (398,124)
CE II 590b610 II) Das Beispiel der yanasa (398,24404,20)
CE II 590b595
IIa: Eunomius Beispiel der yanasa bei
Engeln, Menschen und Gott zur Verdeutlichung des Unterschieds von strhsiw
und pstasiw (398,24400,21)
CE II 596599a
IIb: Eunomius Auassung von yanasa
als Bezeichnung der perox Gottes
(400,22401,25)
CE II 599a604
IIc: Eunomius Verstndnis von yanasa
pousa yantou (401,25403,4)

CE II 561590a

Vgl. die abweichende Gliederung von Stuart Hall (in diesem Band).

volker h. drecoll

340
CE II 605610

IId: Eunomius Argument, es bestehe keine

sumfua zwischen Gott und den Geschpfen (403,5404,20)
CE II 611624
III) Eunomius Argument, aus Basilius Gotteslehre
folge, dass Gott gnzlich aus Nichtseiendem
sei (404,21408,30)
CE II 611
IIIa: Ankndigung des Vorgehens (404,2132)
CE II 612613
IIIb: Paraphrase von Basilius Argument und
seiner Intention (404,32405,20)
CE II 614617
IIIc: Basilius Argument als wrtliches Zitat
(405,21406,5) und Polemik (406,527)
CE II 618624
IIId: Eunomius Argument als wrtliches Zitat
(406,27407,4) und Widerlegung: Ablehnung des metousa-Konzepts (407,421),
Unerlaubtheit der Gleichsetzung von tin
patra m xein und k to pnth m
ntow gegensyai (407,21408,30)
CE II 625627
IV) Abschluss (408,31409,15)
II. Der Streit um die Angemessenheit des strhsiw-Konzepts
zu Ia: Gregor nutzt in Contra Eunomium verschiedene polemische
Techniken, gegen Ende des 2. Buches begegnet mit zunehmender
Hugkeit die polemische Technik, die besagt, dass man die Meinung
des Gegners eigentlich gar nicht anzufhren oder zu widerlegen
braucht und dann quasi im Sinne einer praeteritio doch auf zentrale
Themen und Argumente eingeht.
So erwgt Gregor in CE II 561 zunchst, ob man dem Ablauf
der Apologia apologiae noch weiter folgen soll (Mglichkeit A: 390,17f )2
oder den Kampf (mxh) hiermit beenden (Mglichkeit B: 309,18f ).
Letzteres wird zunchst scheinbar befrwortet, indem ein ausfhrlicher
Vergleich (kayper otvw) zeigt, dass die bisherige Widerlegung
die verderbliche Wirkung der eunomianischen Theologie zur Genge
ans Licht gebracht hat. Dies wird verglichen mit dem Verkauf von

2
Im Folgenden beziehen sich Zahlen mit Komma (z.B. 391,1518) auf GNO I
und geben Seite(n) Komma Zeile(n) an.

gottesbezeichnungen und unsterblichkeit

341

Giften, wobei bereits das Versuchen einer kleinen Menge die verderbliche Wirkung zweifelsfrei erweist. Vergleichspunkt ist die Evidenz
der verderblichen Wirkung, die sich bereits in einem Teil (des Gifts
bzw. der bislang widerlegten Aussagen aus der Apologia apologiae) zeigt
(390,1930). Daraus folgt, dass eigentlich fr die, die Verstand haben
(now), eine Fortfhrung der Widerlegung berssig ist (390,2630).
Trotzdem fhrt Gregor mit der Widerlegung fort, greift also zu
Mglichkeit A (signalisiert durch ll), und zwar mit dem Argument,
man msse dem Vorwurf entgehen, die wichtigeren Argumente (t
sxurteron) in der Apologia apologiae ausgelassen zu haben, schlielich
nden3 die Gegner pollaxyen Aussagen, die berzeugen sollen (t
piyann) (390,30391,4). Daher bittet Gregor seine Leser, die mit
seinem Eifer nun schon vertraut sind und ihn dabei nicht der
Redseligkeit bezichtigen,4 bereitwillig der Widerlegung zu folgen. Es
folgt die polemische Kennzeichnung der eunomianischen Theologie
als eine Abfolge von Trumen (neirow terow neirow) (391,49)
und die Nennung des Themas des begonnenen Abschnitts (Abschnitt
I = 390,17398,24), nmlich: per tw stersevw (391,911). Dabei
soll die Argumentation nicht in Gnze (ps t fluar&) vorgefhrt
und widerlegt werden, sondern zusammengefasst: di suntomaw
(391,1117).
zu Ib: Die Auseinandersetzung mit der texnologa (Begri in
391,10.19) des Eunomius beginnt mit der Wiedergabe eines eunomianischen Arguments (391,1827).5 Eunomius lehnt es ab, Gott aufgrund einer strhsiw als gnnhtow zu bezeichnen, und zwar scheidet
die Anwendung des Konzepts strhsiw vom Begri her (fvn) ebenso
aus wie vom Inhalt her (nnoia) (391,2327).6 Das Referat wird

erskousi autow nimmt hier fast die Bedeutung von sie verschaen sich
an (im Lexicon Gregorianum III 590, s.v. erskv aufgefhrt unter B.1.d etw. nden,
antreen, entdecken, auf etw. stoen, doch scheint der Gebrauch mit dem Reexivpronomen selten zu sein).
4
Zu mhdeman katagnntaw dolesxan (scil. mn) vgl. Lexicon Gregorianum V 176:
auch (mit aus d. Zush. zu erg.) Gen.-Ausdr.
5
Die Meinung des Eunomius wird zunchst in der indirekten Rede wiedergegeben:
w atw fhsin (391,1922), dann wrtlich (391,2327, Zitatformel: fhsn 391,23),
als bergang zwischen indirekter Rede im AcI und direktem Zitat fungiert: mn
on psxesiw ath. d tn gklhmtvn legxow tw; (391,22f ).
6
Eunomius verteidigt damit die Ablehnung des strhsiw-Begris aus Apologia 8,9f
(SC 305, 248), die Basilius in Adversus Eunomium I 9,4f (SC 299, 198) angefhrt und
anschlieend bekmpft hatte, vgl. R. P. Vaggione, Eunomius. The Extant Works, Oxford
1987, 114 mit Anm. 35.
3

342

volker h. drecoll

aufgenommen wenige Zeilen spter (392,1114).7 Der Vorwurf des

Eunomius an Basilius lautet: Basilius verleumde ihn, Eunomius, wegen
seines Gebrauches der paganen Philosophie, weil er nicht wisse, was
er als Argumente gegen Eunomius gebrauchen solle, und stelle dem
die eigene Berufung auf die Lehre des heiligen Geistes gegenber
(392,1419).8
Gregor widerlegt Eunomius zunchst polemisch in zwei Schritten,
bevor er (ab 393,14) in die inhaltliche Auseinandersetzung einsteigt
(= Ic). Zunchst (391,27392,11) weist er Eunomius Argument als
eine vorgeschobene Abwehr gegen eine von niemandem vertretene
Ansicht zurck (391,2732, vgl. 392,10f: w llotran mvran panoryomenow). Dabei setzt er ein bestimmtes Verstndnis von Eunomius
Gebrauch von strhsiw voraus, nmlich quasi ein prozessuales
Verstndnis: strhsiw als zur fsiw erst sekundr hinzutretende
Beraubung. Angewandt auf die Gottesvorstellung wrde dies bedeuten,
dass Gott von seiner fsiw her ber gnnhsiw verfgte, und dieser
natrlichen Eigenschaft dann aber beraubt wrde und so erst gnnhtow
wrde.9 Diese (als wahnsinnige Raserei gekennzeichnete) Meinung
wird von niemandem vertreten, also ist Eunomius Abwehr dieses
Gedankens vorgeschoben (391,32392,7) genauso wie der Titel
Apologia vorgeschoben sei, weil Eunomius in der Abfassungssituation
weder ein Gerichtsverfahren noch Anklger oder Richter konkret
nennen konnte (392,710).10
7
Die Fortsetzung des Eunomiuszitats 392,1419 gehrt wohl zwischen die indirekte Wiedergabe in 391,1922 (vgl. die in der GNO-Edition gesperrt gedruckten
Wrter, die im Zitat 392,1214 wieder begegnen) und das Zitat in 391,2327. R. P.
Vaggione, Eunomius, 114 bleibt fr die Frage, wie 391,1927 und 392,1119 zusammengehren, ohne Auskunft. Seine Paraphrase vernachlssigt, dass Eunomius das
strhsiw-Konzept fr den Begri der Ungezeugtheit begriich wie inhaltlich ablehnt.
8
Vgl. Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 9,614 (SC 299, 198200); vgl. R. P. Vaggione,
Eunomius, 114 mit Anm. 36.
9
Schon in der Apologie hatte Eunomius die Kategorisierung von gnnhtow als
strhsiw mit dem Verweis darauf abgelehnt, dass eine strhsiw gegenber der jiw
sekundr ist. Basilius hatte dies als bernahme der aristotelischen Kategorienschrift
gegeielt (Adversus Eunomium I 9,811, SC 299, 200), gemeint sind wohl Stellen wie
Kat. 10, 13a3234 (wo jedoch der Begri deterow nicht fllt). Dazu, dass dieses
Verstndnis von strhsiw u.a. bei Syrian und Alexander von Aphrodisias belegt ist,
vgl. Th. Bhm, Theoria Unendlichkeit Aufstieg. Philosophische Implikationen zu De vita
Moysis von Gregor von Nyssa, Leiden 1996, 115f mit Anm. 53f.
10
Diesen Gedanken hatte schon Basilius an den Anfang seiner Widerlegung von
Eunomius Apologie gestellt, vgl. Verf., Die Entwicklung der Trinittslehre des Basilius von
Csarea. Sein Weg vom Homusianer zum Neonizner, Gttingen 1996, 6062. Vgl. zu
CE I 6571 (GNO I 44,1547,2) J.-A. Rder, Gregor von Nyssa. Contra Eunomium I
1146. Frankfurt a.M. 1993, 214f.

gottesbezeichnungen und unsterblichkeit

343

Sodann (392,19393,1) beschftigt er sich mit dem Vorwurf, Basilius

habe ihn, Eunomius, wegen des Gebrauches der paganen Philosophie
angegrien, weil er keine Argumente zur Hand hatte. Dies stuft er
zunchst als Traum ein (Aufgri des Motivs neirow aus 391,49)
und verdeutlicht das mit einem Vergleich (otv), wonach einige sich
im Traum als Knigskollegen whnen und entsprechend berschtzen
(392,2125). Entsprechend ist Eunomius Vorwurf als Selbstberschtzung anzusehen, besonders die Meinung, dass er, Eunomius, dem
Basilius aufgrund seiner Philosophiekenntnisse als foberw erschienen
sei (392,20f.25393,1).
Eine weitere praeteritio bezieht sich auf die Argumentation di msou
(393,2, die laut Gregor eigentlich kaum als lgow angesehen werden
kann) (393,16) und vergleicht (sper) dies mit der Abscheu gegenber
eiternden Geschwren und der damit verbundenen Entstellung
(393,69). Stattdessen will Gregor den Sinn (now) kurz (di lgvn)
erlutern und dazu etwas weiter ausholen (393,913).
zu Ic: Gregor beginnt mit einer Denition, derzufolge ein lgow
im eigentlichen Sinne des Wortes ( ge lhyw lgow) der lautliche
Ausdruck einer gedanklichen Bewegung ist (tn kat nnoian kinhmtvn
fvn). Und diese gedankliche Ttigkeit (nrgei te ka knhsiw)
richtet sich, wenn sie gesund ist (als Gegensatz wren denkbar u.a.
mana, neirow und fantzein) auf die Erkenntnis und Betrachtung
des Seienden (prw tn tn ntvn gnsn te ka yevran), und zwar
so sehr sie kann (393,1417).
Dies ist die Voraussetzung dafr, dass Gregor die fsiw der t
nta in einer Dihrese nher beschreibt, und zwar unterteilt er sie
zunchst in t nohtn und t asyhtn (393,1719).11 In dem letzteren Bereich, bei den sinnlich wahrnehmbaren Dingen, entsteht
eine allen gemeinsame Erkenntnis (koin gnsiw), weil die fnf
Sinne zu unumstrittenen Erkenntnissen fhren, die sich in gleicher
Weise artikulieren lassen (mofnvw) (393,19 26), gemeinsamer
Bezugspunkt ist die identische fsiw derer, die ber diese Sinne verfgen (393,25f ). Zu diesem Bereich, bei dem es keine mfibola gibt,
gehrt auch alle Erkenntnis prw te tn politikn ka tn yikn to

11
hnliche Dihresen gebraucht Gregor z.B. in Or. Cat. (GNO III/4 21,710);
In Eccl. VI (GNO V 373,21374,2); In Cant. Cant. VI (GNO VI 173,711); vgl.
Lexicon Gregorianum I 113. Vgl. D. L. Bals, METOUSIA YEOU. Mans Participation in
Gods Perfections according to Saint Gregory of Nyssa, Rom 1966, 43.

344

volker h. drecoll

bou skopn (393,2629).12 Hiervon unterscheidet sich die Betrachtung

der noer fsiw grundlegend. Gregor legt dabei eine Unterscheidung

der Philosophie in drei Bereiche zugrunde, nmlich in a) Physik, b)

Ethik, c) Metaphysik.13
In dem letzteren Bereich, der Metaphysik stellt sich das Problem,
dass der Erkenntnisgegenstand oberhalb der sinnlichen Wahrnehmung
liegt und daher das Denken (dinoia) sich nur vermutungsweise
(stoxastikw) nach dem Erkenntnisobjekt (vgl. t pokemenon 394,3)
ausstrecken (porgomai) kann und nach bestem Vermgen das, was
dabei als Gedanke (dinoia) entsteht, auszudrcken sich bemht
ein Prozess der Annherung (ggzontew), quasi der Optimierung, der
die Begrie zunehmend an das Gedachte angleicht (393,29394,5).
Hierbei gibt es nun zwei Mglichkeiten (mn d), nmlich entweder
gelingt es dem Denken, das Ziel zu erreichen und auerdem lsst
sich das Gedachte auch noch entsprechend ausdrcken (394,69),
oder es verfehlt entweder beides oder eines von beiden. Zwar drfte
das, was beides umfasst (Erkenntnis und begriiches Ausdrcken),
besser sein; nicht weniger gut aber ist es, gedanklich-inhaltlich richtig
zu liegen (tw proshkoshw m diamarten polcevw), selbst wenn
die sprachliche Formulierung (lgow) hinter dem Gedachten (dinoia)
zurckbleibt (394,917).
zu Id: Fr die Gotteslehre14 ergibt sich aus Ic als Konsequenz,
dass Gregor sich nur mit dem Sinn der Worte auseinandersetzen will,
nicht mit den Genauigkeiten des Wortlautes und der Bezeichnungen,
die er den txnai der Grammatiker berlassen mchte (394,1727).
Gregor mchte seine Untersuchung darauf beschrnken, ob der Sinn

12
Die Verbindung von yikw und politikw ist bei Gregor singulr, vgl. Lexicon
Gregorianum IV 96.
13
In Inscr. II 3 (GNO V 75,2976,12) basiert Gregors Argumentation auf der
Zweiteilung von yevrhtik und yik filosofa, in Vita Moysis II (GNO VII/1
43,23) spricht Gregor von der yik ka fusik filosofa, hnlich auch ebd.
68,1113, an letzterer Stelle nennt er dann Geometrie und Astronomie und nennt
dann als dritten Punkt die logik pragmatea (vgl. Lexicon Gregorianum IV 96). Damit
entspricht er der klassischen platonischen Dreiteilung der Philosophie in Logik/Dialektik,
Physik (incl. Betrachtung des Seins und der Theologie) und Ethik, vgl. z.B. Alkinoos,
Didaskalikos III (Whittaker Louis 153,2630, hier bes. die Note complmentaire
28 p. 78f ). Hiervon weicht die in CE gebotene Einteilung in Physik, Ethik und
Metaphysik ab, der die Unterscheidung in asyht und noer zugrundeliegt.
14
Der bergang von der allgemeinen berlegung zur Anwendung in der Gotteslehre ab p. 394,17 wird durch den Ausdruck per tn chln ka yetvn und
die anschlieende Parenthese lgv d per tw yeaw ka frstou fsevw ausgedrckt.

gottesbezeichnungen und unsterblichkeit

345

gesund ist oder nicht (394,25f ). Er sieht es als verwegen an, anzunehmen, dass man bei der gttlichen Natur zu einem auf der Hand
liegenden geistigen Erfassen kommen kann, aber fr noch verwegener, den einmal verwandten Bezeichnungen die Aufgabe zu bertragen, auch den Inhalt (die gginomnh plhciw) sprachlich auszudrcken (rmhnea) (394,1822). Entsprechend kann das, was oberhalb
der Erkenntnis liegt, nicht mit Begrisbezeichnungen erfasst werden
(keine proshgora erweist sich als prosfuw und drckt das pokemenon
hinreichend aus), und dies begrndet wiederum, dass man gezwungen
ist, in der Gotteslehre eine Vielzahl von Bezeichnungen zu verwenden, um die Annahme (pnoia parallel zu plhciw in 394,16.22)
ber Gott auszudrcken (394,27395,3).
Diese Vielzahl von Bezeichnungen erlutert Gregor jetzt in zwei
Abschnitten weiter, und zwar zunchst die negativen Bezeichnungen
(395,3396,13), dann (ll) die positiven (396,13397,31).
Voraussetzung fr die negativen Bezeichnungen ist, dass alles, was
in den Bereich menschlichen Erfassens fllt (= t ktv prgmata
395,15),15 unter eine von vier Fllen (viermaliges in 395,4.5.7.11)
fllt: i) zeitliche Erstreckung (diasthmatik partasiw),16 ii) rumliche
Ausdehnung (topikn xrhma), iii) Begrenztheit (perigraf) der Existenz
durch Anfang und Ende und iv) Vernderlichkeit der Eigenschaften
(scil. es geht mit fyor ka pyow ka trop ka llovsiw einher),
begrndet in der Zusammengesetztheit von allem Krperlichen
(395,314). Da die gttliche Natur mit den Dingen, die unter diese
vier Flle fallen, keine okeithw hat, werden fr sie sog. poxvristik nomat te ka =mata gebraucht (395,1417).17 Dies verdeutlicht Gregor mit Beispielen: proainiow, narxow, telethtow,
smatow, fyartow, payw, treptow, nallovtow (395,1823).
Von dieser Argumentation aus lehnt er das Argument des Eunomius,
das auf der Anwendbarkeit des Konzepts strhsiw beruht, ab, es sei
egal, ob man von sterhtik oder fairetik oder noch etwas anderem
spreche es gehe nur um den Sinn (now) (395,2329). Die Annahme,

15
Der Ausdruck ist bei Gregor singulr, entspricht aber dem hug vorkommenden ktv fsiw, vgl. Lexicon Gregorianum V 312 (unter B.2.) und 313 (unter B.4.c).
16
Dass diasthmatikw hier eine zeitliche Erstreckung meint, legt die Dierenzierung
zur rumlichen Perspektive (topikw 395,5f ) nahe, vgl. Lexicon Gregorianum III 370.
17
Das Adjektiv poxvristikw begegnet bei Gregor nur hier (vgl. Lexicon Gregorianum
I 512), vgl. aber xvristikw 396,3, xvrismw 396,8.

346

volker h. drecoll

dass Gott frher oder irgendwann einmal nicht war (Anspielung auf
den Anathematismus von 325: n pote te ok n), wrde bedeuten,
dass Gott weder telethtow noch narxow wre (395,3032). Ebenso
wrde man die Bezeichnungen nallovtow, smatow und fyartow
ablehnen, wenn man einen Krper, Vergnglichkeit oder Vernderlichkeit bei Gott annehmen wrde (395,32396,2). Weil dies aber
nicht der Fall ist, ist der Gebrauch der xvristik =mata angemessen,
der jedoch nur den xvrismw von dem ausdrckt, was vordergrndig
bei uns existiert, der jedoch nichts ber die fsiw aussagt (396,210).
Fazit: wenn die Bedeutung dieser (scil. negativen) Bezeichnungen zeigt,
was das Gttliche nicht ist, bleibt im Undeutlichen, was jenes gem
seiner Natur ist, was diese (Bezeichnungen) nicht sind (396,1013).
Die Erluterung der Namen, die auf eine ysiw bzw. parjiw18
verweisen, also die positiven Bezeichnungen, verweisen ebenfalls nicht
auf die fsiw selbst, sondern auf den Bereich der t per atn
esebw yevromena (396,1316). Dabei verweist das Adverb esebw
bereits auf einen bestimmten Modus, zu den Betrachtungen um die
gttliche Natur herum zu kommen, der im Folgenden durch die
Bezugnahme auf die Schrift und ihre Unterweisung mehrfach
aufgegrien wird. Voraussetzung fr die positiven Bezeichnungen ist
die These, dass im Bereich des Seienden (und zwar des materiell
erscheinenden wie des gedachten) nichts zufllig existiert, sondern an
der gttlichen Natur hngt (jptai) und von dort her die ata
seiner Existenz hat (396,1620). Dies bildet die Voraussetzung dafr,
dass man aus der Schnheit und Gre der yamata in der Schpfung einzelne Aspekte mit jeweils eigenen Bezeichnungen ausdrckt,
eine Art Analogieverfahren, das biblisch mit Weish 13,5 belegt wird
(396,2127).19

18
Auch Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 10,2844 (SC 299, 206), hatte die negativen von den positiven Bezeichnungen (ysin ka parjin . . . poshmanousin)
unterschieden und eine Diskussion darber abgelehnt, welches philosophische Konzept
(faresiw etc.) man fr die negativen Bezeichnungen zugrundelegen knne (vgl.
CE II 580, GNO I 395,25f ), vgl. Verf., Die Entwicklung der Trinittslehre, 70.
19
Das Adverb nalgvw entstammt Weish 13,5. Gregor passt den Wortlaut von
Weish 13,5 der Syntax seines Satzes an, man kann daher besser von enger Aufnahme
sprechen, unverndert aus Weish 13,5 stammt k (LXX add. gr) megyouw ka
kallonw ktismtvn nalgvw, das nite Verb yevretai wird umformuliert:
fhsin . . . den . . . yevresyai, entsprechend wird aus dem Nominativsubjekt ein
Akkusativ, zustzlich wird das Pronomen atn durch das nicht in Weish 13 stehende

gottesbezeichnungen und unsterblichkeit

347

Dies erlutert Gregor nun durch verschiedene Begrie, die als Beispiele dienen: dhmiourgw, dunatw, gayw, kritw und vor allem
yew. Diese Bezeichnungen gehen auf das menschliche Denken zurck,20
doch wird das Denken seinerseits wieder von der Schrift erzogen
(paideuyntew 397,3, vgl. didaxyntew 397,20). Dies verdeutlicht Gregor
besonders an der Bezeichnung yew, deren mutmaliche etymologische Bedeutung dessen, der auf alles schaut,21 durch eine Reihe von
Bibelzitaten belegt wird (397,819).22 Auch diese Bezeichnung fhrt
nicht zur Erkenntnis der osa Gottes (397,19f ), sondern zeigt vielmehr
die Schwche der menschlichen Natur auf und verweist darauf, dass
Gott ber jedem Namen (Anspielung auf Phil 2,9) ist, ist also ein
Beleg der frastow megaleithw Gottes (397,2331).
Die Einteilung der Gottesbezeichnungen bei Gregor in poxvristik und nalgvw gebildete Begrie ist zu vergleichen mit den
Mglichkeiten zur geistigen Betrachtung Gottes im Platonismus. So
werden im Didaskalikos des Alkinoos drei Arten der nhsiw hinsichtlich
Gott genannt, i) kat faresin p to asyhto, ii) kat nalogan
(womit hier der direkte Vergleich gemeint ist, etwa zwischen Sehen
und Denken), iii) ein gedanklicher Aufstieg, ausgehend von der
Betrachtung krperlicher Schnheit (kllow), Wechsel zur Betrachtung
der Schnheit der Seele usw. bis hin zur Betrachtung des ersten
Guten.23 Gregors poxvristik entsprechen sachlich der ersten Art,

tn pntvn aufgelst: den tn tn pntvn genesiourgn yevresyai, hnlich wird

Weish 13,5 von Gregor gebraucht in CE II 154 (GNO I 270,8f; ohne den) und In
Eccl. I (GNO V 285,24; ebenfalls ohne den, statt yevresyai: kayorsyai),
nalgvw begegnet nur als Adverb (Langerbecks Konjektur zu In Cant. Cant. I,
GNO VI 18,5 ist zu verwerfen), vgl. Lexicon Gregorianum I 283.
20
Vgl. bereits nosantew 396,16, katanosantew 396,22, nnosantew 396,30,
nomata 396,23.24; 397,6, yevresyai in 396,27 entstammt Weish 13,5.
21
Zum Zusammenhang mit yesyai und der daraus abgeleitenen Etymologie,
yew meine die poptik nrgeia Gottes, vgl. Lexicon Gregorianum III 757.
22
Zitiert werden Ps 54,3 LXX (hierher stammt als Zitat nur prsxew moi, die
Anrede yew stammt aus Ps 54,2 LXX, das indef. Possessivum mou ist in Anklang
zu Ps 54,23 LXX ergnzt), Ps 83,10 LXX (unverndert: de yew) und Ps 43,21
LXX (wrtlich, unter Auslassung einiger Wrter in der ersten Vershlfte), vgl. Lexicon
Gregorianum IV 243. Gregor betont die Synonymie der in diesen Zitaten verwandten
Verben prosxv, blpv (bzw. Aor. den) und yev (397,16f ).
23
Alkinoos, Didaskalikos X (Whittaker Louis 165,1634). Weniger vergleichbar
sind die drei Wege Synthese, Analyse und Analogie bei Kelsos, vgl. Origenes, Contra
Celsum VII 44 (SC 150, 116120). Vgl. Whittaker, Note Complmentaire 203, in:
Alkinoos [wie Anm. 13], 106f.

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volker h. drecoll

die positiven Begrie stellen eine Mischform aus der zweiten und
dritten Art dar, und zwar insofern, als es sich einerseits um als
Vergleiche analogiehaft gebrauchte Begrie handelt (= ii), andererseits um bertragungen, die auf Rckschlssen aus der sinnlich
wahrnehmbaren Welt beruhen (= iii).
zu Ie (398,124): Der Abschnitt setzt das Ausgefhrte (vgl. 398,1f )
in Beziehung zu dem Vorwurf des Eunomius, Basilius mache die
Namen wichtiger als die ja/prgmata.24 Zweimal wird Eunomius
referiert (398,711 und 398,14f ), wobei nicht klar wird, ob die
Eunomius-Zitate vom Ablauf der Apologia apologiae her hierher gehren
(und zu einem lngeren, bergangenen Abschnitt gehren) oder einen
frheren Abschnitt heranziehen, der bergangen worden war und
aus dem Gregor jetzt noch zwei Notizen bringt.25 Inhaltlich weist
Gregor den eunomianischen Vorwurf mit dem Hinweis auf die in
Ic-d erluterte Einordnung der Gottesbezeichnungen zurck, weil
Gregor zufolge kein Name die Existenz (pstasiw) als osidhw hat
(398,16f ), sondern lediglich ein gnrism ti ka shmeon osaw tinw
ka dianoaw, das jedoch fr sich genommen nicht ber Existenz verfgt (398,1719). Darin erweist sich die tona der eunomianischen
Polemik (vgl. tonow 398,4).26
III. Die yanasa Gottes als Testfall fr negative Gottesprdikate
zu IIa:27 Inwiefern das strhsiw-Konzept bei Gott nicht angemessen
ist, scheint Eunomius anschlieend am Begri der yanasa verdeut-

24
Vgl. R. P. Vaggione, Eunomius, 114. Der Begri tpow (398,7) legt es nahe,
dass Eunomius hier auf Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 9,2631 (SC 299, 200202;
evtl. auch Adversus Eunomium I 9,4046, SC 299, 202) reagiert.
25
Zu beiden Mglichkeiten wrde 398,2224 passen, eventuell spricht 399,11f
eher fr die erstere Mglichkeit, wenn damit gemeint ist, dass das jetzt gemeinte
Argument mit dem vorangegangenen (= IaId) nichts zu tun hat.
26
Dazu, dass der Begri tonow bzw. tona als Bezeichnung der Schwche
eines gegnerischen Arguments vorkommt und dementsprechend nur in der Auseinandersetzung mit Eunomius und Apollinarius auftaucht, vgl. Lexicon Gregorianum
I 604f.
27
Der Neuansatz ist in der GNO-Ausgabe nicht durch einen Absatz o.. markiert
und wird auch von R. P. Vaggione, Eunomius, 114 nicht bercksichtigt (Vaggione
teilt die Apologia apologiae nach der sicherlich nicht ursprnglichen Kapitelzhlung
von Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I ein, was weder der zu vermutenden Argumentation
des Eunomius noch der Gregors entspricht), doch geht es ab 398,26 um ein neues
Argument des Eunomius (pisretai) und zugleich um ein neues Thema, das in

gottesbezeichnungen und unsterblichkeit

349

licht zu haben.28 Dabei scheint er zunchst anhand biblischer Belege

(398,24f ) einen Unterschied der yanasa beim Menschen und bei
den Engeln geltend gemacht zu haben. Leider lsst die praeteritio
Gregors (398,27f ) nicht erkennen, wie dieses Argument genau aussah.29 Gregor macht hiergegen unmittelbar geltend, dass der Begri
des ynaton keine Abstufung als mllon tton zulasse, weil dies
bedeuten wrde, neben dem Element des ynaton auch einen gewissen Anteil am Gegenteil anzusetzen, dann aber wrde der betreffende Gegenstand nicht mehr unsterblich sein (398,28399,3). Das
anschlieende Eunomiuszitat dierenziert zwischen strhsiw und
pstasiw, strhsiw beziehe sich auf die Trennung (xvrismw) vom
Besseren, pstasiw meine die Distanz vom Schlechteren (399,38).30
Es lsst sich berlegen, in welchem Bezug der Unterschied zwischen
pstasiw und strhsiw zu der Behauptung eines Unterschieds der
Unsterblichkeit bei Engeln und Menschen steht. Zwei Mglichkeiten
der Interpretation sind zu erwgen:
i) Eunomius hat dazu aufgefordert, das strhsiw-Konzept als m
diforow ka msh anzusehen: also einerseits als nicht unterschiedslos, andererseits als mittlere Gre (scil. die eben Abstufungen erlaubt).
Das wrde dann bedeuten, dass der Unterschied der Unsterblichkeit
bei den Engeln und den Menschen in Verbindung mit dem strhsiwKonzept zu verstehen wre, also als eine Eigenschaft, die in Abgrenzung
zum Besseren besteht (nmlich als abgestufte und nicht [scil. wie bei
Gott] absolute), whrend die Unsterblichkeit bei Gott eher als eine
pstasiw zu beschreiben wre, als ein Enthobensein ber dem
Bereich des Schlechteren, der Sphre des Sterblichen.
ii) Der Unterschied zwischen pstasiw und strhsiw wurde mit
dem Unterschied der Unsterblichkeit bei Engeln und Menschen in
Verbindung gebracht, etwa dergestalt, dass die Unsterblichkeit der

CE II 561589 (GNO I 390398) nicht genannt worden war (vgl. lediglich CE II

556, GNO I 389,711 in Entgegnung auf das Eunomiuszitat CE II 536, GNO I
382,2426, vgl. die Aufnahmen in 383,14 und 388,29f, vgl. sodann 384,12.28f ).
28
Auf welche Textstelle bei Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 9 oder 10 Eunomius
damit reagiert, ist unsicher, der von Vaggione, Eunomius, hergestellte Bezug zum
Anfang von Adversus Eunomium I 10 ist terminologisch nicht eindeutig, da die Begrie
ynatow und strhsiw auch in Adversus Eunomium I 9,27f.48f (SC 299, 200202)
fallen.
29
Ohne Auskunft bleibt auch R. P. Vaggione, Eunomius, 114, Anm. 37.
30
Die Dierenz zwischen strhsiw und pstasiw wird nicht bercksichtigt von
R. P. Vaggione, Eunomius, 114 mit Anm. 39, vgl. zu dieser Unterscheidung bei
Syrian und Alexander von Aphrodisias Th. Bhm, Theoria, 115f mit Anm. 53f.

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volker h. drecoll

Engel als eine pstasiw zu verstehen sei, die der Menschen jedoch
aufgrund eines strhsiw-Konzepts. Nach dieser Interpretation sind
die Engel dem Bereich des Sterblichen ebenso entzogen wie Gott.
Das wrde erklren, wieso Gregor in Eunomius Argumentation einen
Widerspruch zu 1 Tim 6,16 sieht, wonach nur Gott unsterblich sei
und allen anderen die Unsterblichkeit erst verleihe (399,811). Denn
wenn die Unsterblichkeit der Engel als pstasiw zu verstehen ist,
sind neben Gott auch die Engel quasi von Natur aus unsterblich,
eben der Sphre des Schlechteren, der Sterblichkeit enthoben.
Gleichzeitig wrde es bedeuten, dass die Dierenz zwischen Unsterblichkeit bei Engeln und Menschen keine graduelle (mllon tton)
Abstufung, sondern eine kategoriale (eben zwischen strhsiw und
pstasiw) wre. Die Qualikation des strhsiw-Konzeptes bei den
Menschen als m diforow ka msh ist dann entweder dahingehend zu verstehen, dass nicht alle Menschen diese Unsterblichkeit
erlangen, oder dahingehend, dass bei den Menschen unterschiedliche
Formen bzw. Abstufungen von Unsterblichkeit anzunehmen sind.
(z.B. analog zur Auferstehung zum Gericht und der Auferstehung
zum ewigen Leben).
Leider geht Gregor so ber Eunomius Argumentation hinweg,
dass sich zwischen diesen beiden Interpretationsmglichkeiten nicht
mit letzter Sicherheit entscheiden lsst. Die erste Interpretationsmglichkeit steht vor dem Problem, Gregors Anfhrung von 1 Tim
6,16 nicht erklren zu knnen. Auerdem bemerkt Gregor wenige
Zeilen spter, dass Eunomius es ablehne, die Gottesbezeichnung
fyartow als Gegensatz zu fyartw zu verstehen und somit die negative Bezeichnung als eine pstasiw to xeronow aufzufassen, vielmehr
gehe es um ein Gottesprdikat, das sich unmittelbar auf das Sein
Gottes beziehe (also nicht in Relation zu besser schlechter stehe)
(400,14). Dies spricht relativ deutlich fr Interpretationsmglichkeit ii).
Ebenfalls fr diese letztere Interpretationsmglichkeit spricht die
berlegung, welche Bibelverse Eunomius in seiner Argumentation
benutzt haben knnte. Das Wort yanasa ist in der LXX sowie im
NT selten, von den wenigen Stellen31 kommen im Grunde nur
zwei in Frage, nmlich Weish 8,17, wonach die suggneia sofaw

31
Belege fr yanasa: Weish 3,4; 4,1; 8,13.17; 15,3; 4 Makk 14,5; 16,13; [Aq.
Ps 47,15 LXX], 1 Kor 15,53f; 1 Tim 6,16; fr ynatow Weish 1,15; Sir 17,30; 51,9;
4 Makk 7,3; 14,6; 18,23.

gottesbezeichnungen und unsterblichkeit

351

(von Eunomius als die Engel interpretiert?) ber yanasa verfgt,

und 1 Kor 15,53f, wonach die Menschen yanasa anziehen. Eine
Gegenberstellung dieser beiden Zitate knnte von Eunomius dahingehend gedeutet worden sein, dass die Engel eine stetige Unsterblichkeit
haben, eben als suggneia sofaw, wohingegen die Menschen die
Unsterblichkeit erst im Eschaton anziehen. Fr eine Verwendung
von 1 Kor 15,53f spricht auch die parallele Behandlung von ynatow und fyartow (401,79).32
Polemisch bemerkt Gregor, dass dieser, auf den Unterschied der
yanasa bei Engeln und Menschen bezogene Gedankengang nichts
mit dem vorangegangenen zu tun habe, und dass Eunomius, sich
dessen bewusst, seine Gegner als unverstndig bei der Beurteilung
von Dingen und dem Gebrauch von Namen bezeichne (399,1116).
Im Stile einer praeteritio verweist Gregor auf einen weiteren Abschnitt,
in dem Eunomius sich mit der Erluterung von fyartow und smatow
(scil. als Verneinung einer krperlichen distasiw bzw. als Bezeichnung
als tw fyorw nepdekton) beschftigt haben muss. Wahrscheinlich
hat Eunomius auch fr diese Begrie geltend gemacht, dass sie sich
in der Gotteslehre nicht als strhsiw verstehen lassen, sondern als
Aussagen ber das Sein Gottes selbst, quasi in einem absoluten Sinne33
(399,16400,1, vgl. 400,3f: ll at t enai di to pokeimnou
shmanesyai). Hierzu passt das von Gregor aufgegriene Argument,
dass es nicht richtig sei, dass die uere Gestalt bzw. Prgung (tpow)34
von nmata zu unsachgemen Konzepten fhrt (399,2325).
Der Weigerung des Eunomius, das Gottesprdikat fyartow auf
den Gegensatz zu fyartw zu beziehen (400,1f ), stellt Gregor eine
reductio ad absurdum gegenber: Dann msste fr Gott gerade das
Gegenteil erfllt sein, der Begri fyartow also gerade auf die Vernderlichkeit Gottes verweisen (keine llotrvsiw fyorw, sondern eine

32
Allerdings hatte schon Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 9,27f (SC 299, 200), mit
der Beispielreihe fyartow, ynatow, ratow argumentiert, aber der Begri
ratow scheint in Eunomius Argumentation keine Rolle gespielt zu haben, vielleicht
eben wegen der Verwendung von 1 Kor 15,53f.
33
Jaegers Konjektur add. t m (399,25) ist wohl richtig, weil die Konstruktion
die Innitivreihung t diabllein . . . ka t lgein . . . ka t . . . polambnein verlangt und zustzlich der Gegensatz ll to enai die Negation verlangt, der Fehler
zudem als Haplographie verstndlich zu machen ist.
34
Der Begri tpow entstammt Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 9,27.28.61 (SC 299,
200204), vgl. oben Anm. 24, vgl. zu 399,2325 auch Basilius, Adversus Eunomium
I 10,21f (SC 299, 204206).

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sugkatyesiw) (400,411). Demgegenber setze er, Gregor, die Abwesenheit von ynatow bei Gott als gleichbedeutend mit der Armation
von Leben bei Gott an, dies sei in der fsiw der ntyeta begrndet, die besagt, dass die Aufhebung/faresiw des einen Elements
das Vorhandensein (die Setzung: ysiw) des Gegenteils (ntikemenon)
bedeutet35 (400,1121).
zu IIb: Eunomius hat die Ablehnung des strhsiw-Konzepts u.a.
damit begrndet, dass das perxein Gottes sich gar nicht durch
Negativbezeichnungen ausdrcken lasse (solange diese im Sinne einer
strhsiw, also als Aussagen bloen Mangels an etwas, zu verstehen
seien)36 (400,22f ). Nachdem Gregor die polemische Kennzeichnung
des Basilius als lyiow ebenso polemisch zurckgegeben hat (400,
2428), sucht er Eunomius von einer mutmalichen gemeinsamen Denkvoraussetzung her zu widerlegen, nmlich der These,
dass sich die Besonderheit der gttlichen Natur darin erkennen lasse,
dass sie keine koinvna mit dem hat, woran die Welt ( ktv fsiw)
teilhat, denn dann wre sie mit diesem eher identisch, ihr berragen (peranstamai) drckt sich gerade dadurch aus, dass es das (scil.
woran die Welt teilhat) nicht hat, Beispiel: der Sndlose ist besser
als die Sndenbeladenen, die Trennung von Bsem erweist einen
Reichtum an Gutem (400,28401,4).
Im Sinne einer praeteritio (401,57) bricht Gregor diesen Gedankengang ab und greift auf das nchste Eunomiuszitat zurck, das
ebenfalls das Thema perxein betrit.37 Hiernach bezeichnen die
Gottesprdikate ynatow, fyartow und gnnhtow in gleicher Weise
(movw) das perxein Gottes (401,710). Gregor hlt mit einer
rhetorischen Frage zunchst die Widerlegung fr berssig, weil die
sbeia dieser Aussage auf der Hand liege (401,1012), skizziert
dann aber doch, worin er das Problem dieser Aussage sieht. Aus
Eunomius Aussage leitet Gregor ab, dass das Gottesprdikat gnnhtow
(ebenso wie ynatow und fyartow) als absolute Aussage ber das

35

Vgl. Aristoteles, Kat. 10, 11b3512a2.

Damit hat Eunomius wohl auf Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 10,4248 (SC 299,
206208), reagiert, vgl. R. P. Vaggione, Eunomius, 115 mit Anm. 41.
37
Der Begri perox begegnete schon bei Eunomius, Apologia 10,4 (SC 305,
252; vgl. dann Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 20,3441, SC 299, 246), das Verb
perxv steht bereits in Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 13,42 (SC 299, 220), daher
ist es wahrscheinlich, dass Eunomius hier auf Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 13,3614,3
(SC 299, 218220) reagiert hat, vgl. hnlich R. P. Vaggione, Eunomius, 115 mit
Anm. 42.
36

gottesbezeichnungen und unsterblichkeit

353

berragen Gottes verstanden werden muss, also als Aussage ber

die Dierenz zwischen der fsiw Gottes und dem Bereich des
Vergnglichen (401,24f ). Weil die genannten drei negativen Prdikate
in gleicher Weise (movw) zu verstehen sind, gilt fr den Bereich,
der als Gegensatz zu Gott zu denken ist, dass er nicht nur fyor
und ynatow unterliegt, sondern auch der gnnhsiw (401,1321). Wenn
aber Christus als gennhtw beschrieben wird (401,15.20f ), ergibt sich
daraus als Konsequenz (die zu ziehen Gregor wieder dem Leser
berlsst; 401,22f ), dass Christus nicht Gott ist, dass also das, was
durch das gleiche Ma (movw = t at mtr) berragt wird,
miteinander gleich (sa) ist (401,12f ). Bleibt also als zu erschlieende
Konsequenz der eunomianischen Theologie, dass Christus nicht als
Gott zu charakterisieren ist.
zu IIc: Die Ablehnung der strhsiw fr die negativen Gottesprdikate bedeutet fr Eunomius, dass auch das Prdikat ynatow nicht
als pousa yantou zu verstehen ist (sondern als quasi absolut zu
nehmende Bezeichnung von Gottes Natur). Gregor zitiert diese eunomianische Aussage dreimal (401,2527; 402,8f.19f ), ohne auf ihre
Intention nher einzugehen. Nach dem ersten Zitieren betont er die
Widersinnigkeit der Aussage, indem er die Verneinung von pousa
yantou unmittelbar als Vorhandensein von ynatow (und fyor) bei
Gott deutet. Hieran anknpfend beharrt er auf der logischen Konsequenz, dass bei Gegensatzpaaren die Verneinung des einen die
Airmation des anderen Begris nach sich zieht (Beispiele: Licht
Finsternis, Leben Tod, Gesundheit Krankheit)38 (401,30402,8).
Nach dem zweiten Zitieren wiederholt Gregor diese Konsequenz,
dass Eunomius damit die Unsterblichkeit Gottes im Grunde leugne,
und verwahrt sich gegen den Vorwurf, er gehe phreastikteron
(ziemlich bzw. zu verleumderisch)39 mit Eunomius um, denn so
wahnsinnig sei niemand, die Unsterblichkeit Gottes zu leugnen. Doch
mchte Gregor Eunomius beim Wortlaut seiner Aussage behaften
(nicht auf einen verborgenen Nebensinn eingehen) (402,919). Auch
nach dem dritten Zitieren wiederholt Gregor die von ihm gesehene

Das Gegensatzpaar giea nsow verwendet Gregor entsprechend zu Aristoteles,

Kat. 10, 12a220, wo jedoch der Gegensatz von Tod und Leben nicht begegnet
und der Gegensatz zwischen Wei und Schwarz gerade als Gegensatz fungiert, zwischen dem es Zwischenstufen gibt (eben die Grautne).
39
Diese Stelle ist der einzige Beleg bei Gregor fr den Komparativ zum nur als
Adverb gebrauchten phreastikw, vgl. Lexicon Gregorianum III 376.
38

354

volker h. drecoll

Konsequenz, dass Gott dann sterblich und Tod und Vergnglichkeit

(fyor) unterworfen sei, und berlsst es dann Eunomius, den verborgenen Sinn der Aussage zu erlutern (402,2027), und stellt dem
das eigene Verharren40 bei dem normalen Sprachgebrauch (sunyeia
403,4) gegenber (402,2831), das bei Gegensatzpaaren eben die
Negation des einen die Armation des anderen bedeute, Beispiele
nosow, phrow, nandrow, #pnow (402,31403,4).
zu IId: Mit einer praeteritio (403,5f.9f ) und der polemischen Aussage,
dass die Ausfhrung des Lcherlichen des Gegenspielers einen selbst
in Verruf bringt (403,69) beginnt Gregor den letzten Abschnitt zum
Thema yanasa. Dabei enthlt das zugrundegelegte Eunomiuszitat
diesen Begri gar nicht, sondern stellt nur einen (bei Eunomius wohl
das vorangehende Argument begrndenden) Genitivus absolutus dar,
der von Gregor in zwei Hlften zitiert wird: in ihm verneint Eunomius,
dass die Wahrheit eine sumfua bezeugt bzw. die Frmmigkeit ein
solches Konzept vorschreibt (403,1012.1618).41 Gemeint ist wohl,
dass fr die Beschreibung Gottes selbst von einer vlligen kategorialen Verschiedenheit ausgegangen werden muss, sich also weder von
der Sache her noch von der gedanklichen Konzeption her (sei es
mit philosophischem Hintergrund [jvyen] oder von Eunomius selbst
[par mn] her) eine Relationalitt Gottes zur Schpfung nahelegt
(die fr Eunomius in der Anwendung des strhsiw-Konzepts auf Gott
gegeben wre).
Hiergegen macht Gregor geltend, dass gerade Eunomius einen
Bezug zwischen den Bezeichnungen (bzw. ihrer nnoia) und der osa
des Vaters herstellt (sumfv) und die Namen gerade an zentraler
Stelle mit der osa Gottes verbindet bzw. derselben aufpfropft
(gkentrzv).42 Nach einer weiteren polemischen Ausfhrung (403,1928)
stellt Gregor seinerseits Eunomius vor die Alternative, entweder auch
40
Dies kennzeichnet Gregor mit einem ironischen Rckgri auf das Eunomiuszitat
399,1416, das er so gerade umdreht.
41
Vgl. R. P. Vaggione, Eunomius, 115, der ebd. Anm. 42 bemerkt: Gregory
passed over a good deal at this point.
42
Bei Gregor wird das Verb gkentrzv auer an dieser Stelle nur in In Cant.
Cant. (GNO VI 117,20) gebraucht (abgesehen vom Stichwort kldow deutet an
dieser Stelle nichts auf eine Rezeption von Rm 11,1724), Lexicon Gregorianum III
12f zieht in Erwgung, ob in der Bedeutung des Verbs in CE II 606 (GNO I
403,16) die Bedeutung von kntron als Mitte bestimmend ist, so dass das Verb
hier heit: konzentrieren auf, vollstndig ausrichten auf, (wie in einem Mittelpunkt)
in eins setzen mit. Die Frage lsst sich deswegen kaum entscheiden, weil jegliche
Panzenmetaphorik fehlt (es sei denn, man wollte diese aus difuw 403,12 und
sumfv 403,14 ableiten).

gottesbezeichnungen und unsterblichkeit

355

die osa Christi als yanasa zu beschreiben oder nicht (403,2830).

Letzteres luft darauf hinaus, Christus dem Vergehen und dem
Tod zu unterwerfen (404,18), ja ihn selbst als Tod zu beschreiben
(404,1013), ersteres luft darauf hinaus, gerade hinsichtlich der osa
eine Identitt zwischen Vater und Sohn anzunehmen (wobei vorausgesetzt wird, dass der Begri yanasa nicht aufgespalten werden,
also keine diafor beinhalten kann) (404,1320).
Der gesamte Abschnitt II lsst die tiefe Dierenz zwischen den
theologischen Systemen Gregors und des Eunomius erkennen. Fr
Eunomius haben die Gottesprdikate, auch die mit a-privativum gebildeten,43 etwas mit der osa Gottes zu tun. Daraus folgt, dass sie nicht
als Verhltnisbegrie in Verbindung mit anderem, besonders der
Welt, zu begreifen sind (daher auch nicht aufgrund einer strhsiw,
einer pousa oder berhaupt als Ausdruck einer sumfua gebildet
werden knnen), sondern quasi Ausdrcke sui generis sind, absolut zu
nehmende Ausdrcke, die auf das Wesen Gottes verweisen. Die
Transzendenz Gottes wrde fr Eunomius dadurch gestrt, dass Gott
einem Gegensatzpaar zugeordnet wrde, bei dem das andere Element
weltlich-geschpich wre. Das Gegensatzpaar wrde dann die
Dierenz zwischen Gott und der Schpfung berbrcken, gerade
weil die Gottesprdikate die osa Gottes angeben.
Genau dies lehnt Gregor ab. Fr ihn grenzen die negativen
Bezeichnungen Gott lediglich als transzendent ab, sie sind poxvristik, die ber die fsiw bzw. osa Gottes nichts aussagen. Sie
umfassen deswegen auch nicht als eine Metastruktur Gott und die
Schpfung, sondern verweisen nur auf die Dierenz zwischen beidem. Dies ermglicht es Gregor, die logische Struktur von Gegensatzpaaren gerade auch in der Gotteslehre anzuwenden, eben weil
damit die osa Gottes selbst nicht erfasst ist.

IV. Der Streit um die Bedeutung der negativen Gottesprdikate fr die

Ontologie der Gotteslehre
zu IIIa: Das letzte Argument des Eunomius aus Buch I der Apologia
apologiae (vgl. 404,22: p tlei to lgou) behauptet, dass Basilius
(= mw 404,23) Gotteslehre darauf hinauslaufe, Gott-Vater aus dem

43

Vgl. hierzu Th. Bhm, Theoria, 117.173174.

356

volker h. drecoll

gnzlich Nichtseienden sein zu lassen. Gregor erwidert zunchst

polemisch, dass Eunomius Argument darauf basiere, dass er eine
Aussage des Basilius aus dem Kontext reie (404,2427). Dann
kndigt er sein eigenes Vorgehen an, nmlich zunchst den Grundgedanken (dinoia) des von Eunomius ausgewerteten Basiliuszitates
zu erlutern und dann das Basiliuszitat als Beweis wrtlich anzufhren
(404,2732).
zu IIIb: Der Kontext des umstrittenen Basiliuszitates ist die Bedeutung des Attributs gnnhtow (vgl. 405,17f ), wobei Basilius zeigen
will, dass die Bedeutung von gnnhtow nichts mit dem Konzept
(nnoia) der osa zu tun habe (404,32405,4). Es folgt eine Paraphrase
(vgl. fhs 405,4.9) von Basilius Argument. Er habe anhand der
Genealogie des Lukasevangeliums von Joseph rckwrts jeweils nach
der rx gefragt, wobei er bei Adam aufgehrt habe, der als Protoplast
keinen krperlichen Vater gehabt habe, sondern eben Gott (405,49;
Adam hat keinen krperlichen Vater, sondern wird von dem
Evangelisten als (k) to yeo = Gottes/von Gott stammend bezeichnet 405,9, vgl. 405,2729). Dabei ist evident, dass Gott wiederum
seine Existenz (pstasiw) nicht einer anderen Instanz verdankt (scil.
also als die eigentliche rx anzusehen ist) (405,914). Denn eine
rx hngt nicht von etwas anderem ab, sonst ist es keine rx.
Wenn Gott als die rx to pantw anzusehen ist, gibt es also kein
pokemenon (405,1417).
zu IIIc: Es folgt das wrtliche Basiliuszitat.44 Fr Basilius ist die
Tatsache entscheidend, dass die Lukasgenealogie dabei aufhrt, Adam
als k to yeo anzusehen. Das bedeutet, dass man bei Gott sagen
muss, dass er j odenw ist, eben t narxon, was mit t gnnhton
identisch sei. Ebensowenig wie bei den Menschen t k tinow die
osa bezeichnet, ebensowenig bezeichnet das gnnhton (= t narxon
= j odenw) die osa Gottes (405,21406,5).45

44
Von dem bei Sesbo gebotenen Text (Basilius, Adversus Eunomium I 15,12
19.2228, SC 299, 224226) weicht das Zitat bei Gregor wie folgt ab (nicht vermerkt
im Apparat von Sesbo oder Jaeger): Basilius I 15,17 nlusin Gregor 405,25
nbasin (Gregors Lesart ist wahrscheinlich richtig), Basilius I 15,17 pangvn
Gregor 405,26: panagagn (vgl. aber app. crit.) (unentscheidbar), Basilius I 15,2022
oxi . . . ktiymenow Gregor om. (wahrscheinlich Krzung durch Gregor), Basilius
I 15,24 stin n Gregor 405,30: sti (unentscheidbar); Basilius I 15,27 p nyrpvn Gregor 406,3: p tn nyrpvn (unentscheidbar).
45
Vgl. Verf., Die Entwicklung der Trinittslehre, 70f.

gottesbezeichnungen und unsterblichkeit

357

Im Anschlu an dieses Zitat wendet sich Gregor zunchst an die

Anhnger des Eunomius (= mew), die er als Herde der Zugrundegehenden bezeichnet ( tn pollumnvn glh) (406,5f ). Er fragt
polemisch, ob sie sich nicht schmen, sich auf einen solchen xeiragvgw
zu berufen, der solchermaen die Zitate verdreht, und bezeichnet
Eunomius Vorgehensweise als schamlos46 (406,712). Entscheidend
ist, dass Eunomius genauso, wie er mit dem Basiliuszitat umgeht,
auch die Bibelzitate auslegt (1316).47 Gregor fragt sich selbst, ob er
die Freveleien anfhren oder nicht eher bergehen soll. Schlielich
bezichtigt man auch nicht jemanden seiner krperlichen Defekte
(fsevw tuxmata, etwa Mundgeruch oder krperliche Verletzungen)
(406,1521). Die Bemhung, frevelhaft zu sein, ist als Krankheit der
logismo und unglckliche Verletzung der Seele anzusehen (406,2123).
Deswegen fhrt Gregor nur unmittelbar die Aussage an, mit der Eunomius das Basiliuszitat gegen uns (die von Gregor vertretene Basiliuspartei) verdreht (406,2327).
zu IIId: Das Eunomiuszitat setzt bei der Intention des Basilius an,
den Sohn ja nicht k metousaw to ntow sein zu lassen. Dafr nehme
Basilius sogar in Kauf, Gott-Vater aus dem gnzlich Nicht-Seienden
(k to pnth m ntow) sein zu lassen. Dies ergibt sich, weil Basilius
ja behauptet, dass Gott-Vater j odenw sei, odn bzw. mhdn aber
mit m n identisch (tatn) sei und man gleichwertige Aussagen
(sodunamonta) durch einander ersetzen knne. Also behauptet der,
der sagt, Gott-Vater sei j odenw, dass Gott k to pnth m ntow
sei (406,28407,4).
Rhetorisch fragt Gregor, wogegen er als erstes vorgehen soll, gegen
die Meinung, dass der Sohn im Sinne der Teilhabe an Gott teilhat
(k metousaw to yeo), oder gegen die Zusammenstellung des gesamten
Arguments (407,48). Anschlieend geht er auf beide Punkte ein.
Aufgrund von metousa bei der gttlichen Natur Shne anzusetzen, gehrt ins Reich der Dichter und Mythenbildner, die irgendwelche
Dionysos-, Heraklesguren etc. ernden, die eine Verbindung mit
menschlichen Krpern haben, aber gleichzeitig durch die Teilhabe
an der strkeren Natur ber die brigen Menschen erhaben sind
(407,816). Dieses Konzept (scil. den Sohn analog hierzu an Gott
46
Vgl. naidea 406,8 (abgesehen von einer Ausnahme nur im Zusammenhang
mit Eunomius, vgl. Lexicon Gregorianum I 266), naisxntvw 406,12 (als Adverb nur
hier, huger ist nepaisxntvw, vgl. Lexicon Gregorianum I 269.318), naisxunta
406,16f.
47
Das Fragezeichen in 406,16 ist nicht zwingend.

358

volker h. drecoll

lediglich teilhaben zu lassen) zeigt von sich aus so viel Unvernunft

(noia) und Frevelei (sbeia),48 dass man es nicht zu widerlegen
braucht (407,1621).
Ausfhrlicher geht Gregor auf den zweiten Punkt ein. Dazu wiederholt er den entscheidenden Teil des Eunomiuszitats noch einmal
(407,2125). Er kennzeichnet die Argumentationsweise des Eunomius
als Schwingen der Aristotelischen Lanze,49 und zwar genauer den
Punkt, dass das tin patra m xein mit dem t k to pnth m
ntow gegensyai identisch (tatn) sei (407,2528).
Die Lukasgenealogie ist eine Aufzhlung (parymhsiw) der Vter
(407,28408,4). Analog ist bei Gott-Vater nach dem Vater zu fragen.
Die ironische Auorderung Gregors an Eunomius zu sagen, wer als
Vater von Gott-Vater zu nennen ist, hierfr die gesamte txnh
aufzuwenden, zwingt Eunomius zu der Alternative, entweder das
Attribut gnnhton fallen zu lassen oder zu sagen, dass es keinen Vater
von Gott-Vater gibt, dass die Antwort lautet: odew (408,411).
Dadurch bricht die Argumentation des Eunomius zusammen (408,11
13). Eunomius hat nicht beachtet, dass in Basilius Argumentation
die Bedeutung des gnnhtow beschrieben wird als j odenw patrw,
selbst wo das Wort Vater nicht ausdrcklich hinzugefgt ist. Stattdessen
hat er aus dem j odenw patrw ein mhdn gemacht und dies mit
dem k to pnth m ntow gleichgesetzt (408,120). Also lsst sich
das Argument des Eunomius gegen ihn umdrehen. Eunomius muss
zugeben, dass der gnnhtow keinen Vater haben kann, also odew
der Vater Gottes ist, dies wird dann mit mhdn gleichgesetzt, was als
identisch mit dem t pnth m n angesehen wird, also ergibt sich
gerade aus Eunomius Argumentation, dass ihm zufolge Gott-Vater
eigentlich aus dem Nicht-Seienden ist (408,2030). Damit hat Gregor
sein Argumentationsziel erreicht. Eunomius ist dadurch widerlegt,
dass der Vorwurf, den er gegen Basilius erhebt, gerade gegen ihn
selbst zu erheben ist.

48
49

Zur Verbindung von noia und sbeia vgl. Lexicon Gregorianum I 386.
Vgl. hierzu den Beitrag von Ladislav Chvtal in diesem Band.

gottesbezeichnungen und unsterblichkeit

359

V. Der Abschluss
Das Ende von CE II ist polemischer Art. Gregor greift Worte des
Eunomius auf (dass es schlimm sei, weise zu scheinen und nicht zu
sein), und fhrt dies fort. Noch schlimmer sei es, sich selbst zu verkennen und nicht den Unterschied zwischen dem hochiegenden Basilius
und dem am Lande lebenden Tier (scil. also Eunomius selbst) zu
kennen (408,31409,4). Das Bild des hochiegenden (cipetw)
Basilius fhrt Gregor noch fort: Wenn das scharfe und gttliche Auge
des Basilius (scil. wie bei einem Greifvogel aus der Hhe) Gregor
she, wenn er mit dem Flgel der Weisheit (t tw sofaw ptern)
lebte, wre er herabgeogen und htte gezeigt, gegen wen sich Eunomius
erhoben hat, mit welcher Scherbe der Unvernunft er verknpft ist
(sumfv), wobei er danach jagt, jemand zu sein zu scheinen, und
zwar bei den alten Frauen und den Kastraten (ktomai)50 (409,410).
Trotzdem ist die Honung noch nicht aufzugeben, weder hinsichtlich
Eunomius noch hinsichtlich der Krallen des Basilius. Seine eigene
Aufgabe beschreibt Gregor darin, quasi als ein Teil einer Kralle
(nuxow mora) angesehen zu werden, als das, was fr Eunomius
ansteht, bezeichnet er es, dass die Schale zerbrochen und so die
durch die Scherbe verborgene Gestaltlosigkeit gezeigt wird (409,1015).

50
Bei Gregor nur hier (vgl. Lexicon Gregorianum III 134), gradion taucht bei
Gregor nur in der Polemik mit Eunomius auf, vgl. Lexicon Gregorianum II 224.

PART IV

SUPPORTING STUDIES
IV.1. PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS

PINOIA ET IMAGINAIRE CHEZ GRGOIRE DE NYSSE

(CE II 172195)
Evanghlos Moutsopoulos

Presque tous les philosophes grecs saccordent pour voir dans la

pense humaine le produit de la collaboration de lensemble des
facults de lesprit : sensation (asyhsiw), imagination (fantasa), opinion (dja), intellection (nhsiw), entendement (dinoia), raison (lgow).
Or, plus son activit se trouve aranchie de lintervention des facults dites infrieures, plus la raison agit seule, et plus son activit se
voit pure de toute intervention falsicatrice de la rectitude de son
cheminement, partant dlivre de tout danger de jugement erron.
ce propos, Aristote distingue avec rigueur les sophismes, syllogismes volontairement mensongers, des paralogismes, syllogismes involontairement errons, les uns et les autres rsultant de laltration
dun des lments de leurs prmisses, dont le plus frquent serait le
double sens attribu au moyen terme (rvn tetrw) ou encore le
choix dune argumentation fautive (argumentum ad hominem ; ad verecundiam).1
Aucune de ces dmarches nest exempte de fausset ; mais cest
surtout le recours limagination, qui, depuis Platon, fut rendu responsable de laberration de la pense.2 Le noplatonisme tenta de
rhabiliter limaginaire en renversant le rle fondamental de limagination par rapport limage, donne premire, sans toutefois aller

1
Cf. E. Moutsopoulos, Vers un largissement du concept de vrit : le presquevrai, Annales de la Facult des Lettres et Sciences Humaines dAix 40 (1966) 189196.
2
Cf. Platon, entre autres, Phdon 110d : sunexw poiklon fantzesyai ; Rp. II
380d : fantzesyai llote n llaiw ; IV 476a : pantaxo fantazmena ; Soph.
216c : pantooi fantazmenoi ; Tim. 43e : katroiw t katrvn fantzetai ; 49e :
odpote tn atn kstvn fantazomnvn ; 54b : ok ryw fantazmena ; 60a :
fantazmenon laihrn edow ; Aristote, quant lui, De anima 431a1617 : odpote
noe neu fantsmatow cux ; De mem. et reminisc. 449b33450a1 : noen ok stin
neu fantsmatow, semble exclure lexistence dune raison pure ; cf. cependant De
anima 428a25 : ok sti sumplok djhw ka asysevw, ainsi quon serait tent de
lenvisager et tenant compte du rle intermdiaire de limagination. Cf. picure,
Rat. sent. XXIV 3 (Arrighetti 129) : psan fantastikn piboln tw dianoaw . . .
t dojazmenon ka t prosmnon . . . t mata dj ; Lettre Hrod. 51,57
(Arrighetti 47) : t dihmarthmnon ok n prxen, e m . . . t fantastik

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evanghlos moutsopoulos

jusqu soutenir une thse contraire la tradition.3 Les Pres suivirent, dans lensemble, cette tradition qui leur permettait, entre autres, et au-del de leur eort de fonder la foi sur la raison, de
combattre les hrsies, nhsitant pas adopter cet eet les tropes, ces arguments que les Sceptiques avaient utiliss pour dmontrer limpossibilit de la connaissance. Grgoire de Nysse, pour sa
part, on le verra, use de la notion dpinoia pour indiquer le rsultat de lactivit dune facult supplmentaire qui intervient dans le
processus de la pense rationnelle quelle renforce ou quelle altre
selon quelle dessert une intention bonne ou mauvaise, grce au concours de limagination, entendue comme formatrice,4 mais aussi comme
dformante.
Le sens de la notion dpinoia a vari au cours des sicles : il dsigna
lorigine, et conformment son tymologie, une pense seconde
venant conrmer, inrmer, corriger ou complter une pense premire ;5 puis, une simple reprsentation6 ou mme la nalit dun
dessein mental ;7 enn, la facult dinventer autant que son produit,
linvention.8 Cest dans cette acception que Grgoire de Nysse emploie
le terme dpinoia et ses drivs9 dans le livre II du trait Contre

pibol ; [2] 75,10 (Arrighetti 67) : tn payn ka tn fantasmtvn. Pour les

Stociens, cf. Nmsius (Morani 55,2022) : fantastikn dikenon lkusmn, w p
tn memhntvn ; Plut., Placit. philos. IV 12 (Diels 401) : fantastikn . . . dikenow
lkusmw ; Cf. E. Moutsopoulos, Le problme de limaginaire chez Plotin, 2e d., Paris
2000, 1439.
3
Cf. E. Moutsopoulos, Le problme de limaginaire, 4068. cf. Idem, Les structures de
limaginaire dans la philosophie de Proclus, Paris 1985, 97176.
4
Cf. E. Moutsopoulos, Limagination formatrice, Annales dEsthtique 2 (1963)
6471 ; cf. Idem, Les structures, 25 et la n. 57 ; 29 et la n. 2 ; 33 et la n. 23 ; 83 et
la n. 67 ; 234.
5
Cf. Soph. Antig. 389 : cedei gr pnoia tn gnmhn, Platon, Phd. 99d :
deteron plon, Polit. 300b : deterow plow, Philbe 19c ; Cf. E. Moutsopoulos,
Deuteros plos, la mise en valeur dune expression proverbiale, Nautica Chronica 5
(1998) 26.
6
Cf. Thucid. III 16 ; Polybe I 20,12 ; V 110,10, o on rencontre dj une allusion au rle de limagination.
7
Cf. Eurip., Phn. 408 : tn pnoian sxeyew ; Mde 760 ; Aristoph., Thesm. 766 ;
Oiseaux 405 ; 1073 ; Plout. 45.
8
Cf. Aristoph., Cav. 90 : onon s tolmw ew pnoian loidoren ; ibid., 539 :
pnoia steiotth ; 1202 : pw penhsaw rpsai ; 1322 : yaumastw jeurskvn
pinoaw ; Gupes 346 : kainn pnoian zhten ; Xnoph., Cyr. 2, 3, 19 ; Thophr.,
Des odeurs 7.
9
Grg. Nys., PG 45, 334c : t pinoen (inventer) auquel sajoutent pinhsiw
(invention acte dinventer), pinhma (invention rsultat de lacte dinventer),

pinoia et imaginaire

365

Eunomius, qui est une rponse aux objections du destinataire au

livre I ; objections rejetes parce que provenant dun esprit mal intentionn, et destines occulter la vrit du dogme. Laccusation fondamentale quil adresse Eunomius, cest davoir os lui reprocher
de soutenir que le nom de Dieu, qui dsigne son essence, est une
invention humaine.10 Vraisemblablement, Eunomius a pu sinspirer
ce sujet dune source antrieure.11 Nanmoins, la critique de Grgoire
la critique dEunomius constitue en soi la rfutation dune invention au second degr, cest--dire dune invention dformante oppose
une invention explicative initiale. En traduction libre, largument
de Grgoire est le suivant : on ne saurait refuser ltre en soi celui
qui est par excellence et qui a su porter lexistence tout ce qui
existe.12
Grgoire accuse tout particulirement Eunomius de recourir en
loccurrence un sophisme du type connu comme changement de
critre ; notamment, de faire dvier son propos partir dun adjectif (gnnhtow) qui dsigne un tat, vers un substantif (gennhsa) dont
le sens nest mme pas en cause. 13 En fait, Grgoire estime
quEunomius, voyant son enseignement ananti, se rfugie dans une
argumentation sophistique sans fondement, semant par l le doute
et crant une confusion des termes,14 dont il rsulterait une confusion dans les esprits non verss dans la question.15 Par un vritable
artice de raisonnement qui frle la supercherie, il aurait tent de

pinohmatikw (inventif ), pinomvn, pinohton, pinohtw, pnoia dsignerait la

pense seconde, complmentaire. Grgoire utilise galement le terme dpnoia

dans un sens tout dirent pour marquer une cohrence logique.

10
En fait, ce qui est reproch Eunomius, cest une inconsquence logique qui
frle laberration (paraplhja).
11
Cf. dj Lucien, Assembles des dieux 13 : nmata p tn filosfvn pinohynta.
12
Cf. CE II 172 (GNO I 275,57) : tn ntvw nta ka t lla pnta sa
stin ew gnesin gagnta, toton m kay pstasin dan enai lgein, ll
pnoian nmatow atn pofanesyai ; Cf. E. Moutsopoulos, Une archologie
chrtienne de ltre est-elle possible?, Diotima 9 (1981) 184186.
13
Cf. CE II 172173 (GNO I 275,78) : t mthn skiamaxe tow o teyesi
maxmenow ; cf. CE II 176 (GNO I 276,45) : tw . . . kay mn mxhw.
14
Cf. CE II 173 (GNO I 275,814, notamment 1314) : kn poietai tn
legomnvn tn sgxusin, p to nmatow p t prgmata metabibzvn tn
mxhn, cf. CE II 173174 (GNO I 275,1718) : katalipn nlegkton t mteron
(argument qui portait sur la qualit d incr attribue Dieu) prw tera metafrei
tn mxhn. Cf. Aristote, Sec. anal. III 7, 75a38 : metbasiw ew llo gnow.
15
CE II 173 (GNO I 275,1415) : w tow nepisttouw eklvw di tw toiathw
parakrousynai sugxsevw.

366

evanghlos moutsopoulos

dformer le sens dun simple artice du langage. Selon la thse constante de Grgoire, lide de Dieu est une donne premire, alors
que lattribut gnnhtow, non cr, auquel il renvoie, en est la consquence logique16 qui dsigne une existence indpendante de toute
cause,17 tant elle-mme cause premire.18 Le terme dpinoia acquiert
ici une signication nouvelle : il dsigne le rsultat dune drivation
logique rigoureuse et non point linvention sophistique dun esprit
qui fait appel lactivit incontrle de limaginaire.19
Grgoire poursuit son interrogatoire contre les allgations rptes
dEunomius qui aurait indment invent, tout en le lui imputant, le
terme gennhsa, driv du terme gnnhtow. En eet, cause premire, Dieu est et demeure incr. Ce terme est appliqu un fait
indiscutable.20 Or le terme gennhsa, lui, non seulement ne se rapporte pas un fait, dans la mesure o il ne dsigne nullement une
essence et une qualit,21 mais, de plus, il est faussement attribu
Grgoire en tant que synonyme du terme de divinit. La dirence
smantique subtile saisir, est norme, et lobjection de Grgoire se
voit ainsi justie.22 Son attitude implique quil se conforme (i) une
conception partiellement inspire de la thologie ngative en formation son poque ; et (ii) une tendance nominaliste, elle aussi en
train de se former de son temps.23 Dans cet ordre dides, le terme
gennhsa, invent par Eunomius, nindiquerait pas le fait que Dieu
existe sans avoir t cr, mais se substituerait son existence et le
remplacerait au niveau du langage, sidentiant ainsi avec lui,24 ce
qui serait absurde. Lemploi du terme gennhsa serait simplement
(et sans plus) un moyen de dsigner aprs coup (pnoia au second
degr) ce que dsigne dj gnnhtow (pnoia au premier degr) : le

Cf. CE II 174 (GNO I 275,20) : j pinoaw farmzein t fsei, CE II 175

(GNO I 275,2829) : w pinooumnou.
17
Cf. CE II 174 (GNO I 275,21) : t neu ataw atn festnai shmanetai.
18
Cf. CE II 175 (GNO I 275,29) : prw ndeijin to nrxvw enai t prton
ation.
19
Cf. E. Moutsopoulos, Les structures, 7392 ; cf. idem, Le problme de limagination,
4068.
20
Cf. CE II 177 (GNO I 276,78) : tot ka mew suntiymeya.
21
Cf. CE II 177 (GNO I 276,78) : fasi . . . ka tn gennhsan osan enai.
22
Cf. CE II 177 (GNO I 276,9) : prw toto par mn ntrrhsiw.
23
Le ps.-Denys, Des noms divins, sen inspirera ouvertement. Cf. E. Moutsopoulos,
La fonction catalytique de ljafnhw chez Denys, Diotima 23 (1995) 916.
24
Cf. CE II 177 (GNO I 276,911) : noma gr tot famen ndeiktikn enai
to genntvw tn yen festnai, o tn gennhsan enai yen.
16

pinoia et imaginaire

367

fait que Dieu existe par soi-mme. Largumentation vicieuse dEunomius

aurait altr (diakvmde) la signication normale du terme dpnoia,
en se servant de sa propre pinoia (au sens d invention) en donnant libre cours son imagination inventive dans le but de dformer la porte du discours de Grgoire.25 Linuence positive de
limaginaire est rendue franchement ngative ds lors que son intervention cesse dtre formatrice pour devenir dformante de penses
et de paroles.26
Cest pourtant cette acception dune pinoia dformante quEunomius
est prcisment cens reconnatre ce terme que Grgoire fut, il est
vrai, le premier utiliser dans son texte prcdent.27 Lui-mme accuse
dailleurs, son tour, Eunomius de dvaloriser limportance de la
signication positive de lpinoia, en substituant frauduleusement au
terme gnnhtow, simple dsignation de convenance,28 le terme
gennhsa. Le statut de lpinoia en tant que cohrence logique se
voit dgrad au point de devenir celui dune vile altration dcoulant dun procd utilis selon les circonstances. Une telle falsication
du sens de lpinoia serait elle-mme aberrante. Et Grgoire de reprendre, dnumrer et de formuler son tour et sa manire les vices
reconnus lpinoia par Eunomius dont largumentation constitue une
parfaite illustration des possibilits mises la disposition dune pense
perverse par ce mcanisme : analyse trop pousse, valuation contre
nature, allongement, compression ou intensication des mesures et
assemblage excessif de donnes par ailleurs incompatibles, au point
de savrer inutile et dpourvu de sens, sinon dangereux. . . .29

25

Cf. CE II 179 (GNO I 276,2122) : n taw per tw pinoaw diastolaw at

diakvmde tw pinoaw t noma.

26
Cf. E. Moutsopoulos, Limagination formatrice, loc. cit. (cf. supra et la n. 4) ;
cf. Idem, La pense et lerreur, Athnes 1961, 3752 ; cf. Idem, La connaissance et la
science, Athnes 1972, 134141.
27
Grgoire (CE II 179, GNO I 276,2229) cite Eunomius textuellement : tn

gr otv kat pnoian legomnvn fhs t mn kat tn proforn xein mnhn

tn parjin w t mhdn shmanonta, t d kat dan dinoian ka totvn t
mn kat ajhsin w p tn kolossiavn, t d kat mevsin w p tn pugmavn,
t d kat prsyesin w p tn polukeflvn kat snyesin w p tn
mijoyrvn. Lnumration de ces procds de falsication de la ralit, loin dtre

exhaustive, nest quindicative.

28
Cf. supra et les nn. 6 et 17.
29
Cf. CE II 180 (GNO I 276,29277,7) : rw ew t tn pnoian mn sofw
diakermatsaw peraitrv tn dnamin atw proelyen ok jvsen. smanton
ena fhsi tn pnoian, dianhton, t par fsin sofizomnhn diakolobo-

368

evanghlos moutsopoulos

Il sagit, cela va de soi, dune critique subjective deux volets

runis tant quils dsignent deux attitudes de rpulsion communes aux
deux esprits, mais opposes lorsque Eunomius envisage la notion
dpinoia dans une acception uniquement ngative, alors que Grgoire
la considre comme positive ou ngative selon lintention quelle vhicule et quelle exprime. Chacun des points de vue fait partie dune
stratgie distincte : Eunomius a attaqu le premier en dnonant les
eets dune pinoia nfaste ; Grgoire contre-attaque en reprenant
dabord son compte les dnonciations dEunomius avant de signaler
les avantages dune pinoia envisage selon un point de vue positif.
Eectivement, souligne-t-il, linventivit de la raison assiste par
limagination, et dont lpinoia fait preuve, est rendue agrante dans
le domaine des sciences et des pratiques. Lpinoia serait notamment
lorigine de tout progrs en mathmatiques, en gomtrie, dans la
science et la philosophie des nombres, en logique, en physique thorique, en mtorologie, en philosophie (ontologie et thorie des ides)
dans le domaine de la technologie (invention de machines) et, en
gnral, dans tous les domaines suprieurs qui se rapportent au psychisme humain. La mme pinoia serait lorigine de tout progrs
dans lagriculture, la navigation, lconomie. Bref, cest lpinoia de
lesprit que serait due la matrise de la nature, par ailleurs indomptable,30 au prot de la vie humaine.31
ce point, Grgoire estime avoir assez prpar le terrain pour
tre en mesure davancer une dnition de la notion dpinoia qui,
daprs lui,32 serait un processus conduisant partir dune pense
premire. . . , la dcouverte de ce qui est encore inconnu, et
prgurant la connaissance de ce qui se situe au-del ;33 dnition
plthorique, certes, qui est loin de prsenter la concision et llgance
san pertenousan t rismna mtra tw fsevw j terofun suntiyesan
terateuomnhn taw lloktoiw prosykaiw. n totoiw katapajaw to tw pinoaw
nmatow xrhston atn ka nnhton t b t kat atn podeknusin. Proclus
dissertera longuement sur les relations de la raison et de la nhsiw en tant que sa

lumire et que son instrument. Cf. Comm. sur le Time (Diehl I 255,67), notamment propos du long passage de Svre (philosophe du IIe sicle de notre re,
clectique qui se laissa inuencer par le stocisme), Commentaire sur le Time, conserv
par Eusbe, Praepar. Evang. XIII 17 (PG 21, 700701), sous le titre dExtraits des
livres de Svre le platonicien sur lme.
30
Cf. CE II 180181 (GNO I 277,719).
31
Cf. CE II 182 (GNO I 277,1920).
32
Cf. CE II 182 (GNO I 277,20) : kat ge tn mn lgon.
33
CE II 182 (GNO I 277,2123) : fodow eretik tn gnooumnvn, di tn

prosexn te ka koloyvn t prt per t spoudazmenon nosei t fejw

jeurskousa.

pinoia et imaginaire

369

des dnitions aristotliciennes,34 strictement labores sur le principe k gnouw ka diaforn,35 mais qui prsente lavantage de mettre
en valeur le caractre la fois complmentaire et supratif de
lpinoia par rapport la pense principale laquelle elle sassocie.
Grgoire poursuit son argumentation en explicitant le contenu de sa
dnition, dans lintention, bien entendu, de montrer limportance
du rle de lpinoia au cours du processus de lintellection. Inconsciemment, selon toute vraisemblance, il dcrit alors, un peu navement, il est vrai, la structure du syllogisme classique36 que lpinoia
est suppose complter.
la suite de cette parenthse dordre technique dans le droulement de largumentation, lauteur poursuit son loge de lpinoia et
de son utilit pour lhumanit en postulant que toute conscience
bienveillante conviendra des bienfaits de cette activit, promue, pour
la cause, en facult de lesprit.37 Commence alors une nouvelle
numration de ces bienfaits.38 Cest loccasion, pour lauteur, de
reconnatre lpinoia une dimension dinventivit tout en lui accordant le mrite, trs gnralement formul, dtre tous gards utile
lhomme.39 Lhumanit devrait lui tre reconnaissante de lensemble des innovations ralises au cours des ges grce son impulsion et au dploiement de ses possibilits.40

34
Cf. par exemple la dnition de linduction (pagvg), Arist., Top. I 12, 105a13 :
p tn kay kasta p t kaylou fodow, dont la dnition grgorienne rete,
nen pas douter, le souvenir. En eet outre le terme fodow, commun aux deux
dnitions, le terme prosexn renvoie directement lexpression prosexw gnow,

applique lun des lments structuraux de la dnition, telle quAristote la conoit.

35
Cf. Arist., Top. I 8, 103b15 : rismw k gnouw ka diaforn stin, cf. ibid.,
VI 3, 141a28 ; VI 4, 141b.
36
Cf. CE II 182 (GNO I 277,2326) : nosantew gr ti per to zhtoumnou t
rx to lhfyntow (prmisses, majeure), di tn feuriskomnvn nohmtvn sun-

armzontew t klouyon ew t praw tn spoudazomnvn tn gxerhsin gomen

(conclusion).
37
Cf. CE II 183 (GNO I 277,2829) : jesti . . . t m filonekvw xonti prw
tn lyeian katiden . . .
38
Cf. CE II 183 (GNO I 277,2526) : ka t moi t mezv ka chltera tn
tw pinoaw katoryvmtvn pariymesyai.
39
Cf. CE II 183 (GNO I 277,2930) : t lla pnta, sa bivfel te ka
xrsima t zv tn nyrpvn.
40
Cf. CE II 183 (GNO I 277,31) : xrnow feren. Cette expression est manifestement inadquate. En ralit, ce nest pas le temps qui invente, mais bien lesprit humain. On serait tent de reconnatre ici un souvenir de Xnophane, fr. B18
(Diels Kranz I 133,14 = Stobe, Ecl. I 8,2 ; Flor. 29,41) : xrnvi zhtontew
feurskousin meinon.

370

evanghlos moutsopoulos

Grgoire frle ici le domaine de la philosophie de lhistoire dont

il adopte cependant un modle totalement dirent des modles classiques hrits aussi bien de lantiquit grecque que de la tradition
palotestamentaire : le premier, de structure cyclique ;41 le second,
comme ligne droite descendante que le christianisme transformera
en ligne brise.42 De toute vidence, il se rend la conception xnophanienne du progrs, qui, vers la n du Moyen ge, sera reprise
et mise en valeur successivement par Joachim de Flores et Gerardo
di Borgo San Donnino.43 Pour eux, lhistoire ne serait quun progrs
discontinu trois tapes : celles du Pre (Ancien Testament), du Fils
(Nouveau Testament) et de lEsprit, dont le point de dpart se situerait
en lan 1260. Ce progressisme sera plus tard rnov par Condorcet44
et, nalement, par Auguste Comte (rgle des trois tats).45 Le progressisme grgorien semble nattribuer la marche de lhistoire ni
lhumanit elle-mme ni la providence divine, mais la dynamique du temps quil personnie en quelque sorte, et ce dans un cadre
plutt continuiste, lencontre du cadre kairique discontinuiste envisag par les penseurs mdivaux et modernes qui viennent dtre cits.46
Si la providence divine doit ncessairement apparatre dans ce
contexte, elle le fait moyennant la facult de lpinoia dont le genre
humain a t grati (xarismenow).47 ce point, se rendant compte
du danger qui le guette, de dvier du dogme plus ou moins constitu de son temps, Grgoire se rachte en sappuyant sur un passage
de lcriture,48 o Dieu rvle aux hommes quil aurait (eh) enseign (pistsaw), spcialement aux femmes, le savoir du tissage et
de la dcoration.49 On conviendra, bien entendu, et condition de
41

Cf. V. Goldschmidt, Le systme stocien et lide de temps, Paris 1953, 135 et suiv.
Cf. E. Moutsopoulos, Litinraire de lesprit, t. 3, Les valeurs, Athnes 1977, 268292.
43
Cf. ibid., 285287.
44
Cf. ibid., 286.
45
Cf. A. Comte, Cours de philosophie positive, 6 vols, Paris 18301836. Cf.
G. Vlachos, Des prophties anciennes aux prophties modernes, in : Lavenir, Actes
du XXI e Congrs de lASPLF (Athnes 1986), Paris 1987, 5572.
46
Cf. E. Moutsopoulos, Philosophie de la kairicit, Athnes 1985, 188189 ; Idem,
Kairos et histoire, Actes de lAdacmie dAthnes 59 (1984) 532553.
47
Cf. CE II 183 (GNO I 277,32278,3) : ka moi doke pntvn tn kat tn
42

zvn tathn nergoumnvn n mn gayn tn taw cuxaw mn par tw yeaw

promhyeaw nuparxntvn tn pnoin tiw protimotran krnvn m n tw preposhw krsevw diaceusynai.
48
Cf. Jb 38,36 (LXX) : tw d dvken gunaijn fsmatow sofan poikiltikn
pistmhn, cf. CE II 184 (GNO I 278,47). Cf. infra, et la note suivante 49.
49
Cf. CE II 184 (GNO I 278,79) : ti atw eh taw txnaiw pistsaw
tn nyrvpon ka gunaij xarismenow fantikn te ka poikiltikn pistmhn.

pinoia et imaginaire

371

faire preuve de bonne foi,50 quun tel enseignement ne fut pas ralis sur le terrain, comme cela se passe au niveau de la scolarit,
cest--dire en prsence du matre.51 Nanmoins, tant donn que
Dieu arme avoir transmis aux hommes ces comptences,52 on en
conclura que ce quils tiennent surtout de lui, cest la facult dinventer53 et que par consquent, cest lui que toute invention et
tout exploit sont raisonnablement attribuables.54
Il faut tenir compte du caractre polmique du texte grgorien
pour comprendre le cheminement irrgulier et discontinu de sa pense : il sagit dune rponse une accusation injuste, et il est plus ou
moins naturel que la rdaction du texte ait t accomplie en tat
de verve. Donc, soit lauteur se laisse momentanment garer, quitte
se reprendre, comme dans le cas dj mentionn o il attribue le
progrs de lhumanit au temps, alors quil sagit de le situer dans le
temps,55 soit il procde par -coups, comme dans lnumration des
bienfaits de lpinoia. Cest donc pour la troisime fois quaprs une
mise au point de la question de la paternit de lpinoia, se rendant
compte de ses omissions, il reprend cette numration pour ltendre la mdecine56 laquelle il attribue le reste des bienfaits dont
jouit lhumanit, considrs prsent dans leur ensemble, pour que
le compte soit exhaustif au possible.57 An de relier cette adjonction

Faire remonter les origines de lart du tissage une inspiration divine est une tradition bien ancienne. Cf. E. Moutsopoulos, Un instrument divin : la navette, de
Platon Proclus, Kermos 10 (1997) 241247.
50
Cf. CE II 184 (GNO I 278,1213).
51
Cf. CE II 184 (GNO I 278,912) : ok nerge& tin tw toiataw txnaw mw
didjato atw prokaymenow tw rgasaw, kayper n tow svmatikw didaskomnoiw stin den, cf. CE II 185 (GNO I 278,16) : atw mw prw tw txnaw
progage.
52
Cf. CE II 185 (GNO I 278,1314) : ll mn erhtai par ato gegensyai
mn tn toiotvn texnn kayghsiw. Cf. supra, et la n. 49.
53
Cf. CE II 185 (GNO I 278,1516) : dow t fsei (humaine) tn pinohtikn
ka eretikn tn zhtoumnvn dnamin.
54
Cf. CE II 185 (GNO I 278,1718) : t tw ataw lg pn t eriskmenn
te ka katoryomenon ew tn rxhgn (donateur) tw dunmevw tathw panafretai.
55
Cf. supra, et la note 46.
56
Cf. CE II 185 (GNO I 278,19) : otv ka tn atrikn bow erato. On
notera ici le passage (provisoire) de lesprit humain la vie humaine.
57
Cf. CE II 186 (GNO I 278,2023) : ka pn tipr sti kat tn nyrvpnhn
zvn jeurhmnon kat ernhn ka plemon prw ti tn xrhsmvn pithdevw
xon.

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evanghlos moutsopoulos

ce qui prcde, Grgoire arme, une fois de plus, que lpinoia

procde du divin.58
La partie dmonstrative de largumentation se termine ici. Ce qui
suit nest que lapplication des conclusions tires de leort de lauteur de combattre et dinvalider lide avance par Eunomius selon
qui, rappelons-le, il est faux dattribuer Dieu la qualit dgennhsa,
qualit pourtant littralement invente ad hoc par lui-mme en vue
de rfuter la thse initiale de Grgoire qui navait utilis que le terme
gnnhtow en le considrant comme une pinoia, une invention aprs
coup, au sens dune qualication notique compltant lide de Dieu.
Grgoire passe alors lattaque. On se rappellera quil accorde au
terme dpinoia deux acceptions : une positive, applicable sa propre
thse, et quil dfend tout au long de son argumentation ; et une
ngative, quil applique, titre dexemple, lusage trompeur du
terme dgennhsa, produit de linventivit dun esprit malveillant,
celui de son adversaire.
Dentre de jeu, la stratgie59 de Grgoire consistait, dans lensemble, discrditer Eunomius et sa thse. Dsormais, il se propose
de le confondre en lattaquant dans les dtails et commence par feindre daccepter en principe que lpinoia contribue formuler et
rationaliser des crations fabuleuses (muydh) et des monstruosits
mensongres.60 Ses ressources, arme-t-il toutefois, sont susceptibles
dtre utilises en bien et en mal, comme dans le cas de la mdecine o un mdicament peut tre galement administr comme poison ; de la navigation o le capitaine, au lieu de sauver son navire,
le fait chouer pour que prissent les passagers ; en peinture o lartiste est capable de reproduire les formes les plus belles aussi bien
que les plus laides ;61 en orthopdie enn, o le rebouteux qui remet
en place un membre dsarticul peut tout aussi bien en tordre un

58
Cf. CE II 186 (GNO I 278,2326) : odamyen mn sxe tn prodon, ll
to no t kay kaston mn katalllvw noontow ka feurskontow now d,
(tout comme l) pnoia, rgon yeo okon k yeo pnta sa di to no mn
pepristai.
59
Cf. CE II 187 (GNO I 278,29279,1) : tn mteron skopn.
60
Cf. CE II 187 (GNO I 278,2728): . . . t muydh plsmata ka t ceud
teratemata par tw pinoaw logopoiesyai ka plssesyai . . .
61
Cf. toutefois E. Moutsopoulos, Les catgories esthtiques. Introduction une axiologie de
lobjet esthtique, 2e d., Athnes 1996, 2728, propos de la laideur. Cf. Idem, La
laideur et ses droits dans le domaine des arts, in : V. Cauchy (d.), Philosophie et
Culture, Actes du XVIIe Congrs Mondial de Philosophie (1983), Montral 1988, 705709.

pinoia et imaginaire

373

autre encore valide.62 Bref,63 tout le monde serait daccord sur le fait
quun art se prte un bon et un mauvais usage.64
Il en serait de mme de lpinoia, facult dont Dieu nous aurait
arms pour faire le bien, mais qui, souvent, et par abus, dessert des
machinations condamnables, si elle ne les cre.65 Ce nest donc pas
parce quelle est susceptible dinventer des faussets (ceud) et des
donnes inexistantes (nparkta) quelle sera juge incapable de scruter et de proposer des vrits.66 Cest pourquoi on doit lui tre reconnaissant de lventualit mme de son bon usage.67 Tout au plus, les
distortions de la rgularit et de la symtrie quelle occasionne, si
elles ne visent pas au mal, sont-elles propres provoquer le rire et
le plaisir esthtique,68 tout en conrmant ses potentialits en direction
du bien.69 Ce nest que par abus quune facult destine servir les
bonnes intentions (proairetik, proaresiw) scarte du droit chemin.70
Par consquent, son usage vicieux ne sut pas la condamner dans
lensemble.71
Grgoire entame enn la conclusion gnrale de son argumentation en en rappelant le point de dpart : cause premire, Dieu, estil soumis quelque principe ou non (narxow)?72 Lentendement
sopposant concevoir une cause premire dpendante, force tait
dinventer (penosamen) un attribut qualiant cette cause, cet tre
(nta), qui existe par lui-mme (nrxvw) et sans avoir t cr
(genntvw), en considrant non ce que cet tre est, mais ce quil
nest pas,73 ainsi quon le ferait propos dune plante dont on se
62

187188 (GNO I 279,411).

189 (GNO I 279,1516).
64
189 (GNO I 279,1619).
65
189 (GNO I 279,2123) : katakexrhmnvn d tinvn t feuretik
dunmei dikonon pollkiw ka sunergn gnesyai tn nvfeln erhmtvn.
66
Cf. CE II 190 (GNO I 279,2325).
67
Cf. CE II 190 (GNO I 279).
68
Cf. CE II 190 (GNO I 279,26280,4). Grgoire se rfre ici Aristote, Pot.
5, 1449a33 ( propos du risible) : mrthm ti ka asxow ndunon ka o fyartikn. Cf. E. Moutsopoulos, Dune application de la catgorie esthtique du visible : la catgorie du comique daprs Aristote, in : IVth International Conference on
Aristotles Poetics and Rhetoric (2001), Athens 2004, 230239.
69
Cf. CE II 191 (GNO I 280,46).
70
Cf. CE II 191 (GNO I 280,616).
71
Cf. CE II 191 (GNO I 280,1621).
72
Cf. CE II 192 (GNO I 280,2325).
73
Cf. CE II 192 (GNO I 280,2829) : o t stin, ll t ok sti di to
nmatow ndeiknmenoi. Sur la thologie ngative, cf. J. Whittaker, Ar=htow ka
katonmastow, in : H.-D. Blume F. Mann (eds.), Platonismus und Christentum. FS
Heinrich Drrie, Mnster 1983, 109125.
63

Cf.
Cf.
Cf.
Cf.

CE
CE
CE
CE

II
II
II
II

374

evanghlos moutsopoulos

demanderait si elle a t plante ou si elle a pouss delle-mme

(atofuw, fteuton). On conoit le mode dexistence de la plante
atofuw en voquant le fait quelle ne fut pas plante. En la dsignant dune manire plutt que dune autre on demeure dans le
vrai ; mais, ce faisant, on nest pas plus avanc quant son essence
(platane ou vigne). Ayant saisi le sens de lexemple, on peut passer
la ralit quil gure : Dieu. Ce passage est cens critique voire
kairique (kairw).74 Dsigner la cause premire (t prton ation), Dieu,
dtre non cr (genntvw nta Yen) revient lui attribuer une
qualit sous forme de nom invent,75 sans russir pour autant
concevoir ce quest cette essence qui existe sans avoir t cre.76
Notre raison demeure limite pour pouvoir saisir linsaisissable, mme
en se servant de son inventivit.77 Tout au plus, lartice invent permet-il une consolidation de nos connaissances dj acquises.
Facult double tranchant, lpinoia est utile quand elle sert une
bonne intention dans la vie pratique ; mais, sagissant de choses divines, elle est impuissante fournir quoi que ce soit dautre que des
moyens appropris en vue dune meilleure comprhension de ce que
lon en sait dj. Eunomius aurait dform (sfeterzetai) sans vergogne (paisxnetai)78 lutilisation du terme dpinoia par Grgoire, en
inventant littralement, partir de ladjectif gnnhtow, le substantif
gennhsa,79 et en insinuant par l que Grgoire aurait identi le
sens de ce terme avec la divinit. Par un dtour astucieusement
accompli, Grgoire arrive ses ns : confondre et discrditer Eunomius.
En mme temps il labore une thorie de lpinoia, dont le bien-fond
et loriginalit sont vidents. Lanalyse de son texte correspondant
permet de constater son rationalisme quon qualiera de critique
dans la mesure o il ne saurait sapparenter quelque dogmatisme :
le suprarationnel qui caractrise le divin ne peut tre atteint par la

74
Cf. CE II 194 (GNO I 281,810) : e d nenhtai t pdeigma, kairw (nous
soulignons) n eh metabibsai tn lgon p t prgma o t pdeigma. Cf.
E. Moutsopoulos, Sur une connotation spatiale de la notion de kairos chez Platon,
Aristote et Proclus, Philosophia 31 (2001) 135138.
75
Cf. CE II 194 (GNO I 281,1112) : tn on genntvw nta yen ew nmatow
tpon tn nnoian tathn pargontew gnnhton nomsamen.
76
Cf. CE II 194 (GNO I 281,1517) : at d osa genntvw osa tw
kat tn dan fsin stn, odn k tw pvnumaw tathw prw t katiden
dhgyhmen.
77
Cf. CE II 195 (GNO I 281,1721).
78
Cf. CE II 196 (GNO I 281,2526).
79
Cf. supra, et la n. 24.

pinoia et imaginaire

375

raison qui ne fait alors que dployer ses possibilits non pour en
savoir davantage sur lui, mais pour le mieux comprendre. En en
appelant des donnes de limaginaire, lpinoia, facult auxiliaire
mobilise dans de tels cas diciles, se concrtise alors en ces donnes ;
autrement dit, en images nominatives, toujours ngativement formules, qui, en loccurrence, se prsentent sous laspect de noms
divins.

LIMITES DU LANGAGE, LIMITES DU MONDE

DANS LE CONTRE EUNOME II DE GRGOIRE DE NYSSE
Georges Arabatzis

Avant de passer lanalyse du CE II, citons ce passage du IIIe livre

o Grgoire sinterroge sur ce quEunome dit propos du Fils
Unique, qu Il nhabite pas (okeiotai) cette valeur, cest--dire la
valeur de sappeler ltre. Grgoire sindigne :
Quelle philosophie est celle-ci, bien ct du Logos ! . . . Qui parmi
les hommes du pass, soit des Grecs soit des philosophes barbares,1
qui parmi les ntres qui, travers le temps, ont-ils dnomm valeur
ce qui est ? Il est habituel ceux qui soccupent du Logos de parler
de ce quils voient comme ce qui se-dresse-en-soi-mme (postsei)2
en utilisant le nom de ltre ; cest par ltre quon nomme ce qui est
. . . Si lon admet le nom de valeur pour ltre, alors Celui-qui-est
nhabite-t-Il pas ltre ? . . . Pourquoi tu dis quIl nhabite pas ltre ?
Dire quIl nest pas chez Lui dans ltre signie quIl est tranger
ltre. Dire pour quelquun quil nest pas chez lui cela veut dire quil
est autre et, ainsi, lentreprise mtaphysique [dEunome] ( tn
shmainomnvn ntidiaresiw) devient visible : le demeurant chez lui nest
pas autre et lautre nest pas chez lui. Celui qui ne demeure pas dans
ltre est tout autre que ltre. Et celui qui est autre que ltre nest
pas demeurant de ltre. Ce dterminisme du non-lieu vient de son
induction (pgagen) selon laquelle lessence qui sempare aussi de cette
demeure attire dans len-soi le concept de ltre.3

Cf. Diogne Larce, Vie et doctrines des philosophes illustres, Prologue 1 (Marcovich
I 5); cf., aussi, Clment dAlexandrie, Strom. I 71 (GCS 76, 4546).
2
Cf. M. Heidegger, Comment se dtermine la fsiw, in: M. Heidegger, Questions
I et II, Paris 1968, 517 : Si les Grecs saisissent ltre tantt comme se-dresser-ensoi-mme, pstasiw-substantia, tantt comme stendre-devant, pokemenon-subjectum, les deux ont tout autant de poids parce que dans les deux cas leur regard
envisage lUn et Unique : le venir depuis soi-mme ltre, lentre dans la prsence.
3
CE III/VIII 5962 (GNO II 261,5262,3): ti ok okeiotai tathn tn jan.
jan gr nomzei tn to ntow proshgoran. paralgou filosofaw. tw tn
ppote gegontvn nyrpvn ete par Ellhsin ete par t barbarik filosof&,
tw tn kay mw, tw tn n pant t xrn jan noma t nti yeto; pn gr

378

georges arabatzis

Ce passage, traduit de telle manire, prsente des similitudes frappantes avec la pense de Heidegger. Ltre nest pas une valeur pour
Grgoire comme le pensera aussi Heidegger contre le Nokantisme.
Pour Heidegger, ltre se comprend par rapport une demeure ou,
autrement dit, on ne comprend pas ltre, on lhabite. Trs proche
semble tre ici lintuition de Grgoire. Lanit entre les deux penses nous a mme conduit adopter la manire barbare de Heidegger
dans ses propres traductions des textes grecs.4 Ainsi, on associe
Grgoire aux proccupations ontologiques de notre temps,5 o le langage joue un rle de premire importance.
La thorie grgorienne du langage est construite sur la base de la
rfutation dEunome. Il est vrai que la thorie du langage dEunome,
si lon juge daprs ce que Grgoire dit, semble tre de nature profondment mtaphysique : dans le CE II, on voit quEunome avance
sans ambigut la thse de la dpendance directe des noms de la
volont divine. Suivant ce principe, il poursuit son entreprise de
clarication catgorielle des attributs divins et surtout du concept
dinengendr (gnnhton). Aristote voyait dans la gnration de pre
en ls un paradigme de continuit dexistence singulire, vitant,
ainsi, tout recours quelconque participation une ide, thse
soutenue par Platon. Aristote niait encore toute notion de contradiction
directe sans la mdiation dun sujet qui soutiendrait le passage dun

t n postsei yevromenon koin tn lg kexrhmnvn sunyeia enai lgei.

par d t enai to ntow pvnuma paresxhmtistai. (. . .) dedsyv t n jan
katonomzesyai. t on n ok okeiotai t enai; (. . .) okon m enai lgeiw
tn t enai m okeiomenon; t gr m okeiosyai t llotriosyai tatn
shmanei, ka prdhlow tn shmainomnvn ntidiaresiw. t te gr okeon ok
lltrion ka t lltrion ok okeon. on m okeiomenow t enai llotrvtai
pntvw to enai. d to enai lltriow n t enai ok stin. ll tn
ngkhn tw topaw tathw pgagen epn tw ka totou kurieuoshw osaw
prw autn lkoshw tn to ntow nnoian.
4
Cf. ibid, la note du traducteur sur le style heideggerien de traduire (490491,
note 1): la traduction en franais de la traduction par Heidegger . . . prsente un
ct abrupt et pour tout dire barbare [cest moi qui souligne]. Comme le dit Heidegger,
ce type de traduction est en fait le contraire de ce quon entend habituellement
par traduire. Il ne se justie que sil permet daller jusqu ce qui est dit dans lautre
langue. Cf. galement, Th. W. Adorno, Jargon der Eigentlichkeit. Zur deutschen Ideologie,
Frankfurt am Main 1964.
5
Cf. Jean Danilou, Ltre et le temps chez Grgoire de Nysse, Leiden 1970, Introduction,
VIIIIX: A ct dune philosophie de ltre, la pense de Grgoire est une philosophie du temps. Et cest peut-tre lunion de ces deux traits, Zeit und Sein, qui est le
trait fondamental de sa synthse.

limites du langage, limites du monde

379

attribut son contraire.6 La combinaison de ces deux prsuppositions

autour de lattribut dinengendr servait de cadre conceptuel aux
ambitions ariennes dEunome. plusieurs reprises Grgoire blme
laristotlisme dEunome. On devrait, pourtant, clarier ce qu aristotlisme veut dire dans ce contexte. Il semblerait que cest au paralllisme logico-grammatical dAristote7 trs contest par la logique
moderne que rpond le paralllisme thologico-grammatical promu
par Eunome ; dans le langage philosophique moderne on parlerait
d onto-thologie.8 Et comme dans le cas dAristote on essaie de
faire partir des noms des valeurs logiques, de mme chez Eunome
on essaie de faire partir des noms des valeurs thologiques. Dans
cette perspective, la rfutation grgorienne pourrait mme prendre
une allure dconstructive.9
Contre ce paralllisme se dresse la critique grgorienne de la mtaphysique eunomenne. Il faudrait, pourtant, essayer de voir plus
clairement les tapes de la rexion de Grgoire. Pour ce dernier,
les limites du langage humain sont xes par les limites du monde
que lintellect humain peut concevoir. Si ce monde infrieur qui est
objet de nos sens se trouve, dj, au-del des limites de notre comprhension, comment alors pourra-t-on comprendre Celui qui, par
sa volont, a compos le tout ?10 Les noms ne sont quune sorte
dombres des choses ;11 en tudiant les mots et les noms, on ne fait
que quter les traces de la pit ;12 il ny a pas de lien direct entre les
mots et Dieu. Les noms sont invents par nous, pour saisir ltre ;13
la ralit est l, avant linvention des noms. Eunome a essay de
montrer que le nom illustre lessence ; cela est selon lui le pouvoir
du nom.14 Pour Grgoire, le langage est en rapport avec le divin
6
Cf. J.-P. Dumont, Introduction la mthode dAristote, Paris 1986, chap. II: Ce
quelque chose qui est sujet, 2739.
7
Cf. S. M. Th. Larkin, C.S.J., Language in the Philosophy of Aristotle, The Hague
Paris 1971, 21ss.
8
Cest sur ce point que leort dEunome peut se dire mtaphysique: la mtaphysique est une onto-thologie, M. Heidegger, Identit et dirence, in :
M. Heidegger, Questions I et II, 289.
9
Cf. M. Laird, Whereof We Speak: Gregory of Nyssa, Jean-Luc Marion and
the Current Apophatic Rage, Heythrop Journal 42 (2001) 112, o plus de rfrences
bibliographiques.
10
Cf. CE II 79 (GNO I 250,36).
11
Cf. CE II 150 (GNO I 269,13).
12
Cf. CE II 158 (GNO I 270,31271,1).
13
Cf. CE II 167 (GNO I 273,25f ).
14
Cf. CE II 174 (GNO I 275,23f ).

georges arabatzis

380

dans la mesure o lintellect dinvention langagire est une uvre

de Dieu.15 Le pouvoir de lintellect produire des ctions est un indice
de la grandeur du pouvoir inventif au sujet des noms.16 La physiologie mme du discours parl chez lhomme prouve limpossibilit
de lattribuer Dieu et de dire que le Trs Haut sexprime en parlant.17 Dire que la cration raconte la grandeur divine nest quune
mtaphore ;18 le discours humain, tout autre que le Logos vritable,
nexistait pas ds le commencement mais il fut cr en mme temps
que la nature humaine.19 Parler apophatiquement, quand, par exemple,
on profre le terme inengendr, est une faon de se taire propos des choses dont on ne peut pas se prononcer. La ngation dune
armation nest pas une armation, cest la rfutation de se prononcer armativement. Les attributs de Dieu, mme sils sont singuliers,
ne peuvent tre contradictoires entre eux.20 Leort de mettre de
lordre catgoriel aux attributs ngatifs de Dieu est, par consquent,
une entreprise dnue dimportance.
Le monde dici-bas, le monde naturel, la dirence du monde
intelligible et supra-cosmique, est le monde des contradictions do
sont ns les noms pour signier les dirences des lments comme,
par exemple, la terre, la jhr, est le contraire de leau.21 Ici, Grgoire
se montre galement ou, peut-tre, aristotlicien encore plus n
quEunome ; de mme, quand il rsume avec justesse la thorie
dAristote sur le bonheur lequel ne connat pas de distinction entre
actuel et potentiel.22 Les divers noms, selon Grgoire, ne sont que
les expressions du mouvement de notre intellect.23 Le monde naturel,
nalement, est la limite de notre usage des noms qui ne sont que
les inventions de la facult discursive, mise notre disposition par
Dieu ;24 la facult onomatopotique des hommes nest pas trangre
leur facult cognitive. Trs importante est, ici, la distinction faite
par Grgoire entre porzein et prosagoreein, cest--dire entre suppler

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Cf.
Cf.
Cf.
Cf.
Cf.
Cf.
Cf.
Cf.
Cf.
Cf.

CE
CE
CE
CE
CE
CE
CE
CE
CE
CE

II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II

185 (GNO I 278,14f ).

190 (GNO I 279,23280,6).
200 (GNO I 283,13f ).
223 (GNO I 290,1622).
236 (GNO I 295,3f ).
478f (GNO I 365,22366,8).
274 (GNO I 307,14).
230 (GNO I 293,16).
391 (GNO I 340,21f ).
395 (GNO I 341,22342,3).

limites du langage, limites du monde

381

une aporie et se prononcer propos de ltre.25 Le terme mme

de porzein est dorigine platonico-aristotlicienne, labor notamment dans le Banquet 26 et dans la mthodologie aristotlicienne qui
distingue entre mthode scientique qui doit rpondre une aporie,
mthode dialectique qui traite dune problmatique et mthode rhtorique qui concerne les questions de croyance. On connat, par
ailleurs, que les penses hellnistique et romaine ont vacu laspect
purement scientique de laristotlisme et ont tent deectuer la
superposition entre dialectique et rhtorique.27
Pour Eunome, les noms ont de la valeur et leur valeur est celle
des choses quils dnomment ; elle nest aucunement la valeur du
pouvoir des fabricants de noms.28 Au niveau de lanalyse de la langue,
cela voulait dire quEunome est partisan dune thorie de dnomination rigide, oppos lide que les noms ne sont que des descriptions abrges comme cest la position de Grgoire. Ainsi, daprs
ce dernier, le nom de Dieu, Yew, est cr pour dsigner le divin
qui est partout visible, yeatn. Dailleurs, cette description abrge
quest le nom Yew ne nous rapproche pas davantage de lessence
divine, pas plus que tout autre nom que les hommes auraient pu
concevoir. Le fait que Dieu dpasse ce rsum nominal est preuve
de sa grandeur indicible.29 En ce qui concerne lerreur dans la dnomination, le paradoxe est quEunome pense que Dieu a attribu aux
tres les plus faibles les noms les plus dignes (timitaton) sans leur
faire partager la part correspondante des dignits, et aux tres suprmes
les noms les plus triviaux sans leur communiquer, en mme temps,
la trivialit naturelle.30 On pourrait, peut-tre, ici, apercevoir une
sorte de critique de la part dEunome adresse la hirarchie ecclsiastique ; en tout cas, on se trouve devant une contradiction au sein de
la pense eunomenne. Pour Grgoire, cet argument eunomen veut
montrer que la dignit concerne les noms seuls tandis que le pouvoir
des noms ne participe pas la valeur qui nest que phnomnale.31

25

Cf. CE II 451 (GNO I 358,12f ).

Cf. S. Kofman, Comment sen sortir?, Paris 1983, 113.
27
Cf. R. McKeon, The Hellenistic and Roman Foundations of the Tradition
of Aristotle in the West, The Review of Metaphysics, 32/4, 128 (1979) 700ss.
28
Cf. CE II 541 (GNO I 384,2124).
29
Cf. CE II 585f (GNO I 396f ).
30
Cf. CE II 315 (GNO I 318,1015).
31
Cf. CE II 331 (GNO I 322,2123).
26

382

georges arabatzis

Sur ce point, la question des valeurs nous introduit celle des

normes qui rgissent le dveloppement de lopposition entre les deux
penses. Il est vident que, malgr toutes leurs dirences dogmatiques, Eunome et Grgoire se rfrent un fond de culture grecque
classique qui leur est commun. Quelle serait, alors, la porte relle
de la controverse entre Grgoire et Eunome ? Pour Jean Danilou,
cette discussion constitue un chanon prcieux de lhistoire des discussions sur lorigine des langues dans lantiquit et nous ouvre des
horizons sur lhistoire du no-platonisme entre Jamblique et Proclus.32
Il vaudrait mieux sattarder ici sur les positions de Danilou propos des thories du langage chez les deux penseurs. Eunome, crit-il, dfend une thorie curieuse, selon laquelle les mots sont rvls
par Dieu. Grgoire lui oppose une doctrine de lorigine humaine du
langage.33 Pour Danilou, les dites thories ne se situent pas exactement dans le prolongement direct des thories antiques mais sont
signicatives dune opposition intrieure au noplatonisme. Danilou
rattache Grgoire au courant noplatonicien exprim notamment par
Hirocls une tradition autre que celle de Plotin, de Porphyre et
de Jamblique malgr le fait quHirocls est postrieur au Pre
grec. Les similitudes seraient dues une source commune, la philosophie dAmmonius Sakkas.34 Le nom dAmmonius Sakkas voque,
bien-sr, dimportantes interrogations sur lorigine de la philosophie
chrtienne,35 auxquelles Danilou naurait pas pu rester indirent.
Malgr les problmes gnraux que les thses exposes ci-dessus
causent lhistorien des ides, nous avons dcel un passage dHirocls
qui rappelle fortement les positions de Grgoire sur larbitraire des
mots et leur dpendance des oprations de la facult intellectuelle.36
32
J. Danilou, Eunome lArien et lexgse no-platonicienne du Cratyle, REG
69 (1956) 412.
33
Ibid.
34
Cf. ibid. et J. Danilou, Grgoire de Nysse et le no-platonisme de lcole
dAthnes, REG 80 (1967) 395401. Les mmes positions se trouvent galement
dans son livre tardif sur Ltre et le temps chez Grgoire de Nysse, 13: Hirocls est
postrieur Grgoire, mais ils paraissent se rattacher une mme forme de noplatonisme. Ici, les proccupations ontologiques de Danilou indiquent un tournant par rapport lexistentialisme de son Platonisme et thologie mystique. Doctrine
spirituelle de saint Grgoire de Nysse, Paris 21953.
35
Cf. H. Langerbeck, The Philosophy of Ammonius Saccas and the Connection
of Aristotelian and Christian Elements Therein, The Journal of Hellenic Studies 57
(1957) 6774.
36
Le texte grec dHirocls est le suivant : t gr toiata [sc. nmata] odn
metxei tw tn nomtvn rythtow, ti mhdn tw osaw tw nergeaw parsthsi

limites du langage, limites du monde

383

Or, quelles sont, plus prcisment, les prrogatives du courant

auquel Grgoire semble-t-il sattacher ? Il parat bien quil sagit de
faire le point sur loriginel autrement que dans les limites de lontothologie. Le statut barbare de la langue se trouve li la condition mme de lhomme. Pour les uns, la langue provient directement
de Dieu cest notamment, selon Danilou, la position dOrigne
et lhomme parcourt lchelle des hypostases. Pour les autres, les
langues font preuve du gnie des peuples et lhomme est une limite
( meyriow) dans le monde. Cest ainsi qu travers la thorisation du
langage on vient repenser le concept mme de lhomme. Est-ce le
mme chemin parcouru par Grgoire ? Rfrons-nous, ici, brivement, Basile le Grand, non pas pour tudier sa propre argumentation contre Eunome mais pour se pencher sur son valuation clbre
de la culture hellnique. Il sagit du trait Aux jeunes gens sur la manire
de tirer prot des lettres hellniques.37 L, et propos de la notion de
valeur, Basile fait une distinction entre la valeur de la vie prsente
et celle de la vie future parallle la distinction entre me et corps.
Cette dernire distinction, dit-il, est un paradigme des plus habituels
(okeivtr) chez les Chrtiens. Elle est, ainsi, une distinction avance
pour servir de signe de dmarcation entre culture hellnique et culture chrtienne. Lme, dit Basile, est timivtra tout aspect du
corps ; similaire cette distinction est la dirence entre les deux
vies et les deux cultures ; le superlatif de timivtra veut la fois
dire la plus digne et la plus honnte. Pour rsumer le noyau
gnosologique de lapproche basilienne, la distinction entre me et
corps ne signie pas, seulement ou littralement, que lhellnisme est
le corps et le christianisme lme mais il sagit plutt dun paradigme

tn pragmtvn kenvn, ow ketai nmata. tn on ntvw rythta tn nomtvn

n tow doiw tn pragmtvn proskei zhten ka totvn n tow yeoiw ka tn
yevn n tow rstoiw. yen ka t to Diw noma smboln sti ka ekn n
fvn dhmiourgikw osaw t tow prtouw yemnouw tow prgmasi t nmata
di sofaw perboln sper tinw galmatopoiow rstouw di tn nomtvn
w di eknvn mfansai atn tw dunmeiw. t gr n t fvn nmata smbola tn n t cux nosevn peirgzonto, tw d noseiw atw gnvstikw
eknaw tn nohyntvn pragmtvn poionto . . . o pollo ox rsi di t xrsyai
ryw taw koinaw nnoaiw, w prosfusen dhmiourgw t logik gnei prw
pgnvsin auto. Hirocls, In Aureum Pythagoreorum Carmen Commentarius (Koehler

105,1426; 108,1519).
37
Cf. Basil le Grand, Aux jeunes gens sur la manire de tirer prot des lettres hellniques
2,20f (Boulenger 43).

384

georges arabatzis

sur le fait que la dirence entre les deux cultures est aussi claire
pour nous que la distinction entre me et corps ; le nous de
Basile veut dire, nous les Chrtiens, mais, aussi, nous qui sommes
dans le vrai ou, autrement, dans la droiture (rythw) de pense. La
droiture de pense, donc, consiste bien faire les distinctions, possder l habitus de la droiture, savoir demeurer dans la droiture.
Pour Grgoire, la puret de raisonnement nest moins imprgne
de philosophie grecque. Il est vrai quil accuse Eunome, comme on
la dj soulign, daristotlisme. Toutefois, il nest pas, lui-mme,
tranger la philosophie du Stagirite comme on la montr plus
haut. Grgoire attribue galement Eunome linuence du Cratyle
de Platon. Le platonisme de Grgoire est tout aussi vident et les
rfrences, par exemple, au Phdre ne sont pas moins importantes,
malgr le fait que la source nest jamais mentionne par son nom.
un moment, Grgoire se permet la libert dironiser sur lducation philosophique de son adversaire quand il rfute laccusation
dEunome que lpnoia est dorigine picurienne et que la conception des mots selon lpnoia correspond un atomisme linguistique :
selon Eunome, si Grgoire dit que les noms viennent de la facult
intellectuelle de lhomme alors le sens est n de lentrelacement de
ces units signicatives,38 entrelacement qui serait analogue au clinamen picurien. Oh, comme Eunome a compris picure !, sexclame
ironiquement Grgoire.39 Bien-sr, leort de la part dEunome de
lier lpnoia lpicurisme nest aucunement innocent car en utilisant le nom dpicure, cest comme sil accusait le parti grgorien
dimpit. Ce bref dbat autour de lpicurisme fait taire dautres
inuences probablement exerces sur la pense grgorienne : on pense
au scepticisme propos de la facult intellectuelle de lhomme ou
lapologie stocienne de la nature. Le comble est que, selon les dires
de Grgoire, juste aprs la rfrence picure, Eunome accuse la
notion dpnoia dtre dorigine aristotlicienne. Dcidment, on a
le sentiment dtre pris dans un jeu de miroirs par rapport aux
rfrences philosophiques des deux hommes.
Or, il semble que le texte de Grgoire comprend deux types de
discours. Le premier est la critique de la mtaphysique eunomenne
o Grgoire arme, avant toute autre chose, que les mots dpendent

38
39

Cf. CE II 410 (GNO I 345,25346,4).

CE II 410 (GNO I 345,29).

limites du langage, limites du monde

385

de lintellect humain. Est-ce pour cette raison que Grgoire serait

un idaliste comme le prtend, par ailleurs, R. Sorabji ?40 Nous ne
le croyons pas en ce qui concerne la thorie grgorienne du langage car, ici, la limite de lusage du langage est, comme on la rpt,
le monde naturel. Or, ce premier type du discours de Grgoire est
transcend par un deuxime, une sorte de jeu de langage autorfrentiel des deux opposants. Un indice qui pourrait nous orienter est la distinction grgorienne suivante : plusieurs reprises Grgoire
accuse Eunome en utilisant le terme pjoratif de logogrfow ou de
texnolgow. Par contre, quand il parle de Basile, il fait tat d auditeur prudent (sunetw kroatw),41 empruntant le terme sae.
Airmer ainsi une telle dirence cest rester en plein champ platonicien ; on pense lapologie du discours parl fait par Platon dans
son Phdre, contre la logografa de Lysis.
On devrait insister, ici, sur les points suivants : il est vident quaussi
bien Grgoire quEunome construisent leurs propos sur un fond commun de tradition philosophique ; or, Grgoire se dresse avec un zle
particulier contre les eorts eunomens de substantialisation du langage. La manire dont Eunome intgre les mots au sein de la Cration
ressemble fort des absoluits du langage qui fournissent le matriel
certains des plus brillants rcits de Jorge Luis Borges. Grgoire
nest pas seulement schmatique quand il accuse Eunome dtre un
sophiste ; il distingue dune faon claire chez ce dernier un rductionnisme du tout au langage ; do probablement lattachement de
Grgoire des formulations contenues dans le Phdre de Platon, o
est dfendue lide dune saine rhtorique. Par ailleurs, les thses de
Grgoire sont dun rel intrt en ce qui concerne les interrogations
modernes propos de la dirence ontologique ; sur cette question
le passage du CE III qui a ouvert notre texte est profondment
signicatif. En vrit, laperception dun pareil dirence entre le
langage et le monde nest pas caractristique de lontologie seule.42
La mise en rapport avec la modernit prouve que Grgoire, sur la

40
R. Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum. Theories in Antiquity and the Early
Middle Ages, London 1983, 287ss.
41
CE II 49 (GNO I 240,4).
42
Ltonnement devant lexistence du monde dont parle encore Wittgenstein . . .
pouvait mme autoriser un rapprochement avec Heidegger ou, du moins, une comparaison; J. Lacoste, La philosophie au XX e sicle, Paris, 1988, 38. Cf. galement ce
fameux passage de Wittgenstein: la proposition est capable de reprsenter la ralit, mais elle nest pas capable de reprsenter ce quelle doit avoir de commun avec

386

georges arabatzis

base des outils fournis par la philosophie classique, a su restructurer

les donnes conceptuelles sa disposition.
Pour Danilou, dans le champ du langage, la conception relle
de Grgoire et de Basile est la conception commune des grammairiens,
celle que nous appellerons scientique.43 Par ailleurs, ce que nous
voyons revivre en Grgoire de Nysse, crit-il, cest lesprit scientique
de la Grce classique, celui des prsocratiques et des aristotliciens.44
Plus prcisment, le fait de lier le langage la nature de lhomme
et de penser lhomme comme limite laisse ouverte la possibilit, pour
un chrtien comme Grgoire, de se prouver homme de science ou,
autrement, dexplorer le champ scientique dlimit par Basile dans
son trait sur les lettres hellniques, celui des sciences littraires. Cest
peut-tre cela que les spcialistes de la dconstruction en matire de
religion appellent logophasis au sein de lapophasis grgorienne, pour
distinguer la positivit du discours de la thologie mystique de toute
sorte dhyper-essentialit.45 En sopposant Eunome, Grgoire, la
suite de Basile, garantit les potentialits du discours potique (au sens
aristotlicien du terme) de lge chrtien.

la ralit pour pouvoir reprsenter la ralit, savoir la

voir reprsenter la forme logique, il nous faudrait, avec
lextrieur de la logique, cest--dire lextrieur du
Tractatus logico-philosophicus, trad. fr., Paris 1961, prop.
P. Hadot, Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique, nouvelle
te, Paris 2002, chap. La thologie ngative, 249.
43
J. Danilou, Eunome lArien, 416.
44
Ibid., p. 432.
45
Cf. M. Laird, Whereof We Speak.

forme logique. Pour poula proposition nous situer

monde; L. Wittgenstein,
4.12, cit notamment in
dition revue et augmen-

GLOSSOGONY OR EPISTEMOLOGY?
EUNOMIUS OF CYZICUS AND BASIL
OF CAESAREAS STOIC CONCEPT OF EPINOIA
AND ITS MISREPRESENTATION
BY GREGORY OF NYSSA
John A. Demetracopoulos

My intention1 is to shed more light on Gregory of Nyssas attempt

at justifying Basil of Caesareas views of pnoia and show that in
so doing he misrepresented Basils (as well as Eunomius) views.
Before, however, examining the most relevant passages from Gregorys
Contra Eunomium II, some crucial notes on what pnoia means in
Eunomius and Basils texts are naturally in order.
Epnoia was placed in the context of the Trinitarian quarrels of
the 4th century by Eunomius. Unfortunately, Eunomius usage of
this term in his rst piece, the Apologa, is rather obscure. Nowhere
does he dene it; he just uses it thrice in the 8th chapter:
Agnnhton d lgontew, ok nmati mnon kat pnoian nyrvpnhn

semnnein omeya den , potinnnai d kat lyeian t pntvn

nagkaitaton flhma t Ye, tn to enai stin mologan. T gr
toi kat pnoian legmena, n nmasi mnon ka profor t enai

1
Let a double note be made in advance. This paper is a highly selective abridgment of a forthcoming monograph of mine on The Philosophical Theology of Eunomius
of Cyzicus: a Restoration, Athens, forthcoming in 2007. For more documentation and
full secondary literature one should refer to the monograph. Secondly, its point happens to clash with the established admiration of Gregory of Nyssa and match with
the critical approach to his thought inaugurated by H. F. Cherniss and followed
recently by C. G. Stead and others. The former, in his old well-known study, The
Platonism of Gregory of Nyssa, Berkeley 1930, concluded that Gregory, in his attempt
at submitting philosophy to theology, contradicted himself at every point (H. F.
Cherniss, The Platonism, 57; 63) and that in his polemic against Eunomius . . . every
weapon is used that is suited to hurt the enemy (27), regardless of the inconsistencies in which he was involved. The latter, in his Ontology and Terminology
in Gregory of Nyssa (in: H. Drrie M. Altenburger U. Schramm, eds., Gregor
von Nyssa und die Philosophie. Zweites internationales Kolloquium ber Gregor von Nyssa,
Freckenhorst bei Mnster 18.23. September 1972, Leiden 1976, 107127, esp. 107)
concluded from his research into special topics that Gregory lacks the essential
attributes of the philosopher the concern for consistency and the respect for
truth. Provided [his conclusions] seem reasonably persuasive, he is satised; and

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john a. demetracopoulos
xonta, taw fvnaw sundialesyai pfuken, d Yew ka sivpntvn
ka fyeggomnvn ka gegenhmnvn ka pr to gensyai t nta n te
ka stin gnnhtow.2

Surprisingly enough, no scholar has thus far paid due attention to

the mnon of the rst sentence.3 Contrary to what Basil and Gregory
say of Eunomius pnoia, this mnon shows that Eunomius does not
discard pnoia en bloc; what he says is just that conceiving God
through pnoia is not sucient (o . . . mnon), since there is a way of
a closer approach to His being (t enai, osa or pstasiw).
Eunomius, when saying potinnnai . . . kat lyeian (not just kat
pnoian), used the Stoic distinction between lhyw and lyeia.4
Alhyw is a truth which can be possessed even by a non-sage, who
does not know why what he believes is true and, for that reason,
may wrongly change his mind and fall into falsehood. That is why
Eunomius says that t . . . kat pnoian legmena . . . taw fvnaw sundialesyai pfuken.5 Alyeia, in contrast with lhyw, is the rmly

this [is] characteristic of his . . . opportunistic use of philosophical themes (C. G.

Stead, Ontology and Terminology, 116; cf. id., Why Not Three Gods? The
Logic of Gregory of Nyssas Trinitarian Doctrine, in: H. R. Drobner C. Klock,
eds., Studien zu Gregor von Nyssa und der christlichen Sptantike, Leiden New York
Kbenhavn Kln 1990, 149163, esp. 149). This is the spirit of my monograph
Philosophy and Faith. The Demonstrability of Christian Dogmas according to Gregory of Nyssa
or Fides deprecans intellectum, Athens 1996, where Cherniss main point was enriched
and systematized by a list of Gregorys plain contradictions in matters regarding
ontology, epistemology, logic, ethics, and apologetics.
2
Eunomius, Apologia 8 (Vaggione 4042; SC 305, 246248).
3
Even desperate corrections of this passage (in full despise of the manuscript
evidence) have been suggested, so as to make it match somehow with the standard
interpretation (see e.g. K.-H. Uthemann, Die Sprache der Theologie nach Eunomius
von Cyzicus, ZKG 104 [1993] 143175, esp. 153).
4
See Sextus Empiricus Adversus Mathematicos VIII 8183 (Mutchmann II 120121)
(VIII 8084, Mutchmann II 120121: Per lhyow ka lhyeaw). Cf. A. A. Long,
Language and Thought in Stoicism, in: A. A. Long (ed.), Problems in Stoicism,
London 1971, 75113 (esp. 98112). An ethical statement in chapter 13 of the
Apologa is very close to the main ethical corollary drawn by the Stoics from their
distinction between lhyw and lyeia. This distinction taken for granted the
Stoics said that falsehood does not consist in uttering something contrary to an
lhyw but in clashing with lyeia, ceudw or lhyw are words which x the
truth or falsity of statements made at a particular time (A. A. Long, Language
and Thought, 101). Likewise, Eunomius declares that speaking the truth is good
not in principle but only under conditions: mhdn tn lhyn [nota bene the careful use of lhyw, not lyeia] n kair ka mtr legomnvn pation (Eunomius,
Apologia 13,34, Vaggione 48; SC 305, 258).
5
Let us also recall the Biblical dictum: Logismo gr ynhtn deilo, ka pisfalew a pnoiai mn (Sap 9,14).

glossogony or epistemology?

389

established edication of all the particular truths by the sage, who

always knows fully what he talks about.6
Let us go back to pnoia. Eunomius Apologa oers us some
important information with regard to the logical status of pnoia.
In chapters 1618, a distinction is drawn between two classes of
divine names. Under the rst one fall various names which regard
God per se for example, being, not-generate, incorruptible,
immortal, eternal, life and light. Since, however, God is simple, they all have the same reference and meaning when applied
to Him. In terms of ancient Logic, they are polunuma, that is synonyms. On the other hand, the second (and lower) class of divine
names, which are the various pnoiai, comprises ternuma, which
describe God ad extra, that is His various relations with the world
(protector, saviour etc.).
Let us now turn to Basils response to Eunomius. As I have argued
elsewhere,7 Basils Adversus Eunomium (363366) I 67 (SC 299, 182192)
should be regarded our principal source for the Stoic pnoia. Basils
aim was to reconcile the multiplicity of Gods names with His substantial simplicity. And he drew upon Plotinus Enneads VI 2 [43]
3,2025:
Olvw d svw od t En [i.e. the Second One] faton ation tow
lloiw enai, ll oon mrh ato ka oon stoixea ato ka pnta
man fsin merizomnhn taw mn pinoaiw, at d enai . . . n ew
pnta ka fainmenon poll ka ginmenon poll.

Plotinus (VI 2 [43] 4,19; 14) brings forth the simile of body, which,
albeit one, is composed of a substratum and its various properties
6
By the way, grasping Gods essence does not mean for Eunomius knowing
Gods quid est, as he is constantly accused from his time, e.g. by Basil of Caesarea
(Adversus Eunomium I 12,9, SC 299, 212; cf. Gregory of Nyssas Contra Eunomium II
67129; GNO I 245,19263,20) up to-day; for, according to Eunomius, God is
sgkritow (Apologia 9; 11; 26; Vaggione 42,3, 46,79 and 68,37; SC 305, 250,3,
256,7 and 288,49), that is radically dierent from anything else. Rather, grasping
Gods essence means just realizing the unbridgeable gap between Him and His
creatures, that is realizing His uniqueness. Thus, Eunomius statement that gn(n)hton
or gen(n)hsa is Gods essence is no rationalistic in tenor; as a matter of fact,
this statement is just a reproduction of a passage from Dionysius of Alexandrias
writing Per to m gnnhton enai tn lhn, which is partially preserved in
Eusebius Praeparatio evangelica VII 19,3 (GCS 43/1, 401,1213): Atoagnhtn stin
Yew ka osa stn ato, w n epoi tiw, genhsa.
7
The Sources of Content and Use of pnoia in Basil of Caesareas Adversus
Eunomium I: Stoicism and Plotinus (in Modern Greek with an English summary),
Buzantin (Salonica) 20 (1999) 742.

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john a. demetracopoulos

(magnitude, colour, shape etc.), which are divided by our reasoning

(lg). Basil states a similar view and puts forward the same simile,
in order to describe Gods simplicity and multiplicity.
Basil insisted on the exact signicance of Plotinus pnoia. Drawing,
in all probability, upon the (lost) logical part of Arius Didymus Epitome,8 he produced three denitions. Epnoia is an epistemological
process through which our mind discerns the various (past, present
and future) aspects of a thing perceived through a koin nnoia as
one and simple. Through this afterthought one divides a being into:
i) its parts (1st denition); ii) its categorical properties (instances of
substance, quality, quantity etc.) (1st denition); iii) its previous and
next states or acts, relying on its present state (2nd denition). The
third case falls under what the Stoics called pilogismw, which uncovers t prskaira dhla, namely, what cannot be grasped, for a
given moment, directly through the senses. The 3rd denition includes
the properties of the two previous ones: as pnoia can be dened
any speculative analysis of a being prima facie perceived as one.
As one can see in the Appendix, Basils doctrine is almost identical with the epistemological process described in a text contemporary to him, namely, pseudo-Augustines Categoriae decem (ca. 350/380),
which in fact comes from Themistius (317ca. 388) circle.9
Needless to say, Basils restriction10 of Eunomius pnoiai to imaginary things, such as mythological monsters, or to senseless words,11
is false. As we saw, Eunomius regarded pnoia as a preliminary
stage of grasping God, not as mere babbling. And in this point

8
See my forthcoming monograph: The Philosophical Theology of Eunomius of Cyzicus:
a Restoration, Excursus II (The Source of Eunomius Stoic Epistemological and
Logical Ideas: Arius Didymus [or Arius Augusti] deperditus).
9
See my paper Alcuin and the Realm of Application of Aristotles Categories,
in J. Merinhs A. Pacheco (eds.), Actes du XI e Congrs International de Philosophie
Mdivale: Intellect and Imagination in the Middle Ages, Porto (Portugal), 2530/8/2002,
Vol. I, Porto 2004, 950959. Cf. also id., Stoic Epistemology in the Early Middle
Ages. Epnoia in Basil of Caesareas Adversus Eunomium, Intentio in Pseudo-Augustines
Categoriae decem, and Alcuins Aspectual Theory of Aristotles Categories (forthcoming
in the Archiv fr mittelalterliche Philosophie und Kultur 13, 2007). Let it be noted that in
the Latin text pnoia is called intentio. As we will see (cf. infra, pp. 392393), a
similar process is described by the verb intendere in Ciceros Academica.
10
Basil of Caesarea, Adversus Eunomium I 6,3435 (SC 299, 186).
11
I.e. the so-called shmoi fvna (blturi, skindacw etc. mentioned by Gregory
of Nyssa in CE III/V 44, GNO II 176,67). Cf. Basils Adversus Eunomium I 6,23
(SC 299, 182).

glossogony or epistemology?

391

Eunomius and Basil are in fact in accord with each other, regardless of what the latter said of the former.
Let it be added that Basils pnoiai, like the Eunomian ones, correspond to the logical status of ternuma. For example, Basils example of the various aspects of stow (seed, fruit, bread) had been
produced two centuries earlier by Alexander of Aphrodisias,12 who
had explicitly called these aspects ternuma.
Let us now see how Gregory of Nyssa presents and defends Basils
pnoia against Eunomius. First, Gregory reproduces, just as unfairly,
Basils misinterpretation of Eunomius pnoia. This can be seen, for
example, in the following passage from Eunomius Upr tw Apologaw
pologa as preserved and bitterly commented upon by Gregory:
. . . at diakvmde tw pinoaw t noma. Tn gr otv kat pnoian
legomnvn, fhs, t mn kat tn proforn xein mnhn tn parjin,
w t mhdn shmanonta, t d kat dan dinoian: ka totvn t mn
kat ajhsin, w p tn kolossiavn, t d kat mevsin, w p tn
pugmavn, t d kat prsyesin, w p tn polukeflvn, kat
snyesin, w p tn mijoyrvn. . . . Orw ew t tn pnoian mn
sofw diakermatsaw peraitrv tn dnamin atw proelyen ok jvsen.
Asmanton ena fhsi tn pnoian, dianhton, t par fsin sofizomnhn, diakolobosan pertenousan t rismna mtra tw
fsevw, j terofun suntiyesan terateuomnhn taw lloktoiw
prosykaiw. En totoiw katapajaw to tw pinoaw nmatow, xrhston
atn ka nnhton t b . . . podeknusin.13

Eunomius lists the Stoic ways of producing imaginary ideas as preserved in Sextus Empiricus.14 As a matter of fact, however, he does
not reduce pnoia to these sorts of beings. This is indicated by the
usually discarded opening word of his passage: otv. Imaginary things
and words without sense are t otv kat pnoian legmena, not all
t kat pnoian legmena. And yet, Gregory in his interpretation
passes otv over in silence.
Anyway, that Gregory would not treat Eunomius better than his
brother did would be all too expected; to mention Ammianus

12

Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Metaphysica (CAG I 247,1829).

CE II 179180 (GNO I 276,21277,7).
14
Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos VIII 5860 (Mutschmann II 115116);
III 4050 (Mau III 115117). Cf. Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum VII 5253
(Marcovich I 475476). The mode kat prsyesin does not occur in Sextus or
Laertius; this means that Eunomius had used a Stoic source unknown to us.
13

392

john a. demetracopoulos

Marcellinus,15 nullas infestas hominibus bestias, ut sunt sibi ferales plerique

Christianorum expertus . . . What, however, is rather unexpected is that
Gregory fails to describe correctly even his own brothers views. Let
us recall his denition of pnoia:
Esti gr kat ge tn mn lgon pnoia fodow eretik tn
gnooumnvn, di tn prosexn te ka koloyvn t prt per t
spoudazmenon nosei t fejw jeurskousa. Nosantew gr ti per
to zhtoumnou, t rx to lhfyntow di tn feuriskomnvn nohmtvn
sunarmzontew t klouyon, ew t praw tn spoudazomnvn tn
gxerhsin gomen.16

Gregory accompanies this denition by a set of examples taken from

the various arts, liberal and illiberal, which show that, in contrast to
Basils conception of pnoia, his own conception was not epistemological. Whereas Basil speaks of discovering more truths about reality,
Gregory speaks of inventing things and adding them up to reality for
the benet of humankind. In so doing, Gregory seems not to draw
upon any logical work, as Basil did, but upon Philo of Alexandrias
doctrine of the origins of civilization from nyrvpnh pnoia.17
Philos description of pnoia seems to be Stoic. In a passage from
Ciceros Academica, where the general Stoic idea of philosophy is
expounded and defended against radical Scepticism, intendere, which,
as we saw, in pseudo-Augustines Categoriae decem (Paraphrasis Themistiana)

15

Ammianus Marcellinus, Historia XXII 5,4 (Fontaine 99).

CE II 182 (GNO I 277,2026).
17
Philo of Alexandria, De praemiis 145,7 (Cohn V 370); De fuga 168,25 (Wendland
III 146147); De mutatione 249,2 (Wendland III 200); De specialibus legibus I 334,13;
335,3; 345,3; 336,1 (Cohn V 81; 81; 84; 81); De migratione 142 (Wendland II 295);
De somniis I 204,23; I 40,12; II 212,6 (Wendland III 249; 213; 251). Cf. Clement
of Alexandria, Stromata I 16,74,180,6 (GCS 15, 47,2052,23). On Gregorys reading of Philos writings see J. Danilou, Platonisme et thologie mystique. Doctrine spirituelle
de saint Grgoire de Nysse, Paris 1944, 7477; 262266; 274276; id., Ltre et le temps
chez Grgoire de Nysse, Leiden 1970, 31; 8593; 107; 117132; D. T. Runia, Philo and
the Church Fathers. A Collection of Papers, Leiden New York Kln 1995, 1819;
129; 145151; 257258. Occasione data I cannot resist the temptation to suggest (even
though without documentation) in brief a new parallel between Philo and Gregory;
the latters famous identication of the everlasting search for God (In Ecclesiasten
VII, GNO V 400,20401,2) with the very nding of Him sounds as an echo of
Philos strikingly similar idea in Legum allegoriae I 3250 (Cohn I 6973), esp. 36
and 40, where the fundamental tenet of the ephectic Sceptics that they ti zhtosin
(Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhoniae hypotyposes I 2, Bury I 4) seems to be assimilated into
the Platonic framework of Philos doctrine of the transcendence of God and the
16

glossogony or epistemology?

393

corresponds to Basil of Caesareas pnoia (cf. Appendix, p. 395) is

used in both epistemological and cultural senses:
Mens enim ipsa, quae sensuum fons est atque etiam ipsa sensus est, naturalem
vim habet, quam intendit ad ea quibus movetur. Itaque alia visa sic arripit, ut
iis statim utatur, alia quasi recondit, e quibus memoria oritur; cetera autem similitudinibus construit, ex quibus eciuntur notitiae rerum, quas Graeci tum nnoaw
tum prolceiw vocant; eo cum accessit ratio argumentique conclusio rerumque
innumerabilium multitudo, tum et perceptio eorum omnium apparet et eadem ratio
perfecta is gradibus ad sapientiam pervenit.
Ad rerum igitur scientiam vitaeque constantiam aptissima cum sit, mens hominis
amplectitur maxime cognitionem et istam katlhcin, quam, ut dixi, verbum e
verbo exprimentes conprensionem dicemus, cum ipsam per se amat. Nihil enim est
ei veritatis luce dulcius tum etiam propter usum. Quocirca et sensibus utitur et
artes ecit quasi sensus alteros et usque eo philosophiam ipsam corroborat, ut virtutem eciat, ex qua re una vita omnis apta sit.
Ergo i qui negant quicquam posse conprendi, haec ipsa eripiunt vel instrumenta vel ornamenta vitae, vel potius etiam totam vitam evertunt funditus
ipsumque animal orbant animo, ut dicile sit de temeritate eorum perinde ut causa
postulat dicere.

The anti-Sceptical conclusion of this passage reminds us strongly of

Gregorys bitter attack on Eunomius alleged nihilistic views of
human mind.18
True, Gregory distinguishes between discovering and inventing.
Yet, this releases him neither from wrongly ascribing to Basils pnoia
the sense of invention nor from another fundamental confusion, which
has to do with another misrepresentation of Eunomian thought. The
reason why Gregory refers to pnoia in the Philonic sense of the term
is that he wants to combat Eunomius alleged doctrine of the natural
character (fsei) of the names and explain language in terms of
mans own mental ability and inventiveness, that is in terms of pnoia.
This strategy led him to transfer Basils pnoia from the eld of
epistemology, to which it plainly and exclusively belongs, to the eld
of glossogony. Gregory refers to Basils 2nd denition of pnoia as
follows:

correlate idea that the very seeking of God, even without nding, is felicity itself.
This is, I think, one of the roots of Gregorys concept of perpetual progress. Let
it be also added that the ascription of the multifarious sects of civilization to pnoia
in CE II 181183 (GNO I 277,7278,4) may share a common Greek source with
the theory of the origins of civilization based on inventio atque excogitatio as expounded
in Ciceros Tusculanae disputationes I 2527, 6267 (Pohlenz 248251).
18
CE II 180191 (GNO I 276,29280,21).

394

john a. demetracopoulos
To d meglou Basileou dioryvsamnou tn pathmnhn pnoian ka
tina per tn nomtvn diejelyntow w ok k fsevw ntvn, ll
kat pnoian pikeimnvn tow prgmasi . . .19
. . . Per tw tn nomtvn nnoaw yevra prokeito, pteron fsin
ndeknutai pinohtikw k tn nergein nomzetai.20

That in so doing he does not do justice to Basils pnoia is obvious.

What is more, the reason why he led himself to this lateral loss
rests on shaky foundations, too. For, if we remember what we said
of Eunomius doctrine of the divine names in the Apologa, we
shall realize that Eunomius accepted a conventional (ysei) doctrine
of human language. He accepted the existence of polunuma, that
is of various names standing for one and the same thing: mhd taw
fvnaw pfuken kolouyen tn pragmtvn fsiw, tow d prgmasin
farmzesyai kat tn jan tn nomtvn dnamiw.21
As of the passages from the Upr tw Apologaw pologa produced by Gregory in order to show that Eunomius regarded some
names, such as gn(n)htow, as natural, they all admit of an interpretation compatible with the plain conventional doctrine of Apologa.
According to Eunomius, some names are natural only in the sense
that their signi (not their signiant) denotes the essential properties of the things they stand for.
Rebus sic stantibus, Gregorys long argumentation for the conventional
character of human speech22 is just an ignoratio elenchi, since it misses
the point of Eunomius theonymy and epistemology,23 whose conception
of pnoia actually does not dier from Basil of Caesareas pnoia
and the intentio of the heavily Stoicizing Paraphrasis Themistiana of
Aristotles Categories.
19

CE II 125 (GNO I 262,2124). Cf. ibid. (GNO I 262,2728): kat pnoian

lgesyai vs. tn fsin paristnai.

20
CE II 354 (GNO I 329,2022). Gregorys distinction between k fsevw and
pinohtikw is met in Origens Selecta in Genesim (PG 12, 100: fusikw . . ., ka ok
pinohtikw).
21

Eunomius, Apologia 18 (Vaggione 5456; SC 305, 266268).

CE II 246292 (GNO I 298,17312,25).
23
A brief note on J. Danilous well-known and much-worn article on the alleged
anity of Eunomius linguistic doctrine with that of Jamblichus De mysteriis Aegyptiorum
(Eunome lArien et lexgse no-platonicienne du Cratyle, REG 69, 1956, 412432).
Danilous argumentation for this anity rests on two rotten premisses. Firstly, it
takes for Eunomius view whatever Gregory of Nyssa reports from his study of the
lost Upr tw Apologaw pologa. Secondly, it mistakes Jamblichus doctrine
of the magical power of the sound of the traditional divine names used in the pagan
rituals for a doctrine of how humans acquire some knowledge of God, whereas,
according to Jamblichus, the divine names are eective in terms of their signiant,
even if their content is not understood by the auditors of the ritual.
22

glossogony or epistemology?

395

APPENDIX
Epnoia in Basil of Caesareas Adversus Eunominum I 67 and intentio in
the Paraphrasis Themistiana (pseudo-Augustines Categoriae decem), 2729.24

Basil of Caesarea

Paraphrasis Themistiana

Uploipon d n eh [1] deiknnai {2}, pw [3] mn sunyeia

{4} ka p povn pragmtvn {5}
t pino& [6] xrtai [7], pw d
t yea lgia tn xrsin [7] atw
paredjato.
[1st denition of pnoia] Ormen tonun [8] ti n mn [9a] t
koin xrsei [7] t taw yraiw
pibolaw to no [10] pl dokonta [11] enai [12a] ka monax [12b], taw d [9b] kat
leptn jetsesi poikla fainmena ka poll [13], tata t n
[10] diairomena {14} pino& [6]
mn diairet [14a/b] lgetai.
Oon, t sma [15] plon mn
[9a] ena fhsin {16a} prth
nteujiw {16b}, poiklon d [9a]
lgow pin deknusi, t pino&
[6] at ew t j n sgkeitai
[17] dialvn {14}, xrma [18] ka
sxma ka ntitupan ka mgeyow
ka t loip {19} . . .
[2nd denition] . . . ste met t
prton mn p tw asysevw [20]

Restat [1] ut ~eorum quae sunt {5}

quo pacto [3] Aristoteles {4} tractaverit [7] enarremus {2}.
Sunt igitur [8] illa quae aut percipimus sensibus [20] aut mente et
cogitatione [10] colligimus: sensibus
[20] tenemus quae aut videndo
aut contrectando aut audiendo aut
gustando aut odorando cognoscimus [22]; mente [10] ut, cum quis
equum aut hominem vel quodlibet animal viderit [11], quamquam
unum [12b] corpus [15] esse [12a]
respondeat {16a/b}, intelligit tamen
[9a/b] multis [13] partibus esse concretum [17 e contrario] (siquidem alia
sit pars capitis, alia pedum caeterorumque membrorum, in ipso
capite partes suas aures habeant,
habeat propriam lingua, ipsae
quoque partes singulae multa [13]
in se habeant quae dividi et separari
[14a] possunt [14b], ut caro sit
aliud, aliud corium, aliud venae,
aliud nervi, capilli aliud; ergo haec
mente vel intellectu [10] colligimus,

24
Basil of Caesarea, Adversus Eunomium I 6,1929; 4151; 5457; I 7,129 (SC
299, 184190); Pseudo-Augustini paraphrasis Themistiana 2729 (Minio-Paluello 139,9140,6
[= PL 32, 1423]). The self-same parallels are marked with numbers in square
brackets [1, 2, 3 . . .], whereas the synonym or inferred parallels (e.g., 4) are marked
with numbers in hook brackets {1, 2, 3 . . .}.

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john a. demetracopoulos

gginmenon nhma [21] tn leptotran ka kribestran to nohyntow [21] penymhsin pnoian

[6] nomzesyai: yen sunyeia
{4} kale pilogismn, e ka m
okevw.25 Oon to stou nhma
[21] mn [9a] plon nuprxei psi,
kay fannta {11} gnvrzomen
[22]: n d [9b] t kribe per
ato jetsei yevra [23] te pleinvn [13] prosrxetai ka proshgorai diforoi tn nohyntvn [21]
shmantika. Tn gr atn ston nn
mn [24a] karpn lgomen, nn d
[24b] sprma, ka plin trofn:
karpn mn w tlow tw parelyoshw gevrgaw, sprma d w
rxn tw melloshw, trofn d
w katllhlon ew prosykhn t
to prosferomnou smati. Totvn
d kaston tn legomnvn . . . kat
pnoian [6] yevretai [23].
[3rd denition] Ka pajaplw pnta t t asysei [20] gnrima [22] ka pl mn enai t
pokeimn [25] dokonta [11],
poiklon d lgon kat tn yevran [23] pidexmena, pino& [6]
yevrht [23] lgetai . . .
Eggw d to toiotou trpou
[3] tw pinoaw [6] tn xrsin [7]
ka par to yeou dedidgmeya

ad quae nostri sensus [20] penetrare

non possunt).
Consideramus [23] et illa [19], et
animi [10] intentione [6] cognoscimus
[22], vel hominem vel aliud animal crescere, senescere, nunc [24a]
stare nunc [24b] movere gressum,
modo [24a] angi curis modo [24b]
securo pectore conquiescere, sanitate alias [26a] frui alias [26b]
dolorem perpeti, ex nigro album,
nigrum ex albo colorem [18] mutari, peritum ex imperito, ex indocto doctum, ex mansueto ferum,
ex feroci mansuetum.
Cum igitur, in iis quae sunt {5},
alia sensibus [20], alia mentibus [21]
colligantur, separari haec propriis
nominibus homines eruditi maluerunt, et id quod dinoscitur [22]
sensibus [20] usian [26b] dici,
illud autem quod animi [10] tractatu [7] colligitur ac saepe mutatur
sumbebhkw (id est accidens)
nominari voluerunt. Et quoniam
in permanente usia [25b] ea quae
accidunt inesse noscuntur, ipsam
usian [25b] pokemenon [25a] (id
est subjacens) et non in subjecto appellari voluerunt, illa vero
quae accidunt, n pokeimn
(id est in subjacenti) dixerunt.26

25
For the genuineness of this semicolon on pilogismw see my The Sources of
Content, 1718.
26
For a full analysis of the parallels (especially the ad sensum ones) see my Stoic
Epistemology.

glossogony or epistemology?
lgou . . . O Kriow mn Ihsow
Xristw . . . , n [12b] n [12a] kat
t pokemenon [25a] ka ma [12b]
osa [25b] ka pl ka snyetow {17 e contrario}, llote [26a/b]
llvw autn nomzei taw pinoaiw [6] diaferosaw lllvn tw
proshgoraw meyarmozmenow . . .
Ka otvw n tiw tn nomtvn
kaston fodevn poiklaw eroi
tw pinoaw [6] nw [12b] kstou to kat tn osan [25b]
tow psin pokeimnou [25a].

397

HE BRANDISHES OVER US
THIS ARISTOTELIAN WEAPON (CE II 620).
AN EXAMPLE OF (MIS)USE OF ARISTOTLES NAME
IN THE CONTROVERSY OVER UNBEGOTTENNESS*
Ladislav Chvtal

H tn Aristotlouw ntvw mn ka Xrusppou

sullogismn dei prw t mayen, ti gnnhtow
o gegnnhtai;

(Basil of Caesarea, C. Eun. I,5,43)

lieutikw, ll ok Aristotelikw

(Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. 23,12,12)

As the main topic of my paper, I have chosen an example of the

use or misuse of Aristotles name and his heritage in Gregory of
Nyssas Contra Eunomium II. This article could be regarded as a contribution both (I) to the debate about the reception of Aristotle and
his philosophy by the Greek Fathers, and (II) to the discussion about
the concept of unbegottenness (gennhsa) between the Cappadocians
and the Eunomians.

Introduction
By attaching an appendix on Aristotle in the Church Fathers to
his Lidal religieux des Grecs et lvangile (1932), a text on both the
philosophical and religious aspects of Greek culture,1 A. J. Festugire
stirred up discussion concerning the attitude of Greek patristics to

* I am greatly indebted to P. Dvok and S. Douglass for their valuable comments and remarks about this essay.
1
Cf. A. J. Festugire, Lidal religieux des Grecs et lvangile, Paris 21981, 221263
(Excursus C. Aristotle dans la littrature grecque chrtienne jusqu Thodoret).
This appendix is actually a question: how it could have happened that the Fathers
so decisively rejected the philosophy which later was to form the foundation of the
most successful and inuential Christian philosophy ever devised? Cf. D. T. Runia,
Festugire Revisited: Aristotle in the Greek Patres, VigChr 43 (1989) 2.

400

ladislav chvtal

Aristotelian philosophy.2 David Runia has enlarged and elaborated

on Festugires conclusions.3 The nucleus of Runias paper is an
extended list of all references to Aristotle and his school in the Greek
Fathers.4 According to this revised list of occurrences, the name of
Aristotle (or Aristotelian or Peripatetic) is found eight times in Gregory
of Nyssa and twice in the second book of the Contra Eunomium.5
In a section discussing the origin of words (CE II 403442), Gregory
mentions Aristotle as Eunomius champion and ally in doctrine.6
This is because Eunomius argues for the divine origin of naming
and words using a doctrine ascribed to Aristotle in the doxographic
tradition which excludes divine providence from the sublunar world.7
In this essay, I restrict myself to the second occurrence relating to
an Aristotelian weapon (CE II 620). The rst part deals with the
formal structure of the Aristotelian argument, the second with its
content and contextual aspects.

I. Formal analysis: Aristotelian weapon in the CE II

According to the division of Pottier, the tail end of CE II concerns
quelques thses mineures dEunome (CE II 561627), amongst
which he ranks a passage devoted to Eunomius dishonesty (CE II
611627).8 This passage deals with the question of whether God

2
Besides Festugires and Ruinas essays mentioned above and below let us quote
other inuential studies: e.g. G. Lazzati, LAristotele perduto e gli scrittori cristiani, Milano
1937; H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, Cambridge (MA) 1956;
J. Danilou, Message vanglique et culture hellnistique, Tournai 1961; J. C. van Winden,
An Early Christian Philosopher, Leiden 1971; L. J. Elders, The Greek Christian Authors
and Aristotle, Doctor Communis 43 (1990) 2657.
3
Cf. D. T. Runia, Festugire Revisited, 134.
4
Cf. D. T. Runia, Festugire Revisited, 512.
5
CE I 46; 55 (GNO I 37,20; 41,4); CE II 411; 620 (GNO I 346,5; 407,25); CE
III/V 6 (GNO II 162,11); CE III/VII 15 (GNO II 220,4); CE III/X 50 (GNO II
309,9); De an. et res. (PG 46, 52b3c1). However, the writings of Gregory show
numerous reminiscences of Aristotle without naming him. E.g. only in the work In
Canticum canticorum there are in Langerbecks opinion about 40 places where the terms
may have been taken over from Aristotle; cf. In Canticum canticorum (GNO VI 483484).
6
CE II 411 (GNO I 346,45): prostthw ato ka smmaxow tn dogmtvn.
7
CE II 411 (GNO I 346,415).
8
B. Pottier, Dieu et le Christ selon Grgoire de Nysse, Namur 1994, 430. On the other
divisions of CE II according S. Hall and L. Karfkov, see the results of this discussion above, p. 5557; cf. A. Schindler, Die Begrndung der Trinittslehre in der eunomianischen Kontroverse, unpublished disertation thesis, Zrich 1964, 190.

(mis)use

of aristotles name

401

comes from non-being. Eunomius had accused Basil of this assertion. After presenting his opponents argument word-for-word, Gregorys
immediate reaction to Eunomius accusation is to exclaim: He brandishes over us this Aristotelian weapon!, or in the translation of
Stuart G. Hall: Who agreed with the one threatening us with the
Aristotelian spear?9 To answer the question what Gregory means
by this Aristotelian weapon/Aristotelian spear (Aristotelik axm),
let us inquire into the statement of Eunomius.
Ina gr, fhs, m kvluy tn un k metousaw epen to ntow,
llhyen autn tn p pntvn yen k to pnth m ntow epn.
e gr t mhdn t pnth m nti tatn kat tn nnoian,
tn d sodunamontvn klutow metlhciw,
lgvn j odenw enai tn yen k to pnth m ntow enai lgei
tn yen.10

In the translation of Stuart G. Hall:

So that he may not be prevented, he says, from saying that the Son
derives from participation in him who is, he [i.e. Basil] has inadvertently said that the God over all is from total non-being.
For if A. nothing is the same in meaning as total non-being,
and
B. the substitution of synonyms is unavoidable,
C. one who says that God is from no one is saying that God
is from total non-being.11

At rst sight this assertion seems to be a syllogism, but it is not in

the proper sense of the word. Proposition A arms the identity
(tatn [stin]) between the meanings of two predicates: nothing
(t mhdn) and total non-being (t pnth m n).

9
CE II 620 (GNO I 407,2528): tw dvke t tn Aristotelikn mn axmn
piseonti, ti t lgein tin patra m xein tatn sti t k to pnth m
ntow atn gegensyai lgein.
10

CE II 618 (GNO I 406,28407,4).

The other translation by A. Roberts I. Donaldson, Gregory of Nyssa, Answer
to Eunomius second book, in: Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series: Volume V,
Oak Harbor (WA) 1997:
We will allow him to say that the Son exists by participation in the self-existent; but (instead of this), he has unconsciously armed that the God over all
comes from absolute nonentity.
If
A. the idea of the absence of everything amounts to that of absolute
nonentity,
and B. the transposition of equivalents is perfectly legitimate,
then C. the man who says that God comes from nothing, says that He comes
from nonentity.
11

ladislav chvtal

402

Proposition B expresses the substitution rule which does not have

to be stated explicitly12 as long as the speaker does not put special
stress on it as Eunomius does in our case.13
Prima facie, proposition C seems to be a compound statement.
Nevertheless, whichever role the components of our statement play
in Eunomius argument, proposition C contains both the rst premise
([ lgvn] j odenw enai tn yen) and the conclusion ([lgei] k
to pnth m ntow enai tn yen).
For a correct formalization, it is necessary to rearrange the individual components of the argument string as follows:

and

C1. God is from no one,

A. nothing is the same in meaning as total non-being
[+ B. the substitution rule]
C2. God is from total non-being

Thus,14
Oga
a = b
Ogb

O . . . x is from y; g . . . God; a . . . nothing; b . . . total

non-being;
[+ B. the substitution rule]

It has also been said that this is not a classical Aristotelian syllogism, even if Gregory calls the above mentioned Eunomius argument the syllogism.15
12

The substitution rule does not have to be expressed, because it falls along with
the separation rule into the implicitly supposed rules.
13
On the reason why Eunomius emphasizes the substitution rule, see below,
p. 409.
14
In this instance a problem has arisen with the predicates a and b, because
they are not constants in the proper sense of the word: they do not denote individuals. In our formalization it could appear as if we describe nothing as something which is inadmissible. Since the modern predicate logic is not capable of
writing down formally the term nothing or total non-being otherwise than by the
statement
(x)(F)(~Fx) in contradiction to x F (Fx)
(nothing has any property; because of using the extensional interpretation, this
statement means nothing comes under any set),
we fall back on the formalization nothing and total non-being as a a b, in the
interest of clarity, being aware of that this is not substitution in a proper sense.
15
Cf. for example CE II 617 (GNO I 406,2425): this vehement and irresistible
web of syllogism (tn sfodrn kenhn ka maxon to sullogismo plokn); CE

(mis)use

of aristotles name

403

In Aristotles work we can nd two concepts of syllogism. In the

Prior Analytics, Aristotle denes a syllogism as a discourse in which
from certain propositions that are laid down something other than
what is stated follows of necessity.16 This describes syllogism in the
broad sense of the word because this formula embraces almost any
argument in which a conclusion is inferred from two or more premises.17
But discussing syllogism in detail, Aristotle considers almost exclusively arguments in which there are two premises (a protseiw) and,
in his sense, a simple and general conclusion (t sumprasma). Speaking
more precisely, every syllogistic conclusion follows from two premises
which relate the terms of the conclusion to a third term called the
middle.18 The premises and the conclusion are simple statements
because they arm a predicate of the subject. Their internal structure corresponds to the manner of connection among individual
terms. The number of statements (for Aristotle only 3) amounts to
the number of terms (roi). The same is also the number of symbols which Aristotles syllogism uses to represent the terms.19
It follows that according to Aristotles narrower usage of syllogism
we may not apply the name syllogism to any argument with a compound statement as a premise.20 However, we have seen that Eunomius
argument does not contain a compound statement, even if it seemingly does.21 The main reason why Eunomius argument cannot be
called an Aristotelian syllogism is that the word is in propositions
C1 and C2 does not have the meaning of the Aristotelian copula,
that of arming a predicate of the subject. Instead, Eunomius uses
is to convey the idea of origin, comes from. It is not, therefore,

II 619 (GNO I 407,1819): that irresistible syllogism (tn maxon kenon sullogismn); CE II 623 (GNO I 408,1920): that invalid syllogism (tn lelumnon
kenon sullogismn); CE II 618 (GNO I 407,7): the feeble illusion of his sophistic syllogism (tn cuxrn ka neirdh to sofsmatow sunykhn); CE II 621
(GNO I 408,78): the grip of your syllogism (tn to sofsmatw sou labn);
CE II 622 (GNO I 408,1213): that soggy web of your syllogism ( malyak to
sofsmatow ath diaplok).
16
Aristotle, An. Pr. I 1, 24b1820: sullogismw d sti lgow n teyntvn
tinn tern ti tn keimnvn j ngkhw sumbanei t tata enai.
17
Syllogism in this inclusive sense had already been used in the Topics. Aristotle,
Top. I 1, 100a25.
18
Cf. Aristotle, An. Pr. I 25, 41b3642a5.
19
It is universally accepted that Aristotles categorical syllogistic anticipates the
modern predicate logic.
20
Cf. W. Kneale M. Kneale, The Development of Logic, Oxford 1984, 67.
21
See above, p. 402.

404

ladislav chvtal

a case of Aristotles categorical subject-predicate statement but a relational one: the terms God, nothing, resp. total non-being are
members of a relation expressed by the predicate is from/comes
from. The Aristotelian logical apparatus was not able to cope with
this kind of statement.22
If we work only with the English translation, it could be legitimately objected that both Eunomius argument and our formalization make no sense. Proposition C runs in the translation of S. G.
Hall: one who says that God is from no one is saying that God is
from total non-being, but proposition A asserts the identity of meaning of the terms nothing and total non-being. The translation, which is
rather an explication here, is markedly limited by English language
within its scope of expressing the relevant Greek terms. The masculine genitive of the negative indenite pronoun odew (no one,
nobody) has the same form as that of odn (nothing): j odenw.23
Hence the expression j odenw could be understood and translated
22
Eunomius relational argument is resolvable neither by Aristotelian logic nor
by the apparatus of Megarian-Stoic logic. This logic school diers from the Paripatetic
particularly in the fact that the propositions of a syllogism can be coumpounded
with other propositions. The construction component of a syllogism is not a term
as in Aristotle, but a statement. The form of syllogism rests only on the way of
connection of propositions by propositional conjunction (if, then, but and therefore).
The way the statements are connected with the help of conjunctions inuences the
rightness of the syllogism. However the basis of preposition remains still the
(Aristotelian) scheme S is P. On the Megarian and Stoic logic cf. W. Kneale
M. Kneale, The Development of Logic, 113176.
Although the theory of relations and the solution of relational syllogisms is commonly (cf. for example W. Kneale M. Kneale, The Development of Logic, 427) connected with Augustus de Morgan and his paper written in 1859 (On the Syllogism
IV and on the Logic of Relations, Cambridge Philosophical Transactions 10, 1864,
331358), there is found in the history of philosophy in addition to minor attempts
at a solution (for example Joachim Jungius [ Junge] and his Logica Hamburgensis published in 1638) chiey the book Logica obliqua written by Juan Caramuel of Lobkowicz
(on the presentation of Juan Caramuel and his logic as the forerunner of de Morgan
see P. Dvork, Jan Caramuel z Lobkovic, Praha 2006; P. Dvork, Relational Logic
of Juan Caramuel, in: D. M. Gabbay J. Woods, eds., The Handbook of the History
of Logic, II, Amsterdam, forthcoming).
23
Being perfectly precise by formalization of Eunomius argument, we should
append another step which asserts the identity of the terms odn and mhdn nothing, so that the record can be complete. The full version would look as follows:
C1. God is from odenw,
[+ A1unexpressed. t odn/nothing is the same in meaning as t mhdn/
nothing]
and A2. t mhdn/nothing is the same in meaning as t pnth m n/total nonbeing
[+ B. the substitution rule]
C2. God is from to pnth m ntow/total non-being.

(mis)use

of aristotles name

405

both from no one, as Hall has done, and from nothing, as RobertsDonaldson.24 These two possibilities of understanding and translation are the root of the trouble: Did Eunomius understand the
expression j odenw as referring to odn nothing or did he take
advantage of the agreement of the genitive forms to twist the meaning of Basils argument and to accuse him of asserting the scandalous opinion that God comes from nothing? Gregory positively
tends towards the second alternative and aims to present the original meaning of Basils words.

II. Content analysis: Gregorys and Basils explanations of unbegottenness

Basil of Caesarea endeavours in a section of the rst book of Adversus
Eunomium to prove that the term unbegottenness cannot express the
divine essence as the Eunomians maintain.25 He points to a biblical
genealogy (Lk 3,2327).26 The origin of every human being is derived
from his parents: Joseph was the son of Eli, Eli of Mattath, Mattath
of Levi and so on, up to the rst man Adam who is said to be from
God (Lk 3,38). And there we have to stop going backwards. This is
a clear sign for Basil, and should be to the understanding of all
that God is from no one (j odenw).27 He is the beginning of all,
there is nothing whatever preceding him.28 To be from no one (t
j odenw) is the same in meaning as to be unbegun (t narxon),
and to be unbegun amounts to being unbegotten (t gnnhton).29

24

See above, n. 11.

As regards the attitudes of Eunomius we have to rely particularly on Basils
and Gregorys reports in their works. Eunomius well-preserved writings are gathered in R. P. Vaggione (ed.), Eunomius. The Extant Works, Text and Translation, Oxford
1987. On doubts if Gregory reproduces Eunomius doctrine correctly cf. K.-H.
Uthemann, Die Sprache der Theologie nach Eunomius von Cyzikus, ZKG 104
(1993) 143175.
26
Basil of Caesarea, Adv. Eun. I 15,1237(SC 299, 224226); Gregory of Nyssa,
CE II 614615 (GNO I 405,21406,5).
27
CE II 614615 (GNO I 405,21406,1): rvtsvmen d yew k tnow; r
ox prxeirn sti t kstou diano& ti j odenw.
28
Cf. CE II 613 (GNO I 405,1317): peidn gr pnta diejelyntew tn yen
met pnta t n lbvmen, tn pntvn rxn nosamen. rx d psa eper
trou tinw jhmmnh txoi, rx ok stin. okon e rx to pantw yew,
od tion stai tw tn pntvn rxw perkemenon.
29
Cf. Basil of Caesarea, Adv. Eun. I 15,2526 (SC 299, 226): t d j odenw
t narxn sti dhlonti, t d narxon t gnnhton.
25

ladislav chvtal

406

But Basils explication of the connotation of unbegotten30 does not

stop here. As in the case of humans, an expression of origin (t k
tinow) (e.g. to be from Peter and Mary) is not an expression of essence
(osa); the phrase of unbegottenness when it means to be from
no one (t j odenw) cannot characterize the Divine essence.31
Basil and Gregory try to explain to Eunomius that the terms
gennhsa/gnnhtow do not have an exclusive status among the other
predicates of God, as the Eunomians assert, but that it is possible
to substitute synonyms for unbegottenness such as to be from no
one (t j odenw) or to be unbegun (t narxon) without any
change in meaning. Unbegottenness is not the only proper name
of the Divine essence or nature.32 Against the singleness of Eunomian
unbegottenness, Basil and Gregory put together a series of positive
and negative terms by which they aim to describe what could
not be grasped conceptually.33 It is crucial for them that (1.) there
are many predicates and (2.) there are both negative and positive
expressions.

30

Cf. CE II 613 (GNO I 405,1718): ath to didasklou per tw to genntou

shmasaw kyesiw.

31
CE II 615 (GNO I 406,25): w on p tn nyrpvn ok n osa t k
tinow, otvw od p to yeo tn lvn osan stin epen t gnnhton.
32
Cf. e.g. CE II 62 (GNO I 244,12): lgousi mhdn teron enai tn yean
fsin pln tn gennhsan atn, CE II 21 (GNO I 232,2930): osan tn
gennhsan rzontai, in a similar way Eunomius, Apol. 8 (Vaggione 42,1718); CE
II 23 (GNO I 233,1517): tw fsevw noma t gnnhton, ka stin odn teron
gennhsa fsiw. The fact that only one appropriate expression about God

can exist is derived by Eunomius from the divine origin of words (things are named
by God and their names contain the substance of things in utterance there is no
comparison between the names given by God and those created by human reason,
which cannot reect reality; on the dierent Eunomian and Cappadocian semiotic
models cf. T. Dolidze, The Logic of Language in Gregory of Nyssas Treatise
Against Eunomius , Phasis (Tbilisi) 4, 2001, 1525, see 1619; L. Karfkov, Die
Rede von Gott nach Gregor von Nyssa: Warum ist Pluralitt der theologischen
Diskurse notwendig, Graecolatina Pragensia 18, 2000, 5361, see 5456) and from
Gods simplicity. God is simple and uncompound; that is why only one term can
fully expresses him; cf. CE II 23 (GNO I 233,1117); Eunomius, Apol. 19 (Vaggione
58,16 ). On the subject of connection of unbegottenness, simplicity and being cf.
CE II 2241 (GNO I 233,8238,8).
33
Cf. e.g. Basil of Caesarea, Adv. Eun. I 10,148; 14,12 (SC 299, 204206;
220). But in the opinions of the Cappadocians not only the essence of God is
unknowable, but the essence of all creatures as well; cf. e.g. CE II 7178 (GNO I
236,14239,1). This is a clear result of Gregorys conception of the cognitive status
of language along with the ontological structure innite Godnite creatures as
T. Dolidze points out; cf. T. Dolidze, The Logic of Language, 18; L. Karfkov,
Die Rede von Gott, 58.

(mis)use

of aristotles name

407

1. According to Gregory, it is imperative that we name God by

a great number of various predicates.34 As there is not only one
name describing the Divine essence, we must have recourse to a
plurality of terms. Each of them expresses only a part of the Divine
reality.35 We are related to the inexpressible Divine essence by many
thoughts and from many points of view.36 Only the multiplicity and
variety of individual terms could mediate to us at least a partial
knowledge of God,37 without knowing the denition of his essence
( tw osaw lgow).38 Individual names of God only refer our mind
to God, nothing else.39
2. Gregory places alongside the expression unbegottenness a series
of positive ( pntvn rx, to pantw ata) and negative (t
narxon, t j odenw) terms. The positive terms express what pertains to the Godhead,40 the negative to what does not belong to it.41
According to Gregory, the same idea can be expressed by both negation42 and armation. The synonyms of unbegottenness are mutually equivalent43 and their meaning remains one and the same.44

34
On the necessary plurality of theological utterances in Gregory of Nyssa cf.
L. Karfkov, Die Rede von Gott, particularly 5861.
35
Cf. CE II 145 (GNO I 267,2126): peid gr n odn noma perilhptikn
tw yeaw jerhtai fsevw kat ato to pokeimnou prosfuw tetagmnon, di
toto pollow nmasi, kstou kat diafrouw pibolw dizousn tina per
ato tn nnoian poioumnou, t yeon prosagoreomen. According to Gregory
the God is katonmastow unnameable; cf. CE III/V 59 (GNO II 182,2); Ref.
1415 (GNO II 318,325).
36
Cf. CE II 475 (GNO I 365,48): di t m dnasyai thlaugw katiden t

zhtomenon pollaw nnoaiw tw frstou fsevw polutrpvw ka polumerw

porgetai, o kat man tin dinoian t kekrummnon yhreousa.
37
Cf. CE II 145 (GNO I 267,2628): k tw polueidow ka poiklhw kat ato
shmasaw nasmat tina prw tn katanhsin to zhtoumnou yhreontew.
38

CE II 71 (GNO I 248,2).
Cf. e.g. CE II 89 (GNO I 253,512). Cf. M. Canvet, Grgoire de Nysse et lhermneutique biblique, Paris 1983, 54 59; B. Pottier, Dieu et le Christ, 180181;
L. Karfkov, Reho z Nyssy, Praha 1999, 182187.
40
CE II 131 (GNO I 263,2728): t mn [nmata] tn prosntvn t ye.
41
CE II 131 (GNO I 263,2829): t d tn popefuktvn xei tn mfasin.
42
CE II 135 (GNO I 264,23): t mn ysin t d naresn tinow xein.
43
CE II 137 (GNO I 265,1621): ete gr rxn atn ka ation to pantw
39

enai lgoiw ete narxon atn nomzoiw ete genntvw enai ete j dou
festnai ete to pantw ation ete j odenw atou mnon, pnta t toiata
sostsi pvw llloiw st kat tn dnamin tn shmainomnvn ka motmvw
xei t =mata.
44
CE II 136 (GNO I 265,6): tn d non tow legomnoiw na ka tn atn
diamnein.

408

ladislav chvtal

Gregory and Basil dilute the exclusivity of the term unbegottenness

not only by connecting to it a plurality of positive and negative terms
which express the same meaning, but also by attaching to unbegottenness indestructibility (fyarsa/fyartow) as the polar term
(which already does not have the same meaning!).45 We predicate
unbegottenness of God, if we approach God from the point of view
of beginning; indestructibility, if we come up to Him from the point
of view of end.46 Unbegottenness, from being an absolute proper
term which reveals the Divine essence itself, becomes one of the
predicates expressing a peripheral property of the essence.47

Conclusion
I have asked what the Aristotelian weapon in CE II 620 means.
Eunomius accused Basil of maintaining that God is from total nonbeing.48 The detailed analysis of Eunomius argument has shown that
this is not an Aristotelian (subject-predicate) syllogism, even if Gregory
calls it a syllogism in several passages49 but a relational statement
which the Aristotelian logical apparatus was not able to cope with.
This Aristotelian weapon is not the use of Aristotelian syllogistic
or/and logic, but a syllogism in the broad, general and rather inaccurate sense of the word: an elementary inferential rule of discur-

45

Cf. CE II 366386, 445560 (GNO I 333,11339,7; 356,17390,16).

To this subjectivizing step in Basil cf. Basil of Caesarea, Adv. Eun. I 7,3544
(SC 299, 192); B. Pottier, Dieu et le Christ, 162163.
47
Cf. Basil of Caesarea, Adv. Eun. I 7,1217.2729 (SC 299, 188190); B. Pottier,
Dieu et le Christ, 166: une qualit priphrique de la substance; on the inuence
of Greek philosophical schools on Basils theory of language and on the whole controversy cf. e.g. Th. Dams, La controverse eunomenne, Paris 1951, 174; J. Danilou,
Eunome lArien et lexgse noplatonicienne du Cratyle, REG 69 (1956) 412432;
E. Cavalcanti, Studi eunomiani, Roma 1976, 3446; J. M. Rist, Basils Neoplatonism:
its background and Nature, in: P. J. Fedwick, (ed.), Basil of Caesarea: Christian,
Humanist, Ascetic, I, Toronto 1981, 137220; Th. Kobusch, Name und Sein. Zu
den sprachphilosophischen Grundlagen in der Schrift Contra Eunomium des Gregor
von Nyssa, in: L. F. Mateo-Seco J. L. Bastero (eds.), El Contra Eunomium I en
la Produccion Literaria De Gregorio De Nisa. VI. Coloquio Internacional sobre Gregorio de Nisa,
Pamplona 1988, 247268; G. C. Stead, Logic and the Application of Names to God, in:
L. F. Mateo-Seco J. L. Bastero (eds.), El Contra Eunomium I, 303320;
L. Karfkov, Die Rede von Gott, 5356.
48
CE II 611; 618 (GNO I 404,2324; 406,28407,4).
49
Cf. above, n. 15.
46

(mis)use

of aristotles name

409

sive thought. Aristotles name is used less as a reference to his philosophy and intellectual heritage than as a contemptuous invective
which the participants of dogmatic controversies in the 4th century
C.E. often used as a curse.50 Gregorys insult and its specic occasion are only a tiny fraction of the huge problem of argumentation
in the debates between Eunomius and the Cappadocians.51 To elaborate on this issue was not within the compass of this essay.
The fact that Eunomius argument comes to the conclusion that
God comes from non-being is a response to Basils attempt to explain
the term unbegottenness as to be from no one (t j odenw).
We have to agree with Gregory that Eunomius took Basils words
out of context52 because it must have been evident to Eunomius that
t j odenw refers to odew no one, nobody and not to odn
nothing. By the sequence j odenw t odn/t mhdn t pnth
m n and the substitutability of these terms, Eunomius aims at the
Cappadocian method of explaining the name unbegottenness53 and
turns it against Basil. On the basis of a list of synonymous names
which are the same in meaning (tatn kat tn nnoian), Basil
and Gregory aim to prove that unbegottenness is not the only,
exclusive term which reveals the Divine essence. It is only one of
several names, either positive or negative, which are equivalent and
through which we come to God from our point of view. He still
remains unnameable and by our mind incomprehensible, not subject to being comprehended, grasped and expressed in His essence.

50
On the association of Aristotelian dialectic with the origin and practice of
heresy cf. D. T. Runia, Festugire Revisited, 2326; L. J. Elders, The Greek
Christian Authors and Aristotle, 47; J. Mansfeld, Heresiography in Context, Leiden
1992, passim.
51
Cf. e.g. E. Vandenbussche, La part de la dialectique dans la thologie
dEunomius le Technologue , RHE 40 (194445) 4772; R. J. De Simone, The
Dialectical Development of Trinitarian Theology: Augustine versus Eunomius
Technological Theology, Angelicum 64 (1987) 453475.
52
Cf. CE II 611 (GNO I 404,2427). This is one of the repeated objections to
Eunomius; cf. e.g. Basil of Caesarea, Adv. Eun. I 5,6978 (SC 299, 174176). On
the interrelationship of a signicative word and context cf. T. Dolidze, The Logic
of Language, 23.
53
Cf. above p. 405.

GREGOR VON NYSSA UND PLOTIN ZUM PROBLEM

DER GOTTESPRDIKATIONEN EIN VERGLEICH
Theodoros Alexopoulos

1
Die Transzendenzbehauptung, Gott sei nicht nur dem Begreifen von
Menschen, sondern auch dem von Engeln, ja, jedem berweltlichen
Begreifen berlegen, er sei unaussprechlich, unsagbar, zu erhaben,
als dass er sich durch Worte bezeichnen liee,1 siedelt das Gttliche
jenseits jeden Bereichs des Denkens an.
Gregor fasst seinen Apophatismus mit folgenden Worten zusammen: Zuerst lernen wir, was von Gott zu erkennen ntig ist: dieses Erkennen besteht darin, auf ihn nichts anzuwenden, was mit
menschlicher Auassungskraft erkannt wird.2 Wenn aber Gott wesentlich unsagbar und unaussprechlich ist, fragt man sich billigerweise,
ob das yeologen, die Rede von Gott, wirklich einen Sinn hat, und
nicht blo eine berssige, nutzlose Beschftigung ist. Nach Gregor
gibt es fnf wichtige Grnde, die den Prozess der Namensgebung
legitimieren, und ihr einen besonderen Stellenwert verleihen:
1) Der erste Grund hngt eng mit der Perspektive der menschlichen Existenz zusammen. Diese Perspektive besteht vor allem in der
Erkenntnis und der Betrachtung der Seienden.3
2) Von groer Bedeutung ist auch die Konzeption des Gttlichen
als des Allerersehntesten (poyeintaton) und Reizvollsten (rasmitaton)4
(bzw. Anziehendsten).5 Nach Gregor kann Gott nur das Ziel allen
1

CE I 683 (GNO I 222,1825).

VM II (GNO VII/1 88,810).
3
CE II 572 (GNO I 393,1517): Jede Ttigkeit und Bewegung des gesunden
Denkens zielt nach Mglichkeit auf die Erkenntnis und die Betrachtung der Seienden
ab.
4
Vgl. Cant. I (GNO VI 31,56). S.u. Anm. 7. Dazu A. Meredith, The Good
and the Beautiful in Gregory of Nyssa, in: H. Eisenberger (ed.), ERMHNEUMATA.
FS H. Hrner, Heidelberg 1990, 133145. Vgl. auch Plotin, Enn. VI 7 [38] 32,25
26. Dazu G. Siegmann, Plotins Philosophie des Guten. Eine Interpretation von Enneade VI
7, Wrzburg 1990, 101108; 153157.
5
An et res. 54 (PG 46, 89b). Vgl. auch Plotin, Enn. VI 7 [38] 23,3.
2

412

theodoros alexopoulos

Strebens sein (mnon rektn),6 was ein unendliches Fortschreiten zu

Ihm verursacht.7 Das absolut Gute ist dasjenige, das durch seine
Anziehungskraft die Liebe der Seele weckt und nhrt und sie als
Quelle jeder Gutheit zu seiner Teilhabe ruft.8
3) Darber hinaus ist man in der Lage ber Gott zu sprechen
wegen der ursprnglichen Verwandtschaft (suggneia)9 zwischen der
menschlichen Seele und Gott. Diese Verwandtschaft wird durch die
ekn zum Ausdruck gebracht. Die ekn zeigt die von Gott gesetzte
ursprngliche Bestimmung des Menschen und sie ist die Voraussetzung
fr die Metousia.10 Die Gottebenbildlichkeit des Menschen erklrt
die innere Dynamik und den unaufhrlichen Drang der Seele nach
Gott, der das endgltige Ziel aller Wnsche und Gedanken des
Menschen ist. Wegen ihrer ekn-Haftigkeit ist die Natur des Menschen
potentiell unendlich.
4) Gott verleiht uns Zeichen (xnh) und (zndende) Funken (nasmata) durch seine Wirkungen, so dass wir das Unfassbare auf dem
Wege der Analogie zu dem, was wir in der Wirklichkeit wahrnehmen, betrachten knnen.11 Der Mensch erfhrt die gttliche Energeia,
die zu uns herunterkommt und die zur Grenze unseres Verstndnisses
von Gott wird.12
5) Die wichtigste Voraussetzung fr die Gottesprdikation bezieht
sich auf das auerordentliche und bernatrliche Ereignis der
Menschenwerdung des Logos. Die Herablassung des Unvernderlichen
ins Vernderliche hat Gott denen hienieden (tow ktv)13 zugnglicher gemacht. Die Seele verfgt jetzt ber einen Wegweiser, einen
Leiter, der sie nach oben emporfhren kann.

Vgl. VM II (GNO VII/1 40,24).

Vgl. Cant. I (GNO VI 31,57).
8
Vgl. Cant. V (GNO VI 158,1214). Vgl. Cant. I (GNO VI 16,13).
9
Vgl. An et res. (PG 46, 97b).
10
Infant. (GNO III/2 79,1416.2122).
11
Vgl. Cant. I (GNO VI 37,1). Um seinen Gedanke zu veranschaulichen, verwendet Gregor zur Auslegung der Stelle Cant. 1,3 (mron kkenvyn nom sou)
das Bild eines entleerten Salblgefes, das aufgrung des Dampf-Rckstandes im
Gef eine Vermutung ber das ausgeleerte Salbl zult. Mit allen theologischen
Begrien bezeichnen wir nicht das Salbl der Gottheit selbst, sondern zeigen wir
nur einen kleinen Rest vom Dampf des gttlichen Wohlgeruchs (brax ti lecanon
tmo tw yeaw evdaw) auf. Dazu F. Dnzl, Braut und Brutigam, Die Auslegung des
Canticum durch Gregor von Nyssa, Tbingen 1993, 6465.
12
Vgl. Cant. XI (GNO VI 334,59). Vgl. Abl. (GNO III/1 44,79).
13
Vgl. Cant. X (GNO VI 304,17305,2).
7

gregor von nyssa und plotin

413

Die Zuschreibung verschiedener Prdikationen beeintrchtigt nach

Gregor die gttliche Einfachheit nicht, und zwar aus folgenden
Grnden:
1) O gr k to kalesya ti t enai gnetai, ll pokeimnh
fsiw, oa di n osa tx, di tw prosfuow to nmatow shmasaw
gnvrzetai.14 Der Name betrit alles, was um das Seiende herum
betrachtet wird.15 Er umschreibt und umfasst das Ding ohne16 sein
Wesen zu bezeichnen. Er weist auf die jeweilige Eigenschaft (t
prosn) des Dings hin, und erlutert das wie sein (pw enai) des
Seienden.17 Wrden die vielen Namen, die wir, gesttzt auf die
Schrift, dem Gttlichen geben, sein Wesen bezeichnen, wre die gttliche Natur vielartig und zusammengesetzt.18
2) Darber hinaus bleibt die Einfachheit der gttlichen Natur deshalb unaziert, weil jeder Name eine besondere Bedeutung hat, die
nicht in Widerspruch zu einer anderen Bestimmung steht. Die vielen Benennungen verursachen nicht die Zerspaltung des Subjekts,
weil sie nicht sein Wesen, sondern seine Eigenschaften auslegen.19
Alle Namen sind einander gleichgewichtig und gleichwertig (sostsia stima).20
3) Es gibt eine Identitt von Prdikationen, die sowohl dem
Menschen als auch Gott zuzuweisen sind. Diese Art von Aussagen
geschieht vom Sein her und entspricht der Tendenz, Bestimmungen
des Niedrigeren auf das Hhere zu bertragen. Es besteht jedoch
nur eine oberchliche hnlichkeit, da die Bezeichneten so weit voneinander entfernt sind. In dem Mae, wie beide Naturen, die menschliche und die gttliche, voneinander entfernt sind, unterscheiden sich

14
Perf. (GNO VIII/1 177,1416): Nicht dadurch, dass etwas benannt wird,
kommt Sein zustande, sondern die zugrunde liegende Natur wird in ihrer jeweiligen Beschaenheit durch die Bedeutung des von Natur aus zukommenden Namens
erkannt.
15
Vgl. CE III/V 56 (GNO II 180,2324): llo mn ti per to ntow noen,
llo d ti per to piyevroumnou t nti (Es ist ein Unterschied zwischen dem
Nachdenken ber das Seiende und dem (Nachdenken) ber das, was an dem
Seienden zu beobachten ist). Vgl. ebd. CE III/V 60 (GNO II 182,913); vgl. Abl.
(GNO III/1 42,2143,2).
16
CE III/V 55 (GNO II 180,710): Jedes Wort, dass durch namentliche
Bezeichnung die unbegrenzte Natur zu umfassen und auszulegen verspricht, gleicht
einem, der sich einbildet, in seiner achen Hand das ganze Meer einzuschlieen.
17
CE III/V 60 (GNO II 182,1213).
18
Vgl. CE II 302 (GNO I 315,1113).
19
CE II 477 (GNO I 365,1922).
20
CE II 137 (GNO I 265,1921); vgl CE II 478 (GNO I 365,2230).

414

theodoros alexopoulos

auch die Eigenschaften der gttlichen Natur von den an uns feststellbaren und haben sich zum Erhabeneren und zum Gottangemesseneren gewandelt.21 In dieser Hinsicht messen wir, wenn wir den
Herrn Macht, Leben, Licht, Wort nennen, diesen Bestimmungen
eine gotteswrdige (yeoprepw)22 Bedeutung bei und sind uns bewusst,
dass die uns zugeschriebene Prdikation im Vergleich zu der, die
dem Herrn zuzuschreiben ist, von niedrigerer Wertigkeit ist.
4) Gregor kennt zwei Weisen, von Gott zu reden: die positive und
die negative. Sie sind durch eine Beziehung gegenseitiger Ergnzung
gekennzeichnet. Die beiden sprachlichen Formen wechseln einander
unablssig ab. Beide Formen bilden eine zusammenhngende, einheitliche23 Redeweise, die zum besseren Verstndnis des Gttlichen
fhrt. Die positiven Bestimmungen haben die Bezglichkeit Gottes
durch seine Wirkungen auf die Seienden im Blick, eine positive
Erfahrung der Wahrheit. Sie sind relationale Bestimmungen und
Erklrungen und gehren zu den so genannten prw ti legmena.24
Diese Art von Prdikationen aber leidet an einer Schwche. Sie
trennt25 nicht Schpfer und Geschpf. Diese Rolle spielen die verneinenden Bestimmungen. Sie haben eine abwendende Wirkung,
mahnen uns fernzuhalten, was Gott in seinsmig-naturhafte Beziehung
zur Schpfung bringen knnte. Sie sagen aus, was Gott nicht ist.
Die negativen Namen bedeuten einen Verzicht auf alle Seinsbestimmungen und betonen genau die Stellung des Absoluten jenseits alles
Seienden.
Positive und negative, kataphatische und apophatische Theologie
sind gleichwertig.26 Keine von beiden stellt die Teilhabe mit Gott
sicher und keine beschreibt das Wesen Gottes als solches. Beide sind
bestenfalls Annherungen mit begrenzter Gltigkeit. In diesem Punkt

21

CE II 235 (GNO I 294,2124).

CE III/I 135 (GNO II 49,712); vgl. CE III/I 129 (GNO II 47,49).
23
CE I 588 (GNO I 196,410): Jede Gottesprdikation und jeder erhabene
Gedanke, jede Aussage und jede Annahme, sofern sie den Ideen von Gott gem
ist, ist mit der anderen zusammengefgt und geeint; und smtliche Annahmen bezglich Gottes begreift man als fortwhrend geeint und miteinander zusammengeschmiedet: Vaterschaft, Ungezeutsein . . . Dazu Ch. Boukis, H glssa to Grhgorou
Nsshw p t fw tw filosofikw nalsevw, yeologik dokmia 2, Yessalonkh
1970, 9296.
24
CE I 569 (GNO I 190,21).
25
Vgl. CE II 579 (GNO I 395,1617).
26
CE II 137 (GNO I 265,1921).
22

gregor von nyssa und plotin

415

unterscheidet sich Gregor von dem Verfasser des Corpus Areopagiticum,

der der Apophasis gegenber der Kataphasis einen deutlichen Vorrang
zuerkennt.27

2
Sehen wir uns jetzt die Lehre Plotins nher an. Das Jenseits des
Seins hebt das Absolute Eine ber das Sein hinaus und damit ber
alle berhaupt mglichen und denkbaren Bestimmungen. Plotin expliziert die absolute Transzendenz des Einen durch eine Reihe von
negativen Prdikationen. In diesen Prdikationen werden dem Einen
alle Bestimmungen des Intelligiblen wie des Sinnenflligen abgesprochen. Die Negation versucht das Absolute nicht zu denieren
und dadurch zu begrenzen, sondern durch Aphairesis aus dem Bereich
der Seienden abzutrennen, auszugrenzen. Sie erweist sich dementsprechend als die Aussage, welche die Transzendenz des Absoluten
zum Ausdruck bringt, und die seine vollkommene Unbezglichkeit
auf die Seinsordnung verdeutlicht. Die negative Methode aber sagt,
was das Eine nicht ist, und nicht was Es ist. Das Eine wird an sich
auch in der Negation nicht getroen.28 Die Negation aber hat den
Vorrang vor der Position. Whrend die positive Aussage es unter
einer Seinsbestimmung andeutet, macht die negative seine Seinstranszendenz sichtbar.
Die Negationen beziehen sich zwar auf das Absolute, vermgen
es aber nur von auen zu umkreisen, ohne Es selbst zu erreichen.29
Sogar der Name Eines, der schlechthin die Einfachheit anzeigt, und
der, soweit mglich, treend in Vergleich zu anderen Bestimmungen
gesetzt ist, erweist sich als unangemessen,30 um Es (Das Eine) an sich

27

Vgl. Div. Nom. XIII 3 (PG 3, 981b = Suchla 230,12).

Darum bleibt auch die Negation dem Absoluten unangemessen, denn sie
bezeichnet das Absolute wesentlich als das, was nicht das Sein ist, durch eine
Relation also, in der das Absolute wesentlich doch nicht steht. Die Unwahrheit der
negativen Transzendenzbehauptung ist ihre Unwesentlichkeit fr das Absolute. Allein,
ber solche Unwesentlichkeit kommt keine Aussage hinaus. G. Huber, Das Sein und
das Absolute. Studien zur Geschichte der ontologischen Problematik in der sptantiken Philosophie,
Basel 1955, 82.
29
Enn. VI 9 [9] 3,5253: mw oon jvyen periyontaw. Vgl. Enn. VI 9 [9]
8,4345.
30
Vgl. Enn. V 5 [32] 6,3134: . . . na zhtsaw rjmenow p ato, pntvw
plthtw sti shmantikn, pofs teleutn ka toto, w teyn mn son on
28

416

theodoros alexopoulos

kund zu tun. Plotin gelingt es sogar zu sagen, die Bezeichnung Eines

sei lgnerisch. 31 Im eigentlichen Sinne kommt dem Absoluten
berhaupt kein Name zu, weil es in seiner absoluten Transzendenz
ber alle Namen erhaben ist. Wenn es keinen der Erhabenheit des
Absoluten wrdigen Namen gibt, dann muss man auf jeden Versuch
Es zu benennen, verzichten. Plotin fordert uns immer wieder alles
wegzunehmen (fele pnta),32 um so zu einem einigeren Leben
oder einem Leben auf Einheit hin zu gelangen:33 Im Wegnehmen
von allem wird die absolute Einfachheit des Einen bewahrt. Die
Unaussagbarkeit des Einen ist nach Plotin in seiner Einfachheit
begrndet.
1) Das primre Eine bestehe ohne die Beifgung eines anderen
( mhdn llo prsesti) und sei infolgedessen von nichts aussagbar
(odenw n kathgoroto toto).34 Jede Ergnzung eines Prdikats
wrde eine Hinzufgung und daher eine Zerstrung der Einheit
bedeuten.
2) Wrde man versuchen, von dem Einen etwas zu prdizieren,
dann wrde es bedeuten, ihm ein Akzidens (sumbebhkw) zuzuschreiben.35 Das Eine weist nicht die fr alles Sensible charakteristische Spaltung in osa und sumbebhkw auf; denn Es besitzt (im
Unterschied zu diesem) seine Einheit nicht als einen Zusatz: ox w
llo, eta n (nicht als sei es sonst etwas und dann erst Eines).36

te kalw t yemn ok jion mn od toto ew dlvsin tw fsevw kenhw . . .

K. H. Volkmann-Schluck (Plotin als Interpret der Ontologie Platos, Frankfurt 1966, 85)
kommentieret die Stelle: Das pythagorische Symbol A-pollon als der Un-viele trit
es ebenso wie die Bezeichnung Eines, wenn sie nicht mehr zu sein beanspruchen
als Aufhebung der Vielheit und Bestimmtheit. Aber noch die angemessenste
Bezeichnung fhrt zur Einsicht in die Unangemessenheit von Bezeichnung schlechthin.
31
Enn. V 4 [7] 1,9.
32
Enn. V 3 [49] 17,38. Vgl. auch V 5 [32] 13,11; V 5 [32] 6,20; VI 7 [38]
35,7; VI 8 [39] 21,2628; VI 8 [39] 15,2223; III 8 [30] 10,31.
33
Die Gelassenheit ist somit die Bedingung der Mglichkeit der Einung. Die
Abstraktionsbewegung (faresiw) darf nicht nur als logischer Prozess, sondern muss
geradezu als ethischer Imperativ, als Lebensprogramm eines bewuten Lebens verstanden werden; dazu vgl. W. Beierwaltes, Selbsterkenntnis und Erfahrung der Einheit.
Plotins Enneade V 3 (Text, bersetzung, Interpretation, Erluterungen), Frankfurt
1991, 250253; ders., s. v. Erleuchtung, in: J. Ritter (Hrsg.), Historisches Wrterbuch
der Philosophie, Bd. 2, Basel Stuttgart 1972, 714.
34
Enn. VI 2 [43] 9,67.
35
Vgl. Enn. VI 9 [9] 3,4951.
36
Enn. VI 9 [9] 5,3233. Dazu Chr. Horn, Plotin ber Sein, Zahl und Einheit. Eine
Studie zu den systematischen Grundlagen der Enneaden, Stuttgart Leipzig 1995, 297, 325
326.

gregor von nyssa und plotin

417

3) Das absolute Eine ist von nichts aussagbar auch deshalb, weil
es durch seine strenge Einheit ein Unendliches ist, da es zu seinem Inhalt
keine Grenze gibt. Denn eine externe wie eine interne Begrenzung,
mithin eine Unterscheidung, wre nur durch eine vorhergehende
messende Gre mglich, die von Plotin ausgeschlossen wird: das
Eine ist weder gegen ein anderes, noch gegen sich selber begrenzt;
denn dann wre es schon Zweiheit.
Trotz der Grundhaltung, das Eine durch Negationen vom Seienden
abzuheben, ist es unvermeidlich, dass vom Absoluten auch in positiven Aussagen die Rede ist. Wir nennen es so (z.B. gayn), nicht
weil ihm dies angemessen wre, sondern weil wir nichts Besseres
haben. Alle positiven Bestimmungen haben nur uneigentlichen und
metaphorischen Charakter, sie haben einen rein didaktischen Sinn37
und sind Hinweise auf das Unnennbare, die nur um unsertwillen
ntig sind.38 Sie sagen das Eine nicht aus, sondern sie weisen auf Es
hin, denn die Sageweise der Aussage ist aufgrund ihrer zwiefltigen
Struktur (etwas ber etwas) dem absolut Einfachen unangemessen.
Unter dem Vorbehalt der Uneigentlichkeit der Namen mssen wir
in jeder Prdikation auch ein gleichsam (oon) hinzufgen.39 Alle
Rede ber das Eine, sowohl die bejahende als auch die verneinende,
bringt nicht Es selbst zur Sprache, denn Es selbst ist absolut unsagbar: Wir sprechen zwar ber Es aber wir bringen nicht Es selbst
zur Sprache. Denn wir sagen nur, was Es nicht ist, was Es aber ist,
sagen wir nicht.40

3
Unser Vergleich zwischen den Konzeptionen beider Denker hat folgende Ergebnisse erbracht:

37

Vgl. Enn. VI 8 [39] 13,4: tw peiyow xrin; VI 8 [39] 13,48: j ngkhw

ndejevw neka.

38
Vgl. Enn. VI 2 [43] 17,25: t mn gayn, e t prton, n lgomen tn to
gayo fsin, kay w odn kathgoretai, ll mew m xontew llvw shmnai
otv lgomen. Vgl. auch Enn. VI 9 [9] 5,3132; V 5 [32] 6,2528; II 9 [33] 1,5

8; VI 7 [38] 38,46; V 3 [49] 13,56. Der Versuch, das Absolute armativ zu

bestimmen, wre, so Plotin, eine verwegene Rede (tolmhrw lgow) und mit der
absoluten Transzendenz nicht zu kombinieren. Vgl. Enn. VI 8 [39] 7,11.
39
Enn. VI 8 [39] 13,50.
40
Enn. V 3 [49] 14,58.

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theodoros alexopoulos

1) Fr beide hat die Sprache einen relativen Charakter und basiert

auf einer Vereinbarung. Sie ist nicht in der Lage, das absolut
Unendliche in den engen Grenzen eines Wortes einzusperren. Die
Wahrheit kann nicht in geschlossenen Begrisbestimmungen, weder
in positiven noch in negativen, bestimmt werden.41
2) Die Sprache hat primr eine semantisch-hinweisende Wirkung.
Alle Prdikationen vermgen das Absolute nur von auen zu umkreisen,42 darum beziehen sie sich zwar auf Es, aber ohne Es zu erreichen.
3) Alle Begrie ber Gott sind Anleihen aus dem Bereich des
Seins. Diesen Begrien verleihen wir einen Gottes Erhabenheit geziemenden Sinn.43 Alles, was wir ber Gott reden, reden wir daher
uneigentlich (k kataxrsevw),44 gerade weil wir Ihn nicht anders
bezeichnen knnen.45
4) Die Henologie Plotins ist nach Form und Gestalt wesentlich
negativ. Plotin verwendet mit Vorsicht positive Prdikationen. Er legt
keinen groen Wert auf die Kataphasis, und darin unterscheidet er
sich stark von Gregor, der den Ausgleich zwischen den beiden
Methoden festhlt. Nach Plotin wre jede positive Prdikation eine
Hinzufgung und wrde daher zur Zerstrung der Einfachheit fhren.
Dem Einen kommt aufgrund seiner Transzendenz das stin oder
stin nicht zu.46 Dagegen wird Gott von Gregor in der Auslegung
von Ex 3,14 als das wahrhafte Seiende (ntvw n) bezeichnet.47 Durch
diese Bezeichnung kommt Gregors Gott auch der plotinischen zweiten Hypostase nahe48 und unterscheidet sich von dem des Dionysius
Areopagita, der eine strkere Terminologie zur Betonung der Gottestranszendez verwendet.49 Dazu kann man auch bemerken, dass bei
Gregor der platonische Ausdrck jenseits des Seins nicht zu nden

41

Vgl. Plotin Enn. V 5 [32] 6,1415. Vgl. CE III/I 103 (GNO II 38,1921).
Vgl. Plotin Enn. VI 8 [39] 8,67: per ato. Vgl. Gr. Nyss., Abl. (GNO III/1
43,1416).
43
Vgl. CE III/I 128 (GNO II 47,45).
44
Vgl. CE II 459 (GNO I 360,24).
45
Vgl. Plotin Enn. VI 2 [43] 17,35.
46
Vgl. Plotin Enn. VI 7 [38] 38,12.11; VI 8 [39] 8,14.20.
47
Vgl. VM II (GNO VII/1 40,8). Dazu Th. Bhm, Theoria Unendlichkeit
Aufstieg. Philosophische Implikationen zu de Vita Moysis von Gregor von Nyssa. Leiden New
York Kln 1996, 94
48
Vgl. S. R. C. Lilla, Neuplatonisches Gedankengut in den Homilien ber die Seligpreisungen
Gregors von Nyssa, Leiden Boston 2004, 60, Anm. 216.
49
Dionysius Areopagita bezeichnet Gott als m n. Vgl. Div. Nom. I 1 (PG 3,
588b = Suchla 109,16).
42

gregor von nyssa und plotin

419

ist.50 Trotz dieses wesentlichen Unterschieds, was die Terminologie

angeht, stimmen Gregor und Plotin in der Behauptung berein, dass
Gott jeden Bereich des Geistes transzendiert.51
5) Betres des Prozesses der Namensgebung (Gottesprdikation)
setzt Gregor die gttliche Energeia voraus. Die Kataphasis hat auch
fr Gregor eine besondere Bedeutung, weil sie die Erfahrung der
Wahrheit beschreibt. Sie beruht auf der gttlichen Wirkung, die der
Mensch in seinem Aufstieg zu Gott erfhrt und die er positiv zum
Ausdruck bringt.52 Auf die Wrde der Kataphasis weist auch Gregor
von Nazianz besonders hin, indem er sagt: Es ist viel einfacher und
krzer zu zeigen, was etwas nicht ist, indem du sagst, was es ist,
statt alles zu widerlegen was es nicht ist, um zu zeigen was es ist.53
Derjenige, der sagt, was etwas nicht ist, und verschweigt, was es ist,
verhlt sich hnlich jemandem, der, wenn er gefragt wird, wie viel
zwei mal fnf macht, antwortet: es macht weder drei, noch vier,
noch fnf usw. Plotin dagegen setzt kein gttliches Heilshandeln an
der Welt und besonders fr den Menschen voraus. Daher kann er
sich nicht fr eine Theologie einsetzen, die auf der Beschreibung der
erfahrenen Wirkung beruht. In Plotins Betrachtung des Seienden auf
seinen Einheitscharakter hin erkennt man Spuren54 des Einen. Alles,
was ist, ist dadurch, dass es am Einen teilhat.55
6) Fr beide Autoren hat die Apophasis keinen privativen Sinn.
Das Fehlen (strhsiw) ist das Ausbleiben dessen, was einem Wesen
an sich zukme; da Gott aber absolut einfach ist, kommt ihm an
sich selbst berhaupt nichts zu. Gott ist vllig unbedrftig. Er bedarf
nicht darber hinaus noch der Benennung.
7) Als nchster, und zwar sehr wichtiger Punkt, in dem sich Gregor
mit dem Gedanken Plotins berhrt, ist die Unendlichkeit56 und

Lexicon Gregorianum III 369370, s.v. pkeina.

Vgl. CE III/VIII 2 (GNO II 238,18); CE III/I 105 (GNO II 39,56); VM II
(GNO VII/1 87,1617). Vgl. Enn. VI 7 [38] 41,3238; III 9 [13] 9,1012.
52
Vgl. S. Papadopoulos, YEOLOGIA ka GLVSSA. Empeirik yeologa Sumbatik
glssa, Athen 2002, 145.
53
Vgl. Or. XXVIII 9 (PG 36, 37ab = SC 250, 118120).
54
Vgl. Plotin Enn. V 5 [32] 5,1314: st enai t enai xnow to nw. Vgl.
III 8 [30] 11,1923; V 5 [32] 10,12; V 5 [32] 6,17. Vgl. Gr. Nyss., Cant. I (GNO
VI 37,1).
55
Vgl. Enn. III 8 [30] 9,2324; V 5 [32] 10,34; VI 8 [39] 21,2022.
56
ber den Begri der Unendlichkeit bei Gregor von Nyssa im Vergleich zu
Plotin, siehe die eingehende Studie von Th. Bhm, Theoria, 108149, 164170, 195
198.
50
51

420

theodoros alexopoulos

Unbegrenztheit Gottes des Einen. Gregor von Nyssa geht davon

aus, dass jedes Seiende vor allem dadurch gekennzeichnet ist, dass
es durch gewisse Grenzen festgelegt wird (pras tisin rismnoiw).57
Diese Grenzen sind der Anfang und das Ende. Umschrieben von
einer Arche und einem Telos ist jedes Seiende berschaubar (poptesimon).58 Die Grenze ist die grundlegende Eigentlichkeit jedes
Seienden. Sie bestimmt jedes Seiende zu einem umgrenzten Etwas,
so dass dieses mit sich selbst identisch und von allem anderen unterschieden ist. Durch die Grenze wird jedes Seiende bestimmbar,
denierbar und denkbar. Da der Mensch etwas nur als bestimmt
bezeichnet erfassen kann und da Gott jede Seinsbestimmung wie
Gestalt, Form, Gre, Qualitt abgesprochen wird,59 ergibt sich daraus, dass Er unfassbar und daher undenierbar ist. Bei ihm erkennt
man kein Ma. Im eigentlichen Sinn ist sein Ma die Unendlichkeit,
d.h. die Fhigkeit, sich in jede Richtung auszudehnen und durch
keine Grenzen beschrnkt zu werden.60 Wenn aber der Name eine
Art von Umschreibung,61 d.h. eine Art von Begrenzung ist, ist es
selbstverstndlich, dass sich Gott jeder Beschrnkung durch die Worte
entzieht.62 Die oben erwhnte Vorstellung des Begrenzten als grundlegende Eigenschaft des Seienden ist ein sehr wichtiger Anknpfungspunkt zwischen Gregor von Nyssa und Plotin. Auch bei Plotin hat
das Seiende einen bestimmten ontischen Inhalt, die Form (t edow).
Alles was gestaltlos ist, ist keine Existenz, keine osa. Und das ist
so, weil die osa ein etwas (ti) sein muss und daher etwas Bestimmtes,
Begrenztes. Anedeon n ok osa: tde gr ti de tn osan enai:
toto d rismnon. (Ist das Eine gestaltlos, so ist es kein Sein; denn
das Sein muss ein Dieses sein, und das heit, ein Begrenztes.)63 Die
eidetische Bestimmtheit ist also der Grundzug des Seins und macht
seine Erkennbarkeit fr das Denken aus. Als absolut Einfaches kann

57
Vgl. VM I (GNO VII/1 3,68). Gregor nennt als Beispiele im Bereich des
Quantitativen die Elle oder die Zahl zehn, die jeweils an einem Punkt beginnen
und an einem Punkt enden.
58
Vgl. CE II 578 (GNO I 395,311).
59
Vgl. Beat. III (GNO VII/2 104,1519); vgl. auch Virg. X (GNO VIII/1 290,23
291,4); Cant. V; XII (GNO VI 157,1421; 357,1020).
60
Vgl. CE I 345346 (GNO I 129,1113).
61
Vgl. Cant. V (GNO VI 157,19). Vgl. auch Gr. Naz., Or. XVIII 10 (PG 36,
37d = SC 250, 120).
62
Vgl. CE III/I 103 (GNO II 38,1921); vgl. auch CE II 587 (GNO I 397, 29
30); Abl. (GNO III/1 52,1553,3).
63
Enn. V 5 [32] 6,56.

gregor von nyssa und plotin

421

das Eine nicht eidetisch bestimmt sein; Das absolut einfache Eine
liegt ber jede Bestimmtheit hinaus und damit auch ber das Sein,
weil Sein wesentlich Bestimmtheit bedeutet. Indem das Absolute
das edow transzendiert, transzendiert es eo ipso auch das Sein.64
Indem das Eine nicht in bestimmten Grenzen eingeschrnkt sein
kann, kann es auch kein Gegenstand des Erkennens sein. Das Erkennen
selber hat den Charakter der Einheit, aber den der bestimmten und
relationalen Einheit (n ti), nicht der absoluten und reinen. Denn
Erkennen ist wesentlich intentional, es ist immer auf ein Bestimmtes
(t) gerichtet,65 das als Bestimmtes auch erkennbar ist. Das absolute
Eine als reine Einheit ist nicht Etwas Eines, sondern vor dem
Etwas (pr to t),66 ber jedes Was hinaus.
8) Abschlieend: Einer der wichtigsten Punkte, in dem sich Gregor
in bereinstimmung mit Plotin bendet, besteht in der berzeugung, dass Gott der direkten Erkenntnis fr das ihm Nachgeordnete
wesenhaft entzogen ist. In der Wirklichkeit kann dem Absoluten
berhaupt kein Name zukommen. Die angemessene Weise der
Gottesprdikation ist nicht die theologia negativa, sondern die theologia
superlativa (bersteigende Theologie). Proklos und der Verfasser des
Corpus Areopagiticum haben auf diese dritte Art der Theologie klar
hingewiesen.67 Spuren dieser Theologie, die zur Aufhebung jeder
Erkenntnis fhren, welche durch Kataphasis und Apophasis erreicht
wird, sind sowohl bei Plotin68 als auch bei Gregor zu nden. In unserem Fall, d.h. im zweiten Buch von Contra Eunomium, gibt es eine
entscheidende Stelle,69 an der diese Idee der Annherung an Gott
durch die Selbstberschreitung des Denkens deutlich wird.
Das menschliche Denken, indem es forschend und vielgeschftig ist,
begehrt und berhrt, soweit mglich, durch berlegungen die unberschreitbare und erhabene Natur. Weder besitzt es eine Scharfsichtigkeit, um klar das Unsichtbare zu sehen, noch ist es vllig von

64

G. Huber, Das Sein und das Absolute, 55.

Vgl. Enn. VI 7 [38] 40,6: nhsiw psa k tinw sti ka tinw.
66
Enn. V 3 [49] 12,52; dazu P. Crome, Symbol und Unzulnglichkeit der Sprache.
Iamblichos, Plotin, Porphyrios, Proklos. Mnchen 1970, 87; J. Halfwassen, Der Aufstieg
zum Einen. Untersuchungen zu Platon und Plotin, Stuttgart 1991, 165.
67
Vgl. Proklos, In Parm. VII 7,910 (Cousin 1159f ); dazu J. Halfwassen, Der
Aufstieg, 181; W. Beierwaltes, Proklos. Grundzge seiner Metaphysik, Frankfurt 1965, 361
366. Vgl. auch Ps. Dion. Areop., MTh. V (PG 3, 1048b = Ritter 150,79).
68
Vgl. Plotin Enn. V 3 [49] 14,13.67.1718; Enn. V 5 [32] 6,3133; Enn. VI
8 [39] 8,68; dazu J. Halfwassen, Der Aufstieg, 181.
69
CE II 138139 (GNO I 265,28266,3).
65

422

theodoros alexopoulos
der Annherung ausgeschlossen, so dass es nicht in der Lage wre, in
sich ein Bild des Gesuchten zu formen. Ein Teil des Gesuchten hat
es mit Hilfe der Vernunft aufgefasst, das andere aber hat es gewissermaen durch die Schwche, es deutlich zu erkennen, begrien,
indem es die Tatsache fr eine Art des klaren Wissens hielt, dass das
Gesuchte jede Erkenntnis bersteigt.

Das ber das Sein Hinausgehende ist weder durch Worte auszudrcken noch der Vernunft zugnglich.70 Gott kann weder durch die
Kataphasis noch durch die Apophasis, d.h. nicht durch die Zugrie
der methodisch vorgehenden, alles erfassenden theoretischen Vernunft,
erreicht werden. Gott wird in dem wissenden Nichtwissen71 erreicht,
d.h. im Verzicht und in der Ablsung von allem Denkbaren und
Sinnlichen.72 Im ekstatischen Nichtwissen wird der Geist selbst berschritten: hinausgehoben ber sich selbst, wird er in der Erleuchtung
durch das berhelle Licht mit Gott vereinigt.73 Das Heraustreten des
Geistes aus sich selbst, die Ekstasis, weist darauf hin, die hchste
Erfllung des Erkennens, die zugleich dessen Aufhebung ist.74 Es handelt sich um eine lobenswerte gnvsa, denn sie wird sich dessen
bewusst, dass ihr alles Unbegreiiche ber Gott unbekannt ist.75

70

CE II 39140 (GNO I 265,28266,3).

VM II (GNO VII/1 87,7). Vgl. Plotin, Enn. V 5 [32] 7,32: mhdn rn yesetai.
72
VM II (GNO VII/1 88,810).
73
Vgl. Beat I (GNO VII/2 77,910); Virg. V (GNO VIII/1 277,1112); Ps. I 7
(GNO V 44,24). Vgl. Ps. Dion. Areop., Div. Nom. I 1 (PG 3, 588a = Suchla
108,35), Vgl. Plotin. Enn. V 5 [32] 7,1622; V 3 [49] 17,2837.
74
G. Huber, Das Sein und das Absolute, 88.
75
Vgl. Maximus, Schol. in Div. Nom. IV 2 (PG 4,264a); Vgl. auch II 4 (PG 4,
216d217a): edow gr ka at gnvristikn.
71

SIMPLICIT ET CARACTRE INENGENDR DE DIEU

SELON PLOTIN, EUNOME ET GRGOIRE DE NYSSE
Georgios Lekkas

Parmi les caractristiques particulires de lUn plotinien, celles qui

dominent sont sa simplicit1 et son caractre inengendr.2 Tant la
simplicit que le statut dinengendr de lUn plotinien sexpliquent
par la place quIl occupe en tant que cause premire au sein du
systme plotinien. LUn est inengendr parce que, du fait quIl est
premier, il ny a rien avant lui qui pourrait lengendrer.3 De mme
lUn est ce quil y a de plus simple (plostaton) puisquIl ne serait
pas le premier sIl tait constitu de multiples.4
LUn simple et inengendr est donc premier pour Plotin, tandis
que le second rang revient ce quIl engendre et qui est lun-multiples, cest--dire le Nos,5 ce dernier tant, en sa qualit de produit
de lacte de gnration de lUn, ncessairement6 moins simple que
son gniteur.7 Le principe qui veut que lengendr soit ncessairement infrieur son gniteur constitue une constante de la mtaphysique plotinienne8 et nest pas sans consquences tragiques pour
lengendr dans la mesure o ds sa naissance celui-ci porte sur
lui la marque de son incapacit sgaliser son pre,9 de sorte
que, comme lobserve pertinemment Jean Trouillard, le retour de
lengendr est impuissant le ddouaner pleinement de sa sortie
hors de son gniteur.10
1

Cf. Enn. V 2 [11] 1,34. Ibid. V 4 [7] 1,5. Ibid. V 5 [32] 6,3033.
Enn. VI 8 [39] 7,3536. Ibid. V 4 [7] 1,1819.
3
Enn. VI 8 [39] 10,1621.
4
Ibid. II 9 [33] 1,89.
5
Enn. V 4 [7] 1,2021. Ibid. V 6 [24] 3,24.2125.
6
Enn. III 8 [30] 9,4243. Cf. G. Lekkas, Le concept positif de la ncessit et
la production des tres chez Plotin, Les tudes philosophiques 71,4 (2004) 554557.
7
Enn. VI 7 [38] 13,13.
8
Enn. V 4 [7] 1,3941. Cf. ibid. VI 9 [9] 2,2932. Ibid. V 5 [32] 13,3738.
Ibid. VI 7 [38] 17,36. Ibid. V 3 [49] 15,311.
9
Lunit cherche compenser son inadquation par la rigueur des relations idales.
J. Trouillard, La purication plotinienne, Paris 1955, 107 (les italiques sont de lauteur).
10
Le processus de diversication est imparfaitement compens par la dmarche
dassimilation. J. Trouillard, La purication plotinienne, 108.
2

424

georgios lekkas

Nanmoins, nonobstant linfriorit ontologique du Nos engendr

par rapport lUn qui lui donne naissance, les lments qui, notre
sens,11 prdominent dans toutes les mtaphores utilises par le philosophe alexandrin pour dcrire la relation entre lUn et le Nos sont
ceux-l mme qui, dans son esprit, garantissent continuum et homologie entre le gniteur et les produits de sa procration, cest--dire
entre lUn et le Nos.12 On comprend ainsi pourquoi la dirence
entre lUn et le Nos, en dautres termes la dirence du pre13
davec les produits de sa gnration qui lui sont infrieurs, est entre
autres dcrite par Plotin en termes de dirence sparant tout et
parties, tout qui nest pas constitu de parties, savoir lUn et parties qui constituent un tout, savoir le Nos.14
Sur lchelle plotinienne des tres, les dirents degrs ontologiques (Nos, me, ralits sensibles) ne rsultent pas simplement les
uns des autres, mais constituent dans leur totalit luvre dune puissance autoproductrice et se dployant elle-mme, puissance qui nest
autre que lUn plotinien15 dont le caractre transcendant est en propre celui du gniteur qui, tout en engendrant, demeure inentam
sur lui-mme (f auto).16 Plotin considre la relation de lUn
avec les produits infrieurs lui de son acte de procration sur base
des prsupposs de la doctrine platonicienne traditionnelle relative
la participation et la sparation.17 Par consquent, les dirents
degrs ontologiques sinscrivent, son sens, dans la ligne des degrs
dirents auxquels les produits de lacte de gnration de lUn participent de celui en qui tous trouvent leur origine.18 LUn plotinien
ne constitue pas seulement lorigine de la sortie ouvrant par intellection la multiplicit (noer dijodow),19 mais galement le point de
rtrogression de toutes les ralits qui participent de lui.20 linstar

11
G. Lekkas, Plotinus. Towards an ontology of likeness, International Journal of
Philosophical Studies (Dublin), 13 (2005) 5368.
12
Enn. VI 8 [39] 18,36. Cf. ibid. 1530. Ibid. VI 7 [38] 17,1314. Ibid. V 9 [5]
2,2627.
13
Enn. VI 8 [39] 14,3738. Cf. ibid. 9,29.
14
Enn. VI 7 [38] 12,2330.
15
Enn. IV 8 [6] 6,1116. Cf. ibid. 2526.
16
Enn. V 6 [24] 3,611. Cf. ibid. III 3 [48] 7,811.
17
D. Koutras, La notion de lumire dans lesthtique de Plotin, Athnes 1968, 24 et
2627 (en grec).
18
Enn. V 3 [49] 15,1518. Ibid. VI 9 [9] 2,2224. Ibid. VI 5 [23] 4,1920.
19
Enn. IV 8 [6] 7,1723.
20
Enn. VI 8 [39] 21,2022. Cf. ibid. V 5 [32] 4,16.

simplicit et caractre inengendr de dieu

425

du Bien dans la Rpublique de Platon,21 lUn plotinien nest pas un

principe agissant du dehors par rapport aux produits de sa procration,22 mais constitue au contraire pour eux une rfrence ontologique
constante qui, par sa mdiation (son eusion de lumire)23 les pose
ontologiquement et leur garantit la facult de se connatre soi-mme.
Lutilisation par Plotin de la participation platonicienne pour rendre compte en termes philosophiques du fait que tous les autres tres
proviennent de lUn explique, notre sens, que lapproche cataphatique
(positive) de lUn prenne dcidment le pas dans luvre plotinienne
sur son approche apophatique.24 LUn se connat lui-mme,25 mais
non pas de la mme manire que le Nos.26 LUn nest pas insensible (nasyhton),27 mais vivant.28 LUn ne pense pas mais est la
pense mme.29 Ds lors, nous sommes en droit de douter que,
comme le soutient Georges Leroux, lUn plotinien ne puisse recevoir de prdicats qui soient de lordre de lintellection pure (notiques
crit lauteur),30 mais, en tout tat de cause, nous ne pouvons qutre
daccord avec lui pour dire que Plotin recourt aux diverses acceptions
positives du Bien platonicien pour dmontrer quil est possible
daccder positivement au principe premier (lUn) au travers
dattributs relatifs laction (thiques) tels que la volont et la
libert.31 Il reste toutefois faire clairement apparatre que loin de
constituer simplement lune des nombreuses possibilits particulires
daccs au premier principe plotinien, cet accs positif au dit principe est tout dabord celui qui en n de compte lemporte dans
luvre plotinienne tant donn que le recours la participation
platonicienne pour les besoins de la cosmologie plotinienne fait du

21

Platon, Rpublique 508a56, 508a1112, 508b910, 508e13, 509b69 et 540a8.

Enn. VI 7 [38] 16,3335.
23
Ibid. 2124 et 2731.
24
G. Lekkas, Plotinus, 5859.
25
Enn. V 4 [7] 2,1516.
26
Enn. V 3 [49] 15,2731.
27
Enn. V 4 [7] 2,15.
28
Ibid. 1617.
29
Enn. VI 9 [9] 6,5253.
30
Si on doit chercher une opposition lintrieur des prdicats de lUn, on la
trouvera principalement dans la polarit des prdicats notiques, constamment nis
et des prdicats thiques que Plotin, avec force, leur substitue.. G. Leroux, Plotin.
Trait sur la libert et la volont de lUn. Ennade VI, 8 (39), Paris 1990, 38. Cf. ibidem,
p. 37.
31
G. Leroux, Plotin, 3839.
22

426

georgios lekkas

rapport entre procrateur et procr tel que le peroit le philosophe

alexandrin davantage un rapport de similarit ontologique que de
dirence radicale.32
Le point commun que lontologie plotinienne prsente avec celle
dEunome porte sur la dtermination du quoi (de lessence) au
dpart du comment (de la question du principe). Selon Eunome,33
le Pre inengendr reprsente une essence suprieure au Fils tant
donn que cest le Pre qui engendre le Fils, de la mme manire
que lUn plotinien est ontologiquement suprieur ce quIl engendre, cest--dire au Nos. Toutefois, il y a lieu dinsister ici sur ltroite
liation intellectuelle qui lie Eunome Plotin : en eet, ce quoi
lUn plotinien est ontologiquement suprieur, cest le monde intelligible
(le Nos) dont lui-mme est le crateur, tout comme Eunome, en
faisant du Pre le crateur de son Fils, rejette le Fils du ct de la
cration (ktistn).34 Suivant Grgoire de Nysse,35 laberration o aboutit Eunome prend sa source dans lidentication des notions de pre
et de crateur et dans lapplication du schma de relation de cause
eet (le principe et ce qui en dcoule) au sein de la Trinit, et
ce, en lui confrant le mme contenu smantique que celui que ce
schma a hrit de son application sur le plan cosmologique du Dieu
crateur et du monde cr.
En appliquant la Trinit le schma philosophique bipolaire de
la cause et de leet avec la porte smantique que ce schma tirait
de son application dans les cosmologies dinspiration platonicienne,
Eunome ne pouvait parvenir plus, en ce qui concerne le Fils, qua
voir en lui un degr intermdiaire entre le Pre et le monde, cest-dire le degr ontologique dun Dieu qui, ntant Dieu quen tant
que participant (k metousaw)36 du Pre, est ncessairement infrieur
lui.37
La question laquelle il importe de rpondre est de savoir quel
est lenjeu de lapplication du schma philosophique de la cause et
de leet auquel Eunome procde sans distinguer le plan de la tho-

32

G. Lekkas, Plotinus, 5357.

CE II 52 (GNO I 241,79). Cf. CE II 65 ; 60 et 21 (GNO I 245,4f ; 243,18
20 et 232,29233,1).
34
CE II 15 (GNO I 231,1114). Cf. B. Pottier, Dieu et le Christ selon Grgoire de
Nysse, Namur 1994, 190.
35
CE II 497498 (GNO I 371,1628).
36
CE II 618 (GNO I 407,45). Cf. CE II 619 (GNO I 407,1415).
37
CE II 5455 (GNO I 241,1924).
33

simplicit et caractre inengendr de dieu

427

logie trinitaire du plan cosmologique. Cet enjeu est purement et simplement lgalit de rang divin du Pre et du Fils. Grgoire de Nysse
estime quEunome a recours largument du caractre inengendr
du Pre pour faire tort au Fils ;38 aussi sassigne-t-il pour principal
objectif, dans la rfutation quil lui rserve, du moins dans le CE II,
de dmontrer lgalit en dignit du Pre et du Fils.39
Comme avant lui lavait dj fait Basile de Csare,40 le moyen
quutilise Grgoire de Nysse pour atteindre son objectif est de dgager la question de lessence de celle du principe41 et de dmarquer
corollairement les noms qui se rfrent lessence (telle la simplicit)
de ceux qui dsignent une relation ou une absence de relation avec
un principe surminent (perkeimnh) (tel le statut dinengendr).42
Plus spciquement, pour Grgoire de Nysse, les termes dengendr et dinengendr dsignent exclusivement une relation dorigine
et non une essence.43 Le Pre est inengendr, mais ce statut qui est
le sien nest en rien constitutif de son essence.44 Ainsi, ce qui se
trouve exprim par la distinction du Pre inengendr et du Fils
engendr, cest une dirence dhypostases, celle du Pre qui engendre le Fils et celle du Fils engendr par le Pre, et non une dirence
dessence.45 La thse soutenue par Grgoire de Nysse,46 en accord
avec Basile de Csare,47 cest que ce que nous dit le qualicatif
inengendr propos du Pre, ce nest rien dautre que labsence de
toute dpendance du Pre lgard dun principe qui lui serait
surminent, mais sans rien nous apprendre sur son essence.
Ayant ainsi scind la dtermination, commune Plotin et Eunome,
de lessence au dpart de la modalit marquant son origine (cest-dire au dpart de la question du principe), Grgoire de Nysse na
dsormais nulle peine soutenir que, bien quengendr, le Fils est
quant son essence aussi simple que le Pre inengendr.48 Plus spciquement, le Pre inengendr dire de son Fils engendr quant

38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

CE
CE
CE
CE
CE
CE
CE
CE
CE
CE
CE

II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II

1516 et 58 (GNO I 231,1921 et 242,26f ).

51 (GNO I 240,2526).
615 (GNO I 406,15).
386 et 177 (GNO I 339,37 et 276,711).
2425 et 2829 (GNO I 233,2229 et 234,1923).
41 (GNO I 238,38).
379380 (GNO I 337).
3839 et 36 (GNO I 237,1924 et 236,2528).
34 ; 18 et 192 (GNO I 236,1720 ; 232,1f et 280,2429).
613 (GNO I 405,1418).
29 ; 42 et 30 (GNO I 234,2324.2629 ; 238,1215 et 235,16f ).

georgios lekkas

428

au comment de son origine et non quant sa simplicit.49 De la

sorte, alors que lontologie plotino-eunomienne excipait de la dirence
entre le Pre et le Fils au niveau de la modalit propre leur origine lexistence dune dirence subsquente au niveau de leur essence, Grgoire de Nysse conclut, quant lui, lgalit dessence
du Pre et du Fils partir de la simplicit ontologique qui leur est
commune.50
Il est intressant dobserver combien dirente est la faon dont
les ontologies plotino-eunomienne et grgorienne tirent parti du
schma participatif platonicien relatif la production du semblable
partir du semblable. En clair, dans le fait que le Fils doive son
origine au Pre Eunome voit une infriorit ontologique du Fils par
rapport au Pre attendu que, selon lui,51 le Fils constitue leet dun
acte du Pre qui, lui, nest pas le produit dun acte (m j nergeaw).
En revanche, pour Grgoire de Nysse, davoir son origine dans le
Pre garantit au Fils le statut de vrai Dieu n du vrai Dieu avec
une pleine galit de dignit du Pre et du Fils.52 Ayant la cause
de son origine dans le Pre, le Fils se trouve avec lui dans un rapport dimage vis--vis de loriginal, ce rapport ntant pas celui
dun infrieur ce qui lui serait ontologiquement suprieur, comme
le postulait la mtaphysique plotino-eunomienne, mais bien un rapport dgalit de rang ontologique entre le Pre et le Fils53 et, qui
plus est, de plein et entier englobement rciproque sans aucune confusion de lun avec lautre.54 Vrai Dieu, le Dieu-Logos55 est, selon
Grgoire de Nysse, tout aussi ternel56 et incorruptible57 que lest le
Principe de son origine.
Il apparat donc clairement que par la scission quil opre au sein
de lidentit plotino-eunomienne du principe et de lessence, Grgoire
de Nysse est parvenu dmontrer que, bien que simple (quant

49
50
51
52
53
54

CE
CE
CE
CE
CE
CE

II
II
II
II
II
II

mllon d
55
56
57

CE II
CE II
CE II

29 (GNO I 234,30235,3).
489490 (GNO I 369,515).
376 (GNO I 336,1115).
377 (GNO I 337,1822).
215 (GNO I 288,46).
215216 (GNO I 288), (v. particulirement : xei n aut t patra,
ka atn tn patra). Cf. CE II 214 (GNO I 288,13).
236237 (GNO I 295,713).
610 (GNO I 404,1620).
369 (GNO I 334,78).

simplicit et caractre inengendr de dieu

429

son essence) et sans principe qui le prcde (quant son origine),

ce nest pas parce quIl nest subordonn aucun principe que le
Pre est simple, comme le soutenait la mtaphysique commune
Plotin et Eunome. Lidentication par Eunome de lessence et du
caractre inengendr du Pre, arme Grgoire de Nysse, fait de sa
dialectique un pur nihilisme : en eet, en ce qui concerne le Pre,
cette dialectique prive le Pre dessence en identiant ce quIl est
ce quIl na pas, cest--dire un principe auquel Il serait ontologiquement subordonn, de mme que, en ce qui concerne le Fils (ainsi
que la cration), elle le prive dessence (tout autant que la cration),
ds lors que ne peut tre essence, comme semble le soutenir Eunome
selon Grgoire de Nysse, que le seul caractre inengendr du Pre.58
Le problme philosophique central quexamine le CE dans son
ensemble est de savoir comment il y aura lieu de tirer parti du
schma ontologique traditionnel de la cause et de leet dans le cadre
nouveau de la philosophie chrtienne. Eunome fait usage du schma
bipolaire grec traditionnel de la relation de cause eet en le considrant sous langle de la mtaphysique plotinienne et, plus spciquement, (a) de la subordination de la question de lessence celle
du principe et (b) du continuum ontologique (du haut vers le bas)
entre Dieu et le monde. Cependant, lapplication du schma ontogntique plotinien de la cause engendrant et du produit engendr
dans le cadre de la Trinit chrtienne aboutissait des relations
dingalit de rang ontologique entre les trois Hypostases, et ce, du
fait que le schma susmentionn ntait pas seulement un schma
thologique, mais galement cosmologique destin permettre de
rendre compte en termes philosophiques de lorigine du monde de
la multiplicit au dpart dun principe premier un (et non pas trinitaire). La rfutation dEunome par Grgoire de Nysse se dveloppe
sur base dune double stratgie et se trouve modalise par un recours dirent au schma philosophique grec traditionnel de la cause
et de leet suivant son domaine dapplication, savoir tantt celui
de la thologie trinitaire et tantt celui de la cosmologie : il sagit
en clair (a) de rcuser en faux la subordination de lessence la
question du principe tout en rtablissant corollairement le primat de
lessence vis--vis du principe et (b) de rompre le continuum entre Dieu

58

CE II 484485 et 63 (GNO I 367,1424 et 244,1315).

430

georgios lekkas

et le monde en proclamant la dirence ontologique radicale sparant le cr de lincr.

(a) En ce qui concerne la rfutation de la subordination de lessence
au principe
Dans sa manire daborder la thologie trinitaire chrtienne sur la
base des prsupposs onto-cosmologiques plotiniens, Eunome conclut
un continuum sens unique du type de la relation de cause
eet, continuum qui va du Pre au Fils et selon lequel, au niveau
ontologique, le Fils est ncessairement infrieur (pobebhkta) au Pre
dans la mesure o ce dernier constitue sa cause, raison pour laquelle,
daprs Eunome, il nest pas possible dattribuer au Fils par raison
discursive (kat pnoian) lgalit divine avec le Pre.59 Cependant,
en dgageant le thme de lessence divine de ses liens avec la question de la cause, ce que Grgoire rcuse en faux, cest en dnitive
la ncessit qui, pour Plotin et dans sa suite Eunome, rgit lessence
quant sa dpendance originaire lgard dune cause suprieure
elle.60 La relation de cause gnitrice produit engendr ne constitue pas ncessairement, aux yeux de Grgoire de Nysse, une relation de gniteur ontologiquement suprieur produit ontologiquement
infrieur de son acte de gnration. Daprs le penseur chrtien, du
moins sur le terrain de la thologie trinitaire, la relation de cause
gnitrice produit engendr ne prdtermine pas ngativement le
status ontologique de lacte de procration. Par consquent, contrairement ce qui prvaut de droit dans le cas de la philosophie
plotinienne, la relation de cause engendrant produit engendr ne
prsuppose pas quil existe entre lune et lautre une ncessaire
dirence dans lordre de lessence. Loin daboutir la dirence
ontologique sparant le procr et son procrateur, comme cest le
cas pour lontologie adopte par Plotin et Eunome, lapplication par
Grgoire de Nysse, dans le cadre de la Trinit, du schma ontogntique dune relation de cause eet lui permet, bien au contraire, de garantir lidentit essentielle de la cause et de leet, en
loccurrence celle du Pre et du Fils. Cette identit, peut-tre Grgoire
de Nysse ladmettait-il comme naturelle lchelle du surnaturel,

59
60

CE II 331332 (GNO I 323,215).

G. Lekkas, Le concept positif de la ncessit, 556.

simplicit et caractre inengendr de dieu

431

mais en aucun cas il ne let volontiers accepte en tant que pareillement ncessaire. Si nous devinons bien ce qui fait la teneur de sa
pense la plus intime, quil nous soit permis de supposer quil jugeait naturel que Dieu engendre Dieu (que le Pre engendre le Fils)
tout en faisant de lui son gal, sans cependant estimer que cela dt
tre semblablement ncessaire. Il est au contraire naturel mais galement ncessaire pour Plotin que ce qui est divin par excellence (lUn)
engendre du divin (le Nos) et, qui plus est, quil lengendre en tant
quinfrieur lui. Ce qui soppose ici, cest, dune part, une ontologie chrtienne de la libert inspire par les recherches dOrigne61
et dautre part, lontologie plotinienne de la ncessit.
(b) En ce qui concerne la rupture introduite dans le continuum ontologique unissant Dieu et le monde
Les rponses donnes aprs Platon par la philosophie grecque antique
la question de la cration et de la conservation du monde cr
ont t, dune poque lautre et sous une forme plus ou moins
modie, trs souvent entrines comme prsuppose la doctrine platonicienne de la participation. Dans le contexte plus spcique de
la cosmologie plotinienne, le monde fait partie intgrante de la vie
de Dieu62 tant donn que Dieu est lui-mme en puissance tout ce
quIl cre. Pareille conception avait pour consquence de rendre
impossible la dnition de limites strictes entre Dieu et le monde
quIl cre. Au contraire, la rponse que la rexion chrtienne de
Grgoire de Nysse sest eorce de fournir ce problme prsupposait que Dieu et le monde fussent rigoureusement distingus sur
le plan ontologique et quune solution de continuit sinscrivt entre
Dieu incr et le monde cr.63 De la sorte, Grgoire de Nysse est

61
J. Gath, La conception de la libert chez Grgoire de Nysse, Paris, 1953, 1739 (particulirement 3132). Cf. B. Pottier, Dieu et le Christ, 204205, et G. Lekkas, Libert
et progrs chez Origne, Turnhout 2001, 3537 et 144176.
62
J. Rist, Plotinus and Christian philosophy, in : L. P. Gerson (d.), The Cambridge
Companion to Plotinus, Cambridge 1996, 390391.
63
CE I 270316 (GNO I 105121). Cf. C. B. Skoutris, La distinction et lunion
du cr et de lincr comme point central de la doctrine de saint Grgoire de
Nysse, in : Les Actes de la Rencontre organise sur le thme Saint Grgoire vque de Nysse
Son uvre pdagogique, anthropologique et thologique, Vouliagmni, 11/1/2003, Athnes
2003, 1723 (en grec). Cf. B. Pottier, Dieu et le Christ, 119123, 149 et 180. Voir
galement M. Canvet, Grgoire de Nysse et lhermneutique biblique. tude des rapports entre
le langage et la connaissance de Dieu, Paris 1983, 249253.

432

georgios lekkas

parvenu non seulement tablir une distinction nette entre nature

incre et natures cres (et, partant, entre thologie et cosmologie,
ce qui tait inconcevable, par exemple, dans le cadre de la philosophie plotinienne), mais galement sauvegarder une nature commune de Dieu Trinitaire incr en vue de satisfaire au postulat
chrtien dune galit de rang ontologique des trois Hypostases divines.

ESSENCE AND ACTIVITY (ENERGEIA) IN EUNOMIUS

AND ST. GREGORY OF NYSSA
Torstein Theodor Tollefsen
The terms osa and nrgeia play a lot of dierent roles in ancient
philosophy as well as in the Christian theology of Late Antiquity.
The terms are important, for instance, in the controversy over NeoArianism because they are central to Eunomius theology as well as
to the Cappadocian polemics against the position of Eunomius. They
are also important because they even have a further history in Eastern
Christianity, from the Cappadocians to St Gregory Palamas, and
from him to modern Orthodox theology. The present paper is devoted
to the Eunomian controversy. My intention is to discuss how the
concepts of ousia and energeia function within Eunomius theory of causation and how St Gregory of Nyssa responds to Eunomius reasoning. I will end the paper, however, with some considerations about
possible links between Gregory of Nyssa and the Palamite doctrine
of uncreated energies.
In modern literature on Palamism, the word energeia is often translated as energy. I do not want to avoid this translation as a general
rule, but I think it might be misleading in some instances. I prefer
the more neutral and, perhaps, the philosophically more suitable
term activity. The Eunomian doctrine of activity is a doctrine of causation, i.e. of divine causation. According to Eunomian theology,
divine causation means a doctrine of how God acts as the cause
of created otherness. In the case of the Cappadocians, it refers to
God as the cause of the uncreated divine hypostases of the Son and
the Spirit as well.
In Eunomian theology, there is a hierarchy of three essences or
primary beings.1 The unbegotten God is the rst, the only one that
is God in the proper sense. The second is caused by the rst, and
the third is brought to being by the second. To make things quite
clear, according to Eunomius, the second being, the Son of God, is

Eunomius, Apologia apologiae, cf. CE I 151153 (GNO I 7172).

434

torstein th. tollefsen

a creature (pohma).2 The unbegotten God is his cause. The Son is, of
course, not just any creature. He is created before all things as the
Only-begotten God. He is, consequently, the most perfect creature
that the primary, unbegotten God has ever made. The question is
how God works as the cause of the Son.
It is in this connection we must analyze Eunomius concept of
divine activity.3 How does the Son result from such activity? Eunomius
denies that this activity is some kind of division or movement of the
essence (merismn knhsn tina tw osaw tn nrgeian) of God.4
This, for a start, is obviously a denial of central Nicene ideas in
Cappadocian thought, i.e. the homoousion and divine generation.
According to Eunomius, the divine essence cannot enter the causal
relation in such a way that could divide itself and be portioned out
like some kind of spiritual stu. Nor can the activity be a movement of essence, because if essence is eternal, the activity would have
to be eternal as well, and therefore the eect would be eternal. This
corollary is clearly seen by Eunomius and, as a consequence, he
denies its presupposition.5
Now, what is the exact relationship between the divine essence
and the divine activity in the Eunomian theory of causation? In his
Apologia apologiae Eunomius speaks of the activities that follow the
essences (tn taw osaiw parepomnvn nergein and tn osin
pomnaw nergeaw).6 The key terms are the verbs parpomai (follows
along side) and pomai (comes after, follows). If the activity is not an
essential movement, one alternative strategy could be to emphasize
the distinction between essence and activity in the way done here.
The activity is not eternally stemming from the being of God, rather
it has a loose connection with His essence as such. One could even
speak of activities in the plural, and that they dier proportionately
to the kind of work that is executed.7 Higher products result from
2

Eunomius, Apologia 20,17; 26,112 (Vaggione 60; 6870).

There is some material on the history of the causal sequence of ousia-dynamisenergeia-ergon in M. R. Barnes paper The background and Use of Eunomius Causal
Language, in: M. R. Barnes D. H. Williams, Arianism after Arius, Edinburgh 1993.
The paper lacks, however, comments on Neo-Platonist theories of causation.
4
Eunomius, Apologia 22,9 (Vaggione 62).
5
Eunomius, Apologia 22 (Vaggione 62).
6
Cf. CE I 151152 (GNO I 72,89.16). English translation by A. Roberts
I. Donaldson in: Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Second Series: Volume V, Oak Harbor
(WA) 1997, 50.
7
CE I 152153 (GNO I 72) (A. Roberts I. Donaldson, 50). Cf. Eunomius,
Apologia 23 (Vaggione 6264).
3

essence and activity (energeia)

435

more exalted activities, lower ones from more inferior activities.

Whenever some thing has a beginning of being, this is a sure sign
that the activity begins as well. Does this mean that activities have
a temporal character?
Kopecek says the Neo-Arian Trinity consisted in discretely independent essences that have arranged themselves in a hierarchy of
both time and space.8 He qualies this to mean pre-temporal time,
a term that unfortunately is not explained. However, there are problems with this interpretation. According to Eunomius Expositio dei
the Son is created and has a beginning, but even so he is genuinely
begotten before the ages (lhyw gennhynta pr anvn).9 For this
reason I am sure that Eunomius would not have admitted time (i.e.
ages) into the spiritual realm. When it comes to space, Kopecek
seems just to have taken an objection from Gregory at face value.
Gregory points out the spatial indications in Eunomius description
of the hierarchy.10 I think Eunomius could easily have defended himself against these charges. It is well known that temporal and spatial metaphors are frequent within Neo-Platonic as well as in Christian
systems of theology. Such metaphors are unavoidable when speaking of intelligible being. When the productive activity takes place
beyond the material world, any speaking of beginning and end or
any thinking of entities existing discretely must be recognized as
speaking and thinking metaphorically of something belonging to a
realm that does not answer to our ordinary categories. This, of
course, makes it more dicult to understand what it means that the
Son is a creature in the realm transcending material creation. The
Cappadocians fully accept that the Son is begotten, but not that he
is ok ktiston.11 On the one hand, this makes it urgent to reect
on what is meant by beginning (rx): does it mean temporal beginning, source of movement (rx tw kinsevw), source of being, that
from which something originates? What is clear, though, is that, for
Eunomius, the spiritual essences are separated to such a degree that
only the rst one is God in the proper sense. There must be an
ontological gap, then, between God and the Son. This disthma is

8
Th. A. Kopecek, A History of Neo-Arianism, Cambridge (Mass.) 1979, vol. 2,
453. This is repeated by M. R. Barnes, The background, 221, cf. note 3.
9
Eunomius, Expositio dei 3,23 (Vaggione 152).
10
CE I 166 (GNO I 76).
11
Eunomius, Expositio dei 3,4 (Vaggione 152).

436

torstein th. tollefsen

one of the things that makes the Eunomian position heretical to the
Cappadocians.
The Eunomian system requires a dimension of extended succession between Gods eternity and the temporality of material beings
to make room for the Son and the Spirit.12 The interesting thing is
that Gods activities themselves are located to such a dimension.
One might feel tempted to ask with St Gregory, how and whence
did they arise (pw par tnow genmenai)?13 It strikes me as dicult
to explain. On the other hand, a similar problem becomes acute for
Gregory, himself, when he comes to the doctrine of creation: could
we explain how the eternal divine activity becomes causative of temporal being? He is obviously aware of the diculty, and simply drops
a philosophical explanation of it.14
The activity that according to the Eunomian system results in the
being of the Son has a loose connection with Gods essence and has
an rx. However, even if there should be good reasons for the distinction between divine essence and divine activity, in a doctrine of
causation one would desire to know something more of the character of the cause as such. One would like to know what it is capable of and how it works. If the cause is a rational agent or artisan,
one should like to know if the eect was intended by the cause or
not, i.e. if it was willed by it. According to Eunomius, the divine
activity is eternal in one special sense, i.e. as foreknown by God
before (a temporal metaphor, of course) the creation of the rstborn.15
God, in His foreknowledge, knew unbegottenly what He was going
to do, and when He did it, the activity was executed as Gods will
(bolhsiw) to do it.16 In short, the cause, as a rational maker, was
both capable of, knew and willed the work. At this point one might
wish Eunomius to be confronted with the challenge to dene more
closely how he would avoid the impression that a kind of temporality intrudes into the being of the rst cause. There is an rx of

12

I cannot develop the history of such a concept within the limits of this paper,
but we are led back to the history of time-concepts from Parmenides, through
Plato (Parmenides and Timaeus) to Plotinus (Ennead III 7 [45]) and the requirements
of a Christian doctrine of angelic being. Aquinas speaks of the aevum, cf. Summa
Theologiae I 10,5 and I 63,6.
13
CE I 207 (GNO I 87).
14
Cf. De anima et resurrectione (PG 46, 121a ).
15
Eunomius, Apologia 24,613 (Vaggione 64).
16
Eunomius, Apologia 24,12 (Vaggione 64).

essence and activity (energeia)

437

the activity and an rx of the Son. The divine will eects the creation of the Son: . . . at the same moment he intends it (ma te
boletai), whatever he willed comes to be.17 There is simultaneity
between the exercise of will and the existence of the work. Maybe
we just have to say that God knew eternally that He would execute
His external activity in such a way that the being of the Son emerged
from non-being in ontological dependence on this act of will as his
rx. There must be, then, a relation between Gods foreknowledge
and the activity of will.
It strikes me as rather odd to separate the being of God from the
divine activity if the eect is willed by the causal agent. Of course,
there is one doctrine of causality that to some degree could t
Eunomius concerns, but eventually it would work very badly within
a theology considered to be Christian. What I have in mind is the
Plotinian doctrine of double activity.18 According to this doctrine,
the internal activity of a hypostasis (its activity of essence) is accompanied by an external activity (its activity out of the essence), like
re that generates heat. The external activity is both necessitated
and accidental.19 This paradoxical statement is, in fact, not very
dicult to understand. The point is that the internal activity is executed for its own sake and is in this regard intransitive. If I go for
a walk, the going for a walk could be my only objective. In connection with my preoccupation, external results are incidental. I do
not, for example, intend to make footprints in the snow. On the
other hand, whenever internal activity occurs, it necessarily leaves
an external (transitive) result. Footprint-making is a necessary result
of my walking in the snow.
God, according to such a theory, could be preoccupied eternally
with His own internal contemplation and remain in His own intransient being. As a result of this, there occurs the external activity of
making the Son, necessarily and incidentally. However, this doctrine
of causality ts very badly with the image of God in the Scriptures,
and as a scriptural theologian Eunomius could never have used it.
God is obviously good and loving, and wills the economy of the

17

Eunomius, Apologia 23,20 (Vaggione 64).

Cf. Ennead V 4 [7] 2 and V 1 [10] 6. On double activity, cf. E. K. Emilsson,
Remarks on the Relation between the One and Intellect in Plotinus, in J. Cleary
(ed.), Traditions of Platonism, Dortrecht 1999.
19
Cf. Ennead V 4 [7] 2 and VI 1 [42] 22.
18

438

torstein th. tollefsen

Son. There seems to be no reason for saying that Eunomius was

inuenced by Neo-Platonism at all, even if this is what some patristic scholars suggested earlier.20
Terms like Father and Son lay claim to a denite relationship
between two entities, so that we could imagine a kind of essential
communication of being from the one to the other. As we have seen,
however, this is explicitly denied by Eunomius.21 Actually, Father is
not a designation of the essence of God at all. It is the name of the
divine activity. Son, on the other hand, reveals the essence of Christ.22
One might be a bit surprised at the disproportion in the use of this
Father-Son metaphor, but, of course, in accordance with the nature
of the case (it is a mystery, I suppose), it would not be inadmissible in principle to use metaphorical language that shows limitations.
The term Father is sanctioned by Scripture and, I think, Eunomius
uses it in the sense of generative activity. In fact, for him, this
would have the same sense as creative activity.
It is quite unsatisfactory to conceive of the activity of God as distinct from His essence the way Eunomius does. Further, it is dicult
to understand how he will avoid Gods essential involvement with
the making of the Son. If God wills the creation of the Son, this
must, even on Eunomian principles, be an essential act; if not, Gods
being cannot have the simplicity Eunomius thinks it has: the will
would have to be some additional element in the being of God, and
this would make Him into a composite.
The last point is, in fact, made by Gregory against Eunomius.23
By activities, he says, Eunomius understands the powers (dunmeiw)
by which the Son and the Holy Spirit are produced. Are the activities something other, apart from the essences which they follow, or
are they a part of these essences, belonging to their nature (llo ti
par tw osaw aw parpontai mrow kenvn ka tw atw
fsevw)? If they are other than the nature, how and whence did

they come into being? If they are the same, how were they separated from these essences, and how did they come to follow them
as something external (jvyen), instead of coexist with them? Gregory

20
J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, London 1977, 249; D. L. Bals, METOUSIA YEOU, Rome 1966, 25.
21
Eunomius, Apologia 16 (Vaggione 52).
22
Eunomius, Apologia 24,1822 (Vaggione 66).
23
CE I 205209 (GNO I 8688).

essence and activity (energeia)

439

charges Eunomius with the view that the activity is expressed by a

necessity of nature and that it occurs spontaneously, i.e. without God
being engaged in the result. This, somehow, makes God into a composite being, i.e. an essence combined with an externally added activity. On Gregorys view, Eunomius should have to argue that the
activity is not an accident contained in a subject (w ti sumbebhkw
n pokeimn). On the whole it is inadmissible to speak of the activity as an accident following the essence in this connection I think
Gregory is correct. This is indeed a weak point in Eunomius doctrine. It is more reasonable, from a philosophical point of view, to
hold that an activity is what is expressed by a causal agent engaged
in some work, than not to be able to state the relationship between
cause and eect with any precision at all. According to Gregory,
essences, deliberate and self-determined in their movement, produce
by themselves the expected result (t dokon). These free activities
of forethought are not some kind of external results. We cannot separate the activity of a worker from the worker himself. When we
conceive an idea of activity, Gregory holds that we comprehend
simultaneously the one who is moved with the activity. And when
we think of an agent, we include the idea of activity not explicitly
put forward. This principle is sound, for instance if we conceive the
idea of running or house-building, we would quite naturally include
the idea of a runner or a carpenter.
Gregory, himself, tries to make his point clearer by an example.
If we consider someone who works in metal, two aspects are comprehended, viz. the work done (activity) and the articer. If we
remove the one, the other has no existence either. An activity, it
seems, is the self-expression of a cause. On this view, the activity
must be essential and natural, in the sense that it is an actualization of potencies innate to the cause.
This ontological immediacy between cause and activity precludes
any talk of activities going between (mesiteousa) the rst being
(the cause) and the second (the eect). According to Gregory, on the
other hand, the Eunomian scheme implies that the activity neither
coincides with (sumbanousa) the rst nature, nor combines with
(sunaptomnh) the second.24 As we have seen, Gregory denies the
rst of these ideas. Whether the second point is made by Eunomius

24

CE I 211 (GNO I 88).

440

torstein th. tollefsen

or not, Gregory denies it as well, and on the whole it makes his

theory of creative activity into an interesting philosophical doctrine.
As a matter of fact, he comes close to Aristotelian doctrine. According
to Aristotle, where the result of an activity is something existing apart
for the exercise of an art, the energeia is in the thing made.25 The
artist or artisan has left the imprint of his art as a design or a form
in the material.26 In the 6th oration of De beatitudinibus there is a
passage in which St Gregory shows how he reasons in this regard.27
When we look at a work of art, we become aware of the artistic
skill that the artist has left as an imprint of his art. This once more
stresses the importance of identifying the cause of the activity as one
who possesses potentialities in form of a power to act, an art or certain skills. Such potentialities would belong to the essence of something and carry the marks of essential being. The skills would not
in the case of created being be included in the denition of the
essence, but they would be properties in the sense that they are the
kind of skills this kind of being is naturally apt to achieve. Further,
a rational being, considered as one that possesses an art, would act
from a plan (or a form in his mind), and by the work of his hands
form a suitable material into a design of which one could say it carries the imprint of his art. It seems reasonable to say, on the basis
of his writings, that Eunomius leaves much to be desired.
As far as I can see, this indicates that Gregorys concept of divine
activity may be characterized as follows: (1) the activity is closely
united with the entity that executes it. It springs from an inherent
power of its being. (2) The activity is not some separate reality occurring between the cause and the eect. (3) The activity does not terminate at the moment an external result is accomplished, but resides
in the result as the imprint of the art of the maker.
One might wonder in what way this Gregorian concept of activity serves his own theological concerns. When Gregory in accordance
with the Nicene faith speaks of the generation of the Son, this is
viewed by him as a dierent kind of process than the creation of
the Son spoken of by Eunomius. There is no sempiternal beginning of the Sons being if I may be allowed to speak of the dimen-

25
26
27

Aristotle, Metaphysics IX 8, 1050a30.

Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics VII 7, 1032a32.
De beatitudinibus VI (GNO VII/2 141).

essence and activity (energeia)

441

sion between eternity and time in this way. The Son is eternal and
belongs to the sphere of the uncreated. Gregory admits, though, that
the Son originates from divine will, this will, however, is not a separate activity called Father, but the activity of the hypostasis of the
Father.28 It is not admissible to conceive of this will as an extension
(disthma) between the hypostases of the Godhead. According to
Gregory, there is an immediate togetherness or union (mesow [. . .]
sunfeia) between Father and Son in the Godhead.
These consequences should not surprise one. If there is an eternal spiritual being that is the cause of two more eternal, spiritual
beings the one generated from it, the other proceeding from it
the intimate togetherness of the three is obvious. How could they
be separated? There is no sempiternity, no time, no space, nor any
other category of created otherness to separate such beings. This
concept of Godhead diers heavily from the Eunomian one. According
to Gregorys concept of divine activity, the movement of the essence
or nature has no end at which it just stops, but resides in the product. If the being of God is thought to be simple, and if one argues
for the establishment of a triune God, there would be no obstacle
in principle to imagine the possibility that divine activity ad intra
could culminate in a triad of hypostases.
I suppose one could challenge Gregory to explain why the divine
activity results in a triad of hypostases on the same ontological level
and not in a hierarchy of subordinated beings. According to the
Plotinian scheme of causality, the doctrine of double activity is
designed to explain a hierarchy of subordinated hypostases. Even if
Eunomius causal doctrine diers from that of Plotinus, I think it
would be in Eunomius interest to know Gregorys arguments. However,
I cannot see there are any arguments. Gregory, I suppose, would
just keep to an assertion that this is indeed a reasonable theory of
causation, and why not? I think his doctrine is within the range of
possible theories.
St Gregorys doctrine of divine activity has two aspects, the ad
intra and the ad extra. Ad extra, God creates the world, works in relation to His own human nature in the Incarnation and is active
in the human person on its way to salvation.29 The richness of his
28

CE III/VI 1522 (GNO II 191194).

Cf. In hexaemeron (PG 44, 68d ); De anima et resurrectione (PG 46, 28a); CE III/III
51.64 (GNO II 126,69; 130,23 ); De professione christiana (GNO VIII/1 138);
29

442

torstein th. tollefsen

doctrine makes it impossible to develop any of the aspects further

within the limits of the present paper. Barnes, in a note in a paper
on Eunomius terminology of causation, quotes Lionel Wickham:30
As Dr. H. Chadwick once remarked to me, how bizarre it is that
all this intense discussion about the divine energies should trace its
source to Eunomius and Arius. The remark, of course, concerns
the modern interpretation and discussion of St Gregory Palamas
doctrine of divine energies. Firstly, I think it could be fairly said that
Gregory of Nyssas doctrine of energeia is well integrated within his
Christian system and owes nothing to a Eunomian concept. Secondly,
the Palamitic concept of energeia is as dynamic as the one we nd
in the writings of Gregory of Nyssa. Finally, when Palamas appeals
to the tradition for his concept of energeia, it strikes me that he does
not have to distort the thought of Gregory in order to make the
idea of energeia useful for his own purposes.31 There is, I think, a
positive link between the two Gregories, and what is bizarre is
that some modern scholars have missed the real import of Palamas
theology.

De beatitudinibus VII (GNO VII/2 159f ); De oratione Dominica (GNO VII/2 37 and
40f ); De instituto christiano (GNO VIII/1 44 and 85).
30
Cf. note 3 above.
31
Cf. Gregory Palamas, Capita CL, 112 (Sinkewicz 210212). This text depends
in part on Gregory of Nyssas Ad Ablabium (GNO III/1 4748).

PART IV

SUPPORTING STUDIES
IV.2. THEOLOGICAL MOTIVES

THE COGNITIVE FUNCTION OF EPINOIA IN CE II

AND ITS MEANING FOR GREGORY OF NYSSAS
THEORY OF THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE
Tina Dolidze

In the background of the sharp controversy contra Eunomium, one can

discern the outline of the cohesive epistemological doctrine of St.
Gregory. It broadly considers the subject of the ability of human
thought and language, and the mutual relation between them. The
central epistemological term for St. Gregory, as well as for his brother,
in their dogmatic polemics with Eunomius is pnoia in its various
meanings and modications. The dierent interpretations of this common term of philosophy of Late Antiquity correspond to two dierent
epistemological models in the Cappadocian and Neo-Arian thought.
Following classical semiotics, mainly Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics,
the Cappadocian theologians developed a tripartite semiotic theory,
that (1) distinguishes thing, human intelligence and linguistic annunciation as three components of reality and (2) simultaneously stresses
the complex character of mental and linguistic entities in their dialectical ambivalence. CE II provides a theoretical frame for discussing
these traditional philosophical issues in respect to Christian theology.
In order to focus on positive issues of Nyssas teaching, this survey
presents the theoretical content of the interrelated topics of the CE
II in a systematic exposition, excluding the discussion in extenso of
the polemic context which provoked its development.

I. Epinoia as conceptual thinking

In the books of both Cappadocian brothers against Eunomius pnoia
occurs in two main senses: it denotes a result of thinking, i.e. a conception, according to the patristic basis found largely in Origens
pnoia theory; and along with this, in St. Gregory and St. Basil, it
concerns a faculty and a process of reasoning.1 This latter sense,
Cf. V. H. Drecoll, pnoia, Lexicon Gregorianum III, App. II, 793799, esp. pnoia
II and III.
1

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tina dolidze

although already implied in Origens theory, was evidently coined

in the polemic against the heterodoxy of Neo-Arians. Quite in accord
with Origens understanding of the term, Basil and with him both
Gregories attach to it the faculty to analyze its object in mental
categories through abstraction from sensible reality. In its particular
theological usage, it means for the Cappadocians as well as for
their Alexandrian authority that it is possible through rational reasoning to reach a valid idea of God and confess him in a manner
that corresponds to His being. Gregorys own denition of pnoia
is very important, inasmuch as it represents the semantic range of
the term in a comprehensive form (both static and dynamic) and
species its relevance in theological abstraction.2 As signicant as it
is to the ability to conceive the world, man or God,3 the role of
rational conception is to both Cappadocians severely limited. The
rhetorical cascade of questions is a common place in the attempt to
persuade a reader that no scientic judgement can nd either an
answer to questions regarding the essence or the mode of existence
of the supreme Being or dene the essence, cause and mode of
existence of various creatures. Another rhetorical technique, the
naklouyon, is used to convey the same epistemological reality,
drawing the readers attention to the greatness of Gods creation and
allowing them to experience its wonder only to bring them to the
conclusion that scientic investigation and the logical designation of
Gods wisdom are pursuits doomed to failure.4 The Cappadocian
2
CE II 182 (GNO I 277,2026): sti gr kat ge tn mn lgon pnoia
fodow eretik tn gnooumnvn, di tn prosexn te ka koloyvn t prt
per t spoudazmenon nosei t fejw jeurskousa. nosantew gr ti per to
zhtoumnou t rx to lhfyntow di tn feuriskomnvn nohmtvn sunarmzontew t klouyon ew t praw tn spoudazomnvn tn gxerhsin gomen. Cf. the

denition of demonstrative knowledge in Arist. Anal. post. 71b20. Basils denition

reects a common philosophical account about noetic comprehension through the
perception of sensible things: ste met t prton mn p tw asysevw gginmenon

nhma tn leptotran ka kribestran to nohyntow penymhsin pnoian

nomzesyai: yen sunyeia kale pilogismn, e ka m okevw (Adversus

Eunomium I 6, PG 29, 524b).

3
CE II 181195 (GNO I 277,721).
4
CE II 7181 (GNO I 247,4250,28); 103 (GNO I 256,25). Basil, Hex. (PG 29,
28ab); Gr. Naz. Or. 20,11 (PG 35, 1077c1080a); Gr. Naz. Or. 28,2226; 28,2831
(Mason 54,863,8; 64,1572,2). The gura sententia of the classical rhetoric interrogatio (subiection) (cf. e.g. Quintil., Inst. orat. IX 2,614, Radermacher-Buchheit I
144,25147,2) is used in the Cappadocian fathers as a topic when discussing the
problem of the impossibility of knowledge of the essence of things. I express my
gratitude to the late Prof. Andreas Spira for advice on this rhetorical gure. For

the cognitive function of epinoia

447

scepticism towards scientic knowledge is intensied in Gregory

through his development of the primary ontological opposition between
the innite/adiastemic (God) and the nite/diastemic (man as creature), an opposition that characterizes the contradictory parts of being
specically in conjunction with the theoretical aspect of knowing.5
When Nyssa in CE II points to the great cognitive barrier between
the subject and object of comprehension within the sensible universe
while at the same time developing the idea that pnoia in the Divine
realm can claim only to be a correct surmise, he actually prepares
his reader for the suggestion of an alternative approach to the
Transcendent. In addition, therefore, to their doctrinal disagreement,
the Cappadocians understand Eunomius error to be that he pretends to have knowledge where human reason can produce only
hypothetical conclusions. Such a question concerns not only Eunomius
conclusions but his method of thinking. Eunomius, as the Cappadocians
argue, proceeds from the false rationalistic premise that he can grasp
in a concrete linguistic sign the divine being, and in order to rectify this rationalistic thesis turns to boundless logical artices. When
it concerns the realm of absolute transcendent nature, St. Gregory
recommends as an alternative method to this kind of reasoning a
simple deposit of faith ( pl tw pstevw parakataykh).6 This
has for him a unique capacity to neutralize in some degree the
unbridgeable cognitive gap faced by dimensional human reasoning.
The descriptive denition of faith in CE II presents it as a special
spiritual power which mediates between subject and object of enquiry
and, of itself, allows the inquiring mind to approach the incomprehensible nature.7 There are peculiarities, opposite to those of bare
rational reasoning, that Nyssa denotes in regard to the law of faith:

naklouyon in Gregory see Ch. Klock, Untersuchungen zu Stil und Rhythmus bei Gregor

von Nyssa, Frankfurt a.M. 1987, 211214; H. M. Meissner, Rhetorik und Theologie,
Frankfurt a.M. 1991, 207210.
5
Locus classicus CE II 6770 (GNO I 245,18247,4).
6
E.g. CE II 91 (GNO I 253,23); CE II 93 (GNO I 254,510); CE II 100 (GNO
I 255,2425); CE II 13 (GNO I 230,26); CE II 78 (GNO I 250,1); CE I 371 (GNO
I 136,1417).
7
CE II 91 (GNO I 253,2528): . . . pstevw mesiteuoshw ka sunaptoshw di
autw tn pizhtonta non prw tn katlhpton fsin. This phrase in some
way alludes to and neutralizes CE II 69 (GNO I 246,14) where Gregory speaks
about the impenetrable ontological gap between uncreated nature and created being:
pol gr t mson ka diejthton, prw tn ktistn osan ktistow fsiw
diatetexistai.

448

tina dolidze

although by its inner intention it remains reverently at a distance

from the object of aection, it operates in certainty and achieves
what eludes the human understanding. Knowledge and faith accordingly have dierent premises: the rst has an empirical approach
based on that which is known (t ginvskmena), whereas Christian
faith concerns things that are hoped for (t lpizmena). St. Gregory
sees the blasphemy of Eunomius in the fact that his opponents model
of thinking denies hope as the essence of Christian faith while determining the present existential status of man as already having reached
salvation.8 Nyssen explains the advantage of pstiw over gnsiw through
the goal of human life, which is ethical, not intellectual.
The allegorical interpretation of Abrahams migration as an ecstasy
one of the standard descriptions of mystical ascent to the divine
beauty in St. Gregory illustrates what he means by reasoning in
faith.9 In regard to the point of indicating a correct method of thinking, the passage is focused on structural elements of contemplation.
The way to God begins from following Gods call in love and
ignorance. That means Abraham begins via a detachment of mind
from physical phenomena, as Basil had postulated in his denition
of pnoia.10 The further description of self-transcendence resembles
the hierarchy of divine cognition in Platonic theology and the function of dialectic in it. From concentrating his mind on the beauty
observed in sensible things, Abraham passes to the original model
of beauty in God and, beholding only this idea, he grasps in abstract
conception various features of the Godhead as human reasoning
advances and uses all these as the foundation (pbayra) for his further apprehension of God.11 He transcends all that his own intellect
could grasp, surpasses every verbal description of God and resorts

8
CE II 82 (GNO I 250,28); CE II 84 (GNO I 251,19); CE II 9399 (GNO I
254,330).
9
CE II 8592 (GNO I 251,22254,3).
10
See above note 2.
11
The description up to this point has a strong anity with Enn. VI 7 [38]
36,127 even though Plotinus names in much more detail the stages of union with
God (that is, through analogy, abstraction, knowledge of God in his acts, arts of
ascent (nabasmo) purgation, progress in virtue, entrance (pibseiw), establishing (drseiw) and banquet (stiseiw). Coming near to the Good the soul leaves
behind all science, which brought it there, and concentrates itself only on the
supreme beauty, thinking about nothing but beauty. The ascent in Plotinus ends
as in Plato with supreme intuition, but not in terms of faith and not in the way
of sobria ebrietas as Gregory understands it: on the highest stage of union with God

the cognitive function of epinoia

449

solely to faith, pure and unadulterated by any notion (nnoia). At

the end of ecstasy, as Gregory says, Abraham reaches the supreme
knowledge: he takes as an indicator of the knowledge of God that
he believes him to be greater and higher than any cognitive indicator (gnvristikn shmeon).
J. Danilou sees in this passage a combination of two philosophical view points on beauty: a Stoic contemplation of divine beauty
in the universe and the Platonic contemplation of intelligible beauty,
as it is presented in the dialectic of Eros in the Symposium. Although
he remarks that the movement of Gregorys thought is Platonic, he
estimates Gregorys thought to be original.12 The novelty consists in
a new horizon of striving from Divine light to Divine darkness, as
well as in a new mode of attitude to the object of contemplation.
If the idea of Divine Being is absolutely transcendant to human intellectual grasp, dialectic is no longer the most relevant method for
that upward journey.13 In accordance with the souls movement in
faith, Abrahams ecstasy is conducted, as Gregory stresses, to a great
extent by the heart, rather than by the mind, as the center of pious
intuition and the principle organ within which the irrational striving in love toward the absolutely unknowable can be accomplished.
If we, in addition, concentrate on the formal aspect of the ecstasy,
precisely on Gregorys antithetical way of expression, it will be
evident that here the faresiw of the Platonic tradition is framed
and hence modied by the new context of a paradoxical Christian
mentality.14 This paradox is actually what Gregory lays out as the

soul in its introverted position becomes at the same time subject and object of its
contemplation. See also Enn. VI 7 [38] 35,145; I 6 [1] 9,143 and the whole
treatise III 8 [30]. Alcinoos (Didasc. X, (Whittaker H164,31166,2) mentions abstraction (through synthesis and analysis), analogy and dialectical ascent which begins
with contemplation of the Good in sensibles things, in its social aspects, in intelligible objects, up to contemplating the supreme Good by itself. The model goes
back truly to Plato (cf. Symp. 210e, 212a; Rep. VI, 510b511d).
12
Il va plus loin que Platon, qui identie Dieu avec la sphre des intelligibles.
Mais de mme quil passait des fainmena aux noht par la nuit des sens, il passe
maintenant des noht losa par la nuit de lesprit . . . La nuit de lesprit . . . consiste dpasser les attributs divins, purier lesprit de tout concept, senfoncer
dans la tnbre. J. Danilou, Platonisme et thologie mystique. Doctrine spirituelle de saint
Grgoire de Nysse, Paris 1944, 140142.
13
The priority of dialectic in Platos view is that it operates in the intelligible
world by making suppositions in due course reaching the nupyeton (Cf. Rep. VI,
511bd).
14
A. Spira invites a vivid illustration in Gregory of Nazianzen, how upon the

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tina dolidze

structure of his ascensional hermeneutics, in the structure of his theology in general, and its specic role in his theory of theological language. From the many passages in St. Gregory of Nyssas work that
describe knowledge in faith, I refer to CE II 138141.15 It outlines
the main attributes of the theological manner of reasoning and allows
us to look at its criteria. Nyssa again discusses here the comprehension of the incomprehensible: although the religious mind knows
God as intangible, inconceivable, and beyond all rational comprehension, it investigates and searches
by such reasoning as it is possible, reaches out (porgetai) and touches
(yiggnei tw prospelstou ka chlw fsevw) the unapproachable
and sublime Nature, neither seeing so clearly as distinctly to catch
sight of the Invisible (den t raton), nor so totally debarred from
approaching (pesxoinismnh tw proseggsevw) as to be unable to form
any impression (ekasa) of what it seeks.16

Knowledge achieved by the intention of the religious mind ends as

in the allegorical interpretation of Abrahams ecstasy with cognitive
paradox:
By the reach of reason its goal is to discover what that is which it
seeks, and in a sense understands that by the very fact that it cannot
perceive it, inasmach as it acquires clear knowledge that what it seeks
is beyond all knowledge.17

This way of thinking, which starts from the premise that God is
beyond all knowledge and results in the same idea after all its eorts,
has a cognitive value. The cognitive paradox elaborates the rst criterion of true reasoning: comprehension of the incomprehensible is
not knowledge. Being convinced of this epistemological reality, human
reason passes on to the next criterion of true reasoning: the concrete positive action of mind in producing betting conceptions of

impact of the paradoxical mystery of Incarnation the classical antithesis gure is

transformed in holy Christian antitheta; see A. Spira, The Impact of Christianity
on Ancient Rhetoric. The Decay of Eloquence, StPatr 18/2 (1989) 137153, esp.
147149.
15
GNO I 265,26266,26. For further passages on Nyssas pious docta ignorantia
stressing the cognitive function of mystical paradox, see H. U. von Balthasar, Presence
and Thought. An Essay on the Religious Philosophy of Gregory of Nyssa, San Francisco 1995,
97108.
16
CE II 138 (GNO I 265,29266,3; tr. Hall 89).
17
CE II 139 (GNO I 266,36; tr. Hall 89).

the cognitive function of epinoia

451

God by the Platonic synthesis, analysis and analogy.18 That is, not
being xed on these concrete rational data of its own work, the mind
employs them as a springboard for self-transcendence, where it can
behold itself in pious distance from every designation of God. In this
way the mind now comes through spiritual experience to its initial
theoretical knowledge that God exists (ti sti katalambnetai). The
very purpose of theology, St. Gregory sees, is exactly to reach a reverent conception of God by which it would be kept intact, what
bets the conjecture of Him.19
II. Epinoia as conceptual word ( kat pnoian lgow)
If one turns now to Gregorys approach to the conceptual word, he
can discover that conceptual thought and word are actually identied
in Gregory, and hence own the same peculiarities. The most signicant
common feature of reason and language issues from their diastemic
nature; both of them divide and classify their object and reect it
in multiplicity. Already Origen in his biblical hermeneutics took notice
of that semiotic fact and drew from it a most productive idea of
religious pnoiai respective thoughts and expressions reecting
through multiple indicators the fullness and perfection of Gods simple being.20 One of the principal components of Origens hermeneutical doctrine nds a strong echo in the upholding of the cognitive
power of pnoia as human thought and linguistic expression in the
treatises of the Cappadocians against their great adversary. The multiplied representation of an integral object explain St. Basil and
his brother after Origen is the specicity of the human mind. It

18
Celsus maintains these three methods to be an achievement of philosophy. Cf.
Orig., C. Cels. VII 42 (GCS 3, 192,22193,22).
19
CE II 136 (GNO I 265,710): n tow per yeo lgoiw stn . . . eseb
dinoian jeuren di w t prpon t polcei t per yeo fulaxysetai. Cf.
above the denition of pnoia by Nyssa.
20
Orig., Comm. in Ioh. I 910 (GCS 10, 14,1216,20); De princ. IV 4,1 (Grgemanns Karpp 350,12). Vgl. Comm. in Jer. VIII 2 (GCS 6, 57,59). Cf. M. Harl,
Origne et la fonction rvlatrice du verbe incarn, Paris 1958, 121123. The way for the
Christian application of the idea was evidently prepared by Philo; cf. G. C. Stead,
Logic and the application of names to God, in: F. Mateo-Seco J. L. Bastero
(eds.), El Contra Eunomium I en la produccin literaria de Gregorio de Nisa. VI. Coloquio
Internacional sobre Gregorio de Nisa, Pamplona 1988, 309311.

452

tina dolidze

is not misleading, however, but, when mentally and linguistically

properly classied, can bring to knowledge the underlying object or
can even supply a correct surmise on the Divine realm.21
Moreover, it was the paradoxical mode of narration in so much
of Holy Scripture that rst motivated the speculative mind of the
Alexandrian master to produce its scientic interpretation and to
explain the variety of obscure passages as indications on Gods mystery. The sacred paradox, the essence of Origens allegorical interpretation as it is, agitated, on the one hand, human reason to nd
integral sense in historical events that seemed literally independent
or contrary, and to harmonize, on the other hand, the discrepancy
between the sensible content of the biblical language and its spiritual dimension.22 St. Gregory shared Origens pathos for allegorical
interpretation, and, therefore, the idea of sacred paradox is fundamental to Christian language and a Christian mentality. As in Gregory
of Nyssa so in Origen intelligence and language are, nonetheless,
things of dierent order. The Bishop of Nyssa had, in particular, to
highlight it in his dogmatic controversy.
It was Origen who at rst had to defend in his biblical hermeneutics the simple language of the Bible against Greek intellectuals and
who insisted on the hidden spiritual treasures in earthern vessels
of common language.23 In contention with the Neo-Arian stance that
naming God can express his divine essence, the Cappadocians had
to move further in the direction of a sceptical approach to linguistic utterance. Epnoiai nyrvpnvn logismn, tells Gregory, are
dierent in all men, but they assume even more diverse shapes in
linguistic utterance. The process of dimensional multiplying of the
object goes further in linguistic designations, as far as concluding
that a number of signiers can correspond to one signied. This is
a strong argument for St. Gregory to uphold the conventional character of human language. The process goes actually into reductio ad

21
CE II 271276; 300; 475; 501503 (GNO I 305,27307,21; 314,22; 364,32;
372,16373,8); Basil, Adv. Eun. I 6; I 7 (PG 29, 524b; 524d525b).
22
In more detail on the horizontal and vertical paradox in Origens hermeneutic: T. Dolidze, Der Glaube als Erkenntnis bei Origenes in: W. Geerlings
C. Schulze (eds.), Der Kommentar in Antike und Mittelalter. Neue Beitrge zu seiner Erforschung,
Leiden 2004, 185211.
23
Orig., De prin. IV 1,7; IV 3,14 (Grgemanns Karpp 303,14304,1; 345,5347,4).
Cf. 2 Cor 4,7.

the cognitive function of epinoia

453

innitum, if one takes into account that conceptual thought has even
more diverse phonetic shapes in dierent languages.24 Reminiscent
of Basils words, and in accord with Origen, Nyssa writes: we have
a faint and slight apprehension of the divine Nature through reasoning, but we still gather knowledge enough for our slight capacity through the words which are reverently used of it.25
This approximate knowledge issues from the main peculiarity of
religious articulation: its equivocality. This equivocality is, in fact, a
Christian religious paradox on the linguistic level and, as such, aims
to mediate the contraries. In De anima et resurrectione, Nyssa introduces
the anthropological background of equivocality. Man by his own
choice abandoned his original uniform life (monoeidw zv) in good
and voluntarily became a nature compounded from opposites (smmiktow k tn nantvn fsiw), that is of good and evil. This new
existential status divides the whole human life into these two opposite poles and locates him permanently between opposite choices.
After becoming twofold in nature, man becomes ambiguous having
a homonymical understanding of good and evil in respect to his reason and senses.26 Thus Gregory draws primarily on the traditional
interpretation of equivocality as a principle of dierentiation.27 But
this is only one aspect of the term, which was evidently used in contemporary school tradition, and along with this it pointed out the
possibility of a correlation of two dierent things.28 Already in Alcinoos
equivocality is considered to be a logical analogy between a transcendent idea and its correlate in the world of phenomena.29 Origen

24

CE II 283284; 406410; 546 (GNO I 309,23310,11; 344,25346,4; 385,28);

CE III/V 5052 (GNO II 178,13179,15). Nyssas concept of the ambivalence and
relativity of human epinoetic thought and language is a part of his profoundly
dialectical theology.
25
CE II 130 (GNO I 263,2126; tr. Hall 87); cf. Basil, Adv. Eun. I 10 (PG 29,
533c); Gr. Naz., Or. 28,4 (Mason 26,12). In C. Cels. VII 42 (GCS 3, 192,22193,22)
Origen opposes his Christian position concerning the limited epistemological capacity of both reason and language to that of Plato; in Timaios 28c Plato maintains
that it is impossible to express the metaphysical reality with human language, but
ascribes the possibility of its comprehension to human reasoning.
26
De an. et res. (PG 46, 81bc).
27
Cf. Arist., Cat. 1a1; Arist., Polit. I 1,11, 1253a21.
28
Clem. Alex., Strom. VIII 8,24,8 (GCS 17, 95). See M. Harl, Origne et la
smantique du langage biblique, in: M. Harl, Le Dchirement du Sens. tudes sur
lhermneutique chrtienne dOrigne Grgoire de Nysse, Paris 1993, 6187, esp. 65, note
1314.
29
Alcinoos, Didasc. XXX (Whittaker H183,17).

454

tina dolidze

and the Cappadocians followed this model, but transposed and

modied it according to their actual task. In Origens biblical hermeneutics and Gregorys systematic reection on religious language, the
vertical interpretation of the term homonyma resulted in an ingenious solution to the problem: religious expressions combine in equivocality the common human vocabulary with the inspired sense, which
transcends its literal meaning.30
According to Gregory of Nyssa, everything that is linguistically
expressed of God is expressed equivocally of him, be it an armative
or negative term. The rst designates it in an equivocal analogy with
human attributes or sensible things. It means that God communicates mysteries of divine truth in human terms so as to give instructions to mankind in accordance with the level of human capacity.31
So are to be explained, in retrospective view to Origen and Judaic
Hellenistic exegesis, all anthropomorphisms of God in the Bible.32
Gregory repeats Origens hermeneutical request to think about God
in a manner that is worthy of God. The task of allegorical interpretation is, namely, to penetrate the sensible, verbal veil of Holy
Scripture and to speak in a spiritual way spiritual matters concealed
by it. Negative epithets belong to another type of linguistic multiplying of the transcendent Divine image. Nyssen, in a manner dierent
to the negative theology of Platonism, gives no advantage to this
kind of divine nomination; he nds it to be a conceptual expression
of a special grammatical order that, through the prex of privation,
expresses Gods divergence from the creature.33 In theological language, both positive and negative articulations lead to the trans-

30
Orig., Comm. in Cant. prol. (GCS 33, 64,1620): Ostendere enim ex his volumus
quod scripturis divinis per homonymas, id est per similes appellationes, immo per eadem vocabula et exterioris hominis membra ei illius interioris partes aectusque nominantur eaque non solum
vocabulis, sed et rebus ipsis invicem comparantur. Cf. CE II 300f (GNO I 314,22315,5).
On equivocality in Origen, cf. R. Roukema, The Diversity of Laws in Origens Commentary
on Romans, Amsterdam 1988; M. Harl Origne et la smantique, 6265; R. Ggler,
Zur Theologie des biblischen Wortes bei Origenes, Dsseldorf 1963, 326331; T. Dolidze,
Der Glaube als Erkenntnis, 204210.
31
CE II 130147; 578580; 104105 (GNO I 263,21268,18; 395,329; 257,221).
The idea can be traced back to Philo; see J. M. Soskice, Philo and Negative
Theology, in: M. M. Olivetti (ed.), Thologie ngative, Milan 2002, 491504, esp.
500503.
32
Aristobulos was the rst to originate the point; cf. R. Ggler, Zur Theologie des
biblischen Wortes, 9394.
33
CE II 192194 (GNO I 280,22281,21).

the cognitive function of epinoia

455

gression of a multiplicity of designators in order to produce a comprehensive spiritual content under the condition that every designation is dened semantically through conceptual thought and properly
applied to God. Correlated with each other, these terms imitate the
integrity of our conception regarding Gods life and then, through
the intuition of reason, approximate the reality that surpasses the
human intelligence. The correlating principle is valid also in biblical hermeneutics, as a part of theological language, but is shaped
there in its specic way. There an interpreter and the common
reader, led by him, primarily dierentiate the biblical text into basic
semantic parts (Gregory unlike Origen knows only of a twofold interpretation of text, spiritual and corporeal) with the aim to show a
participation of a concrete historical event in the whole of Gods
economy. The same principle of mental and linguistic imitation of
eternal reality is subjected to the manifold interpretation of biblical
personages in typological and allegorical manner. In this sense, the
hermeneutic interpretation of Solomons Canticum canticorum this
epoptic of Christian theology is most impressive. Likeness with the
plenitude of Gods mystery is achieved in commentaries of Nyssa
and Origen through the complex meaning of gures and images,
the accumulation of these meanings and the transposition from one
to another in order to reveal their reciprocity.34 The allegorical exegesis is thus an exercise of conceptual reasoning, which aims to overcome focusing on the variability of conceptual articulation and to
reach methodically the understanding of the entire text as sacred
metaphor.
This metaphysical perspective in St. Gregorys theory of language
is supported by the biblical argument that, even if naming things is
the invention of Adam,35 the very faculty of expressing thoughts, as
well as of reasoning, belongs to the work of God. It involves along
with this an important ontological argument: that divine essence and
its action are inseparable. As Gregory asserts, the created world is
not a result of Gods energy as something that is beyond his existence, but it is inherent to God and at the same time immanent to

34
T. Dolidze, Einige Aspekte der allegorischen Sprache in den Auslegungen
von Origenes und Gregor von Nyssa zum Hohenlied, in: L. Perrone (ed.), Origeniana
Octava, Leuven 2003, 10611070.
35
CE II 402 (GNO I 343,25).

456

tina dolidze

creation. Uncreated as it is, the divine energy is to be considered as

a permanent spreading out of Gods grace on creation. In the theory of theological language, this ontological doctrine is expressed in
an identity of inspired word and divine energy and participation of
human intelligence in this energetic union ideally.36 This discrepancy
was crucial to the Neo-Arian. Eunomius, entirely conditioned by
Platonic tradition, divided divine energy from divine essence with
the aim of legitimating the dierence of Trinitarian persons in essence
and dignity.37 Presumably, his immediate source for doing this was
Plotinus, who distinguished two kinds of energy in the intelligible
world: essential, which coincides with the active being of divine
hypostasis, and nrgeiai, that issue from its essence and are something external to it.38 The dogmatic dispute had an intimate connection
with the problem of Divine nomenclature. The ambiguity of the
term j nalogaw mvnuma (homonymy based on analogy),
specically, the question of its genuine meaning, played a key role,
as each side attempted to control its essential theological meaning.
Eunomius, as we can judge from his Apologia, discerns two methods of approach to the Divine persons: (1) through the Platonic
abstraction, oriented on examination and designation of their divine
essence, and (2) through equivocal analogy, which depict them according to their activity. The rst method, although it fails to provide a
cataphatic denition of the rst person of the Trinity because of the
absolute transcendence of his essence and energy, comprehends Him
in an apophatic designation. The inductive method of equivocal analogy enables the positivistic comprehension of the second and third

36
Cf. CE II 298299; 148158; 581587 (GNO I 314,820; 268,18271,10;
395,30397,31); Beat. VI (GNO VII/2 141,25 ); De an. et res. (PG 46, 124b). See
. , O M (.
.), in: M , 1991, 142143; H. U. von Balthasar,
Presence and Thought, 8485.
37
Eun., Apol. 20,122; 25,126 (Vaggione 5860; 6668); Basil, Adv. Eun. I 5; I
6; I 24; II 32 (PG 29, 520c-521a; 521c524a; 565a; 648b).
38
Eun., Apol. 22,516; 24,1 (Vaggione 62; 64); cf. esp. CE I 205211; 246249
(GNO I 86,1788,17; 98,2799,24) with Enn. V 4 [7] 2,1937 and V 3 [49] 12,152.
Eunomius phrase CE I 205 (GNO I 86,17) tn taw osaiw pomnvn nergein
ka tn tataiw prosfun nomtvn resembles Enn. V 4 [7] 2,29: d p kenhw
(scil. tw osaw T.D.), n de pant pesyai j ngkhw tran osan ato. On
metaphysical energy see also Porph. (?), Comm. in Plat. Parm. XIV 21 (Hadot 90);
Porph., Sent. 43 (Lamberz 54,756,15); 44 (Lamberz 57,1; 58,4; 58,18; 59,1).

the cognitive function of epinoia

457

persons of the Trinity. The Son, the rst and only result of Gods
energy, can be grasped through the extension of his creative energy
in the universe.39 The inspired language of the Scripture in Eunomius
eyes is based completely on equivocal analogy, but this linguistic
phenomenon, itself, in his particuliar insistence, does not belong to
human epinoetic language.40
The point argued by Gregory of Nyssa lies at the opposite pole
to this thesis of the Neo-Arian. With the doctrine of the union of
Divine essence and energy, and of common manifestation of energy
in the Holy Trinity, Gregory of Nyssa gives another ontological reading to the notion of equivocal analogy.41 He, like Basil, transposes
the accent from the analogy between the created universe and the
Son to the idea that the Triune God is not only transcendent, but
also immanent to the world in its creative action. The equivocality
of theological language in this context matches a exible cognitive
method; it can move in an act of energetic naming from divergence
with the Divine to congruence with it.42
39
Eun., Apol. 20,22; cf. 26,4; 28,126 (Vaggione 60; 68; 74). Further on the levels of Being and energeia in Eunomius linguistic theory see: Th. Bhm, Theoria.
Unendlichkeit. Aufstieg. Philosophische Implikationen zu De Vita Moysis von Gregor von Nyssa,
Leiden 1996, 171; K.-H. Uthemann, Die Sprache der Theologie nach Eunomius
von Cyzicus, ZKG 104 (1993) 143175; also his Die Sprachtheorie des Eunomios
von Kyzikos und Severianos von Gabala, Theologie im Reex kirchlicher Predigt,
StPatr 24 (1993) 336344, esp. 339. In his method of thinking Eunomius tends actually to nominalism, inasmuch as his conclusions stem from the formal contradiction
of generated/ungenerated, the most important opposition of his philosophy of language (Eun., Apol. 18,1316.19; 19,12, Vaggione 56; 58). Cf. with the view of
Cratylus, who asserted: whoever knows the names knows the things (Plat., Crat. 435d).
40
Cf. Eun., Apol. 16,117,17; 18,6 (Vaggione 5254; 54); CE II 306312; 141
(GNO I 316,6317,24; 266,25). In the extant fragments that came down to us, we
can identify four categories of theological naming in Eunomius: (1) the naming of
divine essence, which is an unequivocal designation (Unbegotten, Being), (2) the
sacred language of the Bible, (3) theological language, based on the correct interpretation of the scripture and (4) false theological expressions, that are the product
of human pnoia.
41
CE II 238240; 460 (GNO I 295,27296,24; 361,1012); Ad Eustath. (GNO
III/1 11,3; 13,2115,3); Ad Ablab. (GNO III/1 48,2049,7); vgl. CE III/VII 914
(GNO II 206,28208,21); De an et res. (PG 46, 124b). As E. Mhlenberg estimates,
the idea that theological nomination does not denote essence, but denotes energies
of God in the form of attributes, issues from Origen; E. Mhlenberg, Die philosophische Bildung Gregors von Nyssa in den Bchern Contra Eunomium, in: M. Harl
(ed.), criture et culture philosophique dans la pense de Grgoire de Nysse. Actes du colloque de
Chevetogne (2226 Septembre 1969), Leiden 1971, 230244, esp. 241.
42
Cf. e.g. Basil, Adv. Eun. I 1622; II 10 (PG 29, 548c561b; 589c); CE II 577
(GNO I 394,27); CE III/V 4345 (GNO II 175,23177,4); CE III/II 910 (GNO
II 55,319).

458

tina dolidze

It was Nyssen, while defending Basils view of pnoia, who introduced for the rst time the theory of theological language into patristic theology. He actually extended Origens great hermeneutic
construction on the whole linguistic corpus of reexive theology. As
signicant as it is, the novelty consists not only in this. There also
occurs in Gregory of Nyssas theology of language a concept of
silence, which brings a new element to the spiritual inheritance. The
idea of silent adoration is evidently derived from the Bible, especially from Pauls and Johns revelations, but, perhaps, supplemented
by Plotinus mysticism.43 One can argue, that silence has an essential weight in St. Gregorys theory of theological language. In CE II
he says: the divine decree not to reveal his Being even in Sacred
Scripture, is caused by his will to be honoured in silence, and hence
to prohibit human enquiry into the deepest things.44 Thus at its
height faiths comprehension comes to actualization precisely in a
verbal hiatus. In the context of Nyssens intertextuality45 this type of
informative silence occurs not only in Gods realm, or in the written Word in the Bible, but also in the whole universe created by
the Word. Again in CE II, as well as in other treatises, this close
at hand silence is signied to have a higher degree of reality than
the most reverent utterance about God.46
It has already been indicated in research into Gregory of Nyssa
that the methodic conceptual reasoning in Nyssen ends in mystical
silence.47 Thus the theory of St. Gregorys theological language in
its zenith comes to its negation. The doctrinal paradox is, however,

43

Cf. CE II 268 (GNO I 304,25); Enn. III 8 [30] 4,1; III 8 [30] 6,10; VI 8 [39]

11,1.
44

CE II 97101; 105 (GNO I 255,1256,15; 257,21).

A. A. Mosshammer, Disclosing but not Disclosed, Gregory of Nyssa as
Deconstructionist, in: H. R. Drobner C. Klock (eds.), Studien zu Gregor von Nyssa
und der Christlichen Sptantike, Leiden 1990, 99123, esp. 120122.
46
CE II 224 225 (GNO I 290,25291,23); cf. In Cant. XV (GNO VI
455,10456,15).
47
Th. Kobusch, Name und Sein. Zu den sprachphilosophischen Grundlagen in
der Schrift Contra Eunomium des Gregor von Nyssa, in: F. Mateo-Seco J. L.
Bastero (eds.), El Contra Eunomium I en la produccin literaria de Gregorio de Nisa, 247268,
esp. 261. S. Douglass provides the conception of a sacred silence within the poles
of paradoxical Christian metaphors in Nyssa; see S. Douglass A Critical Analysis
of Gregorys Philosophy of Language: The Linguistic Reconstitution of Metadiastemic
Intrusions, in: H. R. Drobner A. Viciano (eds.), Homilies on the Beatitudes. Proceedings
of the Eighth International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa (Paderborn, 1418 September 1998),
Leiden 1999, 447465, esp. 454.
45

the cognitive function of epinoia

459

visible for it stays in full agreement with its ontological correlate

the divine innity. This mutual contact, as Gregory attests, takes
place on the borders of extensive and inextensive existence, in the
duton, where man with his innite desire of vision of the Beloved,
comes into participation with His innity. As for the Christian theologian, the realm of sacred silence is for St. Gregory a realm of
Unspoken Words.48 There the human soul no longer needs the rules
of logical discursive pnoia, while in sharp antithesis to them it
begins to see the voice and move in stand.49
St. Gregory of Nyssas idea of charismatic silence in theological
language proved to be fertile: it can be traced through the thinking
of Gregory Palamas, who laid silence as the ground of his mystical
theory of the unspoken word as an area of Gods uncreated energy.

48
49

CE III/I 16 (GNO II 9,13); CE I 308316 (GNO I 118,19121,3).

De an. et res. (PG 46, 25a; cf. Apoc 1,12; 10,4); Vita Moysis (GNO VII/1 118,124).

GREGORY OF NYSSA AND

THEOLOGICAL IMAGINATION
Scot Douglass
Imagination is not entirely evil, it is evil and good, for in
the midst of it man can master the vortex of possibilities
and realize the human gure proposed in creation, as he
could not do prior to the knowledge of good and evil . . .
Greatest danger and greatest opportunity at once . . . To unite
the two urges of the imagination implies to equip the absolute
potency of passion with the one direction that renders it
capable of great love and great service. Thus and not otherwise can man become whole.
Martin Buber, Good and Evil

I. Situating pnoia in the gap

Martin Bubers twentieth-century thoughts on the dynamis of imagination reect a number of historical perspectives that are relevant
to my reading of Gregory of Nyssa. At its very core, imagination
has always been implicated in the notion of time, in the created
order of existence. That is, it functions in the vortex of possibilities,
in the ux of becoming, in the capacity to envision, evaluate and
choose. As the substrate for the possibility of intentional change, it
simultaneously looks back, summoning the never was, and looks forward, calling forth the yet to be and the never to be. By imposing
a type of sovereignty over an innite projection of potential futures
and non-existent pasts, it is the servant of the present decision, the
servant of yet another moment of becoming. Such service, as Buber
notes, is deeply ambiguous. It is good and evil.
In addition to this ethical register of reading imagination, there
has always been an epistemological interrogation of the role of imagination. Plato, for example, famously concluded that the creative
ospring of imagination were the poor children of poor parents.
In the dividing line between knowledge (pistmh) and opinion (dja)
in Book VI of the Republic, whereas reason (now) can contemplate
truth, imagination serves the most inferior form of human opinion:

462

scot douglass

illusion (ekasa). Plato goes on to say: Opinion is concerned with

becoming and the exercise of reason with being . . . and what being
is to becoming, the exercise of reason is to opinion.1 Imagination
for Plato is always implicated in becoming, and is, therefore, always
inferior.
With the 1781 rst edition of his Critique of Pure Reason, Platonic
epistemology gets turned somewhat on its head as Kant claims that
imagination precedes both rational thought and sensible intuition
imagination is the originating and productive root of both stems of
knowledge: intuition and understanding. This re-orientation of the
valuation of the role of imagination is reected in the canonical
metaphors used to describe them. Platonic imagination as mirror,
the distorted and deformed reection of reality, gives way to Modern
imagination as lamp, the generation and creation of light. Heidegger
comments on this rst edition of Kants Critique of Pure Reason:
As a faculty of intuition, imagination is formative in the sense that it
produces an image. As a faculty not dependent on objects of intuition,
it produces, i.e. forms and provides, images. This formative power is
at one and the same time receptive and productive (spontaneous). In
this at one and the same time is to be found the true essence of the
structure of the imagination. However, if receptivity is identied with
sensibility, and spontaneity with understanding, then imagination falls
in a peculiar way between the two.2

There are two notions here in Heideggers reading of Kant relevant

to reading Gregorys understanding of epinoetic invention: that imagination is at one and at the same time receptive and productive
and that imagination falls in a peculiar way between the two. In
the lexicon of Gregory, pnoia, on an epistemological level, exists
(in a peculiar way) in the disthma between the reception of Gods
revelation and the production of theological discourse. That is, since
created beings are limited to receiving revelation that is diastemically
mediated, any theological discourse about the adiastemic God that
attempts to speak beyond His activities must always be an epinoetic
construction that consciously detours away from the goal of mimesis.3

Plato, Republic 534a.

M. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, tr. J. Churchill, Bloomington
(IN) 1962, 135.
3
For an extended examination of this type of epinoetic construction, see the chapter
The Metadiastemic Intrusion in my Theology of the Gap. Cappadocian Language Theory
2

theological imagination

463

On an ethical level, pnoia functions in the disthma between the

lives of ancient saints and the life-choices of contemporary believers.
Richard Kearney summarizes the three decisive claims regarding
the dynamis of imagination made within the phenomenological trajectory (i.e. Husserl, Heidegger, and their diverse heirs):
(1) imagining is a productive act of consciousness, not a mental reproduction in the mind; (2) imagining does not involve a courier service
between body and mind but an original synthesis which precedes the
age-old opposition between the sensible and the intelligible; and (3)
imagining is not a luxury of idle fancy but an instrument of semantic innovation.4

Gregorys valorization of pnoia in Book II of the Contra Eunomium5

is rooted in the incredible scope of its productive capacity. Similar
to the stolen re of Prometheus, the source according to Aeschylus
of every art possessed by man, Gregory regards it as the most precious of all providential provisions and the source of every useful
thought, skill and discipline of inquiry. It is the faculty that produces
language and the capacity to discover, invent and construct. Epnoia
is even the source of the very philosophy of being itself and metaphysical speculation (at d per to ntow filosofa ka tn
nohtn yevra). Very telling in his long list of the achievements of
pnoia are the references to navigation. In a created order dominated by dimensionality (disthma) and motion (knhsiw), the epinoetic
capacity enables created beings to move within the distanciated ux
in a meaningful manner. In the explicitly theological thinking of
Gregory, pnoia is the source of the greatest orthodoxies and the
greatest heresies. As laid out in his sermons on Ecclesiastes, it is the
ethical possibility of constitutionally kinetic beings exercising either
good knhsiw and thus participating in the Holy of Holies or of
exercising bad knhsiw and thus participating in the Vanity of
Vanities. As exemplied in his yevra of the life of Moses, it is the
hermeneutical possibility of bringing together the life of an ancient
saint with the radically dierent life of a fourth-century believer.6

and the Trinitarian Controversy, New York Bern Berlin Bruxelles Frankfurt am
Main Oxford Wien 2005.
4
R. Kearney, Poetics of Imagining. Modern to Post-modern, New York 1998, 6.
5
See CE II 182183 (GNO I 277,16278,4).
6
Gregory acknowledged a number of distanciations between his reader and
Moses: cultural, historical and circumstantial. Since the Textwelt was other to the

464

scot douglass

That is, epinoetic theologizing for Gregory was as equally concerned

with the noetic as it was the metanoetic, with the knowledge of God as
it was with the intentional transformation of a believer into the image
of God.

II. Epinoetic ambiguity in Gregory

What Adam within the Hebrew tradition had to sin to get and
Prometheus had to steal, God, according to Gregory, freely gave to
humanity. This gift, like the gift of the Hebrew rxy, could be used
for good or evil, but it was not implicated in the fall of humanity
nor the creation of history in the same manner. To Gregory, diastemic
and kinetic humanity were historical beings by nature, created as a
function of alteration, always embedded in the process of becoming.
In Gregory shorthand, Diastema is nothing other than creation (t
d disthma odn llo ktsiw stn)7 and to stop moving would
mean to cease to exist altogether (E d pote kinomenon pasoito,
ka to enai pntvw tn palan jei).8 The great gift of the dnamiw
of pnoia the most precious of all gifts given to humanity9
was necessary for there to be any possibility of connection, relationship and the avoidance of the empty abyss of absolute isolation.
It is the divine gift that resists the total chaos and entropic dissemination of a universe constitutionally dominated by the chronotopic
realities of disthma and knhsiw. As a diastemic gift given by God
to help humanity overcome diastemic limitations, it shares in the very
limitations it is meant to overcome. Gregory, therefore, shares the
Platonic concern for the epistemological dangers of imagination, questioning whether it would not just be safer to reject it as a legitimate
tool of theologizing.

worlds of Gregory and his readers, each of these distances constituted a diastemic
barrier to the metanoetic project of imitating the life of a Jewish saint, of placing
[oneself] (mautn katastsv) in their ranks (De vita Moysis, GNO VII/1 6,514).
7
In eccl. (GNO V 412,14).
8
De hominus opicio (PG 44, 165ab).

9
ka moi doke pntvn tn kat tn zvn tathn nergoumnvn n mn gayn
tn taw cuxaw mn par tw yeaw promhyeaw nuparxntvn tn pnoin tiw
protimotran krnvn m n tw preposhw krsevw diaceusynai (CE II 183, GNO

I 277,32278,4).

theological imagination

465

In another way, one might argue that safety lies in leaving the divine
nature unexplored, as being inexpressible and beyond the reach of
human reasoning. Speculating about the obscure and using the epinoia
of human reason to search for some kind of knowledge of things hidden, allows admission and currency to false ideas, since speculation
about the unknown understands not only what is true to be true, but
often also what is false.10

Gregorys embracing of the ambiguous potential of pnoia meant

that the act of addressing God was fraught with risk11 and guaranteed to end in a certain type of failure. Gregory reads Davids comment in Psalm 115,2: pw nyrvpow cesthw (all men are liars), not
as a text about depravity (as does Paul in Romans), but rather as one
about the constitutional limitations of dimensional being. All men lie
ox t msei tw lhyeaw, ll t syene& tw dihgsevw (not in
any hatred of the truth, but in the feebleness of being able to set
out a description).12 Gregory of Nazianzus, in discussing the cost to
Christ of His kenosis, tropes this same idea in a much more violent
image. While proclaiming, Lgow koeiw, ka pr lgon e (You
are called Logos, and You are beyond Logos),13 the Theologian laments
that, unavoidably and against his will, even his own reverent logos
participated with those whom he regarded as heretics in casting
stones at his Savior:
And even now He bears being stoned, not only by those who are
intentionally abusive, but also by we ourselves who seem to reverence
Him. For to use corporeal names when discoursing of the incorporeal
is perhaps to partake with those who intentionally abuse and stone
Him; but be lenient, I say again, in respect to our weakness, for I do
not willingly stone Him; but having no other words to us, we use what
we have. You are called Logos, and You are above logos.14

10
Ka llvw d n tiw sfalw enai fseien polupragmnhton n tn yean
osan w prrhton ka npefon logismow nyrvpnoiw. t mn gr tn dlvn
katastoxzesyai ka tina tn pokrfvn gnsin j pinoaw nyrvpnvn logismn
reunsyai prodon ka kolouyan ka taw dieceusmnaiw tn polcevn ddvsin,
diti tn gnooumnvn stoxasmw o mnon t lhyw, ll ka at pollkiw
t cedow w lhyw polcetai (CE II 97, GNO I 255,18).
11
Gregorys rst 19 usages of pnoia and its cognates in CE I are uniformly

negative, referring to Aetius scheming to get money and Eunomius ctitious

heresies.
12
Gregory of Nyssa, De virginitate (GNO VIII/1 290,1314).
13
Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio 37,4 (PG 36, 285d).
14
Frei ka nn liyazmenow, o mnon p tn phreazntvn, ll ka f
mn atn tn eseben dokontvn. T gr per svmtou dialegmenon, svmatikow

466

scot douglass

The status of epinoetic theological discourse (the only theological discourse Gregory thought possible within the diasteme) is that every
truth about God is also a lie about God and that every theological
utterance aimed at accurately hitting the truth of God unavoidably
also contains fragments of the very same stones hurled at God by
the heretics.
Although Gregory shares with Plato the notion of an absolute
realm of Being, there remains in Gregory a decisive disthma between
humanity and God that can never be bridged. All we can ever see
is the disthma in something.15 As a result, all truth is mediated via
the constitutional realities of creation. Truth from above always
appears, as it were, from below. That is, epinoetic theology is always,
in Derridean terms, from the xra. As such, truth takes a detour,
a detour always marked by a type of kenosis that denies itself a complete noetic return to its absolute source. Imagination, therefore, cannot be delimited (as with Socrates) as being a helpful ladder to be
discarded once it has been climbed, leaving the seeker in a realm
where pure reason can contemplate essence. To be sure, Gregory
defends the use of analogy at times in these very terms, but this
must always be situated within the larger structure of his construction of a diastemic episteme in which any noetic access to essence is
structurally denied.16 As a result, there is no choice but to utilize
pnoia, despite its risks, limitations and its being always implicated
in becoming. The cost of this choice is a recalibration of the possibility of theological discourse and a subsequent increased investment
in the impact of theology. Such an investment, the move away from
a Eunomian valorization of what Heidegger would later call die
Wahrheit als Richtigkeit, created more space for the operation of theological imagination.
kexrsyai nmasi, tuxn phreazntvn st ka liyazntvn: ll suggnmh,
plin lgv, t syene&. Liyzomen gr ox kntew, ll t fyggesyai llvw
ok xontew, d xomen xrmenoi. Lgow koeiw, ka pr lgon e (Gregory of

Nazianzus, Oratio 37,4, PG 36, 285cd).

otv ka psa ktsiw jv autw gensyai di tw katalhptikw yevraw

o dnatai, ll n aut mnei e ka per n d, autn blpei: kn ohy
ti pr autn blpein, t ktw autw den fsin ok xei. oon tn diasthmatikn
nnoian n t tn ntvn yevr& parelyen bizetai, ll o parrxetai. pant
gr t eriskomn nomati sunyevre pntvw t sugkatalambanmenon t postsei to nooumnou disthma: t d disthma odn llo ktsiw stn (In eccl.,
15

GNO V 412,614).
16
See my Theology of the Gap for a development of what I am calling a diastemic
episteme.

theological imagination

467

The purpose of theology is not to think (pinosai) up resounding and

harmonious verbal beauty, but to identify a reverent notion by which
what bets the thought of God may be kept intact.17

The epinoetic faculty cannot construct a harmonious whole whose

diastemic fractures and kinetic disseminations are sutured and overcome.18 To the contrary (as will be seen in the next section), governed by a greater concern for reverence than correctness, epinoetic
theology must use epinoetic thinking to guard against (fulaxysetai)
the inherent risks of thinking epinoetically. Such a stance has earned
him the reputation amongst many scholars of simply being a bad
philosopher. This paper is a brief consideration of the possibility that
this is, at least at times and in part, more a function of his acknowledged reliance upon a certain type of theological imagination than
it is upon poor thinking.

III. Silence, presence and the productive theological imagination

The question of imagination and its utility in the production of theology is closely related to two problems with which Gregory wrestles: the problem of silence and the problem of presence. Language
rst emerges in order to negotiate the constitutional distanciation
of the created order.19 It is an epinoetic maneuver to confront the
17
t gr spoudazmenon n tow per yeo lgoiw stn ox =hmtvn efvnan
ekrotn te ka narmnion pinosai, ll eseb dinoian jeuren di w t
prpon t polcei t per yeo fulaxysetai (CE II 136, GNO I 265,710).
18

Gregory of Nazianzus invoked the same type of epinoetic sensibility in his judgment of what constituted the best theologian: ka otow ristow mn yeolgow,
ox w ere t pn, od gr dxetai t pn desmw, ll w n llou fantasy plon, ka pleon n aut sunagg t tw lhyeaw ndalma, poskasma,
ti ka nomsomen (Oratio 30,17, PG 36, 125c). Gregory of Nazianzus recognized the diastemic bondage that made an analytical approach to truth impossible.
It was beyond his capacity to construct a totalizing discourse (t pn) because it
was beyond his ability to discover or receive t pn.
19
This hope is central to Basils high regard for the capacity of language. To
lgou tn xrsin ddvken mn ktsaw mw yew, na tw boulw tn kardin
llloiw pokalptvmen . . . tn tw kardaw kruptn profrontew t boulemata. E mn gr gumn t cux deizmen, eyw n p tn nohmtvn llloiw

suneginmeya: peid d p parapetsmati t sark kaluptomnh mn cux

tw nnoaw rgzetai, =hmtvn detai ka nomtvn prw t dhmosieein t n
t byei kemena (Hom. in illud, Attende tibi ipsi 1, PG 31, 197cd). Nouns and verbs

bear the desire to overcome secrets, the yearning to transcend the alienation of distanciation the longing to know and be known.

468

scot douglass

problem of the ever-present disthma that makes the experience of

presence impossible.
For things have their names, not for His sake but for ours. For as we
cannot always have all things before our eyes, we take knowledge of
some of the things that are present with us from time to time, and
others we register in our memories. But it would be impossible to keep
memory unconfused unless we had the notation of words to distinguish the things that are stored up in our minds from one another.
But to God all things are present, nor does He need memory, all
things being within the range of His penetrating vision. What need,
then, in His case, for parts of speech, when His own wisdom and
power embrace and hold the nature of things distinct and unconfused?
Whereas all things that exist substantially are from God, all things that
exist are provided with names to indicate them for our guidance. And
if any one says that such names were imposed by the arbitrary usage
of mankind, he will be guilty of no oense against the scheme of
Divine providence.20

Gods access to presence, indeed that all things are always present
to Him, eliminates His need for memory and language. For humanity, on the other hand, language is the very condition for the possibility of memory.21 The kinetic aspects of dimensional thinking must
be stabilized by the arbitrary assignment of words, llvw d ok
stin sgxuton fulaxynai mn tn mnmhn (otherwise there would
not be the guarding of our memory as unconfused). There is a certain kinetic entropic force at play in human thinking that must be
arrested, even momentarily, to guard against (fulaxynai) complete
disseminated confusion. In the mind of God, though, there is no

20
od gr kenou xrin, ll mn neken pkeitai tow prgmasi t nmata.
di gr t m pntote dunatn mn enai pnta n fyalmow xein t nta t
mn ti tn e parntvn ginskomen, t d t mnm napogrfomen. llvw d
ok stin sgxuton fulaxynai mn tn mnmhn, m tw tn nomtvn shmasaw
diastelloshw p lllvn t napokemena t diano& prgmata. ye d pnta
presti ka odn de mnmhw at, pntvn t dioratik dunmei perikratoumnvn
te ka yevroumnvn. tw on p ato xrea =matow nmatow, atw tw n
at sofaw te ka dunmevw sgxtn te ka diakekrimnhn tn tn ntvn fsin
periexoshw; okon par yeo mn t nta ka festta pnta, tw d metraw
neken dhgaw pesti tow osi t shmeivtik tn pragmtvn nmata. tata d
kat t rskon taw tn nyrpvn sunhyeaiw gnesya tiw epn odn ew tn
tw pronoaw plhmmelsei lgon (CE II 281283, GNO I 309,14310,1).
21
Although the Cappadocians make distinctions between thinking and speaking,
passages like this seem to implicate an inextricable relationship between thought
and language both being rooted in pnoia.

theological imagination

469

potential for confusion, no possibility of kinetic slippage between one

concept and another, because all things and their natures are always
present to Him. As a result, there is no need of the guardian service of language. God, therefore, does not speak, save in His relationship with diastemic beings.
In defending the dynamic unity of the Trinity, Gregory developed
the following ratios: diastema language; no diastema no language.
But where no separation is conceived, close conjunction is surely
acknowledged; and what is totally conjoined is not mediated by voice
and speech. By conjoined I mean that which is totally inseparable;
for the word conjunction does not imply a kind of bodily anity in
what is essentially intelligent, but the union of wills between one intelligent being and another.22

Where there is a full conjoining between two beings (that is, no

disthma, total and complete presence), the mediating function of
language is not needed (fvn ka lg o mesiteetai). As constitutionally diastemic and kinetic beings, as beings who can never experience being fully conjoined (sunhmmnon) with anything, humanity
can neither comprehend nor experience adiastemic and akinetic being
nor function within the diasteme without diastemic and kinetic language
nor, as a result, can they ever experience the osa of other diastemic
beings.23 Widening the scope of Platos concern in the Phaedrus for
the ambiguous, pharmakological role of writing in preserving orphaned
speech, Gregory presented language as the vehicle of not being
orphaned from oneself and, more importantly, not being orphaned
from God.
Much of what Gregory says about pnoia and theological language, especially in Book II of the Contra Eunomium, is rightly circumscribed within the realm of similitude, within the context of
working with analogies, of what he refers to above as anities. He

22
pou d distasiw ok pinoetai, t sunhmmnon pntvw mologetai, t d
di pntvn sunhmmnon fvn ka lg o mesiteetai. sunhmmnon d lgv t n
psin xriston. o gr svmatikn tina sumfuan p tw noerw fsevw t noma
tw sunafeaw ndeknutai, ll tn to nohto prw t nohtn di tw tatthtow
tn yelhmtvn nvsn te ka nkrasin (CE II 214, GNO I 287,26288,3).
23
Di toto psn tiw yepneuston fvnn reunmenow ok n eroi tw yeaw
fsevw tn didaskalan od mn llou tinw tn kat osan pesthktvn: yen
n gno& pntvn digomen prton autow gnoontew o nyrvpoi, peita d ka
t lla pnta (CE II 106, GNO I 257,26258,1).

scot douglass

470

advocates a type of non-total conjoining, similar to the use of analogy by Socrates, that seeks helpful illustrations of truth.24 Most of
this has to do with nding diastemic analogs to Gods diastemically
mediated nrgeiai. In addition to this, though, there is also the
attempt to conjoin that which resists conjoining, a bringing together
of the dissimilar. Christ is moosiow with the Father. Christ is fully
human and fully divine. Mary is a virgin and the mother of God,
etc. This type of theologizing nds great expression in the theological poetry of Gregory of Nazianzus, as well as in the liturgy of Basil.
In such a maneuver, there is always the creation of space, a moment
of reection upon the incommensurable. There is no language in
this space, only silence. There is no accessible presence, only the
desire for presence and the positing of a presence that remains out
of reach. But this silence is not merely a moment of defeat. It is a
carefully crafted silence that bears the status of somehow being an
orthodox silence. That is, it is a silence that has a value. When
Gregory states that we have learned to honor with silence what
transcends speech and thought (sivp timn t pr lgon te ka
dinoian memaykamen),25 there is something more than a complete
agnosticism and something far less than a totalizing noeticism. There
is, in this moment of worship, both an imaginative creation and
entrance into this space an entrance barred to reason and language, but one that retains for the worshipper some sense of worshipping someone. In the language of mathematics, worship is always
a vector and never merely a scalar (i.e. it has direction as well as
magnitude). This space, though, is decisively not mimetic; the space
does not aspire to be a copy. The silence of the space has already
acknowledged its inability to be a replica. It is the result of a productive moment of imagination and the believers experience of it
is a function of a type of pious imagination.
The creative epinoetic drive for Gregory is not a Platonic remembrance of pre-embodied access to truth; it is a productive activity
that brings together what can be known within the diasteme in a manner that produces new knowledge.26 In this manner, pnoia func24
25

CE I 213; 622 (GNO I 88,2328; 205,1925).

CE III/I 105 (GNO II 39,56).

26
sti gr kat ge tn mn lgon pnoia fodow eretik tn gnooumnvn,
di tn prosexn te ka koloyvn t prt per t spoudazmenon nosei t
fejw jeurskousa (CE II 182183, GNO I 277,16278,4 for the full context of

this comment).

theological imagination

471

tions in an originary manner that is similar to that ascribed to imagination by Kant in the 1781 rst edition of the Critique of Pure Reason,
but it is put by Gregory into the service of worship, obedience and
the production of theological reection. As opposed to discovering
the true knowledge of Gods being, pnoia creates what Wittgenstein
might have called an epinoetic style.

SERVICE OR MASTERY?
THEOLOGY IN GREGORY OF NYSSAS
CONTRA EUNOMIUM II
Ari Ojell

I. Introduction
In this presentation, I discuss the concept of yeologa in Gregory of
Nyssa in light of his use of the title yeolgow in his Contra Eunomium II
and in relation to some of his other works, especially CE III and
De vita Moysis. As a concept, theologia is most often read and understood in Gregory as synonymous and interchangeable with the concept of divine knowledge, yeognvsa.1 As an activity, it is most commonly
regarded as a human approach to God, as contemplation, yevra,
or, to use the words of Werner Jaeger,2 as something that Hellenic
striving for a philosophic understanding of what we believe has
called into being. That one nds much philosophic striving in
Gregory whether Hellenic or more universally human is nothing less than sure. It seems, however, that it is not the human striving and speculative approach to God what can properly be called
theology according to Gregory. Consistent with this understanding,
Gregory does not use the word yeologa in CE II, but instead, he
speaks of a word coming down3 in the words of the saints of the
Holy Scripture. Gregorys idea is that in the human words of the
Scripture, the divine Word comes down for the benet of the hearers, that they may know Gods will and God according to His will.
This, if anything, is theology according to Gregory.
In the second book of Contra Eunomium, Gregory also explains how
language, according to his view, is based on two things: on the divine
gift of abstract conception (pnoia), and on human conventions concerning how to use the words we people are able to produce in
1
See J. Danilou, Platonisme et thologie mystique, Paris 1944, 200201, 159 translating both yeologa and yeognovsa as la connaissance de Dieu.
2
W. Jaeger, Two Rediscovered Works of Ancient Christian Literature: Gregory of Nyssa
and Macarius, Leiden 1965, 73.
3
CE II 431 (GNO I 352).

474

ari ojell

expressing the thoughts we are able to think.4 Our prevailing scholarly custom invites us to speak of the theology of Gregory of Nyssa
with no second thoughts. As a result, it is quite natural for us, according to our modern conventions of language, to compare Gregorys
theology to the theologies of Basil, Origen, Augustine, Eunomius,
Plato, etc. In doing so, we make it appear as if there really
were some speculative construction, a train of thought or inventive
approach5 that Gregory himself might have called my theology in
contrast to other theologies of the other theologians, whether
Christian or pagan.6
However, for Gregory, himself, it seems there can be but one theology, common for us all, expressed in the divine words (or statements: yeologai) of the Holy Scripture, set out for us by the persons
inspired by the Holy Spirit. Gregory uses this expression in his
Homilies on the Beatitudes,7 and it is this idea that his conception of
theology is built on: many words but only one speaking body of
several members. One seeks in vain from Gregory any positive concept of an individual theology of Basil, my theology or the natural theology of Plato. In CE II, Gregory consistently indicates that
according to his conception of theology which implicitly was his
suggestion for a convention how to use the concept 8 any
identication of himself as a theologian, any claim according to my
theology with a reference to his personal speculations concerning
God, would be the same as admitting that he is a heretic having
his own private God, an idol that he has made up of his own theory.

CE II 183186; 395402 (GNO I 277f; 341344).

H. U. von Balthasar, Presence and Thought. An Essay on the Religious Philosophy of
Gregory of Nyssa, San Francisco 1995, 172f. Von Balthasar importantly pays attention to the signicance of the strict and denitive correlation between the word of
God and what the creature hears as well as the idea of the God who speaks
(Yew lgvn) in Gregory. He nevertheless goes on talking about the theology of
Gregory of Nyssa as (human) inventive approach having its object in what God
wants us to hear.
6
See H. Drobner, Gregory of Nyssa as Philosopher, Halifax 2000, 67101. Drobner
correctly points out that the modern separation of theology and philosophy does
not apply in ancient authors. However, I do not think Drobner is right when he
indicates that Gregory regarded Plato as a theologian.
7
De beat. 7 (GNO VII/2 150).
8
Yeologa is not a biblical term. Clement and Origen were the rst Christian
authors to use it extensively. W. Jaeger, Two Rediscovered Works, 7273, n. 3.
5

service or mastery?

475

II. Gregorys heroes: Gregory the Wonderworker and Basil

Unlike Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa nowhere in his
writings calls himself a theologian or indicates in any way that he
is one despite his elaborate discussions of theological issues.9 He
is not just being humble. Instead, he is deliberately making a point:
he never uses the designation theologian for any of the Fathers of
the Church he greatly respected those we are accustomed to call
theologians. Gregory does not attach the title of theologos even to
those whom he calls great (mgaw), respects as teachers (didskalow)
and regards as saints (giow) after the type (tpow) of Moses: the
second Moses Gregory the Wonderworker10 and Gregorys brother
Basil whom he introduces as a contemporary Moses.11 Instead, as
mighty imitators of Moses, the perfect servant of God (okthw yeo)
serving in the ministry of God (okonoma to yeo),12 their greatness
lies in that they may be regarded like Moses as Gods servants.13
Paul, as Gregory well knew, also identied himself as a servant,
dikonow kat tn okonoman to yeo announcing the lgow to
yeo the mystery (t mustrion) revealed to his saints for the benet
of Christs Body: Christ in us (Col 1,2429). Accordingly, Gregory
identies Basil as a diakonos of the mysteries of Christ whose tongue
was taught by God.14 Furthermore, the utmost Christian perfection,
according to Gregory, is not to be called theologos but a servant
(okthw) of God whom the Lord himself calls his friend (flon).15

9
The namesakes agreed that speculation in theological issues is not for everyone. There is, however, a dierence in how they use the terms yeologa and
yeolgow. That Nazianzen had no problem in calling theologians those found
qualied for theological reection, becomes clear in his Theological Orations.
10
Thaum. 25 (GNO X/1 14).
11
Also in the opening of CE II there is an implicit equalisation of Moses and
Basil leading Lords army in the battle, CE II 10 (GNO I 229). Defending Gods
people against idolatry was an important virtue of Moses. See also Hex. (PG 44,
61f ) and Bas. (GNO X/1 109134).
12
VM II 317; 279 (SC 1bis, 133; 120).
13
For Gregory as a servant, see Thaum. 41 (GNO X/1 2324).
14
Basil as dikonow mustervn Xristo setting forth divine mystery di tw
yeopaidetou gltthw, see CE III/VI 57 (GNO II 206). In this denition, Gregory
combines the elements of Pauls formulations in Col 1,25 and 1 Cor 4,1. Basil belongs
to Pauls order (tjiw) as his successor with the same eminence as Sylvanus and
Timothy. Bas. (GNO X/1 110111).
15
VM II 305321 (SC 1bis, 129135). The title yeolgow preaches by its absence
in this Gregorys mature work.

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ari ojell

These are the things that one can become by imitating and following the saints not by aspiring to be a theologian. Since the era
of the biblical saints the architects of faith (rxitktonew tw pstevw)
who laid the foundation of the faith in Christ16 no individual thinker
can authoritatively contribute to theology; only the apostolic Church
as one terrestrial Body of Christ having Christ himself as its head,
can do this. It always maintains its centre in Christ and through this
centre ecclesiastically culminates in the confession, mologa, of the
faith in the Triune God.

III. Eunomius as a new theologian

Gregory makes one, very revealing exception to his rule. Indeed,
there is one among his contemporaries whom he calls a theologian:
his adversary Eunomius and it is no compliment. It is a serious accusation and mockery. When Gregory calls Eunomius a theologian,17
always with epithets like new (kainw), wise (sofw) and corporeal (
svmatikw yeolgow),18 his point is not simply that Eunomius is a
lousy theologian or unorthodox theologian. The point is that Eunomius
is not and simply cannot be a theologian at all. He is not one of the
saints of the Bible above whom he is elevating himself 19 by replacing
the God-tting names given by them with his new ones. Everyone
still has a right to express some reverent notion concerning God
according to the actions he performs for our lives with whatever
words and names, new or old, one nds to suit the reverent purpose best,20 but Eunomius greatly exceeds in his desire to contribute to
theology as though he were a theologian, even over and against the
authority of the Word of truth itself.21 He is naming the Father anew,
kat fsin, as gnnhtow, Unbegotten, whose being is gennhsa,

16
CE III/I 55 (GNO II 23). The apostles enjoyed an order (tjiw) which formed
prophets, shepherds and teachers: the Only-begotten Sons theophany through his
birth from a virgin. Bas. (GNO X/1 109).
17
Altogether sixteen times in CE IIII and Ref. Eun. Five times in CE II: 42,
326, 365, 389, 409 (GNO I 238; 321; 333; 339; 345).
18
CE III/VI 43 (GNO II 201).
19
CE II 82; 97105 (GNO I 250f; 255 ).
20
CE II 130136; 148150 (GNO I 263; 268f ).
21
CE II 5066 (GNO I 240245). Eunomius actual aim, according to Gregory,
is to degrade Christ.

service or mastery?

477

unbegottenness, in order to establish a dierence of nature between

the Father as gnnhtow and the Only-begotten Son as gennhtw,
begotten.22 He is revealing them as the God and created God
and is thus openly inviting people to worship creation. In proclaiming
the divine nature, Eunomius claims for himself a supreme knowledge
far more excellent than the knowledge of the saints the saints
never claimed to know Gods unnameable essence. Obviously, according to Gregory, he is in the business of making a new revelation,
not proclaiming or interpreting the old. This can be nothing but a
revelation of his private God, a new and strange God23 an idol
that he has made up of his own theory.24
Gregory, therefore, does have a concept of my theology but he
relates it negatively to the endeavours of Eunomius. His theology
is actually only a human theory, a result of his own philosophic striving, a harmonious construction of words leading up to God as the
result of human reasoning. But Gregory demands that it must be
acknowledged what our word is compared with the Word that truly
Is nothing.25 Eunomius is mistaken in how he thinks vanishing
human words serve the subsisting Word of God. The purpose of
per yeo lgoi is not to think up God but to bring down a reverent notion betting the thought of God (per yeo).26 Philosophic
speculation is not a bad thing as long as it does not, instead of
following it in order to serve it, become an attempt to master the
divine Word. Eunomius theory by which he worships and services
human logos instead of the Divine is an open violation against the
theology of John.

IV. Theology of St. John

Following the custom that had become traditional by his time, Gregory
allows St. John the title yeolgow.27 As such, he is the voice of

22

CE II 21 (GNO I 232).
CE II 204205 (GNO I 284f ). Gregory regards Eunomius attempt to capture
the essence God in one human word as yeopoia.
24
CE II 100 (GNO I 255f ).
25
CE II 235237 (GNO I 294f ).
26
CE II 136, 154158 (GNO I 265; 270f ).
27
Theod. (GNO X/1 71).
23

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ari ojell

thunder who shouts out, proclaims and celebrates the mystery

of theology in the most open manner. He proclaims Christ, the
Only-begotten Son, as the lgow to yeo who in the beginning was
in God, with God and was God, the Logos through whom everything is created, the Logos who is Life and Light and who became
esh. The whole Gospel according to John is written from the perspective of Christs divinity. For Gregory, St. John the beloved
disciple who rested on Christs chest, hearing secrets is the embodiment of his idea that there is one divine origin behind all theologiai
of the Holy Scripture. John is the leader of the choir of the saints
in theology:28 to him it was given to scale the summit of t per tw
yeaw fsevw krugma29 as handed down in the Scripture by making the pre-existence and the divinity of the Incarnated One open
and manifest. But all the saints of the Bible in their several Godtting statements constituting the one Body of the Holy Scripture
actually share and proclaim the one and same theology which is
identical with the theology of John. They all reveal the one and
same God in Christ. They all proclaim the one and the same Word
of God in their own due part, as much was given to each of them
to reveal according to the instruction of the Spirit. One summit of
theologia and one human theologos according to his God-given mission
so entitled30 points beyond itself to the one and single source of all
theologia: to God who speaks his own Word of truth about himself
in the Spirit, making himself known to men according to his will.

V. The choir of the saints

It is quite certain that Gregory did not regard himself as a theologian according to his own understanding of how to use the term.
Technically, he wanted to preserve this particular title, if and when
applied to some collective of human agents, for those whom he calls
in his De vita Moysis the trumpets31 of divine mysteries, those who
28

CE III/I 1114 (GNO II 7f ). Cant. (GNO VI 3942).

VM II 158 (SC 1bis, 79).
30
John does have a type in the Old Testament Isaiah. Neither of them is
superior to Paul, but not even Isaiah or Paul are actually entitled theologos by Gregory.
However, they both, like John, proclaim theology laying down the law of worship. CE
III/III 811 (GNO II 109 ); CE III/II 4041 (GNO II 65).
31
VM II 159161 (SC 1bis, 7980).
29

service or mastery?

479

proclaim the divine nature as pure-sounding instruments of Gods

will the saints of the Bible. In CE II, when accusing Eunomius of
idolising his own mental processes, Gregory introduces against him
the saints as one choir by using biblical verses: The prophets and
patriarchs in whose time the Word of truth spoke in diverse parts and
manners (Heb 1,1), and thereafter those [apostles] who became the
eyewitnesses and servants of the Word (Lk 1,2). It is safest, Gregory
appeals, and also necessary to respect the reliability of those attested
by the Spirit himself and stay within the limits of their learning
and knowledge.32 Their authority rests in the Word of truth.

VI. Divine speaking: Holy Scripture as the loving oikonomia of the Spirit
Gregorys point is that we may still hear the Word of truth himself,
speaking in the words of his prophets and apostles in the Godinspired Scripture. We are not expecting additions from some new
revealers of God to what has been revealed in Christ, what the
Spirit reveals of God through him. In CE II Gregory says that the
reason why God converses with his servants is his love of man,
filanyrvpa. God himself has no need of words. But like a compassionate mother joins in the baby-talk of her babies, the divine
philanthropic Power passes on to the human race that which we are
capable of receiving.33 These are the human words of the inspired
saints. The saints were silently instructed by the Spirit in what to
express: for them it was left to decide which ordinary human words
to use to match the divine purpose. They became pure instruments
of Gods will not like marionettes but as his faithful and morally
responsible servants and co-workers in dispensing the divine will
for the benet of all men, by applying words to the wordless speaking of God through his own Word in his Spirit. While God himself
does not use words, he nevertheless authorises all things said about
him in the Scripture.
In CE III, Gregory is very clear on this issue. In Christ, the God
who was in the beginning descended out of his love of man in
the okonoma of filanyrvpa to commune with our lowliness and

32
33

CE II 101 (GNO I 256).

CE II 417420 (GNO I 348f ).

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ari ojell

weakness; [he] was seen upon earth and conversed with men (Bar 3,38). In
the Holy Scriptures, the eye-witnesses and servants of the Word
deliver to us what they saw and heard.34 Scripture is the philanthropic okonoma of the Spirit through which theology reaches our
hearing and understanding. The divine dispensation of the Spirit
delivers to us the divine mysteries and conveys its instruction on
those matters which transcend language, by means of what is within
our capacity. Divine intention lies hidden under the body of the
Scripture where all things said are utterances of the Holy Spirit;
it is the teaching of divine aatus, given to benet men. If the
bodily veil of the words were removed, that which remains is Lord
and life and Spirit.35

VII. Gregory an imitator of the servants of the Word

Gregorys idea in CE II is that those who proclaim the Word of
truth in the Bible inspired and instructed by the Spirit can be
regarded as theologians in relation to us: it is their learning and
knowledge expressed in their theologiai or peri theou logoi we must trust
when hoping to share with them in the knowledge of God (theognosia). For us, the God-inspired Holy Scripture with its saints proclaiming Christ represents what the Holy Mountain of the divine
trumpets was for Moses. But in relation to the Word of truth i.e.
Christ himself who is the Fathers Word, Will and Wisdom that the
Spirit communicates, and who himself speaks in the Body of the
Scripture no man can ever be identied as a theologian. If and
when we follow and imitate the saints, as much as we grant them
authority in theology in relation to us, we must not identify ourselves as theologians, authoritative God-speakers, but notice how the
saints identied themselves in relation to the Word. Gregory hears and follows the instruction of St. Paul, the imitator of Christ in whom
Christ spoke, and who himself is to be imitated:36 People should
34
CE III/III 3340 (GNO II 119f ). Importantly, conversation is discussed in
relation to oikonomia of philanthropia and oikonomia of the Cross. In Trid. Spat. (GNO
IX 299303) Gregory introduces the Cross as a theologian.
35
CE III/V 716 (GNO II 162166); CE III/VI 3241 (GNO II 197200).
36
1 Cor 11,1; 2 Cor 13,3. For Paul as an imitator of Christ, see CE I 546 (GNO
I 184); CE II 259 (GNO I 302); Perf. (GNO VIII/1 174175); Inst. (GNO VIII/1
50); Cant. (GNO VI 46; 212); Tunc et ipse (GNO III/2 3; 15; 23).

service or mastery?

481

consider us as servants of Christ and stewards of Gods mysteries

(1 Cor 4,1).37 It is this advice through which Gregory identies his
own teachers, his brother Basil (as well as his sister Macrina), Gregory
the Wonderworker and all the rest who faithfully teach, proclaim
and serve the Word in the apostolic tradition of the Church. This
is also how Gregory wished himself to be identied: as a servant of
Christ and steward of Gods mysteries, an imitator of those who
heard the Word of truth speaking and who became eyewitnesses and
servants of the Word.

VIII. Looking, hearing and seeing the Word:

yevra yeologa yeognvsa
As an imitator of the servants and eyewitnesses of the Word , Gregory
desired to share their vision of God: to share in their knowledge
and learning in order to be a servant of Christ in their order and
sequence (tjiw ka kolouya) according to Gods will (ylhma). The
biblical coupling of Word and vision of listening and looking, hearing and seeing, the functioning of ears and eyes in receiving knowledge of God in faith38 is what constitutes Gregorys idea of Christian
contemplation (yevra) as a following (kolouya)39 of the divine
Word in a continuous dialectic of hearing and seeing the essentially
spiritual divine Word.
The akolouthia of the contemplation of the divine nature begins by
looking at the oikonomia of incarnation40 as it is presented in the oikonomia of the Spirit, the God-inspired Scripture. One then distinguishes
between conceptions (polceiw) concerning the divinity (per t yeon)
and the humanity (per t nyrpinon) of Christ Jesus,41 in order to

37
38

Uphrthw for servant and okonmow for steward.

Through and through, Gregory writes, the Divinity is sight and hearing and
knowledge. So it is with the divine Word but not so with human receiver of the
Word. CE II 211212 (GNO I 286f ).
39
For akolouthia as Leitmotiv of Gregorys thought, see J. Danilou, Ltre et le temps
chez Grgoire de Nysse, Leiden 1970, 1850.
40
Cf. VM I 2021 (SC 1bis, 910); VM II 1926 (SC 1bis, 3739).
41
CE III/I 54 (GNO II 22f ). By this method Gregory improves Basils technical theologia-oikonomia-distinction. While defending it for its intention, he actually uses
another technical distinction, ktiston ktistn for discussing the two natures of the
one person Christ Jesus.

482

ari ojell

hear the preaching (krugma) concerning the divine nature.42 This is

theologia which becomes perfectly heard according to its spiritual meaning and divine intention when the bodily veil of human words that
surround the Word becomes completely removed. In this process,43
the Word enters the heart of a believer through the spiritual sense
of hearing.44 The receiving of the Word makes the soul open up for
the divine Light and become perceptive of God. The Word becomes
an object of spiritual and intellectual visions as it indwells the heart.
Spiritual seeing and vision knowledge partly communicable to the
intellect is theognosia. Every vision becomes a new look towards
the Word that one still hears calling and willing: koloyei moi!45
In the divine contemplation, the soul always follows behind the
divine voice (yeo fvn) and the souls happiness consists of seeing God. In the nal state of beatitude, both seeing and hearing of
the Word become purely spiritual and immediate. One has then
fully received the divine Spirit and entered, by faith, through intellectual not-seeing and not-knowing, the inner sanctuary of theognosia
Christ himself beyond the sound of the trumpets, beyond theologia.46
In Christ the hearing of the Word is no longer mediated by human
words. Instead, as the soul is now in Christ and Christ dwells in the
soul, hearing is a result of becoming perfectly one in will with Christ
just as between the Father and the Son (and the Spirit) there is a
perfect union and commingling (nvsiw ka nkrasiw) between two (three)
individual intelligent existents (to nohto prw t nohtn) through the identity of their wills (di tw tatthtow tn yelhmtvn) in their action.47
This is how the human soul eventually learns to know and see God,
and, accordingly, speak about him: not according to his innite
essence but according to his will. The Fathers will is his Son loving and sharing of his Goodness in and through his Son, our Lord
Christ, the Wisdom and Power of God.

42
VM II 158 (SC 1bis, 79). Climbing importantly relates to yeologa, but theology itself is the trumpet blast to be more and more clearly heard.
43
See CE III/II 1625 (GNO II 5760).
44
Even the natural theology of divine Power proclaimed silently by the heavens is to be heard. CE II 219225 (GNO I 289 ).
45
VM II 250255 (SC 1bis, 112114). Theognosia in CE II 232; 259261 (GNO
I 293; 302).
46
VM II 152175 (SC 1bis, 7786).
47
CE II 214218 (GNO I 287 ). Cf. Abl. (GNO III/1 4849); Tunc et ipse (GNO
III/2 2223).

service or mastery?

483

IX. Theology as divine philosophy and the Mother-tongue of worship

As a Christian, Gregory knew that true Wisdom has an identity and
knew how to identify her or him as Christ.48 As filsofow,
Gregory was filxristow, a lover of Christ.49 In Christ, a Christian
wisdom-lover loves the same Wisdom that the Father has always
loved when loving his own Son. As a result, the human Christloving movement of the intellect, desiring to ascend to divine Wisdom
and Gods man-loving movement, descending to share his own Wisdom,
meet in Christ. The essentially divine, descending philosophic
movement of Gods Word may be called divine philosophy and
theology alike, but the essentially human, ascending philosophic
movement can only adequately be called philosophy. When the
Christian philosopher receives the down-coming Word and gives it
a body in human words, this participation is most adequately to be
called serving the Word according to Gods will: it is diakona in
the okonoma to yeo.
When theology becomes natural human expression and spiritual
movement up in the conversation between man and God, it is not
human speculation but already a response of worship and praise to the
initial address of God. In its natural state, all creation is an expression of Gods will, manifesting and proclaiming Gods glory, wisdom
and power. As Gods work, the whole oikonomia is a saying of God
named by men.50 Humankind in its natural state as Gods image
and likeness is a manifestation of Gods Wisdom and Power as Love
of God himself as loving nature. As much as it has now received
the divine Word in the Spirit, it proclaims Christ Jesus as the Lord
and glories God in the Churchs Mother-tongue of worship: in
the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. The Church51
already participates in divine philosophy where Christ loves the

For identication, see Gregorys rst work De virg. 20 (GNO VIII/1 328).
VM II 31; 176 (SC 1bis, 40; 86).
50
CE II 219225; 265267 (GNO I 289; 303f ); VM II 168169 (SC 1bis,
8384).
51
Gregory discusses the ecclesiological and eschatological dimensions of human
perfection in Tunc et ipse (GNO III/2 328) and Cant. (GNO VI). For further discussion of the eschatological dimensions in Tunc et ipse, see A. Ojell, El telos escatolgico de la vida cristiana. La vida en Christo segn San Gregorio de Nisa, in:
C. Izquiero J. Burggraf J. L. Gutirrez E. Flandes (eds.), Escatologa y Vida
Cristiana, Pamplona 2002, 353373.
48
49

484

ari ojell

Church (and each faithful soul) as his Bride and she loves him as
her Bridegroom and the Father loves man in his Son as he loves
his natural Son. In the eschatological consummation, the whole
plrvma of nyrvpow as monw then called kklhsa becomes
subjected, through the Son, to the loving will of the Father, and
Man as one Body of Christ is exalted to the subsisting reality of
Divine Philosophy the Father loving his Son. Then Sophia calls
Ecclesia her friend whom she knows in the same manner as if she
was looking at her own image in the mirror. Man then nally leads
the chorus of all creation celebrating God and in one voice joins
the Angels52 in the singing of Gods glory: yeologa.

52
In diem lum. (GNO IX 241). Angels singing is the natural theology of the
created intelligible order.

EUNOMIUS APOLOGIA AND

BASIL OF CAESAREAS ADVERSUS EUNOMIUM
Anne Gordon Keidel

The theological challenges of the fourth century provided the exercize ground which allowed orthodox theologians to work out clear
statements of orthodox Christian faith. This process began with Arius
and the Arian movement, which resulted in preliminary statements
of faith at Nicaea in 325 A.D. But it was with the second generation
Arians and their best spokesman, Eunomius, that major issues were
argued and faith statements were more clearly dened. The eorts
of Basil and his brother Gregory culminated in the Constantinople/
Nicaean Creed at the Council of Constantinople in 381. This achievement brought an end to the Arian challenge and represented the
triumph of orthodoxy.
Eunomius and Basil shared a lot in common. They were both
born in Cappadocia around the same time, and both were intelligent, articulate and well-educated. Where Basil and Eunomius dier
in their background, is in the social standing in which they were
born. Basils family was part of the landed aristocracy, the elite of
Cappadocian society. Eunomius was born in northwest Cappadocia
into a family of peasants and craftsmen.1 While we have not specic
information concerning Eunomius education, we can deduce from
the writings of his accusers that he moved through the Greek educational system to its highest level, from grammar school through
the study of Greek philosophy. Basil accuses him of basing his ideas
on Aristotle and Chrysippus, and Gregory of Nyssa, in challenging
his second Apologia, accuses him of Neo-Platonism. It is interesting
to note that his experience provides evidence of the possibility at
that time for those born into the poorest class of society to achieve
upward mobility and inuence within that society.
Eunomius was a disciple of Aetius, the leader of the second generation Arians called Anomoeans, who held an extremist position

W. V. Harris, Ancient Literacy, Cambridge (Mass.) London 1989, 284, 288.

486

anne gordon keidel

concerning Father and Son. Eunomius followed Aetius from Antioch

to Alexandria studying philosophy and dialectics under him during
the years 356358. Intellectually he outshone his master. In 358, the
two of them together with the Arian Eudoxius participated in the
Arian council held in Antioch. Here, they alarmed the more moderate Arians such as Basil of Ancyre, who was able to get them
exiled to Phrygia. Two years later the tables turned, Eudoxius was
made bishop of Constantinople, and the emperor called a synod in
360 in that city to solidify the Arian position. Eunomius came as a
deacon, having been ordained by Eudoxius at the Council of Antioch
in 358,2 and Basil came accompanying Dianius, who ordained him
reader on their return to Caesarea. It was at this synod that Eunomius
delivered his Apologia and stirred up a lot of commotion, challenging and stimulating the Cappadocian Fathers to produce some of
their most important works.

I. Eunomius Apologia
Eunomius Apologia begins with a rhetorical and methodological preamble and a preliminary confession of faith. The principal body of
the work sets out to explain the tenets of this confession of faith and
leads to a more developed confession of faith at the end. The three
principal sections address 1) God as unique and ungenerated, 2) the
Son as product and creature of the Father, and 3) the Spirit as creature of the Son, Paraclete and third in order of nature. We will
briey consider the main points.
God as unique and ungenerated: The central point of Eunomius thesis is that ungenerated denotes the substance of God. He claimed
that God himself and the nature of being ungenerated were correlative. From this he deduces that because God is ungenerated he
cannot generate. Eunomius responds to objections by saying that neither time, century, nor order is able to dierentiate the essence of
God, thus proving Gods simplicity of essence (osa).3

B. Sesbo, Introduction to Basils Adverus Eunomium, SC 299, 19.

Eunomius, Apol. 7 (SC 305, 244246). (For Eunomius Apologia, the edition used
was SC 305, with Introduction, French translation and notes by Bernard Sesbo
and Georges-Matthieu de Durand. It will be abbreviated Apol., followed by the section(s) numbers.)
3

APOLOGIA

and

ADVERSUS EUNOMIUM

487

The Son, product and creature of the Father: According to Eunomius,

the Son was not generated within the divine nature, but was produced, made, created by the Father. This enabled him to have creative power and only in this way to resemble the Father. Concerning
the generation or non-generation of the Son, Eunomius rst makes
the point that the opinion in opposition to his own implies that the
Son must have been generated while he was already existing. But
this does not make sense Eunomius says, because whoever is existing does not need generating. He believes that Gods essence does
not allow for generation, since God himself is not generated, and as
he is incorruptible, his essence can neither be separated nor split.
This would eliminate the only essence that could serve as a substratum for generation of the Son. Concurrently, those who would
teach the generation of the Son would be saying that the Son has
been generated when he was not yet in existence. This is the reasoning which leads Eunomius to say that the Son, being product
and creature of the Father, is excluded from being of similar essence
as the Father.4
Two ways of knowing: Next, Eunomius describes two ways of knowing. First, he says, we examine the essences (substances) themselves,
and judge each one by means of pure reason. The second way is
knowing by examining the activities and judging them from their
created works and the eects of these works. From this he concludes
that neither of these ways show evidence of similarity in essence.5
To demonstrate his position Eunomius cites Scripture, where he says
that the Law and the Prophets announce One God. He specically
cites the place where the Savior and Only-begotten himself confesses
that he is going to his God and to our God ( Jn 20,17).6
Eunomius does say however that the Son is in the image of the
Father by reason of the similarity of activity. But, he hastens to add
that the activity of the ungenerated is not the same thing as the substance of the ungenerated. The statement that the Son is in the
image of the Father, is explained by the identity of the Sons will
and activity, with the activity being separate to his essence. As the
Monogenes is under the will of the Father, so his activity is the same
as the Fathers, while their two essences remain dierent.7
4
5
6
7

Eunomius,
Eunomius,
Eunomius,
Eunomius,

Apol.
Apol.
Apol.
Apol.

18 (SC 305, 268270).

20 (SC 305, 274276).
21 (SC 305, 276278).
2224 (SC 305, 278284).

488

anne gordon keidel

The Spirit: Paraclete, third in order of nature: According to Eunomius,

the Spirit is the rst creature of the Son, dierent in nature from the
Son, and has no creative power. However, the Son has given the
Spirit the power to sanctify and to teach. Thus, the hierarchy is represented by the Son being the creature of the Father, and the Spirit
being the creature of the Son. And, just as the Sons nature is
dierent from the Fathers, so the Spirits nature is dierent from
the Sons. Here, Eunomius replaces the word essence with the word
nature (fsiw).8
Confession of Faith developed: With this confession of faith Eunomius
summarizes and concludes the thesis he has just presented, with the
principal points being as follows: God of the universe is unique and
alone true God. God is ungenerated, without principle, incomparable, superior to all cause and the cause of the existence of all beings.
God did not constitute the created world from a community, together
with others. And before everything else, he created the Son.9
According to this statement of faith, the Son, the Monogenes, Our
Lord Jesus Christ, by whom everything is made, is in the image of
the Father by reason of power and activity, but not by substance.
The Son is without end, and so without error. As product of the
Father, the Son is obedient, a very perfect minister, who served in
order to accomplish all of the Fathers work and decisions. The Son
does this for the Economy, to realize Gods plan of salvation. He
was engendered by the holy virgin, and lived under human laws.
The Spirit is the rst work of the Son, a product by order of the
Father, but product by the activity of the Son. The Spirit is the servant of the Son for the sanctifying and teaching and conrming of
believers.10

II. Basils Adversus Eunomium

Basil, along with many other orthodox participants at the Synod of
Constantinople, was profoundly disturbed by the challenge of the
Anomoeans, represented in particular by Aetius and Eunomius pre-

8
9
10

Eunomius, Apol. 25 (SC 305, 284286).

Eunomius, Apol. 26 (SC 305, 288290).
Eunomius, Apol. 27 (SC 305, 290294).

APOLOGIA

and

ADVERSUS EUNOMIUM

489

sentation at the Synod. He most likely is referring to this experience,

when he writes in one of his earliest works, the De judicio Dei:
In the Church of God alone, I saw a great and exceeding discord . . . I
saw its very leaders diering so much from one another in sentiment
and opinion, and so hostile to the commandments of our Lord Jesus
Christ, and so mercilessly rending the Church of God, and unsparingly agitating his ock, that now, if ever, when the Anomoeans had
sprung up, was fullled the saying: From among your own selves shall
men arise, speaking perverse things, to draw away the disciples after
them (Acts 20,30).11

Basil was persuaded by other concerned Christians to write, in time

for the Council of Lampsacus in 364 a rebuttal to Eunomius Apologia.
He undertakes the task, while saying that he is of words absolutely
unpracticed in such kinds of things.12 Basils response to Eunomius
is divided into three parts, addressing Eunomius three main sections, on Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.13
Book One. Basil begins by characterizing Eunomius as a liar and
his Apologia as a ction. Eunomius is called vain for presenting himself as a model of courage, and an opponent of the [Christian] tradition for correcting the confession of faith. Basil accuses Eunomius
of contradicting himself, when he states that the two terms, ungenerated and essence are mutually related.14 For them to be related
they must be two separate things, with ungenerate existing outside
the essence. Basil says that which is exterior to God cannot be Gods
substance.15
Eunomius says that because ungenerate is not a concept but rather
the substance of God, saying that the Son was generated precludes

11

Basil, De judicio Dei 1 (PG 31, 653ab).

Basil, Adv. Eun. I 1 (SC 299, 140146).
13
W. K. L. Clarke, St. Basil the Great, Cambridge 1913, 92, n. 2; Jean Gribomont
dates Adversus Eunomium about 370, just before he became a bishop, believing that
Basil would have had to have had more experience in dealing concretely with the
problems in the Church before writing such a dogmatic work. See J. Gribomont,
Notes biographiques sur s. Basile le Grand, in: P. J. Fedwick (ed.), Basil of Caesarea.
Christian, Humanist, Acsetic, I, Toronto 1981, 38. However, most scholars date this
work (Books 13) to immediately before the Synod of Lampsacus (364), citing the
clear evidence of the Council that Basil had brought the writings with him when
he came. See P. J. Fedwick, A Chronology of the Life and Works of Basil of
Caesarea, in: P. J. Fedwick (ed.), Basil of Caesarea, I, 10, and M. V. Anastos in his
article in the same volume, Basils Kat Enomou, 70, n. 8.
14
Eunomius, Apol. 7,1114 (SC 305, 246).
15
Basil, Adv. Eun. I 5 (SC 299, 168182).
12

anne gordon keidel

490

the Son from being of the same substance as God. The word
concept is convenient for Eunomius, Basil says, because it signies
nothing more than the act of enumeration. Basil illustrates the nature
and usage of this concept by citing Scripture, where the Lord gives
himself certain names, such as door, way, bread, vine, shepherd, and light. The Lord is one essence (ma osa) and the names
indicate, not essence but properties.16 Basil says that Eunomius use
of language causes confusion, and cites his statement that the body
is simple, when reason tells us that it is complex.17
Eumomius uses the term, strhsiw, privation, negation, in reference to God, saying that the word refers to privation of natural
attributes. Basil replies that ungenerate designates an absence in
God, that there does not exist a unique name which suces to
embrace the complete nature of God, and explain it in a satisfactory manner. But we do speak of God in negative terms, invisible,
incorruptible, immortal. Basil shows by this the limitations, not of
God, but of our language and comprehension when considering
Gods essence. This essence is known only by the Son and the Spirit,
but is beyond human comprehension. Likewise, the essence of earth
is not revealed in Scriptures. Because of this we say that God is
incomprehensible, totally inexpressible, and that we are thus faced
with the inaccessibility of God. What is revealed in Scripture is Gods
goodness and wisdom. This means that we can know the properties
of God, but are unable to know Gods essence. Ungenerate indicates the how of God but not Gods essence.18
In response to Eunomius claim that ideas of order, time and century can exist in the substance of God, Basil says that consubstantiality is eternal in the order of the persons in God, because there
can be no Father without the Son.19 Eunomius premise that the
divine simplicity suggests the inequality of Father and Son, Basil says
that, on the contrary, this shows the sameness of Father and Son.
Eunomius refers to the words, the Father is greater than I, to substantiate his claim that the Father is rst in the hierarchy, and greater
in power than the Son. Basil says that greater refers to cause and

16
17
18
19

Basil,
Basil,
Basil,
Basil,

Adv.
Adv.
Adv.
Adv.

Eun.
Eun.
Eun.
Eun.

I
I
I
I

7 (SC 299, 188192).

8 (SC 299, 192198).
912 (SC 299, 198216).
19 (SC 299, 238242).

APOLOGIA

and

ADVERSUS EUNOMIUM

491

principle, meaning the term Father as cause and principle of the

term Son is said to be greater. However, Basil totally rejects the
assumption that greater refers to power, that Christ can be said to
have less power than God, and cites the passages where Christ states,
The Father and I are one, saying that this refers to the equality
and identity of Father and Son according to power.20 At the same
time, Basil says that it is a contradiction to say that God is greater
and incomparable,21 and at one point states:
I am not able to believe that even in full delirium you would ever
arm that the Son is other than incorporal, without form, without
gure and all that you would say of the Father.22

Book Two: the Son. Against the thesis that the Son is product (gnnhma)
and creature (pohma) of the Father, Basil says that Eunomius misuses Scripture by trying to use the passage, God made this Jesus
Lord and Christ (Acts 2,36) to prove his point. This passage rather
envisages a moment in the Economy of God (Gods work of salvation).23 Basil asks where Eunomius got such an idea of the Son being
a product and creature of the Father, saying that it is something
extraneous to Scripture. The fruits of the earth are products, Basil
says, but a child is not a product.24
Against the thesis that the Son was generated, when he was not, meaning
that if the Son was generated, then there was a time when the Son was not.
Basil answers this by saying that that which is good is always present in God, that God the Father always possessed the Son by reason of his always willing that which is good. The Father is Father
from all eternity. The Father is not Father without the Son. Thus,
the Son is co-eternal with the Father and never had a beginning.25
Against the thesis that the Son is a creature of the Father, and
the Spirit is a creature of the Son. Basil responds by saying that if
the Son knows the essence of the Father then it is impossible for
him to have been created. One is able to ascertain Gods power by
knowing his works, but one cannot understand that which is his

20
21
22
23
24
25

Basil,
Basil,
Basil,
Basil,
Basil,
Basil,

Adv.
Adv.
Adv.
Adv.
Adv.
Adv.

Eun.
Eun.
Eun.
Eun.
Eun.
Eun.

I 25 (SC 299, 260262).

I 26 (SC 299, 264266).
I 23 (SC 299, 252256).
II 3 (SC 305, 1618).
II 8 (SC 305, 3034).
II 12 (SC 305, 4446).

492

anne gordon keidel

essence. Gods power (dnamiw) is the same as his essence.26 We know

God through his works, but not through his essence.27 The Spirit is
at the same time Spirit of God and Spirit of Christ. He calls the
Spirit, the Spirit of Truth, because he himself is Truth.28
Book Three: the Spirit. Basil counters Eunomius on the Spirit by saying that the dierence in order and dignity doesnt suggest a dierence
in nature. The names, Holy and Paraclete prove that the Spirit
is divine. The Holy Spirit not only shares the designation holy with
God, but also the designation Spirit: God is Spirit, and those who
worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth ( Jn 4,24).29
The activities are on the same level as the activities of the Father
and the Son. The divine character of the Spirit is shown in the
words: All these are activated by one and the same Spirit, who
alots to each one individually just as the Spirit chooses (1 Cor
12,11).30
The indwelling of the Spirit, Basil says, is a divine indwelling, citing: Go baptise in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy
Spirit (Mt 28,19). Baptism is the seal of faith and faith is an assent
to the divinity. Basil rejects Eunomius claim that the Spirit is something made, a creature created by the Son,31 and says that although
not generated, the Spirit belongs to the Trinity.32
In conclusion we can say that Basils response to Eunomius resulted
in the following statements of orthodox faith: We cannot know the
essence of God, and so we speak of the unknowability of God, the
inaccessibility of God to the human mind. This theological statement, along with Gregory of Nyssas theology on the same subject
was to underpin Christian apophatic spirituality. However, we can
know God through his works, we can know Gods properties. Basil
also articulated the eternal generation of the Son, and that the Son
is co-eternal with the Father, and states that the divine character of
the Spirit is shown in the Scriptures, citing 1 Cor 12,11. While this
early response to Eunomius did not silence the challenge, it did help

26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Basil, Adv. Eun. II 32 (SC 305, 132136).

Basil, Adv. Eun. II 32,1827 (SC 305, 134).
Basil, Adv. Eun. II 34 (SC 305, 140142).
Basil, Adv. Eun. III 23 (SC 305, 150153).
Basil, Adv. Eun. III 4 (SC 305, 156162).
Eunomius, Apol. 26,2426 (SC 305, 290).
Basil, Adv. Eun. III 5 (SC 305, 162164).

APOLOGIA

and

ADVERSUS EUNOMIUM

493

provide a framework of basic principles, which Gregory of Nyssa

would later develop, when, after Basils death, he continued the work
of providing what would become the orthodox response to the Arian
challenge.

DIE ALLEGORESE IN DER SCHRIFT

LEBEN DES MOSE GREGORS VON NYSSA
IM KONTEXT SEINER EPINOIA-THEORIE
Tamara Aptsiauri
Der Begri pnoia hat sich in der Lehre der kappadozischen
Kirchenvter whrend der Debatten gegen Eunomius formiert. Die
Kappadozier unterscheiden in epistemologischer Hinsicht zwischen
einer positiven und einer negativen Bedeutung. Epinoia bezeichnet
einerseits eine phantastische Erndung,1 andererseits ein Konzept,
Sinn, eine Vorstellung, wenn es sich mit dem Denkvermgen verbindet, womit Gott die intelligible menschliche Natur ausgezeichnet
hat.2 Nach Gregor von Nyssa ist gerade pnoia, der bekannte
Terminus der antiken Erkenntnistheorie, allgemein die Grundlage
der Wissenschaft und so auch des spekulativen theologischen Wissens.3
Das Denksystem des kappadozischen Kirchenvaters stellt eine eng
miteinander verbundene Ideenkette dar: Zwischen Gregors Idee der
Unendlichkeit Gottes, der epinoetischen Beziehung des Menschen
zum gttlichen Wesen und der allegorischen Auslegung der Heiligen
Schrift soll ein sachlicher Zusammenhang gesehen werden.
Obwohl der Terminus pnoia im Leben des Mose nicht im Besonderen
erlutert wird, bietet diese Schrift, eines der wichtigsten allegorischmystischen Werke Gregors von Nyssa, eine Mglichkeit zu betrachten,
wie im allgemeinen Kontext der Epinoia-Theorie die grundlegenden
Fragen der Hermeneutik von Gregor beantwortet werden: Die Notwendigkeit des tiefen Durchdenkens der Heiligen Schrift, die Eigenart
und die Aufgabe der allegorischen Sprache.

1
CE II 187 (GNO I 278): t d lgesyai par tn penantvn t muydh
plsmata ka t ceud teratemata par tw pinoaw logopoiesyai ka plssesyai, od atw ntilgv.
2
CE II 186 (GNO I 278): now d rgon yeo. okon k yeo pnta sa di
to no mn pepristai. CE II 189 (GNO I 279): otvw famn ka tw pinoaw
tn dnamin p gay mn nteyesyai par to yeo t nyrvpn fsei.
3

CE II 181182 (GNO I 277).

496

tamara aptsiauri
I. Die Notwendigkeit der allegorischen Auslegung der Heiligen Schrift

Das Hauptthema der Auseinandersetzung der Kappadozier mit dem

Neoarianer Eunomius ist bekanntlich dessen Lehre, dass die einzig
wahre Denition des gttlichen Wesens das selbst von Gott oenbarte
Prdikat ungezeugt (gnnhtow) sei. Die Idee der Unendlichkeit
Gottes, seiner Transzendenz und Unerreichbarkeit ist das wichtigste
Konzept, mittels dessen sich Gregor von Nyssa mit dieser Theorie
des Eunomius auseinandergesetzt hat.
Fr Gregor von Nyssas Schema ist es spezisch, dass er scharf
zwischen der geschaenen und ungeschaenen Natur unterscheidet.
Um den zwischen der geschaenen vernnftigen und der ungeschaenen Natur existierenden Erkenntnis- und ontologischen Abgrund
zu bezeichnen, fhrt Gregor den Begri disthma ein. Gott, als die
adiastematische Natur, ist unerreichbar und unbegreiich fr die
geschaene Natur, die diastematisch ist; nicht nur fr die krperliche Schpfung fr den Menschen , sondern auch fr die unkrperlichen Wesen.4 Das Erkennen des Wahrhaftseienden bedeutet
gerade die Anerkennung seiner Unerkennbarkeit, Unerreichbarkeit
und Unendlichkeit; und auch der mystische Aufstieg zu ihm ist ein
unendlicher Prozess, wie es dem Mose whrend der zweiten und
dritten Theophanien geoenbart wurde.5 Durch dieses ontologische
Schema wird das unmittelbare Begreifen Gottes, wie Gott von Natur
ist (denken wir an Moses Wunsch, Gott von Angesicht zu Angesicht
zu sehen),6 von selbst ausgeschlossen. Der einzige Weg zur Betrachtung
des Schpfers ist fr den sich in der zeitlichen und rumlichen
Dimension bendenden Menschen das geschaene Universum, das
als Oenbarung der gttlichen Energie selbst vom Schpfer zeugt.
Der Teilung der Welt in diese zwei ontologischen Pole (geschaen/
ungeschaen) entspricht Gregor von Nyssas Konzept von Erkenntnis
und von der diskursiven und bedingten Natur der Sprache. Die
menschliche Vernunft und die Fhigkeit der Benennung sind Teil
der geschaenen Natur und begrenzt als eine diastematische Schpfung.
Die Sprache, so Gregor, ist eine menschliche Schpfung7 und hat
CE II 67 (GNO I 245). Auch De vita Moysis II (GNO VII/1 87,1013): yen
odew rake ppote, o mnon tow nyrpoiw ll ka ps t noht fsei
tw yeaw osaw tn gnsin nfikton enai t pofsei tat diorizmenow.
4

5
6
7

VM II (GNO VII/1 66,2067,8).

VM II (GNO VII/1 110,615).
CE II 392.395402 (GNO I 340344).

die allegorese im

LEBEN DES MOSE

497

einen diastematischen Charakter. Deshalb vermag die Sprache nicht

jedes Phnomen des intellektuellen Bereichs wiederzugeben, umso
weniger das ewige und unendliche Wesen zu bezeichnen. Unter den
Bedingungen von Gregor von Nyssas Teilung der Welt in einen sinnlichen und einen vernnftigen Bereich gibt es folgende Alternative
der Erkenntnis der Dinge. Einerseits, wenn es um den sinnlichen
Bereich geht, gibt die sinnliche Wahrnehmung der Dinge die
Mglichkeit, ber sie ein wahrhaftes Wissen zu erhalten.8 Andererseits,
wenn das zu untersuchende Objekt zum intelligiblen Teil der Welt
gehrt, spielt im Prozess seiner Erkenntnis und Benennung dinoia
die entscheidende Rolle, die in diesem Fall eine intellektuelle Vorstellungsfhigkeit des Menschen, eine konzeptionelle Vermutung ber
das Objekt darstellt.9 Die dem transzendenten hchsten Wesen entsprechende menschliche Vorstellung und die wrtliche Bezeichnung
dieser Vorstellung kann nur bedingt und teilweise zutreend sein.
So hat Mose auf dem Berg Sinai die gttliche Anordnung erhalten,
dass es vor allem auf der Tugend geziemende Vorstellungen (tw
preposaw polceiw) von der Natur Gottes ankommt, da diese jenseits alles erkennenden Verstehens und jenseits aller Beispiele liegt
(prkeitai pantw gnvristiko nomatw te ka podegmatow), und
mit nichts zu vergleichen ist, was erkannt wird (oden tn ginvskomnvn moioumnh).10 Die Betrachtung Gottes bedenkt, dass sein
Wesen mit nichts gleichzusetzen ist, was durch die menschliche
Erkenntnis erlangt wird.11 Unsere Erkenntnis und Vorstellung des
gttlichen Wesens erzeugt nichts anderes als ein edvlon yeo12 keine
Bezeichnung des Wesens Gottes. Wenn jemand meint, es sei mglich, die gttliche Natur zu begreifen, sinkt er schon von dem wirklich Seienden zu dem, das durch die erfassende Vorstellung verstanden
wird.13 Da die dierenzierte Sprache unfhig ist, direkt auf das

CE II 572573 (GNO I 393).

CE II 574576 (GNO I 393f ).
10
VM II (GNO VII/1 22,1418).
11
VM II (GNO VII/1 88,710): mayn n prtoiw xr per to yeo ginskein:
t d ginskein, t mhdn per ato tn j nyrvpnhw katalcevw ginvskomnvn
ednai.
12
VM II (GNO VII/1 88,25): pantw nomatow to kat tina perilhptikn
9

fantasan n perino& tin ka stoxasm tw yeaw fsevw ginomnou edvlon

yeo plssontow ka o yen kataggllontow.
13
VM II (GNO VII/1 115,68): tonun tn ginvskomnvn ti tn yen enai
omenow, w paratrapew p to ntvw ntow prw t t katalhptik fantas&
nomisyn enai, zvn ok xei.

498

tamara aptsiauri

einfache gttliche Wesen hinzuweisen, wird von einem jeglichen zu

Gott gerichteten apophatischen oder kataphatischen Terminus unsere
Epinoia ber die gttliche Natur bezeichnet.14 Ausgehend von dieser berlegung, ist fr Gregor der von Eunomius eingefhrte Terminus
ungezeugt vllig annehmbar als eines der Prdikate des gttlichen
Wesens, obwohl er kategorisch verneint, dass die Ungezeugtheit als
der bezeichnende Begri selbst das gttliche Wesen sei.15 Wenn der
Verfasser das Symbol des ungeschaenen Zeltes auslegt, weist er auf
das relative Prinzip der Namensgebung der gttlichen Natur hin,
dass durch jeden fr Gott gebrauchten Namen nur die Wirkung
(Energie) Gottes bezeichnet wird: Wie alle anderen Namen im religisen Sinn zur Bezeichnung der Macht Gottes gebraucht werden,
wie z.B. Arzt, Hirte, Schtzer . . . und was sonst noch von Ihm gesagt
wird, so wird Er auch mit einem Namen, der der gttlichen Natur
angemessen ist (kat tina yeoprep shmasan), Zelt genannt.16
Nimmt man auf diese Idee Rcksicht, wird deutlich, dass, obwohl
die Heilige Schrift inspiriert worden ist, sie trotzdem durch die
menschliche Sprache spricht und so imstande ist, Wahrheit durch
eine rtselhafte Aussage (di angmatow) wiederzugeben.17 Die Teilung
der inspirierten Heiligen Schrift in historische und theoretische Teile
bernimmt Gregor von Origenes als etwas vllig Selbstverstndliches.18
Gregors Hermeneutik der biblischen Bcher geht von der Koexistenz
von Historie und Theorie aus. Der Mensch erhebt sich durch eine
Interpretation der Geschichte zur Betrachtung des Hchsten Wesens.
Durch die Suche nach dem hinter dem einfachen Wort und der
Erzhlweise der Heiligen Schrift versteckten tieferen Sinn fhrt die
biblische Geschichte zur mystischen Betrachtung,19 was wiederum
den Menschen auf den unendlichen Weg der geistigen Vervoll-

14

CE II 130136.446449 (GNO I 263265.356f ).

CE II 177 (GNO I 276): gnnhtn fasi tn yen enai: tot ka mew suntiymeya. ll ka tn gennhsan osan enai: prw toto par mn ntrrhsiw. noma gr tot famen ndeiktikn enai to genntvw tn yen festnai,
o tn gennhsan enai yen.
16
VM II (GNO VII/1 92,818).
17
VM II (GNO VII/1 62,10; 65,10; 72,8).
18
S. T. Dolidze, Einige Aspekte der allegorischen Sprache in der Auslegung
von Origenes und Gregor von Nyssa zum Hohenlied, in: L. Perrone (Hrsg.),
Origeniana Octava, vol. II, Leuven 2003, 10611070.
19
Dazu s. Th. Bhm, Theoria Unendlichkeit Aufstieg. Philosophische Implikationen zu De
Vita Moysis von Gregor von Nyssa, Leiden New York Kln 1996, 212227.
15

die allegorese im

LEBEN DES MOSE

499

kommnung und zur Erkenntnis der gttlichen Schnheit fhrt. Ein

deutliches Beispiel dafr bietet Gregors spirituelles Nachdenken ber
jedes Detail des Lebens des Mose.
Damit ist aber die Allegorie auch ein Mittel zum Aufstieg vom
Sinnlichen zum Sittlich-Geistigen. Fr Gregor von Nyssa ist die allegorische Betrachtung der biblischen Bcher untrennbar von der
Gewinnung der Tugend d.h. vom sittlichen Leben.20 Wenn beim
buchstblichen Verstehen der Heiligen Schrift die biblische Geschichte
in eine Art Widerspruch mit der gttlichen Gerechtigkeit gert, wird
es notwendig, diese Geschichte sittlich-allegorisch zu reektieren.
Dieser Gedanke Gregors von der scheinbaren Unangemessenheit der
Schrift stammt aus der Hermeneutik des Origenes. Im Leben des Mose
weist Gregor oft auf die Unangemessenheiten hin, die entstehen wrden, wenn der Exeget nicht von einer konkreten Geschichte abstrahiert
und dem Leser so beim Begreifen des tieferen Sinnes des inspirierten Textes hilft.21 Indem er die Ttung der gyptischen Erstgeborenen,
die Aneignung des Schmucks der gypter, den Hinweis auf den
Aufenthaltsort Gottes whrend der dritten Theophanie und mehrere
anderen Passage auslegt, macht der kappadozische Kirchenvater durch
eine Verbindung der berzeugenden Logik und der rhetorischen
Verfahren deutlich, dass die Allegorie der einzige richtige Weg fr
die Auslegung der biblischen Bcher sei.22

II. Die Eigenart der allegorischen Sprache

Mit Blick auf die Lehre Gregors von Nyssa von der Sprache und
insbesondere von deren Dierenziertheit und Konventionalitt entsteht die Frage: Welche Gemeinsamkeiten und welche Unterschiede
bestehen zwischen der theologischen Sprache und der Sprache
schlechthin?

20
Th. Kobusch, Metaphysik als Lebensform bei Gregor von Nyssa, in: H. R.
Drobner A. Viciano (Hrsg.), Gregory of Nyssa: Homilies on the Beatitudes. An English
Version with Commentary and Supporting Studies, Proceedings of the Eighth International Colloquium
on Gregory of Nyssa (Paderborn, 1418 September 1998), Leiden Boston Kln 2000,
467485. Auch T. Dolidze, Einige Aspekte, 1063.
21
Allegorese als Abstand von dem Sinnlich-Konkreten, s. T. Dolidze, Einige
Aspekte, 10651066.
22
Vgl. VM II (GNO VII/1 110,24111,17; 60; 68).

500

tamara aptsiauri

Weil fr Gott in seiner transzendenten Natur Sprache dieses fr

den diastematischen Bereich bestimmte Phnomen etwas vllig
Fremdes ist, spricht der Herr mit uns in unserer Sprache durch die
Heilige Schrift. Die Propheten und Apostel sind Instrumente des
Heiligen Geistes.23 Einer davon ist Mose durch sein ganzes Wirken
und dadurch, dass er Mittler zwischen Gott und den Menschen wird,
wenn er vom Berg Sinai Gottes Gebote fr sie mitbringt. Die
Propheten und Apostel geben nicht ein konkretes Konzept von der
gttlichen Natur, sondern eine Vielfalt an Namen und Analogien, damit
der Mensch die fr ihn entsprechenden Vorstellungen ( yeoprepw
nnoia) ber Gott zu schaen vermag.24
Durch die Unendlichkeit und Transzendenz des gttlichen Wesens
einerseits, andererseits aber durch die gegliederte Struktur der menschlichen Sprache und ihre Bedingtheit wird die Vielfltigkeit der durch
die epinoetische Fhigkeit des Menschen gewonnenen Analogien und
gttlichen Namen bedingt. Die gttliche Natur oenbart sich dem
Menschen nicht nach ihrem wahren und absoluten Wesen, sondern
nach dem Vermgen des Empfngers (otvw mfainomnh kayw
n xvr t dexmenon).25 Dementsprechend ist fr die Sprache der
inspirierten Schrift Mehrdeutigkeit und Mannigfaltigkeit charakteristisch.
Gregor von Nyssa gebraucht im Leben des Mose den Begri Homonymie in Bezug auf die Allegorie. Dieser Begri erscheint in einigen anderen seiner Werke bei der Auslegung der hermeneutischen
Fragen. Mit diesem Terminus ist eine Reihe von Fragen verbunden,
die noch nicht erforscht sind, wie es in der wissenschaftlichen
Spezialliteratur der letzten Jahre bemerkt wurde.26 Wegen der
Kompliziertheit der Frage wollen wir sie diesmal nicht genauer erforschen, ich mchte nur bemerken, in welchem Kontext hier der
Terminus Homonymie erwhnt wird. Ausgehend von der bedingten und vernderlichen Natur der Sprache, hlt Gregor die Ambivalenz
von Worten fr mglich in dem Sinn, dass eine lexikalische Einheit
in verschiedenen Kontexten eine gegenstzliche Bedeutung haben

23

CE II 393394 (GNO I 341).

VM II (GNO VII/1 22,1416); CE II 168 (GNO I 273f ).
25
VM II (GNO VII/1 70,811).
26
M. Harl, Origne et la smantique du langage biblique, in: Le dchirement
du sens, Paris 1993, 65. T. Dolidze, Der Glaube als Erkenntnis bei Origenes, in:
W. Geerlings C. Schulze (Hrsg.), Kommentar in Antike und Mittelalter. Neue Beitrge
zu seiner Erforschung, Leiden 2003, 205.
24

die allegorese im

LEBEN DES MOSE

501

kann. So spricht er im Leben des Mose ber Aaron: Das Wort Bruder
wird vom Autor in einem Fall als eine Metapher fr den Herrenengel
erlutert, in einem anderen aber als Anfhrer des Gtzendienstes
und als Allegorem des bsen Trachtens. Gregor betont: tw on
ntiysevw oshw . . . kke metrvw paredlou tn tw delfthtow
mvnuman lgow, w ox pntote to ato shmainomnou p tw
atw fvnw tan p tn nantvn nohmton t at lambnhtai
noma.27

Das Leben des Mose belegt, genauso wie der Kommentar Gregors
von Nyssa ber das Hohelied, die komplexe Natur der allegorischen
Sprache des kappadozischen Kirchenvaters. Die Polysemantik ist eine
wichtige Eigenschaft der theologischen Sprache, die nicht nur auf
der Ebene der Metapher erforscht werden soll.28 Die Vielfltigkeit
der allegorischen Sprache wird bei der mehrdeutigen Auslegung von
mehreren sprachlichen Bildern deutlich. Die Heilige Schrift bietet
(in Analogie zum unendlichen gttlichen Wesen) die Mglichkeit
unendlicher Hermeneutik. In dieser Hinsicht ist es fr Gregor vllig annehmbar, dass von verschiedenen Auslegern eine und dieselbe
biblische Passage individuell und unterschiedlich erlutert wird. Bei
der Interpretation der hyazinthblauen Kleidung zum Beispiel bemerkt
er: Manche, die diese Stelle vor uns betrachtet haben, sagen, dass
mit dieser Farbe die Luft gemeint sei. Ich fr meine Person vermag
nicht genau zu entscheiden, ob die Farbe dieser Blume etwas mit
der Farbe der Luft gemein hat. Jedoch weise ich diese Auslegung
nicht zurck.29
Die Mehrdeutigkeit der Konzepte ist nicht nur bei der Erluterung
des Unterschieds zwischen verschiedenen Interpreten zulssig, sie tritt
auch bei einem einzelnen Exegeten auf. Aufgrund der Vielfltigkeit
der Erscheinungen des gttlichen Wesens ist Gregor bei der allegorischen Auslegung der Schrift nicht kategorisch. Dies wird deutlich
zum Ausdruck gebracht durch die Metapher vom himmlischen Manna.
Dies symbolisiert fr Gregor das Wort Gottes, das seine Kraft
mannigfach verndert, entsprechend dem Verlangen derjenigen, die

27

VM II (GNO VII/1 106,1116).

Die Frage der Polysemantik in der Allegorese von Origenes und Gregor von
Nyssa wird bei T. Dolidze besonders beachtet, s. T. Dolidze, Einige Aspekte,
10611070.
29
VM II (GNO VII/1 98,1519).
28

tamara aptsiauri

502

es zu sich nehmen.30 Das Leben des Mose ist voll von Metaphern
komplexen Charakters, bei denen verschiedene allegorische Bedeutungen
mit erstaunlicher Meisterschaft innerhalb eines Symbols wechseln. So
ist Mose einerseits fr die auf dem Weg der Tugend wandelnden
Menschen das Vorbild, das gleich bei der geistigen Geburt nach seinem freien Willen die Tugend whlt, andererseits ist er als Fhrer
der Hebrer ein Typus des wahren Erlsers und Gesetzgebers Jesu
Christi.
Wie Gregor von Nyssa im Leben des Mose bemerkt, ist die Vertiefung
in das inspirierte Wort und danach die Betrachtung des gttlichen
Wesens ein unendlicher Prozess, so wie fr den Suchenden der geistigen Vervollkommnung, der sich auf Jakobs Leiter stellt, auf der
jede Stufe eine andere folgt, bis ins Unendliche.31 Die Komplexitt
der allegorischen Sprache und die endlose Mglichkeit der Auslegung
der Bilder dienen der anagogischen Funktion der Heiligen Schrift.32
Bei Gregor von Nyssa bekommt die Mglichkeit der vielfltigen und
unbegrenzten Hermeneutik der biblischen Geschichte, genauso wie
die Idee der Unendlichkeit und der Transzendenz des gttlichen
Wesens, eine positive Bedeutung. Jeder auf dem Weg der Vervollkommnung gemachte Schritt ist die Grundlage eines nchsten, jede
beliebige Interpretation ist der Anfang einer neuen Interpretation,
obwohl der Abstand bis zum hchsten Wesen unvernderlich bleibt.
Und wieder fhrt die Schrift unseren Geist aufsteigend zu hheren
Stufen der Tugend.33 Am Beispiel des Vorausgehenden soll der
Wahrheitssuchende seine eigene spekulative Erfahrung gewinnen, so
wie Mose zum Wegweiser und Fhrer fr die in der Tugend
Wandelnden wurde. Nach der Hermeneutik Gregors im Leben des
Mose ist jedes sprachliche Bild von anagogischem Charakter und wird
im Allgemeinen protreptischen Kontext gelesen.
Zusammenfassend lsst sich sagen: Wie in anderen Werken von
Gregor von Nyssa wird auch im Leben des Mose die Notwendigkeit
der allegorischen Interpretation der biblischen Bcher und ihr komplexer Charakter zusammen mit Gregors Idee der Unendlichkeit des
gttlichen Wesens auch durch die Diastemie des Denkens und der

30
31
32
33

VM
VM
VM
VM

II
II
II
II

(GNO
(GNO
(GNO
(GNO

VII/1
VII/1
VII/1
VII/1

78,13; vgl. 51,24; 17,1020).

113,36).
76,1214; 82,1718).
82,45).

die allegorese im

LEBEN DES MOSE

503

Sprache bedingt. Das geistliche Nachdenken ber die Heilige Schrift

als das einzige richtige Verfahren der Erkenntnis und Hermeneutik
des inspirierten Wortes dient zur Verwirklichung der soteriologischen
Mission des Erlsers, und die Allegorese soll im Werk Gregors von
Nyssa als die logische Folge seiner Epinoia-Theorie verstanden werden.

DIE BEDEUTUNG DER EPINOIAI IN DEN

PREDIGTEN GREGORS VON NYSSA
Jochen Rexer

Die Predigten des 4. Jh. sind eine wichtige Quelle, um Informationen

ber das Verstndnis reichskirchlicher Theologie zu erhalten. Dabei
muss grundstzlich unterschieden werden zwischen den vielen gehaltenen Predigten in den verschiedenen Gemeinden jener Zeit und den
dann auch publizierten sowie uns heute noch zugnglichen, d.h.:
zwischen der verbreiteten Predigtpraxis und der eingeschrnkten
Predigtpublikation, die dann auch noch tradiert werden musste. Es
ist also immer zu bercksichtigen, dass in dieser Zeit einmal nur die
Predigten der bekanntesten Prediger meist waren es die Bischfe in
den greren christlichen Zentren1 niedergeschrieben wurden, dass
dabei wiederum allein ihre herausragendsten Predigten weitertradiert
wurden, und dass schlielich auch bei den Hrern von einem berdurchschnittlich gebildeten und interessierten Publikum ausgegangen
werden muss.2 Deshalb sind die heute noch zugnglichen Predigten
immer als Musterreden anzusehen, die zu besonderen Anlssen und
mit einer bestimmten Absicht vorgetragen, aufgeschrieben und weitertradiert wurden. Auf diesem Hintergrund gelten die Predigten, die
bis heute gesichert dem Bischof Gregor von Nyssa zugeschrieben
werden, als ein reprsentatives Beispiel und Muster der Predigtpraxis
seiner Zeit. Die reichskirchlichen Predigten und im Besonderen die

1
Predigtrecht und -picht hatte zunchst allein der Bischof, der fr die Verkndigung und den Glaubenshalt seiner Gemeinde verantwortlich war. In der
stlichen Kirche wurde es sicher bezeugt ab dem 4. Jh. blich, auch Presbyter
und Diakone zu beauftragen, den Bischof im Predigtdienst zu vertreten (z.B. Johannes
Chrysostomus). Im Westen setzt diese Entwicklung erst mit Augustinus ein; vgl.
E. Dassmann, Kirchengeschichte II/2. Theologie und innerkirchliches Leben bis zum Ausgang
der Sptantike, Stuttgart 1999, 129.
2
Zur berlieferung der christlichen Predigt vgl. B. Studer, Schola christiana. Die
Theologie zwischen Niza (325) und Chalzedon (451), Paderborn 1998, 114f; zum liturgischen Ort und dem Verhltnis Predigt Prediger Hrer vgl. H. G. Thmmel,
Materialien zum liturgischen Ort der Predigt in der Alten Kirche, in: E. Mhlenberg J. van Oort (Hrsg.), Predigt in der Alten Kirche, Kampen 1994, 115122;
L. Brottier, Predigt V. Alte Kirche: TRE 27 (1997) 244248.

506

jochen rexer

Festtagspredigten sind bedeutsam sowohl fr die Predigt , als auch

fr die Liturgiegeschichte. Darber hinaus spiegeln sie aber immer
auch die theologische Diskussion ihrer Zeit wider.
Daher wird zuerst die Rolle der Festtagspredigten Gregors im
Allgemeinen behandelt, um zweitens die pnoiai in seinen Predigten
darzustellen und drittens den erkenntnistheoretischen Hintergrund
aufzuzeigen.

I. Die Festtagspredigten Gregors von Nyssa

Gregor von Nyssa bezeugt als der erste bis heute bekannte Prediger
mit seinem umfangreichen Corpus an tradierten Festtagspredigten
einen abgeschlossenen Oster- und Weihnachtsfestkreis.3 Daneben hat
er zahlreiche Mrtyrerpredigten sowie Lob- und Trostreden hinterlassen.4 Die Predigten sind in seiner produktivsten Zeit zwischen 379
und 386 entstanden. Gregor von Nyssa entwickelte zwar keine explizite Theorie des Festes, gibt aber in seinen Festtagsreden deutliche
Hinweise auf eine angemessene Theologie des Festes. Er reektiert
selbstndig die Festpraxis seiner Zeit, nimmt dabei seine theologische Tradition kritisch auf und rezipiert ganz selbstverstndlich allgemein anerkannte Festelemente seines soziokulturellen Umfelds.5
3
Sieben Predigten zu den christlichen Herrenfesten werden Gregor von Nyssa
sicher zugeschrieben: die Osterpredigten Sanct. Pasch. (GNO IX 245270) und Trid.
spat. (GNO IX 273306) mit dem Epilog Salut. Pasch. (GNO IX 315319); die
Himmelfahrtspredigt Ascens. (GNO IX 323327); die Pngstpredigt Pent. (GNO X/2
287292); die Weihnachtspredigt In diem nat. (GNO X/2 235296), sowie die
Epiphaniepredigten In diem lum. (GNO IX 221242) und Bapt. (GNO X/2 357
370). Vgl. dazu den tabellarischen berblick bei J. Rexer, Die Festtheologie Gregors von
Nyssa. Ein Beispiel reichskirchlicher Heortologie, Frankfurt 2002, 6.
4
Bas. (GNO X/1 109134); Flacill. (GNO IX 475490); Mart. Ia (GNO X/1
137142); Mart. Ib (GNO X/1 145156); Mart. II (GNO X/1 159169); Melet.
(GNO IX 441457); Pulcher. (GNO IX 461472); Steph. I (GNO X/1 7594); Steph.
II (GNO X/1 97105); Thaum. (GNO X/1 357); Theod. (GNO X/1 6171). Zu
den Mrtyrer- und Heiligenreden Gregors von Nyssa vgl. die Beitrge des Sammelbandes: A. Spira (Hrsg.), The Biographical Works of Gregory of Nyssa. Proceedings of
the Fifth International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa, Mainz 610 September 1982, Cambridge
(Mass.) 1984.
5
In welcher Art und Weise die Kirche ber ihre Festpraxis reektierte, d.h.:
Welche berzeugungen, Bedrfnisse und Vorstellungen hinter der sich entwickelnden kirchlichen Festpraxis stehen, fhrt in den Themenbereich der Heortologie, der
Rede ber das Fest, genauer in den Themenbereich der Theologie des Festes, der
Rede von Gott am Fest. Zur Praxis und Theorie des christlichen Festes vgl. Rexer,
Festtheologie.

epinoiai in den predigten gregors von nyssa

507

Die Festtagspredigten bezeugen einmal, wie ber das Mittel des

sich entwickelnden liturgischen Jahres der Kirche das Christusgeschehen in die Zeitstrecke des Jahres vermittelt werden sollte, d.h.: Die
Predigten sind erstens ein Ausdruck der damaligen spirituellen bzw.
geistlichen Reexion. Zum anderen sind sie aber immer auch eine
Reexion der damaligen theologischen Auseinandersetzungen und
spiegeln zweitens die theologische Diskussion ihrer Zeit wider. In den
Festtagspredigten Gregors von Nyssa nden sich deutliche Spuren
der dogmatischen, speziell trinitarischen und christologischen Kontroversen des 4. Jh.: Arianismus und Apollinarismus.
So behandelt etwa die Osterpredigt De tridui spatio (nicht vor 386)
im ersten Hauptteil vier Fragen,6 deren Art der Darstellung wie der
Lsung nach Hubertus R. Drobner nur aus Gregors groen polemischen Traktaten Contra Eunomium und Adversus Apolinarium zu erklren
sind.7 Die Pngstpredigt In sanctam Pentecosten (388) richtet sich im
Rahmen der zeitgenssischen Diskussion explizit gegen die Pneumatomachen, welche die Gttlichkeit des Heiligen Geistes leugnen. Ebenso
setzt sich Gregor in seiner ersten Lobrede auf den Protomrtyrer
Stephanus In sanctum Stephanum I (386) mit den Pneumatomachen
ber die Gttlichkeit des Heiligen Geistes und dem damit verbundenen
richtigen Schriftverstndnis auseinander.8 In diesem Zusammenhang
wendet sich Gregor dann auch gegen die Neuarianer, die er parallel zu den Pneumatomachen Christomachen nennt, weil sie den Sohn
dem Vater unterordnen.9 Die christologische Diskussion scheint
in Gregors Weihnachtspredigt In diem natalem Salvatoris (386) durch,
wenn er gegen eine doketische Position unterstreicht, dass Christus
wahrer Gott und wahrer Mensch ist und Christus wirklich die menschliche Natur annahm.10 Schlielich wendet sich Gregor in seiner

6
Erstens die Frage Was whrend der drei Tage geschah: der Descensus Christi
als Sieg ber Tod und Teufel (Trid. spat., GNO IX 280,14283,9); zweitens die
Frage nach dem Warum der drei Tage (Trid. spat., GNO IX 283,10286,12); drittens die Frage Wie die prophetischen drei Tage und Nchte zu berechnen sind
(Trid. spat., GNO IX 286,16290,17) und viertens die Frage des Wie sich Christus
an diesen Tagen gleichzeitig Dreien geben konnte (Trid. spat., GNO IX 290,18
294,13).
7
H.R. Drobner, Die drei Tage zwischen Tod und Auferstehung unseres Herrn Jesus
Christus. Eingel., bers. u. kommentiert, Leiden 1982, 172.
8
Vgl. Steph. I (GNO X/1 88,2394,7).
9
Vgl. Steph. I (GNO X/1 91,1094,7).
10
Vgl. In diem nat. (GNO X/2 266,14269,7).

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Epiphaniepredigt In diem luminum (383) zugleich gegen Pneumatomachen, Eunomius und Neuarianer, wenn er sagt, dass kein Unterschied in der Heiligung durch drei Hypostasen bestehe, weil alle drei
gleich gttlich seien. Die drei Hypostasen seien nicht drei Gtter,
die einander unhnlich (nomoouw; 229,17) sind. Deshalb drften die
drei Hypostasen nicht in verschiedene Naturen zerstckelt werden,
da ein und dieselbe Gnade von allen drei ausgehe.11
Zweifellos entwickelt und vertieft Gregor von Nyssa sein Festverstndnis im Rahmen seines trinitarischen und christologischen Denkens.
Deshalb verwundert es nicht, dass sich in seinen Festtagspredigten
pnoiai nden.
II. Der Begri der pnoiai in den Festtagspredigten Gregors von Nyssa
Aufgrund der Vielfalt der biblischen Begrie fr Jesus Christus entfaltet Origenes seine Lehre von den pnoiai, die Gregor von Nyssa
und die anderen Kappadokier bernehmen. Nach Origenes vermittelt Christus zwischen der Einheit Gottes und der Vielfltigkeit der
geschaenen Welt. Er erweist sich als Mittler, der zugleich an der
Einheit Gottes in der Vielfalt der Geschpfe teilnimmt. Christus als
die Weisheit Gottes und als Wort fr die Menschen in der Welt
zeigt sich nach Origenes in verschiedenen Aspekten der Bibel, die
er als pnoiai bezeichnet: z.B. als Arzt, Hirte, Knig oder Licht,
Weg und Wahrheit, aber auch als Sohn, Erlser und Auferstehung.12
Hermann Josef Sieben wies nach, dass Origenes im engsten Zusammenhang mit seiner Epinoiailehre die Auassung vertritt, Christus

11

Vgl. In diem lum. (GNO IX 228,26229,18).

Vgl. zur pnoia-Lehre bei Origenes und ihrer Rezeption durch die Kappadokier
ausfhrlich H. J. Sieben, Vom Heil in den vielen Namen Christi zur Nachahmung
derselben. Zur Rezeption der Epinoiai-Lehre des Origenes durch die Kappadokischen
Vter, ThPh 73 (1998) 128, der 211 die Epinoiailehre des Origenes referiert und
Literaturangaben zum Status quaestionis gibt. Origenes unterscheidet im einzelnen
folgende pnoiai: 1. Bezeichnungen, die Christus sich selber gibt, die er dann noch
weiter dierenziert in solche, die in den Evangelien festgehalten sind (Licht,
Auferstehung, Weg, Wahrheit, etc.), solche, die die geheime Oenbarung bezeugt
(Erster, Letzter, Lebender, Alpha und Omega), sowie solche, die sich bei den
Propheten benden (Pfeil, Gottesknecht, Licht der Vlker, Lamm); 2. Bezeichnungen,
die Christus von Autoren des Neuen Testaments zugeschrieben werden; 3. solche,
die ihm schon die Propheten gegeben haben; 4. die ihm von Johannes gegebene
Bezeichnung Logos (vgl. ebd., 4, mit ausfhrlichen Stellenangaben).
12

epinoiai in den predigten gregors von nyssa

509

oenbare sich den Menschen je nach ihrer Erkenntnismglichkeit

oder ihrem Tugendgrad in verschiedener Gestalt. Die Polymorphie
Christi sei eine Variante der Epinoiailehre. Folglich hnge unsere
menschliche Erkenntnis Christi davon ab, wie nahe wir ihm kommen,
diese Nhe wiederum vom Grad unserer Tugend.13
Hinter Gregors Festtheologie steht die von Origenes rezipierte
pnoiai-Lehre, wenn er in seiner Weihnachtspredigt In diem natalem
Salvatoris die Lehre der Heilsordnung (tn lgon tw okonomaw, 267,14)
erlutert und sagt, die Gottheit besitze alle Dinge, die zum Aspekt,
Begri, Konzept oder Gedanken (kat pnoian, 267,17) gut gehren,
d.h.: Macht, Gerechtigkeit, Gte und Weisheit seien alles Begrie,
die Gott wrdig bezeichneten.14 Die pnoia gut, fhrt Gregor fort,
sei den Menschen in Christus whrend seiner irdischen Wirksamkeit
oenbart worden, der in seiner Gte (gaythw, gayw, 268,4f ) die
Abgefallenen liebte und in seiner Weisheit (sofa, sofw, 268,4f ) den
Gedanken (pnoian, 268,6) fasste, die Geknechteten zu befreien. In
seiner Gerechtigkeit (dikaiosnh, dkaiow, 268,4.7) htte er sich daher
als Lsegeld (ntllagma, 268,9) fr die menschliche Schuld hingegeben, um schlielich in seiner Macht (dnamiw, dunatw, 268,4.11)
den Tod zu berwinden, indem er leiblich auferstand.15 Gregor
gebraucht den Terminus pnoia im Zusammenhang der Festrede
also nicht wie Origenes fr die biblischen Aspekte Christi, sondern
im erkenntnistheoretischen Sinne. Macht, Gerechtigkeit, Gte und
Weisheit sind Gedanken oder Begrie, pnoiai, die Gregor aus
der Schpfung ableitet und nicht mehr nur aus der Bibel wie Origenes.
Fr Gregor vermitteln die pnoiai den Menschen die Mglichkeit,
das Heilswirken Gottes in Christus zu erkennen. Ebenso bezeichnet
Gregor in anderen Festreden mit pnoia allgemein den Gedanken
oder Einfall.16
In seiner am frhest bezeugten Osterpredigt In sanctum Pascha (382)
hebt Gregor im Hinblick auf die menschliche Erkenntnis Gottes aber
zugleich hervor: Es sei nicht mglich, allein durch menschliches

13

Vgl. Sieben, Zur Rezeption der Epinoiai-Lehre, 811.

Vgl. In diem nat. (GNO X/2 267,14268,2).
15
Vgl. In diem nat. (GNO X/2 268,214).
16
Z.B. Gregors erste Lobrede auf die 40 Mrtyrer Mart. II (GNO X/1 163,23)
von 379; seine Lobrede zum zweiten Todestag seines Bruders Bas. (GNO X/1
133,4.5) von 381; die Festrede auf Gregor den Wundertter Thaum. (GNO X/1
10,19; 15,13; 27,3; 29,3), die nicht genau zu datieren ist; etc.
14

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Nachdenken (pinoaiw nyrvpikaw, 255,24) die Wirksamkeit Gottes

(yeo nergeaw, 255,25) zu erforschen. Der Mensch knne zwar einzelne Wirkungen Gottes, die Oikonomia, wahrnehmen und auf Gottes
Allmacht schlieen, aber die Heilsursache, Gott selbst, msse er glaubend anerkennen.17 Gregor wahrt damit wie bereits Origenes die
transzendenten Eigenschaften in Gott Vater, der absoluten Einfachheit,
in der strenggenommen keine Mehrzahl von Namen zu nden ist.
Hingegen lsst Christus in origenischer Sicht als multiplex in constitutione, also wegen seiner Zusammensetzung, Platz fr eine Vielzahl
solcher Benennungen,18 wie Alois Grillmeier feststellt. Daraus lsst
sich schlieen: Christus vermittelt den Menschen die eine Wirklichkeit
Gottes in vielen Einzelheiten, in pnoiai.
Die durch Christus oenbarten pnoiai als Weg des Menschen
zu Gott sind oensichtlich der Hintergrund fr das allgemeine Verstndnis der Theologie des Festes bei Gregor. Denn zu Beginn seiner
zweiten Osterpredigt De tridui spatio spricht Gregor von den Strahlen
der alttestamentlichen Verheiungen, die sich mit den Fackeln der
gegenwrtigen Festfeier zu einem groen Gnadenlicht Gottes verbinden, d.h.: Wie Gott seine Gnade uns Menschen in Christus
oenbarte, so bereits in den Verheiungen des Alten Testaments und
so auch gegenwrtig am Fest. Damit ist das Fest wie das Zeugnis
der Schrift als geschichtliche Oenbarung Gottes Teil der Oikonomia,
der Dinge also, die Gott zum Heil der Menschen unternimmt.19
Schlielich zeigt sich in Gregors Predigten sogar die Verbindung
der pnoiai-Lehre mit der Nachahmung Christi, die er in einer eigenen, systematisch aufgebauten Schrift mit dem Titel De perfectione
entfaltet.20 Formal gesehen ist De perfectione ein Kommentar, der sechsundzwanzig aus den Paulusbriefen und vier aus weiteren biblischen
Schriften entnommenen pnoiai Christi behandelt.21 Inhaltlich interpretiert Gregor die Epinoiailehre des Origenes dort aber entscheidend
neu, wenn er aufgrund der pnoiai Christi zur Nachahmung (
mmhsiw) auordert.22 Der Weg zur christlichen Vollkommenheit, so

17

Vgl. Sanct. Pasch. (GNO IX 255,24256,7).

A. Grillmeier, Jesus der Christus im Glauben der Kirche I. Von der Apostolischen Zeit
bis zum Konzil von Chalcedon (451), Freiburg im Breisgau 31990, 270.
19
Vgl. Trid. spat. (GNO IX 273,5274,2).
20
Vgl. H. J. Sieben, Zur Rezeption der Epinoiai-Lehre, 1828.
21
Vgl. ebd., 22.
22
Vgl. Perf. 4 (GNO VIII/1 178,11): Merkmale eines wahren Christseins sind
18

epinoiai in den predigten gregors von nyssa

511

Gregor, bestehe in der Nachahmung der pnoiai Christi, der Aspekte

unseres Erlsers.23
So nennt Gregor in seiner Osterpredigt In sanctum Pascha das gegenwrtige Fest das wahrhafte Abbild oder die wirklichkeitsgetreue
Nachahmung ( mmhsiw) des zuknftigen Tages der eschatologischen
Vollendung.24 Das gegenwrtige Fest sei die richtige, angemessene
und passende (kalw) Form, um die geistige Wirklichkeit sinnlich
wahrnehmbar zu machen. Explizit geht Gregor auf die Nachahmung
der pnoiai Christi in der Lobrede auf seinen Bruder In Basilium
fratrem (381) ein, wenn er von dem Gedanken ( pnoia, 133,5)
spricht, der Wort und Tat verbindet:25 Das Wort als solches, sagt
er, das von der Tat getrennt ist, sei nichtig (mtaiow, 133,6) und
ohne sichere Grundlage (nupstatow, 133,7), also irreal. Hingegen
zeige die Natur der Werke in Verwirklichung und Wahrheit (n postsei ka lhye&, 133,7)26 sinnlich wahrnehmbar das geistliche und
gedankliche Konzept, das hinter dem gesprochenen Wort stehe, d.h.:
Die Werke oenbarten pstasiw und lyeia (Verwirklichung und
Wahrheit) der pnoiai. Deshalb sei Basilius als Vorbild in der
Nachfolge Christi hher geehrt durch Werke als durch die Lobrede.
Die Nachahmung seines Lebens sei wertvoller als dessen Erinnerung
in Worten.

aber alle die, die wir an Christus erkannt haben. Davon ahmen wir nach (mimomai),
was uns mglich ist, was unsere Natur davon nicht nachahmen kann, das verehren wir. Alle Namen also, die die Bezeichnung Christus nher ausdeuten, mssen
im Leben eines Christen aueuchten, entweder durch Nachahmung oder durch
Verehrung. Dazu meint Sieben, Zur Rezeption der Epinoiai-Lehre, 24: Es handelt sich um eine Neuinterpretation, insofern als die pnoiai nicht mehr einfach
als im Glauben geschenktes Heil, als Heilsgter in Christus konzipiert sind, wie das
bei Origenes der Fall war, sondern als durch Bemhung, durch willentliche, aszetische Bemhung anzueignende Tugenden und Haltungen.
23
Daher stellt Sieben, Zur Rezeption der Epinoiai-Lehre, 28, als Ergebnis fest:
Der Traktat De perfectione stellt ein wichtiges Zeugnis fr die Rezeption der origenischen Epinoiailehre dar, er dokumentiert sowohl die Kontinuitt mit dem genialen Alexandriner als auch die neuen Akzente, die die Kappadokischen Vter in
diese Lehre eintrugen. Sah Origenes das Heil noch in eben diesen vielen Namen
Christi geschenkt, so sind sie fr Gregor von Nyssa nicht nur Heilsgabe, sondern
auch ein aszetisches Programm, eben Tugenden, die nachzuahmen sind.
24
Vgl. Sanct. Pasch. (GNO IX 250,214).
25
Vgl. Bas. (GNO X/1 133,518).
26
Zur Bedeutung von pstasiw bei Gregor vgl. R. J. Kees, Die Lehre von der
Oikonomia Gottes in der Oratio catechetica Gregors von Nyssa, Leiden 1995, 93, bes. 94
Anm. 10.

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III. Der erkenntnistheoretische Hintergrund der Festtheologie
Gregors von Nyssa

In seinen Festtagsreden nimmt Gregor von Nyssa das allgemeine

erkenntnistheoretische Problem der Erkennbarkeit Gottes durch den
Menschen auf, wenn er in seiner Osterpredigt In sanctum Pascha sagt:27
Gott ist allmchtig (pantodnamow, 256,26), seine Schpfung das Bild
seiner unaussprechlichen Wirksamkeit, die bereits das menschliche
Denkvermgen zur Verzweiung bringt und somit zeigt, dass sich
der Mensch das Wesen Gottes nicht vorstellen kann. Der Mensch
knne zwar einzelne Wirkungen Gottes wahrnehmen, niemals aber
Gottes Wesen erfassen, er msse an Gottes Allmacht glauben. Damit
kann der Mensch nach Gregor von der Wirkung Gottes zwar auf
seine Allmacht schlieen, nicht aber sein Wesen erkennen. Nach
Gregor ist die Oenbarung Gottes in der Welt und die Erkennbarkeit
Gottes durch den Menschen immer eine Bewegung, die von Gott
aus zu den Menschen geht. Als Beweise der Allmacht Gottes, die
dann auch die zuknftige leibliche Auferstehung bewirken kann, nennt
Gregor neben der Schpfung bereits geschehene Totenauferweckungen,
wie die des Lazarus und vieler anderer.28 Schlielich habe Gott sogar
den Aposteln die Kraft verliehen, Tote aufzuerwecken.29 Daher werde
der Vernnftige nachvollziehen knnen, dass der Mensch, wie er
durch Teile der Schpfung auf den allmchtigen Schpfer schlieen
knne, so auch aufgrund der geschehenen Auferweckung des einzelnen, wie des Lazarus, an die zuknftige Auferstehung vieler glauben drfe.30

27

Vgl. Sanct. Pasch. (GNO IX 256,2326).

Vgl. Sanct. Pasch. (GNO IX 257,713); Joh 11,44.
29
Vgl. Sanct. Pasch. (GNO IX 257,1416).
30
Vgl. Sanct. Pasch. (GNO IX 258,215); zu Glaube und Gotteserkenntnis bei
Gregor von Nyssa vgl. I. Escribano-Alberca, Glaube und Gotteserkenntnis in der Schrift
und Patristik, Freiburg 1974, 91105 u. 111115, der 103 zum Paradox in Gregors
yevra sagt: Jedes Schauen des Gttlichen, sei es noch so erhaben und einem
eminent fortgeschrittenen Entwicklungsstadium angemessen, gipfelt in der Einsicht,
dass die eigentliche Schau eine erst zu gewhrende Gnade ist, deren Zustandekommen
sowohl die menschliche Begrenztheit als auch die gttliche Andersartigkeit hindernd
im Wege stehen. Zur Darstellung dieses nicht leicht erfabaren Sachverhaltes ist
Gregor als Stilmittel die Paradoxie mit ihren verneinend-bejahenden Imponderabilien ein willkommener Ausdruck: Einsicht in das Wesen Gottes ist Einsicht in
die Unerfabarkeit Gottes durch yevra; die eigentliche Erkenntnis steht in der
Einsicht, dass man von Gott keine Einsicht haben kann den n t m den.
28

epinoiai in den predigten gregors von nyssa

513

In seiner ersten Lobrede auf den Protomrtyrer Stephanus In sanctum Stephanum I beweist Gregor dann auf seiner erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlage den Wahrheitsgehalt der Trinittslehre mit dem
Bild der platonischen Ideenlehre:31 Die Sinneinheit des Bildes ( tw
eknow lgow, 93,16), sagt er, bleibe erhalten, wenn geglaubt wird,
dass dieselben Dinge, die im Bild vorgestellt und angeschaut werden, auch im Urbild (n t rxetp, 94,1) vorhanden sind. Denn
wie im Guten das Gute und im Licht das Licht sinnlich wahrgenommen wird, so werde in allen Dingen die ursprngliche Schnheit
(t prvttupon kllow, 94,2) durch das ihr Eigentmliche im Bilde
(n t ekni, 94,2) ausgeprgt. Im Bild drcke sich das Urbild sinnlich wahrnehmbar aus. Dieses philosophische Konzept bertrgt
Gregor auf die Trinittslehre und erklrt:32 Damit die Sinneinheit
des Bildes (tw eknow lgow, 94,5f ) nicht auseinanderfllt, drften die Eigentmlichkeiten des Bildes gegenber dem Urbild (n t
palljei tn divmtvn to rxetpou, 94,6) nicht verndert und
entfremdet werden. Deshalb werde im Sitzen des Sohnes welche
Vorstellung auch immer dieser Begri (t noma, 94,4) hervorrufe
auch das Sitzen des Vaters mit einbegrien, und im Stehen das
Stehen. Gregor spricht also von einem Aussagentausch der Eigentmlichkeiten zwischen Vater und Sohn, weil der Sohn dasselbe
Urbild oder Wesen (osa) habe wie der Vater. Die Eigentmlichkeit,
die entweder nur vom Vater oder nur vom Sohn ausgesagt wird, ist
fr Gregor als tertium comparationis immer von beiden anzunehmen.
Folglich symbolisiere das Stehen oder Sitzen des Vaters und des
Sohnes immer dieselbe gttliche Herrlichkeit,33 d.h.: Die Dinge oder
Vorstellungen (pnoiai), die ber den Sohn ausgesagt werden,
knnen nach Gregor auch ber den Vater ausgesagt werden und
umgekehrt.

31

Vgl. Steph. I (GNO X/1 93,1694,7).

Zur Bildtheologie im allgemeineren bei Gregor vgl. I. Escribano-Alberca, Glaube
und Gotteserkenntnis, 111115, der 111f zur erkenntnistheoretischen Bedeutung der
Bild-Theologie, dass Gott im Bild wirklich erkennbar ist, sagt: Als Verstndigungsmittel
mit der Philosophie ist Gregor der ekn-Begri willkommen. An einer beachtenswerten Stelle heit es, alle Philosophie komme berein in der Anerkennung, dass
alles eine Ursache und ein Prinzip hat. Das, fgt Gregor hinzu, kommt dem gleich,
was die Schrift behauptet (Gen 1,26): Der Mensch wurde geschaen nach dem Bilde
Gottes.
33
Vgl. Steph. I (GNO X/1 92,1094,6).
32

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IV. Schluss

Die Untersuchung der pnoiai in den Predigten Gregors von Nyssa

zeigt, dass die Rezeption der Epinoiailehre des Origenes hinter seiner Festtheologie steht.
Gregor gebraucht den Begri der pnoiai in seinen Festpredigten
jedoch anders als Origenes: nicht nur fr die biblischen Aspekte
Christi, sondern in einem umfassenderen erkenntnistheoretischen Sinn
fr den Gedanken oder Einfall. Die pnoiai sind Begrie, die
Gregor allgemein aus der Schpfung ableiten kann. Die pnoiai als
Weg des Menschen zu Gott bleiben aber auch fr Gregor geschichtliche Oenbarungsweisen Christi, d.h.: Christus vermittelt den
Menschen in vielen Einzelheiten die eine Wirklichkeit Gottes, die
teilweise erkannt, aber letztlich geglaubt werden muss. Diesen geschichtlich oenbarten pnoiai Christi soll der Mensch nachfolgen und sie
in seinem Leben nachahmen, um Christus nahe zu sein.
Damit nimmt Gregor in seinen Festtagsreden das allgemeine erkenntnistheoretische Problem der Erkennbarkeit Gottes durch den Menschen
auf. Im Anschluss an seinen Bruder und damit gegen Eunomius
betont er, dass die pnoiai immer nur die Wirkungen einer Sache,
aber niemals ihr Wesen benennen knnen. Die pnoiai sind Aspekte,
die letztlich auf einen menschlichen Denkakt zurckgehen, um einzelne geschichtliche Wirkungen Gottes in Jesus Christus zu benennen. ber die pnoiai Christi kann der Mensch zwar auf Gott-Vater
schlieen, aber niemals sein Wesen erkennen.
Trinitarisch gesprochen geben die pnoiai ein Bild davon, wie der
Vater und der Sohn sind, aber niemals was sie sind. ber den Sohn
bekommt der Mensch zwar ein Bild vom Vater. Der Sohn ist aber
zugleich auch mehr als dieses Bild, weil er vom Vater kommt und
dasselbe Wesen hat wie er, d.h.: Die Dinge oder Vorstellungen
(pnoiai), die ber den Sohn ausgesagt werden, knnen nach Gregor
auch ber den Vater ausgesagt werden und umgekehrt.
Die Festtagspredigten Gregors von Nyssa spiegeln die theologische
Diskussion seiner Zeit wider. Diesen Schluss legt bereits die gemeinsame Entstehungszeit der drei Bcher Contra Eunomium (380383) und
der Festtagspredigten (379386) nahe. Von daher ergnzen Gregors
Aussagen ber die pnoiai im Rahmen seiner Festtheologie das
grundlegende Verstndnis der pnoiai im Hinblick auf die Kontroverse um Eunomius.

ABBREVIATIONS

A. Periodicals and series

BGL
CAG
CCL
CPG
FC
GCS

Bibliothek der griechischen Literatur, Stuttgart

Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, Berlin
Corpus Christianorum. Series Latina, Turnhout
Clavis Patrum Graecorum, Turnhout
Fontes Christiani, Freiburg i.Br.
Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei
Jahrhunderte, Berlin
GNO Gregorii Nysseni Opera, Leiden
JThS Journal of Theological Studies, Oxford
PG
Patrologiae cursus completus. Accurante Jacques-Paul Migne.
Series Graeca, Paris
PGL
G. W. H. Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon, Oxford 1961
PL
Patrologiae cursus completus. Accurante Jacques-Paul Migne.
Series Latina, Paris
RAC
Reallexikon fr Antike und Christentum, Stuttgart
REG
Revue des tudes grecques, Paris
RHE
Revue dhistoire ecclsiastique, Louvain
SC
Sources chrtiennes, Paris
StPatr Studia patristica, Berlin u.a.
SVF
Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, Stuttgart
ThPh Theologie und Philosophie, Freiburg i.Br.
ThQ
Theologische Quartalschrift, Tbingen
TRE
Theologische Realenzyklopdie, Berlin
TU
Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen
Literatur, Berlin
VigChr Vigiliae Christianae, Amsterdam
ZKG
Zeitschrift fr Kirchengeschichte, Stuttgart

B. Others
ad loc.
Anm.

ad locum
Anmerkung

516
Bd.
bes.
bzw.
cf.
ders.
d.h.
Diss.
e.a.
e.g.
ebd.
ed.
d.
eds.
ds.
esp.
ET
f,
Fr.
FS
Hrsg.
ibid.
Lit.
LXX
MS
MSS
p.
par
s.
s.v.
tr.
u.a.
usw.
vgl.
z.B.

abbreviations
Band
besonders
beziehungsweise
confer
derselbe
das heit
Dissertation
et alii
exempli gratia, for instance
ebenda
editor
diteur
editors
diteurs
especially
English translation
folgender, folgende, following
Fragment
Festschrift
Herausgeber
ibidem
Literatur
Septuaginta
Manuscript
Manuscripts
page
parallel
siehe
sub voce
translated by
und andere, unter anderem
und so weiter
vergleiche
zum Beispiel

INDICES
(Ladislav Chvtal)

I. INDEX LOCORUM
I.1. BIBLIA
I.1.A. VETUS TESTAMENTUM
Genesis
1
1,1
1,320
1,3
1,45
1,4
1,5
1,8
1,10
1,1112
1,26
1,31
2,1920
3,8
8,21
11
11,18
12,8
15,6
18,27
21,36
25,26
28,12
28,13
28,19
38,29
49,9
50,11

47, 281, 286

46, 119
103
119
121
110, 253
119, 122, 250f
119, 251
119, 251
101
124, 513
269
150, 281, 286
155
110, 253
290
115
226
80
79
139
123
228
227
226
123
126
123

Exodus
2,110
3,2
3,14
12,37
13,21
14,212
14,15
15,18
16,16
33,19

123
136
240, 268, 418
159
136
118
118
163
112
154

Leviticus
2,45
23,13

112
112

Numeri
11,35
12,78
13,24
20,13

158
123
123
123

Deuteronomium
32,30

59

Iosue
5,3

123

Samuhel I
1,24
15,35
17,2351

112
155
59

Iob
9,9
14,1
26,7
32,14
38,3132
38,36

158
124
121
158
158
98, 370

Psalmi
8,3
15/16,2
15/16,4
18/19,23
18/19,4
21/22,2(LXX)
22/23,1
29,11/30,10
35,10/36,9
36/37,23
38,6/39,5
39/40,5
43,22/44,21
44,4
47,15(LXX Aq.)

110
92
159
107
107
191
136
110, 253
136
113
86, 111
77
191, 347
323
350

indices

518
48,14
54,23(LXX)
54,2(LXX)
54,3(LXX)
54/55,3
54,20/55,19
73/74,12
77/78,65
79,2/80,1
80,6/81,5
83/84
83/84,6
83,10/84,9
85/86,15
88,7/89,6
91,16/92,15
102/103,8
104/105,39
105/106,40
109/110,1
115,2
117/118,22
143/144,1
146/147,4
146/147,5

323
347
347
347
191
163
163, 323
155
136
116
228
79, 230
191, 347
131
80
131
91
136
154f
148
465
126, 136
61
155, 281, 286
86

Proverbia
8,22

35

Ecclesiastes
5,1/2

80, 83

I.1.B. NOVUM TESTAMENTUM

Canticum Canticorum
1,3

455
412

Sapientia Salomonis
1,15
3,4
4,1
7,2526
8,13
8,17
9,14
13
13,5
15,3

350
350
350
38
350
350
388
346
63, 92, 191, 346f
350

Sirach (Ecclesiasticus)
3,21
17,30
51,9

Matthaeus
3,10
3,17
5,4
7,35
11,5
11,16
13,21
13,2430
14,21
17,5
21,42
25,34
25,41
27,8
28,19

126, 136
114
xxi
129
85
77
136
183
159
114
126, 136
131f
131
123
492

81
350
350

Marcus
12,3537

148

Isaias
3,3

70

Lucas
1,2

82, 479

5,20
5,25
9,5/6
13,21
43,1
43,10
52,7
62,5
65,19

130
154
132
158
159
41
37
154
154

Baruch
3,38

480

Osee
4,16
13,78

126
126

Ionas
3,10

155

Zacharias
9,17

144, 312

Machabaeorum IV
7,3
14,5
14,6
16,13
18,23

350
350
350
350
350

indices
3,9
3,2337
3,38
7,22

126, 136
198, 405
405
85

Iohannes
1,1
1,18
1,9
4,22
4,24
5,23
6,3233
6,35
8,12
8,42
10,7
10,11
10,30
10,3738
11,25
11,44
12,28
12,2930
14,6
14,11
14,28
15,1
16,15
20,17
21,25

35, 46, 111

132
136
244, 256
492
63
137
125
125, 132
63
125
125
41, 254
70
180
512
114
114
125, 132
147
211
125
106, 254
487
29, 85

Acta Apostolorum
2,6
2,36
9,5
10,42

112, 116
491
136
132

Ad Romanos
1,20
3,25
4,23
6,10
8,24
8,26
9,5
11,1724

465
108
265
80
37
80
119
132
354

Ad Corinthios I
1,22
1,24
1,30
2,1011
2,10

37
132
37
106
147

519

3,8
4,1
8,1
910
11,1
11,3
12,11
15,45
15,5354

61
475, 481
80
250
480
60, 205
492f
159
350f

Ad Corinthios II
3,6
4,7
5,7
5,21
13,3

102
452
78
126, 154
480

Ad Galatas
3,13
4

126, 154
250

Ad Ephesios
5,3132
6,1617

159
61

Ad Philippenses
2,9
3,13

131, 347
232

Ad Colossenses
1,15
1,2429
1,25

38, 106, 265

475
475

Ad Timotheum I
1,7
2,4
6,16

78
114
193, 350

Ad Hebraeos
1,1
1,3
5,12
7,3
11
11,1
11,3
11,6
11,8
11,9
11,10
11,1316
11,27
12

82, 113, 479

38
117
162, 322
222, 225, 227, 233f
80
77, 221
82
79
227
218
227, 233
80
234

indices

520
Petri I
2,4

126

Apocalypsis
1,12
10,4

459
459

Antisthenes
Fragmenta (ed. F. D. Caizzi,
Milano 1966)
50C (Caizzi 42)

I.2. AUCTORES ANTIQUI

ET MEDII AEVI
Atius
Syntagmation
prop. 12
prop. 13
prop. 26

10
307
322
307

Alcinoos
Didaskalikos (ed. J. Whittaker,
Alcinoos, Enseignement des
doctrines de Platon, Paris
1990)
III (Whittaker 153,2630)
X (Whittaker 164,31166,2)
X (Whittaker 165,1634)
XXX (Whittaker 183,17)

347, 453
344
449
347
453

Alexander Aphrodisiensis
Commentaria in Aristotelis
Metaphysica (ed. M. Hayduck,
CAG I, Berlin 1891)
CAG I 52,1316
7
CAG I 55,2223
207
CAG I 229,31230,1
264
CAG I 247,1829
391
CAG I 327,2224
208
CAG I 483,2328
7
Ammianus Marcellinus
Historia (ed. J. Fontaine,
Ammien Marcellin. Histoire,
III, Paris 1996)
XXII 5,4 (Fontaine 99)
Ammonius Hermeiou
Commentarius in Aristotelis
De Interpretatione (ed.
A. Busse, CAG IV/5,
Berlin 1897)
CAG IV/5 22,910
CAG IV/5 22,1920
CAG IV/5 24,11

Commentarius in Porphyrii
Isagogen (ed. A. Busse,
CAG IV/3, Berlin 1891)
CAG IV/3 40,68
Anonymus
Contra Noetum

392

300
300
300

4
40

Aristophanes
(ed. V. Coulon M. van Daele,
Aristophane, IV, Paris
19231930, repr. 1967)
Aves
405
364
1073
364
Equites
90
539
1202
1322

364
364
364
364

Plutus
45

364

Thesmophoriazusae
766

364

Vespae
346

364

Aristoteles
Analytica priora
24b1820
41b3642a5

403
403
403

Analytica posteriora
71a1117
71b20
75a38

211
211
446
365

Categoriae
1a1
3b33
11b3512a2
12a220
13a3234

394
453
193, 310
352
353
342

indices
De anima
428a25
431a1617
De interpretatione
16a1.19
16a117a7
De memoria et reminiscentia
449b33450a1

363
363
280
300
363

VII 1,13,6 (CCL 50,

244254)
XV 7 (CCL 50a, 469470)
Pseudo-Augustinus
Pseudo-Augustini paraphrasis
Themistiana (ed.
L. Minio-Paluello,
Aristoteles Latinus I 15,
BrugesParis 1961)

521
49
314

390, 392,
394

Metaphysica
1019a24
1032a32
1050a30

207
440
440

2729 (Minio-Paluello
139,9140,6 [= PL 32,
1423])

Poetica
1449a33
1457a1018
1457b67

373
280
268

Basilius Caesariensis
Ad Adolescentes de legendis
libris gentilium (ed.
F. Boulenger, Paris 2002) 383
2,2021 (Boulenger 43)
383

Politica
1253a21

453

100a25
103b15
105a1314
105a13
141a28
141b

15,
403
403
369
242
369
369
369

Arius Didymus
Epitom

390

Pseudo-Athanasius
De sancta trinitate dialogus
(PG 28, 11161285)
1 (PG 28, 1144d1145a)

Topica

Oratio quarta contra Arianos

(PG 26, 12525; ed.
A. Stegmann, Die
pseudoathanasianische IVte
Rede gegen die Arianer,
Rottenburg-Tbingen
1917)
(Stegmann 2,2429)
I 5 (PG 26, 21a)
Augustinus Aurelius
De Trinitate (ed. W. J.
Mountain, CCL 50.50a,
Turhout 1968)

9
243

Adversus Eunomium
(ed. B. Sesboe,
SC 299.305, Paris
19821983; PG 29,
497669)

Adversus Eunomium I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

12 (SC 299, 140156)

1 (SC 299, 140146)
45 (SC 299, 162170)
4 (SC 299, 164)
4 (SC 299, 166)
58 (PG 29, 520c529c)
57 (SC 299, 180188)
56 (SC 299, 180188)
5 (SC 299, 168182)
5,1247,49 (SC 229,
180192)
5 (SC 299, 170)
5 (SC 299, 174)
5 (SC 299, 176)
5 (SC 299, 180)
5,4345 (SC 299,
172174)
5,4344 (SC 299,
172174)
5,6978 (SC 299,
174176)
5,132 (SC 299, 180)

395f

11, 28f,
31, 205,
211, 215,
257, 260,
265f, 276
21, 32,
349, 405
205
489
27
23
27
279
22
285
489
258
27
28
23
26
302
399
409
212

indices

522
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

5 (PG 29, 516b)

5 (PG 29, 517a)
5 (PG 29, 517bc)
5 (PG 29, 517c520a)
5 (PG 29, 520c521a)
5 (PG 29, 520c )
67 (SC 299, 182192)

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

67 (PG 29, 524cd)

6 (SC 299, 182188)
6 (SC 299, 182)
6 (SC 299, 184188)
6 (SC 299, 186187)
6 (SC 299, 186)
6,12 (SC 299, 182)
6,23 (SC 299, 182)
6,1929 (SC 299, 184)
6,2125 (SC 299, 184)
6,25 (SC 299, 184)
6,3435 (SC 299, 186)
6,4451 (SC 299, 186)
6,5154 (SC 299, 186)
6,5457 (SC 299,
186188)
6 (PG 29, 521ab)
6 (PG 29, 521c524a)
6 (PG 29, 524a)
6 (PG 29, 524bc)
6 (PG 29, 524b)

I
I
I
I
I

I 6 (PG 29, 524c)

I 7 (SC 299, 188192)
I 7 (SC 299, 188)
I 7,129 (SC 299,
188190)
I 7,46 (SC 299, 188)
I 7,56 (SC 299, 188)
I 7,7 (SC 299, 188)
I 7,10 (SC 299, 188)
I 7,1217 (SC 299,
188190)
I 7,1215 (SC 299,
18890)
I 7,2729 (SC 299,
188190)
I 7,3544 (SC 299, 192)
I 7 (SC 299, 192)
I 7 (PG 29, 524d525b)
I 7 (PG 29, 525bc)
I
I
I
I

7
7
8
8

(PG
(PG
(SC
(SC

29, 525b)
29, 525c)
299, 192198)
299, 194196)

315
317
315
315
456
70
13, 389,
395
125
249
283
288
30
30f
261
390
395
261
264
390
261, 395
14
395
316
456
316
138
2, 64, 138,
308, 452
111
248, 271,
490
30
395
270
262, 271
262
14
408
262
408
408
30
452
160, 173,
330
320
322
490
292

I 8 (PG 29, 528ab)

I 912 (SC 299, 198216)
I 9
I 9,45 (SC 299, 198)
I 9,614 (SC 299,
198200)
I 9,6 (SC 299, 198)
I 9 (SC 299, 200 )
I 9 (SC 299, 200)
I 9,811 (SC 299, 200)
I 9,2631 (SC 299,
200202)
I 9,2728 (SC 299, 200)
I 9,4046 (SC 299, 202)
I 9,4849 (SC 299, 202)
I 9,61 (SC 299, 200204)
I 10
I 10,148 (SC 299,
204206)
I 10,2122 (SC 299,
204206)
I 10,2844 (SC 299, 206)
I 10,4248 (SC 299,
206208)
I 10 (PG 29, 533c)
I 11 (SC 299, 208)
I 1213 (SC 299,
214218)
I 12 (SC 299, 212216)
I 12,9 (SC 299, 212)
I 12,3048, (SC 299,
214216)
I 13,3614,3 (SC 299,
218220)
I 13,42 (SC 299, 220)
I 14 (SC 299, 224)
I 14,12 (SC 299, 220)
I 15 (SC 299, 226)
I 15,1237 (SC 299,
224226)
I 15,1219 (SC 299,
224226)
I 15,2228 (SC 299, 226)
I 15,2526 (SC 299, 226)
I 15 (PG 29, 545b548a)
I 15 (PG 29, 545b)
I 19 (SC 299, 238242)
I 19 (SC 299, 242)
I 20 (SC 299, 244246)
I 20,3441 (SC 299, 246)
I 22 (SC 299, 250252)
I 23 (SC 299, 252256)
I 24 (PG 29, 565a)
I 25 (SC 299, 260262)
I 26 (SC 299, 264266)

279
490
349
341
342
248
28
302
342
348
349, 351
348
349
351
349
406
351
346
352
326, 453
30
301
26
389
263
352
352
211
406
32
405
356
356
405
198
322
490
49
27
352
23
491
456
491
491

indices
Adversus Eunomium II
II 34 (SC 305, 18)
II 3 (SC 305, 1618)
II 4 (SC 305, 1823)
II 4 (SC 305, 1822)
II 4 (SC 305, 20)
II 8 (SC 305, 3034)
II 9 (SC 305, 3638)
II 9 (SC 305, 36)
II 9 (SC 305, 38)
II 12 (SC 305, 4446)
II 18 (SC 305, 70 )
II 28 (SC 305, 118)
II 28 (SC 305, 120)
II 28 (SC 305, 118122)
II 32 (SC 305, 132136)
II 32,1827 (SC 305, 134)
II 32 (PG 29, 648b)
II 34 (SC 305, 140142)

23
491
31
285
32
491
285
23
24
91
27
28
24
49
492
492
456
492

Adversus Eunomium III

III 23 (SC 305, 150153)
III 4 (SC 305, 156162)
III 5 (SC 305, 162164)

32
492
492
492

De judicio Dei (PG 31,

653676)
1 (PG 31, 653ab)
De spiritu sancto (ed. B. Pruche,
SC 17bis, Paris 1968 =
H. J. Sieben, FC 12,
Freiburg i.Br.Basel)
17,41,1721 (SC 17bis, 394)
24 (FC 12, 142144)
40 (FC 12, 194198)
60 (FC 12, 256258)
63 (FC 12, 266268)
Epistulae (ed. Y. Courtonne,
IIII, Paris 19571966)
8,8,6 (Courtonne I 32)
210,34 (Courtonne II
191194)
210,5 (Courtonne II 195196)
210,5,911 (Courtonne II 195)
234 (Courtonne III 4144)
234,1 (Courtonne III 41)

489

258
254
254
254
254

14
31
49
9
256
243

Homilia in illud, Attende tibi

ipsi (PG 31, 197217)
1 (PG 31, 197cd)

467

In Hexaemeron (PG 29, 4208)

PG 29, 28ab

446

523

Basilius Caesariensis vel

Gregorius Nyssenus
Epistulae (ed. Y. Courtonne,
IIII, Paris 19571966)
38,45 (Courtonne I 8489) 28
38,5 (Courtonne I 8487)
49
Pseudo-Basilius
Adversus Eunomium IVV
(PG 29, 672773)
V (PG 29, 748c761b)

215
457

Bothius
Commentarius in librum
Aristotelis De interpretatione
(ed. C. Meiser, editio II,
vol. II, Leipzig 1880)
I 1 (Meiser II 43)

300

Clemens Alexandrinus
Stromata (ed. O. Sthlin
L. Frchtel, GCS 15.17.76,
Berlin 1960.1970.1985)
I 71 (GCS 76, 4546)
I 74,180,6 (GCS 15,
47,2052,23)
I 143,67 (GCS 15, 89)
VIII 8,24,8 (GCS 17, 95)

392
297
453

Cicero
Academica

390, 392

377

Tusculanae disputationes
(ed. M. Pohlenz, Leipzig
1918, repr. Stuttgart 1982)
I 2527, 6267
(Pohlenz 248251)
393
Cyrillus Alexandrinus
Thesaurus de sancta consubstantiali
trinitate (PG 75, 24656)
PG 75, 141c
9
David Neoplatonicus
Commentarius in Porphyrii
Isagogen (ed. A. Busse,
CAG XVIII/2, Berlin
1904)
CAG XVIII/2 119,1724
CAG XVIII/2 189,611

8
8

Demosthenes
(ed. W. Dindorf, Demosthenis
Orationes, Leipzig 1850)
XVIII 262 (Dindorf I 324)

60

indices

524
Dexippus
Commentarium in Aristotelis
Categorias (ed. A. Busse,
CAG IV/2, Berlin 1888)
CAG IV/2 44
Didymus Caecus
Commentarius in Psalmos
(ed. M. Gronewald,
Didymos der Blinde,
Psalmenkommentar, II:
Kommentar zu Psalm
2226,10, Bonn 1968)
109,1620 (Gronewald
II 230232)
Diogenes Laertius
Vitae philosophorum
(ed. M. Marcovich, I,
Stuttgart-Leipzig 1999)
prologus 1 (Marcovich I 5)
VII 52 (SVF II 87)
VII 5253 (Marcovich I
475476)
VII 58 (Marcovich 479)
X 33 (Arrighetti 33)
Dionysius Alexandrinus
Apud Eusebium
Caesariensem, Praeparatio
evangelica VII 18,13
(GCS 43/1, 401,25)
Dionysius Areopagita
De divinis nominibus
(ed. B. R. Suchla,
BerlinNew York 1980)
I 1 (PG 3, 588a = Suchla
108,35)
I 1 (PG 3, 588b = Suchla
109,16)
XIII 3 (PG 3, 981b =
Suchla 230,12)

209

377
5
391
280
303

5
152, 302
363
364
303

Fragmenta (ed. H. Usener,

Epicurea, Leipzig 1887,
repr. Stuttgart 1966)
Fr. 36 (Usener 105106)

12, 241

Ratae sententiae
XXIV 3 (Arrighetti 129)

363

Vita Epicuri (ed. A. Laks, in:

J. Bollack A. Laks, eds.,
tudes sur lEpicurisme
antique, I, Lille 1976)
Laks 30,2
5
Eunomius
Apologia (ed. R. Vaggione,
Eunomius, The Extant
Works, Oxford 1987; ed.
B. Sesbo, SC 305,
Paris 1983)

389, 394

366
422
418
415

De mystica theologia
(eds. G. Heil A. M. Ritter,
BerlinNew York 1991)
V (PG 3, 1048b = Ritter
150,79)
421
Epicurus
De natura
XXVIII

Epistula ad Herodotum
(ed. G. Arrighetti, Epicuro,
Opere, Torino 1973)
40 (Arrighetti 39)
4344 (Arrighetti 4143)
51,57 (Arrighetti 47)
75,10 (Arrighetti 67)
7576 (Arrighetti 67)

304

16 (SC 305, 234244)

68 (SC 305, 242250)
711 (SC 305, 244256)
78 (Vaggione 4042)
7 (Vaggione 40)
7 (SC 305, 244246)
7 (SC 305, 244)
7,1114 (SC 305, 246)
8 (Vaggione 4042)
8 (Vaggione 40,1642,1)
8 (Vaggione 42)
8 (Vaggione 42,17)
8 (SC 305, 250)
8,16 (SC 305, 246248)
8,4 (SC 305, 248)
8,910 (SC 305, 248)

11,
210212,
215, 255,
258, 261,
267, 297,
387389,
394, 456,
486, 489
27
26
23
205f
206
486
27
489
208, 284,
316, 388
258
209, 283
258
30
26
11
341

indices
8,1718 (Vaggione 42)
9 (Vaggione 44)
9,3 (Vaggione 42)
10,4 (SC 305, 252)
11,113.1719 (SC 305,
254256)
11,79 (Vaggione 46)
12,9 (Vaggione 48)
12,1112 (Vaggione 48)
13,34 (Vaggione 48)
14 (Vaggione 50)
16,117,17 (Vaggione
5254)
16 (Vaggione 52)
18 (Vaggione 5456)
18 (SC 305, 268270)
18,6 (Vaggione 54)
18 (Vaggione 56)
18,1316 (Vaggione 56)
18,19 (Vaggione 56)
19 (Vaggione 5658)
19,12 (Vaggione 58)
19,1618 (Vaggione 58)
20 (Vaggione 58)
20 (SC 305, 274276)
20,122 (Vaggione
5860)
20,17 (Vaggione 60)
20,22 (Vaggione 60)
21 (SC 305, 276278)
2224 (SC 305,
278284)
22 (Vaggione 62)
22,516 (Vaggione 62)
22,9 (Vaggione 62)
23 (Vaggione 6264)
23,20 (Vaggione 64)
24,1 (Vaggione 64)
24,12 (Vaggione 64)
24,613 (Vaggione 64)
24,1822 (Vaggione 66)
25,126 (Vaggione
6668)
25 (SC 305, 284286)
26 (SC 305, 288290)
26,112 (Vaggione
6870)
26,37 (Vaggione 68)
26,4 (Vaggione 68)
26,2426 (SC 305, 290)
27 (SC 305,290294)
28,126 (Vaggione 74)
Apologia apologiae

406
297
389
352
23
389
12
211
388
327
297, 457
438
283, 394
26, 487
457
297
457
457
310, 313
457
259, 406
292
487
456
434
457
487
487
434
456
434
292, 434
437
456
436
436
438
456
488
488
434
389
457
492
27, 488
457
11, 29f,
212, 270,

Expositio dei
3,23 (Vaggione 152)
3,4 (Vaggione 152)

525
340f, 348,
391, 394,
433f, 485
11, 435
435
435

Euripides
Fragmenta Phaethontis (ed.
J. Diggle, Euripides. Phaethon.
Cambridge 1970)
408
364
Medea (ed. J. Diggle,
Euripidis fabulae, I,
Oxford 1984)
760

364

Eusebius Caesariensis
De ecclesiastica theologia
(PG 24, 825c1045d)
I 8 (PG 24, 837ad)
I 1920 (PG 24,
864c896c)

41

Praeparatio evangelica (eds.

K. Mras . des Places,
GCS 43/1, Berlin
1982; PG 21, 241408)
VII 19,3 (GCS 43/1,
401,1213)
XIII 17 (PG 21, 700701)

389
368

Gregorius Nazianzenus
Orationes (ed. P. Gallay,
J. Mossay, SC 250.270,
Paris 19781980; ed.
A. J. Mason, Five orations
of Gregory of Nazianzus,
Cambridge 1899; PG 36,
12621)
18,10 (PG 36, 37d = SC
250, 120)
20,11 (PG 35,
1077c1080a)
23,12,12 (SC 270, 304)
27,10,69 (SC 250, 9496)
28,4 (Mason 26,12)
28,9 (PG 36, 37ab =
SC 250, 118120)
28,2226 (Mason
54,863,8)
28,2831 (Mason
64,1572,2)
30,17 (PG 36, 125c)

41

254, 475
420
446
399
251
453
419
446
446
467

indices

526
30,20,7 (SC 250, 266)
37,4 (PG 36, 285cd)
37,4 (PG 36, 285d)

254
466
465

Gregorius Palamas
Capita CL
(ed. R. E. Sinkewicz,
The One Hundred and Fifty
Chapters, Toronto 1988)
112 (Sinkewicz 210212)

442

Gregorius Nyssenus
Ad Ablabium (ed. F. Mller,
GNO III/1, Leiden 1958)
GNO III/1 42,1344,16
GNO III/1 42,2143,2
GNO III/1 43,1416
GNO III/1 44,716
GNO III/1 44,79
GNO III/1 4748
GNO III/1 4849
GNO III/1 48,2049,7
GNO III/1 52,1553,3
GNO III/1 56

275, 276
276
413
418
276
412
442
482
457
420
315

Ad Eustathium (ed. F. Mller,

GNO III/1, Leiden 1958)
GNO III/1 11,3
457
GNO III/1 13,2115,3
457
Adversos eos qui baptismum
dierunt (ed. H. Polack,
GNO X/2, Leiden 1996)
GNO X/2 357370

506

Adversus Apolinarium
(ed. F. Mueller, GNO
III/1, Leiden 1958)
5 (GNO III/1, 136,2730)

507
314

Adversus Macedonianos
(PG 45, 13011333)
5 (PG 45, 1305d)

314

Apologia in Hexaemeron
(PG 44, 61121)
PG 44, 6162
PG 44, 68d

109
475
441

Contra Eunomium
Contra Eunomium I
(ed. W. Jaeger, GNO I,
Leiden 1960)

11, 19,
476, 507,
514
22, 53

46 (GNO I 37,20)
50 (GNO I 39,17)
55 (GNO I 41,4)
61 (GNO I 43,6)
6571 (GNO I 44,1547,2)
65 (GNO I 44,1545,1)
81 (GNO I 50,1415)
88 (GNO I 52)
126 (GNO I 65,6)
144 (GNO I 70,11)
151154 (GNO I 7173)
151153 (GNO I 7172)
151152 (GNO I 71 )
151152 (GNO I 72,89)
151152 (GNO I 72,16)
152153 (GNO I 72)
162 (GNO I 75)
166 (GNO I 76)
169 (GNO I 77)
180182 (GNO I 7980)
205211 (GNO I 86,1788,17)
205209 (GNO I 8688)
205 (GNO I 86,17)
207 (GNO I 87)
211 (GNO I 88)
213 (GNO I 88,2328)
224 (GNO I 92)
231 (GNO I 94)
246249 (GNO I 98,2799,24)
270316 (GNO I 105121)
279 (GNO I 108)
282 (GNO I 109)
308316 (GNO I 118,19121,3)
345346 (GNO I 129,1113)
371 (GNO I 136,1417)
498503 (GNO I 170172)
535 (GNO I 181,1617)
546 (GNO I 184)
549611 (GNO I 386404)
557580 (GNO I 187193)
560 (GNO I 188,13)
560 (GNO I 188,15)
569 (GNO I 190,21)
575576 (GNO I 394)
588 (GNO I 196,410)
599 (GNO I 199,1)
601 (GNO I 199,13)
622 (GNO I 205,1925)
643 (GNO I 211,16)
653 (GNO I 214,11)
655 (GNO I 214,2223)
666684 (GNO I 217223)
672 (GNO I 219220)
675 (GNO I 220)
683 (GNO I 222,1825)

400
180
400
252
342
187
252
248
252
252
310
433
47
434
434
434
310
435
310
310
456
438
456
436
439
470
254
314
456
431
254
28
456
420
447
254
252
480
317
322
14
14
414
317
414
14
252
470
14
252
252
331
331
221
411

indices
Contra Eunomium II
(ed. W. Jaeger, GNO I,
Leiden 1960)

3 (GNO I 226,1821)
56 (GNO I
227,13228,5)
5 (GNO I 227,2226)
6 (GNO I 227,27228,5)
8 (GNO I 228,1224)
9 (GNO I 229,29)
1011 (GNO I
229,18230,14)
10 (GNO I 229)
11 (GNO I 229,29 )
11 (GNO I 229230)
11 (GNO I 229 )
1223 (GNO I 230233)
1222 (GNO I
230,15233,10)
12 (GNO I 230)
12 (GNO I 230,1921)
12 (GNO I 230,2226)
13 (GNO I 230)
13 (GNO I 230,2630)
13 (GNO I 230,26)
1517 (GNO I
231,8232,1)
1516 (GNO I
231,1921)
15 (GNO I 231,1114)
1617 (GNO I
231,27232,1)
1819 (GNO I 232,119)
18 (GNO I 232)
18 (GNO I 232,12)
21 (GNO I 232)
21 (GNO I 232,26233,1)
21 (GNO I 232,2930)
2241 (GNO I
233,8238,8)
22 (GNO I 233)
23 (GNO I 233)
23 (GNO I 233,1117)
23 (GNO I 233,1517)
2425 (GNO I
233,17234,3)
2425 (GNO I 233)
2425 (GNO I 233,2229)

21f, 24,
29f, 32,
47, 261,
364, 377f,
387, 399f,
469, 473
205
205
206
205
205
206
30, 206
475
12
27
27
23
210
25
210
210
24
210
447
211
427
426

24 (GNO I 233,1722)
25 (GNO I 233234)
26 (GNO I 234,34)
2627 (GNO I 234,318)
2829 (GNO I
234,19235,8)
2829 (GNO I 234,1923)
28 (GNO I 234)
2930 (GNO I 234235)
29 (GNO I 234235)
29 (GNO I
234,2324.2629)
29 (GNO I 234,30235,3)
30 (GNO I 235,818)
30 (GNO I 235,1617)
3133 (GNO I
235,18236,14)
31 (GNO I 235)
33 (GNO I 236)
34 (GNO I 236,1720)
3541 (GNO I
236,21238,8)
35 (GNO I 236,2125)
36 (GNO I 236,25237,4)
36 (GNO I 236,2528)
3739 (GNO I 237,427)
37 (GNO I 237)
3839 (GNO I 237,1924)
39140 (GNO I
265,28266,3)
40 (GNO I 237)
41 (GNO I 238,38)
4250 (GNO I
238,12240,20)
42 (GNO I 238)

211
211
322
427
23, 477
211, 426
406
406
311
311
212, 406
406
212
322
427

42 (GNO I 238,1215)
43 (GNO I 237238)
44 (GNO I 238239)
44 (GNO I 238,2629)
44 (GNO I 238,26)
4549 (GNO I 239240)
49 (GNO I 240)
49 (GNO I 240,4)
5066 (GNO I 240245)
5060 (GNO I 240243)
5051 (GNO I
240,10241,3)
5159 (GNO I 240243)
51 (GNO I 240,2526)
52 (GNO I 241,313)
52 (GNO I 241,79)

527
13
311
213
213, 312
213
427
322
312
311
427
428
213, 311
427
214
311
312
427
214
214, 322
214, 318
427
214, 312
322
427
422
318
427
24, 26,
214
311, 312,
476
427
318
316
284
11
26
27
385
476
23
215
312
427
214
426

indices

528
52 (GNO I 241,1113)
53 (GNO I 241,1719)
5455 (GNO I 241,1924)
54 (GNO I 241,1924)
56 (GNO I 242)
57 (GNO I 242,1424)
58 (GNO I 242,2627)
59 (GNO I 243,413)
60 (GNO I 243,1820)
61
62
62 (GNO I 244,12)
6383 (GNO I 244251)
63 (GNO I 244,1018)
63 (GNO I 244,1315)
6566 (GNO I 244245)
65 (GNO I 244)
65 (GNO I 245,45)
66 (GNO I 245)
66 (GNO I 245,6)
67358 (GNO I 245331)
67129 (GNO I
245,19263,20)
67170
67124
6770 (GNO I
245,18247,4)
67 (GNO I 245)
6869
6970
69 (GNO I 246,14)
7181 (GNO I
247,4250,28)
7178 (GNO I
236,14239,1)
71
71 (GNO I 248,2)
71 (GNO I 247248)
78 (GNO I 250,1)
7981
79 (GNO I 250,310)
79 (GNO I 250,36)
8283
82 (GNO I 250260)
82 (GNO I 250,28)
8496 (GNO I 251254)
8489
84
84 (GNO I 251,19)
8592 (GNO I
251,22254,3)

215
215
426
23, 215
313
215
427
215
426
219, 221
219
406
25
215
429
30
28
426
24, 26,
30
252
307
389
217, 219,
221, 225
224
447
221f, 496
221
221, 224
447
446
221, 406
224
407
25
447
221
301
379
222
220, 224,
236, 476
448
25, 29,
236
222
219
448
448

85
89
89 (GNO I 253,512)
9094
91 (GNO I 253,23)
91 (GNO I 253,2528)
9399 (GNO I 254,330)
93 (GNO I 254)
93 (GNO I 254,510)
94105 (GNO I 254257)
94 (GNO I 281,810)
9596
96
96105
97105 (GNO I 255257)
97101 (GNO I
255,1256,15)
97
97 (GNO I 225,18)
98 (GNO I 255)
99100
100 (GNO I 255266)
100 (GNO I 255,2425)
101 (GNO I 256)
103 (GNO I 256,25)
104105 (GNO I
257,221)
104105
105 (GNO I 257,21)
106124
106120 (GNO I 257261)
106118 (GNO I
257,26260,25)
106 (GNO I 257,26258,1)
119124 (GNO I 260262)
119 (GNO I 260261)
122124
125195 (GNO I 262281)
125170
125 (GNO I 262)
125 (GNO I 262,2124)
125 (GNO I 262,2728)
130147 (GNO I 263268)
130136 (GNO I 263265)
130 (GNO I 263)
130 (GNO I 263,2126)
131 (GNO I 263,2728)
131 (GNO I 263,2829)

218
224, 226,
228, 230,
236
407
222
447
447
448
25
447
24
374
222
223
220
25, 223,
476
458
223
465
27, 224
223
224, 236,
477
447
220, 223,
479
446
454
223
458
223
27
301
469
24
29
224
25
224, 225
23f, 26,
30, 220,
224
394
394
320, 454
476, 498
30, 224
453
407
407

indices
131 (GNO I 263,29)
133 (GNO I 264)
134 (GNO I 264 )
135 (GNO I 264,23)
136137 (GNO I 265)
136 (GNO I 265)
136 (GNO I 265,6)
136 (GNO I 265,710)
137141 (GNO I 265266)
137 (GNO I 265,1621)
137 (GNO I 265,1921)
138141 (GNO I
265,26266,26)
138139 (GNO I
265,28266,3)
138 (GNO I 265,29266,3)
139
139 (GNO I 266,36)
140
141 (GNO I 266)
141 (GNO I 266,16)
141 (GNO I 266,25)
142158
145 (GNO I 267)
145 (GNO I 267,2126)
145 (GNO I 267,2628)
146147 (GNO I 267268)
148158 (GNO I 268271)
148150 (GNO I 268269)
148 (GNO I 268,19)
149 GNO I 268,2530)
150 (GNO I 269,1114)
150 (GNO I 269,13)
154158 (GNO I 270271)
154 (GNO I 270)
154 (GNO I 270,89)
158 (GNO I 270271)
158 (GNO I 271)
158 (GNO I 270,31271,1)
159 (GNO I 271)
160 (GNO I 271)
161163 (GNO I 271272)
161 (GNO I 271272)
167 (GNO I 273,2526)
168 (GNO I 273274)
171172 (GNO I 274275)
172173 (GNO I 275)
172173 (GNO I 275,78)
172 (GNO I 275,57)
173174 (GNO I
275,1718)
173 (GNO I 275)
173 (GNO I 275,814)
173 (GNO I 275,1314)

141
25
326
407
322
25, 477
407
451, 467
25
407
3, 414
450
421
450
224
450
224
22, 30,
224
252
457
224
325
407
407
322
24, 456
476
290
292
290
379
477
308
347
322
22
379
316
25, 239
258
322
379
500
239
240
365
365
365
239
365
365

173 (GNO I 275,1415)

174177 (GNO I 275276)
174 (GNO I 275)
174 (GNO I 275,20)
174 (GNO I 275,21)
174 (GNO I 275,2324)
175 (GNO I 275276)
175 (GNO I 275,2829)
175 (GNO I 275,29)
176 (GNO I 276)
176 (GNO I 276,45)
177293 (GNO I 276313)
177 (GNO I 276)

529
365
28
25
366
366
379
240, 322
366
366
240
365
148
23, 23,
240, 498
427
366, 366
366
366

177 (GNO I 339,37)

177 (GNO I 276,78)
177 (GNO I 276,9)
177 (GNO I 276,911)
179180 (GNO I
276,20277,7)
283
179180 (GNO I
276,22277,7)
391
179 (GNO I 276,2230)
283
179 (GNO I 276)
22
179 (GNO I 276,22 )
12
179 (GNO I 276,2122)
367
179 (GNO I 276,2229)
367
180191 (GNO I
276,29280,21)
393
180181 (GNO I 277,719) 368
180 (GNO I 276277)
26
180 (GNO I 276,29277,7) 367
181195 (GNO I 277,721) 446
181183 (GNO I
277,7278,4)
393
181182 (GNO I 277)
495
181182 (GNO I 277,726) 288
182183 (GNO I
277,16278,4)
463, 470
182 (GNO I 277)
22, 24,
241, 252
182 (GNO I 277,1920)
368
182 (GNO I 277,2026)
392, 446
182 (GNO I 277,20)
368
182 (GNO I 277,2123)
368
182 (GNO I 277,21)
15, 249
182 (GNO I 277,2326)
369
183186 (GNO I 277278) 474
183 (GNO I 277,2526)
369
183 (GNO I 277,2829)
369
183 (GNO I 277,2930)
369
183 (GNO I 277,30)
16
183 (GNO I 277,31)
369
183 (GNO I 277,32278,4) 464
183 (GNO I 277,32278,3) 370

indices

530
184 (GNO I 278,47)
184 (GNO I 278,79)
184 (GNO I 278,912)
184 (GNO I 278,1213)
185192 (GNO I 278280)
185 (GNO I 278)
185 (GNO I 278,1314)
185 (GNO I 278,1414)
185 (GNO I 278,1516)
185 (GNO I 278,16)
185 (GNO I 278,1718)
185 (GNO I 278,19)
186 (GNO I 278)
186 (GNO I 278,2023)
186 (GNO I 278,2326)
187 (GNO I 278)
187 (GNO I 278,2728)
187 (GNO I 278,29279,1)
187188 (GNO I 279,411)
189195a (GNO I
279281)
189 (GNO I 279)
189 (GNO I 279,1516)
189 (GNO I 279,1619)
189 (GNO I 279,2123)
190 (GNO I 279)
190 (GNO I 279,2325)
190 (GNO I 279,23280,6)
190 (GNO I 279,26280,4)
191 (GNO I 280,46)
191 (GNO I 280,616)
191 (GNO I 280,1621)
192194 (GNO I
280,22281,21)
192 (GNO I 280281)
192 (GNO I 280)
192 (GNO I 280,2325)
192 (GNO I 280,2429)
192 (GNO I 280,2829)
194 (GNO I 281)
194 (GNO I 281,1112)
194 (GNO I 281,1517)
195204 (GNO I 281284)
195293 (GNO I 281313)
195 (GNO I 281)
195 (GNO I 281,1721)
196 (GNO I 281,2526)
195 (GNO I 282)
196 (GNO I 282)
196 (GNO I 282,37)
197 (GNO I 282)
197 (GNO I 282,19)
198205 (GNO I 282285)
198204 (GNO I 282284)

370
370
371
371
16
252
371
380
371
371
371
371
495
371
372
495
372
372
373
148
495
373
373
373
373
373
380
373
373
373
373
454
322
24
373
427
373
24
374
374
26
247
30, 252
374
374
26
248, 252
248
30, 252
251
47
247

198203 (GNO I 282284)

199 (GNO I 283)
200202 (GNO I 283284)
200 (GNO I 283,1314)
204205 (GNO I 284285)
205214 (GNO I 284288)
207 (GNO I 285)
207 (GNO I 285,1319)
207 (GNO I 285,18f )
208214 (GNO I 285288)
209 (GNO I 285286)
211212 (GNO I 286287)
212218 (GNO I
287,6289,10)
213 (GNO I 287)
214218 (GNO I 287 )
214 (GNO I 287288)
214 (GNO I 287,26288,3)
214 (GNO I 288,13)
215221 (GNO I 288290)
215216 (GNO I 288)
215 (GNO I 288,46)
216 (GNO I 288)
216 (GNO I 288,1921)
219225 (GNO I 289 )
222226 (GNO I 290292)
222 (GNO I 290)
223 (GNO I 290,1622)
224225 (GNO I
290,25291,23)
225 (GNO I 291)
226 (GNO I 291)
226 (GNO I 291292)
227238 (GNO I 292296)
228 (GNO I 292)
229 (GNO I 292293)
230 (GNO I 293,16)
232 (GNO I 293)
233 (GNO I 293294)
235237 (GNO I 294295)
235 (GNO I 294,2124)
236237 (GNO I 295,713)
236 (GNO I 295)
236 (GNO I 295,34)
237 (GNO I 295)
237 (GNO I 295,27)
238240 (GNO I
295,27296,24)
239250 (GNO I 296299)
242 (GNO I 297)
243 (GNO I 297)
246293 (GNO I 298313)
246292 (GNO I
298,17312,25)

16
253, 255
253
380
477
247
253
289
17
17
316
481
289
253
482
253
469
428
247
428
428
254
254
482f
247
252
380
458
254
29
47
247
252, 254
254
380
482
253
477
414
428
251
380
255
18
457
247
308
252
26, 47
394

indices
246 (GNO I 298)
246 (GNO I 298,10 )
246 (GNO I 298,15)
246 (GNO I 298,17)
250 (GNO I 299)
250 (GNO I 299,16)
251254 (GNO I 299300)
251 (GNO I 299,21)
252254 (GNO I
299,28300,26)
254 (GNO I 300,1518)
255 (GNO I 300)
259261 (GNO I 302)
259 (GNO I 302)
261 (GNO I 302)
262 (GNO I 303,16)
263281 (GNO I
303,7309,15)
265267 (GNO I 303304)
266268 (GNO I
304,12305,4)
268 (GNO I 304,25)
269281 (GNO I 305309)
269275 (GNO I 305307)
269 (GNO I 305)
269 (GNO I 305,1315)
270 (GNO I 305)
270 (GNO I 305,2326)
270 (GNO I 305,24)
271276 (GNO I
305,27307,21)
271 (GNO I 305306)
274275 (GNO I
306,25307,16)
274 (GNO I 307,14)
275 (GNO I 307,1516)
276281 (GNO I 307309)
278 (GNO I 308)
280 (GNO I 308)
281283 (GNO I
309,14310,1)
281 (GNO I 309)
281288 (GNO I 309 )
281 (GNO I 309,13 )
282293 (GNO I 309313)
283284 (GNO I
309,23310,11)
283 (GNO I 310)
284 (GNO I 310,25)
285288 (GNO I
310,11311,17)
290 (GNO I 311312)
290 (GNO I 312,5)
293358 (GNO I 312331)

254f
18
251
19
253, 255
251
254
301
291
301
29
482
480
247
281
286
483
289
458
29
247
247, 251
281
25, 254
290
251
452
25
290
380
290
247
254
251
468
251, 254
26
18
247
453
255
301
294
254f
251
27

294332 (GNO I 313323)

294298 (GNO I 313314)
294 (GNO I 313)
295 (GNO I 313,16)
298299 (GNO I 314)
298299 (GNO I 314,820)
298299 (GNO I
314,1419)
298 (GNO I 314)
300301 (GNO I
314,22315,5)
300 (GNO I 314,22)
302 (GNO I 315,1013)
302 (GNO I 315,1113)
304305 (GNO I 315,27 )
304 (GNO I 315)
304 (GNO I 315,1923)
305 (GNO I 316,23)
306312 (GNO I
316,6317,24)
306 (GNO I 316,611)
310 (GNO I 317)
310 (GNO I 317)
310 (GNO I 317,47)
315 (GNO I 318,1015)
317 (GNO I 318,30319,1)
319 (GNO I 319)
321 (GNO I 319,28320,6)
326 (GNO I 321)
327 (GNO I 320,189)
328 (GNO I 321,28322,1)
331332 (GNO I 322323)
331332 (GNO I 323,215)
331 (GNO I 322,2123)
334335 (GNO I
323,2326, 324,15)
334 (GNO I 323324)
334 (GNO I 323,29)
336339 (GNO I 324325)
343349 (GNO I 326 )
343358 (GNO I 326331)
344 (GNO I 326)
345346 (GNO I 326327)
345 (GNO I 326)
345 (GNO I 326,25)
347350 (GNO I 327328)
347 (GNO I 327)
350 (GNO I 328)
350358 (GNO I 328331)
350370 (GNO I 331334)
351 (GNO I 328329)
351 (GNO I 328,2125)
352 (GNO I 328329)

531
26
312
30, 253
267
24
456
272
271
454
452
272
413
19
24, 308
272
267
457
268
26
27
268
269, 381
269
27
269
476
273
274
312
430
381
269
26, 28,
28
19
26
31
26
22, 30
308
31
252
26
22
22
26, 31
26
30
270
31

indices

532
353356 (GNO I 329330)
353354 (GNO I
329,812.1723)
353 (GNO I 329)
354 (GNO I 329)
354 (GNO I 329,2022)
356 (GNO I 330)
359378 (GNO I 331337)
359365 (GNO I 331 )
362 (GNO I 332)
363 (GNO I 332)
364365 (GNO I 332333)
365 (GNO I 333)
366386 (GNO I
333,11339,7)
366 (GNO I 333)
367 (GNO I 333)
368377 (GNO I 333336)
368370 (GNO I 333334)
369 (GNO I 334,78)
371378 (GNO I 334337)
371 (GNO I 334)
371 (GNO I 334,2324)
372373 (GNO I 334335)
374 (GNO I 335336)
375 (GNO I 336)
376 (GNO I 336,1115)
377386 (GNO I 336339)
377 (GNO I 336)
377 (GNO I 337,1822)
378 (GNO I 336337)
378 (GNO I 337,12)
379386 (GNO I 337339)
379380 (GNO I 337)
379 (GNO I 337)
380 (GNO I 337)
381 (GNO I 337)
382 (GNO I 337338)
383385 (GNO I 338)
383 (GNO I 338)
386 (GNO I 338339)
386 (GNO I 339,37)
387444 (GNO I 339356)
387389 (GNO I 339340)
387 (GNO I 339)
387388 (GNO I 339)
389394 (GNO I 339 )
389 (GNO I 339,28340,4)
389 (GNO I 339)
390 (GNO I 340,911)
390 (GNO I 340,1118)

25
274
24, 31
28
394
28, 31
307
26
307
309
26
476
408
309
310
312
310
428
142
310
141, 171
311
311
311
428
23, 26
310, 312
428
312
142
318
427
318
310,
318f
319
319
312
319
24, 315,
319
427
279,
307, 320
321
26
26
26
284
476
284
292

391392 (GNO I 340)

391392 (GNO I
340,19341,9)
391 (GNO I 340,2428)
391 (GNO I 340,21 )
391 (GNO I 340,2122)
392 (GNO I 340)
393394 (GNO I 341)
393394 (GNO I 341,921)
395402 (GNO I 341344)
395 (GNO I 341,22342,3)
395 (GNO I 341,29342,3)
396 (GNO I 342,312)
396 (GNO I 342,10 )
397 (GNO I 342,1315)
397 (GNO I 342,1415)
397 (GNO I 342,1921)
398 (GNO I 342,2229)
398 (GNO I 342,2223)
398 (GNO I 342,22 )
398 (GNO I 342,2526)
400 (GNO I 343,710)
401 (GNO I 343,2025)
402 (GNO I 343344)
402 (GNO I 343,25)
403442 (GNO I 343356)
403445 (GNO I 344356)
403 (GNO I 344,1013)
403 (GNO I 344,1113)
404405 (GNO I
344,1325)
404 (GNO I 344)
405 (GNO I 344)
405 (GNO I 344,2223)
406410 (GNO I
344,25346,4)
406408 (GNO I
344,25345,12)
408 (GNO I 345,1314)
409 (GNO I 345)
409 (GNO I 345,1824)
410 (GNO I 345346)
410 (GNO I 345,25346,4)
410 (GNO I 345,25 )
410 (GNO I 345,29)
411 (GNO I 346)
411 (GNO I 346,415)
411 (GNO I 346,45)
411 (GNO I 346,5)
411 (GNO I 346,412)
411 (GNO I 346,69)
411 (GNO I 346,1315)
412 (GNO I 346,1720)
413422 (GNO I 346350)

25
289
288
17
380
496
500
292
474, 496
380
285
287
19
291
301
282
280
282
18
282
287
287
152
455
400
47
294
281
294
250
248
294
453
290
281
476
291
248, 248
302, 384
12
384
248, 251
400
400
400
302
302
281
286
26

indices
413 (GNO I 346,2223)
413 (GNO I 346,23347,1)
414 (GNO I 347,46)
415 (GNO I 347,1821)
417420 (GNO I 348349)
417 (GNO I 348,610)
417418 (GNO I
348,1017)
419 (GNO I 348,17349,1)
419 (GNO I 348,2425)
421 (GNO I 349,1726)
422 (GNO I 350,15)
423440 (GNO I
350,5355,21)
423 (GNO I 350,89)
424426 (GNO I
350,13351,6)
426 (GNO I 351)
429 (GNO I 351,29352,3)
431 (GNO I 352)
432 (GNO I 352,2428)
433 (GNO I 353,110)
434 (GNO I 353)
435436 (GNO I
353,23354,7)
443 (GNO I 356,47)
443444 (GNO I 356,716)
445560 (GNO I
356,17390,16)
445542 (GNO I
356,17384,32)
445468 (GNO I 356363)
445456 (GNO I 356360)
445 (GNO I 356)
445 (GNO I 356,20)
446449 (GNO I 356357)
446447 (GNO I 356357)
446 (GNO I 356357)
448 (GNO I 357)
450454 (GNO I 357 )
450 (GNO I 357358)
451 (GNO I 358)
451 (GNO I 358,1213)
452454 (GNO I 358359)
452 (GNO I 358)
454 (GNO I 359)
455 (GNO I 359)
457468 (GNO I 360363)
457 (GNO I 360)
458 (GNO I 360)
459 (GNO I 360)
459 (GNO I 360,24)
460 (GNO I 361)
460 (GNO I 361,1012)

294
282
283
283
479
285
292
292
292
293
293
286
281, 286
292
29
286
473
287
287
29
287
281
281
408
279
320
321
320
252
498
320
30, 320
28, 321
329
321
322
381
322
322
322
312
322
323
323
323
418
323
457

462468 (GNO I 361 )

462 (GNO I 361)
463 (GNO I 361362)
464465 (GNO I 362)
464 (GNO I 362)
466 (GNO I 362)
468 (GNO I 363)
469479 (GNO I 363366)
469 (GNO I 363)
471 (GNO I 364)
472
473 (GNO I 364)
474 (GNO I 364,26 )
475 (GNO I 364365)
475 (GNO I 364365)
475 (GNO I 365,48)
475 (GNO I 364,32)
476 (GNO I 365)
477 (GNO I 365)
477 (GNO I 365,1922)
478479 (GNO I
365,22366,8)
478 (GNO I 365,2230)
480491 (GNO I 366370)
481 (GNO I 366)
483 (GNO I 367)
484485 (GNO I
367,1424)
484 (GNO I 367)
485 (GNO I 367)
486490 (GNO I 367369)
486 (GNO I 367368)
487 (GNO I 368)
487 (GNO I 368,618)
489490 (GNO I 369,515)
489 (GNO I 369)
489 (GNO I 369,25)
492503 (GNO I 370373)
492 (GNO I 370)
493 (GNO I 370)
495 (GNO I 370371)
496497 (GNO I 371)
496 (GNO I 371)
497498 (GNO I 371)
497498 (GNO I 371,1628)
498 (GNO I 371)
499 (GNO I 371372)
501503 (GNO I
372,16373,8)
503 (GNO I 373)
504523a (GNO I
373379)
504 (GNO I 373)
504 (GNO I 373,2123)

533
26
323
323
312
324
324
324
25f, 324
222, 324
324
220
25, 324
14
31
26, 325
407
452
325
326
413
380
413
326
23, 326
314, 326
429
326
326
312
327
23
167
428
327
169
26, 327
327
327
327, 327
328
328
312
426
328
328
452
328
23, 329
329
175

indices

534
506507 (GNO I 374,313)
506 (GNO I 374)
511 (GNO I 375)
512 (GNO I 376)
513 (GNO I 376)
514 (GNO I 376)
515 (GNO I 377)
523 (GNO I 377)
523b542 (GNO I
379384)
524 (GNO I 379)
527528 (GNO I
380,1523)
528 (GNO I 380)
529 (GNO I 380381)
530 (GNO I 381)
531 (GNO I 381)
532 (GNO I 381)
533 (GNO I 381382)
534535 (GNO I 382)
536 (GNO I 382383)
536 (GNO I 382,2426)
537 (GNO I 383)
538 (GNO I 383384)
539 (GNO I 384)
541 (GNO I 384)
541 (GNO I 384,2124)
543553 (GNO I
385,1388,24)
544 (GNO I 385,19)
545 (GNO I 385,1921)
545 (GNO I 385,2224)
545 (GNO I 385,2428)
546 (GNO I 385,28386,2)
546 (GNO I 385,2931)
546 (GNO I 385,25)
546 (GNO I 386,57)
546 (GNO I 386,67)
546 (GNO I 385,28)
547 (GNO I 386,1017)
548549 (GNO I
386,18387,6)
548 (GNO I 386,1920)
549 (GNO I 386,30 )
550 (GNO I 387,616)
551 (GNO I 387,1619)
551 (GNO I 387,27388,2)
551 (GNO I 387,28388,2)
552 (GNO I 388,37)
552 (GNO I 388,914)
553 (GNO I 388,1724)
554560 (GNO I 388390)
554 (GNO I 388)
555 (GNO I 388389)

178
30
329
329
25, 330
330
25
330
330
336
173
331
331,
332
332
332
312,
333
312
349
333
333
333,
333,
381

336

332

333
336

279
284
291
283
290
18, 289
287
289
281
283
453
286
292
282
18
290
290
291
290
284
291
292
334
334
334

556 (GNO I 389)

556 (GNO I 389,711)
557 (GNO I 389)
558 (GNO I 389)
559 (GNO I 389390)
560 (GNO I 390)
561627 (GNO I
390,17409,15)
561589 (GNO I 390398)
561590a (GNO I
390,17398,24)
561564 (GNO I
390,17391,17)
561 (GNO I 390,1730)
565571 (GNO I
391,18393,13)
572576a (GNO I
393,11394,17)
572573 (GNO I 393)
572 (GNO I 393,1517)
576b587 (GNO I
394,17397,31)
577 (GNO I 394,27)
578580 (GNO I 395,329)
578 (GNO I 395,311)
579581 (GNO I 395396)
579 (GNO I 395,1617)
580 (GNO I 395,2526)
581587 (GNO I 359397)
582 (GNO I 396)
583584 (GNO I 396397)
585586 (GNO I 396397)
587 (GNO I 397,2930)
588590a (GNO I
398,124)
589 (GNO I 398)
590b610 (GNO I
398,24404,20)
590b595 (GNO I
398,24400,21)
592 (GNO I 399,1416)
596599a (GNO I
400,22401,25)
599a604 (GNO I
401,25403,4)
599 (GNO I 199,1)
604 (GNO I 402,28)
605610 (GNO I
403,5404,20)
606 (GNO I 403,16)
606 (GNO I 403,1719)
610 (GNO I 404,1620)
611627 (GNO I 404409)

312, 334
349
335
335
336
312, 336
339f
349
339
339
340
339
339, 497
497
411
339
457
454
420
326
414
346
24, 29,
456
326
24
381
420
339
25f, 28
339
339
196
339
339
14
296
340
354
196
428
400

indices
611624 (GNO I
404,21408,30)
611 (GNO I 404,2132)
611 (GNO I 404,2324)
611 (GNO I 404,2427)
612613 (GNO I
404,32405,20)
612 (GNO I 404405)
613 (GNO I 405,1317)
613 (GNO I 405,1418)
613 (GNO I 405,1718)
614615 (GNO I
405,21406,1)
614615 (GNO I
405,21406,5)
614617 (GNO I
405,21406,27)
614615 (GNO I
405,21406,1)
614615 (GNO I
405,21406,5)
615 (GNO I 406,15)
615 (GNO I 406,25)
617 (GNO I 406,2425)
618624 (GNO I
406,27408,30)
618 (GNO I
406,28407,4)
618 (GNO I 407,45)
618 (GNO I 407,7)
619 (GNO I 407,1415)
619 (GNO I 407,1819)
620 (GNO I 407)
620 (GNO I 407,2528)
620 (GNO I 407,25)
621 (GNO I 408,78)
622 (GNO I 408,1213)
623624 (GNO I 408)
623 (GNO I 408,1920)
625627 (GNO I
408,31409,15)
Contra Eunomium III
(ed. W. Jaeger, GNO II,
Leiden 1960)
III/I
III/I 1114 (GNO II 78)
III/I 16 (GNO II 9,13)
III/I 54 (GNO II 2223)
III/I 55 (GNO II 23)
III/I 103 (GNO II
38,1921)
III/I 105 (GNO II 39)

340
340
408
409
340
25
405
427
406
405
405
340
405
405
427
406
402
340
401, 408
426
403
426
403
251
400f, 408
400
403
403
23
403
340

377, 385,
473
21
478
459
481
476
418, 420
255

III/I 105 (GNO II 39,56)

III/I 105 (GNO II
39,1314)
III/I 128 (GNO II 47,45)
III/I 129 (GNO II 47,49)
III/I 135 (GNO II
49,712)
III/II 910 (GNO II
55,319)
III/II 1625 (GNO II
5760)
III/II 4041 (GNO II 65)
III/III 811 (GNO II
109 )
III/III 3340 (GNO II
119120)
III/III 51 (GNO II
126,69)
III/III 64 (GNO II
130,23 )
III/V 5 (GNO II 162,10)
III/V 6 (GNO II 162,11)
III/V 716 (GNO II
162166)
III/V 4345 (GNO II
175,23177,4)
III/V 44 (GNO II 176,67)
III/V 5052 (GNO II
178,13179,15)
III/V 55 (GNO II
180,710)
III/V 56 (GNO II 180)
III/V 56 (GNO II
180,2324)
III/V 59 (GNO II 182,2)
III/V 60 (GNO II
182,913)
III/V 60 (GNO II
182,1213)
III/V 63 (GNO II 26,711)
III/VI 1522 (GNO II
191194)
III/VI 3241 (GNO II
197200)
III/VI 43 (GNO II 201)
III/VI 57 (GNO II 206)
III/VII 914 (GNO II
206,28208,21)
III/VII 15 (GNO II 220,4)
III/VIII 2 (GNO II
238,18)
III/VIII 5962 (GNO II
261,5262,3)
III/X 50 (GNO II 309,9)

535
419, 470
244
418
414
414
457
482
478
478
480
441
441
15
400
480
457
12, 390
453
413
25
413
407
413
413
28
441
480
476
475
457
400
419
377
400

indices

536
De anima et resurrectione
(PG 46, 12160)
PG
PG
PG
PG
PG
PG
PG
PG
PG

46,
46,
46,
46,
46,
46,
46,
46,
46,

25a
28a
52b3c1
57b
81bc
89b
97b
121a
124b

xxi, 245,
453
459
441
400
245
453
411
412
436
456f

De beatitudinibus
(ed. J. F. Callahan,
GNO VII/2, Leiden
1992; trans. S. G. Hall,
in: H. R. Drobner
A. Viciano, eds., Gregory
of Nyssa: Homilies on
the Beatitudes,
LeidenBostonKln
2000)
229f, 232f,
440, 474
I (GNO VII/2 77,910)
422
II 1 (tr. Hall 32)
229
III (GNO VII/2
104,1519)
420
IV 1 (tr. Hall 4748)
230
V (tr. Hall 5765)
230
V 1 (tr. Hall 57)
230, 233
VI (GNO VII/2 141)
440
VI (GNO VII/2 141,25 ) 456
VI 5 (tr. Hall 7172)
230
VII (GNO VII/2 150)
474
VII (GNO VII/2
159160)
442
De hominis opicio
(PG 44, 123256)
PG 44, 149b
PG 44, 149bc
PG 44, 165ac
De infantibus proemature
abreptis (ed. H. Hrner,
GNO III/2, Leiden
1987)
GNO III/2 79,1416
GNO III/2 79, 2122
De instituto christiano
(ed. W. Jaeger, GNO
VIII/1, Leiden 1952)

109, 242
16
242
464

GNO VIII/1 44
GNO VIII/1 50

442
480

De mortuis (PG 46,

497537)
3 (PG 46, 509c)

314

De oratione Dominica
(ed. J. F. Callahan,
GNO VII/2, Leiden
1992)
GNO VII/2 37
GNO VII/2 4041

442
442

De perfectione
(ed. W. Jaeger, GNO
VIII/1, Leiden 1952)
GNO VIII/1 174175
GNO VIII/1 177,1416
GNO VIII/1 178,11

21, 510
480
413
510

De professione christiana
(ed. W. Jaeger, GNO
VIII/1, Leiden 1952)
GNO VIII/1 85
GNO VIII/1 138

442
441

De sancto Theodoro
(ed. J. P. Cavarnos, GNO
X/1, Leiden 1990)
GNO X/1 6171
506
GNO X/1 71
477
De tridui spatio
(ed. E. Gebhardt,
GNO IX, Leiden 1967)
GNO IX 273306
GNO IX 280,14283,9
GNO IX 283,10286,12
GNO IX 286,16290,17
GNO IX 290,18294,13
GNO IX 299303
De virginitate
(ed. J. P. Cavarnos,
GNO VIII/1, Leiden
1952)

412
412

V (GNO VIII/1
277,1112)
X (GNO VIII/I
290,1314)
X (GNO VIII/1
290,23291,4)

506f, 510
507
507
507
507
480

229f, 232,
235f
422
465
420

indices
XI (GNO VIII/1
291,15292,15)
XI (GNO VIII/1
293,23294,1)
XI (GNO VIII/1
296,1415)
XX (GNO VIII/1 328)
De vita Moysis
(ed. H. Musurillo, GNO
VII/1, Leiden 1964; ed.
J. Danilou, SC 1bis,
Paris 1955; trans.
E. Ferguson
A. Malherbe,
New York 1978)

229
229
229
483

231234,
473, 478,
495,
499502
I (GNO VII/1 3,68)
420
I (GNO VII/I 6,514)
464
II (GNO VII/1 17,1020)
502
II (GNO VII/1 22,1416)
500
II (GNO VII/1 22,1418)
497
II (GNO VII/1 40,8)
418
II (GNO VII/1 40, 24)
412
II (GNO VII/1 43,23)
344
II (GNO VII/1 60)
499
II (GNO VII/1 62,6)
249
II (GNO VII/1 62,10)
498
II (GNO VII/1 65,10)
498
II (GNO VII/1 66,2067,8) 496
II (GNO VII/1 68)
499
II (GNO VII/1 68,1)
249
II (GNO VII/1 70,811)
500
II (GNO VII/1 72,8)
498
II (GNO VII/1 76,1214)
502
II (GNO VII/1 78,13)
502
II (GNO VII/1 82,45)
502
II (GNO VII/1 82,1718)
502
II (GNO VII/1 87,7)
412
II (GNO VII/1 87,1013)
496
II (GNO VII/1 87,1617)
419
II (GNO VII/1 88,25)
497
II (GNO VII/1 88,810)
411, 422
II (GNO VII/1 88,710)
497
II (GNO VII/1 92,818)
498
II (GNO VII/1 98,1519)
501
II (GNO VII/1 106,1116) 501
II (GNO VII/1 110,615)
496
II (GNO VII/1
110,24111,17)
499
II (GNO VII/1 113,36)
502
II (GNO VII/1 115,68)
497

II (GNO VII/1 118,124)

I 2021 (SC 1bis, 910)
II 1926 (SC 1bis, 3739)
II 31 (SC 1bis, 40)
II 152175 (SC 1bis, 7786)
II 158 (SC 1bis, 79)
II 159161 (SC 1bis,
7980)
II 168169 (SC 1bis,
8384)
II 176 (SC 1bis, 86)
II 220239 (tr.
Ferguson-Malherbe
112116)
II 225 (tr.
Ferguson-Malherbe 113)
II 227 (tr.
Ferguson-Malherbe
113114)
II 230 (tr.
Ferguson-Malherbe 114)
II 238239 (tr.
Ferguson-Malherbe 116)
II 250255 (SC 1bis,
112114)
II 279 (SC 1bis, 120)
II 305321 (SC 1bis,
129135)
II 317 (SC 1bis, 133)
In ascensionem Christi oratio
(ed. E. Gebhardt,
GNO IX, Leiden 1967)
GNO IX 323327

537
459
481
481
483
482
478, 482
478
483
483
231
232
232
233
231
482
475
475
475

506

In Basilium fratrem
(ed. O. Lendle,
GNO X/1, Leiden 1990)
GNO X/1 109134
475, 506
511
GNO X/1 109
476
GNO X/1 110111
475
GNO X/1 133,4.5
509
GNO X/1 133,518
511
In Canticum canticorum
(ed. H. Langerbeck,
GNO VI, Leiden 1960;
trans. C. McCambley,
Brookline, Mass., 1987)
I (GNO VI 16,13)
I (GNO VI 18,5)

231233,
400, 483,
501
412
347

indices

538
I (GNO VI 31,56)
I (GNO VI 31,57)
I (GNO VI 37,1)
I (GNO VI 3942)
II (GNO VI 46)
IV (GNO VI 117,20)
V (GNO VI 157,1421)
V (GNO VI 157,19)
V (GNO VI 158,1219)
V (GNO VI 158,1214)
V (GNO VI 158,1921)
V (GNO VI 158,21159,2)
V (GNO VI 159,8)
V (tr. McCambley 119)
VI (GNO VI 173,711)
VII (GNO VI 212)
XI (GNO VI 334,59)
X (GNO VI 304,17305,2)
XII (GNO VI 357,1020)
XV (GNO VI
455,10456,15)
GNO VI 483484
In diem luminum
(ed. E. Gebhardt,
GNO IX, Leiden 1967)
GNO IX 221242
GNO IX 228,26229,18
GNO IX 241
In diem natalem Salvatoris
(ed. F. Mann, GNO X/2,
Leiden 1996)
GNO X/2 235296
GNO X/2 266,14269,7
GNO X/2 267,14268,2
GNO X/2 268,214

411
412
412, 419
478
480
354
420
420
233
412
231
231
231
231
343
480
412
412
420
458
400

506, 508
508
484

506f, 509
507
509
509

In Ecclesiasten
(ed. P. Alexander,
GNO V, Leiden 1962)
I (GNO V 281,4 )
I (GNO V 285,24)
VI (GNO V 373,21374,2)
VII (GNO V 400,20401,2)
VII (GNO V 412,614)
VII (GNO V 412,14)

12
347
343
392
466
464

In inscriptiones Psalmorum
(ed. J. A. Mc Donough,
GNO V, Leiden 1962)
I 7 (GNO V 44,24)
II 3 (GNO V 75,2976,12)

422
344

In sanctam Pentecosten
(ed. D. Teske, GNO X/2,
Leiden 1996)
GNO X/2 287292
506f
In sanctum et salutare Pascha
(ed. E. Gebhardt,
GNO IX, Leiden 1967)
GNO IX 315319
In sanctum Pascha
(ed. E. Gebhardt,
GNO IX, Leiden 1967)
GNO IX 245270
GNO
GNO
GNO
GNO
GNO

IX
IX
IX
IX
IX

250,214
256,2326
257,713
257,1416
258,215

In sanctum Stephanum I
(ed. O. Lendle,
GNO X/1, Leiden 1990)
GNO X/1 7594
I (GNO X/1 88,2394,7)
I (GNO X/1 91,1094,7)
I (GNO X/1 92,1093,16)
I (GNO X/1 93,1694,7)

506

506, 509,
511f
511
512
512
512
512

506f, 513
507
507
513
513

In sanctum Stephanum II
(ed. O. Lendle,
GNO X/1, Leiden 1990)
II (GNO X/1 97105)
506
In XL martyres
(ed. O. Lendle, GNO
X/1, Leiden 1990)
Ia (GNO X/1 137142)
Ib (GNO X/1 145156)
II (GNO X/1 159169)
II (GNO X/1 163,23)

506
506
506
509

Oratio catechetica magna (ed.

E. Mhlenberg, GNO
III/4, Leiden 1996)
GNO III/4 6,1414,13
GNO III/4 7,7
GNO III/4 21,710
GNO III/4 26,2
GNO III/4 60,22
GNO III/4 66,4
GNO III/4 87,15

29, 249
29
249
343
249
249
249
249

indices
Oratio consolatoria in
Pulcheriam (ed. A. Spira,
GNO IX, Leiden 1967)
GNO IX 461472

506

Oratio funebris in Meletium

episcopum (ed. A. Spira,
GNO IX, Leiden 1967)
GNO IX 441457

506

Oratio funebris in Flacillam

imperatricem (ed. A. Spira,
GNO IX, Leiden 1967)
GNO IX 475490

506

Refutatio confessionis Eunomii

(ed. W. Jaeger, GNO II,
Leiden 1960)
1415 (GNO II 318,325)

11, 476
407

Tunc et ipse Filius

(ed. J. K. Downing,
GNO III/2, Leiden
1987)
GNO III/2 328
GNO III/2 3
GNO III/2 15
GNO III/2 2223
GNO III/2 23
Vita Gregorii Thaumaturgi
(ed. G. Heil, GNO X/1,
Leiden 1990)
GNO X/1 357
GNO X/1 10,19
GNO X/1 14
GNO X/1 15,13
GNO X/1 2324
GNO X/1 27,3
GNO X/1 29,3
Hierocles
In Aureum Pythagoreorum
Carmen Commentarius
(ed. F. G. Koehler,
Stuttgart 1974)
Koehler 105,1426
Koehler 108,1519
Iamblichus
De mysteriis Aegyptiorum = De
oraculis (ed. E. des Places,
Paris 1966)

483
483
480
480
482
480

506
509
475
509
475
509
509

383
383

539

VII 45 (Des Places

191,12195,3)

295

Irenaeus
Adversus haereses (ed.
A. Rousseau, SC 100.294,
Paris 19651982)
II 13,9 (SC 294, 126)
IV 20,4 (SC 100, 634)
IV 20,7 (SC 100, 646 )
IV 38,2 (SC 100, 948 )

43
45
45
45

Isocrates
(ed. B. G. Mandilaras,
Opera omnia, IIII,
MnchenLeipzig 2003)
Antidosis (Oratio 15)
Or. 15,253257
(Mandilaras III 130131)

242

Iustinus Martyr
Apologia secunda (ed.
A. Wartelle, Saint Justin,
Apologies, Paris 1987)
6,12 (Wartelle 204)
6,34 (Wartelle 204)
6,6 (Wartelle 204)

45, 308
45
45

Dialogus cum Tryphone

45

Lucianus Samosatenus
Dearum judicium
(ed. A. M. Harmon,
Lucian, III, Cambridge,
Mass., 1921, repr. 1969)
13

365

Marcus Aurelius
Antoninus Augustus
Meditationes
(ed. A. I. Trannoy,
Penses, Paris 1975)
VII 50 (Trannoy 77)

152, 302

Nemesius Emesenus
De natura hominis
(ed. M. Morani,
Leipzig 1987)
6 (Morani 55,2022)

364

Oratia Chaldaica
(ed. E. des Places,
Paris 1971)
150 (Des Places 103)

295, 296
295

indices

540
Origenes Adamantius
Commentarius in Canticum
Canticorum (ed.
W. A. Baehrens, GCS 33,
Leipzig 1925; Origen, An
Exhortation to Martyrdom,
Prayer and selected works,
trans. R. Greer,
MahwahNew Jersey
1979)
prol. (GCS 33, 64,1620)
454
preface 3,1819
(tr. Greer 235)
227
preface 3,20 (tr. Geer 235) 234
Commentarius in Iohannem
(ed. E. Preuschen,
GCS 10, Leipzig 1903;
ed. C. Blanc, SC
120.157.222.290.385,
Paris 19661992)
I
I 1,115,89 (SC 120,
56104)
I 5,2715,89 (SC 120,
74104)
I 8,51 (SC 120, 86)
I 910 (GCS 10,
14,1216,20)
I 9,52 (SC 120, 88)
I 9,53 (SC 120, 88)
I 9,5357 (SC 120, 88 )
I 9,55 (SC 120, 88)
I 9,5859 (SC 120, 90)
I 9,6061 (SC 120, 90)
I 16,9018,108 (SC 120,
106118)
I 16,9020,124 (SC 120,
106124)
I 17,101 (SC 120, 112)
I 18,107 (SC 120, 116)
I 19,10920,14 (SC 120,
118124)
I 19,118 (GCS 10,
24,1722)
I 20,119 (SC 120, 122)
I 20,119 (GCS 10,
24,236)
I 20,123124 (SC 120, 124)
I 20,124 (SC 120, 124)
I 21,12539,292 (SC 120,
126206)

265, 309
34f, 40
37
37
37
451
37
41
37
41
37
37
46
35
35
35
35
265
35
265, 272
35
36
34, 36,
298

I 21,125 (SC 120, 126)

I 21,12623,150 (SC
120, 126136)
I 24,151 (SC 120, 136 )
I 28,200 (GCS 10, 37,
SC 136, 158)
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

30,207 (SC 120, 162)

34,251 (SC 120, 184)
37,267 (SC 120, 192)
37,273 (SC 120, 196)
37,276 (SC 120, 198)
39,291 (SC 120, 206)
39,291292 (SC 120,
206)
II 2,16 (SC 120, 216)
II 2,1617 (SC 120, 216 )
II 10,75 (SC 120, 234)
II 18,125128 (SC 120,
290292)
II 75 (GCS 10, 65,16)
X 37,246 (SC 157, 528 )
XIII 34,203225
(SC 222,145153)
XIX 5,2627 (SC 290,
6064)
XIX 5,2628 (SC 290,
6064)
XIX 6,3339 (SC 290,
6670)
Commentarius in Matthaeum (ed.
E. Klostermann E. Benz,
GCS 38, Leipzig 1933;
PG 13, 8361600)
XI 3 (GCS 38, 37,21 )
XIV 7 (PG 13, 1197c)
XIV 7 (PG 13, 1197cd)
XVII 14 (PG 13,
1517b1520b)

36
36
40
42, 249f,
255
41
36
42
37
37
36
35
40
36
40
298
9
40
45
42
34
39

34
159
39
34
41

Contra Celsum
(ed. P. Koetschau, GCS 3,
Leipzig 1899; ed.
M. Borret, SC
132.136.147.150, Paris
19671969)
34, 44,
248, 264
I 8 (SC 132, 9496)
248
I 9 (SC 132, 96100)
248
I 20 (SC 132, 126128)
248
I 2425 (SC 132,
136144)
297

indices
I 24 (SC 132, 134140)
I 24 (SC 132, 136)
II 64 (SC 132, 434436)
II 64 (GCS 3, 185,26)
II 64 (SC 132, 434)
III 7 (SC 136, 26)
III 41 (SC 136, 96)
IV 9 (SC 136, 206)
IV 99 (SC 136, 430434)
V 4546 (SC 147,
130134)
VII 42 (GCS 3,
192,22193,22)
VII 44 (SC 150, 116120)

42, 44
298
34, 249f
265
298
116
42
48
248

451, 453
347

De oratione (PG 11,

416a561b)
4,2 (PG 11, 428bc)
24 (PG 11, 492a496b)
24 (PG 11, 492b493b)

317
34, 43
39

Homiliae in Genesim
(ed. L. Doutreleau,
SC 7bis, Paris 2003)
14,1 (SC 7bis, 334)

Homiliae in Ieremiam
(ed. P. Nautin, GCS 6,
Berlin 1983; SC 232,
Paris 1976)
VIII
VIII
VIII
VIII

2
2
2
2

(GCS 6, 57,59)
(SC 232, 356 )
(SC 232, 356362)
(SC 232, 358)

34, 42,
46
451
46
34
39, 42,
299

297

De principiis (ed. P. Koetschau,

GCS 22, Leipzig; eds.
H. Crouzel M. Simonetti,
SC 252.268, Paris
19781980)
33f, 39f
I
37, 40
I prol. 1 (SC 252, 76)
40
I 2 (SC 252, 110142)
34, 38
I 2,9 (SC 252, 128)
38
I 2,10 (SC 252, 134)
38
I 2,13 (SC 252, 142)
39
IV
252
IV 1,7 (GCS 22,
303,14304,1)
452
IV 2,6 (GCS 22,
315,4318,6)
250
IV 3,14 (GCS 22,
345,5347,4)
452
IV 4,1 (GCS 22, 350,12)
451
IV 4,1 (SC 268, 402404)
298
IV 4,1 (SC 268, 402)
41
Dialogus cum Heraclide
(ed. J. Scherer, SC 67,
Paris 1960)
4 (SC 67, 62)
4,610 (SC 67, 6076)

541

37, 40
41
36

298

Homiliae in Iesu Nave

(ed. M. Harl, SC 302,
Paris 1986)
fr. (SC 302, 388392)
Philocalia (ed. M. Harl,
SC 302, Paris 1986)

44
44

14,2 (SC 302, 408 )

33, 46f,
297
46

Selecta in Genesim (PG 12,

92145)
PG 12, 100

394

Philo Alexandrinus
(ed. L. CohnP. Wendland,
Philonis Alexandrini opera
quae supersunt, IVII,
Berlin 1886, repr.
1962)
De decalogo
23 (Cohn IV 273274)

286

De fuga
168,25 (Wendland III
146147)

392

De migratione
142 (Wendland II 295)

392

De mutatione nominum
1138 (Wendland III
158163)
6364 (Wendland III 168)
249,2 (Wendland III 200)

211
286
392

De opicio mundi
148 (Cohn I 5152)

286

De praemiis
145,7 (Cohn V 370)

392

indices

542
De somniis
I 40,12 (Wendland III
213)
392
I 204,23 (Wendland III
249)
392
II 212,6 (Wendland III 251) 392
De specialibus legibus
I 334,13 (Cohn V 81)
I 335,3 (Cohn V 81)
I 336,1 (Cohn V 81)
I 345,3 (Cohn V 84)

392
392
392
392

Legum allegoriae
I 3250 (Cohn I 6973)
I 36 (Cohn I 70)
I 40 (Cohn I 7071)
II 1415 (Cohn I 9394)

392
392
392
286

Quis rerum divinarum heres

2223 (Wendland III 67)

46
46

Platon
Cratylus
390de
391de
393d
399ab
425a
431b
435d

239, 250,
294297,
304, 384
150, 239
250
294
280
280
280
457

Parmenides
137c
139e140b
140e

207, 436
207
207
207

Phaedon
99d
110d

364
363

508a56
508a1112
508b910
508e13
509b69
510b511d
511bd
534a
540a8

425
425
425
425
425
449
449
462
425

Sophista
216c
262a
259e

325
363
280
296

Symposium
210e
211b
212a

227, 381, 449

449
228
449

Timaeus
28c
43e
49e
54b
60a

436
453
363
363
363
363

Plotinus
Enneades (ed.
P. Henry H.-R.
Schwyzer, Plotini Opera,
IIII, New York
19641983)
I 6 [1] 1,820
228
I 6 [1] 8,2223
228
I 6 [1] 9,143
449
II 9 [33] 1,58
II 9 [33] 1,89
II 9 [33] 1,4044

417
423
43
424
436
449
458
458
419
423
416
419
419

Philebus
19c

364

Politicus
300b

364

III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III

Respublica
380d
476a

363
363

IV 8 [6] 7,1723
IV 8 [6] 6,1116
IV 8 [6] 6,2526

Phaedrus

230,
384f, 469

3
7
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
9

[48]
[45]
[30]
[30]
[30]
[30]
[30]
[30]
[30]
[13]

7,811
4,1
6,10
9,2324
9,4243
10,31
11,1923
9,1012

424
424
424

indices
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI

1
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
9
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2

[10] 6
[11] 1,34
[49] 12,152
[49] 12,52
[49] 13,56
[49] 14,13
[49] 14,58
[49] 14,67
[49] 14,1718
[49] 15,311
[49] 15,1518
[49] 15,2731
[49] 17,2837
[49] 17,38
[7] 1,5
[7] 1,9
[7] 1,1819
[7] 1,2021
[7] 1,3941
[7] 2
[7] 2,1516
[7] 2,15
[7] 2,1617
[7] 2,1937
[7] 2,29
[32] 4,16
[32] 4,1316
[32] 5,1314
[32] 6,56
[32] 6,1415
[32] 6,17
[32] 6,20
[32] 6,2528
[32] 6,3033
[32] 6,3133
[32] 6,3134
[32] 7,1622
[32] 7,32
[32] 10,12
[32] 10,34
[32] 13,11
[32] 13,3738
[24] 3,24
[24] 3,611
[24] 3,2125
[5] 2,2627
[42]
[42]
[43]
[43]
[43]
[43]
[43]
[43]

2,15
22
3,2025
4,19
9,67
14
17,25
17,35

437
423
456
421
417
421
417
421
421
423
424
425
422
416
423
416
423
423
423
437, 437
425
425
425
456
456
424
207
419
420
418
419
416
417
423
421
415
422
422
419
419
416
423
423
424
423
424
209
437
389
389
416
389
417
418

VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI

543
5
6
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9

[23] 4,1920
[34]
[38] 12,2330
[38] 13,13
[38] 16,2124
[38] 16,2731
[38] 16,3335
[38] 17,36
[38] 17,1314
[38] 23,3
[38] 32,2526
[38] 35,145
[38] 35,7
[38] 36,127
[38] 38,12.11
[38] 38,46
[38] 40,6
[38] 41,3238
[39] 7,11
[39] 7,3536
[39] 8,67
[39] 8,68
[39] 8,14
[39] 8,20
[39] 9,29
[39] 10,1621
[39] 11,1
[39] 13,4
[39] 13,48
[39] 13,50
[39] 14,3738
[39] 15,2223
[39] 18,1530
[39] 18,36
[39] 21,2022
[39] 21,2628
[9] 2,2224
[9] 2,2932
[9] 3,4951
[9] 3,5253
[9] 5,3132
[9] 5,3233
[9] 6,5253
[9] 8,4345

424
6
424
423
425
425
425
423
424
411
411
449
416
448
418
417
421
419
417
423
418
421
418
418
424
423
458
417
417
417
424
416
424
424
419, 424
416
424
423
416
415
417
416
425
415

Plutarchus
Adversus Colotem (in:
G. Arrighetti, Epicuro,
Opere, Torino 1973)
22, 1119f (Arrighetti 146)

303

Placita philosophorum (in:

H. Diels, Doxographi
graeci, Berlin 1976)
IV 12 (Diels 401)

364

544
Polybius
Historiae (ed.
T. Bttner-Wobst, Polybii
historiae, IIV, Leipzig
18891905, repr. Stuttgart
19621967)
I 20,12
II 1065D
V 110,10
Porphyrius
Commentarius in Aristotelis
Categorias (ed. A. Busse,
CAG IV/1, Berlin 1887)
CAG IV/1
65,1820.3166,2
CAG IV/1 66,2967,32
Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes
(ed. E. Lamberz, Leipzig
1975)
43 (Lamberz 54,756,15)
44 (Lamberz 57, 58, 58, 59, 1)

indices

364
364
364

268
268
268

456
456

Porphyrius (?)
Commentarius in Platonis Parmenidem
(ed. P. Hadot, Porrio,
Commentario al Parmenide di
Platone, Milano 1993)
XIV 21,90 (Hadot 90)
456
Poseidonios
(ed. L. Edelstein I. G. Kidd,
Posidonius, I. Fragments,
Cambridge 1972)
Fr. 92 (EdelsteinKidd 99)
Proclus Diadochus
Commentaria in Platonis Timaeum
(ed. E. Diehl, Amsterdam
1965)
Diehl I 255,67
Commentarius in Platonis Cratylum
(ed. G. Pasquali,
StuttgartLeipzig 1994)
51 (Pasquali 1820)

299

368

295

Commentarius in Platonis Parmenidem

(ed. V. Cousin, Paris 1821,
repr. HildesheimNew York
1961, 1980)
VII 7,910 (Cousin
11591160)
421
Cousin 1216,371217,13
207

Theologia Platonica (ed. H. D.

Sarey L. G. Westerink,
IVI, Paris 19681997)
II 5 (Sarey-Westerink 3739)

208

Pseudo-Eratoshenes
Catasterismi (ed. A. Olivieri,
Mythographi graeci III/1,
Leipzig 1897)
Olivieri 5
Olivieri 9
Olivieri 30
Olivieri 36
Olivieri 37
Olivieri 41
Olivieri 39

157
157
157
157
157
157
157

Pseudo-Maximus Confessor
Scholia in Divinis Nominibus
(PG 4, 527576)
II 4 (PG 4, 216d217a)
IV 2 (PG 4, 264a)

422
422

Quintilianus Marcus Fabius

Institutionis oratoriae libri XII
(ed. L. Radermacher
V. Buchheit, Leipzig 1971)
IX 2,614 (RadermacherBuchheit I 144,25147,2)

446

Sextus Empiricus
(Sexti Empirici opera, ed.
H. Mutschmann, III,
Leipzig 19121914; ed.
J. Mau, III, Leipzig 1954;
ed. R. G. Bury, Sextus
Empiricus, IIV, Cambridge,
Mass.London 19331949)
Adversus dogmaticos
II 13 (Mutchmann II 170)

303

Adversus mathematicos
III 4050 (Mutschmann II
115116)
III 4049 (Mau III 115117)
VIII 5660 (SVF II 88)
VIII 58 (Mutschmann II
115 )
VIII 5860 (SVF II 88)
VIII 8084 (Mutschmann II
120121)
VIII 8183 (Mutschmann II
120121)
IX 393394 (Mutschmann II
293)

391
4
5
12
391
388
388
12

indices
IX 393402 (Mutschmann II
293294)

Pyrrhoniae hypotyposes
I 2 (Bury I 4)

392

Severus Platonicus
Commentaria in Platonis
Timaeum

368

Socrates Scholasticus
Historia ecclesiastica (PG 67,
33841)
IV 7 (PG 67, 472b475c)

316

Sophocles
Antigone (ed.
H. Lloyd-Jones
N.G. Wilson, Sophoclis fabulae,
Oxford 1990, p. 182238)
389
364
Stoicorum Veterum
Fragmenta (ed. I.
von Arnim, IIV, Leipzig
19031924)
II 87
II 88
II 89
II 149
II 166
II 181
II 331
II 509
II 836
III 20

12
12, 299
299
12
299
299
299
299
16
12

Tertullianus Quintus
Septimius Florens
Apologia

248

545

Theodorus Asinensis
De nominibus

296

Theophrastus
De odoribus (ed. A. Hort,
Enquiry into plants and Minor
works on odours and weather
signs, II, Cambridge,
Mass.London 1926, repr.
1980, p. 326388)
7

364

Thomas Aquinas
Summa Theologiae
I 13,2,resp.
I 10,5
I 63,6

277
436
436

Thucydides
Historiae (eds. H. S. Jones
J. E. Powell, Thucydidis
historiae, III, Oxford 1942,
repr. 19701967)
III 16
364
Xenophanes
Fr. B18 (DK I 133,14 =
Stobe, Ecl. I 8,2, Flor.
29,41)

369

Xenophon
Cynegeticus (ed. E. C. Marchant,
Xenophontis opera omnia, V,
Oxford 1920, repr. 1969)
2
364
3
364
19
364

II. INDEX NOMINUM

Abramowski L. 12, 18
Adorno Th. W. 378
Atius 23, 295, 298, 307, 322, 465,
485f, 488
Alexander Aphrodisiensis 7, 208, 342,
349, 391
Altenburger M. 387
Ambrosius Mediolanensis 32
Ammianus Marcellinus 391/392
Ammonius Hermeiou 3
Ammonius Sakkas 382

Anastos M. V. 29, 31f, 489

Antisthenes 3
Apollinarius 215, 348
Apostolopoulos Ch. 242, 244f
Arens H. 300
Aristobulos 454
Aristoteles 4, 8, 15, 152, 200, 207,
248, 251, 268, 300, 302, 304, 363,
369, 378f, 384, 399f, 400, 403f, 409,
440, 445, 485
Arius 243, 252, 254, 442

546

indices

Athanasius Alexandrinus 8, 10, 32,

335, 337
Atticus 268
Augustinus Aurelius xx, 32, 49, 307,
314, 474, 505
Bals D. L. 32, 343, 438
Balthasar H. U. von xx, 450, 456,
474
Baratin M. 280
Barnes M. R. 434f, 442
Barth K. 308
Basilius Caesariensis ( passim)
Bastero J. L. 13, 22, 53, 241, 273,
290, 300f, 408, 451, 458
Beierwaltes W. 207, 416, 421
Bergjan S.-P. 308f
Bienert W. A. 35
Blanc C. 41
Blume H.-D. 373
Bhm Th. 206211, 215f, 284, 295f,
342, 349, 355, 418f, 457, 498
Borges J. L. 385
Borret M. 42
Borsche T. 280
Borst A. 19, 291
Boukis Ch. 414
Le Boulluec A. 33
Brinker W. xvii
Brottier L. 505
Buber M. 461
Burggraf J. 483
Canvet M. 407, 431
Caramuel de Lobkowicz J. 404
Caritat de Condorcet J.-A.-N. 370
Cauchy V. 372
Cavalcanti E. 23, 29, 283, 408
Chadwick H. 442
Cherniss H. F. 387f
Chrysippus 299, 399, 485
Chvtal L. 358
Clarke W. K. L. 489
Cleary J. 437
Clemens Alexandrinus xx, 45f, 48,
191, 297, 474
Comte A. 370
Corbellini V. 29
Corsini E. 40
Crome P. 421
Crouzel H. 298
Dalsgaard Larsen B. 207
Daly R. J. 40

Dams Th. 13, 408

Danilou J. xx, 250, 295, 297, 378,
382f, 386, 392, 394, 400, 408, 449,
473, 481
Dassmann E. 505
David Neoplatonicus 7f
Demetracopoulos J. A. 387390, 396
Democritus 4
Derrida J. 466
Dexippus 209
Dianius 486
Didymus Caecus 8
Diekamp F. 311
Diels H. 152, 302
Diogenes Laertius 5, 391
Dionysius Alexandrinus 389, 394
Dionysius Areopagita 337, 418
Dionysius Petavius 308, 311, 318,
325, 328, 329
Dolidze T. 406, 409, 452, 454f,
498501
Domiter K. xviii
Donaldson I. 401, 405, 434
Dorival G. 33
Drrie H. xx, 6, 6, 387
Douglass S. 399, 458, 462, 466
Drecoll V. H. 309, 342, 346, 356,
445
Drobner H. R. xvi, xx, 20, 388, 458,
474, 499, 507
Dumont J.-P. 379
Dnzl F. 412
Durand G.-M. de 486
Dvok P. 399, 404
Eisenberger H. 411
Elders L. J. 400, 409
Emilsson E. K. 437
Epicurus 248, 251, 303, 384
Esbroeck M. van 29, 31, 47
Escribano-Alberca I. 512f
Eudoxius 486
Eunomius ( passim)
Euripides xviii
Eusebius Caesariensis 33f, 41f, 48, 265
Farrer A. 219
Fedwick P. J. 12, 29, 47, 295, 408,
489
Festugire A. J. 399f
Flacilla xviii
Flandes E. 483
Fontaine J. 28

indices
Gath J. 431
Geerlings W. 452, 500
Gerardo di Borgo San Donnino 370
Gerson L. P. 431
Gessel W. 44
Gibbon E. 248
Ggler R. 43f, 298, 454
Goldschmidt V. 370
Grgemanns H. 243
Gregorius Nazianzenus 32, 251, 419,
449, 465, 467, 475
Gregorius Palamas 433, 442, 459
Gregorius Thaumaturgus 9, 475, 509
Gregorius Nyssenus ( passim)
Gribomont J. 489
Grillmeier A. 510
Gutirrez J. L. 483
Hadot P. 386
Halfwassen J. 208, 421
Hall S. G. 20, 220, 242, 247, 339,
400f, 404f
Hanson R. P. C. 21, 23, 27
Harl M. 27, 33f, 39, 41f, 4446,
297, 451, 453, 454, 457, 500
Harnack A. 307
Harris W. V. 485
Heck A. von xix
Hegel G. W. F. 260
Heidegger M. 307, 377379, 462f,
466
Herder J. G. 19
Hierocles 382, 383
Hippolytus 40
Hodgson L. 328
Holl K. 308, 322
Horn Chr. 416
Hossenfelder M. 303f
Huber G. 415, 421f
Hbner R. M. 28, 206, 215
Humboldt W. von 19
Husserl E. 463
Iamblichus 207, 251, 295, 382, 394
Ierodiakonou K. 285
Iohannes Chrysostomus 11, 505
Irenaeus 43, 45, 191
Isocrates 242
Iustinus Martyr 43, 45, 308
Ivnka E. von 243
Izquiero C. 483
Jaeger W. xx, 30, 53, 59, 73, 105,
136f, 141, 145, 147, 150153, 157,
159, 160, 162, 168, 170, 173, 176f,

547

182, 191, 193, 198, 212, 271, 302,

351, 356, 473f
Joachim de Flores 370
Jungius J. 404
Kahn Ch. 296
Kalligas P. 285, 296, 300
Kannengiesser C. 28
Kant I. 462, 471
Karfkov L. 53f, 400, 406408
Kearney R. 463
Kees R. J. 511
Kelly J. N. D. 438
Klock Chr. xviixix, 388, 447, 458
Kneale M. 403f
Kneale W. 403f
Kobusch Th. 3, 57, 10, 12, 15, 19f,
214f, 241, 255, 273, 283, 298300,
303, 408, 458, 499
Kofman S. 381
Kopecek Th. A. 435
Koutras D. 424
Kustas G. L. 29
Lacoste J. 385
Laird M. 379, 386
Langerbeck H. 347, 382, 400
Larkin S. M. Th. 381
Lazzati G. 400
Lekkas G. 423426, 430f
Leroux G. 425
Lilla S. R. C. 418
Lloyd A. C. 280, 300
Long A. A. 280, 299f, 303f, 388
Lossky V. 456
Lubac H. de xx
Lucianus Antiochenus 298
Ludlow M. 223
Macrina 252, 481
Mann F. 252, 373
Mansfeld J. 409
Marcion 250, 252
Marg W. xviii
Maspero G. 22, 29, 276, 309
Mateo-Seco L. F. 13, 22, 53, 241,
273, 290, 300f, 408, 451, 458
Maupertuis P.-L. M. de 19
McKeon R. 381
Meissner H. xviii, 447
Meredith A. 411
Merinhs J. 390
Monaci Castagno A. 33f, 39
Moore W. 137
Morgan A. de 404

548

indices

Mortley R. 208
Mosshammer A. A. 458
Moutsopoulos E. 363367, 370,
372374
Mhlenberg E. 24, 457, 505
Nautin P. 46
Neuner P. 206
Neuschfer B. 46
Ojell A. 483
OLeary J. S. 53f, 337
Olivetti M. M. 454
Oort J. van 505
Orbe A. 298
Origenes Adamantius xx, 6, 810,
14, 2123, 3348, 218, 227, 234f,
248253, 264266, 272, 297299,
305, 309, 337, 383, 431, 445f,
451455, 457, 474, 498f, 501,
508511, 514
Pacheco A. 390
Papadopoulos S. 419
Parmenides 436
Patzer H. xvii
Pazzini D. 35, 40
Perrone L. 35, 455, 498
Philo Alexandrinus 25, 4548, 211,
286, 392, 451, 454
Philostorgius 23
Platon 4, 8, 207, 218, 227f, 232f,
236, 248, 251, 304, 363, 378, 385,
431, 445, 448f, 453, 461f, 474
Plotinus 6, 12, 30, 43, 209, 314, 382,
389f, 415421, 423425, 430f, 441,
448, 456, 458
Porphyrius 7, 268, 298, 300, 382
Poseidonios 6, 264, 299
Pottier B. 54, 279, 281, 283,
308310, 313, 320, 328, 400, 407f,
426, 431
Prinzivalli E. 33f
Proclus Diadochus 7, 207, 295, 382
Pulcheria xviii
Quacquarelli A. 298
Rexer J. 29, 506
Riedweg Ch. xvii
Rist J. M. 12, 30, 47, 295, 408, 431
Ritter A. M. 10, 12, 416
Roberts A. 401, 406, 434
Rder J.-A. xviii, 11, 342

Romano F. 7
Roukema R. 454
Runia D. T. 392, 399f, 409
Rutten C. 7
Sabellius 67, 254
Schindler A. 295, 298, 400
Schmitter P. 280, 300, 303
Schramm U. 387
Schulze C. 452, 500
Scipioni L. I. 28
Seleucus 209
Seneca Lucius Annaeus 248
Sesbo B. 23, 2730, 33f, 47, 308,
313, 315, 327, 356, 486
Sextus Empiricus 4, 5, 391
Sieben H. J. 21, 33f, 39, 266,
508511
Siegmann G. 411
De Simone R. J. 409
Skoutris C. B. 431
Smets A. 29
Socrates 4, 250, 466, 470
Sonderegger E. 207
Sophocles xviii
Sorabji R. 385
Soskice J. M. 454
Spinoza B. 260
Spira A. xviixxi, 446, 449f, 506
Srawley J. H. 249
Stead Ch. 308, 328
Stead G. C. 290, 296, 299, 387f,
408, 451
Studer B. 22, 27, 32, 34, 39f, 46f,
49, 214f, 265, 505
Strutwolf H. 34
Smilch J. P. 19
Syrianus Atheniensis 342, 349
Taormina D. P. 7
Tertullianus Quintus Septimius Florens
40
Themistius Constantinopolitanus 390
Theodorus Mopsuestenus 11
Thierfelder A. xviii
Thomas Aquinas 277f, 313f
Thmmel H. G. 6f, 505
Tillich P. 243
Toland J. 276f
Troiano M. S. 279
Trouillard J. 423
Uthemann K.-H.
405, 457

211, 283, 292, 388,

indices
Vaggione R. P. 212, 267, 279, 296,
298, 317, 341f, 348f, 352, 354, 405
Vandenbussche E. 296, 409
Viciano A. xx, 20, 301, 458, 499
Vlachos G. 370
Volkmann-Schluck K. H. 416
Weidemann H. 300
Weitlau M. 206
Whittaker J. 347, 373
Wickham L. R. 298, 307, 442
Wilamowitz U. von 168

549

Wiles M. 240, 317

Williams R. D. H. 240, 308, 316f,
434
Winden J. C. van 400
Witt R. E. 6, 9, 264
Wittgenstein L. 385f, 471
Wolfson H. A. 400
Wolinski J. 33, 35f, 39, 43, 45f
Wood H. G. 6, 264
Wyrwa D. 6
Zachhuber J.

53, 263, 310, 313

III. INDEX VERBORUM

III.1. VERBA GRAECA
gayw 37, 347, 417, 509
gennhsa 23, 25f, 28, 31, 53, 205,

210213, 224, 239f, 268, 309, 314f,

318, 331, 365367, 372, 374, 389,
399, 406, 476, 498
gnhtow 314f
gnnhtow 11, 23, 142, 206, 208f,
211215, 217, 219, 224, 243, 251,
259, 268, 284, 308, 314f, 317, 322,
342, 352, 356, 358, 365367, 370,
374, 378, 387389, 394, 399, 405f,
476f, 496, 498
genntvw 240, 373f, 498
gnvsa 422
diforow 349f
dolesxa 341
duton 459
yanasa 9, 339, 348351, 354f
ynatow 349353
anigma 498
asyhsiw 303, 363, 446
asyhtn 7, 343f
ata 287, 322, 346, 407
an 160, 435
axm 401
katonmastow 407
kolouya 481
ktiston 435, 481
lyeia 387f, 511
lhyw 388
llovsiw 345
llotrvsiw 351
logon 114
mfibola 343
nbasiw 229, 231, 356
nabasmw 448

nasyhtow 425
naklouyon 446f
nkrasiw 482
naloga 347, 456
nalgvw 346f
nlusiw 356
narxow 243, 322, 326, 345f, 356,

373, 405, 407

nedeon 420
nodow 231
noia 358
nmoiow 508
ntidiaresiw 377
ntyesiw 501
ntlhciw 224
nupstatow 319, 511
ja 284
ratow 351, 450
riston 243245, 330
payw 345
peira 323
pergrapton 322
plostaton 423
plw 36
pstasiw 339, 349f
pousa 339, 353, 355
pfasiw 209, 386
poxvristikw 345
rskon 290
ryron 280
rxtupow 513
rx 46, 326, 356, 407, 435437
sbeia 352, 358
sgkritow 389
sunrthtow 240
smatow 345f, 351
telethtow 345f
treptow 345

indices

550

atalyeia 42
atolgow 42
atosofa 42
faresiw 346f, 352, 416, 449
fyarsa 9, 26, 87, 141, 309, 331,

408

fyartw

87, 141, 345f, 350352,

408

fyartow

347

baymw 229, 232

baymw 231
blturi 11f, 390
bolhsiw 436
gnesiw 208, 302
gennhyew 32, 435
gnnhma 491
gnnhsiw 342, 353
gennhtw 341, 353, 477
gnow 4, 369
gnsiw 131, 224, 287f, 339, 343, 448
grmma (ciln g.) 251, 253, 255
dhmiourgw 18, 66, 347
diakona 483
dikonow 475
dinoia 8, 25, 240, 254, 280, 288f,

344, 348, 356, 363, 451, 470, 497

distasiw 210, 253f, 351

disthma 210, 331, 435, 441,

462464, 466, 468, 496

diasthmatikw 323, 345

diafor 355, 369
diacesyai 283
didskalow 252, 475
dijodow (logika d.) 295, (noer d.)

424

dikaiosnh 509
dja 363, 461
dnamiw 290, 394, 438, 492, 461,
463f, 509, ( dianohtik d.) 287f,
(pinohtik ka eretik d.) 252,
(zvopoiw d.) 308, (logik d.) 251,

255, 285, 287f

347

dunatw

edvlon 242, 497

e`dow 4, 296, 420f
ekasa 450, 462
ekn 412f
t enai 387f, (pw enai) 413
kklhsa 484
mfasiw 6, 13f, 300

nrgeia

8, 25, 29, 31, 141f, 256,

260, 263, 266, 272, 274276, 288,
309, 330, 428, 433f, 440, 442, 347,
456, 470, 510
nergen 289, 292
nnoia 18, 27, 39, 48, 283, 341, 343,
354, 356, 393f, 409, 449f
nnoen 347
nuprxein 7
nvsiw 482
jiw 342
jousa 19, 286f
pgein 377
pagvg 242, 369
panabasmw 228
pkeina 419
pekteinmenow 232
penymhsiw 14
pbasiw 448
pibol 308, 314, 320, 323, 331
piyuma 231
pilogismw 308, 390, 396
pinoen 9, 18, 24, 62, 284, 322,
364, 370, 373, 467
pinhma 364f
pinohmatikw 365
pinhsiw 364
pinohton 365
pinohtw
365
pnoia 320, 2148, 53, 62, 210,
213215, 217, 219, 224, 239243,
249, 251253, 255, 258, 260266,
268, 270, 272, 277, 283f, 287f, 295,
298f, 307309, 312, 315f, 318, 320,
330332, 334, 336, 363375, 384,
387397, 430, 445448, 451,
457459, 462466, 468471, 473,
495, 498, 503, 505f, 508511, 513f
pinohtikw 274, 394
pishmevsiw 288
pistmh 461
rasmitaton 411
stasiw 448
ternuma 391
erskein 341
rmhnea 345
esbeia 30
esebw 346
farmttein 283
fodow 242, 369, (eretik .) 15,
241, 249
xein (t prw t pvw .) 289
ziznion

160

indices
ynatow 352f
ylhma 254, 481f
yeologen 411
yeologa 22, 29, 473475, 478,

480482, 484

yeolgow 473, 475478

yeopoia 477
yeoprepw 414
yeofneia 292
ysiw 281, 297, 346, 352, 394
yevra 247, 339, 343, 463, 473, 481,

512
t dizon 31
dithw 40
dvma 28, 31, 260, 262, 513
drusiw 448
sostsiow 413
stimow 413
stora 29, (eaggelik .) 29
xnow 412
kallifvna 294
kllow 347
kalw 142
katlhciw 393
katanoen 41, 347
katxrhsiw 323, 418
knvsiw 465f
khdemona 248
klmaj 228, 230, 232
koinn 28, 31
koinvna 352
krsiw 193
lektn 299, 303
logikw 285, 287f, 295
logismw 236, 357, 388, 451f
logografa 385
lgow 14, 114, 261, 288, 296, 300,

308, 319, 332, 343f, 363, 390, 407,

451, 465, 469f, 475, 477f, 501, 509,
513, (tolmhrw l.) 417
t mayhmatik 7
meyriow 383
mesthw 280
metafor 268
metousa 199, 340, 357
mmhsiw 510f
mnmh 468
noen 19, 291, 301, 347
noerw 344

551

nhma

13f, 17, 25, 241, 261, 288,

300, 323, 345347, 497, 501
nhsiw 4, 299, 347, 363
nohtn 41, 343, 449, 482
nmow 18, 281, 289
nomoythw 296
now 3, 7, 245, 288, 322, 343, 345,
423426, 431, 461, 495
jhr

380

okthw 475
okeithw 345
okonoma 22, 29, 48, 262, 270f, 475,

479481, 483, 509f

okonmow 481
lon di lou 17
mglvssow 18
movma 300
mologa 387, 476
moosiow 32, 434, 470
mofnvw 343
mvnuma 268, 456, 500
noma 14, 18, 24f, 28, 193, 250,

254f, 268, 280f, 288, 297, 299, 351,

387, 394, 406, 413, 456, 498, 501,
513
nomzein 280, 284, 301
rganon 300
rektn (mnon .) 412
rismw 369
rm (. dianoaw) 289
osa 6, 9, 24f, 28, 3032, 40, 42,
49, 53, 62, 205f, 208215, 256, 260,
262, 266, 268f, 275, 297, 309, 315,
317f, 325f, 332, 347f, 354356, 388,
406f, 416, 420, 429, 430, 433f, 438,
447, 449, 456, 486, 490, 496, 498,
513
osidhw 9, 348
pyhma 300
pyow 303, 345
pantodnamow 512
parbasiw 183
parnoia 13
partasiw 345
psxein 289
perigraf 36, 40, 331, 345
pstiw 223, 447f, 476
plrvma 484
pnema 9, 308
pohma 434
poihyew 32

indices

552
t poin 24
poithw 28, 30, 49
polueidw 272
polusnyetow 272
polunumon 389, 394
porzein 322, 380
prgma 18, 25, 37, 41, 193, 254f,

290, 339, 345, 348, 394

prjiw 254, 280

proaresiw 18, 19, 242, 254, 289,

373

proainiow 345
prlhciw 303, 393
prnoia 255
prosagoreein 380
prosggnesyai 290, 324
proshgora 18, 24, 261, 280, 283f,

290f, 294, 297, 345

prsyesiw 391
prosn 413
prsociw 160
prsvpon 9
prtasiw 403
profor 240, 387
t pw 24
=ma

17f, 239, 254, 280, 288, 345f

shmainmenon

12f , 14, 41, 46, 299,

377, 501

shmanon 280, 299, 303

smantron 288
shmasa 406, 413, 498
shmeon 288, 300, 348f
ski (s. tn pragmtvn) 290
skindacw 11, 12, 390
skopw 240
sofa 248, 350f, 359, 509
sfisma 403
strhsiw 339342, 345, 348355,

419, 490

suggneia 350f, 412

sugkatyesiw 352
sullogismw 399, 402f
sumbebhkw 416, 439
smbolon 300
sumprasma 403
sumplok 296
sumfua 340, 354f
sunptein 254, 439
sunfeia 254f, 441
sndesmow 280
sunyeia 290, 354, 446
sunhmmnon 8, 254, 469

suntoma 341
sxsiw 266, 311
sxetikn 318
tjiw 27, 475f, 481
txnh 344, 358
texnologa 341
texnolgow 385
trop 345
trpow 4, 93, 215
tugxnon 299, 303
tpow 93, 348, 351, 475
uoptvr 68
lh 299
parjiw 7, 215, 346
prxein 8, 9, 299
perxein 352
perox 339, 352
pobyra 229
pograf 209
pdeigma 497
pokemenon 14, 18, 25, 28, 31f, 42,

258, 262, 299, 309, 325, 330, 333,

344, 345, 351, 356, 439
plhciw 344, 345, 451, 481, 497
pstasiw 6, 9, 26, 31, 35, 40, 42,
67, 215, 240, 258, 264, 299, 307,
317, 348, 356, 377, 388, 427, 511,
(trew .) 9, 309
fistnai 5, 7f, 240, 299
fantasa 363
fyartw 350
fyor 345, 351, 353f
filanyrvpa 262, 270f, 292f, 479f
filosofa (jvyen f.) 248, (yik f.)
344, (yevrhtik f.) 344, (fusik f.)
344, ( per to ntow f.) 463
filsofow 483
filxristow 483
fsiw 8, 9, 1719, 250, 260, 271,

289f, 295, 297f, 300, 308, 316,

342346, 352f, 355, 357, 393f, 406,
413, 438, 447, 450, 453, 488, 476,
478, 495497
fusikw 394
fvn 41, 254, 288-290, 300, 303,
341, 343, 388, 390, 394, 469, 482,
501
xriw 262, 270f
xrsiw 193
xra 466

indices
xrhma (topikn x.) 345
xvrismw 345f, 349
cux 14, 282, 300
rismnow 420

III.2. VERBA LATINA

aevum 436
appellatio 39
beatitudo 314
bonitas 314
causa sui 314
clinamen 384
cognitio (rerum) 46, (verborum) 46
communiter 49
enarratio 46
excogitatio 393
atus vocis 11, 13, 210, 283
historia Iesu 44
innascibilis 318
intellectus (in i.) 258
intendere 392
intentio 390, 394f

553

inventio 393
iustitia 314
modus signicandi 336
multiplex in constitutione 510
proprie 49
principium 49
reductio (ad absurdum) 267, (ad innitum)
452f
res ( fundamentum in re) 10, 316, (in re)
258
sapientia 38
sobria ebrietas 448
subsistentia 40
subsistere 38
substantia 40
substantialiter 38
substratum 389
theologia (negativa) 421, (superlativa)
421
veritas 40
via inventionis 15
voces non signicativae 11f, 240

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67. Carriker, A. The Library of Eusebius of Caesarea. 2003. ISBN 90 04 13132 9
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