Options and Efficiency Author(s) : Stephen A. Ross Source: The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 90, No. 1 (Feb., 1976), Pp. 75-89 Published By: Stable URL: Accessed: 20/12/2014 08:54
Options and Efficiency Author(s) : Stephen A. Ross Source: The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 90, No. 1 (Feb., 1976), Pp. 75-89 Published By: Stable URL: Accessed: 20/12/2014 08:54
Options and Efficiency Author(s) : Stephen A. Ross Source: The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 90, No. 1 (Feb., 1976), Pp. 75-89 Published By: Stable URL: Accessed: 20/12/2014 08:54
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
Oxford University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Quarterly
Journal of Economics.
http://www.jstor.org
A. Ross
76
one grapefruit with one orange, this constraint has no force. Otherwise, opening separate markets would improve efficiency.
This result, however, must be qualified. On the one hand, many
of the states will be idiosyncratic to individuals, and events on these
states will be independent across individuals permitting a simplification of the efficient market structure. Malinvaud 3 has recently
confirmed this intuition and demonstrated that with large numbers
of individuals a simple insurance program in lieu of the theoretically
requisite complete contingency markets will remove this source of
inefficiency. Second, economists have now begun to consider explicitly the impact of transactions and set-up costs of an institutional sort on equilibrium and efficiency.4 If the introduction of a
contingent claims market will use more resources than it will save, in
an opportunity cost sense, by moving closer to efficiency, then within
the context of the institutional structure of the economy the absence
of the market is required for efficiency. Nevertheless, it is difficult
to believe that such costs would be so prohibitive as to prevent the
formation of nearly all contingent claims markets. Yet with the
exception of some insurance examples, contingent contracts are
difficult to find in actual markets. Even if we eliminate individualistic partitions of the state space, the number of states may greatly
exceed the number of assets, and competitive equilibrium could be
significantly inefficient.
The possibility of writing option contracts opens up new spanning opportunities. Although there are only a finite number of
marketed capital assets, shares of stock, bonds, or as we shall call
them "primitives," there is a virtual infinity of options or "derivative" assets that the primitives may generate. Furthermore, in
general, it is less costly to market a derived asset generated by a
primitive than to issue a new primitive, and there is at least some
reason to believe that options will be created until the gains are
outweighed by the set-up costs.
The main purpose of this paper will be to explore the relationship between primitive assets, derived options, and the attainment
of theoretical efficiency. We shall not be concerned explicitly with
transactions costs, but the relative cheapness of forming options, as
opposed to primitives, underlies much of the analysis. The basic
framework and definitions are presented in Section I and used to
3. E. Malinvaud, "Markets for an Exchange Economy with Individual
Risks," Econometrica, XXXXI (May 1973), 383-410.
4. See, for example, F. H. Hahn, "Equilibrium with Transaction Costs,"
Econometrica, XXXIX (May 1971), 417-40.
77
I
In the state-space framework, commodities are viewed as functions on the underlying state space. For simplicity and without loss
of generality, we shall interpret each random vector as a security
yielding returns denominated in dollars in each state of the world
per unit investment. A typical asset x, then, is a map from the state
space f2 to the line E:
x: s-4E.
If the range of x is restricted to E+, then the market is organized so
that the asset offers limited liability. We shall assume that the
state space ? is finite, that a= {01, . . . , 64}, and that there are n
primitive assets {1, . . . , xn}. The set of primitives is assumed to
be invariant and cannot be altered, i.e., production decisions are
precluded. We shall use X to denote both the mxn state-space tableau, with entries xij, the gross return on asset j in state i, and the
set of n primitives.
Associated with X is the generated set,
Px
{Z I (aqaEEn) Z= Xa},
of derived assets attainable by forming portfolios a of the primitive
assets. In the definition of Px we permit short sales. We could, however, restrict z to be nonnegative to avoid the possibility of bankruptcy in any state. With this restriction Px is a polyhedral cone
in the positive orthant E+8, and the results below are unaltered.
If X has rank (or dimension) p (X), then Px lies in and spans a
subspace of dimension p(X). If p (X) = m, then there will exist a
matrix of portfolios A, such that
XA = Im,
i.e., X will possess a right inverse. This is equivalent to our being
able to combine the primitives so as to form a complete set of pure
78
contingent claims offering a return in only one state and zero in all
the other states.
We shall assume that each of the states is critical in the economy
in the sense that all of the states must be spanned (by contingent
claims) to attain full Pareto efficiency. A sufficient condition for
this to be true is that for each state there is some individual who
values wealth in that state (and is not satiated). In an important
sense, though, it is difficult to see how a state could appear in the
tableau without its being critical for efficiency. States are merely
elements in a minimal mathematical construct Q, chosen to be just
large enough to explain observed realizations. If a state appears in
Q., it is required to explain anticipated realizations, and as such
must be critical. The criterion for efficiency then is that there exist
assets to span all the states.
If, as is typical, there are more states than primitives, then we
cannot span all of the states, and competitive equilibrium will be
inefficient. Even though X fails to span Q, however, it may be
possible to augment the rank of X sufficiently by forming options
on the existing primitives. This possibility is the focus of this paper.
Of course, we are neglecting the consideration that the creation
of markets in new assets will be costly. In general, efficiency must
be assessed across alternative market and institutional structures.
If costs are sufficiently high, it will be inefficient to open all the
markets even if it does permit all the states to be spanned. (If
costs are low, however, unless markets have significant public goods
aspects, it is not clear why they will not be open in competition.)
Our concern, though, will be solely with whether pure, or theoretical,
efficiency is attainable. We shall use a crude ordinal notion of cost
to establish a taxonomy of options. In effect, we shall prohibit
some options as exorbitant in their resource use, and those that are
allowed will be considered as costlessly marketable.
To begin with a concrete example, consider a call option written
on an asset x. A call option promises a gross payment of
c (x;a)
max{x () -a, O}
in state of the world 0, where a is the exercise or threshold price.
Figure I illustrates the option contract. If
a> max x
0
then co(x;a)= 0, and the call option will have a zero gross rate of
return in all states. For
O<a< max x
0
79
the gross return will depend on the price of the option, which will be
determined in the equilibrium. For all (positive) prices, though,
the gross return will be proportional to c0(x;a), and this is all that
we need to know for our purposes.
aa
c~~~~~~~~~~~~~~e
( x; a)
0~
Xe
FIGURE,
i.e., a call with a zero exercise price is equivalent to. the primitive
asset on which it is written.
Similarly, we can define a.put on an asset x by its gross payment,
pa (xha) ~-max {0. a -x (0) },
where a is the exercise price of the put. Inversely to a call, for a
limited liability asset
pao(x; ;)
= 0,
80
x=
3_
since p(X)
By itself X cannot span = {01,02,03},
calls on x with exercise prices 1 and 2, we have
O?I
c (x;1)
1 <3. Forming
and
0
c (x;2) =
8_
2 1 0
_3 2 1_
is full, and the call options permit us to attain efficiency.
[x
C
c(X;l!.
c(x;2)]=
2
2
3-a_
a
if 2<a<3.
_3-a_
81
X: nyEnl
then a general or multiple option M is a mapping
M: EnsuE
giving a composite mapping M(X(0)) on states. It is important to
emphasize that an option's return depends only on the return on the
underlying assets it is written on and not on which state occurred.
Letting M denote the class of general options and Ox(M) the space
spanned by X and all general options that can be written on X, we
have the following simple result.
1. The dimension of Ox (M) is full if and only if no two
rows of X are identical.
THEOREM
O if j=/.i
I1 if j-i
and
[ GI (X1i)G2 (X2)
-Im
spanning all the states.
. Gm(Xm)]
Q.E.D.
Theorem 1 is somewhat obvious, but it does serve to formalize
the conjecture that a sufficient condition for spanning n is that for
any two states there be some asset that distinguishes between them.
It is clear that X is not necessarily of full rank simply because
(for all i,j) (alk)
Xik=,-1Xjk)
82
QUARTERLY
JOURNAL
OF ECONOMICS
THEOREM
(1)
y= >
wa
y=1
~co(X ;Xi_1),
(2)
y7jZO
83
Nl/(Wl.Wo)
for I<i<kl
N,
Nk
+1
N1-S (Xkl
+ 1 -S X)
Xkl+l-X1
Y.
i= 1
yic .
The productivity assumption assures us that the calls are not illusory and the call options, alone, span N. A similar argument holds
for put options.
Q.E.D.
If X is restricted to limited liability assets and we are not permitted to write calls with negative exercise prices, then Theorem 2
is no longer true. Consider the following example.
Example 3. Let
0 1 0
O 1 1
1 1
and
11
is of full rank. The example is not unique, and with limited liability
we can span the simple options by using both puts and calls.
84
3. Let Nx denote the space spanned by all the simple options written on the primitives X, and let Ox denote the space
spanned by the put and call options that can be written on X.
It follows that
Nx= Ox,
even if X is limited liability and exercise prices are nonnegative.
THEOREM
xl
i_ in the
THEOREM
85
min b6>o,
where
A a
{a I (XO-XO)a =O} .
If we cannot obtain a solution to (3a) for any a, then a==En. Since
a finite union of linear manifolds cannot have a dimension in excess
of the highest dimension among the component sets, (ao,o')
=
As=
En.
86
QUARTERLY
JOURNAL
OF ECONOMICS
tion for efficiency is that there exists a single portfolio a with the
property that options written on it can span Q. This result permits
us to link the simple options to the more general ones.
THEOREM
YEOpX.
Q.E.D.
In other words, by increasing the domain of simple options to
include portfolios of primitive assets, we can span the same space
with simple options as with multiple options. (Notice, of course,
that
Ox (M) =?px (M),
X=
1 1
1 2
2 1
2 2
87
1~~~~~
2
11
226
KY0
0KK
=LT
11I0
A_= [X
|C1 |C2]
1 2 0
ol.
2 11 01
2 2 11
Since
A1+A4 =A%2+A3
xi =
1
3
2
We can take
r1 0 -1 0
L0 1
0l
0 0 -I]
Oxi
{X I Lix = }.
Proof. If ycO,
then
Yk=Yl
if Xkf=X1,
88
THEOREM
y
n
. . .,
n
i=j
an.)
z aLi=
. . .
=anLn.
Q.E.D.
Condition (5) is actually fairly straightforward to check in
practice. By performing column operations, each (kxm) Li can be
reduced to echelon form in k operations of the type "add column k
to column 1 if there is a row 0 with a 1 in column k and a -1 in
column 1." Condition (5) can now be verified by checking if any
unit vector appears in all of the reduced Li matrices.
Applying Theorem 6 to Example 4, we have
0
L2
0 1 -1
rtlo wt-1
to
_1g
89
OF PENNSYLVANIA
6. Edward L. Schrems, "The Sufficiency of Existing Financial Instruments for Pareto-Optimal Risk Allocation," Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University,
1973.
7. See Robert C. Merton, "The Theory of Rational Option Pricing,"
Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, IV (Spring 1973), 141-83.