Eristingcol Vs Court of Appeals

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LOURDES L.

ERISTINGCOL,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 167702


Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
TINGA,*
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

- versus -

COURT OF APPEALS and RANDOLPHC. LIMJOCO,


Respondents.

her building plans and acceptance of the construction bond


and architects fee, Eristingcol started constructing a house
on her lot with concrete canopy directly above the main
door and highway; that for alleged violation of its
Construction Rules and Regulations (or CRR) on Set Back
Line vis-a-vis the canopy easement, UVAI imposed on her a
penalty of P400,000.00 and barred her workers and
contractors from entering the village and working on her
property; that the CRR, particularly on Set Back Line, is
contrary to law; and that the penalty is unwarranted and
excessive.

Promulgated:
March 20, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court which assails the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision [1] in CA-G.R. SP. No.
64642 dismissing Civil Case No. 99-297 before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) for lack of jurisdiction.
The facts, as narrated by the CA, are simple.
[Petitioner Lourdes] Eristingcol is an owner of a
residential
lot
in Urdaneta Village (or
village), Makati City and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 208586. On the other hand, [respondent Randolph]
Limjoco, [Lorenzo] Tan and [June] Vilvestre were the former
president and chairman of the board of governors (or
board), construction committee chairman and village
manager of [Urdaneta Village Association Inc.] UVAI,
respectively. UVAI is an association of homeowners
at Urdaneta Village.
[Eristingcols] action [against UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and
Vilvestre] is founded on the allegations that in compliance
with the National Building Code and after UVAIs approval of

On February 9, 1999, or a day after the filing of the


complaint, the parties reached a temporary settlement
whereby UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre executed an
undertaking which allowed Eristingcols workers, contractors
and suppliers to leave and enter the village, subject only to
normal security regulations of UVAI.
On February 26, 1999, UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and
Vilvestre filed a motion to dismiss on ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. They
argued that it is the Home Insurance Guaranty Corporation
(or HIGC)[2] which has jurisdiction over intra-corporate
disputes involving homeowners associations, pursuant to
Exec. Order No. 535, Series of 1979, as amended by Exec.
Order No. 90, Series of 1986.
Opposing the motion, Eristingcol alleged, among
others, that UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre did not
comply with the mandatory provisions of Secs. 4 and 6,
Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and are
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the [RTC]
after they voluntarily appeared therein and embraced
its authority by agreeing to sign an Undertaking.
On May 20, 1999, Eristingcol filed an amended
complaint by (i) impleading Manuel Carmona (or Carmona)
and Rene Cristobal (or Cristobal), UVAIs newly-elected
president and chairman of the board and newly-designated
construction committee chairman, respectively, as additional
On May 25, 1999, Eristingcol filed a motion for
production and inspection of documents, which UVAI,
Limjoco, Tan, Vilvestre, Carmona and Cristobal opposed.
The motion sought to compel [UVAI and its officers] to
produce the documents used by UVAI as basis for the

imposition of the P400,000.00 penalty on Eristingcol as well


as letters and documents showing that UVAI had informed
the other homeowners of their violations of the CRR.

Whether or not the RTC or HLURB has jurisdiction over the case?

Held:

On May 26, 1999, the [RTC] issued an order which


denied defendants the motion to dismiss and plaintiffs
motion to declare defendants in default and contempt.

On this score alone, the present petition could have been dismissed
outright.[5] However, to settle the issue of jurisdiction, we have opted to
dispose of this case on the merits.

The [RTC] ratiocinated that [UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and


Vilvestre] may not assail its jurisdiction after they voluntarily
entered their appearance, sought reliefs therein, and
embraced its authority by agreeing to sign an undertaking to
desist from prohibiting (Eristingcols) workers from entering
the village. In so ruling, it applied the doctrine enunciated
in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.

Well-settled in jurisprudence is the rule that in determining which


body has jurisdiction over a case, we should consider not only the status or
relationship of the parties, but also the nature of the question that is the
subject of their controversy.[6] To determine the nature of an action and which

On June 7, 1999, Eristingcol filed a motion reiterating


her earlier motion for production and inspection of
documents.

court has jurisdiction, courts must look at the averments of the complaint or
petition and the essence of the relief prayed for.[7] Thus, we examine the
pertinent allegations in Eristingcols complaint, specifically her amended

On June 8, 1999, [UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre]


moved for partial reconsideration of the order dated May 26,
1999. Eristingcol opposed the motion.

complaint, to wit:
Eristingcols contention is wrong.

On March 24, 2001, the [RTC] issued an order


granting Eristingcols motion for production and inspection of
documents, while on March 26, 2001, it issued an order
denying [UVAIs, Limjocos, Tans and Vilvestres] motion for
partial reconsideration.

Ostensibly, Eristingcols complaint, designated as one for declaration


of nullity, falls within the regular courts jurisdiction. However, we have, on
more than one occasion, held that the caption of the complaint is not

On May 10, 2001, [UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre]


elevated the dispute before [the CA] via [a] petition
for certiorari alleging that the [RTC] acted without jurisdiction
in issuing the orders of May 26, 1999 and March 24 and 26,
2001.[3]

determinative of the nature of the action.[9]


A scrutiny of the allegations contained in Eristingcols complaint
reveals that the nature of the question subject of this controversy only
superficially delves into the validity of UVAIs Construction Rules. The
[4]

The CA issued the herein assailed Decision reversing the RTC Order and

complaint actually goes into the proper interpretation and application of

dismissing Eristingcols complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

UVAIs by-laws, specifically its construction rules. Essentially, the conflict


between the parties arose as Eristingcol, admittedly a member of UVAI, now

Hence, this appeal positing a sole issue for our resolution:

wishes to be exempt from the application of the canopy requirement set forth
in UVAIs Construction Rules. Significantly, Eristingcol does not assail the

Issue:

height restriction of UVAIs Construction Rules, as she has readily complied


therewith.

To further highlight the distinction in this case, the TRO hearing was
held on February 9, 1999, a day after the filing of the complaint. On even
date, the parties reached a temporary settlement reflected in the

In stark contrast, the relationship between the parties in the instant

Undertaking. Fifteen days thereafter, defendants, including Limjoco, filed a

case is well-established. Given this admitted relationship, the privity of

Motion to Dismiss. Certainly, this successive and continuous chain of events

contract between UVAI and Eristingcol is palpable, despite the latters deft

cannot be characterized as laches as would bar defendants from questioning

phraseology of its primary cause of action as a declaration of nullity of UVAIs

the RTCs jurisdiction.

Construction Rules.
In fine, based on the allegations contained in Eristingcols complaint, it
SECs original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving
controversies
[15]

arising

from

intra-corporate

or

partnership

relations.

Thereafter, with the advent of Republic Act No. 8763, the foregoing

powers and responsibilities vested in the HIGC, with respect to homeowners


associations, were transferred to the HLURB.
As regards the defendants supposed embrace of the RTCs jurisdiction

is the HLURB, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over this case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 64642 is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

by appearing thereat and undertaking to desist from prohibiting Eristingcols


workers from entering the village, suffice it to state that the invocation of the
doctrine in Tijam, et al. v. Sibonghanoy, et al.[16] is quite a long stretch.
The landmark case of Tijam is, in fact, only an exception to the general
rule that an objection to the courts jurisdiction over a case may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings, as the lack of jurisdiction affects the very
authority of the court to take cognizance of a case. [17] In that case, the Surety
filed a Motion to Dismiss before the CA, raising the question of lack of
jurisdiction for the first timefifteen years after the action was commenced in
the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu. Indeed, in several stages of the
proceedings in the CFI, as well as in the CA, the Surety invoked the
jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief, and even submitted its
case for a final adjudication on the merits. Consequently, it was barred
bylaches from invoking the CFIs lack of jurisdiction.

(E.O. No. 535, which amended Republic Act No. 580 creating the HIGC,
transferred to the HIGC the regulatory and administrative functions over
homeowners associations originally vested with the SEC as well as
controversies arising from intra-corporate or partnership relations. Thereafter,
with Republic Act No. 8763, the foregoing powers and responsibilities vested
in the HIGC, with respect to homeowners associations, were transferred to
the HLURB.)

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