Poverty Alleviation Programmes in India: A Social Audit: Review Article
Poverty Alleviation Programmes in India: A Social Audit: Review Article
Poverty Alleviation Programmes in India: A Social Audit: Review Article
The review highlights the poverty alleviation programmes of the government in the post-economic
reform era to evaluate the contribution of these programmes towards reducing poverty in the country.
The poverty alleviation programmes are classified into (i) self-employment programmes; (ii) wage
employment programmes; (iii) food security programmes; (iv) social security programmes; and (v)
urban poverty alleviation programmes. The parameter used for evaluation included utilization of
allocated funds, change in poverty level, employment generation and number or proportion of
beneficiaries. The paper attempts to go beyond the economic benefit of the programmes and analyzes
the social impact of these programmes on the communities where the poor live, and concludes that
too much of government involvement is actually an impediment. On the other hand, involvement of
the community, especially the poor has led to better achievement of the goals of the programmes.
Such endeavours not only reduced poverty but also empowered the poor to find their own solutions
to their economic problems. There is a need for decentralization of the programmes by strengthening
the panchayat raj institutions as poverty is not merely economic deprivation but also social
marginalization that affects the poor most.
Key words Poverty alleviation - public distribution system - self-employment - social marginalization - social security wage employment
Introduction
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because the price gap between the TPDS and the open
market was wider than the price difference between
UPDS and the open market price15. Even the urban poor
community is not aware of what they are entitled in the
PDS. As a result, the fair price shop owners cheated
them. The situation must be worse among the rural poor.
Another problem was the purchasing power of the
poor. The food grain is supplied to them once in a
fortnight. It is difficult for the families living below
poverty line to buy food grains for 2 wk in one go. Under
the TPDS programme, the quota of food grains was
increased to 20 kg. The very poor do not have the
purchasing power to buy such large quantity of food
grains at a time. This resulted in many not availing the
PDS and the unutilized food grain was diverted to the
open market.
Targeting was a major problem in the TPDS
programme. According to Jha and Srinivasan15, the
selection of beneficiaries was not transparent and the
basis for selection was too complicated for the local
officials to administer. It also involves high cost in
identifying the poorest among the poor. As TPDS
narrowly targets at the household level, it requires very
detailed data for these households and a complex and
expensive means testing process.
Apart from the issues of transparency,
administrative complications and high cost, social and
political factors played a role in identifying BPL
families. Caste factor played a role in rural areas. In
urban areas, the issue of residency played a role.
Those who are not residents but living in the slum
are not considered for the food subsidy. They are mainly
migrants. Those who are not in favour of the ruling
leadership were not included in the list of BPL. In urban
areas, those who are not living in dwellings but on the
roadside (pavement dweller) are the poorest among the
poor but they are excluded from the TPDS because they
do not have an address in the city.
According to Parikh16 a majority of the poorest of
the bottom 20 per cent of the households in the north and
north-eastern States do not procure any food grains from
the PDS. Dutta & Ramaswami8 found that 20 per cent of
the poor in Maharashtra do not buy food grains from
PDS due to lack of access. Ramaswamy14 had calculated
the cost of subsidy and found that it costs Rs. 3.14 and
Rs. 4.00 to transfer a rupee to the target group of bottom
40 per cent in Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra
respectively. The cost of food subsidy is high because of
targeting errors and lapses in implementation.
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References
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Reprint requests: Dr C.A.K. Yesudian, Professor & Dean (R&D), Tata Institute of Social Sciences, P.O. Box 8318, Deonar
Mumbai 400088, India
e-mail: [email protected]