CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM), petitioner, vs.

EUSEBIO
VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First
Instance of Manila, respondents
G.R. No. L-5
September 17, 1945
Facts: Petitioner Co Kim Cham had as pending civil Case initiated
during the time of the Japanese occupation. After the liberation of
Manila Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on his
case saying that the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944 of
Gen Douglas MacArthur has invalidated and nullified all judicial
proceedings and judgements of the courts of the Philippines and
without the enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct
Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not under the rules of international law the judicial
acts and proceedings of the courts during a de facto government
are good and valid.
2. Whether it was the intention of the Gen McArthur to annul and
void thereby all judgments and judicial proceedings of the courts
established in the Philippines during the Japanese military
occupation.
3. Whether the present courts of the Commonwealth, which were
the same court existing prior to, and continued during, the
Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, may continue those
proceedings pending in said courts at the time the Philippines were
reoccupied and liberated by the United States and Filipino forces,
and the Commonwealth of the Philippines were reestablished in the
Islands.
HELD:
1. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts
and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments of a de facto government are good and valid. The
doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his
work on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): The right of one
belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy while in
its military possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows
directly from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the
Constitution or political institutions of the conqueror, for authority
to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his
possession, during its military occupation, nor for the rules by
which the powers of such government are regulated and limited.
Such authority and such rules are derived directly from the laws
war, as established by the usage of the of the world, and confirmed

by the writings of publicists and decisions of courts in fine, from

the law of nations. . . . The municipal laws of a conquered territory,
or the laws which regulate private rights, continue in force during
military occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or
changed by the acts of conqueror. . . . He, nevertheless, has all the
powers of a de factogovernment, and can at his pleasure either
change the existing laws or make new ones.
According to that well-known principle in international law, the fact
that a territory which has been occupied by an enemy comes again
into the power of its legitimate government of sovereignty, does
not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by
an invader, which for one reason or another it is within his
competence to do. Thus judicial acts done under his control, when
they are not of a political complexion, administrative acts so done,
to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his
control, and the various acts done during the same time by private
persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good.
That not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto
governments, which are not of a political complexion, are and
remain valid after reoccupation of a territory occupied by a
belligerent occupant, is confirmed by the Proclamation issued by
General Douglas MacArthur on October 23, 1944, which declares
null and void all laws, regulations and processes of the
governments established in the Philippines during the Japanese
occupation, for it would not have been necessary for said
proclamation to abrogate them if they were invalid ab initio.
2. NO. The phrase processes of any other government is broad
and may refer not only to the judicial processes, but also to
administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of
the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies
established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking
into consideration the fact that, as above indicated, according to
the well-known principles of international law all judgements and
judicial proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of the
de facto governments during the Japanese military occupation were
good and valid before and remained so after the occupied territory
had come again into the power of the titular sovereign, it should be
presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of
General Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase processes of any
other government in said proclamation, to refer to judicial
processes, in violation of said principles of international law.
3. YES. Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial
administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as
military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not

usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but
continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of
the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to
respect. An Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary
of War states that in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not
usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be
administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were
before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as
possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion. And Taylor in
this connection says: From a theoretical point of view it may be
said that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his
arbitrary will for all preexisting forms of government, legislative,
executive and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such
arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations
which compels the conqueror to continue local laws and institution
so far as military necessity will permit. Undoubtedly, this practice
has been adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and business
of society may not be unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as
belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and the
government established by the occupant of transient character.
If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands
prior to the Japanese military occupation had been continued
during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine
Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of the
Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts, which had
become reestablished and conceived of as having in continued
existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by
virtue of the principle of postliminy, may continue the proceedings
in cases then pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting
a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said
proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in speaking of said
principles a state or other governmental entity, upon the removal
of a foreign military force, resumes its old place with its right and
duties substantially unimpaired. . . . Such political resurrection is
the result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to
regain their original shape upon removal of the external force,
and subject to the same exception in case of absolute crushing of
the whole fibre and content.
DECISION: WRIT OF MANDAMUS IS ISSUED to the judge of the Court
Of First Instance of Manila ordering him to take cognizance and
continue to final judgment the proceedings in Case No. 3012.
3 Kinds of De Facto Government:

1. Established through Rebellion Governments gets

possession and control through the force of the voice of the
majority and maintains itself rightful government
2. Established through Occupation (PARAMOUNT FORCE)
Maintained by the military forces who invade and occupy the
territory of the enemy.
3. Established through Insurrection Established as an
independent government by the inhabitants of the country who rise
in insurrection against the parent state.
Effects of a belligerent occupation
According to the precepts of the Hague Conventions, the
belligerent occupant:
(i)
possesses all the powers of a de facto government
(ii)
can suspend the old laws and promulgate new ones and
make such changes in the old as he may see fit;
(iii)
the municipal laws in force in the country must be
respected, unless absolutely prevented by the
circumstances prevailing in the occupied territory .i.e.
affect private rights of person and property and provide
for the punishment of crime);
(iv)
laws of a political nature or affecting political relations
are considered as suspended during the military
occupation (i.e. right of assembly, the right to bear arms,
the freedom of the press, and the right to travel freely in
the territory occupied)
(v)
local ordinary tribunals are authorized to continue
administering justice; judges and other judicial officers
are kept in their posts if they accept the authority of the
belligerent occupant or are required to continue in their
positions under the supervision of the military or civil
authorities appointed.
(vi)
There is no transfer of sovereignty during a belligerent
occupation.
The
occupation,
being
essentially
provisional, does not serve to transfer sovereignty over
the territory controlled. The de jure government, during
the period of occupancy, is deprived of the power to
exercise its rights as such
(Note: There is no suspension of sovereignty during a
belligerent occupation, but merely the suspension of the
exercise of sovereignty by the de jure government
Great Britain-Costa Rica Arbitral Tribunal (Tinoco
Arbitration case)
OPINION AND AWARD OF WILLIAM H. TAFT, SOLE ARBITRATOR.

Washington, D.C., October 18, 1923.

Facts: In January, 1917, the Government of Costa Rica, under
President Alfredo Gonzalez was overthrown by Frederico Tinoco, the
Secretary of War. Gonzalez fled. Tinoco assumed power, called an
election, and established a new constitution in June, 1917. His
government continued until August, 1919, when Tinoco retired, and
left the country. His government fell in September following. After a
provisional government under one Barquero, the old constitution was
restored and elections held under it. The restored government is a
signatory to this treaty of arbitration.
On the 22nd of August, 1922, the Constitutional Congress of
the restored Costa Rican Government passed a law known as Law of
Nullities No. 41. It invalidated all contracts between the executive
power and private persons, made with or without approval of the
legislative power between January 27, 1917 and September 2, 1919,
covering the period of the Tinoco government. It also nullified the
legislative decree No. 12 of the Tinoco government, dated June 28,
1919, authorizing the issue of the fifteen million colones currency
notes. The colon is a Costa Rican gold coin or standard nominally
equal to forty-six and one-half cents of an American dollar, but it is
uncoined and the exchange value of the paper colon actually in
circulation is much less. The Nullities Law also invalidated the
legislative decree of the Tinoco government of July 8, 1919,
authorizing the circulation of notes of the nomination of 1,000
colones, and annulled all transactions with such colones bills between
holders and the state, directly or indirectly, by means of negotiation
or contract, if thereby the holders received value as if they were
ordinary bills of current issue.
The claim of Great Britain is that the Royal Bank of Canada
and the Central Costa Rica Petroleum Company are Britain
corporations whose shares are owned by British subjects; that the
Banco Internacional of Costa Rica and the Government of Costa Rica
are both indebted to the Royal Bank in the sum of 998,000 colones,
evidenced by 998 one thousand colones bills held by the Bank; that
the Central Costa Rica Petroleum Company owns, by due assignment,
a grant by the Tinoco government in 1918 of the right to explore for
an exploit oil deposits in Costa Rica, and that both the indebtedness
and the concession have been annulled without right by the Law of
Nullities and should be excepted from its operation. She asks an
award that she is entitled on behalf of her subjects to have the claim
of the bank paid, and the concession recognized and given effect by
the Costa Rican Government.
The Government of Costa Rica denies its liability for the acts
or obligations of the Tinoco government and maintains that the Law
of Nullities was a legitimate exercise of its legislative governing

power. It further denies the validity of such claims on the merits,

unaffected by the Law of Nullities.
Issues:
W/N Costa Rica is liable for the liabilities of the Tinoco
government
HELD: YES! Under the Principle of Continuity of States, the state is
bound by the engagements entered into by governments that have
ceased to exist. The restores government is generally liable for the
acts of the usurper.
Also changes in the government or the internal policy do not, as a
rule, affect its position in the International Law. Though the
government changes, the nation remains, with rights and
obligations unimpaired. Non-recognition by other nations of a
government claiming to be a national personality is usually
appropriate evidence that it has not attained the independence and
control entitling it by International Law to be classified as such. But
when recognition of a government is determined by inquiry, not
into its de facto sovereignty but into its illegitimacy or irregularity
of origin, their non-recognition loses evidential weight it cannot
outweigh evidence of the de facto character if a government.
Great Britain was able to sustain a claim against Costa Rica
because the contracts were made with Costa Rica not Tinoco.
Ratio:
Even an illegal government may bind a state to international
obligations. International law looks to the State, not the gov entity
w/in the state.
Caveat: when government in power contrary to international law,
not just domestic law, then doctrine of state continuity will not
generally apply.
Tinoco was a sovereign government. Even though some sates did
not recognize it that cannot outweigh the evidence disclosed that
de facto it was a government.
The question is not if the government abides by a constitution but
is: Has it established itself in such a way that all w/in the its
influence recognize its control, and that there is no opposing force
assuming to be a gov in its place
As long a it is the effective government of the state it is the
government of the state. Debts owed are not owed by the
government of the day but between the state the only legal entity
that is relevant is the state.

George W. Hopkins (USA) v. United Mexican States, 31

March 1926 (cited by Agpalo as U.S. v. Mexico)
See attached document
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897
Facts: In an 1892 revolution, General Hernandez deposed the
existing Venezuelangovernment and took control of Ciudad Bolivar,
where Pl Underhill, an Americancitizen, lived and ran a waterworks
system for the city. Underhill applied toHernandez, requesting a
passport to leave the city. Hernandez initially refused,but ultimately
granted it. When Underhill finally got back to the U.S. he broughtan
action to recover damages caused by his detention in Venezuela,
for allegedconfinement to his own house, and for certain alleged
assaults and affronts bysoldiers of Hernandez's army.
Holding/Reasoning: Court determined that Hernandez had acted
in his officialcapacity as a military commander so his actions were
those of the Venezuelangovernment. The Court therefore refused to
hear the claim against based on the Actof State Doctrine. The Court
reasoned, "Every sovereign state is bound to respectthe
independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one
countrywill not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of
another, done within itsown territory." Also, it didnt matter that it
was a revolution, and that thecommander may not have had
recognition at the time as the leader from outside theterritory.
What matters is that he succeeded and is now recognized as such.
Notes Court will not let case proceed in U.S. why?Use the int'l
reasoning - we should judge another country's actions if they have
justification for it within their own laws.Govt actor, and it occurred
in Venezuela. Therefore we should apply their law. Why apply U.S.
law? U.S. can make a jurisdictional claim b/c victim is American,
but b/c of act of state doctrine, we should leave it up to Venezuela
to deal with.
Full txt:
On a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.
In the early part of 1892 a revolution was initiated in
Venezuela, against the administration thereof, which the
revolutionists claimed had ceased to be the legitimate government.
The principal parties to this conflict were those who recognized

Palacio as their head, and those who followed the leadership of

Crespo. Gen. Hernandez belonged to the anti-administration party,
and commanded its forces in the vicinity of Ciudad Bolivar.
On the 8th of August, 1892, an engagement took place
between the armies of the two parties at Buena Vista, some seven
miles from Bolivar, in which the troops under Hernandez prevailed;
and, on the 13th of August, Hernandez entered Bolivar, and
assumed command of the city. All of the local officials had in the
meantime left, and the vacant positions were filled by Gen.
Hernandez, who from that date and during the period of the
transactions complained of, was the civil and military chief of the
city and district. In October the party in revolt had achieved
success generally, taking possession of the capital of Venezuela,
October 6th; and on October 23, 1892, the 'Crespo government,' so
called, was formally recognized as the legitimate government of
Venezuela by the United States.
George F. Underhill was a citizen of the United States, who
had constructed a waterworks system for the city of Bolivar, under
a contract with the government, and was engaged in supplying the
place with water; and he also carried on a machinery repair
business. Sometime after the entry of Gen. Hernandez, Underhill
applied to him, as the officer in command, for a passport to leave
the city. Hernandez refused this request, and requests made by
others in Underhill's behalf, until October 18th, when a passport
was given, and Underhill left the country.
This action was brought to recover damages for the
detention caused by reason of the refusal to grant the passport, for
the alleged confinement of Underhill to his own house, and for
certain alleged assaults and affronts by the soldiers of Hernandez's
army.
The cause was tried in the circuit court of the United States
for the Eastern district of New York, and on the conclusion of
plaintiff's case the circuit court ruled that upon the facts plaintiff
was not entitled to recover, and directed a verdict for defendant, on
the ground that 'because the acts of defendant were those of a
military commander, representing a de facto government in the
prosecution of a war, he was not civilly responsible therefor.'
Judgment having been rendered for defendant, the case was taken
to the circuit court of appeals, and by that court affirmed, upon the
ground 'that the acts of the defendant were the acts of the
government of Venezuela, and as such are not properly the subject
of adjudication in the courts of another government.' 26 U. S. App.
573. Thereupon the cause was brought to this court on certiorari.
Mr. Chief Justice FULLER, after stating the facts in the foregoing
language, delivered the opinion of the court.

Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence

of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done
within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such
acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by
sovereign powers as between themselves.
Nor can the principle be confined to lawful or recognized
governments or to cases where redress can manifestly be had
through public channels. The immunity of individuals from suits
brought in foreign tribunals for acts done within their own states, in
the exercise of governmental authority, whether as civil officers or
as military commanders, must necessarily extend to the agents of
governments ruling by paramount force as matter of fact. Where a
civil war prevails (that is, where the people of a country are divided
into two hostile parties, who take up arms and oppose one another
by military force), generally speaking, foreign nations do not
assume to judge of the merits of the quarrel. If the party seeking to
dislodge the existing government succeeds, and the independence
of the government it has set up is recognized, then the acts of such
government, from the commencement of its existence, are
regarded as those of an independent nation. If the political revolt
fails of success, still, if actual war has been waged, acts of
legitimate warfare cannot be made the basis of individual liability.
U. S. v. Rice, 4 Wheat. 246; Fleming v. Page, 9 How. 603; Thorington
v. Smith, 8 Wall. 1; Williams v.
Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176; Ford v. Surget, 97 U. S. 594; Dow v. Johnson,
100 U. S. 158; and other cases.
Revolutions or insurrections may inconvenience other
nations, but by accommodation to the facts the application of
settled rules is readily reached. And, where the fact of the
existence of war is in issue in the instance of complaint of acts
committed within foreign territory, it is not an absolute prerequisite
that that fact should be made out by an acknowledgment of
belligerency, as other official recognition of its existence may be
sufficient proof thereof. The Three Friends, 166 U. S. 1. In this case
the archives of the state department show that civil war was
flagrant in Venezuela from the spring of 1892, that the revolution
was successful, and that the
revolutionary government was
recognized by the United States as the government of the country;
it being, to use the language of the secretary of state a
communication to our minister to Venezuela, 'accepted by the
people, in the possession of the power of the nation, and fully
established.' That these were facts of which the court is bound to
take judicial notice, and for information as to which it may consult
the department of state, there can be no doubt. Jones v. U. S., 137
U. S. 202; Mighell v. Sultan of Jahore [1894] 1 Q. B. 149.

It is idle to argue that the proceedings of those who thus

triumphed should be treated as the acts of baditti, or mere mobs.
We entertain no doubt, upon the evidence, that Hernandez was
carrying on military operations in support of the revolutionary party.
It may be that adherents of that side of the controversy in the
particular locality where Hernandez was the leader of the
movement entertained a preference for him as the future executive
head of the nation, but that is besidi the question. The acts
complained of were the acts of a military commander representing
the authority of the revolutionary party as a government, which
afterwards succeeded, and was recognized by the United States.
We think the circuit court of appeals was justified in concluding
'that the acts of the defendant were the acts of the government of
Venezuela, and as such are not properly the subject of adjudication
in the courts of another government.'
The decisions cited on plaintiff's behalf are not in point.
Cases respecting arrests by military authority in the absence of the
prevalence of war, or the validity of contracts between individuals
entered into in aid of insurrection, or the right or revolutionary
bodies to vex the commerce of the world on its common highway
without incurring the penalties denounced on piracy, and the like,
do not involve the questions presented here.
We agree with the circuit court of appeals that 'the evidence
upon the trial indicated that the purpose of the defendant in his
treatment of the plaintiff was to coerce the plaintiff to operate his
waterworks and his repair works for the benefit of the community
and the revolutionary forces,' and that 'it was not sufficient to have
warranted a finding by the jury that the defendant was actuated by
malice or any personal or private motive,' and we concur in its
disposition of the rulings below. The decree of the circuit court is
affirmed.
Ford v. Surget, 97 U.S. 594 (1878)
Syllabus
1. The court reaffirms the doctrine in Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S.
176, that an enactment of the Confederate States, enforced as a
law of one of the states composing that confederation, is a statute
of such state within the meaning of the act regulating the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court over the judgments and decrees of the
state courts.
2. A., a resident of Adams County, Mississippi, whose cotton was
there burnt by B. in May, 1862, brought an action for its value
against the latter, who set up as a defense that that state, whereof
he was at that date a resident, was then in subjection to and under

the control of the "Confederate States;" that an act of their

congress, approved March 6, 1862, declared that it was the duty of
all military commanders in their service to destroy all cotton
whenever, in their judgment, the same should be about to fall into
the hands of the United States; that in obedience to that act, the
commander of their forces in Mississippi issued an order, directed
to his subordinate officers in that state, to burn all cotton along the
Mississippi River likely to fall into the hands of the forces of the
United States; that the provost marshal of that county was charged
with executing within it that order; that A.'s cotton was likely to fall
into the hands of the United States; that the provost marshal
ordered and required B. to burn it; and that B. did burn it in
obedience to the said act and the orders of that commander and
the provost marshal. Held l. that the said act, as a measure of
legislation, can have no force in any court recognizing the
Constitution of the United Staten as the supreme law of the land; 2.
that it did not assume to confer upon
Page 97 U. S. 595 such commanders any greater authority than
they, by the laws and usages of war, were entitled to exercise;
3. that the orders, as an act of war, exempted a soldier of the
Confederate army who executed them from liability to the owner of
the cotton who, at the time of its destruction, was a voluntary
resident within the lines of the insurrection;
4. that the plea should, upon demurrer, be deemed as sufficiently
averring the existence of such relations between B. and the
Confederate military authorities as entitled him to make the same
defense as if he had been such soldier. Ford filed his complaint
against Surget in the Circuit Court of Adams County, Mississippi, on
the 2d of October, 1866, alleging that he,"at his plantation in said
county, on the fifth day of May, in the year 1862, was possessed, as
of his own personal property, of two hundred bales of cotton,
averaging in weight four hundred pounds per bale, and of the value
of $600 per bale; and that he being so possessed, Surget, at the
place aforesaid, and upon the day and year aforesaid, did willfully
and utterly, and against the consent and will of the plaintiff, destroy
of fire the said two hundred bales of cotton," to the plaintiff's
damage in the sum of $120,000.
The defendant pleaded not guilty, and also filed numerous special
pleas.
The defense, although presented by the special pleas in different
forms, is in substance embraced by the following allegations,
namely: That at and before the time the alleged trespasses were
committed, the people of Mississippi, and of Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana,
Arkansas, and Texas, had confederated together for revolt against,

and within their territorial limits had entirely subverted, the

government of the United States, and in place thereof, and within
and for their territory and people, had created a new and separate
government, called the Confederate States of America, having
executive, legislative, and judicial departments; that on the 6th of
March, 1862, and from that date until the time when the alleged
trespasses were committed, a war had been, and was then, waged
and prosecuted by and between the United States and the
Confederate States, and against each other, as belligerent powers
and nations; that the Confederate States, for the prosecution of the
war and the maintenance of its powers, then and before had
maintained in its service, in the State of Mississippi, an army of
which General Beauregard was commander whereby the territory,
property, and inhabitants of that state were held in subjection to
and under the control of the Confederate States; that on the 6th of
March, 1862, and by an act on that day approved and promulgated
by the Confederate Congress, it was declared to be the duty of all
military commanders in the service of the Confederate state to
destroy all cotton, tobacco, and other property that might be useful
to the forces of the United States whenever in their judgment the
same should be about to fall into their hands; that afterwards, on
the 2d of May, 1862, General Beauregard, commanding the
Confederate forces, in obedience to that act, made and issued a
general ordered, directed to officers under his command in the
State of Mississippi and in the service of the Confederate States to
burn all cotton along the Mississippi River likely to fall into the
hands of the forces of the United States; that before and at the
date last mentioned, and afterwards until the time the supposed
trespasses were committed, Alexander K. Farrar was acting as
provost marshal of the County of Adams, charged with the duty,
among others, of executing, within that county the orders of
military commanders in the State of Mississippi in the service of the
Confederate States, and in pursuance thereof was commanded by
the Confederate military authorities to burn all the cotton along the
bank of that river likely to fall into the hands of the forces of the
United States; that the cotton in the complaint mentioned was near
the bank of the Mississippi within that county, and was, when
burned, likely to fall into the hands of the federal forces; that the
defendant was then ordered and required by said Farrar, acting as
provost marshal under the orders aforesaid, to burn certain cotton,
including the cotton in controversy; and that afterwards the
defendant, in obedience to the act of the Confederate Congress
and the orders of said military commanders and provost marshal,
did burn Ford's cotton, which is the supposed trespass complained
of.

To each of the special pleas the plaintiff in error demurred,

assigning numerous causes of demurrer. The demurrers were
overruled and replications filed. The cause, being at issue, was tried
by a jury. Verdict for the defendant. Judgment having been
rendered thereon, the plaintiff removed the cause to the supreme
court of the state. Upon the affirmance of the judgment, he sued
out this writ of error.
Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh, supra
ANICETO
ALCANTARA, petitioner,
vs.
PRISONS, respondent.
G.R. No. L-6
November 29, 1945

DIRECTOR

OF

FACTS:
Petitioner Aniceto Alcantara was convicted of the crime of illegal
discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries. The Court
of Appeals modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty from
arresto mayor to prison correccional. Petitioner now questions the
validity of the decision on the sole ground that said court was only
a creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during
Japanese military occupation, thus, a petition for the issuance of
writ of habeas corpus from petitioner.
ISSUE:
Is the judgment of Court of Appeals good and valid?

unlawfully imprisoned and restrained of his liberty by the

respondent Director of Prison in the provincial jail at Vigan, Ilocos
Sur.
Petitioner was convicted by the Court First Instance of Ilocos Sur
(Criminal case No. 23) of the crime of illegal discharge of firearms
with less serious physical injuries. Upon appeal, the Court of
Appeals of Northern Luzon at Baguio modified said sentence (CAG.R. No. 790)and sentence the petitioner to an indeterminate
penalty of from four months four months and twenty-one days of
arresto mayor to three years, nine months and three days of prison
correccional. The sentence as modified became final on September
12, 1944, and June 23, 1945, petitioner commenced serving his
sentence.
Petitioner now questions the validity of the decision of the Court of
Appeals of Northern Luzon, on the sole ground that said court was
only a creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during
the Japanese military occupation of the Islands; that the Court of
Appeals was not authorized by Commonwealth Act No. 3 to hold
sessions in Baguio, and that only the two Justices constituted the
majority which promulgated the decision in question. The petitioner
does not question the validity of said decision on the strength of
the Proclamation of General Douglas McArthur of October 23, 1944,
which according to our decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs.
Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, G.R. No. L-5 (p. 113, ante), does not refer
to judicial processes.

Fulltxt:
FERIA, J.:

In the said case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, this
Court ruled that the so-called Republic of the Philippines and the
Philippine Executive Commission established in the Philippines
during the Japanese regime were governments de facto organized
by the belligerent occupant by the judicial acts thereof were good
and valid and remained good and valid after the restoration of the
Commonwealth Government, except those a political complexion.
In that the same case this Court held that the Court of Appeals
which was continued throughout the Japanese occupation, was the
same Court of Appeals existed prior to the Japanese occupation and
was lately abolished by Executive Order No. 37. The division of the
Court of Appeals into several District Court of Appeals, and the
reduction of the number of Justices sitting in each division, the
regime of the so-called Republic effected no substantial change in
its nature and jurisdiction.

This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and for
the release of the petitioner on the ground that the latter is

Even assuming that the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon was a

new court created by the belligerent occupant or the de facto

HELD:
Judgments of such court were good and valid and remain good and
valid for the sentence which petitioner is now serving has no
political complexion. A penal sentence is said to be of a political
complexion when it penalizes a new act not defined in the
municipal laws, or acts already penalized by the latter as a crime
against the legitimate government but taken out of territorial law
and penalized as new offenses committed against the belligerent
occupant which is necessary for the control of the occupied
territory and the protection of the army of the occupier. Such is the
case at hand, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

governments established by him, the judgments of such court, like

those of the court which were continued during the Japanese
occupation, were good and valid and remain good and valid, and
therefore enforceable now after the liberation or occupation of the
Philippines, provided that such judgments do not have a political
complexion, as this court held in its decision in the
abovementioned case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and
Dizon supra, in accordance with the authorities therein cited.
Obviously, the sentence which petitioner is now serving has no
political complexion. He was charged with and convicted of an
offense punishable under the municipal law of the Commonwealth,
the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, the sentence of the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Sur, as modified by the Court of Appeals of
Northern Luzon, is valid and enforceable.
A punitive or penal sentence is said to of a political complexion
when it penalizes either a new act not defined in the municipal
laws, or acts already penalized by the latter as a crime against the
legitimate government, but taken out of the territorial law and
penalized as a new offenses committed against belligerent
occupant, incident to a state of a war and necessary for the control
of the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the
occupier. They are acts penalized for public rather than private
reasons, acts which tend, directly or indirectly, to aid or favor the
enemy and are directed against the welfare, safety and security, of
the belligerent occupant. As example, the crimes against national
security , such as treason, espionage, etc., and against public
order, such as rebellion, sedition, etc., were crimes against the
Commonwealth or United States Government under the Revised
Penal Code, which were made crimes against the belligerent
occupant.
In view of the foregoing, the petitioner for the writ of habeas corpus
is denied.
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS and
ELIZABETH DIMAANO, Respondents
G.R. No. 104768
July 21, 2003
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines
Respondent: Sandiganbayan, Major General Josephus Q. Ramas and
Elizabeth Dimaano
Ponente: CARPIO, J.:

SUMMARY:
After the EDSA Revolution, Pres. Aquino created the PCGG,
which thereafter created an AFP Anti-Graft Board. It investigated
various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of Maj. Gen. Ramas.
A search warrant was issued which allowed the authorities to seize
items (equipments, money, etc) from Dimaanos house in Batangas
(alleged mistress of Ramas). The PCGG then filed a case in the SB
against Ramas and Dimaano for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Ramas and Dimaano filed their MTD based
on Republic v. Migrino, which held that the PCGG does not have
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by reason
of mere position held without a showing that they are
subordinates of Marcos. SB dismissed the complaint but ordered
that the monies, equipment etc be returned to Dimaano. It
remanded the case to the OMB for appropriate action. PCGG argues
(among others) that the search and seizure was legal because the
two cannot invoke their exclusionary right, as there was no Bill of
Rights or Constitution in force at the time of the seizure.
The SC held that the ICCPR and the UNDHR remained in
force during the interregnum period. The revolutionary government
did not repudiate such obligations of the Philippines; hence, the
respondents rights are protected under these treaties.
Furthermore, the authorities exceeded their authority by seizing
items, which were not particularly described in the warrant.
FACTS:
Pres. Cory Aquino issued EO 1 creating the PCGG.
o PCGG is primarily tasked to recover all ill-gotten wealth
of former Marcos, his family and cronies.
The PCGG, through Chairman Salonga, created an AFP AntiGraft Board (AFP Board) tasked to investigate reports of
unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel,
whether in the active service or retired.
The AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged
unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Ramas
(Ramas).
It issued a Resolution on its findings and recommendation on
the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas, and concluded that
a prima facie case exists against him. It further recommended
that he be tried for the violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (RA 1379).
Some of the findings stated in the resolution:
o He owns a house in La Vista worth P700,000.
o Military equipment/items and communication facilities
were found in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaanos (his

alleged mistress, as stated in the affidavits of certain

Military Units) house in Batangas.
o The team was also able to confiscate money in the
amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the
house of Elizabeth Dimaano.
o Sworn statement disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano had
no visible means of income and is supported by Ramas
for she was formerly a mere secretary.
o Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not
have used the items seized in her house without the
consent of respondent as general of the AFP.
o It is also impossible for Elizabeth Dimaano to claim that
she owns the the money for she had no visible source of
income.
o The money was never declared in the SALN of Ramas as
these are all ill-gotten and unexplained wealth.
Thus, PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under RA 1379 against
Ramas.
Before Ramas could answer the petition, then SolGen Chavez
filed an Amended Complaint naming the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the PCGG, as plaintiff and Ramas as
defendant. It also impleaded Elizabeth Dimaano (Dimaano)
as co-defendant.
o
xxx alleged that Ramas acquired funds, assets and
properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as
an army officer and his other income from legitimately
acquired property by taking undue advantage of his
public office and/or using his power, authority and
influence as such officer of the AFP and as a subordinate
and close associate of the deposed President Ferdinand
Marcos.
It also alleged that the AFP Board found reasonable grounds to
believe such allegation and prayed for the forfeiture of Ramas
properties, funds and equipment in favor of the State.
Ramas filed an Answer contending that his property consisted
only of a house in La Vista. He denied ownership of any
mansion in Cebu City and the cash, communications equipment
and other items confiscated from the house of Dimaano.
Dimaano filed her own Answer admitting her employment as a
clerk-typist in the office of Ramas and claimed ownership of the
monies, communications equipment, etc seized from her house.
The case was set for trial by November of 1988.
Petitioner from then on started askin for defgerment of hearing
due to its lack of preparation, absence of witnesses and
documents, among other reasons.On

SB noted that petitioner had already delayed the case

for over a year mainly because of its many
postponements.
Ramas and Dimaano eventually filed their MTD based on
Republic v. Migrino which held that the PCGG does not have
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by
reason of mere position held without a showing that they are
subordinates of Marcos.
SB dismissed the complaint but ordered that the monies,
equipment etc be returned to Dimaano. It remanded the case to
the OMB for appropriate action.
A MR was filed but the same was dismissed.
o

ISSUES:
1st ISSUE: W/N PCGG has Jurisdiction to Investigate Private
RespondentsNO JURISDICTION.
This involves the revisiting of an issue decided by this Court in
Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan and Republic v. Migrino:
(summarized version)
o The term subordinate refers to one who enjoys a close
association with former President Marcos and/or his wife,
similar to the immediate family member, relative,
and close associate in EO No. 1 and the close
relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or
nominee in EO No. 2.
o It does not suffice that the respondent is or was a
government
official
or
employee
during
the
administration of former President Marcos. There must
be a prima facie showing that the respondent
unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his
close association or relation with former Pres.
Marcos and/or his wife. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents.
The PCGG cannot exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers
never granted to it.
o PCGGs powers are specific and limited.
o Unless given additional assignment by the President,
PCGGs sole task is only to recover the ill-gotten wealth
of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies.
Private respondents questioned the jurisdiction of the PCGG by
filing their MTD as soon as they learned of the pronouncement
in Migrino. This case was decided on 30 August 1990, which
explains why private respondents only filed their MTD on 8
October 1990.

Nevertheless, it has been held that the parties may raise

lack of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceeding.
o Hence, there was no waiver of jurisdiction in this case.
o Jurisdiction is vested by law and not by the parties to an
action.
Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction by the PCGG to conduct the preliminary
investigation.
o

2nd ISSUE: W/N the Dismissal of the Case is Proper Before

Completion of Presentation of EvidenceYES, dismissal was
proper.
Based on the findings of the SB and the records of this case, the
SC finds that petitioner has only itself to blame for noncompletion of the presentation of its evidence.
The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner more than sufficient time to
finish the presentation of its evidence. It overlooked petitioners
delays and yet petitioner ended the long-string of delays with
the filing of a Re-Amended Complaint, which would only prolong
even more the disposition of the case.
Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing
the case before completion of the presentation of petitioners
evidence.
3rd ISSUE (IMPT!): W/N the Search and Seizure was legal
NOT LEGAL.
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding
team conducted the search and seizure five days after the
successful EDSA revolution.
o It argues that a revolutionary government was operative
at that time and asserts that the revolutionary
government effectively withheld the operation of
the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private
respondents exclusionary right.
o It also argues that the exclusionary right arising from an
illegal search applies only beginning 2 February 1987,
the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution.
o Petitioner contends that all rights under the Bill of Rights
had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time
of the search.
o Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies
and items taken from Dimaano and use the same in
evidence against her since at the time of their seizure,
private respondents did not enjoy any constitutional
right.

SC: Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.

The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary
government bound by no constitution or legal limitations
except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government,
as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under
international law.
The correct issues are:
o W/N the revolutionary government was bound by
the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during
the interregnum; and
o W/N the protection accorded to individuals under
the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (Covenant) and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (Declaration) remained in
effect during the interregnum.
SC: the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was
NOT operative during the interregnum.
o However, the protection accorded to individuals
under
the
Covenant
and
the
Declaration
REMAINED IN EFFECT during the interregnum.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government were the supreme law because no
constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and
orders.
o Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not
invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of
Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a
Bill of Rights during the interregnum.
o To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973
Constitution remained operative during the interregnum
would render void all sequestration orders PCGG before
the adoption of the Freedom Constitution.
During the interregnum, no one could validly question the
sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights because
there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum.
To rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained
in force during the interregnum, absent a constitutional
provision excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of
Rights, would clearly render all sequestration orders void during
the interregnum.
o Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the
Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the
Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same
rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution.

The revolutionary government, after installing itself as

the de jure government, assumed responsibility for the
States good faith compliance with the Covenant to
which the Philippines is a signatory.
o Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory
State to respect and to ensure to all individuals within
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the present Covenant.
o Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary
government had the duty to insure that [n]o one shall
be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with
his privacy, family, home or correspondence.
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory,
provides in its Article 17(2) that [n]o one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his property.
o Although the signatories to the Declaration did not
intend it as a legally binding document, being only a
declaration,
the
Court
has
interpreted
the
Declaration as part of the generally accepted
principles of international law and binding on the
State.
o Thus, the revolutionary government was also
obligated under international law to observe the
rights of individuals under the Declaration.
The revolutionary government did not repudiate the
Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum.
Suffice it to say that the Court considers the Declaration as
part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as
human beings are proper subjects of the rules of
international law laid down in the Covenant.
As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could
not escape responsibility for the States good faith compliance
with its treaty obligations under international law.
During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of
Rights existed, directives and orders issued by
government officers were valid so long as these officers
did not exceed the authority granted them by the
revolutionary government.
o The directives and orders should not have also
violated the Covenant or the Declaration.
In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively
sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government did
not repudiate it.
o The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application,
specified the items to be searched and seized.

The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items

specifically described in the warrant.
However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not
included in the warrant.
o The search warrant did not particularly describe these
items and the raiding team confiscated them on its own
authority.
o The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items
without showing that these items could be the subject of
warrantless search and seizure.
o Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority
when it seized these items.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless
these items are contraband per se, and they are not, they must
be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them.
o

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is

DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan,
remanding the records of this case to the Ombudsman for such
appropriate action as the evidence may warrant, and referring this
case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a
determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano,
are AFFIRMED.
IN re Letter of Associate Justice Reynato Puno
A.M No. 90-11-2697- CA, June 29, 1992
Facts:
Petitioner Assoc. Justice Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals
(CA), wrote a letter dated Nov. 14, 1990addressed to the Supreme
Court about the correction of his seniority ranking in the CA. It
appears from the records that petitioner was first appointed as
associate justice of the CA on June 20, 1980 but took his oath of
office on Nov. 29, 1982. The CA was reorganized and became the
Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) pursuant to Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary Appropriating Funds
Therefore and For Other Purposes." He was then appointed as
appellate justice and later accepted an appointment to be a deputy
minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice. In Edsa Revolution in
Feb. 1986 brought about reorganization of the entire government
including the judiciary. A Screening Committee was created. When
Pres. Cory Aquino issuedExecutive Order No. 33, as an exercise of
her legislative power, the Screening Committee assigned the
petitioner to rank no. 11 from being the assoc. justice of the NEW

CA. However, the petitioner's ranking changed from no.11, he now

ranked as no. 26. He alleges that the change in his seniority
ranking would be contrary to the provisions of issued order of Pres.
Aquino. The court en banc ranted Justice Puno's request. A motion
for consideration was later filed by Campos and Javelliano who
were affected by the change of ranking. They contend that the
petitioner cannot claim such reappointment because the court he
had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his
last appointment.
Issue:
Whether the present CA is a new court or merely a continuation of
the CA and IAC that would negate any claim to seniority enjoyed by
the petitioner existing prior to said EO No. 33.
Held:
The present CA is a new entity, different and distinct from the CA or
the IAC, for it was created in the wake of the massive
reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of
Corazon Aquino in the people power. A revolution has been defined
as the complete overthrow of the established government in any
country or state by those who were previously subject to it as as
sudden, radical, and fundamental change in the government or
political system, usually affected with violence. A government as a
result of people's revolution is considered de jure if it is already
accepted by the family of nations or countries like the US, Great
Britain, Germany, Japan, and others. In the new government under
Pres. Aquino, it was installed through direct exercise of the Filipino
power. Therefore, it is the present CA that would negate the claims
of Justice Puno concerning his seniority ranking.

JULIANA ETORMA, ROSARIO INDEFENSO and GREGORIO

SALUMBIDES, petitioners,
vs. LUCILA RAVELO and THE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-718
March 24, 1947
Facts:
The petition for certiorari assailing the validity of the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Tayabas against the petitioners, on the
ground that the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals during
the Japanese occupation was null and void, because the question
involved in the litigation was the validity or invalidity of a free

patent issued by the Governor General of the Philippines under the

authority granted by an Act of Congress of the United States
One of the parties in the case was the Director of Lands, as
officer in charge with the administration and alienation of public
lands placed under the control of the Government of the
Philippines; and the petitioners were claiming vested rights, not
only under the laws in force in the Philippines, but also under the
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. The decision of the Court of Appeals
was also attacked as being in violation of the fundamental right of
the petitioners, for the reason that the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Tayabas did not contain findings of facts, that is,
whether or not there was fraud in obtaining the free patent in
question, and the Court of Appeals made its own findings of fact
without hearing the appellants nor giving them opportunity to be
heard on the questions of fact therein raised. And the petitioners
prayed that the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, to which the
case was remanded several years ago for the execution of the
judgment by the Court of Appeals, be required to send the record of
said case to this Court for consideration and decision.
Issue:
W/N judicial decision rendered during Japanese Occupation is valid?
Held:
Yes, it is valid. This Court did not deem it necessary to render a
reasoned decision in deciding the petition for certiorari, for it
considered the latter without merits. Because the decision of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on December 22, 1942, which
affirmed that of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, has become
final several years ago, and the judgment of the Courts in the
Philippines during the Japanese occupation are valid and binding in
accordance with the ruling of this Court in the case of Co Kim Cham
vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113).
The fact that the question involved was the validity of a free
patent, and the Director of Public Lands was a party, and that the
authority to grant free patent was conferred upon the Governor
General, and the power to regulate the procedure to obtain it upon
the Legislature of the Philippines by Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
did not make the judgment rendered thereon of political nature.
The Acts authorizing and regulating the grant of free patents to
occupants or possessors of public lands are municipal laws, and the
judgments of the courts which apply said laws are not of political
complexion.

JACINTO NOTOR, petitioner,

vs. RAMON MARTINEZ, as
guardian of the incompetent, Pedro Martinez, and THE
COURT OF APPEALS,respondents
G.R. No. L-1892
August 16, 1949
PARAS, J.:
On February 28, 1943, Pio Martinez, as guardian of Pedro Martinez,
executed a promissory note for P2,000 in favor of Jacinto Notor,
with interest at 10 per cent annually, and payable within two years
from said date. In a mortgage executed on March 28, 1943,
covering said note, it was further provided that the contract was
"renewable at the discretion of the mortgagee," and that the
mortgagor promised to pay the sum specified in the note
"according to the terms thereof". Due to additional sums
subsequently obtained from Jacinto Notor, plus interest, the total
indebtedness amounted as of January 29, 1945, to P10,111.
Some time prior to this date, the guardian of Pedro Martinez offered
to pay the debt, but the creditor Jacinto Notor refused to accept the
payment, as a result of which the present action was instituted by
the guardian of Pedro Martinez in the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, wherein, the necessary amount was deposited. In the
complaint (filed before the liberation of the Philippines), it was
prayed that the debtor be declared as having fully paid his
indebtedness to Jacinto Notor. After trial, the lower court, on August
18, 1945, (already after liberation) rendered judgment declaring
that the plaintiff, Ramon Martinez, as guardian of Pedro Martinez,
had paid in full his indebtedness to the defendant, Jacinto Notor,
from the time he consigned the amount thereof by depositing it
with the clerk of court of First Instance of Batangas. From this
judgment, Jacinto Notor appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on
November 25, 1947, rendered a decision affirming the judgment of
the court of origin. From the latter decision, Jacinto Notor (the
petitioner) has come to this court in an appeal by way of certiorari.
He alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in holding (1) that there
was a valid consignation; (2) that the respondent can pay off the
mortgage within two years parties agreed "that this contract is
discretion of the mortgagee"; and (3) that courts of the
Commonwealth and their successors, the court of the Philippine
Republic, have jurisdiction over the case.
It appearing from the stipulation of the parties that defendant
Jacinto Notor "admits the in the complaint in sub-paragraphs 1, 3,
4, 5, and 6 that "the only question to be raised it the whether,
according to the contract at his Exhibit A, the defendant mortgagee

has the right to renew or not the contract at his discretion, as

embodied in paragraph 2 of Exhibit A." the herein petitioner there
was no valid consignation. It is true that no allegation in paragraphs
5 and 6 of the complaint to the effect that there was as notice of
consignation, as required by article 1177 of the Civil Code, but the
absence of such allegation is cured by the positive stipulation that
the only question to be raised is whether the creditor has the right
to renew the mortgage contract at his discretion. The first
assignment of error is therefore without merit.
It is the view of the herein petitioner that he has the absolute right
to renew the term of the promissory note and accordingly refuse to
accept payment from the debtor. It is noteworthy that the note is
payable within two years from February 28, 1943, and that the
clause providing that the contract is renewable at the discretion of
the creditor, contains the condition that the debtor promises to pay
according to the terms of promissory note. Since at the time (prior
to January 29, 1945) the promissory note in question was
undeniably in force, the debtor had the right thereunder to pay
within two years from February 28, 1943. The pact allowing
payment within two years will be meaningless, if the theory of the
herein petitioner were correct. At any rate, it is futile to speak of
any renewal before the note had even matured and unless the
debtor was unable to pay within the original term of two years. The
second assignment of error is also untenable.
There can be no doubt as to the jurisdiction of the courts of the
Commonwealth and of the Republic. In the case of Co Kan Cham vs.
Valdez Tau, 75 Phil., 113, 371; 41 Off. Gaz., 779, we have held that
the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice during the
Japanese military occupation which are not of a political
complexion, were good and valid and, by virtue of the principle of
post preliminary in international law, remained good and valid after
the liberation of the Philippines. The litigation between the parties
herein is certainly not of a political complexion, since it involves
merely their civil rights, and it is immaterial whether the currency
in dispute was Japanese military notes. At any rate, the tender of
payment was made during the Japanese military occupation when
military notes were legal tender. Under the rules of Public
international Law, the right of the military occupant, in the exercise
of his governmental power, to issue military currency as legal
tender has never been seriously questioned. (Haw Pia vs. China
Banking Corporation, 80 Phil., 604; 45 Off Gaz. (Supp. to No. 9),
229; Philippine Trust Company vs. Araneta, G. R. No. L-2734, March
17, 19491). In the case of Haw Pia vs. China Banking Corporation,
supra, we have already recognized the validity of a payment of a

mortgage indebtedness in Japanese military notes. This has to be

so, because "the law made by the occupant within his admitted
power, whether morally justifiable or not will bind any member of
the occupied population as against any other member of it, . . . as
far as it produces an effect during the occupation." (Hilado vs. De la
Costa and Philippine National Bank, G. R. No. L-150, April 30,
19492). In the case at bar we are not authorizing the circulation of
Japanese military notes, as legal tender at present, but we are
merely giving effect to a payment that was valid and binding at the
time it was made. The third assignment of error is likewise without
merit.
Wherefore, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed with costs against the herein petitioner. So ordered.
ALFONSO MONTEBON, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE DIRECTOR
OF PRISONS, ET AL., respondent
G.R. No. L-1352
April 30, 1947
TUASON, J.:
This is a petition for habeas corpus by Alfonso Montebon on behalf
of Elpidio S. Cruz, a prisoner at the Iwahig Penal Colony. A similar
petition was filed with this Court by Felicisima Santiago in the name
of the same prisoner (Santiago vs. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil.,
927), a petition which was denied by us in a decision promulgated
on January 30, 1947. The ground of the first petition was the
alleged illegality of one of the prisoner's three convictions for
estafa. The present application contests the validity of the
prisoner's recommitment decreed by the Commissioner of Justice of
the Philippine Executive Commission under date of June 3, 1943, for
the unexpired portion of his (prisoner's) maximum aggregate
sentences in three cases in which he had been paroled by the
Board of Indeterminate Sentence on June 26, 1941, when he still
had over five years to serve. The commissioner of Justice's
recommitment order was made by virtue of Administrative Order
No. 21, dated June 21, 1942, and approved by the Chairman of the
Executive Commission, which read: "The Board of Indeterminate
Sentence and the Board of Pardons having been abolished, the
powers, duties and functions thereof shall henceforth be assumed
and exercised by the Commissioner of Justice."
The petitioner does not reveal the nature of his interest in the
prisoner's incarceration, or what relation, if any, he has with him.
As to the effect on this case of our decision on the first application,
res judicata as an inflexible doctrine has been held not to apply in

habeas corpus proceedings. Still the court in the exercise of a

sound judicial discretion, it has also been held, may give controlling
weight to the prior refusal. Such discretion was used against the
petitioner in Wong Doo vs. United States (68 Law. ed., 241), on the
ground that the petitioner had had full opportunity to offer in the
first case proof on the point he raised in the second. By a similar
criterion and reasonIng, that principle might be brought into play
here. No reason whatever is shown why the petitioner did not
question in the first petition the legality of the recommitment order
of the Commissioner of Justice. Nevertheless, we choose not to
dispose of this application on a point of procedural technicality, but
will decide it on the merits.
The authority of the Commissioner of Justice under the then
existing government, laws, and military, executive and
administrative orders, to take over the powers, functions and duties
of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, is beyond dispute. In an
international sense it matters not how the Commissioner of Justice
was vested with that authority. For most purposes the government
of the occupant is likely to exercise the lawmaking functions
through decrees or regulations emanating from a military source;
and these become as effective in operation as though they were
expressed in statutory enactments. As a matter of practical
expediency the occupant may be disposed to utilize certain existing
agencies of that government and to suspend the operation of
others. (III Hyde, International Law, 2 ed., 1883.) This Court has
held that the Philippine Executive Commission was a de facto
government, in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdes Tan Keh and Dizon (75
Phil., 113).
As to whether the Indeterminate Sentence Act was in force during
the occupation, the answer is in the affirmative. A proclamation of
the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces of January 2, 1942,
directed that "so far as the military administration permits, all the
laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and
judicial institutions, shall continue to be effective for the time being
as in the past." This was nothing more than a confirmation of the
well-known rule of the Law of Nations that municipal laws, as
contra-distinguished from laws of political nature, are not
abrogated by a change of sovereignty. (Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan
Keh and Dizon, supra.) The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not a
political law. It does not affect political relations. In fact, it is a part
of the Commonwealth's criminal and penal system directly related
to the punishment of crime and the maintenance of public peace
and order, which Article 43 of Section III of the Hague Regulations

of 1907 compels the belligerent occupant to take all steps in his

power to reestablish and insure as far as possible.
But the petitioner takes the position that the recommitment of
which he complains was not such an act of the belligerent occupant
as should be accorded respect and recognition by the
Commonwealth Government, now Republic of the Philippines, after
the cessation of the enemy occupation. We have only to refer to the
Co Kim Cham case for a precedent that refuses this contention. In
that case it was said, "It is legal truism in political and international
law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive and
judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid."
We held that in consonance with the theory of jus postliminii in
international law, such acts and proceedings remained good and
valid after the liberation or re-occupation of the Philippines by the
American and Filipino forces. The decision cited Hall's work on
International Law, 7th ed., p. 518, according to which the fact that
the territory which has been occupied by an enemy comes again
into the power of its legitimate government or sovereignty, does
not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by
the invader, which for one reason or another it is within his
competence to do.
Enforcement of the criminal law by the forces of occupation is not
only valid and binding; it is imposed on them as a high obligation
by the Hague Convention, as we have pointed out. The reason
underlying requirement is thus stated in William vs. Bruffy (96 U.S.,
176, 192), cited in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon,
supra:
"The existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the
bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular
administration of the laws. Order was to be preserved, police
regulations maintained, crime prosecuted, property protected,
contracts enforced, marriages celebrated, estates settled, and the
transfer and descent of property regulated, precisely as in the time
of peace. No one, that we are aware of, seriously questions the
validity of judicial or legislative Acts in the insurrectionary States
touching these and kindred subjects, where they were not hostile in
their purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority of the
National Government, and did not impair the rights of citizens
under the Constitution." The same doctrine has been asserted in
numerous other cases.
The petition is denied without costs.

HAW PIA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs. THE
CORPORATION, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-554
April 9, 1948
Facts:

CHINA

BANKING

Plaintiff-appellants indebtedness to the defendant-appellee China

Banking Corporation in the sum of P5,103.35 by way of overdraft in
current account payable on demand together with its interests, has
been completely paid, on different occasions to the defendant Bank
China Banking Corporation through the defendant Bank of Taiwan,
Ltd., that was appointed by the Japanese Military authorities as
liquidator of the China Banking Corporation.
The trial court held that, as there was no evidence presented to
show that the defendant Bank had authorized the Bank of Taiwan,
Ltd., to accept the payment of the plaintiffs debt to the said
defendant, and said Bank of Taiwan, as an agency of the Japanese
invading army, was not authorized under the international law to
liquidate the business of the China Banking Corporation, the
payment has not extinguished the indebtedness of the plaintiff to
the said defendant under Article 1162 of the Civil Code.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Japanese Military Administration had
authority to order the liquidation or winding up of the business of
defendant-appellee China Banking Corporation, and to appoint the
Bank of Taiwan liquidator authorized as such to accept the payment
by the plaintiff-appellant to said defendant-appellee; and
2. Whether or not such payment by the plaintiff-appellant has
extinguished her obligation to said defendant-appellee.
Ruling:
1. YES. The Japanese military authorities had power, under the
international law, to order the liquidation of the China Banking
Corporation and to appoint and authorize the Bank of Taiwan as
liquidator to accept the payment in question, because such
liquidation is not confiscation of the properties of the bank
appellee, but a mere sequestration of its assets which required the
liquidation or winding up of the business of said bank. The
sequestration or liquidation of enemy banks in occupied territories
is authorized expressly by the United States Army and Navy Manual
of Military Government and Civil Affairs F.M. 2710 OPNAV 50-E-3.

2. YES. It having been shown above that the Japanese Military

Forces had power to sequestrate and impound the assets or funds
of the China Banking Corporation, and for that purpose to liquidate
it by collecting the debts due to said bank from its debtors, and
paying its creditors, and therefore to appoint the Bank of Taiwan as
liquidator with the consequent authority to make the collection, it
follows evidently that the payments by the debtors to the Bank of
Taiwan of their debts to the China Banking Corporation have
extinguished their obligation to the latter. Said payments were
made to a person, the Bank of Taiwan, authorized to receive them
in the name of the bank creditor under article 1162, of the Civil
Code. Because it is evident the words a person authorized to
receive it, as used therein, means not only a person authorized by
the same creditor, but also a person authorized by law to do so,
such as guardian, executor or administrator of estate of a
deceased, and assignee or liquidator of a partnership or
corporation, as well as any other who may be authorized to do so
by law (Manresa, Civil Code, 4th ed. p. 254.)
The fact that the money with which that debts have been paid were
Japanese war notes does not affect the validity of the payments.
The power of the military governments established in occupied
enemy territory to issue military currency in the exercise of their
governmental power is based, not only on the occupants general
power to maintain law and order recognized in article 43 of the
Hague Regulations (Feilchenfeld of Belligerent Occupation,
paragraph 6), but on military necessity as shown by the history of
the use of money or currency in wars.
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918)

Syllabus
The court notices judicially that the government of the United
States recognized the government of Carranza as the de facto
government of the Republic of Mexico on October 19, 1915, and as
the de jure government on August 31, 1917.
Semble, that the Hague Conventions, in view of their terms and
international character, do not apply to a civil war, and that the
regulations annexed to the Convention of 1907 do not forbid such a
military seizure and sale of private property as is involved in this
case.

The conduct of our foreign relations is committed by the

Constitution to the executive and legislative -- the political -departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be
done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial
inquiry or decision.
Who is the sovereign de jure or de facto of a foreign territory is a
political question the determination of which by the political
departments of the government conclusively binds the judges.
When a government which originates in revolution or revolt is
recognized by the political department of our government as the de
jure government of the country in which it is established, such
recognition is retroactive in effect, and validates all the actions and
conduct of the government so recognized from the commencement
of its existence.
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not
sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done
within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such
acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by
sovereign powers as between themselves.
The principle that the conduct of one independent government
cannot be successfully questioned in the courts of another is as
applicable to a case involving the title to property brought within
the custody of a court as to claims for damages based upon acts
done in a foreign country, for it rests at last upon the highest
considerations of international comity and expediency.
In January, 1914, General Francisco Villa, while conducting
independent operations as a duly commissioned military
commander of the Carranza government, which had then made
much progress in its revolution in Mexico, levied a military
contribution, and, in enforcing it, seized and sold some hides then
owned and possessed by a citizen of Mexico. Held that the act
could not be reexamined and modified by a New Jersey court in
replevin.
87 N.J.L. 552, 704, affirmed.
This cases are stated in the opinion.