IFS Info 2/02

Bernd Schfer

Stasi Files and GDR

Espionage Against the West

Table of contents

On the author ........................................................................................................................... 4

The Seizure of Stasi Buildings in 1989/90 and the Stasi Records Law of 1991 ....................... 5
The Foreign Intelligence Files ................................................................................................... 6
The Rosenholz File Cards ................................................................................................ 7
The SIRA Tapes ................................................................................................................... 7
GDR Espionage Against the West ............................................................................................ 8
Penetration of West German Government and Intelligence Sources ................................... 8
Espionage against NATO .................................................................................................. 10
Notes ...................................................................................................................................... 13
Tidligere utgitte publikasjoner ............................................................................................... 15

On the author

Dr. Bernd Schfer was born in Kaiserslautern in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1962.
During the 1980s, he studied History, Catholic Theology and Political Science at the Universities
of Tbingen, Germany and Vienna, Austria. From 1989 to 1991 he was John M. McCloy
Fellow at Harvard University, were he obtained a Masters of Public Administration degree in
1991. Following to years as dissertation fellow at the German National Merit Foundation, he
became in 1993 a fellow at the Commision of East German Catholic Episcopate, working on
GDR and the Catholic Church. In 1997 he defended his Ph. D. thesis State and Catholic
Church in the GDR 1945-1989 at the Martin-Luther-Universitt, Halle. From 1998 to 2001 he
was a fellow at the Hannah Arendt Institute for Research on Totalitarianism. Since then, he has
worked on American Triangular Diplomay, 1969-1976 at the German Historical Institute,
Washington DC.
This paper is based on a lecture Dr. Schfer gave at the Norwegian Institute for Defence
Studies in February 2002.

4 IFS Info 2/02

Stasi Files and GDR Espionage Against the West

The Seizure of Stasi Buildings in

1989/90 and the Stasi Records
Law of 1991
The East German experience of 1989 was in
many ways different from the downfall pattern of other Warsaw Pact countries regimes.
Concerning the legacy of a repressive regimes
intelligence files, the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) was even unique. Attempts by its intelligence agency Ministry
for State Security (Ministerium fr Staatssicherheit - Stasi) to burn their files without
having the capacity to conceal smoking chimneys, were met by civic resistance groups all
over the GDR entering and seizing Stasi
buildings. Such targeted and persistent attacks
on a central nerve center of communist regimes were without analogies in the countries
of the Soviet bloc.
Between 4th and 7th December 1989 the
Stasi buildings in all district cities and most
of the county towns all over the GDR were
stormed and seized by spontaneously arranged citizens committees. All remaining
files and documents were secured and sealed. Those were the days when the Central
Committee of the Socialist Unity Party
(Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands/ SED), the GDRs communist party, had disbanded itself and the GDRs financial wizard
for acquiring capitalist hard valuta currency,
Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski, feared for
his life in the GDR and defected to the West,
where he got debriefed by West Germanys

intelligence service. After December 7 only

the Stasi headquarters in Berlin were still in
business, since people living in the GDRs
former center of power did not dare to enter
the huge compound. Finally on 15 January
1990 there were efforts made to negotiate a
takeover combined with simultaneous pressure from outside demonstrators. They resulted in the seizure of still remaining, quite
comprehensive central files as well.
In the following months leading toward
German unification in October 1990, citizens
committees in East Germany oversaw the
dismantling of the Stasi. They regarded its
files as property of the public and fenced off
all attempts by the West German government
to close them forever or at least move them
to the West German Federal Archive with its
strict archival guidelines and then across-theboard 30-Years-Rule. The first freely elected
East German parliament passed a law on
handling and accessing the files in August
1990. The German Unification Treaty created
a special body to administer the files headed
by Joachim Gauck until new regulations
would have been passed by all-German parliament after unification. The final Law on
the Files of the State Security Service of the
former German Democratic Republic was
then codified on 20 December 1991 and came
into effect a few days later on 1 January
1992.1 When the new Authority of the Federal Envoy for the Materials of the Ministry
for State Security of the former GDR,2 which
soon became popularly known as Gauck

IFS Info 2/02 5

Authority, officially began its work at the

same day, it had at its disposal files at a length
of altogether 180 kilometers designed for public use.
Since 1992 all individual German or foreign
citizens, on which the Stasi had created files,
are entitled to apply for checking and reading
them in the newly established federal authority.
According to the Stasi records law, academic
and other researchers, as well as the press,
were granted the right to see all non-personal
files, personal files of Stasi informers and the
surveillance files of so-called people of
contemporary history. The latter clause for
prominents was very generously interpreted
and affected various intellectuals and politicians of all kinds, down to many lower-ranking
officials in East and West Germany. Recently
this clause was overturned by the Federal
Administrative Court after former Federal
Chancellor Helmut Kohl had issued a lawsuit
to deny public access to his Stasi files. In the
wake of the courts decision, the Federal
Authority on the Stasi files, meanwhile headed
by Marianne Birthler, was temporarily required to block further access to some of its
papers on prominents and to blacken many
names from copies handed out until then
without such deletions. In all likelihood the
German Parliament will take up this issue and
amend the current Stasi Records Law in the
near future, though without fully returning
to status quo ante.

The Foreign Intelligence Files

The so-called foreign intelligence lines
within the Stasi consisted of the Berlin center
of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklrung (HVA)
and the Departments XV in the fifteen district
Stasi headquarters all over the GDR. In

6 IFS Info 2/02

October 1989 approximately 5.000 full-time

employees worked for these foreign intelligence units, among them 4.000 in Berlin.
Compared to the 1950s the number of officers
was ten times as high at the end of the GDR
and had tripled since the heydays of detente
in 1972. If one also includes the signal
intelligence people and the military and administrative staff of the intelligence service
of the Ministry of Defense, roughly 10.000
people within the GDR worked in foreign
intelligence. In relation to the overall population this was by any proportions a world
record. Only the KGB and the CIA were
numerically somewhat stronger, but they
operated from countries with more than two
hundred million people compared to the 16.5
million population of the GDR. In 1988 these
foreign intelligence officers directed about
3.000 agents of various status and intensity
in the FRG alone. Agents from other foreign
countries are significantly lower than this
number.3 So far the latter are not fully accounted for unless the CIA will let us know
the full scope of the files it acquired in 1992
(Rosenholz).4
Besides this human intelligence, the Stasi
had an ever-increasing capacity and capability
of signal intelligence. At least since the mid1970s it could listen not just into every phone
conversation between West and East Germany. It also targeted certain objects and individuals in West Berlin and West Germany and
tapped their lines whenever they became busy.
Those conversations were recorded, transcribed, summarized and sometimes even
analyzed. As a matter of fact the Stasi was
able to target basically every phone conversation originating from West Berlin or within
West Germany, including government lines
in the far away Western federal capital of
Bonn in the Rhineland.

The Rosenholz File Cards

In 1985 Stasi Minister Erich Mielke, still preparing for emergency measures against a nuclear attack from the West, ordered to microfilm all 317.000 personal file cards with the real
names of all HVA agents and 77.000 file cards
with codewords of HVA operations. In
addition, on his order also computerized
forms had to be prepared on each individual
agent holding some basic information on the
nature of the contact. Whereas the paper file
cards were destroyed in early 1990, one microfilm copy had apparently made it to the KGB.
From there supposedly the CIA obtained the
films in 1992 and brought them to its center
in Langley for scrutiny. According to another
rumor a former Stasi Major General sold it
to the CIA for 1.5 million U.S. dollars.5
It took a while for German authorities to
find out about this coup. Finally there was
an arrangement set up for West German intelligence officers to travel to the United States
and transcribe during many weeks in 1993
the information in these films concerning
West German agents only. The West German
service called this operation on the more or
less friendly territory of Northern Virginia
Rosenholz. As a result of this operation,
back in Germany many agents were identified,
but the trials they were put on produced comparatively minor sentences. Besides formal facts
like in which period a particular agent worked
for the Stasi, what his code-name was, whether
he used technical devices to communicate
with his handlers in East Berlin and the number of pages in his destroyed working file, there
was not much substance to sentence somebody
on this basis to a significant term in prison.
Sharing this assessment, the United States
FBI felt the need to produce additional evidence. In the cases of the rather minor American Stasi agent couple Kurt Stand and Teresa
Squillacote, identified by the microfilms, they
launched a so-called sting operation to prove

the couples ongoing willingness to spy for

communist causes, in this case for South
Africa. Since Mrs. Squillacote, who worked
at that time in the Pentagon, fell into this trap,
the U.S. Government built a case mostly on
that recent incident and sentenced the couple
to very harsh 21 respectively 17 years in
prison in accordance with U.S. law on delivering classified government material to a
foreign power.6 Their sentences alone almost
exceed the ones for all convicted West German HVA spies combined.
The SIRA Tapes
Some of these sentences in West Germany
might have been higher, had the decoding of
the so-called SIRA tapes not occurred in 1998
but somewhat earlier. This System Information Recherche Aufklrung (SIRA) consisted
of computerized databases, in which the HVA
put the headlines of almost every single information obtained by its different agents
together with other statistical data including
evaluating grades on an informations value.
These electronic tapes were destroyed in the
early 1990s, but copies turned up later with
the former East German army where the
Gauck-Authority discovered and decoded
them in many years work.
For the period between 1969 and 1989 there
have been 4.500 different sources with
codenames identified, although this number
is not identical with the actual number of
individual agents. 7 Some codenames were
used to conceal electronic sources. In other
cases the number of informations attributed
to certain agents might not match their actual
output. Anyway, a fraction of the printed information left over in 1990 might now be
traced to individual agents since the SIRA
tapes contain the call numbers of these
informations.
The whole SIRA tapes complex could be
appropriately described as an excellent archi-

IFS Info 2/02 7

val finding aide or a decent library catalogue

but without any files or books to order. A
very important aspect of the SIRA tapes was
their discovery and decoding as such. It finally
made the CIA in 1999 to accept a trade with
the German government to deliver CD-ROMs
with Rosenholz file cards and forms to Germany and obtain in turn copies of the SIRA
tapes. Together these two sources contribute
to an assessment of the intensity and value of
various HVA agents.

GDR Espionage Against the West

As a reflection of a period of increasing cold
war tensions, in 1980 the HVA listed among
ten complexes of intelligence gathering at the
first position: Military policy, military planning and intentions, military potential of
NATO, USA, FRG, other main imperialistic
powers and the PRC8 . The second position
was reserved for armament research and
armament production in the USA and other
NATO countries, particularly development
and production of new strategic weapons and
weapon systems. Only on third position
there was the actual policy of USA, NATO
and FRG vis--vis the member states of the
socialist community.9
Of the eighteen HVA departments only four
were assigned to monitor and infiltrate specific countries respectively their institutions:
Department I (Federal Republic of Germany/
FRG government), II (FRG parties and
institutions), XI (USA) and XII (NATO and
European Community). Besides the latter two
all other departments were more or less focused on the FRG anyway, for instance Department IV (Military Espionage). Actual Stasi

8 IFS Info 2/02

intelligence on policy and strategy developed

in the USA itself was almost negligible.
Knowledge about the U.S. was almost exclusively limited to the military theater of
West Germany and consisted of mostly shortliving human and technical sources in the U.S.
Military in West Berlin respectively West
Germany or of a staff member from the U.S.
Embassy in Bonn.
Penetration of West German
Government and Intelligence Services
The HVA, on the other hand, was very
successful in placing agents in the Federal
Chancellery as well as in various ministries
of the Federal Government. 10 Since those
agents were mostly serving in administrative
staff functions, they were excellent in delivering secret documents and internal information. However, with very few exceptions,
they were not themselves involved with
decision making. In 1988, for instance, the
Stasi had two agents connected to the center
of FRG executive power - a female technical
assistant in the Federal Chancellery and a
political scientist working for government
affiliated think tanks. Of course there had
been the famous case of Gnter Guillaume,
a sleeper agent of the HVA emigrating to
West Germany in the 1950s and rising
through the ranks of the Social Democratic
Party right into the staff of Chancellor Willy
Brandt after 1969. Identified in 1974, he was
arrested and later traded for Western agents
to the GDR. Guillaume, who contributed to
the down-fall of Brandt by also spying on him
during his vacations in Norway, provided the
GDR with a wealth of information on
Brandts policies and personality, but in the
end politic-ally burned the very politician the
HVA so desperately wanted to keep in office
during the debate over the no-confidence vote
in the German parliament of May 1972.
Brandt had survived this motion by just one

vote. After the political opposition had bought

some members of Brandts coalition to defect
him, the Stasi was very likely instrumental
in buying two CDU parliamentarians to
secretly vote for Brandt, maybe the only case
when the Stasi really influenced German
politics. Nevertheless six months later in
November 1972 Brandt won an overwhelming election victory without any help
by the Stasi.
With regard to other federal ministries, the
Stasi had recruited between one and two
lower-ranking division heads as well as female technical assistants and people working
in affiliate institutions of almost every department. Particularly affected were the Ministries
of Foreign Affairs, where the Stasi had obtained the cooperation of a few minor diplomats,
and the Ministries of the Interior, Economic
Affairs and Intra-German Relations. Agents
within these institutions provided a wealth
of documents and information for the GDR.
It might be fairly concluded, however, that
their actual influence on shaping or changing
political strategies and events in the West was
very much limited. Such active involvement
also was not part of their assignments given
from East Berlin. They were just expected to
collect as much information as possible without arousing any suspicion of being affiliated
with or sympathetic to East German causes.
Thus it was up to the East German political
decision makers to use the massive insights
into the FRG provided by the HVA for furthering the interests of the GDR. But if it comes
to an analysis of the actual East German advantages stemming from the espionage on the
West German government, there is not this
much left to say. Obviously it hasnt contributed to a enlightening of the mindset or at
least a refining of political strategies of the
East German communists. This was mostly
due to the rigid ideological framework and
the Byzantine power structures in the GDR

politburo, but also to the problem of making

use of all this clandestine information without
compromising or identifying the valuable
Stasi sources in the West.
But there should be no downplaying of the
successes and achievements of East German
intelligence at all. Those are becoming easily
evident if one shifts the focus from surveillance or influencing the FRG Government to
the operational influence on the three West
German intelligence services. Since the late
1960s the HVA effectively could monitor and
thwart all relevant West German intelligence
efforts on GDR territory.11 These Eastern
intelligence coups were never matched by any
similar Western penetration of Eastern
services.
Already in the 1950s the KGB was able to
recruit as an agent the leader of the counterespionage division against the USSR in the
FRGs foreign intelligence service BND.12 Detected and arrested in 1961, Heinz Felfe was
later traded to the GDR in exchange for Western agents. Never detected were two Stasi
top agents in the BND working there from
the early 1970s up to 1989. Alfred Spuhler
worked in the division of sources from communist countries; Gabriele Gast worked in
the analysis department and later became
deputy of the Soviet Union division.
With Hans-Joachim Tiedges defection to
the GDR in 1985, the domestic intelligence
service BfV13 unexpectedly lost a high-ranking
division head. Only in 1989 did it become
aware of the espionage activity of Tiedges
subordinate Klaus Kuron from the so-called
countermen operations division, who had
offered the Stasi his services in 1982. Even
worse hit was the West German military
intelligence service MAD14 , whose deputy
chief, Colonel Joachim Krase, worked for the
Stasi from 1973 until his death in 1988.

IFS Info 2/02 9

Espionage against NATO

The East German intelligence success story
continues when we proceed to military espionage against the German Ministry of Defense,
the German Federal Army and NATO Headquarters. Following the Soviet model of KGB
and GRU, the GDR had founded and created
two separate foreign intelligence services,
both working on military matters: The Military Intelligence Service (Militrischer Nachrichtendienst/ MilND) integrated in the East
German Ministry of Defense and the political
intelligence of the HVA within the Ministry
for State Security. Omitting institutional history details of these two services since the
1950s, we might base the following analysis
of GDR military espionage on the combined
forces of the two services.15
By its partners in the Warsaw Pact, MilND
was assigned West Berlin, FRG, Benelux and
Denmark as explicit areas of operation. It also
organized the service of military attaches in
GDR embassies worldwide, recruiting them
and sometimes additional embassy personnel
as their informers. Relying not just on human
intelligence, information was also gathered
to a great extent by signal and electronic sources. Presenting intelligence findings right to
the military leadership, the MilNDs analyses
were blunt, filled with ideological phrases and
had the tendency to overstate the strength of
the enemy in order to justify and increase the
defense budget (sounds like a familiar pattern
to Western defense analysts). In 1989 it employed 1146 soldiers and civilians in all its
GDR facilities. At that time it directed 293
agents worldwide, among them 138 in the
FRG.
But MilND never was really independent.
When the West German intelligence service
had been successful to hire MilND officers
at highest levels up to 1958, the Defense
Ministrys intelligence service soon came under the control of the Stasi, which secretly

10 IFS Info 2/02

penetrated its fraternal partner service to a

high degree, treated it like a subordinate and
dependent body and stole a lot of its intelligence. There was a lot of double work, but
combined the results of military intelligence
were even more impressive than the respective
record of each service seen in isolation.
The HVA as the political intelligence branch
was assigned within the Warsaw Pact the
targeting of West Berlin, the FRG, USA and
other NATO countries. It presented its intelligence information to the political leadership
in less ideological language than the military
counterparts. In 1988 Department IV of the
HVA (Military Espionage) directed 74 FRG
citizens as agents16 , whereas Department XII,
in charge of infiltrating NATO and EU, had
72 agents on these institutions on file.17
It would consume some considerable time
and space to tell the stories of all the highly
valuable agents within the German Ministry
of Defense, the German Federal Army and
the U.S. Armed Forces in West Germany and
Berlin, all of them having obtained from time
to time also NATO documents for East Berlin
and Moscow. A focus on the sources known
to have operated for the GDR services in
Brussels is quite revealing in a sense. Although
MilND and HVA could never place sources
with nuclear target planning decision makers
or within the operational process of the Supreme European Command of NATO in Belgium, from 1967 to 1989 it gathered an ever
increasing flow of documents from Brussels
primarily from these sources:
* Between 1967 and 1979 Ursula Lorenzen
alias Michelle worked as an Assistant to
the British Director for Operations in NATOs
General Secretariat. She had been recruited
in 1962 in West Germany by an East German romeo agent with the codename of
Bordeaux, whom she later married. They
worked closely together in Brussels before the
GDR called them back abruptly in 1979, af-

ter a Stasi officer had defected from East Berlin to West Germany.
* Rainer Rupp, a student from West Germany, had been recruited by the HVA as an
informant in 1968 and given the codename
Mosel. In 1972 he married the British citizen
Ann-Christine Bowen, whom he recruited for
the HVA himself as Kriemhild. She worked
as a secretary in the NATO Integrated Communications System Management Agency at
that time. In early 1975 she switched to Plans
and Policy in the International Staff of NATO
and in 1977 to Office of Security in NATO
Headquarters. In that year Rupp himself
finally made it into NATO bureaucracy by
becoming a country rapporteur in the Directorate for Economics of NATO General Secretariat. When Michelle had to be withdrawn in March 1979, the HVA activitated
Rupp to fill the gap and he delivered. He even
inherited Michelles now vacant internal
Stasi identification number, a highly unusual
procedure. Now named Topas, he delivered
in the next ten years nearly 2500 informations to East Berlin, for instance documents
on every NATO summit and each meeting of
the Defense Planning Council and much,
much more. Every six to eight weeks he was
on duty in the Situation Center of NATO HQ
and reported from there. As a result NATO
defense planning in Brussels was absolutely
transparent for Moscow in those years. Rupp
was even considered to early warn the Warsaw Pact of a supposed NATO first strike for
which HVA provided him with technology.
If one wants to know more on some GDR
double work on NATO, here are the sources
of MilND:
* Between 1973 and 1980 a Belgian secretary, codename Weiler, recruited by GDRRomeo Valentin whom she later married,
worked in the French Language Staff in
NATO General Secretariat and delivered
documents matching HVA-Michelle of the

same period. In 1980 the GDR called the

couple back to prevent detection.
* In 1987 the former West German signal
officer and diplomat Cherry, having
worked for MilND for many years, e.g. in
the German embassy in Vienna with its extensive materials on the Mutual and Balanced
Force Reduction (MBFR) negotia-tions , was
finally transferred to Brussels as member of
the German Delegation to NATO. From his
work as a signal officer, he could deliver about
800 pages of documents monthly.
Almost all this wealth of intelligence on
NATO obtained by the East German services
went right to Moscow. Only the Soviet Union
was capable of evaluating, assessing and
applying information from those documents
for the purpose of developing their own
military strategy and, moreover, of using it
to advance military technology at home and
within the Warsaw Pact. For Soviet State
Holidays the Stasi prepared leather-bound
booklets for the KGB with cover letters by
Minister Mielke and some exquisite original
documents from NATO. In certain cases affected socialist partners in Eastern Europe got
selected documents (except Romania). The
analysis departments in HVA and MilND
were deliberately small and understaffed, and
despite the overwhelming amount of intelligence raw material the GDR leadership proved unable to develop a sense for the inner
sophistication of NATO strategies and
armaments.
Paradoxically (or logically?) the superb
quantity and quality of documents obtained
from NATO since the late 1960s not only
scrapped adventurous war scenarios of the
Warsaw Pact from the 50s and 60s.18 It also
encouraged the Soviet Union to follow a more
aggressive strategy of seeking superiority in
some fields. Furthermore, in the political context of superpower confrontation, it substantially increased Moscows fear of a Wes-

IFS Info 2/02 11

tern nuclear first strike in the early 1980s.

This Soviet War Scare phenomenon Wrjan
(Veroiatnost Raketno-Iadernogo Napadeniia
i.e. Likeliness of Nuclear Missile Attack)19
and the assessments of threats and threat
perceptions subsided in the Soviet Union in
the late 1980s and led to a change of doctrine.
It would be fascinating to assess the role
intelligence from GDR agents within NATO
may have played during those years. Due to
their activities, the Soviet Union knew all too
well the real strategies and planning of NATO
and had two basic options at hand. Both of
them it pursued for some time either to
exploit the weaknesses of NATO by going
for superiority or to acknowledge its military
strength and go for negotiation and accommodation.

12 IFS Info 2/02

For both opposing strategies the material

from GDR intelligence proved to be vital.
Through the channels of these agents, who
absolutely were no mediators at all, NATO
finally and inadvertently provided to the
Soviet Union the background for changes in
military strategy implemented in the late
Gorbachev era, which were based on a modified assessment of a potential threat posed
by NATO to the USSR and the Warsaw Pact.
In the pre-Gorbachev period, however, the
East German agents would have delivered
significant and substantial advantages to the
USSR in a military crisis situation. Indeed they
were everything else but messengers of
peace, as the GDRs official propaganda
heralded its Stasi agents on foreign soil.

Notes
1

Cf. A. James McAdams, Judging the German Past,

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
2
Der Bundesbeauftragte fr die Materialien des
Ministeriums fr Staatssicherheit der ehemaligen
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik.
3
Jens Gieseke, Mielke-Konzern, Die Geschichte der
Stasi 1945-1990, DVA: Stuttgart 2001, p. 201-2.
4
See chapter 2b below.
5
John O. Koehler, Stasi. The Untold Story of the East
German Secret Police, Westview Press: Boulder 2001,
p. 245.
6
United States vs. Squillacote, Nos. 99-4088, 994099.
7
Gieseke, Mielke-Konzern, p. 204-5.
8
FRG = Federal Republic of Germany, PRC =
Peoples Republic of China.
9
Helmut Mller-Enbergs (Hg.), Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter des Ministeriums fr Staatssicherheit. Teil 2: Anleitungen fr die Arbeit mit Agenten, Kundschaftern
und Spionen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Ch.
Links: Berlin 1998, p. 542-3.

10

See Mller-Enbergs, Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter, pp.

199-203.
11
See Gieseke, Mielke-Konzern, p. 209-10; MllerEnbergs, Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter, pp. 217-225.
12
BND = Bundesnachrichtendienst (Federal Intelligence Service).
13
BfV = Bundesamt fr Verfassungsschutz (Federal
Office for the Protection of the Constitution).
14
MAD = Militrischer Abschirmdienst (Military
Shielding Service).
15
See for details of this chapter extensively: Walter
Richter, Der Militrische Nachrichtendienst der DDR
und seine Kontrolle durch das Ministerium fr
Staatssicherheit, Peter Lang Publishing: Frankfurt/
New York, 2002; Heinz Busch, Die Militrspionage
der DDR, Manuskript, 2001.
16
Mller-Enbergs, pp. 211-214.
17
Gieseke, Mielke-Konzern, p. 214; Mller-Enbergs,
pp. 231-233.
18
See the website of the Parallel History Project on
NATO and Warsaw Pact: www.isn.ethz.ch/php.
19
Cf. Ben B. Fischer, A Cold War Conundrum: The
1983 Soviet War Scare, Center for the Study of
Intelligence: Washington D.C., 1997.

IFS Info 2/02 13

14 IFS Info 2/02

Tidligere utgitte publikasjoner

1991:
1.
Div. forfattere:
2.
C. Archer
3.
Div. forfattere:
4.
O. Riste
5.
T. Huitfeldt,
T. Ries,
J.K. Skogan
6.
R. Kristiansen
7.
T. Ries
8.
N.A. Rhne
1992:
1.
O. Riste
2.
R. Tamnes
3.
4.

L. Shevtsova
T. Kristiansen

5.

O. Riste

6.
7.

O. Wicken
K. Hirsch

1993:
1.
F. Liland
2.

R. Tamnes

3.

H. Sjursen

4.

W. Wladyka

5.

K.E. Eriksen,
H. Pharo

6.
7.

E. Lchen
M. Berdal

Perspektiver p Norges sikkerhet.

Security Options for Denmark.
Perspektiver p Sveriges sikkerhet.
De Gaulle, Alliances, and Minor Powers.
Sovjet i nord etter CFE.

Norsk forsvarsindustri ved en skillevei?

Consequences of START for the Nordic Region.
Norwegian Attitudes Towards the Briand Plan.

Postwar security: Universal or regional?

Norges hemmelige tjenester under den kalde krigen.
Et sammenlignende internasjonalt perspektiv.
August 1991. The attempted coup and its consequences.
Det fjerne og farlige Baltikum.
Norge og det baltiske sprsml 1918-1922.
Eit minimumsforsvar for Norge?
FK90 og sprsmlet om alliert assistanse.
Kald krig i norsk forskning.
Den norske klagesaken mot Tyrkia i 1982.

Culture and Foreign Policy.

An introduction to Approaches and Theory.
Penetrasjon og polarisering.
Nordomrdene i et historisk perspektiv.
Gamle problemer i ny klesdrakt?
EFs utvidelsesproblemer i 1990-rene.
Fortidens skygger i polsk politikk.
Reformprosessens utfordringer etter valget.
Norway and the Early Cold War:
Conditional Atlantic Cooperation.
Norges mte med Europa,1950-1964.
United Nations Peacekeeping at a Crossroads.
The Challenges of Management and Institutional Reform.

IFS Info 2/02 15

1994:
1.
S.R. Rader
2.

J.M. van Splunter

3.
4.
5.
6.

N.A. Rhne
F. Molvig
K.E. Haug
S.G. Holtsmark

7.

S.G. Holtsmark

8.

O. Njlstad

1995:
1.
F.O. Nilsen
2.
J. Hammerstad,
K. Jahr
3.
4.

5.
6.

M.R. Berdal
O. Njlstad,
O.K.Grimnes,
J.Rnneberg,
B. Goldschmidt
T. Ito
R.Hobson,
T. Kristiansen

1996:
1.
Holtsmark, S.G.
2.
3.
4.

O. Riste,
R. Berg
F. Liland
K.O. Sundnes

5.
6.

Chr. Coker
H. Macdonald

16 IFS Info 2/02

Strengthening the Management of UN Peacekeeping Operations.

An Agenda for Reform.
Love at first sight. Co-operation between the Netherlands and
Norway on the peaceful use of atomic energy, 1950-60.
Norway Between Great Britain and Germany.
Norsk forsvarspolitikk i 1970- og 80-rene.
Den tysk-norske spenningen under Frste verdenskrig.
Om Den rde hr rykker inn i Norge ... Sprsmlet om sovjetisk
deltagelse i frigjringen av Norge 1941-1944.
The limits to Soviet influence: Soviet strategic interests in
Norway and Denmark 1944-47.
Fissionable consensus: Scandinavia and the US quest for
international atomic energy control, 1946-1950.

Sovjetisk ubtvirksomhet i nord - behov og tradisjoner.

Telemark bataljon. NATOs nye styrkestruktur og
Norges deltakelse i IRF.
The United Nations at Fifty: Its role in Global Security.

The Race for Norwegian Heavy Water, 1940-1945.

UN Authorized Use of Force: Recent Changes in UN Practice.
Militrmakt, krig og historie. En innfring i militre studier fra
Clausewitz til vre dager.

Great Power Guarantees or Small State Cooperation? Atlanticism

and European regionalism in Norwegian Foreign Policy, 1940-45.
Isolasjonisme, atlantisk samarbeid og nordpolitikk.
Moral og realpolitikk. Norges forhold til Kina etter 1966.
A Balkan Sideshow. The Medical Support System and United
Nations Peacekeeping in the Former Yugoslavia.
The future is history.
National separatisms and the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

1997:
1.
P.V. Wiker
2.
H. Krombach
3.
T. Huitfeldt
4.
5.
6.

R. Berg
H.O. Sandnes
R.G. Patman

1998:
1.
L.M. Ramberg
2.

K. Skogrand

3.

T. Huitfeldt

4.
5.

R. Berg
K. Skogrand
O. Njlstad
R. Tamnes
J. Sherr

6.

1999:
1.
I. Johnstone
2.

S.G. Holtsmark

3.

T. Farer

4.
5.
6.

V. Helgesen
W.P.S. Sidhu
R. Berg

2000:
1.
P.Fr.I. Pharo
2.
A. Brookes
3.
P.Fr.I. Pharo
4.
J. Kidd,
P. Mitchell
5.
M. Petersson
6.

A. Brookes

Amerikansk vpenhjelp til Norge 1949-1953.

The Meaning of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
De norske partisanene i Finnmark 1941-44 - i skyggen av
den kalde krigen.
Nordisk samarbeid 1914-1918.
"Olav Tryggvason-affren".
Securing Somalia : A Comparison of US and Australian Peacekeeping during the UNITAF Operation.

Luftforsvaret en lringsorganisasjon? Logistiske utfordringer

ved NORAIRs deployering til Bosnia 1993.
Cash and Cannons. Norway, Denmark, and the US
Aid Programmes 1947-1952.
Striden om landminer.Ottawa-konvensjonens muligheter
og begrensninger.
Nasjon - union - profesjon. Forsvaret p 1800-tallet.

Brennpunkt. Kald krig, nordomrder og storstrategi.

Ukraine's new time of troubles.

The UN's Role in Transitions from War to Peace: Sovereignty,

Consent and the Evolving Normative Climate.
Gullet fra Moskva. Sovjetisk pengesttte til norske
kommunister, 1917-1990.
Shaping Agendas in Civil Wars. Can international criminal
law help?
Kosovo og folkeretten.
New Challanges for the Non-Proliferation Regime.
Den svenske "generalguvernrtiden" i Norge, 1814-1829.

Necessary, not perfect: NATO's war in Kosovo.

Hard European Lessons from the Kosovo Air Campaign.
Norge p Balkan 1990-1999. "Lessons learned".
European defence challenges.
Vapenbrder. Svensk-norska skerhetspolitiska relationer
under det kalla kriget.
The prospects for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.

IFS Info 2/02 17

2001:
1.
Chr. Coker
2.
O. Bosch
3.
K. Kleve (red.)
4.
R. Tamnes (red.)

2002:
1.
E. Mnnik
2.
B. Schfer

18 IFS Info 2/02

Asymmetrical War.
The Year 2000 Issue and Information Infrastructure Security.
Kilder til norsk luftmilitr historie
Kommandosprsmlet p nordflanken.
Utviklingen i to formative perioder.

Estonian Defence. Ten Years of Development.

Stasi Files and GDR Espionage Against the West.

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IFS Info 2/2000

Bernd Schfer

Institutt for forsvarsstudier

Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies
Tollbugt. 10
N-0152 OSLO
Norway
Tlf: +47 23 09 31 05
Fax: +47 23 09 33 79

Institutt for forsvarsstudier

Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies