AKBAYAN-YOUTH v.

COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioners in this case represent the youth sector and they seek to seek to direct COMELEC to conduct a
special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to
them, around four million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the
respondent COMELEC. However, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3584 disapproving the request
for additional registration of voters on the ground that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that no
registration shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular
election and that the Commission has no more time left to accomplish all pre-election activities. Aggrieved
by the denial, petitioners filed before the SC the instant which seeks to set aside and nullify respondent
COMELECs Resolution and/or to declare Section 8 of R. A. 8189 unconstitutional insofar as said
provision effectively causes the disenfranchisement of petitioners and others similarly situated. Likewise,
petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing respondent COMELEC to conduct a
special registration of new voters and to admit for registration petitioners and other similarly situated
young Filipinos to qualify them to vote in the May 14, 2001 General Elections.

Issue: Whether or not the SC can compel respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of new
voters during the period between the COMELEC's imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14,
2001 general elections.

Held:
N0. The right of suffrage invoked by petitioners is not at all absolute. The exercise of the right of suffrage,
as in the enjoyment of all other rights is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements
embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law. As to the procedural limitation,
the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he must
undergo: among others, the process of registration. Section 8, of the R.A. 8189, explicitly provides that
"No registration shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a
regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election." The 100-day prohibitive period serves a
vital role in protecting the integrity of the registration process. Without the prohibitive periods, the
COMELEC would be deprived of any time to evaluate the evidence on the application.
Considering the circumstances where the writ of mandamus lies and the peculiarities of the present case,
we are of the firm belief that petitioners failed to establish, to the satisfaction of this Court, that they are
entitled to the issuance of this extraordinary writ so as to effectively compel respondent COMELEC to
conduct a special registration of voters.

Albano v. Arranz
Facts:
Albano was the official candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the office of Representative for the lone
congressional district of Isabela. His opponent was respondent Samuel Reyes, official candidate of the
Liberal Party for the same position.
Albano questioned the returns produced by the Provincial Treasurer for a number of precincts on the
ground that the said returns appeared with erasures on their face and alterations that operated to the
detriment of Albano. The Commission on Elections ordered the suspension of the proclamation of the
winning candidate until further orders.
Reyes filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Isabela, Branch I, presided
over by Judge Manuel Arranz, with the Provincial Board of Canvassers as lone respondents, praying
Board of Canvassers be directed to canvass the disputed votes cast in the precincts referred to, and
proclaim the winner, claiming that the suspension orders of the Commission on Elections were null and
void. Respondent Judge, thereafter ordered the case set for hearing within five days, and on the same
day, upon motion of Reyes, issued a preliminary injunction ordering the board of Canvassers and the
Provincial Treasurer to refrain from bringing the questioned returns to Manila, as instructed by the
Commission on Elections.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion when it
attempted to correct the error of the Commission on Election.
Held:
Yes, respondent court's actions are highly irregular and void for lack of jurisdiction. The suspension of the
proclamation of the winning candidate pending an inquiry into irregularities brought to the attention of the
Commission on Elections was well within its administrative jurisdiction, in view of the exclusive authority
conferred upon it by the Constitution (Art. X), for the administration and enforcement of all laws relative to
elections. The Commission certainly had the right to inquire whether or not discrepancies existed
between the various copies of election returns for the precincts in question, and suspend the canvass in
the meantime, so the parties could ask for a recount in case of variance. Moreover, the Court below could
not properly pass upon the validity of the Commissions orders without giving it a hearing, and the
Commission had not been impleaded.
Even assuming that the order to suspend the proclamation of the winner was in any way defective, the
correction thereof did not lie within the authority of the statutory Courts of First Instance, since Article X,
section 2 (in fine) expressly prescribes "that the decisions, orders, and rulings of the Commission shall be
subject to review by the Supreme Court" and by no other tribunal (Luison v. Garcia, G. R. No. L-10916,
May 20, 1957). It is easy to realize the chaos that would ensue if the Court of First Instance of each and
every province were to arrogate unto itself the power to disregard, suspend, or contradict any order of the
Commission on Elections: that constitutional body would be speedily reduced to impotence.

Aquino Vs COMELEC, G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995

FACTS:
Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for the
Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and
Mateo Bedon,Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy.Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify
petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman
which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1 year immediately
preceding the elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman as
mandated by Sec. 6, Art.VI of the Constitution.
HELD:
In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati
City, he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice.
Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident
of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately
preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the
same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What stands
consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his
most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.
The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium
unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of petitioners intention to reside in
Makati City, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of ones
original domicile.

Petitioners assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which
is hardly supported by the facts. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an
actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In the
absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

Aratuc v. Comelec
Facts:
Tomatic Aratuc et al. sought the suspension of the canvass then being undertaken by respondent Board
in Cotabato city. A supervening panel headed by Commissioner of Elections, Hon- Venancio S. Duque,
had conducted of the complaints of the petitioners therein of alleged irregularities in the election records
in the voting centers. Before hearing, the canvass was suspended. After hearing the parties, the Court
allowed resumption of the canvass but issued guidelines to be followed but thereafter modified. On July
11, 1978, respondent Board terminated its canvass and declared the result of the voting. The petitioners
brought the resolution of respondent Board to the Comelec. Hearing was held on April 25, 1978, after
which, the case was declared submitted for decision. In order to enable the Commission to decide the
appeal properly:
a. It will have to go deeper into the examination of the voting records and registration records and in the
case of voting centers whose voting and registration records which have not yet been submitted for the
Commission to decide to open the ballot boxes; and
b. To interview and get statements under oath of impartial and disinterested persons from the area to
determine whether actual voting took place on April 7, 1978, as well as those of the military authorities in
the areas affected.
On January 13, 1979, the Comelec rendered its resolution being assailed in these cases, declaring the
final result of the canvass.
Issue:
WON there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of COMELEC.
Held:
Under Section 168 of the Revised Election Code of 1978, "the Commission (on Elections)shall have direct
control and supervision over the board of canvassers" and that relatedly, Section175 of the same Code
provides that it "shall be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies." The fact of the matter is
that the authority of the Commission in reviewing actuations of board of canvassers does not spring from
any appellate jurisdiction conferred by any specific provision of law, for there is none such provision
anywhere in the Election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct control and supervision
endowed to it by the above-quoted provisions of Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too well
settled postulate to need any supporting citation here, that a superior body or office having supervision
and control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done. We
cannot fault respondent Comelec for its having extended its inquiry beyond that undertaken by the Board
of Canvass. On the contrary, it must be stated that Comelec correctly and commendably asserted its
statutory authority born of its envisaged constitutional duties vis--vis the preservation of the purity of
elections and electoral.

ATIENZA v. COMELEC (16 Feb 2010)

Facts:
In 2005, Drilon (Liberal Party president) withdrew his support from the Arroyo administration
The next year, 2006, Atienza (LP chairman) hosted a party conference/assembly which proceeded to
elect new officers for all positions. Atienza won as LP president. Drilon filed a petition before COMELEC
for the nullification of the election.
In 2007, the National Executive Council (NECO), the partys electing body, convened for the election of
new set of officers before Drilons term expired. Manuel Roxas II was installed as new LP president.
Atienza and other LP members filed a petition for mandatory and prohibitory injunction to enjoin Roxas
from assuming his position, alleging illegal constitution of the NECO and illegal expulsion/exclusion of
Atienza from the party and its election.
Issue
WON COMELEC has jurisdiction over the issue of validity of Atienza, et al.s expulsion from the party
Held:
No. The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have blanket authority to
resolve any and all controversies involving political parties. Political parties are generally free to conduct
their activities without interference from the state. The COM ELEC may intervene in disputes internal to a
party only when necessary to the discharge of its constitutional functions. The COMELECs jurisdiction
over intra-party leadership disputes has already been settled by the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v.
Commission on Elections that the COMELECs powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, "include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers
responsible for its acts." The Court also declared in another case that the COMELECs power to register
political parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus,
the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an
incident of its power to register political parties.
Courts will ordinarily not interfere in membership and disciplinary matters within apolitical party. A political
party is free to conduct its internal affairs, pursuant to its constitutionally-protected right to free
association. In Sinaca v. Mula, the Court said that judicial restraint in internal party matters serves the
public interest by allowing the political processes to operate without undue interference. It is also
consistent with the state policy of allowing a free and open party system to evolve, according to the free
choice of the people.

ATONG PAGLAUM VS COMELEC[G.R. NO. 203766 ETC., 02 APRIL 2013 ]

Facts:
A few weeks before the elections, the Supreme Court in Atong Paglaum Inc. vs. Commission on Elections
reinterpreted Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and reversed its own ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani
and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections
(BANAT).
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May
2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for
marginalized or underrepresented sectors, which is contrary to the doctrine laid down in Ang Bagong
Bayani, stating that the party-list system is not the exclusive domain of sectoral representatives
belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors but may be participated in by non-sectoral
parties as well who do not need to represent marginalized and underrepresented sector.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion because it merely
followed the rulings laid down in ABB and BANAT. However, the Court decided to abandon these rulings
and adopted new parameters for the upcoming elections; thus, it remanded the case to COMELEC so the
latter can determine the status of the petitioners based on the following new guidelines:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system
and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that
fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in partylist elections only through its
sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in
well-defined political constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented include

labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and
overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack well-defined political
constituencies must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who lack
well-defined political constituencies, either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track
record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
It is clear from the foregoing that a new rule has been set: not all parties in the party-list system have to
represent a sector that is marginalized and underrepresented.

Carlos v. Angeles (2000)

Facts:
In the May 11, 1998 elections, Jose Carlos was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela over
Antonio Serapio. Serapio filed an election protest challenging the results and the case was assigned to
Judge Angeles of the RTC of Caloocan (because of the inhibition of all the judges of the RTC in
Valenzuela). The final tally showed that Carlos won over a margin of 17,007 votes. However, the trial
court set aside the final tally of valid votes because of its finding of significant badges of fraud. The trial
court held that the fraud was attributable to Carlos and it declared Serapio as the duly elected mayor of
Valenzuela City.

Issues:
1. W/N the SC has jurisdiction.
2. W/N the trial court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

Held/Ratio:
1. YES. The SC has jurisdiction over the present petition. Both the Supreme Court and Comelec (in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction) have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus over decisions of trial courts of general jurisdiction (RTC) in election cases involving elective
municipal officials. The Court that takes jurisdiction first shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
2. YES. The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
proclaiming Serapio the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela even without a majority of votes cast in his
favor. The trial court in its decision actually pronounced a failure of election by disregarding and setting
aside the results of the election. The trial court erred to the extent of ousting itself of jurisdiction because
the grounds for failure of election were not significant and even non-existent. More importantly, the
commission of fraud cannot be attributed to Carlos as there was no evidence on record that he had a
hand in any of the irregularities that Serapio averred. The court annuls and declares void the trial court
decision. The case is remanded to the trial court for decision.

Francisco I. Chavez v Commission on Elections

Facts:
This case was originally an urgent petition ad cautelam praying, among others, for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order enjoining respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from proclaiming
the 24th highest senatorial candidate.
On May 5, 1992, this Court issued a resolution in GR No. 104704. The above mentioned resolution was
received by respondent COMELEC on May 6, 1992 and on the same day, petitioner filed an urgent
motion to disseminate through the fastest available means and order said Election Officials to delete the
name Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified list of candidates tally sheets, election returns and count
all votes in favor of Fransisco I. Chavez. But petitioner assailed that COMELEC failed to perform its
mandatory function thus the name of Melchor Chavez remained undeleted.
Petitioner prays not only for a restraining order but the judgment be rendered requiring the COMELEC to
reopen the ballot boxes in 80,348 precincts in 13 provinces including Metro Manila, scan the ballots for
Chavez votes which were invalidated or declared stray and credit said scanned Chavez votes in favor
of petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition.
Ruling:
It is quite obvious that petitioners prayer does not call for the correction of manifest errors in the
certificates of canvass or election returns before the COMELEC but for the ballots contained therein.
Indeed, petitioner has not even pointed to any manifest error in the certificates of canvass or election
returns he desires to be rectified. There being none, petitioners proper recourse is to file a regular
election protest which, under the constitution and the Omnibus Election code, exclusively pertains to the
Senate Electoral Tribunal.
Thus, Sec. 17 Art. Vl of the constitution provides that the Senate and the House of Representatives shall
each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contest relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective members (Emphasis supplied). The word sole
underscores the exclusivity of the tribunals jurisdiction over election contest relating to their respective
members. It is therefore crystal clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. It is
the Senate Electoral Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of petitioner relating
to the election of a member of the Senate.
As the authenticity of the certificates of canvass or election returns are not questioned, they must be
prima facie considered valid for purposes of canvassing the same and proclamation of the winning
candidates.
Premises considered, the Court resolved to dismiss the instant petition for lack of merit.

Demafiles v. Comelec
FACTS:
Respondent Galido won over Petitioner due to the Provincial Board voting to reject returns. Petitioner
challenged the right of 2 board members to sit, considering that they were re-electionists. Respondent
Commission ruled in favor of Petitioner. Galido then asked for reconsideration, stating that the 2 board
members in question were disqualified only when the board was acting as a provincial but not as
municipal. In light of this, Respondent Commission reversed its previous decision.
ISSUES:
1. W/N this case is moot and the board had the authority to reject the returns from Precinct.
2. W/N the board members who were candidates for reelection were disqualified from sitting in the board
in its capacity as a municipal board of canvassers.
3.W/N Respondent Commission can order the board of canvassers to count a return.
HELD: RA 4970 reads the first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the municipality of Sebaste shall be
elected in the next general elections for local officials and shall have qualified. The Supreme Court ruled
that and shall have qualified is devoid of meaning. The term of office of municipals shall begin in the 1st
day of January following their election, despite the fact that Sebaste was a newly created municipality.
No, a canvassing board may not reject any returns due to whatever cause. However, since there is a
possibility of fraud, the canvass made and proclamation should be annulled. The laws states any member
of a provincial board or of municipal council who is a candidate for office in any election, shall be in
competent to act on the said body. Since Respondent Commission has the power to annul an illegal
canvass and proclamation, there is no reason as to why it cannot order canvassing bodies to count all
returns which are otherwise regular.

Dino v. Olivarez

Jurisdiction; election cases. A public prosecutor exceeded the authority delegated to him by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to prosecute election-related cases when he filed amended
informations in court against the respondent Pablo Olivares even after he had been directed by the Legal
Department of the COMELEC to suspend the implementation of his joint resolution (which found that the
respondent should be indicted) but before his delegated authority had been revoked by the COMELEC en
banc.

The Constitution, particularly Article IX, Section 20, empowers the COMELEC to investigate and, when
appropriate, prosecute election cases. Furthermore, under Section 265 of the OEC, the COMELEC,
through its duly authorized legal officers, has the exclusive power to conduct the preliminary investigation
of all election offenses punishable under the OEC and to prosecute the same. Under Section 265 of the
OEC, the COMELEC may avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government.
Thus, Section 2, Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides for the continuing delegation of
authority to other prosecuting arms of the government, which authority, however, may be revoked or
withdrawn at anytime by the COMELEC in the proper exercise of its judgment. Section 10 of the same
Rule 34 gives the COMELEC the power to motu proprio revise, modify and reverse the resolution of the
Chief State Prosecutor and/or provincial/city prosecutors.

Clearly, the Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Fiscals, and/or their respective assistants have
been given continuing authority, as deputies of the Commission, to conduct a preliminary investigation of
complaints involving election offenses under the election laws and to prosecute the same. However, such
authority may be revoked or withdrawn anytime by the COMELEC either expressly or impliedly, when in
its judgment, such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the process to promote
the common good or where it believes that the successful prosecution of the case can be done by the
COMELEC. Moreover, being mere deputies or agents of the COMELEC, provincial or city prosecutors
deputized by it are expected to act in accord with and not contrary to or in derogation of the resolutions,
directives or orders of the COMELEC in relation to election cases where it had been deputized to
investigate and prosecute by the COMELEC. As mere deputies, provincial and city prosecutors acting on
behalf of the COMELEC must proceed within the lawful scope of their delegated authority. (Bievenido
Dio and Renato Comparativo vs. Pablo Olivarez, G.R. No. 170447, December 4, 2009.)

Domino vs Comelec
Facts:
Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the lone legislative
district of the Province of Sarangani indicating that he has resided in the constituency where he seeks to
be elected for 1 year and 2 months. Private respondents filed a petition seeking to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of Domino, alleging that Domino, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is
not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election.
Thereafter, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution declaring Domino disqualified as candidate for the
position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani in the May 11, 1998 polls for lack of the oneyear residency requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy based on
his own Voters Registration Record and his address indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Hts., Old
Balara, Quezon City.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani Province for at least 1 year immediately preceding the
May 11, 1998 elections
Held:
The term residence, as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office,
means the same thing as domicile, which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one
intends to return.
Records show that petitioners domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in 1991, he
acquired a new domicile of choice in Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the
position of representative of the Third District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now
claiming that he had effectively abandoned his residence in Quezon City and has established a new
domicile of choice in the Province of Sarangani. A persons domicile, once established, is considered to
continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention
of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose.
The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997 does not adequately
support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of Dominos intention to reside in
Sarangani, but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of ones
original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long,
without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus, the date of the
contract of lease of a house and lot in Sarangani cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances,
as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement. Further, Dominos lack of intention to
abandon his residence in Quezon City is strengthened by his act of registering as voter in Quezon City.
While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence
especially in this case where Domino registered in his former barangay.

Fermin v. Comelec
FACTS:
Mike A. Fermin, the petitioner in both cases, was a registered voter of Barangay Payan, Kabuntalan. On
December 13, 2006, claiming that he had been a resident of Barangay Indatuan for 1 year and 6 months,
petitioner applied with the COMELEC for the transfer of his registration record to the said barangay. In the
meantime, the creation of North Kabuntalan was ratified in a plebiscite on December 30, 2006, formally
making Barangay Indatuan a component of Northern Kabuntalan. Thereafter, on January 8, 2007, the
COMELEC approved petitioner's application for the transfer of his voting record and registration as a
voter of Barangay Indatuan, Northern Kabuntalan. On March 29, 2007, Fermin filed his Certificate of
Candidacy (CoC) for mayor of Northern Kabuntalan in the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections.
Private respondent filed a disqualification case against petitioner. The petition alleged that the petitioner
did not possess the period of residency required for candidacy and that he perjured himself in his CoC
and in his application for transfer of voting record. Elections were held without any decision being
rendered by the COMELEC in the said case. After the counting and canvassing of votes, Dilangalen
emerged as the victor. Fermin subsequently filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
nd
Branch 13 of Cotabato City. On June 29, 2007, the COMELEC 2 Division, disqualified Fermin for not
being a resident of Northern Kabuntalan. It ruled that, based on his declaration that he is a resident of
Barangay Payan as of April 27, 2006 in his oath of office before Datu Andal Ampatuan, Fermin could
nothave been a resident of Barangay Indatuan for at least one year Petitioner argues that he has been a
resident of Barangay Indatuan long before the creation of Northern Kabuntalan. This change of residence
prompted him to apply for the transfer of his voters registration record from Barangay Payan to Barangay
Indatuan. Moreover, the one year residency requirement under the law is not applicable to candidates for
elective office in a newly created municipality, because the length of residency of all its inhabitants is
reckoned from the effective date of its creation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when it declared petitioner as not a
resident of the locality for at least one year prior to the May 14, 2007 elections
HELD: YES. The Court finds the COMELEC to have gravely abused its discretion when it precipitately
declared that Fermin was not a resident of Northern Kabuntalan for at least one year prior to the said
elections. COMELEC relied on a single piece of evidence to support its finding that petitioner was not a
resident of Barangay Indatuan, Northern Kabuntalan, i.e., the oath of office subscribed and sworn to
before Governor Datu Andal Ampatuan, in which petitioner merely admitted that he was a resident of
another locality as of April 27, 2006, which was more than a year before the elections. It is not
inconsistent with his subsequent claim that he complied with the residency requirement for the elective
office, as petitioner could have transferred to Barangay Indatuan after April 27, 2006, on or before May
14, 2006.

Gayo vs. Verceles

Facts:
Verceles is running for mayor and was subsequently proclaimed as the winner in that election. Her
proclamation was however questioned for the reason that she is a greencard holder and has not complied
with the residence requirement.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent was able to meet the residency requirement for the position of municipal
mayor during the May 2001 elections.

Ruling:
Supreme Court held that when Verceles abandoned her greencard holder status when she surrendered
her alien registration receipt card before the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the American
Embassy in Manila prior to her filing for certificate of candidacy. Thus, when Verceles filed her certificate
of candidacy, she was no longer disqualified to run as an elective official because of such waiver of
permanent resident status in a foreign country.

Javier v. Comelec, 13 SCRA 156

Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of the Batasan in
May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier complained of massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, votebuying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and intimidation,
snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of Pacificador. COMELEC just referred the
complaints to the AFP. On the same complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed
the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the
proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division
ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of
the case before the Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation made by the board of
canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of
appeal, which the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the irregularities of the election
must first be resolved before proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners should
inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the
2nd Division but the Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986,
during pendency, Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor General then moved to have the petition close it
being moot and academic by virtue of Javiers death.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gens tenor. The SC has repeatedly and
consistently demanded the cold neutrality of an impartial judge as the indispensable imperative of due
process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also
appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are
entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge
who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must
believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there
would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter
calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a
suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and
waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing.
Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed
to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to
foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the
arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.

Javier v. Comelec, 144 SCRA 194

Facts:
The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the
May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter had the advantage
of being the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On the eve of the elections, the bitter
contest between the two came to a head when several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and
killed, allegedly by the latters men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing
trial for these murders. Conceivably, it intimidated voters against supporting the Opposition candidate or
into supporting the candidate of the ruling party. It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and
the post-election developments were to run true to form. Owing to what he claimed were attempts to
railroad the private respondents proclamation, the petitioner went to the Comelec to question the
canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was
proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court,
arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by the Comelec en banc
as required by the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the Second Division of the Comelec authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23,
1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election.
Held:
Article XII-C, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution provides that: The COMELEC may sit en banc or in
three divisions. All election cases may be heard and decided by divisions except contests involving
members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc.

Kilosbayan v. Comelec
Facts:
Special Provision No. 1 of the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) under Republic Act No. 7180,
allocates a specific amount of government funds for infrastructure and other priority projects and
activities. In order to be valid, the use and release of said amount should have the following mandatory
requirements: (1) Approval by the President of the Philippines; (2) Release of the amount directly to the
appropriate implementing agency; and (3) List of projects and activities.
Respondent Cesar Sarino, the then DILG Secretary, requested for authority to negotiate, enter into, sign
Memoranda of Agreements with accredited Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in order to utilize
them to implement the projects of the CDF provided for under R.A.
No. 7180. Respondent Franklin Drilon, the then Executive Secretary, granted the abovementioned
request of Secretary Sarino. Such an authority was extended to all the Regional Directors of the DILG.
Pursuant to the above-described authority granted him, respondent Tiburcio Relucio, on April 24, 1992,
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with an accredited NGO known as the Philippine Youth
Health and Sports Development Foundation, Inc. (PYHSDFI). COMELEC received from petitioner
Kilosbayan a letter informing the former of two serious violations of election laws, among them that the
amount of P70 million was released by the Budget Department, shortly before the elections of May 11,
1992, in favor of PYHSDFI a private entity, which had reportedly engaged in dirty election tricks and
practices in said elections and requesting that these offenses and malpractices be investigated promptly,
thoroughly, impartially, without fear of favor.
Issue: Based on recommendations by the Comelec Law Department, the Commission en banc dismissed
the letter-complaint for lack of evidence.
Held: The constitutional and statutory mandate for the Comelec to investigate and prosecute cases of
violation of election laws translates, in effect, to the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations
in cases involving election offenses for the twin purpose of filing an information in court and helping the
Judge determine, in the course of preliminary inquiry, whether or not a warrant of arrest should be issued.
Although only a low quantum and quality of evidence is needed to support a finding of probable cause,
the same cannot be justified upon hearsay evidence that is never given any evidentiary or probative value
in this jurisdiction.

Mastura v. Comelec

Facts: Petitioner Michael O. Mastura and private respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen were congressional
candidates for the first district of Maguindanao during the 8 May 1995 elections. In the canvassing of
votes, Dilangalen objected to the inclusion of the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog on
the ground that the same was allegedly tampered. Acting on the objection, the COMELEC Second
Division ordered the production and examination of the election returns of the Municipality of Matanog. In
the course of the examination four (4) ballot boxes were produced and opened. Upon examination and
comparison of the copies of the election returns of the MTC Judge and the COMELEC, the COMELEC
Second Division found that, indeed, the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog had been
tampered with. Consequently, the COMELEC Second Division issued the herein assailed Order of 29
February 1996 annulling the Certificate of Canvass of Matanog.
Issue: Whether or not COMELEC can suspend the canvass of votes pending its inquiry whether there
exists a discrepancy between the various copies of election returns from the disputed voting centers.
Held: We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent COMELEC. It is settled
jurisprudence that COMELEC can suspend the canvass of votes pending its inquiry whether there exists
a discrepancy between the various copies of election returns from the disputed voting centers. Corollarily,
once the election returns were found to be falsified or tampered with, the COMELEC can annul the illegal
canvass and order the Board of Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the winners on the basis of the
genuine returns or, if it should refuse, replace the members of the board or proclaim the winners itself.
That the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog was tampered with is a factual finding of
the COMELEC. Absent any showing of abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, this Court
should refrain from reviewing the same, and must accord it instead the respect it deserves. The rule that
factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by courts of justice except when there is
absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings should be applied with
greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution intended to place the
COMELEC - created and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself - on a level higher than
statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of the
election by means available to it. For the attainment of that end, it is not strictly bound by the rules of
evidence.

PUNGUTAN VS ABUBAKAR 43 SCRA 1 (1972)

Facts:
COMELEC excluded from the canvass for the election of delegates for the lone district of the province of
Sulu the returns from 107 precincts of Siasi, 56 precincts of Tapul, 67 precincts of Parang and 60
precincts of Luuk for being spurious or manufactured and therefore no returns at all. Unless set aside
then, petitioner Abdulgafar Pungutan, who otherwise would have been entitled to the last remaining seat
for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, there being no question as to the election of the other two
delegates, would lose out to respondent Benjamin Abubakar. Pungutan disputes the power of
respondent Commission to exclude such returns as a result of oral testimony as well as the examination
of the fingerprints and signatures of those who allegedly voted as the basis for the holding that no election
in fact did take place.

Issue:
Whether or not Comelec has exceeded its constitutional power by encroaching on terrain properly
judicial, the right to vote being involved.

Held:
The contention is unavailing, in the light of SCs holding in Usman v. Comelec.
On such issue, it is a time-honored precept that factual findings of the COMELEC based on its own
assessments and duly supported by evidence, are conclusive upon Courts of Law, more so, in the
absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the same. The resolution of respondent Comelec
being assailed in this petition for review, was undoubtedly motivated by the objective of insuring free,
orderly and honest elections in the discharge of its constitutional function to enforce and administer
electoral laws.
The other principal question raised is whether there cognition of such prerogative on the part of
respondent Commission would contravene the constitutional provision that it cannot pass on the right to
vote. The appropriate answer as will be made clear is likewise adverse to petitioner. Hence, respondent
Commission must be sustained. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed and the resolution of the
Commission on Elections dated May14, 1971 is affirmed.

Regina Onsiako Reyes v COMELEC

Facts:
The petitioners assail through a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction resolution of the Commission on Election ordering the cancellation of the Certificate
of Candidacy of petitioner for the position of the Representative of the lone district of Marinduque. On
Octocer 31, 2012 Joseph Socorro Tan filed with the Comelec an amended Petition to Deny Due Course
or to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Regina Ongsiako Reyes, the petitioner, on the ground that it
contained material representations. On March 27, 2013 the COMELEC cancelled the certificate of
candidacy of the petitioner. She filed an MR on April 8, 2013. On May 14, 2014, COMELEC en banc
denied her MR.
Howewer, on May 13, 2013, she was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 Elections. On June 5, 2013,
COMELEC declared the May 14, 2013 Resolution final and E3ecutory.On the same day, petitioner took
her oath of office before Feliciano Belmonte, the Speaker of the House of Representatives. She has yet
to assume office at that time, as her term officially starts at noon of June 30, 2013. According to
petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly proclaimed because pursuant
to Section17, Article VI of the 1987Constitution, the House of the Representatives has the exclusive
jurisdiction to be the ole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives.
Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petitioner who is proclaimed as winner and who has
already taken her oath of office for the position of member of the House of Representative of Marinduque.
Held:
Yes, COMELEC retains jurisdiction because the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives begins only
after the candidate is considered a member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section17,
Article VI of the 1987Constitution. For one to be considered a member of the House of Representatives,
there must be a concurrence of these requisites:
1. Valid proclamation,
2. Proper oath, and
3. Assumption of office.
Thus the petitioner cannot be considered a member of the House of Representatives yet as she has not
assumed office yet.

Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC

Facts:
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of Leyte
First District. On March 2P, 995, private respondent Cirilio Montejo, also a candidate for the same
position, filed a petition for disqualification of the petitioner with COMELEC on the ground that petitioner
did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an amended
certificate of candidacy, changing the entry of seven months to since childhood in item no. 8 in said
certificate. However, the amended certificate was not received since it was already past deadline. She
claimed that she always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile and residence. The Second Division of
the COMELEC With a vote of 2 to 1 came up with a resolution finding private respondents petition for
disqualification meritorious.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the
late President Marcos.
Held:
For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the qualification
of petitioner, despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the district
for only 4 months, because of the following: a. a minor follows the domicile of her parents; Tacloban
became petitioners domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought the family to Leyte; b.
domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the
purpose; in the absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin
should be deemed to continue; c. the wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because
the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; when petitioner married
President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a
domicilium necessarium; d. even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and
acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband died, her acts following her return to the
country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.

Salva v. Makalintal
FACTS: The petitioners filed with the RTC a class suit against the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of
Batangas, Sangguniang Pambayan of Calaca, Batangas, and the COMELEC for annulment of Ordinance
No. 05 and Resolution No. 345 both enacted by the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2987. Ordinance No. 05 declared the abolition of Barangay San Rafael and its
merger with Barangay Dacanlao, municipality of Calaca, Batangas and accordingly instructed the
COMELEC to conduct the required plebiscite. Resolution No. 345 affirmed the effectivity of Ordinance
No. 05, thereby overriding the veto exercised by the governor of Batangas. Ordinance No. 05 was vetoed
by the governor of Batangas for being ultra vires, particularly, as it was not shown that the essential
requirements regarding the attestations or certifications of several government agencies were obtained.
The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2987, providing for the rules and regulations governing the
conduct of the required plebiscite scheduled on February 28, 1998, to decide the issue of the abolition of
barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao, Calaca, Batangas.
The trial court denied the petition saying that any petition or action questioning an act, resolution or
decision of the COMELEC must be brought before the Supreme Court. The petitioners contend that
when the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial functions under Section 52 of the Omnibus Election
Code, its acts are subject to the exclusive review by this Court; but when the COMELEC performs a
purely ministerial duty, such act is subject to scrutiny by the Regional Trial Court. Petitioners submit that
the conduct of a plebiscite, pursuant to Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345, is not adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial in nature but simply ministerial or administrative in nature and only in obedience to the
aforesaid Ordinance and Resolution.
Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC's power to conduct plebiscite, pursuant to Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution
No. 345, is of ministerial or administrative nature.
HELD: The SC ruled that What is contemplated by the term final orders, rulings and decisions of the
COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in
actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of
its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
Briefly, COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations governing the
conduct of the required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the COMELECs quasi-judicial functions but
merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of plebiscites, thus, the said
resolution may not be deemed as a final order reviewable by certiorari by this Court. Any question
pertaining to the validity of said resolution may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial
courts.

SBMA vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 125416 Sep 26, 1996)

Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enactor reject them at the polls
independent of the legislative assembly. On the other hand, referendum is the right reserved to the
people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and which in
most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law
In April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10,
Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join
the Subic Special Economic Zone. On September 5, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong submitted
Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993 to the Office of the President. On May 24, 1993,
respondents Garcia, Calimbas and their companions filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. The SangguniangBayan ng Morong
acted upon the petition of respondents Garcia, Calimbas, et al. by promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan
Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227,
particularly those concerning the matters cited in items (A),(B), (K), (E), and (G) of private respondent's
petition. The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong also informed respondents that items (D) and (H) had
already been referred to and favorably acted upon by the government agencies concerned, such as the
Bases Conversion Development Authority and the Office of the President. Not satisfied, and within 30
days from submission of their petition, herein respondents resorted to their power initiative under the
Local Government Code of 1991. Comelec promulgated the assailed Resolution No. 2848 providing for
"the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal
Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan".
SBMA instituted the present petition for certiorari and prohibition contesting the validity of Resolution No.
2848 and alleging, inter alia, that public respondent "is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that
proposes an amendment of a national law.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Comelec commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating and
implementing Resolution No. 2848

Held: Yes, the process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made
preparations for a REFERENDUM only.
There are statutory and conceptual demarcations between a referendum and an initiative. In enacting the
"Initiative and Referendum Act, Congress differentiated one term from the other, thus
- Initiative is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and
enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.
- Referendum is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called
for the purpose.

Velasco vs COMELEC
FACTS:
This petition for certiorari seeks to set aside and annul the resolutions denying the COC Velasco had filed
for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of Sasmuan, Pampanga. The distinctions between
inclusion/exclusion proceedings and COC denial/cancellation proceedings, refute and belie Velasco's
position that the COMELEC improperly ruled on his right to vote when it cancelled his COC.
ISSUE:
Is decision in an inclusion/exclusion proceeding operate as a bar to any future action challenging ones
right to be registered as a voter?

HELD:
Inclusion/exclusion proceedings, while judicial in character, are summary proceedings. A decision in an
inclusion/exclusion proceeding does not operate as a bar to any future action in any other election that a
party may take concerning his right to be registered as a voter. A ruling on the right to vote by the trial
court for a specific election is binding on the COMELEC. By clear implication, the COMELEC itself does
not rule on the right to vote by recognizing in a Sec. 78 COC denial/cancellation proceeding the final and
executory ruling by a court, as mandated by law, in an inclusion/exclusion proceeding

Veloria v. Comelec
Facts:
The seven (7) petitioners, Ramon Veloria et. al, were not satisfied with the election results and filed an
election protest against their political rivals in the RTC.The election protest was dismissed but instead of
perfecting an appeal within five (5) days as provided by law, the petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. When the MR was denied, the peititioners filed a Notice of Appeal even though it was
beyond the 5 day period provided for the perfection of appeal. Judge Abasolo gave due course to
petitioners' Notice of Appeal.
Thus, the private respondents (as protestees) sought recourse in the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) by a petition for certiorari and Prohibition with a Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction or
Restraining Order (SPR No. 8-90) to annul Judge Abasolo's order giving due course to the appeal.
Issues:
1. WON Judge Abasolo gravely abused his discretion when he gave due course to the petitioners' tardy
appeal.
2. WON COMELEC has jurisdiction to grant jurisdiction to grant the private respondents' petition for
certiorari.
Held:
1. Yes. Since the right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a
statutory privilege that must be exercised in the manner and according to procedures laid down by law
(Borre vs. Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA 560), and its timely perfection within the statutory period is
mandatory and jurisdictional Judge Abasolo gravely abused his discretion when he gave due course to
the petitioners' tardy appeal.

2. No. COMELEC has not been given, by the Constitution nor by law, jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Original special civil action of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus
against a regional trial court in an election contest may be filed only in the Court of Appeals or in this
Court, being the only courts given such original jurisdiction under the Constitution and the law.