Command

Summary of Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN

Nimitz Graybook
7 December 1941 31 August 1945

Volume 2 of 8

Running Estimate and Summary
maintained by Captain James M. Steele, USN,
CINCPAC staff at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii,
covering the period 1 September 1942 to 31 December 1942

The following document is a digitized representation of materials contained in Series I,
Subseries A (original copies), of Coll. 505, Papers of Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN,
maintained by the Archives Branch of the Naval History and Heritage Command,
Washington, DC. The Command Summary, commonly referred to as the Graybook
contains the CINCPAC (Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet) staffs running
estimate of the situation and summary of command decisions, as well as key dispatches
received or originated by CINCPAC headquarters.

The 8 volumes are paginated as follows:

Volume 1 (7 December 1941 to 31 August 1942): pages 1 - 861
Volume 2 (1 September 1942 to 31 December 1942): pages 862 1262
Volume 3 (1 January 1943 to 30 June 1943): pages 1263 1612
Volume 4 (1 July 1943 to 31 December 1943): pages 1613 1830
Volume 5 (1 January 1944 to 31 December 1944): pages 1831 2485
Volume 6 (1 January 1945 to 1 July 1945): pages 2486 3249
Volume 7 (1 July 1945 to 31 August 1945): pages 3250 3548
Volume 8 (Selected dispatches concerning the period 30 December 1941 30 April 1942
and pertaining to the Battle of Midway): pages are not sequentially numbered. Note:
Volume 8 contains dispatch copies, many of which were poorly reproduced at the time of
compilation. Some portions are illegible.

Digitization of the Nimitz Graybook was carried out in 2012 as a cooperative effort between
the Naval War College and the Naval History and Heritage Command. Digitization was
overseen by the Naval War College Library. Funding was provided by the Naval War College
Foundation, Newport, Rhode Island, with donations received from the Naval Order of the
United States and several individual Foundation members.

This PDF file contains a searchable text layer generated by OCR at the time of
digitization. The OCR text is uncorrected and cannot be relied upon as an accurate
transcript, but is included for whatever search utility it may provide. A future digital
edition may include a complete and accurate transcription.

Any previously classified content herein was reviewed and declassified appropriately at the
Naval History and Heritage Command Archives, in accordance with U.S. federal
declassification authority. This document is in the public domain.

United States Naval War College, Newport, RI
2013

~I

SEGRE~

WAR PLAN
CINCPAC FILES
~

lm
:(I)
:"d

:~

lt;:1

:<0

SUBJECT

Captain Steele's "RUNNING ESTIMATE

_and SUW!A.RY", covering the period

~r~,~
FILE -____1_s_e_p_t_e_m__b_e_r_ . _1_9_4_2_ . _t_o_J_l_D_e_c_e_m_b....:e1942.

I
I
I
I
I \.I.)

10
1(1)
~a

:0'
I(D

:ti
,..
I

I~

ko
~

ll\)

I
I
I

l~

:ct

;~
:a
:co

..

lti
:

l~

:'-0

:+-

;rv

.,'

-BE CRE'lj
SEPTEMB".!R ( QC T)

01 0305 COMSOPAC to

D(Q

""l.4ss071J
CINCPAC Inf o cmnN!IcTF 63
''

61 62 COMGENSOPAC.

Most Secret.. Ful l y concur wit h Comai r sopac 310402. CACTUS

not only a base of ma j or value to nation holding but i s first
foot of ground taken from an enemy who has some cause to consider hi s armies i nvincible. The strength of his forces in
and enroute to the area ulus additional availa)le forces indicated as being ~repar e ~ to move in and the relatively short
line of communic a tions leave no doubt of an all out . offensive.
Repeated and sometimes successful attempts to land infiltration or advance tr oops clearly indicate CAC~US as a major
preliminary objective. It is my considered opinion that at
this time the retention of CACTUP ismore vital to the urosecution of the war in the Pacific than any other comraitme~t.
CACTUS cannot be held unless strong air forces of t ypes of
planes reruested in reference and in other dispatches of
like import plus inshore :patrol forces previously requested b~
prom) tly supplied. Comg ensopac and Comtaskfor 62 have by
hand.
01 1315 COMINCH to CilTCPAC info COMSOPAC.
IIandle this with the greatest secrecy. At this distance it
is difficult to understand how enemy operations such as are
reported in Comgen lst Mardiv 310200 and the destroyer bombardment in his 250955 can ap proach ~d proceed relatively unmolested.
01 1 256 COMS OPA C t o C'OMI NCH , CINCPAC CTF s __.1.LJ.. 6 , 1 7,1 8 info LEAHY e tc.
Ope ra t ion s September 1st . Handle as mos t s ecret. Enemy
f orce es t ~ma t ed at least 2 cruisE' rs 2 DD loca t ed by SBD .. ~,
2 miles liiJest TAIVO Point GUADALCANAL 0 0 50 (-1 1 ) 3 1s t .
1 cruiser JINTSU class.
Planes attacked 1 near mis~ on
cruiser . 10 3BDs took of f but lost contact ~~hen sh ips

dispersed.

3 F4 planes failed to return from patrol wen t

in response air raid alarm GUADALCANAL 31st. Fletcher states

SARATOGA able to make 14 knots but dama ge makes it necessary
return b.er PEARL. Leaving larg e part of her pla nes here for
carrier rep ]a ceflent. 3 YPs arrived GUADALACANAL .

l.

862

')

Septemb er , ( GCT)

01 1237 CTF 62 to COMSOPAC Info COMAIRSOPAC, COMINCH, CINCPAC.

Comamphorsopac fully supports the opinion_s expresse d by
Oomairso pac in his 310402 and recommend that the air suphe desires be provided . Para. While always in favor of
the move to TULAGI it may: be remembe red that I warned that
such a move to be permane ntly success ful would entail continuous support by strong Naval and air forces. Para. Here
in the SOLOMONS we now have an unsinkab le aircraft carrier
which I believe may finally be multipli ed into an invincib le
fleet adequate for a decisive move, but this will require
patience , and the determin ed support by forces of a strength
and characte r which you do not now have under your control.
Para. The enem',r is nov" hampered by his adventu res in the
ALEUTIANS and Eastenn NEW GUINEA. I believe that the im~ediate consolid ation and extensio n of our CACTUS lJOSition
is now possible and advisab le, and is a golden military
opportu nity that ought not be missed.
01 2331 CINCPAC to COHr:NcH Info COMSOPAC, C01ffiiRSOPAC, CTF 61 CGHD.

Comairso pac 310402 Comsopac 010305 all aircraft that can be

spared from ENTERPRISE SAHATOGA .) eing transfer red Comsopac
for use present campaign . Employment carrier aircraft ana
pilots Prom - shore bases necessar y because of lack suitable
Arinytyp e planes for GUADALCANAL. fighting but such use carrier pilots most uneconom ic from military viewpoin t and our
present shortage trained carrier air groups. To ensure ~uc
cess present campaign steady flow to SoPac of suitable Army
air-eraft with trained pilots must be institut ed at once.
Uonside r P-38 A-24 B-25 3-26 suitable present types. My
252241 and my serial Ol64W of July 17, '42. Let's give
CACTUP. the wherew ithall to live up to its name. Somethin g
for the Japs to remembe r forever.
02 0300 COl\!SOPAC to

~.~acARTHUR,

Info COMINCH, CINCPAC CGSOPAC.

Handle as most secret. Cominch 271320 (in } parts) refers

me to you for emergenc y assi,stan ce :q~.y air effort. Situatio n
CACTUS is most difficu lt and .becomin g critical due heavy and
freouent air attacks to meet which do not have fighters in
sufficie nt nuMbers or adequate performa nce. Army P-400 sent
CACTUS from POPPY exhauste d. Replacem ents enroute c'annot
be made availabl e CACTU':'" prior late Septemb er and will be
P-39 type. Can you send me small force of P-38 fighters with
pilots and few key mechani cal personn el. I can provide transportatio n.

863

=ber

(GcTJ

'~f:";

v~::CLJ!sslf1r

02 0400 cmmoPAC to COMINCH

Inr:~~AIRSOPAC

CINCPAC 1

cm~SO'NESPAC,

1Vla cAHT:3.1JR.

Your 271320 in 3 parts.. In so far as I can determine I

have no information as to t y pes of ai"I"craft embarked in vessels enroute 8lTI\.L4..C. Nor have I been- a '.)le to interpret the _
instructions to Harmon such as to give me authorityto divert
aircraft in ships for use this area ~ What I have urged and
Harmon has likewise urged is that I be reenforced with airCl... aft (particularly fighters) of suitable t y pes for effective
use in present operations. I am asking MacArthur for such
P-J8's as he can spare from his present operations. I again
urge that my requests ana requests of Harmon be given favora:>le
and prompt co~sideration for the reasons previously given that
other t :rpes of fighters not effective as evidenced that out
of 14 ~-400's sent ' to ~ACTUS only 2 retnained effective yesterday. In present operation we must have planes suitable to
effectively combat the enemy and l")-39 series is not effective
agains't his high altitude operations. Authority for diversion
of STJMAC bombers in transit by air is fully understooq and
has been and will continue to be apnlied with the most careful consideration requirements Sopac and Sowespac.
, 01 2313 C.G. G.ACTUS to CTF 62, Info

C0~1SOPAC.

To CTF 62 Info Comsopac from CACTUS. . My 202013 and Comsopac

201132. A9pears enemy is building up striking force by continuous small landings during darkness. Due to difficult terrain areas are beyond range of land operations except at expense of weakening defense of airfield. We do not have a
balanced force and it is imperative that following measures be
taken: Afirm. Base planes here capable of searching beyond
steaming range during darkness. Baker. Provide surface craft
DD's or motor torpedo boats for night patrolling. Cast. Provide striking force for active defense by transferring 7th
Marines to CACTUS. If not -prevented by surface craft enemy
can continue night landings beyond our range of action and
build up large force. 03 1231 COMSOl:)AC to CTF ll,l6,18,17,COMINCH, CINCPAC 7

COU~ OVillSPAC.

Handle as most secret. Operations 3rd. B 17 on patrol made

1 500 pound bomb hit on AO or AV Lat 7-16 South Long 158-3
East 1100 2nd. Ship stopped. Fire forward. Large oil slick.
PBY on patrol got near miss on DD uossibly escorting SS at
2-40 South 160~18 East 1100 L (-11). At 0500 . 1 (-11) 2nd
several hostile planes bombed GUADALCANAL. 1 killed 1 wounded.
No material damage. At 1140 L (-11) 2nd 18 twin engined bombers dropped bombs GUADALCANAL. 1 killecf 5 wounded. 1 SBD
destr0yed also some Avgas and ammunition. Our planes brought
down 3 bombers 4 zeros~ AA shot down 1 bomber. All our
planes returned. Leary pass to MacArthur. Afternoon 3rd
TF 18 arrived NOlJ'WIEA. WII.JLIAM TVARD BURROW'S unlGaded and
floated off SYLVIA reef after being aground. for 3 days.

864

_3ECRE!r_

September (GCT)
11,18, 63,62, CINCPAC.

While Taskforc.e 18 is engaged in_ replenishment and pending

reorganization on carrier task forces the directive assigned
carrier task forces in Mydis 271026 of August :i:s modified
as follows: Task force 17 operate generally south of latitude 12 degrees. Avoid remaining in same locality to
prevent concentration of enemy submarines against you. Destroy promising targets wheneveT located. Your freedom of
movement as may be required by the presence of enemy submarines or other is not limited ey any general restrictions
herein given.
04 1116 COMSOPAC, to CTF 16,17,18, 62,63,11, CINC?AC, CON120WESPACFOR,
COMINCH, 1v1acARTHUR.
Operations 4th. At 0200 L ( -11). 3rd 3 hostile SS shelled
GUADALCANAL . No damage. No casualties. Our planes 3rd
straffed several boats ,and Jarges on and near beaches southeast TAirlJ Point . BURROVIJS departed GUADALCANAL 1645 L ( -11)
4th.
04 0300 COMSOPAC to CIHCPAC.
Your 032013 for your information I plan to put the 7th
Marines into GUADALCAN'AL probably Southeast TAIVU Point as
soon as nlans and arrangements can be made. Desire but
small force on T:~BVA~\fiON Island ::~ossi bly from a battalion
of Army troops to permit preliminary work on air field that
station and as deterant to enemy action against AVP operating planes from GRACIOSA Bay SANTA CRUZ. Comsopac to
Cincpac.

855

Septem ber (GCT)

04 0610

c ~JWJJVD.,HIEIQUS

SOPAC to G01v1TRANSDIV 2 Info COMINCH, CINGPAC,

COMSOPAC .

Ultra se6ret from Comge nforso pac those not addres sed stop
decod ing. Begin ning about 13 Septem ber under my command
your' unit plus embark ed troops plus raider battal ion in
APDs plus anpro ximat ely one third of 5th Defens e Batta
will hold 2 battle rehea rsals of landin g on beach GREENlion
again st oppos ition for ~ establishmel}t of stro~g suppo rting
positi on. Troops will be commanded by a gener al office r to
be named later. Para. Prepa re detail ed troop and mater ial
landin g and tactic al plans suitab le for rehea rsals gener ally
simila r to CACTU~ landin g my OpPlan Afirm 3 Annex Dog except assume beachh ead will be establ ished by Raide r Battalion during darkn ess. Prot>ose withdr aw surfac e vesse ls
at tne of 14 hours theref ore plan must be carefu lly drawn
to ensure landin g only essen tial person nel and mater ial
rapid unload ing at beach. Para. Follow ing points are and
empha sized Afirm countr y is jungle with many stream s .
Iviotor vehic le s must be few. Amphi bian tracto rs and rubbe r
boats will be requir ed. Baker Engin eering equipm ent largel
hand opera ted. As many mache tes shove ls axes brush hooks y
intren ching tools as possib le plus wire and stakes . Sandbags in bundle s of 100. Camou flage nets. Large supply
radio batter ies all types . Paulin s and flys for prote cting stores . Nil tents excep t shelte r hanves and few hospitals . Water filtra tion plants but nil distil ling appara tus. Cast. Caref ully balanc ed stores for 30 days. Ration s
30 days class baker 10 days cast or king and 5 days dqg.
Gasol ine kerose ne in tins McCAWLEY will land fuel in drums.
Dog. 3 units of fire but maximum amoun ts grenad es canis ter
demol itions charge s and land mines . Para. You will be able
to land some excess vehic les prior to rehea rsal to clear
access to cargo. Para. You are aware of errors we made
at CACTUS and RING"30,LT. Avoid them in this opera tion.

05 1156 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, COMfOWESTPACFOR, CINCPAC, QTF 11, 17,

, 18, 62, 63, CIHCSOUWS~PAC.

Handle as most secre t. Opera tions 5th. 13 boats southe ast

coast ISABEL Island and JO landin g craft southw est coast
SAN JORGE Island were discov ered by GUADALCAl\fAL air patro l
3rd, were bombed strafe d, most were left sunk or burnin g.
At 0200 L {-11) 5th 5 hosti le DD's shelle d GUADALCANAL, sank
LITTLE and. GREGORY. Casua lties not yet known believ ed
heavy .
~

866

, B,_ F

C!z=A$-.T

SEPT GCT
-05 2005

CINCPAC , to C01v1TASF..FOR 1 info OOMINOH

Utmost -secrecz. In the event of fnreatened enemy landing

in Hawaiian Sea Frontier Task Force 1 with maximum available screen will probably be orqered to sail immediately
,to re:pel the attack. Maximum available coNer by land
based aircraft will be furnis4e.d" Current plans .f6r
your operations and training must Tie based on this con-

tingency.

05 2.052

COMTASKFOR 11 to COMSOPAC info

CTF-18, COMf~IRSOPAC

Arrived BLEACHER. 'P ollowing ships to accompany SAHATOGA

Pearl: NEW ORLEANS, ATLANTA, PHELPS, DEWEY, WORDEN,
CUMMillGS, WI.LSON, Commander Cruisers Task Force 11 on .
MINNEAPOLis. That ship with MACDONOUGH P.ARHAGU'T MONSSEN
GRAYSON being provisioned to capa.ci ty a:nd awaiting your
orders.. No fuel available.. Ships re_mai.ning in area have .
enough fuel to reach WHITE POPPY. Necessary this i'orce

fuel prior departure or enroute to Pearl. Transferring

remainder avaation material BLEACHER. SARATOGA still has
six officers including flight surgeon and 86 men to tran,s-
fer to her squadrons , at ROSES and BUTTON. Am forwarding
via airmail report as requested your 030600. Temporary
repairs being effected. ~ill advise later wl~n ready depart
probably- 3 or 4 days-- ~~ Expect to make 15 knots enroute
Pearl. No deaths and only few slight injuries as result
of torpedoing.
06'il46

~OPAC

to CINCPAC, COM:INCH, COMS\"lPAC, CTF ll,l6,l7,18,62,63

Handle as most secret. Operations 6th.. Two B-17s bombed

three enemy DDs 5th position 06-30 sot1th Long 158-38 east
res1.lts negative. lZ officers 226 enlisted from GREGORY
and ~Imrr:ILE - reported rescued.. En~my force which sank them
now reported at least one cruiser two DD~~ Morning patrol
from GUADALCANAL fifth sigh ted 15 l 'arge Jap la: nding boats

each carrying about '75 men approaching northwest 9-UADALCANAL ..

Straffed boats three, sank. P-400s attacked with bombs and
light machine guns. 'hppeared to cause many personnel casualties.. Bombs sank {)ne boat.. SBDs straffed boats on beaches6
Believed to have destroyed several.. 1245 L( -1-1) 5th 26 t\l'Tin
englned bombers covered ~y 20 zer0s approached our position
GUADALCANAL. Only fev.;: our fighters intercepted due previous

alert

ill

These cau. sed bombers to drop bombs ten miles we'st-

ward LUNGA POINT.. Two b ombers ohe ze,r o shot d'Ov.n. One F4F
lost during boat straffing operation .. Ghormley- . s.ends~~ Leary
pass to MacAr.thu:-e.

wounded.
5th sho.t

One F4F missing three damaged one pilot

Lieut F .. C., Ri ley on patrol in PBY at 1310 Dove

do"~rrn one K.awanishi
type f'our engined patrol boat
La t 05--35 3outh Long.. 163-02 east.. Confirmed by second
plane which saw Jap plane burning in water~

867

,.g;g; CRE'F-

September (GCT)

06 1720 COMINOH to Cil:!]ac, CTF 8, a,nd other commands concerned. '.

'

The Joint Chi~ of- Staff are addressing. Greenslade pass to

De~Ni t t and furnish him copy of CTF 8 042027.
Most secret.
The occupation of PRI BitOFF approved subject to provision
last sentence Comtaskfor 8 042027. Modification of occunation of T1~~AGA ~s set forth in CTF 8 052130 also approved.
06 1950 CTF 8 to

CINCPAC~~

Most Secret. My 042027. Am in receipt of message from

-~3UCKNER stating he has orders from De~N i tt to occupy PRI 8ILOFF
and -vvi 11 advise me when to supply escorts and length of time
they will be required. My present orders o ~:)ligate all my
surface forces in FIREPLA.CE operations as stated in reference.
DeWitt has never ask.e d me whether or not local naval forces
are prepared to support PRIBILOFF move. When PHIBILOFF
fighter strip is installed DeWitt apparently expects fighting
planes stationed there without ag~in consulting me although I
command Alaskan air force$. I am in effect being ordered by
Deifl!i tt to take certain action although in no way subject to
his command. ' Shall take no act.ion nor reoly to Buckner until
I have your directive in premises.
07 0452 Comsopac to BOISE, MacDOJ:JOUGH, and various others.
Handle as most secret. A screening and attack force
designated Task J:i..,orce 64 is hereby established composed
initially as follows: Rear Admiral Wright in MI~mlliA.T>OLIS
'Task Force Commander with BOISE 'ffi.11'JZS LEANDER DESDIV 22 FARHAGUT and MacDONOUGH. Task Force 64 assigned temporarily to
Comtaskfor 62 for operational control, units now at BLK~CiillR
to act as escort for transport movement from BLEAClillR to
'3UT':PON as directed by Com.taskfor 62.
BOISE and LE.A.NDER will
join Task Force 64 at BUTTON. Comtaskforce 62 and LE~~DER
have for action Comtaskfor 18 for Info.
07 1150 CCM9.0PAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSOWESPAC,
CTF 62, 11, 17, 63~ 16.

MacArth~

Operations 7th. Handle as most secret. On 6th 2 J_)BYs attacked serial 43 lat 05 south long 163-50 east getting hits
but no visijle damage. B-17 attacked serial 43 on 6th at
latitude 07-30 south long 157-40 east. r1any hit? but Jap
escaped in rain squall. 11 SBDs escorted by 6 fighters
bombed installations and buildings south s ide GIZO h&rbor
6th. Serious damage. caused. No ships or planes seen. No
AA. Re connaissance shovrs 36 Jap landing boats were sunk
SA!'I JORGE Island and CAPE r~SPERJUJOE in attacks previously
reported.. During 6th and 7th Task Irorce. 17 attacked 3 enemy
38 ' S . Results t wice promis~ng one negative.

868

-M~

September (GCT)

07 2305 CINCPAC to COM 12 Info

COIV~ INCII.

Most Secret. For Admiral Nimitz only. During 6th and 7th
TF 17 attacked 3 enemy subs vicinity 13-20 south 162-40
east results 2 promising 1 negative. 11 S~D with 6 VF attacked installations and buildings GIZO causina: serious
damage 2 SBD lost in storm failed to return. i'To ships or
planes seen and no .l\1:... 36 J"ap landing hoats destroyed NW
coast GUADALCAN.'\L in previously reported attack. Para.
TF 64 Rear Admiral Wright giT-JNEA0 0LIS 130ISE LEA.T'JDER Desdi v
22 FlillRAGUT MacDONr)TJGII esta )lished as screening- and attack
force under Turner. Para. Ghormley reruests establishment
advance supply base ~~ITE PO?PY. Has moved Bov~an and staff
to POP~Y and requests additional personnel for AUCXLAND.
SOUTH DAKOTA hit uncharted 35 foot uinnacle off entrance LAHI
channel 5.5 miles bearing 321 from LffiLINOA light. Damage.
to fuel oil and reserve feed tanks est:imated. time in dry
dock for repairs 2 weeks. Because of possiole speed reduction to 20 knots Gho.:.' mley recommends her coming to PEAHL
which have approved. Para. 450 prisoners enroute LONGBUN
in ZEILIN. CG CAC'rus reports 600 casualties to date
requests early replacement program. eara. Sub reconnaissance results NA1JRU positively occupied by Japs land planes
there. OCEAN negative. No shipping either place. Para.
Theobald is unloading 1200 tons daily at FIHEPLACE completion
first phase about September 13th. Urges CG ALASYJi push
fighter field project ATKA ~ow for completion both same
time.
'
08 1146

COJ.'ISOPAC TO COI.liNCH CTF

6~ G3,

64,11,17,18 CINCPAC, COT1TSOHJESPAC

as most secret. Operations 8th. In attack on GIZO

6th 2 SED'S lost in storm on return trip. B-17 which
attacked serial 43 6th had 1 engine and upper turret put
out of action but continued search on 3 enines and strafed
Ja.p landing boats south end IJABEL Island. :B..neny SS was
attacked by patrol plane 7th 1at 07-12 south lon2 163-14 .
East with bombs and mg.. Did not dive but returned with
1. . 1.
No dama e;c.. In view probable attack toni u:ht 8th by
1 Jap CL 10 DDs, fuller and Bellatrix directred stop unloading GUADALCANAL proceed to eastvJard through Lengo
Channel ..
H~ndle

869

0.6 2210

Cb~~~GEN ALASKAN DEFENSE-

to COMALSEC

;11.'

COUfALSEG . ta on to COl\f.i.INCH, CINC~AC

3ince

s~ndinc;

my 060250 received follo-.;,vi.ng from CG 1N'[C "

begin Peceived mes sa-ge from CTF 8 outlining his objections to. garl"~i sonlhg .PRIBILOFS which Admiral Nimitz con- '
cu:cred in. If you (Buckner) agree with - rCheobald and
C1.nC.Pac movement
Pribiloffs .... _will be em celled MOSES
POINT garrison going to ATKA as previously p~anned end
paraphrase.. I replied to Dewitt sayin~ would not occupy
PRIBILOF1?S at this time . but rwould .send MOSES - POINT g::-::trri-son to -ATKA. At la.ter date - conte:nplate sending gar-

to

rison St. PAUL.

08 1736

Cil~CPAC.

to

COMSOBAG ihfo CC~~:S01:VESPAC, CIKCPAG-GDMINCH ADiv-IIN)

Iviake ready to turn over to I!Lacl\rthur one regiment of

3 combat teams of experienced amphibious troops plus
quota o.f auxiliary troops and 1 division of C,Qmbat
loaded transports with a ttach~d A.K . Leary pass to
MacArthur. This at O.irectiont of Cpminch who :ts with
me. Oominch headquarters pass to Lrmy Chief ~~of' Staff.
08 2237

COMINCH to CINCPAC, GOMSOPAC

COMSOWESPAC

Handle with utmost secrecy. Follovrtng from 11!Jar Department

ts forwarded for information: War Department records
show Army planes in central and -s outh pacific under Nimitz

control as of September 2nd as follo-ws Heavy hombcrs on

he.nd '15, en:route or being preparE;d 4:4 of which 6 are
enroute SoWes.Pac lviedium bombers on hand 24, enroute or
being prepared 11. Li::ht bombeTs 7 on hand.. Fighters
on hand 270,. enroutte or being prepared 202 of which 30
are being tra.nsf'erred from Australia.. Para, 2.
Replacements set 1,:1.p for ' Oc tobe.r are 12 heavy :bor1bers,
lt) medium, 44 flgh te):1s.. Para 0 ,,
,Jar' )e:ga:rtnent conslders tha:t i t is not possibl'e to move
short 1"lange aircraft from United frfta tes to GUADA.LCANAI
ln time to meet pPesent requirenents thore .Para. 4.

The P-40 t:ype

:i. s consi"der-ed by m
Jar :Jept.
sui 'table foi" use a g a:i. n~t Japanes~ types.

-~

&l.S app~rently

Para 5 .. .
"

:.{l.boye information subsequent to and superse.d es P.a:'rts 2

and 5 G6m.inch 2713gQ.

870

.
Ope-:r:a:ttfo~s 9th..

f;U.lndle

'

l!lOS~ secret ..

- 0100 ( -11) 9th .

TULAGI 's helled by 1 hostile s urf'ace craft.. No damage. Convpy_unlD:a ding Tl~AG:I bombect .l c9,00 { -11) -8th and again
ll4Q $F ~~~ ll) 9th - by .2iP ~ "'b ombers w~~~en ;apparently- also
dr;,Qppe:cr- p omp~- Tt\&~N1BeJlt0_ :- . - Uear mi-"sse~s but - no - ~~age our
ships. ---_" Our ra1de~~{_ and para tr~oo:P~-- landed XAJ:VU 9INT,
G-UADALCANAL daybrtq-a>k 8th. strik!ng- enemy post t;ton~
After
scme _s i?: i:'r:m.ishirig J~p:S withdrew to --southwest :!eavtng large
amounts food am1-nuni"'tio:o. 4 75mm guns 1 37mm gun considerable radiO" equipment at least 27 a~ad Japa.n~sce~ Village
of T:A.&IMB0KO was- J:)u:r-ned. Inarine ~ caSl.l.al.ties Z dead 4
WoWlded. Planes- sttpported oper~ti on t hrou.ghou - ~y bombing .~,
ana S'trraf'ing enem.~ posd- tions. o:u:v troo:Ps withdrew before
dark. - E~timate tha'E ene:rp.y had a veinforced _ Battalion of ..:
not less than 1060 in area.. Docu.:mentary evidence captured no.t - yet e xamined.
R$ -

Se-ptember (GCT)

09 1016 COMSOPAC to TF 18,17,62,6l},ll,63

&

Info comds concerned.

"'

;Handle as most secret. This is part 1 of 2 par.t dispatch.

OpPlan 3-42. Task Organization of (A) Task Force_ 61, SoPac
striking force, Rear Admiral Noyes consists of Task Force
17 and Task Force 18 (B) Task Force 62, SoPac Amphibious
Force plus 5 DMS's. Repeat of Minron 1 Rear Admiral Turner
(C) Task Force 63, Ai~ Scouting and attack force Rear
Admiral McCain consists of SoPac area aircraft and tenders
(D) Task Force 64, screening and attack force Rear Admiral
Wright as initially constituted -in my 070452. Para 1.
Enemy action and changes in the situation since August 27
have necessitated regrouping of certain Task Forces and
a modification in the general concept expressed in mydis
271026 of August. Since our seizure of CACTUS - RINGBOLT
the enemy has attacked regularly by air and conducted night
raids by surface forces. On two occasions approaches .~
hostile transports have been turned back. A hostile landing attack in force has not developed out remains a strong
possibility. Para 2. This force, by a combination of our
shore based aircraft, carrier aircraft, surface vessels and
defending .troops, wil-l (A) Defend and stren~then the CACTUSRING BOLT position and existing bases and (B) Destroy promising enemy targets when they appear while remaining in
readiness to prevent a landing in force. Comgensopac has
by hand.
Leary pass to Iv1acArthur.

09 1018 This is part 2 of above.

This is part 2 of my 091016. Most Secret. Para 3. Afirm.
Sopac -striking force operate generally south of latitude 12.
Destroy :promising targets wherever lo-cated in order of priority carriers transports battleships cruisers destroyers shipping. Freedom of movement this force as may be required by
presence of enemy submarines and other vessels not limited
by general instructions herein given. Baker. ~~phibious
Force defend and strengthen CACTUS-RIN(l)BOLT f!OSitions and
expedite development of airfield CACTU~, mop up adjacent
enemy outposts, prepare to occupy APRICOT on further directive,
maintain the flow of supplies. Cast. Air Scouting and Attack Force continue search designed for timely location of
the arynroach of enemy in force, gain control of the air over
CACTUf'-RTNG'30LT, destroy enemy ships located. Dog. Screening and attack force operate in support of othe~ task forces
as directed but initially under operational control of CTF 62. Para ' XRay. Task groups will be assigned to various
forces :for the accomplishment of special operations as the
need occurs. In carrying out this plan which leaves much to
the initiative of Task Force Commanders keep in mind that
there is no quicker means to ultimate victory than the sinking of enemy ships. Para 5. Communications accordance Pac
70 and other special ., arrangement. All Tas.k forcoms C.A.CTUS
. (Continued on next page)

872

September (GCT)
09 1018 COMSOPAC (Continued)
and other newly established land forces initially on Taskforcoms freouency. This nlan cancels the directives contained in my dis 271026 of August and my dis 030736 of
September and is effective on signal.
10 0255 COM80PAC to CTF 64,61,6),62, 17,18, Info COJ\FINCH, CINCPAC,
COMGENSOPAC.
Enemy inforn1ation additional that given para 1 my Op Plan
3-42 follows: lndications of strong landing force sailing
from TRUK on 9th for CACTU8 via ffiJKA. Can arrive CACTUS
area by 12th. Ultra. 1 CV and several DDs only naval units
thus far associated this move. 7 XCV's and CV's excluding
one damaged strongly indicated as in or close to TR~, some
possibly further south. Believe 4 available for task forces.
Other 3 ferryinv.. HJGKATA Bay believed either in use as seaplane base or detachment there to service planes which may
arrive during pending operations. Comairsopac pass to C~
gen CACTUS verbally by pilot first opportunity. Comgensopac
has by hand.
10 1156

CO~viSOPAC

to COMINCH info CINCP;..c, COMGENSOPAC.

Handle as most secret. Your 08237. Situation SOL01'Ji0NS not

viewed as transitory~ Anticipate intensive air action for
months to come and movement of fighters from United States
to this area should be continuous. Suitability is relative.
Unquestionably the hish altitude performance of P-38's and P48's make the more suitable than any of the P-39 or P-40
series.. '",!fill make maximu~ possible use Army fighters of
whatever type available this area. Of P-40 series the 1'-40L
with Vl650- 1 engine consi dered best. Although War De~ states
that the P-40 type is considered as apparently suitable for
use against Jap types there are no P-40's this area or
. enroute excent a few P-40 E-1 at BLEA.GH.J::R. Refer Harmons
despatch to 1iarshall of Sept 8 Jomairsopac 310402 and my
270226 Aug and 020400 Sept.

' )

873

September (GCT)

11 0516 COHSOPAC to CINCPAO Info COMINCH.

Handle as most secret. Situation as I view it today extremely critical. Ultra information indicates enemy Naval
Military forces in superior strength in TR111{ SOI.)OHONS ?LAU
area. ame source indicates nowerful effort against CACTUS
area. Rain has reduced ef-f iciency CACTUS f'ield to point where
several planes crashed in take off. We hope hostile attack
will fin~ us with dry field. Marston mats _being moved to
CACTUS slowly. Even with mats it may be necessary, judging
from exp_e rience other fields, to rebuild field laying a firm
base although information lacking this respect. 'rurner enroute CACTUS today for first hand information. Food situation
CACTUS not good. Our transportation problem increases steadily as Japs p_e rfect their olockade methods. Becomir+g increasingly apparent that ships can remain in area only during daylight and then unloading frequently interrupted by air raids.
Sooner or later we are bound to lose some of our valuable
M\'s on this duty. Due to operational and combat losses our
effective air strength CACTUS yesterd~y was 11 F4F4's 22 SED's .
3 P400's. Arrival plane reinforcements this area as we see
it: 58 single engine Army fighters in TILERY and WHIPPLE
20 pilot replacements, 12 Navy PBY5A's from central pacific
if replaced from U S but positive information lacking, 19
Marine F4F4' s and 19 Marine SBD3' s in PiliJ\fMONDSPORT, 21 Marine
F4F4' s .and 12 Marine SBD3' s in COPA..TillE. , Difficulty landing
planes from ship to field but expect to find a way. Due
reduction in our carrier strength their relative effectiveness
as a striking force has been greatly reduced.
Great freedom of action must be allowed Task Force Commanders in order
to get better than an even exchange of losses. Due to this
lack of effective striking force, threat of hostile attack in
great strength, and Jap infiltrations in unknown strength am
planning to employ 7th Marines to augment. strength CAC'IUS,
however this can be done in time ohly if hostile attack delayed beyond date now anticipated. Referring Cincpac 081736
relative having experienced amphibious troops ready to turn
over to wac~~~THUR, it appears at present time that only
regiment is 8th Marines which will be ready abo'lj.t 1 October.
11 1320 COMSOPAC to CO~t:INCH, CTF 61,62, 63,64, C INCPAC, CO:MSOlNESI)AC, MacA.

Operations 11th. Handle as mcs t secret. l)BY on patrol lOth

lat 05-30 south Long 162-52 east attacked serial 43. Some hits
but no apparent damage. At 0015 and again at 0130 L {-11) lOth
hostile DD shelled TULAGI harbor. Hit and destroyed YP previously darnaged. Our SBD ' s bombed sceened village vicinity VISALE
GUADALCANAL be li.eved occupied by Japs. At 1225 L (-11) lOth
27 twin engin bombers dropped bombs on -position GUADA.LCANAL.
11 killed 14 wounded. Attacked by F4F4's. 4 bombers shot
down. Our losses 1 fighter missing 1 badly damaged. 24 F4F4
to fly S.ANTO to GUADALCANAL today 11th patrol plane 1053 L
(-11) 11th after reporting 1 DD and 1 .AK lat 02-05 south long
(Continued on next pag'e )

8?4

.. -;:sE GRE'' ,.

September (GCT)

11 1320 C01'vl~3 0PAC (Continued).

long 160-40 east in vicinity was attacked by enemy plane type
unknown and was apparently shot down.. Presence enemy carrier
that vicinity. a possibility.
09 2300 COMAMPHFORSOPAC TO COMSOPAC I NP O CINCPAC COMINCH

Treat as ultra secre t to be decoded only by adee.. 11Le only

expetianced amphibious troops in Sopac are t~ose in Cactus
and it is i mpra cticable to withdraw them para 7th regiment
left the east coas t in March and has since engaged in
establishing a garrison defense in straw. The last time i.t
received. A1nphi bi ous training was in August 1941 and pre sumably it has received little field training in S\raw. Therefore it is not ready for amphibious combat. It can be made
ready for a comparatively simple landing such as Taivu Point
in 1 week, and ca~ probably be placed in a reasonable state
of effectiveness to face real opposition in.about 1 months
uninterrupted amphibious and field training. The 7th regiMent
has no amphibious tractors and no antiaircraft elements para
Cresent City Hayes Ada:ms Jackson Alchiba now carrying this
regiment probably require considerable reloading of cargo to
meet combat conditions. Alchiba should have services of
Whitney to repair generator for about 1 week. Otherwise
vessels are available para while not required by your 082140
I respectfully invite attention to the present insecure position of Cactus and Hingbolt. Adequate air and naval strength
have not been nade available to ensure their security, and
in the absence of these forces much greater dependence must
be placed on troop defense. Vandergrift consistently has
urged he be reenforced at once by at least 1 more regiment
as essential to clearing enemy out of north Guadalcanal and
I conc~r.
In addition it is essential that we occupy Ndeni
as soon as pos s ible and establish num~rous outposts in other
positions if we are to have a reasonable xpectation of
bringine; the southeast Solomons under a firm control which
is the prer e quisite for any successful offensive a gainst the
ene~r in the Rapaul-Bougainville re g ion either from here or
Australia. This wi 11 require more troops that v're have or
have in pros?ect.
11 2130

..

'

CTF-8 TO 8INCPAC
~ o s t s ecre t.
Comtaskf or 8 rep or ts pro gress of Fireplace.
3 tran s p orts 1 c arB O vess el and 15 ba r ges unload ed. 2 more
ca rg o vess el s will be unloa ded in ab ou t 2 days. Thi s wi ll
c omplete pha se 1 and taE.Jk 1 ' of pr oj ect . 4 th tran s po rt depar t ing Kodiak i'or Pireplace abou t 12 Sc.pter1ber . 2nd convoy
barges left Chernofski on lOth e Next ship convoy l eave s
Chernofski 17th for fireplace with 1 transpo r t .s chedule d
for cavern . Army has constructed flying field by d r ai ning
Sweeper Creek reports 9000 feet long and average width 500

815

hard sand. _- First pla;c~ B 18 pilot Colonel Eareckson landed

yesterday lOth reports fi~ld best in Alaska. P 38s being

sent; fire _plce today to base e.nd operat-e from there.

moveaent still not kn:own to enemy.-

Believe

12 0315
\riw-il~r of Ghormleys 11G51G I consider his plan t .o use
8th Ma:rines if necessary. to reinforce MacArthu:tt is. best
that can be done under the cil,cumstances.

-In

CINCPAC COHitrGH
Ultra neoa.,et.

From :Comapphorsopac-;. Personal reconnaissance

and a 'Careful review of situation with Comg.en lst 1dardiv
confirr.1s opinion e:t,re-ssed MY 092300 that at 1e&l,st 1 nore
regiment is essentlal to defense Cactus no~u. Vandergrift
and I aGree that control of north coas~al plain re~1ires
dispersed strong points with troops and coastal antiaircraft
artillery and ad::li tional airfields, but snvil:y immediate
threat sliown y;our 100.255 air conf'irmatlonby Opnav are of
opinion Kukur,t should -pe reinforced at once paF.a, -urgently
recommend approval m~ eleparture .from Button. for ,Gac tus
morni.ng of 14th local with IilcCawley transdiv 2 7th' Marines
1lask Porce G4 covered and supported by Task Force 61 and 63.
7th tlarines will disembark to cast of Tenaru Ri.ver.
OJW
front will be ONILU para lat6r depldY,tnent will qe_pend on
deve lopmen.t s.

12 1241
Operations 12tb. Handle e.s most seGret* 1240 L (-11) lltl:.
26 bonibers covered by; ZE?l''os bombed Guadalcanal.
6 killed
29 'H01Jnded. 1 P-400 burned 1 P4F be.dl:r dar1ae:ed. 6 bombers
1 zero s.hot d.ovm. 1. F4-F lost pilot reco area. B-.17 on
photo miH>J_:o n over Guadalcana.l 1300 I.t ( -11) 11th shot clown
4 zero.. !200M (-12) 11th SJ3D'S attackAcl' Gtzo with 8 500
pound botribs..
Build.ine;s d;estroyed., Strafed and sa.nk small
boat' nea~ Gizo on ret1J.rn trip~~ At 1350 L ( -11) I1th ll
SED'S \":ent to attack cruiser z DIJs oeaT'inr; 300 from Guadalcanal .. Contact made but no hits cl:te low ceillng. ;lot 021? L
( -11) 12th IJac:{ina.c in Graciosa Bay I~deni Island was shelled
by presu.med OS. 6 shots no damage.-- Ghormley sends.
Carpende:r ]jas.s to l~.~cArt lrt1.r..
,

876 .

..SE CI?:]J'f

Se-ptember (GOT}
13 0540 0 01\:SOPAC to OTF 61, 62, 63, 64, I nfo COMI NCII, CINCPAC.
Most Secret. Ex ecute reinforcement CAC~rus proposed by
Comamphibsopac 120530 subject to following directives.
Close air coverage of CACTUS area by CAC~JS based planes.
Task force 61 supnort operation by destroying threatening
hostile vessels with snecial attention hostile carriers.
Task Force 63 intensif~ search 6perations with due regard
physical and material limitations. Task Force 64 under
operational control of Task B,orce 62. Comso:pac 0-pPlan 3-42
remains in effect.

14 0133 CTF 63 to CTF 61 Info COMSO?AC.

Ref your msg to me via patrol plane requesting info
Turners plan. Turner departed 0600 L (-11) today Monday
to arrive 0500 L (-11) 16th off 'renaur Point CACTUS. Haute
via east and north BUTTON south and west SJ',J-J CHISTOBAL
east and north CACTUS. Task Force 64 operates within 100
miles to westward transnorts until rendezvous lat 11-20
long 161-50 at 1600 L (:11) 15th. His force will land
7th Marines between TENAW and block 4 rivers CACTUS completing operation by 2000 L (-11) 16th. Above from his
Oplan A~5-h2 of 13 September. Aircraft on CACTUS will
provide close coverage this force and at moment are sufficient this puruose. You and I to support operation as
indicated Comsopac 130540.
12 0 5 44

COMSOPAC fJ.1 0 COI'tii NCH I NFO CI:NCPA C CTF 61 CTP 17 BUAER

F oll owing is enclpherme nt Comg e n Ca ctus mailg ram 030600.
Ac t ion Comnopac lnf o Comair sopa c and Gomt a sk for 62.
uyour 300259 since installation 9 0mm a n t l a ircraft Ja p
bomb i ng operations conductea from .24 to 27 ,00 0 feet.
P - 400 ' s servi c e c eiling precludes their use f or inte r ception at these altitudes .
In figh t er c onba t a t lower
altitudes they cannot turn vii th zeros due heavy vzing
loadipg. F'4P4 ' s able fight or inter c ept alti t udes u p
t o 30 , 000 feet . In combat with zeros here they ha ve
proven e-qually maneuverable and superior in fire povver .
Zeros arrive here with he~vy ~as load and avoid full

throttle nancuvers.. This factor increases apparent

superior performance of ' F4F4'sH ..

877

(GQT)
14 1350
.

'

Operatio ns 14th. :tiapdle ns most secret. Heka:tft Bay

13th B-17 on pa'tro1 attacked 4 serial 3-3's om water.,
~

l burned l d.a:maged-.. Same pl-ane . at tacked by 2 seriar 30's

in ~i,r believe 1 shot~ down.
Sowespa cfor SS reports believes s&hk euemy CL 2 Sept off Savo Island. During

night of 12th-13 th and iurlng 13t}d

Guadalca.nal~under

. continuo us attack includin g night ,bomba~dment by at

least 1 cruiser _and .4 DDs both TULP. . GI and GUADA:LCANAL,
probable - landing-a wes of Tal;v:u~ Point anGl' active
pa~rollint.;; in or near o-q.r position~.
Sorne casualti es
and Tight damage from. naval gunf.i re Fire returned of
011r 5 inch. l enemy- shi believed hit. Enerny maintainea continuo us air patrol over urea until clawn.
Offi:EID 1 ( -11) 13th plane- forl'llatio n reported approach ing

Guadalc anal from northwe st.

Our planes took off but

enorny turne'd back.. 1020 L 13th 26 zero's over Guadalcanal engaged by 28 Grurnrnans 1335 L 2.0 twin engine
bombers covered by Zerots intercep ted hy 20 Grurnmans
caused bombers to Jet~ison bor:1bs 15 miles ' away. 1730
L 13th 2 single .float planes sh.ot down l SBD. Enemy
air losses 4 zeros 4 bombers. . 2 Grummans erased 2
missing . On rround our losses 4 killed 12 wounded .
Jap losses exceeded 40. E_nemy forc'e consisti ng 3 BBs
4 cruisers , 4 DDs, 1 AP sighted 1030 _1 14th tat 7-40 S
long 163-50 east course 140. Was attackea at 1515 L
by 9 B-17s.
First report states . 2 hits 4 near misses.
Anothe~ hostile force 1 CV, 3 cruisers , 4 DDs reported
lat 06-30 south 1ong 164-ly e~st at 1140 L 14th course
160. Through out day Guadalc anal attacked bJ: enemy
ground forces all sectors. Last report states situation satisfac tory. 3rd Battalio n 2nd Marines ~hifted
from Tulagi to Guadalca na.l.. Usual dai1;y bombing raid
14th was by 26 twin en'g ine bombers . At . 0930 L 4 zeros
on floats approach ed field and ware deatroye~ by VF 5
pilots. 25 land zeros 3 Fokk:ewu lff bombers over field
at 1340 1 zero 1 bomber sl~ot down.. 12 s:fungle eng:l,.ne
J2and pl9:nes. delivere d bombing attack at;, 1830 L 14th.
;I,.oda.ys FJ. t tack believed to indicate h.ea yy. bombers _being
save1 f or special mission .

15 0039

Lonsview

-r.

""'

with bomber and fighter field is keY. of

.f urth-er Aleutia n opern t.:on but it s ta.nds alone 330
. miles fror'l : Happyla rk the neB.res;.t suppo~:ting pot:?i tion
of streneth . SecuTely h~ld f t is springbp and of our

future offensiv e and sn.feg:ua rd again's t further enemy

advance. .. Its loss would at ence give enemy staging .
land fields as far east ~iS Ca.vern whose capture w.ou.14
inevi 't ab1y follow that of Longview .. This \v-ould crc::J:te

878

.
_.;;.._..;;..;.__--~(-=-G;.;.....CT~

1500,39

(Co;ntipued)
imrneclia te enduring threat to Happylark and 1Vhi:rlaway.
Recqgn;iA~:e defen~~re of; 1ongview is : A1rn~ job .out is rna ttel?
of se~ious concarn to Navy as all operations in this
area rrust be joint .. , In long period o:f low visabiiity
so frequent here or if o1:1:r .comparirti vely weak offensi V?
air forces should be neutralized, ~ mobile ground defense
mu-st be . strong ehough to gar~antee -to U.S. secttrity of
this base. _ Reenforc.ement ater an enemy attack is launched
would be extren1ely di.;fficult if not impossible.. Consider
full strength triangular division plus 'specie.l zed units
wi tn strong " tank support:. in e~ddition and decided early
reenforcemen t of /Lrmy ~laskan off:ensi ve air forces is
es.sential. Present plans as now knovm
be provide by
end of October mobile_ ground troops of approximately one
third this infantry and artillery strength and no tank's.
Am of opinion thB.t even these forces are arriving at
Longview at a rate which is endangering o,peration "as
planned by neglecting consideration of time factor ~o
essential to success desp-lte the favorD.ble start which
apparent lack of enemy o'bser-yatlon and consequt:;nt enterprise has perni tted to date. rrhe last troop echelons
arri~e the-e~d of October.
-

to

15 0929

Handle 'V7ith utmost secrecy .At 1440 V'lASP torpedoes lat;

12-92 long 164-15 burning fiercely. Believe Cf.tsualt1es
heavy. From TB8 :i.n tercepted partial re;)ort from Dunc.an

to Juneau. that Captain .and Admira1 were: on bridge of

rvASP vih,en bridge blow up_.. TF-18 remaining with WASP.
North Ce.rolina received one torpedo hit frame number 60
port at 1452.. Is with me and can rtake 24 knots..
OBri~n
received one tornedo hit clama-rre local he ean make~ 15
knots. Ordered
Button<;
At 1790 ln . lat 12:...43 165.-03
course 085 speed advance 18. Will continu,e .on present
course -until 0700 local tomorrow then 145 T .. , A:m sending
15 SED to Button to make room for rEc0very Wasp aircraft.
From C'l'F-17 passed by Comairsopac.

to

-!<"

15 1255
IIandle with utmost sforecy .. necessary to destroy Wasp
completing destruction apout 200 M ( -12) 15th., Have lost
touch wlth Murray. Unable to ehti.re1y break his 150929;
Request rendezvous be desi .gna'tcd.~ This r.om S,c.btt to
Ghormletr info McCaln . MurX:a.y Turner~~ H~~ve t:t"s sumed temporary
command _wil1 arrive 25 miles north Es:oir:ttu Santo- at 1?00
M (:;12) 10th. Wil.l sencl fn plane;. to n1uke , arrangem~nts ,
land badly, W01Inded t:tfom DDs. Heq11est instructions" otlier
surv:i vors. Total number not kno\vn but in 5 DDs.. Loss of
life ,believed sm:all.
Noyes a.nd SnfJ:rm&tn in PaX?enhol t

apparently good

shape~

818

(GCT)
161220 CQM.0oOPAC to COMS1ATPAC,

c~rF

62,63,61,17,6l+-, CONIM.CH, GIJTCI'AC.

Operations 16th. Handle as most secret. 15th 2 B-17's

bombed -enemy base RUK!~TA Bay started fires. . Light AA. at
1000 Love ( -11) 16th 13 SBD' s and 5 TBF' s attacked 3 enemy CL's 4 DD's . 1at 07-37 south long 156-55 east. 1 torpedo
hit on CL. 1 bomb hit 2 near misses on 2nd CL. 37 enemy
, 'land planes approached to within 100 miles GUADATICANAL
bearing 290 but turned back at 1200 love (-11) 16th.
Ghormley sends. Carpender pass to 1'/La.cArthur.
17 1216

CO~TSOPAC

to Cominch, CINCPAC,

COM~OWESPAC,

CTF 17,62, etc.

Operations 17th. Randle as most secret. 16th 2 B-17's

~ombed dock area GIZO.
No ships present. 1 B-17 strafed
shore installations RAKliTA Bay 1 enerny 1Jlahe on beach.
On GUADALCAl'TAL 16th active patrolling continued by
Marines. Only 1 light contact. Ene~y troops there appear be awaiting reinforcements. 14 S~D's bombed 1 CA
believed K~~ZO class and 2 DD's at 1750 (-11) 16th Lat
08-07 south Long 150 east. No hits. Several near misses.
Ships continued on course 120.
18 1231 GHORMlEY to CINCPAC, COI.~INCH, COlVISWPAC, etc.
Operations 18th. Handle as most secret. 17th B-17
bombed ships GIZO at 0855 Love (-11). Nil hits.
Another
B-17 bombed shore installations GIZO at 1110. No ships
present. ~-17 bombed shore installations RE1v\TA Bay. Results
undetermined. :B,rom GUAD.l\.LCAHAL four planes made. ineffective attack on two enemy CA's lat 07-50 south long 15730 east at 1810 love 17th. Active patrolling continued
by Marines at GUADALCANAL.
Several contacts with enemy
patrols to south of ~osition. Ghormley sends. Carpenter
pass to MacArthur. Task force 65 began landing 7th
marines rei~orced at 0600 love 18th at GUADALCAN.i'..L. No
hostile activity air or ground up to 1835 love 18th.
18 1140

cor-~f'OPAC

to CINCPAC info

CO~liHCH.

Handle as most secret. Brief sum.rnary CO 1.7.l4.EP preliminary

report. While covering movements TJT 65 enroute CACTUS
1Jf.l\.E~P had ..just i'inished launching 200 mile afternoon search
and was turning to base course when at about 1444 mike (-12)
15th 3 torpedoes sighted close aboard 3 uoints forward
starboard beam 4th torpedo passed ahead. Two bits well
below water line between bow and. iJride:;e. Third torpedo
broached then submer17ed and hit close to surface 50 to 75
feet forward 'bridge. All hits vicinity gasoline tanks
and magazines. 45 planes lost with ship.. Bad fires oelov.r
decks and in hangers. Starting immediately '~Ni th torpedo JAU
continuous explosion ready ammunition particularly noted. t)t;Q
About 1505 M severe intArrtal ex'llosions follot.wed shortly .
by severe ex'plosion in hanr.:ar.
Severe fire throughout . ship.
WASP finally destroyed by torpedoes. Comsopac sends.

18 2200

COr:Il~qE

TO CINCPAC IlJFO QOrSOPAQ

C01.1S0~7ESPAC

HACARTIIUR

rrhr:ea t as ultra secret. I.:acArthur s C508 to Marshall

quote in case the enemy launches a sea air and land
attack at 1Jew 8-uinea what assistance may I expect from
the Pacific Fleet . The naval forces at my disposal
are minor in strengt~, practicall~ half were lost or
seriously damaced in the Solomons operations, and my
air and ground troops ore entirely inadequate to meet
a balanced attack from the enemy conprising large sea
elements. In my C367 Aupust 28 I sv.ggested that the
naval force under Admiral Ghormley include in its
mission the covering of the southeastern tip of New
Guinea but this was disapproved both by him and by
It is absolutely essential that I be
!~dr1iral 1Jinitz.
informed as to ryhat the Navy contemplates in case of
a seaborne attack on New Guinea so that I can plan
accordingly. I regard the potential sitvation with
tho gravest concern unquote. CoMMent. Carpender pass
to EacArthur.

20 1240

COHSOPAC to COIIIINCII , CINCPAC, COMSU?AG , CTF 17 62 63 64 , etc,

Operations 20th. Handle as most secret. Estimat e d 4 DD's
bombarded GUADALCANAL froTI 2400 to 0100 L (-11) 19th. 2
killed 2 wounded. Jap ground patrol was wiped out in onl y
contact 19th. 19th B-17 bombed AOCO area GIZO. B-17
bombed another strafed R~I{AT~ ~ay. 7 enemy killed in
monning up operations FLORIDA Island 20th. P-400's bombed
and strafed near Ef'"?Jl~R.r'\.NC"E . Indications there that constderable enemy stores destroyed. in strafing of 17th. 6
S~D 6 Grunmans attacked shore installations REKATA Bay
20th. No afirm no ships no nlanes. Carpender pass to

YacArthur.

20 1542

COHINCH to r;JNCPAC Info CO.

-~O PAC.

Utmost secrecy. Desire early detailed re,ort of tactical

situations existing at the times of recent successful Japanese submarine attacks. It is oboious that protracted.
operations of our task forces on a strategically static
bases in submarine infested waters is proving increasinply hazardous. T'1e determination of escort requirements as demonstrated by tactical experience, particularly
for carrier operations, has an imnortant bearin on other
operations in prospect and on the destriJution of destroy.ers.

88 -

SBCH'E~

SEPTEMBER (GCT)

20

0145

CINCPAC to COMINCH, Info to COFSOPAC, COMSOWE8PitC, MacAR'rHUR.

Your 182200.. Retention our present holdings, in SOLOMONS

and 1\TE'AT GUINEA vi tal to success future offensive OJ?erations.
If enemy uses transports under naval escort or covering
force to- make ~ttack from seaward a~ainst ]\~ORESBY consider
this should aftord Ghormley o1_)portunity to attack enemy
expedition. Success of such attack would depend unon timeliness and accuracy of information of enemy obtained . . by so~.tESPAC
air reconnaissance cma relative strength of enemy naval
forces involved and losses inflicted ?Y SOw~2PAC air attacks. Until direction of enemy movement has been definitely
determined to be against MORESBY with no concurrent attempt
on GUADALCJ'\.NAL consider present. conditions make first duty
of Sopac Naval Forces protection of GUADALCANAL and its
communications from attack while it is Jeing consolidated .
Later best employment would probably be to cover our ex- ,
pans ion along SOL0~.10NS when it is undertaken . If we can
maintain sufficient pressure in SOLOMONS I believe this will
prevent landing attack in force against MOHESBY particularly
if allied aircraft based in l\fEhJ GUINEA remain active .
20 1322 C01'.180PAC to CTF
COMBATDIV

Info CINCPAC

CTF 18

Handle as most secret ... Mission to support withdrawal task

force 65 completed. Pending arrangements for task force
reorganization the carrier task force with attached units
will operate in the retired area defined below prepared for
offensive action a~ainst suitable enemy tar"""ets lqcated within
striking distance. Operate in general area bounded by
latitude parallel 13 and 20 degrees south meridians 165 and
177 east. Avoid direct routes POPPY - 13tJTTON and 0 0PPY FAl\TTll-2\f insofar as pTacticable. Rendezvous for task force
units now at '\'IHIT~ "")OPPY and Task Force 64 units from 5UTTON
to join you will be desi~nated later in otder effect reorganization of task forces in accordance with instructions
to be issued.

J
882

~~CRET

September (GCT)
20 2100

20 2147

CTF-8 to CG ALASKAN DEF INFO COMINCH CINCPAC

I gathered from our conference yesterday that Alaska
Army Air Forces should be somewhat increased especially
the B-25 for use as torpedo planes with eventual number
of latter type set at 3 squadrons or 48 planes in full
operation. Butler now reponts that your Chief of Staff
told him air force strength would remain unchanged
until completion Fireplace operations. Thereafter
Alaska air forces would be reduced as follows: Fighters
from 6 s-quadrons to 4, loss 50 planes. Medium bombers
from 3 squadrons to 2 and 13 operating planes per
squadron, 26 crews total. This would give 26 operating medium bombers and 8 spare planes. Heavy bombers
cut from 3 to 2 .squadrons loss 8 planes. Also losing
the medium bombers used for coastal patrol on eastern
Gulf of Alaska. My 150039 stated that Fireplace required permanent increase Alaska air forces. Consider
minimum requirements of planes in full operations for
Alaskan air forces are following: Heavies 32 and
mediums 48, fighters 150 with 13 old mediums for
coastal patrol with adEtquate spare planes of each
type to permit overhaul and repair.
,. .

COMSOPAC ryy(IrNCH

Your 201322. Desire consideration be given anchoring

carrier task and other covering and striking forces
at White Poppy or other protected anchorages except
when employed for specific tasks. This will decrease
hazard from subs conserve fuel save wear and tear and
give air groups better chance to train. Request reports required by Cominch 201542 be obtained from Task
Force Commanders remaining your area. Also your comments.
21 0730

COMSOPAC TO CINCPAC INFO COMINCH

To be handled most secretly. Your confidential letter
32CL-42. Am I authorized retain Murray as carrier
task force commander with Lee in Washington part of
that force.

21 1221

COMSOPAC INFO COMINCH CINCPAC CTF 17,62,63,64,65,

Operations for 21st. Handle as most secret. On Guadalcanal 20th during day only 1 contact along Lunga River
where ground patrol killed 19 with loss 2 wounded Marines.
At 2100 L(-11) 20th enemy launched nuisance raid against
forward southern strong point. Contacts continued
throughout night. Our losses 2 killed 7 wounded. Many
Jap dead left in wire. 2 SBD's on evening search bombed
Gizo. At 1735 L 20th 10 SI3D's attacked enemy cruiser
150 miles northwest Guadalcanal. 4 near miss.e s. Believe
some damage. Ghormley sends. Carpender pass to r~c~rff ~ur.

,.

SEP~r;p..,..

S EPT.EMB"bH ( GCT)

22 1256 COMSOPAC to :MACiutTIIUR, COMI1TCH, CT:NCPAC , etc . -e t c.

Operations 22nde Handle as most secret. On GUADALCANAL

continued patrolling but no hostile cont a c t during day 21s t .
2345 . ( -11) 21st 3 SBD' s bombed and strafed 4 DDs landlng
boats vicinity CAPE Kc;PERci\.NCE. No hits on DDs which left
on Northwest course. 21st installations REICATA ~ay bombed
and strafed 3 times by single B-17's. Docl~ are a GI,ZO
bombed by B-17 . Near misses on bui l dings. Plane si~ht ing
enemy CA near TfAISI proceeding slowl y -with long oi l slick
to Southeast indicates may have been damaged in S'3D attack
of evening 20th .
-

22 1226 COMSOPAC to . CINCPAC, Into USMC, COMINCH, COMAMPHI I3FORSOPAC,etc.

'
.
.

Refer Cincpac 220035. Propose following plan for occupation (a) about 4 155 guns, 4 90 mm guns, 10 50 caliber
AA, 5 tanks with per.sonnel and administrativ e units from
5th Defense Battalion to embark WHITE POPPY. (b) 2 company
infantry from 3rd Marines SAMOA. (c) Tender and 6 patrol
planes from OAffiJ as none can be ~pared here. Tender also
oring from OAHU for use 5th Defense Battalion 4 twin mount
20 mm guns with 10 units fire. (d) Esco~t of about 2
cruisers and 4 to 6 destroyers from SoPac. Units rendezvous
near HOORN ISLANDS. (e) Occupation about 2 qotober zone
M(-12). (f) Command logistic and construction responsibilit y
then pass to ComGen STRAW. An ACORN too large for purpose.
Construction personne~ to part from STRAW to be replaced.
Infantry ft-om SAMOA to be replaced from States. Need .
immediate REELO. Above proposals subject minor changes as
details are worked out.

22 0035 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC Info COMINCH, GG SAMOAN AREA.

Have reason to believe enemy may move into ELLICE ISLANDS
about October first with weakly escorted forces similar
to his GILBERT Operations. Ultra. Consider FUNAFUTI
should be denied immediately by Marine Force from SAMOA.
Suggest about 900 men four 155 mm guns 8 heavy AA one
platoon tanks and one half special weapons group of
defense . battalion one ' infantry company one SCR dash 270.
For subsequent development of defenses and airfield a
defense battalion and an ACORN now allocated to you could
be employed. Commen t.

884

Sep't ember ( GCT)

26 0826

COMSOPAC TO CTF 63,

CG ~> STRAW,

CO MINCH
CTG 62.6 INFO CTF-62 CINCPAG

Handle as most secret. Comsopac sends action Comtasfor

63 em STRAW Comtaskgroup 62.6 info Comtaskfor 62 Cominch
Cincpac only addressees decode beyond this. Comtasfor
63 cover Fetlock operation. On dog minus three and dog
minus two day by B-17 and Hudson search from Fantan and
PBY search from Button. On Dog minus one day discontinue
Hudson search and transfer PBY's to Fetlock basing on
destroyer tender searching enroute. On dog day conduct
B-17 search from Fantan, PBY search from Button and
Fetlock plus local search by SOC with B-17s from Fantan
furnishing local fighter support. On dog plus two day
withdraw PBY and tender from Fetlock maintaining striking group of B-17s on call at Button and Fantan. Commander task group 62.6 transfer 4 scout planes with
beaching gear and small stock supplies for local patrol
at Fetlock. CG STRAW provide flight crews and small
service detachment. Comtaskfor 63 provide moornings,
bombs, ammunition and matting for ramp. Modifications
in above as necessitated by circumstances authorized.
26 1156

UOMSOPAC TO CTF 63, CTF 62.6 CG STRAW INFO CINCPAC etc.

Most secret. Comsopac sends action CTF 63 CG STRAW
CTF 62.6 info CTF 62 Cominch Cincpac addressees only
decode further. Change that part of mydis 260826 regarding transfer of cruiser planes to Fetlock as
follows. CG STRAW furnish 4 scout seaplanes, necessary
crews and material. Crescent City available for embarkation material and ground personnel on not to
delay basis. Planes to be flown to Fetlock ready
for operation on dog plus one day.

88S

--S:ECRET

September (GOT)

24 0206 COMsOPAC to CTF 62A COMAIRSOPAC, CG SAMOAN GROUP, CINCPAlN

COMINCH, COMGENSOP C, COMSOWESPACFOR, MacARTHUR, CG FAN'!'

Handle as most secret. Comgensopac has by hand. Carpender

pass to MacART!ITffi, Other than addressee s decode no
further. Task Force 62 occupy FETLOCK about 2 October with
about 4 155-mm, 4 90mm, 5 40mm, 10 50 cal AA guns, 5 tanks
and appropria te service and administr ation units of Amphibforce SoPac, and 2 infantry companies of 3rd Marines. Comg~n STRAW direct 2 infantry companies of 3rd Marines report at once to Comamphib forsopac for FETLOCK operation .
See my 231120. Details of air support later. After debarkation and withdrawa l of ships of Task Force 62 command
and logistic responsib ility for FETLOCK pass to Comgen
STRAW. Comtaskfo r 17 and 64 informed for info by another
dispatch.
24 1630 COMINCH to CINCPAC, COMSOPAC, Info NAS DUTCH HARBOR.
Handle this with the greatest secrecy. Cincpac 222327
concur your understand ing that transfer Marine combat
teams dependent on developme nts. Assume that you plan
use Sth Marine regiment to garrison NDENI. Confirm.
Para 2. Subsequen t to the arrival of the Army 43rd
division in Sopac area desire further considera tion be
given to transfer of combat teams. Inform me your plans
for the employment this division. Para 3. Carpender
pass to MacArthur .
25 1124

COMSOPAC TO CG FANTAN AND STRAW info CINCPAC

This is most secret. Comsopac sends. Actions Comgens
Fantan and Straw. Info Cincpac. Communica tion plan for
Fetlock occupation is contained my serial 0055E to Comamphibfor sopac with copy fifth defense battalion and
Comgens straw and Fantan. Requires radio silence except
for special use of coast watcher radio channel to Suva
where Comgen Fantan reenciphe rs in Santa. Will be forwarded next air to Suva and Samac. Fetlock will use
Fepek only until silence lifted then joins Straw circui t.
Temporary call Z6F.

25 1228

COMAIRSOPAC TO COMSOPAC INFO RADM V'lRIGHT

Ultra secret from Comairsop ac. Agree Cincpac 242207.
Believe 4 SOC planes sufficien t. Recommend they come
from Minneapol is Chester less crews. 4 sets beaching
gear and small stock spare parts from same source. CG
Straw provide flight crews small service detachmen t
servicing equipment . Ballard will provide moorings,
bombs, ammunitio n and Summerfeld matting for beaching
ramp. Have conferred Radm Wright who has this by hand.S BS
Comairsop ac does the sending.

:;.

'

SEORE'P ..

SEP'i'.f!!MBER ( GC T)

27 0800 MAUARTHUR to MARSHALL, . info CINCPAC, COMSOPAC, COMINCH.

Super secret from MacArthur Carnender passing. NSS pass
to Marshall for action for info to Adm Nimitz and Adm
Ghormley. There are growing indications that the enemy
intends to throw large ground reinforcements into NEW
GUINEA from the north by means of numerous small increments using usual Marine infiltration technique. A
golden opportunity is being lost by not anticipating the
enemy through clearing the coast ss far as BUNA by trained
amphibious . combat teams operating in conjunction with
projected enveloping movement by infantry over the trails
of the OWEN STANLEY Mountains.
Earnestly request reconsideration of previous decision not to make available such
forces until later developments. Small craft ror landing
and maintenance of supply are a necessary adjunct of the
combat teams.

29 0256 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, Info COMSOWESPAC, CINCPAC .ADMIN.

Your 241630. Most secret. Present plan employ portion
8th Marines initially at APRICOT. This regiment needs
special training before it can be considered an Amphibious
unit. Cincpac and Comsopac have conferred with General
MacArthurs representatives. What he requires are troops
capable of operating along northeast NEW GUINEA coast
from medium sized shallow draft troop barges or small
troop carriers. To use highly trained amphibious units
on such work not economical. There are no troop barges
or small troop carriers of the required type in this area.
At this time all trained amphibious units in this area
are employed at CACTUS-RINGBOLT. The 43rd division req.uires organization and training on its arrival here.
Tentative plans subject to change contemplate employ~ng
this division in garrisoning present bases to .relieve
more experienced troops for forward area. This area at
present has no reservee Cincpac who is with me concurs~
Carpender pass to MacArthur.

887

SECRET

OCTOBER (GCT)

01 1302

COMSOPAC TO CTF-17, 63 INFO COMINCH CINCPAC etc.

Handle with utmost secrecy. Comsopac sends. Enemy
information contained in Daily Bulletins and additional
dispatches addressed to task force commanders. Task
Force 17 proceed to fly off position south of BUINFAISI and at sunrise dog dag attack enemy shipping that
area with air striking force. Priority of targets carriers, transports, other combatant types, oilers, cargo
ships. Recover aircraft and retire to \Vhite Poppy at
~est speed consistent with fuel limitations.
Comtask
force 63 will provide B-17s to act as fighter cover from
about 8 to 12 hours love (-11) on dog day. Comsowespac
has been requested to provide maximum reconnaissance dog
minus two and minus one days and to hit Kieta and Buka
sunrise dog day with air striking force. Depart White
Poppy fueled to capacity. Comsopac will send fleet
oiler to rendezvous with task force enroute to White
Poppy during retirement. Fuel available at Button.
Dog day five October unless otherwise ordered. Carpender pass to MacArthur.

I
I

888

~CR~'I'

OCTOBER (GCT)

02 0050

COMAIRSOPAC TO COMSOPAC INFO COMSWPAC CTF-17

Most Secret. Action Comsoupac. Others cease decoding.
To obtain full benefit B-17s operating accordance your
011427 and in creating diversion and neutralization
enemy aircraft at source suggest following modification
of plan. Your 011302: Afirm Sowespac air striking force
hit both aerodromes at Rabaul instead Buka Kieta. Baker
Sopac B-17s hit Buka Kieta sunrise dog day thence proceed
vicinity carrier to arrive about 0800 love (-11) and provide air support according to plan until 12 hours love
(-11). Attention invited to fact that while B-17s have
excellent defensive qualities neither in speed,maneuverability, diving characteristics nor positioning of
armament does it possess capability successfully intercepting and carrying its gunpower offensively to attacking enemy aircraft. CTF-17 should thoroughly understand
this in forming his plan of action.

03 0244

C01~IRSOPAC

to CTF-17 INFO COMSOPAC

Action Comtaskfor 17 info Comsoupac. Originator Comairsopac assumes that you will launch at 0500 L (minus
11) GCT 5th in position 120 miles bearing 180 true from
Buin and that thereafter point option moves at 20 knots
along 135 true until 0800 L (-11). B-17 air support
after daylight attack Buka will attempt rendezvous at
about 0800 L (-11) on .basis foregoing assumptions with
IFF operating. B-17 cain of leader OV40 will use call
quote Blue Base unquote for carrier. Voice frequency
6970 kcs. Key 4435 kcs. Will maintain radio silence
unless called. If foregoing assumptions and arrangements incorrect or unsatisfactory advise by whatever
means practicable.

04 0330

CTG 62.6 to COMSOPAC, CTF 62, CG STRAW, COMAIRSOPAC, etc.

FETLOCK occupation completed. Handle as ultra secret.
Taskgroup less landing unit withdrawing at 18 hours mike
(-12) third. Pass through following points all south
and east. 10 and 179-30. 15 and 178-30. 23 and 168.
Will refuel destroyers to permit all vessels arrive
NOUMEA with 20 percent fuel. Expect dissolve task group
organization at about 14 hours mike fifth. Expect arrive NOill~EA cruisers and 5 destroyers afternoon 7th. Radio
NOm~A pass to Comsopac and Comtaskforce 62 for action.
Radio SMEOA pass to Comgen STRAW. Comairsopac has this
and will pass to Comtaskforce 64. No evidence enemy
discovery prior to departure.

889

..offiiJ ORE'!'

October (GOT)
02 2110 CTF 62 to CTG 64.6 Into CTF 63 17 64 1
COMSOPAC:

CINCPAC,~COMINC.H.,

Troops of 1st MarDiv will be transported by CACTUS boats

from KUKDM to KOKUMBONA for landing and attack about daylight .October 5th. From CTF 62. Task Group 64.6 GRAYSON
GWIN arrive off boat landing~~ at 4 hours L (-11)
October 5th and emoark officers from 1st MarDiv who will
deliver attack plan. Para. Provide gunfire support for
landing during 5th and 6th as requested by ComGen CACTUS.
Consistent with supporting mission exploit any favorable
opportunity to destroy enemy surface or submarine forces
in CACTUS area. Giving due consideration to information
concerning location and strength enemy surface forces
you are authorized at your, discretion to retire to RINGBOLT or to eastward through LENGO CHANNEL during night
October 5th-6th. Para. When action commences October
5th break radio silence and inform originator your fuel
situation. Para. On completion assigned task and not
later than 2000 L (-11) October 6th return to -BUTTON advising by radio prior departure CACTUS ETA BUTTON. ComGen CACTUS has in another system.

-m!!9nET ..

October (GCT)
05 1202 COMSOPAC to CTF 64 Info CINCPAC, CTF 62, CTF 6:j.
Handle as most secret. Following tasks are in prospect
for Task Force 64 during period 7-27 October. (a) Provide escort for COPAHEE to fly off point and return. This
movement under operational control of Commander Task Force
63 my 050552. (b) Beginning soon as practicable have striking force operate in position of readiness to attack enemy
vessels landing reinforcements at CACTUS generally in
accord idea proposed your dispatch 040600 returning BUTTON
for fuel as necessary. (c) Provide escort consisting of
2 CA and 4 DD APRICOT occupation force departing WHITE
POPPY about 17 October. The forces available to you during this period will be Task Force 64 as organized my
221002 September plus Fletcher O'Bannon. Additional
details covering these operations ~dll be furnished later.
Comsopac originator.

06 2000

COMINCH TO CINCPAC INFO COMSOPAC.

This to be handled with greatest secrecy. Question has
been raised as to whether fighter squadrons at Birch and
Bleacher are essential and would better be employed elsewhere. Also whether fighter squadron at Holly should not
be replaced by light or medium bombers. Further whether
medium bombers in Cactus would not be helpful in knocking
out enemy ships which are landing enemy troops and bombarding our positions there. Comment.

07 0306

COMSOPAC TO CG ARMY SOPAC INFO COMINCH CINCPAC etc.

Handle as most secret. Request you dispatch earliest
practicable 1 army infantry regiment to Cactus consult
Comamphibforsopac relative details including transportation to be furnished by him. Regiment will report to
Comamphibforsopac for duty under principle unity of command. Replacement rations a naval responsibility. Also
request your recommendations relative early reinforcement Button garrison to total infantry strength of 1
infantry regiment reinforced.

891

..sECRET ..

OCTOBER (GCT)

08 1229 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMAIRSOPAC, HARMON.

Most secret. In view use BLEACHER as advanced Fleet
Base consider air production essential Cominch 062000.
My plan contemplates movement fonvard from BLEACHER all
personnel American fighter command and repiacement by
P~ZAF which will take over American equipment.
This then
to be considered.as one of the 10 NEN ZEALAND Sauadrons to
be e~uipped in accordance approved plan. Medium bombers
will be definitely helpful CACTUS area. Have 2 squadrons
B-26s now available and 1 flight B-25s reported as available near future. Pronase employment these from CACTUS
earliest opportunity but cannot do so until improvement
and expansion runways and airdrome facilities now underway is accomplished . Comsopac sender. Harmon has by
hand.
08 0333 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC Info COHAIRPAC.
Cominch 062000 most secret consider fighter squadron
BLEACHER could be better employed fon~ard areas but
should be replaced by 6 light or dive bombers. For
CAC~JS medium bombers would be most useful for both attack and search missions. Do you agree.
14 0230 CTF 8 to CINC:JAC Info COHINCH, COMl'rviESTSEAFTION, etc.
Comtaskforce 8 sends. Station addressed deliver to
Cincpac for action. Cominch and Comdr Westseafron for
info. Most secret. 1Iy earlier estimates, particularly
with respect consolidation LONGVIEW (my 292340 of August)
revised in light of effect of enemy commitments in 3owestpac upon his intentions North Pacific as set forth
your 130139. After increment combatant troops arrives
LONGVIEW about October 23rd bringing strength there to
9000 troops, Army now plans to move 4000 troops to Ar.TULET
before further strengthening LONGVIEVV (My 122234) static
situation of main middle ALEUTIAN gaps will thus be
reached with unloading of FILJ1viORE about 1 November.
Revised estimate is thus this situation can be maintained
with Seafrontier forces augmented by cruiser escorts
specially assigned for important troop movements plus
certain additions enumerated below. Therefor recommend
Task Force 8 be withdrawn from North Pacific about 1
November and Naval effort in task of holding enemy to
present positions, opposing his efforts to further consolidate those positions, while strengthening own positions be assi~ned Sea Frontier Forces as contemulated by
Comnowestsea fron Op Order 2-42 dated September 10. In
addition returning LOUISVILLE about October 17 relieved
(Continued on next page)

892

~CRE11'- .

OCTOBER (GCT)
14 0230 CTF 8 to CINCPAC, Info COMINCH, etc.

(Continued)

specifically as follows. Afirm. Withdrawal surface

units on following approximate dates. October 23 INDI. A.I\fAuoLIS October 28 Canadian Naval Units, November 1 SAINT
LOUIS, NASHVILLE, BANCROFT, BAILEY, COGHLAN; Minelayers
on comnletion LONGVIEW mining project. Baker. Withdrawal
Fleet submarines end of present patrols Captain Colclough
be in~ relieved. Com_mander Gray in command submarines.
About November first submarines, DMS's, Patwing 4, old
destroyers be assigned to Nowestseafron and operation control of these forces pass to the Comnowestseafron. Withdrawal of Task Force 8 be considered complete as of that
date. Co~taskforce 8 answering. Pending decision have
had no discussion with local Army authorities. Request
early information of contemplated action in order to provide Army with as much advance notice as possible of changes
in Naval dispositions this area.

1.2. 1025 CTF 8 to CINCPAC, COMINCH.

Most Secret. Addees only decode. Comtaskforce 8 reply to
Cominch 141325. Bombardment practica)le as follows. A.
From Eastward using direct fire against North and South
Heads and Submarine Base and new installations Southwest side
of har~or and indirect fire against main camp and shipping
')oth of latter screened by high land on and near North Head.
B. From Southward using indirect fire. Damage from air
action or gunfire should be negligible. Some menace possible in Eastern attack but improbable to Southward in view
recent operations our submarines along South Coast but
consider fast mine sweeners desirable in either case. Consider submarines constitute main enemy threat against repetition of bombardment and recommend strong anti submarine
screens. Unless 3ROOFLi~ class cruiser is in close support
for counter battery fire recommend against emnloyment of
additional destroyers for bombardment due to proximity of
destroyer firing lanes to possible shore batteries. Suggest use dive bombers and torpedo planes from AVG against
shipping immediately following bombardment. Lessened chance
of fog at this time of year increases possibility of air spot
which will need fi~hter protection. Planes should include
coordinated land base bom~ing and fi~hter support but should
recognize uncertainty of accomnlishment due weather conditions.

..SECRE'FOCTOBER (GCT)

16 0455 CINCPAC to

COMINC~I,

Info CTF 8, COMNORWESEAFRON.

Most S~cret. Operation your 141325 considered practicab le

and its morale and training value for the OBBs and psychologic effect on country are recognized . However do not
recommend it for following reasons. Afirm. Consider air
attacks are already making KISKA untenable to enemy therefore even small risk to OBBs from subs mine~ and aircraft
hardly justifi,ed . Baker. Bombardment of important section of KISKA must be by indirect fire and air spot for
this usually impossible due to low ceiling. Cast. While
enemy attack against JviiDWAY is not considered probable the
OBBs in this area are, due to our concentra tion to southward, our main reliance against such an attack. Para.
If operation is directed NEW MEXICO and MISSISSIP PI would
be only units available as there ~re no 16-inch high
capacity shells available . Amount 14-inch this type would
permit 30 rounds per gun. Rebagging powder and shifting
ammunition would require about 8 days. Believe air coverage should be furnished by shore aircraft especially
P-38's from bases within range. ACV cannot be counted upon
as combatant carrier as it is slow in handling aircraft
and cannot conduct flight operation s unless there is at
least a 10 knot wind. First .ACV to train with own aircraft
is NASSAU which has just commenced training. Para. Request early advice.

894

g'EORE'l'

October (GCT}_,

16 9937 CINCPAC to COMINCH

l!,or Admiral King only. Ultra from Cincpac. halsey his
Chief of Staff and Intelligence Officer will be with
Ghormley sixteenth our date. In view Ghormley's 160440
and other indications including some noted during my visit
I have under consideration his relief by Halsey at earliest
practicable time. Request your comment. If Halsey becomes
Comsopac would expect him utilize Ghormley as long as eeded.

16 0245 COMINCH to CINCPAC

For Admiral Nimitz only personal and secret.
Your 160937 apnroved.

Most secret.

895

-8H g Iml9:1-

0ctober (GOT)
18 1350 C01v1SOPAC to ALL T:B' COMS SOPAC, ALL COMGENS SOPAC AHEA, etc.
IIandle as most secret. Action all Taskforcoms Sopac all
Comgens Sopac area Comtaskfors 16 and 17 From Comsopac.
Most Secret. Vice Admiral william F. Halsey has this date
relieved Vice Admiral Robert L Ghormley as Commander South
Pacific Force and South Pacific area. Carpender pass to
MacArthur. Comairsopac pass to liomgens BUTTON, CACTUS and
ROSES by mail.
Comsopac Afunin pass to NEW ZEAUU~D Chiefs
of Staff and to USS CLARK for delivery by her to Comgen
BLEACIT~R via President JACK28N and to Comgen BOBCAT on
arrival.

19 1954 COMINCH to COMSOPAC, CINCl)AC, COiviSWPAC.

Handle with greatest secrecy. In order that urgently
needed submarine support may be furnished to and coordinated with forces now operating in the SOJ...JOMONS the Joint
Chiefs of Staff direct that TF 42 be placed temporarily
under the operational control of Comsopac during the continuance of Task 1 and that TF 42 be built up to 12 fleet
submarines in transfer from Western AUSTRALIA as soon as
possible. This force may base and/or operate in either
Sopac or SWPAC area in accordance with paras. 7 and 10 B
of the basic directives to Cine Pacific Ocean Areas and
Supreme Corunander ~vPacific Area as amplified by Cominch
and Army COF 112150 of last May. Carpender pass to Mac-
Arthur. Deployment of submarines should be so adjusted
that sufficient number can ')e readily moved to oppose possible Japanese concentrations against N'EW GTJIJ\lEA. This
from Chief of Staff Ar.my and Cominch.
20 1540 COMINCH to CINCPAC.
Treat as very secret. Cominch 191954 consider greater
concentration of Pacific .B"'1eet submarines in SOLOMON ISLANDS Area than indicated in your 180245 should be made.
Comment and advise me of action taken.

896

.$EQB1?':C.

October (GCT}
20 22'1 5 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC Info COMINCH, COMSOWESPAC, CW.1SUBPAC.

secret Cominch 201540. Will sail PacFleet subs to

Sopac as follows all to proceed as indicated from present
locations toward BUTTON passing your operational control
on crossing equator: {a) SKIPJACK and SILVE~SIDES now TRUK
at once rer1aining endurance 10 and 13 Nov respectively.
(b) POLLA.CK and PLUNGER now 5 days out from MIDWAY to
JAPAN at once endurance 22 and 26 Novem')er. ( c, GRAYLING
sailed PE~\RL 19 for Sopac as permanent transfer. (d) TARPON
departed PEARL today for TRt~C will now divert to Sopac. (e)
To depart PEARL for 80PAC G~O"':fLER 22nd, FL'riNG FISH 23rd,
STINGHAY 26th, G1 TO and w.'\HOO a bout 30th. (f) AJ_,3A.CbRE and
GROUPER from 11ID~'.fAY for Sopac about 30th. (g) A].~3ERJACK
already in area under Comsopac. Para. FT.J"",TON to SO PAC as
soon as possi0le. Captain Roper on board for employment
advisor or command as you desire.
~1ost

20 2309 CINCPAC to COHIT'-JCH info COivfPU-gPAC.

1Iost secret. Your 201540. Unless otherwise directed will
reinforce Sopac submarines as indicated my 202215. This
and Comsowespac 200635 will total 24 subs under Halsey.
Leaves 10 Pacflt subs for Western Pacific patrols, 9 of
which are now on or near station. Of these \niALE has mines.
Remainder mining program will be deferred.
21 1540

COI,~INCH

to COITUS NAVFOR

R~JR!)PJ,

Info CINCPAC, COMSO?AC.

Ultra secret. Say to General DeGaulle that it is necessary

that Comsopac establish Headquarters ashore at N01.JMEA immediately and that due to overcrowded conditions there I
have authorized him and staff General Vogel and Staff and
the Army on basis of urgent military necessity to occupy
certain buildings left vacant by departure of Dargenlieu and
his mission. Para. I urge that DeGaulle delegate full
authority to local governor Montchamp to negotiate with
Comsopac concerning additional matters that may arise. This
authority should be independent of movements of Dargentlieu.
21 1400 COHINCH to AD1:IRALTY, Info CINCPAC.
Pass to Admiralty for action. 5ighest secrecy. Following
from Cincpac quote Present Japanese concentrations of all
services in SOLOMONS area with consequent deduction to
minimum in other areas offers golden opportunity for positive action against enemy by Allied or British action in
BAY of BF:NGAL or along MALAY BARRIER. In my opinion our
situation in SO"LOHDNS urgently requires easing of pressure
which would result from such action unquote. I concur.
Cincpac informed.

897

~ORE"r

October (GCT)
21 1631 C01\1INCH to CIHCPAC Info COhlSOPAC.
Very secret. Comsopac 171230 motor torpedo boats in
areas as follows: Sopac 8, Hawaiian 8, Norwestse afron 4,
Paseafron 6. Enroute Sopac 16 of which 12 arriving about
13 Nov. 8 more in P.~TMlA awaiting shipment. 49 assigned
Sopac ready when ships available from U. S. January to
Assip:ned Sowespac 12, now ready for shipment, and
~/larch.
20 more in January. Shipping is limiting factor in delivery.
Para 2. Subchaser s 2 enroute Sowestpac . Others assigned
Sowestpac ready for sea 4 each month October through January.
Assigned Sopac ready average four monthly November through
February. Hawseafro n 3 on station and 3 enroute. Reassign
to Sopac at your discretion . Para 3. 173 LPCS 3 in Sopac
no others assigned. 6 assigned Sowestpac ready for sea by
end of year. Assigned Hawseafro n one enroute. and 3 on
shakedown . ~ea~sign to Sopac at discretion as they report.

27 02 51

CINC::?AC to COl\IIiJ8II Info COI,180lJAC.

L1ost secret. Halsey has requested reenforcem ent by 1 or
more carriers of the ~ritish Eastern Fleet. In view urgent and immediate need for every possible increase particularly of carriers I recommend that this idea be explored to utmost.

26 0814

COMSOPAC to COMINCH Info CIHCPAC,

:~OII.'!AIR80PAC,

C'JL'~GEirSO?AC.

Comsopac to Cominch info Cincpac Comairsop ac. Handle as

most secret. Following plan emnloymen t Army fighters and
medi urn bombers, CACTUS dash 'lUTTO.N area. Your 241520. IVIaintain CACTUS one single engine and one P-38 fighter squadron
dash total 50 airnlanes . 11aintain CACTUS dash 1UTTOH area two
medium oomb squadrons dash 26 B-26 or 1-25. To be maintained
from reserves-~OPPY which should be 50 percent for fighters
and 25 percent for medium bombers. Attrition at rate of 20
percent ner month for medimn bombers and 50 percent per month
for fighters. Above in no vvay reduces total requireme nt
fighters and medium bombers Sopac area which has been previously renorted as 7 squadrons fighters and 4 squadrons
medium bombers. Gomeensop ac has by hand.
28 0215

CTF 8 to CINCPAC
This is 1)art 1 of 2 parts from CTF 8. My 150039 September .
LONGVIZ( securely held, guarantees our northern flank and
its loss'to the enemy could cause irretrieva ble harm. While
enemy commitmen ts elsewhere rive us complete freedom of action

(Continued on next page)

898

~eR~T

October (GCT)
28 0215 CTF 8 to CINCPAC.

(Continued)

in the AL~TTTIAlTS assu.rine t~e impregna bi lit y of LONGVIEIJIJ

should be our primary aim. If and when enemy co:rnPlitments
elsewhere east sufficiently it is inconceivable that the
enemy wi 11 endure our. const~lnt aiJ. . attacks upon KISKA without counter action. The expansion of our position in the
flid.dle ALEUTI.llliS by the occupation of ANJJLET and the creation of air fields there must be a further invitation to
early enemy reaction to these new middle AL:B,"\:TTIAN happenings. My 150039 September recommended full strength triangular division. Due to non availability more troops the conference with -DeWitt and Buckner produced a compromise accepting 2 combat teams instead of the 3 which were my original
and still preferred figure. Cominch despatch 022120 stated
Joint Chiefs of Staff considered 11,000 adequate. Army will
now have 9200 at LONGVIEvV on October 30 of which 3100 are
infantry, 1297 field artillery, or one combat team plus additional artillery. After that date the occupation of 1UWLET
by 4200 troops has priority in local Army plans. Part 2
follows.
28 0225 CTF 8 to CINCPAC.

Part 2 of above despatch.

This is part 2 of my 2~0215. This situation does not meet

the local Army-Navy compromise agreement, does not meet
number troops approved by Joint Chiefs of Staff, is one third
the_n1rmber of combat teams originally recoNmended, and one
half the number of combat teams mentioned as basis of agreement in De'Nitt-Theobald conference. Eventually LONGVJEVI garrison is to be reenforced by additional infantry regiment.
Firmly believe that primary position of LONGVIEW in ALASKAN
situation should be recognized by bringing the defense force
at that Dlace to accepted strength before initiating J\.1\IDLET
operation. Adequate ground troops at LOHGVIE\~l far more vital
to LONGVIEW defense than a second or dispersal air field 55
miles awav which is all that AHUL::GT means to IJONGVIEVl in a
military sense. Two. Due to reduced numbers of planes in
Army squadrons, the Alaskan Air Jl'orce , instead of being reinforced as recommended in my 202100 September , is actually
re.duced in combatant strength. Reiterate my opinion that with
less than the minimum ground strength of two combat teams at
JJONGVIEvv we can lose that vi tal position of the middle ALEUTIANS
at any time during these next months vvhenever either neutrali zat ion of Army air forces or period of low visibility would per-'
mit the enemy to effect the landing there. Comtaskforce 8
sends to Cincpac.
28 173 5 COMINCH to CINCPAC, Info CONISOPAC.

Very secret. Increasing use of enemy submarines for scouting and gene ral information purposes is indicated. Vfe do not
appear to be making enough similar use of ovm submarines.

899

SEORE'f-

October 30th.
31 0206 .COMSOPAC to COMGENSOPAC, Info COMAIRSOP.AC, CTF 61, CTF 64, etc.
Handle as most secret. Request you dispatch earliest
practicable one Army l.nfantry Tiegiment reinforced less
one battalion infantry to CACTUS. Consult Comamphibforsopac relative details including transportation to be
furnished by him. Regiment will report to Comamnhibforsopac for duty under principle unity of command. Replacement rations a Naval resnonsibility. Comgensopac has for
action all others are info.
01 1312

C01v~SOPAC

to COJ\,1INCH, Info CINCPAC.

Most secret. CTF 17 reports as follows quote HORrrnT

completely inm1obilized about 1010 GCT 26 by two torpedoes
starboard side at forward engine room plus bomb hits forward and aft resulting complete loss power, light, water.
Thereafter unable reestaolish. Towing operations attempted
by NORTHAMPTON throughout day unsuccessful.
First wire
parted. Second cast off due repeated enemy attacks. By
late afternoon damage so complete from these torpedo hits
five bomb hits two crashed enemy planes all possibilities
towing and salvage operations exhausted. In lat 09-41
Long 167-35 two DD's fired 16 torpedoes at HORNET 9 hits
followed by 300 rounds 5 inch shells to sink her. At 2030
6 DD's withdrew from area with HORNET still afloat burning
fiercely for full length, Suhsef1uent air search indicated
no trace. Unquote. At 1730 CTF 17 had reryorted his proposed action to destroy with which I concur and which I
had anticipated.
01 1050 COHSOPAC to CINCPAC.
This is most secret. From best information now available
re your 010501. Halsey talkinP,. Enemy planes shot down
115 certain. 46 nro 1)ahle total 161. Own losses from all
causes VF 27. VS~ 24. VT 13 total 64. Personnel losses
from two airproups 24. Preliminary but more detailed information with McFALL now enroute by air to PEARL.
02 1618 COl/l: INCH to CINCPAC Info COI1illOPAC.
Handle with greatest secrecy. Your 012115 Office of Viar
Information states that Associated Press despatch from
NOffivffiA dated October 28th passed by Censor there contained
news of loss of ship. News released here with approval
of highest quarters. Loss anticipated but not positively
knovm here until receipt of Halsey 011312 in reply to my
311800.

900

04 0235 CTF 16 to COHfOPAC, CIHCPAC.

This is ultra secret. From CTF 16 to Cincpac. Comsopac
has by hand. Captured enemy code and note book and decoded messages give following information relative to
action 26 October. (a) An aviator's notebook reveals he
left KURE on board TPrJOU 2 5 Sept. He sent a ooard ZUIK.A.KU 1
Oct. His route was KURE to SJ\.IPAH to T:EtUK. ':lhether by
ship or plane unknown.
(b) Senior officer probably Comcardiv 1 was in SHOKAKU. (c) Comcard.iv 2 present in HAYAT.i\KA. (d) Carriers prese'nt. PHOKAI~U, ZUIKAKU, ZUTIIO ,
I~.YA~~A.
(e) According to notebook planes from 3 carriers were comnosed as follows: CVl, 17 torpedo, 21
bombers, 25 fighters. CV2, 19 torpedo, 21 bombers, 24
fighters. End of part 1 of 2 part-s.
04 0252 CTF 16

to.CI~CPAC.

This is second part from Comtaskfor 16. Ultra Secret.

CV3, 18 torpedo, nil bombers, 7 fighters.
(f) Planes 1om
REKATA RAY took part in action probably search planes 1d
horizontal bombers.
(g) One -of surface ships present as
HAGI.
(h) After launching enemy carrier ~elieved sno}KU
ke-pt nlanes informed his uosition about every half her
. {i) Presence our carrier search planes reported to erm~
cruiser. (j) Planes reported weather our vicinity. ,kJ
Enemy air group commander in our area appeared to die?t
attacks by each wave as it arrived and also reporte(Wlnd
frequently. (1) After dark enemy surface vessels sarched
for HORNET assisted by flares from more than one nJne.
(m) Partly decoded message included what may be wo,1s
"Operations ryostnoned". (ri) Captured documents forarded
you by air mail. End of second part.

901

---8ECJ:ttE!'

November (GCT)

05 1524 COMINCH to CINCPAC, Info

COLf~OPAC.

I am ') ecoming disturbed about multinlication of special

commands such as Cor:nnander lases Sopac Area vvhen work
done is inextricably linked with that of Subcomserforpac.
This is IIiCom. Para 2. It seems to me that Comserforpac
should have appropriate number of deputies one of whom
should do much of work Comserfor is now doing thus enahlina him to exercise more overall supervision. In case
of Sopac should include all logistic matters including
bases. Para three. Se prepared to discuss these matters

when we meet.
?lanning and develonment bases this area is a major problem. F~ncti,ns of lo~istic sun0ly and battle renair and
Maintenance nrovide full load for Seronsonac. 1Jnder these
circunsta~ces cr)nsidered essential relieve Comseron of
base develonnent and C0 '1Jnand. Conditions here such that
promnt action was and is necessary to prevent sryread of
chaotic conditions particularly VlliiTE pop-::>y. Your 060217.
1

08 1505 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMSOPAC.

Handle with utmost secrecy. After consultation with
Admiral Boyd regarding em:oloyment of ILT}JSTRIOUS in
Pacific Fleet submit reconLuendation as to immediate emT)lovnent in Sopac (Afirrn) with uresent conrolenent (Baker)
necessity of nroceedina. to PEARL or other U. .S. Base for
modifications and outfitting of torned.o souadron with
.
TBF' s. View held here based on Halsev' s despatch that
services of carrier ur~ently required~now and consequentli
immediate nrohlem is emrylo:rrnent of ILLUSTRIOUS if and
when she is made available.
<I

08 2145 CIFCPAC to covsoPAC.

Arter consultation with Boyd and Towers. Most secret.
T3elieve period of a bout f'our weeks at p:~ARL for equipping
with T~F's indoctrination and training is essential to
meet the Japs. Do you consider your present situation
will permit this. Cominch 081505.
09 2107 CINGPAC to

COl : SOPAC_,__QOI'.~AI~~--oPAC,

ALIJ TF COI :S POPAG,

COI.IS'~JP.

L
Excellent. Ultra. Indications that major operation assisted by carrier strikin~ force slated to support movement
Army transnorts to GUAD;\.LCANAL. Cine 'rhird (Carrier
Striking) now proceeding fueling rendezvous near one north
one fifty seven east. Cine Eleventh /t.ir 11,leet to operate

(Continued on next page)

902

9E OIU~'f ...

~ (Ja. <:.f.)
09 2107 CIIJCPAC to

CO ~

r00P.AC,

etc.,

(Continued)
against CACTUS from Zed minus three days.. Eight fleet
to escort Amy convoy. Lare;e movement enemy planes to
KATTILI base near BLTJH. 3trikin~ force to hit cArJTUS Zed
minus one day. Army .AA Unit to embark eleven November
proceed land CAC~JS. Jap sub to attack ~LUE plane tender
VANIEORO and NDENI. Zed day not known but research continues. Air attacks on CACTUS to be augmented by Anny
Air on Zed Day. All aircraft under command of striking
force probably on Zed minus one day. Esti:r1ate availaole
combat carriers Zl1 IHO , HAYATAKA, transport carriers HOSIIO ,
OTAE.:A , UNYO, but last two have not had combat air groups
assigned in past . While this looks like a Jig punch I
am confident that you with your forces will take their
measure .
12 0031 CINCPAC to COMINCH Info COMSOPAC.
Further conference with Boyd and Towers on Comsopac
110954. Most secret. Assuming ILLUSTRIOUS reports
direct from Eastern Fleet with complement 36 fighters
15 Swordfish or Albacore. Pronosals your 081505. Affirm. Require replacement of British planes with Grumman T~F. Baker. u.s. squadron acceptable but British
pilots with TBF preferred.. Cast. Only in view urgent
need indicated by Halsey consider carrier could be
equipped and personnel indoctrinated at Sopac base providing necessary planes available there. Para. Should
point out small offensive power this carrier with approximate complement 36 VF 15 VTB. Alternate may include 6
SBD as deck park at cost about 9 VF. Para. In lessened
urgency or if British Atlantic carrier furnished it should
definitely equip and indoctrinate at Pearl or u.s. Base.
This would be much more efficient considering minor but
essential modifications necessary in ship and in British
planes. Para. Boyd comments that if INDOMITABLE has large
elevator capable taking SBD planes this ship would be invaluable in Pacific operations.
12 2037 CINCPAC to COMINCH.
Our forces in action with enemy off SAVO I SLAND about
0230 L (-11) this morning. Most details lacking but apparently ATLANTA and JUNEAU damaged and PORTLAND steering inoperative from torpedo hit. At least one enemy
unit sunk and several burning~ ULTRA. Enemy relief being sent from BUIN and his Zed day postponed. Para.
SEAWOLF unable to catch carrier off PALAU.

903

-!EGRET

November (GCT)
17 1255 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COHSOPAC CINCLANT OPNAV.
Utmost secret. Begin. CinCLant direct WICHITA CLEVELAND SUVYANNEE SANGAMON JENKINS MURPifV RADFORD WALLER
CONVIAY proceed Panama preferably but not necessarily
in one group as soon as they can be made ready. Also
CHENANGO when other destroyers assigned Pacflt are
available for escort. Upon arrival Panama report
Cincpac for duty. Advise expected departure dates.
Para. Cincpac send BOGUE and CARD to Lantflt as early
as practicable. Present intention assign BOISE to
Lantflt and keep Lant modern cruiser strength up to
6 including those shaking down by holding MONTPELIEH
until BOISE ready. Opnav informed.

22 2241 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC.

Most Secret. Your despatch 2201ao indicates plan for_
relief 1st Marine Division. KIWI uctt, will soon be in
POPPY. Your despatch 210436 indicates command relations
CACTUS not yet settled. In order that I may have information required fol~ own planning and as basis for representation to higher authority request early advice your
plans for following based on forces now available to
you. A. Relief of Marines at CACTUS. B. Final command
organization CACTUS indicated your despatch 210436.
C. Commander CACTUS after relief lst Marine Division.
D. Commander CACTUS after relief all Marines. E. Command -organization and Base Commander POPPY after arrival KIWI ncu and departure American Division. Also
request your plans under A. to E. above based on 25th
Division Army being made available to you with first
Echelon of 1 regimental combat team ETD PEARL November
25 followed by 3 other increments ETD PEARL December
6, 15, and 31.
23 0032 COMINCH to COMSOPAC Info CINCPAC COMSOWESPAC MACARTHUR.
Treat as ultra secret. Chief of Staff Army has by
hand for info. Army has received urgent despatch from
MacArthur "Is it possible to give me some Naval support
for the North coast of NEW GUINEA. My submarines on
east coast are no longer available, operational control
having passed to South Pacific. PT boats would be invaluable in existing situation. If nothing can be done
please let me know at" once as the increasing enemy Naval
pressure may force me to revise my plan of campaignn.
Para. 2. Return 6 submarines to operational control of
Comsowestpac area. Para. 3. Place at least 6 preferably 8 PT boats at disposal of Comsowespac area for
NEW GUINEA operations pending arrival of boats assigned to Sowestpacfor which depart CBnal Zone about mid
90
December. Para. 4. Carpender pass to MacArthur with
4
the suggestion that time could be saved by taking up
coordinating arrangement such as this directly with Halsey.

... SEE7RE~..

24 0330

f'/1? v
COMINCH to CINCPAC
This is a reencipherme nt of Comsowestpac 23lll3 referred in
our. ZMT2 ( NPM 5351/23) ~-v'hich you had to ZPLl correction
ZMLl begins Handle this as super secret Prior receipt
cominch 230032 L had no knowledge MacArthur's despatch.
At 0600 Love (-11) 23rd 3 submarines stationed directly
assist defense northeast coast New Guinea namely off Cape
Ward Hunt. 1 off GASMATA and 1 north TROBRIAND enroute
VITIAX. MacArthur was informed of this on 19 November.
From Comsowespacf or action Cominch. In addition 3 subs
south NEW IRELAND and 3 west and south BOUGAINVELLE
directly assist in defense NEW GUINEA. Consider continuance present method operational control submarines under
Soupac increases flexibility and permits more adequate
defense NEW GUINEA than would be accomplished by assignment
of 6 submarines this area. Prior to start of BUNA campaign
L explained to MacArthur that because most authentic
navigational in formation shows that draft in excess 12 feet
cannot proceed deyond Cape NELSON toward BUNA and because
of inaccurate charts destroyers cannot be sent via this
passage beyond Cape NELSON from MILNE BAY. "t further
explained that surface forces could not be sent into this
general area north of the TROBRIANDS unless adequate air
cover was available. L concur that PT boats are required
at earliest date

25v2330

COMINCH to CINCPAC .
Handle with utmost secrecy. Contemplate taking up with
Army practicabili ty relief by Army of Marine Corps ground
and air units now on garrison or defense duty in SAMOAN
and HAWAIIAN AREAS. If such relief were effected following would result: AFIRM. 2 reinforced infantry regiments
would be available for assignment to First M~ramphCor as
elements of a new division. BAKER. Release/8~fe~se Battalions
in these areas would permit their assignment to advanced
zones of action. CAST. This relief of defenseBatta lions
would obviate necessity for organization of new defense
and airdrome battalions in United States as now scheduled.
DOG. Personnel thus saved woulq be diverted to new division
and advance its availablity to summer 1943. EASY. Release
of defense air group s would permit their assignment to
offensive operations in other areas. Pera. Request your
comment and recommendati ons. MarCorps informed.

9D5

.-sEcg&T

25 2030

'}.Avv--

CTF 8 to CINCPAC
CTF 8 replying to Cincpac 242319. Estimated : total of
7500 to 10000 mixed troops consisting of engineers , construction, infantry and artillery on BOODLE. 1 Battallion
82nd Infantry of from 500 to 1000 on JACKBOOT. Possible
coast watcher force of about 10 on western end FORMULA.
Same number (10) may be on AL ID in SEMICHI. No other
forces believed on any other islands. Ultra.

26 ol55

CTF 8 to CINCPAC info COMINCH

your 252227. Am despatchin g surface striking force 2 cruiser~
4 modern destroyers at best sustained speed accordance my
260014. 1 cruiser 3 destroyers sent forward from KODIAK
yesterday at best speed to fuel LONGVIEW where other cruiser
and destroyer join. Vfuen your ultra secrets received
yesterday they were departihg KODIAK with delayed convoy
and were immediate ly detached from this escort duty. Have
intensifie d air search to westward and have alerted air forcE
for strongest possible air attacks to supplemen t surface ~tt
attacks . Have alerted air and Navy at western bases
against possible enemy diversive action advising Buckner of
this. Only submarine in ATTU area alerted against enemy
approach. Ultra. CTF 8 sends to Cincpac and for info to
Cominch.

26 235

CINCPAC to COMINCH
Utmost secrecy. Agree in principle with relief Marine
ground and air units Urdis 25233 to provide amphibiou s
troops aircraft and defense battalions for further offensive moves. In HAWAIIAN area consider such relief
should not be made until assured organizati on of Army
units permit present scale and effectiven ess of defenses
with approxima tely same number of troops (about the maximum that can be supported on these islands). In SAMOAN
area including FETLOCK agree that relief. be effected as
soon as Army can ma~e available troops of equivalen t
training and experience to marines now there. It is
recommend ed Army units for that area also be especial~y
organized for the variou s tasks to avoid increas~ in
personnel with attendant logistic demands. Para. In
line with basic proposal the asslgnmen t 25th Division
to Sonac for use CACTUS would make available almost
imrnedla tely one I/Iar i ne Amphibiou s Division for further
offensive action.

90 6

-S.E.CREL ~

29 1906

JOINT CHIEF OF STAFF'S to CINCPAC 2 COMSOPAC 2 COMSOWESPAC.

This from Joint Chie~ ofstaff to Cincpac, Comsopa c,Comsow espac area. Carpente r pass to MacArth ur. Nimitz pass to
Emmons. Halsey pass to Harmon. Para 1. 25th Army Division
is assigned to Sopac area and will proceed to WHITE POPPY.
Para 2. 1st Marine Division is to be relieved without
delay, as assigned to Sowespac area and will proceed to
AUSTRALIA for rehabil itation and employm ent. The purpose
of this transfer is to provide an Amphibio us Division
for the future formatio n of an Amphibio us Forceto carry
out amphibio us operatio ns under the co~mander Sowestpa c area.
Para 3. Halsey arrange with MacArth ur details oftransf er
1st Marine Division . Chief of staff Army and Comdt Marine
Corps informed .

30 2350

CTF 67 to COl/l:SOPAC Info COMINCH, CilJCPAC.

Comtask force 67 reports opened fire on four ships believed transpo rts at CAPE E~PERANCE. Hit and fires were
seen. Six minutes later three and perhaps four heavy
cruisers struck by torpedoe s believed fired by destroye rs
and submarin es. Since then have been unable communi cate
with other shins. NORTFJL~TON burns total loss. Believe
PENSACOLA same NEN ORLEANS proceedi ng to ~JLAGI 5 knots
MINlTEA?OLIS same with bow -)lown off three fireroom s
flooded believe HONOLULU all right. No informa tion of
destroy ers.

30 2350

CTF 67 to COMSOPAC Info CINCPAC, COMINCH,

COMS0 1.~,TESPAC.

At ~ T LAGI are followin~: PENSACOLA torpedo hit and severe

fire damage aft. NEN ORLE1~~S bow blown off back to
number 2 turret. PERKINS, MAURY assistin g above ships
undamag ed. 1:INNE.lt.POLIS as previou sly reported . L\RDNER
and LMv1SON are with Tisdale and undamag ed. No further
word of NORTH.Al/T TON. F:LE'I'OflER and DRl\.YTON renorted
separate ly by FLETCHER. 1 Jap cruiser seen to blow up
and 1t is known addition al Jap ships were destroye d as
well as others damaged . Am collecti ng data. Last liPl\1
number received was 604. Am unable decode messages in
crypto channels 7 and 19. Can guard Task Force Commanders
circuit only.

907

30 1915

01 0931
(~}

COMINCH to CINCPAC, COMSOPAC.

To be decoded by Nimitz and Halsey only. Ultra High Command.
Para 1. Final decision cancelling AOLA BAY project in CTF
62 260458 brings to climax my uneasiness of several weeks
duration lest we continue to use up our fighting strength in
virtual uFrontaltt operations such as are involved in expulsion
of enemy from CACTUS which if followed in principle throughout
CACTUS-RABAUL area will keep us busy for years. Para 2.
It seems to me that . there are now-- see my 291906 --adequate
Army troops in Sopac to garrison CACTUS and secure airfield
there and "contain'' enemy forces which should enable us not
only to withdraw First but also Second 1mrine Division latter
for use in seizure of enemy position further northwest in
SOLOMONS preferably one where enemy has airfield. Para 3.
Conception sketched in preceeding para looks to "Flanking
operationu rel..a.tive to CACTUS by seizure of enemy base used
for operations in support of CACTUS whereby latter be made
untenable for enemy and what is more important enables us to
get on with the job of clearing enemy from SOL01t10NS-RABAUL.
Para4. Request your comment on premise that next step will
be done by Afirm Comsopac Baker Comsowespac.
CINCPAC. to COMSOPAC.
For Admiral Halsey only from Cincpac. Utmost secrecy enjoined.
I contemplate making following reply to Cominch 301915. Quote.
Am in complete accord as to necessity for readying our amphibious troops preparatory to pushing along the SUSAN area. I
asked for the 25th Division so that it could relieve the
Second Marine Division. Halsey is relieving 1st Marine Divisior
with American Division from POPPY. I had not contemplated
that the lst Marine Division would join Sowestpac for I estimate that provided we have the necessary Naval and Air superiority we will require at least 2 Divisions to capture BUIN
(The nearest enemy base with an airfield unless he builds one
at MUNDA or REKATA). Para. As the lst Marine Division can
hardly be ready until 1 Mar. there will continue to be a phase
in which CACTUS remains an area of strong contention. All
indications point to continued enemy moves to land reenforcements there and I believe these will include at least one
more major effort. Also during this period we must develop
CACTUS-RINGBOLT as a secure Naval and Air base from which to
launch our offensive. The foregoing plus the ALEUTIAN situation
stresses necessity for much stronger land sea and air forces
than are in sight for the Pacific. I urge immediate action
to obtain them. Para. I strongly recommend that Task 2 in
the SOLOMONS SEA area be revised to provide that Comsopac
continue to command the forces which will extend control up
the SOLOMON CHAIN. I estimate that the bulk of the Pacific
Fleet will continue to be required and I consider that a
change of comnand of these forces which Halsey has welded into
a working orga nization would be most unwise. Para. Unquote.
Request early comment.

908

\'3:ffiCRE't-

0eptember (GCT)

03 1141 COM20PAC to COMSOWESPAC, MacARTHUR, Info CINCPAC, COMI!'JCH,

CTF 61, 62, 63.
During operations of allied forces in the CACTUS-RING-.:30LT
area on 8 August a warning originated by the coast watcher
on T30UGAINVILLE informed our forces of an impending Jap air
attack. The timel i ness and completeness of the warning was
of inestimable benefit and enabled our vessels to take proper
defensive positions in the repeat in advance of the attack.
Please express t6 the Coastwatcher my d~ep appreciation and
that of the officers and men engaged in the subject operation. Well done.
02 1958 COMINCH to COHSOPAC, Info COMAIHSOPAC, COUSVJPAC, CINCPAC.
Your 020400 information my 271320 as to fighter planes which
are part of cargo of certain ships was given to show status
and location of replacements command to let you know aoout
when and by what transportation those planes are due to arrive in ports indicated. Para 2. Breakdown of cargoes
reported my 271320 as follows: ELLERY has 9 P38's, 24 others.
GOODHUE 9 P38's. Lee 9 P38's. VviNGATE 2 P38's. STEELE 8
P38's, 1 other. LANE 9 P38's, 8 others. ASiill 6 P38's, 8
others. VALE 8 P3g's 2R others. Para four. Leary pass to
MacArthur. Para. 30. Your basic recommendations are fully
understood by me and are under conside~ation of the War
Department.
03 1313 COMINCH to CINCPAC and Info commands concerned.
Prospects for organization of additional raider battalions,
your 010309, for present appear limited to: (A) Organization of a 3rd raider battalion at STRAW from CADRES of 2
officers and 25 men each transferred from 1st and 2nd raider
battalions with remainder of personnel recruited from units
of defense f orce STRAVV without replacements. (B) Establishment of raider replacement training detachment on West Coast
in October, personnel a bout 200. Marcorps advised. Your
comment reouested.
02 0337 CTF 16 to CINCPAC I nfo CTF 62,17,18, COIE:SOPAC, COMINCH, CTFl.
The present of a fast battleshiD in task force 16 during
past several weeks and particularly during action on 24 August
was a distinct asset because of her demonstrated fire power
against attacking aircraft and her inherent strength a gainst
possible surface contacts. From Comtaskfor 16 action Cincpac.
Because of . sli ~ht deficien cy in speed and acceleration and
s li ght inh er ent s lowne s s in starting a turn the st ati on of
the -NORTH CAR0LINA in cruising disposition and partic~larly
in ti ght screening dis po s ition during a ir attacks s hould be
down wind from carri er a s was the case on 24 Aug with thoroughl y sat.i s f a ctory r esults.

909

,SECRE'P-

September ( Gcrr)

04 2027 CTF 8 to CINCPAC.

PRIBILOFF move by Japs would be totally contrary to their
technique of advance to date and contrary to sound strategy.
Such an outlying base for them flanked from DUTCH HARBOR
and suoject to ~r~peated bombing attacks from COLD BAY
UMJ,TAK and NA'tWII supported as necessary by P-38' s using
belly tanks for approach flights would always be difficult.
if not impossible to support logistically and could quickly
be rendered untenable to enemy. PRIBILOFF airfield of
little use to ALEUTIAN air operations while NAZAN stagi~
field will be of greatest aid as it provides additional
field in direct line of operations possibly fog free in an
area of constantly shifting local visibility conditions.
NAZAN should be given highest possible priority consistent
with earliest nossible consolidation of FIREPLACE. At
present stage of FIRE~LACE move can not spare cruiser
escort for PRIBILOFF operation which is so eccentric to
FIREPLAC~ as to mean withdrawal of some cruisers from FIREPLACE operation. Covering FIREPLACE and NAZAN is single
operation. At least 4 destroyers antisubmarine screen
desirable in close support of discharging cruisers at
PRISILOFFS anchored in open sea for days. 2 destroyers are
ample at NAZ~T. Weather may seriously hamper and lengthen
period of discharge at PRIBILOFFS. If PRIBILOFF move
decided upon recommend that priority be given FIREPLACE
which has inadequate surface naval support at present
against any move in force by enemy and that risk of PRIBI~
LOFF move be accepted with 2 destroyer antisubmarine
screen and no cruiser escort.

910

SEPT GCT
--05 1050

COMGEN CACTUS to CCMSOPAC info CTF-62, COI'v'fAIRSOPAC

T'd to CINCPAC by CCMSOPAC
ComGen CACTUS to COMSOPAC. My 041510, 042001. Twelve
officers and 226 members crews LITTLE GREGORY reported
rescued. Enemy force consisted of at least one cruiser
two DD. Morning patrol sighted 15 large landing boats
each carrying about 75 men anproaching northwest coast
CACTUS. Strafed boats sunk three. P-400s attacked them
with bombs and li~ht "mach ine guns. Appeared to cause
many personnel casualties. SBDs strafed bombed boats on
beach. Beli-eved to have destroyed several of them.
One
boat was destroyed by bombin~.
26 twin engine bombers covered by 20 zeros approached
position at 1245. This was second alert and only several
fighters reached proper altitude.
These intercepted
planes dropped bombs 10 miles westward LUNGA Point. Two
bombers one zero shot down.
One F4F4 missing three
damaged.
One pilot w~unded.
One additional F4F4 and
pilot lost during boat strafing operations.

05 2130

COMTASKFOR 8 to JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

After consideration general Buckner and I jointly recommend
against ADAK occupation TANAGA for purposes of possible
diversion reference para 3 cominch 211830 of August. l"Jhen
FIREPLACE position consolidated with bombing and fighter
planes operating therefrom the establishment of force at
TANAGA and creation bomber airfield would be highly desirable and next logical move in ALASKAN campaign.
'fi th
troops and equipment for TANAGA asseMbled at FIREPLACE
and continual observation sea conditions in TANAGA Bay
can occupy this place by infiltration using period of
favorable weather and sea to effect short haul from FIREPLACE. Move ~uould be covered at all times by close air
support from FIREPLACE svpplemented by required Naval
screening forces. With such an operation in contemplation
it appears highly undesirable to evidence interest in
TANAGA in advance thereof

911

_ September (GCT)
05 0626 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC & info Commands Concerned.
Refer Cominch 031313 and Cincpac 042210 nature of operation and enemy infiltration tactics make additional raider
. battalions necessary. StrenPth of defense force STRAW
should not be diminished. Ur~entlv need 2 divisions APD's
whose value for island warfare' has"been proven. What :is
status of APR'S. Info radio deliver Comgen STRAW.
06 2246 CTG 2.9 to COHSOPAC Info COMINCE, CINCPAC.
SOUTH DAKOTA struck uncharted 35 foot pinnacle bearing .321
true from MALINDA light distant 5.5 miles. This an extension
to lead in A"TPEXLAIII passage. Extensive contamination with
salt water of fuel and feed water bottom tanks. Divers report numerous dents and several holes. Largest 2 square feet
in outer skin between frames 32 and 90 starboard side. Now
serious leakage several inner bottoms principally due disnlacement sea connections. No apparent derangement propulsive machinery except clogging 1 condenser. Anticipate
no difficulty maintaining 20 knots. No vibration observed.
To accomDlish estimate about 2 weeks in dock. Ready for sea
morning local 8th. Recommend proceed PE~~L that date. DD
escort recommended during daylight local 8th and DD escort
last 24 hours prior arrival PE~1L.
07 1020 COMSOPAC to CTF 17 Info COM.AIRf'OPAC, CTF 18, CINCP.AC.
Your 070212 and 070834. Your attention is called to my
030736 NPM number 573 which gives you entire freedom of
movement. In order that I may be sure you have reference
I have had it repeated for you. My suggestion is that you
move east of APRICOT lUTTON line at good speed.
07 0217 CTF 17 to COV0 0PAC, Info

Cill~IRSOPAC,

CTF 18.

My 070212. Analysis of DF contacts this area and HORNET

contacts past ?4 hours warrant followinp; conclusions. Afirm
presence of large task force in geogranhical area 10 to 15
degrees south 164 to 165 degrees east known to enemy. Baker
apuroximately 9 enemy subs this area. Para. In absence of
imnortant targets consider current direc t ive unduly restrictive
and unnecessary hazard. To heav? shins unprotected by
adeouate number DDs as screen. Para. Foreging situation will
be accentuated unon return Task Force 18 this area. Para.
Recommend Afirm task forces operate within 300 miles radius
C.ACTUQ south lat 8 and east long 160 east and in southeast
direction as necessary to guard CACTUP lUT'J10N APHICOT 3UTTON
lines. Baker. Provi de two DDS ner heavy ship as soon as
practicable. Cast. :i?rovide large nu_mb e r anti suJmarine t ype
vessel to hunt subs this vital area.

912

~BGRE'f

September (GCT)

06 2040 CT:B, 8 to COBnEN ALDKB, FT RICHARDPON, and Info commands conc.e rned
Based on discharging rate at FIRI~PLACE of 1200 tons daily
present vessels there should )e discharged by September 13
completing first phase. Assuming vessels could arrive at
FIREPLACE as soon as their discharge can commence increments
of second phase could be discharged by following dates based
on your cargo estimates for each colon 1st Sept 21, 2nd
Sept 30, 3rd Oct 8, 4th and final October 17. Your HL ADC
Ft. Richardson 052328 imnroves nrevious time schedule but
bottleneck now appears to be transports and loading times at
points of departure. Desire to help, if possible. Is there
anything further that can be done to assist in saving time
so vital to success of whole operation. Radio stations
deliver.
06 2210 COMGEN ALASKAN DEF TO COMALSEC
Since senclinr; my 060250 received following from CG ,"!DC bE)gin
received message from CTF 8 outlinine his objections to
garrisoning Pribilofs which Admiral Nimitz concurred in.
If you (Buckner) agree with Theobald and Cincpac movement
to Pribilofs will be cancelled Moses Point darrison going
to Atka as previously planned end paraphrase.
I replied to
Dewitt saying would not occupy Pribilofs at this time but
would send 1.1oses Point ga rrison to .ttka. At later date
contemplate sendinr garrison St Paul.
07 2206

COMSOPAC TO CGs BUr:F'l1 0N, CACTUS,etc. INFO COMINCH, CINCPAC, etc.

Comairsopac pass this to CG BUTTON. Fuller pass by hand to
Comcubone and CG CACTUS who is to acknowledge. Comcub 13
has. All the above are action addressees. CG SOPAC and all
other addressees info. From Comsopac. Plan for employment
Cub 1 and 13 and 6th and 7th Construction Battalions follows:
Afirm generally Cub 1 and 6th Construction Battalion at
Cactus Hingbolt. Comcub 1 report to CG CACTUS as cor.nnanding
officer advanced naval base CACTUS RINGBOLT. Units of Cub 1
and 6th Cons t. Bn. move from BUTTON to CACTUS RING BOLfJ:, as
required latter place. Hospital unit Cub l establish at
BUTTON. Baker generally Cub 13 and 7th Const Bn at BUTTON.
Cub 13 unload and establish storage and forwarding camp at
i~JHITE POPPY.
Forward material and per -3 onnel to BUTTON only
as required latter place. Consult Staff Comsopac in this
respect. After establishment storage and camp at ~IIITE POPPY
Comcub 13 proceed to BUTTON and report CG BUTTON, under principal of unity of corw.and, as commanding officer advanced
naval base EUTTO~J. Hospital unit Cub 13 remain trvHITE POPPY
until further orders. Cast for guidance this genera l principal is established that rigid adherPnce to cub organizat4on

913

SECRET -

September (GCT)
07 2206

(COMSOPJ~C

Continued)

cannot be maintained. Personnel and naterial must go

where nost needed. Consult Comsopac staff freely this
re'~ard and consult Comairsopac relative Cub aviation
personnel and naterial and construction aviation facilities. Doe. ~hen initiated, construction activities
at apricot will be under Comcub 13 in addition to duties
outlined above. Easy. Comcub 1 and Comcub 13 submit
early reconmendations for development respective bases
to Consopac via base commanders and Comairsopac. Comcub
1 relieved of all duties in connection with Cub 13.
08 1556

HQ LTARCORP TO COMSOPAC INFO COMINCH CINC:PAC etc.

Urdis 070356 assembling 5 officers GOO enlisted ACPF for
transfer Sopac fagtrans after 25 Sept. Also 8 officers
and 1200 enlisted available San Die~o about 20 Oct.
Parachutists for 1st div available initial rate 30 per
week beginning 1 Oct. Further replacement will be sent
as available and required. Comment requested on early
proeram of withdrawal of FMF officers excess in rank to
meet urgent needs u.s.

08 1736

CINCPAC TO

08 2234

COMINCH TO CINCPAC INFO COMSOPAC

This part 1 of 2 part mes~age. Part 1 is being transmitted
as 082234 and 082240 and part 2 is being transmitted as
082355. With reference Secnav secret letter April 20 1942,
subject United Nations operations in Pacific theater,
Cominch has approved deletion paragraph 10 (c) of direc~ive
to CinCPacific Ocean areas and is recommending substitution
of the followine;:
Quote 10 C (1) in the exercise of command
over armed forces which the New Zealand government has
assizned, or may assign, for the local defense of Hew
Zealand, the lJew Zealand Chiefs of Staff will be the ap;ency
through which such local cor.nnand is exercised.. COFS USA
informed. Quote ( 2) in tr1e exercise of command the principles of command as set forth in paragraph 14 of I~.BC 1
are applicable. ~uote (3) with regard to the possible
movement of New Zealand forces out of 1ew ~ea1and territory, the following by the U S Chiefs of Staff to the
president is self ex~lanatory:

914

SECBli'T

Sept. (GCT)

08 2240

08 2355

Quote proposals of the U S Chiefs of Staff (for operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas) made to the President
as U S Commander in Chief are subject to review by him
from the standpoint of higher political con~derations
and to reference by him to the Pacific War Concul in
Washington when necessary8 The interests of the nations
whose forces or whose land possessions may be involved
in these militiry operations are further safeguarded by
the power each nation retains to refuse the use of its
forces for any project which it considers inadvisable
unquote the New Zealand Government hls accepted change
and the matter is being referred to united States Joint
Chiefs of Staff, whose concurrence is expected. End
Part 1. Refer to this as Cominch 082234
Part 2 of 2 part message. New Zealand Government in
accepting modifie4tion pointed out that the following
reservations must be borne in mind: (1) New Zealand
(2) They must keep
army equipment is of British type.
(3) They have overseas
up their middle east forces.
air force commitments for (a) training pr ogram in
Canada, (b) New Zealand squadrons in the United Kingdom.
(4) Consultation with the Prime Mi nister in New Zealand
if required for future movements. Upon approval by
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff change to directive
to CinC Pacific Ocean Areas will be issued. End 2
part message. Refer to this as Cominch 082234.

915

September (GCT)

09 1215

CQ ~.1AIRPOPAC

to

CO~:IS OPAC

info CIJJCPAC.

Comcub ONE from CACTUP recommends SANTA ANA proceed there

soon as pos.s i ble and unload. Comgen CACTUP 080251. In that
ship is 700 bundles marston and 1200 rolls sommerfield mats.
3000 drums avgas. Both gas and water tankage. Power shovel.
All urgently required. Cub ONE executive has verified locally. Estimated 4 ri ays required to unload working 24 hours.
He will nut on board some miscellaneou s equipment recently
requested. Foregoing seems good solution if unloading time
acceptable and I concur. Pronosals my 08706 become alternatives. 9 planes crashed yesterday attempting to use
CACTUS field which today Wednesday is practically inoperative. Situation serious and quick action necessa~y.
08 0935 COMGEN 1st MARDIV, to C'rF 62, Info COHSOPAC.
Urdis 070348. Boats landed vicinity P0038 (not Cincpac
Grid). 3 miles west of CAPE E2PERANCE. Jap force thought
possibly 1000. Information of strength and exact location
~Jeing gathered by Coast 'i'T atcher.
Area distant 2 days.
Movement by trail not feasible for forces with necessary
arms. Intend to attack as soon as ~~D's or other suitable
water transportatio n made availaJle to this division.
Raiders and para troops made attack at TAIVU today. Full
reuort on their return. In view this move no further action
Jeing taken your 031652 pending conference your arrival.
08 2030 COMINCH to CINC_!AC Info C01.180PAC, COUi\;\I:?HIBFOHSOPAC.
Cincpac 062015 Marcorps directed to comply my 031313. Renlacements for personnel assigned raider battalion from units
in STRAV! will be made at time transfer is effected (about
1 December) if situation warrants. Latest estimates on
comoletion dates for A~R's (referred to in Corninch serial
01500 of July 23 1942 as APC's) are as follows September
dash 23 October dash 20 November dash 7 total number involved
50. 'Estimate 2 r1 onths from date completion for arrival on
station Sopac.
10 0202

COT fv'lEST~EAg HQN

to CINCPAC info COMINCH.

Comwestseafro n originates. RDO Hono pass to Cincpac for

action. RDO Wasl-ln nass to Cominch for Info. From General
D~ ~ itt.
Following is paraphrase of personal report from
Commanding General Alaska Defense Command on FI REPLACE
Operation: August 26th one Army reconnaissanc e force landed
from submarine in T0JL1fl<'" Bay ADAK Island. Aup-ust 27th one Army

(Continued on next pa ge)

916

='SEORE'T

sEPT. GCT

---10 0202

COTiWESTSEAFEON (Continued)
reconnaissance force landed from sub~arine at SHAGAK Bay.
Reconnaissance force on ADAK observed one enemy single
motor float plane on August 27th. Plane passed from
Northeast to Southwest and return but apparently did not
observe our reconnaissance force. No other teports of
enemy observation or units.
Initial garrison transported
on BELL. SAN MIHIEL and BRANCH arrived KULUK Bay August
30th. All troops landed on that day. Unloading of
transports completed September 6th. Troops this increment consist of one infantry regiment less one battalion.
One antiaircraft gun battery.
Three antiaircraft automatic weapons batteries.
One antiaircraft searchlight
battery.
One battery coast artillery 155 millimeter gun.
One battery field artillery 105 millimeter howitzer.
One
battery field artillery 75 millimeter pack. Force headquarters. Aircraft warning platoons, and Station complement.
One battalion aviation engineers less one
company and two platoons quartermaster corps company
arrived via barge Au~ust 31st. Total garrison now ashore
consists of 184 officers and 4372 enlisted men. Four
thousand foot landing strip expected to be ready for
operation Septenber lOth. End paraphrased.

10 0725

COI.:AMPHFORSOPAC to COr:ISOPAC
T'd by Comsopac to CINCPAC
The situation forecast in your 100725 and nightly bombardment CACTUS-RINGBOLT indicates urgent need for
several PacFlt submarines that area.
If these are sent
recommend SoWesPac submarines operate on line N~~
GEORGIA ISLAND - Iv1Ar:NING STRAIT.

10 1152

COI/ISOPAC to CINCPAC
This is for Admiral Nimitz from Comsopac. Assume your
091844 refers only to combatant naval forces which are
organized as of 11 September as follows units designated
as indicated in PacFlt Con notice lBCN-42 dated Aug. 8:
Task Force 17 Rear Admiral Iv1urray in IIOHNET, NORTH
CAHOLINA Cruisers Rear ttdmiral Good in NORTHAMPTON,
PENSACOLA SAN lJIEGO and Desron 2 plus DALE. HUGHES and
,:VALKE at present absent on escort assignments will be
ordered join Taskfor 17 as soon as practicable. Task
Force 18 Rear Admiral Noyes in WASP Cruisers Rear
Admiral Scott in SAN PHANCISCO, SALT IAKE CITY, HELENA,
JUKEAU and Desron 12 less 'VOOD~VORTH and MCCALLA plus
CLARK last named temporarily absent escorting.
(continued on next page)

917

SEPT GCT
---10 1152

COMSOPAC to CINCPAC

(Cont~nued)

Task Forces 17 and 18 together comprise Task Force 61

Rear 1!-dmiral Noyes. Task Force 62 Rear .:1.drnira1 Turner
Transdivs 8 and 10. Transdiv 12 less CALHOUN GREGORY
LITTLE. Transdiv 2 less ALMAACK HARRIS. Transdiv 4
less PROCYON and ALCYONE plus ALCHIBA. Following units
of Minron 2: Cominron 2 in HOPKINS, ZANE TREVER,
SOUTHARD, HOVEY. Transdivs of Task Force 62 are organized into Divs in accord my approved dispatch 170841 of
August. Task Force 63 Rear Admiral McCain CURTISS,
MACKINAC, MACFARLAND, BALLARD with attached aircraft.
Task Force 64 Rear .Admiral ~!\fright in MINNEAPOLIS, BOISE,
LEA1JDER Desdiv 22 plus FARRAGUT MACDONOUGH. Combatant
units available SoPac area not assigned to Task Forces
ArrLArTA, HULL, AYLWIN, BENHAM Desdiv 15 less WILSON all
of which currently or prospectively on escort assignments but later intended in part to augment task forces.
Also GA~.IBLE, BREESE, TRACY currently employed in interbase and aircraft tender excort assignments. Not included are Task Force 11 as constituted for return to
Pearl my 080342 and Task Group 2.12 which I intend
assign to Task Force 18 as soon as available, with
Combatdiv 6 in WASHINGTON. ACHILLES made available
2 months refit FULCRUM corrn:J.encing mid September. MONOVIAI
utilized for special missions of short duration.

11 1028

CQI;:AIR~OPAC

to

L:ACKI~JAC

info Co::SOPAC, CTF 61.

At 0 500 1 ( -11) tomorrow Saturday 1.:ACKINAC BALLAHD depart

MJRICOT retiring to South. All flyable planes take off
daylight. Those on search proceeding on mission. Remainder
as a group operate in general area to South and within 60
miles A~RICOT. If no threatening enemy contact received
from search nlanes by 0830 L (-11) Task Group 63.5 less
search planes return APRICOT. As replacement am sending
one plane from BUTTON forenoon tomorrow call 46V35. A
second plane call 45V35 will arrive after completing search
sector 5. Return any 2 your plane crews via BALLAHD.

918

~G:CLT

Sentember ( GC'T)

11 1802

COMIIJCH TO

CINCPJ'~.C

COJ\1SOPAC INFO COM 12 COMSEFOR SUBCOM

It v1ill bo possible to embark l Army regimental combat

team of 43rd infantry division ap~)roxima te strength 5000
in such a manner as to permit direct routing to 1:Vhi te
Poppy or diversion by you enroute. Estimate this regiment ready depart U.S. early October. Advise if this
moclificatjon in loading Army units specified in my
291240 August desired by you. CofS U.S.A. informed.

13 0933

Comairsopac to COMSOPAC Info Cil\TCPAC, COIIliNCH.

When I left at 0645 L (-11) today material situation
CACTUC: OKay except for gas shortage and no Marston mat.
Personnel very tired - no rest at night account bombardment by surface craft or by day account air alerts.
"9UTTOJ'J normal. Turner and McCain at BUTTON.

14 1045

CG CACTUS TO CO .. SOPA.C INTO COMINCH CINCPAC

Enemy attacked throughout night striking at both flanks
and rear of position. JJ..ttack on rear made in strength
and repulsed only after severe fightin8s.
Contact and
mopping up operations continued throughout day.
Our
casualties approximately 35 dead 160 wounded. Enemy
dead exceeded 500 . At 2300 cruiser and 2 D~s bombarded
Dukum area little damage no casualties. Enemy' zeros
over at 0700 0300 and 1745. 4 shot down.
Our losses l
F4. Pilot saved. All times L (-11).

C.G.JvlAR 1st Div to COMSOPAC, CTF 62.

15 0726 /Your ll~Ol?O. My 141045. Enemy struck in three areas.
Cantured operation map indicated attack sent off as ~lanned.
Success of either thrust would have given hiro temnorary
possession of air field. Thrust at rear was main effort.
Difficult to determine numbers in nip.:ht attacks but .forces
on right flank and rear uro)ably exceeded 2000. Suspect
destruction of ~oats by aircraft at SAN JORGE Island and
CAPE ~ 0 PERANCE as cause. At 1200 love (-11) today although numerous snipers in position patrols to flank and
rear had onl y one contact. Main effort made along narrow
ridge was stopped by 400 raiders and paratroops under
Edson supported by intense artillery fire only after 10
hours hand to hand fi ~htine during which our troops suffered
over fifty per cent casua ltie s . We have lost three tanks.
Our casualties to date are 363 some of which are only
slightly wounded.

919

~CRJ:!:'f

September (GCT)

14 2247 CINCPAC to COMSOVJESPAC Info COMilJCH, COMSO-_)AC, COMSUBI.,AC.

For MacArthur from Nimitz. Plan to place one tender and six
modern submarines under operational control Ghormley. For
best emnloyment these and in view disoosal of S-boats made
by Cominch 131830 request that as S-hoats withdraw you make
available for Pacflt sub onerations that nortion your area
bounded as follows. On Soui1h by lat 238. On west by long
155-E to lat 11 S thence along a line to East Cape on
southeast NE\.i'T GUINEA. Thence northwest along HEW GUINEA
coast to longitude 142 E. Thence north to equator.
16 0900 COl.:SOPAC to CTF 64, 65, Info CTF 63,17,18,CINC P.aC.
Hy information indicates ;ossible slackening enemy effort
a~ainst CACTU~ for next day or two while reinforcing -troops
ashore for combined repeated attempts. Consider safest
time entrance CACTUS next 2 days. At your discretion and
provided sufficient fuel vessels transdiv 2 to make trip
in and then out to rendezvous, proceed CACTUS reporting
via DD your intention and ETA CACTUS. Am dispatching
tanker daylight 17th grid posit G4370 (Long 160-45 E lat
20-00 S) to arrive 10 hours L (-11) 18th thence to Grid
Posit G4390 (Long 160-45 E Lat 15-00) arriving daylight
next morning. V/ill issue further orders to tanker ~ased
on your intended movements

4.5 0],.44

CO~~SU3PAC

to CTNCPAC - T' d COI\1INCH for action.

In view of questionable value ARGONAUT as a mine-laying

submarine in enemy waters due to great noise of mine gear
and vulnerability of mine tube doors and recognized future
need for co:n.Jination suhmarine raider unit and cargo carrier propose converting to an AP 0 by removing mine racking
equipment welding tu~e door plantes and installing bunking
facilities to Drovide for apnroximately 176 raiders with
equinment. Su1marine now at ya r d due to fuel tank leaks.
Immediate anproval desirerl to effect work viTi thout delay in
Navy Yard. No further extensive alterations or Navy Yard
work than removal mine racks weldins mine tu~e doors and
reballastin~ intended for present

920

~ECRE!f!

September (GCT)

15 1905 CTF 8 to TF 8 Info cor:Il\TCTI,

C~TJC/AC ,

FR~~E 11 'Lc\N,

GRF'-s T LAD.:,
7

DeWITT.

12 B-24's 14 P-38's and 14 P-39's conducted coordinated

low altitude bomlinv and strafing attack on installations
KISKA Harbor and on ships in har)or and vicinity. Results:
2 mine sweeners at s ubmarine net sunk, direct hits and near
misses on 3 large cargo vessels, hits on several small vessels and barges, lar~e fires in camp area and base , 4
fl0at zero fi~hters and 1 enemy Ji"')lane shot down in flames,
1 Jap 4 engined patrol nlane burned on water, 3 submarines
strafed by P-39's with 37 milimeter guns, stores near dock
strafed and exploded, all installations around har~or
repeatedly strafed, total enemy casualties estimated at
about 500, 1 enemy zero and 1 biplane possibly escaped.
Own casualties: 2 P-38's collided in midair and crashed
while attacking zero fighter, both pilots missing. Comtaskforce eight sends. Cominch Cincpac Freeman and Greenslade all for info. Latter please inform DeWitt.
This supplements my 1st report. B3 55 escorted by DALE
and ANDERSON ordered to BLEACHER at 2015 M ( -12). Damage
not serious. About 12 fuel tanks contaminated 120,000
gallons unusable. Leaving heavy oil slick. None killed
2 injured 3 unaccounted for. O'BRIEN ordered BUTTON.
Damage localized forvvard chiefs quarters. No casualties.
1NASP had 8 fighters and 16
scouts in air. Now on HORNET
less 1 scout water landed alon~side DD. Pilot and passenger believed recovered. Para. Will send VvASP planes
"9tJTTON today and recover ITORNB~T 15 scouts now there. Para.
Condition WASP al)out 1800 Id 15 observed from air. Burning
fiercely forward of island and slightly down by JOW with
list to nort. ~elieve ship bein~ abRndoned. Remainder
task force 18 standinR by. Para. ~ill operate north and
east from ~JTTON until comnletion fueling Friday.

921

SEORF3'3? ,

SEP TS1\1BER ( GC T )
19 0225

CTF 8 to CINCPAC Info COMN0 NESTSEAFRON.

1

Comtaskfor 8 answers Cincpac 180215 with Comnowestsea fron info a dee. TAIJBOT now at yard "SROOKS arriving
shortly. Suggest conversion of these 2 ships begin at
once. Will release DENT 3JJI'liPHRBYS SA~IDS WATERS to
nroceed designated ~Nest Coast yard a~out October first
or as soon as possible after arrival LONG CI-Lill'JDLI~R LE1\~BSR
TON. Am sending ELI.JIOT \~'vi th HOHOLULU denarting a bout
3eptember 20th as this DHS in urgent need of structural
repairs to be returned this force on completion overhaul.
~ust also return LAWTIENCE to Coflwestseafro n by October
15th. Am having conference DeWitt BryCKNER tomorrow subject unknown to -me. Completion present nhase FIRE~LACE
operations about end October should reduce cruiser commitment ~ut will comment more fully after conference.
For normal operations consider four modern destroyers
adequate screen for four cruisers so GIU;J:H:R KANE SANDS
can frenuently be made available for escort duty unless
further joint commitments develops for fall and winter.
Copy by hand to Comalsec.

922

r-SEe~E'r

September (GCT)

20 1949

CTF-8 TO CINCPAC COMINCH

Troops cargo debarking AUOM SKP transports at climate
screened by 2 DD since forenoon 19th. Troops cargo
debarked cavern completing occupation. No report yet
as to status of work of construction of fighter field.
Buckner and I agreed task one of Fireplace project
"Seizure and occupation 11 in accordance Joint Chief Staff
directive contained in Cominch 050003 completed. Project now in phase of Task 2. Ar.my forces at Longview
have terminated statoidus task group under my command
and assumed statoidus unit of ADC. Force now at strength
approximately 5,000. My supporting operations air and
surface continue unchanged.

21 0030

CTF-8 TO CINCPAC COMINCH

CTF-8 sends to Cincpac Cominch. Intend repeated low
altitude bombing attacks of Kiska but weather has prevented repetition since September 14th attack. Kiska
harbor now netted on line from north head to south
head prevents for present contemplated MY boat attack
on shipping there.

923

3EvM'l'

SEPTEl\1BER ( GCT)

22" 1002 CO~~~SOPAC to CTF 17, 64, CINCDAC, CT? 62, 63, COr.1TNCH, C3DIV 6.
The following reorganization of Taskforces 17 and 64 is .
effective upon joining of Task Group 66~4 with Task Force
17 and attached units my 201242. Tactical distri )ution of
units V~Th,fO new taskforces will be effected when practicable
as directed by senior task force commander. Afirrn. Task
Force 17 strikin~ force Rear Admiral Murray in HORNET,
VJASHI.._J(j.'J.10N, NORT:r"IA"~''J:PTO~J, DENf' .AC OLA, ATLANTA, SAN DIEGO,
Jl.LD~ATT, Desron 2 less 0' BRIEN plus B:r:~~H.Ai' : , BARTOtJ and 1~EADE.
Baker. Task Force 64 screenin~ and attack force near Admiral
Scott SAN FRANCISCO, 1:IN1\D~A~OLI'"', SALT I.Al{E CITY, CHJ~STER,
BOIS~, TJFLSNA, Desron 12 less VvO OF10RTH nlus ~ICHOLAS.
Absent units will be directed join Taskforces soon as practicable.
to
21 2207 COI'W'IP:FIFORSOPAC, /CO~ r i 1 .JC~1. :IDQP TJS1'.1C, Info CINC?AC, etc.
Amphibious coTihined with .jun["le warfare in South Pacific
shows following. Comamuhforsopac sends. Need for rapid
means to cut trails clear fields of fire and construct field
fortifications in dense undergrowth. Japanese are making
major attacks at night by ruse infiltration and direct
assault. Japanese control is excellent due to effective use
of small portable radio transmitters and receivers which are
much superior to our own. Our yellow painted munitions are
easily suotted by enemy. Aviation bombs are hard to conceal.
Japanese see our bri ~ htly nainted grenades either day or
night and throw them back. Need for reducing_; volwne of
c0nstruction materials to be transported. Para. In view of
foregoing recommend following. Afirm. Provide following
tools each company three dou )le ;)i tted axes, nine heavy duty
pack mattocks, nine heavy duty short handled shovels, six
heavy duty long handled shovels, two post hole di~gers, two
cross cut saws, two dash man. Baker. Dou)le present
allowance brush hooks. Cast. Provide two commercial macheetes
with broad hea)y blade for each souad. Dog. Increase allowance nails assorted by one ton per division. Easy. Provide
trip flares of at least one minute duration and long burning
illuminating urojectiles for use in 60 and 81 millimeter mortars. Fox. Rerylace present Dortable radio transmitters and
receivers with efficient waterproof li~htwei r ht tyne. Ge~rge.
Increase allowance of these radios so platoon leaders have
them. I~p o. Provide efficient nortable receivers for souad
leaders. Inter. El iminate ;rellow, red and other Jricrht
colors. Paint bombs, grenades, fuel drums, and vehicles with
nonreflectinp- paint. Army combat vehicles oaint suita)le
except color should be mettled green. Jig. Provide on~
small -ryortable sawmill with -r;>ower unit per regiment. King.
Double present allowan ce hand carts. l\Iike . Three utility

924

8EGEE'f

SEPT~fl3ER

( GCT)

21 2207 COMJU'f1JHIBFOR~.,onAc

(Continued)

part for second l\lardi v recor:unended as follows. Love. Leave

scout car comnany and one fifty five millimeter howitzer
battalion in United States. Mike. Grouns three and five
eouiljment and nersonal bap;page narticular neuter clothinp; be
reduced to minimum. Negat. Vehicles be only those suitaole
for rou~h terrain no sedans nor station wagans. Option.
Plan for five units of fire fifty days rations accom-)any
troops in landings ~lan ~or eQual amounts as reserve with
second base de T)Ot LONG SOW.
20 2130 CTF 8 to

YONTG 1)'\:_~RY ,

CT'TCPAC, TG 8, "?RUITT,

c ICAHD,

Ri0'1. . Y.

This is CTF 8 Op Order 11-42. Organization . Task Group

8.12. Mike Divis ion 1, PRUITT, .._,ICARD , l :oNTGOMERY, IUVri.SAY.
Information. Own Army Forces have occupied ADAK and ATKA
Islands and are garrisoning and constructing landing fields
thereon. Considera'Jle movement of friendly shipoing including transnorts cargo and submarines vicinity of AL~1)TIAH
Chain. Japanese have seized YI SI:A and ATTU Islands. Enemy
base on KI 0 I\:A Har')or. ~nemy forces in vicinity may include
combatant ships all types nlus land and seaplanes plus
several types auxiliaries. 0ode name LONGVIZ;r fs ADJ\.K, and
CAVERN is ATKA. Plan. IJine designated approaches to
LONGVIEVv and provide antisubmarine screens and escorts as
directed. Task. Mine Division 1 lay mines in approaches to
KULUK Bay in accordance with instructions which will be
received upon arrival LONGVIEW. Provide anti suomarine
coverage and escorts as directed. Proceed LONGVIEN via AMU~TA
PASS, thence through noint 20 miles north of NORTH CAPE
ATK..t\ I 0 LA_ND, thence through point 20 miles north of SVlALLOW
I~A..D on GR~AT qiTKIN IrL4.ND, and thence to LONGVIEi_l.r.
Enter
~JLT~ BAY only through northern entrance and during daylight.
Report arrival I.ONGVIEW via first airnlane returning to
DUTCH HAHlOft or mr. AY:: . Communicatio ns. Accordance Pac 70
excent guard J\T?G Fox instead of TJD~.JI Fox. Maintain strict
radio silence. Obtain standard communication plan LONGVIE-N
and comnly.

925

(GOT)
23 1326 COMSOPAC to COMCUB 1 and 13, COMAIRSOPAC, etc.
The following policy is established relative to the
employment of CUB ACORNS and Naval Construction Battalions
in the VfliiTE POPPY BUTTON CACTUS RINGBOLT areas: {a)
All materials and personnel of CUBS 1 and 13 and construction battalions 6 and 7 now in BUTTON CACTUS RINGBOLT are
available for any one of those bases. ACORN ONE less its
construction battalion will be landed at BUTTON and will
be available for same bases. Decision as to priorities of
needs , between those bases as effects aviation construction,
facilities' and operations is a ~ function of Comairsopac.
(c) Option ACOR~ ONE on arrival report to CG BUTTON under
principl~ -unity of command as CO Naval Advanced Base
BUTTON. (b) CO CUB 13 designated as CO Base Construction
Depot WHITE POPPY which includes materials and personnel
of CUBS 1 and THIRTEEN now at WHITE POPPY and the construction battalion accompanying ACORN ONE. This depot will
be employed for construction of WHITE POPPY base. (c) In
general additional construction material and personnel sent
this area will be received by the Base Construction Depot
WHITE POPPY and will be available for movement forward by
increments as needed, however present and future needs of
personnel and material and extent of unloading facilities
and congestion -of port will be factors in deciding the port
of debarkation of future shipments. Advanced areas will
advise Comsopac as to requirements not available at BUTTON
or in ACORN ONE. My 072206 modified to accord with above.
Acti on COMCUBONE,CO~~IRSOPAC, COMGEN CACTUS, COMGEN BUTTON.
COMCUB 13 has by hand for action. Anderson pass to COM
ACORN ONE for action. Action addees acknowledge by airmailgram. Following have by hand for info COMSERONSOPAC,
COMGENSOPAC, COMAMPHIBSOPAC.
23 1251 COMSOPAC to VICEOPNAV, CINCPAC, Into COM 12 COMSERONPAC,
BUDOCKS.
WHITE POPPY has of necessity become extremely active and
congested port. Unloading handling storing and housing
facilities totally inadequate or non existent. Urgent
requirement of extreme importance to present operations is
equipment to get large quantities of cargo from ship to
shore. Request earliest possi i)le shipment of following
it:em.s robbing all available LION CUB ACORN or other stocks
with immediate shinment of availa ~Jle items. Twenty self
propelled barges of each of three sizes 50 ton, 100 ton
and 250 ton. After cargo congestion of this port has been
relieved some of the s e barges will be moved forward. All
barges desired selfpropelled type. 20 wharf units five by
(Continued on next page)

92 6

~~e~~

September (GCT)

23 1251 COMSOPAC (Continued)

twelve standard. 20 bridge units. 12 five ton truck

spares. 12 five ton crawler cranes. 6 fifteen ton
crawler cranes. 20 five ton dumn trucks. 40 ten wheel
trucks ten nicku~ trucks. 20 jeeps auarter ton. Five
5 ton EYSTER trucks. Two automotive repair shops. Two
floating ~ile drivers complete. Piles lumber and hardware
for foray by 500 foot pier with 60 foot piles. All above
items to be complete with auxiliary equipment tools spare
parts with two sets of general hand tools. Of aJove items
pontoon and weight handling equipment will be of greatest
immediate -usefulness.
23 2249 CINCPAC to COMINCH, COMDT MARCORPS, Info COMSOPAC, OPNAV, etc.

Concur recommendations Comamphi .1 forsopac 212207 except

leaving 155 mm howitzer battalion in u.s. Although immediate operations do not require this artillery because
enemy had not yet consolidated his positions future operations against defended places will beyond doubt require
powerful artillery. 155 mm should be in area when needed.

927

~CRE'P

SEPT]MBER (GOT)
24 2311 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSWPAC, CTF 17 62 63 64.
Ghormley sends. Operations 24th. 4 enemy DDs attacked by
8 SBDs 150 miles northwest GUADALCANAL. No d~~ge, 1215
L (-11) 24th bombed ,enemy transports SHORTLAND Island and
TONOLEH HAR~OR with B17s. 22 enemy vessels including CL
there. Ceiling 15,000 feet. Three hits 6 near hits. 20
enemy fi~hting planes defended. 1 sure 3 possibly shot
down. On GUADALCANAL 23rd extended ground patrols indicate
no enemy vicinity position except stragglers. 1 Jan killed
1 prisoner. Continued air strafing TASSAFRONGAr't.o SAPURU.
Carpender pass to MacArthur. 23rd 1 of 5 single engines
single float planes at Manning Strait attacked Bl7 and was
shot down, Bombed! REKATA with incendiaries and 100 pound
bombs.

25 1456

COMSOPAC TO COMINCH COMSWPACFOR CTF 62-17-63-64 CINCPAC

Operations 25th. On Guadalcanal 24th 1 battalion on extended patrol made co:n.tact 4 miles to south of position
at sunset. Fighting continued into night when enemy withdrew~
Our losses 7 dead 25 wounded. Enemy losses not
yet reported. 4 enemy DDs towing landing boats were
attacked by 2 SBDs 2100 L (-11) 24th. Despite repeated
attacks by other SBDs and TBFs enemy ships continued
toward Guadalcanal until 0130 when within 8 miles Cape
Esperance were turned away. Damage unknovm. Rekata Bay
24th B-17 encountered 3 float zeros one type 95 single
float seaplane. Latter shot down. Carpender pass to
MacArthur.

25 - 1950

CTF-8 to TF-8 info CINCPAC COMINCH etc.

Reconnaissance Chichagof Harbor and Holtz Bay by B-24 on
22 and 23 September drew no gun fire from either place
planes flying a.s low as 200 feet. No vessels in harbor
no sign of life ashore. Pilot reports installations
between Chichacof and Holts have been abandoned. No guns
observed in emplacements. Photographs verified this observation and in addition show dock in Chichagof Harbor
has been removed. Original houses of village remain.
These observations indicate that the Japanes have abandoned Attu. The presenne of light mine layers recently
at Attu indicate the possibility that harbors have been
mined. Action of enemy probably influenced by the vulnerability of small outlying garrisons. Have issued
orders to destroy the remaining buildings and installations on Attu. This from CTF-8. NPM pass to Cincpac
and NSS pass to Cominch both for info.

928

-BECRET -

SEPTEMBER

~CT)

26 0434

COMSOPAC TO CG POPPY INFO CINCPAC COMINCH etc.

For action CG Poppy info CG Sopac CG White Poppy
Comgenser onsopac and Captain DudlJy have by hand.
Comsopac sends. Captain Roy Dudley is herewith temporarily designated as Commanding Officer US Naval
Advanced Base 'lhite Poppy will reportto CG Poppy for
this duty under principal of unity of command and
will proceed with the organizati on and developme nt
of the base which is to include the following naval
shore activities in the port area port directors office,
Base constructi on depot, Receiving Station, Naval
supply depot, Naval aviation supply depot, naval
ammunitio n depot, Mobile hospital, section base, Naval
radio station, Radio material office, Public Works
Office, Fleet post office, Naval dispensary andother
naval activities that may be assigned.

26 0645

CTF-8 TO CINCPAC COMINCH

CTF-8 sends. Considera ble increased activity at Kiska
many large ships in the harbor one large ship probably
submarine tender observed south of the island. Cause
this increased activity not yet apparent. Am intensifying offensive air and submarine operation and tightening coverage Fireplace while increasing scouting
observatio n until enemy intentions are determine d.

929

SEett"E'r-

SEP'i'EMBER ( GCT)
26 1256 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, COMSOWESPAC, CTF 17 62 63 64, COMINCH.
Operations 26th. REKATA BAY 25th Bl? strafed beach silencing 2 machine gun emplacements damaging 1 single engine
float Bi-plane on water. Same day TONOLEI HARBOR 2 Bl7's
bombed ships. Believe 1 500 pound bomb hit stern CA. In
harbor 15 miles southeast BUKA PASSAGE 1 Bl? bombed 3 ships.
Believe 1 500 pound hit stern AV. TONO~I HARBOR 25th Bl7
saw 12 single engine float biplanes and float zeros. Shot
down 3 in flames. Another probably. GUADANCANAL 25th
extensive air and ground patrolling continued. Area from
KOLI POINT to MATANIKOU RIVER free of enemy forces. All
approaches and entire coastline covered by air search
from 1500 to 0130 L (-11) 26th but no contact. VBCOGE
area bombed. Ghormley sends. Carpender pass to Mac~thur.
26 1259 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, VICE OPNAV.
Recommend decision as to location of South Pacific advanced base depot be :deferred as situation is changing too
rapidly. SUVA not favored as administration would be
difficult. An emergency advanced base denot is being set
up at WHITE POPPY for CUB materials which could not be
delivered at forward bases. Vice Opnavs 241938 is the despatch on which this is comment.
26 1302 COMINCH to CINCPAC, Info COM 12, COMGENDEFFOR SAMOAN GROUP, etc
Consider that Ar.my and Marine units which may be moved up
to forward positions should receive Amphibious training.
Anticipate establishing limited number of Amphibious training groups (as equipment and personnel become available) in
key locations in central and South Pacific areas, each to
consist of 1 .standard landing craft unit organized as
directed Cominch serial 00811 of August 16 1942. Should
you concur, suggest locate .your groups as follows, STRAW,
FANTAN or WHITE POPPY, SPOONER, and COPPER.
Training
groups in South Pacific Area under general control of Comamphforsopac. War Department concurs in above plan and
suggested locations. Advise. Comsopac pass to C of S
US Army (Sopac Theater) for info.
26 2020 CTF 8 to TF 8, Info COMWESTSEAFRON, COMINCH, CINCPAC, etQ.
Comtaskfor 8 sends. 15 bombers and 28 pursuit attacked
KISKA September 25. Preliminary results as reported by
PBY: 1 AK left burning, 1 seaplane fighter shot down and
6 out of 10 seaplane fighters destroyed on water. Photo
KISKA HAR~R show 2 AK's or AP's, 2 minelayers. 8 smaller
craft and many motor launches. Amplifying report will be .
made when full particulars are known here.

930

.. sli:c~~

SEPTEMBER (GCT)
26 2330 CTF 8 to TF 8, Info COMINCH, CINCPAC, COM 12, Eto.
Comtaskforce 8 262020 amplified. 9 B-24's took part in
attack with 11 P-39's and 17 P-40's, 1 B-17 and 1 B-24
photo shiPs. Report hits on 1 transport 2 submarines
strafed, 1 float nlane shot down and from 5 to 8 float
planes out of 20 oaue,ht on surface. Shore installations
strafed. Enemy casualties estimated 150. Only minor
damage to our planes. 2nd attack attempted in afternoon
forced to turn back due to weather. 3 B-24's bombed shore
installations on previous day. Extent of damage to enemy
unknown. Stations addressed deliver locally for info to
Cominch, Cincpac, Admirals Greenslade and Freeman and SanFran
also to General DeWitt.

27 1436

COMSOPAC TO COMINCH CINCPAC COMSWPAC CTF 64 63 62 17.

Operations 27th. 26th 8 B-17s struck shipping Faisi
Shortland. 1 large AP hit heavily left burning probably
sunk. 1 CA hit on stern left afire. 3 float zeros and
3 float biplanes shot down. B-17 on patrol at Faisi
attacked by 4 float zeros. 1 damaged forced land in
water. B-17 on patrol Rekata Bay strafed single engine
float biplane on beach .26th small enemy force was contacted west Matanikau river. Was being encircled morning 27th. Patrols on Florida killed 9 captured 3.
Ghormley sends. Carpender pass to MacArthur. 27th at
Guadalcanal 1355 Love (-11) 18 Jap bombers escorted by
13 fighters were engaged by our fighters. Enemy losses
4 bombers 5 fighters. All our planes returned. 1 SBD
on ground destroyed.

28 1326 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC COMSWPAC, CTF 62 63 64 17.

Operations 28th. While on patrol 27th .plane shot down 1
single float bi9lane 35 miles south GIZO. Same day B-17
near NAT~NAGA ISlAND attacked by Jap seaplane. Ghormley
sends. Carpender pass to MacArthur. GUADALCANAL had its
49th air raid 28th. 25 Jap bombers 18 zeros at 1345. Our
fighters intercepted. Japs jettisoned bombs. Jap losses
23 bombers 1 zero. Our . losses no pilots no planes no damage.

931

S!:CRE'l'

SEPTEMBER (GCT)
29 1226 C6MSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSWESPAC, CTF 17 62 63 64.
Operations 29th. On GUADALCANAL during night 26th-27th
enemy reinforced his position at MATANIKAU. Operations
continuing at last report but enemy not yet dislodged.
Ghormley sends. Carpender pass to MacArthur. Air operations impeded bad weather.
30 0030 CTF 8 to TF 8, COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMGEN WDC, COMNESTSEAFRON,etc

Attack on KISKA Sept 27th by 6 B 24's: Dropped 48 500 pound

bombs from altitude of 1 to 3000 feet on ships in harbor and
shore installations, shot down 1 float zero, no further
damaged reports as yet, no losses, most AA fire received
from ships in harbor. Also 27th Sept 3 bombers attacked
enemy transport and destroyer 100 miles north KEMICHI, near
misses in stern causing transport to stop. Night attack
on KISKA 28 September by 8 B24's supported by 17 fighters:
4 float zeros shot. down, 1 submarine reported sunk with
500 pound bomb, hits and near misses by 8 500 pound bombs
on 1 transport considered badly damaged and sinking, all
bombing at 5000 feet, 64 500 pound bombs dropped on ships
and shore installations, AA opposition stronger than on
previous attack, our losses one P 39 down at sea 5 miles
southeast LITTLE KISKA pilot believed lost, one B-24
hydraulic system damaged by gun fire andcracked up on
landing 1 of crew slightly wounded, 3 destroyers left KISKA
harbor during attack. 2nd attack launched 1058 W (olus 10)
no reports as yet. Catalina dropped 2 chargee 28th alongside small enemy freighter 50 miles north of BULDIR with
possible damage to freighter. Also 28th September bombers
burned and photographed ATTU village no opposition however
weather plane reported being fired on from ATTU, no amplifying report but possible indication presence of lookout
station.

932

.~i:QHE'f"

SEPTEMBER ( GCT)

30 2335

CTF-8 TO TF-8 INFO CINCPAC COMINCH COM-14 etc.

Comtaskfor 8 amplified report of operations 28 Sept.
3 B-24s destroyed with thermite bombs all buildings
Attu village except church, heavy explosions among
houses during fire, bombers then dropped 4 thermite
bombs astradle freighter north of Buldir Island also
strafed ship silencing AA guns. 5 B-24s supported by
16 fighters in afternoon attack on Kiska bombed shipping
at 9000 feet, near misses, no interception, no battle
damage. 3 B-24s bombed freighter north of Sirius Point
at 1 to 4000 feet, near misses. Observation south of
Kiska reports tents, stores, excavation, auxiliary
vessel and boat in Gertrude Cove, encountered 37mm fire.
No morning mission 29th due to weather. Deliver locally
to Cominch Cincpac Freeman and Greenslade all for info.
Latter to inform Dewitt. Buckner has by hand.

30 1022

COMAMPHFORSOPAC TO BUSHIPS OPNAV INFO CINCPAC COMINCH Etc.

This is part 1 of Comamphforsopac 301030. Following
despatches not to all addees are referenced. Comtransgroupsopac 232350 August. Buships 022231. RDO Washington 032120. Com 12 230120. My 232249, 250607 and 290604.
Incident to operations August September following landing craft have been left at bases Cactus Ringbolt Button
Fetlock and are necessary to their operation maintenance
and support: Tank lighters 26 tare roger 55 tare 74.
Due weather and enemy action others have been damaged
beyond repair. Replacement boats actually received
form negligible proportion of above total. In addition
to actual existing deficiency of approximately 150 boats
(33 percent) in 18 ships of transgroups boat engines
and spare parts are being depleted at an alarming rate.
This due to continuous necessity utilize large number
boats in loading unloading and shifting cargo without
dock or adequate water transport and lack boat repair
and maintenance facilities at forward bases.

30 1030

Part two. Some boats not operatable due lack of necessary engine parts. This force as a whole therefore
not now ready for large scale task by reason boat
deficiencies. Para none of references indicate any
replacement tank lighters enroute this area and this
type is essential. Para previous request have been to
small and have failed to envision past present and prospective needs. Para in additlon to replacement existing
deficiency of 150 landing craft, replacement plans should
provide starter stock 50 percent spare boats latter to
be increased to 100 percent within next 6 months plus
additional numbers for training pools. Corresponding
increase in repair and maintenance facilities afloat and
at bases this area also required. Para request this be
threated as urgent requisition and that movement boats 9 33
and parts to this force be expedited. End.

ggQRBT ...

OCTOBER ( GCT)

01 0454

COMSOPAC TO COMINCH INFO CINCPAC OPNAV.

Request acorns 3 and 4 be shipped to White Poppy. Cominch
172240. Recommend plans be held in abeyance for shipment
to Sopac area of remaining 4 acorns. Request 1 complete
Yards and Docks component of Cub including 1 construction
battalion be sent to White Poppy. Lion components depend
on approval of projects for spooner but the current importance of bases in spooner has decreased and White
Poppy development is of the greatest urgency in view of
extremely limited shore facilities. Critical items are
equipment for unloading and weight handling, water
transportation, tugs, and spare parts for all such equipment. Following additional recommendations are also in
answer to Vice Opnav 241725 regarding escort vessels.
For major maintenance base Auckland directive for which
has been issued by Opnav recomnend surface ship repair
component of Lion including also 1 flating drydock ARD 2
type. For voyage repairs Borabora Samoa Tongatabu and
Noumea recommend repair facilities equivalent to an AD
plus an ART 2 dock at Tongatabu. Vice Opnav letter
020803 August 17 not received.

934

-8E CftE'fL-

OCTOBER ( GCT)'
30 1300 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, COMSWPAC, COMINCH, MacARTHUR, TG 62.6, etc.
Operations 30th. On GUADALCAJ~AL during 28th and 29th continued patrol activity but no contact. Enemy remains in
occupation MITANIKAU line. FLORIDA patrol killed five Japs
at HAROVO. No casualties our patrol. 29th at 1400 love (-11}
about 20 zeros followed by small group bombers approached from
northwest. One squadron our fighters intercepted zeros.
Bombers jettisoned northwest SAVO and fled. Two zeros probably
four shot down. Our loss one plane one pilot. 30th ALHENA
reports being torpedoed while returning from CACTUS Lat 10-47
south long 161-16 east. Shaft sprung. NAVAJO enroute to tow
her. Ghormley sender Carpender pass to MacARTIIDR.

01 1716 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSOWESPAC, CTF 17 62 63 64.

Fires started Jap gasoline storage REKATA BAY 30th by 9
quarter ton bombs. Operations first. 29th GUADALCANAL patrol
activity only. No ground contact. Search planes destroyed
2 float biplanes bombed AA installations REKATA Bay. 4 enemy
boats landing supplies VISALE a't ta.cked by our search planes
later by P-400's and SBD's. P-400's bombed strafed enemy
trucks and troops near KOKUMBONA. Yesterday's report air
action GUADALCANAL should read 4 shot down prooably 6.
GHORMLEY sends. Carpender pass to MacARTHUR. GUADALCANAL
30th usual patrols. SBD's . attacked REKATA BAY damaging 2
float planes and burning dump. SBD's and P-400's attacked
supply dump ~OKUMBONA and TENARU. No plane losses.
01 2100

CTF-8 TO TF-8 INFO COMINCH CINCPAC COMWES & NORWES SEAFRON

Attack on Kiska September 30th made by 9 B-24s at altitude
of 15000 ft. Photographs show one possible two direct hits
one near miss on transport left burning. Three fires started
in camp area. AA fire heavy but inaccurate. One bomber
attacked by two pursuits. No damage to own planes. September 29th photo ship dropped bombs at low level and strafed
deck of small cargo ship which was bombed 28th north of Attu.
No opposition or sign of life. Possibly abandoned. Photos
taken. Comtasfor 8 sends. NSS pass to Cominch. NPM to
Cincpac. NPC to Comnorwestseafrontier and NPG to Comwestseafron.

01 0812

COMSOPAC TO COMINCH INFO CINCPAC.

Comsopac replying to Cominch 181F36. Carrier.task forces have
now used White Poppy as replenishment anchorage on two accasions.
Carrier anchored Great Road just inside anti torpedo net
cruisers generally berthed Dumbea Bay due necessity use Great
Road berths to facilitate unloading cargo ships with limited
dock and barge facilities. Only one berth inside Great Road
feasible for carrier or battleship. Dumbea Bay affords large
number BAT shi ps berths satisfact9ry except no underwater
protection. Mat e rial on hand for 2 individual anti torpedo
nets not yet nrepared for use due employment net detail in-

935

-SECRET

OCTOBER (GCT)

01 0812

(Continued)
stalling Great Road and Little Entrance nets. 2 nets
on hand expected ready within 2 weeks. Following underwater defense equipment requires to make safe anchorage
for single carrier task force.A.mate rial for 3 additional
individual anti torpedo nets. B. Sound equipped gate
barges to detect sub attempting entry behind ship. C.
Small craft sound equipped to patrol in vicinity of loop.
Simultaneous use of White Poppy as replenishmen t anchorage by 2 carrier task groups not considered advisable.

30 0049Z

C OF S

AR1[f TO CG HAWDEPT INFO CINCPAC.

397/29th - To provide amphibious training for units your

command in pre~aration for possible assumption offensive
action in Pacific, Cominch contemplates dispatching your
area one standard landing craft unit capable of transporting reinforced infantry battalion (Cominch dispatch
261302 NCR 9532). Your comments desired on the following
plan for establishmen t of amphibious training center: 1.
Initial location on Island of Hawaii with a view to giving
training to units of 27th division without unnecessarily
interfering with accomplishme nt of assigned mission. 2.
Movement of training center or combat units so as to
provide rotational training of all divisions your command
for Hawaiian Department (signed 1~rshall). 3. Amphibiously
trained units echeloned forward as needed for offensive
action. 4. Forces echeloned forward to be replaced by
mainland units which will in turn be trained in amphibious
and jungle warfare. Complexity of defensive organization
on island of Oahu fully appreciated by war department.
However, deemed necessary to train 24th and 25th divisions
with view toward their possible utilization elsewhere on
offensive missions and assumption their present functions
by less well trained division. Priority radio reply
desired to include requirements in Army boat and shore
units necessary to augment navy landing craft unit to
provide training on scale you feel essential. Marshall.

936

'-SBGRE'il_

OCTOBER (GCT)

02 1436

COMSOPAC TO CTFs 17,62,63,64 CINCPAC COMINCH COMSOWESPAp

Sopac operations. October 1st 5 SBDs 5 TBFs from GUADALCANAL attacked 4 Jap DDs lat 09-05 s, Long 158-05 E, at
1900 L (-11). 1 DD damaged left dead in water. 3 TBFs
failed return. Ghormley sends. Carpender pass to I~c
Arthur.

02 2025

CTF-8 to TF 8 info CINCPAC COMINCH etc.

7 B-24s from 15,000 feet bombed seaplane base and other

installations Kiska Harbor and main camp wtih incendiary and demolition bombs during morning October one.
Fires observed. Photos taken. Enemy shipping evidently
now being routed well north of Kiska and close to track
of Russian ships. From CTF-8. Stations addressed
deliver locally to Cominch Cincpac West and Norwest Sea
Frontier Comdrs and Comgen West Def Command.
02 2120

COMINCH TO CINCPAC INFO CTF 8 COMWEST & NORWEST SEAFRON

If you are not an addressee do not decode further.
Dewitt and Theobald have agreed on the following garrisons: (A) Adak about 11,000 including 2 regimental
combat teams 1 regiment AA artillery 15 light tanks
8 155mm guns and 8 105mm or 75mm field guns. (B) Tanaga
about 4,000 including 1 battalion infantry reinforced
2 batteries auto weapons AA 4 155mm CA guns and 4 105mm
or 75mm field guns. Para 2 War department considers it
impracticable at this time to increase present commitments to 11th air force which are 30 heavy bombers 40
medium bombers and 155 fighters. Pars 3 The chief of
Staff Army and I consider that under present circumstances the aforementioned forces are adequate for area
in question.

03 1356

COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMSWPAC, CTF 62, 6 3,64,17.

Daily dope. S.opac operations. GUADALCANAL 1st October
only one ground contact. One prisoner. P-400's and
artillery straffed small hostile groups from KOKUM BUNA
to VISALE. Eostile plane over GUADALCANAL 2130 Love (-11).
3 more at 0405 love 2nd. Dropped few bombs igniting gas
dump. 80 foot boat with antenna and radio equipment .
straffed set on fire by B-17's reconnaissance at GREENWICH ISLAND. Reconnaissance planes REKATA BAY 2nd dropped
ten 100 pounders. Large explosion in palm grove. October
2nd usual ground patrols. No contact. One prisoner. 30
zeros followed by small group bombers our area at 1310
no bombs dropped four zeros shot down. Our losses 6
fighters four ~ilots. One SBD landed in water. Gunner

937

"SECRET-

OCTOBER (GCT)

03 1356 COMSOPAC (Conninue d).

resscued pilot killed. Two SBD's failed to return search.
Single hostile plane over area at 2100 and 0430. Japs
attacked by P-400 at NARABO, TENARO, KOKID~ and POINT CRUZ.
Crews of three TBF's lost on first reported rescued. Morning search disclosed large group enemy landing boats well
camouflage d inside VIRU repeat VIRU HARBOR south coast NFN
G~ORGIA.
On afternoon third 9 enemy DD one CA sighted
northwest of CACTUS. 7 SBD and TBF attacked cruiser and 2
DD lat 08-32 south long 158-15 east at 1715 love with no
apparent dama~e. Ship.s observed to continue on course 120
speed 30 until 1800. Ghormley sends. Carpender pass to
MacARTHUR.
03 2010 11 B-24's and 6 P-39's attacked KISKA HARBOR and installa-tions morning of October 2nd. 25 1,000 demolition bombs
dropped from 10,000 feet on 2 cargo ships, no direct hits
observed. 71 500 pound demolition oombs dropped in camp
area, hits throughou t area, direct hit on hangar at seaplane
ramp. 1 Jap biulane destroyed by B-24, 4 zero float fighters
shot down by P-39's. Our losses 2 killed in head on attack.
AA fire heavier and more accurate than usual particula rly
from north HEAD. Shore stations deliver info copies. NSS
to eominch NPM to Cincpac NPC to Comnowes tseafron. NPG to
Comweseaf ron and Comgen WDC.
05 0211 COMSOVVESPACFOR to COMINCH Info CINCPAC, COMSUBSOWESPAC.
Plans now developed advance base EXMOUTH GULF with further
plans move bases northward soon as nossible. Part 2 from
Comsowesp acfor action Cominch Info Cincpac Comsubsow espac.
2 vessels Subdiv 201 have reported Cincpac and last 2 vessels this division depart SUN~C about 19th October. Recommend as follows (A) Complete transfer to Southwest Pacific
Force of Subron 6 and 8 total 24 submarines as proposed in
Cincpac Serial 0192 of 26 August. (B) Transfer Subdivs 21,
22 and 202 in exchange accordance schedule proposed same
reference . (C) Retain 3 tenders (PELIAS, HOLLAND and

GRIFFIN) in Southwest Pacific area. HOLLAND to be transferred Cincpac in exchange for FULTON at date to be determined
later. (D) In addition retain Subdiv 53 (6 S type subs) until
additiona l division fleet submarine s arrives to relieve
them. (E ) Complete assignmen t at least 30 fleet submarine s
this area at earliest date. This number to be increased to
36 soon thereafte r as possible.

938
I

-~CRfl'I'~

OCTOBER ( GCT)
05 0150 COMSOWESPACFOR to COMINCH Info CINCPAC, COiviSUBSOWESPAC.
Cominch Serial 00928 of 6 September 1942. Minimum 30
fleet subs plus 3 tenders required this area to comply with
the provisions above reference as applied Southwest Pacific
Area. 20 Fleet submarines plus 2 tenders inadequate.
Minimum 12 subs plus 1 tender required adobe to support
offensive operations in the Solomon area where major Jap
forces and effort now concentrated. Reference ComSWPacFor
160419 of Sept in which Cominch concurs by his 161345.
This action Cominch info Cincpac Comsubsowespac. from Comsowespacfor. Consider Griffin plus docking facilities
adobe capable cope with all logistic and repair problems
except major overhaul and modernization. Minimum 16 subs
plus 2 tenders required cover major supply routes Indo
china Philippines plus strategic shipment routes by blocade
runners to and fro~ Europe. Completion marine railway
Pinafore where 1st sub just docked gives equal facilities
that port as Adobe. Part 2 follows.

OJ ..22.01

~ COMGEN

-1-s.t MARDIV to COMSOPAC Info COMAIRSOPAC, CTF 62.

No ground contact. 15 landing boats attacked at VIRU HARBOR.

All destroyed or damaged. 30 zeros overhead at 1300. 7
Grummans made contact shooting down 9 certain 1 probable.
AA shot down 2 certain 1 probable when 3 zeros attempted
strafe field. Our losses 1 Grumman pilot rescued. Jap
bombers following zeros turned back 85 miles CACTUS. 9
DDs 1 CA sighted 1500 by evening search Lat 08-30 South
Long 158-20 East. Force protected by over 20 zero land
planes. Striking force attacking 1715 opposed only by float
biplane. No hits. Ships attacked during nippt. 1 hit on
CA near SAVO 3 DDs at 1'IARAVO VO , 3 at VI SALE, 3 at TASKAFORONGA believed unloading troops and supplies. All were attacked but damage unknown. 1 SBD failed to return. Scattered bombing during night by single Jap ~lanes. Hostile
groups totaling 7 DD 1 CA heading Northwest picked up Qy
morning search 120 miles CACTUS. Speed 20. CA smoking at
stern. Our planes now on strike.
05 2030 CTF 8 to TF 8, CG ALASYJi DEF, RDO

~RERffiRTON,

SAN FRMJ,

etc.

Comtaskfor 8 summary action Oct. )rd. Six B-24's supported by

4 P-J8's 8 P-39's in attack on KISKA. 5 bombers concentrated
on hangar and camp area drouped ei~hty 100 pound incendiaries
and 12 500 uound demolition bombs from 10 to 11000 feet observed hits- on tar get. One bomber dropped 5 1000 pound bombs
on cargo ship beached near TROUT LAGOON results unobserved.
Our fi ghters shot down six twin float Jap fighters 5 at 16000
feet and one which attacked bombers. AA fire light and inaccurate. All our planes returned without damage. Shipping
observed KISKA one medium AK bea ched one mile West South Head.
One large AK beached near TROUT LAGOON. One medium M~ West of
(Continued on next page)

939

r~O~~
v

05 2030 CTF 8 (Continued )

North Head. Two small DDs patrolling entrance. One AK

second cove West ~IN ROCKS. One AK off REYNARD cove.
Enemy planes dropped 39 bombs on LONGVIEW at 0400 W (plus 10)
no damage. Info radio stations pass to following local commands for info Cominch, Cincpac, Comnorwe sseafron, Comgen ~DC
and Comwessea fron.
05 1226

MacARTHUR
COMSOPAC TO COMINCH CINCPAC COMSWPAC CTF 17,62,63,6 4 info/

Sopac operation s. Guadalcan al 3rd no ground contact. 15

Jap landing barges at Viru harbor New Georgia attacked by
our planes. All destroyed or damaged. 30 zeros overhead
1300 (-11) 3rd. 7 Grummans contacked shot down 9 certain
1 probable. AA shot down 2 certain 1 probable when zeros
attempted strafe field.
Our losses 1 plane pilot saved.
Jap bombers followed zeros turned back 85 miles from Guadalcanal. Jap ships consisting -1 CA 9 DDs landed reinforce ments during night 3rd - 4th. Our planes attacked throughout night. Reported 1 hit CA near Savo. 1 SBD failed return. Enemy ships found by morning search 120 miles northwest Guadalcan al. Consisted 1 CA smoking at stern 7 DDs.
Ghormley sends. Carpender pass to MacArthur . Striking
force after them secured 2 torpedo hits on CA. During 4th
October 2 small ground contacts along Matanikau . Jap
losses 2 killed 3 wounded 1 prisoner. No marine casualtie s.
SBDs and ~-400s attacked Jap installati ons West Cape Tagura
Point.
06 2114

CTF-17 TO COMSOPAC INFO CTF 62,63,64 COMINCH CINCPAC etc.

Results of attack Buin Faisi Tonolei area 5 October.
Originato r CTF 17. 16 fighters 18 dive bombers 15 torpedo
planes participa ting. Dropped 8 1000 pound bombs 32 500
pound bombs. Extremely unfavorab le weather prevented remainder attacking . Hits as follows. 1000 pounders 1 heavy
cruiser 1 transport. 500 pounders 10,000 ton cargo 1 seaplane tender 1 cargo. Near misses 1 1000 pound and 3 500
pound on heavy cruiser. Remainder unobserve d. In addition
put 3 1000 pound bombs on runway and buildings Kieta field.
Shot down 1 zero seaplane and 1 float type seaplane in
target area. Strafed 10 4 engine seaplanes on water at
Faisi believe 4 sunk. Strafed 1 cruiser and . l destroyer
in Shortland harbor. Du ring TF retiremen t fighter combat
patrol destroyed 2 twin: engine type 97 Mitsubish i bombers.
All aircraft _recovered . No damage no losses this force.

94 0

-SE.aRE'f' -

OCTOBER (GCT)

06 1410 COll:t.SOPAC to CINCPAC, COMINCH,. COMSVlPAC, CTF 17,62, 63,64 ,MacArthu ,

Sopac operations. B-17s on strike morning 5th turned back
by weather. One plane p.enetrated to BUKA bombing parking
area. Twenty 100 lb bombs. Planes on ground reported
damaged. Eighty eight 100 pound bombs dropped on GIZO. No
observed results. REKATA BAY attacked by eight planes from
GUADALCANAL morning fifth. One small plane and motor launch
destroyed in water. Two of six enemy planes shot down.
Beach bombed and strafed. Ghormley sends. Carpender pass
to MacArthur. One SBD forced down SANTA ISABEL. Prep four
hundreds attacked boats and installations TASSAFARONGA and
MAROVOVO during day fifth. Enemy force six dog dogs approaching from north west were attacked throughout night
fifth - sixth. One DD sunk and one reported damaged first
attack. Two TBF failed return from night search. Usual
ground patrols GUADALCANAL. Several small contacts in
MATANIKAU RIVER area. Our casualties one killed six wounded.
Jap losses exceed 10 killed.
07 2025 CTF 8 to TF 8 Info CINCPAC, COMINCH, CONITvSEAFRON, etc.
Oct 6th attack on KISKA by 8 B-24s supported by 10 P-39s and
8 P-38s. Bombing from 10 to 12,000 feet with 500 lb demolition bombs, 28 on hangar area, 33 on GERTRUDE COVE camp area,
8 on large AK in harbor, 12 on large AK and corvette in
GERTRUDE COVE. Pursuit strafing harbor area set fire to
one of 5 zero float planes on water damaged another also
damaged radio station, reported shiu in harbor on fire and
sinking also fire in camp area as result of bombing. All
planes returned with minor damage to 1 B-24 and 1 P-39.
Reconnaissance ATTU and AGATTU showed no signs of any enemy
occupation. This is from CTF 8. NSS pass to Cominch NPM
pass to Cincpac. ~~C pass to Comnorwestseafron NPG pass to
Comwestseafron and CGADC repeat CGADC.
09 0125

CINCPAC to COMINCH
Details of additional information urdis 071630 on existing
situation between Military and Naval Governors SAMOA not
available nor even brought to attention Cincpac. On basis
first hand information obtained from officer temporarily at
PEAHL from SAMOA believe existing situation requires no change
in recommendations made my serial 0202W of Sept 6. Only known
basis of unsatisfactory situation is that present Naval Governor does not have unrestricted prestige and authority of his
predecessors. As in IiAWAII this condition follows logically
from present military situation and unavoida:Jle during emer-.
gency. Believe it undesirable to add civil administrative
duties to military governor who is also in command of combatant
troops and should be free to move to another area at a moments
notice. My recommendati ons to specific changes proposed are
negat ive to Afirm Baker and Cast. If my recommendations are
approved will issue instructions to both governors with view
to clarifying situation.
9 41

~OHET

OCTOBER (GCT)

07 1246 COMSOPAC to COMINCH CINCPAC

1

COMclOWESPAC, CTF 17, 62, 6 3, 64.

Sopac operations. Morning 5th in extremely unfavorable

weather Task Force 17 struck BlJIN~FAISI-TONOLEI area with
16 fighters 18 dive bombers 15 torpedo planes , dropping 8
1000 pound bombs 32 500 nound bombs. Hits reported: 1000
pounder each on CA and AP. 500 pounders on 10000 ton cargo
ship, seaplane tender, cargo shin. Near misses with 1000
uounder and 3 500 uounder on CA. Remainder unobserved.
Also dropped 3 1000 pounders on runways and buildings
KIETA. Shot down 1 zero seaulane 1 float type seaplane
in target area. Straffed 10 4 engine seaplanes. Later
believed 4 sunk. Strafed 1 cruiser 1 DD SHORTLAND HARBOR.
During Taskforce retirement fighter patrol shot down 2
twin engine type Mitsubishi bombers. No losses no damage
our forces. Ghormley sends. Car9ender pass to 1IacArthur.
Jap SS was attacked by our patrol plane with 4 depth bombs
at 0850 love (-11) 6th Lat 11-22 south long 162-20 east.
Oil and bubbles appeared. On GUADALCAtTAL 6th active patrolling continued. No contacts on ground. P-400's bombed
strafed probable enemy uositions vicinity KOKIDJBONO. Air
striking. force located 3 returning hostile DD's 225 miles
northwest GUADALCANAL morning 6th. Did not attack due
heavy enemy fighter coverages.
10 0150 CTF 8 to TF 8 Info CINCPAC, COMINCH,

COMr~ENALADEF,

etc.

Comtaskforce 8 sends summary offensive air operations

against KISKA Oct 8th. 6 B-24's, 2 B-17's supported by
12 P-J8's at altitude of 3400 feet dropped 12 500 lb
demolition bombs and 57 incendiary bombs on camp area
starting at least 3 fires. Also dropped at 3800 feet
12 500 lb demo l ition bOmbs on cargo ship in GERTHUDE COVE.
4 P-38's strafed AA installations and hanger also a
freighter and ~ corvette. Another mission 3-B24's dropped
10 1000 lb demolit~on bombs at 4000 feet on same ship in
GERTRUDR COVE; photos taken damage still unreported. Own
casualties minor injury by machine gun bullet to waist
gunner, 1 B-24 damaged on landing, minor damage from AA
fire to 3 P-38's. All planes returned. No enemy aircraft
encountered. Shore stations deliver for info. Br emerton
to Comnorwestse afron. San Fran to Comwestseafro n and CG
WDC. Honolulu to Ci ncp ac and Ann auoli~ to Cominch.

942

SBCHE'3? . -

OCTOBER ( GCT)

11 1006

COMSOPAC TO CINCPAC INFO COMINCH COMAMPHIBFORSOPAC

Cominch 261302 Sept Cincpac 272039. Comsopac to Cincpac.
Turner at sea and am unable discuss subject with him.
A most important and difficult part of Amphibious Training is the training of officers in the intricate planning
necessary. This cannot be accomplished in a few months.
Of equal importance is training in the coordinated employment of troops boats groups transport divisions
naval gunfire support and air support. There must be
training in the special communications technique involved. Officers must have a knowledge of transport
loading and close acquaintance with supply problems
prior during and after landing. Specialized equipment
is necessary. The formation of amphibious training
groups in Sopac area as in para 4 cominch serial 001006
would be but a minor step in a difficult problem. Officers of the experience necessary for conduction the required training cannot be spared as they are already too
thinly spread through the Marine Divisions. Plans now
on hand for the training of Marine Divisions Sopac area
will actively employ all available transports. There
will be plenty of active combat employment in this area
other operations than effecting landings against opposition for all army troops made available. I~ is believed
that the training suggested might convert well trained
army divisions into half trained amphibious divisions.
If amphibious training is necessary for army troops sent
to the Sopac area it is recommended that it be thorough
and be done in the United States where personnel and
facilities perhaps are available.

11 1930

CTF-8 to TASKFORCE 8 INFO CINCPAC COMINCH etc.

Six attack missions flew to Kiska 9 October. Total
planes for six flights: 10 B-24, 8 B-17, 4 P-39 and
8 P-36. Bombs dropped from low altitude, numbers and
observed results as follows: 52 500 pound demolition
on AK in Gertrude Cove no hits, 25 500 pound~rs on two
small AKs in KISI~ harbor posible hit, 40 bombs of 100
pounds on north head also 20 of 100 pounds and 16 of
500 pounds in hangar camp area some hits observed. 4
P-39s strafed freighter and two gun emplacements. No
enemy aircraft observed. Own damage: 4 bombers minor
damage, 2 fighters damaged by AA fire, all returned to
base. Preliminary report for 10 October 3 B-17s and
4 P-38 attacked camp hangar area from 100 feet dropping
45 magnesium fire bombs report large fires started, damage
will be verified by photos taken. Three enemy planes
observed on water. No change in enemy shipping over previous reports. From CTF 8. Info stations pass to following local adees, Cincpac Cominch Comnowesseafron, Comwestseafron and Comgen WCD.

94 3

~GR1T

OCTOBER (GCT)

09 1316 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSOWESPAC, CTF 62,63,74, etc.

Sopac operation s. Bl7 on search SHORTLAND ISLAND 1225L
(-11) 8th was attacked sustained minor damage shot down .
1 zero. From GUADLCANAL 8th 7 SBD's 4 T~F's escorted by
11 Grummans attacked CA KIFJUGASA Class 5 DD' s at 1800 L
(-11) Lat 08-45 South, Long 158-30 East. 1 sure torpedo
hit 1 probable bomb hit 4 near misses on CA reported. J
of 10 float biplanes shot down. 1 other probable. 1 SBD
1 Grumman failed return. 2 search planes which made
original contact shot down 1 float binlane one probable.
Both our pilots wounded but returned to base. At 1315 L
(-11) 9th search plane reports 1 Jap BB on fire approaching RUIN HARBOR with 4 DD escort. Ghormley sends. Carpender pass to MacArthur . 20 Grurnmans from COPAHEE arrived GUADALCANAL 1510 (-11) 9th.
11 1314 COMSOPAC to C01.180PAC (Admin), Info CINCJPAC.

Your 102324. Flexible situation necessita tes employmen t

troops where and when available and precludes formulatio n
fixed future policy.
10 1946

COMSOPAC to CINCPAC COMINCH COMSWPAC CTF 17,62,63,6 4.

Sopac operation s. Two enemy CL 4 DD lat 07-50 South
long 157-40 E attacked by Guadalcan al air striking force
at 0640 L(-11) ninth. One hit on CL several near misses.
Ship left down by bow. Probable hit reported on second
CL but damage unknown. 3 of 15 escorting float planes
shot down also on 9th search planes from Guadalcan al
strafed 5 byplaines bombed AA installati ons Rekata Bay.
Results unknown. Guadalcan al ground forces supported by
P 400s concluded on lOth a 2 day attack to west Matanikau
river. Completely mopped up area ~futanikau village - .
Point Cruz. Our troops have withdrawn to main positions
except for strong force holding east bank Matanikau River.
Early reports states our casualties less than 100 Jap
casualties heavy. During night 8-9th single Jap planes
over Guadalcan al in relays from 2200 to 0215. 2 Jap DD .
attacked by 9 SBDs escorted by 12 Grummans lat 07-55 s,
157-50 Eat 1120 L(-11) lOth. No hits. Ghormley sends.
Carpendar pass to r~cArthur.

12 0329

CINCPAC to COMSOPAC, COMINCH.

While in agreement with Comsopac 111006 consider proposal
Cominch 261302 is a step in right direction to provide
basic training without diverting AP'S from combat tasks and
will expedite ultimate readiness of Amphibiou s troops for
active combat. Concur STRAW, SPOONER and COPPER should each
have group. Comsopac advise which of FANTAN and VffiiTE POPPr
(Continued on next page)

944

OCTOBER (GCT)

12 0329 CINCPAC to C0~1SOPAC, COMINCH.

(Continued from preceding page).

should have group. A~tention Cominch invited that boats

are now re~uired to fill authorized complements of combat
AP and AK 1n Sopac area. Recommend those comnlements be
~illed prior assignment boats to amphibious training groups
1n order have AP and AK ready further offensive operations.
12 2010 CTF 8 to TF 8 Info COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMNORWESTSEAFRON, etc.
Info stations pass to following local addees Cominch Cincuac
Comnorwestseafron Comwestseafron and CG WDC. CTF 8 sends:
Amplifying attack on KI8KA 10 October by 5 Bl7's and 4 P38's.
In addition to 45 incendiaries which started large fires
camp area dropped 15 demolitions 100 pound bombs in crunp
area and 6 same type on ship East of TROUT lAGOON. Fighters
strafed AA installations. Jap planes on water reported
wrecked, 2 ships in harbor beached, 2 medium AK's South of
NORTH HEAD 1 small camouflaged ship in GERTRUDE COVE. Report for 11 October 6 B24's from 8 to 10 thousand feet
bombed shipping and shore installations KISKA. 40 - 500
pounders on ship East of TROUT LAGOON and ship West of SOUTH
HEAD no hits. 27 same type bombs on camp ares. damage un':-:nown.
Only above 2 previously damaged ships still in harbor also
1 still in GERTRUDE COVE. Cats.lina on search mission South
of KISKA contacted small enemy AK and attacked with 2 500
pound hombs and machine guns bombs missed received an AA hole
in wing. Another Catalina on search North of KISKA contacted
enemy small AK. 4 heavy bombers dronped 24 500 pounders from
1, 000 feet no hits. Catalina c1ropped 1 bomb which also
missed then strafed decks with machine guns. HALIBUT on
patrol in this area then made contact and attacked on surface with torpedoes at 1600 yards. Torpedoes did not detonate. Enemy vessel was Queen ship equipped with 3 guns
forward and submerged torpedo tubes. Torpedo missed HALIBUT
10 yards to ryort. HALIBUT retired undamaged.
12 2234 CTF 8 to CINCPAC.
Comtaskforce 8 reply to your 112155. Garrison strength LONGVIEW now 7500. Wi ll be approximately 9000 about October 23rd
at which time original FIIlli?LACE project will be approximately
completed. CLTiviATE and CAVERH 750 each of which is ultimate.
IDIULET . When garrison at LONGVIEtN reaches approximately
11000 about 15 November plan is to start garrison at M:TIJLET
by movement of troops from LONGVlgW. Additional troops from
ALASKAN sector will eventually bring total to 11000 troops at
IJONGVIEW and 4000 at AIfJLET . Estimate fighter stri!' at CAVIi:HN
will be completed about November 10. Work continuing on additional striD at LONGVIEW. Land.ine areA. 3300 by 100 feet
will be finished by October 18 at CLIMATE.

945

'SECM'f

OCTOBER (GCT)
13 0139 CINCPAC to CTF 8 to COMINCH, C01v1NORWESEA:B.,TIONT.
In view changing situation in Pacific Ocean Areas adjustment of forces must be made. Believe enemy deeply committed
in Sopac and not prepared to carry out more than minor raids
chiefly by submarines in Horthern area. We must continue
pressure and replace losses in Sopac and this requires all
forces that can be assembled. The above factors and impending bad weather point reduction in Northern Force. Para.
Propose following for your cornnent. A. On completion present
patrol reduce surface forces to those actually needed for
escort. Do not consider cruisers will be needed except as
escorts supplied by Cincpac for important troop movements.
B. In view 4 more S boats shortly will he added to squadron
45 retire large submarines after present patrols completed.
Would also return Captain Colclough to Pearl if you consider duties can be performed by Comdr. Gray. c. Return
F4F4's for employment carriers or Sopac.

12 1316 COMSOPAC to COMIHCH, CINCPAC,

C01'vT~01 ;'lE8PAC,

CTF 17 62 63 64.

Sopac operations. GUADALCAl'TAL 11th had no ground contacts.

Patrol found abandoned ~ap 75 1~1 2 gun battery East of own
nosition. 2 hour air alert beginning 1240 L (-11) 11th.
Enemy planes in waves. 16 ' s then 18 bombers and 4 ' s then
8 bombers 4 's. Bombs dropped on KOLI POINT. Shot down 8
Jap bombers 4 's. We lost 1 P-39 1 Grumman. Grumman pilot
rescued. Our Task Force intercepted enemy surface vessels
near 8AVO ISLAtiD about midnight 11th. Preliminary and inconclusive reports indicate enemy suffered considerable damage but details not yet confirmed. Air attack on 2 Jap
cruisers at 1020 L (-11) 12th Lat 09 South 157-15 East resulted 1 torpedo hit several near bomb misses on 1 CA left
dead in water burning. Ghormley sends. Carpender pass to
MacArthur. 60 hundred pound and 2 1000 bombs dropped BUKA
airdrome by B-17 striking force. 5 of 15 's on runway
destroyed. Many fires started.
14 1410 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH.
Situation midnight 14-15 local. Estimate that 6 enemy AP
heavily supported b~r surface ships will land large number of
troops on CAC~JS tonight. Enemy carriers and a force of
cruisers were reported today about 250 miles north of 1~LAITA.
Our carrier group is refueling north west of POPPY. And Task
Force 64 is at SUTTON after their recent action. Intend to
employ the carrier group and available surface forces to prevent further large scale landing s feeling that the situation
is critical and enemy reenforcements must be stopped if our
nosition in CACTUS is to be held. Estimate our carrier group
can be in position to strike late afternoon 15th and Taskeroup
17.8 can join Task Force 64 and reach the CACTUS area afternoon of the 16th.

946

OCTOBER (GCT)

13 2000 COM INCH to CINCP AC Info CofS AillJlY.

Your 070141 movement 12 B-17's cleared earlier today. Para.
This MTQGR must be considered special case incident to
certain general allocations of Army aircraft. Para. Whole
situation as to Army aircraft in Pacific theater is approaching settlement which when promulgated should enable
you to make effective disuosi~ions but without expecting
each allocation to involve re~lacement from here. Chief of
Staff Army has by hand.
15 0212 COMSOPAC to'CTF 17.8, CTF 64,

~nfo

CINCPAC, CTU 62.4.5, etc.

CTF 64 and CTG 17.8 join forces vicinity Cincpac grid posit.
G 6295 (Long 165-30 E Lat 13-45 S) about 5 hours GCT 15
Oct. Rear Admiral Lee assume tactical command combined
force d~signated mF 64. Send TG 17 destroyers to BJTTON
for fuel when considered advisable. Combined TF proceed to
operage general area to South and West of SOLOMONS chain
in position to intercept enemy forces approaching CACTUS
area from westerly direction with apparent intent land
forces or attack our position during night. Available
enemy info is hroadcast addressed all ships and bases. This
changes my 141442. Detach units to proceed to BUTTON for
fuel as necessary. Carpender pass to MacArth~r
15 0246 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, ALL SHIPS SOPAC.
Urgently need this area 1 additional Army Infantry Division.
Present forces including 43rd Division reenforced insufficient
to garrison present bases and therefore obviously inadequate
support offensive operations. Have neither on hand nor in
sight sufficient force to render CACTUS secure against present infiltration tactics. Essential that CACTUS be garrisoned with a force sufficient to provide protection dispersed air fields and to take a sustained and -decisive offensive against hostile forces on the Island. Although full
division with all components is required urgency of need is
such that division should be sent out by regimental combat
teams as ready. Plans being prepared for use NEVv ZEALAND .troops
to garrison AZTEC and BLEACHER and to reinforce POPPY. Comgensopac in complete accord. Copy by hand to him.
14 1325 COMINCH to CINCPAC, CTF 8, Info COMJJOWESTSEAFRON.
Addressees only decode. Highest quarters interested in
practicability of making attack on BOODLE using 2 or 3 OBB
for bombardment with an AVG and some DD's in support and
with land based air coordinated in attack. Comment. By
hand to Admiral Leahy.

947

-EOHE'I' .__

OCTOBER (GCT)

16 003 5 COMGEN 1st MARDIV to COidSOPAC Info CTF 62.

Morning air searches negative enemy land concentration s
along coast between KOKTTJ\IIJONA and CAPE ESPElli\NCE. Air is
striking at them. Request 2 destroyers be made available
at once for shore bombardment that area during daylight
hours. Profitable targets exist and psychologica l effect
on personnel here would be excellent.
15 2125 COMINCH to COMSOPAC Info CINCPAC.
Assume your 110214 refers to evacuation transports designated as APH's. These ships are convoy loaded AP's intended
transport troops from United S~ates and evacuate wounded
from base hospitals on return. They do not enjoy the immunity of the Geneva Conference and therefore should not
be used as hospital ships in advanced areas except emergency
and vvi th escort. Normal troop capacity 112 officers 1200
troops and evacuation capacity 166 serious cases remainder
troop space for minor cases. No regular hospital ships
available. Sopacfor authorized retain TRYON APH 1 for essential purposes and to be returned to United States earliest
practicable date. TRYON now under NTS departing West Coast
in PHAL.l\J''!X 19 October. Suggest consideration demilitarizing STRATFORD for operation under.Geneva Convention. Advise.
15 1744 COM 12 to VICE OPNAV Info CINCPAC, COHINCH, BUPERS , etc.
In view of urgency move large number Navy personnel construction battalions renlaaement personnel to Pearl Harbor
South Pacific Bases and to Comsouviestpa c imperative to
start program of converting EC2's to carry 50 officers 1000
troops. All transports not necessarily employed in named
movements. Recommend 1 EC2 Be allocated by War Shipping
Administratio n immediately followed by additional allocations every 3 weeks until situation relieved. To relieve
immediate situation recommend MOUNT VERNON be employed for
shuttle trip to PEARL before assignment to designated
movement. Fleet personnel officer reports at least 8000
enlisted nersonnel to move. Cincpac pass Serforpac.
Info
15 2050 CTF 8 to TF 8,/CG ADC, COMINCH, CINCPAC , COl~!IS OJlESEAFRON, etc.
9 B-24's supported by 5 P-38's attacked KISKA 14 OctoJer.
Dropped 180 incendiaries in camp area, made large fires
throughout crunp. P-38's destroyed 3 enemy float planes on
water, no other enemy planes seen. 1 B-17 took photos and
bombed submarine area with 6 500 pound bombs. Ships in
harbor reported as follows: 2 beached vessels previously
(Continued on next page)

948

g;g GTIE'i' -

OCTOBER (GCT)

15 0921 COMAIRSOPAC to COMSOPAC.

Comairsopac sends. KERLTODLE brings this message from
VANDERGRIFT. That Jap has moved in and emplaced artillery
of longer range than his which is shelling him positions
and airfield at will. That enemy surface craft move at
will in surrounding waters and shell his positions destructively both day and night and that he will be unable indefinitely to hold these positions if this continues.
Geiger states that he can use no more aircraft until avgas
situation im~roves and until destructive enemy fire on
airfield from both land and sea is halted. So long as
enemy ships patrol the sea area off LUNGA day and night
I cannot see how McFi~LAND or PAB barge can be brought in
with reasonable chance of success and until this is
changed the avgas situation cannot be improved to any
extent. Offensive air operations limited now to strikes
from BUTTON.
16 0005 COMGEN 1ST MARDIV to COMSOPAC Info CTF 62, COiviAIRSOPAC.
At daylight 15 Oct 5 enemy AP's sighted unloading along
coast from KUKUMBONA Westward. Escorted by 11 combatant
vessels with constant fighters over. Our air made repeated
attacks. Set fire to 3 AP's one of these now sunk other
still burning. Remaining 2 FPA but stood out with eEcort.
Bl7's also attacked and were observed to hit at least 1
AP and 1 large combat ship. Air raid at 1130 AA shot down
3 bombers. Some damage to rylanes and runways. 5 zero
biplanes shot down in air fi ~hting. Our combat losses 3
F4's 3 SBD's 1 P-39. 4 engined seaplane bombed position
twice during night. Naval gunfire 0030 to 0130. 3 ships
firing. Damage to runways planes and dumps. Casualties
12th and 13th 41 dead 15 injured. Planes available approximately 9 F4's 11 SBD's 7 P-400's and P-39's.
16 0025 COMGEN 1st :rviARDIV to COMSOPAC Info CTF 62; 64, CINCPAC.
Despite destruction of 4 hostile transports and departure
of remaining 2 estimate enemy landed a -1 out 10,000 troops
yesterday on CACTUS with considerable equipment and supplies
bringing total force ashore to at least 15,000. Our force
exceeds that number but more than half of it is in no condition to undertake a protracted land campaign due to incessant hostile operations and labor connected with development of this base over period of 10 weeks. The situation
demands two urgent and immediate steps; Afirm. Take and
maintain control of sea areas adjacent to CACTUS to prevent further enemy landings and enemy bombardment such as
this force has taken forthe last 3 nights. Baker. Reinforcement of ground forces by at least 1 division in order
that offensive operations may be initiated to destroy hostile
force now on 6ACTUS.

949

'"BECfiBg?

OCTOBER (GCT)
16 0812 60MSOPAC to CTF 6it, Info CINCl")AC, CTF 17 62 63.
Comsopac sends. Your 160330. No contemplated air operations CACTUS Area by Task Fo~ce 17 Saturday. See my 160032.
Comairsopac and Comgen CACTUS will inform you their air
operations as practicaJle. No shore bombardment by your
force contemplated at present except as directed in my
160722. In view of one and possibly more enemy carriers
operate generally South of Latitude 11-45 until air search
information from CACTUS or nlanes of Task Force 63 indicates ap~roach of suitable target.
~

16 0722 COHSOPAC to 'CTF 64 Info TF 64 CINCPAC, CTF 17 62 63.

Send :2 destroyers designating them Task Unit 64.5.1 to
proceed CACTUS arriving via LENGO CFf.Al\fNEL daylight 17th.
Direct Task Commander contact Comgen CACTUS on arrival
LLITJGA roads to receive info bombardment targets then
bombard enemy positions as directed by Comgen CACTUS.
Upon completion bombardment same day Task Unit withdraw
by most expeditious route to South and East of RENNEL
ISLAND awaiting further instructions. Caution enemy mines
may be laid close inshore LENGO CHANN~EL and in minable
waters CAPE ESPERANCE-SAVO. MacFATILL\.ND MEREDITH and VIREO
with PAB barge in tow may be in CACTUS area or retiring
via LENGO CHANNEL during night.
16 0032 C01\1SOPAC to CTF 17 Info CINCPAC, CTF's 62, 63, 64, 16, CTG17.8.
Sighting of one enemy carrier group and information of possible presence of second group on_ North flank off BUTTONCACTU~ supply line indicates enemy effort sever that line.
Task Force 17 operate in general area to Eastward of BUTTON
proceeding thence by route South of ROSES to avoid detection
b~; enemy carrier scouts.
Strike enemy carriers when favorable opportunity affords. When practicable inform me by
plane your fuel situation. This modifies my 150402.
16 0440 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH.
From Comsopac. RDO CA1~BERRA 160233 and 160145 also 1 CV
to westward of 1mENI. This appears to be all out enemy
effort against CACTUS possibly other positions also. ~[y
forces totallv inadeouate meet situation. Urgently request all avi~tion reenforcement possible.

95 0

--BEG~ET

OCTOBER (GCT)

15 2050 CTF 8 (Continued)

reported, the one reported west of SOUTH HEAD now reported
stripped of removable gear, 2 sunken ships in harbor 1
of which has been previously reported. 3 B-26's made 2
torpedo attacks on ships in GERTRUDE COVE, 1 erratic run
observed others probably hit bottom due to shallow water at
launching point. Our losses 1 P-38 and pilot. Comtaskforce
8 sends. Radio stations addressed deliver locally to info
addees as follows Cominch, Cincpac, Comsowest and Norwestseafrontiers Com Generals Western Defence Co~mand CG ADC.
15 1346 CON[SOPAC to COr.liNCH, CINCPAC, COHSC
JJESTPAC, CTF 17 62 63 64.
Sopac operations. 1040 1 (-11) 14th search plane machine
gunned 9 biplanes on beach REKATA. Believed all damaged.
During night 13th-14th GUADA1CJIJ\JAL shelled for 1 hour 20
minutes by BB cruisers and DD's. Shells identified as 14,
12 and 8 inch. Our 5 inch scored direct hits on 3 DD's.
Cruiser planes overhead all night. Occasionally land battery shelled position during night. 'Morning search showed
2 large oil slicks debris and boats where CA and DD where
attacked on 12th. Shelling damaged runways bomber fields
bomber fields destroyed 1 B-17, 5000 gals gas. 2 's 1
bomber shot down. At 1600 L (-11) and again at 1820 L
(-11) 14th enemy landing force attacked by S~D's. Near
misses only on AP' s. 1 Grurnann missing. GTJADA1CJ'JTAL
shelled. again nip.:ht 14th - 15th. Shelling ceased at 0315 1
(-11) 15th. No detailed report. At 0300 L (-11) 15th
enemy force 4 cruisers 7 or - 8 DD attacked by 4 lv~TB vicinity
SMJDFLY passage.
1 probable hit on cruiser. At 0624 1
(-11) 15th GUADALCAtt~L reported enemy landing force in 5
AP's 1 AP or AK supported by 1 BB 2 CL's 4 DD's 15 miles
northwest SAVO. Shortly after enemy began landing troops
to westward KOKUMBONA. Air strik of 5 B-17's contacted at
1145 1 (-11) 15th. Reported 3 direct hits on transports.
2 trans~orts burning. BB cripu1ed. Shot down 1 . At
1445 1 (-11) 15th 5 B-17's out for strike against enemy CV
reported 1at 09 S Long 165 E at 1351. No report yet. At
15j3 1 (-11) 15th Tas~ Unit 62.~.5 attacked by 9 dive
:) om bsrs La t 13-18 South LOng 16 3 East No damage.
Ghormley
sends. Carpender pa s s to MacArthur. At 1430 1 (-11) 15th
GUADA1CMJA1 reports 3 transports beached and bur ning fiercely.
Near SAVO Island 1 BB or CA which was hit by B-17 bomb, 1 CL
and 5 DD's

95 1

..fJffi GRE'3? ..

October (GC':!?)
16 1326 COM:SOPAC to CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMS\JJPAC, CTF 62 63 64 17.
Sopac operations. Comgen GUADALCANAI. . estimated about
10000 Jap troops landed GUADALCM.JAL during morning 15th.
Morning air searches 16th from GUADALCANAL negative. Enemy
land concentrations observed along coast from ESPERANCE to
KOICCJJ'v1BONA. Ghormley sends. Ca1:pender pass to IvlacArthur.
0200 L( -11) 16th VP' s on search for enemy CV reported attack on enemy cruiser Lat 09-50 South Long 164-55 East. Believe hits scored on cruiser bow. During afternoon 16th
McFARLAND delivered 32,5000 gallons avgas to GUADALC&l\JAL.
McFarland bombed 1745 Love 16th. Stern damaged proceeding
RINGBOLT. Two Ja:p AP's seven DD Lat 08-50 South Long 156-10
East attacked by S3D's. One AP hit left burning. Other AP
near misses. Continued course toward GUADALCANAL.

16 2138 COHAIRSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COHSOPAC, COII1INCH, 3UAER.

Comairsopac sends. Strongly recommend earliest formation of
Navy shore based air striking group for long range offensive
operations this are~. Group to consist essentially 2 squadrons each B-24' s. ..tl'ighters and torpedo-dive bombers. Last
2 equipped with latest types now beginning production. In
meantime consider highly desirable assigmnent to CACTUS as
renlacement for carrier squadrons now in process being withdrawn 1 each fi~hter. Dive bomber and torpedo sauadrons.
These to be drawn from carrier renlacements of sufficient
operation basic training. Actual carrier experience not
essential. To be assigned operationally as a group under
air commander CACTU8. Combat experience thus gained in
shore based status will be invalua ')le information future
air striking groups which definitely necessary to successful
war this area.
16 0106 COHSOPAC to CO

th DF BTN

COMGJ"N ROSES

CIHCPAC

COTV~:iP:IIlFORSP

Comgen ROSES pass to CO 4th Defense Battalion action. Upon

arrival ROSES 9th Defense Battalion report Comgen ROSES for
duty defense base HOSES under princiule unity of command.
Relieve 4th defense battalion which embarks same vessels. 5
and 3 inch batteries with ammunition and present installations
remain intact at ROSES. 155 and 90mm batteries complete
with ammunition remain a '>oard ship. Battalions authorized
exchange serviceable tentage at discretion. Rations will be
exchanged. All other equipment including vehicles and tanks
remain with own organization.

17 0800 COMSOVlESPAC to CI1'JCPAC Info

CO~'ITPOPAC,

COMINCH.

Cinci)ac 170123. All 6 f:leet submarines now based ABODE are

in northeast area as follows: South rmrN IRELAND between
TIA'3ATTL and KA vrr~NG, SAINT G1'QRGE CFIAti1~ETJ, FAISI, SOUTH NEW
~EORGIA, between l'Jl~ pr GEORGIA and CTTOISEUJ.J ISLA.ND, one proceeding southeast along north coast of fOLOMONS to round g S
1

SEGRE'F -

October {GCT)
17 0800 COI.1SOWESPAC ( Continued)

dur
[

east and I SA 3EL I SLAND enroute to base.

of these
directllr supporting Soupac operations in CHOISEUI.J SHORTLAND
area. .Jo additional fleet subs can be moved by this area
within reasonable time although two more enroute from PINAFORE. My 300818 Sept and 140640 October~ 2 S class submarines with 12 torpedoes each can be sent patrol CACTUS
area ETA 27 October 12 days on station thence return ABODE
for overhaul prior transfer your command accordance first
reference. Alternative see Cincpac 092205 October and my
11653. 3 subs of Subdiv 53 can depart A"SODE 20 October with
12 torpedoes each ETA CACTUS 28 Octo)er remaining on station
12 days thence proceed SUVA and join GRIFFIN ulus other three
submarines that division. After overhaul there tender and 6
subs proceed PANAr.IA. Must know immediatel:.r if either plan
desired in order uermit modification torpedo loadings. MacArthur has this.
16 2221 CI NCPAC to CTF 8 Info COMINCH,

COM_\fORVI!ES~AFRON.

Propose to reduce your cruisers to 2. Advise when present

commitments permit and name 6 inch cruiser to go. Due to
overwhelming need for strength in SoPac comraent on relief of
remaining 2 by HALEIGH and DETROIT.
17 1536 COBSOPAd to COI~:INCH, CINCPAC, CTF 16,17, 62,63, 64, COM20WESTPAC.
Sopac operations. Later report PBY attack 0245 Love (-11)
16th states 1 torpedo hit on bow of 1 cruiser of 10 cruisers
and DDs Lat 09-50 South, Long 164-55 East. MacFARLAND was
attacked at 1745 Love (-11) 16th by 8 type 99 2 place dive
bombers. Stern was blown off aft of after deck house. Now
anchored ~J LAGI. 4 zeros shot down. 7 B-17's at 1750 Love
(-11) 16th dropped 44 500 pound bombs on enemy supplies
KOK1JMBONA BEACH. Several fires started. 5 zero attacked
1 B-17. 1 zero shot down. All our Rlanes returned. B-17
on search Lat 08-55 South, Long 160-46 East shot down serial
43. No ground activity GUADALCM~AL 16th. Our air struck
troop concentrations supplies and battery positions incessantly throughout 16th. 14 Aichi type dive bombers and 8
zeros over GtJADALC.~JAL at 0745 Love (-11) 17th. 8 bombers
2 zeros downed by planes. Unknown number others shot down
by AA. Our loss 1 p lane missing . No other damage. Ghormley
sends. Carpender pass to MacArthur. 15 twin engine bombers
accompanied by many zer os bombed position at 1315 Love (-11)
17th. Our planes una ble gain a ltitude in time intercept.
1 bomber nro bably shot dovm. Our l9sses none.

953

-B:BORB'f'

October (GCT)

18 1426 COMSOPAC to Com 12, COJ.,.:INCH, CINCPAC,

co-r .~ po-lEPPAC ,

etc, etc.

Sopac operations. CTF 17 reports shot down 1 Kawanishi

type 97 twin tail 4 en.g;ined fl ~ ring . Joat Lat 1 7-20 South,
Long 162-47 at 1255 L(-11) 15th. Also 1 Mitsubishi type
97 twin en~ine land bomber at 0945 L (-11) 16th. ,In Jap
attack 0745 L(-11) 17th renorted yesterday AA aot 6
'J ombers. l.Iorning 17th 2 our DD bombarded enemy positions
West of KOYJJJ\I SOHA. 2000 rounds fired. At least 2 ammunition dumps set off. Many other fires started. Afternoon
17th GU.A.DALCANAL search planes REKATA BAY attacked by 6
float biplanes 1 float zero 1 enemy plane shot down. One
SBD missing. GUADALCANAL planes made 4 attacks against
Jap positions. GUADALCi\NAL reported being shelled by
single cruiser or DD night 17th-18th. Fire ceased 0010
L(-11). Again re~orted heavy fire 0013 L(-11). 1250
L(-11) 18th GUADALCANAL attacked by about 20 oombers 20
zeros. 8 bombers 11 zeros shot down. 2 Grummans missing.
Halsey sends. Carpender pass to r.IacArthur. Delayed report
TF 17 states in daylong operations 16th strafed burned 12
float planes REKATA, destroyed fuel dump aa positions. At
GUADALC.iU~AL made ~- direct hits on beached transports set
fires sunnly dumps strafed silenced AA fired landing barges
KOJCt.ITJlONA to -r~~P~RANCE. No damage no casualties own force.

..
consideration

18 235S CINCPAC ito 80MSOBAC, Info

C.G. 1st IviarDiv

COl~IlTCII,

Suggest earnest
sendin~ 9th Defense 3attalion
direct to CACTUS instead r8lieving 4th Defense Battalion
at ROSES. This move will give Vandegrift double number
155 1\fJII guns he requested which are badly needed. 'J'iill
double antiairc.,... aft urotection .for fields, supnlies, and
installations by both heavy and automatic weapons which
in secondary role will tremendouslv increase ground
defense against tanks and troops. TTni t also has powerful
ground defense newer in thirty caliber machine guns. Personnel involved much less than if units of equal fire power
but organized for Mobile offensive operations were sent
in. Unit in ships ready for immediate movement and personnel already acclimated to tropics. Relief 4th Defense
would be ryostnoned but move considered im~elled by
critical situation and am sure personnel of 4th will
p:ladly contriJute their part to ensure success CACTUS.
u

954

-sECllET

October (GCT)
19 1256

CO ~dSOPAC

to COMINCH, cr\CPAC, COMSWFA_r;, CTF 16 17 62 63 64.

Sopac operations. ffiTADALCAHAL 18th no ~round activity.

1250 L(-11) 20 bombers 20 zeros dronned bombs vicinity
defense lines. Our fighters intercepted shot down 11
zeros 8 bombers. Two Grummans lost. 7 killed 18 wounded
by bombing. From 2000 to 0100 love maintained SBD and
PBY patrol over Jap positions strafing bombin?. Three
enemy CA's lat 07-45 South Long 157-05 East at 1700 Love
19th bombed by search planes. -No hits. B-17's out for
strike afternoon 19th followed by PBY strike at ni@:ht.
No renort on these. Halsey sends. Carpender pass to
MacArthur.
20 1321 COI<SOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COiviS OWESPAC, CTF 62 63 64 18 17.
Sopac operations. 1810 Love (-11) 19th 3 DD's with 10 float
biplane escort northwest SAVO bombed by SSD's. One DD appeared damaa,ed but continued on course. One enemy plane
destroyed. All our planes returned. Due to bad weather
only two of 6 PBY's reached target 2 CA's 2 DD's one mile
West.POINT CRUZ at midnight 19th. From 2000 feet one plane
got direct hit on cruiser. Two heavy explosions heard.
Other PBY's bombed beach POINT CRUZ to TASSAFARONGA. All
our planes returned. On GUADALCANAL little ground activity
19th. 15 zeros over position 1330 L (-11). 2 shot down.
One Grumman lost. 0100 (-11) 20th bombed enemy DD off
KOKUMBONE. ID. .LSEY sends. Carpender pass to MacArthur. 30
zeros over airfield at lOlt- 5 ( -11) 20th followed by 16 bombers
at 1145. 7 zeros 1 probably plus 2 bombers shot down. 2
our pilots missing.
20 0407 COM.MAR1'TING 1 to

CO~IfJ'_IRPOPAC,

Info cor.rsoPAC ,

~INCPAC,

etc.

Essential that reserve aircraft be maintained BUTTON area

for replacements at CAC~Jc. Past experiences have required
50~b replacements S13D' s and Fl~F' s every 10 days.
Should Jap
pressure continue CACTUS will require 18 F4F and 18 SBD with
100~ fli~ht crews every 10 days.
Pass to Commarairwingspac.

955

<JECMT

...

October (GCT)
21 1630
21 1523 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMSOPAC, COMAIRPAC!..
Part 1 of 3 my 211630. Hidom. Your 172359. Concerning aircraft. Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved following
forces by 1 January. 19~3. For tmWCAL-FIJI-EFATE-NDENIGUADALCANAL area: 2 groups Army heavy bombers total 70
planes. 2 groups Army fighters total 150. 1 group Army
medium bombers total 52. 5 squadrons VPB total 60. Four
18 plane squadrons V.MF. Four 18 plane squadrons VMSB. 1
squadron V.MTB. 40 VOS nlanes. 13 Army and 36 Navy transport planes. 3 souadrons RNZAF Hudsons and RI'-JZAF Vincents
and Singanores now at ~TVA.

21 1723 Part 2 of above. Para 2. Jig Cast Sail directive also

provides for flow of replacements personnel and material
to meet actualities of expenditures and attrition. Para 3.
Navy part of these increases in air strength is under control of Cincpac. Copy of JCS directive forwarded by mail.
To meet these and other requirements. PacFleet pool during October will receive following approximate totals:
80 VF. 85 VSB. 50 VT3. 20 VPB. 7 VR and inshore patrol

vos

21 1630 Here is last part of three my 211630. Hicom. During

November: 125 VF. 75 VSB. 50 VTB. 75 VPB and 10
inshore patrol VOS. Foregoing includes VOS planes for
new squadrons VS7D 14 and VS8D 14. Para four. Information as to availability of planes and personnel now in
area and now enroute is known to you. Information as to
dates of Anny reenforcements and flow of Army replacements
other than that you have not now available but will be
forwarded when received. Para five. Concerning other
craft in separate despatch. Para six Halsey pass to Harmon.
21 0}17 COMSOPAC to VICE OPNAV, Info CINCPAC, Com 12, BUDOCKS.
Recent developments have intensified the need for immediate shipment of all items in Vice Opnav 131255. The unloading situation has been decidedly improved and there are
now only 6 ships in the harbor for unloading. Com 12
152320 to Vice. Opnav states that LONGFELLOW, ALDRICH and COLT
will be used for shinment of construction materials. Additional cargo ships o~ West Coast must be made available immediately for further shipment of materials including the
complete Yard.s and Docks component of a CUB requested in
my 010454. The large numbers of personnel afloat and ashore
and the ships to be supplied from this base require that a
major supply deuot be established here instead of the
Advanced Base Supuly Denot originally contemplated. The
total covered storap;re rea_uired for -Javal supplies is now
estimated at one million s quare feet instead of the two
(Continued on next page)

956

ffiiJ ORE''

October (GCT)
21 0517 COMSOPAC (Continue d).
hundred thousand square feet first recommend ed. Paymaster
General concurs in this estimate. Renuest 200 more store
houses 40 by 100 feet be furnished for this puruose, and
10 more refrigera tor storehous es. Request complete lumber
and hardware for 160 by 600 foot pier, and 3 complete sets
of battalion hand tools for WHIT3 POPPY, BUTTON and CACTUS.
Large number of develo:pme nts planned at \illiTE POPPY requires constructi on of all types of shore facilities for a
complete Naval base including facilities for over 20,000
men. The maximum possible urgency must be assigned to the
developme nt of this base. To plan and direct the activities
of the 19th, 20 and 24th Constructi on Battalions which will
be temporari ly used in this area and to be Public 'vlforks Officer of the Naval Base at ~NHITE PO?PY request that a Captain
or Commander in the Civil Engineer Corps be immediate ly assigned for this duty.
21 2300 COMAIRSOPAC to COMFAIRVtTESTCOAST, Info 3UAEI-?., CINCPAC, etc.
Here goes account critical shortage fighters South Pacific
considera tion being given to proposal load ALT.ANlAHA with
aircraft to proceed direct from S~~ DIEGO. It may be necessary to: (a) Reduce AVC units to one third allowance .
(b) Reduce VF 11 to half allowance . (c) Take some F4F's
from Marine Fighter Squadrons . Based on foregoing request
recommend ation as to date of readiness and approxima te
compositio n of cargo for ALTM~~a~ aircraft to be in fly
off condition . Recommend ation also requested concerning
eauipping one Marine Fighter Sauadron with F4 units and best
pilots available for early service in Sopac. Originato r .
Comairpac for action Cornfairw estcoast. NPG pass. IJSS ~ive
to Buaer for info. Cincpac has.

957

..... SE CltE'' -

October (GCT)
/C0]\1SOPAC to COMINCH, lnfo CINCPAC, CTF 16 17 62 63 64 42.
22 2246 Sopac operations. At GUPillALCANAL 21st 7 bombers 15 to 20
zeros over field 1115 L(-11). 6 zeros shot down by Grumans.
1 bomber by AA. 2 bombers left smoking. 2 Grumans missing. 4 others damaged by enemy fire. 9 killed 44 wounded.
GUADALCA}TAL ground forces 21st small contact MATJU~IKAU,
Japs used some 9 ton tanks. These withdrew un~er artillery
fire. Our planes continued harassing missions against enemy
ground forces. Occupied village on RUSSELL ISLAND bombed
strafed by 3 SBDs. 22nd several groups enemy planes over
.GUADALCANAL 13 to 1400 L9-ll). Made contact with only 5
due to weather. These were fixed landing gear dive bombers.
All 5 shot down. Airfield BUTTON shelled by enemy sub 0230
L(-11) 23rd. Halsey sends. Carpender pass to MacArthur.

21 0956 COMAHPHIBFORPOPAC to CINCPAC, Info COMINCH, CONSOWESPAC, etc.

Following additional information obtained from prisoners and
diaries. Force engaged off PAVO ISLP~TD night October 11/12
was proceeding CACTUS to bombard airfield. Officer prisoner
states TIJRUTAKA was second cruiser in column and not third.
Rear Admiral Zonji Goto Oigaaba commanded force. Some indication from prisoners statements that AOBl\. KI:I\IDGASA FURUTUKA
and accompanying 3 DDs were 5oined by 2 light cruisers and .
other DDs. Ensign from FURUTAKA states he saw another cruiser sinking while his ships was going down. I.t-ruRUTAKA sank
stern first. Discrepancies. in statements of prisoners claiming .to be from SHIRAKillviO indicate possibility that they may
be from different 3 DDs. Comamphibforsopac sends. Comsopac
has this.
2'1 0942 COM.AJVIPHIBFORSOPAC to CINCPAC, Info COJVfSOPAC, COIVlAIRSOPAC, etc.
From prisoners statements and diaries learned that CHOKAI
KAKO AOBA KIHUGASA FURUT.AKA TATSUTA TFNRY1J and 1 of 2 DDs
took part in attack on our forces night August 8-9 off SAVO ISLAND. This force came around west side SAVO ISLAliD and veered
continually left till it retired. Firing was initially to
starboard. No Japanese ships sunk or hit by,torpedo. AOBA
had damage to forward turret. Y.lU\:0 damaged. Statement rra de
that force came from KAVIENG or. RABAUL. l~utes of approach
and retirement not known. 1 prisoner says that no land was
visi1le during daytime considered probable that at least part
of force came south of Island chain which area not air scouted
on 8th. Para. Y....AYO received 3 torpedo hits and sank about
0700 love (-11) on August 10. Diary says 651 men rescued
before KAKO sunk. Diary states AP KINRYU MAJ:'tU and DD MUTUII
were sunk on August 25.. Comamphforsopac sends. Comsopac has.
22 2129 CINCPAC to COJVI IJJCH.
Request ap-proval exchange DET::;.orT and HALEIGH for cruisers in
T~ 8 in view Theo)ald's 172343 and critical need for maximum
strength in Sopac.

958

~Gli.ET

October {GCT)
25 1450 COTv1AIRSOPAC to COM;-::.QPAC Info CTF 62 64 61

COMSOVll~SPAC.

Comairsopac sends. Results B-17 strikes today. All planes

armed with four flive hundreds. 5 nlanes sent to intercept
ene.my LGNG victors at Lat 0~-05 long 164-30 failed to intercept. 2nd flight 6 planes sighted 12 enemy ships 1430
love (-11) lat 07-50 long 163-40 course 000 speed 25 dropped at 1510 from 15500 feet on BB nil hits. Other ships
this force not identified but no CV. Opposed ~)y land plane
VF and AA. Third strike 6 planes altitude 13500 at 1710
hit force of 2 CA and 4 DD in lat OR17 long 160 2 hits
certain on undamaged CA. Ship r enorted left dead in water
burnine heavily. 4 explosions noted after attack. Leader
reports his . attack was preceded at 1700 by Dauntless attack which also obtained one hit .on other cruiser. All
planes returned. Please pass to Comgensopac.
25 0216 CONISOPAC to C01.1INCH CINCPAC

COIT~O.YESTPAC

CTF 62 61 63 64. etc.

Sopac operations. 3 Catalinas made night torpedo attacks

on Jap ships 8HORTLl1ND TOJJOLEI area at 0245 L (-11) 23rd.
Two torpedoes at CL anchored off :MOILA POINT one hit certain.
One hit probable. Also 500 pound oomb hit on another CL or
DD. Third plane attacked probable BB one torpedo vicinity
ERVENBA ISLAliD results unobserved due to AA and searchlights.
All planes returned. Ni~ht 23rd search plane contacted two
groups enemy Naval force. 2027 L 23rd one group Lat 04-55
South Long 164-52 ~ast CV CL DD. One group CA CL and 2
DD. CV described as flat top no island about 600 feet long.
One Catalina with torpedo made contact with CA CL and 3 DD's
at 0110 L 24th Lat 06-09 South Long 164-14 East. Torpedo
dropped at 400 yards on CA described as MOGAMI class. Force
opened with AA after attack. Large explosion which may have
been torpedo hit noted during retirement. On GUADALCMJAL
beginning 1800 L 23rd Japs laid heavy barrage on our front
lines along MATAI'JIKAU RIVER. All calibers including six inch.
ii<Jhen barrage lifted Japs attempted river crossing in force
with tanks and massed infantry. Four attacks thrown back with
five large enemy tanks destroyed. Our air and artillery took
under fire Jap force observed early morning 24th attempting
out flank left ~'IATA!TIV PTJ T{IVER line.. One T~F shot down by
Jap AA. Pilot gunner rescued passenger missing. Halsey
sends. Carpender pass to MacArthur.

959

--8ECRB''

October (GOT)

24 0041 COMSOPAC to

CO~ /f iNCH,

CINCPAC, COMP01vVEPPAC, CTF 16 17 62 63 64.

Sopac operations. GUADALCANAL reports 16 Ja~ oombers about

20 zeros over airfield 1120L (-11) 23rd. 20 - zeros 1 bomber
destroyed. 3 bombers left s~oking. All our pilots safe.
Halsey sends. 8arpender pass to 11acArthur. 1315 L 23rd our
search -plane at INDISPENfiBLE STRAIT shot down Jap 4 engine
flying boat. Small groups enemy planes over GUADALCAITAL
1300 L 23rd. Group of 5 dive bombers sighted shot down. 1
S3D crashed take off pilot gunner killed. On ground only
activity artillery fire. Our artillery and air concentrated
on enemy 155 mm position which believed damaged.
26 0440 CTF 61 to CO!>.ISOPAC .
My 260200. Damage ENTERPRISE more extensive. 2 bomb hits.
Number 1 elevator out of commission. Can operate reduced
number planes. More details later. SOUTH DAKOTA bomb hit
on turret 1. PORTLAND steering gear unreliable. SAN JUMJ
2 small compartments flooded. PORTER sunk. Other DD's
damaged. R~quest tanker lat 14 south, 170 east soon as
practicable. From Comtaskfor 61 to Comsopac.
26 0210 CTF 61 to

C0J.~ 0 0PAC.

1 carrier of SHOKAKAU Class hit by 3 1000 lbs. Other carrier of same class hit by 2 500 lbs bombs. That carrier
smoking and being attacked by B-17's in position latitude 0705 South Longitude 161-5.6. r,fOG.AMI CA hit by 2 1000 lb bombs.
1 hit and 2 near misses on BB. ENTEPJ?RISE landing HORNET
planes. This report will be amplified. ENTERPRISE attacked
4 times. No serious damage. From Comtaskfor 61 to Comsopac. Flight deck inunobilized due to portion of HORNET group.
Will endeavor to send extra nlanes to BUTTON. Comtaskgroup
17.2 252340 gives information on IIORNET.
26 0210 COHSOPAC to COT..1SV!P.!'.. C, CTF 62 42 61 63 64 CINCPAC, COiviiNCH.
Sopac operations. During 25th Jap naval fb rces approached
GUADALCAJJAL from southwest north west and north. Others
operating to northeast GUADALCAlJAL. Few reports yet received
from our striking forces. 1115 Love (-11) 25th lat 07-50
south, long 160-28 east our search plane shot down Jap flying boat. 1052 love 25th GUADALCANAL reported receiving naval
gunfire from 2 cruisers 1 DD. 1300 love L1- SDD' s from GUADALCM~AL scored 1 hit 1000 pound bomb on forecastle of enemy CA
also damaging hit or near miss on CL. CA dead in water.
Enemy force consisted 1 CA 1 CL 3 DD. 2nd SBD strike scored
hit on CA and near miss on CL same force at 1700 love. B-17
strike of 6 plRnes also hit this Jap f6rce at 1710 love. 2
500 nound bom~J hits certain on CL. Left dead in water burn(Continued on next pa~e)

960

SEG~B'=P

October (GCT)
26 0210 COMSOPAC to COMS".:VPAC, etc.

(Continued)

ing heavily8 4 explosions noted. after attack. At HEKATA 3AY

2 small AK's with deck load vehicles and boxes strafed bv
search plane. Plane attacked by 2 float binlanes. 1 bi:
plane shot down. On ground 24th little action along MATANIKAU where our position intact. Beginning midnight continuing through early morning 25th Japs attacked toward airfield
from south. Army battalion reinforced Marines and uosition
held durine; night. Halsey sends. Carpender pass t~ MacArthur. Japs still attacking this area morning 25th. In
air over GUADALCANAL 25th enemy fighters throughout day at
irregular intervals. 17 Jap fighters shot down. 16 Jap
heavy bombers over at 1435 love 25th. 5 Jombers shot down.
9 dive bombers Aichi type attacked position at 1500 love.
Only minor damae:e by bombs. 2 our fip;hter pilots jumped and
rescued.
27 0426 Comsonac to Cincpac, Cominch, CTF 61 62 63 64 42, etc.
Sopac operations. B-17 on search 1020 L(-11) 25th was attacked by 6 Nagoya landplane zeros with bellytanks. 1 zero
down in flame. Bombardier killed. Our plane returned.
Taskforce 64 made #offensive sweep through area west GUADALC_t\.N.AL evening 25th.. No surface contact with enemy. Preliminary reports from Task Force 61 indicate that force got
3 1000-pound bomb hits on 1 enemy CV. 2 500-pound bomb hits
on another CV. Both CV's SHOKM{U class. 2 1000-pound oombs
on CA r.~OGM~I class. 1 hit 2 near misses on Jap BB. Halsey
sends. Carpender pass to MacArthur. PBY reported at 0215
L 27th had torpedoed Jap carrier result not seen. Jap force
1 CA 1 CL Lf- DD which was reported under attack 25th by SBD
twice and B-17 strike once was again attacked by SED's and
P-39's at 0700 L 26th. P-39 got 1 500-pound bomb hit on
CA. Very near miss on CL by SBD. Both cruisers proceeding
slowly leaving large oil slicks. Jap DD which shelled
SPJ'!IINOLE morning 25th were strafed by 4 Grummans. 1 DD also
hit by 3 5-inch shells from LUNGA battery. At GUAD.A.LCANAL
Japs attacked in force during night 25th-26th. Main attack
dovrn L1JNGA River from South. 1 attack this sector by J~p
29th infantry penetrated lines south of airfield. Our lines
here restored by strong counterattack of 1 64th infantry.
Alone HATANK. .\t: River 7th Marines drove ,J aps to south. During
25th our AA shot down 1 bomber 3 zeros. Ground troops got
1 zero.

961

~EC~'l!

October (GCT)

27 0031 COHAIRSOPAC to

CO~:SOPAC,

Info CTF 62 61 64.

Amplifying report 51 P 6 261540. At 0055 enemy force

2 CV 1 BB 2 CA 2 CL 1 DD lat 06-51 long 165-06 course
030 speed 20. 1 CV very large with small island other
CV smaller with flush deck. No ,lanes on deck either
carrier. Fish dropped at 500 yards at largest carrier.
Results unobserved due heavy lli\. Other Catalina armed
with 4 contact 500's made steep glide bombing attack on
CA at 0105 L (-11) lat Oh-25 Long 164-35 .course 080 speed
JO. 2 bombs under stern threw water over ship and into
tunnel hatch. 2 direct bomb hits fell aft stack lit up
ship permitting identification. After retirement 2 large
explosions seen at same location. Attack opposed by heavy
AA until after both hits. Plane de~aged but returned
safely. No other ships in area. 3rd Catalina no contact.
27 0045 CTF 61 to

C0I.~POPAC.

(Comtaskfor 61's) 260440. This action to Comsopac.

Damaee now determined requires followinp ships proceed to
port for further examination and temporary repairs. ENTERPRISE PORTLi\.ND SAN JUAN SMITH IviAURY. SHAW vyi th survivors
of PORTER not damaged. Commanding Offj_ cer SOUTH D..l\.KOTA
seriously wounded. Guns of turret 2 nicked by fragments but
may be servicea 1le. Following undamaged CON'0JGHPJ1 PRESTON
Also -JtTNEAU now with me. Additional darn~'::AHAN ClTf'HING.
age ENTERPRIPE. Forward gyro out. 4 feet down by the
head. Fragment holes in sides. Number 3 and 4 bomb
elevators out. .Also 5 inch ammunition hoists to groups 1
and 2. Forward 50 feet hanger deck bulged. 3 radio transmitters out. 1 DF loop shot away. Degaussing cables cut.
Personnel casualties ENTERPRI~B 30 dead 60 wounded. PORTLAND 1 steering unit out other unrelia)le. Vessels task
force 17 are about to join me.
I~y

26 0814 COMSOPAC to COMIHC:S: Info CI:\fCPAC, COMAIRSOPAC,

Comsopac to Qominch Info Cincpac Comairsopac.

COMG"E~JSOPAC.

(See Pinks)

27 0437 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info Opnav, Comserforpac, Cominch,Bupers.

A base command separate from 2eronsopac is essential this
area for planning construction and administration. Your
210225 and my 230837. Long known need for base construction on large scale now reemphasized by damage to ships and
lack of facilities for adequate support of land based air
and amphibious o~erations. If approved I rylan to assign
Captain Tl H Carter now in this area as Commander Naval Bases
South Pacific Area. Request following additional personnel
report by air: 1 CBpt for aviation planning, l Colonel
Marine Corps for nlanning land and AA defenses 1 Captain
(Continued on next page)

962

~16C~i'Ji

October (GCT)

27 0437 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, etc. (Continued)

CEC for advanced base planning and constructirn and 1
Commander or Lt Comdr Specialist in each of the following: Aircraft maintenance, Aircraft supplies, Aerology,
Ship Maintenance, Radio lVJ.a terial, Radar degaussing loops
and sono buoys, mines, nets and booms, torpedoes, ordnance plus appropriate officer personnel for operation
of South Pacific Advanced Base Depot. Ref Opnav 241938.
Additional assistants to the Commander !~a val Bases wtll
be furnished from this area or requested by despatch if
recommended organization is approved. Early action requested.
Opnav deliver Cominch Bupers and Budocks for
info.
28 0311 CINCPAC to COMINCH
For Admiral King only. While not havins complete picture
believe WASP announcement somewhat premature unless certain that Japs had full knowledge of it.
Also immediate
release of PORTER's name was hard on morale of dependents
therefore on 011r personnel. Recommend previous policy of
withholding name of ship until it can be announced that
next of kin have been informed.
28 0326 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, CTF 61, COMSOWESPAC, etc.
Further report. Sopac operations. PBY attacks early
morning 27th states enemy force consisted 2 CV, 1 BB,
2 CA, 2 CL, 1 DD lat 06-41 south long 165-06 east. 1 CV
very large small island. Other CV smaller with flush
flight deck. No planes on deck either carrier. Torpedo
wasdropped 500 yards at larger carrier. Heavy AA. Another PBY with 4 contact 500 pound bombs made steep glide
on CA at 0105 love (-11) 27th lat 05-25 south long 161-35
east. 2 bombs under stern throwing water over ship. 2
direct hits aft stack. After retirement of plane, 2 large
explosions seen. Heavy AA until after bomb hits. Plane
damaged but returned safely. Halsey sends. Carpender
pass to IvlacArthur. On GUADALCANAL during night 26th-27th
numerous smal., attacks by Jap land forces. All repulsed
outside our wire. Last 5 days our casualties 86 dead,
109 wounded. Jap lossea 9 tanks (14-18 tons), one regimental battery, many heavy and light machine guns. At
least 2000 Japs killed. TREVER, ZANE report being attacked
by 3 new Jap DD while returning from GUADALCANAL 25th.
Scored at least four hit s on DD's. They report at least
2 of these Jap ships sunk b y GUADALCAJ.\IAL bombers.
28 0351 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC

Info COMINCH

Am concerned over each of defenses of BUTTON and desire

to assist you in eve ry way to improve them. As there

963

(GCT)
28 0351 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC INFO COMINCH
was no basic joint plan for its establishment suggest you
have one drawn up for its defenses and I will submit it to
Cominch for approval and implementation. Enroute to you
is copy of Joint Chiefs of Staff Aircraft Plan which sets
BUTTONS aircraft complement by January lst as 13 Army medium bombers, 25 Army fighters, 18 VSB, 8 VOS, and 18 VF.
28 0921 COMNAVUNIT BUTrroN to COMSOPAC

INFO COMAIRSOPAC, CINCPAC

COOLIDGE struck two mines 0930. Sank SEGOND CHANNEL 1050

local October 26 in about 20 fathoms. Vessel and cargo
total loss. Army personnel on board 4604. Known loss 1
officer, 3 men. 27 ~dditional missing but reported seen
ashore. Navy personnel on board 2 officers, 50 enlisted;
all saved. Crew ship reported 290. Only loss 1 fireman.
Survivors being temporarily based ashore. Ch.a nnel open
to normal traffic. Ship entered Channel through mined
entrance. Master states was not notified of existence
mine field.
Picket boat with pilot stationed proper entrance could not attract attention of ship or overtake.
Signal station ashore warned ship but ship could not kill
headway before hitting mine.
Beached turned over to port
and slid off coral ledge into deep water one hour twenty
minl1tes after hitting mine. Letter report follows.
Comairsopac has by hand for information. And passes.
Comnavunit BUT TON originates.
28 1001 rMCARTHUR to COMSOPAC

INFO CINCPAC

Can utilize to advantage from airdromes this area any

available B-24's. Re Comsopac 272330. Assume planes
belong 90th Group. SQuadron just arrived here from that
group grounded about four days for replacement nose wheel
collars. Due to lack protection underneath where interception is normally exoec ted consider this type ffi ould
be used in night missions. Otherwise operational losses
and damage will soon reduce weight of attack below that
whlch can be regularly sustained in night operations.
Pilots of squadron just arrived here not yet competent for
night operations under adverse weather conditions encountered here, but expect to have the~ ready in ten days.
Every effort being made and will be made to hasten training Deriod for pilots here on arriving. Above facts given
in order you may have complete picture of situation. Let
me know your decision. From MacArthur to Halsey. Info
Nimitz.

964

3ECES';t1

OCTOBEH (GOT)

28 2225 CINC?AC to

C O:'~SO P.P:~.C

Info SQUI NCH.

Ground situation at CAC~JS can be turned in our favor

only by offensive action. Our present forces have performed magnificently but their present strength appears
to have restricted them to the defensive which may be
fatal if enemy succeeds in building up sufficient superiority on Island. Japs have favored dark of moon for
reinforcing their troops. Lull after intense activity
appears to ~ive us opportunity now for placing strong
reinforcements on CACTUS that will permit offensive
operations. Comment.
29 0130 COHSOPAC to CINCPAC, Info COMINCH.
In complete aP.'reement your 282225. Supplies now enroute.
From Comsopac to Cincpac info Cominch. Force consisting
2 raider companies, Army infantry battalion, small AA unit
and ACORN 2 shortly at AOLA BAY CACTUS to develop sup~ort
ing airfield there. Above to be increased in strength as
field develops. 8th Marines land soon at KU.KUM , landing
coordinated with offensive launched by ~resent garrison
if then feasible. Marine aviation engineer battalion and
2 batteries 155 guns now enroute Y~1 . Marine replacements 1 Army regiment American Division -moves o-GACTUS as
transportation available. Onening ryhase above operations
be~ins morning 30th L (-11) with ships gunfire on hostile
installations. CACTUS will not crAck.
29 0106 COI.YSOPAC to COMINCH, CTF 61 6? 63 64, CINCPAC, etc.
WASHINGTON subjected 2 submarine attacks early morning 26th.
SoPac operations. Several torpedoes seen each attack. All
missed. Torpedoes apparently set to explode at end of run.
On GUADAJ...JCANAL cTaps attacked 3 points on perimeter at nightfall 27th. Halsey sends. Carpender pass to Mac.lirthur. One
attack penetrated but position restored by counter attack.
Other attacks stopped outside wire. GUADALCAIJAL air forces
attacked Jap 8 gun AA battery at KOKUM130NA with SBD's and
P400's. Battery silenced and ammunition dump and stores
destroyed. Continued attacks on suspected field gun positions. No fire from these 26th. GUADALCMJAL air dropped
11 100 DOUnd 3 300 pound bombs on Jap oivouac area RRXATA
Fuel or ammunition dump set afire.
R~Y 0920 L (-11) 27th.
7 float nlanes strafed on water. J:l.,our of these burned~
One our pilots parachuted northwest tip YSAgEL ISLAnm.
28 0330 CTF 16 to CTNCPAC Info COHilJCII, COMf) OPAC, CTF 17.
Your 262351 following fro1:1 Comtaskforce 17 Q,uote J'-J:PM 803
oct 18. Action addressee incorrectly decoded as Comtaskforce 17 resulted in dispatchin~ s 1ips of this task force.
(Continued on next page)

965

eEG~ET

..

OCTOBER (GCT)

28 0330 CTF 16 to CITJCPAC (Continued).

Mission unsuccessful. Letter and MORRIS action report
forvvarded when practicable. Unquote. Comdesron 2 in MORRIS raided patrol line about four hours 15 minutes prior
raid by Comdesdiv 9 in LAMSON with HARAN. This originated
by Comtaskforce 16.. N?M deliver to Cincpac for action and
NSS for in~o Cominch. Also pass to Comsopac. By visual to
Comtaskforce 17.
28 2240 CTF 8 to TASKFORCE 8, Info COJVIINCH, CINCT>AC, COMWBSTSEAFRON,etc.
Comtaskforce 8 reports reconnaissance October 27. SEGULA:
coast negative, one shack on west slope which was
in ruins. GARELO: Grey shack observed. No traces enemy
occupation either island nor on ATTU also scouted. Damaged
ships VIPKA H.i\.RlO:S. and GRRTT<TTD~ COVE as previously reported.
Afternoon mission of 6 B-24's found vi~KA closed in and returned with bomhs. Info stations deliver to usual local
adees Cominch Cincpac Comwest seafron Comda,en ''VDC and Comnorwestseafron. ,
r~ortheast

29 0251 COMSOPAC to COMAIRSOPAC, Info C-INCPAC, COMAIRPAO, etc.

Your 240221 concur necessity establishment subordinate command. Eventually propose Comfair each important base in
Sopac area. At present WHITE POPPY only such activity in
being. Until separate C.O. provided necessary Compatwing
1 continue functioning as Comfair WHITE POPPY. This by
mailgram with copy of reference for all info adees.
Ref: Comairsopac 240221: The rapidly increasing importance
and employment of Naval Aviation in the South Pacific Area
makes it essential that a shore based aircraft subordinate
command be established as soon as practicable. It would
seem logical that this command be a part of Aircraft Pacific
Fleet, that organization being the source of aircraft supply
in this area. Para. The duties of Commander Aircraft South
Pacific are such that it is impracticable for that officer
to carry out properly the administrative functions of a subordinate command. Compatwing ONE for the present is functioning as such for patrol aircraft within the limitations of
his organiz~tion which is in process of establishment.

965

~~ 0R:tL '!1--

0ctober (GCT)
30 0150 COT-TSOPAC to C0JI TITJCE, CIHCPAC,

C0T180'1if~G~PAC,

CTF 42 61 62 63 64.

Sopac operations. Search nlane lat 13-15 South Long 16245 East drouped 2 Jombs on Jap sub submerged at 0735 L
(-11) 29th. Laro;e oil slick. Ground action at GTJADALCAHAL
confined to small patrol contacts and moppjng up vicinity
our position. Patrols operating West M.i\.TANIKAU report several
hundred Jap dead vicinity POINT CRUZ. 3 additional Jap tanks
found destroyed. llostile order of battle established as
OKA Regiment 4th Infantry 29th Infantry 15th Heavy Artillery
Regiments and additional units not yet identified. P-400's
attacked Jap troops 1Nest l::J.\.TANIT..AU. 1730 L 28th 2 P-400' s
destroyed 2 float planes IQYATA BAY. 2 Jap heavy bombers
overhead at 0400 L 29th. Bombs fell in water. At 0030 L
./
30th PT boat reported torpedo hit on Jap DD between ESPERANC"Jl~ and SAVO.
Left dead in water. Halsey sends. Carpender pass to MacArthur.
30 0602 COHSOPA.C to COMAIRPOPAC, COMGEN 1st MARD.IV, COHSO.i'!ESTPAC, etc.
Task Force 65 (3 cruisers 10 destroyers 3 transports) will
land 8th Marines reinforced at CACTUS on 3 November to reinforce garrison. My 291007. Details in CTF 65 OpPlan Cl
which Corr1airsopac and units of TF 65'have. In air mail to
other addressees. CTF 63 nrovide all practicable supnort
by air scouting and striking opDosinet enemy forces. Com@'en CACTUS provide air covera~e for TF during approach,
retirement and while in CACTTJS area. Carpender pass to
1-TacArthur. Request Sowespac air supnort by continued
strikes against enemy forces northwest SOID~ TONS area.
Priority of targets carriers, battleshins, other combatant
units. Action addees acknowled.~e.
30 1819 CIT!CPAC to CTF 8 Info CO:ISOPAC,

COI~~ INCH.

PacFlt experience to date with defensive mining not repeat

not conducive to extension such measures. Take every practicable step to insure that your defensive minefields are
less danBerous to own ships than to enemy.

967

SJ!l CR:E 'iJ..

October (GCT)
31 0534 COMSOPAC to

C0~.1INCH,

CINCPAC, COMSOWERPAC, CTF 42, etc.

Searchplane reports. Sopac operations. Attack on Sub lat

13-lQ south long 163-44 east. Results negative. On GUADALCANAL 29th no important ground contacts. We continued mopping up operations. Small patrol captured and damaged 2
Jap 75 mm guns west MATANir~U. Our planes continued attack
missions on Jap nositions. 2235 L (-11) 29th SED on patrol
sighted 2 Jap DDs vicinity TASSAFAROIJGA and dropped bombs.
No damage but DDs proceeded toward RUSSELLS. 0015 L 30th
3 SBD's bombed DDs west RUSSELLS. No contact thereafter.
1 SBD missing. 0510 L 30th 7 Grummans attacked REKATA BAY.
Destroyed 3 biplanes on water 3 zero float planes 2 biplanes in air. Set fire to and strafed main building and
fuel dump. Strafed camp results unknown. Halsey sends.
Carpender pass to MacArthur. 0030 to 0845 L 30th 1 cruiser
and 4 DDs bombarded Jap positions GUADALCANAL. Destroyed
~
artillery boats buildings.
31 0355 CINCPAC to COMINCH info COMSOPAC, COMSUBPAC.
Your 281735 believe our situation different from enemys
in that area os his operations against CACTUS is quite
thoroughly scouted by our aircraft while he has difficulty
in projecting aircraft to southward and southeastward of
CACTUS. Aircraft are so much more efficient as scouts
and submarine offensive role is so much the most effective
employment that - I consider it correct to keep the majority
of submarines in focal areas and make information mission
secondary to attack. However, due to repetitious enemy
deployment during his advances I believe that employment
suggested by Halsey's 300416 offers excellent possibilities.

968

October (GCT)

31 0946 CTF 62 to STURGIS, CARNEY, MCKBAN , Info CINCPAC, etc.

11ission AOLA BAY occupation group is to construct fighter
strip soon as possible to be followed by bomber strip and
to deny AOL~ BAY to enemy. CTF 62 sends for delivery to
STURGIS and CARNEY. Command passes to Comgen CACTUS on
completion of debarkation. Para. Plan to reinforce with
following units: Afir.m - Remainder ACORN or~. Baker One five five millimeter guns as soon as available. Cast Additional infantry to )ring total of one regiment less
one battalion. Dog - One battalion field artillery.

31 2126 COHSOPAC to CINCPAC.

Recommend following reorganization Sopac Force. Afirm.
Detach first Marine Corps from Amphibious Force. Baker.
Establish Corps Commander on same echelon of command as
Commander Amphibious Force. Cast. Joint planning between
two commanders under control Comsopac. Dog. Comsopac
assign units of First Corps to Amphibious Force as necessary for operations or training. On conclusion of training exercises such units revert to Corps. When deemed
advisa)le after conclusion of landing phase of an operation a task organization for the shore phase of the operation will be established, or the Corps units will revert
to the Corps, when and as directed by Comsopac.

969

4SECRE~

November (GCT)
01 2359

COMSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPA C, COMSOWESPAC etc.

Sopac operations. 0530 L C-11) 1st 7 Gru:r.umrans at
REllliTA BAY destroyed all 5 Jap planes on beach.
Many wrecked planes about. Straffed all buidlings,
started fire in cocoanut grove. AA very heavy and
accurate . Our planes damaged but returned. 5th
Marines crossed MATANIKAU at daybreak lst. Attacked ./
to west. Supported by B-17's. Continuous attacks by
P-400's and SED's throughout day silenced Jap artillery.
Enemy withdrawing slowly. We have advanced about 2
miles with relatively light casualties. Halsey sends.
Carpender pass to N~cArthur

. 01 0515

COMGEN 1st MARDIV to COMSOPAC info CTF 62 etc.

5th Marines crossed MATANIKAO at daylight this morning and attacked to the west. Attack supported by
B-17 bo~bardments. Constant attacks by P-400 1 s and
SED's throughout the day silenced Jap artillery.
Enemy withdrawing slowly taking advantage of rough
terrain to reduce effect of air and artillery attack.
We have pushed forward approximately 2 miles with relatively light casualties. Attack followed up by
large reserve force for use in event enemy make determined stand this side POHA river.

01 0501

COMJ.1ARDIV 1 to COMSOPAC lnfo COM.AIRSOPAC etc.

Bomber field graded 5400 feet. Take off end 1700
feet being crowned to receive mat. Mat laid last
3500 feet. Fighter field one rolled grass surface
4600 feet long completed. Fighter number 2 graded
3250 feet.
Soil stabilization in progress prior to
laying somerfield mesh.

01 2116

CINCPAC to COMINCH
Unless there is evidence not at hand here that the
enemy actually saw the HORNET sink, I feel very strongly that yesterday's announcement was of considerable
assistan~e to the enemy and correspondingly harmful
to us in a very critical situation.

970

SEiGRE'' ....,

November (GCT)
03 0130

COio.~SOPAC

to CINCPAC, COHINC}!, COMSOWESPACFOR, etc.

Sopac operation s. Patrol returning from AOLA on

GUADALCANAL reported only contact with small groups
Japs to eastward our position. No ground activity
during night first-seco nd. S3D's harrassed Jap positions
during night. Our destroyers assisted attack west
MAT.ft..NIKAU RIVER morning 2nd by bombardme nt. Later
report of damage to Jap naval forces by TF 61 26th
states: Add 4 1000-poun ders on 2nd TONE Class CA.
Change 1000 pounder on unidentifi ed BB to 500 pounder
on CL. Add 1 additiona l torpedo hit port side s~me
NACHI Glass CA. Halsey sends. Carpender pass to
MacArthur .
04 0146 COMSOPAC to COM INCH, CI:JCPAC, C0~ i~OWESPACFOR, etc.
On GUADALCA~JAL. Sopac operation s. Our attack continued
with slow progress during second. One 75, 6 37 mm and
many machine guns captured. All units advancing morning third. Two fighters lost due operation al crashes
but pilots safe. SBD's and P-39's completed numerous
missions supporting ground troops. One enemy gun and
three trucks destroyed by bombing. 3 SBD's off 1730
L (-11) second to attack hostile force 4 CL, 17 DD.
None returned. 1 S"SD reported enemy DD vicinity KOJGn~.:
BONA at 2130 L (-11) second. Plane failed return.
Halsey sends. Carpender pass to 1\.~acArthur.
04 0725 Retiring CACTUS transports for ni~ht to South IIJDISPENSABLE STRAIT to return tomorrow entering SEAL'\RK CHANN~L
at 0430 Hovember 5th. Require 6 more hours. AOLA BAY
group will continue unloading tonight estimate complete
late tomorrow. 4 cruisers 6 destroyers remain south 0912 in INDISPENf'ABLE STRAIT ready to strike favorable
targets tonight. This from Callaghan .
04 0235 CTF 62 to CTG 65.5 Info CTF 65 63,

COI~ :soPAC,

COI.IGEN CACTUS.

Comsopac has directed Carlson and two c ornpanies second

raiders remain AOLA ~3AY for present and be reenforced with
two additiona l companies . Para. Direct McKEAN, 1-/IA:JLTI on
completion debarkatio n raiders ~roceed at best speed to
arrive 3UTTON during daylight refuel embark two companies
second raiders. Orders as to logistics and further movements will be issued later. Inform STURGIS and Carlson.
Pass to McKEAN and NIANLEY by hand. Comgen CACTUS informed
in another system. CTF 62 originato r.

971

03 0015 CINCPAC to COMINCH.

For Admiral King only. Believe .\rilly should retain
defense HOLLY and increase effectiveness thereof in
accordance with recommendations being sent you separately.
We need for amphibious purposes all the Marines that can
be made available. I note from enclosure your ser 00935
of 7 September that Army troops are only used for amphibious
work due to lack of Marines.
0 5 0524 COt1SOPAC to CINCPAC, COMINCH, COHSilPAC, CT:B, h2, 61, 62, 63.
Friendly SS reports. Sopac operations. 2 torpedo hits in
NATORI Class cruiser IliDES~ENSASLE 3Tlli\IT 0415 love (-11)
3rd. On GUADALCANAL our attack west r,1.l~.TANIYu-I\..U continued
successfully. 350 Japs killed one position west POINT
cnuz. 3 field pieces twelve 37 mm, 30 !11achine guns captured. Jap positlons KOKUHBONA shelled by our naval
forces. Ni~ht third - fourth Japs landed force 7000
yards east KOLI POINT. Attacked at dawn by battalion 7th
Harines. Attack driven back by superior forces with artillery. Our ground troops concentrating afternoon fourth to
destroy this hostile force. Beginning 1630 love 4th three
planes bombed strafed area east KOLI POINT. Halsey sends.
Carpender pass to MacArthur.

972

November {GCT)
05 2358 COI :SOP.AC to

CO~JINC 1 I,

CINCPAC,

CO~~S\J~"PAC,

CTF 61 62 63 64.

On GUADALCAl\fAl. Sopac operations. Marines holding captured

positions west MATANIKAU. Enemy made strong counterattac.k
this area night 4th-5th. Repulsed with heavy Jap losses.
On east sector r~1arines holding vicinity KOLI POINT while
2 battalions Army move to envelop enemy left flank from
south. Fighting this sector during 4th limited to patrol
actions. Our air maintained continuous patrols over
enemy positions. Strafed known hostile positions including mobile gun with ammunition trailer on road east KOI\.'1TiviBONA. Halsey sends. Carpender pass to MacArthur. 8th
:V.1ari ne s landed reinforced GUADALCAT AL no sit ion 4th- 5th.
AOLA BAY detachment now ashore. Compenlst ~.iarAmph Corps
and ComGenSoPac have.
07 0150 cor:S')"lAC to CI_,TC-=>AC, COriJJCII, CO BWP.AC, CTF 42, 61, etc.
During October. Souac operations. Sopac airforces destroyed 369 hostile aircraft. ITo probables or damaged included. At 0400 love ( -11) third ~lCCALT_JA sighted neriscope close aboard submerging 1at~ 10-50 south lone 16120 east. Attacked with de1)th charges. ~joud underwater
exulosions after depth charges exploded. Sub possibly
sunk.
On GUAD.A..I CJJTAI..J morning 6th, 164 th Infantry had completed passage !FJ\liJ'' BIU river and advancing to north to
envelop hostile south flank. No large contacts this area.
On west our position second mari!les repulsed light attacks
west of ~")OIF~ CHUZ duri ~ lg night 5th - 6th. TULAGI marines
COlllpleted successf'ul o_n eration against Jap outpost C.t\l)E AGTROLA1E. 19 enemy killed, one captured. All radio equiument docw'TI.ents arms and ammunition cantured intact. Only
two unarmed Japs escaned to bush. ~o marine casualties.
1130 love 5th 27 bombers and zeros over GUADALCA"LJAT, positions.
Our fighters Made no c ontact due cloud condit~ons. Bombs
dro~ned near defense li1es killing one, wounding five.
Our
air co~tinuously over Jan nositions. Five attacks by P-400's,
one by S"lD' s on enemy nosi t5.ons. Halsey sends. Carnender
nass to MacArthur.

Following 1JlanYl..ed (.A.) ~ail ~~OUNT \TER1.,TOIT for 'If-liTE '?OPPY

fr0Y'1 SA~T ')EDR'J about 24 november with ')ersonnel for voyage renair facilities 8nuivalent l AD , 20th, 24th, 26th,
27th, ~eebees, J'Jobile ,.Iosn i tal r.rumlJer 7 and casuals plus
baR~a~e tentage and galleys for all embarked ~ersonnel.
Qail ,TIT?ITER from F1 JE~;~~ ~~ about 19 November with essential Se e bee material and medical sun 'llies and eqtti ')r1ent
followed h:r another ship with remainder 8eebee carp.o and
equivalent ad carr:o. Shi f:) l\,~'obile Hospital Nu'l"rlber 7 carp;o
later when v,~i l l not interfere With Vi tal ni li tar/ SU"l'Jlies

913

November (GCT)

06 2139 VO'?NAV t o

c r)}"P"Y')AC

info

CI:\TCPAC ,

CfJlllli,'FP.QEAFRON ,

etc. ( Cont' d)

and equipment. Eta M0UNT VER TJON 6 December. TUPIT::l:TI 5 December. (B) Sail coal~ ine as schedu led (C) 3ail AC O~J8 3
and 4 wh en con struction equi Y)ment diverted to .l\.D' s is replaced requiri ng 30 dRys, and transryorts are available
estiMated ~ id d le December. Do y 01 1 a~ rove 0 Request immediate renly in order start loadi ng . Nl )L pass to Mobile
Hosnital 7 for info.
07 2358 COMAMPHOHSOPAC to CINCPAC, Info Cor,1INCH, COMSOPAC, etc.
Documents captured CACTUS indicate presence our naval forces
has prevented landing that part 38th Div. embarked on transports and general attack planned for Nov. 3rd therefore not
possible. Sickness and shortage of food and ammunition in
enemy forces noted in diaries. Our naval gun fire and air
attacks appear very effective and decline in morale noted.
Indications continue of presence 17th Army Headquarters on
CACTUS. Enemy tank vnit identified as lst Independent Tank
Company.
08 0101 COMSOPAC to COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSWPAC, CTF 16,42,62,63,6 4,65.
No activity, Sopac operations, on west flank GUADALCANAL 6th.
On east flank we advanced to METAP,ON.A RIVER, 4 miles east
KOLI POINT. No contact enemy forces. Advance to east continuing morning 7th. P-400's made 7 attacks on Jap positions.
Destroyed large ammunition dump and boat with gas drums. Continuous SBD patrol over Jap positions. PT boats reported 2
Jap DD off LUNGI POINT 0200 L(-11) 7th. Claim 1 DD sunk.
Our air reported later large oil slick boxes liferafts and
debris vicinity NUGU ISLAND SKYLARK CHANNEL. MAJABA while
unloading supplies to GUADALCANAL struck amidships by one
torpedo 2 miles east LUNGA 0930 L 7th. Halsey sends.
Carpender pass to MacArthur. At 1730 L 7th air strike consisting 7 SBD 3 TBF 8 P-39 22 F4 attacked 1 CL 10 DD at Lat.
07-lOS Long . 159-40East. 2 torpedo hits 1 1000 pound bomb
hit 1 near miss on CL. 1 torpedo hit on DD. P-39's shot
down 5 float biplanes. F4's sh ot down 5 float Zeros 2 float
biplanes. 4 F4's failed return. One pilot rescued. Enemy
headed ea s t 1800. Planes saw explosion after ships no longer
visible.

974

November (GCT)
09 0126

CO~.:SOPAC

to CQ1,-T INCH, CINCJ?AC,

CO~~C"'OWESI)ACFO:::t,

CTF 42, 16, etc.

GUADACANAL mornine; search strafed bombed 3 beached float

biplanes :REKATA DAY. Destroyed 3 landing boats south Cf:.PE
Ef'PERA.NC~.
Destroyed 3 landing )Oats west TASSAFAR01JGA.
Evening 8th. Sopac operations. Sighted bo:r1bed strafed
destroyed a 2 man J"ap SS C1\PE :cc:l)ERANC2. GRAYLING reports
2 torpedo hits in C:IIYODA type aircraft tender. 1500 L
( -11) 7th LLU'JSDO:'JNE bombarded suspected J"ap positions east
I~OLI POINT.
On GTJADALC.Al'JAL 7th no activity in west. Our
forces moving east from HET./'..PONA RIVER but no c0ntact. In
attack on CL and 10 DD reported yesterday GRill.1Llii.NS scored
additional 2 hits 2 near misses with 100 pound bombs on J"ap
DD. P-400's executed 5 attacks missions J"ap ground installations. Halsey sends. Carpender pass to MacArthur. Comgens Sopac and Gomgensopac have by hand.
08 0020 CTG 62.4 to

cm~OPAC,

Info CINCPAC, CTF 16, 64, 62, 63, 65.

For operations against Jap light forces submit necessity

for guns larger than 5 inch. Jap strength in torpedoes
necessitates early effective hits which can only be made
by larger guns.
Effectivenes s of 5 inch AA for sinking DD
is doubtful. ATL~A carries only about 10 percent coMmon
mark 32. In order make best use of our doubtful torpedoes
DD's with 2 or more mounts should be assi~ned striking
e:roups. Para. :b,or nie:ht November 2nd I would necessarily
have called off my operation due PT boats western end SEALAPX and at KOLI POINT. '.'las readv to enter SEALARK and
-proceed vicinity KOLI POINT VJhen info received that PT
boats were stationed at both positions. Originator Scott
in ATLANTA
09 0347 COHSOPAC to

CO~~IHCE,

lnfo CINC:?AC.

Comsopac answers your Cominch 081500. Can now make full

power operate 30 fiphters 27 SED's, 9 VTs on 24 hours
notice. Expect coMplete number 1 elevator and hanger deck
November 21st. Thereafter vessel capable operate full
power complete air group op~rations indefinitely. Cognizance should be taken lon~itudinal slit starboard shell
below side armor frames 123 aft to 134. 3 fuel ballast
tanks open to sea. After pedestal number 2 hypo prep
turbine stronger than before break. Similar strengthening
being done all other pedestals. Info Cincpac.

975

OElGRElf

November (GCT)
10 0316 CQ},1SOPAC to COMSOWESTPAC,

CI ~TC PAC,.

C01.1I NCH, CTF 42,61, 62, etc.

At 2150 L( -11) 8th PT' s got hit on 1 of 2 ~Jap DDs off

Sopac operations. 1 PT slightly damaged by
gunfire. On GUADALCPJ~~L no activity in west. On eastern
flank contact with enemy 3000 yards east I\IETAPOIJA RIVER.
Action continuing. 111.orning search bombed straffed REKATA
SAY. Results unknown. 1 plane failed to return. Additional Jap landing boats filled with supplies sunk vicinity
ESPEHAHCE. Evening search 8th sighted bombed straffed 2
man SS beached at ESPEIL'l.NCE. Halsey sends. Carpender pass
to MacArthur. Additional enemy air losses 7th not previously included Sopac summary 3 zero float planes, 1 float
biplane.
ESlJERANCE.

09 23 59 COMGEN 1st H.AHDIV to COl\1SOPAC

Inf o CTF 62

On east flank a Jap force of undetermined size has been

surrounded near TETERl-i~. On west flanl< advance toward KOKUMBOHA resumed at daylight this morning with 2 regiments attacking in column. Morninf2: search yesterday found 2 CL and
3 DD bearing 300 distance 180 course 300 speed 20. SP~TA
ISABEL search located 2 masted schooner radio equipped and
camouflaged. 4 attack missions by P-39s in support of
ground troops. Evening searches ne~ative. Planes available F4F4 34, Sl3D3 20, P-400 2 , TBF 13, F4F7 1 , P-39 13.
Reencipher my 092248.
09 2045 CTF 8 to CINCPAC , Info COMSERFOJ<STJlCOM ,

CQMS~RFORPAC ,

etc ....

CTF 8 sends. Mining project LONGVIEII'l completed . My

110437 Sept. Except magnetic mines in KAGALASKA fTRAIT
and ID.'IAK PASS in which fields mines exnloded prematurely.
Do not propose to remine these fields at this time. l'\JPM
pass to Cincpac for actj_on and Comserfor for info. NPG
pass to Comserfor Subcom for Info, NSS pass to Vice Opnav
and Cominch for info.
11 0251 C01!ISOPAC to CTF 17 42 63 67, COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSOWESPAC, eto
On GUADALCANAL. Sopac operations. East flank a Jap force
of undetermined size has been surrounded near TETERE. On
west flank resumed advance toward K OKm~BONA at daylight
lOth. 4 attack missions during 9th by P39's. SOUTHARD
reports sighted attacked enemy SS lat 10-13 south, long
161-09 at 0230 love (-11 ) lOth. At 1110 love lOth 2
Grummans dived through formation of 15 zeros at 27,000
fee t . Shot down one. Hals ey s ends. Carpender pass to
MacArthur . Comge nsopac has.

876

tmORE'f

November {GCT}_
10 2102 COMSOPAC to CTF 16 Info CINCPAC, COMSOWESPAC, CTF 6), 67.
Task Fo_rce 16 sortie with all units present when ready
a bout 2 3 hours zed 10 Nov em ) er. Order of sortie and zero
hour as 'd irected by Task Force Commander. Local minesweepers will sweep channel to one hundred fathom curve
prior sortie. Task force provide own air coverage and
surface antisubmarine protection. After sortie fly on
air group. Proceed via route to west of POPPY toward
CACTUS arriving vicinity Uincpac grid posit G4694 {Lat.
14-00 s, Long. 161-30 E) about 21 hours zed 12 November.
Be prepared strike enemy targets CACTUS Area.
10 2156 CG FIRST MARDIV to COMSOPAC info CTF 62, COMAIRSOPAC, NOUMEA.
On West flank advance continued slowly in fact of increasing enemy resistance. On East flank our troops engaged
in mopping up Jap position near TETERE. Raider battalion
has reached BINIU and is patrolling between BALESUNA and
METAPONA rivers. Morning search negative. Enemy planes
approached at 1015. Fighters intercepted. One zero hot
down. Evening search sighted five DD's 210 miles CACTUS.
Striking force of 17 fighters and 8 SED's got three near
misses on each of two destroyers at 1815. One plane lost
after takeoff. Pilot and gurmer rescued. One pilot lost
last week also recovered.
11 0954 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC info COMINCH.
Consider situation here such that reenforcements required
earliest possible time. Highly desirable use own aircraft, bombs, torpedoes, and ammunition along with our
landing signal officers, key deck personnel, maintenance
crews and torpedomen. If above is done believe 2 weeks
tra.ining will suffice. Augmentation by Sopac Squadron
will be dependent upon timely arrival of additional such
this area.
10 2030 CTF 8 to TF 8, Info COMINCH, CINCPAC, CGWDC, etc.
Four P-38's escorted by B-17 strafed and destroyed 7 float
zeros in HOLTZ BAY ATTU 9 November. Two exploded all
burning. Ten or 12 men observed on beach. No opposition
no damage to cw1n planes. Two B-26's made low level attack
on AK in GERTRUDE COVE-result ing in near misses. Two
P-3S's strafed cargo ship in KISKA harbor and beach area.
Heavy AA fire from cargo ship shooting out one engine in
P-38. All planes returned. No changes in enemy shipping
at KISKA. CTF 8 sends. Info stati~ns pass to following
local addes Cominch Cincpac Comwesseafron CGWDC and
Coml~lSeaFron.

977

-BECRET

November (GCT)
09 0334 FANTAN to COMAIRSOPAC Info CINCPAC.

Field report on NANDI NAREWA field follows. No runway

construction in progress. New dispersal area is 70%
completed, Five heavy bomber hardstandings and three
dispersal roads totaling 4000 feet have been completed.
Three roads totaling 3000 feet are being stabilized.
The last 2000 feet of road is being cleared. Report on
DRASA follows. The number two runway is 50% completed.
Allow seven weeks to complete. Cat and fill work is being done on the last 2000 feet. Gravel is oeing placed
on the first 2000 feet. Gravel stabilization is 15% completed. Report on NAUSORI aerodrome follows. The one
four runway is completed to 5000 feet. The tile drain
is 47% completed. The open drains are 90% completed.
The 48 inch culvert has been completed. Stabilization
is 17% completed.
12 0635 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC Into COMINCH, COM.AMPHIBFORSOPAC, etc.
Amphibforpac at SAN DIEGO faced with necessity of rapidly
training for amphibious warfare third Marine division and
possibly one Army division. Only combat loaders now
available to Amphibforpac are two transports one freighter.
Training cannot be carried forward at reasonable rate nor
progress beyond elementary stage without sufficient combat
loaders for at least a reenforced regiment preferably for
a division. Spearhead for next Sopac advance cannot be
sharpened without this training. Believe completion troop
movements now in hand in your area and delivery of ten
liberty class freighters to you of which first is now
enroute will materially ease your shipping situation. Therefore I desire that the combat loading transports and
freighters which are permanently assigned Amphibforpac but
doing temporary duty at present in Amphibforsopac be returned to SAN DIEGO as soon as this can be done without
serious prejudice to your current operations. First two
transports and first freighter should arrive SAN DIEGO by
20 December if pra-c ticable. It will be satisfactory for
ships returning to leave in Amphibforsopac all serviceable
landing craft and boat crews for them these shortages to
be made good after arrival in SAN DIEGO. Advise.
12 0059 COMSOPAC to COlVIINCH~ CINCPAC, COMSWESPAC, CTF 42 16 17 63.
Referring SOUTI~tD attack on Jap ss. Sopac operations.
Later reports states attack blew sub stern out of water.
Sub surfaced 1 minut e later then slid under stern 1st
after 1 4" hit in about control room. Search made afterward by HOVEY and PBY. Result negative. Halsey sends.
(Continued on next page)

97 8

SECRE'l'

November (GCT)
12 0059 COMSOPAC {Continued)
Carpender pass to MacArthur. Comgensopac and ComgenSUMA.C
have. on ~ GUADALCANAL lOth our advance continued on west
flank. Enemy resistance there increasing. On east flank
our troops engaged in mopping up Jap positions near
TETERE. Evening search lOth sighted 5 DDs 210 miles from
GUADALCANAL. Striking force of 17 fighters 8 SBD's got
3 near misses on each of 2 DDs. 1 plane lost after takeoff. Pilot and gunner rescued. At 0930 L (-11) 10 Aichi
Type 97 dive bombers and 12 zeros attacked ships GUADALCANAL. ZEILIN damaged by 3 near misses. No other damage.
Our planes shot down 5 zeros 1 dive bomber. 2 zeros 1
dive bomber additional probables. At 1135 L (-11) 11th
5 zeros and 25 twin engine bombers attacked GUADALCANAL.
Our ulanes shot down 6 bombers. AA downed 1 bomber. Our
losses 7 Grummans. 2 pilots saved. Also 5 Grummans
damaged. No other damage.
12 2322 PORTLAND to COMSOPAC _Info CTF 67, 67.4. CINCPAC, COMINCH.
Damage

action 12-13 November off GUADALCANAL. PORTTorpedo hit aft frame 137 starboard blew large hole
in side destroying stern. No means of steering. Minor
damage caused by 5-inch shell hit starboard hangar no fire.
Can use 2 outboard engines. Rudder appears jammed hard
right. Following garbled account from ATLANTA damage as
result of night action. 6 turrets out of commission. Both
fire rooms and forward engine rooms flooded. After engine
room gradually flooding. Have only diesel auxiliary uower.
Steering gear operating. Foremast gone. Ship received
many 8-inch hits and 1 torpedo hit. Latter in number 1
engine room port. Bridge struck. Have renuested assistance
from CACTUS. Intend to send WORDEN and others NECUJRS
to garble garble in case available for garble garble. If
not available conditions of ship warrants sinking. Request
instructions regarding. Following observed. CUSHING large
fire visible under formast from waterline. 2 other friendly
destroyers near TULAGI damage unknown.
ni~ht

UU~D.

13 0115 CTF 67 to COMSOPAC, CINCPAC, ALL TF COMDRS PACIFIC, etc.

Following essential for your information includes originator
CTF 67 120522 refused 10 times by circuit Monitor. Para.
Task Force 67 on arrival KUKUM 12th received fire from
enemy shore battery. This is part one of CTF 67 130200.
Our cruisers and destroyers heavily shelled enemy positions
silencing battery causing many large fires and explosions.
At TASSFARONGA found 75 landing boats some previously
damaged. Our ships gunfire destroyed 30 large damaged others.
Fire stopped due to enemy air attacks.

979

~ORE'l.'-

November (GCT)

.'~

13 0140 CTF 67 to COMSOPAC Info CINCPAC, All TF COMS PAC, COMINCH, etc.
This is part 2 of CTF 67 130200. At 1414 12th ships this
force plus BETELGEUSE LIBRA SOUTHARD HOVEY while underway
in close disposition were attacked by about 21 Mitsubishi
97 torpedo bombers which approached low over FLORIDA during
high and dive bombing attack on CACTUS, 9 enemy planes
seen shot down by ships and boat gunfire others by fighters
only 1 enemy plane seen to escape. SAN FRANCISCO was side
swiped stern to bow by heavily burning plane battle 2 after
control and radar destroyed causing 30 casualties. BUCiiANAN
struck by one 5-inch shell some materiel damage 6 casualties.
A few casualties other ships from own fire, No other damage
to our ships. Para. All troops debarked from convoy McCAWLEY JACKSON completely unloadedg ADAMS SO%, CRESCENT .
CITY 50%, BETELGEUSE 40%, LIBRA 20~.
13 0200 CTF 67 to COMSOPAC, etc.
This is part 3 master reference 130200. At 1830 force
withdrew to east, Turner with trans~orts and AK's SIIAW,
McCALLA, BUCHANAN, SOUTHARD, HOVEY for RJT'fON, Callaghan
with Task Group 67.4 5 cruisers, 8 destroyers, intending
strike force reported in CTF 63 120030. If enemy was
found in Straits Callaghan expected reenter SAVO SOUND
through SEALARK between 2300 and 0100. We were aware of
enemy forces reported NPM 200 and CACTUS 120625. Para.
After arrival BUTTON SHAW McCALLA, BUCHANAN available to
you after fueling latter requires some repairs. Comsopao
pass to Comgensopac.
13 0428 CACTUS to COMSOPAC Info CO:MAIRSOPAC, CTF 67, NOUMEA, etc.
First intelligible picture this cockpit. At 1200 love (-11)
KONGO Class BB with 7 torpedo hits and 1-1000 pound bomb
after part of ship burning fiercely 10 miles north SAVO
ISLAND. 5 enemy DD's attempting assist her. 1 ship believed hostile DD beached and smoking north coast OLEVUGA
IRLAND. 2 vessels possibly DDs steaming circles trailing
oil just east NUGU ISLAND identity unknown. Large vessel
I~IDISPENSA~LE STRAIT type and identity unknown,
CUSHING
burning 5 miles southeast SAVO ISLAND, MONSSEN dead in
water near CUSHING both abandoned, ATLANTA and PORTLAND
badly damaged 10 miles southeast SAVO ISLAND proceeding
slowly eastward. ATLANTA in tow by lOBOLINK. LAFFEY was
sunk. 700 survivors picked up 25 percent of which wounded,
Much oil and debris and some survivors in water south of
SAVO ISLAND. Some enemy survivors taken being questioned
to determine name of vessel.

980

-8EORET

NOVEMBER (GCT)
13 1730 COMSOPAC to CTF 16 Info ALL TF COMS SOP.AC, CINCPAC, COMSWPac.
Proceed northwesterly remaining about 100 miles from
SOJ.JOMON ISLAND chain. Your objective transports expected
moving from FAISI area toward CAy- ~RJS. See NPM Fox Number
349 TOR 130110. Intention send lee similar objective
parallel to you near Island chain. Supplement BUTTON and
CACTUS searches by your own as necessary to locate and
destroy AP's. CACTUS has essentials. CARPENDER pass.

14 1020

CO~.~SOPAC

to GUADALCANAL Info CINCPAC.

Taskfor 16 VF shot down 4 engine seaplane at 1030. Scouts

reported 10 enemy pls.nes apryroaching us but no attack
developed. Sent attack group hit enemy near NIDv GEORGIA
to land CACRJS. Retiring south to fuel DDs tomorrow. If
there is an air group available CACTUS can return to pick
it up but not advisable. No information regarding number
that arrived
from Kinkaid. Number 1 elevator out of
commission. Has trouble with number 3. MUSTIN separated
due change orders proceedin~ nearest port for fuel. 16
VF remaining on board. No (last three groups garbled).
This is Comtaskfor 16 140122 passed to you in another system by Comsopac.

14 ,Q716 COM NAV UNIT CACTUS to RDO TULAGI, Info COMSOPAC, COMAIRSOPAC,
My 140122 air strike from CACTUS have seriously damaged
many transports but force may proceed in reduced numbers.
Task Force 64 may be in area this evening. Info PT's.

etc.

14 1058 .SAN FRANCISCO to CINCPAC, COMSOPAC, CTF 17, Info COMAIRSOPAC,

HELENA.
Preliminary report battle damage ni~~t action 12-13 Nov.
Captain Young. Comdr. Grouter. Comdr. Hubbard dead. Comdr.
Arison (navigator) seriously wounded. Lt.Comdr. Schonland
in command. Officers dead 11. Missing 1. Wounded S. Enlisted dead 63. Wounded 88. Missing 10. Staff reported
separately. Numerous shell hits (several 14 inch bombardment) above and below water line. Superstructure riddled.
Nav bridge battle 2 both after directors out of commission.
Turret 2 out due flooded handling room and possibly flooded
magazines. Plotting room untenable due lack of ventilation.
4 5-inch guns 3 1.1-mounts and 4 20-mm out. Engineering
Dept. in good condition except for numerous ruptures of
cables including degaussing 4 leaky fuel tanks and no engine
room ventilation. After gyro out. Ship control from Conn
and Central only. TBC transmitter plus SC and after Radars
out. No fightin g lights. Fighting efficiency about 25 percent. Got numerous hits on Jap cruiser which blew up and
(Continued on next page)

981

November (GCT}
14 1058 SAN FRANCISCO to CINCPAC.

(Continued )

got 18 main battery hits on KCDNGO Class battleship at

2000 yards. 5 inch battery sank a DD. SAN FRM~CISCO
paren night boat to TULAGI originate s. Comairsop ac and
HELENA have.
14 1115 SAN FRANCISCO to COMSOPAC, CTF 17, CINCPAC, Info COMAIRSOPAC.
Originated by SAN F~crsco. During air attack afternoon
Nov 12 following casualtie s. Dead 1 officer 10 enlisted.
Wounded 5 officers 22 enlisted. Missing 5 enlisted of whom
1 picked up by LAFFEY and on her during subsequen t night
action. All wounded transferre d to transports except
Comdr Grouter who later died of additiona l wounds received
in night action. Torpedo plane flew into control aft .
putting that station after FC Radar and after machine gun
platfor-m out of action and damaging battle 2. CO HELENA
and Comairsop ac have this.
14 1406 HELENA to COMSOPAC, Info CINCPAC. CTF 67, COI!AIRSOPAC,
Your 140925. dUNEAU torpedoed and sunk by submarine at
1109 love (-11} 14th posit 10-32 south 161-02 east. HELENA
originatin g this. Thls informatio n transmitte d visually
to B-17 patrol plane with instructio ns to forward to Comsopac at 1121 love. Buchanan joined this group from Turners
force at 1215 love.
13 2233 CG 1st MARDIV to COMSOPAC, Info CTF 62, COMAIRSOPAC, etc.
Ground action confined to east flank where raiders continued to attack Jap groups southwest of TETERE. At least
eip~ty Japs killed in three contacts.
0730 fighters shot
down eight of group 10 zeros near SAVO '"ri th loss one
fighter. KONGO Class BB attacked 7 times by TBF's and 5
times by SBD's. Seven torpedo hits and two 1,000 pound
bomb hits. At 1850 BB still afloat although burning and
smoking ve~J little way with five DD escorting . Fighters
straffed DD at zero nine thirty and twelve thirty. 2 recon-
naissance flights for reported enemy CV's negative. 1745
near miss by SBD on probable Cast Love circling damaged
BB. Other SBD's failed make contact due zero weather 2
SBD's lost 1900 Dog Cast 3 crashed off KUKl~. Crew lost
zero one thirty dash zero two forty enemy surface craft
bombarded airfield. Two hits on fighter strip. One SED
two F4F destroyed . 17 F4F damaged but majority repairable
today. Personnel casualties light. Pass to Comgen First
MarAmphCorp for Info.

982

8EORE'f

November (GCT)
15 0355 CTF 64 to COMSOPAC, Info CINCPAC, COiv1AIRSOPAC.
Enemy damage considerable but data incomplete. WALKE,
PRESTON lost south SAVO. BENHAM, GWIN seriously damaged
proceeding slow speed west and south GUADALCM~AL toward
BUTTON at 0245 (-11) 15th. Present status not known.
SOUTH DAKOTA by gunfire hits 30 dead 60 wounded. Serious
damage battery. Fire Control. Radar. Catapult and
planes. 5 tanks ruptured but is capable 27 knots. Navy
yard repairs required to make effective. WASIIINGTON undamaged except washed out kingfishers by own gun blast.
Now in company SOUTH DAKOTA proceeding to meet DD's your
142358. Unless otherwise directed will send SOUTH DAKOTA
to WHITE POPPY escorted by 2 DD's. Request air coverage
~ENJL[M and GWIN and search for survivors south and west
of SAVO. Air attack reported my 142344 planes withdrew
before attack developed.
15 0355 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, Info COMINCH, COMSOWESPAC.
At 1030 L 14th a convoy of 25 ships comprising 12 AP,
and the rest escort 115 miles northwest CACTUS course
southeast. At 1600 L (-11) 14th CACTUS reported 6 AP
seriously damaged several DD milling around 60 miles
northwest of SAVO ISLAND. At 600 L 15th, 3 AP are reported burning and abandoned in position of first contact. The same hour 4 AP unloading at TASSAFARONGA and
CAPE ESPERANCE. At 1600 L 14th a large enemy force of
cruisers and DD's reported at 6-52 south 160 east course
165 speed 17 verified by submarine. At 200 L 15th this
force identified as 1 CL 4 CA 10 DD. At 800 L 15th 1
CA 1 CL 2 DD 150 miles north course speed 12. 3 CA
and 8 DD missing at 1030 L 15th. Task 64 in 11-00 south
160-45 east. My 122314 ATLANTA MONSSEN and LAFFEY sunk
CUSHING and ~TON missing. 1400 survivors at CACTUS.
Aircraft losses 1 fighter 2 F4F 3 SBD 1 DC-J. Enemy
lost 8 of 10 zeros. ~AU torpedoed and sunk by SS
1109 L 14th at 10-32 south 161-02 east. Enemy appears
to have suffered the following damage 1 DD sunk 1 cruiser
blew up 1 BB KONGO or FUSO Class heavily damaged and
unreported since afternoon 13th. Another BB damaged.
3 cruisers heavily damaged possibly sunk. 3 DD damag.e d
1 unaccounted for. This does not include damage to
convoy and its escort nor large force cruisers and DD's.
Reported at 1600 L 14th in 06-52 south 160-00 east.
Comsopac originator. Carpender pass to MacArthur. Comgensopac Compenamphi bforsopac info by hand.

98 3

..fffi!C HET' -

November (GCT)
15 1310 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, COMSOWESPAC, MacARTHUR,
COMGENSOPAC.
In addition to my 150355 regarding 12 AP. Five sunk
three burning dead in water northwest of SAVO. Four
~ ~eported unloading at GUADALCANAL are beached and jurning there. Comsopac sends, Lee reports much damage to
enemy but no specific information. Carpender pass to
MacArthur. SOUTH DAKOTA ~equires Navy Yard repairs but
still capable of 27 knots. Comgensopac has by hand for
info. WASHINGTON unharmed, WAlKE and PRESTON sunk.
BENHAM and GWIN seriously damaged, PORTLAND sank 1
SHIGURI type BD night action early morning 13th.

14 1926 VOPNAV to COMPOPAC, Info CINCPAC.

Delivery of aircraft and aviation material to NEW ZEALAND
air force has been limited by combined agreements to 10
combat squadrons for period ending April 1943. Now under
consideration is question of allocation of aircraft production to various united nations for period ending April
1943. NEW ZEALAND considers herself capable of training
air and ground personnel up to 30 squadrons for service
in SoPac and would prefer to employ them in that area
rather than continue to send them overseas to EUROPEAN
and AFRICAN theaters. Present outlook indicates feasibility of increasing all allocations a bove present levels.
NIDV ZEALAND's share of increase would be on the order of
50 percent which would give a grand total of 15 squadrons
by April 1943. Any disproportionate increase in allocation of material to NEW ZEALAND must be set by corresponding decrease of allocations to other services now in South
Pacific. Your views on this matter are desired at an
early date in view of studies now being made. In particular desire your estimate of attrition based on the 15
squadrons strength having in mind your plans for their
employment. NEW ZEALAND air force is being queried on
the subject by their representatives in Washington.
15 1012 CTF 62 to COMSOPAC, Info TF COMRDS SOPAC etc.
..

'

Preliminary report by HELENA of night action 13th by Task

Group 67.4 now in airmail. From CTF 62. As result conference today with commanding officers ships of this groun
present BUTTON. My preliminary evaluation enemy strengt h ~.
and losses and certain other details follows. A enemy
in 3 grouns totalling 2 KONGO battleships, 2 CA, 4 CL,
about 10 destroyers. Our force passed between right and
center grou~s. Most of the firing was at ranges of 1500
to 4000 yards. B 1 battleship was struck with 2 torpedoes
seen to detonate also heavily hit set afire by 8 inch.
This probably shi p found and attacked near SAVO during
next day. Am (not clear what finally became of this vessel.

984

.-OEORE'f

November (GCT)
15 1012 CTF 62 to CO.HSOPAC (continued)
5 destroyers seen about noon assisting believed not to have
been in this action). Other battleship hit with 2 torpedoes
and gun fire. 'This probably ship seen at dawn with 3 destroyers 40 miles distant.

15 1015 Part two of master reference 151012 from CTF 62.

C 2 CA seen to blow up and sink from torpedoes and gunfire.
D 1 NATORI seen to sink, 2 additional TENRU or NATORI
heavily hit and aflame;possibly these were the vessels
seen later near NUGU ISLAND. E 1 BUBUKI, 2 or 3 other
destroyers blew u~ several set on fire, probably one of
these later seen beached on OLEVUGA ISLAND. F Center and
left enemy groups apparently engaged each other, then all
remaining ceased fire and withdrew. G Believe all enemy
vessels that escaped were hit. H. Action started at 0148
LAFFEY seen to sink from gunfire at 0153. BARTON seen to
blow up from gunfire and torpedo hit. At 0156 T Callaghan
and most of staff killed within 10 minutes of start of
action. This fact not known to other ships until action
was over.
Neither Fletcher nor Obannon were hit but latter damaged by underwater explosion possibly depth charge from
LAFFEY.

16 1124 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, COMINCH, COMSOWESPAC,

Summary of enemy damage. Evaluated by Comsopac. From
November 8th to 16th inclusive. Carpenter hand to
McArthur. Sunk or destroyed 1 B'9,. 3 CA, 2 CL, 5 DD,
10 AP, 3 AK, 2 ss. Damaged 1 BB, 6 DD. Comgensopac
and Comgenamphibsonac have for info by hand. Comsopac
sends. SOLOMON, HEW BRITAIN area froYrJ. all sources so
far reported. Neither lees score nor possible bag by
our subs included. CACTUS reports raider patrol captured
large quantity ammunition and suuDlies including personal
effects Major General Kawacuchi. 15th November bombers
with 8 zeros; over 6 zeros shot down, 2 others urobable
bombers turned back. Our air losses nil. Heavy losses
of enemy personnel suffered from beached transuorts.
Their operations unsuccessful. Our continuous bombi r1gs
started series of fires still burni~g at dawn November 16th.
15 2246 COMDGEN 1ST MARDIV to COMSOPAC, Info CTF 62 etc.
Daily dope part one. Raider patrol destroyed nip NARAUDER
BASE VOUTEA 5 miles southwest of BINIU killing five and
capturing large quantities of ammunition sup:)lies and
documents. Material recentl y captured near TETERE included personal effects Major General Kawaguchi. Morning

98 5

~CRET

November (GCT)

15 2246 COMDGENlST

MAJ~DIV

to COMSQDAC (continued)

search reported enemy force 4 CL and DDs bearing 350,

course 330, distance 80. 0630 3 enemy AK and 1 AP between POHA RIVER and CAPE ESPERANCE. All destroyed by
noon, 1 sunk, 3 completely ablaze. 1530 8 zeros and
10-12 dive bombers intercepted by f~hers. 6 zeros certain and 2 probables shot down. Bombers turned back.
No fighters lost.
14 1921 COMINCH to CINCPAC, Info COMSOPAC
From COFS Army and Cominch. Addressees will deliver this
despatch to army and navy commanders as necessary.
Army and navy air organizations assigned to the Central
and South Pacific areas and navy air organizations assigned North Pacific are subject to deployment and redistribution by Cincpac at his descretion. Jig, cast,
sail confidential despatch 041819 of May is modified
accordingly.
The purpo~e of authorizing Cinc,ac to dispose all navy
and army air organizations in the Central and South Pacific areas at his descretion is to allow the commander on
the spot entire freedom in the disuosition of available
forces for the defense of positions for which he is responsible. Redistributions under this authority are
limited to the forxes allotted by the war and Navy Departments and therefore will not be ordered on the basis
of creating requirements for additional units.
14 1928 Part two of 141928.
Necessary delegation to Comsouac of your mentioned authority is authorized.
Any redistribution of air organizations made or planned
should be reported to the War or Navy Department as appropriate for information and logistic purposes.
War and Navy Departments will keep Cincpac informed of
planned replacements and allocations of aircraft and personnel when in all respects ready for delivery can be
loaded or flown .to destination desired 0y Cincpac. A
similar procedure will be followed in regard to air
organizations made available by War or Navy Department.

986

-SECRE!'

November (GOG)
16 0830 PORTLAND to CTF 64, etc.

(Continued)

open fire. Rolled over and sank in 30 seconds. WALKE

hit by heavy cali b.r e shells forward and in waist and
possible torpedo, sank in about 5 minutes. MEADE, BOBOLINK and YP recovered about 24 officers and about 220
men. By hand to Comnavact SOLOMON ISLANDS.
15 0145 MEADE to

CO~!L.SOPAC,

CTF 62, Info CINCPAC, COMINCH, etc.

Bombarded 3 enemy transports beached on GUADALCANAL

morning of 15th (MEADE RENDS). 600 rounds expended no
opposition believed personnel landed prior to bombardment. Left transports burning fiercely. Recovered
following survivors from waters off SAVO ISLAND from
WALKE Executive and 5 officers 129 men, from PRESTON
10 officers 121 men,from BENHAM one man, landed all at
RINGIDLT. Straffed by zero 3 my crew minor wounds.
Senior naval officer GUADALCANAL has in another system.
16 1144 COMCOPAC, to All COMGENS SOPAC, etc,
Following effective this date. Afirm. Marine units deBaker. For coordination
tached from Amphibious Force.
of operations joint planning will be conducted by Comgen
First Marine Amphibious Corps and Comamphibfor Sopac under
control Comsopac. Cast, All Marine Corps organizations
Sopac Area except Marine aviation regular ships detachments and units in STRAW area and FETLOCK assigned First
Marine Amphibious Corps. Dog. Transportation of reinforcements replacements relief units and supplies and
equipment to CACTUS RINGBOLT remains responsibility Comamphibforsopac.
14 0358 RDO CACTUS to CO:MSOPAC, C011AIR80PAC, Info CINCPAC, etc,
Captain Jenkins senior survivor CACTUS sends. Results
action TF 67.4 off SAVO 0200 13th. Believe BARTON and
LAFFEY sank early in action ATLANTA sank 2015 love (-11)
fair search 14th failed to locate MONSSEN and CUSHING latter seen fast burning southeast of SAVO dark 13th. Rear
Admiral Scott and entire staff killed in action except
Lt. Murdock badly wounded. Lt. Thomas Ranr also killed.
Conm.anding officers ATLANTA, CUSHING, MONSSEN and Comdesdiv 10 among survivors here. Approximate percentage survivors officers and crews above vessels ATLANTA 60, CUSHING 70, LAFFEY MONSSEN 30, BARTON 10. About 25 percent
survivors wounded many ~eriously. Known Jap losses two
destroyers sunk, one badly damaged and beached. One BB
badly damaged and later information indicates sunk by aircraft.

987

SECREr:r--

November (GCT)
16 1133 CTli' 62 to CONISOPAC, Info ALL TF COMDHS SOPAC, COMINCH, CINCPAC,
Whatever the enemy plans with regard to major offensive
measures it is clear that he now will do what he has heretofore neglected to do: Concentrate on damage to our supply lines to CACTUS by the use of submarines, minor surface
vessels and aircraft, Para. As the maintenance and building up of our CAC~JS position is the cardinal feature of the
Sopac campaign, it is recommended that every effort be
exerted to obtain protection of our co~~unications in the
features and forces which we now lack. These are: About
20 su~chasers based in RINGBOLT for direct protection and
to operate as hunting groups in INDISPENSABLE STRAIT, 12
VOS seaplanes in RINGEOLT and 12 in MARMASIKE STRAIT for
the same purpose, minefields off RING~LT and in LENGO CHANNEL, 1 alternate carrier air group at AOLA BAY as soon as
the field is ready, and reinforcemen ts of destroyers withdrawn from regions of less imminent importance, Para. It
is unnecessary to mention to you the requirement of carriers
long range aircraft cruisers battleships and troops and
their transport which Cincpac has recommended for offensive
employment and for broadening our base of operations. Such
forces have been indicated as available but so far have
not been sent. Para. It is my belief that the Navy has now
the forces which we require for our job, and I hope that
the Navy will be able to send us these forces, here when
they are needed in the South Pacific, to forward our final
victory.
17 0400 PORTLAND to COMSOPAC Info CINCPAC.
Part two. Action and info same except Buord not info this
part. Still from PORTLAND. After action positively identified one NACHI Class burning until gutted and sank about
0330 L {-11) 13th. Tentative identificatio n one TENRYU
Class did same. After action there were nine burning ships
lying to of which only three could have been friendly. At
daylipftt saw one Jap DD off SAVO previously reported sunk
my 142100 and one IL~RUNA and unidentified Jap cruiser on
horizon. During action in addition to sinking one HIBIKI
Class DD PORTLAND hit BB many times with 4 salvos about
4000 yards and several hits 2 salvos one unidentified cruiser. Action report follows air mail.
(Note: Part 2 received 1st, part 1 not yet received).
16 0830 POHTLAND to CTF 64, Info COMSOPAC, CINCPAC, COT':'fNAVACT SOLOMONS.
Action Comtaskfor 64 info Comsopac and Cincpac from the
Senior uninjured stl'rvi vor PRESTON Lt. ( jg) Gibson
states most of action night 14 - 15th neither PRESTON nor
WALKE saw target when ~3Bs opened. Both opened fir'e on believed cruiser targets about 3 minutes after BBs PRESTON
hit by 8 inch salvo plus possible torpedo 3 minutes after
PORTLAND.

(Continued on next page)

98 8

.
I

~EGRET

November (GCT)

'-~ -

17 0804 PORTLAND to COMSOPAC Info CINCPAC BUORD.

Here comes part one of two parts. Action Comsopac info
Cincpac with ~ord info first part only. PORTLAND sends.
Examination two fourteen inch hits PORTLAND ANBNFJD
AARON WARD clearly indicates Japanese battleships were
loaded with bombardment shells instantaneous fused.
Practically no penetration and little damage. Half of
one fourteen inch projectile base ring recovered stamped
3687520 with 22 under last two digits. Also 142 with
inverted 4 ov'e r center digit Q.Q thats all part o.n e,
18 0655 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, COMSOWESPAC, COMGENSOPAC, etc
Action Cincpac info Cominch and Comsowespac from Comsopac.
From incomplete reports ENTERPRISE planes made repeated
attacks on enemy ships between November 13 and 15 inclusive inflicting following damage. Carpender pass to
MacArthur. 8 torpedo hits on BB. 3 torpedo hits on a
CL. 4 torpedo hits 3 bomb hits 2 near misses on transports. Comsopac forwards. On troops and equipment 2
500 pound bombs and 25 incendiary bombs. By hand to
Comgensopac and First Maramphcorps for info.
17 2205 COMDGEN 1st

Y~DIV

to COMSOPAC Info CTF 62 P.ADIO NOUMEA, etc.

No important ground activity with ref enemy landing near

TETERE two November now estimated fifteen hundred troops
landed. Eight hundred have been killed. Remainder dispersed into -groups working back into jungle. Force no
longer considered to be effective due disorganization pursuant to loss of supplies and repeated attacks air and
ground. Morning searches negative except large fires
northern tip of NEW GEORGIA. P-38's and S~D's attacked
mission station northern ~N GEORGIA near ROVIA!JA ISLE
reported occupied by Japs. Bombs dropped but no activity
noted. Evening searches negative. RDO WHITE POPPY pass
to Comgen First Marphcorp.

989

-s.EC:Etl1:T

November (GCT)
18 2131

CINCPAC to COMSOPAC Info COMSUBPAC.

In view. A. Effectiven ess of past patrols in Empire
waters. B. Very low present strength these patrols.
C. Lull in enemy activity and improved situation CACTUS
area. Propose return to Empire patrol Subron 10 subs
now based PEARL and withdraw SILVERSIDES, FLYING FISH,
WAHOO from Sopac for far western patrol on completion
present patrols and refit by SPERRY at BRISBA}ffi. Would
then return SPERRY to PEARL. On assumption twelve
Sowespac submarines continue base northeast AUSTRALIA
you will have available that number f.Or patrols : SOLOMONS
SEA. Comsowesp acfor to retain a number of submarines
from Squadron 2 to keep at 20 the total based AUSTRALIA
pending arrival remainder Subrons 6 and 8. I also plan
send you ARGONAUT on 23rd. English will send you her
new character istics as APS. Comment.

19 0659

CTF 64 to COMSOPAC Info ALL TF COMDR SOPAC AREA, CINCPAC, etc.

Summary by Comtaskfo r 64 of data available from WASHINGTON, SOUTH DAKOTA concerning night action SAVO ISLAND
14-15 November indicates following enemy sunk. 1 heavy
cruiser or battleship . 3 large cruisers probably heavies.
1 destroyer . Additiona l enemy ships damaged. l 14-inch
gun battleship hit repeatedly by 16-inch and some 5-inch.
One cruiser and 1 destroyer burning. Observed rapid and
accurate gunfire from own destroyer s which contribute d
to sinking of 1 enemy nn and damage to other as reported
above.

lS 233S

C01.1GEN 1ST :MARDIV to COMSQ"TJACFOR Info COMAIRSOPACFOR, etc.

Bomber field graded 5400 feet mat laid 3900 feet. Crowning complete to additiona l hundred feet. Mat constructi on
to terminate at 400 feet fort ime being. 5 revetments
comnlete and sixth under constructi on. Drainage system
under constructi on. Fighter field 2 graded four thousand
feet. Approache s 90% cleared. Four retments(p robably
revetment s) under constructi on. Runways being graded and
four hundred feet matted. Road system at bomber field and
fighter field 2 being graded. One bomb resistant command
post and two uersonnel bomb resistant shelters completed
at bomber field. Weekly report.

99 0

..g=g 011El '!'

November (GCT)
20 1135

COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, COMSOWESPAC, etc.

Jap uatrols were active and aggressive during the 18th.
Our forces pushing strong outposts nreceded by uatrols
across the r~TANIKAU RIVER to nositions west of POINT
CRUZ preparatory to general attack. Comso~ac relays
P-38's from CACTUS escorted B-17 and B-26's on raid to
TO NO LEI morning 18th. :h,ormer shot down 3 zeros in addition to damage of enemy reported yesterday. Carpender pass to McArthur. Ground action GUADALCANAL 19th
limited to patrol activity covering advancement of outpost line. About 35 Japs killed; own casualties light
Burned out enemy cargo ship not previously recorded, sank
close in shore CAPE ASTORLAE, MALAITA after an explosion time 0330 GCT/19. Comgensopac and Comgen I1~C have /
by hand for info.

20 0021

COMSUBPAC to COMSOPAC Info CINCPAC, COMINCH, CTF 42, etc.

ARGONAUT departs PEARL for Sopac November 23rd. Has following characteristics. In addition to crew can carry
164 fully equipped enlisted and 6 officer troops. Aviation gas capacity 22,000 gallons. Armament 2 6 inch 53
caliber, 5 20~ 1 , 4 submerged and 4 deck firing tubes,
4 deck stowage tubes, 8 interior torpedo stowage racks.
Ammunition 200 rounds 6 inch bombardment, 200 rounds common, 15,000 rounds 20MM, 20 torpedoes. If only 6 torpedoes
are carried, apnroximately 100 tons bulk cargo can be carried.ln cargo space of approximately 14000 cubic feet.
Cargo must be able to pass through circular hatch 26 inch
diameter. 9000 miles radius at maximum surface speed 13.5
knots. Stowage for 24 marine rubber landing boats. 30
days subsistence when carrying troons. Particularly suit~
ed as raider transuort with six inch gun landing su~nort,
advance base seaplane tender, fueling seaplanes at sea,
cargo carrier, bombardment of enemy positions and general
submarine duties a~ainst ~ombardment of own forces.
Cincpac has for info.

20 0923

CINCPAC t'o COMINCH Info COMSO'?AC, COMGENHAWDEPT.

Status bases OSTLER and LINEOUT not entirely clear.
Understand garrisons have arrived or about to. Recommend commanding officers report to Comsopac and assume
status of other Sopac bases. vtfill forward in a few days
my recommendations c ,)noerning ultimat-e defenses. Commanding Officer AZTEC should also re port to Comsopao if
he has not already done so.

991

SECRi:!J:' -

November (GCT)
21 0600 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMSOWESPAC, COMINCH, etc.
CACTUS announces for 21 November. Local operations by
Army unit vicinity POINT CRUZ in preparation for general
attack. Numerous patrols contacts along upper !/LATAHlKAU.
Comsopac daily. P-39's carried out 11 attack missions
against enemy installations. MacArthur from Carpender.
Comgensopac and Comgen ll~~c have by hand for info.
21 0643 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMSU3PAC, CTF 42, COMSUWESPAC.
Your 182131. NBNl BRITAIN - SOLOMONS areas are most fertile
hunting grounds so long as RABAUL - FAISI - KAVEING remain
in enemy hands and enemy forces on GUADALCANAL. Recommend no reduction in Sopac subs at present. If reduction
is made strongly urge 14 subs minimum for patrols in
SOLOMONS area divided 7 on patrol and 7 enroute or refitting ABODE. Comsopac sends.
20 0925 Cincpac to Vice Opnav, Info COMSERFORSUBCOM, COMSERONSOPAC, etc
Subject following comments concur fully objectives suggested
your 171939. Slow tankers to numbe J required best fitted
for COPPER run where convoys still in effect. Intermediate
fast and remaining slow ships are in ALASKA cma coastal and
Sopac services. Five or six fast Fleet tankers have been
kept available in Sopac area for task forces, Incident of
ESSO RICHM:OND regrettable but was primarily due to lack of
any shore storage in forward area. We are now employing
J. c. _DONNELL as mobile storage for biack oil Sopac area
and contemplate same use for KANAWHA when current repairs
completed. Hulk ERSKINE PHELPS will also help that regard.
Principal relief will be afforded by shore tanks under construction at WHITE POPPY ROSES and BU'rTON. Unless transportation of PT boats of immediate concern do not need any
more tankers for present other than those now in prospect.
Namely. WHITE PLAINS KAISER (AO) and PATUXENT when ready.
Situation may change by February as per Cincpac secret ltr
serial 0246 of 13 November to VOpnav. In addition foregoing and in furtherance your suggestions Comseronsopac hereby requested consider. Adopt and report on such of following measures as are practicable. Retain clean tanker ltRANK
G DRtT.M now in area as mobile storage. Do same for such
black oil slow commercial tankers as may be required. Do
not use fleet tankers for mobile storages unless absolutely
necessary and reduce those held for task forces to reasonable
number. Employ fleet tankers so released for freighting. As
implied by VOpnav the guiding principle should always be to
employ the faster ships on the long hauls.

992

~EOTIE'!'

November (GCT)
21 1238 Combatdiv 6 to COMSOPAC, Info COMINCH, COMBATPAC, CINCPAC, OPNAV.
Part 1 from Combatdiv 6. Tremendous value and some limitations radar demonstrated night of 14-15 November. BB's obtained excellent fire control results using radar range and
radar spot plus optical bearings. Strong signals from enemy
ships permitted quicker and more accurate solutions and spots
than on target practice. Opening range 1st phase 16 and
18000 yards illuminated by setting ~ both ships hitting
selected targets on 2nd salvos. Opening 2nd phase 6000 to
900 yards we used some star shells which functioned properly
but did not add to accuracy of fire. No indication enemy
used radar. When deprived artificial illumination he apparently ranged inaccurately on gun flashes. Hits on B 57 obtained when that ship illuminated by enemy searchlights at
about 6000 yards.

21 1242 Part 2. Second and final part Combatdiv 6. Accuracy own

fire definitely better than Japs and superiority increased
rapidly with range. SG radar invaluable in finding surface
targets and coaching fire control radars on. As currently
installed Batdiv 6 SG has wide blind arc astern. Single
instrument found insufficient to meet fire control needs and
supply adequate ship control and tactical information. Most
urgent and most important need for improvement night fighting
efficiency BBs is provision additional SG to 93rmit visual
access to plan position indicator by flag and conning officer. Elimination blind arcs also urgent and important.
SG type radar of little value in enclosed waters as targets
are lost in asparagus patch of land signals. Neither SC SG
nor fire control radars could discriminate Jap DD knom to
be- lying in against SAVO ISLAlJDS.
22 0120 COM.SOPAC to CINCPAC, Info COMINCH.

Your 120635 if ships detached from Sopac in accordance with

reference there would remain 7 AP 4 AK of which ~ELLATRIX
temporarily out due to battle damage LIBRA slightly damaged
and needs docking FULLER temporarily out due to collision.
McCAWLEY urgently requires docking. Present shortage requires sending chartered ship to CACTUS. Am sending remainder
American Division plus 6th Marines to CACTUS and withdrawing
1st Marine Division. Plan storing material CACTUS in preparation for next offensive move. 1st Marine Division upon
withdrawal must go into amphibious training. Desirable Army
and New Zealand troops this area also receive some amphibious
training. Even provided no further losses received ships
now this area totally inadequate for present and planned
operations. Liberty frei ghters will materially ease cargo
shipping situation but are not transports or equipped for
amphibious operations. Cannot transfer now or in future any
combat loadinR transports or frei ghters without prejudice to
operations. Comgensopac Comgen n.~c and Comamphibf orsopac .
have by hand for info from Comsopac.
993

SEQmi:T ,

November (GOT)
21 0052 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH.
Request all practicable efforts speed delivery PO's and
other listening equipped craft for base patrol and local
escort duties Sopac. Comsopac (originator) refers Cominch
151657 of September (Action Cincpac and Info Cominch) need
for these units to combat submarine menance in CACTUS area
and vicinity established bases increasingly acute.
21 1800 COMINCH to CINCPAC, Info COMSOPAC, COMAIR80PAC, COMAIRPAC.
Cincpac 180159. Indicate proposed relationship of subordinate command to Comairsopac and responsibilities toward Marine aviation in Sopac. Would additional personnel
be required. If proposed comt1and is established a more
distinctive title will be required,
22. 1037 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMGENSOPAC, COMINCH, etc.
In face of the stubborn resistance. Comsopac sends.
via Carpender. Our advance is continuing
slowly on west flank. No activity on other sectors.
Action Cincpac, Comgensopac, Comgenspac have for info.
Enemy positions west of MATANIKAU RIVER under continuous
attacking missions by P-39's, TBF's and SBD's. 1 near
miss was made on an AKin vicinity of DUNAI, NEW GEORGIA.
~~cArthur

22 1541 COMINCH to CINCLANT Info CINCPAC, COMSOPAC.

Transfer to Pac Flt for duty soon as practicable 4
combat loaded APs, one of them suitable for division
flagship, plus 2 combat loaded AKs. Advise expected
date ready to depart and names of vessels.
22 2125 CINCPAC to COMINCH Info COMSOPAC, COMSOWESPAC, COMSUBPAC.
Shift of submarines to Sopac in recent emergency required
practical abandonment of our patrol of Jap waters which
was very effective. As of this date none of .these patrol
stations is filled and no sub is yet enroute to them.
Consider the most critical period for CACTUS has passed.
Unless otherwise directed I will distribute Subs Pac Flt
as follows. ARGONAu~ plus one to bring to fourteen the
number of subs available operations SOLOMONS SEA. Subron
forty-five of 13 S boats for ALASKA and Sound School.
Remainder Subrons FOUR and TEN for Empire and TRUK patrols
comprising about 17 submarines not under navy yard overhaul.

994

~~

s~cg:gr;p

November (GOT)

~~~ti

22 2357 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, VOPNAV, COMSERFORPAC, ETC.

Consopac sends to Cincpac info Cominch, VOpnav, Comserforpac, Comdesp ac. STERETT sustained 11 shell hits port
side including 1 major caliber bombardment all above
waterline. Number 3 handling room, gun shelter and Number
4 handling room holed. Resultant fires with ready sel',vice
powder explosions caused extensive damage. Both after
guns out necessary replace. Also both torpedo mounts out
due direct hits require renewal. Recommend PEARL. Repairs make seaworthy completed. Vessel capable full power.
BUCHANAN being repaired WHITE POPPY completion December 6.
Repairs O'BANNON minor damage completed. Comseronsopac
by hand. Cincpac please deliver to Comdespac.
23 0612 COMSOPAC to ALL TF COMDRS SOPAC CTF 16,11,62,63,64, Info etc.
Task Forces under operational control of originator Comsopac are reorganized as follows: Task Force 11 Rear Admiral Ramsey in SARATOGA, SAN JUAN, COMDESRON 6 in BALCH,
GRIDLEY MCCALL CRAVEN DUNLAP FANNING. Task Force 16 Rear
Admiral Sherman in ENTERPRISE, SANDIEGO, Desron 2 MORRIS,
ANDERSON HUGiillS MUSTIN RUSSEL EE,UET CLARK. Task Force
64 Rear Admiral Lee in WASHINGTON, Batdiv 6 plus sc reening units as assigned. Task Force 65 Rear Admir~l Hill
in MARYLAND, COLORADO, NASSAU, ALTAMAHA, FARRAGUT, DALE
AYLWIN, HULL, MACDONOUGH, MONAGHAN. Task Force 67 Rear
Admiral Kinkaid (Rear Admiral Tisdale second in command)
NORTHAMPTON, PENSACOLA, NEVv ORLEANS, HONOLULU, HELENA,
LAMSON, NICHOLAS, 0 1 BANNON, FLETCHER, GRAYSON, MAURY.
The following units are assigned Task Force 66 (Escorts):
LANSDOWNE, WOODWORTH, LARDNER, MCCALLA, MEADE, SHAW,
STACK, BUCHANAN. Units not now in company will be directed to join Task Force Coomanders by originator Comsopac
as soon as practicable. Units assigned Task Forces 62
and 63 remain unchanged. Additional assignments to Task
Forces will be made from units now enroute. Combatant
units in Sopac area not assigned to Task Forces will operate under orders of Comsopac. The organization herein
prescribed is effective zero hours 24 November.

995

-flElCRET

November. (GCT)
24 0145 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMGENSOPAC.
Your 222241. Comsopac sends for action Cincpac. Based
on forces now available, garrison CACTUS after relief
now planned will consist of American Division and 2nd
1~r Div {6th, 7th, 8th Marines) plus attached units.
Command to senior troop commander under principal unity
of command. Command organization be separate despatch.
Base Commander POPPY Major General Lincoln, USA commands
all defense forces including KIWI CAST. under principal
unity of command. If 25th Division made available plan
send CACTUS relieve 2nd Marine Division in preparation
further offensive action. Comgen Sopac concurs and has
for info.

24 0525 An enemy encampment Reports GUADALCANAL On the north

slope Mambulo was contacted by patrol of 30 men First Marines.
ComSoPac Forwards Orange lost 5 machine guns plus
70 killed. Our casualties 2 wounded. Vfuile reorganizing
have temporarily halted operations on west flank. On 23rd
SBD and F4F4 strike at MUNDA; NEW GEORGE scored lDirect hit
on warehouse at LAMBETI. Sighted no shipping. Air reports
indicate Nips unloading at LIU LIU CHOISEL on 21st. Also
1 AK unloading near MUNDA 20th and 21st. Weather prevented
planes from reaching MUNDA. ComGenSoPac ComGen lMAC and
CTF 62 have by hand for info.
25 1215 COMSOPAC WO CINCPAC info

Cominch,CTF62,Comsowespac,Comgen~~

Comsopac relays from GUADALCANAL. At three hourse love (-11)

one enemy plane dropped bombs to the south of the field killing
and wounding several. No ground activity of importance past
twenty four hours. Shore positions of enemy harassed by nine
individual P-39 missions. Four bomb hits on buildings
LAMBETI not LOMBEJI as previously reported yesterdays despatch
NEW GEORGIA on 24th. Ten Zeros attacked bombers without damage
our planes ComGenSoPac and ComGenlMAC have by hand.
232222

COMINCH TO CINCPAC info COMSOPAC.

Your 200923 Garrisons OSTLER,LINEOUT each total 45 officers and
827 men and consist Headquarters Detachment, 1 Coast Artillery
Battery automatic weapons antiaircraft with searchlight platoon,
1 engineer company aviation, 1 airways detachment, 1 signal anti
aircraft warning company plus miscellaneou s service units. Both
SS KOTA AGEONG arrived OSTLER November 8 Thence to LINEOUT.
Report ComGenSoPac by dispatch. New Zealnd joint staff mission
assumes commanding officer Aztec already reported Comsopac.
Comsopac confirms. Cincpac give to ComGen Haw Dept for info.CO~ 1
Army has by hand.

996

(GCT)
26 1300 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, COMSOWESPAC, COMGENSOPAC, etc
Front lines area GUADALCANAL witnessed only ground activity
for the day. Our patrols engaged in cleaning out isolated
groups offering resistance. Daily Comsopac info. 4 B-17s
dropped 8 500-pound bombs enemy convoy 2 DDs and 2 AKs 1
AO vicinity PILOPILO GANONGGA. No hits observed. Our
bombers intercepted by 4 enemy zeros no damage resulting.
At 0410 L (-11) 26th 2 enemy bombers over CACTUS dropped
bombs without resultant damage. Our SED continued nightly
patrol over enemy lines. Comgensopac and Comgeni11AC have
by hand. Action Cincpac Info Cominch.
26 0458 CTF 62 to COMTltANSPORT DIV 8, Info C011INCH, CINCPAC, etc.
Abandonment AOLA project approved. Form Task Unit 62.4.6
Captain Ashe in NEVILLE, HEYiiJOOD, PRES. HAYES, FORMALHAUT,
Comdesdiv 24 in LANSDOVlNE, GRAYSON, SHAW, NICHOLAS. From
CTF 62. Task unit depart BUTTON earliest daylight Nov
27th proceed CACTUS via east and north of SAN CRIST03AL
and LENGO CHANNEL to arrive 0530L (-11) 29th. Unload on
beach extending 3000 yards east of TOG~~~A POINT. Embarked
personnel esta0lish base at VOLINAVUA as directed by Comgen CACTUS. On completion unloading NEVILLE, HAYES, HEYVvOOD return to BUTTON via same route escorted by 2 DD' s.
When FOMALHAUT unloaded at TOG.AMA direct her proceed AOLA
BAY accompanied by remaining 2 DD's and load about 75,000
cubic feet heavy cargo for transfer to TOGAMA POINT and
RINGBOLT as designated. by Comgen CACTUS. FOMALHAUT and
escort return to BUTTON on completion. Op Plan Afirm 24
covering this movement being forwarded Comadnavbase by
air for delivery to you on arrival.
25 0609 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMAIRSOPAC, COMINCH,

C0~1AIRPAC.

Cincpac 180159 Cominch 211800. In order clarify situation

urge following action. Afirm. Fitch's title to be only
Commander Task Force 63. Baker. Establish Comairsopac at
WHITE POPPY in order discharge functions outlined para 5
of PacFlt letter 33 L-42 in Sopac area. Comsopac the
sender. Cast. Order aviation Rear Admiral to command
same. The Commander of the Task Force comprising the
combatant elements of land based aviation is a full time
job and must be filled by the most experienced Naval aviator
available in this area.

997

S:rlORE'i'

November (GCT)
26 0247 CINCPAC to COMINCH, Info COl\1SOPAC, COMAIRSOPAC, COMAIRPAC.
Commander Fleet Aircraft NOT~ffiA short title Comfair NOtm1EA
considered most distinctive title new cow~ander. My
180159 Cominch 211800. See Comairsopac 240221 Comsopac
290251 October now passed to you which basis original
recommendation. Also Comairsopac 242331 Comsopac 250609
which comment your 211800. Propose duties Comfair NOlThmA
within Sopac area to parallel and extend those now assigned
Comairpac for entire Pacific Ocean Area would concern all
Naval air units and air base facilities and would for Marine
aviation include supply of aircraft and aviation material
plus other administrative assistance as directed by Comsopac.
Agree Halsey proposal that Fitch as Comtaskfor 63 exercise
operational control over such Army Navy and Marine aircraft
as assigned by area commander but consider present inopportune time to reassign title Comairsopac. Additional Flag
Officer and Staff necessary to free Fitch of widespread
administrative responsibilities.
26 0632 C01ISOPAC to VICE OPNAV Info COMNAV, CINCPAC.
Prior receipt of Vice Opnav serial 123739 of Oct. 13 and
Cincpac serial 4235 of Nov 16 Comsopac originator directed
by his serial 5356 of November lOth all commanding generals
at established island bases to designate a U. s. Naval
Officer as Port Director where no Port Director had been
regularly assigned. Port Director's have also been instructed to act as routing and reporting officers for
merchant shipping British route and Vesca arrival signals
are prescribed with NZNB as reporting center responsible
to pass them to regular US and British Adees. Authority
hereby renuested for Port Directors so designated to draw
publications listed in paragraph 3 subparagraphs A through
F of Vice Opnav Serial 0127320 of May 2nd. Mobil.e issuing
office USS ARGOl\TNE and issuing office NOS ::TtJLCRID.II will be
directed to make issues subject your approval. Names of
Port Directors designated will be communicated to the
Director Naval Transportation Service. Action Vice Opnav
Information Cominch b and R Cincpac.
25 1659 COMINCH to CINCPAC, COM80PAC,

COMAIR~OPAC,

COM 0 0 NE8PACFOR, etc.

1

Refer to this as Admiraltys 1726A/24. Your 1350 21st not

to all addressees. Engadine should not complete patrol
systems 2 she is to proceed to NOUMEA via AUSTRALIA as soon
as she is ready for sea. She is not required to embark
Martlets from KILil'TDINI . 3 ATHENE is also to be sailed for
same destination as soon as ready. 4 Other ships are to
come under operational control of Cincpac on arrival in
South Paeific Area.

998

~li:CEE'l1

--

November (GCT)

2.5 1415 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMSOPAC CINCLANT OPNAV BUPERS etc.
Opnav Bupers Marcorps informed. 4 APs and 2 AKs escorted
by 4 PacFlt destroyers expected depart Base H mid December
for CANAL ZONE where report Cincpac for duty. NTS now planning load ALLEN with 3rd Marine Replacement Battalion and
2nd Garrison Replacement Battalion for STRAW and cargo for
WHITE POPPY. GEORGE CLYMER, JOHN PENN, TITANIA, ALGORAB,
with SeeBees 25 and 37 Pontoon Assembly Depot other personnel
and urgent cargo for WHITE POPPY. THOMAS JEFFERSON with
personnel for CANAL ZONE thence West Coast or Army personnel
to Sopac as desired by you. Comment. Advise also desired
division assignments APs and AKs unless you wish retain in
new Transdiv 18. This movement direct to Sopac should be
considered in connection return APs and AKs to Amphforpac.
26 2230 NAVAL ATTACHE

~NELLINGTON

to CINCPAC

Afirm 416-26 November. From Goddard. Just returned from

visit to Halsey and Fitch. Neither had been able to consider RNZAF development but hope now to have time to complete my directive and formulate future requirements for
RNZAF. Para 2. Was informed Vice Opnav has stated intention to expand RNZAF from ten squadrons to fifteen by April
1944. This is no expansion since we already have sixteen
squadrons. Under this arrangement mostly all our future
output trained personnel will continue to be sent to England
contrary to your wishes. Para 3. Vice Opnav further suggested that if intended allotments of aircraft to South
Pacific are exceeded the surplus should go exclusively to
American Squadrons. This would effectually prevent employing New Zealand personnel resources. Para 4. Please regard this as advance information only am sending letter by
airmail. Please accept congratulations on great successes
and regrets at loss of Callaghan. 0645Z/26.
27 1254 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC
50 Japs killed number of machine guns captured in local
operations west of POINT CRUZ. There were no other ground
activities Comgensopac Comgen IMAC info by hand. At 2400
26th 7 B-17's struck aerodrome at KAHILI no opposition encountered. Large fires resulted at dispersal area plus 16
. hits on runway. During the night. Comsopac forwards daily
summary from GUADALCANAL area. 2 enemy bombers dropped
:c1issiles near mouth of LUNGA RIVER no damage. On the 23rd
and the 24th CACTUS bomb!ng . of KOKONGOLO mission NEN GEORGIA
destroyed all houses that area. Nips reported hiding ~n bush
during ralds. Enemy explorations toward the eastern side of
NEW GEORGIA are continued. On the 21st bar ge with 50 Japs
was reported in BALFOUR CHANNEL near RENDOVA. Good native
report states 3000 ORANGE at REKATA BAY.

99 9

sSBGR:S'3?

November (GCT)

HELENA to COMTASKFOR 67 . Info

COMSOPAC etc.
14 0001 TG 67.4 engaged apparently 2 enemy forces containing BBs
and cruisers plus DDs to SE of SAVO about 0124 bearing
312 range 27100. We approached in long column 4 DDs,
1 CLAA, 2 CAs, 1 CL, 1 CLAA., 4 DDs via LENGO CHANNEL on
280 along north coast close in. Changed course to about
310 True then 000 then 315 at 0137, then 270 closing to
about 3000 yards of enemy. Enemy force believed coming in
to south of SAVO from NW in 2 or 3 groups. Bearing and
distance of groups by sail george radar from HELENA: 5
ships 250 True range 4200 course 120 speed 20, 6 ships 315
True range 7000, 4 large ships 290 true range 10000. At
0143 DDs instructed to launch torpedo attack. At 0145
ordered to stand by to fire. At range of about 3000 yards
to group on port bow while turning to course 270 commenced
firing at 0148. Enemy turned on searchlights and commended
firing at short range just prior to our opening fire. 0158
changed course to 000 on signal and speed 28 knots. ATLANTA
fell out to left and believed on fire at 0210. SAN FRANCISCO
hit heavily especially bridge area and Rear Admiral Callaghan
and all staff but one killed. JUNEAU hit by torpedo forward
engine room ti~e unknown. PORTLAND believed hit by torpedo
and lost steering control prior to 0218. Melee resulted in
which events uncertain but destroyers both sides very active.
Numerous ships afire including one large ship capsized and
one large BB or CA stopped and completely enveloped in flames
and passed both close aboard. At 0212 attempted to assemble
forces remaining. At 0226 gave course 092 True speed 18
Form 18 to ships able to comply. At 0240 contacted SAN FRANCISCO on port bow and she formed up. FLETCHER reported in
SEALARK CHANNEL. STERRETT and O'BANNON in LENGO CHAllliEL.
at 0310 reported condition PORTLAND to radio TULAGI and requested tow and air coverage. After transiting SEALARK
destroyers formed screen. At daylight picked up JUNEAU in
INDISPENSABLE STRAIT near MALAITA Island. Instructed to
join up. Took course to southward and speed 10 knots until
SAN FRANCISCO made temporary repairs. Transferred medical
assistance to SAN FRANCISCO and sent O'BANNON to position
to transmit report on force position and intentions. O'BANNON
rejoined at 1530. At 0826 course 180 speed 17 khots Zigzag
No. 8 all speed JUNEAU could make. At 1101 torpedo fired
from about 260 relative running on or near surface passed
astern of HELENA and ahead SAN FRANCISCO and hit JUNEAU (then
down 4 feet by head) on port side of fantail (location of hit
debatable but aft) as she was Zigging 15 deg. to the right.
JUNEAU was third ship in formation about 800 yards on
quarter of SAN FRANCISCO due to steering difficulty using one
screw and as requested by commanding officer. There was a
single enormous explosion filling the area with debris and
large cloud of yellow black and brown smoke. Debris fell to
such an extent and volume. as to cause belief of high level
bombing attack. Remaining shi ps increased to maximum speed
and radical course change.s . As only FLETCHER and STERRETT
screening and ships crippled continued on course and reported
events by visual for further transmission to Comsopac via
(Continued next pa ge)

1000

~ca~r:r

November (GCT)

14 0001

(Continued)
B-17 sighted at 1121. Within minute after explosion
JUNEAU had completely disappeared. Debris fell and smoke
remained for about 9 minutes. No sight or sound contact
on submarine. SAN FRANCISCO worst material and personnel
casualties including Captain Young. Lt. Comdr. Schonland
now commanding. STERRETT extensive personnel and material
casualties. Material and personnel damage various extent
remaining ships. SAN FRANCISCO and probably STERRETT will
require navy yard overhaul. HELENA and O'BANNON tender
availability. All times mentioned are minus 11.

28 0309 CTF 62 to CTU 62.4.7, CTU 62.4.6, CTU 62.4.8 Info CINCPAC etc.
MAJABA and ALCHIBA have been torpedoed vicinity LUNGA POINT.
From CTF 62. Indications that Jap subs are also operating in
INDISPENSABLE STRAIT. Possibility that subs enter SAVO SOUND
at night and lie on shelf near beach at CACTUS awaiting early
morning return of ships to anchorage. Suggest part of screen
make sweep close in CACTUS beach prior daily arrival APs and
AKs in unloading area. On rettrement to eastward recommend
units of screen made sweep INDISPENSABLE STRAIT ahead of
transports. If retire to RINGBOLT desirable that units of
screen patrol SAVO SOUND during night with view intercepting
subs on surface.
28 0145 COMSOPAC to TviACARTHUR VIA COMSOVlESPAC Info COMINCH, CINCI)AC.
This despatch to General MacArthur from Admiral Halsey.
Your 270055 and 271136. Our common objective is RABAUL.
Until Jap air in NEVf BRITAIN and northern SOLOMONS has
been reduced, risk of valuable naval units in middle and
western reaches SOLOMON SEA can only be justified by major
enemy seaborne movement against south coast N'EW GUINEA or
AUSTRALIA itself. Seaborne sup:9ly of bases we take on northern coast of N@N GUINEA not feasible until we control SOLOMON SEA, in other words RA13AUL. ~ursuant foregoing and with
history uast months in view, consider RA.~AUL assault campaign must be amphibious along the SOLOHONS with NEW GUINEA
land . position basically a sunporting one only. I am currently reinforcing CAC~JS nosition and exnediting means of
oneratin.q heavv air from there. It is m~r belief that the
sound nrbcedur~ at this time is to maintain as strong a land
and air nressure against the Jananese BUNA position as your
lines of conmunication ~ermit, and c~ntinue to extract a
constant toll of tT apanese shiplJing, an attriti. )11 which if continued at the present rate he cAn not long sustain. I believe that my greatest contribution to our common. effort
would be to strengthen my Dosition and resume the advance
up t~e SOLOMONS as soon as possible, while c1ntinuing to
maintain a naval force in being on the flank of any oossi ble Jananese large scale advance against AUSTRA.LIA or
Southern NEW GUINEA coast. Carpender pass.

1001

<(rtl

~em:'!l

November (GCT)

29 1050 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC

This is MacArthur's 271136 you asked for in your 290709.
"MacArthur sending to Comso:pac. Ultra. In connection
wifumy radio of this morning it is reported from our naval
sources that the enemy will attempt landing at GONA 5 .AK's
on the night of November 29 and 4 P...K's on November 30 and
reneating on the nights of December 3rd and December 4th.
The escorting naval force is reported as one cruiser and
4 destroyers. Can you help me by a diversionary move to
threaten his flank query? Admiral Carpender, please pass."
29 1100 Iv!i\GARTHUR VIA CO:MSOPAC to CINCPAC
MacArthur's 270055 follows. Reference your 290709. Comsopac passing. This dispatch .'. :ts for Admiral Halsey from
General MacArthur. In my operations in N1!.""'V! GUINEA my gro\lnd
forces have driven the enemy back to a shallow beach head in
the BUNA GONA area. The air force has Drovided close support,
has transported large numbers of troous and has suDplied the
entire o~eration. Pending the estaolishment of seaborne
line of communications, the number of tr1ops I can em..-,loy
is definitely restricted by limited caDacity of air transport. The enemy is making every effort to reinforce and
sunnly the garrison by sea and des,)ite losses from air attack,
has recently succeeded to an extent . sufficient to 'lrevent
my destroying his beach head. He is evidentl._r increasing
his efforts and is in position tomake a move of considerable magnitude a~ainst lJEIN GUINEA. The Chief of Staff of
the Army after discussion with the Navy in Washington, has
suggested that I take up with you the detailed naval requirements for the sunport of my immediate onerations in
order to reach an agreement as to the uracticable measures
to be taken with the naval forces now available in our
respective areas. I would B]oreciate an expression of
your views. Carpender please pass.
28 1235 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info

COHA~RJ?AC,

CO~ ISOPAC,

COMAIRSOPAC,etc.

Cincpac 260247 ap~roved. Cincpac hereby authorized to

establish new flag officer command in South Pacific "l!,leet
Air Cornraand NOUMEA". Short title Fairconinoumea will be
a subordinate command of Comairnac and Comfairnournea. Will
report for duty to Comsopac. Bureaus and officers of Havy
take necessary action.
29 0035 CTF 8 to CINCPAC, COMNORWESSEAJPRON, NYf.lii, OPNAV, etc.
Radio HONOilJT) T, -pass to Cincpac - refer Cominch 272156.
Following status of CTF 8 destroyers. 15 at present operRting with TF VI Z four modern, l l o ~_ i ncluding sweepers.

100 2

r-SEGRE9?

, ,

f)r

November (GCT)

29 0035

(continued)
Essential duties. 3 old on ryermanent escort duty between
OCEAN BLUE and ~'lTIIRIAWAY. 2 old anti-submar.ine ryatrol
LOFG-VIEW. 3 to 4 will be as : igned A~'lTTLET VOVE. Two for
anti-subnarine '~atrol. 1 to 2 screeni 1g m0ves between
J-'OPGVIEW and .A.:MrtET. Hinimum 3 required for screeninR" OCEAN
BLUE to LO~GVIEJT for trans '1orts and iYP')Ortant cargo shins.
Movement of important cargo ships will continue indefinitely.
At infrequent intervals and 1Jeriods lasting m~;nth must maintain anti-submarine 1')atrol at CAVERN to protect discharging
ships. Four modern destroyers now in striking force with
cruisers. Operational breakdowns old destroyers frequent.
Present status king at BREI1ERTON urgent reuairs. KAIJE must
follow for same when king returns. vVASNIUTH, PEHRY o1erating with cracked reduction gears which should be repaired
when shi-os can be spared. LAMBERTON has boiler completely
burnt out. Destroyers have been operating practically continuously without op 1ortunity for upkeep. Margin with respect
to prospective demands now zero. rtecent net reduction in
escort vessels to the force includi ng Canadian is nine.
Renuest retention TALBOT dent with this taskforce until
reliefs cen be provided or at least until one January.
CTF 8 sends. Radio BREMERTOn pass to Comnwseafron and
HYPS X RDO SanFran pss to Comwesseaf'"ron and N''MI X RDO Annapolis pass to Opnav and Cominch.

28 1708 COMINCH to COMSOPAC Info CINCPAC COMAIRSOPAC COM 12 . .

'

Comairsopac 240557 from Comnavbassopac. Do you approve

development of BUTTON into LION Base as recommended? If
so does this base supplement or replace development heretofore stressed for WHITE POPPY'? See your 210517 October
next to last sentence. If BUTTON development is in addition you must balance large shipping requirements against
other shipping needs Sopac. Little additional shipping in
prospect. If not approved as recommended specify location
of approved components. What is to be division of base
functions between BUTTON and WHITE POPPY? Rdo NOUMEA pass
to Comnavbassopac.

1003

-8~GRE~

NO"veniber ( GCT)
29 1755 COMINCH to CINCPAC CINCLANT COMUSNAVFOREUROPE,

COMSO~~SPAC

etc.

Addressees promulgate following to extend commands need to

know. Para. In event usage gas by enemy is suspected.
Afirm. Make immediate dispatch report addressed for action
to entire chain of command. Baker. Conduct immediate investigation on spot by qualified personnel. Cast. Make
amplifying report confirmed or not confirmed. Dog. No not
retaliate with gas until authorized by Cominch and Cast Negat
Option. Use of toxic gas will not be initiated by any units
Sail commander. Undertake instruction and training to insure
that retaliation if authorized will be effective. In precaution against initiating use of gas under stress offensive
materials are to be kept in ready reserve but not issued to
combatant units.. Buord will keep addressees advised regarding availability of materials. VCNO has for action Comdt
Marcorps, Buord, Buaer informed.
29 1811 COMSOPAC to COMINCH Info CINCPAC, COMSOWESPAC.

Answering Cominch 261230. Unless sterilizers more reliable

than indicated by statements Doctor Michels, use of aircraft
mines offensively this area subject same tactical drawbacks
as mustard inland warfare. From Comsopac. Action Cominch.
Infor Cincpac, Comsowespac. Basically propose use aircraft
mines offensively first in passages much used by enemy traffic and in which later resulting menace to our forces is
acceptable; second, as anvil to interdict enemy passage incident to specific attack. First of above dependent upon
continuing adequate reconnaissance enemy traffic at his
bases, which lack of aerial photo reconnaissance equipment
this area has so far prevented. No suitable opening for
second use has presented itself up to now. Unable be more
specific until campaign features more clearly defined.
30 0841 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC, info C0}Jlt\r1tTPHI8 H'OH00PAC, COMINCH, etc.
Urdi s 270145. Comsopac sends. Torpedoing of ALCHIBA. leaves
SoPac area with 4 MC's, 1 of which is under repair. Necessity for moving laree quantities construction equipment and
material to CACTU0 and resulting from interruptions and
damage by enemy action, results CACTUS food and ammunition
supply critical. Even with temporary addition 4 noncombat
cargo vessels, several essential cargoes would still await
transportation. No AK's can be spared without endangering
CACTU~ position.
Further losses must be expected. All
operable AP' s except McCAULEY (Sl?OOID~H drydocking) are engaged
transporting troops. McCAvlLEY essential as force flagship
due adequacy radio installations. Following is schedule for
amphi bforsopac ships
Afirm~~
J ACKSON, ADAI\18 , CREE-)CENT CITY,
Ol

(Continued)

1004

~R0.B~I"f1

;;~~C.IJ
30 0841 COTffiOPAC (Continued).

loaded troops for CACTUS return trip evacuate troops first

mardiv. If 6th Marines to CACTUS these ships occupied until
January 25. Baker. NEVILLE, HEY\i.fQOD, BARNETT occupied
transporting .Americal Division and 9th Defense Battalion to
CACTUS until December 20. Cast. FULlER under repair collision estimated ready December 25. Dog. ZEILIN departs
for West Coast about 1 December time of repair estimated 3
weeks. Easy. HUNTER LIGGETT enroute CACTUS with troops
returning BUTTON about 10 December. .AMERICAN LEGION to load
18th Construction Battalion for CACTUS to return BUTTON about
December 15. Fox. McCAWLEY due VlHITE POPPY about December
20. Additional movements anticipated are relief remainder
First Mardi v, movement Army troops from 1JfHITE POPPY and
BlEACHER to CACTUS, movement Third Raiders from STRAW to
BUTTON, training Sopac troops for amphibious operations.
Providing movements mentioned in preceding sentence are postponed, estimate that transports can arrive SAN DIEGO on following dates. HUNTER LIGGETT on December 26. MiERICAN LEGION
on January 1. NEVILLE, HEY ~OOD, BARNETT on January 8. FULLER
and McCAWLEY on January 12. Four ships of Transdiv 2 on
February 10.
01 0335 CINCPAC to CQMC,QPAC Info COMINCH,

CONf.i\."~fPHilFORSOPAC,

etc.

Urdis 300841. NEVILLE 6 HEY'IfOOD, -3ARNETT designated for

return A.mphi b-""'orpac. 0 ince KE:NMOR"E made available for trip
to CACTUS assume this takes care of 9th Defense Battalion
'Therefore sail one of the 3 designated
your item Baker.
now and the other two upon completion
DIEGO
s~~
for
ships
Item Baker to arrive about 8 January. Appreciate situation
as regards freighters. When 2nd LIBERTY Class freighter arrives Sopac area transfer 1 combat loader to SAN DIEGO and
when 3rd arrives send 2nd combat loader. In addition I will
direct retention ZEILIN on West Coast on completion repairs.
Advise division organization desired by you. Ships which
will remain Sopac including 5 enroute from At'1ant.id and 10
liberties. Direct ships ordered SAN DIEGO leave all landing craft in Sopac area.
01 1321 COMSOPAC to Cincpac Info COMINCH, COMSOWESPAC, CT:B, 62.
Yesterday's .activities comprised numerous patrols First
Marines captured 6 machine guns on MAIBULO killing 15.
Patrol 164th Infantry killed 11 captured 70 mm gun. Marine
naiders ori upper LUNGA killed 25 captured 1 75 mm gun and
1 30 rnrn. Comsopac rei teretes. 4 attack missions carried
out by P-39's against ORANGE positions. 3 biplanes and 2
flying boats sighted REKATA BAY by morning search plane drew
AA fire. B-17's sighted 5 ships near KI ETA 10 AK or AP
5 DD and possible CV.B~.VN TONOLEI evening 30th. Friendly
task force engaged with enemy near SAVO beginning 2300 love
(-11) 30th. Unidentified planes overhead CACTUS at 2300 love
30th and again 0400 love 1 December. Comgensopac Comgen 1st .
10 Q5
Mar CT:B, 62 all info by hand.

8:E!9Rffi'f

.,.

November (GCT)
01 0645 CINCPAC to COMINCH, Info COiviSOPAC, COMSOvVESPAC, CT:b, 8.
Lacking suitable target areas within reach there are no plans
in immediate prospect for use of aircraft mines in central
Pacific. This in reply your 261230. For all other areas including Sowespac am strongly of opinion that this weapon should
be used without too much stress on probable failures of sterilizing features hazarding our future actions. This view based
on definite experience of British with favorable damage ratio
of mines versus bombs even under admittedly different circumstances. We should harass the enemy with every conceivable
means. Further of note is certainty that as Japs are driven
from any locations now held by them we will encounter more
mine opposition. Sweeping measures undertaken concurrently
with offensives will therefore give some degree os protection
against own mines previously laid.
30 0255 SrAv GUADALCANAL to

COEE~OPAC

Info COIVJ.AIRSOPAQ, CINCPAC, etc.

Construction of 1000 lineal feet more coral. 15,600 lineal

feet taxiway 8000 lineal feet road. 37 plane revetments. Command post shelter. Ready room shelter 67,200 lineal feet
drainage ditch. Preparation of campsite. Installation gasoline tanks necessary to complete fighter 2 field. Construction of 4000 lineal feet of Marston mat. 29,350 lineal feet
taxiway. 36 plane revetments 8000 lineal feet roads. Command post shelter. Ready room shelter. 67,000 lineal feet
drainage ditch preparation of camp site. Installation gasoline tanks necessary to complete fighter 1 field. Reconstruction of 500 lineal feet Marston mat. Construction of 23,100
lineal feet taxiway. 41 plane revetments. Command post
shelter. 50,200 lineal feet drainage ditch. 10,000 lineal
feet road 1mprovement. Air base office. Repair shop installation gasoline tanks. Necessary to complete bomber field. All
of foregoing must be completed before prolonged rains estimated
middle December if fields are to operate. No work started
fighter 3 or YOLINAVUA fields.
29 0110 CTF 8 to COMINCH, Info CINCPAC, VOPNAV.
Taskforce commander has 25 each 1~Iark XII Mod 1 and Mark XIII
aerial mines at DUTCH HARBBR. No others enroute. Plan use
Mark XIII's against enemy shipping concentrations CHICHAGOF
HARBOR, OTKRITI BAY and Pass between SOUTH HEAD and LITTLE
KISKA. Mark XII-l's sarne.purpose HOLTZ BAY, MCDONALD COVE,
Pass SOUTH HEAD to NORTH HEAD KISY~ and possible anchorages
in SDdiCHIS if more accurate charts received. Strong antiaircraft installations KIS~~ fffiRBOR prevent mining mission
that area until these installations reduced by bombing or
other means. The lack of shipping in KISKA at the present time
also militates against use mines that location. Failure mark
XII' s recent mine plants K.AGAIASKA STRAIT and illtiAK PASS attributed strong ocean currents and 600 foot spacing. Believe cur( Contint1ed)

1006

~~c~~~

November (GCT)
29 0110 CTF 8 to COMINCIT, Info CINCPAC, 70PNAV.

(Continued )

rents reduced magnitude in areas nlanned for future use and

revised directive for 1000 spacing will insure more successfu l
performan ce by aerial mines. Pass Vice Opnav for info. Comtaskforce 8 originato r. Cominch for action. Cincpac info
addee.

1007

...gEOftE./1'

September 1.
The damaged SARATOGA is enroute TONGATABU with two
cruisers and seven destroyers, and will arrive there the 6th.
Her power plant is uncertain and she can only make 10 knots.
To enter the harbor she will probably need the NAVAJO and
SEMINOLE, both of which are available to her. All her surviving planes except 6 VF, 8 VB, and 4 VT have been flown to
the ROSES-BUTTON area for distribution.
It seems probable
that the sub which torpedoed the SARATOGA was sunk by the
MONSSEN before it could get off a report of hitting.
With the ENTERPRISE and SARATOGA out of action for
some time to come the ~~rASP and HORNET groups will have to remain in the SOLOMONS-)JEN CALEDONIA area indefinitely. 'The .
adcli tion of the WASHINGTON and SOUTH DAKO'l1A will greatly add
to our strength in that area. Fevertheless, the Japs are
capable of placing superior forces in the area.
Three Jap DDs landed troops and supplies about 20
miles east of our position on the north side of GUADALCANAL.
It has not yet been learned how such operations can take place
without satisfactory~counter action on our part.
CTF-62 011237 pink joins other commanders there in
a plea for more air in the GUADALCANAL area. Thus every major
commander in the South Pacific and the Under Secretary of the
Navy have urged that the flov: of planes in a de qua te :oumbers
be ~~-~ to that area. CinCPac Ol233ltntges specific types of
Army planes and pilots to fly them. 7 - -~'
In a letter to Cominch today CinCpac disapproves
the use of carriers to support landinf s when they are vulnerable to enemy shore based air and when the job can be more
properly done by our shore based air. The letter is designed
to prevent the use of our carriers to cover landings in Tasks
':ewo and Three.

Comsopac 020300 pink requestp MacArthur to supply

P-38s to the TULAGI area. And his 02o'4ootffi:"akes a further plea
for aircraft reinforcements, particularly fi gh ters.

e::

C.G. CACTUS 012313'\ oxplains his fear of the enemy

building up a large striking for ce by repeated small landings
during darkness and recommends adequate search by aircraft
and DDs or ~TBs and the 7th Marines as a striking force.
Submarines continue active in the South Pacific.
One was seen off TULliG I today.
In the ALEUTih.NS CTF-8 reports that the EL ID sank
the RRo 61 and took prisoners from her.

1008

EGREr;F

Seotember 1 (continued)
The Jap forces thought northeast of the SOLOMONS
have not been si g hted for several days.
It seems possible
that the HYUJO has returned to the Empire and that one CV is
enroute south to replace her. The recent occupatlon of OCEAN
and NAURU now seems a fact. APAr/IA1ili in the GILEERTS was probably occupied today. Cardiv Two is still indicated in home
vra ters.
CinCPac continues to k eep the Army here fully informed of the current developments.

1009

Sentember 2.

o3{23l~es

ComSoPac
a summary of operations for the
day. The bombings on Cactus took place the day before. Evidently the BURHo~vs went a g round a seco~ time off TULAGI and
v1as hauled off by the GAMBLE. His 030736 pink gives the employment of TF-17 while TF-18 is at Noumea for fuel and supplies.
TF-18 arrives at Houmea tomorrow.
ComSoPac estimates that on August 24th local an enemy
CV received a torpedo ;J"t. Danage to other units is not clear.
ComSoPac 0~1141 justly praises the fine work of the
Bougainville coast watcher in giving timely warning of an
approaching air raid.

Cominch 02195~ indicates that 60 P-38s in addition

to other planes are enroute Pacific bases.
The DRUU in Midway from patrol off Truk and Kavieng
reports poor hunting both places.

Air reconnaissance of the Gilberts by the Japs continued today.

The c.o. at Fanning Island reports serious labor
trouble and requests that the trouble makers be dep a rted.
The Army reports 6 APs at Kiska, 2 of which are over
20,000 tons. This report by Alaskan G-3 stirred up the Commander Western Defense. CTF-8 doubts thj_s report as does
CinCPac. Steps are being taken by the Army to garrison the
Pribilofs.
There is nothing significant about enemy moves.

September 3.
/

Cp~sopac 04lll6~es

a summary for the day in his area.

His 0403001:lndicates his plan to put the 7th Marines in GUADALCANAL

and to put a battalion of Army troops on TREVANION Island (Santa
Cruz)

./

Cominch 031313 does not give much encouragement for

large development of raider battalions.
I
CTF 16 020337 comments favorajly on the employment of
the new BBs j_n the carrier task forces. The best place seems to
have them down wind from the carrier.

1010

September 3.

(Continued)

The TANIBOR reports sinking 22000 tons off TRUK.

There is further confirmation of the enemy occupation
of OCEAN and NAURU Islands. This bei'ng the case, Cincpac will
not attempt to send food to OCE~~~ Island.
As the Japs are apparently occupying TARAV'lA Island in
the GILBERTS, the ALBACORE, which was close by, was diverted to
that place to take any apnropriate action possible.
The firssA~~rre transports have unloaded undetected at
ADAK Island. At ~~~ Bay the CASCO is still aground and a salvage tug is enroute to assist. There is comnlete disagreement
between the Army and the Navy concerning the activity at KISKA.
An Army report of 2 20000 ton APs in that harbor is not believed
JY CTF 8.
Cardiv 2 is still i ndicated in home waters. All signs
continue to noint to an all out enen y attempt to recanture TULAGI ~
and GUADALCANAL.
~
September 4.
Admiral Ghormley's 051156 summarizes the South Pacific
situation.
The SOUTH DA.KOTA will join Task Force 18 on the 8th.
So far in their operations in the South Pacific the
combat and operational losses of PBYs run 23 % a month.
There is some fear by CTF 62 that the enemy will raid
SPJAOA tonight or tomorrow.
Comsowestpac requires replacements of ships lost in the
operation. This involves 1 CA and 3 DD. In addition he
wants one destroyer division. These ships are requested to keep
the lines open to :f\TE'N GUINEA.
~TLAGI

To rectify landing mistake~: __~ade in the initial ~J LAGI

landing, Comamphibious SoPac 0406106prans an extensive r eheaTsal
of a landing on September 13th.
CTF 8 ' 042027 objects to the Army proposal to garrison the
PRIBILOF Islands.
Pacific.
today.

The Jap subma rines continue to be active in the South

One was re norted off TULAGI yesterday and one off :JLEACHER

A major move of J apanese units from the Empire to the South

Pacific in the next fe w day s is indicated. Cardiv 2 seems involved in the move.

September J2...,_1 942.

ComSoPac 061146 ( pink ) gives the summary of his operations for that day.
The SOUTH DJKOTA eroup which included the Jffi~EAU and
3 DD were ordered to leave BLEACHE.R today to rendezvous with
TaskPorce 18 on the 8th.. ..Jhen clearing the harbor the SOUTH
DAKOTA hit a pinnacle rock and \.Vil l probably require drydocking.
The SAlliTOGA g roup arrived at BLEACHER (CTF-11 052052).
When temporary repairs are made and certain spares and stores are
unloaded to be left there that ship will proceed to Pearl with
1 CA, 1 CL and 5 D~ as escort.
ComSoPac plans to send Vice Admiral ? letcher north with the SARATOGA and make Rear Admiral Noyes
ComTaskFor 61.
The rrfASHINGTON and 3 DDs vtill arri ye at BLEACHER Sept. 13.
It now ap~ears that each Task Force 17 and 18 will have a new BB
-vvi th them by around the 17th of September.
landing .

Comnanding Gmera l, CACTUS 051050 reports another small

It is probable that these will continue.

The flurry caused by a report of CVs off SAMOA yesterday

was found to be the result of an error.
CinCPac 052005 reminds ComTaskFor 1 that the BBs are
now at Pearl to break up any attempted enemy landing in the Hawaiian G.rea.
It is now probable that Task Force 1 will remain at
Pearl durins September.
The FLYING FISH on patrol off TRUK was damaged by depth
charges and is returning to Pearl. She reports hitting a BB and
setting it on fire.
ConTaskFor 8 052130 advises ~~ainst the occupation of
at the same time that the move is bein~r made to ADAK. .tie
su/::;gests that when aj r support is available f~om ADAK the T.f'NAGA
occupation will be much simpljfied insofar as escort is concerned.
CinCPac concurs with ConTaskFor 8 t fa t the Pribiloffs should not
be garrisoned at this tme.
Tl.~.rAGA

There is indication that at least five Jap carriers ~re

in rr enroute tr the Rl-tl: l.UL area.
rrhis , together with continued
evidence of large reinforcements to the area point to a major
effort to recapture positions in the GU :8ll.LCAHAL - TULAGI area
.hctivitv in the GILBJ.~RTS continues.
It now seems probable that
most ofvthat group are now or will be occupied by t }.e enemy.
ComTas!-<:For 8 snspects mininp: in the ALEUTIAITS but no r.1 ines have
been encountered tl-:tere.

1012

SECRET ,.

September 6th.
Comsopac 050626 expresses his desire for more Marine Raiders.
The 2nd Marine Raider Battalion left PEARL today for the South
Pacific.
Cominch 061720 pink approves the project to garrison the
PRIBILOFS and to delay the occupation of TANAGA.
CTF 8 feels that he has been given orders by General DeWitt
to provide escort to the PRIBIIJOFS and. registered a protect to
Cincnac. He had not yet received the directive above from Cominch.
Thus, a few hours delay on the ~art of CTF 8 would have cleared
up the ~atter and made his protect unnecessary. Army - Navy command relations in the North Pacific are not good.
Admiral Nimitz left PEATIL for San Francisco to confer with
Admiral King. Developments in all areas since his departure are
summarized in CincPac 723oS pink.
There are no new enemy developments.
September 7th.
The day was generally very quiet. Comsopac 081146 pink
summar izes operations that area . The transports were ordered
to return to GUADALCANAL a t daylight.
450 Jap prisoners from the .SOLOr.~ ONS wi ll arrive in NEW
ZEALLND on the 11th. That Gove rnment will accept and be responsible for any prisoners we de liver to them during the current
offensi ve.

Comso pac 072206 gives plans for the employment of Cubs 1

and 13.
The SOUTH DAKOTA will come to Pearl with the SARATOGA,

NEW ORLEA1~S and 5 destroyers.

C.G. Alaska 062210 states that he will defer the garrisonirH; of the PRIBILOFS. Acirnral Theobald strenuously objects
to the plan as he conside rs it strate gi cally unsound .
Fairly good inform~tion states that the Japs plan to
attack I . . ~DI!l. at the end of the present monsoon season; and that
the IIILUE BAY occupation is the first step in the attack on
AU3rJ:lRALIA.
The Japs are now concentrating nearly all of their sea f_?;oing forces for the expected attenpt to recapture their posi tions in the TULAGI area.

101 3

..............

.. S iS 0 "TrE T

September 9 1942

-~

1.

ot f'oroos at tlto disposal ot ContSoPao made.

Rooap1 tulation

Verification requested of ComSoPo

2.

CoJamenta on mploymont

or

rorce

by ComSoPac:

(a)~~

not cloael knit.

(b)

Opera~ione

( o)

RetueliDg aooompliahed. at iaopportur&e tillea.

(d)

Delay in ntting up TF 64.

(e)

Surpriee attack should not have beea poaaible.

(f)

Diatribution ot Flag Officer

(g)

Diaad.vw1~ea

or mixod rorcee.

Diacuasion ot the uao of Me

3.
replaceJaent

or

aqua.dron under

aoArthur

of' Lend-Leaae arrangaenta to be

ana

aland. tt~oops~

to oleo

hia ret'uaal to p rmit.

~hs>rtly.

Sffeot

The goel is to ha.ve all

Juaerioan equipment in Auatr lia and New Zeal.and.

CominCh related hit

&f!'orta to ,get Ventura& end explained the situation regarding air oratt
. s.e rvicc

units~

has notse.

ntm1el)' that lfaw Zealand has surplua u.ru.ta and Australia:

I>lan ia to make aurplua \mit& s.vail.Ulo to Ohortaley'.

bert ot air

r~elds

and facilities.

The

Auatr-.11&

turation point muat be ll&i.n-

talned..

4.

Comment on u

ot: Copahtte to supply planea.

- 1-

1014

Sept. 9, 1942.

COlfFEREMCE , OTES

5.

Com.monto on Andlni foreo -- Tth Resilient.

e.

CinOPac to prepar Pres

oruia

and Fletch

Releaae

COY

rinc Brown. a 60-dq

ra 101-d.q crui Fuelling arra.ng.ementa

to be soft-

pedalled.
Discuaaion

1.

haul.

ot aatorial condition of' ahips

CondnOb expr as d the view that routine overhaul

it 1a a peace tiJJae practice.

oVerhaul& during

and their aver-

hould bo a'boliahed.

ar ahould be -.de only

when MOO aar:f

8.

~TttR

SOUTH DAICOTA ia 1n .. dit'fer nt status.

Pleet.

at -

Ci!ROLI A and ASHl GtOI' permanently in the Pe.oitio

BB' ... ~ to go to_:_ P~io l!'leet u

8001:1

availllble.

v~~at Cruiser .. Carrier groupe. lUg 00' 8

9.

will not do as subst1 tutea tor orui era.

Employ~~ent

to

Discus ion ot employment

Ef'teotiveneaa of small carriere.

ot Pf bo.ata ana 110 "' tooters. 'lrmater ot two 173 - footer

raail.
10.

. Coraineh spoke ot the Dll building progr an4 discussed the

question

ot whethftr or not the

11.
route.

Oll'la -

A:rtfll'

90/111 gun can. be e.d.. to to ahip board uee.

RWl o-Jap r lations.

Siberia.

o aible

J~p

mov. e. Plane ferry

R luotonoe ot Rusaif.tl'tS to put out information.

- 2-

1015

-----&11$1 .

s-- c
r-----g

tt E

COHFERm:rc E

12.

Capabiliti s ot oruisera.

l:S.

Change

ot

Sept.

N01''l~JJ

!tel tive a4wm

"ea

s.

1942.

ot large

m'berah1p .o f G eneral s oan! ami etfeot thereot.

FOLLOWING PO:mtS BROUGHT tlP BY REAR ADMIRJtL JACOBS:

14.

CinCPao to ohec.,. on aalvage parao1m.el.

15.

survtvora of ehipa ahould not be ent to shore baae

Iutead they ahould go to new construction.

( 'f bis is being done) .

a-val Ji.ir Foreea" .

17.

D aohargo o HoCalob.

18.
CinCPac

111.

a~a

o" .
!~'1 tnea

reports to be more d acriptive

or

the duties per..

formed. by of.ticera reported upon.

20.

ContOo&Pao freezing his personnel? J..U'ftrt

Teraporarily

only 1 .aatter ia nQW in li and.

21.

.Simplification of ratio%1 allowancea .

straight. oney allowances.

22.

Many ahipa to ,o

savinw ot volume ot tood atutta.

Cut uown peaaengera going to Pearl Harbor by Clipper.

Sp&Ge needed for mail.

-ss E ......,...c ......,n ...........'!

...........

101 6

------.. .. -- - ..

-s

S C4rE T
._

- - ,. .. - .. ...
..., ""

... .-

- -... - .. - ....

....

...

.. .. - -

-.

....

eouporation center for Flag ot1oen 1n Uaii .

2S.

24.

EmploJUnt or negro peraonnol -- will do nll 1n Ai'rioa.

(Rear Admiral Jacoba has no more items.)

25.

A.s

taffs with them

20.

matter ot policy, Fl&(;

or

cera are not to take their

en tr.naerred..

Repairs to Cali.fornia.t

Pr dioted date

orr

El ctrical aaterial oelqed...

completion October la.t.

~:ES T

VIRGIUIA had aev n torpedo

Coapletion depends on repairs to ruclder poet. about Jan\18.17 lat.

hita.

ill not J"equire further docking until that ti.Jae.

be re.fitted as .. llline layer.

tollowed by the U!AH.

27.

28.

OKLAHOMA will be righted 1n Novaber.

Guna and powd.er bei.ng reraovod tram .ARlZOIA.

( Adairal llaleey uow preaent.)

29.
to

Ui ouaaion

or

&iroratt.

Establiahlaent ot new a1t- tiolda end f"e.cili tiea.

u e Anq fields where arrangelllenta

progr

oclala goes to ooaat to

O&.U

bo made!

Why DOt

Discu ion ot tr&ird:JG

for 270Q:)pluea -- all ha.nd.s need not bo trained ei:multtUl.OGUil)'.

Pi1o.r-ity ot repair work a.t Seattle.

Bl ould lt be civa

AVG'& in preference to BBtat

-4sEcn.~t
................................
.-

1017

P... J _,"o

v~J \1

~''

ro~ll

"';("/' "')1t'lt\~

,,

t/

~..

CO!IFERENCE NOTES
s.e pteimbar

a.

1942
/.

I'

n
I

1.

I)ispateh sent to Ghormley telling him to get ready one rff/tgit

ment of Uariues ( thr$e comb&.ct

~ems)

and stand by 'to trazaatel" them to

MacJ.rthur al011g with or:c, Diviaion ot ~ombat loaded

A.K.

apori;s sll:d at~ached.

clp~~l##\ft_~~
t1
Admiral King remarked that TaskS 2 end !s ' go out the window., 1
'A

2.

General DeWitt to be told the.t Arlrltf troops used

i!l. oce.up;ying

various islandt.t in the Aleuti-ans 1tnst be under :Navy control.

s.

Vio.e. Admiral Fletcher. now en route to Fee.rl. is to come to

Washington, reporting to CominCh :for temporary duty for

~ t,lJ.,~~'\1

about~.

Halsey to taka over EtiTERPRISE group.

stated that the job was important oniefly because of the reported

de~~s

in

the mer:ming, ooomission.ing, and fitting out of J).VGs. (fhis question solved
temp~rarily

by issuing orders to Captain Ginder to report to Oom 13 for

&ddi tional duty in this connection.) Admiral Free1Dl.m noti..fied by telephone.,

Air Centeriaad Ne.v-.1 Ail" Training

Cente~ was

discussed with parttioular

reference to whether or not they sh.ollld be eonna&nded by Fl-ag Offtoers.

Incident to the Seattle situation, Cotn.ineh announced that aviators must be

qualified for advaneelll0nt in the$e eas.e s and that they were to be promoted
to fill billets only.

Methods of determining whc should be promoted were

also explained.

S E C................
R ET

~..--~

1018

CONFERENCE NOTES

6.

Sept.

s.

1942.

Personnel items:
(a)

CominCh inquired

&s

to whether or not Hoover could be

usefully employeu in the Pacific Fleet.

plied "lo billet at present".

CinCPac re-

CominOh said he brought

up the matter at this time merely for possible

aoco~

plishment at an undetermined date.

(b)

Assignment of Fletcher.

Probability o various jobs in

Washington for him was discussed.

{c)

Bernhard or

o horter could relieTe Hoover and Buck-

master could be used to fill in where needed.

(d)

Status of lias on. Ramsey Bogan. and Wagner touched upon;

also rotation
1.

or

Flag Offiaera in &eneral.

CominCh rel ted his effort to r3organi&e the Navy Department

and explained the present situation in that respect.

8.

To b~aken up upon return to Washington:

Should the supervision of the making ready of AVGs be exeroised at CominCh Headquarters?

9.

OinCPao dwelt on the method of providing escorts in the

Pacific Fleet. also hether or not Leary's request for more ships should be
acted upon a.t this time.

Decision made to do nothing about tho despatch

request but i11ste&d. Uh0nnlay to lend them

a cover; force .}.

..SECRE!
................
..._.

101 9

Sept. 8, 1942.

CominCh discussed prospective additions t .o the Fleet and stated

lO~t

his opposition to overhauls in Australif&.

Tie also spoke of ttLe effect

Second Front operations and the small boat building program.

therewi. th, CominCh spok
r

of

the

their position with respect to

explained

r. Nelson

~f

In.aonnectio a

functions of the ArnJ-Ne.vy f.il4"li tions Board.

priorities~

and how ~~~~,w~rk.

CominGh also

po ition e.s compared to General Sommervill e's.

sion of the Army has resulted in surpluses

surpluses ought to be llsed. (Also,

in non-critica l materials.

Army fighting planes located

ExpanThese

in. various

parts of the Country).

11.

The formation of T sk Force 64 was reviewed.

remarked that it

about one month late.

f'I'O..S

Consl.derati on given to the possibility of VicC.A.dtnira l Ghorm-

12.

ley being unable to stand up

mentioned.

p~sically.

Po3sible reliefs for hlm were

pinCP,a.c stated that he preferred Turner. (Subsequent ly, CinCPac

stated that he

ould check up on Vice Admiral Ghormley's physical exmnination

and notify CominCb

13.

Admita.l King

or

the results.)

Tulagi operations CritioisDW of:

(a)

Day disposition s all right; night disposi tiona look bad.

Was the best use made of th

lerly Flag Officers; that

both groups?

ia~

forces a.vailalle, particuhy were they absent from

And why was not consideratio n given to

the question of fatigue?

- 3 5 .......
E ._
C ..............
R E T
...,

1020

CONFERENCE NotES

{b) When Turner retired to Ghormley, Vandergri~le.tt to

hold out by himself'.
(c) Was the surprise attaok

&

result of inefficiency and

why were not m ans taken to prevent Jap forces from

getting in?

(d) Tactical dispositions discu sod by einCPao.

Captain

McCormick stated that the delayed de patch

ll

ade no

difference, that is, it was received in time to be

acted upon.

(e) Over-all responsibility was Ghormley's; immediQte

re ponaibility waa Turner's; final

judg~ment

left until receipt of CQmploted report

to be

{At thi

point Major General Upabur called# followed by General

DeWitt}.
14.

(Vice Admirals nslsey and Gr ensl de present.)

Vice Admirals

Halsey and Greenslade explained the situation at the Supply Depot at Oakland.

Despatch sent to the Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts to

send a personal representative to clear the log jam there.

CominCh agr ed

that this would not &olve the problem permanently.

15.

Vice Admiral Halsey

AVG 1 a in Seattle.

poke of the situation with respeet to

(!his point previously covered.)

S E C RE T

1021

....-8E CRE!

CONFERENCE NOtES

16.

sept.

1942

Vice Admiral Halsey sugges ted that the Commander of the

Fleet Air Dete.tohment at Alameda be given quarte rs.

an e phatic negati ve.

Detato hment a.

17.

a.

This propos al met with

Short discus sion relati ve to status

1
llit.. 41tH14.~1'.-, ~-~
~
t'

Additi onal comment

~
-"

~th

or

Fleet Air

~dtMV

.(.flc_

respec t to the Supply aituat ion, with

refere nce to the possib le establ ishme nt of

~re

subord inate commands.

Decisi on made that Commander Servic e Force could have repres

entati ves at
Seattl e. San Diego, Washi ngton, ruld perhap s elsewh ere, but that
these repro-

aentat ive s could not build up an organ izatio n.

18.

Should

'

ateria l be assemb led a.t

'

A~land

or Bleach er?

CinCPe.c

remark ed that this questi on is academiQ at this ti c becaus e mater

ial is
being sent to the place where it is used as ta.st as is possib
le.

propo sal touche d upon.

McCain ' a

Capta in McCormick read letter from Rear Admiral

Turner to Rear Admir al Spruan oe.

19.
marine pay?

Should sub arine type

Commanders

CoroinCh read memo on this subjoe t.

and their staffs draw subDecisi on

made

to recommend

yes if the new l&Jr leaves it up to the secret ary of the navy
otharw ise

this questi on to be answer ed in the negati ve .

In other

orda. if the naw

law znerely increa ses the figure and says nothin g about anJ other
change in

the prior law. the same person nel no

draw~ng

this pay, and no others . will

dru it.

20.

CollinOh remark ed on tho neces sity of freezi ng certai n people

- 5 Slt1C RET

1022

a.

Sept.

OONFEREllCE NOTES

1942.

in their jobs for the duration of the war. such as Intelligence. Aviation.
Submarine. and Communication jobs.

As .food for thought. CominCh mentioned

the possibility of establishing "Servic a". tho idea being to detail officers
in and out of these

services~.

or

CominCh went on to explain the uses

radio intelligence and at ted that it is essentially a commu.nica.t"ions

matter and not a proper function of ONI.

Copy of the treatise prepared by

the Ensign in Redman's office to be given CinCPac and OinCLant.

21.

Upon return to

ashington take up with the

rmy in connec-

tion with their route to the Southwest Pacific. what do if Canton Island is
knocked outf

22.

FOLLOWING ItA\IS BROUGHT UP BY CINCPAC:' ,

&cArtbur'a discussion

or

Tulagia operations.~~ ~ .

Rear Admiral Byrd's letter regarding Ghormley and MacArthur

and Tasks 2 and 3.
24.

UaeArthur

release ot news.

It is obvious that the

inform~

tion he releases is obtained only from Secret despatches.

25.
and no

Assignment of submarines in the Pacific.

{Covered yesterday

fully understoo-d by OinCPao).

26.

.Fitch to be Com.Airpa.c; Halsey to be TF Commander.

(Also

covered yesterday.)
27.

Releases

reporter a.

or

War news.

CinCPac states that he is bedeviled by

ishes Elmer Dav-is to know that he assumes role se of war news

to the Preas means release to t he ene my.

battle

Cm.trl.nCh replied that he tought that

t le ast once a dfl

S ECRE T

102 3

Sept.

CONFERENCE liOTES

28.

Answer:

a_

1942.

Should there be a Civil Engineer on CinCPao' s Staff?

No ne d tor one

now~

but poaaibly later.

Thom

already given

additional duty as such at request of ore 11.

29.
Ghormley.

Fraser wants a Liaison officer with New Zealand forces and

ew Zealand

an is a Lieutenant General.

the matter ia up to Ghol'lllle;r.

CominCh replied that

Short discussion as to

.functions of

Liaison officer.

30.
earmarked.

Army r

( ote s

inf'orce ents to SoPac and So

General DC itt

aya

Fourteen Squadrona

a.c.

signment of 31

ediw bombers to

estern Defense Command has been cancelled.)

31.

Upon return to aahington:

tako up with the Army the propo-

sition ot putting at the disposal of CinCPac another Army Division for

phibian training to replace the Third.
Amphibious Force Pacific.
32.

the

Tnis division would

~o

to the

CinCPac has no more items.

CominCh discussed raider battalions, also tho situation in

arin Corps in general and disposition and distributio

33.

Land baaed planes are to go to CinCPac.

CinCPao notified that

there are no more restrictions on the type of plane considered

ne~essary.

B-17' s are all right.

34.

Should mining operations be undertaken in tho Aleutians?

Theobald has proposed. CinCPac is opposed. but is investigating.

mining be done by submarine?

Answer:

Should the

.(..

Supply of torpedoj is a factor.

SECR E T

1024

CONFERENC E NOTES

35.

. Sept.

s.

1942.

CinCPac has been requested by Ghormley and others to set up

.an Airplane replaceme nt program.

As all available planes will be sent.

there is nothing to plan at this time.

36.

The question of whether or not Fulcrum should be major air-

plane repair base ..-as brought up.

3Y.

}t'ot feasable at this timo.

Brief discussio n of the characte ristics of P-400'a and the

best way to employ them.

38.

Prospecti ve battle damage repairs to be effected.

CinCPac

gave approxima te datea.

39.

Upon return to Washingto n:

F-1 follow up day by da.r the

forwardin g of material to repair the ENTERPRISE.

40.

to

Kaneohe projects:

CinCPac furnished a lettor.

r-o.
41.

F-33 comment

ays and moans 'b get the Army to bomb from lower altitude.

Upon return to Washingto n request Army Air Force IIeadquA.rters to furnish a

digest of

Hi~1

Level Bombing Instructio ns.

When received, send copy to

I

U"CinCPao and ciroulate to ell other forces with 1\rnry units aa.tlcooperati on,

42.

Secret.
43.

Forwardin g of casualty lists - classific ation thereof

to be

(Also other routine lists).

CinCPac to furnish Cominch tomorrow with complete list of

forces at the disposal o CoinSoPac.

S E C RE T

102 5

- - - - - - - -- . . - - - - - - --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~

44.

Com.inGh remarked that in effecting battle dtlJt&ge repairs.

is a :.f'actor.

Puget Soun.d now filled up.. . The question of 1tthere to overhaul

the PK'!DUJYLV.AJU. recently arose. !he Pearl lta.rbor g$Ug is

45.
ex~B.

and

CominCh told ClnOPac that loss

o~

$Xoellent~

c:ruiaers ie oft-set by one

Short diaeusaion follow:ed iu r-e,.ard to other BfPs. the WICHI'TA

~A,

alao as to .how many cruisers Theob6ld should have.

neeision

that he would ila.ve more tools as soon as they became e..vailable .

CillCPac replied that it is workillg all right but that he has. too

out for the interests of the sea going for0e$?

that the teohnie.al people

&Uld

Answer:

!{o.

Similar .s itu.a-

the se& going people do not talk the s8lllfJ .

language.

- 9SECRET

1.02 6

~~~
OOIF.FJRDOE NOTES

leptem'ber f 1941.

SBCRE! -

1.

Shift of AViation Flight

cOtiirPao

\Y'i th

rtUlk of V1ce ..t\.dmiral.

Cat~'1lrLnds

discussed.

Decision

tti teh to reliev$ Mocaia.

Halsey

to be Task Force Colnm&nder .. retaining his. rank of Vice t:.dmiral but to

be aubordinate to Ghormley.

Incidents included ?l1oobald 1 a roport against Buckner Glld the reliefs of

letter from Vice Admiral Freeman who recently made

tour of: inspootion.

fbe jiet ot the lett6r is that bad feeling exists baoAUae ot bombing
limitations placed on !rmy aviators# which has res\11 ted in the lack of

etfective 1\rmy air support.

to

th~

effect that

th~

J,o.s,

Vice Admiral Freeman recommends complete

directive is interpret.ed by him Md CominCh

to give him the authority he dsires with respect to the Pribolofa .

3.

Admiral Nind t.s. discussed the Aleutian si tu.ation 1n general

not feel that the oceupa.tion of th-e Pribolota by the Ja.ps would be
profitable. hence does not b$l1eve they will ur.uiertnke it.

marinas in tho 'Pac1f'ic Fleet.

!his covered the transfer of SubDiv {)3 to

- 1 -

S EQ
R g 'f
...............
..,..- ................

1027

Sept. 1. 1942

COlWERENCE NOTES

CincLant.

co

ious

~aoond

ront operations di cussed.

SubDiv 201 oan

to CotnSoPao.

s.

Admiral

l~imi t1.

stated that the docking situation at

Pearl hu improved tremendously - special credit due Salv

Party.

Personnel items:

6.

(e.)

Mo-nroe to relieYe Anderson (not decided) .

(b)

Should Anderson

(o)

reliav~

ho should relieve

Holmea?

ewton?

Hewitt a possibility.

(d)

Should Anderson become Com Eloven?

(e)

Diaou sion regarding casualties following 58 year

old physioal examination.

utbori ty for ComSoPae to 1.nake awards on the spot.

1.

It

8.

boundary

li~e

as agreed that it would be dtlsire.ble to change the

between CamSoPac and ComSdWPao ta give Ghor ley more tree-

dom# but the dcision wws made not to do it b cause ot possible complications ari ing !'rom certain protests fro
Admiral

9.

Kin~

General

discussed the Co

C.tlrthur.

ands in the SoWPac

Also explained the duties to he performed by Vice Admiral

10.
of St

~oroe .

illsott.

A.d.r.tira.l King explained Admiral Lctiliy s duti a as Chiet

t to the Pre ident.

11 .

Admiral Mimi tz brought up the question of employment of

battleships ot Task Force l.

to C Task

Gave Adroir 1 King a copy of hi

desp tch

orae 1 on this subjeet.

1028
S lll CR L T

Sept.

12.

7~

1942.

Admiral . ir11itz announeed th t the develop ent of ,idwa.y

HG also stated th t B-17' s are

field h a pro&ressed satisfactorily.

ow operating trom Johnson Isl d.

13.

.dmiral

B sur.e to tall Admiral Bloch.

ing brought up

~he

subject of Canton Isl

d in

alternate route - BoraBora - tongatabu .

14.
imita.
Academy

or the

The detail

The c

tured

akin raid

ere rele.t d by .A.dutiral

ord (with blood r.till on it) goes to the

um. the oaptur

In this conneotion Admiral Ki

achinG gun to the Marine Corps

e.vel

us ua.

stated that a Third Raider B ttalion

will be for ad in the South Pacifia. t.ha nucleus to be men taken from.
the first tllld
~ad

ooond Raider

attalions .

dmire.l .:"'imi. tz stated that he

recently given orders to round up the tarinos in the 14th District

who were n t doing a rrtan' s

questioned their

work to form auch

15.
supply

Admiral King

uitability to which Adtniral l"i tz replied that they

could be us ad to ropl oe those who

there would b

nucleus.

ere suit ble.

Admiral .King said

a fourth e.f'ter a while .

Tho Under Secretary having mad.o some comment about the

i tuat1on,. and h ving intimated the.t it might be d sirablo to

have anoth r ag ncy in llfashin ton. it

decided that Admiral Calhoun

should have a representativo in the N vy Dep rtmeut to act in the s

oapaoity th.are as 9u.pts.in Eason doos for the At.la.ntio Fleet.

ing remurked that the

uopl y si1..'1lati on in {Lenoral is

- 3 -

J.o..dmir 1

matt .. r for the

102 9

CONFI!:RE ~CE NOTES

Pay1JUl.ater General,

in th

Sept. '7, 1942

o, although not farrnally designated as auch. acta

capacity o Fleet Supply Officer.

16.

Complications in

~1e

Command rel tiona under General

carthur together with his complia.noe with the directive he received:

Items under tho foregoing ere tl ..e railure of Gene.ral .B rett to get
along~

and speculation aa to what Kenny will be able to do in that ca.pa-

oi ty.

In this connection, the employment

and a (luesticn

or

lfew Zealand ships and .troops

ot who as r aponaible for the local detenao of ... ew

Zealand was touohed upon.

Alao 1 what information ia due the New Zealand

Government and to wh t official should it bo given.

11.
d~ted

Septe

Captain cCor.mick read a letter fro

CincPao to Comineh

er 2nd on the aubjeot of prospective employ

nt of carriers.

Copy of tho letter delivered to GominCh.

18.

Revision

or

Tasks 2 and 3 TUlagi operations to be made.

Admiral King explained how the e tasks wer

what tho various oonsiderat1ons

originally dooided upon and

ere. including the part played by the

J.c.s. ,
19.

Distinction drum bewo&n oon"&m.Utliquea and press rele

ea.

Admiral N'im,i tz is to isaue co :nuniqu.es but if' he teels a press reluae

is deaira'bl

20.

it should bo sub-!!l.i tted to Ad:mir l King.

Gen~ral

UpShur has

~pointment

at 10:45 follo ed b7

General Dttlfitt at 11:00.

- 4-

S ECRE T

10 30

SBGRI*--

September 8.
Cominch 082234 gives the pl 8n for
Zealand forces in the war.

e~ployment

of New

Cominch 082237 pink summarizes the Army airplanes in

fe reiterand presently t n route to the Pacific Ocean Areas.
Nimitz.
Admiral
of
ates that all these planes are under control
Cincpac 081736 directs Sopac to malce ready to turn over
one regiment of experienced amphibious troops and 1 division of
APs to T..~.acArthur.
Coninch believes that I.~acArthur has a squadron of A-24s
which are not being used for combat and sugrrest Ghormley get them.
Investieation shows that the entrance to Bleacher is safe
for tb.e r/ASHINGTON. The 5 fa tho111 coral head which the SOUTH DAKOTA
hit has been buoyed. The SU1.:NER is not needeinow to clear out the
entrance.
Comsopac 091146 summarizes the operations for the day in
his Area.
The SARATOGA can now go ahead on 4 shafts and back on 3.
He~dquarters

progra111 for the South

Marines 081556 is planning a replacement

acific.

Task forces 17 and 18 will join under Admiral Noyes on

September 11th just east of the NEW HEDRIDIES. .

pee.:\.," l

The P0~.1PANO returning from ,.. off Japan reports sinking

1 AK, 1 DD, 1 PY.
In the north a sub arine v1as reported at SITKA and another
off DIXON. General Dewitt stated that his Message concerning the
sarrisonlng of the Pribilofs was not a directive to Admiral
Theobald. The incident could and should have been avoided. A
submarine on patrol sighted two destroyers at ATTU.
The Japanese continue to build up forces in the South
Pacific. There are indications that the 17t~ army left Truk
yesterday for Guadalcanal. The APs are escorted by DDs only.
If this be true that army can attack Guadalcanal as early as

lbffe~lw<13 t h

\,_

<'(..;"

1031

September 9th.
Comsopac 091016 and 091018 nlus 100255 all pink give the
new operating p lan for the South Pa ci fi c Forces. It will be put
in effect by despatch, presumably on th e eleventh.
There were no contacts in the South ~ acific area yesterday
and all forces are ~ usily enga ged in stren~ t h ening positions.
The landing field at CAC TUS is inoperative today (Comairsopac
091215).
At least 1000 Japs are estimated to have landed on NW
(e.G. 1st ~1arine Division 0~0935). Thus about 2000
have been landed on that island recently. The second group is
in the vicinity of TAIVO.
GUADALC .~~AL

Cominch 082030 says that the 3rd Marine Raider Battalion

will be formed at SM.IOA.
The ENTERPRI SE will arrive at PEARL for repairs tomorrow.
The SARATOGA group , which includes the SOUTH DAKOTA, will fuel
at BLEACHER tomorrow and depart immediately thereafter for PEili~L.
That carrier believes she can make an engine speed of 15 knots
for the trip.
TFi continues training at PEARL. The force is constantly
ready to break up any attempted enemy landing in the HAWAIIAN
area.
Comnowestseafron 100202 gives the progress of the FIHEPLACE
operation. The ALEUTIANS are otherwise quiet.
~
September lOth
The operations for the day in the South Pacific are sum-

~arized in his 111320 (pink).

Because of the serious situation which now confronts Admiral

Ghormley and because he needs the 7th Marines now at GUhDALCANAL,
he plans to make the 8th Marines available to General r~iacArthur
when ordered to do so by CinCPac. That regiment will not be ready
until October 1st (Comsopac 110516 (plnk)).
Ad:miral Ghormley's 101156 (pink) stresses the need for more
VFs. And his 101152 [)ives the organi zation of the South Pacific
-c
Force as of September 11th.
v

(continued on neYt pa s~ e)

10 .32

Septer1ber lOth (continued):

A&1iral Turner (100725) suggests that Pacific Fleet submarines no,~; be er1ployed off the eastern NE,'N GUIJ~B-::A coast. In
this connection, the only sub:narine now immediately available
was offered to General MacArthur for patrol off SHORTLAND Island.
The offer was not accepted as ComSWPac is employing his own submarines to the westv.rard of the SOLOMONS.
There was no news from the

~LEUTLNS8

The ENTERPRISE zroup arrived at Pearl.

should depart BLEACiffiR today.
Oahu.

The SARATOGA group

Task Force 1 departs tomorrow for four days training off

There is some evidence that the forces for the counter attack on GUADALCA:TAL are now approaching that area. If our infor~ation is correct, they can be exoected to arrive there in
sreat strength. There j_s no inclication of prospective Jap effort
in any place except the South and Southwest ?acific.
September 11.
CinCPac 120315 (pink) states that sending the 8th r~1arines
to reinforce General Macarthur is the best that can be done under the circumstances.
GUADALCANAL 120530 (pink). Admiral Turner agrees with
General Vande grir t that GUADALCANAL nust have at least one more
ree:iment for defense. Admiral Turner proposes to sail the 7th
liarines to that place from ESPIHITU SA~TTO on the 14th, covering
the move with all task forces. His 092300 (pink) eives status
of the 7th L:arines and stresses need for troops to bring the
Southeast SOLOI.~ONS under firm control.
ComSoPac 121241 summarizes the operations for the day. One
enemy carrier and one enemy cruiser was sighted by our patrol
plane durinG the afternoon in Lat 7-20S, Long 168-50E. This
group v1as probably seen further South later in the afternoon ..
A flight of 15 B-l?s vJere ordered to attack, but have not yet
reported res,llts. Durin[. the ni}'ht at least one cruiser and
four destro:rers shelled the I.is.rines on GUADh.LC.:lNAL.
Adrn.lral rimitz returned from his conference with Admiral
King in 3an Francisco. It seems very difficult to interest the
Army in the war in the Pacific. Cominch 111802 ~ives the status
of one Arm~Jr regiment of the 43rd Division. It can be expected
to be ready to leave the ~est Coast early next month.

1033

September 11th (Continued~

The GUARDFISH repo r ts sinking 50,000 tons of enemy shiJpping
along their ore route.
\
In his 112130 (pink), ComTaskFor 8 reports progress in the
~:he Army found a qtlick way to make an
airfield by draining Sweeper Creek. The field is 9,000 feet long
and averages 500 feet 111T ide .A B-18 landed there today.
It was
expected that the co nstructinn of this field would take months.
In his 112120 he gives his escort plan for the garrisoning of the
PRIBILOFFs.
ADAK airfield operation.

CinCPac has approved a plan for quite extensive defensive

mining at ADAK.
The enemy continues to assemble his forces for an attack on
GUADALCANAL. There are indications that paratroops will be employed in an effort to capture the airfield.
There is no new
evidence of changes in the Jap deployments.

September 12th.
There continues to be considerable enemy surface and air
activity in tl~ Central and Northern SOLOMONS~ During the afternoon a patrol plane sighted a good sized group of enemy cruisers
and destroyers about 200 miles northeast of ~.I[ALAITA. GUADALCANAL
was shelled asain last night by at least one cruiser and two
destroyers. The situation at that place is shown in Rear AdMiral
Tu.rner' s 130933.. A ma.i or attack on GUADALCANAL is to be expected
ln the near future.
'11he plan to land the 7th Marines on GUADALCANAL, dawn Sept.

16th, has been approved by Cominch and CinCPac.

(pink) gives the general directive).

(ComSoPac 130540

The first ACORN is now enroute the South Pacific and the
second should leave the ~.7est Coast September 17th.
The ALEUTIANS were generally quiet.
Further enemy activity in the GILB:bRTs is

noted~

Radio Intelligence indicates that Cardiv 2 is still in home

waters.. The SIIOKAKU and ZUIK1l.KU are sti.ll unheard~
It is still
uncertain as to whether or not the HYUJO was badly damaged and
possibly sunk on Aug ust 24th.. CinC Combined Fleet continues to
show much interest in t h e S OL OMONS situ.e.tion ..

10 ,34

September 13.
During the late morning our search planes discovered
two enemy forces in the area to the east,!Tard of the SOLOMONS ..
One force ~vas composed of three BBs, four cruisers, four DDs,
one transport headinc; southeast. 1'Vhen last seen the force was
on a northerly course. 14 B-17s attacked and claim 2 hits.
The second force was located about 120 miles north of the BB
group , (\~d_ <,oV\+a. \~e ~ l C. \1 , CY'\I'.sc~ '-, a.""e<. 'OD J..
For the past two days the Japs have been attacking the
Marines on GUADALCANAL from the rear and flank. Tbe attacks
were repulsed, - enemy dead over 10 to our 1. It is believed
that the enemy will attempt to surround the Marines and try to
capture the airfield. An enemy bombing r'aid was repulsed.
Due to approaching hostile forces our transports and
tenders were withdrawn to the south.
Rear Admiral Turner's plan to land the 7th Marines
(CTF-63 140133 pink) may be delayed because of the enemy ships
sighted during the day.
Comsopac 120544 again comr~ents on the fact that P-400s
are of little use to him. Comairsopac desires about 12 B-17Es
from Hawaii at this time. These will be sent. Eventually, w!.1en
they can be handled in the south about 15 more will be sent from
Eawaii.
Twenty fleet subs and two tenders will be maintained
at present in the Southwest. Pacific. '11he S-boa ts now there will
be withdrawn.
In the ALEUTIANS a sub was reported off SEGUAr Island.
T'he CASCO has been refloated and will be towed to DUTCH HARBOR.
The enemy continues to assemble large forces of all
kinds for attack in the South Pacific. At least five CVs and
four BBs may now be in the BISivll~RCK-SOLOMONS area. The Japs
seem to be concentratine; almost everything they have except
their battleline in that area. A small force is now to land
in the GILBERTS.. TARAnA may be the first landing point..
It
is probably the best place in that island group ..

~~

September 14th.
TF 61 composed of the WASP and HORNET groups under
Rear Admiral Noyes was proceeding to the westward, speed 12,
to rendezvous with TF 64 and 65 (7th Marines in APs and escort
under Rear Admiral Turner). The carrier groups had been ordered
to cover the landing of the 7th Marines to reinforce our position
on GUADl~.LCANAL. At 1440 local 15th the WASP was torpedoes. Twelve
minutes later the NORTH CAROLINA received one torpedo hit. Rear
Admiral Srott 151?55 pink and CTF 17 150929 uink described the
action and give future moves. The torpedoing was certainly done
by one or more submarines and the subs are indicated as having
reported results by radio.
the 14th.

Comsopacs 141350 pink summarizes the operations for

Much of this has been recorded before.

C.G. Karines 1st Div 141045 gives the details of fighting on the 13th and 14th. His 150226 amnlifies the first report and goes on to say that after severe fi phting his position continues to be satisfactory. If the disaster to TF 61
does not change our -olans, the 7th Marines will be landed tomorrow
in the vicinity of the LU~GA river. A group of 7 enemy DDs
was heading toward GUADALCANAL in the afternoon and it seems
probable that they will land reinforcements there tonight. It
must be recorded that our surface forces in the South Pacific
have done nothing the past 30 days to prevent or interrupt these
night landings and shellings of Marine positions.
Cincpac 142247. It is planned to send one tender and
six fleet submarines to operate under Vice Admiral Ghormley. The
message also renuests part of General MacArthur's area for submarine operations.
The
active area.
OAHU.
FARP.. LJJONS .

~vAS~-I INGTON

group leaves BLEACHER today for the

TF 1 returned to Pearl from a training cruise south of

There was a possible SU)marine sivhting off the

Rear Admiral Fitch will relieve Rear Admiral McCai n

as Comairsopac. Vice Adr1iral I.eary wi ll relieve Vice Admiral
Pye as CTF 1. He may also rf~lieve Rear Ao':1ira l Anderson as
Gombatships.
The G R O"JT}i~~ returning from patrol reports sinking
20,000 tons and damaging 6000 tons.

103 6

September 14 (Continued)
In the ALEUTIAlrs photo reconnaissance shows 4 SS,
3 AK at KI3EA and 1 3S, 1 Ci~ and DDs at ATTr.
CTF-8 150039
gives his views conccrnin3 the stratesic location of airfields
and the need for ;~rmy troops in the north Pacific.
At least 17 enery submarines are opera t! ng in the
SCLOI"OlTS area as adva~ce screen and attackin~ group for the
eneny surface forces thoucht to the north and eastward of the
30LOI.IONS. While ener1y s trene;th in that general area cann ot be
stated accurately, it is possible that r1a,ior units include as
:nany as 5 CVs and 3 BBs. The llAG .TO may be in the SC'LO::ON3,

September 15th.
Comsopac 161220 pink summarizes operations for the day.
The need for avgas at GUADALCANAL is acute and the "SF.l,I,ATRIX will
be sent there tomorrow to supnly this need. Comsopac 160900 gives
his estimate that the next two days are favorable for unloading
stores, etc., in the GUADALC~~AL- ~TLAGI area. Because of the
threatening situation Rear Aruniral Turner did not bring in the 7th
Marines for the planned reinforcement of our Southern SOLOMONS
positions.
TF 17 and units of TF 18 were combined to rendezvous
September 17 (local) and will operate to westward of the longitude
of EFAT:E and withln 200 miles of that base awaiting further developments. Cruisers and DDs of TF 18 arrived at ~S7IRITO SANTO where
they wi 11 land hospital cases, then proceed to NOUL1EA.
General MacArthur sees many difficulties in PacFleet subs
operating in his area. If any go there he would desire operational
control. The plan to send one tender and 6 SS to Comsopac is thus
held in abeyance for further study. The AJ\flBERJJ..CK has been moved
from patrol of KAVIENG to the north and east of the BOUGAINVILLE
STRAIT area.
Our submarine on patrol in lat 24-25 N, long 139-01 E
sighted an enemy CV escorted by 2 DD.
Comsubpac proposes and Cincpac anproves the conversion of
the ARGONAUT to a troop carrying sub~arine (Comsubpac 150144).
The C~TTTI.JEFI9H in the CHINA SEA reryorts sinking a 10,000
ton passenger frei ghter and a 19,000 ton tanker.
In the ALEUTIAN~ the Arm:r air made a v ery successful air
raid on KI~KA (CTF 8 151905). Thus the new airfield at ADAY has
started to pay dividends.
It now annears that Cardiv 2 (IIITAKA and TIAYATAKA included) have left home i.l'aters for the ~ outh "Pacific. 'L'here are no
other imnort ant enemy moves
10 ~7

September lG.
Cor1.sopac 171216 pink summarizes the day in the South
Pacific. The IJOHTH CATI.OLINA is not seriously damaged (CTF-17
151235 pink) and will arrive at rTONGJ~.TAI3U th~ 19th local date.
,lhen terr1porary repairs are completed she will sail for Pearl.
The 7th ~arines are expected to arrive at GUADALCA~AL toMorrow.
Reports of large numbers of enemy vessels, mostly destroyers
and auxiliaries, continue to be received from reconnaissance
planes over the central and north SOLOMONS.
There is continued minor enemy activity in the GIL-.
BERTS. Because of this)consideration will be given to establishing a landing field_in the ELLICE Islands.
The USS CRYSTi~L grounded at MID .VAY when shifting
berth in the lagoon.
1

TF-1 continues training in the OAHU area and remains

ready to oppose an enemy landing in the HAWAIIAN Area.
A PBY on patrol from IvTID7JAY was attacked by a
L:ITSUBISIII twin engine plane 445 miles south.st of T!IID1VAY.
I~ o dan.a~e was done to either plane
APDs.

Cor1.lnch oroposed to convert G ODD now with TF-8 to

Replacenents would come fron the Pacific Fleet.

There is nothing new concerning eneny moves. Interest of the ener1y continues to be centered in the South Pacific.
As lone as this continues there seems little chance of an attack
on the III:CWl Y-OAHU line.
happenin~s

General Erwons ~as brought up to date on current

at a conference hold by fldniral NiMitz this morninC:.

General Emmons j ust returned from a visit in the South

and Southwest Pacific. f..k~~-~-g_
.1 pg talk with General r\~acArthur
the gist of which wJMha~TJ '-~~~ di::JINl!.:A can be taken by the
Japs any time they are ready, (2) he thinks our positions in the
~OLOkON~ i~.very precarious, and (3) as soon as the Japs clear
us out of the ~QT-'OL.OifS they will attack HA~vlAII.

1038

.-r

~1!1 GRr"S 'L

September 17th.

Comsopac 181231 pink summarizes operations in his area

for the day. The B-17 attacks and the SlD attacks were particularly
ineffective. The NORTH CAROLINA is not badly damaged, as noted
before. She was examined at BLEACJillR and the Captain reports her
ready for further active service but with sneed reduced to 24 knots.
The O'BRI~N was examined at E~PIRITO SANTO and is badly damaBed.
She will be escorted to N01Tl"rEA. The loss of the WA P is brieflv
described in Comsopac 181140 pink.
0

The enemy radio at GUADALCA\!AL renorted the arrival of TF 64

and 65. About midni~ht surface forces arrived and bombarded the
marine position. Presumably our surface forces had departed
shortly after dark. The unloading of fuel, food, and other needed
material in this area is severely handicapned by enemy activity. At
present the only solution seems to keen our ships away durin8 darkness and to get them underway when day air attacks are renorted
coming in. And until a better solution is found our situation will
continue unsatisfactory.
The HADDOCK returning from patrol in the
ports sinking 26,000 tons of freihters.

~ast

China Sea re-

The landing mat on SAND ISLAl'JD, : '!IIDWAY , is now ready for

emergency use.
The Central and North Pacific areas are general quiet.
The COPAHEE left PEARL today with fighter and dive bomber
renlacements for Sanae. She is also transporting personnel for
Patwing ONE. Vice Admiral Ghormley will be given authority to
retain her there as a carrier, otherwise to return her to SAN DIEGO.
No changes in Jap denloyment are noted. The inability to
t'read the mail" leaves us in the dark. We can guess, but are never
sure.

1039

SepteMber 18.
The Pacific Oceap hreas are generally quiet. ~ith
the landine; of the 7th llarine s at GUADALCA1JAL there are about
15,000 troops there. TF-17 was ordered to cover the retirement of TF-EJ5. The r.1ain problem in the TULAGI-GUADALCAIJAL
area now is to build up the airfield so that land based planes
can cover own shipping there .
Vice Admiral Leary arrived from AUSTRALIA and brings
a rather depressing view of the situation there.
The Australians seem t<? ~r:ave little enthusiasM for fie;hting the Japs in
NE',/ GLIINEA ~ can probably prevent use of the PORT IIOHESEY
airfields.
1 he NOETH C1-1.ROLJNA is now reported able to make only
18 knots and has been ordered to PURL.
1

Cominch 182200 pink gives General MacArthur's present

estir.1ate and vrants to know ,,That the Pacific Fleet will do to
prevent a seaborne invasion in his area. There are now about
20,000 troops in the POHT l\:ORESBY area and around 10,000 in
the t=ILNE BAY area.
Since the start of the war our subnarines in the
Pacific Ocean have sunk approximately 1,016,000 tons of Jap
ships.
The Hawaiian Sea Frontier will take over the direction
of the daily Hawaiian search on Se)tenber 24th.
Up to now it
has been run by the Patrol :rings under Cincpac' s general dire~ tion.
'11hc ALE1JTI_

~fS

are quiet.

The locations of Ja9 carriers continues indefinite.

It is assumed that nt le2st four are in the area south of 'J:IRUK.
There is no 600d indics.tion of the objective of the Japs next
r1ove except that it will be in the 3outhwestern Pacific.

10 40

SEGRE'l -

September 19.
Comsopac 201240 pink summarizes the day in his area.
TF-17 will be reorganized in the near future. Meanwhile it will
operate in the general area bounded by 13 and 20 degrees south,
165 and 177 east prepared to take offensive action against suitable enemy targets within reach. In his 201542 pink Cominch
questions the employment of striking forces on a strategically
static basis in submarine infested waters.
The question raised by General MacArthur regarding
the employment of the Pacific Fleet to repel Jap landings in
NEW GUINEA was answered by CinCPac 200145 pink.
Minor enemy surface and plane movements continue to
be observed by our search planes in the Central SOLOMONS and in
the general area to the east of the SOLOMONS. Major units~
not observed within the limits of our search.

A drydock at AUCKLAND capable of taking a damaged BB

is under consideration.
Vice Admiral Leary will relieve Vice Admiral Pye as
CTF-1 and also assume Combatships on September 20th.
CTF-8 summarizes his need for destroyers in connection
with the withdrawal of ODDs for conversion to APDs (his 190225).
The first phase of FIREPLACE will be regarded as completed tomorrow . ..
There is no new information of enemy deployments. The
carrier locations are very much in doubt. There is some possibility that the enemy may make a raid similar to our r~KIN raid
on our staging route to the South Pacific.
~
September 20.
Only minor enemy activity is noted in Comsopac daily
summary (211221 pink).
CTF-8 210030 states that bad weather has prevented
further attacks on KISKA. His 201949 reports the landing of an
Army garrison at ST PAUL in the PRIBILOFS, and of an Army landing at ATKA. His 202100 objects to reported reduction of Army
planes in the Alaskan Sector and gives his estimate of current
army plane requirements.
CinCPac 202147 pink suggests that our striking forces
anchor at NOU1ffiA except when employed on specific attacks.
APAIANA and TARAWA in the GILBERTS report continued
enemy actt'vity. This indicates that those atolls are not yet
completely occupied. CinCPac is now considering occupying
Fill~AFUTI in the ELLICE Islands where the Ja.ps are indicated as
going around the first of October.
No change in enemy deployment was noted during the day.

1041
~

September 21
The reorganized task forces under Vice Admiral Ghorml ey
are as shown in his 221002. Rear Admiral r.:urray retains command of TF 17 in spite of the fact that Hear Admiral Lee in the
~~ lASHilJC~TON is senior.
Operations in the South Pacific are as shown in
Comsopac 221256 pink.
Admiral Nimitz expects to arrive in NOUEEA September
28 for a conference with Admiral Ghormley. He wj_ll also inspect
various South Pacific activities.
Rear Admiral Turner 212207 tells of Japanese methods
of fiD'hting ashore and lists some of our shortcomings and makes
recommendations to correct deficiencies.
The 2nd Raider Battalion wi l l initial l y disembark at
"S 0 PIRITO SATTTO.
CT~

8 202130

~ives

the

minin~

ulan for ADAK.

The SOUTE DAKOTA and SARATOGA group arrived at PEARL

for renairs . The NORT~I CAROLINA is due at PEARJ_J for repairs
September 30th .
There is no new information on location of major Jap
units. Carrier deplo~,rrnent is most uncertain .
There continues
to be strong evidence of a lar~e scale attack to recapture the
Southern 30"SOllfON3 .
_t . - ~k

Cincpac 220035 is a proposal for the occupation of

September 22

FU~TI.

There were no important contacts or developments in the

South Pacific during the day.
General MacArthur seems to expect one Marine regiment about
October 1st. 0n September 8 Cincpac ordered a regiment made ready
for duty in the SWPac but it is not yet certain that the Marines
will be sent. All available troops in the SoPac are urgently
needed by Admiral Ghormley at present.
in NO~ffiA
to extend
feel that
cross the

Admiral Nimitz invited General MacArthur t 'o a conference

next week and General MacArthur invited Admiral Nimitz
his trip South to Brisbane. Neither of these officers
they can be away from their commands long enough to
Coral Sea.

The Jrd Marine Raider Battalion was formed at SAMOA on

September 20th.
~ ~
(Conti nued on next page)

1 042

 OBORET

September 22 (Continued)
The first of 12 B-17s from OAHU to SoPac are now enroute
and 12 more are being prepared for early despatch.
Comsopa.c 221226 pink gives his plan for the occupation
of F'UNAFUTI.
The AMBERJACK on patrol off BOUGAINVILLE STRAIT reports
sinking one 5000 ton frei ghter. While there she grounded and
suffered damage to her sound gear.
The ALEUTIANS continued quiet
.There is continued doubt regarding present deployment of
Jap major units. A large number of subs are in the South Pacific
and a good number of cruisers and destroyers are sighted in the
SOLOMONS - NEW BRITAIN area. All evidence continues to point to
a large attack in the near future to recapture the Southern
SOLOMONS.
September 23
Comsopac 240206 pink orders the occupation of FUNAFUTI
about October 2nd. Under Rear Admiral Turner, Rear Admiral
Wright will command the expedition.
Comsopac 2)1326 gives the general plan for the employment of CUBS, ACORNS, and construction battalions.
Comsopac 231251 states that the harbor of NOUMEA is very
congested and requests weight handling and other equipment. As
operations progress in the present offensive it becomes more and
more apparent that facilities and equipment needed to support
the operation were not made available initially~ Cincpao 232249
generally concurs with Rear Admiral Turners recommendations to
perfect our amphibious efforts.
There is some indication that GIZO and FAISI are mined.
While the day was quiet in the GUADALCJ\._N"AL - TULAGI area, all
our moves were promptly reported by Jap radio on GUADALCANAL.
There were possible submarine sightings by Army planes
today - one off FANNING ISLAND and one 240 miles SW of CANTON
ISLAND.
The

AL~JTIAN S

continue quiet.

Indications continue of Jap plans to recapture the

southern SOLOMONS and eastern NEW GUINEA. There is some evidence
that this operation may be delayed.

September 24.
.... \

1\'\q

Cominch 241630 pink concurs that ,a Marine regiment

experienced in amphibious warfare to General MacArthur will
depend on developments . The message also reauests plans for
the employment of the Army 43rd Division.
The South Pacific is generally quiet. This may be
the lull before the storm as all indications continue to point
to major Jap operations there in the very near future. TF 17
is about to enter NOUMEA ~ while the WASHINGTON group is approaching TONGATABU. The unloading at GUADALCANAL has greatly improved in the past few days and critical shortages in the area
have been supplied.
The ALEUTIANS continue quiet.
There are no changes in Jap major deployments. Apparently small garrisons are being left on the atolls in the
GILBERTS and allied coast watchers are being captured.
September 25.
Arrangements for the occupation of. FUNAFUT~ - ~~arding
air coverage ~re shown in Comsopac 260826~ 261156~d Comairsopac 251228 ~
Comsopac 251456 gives operations for the 24th in his
area. There were no major developments or contacts. The performance of the SBDs from CACTUS against approaching enemy DDs
was not good.
Admiral Nimitz and party were delayed at PAillYRA due
to engine trouble in his plane.
Plans are going forward to establish an advanced base
at NOUMEA along the lines described in Comsopac 260434.
CTF 8 251950 and 260645 indicate that the Japs have
abandoned ATTU. Increased activity at KISKA might possibly
indicate an abandonment there also. It is hard to see where
the Japs have profited in their ALEUTIAN adventure.
Indications of preparation for a major Japanese offensive in the South Pacific continue. Best guess is that they
plan to recapture the Southern SOLOMONS, PORT MORESBY and attack
AUSTRALIA. They are thought to be making a major effort to assemble the means for this in the RABAUL area. This being the case,
no move on the OAIID-MIDWAY line is expected. Nor will they be
able to launch a major attack toward INDIA.

1044

Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

Pac-16-Es
Al6(6)
Serial

02798
September 24, 1942

From:
To:.

Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject:

Amphibiou s Training of Army Troops for Operations

ln Kiska Area.

1.
Weather condition s in the Western Aleutians since
the occupation by the Japanese of Kiska and Attu have been .
such that neither aircraft bombing or surface ship bombardme nt
of Kiska nor submarine operations off that port have been able
to prevent the enemy from consolida ting and strengthen ing his
hold in that area.
2.
There is no indication that weather conditions will
be such as to ensure the ejection of the Japanese from Kiska
as a result of aerial bombing to be conducted from Adak.
3.
The current stalemate has caused the neutraliza tion
of the considerab le naval strength now assigned to Task Force
EIG~T without a correspond ing holding or reduction of Japanese
nava.l forces.

4.
Informatio n received from Commander Task Force EIGHT
states that he has arranged with General DeWitt for Army
garrisons of 15,000 men for Adak and 5,000 men for Tanaga.
5.
It is believed that a satisfacto ry solution for the
Aleutian situation can be reached only through the ejection
of the Japanese from Kiska and Attu. Such ejection can be
effected only by a landing of amphiaiou s troops.
6.
It is therefore recommend ed that the Army at once
begin the amphibiou s training of a suitable contingen t of
troops now in the Alaskan Area (including Adak and Tanaga)
with a view to retaking Kiska and then Attu when suitable ships
are available for this operation .

Copy to:
Comtaskfo r 8
Comnorwe sseafron

C. W. NIMITZ

104 5

September 26.
Operations for the 26th in the South Pacific are
summarized in ComSoPac 26125&. Air offensive operations,
particularly against enemy shipping in the SHORTLANDS and
RABAUL areas, have been stepped up by both ComSoPac and ComSWPac. Our Task Forces there, except those in the FUNAFUTI
operation, are in port.
Vice Chief of Naval Operations suggests SUVA as an
advance base depot for storage of Cub and Acorn material.
ComSoPac 261259 requests that the decision on this be deferred.
The mail situation has, and continues to be bad in
the South Pacific. Officers and men go for months without
mail. The job has been sadly bungled.
Cominch 261302 suggests that troops to be moved to
forward positions be given amphibious training in the Central
and South Pacific. He suggests training centers at OAHU,
WELLINGTON, SAMOA, and NOUMEA or FIJI.
ARD-2 will be towed at once from OAHU to NOUMEA.
air raid

CTF-8 262020 and 262330 describes another successful

KISKA. The ADAK field is paying good dividends.

on

General MacArthur wants the marines to clean out the

northeast coast of NEW GUIN~. . ~~~has about 15,000 troops in
that area now and seems to ~ 5,000 marines t~ he necessary
in addition. As previously noted, the despatch of amphibious
troops to the Southwest Pacific from the South Pacific will
depend on developments. No present developments indicate that
such a plan is suitable. See his 270800 pink.
C .G. SAMOA urges prompt action in furnishing 2500
marines to bring his garrison up to strength and ComSoPac
concurs.
There are no major changes in Jap deployments.
September 27.
The general situation in the South Pacific is improving. Admiral McCain, who has just been relieved as Comairsopac,
told the morning conference that GUADALCANAL can be held if
sufficient fighter planes and pilots can be brought in to maintain present levels. The Japs are afraid of our F4F and will
not attack them consistently. Unfortunately, the requisite
number of VF and trained pilots are not yet in sight. Admiral
Ghormley's 271436 summarizes the day except that during the day
25 enemy VB covered by fighters approached GUADALCANAL and
were intercepted by our fighters who shot down 23 VB and several
8 with no loss to themselves. A magnificent performance.

1046

-BEGRE':t' -

September 27 (Continued)
TF-17 is in port at WHITE POPPY. The WASHINGTON
group is at TONGATABU. The ENTERPRISE group may be able to
leave Pearl for the south about October third.
TF-1 continues to conduct minor training exercises
in the OAHU area.
TF-3 continues comparatively inactive as they are
hampered by lack of APs for training. In a recent letter Vice
Admiral Greenslade reported that our landing boat personnel are
definitely inferior to the Army. This is another manifestation
of naval growing pains.
TF-8 was quiet.
, While there are indications that the Japs will make
an all out effort in the Southern SOLOMONS and possibly NEW
GUINEA, there are also many signs which point to troubles that
he is having. It seems reasonable to suppose that we have now
destroyed the cream of his naval air pilots. Also, our attrition attacks on his ships and planes must be causing them extreme difficulties. Our submarines are causing increasing
shipping shortages.
Admiral Nimitz and party arrived during the afternoon at NOUMEA.

~~.

1~-

September 28.
Operations on the 28th in the South Pacific are summarized in Comsopac 281326. Admiral Nimitz apparently completed his conference with Vice Admiral Ghormley and with
General MacArthur's Chief of Staff and with his Air Force
General and went on to ESPIRITO SANTO. Among the things discussed was the employment of the 8th Marines which are earmarked for the NDENI garrison and the 43rd Army division for
the TULAGI-GUADALCANAL area (see Comsopac 290256 pink).
The ALHENA completed unloading at GUADALCANAL.
The unloading follows the same pattern each day: the AK with
a DD escort unloads during daylight and departs each evening
via the LENGO channel, returning that way in the early morning. The Japs have observed and reported this procedure.
The COPAHEE is having some troubles in shaking down.
There are labor troubles at WELLINGTON. Waterfront
workers refuse to work overtime and unloading is being unduely
delayed.

10 47

~ECR:E'f'

...

September 28 (continued)
The TROUT reports hitting a large CV off TRUK with
two torpedoes. This may be the ZUIKAKU. Another Jap carrier
reports being attacked by a submarine. ~ As this latter is
thought to have occurred off NEN IRELAND and as the TROUT was
definitely off TRUK, it seems probable that two Jap carriers
are in trouble.
The Central and North Pacific areas are quiet.
There is nothing to confirm the suspicion that the Japs plan
to evacuate KISKA.
F\v- ~i

A good RDF cut places the CinC ~n Air Fleet in

the vicinity of the GREENWICH Islands. While some CVs seem
to be leaving the South for the homeland there is no major
change in Jap intentions noted.

September 29.
SoPac 291226 summarizes operations on the 29th in
his area. The ALHENA was torpedoed leaving GUADALCANAL but
not sunk. She will be towed to BUTTON. Our AKs are continually exposed to this submarine menace. TF-17 continues in
port waiting for suitable targets.
Minor activity continues in the GILBERTS. All islands
there can be considered visited by the Japs and small garrisons
have been placed on the principal atolls. Planes were reported
over the ELLICE Islands.
The Central Pacific is generally quiet. Good progress
is being made at PEARL in repair of damaged CVs and the SOUTH
DAKOTA.
The Army bombed KISKA again on the 27th and 28th
. CTF-8 30030 summarizes known results. It seems confirmed
that the Japs have abandoned ATTU and AGGATU. Withdrawal of
some ships of TF-8 from the area may be possible soon.
The Japs are suffering attrition losses of planes
and ships in the SOLOMONS. They continue to land troops on
GUADALCANAL. And they continue to bring in planes and ships
to the general RABA1~ area. KAVIENG is becoming an important
airplane center.

104 8

"SBGRBT

September 30.
There were no important contacts in the South Pacific
during the day. Comsopac plans to employ TF-17 to strike the
shipping in the SHORTLANDS Area on October 5th (local). His
011302 pink.
Comamphibiou sforsopac 301022 and 301030 gives the
need of landing boats for his operations. At present there is
such a shortage that further major operations can not be undertaken.
Comsopac 010454 gives the dispostion of Acorns 3 and
4. He outlines the needs of equipment and repair facilities to
support his operations.
The 8th Marines are now assembled at TUTUILA and are
being trained in amphibious warfare.
Admiral .Nimitz plans to arrive at NOUllEA tomorrow and
at SUVA the day after.
CTF-8 302335 amplifies the report of army bombing at
KISKA. As an enemy plane dropped 1 - 100# bomb at ATKA yesterday it must be assumed that the FIREPLACE operations has been
discovered.
The enemy has changed his communication systems completely. Thus, for some time now we can expect very little
information from radio intelligence .
October 1.
Comsopac 301300 and 011716 gi~e operations in his area
for the past three days. There were no unusual happenings recorded. Other sources report that an enemy DD was hit by our
bombs and damaged north of the NEW GEORGIA group and an enemy
cruiser is aground on a reef in TONOLEI harbor. During the past
weeks our aircraft and submarines have inflicted quite satisfactory damage on enemy ships in the South and Southwest Pacific.
During the day enemy fighters and bombers appeared over GUADALCANAL. Our fighters intercepted but lost 6 VF to the enemy's
4 Zeros. Comairsopac 020050 pink suggests that B-17s from
GUADALCANAL bomb in the SOLOMONS when the HORNET group attacks
the BUIN area and that MacArthur hit the RABAUL area. He also
notes that B-17s are not entirely suitable to give a CV fighter
coverage. Comsopac concurs if the airfield at GUADALCANAL can
take B-17s.
Admiral Ghormley 010812 describes the use of
as a carrier replacement harbor and gives needs.

Nom~

1049

8EGR~

October 1 (continued)
KISY~ was again attacked by Army air yesterday.
Results were not impressive and are shown in CTF-8 012100.

General Marshall 0049%/30 directs amphibious training

for army units be commenced in the Hawaiian area.
The ZUIKAKQ is probably now in Japan. Traffic analysis
indicates that only three CVs are in the TRUK-RABAUL area.
There are no indications as to when the enemy expects to launch
a major attack on the Southern SOLOMONS. Change in all his
call signs makes it impossible for R.I. to analyse current Jap
,....-t,
moves.
\.r--'
October 2.

Comsopac 021436 gives operation summary for his area

on the 1st. Nothing extraordinary happened.
Comairsopac 030244 pink gives his plan of cooperation
with TF 17 for the 5th.
CTF 62 022110 pink gives plans to attack Jap positions
from seaward on the 5th.
Cominch 022120 pink gives troops and planes agreed to
for the FIREPLACE operations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. No
mention is made of the ATKA garrison.
CTF 8 022025 reports Army bombing of KISKA with minor
results. He also reports that ADAK was bombed by an enemy plane.
No damage resulted but the airfield project there was definitely
discovered.
No changes are noted in Jap deployment.
Admiral Nimitz arrived at SUVA.
October 3.
ComSo Pac 031356 gives operations in that area for the
1st. The usual shipping was noted in the SHORTLANDS AREA.
FUNAFUTI was occupied as desvribed in TF 62.6 - 040330. The
planned landing of marines to the westward of the GUADALCANAL
position was posponed at the request of CG lst Marines. GREENWICH
was observed by plane. Only one small non-combatan t ship was
seen in the lagoon and no air field was discovered. Thus the
belief that this place is being used as a fleet anchora ge or
as a plane staging point is shown incorrect.
the 2nd.

CTF 8 - 032010 r e ports another Army bombing of KISKA on

/~
~

10 50

:>8

a t

r=

94 2

..,he
c:i

1942.

e1.estroye s .

',ooo- ,o

lan

J~

r st e. l'th

bOut S

.'ilor~~__,tr. ,

JJ-o,- v eoo

u1

~ r

1051

1052

2rtlk r a.
n a iD.; 1 1

nul ar

0
2

1053

~"nk ~rea.

/(t l~aat

ets tar ou.tb as trz11k.

to ~p1re.

ltnrol:dl& Truk

lfll;t:\:11-se.
lUiiiJli:r 6

Prob~tbly

KA ~JUGA

~\ltU

O~lJtA

U<k1HO

l."'t~A'fA :~if~U

'0!\.'YOU

sunk.

l~il1ll 'l'>G -~ sh1I>

Y1a1:n1t;v o.f

as O:t~AK:A..

~tv:l~.
!fo .iuto~tio.n.
~tl1 be ~e ~h11? as tliiYOU.

:iurout e Kure tG Truk vi&

Cll ch1Jb._ and 2!a1pau.

1054

o Truk

01

"'o
0

1 fo

t1

10 55

'~D~~og. ,12 {Mi~lays;rs)

~1WJ\HU
OlttNO~~HIM.~

9/19, no late 1nf)l"J?.ilt1oa_.

are 9/l,,. no late tn~o~t1oa.

frtlk aroa

T~t

~f!n!telJ

l1Uk,.

1--Wrthern e. rea.
No lte lltfe,~'ntQt1oll. Otd.nato area,

9/19.

~J

No

1ntom.Q,1M.

t'fits&at ~formation. ~oltJmona

!1'o.r'St~aern area.

9/16.

Ia1d 1ea a:ree..

M-o late !D.tor~tlon. fl~ area 9/19.
llfr\ik

s.Jtoa.

iLOOtPtOilrS

1056

rn

~ruk.

9/15.

o,

..
-7

1057

DesD1v 1
~leaDtv

area.
T.,.
roraoua a31ea.

1\fo:~;~thern
40Afl tt

)l

DeaDiv l)
D sD1V )i
DesD1v

area.
<lne unit JU.eut1mut , two wdte
Yokollka.
~:Ja1go:a

1058

.../

~ igo
, t o un ts

v 4

t, on

ro
units Stl

tl~

s t

ire.

le

Sth

p re.

rtta.,

t:;

ree

ea, t
, 2 lmits

Saigo
0

;.

-..

a -

unit

12

10
3
)

- -d

..

13

10 .59

.AIl,:OKU MA.Rll

i\J,~:J:'fHt\XJU Ii~

F't1T!l<~JfA Mfll'!U
t}()Slt11 ~~bJ~U
J'

~"'., ;)'11'

H"'t Jt~

'-~

,:.\)

c:.

....

t:.e.V

l~JJ~IK1~.l~A i1'J:1 RU
-:t!...~(I'TrJtr ""'~tftHU

KJU\OI

iL'tff,C i!Al1ti

.L4.~JO ''"U'l>l~

1\IYO!tir\ ~A :,~~a~U
!..~YOI~S lU,. 1~U
'ii~GIS.QN ~~..:UJ
HJ8UT" ~1J- Ir

' . . 't'l
~s\hliJ
....
r4IS!ll.tl tF'A~W
NI}~lmDJf. ~lt~.a'O
NO~Ot10 t;~%1<t1
OKI~U !L~"'iH:U
'M?l.l'~'.l'

.t.'i~v.s.i

Siu.~w.:r

~~a.baul

nrea

No .1a1u' 1nf'ol1Uat1on. Believed liew Britain area.

Sbofi;la~~4a .

OliiTO~U~

OUIYODA
: ~r

lfo urte tnroratflt1on. Believed

.}.au

:AU"'!!:i tJtft-iW'
,; S f';l!IJU }i. .~.;tU
SENDAI ~o::Jd1U
L':fiil~~;IiO li i\~IU
TOl~I :V!A!ttJ

ii 2 trOJi.,i1,li

:~ARU

Em.ptr.e ,

l~Q

1nftiu:mattoo.

~i;imp1re .

l~o

u te lntormt"ltion.

t'iutpan 411'-ea..

no

tnto~t1

Truk tt:rM.-

a.

'

lntorm(\tion.
1nfor~r.t't1t.m.

t~o

1-lo

M:(?U"Shalls
1.nfol-xr~tletrt.

8th tl"e~ area 9/19.

,
1ntoJtrmt1on.
~o l!ttG 1ntorJl'Ja t1or.t. Tru.k-Palau. 9/17.
":olomoas

r$o late

no

~~abaul

Qrea.

K~~Y!ttDJ.

tl&\"1

ar.a,

Britain. ,

lio iR:tormatton.
te.baul "'rea.
~~~
~io

l,ntormttf t 1 on.

nabaul"
No 1nto~t1on.

ito lat.e 1r&fo~t1oa. Sol~J:lmOna 9/16.

Mo tlettaito 1nf()a~rft1o.n.

1060

AIR

ill&1le verr 11-ttle 1n:to~t1o-. is ava1le:ble 1t 1~ poas1ble to make a fe.i:r gueae t11w the abse-nce of Or~n)6e air
aettv1ty tlurt the l.t$.paneasft 4o Aot hav ao1e than 2S planes
in the Mleutiana. Tl\e 5th Ai:.r tlroU}> at1ll appear$ -a t Kiaka.
ttttu Island, *ffiioh witn Kiskta waa rated a~ ;'a aeapl~e base,
?;be land based \1l1.ll reno~ appt~ re to have be~n a bandonet\.
A llb-,po~ted over ~~ak 1n AU6\.1.$t l'l4\n aot apfJ(!Jtt~d J:~t:coa.
eral gQells o-r Japanese ~tr at~ensth 1n thls e.rea by plane
types 1s:

2 - lrawan1Ph1 97 rour engine :.flyiug boats.

' .. Float t?<' reoom1a:i~~ant.u.~ planes.
l0-15 - l~lcnxt type ;vJ".
Total - , 11-~t: 2 plane&,
lt~wr rJ~A
1~e.r is not suffi etent lnt<~mat1on ~va1labl e to ef!ti~te
the Ja,panese air strength. lti th.1$ area. Tlte 40th Air Group

appee.rs 1n this area and pos~)1bly alao tli61 ))rd Air Group and
)5tli Air Oro'u,p which are 4f18lter in .! talay 01't the Dutch J;ast
IDdies. There 1s ilO:me filight 1u41out1on tb.a\t tneao g1ou;e ~Y

also move

&~st.

Bo other 1ntontat1on on tllt.a area 1s

tYalle~.ble ,.

!to reoent information ex1C~Jts on th.e 23%11 A1r i'!;lot \\'kie h

hell been 1n this a.rea exce?t tha:t tr,:>m. $$SOc1ation it may
op-erate in 'the ~}olotr4lno. 'f"he o.Ol$zt~ntl. e~ ot Tekao Atr oroup
was still at i'enihtri 9/24 \vtt.h a thtt,eohli~ut tlf the group at
Tru.k 9/22. Jr' Air rJ.roup l1a11 n<:>t bG!tlll. 1u~a~4 tram s1ae- be
lieYM enroute Ntrn Br1\ain about 9/12, ~e ti:rat attacks on
Darwin since J\Ug\l.Bt 30th ( 27VF .ana 2~1 VIIS} to{ik: ph ce s.:eptemb-er
25th {2 pl~:lttes) n~a " e.ptQ.r~ber 26th (J ~;uB )., ~he absence ot
Japane.s e a.11:1 attacks 1n thie area and the previously r porte4
moveJtiU~nt of planee to !~ tv~ Bri ta111 mak,e 1ft pJ?Obtlble tbfJ.t th~
tona~r strength ot: about 45 \rlf e,:~,).d 4S VHB lUls b~en gre:atly
reduoe-4 . l{eoonnais~e.nc(t Gt X:Oepfi.Jlg on s ep\$mbu-r 2)r4 revealed
2 VHI' ~d ot~ Dill.1 on .~f.JlttD.bGr 24th a:ul 2;tJ1 rev;ealc4 l vr
~ n4

4 VF

~e$p~ctively.

1061

~ 'ewt <lu!ne~ 5W t
sa
bombiili~

~otJJJ.1derttd w1tb li~ Br1 ta1n 'b oaue

~ort :J.QreaDy ant o1~he:r k ..lli~td basea 1n
tills a:.roo aa a general l11le Ol}erat r~om bb~~ul a1rt1elta.
OAll' . VP an<.l .:t: eoo~uw.!~,~too lltllt~fl l~ve been pe.l*manentlr
b ~.aed itt. ~w Guinea. tl'he 2S\h .,!.i\1r Jllo't a till npiJaal".s ta a
in o~nti or t:~.
!.ntiti ~i.r t)perat:lans, bat the 2let Air ;lot
1n~~ also he opttrat1ng som pltUl a t.~ere .
~J~re 1 n.o reo11t
1ntormat1oo on 4:tth, fttlt!an tulfl l'o.ko!~ ~!r G~UflS ot the
2Stb. A1:r D1vi.s1oa exoeJrt theit totol~ st~ to be arrengin.g
for tl).,1n~ boat reiJ.lao . en.t~ t~O:ftl th~ ~~l:Pir . tl~~ .r~t.taese
air a-t ,rea.tb in t.b1e A~e.a pro~ul.:r ilo-tsra slot ltceea:

.P~

vtm

'b

10 - ~7P -Vlt usuallz.r baaed .a t Lae ~ auna.

10 - 12 - JieoottA~ts~.,.a ott see.p1&.nes .
2 - X&waa1sll1 97 flybl& boat
21 ~111\nubi hi t3'PGB 96. 91. 07 l V".dn O)e~t11118

' trot

~.a

ooul.

fo,~.J. ~9-Sl

.E~lil"O"nt : Yro~ lJ on(; fu1l f'i(;!bter

-V""'~' 1.e eltroute. !iew (iulnea

be&YJ

.lof,r~'UJS

tut11o'bed.

group t.d~

'*'

tJJUl

to replaee tha

4u:t~.tng A~st.

!~arrt !:rt).l and tEA pr1~toillll7 ft BUP,fl3' , r :petr, Ql\4

ass~bly base toY plru1ea co~ )rom t.t1e ;~!\1r
o;r- 4~<:m.ged
in op~rat1ona . T'll 21st -1ir !"lot ft -i itJ p.resen~ly ~~ Kav1a~,
Ma tllat .t:...!l.. r"lo't 1$ ~uaooie.ted W"itli bot.t' the t: o1~onm ~lt4

Guinea. Tb,e 26th A'l r .v~l.,t at 111 a~ur~tiH to 'be tl e oomot air op&rt~t1otu~ 1n 1:~11'' o::~ol~J:ui; whS.lG t he llth ;,;.ell
rlat div 1s ~ .tliO'tt L::a,POrtant tJeaplall~ eo~.{.tnd. 1n tiult a~t.
if he 2\it. Bea:pJ*~1H1i~ 1v 1 s a1~to in tl'~ :~ol~s, 'J~lae .t l t n A1r
.

1ifij}W

UlBUl<J~-

Fle~t t;om~~f'#r a.~;~ ~ar,a

ud a d&t90hr~H}nt.

olomons,

'Uo D.e it this

a,:ett ,~

>llb~ O'O:Ml;~~.Ad~r

6th t}.ir OoU;rt (p.:rob~.bly ll'l 1s tn tilts

t)t

or

llfl:l.i~~ a<~tlitio11nl .Pl~lt~~u:i<

t.u.1s \.itrou"'l an be1ttg
b~ terrled rroa ~:19alr~tG\l to- tl\l\'6 sou:th bJ' the
togo;;1a~a
!lru (4Jl4 t.ll'S
fbt* 2nd. ..:i1l~l <l ro~
r-'! - s~t~ tt
~n
- an4~ l'\.1~uloy~:~
.
.r1ir 'Jrau~p ~ Pt ear ttl be reu lvi~ ~~l.an4'1n ~ ;pr(lii.a blJf YF 1 froJa
~

or are 3oon to
lrttvao vi6 ~n~

..

Tok:Q '*~ir cr-ou,9 {V: 1 l 1" ~t 5A%iortlaa4~

<lrotlp ie &\ littbtlul, Oilhtir @lrot!l)S 't.~\

l$le.M. 108-tn .,:u1~

"'~tJ-Y be itt t.hi.s. . rea have no\

b(te~ .b~Ui:l:'ll d ~t:r-i:v45 't-h-~ i}~~ilt ~t~*lk.

T t~ lit~ tttl1.9~~ a:lr ~trength 1n Kr.; l:x~land, ~xol"liliv~ <)f pltt.le
b~1ng ~e sfmlbl$d, re~~:tir\ld ~u~~tt t ort-Jr4tld to .~i-\1 Britt41n u.ad
t;r~e ~:.A>lmraf$, blf ~n ~a a.tld. typf# s vroualy 4.ot)o n.o't eJ:tf)~4:

.Japt~nese ~'l~,nes

the Solomons

DJ

J~robnbly

n~z ~~tlti

ttc, not

t ltl'sGG l:n He-w Britaia Mel

~xc~:

45 - l.~:t4 'tNp~

t/JV11,

12 -

97 rour sag1ne VP.

21 tloat t1 J)fi {IVJ!.

24 l.!eoormaisset!e& ea,Plan
~~wan1ahi

2? l'.Utsublahi typea 96, 97, or l 'VIm

uf tbe 2.1 Vlm baftd. at 1\~abaul an4
bomb l"ort

-~~eeby)

rotal - 1)2
.l&nrcn1te:

~"t:robablt

54 -

4; _tJ:P

;vr.

tJll& 1 Viii.
Qt oth$r types.

~ltsubishi

s~tttering

te~nluAliVe
tt.~ed to

t:rhe 24th .Jlir Flot. f.:lt1d 1 t~ Groups, lst, 14th ~uta, Ch1tcuuJ _.
were ti:.ie week plaoe4 011 ~t~o alar t tor a u.:\,. otfenstve. in
thie ar ~'th~re 1s no ep~e:!flo 1'$)-o.eu-t intorznati on On these
air c.omr~nds, but they a.:re shown still tio be in the 1&\rolt~lle.
19tit Air Orou.p iM et1ll in 'tile ~r-abstlls ewd oono.flrll$4 wlth
the Gil~rts 1nt11trat1on s, Ttl.~ total air stru.gth in this
area nrobttbly do&s not exeeed:
9-12 - M\lllal11$h1 97 toltr ensl~e Vl?.
18-24 - :~eeonns1;~aen.ee SM!ll~1taes ~tt. h some
}JO.fUlibly V!*\,.

;4 - }Jltsubiabl ty ~)08 ()6

)0 - (ap ~.~rox.) type
n1rt1&lds.

;vr

~tid l vrm1t
tiUj;tl1gn~d. t-o

4ofene,s o.t

~rota'l: ~)llltO.
~nrou:te: :Probably tH.)JlG

1063

N{'TE;

A,ir dtvi.sion e a:rQt Aow te1~c Jli;r ll~lot!lla~ .

Tlte

2l~Jt

in t hi$ roport aa the 21st - 26th ;.\ir

26th .f\.l.r f>1v1
~.ir Div1sion a, . because th.&Y are~se
.
12\h
and
ThtW llth
~~lots.
the lltb. ~J.w!l l2t.h 3e~plate\li.lta.
oal.le4
fAl'e
unJJots,
)lane tenu~r
~
~iona a:p;; ~a.:r:

'

number ot pl till. ~as ettown 1n ~u:1y eirou:p !a tl~ lt;jrset&t

nown tG ha:ve opt~:ra ted in that ~~roup at .a ny
t)lMea
numbetl> o.f
~c'ho

time.

llth . t!.r

tl~~t

.tv

is VfJJ7 a,o tlve ia the ~""'Ol(.>mons part 1 oulftt"ly itt connect! on w1 tb tluadaltl: anal .
Cmdr . may llaV'~ btfftm at Ten1an 9/2)

Omdr~

llt.h

rleaplnt ~nt'l1 1r -

2lat

;~ ir '~lot

Im,portar.rt CG5~~.nnd .i ll
t,o he at f.;ho:t~tlttn<ls.

~Solcmons .

!! . a.p::lfiia:rs

trom

Is raoeivi.n g plans
J,~.:m.vttlug .
rb.11ip~;)1nas ,!lnd ".ay already have O~)~t'Ated ~~e
A~;aoei~ted. with 'both
pl~~?416tS OVfJ:t He~ c;,utnea .
iiew l,U:inea t:l,UO, '~': o. lom:J>Il&

u. ~ . now e:t

Cm4r. e.t

Xavl~ng

~ntt group receivin g

pl~~~~ tro~

1:1in~s

Toko Air Group

12 v:v. t"l,yins
llO.fsti'

Philip

via O'taka.

eort.itr. at

!~bortlenda

12\. O;paratit l& in

:nclOBlO!UJ ..

~o. l"eo~nt .1nf~or~~t1on

on lootitl-on , t.suooiatfftti
1~1. th

?iisawa

i~.1:r (~roup

and mmy .rtartl1etli, 1 t with

plE,;ne.e .

Tokyo 110

~rak

delivery 9/2).

:tor

1064

'1ro .,

!Htlu

>I

24ti
1 t

14

.~1r

oe\

''

up

at

ruJ. 9/22,.

;??Vl

ill

~:~

Bt

U.

I'"

9/'i;.

~ ndari

ll 1n . t rsh ls.

Clli

lo

Air

2't

v ut
Gui

iU
?

a to b aetj v ly s"ociat d witb

o ~:tJand thore.
baa s art

21

;vr, 6

"
to

6t

rt.ir lot - ,..

.ut .!

-1r

6 h Air tJ

r Gro p
a
2nd :i.i

1r Or

.. ~o r

nfo

nt

Oroup

~.

s a.
info

15-

l'4a

106 5

19

ro 9

n
.....

21

"i'

r~o~i

fi tr

lo:ne

0 0

..

a.
'"'.a-ro .P

Ji

)J

f)
Jt

lea

r,
)5 h

~1

..

011.

laJ or

~,

that s
c
u
~

40 h

1 8t.b.

up

(.-

~u

-..... t!plruteu ( 'l)

~ir

~:~

1 . 1r

oro

.t

f't

ear d 'tor tir t ti

..1r
t "1 a t
ti n.

9/27

ou

1"1.. 1 !ng Un.i

V"tl"J

ksn

..r

lo

_fay be

-l .

t 1

n t

oa

105 6

J,AlE*l~~l\fi\.!U~ ~1 R 1'-'l~i~li'!:: LO~::ams

~Q;~\I:':!

( ~ OIJt. 19-26tb incl. )

SOLOt'Y.~OJ:l$ - Dtltroy~d

- i tloat ~:;:ype Vl1l - 7 (alS1J ) _p robftble.

lieoeo. Floatyl*wtut 4
Datug"ed - t.etUJo lflof!:tplanos - 3.

m~:? <P'IJ~lllCA

To-tal -

- DstJOyed Land

Destro:~4

tr.Pt~

VI - l.

Type Vl .,. l4 () probe.ble}

Lancl tr.pe Vlf .... l' (.2 Plt~obahle )
Reeoo. JloatplAAes - 4

Jrlo~ft

11-

1057

',.
.1
1'

'

"l:
l

O OW;i~.T li~TEU~IO~NO i':

1~4. V.Al.- !II StiiiC T'

F\)Ul1tTf!J3i1'li.

~~3f:i*.,ii!T

A~tu. and l~.i.ska. .

titintt e.bnorma.l is ln

lu~d1~,

tretf1o bas

indica~~ tl\1..~ ~Jott

Ji;rQil*f;$8 iatf>ZO$, i#dl 1\ bu" b&Ci 1CtQrp,reted.

to k t.tg:a't tb.~ ea.., Jlflrofle a;r.e wtthd.;,r~awitl& J\er1~el. vi .. ual
.reeon~uais.sanc~ ot J1.'t!t u l~y 'fast: 1fm~ ett ,Silttt r e ve.a leet no ai~s

ot enemy ~nd stU work s t~ba.rulon.ed.. CC.r att1.c has oomHilCted tbe
M11-z'\ irU no. ) ~~p&oial !.and1lli.J: f{~roe, iA'hiull ~"as pa1..t of the
oocupe.tien force. with tl:t$ ltaba~l til'*ea. re-s ~ure in t,b,e
~ olom,orw aoo th11 1aole.t e4 LJ;Q~1tiotrt of ti"e l~:ttu - Ki.$a torees

wa.y aooount tor \l1is \tv"1thdraw.l.

Ial.ano.a occupied by tile l!fo .2 t1<.%t~b1n~d I,u.uting ttcree, the

) >!~pec t&J. L.anding .roroe ~ ~ok.osuka ilo. 6 Spe:eial
Lf.W.d!ng Fot..oe, ,pius s1d1titxuu an,t1a,r o ratt troo.p s. ~~rn units,

~'okoeW:a ~to.

etc.

'Beru

L18.1na

1larti.'WB

hta14od 0Jt 26th and probably 0eoupief..

- 6teupie4.
... Oocr:up!e.

Radio tr~tric tnaiettes a at$ady influx ~t re tu.roraaDn.ts

Uolomnru.t t.rea. Intomr~t1oA is .l nsut:f1o1,eut to :mak~ a
new t~sti.matG to 7-eplace l1i114it we~k's f'i~re of troo.p str.e:a.tftb.,
but it 16 probable t.bM..t li<-z(r t:roops have aJ!IIi.Y.e4_ thre.

tor

~he

Ti.te

toll~ing

unit s

ffS~

~t, tt

r ar

11th. .,t,rgq f.t11$10n {part b.e.re,

Gua.claloanal)
. .
Davao

to }ia ba\ll.

l~~t L~!tndl~

!Jt..,~ Ea:~Je

end &4jtu1ent

f~oroe.

j!ar't

COllll'$ ct4itd w1th,

lts.buul:

at BUM tmd part iA

( .~~~') is s t nlittg cayhi'blou troopa

Faroe is ff'diln 1<tent ,;fi()o }:aval

e;arri~Hlti

ar~!t.

itflbaul ... - - - - - .. - .. - - - - - Poudo- ~J'J.,fu~.o.ao

(?ias ta- tt!ll~~

'f'at:1ru.nala ... - - ... - - - - - - - -

~-

)o.ooo

to

at

~"~b&1ll

,,,.ooo

),000 (old e:stimat)

106 8

lo. 5
. orce,
lt

-- .. -

,ooo.
a ~ - - - - - - 2,ooo to J.ooo.
r ere
- - - ,o o.
ry

-- - - .... - -- - ...
l

- -- -- -- - - - . - . of

11

island

sl.

c etr

tr

- - - - ... - - - .. - - - -- - - - - - - - - --

1 v
I

- - - - - - -

o. )

0 0

a1,.

o.
o.
)

... - - - ....... - - - - - l,

) ---

.. o

ta

. ev.rainu
n
e.trol

t .: or

----

, u

..

t %<-op

1069

--

d) ..

vy troop ,
t. ~i t-

t total - - - - - - 100
...
;
100

~0~

.... - - .. - - - ---- -.. - - -- ...

... - - ... - ...
- - -- -- 48, 50

()

()

10

=>5, 50

.,1.

pe 1

61.

,bin

land

-- ..- -- - - -

ro

...
...

oh

.. -- --

00

n)

-1.- -- - - -- ---... - ...

2 - ...
o.
- -- - o. 4
- - -- -- 1 --2
3
- .. - - 5

....

~o.

.....

~~1

- - -... -- - - --... - .. ...

- -- - -... - - ... - --.. --- -- ...

1 t

1-

....

4
5

y b

rt-

ha .l .
) 0

2)

s !on .... - - - - - - -

- - - - - - ... - -

1070

ESTI1ffiTE OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES

October 1, 1942.
1.

Prelimin ary.

Much of the Estimate of Enemy Capabil ities for the

month of August continue s to remain valid and is not repeated .
2.

Brief of Events during Septemb er, 1942.

SOUTH PACIFIC .
The SARATOGA was torpedoe d on August 30 and proceede d
to PEARL for repair. On Septemb er 5 the SOUTH DAKOTA hit a
pinnacle rock at BLEACHER and also came to PEARL for repair.
On the 16th the WASP was hit and sunk by Submarin e torpedoe s
and the NORTH CAROLINA received one torpedo hit and proceede d
to PEARL for repair.
In the Southern SOLOMONS our position has been
stre ngthened by landing the 7th Marines on GUADALCANAL. Plane
strength there is now nearly at a satisfac tory level. The
maintena nce of logistic supply to the TULAGI area continue d
to be difficu lt. On Septemb er 29th the ALHENA was torpedoe d
leaving GUADALCANAL. We have been unable to prevent the Japs
from bombard ing our position s and from landing troops on either
flank of the Marine GUADALCANAL position . Jap bombing of the
position has been almost complet ely prevente d.
The enemy mopped up the GILBERTS Islands and landed
small garrison s on the main islands.

On Septemb er 13th enemy major forces made their only

appearan ce in reach of our search to the east and north of the
SOLOMONS. The enemy turned back before our land-bas ed air
could attack with satisfac tory results and before our striking
forces could reach them.
Large enemy reinforc ements
tinued througho ut the month. Except
landings on GUADALCANAL, they remain
Indicati ons continue d that they were
all out effort in the South Pacific.

to the RABAUL area conin N~N GUINEA and the

in the general RABAUL area.
assembli ng forces for an

During the month it has become almost certain that

RYUJO was sunk on August 24th. On Septemb er 28th one of our
submarin es probably badly damaged one carrier. . Planes have reported hitting cruisers , destroy ers, and auxiliar ies but the
amount of damage done is uncerta in.
-1-

107 1

----

""8EGRE'l1-

The enemy used the FAISI-BUIN area as an assembly

point for cruisers, destroyer s, transports and other auxiliaries. This area was the jump off point for troop carrying
destroyers bound for GUADALCANAL. Airfields at KAVIENG, BUKA,
and KIETA were being improved.
The Japs advanced over the OWEN STANLEY mountain
range in Eastern N~N GUINEA to within about 15 miles of the
PORT MORESBY airfields . At that point allied resistance
stiffened , and by the end of the month the enemy was retreating. At MILNE BAY the enemy landed in some force but were
unable to capture the airfield, and later withdrew.
CENTRAL PACIFIC.
The area was generally quiet during the month. Good
progress was made in strengthen ing defenses at MIDWAY. Those
defenses will serve as a model for JOHNSTON, PALMYRA and CANTON.
Our submarines have been very successfu l in destroying enemy shipping but the numbers on patrol in enemy home
waters continues small.
NORTH PACIFIC.
The airfield on ADAK was first used on the 11th, and
the first phase of the FIREPLACE operation was completed on
September 20th. The Army has placed a garrison on .ST. PAUL
Island and plans to garrison TANAGA Island. Each time weather
has permitted , KISI~ has been successfu lly bombed and strafed
from the new field at ADAK. The Japs have evacuated ATTU and
AGGATU.
3.

The Situation .

(a) Enemy. For the past six or seven weeks the Japs
have been assembling planes, troops and ships in the general
RABAUL area. There are no indication s whatever of a move in
any other direction .
While the Japs may wish to start such an effort in
the near future, there is evidence that they are having their
troubles. Our planes and submarines are taking increasing
toll of the1.r forces. On GUADALCANAL our Marines 'invariably
have thrown back attackers with heavy enemy losses. The Japs
may have lost the services of 3 CV, 1 BB, several cruisers,
destroyer s and auxiliarie s during the month. Their aircraft
losses have been heavy in August and September . All this has
definitely slowed up their preparatio ns.

-2-

1072

5ECRE'r.

An estimate of Japanese strength in the Pacific as

of September 28, 1942 is appended.
The enemy is copying our communication methods with
good success. As a result, we continue to be unable to read
his mail to any great extent.
(b) Own. We retain TF-1 at PEARL for the purpose of
breaking up any enemy landing in the IIAWAIIAN SEA FRONTIER.
As of October 1st the ENTERPRISE, SARATOGA, SOUTH DAKOTA, and
NORTH CAROLINA are under repair at PEARL. With them are cruiser
and destroyer escorts. The ENTERPIY-ISE group can reach the
SOLOMONS area by about the middle of October. In the South
Pacific TF-17 waits in port for a suitable target.
While we think 'that our OAHU-MIDWAY line is vulnerable to raids, there seems little probability of a major landing. The battleships at PEARL probably could prevent a landing in the area. This situation will improve when more air
striking forces, properly trained and indoctrinated, are
stationed in the Hawaiian Islands.
The situation in the ALEUTIANS is obscure. It has
always been hard to understand how Japan could profit much in
the occupation of KISKA and ATTU. Complete evacuation there
would be no surprise. Meanwhile TF-8 will continue to cover
Army seaborne movements while remaining ready to strike any
enemy within reach.
While the situation in the South Pacific has improved considerably in the past month, it is far from satisfactory. We are strengthening our positions in the Southern
SOLOMONS but the logistic and personnel replacement programs
remain to be put on a satisfactory basis. It is hoped that
the Army 43rd Division can relieve the Marines in the TULAGI
area. soon, but probably not during October. No additional
marines will arrive in the area until after the end of the
month. The harbors at NOUMEA and ESPIRITU SANTO are overcrowded
and unloading facilities are most primitive. Measures to improve this condition will hardly be effective in October. Unloading facilities in the TULAGI area are meagre, and to date
we have been unable to provide adequate protection for our AKs
during the unloading period. There are no planes in sight to
take care of combat and operational losses in the area beyond
about October 30th. The airfield at GUADALC~~AL with necessary
facilities such as underground gas storage, dispersal areas,
repair facilities, etc., will not be complete during October.
It is, however, now in good use.

- 3-

107 3

Our submarine offensive against the Jap trade in

her o~m waters continues at a low ebb because of the shortage
of Pacific Fleet Submarines, which is aggravated by necessary
diversions of boats to ALASKA and the WANDATES. In October
we hope to commence laying mines in focal points of Jap trade.
4.

Threats to Japan.

The UNITED STATES continues to be the only real

threat to Japan. The start of our offensive in the South
Pacific evidently has c aused serious repercussions, and probably cuased the enemy to abandon plans in any other theatre
until that threat is removed. There is good reason to believe
that our own offensive nipped in the bud the Jap plan to cut
our lines of communications to AUSTRALIA. As our greatest
threat to Japanese interests now is via the South Pacific, it
seems most unlikely that they will move toward INDIA or SIBERIA
or toward any other place in the Pacific until their South
Pacific flank is secured.
HAWAII is always a threat to Japan in that it is an
advanced base for supplies and operations. They will always
desire to damage our MIDWAY-OAHU-SAMOA line in order to decrease
our overall Pacific capabilities.
It does not seem probable that Japan takes the
threat from the UNITED STATES via the ALEUTIANS very seriously.
Whether Ja~knows it or not, they need have no fear
from AUSTRALIA at the moment. The Australians do not even
feel sure of being able to hold NEW GUINEA now. However, Japan
knows that eventually large forces can get underway from AUSTRALIA and threaten seriously all of their gains inside the
IflALAY BARRIER.
GREAT BRITAIN, at present, is unable to threaten
Japan's Indian Ocean Front. That front only can become dangerous when GREAT BRITAIN is free of her commitments in EUROPE and
the Near East.
Today RUSSIA is entirely too occupied with GERMANY
to permit her to open the SIBERIAN front. But should the GERMAN
situation change radically in favor of the RUSSIANS, there would
be a chance of a threat by opening SIBERIAN air bases to the
Allies. It is significant that RUSSIA has opened a radio channel with us and has finally begun an exchange of information.
Because of the many uncertainties throughout the
world today it is hard to speculate very far into the future.
Suffice to say that for October Japan considers our activities
in the SOLOMONS her major threat while still remaining very
sensitive to possible moves for bombing the Empire.
107 4
-4-

5.

Broad Courses of Action.

There is overwhelming evidence that the enemy's intention is to try to cut us off from AUSTRALIA and then capture
or neutralize that continent.
Other broad courses of action within enemy capabilities remain the same as for September, and include:
(a) An attempt to capture MIDWAY ./
(b) An extension in the ALEUTIANS.
(c) An attack on Western AUSTRALIA/
(d) ' Raids on our positions froni MIDWAY to NOUMEA./
(e) An offensive toward INDIA.
(f) An attack on RUSSIA.
6.

Most Probable Enemy Intention.

The enemy's most probable next moves are the recapture

of the Southern SOLOMONS, and the extension of control in Nffi~
GUINEA.
It now seems that the effort
NEW GUINEA will be in the nature of a
followed by a major assault. Whether
SOLOMONS will be concurrent with that
known.

in the SOLOMONS and in

gradual infiltration
the final effort in the
in NEW GUINEA is not

Before any grand assault we can expect the following

to continue:
(a) Submarine reconnaissance in the SOLOMONS AREA
and along our lines of comnunications to the South.
While the submarines may now have the primary duty of
reconnaissance, it has been shown that they can and will attack
important targets. During October the enemy is estimated to be
capable of maintaining no less than twenty submarines in the
area for this purpose. It is indicated a total of 32 submarines
could be ~ade available for this duty.
(b) Air attacks on our positions and shipping using
shore based air.
Our recent successes in repelling bombing attacks on
GUADALCANAL has reduced the enemy capacity to continue this
form of attack, but has not eliminated the danger.

-5-

107 5

~EGRET

As of October 1st the following shore based air is

indicated as in or enroute to the NEW BRITAIN-SOLOMONS area
and could be made available for this duty:

108 - VHB
90 - VF

To these it is possible to add, from the

about:54 - VHB

1~RSHALLS

and GILBERTS,

50 - VF

It is difficult to estimate the ability of the enemy

to maintain such levels in the area as that ability depends on
rate of losses and other circumstances. If losses are exessive
they would have great difficulty.
(c) Occasionally shell our shore positions in the
SOLOMONS.
This has been possible in the past and will undoubtedly continue. The shelling usually takes place at night and
may be incidental to landing of small numbers of infiltration
troops.
As many as 16 cruisers could be made available for
this duty but only if the usual striking force escort were to
be employed. The same situation applies to eighteen Desdivs
estimated in the TRUK-RABAUL area on October lst. While no
such numbers are believed possible, the main thing is that
there are ample cruisers and destroyers for this job. Submarines may be employed likewise also.
If we are able to cause sufficient losses to the
enemy cruisers and destroyers at their jump off points, and
enroute, it seems probable that operations of this type will
cease to be profitable.
(d) Attacks in the general area from ESPIRITU SANTO,
north, on our transports, freighters and escorts,
both day and night; especially while unloading,
or at anchor.
These attacks are always to be expected from submarines. It is quite possible that the enemy will employ
cruisers, destroyers, and motor torpedo boats, if he thinks
circumstances warrant. Should he detect a large enough target
within reach of a CV or BB striking force he may attempt a

-6-

1075

SECRET
raid. However , it does not seem likely that he will risk any
major striking force within reach of our effectiv e shore based
air. The most likely attempt would be to make a high speed
attack with cruisers or destroye rs based on advance . informa tion
of our movemen ts.
During the all out attack we should expect carrier
raids on our advance position s such as ESPIRITU SANTO and ROSES
to break up our line of supply. The all out attack most probably would include a determin ed effort to neutrali ze the
GUADALCANAL airfield .
As matters now stand, it does not seem necessar y for
ORANGE to employ carriers to cover the landing of troops on
the east coast of NEW GUINEA. The Japs have the capacity to
make a large landing on eastern N~N GUINEA, and at the same
time make an assault on the Southern SOLOMONS. If theycon tinue to land sizeable forces at night on GUADALCANAL they will
build up a force which can assist in an assault by attackin g
on all sides of- our position there at the same time. If this
were a night attack they would hardly employ carriers to cover
the landing at GUADALCANAL.
When and if an all out attack occurs it seems most
probable that:(1) The landing will be at night, the transpo rts,
barges, etc., escorted by cruisers and destroye rs.
(2) CV striking forces covered by BB groups and
preceded by submarin e scouts will attack our airfields, shipping .and installa tions at BUTTON and
possibly ROSES.
(3) SANTA CRUZ Islands will be occupied if we
are not already there, - in which case the enemy
would be expected to attack that position .
There are many varietie s of such an operatio n and
it would only be a guess to set down details.
7.
In spite of the fact that enemy intentio ns appear
clear it is desirabl e to list other operatio ns within the
capacity of the enemy during October.
Our estimate of enemy loca~ions shows that it is
possible to concent rate sizeable forces almost any place in
the Pacific Ocean Areas during October. We know that the
great part of his Navy is servicea ble and that logistic and
other conside rations make it possible for him to do much harm
in widely separate d places. \Vhile the followin g are not considered probable they are discusse d briefly.

-7-

107 7

(a) A raid on PEARL HARBOR.

At the moment fine targets are presented at PEARL.
Our defenses have improved but there is no assurance that a
well timed raid could not get in. We might well suppose that
the cost to the enemy would not be acceptable. On the other
hand, if he could hit our ships in dry dock and our tank farms
he might be willing to accept anything our Army air could give
him. We have not, on October 1st, a force adequate to repel a
strong carrier raid. Nor will we be able to meet 4 enemy CV
groups in t~e HAWAIIAN area on equal terms during the month.
But to make such a raid the Japs would have to give
up or postpone any powerful attack in the SOLOMONS. They could
do this; and because of the RI situation we would hardly find
out what was up until too late.
Although this is again stated as not probable, the
mere possibility indicates stiffening the search and alertness
conditions)at least until the enemy further commits himself.
It must be remembered that major forces have not been located
for some time.
{b) A raid on MIDWAY or JOHNSTON.
Such an operation would be in the nature of a
diversion, but unless made in strength which he can hardly
afford at this time, there would be little profit in the adventure.
(c) At attempt to capture MIDWAY.
This has been a Jap objective and still must
figure in their plans. While he must know that we have improved our defenses there, he may think that his moves in the
South Pacific have diverted sufficient forces to permit success
on the second attempt.
(d) Light raids on our staging points south of OAHU.
These are always within enemy capabilities.
fact they are easily possible as a diversion now.

-8-

In

1078

October 3rd Cont'd.

The central pacific was quiet. The BBs of TF 1 are
at sea off OAHU for training and will return to PEARL tomorrow.
No changes of enemy deployments were noted.

October 4th.
So far as is known TF 17 did not attack shipping in the
RTIN area today as planned. Bad weather may be the reason. The
COPAHEE will fly in reinforcements of VFs to GtJADALCANAL during
the coming week. The enemy continues to land reinforcements at
GUADALCANAL during the night from destroyers. It is not known
here why our surface forces have been unable to break this up.
In his 2 part 050211 General MacArthur explains his
need for a minimum of 30 fleet submarines in his area. These
cannot be supplied by Cincpac without severe reduction of patrols
off JAPAN.
The occupation of the PRIBILOFS was completed.
subs on a marine railway were seen at KISKA.

Midget

As the old BBs of TF 1 urgently require modernization,

Cincpac will recommend a program to start in the near future~
Among other things, the removal of the 5"/51 battery, conning
tower, and boat cranes is to be accomplished.
There are no changes noted in enemy

deploJ~ents.

October 5th.
Admiral Nimitz returned from his inspection trip in the
South Pacific. In general he feels that the situation is favorable.
He desires continual pressure on the Japs to prevent them from
thinking of adventures in other areas and to prevent them from
getting set to re-capture the Southern SOLOMONS. There are qt1i te
a few rough spots in the South Pacific set up.
The expeditious
handlying of supplies is the greatest need at the present.
Communications are poor, - the Japs have not yet been prevented
from landing troops on GUADALCANAL.
This later fault may be
corrected by Admiral Scott when he arrives in the area (see
Comsopac 051202 pink for operations of CTF 64)
No word has been received regarding the planned attack
on the shipping in the BUIN-FAISI area by TF 17. The weather may
have prevented air operations. Reports of that area indicate that
all ships left the area yesterday but returned in greater numbers
to-day.
Com Gen 1st Marines 032201 gives a summary of his
activities on the 3rd.

107 3

SECftET .,

October 5th (Cont't)

It seems probable that our occupation of FUNAFUTI has
been discovered by the enemy as one of his 4 engine patrol
planes was sighted from there.
CTF-8 052030 gives the results of an Army bombing of
KISKA on the 3rd. In the ALEUTIANS the CALD\~LL was damaged in
a collision with the SPICA and will have to be docked.
There is no new of Jap deployments.
October 6th.
At his regular morning conference, which was attended
by General Emmons and Vice Admirals Halsey, Leary and Calhoun,
Admiral Nimitz recounted his visit to the South Pacific in considerable detail. The jist of the remarks was to the effect
that the general situation is not bad and the many difficulties
are being overcome gradually.
<;l, ,{ '::
Comsopac 070306 pink TequeB~s one army regiment for
use at GUADALCANAL. He also expresses his desire to increase
the army garrison at ESPIRITU SANTO to strength of one infantry
regiment.
Cominch 062000 questions the employment of VF at
CHRISTMAS, TONGATABU and CANTON. Cincpac believes that plenty
of VFs should be in advanced areas.
Comsopac 051226 gives the summary for the 4th and
CTF-17 062114 gives results of the bombing of the BUIN area.
At that place results were modest, probably because of adverse
weather.
Task Force 17 has been ordered by Comsopac to operate
generally between NEW ZEALAND and AUSTRALIA. Thus that force
is a running sub target and is too far south to be used offensively. The Cincpac would be pleased to see that force at
anchor in ESPIRITU SANTO until needed for further offensive
operations.
Task Force 64 has been ordered by Comsopac to operate
to the south and east of GUADALCANAL. As it has the job of
breaking up the enemy landings at GUADALCANAL, it looks like
it is poorly placed. A better initial position would be generally to the westward of GUADALCAN.
The ALHENA arrived at ESPIRITU SANTO where an examination of her damage is being made. This again demonstrates
the need of salvage vessels in the active areas.
CTF-8 reports an unsuccessful attack on a frei ghter
north of KISKA by three B-24s.

1080

S~CRE:r

..

October 6th (Cont'd)

Continued lack of information regarding enemy moves
because of call sign changes makes it difficult to make good
predictions regarding the timing of enemy moves. However,
there is nothing to indicate that he has abandoned the idea
of recapturing the Southern SOLOMONS as soon as possible.
October 7.
The day was generally quiet. In the South Pacific
the usual movemenuof cruisers and destroyers were sighted by
our search planes in the Central and North SOLOMONS Area.
Admiral Ghormley's 061410 summarizes the 5th and 6th of October.
The query concerning the uses of fighters in rear
positions which was made by Cominch is partially answered by
Comsopac 081229 pink and Cincpac 080333 pink.
CTF-17 does not believe his ships were sighted on his
recent trip to bomb the BUIN area.
An examination of the ALHENA shows that she will require docking.
6th.

TF-8 072025 gives the results of bombing KISKA on the

Results were minor.

Call sign recoveries still do not permit traffic

analysis. This condition may improve during the next month.
As long as this condition continues we will not expect much
from RI.

1081

October 8.
Comsopac 0~26 gives the summary in his area for
the 7th. The daily arrival of troop carrying destroyers at
GUADALCANAL continues in spite of our air attacks. During
the afternoon of the 7th one CA was reported hit by one
bomb and one torpedo. The repeated movement of enemy light
vessels into range of our shore based air despite recent
damage is an indication of the determination of the enemy
to land troops and supplies on GUADALCANAL. Large numbers
of cruisers, destroyers, and auxiliaries in the SHORTLANDS
area show that place as the advanced jump off point. TF-64
is not yet in position to intercept these approaching ships.
Rear Admiral Turner will command a~ expedition to
land an Army regiment at GUADALCANAL and is scheduled to
arrive there the 13th. TF-61, 63 and 64 will cover the move.
On the 15th the VIREO, JAMESTm~, a MTB division will arrive
and be stationed in the TULAGI area.
TF-1 continues at PEARL, conducting training off
OAHU and prepared to repel landings in the HAWAIIAN area.
TF-16 is preparing to sail for the South Pacific on about
the 16th.
TF-8 is quiet. It has been suggested to Cominch
that the LOUISVILLE of that force be sent to the Southwest
Pacific to replace the CHICAGO.
Traffic analysis of the enemy is still not possible.
However, sightings in the NEW BRITAIN - SOLOMONS Area -shows
the presence of a good number of cruisers, destroyers, transports, freighters and miscellaneous smaller types. The major
units are not located by any means, but 4 BB and 3 CVs with
screening vessels are believed in the TRUK - RABAUL general
area.
October 9
Comsopac 071246 gives a summary of operations. These
are now two days lat~ but intercepts here keep us well informed.
The pressure by air attacks on the enemy shipping in the central
SOLOMONS continues with gratifying results. However, the inability of our surface groups to intercept the enemy approaching GUADALCANAL is disappointing. It is hoped that MTBs arriving in the area the 12th or 13th will be able to get in some
attacks.
Fleet.

The CHICAGO will be replaced by a CA from the Pacific

The Commandant, Marine Corps, will send 20 officers

and 1000 recruits monthly to SM10A to provide replacements in
the South Pacific.

108 2

Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

October 10, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR WAR PLANS:

Subject:
Alaska:

Suggested Changes in

1.

ir Strength -- Alaska.

The Army {ELEVENTH .A ir Force) now have in

146

50

28
224

Fighters

Medium bombers (inclndinr 22 attached from

Heavy bombers
Total

R.C .. A.F.)

As components of the EL''N t'fNTll Air Force these aircraft are not
ithin the jurisdiction of OinOPao. Aside from this fact, however,
the present stren~th oan certainly not .be called a generous provision to resist sudden attack or to aintain present scale or
effort a ainst the onemy.
The aroa of .A asku is provided with a fairly adeq\la.te

2.

airways system permitting the ready transfer of all types of airora:rt throu hout the area. This has the effect of reducing the
over-all total required to maintain an adequate defense- Tinless
and Uiltil some lmportant change occurs in the strat~c: ic aituation,k ......../
1 t is recommended that the present Army air. strength be maintai11ed.
7

3.

Tha Navy now has 1.n Alaska a total of

12 F4F-4 Fighters (ex-COP.AKEE)

35

PBY-5 and PBY~5A

Patrol Planes {I~atWint?.; 4)

These latter comprise 4 squadrons of which it is the indiaated

intention of ComPatW1ng f'()Jll to return one squadron to tha West
Coast during t.1e bad wint ~r \Veather period beginning about
1 t~overnber .
Again considering the importance of the area,
4.
1 t is considered - decid(;ldly unvJise to reduce the patrol plane
strength available ther In the eva:nt of a thra-t -r;.om the
westward the Defense Forces would undoubtedly re:Y 80mpletely
on Navy VP plenes for search operations. Dependenc could not
be Jroperly placed on airor .. ft of this type, if available, being
flown up from the West Coast after the threat had developed"
- l

108 '1

Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

Subject:

5.
on tho other hand, the basing or carrier type
fin-hters in the .Alaskan ~A.rea is not justified except to meet
sole immediate urgency. That situation ..... ua lon.,. since ceased
to exist and the Uo.~J i ig.1ters should u.~cordingly be returned
to their nor~1.al ern.ployment in the carr:i.er force at the earliest
possible de.te.

R. A. Ol1\3TIE

1084

..

PROPOSED REDUGTIO.t 1 OJ!' IiORTHEHN FOHCE

Ootobr ll,

19~2 .

1.
The Northern Faroe, Task Foroe EIGHT, was formed by
d1reotion of Oominoh to oppose an expected enemy major attack
against Dutoh f:Iarbor and possibly .A laska. The composition and
force com.rnander are as assigned by Cinopao who was governed
largely by the restriation of employing forces which had n.ot
been sent to the Coral Sea.
2.
Th6ueh the enemy occupied three Western Aleutians, no
major enemy t hreat developed . In fact he soon reduoed his sur-

face roroes to a very weak nucleus and has never been able to
maintain aircraft of suitabl.e types and numbe~s to oons.t itu'te.
much or a threat. He has now .a bandoned ATTt1 . e.nd AGATTU and is
beaten down regularly at KISKA by strong air atta.oks. He is
deeply involved in the South Pacific and \Te have every hope of
k4tep1ng him ao .

3.

Therefore there is little liklihood of a strong enemy

effort in the !iorthern area ror some time to oome.

operations o:r the enemy appear to be:

Feasible

(a} .A ir operations rrom KISKA employing sea1)lane types ,

and, if he is able to complete a landing field, land planes .

(The feasibility of oompleting a field suitable forheavy
bombers is very d.ouhtful . )

(b) Submarine patrols ott our baaee and on our line

communications .

or

(o) Crulser raids for bombardment and against our com(Destroyers might be uaetl if fueled at KISKA.)

munioations .

(d) Mining off our bases

base sites,

and/or to dan y unoocupied

(e) Commando raids.

4.
Our eir base at AD1U<. may be considered to be well
established and is held by a strong garrison (11000). A strongly held outpost (4000) is being placed OI;l *l.'ANAGA and another
(about 2000) on the PRIBILOFS. There may be a garrison and
fi ghter strip on ATKA. These and the .A..rmy e.iroraft appear
ample to handle the minor activities the enemy may undertake,
with the exoeption of submarine and surfa.co raider attaoks on
oonllllunioa.tions. w~ should also keep sorne pressure with our
submarines on the enemy s comm.unioations. Now that there is

108 .5

only one terminal for enemy shipping the number o:t submarines
which oan b profitably employed in this way has b en decreased.
Also any defensive deplo~~~nt ot ubmarines would have little
oh noe of encountering targets .
;.
A faetor not yet mentioned is the weather. This 111
h v a tendency to decrease all op rations, and will shortly
prevent op ration of seaplanes .

6.
This all leads to tha conviction that the Northern
Force should be reduoed and perhaps abolished as suoh . Enemy
submarin action is regarded as oertain. Therefor A/9 escorts
must be provided .
(a) It .is oonsidered that Hear Admiral Theobald's
estimate on the number required must be obtained and given full
considorntion .
(b) The thr at of surface raiders is so small tbat
there is doubt whether any cruisers should be left in the area .
It , say two , were based at PEARL they oould aot e.s effectivel y
against raiders as they oould from KODIAK . 8" cruisers woul d be
preferred . We need the 6" for our night work against Japanese
light forces 1n tho GUADAL~Ut\L area .
(o) Navy aircraft should be reduced . 95 is studying
this . Compatw1ng FOUR hes recently made proposals for a rotation or squadrons .
(d) domsubpao will make reoo~~endations as to submarines .
The 8-boats offer qu!ta a problem. There ar~ nine of them being
rotated l>etween SAN DIEGO and DUTCH IIAIU30R. They have been very
ineffective but they may have been "pepped up'' some and have not
been ble to d monstrate it becaus of laok of targets . In any
casej if e remove all large submarines we would be decreasing
our submarine strength there muoh more than mere numbers would
show. There is only on eood submarine "beat' and that is the
vicinity of KISKA. The S-boats ought to be able to handle it,.
but perhaps w should lteep one certainly effective unit on station in the ALEUTIANS. ~1th suoh a reduction it must be determin d whether Oaptain Colclough will continue to b needed .
(e) Should the Northern Foroe be abolished and Rear
Admiral Theobald be withdrawn? I believe the regular sea frontier command set .. up oan handle the reduced foroes. ~f "fleet
opposed invasion" stat.us is continued it should be made oonsistent with other sea frontiers - l'favy oontrol Army bombers and
scouts; A~1y control the fighters .
-2-

1.085

October 9

(Continued)

Ten EC2 type ships will be sent to the South Pacific

at the rate of three per month, starting October.
100150.

KISKA was bombed again on the 8th as shown in CTF 8

No changes in enemy plans or intentions are noted today. Jap interest continues to center in the NFN BRITAIN SOLOMONS area.
October 10.
Shortly before midnight TF-64.2 intercepted an enemy
force thoughtto contain 2 cruisers and 6 destroyers west of SAVO
Island. Res~ults are not in yet. During the day the Japs made
strong but harmless bombing attacks on GUADALCANAL. Their plane
losses were roughly the ratio 4 to 1 of ours. Our Marines now
have their battle position on the west of the MATANIKAU river.
The operations for the 8th and 9th are summarized by
ComSoPac in his 091316. His 111314 states that the situation will~t
permit him to give a fixed policy in the assignment of troops.
He also has a shortage of communication personnel in his area and
requests CinCPac to supply deficiencies.
Acorn One has been assi gned to NDENI and Acorn Two to
ESPIRITU SANTO.
The AMBERJACK sank the No. 3 TONAU MARU (whale factory
ship) in KAVIENG Harbor. As a result of DI the AMBERJACK was
also ordered to intercept an AK enroute PONAPE. The AK was sunk.
The ZUIY~KU, escorted by one cruiser and one destroyer,
was sighted by one of our submarines to the northwest of TRUK
and headins toward that place.
In the SW Pacific the Japs are trying to evacuate remaining troops at MILNE in submarines. Also, there is reported
a serious lack of torpedoes in that area and the submarines are
now being sent on mining missions.
C.G. SAMOA has inspected Fill~AFUTI and finds that the
defenses are coming along fine and that preparations are going
ahead to construct a landing strip.
The North Pacific was quiet. Admiral Theobald complains that air bombs supplied to him are poor. He reports that
three hits on ships at KISKA last month were duds.

1087

3E:CR~1'

October 10 (Continued).
The Japs continue to suffer losses and damage from
our air attacks in the N~M BRITAIN - SOLOMONS Area, but in spite
of that indications continue of preparations for an assault on
GUADALCANAL in the near future. The sighting of the ZUIKAKU
confirms the belief that she made a trip home.
October 11.
The results of the engagement between Task Force 64.2
off SAVO Island yesterday are not known completely today. It
appears that the DUNCAN was sunk, the BOISE severely damaged,
the other cruis~~gptly damaged. The enemy may have lost
four DD and one CA damaged. During the following daylight
period our air from GUADALCANAL may have sunk one cruiser, and
damaged two destroyers. TF-64.2 is retiring to ESPIRITU SANTO.
Comsopac 101946 summarizes the activities of his area
for the 9th and lOth. There were no important developments
reported.
Comsopac 111006 and Cincpac 120329 comment on amphibious training in the South Pacific.
As the situation has now changed materially in the
Pacific Ocean Areas, and especially in the North Pacific, consideration is being given to a reduction of TF-8. Attached is
the whole story. CTF -8 111930 amplifies the report of the
bombing of KISKA on the 9th. Army bombing was very poor in
spite of favorable circumstances. The I~LIBUT ran into what
he reports as a decoy (a maru type, guns, 2000 tons) 50 miles
~tl;;t ef ASP;m\ Island.
His torpedo attack was not successful.
~~ ~ RTTU
The CALIFORNIA left PEARL for BREMERTON yesterday.
The ~ffiST VIRGINIA will follow in about a month. The NYPS
thinks they can put these ships in service after 5! months
overhaul.
1

There are some indications that the Japs have underestimated our strength in the SOLOMONS, and are now gathering
considerably more army strength from the PHILIPPINES and the
NEI. In this case they would not attempt an all out attack
for some time. Meanwhile our attrition successes are bound
to effect seriously any plans they may have. In any event we
feel quite sure that Japan is so deeply committed in the 0 outh
Pacific that they cannot undertake any major adventures in any
other area.

1 088

October 12.
Fragmentary re~orts do not permit accurate assessment
of the damage inflicted on the enemy intercepted by Rear Admiral
Scott's Force in the 2nd battle of SAVO I~L.AND. The estimate today is one cruiser sunk, one cruiser damaged, four destroyers
sunk or damaged, small transport probably sunk. Our damage was
DUNCAN sunk; BOISE badly damaged; HELENA, SALT lAKE CITY, and
FARE}lliOLT slightly damaged.
Rear Admiral Turner brouf,ht one Army regiment to GUADAL-

CANAL in the early morning and was able to unload the transports

and depart in the evening. He was interrupted by two air raids,

and shelling from enemy shore positions on his ships and our shore
positions. No damage was done to ships but the GUADALC1\NAL airfield was damaged by bombs to the extent that heavy bombers could
use it only in emergency. Toward midnight enemy ships commenced
a bombardment of the Marine position.
Comsopac 121316 gives the summary for his area.
TF 17 was evidently sighted West of RE~rnEL ISLAND and
reported by the enemy. The WASHINGTON group Northwest of S~~
CRISTOBAL was sighted and reported also.
Cominch has not yet replied to
ification of his status resulting from
to e.G. Hawaii to stop the move of the
HAWAII to the South Pacific. A follow

Cincpac request for clarGeneral Marshall's order

second group of B-17s from
up was sent.

KISKA was bombed on both the lOth and 11th as reported in

CTF 8 122010. The new Army garrisons in the , ALETJTIANS ang PRIBILOFS
are shown in CT:B., 8 122234. We now find that the Army plans an
airfield on St. PAUL ISLAND. Cincpac 130139 crystalizes views
here on a reduction of TF 8.
A large concentration of enemy ships is reported in the
BUIN-FAISI area. There continues to be no doubt in the mind of
Cincpac that the enemy is proceeding along the lines shown in
the Estimate of Enemy Capabilities dated October 1, 1942.

October 13.
On the 11th (local date) a marine battalion from TULAGI
landed to the eastward of our main position on GUADALCANAL and
successfully attacked small enemy outposts. Also on that day
our CACTUS planes (1) bombed 3 DD badly damaging one, (2) attacked
a CA getting one torpedo hit, (3) again attacked the same CA and
2 screening DDs causing the CA to be abandoned and badly damaging
one DD.

1089

October 13th (Continued)

On the 12th local B-17s bombed BUKA causing minor damage.
Again on the 13th (local) B-17s bombed the BUKA airfield and
attacked shipping in the BUIN harbor. Of the 36 vessels reported
in that vicinity one AK was dama g ed. All of theses vessels were
seen still there the n~xt morning by a coastwatcher and included
2 CA, 3 CL, 10 DD, 1 A~.
The heavy gunfire on GUADALCANAL noted yesterday continued
for 70 minutes during the night 13-14th local causing very heavy
damage to planes on the field. During the middle of the day there
were two bombing attacks on the airfield causing additional damage,
but the field was in service for all but the qiggest planes.

T&62.4~was enroute GUADALCANAL with supplies including

avgas. Due to approaching enemy the AKs were turned back and the
VIREO towing PAB barges loaded with avgas and escorted by the
1ffiREDITH was ordered to continue to GUADALCANAL. The McFARLAND
was also ordered to bring in a deck load of avgas.
During the morning search planes discovered three enemy
forces.
One consisting of 6 AP, 1 CL, 7 DD and covered by 1 BB,
3 CL, 4 DD was tracked along the east coast of SANTA ISABEL I SLAND
and heading for GUADALCANAL. Six B-17s attacked this force in
the late afternoon. Tb~~~gnd force about 400 miles N.E. of
GUADALCANAL, and on sou~~ courses consisted of carriers escorted by BBs, CAs, and DDs. That force was not sighted again
during the day. A third force consisting of cruisers and DDs
apparently scouting in advance of the carrier group was sighted
during the morning about 225 miles northeast of GUADALCANAL.
As a result of these sightings Comsopac ordered: TF-64
(SAN FRANCISCO, CHESTER, HELENA, LANSD'OWNE, LARDNER, McCALLA,
BUCHANAN, AARON WARD, LAFFEY) to proceed toward GUADALCANAL
(got underway daybreack 15th local); TF-17 to proceed toward
GUADALCANAL as soon as fuel permits; TF-17.8 proceed ESPIRITU
SANTOS for fuel and report readiness to depart.
The above indicates that the enemy has commenced his
major offensive. Because our surface forces need fuel, our
lack of adequate avgas at GUADALCANAL (to be flown in), and
recent heavy loss of planes, our position is not favo~able to
prevent a major enemy landing . Planes left are 7 SBD, 4 P-400,
2 P-39; 10 SBDs were flown in during the aftern on.
,.
"),. ~

rt:

The positions of our forces in the area hauebeen discovered

by the enemy.
The TROUT r e port s that she g ot two hits on the OTAKA on
Sep tember 28 th in the TRUK a rea.
The ACHILLES and LEANDER are to go to EN GLAND for a 4~
months r e fit.

1090

8EGRE!IL

October 13th (Continued)

Cominch 132000 indicates that there will soon be an
agreement on the use of Army airplanes in the Pacific Ocean
areas. --- 1-- "'J .~
'
v
u
TF-16 is at sea off OAHU training and will probably depart for the South Pacific on the 16th. TF-1 continues training and readiness for PEARL.
CTF-8 140230 pink recommends withdrawal of TF-8 from the 1 _,
North Pacific about November 1st and turning over the job to
1 .,.....-\./'""
Cor.1norwestseafront.
~

October 14th
After midnight an enemy force commenced shelling our
position on GU~DALCili~AL heavily. Damage done was not reported.
During night the six enemy transuorts started landing ~ tg the
westward of our position. The landing was covered by~ BB group
west of SAVO and screened by cruisers and destroyers. During
the morning search the CV striking force seen yesterday was
located Northeast of SAN CRISTOBAL ISlAND.
During the morning a group of B-17s attacked the transports and ships at GUADALCANAL setti~g three on fire so badly
that they were beached, and hitting a BB.
As the day ended all enemy forces in the GUADALCANAL area
were retiring. The CV group moves are not clear and may be
moving on ESPIRITU SANTO.
TF 17 was probably fueling during the day and may be in
a position to strike tomorrow. TF 17.8 fueled at ESPIRITU SANTO
and departed at 8 p.m. (local) to rendezvous with TF 64, where
the forces will merge as TF 64 under Rear Admiral Lee. Comsopac
150212. This force cannot get to the GUADALCA!JAL area before
day after tomorrow. Because of a possible enemy raid, all shipping at ESPIRITU SANTO got underway toward the South.
The gasoline situation at GUADALCANAL continues critical.
The VIREO towing a PAB barge, and screened by the MEREDITH, can
arrive there tomorrow morning.
Motor torpedo boats attacked the DDs protecting the enemy
APs at GUADALCANAL. ~aits we
not observed. D ~ ~ ~ ~-
A submarine shelled E2PIRITU SANTO last night.
Our .AKs which were turned back from the TULAGI area yesterday were bombed but not damaged..

1091

October 14th (Continued)

Comsopac 1502L+-6 feels that he needs another Army division
for present operations. Cincpac concurs.
Our cruiser action in the GILBERTS (POTITL~ND and SAN JU_~)
caused the Japs some uneasy moments. Results have not been reported.
Highest quarters would be pleased to have KISKA shelled
by our old BBs. (Cominch 141325). CTF 8 151025, in answer to a
query on the operation from Cincpac, states that it is feasible.
The Japanese may be expected to reorganize their forces
during the next few days. There is no indication that they have
abandoned their efforts to recapture the Southern SOLOMONS or
~~~
'
that they are planning anything in other areas.
October 15th
The days reports indicate that the enemy now has two major
forces in the South Pacific. In the central and northern SOLOMOHS
forces are:
Off NE BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND:
1 BB, 2 CA, 2 DD, 1 AV.
At BUKA:

2 CA, 2 CL, 8 DD, 3 AV, 10 auxiliaries

At BUIN - FAISI:
3 BB, 2 CV, 3 CA, 5 CL, 10 DD, 14 auxiliaries
Along the 165th meridian (east) as far south as 11-00 S:
2 BB, 1 CV, 17 cruisers and destroyers.
In view of the above enemy deployment TF 64 was ordered
to operate generally South of Lat 11-45 s. Comsopac 160812. He
is also sending two DDs to bombard enemy at mTADALCANAL (his
160722). Comsopac has asked that the vess~ls in the BUIN-FAISI
area be attacked by SWPac air, which General MacArthur promises to
do. Comsopac 160032 orders TF 17 to operate to eastward of ESPIRITU
Comsopac 160440 considers his present forces inadequate
S~TTO.
for his tasks.
There is some indication that the LUNGA area may have
been mined by the enemy on the 12th (local).
The HOVEY reports capturing 4 officers and 70 men, survivors
of the 2nd Battle of SAVO. Preliminary statements of these prisoners
are not ere~ able.

.1 092

~GRET

October 15th (Continued)

Comairsopac 150921 gives the cri tica l situation at GUADALCANAL.
Comgen 1st MarDiv 160005 describes action on yesterday; and his
160035 tells of enemy land concentrations. Also his 160025 tells
of needs to relieve his present situation. He requests 1 battery
of 155 mm guns be sent to him as soon as possible.
Air strength at GUADALCANAL was increased today by 7 SBD and
four R4Dl. The shortage of planes and gasoline there now will
almost preclude offensive action.
It now appears that we are unable to control the sea area
in the GUADALCANAL area. Thus our supply of the positions will
only be done at great expense to us. The situation is not hopeless, but it is certainly critical.
The McFARLAND did a splendid piece of work in delivering
gasoline and ammunition to GUADALCANAL today. As she was about
to leave she received a bomb hit on her stern Which knocked out
her steering gear. It now seems probable that the ~ffiREDITH was
lost and the VIREO towing avgas to GUADALCANAL was damaged by
enemy air.
Cominch 152125 describes APHs. They are not hospital
ships under the Geneva Conventions. Com 12 151744 tells of sending EC2 ships to Sopac.
CTF 8 152050 describes a bombing attack on KISKA the 14th.
Results were minor.
KISKA.

Cincpac 160455 pink does not recommend use of BBs to shell

There is no doubt now that Japs are making an all out effort
in the SOLOMOlJS, employj ng the greater part of their Navy.
~( ~-Ltlo eX l 'j r.r4- AA-4_...._.....,.~..... )
~

October 16th

Just as the McF..'\....-qLAND was ready to leave GUADALCfw"\JAL in the

evening she was hit by a bomb on the stern. 350 drums of avgas in
a barge alone;side was also exploded. About 20000 gals. reached the
shore. While enroute GUADALC~~AL towinB a barge with 2000 drums
avgas the VIREO was damaged by an air attack and unable to conti~ue
the tow. The UEREDITH , escorting, is unreported and suspected mlssing. The the acute avgas shortage continues. The HOVEY and SOUTHARD
are scheduled to arrive with deck loads of aveas on the 19th local.
There is also a critical shortage of bombs - which may have to be
flown in. The .AJ\1BERJACK is now enroute ESPIRITU SANTO to be fitted
to carry gas.
During the night the Marines at GUADALCANAL were shelled by
a cruiser or a destroyer. The results of our bombardment of enemy

109 1

.sECRET .

October 16th (Continued)

positions by 2 DDs is not yet known.
Sopac 151346 gives his summary for the 14th and 15th, and
his 161326 summarizes the situation to the 16th local.
Comairsopac 162138 describes air needs fo his command and
Comsopac 171230 gives what he considers necessary to reinforce his
position.
The New Zealand Army has agreed to garrison BLEACHER and will
have a reinforced KIWI ready about November 7th.
The BELLATRIX arrived at ESPIRITU SANTO and reports some damage
from an air attack two days ago, which also forced her to cast a
PAB barge adrift.
Comsopac 160106 deals with the relief of the 4th defense battalion with the 9th at EFATE.
It has been decided to send about 50 Army fighters from the
Central Pacific area to the South Pacific in the immediate future.
Comsopac 170800 is a ,ronosal for the employment of submarines
to supuort Sopac current operations. Two Pacific Fleet subs will
be sent to General MacArthur to assist his coverage of the SHORTLANDSFAISI area.
Cincpac 162221 proposes a reduction of TF 8 forces in ALASKA.
Cominch approves an immediate reduction of the cruisers to two.
This will permit reinforcement to Sopac. CTF 8 reports that 3 B-26's
got hits on a ship in GERTRUDE COVE, KISKA. Also that Army bombers
probably sank one DD and damaged another ,just north of KISKA.
The deployment of the Jap forces in the South Pacific is uncertain. Some forces have left the BUIN area and the CV striking
force thought north of NDENI is unreported.
~~

1094

October 1'7th.
The Admiral's conference this morning was attended
by General Emmons and Rear Admiral Bagley. These officers
were brought up to date on the situation in the Pacific Ocean
Areas.
The day in the South Pacific is summarized in
Comsopac 171536.
Our DDs, previously mentioned,, report having fired
l_QOO rounds per ship into the Jap positions at GUADALCANAL.
Also, during th day TF17 planes attacked the same positions
incessantly. REKATA was also attacked by TF17 planes, Admiral
Nimitz will urge Comsopac to repeat the bombardment daily when
feasible.
The Japs launched what must be to them a very disappointing air attack ~ on GUADALCANAL today.
Of the 14 bombers
attacking, 8 were shot down by our fighters and 6 were shot down
by AA.
~ total of 50 Army fighters will be sent to the
Sopac from the Central Pacific. 25 were ordered sent by General
Marshall and 25 will be sent by Cincpac.

The VIREO will be towed to port and her barge will

be towed to GUADALCANAL by the SEMINOLE arriving the 19th local.
GUADALCANAL.
enemy today.

Comsopac is flying emergency gas and ammunition to

It seems most probable that T:B'54 was seen by the

The SAN JUAN reports sinking two small J'ap patrol

boats when retiring from their raid on the GILBERTS and the
patrol lines to the South. Two officers and 14 men were capture. We will continue to raid that 1ne with our ships enroute to and from the Sopac.
The SWPac bombers are having Much better success
in bombing enemy ships in the SOLOMONS and NEW' BRITAIN.
TF16 is enroute to the South Pacific via a point.
to the westward of FUNAFUTI where it will fuel.
Two fleet subs from PEARL may be sent to operate
under General McArthur in the near future in order to provide
denser coverage of the SHOR'rLAND - FAISI area.
The position of the main enemy forces in the South
Pacific is obscure.
It is not thought, however, that they have
withdrawn from the general area.

1095

Octo ber 18th

Comsopac 1Rl350 pink. Vice Admiral Halsey relieved Vice
as Commander South Pacific Force and South Pacific
Ghormley
Admiral
Area. On the evening of the 15th Admiral Nimitz conferred with
members of his staff concerning relieving Admiral Ghormley. It
was felt that Admiral Ghormley has not been successful for several
reasons and that the critical situation there requires a more aggressive Commander. The following morning, after having received
authority from Admiral King to make the change, a decision was
made to etf.e~\ the chan~e upon the arrival of Admiral Halsey who
was enrou-r~~oy air. Rear Admiral Kinkaid will thus )retain command of TF .L6. -se.e... c\.V\ C pCl c.. 16D'1 :::.1 ctVlcl lb 1'1.- t.t s- ( fl"" K
The C.G. Hawaiian Department has been directed by General
Marshall {October 16th) to select one infantry division from his
command for movement to the South or ffiv Pacific and to report
earliest date of readiness of the first regimental combat team.
Also General Marshall prefers General Collins as division commander as General Pennel is too old. Early replacement this
division will not be possi ble.
The Sopac situation to the 18th was summarized in Comsopa c 181426. Generally the day (19th local) was quiet. There were
no contacts ashore on GUADALC.t\NAL reported. While 40 vessels were
sighted in the SHORTLANDS area, the location of major enemy units
was in doubt. 4 cruisers and 4 dest r oyers were reported enroute
to attack GUADALCA}L~L and CTF 64 was ordered to intercept. However, he was fueling 'Nest of ESPIRITU SAN~ro and was una:)le to
comply. The SOUTHARD delivered almost 10,000 gallons avgas to
GUADALCANAL. The SEMINOLE towed the VIREO barge with 2000 drums
of avgas aboard into the area but went to TULAGI because of the
approaching enemy. No bombardment was reported last night, but
some troops and supnlies may have been landed. Apparently the
VIREO was abandoned by her crew because of fear of an air attack.
The crew embarked on the lVIER~DITH which was sunk by aerial torpedoes and bombs shortly thereafter. The aJandoning of the VIREO
is not understood. It looks like a dis g~ aceful procedure. TF 64
.continues to be trailed by enemy planes. RE T.f\fE L and SAVO I 9LANDS
~:O ccupied by small enemy garrisons.
The S"V Pacific air sent 22 B-17' s to bomb the enemy in
the SHORTLANDS area. Hesults were minor. The SCULP I N reported.
sinking two tankers on the 18th.
CTF 64 estimates th a t in the second battle of SAVO he
sank 3 CA, 4 DD, and possi bl y 1 CL a nd one more DD. These fi gures
seem high because of the number of cruisers and destroyers seen
and attacked by p l a nes the followi ng day.
The PORTLAND reports enga ging two DDs and two marus in her
raid of the GILBERTS. No si nki ngs were re ported. The att a cks

109 6

October 18th

(Continued)

were not pressed home because of fear of air attack.

The Army in Washington has approved Admiral Nimitz's
orders to send 25 P- 39's from CHRIS'llviAS to the South Pacific.
TF 1 has been ordered to prepare a plan to bombard "'1\TAKE
at an early date - the date dependent upon availability of 1 XAV
and 1 CL(AA) to be added to the bombardment group.
Cincpac 182359 urges that the 9th defense battalion be
sent directly to GUADALCANAL instead of relieving the 4th at EFATE.
CTF 8 gives the minor results of a bombing of KISKA on
the 17th. Cominch has approved the immediate reduction to two
of TF 8 cruisers but reserves decision on withdrawal of other
forces and of Rear Admiral Theobald. The Army plans to increase
the garrisons at ADAK and TA}TAGA to 1500 and 5000 respectively.
There are no changes noted in enemy deployments.
October 19th
Sopac operations to the 20th are summarized in his 191256.
About 9 p.n. local the CilliSTER was torpedoed South of SAN
CRISTOBAL. She reports being without power and a tug and DD escorts were provided.
CTF 64 sent part of his force to ESPIRITU SANTO to fuel,
and the remainder will fuel there in the next few days. CTF 17
is operating to the East of ESPIRI~J SANTO. TF 16 is enroute
South.
In his 191954 Cominch directed Comsowestpac to place and
maintain 12 fleet subs under operational control of Comsopac. Also
in his 201540 he desires Cincpac to reinforce Sopac submarines.
There were two air raics on GUADALCANAL. Of the 30 zeros
and 16 bombers involved 7 zeros and 2 bombers were shot down. We
lost two pilots.
The O'BRIH'N broke in two and sank today while enroute
PEARL for repairs, after being torpedoed last month.
While the sup:JlY of avgas and )ombs to GUADALC~\J'JAL is still
critical, enough _is oeina sent - in to permit operations to continue.
The M~~" BERJACK wi 11 arrive with a small cargo of gas on the 25th.
The 12 B-17's for the Sopac have left O~~TIJ. This brings
the total transferred recently up to 24. Also from OAHU was the

.1087

fiF.l GIill '! -

October lgth (Continued)

first of the 19th bombardment group ( R-2L~' s)

~oing

to AUSTlli\LIA .

In the RJIN area yesterday were at least 1 BB , 1 AV,

8 cruisers, 8 DD, 8 AK's. At RABAUL were 34 large vessels and
22 of medium size. In that group was 1 CV and 1 AV. Thus we now
have the position of most stren~th in the area except it is
probable that 3 ~Bs , 2 CV, with usual flotilla are someplace in
the general TRTJK- RABAUL area.
..-(._.
October 20th
201321.

Sopac operations for the 20th are summarized in his

The CHESTER is making 6 knots under own steam and at

that rate should arrive at ESPIRITU SANTO day after tomorrow.
Comair ON'E 200407 indicates the shortage of planes at
GUADALCANAL. The rate of attrition there is extremely high.
Much damage to planes was caused by recent enemy shelling.
Yesterday the Marines repulsed a minor attempt to cross
the NLATANIKAU RIVER.
Cincpac 202215 and 202309 desc ribe a plan to send 12
Pac Fleet subs to the Sopac. This is an emergency move to provide dense coverage in the active area, and complies with Cominch
desire noted yesterday.
REN1ffiLL

IS~_ND

is not occupied by the Japs.

The Fighting French High Commissiorle""r has left NOUMEA

for good ~ iB tho QpiRign of Qo~Bep~e.
~
The GROUP~R returning from patrol in the EAST CHINA SEA
reports sinking 12,000 tons of marus ( 2 ships).
The very large concentration of Jap ships at FATh\UL apparently continues. Photos do not show a CV there as reported
yesterday. There is very good indication that the Japs are having to slow up their plans for an attack in force on GUADALCANAL
because of large attrition losses.
Cincpac uointed out to Cominch that now is a golden
opportunity for the British Eastern Fleet to take action on the
Jap west flank.

1.098

October 21st
Vice Admiral Halsey wi 11 move ashore at NOU.MEA occupying certain buildings vacated by the Fighting Fr ~~ High Commissioner. Cominch apuroves taking over this French property as
a military necessity (his 211540 pink).
Cominch concurs in Cincpac proposal for British action
(Cominch 211400 pink) and passed the message along to the Admiralty.
In a 3 part (211630) Cominch gives the present
Army and Navy air supuort to the Sopac operations.

~lan

for

TF 16 and TF 17 will .ioin as TF 61 under Rear Admiral

Kinkaid at OJOO GCT October 24th and make a sweep around north
S.l\.NTA CRUZ ISLANDS, thence southwesterly east of SAN C~I8TOBAL to
the Coral Sea area in position to intercept enemy forces . approaching our positions in the Southern SOLOMONS.
The INDIANA, COLUM3IA, DeHAVSN, and SAUFLEY have been
ordered to the Pacific Fleet and will depart Atlantic ports for
the Canal Zone no later than November lOth.
Pacific.

Cominch 211631 pink summarizes the MTB situation in the

Comsopac 210517 tells of needs of a major supply base

at NOillvffiA. Comairsopac 212300 tells of needs of VF planes in
the forward areas.
FUNAFUTI.

There is a shortage of Marines in the STRAW area and at

The 25th Army Divi.sion at OAHU has been ordered to move

to the South or SW?ac starting November 15.
The PORT~R sighted an enemy merchant type vessel of about
5,000 tons, apparently armed with several guns, 4" or larger, near
the GlLB ~RT ISLANDS . In an engagemen~t which followed the :!?ORTER
fired about 1200 rounds without sinkinP' the vessel. No damage was
done to the ? OR~~R.
Cominch has anproved the withdrawal of the COPAHEE VF
squadron rrom ALASKA and cancelled the directive to maintain one
fighter division in ALASKA.

109 9

October 22nd.
Comsopac2?2246 summarizes operations in his area. The
use of tanks and small artillery by the enemy on GUADALCANAL indicates the aJility of the Japs to land good sized weights. There
have been indications of towing liehters to GUADALCAIJAL by destroyers.
PBYs attacked shipping in the SHORTLAND area early in the
morning. Although one plane reported a torpedo hit, DI indicates
no damage.
A search plane reported sighting an enemy task force about
3 50 miles NE of 1\fllU.~AITA about 10 in the morning (local) This was
indicated to be a CV striking force on southerly courses. The search
kept the force fairly well under observation during the day. During the following night a search plane reported making radar contact
in that general vicinity. One hour later the same plane reported 9
ships, of which one was believed to be a CV, and that he dropped his
torpedo but failed to get a hit. When last observed the force was
reported on course 260 speed 20 - which would permit it to be in a
fly off position for GUADALC-~JAL next daylight. This is the first
time in several days that we have been able to get much light on
Jap deployments. The RABAUL and SHORTLANDS areas continued to be
well filled ~th Jap ships, most of which were auxiliaries. The
(i)ombined total in those areas was 93 vessels. From all indications
the enemy seems about ready to start his long expected all out attack on GUADALCANAL. The next three or four days are critical.
GUADALCA:rAL renorted three flights of planes coming in
from the northwest during the middle of the day but no report of
bombing was received.
Comairsonac welcomes the Army P-J9's but noints out that
if they are not the I'"ITTG series they are no good as fighters but
excellent for ground strafing. ~lhi le the flovv of planes to the
area cannot be considered satisfactory, it is inproving. In the
GUADALCAJJAL area there is enough avgas (over 100,000 ~als) to keep
General Geiger's planes filled, there is not enough to operate
B-17's; nor is there any immediate prospect of so doing. Avgas
end ammunition still arrives there in driblet s.
A crew was put on the VIREO.
tow, is now enroute ESPIRITU SANTO.
TF 61.

That ship, with PAB

f/6 in

hardly be in a position to i.ntercept enemy forces

in the SOLOEON~ before late afternoon of the 25th local. TF 64
could be off GUADALCiJ~AL on the 25th. Thus, should the enemy stril{e
tomorrow air and submarines will be the only opposition.
~;vill

Comamphibforsopac 210956 eives information fron prisoners

on the 2nd Battle of S!1.VO . General DeGaulle has fully agreed to
the assignment of necessary buildine;s at NOllliEA to Comsopac. Governor Monchamps was authorized to negotiate any other matters with
Comsopac. In a very cordial conversation with Comneveu he emphasized his desire for full cooperation with U. 0
About time.
(Continued on next page)

11 QO

-sECRET.
October 22nd.

(Continued)

It is possible that the poor shooting reported yesterday

A-nd attributed to the :PORTER was done by Comdesron ~NO in the MORRIS.
TF 1 continues at PEARL engaged in training and upkeep
while being prepared to repel landin ~ attempts in the Hawaiian Area.
In the _A_L-~TJTIANP enemy su omarine s were active. One fired
torpedoes at the DOLPHIN which missed. The S-32 reports hitting
2 AKs with torpedoes in the vicinity of PA:R.l'-J/fUGHIRO and claims
one probabl ~ sunk and one damaged. The cruisers of TF 8 completed
a 10 day sweep as far west as ATTU. Results were negative. Cincpac 222129 requests Cominch approval to exchange the DETROIT and
RALEIGH for cruisers of TF 8.
M~y

We are still without definite news of ~ 4 ~ajor units of

the .enemy which are thought to be in the general 8opac area. If
our .guess is correct they can throw more ships, planes, and troops
into the vi tal area than we can. .And this si tuation will continue
for the next few weeks. Having inferior forces we must count
heavi.ly on attrition, but losing no chance to come to grips with
the enemy under the principle of calculated risk.
L
October 23rd.
Operations in the South Pacific are s1nrrmarized in Comsopac 240041. The very fine work of our Marine pilots in shooting
down the enemy planes is most encourae,ing. Rain during the day
made the airfield unsuitable for heavy planes. There is much work
to be done to nrovide all-weather fields in the area and several
other locations are under consideration.
General MacArthur reports good success in air raids in the
RABAUL areR. Among other targets claimed hit he reports setting
a tanker on fire. If this is verified it is bound to slow up the
enemy somewhat.
The submarine concentration in the active area is beginning to shape up with the arrival of two Pacific Fleet subs from
TRUK. Ten more are to follow from PEAHL, leaving before the end
of this month.
Both TF 61 and TF 64 will be in position to strike the
enemy in the Southern SO~OMONS by late tomorrow.
The logis tic support of our pos itions in the Southern
SO LOMONS is proceeding, but the difficulties of unloadine; and the
great risk to ships involved continues.
The CHESTER probably arrived at EfPIRITU
repairs today.

Sl~TO

(Continued on next page)

for emereency

1101

... SJ!: CORE'!'

October 23rd

(Continued)

Our search plane from OAHU reported sighting a submarine

about 500 miles southwest of that nlace. If this can be verified
it may be the forerunner of projected enemy operations in the
Hawaiian Sea Frontier. R. I. also gives indication of some sort
of a raid. A raid in the near future, probably at MIDWAY , is considered a possibility. All signs continue to noint to the commencement of major operations in the South Pacific within the next two
or three days. If these signs are right, a raid in the HNNAIIAN
area or along our exnosed positions to the South will be a minor
hit and run affair.
The exchange of the DETROIT and RALEIGH for TF 8 cruisers
has been approved by Cominch and will be effected as soon as possible.
~
October 24th.

~~,-,

Reports of enemy contacts from search planes in the South

Pacific during the morning were confusing. One force com9osed of
BBs, CAs, and DDs was reported 140 miles NE of the GUADALCANAL airfield. 130 miles to the eastward of that group a second force was
reported. This was reported to be 2 BB, 2 CV, 2 CA, 2 CL, and at
least 4 DD. A third force stated to be composed .of nine ships was
reported 210 miles NE GUADALC.A...~AL . Off the east coast of SANTA
ISABEL ISLAND a force composed of 1 BB, 3 CL, and 2 DD was reported.
Off the west coast of MAL\ITA a force of two cruisers and three
destroyers was reported. While the picture is not clear, enough
was reported to show a typical major enemy move toward the south.
TF 61 was too far ~ttt to attack. TF 64 was ordered to strike any
forces encountered in the vic~~~~ at~UADALCANAL. That force made
a sweep of the GUADALCANAL area but'1'falled to niake contact with the
enemy and withdrew. B-17' s wer~ ordered to strike. the forces n~earest
GUADALCPJ~AL, probably because they were the irmnediate threat.
Results are shown in Comairsopac 251450. During the morning our position on GUADALCAHAL was she.lled by two cruisers and one destroyer. /
As that group was retiring to the northward Marine SBD's attacked
and reported one cruiser obviously damaged. As enemy might attempt
night landings, General Vandergrift ordered motor torpedo boats
from TULAGI to strjke the enemy approaching GUADALCANAL after dark.
During the afternoon enemy planes were reported heading toward
GUADALCANAL.
from

A Catalina
~SPJRITU

ni~ht radar search and torpedo strike was ordered

SANTO to the NW.

One squadron of the 90th bombardment group (B-24's) previously ordered to AUSTrJ~LIA is to renort to General Harmon for
temporary duty by orders from General Marshall.
(Continued on next page)

October 24th.

(Continued)

The 8th Marines have been ordered t o EFATE end

should arrive there October 30th.
Sopac 250216 gives the summary of operations in that
area to the 24th.
ington.

Admiral Ghormley arrived at PEARL today enroute to Wash-

This
A submarine was reuorted 320 miles west of OAh~.
may be the same one siphted yesterday about 500 miles ~N of OPBU.
Two DDs from TF 16 raided the enemy patrol line south of
the GILBERTS on the 22nd and sank two small patrol vessels. It
now appears that a DD of TF 17 also raided the same patrol line
on the same day.
the day.

The Army planes made a minor air e.ttack on YISKA during

~
~

October 25th.
In the early morning TF 61 was about 150 miles southeast
of the enemy strikine forces noted yesterday in the area to the
eastward of the SOLOMONS. Both forces had good knowledge of the
approximate position and composition of each other. Our position
and strength seened quite favorable. Shortly before 7 a.m. local
an enemy shore based patrol plane made an accurate contact report
of TF 61. The enemy i mmediately launched a carrier strike which
was able to find TF 61 without further search. J)resuma bly our
carrier strike was launched at about the same time but there is
some evidence that it had to search before locating the tar8et.
A little after 9 a.m. local the enemy started air attacks on TF 61.
The HOR~~T was severely damae ed by bombs and torpedoes and was
taken in tow by the NORTHIIAHPTON. A preliminary ::-eport of damaee
to other vessels is P'i ven in CTF 61 26041}0. Damage inflicted by
our CV planes is shown in CTF 61 260210. B-17's from ESPIRITU
SANTO were also ordered to att a ck but the account of dama ge inflicted is not in. After the first attack TF 61 comrnenced retirement to the southe a st. Durin ~ the a fter noon the enemy CV ulanes
attacked the BOHNET a gain with bombs and tornedoes c ausin ~ such
serious damage tha t C'rF 17 decide d to sink the carrier with own
torpedoes. ~"i... s the day ended the enem .. s eemed to be retiring to
the northwest a nd all of our t a sk fo rces were retirin - on southerly
courses.
except for one force con- -- ---~ ing BB 's which was attempting to intercept our
force durinE the
)
.
~_:_: - ,-,

afternoon
( vontlnued on next page

'

110 3

October 25th.

(Continued)

For the first time inJ~he ~ouih Pacific our CV task forces
were able to operate under a0 "~eaV~n umbrella and the enemy
strength and disposition wasAreported frequently. The Japs have
always had this advantage in the area. During the past two days
there has been a front along the northern part of the search area
which has reduced the efficiency of the search.
No report of enemy plane losses has been received but they
must have been very heavy. If the percentage of loss approaches
that of previous recent engagements (and it should as we have
been loading our ships with AA), the three enemy CV's thought to
have been in the battle today will be unable to do much more
damage soon.
At daylight TF 6~ presumably was retiring from GUADALCANAL.
During the morning Comsopac ordered all TF to strike the enemy.
Later in the day TF 64 was ordered to retire to the southward.
The enemy group which shelled GUADALCANAL on the 24th also
sank the SEMINOLE and a Yf at TULAGI. The SEMINOLE was fitted
for salvage and her loss is serious.
JVhile entering ESPIRITU SANTO the COOLIDGE, with one regimental combat team of the 43rd Army Division embarked, struck
one or more mines ,and sank. While she probably struck our ovm
mine field, there is a possibility that enemy mines are responsible as a Jap sub was in the vicinity recently.
1

General Harmon is holding usable B-17's at FANTAN for

emergency combat. Those held were enroute from AUSTRALIA to
OAHU.
Operations preceeding the battle in the South Pacific are
summarized in Comsopac 260210.
The SARGO returning from patrol off the CHINA coast reports
sinking one 7000 ton freighter with torpedos and gunfire. The
STURGEON returning from patrol in the FAISI - ST GEORGES channel
area reported sinking one loaded 10,000 ton tanker and one 7000
ton freighter. The NAUTILUS clearing patrol area off Eastern
HONSHU reports sinking 22000 tons enemy shipping.
The CHESTER will be able to leave ESPIRITU SANTO about
October 29th under her own power. Due to extensive damage she
will be able to make only seven knots. She will go to SYDNEY
for temporary repairs.
There were no important contacts in the Central or North
Pacific Brea. ' The landing strip on ST PAUL ISLAND is now 100
feet wide by 2300 feet long. The SPERRY and FULTON leave PEARL
for the South Pacific tomorrow.
Although the enemy has suffered considerable damage recently
in the general SOL0110NS area there is no indication that he has
(Continued on next page)
1104

October 25th.

(Continued)

abandoned his plan to recapture GUADALCANAL. The Jap subs are

ordered to search for and attack our forces in the area. Due
to the strength in the South, no major operations in any other
area are considered probabJ.e at this time. Small nuisance
raids in the Central Pacific area are possible.

October 26th.
The Chief of Staff , Iawaiian Department, and the Comrnander
Hawaiian Sea Frontier, were present At Cincpac morning conference
when events of the previous day were reviewed. Aclmiral Himitz
continues to keep his principal subordinates fully informed of
developments in the Pacific Ocean Areas.
The mornine: search from E~T'IRI TU SANTO discovered groups
of the enemy a bout 360 miles to the eastward of Gt ADLLCAlJAL. At
least two BBs, 1 CV, several cruisers and destroyers were reported.
All were on northerly courses at fairly high speed. Operations
in the Sopac area are swnmarized in Comsopac 270426, which includes
a night attack by PBYs on an enemy carrier, which is also reported
by Comairsopac in his 2700 31. TF 61 ;gc1!! 'p} reports further details
of damage to his force in his 2700l~5. Afte r delivering PTs and
avgas to GUADALCAIJAL the TREv--GTI and ZAlJJ:; engaged three enemy DDs at
lonr: ranr,e and escaped with minor damage mainly because the L1ar ine
pilots joined the battle and are credited with sinking two of the
enemy DDs. TF 61 and TF 64 retired during the day tov.rard fueling
positions.
TF 64.2 (Rear Admiral 0 cott in ATI.JJlTTA , 4 DDs) is ordered
to bombard enemy -,) osi t ions on GUADALC.AIJAL on the morning of the
29th and 30th (local).
General UacArthur is re(!uested by Admiral Ha lse y to make
maxinum Jombing effort day and ni ~=tht apainst shins in the _SUIH-FAISI TG~JOLEI area.
Adniral Hal~ev reauests carrier reinforcement from the
British Eastern Fleet: C{ncnac concurs and urges Cominch to exnlore the idea (Cincpac 270251 nink) .
Durjng the afternoon 14 B-17s attacked the eneny east of
the SOJJ)H0 l\J 0 1Jil hits.
Comsopac 260P'lh pi ves the 1Jlan for the emtJloyment of Army
fiGShters and medilLm bombers in the GU.t'-D_.\.LCA= AL-ESPIRITU S~ITO area.
(Continued on next page)

11 0'-

October 26th.

(Continued)

Comsopac 270437 sets forth his views for setting up a

base command separate from Seronsopac.
There were no developments of note in the Central and
north Pacific areas.

During the day a force comryosed of battleships and other

combatant vessels was renorted by our ~lanes in a ryosition to
the eastward of the SANTA CRUZ ISLAHD~. The force was reported
to be enemy, but was later identified as units of Task Force 61.
~

October 27th.

Lieut. General Emmons, Rear Admiral Bagley, and Vice Admir~~

Towers attended the morning conference held by Admiral Nimitz.
Cortsopac 280326 amplifies his report of operations for the
previous days. The enemy reported that a unit had received a
torpedo hit about the time of the PBY attack. Vlhile the enemy
usually reports "no damage" or nminor damage" in such cases, we
know from past experience that damage inflicted is often much
greater than reported.
T.G. 61+.2 (near Admiral Scott in ATLArJ'I'A, AARON WARD, BE:N1I.AM,
LARDNER, FJ_,ETCHER) will be unable to shell the Japs on GUADALCANAL
on the 29th as requested and is now ordered to shell on the 30th
only.
The McFARLAND will be used to service seaplanes, \,._fuel and
gas storage;r.. be an alternate radio station, and other services at
TULAGI. It is planned to mount her 4 inch gnns on shore for harbor defense. There are indications that she has been discovered
by the enemy.
TF 61 is proceeding to NOUJ'!JEA, fueling enrout e. TF 64 less
TG 64.2 was enroute to a fuelin~ rendezvous west of ESPIRITU SA1JTO.
At 3:20a.m. and at 5:30a.m., 27th local, the WASHINGTON was attacked by submarines. Several torpedoes were fired in each attack and all missed. "Secause of the known submarine menace east
of ESPIRITU SANTO Cor1sopac ordered the WASHINGTON and 2 DD to
NOTJJ.~A for fuel, and the other vessels in company to ES?IRITU SANTO
for fuel. TF 64.2 will also fuel at ES~IRI~J SANTO on their arrival there ~Jovem ber 1st (local).
The inexcusable loss of the COOLIDGE is described in Comnavunit BUTTON 280921. The existence of a mine field at Ef-riRITU
SANTO has been made known widely, especially after the loss of the
TUCKER in the same locality.
(Continued on next page)

1.105

- SECRET _

October 27th.

(Continued)

Comsopac offered B-24s from his area to General Ma cArthur

to increase bombing of enemy ships in the NEW BRITAIN-f:O:S01tlONS.
General MacArthur re,lied that he could use the nlanes to advanta~e with reservations listed in his 281001.
The approved Joint Chiefs of Staff aircraft nlan for the
active Sopac area has been received by mail. Cincpac 280351 suggests that Consopac have a plan drawn up for the defense o~ ESPIRITU
S.ANTO iNhich Cincpac will submit to Cominch for at")nroval and implementation. The lack of strength there is cause for concern.
The logistic support of our uositions in the Southern SOLOMONS continues, but the risk and difficulties are ~reat.
The Commandant, U. s. IViarine Corps, inaugurated the auxiliary
landing strip at VvALLIS I SLAND when he landed there :Ln a PBY5A
on October 26th (local).
Cominch has stated that as a general rule exchange of information will be direct between our liaison officer and the CinC,
Eastern Jl,leet.
The TRIGGER returning from patrol off ~JNGO CHANNEL reports
sinking one 10,000 ton AO and one 5,000 ton AK. While our submarines have had fine success, there are a few spotty performances.
For example, recently off TRUK two of our submarines each missed
a fine chance to press home attacks on enemy carriers.
CTF 8 280215 and 280255 (pinks) expresses his views on the
needed strength and disnosition of Army troops in the ALEUTIANS.

;!. v

'

It ~ \)

':.

Cincpac 280311 ~e=1iF: ~m~c;,~r ~*aa.t -'tl(a:. bail.~ovres is the

somewhat premature announcement of the loss of the .WASP, and of
the loss of the PORTER before it could be announced that next of
kin informed.
Cominch 281735 (pink) deals with the use of our suomarines
for scoutin~ and general information purposes.
Although the main enemy strength has retired to the north
beyond our air search there is no indication that the Japs have
abandoned plans to recapture GUADALCANAIJ. It seems probable that
damage inflicted and fuel needs have made it necessary to retire
for the time being. Further attempts to land troops on GUADALCANAL are to be expected.
V*

1107

October 28th.
Events of the previous day were discussed at Admiral
Nimitz's morning conference. Lieut. General Emmons and TF Commanders now at PEARL were present.
Cincpac 2R2225 remarks on the present lull in the South Pacarea which appears to gi ve us the opnortunity for placing
Comsopac 290130 is in
stron~ reinforcements on GUADALCAJJAL.
complete agreement and ~ ives his nlans for troop movements starting on the 30th (local).

ific

Land operaCo~sopac 290106 is a su~mary for his area.

tions on GUADALClU AL durine, the 27th (local) are described.
The logistic supnort of Southern QO!_, >HOIJS positions is
being stepped up. On the 28th (local) there were 45,000 gallons
avgas at GTJADALC.iU~AL and 4, 900 eallons avgas at Tt.TLAGI.
The f! CULPIH, returning from patrol in the NE~, v BRITAIN BOUGAirVILLE area, reports the probable sinking of 1 - 9200 AO,
1 - 10000 AP, 1 - large AO, 1 - 4000 AK.
A total of 43 ships including 2 BB, l .XCV, 2 A'T2s, 1 (reported) CC, 2 CA, 8 CL, 1 DD, 12 marus were reported in the SHORTLANDS area.
VJe now have the story of our destroyer raids on the enemy
patrol line south of the GILBE~TS: CTF 16 280330.

HONSHU.

The DRUM reported sinking four J\Y while on patrol off

It appears that the KENDTIICK on a shakedown trip was attacked by a submarine off the WASHINGTON Coast.
CTF 8 282240 p.:ives results of reconnaissance in the Western
AL:SUTIAFS.
Some of the enemy streneth in the South Pacific is located
in the SHOP.TLANDS area and the remainder is believed to he refuelconIt
ingo and reorganizing

_") to the northward of our searches.

.
tinues to aupear :~ro l)a ble that the enemy will continue Wl th plans
to recapture GUADAl~C AlJAJ...J.

1.108

October 29th
As is usual, present at Admiral IJimitz's morning conference were the principal subordinate commanders now at PEARL.
TF co1nmanders at PE-~L are thus given a good picture of current
operations.
The day was quiet in the South Pacific.
the 29th local.

su~narizes

Comsopac 300150

Plans have been completed to reinforce GUADALCANAL , and

to construct an alternate landin~ strip in the vicinity of AOLA
BAY. It is ulanned that the ~th Marines will be landed to reinforce the p;arris on November 3rd (local) and that part of the 5th
Marine Defense Battalion, 1 BN 147th Infantry, 1 battery FA,
2 COs 2nd Marine raiders, and 500 ACORN personnel will be landed
at AOLA the same day.
(See Consopac 300602 for escorts and cooperation by other Sopac and SWPac forces).
The C.O. LION #1 will uroceed to Sonac and assist in
recommendations and execution of a graduated movement of that LION to the South Pacific.
formulatin~

The Central Pacific was quiet. TF 1 continues training

in the HAvlAIIMJ Area, basin~ at n~p~~L. TF 11 has been formed
under Rear Admiral RaMsey and will be ready to proceed South in
the near future.
Cincpac 301819 deals ~ith defensive mines. Experience
to date is not conducive to extension of this method of warfare.
Three enemy cruisers were sie:-~hted well to the westward
of the AL~TIAN~ and were observed on a westerly course. These
cruisers may have made a sweep into the Bearing Sea.
Nothing new is reported concerning enemy deployments or
intentions.

1109

October 30th.
Following the usual morning conference the question of
sending certain old BBs of TF 1 to the South Pacific was discussed .
While no decision was reached it was considered feasible to send
two BBs to operate either with or without ACVs. If BBs are sent
the MARYUL~ and COLO~~DO probably will be the first to go.
The day was extremely quiet in all areas. In the South
Pacific our forces were refueling , refitting , and reorganiz ing.
The enemy is presumed to be doing the same. Comsopac gives a
summary to the morning of the 30th {local) in his 310534. The
~N Pacific air continued attacks on enemy ships in the SHORTLAND
and RA~AUL ar~as. Two direct hits are claimed on a probable CA
in the former place. These attacks are valuable for several
reasons. Army pilots are trained in navigation and ')om bing; reported hits and near misses nay inflict important damage; the
enemy is not permitted to rest secure in the harbors.
Cincpac 310355 gives views on the
in the SOLOMONS area.

emploJ~ent

of submarine s

Comsopac 310206 pink requests Comgensop ac to dispatch

earliest practicab le one Army infantry regiment reinforced , less
one battalion ,to GUADALCMJAL.
Due to shipping, the departure of the first combat team
of the 25th Army Division from OA..TID to the South Pacific is now
delayed until November 25th, and the second team should leave
early in December.
There is no news of enemy major units in the South Pacific.
Five enemy DDs are scheduled to land reinforcem ents at GUADALCANAL
November 2nd (local). Cominch points out that enemy actions may
well be linked with our national elections due next Tuesday.
~~
~

11 10

October 31st
The Chief of Staff, Hawaiian Department; and TF commanders at PEARL where present at the morning conference held by
Admiral Nimitz.
The story of the loss of the HORllliT is told in Comsopac
011312 pink. The poor torpedo shooting by our DDs is not understood. Also, as the two enemy and nine own torpedoes failed to
sink the carrier, there is a suggestion that we should push salvage measures in the hope of saving wounded ships. Comsopac
011050 pink gives his estimate of enemy plane losses and a summary
of own l_)lane losses in the October 26th engagement. We still are
not fully informed of our own damage on that day. For example,
it was learned today for the first time that the MAHAN has serious
damage forward, and the SMJ JUAN requires docking.
Comsopac is now giving his submarines good information of
enemy movements. This should be beneficial.
Tomorrow two AKs and one AP will arrive at GUADALCANAL
with supplies including 8 - 155 mm guns.
A task group has been sent to intercept 5 enemy DDs expected to arrive at GUADALCMJAL tomorrow night.

CTF 62 310946 describes the AOLA BAY project. A fighter,

then a bomber strip will be constructed as soon as possible.
Comsopac 312126 recommends a reorganization of this force.
This has to do with the Amphibious Force.
The landing strip at FUNAFUTI is now 3500 feet long.
is a ver..J quick construction tjob.

This

The KINGFISH reports sinking 12,000 tons of enemy shipping off HONSHU.
A submarine was reported by a plane 120 miles

SN

of OAHU.

There are no new enemy developments.

1111

November 1st
General Emmons and the TF commanders present at PEARL
attended the usual morning conference held by Admiral Nimitz.
The events of the previous day were reviewed.
Comsopac 012359 is an operations summary. Comgen 1st
MarDiv 010515 reports the crossing of the HATANIKAU RIVER by
the 5th Marines. A large force of enemy cruisers and destroyers
was sighted by our search planes during the afternoon about
100 miles NE of ISABEL ISLAliD. Comsopac estimated that the
force intended to make a sweep through INDISP~NP.ABLE STRAIT to
attack our surface forces. TF 65 was ordered to attack but was
unable to intercept the enemy during the ni~ht', and so rejoined
the transport group. The transport group had been ordered to
retire toward ESPIRITU SANTO. In the absence of enemy contacts,
the landings ulanned for the Jrd will take place on the 4th (local).
During the night the FUI.,LER and COJ~l"}JGHAM were in collision. The destroyer has a flooded fireroom and speed reduced
to 10 knots. She was directed to seek shelter inshore at r~.IALAI'rA.
The F1~LER damage was slight.
Commardiv 1 010501 gives the proeress of landing strips
at GTJADALCANAL.
Cincpac notified Comsopac of the probable use of M011Av~
BAY in the S1NALLOW ISlANDS by the enemy during the tlast enemy
1'\0
advance. This information was noted in RI and may
have been
seen by Comsopac.
~
'Blet!.d"-(Y

The sm~rnER will complete the survey and have new charts
ready November 5th.
"
Cincpac 012115 gives views on the press announcements
regarding the HORNET.
The sighting of enemy forces to the eastward of the
SOLO].!ONS is not good evidence of the resumption of the all out .
offensive toward the SOI.OMONS. As the enemy knew of our moves
off GUADALCANAL the day before it seems likely that the force
sighted was ordered to make a sweep to the south in order to
destroy inferior forces. No CVs or BBs were observed within
-~
1
our search area yesterday.
~

1112

 ~ -

c:xa

,.;,~ ~ .Ull~Ott#&~t.~cra
lO-c-~t:t\lU o;,~ ~l'!Qtl,JO sn'!tfac~l 8::,\d,
ol~;"' t;{). .~() of t.Uljt
; 11QlU't ~~l!..C iJ:j,
:,~ -~~l~CH.1 w1,h~l i;i4Utfj._Oit"l
l1J..t:l 4...-*Gtit.:t"t~ t() dJ~~.;.ct;4

t-o"'i

not o;pofli14+'e

!:~~u:o.::rt;.?J:itlon !t1~-.1c.nto {.ktt~

o.r

lt'Ult

111 3

,.

10/~1

l~~

,, ,

~ ~ ~ :i~ ~

.,~o~lOC Qt.U;f

1114

. O'
I

111 5

0/2 J

&.~C~

l~ltl)~!.bl'f dP~~0'f.i.,

9/12,_

, .

C'~ltlPu~:::t,..r C :U1 &.>L;1~~or~'l 'lC/lJ~

St:vr~ l t:.i:lJ:tnd lOlJJZ;

:Ja:vo l:s:!.~'\il\.;1

:r.//la,.

1116

~infl tt.t tk+.l'1QA

<:~~l~at<:) i!!U:)}~i.\

.I!'~t~~>; CLt $ :rLIOifi.\;;;J _ !t l:?'~:)

Kmo ,. lt,,lOKUlf;t;A ..

1117

1118

10

~o

o.

~"
-~4~

, ('\ 1'1

... \..:1j

1119


-. ...
..J...

""'

. J.

,,.

fJ ...... .

.
1120

1121

l~
'\"' .....-Jt

~-vv

il;

~l~Jl);,t,."'t

a arld

StJbi.J:tv 4

-dnl~d.

1122

0/

1123
V 1~2

1124
/

112 5

11.26

1127

t:alda

u. t4
20-. D~
tool',t"~t tlt ilru~a 10/f.!J}:..
Can~l1Je
~1~z~:u:H:t souJ:;'b~ .rv~,~~

C ~clt~..

'l~tl~ (~' ,t~~~t{$'

\1' 1 i''-.;3
6 Vf fl"lr.W;.t#

~ohll~~ t~-~ !~-- 1~

ta~

,!}lttl)l) S

10/10.
ltlf ~~()

Oll . lJ'J/lt

t"~'~-'f1'~
~< ..~~ .. _ -~

)''}l1$'- ~:~ fltll'l't..'1t,a.

"'-~
__,}),-..'-'~-

tJ:ttf!~~Ju;(~,:t"t~tt(i

1~-h.,. P?~t .

to

~-M~-~

"

:::r.1:. ~'7.-t t~'tll\1 <"':!""'~'2-"f"i nb

"""'"~ 91.J"':'~
....._ill
,
.. , .....,"-''j.
..21 10/lC o ~.. t:bct~ ttt~1iz ~; :~'\:)tlt (b*
:::t;;p::.tJ"~nt~:,t C. ;r~::rt!p tf:S.;;'. t~tt:J~l:f'f . ..
*-~

,,..,.~..,.......,.,,...,,,...,

il>~,,~

.fe:t~od. t:;;"J

,~- !-"'"
<.;.? <t;t,,H.

,r~~

~5tll ~~

.i lot
1

'":ot(f ""''t'i'<'l"'

4. r_,....t,-,~:f~-' -;\"';..:~~

112 8

o3~"\<lll~-.

::vJ.i: lOtts

t:j;
~~o.btably ~1~!

i'!"~~~iri'~n.tior~u

4'~1r.i

e~ctio/il~~

in

~~~~)i~e

u:>
to

~-

!~.
~"'*~-~!-~."
vV
t~-~ .~u.l.~.r
_--if.-
11

11~~:1 Qit;~.:~e.

9/J!il

~t~'~'l-'~*o~l~~.m1
<'}''i,
..
' l ..,l.,i!'J!t~,"'~.,1i,ji~J.:;.
"""' llw '
~n ~~t~ l'(),J1~ -J rl'J l)b't
:o..

t;n.

(dr:.~

r:.prJ tJ;p.

(hl 10/~i::t ll
i~4)\l,P

-~. ~c1

~1

~A)

b6t

a t;l(lW

r~~:b-ml .

1129

~:,l~~:~ll::~

t\11"

a
il'l:; t:ttlit

~=tit Vl~ m~

t~""t:,t.n,.

111td~ebl7 t:tt

S..~l;~.

nnbaU.l ov 1n

1.13 0

1131

1132

113 3

1134

1
'"'.-:':"'1.tJ.H ~~I!!

,,....-~li!W!....,.~~-

~'t~

A ..
-~1!.$.~

'

.,1,

~'"

. t~!iiW"!f:

i-r.,/!,.'.a"""

qt'1\
~C..,w

l)' "!7'
$ """
P,.,
~, .,;:. ",,.,

-,"::.f"<
'1._ ....
..,,.,

"!

f'"':

""?

~ !"';:f1t''!

~!'~}.fa

. f't
,_''ft'%,,f.J."t~'~~~l!'}.t~
,,..
~ "", .;;&.,."'"ii.J""" l\'l

~:t<ue,d~l.o-a.'l~ll. ~ iwe tho s:if;~~,.\.<~~~~ f;;f thiS if.Ji

t1 ~.ta.ck~ on :>u.~ ltrtr'~ f.irk~ e.. 'l:.e~?l-P~~;: JOO:'\<~~

x..~.1:t 'o . :.~ ;;t;..,:r~

!r~l'lc;t~ t.o

~;r't:l!(1l~
!:?<,) ~U1:~
l!~!X#11

113 5

- - -
'

-"-d.~?

J ~

"~

,.,..,

~~'

""til?

(:0}

1'!~ ;L ~
ril!'.u:.. ;
~.
~">' :

i;.,;At..G,\ .

J, ";''f'Fl""'"lt'

fit.;;,~"'.)

( lo ::; ~.

c~~l.)

" 1: $ ""' -~

,. -

'J~:ut~.:;l~t.lct~~itl

~u1.:~ t ::~

~". ';>4 t"/tfP"1>

- "'"'. - - ""'

- ,-.

..

II<_....""'""""'"'

~:'~~,~~i"t"

,.

{
~

--

f.

~""'

z~~'*{;Y4'Ji

"""'

.~

- .,..

""""

#;jl

113 6

., .
r

......

('
troop

--- -

1137

"'

l,.

.t

- -.. ..,.- - -""' .. --- ..,...

....

,"'-f

i!liit

.::.-.

...

- -

--

....

"""'

-....

~J. tt ..1...w

:0

.. - ... ------..

-- - -- --- ~

...

..,..

10ov-

*ll!

.,)()
51.)
.... {)
~o

- - -- --

....

..,..

to

-.

<"\('\.

.. ,.i;,;.JI,.i

0
I

.J

1138

- - -

----

- - - .. -- ..-.... -. -- - .... .. -.. ... - .... ... ...

- -- - -)

.,....,

.... _

....

-"f

'~

.....

-- --- ----- --- --- - - -..,.

....
- - -
...
- -- -- -- .... - - ...-- - -- -- -... --,. ... - - --.... - --- -...
~

....

"""" ""*

"0

'

""""

" "'t
~.f f '4'#

......

"""'

""""

"""'

.....

.....

"

"""'

113 9

. .

- - -

- ..

...

--

.....

------- --- - ~

"""

.....

"""

"""'

--- --- ,..-- -""'

- -

.....

JOI!lO

.,..

--

.....

...

-- - ...- -- - -.. - - .. - .... ..

- - -- -- - - -- - -- .. -- -- -... ...
- ;joO

.....

"""

'"

'-

"""'

"""

.... "'

.....

.....

ii;

16olt

"""'

....

--

....

""""

1140

EsrriMATE OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES

1.

Brief of Events during October, 1942.

SOUTH PACIFIC.

(All dates Hawaiian Time)

On October 1 it was estimated that 3 enemy CVs

and 4-6 BBs plus cruisers and DDs were operating in the TRUK RABAUL area.

F1lliAFUTI was occupied by us on that day.

Admiral

Nimitz and certain members of his staff returned to PEARL from

an inspection of the South Pacific on the 4th.
planes raided the BUIN - FAISI area on the 5th.

TF 17 carrier
Damage to

enemy was only moderate because of extremely bad weather in

the target area, but we suffered no losses.

On the night of

10-llth TF 64.2 intercepted an enemy force off SAVO ISLAND.

Damage inflicted seems to be - 1 cruiser sunk, 3 cruisers badly damaged or sunk, 4 DDs probably sunk.

We lost the

DD~CAN;

the BOISE was badly damaged; and some other ships involved were
slightly damaged.

On October 12th one army regiment arrived to

reinforce GUADALCANAL garrison.

On the 13th large forces were

sighted east of the SOLOMONS approaching GUADALCANAL.

No strik-

ing force engagement resulted, but during the next day six APs
landing troops on the NW coast of GUADALCANAL were attacked by
our planes setting three on fire so badly that they had to be
beached.

On the 15th the enemy was estimated to have the fol-

lowing combatant ships in the general HABAUL - SOLOMONS area:

6 BB, 3 CV, 7 CA, 7 CL, about 30 DDs.

On the 16th the Mc FARLAND

at GUADALCANAL was severely damaged by a bomb hit.

The VIREO,

towing a PAB bar g e load of avg as to GUADALCANAL, and escorted

-1-

114 1

"'SECRE'l'

by the MEREDITH, was abandoned due to fear of an air attack.

The VIREO crew cut the tow adrift and embarked in the MEREDITH.
Sometime thereafter, the MEREDITH was lost in an ai. r attack.
The VIREO and barge were salvaged.

On the 17th the SAN JUAN

and PORTLAND raided a Jap patrol line south of the GILBERTS.

On the 18th Vice Admiral Halsey relieved Vice Admiral Ghormley
as Comsopac.

The CHESTER was torpedoed south of SAN CRISTOBAL

on the 19th.

Also on that day the O'BRIEN, enroute to PEARL

for repairs, broke in two and sank.

On the 21st three DDs

raided the enemy patrol line south of the GILBERTS.

and 17 joined up as TF 61 on the 22nd.

TFs 16

On the 23rd a major

move of the enemy toward the southern SOLOMONS was discovered.

The next day the forces were within our search.
at T1JLAGI was sunk by gunfire.

The SEMINOLE

On the 25th air con tact was

made between the approaching enemy and TF 61.

In the air duel

which followed damage inflicted is estimated as:

several cruisers and destroyers damaged.

2 CV, 1 BB,

(Later reports indi-

cate fair chance of 1 large CV being sunk.)

Our damage was:

HOHNET lost, PORTER lost; SOUTH DAKOTA and ENTERPRISE damaged;

several other vessels slightly damageQ.
to have lost twice as many planes as we:

The enemy is believed

130 to 65.

After

this battle both sides retired to fuel and reorganize.

On October 20th it was decided to send 12 submarines
from Submarines Pacific to the South Pacific.

These, plus .

12 from SW Pacific, were placed under CTF 42 who in turn was

placed under Comsopac for operational control.
During the month the enemy continued to land reinforce-

-2-

1142

"C8~CRE'f

ments on GUADALCANAL; make air raids on our positions there;

shell our airfield; and several times attempted to penetrate
our positions.

The 11arines did a splendid job of repulsing all

attacks and keeping the position and airfield intact.

W~rine

pilots and own submarines inflicted severe attrition losses on

the enemy in the SOLOMONS area.

SW Pacific planes were of as-

sistance in scouting and damaging enemy shipping.

Toward the

end of the month these activities plus our surface action had
g reatly reduced the surface activity in the vicinity of GUADALCANAL.

But in spite of this the enemy has established, and been

able to support in some degree, a strong force on the island.

Our difficulties in providing logistic supply to the GUADALCANAL
area continued throughout the month.

We have been able tempo-

rarily to control the sea off GUADALCANAL.

air there has been temporary.

Our control of the

E.nemy submarines were extremely

active along our supply line to the southern SOLOMONS.

As the month ended there was no indication that the
enemy had abandoned plans to recapture GUADALCANAL.
NEW GUINEA.
The Jap offensive over the STANLEY MOUNTAINS toward
PT. I/IOHESBY was stopped only when the advance had reached within
a few miles of the n orthernmost PT. :MORESBY airfield.
t~e

During

month this offensive has been beaten back slowly and at

the end of t h e month allied troops had recaptured KOKODA and

were advancing toward BUNA.

Some

A~erican

troops have been

trans p orted to the battle area by air.

After repulsing a Jap landing in the MILNE BAY area,
-3-

114 3

the allied forces on the eastern tip of NEVI GUINEA and adjacent
islands have been engaged in mopping up small enemy detachments.
Several small enemy landings have been made during the
month on northeastern NEW GUINEA but at no point have new important positions been established.
CENTRAL PACIFIC.
The area was generally quiet during the month.

Our

submarine successes on patrol in Japanese home waters continued.

During the month 12 fleet submarines were ordered to the South
Pacific to operate under Comsopac.

The Army was ordered to

transfer the 25th Division from the lawaiian area to the South
or SW Pacific.

The Army Hawaiian Air transferred 24 heavy bomb-

ers and 50 fighters to the South Pacific.

NORTH PACIFIC.
In the ALEUTIANS the major activity was bombing of KISKA
by Army planes from ADAK.

Vllhile some success was achieved, the

Japs were not forced to abandon KISKA, nor were our submarines
able to find many targets.
AGATTU.
bombard

The~i~,however,abandon

ATTU and

Some pressure was brought on Cincpac to use BBs to

KISY~.

Authority to reduce the cruisers in TF 8 to

two - the RALEIGH and DETROIT - was approved by Cominch.

garrison at

3~.

PAUL was es tablished.

At the end of the month the Japs hold

position~

The

believed to be almost untenable.

KISY~

but their

Our positions

seem reasonably secure with fairly sizeable ga rrisons.

2.

The Situation.
(a) Enemy.

Since the middle of August the Japs have

-4-

1144

been assembling troops and ships in the general

ru~~AUL

area.

During the last days of Octo)er they were turned back, temporarily at least, in what appeared to be another start of an all
out offensive in the South Pacific.
There is good reason to believe that the enemy will continue the attempt to recapture the Southern

SOI..D~,~ONS,

and if

successful, will try to extend his control alone the island chain
to NEW CALEDONIA.

Also, he may be expected to attempt to capture

the remainder of NEW GUIJ\TEA.

Our continued pressure in the SOLOMONS area by all
forces has caused the enemy losses and delays, but in spite of
that he may consider himself in a favorable position.

Our

pressure also has the effect of forcing him to a maximum effort

in the South Pacific and thus prevents him from undertaking any
sizeable operations elsewhere.
An estimate of enemy strength as of November 2nd is
ap-pended.
(b) Own.

TF 1 continues at PE.lillL for the purpose of

opposing attempted enemy landings in the Hawaiian area.

TF 11

is at PEARL, and wlll be ready to depart for the South Pacific

about the middle of the month when torpedo damage repairs to
the SlillATOGA and NORTH CAROLINA are completed.

TF 17 has been

broken up due to the loss of the HORNET and damage to the SOUTH
D.L\KOTA.

TF 16 is not fit for battle as a CV striking force

until the battle damage to the ENTERPRI SE is repaired.

INGTOIJ

'

The WASH-

undamaaed cruisers and destroyers,

and land based air
~
0

-5-

1145

SECRET
in the South Pacific are available to keep the lines of communications open to the GUADALCANAL area, and to intercept the enemy
approaching that area.

r;,re have 24 submarines available for opera-

tions in the South Pacific under Admiral Halsey .

Our air strength in the South Pacific is not adequate
We can, however, provide an

to meet completely all demands.

adequate search and can defend the GU.ADALCJLl\fAL air field.

le

are

unable to count on the Army pilots to find and severely damage

the enemy.

Improvement in the air situation is to be expected

as times goes on.

When adequate numbers of planes in the area

becomes a fact and when the GUADALCJUJAL airfield is ready in all

respects for all-weather operations, and when supporting fields
are constructed, the situation may permit the resumption of the
offensive.
Most of the Marines in the GUADALCPJJAL area are tired
and reouire relief as soon as possible so that they can rest,
reorganize, and !eequip.

The present strength (November 1st) at

GUADALCMJAL will not permit an offenRive to wipe out the enemy

on the island, but this may be possible after the arrival of replacements and reinforcements of about 14000 troops by about the
lOth, - making a total of around 35000 on the island.

There are

several movements of troops toward the South Pacific in the offing,

but as troops arriving are needed for offensive, adequate relief
for tired troops does not seem probable during November.
The logistic problem in the South Pacific continues to
\

be cause for serious concern.

Movements of fuel, food, and

equipment to the GU1DALCANAL area are extremely difficult and

are undertaken with considerable risk.

-6-

IIandling facilities at

1146

"ffiB 0 RB g;' ..,.

all South Pacific ports and beaches are far short of requirements.

Small fast

frei~hters

to run supplies to CACTUS from

BUTTON do not exist; therefore large and valuable combat loaded

freighters have to be employed.
Vvhile our situation in the Southern SOLOHONS is far from
satisfactory, it is far from hopeless.

It is critical, but the

determination, efficiency, and morale of our people there is so

fine that even the most pessimistic critics must concede that
we will win out in the end.
The OAHU - Ivi iDWAY - FIJI line is still vulnerable to
raids, but no probability of serious landing attempts is seen.
The ALEUTIAN situation should give but little concern
during November.

3.

Broad Courses of Action.

OverwheLming evidence continues to point to but one

broad course of action at this time, i. e. to cut us off from

AUSTRALIA and then capture or neutralize that continent.

How-

ever, in spite of this belief, it is necessary to list and briefly to discuss other feasible courses.
If the enemy continues present large concentrations in
the TTIUI{ -

RAB~'\.UL

- SOLOLONS area he wi 11 be unable to strike

in force elsewhere.

But the enemy has the capacity to make minor

raids elsewhere in the Pacific and still retain superiority in

the active area.
Assuming that major forces are moved to another theatre
during November, the following courses of a0tion are within

-7-

114 7

enemy capabilities:
(a) An attempt to capture

~.TIDV!AY.

Always a suitable target, but in view of the bitter

experience in June, the enemy will be unlikely to make such
an attempt unless under more favorable circumstances, i.e.
assured absence of, or after defeat of, our striking forces,
plus security in the South.

It seems most improbable that

the enemy can assemble necessary forces and arrive off HID\lAY during November.

Nevertheless, major enemy forces are

unreported since October 26th.

It is thus physically pos-

sible for the following to be at MIDrJ\lAY on about November

seventh - at least 6 BB and 3 CV, with supporting cruisers
and destroyers ) - escorting and covering a major landing
force.
(b)

P~

attack on Western AUSTRALIA.

The enemy can shift his strength to the westward and

to jump off from the NEI toward N;V AUSTRALIA.

This might

happen if the enemy found losses toogreat in the

to be acceptable.

SO~OMONS

Such a course seems most improbable.

(c) Raids on our positions from MID'NAY to N01ThillA.

The advantages which might accrue include:

damage

to our positions and installations of such magnitude as to

disrupt temporarily our lines of supply to the South Pacific;
and, to force a diversion which would relieve our pressure
on the

SOLO~:~CNS

and thus delay seriously our offensive.

Haids on points near the active area are q_uite pos-

-8-

11.48

sible, but as the distance from RABAUL increases the probability of raids decreases.
(d) An extension in the

AL~UTIJiliS.

Considered most improbable because (1) coming bad

weather; (2) merely holding KISKA may require ali available
resources; (3) the enemy is aware of our ADAK position.
(e) An offensive toward

I~IA.

No doubt this is an ultimate aim of the Japanese.

It cannot take place (with naval support) until the Pacific'
f.lank is secure.

Therefore, we can dismiss this course

for the month of November .

(f) An attack on RUSSIA.
The stiffened Russian defense, especially at STALINGRAD, must have caused repercussions in JAPAN.

V!e do not

think that J.A.Pii.N will attack HUSSIA until a German victory

over RUSSIA in EUROPE is a sure thing.

And even then there

is no assurance of such an attack.

4.

Most Probable Enemy Intention.

For the month of November we conclude that the most prob-

able move continues to be the recapture of the Southern

and the extension of control in

NE~J

SOLm~NS ,

GUINEA.

It is now definite that the enemy suffered heavy attrition losses during October, and considerable damage to striking forces on October 25th.

Thus, they could not continue what

seems to have been the start of a grand scale attack on GUADALC..A.J'JAL.

On the lst of November the striking forces are to the

-9-

1149

northward of our search.

Some major enemy units will have to

retire for repair and will be out of action during the month.
Enemy plane loss.es in October were excessive.
While the enemy may still retain the balance of sea
power in the SOLO:rv:oNS area, the margin seems too small to risk
a grand offensive.

It is considered more probable that the

enemy will - for november - be content to:

(a) Strengthen positions and continue fighting on shore
at

GU.ADALC.Al~AL

and NE,d GUINEA.

(b) 11ake air attacks on our positions and shipping in

the

SOLO~.IONS,

NE1.'l GUINEA, and that part of AUSTRALIA in

reach.
(c) Attack our communications to the SOIDrFONS with
submarines and surface vessels.
(d) Shell our shore positions in the

SOLO~.~ONS.

(e) Possibly raid,. our position at ESPI:::tiTU S.l\JJTO.

These operations will be along the lines discussed in
last month's estimate, -remembering that the capacity of the
enemy to conduct such operations has been reduced by October
losses.

The remark ' applies to the operations listed in para-

graph 7 of the October Estimate.

-10-

1150

,SEC BET

November 2nd.
Lieut. General Holcom b , USMC , was present at the usual
morning conference.
Sopac operetions are in his 030130~ Unloading of our .AKs
in the TULAGI-GUADALCA}TAL area proceeded during the day without
serious inter~uptions. As noted yesterday, the landing of the
8th Marines and the ACORN group is now planned for the 4th (local).
During the night the enemy succeeded in landing a ,.;E:a:i::r numeeP ..ef So ~e.
troops in the vicinity of KOLI, GUADALCANAL.
The PLUNGER reported two hits on an enemy CL in I NDISPENSIBLE STRAIT.
The S1ThT:NER has been ordered to survey l!,UNAJjuTI.
place four PTs arrived for duty there.

At that

The Central and North Pacific Areas were ouiet.

There is no new information regarding enemy denloyments
or intentions.
Cominch 021618 pink is an explanation of the release of
the news of the HORNET sinking.

November 3rd.
Lieut. General Holcomb, UST/IC, Lieut. General Emmons, USA,
Major General Lute~, USA, and TF commanders were present at the
usual morning conference held by Admiral Nimitz. Captain McFall
told of the HORNET enga gement on October 25th.
The operations in the Sopac are reported in Consopac
040146. The transport group arrived at GUADALC ANAL v1i thout meet(CTF 65 040725 and CTF 62
ing opposition and commenced unloading.
040235). The Harines were moving troops to deal vvi th the enemy
landing made near KOLI yesterday and are holding the line to the
west of our position.
CTF 61 040235 pink gives information on the enemy line-up
for the battle of Octo ber 25th.
The
We have had
and sending
what we are

e enera l s ituation at GUADALCAtTAL is not unfavorable.

no real interruption in providing logistic sup ~ ort
in reinforcements. App arently the enemy knows exactly
a bout it. Planes
doing but is una ble to do much
(Continued on ne xt page)

11 .51

November 3rd. {Continued)

reported approaching in the past two days a r e not reported as
having arrived. It is h oped that our escorts arriving with the
transoorts and freighters will shell the enemy positions as
often as possi ble. The situation will not always permit this,
out whenever done it helps our Marines.
ARD-2 arrived at NOUNIEA.
Both the CHESTER and SM J JUAN are being sent to SYDNEY
for repairs.
It now aopears that the COOLIDGE cannot be salvaged, but
a properly equipped expedition can salvage much of the cargo.
General Marshall has ordered General Emmons to move
. immediately to A1JSTRALIA for permanent assignment 15 replacement
B-24s with 17 combat crews.
Cincpac 030015 pink deals with increase of effectiveness
of defense at CANTON.
The 'NHALE has completed the first Pac Fleet offensive
mining mission by making a plant of contact mines in the eastern
part of KII 0 UIDO. That sub also reports five torpedo hits in
four freighters.
It seems probable that
of LAYSAN IPLAND.

\~

345 foundered in the vicinity

There are some indications that the enemy will attempt to

resume his all out attack on GUADALCANAL in the near future. We
G/
believe that he has superior sea power in the area, but may not l. /
know it.
~

1152

November 4th.
At his norning conference, which was attended by General
Holcomb and TF commanders at P~&tL, Admiral Nimitz read extracts
from a letter written by Admiral Halsey on October 31st. The
foliowing were high points: (a) The day before the battle of
October 25th, the ENTEHPRISE had operational losses which amounted
to 12 planes; (b) fighter control during the battle was not too
good; (c) heavy damage is believed inflicted on the enemy during
the battle - maybe a CV was sunk; (d) the PORTER was lost due to
a battle freak - hit by a -:J roaching circling enemy torpedo; (e)
an enemy plane la nded on the forecastle of the SI\1ITII causing an
enormous fire ~ut the ship kept right on fighting; (f) while enroute NOUMEA the MAHAN collided with the SOUTH DAKOTA; (g) the
SOUTH DAKOTA is not seriously damaged but may have to return to
_PEARL because of collision damage; (h) Admiral Halsey will not keep
CVs and BBs at sea continuously in submarine infested waters; (i)
logistics in the South Pacific is a headache.
The day in the South Pacific was generally quiet. We
were engaged in reinforcing our SOLOI10N positions and the enemy
was thou~ht to be reorganizing for another southward push. Cornsopac 05052lr is a summary to the evening of the 4th (local). During
the nieht two eneny ships were reported in the vicinity of CAPE
ESPERANCE.
Comsopac has requested the 1TEV\T ZEAlAND authorities to
provide NEW ZEALAND troops for the renlacement of one U. 2. infantry battalion and regimental headquarters at TONGATABU. This
is in addition to NETd ZEALAJ\ID troops previously requested. Transportation could be available at 1dEJ__,IJINGTOIJ on November 18th.
It seems indicated that the loss of the COOLIDGE was due
to negligence and disobedience of orders on the part of the Master
of that vessel. Comsopac is investi gating.
IIEAD.

There was a possiole sub contact 10 miles south of KOKO

The S- 31 reports sinking 1 large C~i: off PiutilJWS:t1IRO again demonstrating that S-boats skillfully handled can inflict
important damage on the enemy.
A nightly dispersal from the anchorage in the BUIN-FAISI
area is reported. A photograph shows a CV at RABAUL on the afternoon of the 5th (local). There are no further indications of
major enemy Moves.
The followina is a summary of dama ~ e inflicted by carriers of TF 61 on October 25th, as reported by vTF 61:
SHOKAKU Class CV
2nd Do

- 2 - 500# bomb hits

4 to 6 1000# bomb h its

(Continued on next page)

11.5 3

November 4th.

(Continued)

YONGO Class BB
Unidentified CL
ATAGO Glass CA
TOIJE Class CA
2nd
Do
NACHI Class CA

1000# bomb hits

1 - 500# bomb hit

1 - possible torpedo hit

soot bomb hit

5 - 500# bomb hits
4 - 1000# bomb hits
3 - torpedo hits
1 - possible

Planes destroyed:
Certain 67; probable 23, total 90.
There is still doubt as to the source of the press release concerning the HORNET.
V

tWL

11.54

November 5th.
Comsopac 052358 is a sumnary of operations in that area
to the 5th local. As there is increasing delay in receiving
action and battle reports from Admiral Halsey he was requested
to pass these along promptly in addition to his daily summary.
Communication facilities availa !) le to Admiral Halsey are not
good but constant effort for improvement is being made.
The day was quiet, so far as is known. A flight of
enemy planes reported heading for GUADALCANAL is unreported. A
enemy group of 1 cruiser and 16 DDs was sighted heading toward
the SHORTLAND area during the day by search planes. One XCV,
4 DD, several smaller combatant craft, and 31 maru type were
reported at RARAUL.
(No.vy_)
There is urgent need for 3000 menAof balanced ratings
in the South Pacific Area.
rr\tvo enemy ships, thought DDs, were renorted about 10
miles north of our ~osition at GUADALCANAL.
Unloading of all APs in the GUADALCANAL area was completed by early morning of the 6th (local). Further movements
of troops and supplies to the area are underway.
The CONYNGFIPlv~ is being patched by the lJAVAtTO at MALAITA
and should leave for E0 PITI.ITU SANTO in the next day or so.
Cominch (051524 pink) is disturbed about the multinlication of special commands in the Sopac are.a and desires Admiral
Nimitz t:e discuss the matter with him at the next meeting.
At the request of Comsopac the S1J1./l.NEH will report to
him for survey duty - probably at ESPIRITU SJu~TO.
ready

fo~

Gomsopac assumes that the 3rd Raider 3attalion will be

duty assigned on December 1st.

The Central Pacific and North Pacific areas were quiet.

In the ALEUTIANS CTJT 8 reports that weather conditions have
become so severe that fueling at sea is now rarely possiole.
There are no new enemy

develo:;>me~

~
1155

November 6th.
General Emmons and the usual Task Force Commanders v1ere
present at the morning conference held by Admiral Nimitz. The
general situation in the Pacific Ocean Areas was reviewed.
During the late afternoon planes from GUADALCANAL attacked an enemy force of 1 CL and 10 DDs discovered approaching GUADALCANAL about 60 miles northeast of ISABEL ISLAND and obtained 2
torpedo hits and one 1000# bomb hit on the CL, 1 torpedo hit on
a DD, and shot down 12 enemy planes. Our losses were four F4F4s
and three pilots.
It is indicated that enemy ships had on board
a relief force to be landed near TASSAFARONGA POINT.
The ~~JABA was torpedoed while discharging cargo in the
vicinity of LUNGA POINT, and was beached. All ammunition had been
landed. Eye witnesses believe a midget or very small enemy sub
was responsible.
Comsopac 070150 gives operations to the morning of the
6th (local).
Comsopac 061345 is comment on Cominch message regarding
the multiplication of base commands in his area.
During the day Comsopac reorganized two major task forces.
TF 16 under Rear AdMiral Kinkaid is the new CV force and TF 65
under Rear Admiral Callaghan is the new cruiser force.
Vice Opnav 062139 gives the loading of Seebees, etc.,
in the MT. VERNON and JUPITER for NOUMEA to arrive early in
December, and the plans for sailing the COALMINE movement and
ACORNS 3 and 4 for Sopac.
The 147th infantry less two battalions is scheduled to
arrive at AOLA BAY from TONGATABU during the last half of November. Yfuen this outfit arrives there will be over 2000 Army troops
at AOLA BAY.

NIA.

A submarine was reported off the North Coast of CALIFOR-

Present indications are that the planting of minefields

at ADAK will be completed tomorrow. Photographs indicate minor
enemy activity at ATTU.
The enemy continues to reinforce and supply troops at
GUADALCANAL.
It may well be that when the number of troops landed
is considered sufficient, the enemy will make a coordinated attack on our positions, employing surface ships, air, and ground
troops to the limit of their resources in the seneral area.

SECRET -Novernl?er 7th.

At 1730 local a force of 4 CL's and 5 DD 1 s was sighted
about 125 miles north of GUADALCANAL and apparently headed for
that place. Last night and a gain the night before PT boats off
GUADALCANAL report hitting enemy DD 1 s. Comsopac 080101 s~arizes
operations in his area to the afternoon of the 7th local. A 2man sub is claimed sunk by a plane off CAPE ESPEHANCE. This may
be the sub that hit the 1\TAJABA off LUNGA. Rear Admiral Turner
will command TF 67 and expects to land reinforcements at GUADALCANAL on the 12th local. This move involves one Army regiment,
one Marine aviation engineer battalion, and 2000 Marine replacements--a total of about 6000 men. Two companies of Marine 2nd
Raider Battalion were landed at AOLA BAY during the day. Good
progress is being made on the airfields at GUADALCANAL, and the
tank farm for avgas there should be unloaded in the near future.
Comamphibforsopac 072358 deals with enemy troops at
GUADALCANAL as learned from captured documents.
his area.

Comsopac 290251 gives plans for air base commands in

There is some evidence of mlnlng off LUNGA and the

HOVEY has been ordered to sweep the area on the lOth (local).
She will also deliver a deck load of avgas to add to the meagre
supply~

In the Central Pacific the only activity above routine

is the search for a PBY5A down off JOHNSTON and a B-24 down enroute OAHU to CANTON.
Seven float VF were sighted at HOLTZ BAY, ATTU,
yesterday. This is not taken as a resumption of enemy activity there. Enemy subs continue small activity in the central
Aleutians. There are indications of some personnel trouble
with merchant vessels in ALASKA which is being investigated.
The GRAYLING reports getting two torpedo hits in a
CHIYODA class AV off TRUK.
There is nothing new concerning enemy deployments or
intentions.
It continues almost certain that main enemy interest
is in the Southern SOLOMONS.
~(../
.A

1157

November 8th
At the usual morning conference held by Admiral Nimitz,
and attended today by General Ennons and TF Commanders, Rear
Admiral r~:urray, who was recently CTF 17, told of his activities
in October - especlally on the 5th and 25th. The poor performance
of our DD torpedoes was commented on and is a rnatter of serious
concern. Admiral Nimitz congratulated Admiral Murray for the
fine work done by TF 17.
The day in the South Pacific was quiet. Cor1sopac 0901.26
is the operations summary. Admiral 3cott comments on the present
employment of the ATLA.NTA in his 080020. Also, he points to a
disadvantage in the employment of PTs north of GUf.JJALCJ\.NAL. The
EDGAR ALLEN J?OE is reported to have been torpedoed south of
NOTT.l\IEA. Comso~:'b90347 gives further details on the condition of
the E.NTERPHISE. Vice Admiral Halsey has closed his administrat ive office at AUCKL.l\JID and is consolidating his staff at NOilliJEA.
The RALEIGH made a sweep along the reported position
of an enemy patrol line south of the GIL3ERTS with negative results.

There is strong indication of a grand scale I offenslve

aimed at GTJPJ)ALCA1TAL to be undertaken by the enemy in the very
near future.

The followin~ is an estimate of the maxlmum enemy surface combatant force that can be employed in the SOLOLOIT area for
the offensive in the next week:
4 BB , 2 CV , 5 CA, 6 CL , 21 DD.

It must be noted that some of these units may have some damage .
is:

Our surface force available to opnose that offensive

2 BB (one damaged) , 1 CV (damaged), 4 CA , 4 CL ,
33 DD (some required for escort).

Cominch 081505 pink and Cincpac 082145 pink deals with

the employment of the I LLUSTTIIou.c:; in the Pacific Fleet.
Cincpac 092107 pink gives an estimate of enemy intentions in the so::-_;oEoNs .
~MV

November 9th.
At the usual morning conference Rear Ad~iral Mason told
of the attack on the HORNET which resulted in her loss.
Comsonac 100316 is the operations summary for that area.
~~d.. . tv\a:r \ V\ ~ -1 Y"~o ~~

nt whl:C~ been mav1 ng e~ stward the past ~e-1

Armyeg1.me
da:-ys ha te succeeded in surrounding a Jap force of undetermined
(Comgen 1st Marines 092359).
size in the vicinity of TETERE.
A group of 5 DD's was sighted and attacked by the evening air
search just off the northeast coast of NRN GEORGIA and these
ships arrived in the vicinity of CAPE ESPERANCE at 2230 (local).
The ATLANTA group will arrive at GUADALCANAL tomorrow, and Rear
Admiral Turner's group of reinforcements are scheduled to arrive
the day after. His support group is preceding the AP's and is
due to arrive one hour before midnight. The SOUTHARD reports the
probable sinking of a Jap sub between SAN CRISTOBAL and GUADALCANAL. The FLETCHER reports a possible sub contact to the east
of SAN CRISTOBAL.
~

General MacArthur will comply with the request of Comsopac for maximum air effort against shipping in the BUIN-FAISITONOLEI area during the period 11-14 November (local) inclusive.
Today at least 61 ships were reported by a coast watcher in that
area including six cruisers and 33 DD's. Another coast watcher
report from that area states four probable BE's there.
Comsopac has requested that eight P-38's be flown from
AUSTRALIA to GUADALCANAL at once.

, "

During the day subs were reported sighted off SAN PEDRO
and near DUTCH HARBOH. CTF 8 reports the ADAK mining project
completed in his 092045
It is generally believed that Zed day for the landing
of enemy Army troops on GUADALCANAL is November 13th local. This
is expected to be a major effort to recapture GUADALCANAL. TF 61
has been put on one hours sailing notice at NOUMEA, but if the
attack starts as believed , it will have to get underway at once ~~
to intercept.
v

1158

~ORE 'Po

November lOth.
Sopac operations through the lOth local are in Comsopac
110251. Comsopac 102102 ordered TF 16 to sortie at 10 a.m. today
from N01JMEA and proceed toward GUADALCANAL. Two air attacks were
made by the enemy this morning. The enemy lost a total of 5 zenos
and 8 bombers out of 17 zeros and 35 bombers attacking. We lost
7 F4F4 and five pilots. The ZEILIN was damaged by three near misses in the first attack but was able to start for ESPIRITU S~~To.
No other damage was reported. Comgen 1st Mardiv 102156 reports
ground activities and the air strike on 5 DDs 210 miles north of
GUADALCANAL on the evening of the lOth (local). Just before midnight Rear Admiral Callaghan's force arrived off the Marine position and conti~ued to the westward of GUADALCANAL without making
enemy contacts. The APs under Rear Admiral Turner are due at
GUADALCANAL at dawn tomorrow. TF 67 approaching GUADALCANAL has ,__
been sighted and reported by enemy search planes.
Comsopac has ordered three of his subs to the vicinity
of a point 75 miles northeast of ISABEL ISLAND.
TF 66 has been for.med as an escort force. CTF 66 will be
the administrative type commander for destroyers, South Pacific.
Comsopac 110954 believes that two weeks training for a
British CV will suffice if we use our own aircraft, bombs, key
personnel,. etc.
The 9th Defense Battalion which arrived at NOUMEA today
has been assigned to TF 62 for duty at GUADALCANAL.
Enemy submarines continue active in the SOLOMONS area.
One was reported 15 miles east of LUNGA POINT.
Cominch has approved the reorganization of the Sopac Marines as outlined in Comsopac 312126.
The SEAWOLF reported sighting a large CV and 2 DD departing from PALAU for the South during the late afternoon.

CTF 8 r~ports an air attack on enemy planes at ATTU and

a minor air attack at KISKA. There are indications of renewed
enemy activity in that area. This may be in the nature of a diversion. ATTU is mentioned and minor activity reported by sub reconnaissance on MACHITKA.
Tf our reading of the mail is correct, today is Z minus
2 day and the striking forces will attack GUADALCANAL tomorrow.
There are no indications of raids or other major enemy activities
in the Pacific except as noted above in the ALEUTIANS.
As a result of our landing in North Africa on the 7th,
Vichy France broke diplomatic relations with us at 1930 on November
8th.

1160

November 11th
General Emmons and TF commanders at PEARL attended the
usual morning conference held by Admiral Nimitz.
Comsopac 120059 is the operations summary for that area.
The good news of the day is that 20 to 25 enemy torpedo bombers
escorted by 8 zeros were shot down by our planes and AA.when
they attacked our shipping off GUADALCANAL. Rear Admiral Turner's
force arrived as scheduled and was attacked in the early afternoon.
Other flights were reported coming in but it is not reported whether or not they arrived. Rear Admiral Callaghan's force made two
sweeps to the westward then took a covering position to the westward of SAVO. The APs and AKs were expected to retire from the
area during the night of the 12th (local).
Our search planes reported the following enemy forces
during the day: 2 BB or CA, 1 cruiser, 6 DD, 270 miles northeast
of ISABEL ISLAND; 5 DD 110 miles north of ISABEL; 2 CV, 2 DD west
of GUADALCANAL. There were several enemy search plane contacts in
the SOLOMONS area. An enemy sub was reported north of LUNGA POINT.
Fragmentary reports have begun to arrive indicating a
battle near SAVO during the night. The PORTLAND steering engine
was disabled and a tow requested, and the ATLANTA said she needed
assistance. Other known details are in Cincpac 122037 pink.
Cincpac 120031 pink is further information on the employment of the -ILLUSTRIOUS.
FANTAN 090334 is a report of airfield construction at SUVA.
Com~N.Pac reports that a small Allied corvette engaged
two enemy raiders at 19-50 s, 92-40 E. One raider was reported hit
and afire and the corvette was damaged.

The landing field at FUNAFUTI was put in commission by

ComGen STRAW on November 8. It is now 250' x 3500', and will be
extended to 300' x 6000'.

The 147th Infantry is now loaded in the PRESIDENT

at BLEACHER.

HAYES

The first section of TF 11 will depart PEARL for the

south tomorrow and the second section will leave when the NORTH
CAROLINA is ready - about the 17th.
CTF 8 reports a medium tanker and one DD at HOLTZ BAY.
There are several indications of renewed enemy activity in the
ALEUTIANS but because of great enemy activity in the SOLOMONS it
is believ~d that no major effort is probable in the north.
Cincpac 120635 indicates the need for APs and AKs for
training purposes on the West Coast.

116 1

- SEGRE'J?

November 12th
General Emnons and Task Force Commanders at PEARL were
present at the usual morning conference held by Admiral Nimitz.
All present were brought up to date regarding current operations.
The day in the South Pacific was one of great activity.
As noted yesterday, a battle was working up in the vicinity of
SAVO ISLAND. CTF 67 had completed a good percentage of unloading and departed durin~ the evening. llis three part 130115 reports
the shelling of enemy positions by cruisers and destroyers at
GUADALCA1TAL during the unloading, and of air attacks, and of
percentage of unloading. Rear Admiral Callaghan's cruiser and de strayer group v1ere to intercept the enemy approaching GUADALRear Admiral Scott in the ATLANTA with 4 DD of Desron 12
CA1:AL.
Admiral Callaghan.
Rear
joined
At 9 310, local, off LUNGA POINT, the PORTLAND requested
air coverage and tow, having been hit by a torpedo. At 0705, local,
the HEWNA originated a message, as senior ship, saying that the
HELENA, SAl'! FRANCISCO, JUNEAU, O'BANNON, FLETCHER and Slt"tfft"'rTwere
proceeding toward ESTIRITU SANTO at 15 knots. All these ships are
By 10. a.m. local, Comsopac had accounted for all
reported damaged.
his ships except the ATLANTA and 5 DDs. Shortly thereafter Comsopac
gave details of the damage to the PORTLAND and ATLANTA in his 122322.
By 1100 the AARON WARD reported being towed to TULAGI for examination
By the afternoon the ATLANTA was
of damage to engines and boilers.
Comsopac ga ve those on the spot
sinking and had to be abandoned ,
authority to use discretion in destro-ying tfle ALTANTA. The PORTAt 1755, local,
LAND was being towed to Tt'LAGI at this tir:1e.
there were about 1400 survivors of Rear Admiral Callaghan's force
ashore at GUADALCANAL. During the evening RDO TULAGI asked
whether or not to torpedo the MONSSEN. The extent p f damage to
two other DDs is not completely reported. Preliminary information
of damaee inflicted on the enemy includes the disabling of one
One enemyfship
KONGO Class BB and one CL by tor"'Jedoes and bombs.
was reported blown up.
As the results of the morning a-; r searcres came in, the
following enemy forces were reported:
KONGO Class BE vicinity of SAVO.
1 BB, 3 DD - 40 miles north of GUADALCANAL.
1 CV, 1 BB, 3 DD - 230 niles northest of GUADALACANAL,
with 3 cruisers and at least 4 DDs about 50
miles to the eastward of this CV group.
10 AP, 12 cruisers and destroyers heading toward and
.
about 50 miles from BUIN.
1 BB, 3 DD - 45 miles north of LUNGA with 1 BB, 1 crulse:r
4 :0D near that position about 1~ hours later~.

(Continued on next page)

l.

1152

November 12th (Cont~

2 CA, 1 DD - 330 miles northeast of MALAITA.
In the afternoon there was reported:
1 BB, 1 DD - 150 miles north of and heading toward
GUADALCANAL.
1 CV east of MALAITA.
A large ship 60 miles north of GUADALACANAL.
TF 16 had been ordered to support GUADALCANAL and the
withdrawal of our damaged units, operating to the south of SOLOMONS.
As a result of these sightings TF 64 was formed with 2 BBs and 4
DDs to prevent the bombardment of our GUADALCANAL position during
the coming night. The remainder of TF 16 was directed to continue
operations to the southwest of GUADALCANAL , striking suitable
targets. TF 64 cannot reach an intercepting position before 0800
local tomorrow but the ENTERPRISE group will be in a position to
strike in the GUADALACANAL area at daylight tomorrow. The
ENTERPRISE flew in some planes to GUADALACANAL, probably because
her damage (70/S effective estimated) will not permit her to
operate all of her planes effectively.
Comairsopac stated he would attack enemy cruisers if
they approached VANIKORO with SBDs and TBFs from ESPITIRU SANTO.
During the day two strikes of B-17s were launched.
The first strike of 8 B-17s failed to get hits on the BB northwest
of GUADALCANAL, and the other strike is not reported.
CANAL.

At least five enemy plane strikes w~re made on GUADALNone were reported reaching that place.

During the day it became doubtful if there were any

enemy CVs in the SOLOMONS area.
Air forces from the SW Pacific attacked shipping in the
BUIN area with good results, and Admiral Halsey requested further
attacks on the APs. He also requested that 18 B-24s be alerte.d
in the SW Pacific for a flight to ES:IPIRITU SANTO, or EFATE, or
NE\.IIJ CALEDONIA, as designated later.
During the evening GUADALCANAL directed the sinking of
the ATLANTA tomorrow at daylight.
Shortly after midnight GUADALCANAL reported being heavily
shelled by naval gunfire . The last she!lling there caused serious
damage and so this report causes much concern.
The enemy has postponed Z day until the 14th (Local).
Thus tomorrow may be another very exci tine; day. Yle continue to

(Continued on next page)

1163

November 12th.

(Continued)

be optimistic. Our . forces will be in good position to come to

grips with the enemy, and if gunfire did not put HENDERSON field
out of commission, our M:arine pilots should make the landing
extremely costly.
The FINBACK reports sinking 27,000 tons enemy shipping
to the east of FORMOSA.
The pilot of the Rickenbacker plane which landed at sea
three weeks ago was rescued today off FUNAFUTI. As other personnel
are thought in rubber boats near the position where the pilot was
rescued, there seems some chance of saving them.
~

November 13th.
Continuing with the narrative of yesterday Comsopac
130428 describes some results SAVO action. rhe ATLANTA was
suru{ by our forces after damage received from the enemy had
completely wrecked her. It is found from enemy survivors that
our forces may have engaged two enemy groups, - 1st 2 BB, 1 CL,
6 DDs; 2nd 2 BBs, 2 CAs. The PORTLAND and AARON WARD arrived
at T:.ULAGI for temporary repairs to permit them to withdraw. The
MONSSEN probably was torpedoed by our own forces.
Morning searches discovered the following enemy forces:
(1) A convoy of 12 AP off the northern coast off the north
coast of NEW GEORGIA headed southeast.
(2) A group of 25 ships southwest of ISABEL ISLAND headed
southeast.
(J) 5 ships (one damaged) 75 miles northeast ISABEL ISLAND

headed northwest.

(4) A "large force" of cruisers

~nd

of ISABEL ISLAND headed south.

DDs 60 miles northeast

(5) 2 BB, 1 CL, 11 DD just off the east coast of

GIA on southeast heading.

~V

(6) 1 BB, 1 CL, 2 DD 60 miles south of SHORTLAND

I ~LAND

heading to that place.

GEORand

(?) Several enemy patrol planes.

Other minor contacts were made.
(Continued on next page)

11.54

,SECRET-

November 13th.

(Continued)

Photos yesterday show one direct hit and two near misses by B-17s in first drop on BB of the FUSO Class, and a second
~drop claims three hits.
131730.

The orders for TF 16 and TF 64 are shown in Comsopac

Both the planes from the ENTERPRISE (See Comsopac 141020) and from GUADALCANAL attacked enemy forces approaching in
the vicinity of the NEW GEORGIA group. As a result of these air
attacks Comgen CACTUS reported 11 enemy AP, 6 of which were damaged, and several DDs were milling around 60 miles northwest of
SAVO at 1600 local and asked CTF 64 if he could strike. The results of B-17 and PBY strikes during the day w~not reported.
ComNavUnit CACTUS 140716 is his belief of en~my conditions.
As GUADALCANAL planes operated successfully during the
day it is assumed that last nights shelling did not seriously
damage the airfield.
The FLYING FISH made an unsuccessful attack on the force
of cruisers and DDs northeast of ISABEL. CTF 42 readjusted sub
positions in the hopes of getting the cripnles, or any other
prime targets.

At 1903 local CTF 64 stated he would enter east of RUSSEL at 2200. At 2000 a plane reported a naval battle to the
westward of RUSSEL ISLAND. This report is not understood. CTF
64 reported being off llJNGA at 2245. At 2322 CTF 64 reported
"engaging enemy".
SAN FRANCISCO damage and casualties are reported in
his 141058 and 141115. The loss of the JUNEAU by enemy torpedoes is reported in the HELENA's 141406. It is certain that
Captain Young of the SAN FRANCISCO was killed, but no report has
been made concerning Rear Admiral Callaghan.
13 local.

Comgen 1st MarDiv 132233 reports activities on the 12-

The first NEW ZEALAND troops to garrison NOUMEA should

arrive there November 16th.
The PRESIDENT HAYES with Army ~roops from BLEACHER embarked has been ordered to ESPIRITU SANTO.
For the first time in this campai gn P-38s and B-26s are
reported at GUADALCANAL.
(Cont inued on next page)

116 5

November 13th.

(Continued)

The personnel of the Rickenbacker plane, except one man

who died at sea, have been saved.
The Central and North Pacific areas were quiet.
As the day ends it seems most probable that while we
have suffered severe losses in ships and personnel, our gallant
shipmates have again thwarted the enemy. If so, this may well _ ~/
be the decisive battle. of this campaign.
~

November 14th.
General Emmons and the usual Task Force ommanders
were present at Admiral Nimitz's morning conference.
As previously noted our BB group had been ordered to
parallel the SOLOMONS 50 miles to the westward and the ENTERPRISE group to parallel 100 miles to the westward. The subsequent action of our BB group is described in CTF 64 150355.
Probably because the ENTERPRISE damage would not permit her
planes to operate efficiently, 54 were flown off to GUADALCANAL.
At the end of the day the BBs and the ENTERPRISE were returning
to NOUMEA and the ENTERPRISE planes will proceed to ESPIRITU
SANTO as soon as conditions warrant. Comsopac 150355 and 151310
give damage to own and enemy forces. The MEADE and air bombardment are credited with the destruction of all four enemy .AKs
beached in the vicinity of TASSAFARONGA POINT. While a great
many of the details of the events of the day in the general GUADALCANAL area are not yet known, it is certain that TF 67, 64,
and 16 inflicted such heavy damage on the enemy that the push
was completely brolcen up and the enemy was forced to retire.
During the retirement of TF 64 the WASHINGTON and SOUTH
DAKOTA were attacked by enemy air.
A summary of our losses and damage is:

Lost:

ATLANTA, JUNEAU, MONSSEN, WALKE, LAFFEY, PRESTON.

Probably lost: BARTON, CUSHING.

Severely damaged: SOUTH DAKOTA, SAN FRANCISCO, FORTLAND.
Damaged: HELENA, FLETCHER, O'BANNON, STE!RRETT, BENHAM,
GWIN, AARON WARD.
(Continued

on

next page)

1156

November 14th,

(Continued)

Personnel loss is not known, but includes Rear Admiral

Callaghan and three of his staff, and Captain Young- all of .
whom were in the SAN FRANCISCO and were killed during the night
action of TF 67.
The enemy losses are not accurately known,
to assume at least the following:
Sunk:

It is safe

lr AP(AK}, 3 CA, 9 DD.

Severely damaged:
Damaged:

1 BB,

1 BB, several cruisers and DDs,

SW Pac air is expected to strike damaged ships reported

entering the BUIN-FAISI area.
We still have to hear of what was accomplished by TF
63, TF 42, GUADALCANAL air, and the PTs,
The INDIANA group arrived at BALBOA and will proceed at
once to the South Pacific,
Batdiv 4 has been diverted to NAJ-I DI.
group will cross the equator next Monday,

The SARATOGA

The N~LEY and McKEAN will land 2 companies of the 2nd

Raider Battalion at AOLA BAY and will also tow 4 PTs to TULAGI.
grift,

We are two days behind on reports from General VandeNo major land action is reported,

Vice Opnav 141926 gives plans for NEW ZEALAND air em. ployment and requests CinC Pac and Comsopac views,
The Central Pacific area was quiet.
In the North Pacific AA fire was encountered by our
planes at ATTU and landing barges were sighted. Possible enemy
radio activity was reported at AMCHITKA.

~v

1167

_SECRET_..,.

November 15th.
General Emmons and the Task Force Commanders at Pearl were
present at the usual morning conference.
It is now definite that the enemy offensive was completely
stopped. It is probable that damage we inflicted on the enemy
is greater than received by us. As striking forces of both
sides have retired from the GUADALCANAL area and can hardly be
in large scale action in the near future, it appears that now
is the time to move in supplies and to relieve the tired Marine
amphibious troops. CTF 62 has already started a movement of
supplies to GUADALCANAL.
The ENTERPRISE, SOUTH DAKOTA, WASHINGTON, and screening
DDs are enroute NOUMEA. The NORTHAMPTON, PENSACOLA, and 3 DDs
(TF 16.6) are at ESPIRITU SANTO waiting orders where they will
be joined by the LEANDER. The PORTLAND and AARON WARD are making temporary repairs at TULAGI. The BENHAM and GWIN are limping toward ESPIRITU ' SANTO and are being escorted by the SHAW
and NICHOLAS.
CTF 62 151012 (2 parts) gives results of recent action
after conference with commanding officers engaged. Comsopac
161124 also summarizes results of the battle.
Comgen 1st Marines 152246 reports action on GUADALCANAL,
including air activity.

c.o.s. Army & Cominch 141928 (2 parts) gives procedure

for distribution, allocation, and replacement of aircraft in
the facific Ocean Areas.
Because of a report of sighting an enemy land plane by
our search plane 675 miles NW OAHU, condition ONE was ordered
at midnight. The enemy threat did not materialize and normal
conditions of alert were resumed about eight hours later.
Except for two reports of enemy submarines the Central
and North Pacific areas were quiet.

115 8

November 16th.
As the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, the
Commander, !Iawaiian Sea Frontier, and Task Force Commanders at
PEARL are either present in person or represented at the daily
morning conference held by Admiral Nimitz, notation will not be
made except to note absentees.
There was no action with the enemy in the Pacific Ocean
Areas yesterday except minor air and submarine contacts. During
this lull in the South Pacific both the enemy and ourselves are
commencing to regroup, and to plan for the repair of damaged ships.
Major logistic support for the GUADALCANAL area is underway.
Rear Admiral Turner expresses his views regarding the
force necessary to protect our lines of communications to advance
positions in his CTF 62 161133.
The action of the PORTLAND in the Jrd Battle of SAVO
is in his 2 part '1 o 8 o 4 and 170400. The PORTLAND also seno.s
(160830) the account of the senior survivor of the PRESTON. Captain Jenkins, senior survivor on GUADALCANAL describes other
losses and personnel casualties (RDO CACTUS 140358). The MEADE
150145 reports bombardment of enemy APs (AKs?) and the rescue ot
survivors.
An enemy AK was reported stopped and smoking just west
of SAVO ISLAND.

The Marine reorganization in the South Pacific is made

effective by Comsopac 161144.
Cincpac has delegated to Comsopac authority for deployment and redistribution of Army and Navy air organizations in
the South Pacific Area.
Two enemy submarines were reported
HINCHEN.8ROOK, ALASKA.

si ~hted

off CAPE

There is indication that the enemy is again becoming

active in the BUNA area. So far the move of forces to that area
is of a minor nature. It is believed, however, that if the enemy
can find the means, they will plan to capture all of NWN GUINEA.

v~

116 9

8EORB'P

November 17th.
The only enemy action of note in the Pacific during
the day is the movement of troops and air to the vicinity of
BUNA, NEW GUINEA. It appears that the enemy is reinforcing
the position there.
The report of ENTEI~RISE plane operations between
November 13 and 15 inclusive is in Comsopac 180655.
Comgen Mardiv 172205 reports GUADALCANAL operations.
The PORTLAND will require the services of a tug when
she leaves TULAGI. That ship recommends repairs be accomplished
at SYDNEY.
The delivery of supplies of all kinds to the GUADALCANAL area is now underway on a large scale.
The WICHITA, CLEVELAND, SUWANNEE, SANGAMON, JENKINS,
MURPHY, RADFORD, WALLER and CONVvAY have been ordered to proceed to the Pacific for duty at an early date. The BOISE will
remain in the Atlantic. Cominch 180255 pink.
.
CTF 8 has been directed to submit a plan as early as
practicable for expulsion of Japs from the ALffi1 TIANS. The plan
will also include consideration of early occupation of AMCHITKA
to deny it to the enemy as an air field site.
Aside from minor enemy moves toward KISKA and BUNA,
there is no new information of enemy deployment or intentions.

~'

November 18th.
Again the day was quiet in the South and Southwest Pacific except for minor activity in the BUNA area. Our logistic
movements to the SOLOMONS are proceeding satisfactorily according to plan, and when completed and bulk avgas storage installed much greater strength of our positions will result.
In his 190659 CTF 64 reports damage inflicted during
the night of 14-15 local. As some of this was predicted and
reported by Comsopac, we are not yet ready to estimate enemy
losses. It seems quite probable that damage inflicted is considerably greater than the preliminary fragmentary reports indicated. It may even be that our forces in the south have inflicted decisive damage for this phase of the campaign. In any
event we can reasonably assume that with the arrival of TF 11
in the near future and the strengthening of GUADALCANAL now in
progress that we can expect to control both the sea and air in
the Southern SOLOMONS. If the 25th Army Division can be sent
in to GUADALCANAL to relieve the 1st Marine Division, the Marines
(Continued on next page)

117 0

3ECftE'r

November 18th.

(Continued)

can rest, reequip, and prepare for the next step. As . the situation now stands there seems to be a good chance to starve
out the Japs on GUADALCANAL.
There were no new developments in the Central or North
Pacific areas.
In Cincpac 182131 is a plan to withdraw Pacific Fleet
submarines from the South Pacific area in order to increase
~~
patrols in Empire waters.
\y-

November 19th.

The South Pacific continues quiet. Logistic support

of GUADALCMJAL is proceeding according to plan. The present
development of airplane fields at GUADALCAl{AL is in Comgen 1st
Mardiv 182338. Comsopac 201135 is a summary to the 19th local.
It is now learned that damage inflicted on the enemy on November 14-15 by TF 64 was not included in ~ damage reports
made by Admiral Halsey. On this basis a tentative estimate
damage to the enemy November 8-16 is
Sunk
~
BB

CA
CL

DD

AP
AK

ss
*

**

Damaged

(ll_ (.Ql_
1
3
2
5
l<D
3
2

1*
3
1

ill

Total

hl

2*
6
2
6
10

1
1**

Total
2

2
n-

BB or CA
Type not stated

The remodeled ARGONAUT will leave PEARL about the 23rd

for the South Pacific. Her new capabilities are shown in Com. subpac 200021.
The Central and North Pacific areas were quiet. Cincpac 200923 requests clarification of the status of the bases
OSTLER and LI NEOUT.
The c enter of enemy i nterest in the South has shifted
from GUADALCPJ'TAL to the BUNA area, but t he re i s nothing yet to
indi cate. anything like a maj or move towar d I~~v GUI }lliA . There

11 71

November 19th.

(Continued)

is nothing new learned of enemy deployments or intentions,

except some activity at MUNDA, N~v GEORGIA and the indications of further strengthening at BUKA.
November 20th.

----

The day in the South Pacific was8f~et. Some enemy

submarine and air activity was noted but
main interest continued to be the logistic su~ply of our SOLffi~ONS positions and
the repair of damaged combatant units. Comsopac 210600 refers
to plans for the 21st (local). A flight of enemy planes were
reported coming in to CACTUS but no arrival report was received.
Comsopac urges that Pacific Fleet submarines remain in his area
(his 210643).
The tanker situation in the Sopac area is discussed in
Cincpac 200925.
The Central and North Pacific areas were quiet.
Rear Admiral Giffen's force will leave the east for
the Canal Zone, enroute to the Pacific, on December 5th.
There are no new enemy developments .
November 21
The South Pacific continues quiet, as is also the case
in the Central and North Pacific areas. The logistic support of
GUADALCANAL is proceeding according to plan without opposition.
No report of land operations on GUADALCANAL was received during
the day. Minor enemy activity continues in the BUNA area. The
enemy is landing some troops and materials at MUNDA, NEW GUINEA.
The Japs are to try to land troops and supplies on GUADALCANAL
from submarines.
Combatdiv SIX 211238 (2 parts) discusses the gunnery of
his part in the 3rd Battle of Savo and stresses the importance
of radar in night action.
Comsopac 220120 comments on need of present APs and AKs
in his area.
area.

Comsopac 210052 requests speed in delivery of PCs to his

Cominch 211800 desires further information on Cincpac

to establish Comairsopac Svb<o~.
Consideration is being given to conv.ert 5 additional ODDs ~
to .APDs for use in the South Pacific.
. ._,
There were no new enemy developments .
~
;

~ proposal

117

SECBErr

November 22:
negative.
weather.

The South Pacific continues quiet. Air searches were

Complete coverage was not possible due to bad

Comsopac 221037 is a summary of the day at GUADALCANAL. Logistic support is going in, including turkeys for
Thanksgiv ing.
The BENHAM received a torpedo hit during the night
of 14-15 November off SAVO. During the following afternoon
the ship was thought breaking up and the crew was transferre d
to the GWIN who sank the BENHAM by gunfire.
There is the possibilit y that the Japs are using
captured Allied planes to trail our forces.
Comsopac 222357 gives progress of repair to STERETT,
BUCHANAN, and O'BANNON. The PORTLAND is underway for SYDNEY
after temporary repairs at TULAGI.
Comsopac 230612 is the Task Force reorganiz ation of
the forces under his command.
Cominch 230032 pink directs the return of 6 subs to
Comsowesp ac and that 6 preferably 8 PT boats be placed at the
disposal of MacArthur in response to the latter's request.
Cincpac 222125 is a proposal for redistribu tion of
Pacific Fleet subs.

, J

Cincpac 22224l(~uests informatio n

relations at GUADALCANAL.

of p~-e ~ornmand

Cominch 221541 directs the transfer of 4 APs and 2 AKs

from the Atlantic to the Pacific Fleet. This will ease the
training problem of TF 3.
The enemy continues active in the BUNA and MUNDA area.
There is some indication that Jap CVs have returned to JAPAN
for reorganiz ing, refitting and training.

t ~~

vr

1.17 3

November 23rd.
There were no new developments in any Pacific Ocean Areat
today. Because of expected enemy submarinq~EQ~rations off
GUADALCANAL, Com Gen 1st Marines requests ~ forces in
additional to the PT's.
The SOUTH DAKOTA will go to NEW YORK for battle damage
repair, and the SAN FRANCISCO will go to MARE ISLAND.
The proposed command set up at GUADALCANAL is shown in
ComSoPac's 240145.
The enemy is planning reinforcements to the BUNA, MUNDA,
As previously mentioned,
subs have been ordered to bring supplies and troops to GUADALCANAL. It is evident that the enemy is in no position to
dispute our command of the sea area in the Southern SOLOMONS
at this time.
~
and GUADALCANAL area by destroyers.

November 24th.
As has been noted for several days, the ene~t in
the South and Southwest Pacific concerns: (1) Ttie BUNA relief
force, (2) Logistic support of GUADALCANAL by submarines and DDs,
(3) strengthening the MUNDA position.
Our logistic support of GUADALCANAL continues in a satisfactory manner. Comsopac 240525 and 251215 summarize activities
in the Southern SOLOMONS. At 0320 the 26th Clocal) enemy planes
were reported over GUADALC.A.NAL.
Comsopac believes that the SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS occupation
to be held in abeyance because of construction difficulties and desirability of avoiding dissipation of
effort.
should~ continue~

In the SW Pacific the allied troops are pressing the enemy

in the BUNA area. Of a reported group of l CL and 4 DDs attacked
by SNPac air to the southwest of NEW BRITAIN, two DDs are reported
hit and burning.
The NORTH CAROLINA has been sent to SUVA to join other BBs
there. The MINNEAPOLIS, PEHKINS, and DRJ\YTON will join TF 67
at ESPIRI~J SANTO.
The LOUISVILLE, FRAZER, and GANSEVOORT depart PEARL for the
South tomorrow escorting APs loaded with the first combat team
of the 25th Infantry Division.

11.74

.SEC~T .

November 24th {Continued)

Cominch 232222 describes the I.I NEOUT and OSTLER garrisons.
Cincpac plans for the seizure and occupation of KISKA, and
an estimate for the resumption of the Sopac offensiv7 are underway.
~
V

~~

November 25th.
There were no major activities in the Pacific today.
Comsopac 261300 is a summary for his~rea. The AOLA project
has been abandoned. Apparently the new unloading point is 3000
yards east of TOGAMA Point. (CTF 62 260458). Comsopac 250609
urges that Admiral Fitch's title be CTF 63 only and a rear admiral
be ordered as Comairsopac at N01ThmA. Cincpac comments on this
in his 260247 to Cominch. The nort director setup in the South
Pacific is outlined in Comsopac 260632.
The master of the COOLIDGE will be brought to trial.
Army and Navy have jurisdiction.

Both

Cominch 240330 {pink) relays SwPac despatch to Cincpac showing that Admiral Carpender was not consulted by General MacArthur
prior to his recent request to Vvashington for Naval forces. It
also gives sub distribution in support of NEW GUINEA.
Cominch 252330 {pink) suggests possibility of relief of Marines
in SAMOA and HAWAII by the Army.
A tanker wa~ t attacked off San Francisco Bay today by an enemy
fl.
submarine.
CTF 8 252030 (pink) gives his estimate of enemy troop strength
in the western ALEUTIANS. The estimate seems a bit high. Cominch
desires a report and recommendations of landing field possibilities
on AM:CHITKA. The Army recommended against occupation for that
purpose in the early fall. CTF 8 will make a survey as soon as
possible.
CTF 8 260155 (pink) 2 CLs and 4 DDs to intercept a convoy
indicated now enroute KISKA.
Cominch 251659 indicates 3ritish units may soon report to
South Pacific for duty.
The Army Signal Corps seems to think action imminent at RABAUL,
Here it is believed that no major enemy activity in the South
~~
Pacific can take place in the next two or three weeks.
~

117 5

...SECRET

November 26
Comsopac 271254 is the daily summary of his area.
The report of 3000 Japs at REKATA is a much larger force than
had been estimated there. A.t 0434/28th local (-11) enemy planes
were reported over CACTUS. There is some doubt concerning the
combat readiness of the 43rd Division, location of the Americal
Division and 9th Defense Battalion, and the 1st Raider Battalion.
Comsopac has been requested to keep Cincpac informed of these and
the organization and strength of future troop movements.
Cominch 251415 is sending 4 APs and 2 AKs to the Pacific, leaving the east coast mid December. As 3 AP and 2 AKs are
to be loaded for the South Pacific it seems best to send them as
planned. The need for APs and AKs in TF 3 for training is urgent.
Until the planned training there is completed no troops will be
available to oust the Japs from the ALEUTIANS. Because of this
Adrdral Halsey has been asked to comment on the immediate release
to TF 3 of 3 AP and 2 AK.
NA. WELLINGTON 2622.30 gives Commodore Goddards views
on New Zealand air.
The reported submarine sighting off SAN FRANCISCO
yesterday now appears quite doubtful.
Cincpac 26235 pink agrees in principle with the relief of ~~rine ground and air units at SAMOA and HAWAII mentioned
yesterday.
In the ALEUTIANS, the enemy convoy believed enroute
to SEMICHI has been delayed 2 or 3 days. CTF 8 is attempting to
intercept with 2 CL and 4 DD, working with PBY search.
There are no new enemy developments.
November 27
There were no maj or contacts with enemy units during
the day. Various sightings indicate an AK afire to the westward
of N~N GEORGIA. This damaged ship is in a small group of DDs and
Marus apparently standing toward the SHORTLANDS area. The ALCHIBA
was torpedoed off LUNGA today. The ship was beached and when last
reported was on fire forward but unloading continued from the after
hatches. CTF 62 280309 suggests sweeps to reduce the hazard of unloading.
The INDIANA will join up with other BBs at FIJI and the
COLUMBIA will go to ESPIRITU SANTO to join the force under Rear
Admiral Vlfright.
(Continued on next page)

117 G

--BEORE'f

November 27

(Continued)

The HELENA 140001 gives additional details regarding

the 3rd Battle of Savo, including details of the loss of the
JUNEAU.
Ground activity continues in the BUNA area.
side is indicated having the upper hand.

Neither

In the North Pacific Rear Admiral Smith with 2 CL and

4 DD is making a sweep toward ATTU in the hope of intercepting an
enemy convoy which is indicated bringing reinforcements and supplies to the Western ALEUTIANS. B-26's were ordered to attack a
small AK reported in HOLTZ BAY. The planes reported 3 hits leaving the AK on fire and sinking. The air search which covered
ATTU and SEMICHI reported negative results except for sighting
the above AK aground. A possible sub was also reported.
~~There are no new enemy developments.
November 28th.
The South Pacific was generally quiet during the day.
As it .is believed that an enemy convoy indicated as eight DDs and
6 APs will attempt to land food at GUADALCANAL tomorrow, CTF 67
was ordered ~ to proceed from ESPIRITU PANTO with available cruisers
and DDs to ~nfercept.
,

t')

~J

c~ ~ !t> r

ENTERPRISE engine repairs are now completed and the

ship can make full power. As battle damage repairs are not yet
permanently made, there will be some reduction in the reliability
of air operations. No yard overhaul is proposed at this time.
The COLUMBIA at BLEACHER has turbine trouble which reduces her
speed to 20 knots. The ship will arrive at NOUMEA December 2
(local).
Comsopac 280145, 291050 (passing MacArthur's 271136),
and MacArthur's 291100 discuss Naval requirements to support N11'W
GUINEA operations.
The enemy continues to receive damage from SNPac air
in attempts to run convoys to the EDNA area. A DD was reported
hit west of ~N BRITAIN and the group, of which this was one,
turned back.

Cominch 281235 authorizes "Fleet Air Command, Noumea".

CTF 8 290035 outlines destroyer needs for the North
Pacific Force. Those vessels are now operating at maximum canacity
and without a reserve number to permit needed overhauls. A sub
was reported southwest of SITKA.
The German auxiliary "RANf SES" enroute KOB::!: to Germany
was intercepted b :r the ADELAIDE. The Germans scuttled their ship.
(Continued)

117 7

E OHE':F

November 28th.

(Continued )

Aside from the J ap attempts t o feed and reinforce positions at NEW GUINEA, GUADALCANAL and the AI.JEUTIANS, there is
nothing new known of enemy denloyments or intentions. ~
November 29th
During the night the first reports, came from Rear Admiral
Wright (CTF 67). That force had been ordered from ESPIRITU SANTO
to intercept an enemy force of eight DDs, plus possible 6 APs, off
GUADALCANAL. Act:ton between surface forces commenced about 1030
p.m. local. Of Ad~rals Wright's force of 4 CA, 1 CL, 6 DD, the
first damage renor~s are: MimJEAPOLIS, 2 torpedo hits; NORTHAMPTON,
on fire aft looks like total loss; NEW ORLEANS, torpedoed;
PENSACOLA, uncertain; HONOLULU, not reported. As is usually the
case we get bad newsfirst; enemy damage is not reported. ComSoPac
ordered CTF 11 to proceed at once toward GUADALCANAL ~i SARATOGA,
SAN JUAN, DESRON 6). TF 65 (MARYLAND, COLORADO, NORTH CAROLINA,
HULL, MONAGHAM) were placed on 2 hours notice.
~he MAC FARLAND, which was badly damaged sometime ago in
an aircattack of f LUNGA, is enroute ES,IRITU SANTO.

The ALCHIBA is still afire

Salvage is being investigated.

forward, and aground off LUNGA.

COMINCH 291906 (Pink) gives the destination of the 25th

DIVISION. It also states that the 1st Marine Division will be
sent to AUSTRALIA.
COMSOPAC 29181] gives his plans for aerial mining.
not ready now for such an offensive campaign.

He is

COMINCH 281708 discusses base developments in South Pacific.

ComSoPac is asked whether or not he approves the development of
BUTTON into a LION base.
COMINCH 291755 deals with the employment of gas in warfare.
Gas warfare is forbidden to be initiated by any U.S. Commander.
The extent of the enemy move to the ALEUTIANS is in doubt.
Five convoys are believed to be enroute. Except for this move,
and the known activities in the NEW GUINEA area nothing significan~ ~
is known of enemy plans or developments.
~
/~

1178

November 30th
Comtas kf or 67 301730 and 302350 p ink describes what is
now known of yesterdays action. Many imp ortant details are yet
to be reported. Rear Admiral Tisdale will arrive at BU'rTON in
the HONOLULU tomorrow and will be a~le to make ~1rther report.
.
c.
.
S\owne.J.s Q,fComlnch 3oJq I~ p1.nk 1s uneas y regarding Athe South Pacific
campaign and requests comment from Cincpac. A tentative answer
to Cominch is in Cincpac 010931 pink to Comsopac, :&e for the
latter's comment.
In answer to Cincpac proposal to sail 3 AP and 2 1\K to
San Diego to meet urgent training requirements, Comsopac sent
his 300841. Because of the necessity for CTF 3 to start training on a much larger scale than now underway, Cincpac directed
3 .AP_s to return to San Diego in his 010335.
Comsopac 011321 gives CACTUS activities.
The PORTLAND is making satisfactory proeress toward
SYDNEY. The NAVAJO, which was accompanying the PORTL~~D, has
been ordered to CACTUS for salva~e.
Cincpac 010645 gives views on aerial offensive mining
in the Pacific. It is believed that we should harass the enemy
with every conceivable means.
The work remaining to be done on the CACTUS airfields
is in GUADALCANAL 300255. The SARATOGA has turbine trou ,Jle which reduces ship
speed to 27 knots. Repairs are beyond the capacity of the ship's
force. So far as is known today the SARATOGA task force is still
proceeding to CACTUS, but other SoPac combatant units have been
returned to 12 hours notice.
Returning from patrol off NEW GEORGIA the GRAiviPUS reports (1) 18 October- possiJle hit in CL; (2) 6 November- 1 hit
in DD; (3) 9 November - 2 hits in DD. The TROUT ~ired 5 torpedoes
at a RB north of MALP.ITA on 13 November but all m1ssed.
CTF 8 290110 gives his aerial offensive mining plans.
Some evidence is beginning to come in of another push
toward CACTUS . It may be that the enemy will enploy CVs when
and if it takes p lace. The enemy continues to be active in the
I\TEW GUINEA area 'J ut no large scale move in that direction is
noted~

In the ALmJ TIANS the enemy moves are not clear. It see~s
probable thB.t c onvoys now en route the rJvestern ALEUTI.i\.NS are bringing in reinforcements a nd re pl a cements. Photos show that the
j

enemy is there to s tay until ousted by troops.

~ l 79

g;gQRE'fl

; December (GCT)
03 0521 CINCPAC to COMINCH
For Admiral King only. Highest secrecy. Had given full
consideration to disadvantages raised by your 011605 as
to operating Eatdiv 3 in Sopac. Logistics can be met.
I have had the AA batteries of Batdiv 3 increased by addition of 2 40 MM quads and 46 20 Tv1M guns per ship, making them comparable to those of Batdiv 4. These AA batteries will of course be improved when they receive their
remaining 40 MM guns and replace 5*'-25s with 5"-38 but
their underwater defense will not be satisfactory until
third deck centerline compartments are made watertight.
It was with all t h is in mind I decided in view of the military situation these ships should go to Sopac. My 232047
and Halsey's 250522. It is probable that the enemy will
make at least one more powerful move against CACTUS including more of his battleships than he used last time.
The need for additional gun power to defeat this move has
been accentuated by recent losses in heavy cruiser strength.
I consider this situation more acute than those in the past
which led to suggestions for use of OBB. Your 272058 of
April and 121750 of August. Para. I believe that decision
should be made now whether we shall lay up all 6BB for
lengthy modernization or whether we shall keep available
and utilize some in situations where their hitting power
may be the deciding factor~ Will await your further advice
before cancelling transfer of Batdiv 3 one ship at least
of which will be required as part of escort for troop convoy departing December 6.
02 2155 CINCPAC to

COMGENI~~~EPT,

COMHAWSR~FRON

Info ASP PEARL etc.

,....

While situation at present does not indicate probability

any major Jap attack Hawaiian area O r' first anniversary or /
Battle of Pearl Harbor, possibility exists of acts of saba
tage by misguided local Japanese or of minor shelling by ~~"
submarines. Desire modified alert effective from prior
dark 5 December to after dayligt.lt 7 December with special
emphasis on sabotage directed a ; ainst ships or shore installations. Blackout exceptions made to expedite work
on damaged ships and movements important cargoes are not
rescinded but excepted activities be particularly alert
to blackout promptly if later ordered.
COHSOPAC to COMINCH Info CINC PAC.
02 0637 To be decoded by Cominch and CJ.ncpac only. Ultra high
connnand.. Your 301915. Concur conception therein. BUIN
at present key ORANGE position in SUSAN. To take this near
future requires:A CACTUS, RINGBOLT development ot support
planned surface operations.B Neutralize or take IviUNDA and
REKATA as may be needed later. C Increased air surface
and shipping available. Para. Relative above, enemy
(continued)

118 0

-SECRET
December (GCT)
02 0637 (continued)
continues efforts reenforce CACTUS. He has not abandoned
it. Securing al1 development that position and RINGBOLT
continue absorb available Sopac effort and are progressing
too slowly. 'Reenforcement and more shipping needed now.
Lack anti-sub craft is grave weakness. Jap activity MUNDA, REKATA, BUIN obscure due inadequate reconnaissance
which difficult and slow due lack of means and weather.
Consider Mardiv 1 required for move on EUIN. Para. Army
troops now here plus 25th Division adequate to garrison
back areas and CACTUS provided BUIN offensive is gotten
underway promptly. In this connection it is essential that
next offensive will not be undertaken until ships and troops
are available to exploit immediately in1. tial landing and
follow through otherwise a 2nd CACTUS may result. Para.
Operations involve directly and mainly Sopac forces, bases,
and communications. Command should be located accordingly
regardless of who it is.
03 1740 COMINCH to CINCPAC
Decode only for Adn1iral Nimitz. Ultra SE~ cret. Last paragraph your 030521 think only sound course is to continue
modernization and rehabilitation of OBB's as underway in
TENNESSEE and CALIFORNIA which must be adjusted to Navy
Yard capabilities after consideration new construction and
battle damage repairs. Para. However only acute needs
such as ~ ow exist in Sopac should cause us to unduly expose
OBB's which have not been mndernized.
04 0253 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC Info COMINCH, CTF 1
Treat with utmost Secrecy. Due to non-water tightness of
centerline compartments of 3rd deck of NEW MEXICO and MISSISSIPPI, I desire that they not be unnecessarily exposed
to underwater damage unless they are required in an urgent
situation. Under present conditions I consider thatr operating them west of FANTAN one would result in such exposure.
Their AA battery now consists of 8 5u-25s, 4 1.1 quads,
2 40 MM quads and 46 20 MM guns. Half of their secondary
battery has be en removed. Para. Suggest on his arrival
FANTAN you have Leary confer with you on BB employment.

1.18 1

-8ECRE'f

December (GCT)
08 0112 CTF 8 to CINCPAC

Radio HONOLULU pass to Cincpac from Comtaskforce 8.

Ultra. Ordered late afternoon air ~ttack 2 ships expected ATTU today without awaiting scouting contact.
Secondary objective KISKA shipping and land installations in event ATTU attack not made. Weather prevented operation now scheduled early tomorrow. Cruisers
fueling LONGVIEW tonight. 'Nea ther holds. McMorris
U}ffiAK today. Unless enemy info requires differing action, will return flagship ADAK tomorrow night to accomplish flag relief.
090502

C01ffiOPAC to ALL US NAVAL SHIPS SOPAC, Info CINPAC COMINCH ETC.

The following reorganization of Sopac task forces is
effective immediately for all units in company with Task
Force Commanders. Absent units will be directed to join
by Comsopac, originator, as soon as practicable. Task
Forces 11 and 16, no change from organization in my 230612
November except delete CLARK from Desron 2 and Tas}r: Force
16. Task Force 64, Rear Admiral Lee in WASHINGTON, NORTH
CAROLINA, INDIANA, WJ.AURY, CUMMINGS plus additional destroyers as may be assigned. Task Force 65, Rear Admiral Mason
in NASSAU, ALTA~~Iffi, Combatdiv 4 in ~~RYLAND, COLORADO,
Comdesron 12, WOODWORTH, BUCHANAN, LANSD01,VNE, LARDNER,
MCCALLA, GRAYSON. Task Force 67, Rear Admiral Ainsworth
Task Force Commander in LOUISVILLE, Rear Admiral Tisdale
second in command in HONOLULU, HELENA, COLUMBIA, Comdesron
5, SHAW, LAMSON, PERKINS, DRAYTON, NICHOLAS, FLETCHER,
OBANNON, DE HAVEN, SAUFLEY. The following units will operate directly under Comsopac PENSACOLA, MINNEAPOLIS, NEW
ORLEANS, HULL, MONAGHAN, FARRAGUT, MEADE, STACK, LANG,
FRAZIBR, GANSEVOORT. Comsopac will act as Comtaskfor 66
using group and unit designations that force for units
operating under his direct control. Task Forces 62 and 63
are not affected by this reorganization. Comseronsopac
and Comdespac have by hand for info. Interested Bases
Sopac have also for action in another system.

09 0506

COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH

Handle as most secret. Mining plans vicinity CAPE ESPERANCE
CACTUS reco~mended for approval as follows, one standard
field of 340 Mark Six mines fitted with five hundred fathoms
mooring wire, floats and mines at standard depths against
surface ships as soon as prepared at VIlEST LOCH be loaded on
four light minelayers and sent WHITE POPPY soon as practicable. Comsopac sends to Cincpac action, Cominch info.
ReconL~end approximate location of field one mile northeast
entrance of TENAMBA RIVER long axis field 040. Foregoing
after consultation Captain Hull. This field designed cui'tail infiltration Jap troops and supplies northwest our
position on CACTUS.

1182

SEORE':P
December (GCT)

09 2145 COMINCH to CI:NCPAC Info COMSOPAC, COMGEN 1ST MARAMPHCORPS etc.

Utmost secret. In connecti on my 191645 October you are
authorized to transfer lOth Defense Battalion to Sopac as
relief of 4th now in ROSES when transportation can be arranBed.
If lOth is utilized, Marcorps will make available
to you SAN DIEGO about 10 January; 12th for transfer to
PEARL as replacement for lOth. 12th will be retrained to
full streng th in January. Should you utilize lOth, infor:r.1
desired date to sail in order arrange transportation.
NPM deliver;action Cincpac.
NXZ for info, Comsopac, Comgen 1st Maramphcorps. Marcorps has by hand; originator
Cominch.
11 2007 CINCPAC to COMSOPAC
Utmost secret. Request comment Cominch 092145. Tenth
Defense Battalion consists mainly personnel with year or
more experience bases Hawaiian area and expected ready
depart PEARL 1 January. Equipped with 155, 90, 40, and
20 MM,plus machine guns, tanks, and other Defense Battalion
equipment;strength 50 officers, 1113 enlisted.

14 0932 COMSOPAO to

CO~!.l:GEN

CAOTU9 Info CTF 62 63 COMGEN~OPAO, etc.

It is important. Ultra. That action reports be promptly

made, by preliminary and one or more amplifying dispatches
when necessary. Your 122352 was first report on action
off SAVO night of 11th?
26 hours earlier than your time
group we had fairly complete renort from zeal sources.
Necessary that Zed 6. Zed Class 5 Addes be advised in advance of use of surface forces in GUADALCANAL - FLORIDA
area. This not to restrict your discretion but to avoid
nosstbility of conflict between forces your command and
those of other commanders. Prior to receipt of your 130320
regarding ground reconnaissance at KA.llfii~EBO had received
report through TOI:::Yo that 3 BLUE DD covered by PT bombarded
the area and. landed raiders at MARVOVO the morning of 12th.
If true originator should have been informed of plan or
orders to our force. Pass to Comaunavbase CACTUS by hand.
Act ion to Comgen CACTUS from COT.~SOPAC who has given to
Comgen Sopac and CTF 62 for info.

118 3

~ECR:gT ..
December (GCT)

16 0424 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC

Highest secret. Critical shortage destroyers herewith outDue limited unloading areas beaches and equipment
lined~
CACTUS, RINGBOL11 movements cannot be lur1ped in large convoys.
Small frequent grovps into and out of that area make heavy
drain on escorts. This situation unavoidable for some time
to come and the movements must continue. Lack of maintenance
opportunity increasingly apparent in material casualties.
Further serious consequence of hand to mouth condition is
impracticability retaining any emblance of division and
squadron organization. Comdespac suggests Desron 29 be
If you can do so earnestly
ordered here for escort wor~k.
recomMend this at once. Relief so afforded will permit some
permanency in destroyer assignMent and training with task
forces and will be reflected in marked increase in battle
I know that you are acutely
effectiveness of those forces.
aware my need for the ships, however, the forec;oing may clarify
your picture somewhat. At present part of our heavy striking forces are immobilized and remainder suffer gravely reduced battle efficiency due to what I have outlined.
16 0435 CINCPAC to

CO~SOPAC

Info

CO~INCE

Am sending 190 mines in JAHES RUr~SEY (most secret) Departing 17th. Comindiv 1 in TRACY and MONTGOMERY both loaded
with mines accompany. I do not aoprove plan proposed your
090506 as it aooears to restrict cur possible futu~e moveI will aDprove fields laid off enemy
ments in that area.
landing beaches which you will not want to use in future
yourself and in depths of not over 200 fathoms.
15 1959 CINCPAC to CTP 8 Info COTviiNCH
Utmost secret. Expect di~ective from joint chiefs of staff
canceling occupation TANAGA and ordering occllpa tion AMCHITKA.
Be prepared carry out latter task at earliest practicable
date after receipt of orders.
15 1650 COMINCU to CINCPAC Info COUSOPACFOR
Ultra secret. Advise Cominch as to strength of all units of
all services, less aviation, which are now in CACTUS-RINGBOLT.
M1en various units are relieved inform Cominch as to their
Strength and the amount and type of organizational military
equipment not withdrawn. This information essential for
material and personnel planning. Limited supplies amphibious
material available for MarDivs necessitates serviceable equipment and weapons this type should be withdrawn if and when
practicable. I'. 'IarCorps informed.

1184

December (GCT)
17 0510 COMSOPAC to COMSOVJESPAC Info CIN9J'AC,

C01.1I~CH.

This from Comsopac. Strategic location of WOODLARK ISLAND

as advanced air base for operations Northern CORAL SEA b e lieved to offer pos s ibilities. Such preliminary informa t i on
as available here indicates relative ea s e of es tab l i s hment
fie l d. Subs e quent logistic support does n ot a pp ear to
pre sent too great difficulties. Request I be f ur ni shed,
f or inf ormation, any recent topographic a l survey inf or ma t ion
v i sual and photographic reconnaiss ance inf orma t i on a lso any
ot her use ful data available. This i s ultra .
1 7 0327 CINCPA C to COMSOPAC

Your 160424. Ha ve reduced vess e l s as s igned ocean e scort to

minimum c ompatible with t a sk. I wi ll continu e poli cy of
s ending you all I ca n bu t r egret n one in si ght excep t DD's
now under r epair.
18 1315 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info

C0~1E3EAFRON,

COimOIDESEAFRON, etc.

Treat this as most secret. The Joint Chiefs of Staff direct

that if reconnaissance of AMCHITKA shows that a satisfactory
airfield can be constructed thereonin a reasonable time, the
following directive will be executed: Comwestseafron pass
to DEWITT. Objective. Occupation of AMCHITKA at earliest
date. Purpose. One, to render KISKA untenable as an operating base for the enemy. Two, to provide an advanced base for
possible operation against KISKA. Tasks. Afirm,seize and
occupy AMCHITKA and build airfield thereon. Bake~ train force
for assault and occupation of KISKA. The Army assault units
as assigned by the War Department can be trained in SAN DIEGO.
No Marine amphibious units are available for this operation.
General instructions. Cincpac in conjunction with Comgen
We stern Defense Command form plan for occupying AMCHITKA to
be executed on earliest date. Cincpac furnish CTF 8 immediately 1 AP combat load for first troops to land in occuDation of
AMCHITKA. Report target days for AMCHITKA occupation and
outline of plan and means required for this operation and
for future occupation of KISY~. Code name for AMCHITY~ operation is CROWBAR. Occupation of TANAGA suspended in
accordance with Cinc pac.
18 2321 CINCPAC to CTF 8 Info COMINCH, COM:'JORWESTSEAFRON, etc.

Utmost secrecy. Cominch 181315. On assumption that TERRAIN

at AMCHITKA proves suitable and that directive for its occupation will be is sued by Cincpac and Gomgen Western Defense,
I desire you continue detailed plans in conjunction with such
Army agency as may be designated by Lieut. General De Witt.
Consideration will be given t o r equests by you for forces in
addition to t h os e now at your disposal but beyond t he one AP
very little i s i mme diately avai l able. De Witt is being address ed se paratel y re ga r d i ng troops. Gre enslade pass to De
i.'lfi t t.

1185

-s:SORE~

December ( GCT)
18 2345 CINCPAC to COMWESEAFRONT Info COMNORWESEAFRONT, etc.

For General De Witt. Most secret. Referring to Cominch

181315 and my 182321 to Theobald which is being passed to
you. After final . approval of AMCHITKA project and determination of forces to be employed, I visualize that our joint
directive for that project will assign the task and make
available the forces decided upon. CTF 8 will be assigned
the naval task by me and I presume will command all.: forces
until the amphibious phase is completed. If you con~cur ~,
please inform him of the agency with whom he will deal in
preparing detailed plans. Would also appreciate information
as to your plan for the garrison and whether all units are
now available to you.
19 0320 COM 12 to CINCPAC
Pass to Cincpac for action; treat as most secret. Com 12
sending. Paraphrase of despatch sent by Lieut. General
DeWitt to Chief of Staff as follows after conference with
Cincpac and staff, Admiral Kinkaid and staff, officers Cominch, recommend adoption following General ~lan as basis
preparation detailed ulan for reduction and occupation
BOODLE. Occupy FORMUlLA at once with garrison formerly
destined for AMULET supplemented by additional units from
LONGVIEW if necessary. Plan to use 184th Infantry after
BOODLE is reduced with units from LONGVIE'N, FORMULA and
other ADC garrisons as occupational force, BOODLE. 35th
Division to be designated task force BOODLE reduction and
brought up to full strength. General Corlett and General
Landrum to be returned from BRONZE and assigned as division
and ass't. division commanders that division, both having
served with division in amphibious training. Second part
follows four minutes later.
19 0324 COM 12 to CINQPAC

Most Secret for action Cincpac; second part my 190320 says

Com 12. Both officers familiar with Alaskan conditions and
have -w orked joint exercises. with Marine amphibious forces.
Present location 35th Division, LOS ANGELES and its early
relief from Western Defense Command will facj_litate training of specific force for reduction of BOODLE. Training can
be initiated lmmediately under Admiral Rockwell provided
given first priority by Cincpac. 184 Infantry now intensive
training should be sent OCEAN BLUE immediately for acclimatization and traini ng in preparation occupational task.
Recommend approval of above as basis for preparation detailed plan. Request authorization take necessary measures
implement plan coordination and collaboration with Kinkaid
and Rockwell who have seen this message and concur paraphrase ends 1reference Cominch 181315 War Department directive therein your eoncurrence requested in working out plans
directly with Admirals Kinkaid and Rockwell subject to your
approval. DeWitt.

11 86

-s~GRET

December (GC T)

19 0215 CINCPAC to COivfVE SEAFRON Info COMINCH, COMAMPHIFORPAC

For GeneralDeWitt. Most secret. Studies by1 my staff and

CTF 8 indicate probable 10,000 enemy at KISKA and that 2
divisions will be required for its capture. Request your
comment and that I be kept informed of situation as to
availability of troops for the KISKA operation. Rear Admiral Spruance, my Chief of Staff, will confer with you immediately on his arrival SAN FRANCISCO tomorrow.
19 2048 DErviTrr to CINCPAC

This from De'~itt to Cincpac. Answering your 182345 concur

in designation Comtaskfor 8 as commander all forces FORMULA
p~oject until amphibious phase is completed.
~onferring with
Admiral Kinkaid here today and will inform him detailed
plans will be worked out between him and Commanding General
Alaska Defense Command. All units are now available to me
for occupa t:i.on FORMULA and are assembled LONGVIEV'T except battalion of general service or combat engineers. Initial garrison to consist 1 battalion infantry, 2 AW batteries AA, 1
battery 105 Mfv1 howitzer, 1 battalion engineers combat or
general service, 1 battalion construction engineers aviation,
1 battery 155 MM gun. Engineer battalion general service
or combat w:i11 be made available in Alaska Defense Command
for movement to FORMULA.
22 0557 CINCPAC to

C O~~SEAFRONT

For Lieut. General Deli!Ji tt. As indica ted in my 212137 I

concur your 202304. Following is tentative text of dispatch
which I propose that we issue as our joint plan. nobjective,
occupation of AMC EITKA at earliest date. Purpose, to immediately deny AMCHITKA to enemy and utilize it as soon as
possible in air operatio:1s against enemy forces and KISKA
installations. Task, seize and occupy AMCHITKA and build
airfield thereon. In command. Commander Northern Force
(TF 8) Pacific Fleet. Forces assigned, Task Force Eight
plus INDIANAPOLIS, DENEY, WORDEN, KALK, GILLESPIE, MIDDLETON. Army garrison of about blank thous and plus construction and transportation forces as designated by CG
Western Defense Command. Para. Target date January blank.
Command of Army forces less aircraft will revert to Army
when CG FORMULA informs CTF 8 he is ready to take over.
Code name of this operation is CROWBAR." Request you
give me information tosubstitute for above blanks and also
any other suggestions to make the plan acceptable to you.
If no appreciable disagreement exists, I suggest you include your approval and I will issue the dispatch as coming from us both.

1187

SEGR&!J!._

December (GCT)
21 2238 COMGEN ALASKAN DEFENSE COM CTF 8 to CINCPAC, COMWESTSEAFRON,etc.
Buckner and Theobald concur that enemy discovery of CROWBOW operation must be almost immediate . Threat to BOODLE
created thereby assures early and continuing maximum enemy
reaction. With force herein recommend ed, shape of island
confines our held position within fairly narrow limits
near southern end of island. Subject only to our air action enemy thus has opportuni ty to infiltrate d forces at
will by barges, submarine and other transporta tion in ~ low
visibility to unoccupied middle and northern sections of
island. It is recognized that our supporting naval surface
forces will be weak. Our occupation force must therefore
be strong enough to assure our control of area within
artillery range of conte~plated airfields . These consiaeration s dictate that min~mum force desirable is 2 full
regiments of infantry, 2 batteries of 155's, 4 batteries
75's, .1 regiment anti-airc raft plus constructi on and service troops. T!J.is full strength must be fully available
Dog day. Commanding General Alaskan Defense Command and
Commander Task Force 8 jointly send. Most Secret. Radio
HONOLULU deliver to Cincpac for action and Comwestse afron
deliver to Commanding General Western Defense Command for
~ction.

19 1906 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMSOPAC, 1ST MAR ANIP HIEIOUS CORPS,etc .
Handle this as su er secret. Non addressee s do not decode
begin Cincpac 170545 and 180151 Comsopac 181056. Disregard
my 162115. NTS provide transporta tion for Twelfth Defense
Battalion with ~ its normal equipment and supplies from SAN
DIEGO to COPPER and if transporta tion can not be furnished
by Cincpac for Tenth Defense Battalion from COPPER to port
in Sopac designated by Cincpac. Twelfth Defense Battalion
will load SAN DIEGO 4th January or as soon thereafte r as
transporta tion can be made available . Marine Corps issue
necessary movement order Twelfth Defense Battalion . Cincpac
advise whether transporta tion is or is not required for
Tenth Defense Battalion . Marcorps and Opnav informed.
,23 0016 DeWITT to CINCPAC Info COMWESEAFRON.

Concur entirely your 220557 pass this to Cincpac handle as

most secret Com 12 sending for Gen DeWitt. Army Garrison
strength at FOffiMJLA 6,000 including approxima tely 800 in
engineer aviation constructi on battalion and same number
in air combat and service units expected to be stationed at
FORMULA upon completion constructi on air base. Engineer
constructi on battalion aviation armed organical ly with
rifles machine guns both 30 and 50 caliber and 37 millimete r
guns and available for combat if needed. Tar~et date
January 5th in which Adm Kinkaid concurs. Comweseaf ron has
by hand.

1188

-sEGRE'X'

December (GCT/
25 2050 COMGEN VVEST DEF COMMAND to CINCPAC.
C 12095 this answers your 242149. To Admiral Nimitz from
Gen De Witt. C of S from Alaska Defense Co~~and here a few
days ago and brought Buckner's estimate of minimum force
desirable for FORMULA project which was approximately same
strength and composition as outlined in Theobalds dispatch
212238 sent jointly to you and me. Consider minimum garrison
necessary as outlined in my reply to your 182345 and so informed Buckner. This is force of Six thousand strength as
contained in our joint dispatch implementing CROWBAR project.
In discussion with Kinkaid just prior to his departure for
north, which was attended by Admiral Smith who had just returned from ALASKA, various matters connected with CROWBAR
project were discussed including the possibility of prompt
retaliation by enemy. It was consensus of all present at
conference that enemy would doubtless attempt to interfere
with CROWBAR operation utilizing all possible means including submarines and possible barging of troops from KISKA.
No one at any time expressed confidence that movement would
be unoppo sed or that Navy could prevent anything coming to
either FORMULA or LONGVIEW. Kinkaid stated it was Navy job
to do everything possible to prevent enemy action interfering
with movenent and occupation of FORMULA and both he and
Smith considered that effective measures with Naval forces
available could be taken to seriously interfere with possible
enemy parging operations from KISY~. It may become necessary
to augment FORMt~A force later. This can only be done at
expense of other ALASY~N garrisons and in absence of present
unloading facilities FORMULA reinforcements should not be
scheduled pending change in present estimate of immediate
enemy capabilities.

26 0612 COMSOPAC to COMSO'V'IESPAC Info C01VfAIRSOPAC, CINCPAC.

In regard to Cincpac 250303. Comsopac speaks. CACTUS gas
situation will not yet permit repeated heavy long range
strikes from there. Further impracticable give fighter
coverage CACTUS to RABAUL hence night strikes only can be
made. Can send you 18 fortresses, 9 B-26 and 8 Lightenings
to operate temporarily from Sowespac against RABAUL shipping.
Request your opinion and desires in this regard. Very secret
Comgensopac has by hand for info.
27 1750 COMINCH to CINCPAC
Hicom Hicom. Only for addressee. Your repeated and long
continued indication of carrier training activities in
ORANGE waters may repeat may involve rehearsals of operations
directed against HAWAII - MIDWAY line or elsewhere other
than South or Southwest Pacific.

118 9

SEGRB'f

December (GCT)
COMSOPAC to COMTASKFOR 67 Info CINCPAC, CTF 62, CTF 42, etc.
30 0602 Addressee s only decode. Most secret. Be prepared carry
out shore bombardme nt .against MUNDA airfield on NEW GEORGIA
during night of 4 January with three (3) CL and probably
2 DD. Use own planes for illuminati on and spotting retiring them to RINGBOLT. GRAYBACK available for navigation al
or other aid desired CMA informatio n to be provided her
through Comtaskfo r 42 by January 2. Propose to employ VF
coverage from CACTUS. Obtain air photos of target area and
sea approache s to firing position from Comtaskfo r 63. This
operation to support landing of own troops CACTUS. Advise
ships designated . Comsopac sends. CTF 42 and GRAYBACK
have for info in another system.

31 0341 CINCPAC to COMINCH Info COMSOPAC

Handle with utmost secrecy. It is apparent from Halsey's
300350 that the estimated dates of readiness of amphibiou s
troops c.ontained myser 0259W of 8 December are much too
optimistic . Therefore recommend before any directive by
Joint Chiefs of Staff be issued that the objective and
target date be referred to Cincpac and Comsopac for
comment.
31 1815 COMINCH to CINCPAC, COMSOPAC Info CSA,
* VCNO.
Very Secret. Only for addressee s. Comment on contempla ted
set-up whereby Deputy Commander Sopac area relieves Comsopac
of administr ative and local operation al matters including
bases except advanced so that Comsopac is free to give full
attention to enemy especially as SUSAN campaign progresses
when command relations with Comsowest pac area will develop
importanc e. Chief of Staff Army, VCNO informed.

11 90

~JfC~.E'!P

December (GCT)

01 0655 CTF 67 to COMSOPAC Info CCHSOWE2PAC, COMINCH, CINCPP..C.

Preliminary survey results ni~ht action 30 Nov - 1 Dec.
from CTF 67 who has not yet consulted Admiral Tisdale and
COs HONOIJJLU and 4 DD's. J"ap ships sunk 2 AP, 1 AK, 2
CL (YU3ARI or SENDARI Class) 4 DD' s. 2 other AP' s damaged.
Some indication that CA was present but escaped undamaged.
About 5 destroyers escaped. Am convinced no landings were
made fro~ any ship. Jap force believed co~posed of 5 AP
or AK 3 cruisers 9 destroyers. Action commenced 2320 following torpedo attack on transport group by our DD's from
5,000 yards. Gunfire at ranees 12 to 5 thousand yards.
8G Radars of great benefit. Jap gun fire wnimpressive

01 2252 TISDALE to

CO~~fSOPAC,

Info CINCPAC, COMINCH, All TF COHDHS.

Part 1 of 2 parts. Partial preliminary narrative 4th SAVO.

Tisdale sends. 4 DD's 2 miles ahead cruisers ordered
launchtor:pedo attack followed shortly by gun fire from
cruisers at targets already along beach area. This at
2323. All time L(-11). HONOLULU commenced fire at 2324
'range 8300 closine rapidly. Order in column MINlffiAPOLIS,
NE\N OHLEANS, PENSACOLA, HONOLULU, NORTHA1v1PTON, LAMSON,
LARDNER. First hit I saw was on NEV'l ORLEANS, second PENSACOLA. MINNEAPOLIS, NOHTHAiviPTON hits not noted. At
midnight Wright with 2 torpedo hits and rapidly failing
TBS ordered me take charge. Gunfire now desultory or over.
PT!:NSACr)LA half way SAVO to RIHG BOLT speed 8. NEW ORLEANS
retiring toward RING10LT speed 5 knots. NORTHl\MPTON immobilized and burninR advised was abandoning. ~diNNEJU?OLIS
making 5 knots toward llJNGA POI1~. Location DD's unknown.
Large fire alon~ stretch of beach seemed fully half mile
long. Ordered all destroyers to stand by crippled cruisers.
HONOLULU at about 0230 cleared area to westward to await
daylight due 0530 when returned via South of 9AVO hunting
crippled enemy ships south of TIUPSEL ISLAND9 enrout e. None
located. LARDNER, L4M8f)N joined inside 2AVO. Snd of part
1. CTF 67 pass to Comgen CACTU8, Info to Comairsopac by
hand. Comsopac pass to Comseronsopac.
02 0011 Part

~NO

of CTU 67.2.3 (TISDALE).

Part 2 of 4th SAVO. CTU 67.2.3 originator. MAURY patrolling TULAGI advised PERKIN~ and all 3 cruisers inside TULL\.GI
HAR jQR, Only MIJ\fi\TEAPOLIS vi si ~le. Circled off harbor to
signal 111/right in endeavor arranBe convoy to BUTTON but contact broken when :MINNEAPOLIS shifted berth behind island.
~~RUY. then advised no disabled cruisers able make trip.
Dlli\YTON, FLETCHER already departed. 11y group started for
BUTTON.. Extent damage to enern.y P:B~NSACOLA, NE\Iv ORLEANS,
PERKINS, lvl.AURY unknown. LAMSON, . LAHDNER, FLB~TCH~R, DRA.YTON,
(Continued)

1191

02 0011 Part TVtTO of CTH 67.2. 3 (TISDALE)

(Continued)

HONOLULU undamaged except HONOLUDJ maximum speed 28 until

granted 24 hours availability repair one engine. All require ammunition. 10 cruiser planes if none lost now at
TULAGI 10 others BUrrTON. Kitts in DRAYTON advises his ship
sunk 0257, 57 officers including Captain, Executive, Navigator, Gunnery, Supply, :Medical, 1st Lieut. all Comcrudi v 5
staff 1 British and 667 enlisted arrived BUTTON in FLETCHER
DRAYTON. Only 3 enlisted seriously in.jured. Understand
more survivors in RING30LT area. Believe entire enemy attack force destroyers and submarines.
02 0600 CT:B, 8 to TF 8 info CINCPAC.
This is CTF 8 Operation Order Number 15-42. Information.
SE11ICHI convoy and. KISKA convoy enroute these destinations,
one at least scheduled to arrive early evening December 2nd.
Escort probably consists 1 TA1ill and small number of destroyers.
Another force speed 24 arrived in an objective area above
time or about 0600W (-12) Dec 3rd approaching on course 040.
Assumptions. (1) Task Force is covering escort for sm1ICHI
convoy. (2) This force is carrier raiding force or surface
raiding force objective probably LONGVIEW for early morning
air attack or night shelling. Plan. This force will locate
enemy approaching LONGVIEW and SENIICHI - ATTU on afternoon
2 December or as early as possi~le 3 Decem1er and will destroy
fast enemy force by repeated air attacks in vicinity of LONGVIEW or full scale primary attack by air in 9EMICHI area and
will utilize surface force attack to complete destruction enemy
combatant surface force and SE:~~1ICHI convoy in order to prevent esta~lishment of enemv on SEMICHI IPLAND while safe
guardinR; forces and installations at T_DNGVIEW. Tasks. Air
Group. Air search unit. Locate enemy force auproaching
SID1ICHI and LONGVIEW as late as possible in December 2nd consistent with uredark return to bases and as early as possi~le
on December 3rd. Determine type and number enemy combatant
units. As consistent with primary task, assist in attacks on
enemy combatant forces and SI!l1ICHI convoy. Air striking
unit. Destroy as primary target, fast enemy combatant units
protecting SID~ICHI convoy. If and when search eliminates
p :~o ba bili ty of presence enemy near LONGVIEW. on 3 December, be
prepared to dispatch force as early as possible against enemy
located in ATTU SEMICHI area. Consistent vvi th tasks against
enemy combatant forces, assist in destruction of transports
and auxiliaries of SEMICHI convoy. ~ lith due regard for offensive tasks, while awaiting information of enemy, safeguard
air force at Western Bases to maximum possi'Jle especially on
early 3 December. Surface striking group. Destroy SEMICHI
convoy when search intelligence indicates favorable situation
or when ordered. Destroy or drive off enemy combatant units
interfering with primary task. Consistent with primary task
(Continued)

1192

--BECH~

December (GCT)
02 0600 CTF 8 to TF 8 Info CINCPAC. (Continued)
and as situation warrants complete destruction of enemy
combatant units. Xray. If not located until after arrival,
SE~~~ ICHI convoy may be found dispersed at SEMICHI, in TEMNAC
MASSACRE SARANA CHICHAGOF or HOLTZ BAYS ATTU or in lee of
AGATTU. SEMICHI convoy is primary convoy objective. No
action against KI SKA convoy must interfere with or delay
destruction SEMICEI convoy. Organization of groups and units
and commanders tbereof are set forth in my OPlan 14-42. Tasks
of groups not mentioned herein are covered by my OPlan 14-42.
This Op Order effective on receipt. Senavoff LONGVIEW assure delivery to BUTLER and LANDRUM.
04 0459 COI\TSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMAIRSOPAC
Your 270149. 2 bomber, 2 fighter strips planned for CACTUS.
Complement aircraft desired including attack group, 80 VF
and pursuit, 40 VSB, 18 VTB, 30 heavy bombardment, 20 medium bombardment, 12 Hudsons, 6 photo and utility, Comsopac
sends to Cincpac for action.

032127

COMSOPAC to COMINCH Info CINCPAC COMSERFORPAC COMSERONSOPAC.

272203 X SALVAGE OPERATIONS COOLIDGE WITH VIEVi TO RAISING not
practicable during war activities on account large force of
personnel and equipment diverted from salvage and battle
damage repairs to combatant vessels. As bow is 66 feet under
water and stern 138 feet under water ultimate salvage considered
questionable. Present program is cut holes in sides for removal urgently needed military materials of special value.
This program will be continued as fill in, when, work on combatant vessels permits. Action Cominch. Info Cincpac, Comserforpac. Comsopac originates. Comseronsopac has by hand.

04 1153 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMSOPAC COMGENSOPAC COMGEN lMAC etc.

West of POINT CRUZ 164th Infantry patrol killed 5 Japs
destroyed machine gun. On upper LUNGA Marine Raider patrol
captured 1 mortar some ammunition several machine guns and
killed 16 orientals with loss of 4 wounded. Comsopac summary.
3 CAs arrived BUIN from north at 1100. All times Love (-11)
December 3rd. Left at 1700. Last seen at 1825 north of
CHOISEUL course northeast. 10 DDs left BUIN 1300 course southeast. Probable these ships same as those engaged by CACTUS
air at 1830, 150 miles, bearing 300. Hits: 2 1000 pound hits
on 1 vessel, 1 1000 pound hit on 2nd vessel, 2 torpedo hits on
DD and 2 possibles on another. By hand to Comgensopac, Comgen
lst MAC, NSS give to Cominch info. Cincpac is action.

1193

BEC:Rl!!! -

December (GCT)
04 1750 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMSOPAC, CTF 8, COMNWSEAFRON, etc.
Addressee s only decode. It is considered possible even
probable that enemy will make definite effort to effect
surprise even suicidal attack perhaps of air raid character
on some of our positions and/or forces on or about 7th
instant. Para. Vfuen you pass this despatch along make
sure of adequate paraphras e.
04 2153 CTF 8 to TASK FORCE 8 Info COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMGENALDEFENSE.
From Tas~ Force Commander . Search plane contacted enemy
force Lat 49-11 N, Long 180. Compositio n: 2 CL, several
DDs and many transport s. Course north. Speed 12. Dispositio n
number 1. Search plane trailing enemy.

05 1441 COMDJCH to CI:rJCPAC, Info CI!TCLANT, COllSOPAC, COHSOWESPAC, etc.

4 AP's and 2 ~X's in addition to those my 251415 November to
all adees expected depart base hyno late December for MERCURY
where report Cincpac for duty. Now planning embark 158
Infantry Combat Team (trained in jungle warfare) at MERCURY
for AlODE in JOSEPB DICKMAJ\T CHARLES CARROLL THO~'LAS JEFFERSON
ARCTU~US also Army Navy personnel and cargo at base hy-po in
wiLLI.AJvT RIDDLE OBERON for WHITE POPPY. Comment. Early reply
necessary in order arrange loading. Opnav has by hand.
06 0143 Cornsopac to Cincpac Info COMINCH, COMSOW~SPAC, COMGEN';OPAC, etc.
Night of 4th after remarkable 30 day operation through mountainous jungle 2nd Raiders reached LUHGA. Comsopas passes.
They destroyed 5 Jap bases killed 400 enemy. Suffering only
17 dead their own force. West of MATA1'JIKAU 164th infantry
killed 7 nips. On 6 missions P-39's strafed 15 enemy landing
barRes and rafts vicinity TASRAFARONGA. Jap supplies lashed
to drums drifted toward beach. Cincpac action. Cominch
info. Comgensop ac and CoM~en First Maramphco rps have by
hand for info.

1194

B~CRE'f

DeCember (GOT}
06 2031 CINCPAC to COMINCH.
PENSACOLA scheduled depart RINGBOLT 6th local for BUT'I1 0N
speed about 8. Comsopac ordered following moves yesterday
afternoon, TF 16 proceed toward Lat. 15-00 S, 160-00 E,
engine speed 22, NORTH CAROLINA with DD escort from FANTAN 1
toward same position, speed 20, CTF 64 in WASHINGTON with
INDIANA, COLID~BIA, and DD escort from WHITE POPPY toward
same position speed 20. HONOLULU, HELENA available DDs at
BUTTON placed on 2 hours notice.

06 1929 COMSOPAC to COMINCH Info CINCPAC, COMAIHSOPAC, CTF 62.

Your 281708 Nov. The development of BUTTON as an advance
operating base of LION dimensions is approved. NOUMEA is
too far from present and prospective active combat areas
to answer all requirements. NOlJNrEA however is desirably
situated for supply. Provisions. Hospitalization. Training groups and 'Jattle damage repairs in conjunction with
d.rydocking tender and shore facilities equivalent to one
destroyer tender. Comsopac sends. Cominch action. Cincpac
info.
29 Nov

COMSOPAC to CINCPAC
Urdis 270841 . Afirm. At BUT'rON; 172nd C0 11bat team with
103rd Field Artillery Battalion plus attached medical company and engineer platoon. Enroute SPOONER to POPPY; one
battalion 103rd Infantry, one battery 152nd Field Artillery,
one battalion 169th Infantry, detachments of division service troops. Remainder 43rd Division, in POPPY, consists
of 103rd Infantry, 169th Infantry, 152nd and 169th Field
Artillery Battalions, 43rd reconnaissance troop, attached
medical quartermaster, ordnance, engineer units. Entire
Division reported as ready to combat except BUTTON contingent which is lacking con siderable equipment. Baker.
At CACTUS; 164th Infantry (3150), 182nd Infantry less one
battalion (3075), 245th Field Artillery Battalion (570),
246th Field Artillery Battalion (486). Enroute CACTUS due
3 DecembFr; 132nd Infantry less one battalion (2100),
247th Field Artillery Battalion (400). At BUTTON; 3rd
Battalion of 182nd Infantry (900). At POPPY; 1st Battalion 132nd Infantry (900), 22lst Field Artillery Battalion (500), reconnaissance squadron (196). All service
elements at CACTUS or enro11te. Cast. 9th Defense Battalion enroute CACTUS last elements arriving 3 December.
Dog. 1st Raider Battalion, present streng th 16 officers,
613 enlisted; now based WHITE POPPY. Of these 511 enlisted now NE!l ZEALAND for recreation, rehabilitation to
return about 20 December. Easy .6-155 11M guns and 4-155
MJ'l howitzers.
Enro1J. te with Def ense Battali on ; 6 additional
155 MM guns. Marairwing ONE; he a dquar ters WHITE POPPY,
forward eche lon CACTUS. Group 11 at DACTUS.and BUTTON
(moving to CACTUS ). Group 14 at CAC ~rus. Group 25 at
S
TONTOUTA. VMO 251 at BUTTON. VMF 212 enrou te USA.
11 9
1

BEOfil!!'.f'

December (GCT)
07 1251 COMI NCH to COMSOPAC Info CINCPAC.
As Sopac has first priority your request for shipments
are being met and will continue to be met to the full
extent that shipping can be made available after denying
much needed support to areas of lower priority. In addition 'to the s hips now at NOUMEA and BUTr.2 0N ships enroute and loading for NOU~FEA will arrive throughout December at rate exce eding 1 per day. Request you reaffirm
that this acclli~ulation shipping your area is wanted.
COMSOPAC to GOMGEN 1ST MARDIV, COMGEN FMAC, COMAMPHFORSOPAC, etc.
07 0446 Effective 10 December the GUADALCAUAL - TULAGI position
will assume a status generally similar to other island bases
in South Pacific. The base to be known "CACTUS" will embrace
the airfields on GUADALCANAL the seaplane base at TULAGI and
the Advanced Naval Bases and Naval Local Defense Forces at
GUADALCANAL and TULAGI, and all troops and installations in
the general area. ComGen CACTUS will command the base under
Comsopac. The principal of unity of command will be observed.
The administration and operation of aircraft will be responsibility of Comairsopac is covered in uorganization of aircraft Sopacu promulgated by Comsopac serial 285 of August 4,
1942. Naval Advance Bases and Naval Local Defense Forces
under Comnavbase CACTUS. For purposes of planning, administration, and development following presponsibilities are
established: Afirm. Airfields, seaplane pases, advanced
na.val bases, and naval local defense forces, ComnavbasEis
Sopac . Baker. Troops Comgen FMAC (Passes to Comgen Sopac
when Army forces assume defense responsibilities). Comamphibforsopac relieved responsibility defense CACTUS but
retains
responsibility for transportation of reinforcenents
',
replacements relief units supplies and equipment until Comseronsopac is able to assume this responsibility. MTRon 3
plus JAMESTO\~, MTRon 2 assigned to operational control
Comadnavalbase CACTUS. Comgen FMAC, Comamphforsopac, Comnavebasesopac have for action. Corngensopac, Comseronsopac
for info all by hand from Comsopac.
08 1225 COMSOPAC to COMINCH Info CINCPAC.
Accumulation shipping, your 071251, considered warranted.
With arrivals December, plus installation pontoon dock expect
materially improve turn around which is main bottleneck at
present. This will be further materials expedited by better
loading now a pparent in recent arrivals. Comsopac sends to
Cominch for action, Cincpac informa tion.

1196

,.EC2ET ..

December (GOT)
09 0405 OTF 8 to 0 INC PAC
Present garrison ADAK, 16,056; TANAGA garrison 0. Following future arrivals ADAK 12th, 600 ; I4th, 1264; December
28th, 550 completing troop movement to ADAK. January 5th
TANAGA troop movement from ADAK begins. Expected date
completion January 15th. Eventual garrison ADAK 14,361.
Eventual garrison TANAGA 4,109. Have no knowledge of approved preliminary plan for AMOHITKA occupation. Army
survey party proceeds there at early date. OTF 8 answers
Oincpac 071049.
11 2025 CINCPAC to COM 14 Info COMINCH
For Admiral Nimitz. B-17 strike reported was in BUIN area.
Photos 9th local show Iv1UNDA airfield 90fo completed with
taxi-ways revetments bomb blast shelters 4 gun positions.
Halsey orders Fitch make repeated attacks there. On departure Ril{GBOLT, MINNEAPOLIS ordered BUTTON; NEVIl ORLEANS,
ACACIA. PT reports sinking Jap sub off KAMIMBO night
9th local. Tentative Comsopac plan counter Jap subs
CACTUS,PBY locate with radar, cruiser planes illuminate
area, PTs or available DDs strike. Vandergrift relieved
by Patch, arrives BRISBANE 12th. Halsey advises MacArthur 75% lst Mardiv have malaria. Time rehabilitation
3, possibly 6 months considers climate of SYDNEY or further
South necessary. RAdm.. Wright ordered u.s. temporary duty
by Halsey. Hadar and sound by DD last night indicate 2
probable subs 20 miles from NE end MOLOKAI. Being hunted
today by 2 DD VPBS. No word yet of 11 DD TOKYO-E~press
expected CACTUS last night.
11 2147 V OPNAV to COMSOPAC INFO CTHCPAC COM 12, COMNAVBASESOPAC
To facilitate planning orderly flow of base materials assign relative priority on outstanding and future requests
for base materials and organizations using decimal system.
Pending receipt of priorities intend ship as follows: A.
ACORNS 3 and 4 in December: B. Cor.m-:.unica tion component LION
1 to BUTTON, FAGTRANS, CINCPAC 090109. C. Material for
development WHITE POP PY and piling requested Comnavbasepac
040421 as space ava i lable. D. First echelon LION 1 early
January Comnavbasepac 240557, BOAKE assisting. E. Stevedore
battalions as requested my 072053. F. Will modify CUB 2
to include all material request e d your serial 0089130 and
send with its organized and trained personnel to CACTUS and
RI KGBOLT. Pro g r~ssive assignment of priorities will greatly
assist in te g ratin~ co ncurrent development of W]IITE POPPY,
CACTUS,- BUTTON and -shipment subsequent ACORNS. Pass to
Comnavbasopac

119 7

gGRE'3?-

December ( GCT)
10 2220 COMINCH Info CINCPAC, GOMSOPAC, COMSO'NE SPAC
This is option, negat Inter Intelli gence Bulletin Number
1 resumes former ORANGE Navy summary informative of trends
and new developments when noted here. Zeal. Believe CinC
3rd enroute South and will command striking force of CV's
supported by CinC 2nd with available CA's and some CL's
plus DD's. In coordination with indicated strong land
based aircraft forces in RABAUL-SOLOMONS believe primary
objective will be to gain control of ~r first, sea command second. CinC 8th now considered in subsidiary holt
concerned logistics GUADALCAl~AL and IDNA with forces limited to DD's, SS's and small number CL's. Info concerning
BE's too fragmentary hazard opinion. CinC Combined believed to retain strategic control impending operations.
Indication MUNDA further reinforced on lOth.
11 2025

Cincpac to Cominch.
For Admiral Nimitz. B-17 strike reported was in BUIN
area. Photos 9th local show 1TIJNDA airfield 90% completed
with taxiways revetments bonb ,J last shelters 4 gun posi-:tions. Halsey orders Fitch make repeated attacks there.
On departure Hingbolt MINNEAPOLIS ordered BUTTON, NEW
ORLEANS ACACIA. PT reports sinking Jap sub off KA.HJJviBO
night 9th local. Tentative Comsopac plan counter Jap
subs CACTUS PBY locate with radar-- cruiser planes illuminate area PTs or available DDs strike. Vandegrift relieved by Patch arrives lR IS~A1ill 12th. Halsey advices
MacArthur 75% 1st :rv~ardi v have malaria time rehabilitation
3 pqssibly 6 months considers climate of SYDNEY or further
south necessary. RAdm Vlrir:ht ordered U.s. temporary duty
by Halsey. Radar and sound by DD last night indicate 2
probable subs 20 miles from WJ: end M0I/J1\AI. Being hunted
today by 2 DD ITPBs. No word yet of 11 DD Tokyo Express
expected CACTUS last night.

12 1501

lA. 2:P SOPAC , CTF 42, etc. Info COJ\CINCH,

CINCPAC.
Refer Comsopac (originator) 0704h6. Hearafter followCor.mavbase CACTUS includes
in~ designations will apply:
SuJordinate Commands of Comnavbase LUNGA and Comnavoase
Comgen sopac and l ivu\.C have. Also Comseronsopac
TUL.L\..GI.
and Comnavadvbase Sopac. lnfo Cominch and Cincpac.

12 2112

CiaCPAC via Com 12 to CTF 8 Info COiviiNCH, CITJCPAC ADMIN.

COMSOPAC to ALL

r~LAND

This from Cincpac. Following has been sent by DeWitt with

concurrence of Cominch and Ci ncpac " [3uspend all action in
connection with occupation of TJ.JJAGA pe nding further
instructions from this headquarters. Retain troops destined for TANAGA at ADAK taki ng all measures possiole to
contri)ute to their comfort and use them to maximum to
expedite construct ion dispersal ar r;as harbors and stora.:f!S
8
facilities ADAK . Further information later.

g:gonE';f;!.

December (GOT)
11 1629 CCYMINCH to BUAER, CINCLANT, CISJCPAC, Info BuOrd, Opnav, etc.
Plan eventually to return all P"9Y planes from advanced
combat areas, and to replace with squadrons equipped VJi th
PBiviJC planes. About 14 new PB1v1JC squadrons should oecome
operative on East Coast by tTuly 1943. Of these half' are
assigned Cinclant and half Cincpac. Cinclant designate
and arrange for transfer to Pacific at least 1 PBM3c
squadron per month beginning January. These squadrons as
received will replace PBY s~uadrons now in Pacific.
Cincpac desir:nate PBY squadrons to be returned and arrange
for their return to Continental U. S. as appropriate.
Cincpac is authorized to delay return of these squadrons
at discretion X Upon return, PB': squadrons will become
available for redistributio n by Cominch. Squadron personnel to be transferred will consist of 1 and 1/2 combat
flight crews per aircraft assigned, plus 2 ground officers
and 6 enlisted technicians per squadron. Transfer of
headauarters squadrons or other ground personnel not involved in this Movement. Any readjustment of such ground
personnel is to be handled through normal channels. 3uaer
initiate advance flow of supportin~ material to operating
areas as designated by Cincpac. Buaer has this for action.
Ru0rd and VOnnav for info.
15 0422 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Inf'o COMSWPAC, ALL TF COMS SOPAC AREA
Catalina bombed and strafed MUNDA for three hours night
of 13th from 2000 feet. Fortresses and CACTUS planes continued attacks on 14th reporting that runway appeared well
bombed. Scouts report any casual ties :fv1UNDA area from bombing of 12th also that Japs have 5 inch AA gun there. Some
sources indicate no Japs on CHOISEUL except radio post on
northwest tip at MALAVAGA. Two Bl?'s bombed KAHILI RPT
KAHILI on 14th meeting no AA or fighter opposition. From
Comsopac. Ground forces continued patrols in GUADALCANAL
on 13th and reconnoitered Mount KUSTIN prior to intended
occupation. 2 MG positions and crews destroyed. Several
ORANGE planes dropped bombs near HENDERSON FIELD fighter
strip with damage. Destroyer SAUFLY depth charged sub
resulting in oil slick east of GUADALCANAL night of 13th.
B l?'s reports 3 D0's, 3 tankers, 4 AK's, 1 passenger
liner possibly AH at BUIN. 3 destroyers south of Bt~;
one with stern blown ofr being towed by_another.
10 2147 COMINCH to CTNCPAC, COMSOPAC, COJJfWESEAFRON Info M:ARCORPS, etc.
Para 1. Marine Corps make following units available for
loading at SAN DIEGO beginning 10 January, 1943, and transfer as soon thereafter as practicable to Sopac area: (Afirm)
Advance echelon headquarters 3rd fuardiv, 12 officers, 100
enlisted men and 200 measurement tons. (Baker) 9th Marine
Regiment reinforced, 243 ofticers, 5400 enlisted men and

1199

SFCRE11 ,

December (GCT)
10 2147 COMINCH to CINCPAC etc. (Continued)
25,000 measurement tons. Para 2. Ultimate destination
of units as Cincpac directs. Para 3. NTS provide sea
transportatio n issue necessary instructions regarding
loading of vessels, and inform other action addressees of
names of vessels involved in movement, date available for
loading, and approximate date of departure UNITED STATES
ports. Para 4. Marcorps (Afirm) Assist in preparation
of loading plans as necessary. (Baker) Provide normal
weapons and equipment, 90 days supply, 10 units of fore
all units. ?ara 5. Code name this movement Tiresome .
Marcorps and Opnav have by hand. NXZ give to Comgen 1st
MAC. Com 11 pass to Comgen FMF, SAN DIEGO area. Para 6.
Execute this plan on receipt.
15 2350 COMSOWESPAC to CINCPAC Info COMSOPAC
Information very meager and old concerning DUTCH NEW GUINF.A,
following best available: positions (Comsowespac for sending,
action Cincpac, info Comsopac) at SOAONG BANO and FAK-FAK
total strength 6-800. Allied ship attacked in eastern ARAFURA SEA 15th by plane presumed from DOBO in AROE ISLANDS
where garrison estimated 140 in September. 7000 troops
Portugese TI1~-IOR covering north coast thoroughly, 26-4600
Dutch TIMOR mostly KAiviPANG area. TORRES STRAIT open but
some passes great barrier reef mined according of despatches.
Northeast NEW GUINEA, . WEWAK and MADANG occupied,no estimate
strength,HOLLA NDIA not occupied December 4th; native police
pro Japanese. LAE SALA1~UA unreliable,es timate 4000 including construction workers and aircraft ground crews.
CAPE WARD HilliT area 1400. BL~A area 1400. 3000 along
SOPUTA track (leads inland about halfway between BUNA and
GONA)
16 2115 COMINCH to CINCPAC Info COMGEN FMF AT SAN DIEGO

Reference my 092145. Plan send 12th Marine Defense Battalion

to COPPER early January to relieve lOth Defense Battalion
which will embark same vessel for ROSES. Plan to exchange
12th and lOth equipment thus avoid unloading copper. Remainder of 12th Battalion equipment unable to load in vessel
provided by NTS will be sent from West Coast direct to final
destination for assignment 4th Defense Battalion on its withdrawal from ROSES Do you concur? Request immediate reply
in order to arrange transportatio n.

1200

ECRBr.I?

December (GCT)
17 0812 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info

COMSO~ffiSPAC,

All TF COMS SOPAC.

CACTUS ground forces extended patroling on 15th. Comsopac

puts out the dope. 24 Japs killed. 6 Marines wounded.
MUNDA bombed by Catalina night of 15th and twice by B-17's
on 16th. In the morning strike 3 of 12 a-ttacking float
zeros were destroyed and 1 B-17 shot down near TETAPARI,
NEW GEORGIA. Crew rescued. At 2240 L (-11) SBD's on strike
against 6 DDs seen approaching MUNDA. 1 SBD hit 1 destroyer
with 500 lb. bomb near miss with 200 pounders. 2nd SBD
bombed same target fut failed to return to base and results
unobserved. Other SBD's failed to locate target and bombed
runway. Fortress bombed KAHIL! runway morning 16th.
Dauntless and Wildcat silenced anitaircraft positions bombed
and straffed REKATA area evening of 16th. KINGFISHER san~
midget sub GUADALCANAL area. Small schooner destroyed in
RUSSELL ISLAND by CACTUS air. On 15th MUNDA craters appeared
to have been filled. Photos on 16th show BALALLE coral
surfaced fighter strip 2000 feet long 75 percent completed.
Local sources report 2 subs at REKATA 4 different nights
during December. 12 DDs, 6 APs AKs, 2 Tankers, 5 float zeros
and 7 flying boats reported at BUIN 16th. Damaged tanker
still anchored there. 8 of the Destroyers arrived BUIN from
north during morning and 6 left for south late in afternoon.
HARUNA and KONGO according to captured documents left SOLOMON
action October 14th at speed of 29 knots.
18 0151 CINCPAC to COMINCH Info COMSOPAC

My objection to arrangement your 162115 is that in spite

concurrence my 170545 to tentative destination ROSES for
lOth Defense Battalion I think that situation migqt :.require
Halsey to change employment this battalion to a forward area.
It is the only such organization uncomrnited and suitable for
this use during the next few months. I had therefore contemplated asking Halsey to consider retiring the 4th Defense
Battalion without relief or to fill its place with Army personnel. Due to freedom from malaria lOth will be more effective
than 4th even after latter has been rehabilitated. Experience
shows undesirability of exchanging weapons particularly when
differences exist. Also it has been found most desirable
where spare parts are immediately available. To summarize the
foregoing I think lOth Battalion should leave HAWAII with its
own weapons and thus ready to land and fight in a forward area
if required. Request action your 162115 be withheld until
Halsey's further comment obtained

1201

faEGHEl~

December(GCT)
18 1056 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH
Your 180151 to Cominch. Cominch 162115 not received.
Until your reference was received have planned: .. Afirm.
lOth Defense Battalion relieve 4th ROSES. Baker. 4th
LONGBOW rehabilitation; Cast. 11th (now arriving in
area) temporarily to BUTTON pending further probable
duty TULAGI-PORT PURVIS; Dog. 3rd now being relieved by
Army CACTUS to LONGBOW rehabilitation. Result availability, 11th depending results reconnaissance and developments, 3rd and 4th available abo1Jt March for employment
new areas. Will proceed on above basis unless otherwise
instructed. Comsopac to Cincpac for info vominch.
19 2206 SENAV CACTUS to

C01~IRSOPAC

Info CINCPAC, COMSOPAC etc.

Summary of flights from dawn yesterday until daylight this

morning. 12 SED's escorted by fighters hit MUNDA 1330 L)11) destroying several building and received no opposition
from enemy planes or AA. 7 B-17's bombed MUNDA 1715 L starting several fires. Anti-aircraft fire light. Runway has
several bomb craters from previous raids. These planes,
sent to attack shipping at BUIN were met by at least ~20'
enemy planes in air over SHORTLAND ISLAND. Some were 's,
some float 's and other float biplanes. Japs did no damage
with phosphorous bombs but 1 B-17 and 5 P-38 received damage
from bullets. About 25 float planes and 4 flying boats were
in KULITANAI BAY, SHORTLAND ISALND and AA was received from
KORORO. Weather bad in vicinity and our striking force
turned back and bombed MUNDA. All planes returned. 1 B-17
over KIHILI for 2 hours starting 0045, 1 over MUNDA from
midnight until 0400, 1 spent 2 hours over BUKA leaving
there at 0300. They dropped 20 hundred pound bombs, several
flares, and many empty bottles at irregular intervals from
BUKA; 1 large fire was left burning at south west end of
runway; 1 DD at northeast end BUKA passage. 3 SBD's,one
PBY dropped flares and searched unsuccessfully for transport
reported at TASSAFARONGA at 2300 L(-11). No signs of enemy
activity seen. Small groups of Japs straffed during day on
coast road between TONEGI RIVER and TASSAFARONGA. RDO
BUTTON pass to Comgen ls t Mar- for info.
20 2207 SENAV GUADALCANAL to COMAIRSOPAC, Info CG ARMY FORCES SOPAC, etq
Condensed version of 24 hours preceding 0600 Love (-11)
today. Attack on MUNDA by 4 B-17's with indifferent results
at 0700 received little AA. Planes over local Jap territory
during entire day saw few si gns of activity. Single Bogie
on screen at 2350 came to CAPE ESPERANCE and vJ ithdrew track
300. 2 B-17's attacked two AKs East of KIIIILI airdrome with
500 lb bombs from 0200 . until 0345. Direct hi t 2 near misses
(Continued)

1202

iH~lORE'i'

December (GCT)
20 2207 SENAV GUADALCANAL to COMAIRSOPAC, etc.(Continued)
started fire on one ship. 3 near misses on 2nd. Strafed
both vessels. Damaged ship settling by stern when last
seen. Small calibre AA from ship and airdrome. One Fortress harassed MUNDA for three hours beginning at 0100
dropped 20 100 pounders from 4000 feet. Results unobserved.
No sign of Jap activity. One similar type plane spent hour
over BUKA dropping 100 lb. bombs. Hit wharf SOHONA TSSPAND(?)
and north east jetty starting fire latter place. Small
calibre anti aircraft ineffective. Another fortress molested
KIHILI from 0200 to 0400 with same armament. Dropped two
bombs on NADI village and two on landing strip on BALLALE
ISLAND. Daily searches all completed. Air observation
indicates field on BALLALE ISLAND ready for use. Request
photo reconnaissance. Pass to Comgen lMAC for information.
20 2304 DE WITT to CINCPAC
From General De Witt to Cincpac. Preliminary report FORMULA
reconnaissance indicates suitable fighter field strip at the
head of CONSTANTINE HARBOR 150 feet wide by 3,000 with metal
mat can be constructed in from 2 to 3 weeks. Sites exist
for fields more than 5,000 feet long suitable as main field
and can be constructed in period estimated as from 90 to 120
days and provide some dispersion. I interpret this report
as meaning construction of airfield on FORMULA is feasible
and as placing Joint Directive in effect. Do you concur?
21 0215 CTF 8 to CINCPAC
To Cincpac for action. Originator CTF 8 considers additional
forces required for escort and covering in CROWBAR operation
(your 182321) are three modern cruisers, one of which should
be 8 inch and one ,s quadron new DDs. Recognize probable unavailability but state estimated requirements as suggested in
reference. Consider early discovery of movement by enemy air
and submarines certain threat to BOODLE must result in immediate and maximum possible enemy reaction. First and incomplete report from FORMULA survey party establishes that
Japs have dug test holes east end of island within past month
and are keeping area under close air observation. Am preparing p1ans on basis of present local naval strength as any
reenforcement can be absorbed with very minor alteration.
21 0830 CTF 8 to CINCPAC Info COMINCH COMWESEAFRON, COMNOWESEAFRON.
FORMULA Survey Party returned LONGVIm~ December 19. Report
concerning construction air fields follows. Metal mat fighter
strip 150 by 3000 feet head of CONSTANTINE HARBOR feasible by
aviation batallion in 2 or 3 weeks after starting construction.
Sites exist for main airfield with some dispersion. 90 to 120
days estimated to complete field 5000 by 200 feet by 1 aviation
batallion. Tracks and test holes indicate enemy has investigated southern end of island for suitable airfield. Island
scouted by enemy air both days but survey party believes t~,;{
1 L U0
were not sighted. Addees pass to Cincpac for action.

SEORE'f

December ( GCT)

Zl 2307 CTF 8 to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, CG ADC

CTF 8 reports. Coordinated air attack shore installations
KISKA HARBOR 1345 to 1350 W(-10) December 20 by 5 B-24's,
4 B-26's, 4 B-25's, and 9 P-38's. 52 500 pomnders on Subbase area with hits heavy explosions and flames observed
in buildings south of Marine railway. South and north
heads strafed and bombed with 48 100 pound demolition.
Direct hit on gun emplacement and on building AA battery
area. Camp area strafed and bombed with 16 each 100
pound incendiaries magneizum and general purpose. Results
not observed except hit on munition sheds with heavy explosion. P-38's strafed camp area south and north head
and beached cargo ship. All planes returned. Light battle damage from heavy AA. 1 pilot, 1 crew memb'er minor
injuries. For Cincpac action, Cominch info, CG ADC by hand.
23 Q407 CINCPAC to COMWESEAFRONT Info COMINCH
For General DeWitt. Concur your 211820 as basis for
initiating training. Request you send me your suggestea
draft of the joint directive we should issue in ~arrying
out task B of Cominch 181315. Foregoing based on assumptions. Afirm. That troops have been or will be made
available to your. Baker. That location of amphibious
training is satisfactory to Rockwell. Cast. That necessary transports for the indicated combat loading can be
made available for the actual operation agmnst BOODLE.

23 0016 DeWITT to CINCPAC Info COMWESEAFRON.

Concur entirely your 220557 pass this to Cincpac handle.
(copies in pinks as this despatch is Most Secret).
23 2215 CINCPAC to CTF 8 Info COMINCH CTF 3 COMWESEAFRON etc.
Execute the following plan which is issued jointly by Cincpac
and . CG. Western Defense Command. Objective. Occupation of
AMCHITKA at earliest date. Purpose. To deny AMCHITKA immediately to enemy and utilize it as soon as possible in air
operations against enemy forces and KISKA installations .
Task. Seize and occupy AMCHITKA and build airfield thereon.
In Command. Commander Northern Force (CTF 8) Pacific Fleet.
Forces Assigned. Task Force 8 plus INDIANAPOLIS, DEWEY,
WORDEN, KALK, GILLESPIE, MIDDLETON. Army Garrison of about
6000 plus transportatio n forces as designat ed by ComGen
Western Defense Command. Target Date. January FIFTH. Command
of Army Forces less aircraft will revert to Army when CG
FORMULA informs CTF 8 he is ready to take over. Code name
of this pperation is CROW-BAR. Addressees pass for info to
interested Army Commands.

1204

BEGRB':I?

December (GCT)
23 2359 CTF 17 to CINCPAC Info CONGEN 7th AIRFORCE.
CTF 17 speaking. Pass to ComGen 7th Air Force. Initial
estimates of attack are approxima tely 90% of projectile s
were placed in target area. Every indication attack
complete surprise. No AA fire until after passage of 1st
Airplane. Many fires started which were visible 75 miles.
No injury to personnel , only minor damage to aircraft.
Photo airplane departed 0420 . Y (Plus 12).

24 0616 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info ALL TFC SOPAC COMSOWESTPAC NZNB.

Day long strafing Nip positions GUADALCANAL featured activity
there 23rd. SBTs, SBDs and fortresses hit MUNDA noon same
day concentra ting areas just north and east of field and on
coastal gun positions and west end runway. 7 zeros downed
by fighter escort. Photos this strike show clearing underway for possible extension eastern end of strip, which appears useable. Sin.g le B-17 harassed ?~roNDA prior dawn today.
1 AK, 8 other ships BUIN yesterday with 20 planes on KAHILI
field. At 230535 GOT 1 CL, 1 DD between FAIST and VELLA LAVELLA on southeast course. From Comsopac. NWX pass to NXNB
for info.
24 0225 CTF 8 to CINCPAC
Comtaskfo rce 8 sends. Radio Honolulu pass to Cincpac for
action. DeWitts orders to Buckner establish CROBAR Army
force as fol~ows: 1st Echelon total 2952 composed of 1
Battalion infantry, 1 Battery 75's, 1 Battery 155's, 2
Antiaircr aft Batteries , plus regiment engineers ; 2nd Echelon
probably 2 weeks later total 1600 composed of 1 Battalion
of infantry, plus engineers . lOOOmisce llaneous troops not
yet assigned to echelons. Total 5560. Buckner's chief of
staff reports from personal conference with DeWitt in San
Francisco that latter realizes larger garrison more desirable but has decided against increased force for the following reasons: A. Additiona l freight tonnage involved.
B. "The Navy is confident the movement will be unopposed
and that the7. can prevent anything coming either to FORMULA
or LONGVIEW. t

1205

-8EGRE~

December (GCT)

25 0303

CINCPAC TO COMSOPAC INFO CC'MSO VVESTPACFOR, COIVLAIRSOPAC ,COMINCH.

Present concentration over 100 Jap ships in RAEAUL offers
best chance of war to date to strike crippling blow at enemy
overseas transportation service. Request your ideas and
specific comments as to planes and munitions available for
all out air strike combining low altitude bomb and torpedo
attack on shi pping by medi1rn bombers and li ghtning fi ghter
escort from BUTTON via CACTUS coordinated with maximum effort
by heavy bombardment aviation against adjacent airdromes and
AA installations in RABAUL area. Coordination with Sowespac
forces necessary in order to provide maximum effort. Sup:gest
you take up with Mac Arthur. Also believe this enemy concentration warrants greater number of our submarines in RABAUL
approaches.
Carpenter pass to MacArthur.

25 0449 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH

CO~~IRSOPAC

COMGEN CACTUS ETC

Comsopac sending. Current night nuisance raids over CACTUS

are lowering combat efficiency of our troops through loss of
sleep and increased exposure to malaria during hours of darkness spent in fox holes and dubouts. Recommend that a
minimum of 6 night fighting aircraft with homiing radars and
personnel now undergoing night fighter training plus ground
equipment be dispatched CACTUS earliest time. Best available
altitude determining intercepter radars with night fighter
directing personnel should accompany. Advise. Action Cincpac
info Cominch, Comairpac, Comgen CACTUS, Comairwingspac,
Comgensopac, Comfair NOUMEA by hand, Comairsopac, please pass
to Com.a irwing 1.
26 0224 COMAIRSOPAC TO COMSOPACFOR Info CINCPAC, COMSO'!VESPACFOR
.Christmas photos BALLALE ISLAND show landing strip to be
surfaced 3500 feet with 500 feet north east end unfinished.
Dlearing extends complete length . island from northeast to
southwest beaches. Dispersal lane southwest end much improved. 1 Revetment finished 7 more under construction.
Similar dispersal area _started to northeast end. No planes
observed but strip looks serviceable. Large concentration
stores southwest tip of island. Previous :dispatch e.rroneously
repbrted ~ strip to be shorter.
Careful check show these
measurements more accurate.

1205

.. SEGHB''

December (GCT)
30 0350 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC.
Urdis 270841 November. Following planned. A. By 10 Jan.
entire Americal and 25th Divisions in CACTUS. 2nd Marine
Division in CACTUS. Lst N~rine Division in AUSTRALIA.
214th Coast Artillery Regiment embarking WHITE POPPY for
CACTUS. 1st Raider Battalion and 2nd Parachute Battalion
from SPOONER embarking at POPPY. 6th Construction Battalion
enroute CACTUS to FULCRUM for rehabilitation. B. About
25 January 2nd Marine Regiment embark CACTUS for LONGBOW,
27th Construction Battalion embark WHITE POPPY for CACTUS.
c. Debark 3rd Raider Battalion from STRAW at BUTTON. D.
30 January embark 8th Marine Regiment at CACTUS for LONGBOW.
E. 20 February embark 6th Marine Regiment at CACTUS for
LONGBOW. F. About 14 January 11th Defense Battalion unload
RINGBOLT for gradual transfer to PORT PURVIS. More detailed
info regarding movements by airmail.

30 0627 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC info COMSOW:E,SPAC, ALL TF COMS SOPAC etc.

CACTUS Marines killed 110 Japs 27th and results artillery
fire plus minor clashes raise total enemy slain GUADALCANAL
past few days to 155-165. Pair of small AKs at WICKHAM
le.ft blazing exploding total wrecks after 2 BLUE air strikes
29th. Early CATS harassed MUNDA 29th and 30th dropping bombs
and mortar shells. Comsopac daily dope. Rdo AUCKLAND pass
to NZNB. Heavy AA 29th from point and shore emplacements
toward KOKENGOLO. Further reports much barge activity and
unloading southeast KOLOMBANGARA. KUNDU POINT west GANONGGA
also may be staging point MUNDA supply. Barges small AKs
there 27th and 100 men ashore. Native patrol SANTA ISABEL
jumped 24 Japs December 28th only 3 escaped alive. 29th
air search REKATA saw construction continuing PAPATURA
ISLAND strafed 3 float planes on water.
30 1223CONSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMINCH.
Cincpac action Comsopac originator Cominch info. Cominch
151650 Cincpac 170505. Following units CACTUS-RINGBOLT
area by unit, Officers strength, enlisted. A. Army. 246th
F.A. Battalion 25, 418. 164th Inf. Regt. 123, 3325. 182nd
Inf. Regt. 125, 2511. 247th F.A. Battalion 26, 369. 245th
F.A. Battalion 29, 524. 132nd Inf. Regt. 126, 3536.
Americal Division service troops 102, 1235, reconnaissance
Squadron 12, 470. B. Navy. Advanced Bases 138, 604. 6th
Construction Battalion 17, 955. Acorn Red 150, 1368. C.
Marine. First Marine Division service and special detachment 25~ 1000. 7th Marines reinforced 241, 4202. Second
marines reinforced 209, 4435. 8th Marines reinforced 140,
2808. 3rd Defense Battalion 241, 4202. 5th Defense Battalion
79, 272. 9th Defense Battalion 51, 1139. 3rd Barrage Balloon
Squad~on 11, 220.
18th Construction Battalion 14, 523.
155 mm Battery Corps Artillery 7, 148. Info military equipment not withdrawn follows by airmail.

1207

Si.:QHE'f=

December (GCT)
31 0836 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info COMSWPAC, ALL TF COMS SOPAC, etc.
Daily dope from Comsopac patrols .k illed 20 more Japs and
single dive bomber demolished heavy gun behind their lines
the 30th. 1700 love (-11) same day SED's and F4F's raided REKATA scoring bomb hits new buildings PAPATIRAGIA
ISLAND and other structures SUAVANUA POINT. Only slight
AA. Special RECCE VILA area southeastern KOLOMBANGARA
1140 love 30 negative. WICKHAM HARBOR empty oil slicks
evidence almost certain destruction AK's bombed there
29th. P-39's and F4F's destroyed 5 small barges another
point on south VANGUNU 1300 love 30th. C1N reports DD
close inshore CHOISEUL BAY 30th and DD patrols off northern entrance TONOLEI area said daily late afternoon routine.
Nips hot breath on North SOLOMONS watchers and 1 in
CHOISEUL made forced move yesterday. Shipping still light
FAISI-BUIN area but 91 vessels seen RABAUL 1000 love 30th.
Medium bombers now using MUNDA where PBY' s made nuisance
raids this morning. At 0600 love 31 s~arch from CACTUS
saw 5 submerged possible midget subs in MAROVO LAGOON.
Strike despatched. BLUE subs report folloWing successes:
ALBACORE got 6,000 ton AK or AP just off MADANG December
k8th. GREENLING sank 2 AK's northeast of ADMIRALTYS and
DD north by BOUGAINVILLE STRAIT.
3.1. 0830 COMARAIRWING 2 to COMAIRSOPAC Info CINCPAC, COMSOPAC etc.
6 B-26's protected by 4 Lightnings C1~, 4 Cobras CMA,
4 Wildcats dropped 6 500 and 42 100 pound bombs ~AUNDA
field 1630 L (minus 11) CMA altitude 8000. No enemy
planes seen on ground or in air. AA heavy but not effective. 1 P-39 landed in water on way up CMA pilot
ashore safely RUSSELL. About 8 large caliber AA guns
now at MUNDA, Wildcats had difficulty maintaining speed
of bombers. Hand for info to Comgen FMAil\T.
31 0459 CINCPAC to .COMINCH Info COMGENHAWDEPT
Presume you have been informed of Emmons 282325 to Chief
of Staff, U.S. Army. I plan to give maximum employment
to bombardment aircraft as suggested by your 261315.
This is not only effective action against enemy but excellent training for all concerned. In addition believe
important to add to long range search and striking forces
here while there is threat to outlying bases this area.
Addtional b ombardment group is most desirable.

1208

~sECRE'f

December (GCT)

31 1100 COMSOPAC to CTF 63, CTF 67 Info COMGEN CACTUS, etc.

311100 part 1 of 3 parts. Comsopac Operation Plan 1-43.
Task Group 62.6 Captain Reifsnider consisting 6 AP's, 1 AK,
5 DD's depart WHITE POPPY 1800 GCT December 31st to land troop
reenforcements and cargo for GUADALCANAL and TULAGI embark
personnel and equipment for further transfer in accordance
Comtaskfor 62 Operation Order A26-42. Landings is scheduled
to commence LUNGA POINT area by 1830 GCT January 3rd. Estimate withdrawal of 5 AP's with personnel will be completed
by local night January 6th. Task organization. Task Force
63 Vice Admiral Fitch shore-based air units CACTUS, RINGBOLT, BUT'roN. Task Force 64 Rear Admiral Lee Ba tdi v 6;
DUNLAP, FANNING, MAURY, LARDNER. Task Force 67 Rear Admiral
Ainsworth; LOUISVILLE, HONOLULU, HELENA, NASHVILLE, ST. LOUIS,
COLUMBIA, ACHILLES, FLETCHER, DRAl'TON, LAMSON, OBANNON, NICHOLAS, GRAYBACK. Task unit 66.1.6 Commander Ryan: PLATTE,
LANSDOWNE, no general task. This force will cover Task
Group 62.6 until safe withdrawal of 5 AP's from CACTUS area
as determined by Commander, South Pacific Force. End
part 1. Addees who have all 3 parts by hand and otherwise
stated in part 3.

31 1112 COMSOPAC to CTF 63, CTF 67 Ipfo CTF 42, CINCPAC, etc.
This is part 2 of my Opplan 1-43. Tasks. Task Force 63
provide close air protection for Task Group 62.6 from point
Q until safe withdrawal 5 AP's, strike enemy forces and installations repeatedly commencing 3 January as far north
as and including BUIN area, provide air protection for approach
and withdrawal of Task Force 67 1IDNDA bombardment unit period
(Comsowespac Plans to strike RABAUL every morning until and
including January 7th). Task Force 64 depart NOUMEA 1800
GCT January 1st arrive point S 0800 GCT January 3rd operating
thereafter as practicable in general area point S until
otherwise directed. Task Force 67 depart BUTTON 0300 GCT
January 2nd contact Task Group 62.6 approximately 60 miles
south of Point Q at 2100 GCT January 2nd, proceed independently thereafter to operate 100 miles northeast of point Q,
detach unit to bombard MUNDA airfield installation N~N GEORGIA
the night of January 4th local date, be prepared to coun er
enemy threats against landing and withdrawal opera tions of
Task Group 62.6. Task Unit 66.1.6 depart WHITE POPPY 1800
GCT January 2nd proceed to arrive point 0 at 2300 GCT the
4th, operate to eastward passing through point 0 daily at
2000 and 0700 all GCT for fueling rendezvous until further
orders. Finish part 2. Adees who have all 3 parts by hand
or 'otherwise listed in part 3
31 1124 COMSOPAC to CTF 63, CTF 64, ALL TF COMSOPAC, GRAYBACK, etc.
Part 2of 311100 started "This is part 2 of my Opplan 1-43 11
~fuat follows is part 3 of Comsopac 311100.
Opplan 1-43 part
3. Logistics fuel in battleships, cruisers, PLATTE, "!'JHITE
POPPY, BUTTON. Communications in accordance Pac 70 TF Commanders frequency 4205 KCS ~eries. In addition ComsopaC1209

:3E 0 RE't-..

December (GCT)
31 1124 (Continued)
will guard secondary series as follows: commencing with
execution this plan. 4295 KCS from 0700 to 800 GCT. 8590
continuously. 12885 from 1800 to 0700 GCT. Employ secondary
frequencies as necessitated by volumns of traffic or interferenc~ on a primary circuit.
Operation traffic will be
paralleled on NPM fox and loted during period of operations.
Point 0 latitude 14 South, longitude 164 East;point Q lat.
12-30 South, long. 162-45 East;point S l~t. 15 South, long.
159 East. This Operation Plan effective on receipt. Comsopacfor at NOU1ffiA. End Operation Plan. CTF 62, CTG 62.6
and Comseronsopac have by hand for information. CTF 64 action
and Comgensopac info by hand. Comgen CACTUS and Comnavbases
CACTUS and RINGBOLT info. GRAYBACK has in another system
as an action addee.
01 0514 COMSOPAC to COMNAVBASESOPAC, COMGEN CACTUS, COMGEN 1ST MAC.
PORT PURVIS (FLORIDA ISLAND) development as fleet anchorage
and transhipment point approved. Harbor survey and development of harbor facilities, underwater defenses, shore storage
facilities responsibility Comnavbasessopac. Defense PORT
PURVIS responsibility Comgen CACTUS. 11th Defense 'Battalion
assigned as . initial defense force. Responsible Commanders
proceed with development PORT PURVIS earliest practicable
date and make detailed recommendation for ultimate development and defense. Code name PINMONEY assigned PORT PURVIS.
Carpender pass to MacArthur. Comsopac sends. Comnavbasesopac has as action adee. Also act:ton Comgen CACTUS, corngen
1st MAC, Comgen Sopac, CTF 62, Comseronsopac have by hand
all info. Comnavbase CACTUS info.
31 2140 CTF 8 to CINCPAC Info COMINCH, COMGEN ADC.
Air action as follows. All times GCT. For action Cincpac
Info Cominch. From CTF 8. 2130 December 30th 14 P-38's,
3 B-25's found recently arrived AK's or AP's KISKA HARBOR.
Also 3 small subs probably midgets. 8 Lightnings proceeding for bombing and strafing attack engaged by 4 float zeros
at 2000 feet. Attack broken up. 2 Lightnings shot down 1
zero crashed water. 5 other float zeros seen in air. 1
B-25 shot down (Probably AA fire). other 2 attacked cargo
ships with 4 500 pounders and 3 300's. Results unobserved.
2nd attack at 0147 on 31st. 5 heavies 8 medium dropped 77
quarter ton bombs and 5-300 on cargo ships. Observed results
include 3 hits one shiW 2 on other with smoke and heavy
explosion from 1. During afternoon attack bombers encountered
1 Float zero. Catalina off KISKA attacked by 4 zeros evaded
in cloud cover. Afternoon photographs show 6 zero (4 twin
float 2 single float) on beach also show new ships are approximately 465 and 300 feet in length. Former still loaded.
Army Catalina during morning attack landed vicinity crashed
B-25 and took off but not heard from since. All planes afternoon mission returned, minor damage, 1 tail gunner kill::f21 0
2 pilots minor injuries from AA.
-

SBORE'-

January (GCT)

01 1136 COMSOPAC to CINCPAC Info . COMINCH.

For Cincpac Cominch only. From Comsopac. Cominch 311405.
2nd Marine Division being withdrawn as rapidly as availability
shipping permits. Plan xoading 2nd and 8th Marines CACTUS
25th and 28th. 6th 1~rines now enroute arrive CACTUS 4th for
6 weeks combat experience. See also last sentence this despatch.
Ships which land 6th will load 7th for ADOBE. Copy shipping
schedule has been airmailed Cincpac. Last element Army 25th
Division due CACTUS 4th. Present plans for cleaning up CACTUS
situation: A. Seizure by Army of POINT AUSTIN a Jap held hill
mass dominating present position from south. B. Landing reinforced regiment vicinity TASSAFARONGA about 18th to sever
Jap communications and pocket Jap main body. C. Subsequent
cleaning up operations. For your personal information were it
practicable to withdraw them earlier I would feel retention
Second Marine Division CACTUS as outlined above .e ssential until
Army combat efficiency has been demonstrated.

1211

8BGHE':P

December lst
Fu~ther reports of the 4th Sattle of SAVO are contained
in CTF 67 010655 (via Comsopac) and Rear Admiral ~risdale' s
012252 and 020011. It is believed that our damaged cruisers can
be patched up and sent to AUSTRALIA for preliminary repairs,
then to .u.s. yards. Rear Admiral Wright's force has repulsed
another '!_')Ush of the enemy and inflicted severe losses. Ide continue to retain command of the sea in the Southern SOLOM1Nf3.

Twenty six Jau survivors of a Jap DD landed at CACTUf and

stated that their shin was one of 5 DDs attempting to run su-p-plies in to GUADAJ_JCi\IJAJ.J.
TF 16 will go to FIJI and TF 11 to NOUMEA, both training
enroute. The ACHII.J~ IES will join TF 67 at ESDIRITU 8ANTO. The
LOUI~VII. LE will go to SoDac instead of PTVPac.
Activity in the BUNA area continues, but is not of major
proportions.
CTF 8 020600 is his operation order to deal with enemy
convoys approaching the .fest ern A~_JGUTIANS.
The MOlJT?ELI~:::?., LaVALLETTE, and CHEUANGO are ordered to
the Pacific Fleet from the Atlantic.
It is still indicated that a major attempt to recaryture
CACTUS is making up.

December 2nd.

\~.........

\).Y

The Tokyo express, composed of 2 CA, 2 CL, 6 DD was intercepted 150 miles northwest of CACTUS during the late afternoon by
planes from CACTUS. Our reports give 2 - 1000-pound bomb hits
on one cruiser, 1 - 1000-pound bomb hit on second cruiser, 2
torpedo hits on another ship, 2 possible hits on another ship.
On the other hand, the Japs report no damage in this attack. It
seems extremely difficult to assess damage inflicted by our
planes. Damage is believed less than reported.
There was only minor activity by patrols at CACTUS during
the day. The fire in the forward holds of the ALCIIIBA continued
burning on the 1st (local). All undamaged cargo has been unloaded.
Salvage !)OSsibilities are being investigated . Other logistic
support of CACTUS is proceeding in a satisfactory manner. During
the nieht enemy planes were reported overhead.
Engine repairs to the 8/.Ut.A.TOGA and
tempted at NOU11EA.
(Continued)

COLillv~BIA

wi 11 be at-

121.?.

December 2nd

(Continued)

The HcFATILAND is now reported able to proceed to PEARL

under own power at about 10 knots.
There were several reports of enemy submarines in the
area to the south of the SOLOMONS yesterday. Sub reconnaissance
and attacks on prime targets are to be expected.
The First Marine Division at CACTUS will be relieved as
soon as possible and sent to BRISBANE, reporting to Comsowespac.
Comsopac 020637 pink comments on Cominch's proposal for
speeding up the campaign in the SOLOI.ION3.
As Cominch expressed doubt concerning operating Batdiv 3
in SoPac, Cincpac sent his 030521 pink which reviews the need of
OBB gun uower in certain circumstances, and suggests that decision
should be made now regarding lengthy modernization of OBBs.
The next section of the 25th Division will move from
PEARL to the 3outh Pacific on December 6th, and the final section
is expected to leave the 15th.
To warn against minor cTap er"forts at PEARL on December 7th
Cincpac sent his 022155 to Comgenhawdept and Co~hawseafron.
There are no new major enemy developments.

December 3rd.
There were no major developments in the South Pacific
during the day. Early in the morning 2 DDs and 3 other enemy
ships were seen . lOO _: miles northwest of CACTUS. No report of
a strike on these was received, but it is knovm that the weather
was bad. Ground action at CACTUS was limited to m:l.nor oatrol
actions. ComSoPac 's 040459 gives plans for landing strips and
air at CACTUS.
The GUDGEON returning from patrol in the NEW IRELANDSHORTLANDS area reports sinking 3 AKs totalling 22,100 tons.
Prisoners of war recently captured from DDs sunk off LUNGA
indicate the HEYEL and KIRSHI~iiA were sunk in mid-November, and
that 5 CVs are at TRUK and are damaged.
There is a rather large concentration of shipping in the
TULAGI - UA DALCANAL area today. Damaged cruisers are still there
and several AKs are unloading.

121 3

"'8ECRET -,

December 3rd (Continued )

The POMPOM moveme,nt is in part the transfer of Marine
replaceme nts from NORFOLK to the STRAW area.
Minor activity continues in the BUNA area. A large number
of SWPac planes attacked enemy DDs retiring south of NEW BRITAIN
but failed to get hits.
Cominch 031740 pink answers Cincpac in regards to modernization and present employmen t of OBBs. Cincpac 040253 does not
desire to expose unnecessa rily the NEN tffiXICO and MISSISSIP PI to
underwate r damage and considers that operations west of FIJI under
present conditions would result in such exposure. These vessels
depart from PEARL for the South on December 6th.
Cominch has ordered four more APs and 2 more AKs from the
Atlantic to Pacific Fleet during December.
It is believed that the enemy is now making arrangeme nts for
another major effort to recapture the Southern SOLOMONS. Convoys
are enroute to the Western ALEUTIANS, but the strength and purpose
of this move -is not clear. No major threat to the MIDWAY-OAHU line
is seen. Minor raids in the Central Pacific continue to be possible.
December 4th.
The day was generally quiet in the Central and South Pacific
areas. TF ll and 16 are at sea training and will go to NOU1~ and
NANDI respectiv ely. TF 67 is at ESPIRITU SANTO. TF 64 is divided
between NOUb~ and NANDI with the NORTH CAROLINA at NANDI and the
WASHINGTON at NOu~A. TF 65 is at NANDI. The N~V MEXICO, with CTF 1
embarked, and the MISSISSIP PI will proceed initially to NANDI. The
INDIANA and COLUMBIA are at NOUMEA.
There were no major sightings in the Southern SOLOMONS area.
Enemy subs continue active in. that general area, including midget
subs believed using KAMIMBO as a base.
The logistic supply of CACTUS is being
because of shortage of boats.

slowe~

down somewhat

Comsopac 041153 summarize s his day.

Our damaged cruisers are still at TULAGI. Their condition
today is not reported. The salvage possibili ties of the ALCHIBA at
CACTUS are being investiga ted.
The KENMORE grounded when leaving TULAGI, but came off about
ten hours later with no apparent damage.
(Continued on next page)

1214

.- SECRET

"

December 4th. (Continued )

Comsopac recommend s against an attempt to salvage the
COOLIDGE at this time (032127).
An enemy force was reported about 200 miles south of
AMCHITKA by a search plane. The report is complete as shown by
CTF 8 042153. On return the. pilot reported that no positive
contact had been made. As we and CTF 8 have good informatio n
of enemy convoys approachin g the Western ALEUTIANS, the contact
was believed authentic . CTF 8 alerted his forces and sent out a
search and strike to develop and attack the enemy. His forces
resumed operations in .accordanc e with his Op. Order 15-42 when
the report,was seen to be erroneous . It is not clear here why
the report was made.
Cominch 041750 alerts against a Jap move on December 7.
No major Jap action on that day is considered likely. The enemy
is continuing to gather his forces for another push toward CACTUS
but there is no indication that he can move that soon.
~
~
December 5th.
eneh\.y

Because surface units are expected to attempt to reinforce

GUADALCAIJAL between the 6th and 12th, Admiral Halsey ordered
moves indicated in Cincpac Ob'2031 It must be assumed that the
SA&~TOGA is completing turbine repairs as she was not ordered
' to rendezvou s with other combatant units. The PENSACOLA left
TULAGI for ESPIRITU SANTO. The II/LINNEA_._ OLIS and NEW ORLEANS are
not yet ready to leav.e TULAGI.
The remarkable trip of the 2nd raiders at GUADALCANAL is
described in Consopac 060143.
T:B, R search of the Western ALEUTIANS today was negative.
It indicates that the weather was good - mRy~be good enough to
bomb KI.SKA.
Cominch 051441 shows that 4 AJ,s and 2 AKs above those
previously mentioned are to be sent to Cincpac from the Atlantic.
Cominch proposes to reDlace 1 OCL with 1 DL in order to make
another OCL available for Task Force EIGHT.
Indication s of a major uush toward the Southern SOT..JOMONS
continue. The time is uncertain . Because of this . push no major
activity by the enemv in any other Pacific area is considered
possi)le. The move of troops to the AL~T TIANS continues . A minor
raid in the Hawaiian Sea Frontier js nossible but not probable.

121 5

SRORE'f

December 6th
Rear Admiral Kinkaid leaves here toMorrow to take command of the North Pacific Force (TF 8) .An intensive preliminary
.study of the problem of seizing KISKA has been made here, and
Admiral Kinkaid has been made fully acquainted with the present
views of Admiral Nimitz on that subject.
At GUADALCANAL our logistic sup9ly of the Marines is
proceeding. At eight in the ~orning the ALCHIBA was torpedoed
for the s~nd tfme; this time by a reported 2-man submarine.
The shipMa~ be a total loss.
The HONOLULU and.IillLENA plus 2 DD have been ordered to
join other combatant units of TF 64Lmentioned yesterda~ on the
8th (local)." CTF 64 in the WASHINGTON will operate in an . area
about 200 miles southwest of GUADACANAL. The NORTH CAROLINA
and DD escorts also will join TF 64. TF 16 will fUel starting
tomorrow evening about 200 miles southwest of REID~LL ISLP~TD.
Late in the evening the TOKYO Express was sighted heading toward GUADALCANAL off the east coast of NETAJ GEORGIA. No
further word was heard of this group, which was reported as at
least 9 DDs.
In the TONOLEI area 2 BB, 5 CA, 3 CL, 12 DD, 5 AP or
At RABAUL at least 30 ships were coun~ed.

AK, were reported.

The S.S. EDISON is aground at VAUTA VATOA. A tug is

being sent to assist the GREBE in hauling off the ship.
SEPacfor.

Either the CLARK or BALCH will relieve one OCL in the

It is expected that the OCL will be added to TF 8.

Comsopac 061929 approves the development of BUTTON as

an advance operating base of LION dimensions.
The enemy is making large troop movements to . the llA.BAUL
area. Combatant units, including CVs, are believed assembling
for another major attempt to recapture the Southern ~30JjOMONS.
In the meantime supplies are being brought into GUADALCANAL by
submarines, and DDs seem earmarked for the same duty. As long
as these operations continue no threat to the MIDWAY - OAHU line
is seen. Of course, minor r~ids on our advanced positions in
the Central Pacific are always a possibility.
The ALEUTIAN situation is obscure.

121 5

ESTIMATE OF Tfffi SITUATION

I - SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION
1.
As a result of recent actions in the SOLOMONS area
we are in command of the sea and air in the Southern SOLOMONS
and approaches thereto.
2.
Our positions at GUADALCANAL and TULAGI are not apt
to be recaptured. At GUADALCANAL there still remain the following major i terns to be accompli shed:
{a) Eliminate the enemy troops thereon.
(b) Construct alternate landing fields.

{c) Provide for logistic supply; which includes bulk

avgas storage tanks with pipe lines so that bulk
carriers can discharge; roads; storage space;
weight handling gear; etc.
3.
GUADALCANAL is our most advanced position. Its security requires the occupation and development of further advanced
positions.
4.
The Nmv GUINEA situation is not satisfactory but is
not dangerous at present. The enemy is attempting to improve
positions on the northeast coast, but it is unlikely that control can be extended to the southern coast. This is particul. .arly true if pressure continues in the SOLOMONS.
II - THE PROBLEM
1.
WPL-46-PC is the broad directive for the campaign.
Task One, which is the seizure and occupation of the SANTA CRUZ
Islands, TULAGI, and adjacent positions, has been completed
except for the SANTA CRUZ operation which has been deferred.
2.
Task Two is the seizure and occupation of the remainder of the SOLOMONS .ISLANDS, LAE, SALAI\1AUA and the north coast
of N~N GUINEA. The Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific was
assigned to command for this Task. Due to the changing situation it is evident that that Task, and the assignment of the
Commander, must be reconsidered.
3.
Task Three involves the expulsion of the enemy from
the BISMARK ARCHIPELAGO. As is the case with Task Two, certain
revisions to meet the situation are to be expected.
- 1 -

1217

SE-OREJ 'il

II - Ttffi PROBLEM

(Continued )

4.
The problem is to estimate the how, when, and where
of the resumption of the offensive; to restate Task Two; and
to suggest command to fit the restated Task.
5.
Other tasks assigned to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas are still effective .

III - MEANS AVAILABLE AND OPPOSED.

1.

Own.

(Under Cincpac)

(a) Surface:
BB

OBB

cv

CA
CL
CL(AA)
DD

ss

APD
AVD

ACV

AP

AK

AO
LC

Nov. 24

Feb. 20*

3
4

5
8

2
4

2
42

2
81

7
9

30
3

38

10
4

4
4
14

17

19

24
Exact No.
in doubt.

LS

Ma:.y 20*
6
9
7

12
9

96
53
?
4
?
?
?

28
132
72

*No estimate of losses included.

- 2 -

1218

Air:

(as assigned by Joint Plan)

. OTiillR

NAVY
GUADALCANAL
(Incl. TULAGI)

:Class :Aircraft :Class

ESPIRITU SP..NTO
EFATE

Ftr

VSB

25

M/B
Ftr

VF

vos

13

M R

vos

VSB

Ftr
M/B

VF

vos

VSB
VF

70

FIJI

13
33

M/B
Ftr :
Trans:

13 *

M/B

13

Ftr
NEW ZEALAND
hoNGATABU
Ftr
SAMOAN Area (In-:
cl. FUNAFUTI,
:
WALLIS, TUTUILA,:
UPOLU)
:
BORABORA
CANTON

VTB

vos
NDENI
(When ready)

Aircraft: Class : Aircraft

:'

VPB

vos

VSB
VF
VR

..

12
8
18
18

8
18
18
8
9
18
0

8
18
18
36*

25

vos
vos

VSB

VF
VPB

vos

: VPB
Ftr
25
M/B or L/B-13, or VSB

12

: RNZ.AF :

12

25X

:RNZAF

:Hudsons:

24
18
27
3
8
12
18

:Hudsons:

RNZAF

:Hudsons:
12
:Singa- :
: pores :
4
:Vincents:
9
:Ten Combat Sgds.

*Operating throughout NEW CALEDONIA - GUADALCANAL - NDENI FIJI Area.

X To be manned by R.N.Z.A.F. personnel.

-3-

1.2 19

LECRBT

(b) Air:

(Continued)

Explanatory Memorandum on Recommended Employment of Planes.

GUADALCANAL, NDENI, ESPIRITU SANTO, and EFATE are
considered front line positions. The first three are to be
kept filled with light and medium planes to operating capacity,
reserves to an aggregate of 150% or more in the back areas of
flyable planes with pilots. The Army considers the planes in
NEW CALEDONIA, FIJI and TONGATABU a part of this flyable reserve.
As the capacity of GUADALCANAL, NDENI, and ESPIRITU
SANTO increases, the number of planes assigned thereto must
, keep step with the capacity, with corresponding increases in
reserves. This also applies to new positions seized.
Half the Army fighters assigned to the forward positions should be high altitude fighters. This matter was discussed but not concluded.
(c) Trooos:
Appended.
(d) Logistics:
There are
Adequate support of
usual difficulties ,
with no facilities,

no insuperable logistic difficulties .

all kinds is available in the area. The
which are met when landing on beaches
will have to be overcome .

- 4 -

1220

J ECBET
2.

Enemy
Enemy Surface Strength:

BB

CV

XCV -

AV

XAV DD
SS

November 23, 1942.

10 (2 were probably sunk; 2 probably damaged)

SHOKAKU - probably damaged.
ZUIKAKU - probably damaged.
RYUJO
possibly sunk
ZUIHO
HOSHO
HAYATAKA
HITAKA
- dama ~ ed.
OTAKA
UNYO
CHUYO
CHITOSE - damaged
CHIYODA, NISSHIN, ATISUSHI1~
4 - 6.
About 105 in Navy. Not thought feasible to employ more than 40 in the South Pacific.
About 40 available for use in the South Pacific.

Enemy Air Strength - Naval Air.

This does not include ship based planes. Also,
there is insufficient information to estimate Army ~r
strength. It seems probable that Army air is moving
into the South Pacific.

MARIANAS and CAROLINES

VF
45
VHB --VP

27
6

Seaplanes 60

RABA.UL Area
VF

VB

VHB --VP

90
18

72

18

Seaplanes 24

- 5 -

Total 138

Total 202

122 1

Enemy Air Strength - Naval Air

MARSHALLS and GILBERTS
VF
50
VHB
54
VP
12
Seaplanes
24

(Continued)

Total 140

Grand total which it is believed physical.ly possible to put in the South Pacific:
VF
VB

320
54
234

VHB

Note:

Total 608

Details of above in ICPOA estimate attached.

Enemy Troop Strength - South Pacific

GUADALCANAL - - - - - - - - - - - Garrisons - BISMARK - SOLOMONS- Troops available for assignment
NEW GUINEA - - - - - - - - - - - Total troops South and
Southwest PacificNote!'

- 15,000
10,000
- 35,000
- 7,500
- 80,000

Details of above are in ICPOA estimate attached.

It is believed that the above are maximum figures. Troops are continually moving to the area
and a large and well trained reservoir of troops
is thought to be available to the enemy from outside the area. Of the numbers indicated not all
are effectives; that is, some 50% may be considered engineers, laborers, ground personnel for airplanes, etc.

- 6 -

12(~ 2

IV - CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THEATRE

. . 1 . In the advance up the SOLOMONS from GUADALCANAL, deClSlon w~ll be made whether to go all the way to Jap positions;
such as 1n the BUIN area, or whether to establish in intermediate positions. If the latter is decided upon the ~N GEORGIA group, ISABEL, and CHOISEUL Islands offer a mid-position insofar as distance is concerned.

From GUADALCANAL to
North part ISABEL
South part CHOISEUL
Mid NEW GEORGIA
TONOLEI

150 miles

180 miles

175 miles

290 miles

TONOLEI to

BUKA

120 miles

275 miles

RABAUL

The only places considered are those which seem to offer

possi'bilities which include:
Reasonably safe approach
Good landing beach
Adjacent airfield possibilities
2.

& \)
l

NE'N GEORGIA

VIRU HARBOR

APs could not be expected to enter the anchorage.

ing in the harbor should be very easy.

Boat-

The undergrowth appears to extend to the water's edge

but landings could be made at piers on both the east and west
sides of the harbor.
Level country around the harbor appears suitable for
a landing strip, but because of dense under growth clearing the
site would be difficult. A coconut plantation on the west side
may offer possibilities in this respect.
The Japs are reported here in small numbers.
RENDOVA HARBOR
At least equal to VIRU, but here again the APs could
hardly expect to enter without a good pilot.

-7-

122 3

There are reasonably good beaches and water supply.

Nearby coconut plantations seem to offer landing strip possibilities.
HATHORN SOUND
.
A fairly good anchorage which might be used by a division of APs. Beaches are only fair and will present landing
difficulties. ARUNDEL ISLAND has landing strip possibilities.
Just around the coast to the west and north is I~NDA
POINT. Recently Japs have landed there. Almost nothing is known
of the approach to this anchorage. Entrance is reported by way
of a tricky passage through shoals.
Because of adjacent noa?hy flat terrain the following
are possible sites listed:
RICE, LEVER, and LINGUTU, all in NEW GEORGIA.
way.

Recently the Japs have used GIZO HARBOR in a small

It seems suitable for limited seaplane operation only.

In general, all islands of the NEW GEORGIA group are

densely forested. The only roads run for short distances around
coconut plantations. Native villages are located along the
coasts and lagoons. Population of .the group is around 2000.

3.

CHOISEUL ISlAND

Very little is known of this island. Sailing directions, and other meagre information indicate that no suitable
landing sites for our purpose exist in the southern half of the
island.

4.

ISABEL ISlAND
REKATA BAY

Seems to be a fine seaplane anchorage and could be developed into a major airfield. It is 170 miles southeast of
TONOLEI. The landing of a large force seems to present no great
navigati9nal or other dangers. As it is now in use by the enemy
as a seaplane base, the landing would be opposed.
MARINGE LAGOON
It is also suitable for landing and development but is
only 85 miles due north of GUADALCANAL.

5.
The SHORTLANDS area, which includes BUIN, FAISI, and
TONOLEI is adequate for large forces and capable of considerable
-8-

122 4

development. A Jap landing field is under construction. As

it is held in some strength and is under the guns of RABAUL and
BUKA air, there would be enemy opposition to the landing by
both air and shore defenses.
V - ENEMY CAPABILITIES
Enemy's Problem
1.
During the period since our occupation of GUADALCAN~~
the enemy has suffered severe losses in ships and planes. Resultant enemy strength has been noted. Because of these losses
the enemy has been unable to carry out planned operations which
included the recapture of GUADALCANAL. As the situation now
stands the enemy is faced with the immediate problem of maintaining a . supply line to her GUADALCANAL troops.
'As there are insufficient enemy troops there to drive out the Marines, the
enemy must (1) be reinforced heavily, (2) surrender, (3) starve.
The latter seems probable as l,ong as we retain local command of
the sea. Submarines cannot provide adequate logistic support.
2.
The situation is somewhat better for the enemy at NEW
GUINEA. We do not control the approaches to the LAE-BUNA area
but Allied troops are actively opposing the enemy and Allied air
has, and can cause considerable damage to shipping and positions.
It seems possible for the enemy to land strong forces on the
north coast, but to extend control to PORT MORESBY they must go
over the mountains or around the eastern tip of NEW GUINEA by
water. Determined Australian opposition should prevent the former
and Admiral Halsey's force can oppose the latter.

3.
There is every ind-ication that the enemy is on the
defensive in the Central Pacific. This is not b y choice, but
because the South Pacific venture does not leave sufficient
strength to do anything else. The occupation of the GILBERTS
is a minor affair and further extension southward will be opposed from FUNAFUTI. Should the enemy decide to assume defensive in the South Pacific enough naval strength could be withdrawn to attack in the FIAWAIIAN area and/or our positions to the
south of OAHU.

4.

The enemy is in good control of the PHILIPPINES an~ the

barrier. No immediate threat in that region is seen. Here
again, as long as the bulk of strength is committed to the South
Pacific the enemy is unable to extend~~~ntrol in the direction
of Western AUSTR~LIA or INDIA. The latter is a land operation
which does not involve large naval strength. The enemy has a
st r0ng hold on the PHILIPPINES, NEI, the MALi\.Y peninsula, and
INDO CHINA, and the sea routes from those places to JAPAN. To
permit Japan to exploit that vast area and to transport the strategic materials to Japan on a large scale would be to prolong the
war, and might even make the outcome uncertain.
r~LAY

-9-

122 5

5.
The defense position of Japan is nowhere seriously
threatened at the moment. Although offensive has been stopped
on all fronts, capacity for defense is not materially disturbed.
It is known that JAPAN wanted to extend control to NEW CALEDONIA
and neutralize AUSTRALIA in order to perfect her position in
the South. There are some early indications that the southern
defense outer position will be the BISMARK ARCHIPELAGO. However, it is too early to state this idea with any assurance.
6.
In the North Pacific, the enemy is intrenched a.t KISKA
and will stay there until we occupy that area. There is no
evidence of the desire or capacity of the enemy to extend control eastward along the ALEUTI-~S or to make major attacks on
other ALASKAN positions.

7.
Off JAPAN the enemy maintains a comprehensive patrol
line. The bulk of her battle line is always ready to repel '
raids on the Empire proper.
Probable Enemy Course of Action
8.
As stated above, it now appears that the enemy no
longer has capacity for further expansion. The broad course of
action, therefore, will be to maintain a strong defensive position on all present fronts until exploitation of gains have made
her Asiatic position too strong for the Allies to do more than
accept a stalemate, and thus give JAPAN her ultimate war aim complete hegemony in the Far East.

9.
Such a broad course of action does not rule out offensive moves in selected sectors to enhance overall defense.
These are to be expected, and may include:(a) Further attempts to capture or at least
neutralize GUADALCANAL.
(b) Establishment and strengthening of outlying
positions in the SOLOMONS and NEiiv GUINEA to
provide defense in depth for the BISMARK
ARCHIPELAGO, and to provide bases for attrition
attacks on Allied shipping and positions.
(c) Continued attacks on our lines of communications employing submarines, air and surface
forces.
(d) Raid.s on our advanced positions from MIDWAY . to
GUADALCANAL.
(e) Troop movements toward I NDI A.

-10-

1.22 6

(f) Political and 5th Column activities in INDIA.

(g) Raids toward north and west AUSTRALIA.
(h) Raids in the ALEUTIANS.
10. We may continue to expect ~~AN to attempt the stabilization of the CHINA affair by political moves. The same applies
to BURMA.

VI - OWN COURSES OF ACTION

1.
As it now stands, our broad courses of action are set
forth in current directives. 'rhe overall concept appears acceptable i.e. to defend ALASl{A; to hold the MIDWAY-OAHU-CM~TON
FUNAFUTI-FIJI line, and, during the second phase of the war, to
expel the enemy from the BIS~ARK ARCHIPELAGO. Our immediate
concern is the accomplishment of Task Two. Task Three will require readjustments to fit circumstances as the war develops.
2.
For many good reasons, of which the appeasement of
public opinion and prestige are of importance, the Japs must
be expelled from the KISKA area by our land forces and the area
occupied. Plans for this project are underway.

3.
The MIDWAY-OAHU-FIJI line is secure against permanent
capture. Nowhere is the line secure against raids, nor will it
be so in the foreseeable future.

4.
Our lines of communications behind our present positions are reasonably secure. Convoys must continue as at present
and good air and surface coverage must be provided at focal
points.
VII - THE SOLOMONS OFFENSIVE
1.
As so little is known of the plans, strength, and intentions of the Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific, that part
of the Task Two which refers to the NEN GUINEA area is not discussed.
2.
There are the followin g methods by which the SOLOMONS
can be captured and occupied:
(a) Step by step . In this method an intermediate point
about half way from GUADALC.ANAL to BUIN would be established as
the first step. There are several suita ble positions available.
None are held in strength by the enemy and none are developed to
any extent. The only i mmediate value of any are the anchorages
which include advan ced s ea plane operating positions. All are
-11-

1227

vulnerable to enemy air from the RABAUL, SHORTLANDS, and BmL~

areas. On the other hand CACTUS air could support our operations to a limited extent.
The great objection to such an intermediate position
is the necessity to develop it. We have learned a great deal
about how to go about constructing an airfield in the jungles.
We have, or soon will have, adequate and competent construction
personnel. We can have adequate material. Nevertheless, this
construction must be undertaken under the guns of the enemy.
Based on previous experience the enemy will react violently when
our moves are discovered. Our auxiliaries, escorts, and covering vessels will be subject to heavy attrition attacks. The
situation during the time we are developing the position will be
favorable to the enemy, insofar as they will be able to plan and
execute attrition almost at leisure. We must expect to pay
heavily for such a move.
{b) Modified step by step. This method would involve the capture of'the SHORTLANDS area first. The great advantage is that we would capture an airfield which could be
used in a very short time. The dangers and difficulties of the
capture are increased: (1) because we move nearer enemy air
from RABAUL and BUKA; (2) much stronger enemy forces to overcome; (3) the probabllity of the approaches being mined; (4)
and the lack of VF support from GUADALCANAL.
(c) Simultaneous capture of all major enemy positions
in the SOLOMONS. This would involve the capture and occupation
of the SHORTLANDS area, the BUKA area, REKATA BAY, and the neutralization of other enemy minor positions such as NIDNDA, GIZO,
KIETA, and the eventual mopping up of enemy observation positions.

3.
Course (a} is feasible. Of the positions investigated earlier, REKATA BAY seems to offer the maximum advantages.
It is 180 miles by air from the nearest enemy airfield at BUIN,
and 180 miles by water and 140 miles by air from GUADALCN~AL.
Approaches permit ample sea room for any sized forces. Radar
operation offshore should be efficient. Vvarning of the approach
of the enemy from passes through the SOLOMONS may be possible by
submarine and coast watcher observation. Seaplane operations
can commence almost immediately. Probable enemy local troops
should be relatively easy to overcome. The choice of REKATA
does not eliminate the VIRU or HATHORN S01JND areas. But because radar will be less effective at those places they are
less desirable; and they do not seem to offer any advantages
not possessed at REKATA. For the initial landing no more than

-12-

1228

fHsGRE''-

one amphibious marine regiment would be required. The rnove

would have to be covered by sufficient surface forces to prevent successful enemy surface attack. The size of our covering
force would depend on an estimate of enemy surface strength
capable of attack at the time of the move. Air coverage seems
possible from GUADALCANAL. Preliminary surface bombardment of
enemy positions is possible but not believed required on a
large scale. After the initial landing the garrison troops
should relieve the amphibious troops. Air field construction
personnel and material would follow at once.
There is considerable doubt regarding the suitability of
this move. This is mainly because so little is accomplished
until an air field is constructed. The immediate result is to
deny a seaplane base to the enemy. Past experience indicates
that shore based planes could not operate under a month from
the date of the landing.
The cost may be high. It will take at least one day to
land the amphibious troops. Three or four days will be required to .land the air field construction personnel and material.
Up to now we have been unable to prevent enemy use of his air
fields by bombing. Unless we improve in this respect the ex-.
pedition will be under air attack during the landings and during the air field constructiqn period. And until antiaircraft
weapons are placed ashore the enemy air activity will find little
opposition. Surface raids must be expected at all times. Submarines would attack our line of supply.

4.
Course (b) is suitable as it denies a most important
base to the enemy and permits as the use of an air field almost
at once.
It is only feasible when there is available two amphibious
marine divisions. Because of this important limitation the
operation cannot be scheduled before March 1, 1943. There are
advantages in such a delay. Our surface forces available then
are estimated to be strong enough to prevent any enemy surface
opposition. Garrison troops to move in promptly can be available. The disadvantage in delay lies in the expected strengthening of the enemy defensive positions on the SOLOiviONS during that
time.
Asthe SHORTLANDS area is a relatively strong enemy position
the cost will be hi gher than at REKATA. It is nearer to RABAUL
and BUKA which would indicate heavier air opposition. We would
pay heavily for this fine prize, but it might be worth heavy
losses. As at any p lace in the SOLOiv10NS , our losses will be in
proportion to the effort of the enemy to op pose our plan. Should
a slugging match tak e place between surface units, such as at

122 9
-13-

SAVO, we can expect to inflict at least equal losses. As time

goes on our capacity to absorb losses, in relation to enemy
capacity, will increase. We must plan to avoid a repetition
of the WASP, SAHATOGA, and NORTH CAROLINA affairs.
Course (c) is suitable as it accomplishes the major part
of our task. The feasibility is open to question. To do this
we must land strong amphibious forces in the SHORTLANDS , and
at BUKA, and sma.ller forces at KIETA, REKATA , and possibly
MUNDA. Short of six months, the necessary troops do not seem
available. 1Ne must , therefore, a bandon this course for the
present. If neither (a) nor (b) can be accepted, and if we
are forced to wait until late spring, the details of (c) must
be considered in light of developments during the next three
or four months.
VIII - Selected Course of Action.
Preliminary.'
1.
As previously stated, information is lacking regarding the NEW GUINEA part of Task Two. We can only conclude that
it will go forward simultaneously with the SOLOMONS operation,
and that the ComNander Southwest Pacific will make requests for
naval support.
2.
In any move up the SOLOMONS, the operation will be
a continuation of Task One, and the main forces will be those
of the Pacific Fleet. It seems logical that the command for
that part of Task Two which involves the SOLOMONS be retained
by the Commander in Chief, U. s. Pacific Fleet.

3.
After consideration of the various factors involved
in the three courses stated for the capture and occupation of
the SOLOMONS, it is decided to adopt course (b). For purposes
of planning the target date is March 15, 1943.
Discussion

4.

The various phases of the course adopted are:

Preparations.
The capture of the SHORTLANDS area.
The mopping up of intermediate positions.
The assault and occupation of BOUGAINVILLE.

5.
Preparations. The three major items which must be
disposed of before the attack on the SHORTLANDS can get underway are:
(a) The relief, rest, reorganization, and refitting
of amphibious troops now on GUADALCANAL. This is covered in

-14-

1230

the appended discussion of troops.

(b) The improvement of the GUADALCANAL position.
Major items are:
(1) Installation of bulk aviation gasoline storage.
This is underway at present but will not be on a satisfactory basis until there is at least two million gallons
storage.
(2) Building of a wharf, with weight handling devices. This is planned but not started. Materials are
in the South Pacific.

tion.

(3) Erection of housine for troops, stores, ammuni(4) Completion of alternate

landi~g

strips.

(5) The ejection or other disposal of enemy troops

on the Island.
If we can retain command of the sea approaches for the
next month sufficiently to prevent adequate enemy logistic support and the arrival of reinforcements, the enemy must either
starve or surrender. There is every reason to expect that the
Japs will make at least one more major attempt on GUADALCANAL.
If we can repeat the successes of mid-November, there can be
little doubt of the ultimate outcome of this phase of the
campaign. Enemy success, on the other hand, would reverse
completely the situation. With reinforcements now arriving,
our situation is favorable - except for carriers.
While it would be desirable to have a landing strip in the
CRUZ ISLANDS, that position is not considered essential
to the capture of the SOLOMONS.
SANTA

The positions at C_t\.NTON and FUNAFUTI are not up to satisfactory strength and must be improved, principally by additional
air strength.
Reserve air strength to maintain GUADALCANAL fields saturated must be built up at ESPIRITU SJUJTO, EFATE, FIJI, and
NOUMEA.

6.

The Capture of the SHORTLANDS Area.

There are so manv unknown factors that it is impossible at this time to prese~t a finished plan. It will suffice
to outline the operation.

-15-

123 ~

Forces, 1st wave.

D day.

Carrier striking groups.

BE covering group.
Cruiser and DD support group.
Transport group - two division marine amphibiou s force.
One defense battalion , plus one Acorn.
Forces, 2nd wave.

14 days.

Carrier striking groups.

BB covering group.
Transport and freighter group - one constructi on regiment and one defense battalion embarked.
Rehearsal . On D -10 to D -5 day transport group, 1st wave,
rehearse landing at BUTTON or ROSES.
Embarkatio n points. Amphibiou s troops jump off from NEW
ZEALAND or AUSTRALIA for rehearsal . Defense .battalion , and Acorns
embark at BUTTON by D -5 day. Constructi on battalion embark at
BUTTON by D -12 day.
Mopping up of intermedi ate positions .
Raider battalions will be employed in these operations. As no intermedi ate position is to be developed under this
plan, no occupation troops are required. It may develop that
MUNDA and REKATA will be too stronP- for raiders alone. In this
case, amphibiou s troops may be necessary to assist.
The capture and. occupation of the remainder of BOUGAINVILLE
will be completed by an amphibiou s division. The attack on BUKA
will be similar to but on a smaller scale than the attack on the
SHORTL~tos.
In each of these it will be of first importance to
secure the landing field for our own use. KIETA will only be
neutralize d by a raid or short occupatio n.
The final step is to garrison the SHORTLANDS and BUKA, and
release amphibiou s troops for the capture of RABAUL. Lessons
learned, plus availabil ity of Army and Allied troops, should permit the accomplish ment of this in two months from D-Day.
Air support. It is essential that the RABAUL and BUKA air
fields be neutralize d from D -2 to D t4 day. This can be done
only if our pilots are willing to get near enough to hit the air
fields. It is well known that hedge hopping technique is effective and not too costly. No attempt is made at this time to
detail this operation .

-16-

123 2

IX

1.
It will be seen that as long as the enemy does not
capture eastern NEv GUI}ffiA in the next three months, that the
present status is acceptable. With the proposed increase in
pressure in the SOLOMONS there can be no slmultaneous enemy
threat to NEW GUINEA.
2.
With the SOLOMONS in our hands we will be able to
attempt the capture of RABAUL. That task is amphibious and is
merely a continuation of the same operation. No reason is seen
to shift the Supreme Command to the Southwest Pacific. To do
so would place the Command in less experienced hands.

3.
Task Two is thus restated "Capture and occupy the
remainder of the SOLOMON ISLANDS, while holding in NE'N GUINEA".
Instructions: Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet will
execute .Task Two except for NEW GUINEA. The South Pacific area
is extended to the equator at 145 East, thence to the center
of VITIAZ STRAIT, to WOODLARK ISLAND, to ROSSEL ISLAND, thence
South.

-17-

123 3

Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

..
:t

t reno

in Oh1et,
er in en t,
:

( }
( )

u.

tlon 1nt

ore

( )

:..

""

Pao1t1c
le t.

. j()~omon

-"e

ot
r.t1on

1942.

(4)

,r

1942.

1942.

Sout we t

e t a y reter n
f r no (b) co ent , a r
1.
lo.mon
ot the amp 1gn in th
( ) , u on oel't in t tu
Th1 l t r 1 intend d to amplify the oomnnt in reference (b)

-1

1234

Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

_fCLASSJiltD

FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

/

- - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - -- - - ~- - - - - - - - - -uture

~ lo~n -

Se

~~a .

d1

face

on t

1 rly
1or1ty
t

r tio s 1n the

ou-

re t1-

ot 194) .

123

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

- --- - - - -- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - 1

th

L"'lO a

u t1ont

ivi 1
ot or

r,1nn or ven

.ign d.,
t
.A

It

:phi 1

dyinls

th

th

"""'il''\ftli1

his will, of co

r
1

(a)

ref

~1'f1c1e

t elrfi lds with

ll oompla e ts o

1235

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

---

r i;l
~

in t e C::o l

o
~'

or
t

u.

t.

1 ht .

on
~

ott

....

t oll1 is,

.
~

g 1 s

--

ly

rttc~~

o.rp do

( ) tfh

l 1n hi

ly

(o)

1 ,..

( ) Our

t.m

h v

o th

u 1-

ved trunttset.t: e
r ps.

(t) OUr re t interiority is in

ot torp does.

-4-

1237

Cincpac File No.

-- - -

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

--

--------

(1)

..1

_,_

1.2 38

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

- -- - - - - - - - - - --- - - - - - - - - - - -- - -- - -

1239

Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

y
11

t
1 iou t oop
oul b pl

tit
in

~W

rlou~

tt -

NIMITZ..

y
o. 0

-7-

1240

Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

Pac-16-Fn

16-v/ "Gl (l)

1

t2t>O__w.

~.....,...~

S OREt

om:
o:

Commander
Command r

in-Ol~ef;
inCh.~

r,

u.s.

Pacific Fleet.

United States Fl et.

Subject:

Rvi

(a) C1ncpac Secret Despatch 290409 o Jun 1942.

(b) Cine ac S cret S rial Al6(6) 02798 of 24
September 1942.
.
(c) Cincpac Secret Despatch 221841 of Nov. 1942.

rerenc s:

of: Aleutian Situation.

1.
It 1 considered that a careful surve,- or tb
leuti n situation ls necessary at th:Ls tlm - not onl,. be
o u
~ its own
sp ct but becau e or it be rillS on future
10peration in the pres nt major Paoiic theat r - the Solomons
s a.r a.
2.
Shortly fter the Ja~ n
occupied K1 k and
ttu, I s
st d in
fer ne (a) that the 2nd Raid r
tt l1on and APDe could be made availabl for otf"ens1v action
p~ovided th
rnty su pli d sup lementary troop , and then took
over the defense of the ar a 1nclud1~ t~~ con truct on of an
a1rf1 ld on mold tka.
)

v1

Thi projee
as no t approved e.t tb time.
of the Command r in Chief~ u. s. Fl et w re thatl

3.

The

( ) The Navy ould be un ble to divert fore

from the ,outh Paeiflc to oo-an.ter th expected strong
r action ot the enemy e.ge.:tnet the l'*ecaptur~d t1oa1 tions

nd th ir su,ply lines.
(b) 1'he

moVE!

oaeup1ed ' tka nd

to do.

ha

hould not be

dak,

de before th Army
hieh it w s not y t pr par

(c) Th raider battalion plu Army troop

hioh
could ba carried in combatant sh.tp was probably not
uff ci ntly strong to accomplish the t
; and ~n any
case it would probe.bl:,r be requiPed in th South Pacific.
- l -

Cincpac File No.

. SECRE;T

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

, FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER IN ,CHIEF'

- - - - - - -- - - - -

Subjectt
Force

4.

. - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - -

R view ot Ale-utian Situatton.

~

The 1e of the Comraand r

IGUT) wa tb.a t :

orthern Force (Task

(a) The 1nit1 t1on ot euch an operation would

val .force lnoluding, c rrie~e were
be unwise unl sa
a ilabl to cov r the op ration for a .long p r1od.
(b) In any case it hould b an operation for
mo11t1on and not for occupat on because or difricul
o our supply! , th1e a):tea long vuln r bl 11nes o
communications.
(e) -!lithout such an op rati-o n, it wa prob bl
tl t the Jap could b made to e that continued occupation waa too costly.
that at the t.t all eoncerned thought
I '0011.
5.
good possibility that Ki k , at l ast~ eould b
as
th r
ma.de untona.bl tor: the en my. Later, this appeared even mor
tout om
.fa-vor bl atter th Art11y occupie Adak a.nd c. rr1

feotiv air raids on . .iska.

Howev r, van by 24 s ptember. th abov -mantion

e.
pos 1bility beeame so doubtful that I wrote refe nc (b), reco~
that ple~s be in1t1 ted for th pr paration by he Army
~

of su.f1o1ent amph1b1ou troops to j ct the enemy trom the

Al ut1a.ns.

Although the Japanese, since then, Fj'av some sli3ht

7.
:t..ndieation of' reltn ui hints th 1r hol in th Aleu ian 1 and
undoubtedly did evaeuate .A.ttu at OM tl~.e, this la t d .for
very hort period. Fo the la t month th y b. v b n vigorou 11
pro ecuting the establishment of their o it.~o in th a e

Rlska installation have grown by leaps and bound , Attu is

active e.ga~. n. and indications point to his occup&tioll of S miohi,
nd po eibly Ameh1tka

2-

1242

Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

0- 16-.

Al6-3/~Gl(l}

2oU

. ri

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - -- ~ - - Review ot

l utlan Situ tion .

10.

1n th

ot th pr sent

I b liev that this proble ot our rlr

Al u ian

should b

thorou

y review 4 in

bi

t1on

tion

1th that of making autfic1ent f ro s availabl 1n th Sol ons

Se ar It 1 alr dy 1 ar th t th pl .ci . ot
y
troop 1n tr 1n1n. for am h1b1ous o.perations 1
t r t
gre t urg noy .
C. W. N l /V1 /T Z-

124 3

December 7th
On the first anniversary of the war no unusual activities
of the Japs were reported.
There were no major sightings in the Southern SOLm:lNS .
Ground activities at GUADALCAITA:S were routine. In the NEVl GEORGIA
group there was some patrol activity, the nature of which is not
clear.
TFs 16 and 64 are operating in the coru~L SEA. TF 11 continues at HOUI~:lEA, where the SARATOGA is believed undergoing turbine repairs. TF 42 su brnarines are covering the SOLOlfiONS ch ain
and SOLOMOHS SEA area with 16 subs on uatrol today. Reports to
date indicate that these subs are not very effective. TF 65 is at
NANDI. The RICHHONTI will report to Cincoac for duty about December 9th.
The 5th Marines will be the first of the 1st Marin~ Division
to be relieved at GUADALC.t;.NAL and the relief will be accomplished
now. Troop dispositions in the active area are shovm in Comsopac
mailgram of November 29. About 9000 Kiwi C are in NEVI ZE.A.LA.ND
awaiting transportation to NOULlliA. It seems probable that from
3 to 4 thousAnd \Jew Zealanders have already reported for duty
in ~N CAL~DON IA.
1\Ud c>.F H..,_
Cominc.h 071251 requests reaffirmation of the dhipuing
concentration in the SoPac area.
~
CTF 8 080112 gives current operations.
There are no new developments regarding enemy intentions
or denloyrnents. The build up for another push to the Southern
SOLOMONS continues and maru movements toward the Western ALEUTIANS
seem schedule-d at least to mid-January.
(l..-/
~v
December 8th
Admiral Nimitz left for San Francisco by plane to confer
with Admiral King. The agenda includes many important subjects
among which are our offensive in the SOLOMONS and the expulsion
of the Japs from KISKA.
B-17's from BUTTON dropped 326 100# bombs on MUNDA. The
landing strip there appears about ready for use. A planned B-17
and P-38 strike on shipping at TONOLEI from CACTUS has been delayed because rain has temporarlly grounded these planes at CACTUS ..
TF 16 and the cruisers of TF 64 have been ordered to BUT'I'ON.
TF 64 BBs will train in the CORAL SEA for two days, then proceed
to POU1rnA. - The new Sopac task force set up is shown in Comsopac
090502 pink.

124 4
(Continued next page )

' tClAS$1.

sEonEJr
December 8th

(Continued)

Comsopac 090506 pink proposes a standard mine field in

the vicinity of CAPE ESPERANCE. Mines are ready at PEARL now
but four DMs requested cannot reach the area before January 5t~.
The SARATOGA, NASSAU, and ALTAMAHA air groups are on 4
hours notice to proceed to BUTTON, CACTUS, or ROSES.
The bases ncACTusn set up is in Comsopac 070446.
A plane reports sinking a two-nan

ene~y

sub off LUNGA POINT.

Comsopac 081225 tells Cominch that the shipping accumulation

to yesterday is considered warranted.

refer~ed

The GREBE grounded v1hile assisting the THOMAS EDISON at

TUR';I:LE ISLAND and may be a total loss. The MENOMINEE is proceeding there to conduct salvage.
CTF 8 suggests that, as his search has not discovered
convoys reported by DI in the Western ALEUTIANS, the enemy may
be using radio deception on a large scale. While enemy radio
deception is being practiced, this .is not believed an example of it.
~roNDA is rapidly developing as an airfield.
Planes report
the strip almost ready for use. There are no new enemy developments, except that the report of CVs in the TONOLEI area was
~
probably in error.

December 9th.
There were no major sightings or contacts in the South
Pacific during the day. Other areas were quiet.
TF 16 and the cruisers of TF 64 are returning to BUTTon.
Admiral Lee is training his BBs in the Coral Sea and will leave
the training area for NO'liT\1EA tomorrow. The logistic supply of
GUi\..DALCJ'lNAL is proceeding satisfactorily.
The PENSACOLA arrived at BU'I'TON. It is expected that the
damaged NFN ORLEANS and MI1JNE.APOLIS wi 11 be able to leave TULAGI
in about four more days. Each ship hopes to be able to make 8
knots.
The B-17 and P-38 strike mentioned yesterday was made. Three
hits were made on one large ship (reported vossible CV, but
identity doubted here) and two straddles were made on a tanker.
For the second time this month Comsopac reports evidence
of landing strip construction at 1\flJJ\~A ]\fUNA , BOUGAINVILLE.

~
(Continued)

124 5

""SEC RB'f

--..,

December 9th

(Continued)

It is reported fror.1 CACTUS that our PTs are having "unbelievable successu in that area. Details are not given.
Thought is being g iven by Cominch to the installation of
torpedo baffles for unloading at CACTUS, and for an aerial reconnaissance of TRUK. Both of these projects have been considered
by Cincpac.
CTF 8 090405 describes troops at and enroute ADAK and
TANAGA. An Army survey party will look over AMCHITKA soon.
The enemy is expected to run the Tokyo Express to GUADALCANAL tomorrow night. At least eleven DDs will be employed. The
major push toward the Southern SOLOMONS is still building up and
should take place fairly soon. Because of this, no major threat
is seen any other place in the Pacific.
~~
December lOth
Operations for the day are summarized in Cinc~ac((to~t:
The salvage of the THOHAS EDISON is doubtful, but the cargo
probably can be saved.
The SABINE touched an uncharted shoal about 75 miles southwest of ESP I RITU SANTO. Minor underwater damage waP- sustained.
The Fleet Haintainence Officer estimates that it will take
two years and much la bor and material to put the OKLAHOMA in
service. The OGLALA had a successful dock trial on the 7th.
The ARI"ZONA is , being scrapped in place. No work is being done
on the UTAH:.
The North and Central areas are generally quiet.
There is some indication that the move of 11 - 13 DDs to
GUADALCAIJAL and the bom'Jing of H~NDER S O N field scheduled for last
night was cancelled. We still believe that the Japs intend to
launch a major move to recapture the Southern SOLOl~ONS fairly
soon. That being the case, no major threat toward the Hawaiian
or Aleutian areas are seen. There have been no si e hting s of indicated convoy~ in the ~ est e rn Aleutians.

... SECRET

December 11th
The operations in the areas for the day are summarized in
Cincpac 112025. It is not clear whethe!' or not any part of the
11 DD Tokyo Express arrived at GUADALCANAL. Present ultra information is that at lea.st one enemy DD was sunk. 8 DDs were sighted
by the next morning CACTUS search in the NEH GEORGIA area on NW
courses.
The first increment of the 25th Division which arrived in
NOUMEA this week will proceed in the same ships to CACTUS arriving
there the 17th.
Cominch 092145 authorizes sending the lOth Defense Battalion
to Sopac. Cincpac 112007 gives condition and strength of this battalion.
Vice Opnav 112147 gives shipment plans for Sopac base materials.
Cominch 102220 is the first ONI Intelligence Bulletin.
The guesses therein are not unreasonable.
December 12th
There were no major sightings in the South Pacific area
today. Ground activities at CACTUS were limited to patrols.
Shortly after midnight 11-12 local our PTs attacked the Tokyo
Express off SAVO. One enemy DD was definitely sunk, a second is
believed sunk, and a third was hit. We lost one PT. There were
two air strikes on MUNDA from ESPIRITU SANTO during the day, and
a similar daily strike is planned.
The MIID~EAPOLIS departed TULAGI, making 8 .. 5 knots. The
It now
Nm~ ORLEANS will be able to depart for SYDNEY tomorrow.
appears that the ALCHIBA can be salvaged, and that she can be
floated within two weeks. The FLYING FISH reports sinking 2 DDs
in the SOLOMONS area.
Names for the Naval base set up in the GUADALCANAL area
are in Comsopac 121501.
The SUMNER has completed the survey of HAVANNAH harbor.
The 4th Raider Battalion is assigned to Amphibious Force
Pacific Fleet effective 1 January.
Cominch 111629. All PBYs will be withdravm from advanced
combat areas and replaced with PBM3C planes.
Cincpac 122112. With the concurrence of the Army, Cominch,
and Cincpac all action in connection with the occupation of TANAGA
is suspended.
It is believed tha t the enemy has no intention of giving
up attempts to recapture positions in t he Southern SOLOMONS.
However, tQ~~e ~ ar g e scale move, probably scheduled for December
18, is re~~ement'" of -.IEi'lfAK, NEW GUI NEA. There is some indication
of a plan to att a ck or attempt to occupy the KULUK BAY area of ADAK.
This may be in the na t ur e of a large scale diversion. No threat ~o~~ /~
S!<[--~
the HAWAIIAN area is seen at t h is time.

.&EGRET

December 13th
In the South Pacific activities were limited to two
strikes on ~:illNDA. The first was 7 B-l?s from ESPIHITU SAJ;rTO ar..;
riving in the target area at 10 a.m. The second was SI3Ds escorted
by P-38s and F4F4s from CACTU3 arriving at noon. In the past
three days five strikes have been made on MUNDA. \1/hile the landing field is believed ready for VFs, no report of such use has
been received.
The Central and North Pacific areas were quiet.
CinC Eastern Fleet will land agents on the COCHIN CHINA
coast by submarine between the 4th and 6th of January.
Rear Admiral Giffen's grouu expect to arrive NOtTha:EA
January 4th.
The Army J)lans to bomb WAKE with 30 B-24s between December
21 and 24.
Comsopac 140932 pink deals with delay in action reports
in his area.
From fragmentary DI it seems that the Japs plan some
sort of a raid in the KULUK BAY area from su ,Jmarines. If true
they must underestimate our strength there. Our search in the
ALE1JTIANS has failed to locate enemy convoys often reported by
DI, but some landings are indicated. The unusual interest in the
DUTCH - NEW GUII\TEA area, and from there westward to JAVA may
mean a revival of activity - possibly toward the northwest coast
of AUSTRALIA. No troop move is seen at this time. This does
not mean that there is any change noted in the enemy prime
desire to recapture the southern SOLOMO JS. 1loves in NEi1f GUINEA
and the ALEUTIAl~S may be regarded as diversion attempts. Also,
in NEW GUilffiA there is the suggestion that an attempt is being
made to strengthen defense positions in that area, and to facilitate air transport to and from the NEI.
No major threat in the direction of the Hawaiian Sea
Frontier seems prooable in the foreseeable future, although
minor raids on OMID and our outlying positions are always within
enemy capabilities .
~
~
~

124 B

- 3I!CRET

December 14, 1942

TF 16 at ESPIRITU SANTO has been placed on 4 hours
notice, as have the BBs (TF 64) at NOUMF~. TF 11 is anchored
at NOUMEA. TF 67 is at ESPIRITU SANTO. TF 65 is at NANDI.
The CACTUS planes attacked the MUNDA area a g ain today. No AA or enemy plane opposition was encountered. This
may indicate successful bombing the past few days.
ing.

Enemy planes were reported over TULAGI in the even-

The unloading of supplies at GUADALCANAL is proceed~

ing under difficulties. There seems to be a shorta g e of craft
to handle stores from the ships to the beach, and on the beach
the facilities are inadequate.
Comsopac 150422 is an operation summary.
Cominch 102147 is the "Tiresome" Marine troop movement froM the West Coast to the Sopac.
Crudiv ONE composed of the RALEIGH, DETROIT and
RICHMOND has been formed under Rear Adm. McMorris.
The Plan.s Section will reexamine MIDWAY for use as
a stepping stone to the Jap positions in the Central Pacific.
tions.

December

There is nothing new of enemy deployment or inten~5th.

TFs 11 o.nd 64 departed NOUJ\'IEA today and TFs 16 and

67 depart :B~f'~)IR ITU 81\NTr tomorrow. All wi 11 o:perat e in the CO RAL
SEA for trainin ~ and to awai t ~ev elopments. TF 11 and 16 will
continue as TF 61 under Rear Admiral Sherman.
Both 1fl1HIDA and R"'"::XATA are now daily targets for nlane s .
from CACTUS and TIDTTO N in order to retard development of either
place. A report today indicates that the ~om h craters we made
in the 111JNDA strip the :~ a st fe w days a pnear filled up. Harassing
minor strikes are being made da ily at the BUIN airfield.

I SL/\.1\TD .

There is some indication of Jap occupation of RUSSELL

A small !J? was re~orted unloa d inP-: there today.

The GRJ\VLI NCi r eports t wo h its in a CHTTODI t y pe plane

tender on Novembe r 6th a nd s a n k a sma ll ta nker on Novembe r lOth.
Both att a cks we r e made off TRUK .
(Continued)

124 9

SBO~'f

December 15th.

(Continued)

An OS2U reports sinking a midget sub near the 1\TEW

G1i'ORGIA group.

Comsopac 160424 pink outlines his critical DD shortage.

Cincpac 160435 pink does not approve Comsop ac ulan
for mines off GUADALC ~t\NAL but gives a sur:gesti on which would be
a-pproved.
The meagre information of WEST J\TEV'f GUINEA and enemy
positions west of there is contained in Comsowespac 152350.
Cincpac 151959 pink orders CTF 8 to be prepared to
occupy AMCHITKA at an early date.
Captain Coman with the T.if .P. BIDDLE , CH.L\.RIES CARROLL ,
THOMAS JEFFERSON, J. T. DICKJ\JAN, HETiliiTAGE, MONTICELLO, OBERON ,
ARCTURUS, CONY, and escort leave Norfolk about December 27th.
On
arrival at the Canal Zone the .APs and CONY will report to Cincpac
for duty.
The enemy is making strenuous efforts to create and
improve positions in the central SOLOMONS. As previously noted,
positions at lVT&DANG and WI~VlAK are expected to be occupied in
moderate strength about the 18th. Moves toward the We~tern
ALEUTIAN~"' , including KULUK BAY are indicated.
None of these in..:.
dicate a lessenine in the enemy desire to recapture the Southern
SOLOMOIJS. It seems probable that large enemy forces are now
organizing and training for a major push toward GUADALCAN.A.L. It
is believed that losses sustained in the past few months have
caused the enemy to abandon plans to extend control beyond the
SOLOMONS.
~
...---v

December 16th.

Aside from routine air strikes on 1vTIJl'IDA the Pacific

Ocean Areas were quiet. SlDs claim one 500 pound hit on the stern
of a DD or CL off 1\tiTHIDA bar. The only najor unit si ghted was a
CV leaving TR1JK on southerly courses by the PCULPI N.
The E. J. HINDS grounded in SEAIJ\.HK CHltNNEL.
had about 1200 troops of the 25th Division on board.

This ship

The I NDIANAPO LI S and 1 li L00H conducted firing tests

t.oday off OAHU with the 5;{~~Mk. 3 2 fuze. Perf ormance indicates
great possibilities and battle distri)ution of the fuze is underway.
Work on the OY=L.AliOMA wi 11 be limited to that necessary
to prepare the vessel to be towed to the mainland for scrapping.
(Continued)

1250

December 16th.

( Conti nue d )

Cominch 151 650 pink re que s t s i nf orma tion conce r ning

the strengt h of our f orc es i n t he CACTUS - TIIHGBOLT area.
In re p l y to Comso pac me ssag e concerning the cri tical
DD shortag e in the Sopa c, Ci ncpa c ren lie d tha t all that can be
done is being done (170327 pink ).
Coms opa c 170 510 ni nk be lieve s 'JOODLARK I SU1.ND offers
possibilities as an advan ce d a ir ba s e a nd re nue s t s information
on it fror11 Coros owespac.
DI shows that mines h a ve been laid by the enemy at
KI SKA. The fields as reporte d. will not hamper us to an y g reat
extent. These fields are just one more indic a tion that the Japs
are there to stay until thrown out. With the const r uction of a
fighter strip on BALLALE I SLAND ( SHORTLANDS area) underway, there
is further evidence of the determination to defend l1ABAUL with
considerable air streng th.
December 17th.
Task Forces in the South Pacific, less TF 65, continue
operations in the eastern CORAL SEA. Two B-17 air strikes were
made on MUNDA from CACTUS. The HINDS, which grounded two days
ago in the SEALARK CHANNEL, was refloated. New Zealand patrol
boats are now operating in the TULAGI-GUADALCANAL area. Comsopac
170812 is an operations summary.
Temporary repairs have been made to the COLUMBIA turbines
permitting speeds up to 25 kts.
In answer to Cominch 162115 regarding disposition of
defense battalions Cincpac sent his 180151.
The FLYING FISH repQrts sinking two DDs in the central
SOLOMONS while on patrol there since early November.
Orders were issued to the 7th Bomber command to attack
WAKE with 24 B-24's during the night of December 22-23. 3 subs
and one DD will be stationed between MIDWAY and WAKE to assist
the Army and rescue personnel as necessary.
Cominch is waiting on reports from a special survey of
AMCHITKA before deciding whether or not to occupy that island.
A report from the ELLIOT in the ALEUTIANS indicates her
back broken. The damage probably was caused by heavy seas.
(Continued next page)

12 5 :..

December 17th.

(Continued)

The only~newy activity noted during the day was a landing in the MADANG,a~#a. This was predicted. Evidently Sowespac
air was unable to prevent the convoy approach and.no sizeable air
attack on the convoy was reported. The CV sighted by the SCULPIN
off TRUK, noted yesterday, may have returned to TRUK. It has never
been clear why the Japs would want to use a CV in the operation to
occupy MADANG and ~VAK. There is some evidence of Jap desire for
a landing field in the HOLLANDIA area, a.~ ooV\. WAK~E !SL~l'IS> ,a."'-cll MoEMl.
Nothing new is learned of enemy deployments or intentions.
A strong push toward GUADALCANAL is still predicted, and no major
threat in the HAWAIIAN area is seen.

~~~ ~

December 18th.

There were~~~~Qr si~htings in the Pacific Ocean Areas

Activity was~l1m~ea to the routine daily strike on the
IJIUl\TDA area by SBDs from GUADALC...:'\N.l\L.
today.

Sopac task forces, less TF 65, continue operations in

the east CORAL SEA.
The CHESTER will be ready for sea at SYDNEY December
24th, and the PORTLMJD will be docked there that day.
Cominch indicates that KIRY.i'l iNA and perhaps other islands
of the TOBRIAND group may be suitable for an advanced air base
fo.r operations in the Northern COH..A.L SEA area.
CTF 8 reports a B-24 strike on KI SKA.
vey party landed on PJ:CHITKA the 17th.
_.

Also, that a sur-

~\--J ~: OV~f\1"~ \) ~\A

Cominch 1g1315 pink i~ a direct.i\re to occupy AMCHITKA

if reconnaissance sho~rs that an airfield thereon can be constructed
l'ii' a reasonable time. Cincpac 182321 pink directs C'rF 8 to continue plans and to recommend forces needed. Cincuac 182345 pink
says that CTF 8 will be assi gned the Naval task. Admiral Nimitz
and General DeWitt probably will issue a joint directive for the
operation.
'
Com 12 190320 ( 2 part) pink gives General De'.Ji tt' s views
on the ca~ture of KI 0.KA . Cincpac 190215 pink states that belief
here is that 2 divisions will be re quired. Rear Admiral Spruance
will confer with General DeWitt on this tomorrow.
Consopac 181056 gives planned employment of ].Iarine defense
battalions in his area.
The enemy was successful i n lan d in ~ a t HlDANG, "HE~vAK , and
,!i th t h e comp letion of this operation we can expect
ste pp ed u p e f fo r t t owa rds GUADALC\.lJAL . IJo other new enemy d evelo p -~
ments are seen.
FINCEA'VEN .

1252
/

SEGRE'f-

December 19th.
All Pacific Ocean Areas were generally quiet.
mary of air strikes from CACTUS is in CACTUS 192206.

A sum-

TF 61 will split up into TF 11 and 16 tomorrow. TF 11

will proceed to NOtTJMEA and TF 16 to ESPIRITU SANTO. TFs 64 and
67 will continue operations in the CORAL SEA.
While operating off GUADALCANAL the GANESVOORT damaged
one propeller and her speed is limited to 23 knots. The E. J.
HINDS is proceeding to ESPIRITU SANTO at eight knots. Her grounding damage is limited to propeller and shafting.
In the Southwest Pacific it is reported that an air attack on a group of 1 CL and 4 DD west of NEW BRITAIN resulted in
direct hit-s and possible sinking of the CL.
General DeWitt's 192048 pink gives further details on
the occupation of AMCHITKA.
The S-35 was attacked by two enemy float planes south of
ANTIGNAK ISLAND yesterday. These probably came from KISKA.
There are no new enemy developments.

December 20th.
There were no major sightings or contacts in the Pacific
Ocean Areas today.
tomorrow.

TF 67 has been ordered to ESPIRITU SM~TO arriving there

TF 64 will arrive at NOUMEA day after tomorrow.

The first increment of the 25th division is still unloading at GUADALCANAL and the second increment of the same d'ivision
is being. held temporarily at SUVA.
. Routine bombing and harassing strikes were made on the
enemy positions in the central SOLOMONS. GUADALCANAL 202207.
A survey of MACHITKA indicates the feasibility of constructing a fighter strip within about two weeks of the commencement of the occupation, and of the construction of a bombing
strip within about three months (CTF 8 210830). CTF 8 210215
gives naval forces he believes required for the operation. General
DeWitt (202304) believes that the survey report will permit the
operation to proceed under the directive from Cominch. It now
appears that the target date will be a bout January 5th.
(Continued)

1253

December 20th.

(Continued)

Our strikes on ~~A undoubtedly have hindered the

enemy, but not caused the airfield project to be abandoned. At
BBLLALE a landing strip is well underway. The Japs continue to
make strenuous effort to improve their Central SOI.OMONS posi~
tion. Sixty-two vessels were sighted at RABAUL yesterday. Signs
continue to point to another major drive towa~d the Southern
SOLOMONS within the next two or three weeks. It this estimate
is correct no major threat toward the Hawaiian area is seen. ~vr
A

December 21st.

No surface or ground operations of significance were

reported during the~~i~~~ ~here was a strike on MUl~A by eleven
SBDs from GUADALC.A.Nll~. These planes were not opposed and were
unable to see any ground activity. A few minutes later a B-17
over the runway received AA fire.
CTF 8 reports a strike on KISKA in his 212307.
All Sopac striking forces are heading for or in port,
as previously noted.
,

C.J'-'t ktd.

t'

The 25th Division, 1st increment, disembark~at GUADALCANAL today. The 2nd increment of that Division is waiting
orders at SUVA.
It is expected that the PENSACOLA will be ready to leave
ESPIRITU SANTO about December 28 and the MINNEAPOLIS about
January 5th. 'F!te NIDf ORLEitlq'S has arrivea e:t O~Blfl!:Y. The CHESTER
will proceed to Norfolk for complete repair of battle damage.
The Army planes which are scheduled to bomb WAKE the
night of December 22 - 23 have arrived at MIDWAY.
For the CROWBAR operation Cincpac will reinforce TF 8
with the INDIANAPOLI~- and 4 DD. This will not give all the antisubmarine forces that could be used profi ta Jly, but no others
are available. A proposal for a joint directive for this operation is in Cincpac 220557 pink. CTF 8 212238 pink estimates
the AMCHI~ troop requirements at about 13,500. This number
raises the problem of logistic support and involves the Navy
insofar as large escort demands can be expected.
1

Cominch 191906 pink gives moves for the lOth and 12th
defense battalions. Cincpac will require transportation for the
lOth, and combat loading is not essential.
(Continued)

1.254

SECRE~-

December 21st. (Continued)

Admiral Halsey proposes to return the NEW MF~ ICO and
MISSISSIPPI from the Sopac to conserve escorts and to permit
accomplishment of watertight integrity improvements to permit
their use in forward areas. Cincpac concurs.
The very large number of vessels seen at RABAUL yesterday is a fine target for air attack both from CACTUS and BUTTON.
It seems probable that these vessels are involved in the expected major push toward GUADALCANAL. It would be worth a great
deal to break up this shipping concentration. It should be noted
that our submarines in the SoPac area seem ineffective. Just
why this is the case is not clear. Plotted patrol positions do
not provide for maximum concentrations at the two main focal
points, i.e. RABAUL and BUIN.
The ene~y today has at least four combatant CVs available. Some are training in Empire waters. While it seems most
probable that the next employment of the CVs will be in the
South, the possibility of raids in the Hawaiian Area and on our
staging points cannot be overlooked. No employment of CVs in
the ALEUTIANS or east of the Meridian of OAHU iS seen.
\)./
December 22nd.
12 SBD, 5 B-17, with VF coverage made strikes on MlffiDA
shortly after noon local. Specific damage inflicted is not reported, but AA opposition was encountered by the B-17's.
An extremely large concentration of shipping was
observed at RABAUL . Ships of all types, including one or two
cruisers and 20 DDs, numbered over one hundred. It would be an
ideal set up for a BLUE CV strike, particularly while HYPOCRITE
(JAPAN) probably could not oppose with more than one CV. The
danger in such an operation is, of course, enemy shore based air.
Comairsopac plans to strike RABAUL tomorrow with 6 B-17's, and
the next day with at least 12 B-17's.
The B-24 strike on WAKE was made on schedule. All
planes returned to MIDWAY safely. Damage inflicted is not yet
reported.
The CROWBAR operation (occupation of AMCHITKA) is
shaping up. Cincpac 230407 requests General DeWitt to send his
suggested draft for a jo i nt directive. This despatch was answered
in DeWitt's 230016 pink. The joint directive to CTF 8 should be
sent along tomorrow.
There are no new enemy developments.

1255

_.SECRET

December 22nd (Continued )

The press indicates that the BRITISH have raided
SABANG with carrier based planes. The BRITISH have also
started a land offensive against AKYAB.
December 23rd.
There were two strikes made on MUNDA during the day from
CACTUS. It is evident that these almost daily attacks are hampering Jap developme nt. However, it was seen for the first time today that zero fighters are operating from the MUNDA field.
No major sightings were reported in the Pacific Ocean
Areas. The large assembly of ships at RABAUL, mentioned yesterday ,
still remains a most attractive target. The B-17 strike on RABAUL
which was scheduled for today is not reported and may have been
called off on account of bad weather.
Comsopac 240616 is a summary for his area.
CTF 17 232359 is the report of the successfu l Army strike
The photo reconnaiss ance which followed the strike.als o
W.t_t'li\.
w~~ ~uccessful.
On the day of this strike the TRITON sank .SA,,()
aAwa~er
sa~ off WAKE.
If bombing destroyed a few distillers ashore the
Japs may have a serious water problem.
on WAKE.

Cincpac 232215 is the joint directive for th~ occupation

of AMCHITKA
CTF 8 240225 gives forces proposed.
There are no new enemy deploymen ts noted, and nothing
new is ~earned of enemy plans.
December 24th.
The Pacific Ocean Areas were quiet except for air strikes
in the SOLOMONS. Eleven B-17's started to bomb RABAUL. Six
reached the target and claim three hits on an AK or AP, and several
near miL.s.._s f..~ ~ther planes were unable to find the target area.
This~~because of bad weather.
The large number of ships at
RABAUL, pl u s a possible CV, previously mentioned , was reported
by returning pilots. In this connection CinC Pac sent his 250303
which suggests a coordinate d air strike on this shipping concentration and the redistribu tion of submarines to cover RABAUL
approache s more effective ly. Minor contacts made during the day
in the SOLOMO NS are~ are of no special si gnificance . 9 SBD's with
VF cover attacked landing barges and the MUNDA airstrip. It is
reported that the landing strip is considerab ly damaged from the
past few days bombing .

1255

SECEET
December 24th (Cont'd)
All task forces in the South Pacific are in port as
follows; TF 65 at NANDI; TFs 16 and 67 at BUTTON; TF 11 and
64 at YVHITE POPPY.
No ground action is reported from GUADALCANAL.
troops in that area have been quiet for some time.

The

A Jap DD which was sunk at TULAGI is in rather shallow

water. It may be possible to recover her charts and other
papers of value.
The photo reconnaissance plane sent to 'NAKE following
the recent strike was unable to get pictures because of overcast.
The Allies in the BUNA area are making slow but continous
progress in cutting off the Jap troops and recapturing two
airfields.
The DRUM reports that an attack on a carrier on Dec. 12th
off Southern HONSHU resulted in two torpedo hits.
CTF 8 plans to make a sweep to the westward with cruisers
and destroyers starting Dec. 28th. The $-35 at ADAK had a
serious battery fire yesterday.
There are no new enemy developments.
(; ~

December 25th

At least two enemy submarines were reported sunk. The

first was sunk off ST. GEORGE CHANNEL by the SEADRAGON while on
patrol in these waters, and the second was sunk by a SWPac PT in
the BUNA area.
Two small enemy AKs were sighted off WICKHAM ISLAND, NEW
GEORGIA during the day and were attacked by CACTUS air. One of
3000 tons was sunk. Reports from the SWPac indicate good success
in air attacks on enemy shipping in the wes-tern SOLOMONS SEA. It
seems probable that one victim was the ARIAKE (DD). It continues
to be of first importance to sink enemy shipping. An efficient
way to do this is by low altitude bombing.
At GUADALCANAL current night nuisance raids are lowering
our troop's combat efficiency as indicated in Comsopac 250449.
The logistic supply of our southern SOLOMONS positions is proceeding satisfactorily.
ComSWPac.

Admiral Halsey is discussing air strikes on RABAUL with

Comsopac 260612 pink.
-(Continued)

12 57

cSECRE'J.L-

December 25th

(Continued)

The present status of the BALLALE airfield is in Comairsopac 260224.

The MONTPELIER g roup will arrive at NOUMEA about January
19. TF 65 less Batdiv 4 ~ is ordered to ESPIRITU SANTO. The ACVs
are warned to be prepared for further service.
Further discussion of the AMCHITKA occupation is contained
. in General De Witt's 252050 pink.
There are no new enemy

developments~

December 26th
As has been the case for several days, the Pacific Ocean
areas were generally quiet. SBDs with fighters made a routine
strike on the MUNDA area. Some zero and A~ opposition was encountered.
The WAHOO returning from patrol in the Central SOLOMONS
area reports sinking one r class sub and one 5600 ton AP in mid
December.
There are
but full operation
storage is not yet
under construction

now 161 planes of various types at GUADALCANAL,

of these is not yet possible because bulk avgas
completed. Completion of the tank farm now
is promised by January 15th.

The 2nd increment of the 25th Division should arrive at

GUADALCANAL about the 28th.
Admiral King says well done to the WAKE bombers, and believes that attacks should be repeated at irregular intervals not
only for the effect on WAKE but as prospective cover if and when
we may wish to follow the attack with assault. We are giving
consideration to other air attacks on enemy Central Pacific positions from JOHNSTON and FUNAFUTI.
Admiral Hepburn will report to Cincpac in a few days to
conduct an administrative investigation of the 1st Battle of SAVO.
~~
There are no new enemy developments.

1258

13ECRE'r

December 27th
There were no major sightings in the Pacific Ocean Areas.
A Southwest Pacific plane saw at least 51 ships anchored at RABAUL.
No large concentration in the BUIN area has been noted for sometime.
It appears probable that four Jap subs have been sunk in
the SOLOMONS SEA area in the past week.
The NEW ORLEANS arrived at SYDNEY the 24th local.
While enroute from WAKE to the South Pacific the TRITON
sank an AK off MOKIL (CAROLINE ISLANDS).
All Task Forces of the South Pacific Force are in port for
upkeep and to await developments.
Army planes over AT~J encountered some AA from that Island.
A reconnaissance plane had reported float planes at ATTU, but a
strike sent from ADAK to destroy them was unable to find them. This
may have been due to radar warning from KISKA.
Cominch 271750 pink suggests enemy CV employment against
the HAWAII - MIDWAY line or elsewhere other than the SOLOMONS SEA
area. This is, of cou~. ~ ~lways possible--as was noted herein on
December 21st. The most: emptoyment seems to be in connection with
another major attempt to recapture positions in the Southern SOLOMONS.
Because of new airfields in the Central SOLOMONS and in NEW GEORGIA,
tl1e next southward push would involve use of considerable enemy shore
based air with better fighter coverage than was possible from RABAUL.
December 28th.

~~

During the day air strikes from GUADALCANAL sank two AKs at
WICKHAM ANCHORAGE, NEW GEORGIA. The Pacific Ocean Areas were otherwise quiet.
An Army photo reconnaissance plane returning from WAKE landed
at sea 200 miles southwest of MIDWAY. Rescue is underway.
The WASMU'J.1H (DMS) broke in two in heavy seas and sank off
UMNAK ISLAND.
The enemy probably is reorganizing and training for another
push toward GUADALCANAL. The carriers are training in Eiv1PIRE Waters.
The bulk of other surface streng th is not located but seems to be
,
in the general area between TRUK and HONSHU.

1259

~~

December 29th
There was very little activity in the Pacific during the
day. GUADALCANAL planes made a strike on enemy installations at
REKATA. Slight AA was encountered and there were few signs of
activity there. Comsopac 300627 is an operation summary for the
past few days.
Cominch has directed that 6 to 12 PTs now ih Sopac be
sent to ComSWPac for temporary duty.
Comsopac 300350 gives the plans for troops in the GUADALCANAL area, and his 301223 reports present troops in the GUADALCANAL-TULAGI area. There seem to be some omissions in the latter
despatch. The second increment of the 25th Division has arrived
at GUADALCANAL.
Sopac Task Forces are still in port with TF 16 and 67 at
SANTO and 11 and 64 at NOUMEA. TF 65 ACVs and escorts were
due at ESPIRITU SANTO at noon today. Batdiv 4 is at NANDI.

ES~IRITU

Comsopac 300602 pink gives a plan for a cruiser and

destroer bombardment of MUNDA during the night of January 4th
(local).
The THOMAS EDISON, which grounded several weeks ago at
TURTLE ISLAND, can now be considered a total loss. She broke her
back the 19th. Most of the
~ cargo, including 48 torpedoes, has
~r~~
been salvaged. Even better~
salvage results may be expected with
the arrival of the new salvage vessels in the South Pacific. At
present ATs with makeshift equipment are employed.
North Pacific cruisers and DD escort under Rea~ Admiral
McMorris will make a sweep to the westward from KODIAK during the
next few days. This is preliminary to the CROWBAR operation now
scheduled to begin on January 5th.
There is very little known of present enemy deployment
and intentions. It is believed that the next major move will be
toward GUADALCANAL, and that the recently noted developments in
the NEW GEORGIA Group and the Central SOLOMONS are primarily to
provide better shore based air coverage. At MUNDA, for example,
it is now known that bombers can operate on the airfield. About
half of the ene1ny carriers are believed about to complete an intensive training operation in the vicinity of HONSHU. The bulk of
combatant surface streng th is thought between TRUK ~nd the Empire.
Based on this, no major enemy move toward GUADALCANAL would take
place before January 7th. But Cardiv ONE has been silent for the
past three days. It may be enroute south. In that case a possible
enemy target date may be somewhat advanced. Because of lack of
definite information, the best that can be done is to predict as
follows:
(Continued next page)

1250

SEORE'f

December 29th. (Continued)

(a) No major move on GUADALCANAL is to be expected
before about January 7th.
~)

.e.

maj eP move 0::1 GUADQLCA NCt.L i~ more p1 ubabl~

that o:ao to'M&ilrd. NJ;i;W GUIHEA..

(c) It is possible, but not probable, that a raid

in strength will be made in the near future on the
MIDWAY-HAWAII line or outlying positions in the
Central Pacific.
(d) It does not seem probable that much strength
will be in the North Pacific to interfere with the
CROWBAR operation.
December 30th.
Pacific Ocean Areas were generally quiet. Comsopac
310836. Our submarines are beginning to show improvement in the
SOLOMONS SEA area. Enemy sources indicate that one of our subs
sank one ship of a convoy heading from the N@N BRITAIN area toward
PALAU and attacked another ship in the convoy about an hour later.
(In this latter attack two torpedoes passed under the ship without
exploding. This is further evidence of our very poor torpedo pe~
formanceJ.
There are no major developments in the SW Pac. Ground
forces continued to close in on Japs in the BUNA area. The enemy
undoubtedly is improving and building air facilities on the North
Coast of NEVI GUINEA.
The press reports increased air and ground action in the
BURMA theatre. In RUSSIA extravagant reports of success against
the Germans appear daily in the press. While the RUSSIANS must
be successful in the present offensive, the degree of that su-ccess
may not be as great as the RUSSIANS report. Little is known of
our African Campaign. It seemsprobable that the advance from the
West has been stopped now that stiff enemy resistance is encountered. The advance from the East seems to be slowed down, possibly
due to logistic problems.
Cotp.airwing TWO 310830 reports a typical strike on MUNDA.
Our logistic supply and troop replacement program to
GUADALCANAL is proceeding well. The second increment of the 25th
Division will be landed by January 3rd. Because of Admiral Ha~sey' s
300350, noted yesterday, Cincpac sent his 310341 pink to Cominch.
In this connection it is recorded again that no troops are in sight
or even contemplated (as ' far as is known here) successfully to
complete tasks- TVvO and THREE. We know that, after jungle duty,
(Continued)

126 1

December 30th.

(Continued)

troops are not available again, because of malaria and other causes,
for from three to six months. Until we have the requisite numbers
of fresh troops to take and keep up ,t he offensive our situation
in the SOLOMON SEA Area will be unsatisfactory from the viewpoint
of getting along with the war. Results in 1942 are gratifying considering the fact that we have not had enough tools to work with.
While we have managed to stop Jap advances toward AUSTRALIA and
the supply lines thereto, we have not impaired Jap capacity to defend gains of 1942. To permit Japan to exploit her present "Far
East" holdings would prolong the war to the danger point. All
this means only one thing for 1943 - more tools to work with than
are now in sight. In addition, we must improve material., such as
torpedoes and radio. Cincpac 310459 is one more plea for more
tools.
No new enemy deployments or intentions are noted.
December 31st.
For the first time in several days a cruiser - destroyer
group was sighted in the vicinity of the SHORTLANDS. Bad weather
in the SOLOMONS area probably was the cause of an ineffective strike
today on MUNDA and of only a part of the usual daily search. The
large concentration of shipping continues at RABAUL . We have 81
merchant type in the NOUMEA-ESPIRITU SANTO-GUDALCANAL area.
Comsopac 311100(3 parts) is his Op Plan 1-43 in which he
outlines cover for 6 APs and 1 AK in the GUADALCANAL area January
3rd to about January 6th.
Comsopac (010514) plans to develop PORT PURVIS, FLORIDA
ISLAND as a fleet anchorage. His 011136 gives his plan to relieve
the 2nd Marine Division at GUADALCANAL and to eliminate the enemy
there.
Cominch 311815 pink is a proposal to create a Deputy
Comsopac to relieve Comsopac of administrative details.
CTF 8 reports an air strike on KISKA in his 312140.
Cominch states that the Arrow is maintaining the ALEUTIAN P-38
squadron at twenty-five airplanes. No additional P-38 squadron
is available at present for assignment to the ~ASKAN area. This
plane is believed the only pursuit which can ~,~atisfactorily S.
employed in that area.
There are no new enemy developments.

1.252