1. Cayetano vs.

Monsod
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner, vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary
of Budget and Management, respondents.
G.R. No. 100113
September 3, 1991
PARAS, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.
Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the
nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess required
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall
be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at
the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position
in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
ISSUE:
It is whether the respondent has the ten year practice of law requirement for
him to assume such office
HELD:
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill.
In general, a practice of law requires a lawyer and client relationship, it is
whether in or out of court. Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyereconomist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyernegotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor
verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years..

2. Cayetano vs. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210

FACTS:

Atty. Christian Monsod was appointed as Chairman of the Commission of Elections.

His appointment was contested by Atty. Renato Cayetano citing that his years of
experience cannot be considered that which constitutes the practice of law.
Atty. Monsod was a member of good standing in the Bar for more than ten (10)
years. He worked:
-

As a lawyer in the law office of his father (1960-1963);

As an operations officer with the World Bank Group (1963-1970);

As a Chief Executive Officer of an investment bank (1970-1986);

As a legal or economic consultant on various companies (1986);

As Secretary General of NAMFREL (1986);

As a member of Constitutional Commission (1986-1987);

As National Chairman of NAMFREL (1987); and,

As a member of the quasi-judicial Davide Commission (1990).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the above mentioned activities may be considered to constitute
the practice of law.
HELD:
YES. By majority vote.
RATIO:
Definition of practice of law by:
Blacks Legal Dictionary: The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and
the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another
with his consent.
Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177): The practice of
law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying.
Further, records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a
liberal interpretation of the term practice of law.

3. PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION VS AGRAVA

G. R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959
FACTS: A petition was filed by the petitioner for prohibition and injunction against
Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office. On
May 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had

scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who
are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office.
The petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar examinations and is
licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in
good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office and
that the respondent Directors holding an examination for the purpose is in excess
of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.The respondent, in reply, maintains
the prosecution of patent cases does not involve entirely or purely the practice
of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and
training as a matter of actual practice so as to include engineers and other
individuals who passed the examination can practice before the Patent office.
Furthermore, he stressed that for the long time he is holding tests, this is the first
time that his right has been questioned formally.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the
preparation and the prosecution of patent application, etc., constitutes or is
included in the practice of law.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance
before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other
persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their opposition
thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Moreover, the practice
before the patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws
and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in
accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. The practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court but also embraces all other
matters connected with the law and any work involving the determination by the
legal mind of the legal effects of facts and conditions. Furthermore, the law
provides that any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or
decision of the director. Thus, if the transactions of business in the Patent Office
involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training,
then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but
rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.

4. People of the Philippines vs Simplicio Villanueva

14 SCRA 109 Legal Ethics Practice of Law Isolated Appearance
In 1959, Villanueva was charged with Malicious Mischief in the municipality of
Alaminos in Laguna. In said case, the private offended party asked his lawyer
friend, Ariston Fule to prosecute said case. Apparently, Fule was the fiscal in San
Pablo, Laguna. Villanueva the opposed the appearance of Fule as counsel for the

offended party as he said that according to the Rules of Court when an attorney
had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and
therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ariston Fule is engaged in private law practice.
HELD: No. Private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself
to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his
professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of
his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. In the case at bar, Fule is not
being compensated but rather hes doing it for free for his friend who happened to
be the offended party. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists
in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other
words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Further, the fact that the Secretary of
Justice approved Fules appearance for his friend should be given credence.

5. CUI VS CUI FACTS:

Jesus and Antonio are the legitimate children of Don Mariano Cui and Doa
Antonia Perales who died intestate in1939. Jesus alleged that during the marriage
of Don Mariano and Dona Antonia, their parents acquired certain properties in the
City of Cebu, namely, Lots Nos. 2312, 2313 and 2319. Upon the death of their
mother, the properties were placed under the administration of their dad. That
while the latter was 84 years of age, Antonio by means of deceit, secured the
transfer to themselves the said lots without any pecuniary consideration; that in
the deed of sale executed on March 8, 1946, Rosario Cui appeared as one of the

vendees, but on learning of this fact she subsequently renounced her rights under
the sale and returned her portion to Don Mariano Cui by executing a deed of
resale in his favor on October 11, 1946; that defendants, fraudulently and with the
desire of enriching themselves unjustly at the expense of their father, Don
Mariano Cui, and of their brothers and co-heirs, secured a loan of P130,000 from
the Rehabilitation properties, and with the loan thus obtained, defendants
constructed thereon an apartment building of strong materials consisting of 14
doors, valued at approximately P130,000 and another building on the same
parcels of land, which buildings were leased to some Chinese commercial firms a
monthly rental of P7,600, which defendants have collected and will continue to
collect to the prejudice of the plaintiffs; Jesus alleged that the sale should be
invalidated so far as the portion of the property sold to Antonio Cui is concerned,
for the reason that when that sale was effected, Antonio was then acting as the
agent or administrator of the properties of Don Mariano Cui. Jesus lays stress on
the power of attorney Exhibit L which was executed by Don Mariano in favor of
Antonio Cui on March 2,1946, wherein the former has constituted the latter as his
"true and lawful attorney" to perform in his name and that of the intestate heirs of
Doa Antonia Perales.
ISSUE: WON the sale of the property to Antonio was valid.
HELD: YES. While under article 1459 of the old Civil Code an agent or
administrator is disqualified from purchasing property in his hands for sale or
management, and, in this case, the property in question was sold to Antonio Cui
while he was already the agent or administrator of the properties of Don Mariano
Cui, we however believe that this question cannot now be raised or invoked.
The prohibition of the law is contained in article 1459 of the old Civil Code, but
this prohibition has already been removed.
Under the provisions of article 1491, section 2, of the new Civil Code, an agent
may now buy property placed in his hands for sale or administration, provided
that the principal gives his consent thereto. While the new Code came into effect
only on August 30, 1950, however, since this is a right that is declared for the first
time, the same may be given retroactive effect if no vested or acquired right is
impaired (Article 2253, new Civil Code). During the lifetime Don Mariano, and
particularly on March 8, 1946, the herein appellants could not claim any vested or
acquired right in these properties, for, as heirs, the most they had was a mere
expectancy. We may, therefore, invoke now this practical and liberal provision of
our new Civil Code even if the sale had taken place before its effectivity.

6. Estrada v Sandiganbayan/ G.R. No. 148560/ November 19, 2001

Bellosillo J.
Facts:
Petitioner calls for the Court to subject RA 7080(An Act defining and Penalizing the
Crime of Plunder) to the crucible of constitutionality for reasons that the act:
is vague
dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes punishable under the Revised Penal
Code

Issue:
Is the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being vague?
Does the Plunder law require less evidence proving the predicate crimes of
plunder thus violates the rights of the accused to due process (specifically Section
4 proposing that "it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act
done by the accused to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of over or
criminal acts indicative of the overall lawful scheme or conspiracy)?
Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum (therefore does
not require that the mind of the offender be guilty to be penalized) and if so,
whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it
Ruling:
Petitioner has miserably failed to show that the Plunder Law is unconstitutional
due to its vagueness.-"...the Plunder Law contains ascertainable
standards and well-defi ned parameters which would enable the accused to
determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its
description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and
prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity."
-"...the doctrines of strict scrutiny, over breadth, and vagueness are
analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free
speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment
cases. Criminal statutes on the other hand cannot be a party to such a rule.
"One to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack
the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying
to other persons or other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional"
Petitioner's stand that the statute (specifically Sec.4) evades the mandatory
element of the prosecution in criminal law to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the acts constituting plunder is turned down by the court. SEC. 4. Rule of
Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in
furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire illgotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern
of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
-W h a t n e e d s p ro o f i s o n l y t h e " n u m b e r o f a c t s s u ffi c i e n t t o f o rm a
c o m b i n a t i o n o r series which should constitute a patter and involving an
amount of at least P50,000,000". Proof to each and every other act is not
needed.- "...we do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily,
all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its
definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec.1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them."
"...because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and it contains
a substantive element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we
can avoid Section 4."-Also there is a reparability clause in the act holding
that if any provision in the act is held invalid, the remaining provisions of the
act shall not be affected. "All the provisions thereof should be accordingly be
treated independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the objects of the
statute can be best achieved."
Court believes that plunder is mala in se.-"...it is noteworthy that the
amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed
"willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of
petitioner."

-The punishment for plunder, which is by reclusion Perpetua to death,

may be deemed as a resolution to any doubts whether the crime of plunder is
mala in se.-Ac t s t h a t a re i n h e re n t l y i m m o r a l o r i n h e re n t l y w ro n g a re
mala in se
, and does not matter that such acts are punished by special laws.
Court declares that RA 7659 as constitutionally valid
. Petition denied for lack of merit.
Facial Challenge
A facial challenge is typically described as a head-on attack on the legislative
judgment, an assertion that the challenged statute violates the Constitution in all,
or virtually all, of its applications" and, as a result, is invalid in its entirety.

7. PCGG v SANDIGANBAYAN
*kalokohan na kaso to, 140++ pages (disclaimer) main decision 28 pages lang** merong
history of Rule 6.03 and other historical stuff sa case
Facts:
1976: General Bank & Trust Company (Genbank) encountered financial
difficulties. Central Bank extended loans to Genbank in the hope of rehabilitating
it (P310M). Nonetheless, Genbank failed to recover.
1977: Genbank was declared insolvent. A public bidding of Genbanks assets
was held with the Lucio

TanGroup winning the bid. Solicitor General Mendoza, representing th

e government, intervened with the liquidation of Genbank.
1986: after EDSA I, Cory established the PCGG to recover the ill-gotten
wealth of Marcos, his family and cronies.
1987: PCGG filed a case against Lucio Tan and certain other people (basta
marami sila). In relation to this case, PCGG issued several writs of
sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the respondents by taking
advantage of their close relationship and influence with Marcos. Sandiganbayan heard
the case.
Estelito Mendoza (Solicitor General during the time of Marcos) represented the
respondents.
1991: PCGG fi led a motion to disqualify Mendoza, because of his
participation in the liquidation of Genbank. Genbank (now Allied Bank) is
one of the properties that PCGG is seeking to be sequestered fromthe Lucion
Tan group. PCGG invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Sandiganbayan denied PCGGs motion. According to the Sandiganbayan,
Mendoza did not take an adverseposition to that taken on behalf of the
Central Bank. And Mendozas appearance as counsel was beyondthe 1 year
prohibitory period since he retired in 1986.

Issue:
W/N Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to Estelito Mendoza
Held:
No, it does not apply to Mendoza. Sandiganbayan decision is affirmed.
The matter (see 3rdnote), or the act of Mendoza as Solicitor General is advising the
Central Bank on how to proceed with the liquidation of Genbank. This is not the
matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The matter involved in the liquidation of Genbank is entirely different from t
he matter involved in thePCGG case against the Lucio Tan group.
The intervention contemplated in Rule 6.03 should be substantial and
important. The role of Mendoza in the liquidation of Genbank is considered
insubstantial.
SC is even questioning why PCGG took such a long time to revive the
motion to disqualify Mendoza. Apparently, PCGG already lost
a lot of cases against Mendoza. Kyles interpretation: PCGG getting
desperate
Something to think about: SC is somehow of the opinion that Rule
6.03 will make it harder for the government to get good lawyers in the
future to work for them because of the prohibition of accepting cases in the
future that were related to ones work as a government counsel. Concurring Opinions:
Panganiban & Carpio: the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 should have a
prescriptive period
Tinga: Rule 6.03 cannot apply retroactively to Mendoza (when he was
Solicitor General, no Rule 6.03 yet)
Bottom line, they are all questioning the unfairness of the rule if applied
without any prescriptive periodand if applied retroactively
Notes:
Adverse-interest conflicts where the matter in which the former
government lawyer represents a clientin private practice is substantially
related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed with
thegovernment and the interests of the current and former are adverse

 Congruent-interest conflicts the use of the word conflict is a misnomer, it

does not involve conflicts
ata l l , a s i t p ro h i b i t s l a w y e r s f ro m re p re s e n t i n g a p r i v a t e p e r s o
n e v e n i f t h e i n t e re s t s o f t h e f o rm e r government client and the new
client are entirely parallel
Matter any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or
conduct involving a particular situation and specific party
Intervention interference that may affect the interests of others