22 24. Evidence

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Prof. Avena
22. COMMERCIAL LIST
22. COMMERCIAL LIST
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
Page 1 of 74
The records disclose that in the early morning of September 21, 1977,
the M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by private respondent Maria Efigenia
Fishing Corporation, was navigating the waters near Fortune Island in
Nasugbu, Batangas on its way to Navotas, Metro Manila when it collided
with the vessel Petroparcel which at the time was owned by the Luzon
Stevedoring Corporation (LSC).
ROMERO, J.:
After investigation was conducted by the Board of Marine Inquiry,

Philippine Coast Guard Commandant Simeon N. Alejandro rendered a
decision finding the Petroparcel at fault. Based on this finding by the
Board and after unsuccessful demands on petitioner, 7 private
respondent sued the LSC and the Petroparcel captain, Edgardo Doruelo,
before the then Court of First Instance of Caloocan City, paying thereto
the docket fee of one thousand two hundred fifty-two pesos (P1,252.00)
and the legal research fee of two pesos (P2.00). 8 In particular, private
respondent prayed for an award of P692,680.00, allegedly representing
the value of the fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes of M/V Maria
Efigenia XV, with interest at the legal rate plus 25% thereof as attorney's
fees. Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, petitioner PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation sought to be substituted in place of
LSC as it had already acquired ownership of thePetroparcel. 9
A party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary

loss actually suffered and duly proved. 1Indeed, basic is the rule that to
recover actual damages, the amount of loss must not only be capable of
proof but must actually be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty,
premised upon competent proof or best evidence obtainable of the
actual amount thereof. 2 The claimant is duty-bound to point out specific
facts that afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory damages
are borne. 3 A court cannot merely rely on speculations, conjectures, or
guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages 4 as well as hearsay 5 or
uncorroborated testimony whose truth is suspect. 6 Such are the
jurisprudential precepts that the Court now applies in resolving the
instant petition.
For its part, private respondent later sought the amendment of its
complaint on the ground that the original complaint failed to plead for
the recovery of the lost value of the hull of M/V Maria Efigenia
XV. 10 Accordingly, in the amended complaint, private respondent
averred that M/V Maria Efigenia XV had an actual value of P800,000.00
and that, after deducting the insurance payment of P200,000.00, the
amount of P600,000.00 should likewise be claimed. The amended
complaint also alleged that inflation resulting from the devaluation of
the Philippine peso had affected the replacement value of the hull of the
vessel, its equipment and its lost cargoes, such that there should be a
reasonable determination thereof. Furthermore, on account of the
sinking of the vessel, private respondent supposedly incurred unrealized
G.R. No. 107518 October 8, 1998

PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA EFIGENIA FISHING
CORPORATION, respondents.
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Prof. Avena
22. COMMERCIAL LIST
profits and lost business opportunities that would thereafter be

proven. 11
Subsequently, the complaint was further amended to include petitioner
as a defendant 12 which the lower court granted in its order of
September 16,
1985. 13 After petitioner had filed its answer to the second amended
complaint, on February 5, 1987, the lower court issued a pre-trial
order 14 containing, among other things, a stipulations of facts, to wit:
1. On 21 September 1977, while the fishing boat "M/V
MARIA EFIGENIA" owned by plaintiff was navigating in
the vicinity of Fortune Island in Nasugbu, Batangas, on its
way to Navotas, Metro Manila, said fishing boat was hit
by the LSCO tanker "Petroparcel" causing the former to
sink.
2. The Board of Marine Inquiry conducted an
investigation of this marine accident and on 21
November 1978, the Commandant of the Philippine Coast
Guard, the Honorable Simeon N. Alejandro, rendered a
decision finding the cause of the accident to be the
reckless and imprudent manner in which Edgardo
Doruelo navigated the LSCO "Petroparcel" and declared
the latter vessel at fault.
3. On 2 April 1978, defendant Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation (LUSTEVECO), executed in favor of PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation a Deed of Transfer
involving several tankers, tugboats, barges and pumping
stations, among which was the LSCO Petroparcel.
4. On the same date on 2 April 1979 (sic), defendant
PNOC STC again entered into an Agreement of Transfer
Page 2 of 74
with co-defendant Lusteveco whereby all the business
properties and other assets appertaining to the tanker
and bulk oil departments including the motor tanker
LSCO Petroparcel of defendant Lusteveco were sold to
PNOC STC.
5. The aforesaid agreement stipulates, among others, that
PNOC-STC assumes, without qualifications, all obligations
arising from and by virtue of all rights it obtained over
the LSCO "Petroparcel".
6. On 6 July 1979, another agreement between defendant
LUSTEVECO and PNOC-STC was executed wherein Board
of Marine Inquiry Case No. 332 (involving the sea
accident of 21 September 1977) was specifically
identified and assumed by the latter.
7. On 23 June 1979, the decision of Board of Marine
Inquiry was affirmed by the Ministry of National Defense,
in its decision dismissing the appeal of Capt. Edgardo
Doruelo and Chief mate Anthony Estenzo of LSCO
"Petroparcel".
8. LSCO "Petroparcel" is presently owned and operated
by PNOC-STC and likewise Capt. Edgardo Doruelo is still
in their employ.
9. As a result of the sinking of M/V Maria Efigenia caused
by the reckless and imprudent manner in which LSCO
Petroparcel was navigated by defendant Doruelo,
plaintiff suffered actual damages by the loss of its fishing
nets, boat equipments (sic) and cargoes, which went
down with the ship when it sank the replacement value
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of which should be left to the sound discretion of this

Honorable Court.
After trial, the lower court 15 rendered on November 18, 1989 its
decision disposing of Civil Case No. C-9457 as follows:
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant PNOC Shipping & Transport Corporation, to
pay the plaintiff:
a. The sum of P6,438,048.00 representing
the value of the fishing boat with interest
from the date of the filing of the complaint
at the rate of 6% per annum;
b. The sum of P50,000.00 as and for
attorney's fees; and
c. The costs of suit.
The counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Likewise, the case against defendant Edgardo Doruelo is
hereby DISMISSED, for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
In arriving at the above disposition, the lower court cited the evidence
presented by private respondent consisting of the testimony of its
general manager and sole witness, Edilberto del Rosario. Private
respondent's witness testified that M/V Maria Efigenia XV was owned by
private respondent per Exhibit A, a certificate of ownership issued by
the Philippine Coast Guard showing that M/V Maria Efigenia XV was a
wooden motor boat constructed in 1965 with 128.23 gross tonnage.
Page 3 of 74
According to him, at the time the vessel sank, it was then carrying 1,060
tubs (baeras) of assorted fish the value of which was never recovered.
Also lost with the vessel were two cummins engines (250 horsepower),
radar, pathometer and compass. He further added that with the loss of
his flagship vessel in his fishing fleet of fourteen (14) vessels, he was
constrained to hire the services of counsel whom he paid P10,000 to
handle the case at the Board of Marine Inquiry and P50,000.00 for
commencing suit for damages in the lower court.
As to the award of P6,438,048.00 in actual damages, the lower court
took into account the following pieces of documentary evidence that
private respondent proffered during trial:
(a) Exhibit A certified xerox copy of the
certificate of ownership of M/V Maria
Efigenia XV;
(b) Exhibit B a document titled
"Marine Protest" executed by Delfin
Villarosa, Jr. on September 22, 1977
stating that as a result of the collision,
the M/V Maria Efigenia XVsustained a
hole at its left side that caused it to sink
with its cargo of 1,050 baerasvalued at
P170,000.00;
(c) Exhibit C a quotation for the
construction of a 95-footer trawler issued
by Isidoro A. Magalong of I. A. Magalong
Engineering and Construction on January
26, 1987 to Del Rosario showing that
construction of such trawler would cost
P2,250,000.00;
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(d) Exhibit D pro forma invoice No.

PSPI-05/87-NAV issued by E.D. Daclan of
Power Systems, Incorporated on January
20, 1987 to Del Rosario showing that two
(2) units of CUMMINS Marine Engine
model N855-M, 195 bhp. at 1800 rpm.
would cost P1,160,000.00;
(e) Exhibit E quotation of prices issued
by Scan Marine Inc. on January 20, 1987
to Del Rosario showing that a unit of
Furuno Compact Daylight Radar, Model
FR-604D, would cost P100,000.00 while a
unit of Furuno Color Video Sounder,
Model FCV-501 would cost P45,000.00 so
that the two units would cost
P145,000.00;
(f) Exhibit F quotation of prices issued
by Seafgear Sales, Inc. on January 21,
1987 to Del Rosario showing that two (2)
rolls of nylon rope (5" cir. X 300fl.) would
cost P140,000.00; two (2) rolls of nylon
rope (3" cir. X 240fl.), P42,750.00; one (1)
binocular (7 x 50), P1,400.00, one (1)
compass (6"), P4,000.00 and 50 pcs. of
floats, P9,000.00 or a total of
P197,150.00;
(g) Exhibit G retainer agreement
between Del Rosario and F. Sumulong
Associates Law Offices stipulating an
acceptance fee of P5,000.00, per
appearance fee of P400.00, monthly
Page 4 of 74
retainer of P500.00, contingent fee of
20% of the total amount recovered and
that attorney's fee to be awarded by the
court should be given to Del Rosario; and
(h) Exhibit H price quotation issued by
Seafgear Sales, Inc. dated April 10, 1987
to Del Rosario showing the cost of poly
nettings as: 50 rolls of 400/18 3kts.
100md x 100mtrs., P70,000.00; 50 rolls of
400/18 5kts. 100md x 100mtrs.,
P81,500.00; 50 rolls of 400/18 8kts.
100md x 100mtrs., P116,000.00, and 50
rolls of 400/18 10kts. 100md x 100mtrs.,
P146,500 and baera (tub) at P65.00 per
piece or a total of P414,065.00.
The lower court held that the prevailing replacement value of

P6,438,048.00 of the fishing boat and all its equipment would regularly
increase at 30% every year from the date the quotations were given.
On the other hand, the lower court noted that petitioner only presented
Lorenzo Lazaro, senior estimator at PNOC Dockyard & Engineering
Corporation, as sole witness and it did not bother at all to offer any
documentary evidence to support its position. Lazaro testified that the
price quotations submitted by private respondent were "excessive" and
that as an expert witness, he used the quotations of his suppliers in
making his estimates. However, he failed to present such quotations of
prices from his suppliers, saying that he could not produce a breakdown
of the costs of his estimates as it was "a sort of secret scheme." For this
reason, the lower court concluded:
Evidently, the quotation of prices submitted by the
plaintiff relative to the replacement value of the fishing
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22. COMMERCIAL LIST
boat and its equipments in the tune of P6,438,048.00

which were lost due to the recklessness and imprudence
of the herein defendants were not rebutted by the latter
with sufficient evidence. The defendants through their
sole witness Lorenzo Lazaro relied heavily on said
witness' bare claim that the amount afore-said is
excessive or bloated, but they did not bother at all to
present any documentary evidence to substantiate such
claim. Evidence to be believed must not only proceed
from the mouth of the credible witness, but it must be
credible in itself. (Vda. de Bonifacio vs. B. L. T. Bus Co.,
Inc. L-26810, August 31, 1970).
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the lower
court's decision contending that: (1) the lower court erred in holding it
liable for damages; that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the case by paying only P1,252.00 as docket fee; (2) assuming that
plaintiff was entitled to damages, the lower court erred in awarding an
amount greater than that prayed for in the second amended complaint;
and (3) the lower court erred when it failed to resolve the issues it had
raised in its memorandum. 16 Petitioner likewise filed a supplemental
motion for reconsideration expounding on whether the lower court
acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case despite therein
plaintiff's failure to pay the prescribed docket fee. 17
On January 25, 1990, the lower court declined reconsideration for lack of
merit. 18 Apparently not having received the order denying its motion for
reconsideration, petitioner still filed a motion for leave to file a reply to
private respondent's opposition to said motion. 19 Hence, on February
12, 1990, the lower court denied said motion for leave to file a reply on
the ground that by the issuance of the order of January 25, 1990, said
motion had become moot and academic. 20
Page 5 of 74
Unsatisfied with the lower court's decision, petitioner elevated the

matter to the Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed the same in
toto on October 14, 1992. 21 On petitioner's assertion that the award of
P6,438,048.00 was not convincingly proved by competent and
admissible evidence, the Court of Appeals ruled that it was not necessary
to qualify Del Rosario as an expert witness because as the owner of the
lost vessel, "it was well within his knowledge and competency to identify
and determine the equipment installed and the cargoes loaded" on the
vessel. Considering the documentary evidence presented as in the
nature of market reports or quotations, trade journals, trade circulars
and price lists, the Court of Appeals held, thus:
Consequently, until such time as the Supreme Court
categorically rules on the admissibility or inadmissibility
of this class of evidence, the reception of these
documentary exhibits (price quotations) as evidence
rests on the sound discretion of the trial court. In fact,
where the lower court is confronted with evidence which
appears to be of doubtful admissibility, the judge should
declare in favor of admissibility rather than of nonadmissibility (The Collector of Palakadhari, 124 [1899],
p. 13, cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court,
Evidence, Volume VII, Part I, 1990 Edition, p. 18). Trial
courts are enjoined to observe the strict enforcement of
the rules of evidence which crystallized through constant
use and practice and are very useful and effective aids in
the search for truth and for the effective administration
of justice. But in connection with evidence which may
appear to be of doubtful relevancy or incompetency or
admissibility, it is the safest policy to be liberal, not
rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but
admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or
incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places
them beyond the consideration of the court. If they are
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thereafter found relevant or competent, can easily be

remedied by completely discarding or ignoring them.
(Banaria vs. Banaria, et al., C.A. No. 4142, May 31,
1950; cited in Francisco, Supra). [Emphasis supplied].
Stressing that the alleged inadmissible documentary exhibits were never
satisfactorily rebutted by appellant's own sole witness in the person of
Lorenzo Lazaro, the appellate court found that petitioner ironically
situated itself in an "inconsistent posture by the fact that its own
witness, admittedly an expert one, heavily relies on the very same pieces
of evidence (price quotations) appellant has so vigorously objected to as
inadmissible evidence." Hence, it concluded:
. . . The amount of P6,438,048.00 was duly established at
the trial on the basis of appellee's documentary exhibits
(price quotations) which stood uncontroverted, and
which already included the amount by way of adjustment
as prayed for in the amended complaint. There was
therefore no need for appellee to amend the second
amended complaint in so far as to the claim for damages
is concerned to conform with the evidence presented at
the trial. The amount of P6,438,048.00 awarded is clearly
within the relief prayed for in appellee's second amended
complaint.
On the issue of lack of jurisdiction, the respondent court held that
following the ruling in Sun Insurance Ltd. v. Asuncion, 22 the additional
docket fee that may later on be declared as still owing the court may be
enforced as a lien on the judgment.
Hence, the instant recourse.
In assailing the Court of Appeals' decision, petitioner posits the view that
the award of P6,438,048 as actual damages should have been in light of
Page 6 of 74
these considerations, namely: (1) the trial court did not base such award
on the actual value of the vessel and its equipment at the time of loss in
1977; (2) there was no evidence on extraordinary inflation that would
warrant an adjustment of the replacement cost of the lost vessel,
equipment and cargo; (3) the value of the lost cargo and the prices
quoted in respondent's documentary evidence only amount to
P4,336,215.00; (4) private respondent's failure to adduce evidence to
support its claim for unrealized profit and business opportunities; and
(5) private respondent's failure to prove the extent and actual value of
damages sustained as a result of the 1977 collision of the vessels. 23
Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages
are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury
sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural justice and are designed
to repair the wrong that has been done, to compensate for the injury
inflicted and not to impose a penalty. 24 In actions based on torts or
quasi-delicts, actual damages include all the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of. 25 There are two
kinds of actual or compensatory damages: one is the loss of what a
person already possesses (dao emergente), and the other is the failure
to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him (lucro
cesante). 26 Thus:
Where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of the
defendant the plaintiff is entitled to their value at the
time of destruction, that is, normally, the sum of money
which he would have to pay in the market for identical or
essentially similar goods, plus in a proper case damages
for the loss of use during the period before replacement.
In other words, in the case of profit-earning chattels,
what has to be assessed is the value of the chattel to its
owner as a going concern at the time and place of the loss,
and this means, at least in the case of ships, that regard
must be had to existing and pending engagements, . . .
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22. COMMERCIAL LIST
. . . . If the market value of the ship reflects the fact that it

is in any case virtually certain of profitable employment,
then nothing can be added to that value in respect of
charters actually lost, for to do so would be pro tanto to
compensate the plaintiff twice over. On the other hand, if
the ship is valued without reference to its actual future
engagements and only in the light of its profit-earning
potentiality, then it may be necessary to add to the value
thus assessed the anticipated profit on a charter or other
engagement which it was unable to fulfill. What the court
has to ascertain in each case is the "capitalised value of
the vessel as a profit-earning machine not in the abstract
but in view of the actual circumstances," without, of
course, taking into account considerations which were
too remote at the time of the loss. 27 [Emphasis supplied].
As stated at the outset, to enable an injured party to recover actual or
compensatory damages, he is required to prove the actual amount of
loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof
and on the best evidence available. 28 The burden of proof is on the party
who would be defeated if no evidence would be presented on either side.
He must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence which means
that the evidence, as a whole, adduced by one side is superior to that of
the other. 29 In other words, damages cannot be presumed and courts, in
making an award must point out specific facts that could afford a basis
for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne. 30
In this case, actual damages were proven through the sole testimony of
private respondent's general manager and certain pieces of
documentary evidence. Except for Exhibit B where the value of the
1,050 baeras of fish were pegged at their September 1977 value when
the collision happened, the pieces of documentary evidence proffered by
private respondent with respect to items and equipment lost show
similar items and equipment with corresponding prices in early 1987 or
Page 7 of 74
approximately ten (10) years after the collision. Noticeably, petitioner

did not object to the exhibits in terms of the time index for valuation of
the lost goods and equipment. In objecting to the same pieces of
evidence, petitioner commented that these were not duly authenticated
and that the witness (Del Rosario) did not have personal knowledge on
the contents of the writings and neither was he an expert on the subjects
thereof. 31 Clearly ignoring petitioner's objections to the exhibits, the
lower court admitted these pieces of evidence and gave them due weight
to arrive at the award of P6,438,048.00 as actual damages.
The exhibits were presented ostensibly in the course of Del Rosario's
testimony. Private respondent did not present any other witnesses
especially those whose signatures appear in the price quotations that
became the bases of the award. We hold, however, that the price
quotations are ordinary private writings which under the Revised Rules
of Court should have been proffered along with the testimony of the
authors thereof. Del Rosario could not have testified on the veracity of
the contents of the writings even though he was the seasoned owner of a
fishing fleet because he was not the one who issued the price quotations.
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a
witness can testify only to those facts that he knows of his personal
knowledge.
For this reason, Del Rosario's claim that private respondent incurred
losses in the total amount of P6,438,048.00 should be admitted with
extreme caution considering that, because it was a bare assertion, it
should be supported by independent evidence. Moreover, because he
was the owner of private respondent corporation 32 whatever testimony
he would give with regard to the value of the lost vessel, its equipment
and cargoes should be viewed in the light of his self-interest therein. We
agree with the Court of Appeals that his testimony as to the equipment
installed and the cargoes loaded on the vessel should be given
credence 33 considering his familiarity thereto. However, we do not
subscribe to the conclusion that his valuation of such equipment, cargo
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22. COMMERCIAL LIST
and the vessel itself should be accepted as gospel truth. 34 We must,

therefore, examine the documentary evidence presented to support Del
Rosario's claim as regards the amount of losses.
The price quotations presented as exhibits partake of the nature of
hearsay evidence considering that the persons who issued them were
not presented as witnesses. 35 Any evidence, whether oral or
documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the
personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another
person who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether
objected to or not, has no probative value unless the proponent can
show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay
evidence rule. 36 On this point, we believe that the exhibits do not fall
under any of the exceptions provided under Sections 37 to 47 of Rule
130. 37
It is true that one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule pertains to
"commercial lists and the like" under Section 45, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence. In this respect, the Court of Appeals considered
private respondent's exhibits as "commercial lists." It added, however,
that these exhibits should be admitted in evidence "until such time as the
Supreme Court categorically rules on the admissibility or inadmissibility
of this class of evidence" because "the reception of these documentary
exhibits (price quotations) as evidence rests on the sound discretion of
the trial court." 38 Reference to Section 45, Rule 130, however, would
show that the conclusion of the Court of Appeals on the matter was
arbitrarily arrived at. This rule states:
Commercial lists and the like. Evidence of statements of
matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation
contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published
compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of
any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is
Page 8 of 74
published for use by persons engaged in that occupation
and is generally used and relied upon by them there.
Under Section 45 of the aforesaid Rule, a document is a commercial list

if: (1) it is a statement of matters of interest to persons engaged in an
occupation; (2) such statement is contained in a list, register, periodical
or other published compilation; (3) said compilation is published for the
use of persons engaged in that occupation, and (4) it is generally used
and relied upon by persons in the same occupation.
Based on the above requisites, it is our considered view that Exhibits B,
C, D, E, F and H 39 are not "commercial lists" for these do not belong to
the category of "other published compilations" under Section 45
aforequoted. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "(w)here general
words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a
particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be
construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to
persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned." 40 The exhibits mentioned are mere price quotations issued
personally to Del Rosario who requested for them from dealers of
equipment similar to the ones lost at the collision of the two vessels.
These are not published in any list, register, periodical or other
compilation on the relevant subject matter. Neither are these "market
reports or quotations" within the purview of "commercial lists" as these
are not "standard handbooks or periodicals, containing data of everyday
professional need and relied upon in the work of the
occupation." 41 These are simply letters responding to the queries of Del
Rosario. Thus, take for example Exhibit D which reads:
January 20, 1987
PROFORMA INVOICE NO. PSPI-05/87-NAV
MARIA EFIGINIA FISHING CORPORATION
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Navotas, Metro Manila
Page 9 of 74
DELIVERY : 60-90 days from date of
order.
Attention: MR. EDDIE DEL ROSARIO

Gentlemen:
VALIDITY : Subject to our final

confirmation.
In accordance to your request, we are pleated to quote

our Cummins Marine Engine, to wit.
WARRANTY : One (1) full year against

factory defect.
Two (2) units CUMMINS

Marine Engine model
N855-M, 195 bhp. at 1800
rpm., 6-cylinder in-line, 4stroke cycle, natural
aspirated, 5 1/2 in. x 6 in.
bore and stroke, 855 cu.
In. displacement, keelcooled, electric starting
coupled with Twin-Disc
Marine gearbox model
MG-509, 4.5:1 reduction
ratio, includes oil cooler,
companion flange, manual
and standard accessories
as per attached sheet.
Price FOB Manila
P580,000.00/unit
Total FOB Manila
P1,160,000.00
TERMS : CASH
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Page 10 of 74
To be sure, letters and

Y telegrams are admissible in evidence but these
are, however, subject
S to the general principles of evidence and to various
rules relating to documentary
T
evidence. 42 Hence, in one case, it was held
that a letter from anEautomobile dealer offering an allowance for an
automobile upon purchase
M
of a new automobile after repairs had been
completed, was notSa "price current" or "commercial list" within the
statute which made, such items presumptive evidence of the value of the
article specified therein. The letter was not admissible in evidence as a
"commercial list" even
I though the clerk of the dealer testified that he
had written the letter
N in due course of business upon instructions of the
dealer.43
C
.
But even on the theory that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled on the
admissibility of those
( letters or communications when it held that unless
"plainly irrelevant, Simmaterial or incompetent," evidence should better
be admitted rather gthan rejected on "doubtful or technical
grounds," 44 the same
d pieces of evidence, however, should not have been
given probative weight.
.
This is a distinction we wish to point out.
Admissibility of evidence
)
refers to the question of whether or not the
circumstance (or evidence) is to considered at all. 45 On the other hand,
the probative valueEof evidence refers to the question of whether or not
it proves an issue. 46. Thus, a letter may be offered in evidence and
admitted as such but its evidentiary weight depends upon the
D on evidence. Accordingly, the author of the letter
observance of the rules
. as witness to provide the other party to the
should be presented
litigation the opportunity to question him on the contents of the letter.
Being mere hearsayDevidence, failure to present the author of the letter
renders its contentsa suspect. As earlier stated, hearsay evidence,
whether objected toc or not, has no probative value. Thus:
l
Theacourts differ as to the weight to be given to hearsay
evidence
n
admitted without objection. Some hold that
when hearsay has been admitted without objection, the
same may be considered as any other properly admitted
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22. COMMERCIAL LIST
testimony. Others maintain that it is entitled to no more

consideration than if it had been excluded.
The rule prevailing in this jurisdiction is the latter one.
Our Supreme Court held that although the question of
admissibility of evidence can not be raised for the first
time on appeal, yet if the evidence is hearsay it has no
probative value and should be disregarded whether
objected to or not. "If no objection is made" quoting
Jones on Evidence "it (hearsay) becomes evidence by
reason of the want of such objection even though its
admission does not confer upon it any new attribute in
point of weight. Its nature and quality remain the same,
so far as its intrinsic weakness and incompetency to
satisfy the mind are concerned, and as opposed to direct
primary evidence, the latter always prevails.
The failure of the defense counsel to object to the
presentation of incompetent evidence, like hearsay
evidence or evidence that violates the rules of res inter
alios acta, or his failure to ask for the striking out of the
same does not give such evidence any probative value.
But admissibility of evidence should not be equated with
weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected
to or not has no probative value. 47
Accordingly, as stated at the outset, damages may not be awarded on the
basis of hearsay evidence. 48
Nonetheless, the non-admissibility of said exhibits does not mean that it
totally deprives private respondent of any redress for the loss of its
vessel. This is because in Lufthansa German Airlines v. Court of Appeals,
49 the Court said:
Page 11 of 74
In the absence of competent proof on the actual damage
suffered, private respondent is "entitled to nominal
damages which, as the law says, is adjudicated in order
that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by defendant, may be vindicated and recognized,
and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for
any loss suffered." [Emphasis supplied].
Nominal damages are awarded in every obligation arising from law,

contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or omissions punished by law, and quasidelicts, or in every case where property right has been invaded. 50 Under
Article 2223 of the Civil Code, "(t)he adjudication of nominal damages
shall preclude further contest upon the right involved and all accessory
questions, as between the parties to the suit, or their respective heirs
and assigns."
Actually, nominal damages are damages in name only and not in fact.
Where these are allowed, they are not treated as an equivalent of a
wrong inflicted but simply in recognition of the existence of a technical
injury. 51However, the amount to be awarded as nominal damages shall
be equal or at least commensurate to the injury sustained by private
respondent considering the concept and purpose of such
damages. 52 The amount of nominal damages to be awarded may also
depend on certain special reasons extant in the case. 53
Applying now such principles to the instant case, we have on record the
fact that petitioner's vessel Petroparcelwas at fault as well as private
respondent's complaint claiming the amount of P692,680.00
representing the fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes that sunk
with the M/V Maria Efigenia XV. In its amended complaint, private
respondent alleged that the vessel had an actual value of P800,000.00
but it had been paid insurance in the amount of P200,000.00 and,
therefore, it claimed only the amount of P600,000.00. Ordinarily, the
receipt of insurance payments should diminish the total value of the
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
22. COMMERCIAL LIST
vessel quoted by private respondent in his complaint considering that

such payment is causally related to the loss for which it claimed
compensation. This Court believes that such allegations in the original
and amended complaints can be the basis for determination of a fair
amount of nominal damages inasmuch as a complaint alleges the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of
action. 54 Private respondent should be bound by its allegations on the
amount of its claims.
With respect to petitioner's contention that the lower court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the amended complaint increasing the amount
of damages claimed to P600,000.00, we agree with the Court of Appeals
that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the case when private
respondent paid the docket fee corresponding to its claim in its original
complaint. Its failure to pay the docket fee corresponding to its increased
claim for damages under the amended complaint should not be
considered as having curtailed the lower court's jurisdiction. Pursuant to
the ruling in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, 55 the unpaid
docket fee should be considered as a lien on the judgment even though
private respondent specified the amount of P600,000.00 as its claim for
damages in its amended complaint.
Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at all the jurisdiction
of the lower court on the ground of insufficient docket fees in its answers
to both the amended complaint and the second amended complaint. It
did so only in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the lower
court after it had received an adverse decision. As this Court held
in Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 56 participation in all
stages of the case before the trial court, that included invoking its
authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively barred petitioner by
estoppel from challenging the court's jurisdiction. Notably, from the time
it filed its answer to the second amended complaint on April 16,
1985, 57 petitioner did not question the lower court's jurisdiction. It was
only on December 29, 1989 58 when it filed its motion for
Page 12 of 74
reconsideration of the lower court's decision that petitioner raised the

question of the lower court's lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner thus
foreclosed its right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by its own inaction.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals dated
October 14, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 26680 affirming that of the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121, is hereby MODIFIED insofar as
it awarded actual damages to private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing
Corporation in the amount of P6,438,048.00 for lack of evidentiary bases
therefor. Considering the fact, however, that: (1) technically petitioner
sustained injury but which, unfortunately, was not adequately and
properly proved, and (2) this case has dragged on for almost two
decades, we believe that an award of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) 59 in
favor of private respondent as and for nominal damages is in order.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1 Kierulf v. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 433 (1997);
Article 2199, Civil Code.
2 Bernardo v. Court of Appeals [Special Sixth Division],
275 SCRA 413 (1997); Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 249 SCRA 331 (1995);
Lufthansa German Airlines v. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA
600 (1995); Sumalpong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
123404, February 26, 1997; Del Rosario v. Court of
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
22. COMMERCIAL LIST
Appeals, G.R. No. 118325, January 29, 1997; People v.

Fabrigas, Jr., 261 SCRA 436 (1996).
Page 13 of 74
17 Ibid., p. 464.
18 Ibid., p. 477.
3 Southeastern College, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.

No. 126389, July 10, 1998.
4 Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals and Lydia Cuba, G.R. No. 118367, January 5,
1998; Barzaga v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 105 (1997).
19 Ibid., p. 478.
20 Ibid., p. 486.
21 Penned by Associate Justice Ricardo J. Francisco;
Sempio-Diy and Galvez, JJ., concurring.
5 People v. Gutierrez 258 SCRA 70 (1996).

22 170 SCRA 274 (1989).
6 Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 746
(1996).
7 Rollo, pp. 49-52.
23 Petition. pp. 2-3.

24 TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Vol. V.
1992 ed., p. 633.
8 Ibid., p. 53.
9 Ibid., pp. 54-55.
25 Art. 2202. Civil Code; Europa v. Hunter Garments Mfg.

(Phil.), Inc., G.R. No. 72827, July 18, 1989, 175 SCRA 394,
397.
10 Ibid., p. 56.
26 TOLENTINO, supra, at p. 636 citing 8 Manresa 100.
11 Ibid., pp. 58-61.
12 Ibid., pp. 62-66.
13 Ibid., p. 67.
27 CLERK & LINDSELL ON TORTS, 17th ed., pp. 14891490.

28 Fuentes, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 323 Phil. 508, 519
(1996).
14 Ibid., p. 71.
15 Presided by Judge Adoracion G. Angeles.
16 Record of Civil Case No. C-9457, p. 408.
29 Summa Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals,

323 Phil. 214, 227 (1996).
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
22. COMMERCIAL LIST
Page 14 of 74
30 Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 367, 376

(1995).
board, whose admissibility were likewise challenged by

appellant as being hearsay. . . ."
31 Rollo, pp. 170-173.
35 People v. Narciso, 330 Phil. 527, 536 (1996).
32 CA Decision, p. 4.
36 Philippine Home Assurance Corporation v. Court of

Appeals, 327 Phil. 255, 267-268 (1996) citingBaguio v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93417, September 14, 1993,
226 SCRA 366, 370.
33 Ibid.
34 On this point, the Court of Appeals said: "Contrary to
appellant's asseverations, Mr. Del Rosario need not be
qualified as an expert witness, and at the same time on
board the 'M/V Maria Efigenia', in order to ascertain
what cargoes and equipment were on board the sunken
vessel. Being the owner of appellee-corporation which in
turn owned the ill-fated vessel, it was well within his
knowledge and competency to identify and determine
the equipment installed and the cargoes loaded on
appellee" vessel. His testimony on these matters
commands great weight and cannot be undermined or
excluded by the simple fact of his absence at the time of
actual collision, nor by his apparent relationship with
herein appellee corporation. The mere fact that a witness
is related to any of the parties does not necessarily
indicate that said witness has falsely testified, if the
witness' testimony is found to be reasonable, consistent,
and not contradicted by evidence from any reliable
source, and where it does not appear that the witness
was guided by such relationship, or any ill-motive when
he gave his testimony (People v. Maboab, 44 Off. Gaz.
564), Besides, appellee presented documentary exhibits
in the form of price quotations from suppliers and proforma invoices to establish the current replacement value
of the sunken vessel and the cargoes and equipment on
37 These are: dying declaration, declaration against

interest, act or declaration about pedigree, family
reputation or tradition regarding pedigree; common
reputation, port of the res gestae, entries in the course of
business, entries in official records, commercial lists and
the like, learned treatises and testimony or deposition at
a former proceeding.
39 Exh. A is the certified true copy of the certificate of
ownership of the vessel while Exh. G is the retainer
agreement between Del Rosario and F. Sumulong
Associates Law Offices.
40 Republic v. Migrio, G.R. No. 89483, August 30, 1990,
189 SCRA 289, 296-297.
41 FRANCISCO, supra.
42 32 C.J.S. 970.
43 Bates v. General Steel Tank Co., Ala., App., 55 So. 2d
213 (1951).
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
22. COMMERCIAL LIST
Page 15 of 74
56 G.R. No. 105180, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 477, 491.
45 2A WORDS AND PHRASES 8 citing Pickard v.

Berryman, 142 S.W. 2d 764, 768, 24 Tenn. App. 263.
57 Record of Civil Case No. C-9457, p. 217.

58 Ibid., p. 408.
46 34 WORDS AND PHRASES 116 citing State v. Scott,

175 P. 2d 1016, 1021, 111 Utah 9.
47 FRANCISCO, supra, at p. 529.
48 See note 5.
49 See note 2 for citation, Cf. Also Japan Airlines v. Court
of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 118664, August 7, 1998.
50 Arts. 2222 & 1157, Civil Code.
51 Robes-Francisco Realty & Development Corporation v.
Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch XXXIV). L-41093,
October 30, 1978, 86 SCRA 59, 65 citing Fouraker v. Kidd
Springs Booting and Fishing Club, 65 S.W. 2d 796797, citing C.J. 720, and a number of authorities.
52 China Air Lines, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
459985, May 18, 1990, 185 SCRA 449, 460.
53 Robes-Francisco Realty & Development Corporation v.
Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch
XXXIV), supra, citing Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Cuenca,
122 Phil. 403 (1965).
54 See Villalon v. Buendia, 315 Phil. 663, 666-667 (1995).
55 See note 22 for citation.
59 Note that under Article 2216 of the Civil Code, it

is provided that " the assessment of such damages
(i.e. moral, nominal, temperate, and exemplary damages)
is left to the discretion of the court, according to the
circumstances of each case. [Emphasis supplied].
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
23. LEARNED TREATISE

Seguritan v. People (supra; Pg 5_21. Entries in Official Records)
23. LEARNED TREATISE
Page 16 of 74
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
24. OPINION RULE
Page 17 of 74
Ernesto Bonifacio,
Alfonso Kipte, Marivi c Kipte and
Register of Deeds of Rizal, with the RTC.
the
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 155299
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, INC., Petitioner,
VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF AVELINA VDA. DE PIERO
and EMMANUEL PIERO, Respondents .
July 24, 200 7
DEC ISIO N
The
deceased Aveli na Vda. de Piero (Avelina),
herein respondents predecessor -in-interest, was the
registered owner of two adjoining parc els of land with
improvements,
consisting
of 510
sq
m
situated
in Mandaluyong City, covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 64018 and 59833. On August 27, 1991,
Alfonso Kipte obtained
a P1,200,000.00 loan
from
petitioner, secured by a promissory note and a real estate
mortgage signed by Avelina over her properties. The
mortgage was annotated on the titles. The loan was also
secured by a surety agreement signed by Kipte as pri ncipal
and by Aveli na as surety. Due to Ki ptes failure to pay his
indebtedness, the m ortgaged properties were foreclosed
and auction sale was scheduled on August 17, 1992.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J .:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
questioning
the
Decision [ 1 ] datedDecember
13,
2000, promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA -G.R.
CV No. 57249, which reversed and set asi de the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, Pasig City, i n
Civil
Case
SCA
No.
171;
and
the
CA
[
2
]
Resolution dated S eptember 16, 2002 which denied the
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
This case originated from an action for Annulment of
Real Estate Mortgage, Foreclosure of Mortgage, Notice of
Auction Sale and Damages with Prayer for Issuance of a
Temporary
Restraining
Order
and/or
Preliminary
Injunction filed by respondents against herein petitioner
China
Banki ng
Corporation,
Inc.,
Notary
Public
Thus, Avelina and respondent Emmanuel Piero filed

the complaint with the RTC, with Aveli na denying having
signed the documents. They alleged that: sometime in
September 1992, Avelina was surprised to receive a
foreclosure notice from the notary public, stating that her
properties would be sold at public auction by virtue of a
petition for extrajudicial foreclosure filed by petitioner;
after inquiring from petitioner, she learned that she
allegedly exec uted a real estate mortgage and a surety
agreement to secure a loan of one Alfredo Kipte, whom she
does not know; the foreclosure is void since she never
voluntarily executed the mortgage or s urety agreement,
never appeared before the notary public, never received
any proceeds from the loan, and was never a business
associate of Kipte ; sometime in 1990, Em manuels common law wife, Ludivi na Rinnoces , asked Avelina to sign some
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
documents allegedly pertaini ng to a loan from one Cerila de

Leon; Aveli nasigned these documents without reading the
same, as she is blind, and without knowing the contents
thereof; i n 1991, Ludivina agai n asked her to sign some
documents, allegedly to pay the ac count to Cerila;
again, Avelina was not able to read or know the contents of
these documents; the alleged mortgage was annotated on
TCT No. 64018, but not on TCT No. 59833; and TCT No.
64018 also contained a cancellation of a mortgage in favor
of Jose Macaraig and Cerila de Leon, both o f whom she does
not know. [ 3 ]
Petitioner, however, contends among others, that
upon the execution of the documents, Avelina was furnished
with copies thereo f; that Aveli na freely and voluntarily
signed the documents; that at the time of the execution of
the documents, though physically weak, she was mentally
sound and in complete possession of her faculties, and she
understood
the
nature
of
the
transactions;
and Avelina personally appeared before the notary public. [ 4 ]
On September
6,
substituted by her heirs.
1996, Aveli na died
and
was
After
trial,
the
RTC
rendered
its
Decision
dated October 21, 1997, the dispositi ve portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
the Court hereby renders judgment i n favor of
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and ERNESTO
BONIFACIO and orders the D ISMISSAL of this
action.
Page 18 of 74
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction is
hereby permanently LIFTED.
The
compulsory
Counter -claim
defendant is likewise DISMISSED.
of
SO ORDERED. [ 5 ]
Respondents then appealed to the CA, which, in a
Decision dated December 13, 2000, reversed the RTC
Decision. The dispositiveportion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of appellants. Appellee bank is further
ordered to reconvey the property to appellant
heirs of appellant Avelina Vda. de Piero.
SO ORDERED. [ 6 ]
The CA held that the deceased Avelina was an old
widow, 80 years of age and bli nd even before she
purportedly signed the Real Estate Mortgage and Surety
Agreement on August 26, 1991 and August 29, 1991,
respectively;
that
Rebecca Piero-Galang,
daughter
of Avelina, testified that in 1985, her mother became totally
blind, was not physically fi t, and suffered an eye disease or
glaucoma; that Aveli na herself testified that she was only
persuaded to sign the questioned documents as witness;
that Ludivi na guided her when she signed the foregoing
documents; that Avelina did not receive from Kipte, the
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
principal borrower, any amount as cons ideration of the

mortgage attests to her credible theory that she was only a
witness to the execution of the documents; that her
deportment in court and the fact tha t she had to be guided
to take the witness stand constituted the strongest proof of
blindness; that the notary public, Atty. Restituto Fano, who
claimed to have notarized the Surety Agreement, said that
he remembered Avelina to be an old lady, with white
complexion and white hair, and who had to be assisted and
accompanied to his table to be able to sign the ques tioned
agreements; that Atty. Fano noticed that she could hardly
see; and that it was unusual for Avelina, a woman of old
age, to be so willi ng to act as surety to a promissory note of
petitioner Kipte, a c omplete stranger, which involved the
large amount of P1,200,000.00.
Its Motion for Reconsideration having been denied in a
Resolution dated September 16, 2002, peti tioner now comes
before the Court raising the sole issue of
WHETHER THE RES PONDENT COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING THE
FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT
APPELLANT
AVELINA
VDA. DE
PINERO
(DECEASED) WAS BLIND, AND IN CONCLUDING
THAT SHE DID N OT VOLUNTARILY AND
KNOWINGLY EXECUTE THE REAL ES TATE
MORTGAGE DATED AUGUST 26, 1991 AND
SURETY
AGREEMENT
DATED AUGUST
29,
[
7
]
1991.
The main issue in this case is one of fact, i.e., whether
or not the deceased Aveli na signed the real estate mortgage
Page 19 of 74
and surety agreement knowingly and voluntarily, with full

knowledge of i ts contents.
As a general rule, i n the exercise of the Supreme
Courts power of revi ew, the Court is not a trier of facts and
does not normally undertake the re -examination of the
evidence presented by the contending parties during the
trial of the case. But jurisprudence has recognized several
exceptions i n which factual issues may be resolved by this
Court, [ 8 ] at least two of which are present in the i nstant
case, namely: (1) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; and (2) when the findings of f acts
of the lower courts are conflicti ng.
Petitioner argues, in the main, that respondents
admitted that Aveli na indeed signed the mortgage and
surety agreements in question; that, as notarial documents,
they are clothed with the prima facie presumption of
regulari ty and due execution; that Avelina, being of sound
and disposing mind despite old age, was duly informed of
the nature and purpose of these agreements by petitioners
branch manager and the notary public before she affixed
her signature; and that the respondents could have easily
submitted a medical certificate attesting to the supposed
blindness of Avelina or made an ophthalmologist take the
witness stand, but they did nei ther.
At the outset, it must be made clear that coun sel for
respondents stipulated to admit merely the authenticity
of Avelinas signature, which was done during trial. [ 9 ] The
admission of this fact does not by itself prove peti tioners
case,
since
at
bottom,
the
issue
is
not
whether Avelina affixed her signature on the agreements in
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
question, but, ultimately, whether she gave her consent to

be bound as surety.
While it is true that both the mortgage and suret y
agreement are publi c documents, notarization per se is not
a guarantee of the validity of the contents of a
document. [ 1 0 ] Generally, a notarized document carries the
evidentiary wei ght c onferred upon it with respect to its due
execution and has in its favor the presumption of
regulari ty. However, such presumption is not absolute. It
may be rebutted by clear and convi ncing evidence to the
contrary. [ 1 1 ]
The rule of evidence requiring the opinion of expert
witnesses applies only to such matters clearly within the
domain of medical science, and not to matters that are
within the common knowledge of manki nd which may be
testified to by anyone familiar with t he facts. [ 1 2 ] Thus, to
prove whether one is blind, it is not nec essary to submit a
medical certificate attesting to the bli ndness or to require
an expert witness, such as an ophthalmologist, to testify to
such fact, since the fact of blindness can be determined
through common knowledge and by anyone with sufficient
familiarity of such fact. In this case, Avelina, then alive
during the trial of the case, cat egorically testified and
attested to her own blindness, a fact which even the trial
court noted, viz:
q-
You stated i n paragraph 8 and 9 of the

same transcript dated Sept. 25, 1992
that you remembered that you were
requested by your daughter -i n-law to
sign a document as a witness and in fact
on page 9 thereof you also stated that
Page 20 of 74
aqa-
q-
aq-
you were guided by your daughter -inlaw in doing so, is that correct?
Yes, sir.
So, when you signed i t as a witness, you
were guided by your daughter -i n-law?
I don [sic] not know who guided me
because I could not see.
But you said, during the heari ng for your
application for writ of injunction that it
was
your
daughter -in-law,
namely, Ludi vina Piero who
guided
you?
I can not remember, sir.
You are an educated person Mrs. Witness,
is it not t rue that it is basic for a perso n
before signing a do cument to read it
first?
ATTY. DE GUZMAN:
Objection.
ATTY. CASIDING:
I am aski ng the witness if she knows ?
COURT:
Yes, but precisely the witness is blind.
ATTY. CASIDING:
I will reform my question.
(to witness, continuing)
Law 126 Evidence

q-
a-
Prof. Avena
You are an educated person Mrs. Wi tness,

is it very basic for you to read first know
the contents of the document before
signing it?
That is true, but I could not read, s ir.
24. OPINION RULE
Page 21 of 74
Yes, sir.
ATTY. CASIDING:
(to witness, continuing)
q-
q-
a-
q-
aq-
Did you not ask Ludi vina Pinero to first

read the contents of the documents
before you si gn it?
I did not say it to Ludivina Pi nero but
she said to me that I would merely act as
a witness only, sir.
When you were made to sign some
documents in 1991 pertaining to the
payment for the loan of Cerila de Leon,
did you not also request to asked
[sic] Ludi vina Piero to tell you what is
the contents of the same document all
about?
No, I did not ask her, sir.
But do you believe Mrs. Witness that
before you signed the documents, it is
but natural for you to be i nvolved i n the
contents of the same document?
ATTY. DE GUZMAN:
Objection x x x.
COURT:
You may answer.
WITNESS:
a-
If it is natural, then why did you not

ask Ludi vina to read or explain to you
the contents of the documents before
signing it?
Because she only told me tha t I would
merely
act
as
a
witness,
[
1
3
]
sir.
(Emphasis supplied)
Also established are the facts that Aveli na was

already bli nd when she was manipulated into signing the
questioned documents by her daughter -in-law, Ludivina,
who did not explain to her the contents and true nature of
the documents beforehand; that her hand had to be guided
by Ludi vina during the ac t of si gning; that Aveli na did not
know that the Surety Agreement and Real Estate Mortgage
she signed were to secure the loan Ki pte contracted from
the petitioner; that she was made to understand that she
was to sign only as witness; and that Kiptewas a total
stranger to her, and, by this reason, i t is implausible that
she agreed to be his surety. [ 1 4 ] In fact, it was only
after Avelinareceived the notices of foreclosure that she
learned that there was a mortgage doc ument among the
papers she si gned.
Aveli na's blindness was further confirmed by the
testimonies of her children, respondents Emmanuel
M. Piero [ 1 5 ] and
Rebecca Pi ero-Galang. [ 1 6 ] Even
the
notary before whom she supposedly appeared tes tified to
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
the fact that she was indeed blind and that she was not
made to understand the documents. [ 1 7 ]
[6]
[7]
[8]
Based on the foregoing, it is therefore clear

that Aveli na was in fact blind, that she did not know the
contents of the documents she signed, and more
importantly, that she did not know the capacity in which
she was signing these documents.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
The evidence presented by respondents are clear and

convincing, sufficient to overturn the presumption of
regulari ty of the subject documents.
[13]
[14]
WHEREFORE, the i nstant petition is DENIED. The

assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
Penned
by
Associate
Justice
Mariano
M. Umali (retired), with Associate Justices Ruben T.
Reyes
and
Rebecca
d e Guia-Salvador,
concurring; rollo, pp. 43-50.
Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes,
with Associate
Justices Mercedes GozoDadole (retired) and Rebecca
de Gui a-Salvador,
concurring; id. at 52.
Records, pp. 5 -8.
Id. at 90-91.
CA rollo, p. 88.
[15]
[16]
[17]
Page 22 of 74
Rollo, p. 49.
Id. at 17.
Heirs of Dicman v. Cario, G.R. No. 146459, June 8,
2006, 490 SCRA 240, 261.
TSN, July 4, 1994, p. 3.
Mayor v. Bel en, G.R. No. 151035, June 3, 2004, 430
SCRA 561, 567.
Id.
See Reyes v. Sisters of Mercy Hospital, 396 Phil. 87,
96 (2000); Ramos v. Court of Appeals , 378 Phil. 1198,
1221 (1999).
TSN, July 12, 1993, pp. 18 -20.
TSN, Septem ber 25, 1992, pp. 8 -10.
TSN, July 19, 1993, p. 8.
TSN, February 17, 1997, p. 12 -13.
TSN, July 4, 1994, pp. 10 -12.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 187912-14
JOEY P. MARQUEZ, Petitioner,
VS.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN 5TH
DIVISION and THE OFFICE OF
THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR,
Respondents.
Page 23 of 74
Paraaque for the years 1996 to 1998, conducted by the Special Audit
Team of the Commission on Audit (COA), several anomalies were
discovered involving Marquez, then City Mayor and Chairman of the Bids
and Awards committee of Paraaque City; and Ofelia C.
Caunan (Caunan), Head of the General Services Office of said city.
It was found that, through personal canvass and without public
bidding, Marquez and Caunan secured the procurement of several
thousand rounds of bullets of different calibers that were grossly
overpriced from VMY Trading, a company not registered as an arms and
ammunitions dealer with either the Firearms and Explosives Division of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) or the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI).
January 31, 2011

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Through this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction,[1] petitioner Joey P. Marquez (Marquez) assails
the 1] February 11, 2009 Resolution[2] of the 5th Division of the
Sandiganbayan (SB-5th Division) in Criminal Case Nos. 27903, 27904 and
27905; and its 2] May 20, 2009 Resolution[3] denying his motion for
reconsideration.
Finding the transactions anomalous, the COA Special Audit Team

issued Notices of Disallowances for the overpriced ammunitions.
Marquez and Caunan sought reconsideration of the findings of the team,
but their plea was denied. Aggrieved, they elevated the matter to the
COA but their appeal was denied.
At the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), in answer to the charges
filed against them, Marquez and Caunan filed their Joint Counter
Affidavit[4] with the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of
said office. In the said affidavit, the two insisted on the propriety of the
transactions and raised the pendency of their appeal with the COA.
In the assailed issuances, the SB-5th Division denied Marquezs

Motion to Refer Prosecutions Evidence for Examination by the
Questioned Documents Section of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).
Having found probable cause to indict them for violation of

Section 3 (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, the OMB, through the Office
of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), filed three (3) informations[5] against
Marquez and Caunan. The cases were raffled to the Fourth Division of
the Sandiganbayan (SB-4th Division).
From the records, it appears that as a result of the Report on the

Audit of Selected Transactions and Walis Ting-ting for the City of
Before arraignment, on November 24, 2003, alleging discovery of

the forged signatures, Marquez sought referral of the disbursement
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Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
Page 24 of 74
vouchers, purchase requests and authorization requests to the NBI and the
reinvestigation of the cases against him.[6] These were denied by the
OSP.
On May 20, 2008, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez recused

themselves from further participating in the cases. The cases were then
raffled to the SB-5thDivision.
Before the SB-4th Division, to prove its case, the prosecution

presented five (5) witnesses, namely: 1] COA State Auditor IV Fatima
Valera Bermudez; 2] Elenita Pracale, Chief, Business Permit and
Licensing Office, Paraaque City; 3] Benjamin Cruz; 4] P/Insp. Rolando C.
Columna, Legal Officer, PNP Firearms and Explosive Division; and 5]
Emerito L. Lejano, President, Guns Empire. Documentary evidence
consisting of disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and
authorization requests were also adduced.
Thereafter, on July 4, 2008, Marquez filed the subject Motion to

Refer Prosecutions Evidence for Examination by the Questioned
Documents Section of the National Bureau of Investigation. In his motion,
he again insisted that his purported signatures on the vouchers were
forged.
After the prosecution rested, Caunan testified and partly

presented evidence for her defense.
By way of Comment/Opposition to the motion, the prosecution

argued that its documentary exhibits had already been formally offered
in January 2006 and had been duly admitted by the anti-graft court. The
prosecution added that, when confronted with the questioned
transactions during the COA audit investigation, Marquez never raised
the defense of forgery. Instead, he insisted on the propriety of the
transactions. He did not claim forgery either when he filed his Joint
Counter-Affidavit with the OMB. Also, in his verified Motion for
Reconsideration dated May 29, 2003 and Supplemental Motion
dated July 1, 2003 filed with the COA, no allegation of forgery was made.
Marquez, on the other hand, in his Omnibus Motion dated April 1,

2008, moved, among others, for the inhibition of Associate Justice
Gregory Ong (Justice Ong) and Associate Justice Jose Hernandez (Justice
Hernandez) and for the referral of the disbursement vouchers, purchase
requests and authorization to the NBI.Associate Justice Hernandez and
Associate Justice Ong inhibited themselves but the request of Marquez
that the questioned documents be referred to the NBI was not acted
upon.
The prosecution pointed to Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised

Rules of Court[7] and posited that since Marquez alleged in his pleadings
that he had relied on the competence of his subordinates, there could be
no palpable mistake, thus, he was estopped from alleging that his
signatures on the subject documents were forged. The prosecution
accused Marquez of filing the motion merely to delay the proceedings.[8]
On January 13, 2006, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of

Evidence consisting of Exhibits A to FFFF, and their sub-markings. All
of the evidence offered were admitted by the anti-graft court on March
22, 2006.
In his Reply, Marquez insisted that he never admitted that his

signatures on the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and
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Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
authorization requests were his and that his motion was not intended to
delay the proceedings.
In its Rejoinder, the prosecution reiterated its earlier arguments
and added that Caunan testified and identified the signatures of Marquez
in the subject vouchers. It further noted that Marquez moved to refer the
documents to the NBI only two and a half (2 ) years after the formal
offer of said documents.
In the subject February 11, 2009 Resolution, the anti-graft court
denied the motion of Marquez. Citing Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court,[9] it was of the view that while resort to the expert opinion of
handwriting experts would be helpful in the examination of alleged
forged documents, the same was neither mandatory nor indispensable,
since the court can determine forgery from its own independent
examination.
The motion for reconsideration of Marquez was likewise denied.
Page 25 of 74
INVESTIGATION WHICH DENIAL IS IN VIOLATION OF
HIS RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE AND HIS TWIN
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND
EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW.
Those availing of the remedy of certiorari must clearly show that

the trial court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. By grave abuse of
discretion, it means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. In sum, for the
extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary
or whimsical exercise of power.[10]
Such circumstance exists in this case.
Aggrieved, Marquez interposed this petition for certiorari raising

this lone
ISSUE
THAT
THE
PUBLIC
RESPONDENT
TH
SANDIGANBAYAN - 5 DIVISION COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED ITS
RESOLUTIONS RESPECTIVELY DATED FEBRUARY 11,
2009 AND MAY 20, 2009 DENYING THE PETITIONERS
MOTION TO REFER PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE FOR
EXAMINATION BY THE QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS
SECTION OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
One of the most vital and precious rights accorded to an accused

by the Constitution is due process, which includes a fair and impartial
trial and a reasonable opportunity to present ones defense. Under
Section 14, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, it is provided that:
(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
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Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the

accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial,
and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment,
trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the
accused provided that he has been duly notified and
his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (emphasis
supplied)
In this connection, it is well settled that due process in criminal

proceedings requires that (a) the court or tribunal trying the case is
properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter
before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person
of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be
heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.
While the Constitution does not specify the nature of this
opportunity, by necessary implication, it means that the accused should
be allowed reasonable freedom to present his defense if the courts are to
give form and substance to this guaranty. Should the trial court fail
to accord an accused reasonable opportunity to submit evidence in his
defense, the exercise by the Court of its certiorari jurisdiction is
warranted as this amounts to a denial of due process.
In this case, the defense interposed by the accused Marquez was

that his signatures in the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and
authorizations were forged. It is hornbook rule that as a rule, forgery
cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and
Page 26 of 74
convincing evidence[11] and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging
forgery.[12]
Thus, Marquez bears the burden of submitting evidence to prove
the fact that his signatures were indeed forged. In order to be able to
discharge his burden, he must be afforded reasonable opportunity to
present evidence to support his allegation. This opportunity is the actual
examination of the signatures he is questioning by no less than the
countrys premier investigative force the NBI. If he is denied such
opportunity, his only evidence on this matter is negative testimonial
evidence which is generally considered as weak. And, he cannot submit
any other examination result because the signatures are on the original
documents which are in the control of either the prosecution or the graft
court.
At any rate, any finding of the NBI will not be binding on the graft
court. It will still be subject to its scrutiny and evaluation in line with
Section 22 of Rule 132. Nevertheless, Marquez should not be deprived of
his right to present his own defense. How the prosecution, or even the
court, perceives his defense to be is irrelevant. To them, his defense may
seem feeble and his strategy frivolous, but he should be allowed to
adduce evidence of his own choice. The court should not control how he
will defend himself as long as the steps to be taken will not be in
violation of the rules.
Contrary to the assertion of the prosecution, this move of

Marquez is not a mere afterthought to delay the prosecution of the
case. From the records, it appears that as early as November 24, 2003,
even before arraignment, upon his alleged discovery of the forged
signatures, Marquez already sought referral of the disbursement
vouchers, purchase requests and authorization requests to the NBI and
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
reinvestigation of the cases against him.[13] At that stage, his plea was
already denied by the OSP.
Apparently, he did not abandon his quest. In his Omnibus Motion
dated April 1, 2008 filed with the SB-4th Division, Marquez did not only
move for the inhibition of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez, but also
moved for the referral of the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests
and authorization to the NBI. Since the latter was not acted upon, he
filed the subject Motion to Refer Prosecutions Evidence for Examination
by the Questioned Documents Section of the National Bureau of
Investigation reiterating his plea, this time with the SB-5th Division.
If this case has been delayed, it is because of the denial of the
simple request of Marquez. If it was granted in the first instance, the
trial of the case would have proceeded smoothly and would have been
over by now. If the Court were to deny this petition and Marquez would
be convicted for having failed to prove forgery, he could not be
prevented from crying that he was prevented from presenting evidence
in his defense.
The fact that Marquez did not raise this issue with the COA is
immaterial and irrelevant. His failure or omission to do so may affect
the appreciation and weight of his defense, but it should not bar him
from insisting on it during his turn to adduce evidence.
In denying said motion, the SB-5th Division offered no valid

explanation other than the fact that, being the trial court, it may validly
determine forgery from its own independent examination of the
documentary evidence. While it is true that the appreciation of whether
the signatures of Marquez are genuine or not is subject to the discretion
of the graft court, this discretion, by the very nature of things, may
rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at
the hearing. Evidence cannot properly be weighed if not exhibited or
Page 27 of 74
produced before the court.[14] Only after evidence is offered and

admitted that the court can appreciate and evaluate it. The prosecution
had already offered its evidence on the matter. The court should not
deny the same right to the defense.
The fact that the documentary exhibits were already formally
offered and duly admitted by the anti-graft court cannot preclude an
examination of the signatures thereon by the defense. With proper
handling by court personnel, this can easily be accomplished by the NBI
expert examiners.
In the conduct of its proceedings, a court is given discretion in
maintaining the delicate balance between the demands of due process
and the strictures of speedy trial on the one hand, and the right of the
State to prosecute crimes and rid society of criminals on the
other. Indeed, both the State and the accused are entitled to due
process. However, the exercise of such discretion must be exercised
judiciously, bearing in mind the circumstances of each case, and the
interests of substantial justice.
Thus, for having denied Marquez the opportunity to be heard

and to produce evidence of his choice in his defense, the SB-5th Division
committed grave abuse of discretion warranting intervention from the
Court. The anti-graft court should allow him to refer the evidence of the
prosecution to the Questioned Documents Section of the NBI for
examination at the soonest time possible and for the latter to
immediately conduct such examination and to submit the results to the
court within a reasonable time.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February
2009 and May 20, 2009 Resolutions of the 5th Division of
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 27903, 27904 and 27905
hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The
5th Division
of
11,
the
are
the
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Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to allow the petitioner Joey P. Marquez

to refer the evidence of the prosecution to the Questioned Documents
Section of the National Bureau of Investigation for examination as soon
as possible and, after submission of the results to the court and proper
proceedings, to act on the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Rollo, p. 5
Penned by Associate Justice Napoleon E. Inoturan with Associate
Justice Ma. Cristina G. Cortez-Estrada
and Associate Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo, concurring; id. at 47-51.
[3] Id. at 52-55.
[4] Id. at 66-75.
[5] Docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 27903-27905. Other graft cases filed
against the petitioner and other officials of the City of Paraaque were
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 27944, 27946, 27952-27954.
[6] Rollo, pp. 154-159.
[7] Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by
the party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not
require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that
it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made. (2a)
[8] Resolution, Sandiganbayan-5th Division, February 11, 2009, pp.12, rollo, pp. 47-48.
[9] Sec. 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. The handwriting of
a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has
seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or
been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of
such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a
comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or
[1]
[2]
Page 28 of 74
treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or

proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. (23a)
[10] Salma v. Hon. Miro, G.R. No. 168362, January 25, 2007, 512 SCRA 724.
[11] Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107967, March 1, 1994,
230 SCRA 550.
[12] Heirs of Severa P. Gregorio v. CA, G.R. No. 117609, 360 Phil. 753
(1998).
[13] Rollo, pp. 154-159.
[14] See Basco v. Rapatalo, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1335, 336 Phil. 214 (1997),
citing Ramos v. Ramos, 45 Phil. 362 (1923).
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 185286
MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, Petitioner,
VS.
RAMON REYES, Respondent.
August 18, 2010
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This case is, again, an instance of the all-too-familiar tale of a

marriage in disarray.
In this regard, we air the caveat that courts should be extra

careful before making a finding of psychological incapacity or vicariously
diagnosing personality disorders in spouses where there are none. On
the other hand, blind adherence by the courts to the exhortation in the
Constitution[1] and in our statutes that marriage is an inviolable so
cial
Page 29 of 74
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Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
institution, and validating a marriage that is null and void despite

convincing proof of psychological incapacity, trenches on the very
reason why a marriage that is doomed from its inception should not be
forcibly inflicted upon its hapless partners for life.
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CV No. 89761[2] which reversed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case
No. Q-01-44854.[3]
First, we unfurl the facts.
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon
Reyes at the University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when
they were both nineteen (19) years old. They were simply classmates
then in one university subject when respondent cross-enrolled from the
UP Los Baos campus. The casual acquaintanceship quickly developed
into a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship. Petitioner was initially attracted
to respondent who she thought was free spirited and bright, although he
did not follow conventions and traditions.[4] Since both resided in
Mandaluyong City, they saw each other every day and drove home
together from the university.
Easily impressed, petitioner enjoyed respondents style of
courtship which included dining out, unlike other couples their age who
were restricted by a university students budget. At that time,
respondent held a job in the family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant.
Petitioners good impression of the respondent was not diminished by
the latters habit of cutting classes, not even by her discovery that
respondent was taking marijuana.
Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies,
obtaining a degree in AB Sociology from the UP. By 1974, respondent
Page 30 of 74
had dropped out of school on his third year, and just continued to work
for the Aristocrat Restaurant.
On December 5, 1976, the year following petitioners graduation
and her fathers death, petitioner and respondent got married. At that
time, petitioner was already five (5) months pregnant and employed at
the Population Center Foundation.
Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the respondents family
in Mandaluyong City. All living expenses were shouldered by
respondents parents, and the couples respective salaries were spent
solely for their personal needs. Initially, respondent gave petitioner a
monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from his salary.
When their first child was born on March 22, 1977, financial
difficulties started. Rearing a child entailed expenses. A year into their
marriage, the monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from respondent stopped.
Further, respondent no longer handed his salary to petitioner. When
petitioner mustered enough courage to ask the respondent about this,
the latter told her that he had resigned due to slow advancement within
the family business. Respondents game plan was to venture into trading
seafood in the province, supplying hotels and restaurants, including the
Aristocrat Restaurant. However, this new business took respondent
away from his young family for days on end without any communication.
Petitioner simply endured the set up, hoping that the situation will
change.
To prod respondent into assuming more responsibility, petitioner
suggested that they live separately from her in-laws. However, the new
living arrangement engendered further financial difficulty. While
petitioner struggled to make ends meet as the single-income earner of
the household, respondents business floundered. Thereafter, another
attempt at business, a fishpond in Mindoro, was similarly unsuccessful.
Respondent gave money to petitioner sporadically. Compounding the
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Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
familys financial woes and further straining the parties relationship

was the indifferent attitude of respondent towards his family. That his
business took him away from his family did not seem to bother
respondent; he did not exert any effort to remain in touch with them
while he was away in Mindoro.
After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence
and, this time, moved in with petitioners mother. But the new set up did
not end their marital difficulties. In fact, the parties became more
estranged. Petitioner continued to carry the burden of supporting a
family not just financially, but in most aspects as well.
In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a miscarriage,
gave birth to their third son. At that time, respondent was
in Mindoro and he did not even inquire on the health of either the
petitioner or the newborn. A week later, respondent arrived in Manila,
acting nonchalantly while playing with the baby, with nary an attempt to
find out how the hospital bills were settled.
In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondents fishpond business
stopped operations. Although without any means to support his family,
respondent refused to go back to work for the family business.
Respondent came up with another business venture, engaging in scrap
paper and carton trading. As with all of respondents business ventures,
this did not succeed and added to the trail of debt which now hounded
not only respondent, but petitioner as well. Not surprisingly, the
relationship of the parties deteriorated.
Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was
having an extra-marital affair. She overheard respondent talking to his
girlfriend, a former secretary, over the phone inquiring if the latter liked
respondents gift to her. Petitioner soon realized that respondent was
not only unable to provide financially for their family, but he was, more
Page 31 of 74
importantly, remiss in his obligation to remain faithful to her and their

family.
One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties marriage
was a surgical operation on petitioner for the removal of a
cyst. Although his wife was about to be operated on, respondent
remained unconcerned and unattentive; and simply read the newspaper,
and played dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany her as
she was wheeled into the operating room. After the operation, petitioner
felt that she had had enough of respondents lack of concern, and asked
her mother to order respondent to leave the recovery room.
Still, petitioner made a string of final attempts to salvage what
was left of their marriage. Petitioner approached respondents siblings
and asked them to intervene, confessing that she was near the end of her
rope. Yet, even respondents siblings waved the white flag on
respondent.
Adolfo Reyes, respondents elder brother, and his spouse,
Peregrina, members of a marriage encounter group, invited and
sponsored the parties to join the group. The elder couple scheduled
counseling sessions with petitioner and respondent, but these did not
improve the parties relationship as respondent remained
uncooperative.
In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a
psychological assessment to determine benchmarks of current
psychological functioning. As with all other attempts to help him,
respondent resisted and did not continue with the clinical psychologists
recommendation to undergo psychotherapy.
At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondents
siblings, told respondent to move out of their house. Respondent
acquiesced to give space to petitioner.
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Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not improve.
Neither did respondents relationship with his children.
Finally, in 2001,[5] petitioner filed (before the RTC) a petition for
the declaration of nullity of her marriage with the respondent, alleging
the latters psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital
obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioners allegations
that he was psychologically incapacitated. Respondent maintained that
he was not remiss in performing his obligations to his familyboth as a
spouse to petitioner and father to their children.
After trial (where the testimonies of two clinical psychologists, Dr.
Dayan and Dr. Estrella Magno, and a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas,
were presented in evidence), the RTC granted the petition and declared
the marriage between the parties null and void on the ground of their
psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled, thus:
Wherefore, on the ground of psychological
incapacity of both parties, the petition is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner MA.
SOCORRO PERPETUA CAMACHO and respondent
RAMON REYES contracted on December 4, 1976 at the
Archbishops Chapel Villa San Miguel Mandaluyong, Rizal,
is declared null and void under Art. 36 of the Family
Code, as amended. Henceforth, their property relation is
dissolved.
Parties are restored to their single or unmarried
status.
Page 32 of 74
Their children JESUS TEODORO CAMACHO
REYES and JOSEPH MICHAEL CAMACHO REYES, who are
already of age and have the full civil capacity and legal
rights to decide for themselves having finished their
studies, are free to decide for themselves.
The Decision becomes final upon the expiration
of fifteen (15) days from notice to the parties. Entry of
Judgment shall be made if no Motion for Reconsideration
or New Trial or Appeal is filed by any of the parties, the
Public Prosecutor or the Solicitor General.
Upon finality of this Decision, the Court shall
forthwith issue the corresponding Decree if the parties
have no properties[.] [O]therwise, the Court shall
observe the procedure prescribed in Section 21 of AM
02-11-10 SC.
The Decree of Nullity quoting the dispositive
portion of the Decision (Sec. 22 AM 02-11-10 SC) shall be
issued by the Court only after compliance with Articles
50 & 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the
Rules on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of
Property (Sections 19 & 21, AM 02-11-10 SC) in a
situation where the parties have properties.
The Entry of Judgment of this Decision shall be
registered in the Local Civil Registry of Mandaluyong and
Quezon City.
Let [a] copy of this Decision be furnished the
parties, their counsel, the Office of the Solicitor General,
the Public Prosecutor, the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar, Mandaluyong City, the Office of the Local Civil
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Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
Registrar, Quezon City and the Civil Registrar General at

their respective office addresses.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Page 33 of 74
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT
RESPONDENT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED
TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF
MARRIAGE.
II
Finding no cogent reason to reverse its prior ruling, the trial court,
on motion for reconsideration of the respondent, affirmed the
declaration of nullity of the parties marriage.
Taking exception to the trial courts rulings, respondent appealed
to
the Court of Appeals, adamant on the validity of his marriage to p
etitioner. The appellate court, agreeing with the respondent, reversed
the RTC and declared the parties marriage as valid and subsisting.
Significantly, a special division of five (two members dissenting from the
majority decision and voting to affirm the decision of the RTC) ruled,
thus:

PETITIONER
IS
LIKEWISE
PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL
OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
DISREGARDED THE TESTIMONIES OF THE EXPERT
WITNESSES PRESENTED BY PETITIONER.
IV
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal

is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 23, 2007 and
Order dated July 13, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 89 in Civil Case No. Q-0144854 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Amended
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is
hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.[7]

THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE BINDING ON
IT.
V
Undaunted by the setback, petitioner now appeals to this Court
positing the following issues:
I

THE TOTALITY OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED DULY
ESTABLISHED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITIES OF
THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL
OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
VI
Page 34 of 74
After a careful evaluation of the entire evidence

presented, the Court finds merit in the petition.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITIES OF THE PARTIES
TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF
MARRIAGE WERE ESTABLISHED, NOT MERELY BY A
TOTALITY, BUT BY A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.
Article 36 of the Family Code reads:
VII
THE PARTIES MARRIAGE, WHICH IS UNDOUBTEDLY
VOID AB INITIO UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY
CODE, DOES NOT FURTHER THE INITIATIVES OF THE
STATE CONCERNING MARRIAGE AND FAMILY AND
THEREFORE, NOT COVERED BY THE MANTLE OF THE
CONSTITUTION ON THE PROTECTION OF MARRIAGE.
A marriage contracted by any

party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after solemnization.
and Art. 68 of the same Code provides:
VIII
THE AMENDED PETITION WAS VALIDLY AMENDED TO
CONFORM TO EVIDENCE.[8]
The husband and wife are obliged

to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual
help and support.
Essentially, petitioner raises the singular issue of whether the

marriage between the parties is void ab initio on the ground of both
parties psychological incapacity, as provided in Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Similarly, Articles 69-71 further define the mutual

obligations of a marital partner towards each other and
Articles 220, 225 and 271 of the Family Code express the
duties of parents toward their children.
In declaring the marriage null and void, the RTC relied heavily on
the oral and documentary evidence obtained from the three (3)
experts i.e., Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas. The RTC ratiocinated,
thus:
Article 36 does not define what psychological

incapacity means. It left the determination of the same
solely to the Court on a case to case basis.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
xxxx
Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines in
the determination of psychological incapacity in
conjunction to the totality of the evidence presented, with
emphasis on the pervasive pattern of behaviors of the
respondent and outcome of the assessment/diagnos[is] of
expert witnesses, Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango and Dra.
Villegas on the psychological condition of the respondent,
the Court finds that the marriage between the parties
from its inception has a congenital infirmity termed
psychological incapacity which pertains to the inability
of the parties to effectively function emotionally,
intellectually and socially towards each other in relation
to their essential duties to mutually observe love, fidelity
and respect as well as to mutually render help and
support, (Art. 68 Family Code). In short, there was already
a fixed niche in the psychological constellation of
respondent which created the death of his marriage.
There is no reason to entertain any slightest doubt on the
truthfulness of the personality disorder of the respondent.
The three expert witnesses have spoken. They were
unanimous in their findings that respondent is suffering
from personality disorder which psychologically
incapacitated him to fulfill his basic duties to the marriage.
Being professionals and hav[ing] solemn duties to their
profession,
the
Court
considered
their
assessment/diagnos[is] as credible or a product of an
honest evaluation on the psychological status of the
respondent. This psychological incapacity of the
respondent, in the uniform words of said three (3) expert
witnesses, is serious, incurable and exists before his
marriage and renders him a helpless victim of his
24. OPINION RULE
Page 35 of 74
structural constellation. It is beyond the respondents
impulse control. In short, he is weaponless or
powerless to restrain himself from his consistent
behaviors simply because he did not consider the same
as wrongful. This is clearly manifested from
his assertion that nothing was wrong in his marriage
with the petitioner and considered their relationship as a
normal one. In fact, with this belief, he lent deaf ears to
counseling and efforts extended to them by his original
family members to save his marriage. In short, he was
blind and too insensitive to the reality of his marital
atmosphere. He totally disregarded the feelings of
petitioner who appeared to have been saturated already
that she finally revealed her misfortunes to her sister-inlaw and willingly submitted to counseling to save their
marriage. However, the hard position of the respondent
finally constrained her to ask respondent to leave the
conjugal dwelling. Even the siblings of the respondent
were unanimous that separation is the remedy to the
seriously ailing marriage of the parties. Respondent
confirmed this stand of his siblings.
xxxx
The process of an ideal atmosphere demands a
give and take relationship and not a one sided one. It also
requires surrender to the fulfillment of the essential
duties to the marriage which must naturally be observed
by the parties as a consequence of their marriage.
Unfortunately, the more than 21 years of marriage
between the parties did not create a monument of
marital integrity, simply because the personality disorder
of the respondent which renders him psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill his basic duties to his marriage, is
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
deeply entombed in his structural system and cure is not

possible due to his belief that there is nothing wrong
with them.
The checkered life of the parties is not solely
attributable to the respondent. Petitioner, too, is to be
blamed. Dra. Villegas was firm that she, too, is afflicted
with psychological incapacity as her personality cannot
be harmonized with the personality of the respondent.
They are poles apart. Petitioner is a well-organized
person or a perfectionist while respondent is a free
spirited or carefree person. Thus, the weakness of the
respondent cannot be catered by the petitioner and viceversa.
Resultantly, the psychological incapacities of both
parties constitute the thunder bolt or principal culprit on
their inability to nurture and reward their marital life
with meaning and significance. So much so that it is a pity
that though their marriage is intact for 21 years, still it is
an empty kingdom due to their psychological incapacity
which is grave, incurable and has origin from unhealthy
event in their growing years.
Both parties to the marriage are protected by the
law. As human beings, they are entitled to live in a
peaceful and orderly environment conducive to a healthy
life. In fact, Article 72 of the Family Code provides
remedy to any party aggrieved by their marital reality.
The case of the parties is already a settled matter due to
their psychological incapacity. In the words of Dra.
Magno, their marriage, at the very inception, was already
at the funeral parlor. Stated differently, there was no life
at all in their marriage for it never existed at all. The
24. OPINION RULE
Page 36 of 74
Court finds that with this reality, both parties suffer in
agony by continuously sustaining a marriage that exists
in paper only. Hence, it could no longer chain or jail the
parties whose marriage remains in its crib with its boots
and diaper due to factors beyond the physical, emotional,
intellectual and social ability of the parties to sustain.[9]
In a complete turnaround, albeit disposing of the case through a

divided decision, the appellate court diverged from the findings of the
RTC in this wise:
On the basis of the guidelines [in Republic v. Court
of Appeals and Molina] vis--vis the totality of evidence
presented by herein [petitioner], we find that the latter
failed to sufficiently establish the alleged psychological
incapacity of her husband, as well as of herself. There is
thus no basis for declaring the nullity of their marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
[Petitioner] presented several expert witnesses to
show that [respondent] is psychologically incapacitated.
Clinical psychologist Dayan diagnosed [respondent] as
purportedly suffering from Mixed Personality Disorder
(Schizoid Narcissistic and Anti-Social Personality
Disorder). Further, clinical psychologist Magno found
[respondent] to be suffering from an Antisocial
Personality Disorder with narcissistic and dependent
features, while Dr. Villegas diagnosed [respondent] to be
suffering from Personality Disorder of the anti-social
type, associated with strong sense of Inadequacy
especially along masculine strivings and narcissistic
features.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as

conclusive, but as purely advisory in character. A court
may place whatever weight it chooses upon such
testimonies. It may even reject them, if it finds that they
are inconsistent with the facts of the case or are
otherwise unreasonable. In the instant case, neither
clinical psychologist Magno nor psychiatrist Dr. Villegas
conducted a psychological examination on the
[respondent].
24. OPINION RULE
Page 37 of 74
Even granting arguendo that the charges cast by
the [petitioner] on [respondent], such as his failure to
give regular support, substance abuse, infidelity and
come and go attitude are true, the totality of the
evidence presented still falls short of establishing that
[respondent] is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations within the
contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
xxxx
Undoubtedly, the assessment and conclusion made

by Magno and Dr. Villegas are hearsay. They are
unscientific and unreliable as they have no personal
knowledge of the psychological condition of the
[respondent] as they never personally examined the
[respondent] himself.
xxxx
[I]t can be gleaned from the recommendation of
Dayan that the purported psychological incapacity of
[respondent] is not incurable as the [petitioner] would
like this Court to think. It bears stressing that
[respondent] was referred to Dayan for psychological
evaluation to determine benchmarks of current
psychological functioning. The undeniable fact is that
based on Dayans personal examination of the
[respondent], the assessment procedures used,
behavioral observations made, background information
gathered and interpretation of psychological data, the
conclusion arrived at is that there is a way to help the
[respondent] through individual therapy and counseling
sessions.
In the case at bar, we hold that the court a

quos findings regarding the [respondents] alleged mixed
personality disorder, his come and go attitude, failed
business ventures, inadequate/delayed financial support
to his family, sexual infidelity, insensitivity to
[petitioners] feelings, irresponsibility, failure to consult
[petitioner] on his business pursuits, unfulfilled
promises, failure to pay debts in connection with his
failed business activities, taking of drugs, etc. are not
rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but
on serious marital difficulties/differences and mere
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. [Respondents] defects were
not present at the inception of marriage. They were even
able to live in harmony in the first few years of their
marriage, which bore them two children xxx. In fact,
[petitioner] admitted in her Amended Petition that
initially they lived comfortably and [respondent] would
give his salary in keeping with the tradition in most
Filipino households, but the situation changed when
[respondent] resigned from the family-owned Aristocrat
Restaurant and thereafter, [respondent] failed in his
business ventures. It appears, however, that
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
[respondent] has been gainfully employed with Marigold

Corporation, Inc. since 1998, which fact was stipulated
upon by the [petitioner].
xxxx
As regards the purported psychological incapacity
of [petitioner], Dr. Villegas Psychiatric Report states that
[petitioner] manifested inadequacies along her affective
sphere, that made her less responsive to the emotional
needs of her husband, who needed a great amount of it,
rendering her relatively psychologically incapacitated to
perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage.
However, a perusal of the Amended Petition shows
that it failed to specifically allege the complete facts
showing
that
petitioner
was
psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage at the time of celebration
[thereof] even if such incapacity became manifest only
after its celebration xxx. In fact, what was merely prayed
for in the said Amended Petition is that judgment be
rendered declaring the marriage between the petitioner
and the respondent solemnized on 04 December 1976 to
be void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of the respondent at the time of the
celebration of marriage x x x.
xxxx
What is evident is that [petitioner] really
encountered a lot of difficulties in their marriage.
However, it is jurisprudentially settled that psychological
incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a
24. OPINION RULE
Page 38 of 74
refusal or a neglect in the performance of some
marital obligations, it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological illness existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
While [petitioners] marriage with [respondent]
failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation,
the remedy, however, is not always to have it declared
void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and
void marriage. No less than the Constitution recognizes
the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it
decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be protected by the State.
Thus, in determining the import of psychological
incapacity under Article 36, it must be read in
conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from
Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for
different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or
Article 45 that would make the marriage merely
voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for
legal separation. Care must be observed so that these
various
circumstances
are
not
applied
so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the
matter. Article 36 should not be confused with a divorce
law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefor manifest themselves. x x x
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in
the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of
the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social

institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.[10]
After a thorough review of the records of the case, we cannot

subscribe to the appellate courts ruling that the psychological incapacity
of respondent was not sufficiently established. We disagree with its
decision declaring the marriage between the parties as valid and
subsisting. Accordingly, we grant the petition.
Appeals[11]
Santos v. Court of
solidified the jurisprudential
foundation of the principle that the factors characterizing psychological
incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations are: (1) gravity,
(2) juridical antecedence, and (3) incurability. We explained:
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that
the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved.[12]
As previously adverted to, the three experts were one in

diagnosing respondent with a personality disorder, to wit:
1.
Dra. Cecilia C. Villegas
PSYCHODYNAMICS OF THE CASE
Page 39 of 74
[Petitioner] is the second among 6 siblings of
educated parents. Belonging to an average social status,
intellectual achievement is quite important to the family
values (sic). All children were equipped with high
intellectual potentials (sic) which made their parents
proud of them. Father was disabled, but despite his
handicap, he was able to assume his financial and
emotional responsibilities to his family and to a limited
extent, his social functions (sic). Despite this, he has been
described as the unseen strength in the family.
Mother [of petitioner] was [actively involved] in
activities outside the home. Doing volunteer and
community services, she was not the demonstrative,
affectionate and the emotional mother (sic). Her love and
concern came in the form of positive attitudes, advices
(sic) and encouragements (sic), but not the caressing,
sensitive and soothing touches of an emotional reaction
(sic). Psychological home environment did not permit
one to nurture a hurt feeling or depression, but one has
to stand up and to help himself (sic). This trained her to
subjugate (sic) emotions to reasons.
Because of her high intellectual endowment, she
has easy facilities for any undertakings (sic). She is
organized, planned (sic), reliable, dependable, systematic,
prudent, loyal, competent and has a strong sense of duty
(sic). But emotionally, she is not as sensitive. Her
analytical resources and strong sense of objectivity
predisposed her to a superficial adjustments (sic). She
acts on the dictates of her mind and reason, and less of
how she feels (sic). The above qualities are perfect for a
leader, but less effective in a heterosexual relationship,
especially to her husband, who has deep seated sense of
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
inadequacy, insecurity, low self esteem and self-worth

despite his intellectual assets (sic). Despite this,
[petitioner] remained in her marriage for more than 20
years, trying to reach out and lending a hand for better
understanding and relationship (sic). She was hoping for
the time when others, like her husband would make
decision for her (sic), instead of being depended upon.
But the more [petitioner] tried to compensate for
[respondents] shortcomings, the bigger was the
discrepancy in their coping mechanisms (sic). At the end,
[petitioner] felt unloved, unappreciated, uncared for and
she characterized their marriage as very much lacking in
relationship (sic).
On the other hand, [respondent] is the 9th of 11

siblings and belonged to the second set of brood (sic),
where there were less bounds (sic) and limitations
during his growing up stage. Additionally, he was
acknowledged as the favorite of his mother, and was
described to have a close relationship with her. At an
early age, he manifested clinical behavior of conduct
disorder and was on marijuana regularly. Despite his
apparent high intellectual potentials (sic), he felt that he
needed a push to keep him going. His being a free
spirit, attracted [petitioner], who adored him for being
able to do what he wanted, without being bothered by
untraditional, unacceptable norms and differing ideas
from other people. He presented no guilt feelings, no
remorse, no anxiety for whatever wrongdoings he has
committed. His studies proved too much of a pressure for
him, and quit at the middle of his course, despite his
apparent high intellectual resources (sic).
24. OPINION RULE
Page 40 of 74
His marriage to [petitioner] became a bigger

pressure. Trying to prove his worth, he quit work from
his family employment and ventured on his own. With no
much planning and project study, his businesses failed.
This became the sources (sic) of their marital conflicts,
the lack of relationships (sic) and consultations (sic) with
each other, his negativistic attitudes (sic) and sarcasm,
stubbornness and insults, his spitting at her face which
impliedly meant you are nothing as compared to me
were in reality, his defenses for a strong sense of
inadequacy (sic).
As described by [petitioner], he is intelligent and
has bright ides. However, this seemed not coupled with
emotional attributes such as perseverance, patience,
maturity, direction, focus, adequacy, stability and
confidence to make it work. He complained that he did
not feel the support of his wife regarding his decision to
go into his own business. But when he failed, the more he
became negativistic and closed to suggestions especially
from [petitioner]. He was too careful not to let go or
make known his strong sense of inadequacy,
ambivalence, doubts, lack of drive and motivation or
even feelings of inferiority, for fear of rejection or loss of
pride. When things did not work out according to his
plans, he suppressed his hostilities in negative ways, such
as stubbornness, sarcasm or drug intake.
His decision making is characterized by poor
impulse control, lack of insight and primitive drives. He
seemed to feel more comfortable in being untraditional
and different from others. Preoccupation is centered on
himself, (sic) an unconscious wish for the continuance of
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
the gratification of his dependency needs, (sic) in his

mother-son relationship. From this stems his difficulties
in heterosexual relationship with his wife, as pressures,
stresses, (sic) demands and expectations filled up
in (sic) up in their marital relationship. Strong masculine
strivings is projected.
drug intake [marijuana] and maybe stronger drugs

lately, are external factors to boost his ego.
The root cause of the above clinical conditions
is due to his underlying defense mechanisms, or the
unconscious mental processes, that the ego uses to
resolve conflicts. His prolonged and closed attachments
to his mother encouraged cross identification and
developed a severe sense of inadequacy specifically along
masculine strivings. He therefore has to camouflage his
weakness, in terms of authority, assertiveness, unilateral
and forceful decision making, aloofness and indifference,
even if it resulted to antisocial acts. His narcissistic
supplies rendered by his mother was not resolved (sic).
For an intelligent person like [respondent], he

may sincerely want to be able to assume his duties
and responsibilities as a husband and father, but
because of a severe psychological deficit, he was
unable to do so.
Based on the clinical data presented, it is the

opinion of the examiner, that [petitioner] manifested
inadequacies along her affective sphere, that made her
less responsive to the emotional needs of her husband,
who needed a great amount of it, rendering her relatively
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of marriage. [Respondent], on the other
hand, has manifested strong clinical evidences (sic),
that he is suffering from a Personality Disorder, of
the antisocial type, associated with strong sense of
Inadequacy
along
masculine
strivings
and
narcissistic features that renders him psychologically
incapacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of marriage. This is characterized by
his inability to conform to the social norms that
ordinarily govern many aspects of adolescent and
adult behavior. His being a free spirit associated
with no remorse, no guilt feelings and no anxiety, is
distinctive of this clinical condition. His prolonged
Page 41 of 74
It existed before marriage, but became

manifest only after the celebration, due to marital
demands and stresses. It is considered as permanent in
nature because it started early in his psychological
development, and therefore became so engrained into his
personality structures (sic). It is considered as severe in
degree, because it hampered, interrupted and interfered
with his normal functioning related to heterosexual
adjustments. (emphasis supplied)[13]
2.
Dr. Natividad A. Dayan

Adolfo and Mandy[, respondent]s brothers,
referred [respondent] to the clinic. According to them,
respondent has not really taken care of his wife and
children. He does not seem to have any direction in life.
He seems to be full of bright ideas and good at starting
things but he never gets to accomplish anything. His
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
brothers are suspecting (sic) that until now [respondent]

is still taking drugs. There are times when they see that
[respondent] is not himself. He likes to bum around and
just spends the day at home doing nothing. They wish
that hed be more responsible and try to give priority to
his family. [Petitioner,] his wife[,] is the breadwinner of
the family because she has a stable job. [Respondent]s
brothers learned from friends that [petitioner] is really
disappointed with him. She has discussed things with
him but he always refused to listen. She does not know
what to do with him anymore. She has grown tired of
him.
When [respondent] was asked about his drug
problem, he mentioned that he stopped taking it in 1993.
His brothers think that he is not telling the truth. It is so
hard for [respondent] to stop taking drugs when he had
been hooked to it for the past 22 years. When
[respondent] was also asked what his problems are at
the moment, he mentioned that he feels lonely and
distressed. He does not have anyone to talk to. He feels
that he and his wife [have] drifted apart. He wants to be
close to somebody and discuss things with this person
but he is not given the chance. He also mentioned that
one of his weak points is that he is very tolerant of
people[,] that is why he is taken advantage of most of the
time. He wants to avoid conflict so hed rather be
submissive and compliant. He does not want to hurt
anyone [or] to cause anymore pain. He wants to make
other people happy.
xxxx
Interpretation of Psychological Data
24. OPINION RULE
Page 42 of 74
A.
Intellectual / Cognitive Functioning

xxxx
B.
Vocational Preference
xxxx
C.
Socio Emotional Functioning
xxxx
In his relationships with people, [respondent] is
apt to project a reserved, aloof and detached attitude.
[Respondent] exhibits withdrawal patterns. He has deep
feelings of inadequacy. Due to a low self-esteem, he tends
to feel inferior and to exclude himself from association
with others. He feels that he is different and as a result
is prone to anticipate rejections. Because of the
discomfort produced by these feelings, he is apt to avoid
personal and social involvement, which increases his
preoccupation with himself and accentuates his tendency
to withdraw from interpersonal contact. [Respondent] is
also apt to be the less dominant partner. He feels better
when he has to follow than when he has to take the lead.
A self-contained person[,] he does not really need to
interact with others in order to enjoy life and to be able
to move on. He has a small need of companionship and is
most comfortable alone. He, too[,] feels uncomfortable in
expressing his more tender feelings for fear of being hurt.
Likewise, he maybe very angry within but he may choose
to repress this feeling. [Respondents] strong need for
social approval, which could have stemmed from some
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
deep seated insecurities makes him submissive and over

[compliant]. He tends to make extra effort to please
people. Although at times[, he] already feels victimized
and
taken
advantage
of,
he
still
tolerates abusive behavior for fear of interpersonal
conflicts. Despite
his [dis]illusion with people, he seeks to minimize
dangers of indifference and disapproval [of] others.
Resentments are suppressed. This is likely to result in
anger and frustrations which is likewise apt to be
repressed.
There are indications that [respondent] is[,] at the
moment[,] experiencing considerable tension and
anxiety. He is prone to fits of apprehension and
nervousness. Likewise, he is also entertaining feelings of
hopelessness and is preoccupied with negative thought.
He feels that he is up in the air but with no sound
foundation. He is striving [for] goals which he knows he
will never be able to attain. Feeling discouraged and
distressed, he has difficulty concentrating and focusing
on things which he needs to prioritize. He has many plans
but he cant accomplish anything because he is unable to
see which path to take. This feeling of hopelessness is
further aggravated by the lack of support from significant
others.
Diagnostic Impression
Axis
Drug Dependence
Axis
II
Mixed Personality Disorder
Page 43 of 74
[Schizoid,
Narcissistic
and
Antisocial
Personality Disorder]
Axis
III
None
Axis IV
:
Psychosocial
and
Environmental Problems:
Severe
He seems to be very good
at planning and starting
things but is unable to
accomplish
anything;
unable to give priority to
the needs of his family; in
social relationships.
Axis
3.
Global
Assessment
of
Functioning
Fair
[14]
(Emphasis supplied)
Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno

Summary and Conclusion
From the evidence available from [petitioners] case
history and from her psychological assessment, and
despite the non-cooperation of the respondent, it is
possible to infer with certainty the nullity of this
marriage. Based on the information available about
the respondent, he suffers from [an] antisocial
personality disorder with narcissistic and dependent
features that renders him too immature and
irresponsible to assume the normal obligations of a
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
marriage. As for the petitioner, she is a good, sincere,

and conscientious person and she has tried her best to
provide for the needs of her children. Her achievements
in
24. OPINION RULE
Page 44 of 74
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
this regard are praiseworthy. But she is emotionally

immature and her comprehension of human situations is
very shallow for a woman of her academic and
professional competence. And this explains why she
married RRR even when she knew he was a pothead,
then despite the abuse, took so long to do something
about her situation.
Diagnosis for [petitioner]:

Axis I
Axis II
Axis III
Axis IV
Partner Relational Problem

Obsessive Compulsive Personality Style
with Self-Defeating features
No diagnosis
Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family
Discord (spouses immaturity, drug abuse,
and infidelity)
Severity:
4-severe
Diagnosis for [respondent]

Axis I
Axis II
Axis III
Partner Relational Problem

Antisocial Personality Disorder with
marked
narcissistic,
aggressive
sadistic and dependent features
24. OPINION RULE
Page 45 of 74
Axis IV
Severity:
Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family

Discord (successful wife)
4 (severe)
xxxx
One has to go back to [respondents] early childhood in
order to understand the root cause of his antisocial
personality disorder. [Respondent] grew up the ninth
child in a brood of 11. His elder siblings were taken cared
of by his grandmother. [Respondents] father was kind,
quiet and blind and [respondent] was [reared] by his
mother. Unfortunately, [respondents] mother grew up
believing that she was not her mothers favorite child, so
she felt api, treated like poor relations. [Respondents]
mothers reaction to her perceived rejection was to act
outwith poor impulse control and poor mood
regulation (spent money like water, had terrible temper
tantrums, etc.). Unwittingly, his mother became
[respondents] role model.
However, because [respondent] had to get on with the
business of living, he learned to use his good looks and
his charms, and learned to size up the weaknesses of
others, to lie convincingly and to say what people wanted
to hear (esp. his deprived mother who liked admiration
and attention, his siblings from whom he borrowed
money, etc.). In the process, his ability to love and to
empathize with others was impaired so that he cannot
sustain a relationship with one person for a long time,
which is devastating in a marriage.
No diagnosis
[Respondents] narcissistic personality features were
manifested by his self-centeredness (e.g. moved to
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Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
Mindoro and lived there for 10 years, leaving his family

in Manila); his grandiose sense of self-importance (e.g. he
would just come and go, without telling his wife his
whereabouts, etc.); his sense of entitlement (e.g. felt
entitled to a mistress because [petitioner] deprived him
of his marital rights, etc.); interpersonally exploitative
(e.g. let his wife spend for all the maintenance needs of
the family, etc.); and lack of empathy (e.g. when asked to
choose between his mistress and his wife, he said he
would think about it, etc.) The aggressive sadistic
personality features were manifested whom he has
physically, emotionally and verbally abusive [of] his wife
when high on drugs; and his dependent personality
features were manifested by his need for others to
assume responsibility for most major areas of his life,
and in his difficulty in doing things on his own.
[Respondent], diagnosed with an antisocial
personality disorder with marked narcissistic
features and aggressive sadistic and dependent
features, is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the
essential obligations of marriage: to love, respect and
render support for his spouse and children. A
personality disorder is not curable as it is permanent
and stable over time.
From a psychological viewpoint, therefore, there is
evidence that the marriage of [petitioner] and
[respondent is] null and void from the very
beginning. (emphasis supplied)[15]
Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the CA rejected,

wholesale, the testimonies of Doctors Magno and Villegas for being
Page 46 of 74
hearsay since they never personally examined and interviewed the

respondent.
We do not agree with the CA.
The lack of personal examination and interview of the
respondent, or any other person diagnosed with personality disorder,
does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their
findings automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their
exclusion as evidence.
For one, marriage, by its very definition,[16] necessarily involves
only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the
cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly
by the other. In this case, the experts testified on their individual
assessment of the present state of the parties marriage from the
perception of one of the parties, herein petitioner. Certainly, petitioner,
during their marriage, had occasion to interact with, and experience,
respondents pattern of behavior which she could then validly relay to
the clinical psychologists and the psychiatrist.
For another, the clinical psychologists and psychiatrists
assessment were not based solely on the narration or personal interview
of the petitioner. Other informants such as respondents own son,
siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified on
their own observations of respondents behavior and interactions with
them, spanning the period of time they knew him.[17] These were also
used as the basis of the doctors assessments.
The recent case of Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,[18] citing The Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM
IV),[19] instructs us on thegeneral diagnostic criteria for personality
disorders:
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and

behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of
the individual's culture. This pattern is manifested in two
(2)
or
more
of
the
following
areas:
(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and

interpreting self, other people, and events)
(2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, liability,
and
appropriateness
of
emotional
response)
24. OPINION RULE
Page 47 of 74
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Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
Page 48 of 74
(3) interpersonal functioning

(4) impulse control
(2)
B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and
pervasive across a broad range of personal and social
situations.
C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically
significant distress or impairment in social, occupational
or other important areas of functioning.
D. The pattern is stable and of long duration,
and its onset can be traced back at least to adolescence or
early adulthood.
E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted
for as a manifestation or a consequence of another
mental disorder.
F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct
physiological effects of a substance (i.e., a drug of abuse, a
medication) or a general medical condition (e.g., head
trauma).
Specifically, the DSM IV outlines the diagnostic criteria for
Antisocial Personality Disorder:
A.
There is a pervasive pattern of disregard
for and violation of the rights of others occurring since
age 15 years, as indicated by three (or more) of the
following:
(1) failure to conform to social norms with
respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
repeatedly performing acts that are grounds

for arrest
deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying,
use of aliases, or conning others for personal
profit or pleasure
impulsivity or failure to plan ahead
irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated
by repeated physical fights or assaults
reckless disregard for safety of self or others
consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by
repeated failure to sustain consistent work
behavior or honor financial obligations
lack of remorse as indicated by being
indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt,
mistreated, or stolen from another
B. The individual is at least 18 years.

C. There is evidence of conduct disorder with
onset before age 15 years.
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Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
D. The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not

exclusively during the course of schizophrenia or a manic
episode.[20]
Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can

diagnose the psychological make up of a person based on a number of
factors culled from various sources. A person afflicted with a personality
disorder will not necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this
case, considering that a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of
behavior, self-diagnosis by the respondent consisting only in his bare
denial of the doctors separate diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke
credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of experts.
The CA declared that, based on Dr. Dayans findings and
recommendation, the psychological incapacity of respondent is not
incurable.
The appellate court is mistaken.
A recommendation for therapy does not automatically
imply curability. In general, recommendations for therapy are given by
clinical psychologists, or even psychiatrists, to manage behavior. In
Kaplan
and
Saddocks
textbook
entitled
Synopsis
of
[21]
Psychiatry, treatment,
ranging
from
psychotherapy
to
pharmacotherapy, for all the listed kinds of personality disorders are
recommended. In short, Dr. Dayans recommendation that respondent
should undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the finding that
respondents psychological incapacity is incurable.
Moreover, Dr. Dayan, during her testimony, categorically
declared that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations.[22] As aptly stated by Justice Romero in her
Page 49 of 74
separate opinion in the ubiquitously cited case of Republic v. Court of

Appeals & Molina:[23]
[T]he professional opinion of a psychological expert
became increasingly important in such cases. Data about
the persons entire life, both before and after the ceremony,
were presented to these experts and they were asked to
give professional opinions about a partys mental capacity
at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely
challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive
evidence of lack of valid consent.
[Because] of advances made in psychology during
the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide
the all-important connecting link between a marriage
breakdown and premarital causes.
In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three
reports and the respective testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and
Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have problems; and (2) these problems
include chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work towards
providing the needs of his family; several failed business attempts;
substance abuse; and a trail of unpaid money obligations.
It is true that a clinical psychologists or psychiatrists diagnoses
that a person has personality disorder is not automatically believed by
the courts in cases of declaration of nullity of marriages. Indeed, a
clinical psychologists or psychiatrists finding of a personality disorder
does not exclude a finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting, and
not beset by one of the parties or both parties psychological incapacity.
On more than one occasion, we have rejected an experts opinion
concerning the supposed psychological incapacity of a party.[24] In Lim v.
Sta. Cruz-Lim,[25] we ruled that, even without delving into the non-
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Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
exclusive list found in Republic v. Court of Appeals & Molina,[26] the

stringent requisites provided in Santos v. Court of Appeals[27] must be
independently met by the party alleging the nullity of the marriage
grounded on Article 36 of the Family Code. We declared, thus:
It was folly for the trial court to accept the
findings and conclusions of Dr. Villegas with nary a link
drawn between the "psychodynamics of the case" and the
factors characterizing the psychological incapacity. Dr.
Villegas' sparse testimony does not lead to the inevitable
conclusion that the parties were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. Even on questioning from the trial court, Dr.
Villegas' testimony did not illuminate on the parties'
alleged personality disorders and their incapacitating
effect on their marriage x x x.
Curiously, Dr. Villegas' global conclusion of both
parties' personality disorders was not supported by
psychological tests properly administered by clinical
psychologists specifically trained in the tests' use and
interpretation. The supposed personality disorders of the
parties, considering that such diagnoses were made,
could have been fully established by psychometric and
neurological tests which are designed to measure specific
aspects of people's intelligence, thinking, or personality.
xxxx
The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at
after a maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and
unsupported by separate psychological tests, cannot tie
the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its
own factual finding on what happened in this case. The
Page 50 of 74
probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie
in a mere statement of his theory or opinion, but rather
in the assistance that he can render to the courts in
showing the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion
and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is
founded.
In the case at bar, however, even without the experts

conclusions,
the
factual
antecedents (narrative
of
events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point
to the inevitable conclusion that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.
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Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
Article 68 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support.
In this connection, it is well to note that persons with antisocial
personality disorder exhibit the following clinical features:
Patients with antisocial personality disorder can
often seem to be normal and even charming and
ingratiating. Their histories, however, reveal many areas
of disordered life functioning. Lying, truancy, running
away from home, thefts, fights, substance abuse, and
illegal activities are typical experiences that patients
report as beginning in childhood. x x x Their own
explanations of their antisocial behavior make it seem
mindless, but their mental content reveals the complete
absence of delusions and other signs of irrational
thinking. In fact, they frequently have a heightened sense
of reality testing and often impress observers as having
good verbal intelligence.
x x x Those with this disorder do not tell the truth
and cannot be trusted to carry out any task or adhere to
any conventional standard of morality. x x x A notable
finding is a lack of remorse for these actions; that is, they
appear to lack a conscience.[28]
In the instant case, respondents pattern of behavior manifests

an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to perform the essential
marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2)
extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts;
Page 51 of 74
(5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not
connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.
On the issue of the petitioners purported psychological
incapacity, we agree with the CAs ruling thereon:
A perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it
failed to specifically allege the complete facts showing
that
petitioner
was
psychologically incapacitated from complying with the
essential marital
obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of
marriage even if such incapacity became manifest only
after its celebration x x x. In fact,
what was merely prayed for in the said Amended Petition

is that judgment be rendered declaring the marriage
between the petitioner and the respondent solemnized
on 04 December 1976 to be void ab initio on the ground
of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent
at the time of the celebration of the marriage x x x
At any rate, even assuming arguendo that
[petitioners] Amended Petition was indeed amended to
conform to the evidence, as provided under Section 5,
Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, Dr. Villegas finding that
[petitioner] is supposedly suffering from an Inadequate
Personality [Disorder] along the affectional area does not
amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code. Such alleged condition of [petitioner] is
not a debilitating psychological condition that
incapacitates her from complying with the essential
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Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
marital obligations of marriage. In fact, in the

Psychological Evaluation Report of clinical psychologist
Magno, [petitioner] was given a glowing evaluation as
she was found to be a good, sincere, and conscientious
person and she has tried her best to provide for the
needs of her children. Her achievements in this regard
are praiseworthy. Even in Dr. Villegas psychiatric
report, it was stated that [petitioner] was able to remain
in their marriage for more than 20 years trying to reach
out and lending a hand for better understanding and
relationship. With the foregoing evaluation made by no
less than [petitioners] own expert witnesses, we find it
hard to believe that she is psychologically incapacitated
within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family
Code.[29]
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential

marital obligations at the time of his marriage to the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA -G.R. CV No. 89761 is REVERSED. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854
declaring
the
marriage
between
petitioner
and
respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code
is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Article XV, Section 2 of the Constitution.

Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, with
Associate Justices Mario L. Guarina III and Pampio A. Abarintos
concurring, and Associate Justices Vicente Q. Roxas and Teresita DyLiacco Flores dissenting,rollo, pp. 9-45.
[3]
Penned by Judge Elsa I. De Guzman, id. at 237-261.
[4]
Psychiatric Report of Dr. Cecilia C. Villegas, id. at 404.
[5]
The original petition was filed in July of 2001; RTC records, pp.
1-18; the amended petition, in December of the same year, id. at 87-88.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 260-261.
[7]
Id. at 231.
[8]
Id. at 102-103.
[9]
Id. at 257-260.
[10]
Id. at 38-44.
[11]
G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20.
[12]
Rollo, pp. 33-34.
[13]
Id. at 413-416.
[14]
Id. at 390-397.
[15]
Id. at 372-375.
[16]
Article 1 of the Family Code.
[1]
[2]
All told, it is wise to be reminded of the caveat articulated by

Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in his separate statement in Republic v. Court
of Appeals and Molina:[30]
x x x Each case must be judged, not on the basis
of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations
but according to its own facts. In the field of
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all fours
with another case. The trial judge must take pains in
examining the factual milieu and the appellate court
must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.
In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of
the foregoing disquisition, we find ample basis to conclude that
Page 52 of 74
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Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union

between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. x x x
[17]
Rollo, pp. 243, 248-249.
[18]
G.R. No. 176464, February 4, 2010.
[19]
Quick Reference to the Diagnostic Criteria from DSM IV-TR,
American Psychiatric Association, 2000.
[20]
See Kaplan and Saddock's Synopsis of Psychiatry and
Psychology Behavioral Sciences/Clinical Psychiatry (8th ed.), p. 785.
[21]
See Kaplan and Saddock's Synopsis of Psychiatry and
Psychology Behavioral Sciences/Clinical Psychiatry (8th ed.), 1998.
Rollo, pp. 243-247.
G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198, 219.
[24]
Padilla-Rumabaua v. Rumbaua, G.R. No. 166738, August 14,
2009, 596 SCRA 157; Paz v. Paz, G.R. No. 166579, February 18, 2010.
[25]
Supra note 18.
[26]
Supra.
[27]
Supra note 11.
[28]
Supra note 20.
[29]
Rollo, p. 43
[30]
Supra note 23, at 214.
[22]
[23]
Page 53 of 74
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G.R. No. 189155
Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
Page 54 of 74
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. This Court

hereby grants Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Amparo and Habeas
Data.
EN BANC
Accordingly, Respondents are enjoined to refrain from distributing or

causing the distribution to the public of any records in whatever form,
reports, documents or similar papers relative to Petitioners Melissa C.
Roxas, and/or Melissa Roxas; alleged ties to the CPP-NPA or pertinently
related to the complained incident. Petitioners prayers for an inspection
order, production order and for the return of the specified personal
belongings are denied for lack of merit. Although there is no evidence
that Respondents are responsible for the abduction, detention or torture
of the Petitioner, said Respondents pursuant to their legally mandated
duties are, nonetheless, ordered to continue/complete the investigation
of this incident with the end in view of prosecuting those who are
responsible. Respondents are also ordered to provide protection to the
Petitioner and her family while in the Philippines against any and all
forms of harassment, intimidation and coercion as may be relevant to
the grant of these reliefs.3
September 7, 2010
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND

THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS,
MELISSA C. ROXAS, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR S.
IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME VERZOSA, LT. GEN. DELFIN N.
BANGIT, PC/SUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA CRUZ, MAJ. GEN. RALPH
VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT. RUDY GAMIDO LACADIN, AND CERTAIN
PERSONS WHO GO BY THE NAME[S] DEX, RC AND
ROSE, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
At bench is a Petition For Review on Certiorari1 assailing the
Decision2 dated 26 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
00036-WRA a petition that was commenced jointly under the Rules
on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) and Habeas Data (Habeas Data
Rule). In its decision, the Court of Appeals extended to the petitioner,
Melissa C. Roxas, the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data
but denied the latters prayers for an inspection order, production order
and return of specified personal belongings. The fallo of the decision
reads:
We begin with the petitioners allegations.

Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent.4 While in the United
States, petitioner enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines
with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America
(BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member.5 During the course of her
immersion, petitioner toured various provinces and towns of Central
Luzon and, in April of 2009, she volunteered to join members of BAYANTarlac6 in conducting an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a
future medical mission.7
In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought her passport, wallet
with Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) in cash, journal, digital
camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard
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Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
Page 55 of 74
disk, IPOD,8 wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and

medicines.9
some construction bustle.21 She inferred that she was taken to the
military camp of Fort Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija.22
After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner and her

companions, Juanito Carabeo (Carabeo) and John Edward Jandoc
(Jandoc), decided to rest in the house of one Mr. Jesus Paolo (Mr. Paolo)
in Sitio Bagong Sikat,Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac.10 At around
1:30 in the afternoon, however, petitioner, her companions and Mr.
Paolo were startled by the loud sounds of someone banging at the front
door and a voice demanding that they open up.11
What followed was five (5) straight days of interrogation coupled with
torture.23 The thrust of the interrogations was to convince petitioner to
abandon her communist beliefs in favor of returning to "the fold."24 The
torture, on the other hand, consisted of taunting, choking, boxing and
suffocating the petitioner.25
Suddenly, fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly opened the door,
barged inside and ordered petitioner and her companions to lie on the
ground face down.12 The armed men were all in civilian clothes and, with
the exception of their leader, were also wearing bonnets to conceal their
faces.13
Petitioner tried to protest the intrusion, but five (5) of the armed men
ganged up on her and tied her hands.14 At this juncture, petitioner saw
the other armed men herding Carabeo and Jandoc, already blindfolded
and taped at their mouths, to a nearby blue van. Petitioner started to
shout her name.15 Against her vigorous resistance, the armed men
dragged petitioner towards the vanbruising her arms, legs and
knees.16 Once inside the van, but before she can be blindfolded,
petitioner was able to see the face of one of the armed men sitting beside
her.17The van then sped away.
After about an hour of traveling, the van stopped.18 Petitioner, Carabeo
and Jandoc were ordered to alight.19After she was informed that she is
being detained for being a member of the Communist Party of the
Philippines-New Peoples Army (CPP-NPA), petitioner was separated
from her companions and was escorted to a room that she believed was
a jail cell from the sound of its metal doors.20 From there, she could hear
the sounds of gunfire, the noise of planes taking off and landing and
Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner was made to suffer in

blindfolds even in her sleep.26 Petitioner was only relieved of her
blindfolds when she was allowed to take a bath, during which she
became acquainted with a woman named "Rose" who bathed
her.27 There were also a few times when she cheated her blindfold and
was able to peek at her surroundings.28
Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner was still able to
learn the names of three of her interrogators who introduced
themselves to her as "Dex," "James" and "RC."29 "RC" even told petitioner
that those who tortured her came from the "Special Operations Group,"
and that she was abducted because her name is included in the "Order of
Battle."30
On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and returned to her
uncles house in Quezon City.31 Before being released, however, the
abductors gave petitioner a cellular phone with a SIM32 card, a slip of
paper containing an e-mail address with password,33 a plastic bag
containing biscuits and books,34 the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and
a pair of shoes.35 Petitioner was also sternly warned not to report the
incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward will happen to
her and her family.36
Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from RC
via the cellular phone given to her.37Out of apprehension that she was
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Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
Page 56 of 74
being monitored and also fearing for the safety of her family, petitioner
threw away the cellular phone with a SIM card.
On 18 June 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Return
of the Writs43 on behalf of the public officials impleaded as respondents.
Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the

suppression of any existing government files or records linking her to
the communist movement, petitioner filed a Petition for the Writs of
Amparo and Habeas Data before this Court on 1 June 2009.38 Petitioner
impleaded public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the
military and police hierarchy as respondents, on the belief that it was
government agents who were behind her abduction and torture.
Petitioner likewise included in her suit "Rose," "Dex" and "RC."39
We now turn to the defenses interposed by the public respondents.
The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that: (1) respondents be
enjoined from harming or even approaching petitioner and her family;
(2) an order be issued allowing the inspection of detention areas in the
7th Infantry Division, Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija; (3)
respondents be ordered to produce documents relating to any report on
the case of petitioner including, but not limited to, intelligence report
and operation reports of the 7th Infantry Division, the Special
Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and its
subsidiaries or branch/es prior to, during and subsequent to 19 May
2009; (4) respondents be ordered to expunge from the records of the
respondents any document pertinent or connected to Melissa C. Roxas,
Melissa Roxas or any name which sounds the same; and (5) respondents
be ordered to return to petitioner her journal, digital camera with
memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD, wristwatch,
sphygmomanometer, stethoscope, medicines and her P15,000.00 cash.40
In a Resolution dated 9 June 2009, this Court issued the desired writs
and referred the case to the Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of
evidence and appropriate action.41 The Resolution also directed the
respondents to file their verified written return.42
The public respondents label petitioners alleged abduction and torture

as "stage managed."44 In support of their accusation, the public
respondents principally rely on the statement of Mr. Paolo, as contained
in the Special Report45 of the La Paz Police Station. In the Special Report,
Mr. Paolo disclosed that, prior to the purported abduction, petitioner
and her companions instructed him and his two sons to avoid leaving the
house.46 From this statement, the public respondents drew the distinct
possibility that, except for those already inside Mr. Paolos house,
nobody else has any way of knowing where petitioner and her
companions were at the time they were supposedly abducted.47 This can
only mean, the public respondents concluded, that if ever there was any
"abduction" it must necessarily have been planned by, or done with the
consent of, the petitioner and her companions themselves.48
Public respondents also cited the Medical Certificate49 of the petitioner,
as actually belying her claims that she was subjected to serious torture
for five (5) days. The public respondents noted that while the petitioner
alleges that she was choked and boxed by her abductorsinflictions that
could have easily produced remarkable bruisesher Medical Certificate
only shows abrasions in her wrists and knee caps.50
For the public respondents, the above anomalies put in question the very
authenticity of petitioners alleged abduction and torture, more so any
military or police involvement therein. Hence, public respondents
conclude that the claims of abduction and torture was no more than a
charade fabricated by the petitioner to put the government in bad light,
and at the same time, bring great media mileage to her and the group
that she represents.51
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Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
Nevertheless, even assuming the abduction and torture to be genuine,

the public respondents insist on the dismissal of the Amparo and Habeas
Data petition based on the following grounds: (a) as against respondent
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in particular, because of her
immunity from suit,52 and (b) as against all of the public respondents, in
general, in view of the absence of any specific allegation in the petition
that they had participated in, or at least authorized, the commission of
such atrocities.53
Finally, the public respondents posit that they had not been remiss in
their duty to ascertain the truth behind the allegations of the
petitioner.54 In both the police and military arms of the government
machinery, inquiries were set-up in the following manner:
Police Action
Police authorities first learned of the purported abduction around 4:30
oclock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009, when Barangay Captain Michael
M. Manuel came to the La Paz Municipal Police Station to report the
presence of heavily armed men somewhere
in Barangay Kapanikian.55 Acting on the report, the police station
launched an initial investigation.56
The initial investigation revolved around the statement of Mr. Paolo,
who informed the investigators of an abduction incident involving three
(3) personslater identified as petitioner Melissa Roxas, Juanito
Carabeo and John Edward Jandocwho were all staying in his
house.57 Mr. Paolo disclosed that the abduction occurred around 1:30
oclock in the afternoon, and was perpetrated by about eight (8) heavily
armed men who forced their way inside his house.58 Other witnesses to
the abduction also confirmed that the armed men used a dark blue van
with an unknown plate number and two (2) Honda XRM motorcycles
with no plate numbers.59
Page 57 of 74
At 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009, the investigators sent a

Flash Message to the different police stations surrounding La Paz, Tarlac,
in an effort to track and locate the van and motorcycles of the suspects.
Unfortunately, the effort yielded negative results.60
On 20 May 2009, the results of the initial investigation were included in
a Special Report61 that was transmitted to the Tarlac Police Provincial
Office, headed by public respondent P/S Supt. Rudy Lacadin (Supt.
Lacadin). Public respondent Supt. Lacadin, in turn, informed the
Regional Police Office of Region 3 about the abduction.62 Follow-up
investigations were, at the same time, pursued.63
On 26 May 2009, public respondent PC/Supt. Leon Nilo Dela Cruz, as
Director of the Regional Police Office for Region 3, caused the creation of
Special Investigation Task GroupCAROJAN (Task Group CAROJAN) to
conduct an in-depth investigation on the abduction of the petitioner,
Carabeo and Jandoc.64
Task Group CAROJAN started its inquiry by making a series of
background examinations on the victims of the purported abduction, in
order to reveal the motive behind the abduction and, ultimately, the
identity of the perpetrators.65 Task Group CAROJAN also maintained
liaisons with Karapatan and the Alliance for Advancement of Peoples
Rightsorganizations trusted by petitionerin the hopes of obtaining
the latters participation in the ongoing investigations.66 Unfortunately,
the letters sent by the investigators requesting for the availability of the
petitioner for inquiries were left unheeded.67
The progress of the investigations conducted by Task Group CAROJAN
had been detailed in the reports68 that it submitted to public respondent
General Jesus Ame Verzosa, the Chief of the Philippine National Police.
However, as of their latest report dated 29 June 2009, Task Group
CAROJAN is still unable to make a definitive finding as to the true
identity and affiliation of the abductorsa fact that task group CAROJAN
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24. OPINION RULE
attributes to the refusal of the petitioner, or any of her fellow victims, to

cooperate in their investigative efforts.69
Military Action
Public respondent Gilbert Teodoro, the Secretary of National Defense,
first came to know about the alleged abduction and torture of the
petitioner upon receipt of the Resolution of this Court directing him and
the other respondents to file their return.70 Immediately thereafter, he
issued a Memorandum Directive71 addressed to the Chief of Staff of the
AFP, ordering the latter, among others, to conduct an inquiry to
determine the validity of the accusation of military involvement in the
abduction.72
Acting pursuant to the Memorandum Directive, public respondent
General Victor S. Ibrado, the AFP Chief of Staff, sent an AFP Radio
Message73 addressed to public respondent Lieutenant General Delfin N.
Bangit (Lt. Gen. Bangit), the Commanding General of the Army, relaying
the order to cause an investigation on the abduction of the petitioner.74
For his part, and taking cue from the allegations in the amparo petition,
public respondent Lt. Gen. Bangit instructed public respondent Major
General Ralph A. Villanueva (Maj. Gen. Villanueva), the Commander of
the 7th Infantry Division of the Army based in Fort Magsaysay, to set in
motion an investigation regarding the possible involvement of any
personnel assigned at the camp in the purported abduction of the
petitioner.75 In turn, public respondent Maj. Gen. Villanueva tapped the
Office of the Provost Marshal (OPV) of the 7th Infantry Division, to
conduct the investigation.76
On 23 June 2009, the OPV of the 7th Infantry Division released an
Investigation Report77 detailing the results of its inquiry. In substance,
the report described petitioners allegations as "opinionated" and
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thereby cleared the military from any involvement in her alleged

abduction and torture.78
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision,79 the Court of Appeals gave due weight and consideration
to the petitioners version that she was indeed abducted and then
subjected to torture for five (5) straight days. The appellate court noted
the sincerity and resolve by which the petitioner affirmed the contents
of her affidavits in open court, and was thereby convinced that the latter
was telling the truth.80
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals disregarded the argument of the
public respondents that the abduction of the petitioner was "stage
managed," as it is merely based on an unfounded speculation that only
the latter and her companions knew where they were staying at the time
they were forcibly taken.81 The Court of Appeals further stressed that the
Medical Certificate of the petitioner can only affirm the existence of a
true abduction, as its findings are reflective of the very injuries the latter
claims to have sustained during her harrowing ordeal, particularly when
she was handcuffed and then dragged by her abductors onto their van.82
The Court of Appeals also recognized the existence of an ongoing threat
against the security of the petitioner, as manifested in the attempts of
"RC" to contact and monitor her, even after she was released.83 This
threat, according to the Court of Appeals, is all the more compounded by
the failure of the police authorities to identify the material perpetrators
who are still at large.84 Thus, the appellate court extended to the
petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo by directing the public
respondents to afford protection to the former, as well as continuing,
under the norm of extraordinary diligence, their existing investigations
involving the abduction.85
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The Court of Appeals likewise observed a transgression of the right to

informational privacy of the petitioner, noting the existence of "records
of investigations" that concerns the petitioner as a suspected member of
the CPP-NPA.86 The appellate court derived the existence of such records
from a photograph and video file presented in a press conference by
party-list representatives Jovito Palparan (Palparan) and Pastor Alcover
(Alcover), which allegedly show the petitioner participating in rebel
exercises. Representative Alcover also revealed that the photograph and
video came from a female CPP-NPA member who wanted out of the
organization. According to the Court of Appeals, the proliferation of the
photograph and video, as well as any form of media, insinuating that
petitioner is part of the CPP-NPA does not only constitute a violation of
the right to privacy of the petitioner but also puts further strain on her
already volatile security.87 To this end, the appellate court granted the
privilege of the writ of habeas data mandating the public respondents to
refrain from distributing to the public any records, in whatever form,
relative to petitioners alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently
related to her abduction and torture.88
The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the Court of Appeals was not
convinced that the military or any other person acting under the
acquiescence of the government, were responsible for the abduction and
torture of the petitioner.89 The appellate court stressed that, judging by
her own statements, the petitioner merely "believed" that the military
was behind her abduction.90 Thus, the Court of Appeals absolved the
public respondents from any complicity in the abduction and torture of
petitioner.91 The petition was likewise dismissed as against public
respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in view of her immunity
from suit.92
Accordingly, the petitioners prayers for the return of her personal
belongings were denied.93 Petitioners prayers for an inspection order
and production order also met the same fate.94
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Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.

AMPARO
A.
Petitioner first contends that the Court of Appeals erred in absolving the
public respondents from any responsibility in her abduction and
torture.95 Corollary to this, petitioner also finds fault on the part of Court
of Appeals in denying her prayer for the return of her personal
belongings.96
Petitioner insists that the manner by which her abduction and torture
was carried out, as well as the sounds of construction, gun-fire and
airplanes that she heard while in detention, as these were detailed in her
two affidavits and affirmed by her in open court, are already sufficient
evidence to prove government involvement.97
Proceeding from such assumption, petitioner invokes the doctrine of
command responsibility to implicate the high-ranking civilian and
military authorities she impleaded as respondents in her amparo
petition.98 Thus, petitioner seeks from this Court a pronouncement
holding the respondents as complicit in her abduction and torture, as
well as liable for the return of her belongings.99
Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings
It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the
doctrine of command responsibility as the justification in impleading the
public respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not
incorrect. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of
substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a
proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo
petition.100
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The case of Rubrico v. Arroyo,101 which was the first to examine

command responsibility in the context of an amparo proceeding,
observed that the doctrine is used to pinpoint liability. Rubrico notes
that:102
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in
the development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr.
Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the
"responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate
members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in
international wars or domestic conflict."103 In this sense, command
responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague
Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command
responsibility,104foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a
superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates
should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated,
command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal
liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes
committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the
perpetrators105 (as opposed to crimes he ordered). (Emphasis in the
orginal, underscoring supplied)
Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an
imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown
criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo
proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the nature of the writ itself:
The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial
relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives
that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations
or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or
security.106 While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial
determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing
or threats thereof had transpiredthe writ does not, by so doing, fix
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liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be

criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive
law.107 The rationale underpinning this peculiar nature of an amparo
writ has been, in turn, clearly set forth in the landmark case of The
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo:108
x x x The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a
summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make
the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to
determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or
liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or
administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will
require full and exhaustive proceedings.109(Emphasis supplied)
It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of
command responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any
measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the
ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with
their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be
impleadednot actually on the basis of command responsibilitybut
rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability. In
Razon v. Tagitis,110 the distinct, but interrelated concepts of
responsibility and accountability were given special and unique
significations in relation to an amparo proceeding, to wit:
x x x Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been
established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever
way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure
of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file
the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties
in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the
measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited
involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of
their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are
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24. OPINION RULE
imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and

who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed
to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation
of the enforced disappearance.
Responsibility of Public Respondents
At any rate, it is clear from the records of the case that the intent of the
petitioner in impleading the public respondents is to ascribe some form
of responsibility on their part, based on her assumption that they, in one
way or the other, had condoned her abduction and torture.111
To establish such assumption, petitioner attempted to show that it was
government agents who were behind her ordeal. Thus, the petitioner
calls attention to the circumstances surrounding her abduction and
torturei.e., the forcible taking in broad daylight; use of vehicles with
no license plates; utilization of blindfolds; conducting interrogations to
elicit communist inclinations; and the infliction of physical abuse
which, according to her, is consistent with the way enforced
disappearances are being practiced by the military or other state
forces.112
Moreover, petitioner also claims that she was held inside the military
camp Fort Magsaysaya conclusion that she was able to infer from the
travel time required to reach the place where she was actually detained,
and also from the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes she
heard while thereat.113
We are not impressed. The totality of the evidence presented by the
petitioner does not inspire reasonable conclusion that her abductors
were military or police personnel and that she was detained at Fort
Magsaysay.
Page 61 of 74
First. The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular

case of abduction with those surrounding previous instances of enforced
disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to prove
that the government orchestrated such abduction. We opine that insofar
as the present case is concerned, the perceived similarity cannot stand
as substantial evidence of the involvement of the government.
In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel
circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely on
the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has
the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the
perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be
preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and
similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to
the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An amparo court
cannot simply leave to remote and hazy inference what it could
otherwise clearly and directly ascertain.
In the case at bench, petitioner was, in fact, able to include in her Offer of
Exhibits,114 the cartographic sketches115 of several of her abductors
whose faces she managed to see. To the mind of this Court, these
cartographic sketches have the undeniable potential of giving the
greatest certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of petitioners
abductors. Unfortunately for the petitioner, this potential has not been
realized in view of the fact that the faces described in such sketches
remain unidentified, much less have been shown to be that of any
military or police personnel. Bluntly stated, the abductors were not
proven to be part of either the military or the police chain of command.
Second. The claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay
was not adequately established by her mere estimate of the time it took
to reach the place where she was detained and by the sounds that she
heard while thereat. Like the Court of Appeals, We are not inclined to
take the estimate and observations of the petitioner as accurate on its
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24. OPINION RULE
facenot only because they were made mostly while she was in
blindfolds, but also in view of the fact that she was a mere sojourner in
the Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort Magsaysay and the travel
time required to reach it is in itself doubtful.116 With nothing else but
obscure observations to support it, petitioners claim that she was taken
to Fort Magsaysay remains a mere speculation.
In sum, the petitioner was not able to establish to a concrete point that
her abductors were actually affiliated, whether formally or informally,
with the military or the police organizations. Neither does the evidence
at hand prove that petitioner was indeed taken to the military camp Fort
Magsaysay to the exclusion of other places. These evidentiary gaps, in
turn, make it virtually impossible to determine whether the abduction
and torture of the petitioner was in fact committed with the
acquiescence of the public respondents. On account of this insufficiency
in evidence, a pronouncement of responsibility on the part of the public
respondents, therefore, cannot be made.
Page 62 of 74
conclusive pronouncement of liability. The order itself is a substantial

relief that can only be granted once the liability of the public
respondents has been fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding. As
already discussed above, matters of liability are not determinable in a
mere summary amparo proceeding.118
But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the
petitioner, lies with the fact that a persons right to be restituted of his
property is already subsumed under the general rubric of property
rightswhich are no longer protected by the writ of amparo.119 Section
1 of the Amparo Rule,120 which defines the scope and extent of the writ,
clearly excludes the protection of property rights.
B.
The next error raised by the petitioner is the denial by the Court of
Appeals of her prayer for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort
Magsaysay.121
Prayer for the Return of Personal Belongings

This brings Us to the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her
personal belongings.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals denied the above prayer of the
petitioner by reason of the failure of the latter to prove that the public
respondents were involved in her abduction and torture.117 We agree
with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, but not entirely with the
reason used to support it. To the mind of this Court, the prayer of the
petitioner for the return of her belongings is doomed to fail regardless of
whether there is sufficient evidence to hold public respondents
responsible for the abduction of the petitioner.
In the first place, an order directing the public respondents to return the
personal belongings of the petitioner is already equivalent to a
Considering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing to any military

involvement in petitioners ordeal, this Court finds no error on the part
of the Court of Appeals in denying an inspection of the military camp at
Fort Magsaysay. We agree with the appellate court that a contrary stance
would be equivalent to sanctioning a "fishing expedition," which was
never intended by the Amparo Rule in providing for the interim relief of
inspection order.122 Contrary to the explicit position123 espoused by the
petitioner, the Amparo Rule does not allow a "fishing expedition" for
evidence.
An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or
strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid
the court before making a decision.124 A basic requirement before an
amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be
inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party
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24. OPINION RULE
seeking the order. While the Amparo Rule does not require that the
place to be inspected be identified with clarity and precision, it is,
nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an inspection order that the
supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in itself, so as to make a
prima facie case. This, as was shown above, petitioner failed to do.
Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not
strong enough to make out a prima facie case that she was detained in
Fort Magsaysay, an inspection of the military camp cannot be ordered.
An inspection order cannot issue on the basis of allegations that are, in
themselves, unreliable and doubtful.
Page 63 of 74
whom false criminal charges were filed based on made up and perjured
information.
Pending resolution of this petition and before Petitioner could testify
before Us, Ex-army general Jovito Palaparan, Bantay party-list, and
Pastor Alcover of the Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy party-list
held a press conference where they revealed that they received an
information from a female NPA rebel who wanted out of the
organization, that Petitioner was a communist rebel. Alcover claimed
that said information reached them thru a letter with photo of Petitioner
holding firearms at an NPA training camp and a video CD of the training
exercises.
HABEAS DATA
As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals granted to the petitioner the
privilege of the writ of habeas data, by enjoining the public respondents
from "distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records
in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers" relative to the
petitioners "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her
abduction and torture." Though not raised as an issue in this appeal, this
Court is constrained to pass upon and review this particular ruling of the
Court of Appeals in order to rectify, what appears to Us, an error
infecting the grant.
For the proper appreciation of the rationale used by the Court of Appeals
in granting the privilege of the writ of habeas data, We quote hereunder
the relevant portion125 of its decision:
Under these premises, Petitioner prayed that all the records, intelligence
reports and reports on the investigations conducted on Melissa C. Roxas
or Melissa Roxas be produced and eventually expunged from the
records. Petitioner claimed to be included in the Governments Order of
Battle under Oplan Bantay Laya which listed political opponents against
Clearly, and notwithstanding Petitioners denial that she was the person
in said video, there were records of other investigations on Melissa C.
Roxas or Melissa Roxas which violate her right to privacy. Without a
doubt, reports of such nature have reasonable connections, one way or
another, to petitioners abduction where she claimed she had been
subjected to cruelties and dehumanizing acts which nearly caused her
life precisely due to allegation of her alleged membership in the CPPNPA. And if said report or similar reports are to be continuously made
available to the public, Petitioners security and privacy will certainly be
in danger of being violated or transgressed by persons who have strong
sentiments or aversion against members of this group. The unregulated
dissemination of said unverified video CD or reports of Petitioners
alleged ties with the CPP-NPA indiscriminately made available for public
consumption without evidence of its authenticity or veracity certainly
violates Petitioners right to privacy which must be protected by this
Court. We, thus, deem it necessary to grant Petitioner the privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Data. (Emphasis supplied).
The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy
enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational
privacy of individuals.126 The writ operates to protect a persons right to
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24. OPINION RULE
control information regarding himself, particularly in the instances

where such information is being collected through unlawful means in
order to achieve unlawful ends.
Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of
the writ may be extended is the showing, at least by substantial
evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in
life, liberty or security of the victim.127 This, in the case at bench, the
petitioner failed to do.
The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there
is actually no evidence on record that shows that any of the public
respondents had violated or threatened the right to privacy of the
petitioner. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the public
respondents that would have violated or threatened the right to privacy
of the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations and other reports
about the petitioners ties with the CPP-NPA, was not adequately
provenconsidering that the origin of such records were virtually
unexplained and its existence, clearly, only inferred by the appellate
court from the video and photograph released by Representatives
Palparan and Alcover in their press conference. No evidence on record
even shows that any of the public respondents had access to such video
or photograph.
In view of the above considerations, the directive by the Court of
Appeals enjoining the public respondents from "distributing or causing
the distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports,
documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioners "alleged ties
with the CPP-NPA," appears to be devoid of any legal basis. The public
respondents cannot be ordered to refrain from distributing something
that, in the first place, it was not proven to have.
Verily, until such time that any of the public respondents were found to
be actually responsible for the abduction and torture of the petitioner,
Page 64 of 74
any inference regarding the existence of reports being kept in violation

of the petitioners right to privacy becomes farfetched, and premature.
For these reasons, this Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down
the grant of the privilege of the writ of habeas data.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
Our review of the evidence of the petitioner, while telling of its innate
insufficiency to impute any form of responsibility on the part of the
public respondents, revealed two important things that can guide Us to a
proper disposition of this case. One, that further investigation with the
use of extraordinary diligence must be made in order to identify the
perpetrators behind the abduction and torture of the petitioner; and
two, that the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), pursuant to its
Constitutional mandate to "investigate all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights and to provide appropriate
legal measures for the protection of human rights,"128must be tapped in
order to fill certain investigative and remedial voids.
Further Investigation Must Be Undertaken
Ironic as it seems, but part and parcel of the reason why the petitioner
was not able to adduce substantial evidence proving her allegations of
government complicity in her abduction and torture, may be attributed
to the incomplete and one-sided investigations conducted by the
government itself. This "awkward" situation, wherein the very persons
alleged to be involved in an enforced disappearance or extralegal killing
are, at the same time, the very ones tasked by law to investigate the
matter, is a unique characteristic of these proceedings and is the main
source of the "evidentiary difficulties" faced by any petitioner in any
amparo case.129
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Cognizant of this situation, however, the Amparo Rule placed a potent

safeguardrequiring the "respondent who is a public official or
employee" to prove that no less than "extraordinary diligence as
required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the
performance of duty."130 Thus, unless and until any of the public
respondents is able to show to the satisfaction of the amparo court that
extraordinary diligence has been observed in their investigations, they
cannot shed the allegations of responsibility despite the prevailing
scarcity of evidence to that effect.
With this in mind, We note that extraordinary diligence, as required by
the Amparo Rule, was not fully observed in the conduct of the police and
military investigations in the case at bar.
A perusal of the investigation reports submitted by Task Group
CAROJAN shows modest effort on the part of the police investigators to
identify the perpetrators of the abduction. To be sure, said reports are
replete with background checks on the victims of the abduction, but are,
at the same time, comparatively silent as to other concrete steps the
investigators have been taking to ascertain the authors of the crime.
Although conducting a background investigation on the victims is a
logical first step in exposing the motive behind the abductionits
necessity is clearly outweighed by the need to identify the perpetrators,
especially in light of the fact that the petitioner, who was no longer in
captivity, already came up with allegations about the motive of her
captors.
Instead, Task Group CAROJAN placed the fate of their investigations
solely on the cooperation or non-cooperation of the petitionerwho,
they claim, was less than enthusiastic in participating in their
investigative efforts.131 While it may be conceded that the participation
of the petitioner would have facilitated the progress of Task Group
CAROJANs investigation, this Court believes that the formers reticence
to cooperate is hardly an excuse for Task Group CAROJAN not to explore
Page 65 of 74
other means or avenues from which they could obtain relevant

leads.132 Indeed, while the allegations of government complicity by the
petitioner cannot, by themselves, hold up as adequate evidence before a
court of lawthey are, nonetheless, a vital source of valuable
investigative leads that must be pursued and verified, if only to comply
with the high standard of diligence required by the Amparo Rule in the
conduct of investigations.
Assuming the non-cooperation of the petitioner, Task Group CAROJANs
reports still failed to explain why it never considered seeking the
assistance of Mr. Jesus Paolowho, along with the victims, is a central
witness to the abduction. The reports of Task Group CAROJAN is silent in
any attempt to obtain from Mr. Paolo, a cartographic sketch of the
abductors or, at the very least, of the one who, by petitioners account,
was not wearing any mask.1avvphi1
The recollection of Mr. Paolo could have served as a comparative
material to the sketches included in petitioners offer of exhibits that, it
may be pointed out, were prepared under the direction of, and first
submitted to, the CHR pursuant to the latters independent investigation
on the abduction and torture of the petitioner.133 But as mentioned
earlier, the CHR sketches remain to be unidentified as of this date.
In light of these considerations, We agree with the Court of Appeals that
further investigation under the norm of extraordinary diligence should
be undertaken. This Court simply cannot write finis to this case, on the
basis of an incomplete investigation conducted by the police and the
military. In a very real sense, the right to security of the petitioner is
continuously put in jeopardy because of the deficient investigation that
directly contributes to the delay in bringing the real perpetrators before
the bar of justice.
To add teeth to the appellate courts directive, however, We find it
fitting, nay, necessary to shift the primary task of conducting further
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24. OPINION RULE
investigations on the abduction and torture of the petitioner upon the

CHR.134 We note that the CHR, unlike the police or the military, seems to
enjoy the trust and confidence of the petitioneras evidenced by her
attendance and participation in the hearings already conducted by the
commission.135 Certainly, it would be reasonable to assume from such
cooperation that the investigations of the CHR have advanced, or at the
very least, bears the most promise of advancing farther, in terms of
locating the perpetrators of the abduction, and is thus, vital for a final
resolution of this petition. From this perspective, We also deem it just
and appropriate to relegate the task of affording interim protection to
the petitioner, also to the CHR.
Hence, We modify the directive of the Court of the Appeals for further
investigation, as follows
1.) Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with
conducting further investigation regarding the abduction and
torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the CHR shall, under the
norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the
necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons described in the
cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as
their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to
petitioners abduction and torture.
2.) Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National
Police (PNP), or his successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff of
the AFP, or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing
investigation of the CHR, including but not limited to furnishing
the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the
petitioners abduction and torture, subject to reasonable
regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws.
3.) Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP, or his
successor, to furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the
Page 66 of 74
petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its
investigations and their recommendations, other than those that
are already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90)
days from receipt of this decision.
4.) Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the Court of
Appeals within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a
copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding
recommendations; and to (b) provide or continue to provide
protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the
Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by
this Court.
Accordingly, this case must be referred back to the Court of Appeals, for
the purposes of monitoring compliance with the above directives and
determining whether, in light of any recent reports or recommendations,
there would already be sufficient evidence to hold any of the public
respondents responsible or, at least, accountable. After making such
determination, the Court of Appeals shall submit its own report with
recommendation to this Court for final action. The Court of Appeals will
continue to have jurisdiction over this case in order to accomplish its
tasks under this decision.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. We
hereby render a decision:
1.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioners prayer for the return
of her personal belongings;
2.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioners prayer for an
inspection of the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay.
3.) REVERSING the grant of the privilege of habeas data, without
prejudice, however, to any modification that this Court may
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
make on the basis of the investigation reports and

recommendations submitted to it under this decision.
4.) MODIFYING the directive that further investigation must be
undertaken, as follows
a. APPOINTING the Commission on Human Rights as the
lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation
regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner.
Accordingly, the Commission on Human Rights shall,
under the norm of extraordinary diligence, take or
continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the
persons described in the cartographic sketches
submitted by the petitioner, as well as their
whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant
to petitioners abduction and torture.
b. DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine
National Police, or his successor, and the incumbent Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or his
successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing
investigation of the Commission on Human Rights,
including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of
its personnel records circa the time of the petitioners
abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations
consistent with the Constitution and existing laws.
c. Further DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the
Philippine National Police, or his successor, to furnish to
this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her
representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations
and their recommendations, other than those that are
already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90)
days from receipt of this decision.
Page 67 of 74
d. Further DIRECTING the Commission on Human Rights
(a) to furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90)
days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports
on its investigation and its corresponding
recommendations; and (b) to provide or continue to
provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or
visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter
be determined by this Court.
5.) REFERRING BACK the instant case to the Court of Appeals for
the following purposes:
a. To MONITOR the investigations and actions taken by
the PNP, AFP, and the CHR;
b. To DETERMINE whether, in light of the reports and
recommendations of the CHR, the abduction and torture
of the petitioner was committed by persons acting under
any of the public respondents; and on the basis of this
determination
c. To SUBMIT to this Court within ten (10) days from
receipt of the report and recommendation of the
Commission on Human Rightsits own report, which
shall include a recommendation either for the DISMISSAL
of the petition as against the public respondents who
were found not responsible and/or accountable, or for
the APPROPRIATE REMEDIAL MEASURES, AS MAY BE
ALLOWED BY THE AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA RULES,
TO BE UNDERTAKEN as against those found responsible
and/or accountable.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain personally impleaded

in this petition to answer for any responsibilities and/or accountabilities
they may have incurred during their incumbencies.
Other findings of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 26 August
2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA that are not contrary to this decision
are AFFIRMED.
Page 68 of 74
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Associate Justice
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO
MORALES
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDODECASTRO
Associate Justice
(On Official Leave)

ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby

certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
*
On Official Leave.
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation with Section 19

of The Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC) and
Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-116-SC).
1
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
Penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam with Associate

Justices Arturo G. Tayag and Normandie B. Pizarro, concurring.
Rollo, pp 50-82.
2
Page 69 of 74
19
Id.
20
Id.
Id. at 81-82.
21
Id.
Id. at 53.
22
Id. at 54.
Id.
23
Id. at 12-15.
A sister organization of BAYAN-USA.
24
Id.
Affidavit of Petitioner. CA rollo, p.11.
25
Id.
A digital multi-media player combined with a hard drive.
26
Id. at 12.
Supplemental Affidavit of Petitioner. CA rollo, p. 194.
27
Id. at 12-13.
10
Id.
28
Supplemental Affidavit. Id. at 194-196.
11
Id.
29
Id. at 14-15 and 195.
12
Id.
30
Id. at 15.
13
Id.
31
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
Id. at 15-16. Per investigation of the police, Juanito Carabeo

was released by the abductors on 24 May 2009 along the
highway of Barangay Santa Cruz, Lubao, Pampanga. His exact
wherabouts are, however, presently unknown. According to the
police, Carabeo has 7 outstanding warrants of arrest. As of the
time of this decision, no news relative to the release and/or
whereabouts of John Edward Jandoc is obtainable.
17
Id. at 12.
32
18
Id.
Meaning, subscriber Identity Module.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
The email address is "[email protected]," with the

password "dantes2009." CA rollo, at 196.
33
The book was "Love in the Times of Cholera" by Gabriel Garcia

Marquez, and a copy of a Bible of the King James Version. Id. at
195.
Page 70 of 74
46
Id.
47
Id. at 58.
48
Id. at 59.
49
Id. at 17.
50
Id. at 60-61.
51
Id. at 60.
52
Id. at 42-43
53
Id. at 43-55.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 18 and 90.
56
Id.
34
35
36
37
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2-18. Shortly after filing the petition, petitioner went to

the United States to recuperate from her experience. She came
back to the Philippines on 30 July 2009 to testify on the affidavits
attached to her petition before the Court of Appeals, but
returned immediately to the United States.
38
The interrogator identified only by the name of "James" was

not similarly impleaded as a co-respondent.
39
40
CA rollo, pp. 7-8.
57
Id.
41
Supreme Court En Banc Resolution, id. at 19-21.
58
Id.
42
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 113
61
Id. at 18.
62
Affidavit of PC/Supt. Leon Nilo A. Dela Cruz. Id. at 83.
63
Id. at 18-90.
No return was filed by or for the unknown respondents "Dex,"

"Rose" and "RC." Id. at 35-98.
43
44
45
Id. at 56.
Id. at 18 and 90.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
Initial Report of Special Investigative Task Group CAROJAN, id.

at 112-114.
64
65
Page 71 of 74
76
Affidavit of Maj. Gen. Ralph A. Villanueva, id. at 81-82.
77
Id. at 107-110.
78
Id. at 110.
79
Rollo, pp. 50-82.
80
Id. at 63-64.
81
Id. at 64.
82
Id. at 64-65.
83
Id. at 67.
84
Id. at 69-71.
85
Id. at 81-82.
Id. at 113-114.
See Letters sent by PC/Supt. Gil C. Meneses, head of Special

Investigative Task Group CAROJAN, to Sister Cecile Ruiz of
Karapatan and the Alliance for Advancement of Peoples Rights.
Id. at 93-94.
66
67
Id. at 54.
See Initial Report dated 26 May 2009; First Progress Report

dated 27 May 2009; Second Progress Report dated 1 June 2009;
Third Progress Report dated 8 June 2009, on the alleged
abduction and torture of Melissa Roxas, Juanito Carabeo and
John Edward Jandoc, prepared by Task Group CAROJAN, id. at
112-120. See also Investigation Report dated 29 June 2009, id. at
179-185.
68
69
Id. at 185.
86
Id. at 80-81.
70
Counter-Affidavit of Secretary Gilbert Teodoro, id. at 121-123.
87
Id.
71
Id. at 124.
88
Id. at 81-82.
72
Id. at 122.
89
Id. at 71-72.
73
Id. at 77.
90
Id. at 73.
74
Affidavit of General Victor S. Ibrado, id. at 73-74.
91
Id. at 71-72.
75
Affidavit of Lt. Gen. Delfin N. Bangit, id. at 79-80.
92
Id. at 73.
93
Id. at 81.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
94
Id. at 75-77.
95
Id. at 2-40 and 7.
24. OPINION RULE
Page 72 of 74
rdc.org/uploads/editor/Command%20Responsibility.pdf
(visited 2 August 2009)
96
Id.
Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, 3 December 2009, 606

SCRA 598, 602.
97
Id. at 15. See also CA rollo, p. 5.
107
98
Id. at 17.
106
Separate Opinion of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion in

Rubrico v. Arroyo, supra note 101.
108
99
G.R. No. 180906, 7 October 2008, 568 SCRA 1, 42.
Id. at 38.
Deliberations of the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of
Court, 10 August 2007, 24 August 2007, 31 August 2007 and 20
September 2008.
109
See Separate Opinion of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion in

Rubrico v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 183871, 18 February 2010.
100
101
Rubrico v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 183871, 18 February 2010.
110
Supra note 106 at 620-621.
102
Id.
111
Rollo, pp. 26-27.
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., Command Responsibility, 5 February

2007,
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/publications/summit/Summit%20Pa
pers/Bernas%20-%20Command%20Responsibility.pdf (visited
2 September 2010).
112
Id. at 15.
113
CA rollo, p. 5.
114
Id. at 187-193.
Eugenia Levine, Command Responsibility, The Mens Rea

Requirement, Global Policy Forum, February 2005
(www.globalpolicy.org.). As stated in Kuroda v. Jalandoni, 83
Phil. 171 (1949), the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague
Conventions.
115
Id. See Exhibit "G, and its sub-markings.
116
Rollo, pp. 75-76. As observed by the Court of Appeals:
103
104
Iavor Rangelov and Jovan Nicic, "Command Responsibility:

The Contemporary Law," http://www.hlc105
As respondents correctly argued, considering that

Petitioner is an American citizen who claimed to be
unfamiliar with Fort Magsaysay or its immediate vicinity,
she cannot possibly have any familiarity or actual
knowledge of the buildings in or around Fort Magsaysay
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
or the relative distances to and from the same. Petitioner

failed to offer a single evidence to definitely prove that
she was brought to Fort Magsaysay to the exclusion of
other places. It is also unfortunate that her two other
companions Messrs. Carabeo and Jandoc, chose not to
appear in Court to corroborate the testimony of the
Petitioner.
117
Id. at 81.
118
Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, supra note 106 at 688-689.
Page 73 of 74
125
Annotation to the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data, A.M. No.

08-1-16-SC, effective 2 February 2008 (pamphlet released by the
Supreme Court), p. 23.
126
127
Tapuz v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484, 17 June 2008, 554

SCRA 768, 784-785.
Section 1 of the Amparo Rule states:
Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of Amparo is a
remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extra-legal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis supplied).
121
Rollo, pp. 27-31.
122
Id. at 76.
123
Id. at 28.
128
Yano v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 186640, 11 February 2010.
CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 18.
In Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, supra note 106 at 684, this Court, thru
Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, recognized the three (3) types
of evidentiary difficulties faced by a petitioner in an amparo
petition. In explaining the origins of such difficulties, Justice
Brion explained:
129
"These difficulties largely arise because the State itself

the party whose involvement is alleged investigates
enforced disappearances. x x x."
130
124
Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule states:

SECTION 1. Habeas Data. - The writ of habeas data is a
remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee,
or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence
of the aggrieved party. (Emphasis supplied).
119
120
Rollo, pp. 80-81.
Section 17 of the Amparo Rule states:

SEC. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence
Required. x x x.
Law 126 Evidence
Prof. Avena
24. OPINION RULE
x x x x.
The respondent who is a public official or employee must
prove that extraordinary diligence as required by
applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in
the performance of duty. (Emphasis supplied.)
131
CA rollo, p. 185.
Placed in a similar situation, the case of Rubrico v. Arroyo,

supra note 101, instructs:
132
The seeming reluctance on the part of the Rubricos or

their witnesses to cooperate ought not to pose a
hindrance to the police in pursuing, on its own initiative,
the investigation in question to its natural end. To repeat
what the Court said in Manalo, the right to security of
persons is a guarantee of the protection of ones right by
the government. And this protection includes conducting
effective investigations of extra-legal killings, enforced
disappearances, or threats of the same kind. (Emphasis
supplied).
133
TSN, 30 July 2009, pp. 171-173.
We follow suit with the recent case of Burgos v. Arroyo, G.R.

No. 183711, 22 June 2010, where this Court, after having found
significant lapses in the conduct of the police investigations,
resolved to assign the CHR, as its directly commissioned agency,
with the task of continuing the investigations on the
disappearance of Jonas Burgos.
134
135
Rollo, p. 33.
Page 74 of 74

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Law 126 Evidence

22. COMMERCIAL LIST

22. COMMERCIAL LIST

Republic of the Philippines

After investigation was conducted by the Board of Marine Inquiry,

A party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary

G.R. No. 107518 October 8, 1998

Law 126 Evidence

22. COMMERCIAL LIST

profits and lost business opportunities that would thereafter be

Law 126 Evidence

22. COMMERCIAL LIST

of which should be left to the sound discretion of this

Law 126 Evidence

22. COMMERCIAL LIST

(d) Exhibit D pro forma invoice No.

The lower court held that the prevailing replacement value of

Law 126 Evidence

22. COMMERCIAL LIST

boat and its equipments in the tune of P6,438,048.00

Unsatisfied with the lower court's decision, petitioner elevated the

Law 126 Evidence

22. COMMERCIAL LIST

thereafter found relevant or competent, can easily be

Law 126 Evidence

22. COMMERCIAL LIST

. . . . If the market value of the ship reflects the fact that it

approximately ten (10) years after the collision. Noticeably, petitioner

Law 126 Evidence

22. COMMERCIAL LIST

and the vessel itself should be accepted as gospel truth. 34 We must,

Under Section 45 of the aforesaid Rule, a document is a commercial list

Law 126 Evidence

22. COMMERCIAL LIST

Navotas, Metro Manila

Attention: MR. EDDIE DEL ROSARIO

VALIDITY : Subject to our final

In accordance to your request, we are pleated to quote

WARRANTY : One (1) full year against

Two (2) units CUMMINS

Law 126 Evidence

22. COMMERCIAL LIST

To be sure, letters and

Law 126 Evidence

22. COMMERCIAL LIST

testimony. Others maintain that it is entitled to no more

Nominal damages are awarded in every obligation arising from law,

Law 126 Evidence

22. COMMERCIAL LIST

vessel quoted by private respondent in his complaint considering that

reconsideration of the lower court's decision that petitioner raised the

Law 126 Evidence

22. COMMERCIAL LIST

Appeals, G.R. No. 118325, January 29, 1997; People v.

3 Southeastern College, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.

5 People v. Gutierrez 258 SCRA 70 (1996).

23 Petition. pp. 2-3.

25 Art. 2202. Civil Code; Europa v. Hunter Garments Mfg.

27 CLERK & LINDSELL ON TORTS, 17th ed., pp. 14891490.