GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Represented by the Philippine Department of

Justice, petitioner, vs. HON. GUILLERMO PURGANAN, Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court of Manila and MARC
JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARCIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondent
G.R. No. 148571
September 24, 2002
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS: Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government sent to the Philippine Government Note
Verbale No. 0522 and accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known
as Mario Batacan Crespo. Jimenez sought and was granted a TRO by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. The TRO prohibited the
DOJ from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a
Petition before this Court. Initially, the Court dismissed the Petition.
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued a Resolution holding that private respondent
was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed
with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the
subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. The
warrant had been issued in connection with the following charges in Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to
defraud the United States and to commit certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion (3) wire
fraud, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false statements and (5) illegal campaign contributions. In order
to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest" pursuant to Section 6
of PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte
Motion," which prayed that petitioners application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. The RTC granted the Motion of
Jimenez and set the case for hearing. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial
court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. Jimenez sought an alternative
prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail. Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned Order,
directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he
had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged
Order. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUES: (1) whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued No.
(2) whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending No.
HELD: The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Preliminary Matters
Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition
Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a Motion for Reconsideration in the Extradition Court: "(1) the
issues were fully considered by such court after requiring the parties to submit their respective memoranda and position papers on
the matter and thus, the filing of a reconsideration motion would serve no useful purpose; (2) the assailed orders are a patent
nullity, absent factual and legal basis therefor; and (3) the need for relief is extremely urgent, as the passage of sufficient time
would give Jimenez ample opportunity to escape and avoid extradition; and (4) the issues raised are purely of law." 16
For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA, petitioner submits the following reasons: "(1) even if the petition is
lodged with the Court of Appeals and such appellate court takes cognizance of the issues and decides them, the parties would still
bring the matter to this Honorable Court to have the issues resolved once and for all [and] to have a binding precedent that all
lower courts ought to follow; (2) the Honorable Court of Appeals had in one case 17 ruled on the issue by disallowing bail but the
court below refused to recognize the decision as a judicial guide and all other courts might likewise adopt the same attitude of
refusal; and (3) there are pending issues on bail both in the extradition courts and the Court of Appeals, which, unless guided by
the decision that this Honorable Court will render in this case, would resolve to grant bail in favor of the potential extraditees and
would give them opportunity to flee and thus, cause adverse effect on the ability of the Philippines to comply with its obligations
under existing extradition treaties." 18
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the inferior court has been given,
through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This rule, though, has certain exceptions: (1)
when the issue raised is purely of law, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of urgency. 19 As a fourth exception, the
Court has also ruled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua
non, when the questions raised are the same as those that have already been squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the
lower court. 20 Aside from being of this nature, the issues in the present case also involve pure questions of law that are of public
interest. Hence, a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with.
Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari when there are
special and important reasons therefor. 21 In Fortich v. Corona 22 we stated:

[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly [before] it
if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be
observed and which has been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et. al., Torres vs. Arranz,
Bercero vs. De Guzman, and, Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al. As we have further stated in Cuaresma:
x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed
only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
This is established policy. x x x.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the interest of
speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present controversy which, as correctly
observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem created by the issuance
of the assailed resolution. Moreover, x x x requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of Appeals
would only result in a waste of time and money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in our
jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals: 23
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their
strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be avoided. Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case
from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy
disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the
merits of the case.
In a number of other exceptional cases, 24 we held as follows:
This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, and we entertain direct resort to us in
cases where special and important reasons or exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the same."
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition proceedings, we deem it best
to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first impression over which there is, as yet, no
local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
Five Postulates of Extradition
The substantive issues raised in this case require an interpretation or construction of the treaty and the law on extradition. A
cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give effect to its intent. 25Since PD 1069 is intended as a
guide for the implementation of extradition treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory, 26 understanding certain postulates of
extradition will aid us in properly deciding the issues raised here.
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.
First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime 27 by facilitating the arrest and the
custodial transfer 28 of a fugitive 29 from one state to the other.
With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the flight of affluent criminals from one
country to another for the purpose of committing crime and evading prosecution has become more frequent.
Accordingly, governments are adjusting their methods of dealing with criminals and crimes that transcend international
boundaries.
Today, "a majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon extradition as the major effective
instrument of international co-operation in the suppression of crime." 30 It is the only regular system that has been
devised to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in accordance with municipal and
international law. 31
An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of the principle that criminals should be restored
to a jurisdiction competent to try and punish them is that the number of criminals seeking refuge abroad will
be reduced. For to the extent that efficient means of detection and the threat of punishment play a significant
role in the deterrence of crime within the territorial limits of a State, so the existence of effective extradition
arrangements and the consequent certainty of return to the locus delicti commissi play a corresponding role in
the deterrence of flight abroad in order to escape the consequence of crime. x x x. From an absence of
extradition arrangements flight abroad by the ingenious criminal receives direct encouragement and thus
indirectly does the commission of crime itself." 32
In Secretary v. Lantion 33 we explained:
The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one way to do it is to facilitate the
extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered [into] by our government. More and more, crimes are becoming
the concern of one world. Laws involving crimes and crime prevention are undergoing universalization. One manifest
purpose of this trend towards globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal whose activities threaten the peace and
progress of civilized countries. It is to the great interest of the Philippines to be part of this irreversible movement in
light of its vulnerability to crimes, especially transnational crimes."
Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of international crimes and
criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in order to improve our chances of
suppressing crime in our own country.
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused

Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and that both accept and trust, each
others legal system and judicial process. 34 More pointedly, our duly authorized representatives signature on an extradition
treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and the willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights of the person sought
to be extradited. 35 That signature signifies our full faith that the accused will be given, upon extradition to the requesting state, all
relevant and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have been
signed, or would have been directly attacked for its unconstitutionality.
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 36 extradition proceedings are not criminal in nature. In criminal
proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition which is sui generis -- in a class by itself -- they are
not.
An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the
rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the
determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state
where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or
innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An extradition
proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In contradistinction to a
criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under less
stringent standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited upon showing of the existence of a prima
facie case. Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an
extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to
extradite him. The United States adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion
in balancing the equities of the case and the demands of the nations foreign relations before making the ultimate
decision to extradite."
Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the
person sought to be extradited. 37 Such determination during the extradition proceedings will only result in needless duplication
and delay. Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a person charged with or convicted
of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. It is not part of the function of the assisting
authorities to enter into questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction. 38 The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in
court is only to determine whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is
extraditable. 39
4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty, and our legislative branch
ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries the presumption that its implementation will serve the national interest.
Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity 40 with the requesting state. On the other hand,
failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a bad image of our country before the world community. Such failure would
discourage other states from entering into treaties with us, particularly an extradition treaty that hinges on reciprocity. 41
Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations under the Treaty. 42 This principle
requires that we deliver the accused to the requesting country if the conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth in the Treaty,
are satisfied. In other words, "[t]he demanding government, when it has done all that the treaty and the law require it to do, is
entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other government is under obligation to make
the surrender." 43 Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the accused, should it be found proper.
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds reinforcement in the
experience 44 of the executive branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the
requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the requesting state.
The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited have a propensity to flee.
Indeed,
extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to trial in the requesting
country. 45 Prior acts of herein respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment
proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and that
the crimes he is charged with are bailable -- eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the requesting state, as well as
his predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high risk of flight. He has
demonstrated that he has the capacity and the will to flee. Having fled once, what is there to stop him, given sufficient
opportunity, from fleeing a second time?
First Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing
Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?
Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC --informing the accused, a fugitive from justice, that an
Extradition Petition has been filed against him, and that petitioner is seeking his arrest -- gives him notice to escape and to avoid

extradition. Moreover, petitioner pleads that such procedure may set a dangerous precedent, in that those sought to be extradited - including terrorists, mass murderers and war criminals -- may invoke it in future extradition cases.
On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that he should not be hurriedly and arbitrarily deprived of his constitutional
right to liberty without due process. He further asserts that there is as yet no specific law or rule setting forth the procedure prior
to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, after the petition for extradition has been filed in court; ergo, the formulation of that
procedure is within the discretion of the presiding judge.
Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their arguments. It states:
SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1) Immediately upon receipt of
the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer
the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused
which may be served any where within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the immediate arrest and
temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice. Upon receipt of the answer, or should the
accused after having received the summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case
or set another date for the hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served each upon
the accused and the attorney having charge of the case." (Emphasis ours)
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganans act of immediately setting for hearing the issuance of a warrant of
arrest? We rule in the negative.
1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law
It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word "immediate" to qualify the arrest of
the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing
entails sending notices to the opposing parties, 46 receiving facts and arguments 47 from them, 48 and giving them time to prepare
and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered "immediate." The law could
not have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in
the determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
By using the phrase "if it appears," the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such early stage.
The trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately upon
the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first
impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the
accused.
Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate of Authentication among others, were the following: (1) Annex
H, the Affidavit executed on May 26, 1999 by Mr. Michael E. Savage -- trial attorney in the Campaign Financing Task Force of
the Criminal Division of the US Department of Justice; (2) Annexes H to G, evidentiary Appendices of various exhibits that
constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment, with Exhibits 1 to 120 (duly authenticated exhibits that constituted
evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment); (3) Annex BB, the Exhibit I "Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements
Referenced in the Affidavit of Angela Byers" and enclosed Statements in two volumes; (4) Annex GG, the Exhibit J "Table of
Contents for Supplemental Evidentiary Appendix" with enclosed Exhibits 121 to 132; and (5) Annex MM, the Exhibit L
"Appendix of Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Betty Steward" and enclosed Statements in two
volumes. 49
It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an impression from these records adequate for him to make an
initial determination of whether the accused was someone who should immediately be arrested in order to "best serve the ends of
justice." He could have determined whether such facts and circumstances existed as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
person to believe that the extradition request was prima facie meritorious. In point of fact, he actually concluded from these
supporting documents that "probable cause" did exist. In the second questioned Order, he stated:
In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US Government in support of [its] request for extradition of
herein respondent are enough to convince the Court of the existence of probable cause to proceed with the hearing
against the extraditee." 50

We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant
was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having already determined therefrom that
a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of
Jimenez. 51
Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon failure of the accused to answer
after receiving the summons. In connection with the matter of immediate arrest, however, the word "hearing" is notably absent
from the provision. Evidently, had the holding of a hearing at that stage been intended, the law could have easily so provided. It
also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary 52 in nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the
Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the
entire proceedings.
It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend something reasonable and something not inconsistent
with generally recognized principles of International Law, nor with previous treaty obligations towards third States. If,

therefore, the meaning of a treaty is ambiguous, the reasonable meaning is to be preferred to the unreasonable, the more
reasonable to the less reasonable x x x ." 53
Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting
it for hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape. Neither the Treaty nor the
Law could have
intended that consequence, for the very purpose of both would have been defeated by the escape of the accused from the
requested state.
2. On the Basis of the Constitution
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing
before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized."
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination -under oath or affirmation -- of complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear the
accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
In Ho v. People 54 and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge required to go to the extent of conducting a hearing
just for the purpose of personally determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. All we required was that the
"judge must have sufficient supporting documents upon which to make his independent judgment, or at the very least, upon
which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause." 55
In Webb v. De Leon, 56 the Court categorically stated that a judge was not supposed to conduct a hearing before issuing a
warrant of arrest:
Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability, not
the certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of
probable cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if
it is supported by substantial evidence."
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further examine complainants and their
witnesses. 57 In the present case, validating the act of respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his
witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If the accused were allowed to be heard
and necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so desires -- in his effort to negate
a prima facie finding? Such a procedure could convert the determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire
proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case superfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the summary nature of
extraditions.
That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set
of procedures more protective of the accused. If a different procedure were called for at all, a more restrictive one -- not the
opposite -- would be justified in view of respondents demonstrated predisposition to flee.
Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the proper procedure:
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as
possible, a prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show compliance with the
Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may
require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If,
in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding 58 is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the
judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a
warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled
summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the
pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the
foregoing procedure will "best serve the ends of justice" in extradition cases.
Second Substantive Issue:

Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?

Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:
Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional provision secures the right to bail of all persons, including
those sought to be extradited. Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones charged with offenses punishable with reclusion

perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. He also alleges the relevance to the present case of Section 4 59 of Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court which, insofar as practicable and consistent with the summary nature of extradition proceedings, shall also apply
according to Section 9 of PD 1069.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no provision in the Philippine Constitution granting the right to bail to a
person who is the subject of an extradition request and arrest warrant.
Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted
above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for
violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render
judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should
not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt." 60 It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal
proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion." 61 Hence, the second sentence in the
constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It
cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant
him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which
he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.
No Violation of Due Process
Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti 62 in arguing that, constitutionally, "[n]o one shall be deprived of x x x
liberty x x x without due process of law."
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not amount to a
violation of his right to due process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be
heard 63 but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. 64 Where the
circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition case -- call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. 65 In the
present case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for
Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness.
Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation of his liberty prior to
his being heard. That his arrest and detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by (1) the DOJs filing in court the
Petition with its supporting documents after a determination that the extradition request meets the requirements of the law and the
relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judges independent prima facie determination that his arrest will best serve the ends of justice
before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he is under the courts custody, to apply for bail as an
exception to the no-initial-bail rule.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had already
been conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before those proceedings could be
completed, it was hindered from continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process now
has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.
In this light, would it be proper and just for the government to increase the risk of violating its treaty obligations in order to
accord Respondent Jimenez his personal liberty in the span of time that it takes to resolve the Petition for Extradition? His
supposed immediate deprivation of liberty without the due process that he had previously shunned pales against the governments
interest in fulfilling its Extradition Treaty obligations and in cooperating with the world community in the suppression of crime.
Indeed, "[c]onstitutional liberties do not exist in a vacuum; the due process rights accorded to individuals must be carefully
balanced against exigent and palpable government interests." 66
Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards and weaklings who, instead of facing the
consequences of their actions, choose to run and hide. Hence, it would not be good policy to increase the risk of violating our
treaty obligations if, through overprotection or excessively liberal treatment, persons sought to be extradited are able to evade
arrest or escape from our custody. In the absence of any provision -- in the Constitution, the law or the treaty -- expressly
guaranteeing the right to bail in extradition proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting them bail, as a general rule, would
be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors.1wphi1.nt
The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with and gives life to Article 14 67of the Treaty,
since this practice would encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to cut short their detention here.
Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of extradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis of the
Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for their speedy disposition.
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional
duty to curb grave abuse of discretion 68 and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce
constitutional rights. 69 Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness

to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the "life, liberty or property" of every person. It is "dynamic and
resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application." 70
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested
or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing
showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist
special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances 71 including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the
requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general principles of
justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and
emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is basically an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising from the
presidential power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature of police assistance amongst states,
which is not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this power should be
characterized by caution, so that the vital international and bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably impeded or
compromised. In short, while this Court is ever protective of "the sporting idea of fair play," it also recognizes the limits of its
own prerogatives and the need to fulfill international obligations.
Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are special circumstances that are compelling enough for the Court to grant his
request for provisional release on bail. We have carefully examined these circumstances and shall now discuss them.
1. Alleged Disenfranchisement
While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was elected as a member of the House of Representatives. On that
basis, he claims that his detention will disenfranchise his Manila district of 600,000 residents. We are not persuaded. In People v.
Jalosjos, 72 the Court has already debunked the disenfranchisement argument when it ruled thus:
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of the
limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results
which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person
with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer
serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws. This simply
means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The
organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice
shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a
Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all
persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a
person validly [from] prison. The duties imposed by the mandate of the people are multifarious. The accusedappellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only
one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the
duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members.
Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be
deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty
of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to
save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police
officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different
classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in
favor of or against groups or types of individuals.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise
of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are
germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class." 73
It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was already of
public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition. Hence, his constituents were or should have been
prepared for the consequences of the extradition case against their representative, including his detention pending the final
resolution of the case. Premises considered and in line with Jalosjos, we are constrained to rule against his claim that his election
to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.
2. Anticipated Delay
Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the extradition proceedings are lengthy, it would be unfair to confine
him during the pendency of the case. Again we are not convinced. We must emphasize that extradition cases are summary in

nature. They are resorted to merely to determine whether the extradition petition and its annexes conform to the Extradition
Treaty, not to determine guilt or innocence. Neither is it, as a rule, intended to address issues relevant to the constitutional rights
available to the accused in a criminal action.
We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner may, in bad faith, unduly delay the proceedings. This is quite another
matter that is not at issue here. Thus, any further discussion of this point would be merely anticipatory and academic.
However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of respondent, with all the more reason would the grant of bail not be
justified. Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be tantamount to giving
him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition
proceedings even more. This we cannot allow.
3. Not a Flight Risk?
Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To support this claim, he stresses that he learned of the extradition
request in June 1999; yet, he has not fled the country. True, he has not actually fled during the preliminary stages of the request
for his extradition. Yet, this fact cannot be taken to mean that he will not flee as the process moves forward to its conclusion, as
he hears the footsteps of the requesting government inching closer and closer. That he has not yet fled from the Philippines
cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our government if and when it matters; that is,
upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.
In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and granted by the trial court at anytime after the applicant has been
taken into custody and prior to judgment, even after bail has been previously denied. In the present case, the extradition court
may continue hearing evidence on the application for bail, which may be granted in accordance with the guidelines in this
Decision.
Brief Refutation of Dissents
The proposal to remand this case to the extradition court, we believe, is totally unnecessary; in fact, it is a cop-out. The
parties -- in particular, Respondent Jimenez -- have been given more than sufficient opportunity both by the trial court and this
Court to discuss fully and exhaustively private respondents claim to bail. As already stated, the RTC set for hearing not only
petitioners application for an arrest warrant, but also private respondents prayer for temporary liberty. Thereafter required by
the RTC were memoranda on the arrest, then position papers on the application for bail, both of which were separately filed by
the parties.
This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition, the Comment, the Reply, the lengthy Memoranda and the Position
Papers of both parties. Additionally, it has patiently heard them in Oral Arguments, a procedure not normally observed in the
great majority of cases in this Tribunal. Moreover, after the Memos had been submitted, the parties -- particularly the potential
extraditee -- have bombarded this Court with additional pleadings -- entitled "Manifestations" by both parties and "CounterManifestation" by private respondent -- in which the main topic was Mr. Jimenezs plea for bail.
A remand would mean that this long, tedious process would be repeated in its entirety. The trial court would again hear
factual and evidentiary matters. Be it noted, however, that, in all his voluminous pleadings and verbal propositions, private
respondent has not asked for a remand. Evidently, even he realizes that there is absolutely no need to rehear factual matters.
Indeed, the inadequacy lies not in the factual presentation of Mr. Jimenez. Rather, it lies in his legal arguments. Remanding the
case will not solve this utter lack of persuasion and strength in his legal reasoning.
In short, this Court -- as shown by this Decision and the spirited Concurring, Separate and Dissenting Opinions written by
the learned justices themselves -- has exhaustively deliberated and carefully passed upon all relevant questions in this case. Thus,
a remand will not serve any useful purpose; it will only further delay these already very delayed proceedings, 74 which our
Extradition Law requires to be summary in character. What we need now is prudent and deliberate speed, not unnecessary and
convoluted delay. What is needed is a firm decision on the merits, not a circuitous cop-out.
Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is allegedly "disregarding basic freedoms when a case is one of
extradition." We believe that this charge is not only baseless, but also unfair. Suffice it to say that, in its length and breath, this
Decision has taken special cognizance of the rights to due process and fundamental fairness of potential extraditees.
Summation
As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and stress these ten points:
1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the request expressed in the petition,
supported by its annexes and the evidence that may be adduced during the hearing of the petition, complies with the
Extradition Treaty and Law; and whether the person sought is extraditable. The proceedings are intended merely to
assist the requesting state in bringing the accused -- or the fugitive who has illegally escaped -- back to its territory, so
that the criminal process may proceed therein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust in the reliability or
soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of the latter
to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal case therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or innocence is
determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the constitutional rights of the accused are
necessarily available. It is more akin, if at all, to a courts request to police authorities for the arrest of the accused who
is at large or has escaped detention or jumped bail. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the requesting state, the
reasonable prima facie presumption is that the person would escape again if given the opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge shall make a
prima facie finding whether the petition is sufficient in form and substance, whether it complies with the Extradition

Treaty and Law, and whether the person sought is extraditable. The magistrate has discretion to require the petitioner to
submit further documentation, or to personally examine the affiants or witnesses. If convinced that a prima facie case
exists, the judge immediately issues a warrant for the arrest of the potential extraditee and summons him or her to
answer and to appear at scheduled hearings on the petition.
5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the applicants have a history of
absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no danger to the community; and (b)
there exist special, humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court in the requesting
state for the grant of bail therein may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a special circumstance. In
extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of
each case.
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. Due process does not
always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity is sufficient due to the flight risk involved.
Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy
fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.
7. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights, a bastion of liberty, a bulwark of democracy and
the conscience of society. But it is also well aware of the limitations of its authority and of the need for respect for the
prerogatives of the other co-equal and co-independent organs of government.
8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of the
presidential power to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of
government has broad discretion in its duty and power of implementation.
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight functions and exercise review authority to prevent or
excise grave abuse and tyranny. They should not allow contortions, delays and "over-due process" every little step of
the way, lest these summary extradition proceedings become not only inutile but also sources of international
embarrassment due to our inability to comply in good faith with a treaty partners simple request to return a fugitive.
Worse, our country should not be converted into a dubious haven where fugitives and escapees can unreasonably delay,
mummify, mock, frustrate, checkmate and defeat the quest for bilateral justice and international cooperation.
10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to determine compliance
with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions,
delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order dated May 23, 2001 is hereby declared NULL and
VOID, while the challenged Order dated July 3, 2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as it granted bail to Respondent Mark Jimenez. The
bail bond posted by private respondent is CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to conduct the
extradition proceedings before it, with all deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our Extradition Treaty with the
United States as well as our Extradition Law.
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the Philippine
Department of Justice vs. HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ
G.R. No. 153675
April 19, 2007
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the
Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the Peoples Republic of China and
became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting
an advantage as agent," in violation of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7)
counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest were issued
against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
The DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent.
The DOJ then forwarded the request to the NBI which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila an application for the provisional
arrest of private respondent.
The RTC of Manila then issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. The NBI agents arrested and detained
him. Private respondent questioned the validity of the Order of Arrest before the CA. The CA declared the Order of Arrest void.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari praying that the Decision of
the Court of Appeals be reversed. This Court sustained the validity of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The
Decision became final and executor.
Meanwhile petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the
extradition of private respondent, docketed presided by Judge Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private respondent filed, in the same
case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail. Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself
from further hearing the case. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.

Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. This was granted by
respondent judge allowing private respondent to post bail. Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was
denied. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in admitting private respondent to bail
HELD: In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights
extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this Court has an
occasion to resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and
Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban,
later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available only in
criminal proceedings," thus:
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal
laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be
subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable
doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6, September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J., later CJ). It follows that the constitutional
provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended" does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It
must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusfinds application "only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the
second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the
aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not
criminal in nature.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondents case. However, this Court cannot ignore the following
trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international law who, in the 20th
century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international
sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and
(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on
extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity
of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking
root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the
second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented
spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws of war, crimes against peace, and crimes against
humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes against
humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of
international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave recognition and importance to
human rights. Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. While not a
treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members of
the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,2 this Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee,
held that under the Constitution,3 the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In 1966, the UN
General Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and
ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as
well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution
which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The
Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on
the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to
make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies
include the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal

proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly
the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Courts ruling in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the States power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to
criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, 4 have likewise
been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine
jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to
bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons
in detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines
under international conventions to uphold human rights.
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure to secure the necessary
certificate of registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting that the prospective deportee had committed no crime,
the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has committed the most serious crime known to law;"
and that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal law." Thus, the
provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,7 this Court ruled that foreign nationals against
whom no formal criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an order of deportation. As
previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainees right to
bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases.
Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it
cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person
detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty
obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the
presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not
impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the removal of an
accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or
government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed
on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused
or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the
demanding state.8 It is not a criminal proceeding.9 Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not
by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow extradition. 10 It is sui
generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. 11 It is not a trial to determine the guilt or
innocence of the potential extraditee.12 Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in
character.13 Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state
from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the
part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of
criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate
arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further note that Section 20
allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the
request for extradition;" and that release from provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a
request for extradition is received subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential
extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state
following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time
of the detention should be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001,
when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without
having been convicted of any crime. By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his
fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him
bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or
her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the latter, the
standard of due process is premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused. As Purganancorrectly points out, it is from
this major premise that the ancillary presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition
proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the

potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. 15 Given the foregoing, the
prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition
Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in
our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these
rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We
should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is
satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof
beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While
administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the
object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion
in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear
and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be
lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by
"clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition
court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this
case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and
convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether private respondent
is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail
bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE TANODBAYAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 72335-39 March 21, 1988
YAP, J.:
FACTS: In this petition for certiorari and prohibition, petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of the Tanodbayan
and the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan and to enjoin the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan from continuing with the trial or
any other proceedings in various criminal cases.
The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the
Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against
then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end
of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had
resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed
with the Tanodbayan and docketed as TBP Case No. 8005-16-07. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint to
the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the
Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L.
Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the
Tanodbayan. However, it was only on July 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan, recommending the ring of
the corresponding criminal informations against the accused Francisco Tatad. Five (5) criminal informations were filed with the
Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone.
The Tanodbayan filed its opposition to petitioner's consolidated motion to quash, stating therein in particular that there
were only two grounds in said motion that needed refutation, namely: 1. The offense charged in Criminal Cases Nos.
10499,10500 and 10501, have already prescribed and criminal liability is extinguished; and 2. The facts charged in the
information (Criminal Case No. 10500 For failure to file Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the year 1973) do not
constitute an offense.
The Sandiganbayan rendered its challenged resolution denying petitioner's motion to quash. In compliance with the
Sandiganbayan's resolution, the Tanodbayan filed an amended information in Criminal Case No. 10500, changing the date of the
commission of the offense.
Petitioners filed a consolidated motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Sandiganbayan. Hence, petitioner
filed this petition assailing the denial of his motion to quash. The Court resolved enjoin the respondents Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan from continuing with the trial.
On April 10, 1986, the Court required the parties to move in the premises considering the supervening events, including
the change of administration that had transpired, and the provisions of Sec. 18, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, insofar far as the
Public respondents were concerned, which requires the successor official to state whether or not he maintains the action or
position taken by his predecessor in office. On June 20, 1986, the new Tanodbayan manifested that since "the charges are not
political offenses and they have no political bearing whatsoever," he had no alternative but to pursue the cases against the

petitioner, should the Court resolve to deny the petition; that in any event, petitioner is not precluded from pursuing any other
legal remedies under the law, such as the filing of a motion for re-evaluation of his cases with the Tanodbayan.
Pursuant to the above manifestation of the new Tanodbayan, the petitioner filed a motion for re-evaluation with the
Office of the Tanodbayan praying that the cases in question be re-evaluated and the informations be quashed.
Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably violated the constitutional mandate of "due process" and "speedy
disposition of cases" in unduly prolonging the termination of the preliminary investigation and in filing the corresponding
informations only after more than a decade from the alleged commission of the purported offenses, which amounted to loss of
jurisdiction and authority to file the informations.
ISSUE: Was petitioner deprived of his constitutional right to due process and the right to "speedy disposition" of the cases
against him as guaranteed by the Constitution?
HELD: Yes. Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably violated the constitutional mandate of "due process" and "speedy
disposition of cases" in unduly prolonging the termination of the preliminary investigation and in filing the corresponding
informations only after more than a decade from the alleged commission of the purported offenses, which amounted to loss of
jurisdiction and authority to file the informations. The respondent Sandiganbayan dismissed petitioner's contention, saying that
the applicability of the authorities cited by him to the case at bar was "nebulous;" that it would be premature for the court to grant
the "radical relief" prayed for by petitioner at this stage of the proceeding; that the mere allegations of "undue delay" do not
suffice to justify acceptance thereof without any showing "as to the supposed lack or omission of any alleged procedural right
granted or allowed to the respondent accused by law or administrative fiat" or in the absence of "indubitable proof of any
irregularity or abuse" committed by the Tanodbayan in the conduct of the preliminary investigation; that such facts and
circumstances as would establish petitioner's claim of denial of due process and other constitutionally guaranteed rights could be
presented and more fully threshed out at the trial. Said the Sandiganbayan:
That there was a hiatus in the proceedings between the alleged termination of the proceedings before the
investigating fiscal on October 25, 1982 and its resolution on April 17, 1985 could have been due to certain
factors which do not appear on record and which both parties did not bother to explain or elaborate upon in
detail. It could even be logically inferred that the delay may be due to a painstaking an gruelling scrutiny by
the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited
prosecution of a former high-ranking government official. In this respect, We are the considered opinion that
the provision of Pres. Decree No. 911, as amended, regarding the resolution of a complaint by
the Tanodbayan within ten (10) days from termination of the preliminary investigation is merely "directory"
in nature, in view of the nature and extent of the proceedings in said office.
The statutory grounds for the quashal of an information are clearly set forth in concise language in Rule 117,
Section 2, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure and no other grounds for quashal may be entertained by
the Court prior to arraignment inasmuch as it would be itself remiss in the performance of its official
functions and subject to the charge that it has gravely abused its discretion. Such facts and circumstances
which could otherwise justify the dismissal of the case, such as failure on the part of the prosecution to
comply with due process or any other constitutionally-guaranteed rights may presented during the trial
wherein evidence for and against the issue involved may be fully threshed out and considered. Regrettably,
the accused herein attempts to have the Court grant such a radical relief during this stage of the proceedings
which precludes a pre-cocious or summary evaluation of insufficient evidence in support thereof.
This brings us to the crux of the issue at hand. Was petitioner deprived of his constitutional right to due process and the right to
"speedy disposition" of the cases against him as guaranteed by the Constitution? May the court, ostrich like, bury its head in the
sand, as it were, at the initial stage of the proceedings and wait to resolve the issue only after the trial?
In a number of cases, 1 this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called "radical relief" and to spare the accused from
undergoing the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial where it is clear that he has been deprived of due process of law or other
constitutionally guaranteed rights. Of course, it goes without saying that in the application of the doctrine enunciated in those
cases, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
Coming to the case at bar, the following relevant facts appear on record and are largely undisputed. The complainant, Antonio de
los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on
October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information
Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely
known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On
December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan and
docketed as TBP Case No. 8005-16-07. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980-which was around two months
after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security
Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the
filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all
affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on July 5,
1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan, recommending the ring of the corresponding criminal informations
against the accused Francisco Tatad. Five (5) criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all
against petitioner Tatad alone.

A painstaking review of the facts can not but leave the impression that political motivations played a vital role in activating and
propelling the prosecutorial process in this case. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a
falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary
investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their
witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report.
We find such blatant departure from the established procedure as a dubious, but revealing attempt to involve an office directly
under the President in the prosecutorial process, lending credence to the suspicion that the prosecution was politically motivated.
We cannot emphasize too strongly that prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that their noble
office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the
basic and fundamental objective of serving the interest of justice even handedly, without fear or favor to any and all litigants
alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the established procedure may the
public's perception of the of the prosecutor be enhanced.
Moreover, the long delay in resolving the case under preliminary investigation can not be justified on the basis of the facts on
record. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by
him from its termination. While we agree with the respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the
other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. It certainly can not be assumed that the law
has included a provision that is deliberately intended to become meaningless and to be treated as a dead letter.
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of
the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct
of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of
the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only
under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as
embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the
petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the
circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by
indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a painstaking and gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as
to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high ranking government
official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected.
Secondly, three out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and
liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual issues necessitating
such "painstaking and gruelling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary
investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while
presenting more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the
Tanodbayan to resolve the case.
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation should not be deemed fatal, for even the
complete absence of a preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of the information. True-but the absence of a
preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving the accused such investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a
preliminary investigation can not be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a device for setting back time.
After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are constrained to hold that the inordinate delay in
terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the information in the instant case is violative of the constitutionally
guaranteed right of the petitioner to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him. Accordingly, the
informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503 should be dismissed. In view of the foregoing, we
find it unnecessary to rule on the other issues raised by petitioner.
Accordingly, the Court Resolved to give due course to the petition and to grant the same. The informations in Criminal Cases
Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Francisco S. Tatad" are hereby
DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on October 22, 1985 is made permanent.
SATURNINA GALMAN et. al. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION (represented by Justice Manuel Pamaran,
Chairman, and Justices Augusto Amores and Bienvenido Vera Cruz, Members), et al.
G.R. No. 72670 September 12, 1986
TEEHANKEE, C.J.:
FACTS: The secret Malacanang conference at which the authoritarian President called together the Presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Fernandez and the entire prosecution panel headed by Deputy Tanodbayan Herrera and told
them how to handle and rig (moro-moro) the trial and the close monitoring of the entire proceedings to assure the pre-determined
ignominious final outcome are without parallel and precedent in our annals and jurisprudence. His obsession for "the boys' "
acquittal led to severalfirst which would otherwise be inexplicable:
1. He turned his back on and repudiated the findings of the very Fact Finding Board that he himself appointed to investigate the
"national tragedy and national shame" of the "treacherous and vicious assassination of Ninoy Aquino and "to ventilate the truth
through free, independent and dispassionate investigation by prestigious and free investigators."
2. He cordially received the chairman with her minority report one day ahead of the four majority members and instantly referred
it to respondents "for final resolution through the legal system" as if it were the majority and controlling report; and rebuked the

four majority members when they presented to him the next day their report calling for the indictment of all 26 respondents
headed by Gens. Ver and Olivas (instead of the lesser seven under the chairman's minority report).
3. From the day after the Aquino assassination to the dictated verdict of acquittal, he totally disregarded the Board's majority and
minority findings of fact and publicly insisted that the military's "fall guy" Rolando Galman was the killer of Ninoy Aquino and
sought futilely to justify the soldiers' incompetence and gross negligence to provide any security for Ninoy in contrast to their
alacrity in gunning down the alleged assassin Galman and searing his lips.
4. The Sandiganbayan's decision (Pamaran, J. ponente) in effect convicted Rolando Galman as Ninoy's assassin notwithstanding
that he was not on trial but the victim according to the very information filed, and evidence to the contrary submitted, by the
Herrera prosecution panel; and
5. Justice Pamaran's ponencia (despite reservations expressed by Justice Amores who wanted to convict some of the accused)
granted all 26 accused total absolution and pronounced them "innocent of the crimes charged in the two informations, and
accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil liability," notwithstanding the evidence on the basis of which the Fact Finding
Board had unanimously declared the soldiers' version of Galman being Aquino's killer a "perjured story, given deliberately and
in conspiracy with one another."
ISSUE: whether the judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.
HELD: Yes. The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version as propounded by the
chief investigator, respondent Gen. Olivas, that Rolando Galman was the NPA-hired assassin, stating that "the evidence shows
[to the contrary] that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations." They were in agreement that "only the soldiers in the
staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him;" that Galman, the military's "fall guy" was "not the assassin of Sen. Aquino and
that "the SWAT troopers who gunned down Galman and the soldiers who escorted Sen. Aquino down the service stairs,
deliberately and in conspiracy with one another, gave a perjured story to us regarding the alleged shooting by Galman of Sen.
Aquino and the mowing down, in turn, of Galman himself;" in short, that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military
conspiracy, not a communist plot The only difference between the two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six
private respondents abovenamed in the title of the case headed by then AFP Chief General Fabian C. Ver involved in the military
conspiracy and therefore "indictable for the premeditated killing of Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman at the
MIA on August 21, 1983;" while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of them and limit as plotters "the six
persons who were on the service stairs while Senator Aquino was descending" and "General Luther Custodio . . . because the
criminal plot could not have been planned and implemented without his intervention."
The chairman wrote in her minority report (somewhat prophetically) that "The epilogue to our work lies in what will transpire in
accordance with the action that the Office of the President may thereafter direct to be taken. "The four-member majority report
(also prophetically) wrote in the epilogue (after warning the forces who adhere to an alien and intolerable political ideology
against unscrupulously using the report "to discredit our traditionally revered institutions"), that "the tragedy opened our eyes and
for the first time confirmed our worst fears of what unchecked evil would be capable of doing." They wrote:
The task of the Board was clear and unequivocal. This task was not only to determine the facts and
circumstances surrounding the death of the late former Senator. Of greater significance is the awesome
responsibility of the Board to uphold righteousness over evil, justice over injustice, rationality over
irrationality, humaneness over inhumanity. The task was indeed a painful test, the inevitable result of which
will restore our country's honored place among the sovereign nations of the free world where peace, law and
order, freedom, and justice are a way of life.
More than any other event in contemporary Philippine history, the killing of the late former Senator Aquino
has brought into sharper focus, the ills pervading Philippine society. It was the concretization of the horror
that has been haunting this country for decades, routinely manifested by the breakdown of peace and order,
economic instability, subversion, graft and corruption, and an increasing number of abusive elements in what
are otherwise noble institutions in our country-the military and law enforcement agencies. We are, however,
convinced that, by and large, the great majority of the officers and men of these institutions have remained
decent and honorable, dedicated to their noble mission in the service of our country and people.
The tragedy opened our eyes and for the first time confirmed our worst fears of what unchecked evil would
be capable of doing. As former Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban observes. "Nobody who has great
authority can be trusted not to go beyond its proper limits." Social apathy, passivity and indifference and
neglect have spawned in secret a dark force that is bent on destroying the values held sacred by freedomloving people.
To assert our proper place in the civilized world, it is imperative that public officials should regard public
service as a reflection of human Ideals in which the highest sense of moral values and integrity are strictly
required.
A tragedy like that which happened on August 21, 1983, and the crisis that followed, would have normally
caused the resignation of the Chief of the Armed Forces in a country where public office is viewed with
highest esteem and respect and where the moral responsibilities of public officials transcend all other
considerations.
It is equally the fact that the then President through all his recorded public acts and statements from the beginning disdained and
rejected his own Board's above findings and insisted on the military version of Galman being Ninoy's assassin. In upholding this

view that "there is no involvement of anyone in his government in the assassination," he told David Briscoe (then AP Manila
Bureau Chief in a Radio-TV interview on September 9, 1983 that "I am convinced that if any member of my government were
involved, I would have known somehow ... Even at a fairly low level, I would have known. I know how they think. I know what
they are thinking of." 7 He told CBS in another interview in May, 1984 (as his Fact Finding Board was holding its hearings) the
following:
CBS: But indeed there has been recent evidence that seems to contradict earlier reports,
namely, the recent evidence seems to indicate that some of the guards may have been
responsible (for shooting Ninoy).
MARCOS: Well, you are of course wrong. What you have been reading are the
newspapers and the newspaper reports have been biased. The evidence still proves that
Galman was the killer. The evidence also shows that there were intelligence reports
connecting the communist party to the killing. 8
In his reply of October 25, 1984 to General Ver's letter of the same date going on leave of absence upon release of the Board's
majority report implicating him, he wrote that "(W)e are even more aware, general, that the circumstances under which the board
has chosen to implicate you in its findings are fraught with doubt and great contradictions of opinion and testimony. And we are
deeply disturbed that on the basis of so-called evidence, you have been so accused by some members of the Board," and extended
"My very best wishes to you and your family for a speedy resolution of your case," 9 even as he announced that he would return
the general to his position as AFP Chief "if he is acquitted by the Sandiganbayan." In an interview on June 4, 1985 with the
Gamma Photo Agency, as respondent court was hearing the cases, he was quoted as saying that "as will probably be shown, those
witnesses (against the accused) are perjured witnesses." 10
It was against this setting that on November 11, 1985 petitioners Saturnina Galman and Reynaldo Galman, mother and son,
respectively, of the late Rolando Galman, and twenty-nine (29) other petitioners, composed of three former Justices of this Court,
five incumbent and former university presidents, a former AFP Chief of Staff, outstanding members of the Philippine Bar and
solid citizens of the community, filed the present action alleging that respondents Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed
serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of
the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law. They asserted that the Tanodbayan did not
represent the interest of the people when he failed to exert genuine and earnest efforts to present vital and important testimonial
and documentary evidence for the prosecution and that the Sandiganbayan Justices were biased, prejudiced and partial in favor of
the accused, and that their acts "clouded with the gravest doubts the sincerity of government to find out the truth about the
Aquino assassination." Petitioners prayed for the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order restraining the respondent
Sandiganbayan from rendering a decision on the merits in the pending criminal cases which it had scheduled on November 20,
1985 and that judgment be rendered declaring a mistrial and nullifying the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a
re-trial before an impartial tribunal by an unbiased prosecutor. 10-a
At the hearing on November 18, 1985 of petitioners' prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent
court from rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the
restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments
and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution as filed in the
Sandiganbayan, the signature page of which alone had been submitted to the Court as Annex 5 of his comment.
But ten days later on November 28, 1985, the Court by the same nine-to- two-vote ratio in reverse, 12 resolved to dismiss the
petition and to lift the temporary restraining order issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its
decision. 13 The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent
Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on them and which they alleged was "very
material to the question of his partiality, bias and prejudice" within which to file a consolidated reply thereto and to respondents'
separate comments, by an eight-to-three vote, with Justice Gutierrez joining the dissenters. 14
On November 29, 1985, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal ground
for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits because if the charge of partiality and bias against
the respondents and suppression of vital evidence by the prosecution are proven, the petitioners would be entitled to the reliefs
demanded: The People are entitled to due process which requires an impartial tribunal and an unbiased prosecutor. If the State is
deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and convict because certain material evidence is suppressed by the prosecution and the
tribunal is not impartial, then the entire proceedings would be null and void. Petitioners prayed that the Sandiganbayan be
restrained from promulgating their decision as scheduled anew on December 2, 1985.
On December 5, 1985, the Court required the respondents to comment on the motion for reconsideration but issued no restraining
order. Thus, on December 2, 1985, as scheduled, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the
crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. This marked another unusual first in that
respondent Sandiganbayan in effect convicted the very victim Rolando Galman (who was not on trial) as the assassin of Ninoy
contrary to the very information and evidence submitted by the prosecution. In opposition, respondents submitted that with the
Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. On February 4, 1986, the same Court
majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, with the writer and Justice Abad Santos maintaining our
dissent.
On March 20, 1986, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration attached therewith. The thrust
of the second motion for reconsideration was the startling and theretofore unknown revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel
Herrera as reported in the March 6, 1986 issue of the Manila Times entitled "Aquino Trial a Sham," that the then President had

ordered the respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez and the prosecution panel headed by Herrera to
whitewash the criminal cases against the 26 respondents accused and produce a verdict of acquittal.
On April 3, 1986, the Court granted the motion to admit the second motion for reconsideration and ordered the respondents to
comment thereon. 15
Respondent Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez stated in his Manifestation filed on April 11, 1986 that he had ceased to hold office
as Tanodbayan as of April 8, 1986 when he was replaced by the new Tanodbayan, Raul M. Gonzales, but reiterating his position
in his comment on the petition, he added "relative to the reported alleged revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera,
herein respondent never succumbed to any alleged attempts to influence his actuations in the premises, having instead
successfully resisted perceived attempts to exert pressure to drop the case after preliminary investigation, and actually ordered
the filing and prosecution of the two (2) murder cases below against herein private party respondents." He candidly admitted also
in his memorandum: "There is not much that need be said about the existence of pressure. That there were pressures can hardly
be denied; in fact, it has never been denied." 15-a He submitted that "even as he vehemently denies insinuations of any direct or
indirect complicity or participation in any alleged attempt to supposedly whitewash the cases below, . . . should this Honorable
Court find sufficient cause to justify the reopening and retrial of the cases below, he would welcome such development so that
any wrong that had been caused may be righted and so that, at the very least the actuations of herein respondent in the premises
may be reviewed and reexamined, confident as he is that the end will show that he had done nothing in the premises that violated
his trust as Tanodbayan (Ombudsman)." New Tanodbayan Raul M. Gonzales in his comment of April 14, 1986 "interposed no
objection to the reopening of the trial of the cases . . . as, in fact, he urged that the said cases be reopened in order that justice
could take its course."
Respondents Justices of the Sandiganbayan First Division in their collective comment of April 9, 1986 stated that the trial of the
criminal cases by them was valid and regular and decided on the basis of evidence presented and the law applicable, but
manifested that "if it is true that the former Tanodbayan and the Deputy Tanodbayan, Chief of the Prosecution Panel, were
pressured into suppressing vital evidence which would probably alter the result of the trial, Answering Respondents would not
interpose any objection to the reopening of those cases, if only to allow justice to take its course." Respondent Sandiganbayan
Justice Bienvenido C. Vera Cruz, in a separate comment, asserted that he passed no note to anyone; the note being bandied about
is not in his handwriting; he had nothing to do with the writing of the note or of any note of any kind intended for any lawyer of
the defense or even of the prosecution; and requested for an investigation by this Court to settle the note passing issue once and
for all.
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, in his comment of April 14, 1986 affirmed the allegations in the second motion for
reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to
whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. He amplified his revelations, as follows:
1. AB INITIO, A. VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL!
Incidents during the preliminary investigation showed ominous signs that the fate of the criminal case on the
death of Ex-Senator Benigno Aquino and Rolando Galman on August 21, 1983 was doomed to an
ignominous end. Malacanang wanted dismissal-to the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the
Investigating Panel (composed of the undersigned, Fiscals Ernesto Bernabe and Leonardo Tamayo) for
signature. This, of course, was resisted by the panel, and a resolution charging all the respondents as
principals was forwarded to the Tanodbayan on January 10, 1985.
2. MALACAANG CONFERENCE PLANNED SCENARIO OF TRIAL
At 6:00 p.m. of said date (January 10) Mr. Ferdinand E. Marcos (the former President) summoned to
Malacaang Justice Bernardo Fernandez (the Tanodbayan), Sandiganbayan Justice Manuel Pamaran (the
Presiding Justice) and an the members of the Panel
Also present at the meeting were Justice Manuel Lazaro (the Coordinator) and Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, who
left earlier, came back and left again. The former President had a copy of the panel's signed resolution
(charging all accused as principals), evidently furnished him in advance, and with prepared notes on the
contents thereof.
The former President started by vehemently maintaining that Galman shot Aquino at the tarmac. Albeit
initially the undersigned argued against the theory, to remain silent was the more discreet posture when the
former President became emotional (he was quite sick then).
During a good part of the conference, the former President talked about Aquino and the communists,
lambasting the Agrava Board, specially the Legal Panel. Shifting to the military he rumbled on such
statements as: "It will be bloody . . . Gen. Ramos, though close to me, is getting ambitious and poor Johnny
does not know what to do". . . 'our understanding with Gen. Ramos is that his stint is only temporary, but he
is becoming ambitious "the boys were frantic when they heard that they will be charged in court, and wig be
detained at city jail."
From outright dismissal, the sentiment veered towards a more pragmatic approach. The former President
more or less conceded that for political and legal reasons all the respondents should be charged in court,
Politically, as it will become evident that the government was serious in pursuing the case towards its logical
conclusion, and thereby ease public demonstrations; on the other hand, legally, it was perceived that after
(not IF) they are acquitted, double jeopardy would inure. The former President ordered then that the
resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each respondent.

In the matter of custody of the accused pendente lite the Coordinator was ordered to get in touch with Gen.
Narciso Cabrera, Gen. Vicente Eduardo and Director Jolly Bugarin to put on record that they had no place in
their respective institutions. The existence of PD No. 1950 (giving custody to commanding officers of
members of AFP charged in court) was never mentioned.
It was decided that the presiding justice (First Division) would personally handle the trial, and assurance was
made by him that it would be finished in four to six months, pointing out that, with the recent effectivity of
the New Rules on Criminal Procedure, the trial could be expedited.
Towards the end of the two-hour meeting and after the script had been tacitly mapped out, the former
President uttered: "Mag moro-moro na lang kayo."
The parting words of the former President were: "Thank you for your cooperation. I know how to
reciprocate."
While still in the palace grounds on the way out, the undersigned manifested his desire to the Tanodbayan to
resign from the panel, or even the office. This, as well as other moves to this effect, had always been refused.
Hoping that with sufficient evidence sincerely and efficiently presented by the prosecution, all involves in the
trial would be conscience-pricked and realize the futility and injustice of proceeding in accordance with the
script, the undersigned opted to say on.
Herrera further added details on the "implementation of the script," such as the holding of a "make-believe raffle" within 18
minutes of the filing of the Informations with the Sandiganbayan at noon of January 23, 1985, while there were no members of
the media; the installation of TV monitors directly beamed to Malacanang; the installation of a "war room" occupied by the
military; attempts to direct and stifle witnesses for the prosecution; the suppression of the evidence that could be given by U.S.
Airforce men about the "scrambling" of Ninoy's plane; the suppression of rebuttal witnesses and the bias and partiality of the
Sandiganbayan; its cavalier disregard of his plea that it "should not decide these cases on the merits without first making a final
ruling on the Motion for Inhibition;" and the Presiding Justice's over-kill with the declaration that "the Court finds all accused
innocent of the crimes charged in the two informations, and accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil liability," adding
that "in the almost twenty years that the undersigned has been the prosecutor in the sala of the Presiding Justice this is the only
occasion where civil liability is pronounced in a decision of acquittal. " He "associated himself with the motion for
reconsideration and likewise prayed that the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan and its decision be declared null and void."
New Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoez' comment of April 25, 1986 submitted that a declaration of mistrial will depend on the
veracity of the evidence supportive of petitioners' claim of suppression of evidence and collusion. He submitted that this would
require reception of evidence by a Court-appointed or designated commissioner or body of commissioners (as was done in G.R.
No. 71316, Fr. Romano case; and G.R. No. 61016, Morales case; and G.R. No. 70054, Banco Filipino case); and that if
petitioners' claim were substantiated, a reopening of the double murder case is proper to avoid a miscarriage of justice since the
verdict of acquittal would no longer be a valid basis for a double jeopardy claim.
Respondents-accused opposed the second motion for reconsideration and prayed for its denial. Respondent Olivas contended that
the proper step for the government was to file a direct action to annul the judgment of acquittal and at a regular trial present its
evidence of collusion and pressures.
As a whole, all the other respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy, and invoked that the issues had become moot and
academic because of the rendition of the Sandiganbayan's judgment of acquittal of all respondents- accused on December 2,
1985, with counsels for respondents Ver and Tigas, as well as Olivas, further arguing that assuming that the judgment of acquittal
is void for any reason, the remedy is a direct action to annul the judgment where the burden of proof falls upon the plaintiff to
establish by clear, competent and convincing evidence the cause of the nullity.
After Petitioners had filed their consolidated reply, the Court resolved per its resolution of June 5, 1986 to appoint a threemember commission composed of retired Supreme Court Justice Conrado Vasquez, chairman, and retired Intermediate Appellate
Court Justices Milagros German and Eduardo Caguioa as members, to hear and receive evidence, testimonial and documentary,
of the charges of collusion and pressures and relevant matters, upon prior notice to all parties, and to submit their findings to this
Court for proper disposition. The Commission conducted hearings on 19 days, starting on June 16, 1986 and ending on July 16,
1986, On the said last day, respondents announced in open hearing that they decided to forego the taking of the projected
deposition of former President Marcos, as his testimony would be merely corroborative of the testimonies of respondents Justice
Pamaran and Tanodbayan Fernandez. On July 31, 1986, it submitted its extensive 64-page Report 16 wherein it discussed fully the
evidence received by it and made a recapitulation of its findings in capsulized form, as follows:
1. The Office of the Tanodbayan, particularly Justice Fernandez and the Special Investigating Panel
composed of Justice Herrera, Fiscal Bernabe and Special Prosecutor Tamayo, was originally of the view that
all of the twenty-six (26) respondents named in the Agrava Board majority report should all be charged as
principals of the crime of double murder for the death of Senator Benigno Aquino and Rolando Galman.
2. When Malacanang learned of the impending filing of the said charge before the Sandiganbayan, the
Special Investigating Panel having already prepared a draft Resolution recommending such course of action,
President Marcos summoned Justice Fernandez, the tree members of the Special Investigating Panel, and
justice Pamaran to a conference in Malacanang in the early evening of January 10, 1985.
3. In said conference, President Marcos initially expressed his disagreement with the recommendation of the
Special Investigating Panel and disputed the findings of the Agrava Board that it was not Galman who shot
Benigno Aquino.

4. Later in the conference, however, President Marcos was convinced of the advisability of filing the murder
charge in court so that, after being acquitted as planned, the accused may no longer be prosecuted in view of
the doctrine of double jeopardy.
5. Presumably in order to be assured that not all of the accused would be denied bail during the trial,
considering that they would be charged with capital offenses, President Marcos directed that the several
accused be "categorized" so that some of them would merely be charged as accomplices and accessories.
6. In addition to said directive, President Marcos ordered that the case be handled personally by Justice
Pamaran who should dispose of it in the earliest possible time.
7. The instructions given in the Malacanang conference were followed to the letter; and compliance therewith
manifested itself in several specific instances in the course of the proceedings, such as, the changing of the
resolution of the special investigating panel, the filing of the case with the Sandiganbayan and its assignment
to Justice Pamaran, suppression of some vital evidence, harassment of witnesses, recantation of witneses who
gave adverse testimony before the Agrava Board, coaching of defense counsels, the hasty trial, monitoring of
proceedings, and even in the very decision rendered in the case.
8. That that expression of President Marcos' desire as to how he wanted the Aquino-Galman case to be
handled and disposed of constituted sufficient pressure on those involved in said task to comply with the
same in the subsequent course of the proceedings.
9. That while Justice Pamaran and Justice Fernandez manifested no revulsion against complying with the
Malacaang directive, justice Herrera played his role with manifestly ambivalent feelings.
10. Sufficient evidence has been ventilated to show a scripted and pre-determined manner of handling and
disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case, as stage-managed from Malacaang and performed by
willing dramatis personnae as well as by recalcitrant ones whipped into line by the omnipresent influence of
an authoritarian ruler.
The Commission submitted the following recommendation.
Considering the existence of adequate credible evidence showing that the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman
case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which
proved to be beyond their capacity to resist, and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate
its position and to offer all the evidences which it could have otherwise presented, but also predetermined the
final outcome of the case, the Commission is of the considered thinking and belief, subject to the better
opinion and judgment of this Honorable Court that the proceedings in the said case have been vitiated by lack
of due process, and hereby respectfully recommends that the prayer in the petition for a declaration of a
mistrial in Sandiganbayan Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled "People vs. Luther Custodia et al.," be
granted.
The Court per its Resolution of July 31, 1986 furnished all the parties with copies of the Report and required them to submit their
objections thereto. It thereafter heard the parties and their objections at the hearing of August 26, 1986 and the matter was
submitted for the Court's resolution.
The Court adopts and approves the Report and its findings and holds on the basis thereof and of the evidence received and
appreciated by the Commission and duly supported by the facts of public record and knowledge set forth above and hereinafter,
that the then President (code named Olympus) had stage-managed in and from Malacanang Palace "a scripted and pre-determined
manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino Galman case and
the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their
capacity to resist', and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences which
it could have otherwise presented, but also pre-determined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the twenty-six
respondents accused of all criminal and civil liability.
The Court finds that the Commission's Report (incorporated herein by reference) and findings and conclusions are duly
substantiated by the evidence and facts of public record. Composed of distinguished members of proven integrity with a
combined total of 141 years of experience in the practice of law (55 years) and in the prosecutoral and judicial services (86 years
in the trial and appellate courts), experts at sifting the chaff from the grain, 17 the Commission properly appraised the evidences
presented and denials made by public respondents, thus:
The desire of President Marcos to have the Aquino-Galman case disposed of in a manner suitable to his
purposes was quite understandable and was but to be expected. The case had stirred unprecedented public
outcry and wide international attention. Not invariably, the finger of suspicion pointed to those then in power
who supposedly had the means and the most compelling motive to eliminate Senator Aquino. A day or so
after the assassination, President Marcos came up with a public statement aired over television that Senator
Aquino was killed not by his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of
wonder that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his announced
theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his administration of any suspected guilty
participation in the assassination.
The calling of the conference was undoubtedly to accomplish this purpose. . . .
President Marcos made no bones to conceal his purpose for calling them. From the start, he expressed
irritation and displeasure at the recommendation of the investigating panel to charge all of the twenty-six (26)
respondents as principals of the crime of double murder. He insisted that it was Galman who shot Senator

Aquino, and that the findings of the Agrava Board were not supported by evidence that could stand in court.
He discussed and argued with Justice Herrera on this point. Midway in the course of the discussion, mention
was made that the filing of the charge in court would at least mollify public demands and possibly prevent
further street demonstrations. It was further pointed out that such a procedure would be a better arrangement
because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the
doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other witnesses shall appear when
President Marcos is no longer in office.
xxx xxx xxx
After an agreement was reached as to filing the case, instead of dismissing it, but with some of the accused to
be charged merely as accomplices or accessories, and the question of preventive custody of the accused
having thereby received satisfactory solution, President Marcos took up the matter of who would try the case
and how long it would take to be finished.
According to Justice Herrera, President Marcos told Justice Pamaran 'point blank' to personally handle the
case. This was denied by Justice Pamaran. No similar denial was voiced by Justice Fernandez in the entire
course of his two-day testimony. Justice Pamaran explained that such order could not have been given
inasmuch as it was not yet certain then that the Sandiganbayan would try the case and, besides, cases therein
are assigned by raffle to a division and not to a particular Justice thereof.
It was preposterous to expect Justice Pamaran to admit having received such presidential directive. His
denial, however, falls to pieces in the light of the fact that the case was indeed handled by him after being
assigned to the division headed by him. A supposition of mere coincidence is at once dispelled by the
circumstance that he was the only one from the Sandiganbayan called to the Malacanang conference wherein
the said directive was given. . . .
The giving of such directive to Justice Pamaran may also be inferred from his admission that he gave
President Marcos the possible time frame when asked as to how long it would take him to finish the case.
The testimony of Justice Herrera that, during the conference, and after an agreement was reached on filing the
case and subsequently acquitting the accused, President Marcos told them "Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang
kayo;" and that on their way out of the room President Marcos expressed his thanks to the group and
uttered "I know how to reciprocate," did not receive any denial or contradiction either on the part of justice
Fernandez or justice Pamaran. (No other person present in the conference was presented by the respondents.
Despite an earlier manifestation by the respondents of their intention to present Fiscal Bernabe and
Prosecutor Tamayo, such move was abandoned without any reason having been given therefor.)
The facts set forth above are all supported by the evidence on record. In the mind of the Commission, the
only conclusion that may be drawn therefrom is that pressure from Malacanang had indeed been made to bear
on both the court and the prosecution in the handling and disposition of the Aquino-Galman case. The
intensity of this pressure is readily deductible from the personality of the one who exerted it, his moral and
official ascendancy over those to whom his instructions were directed, the motivation behind such
instructions, and the nature of the government prevailing at that time which enabled, the then head of state to
exercise authoritarian powers. That the conference called to script or stage-manage the prosecution and
trial of the Aquino-Galman case was considered as something anomalous that should be kept away from the
public eye is shown by the effort to assure its secrecy.None but those directly involved were caned to attend.
The meeting was held in an inner room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant
Justice Lazaro were with the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the room
where the meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to see
the President. Actually,no public mention alas ever made of this conference until Justice Herrera made his
expose some fifteen (15) months later when the former president was no longer around.
President Marcos undoubtedly realized the importance of the matter he wanted to take up with the officials he
asked to be summoned. He had to do it personally, and not merely through trusted assistants. The lack of will
or determination on the part of Justice Fernandez and Justice Pamaran to resist the presidential summons
despite their realization of its unwholesome implications on their handling of the celebrated murder case may
be easily inferred from their unquestioned obedience thereto. No effort to resist was made, despite the
existence of a most valid reason to beg off, on the lame excuses that they went there out of "curiosity," or
"out of respect to the Office of the President," or that it would be 'unbecoming to refuse a summons from the
President.' Such frame of mind only reveals their susceptibility to presidential pressure and lack of capacity to
resist the same. The very acts of being summoned to Malacanang and their ready acquiescence thereto under
the circumstances then obtaining, are in themselves pressure dramatized and exemplified Their abject
deference to President Marcos may likewise be inferred from the admitted fact that, not having been given
seats during the two-hour conference (Justice Fernandez said it was not that long, but did not say how long)
in which President Marcos did the talking most of the time, they listened to him on their feet. Verily, it can be
said that any avowal of independent action or resistance to presidential pressure became illusory from the
very moment they stepped inside Malacanang Palace on January 10, 1985.18
The Commission pinpointed the crucial factual issue thus: "the more significant inquiry is on whether the Sandiganbayan and the
Office of the Tanodbayan actually succumbed to such pressure, as may be gauged by their subsequent actuations in their

respective handling of the case." It duly concluded that "the pressure exerted by President Marcos in the conference held on
January 10, 1985 pervaded the entire proceedings of the Aquino Galman [murder] cases" as manifested in several specific
incidents and instances it enumerated in the Report under the heading of "Manifestations of Pressure and Manipulation."
Suffice it to give hereinbelow brief excerpts:
1. The changing of the original Herrera panel draft Resolution charging all the twenty-six accused as principals by conspiracy by
categorizing and charging 17 as principals, Generals Ver and Olivas and 6 others as accessories and the civilian as accomplice,
and recommending bail for the latter two categories: "The categorization may not be completely justified by saying that, in the
mind of Justice Fernandez, there was no sufficient evidence to justify that all of the accused be charged as principals. The
majority of the Agrava Board found the existence of conspiracy and recommended that all of the accused be charged accordingly.
Without going into the merit of such finding, it may hardly be disputed that, in case of doubt, and in accordance with the standard
practice of the prosecution to charge accused with the most serious possible offense or in the highest category so as to prevent an
incurable injustice in the event that the evidence presented in the trial will show his guilt of the graver charge, the most logical
and practical course of action should have been, as originally recommended by the Herrera panel, to charge all the accused as
principals. As it turned out, Justice Fernandez readily opted for categorization which, not surprisingly, was in consonance with
the Malacaang instruction." It is too much to attribute to coincidence that such unusual categorization came only after the then
President's instruction at Malacanang when Gen. Ver's counsel, Atty. Coronel, had been asking the same of Tanodbayan
Fernandez since November, 1984; and "Justice Fernandez himself, admit(ted) that, as of that time, [the Malacanang conference
on January 10, 1985], his own view was in conformity with that of the Special Investigating Panel to charge all of the twenty-six
(26) respondents as principals of the crime of double murder." 19 As the Commission further noted, "Justice Fernandez never
denied the claim of Justice Herrera that the draft resolution of January 10, 1985 (Exhibit 'B-1') [charging all 26 accused as
principals] was to have been the subject of a press conference on the afternoon of said date which did not go through due to the
summons for them to go to Malacanang in the early evening of said date." 20
2. Suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses:" Realizing, no doubt, that a party's case is as strong as the evidence
it can present, unmistakable and persistent efforts were exerted in behalf of the accused to weaken the case of the prosecution and
thereby assure and justify [the accused's] eventual scripted acquittal. Unfavorable evidences were sought to be suppressed, and
some were indeed prevented from being ventilated. Adverse witnesses were harassed, cajoled, perjured or threatened either to
refrain from testifying or to testify in a manner favorable to the defense."
The Report specified the ordeals of the prosecution witnesses: 21 Cesar Loterina, PAL employee, Roberta Masibay, Galman's
step-daughter who recanted their testimonies before the Fact Finding Board and had to be discarded as prosecution witnesses
before at the trial. Witnesses Viesca andRaas who also testified before the Board "disappeared all of a sudden and could not be
located by the police. The Commission narrated the efforts to stifle Kiyoshi Wakamiya eyewitness who accompanied Ninoy on
his fateful flight on August 21, 1983 and described them as "palpable, if crude and display(ing) sheer abuse of power."
Wakamiya was not even allowed to return to Manila on August 20, 1984 to participate in the first death anniversary of Ninoy but
was deported as an undesirable alien and had to leave on the next plane for Tokyo. The Board had to go to Tokyo to hear
Wakamiya give his testimony before the Japanese police in accordance with their law and Wakamiya claimed before the
Commission that the English transcription of his testimony, as prepared by an official of the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, was
inaccurate and did not correctly reflect the testimony he gave "although there was no clear showing of the discrepancy from the
original transcription which was in Nippongo. Upon his arrival at the MIA on August 21, 1985 on invitation of Justice Herrera to
testify at the ongoing trial, "a shot was fired and a soldier was seen running away by media men who sought to protect Wakamiya
from harm by surrounding him." Wakamiya was forced by immigration officials to leave the country by Saturday (August 24th)
notwithstanding Herrera's request to let him stay until he could testify the following Monday (August 26th). In the case of
principal eyewitness Rebecca Quijano, the Commission reported that
... Undoubtedly in view of the considerable significance of her proposed testimony and its unfavorable effect
on the cause of the defense, the efforts exerted to suppress the same was as much as, if not more than those in
the case of Wakamiya. ... She recounted that she was in constant fear of her life, having been hunted by
armed men; that their house in Tabaco, Albay was ransacked, her family harassed by the foreclosure of the
mortgage on their house by the local Rural Bank, and ejected therefrom when she ignored the request of its
manager to talk with her about her proposed testimony; that a certain William Farias offered her plane
tickets for a trip abroad; that Mayor Rudy Farias of Laoag City kept on calling her sister in the United States
to warn her not to testify; that, later, Rudy and William Farias offered her two million pesos supposedly
coming from Bongbong Marcos, a house and lot in Baguio, the dropping of her estafa case in Hongkong, and
the punishment of the persons responsible for the death of her father, if she would refrain from testifying.
It is a matter of record, however, that despite such cajolery and harassments, or perhaps because of them, Ms.
Quijano eventually testified before the Sandiganbayan. Justice Herrera was told by justice Fernandez of the
displeasure expressed by Olympus at justice Herrera's going out of his way to make Ms. Quijano to testify,
and for his refusal to honor the invitation to attend the birthday party of the First Lady on May 1, 1985, as on
the eve of Ms. Quijano's testimony on May 2, 1985. The insiduous attempts to tamper with her testimony,
however, did not end with her taking the witness stand. In the course of her testimony several notes were
passed to Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez, the defense counsel who cross-examined her, one of which suggested that
she be asked more questions about Dean Narvasa who was suspected of having coached her as to what to
declare (Exhibit "D"); and on another occasion, at a crucial point in her testimony, a power brownout
occurred; which lasted for about twenty minutes, throwing the courtroom into darkness, and making most of

those present to scamper for safety, and Ms. Quijano to pass over the railing of the rostrum so as to be able to
leave the courtroom. It was verified that the brownout was limited to the building housing the
Sandiganbayan, it not having affected the nearby Manila City Hall and the Finance Building. Justice Herrera
declared that the main switchboard of the Sandiganbayan electrical system was located beside the room
occupied by Malacaang people who were keeping track of the proceedings.
Atty. Lupino Lazaro for petitioners further made of record at that August 26th hearing that the two Olivas sisters, Ana and
Catherine (hospitality girls) disappeared on September 4, 1984, two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. And the informant, by the
name of Evelyn (also a hospitality girl) who jotted down the number of the car that took them away, also disappeared. On
January 29, 1984, during the proceedings of the Board, Lina Galman, the common-law wife of Rolando Galman, was kidnapped
together with a neighbor named Rogelio Taruc, They have been missing since then, despite his attempts to find any of them.
According to him, "nobody was looking for these five persons because they said Marcos was in Power [despite his appeal to the
Minister of National Defense to locate them]. Today, still no one is looking for these people." And he appealed to the new
leadership for its assistance in learning their fate.
3. The discarding of the affidavits executed by U.S. airmen "While it is true that the U.S. airmen's proposed testimonies would
show an attempt of the Philippine Air Force to divert the plane to Basa Airfield or some other place, such showing would not
necessarily contravene the theory of the prosecution, nor the actual fact that Senator Aquino was killed at the Manila
International Airport. Justice Herrera had accurately pointed out that such attempt of scrambling Aquino's plane merely showed a
'wider range of conspiracy,' it being possibly just one of two or three other plans designed to accomplish the same purpose of
liquidating Senator Aquino. In any event, even assuming that the said piece of evidence could go either way, it may not be
successfully contended that it was prudent or wise on the part of the prosecution to totally discard the said piece of evidence.
Despite minor inconsistencies contained therein, its introduction could have helped the cause of the prosecution. If it were not so,
or that it would even favor the defense, as averred by Justice Fernandez, the determined effort to suppress the same would have
been totally uncalled for."
4. Nine proposed rebuttal witnesses not presented.
5. The failure to exhaust available remedies against adverse developments: "When the Supreme Court denied the petition of
Justice Fernandez [against the exclusion of the testimonies given by the military respondents headed by Gen. Ver before the Fact
Finding Board], the latter almost immediately announced to media that he was not filing a motion for the reconsideration of said
denial for the reason that it would be futile to do so and foolhardy to expect a favorable action on the same. ... His posture ... is, in
the least, indicative that he was living up to the instruction of finishing the trial of the case as soon as possible, if not of
something else."
6. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran: "Justice Herrera testified that President Marcos ordered Justice
Pamaran point-blank to handle the case. The pro-forma denial by Justice Pamaran of such instruction crumbles under the
actuality of such directive having been complied with to the letter. ...
"Justice Pamaran sought to discredit the claim that he was ordered by President Marcos to handle the case personally by
explaining that cases in the Sandiganbayan are assigned by raffle and not to a particular Justice, but to a division thereof. The
evidence before the Comission on how the case happened to be assigned to Justice Pamaran evinces a strong indication that such
assignment was not done fairly or regularly.
"There was no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of
Justice Pamaran. ... Despite an announcement that Justice Escareal would be presented by the respondents to testify on the
contents of his aforesaid Memorandum, such was not done. No reason was given why Justice Escarel could not, or would not like
to testify. Neither was any one of the officials or employees of the Sandiganbayan who, according to Justice Pamaran, were
present during the supposed raffle, presented to corroborate the claim of Justice
xxx xxx xxx
"It is also an admitted fact that the two Informations in the double murder case were filed by Justice Herrera on January 23, 1985,
at 12:02 p.m., and the members of the Raffle Committee were summoned at 12:20 p.m. or only 18 minutes after the filing of the
two Informations. Such speed in the actual assignment of the case can truly be categorized as unusual, if not extraordinary,
considering that before a case filed may be included in the raffle, there is need for a certain amount of paper work to be
undertaken. If such preliminary requirements were done in this case within the limited time available therefor, the charge that the
raffle was rushed to avoid the presence of media people would ring with truth.
What is more intriguing is the fact that although a raffle might have been actually conducted which resulted in the assignment of
the case to the First Division of the Sandiganbayan, the Commission did not receive any evidence on how or why it was handled
personally by Justice Pamaran who wrote the decision thereof, and not by any one of the two other members of his division. . . .
7. The custody of the accused their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail: "When the question of custody
came up after the case was filed in the Sandiganbayan, the latter issued an order directing the confinement of the accused in the
City Jail of Manila. This order was not carried out in view of the information given by the Warden of the City Jail that there was
no space for the twenty-six accused in said jail. The same information was given when the custody was proposed to be given to
the National Penitentiary in Muntinglupa and to the National Bureau of Investigation. At that point, the defense came up with
Presidential Decree No. 1950A which authorizes the custody of the accused military personnel with their respective
Commanding Officers. Justice Herrera claimed that the said Presidential Decree was not known even to the Tanodbayan Justice
Fernandez who had to call up the then Minister of Justice Estelito Mendoza to request a copy of the same, and was given such
copy only after sometime. ..."

8. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacaang and by Malacaang personnel: "There is
an uncontradicted evidence that the progress of the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan as well as the developments of the case
outside the Court had been monitored by Malacaang presumably for it to know what was happening and to take remedial
measures as may be necessary. Justice Pamaran had candidly admitted that television cameras "boldly carrying the label of
'Office of the President of the Philippines' " were installed in the courtroom for that purpose. There was a room in the
Sandiganbayan, mischievously caned 'war room', wherein military and Malacaang personnel stayed to keep track of the
proceedings." the close monitoring by Malacaang showed its results on several occasions specified in the Report. Malacaang
was immediately aware of the Japanese witness Wakamiya's presence injustice Herrera's office on August 21, 1985 and
forestalled the giving of his testimony by having the Japanese Embassy advise Wakamiya to leave the country at once.
Likewise, Col. Balbino Diego, Malacaang intelligence chief, suddenly appeared at the National Bureau of Investigation office
when the "crying lady" Rebecca Quijano was brought there by NBI agents for interrogation and therein sought to obtain custody
of her. "It is likewise an undisputed fact," the Commission noted "that several military personnel pretended to be deputy sheriffs
of the Sandiganbayan and attended the trials thereof in the prescribed deputy sheriffs' uniforms." The Commission's inescapable
finding. " It is abundantly clear that President Marcos did not only give instructions as to how the case should be handled He
saw to it that he would know if his instructions will be complied with."
9. Partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: "That President Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be
acquitted may not be denied. The disposal of the case in said manner is an integral part of the scenario which was cleverly
designed to accomplish two principal objectives, seemingly conflicting in themselves, but favorable both to then administration
and to the accused; to wit, [1] the satisfaction of the public clamor for the suspected killers of Senator Aquino to be charged in
court, and [2] the foreclosure of any possibility that they may again be prosecuted for the same offense in the event that President
Marcos shall no longer be in power.
"In rendering its decision the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor
of the accused was glaringly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded. ... It was
deemed not sufficient to simply acquit all of the twenty-six accused on thestandard ground that their guilt had not been proven
beyond reasonable doubt, as was the most logical and appropriate way of justifying the acquittal in the case, there not being a
total absence of evidence that could show guilt on the part of the accused. The decision had to pronounce them 'innocent of the
crime charged on the two informations, and accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil liability.' It is a rare phenomenon
to see a person accused of a crime to be favored with such total absolution. ...
Doubt on the soundness of the decision entertained by one of the two justices who concurred with the majority decision penned
by Justice Pamaran was revealed by Justice Herrera who testified that in October, 1985, when the decision was being
prepared, Justice Agusto Amores told him that he was of the view that some of the accused should be convicted he having found
difficulty in acquitting all of them; however, he confided to Justice Herrera that Justice Pamaran made it clear to him and
Justice Vera Cruz that Malacaang had instructions to acquit all of the twenty-six accused (TSN, July 17, 1986, p. 49). Justice
Amores also told Justice Herrera that he would confirm this statement (which was mentioned in Justice Herrera's comment to the
Second Motion for Reconsideration) if asked about it (TSN, June 19, 1986, pp. 92-93). This testimony Justice Herrera remained
unrebutted " (Emphasis supplied)
The record shows suffocatingly that from beginning to end, the then President used, or more precisely, misused the
overwhelming resources of the government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in
the Aquino-Galman murder cases. As graphically depicted in the Report, supra, and borne out by the happenings (res ipsa
loquitur 22) since the resolution prepared by his "Coordinator," Manuel Lazaro, his Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, for the
Tanodbayan's dismissal of the cases against all accused was unpalatable (it would summon the demonstrators back to the
streets 23 ) and at any rate was not acceptable to the Herrera prosecution panel, the unholy scenario for acquittal of all 26 accused
after the rigged trial as ordered at the Malacanang conference, would accomplish the two principal objectives of satisfaction of
the public clamor for the suspected killers to be charged in court and of giving them through their acquittal the legal shield of
double jeopardy. 24
Indeed, the secret Malacanang conference at which the authoritarian President called together the Presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Fernandez and the entire prosecution panel headed by Deputy Tanodbayan Herrera and told
them how to handle and rig (moro-moro) the trial and the close monitoring of the entire proceedings to assure the pre-determined
ignominious final outcome are without parallel and precedent in our annals and jurisprudence. To borrow a phrase from Ninoy's
April 14, 1975 letter withdrawing his petition for habeas corpus, 25 "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal
Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case
or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice." 26 His obsession for "the boys' " acquittal led to
severalfirst which would otherwise be inexplicable:
1. He turned his back on and repudiated the findings of the very Fact Finding Board that he himself appointed to investigate the
"national tragedy and national shame" of the "treacherous and vicious assassination of Ninoy Aquino and "to ventilate the truth
through free, independent and dispassionate investigation by prestigious and free investigators."
2. He cordially received the chairman with her minority report one day ahead of the four majority members and instantly referred
it to respondents "for final resolution through the legal system" as if it were the majority and controlling report; and rebuked the
four majority members when they presented to him the next day their report calling for the indictment of all 26 respondents
headed by Gens. Ver and Olivas (instead of the lesser seven under the chairman's minority report).
3. From the day after the Aquino assassination to the dictated verdict of acquittal, he totally disregarded the Board's majority and
minority findings of fact and publicly insisted that the military's "fall guy" Rolando Galman was the killer of Ninoy Aquino and

sought futilely to justify the soldiers' incompetence and gross negligence to provide any security for Ninoy in contrast to their
alacrity in gunning down the alleged assassin Galman and searing his lips.
4. The Sandiganbayan's decision (Pamaran, J. ponente) in effect convicted Rolando Galman as Ninoy's assassin notwithstanding
that he was not on trial but the victim according to the very information filed, and evidence to the contrary submitted, by the
Herrera prosecution panel; and
5. Justice Pamaran's ponencia (despite reservations expressed by Justice Amores who wanted to convict some of the accused)
granted all 26 accused total absolution and pronounced them "innocent of the crimes charged in the two informations, and
accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil liability," notwithstanding the evidence on the basis of which the Fact Finding
Board had unanimously declared the soldiers' version of Galman being Aquino's killer a "perjured story, given deliberately and
in conspiracy with one another."
The fact of the secret Malacaang conference of January 10, 1985 at which the authoritarian President discussed with the
Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and the entire prosecution panel the matter of the imminent filing of the criminal charges
against all the twenty-six accused (as admitted by respondent Justice Fernandez to have been confirmed by him to the then
President's "Coordinator" Manuel Lazaro on the preceding day) is not denied. It is without precedent. This was illegal under our
penal laws, supra. This illegality vitiated from the very beginning all proceedings in the Sandiganbayan court headed by the very
Presiding Justice who attended. As the Commission noted: "The very acts of being summoned to Malacaang and their ready
acquiescence thereto under the circumstances then obtaining, are in themselves pressure dramatized and exemplified. ... Verily, it
can be said that any avowal of independent action or resistance to presidential pressure became illusory from the very moment
they stepped inside Malacanang Palace on January 10, 1985."
No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions" from the very President who by an amendatory decree
(disclosed only at the hearing of oral arguments on November 8, 1984 on a petition challenging the referral of the AquinoGalman murder cases to the Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan instead of to a court martial, as mandatory required by the known
P.D. 1850 at the time providing for exclusive jurisdiction of courts martial over criminal offenses committed by military men 26a) made it possible to refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial court, which is the very essence of due process of
law. As the writer then wrote, "jurisdiction over cases should be determined by law, and not by preselection of the Executive,
which could be much too easily transformed into a means of predetermining the outcome of individual cases. 26-b "This criminal
collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacanang conference (and revealed
only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its
verdict. This renders moot and irrelevant for now the extensive arguments of respondents accused, particularly Generals Ver and
Olivas and those categorized as accessories, that there has been no evidence or witness suppressed against them, that the
erroneous conclusions of Olivas as police investigator do not make him an accessory of the crimes he investigated and the
appraisal and evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses presented and suppressed. There will be time and opportunity to
present all these arguments and considerations at the remand and retrial of the cases herein ordered before a neutral and impartial
court.
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land
under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as
mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose
judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the
prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice. More so, in the
case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. In
life, as an accused before the military tribunal, Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to due process of law
and trial in the regular civil courts before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim of the
"treacherous and vicious assassination" and the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead once more for due
process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the sham
trial a mock trial the non-trial of the century-and that the pre-determined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.
1. No double jeopardy.-It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial
courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied
due process. As the Court stressed in the 1985 case of People vs. Bocar, 27
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case its right to due process
is thereby violated. 27-a
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their
jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue
(Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L-30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971]which cannot be
glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a
decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction (Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370
[May 25, 1973], 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 [Feb. 27, 1973]). Any
judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a "lawless thing, which can
be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head" (Aducayen vs.
Flores, supra).
Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for lack of jurisdiction, the same
does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy (Serino vs. Zosa, supra).
xxx xxx xxx

Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment,
(d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court was not competent as it
was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process.
In effect the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing
and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not
expose the accused to a second jeopardy.
More so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the cases at bar where as we have held, the sham trial was
but a mock trial where the authoritarian president ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and closely
monitored the entire proceedings to assure the pre-determined final outcome of acquittal and total absolution as innocent of an
the respondents-accused. Notwithstanding the laudable efforts of Justice Herrera which saw him near the end "deactivating"
himself from the case, as it was his belief that its eventual resolution was already a foregone conclusion, they could not cope with
the misuse and abuse of the overwhelming powers of the authoritarian President to weaken the case of the prosecution, to
suppress its evidence, harass, intimidate and threaten its witnesses, secure their recantation or prevent them from testifying. Fully
aware of the prosecution's difficulties in locating witnesses and overcoming their natural fear and reluctance to appear and testify,
respondent Sandiganbayan maintained a "dizzying tempo" of the proceedings and announced its intention to terminate the
proceedings in about 6 months time or less than a year, pursuant to the scripted scenario. The prosecution complained of "the
Presiding Justice's seemingly hostile attitude towards (it)" and their being the subject of warnings, reprimand and contempt
proceedings as compared to the nil situation for the defense. Herrera likewise complained of being "cajoled into producing
witnesses and pressed on making assurances that if given a certain period, they will be able to produce their witnesses Herrera
pleaded for "a reasonable period of preparation of its evidence" and cited other pending cases before respondent court that were
pending trial for a much longer time where the "dizzying tempo" and "fast pace" were not maintained by the court. 28 Manifestly,
the prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due process of law with a partial court and biased Tanodbayan under the
constant and pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian President to assure the carrying out of his
instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal such as that in the case at bar is a void judgment. In legal
contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither binds nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is "a lawless thing which can be treated
as an outlaw". It is a terrible and unspeakable affront to the society and the people. To paraphrase Brandeis: 29 If the authoritarian
head of the government becomes the law-breaker, he breeds contempt for the law, he invites every man to become a law unto
himself, he invites anarchy.
Respondents-accused's contention that the Sandiganbayan judgment of acquittal ends the case which cannot be appealed or reopened, without being put in double jeopardy was forcefully disposed of by the Court in People vs. Court of Appeals, which is
fully applicable here, as follows: "That is the general rule and presupposes a valid judgment. As earlier pointed out, however,
respondent Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy
attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all By it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be
attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts
performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void.
|lang1033 xxx xxx xxx
"Private respondent invoke 'justice for the innocent'. For justice to prevail the scales must balance. It is not to be dispensed for the
accused alone. The interests of the society, which they have wronged must also be equally considered. A judgment of conviction
is not necessarily a denial of justice. A verdict of acquittal neither necessarily spells a triumph of justice. To the party wronged, to
the society offended, it could also mean injustice. This is where the Courts play a vital role. They render justice where justice is
due. 30
2. Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved Ahead.-The private prosecutors had filed a motion to disqualify and for
inhibition of respondents Justices of the Sandiganbayan on grounds of manifest bias and partiality to the defense and arising from
then Atty. (now Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzales' charge that Justice Vera-Cruz had been passing coaching notes to defense
counsel. Justice Herrera had joined the motion and pleaded at the hearing of June 25, 1985 and in the prosecution memorandum
that respondent Sandiganbayan "should not decide the case on the merits without first making a final ruling on the Motion for
Inhibition." Herrera quoted the exchange between him and the Presiding Justice to show the latter's "following the script of
Malacanang.
PJ PAMARAN
Well the court believes that we should proceed with the trial and then deal later on with
that. After all, the most important thing here is, shall we say, the decision of the case.
J. HERRERA
I think more important than the decision of the case, Your Honor, is the capacity of the
justices to sit in judgment. That is more important than anything else.(p. 13 TSN, June 25,
1985) (Emphasis supplied by Herrera). 31
But the Sandiganbayan brushed aside Herrera's pleas and then wrongly blamed him, in the decision, for supposedly not having
joined the petition for inhibition, contrary to the facts above-stated, as follows:
... the motion for inhibition above referred to related exclusively for the contempt proceeding. Too, it must be
remembered that the prosecution neither joined that petition, nor did it at any time manifest a desire to file a
similar motion prior to the submission of these cases for decision. To do it now is not alone out of season but
is also a confession of official insouciance (Page 22, Decision). 32

The action for prohibition was filed in the Court to seek the disqualification of respondents Justices pursuant to the procedure
recognized by the Court in the 1969 case of Paredes vs. Gopengco 33 since an adverse ruling by respondent court might result in a
verdict of acquittal, leaving the offended party without any remedy nor appeal in view of the double jeopardy rule, not to mention
the overiding and transcendental public interest that would make out a case of denial of due process to the People if the alleged
failure on the part of the Tanodbayan to present the complete evidence for the prosecution is substantiated. 34
In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the temporary restraining
order enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which had required the
respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining order was issued anew, respondent
Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of
this Court. This is the teaching of Valdez vs. Aquilizan 35, Wherein the court in setting aside the hasty convictions, ruled that
"prudence dictated that (respondent judge) refrain from deciding the cases or at the very least to hold in abeyance the
promulgation of his decision pending action by this Court. But prudence gave way to imprudence; the respondent judge acted
precipitately by deciding the cases [hastily without awaiting this Court's action]. All of the acts of the respondent judge manifest
grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner."
3. Re: Objections of respondents.-The other related objections of respondents' counsels must be rejected in the face of the Court's
declaration that the trial was a mock trial and that the pre-determined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.
(a) It follows that there is no need to resort to a direct action to annul the judgment, instead of the present action which was
timely filed initially to declare a mistrial and to enjoin the rendition of the void judgment. And after the hasty rendition of such
judgment for the declaration of its nullity, following the presentation of competent proof heard by the Commission and the
Court's findings therefrom that the proceedings were from the beginning vitiated not only by lack of due process but also by the
collusion between the public respondents (court and Tanodbayan) for the rendition of a pre-determined verdict of acquitting all
the twenty-six respondents-accused.
(b) It is manifest that this does not involve a case of mere irregularities in the conduct of the proceedings or errors of judgment
which do not affect the integrity or validity of the judgment or verdict.
(c) The contention of one of defense counsel that the State and the sovereign people are not entitled to due process is clearly
erroneous and contrary to the basic principles and jurisprudence cited hereinabove.
(d) The submittal of respondents-accused that they had not exerted the pressure applied by the authoritarian president on public
respondents and that no evidence was suppressed against them must be held to be untenable in the wake of the evil plot now
exposed for their preordained wholesale exoneration.
(e) Respondents' invocation of the writer's opinion in Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg. Co., Inc. 36 is inappropriate.
The writer therein held that a party should be entitled to only one Supreme Court and may not speculate on vital changes in the
Court's membership for review of his lost case once more, since public policy and sound practice demand that litigation be put to
an end and no second pro forma motion for reconsideration reiterating the same arguments should be kept pending so long (for
over six (6) years and one (1) month since the denial of the first motion for reconsideration), This opinion cannot be properly
invoked, because here, petitioners' second motion for reconsideration was filed promptly on March 20, 1986 following the denial
under date of February 4th of the first motion for reconsideration and the same was admitted per the Court's Resolution of April
3, 1986 and is now being resolved within five months of its filing after the Commission had received the evidence of the parties
who were heard by the Court only last August 26th. The second motion for reconsideration is based on an entirely new material
ground which was not known at the time of the denial of the petition and filing of the first motion for reconsideration, i.e, the
secret Malacaang conference on January 10, 1985 which came to light only fifteen months later in March, 1986 and showed
beyond per adventure (as proved in the Commission hearings) the merits of the petition and that the authoritarian president had
dictated and pre-determined the final outcome of acquittal. Hence, the ten members of the Court (without any new appointees)
unanimously voted to admit the second motion for reconsideration. 37
4. With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an impartial court with an unbiased
prosecutor.-There has been the long dark night of authoritarian regime, since the fake ambush in September, 1972 of then
Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile (as now admitted by Enrile himself was staged to trigger the imposition of martial law and
authoritarian one-man rule, with the padlocking of Congress and the abolition of the office of the Vice-President.
As recently retired Senior Justice Vicente Abad Santos recalled in his valedictory to the new members of the Bar last May, "In
the past few years, the judiciary was under heavy attack by an extremely powerful executive. During this state of judicial siege,
lawyers both in and outside the judiciary perceptively surrendered to the animus of technicality. In the end, morality was
overwhelmed by technicality, so that the latter emerged ugly and naked in its true manifestation."
Now that the light is emerging, the Supreme Court faces the task of restoring public faith and confidence in the courts. The
Supreme Court enjoys neither the power of the sword nor of the purse. Its strength lies mainly in public confidence, based on the
truth and moral force of its judgments. This has been built on its cherished traditions of objectivity and impartiallity integrity and
fairness and unswerving loyalty to the Constitution and the rule of law which compels acceptance as well by the leadership as by
the people. The lower courts draw their bearings from the Supreme Court. With this Court's judgment today declaring the nullity
of the questioned judgment or acquittal and directing a new trial, there must be a rejection of the temptation of becoming
instruments of injustice as vigorously as we rejected becoming its victims. The end of one form of injustice should not become
simply the beginning of another. This simply means that the respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged
against them before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process. What the past regime had denied the
people and the aggrieved parties in the sham trial must now be assured as much to the accused as to the aggrieved parties. The
people will assuredly have a way of knowing when justice has prevailed as well as when it has failed.

The notion nurtured under the past regime that those appointed to public office owe their primary allegiance to the appointing
authority and are accountable to him alone and not to the people or the Constitution must be discarded. The function of the
appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of government, is to fill the public posts. While the
appointee may acknowledge with gratitude the opportunity thus given of rendering public service, the appointing authority
becomes functus officio and the primary loyalty of the appointed must be rendered to the Constitution and the sovereign people in
accordance with his sacred oath of office. To paraphrase the late Chief Justice Earl Warren of the United States Supreme Court,
the Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public
interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only, the Constitution and their own conscience and honor.
5. Note of Commendation.- The Court expresses its appreciation with thanks for the invaluable services rendered by the
Commission composed of retired Supreme Court Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, chairman, and retired Court of Appeals Justices
Milagros German and Eduardo Caguioa as members. In the pure spirit of public service, they rendered selflessly and without
remuneration thorough competent and dedicated service in discharging their tasks of hearing and receiving the evidence,
evaluating the same and submitting their Report and findings to the Court within the scheduled period and greatly easing the
Court's burden.
ACCORDINGLY, petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted. The resolutions of November 28, 1985 dismissing
the petition and of February 4, 1986 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration are hereby set aside and in lieu thereof,
judgment is hereby rendered nullifying the proceedings in respondent Sandiganbayan and its judgment of acquittal in Criminal
Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Gen. Luther Custodia et al." and ordering a re-trial of the said
cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due process, so that the
truth may be finally known and justice done to an
This resolution is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.
BAYANI M. ALONTE, petitioner, vs. HON. MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO JR., NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 131652 March 9, 1998
VITUG, J.:
FACTS: An information for rape was filed against petitioners Bayani M. Alonte, an incumbent Mayor of Bian, Laguna, and
Buenaventura Concepcion predicated on a complaint filed by Juvie-lyn Punongbayan.
The case was assigned by raffle to Branch 25 of the RTC of Bian, Laguna, presided over by Judge Pablo B. Francisco.
Juvie-lyn Punongbayan then filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a Petition for a Change of Venue to have the case
transferred and tried by any of the RTCs in Metro Manila. During the pendency of the petition for change of venue, Juvie-lyn,
assisted by her parents and counsel, executed an affidavit of desistance.
Atty. Ramon C. Casino, on behalf of petitioners, moved to have the petition for change of venue dismissed on the
ground that it had become moot in view of complainant's affidavit of desistance. Meanwhile, this Court issued a Resolution
granting the petition for change of venue. The case was assigned by raffle to Branch 53, RTC Manila, with respondent Judge
Savellano, Jr., presiding.
Juvie-lyn Punongbayan then submitted to the Manila court a "compliance" where she reiterated "her decision to abide
by her Affidavit of Desistance." Judge Savellano found probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of petitioners
Alonte and Concepcion "without prejudice to, and independent of, this Court's separate determination as the trier of facts, of the
voluntariness and validity of the [private complainant's] desistance in the light of the opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst.
Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiyab."
Alonte voluntarily surrendered himself to Director Santiago Toledo of the NBI while Concepcion, in his case, posted
the recommended bail of P150,000.00. Petitioners were arraigned and both pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. The parties
manifested that they were waiving pre-trial. The proceedings forthwith went on. Per Judge Savellano, both parties agreed to
proceed with the trial of the case on the merits. According to Alonte, however, Judge Savellano allowed the prosecution to
present evidence relative only to the question of the voluntariness and validity of the affidavit of desistance.
It would appear that immediately following the arraignment, the prosecution presented private complainant Juvielyn
Punongbayan followed by her parents. During this hearing, Punongbayan affirmed the validity and voluntariness of her affidavit
of desistance. She stated that she had no intention of giving positive testimony in support of the charges against Alonte and had
no interest in further prosecuting the action. Punongbayan confirmed: (i) That she was compelled to desist because of the
harassment she was experiencing from the media, (ii) that no pressures nor influence were exerted upon her to sign the affidavit
of desistance, and (iii) that neither she nor her parents received a single centavo from anybody to secure the affidavit of
desistance.
Assistant State Prosecutor Marilyn Campomanes then presented, in sequence: (i) Punongbayan's parents, who affirmed
their signatures on the affidavit of desistance and their consent to their daughter's decision to desist from the case, and (ii)
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alberto Nofuente, who attested that the affidavit of desistance was signed by Punongbayan and
her parents in his presence and that he was satisfied that the same was executed freely and voluntarily. Finally, Campomanes
manifested that in light of the decision of private complainant and her parents not to pursue the case, the State had no further
evidence against the accused to prove the guilt of the accused. She, then, moved for the "dismissal of the case" against both
Alonte and Concepcion.

Thereupon, respondent judge said that "the case was submitted for decision." Petitioner Alonte filed an "Urgent Motion
to Admit to Bail." Assistant State Prosecutor Campomanes stated that the State interposed "no objection to the granting of bail.
Respondent judge did not act on the application for bail.
Alonte filed anew an Urgent Plea to Resolve the Motion for Bail. Again, the respondent judge did not act on the urgent
motion. The records would indicate that on the 25th November 1997, 1st December 1997, 8th December 1997 and 10th
December 1997, petitioner Alonte filed a Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Motion for Early Resolution, respectively, in respect of
his application for bail. None of these motions were acted upon by Judge Savellano.
Attorney F ortun, the lead counsel for petitioner Alonte received a notice from the RTC Manila notifying him of the
schedule of promulgation of the decision on the case. The counsel for accused Concepcion denied having received any notice of
the scheduled promulgation.
After the case was called, Atty. Fortun and Atty. Flaminiano manifested that Alonte could not attend the promulgation
of the decision because he was suffering from mild hypertension and was confined at the NBI clinic and that, upon the other
hand, petitioner Concepcion and his counsel would appear not to have been notified of the proceedings. The promulgation,
nevertheless, of the decision proceeded in absentia.
On the same day, petitioner Alonte filed a motion for reconsideration. Without waiting for its resolution, Alonte filed
the instant "Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam" for "Certiorari, Prohibition, Habeas Corpus, Bail, Recusation of respondent Judge, and
for Disciplinary Action against an RTC Judge." Petitioner Concepcion later filed his own petition
for certiorari and mandamus with the Court.
ISSUE: whether or not the Decision was rendered in violation of the constitutional rights of the accused
HELD: The petitions deserve some merit; the Court will disregard, in view of the case milieu, the prematurity of petitioners'
invocation, i.e., even before the trial court could resolve Alonte's motion for reconsideration.
The Court must admit that it is puzzled by the somewhat strange way the case has proceeded below. Per Judge Savellano, after
the waiver by the parties of the pre-trial stage, the trial of the case did proceed on the merits but that
The two (2) accused did not present any countervailing evidence during the trial. They did not take the witness stand to
refute or deny under oath the truth of the contents of the private complainant's aforementioned affidavit which she
expressly affirmed and confirmed in Court, but, instead, thru their respective lawyers, they rested and submitted the
case for decision merely on the basis of the private complainant's so called "desistance" which, to them, was sufficient
enough for their purposes. They left everything to the so-called "desistance" of the private complainant. 10
According to petitioners, however, there was no such trial for what was conducted on 07 November 1997, aside from the
arraignment of the accused, was merely a proceeding in conformity with the resolution of this Court in Administrative Case No.
97-1-12-RTC to determine the validity and voluntariness of the affidavit of desistance executed by Punongbayan.
It does seem to the Court that there has been undue precipitancy in the conduct of the proceedings. Perhaps the problem could
have well been avoided had not the basic procedures been, to the Court's perception, taken lightly. And in this shortcoming,
looking at the records of the case, the trial court certainly is not alone to blame.
Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution provides the fundamentals.
(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.
Jurisprudence 11 acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a) that the court or tribunal trying
the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully
acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is
rendered only upon lawful hearing. 12
The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice
system, are mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted
statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a "law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds
upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." 13
The order of trial in criminal cases is clearly spelled out in Section 3, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court; viz:
Sec. 3. Order of trial. The trial shall proceed in the following order:
(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper case, the civil liability.
(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense, and damages, if any, arising from the issuance of any
provisional remedy in the case.
(c) The parties may then respectively present rebutting evidence only, unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permits
them to present additional evidence bearing upon the main issue.
(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision unless the court directs the parties
to argue orally or to submit memoranda.

(e) However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but interposes a
lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified accordingly.
In Tabao vs. Espina, 14 the Court has underscored the need to adhere strictly to the above rules. It reminds that
. . . each step in the trial process serves a specific purpose. In the trial of criminal cases, the constitutional presumption
of innocence in favor of an accused requires that an accused be given sufficient opportunity to present his defense. So,
with the prosecution as to its evidence.
Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial should always take into consideration the rights of all the parties
to the case, whether in the prosecution or defense. In the exercise of their discretion, judges are sworn not only to
uphold the law but also to do what is fair and just. The judicial gavel should not be wielded by one who has an unsound
and distorted sense of justice and fairness. 15
While Judge Savellano has claimed in his Comment that
Petitioners-accused were each represented during the hearing on 07 November 1997 with their respective counsel of
choice. None of their counsel interposed an intention to cross-examine rape victim Juvielyn Punongbayan, even after
she attested, in answer to respondent judge's clarificatory questions, the voluntariness and truth of her two affidavits
one detailing the rape and the other detailing the attempts to buy her desistance; the opportunity was missed/not used,
hence waived. The rule of case law is that the right to confront and cross-examine a witness "is a personal one and may
be waived." (emphasis supplied)
it should be pointed out, however, that the existence of the waiver must be positively demonstrated. The standard of waiver
requires that it "not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences." 16 Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right,
and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. 17 The Solicitor General has aptly discerned a few of
the deviations from what otherwise should have been the regular course of trial: (1) Petitioners have not been directed to present
evidence to prove their defenses nor have dates therefor been scheduled for the purpose; 18 (2) the parties have not been given the
opportunity to present rebutting evidence nor have dates been set by respondent Judge for the purpose; 19 and (3) petitioners have
not admitted the act charged in the Information so as to justify any modification in the order of trial. 20 There can be no short-cut
to the legal process, and there can be no excuse for not affording an accused his full day in court. Due process, rightly occupying
the first and foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be denied even to the
most undeserving.
This case, in fine, must be remanded for further proceedings. And, since the case would have to be sent back to the court a quo,
this ponencia has carefully avoided making any statement or reference that might be misconstrued as prejudgment or as preempting the trial court in the proper disposition of the case. The Court likewise deems it appropriate that all related proceedings
therein, including the petition for bail, should be subject to the proper disposition of the trial court.
Nevertheless, it is needful to stress a few observations on the affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant.
Firstly, the affidavit of desistance of Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan, hereinbefore quoted, does not contain any statement that disavows
the veracity of her complaint against petitioners but merely seeks to "be allowed to withdraw" her complaint and to discontinue
with the case for varied other reasons. On this subject, the case ofPeople vs. Junio, 21 should be instructive. The Court has there
explained:
The appellant's submission that the execution of an Affidavit of Desistance by complainant who was assisted by her
mother supported the "inherent incredibility of prosecution's evidence" is specious. We have said in so many cases that
retractions are generally unreliable and are looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts. The unreliable
character of this document is shown by the fact that it is quite incredible that after going through the process of having
accused-appellant arrested by the police, positively identifying him as the person who raped her, enduring the
humiliation of a physical examination of her private parts, and then repeating her accusations in open court by
recounting her anguish, Maryjane would suddenly turn around and declare that "[a]fter a careful deliberation over the
case, (she) find(s) that the same does not merit or warrant criminal prosecution.
Thus, we have declared that at most the retraction is an afterthought which should not be given probative value. It
would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before the court of justice simply because the witness who has
given it later on changed his mind for one reason or another. Such a rule will make a solemn trial a mockery and place
the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Because affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from
poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for monetary consideration, the Court has invariably regarded such affidavits as
exceedingly unreliable [Flores vs. People, 211 SCRA 622, citing De Guzman vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 184
SCRA 128; People vs. Galicia, 123 SCRA 550.] 22
The Junio rule is no different from ordinary criminal cases. For instance, in People vs. Ballabare, 23 a murder case, the Court has
ruled:
The contention has no merit. To begin with, the Affidavit executed by eyewitness Tessie Asenita is not a recantation.
To recant a prior statement is to renounce and withdraw it formally and publicly. [36 WORDS AND PHRASES 683,
citing Pradlik vs. State, 41-A 2nd, 906, 907.] In her affidavit, Tessie Asenita did not really recant what she had said
during the trial. She only said she wanted to withdraw her testimony because her father, Leonardo Tacadao, Sr., was no
longer interested in prosecuting the case against accused-appellant. Thus, her affidavit stated:
3. That inasmuch as my father, Leonardo Tacadao, Sr., the complainant therein, was no longer interested to prosecute
the case as manifested in the Sworn Affidavit of Desistance before the Provincial Prosecutor, I do hereby WITHDRAW
and/or REVOKE my testimony of record to confirm (sic) with my father's desire;

It is absurd to disregard a testimony that has undergone trial and scrutiny by the court and the parties simply because an
affidavit withdrawing the testimony is subsequently presented by the defense. In the first place, any recantation must be
tested in a public trial with sufficient opportunity given to the party adversely affected by it to cross-examine the
recanting witness. In this case, Tessie Asenita was not recalled to the witness stand to testify on her affidavit. Her
affidavit is thus hearsay. It was her husband, Roque Asenita, who was presented and the matters he testified to did not
even bear on the substance of Tessie's affidavit. He testified that accused-appellant was not involved in the perpetration
of the crime.
In the second place, to accept the new evidence uncritically would be to make a solemn trial a mockery and place the
investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. [De Guzman vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 184 SCRA 128,
134, citing People vs. Morales, 113 SCRA 683.] For even assuming that Tessie Asenita had made a retraction, this
circumstance alone does not require the court to disregard her original testimony. A retraction does not necessarily
negate an earlier declaration. [People vs. Davatos, 229 SCRA 647.] For this reason, courts look with disfavor upon
retractions because they can easily be obtained from witnesses usually through intimidation or for monetary
considerations. [People vs. Clamor, 198 SCRA 642.] Hence, when confronted with a situation where a witness recants
his testimony, courts must not automatically exclude the original testimony solely on the basis of the recantation. They
should determine which testimony should be given credence through a comparison of the original testimony and the
new testimony, applying the general rules of evidence. [Reano vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 525.] In this case we
think the trial court correctly ruled. 24
It may not be amiss to state that courts have the inherent power to compel the attendance of any person to testify in a case
pending before it, and a party is not precluded from invoking that authority. 25
Secondly, an affidavit of desistance by itself, even when construed as a pardon in the so-called "private crimes," is not a ground
for the dismissal of the criminal case once the action has been instituted. The affidavit, nevertheless, may, as so earlier intimated,
possibly constitute evidence whose weight or probative value, like any other piece of evidence, would be up to the court for
proper evaluation. The decision in Junio went on to hold
While "[t]he offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint flied by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor in any case, if the offender has been
expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may be," [Third par. of Art. 344, The Revised Penal
Code.] the pardon to justify the dismissal of the complaint should have been made prior to the institution of the
criminal action. [People vs. Entes, 103 SCRA 162, cited by People vs. Soliao, 194 SCRA 250, which in turn is cited in
People vs. Villorente, 210 SCRA 647.] Here, the motion to dismiss to which the affidavit of desistance is attached was
filed after the institution of the criminal case. And, affiant did not appear to be serious in "signifying (her) intention to
refrain from testifying" since she still completed her testimony notwithstanding her earlier affidavit of desistance.
More, the affidavit is suspect considering that while it was dated "April 1992," it was only submitted sometime in
August 1992, four (4) months after the Information was filed before the court a quo on 6 April 1992, perhaps dated as
such to coincide with the actual filing of the case. 26
In People vs. Miranda, 27 applying the pertinent provisions of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which, in full, states
Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape, and acts of lasciviousness.
The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse.
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive,
nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint
filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly
pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may be.
In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party
shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph
shall also be applicable to the coprincipals, accomplices and accessories after the fact of the above-mentioned crimes.
the Court said:
Paragraph 3 of the legal provision above quoted prohibits a prosecution for seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of
lasciviousness, except upon a complaint made by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in
any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be. It does not
prohibit the continuance of a prosecution if the offended party pardons the offender after the cause has been instituted,
nor does it order the dismissal of said cause. The only act that according to article 344 extinguishes the penal action and
the penalty that may have been imposed is the marriage between the offended and the offended party. 28
In People vs. Infante, 29 decided just a little over a month before Miranda, the Court similarly held:
In this court, after the case had been submitted, a motion to dismiss was filed on behalf of the appellant predicated on
an affidavit executed by Manuel Artigas, Jr., in which he pardoned his guilty spouse for her infidelity. But this
attempted pardon cannot prosper for two reasons. The second paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code
which is in question reads: "The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty
parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders." This provision
means that the pardon afforded the offenders must come before the institution of the criminal prosecution, and means,
further, that both the offenders must be pardoned by the offended party. To elucidate further, article 435 of the old
Penal Code provided: "The husband may at any time remit the penalty imposed upon his wife. In such case the penalty

imposed upon the wife's paramour shall also be deemed to be remitted." These provisions of the old Penal Code
became inoperative after the passage of Act No. 1773, section 2, which had the effect of repealing the same. The
Revised Penal Code thereafter expressly repealed the old Penal Code, and in so doing did not have the effect of
reviving any of its provisions which were not in force. But with the incorporation of the second paragraph of article
344, the pardon given by the offended party again constitutes a bar to the prosecution for adultery. Once more,
however, it must be emphasized that this pardon must come before the institution of the criminal prosecution and must
be for both offenders to be effective circumstances which do not concur in this case. 30
The decisions speak well for themselves, and the Court need not say more than what it has heretofore already held.
Relative to the prayer for the disqualification of Judge Savellano from further hearing the case, the Court is convinced that Judge
Savellano should, given the circumstances, the best excused from the case. Possible animosity between the personalities here
involved may not all be that unlikely. The pronouncement of this Court in the old case of Luque vs. Kayanan 31 could again be
said: All suitors are entitled to nothing short of the cold neutrality of an independent, wholly-free, disinterested and unbiased
tribunal. Second only to the duty of rendering a just decision is the duty of doing it in a manner that will not arouse any suspicion
as to the fairness and integrity of the Judge. 32 It is not enough that a court is impartial, it must also be perceived as impartial.
The Court cannot end this ponencia without a simple reminder on the use of proper language before the courts. While the lawyer
in promoting the cause of his client or defending his rights might do so with fervor, simple courtesy demands that it be done
within the bounds of propriety and decency. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions hardly can be justified nor
can have a place in the dignity of judicial forum. Civility among members of the legal profession is a treasured tradition that must
at no time be lost to it.
Finally, it may be opportune to say, once again, that prosecutors are expected not merely to discharge their duties with the highest
degree or excellence, professionalism and skill but also to act each time with utmost devotion and dedication to duty. 33 The Court
is hopeful that the zeal which has been exhibited many times in the past, although regrettably a disappointment on few occasions,
will not be wanting in the proceedings yet to follow.
WHEREFORE, conformably with all the foregoing, the Court hereby RULES that
(a) The submission of the "Affidavit of Desistance," executed by Juvie-Lyn Y. Punongbayan on 25 June 1997, having
been filed AFTER the institution of Criminal Case No. 97-159935, DOES NOT WARRANT THE DISMISSAL of said
criminal case;
(b) For FAILURE OF DUE PROCESS, the assailed judgment, dated 12 December 1997, convicting petitioners is
declared NULL AND VOID and thereby SET ASIDE; accordingly, the case is REMANDED to the trial court for
further proceedings; and
(c) Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., presiding Judge of Branch 53 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is
ENJOINED from further hearing Criminal Case No. 97-159935; instead, the case shall immediately be scheduled for
raffle among the other branches of that court for proper disposition.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PABLEO DRAMAYO, PATERNO ECUBIN, PRIOLO
BILLONA, FRANCISCO BILLONA, MODESTO RONQUILLA, CRESCENCIO SAVANDAL and SEVERO
SAVANDAL, defendants; PABLEO DRAMAYO and PATERNO ECUBIN, defendants-appellant. G.R. No. L-21325
October 29, 1971
FERNANDO, J.:
FACTS: On the morning of January 9, 1964, the two accused, Dramayo and Ecubin, in the company of the deceased Estelito
Nogaliza, all of Barrio Magsaysay, of the Municipality of Sapao, Surigao del Norte, saw its chief of police. Their purpose was to
shed light on a robbery committed in the house of the deceased five days before by being available as witnesses. The response
was decidedly in the negative as they themselves were prime suspects, having been implicated by at least two individuals who
had confessed. At about 7:00 o'clock of the same day, while they were in the house of their co-accused Priolo Billona, the
accused Dramayo invited all those present including the other accused Francisco Billons, Modesto Ronquilla. Crescencio and
Severo Savandal, for a drinking session at a place at the back of the school house. It was on that occasion that Dramayo brought
up the idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he could not testify in the robbery case. The idea was for Dramayo and Ecubin to
ambush Estelito, who was returning from Sapao. The others were to station themselves nearby.
Soon the unfortunate victim was sighted. He was accosted by Dramayo with a request for a cigarette. It was then that
Ecubin hit him with a piece of wood on the side of the head near the right ear. Dramayo's participation consisted of repeated stabs
with a short pointed bolo as he lay prostrate from the blow of Ecubin. It was the former also, who warned the rest of the group to
keep their mouths sealed as to what had just happened. His equanimity appeared undisturbed for early the next morning, he went
to the house of the deceased and informed the, latter's widow Corazon that he had just seen the cadaver of Estelito. The barrio
lieutenant and the chief of police were duly notified. The latter, upon noticing blood stains on the trousers of Dramayo, asked him
to explain. The answer was that a skin ailment of his daughter was the cause thereof. The death was due to the wounds inflicted,
two in the epigastric region, one in the right lumbar region, and another in the left breast.
It was on the basis of the above testimony offered by the prosecution that the lower court reached its decision. Its
dispositive portion found the accused, now appellant Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of the
crime of murder. Reference was likewise made in such decision as to why the other co-accused were not convicted, two of them,
Crescencio Savandal and Severo Savandal being utilized as state witnesses, and the others three, Priolo Billona, Francisco
Billona and Modesto Roquilla acquitted.

Why they should not be found guilty was explained in the appealed decision thus: "From the beginning the accused
Modesto Ronquilla maintained that he was not with the group but that he was fishing in the sea during the night in question.
These facts that is, that none of the prosecution witnesses has testified that any of these three accused actually helped in the
killing of the deceased, Estelito Nogaliza; that these three accused were included in the case only much later after the filing of
this case against Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin; the consistent contention of the accused Modesto Ronquilla that he was
out in the sea fishing during the night in question; and the testimonies of the accused Priolo Billona [and] Francisco [and their
witnesses,] Juan Billona, Esperanza Oposa Billona, Guillerma Ponce, and Anselmo Lisondra, given in a straight-forward manner,
without hesitation, revealing a clear conscience, and the fact that the testimonies of these witnesses have not been refuted by the
PC soldiers (whom they accused of maltreatment] when they were available to the prosecution, cause the Court to entertain a
very serious doubt as to the guilt of the said accused."
The lower court was hardly impressed with the defense of alibi interposed by appellants.
ISSUE: whether or not the lower court correctly found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt
HELD: Yes. The lower court was hardly impressed with the defense of alibi interposed by now appellants Dramayo and
Ecubin, and it must have been their lack of persuasive character that must have led to the able brief of counsel de oficio, Atty.
Arturo E. Balbastro, stressing the absence of evidence sufficient to convict, there still being a reasonable doubt to be implied
from the fact that while conspiracy was alleged, only two of the seven accused were held culpable. To repeat, a meticulous
appraisal of the evidence justifies a finding of the guilt of the appellants for the offense charged, thus calling for the affirmance of
the decision.
1. It is to be admitted that the starting point is the Presumption of innocence. So it must be, according to the Constitution. 5 That is
a right safeguarded both appellants. Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent
on the prosecution demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf.
Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt be shown
beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard this Court has always been committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful
scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and documentary, independently whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only
if judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person
on trial under such an exacting test should sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that circumstance favoring his
innocence be duly taken into count. The proof against him must survive the reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted
to sway away judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense
charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certainty.
So it has been held from the 1903 decision of United States v. Reyes. 6 United States v. Lasada, 7 decided in 1910, yields this
excerpt: "By reasonable doubt is meant that which of possibility may arise, but it is doubt engendered by an investigation of the
whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certain of
guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any carnal charge but moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required as
to every proposition of proof regular to constitute the offense." 8 To the same effect is an excerpt from the opinion of the late
Justice Tuason in People v. Esquivel. 9 Thus: "In this connection it may not be out of place to bring to the attention of prosecuting
attorneys the absolute necessity of laying before the court the pertinent facts as their disposal with methodical and meticulous
attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in their evidence, to the end that the court's mind may not be
tortured by doubts, that the innocent may not suffer and the guilty not escape unpunished. Obvious to all, this is the prosecution's
prime duty to the court, to the accused, and to the state." 10
It is understandable why the stress should be on the absence of sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of appellants beyond
reasonable doubt, the defense of alibi interposed hardly meriting any further discussion. It cannot be denied though that the
credible and competent evidence of record resulted in moral certainty being entertained not only by the trial judge but by us as to
the culpability of appellants. The force of the controlling doctrines, on the other hand, required that the other three accused be
acquitted precisely because, unlike in the case of appellants, the requisite quantum of proof to show guilt beyond reasonable
doubt was not present. There is no question as to the other two who testified for the state being likewise no long subject to any
criminal liability. The reference then to opinion of the late Justice Laurel, stressing the need for adhering to the fundamental
postulate that a finding of guilt is allowable only when no reasonable doubt could be entertained, is unavailing. This is evident
from the very citation in the brief of appellants of the opinion of Justice Laurel in People v. Manoji.11 Thus: "Upon the other hand
there are certain facts which if taken together are sufficient to raise in the mind of the court a grave doubt as to the guilt of the
defendant-appellant, 'that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability after such investigation, to let
the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.' (U.S. v. Lasada [1910], 18 Phil. 90, 96.) The finding of the two gold teeth of the
deceased the suitcase of Maradani, and the testimony of Erajio Ello that he gave the hat ... to Maradani not only engender serious
doubt in our minds as to the guilt of the appellant but also seems to sustain the theory of the defense and strengthen the suspicion
of the trial court, that Maradani and Salupudin are not foreign to, or entirely ignorant of, the killing of Seijin Ige. In the light of
the facts and circumstances of record, we feel that it is better to acquit a man upon the ground of reasonable doubt, even though
he may in reality be guilty, than to confine in the penitentiary for the rest of his natural life a person who may be innocent.
..." 12 The facts of the present case certainly do not fit within the above mold. Reliance on the part of appellants on the above
decision is therefore futile.
The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise on the part of the two appellants, as from the evidence
deserving of the fullest credence, their guilt had been more than amply demonstrated. The presumption of innocence could not

come to their rescue as it was more than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by the prosecution. What would
have been a blot on the law is that if, on the facts as established, no reasonable doubt being entertained, the two appellants would
have been acquitted likewise just because the other five defendants, for the reasons above stated, were not similarly sentenced.
The principal contention raised is thus clearly untenable. It must be stated likewise that while squarely advanced for the first time,
there had been cases where this Court, notwithstanding a majority of the defendants being acquitted, the element of conspiracy
likewise being allegedly present, did hold the party or parties, responsible for the offense guilty of the crime charged, a moral
certainty having arisen as to their capability. 13
2. The brief for appellants did seek to fortify the allegation as to their guilt not having been sufficiently demonstrated with the
contention that the lower court overlooked or did not properly consider material and significant facts of record that ought to have
substantially affected or altered the judgment. Even the most careful reading of such brief, however, with due recognition of the
vigor in which this particular point is pressed, would not destroy the credibility of the facts as testified to concerning the manner
in which the deceased was killed and the motive that prompted appellants to put an end to his life. That such a version could not
have been concocted is shown by the undeniable fact that the two appellants were duly convicted of robbery, with the deceased as
the offended party. It was understandable then why they would want to do away with the principal witness against them. There
was thus a strong inducement for the appellants to have committed this crime of murder. With the testimony of record pointing to
no other conclusion except the perpetration of the killing by them, the effort of their counsel, while to be expected from an
advocate zealous in defense of his clients' rights, certainly should not be attended with success. It suffices to reiterate the wellsettled principle that this Court has invariably respected the findings of facts of a trial judge who was in a position to weigh and
appraise the testimony before him except when, as was not shown in this case, circumstances weight or influence were ignored or
disregarded by him. 14
WHEREFORE, the judgment of September 8, 1965 affirmed with the modification that the indemnification to the heirs of
Estelito Nogaliza should be in the sum P12,000.00. With costs.

PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR. vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
FACTS: Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory
and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides: Sec. 4. Special
Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing
laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof.
Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits
to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of
office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has
retired.
Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the classification
provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation."
For their part, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of the following statutory provisions:
Sec 7. Terms of Office Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials hereinabove
mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years, which shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980.
Sec. 4. ...Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices
covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan political activity therein: provided that a judgment of conviction
for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the
commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima fascie
evidence of such fact.
Petitioners then pray that these statutory provisions be declared null and void for being violative of the Constitution.
ISSUE: whether or not the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that "... the filing of charges
for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima
facie evidence of such fact" is null and void, for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an
accused.
HELD: Yes.
Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged be declared null and void for being violative of the
Constitution.
I . The procedural Aspect
At the outset, it should be stated that this Petition suffers from basic procedural infirmities, hence, traditionally unacceptable for
judicial resolution. For one, there is a misjoinder of parties and actions. Petitioner Dumlao's interest is alien to that of petitioners
Igot and Salapantan Petitioner Dumlao does not join petitioners Igot and Salapantan in the burden of their complaint, nor do the
latter join Dumlao in his. The respectively contest completely different statutory provisions. Petitioner Dumlao has joined this

suit in his individual capacity as a candidate. The action of petitioners Igot and Salapantan is more in the nature of a taxpayer's
suit. Although petitioners plead nine constraints as the reason of their joint Petition, it would have required only a modicum more
of effort tor petitioner Dumlao, on one hand said petitioners lgot and Salapantan, on the other, to have filed separate suits, in the
interest of orderly procedure.
For another, there are standards that have to be followed inthe exercise of the function of judicial review, namely (1) the
existence of an appropriate case:, (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question: (3) the
plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity and (4) the necessity that the constiutional question be passed upon
in order to decide the case (People vs. Vera 65 Phil. 56 [1937]).
It may be conceded that the third requisite has been complied with, which is, that the parties have raised the issue of
constitutionality early enough in their pleadings.
This Petition, however, has fallen far short of the other three criteria.
A. Actual case and controversy.
It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases and controversies.
Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted earlier, as
being contrary to the equal protection clause guaranteed by the Constitution, and seeks to prohibit respondent COMELEC from
implementing said provision. Yet, Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of that provision. No petition
seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed before the COMELEC. There is no ruling of that constitutional body on the
matter, which this Court is being asked to review on Certiorari. His is a question posed in the abstract, a hypothetical issue, and in
effect, a petition for an advisory opinion from this Court to be rendered without the benefit of a detailed factual record Petitioner
Dumlao's case is clearly within the primary jurisdiction (see concurring Opinion of now Chief Justice Fernando in Peralta vs.
Comelec, 82 SCRA 30, 96 [1978]) of respondent COMELEC as provided for in section 2, Art. XII-C, for the Constitution the
pertinent portion of which reads:
"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall have the following power and functions:
1) xxx
2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all members of the
National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision must also be related to section 11 of Art. XII-C, which provides:
Section 11. Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof.
B. Proper party.
The long-standing rule has been that "the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement" (People vs.
Vera, supra).
In the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan, it was only during the hearing, not in their Petition, that Igot is said to be a
candidate for Councilor. Even then, it cannot be denied that neither one has been convicted nor charged with acts of disloyalty to
the State, nor disqualified from being candidates for local elective positions. Neither one of them has been calle ed to have been
adversely affected by the operation of the statutory provisions they assail as unconstitutional Theirs is a generated grievance.
They have no personal nor substantial interest at stake. In the absence of any litigate interest, they can claim no locus standi in
seeking judicial redress.
It is true that petitioners Igot and Salapantan have instituted this case as a taxpayer's suit, and that the rule enunciated in People
vs. Vera, above stated, has been relaxed in Pascual vs. The Secretary of Public Works (110 Phil. 331 [1960], thus:
... it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury
in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions nullifying at the instance of taxpayers, laws
providing for the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that "the expenditure of public funds, by an
officer of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of
such funds," which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.
In the same vein, it has been held:
In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the
constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers
have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and they may,
therefore, question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. (Philippine
Constitution Association, Inc., et als., vs. Gimenez, et als., 15 SCRA 479 [1965]).
However, the statutory provisions questioned in this case, namely, sec. 7, BP Blg. 51, and sections 4, 1, and 6 BP Blg. 52, do not
directly involve the disbursement of public funds. While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public
moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of
specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power" (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S., 83 [1960]), or that there is a
misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC (see Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]), or
that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting
public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. (Philippine Constitution Association vs. Mathay, 18
SCRA 300 [1966]), citing Philippine Constitution Association vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965]). Besides, the institution of a
taxpayer's suit, per se is no assurance of judicial review. As held by this Court in Tan vs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]),

speaking through our present Chief Justice, this Court is vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be
entertained.
C. Unavoidability of constitutional question.
Again upon the authority of People vs. Vera, "it is a wellsettled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not
be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a
determination of the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented."
We have already stated that, by the standards set forth in People vs. Vera, the present is not an "appropriate case" for either
petitioner Dumlao or for petitioners Igot and Salapantan. They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity
for resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity would require that this suit be dismissed.
II. The substantive viewpoint.
We have resolved, however, to rule squarely on two of the challenged provisions, the Courts not being entirely without discretion
in the matter. Thus, adherence to the strict procedural standard was relaxed in Tinio vs. Mina(26 SCRA 512 [1968]); Edu vs.
Ericta (35 SCRA 481 [1970]); and in Gonzalez vs. Comelec (27 SCRA 835 [1969]), the Opinion in the Tinio and Gonzalez cases
having been penned by our present Chief Justice. The reasons which have impelled us are the paramount public interest involved
and the proximity of the elections which will be held only a few days hence.
Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is discriminatory against him personally is belied by the fact that
several petitions for the disqualification of other candidates for local positions based on the challenged provision have already
been filed with the COMELEC (as listed in p. 15, respondent's Comment). This tellingly overthrows Dumlao's contention of
intentional or purposeful discrimination.
The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safer guard of equal protection is neither well taken. The
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on
reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public
service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that
age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of
age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the
Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law would be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political
elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.
Coming now to the case of retirees. Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for
elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be
reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65 year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not
a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason
to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The
need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically
significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work, but,
which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result
from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection neither does it permit of
such denial (see People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1933]). Persons similarly situated are sinlilarly treated.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a
classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification
based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all Chose
belonging to the same class (Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30 [1978] citing Felwa vs. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966]; Rafael v.
Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board, 21 SCRA 336 [1967]; Inchong etc., et al. vs. Hernandez 101 Phil. 1155
[1957]). The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The classification in question
being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even it at times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is
marred by theoretical inconsistencies" (Chief Justice Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, 1977 ed., p. 547).
There is an additional consideration. Absent herein is a showing of the clear invalidity of the questioned provision. Well accepted
is the rule that to justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful
and equivocal breach. Courts are practically unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall not be declared invalid unless the
conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt (Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 55 [1978], citing Cooper vs.
Telfair 4 Dall 14; Dodd, Cases on Constitutional Law, 3rd ed. 1942, 56). Lastly, it is within the compentence of the legislature to
prescribe qualifications for one who desires to become a candidate for office provided they are reasonable, as in this case.
In so far as the petition of Igot and Salapantan are concerned, the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52,
quoted in full earlier, and which they challenge, may be divided in two parts. The first provides:
a. judgment of conviction jor any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact ...
The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal principle. We are aware of the presumption of validity that attaches
to a challenged statute, of the well-settled principle that "all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of constitutionality,"
and that Courts will not set aside a statute as constitutionally defective "except in a clear case." (People vs. Vera, supra). We are
constrained to hold that this is one such clear case.
Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation,

according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional
presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges have
been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the
degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of dislotalty and one against whom charges have been
filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on
the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a
crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the
term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet. there is "clear
and present danger" that because of the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of
disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.
Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather than before an
administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of findings between two government bodies, to the
extreme detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of guilt
should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination.
Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionable portion is mandated. It is
separable from the first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand by itself.
WHEREFORE, 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid. Said paragraph reads:
SEC. 4. Special disqualification. In addition to violation of Section 10 of Article XII(C) of the
Constitution and disqualifications mentioned in existing laws which are hereby declared as disqualification
for any of the elective officials enumerated in Section 1 hereof, any retired elective provincial, city or
municipal official, who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law
and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be
elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.
2) That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that "... the
filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary
investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact", is hereby declared null and void, for being violative
of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.
BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDUARDO T.
RODRIGUEZ, respondents. G.R. No. 112889 April 18, 1995
VITUG, J.:
FACTS: The Court is called upon to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties on the meaning of the term "fugitive from
justice as that phrase is so used under the provisions of Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160). That law
states: Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: xxx xxx
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad.
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for the elective position for the elective position in the Province of Quezon
in the May 1992 elections filed this petition for certiorari praying for the reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC which
dismissed his petition for quo warranto against the winning candidate, herein private respondent Eduardo Rodriguez, for being
allegedly a fugitive from justice.
It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for ten
(10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles
Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed,
has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged "flight" from that country.
Before the 11th May 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation of respondent's certificate of candidacy, on the ground
of the candidate's disqualification under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code, was filed by petitioner with the
COMELEC. The COMELEC dismissed the petition.
Petitioner's subsequent recourse to this Court from the 08th May 1992 resolution of COMELEC was dismissed without
prejudice, however, to the filing in due time of a possible post-election quo warranto proceeding against private respondent.
Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992. Forthwith, petitioner instituted quo
warranto proceedings against private respondent before the COMELEC. The COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the
petition. The COMELEC En Banc denied a reconsideration of the resolution. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy (and to date), is said to be facing
a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant for his arrest comes within the term "fugitive from justice"
HELD: Petitioner's position is perspicuous and to the point. The law, he asseverates, needs no further interpretation and
construction. Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160, is rather clear, he submits, and it disqualifies "fugitive from justice"
includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid
prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence (Philippine Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 399, by F.B.
Moreno; Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 671; King vs. Noe, 244 S.C. 344, 137 S.E. 2d 102, 103; Hughes vs. PFlanz,

138 Federal Reporter 980; Tobin vs. Casaus, 275 Pacific Reporter, 2d., p. 792), and it may be so conceded as expressing the
general and ordinary connotation of the term.
In turn, private respondent would have the Court respect the conclusions of the Oversight Committee which, conformably with
Section 533 2 of R.A. 7160, was convened by the President to "formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations
necessary for the efficient and effective implementation of any and all provisions of the Code to ensure compliance with the
principles of Local Autonomy.
Here are some excerpts from the committee's deliberations:
CHAIRMAN MERCADO. Session is resumed.
So, we are in agreement to retain Line 12, Page 36, as is. So next, Page 39.
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Kay Benny Marquez.
REP. CUENCO: What does he want?
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Kung puwede i-retain lang iyan. Bahala na kung
kuwestiyunin ang constitutionality nito before the Supreme Court later on.
REP. CUENCO. Anong nakalagay diyan?
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Iyong disqualification to run for public office.
Any person who is a fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad.
Mabigat yung abroad. One who is facing criminal charges with the warrant of arrest
pending, unserved. . .
HONORABLE SAGUISAG. I think that is even a good point, ano what is a fugitive?
It is not defined. We have loose understanding. . .
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. So isingit na rin sa definition of terms iyong fugitive.
Si Benny umalis na, with the understanding na okay na sa atin ito.
THE CHAIRMAN. Whether we have this rule or not she can run. She is not a fugitive
from justice. Mrs. Marcos can run at this point and I have held that for a long time ago.
So can. . .
MS. DOCTOR. Mr. Chairman. . .
THE CHAIRMAN. Yes.
MS. DOCTOR. Let's move to. . .
THE CHAIRMAN. Wait, wait, wait. Can we just agree on the wording, this is very
important. Manny, can you come up?
MR. REYES. Let's use the word conviction by final judgment.
THE CHAIRMAN. Fugitive means somebody who is convicted by final judgment.
Okay,. Fugitive means somebody who is convicted by final judgment. Insert that on Line
43 after the semi-colon. Is that approved? No objection, approved (TSN, Oversight
Committee, 07 May 1991).
xxx xxx xxx
THE CHAIRMAN. Andy, saan ba naman itong amendment on page 2? Sino ba ang
gumawa nito? Okay, on page 2, lines 43 and 44, "fugitive from justice". What "fugitive"?
Sino ba ang gumawa nito, ha?
MR. SANCHEZ. Yes, I think, well, last time, Mr. Chairman, we agree to clarify the word
"fugitive".
THE CHAIRMAN. "Fugitive from justice means a person" ba ito, ha?
MR. SANCHEZ. Means a person...
THE CHAIRMAN. Ha?
HON. REYES. A person who has been convicted.
THE CHAIRMAN; Yes, fugitive from justice, oo. Fugitive from justice shall mean or
means one who has been convicted by final judgment. It means one who has been
convicted by final judgment.
HON. DE PEDRO. Kulang pa rin ang ibig sabihin niyan.
THE CHAIRMAN. Ano? Sige, tingnan natin.
HON. DE PEDRO. Kung nasa loob ng presuhan, fugitive pa rin siya?
THE CHAIRMAN. O, tama na yan, fugitive from justice. He has been convicted by final
judgment, meaning that if he is simply in jail and because he put up, post bail, but the
case is still being reviewed, that is not yet conviction by final judgment. 3
The Oversight Committee evidently entertained serious apprehensions on the possible constitutional infirmity of Section 40(e) of
Republic Act No. 7160 if the disqualification therein meant were to be so taken as to embrace those who merely were facing
criminal charges. A similar concern was expressed by Senator R. A. V. Saguisag who, during the bicameral conference
committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives, made this reservation:
. . . de ipa-refine lang natin 'yung language especially 'yung, the scope of fugitive. Medyo bothered ako doon, a. 4
The Oversight Committee finally came out with Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991. It provided:

Art. 73. Disqualifications. The following persons shall be disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
(a) . . .
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a
person who has been convicted by final judgment. 5 (Emphasis supplied)
Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon law by the officials in charge of its enforcement deserves great
and considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166, 181). The Court certainly
agrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so
written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it. The Court
believes and thus holds, albeit with some personal reservations of the ponente (expressed during the Court's en
banc deliberations), that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the
extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final
judgment." is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not, in fact, private respondent is a "fugitive from
justice" as such term must be interpreted and applied in the light of the Court's opinion. The omission is understandable since the
COMELEC dismissed outrightly the petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court itself, not being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the
COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved factual matter.
WHEREFORE, the questioned resolutions of the Commission on Elections are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the case is
hereby REMANDED to the Commission which is DIRECTED to proceed and resolve the case with dispatch conformably with
the foregoing opinion. No special pronouncement on costs.
GENEROSO P. CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 74259 February 14, 1991
CRUZ, J.:
FACTS: As Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Nueva Vizcaya, the petitioner was
designated Acting Supervising Cashier in the said Office. In this capacity, he received collections, disbursed funds and made
bank deposits and withdrawals pertaining to government accounts.
On April 13, 1981, his designation as Acting Supervising Cashier was terminated, and a Transfer of Accountabilities
was effected between the petitioner and his successor. The Certificate of Turnover revealed a shortage in the amount of
P72,823.08. A demand letter required the petitioner to produce the missing amount but he was able to pay only P10,159,50. The
balance was demanded in another letter. This was subsequently reduced by P12,067.51 through the payment to the petitioner of
temporarily disallowed cash items and deductions from his salary before his dismissal from the service.
A final letter of demand for the total deficiency of P50,596.07 was sent to the petitioner. The demand not having been
met, an information for malversation was filed against him with the respondent court. The above facts are not denied by the
petitioner. He insists, however, that he is not guilty of the charge because the shortage imputed to him was malversed by other
persons.
His claim is that the P50,000.00 constituting the bulk of the shortage represented the unliquidated withdrawal made by
Paymaster Diosdado Pineda through one of four separate checks issued and encashed while the petitioner was on official leave of
absence. He avers he was later made to post the amount in his cash book by Acting Deputy Provincial Treasurer Bernardo C.
Aluning and he had no choice but to comply although he had not actually received the said amount.
Testifying for the prosecution, Pineda insisted he had liquidated all four checks after the amounts thereof were
disbursed, turning over to the petitioner the corresponding withdrawal vouchers, paid vouchers, and payrolls. He added that the
petitioner was not really absent on the dates in question as alleged but was in fact the one who prepared the said checks in the
morning before attending to the sick wife in the hospital, returning to the office in the afternoon. He said that the payroll
payments made on December 22, 23 and 29, 1980, were liquidated on December 29, 1980, after the petitioner came back from
the hospital.
Acting Provincial Treasurer Perfecto Martinez corroborated Pineda's testimony that the petitioner was not on official
leave on the dates in question. He said that although Check No. 958525 had already been encashed on December 23 1980, the
encashment was not immediately recorded in the petitioner's cashbook, "which (was) one way of temporarily hiding the early
detection of a shortage." It was only in March 1981 that the shortage was discovered and, when confronted with it, the petitioner
had no explanation to offer.
Aluning denied he had exerted pressure on the petitioner to post the shortage in the petitioner's cash book. He explained
that after receiving the bank statement from the PNB for December 1980, he discovered that although the amount of P50,000.00
appeared to have been already encashed, the encashment was not reflected in the petitioner's cash book. As his superior, he
required the petitioner to make the proper entry in the cash book because the amount withdrawn was already part of the latter's
accountability.
The Sandiganbayan held that accused must be answerable for the misappropriation of the said amount.
ISSUE: whether or not the presumed innocence of the accused must yield to the positive finding that he malversed the sum of
P50,310.87

HELD: No. After considering the evidence of the parties, the Sandiganbayan, through Justice Amante Q. Alconcel, made the
following findings:
The evidence on record is devoid of any explanation from the defense as to the amount of P595.87. Hence,
the accused must be held answerable for the misappropriation of the said amount.
As to the amount of P50,000.00, We are not disposed to give credence to his claim that same has not been
liquidated by the paymaster, for the following reasons:
First, Check No. 958525 is only one of four (4) checks issued and encashed for the same purpose, and that is,
to pay salary differentials as well as salaries and wages of provincial officials and employees of the province
of Nueva Vizcaya covering the period, January to December, 1980. Issuance and encashment occurred on
December 23, 1980, and in fact, another check (No. 956639) was also issued and encashed on the same day.
The two (2) other checks (Nos. 956637 and 958526) were issued and encashed on December 22 and 29,
1980, respectively. Except for Check No. 958525, which was only entered in accused's Cash Book on March
31, 1981, or three (3) months after its issuance and encashment, all the other three (3) were duly entered.
Then Check No. 956639 which, as pointed out above, was issued and encashed on the same day as Check
No. 958525, was duly entered in his Cash Book. Non-entry of the latter check on time was a subtle way of
camouflaging the embezzlement of its money equivalent.
Secondly, there seems to be no logical reason why Checks Nos. 956639 and 958525, could not have been
liquidated together by Diosdado Pineda who used the proceeds to pay salary differentials of government
officials and employees of the province of Nueva Vizcaya, since these have been issued and encashed on the
same day.
Thirdly, Diosdado Pineda, who was presented as a prosecution witness, swore that he duly liquidated the
proceeds of the four (4) checks as follows:
ATTY. DEL ROSARIO ON DIRECT EXAMINATION:
Q If the payroll is already accomplished, where do you give the payroll?
A I give it back to the cashier with the corresponding voucher to support the vouchers
paid by me or disbursed by me.
ATTY. ESCAREAL:
Q So that your cash advances will be liquidated?
A Yes, Your honor.
xxx xxx xxx
Q In the absence of the cashier to whom do you give these documents?
A give them to the cashier only, no other person.
ATTY. DEL ROSARIO
Q In his absence, do you keep these documents?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q For payrolls that you paid for December 22, 23 and 29, when did you give these
payrolls to the cashier?
A On December 29, sir.
ATTY. ESCAREAL:
Q Duly accomplished?
A Duly accomplished, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. ALCONCEL:
Q Where did you see your cashier on the 29th?
A At the office, Your Honor.
ATTY. DEL ROSARIO:
Q At what time?
A In the afternoon, sir.
ATTY. ALCONCEL:
Q Are you not aware that your cashier was absent on that date?
A He was present on that day, sir. He would go out because the wife was supposedly
having a check-up but in the afternoon, he would return. (t.s.n., March 29, 1985, pp.
1618)
The cashier referred to by the witness is the accused, Generoso P. Corpuz.
And fourthly, We are not impressed by accused's claim that he was absent on December 22, 23 and 29, 1980.
His witness, Diosdado Pineda, declared otherwise. His Employee's Leave Card (Exhibit J), wherein his
earned leaves are indicated, shows that during the month of December, 1980, he earned 1.25 days vacation
leave and 1.25 days sick leave, which is the same number of days vacation and sick leaves that he earned
monthly from July 7, 1976 to October 1981. Moreover, even if it were true that he was absent on December
23, 1980, the day when Check No. 958525 was issued and encashed, yet, the other check which was issued
and encashed on the same day was duly liquidated.

The above findings are mainly factual and are based on substantial evidence. There is no reason to disturb them, absent any of the
exceptional circumstances that will justify their review and reversal. On the contrary, the Court is convinced that the facts as
established point unmistakably to the petitioner's guilt of the offense charged.
This conclusion is bolstered by the Solicitor General's observation that:
Moreover, petitioner's denial of responsibility for the missing P50,000.00 is negated by the following factors:
First. When he entered the said amount in his cash book in March, 1981, he did not make any notation that
said amount, though entered, was not actually received.
Second. At the time he signed the certificate of turn-over (Exhibit C), he did not make any certification that
the amount of P50,000.00 should not be charged against him.
Third. Despite his insistence that Pineda and Martinez misappropriated the money, he did not file any case,
whether civil, criminal or otherwise, against either or both.
The absence of a post-audit is not, as the petitioner contends, a fatal omission. That is not a preliminary requirement to the filing
of an information for malversation as long as the prima facie guilt of the suspect has already been established. The failure of a
public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. 8 And what
determines whether the crime of malversation has been committed is the presence of the following requirements under Article
217 of the Revised Penal Code:
(a) That the offender be a public officer.
(b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office.
(c) That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable.
(d) That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence,
permitted another person to take them.
The petitioner's claim that he is the victim of a "sinister design" to hold him responsible for a crime he has not committed is less
than convincing. His attempt to throw the blame on others for his failure to account for the missing money only shows it is he
who is looking for a scapegoat. The plaintive protest that he is "a small fry" victimized by the "untouchables" during the Marcos
regime is a mere emotional appeal that does not impress at all. The suggestion that the supposed injustice on the petitioner would
be abetted by this Court unless his conviction is reversed must be rejected as an warrant presumptuousness.
The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where the evidence of the parties is evenly balanced, in which
case the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. There is no such equipoise here.
The evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by the petitioner with his nebulous claims of
persecution and conspiracy. The presumed innocence of the accused must yield to the positive finding that he malversed the sum
of P50,310.87 to the prejudice of the public whose confidence he has breached. His conviction must be affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
FEEDER INTERNATIONAL LINE, PTE., LTD., by its agent, FEEDER INTERNATIONAL (PHILS.)
INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Fourteenth Division, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, and COMMISSIONER
OF CUSTOMS, respondents. G.R. No. 94262 May 31, 1991
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS: The instant petition seeks the reversal of the decision of the CA affirming the decision rendered by respondent Court
of Tax Appeals which found the vessel M/T "ULU WAI" liable under Section 2530(a) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines (P.D. No. 1464), as amended, and its cargo of 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil liable
under Section 2530(a), (f), and (1-1) of the same Code and ordering the forfeiture of the said vessel and its cargo.
The M/T "ULU WAI" foreign vessel of Honduran registry, owned and operated by Feeder International Shipping Lines
of Singapore, left Singapore on May 6, 1986 carrying 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil consigned to
Far East Synergy Corporation of Zamboanga, Philippines. On May 14, 1986, the vessel anchored at the vicinity of Guiuanon
Island in Iloilo without notifying the Iloilo customs authorities. The presence of the vessel only came to the knowledge of the
Iloilo authorities by information of the civilian informer. The Acting District Collector of Iloilo then dispatched a Customs team
to verify the report.
The Customs team found out that the vessel did not have on board the required ship and shipping documents, except for
a clearance from the port authorities of Singapore clearing the vessel for "Zamboanga." In view thereof, the vessel and its cargo
were held and a Warrant of Seizure and Detention over the same was issued after due investigation. The petitioner then filed its
Motion to Dismiss and to Quash the Warrants of Seizure and Detention which the District Collector denied.
The District Collector issued his decision, with the following disposition finding M/T "ULU WAI" guilty of violating
Section 2530 (a) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (PD 1464), as amended, while her cargo of 1,100 M/T Gas
Oil and 1,000 M/T Fuel Oil are hereby found guilty of violating Section 2530* (a), (f), and (1-1) under the same Code and are
hereby forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.
The Commissioner of Customs and the CTA affirmed the District Collector in toto. On May 8, 1990, the Court of
Appeals rendered its questioned decision affirming the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied, it interposed this petition contending that:
1. The CA erred in finding on the basis of circumstantial evidence that an illegal importation had been committed;

2. Petitioner was deprived of property without due process of law in that its right to be presumed innocent was not recognized
and the decision was not supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt; and
3. The sworn statements of Deposa and Torres were taken without assistance of counsel in violation of their constitutional right
thereto.
ISSUE: whether or not there was an illegal importation committed
HELD: Yes. We find no merit in the Petition.
1. It must be here emphasized that a forfeiture proceeding under tariff and customs laws is not penal in nature, contrary to the
argument advanced by herein petitioner. In the case of People vs. Court of first Instance of Rizal etc., et al., 9 this Court made an
exhaustive analysis of the nature of forfeiture proceedings, in relation to criminal proceedings, as follows:
. . . It is quite clear that seizure and forfeiture proceedings under the tariff and customs laws are not criminal
in nature as they do not result in the conviction of the offender nor in the imposition of the penalty provided
for in Section 3601 of the Code. As can be gleaned from Section 2533 of the code, seizure proceedings, such
as those instituted in this case, are purely civil and administrative in character, the main purpose of which is
to enforce the administrative fines or forfeiture incident to unlawful importation of goods or their deliberate
possession. The penalty in seizure cases is distinct and separate from the criminal liability that might be
imposed against the indicted importer or possessor and both kinds of penalties may be imposed.
In the case at bar, the decision of the Collector of Customs, as in other seizure proceedings, concerns
the res rather than the persona. The proceeding is a probe on contraband or illegally imported goods. These
merchandise violated the revenue law of the country, and as such, have been prevented from being
assimilated in lawful commerce until corresponding duties are paid thereon and the penalties imposed and
satisfied either in the form of fine or of forfeiture in favor of the government who will dispose of them in
accordance with law. The importer or possessor is treated differently. The fact that the administrative penalty
be falls on him is an inconsequential incidence to criminal liability. By the same token, the probable guilt
cannot be negated simply because he was not held administratively liable. The Collector's final declaration
that the articles are not subject to forfeiture does not detract his findings that untaxed goods were transported
in respondents' car and seized from their possession by agents of the law. Whether criminal liability lurks on
the strength of the provision of the Tariff and Customs Code adduced in the information can only be
determined in a separate criminal action. Respondents' exoneration in the administrative cases cannot deprive
the State of its right to prosecute. But under our penal laws, criminal responsibility, if any, must be proven
not by preponderance of evidence but by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Considering, therefore, that proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally imported are not criminal in nature since they do not
result in the conviction of the wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon him of a penalty, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not
required in order to justify the forfeiture of the goods. In this case, the degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence
which means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 10
In the case at bar, we find and so hold that the Government has sufficiently established that an illegal importation, or at least an
attempt thereof, has been committed with the use of the vessel M/T "ULU WAI," thus warranting the forfeiture of said vessel and
its cargo pursuant to the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code.
Before we proceed to a discussion of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, it bears mention that petitioner, which is a
corporate entity, has no personality to invoke the right to be presumed innocent which right is available only to an individual who
is an accused in a criminal case.
2. The main issue for resolution is whether or not there was an illegal importation committed, or at least an attempt thereof,
which would justify a forfeiture of the subject vessel and its cargo.
Petitioner avers that respondent court erred in finding that an illegal importation had been committed on the basis of
circumstantial evidence, erroneously relying on Section 5 (now Section 4), Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. As earlier stated,
forfeiture proceedings are not criminal in nature, hence said provision of Rule 133 which involves. such circumstantial evidence
as will produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt does not apply.
Section 1202 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides that importation begins when the carrying vessel or aircraft enters the
jurisdiction of the Philippines with intention to unload therein. It is clear from the provision of the law that mere intent to unload
is sufficient to commence an importation. And "intent," being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof, but must
ordinarily be inferred from the facts, 11 and therefore can only be proved by unguarded, expressions, conduct and circumstances
generally. 12
In the case at bar, that petitioner is guilty of illegal importation, there having been an intent to unload, is amply supported by
substantial evidence as clearly demonstrated by this comprehensive discussion in respondent court's decision:
It is undisputed that the vessel M/T "ULU WAI" entered the jurisdiction of the Philippines. The issue that
calls for Our resolution is whether or not there was an intention to unload. The facts and circumstances borne
by the evidence convince Us that there was intent to unload. The following circumstances unmistakably point
to this conclusion.
1. Considering that the vessel came from Singapore, the route to Zamboanga was shorter and Iloilo lies
further north. It is not logical for the sailing vessel to travel a longer distance to get the necessary repairs.
2. When the vessel M/T "ULU WAI" anchored at Guiuanon Island, Guimaras, Iloilo, it did not notify the
Iloilo port or Customs authorities of its arrival. The master of the vessel did not file a marine protest until 12

days after it had anchored, despite the supposed urgency of the repairs needed and notwithstanding the
provision (Sec. 1016) of the Code requiring the master to file protest within 24 hours.
3. At the time of boarding by the customs personnel, the required ship's and shipping documents were not on
board except the clearance from Singaporean port officials clearing the vessel for Zamboanga. Petitioner
claims that these were turned over to the shipping agent who boarded the vessel on May 15, 1986. However,
this claim is belied by the sworn marine protest (Exhibit "E") of the master of M/T "ULU WAI" Mr. Romeo
Deposa.
It was only on or about the 20th of May when I instructed one of the crew to: get down of
(sic) the vessel and find means and ways to contact the vessel's representative.
Moreover, in such Sworn Statement (Exhibit "G"), ship agent, Antonio Torres, stated that he did not know
the buyer of the oil, which is impossible if he had the Local Purchase Order of the alleged buyer, Pogun
Construction SDN. Torres also swore that his knowledge came from the vessel's owner, without mentioning
the shipping documents which indicate such data. He also said that he did not know the consignee of the oil
which would have been patent from the documents. Lastly, as also pointed out by the court a quo, the captain
of the vessel M/T "ULU WAI" Romeo Deposa, in his sworn statement to custom authorities on May 26,
1986, enumerated the documents he allegedly gave to Mr. Antonio Torres, but did not mention as among
them the Local Purchase Order of Pogun Construction SDN and the Bill of Lading.
4. When the vessel was inspected, the tugboat M/T "CATHEAD", and the large M/T "SEMIRANO NO. 819"
were alongside it. A fixture note revealed that the barge and the tugboat were contracted by Consignee Far
East Synergy to load the cargo of the vessel into the awaiting barge and to discharge the same to Manila
(Exhibits "I" and "I-1").
It is of no moment that the fixture note did not expressly mention the vessel M/T "ULU WAI" Government
witnesses, Asencio and Lumagpas, testified that it was the vessel's cargo which was to be unloaded and
brought to Manila by them. 13
The aforequoted findings of fact of respondent Court of Appeals are in consonance with the findings of both the Collector and the
Commissioner of Customs, as affirmed by the Court of Tax Appeals. We, therefore, find no compelling reason to deviate from
the elementary principle that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, and of the administrative and quasi-judicial bodies for that
matter, are entitled to great weight and are conclusive and binding upon this Court absent a showing of a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
3. The fact that the testimonies of Deposa and Torres were given without the assistance of counsel may not be considered an
outright violation of their constitutional right to be assisted by counsel. As explained in the case ofNera vs. The Auditor
General: 14
The right to the assistance of counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution
or a law. Exception is made in the charter only during the custodial investigation of a person suspected of a
crime, who may not waive his right to counsel except in writing and in the presence of counsel, and during
the trial of the accused, who has the right "to be heard by himself and counsel," either retained by him or
provided for him by the government at its expense. These guarantees are embodied in the Constitution, along
with the other rights of the person facing criminal prosecution, because of the odds he must contend with to
defend his liberty (and before even his life) against the awesome authority of the State.
In other proceedings, however, the need for the assistance of counsel is not as urgent nor is it deemed
essential to their validity. There is nothing in the Constitution that says a party in a non-criminal proceeding
is entitled to be represented by counsel and that without such representation he will not be bound by such
proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not
engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members the safeguard is deemed
ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with
a lawyer at his side.
Besides, if ever there was any doubt as to the veracity of the sworn statements of Deposa and Torres, they should have been
presented during any appropriate stage of the proceedings to refute or deny the statements they made. This was not done by
petitioner. Hence, the presumption that official duty was regularly performed stands. In addition, petitioner does not deny that
Torres is himself a lawyer. Finally, petitioner simply contends that the sworn statements were taken without the assistance of
counsel but, however, failed to allege or prove that the same were taken under anomalous circumstances which would render
them inadmissible as evidence against petitioner. We thus find no compelling reason to doubt the validity or veracity of the said
sworn statements.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRISCO HOLGADO, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-2809
March 22, 1950
MORAN, C.J.:
FACTS: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention because
according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one

Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal
liberty." On May 8, 1948, the day set for the trial, the trial court proceeded as follows:
Court: Is this the case ready for trial?
Fiscal: I am ready, your honor.
Court: to the accused.
Q. do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty? A. I have no lawyer and I will plead guilty.
Court: Arraign the accused.
Note: Interpreter read the information to the accused in the local dialect after which he was asked this question.
Q. What do you plead? A. I plead guilty, but I was instructed by one Mr. Ocampo.
Q. Who is that Mr. Ocampo, what is his complete name? A. Mr. Numeriano Ocampo.
The provincial fiscal is hereby ordered to investigate that man.
Fiscal: I have investigated this case and found out that this Ocampo has nothing to do with the case and I found no
evidence against this Ocampo.
Court: Sentenced reserved.
Two days later, the trial court rendered the following judgment:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRISCO HOLGADO defendant-appellant.
SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION
SENTENCE
The accused, Frisco Holgado, stands charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention in the
following
INFORMATION
That on or about December 11, 1947, in the municipality of Concepcion, Province of Romblon, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused being a private individual, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia
Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about 8 hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her
personal liberty.
Contrary to law.
This case is called for trial on May 8, 1948. Upon arraignment the accused pleaded guilty to the information above
described.
The offense committed by the accused is kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined by article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by section 2 of Republic Act No. 18 and punished by reclusion temporal in it
minimum period to death. Applying indeterminate sentence law the penalty shall be prision mayor in its maximum
degree to reclusion temporal in the medium degree as minimum, or ten years (10) and one (1) day of prision mayor to
twenty (20) years, with the accessory penalties provided for by law, with costs. The accused is entitled to one-half of
his preventive imprisonment.
ISSUE: whether or not the proceedings in the trial court were done in violation of the constitutional rights of the accused
HELD: Yes. It must be noticed that in the caption of the case as it appears in the judgment above quoted, the offense charged is
named SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION while in the body of the judgment if is said that the accused "stands charged with the
crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention." In the formation filed by the provincial fiscal it is said that he "accuses Frisco
Holgado of the crime of slight illegal detention." The facts alleged in said information are not clear as to whether the offense is
named therein or capital offense of "kidnapping and serious illegal detention" as found by the trial judge in his judgment. Since
the accused-appellant pleaded guilty and no evidence appears to have been presented by either party, the trial judge must have
deduced the capital offense from the facts pleaded in the information.
Under the circumstances, particularly the qualified plea given by the accused who was unaided by counsel, it was not prudent, to
say the least, for the trial court to render such a serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a capital offense, and imposing
upon him such a heavy penalty as ten years and one day of prision mayor to twenty years, without absolute any evidence to
determine and clarify the true facts of the case.
The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from the beginning. It is expressly provided in our rules of Court, Rule 112,
section 3, that:
If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney being
arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A
reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney.
Under this provision, when a defendant appears without attorney, the court has four important duties to comply with: 1 It must
inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned; 2 After giving him such information the court
must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney; 3 If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign
attorney de oficio to defend him; and 4 If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a
reasonable time therefor.
Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. The record discloses that said court did not inform the accused
of his right to have an attorney nor did it ask him if he desired the aid of one. The trial court failed to inquire whether or not the
accused was to employ an attorney, to grant him reasonable time to procure or assign an attorney de oficio. The question asked by
the court to the accused was "Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?" Not only did such a question fail to

inform the accused that it was his right to have an attorney before arraignment, but, what is worse, the question was so framed
that it could have been construed by the accused as a suggestion from the court that he plead guilt if he had no attorney. And this
is a denial of fair hearing in violation of the due process clause contained in our Constitution.
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal
cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would
be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no
skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is
guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant
or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a
constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused
of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the
court should assign one de oficio if he so desires and he is poor grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.
It must be added, in the instant case, that the accused who was unaided by counsel pleaded guilty but with the following
qualification: "but I was instructed by one Mr. Ocampo." The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of this
qualification. the record does not show whether the supposed instructions was real and whether it had reference to the
commission of the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the
presence of the accused and there is now no way of determining whether the supposed instruction is a good defense or may
vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the court became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had
investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the
simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the
court should have seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel specially because of the qualified plea given by him and the
seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court.
The judgment appealed from is reversed and the case is remanded to the Court below for a new arraignment and a new trial after
the accused is apprised of his right to have and to be assisted by counsel. So ordered.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDUARDO AGBAYANI y MENDOZA, accused-appellant. G.R.
No. 122770 January 16, 1998
PER CURIAM:
FACTS: The evidence adduced on record shows that sometime in September of 1993 in Malolos, Bulacan, the accused was
charged by his two daughters, FEDELINA and DODIMA AGBAYANI, [with] the crime of rape which case was raffled to the
sala of Judge Manalastas of Regional Trial Court, Bulacan. The case was, however, provisionally dismissed by said Judge after
the complainants desisted from pursuing the same in May 1994. Eduardo Agbayani was thus consequently released from jail on
July 13, 1994. Three (3) days thereafter, he began living with four (4) of his six (6) daughters, Fedelina, Eden, Diana and Edima,
in a rented room at 30-A Makabayan St., Bgy. Obrero, Quezon City.
The evidence of the prosecution, in part consisting of the testimonies of Complainant Eden Agbayani, Medico-Legal
Officer, Dr. Florante Baltazar and SPO1 Salvador Buenviaje, shows that at the above-mentioned address the complainant, Eden
Agbayani, on the evening of July 19, 1994, was sleeping on the floor of the room with her father, the accused Eduardo Agbayani
and her youngest sister, Edima, while her sisters, Fedelina and Diana slept on a bed. At the time, complainant's mother was
outside the country, working in Saudi Arabia. At about 9:00 p.m. of July 19, Complainant Eden Agbayani was awakened from
her sleep by hands caressing her breasts and vagina. She turned to discover that it was her father who was then molesting her.
Frightened, she asked, "Tay bakit niyo po ginagawa sa akin ito, gayong kalalabas mo lang sa kulungan?" and threatened to kill
her [sic]. The accused then proceeded to undress her. Thereafter he undressed himself and succeeded in having carnal knowledge
with the complainant who could only cry helplessly. The complainant thereafter felt blood dripping from her vagina and felt pain.
The next day, the complainant informed her elder sister, Fedelina, of what had been done to her by her father. She was
told not to worry as they would go to Bulacan to report the incident to Fiscal Caraeg of Bulacan, who had, the year before,
handled the rape case filed by Fedelina and Dodima. Several attempts were made by her sisters, Fedelina and Eden to reach the
said fiscal but it was only on September 9, 1994, that they were able to meet with him. Fiscal Caraeg of Bulacan reported the
complaint to Judge Danilo Manalastas who reopened the previously provisionally dismissed case and issued a warrant of arrest
against the herein accused.
With the assistance of police officers from Station 10 of the SIID in Quezon City, the accused was arrested on the same
day at his residence at 30-A Makabayan St., Bgy. Obrero, Quezon City and was later brought to Malolos, Bulacan where he is
currently detained. After the accused's arrest, Eden and Fedelina returned to Station 10 where they made individual statements
before SPO1 Salvador Buenviaje narrating the events leading to and occurring after the incident of July 19, 1994.
The next morning, Eden was examined by Medico-Legal Officer and Chief of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Dr. Florante
Baltazar, a colonel, who, accordingly, prepared the corresponding Medico-Legal Report.
Appellant put up the defense of denial and alibi. According to him, he could not have raped his daughter EDEN,
because on 19 July 1994, he was in Barangay Victoria in Sual, Pangasinan, visiting his eldest daughter. He declared that EDEN
charged him with rape because he had hit her with a belt after he caught her lying about her whereabouts one night. Then on 24
July 1994, she left their rented apartment and did not return anymore.

Adoracion Cruz corroborated appellant's alibi. She declared that on 17 July 1994, appellant requested her to take care of his
children because he was going to Pangasinan to visit his sick father, returning home only on 21 July
1994.
The trial court gave full credence to the testimony of EDEN. It also ruled that EDEN did not voluntarily execute the
affidavit of desistance. Accordingly, the trial court imposed the penalty of death.
Appellant, through his new counsel de parte Attorneys Siobal and Floresta, filed a Motion for New Trial on the ground
that serious irregularities prejudicial to his substantial rights were committed during the trial, viz., the failure of the counsel de
oficio to: (a) present at trial the Barangay Captain of Barangay Obrero, Quezon City, who would have testified, on the basis of
certification attached to the motion, that there was a house bearing No. 30, Makabayan St., in his barangay, but that there was no
such place as 30-A Makabayan St. of said barangay, which was the address given by EDEN; (b) consider the futility of
Adoracion Cruz's testimony; (c) present private complainant's mother and sister Fedelina on sur-rebuttal to testify as to the
circumstances which brought about the execution of the affidavit of desistance; and (d) cross-examine complainant and the police
investigator exhaustively. He further alleged that his counsel de oficio was never prepared during all the scheduled hearings,
worse, even waived the presence of appellant after the third witness for the prosecution was presented. He also averred that the
trial court used its inherent power of contempt to intimidate private complainant.
The trial court denied the motion for new trial. In his Appellant's Brief filed before this Court, appellant contends that
the trial court erred in: (a) denying his motion for new trial; and (b) holding that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt
that he committed the crime charged. In support of the first assigned error, appellant reiterates the grounds in his motion for new
trial, and adds two others, namely, (1) the lower court failed to apprise him of his right to have counsel of his own choice; and (2)
the lower court did not give him the opportunity to prepare for trial, despite the mandated period of two days prescribed in
Section 9 of Rule 116.
ISSUE: Did the lower court fail to apprise him of his right to have counsel of his own choice?
HELD: No.
In his Appellant's Brief filed before this Court, appellant contends that the trial court erred in: (a) denying his motion for new
trial; and (b) holding that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the crime charged.
In support of the first assigned error, appellant reiterates the grounds in his motion for new trial, and adds two others, namely, (1)
the lower court failed to apprise him of his right to have counsel of his own choice; and (2) the lower court did not give him the
opportunity to prepare for trial, despite the mandated period of two days prescribed in Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court.
In his second assigned error, appellant contends that EDEN's testimony is not sufficient to convict, since it is unclear and not free
from serious contradictions. Considering their proximity to EDEN, it was impossible for her sisters or any one of them not to
have been awakened when EDEN was allegedly being abused by him. Strangely, EDEN simply kept quiet and allowed him to
abuse her; neither did she shout for help or put up a fight that would have awakened her sisters. Notably, EDEN and her sisters
allowed him to live and sleep with them again in their rented room even after the alleged rape.
Finally, appellant asserts that EDEN's testimony is unreliable because her affidavit of desistance must have necessarily been
contradictory thereto. Her "subsequent turn-around . . . that she was pressured and influenced to execute and sign the affidavit of
desistance further confirmed her being untruthful and, in effect, demolished whatsoever faith left on her charge against the
accused."
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) considers the first assigned error as devoid of merit. When appellant appeared without
counsel at the arraignment, the trial court informed him that it would appoint de oficio counsel for him if he so desired, to which
appellant agreed. Moreover, the 2-day period to prepare for trial provided in Section 9 of Rule 116 is merely directory and does
not prohibit the court from proceeding with trial after arraignment, especially if the defense, as here, consented thereto. It would
have been entirely different if the defense did not agree, in which case the court would have no other alternative but to grant him
the period.
As to appellant's other grievances, the OSG points out that throughout all the hearings, appellant never questioned the way his
defense was being handled by his counsel de oficio. The latter's request for a continuance because he had not yet conferred with
appellant was not evidence of counsel's lack of sincerity. On the contrary, it showed counsel's awareness of his duty to confer
with appellant to ferret out the relevant facts as regards the second witness for the prosecution. Likewise, the waiver of appellant's
presence during the hearing of 18 March 1995 did not prejudice him, because on that date, the defense presented EDEN to testify
as to her affidavit of desistance, and Fedelina to corroborate the statements of EDEN which testimonies were in appellant's
favor. As to the manner appellant's counsel de oficio cross-examined the prosecution witnesses, the OSG stresses that the record
shows that said counsel tried his best.
The OSG then characterizes the second assigned error as "barren of merit." EDEN's positive identification of appellant as the
author of the crime rendered appellant's defense of alibi unavailing; moreover, she demonstrated clearly and vividly what
transpired that fateful evening of 19 July 1994. Thus in view of EDEN's candid and categorical manner of testifying the OSG
concluded that she was a credible witness. 24
As to the commission of rape in a small room and in the presence of other persons, the OSG maintains that such was not at all
improbable. 25 There was, as well, nothing unusual in EDEN's silence; as she could only attempt to shout because appellant had
succeeded in covering her mouth with his hands and exercised a high level of moral ascendancy over EDEN, his
daughter. 26 Hence the OSG invokes the principle that in a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the former's
moral ascendancy and influence over the latter substitutes for violence intimidation. 27

As regards EDEN's affidavit of desistance, the OSG maintains that courts look with disfavor on retraction of testimonies
previously given in court, for such can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses usually for a monetary
consideration, 28 as well as the probability that it may later be repudiated.
In his Reply Brief, appellant countered that his consent to the appointment of counsel de oficio at his arraignment did not relieve
the court of its duty under Section 6 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court to inform him of his right to counsel and that it would be
grievous error to deny an accused such right. Appellant then elaborated on this point as follows:
This is not without judicial precedent. In People vs. Cachero, 73 Phil. 426 and People vs. Domenden, 73 Phil. 349,
cited in RJ Francisco's Criminal Procedure, Third Ed., 1966, p. 323 it was held, that:
The courts should comply with Rule 116, Sec. 3. It would be a grievous error to proceed by
sentencing the accused without due process of law and this is not complete, when the accused is
denied the right recognized by said rule. The records must show compliance therewith or that the
accused renounced his right to be assisted by counsel. This is demanded by the interest of justice
and remove all doubts that if the accused had waived said right, he was fully informed before
giving his plea of its consequences. Omission by courts whether voluntary should not truly be
censured but also condemned.
Discussing further the right to the 2-day period to prepare for trial, the appellant contends that said right:
[H]as been held to be mandatory and denial of this right is a reversible error and a ground for new trial. (R. J.
Francisco's Criminal Procedure, Third Ed., 1986, p. 404, citing People vs. Mijares, et al., 47 OG 4606;Dumasig
v. Morave, 23 SCRA 659). This must be so ". . . to prevent that any accused be caught unaware and deprived of the
means of properly facing the charges presented against him.
The first assigned error does not persuade this Court. It is true that the transcript of the stenographic notes of the proceedings of
22 December 1994 and the order issued by the trial court after the conclusion of said proceedings only state that the court
appointed de oficio counsel with the consent of the said accused. They do not categorically disclose that the trial informed
appellant of his right to counsel of his own choice. However, this does not mean that the trial court failed to inform appellant of
such right. The precise time the two counsel de oficiowere appointed is not disclosed in the record either. At the recorded portion
of the arraignment aspect of the proceedings on 22 December 1994, the two formally entered their appearance, thus:
COURT: Call the case.
(Interpreter calls the case).
FISCAL ROSARIO BARIAS:
For the prosecution, Your Honor.
ATTY. MARIETA AGUJA:
Respectfully appearing for the prosecution, Your Honor under the control and direct supervision of
the Trial Prosecutor, Your Honor, we are ready to present our first witness.
ATTY. BALDADO:
For the accused Your Honor, appointed as counsel de oficio.
ATTY. DE LA CRUZ:
For the accused, Your Honor appointed by the court as counsel de oficio. 29
This obviously means that the appointment had taken place earlier. The trial court's order 30 of 22 December 1994 states that
said de oficio counsel were "duly appointed by the Court with the consent of the accused." Since appellant has miserably failed to
show that he was not informed of his right to counsel, the presumptions that the law has been obeyed and official duty has been
regularly performed by the trial court stand. 31 In other words, the trial court is presumed to have complied with its four-fold
duties under Section 6 32 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, namely, (1) to inform the accused that he has the right to have his
own counsel before being arraigned; (2) after giving such information, to ask accused whether he desires the aid of counsel; (3) if
he so desires to procure the services of counsel, the court must grant him reasonable time to do so; and (4) if he so desires to have
counsel but is unable to employ one, the court must assign counsel de oficio to defend him. 33
It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of his right to counsel is
not sufficient ground to reverse conviction. The reason being that the trial court must be presumed to have complied with the
procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and that such a presumption can only be overcome by an
affirmative showing to the contrary. Thus it has been held that unless the contrary appears in the record, or that it is positively
proved that the trial court failed to inform the accused of his right to counsel, it will be presumed that the accused was informed
by the court of such right. 34
In U.S. v. Labial, 35 this Court held:
Adhering to the doctrine laid down in that case, the only question to be determined in this case is whether the failure of
the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of their right to have counsel is sufficient
ground to reverse the judgment of conviction and to send the case back for a new trial. Upon this point we are all
agreed that in the absence of an affirmative showing that the court below did in fact fail to advise the accused of their
rights under the provisions of sections 17 of General Orders No. 58, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 440, the mere
omission from the record brought here upon appeal of an entry affirmatively disclosing that he did so, is not reversible
error.
In the absence of an affirmative showing to the contrary, the court below must be presumed in matters of this kind to
have complied with the provisions of law prescribing the procedure to be followed in the trial had before him.
While in People v. Miranda 36 this Court explicitly stated:

However, said counsel calls attention to the fact that the record is silent as to whether or not, at the time appellant was
arraigned, the trial court informed him of his right to be assisted by an attorney, under section 3 of Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court.
This precise issue was determined in United States vs. Labial (27 Phil., 87, 88), in the sense that unless the contrary
appears in the records, it will be presumed that the defendant was informed by the court of his right to counsel. ". . . If
we should insist on finding every fact fully recorded before a citizen can be punished for an offense against the laws,
we should destroy public justice, and give unbridled license to crime. Much must be left to intendment and
presumption, for it is often less difficult to do things correctly than to describe them correctly." (United States vs.
Labial, supra.) The same doctrine was reiterated in People vs. Abuyen(52 Phil. 722) and in United States vs. Custan (28
Phil. 19). We see no reason to modify it now.
In the instant case, the trial court appointed two de oficio counsel who assisted the appellant at his arraignment, one of whom
extensively cross-examined the first witness for the prosecution, Dr. Florante Baltazar. 37 Besides, it is only in this appeal that
appellant raised the issue of the failure of the trial court to inform him of the right to counsel. At no time did he previously raise it
in the trial court despite ample opportunity to do so. His consent to be assisted by counsel de oficio, coupled with said counsel's
extensive cross-examination of Dr. Baltazar, may even be considered a waiver of his right to question the alleged failure of the
trial court to inform him of his right to counsel. 38
The cases of People v. Domenden 39 and People v. Cachero 40 cited by appellant are inapplicable. In both cases the trial courts
there clearly failed to inform the accused of their right to counsel nor appoint de oficio counsel during the arraignment.
Nevertheless, we take this opportunity to admonish trial courts to ensure that their compliance with their pre-arraignment duties
to inform the accused of his right to counsel, to ask him if he desires to have one, and to inform him that, unless he is allowed to
defend himself in person or he has counsel of his choice, de oficio counsel will be appointed for him, must appear on record.
Turning to the alleged violation of appellant's right to the 2-day period to prepare for trial, Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court reads:
Sec. 9. Time to prepare for trial After a plea of not guilty, the accused is entitled to two (2) days to prepare for trial
unless the court for good cause grants him further time.
It must be pointed out that the right must be expressly demanded. 41 Only when so demanded does denial thereof constitute
reversible error and a ground for new trial. 42 Further, such right may be waived, expressly or impliedly. 43 In the instant case,
appellant did not ask for time to prepare for trial, hence, he effectively waived such right.
During the succeeding hearings, appellant was represented by Atty. Temanil of the Public Attorney's Office in Quezon City, who
entered his appearance as de parte, and not as de oficio, counsel. It is to be presumed that Atty. Temanil's services were obtained
pursuant to the law creating the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), formerly the Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (CLAO). 44 There
is at all no showing that Atty. Temanil lacked the competence and skill to defend appellant. The latter's contention that his
counsel was not ready at all times because at the hearing on 20 January 1995 he asked for a continuation as he has "not yet
interviewed [his] Client," 45 is misleading. Atty. Temanil made that statement after he cross-examined EDEN and after the judge
realized that it was almost 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon and both of them were already hungry, thus:
ATTY. TEMANIL:
I just want to make it on record, Your Honor that from the start of trial the witness appears to be
fluent and suffers no difficulty in answering the questions, even the questions propounded by the
Private Prosecutor, Your Honor.
COURT:
Put that on record.
That is true, Atty. Temanil, it is almost 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon and we are both hungry now.
ATTY. TEMANIL:
I will just asked [sic] for continuance considering that I have not yet interviewed my client, Your
Honor.46
Neither is there merit in appellant's claim that his counsel committed irregularities: (1) in not considering the futility of the
testimony of Adoracion Cruz; (2) in not presenting the barangay captain in the evidence in chief for the defense, and EDEN's
mother and sister Fedelina in sur-rebuttal; and (3) in not cross-examining exhaustively EDEN.
Adoracion Cruz was presented to corroborate appellant's alibi that he was in the province and not in their rented room from 17 to
21 July 1994. On the other hand, the testimony of the barangay captain could not alter the fact that rape was committed in a
rented room in a house along Makabayan Street in his barangay. Appellant neither testified that he did not occupy a house
numbered 30-A nor denied that he was living with EDEN and her sisters in that room. Besides, he and his children were not
renting the entire house, but merely a room, which could probably be the unit numbered "30-A" referred to by EDEN.
As to the presentation of EDEN's mother and sister Fedelina as sur-rebuttal witnesses to disprove the claim of EDEN that they
coerced her into signing the affidavit of desistance, suffice it to state that there was nothing to show that they were in fact willing
to refute EDEN's claim.
Finally, contrary to appellant's allegation, a meticulous examination of the transcripts of the stenographic notes convinces this
Court that Atty. Temanil sufficiently cross-examined EDEN. If he decided to terminate his cross-examination, it could have been
due to the futility of any further cross-examination which might only prove favorable to the prosecution, as it might have opened
another window of opportunity for EDEN to strengthen her testimony.
The second assigned error is equally unpersuasive. It raises the issue of the credibility of EDEN as a witness. One of the highly
revered dicta Philippine jurisprudence has established is that this Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in

passing upon the credibility of opposing witnesses, unless there appears in the record some facts or circumstances of weight and
influence which have been overlooked and, if considered, would affect the result. This is founded on practical and empirical
considerations, i.e., the trial judge is in a better position to decide the question of credibility, since he personally heard the
witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. 47 He had before him the essential aids to determine whether a
witness was telling the truth or lying. Truth does not always stalk boldly forth naked; she often hides in nooks and crannies
visible only to the mind's eye of the judge who tried the case. To him appears the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame,
the hesitation, the sincere or flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant
or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien. 48 On the other hand, an appellate court has only the cold
record, which generally does not reveal the thin line between fact and prevarication that is crucial in determining innocence or
guilt. 49
At any rate, in view of the gravity of the offense charged and the extreme penalty of death imposed, this Court took painstaking
effort and meticulous care in reviewing the transcripts of the stenographic notes of the testimonies of the witnesses.
This Court is fully satisfied that EDEN told the truth that she was raped by her father, herein appellant, on 19 July 1994, in their
rented room in Barangay Obrero, Quezon City. Her story was made even more credible by the simplicity and candidness of her
answers, as well as by the fact that it came from an innocent girl writhing in emotional and moral shock and anguish. She must
have been torn between the desire to seek justice and the fear that a revelation of her ordeal might mean the imposition of capital
punishment on her father. By testifying in court, she made public a painful and humiliating secret, which others may have simply
kept to themselves for the rest of their lives. She thereby jeopardized her chances of marriage, as even a compassionate man may
be reluctant to marry her because her traumatic experience may be a psychological and emotional impediment to a blissful union.
Moreover, such a revelation divided her family and brought it shame and humiliation.
If EDEN did testify regardless of these consequences and even allowed the examination of her private parts, she did so inspired
by no other motive than to obtain justice and release from the psychological and emotional burdens the painful experience had
foisted upon her. It was then improbable that EDEN fabricated a story of defloration and falsely charged her own father with a
heinous crime.
What appellant claims to be improbabilities in the testimony of EDEN are more apparent than real. The presence of her sisters in
the small room did not at all make impossible the commission of rape. The evil in man has no conscience. The beast in him bears
no respect for time and place; it drives him to commit rape anywhere even in places where people congregate such as in parks,
along the roadside, within school premises, and inside a house where there are other occupants. 50 In People v. Opena, 51 rape was
committed in a room occupied also by other persons. In the instant case, EDEN''s other companions in the room when she was
molested by appellant were young girls who were all asleep.
That EDEN was unable to resist or shout for help can easily be explained by the fact that appellant threatened to kill her. Whether
or not he was armed was of no moment. That threat alone coming from her father, a person who wielded such moral ascendancy,
was enough render her incapable of resisting or asking for help.
Intimidation in rape cases is not calibrated nor governed by hard and fast rules. Since it is addressed to the victim's and is
therefore subjective, it must be viewed in light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the
crime. It is enough that the intimidation produced fear fear that if the victim did not yield to the bestial demands of the
accused, something far worse would happen to her at that moment. Where such intimidation existed and the victim was cowed
into submission as a result thereof, thereby rendering resistance futile, it would be the height of unreasonableness to expect the
victim to resist with all her might and strength. If resistance would nevertheless be futile because of intimidation, then offering
none at all does not mean consent to the assault so as to make the victim's submission to the sexual act voluntary. 52
In any event, in a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, as in this case, the former's moral ascendancy or influence
over the latter substitutes for violence or intimidation. 53 Likewise, it must not be forgotten that at her tender age of 14 years,
EDEN could not be expected to act with the equanimity of disposition and with nerves of steel, or to act like a mature and
experienced woman who would know what to do under the circumstances, or to have courage and intelligence to disregard the
threat. 54 Even in cases of rape of mature women, this Court recognized their different and unpredictable reactions. Some may
shout; some may faint; and some may be shocked into insensibility; while others may openly welcome the intrusion. 55
Neither does the fact that EDEN continued to live with appellant in same rented room disprove the rape. While she was hurt
physically, psychologically and emotionally, yet the thought must have been irresistible and compelling that her assailant was her
own father, who was both a father and mother to her since her mother was in Saudi Arabia and who provided her with the daily
wherewithal to keep her alive. Besides, a less harsh life outside was uncertain. Instances are not few when daughters raped by
their fathers stayed with the latter and kept in the deepest recesses of their hearts the evil deed even if the memory thereof
haunted them forever.
Nor is there merit in the insistent claim that EDEN's affidavit of desistance "must have necessarily contradicted her previous
testimony." We have earlier quoted in full this affidavit of desistance. Plainly, nowhere therein did she retract her previous
testimony or claim that she was raped by her father. In any case, EDEN withdrew her affidavit of desistance and solemnly
declared that she was pressured by her mother and sister to sign it. Moreover, affidavits, being taken ex parte, are generally
considered inferior to the testimony given in open court; 56 and affidavits of recantation have been invariably regarded as
exceedingly unreliable, since they can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses. It would be a dangerous rule to reject
the testimony taken before a court of justice simply because the witness who gave it later on changed his mind for one reason or
another. Such a rule would make a solemn trial a mockery, and place the proceedings at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. 57
This Court has no doubt that appellant is guilty as charged. The penalty therefor is death under the first circumstance mentioned
in Article 335(7) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, which provides, in part, as follows:

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
This law may be difficult to accept for those who believe that the verdict of death for a sin or crime is God's exclusive
prerogative. But the fundamental law of the land allows Congress, for compelling reasons, to impose capital punishment in cases
of heinous crimes, 58 hence the passage of R.A. No. 7659. Hoc quidem per quam durum est sed ita lex scripta est. The law may
be exceedingly hard but so the law is written and the Court is duty-bound to apply it in this case.
To the appellant who inflicted his animal greed on his daughter in a disgusting coercion of incestuous lust, thereby forsaking that
which is highest and noblest in his human nature and reducing himself to lower than the lowliest animal, the full force of the law
must be weighed against him, for he deserves no place in society. All that we concede to him is a modification of the award of
"P75,000.00 as damages," which is hereby reduced to P50,000.00 in accordance with current case law.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106,
in Criminal Case No. Q-94-59149 finding accused-appellant EDUARDO AGBAYANI y MENDOZA guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principal of the crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659, and imposing upon him the penalty of DEATH, subject to the above modification as to the amount of indemnity.
Two Justices voted to impose upon the accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Upon finality of this Decision, let certified true copies thereof, as well as the records of this case, be forwarded without delay to
the Office of the President for possible exercise of executive clemency pursuant to Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.
Baltazar D. Amion, complainant, vs. Judge Roberto S. Chiongson, Branch 50, Regional Trial Court, Bacolod
City, respondent. [A.M. No. RTJ-97-1371. January 22, 1999]
MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS: Accused-complainant explains that respondent judge appointed another lawyer in the person of Atty. Manuel Lao Ong
of the Free Legal Aid to act as counsel de oficio for the scheduled hearing of the aforecited criminal case. He further avers that
his retained counsel was ready for hearing on said dates but on the day before the scheduled hearing, he was informed that Atty.
Depasucat was ill.
It was for this reason that accused-complainant was not represented by his defense lawyer in the scheduled hearing which
prompted respondent judge to appoint Free Legal Aid lawyer Atty. Lao Ong. Notwithstanding complainant-accuseds
opposition, respondent judge proceeded with the trial with Atty. Ong representing the complainant-accused as counsel de
oficio. He also claims that Atty. Ong did not have sufficient knowledge of the case and that no prior conference was held
between said counsel de oficio and himself.
Consequently, complainant-accused filed a Manifestation and Urgent Motion stating that he is not accepting the legal
services of counsel de oficio Atty. Ong.
Complainant-accused also alludes oppression to respondent judge when the latter was still a Municipal Trial Judge of
MTCC, Bacolod City. Complainant was then the offended party in a criminal case for Slander and it took a year before
respondent judge decided to dismiss the same. He complains that now that he is the accused in Criminal Case No. 94-15772,
respondent judge appears to be "very active" and wants the case to be terminated immediately.
In addition, accused-complainant charges respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law when the latter, as then
municipal trial judge of Bacolod City, heard Criminal Case No. 55099 for violation of B.P. 22 against accused-complainant in the
absence of his counsel.
When respondent judge set the case for hearing, trial was not held because accused-complainants counsel Atty. Depasucat,
was not feeling well. The hearing was reset with a warning that no further postponement would be entertained. On said date of
hearing, Atty. Depasucat again failed to appear in court. In order to avoid further delay, the court appointed Atty. Apollo Jacildo
of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) as counsel de oficio. Atty. Jacildo, however, filed a Manifestation explaining that it is the
policy of their office not to represent a party who has retained the services of a counsel of his own choice.
At the next scheduled hearing, accused-complainants counsel de parte still did not show up in court, thus, prompting
private complainant Mrs. Antonietta Vaflor (victims wife) to speak in open court and pour out all her frustration about the long
delay in the resolution of the case.
In view of the fact that Mrs. Vaflor and another government witness, PO3 Richard Dejores, both reside at Escalante, about
70 to 80 kilometers from Bacolod City, and that the appearance of Atty. Depasucat remained uncertain, Judge Chiongson
appointed Atty. Manuel Lao-Ong from the Free Legal Aid Office to represent accused-complainant. The court, however, made
it of record that the appointment of Atty. Ong was without prejudice to the appearance of counsel de parte.[6] Due to the
continued absence of Atty. Depasucat, the counsel de parte, Atty. Ong, represented the accused-complainant at the March 28,
1996 hearing which was opposed by the accused in a Manifestation and Motion filed on March 29, seeking the nullification of
the March 28, 1998 hearing and the inhibition of Judge Chiongson. The hearings were then rescheduled on May 13 and 17,
1996.
On May 8, 1996, accused-complainants counsel, Atty. Depasucat, filed a motion for postponement alleging that the
motion for inhibition should be resolved and that he would not be available on the rescheduled dates for hearings as he would be
out of the country during those times.

An order denying the accused-complainants Motion for Inhibition and Motion to Set Aside the proceedings was issued by
the court. At the scheduled hearing on August 1, 1996, Atty. Depasucat asked the court that he be allowed to withdraw as
counsel de parte of the accused-complainant causing further delay. The trial of the case was again reset with a warning that the
court will not grant any further postponement and that if the accused-complainant was still without counsel, a counsel de
oficio will be appointed.
Thereafter, the accused-complainant engaged the services of different counsels who continued to adopt the dilatory tactics
utilized by the previous counsel de parte.
Atty. Morana, who entered his appearance as counsel filed a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition of respondent judge on
account of a pending administrative case against the latter. Atty. Morana submitted an Explanation to the court stating that he
could not represent the accused as the latter failed to give him the records of the case.
The prosecution then filed a motion to cite the accused in contempt for filing a series of motions for inhibition and for filing
an administrative case against the presiding judge which are plain acts of harassment.
Atty. Salvador Sabio entered his appearance as counsel for the accused-complainant on December 2, 1996 and asked for
the cancellation of the scheduled hearings on December 5 and 6, 1996 as he had to study the case. The court granted the request
for postponement of Atty. Sabio and reset the case on January 24, 1997 with a strong warning that it will not allow any further
dilatory postponement. In the afternoon of January 23, 1997, the court received another motion for postponement filed by Atty.
Sabio requesting for the cancellation of the January 24 hearing. The court, considering the same as another delaying tactic,
immediately issued an order denying the motion. In spite of the denial of the motion for postponement, Atty. Sabio failed to
appear.
Accused-complainant again asked for the voluntary inhibition of the presiding judge which the court again denied for being
merely a dilatory scheme. When the case was called for hearing, Atty. Sabio informed the court that he received a written note
from the accused-complainant discharging him as counsel, to which the court respondent by ruling that Atty. Sabio would only
be allowed to withdraw as accused-complainants lawyer upon the entry of appearance of a new defense counsel.
Judge Chiongson was required to submit a COMMENT on a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus filed by accusedcomplainant.
ISSUE: Was there a denial of the right to counsel?
HELD: We find this administrative complaint devoid of merit.
Verily, the facts and circumstances of this case point to the pervasive and prevaricated procrastination of the proceedings
undertaken by the accused-complainant and his counsel. Contrary to what accused-complainant would want to impress upon this
Court, it seems that he has been the oppressor while respondent judge Roberto Chiongson appears to be the oppressed. Through
the course of the proceedings in the subject criminal case, accused-complainant had filed several Motions for Inhibition, a
Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus and this administrative complaint with the view of delaying the eventual disposition of the
case.
A Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) dated January 14, 1998 10 noted that "Criminal Case No. 9415772 has been pending for almost four (4) years already and the prosecution has yet to rest its case. Complainant has thrown
every legal strategy in the book to delay the trial. . . ."
The claim of accused-complainant that respondent judge's appointment of a counsel de oficio constitutes a clear violation of his
right to due process and a deprivation of his constitutional right to be defended by counsel of his own choice cannot be
countenanced by this Court.
An examination of related provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to counsel, will show that the "preference in the
choice of counsel" pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under investigation 11 rather than one who is the accused in a
criminal prosecution. 12
Even if we were to extend the application of the concept of "preference in the choice of counsel" to an accused in a criminal
prosecution, such preferential discretion cannot partake of a discretion so absolute and arbitrary as would make the choice of
counsel refer exclusively to the predilection of the accused.
As held by this Court in the case of People vs. Barasina: 13
Withal, the word "preferably" under Section 12(1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not convey the
message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally
competent and independent attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo
of a custodial investigation, will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the
progress of the interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer, who for one reason or another, is not available to
protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated by the framers of the charter.
Applying this principle enunciated by the Court, we may likewise say that the accused's discretion in a criminal prosecution with
respect to his choice of counsel is not so much as to grant him a plenary prerogative which would preclude other equally
competent and independent counsels from representing him. Otherwise, the pace of a criminal prosecution will be entirely
dictated by the accused to the detriment of the eventual resolution of the case.
Accused-complainant was not, in any way, deprived of his substantive and constitutional right to due process as he was duly
accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense but he forfeited this right, for not
appearing in court together with his counsel at the scheduled hearings. 14
Accused-complainant had more than sufficient time and every available opportunity to present his side which would have led to
the expeditious termination of the case. A party cannot feign denial of due process when he had the opportunity to present his
side. 15

Moreover, there is no denial of the right to counsel where a counsel de oficio was appointed during the absence of the accused's
counsel de parte pursuant to the court's desire to finish the case as early as practicable under the continuous trial system. 16
Thus, it has been held by this Court in the, case of Lacambra v. Ramos: 17
The Court cannot help but note the series of legal maneuvers resorted to and repeated importunings of the
accused or his counsel, which resulted in the protracted trial of the case, thus making a mockery of the
judicial process, not to mention the injustice caused by the delay to the victim's family.
Undoubtedly, it was accused-complainant's own strategic machinations which brought upon the need for the appointment of a
counsel de oficio in as much as the criminal case had been dragging on its lethargic course.
As to the charges of oppression and gross ignorance of the law against respondent judge relative to cases under him while he was
still in the Municipal Trial Court, the same have been sufficiently answered in the Comments submitted in this case. The
explanation by the respondent judge indicate that the aforesaid allegations have neither legal nor factual basis and that the
conclusions made therein are merely conjectural.
The actuation of respondent judge in this murder case does not warrant reproach and reprimand, but in fact, merits the
acknowledgment and approval of this Court. Such manifestation of zeal clearly show respondent judge's ardent determination to
expedite the case and render justice.
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should administer justice impartially and without delay. 18 A judge should
always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly administer justice. 19
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court RESOLVED to:
1. DISMISS the administrative complaint against Judge Roberto S. Chiongson of RTC, Branch 50, Bacolod City for lack of
merit.
2. IMPOSE a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) and ADMONISH accused-complainant Baltazar D. Amion for
filing a malicious and unmeritorious complaint against Judge Roberto S. Chiongson to delay and prolong the prosecution of the
case.
3. DIRECT Judge Roberto S. Chiongson to continue hearing the case and finally dispose of the same with utmost
dispatch.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RONNIE QUITLONG y FRIAS, SALVADOR QUITLONG y
FRIAS and EMILIO SENOTO, Jr., y PASCUA, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 121562 July 10, 1998
VITUG, J.:
FACTS: At around six o'clock in the evening of 20 October 1994, Lito Adjaro, who had just come from work as a dispatcher of
passenger jeepneys plying the Baguio City-Loakan route, repaired to a nearby game parlor where he saw 19-year-old University
of Baguio medical technology student Jonathan Calpito playing billiards with Jonathan Gosil. Adjaro was Calpito's neighbor
and barkada in Loakan. At past eight o'clock, Calpito decided that it was time to go home. Since at that hour there were no longer
passenger jeepneys bound for Loakan, the three friends decided to walk down to Harrison Road behind the Melvin Jones
grandstand to grab a taxicab. The area was well-lighted. Wanting to partake of some "fishballs, Calpito and Gosil approached a
fishball vendor about three to four meters away. The two returned with three sticks of fishballs worth fifteen pesos. When Calpito
counted the change for his 100-peso bill, he saw that he had only been handed back thirty five pesos. Confronted by Calpito and
Gosil, the fishball vendor would not admit that he had short-changed Calpito.
Herbert Soriano on his way to Loakan, was seen passing by. Adjaro, his neighbor, hailed him. Soriano positioned his
jeep around four or five meters from where Gosil and Calpito were still having an argument with the fishball vendor. Soriano
called out to the two to board the jeep but they ignored him. Moments later, Soriano saw eight men rushing towards Gosil and
Calpito from the direction of the taxicab-stand behind his jeep. Some of the men later backed out but four of them pursued
Calpito who, meanwhile, had started to retreat from the group. The four men, however, succeeded in cornering Calpito. Soriano
saw Calpito fall to the ground and thought that the latter had just been weakened by the men's punches but, when Calpito was
carried on board his jeep, Soriano realized that Calpito had been stabbed.
Adjaro saw no less than eight men approach and aggressively confront Calpito and Gosil. Seeing that his friends were
outnumbered, Adjaro shouted at Calpito and Gosil to run posthaste. Adjaro promptly boarded Soriano's jeep. From where he sat,
Adjaro could see appellant Emilio Senoto embracing Calpito from behind and appellants Salvador Quitlong and Ronnie Quitlong
holding Calpito's right hand and left hand, respectively. Calpito struggled unsuccessfully to free himself. Suddenly, appellant
Ronnie Quitlong stabbed Calpito at the left side of the body just below the nipple. Once the three men had released their hold on
Calpito, the latter fell to the ground. Despite the condition that Calpito was already in, his assailants still went on hitting him with
their feet.
Police officers Jerry Patacsil, Arthur Viado and Nito Revivis were on foot patrol that evening. The police officers
brought accused-appellants to the police station. That same evening of Calpito died at the Baguio General Hospital. Abrasions
were found on different parts of Calpito's body.
The trial court rendered its now assailed decision.
ISSUE: whether or not the three accused participated in, and may be held guilty as co-principals by reason of conspiracy
HELD: No. In their assignment of errors, the Quitlong brothers would have it

1. That the Honorable Lower Court gravely abused its discretion and/or acted in excess of or without
jurisdiction in finding that conspiracy may readily be inferred inspite of explicit failure to allege in the
information or complaint;
2. That the Honorable Lower Court gravely abused its discretion and/or acted in excess of or without
jurisdiction in finding that there was conspiracy between and among the accused-appellants in the
commission of the crime;
3. That the Honorable Lower Court gravely abused its discretion and/or acted in excess of or without
jurisdiction in finding the accused-appellants guilty of the crime of Murder instead of Homicide. 12
In his case, appellant Senoto contends that the trial court has erred in finding conspiracy among the accused and argues that the
crime committed is homicide, not murder, given the circumstances.
On the particular issue of conspiracy, the trial court had this to say:
The question is whether or not the herein three accused participated in, and may be held guilty as coprincipals by reason of conspiracy for, the fatal stabbing of the victim, Calpito, there being no dispute that the
latter died due to the solitary stab inflicted on him.
But before proceeding any further, the Court takes notice of the lapse committed, perhaps inadvertently, by
the prosecution in drafting the indictment. Both the original and amended Informations fail to explicitly
allege conspiracy. This could have been timely cured if obeisance had been observed of the admonition, often
given, that the prosecution should not take the arraignment stage for granted but, instead, treat the notice
thereof as a reminder to review the case and determine if the complaint or information is in due form and the
allegations therein contained are sufficient vis--vis the law involved and the evidence on hand. It is fortunate
that in the case at bench conspiracy may readily be inferred from the way the allegation of abuse of superior
strength has been phrased, to wit: ". . . the above-named accused, being then armed with a knife, with intent
to kill . . . and taking advantage of their numerical superiority and combined strength did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack assault and stab JONATHAN CALPITO y CASTRO . . . ." 13
Citing Balmadrid vs. Sandiganbayan, 14 the trial court has opined that "conspiracy may be deemed adequately alleged if the
averments in the Information logically convey that several persons (have been) animated with the single purpose of committing
the offense charged and that they (have) acted in concert in pursuance of that purpose." 15 Holding that no direct proof is essential
and that it suffices that the existence of a common design to commit the offense charged is shown by the acts of the malefactors
and attendant circumstances, the trial court has concluded:
In the case on hand, it bears repeating that Ronnie Quitlong and Salvador Quitlong were admittedly
responding to Jesus Mendoza's call for help through the latter's daughter. They must have, therefore, been
disposed, out of empathy with a fellow sidewalk vendor, to lend Mendoza all the assistance the latter needed
under the circumstances. They were joined, according to prosecution witnesses Lito Adjaro and Herbert
Soriano, by no less than six others, including Emilio Senoto, Jr. They came upon Mendoza engaged in a
heated altercation with the victim Calpito. When they reached Calpito, they pushed him and started beating
him up and his companion Jonathan Gosil. Four to five men manhandled Calpito who kept on retreating and
even went around Soriano's parked jeep until he was cornered. Senoto then held Calpito's body from behind;
Ronnie, his left hand; and Salvador, his right hand, and they mauled him. Calpito struggled to free himself
but that proved futile and, instead, Ronnie stabbed him once. It was only then that he was released and when
he fell down on his back, his attackers still kicked him. Only the arrival of some policemen made some of the
assailants stop and run away. However, Ronnie, Salvador and Senoto, kept on kicking the victim and they
were restrained and arrested.
Guided by the jurisprudential authorities heretofore cited, it becomes ineluctable for the Court to conclude
that Ronnie, Salvador and Senoto acted in a conspiracy and may thus be held liable as co-principals for the
death of Calpito. 16
Overwhelming, such as it may have been thought of by the trial court, evidence of conspiracy is not enough for an accused to
bear and to respond to all its grave legal consequences; it is equally essential that such accused has been apprised when the
charge is made conformably with prevailing substantive and procedural requirements. Article III, Section 14, of the 1987
Constitution, in particular, mandates that no person shall be held answerable for a criminal offense without due process of law
and that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall first be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. 17 The right to be informed of any such indictment is likewise explicit in procedural rules. 18 The practice and object of
informing an accused in writing of the charges against him has been explained as early as the 1904 decision of the Court in U.S.
vs. Karelsen; 19 viz:
First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his
defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution
for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are
sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had. (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S., 542).
In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is
made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of
time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a
specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged.

An information, in order to ensure that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of his
accusation is not violated, must state the name of the accused; the designation given to the offense by the statute; a statement of
the acts or omissions so complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time and date
of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense has been committed. 20 In embodying the essential elements of
the crime charged, the information must set forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability
of the accused so that the accused can properly prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or circumstance in a
complaint against two or more accused persons is that of conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact
which, if not excepted from or objected to during trial, may be corrected or supplied by competent proof, an allegation, however,
of conspiracy, or one that would impute criminal liability to an accused for the act of another or others, is indispensable in order
to hold such person, regardless of the nature and extent of his own participation, equally guilty with the other or others in the
commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate the
felony becomes of secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to all the others. 21 Verily, an accused must know from
the information whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all the details thereof, like the part
that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence proving the common design or the facts connecting all the accused
with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity
required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a statement of the facts relied upon to be
constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a
manner that can enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision that the accused
may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. It is said, generally, that an indictment
may be held sufficient "if it follows the words of the statute and reasonably informs the accused of the character of the offense he
is charged with conspiring to commit, or, following the language of the statute, contains a sufficient statement of an overt act to
effect the object of the conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the language of the respective
statutes defining them." 22
The information charging herein appellants for the death of Jonathan Calpito, as amended, has but simply stated:
That on or about the 20th day of October 1994, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then armed with a knife, with intent to kill and with
treachery and taking advantage of their numerical superiority and combined strength, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab JONATHAN CALPITO Y CASTRO suddenly
and unexpectedly, without any warning whatsoever, inflicting upon him a stab wound at the left thorax at the
level of the 7th rib, left medclavicular line, penetrating the pereduum and left ventricle causing left
remothones of 700 cc and hemoperecuduum of 250 cc, which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 23
The opinion of the trial court to the effect that conspiracy may be inferred from the allegation of abuse of superior strength and
with the aid of armed men, i.e., that ". . . the above-named accused, being then armed with a knife, with intent to kill . . . and
taking advantage of their numerical superiority and combined strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab JONATHAN CALPITO Y CASTRO . . . " 24 is difficult to accept. Conspiracy arises when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the
very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith to actually pursue it. 25 Verily, the
information must state that the accused have confederated to commit the crime or that there has been a community of design, a
unity of purpose or an agreement to commit the felony among the accused. Such an allegation, in the absence of the usual usage
of the words "conspired" or "confederated" or the phrase "acting in conspiracy," must aptly appear in the information in the form
of definitive acts constituting conspiracy. In fine, the agreement to commit the crime, the unity of purpose or the community of
design among the accused must be conveyed such as either by the use of the term "conspire" or its derivatives and synonyms or
by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the information on
which basis an accused can aptly enter his plea, a matter that is not to be confused with or likened to the adequacy of evidence
that may be required to prove it. In establishing conspiracy when properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not necessarily
be shown by direct proof but may be inferred from shown acts and conduct of the accused.
In the absence of conspiracy, so averred and proved as heretofore explained, an accused can only be made liable for the acts
committed by him alone and this criminal responsibility is individual and not collective. 26 And so it is that must be so held in this
case. The conflicting claims of the prosecution and the defense on who stabbed the victim is an issue that ultimately and
unavoidably goes into the question of whom to believe among the witnesses. This issue of credibility requires a determination
that is concededly best left to the trial court with its unique position of having been enabled to observe that elusive and
incommunicable evidence of the deportment of witnesses on the stand. 27 Findings of the trial court, following that assessment,
must be given the highest degree of respect absent compelling reasons to conclude otherwise. 28
The Court is not, at this time and in this instance, disposed to deviate from the foregoing rule. In the first place, Lito Adjaro, the
eyewitness in the stabbing of Calpito, has steadfastly stood by, even on rebuttal, to his story on the commission of the crime. A
witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward and spontaneous manner, as well as remains consistent on cross and
rebuttal examination, is not likely to be an incredible witness. 29 Secondly, the defense has failed to establish any ill motive on the
part of Adjaro that would have prompted him to testify wrongly against appellants. Where there is no evidence to indicate that the
prosecution witness has been actuated by any improper motive, it would be hard to reject the supposition that a person will not
prevaricate and cause damnation to one who has brought him no harm. 30 Finally, Herbert Soriano and the police, who have

testified seeing the already wounded Calpito lying on the ground and still being attacked, both corroborate Adjaro's positive
identification of appellants as the persons who did maul Calpito.
After positively pointing to appellants in open court to be the persons who ganged up on Calpito, Adjaro testified on their
respective participations in the commission of the crime; thus:
PROSECUTOR:
Q. Now, you pointed to Emilio Senoto, Jr. as one of the persons who held the deceased
Jonathan Calpito. What part of the body of Jonathan Calpito did he hold?
A. His body, sir.
Q. How about Salvador Quitlong whom you also identified in Court. What part of the
body of Jonathan Calpito did he hold?
A. I saw him hold his hand.
Q. What hand was held by Salvador Quitlong?
A. Right hand, sir.
Q. How about Ronnie Quitlong?
A. His left hand.
Q. After Jonathan Calpito was held by these three persons and other, what happened
next?
A. They mauled ("binugbog") Jonathan Calpito.
Q. Did you notice what part of the body was hit and boxed by these three persons?
A. His body and his face.
Q. What did Jonathan Calpito do, if any, when he is being held by these three persons and
others?
A. He was struggling, sir.
Q. Was he able to free himself from the helds (sic) of these persons?
A. No more, sir.
Q. What do you mean no more?
A. He was not able to free himself.
Q. Yes, why was he not able to free himself anymore?
A. They held him tightly, he could not struggle.
Q. And what happened next when you said he could no longer struggle?
A. They boxed him and also stabbed him, sir.
Q. Did you see the person who stabbed him?
A. I saw, sir.
Q. Will you be able to identify him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I will request you to again look inside the courtroom and point to the person whom
you saw stab Jonathan Calpito?
WITNESS:
The person wearing white jacket.
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to a gentleman inside the courtroom wearing cream jacket who gave his
name as Ronnie Quitlong. 31
Appellant Ronnie Quitlong was a principal by his own act of stabbing Calpito that caused the latter's death. 32Appellants Salvador
Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., were holding the hands of Calpito at the precise time that Ronnie Quitlong was in the act of
executing his criminal intent. Simultaneity, however, would not itself demonstrate the concurrence of will or the unity of action
and purpose that could be a basis for collective responsibility of two or more individuals; 33 indeed, from all indications, the
incident would appear to have occurred at the spur of moment. Appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., shall
therefore be held to be mere accomplices conformably with Article 18 34 of the Revised Penal Code.
The crime committed was qualified by abuse of superiority. 35 While superiority in number would not per se mean superiority in
strength, enough proof was adduced, however, to show that the attackers had cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage of
their superiority in strength certainly out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. 36
Treachery may not be here considered as a generic aggravating circumstance although it might have ensured the commission of
the crime. In order that treachery may be taken as an aggravating circumstance, there must be proof that the accused has
consciously adopted a mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself, i.e., appellant Ronnie
Quitlong in this case. 37 No such proof has been adequately shown.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of murder is punishable by reclusion temporal maximum to death. There
being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances to appropriately appreciate in this case, appellant Ronnie Quitlong, as
principal, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The indeterminate penalty of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
minimum to forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum, has been imposed by the trial court on the premise
that reclusion perpetua is a divisible penalty. In the Court's Resolution of 09 January 1995, clarifying its decision 38 in People vs.
Lucas, 39 the Court has said that

. . . although Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 has fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua from twenty (20) years
and one (1) day to forty (40) years, there was no clear legislative intent to alter its original classification as an
indivisible penalty. It shall then remain as an indivisible penalty. 40
The two accomplices, appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., shall be subject to the imposition of the penalty next
lower in degree than reclusion temporal maximum to death or, accordingly, prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its medium period. Absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the penalty that may be imposed is reclusion
temporal minimum. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law to them, each may be held to suffer the indeterminate sentence of
anywhere from prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, as the minimum penalty, to
anywhere within the range of reclusion temporal minimum, as the maximum penalty.
The trial court correctly imposed the payment of a civil indemnity of P50,000.00 in favor of the heirs of the victim. The
consequential (actual) damages in the amount of P35,700.00 not having been substantiated, except for the amount P12,000.00
paid to the memorial chapel, is disallowed. The award of moral damages recoverable under Article 2219 (1), in relation to Article
2206, of the Civil Code is reduced from P100,000.00 to P20,000.00.
WHEREFORE, appellant Ronnie Quitlong is found guilty of the crime of murder for the killing of Jonathan Calpito and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P50,000.00, to reimburse them the actual damages of P12,000.00 and to pay moral damages of P50,000.00. Appellants Salvador
Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., are found guilty as accomplices in the commission of the crime, and each shall suffer the
indeterminate sentence of nine (9) years and four (4) months ofprision mayor minimum period, as minimum penalty, to thirteen
(13) years and nine (9) months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal minimum period, as maximum penalty. Appellants
Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., are also hereby held solidarily liable with appellant Ronnie Quitlong in the payment of
the damages hereinabove mentioned. Costs against appellants.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Philippine National Police and the Department of Justice in order that the other
participants in the killing of Jonathan Calpito, specifically Jesus Mendoza, be arrested and made to face the force of the law.
ODON PECHO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 111399 November 14, 1994
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS: In Criminal Case No. 14844 of the Sandiganbayan, the petitioner and one Jose Catre were charged in an
information with the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 allegedly committed as follows:
That accused ODON PECHO, a public officer being then the Customs Guard, Miscellaneous Bonded Warehouse
Division, Bureau of Customs, South Harbor, Manila, with the indispensable cooperation and assistance of the accused JOSE
CATRE, whose position, whether public or private, but representing himself to be a representative of Eversun Commercial
Trading of Cotabato City, which turned-out to be non-existent, fake with a fictitious Tax Account No., acting in the capacities
aforesaid, with the former taking advantage of his official position and both accused, motivated by personal gain, financial and
pecuniary interest, with deliberate intent to cause damage and undue injury to the Government, through manifest partiality and
evident bad faith, conspiring, confabulating, conniving, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously act, pretend and feign to be agents or representatives of Eversun Commercial Trading in the
importation of 5 x 20 foot containers STC agricultural disc blades and irrigation water pumps, and engage, solicit and contract the
services of one Constantino Calica of Labatique, a CPA Customs Broker for the release of said shipment and/or preparation of
the necessary import entry with the two (2) accused, furnishing, presenting and producing the necessary shipping documents such
as packing list, commercial invoice, bill of lading and import entry declaration, which led and prompted said Customs Broker to
file BOC Import Entry No. 14081-89 with the computed taxes and duties amounting to P53,164.00 declaring the shipment as five
(5) containers STC agricultural disc blades and irrigation water pumps. Contrary to the entry declaration, the subject shipment
before its release, upon examination was found and/or discovered to contain 300 units diesel engines Model 4DR50A and the
correct taxes and duties is P1,080,485.00, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the difference of said amounts or to
be exact in the amount of P1,027,321.00, said offense having been committed in relation to the office of the above-named
accused.
Warrants for the arrest of the accused were issued. Only the petitioner was brought under the Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction when he voluntarily surrendered. After the petitioner had pleaded not guilty at his arraignment, trial on the merits as
against him ensued.
The Sandiganbayan found the petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration based on the
following grounds, to wit:
(1) Invalidity of the information as a consequence of non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of Sections 3 and
4, Rule 112, Rules of Court, and of Sec. 6 and 7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
(2) Failure of the prosecution to overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt the presumption of innocence in favor of
accused Odon Pecho;
(3) Failure of the prosecution to establish the attendance of the concurring elements of the crime charged;
(4) There is no such crime as attempted violation of Section 3(e), RA 3019.
having been denied in the resolution of the Sandiganbayan of 12 August 1993, 11 he now comes before us with a
reiteration of the said grounds.
In the challenged resolution, the Sandiganbayan rejected the first ground invoked by the petitioner in his motion for
reconsideration because of waiver, having voluntarily entered his plea of not guilty, participated at the trial, and offered his

evidence. As to the second and third grounds, it ruled that the decision "is supported with proof beyond reasonable doubt." And
as to the fourth ground, it held that the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on attempted or frustrated felonies do not apply to
offenses penalized by special laws.
ISSUE: Is the attempted or frustrated stage of the offense defined in Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, punishable? -No.
If it is not, may an accused be, nevertheless, convicted for an offense penalized by the Revised Penal Code which is
included in that of the former as charged? Yes.
HELD: There is no doubt in our minds that without the early discovery of the fraud through the timely recommendation by the
Chief Intelligence Officer for a 100% examination of the shipment and the spot check of the shipment by Customs Senior Agent
Ruperto Santiago, the Government would have been defrauded in the sum of P1,027,321.00 corresponding to the deficiency in
taxes. Such discovery and the immediate issuance of a hold order and a warrant of seizure and detention by the District Collector
of Customs against the said articles effectively prevented the consummation of the offense. The Government incurred no undue
injury or damage. At most then, the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 reached only the attempted stage because the
perpetrators had commenced the commission of the offense directly by overt acts but failed to perform all the acts of execution
which would have produced the felony as a consequence by reason or some cause other than their own spontaneous
desistance, 26 namely, the timely intervention of alert customs officials before the release of the cargoes.
Except then as to the third requisite of the offense penalized by Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, viz.: "causing undue
injury to any party, including the Government," we agree with the findings and conclusion of the Sandiganbayan that the
requisites thereof, as laid down in Ponce de Leon vs. Sandiganbayan, 27 are present in this case. Would the absence of the third
requisite, which, therefore, makes the petitioner's act only an attempted violation of Section 3(e), subject him to the same penalty
as if he had committed the consummated crime? The answer would depend on whether Article 6 28 of the Revised Penal Code is
applicable to offenses punished by special laws, like R.A. No. 3019, as amended, more specifically to that covered by Section
3(e) thereof, which is involved in this case.
In United States vs. Basa, 29 this Court held that the last paragraph of Article 3 of the Old Penal Code relating to attempts to
commit crimes is not applicable to offenses punished "by acts of the Commission," i.e., special laws. InPeople vs. Ngan
Te, 30 this Court also held that an accused cannot be convicted of a frustrated violation of a crime punished by a special law
(Section 4 of the Gold Reserve Act of Congress of 30 January 1934).
In People vs. Jolliffe, 31 involving a prosecution for the violation of Section 34 of R.A. No. 265, in relation to Section 4 of Central
Bank Circular No. 21 which provides:
Any person desiring to export gold in any form, including jewelry, whether for refining abroad or otherwise,
must obtain a license from the Central Bank. Applicants for export licenses must present satisfactory
evidence that the import of the gold into the country of the importer will not be in violation of the rules and
regulations of such country.
this Court, in rejecting the contention of the defense that the penalty for violations of the circular refer to consummated
exportation not to "attempted or frustrated exportation," declared:
This section explicitly applies to "any person desiring to export gold" and, hence, it contemplates the
situation existing prior to the consummation of the exportation. Indeed, its purpose would be defeated if the
penal sanction were deferred until after the article in question had left the Philippines, for jurisdiction over it,
and over the guilty party, would be lost thereby.
It may thus be said that the application of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code to offenses penalized by special laws would
depend on how the latter defines the offense. This would give life to Article 10 thereof which provides that the Code shall be
supplementary to special laws, unless the latter should specifically provide the contrary. In the case of Section 4 of Central Bank
Circular No. 21, it is clear from the phrase "desiring to export" that even a mere attempt to export which is necessarily
included in desiring is punishable.
There are two principal reasons why Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, can be said to penalize only consummated
offenses. Firstly, the penalty imposed therefor per Section 9 is "imprisonment for not less than six years and one month nor more
than fifteen years, perpetual disqualification from office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any
prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income." The imposable
imprisonment penalty does not have the nomenclature and duration of any specific penalty in the Revised Penal Code.
Accordingly, there can be no valid basis for the application of, inter alia, Articles 50 and 51 on the penalty to be imposed on the
principal of a frustrated and attempted felony. The penalty of perpetual disqualification is only from office, unlike either the
perpetual absolute and perpetual special disqualifications under Articles 30 and 31 of the Revised Penal Code. Secondly, the third
requisite of Section 3(e), viz., "causing undue injury to any party, including the government," could only mean actual injury or
damage which must be established by evidence. The word causing is the present participle of the word cause. As a verb, the latter
means "to be the cause or occasion of; to effect as an agent; to bring about; to bring into existence; to make to induce; to
compel." 32 The word undue means "more than necessary; not proper; illegal." 33 And the word injury means "any wrong or
damage done to another, either in his person, rights, reputation or property. The invasion of any legally protected interest of
another." 34 Taken together, proof of actual injury or damage is required. Thus, in Alejandro vs. People, 35 which involves a
prosecution for the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, this Court, in acquitting the accused declared:

Moreover, one of the elements of the crime described in Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
is that there should be undue injury caused to any party. However, in the 30 July 1987 decision of the
respondent Sandiganbayan, it is recognized that there was no proof of damage caused to the employees of the
hospital since they were in fact paid on 27 October 1982 their salaries for the entire third quarter of 1982.
In Fernando vs. Sandiganbayan, 36 this Court, quoting the ruling in Alejandro, also stated:
There is no evidence whatsoever to show that the acts of the petitioners were done with evident bad faith or
gross negligence. Neither is there proof that there was undue injury caused to any party. Who is the party
injured? There is nothing in the records to show injury to any party, least of all the government. The urgent
repairs were completed. The Bureau of Customs personnel and the public dealing with them were benefited
but nobody was injured. But most of all, there was no evident partiality.
No actual injury or damage having been caused to the Government due to the timely 100% examination of the shipment and the
subsequent issuance of a hold order and a warrant of seizure and detention, the petitioner must, perforce, be acquitted of the
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Fortunately, for the State, the offense charged in the information in Criminal Case No.
14844 necessarily includes the complex crime of estafa (under paragraph 2(a), Article 315, Revised Penal Code) through
falsification of public documents (under Article 171, Revised Penal Code). Article 315 reads:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned herein
below.
xxx xxx xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means
of other similar deceits.
The information alleges in no uncertain terms the essential ingredients of estafa under said paragraph 2 (a), viz., (1)
false or fraudulent representation of co-accused Jose Catre that he was the duly authorized representative of Eversun
Commercial Trading, the alleged importer of agricultural disc blades and irrigation water pumps in the container van
when, in truth and in fact, said importer is non-existent or fictitious with an equally spurious Tax Account Number, and
that the cargoes imported were not as declared but 300 units of diesel engines, which fraudulent acts were done with
the use of falsified documents such as import entry declaration, packing list, commercial invoice and bill of lading; (2)
the false pretenses or fraudulent acts were executed prior to the commission of the fraud; and (3) the defraudation of the
Government in the amount of P1,027,321.00 in taxes representing the difference between the correct taxes and duties
due and that earlier computed on the basis of the false declaration. In other words some of the essential ingredients of
the offense charged constitute the essential requisites of estafa through falsification of official documents. If duly
proved by the evidence for the prosecution that satisfies the quantum of proof required for conviction, the petitioner
can, under the information be convicted of estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents, an
offense which is, as stated earlier, included in that which is charged.
Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is variance between the
offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the
offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of
the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is
proved.
Analyzing this provision, this Court stated in Esquerra vs. People: 37
Stated differently, an accused may be convicted of an offense provided it is included in the charge, or of an
offense charged which is included in that proved. Still stated differently, an accused can be convicted of an
offense only when it is both charged and proved. If it is not charged although proved, or if it is not proved
although charged, the accused cannot be convicted thereof. In other words, variance between the allegation
and proof cannot justify conviction for either the offense charged or the offense proved unless either is
included in the other.
Section of Rule 120 states when an offense includes or is included in the other:
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged necessarily includes that
which is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense
proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.
In view of the aforesaid rules, it follows then that:
a. When the offense proved is less serious than, and is necessarily included in, the offense charged (as when
the offense proved is homicide and the offense charged is murder), in which case the defendant shall be
convicted of the offense proved (U.S. vs. Macalintal, 2 Phil.
448; . . .).
b. When the offense proved is more serious than and includes the offense charged (as when the offense
proved is serious physical injuries and the offense charged is slight physical injuries), in which case the
defendant shall be convicted only of the offense charged (U.S. vs. Guzman, 8 Phil. 21 . . .). 38

As earlier adverted to, the evidence established by the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that the crime of estafa was
only at its attempted stage and that it was sought to be consummated through the falsification of the following documents: the
packing list (Exhibit "A-3") and Invoice (Exhibit "A-4"), which appear to be prepared by the exporter, Kowa Tsusho Co. Ltd.
through one Masayuki Higuchi, its general manager; Bill of Lading (Exhibit "A-5") which appears to be issued in Yokohama by
the Kisen Kaishe Ltd.; the sworn Import Entry Declaration (Exhibit "A-6") all of which show that the cargoes imported were
"agricultural disc blades and irrigation water pumps; as well as the Import Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration signed by
customs broker Constantino Calica and prepared on the basis of the foregoing documents. The falsifications consist in making it
appear that the importer-consignee indicated is a legitimate importer or an existing importer which had participated in such
importation and authorized the accused to request the release of the imported articles although, in truth, it is non-existent and,
therefore, had no participation in the importation; and in the untruthful statements that what were imported were agricultural disc
blades and irrigation water pumps when in truth they were automotive diesel engines.
The information in this case can also be considered as charging two offenses: the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and
the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents. The accused having failed to
object before trial to the duplicitous information, he may be validly convicted of both or either of the offenses charged and
proved. 39
The Import Entry Declaration (Exhibit "A-6"), a public and official document, is required by Section 1301 of the Revised Tariff
and Customs Code of the Philippines. 40 Under the said section, the parties authorized to make the import entry are (a) the
importer, being the holder of the bill of lading, (b) a duly licensed customs broker acting under authority from a holder of the bill
of lading, or (c) a person duly empowered to act as agent or attorney in fact for such holder. If the entry is filed by a party other
than the importer, the importer shall himself be required to declare under oath and under penalties for falsification or perjury that
the declarations and statements contained in the entry are true and correct. Such statements under oath shall constitute prima
facie evidence of knowledge and consent of the importer of a violation against applicable provisions of the Code should the
importation turn out to be unlawful or irregular.
The falsifications then of the aforesaid official and commercial documents were the necessary means for the commission of the
attempted estafa.
There was no direct proof that the petitioner and his co-conspirator, Jose Catre, were the authors of the falsification.
Nevertheless, since it was shown with moral certainty from the testimony of the Calicas that the petitioner and Catre were in
possession of the falsified documents and personally delivered them to Dennis Calica and that they showed extraordinary
personal interest in securing the release of the cargoes for a fictitious importer, then the petitioner and Catre are presumed to be
the authors of the falsified documents. A rule, well-buttressed upon reason, is that in the absence of satisfactory explanation one
found in possession of and who used a forged document is the forger and therefore guilty of falsification. 41 It is, however,
essential that the use must be so closely connected in time with the forging such that the utterer or user may be proved to have the
capacity of forging, or such close connection with the forger that it becomes, when so accomplished, probable proof of
complicity in the forgery. 42
In People vs. Sendaydiego, 43 this Court reiterated the rule thus:
The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking
advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification.
This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so closely connected in time with the
forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have
close connection with the forgers, and, therefore, had complicity in the forgery. (U.S. vs. Castillo, 6 Phil. 453;
People vs. De Lara, 45 Phil. 754; People vs. Domingo, 49 Phil. 28; People vs. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338; People
vs. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253).
In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document and who
used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger (Alarcon vs. Court of Appeals, L-21846, March 31, 1967, 19
SCRA 688; People vs. Caragao, L-28258, December 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 993).
No explanation at all having been given by the petitioner as to why he and his co-accused were in possession of and used the
falsified official and commercial documents, they are deemed to be the forgers thereof.
Accordingly, the petitioner is liable for and can be validly convicted of the complex crime of attempted estafa through
falsification of official and commercial documents under paragraph 2(a) of Article 315 and Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code. Pursuant to Article 48, the penalty for the more serious crime shall be applied in its maximum period.
If the crime of estafa had been consummated, the Government would have been defrauded in the amount of P1,027,321.00.
Hence, the applicable penalty under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code would have beenprision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its minimum period, with an additional one (1) year for every P10,000.00 in excess of the first
P22,000.00; provided, that the total penalty should not exceed twenty years.
Since what was established was only attempted estafa, then the applicable penalty would be that which is two degrees lower than
that prescribed by law for the consummated felony pursuant to Article 51, in relation to Article 61(5), of the Revised Penal
Code, viz., arresto mayor in its medium period to arresto mayor in its maximum period.
On the other hand, the penalty for falsification under Article 171 is prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P5,000.00. Obviously
then, this is the more serious crime which shall be imposed upon the petitioner pursuant to Article 48. Since he is entitled to the
benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 44 he can be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from two (2) years, four
(4) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional medium as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision

mayor maximum as maximum and a fine of P2,000.00. The maximum of the duration is in conformity with Article 48 which
mandates that the penalty for the more serious crime shall be applied in its maximum period.
The foregoing disquisitions clearly suggest that those in charge of investigating criminal complaints against public officials and
employees and of filing the corresponding informations in court must carefully determine under what law the offenders should be
prosecuted. They should note that the offenses enumerated in Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A.
No. 3019, as amended) are but in addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law. Thus, to attain
the very purpose of said law and further enhance the constitutional mandate that a public office is a public trust and all public
officers and employees "must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
and efficiency," 45 prosecutors should not limit their action to the additional offenses. To be more logical, they should initially
consider if the questioned acts are already penalized by the Revised Penal Code and should the rule on double jeopardy be
inapplicable, to exhaust all the available remedies of the State against the offender. It is a cardinal rule that the protection against
double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense. 46
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED; however, the judgment of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 14844 is
modified, and, as modified, the petitioner is hereby declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of attempted
estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents and, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, is hereby
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment penalty ranging from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY
of prision correccional medium as minimum to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor maximum as maximum,
with the accessories thereof and to pay a fine of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00).
LAURO G. SORIANO, JR., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. No. L-65952 July 31, 1984
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
FACTS: Thomas N. Tan was accused of qualified theft in a complaint lodged with the City Fiscal of Quezon City. The case
was assigned for investigation to the petitioner who was then an Assistant City Fiscal. In the course of the investigation the
petitioner demanded P4,000.00 from Tan as the price for dismissing the case. Tan reported the demand to the NBI which set up
an entrapment. Because Tan was hard put to raise the required amount only P2,000.00 in bills were marked by the NBI which
had to supply one-half thereof. The entrapment succeeded and an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
No. 7393. The Sandiganbayan found accused Lauro G. Soriano, Jr., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, as Principal in the
Information, for Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b), of Republic Act No. 3019.
A motion to reconsider the decision was denied by the Sandiganbayan; hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: whether or not the investigation conducted by the petitioner can be regarded as a "contract or transaction" within the
purview of Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019. -No.
Whether or not petitioner can be deemed guilty of bribery. -Yes.
HELD: The petitioner has raised several legal questions plus one factual question. The latter is to the effect that the
Sandiganbayan convicted him on the weakness of his defense and not on the strength of the prosecution's evidence. This claim is
not meritorious not only because it is not for Us to review the factual findings of the court a quo but also because a reading of its
decision shows that it explicitly stated the facts establishing the guilt of the petitioner and the competence of the witnesses who
testified against him.
As stated above, the principal issue is whether or not the investigation conducted by the petitioner can be regarded as a "contract
or transaction" within the purview of Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019. On this issue the petition is highly impressed with merit.
The afore-mentioned provision reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:
(a) ...
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or
for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other
party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.
The petitioner states:
Assuming in gratia argumenti, petitioner's guilt, the facts make out a case of Direct Bribery defined and
penalized under the provision of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and not a violation of Section 3,
subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended.
The evidence for the prosecution clearly and undoubtedly support, if at all the offense of Direct Bribery,
which is not the offense charged and is not likewise included in or is necessarily included in the offense
charged, which is for violation of Section 3, subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended. The prosecution
showed that: the accused is a public officer; in consideration of P4,000.00 which was allegedly solicited,
P2,000.00 of which was allegedly received, the petitioner undertook or promised to dismiss a criminal
complaint pending preliminary investigation before him, which may or may not constitute a crime; that the
act of dismissing the criminal complaint pending before petitioner was related to the exercise of the function

of his office. Therefore, it is with pristine clarity that the offense proved, if at all is Direct Bribery. (Petition,
p. 5.)
Upon the other hand, the respondents claim:
A reading of the above-quoted provision would show that the term 'transaction' as used thereof is not limited
in its scope or meaning to a commercial or business transaction but includes all kinds of transaction, whether
commercial, civil or administrative in nature, pending with the government. This must be so, otherwise, the
Act would have so stated in the "Definition of Terms", Section 2 thereof. But it did not, perforce leaving no
other interpretation than that the expressed purpose and object is to embrace all kinds of transaction between
the government and other party wherein the public officer would intervene under the law. (Comment, p. 8.)
It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract. Neither was it a transactionbecause this term
must be construed as analogous to the term which precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some
consideration as in credit transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner.
In the light of the foregoing, We agree with the petitioner that it was error for the Sandiganbayan to have convicted him of
violating Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019.
The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under the Revised Penal Code because to do so would be
violative of as constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Wrong. A reading of the
information which has been reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of bribery so that the petitioner cannot claim deprivation
of the right to be informed.
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Sandiganbayan is modified in that the petitioner is deemed guilty of
bribery as defined and penalized by Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years ofprision correccional as maximum, and to pay a fine
of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos. The rest of the judgment is hereby affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.
MANUEL BORJA, petitioner, vs. HON. RAFAEL T. MENDOZA, Judge of the CFI of Cebu (Branch VI) and HON.
ROMULO R. SENINING, Judge of the City Court of Cebu (Branch I), respondents.
G.R. No. L-45667 June 20, 1977
FERNANDO, J.:
FACTS: The jurisdictional infirmity imputer to respondent Judge Romulo R. Senining of the City of Cebu which was not
remedied by respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in this certionrari proceeding was the
absence of an arrainment of petitioner Manuel Borja, who was accused of slight physical injuries. This notwithstanding
respondent Judge Senining proceeded with the trial in abssentia and thereafter, in a decision promulgated finding him guilty of
such offense and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for a period of twenty days of arresto menor. Thereafter, an appeal was
duly elevated to the CFI of Cebu presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. It was then alleged that without any notice to
petitioner and without requiring him to submit his memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered on November 16,
1976 petitioner that the failure to arraign him is violative of his constitutional right to procedural due process, more specifically
of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and of his right to be heard by himself and
counsel. There was thus, at the very least, a grave abuse of discretion. The Solicitor General agreed that the procedural defect was
of such gravity as to render void the decision of the City Court affirmed by the Court of First Instance. The comment was
considered as answer, with the case being submitted for decision.
ISSUE: whether the proceedings had in the criminal case should be nullified
HELD: Respect for the constitutional rights of an accused as authoritatively construed by this Court, duly taken note of in the
comment of the Solicitor General, thus calls for the grant of the writ of certiorari prayed for.
1. The plea of petitioner to nullify the proceedings had in the criminal case against him finds support in the procedural due
process mandate of the Constitution. It requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed as to why he was
indicted and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt
with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. Moreover, the sentence to be imposed in such a case is to be in
accordance with a valid law. 6 This Court, in People v. Castillo, 7 speaking through Justice De Joya and following the language of
the American Supreme Court, Identified due process with the accused having "been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction,
and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him,
with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded with the authority of a constitutional law, ..." 8 An arraignment thus
becomes indispensable as the means "for bringing the accused into court and notifying him of the cause he is required to meet ...
" 9 Its importance was stressed by Justice Moreland as early as 1916 in the leading case ofUnited States v. Binayoh. 10 He pointed
out that upon the accused being arraigned, "there is a duty laid by the Code [now the Rules of Court] upon the court to inform
[him] of certain rights and to extend to him, on his demand, certain others. This duty is an affirmative one which the court, on its
own motion, must perform, unless waived." 11To emphasize its importance, he added: "No such duty, however, is laid on the
court with regard to the rights of the accused which he may be entitled to exercise during the trial. Those are rights which he must
assert himself and the benefits of which he himself must demand. In other words, in the arraignment the court must act of its own
volition, ..." 12 In the terse and apt language of the Solicitor General: "Arraignment is an indispensable requirement in any
criminal prosecution." 13 Procedural due process demands no less.

2. Nor is it only the due process guarantee that calls for the accused being duly arraigned. As noted, it is at that stage where in the
mode and manner required by the Rules, an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that
confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus made fully aware of Possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the
nature of the crime imputed to him. At the very least then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is
mobilized against him. An arraignment serves that purpose. Thereafter he is no longer in the dark. It is true, the complaint or
information may not be worded with sufficient clarity. He would be in a much worse position though if he does not even have
such an opportunity to plead to the charge. With his counsel by his side, he is thus in a position to enter his plea with full
knowledge of the consequences. He is not even required to do so immediately. He may move to quash. What is thus evident is
that an arraignment assures that he be fully acquainted with the nature of the crime imputed to him and the circumstances under
which it is allegedly committed. It is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him. It is not useless formality,
much less an Idle ceremony.
3. An equally fatal defect in the proceeding had before respondent Judge Senining was that notwithstanding its being conducted
in the absence of petitioner, he was convicted. It was shown that after one postponement due to his failure to appear, the case was
reset for hearing. When that date came, December 14, 1973, without petitioner being present, although his bondsmen were
notified, respondent Judge, as set forth in the comment of the Solicitor General, "allowed the prosecution to present its evidence
invoking Letter of Instruction No. 40. Only one witness testified, the offended party herself, and three documents were offered in
evidence after which the prosecution rested its case. Thereupon, respondent City Court set the promulgation of the decision on
December 28, 1973." 14 It could then conclude: :Verily the records clearly show that petitioner was not arraigned at all and was
not represented by counsel throughout the whole proceedings in the respondent City Court." 15 It is indisputable then that there
was a denial of petitioner's constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel. As categorically affirmed by Justice Ozaeta
for this Court in the leading case of Abriol v. Homeres: 16 "It is the constitutional right of the accused to be heard in his defense
before sentence is pronounced on him." 17 He added further that such "constitutional right is inviolate." 18 There is no doubt that it
could be waived, but here there was no such waiver, whether express or implied. It suffices to refer to another leading
case, People v. Holgado, 19where the then Chief Justice Moran emphatically took note of the importance of the right to counsel:
"In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be
heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man
may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not
because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence." 20 With the violation of the constitutional
right to be heard by himself and counsel being thus manifest, it is easily understandable why the Solicitor General agreed with
petitioner that the sentence imposed on him should be set aside for being null.
4. The provision in the present Constitution allowing trial to be held in absentia is unavailing. It cannot justify the actuation of
respondent Judge Senining. Its language is clear and explicit. What is more, it is mandatory. Thus: "However, after arraignment,
trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustified." 21 As pointed out then by the Solicitor General, the indispensable requisite for trial in absentia is that it should come
"after arraignment." The express mention in the present Constitution of the need for such a step emphasizes its importance in the
procedural scheme to accord an accused due process. Without the accused having been arraigned, it becomes academic to discuss
the applicability of this exception to the basic constitutional right that the accused should be heard by himself and counsel.
5. Nor did the appeal to the Court of First Instance presided by respondent Judge Mendoza possess any curative aspect. To quote
anew from the comment of the Solicitor General: "Respondent Court of First Instance ... considered the appeal taken by the
petitioner as waiver of the defects in the proceedings in the respondent City Court. Precisely, the appeal itself is tantamount to
questioning those defects. In fact, the Memorandum in support of the appeal unmistakably raised as error the absence of
petitioner at the arraignment and cited jurisprudence, commentaries and the rules to bolster his position. Specifically, the absence
of an arraignment can be invoked at anytime in view of the requirements of due process to ensure a fair and impartial trial." 22
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of respondent Judge Romulo R. Senining dated December 28,
1973, finding the accused guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries, is nullified and set aside. Likewise, the decision of
respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza dated November 16, 1976, affirming the aforesaid decision of Judge Senining, is nullified
and set aside. The case is remanded to the City Court of Cebu for the prosecution of the offense of slight physical injuries, with
due respect and observance of the provisions of the Rules of Court, starting with the arraignment of petitioner.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MODESTO TEE a.k.a. ESTOY TEE, accused-appellant. [G.R.
Nos. 140546-47. January 20, 2003]
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS: Prosecution witness Danilo Abratique, a Baguio-based taxi driver, and the appellant Modesto Tee are well acquainted
with each other, since Abratiques wife is the sister of Tees sister-in-law.
Sometime in late June 1998, appellant asked Abratique to find him a place for the storage of smuggled cigarettes.
Abratique brought appellant to his friend, Albert Ballesteros, who had a house for rent in Bakakeng, Baguio City. After
negotiating the terms and conditions, Ballesteros agreed to rent out his place to appellant. Appellant then brought several boxes
of purported blue seal cigarettes to the leased premises.

Shortly thereafter, however, Ballesteros learned that the boxes stored in his place were not blue seal cigarettes but
marijuana. Fearful of being involved, Ballesteros informed Abratique. Both later prevailed upon appellant to remove them from
the premises.
Appellant then hired Abratiques taxi and transported the boxes of cannabis from the Ballesteros place to appellants
residence at Km. 6, Dontogan, Green Valley, Sto. Tomas, Baguio City.
On June 30, 1998, appellant hired Abratique to drive him to La Trinidad, Benguet on the pretext of buying and transporting
strawberries. Upon reaching La Trinidad, however, appellant directed Abratique to proceed to Sablan, Benguet, where appellant
proceeded to load several sacks of marijuana in Abratiques taxi. He then asked Abratique to find him a place where he could
store the contraband.
Abratique brought appellant to his grandmothers house at No. 27 Dr. Cario St., QM Subdivision, Baguio City, which was
being managed by Abratiques aunt, Nazarea Abreau. Nazarea agreed to rent a room to appellant. Abratique and appellant
unloaded and stored there the sacks of marijuana brought from Sablan. Abratique was aware that they were transporting
marijuana as some of the articles in the sacks became exposed in the process of loading.
Eventually, Abratique and Nazarea were bothered by the nature of the goods stored in the rented room. She confided to her
daughter, Alice Abreau Fianza, about their predicament. As Alice Fianzas brother-in-law, Edwin Fianza, was an NBI agent,
Alice and Abratique phoned him and disclosed what had transpired.
On the morning of July 1, 1998, alerted by information that appellant would retrieve the sacks of prohibited drugs that day,
Edwin Fianza and other NBI operatives conducted a stake out at No. 27, Dr. Cario St. While the NBI agents were conducting
their surveillance, they noticed that several PNP NARCOM personnel were also watching the place. The NBI then learned that
the PNP NARCOM had received a tip from one of their informers regarding the presence of a huge amount of drugs in that place.
The NBI and PNP NARCOM agreed to have a joint operation.
As the day wore on and appellant did not show up, the NBI agents sought the permission of Nazarea Abreau to enter the
room rented by appellant. She acceded and allowed them entry. The NBI team then searched the rented premises and found four
(4) boxes and thirteen (13) sacks of marijuana, totaling 336.93 kilograms.
Later that evening, NBI Special Agent Darwin Lising, with Abratique as his witness, applied for a search warrant from
RTC Judge Reyes at his residence. Judge Reyes ordered the NBI agents to fetch the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Muoz, so the
proceedings could be properly recorded. After Atty. Muoz arrived, Judge Reyes questioned Lising and Abratique. Thereafter,
the judge issued a warrant directing the NBI to search appellants residence at Km. 6, Dontogan, Green Valley, Baguio City for
marijuana.
The NBI operatives, with some PNP NARCOM personnel in tow, proceeded to appellants residence where they served the
warrant upon appellant himself. The search was witnessed by appellant, members of his family, barangay officials, and members
of the media. Photographs were taken during the actual search. The law enforcers found 26 boxes and a sack of dried
marijuana in the water tank, garage, and storeroom of appellants residence. The total weight of the haul was 591.81 kilograms.
Appellant was arrested for illegal possession of marijuana.
The seized items were then submitted to the NBI laboratory for testing. NBI Forensic Chemist Maria Carina Madrigal
conducted the tests. Detailed microscopic and chromatographic examinations of the items taken from appellants rented room at
No. 27, Dr. Cario St., as well as those from his residence at Green Valley, showed these to be marijuana.
In Criminal Case No. 15822-R, appellant was acquitted of the charge. However, the trial court found prosecutions
evidence was more than ample to prove appellants guilt in Criminal Case No. 15800-R and sentenced him to death. Hence, this
automatic review.
ISSUE: whether or not petitioners constitutional right to speedy trial was violated.
HELD: No.
We find that the pertinent issues for resolution concern the following: (1) the validity of the search conducted at the appellants
residence; (2) the alleged prejudice caused by the reopening of the case and absences of the prosecution witness, on appellants
right to speedy trial; (3) the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence to sustain a finding of guilt with moral certainty; and (4) the
propriety of the penalty imposed.
1. On the Validity of the Search Warrant; Its Obtention and Execution
Appellant initially contends that the warrant, which directed the peace officers to search for and seize "an undetermined amount
of marijuana," was too general and hence, void for vagueness. He insists that Abratique could already estimate the amount of
marijuana supposed to be found at appellants residence since Abratique helped to transport the same.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that a search warrant is issued if a judge finds probable cause
that the place to be searched contains prohibited drugs, and not that he believes the place contains a specific amount of it. The
OSG points out that, as the trial court observed, it is impossible beforehand to determine the exact amount of prohibited drugs
that a person has on himself.
Appellant avers that the phrase "an undetermined amount of marijuana" as used in the search warrant fails to satisfy the
requirement of Article III, Section 229 of the Constitution that the things to be seized must be particularly described. Appellants
contention, in our view, has no leg to stand on. The constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of description of the
things to be seized is primarily meant to enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties to be
seized and thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items;30 and (2) leave said peace officers with no discretion regarding the
articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches and seizures.31 What the Constitution seeks to avoid are search
warrants of broad or general characterization or sweeping descriptions, which will authorize police officers to undertake a fishing
expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to an offense.32However, it is not required that

technical precision of description be required,33 particularly, where by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must
be rather general, since the requirement of a technical description would mean that no warrant could issue. 34
Thus, it has been held that term "narcotics paraphernalia" is not so wanting in particularity as to create a general warrant. 35 Nor is
the description "any and all narcotics" and "all implements, paraphernalia, articles, papers and records pertaining to" the use,
possession, or sale of narcotics or dangerous drugs so broad as to be unconstitutional. 36 A search warrant commanding peace
officers to seize "a quantity of loose heroin" has been held sufficiently particular.37
Tested against the foregoing precedents, the description "an undetermined amount of marijuana" must be held to satisfy the
requirement for particularity in a search warrant. Noteworthy, what is to be seized in the instant case is property of a specified
character, i.e., marijuana, an illicit drug. By reason of its character and the circumstances under which it would be found, said
article is illegal. A further description would be unnecessary and ordinarily impossible, except as to such character, the place, and
the circumstances.38 Thus, this Court has held that the description "illegally in possession of undetermined quantity/amount of
dried marijuana leaves and Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) and sets of paraphernalia" particularizes the things to be
seized.39
The search warrant in the present case, given its nearly similar wording, "undetermined amount of marijuana or Indian hemp," in
our view, has satisfied the Constitutions requirements on particularity of description. The description therein is: (1) as specific as
the circumstances will ordinarily allow; (2) expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the peace officers may be
guided in making the search and seizure; and (3) limits the things to be seized to those which bear direct relation to the offense
for which the warrant is being issued.40 Said warrant imposes a meaningful restriction upon the objects to be seized by the
officers serving the warrant. Thus, it prevents exploratory searches, which might be violative of the Bill of Rights.
Appellant next assails the warrant for merely stating that he should be searched, as he could be guilty of violation of Republic
Act No. 6425. Appellant claims that this is a sweeping statement as said statute lists a number of offenses with respect to illegal
drugs. Hence, he contends, said warrant is a general warrant and is thus unconstitutional.
For the appellee, the OSG points out that the warrant clearly states that appellant has in his possession and control marijuana or
Indian hemp, in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425.
We have carefully scrutinized Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98),41 and we find that it is captioned "For Violation of R.A. 6425, as
amended."42 It is clearly stated in the body of the warrant that "there is probable cause to believe that a case for violation of R.A.
6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as further amended by R.A. 7659 has been and is
being committed by one MODESTO TEE a.k.a. ESTOY TEE of Km. 6, Dontogan Bgy., Green Valley, Sto. Tomas, Baguio City
by having in his possession and control an UNDETERMINED AMOUNT OF MARIJUANA or INDIAN HEMP in violation of
the aforementioned law."43 In an earlier case, we held that though the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Law is not
pinpointed, "there is no question at all of the specific offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of
probable cause."44Appellants averment is, therefore, baseless. Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) appears clearly issued for one
offense, namely, illegal possession of marijuana.
Appellant next faults the Judge who issued Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) for his failure to exhaustively examine the applicant
and his witness. Appellant points out that said magistrate should not have swallowed all of Abratiques statements hook, line,
and sinker. He points out that since Abratique consented to assist in the transport of the marijuana, the examining judge should
have elicited from Abratique his participation in the crime and his motive for squealing on appellant. Appellant further points out
that the evidence of the NBI operative who applied for the warrant is merely hearsay and should not have been given credit at all
by Judge Reyes.
Again, the lack of factual basis for appellants contention is apparent. The OSG points out that Abratique personally assisted
appellant in loading and transporting the marijuana to the latters house and to appellants rented room at No. 27 Dr. Cario St.,
Baguio City. Definitely, this indicates personal knowledge on Abratiques part. Law enforcers cannot themselves be eyewitnesses
to every crime; they are allowed to present witnesses before an examining judge. In this case, witness Abratique personally saw
and handled the marijuana. Hence, the NBI did not rely on hearsay information in applying for a search warrant but on personal
knowledge of the witness, Abratique.
Before a valid search warrant is issued, both the Constitution 45 and the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure46 require that
the judge must personally examine the complainant and his witnesses under oath or affirmation. The personal examination must
not be merely routinary or pro forma, but must be probing and exhaustive.47 In the instant case, it is not disputed that Judge
Antonio Reyes personally examined NBI Special Investigator III Darwin A. Lising, the applicant for the search warrant as well
as his witness, Danilo G. Abratique. Notes of the proceedings were taken by Atty. Delilah Muoz, Clerk of Court, RTC of
Baguio City, Branch 61, whom Judge Reyes had ordered to be summoned. In the letter of transmittal of the Clerk of Court of the
RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61 to Branch 6 of said court, mention is made of "notes" at "pages 7-11."48 We have thoroughly
perused the records of Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) and nowhere find said "notes." The depositions of Lising and Abratique
were not attached to Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) as required by the Rules of Court. We must stress, however, that the purpose
of the Rules in requiring depositions to be taken is to satisfy the examining magistrate as to the existence of probable cause. 49 The
Bill of Rights does not make it an imperative necessity that depositions be attached to the records of an application for a search
warrant. Hence, said omission is not necessarily fatal, for as long as there is evidence on the record showing what testimony was
presented.50 In the testimony of witness Abratique, Judge Reyes required Abratique to confirm the contents of his
affidavit;51 there were instances when Judge Reyes questioned him extensively. 52 It is presumed that a judicial function has been
regularly performed,53 absent a showing to the contrary. A magistrates determination of probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court,54 as long as there was substantial basis for that
determination.55 Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as

would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection
with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched.
On record, appellant never raised the want of adequate depositions to support Warrant No. 415 (7-98) in his motion to quash
before the trial court. Instead, his motion contained vague generalities that Judge Reyes failed to ask searching questions of the
applicant and his witness. Belatedly, however, he now claims that Judge Reyes perfunctorily examined said witness.56 But it is
settled that when a motion to quash a warrant is filed, all grounds and objections then available, existent or known, should be
raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they are deemed waived.57
In this case, NBI Special Investigator Lisings knowledge of the illicit drugs stored in appellants house was indeed hearsay. But
he had a witness, Danilo Abratique, who had personal knowledge about said drugs and their particular location. Abratiques
statements to the NBI and to Judge Reyes contained credible and reliable details. As the NBIs witness, Abratique was a person
on whose statements Judge Reyes could rely. His detailed description of appellants activities with respect to the seized drugs
was substantial. In relying on witness Abratique, Judge Reyes was not depending on casual rumor circulating in the underworld,
but on personal knowledge Abratique possessed.
In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33, 44 (1937), we held that:
The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been
drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused.58
Appellant argues that the address indicated in the search warrant did not clearly indicate the place to be searched. The OSG
points out that the address stated in the warrant is as specific as can be. The NBI even submitted a detailed sketch of the premises
prepared by Abratique, thus ensuring that there would be no mistake.
A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and
identify the place intended59 and distinguish it from other places in the community.60 A designation or description that points out
the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement of definiteness.
Appellant finally harps on the use of unnecessary force during the execution of the search warrant. Appellant fails, however, to
point to any evidentiary matter in the record to support his contention. Defense witness Cipriana Tee, appellants mother, testified
on the search conducted but she said nothing that indicated the use of force on the part of the NBI operatives who conducted the
search and seizure.61 What the record discloses is that the warrant was served on appellant, 62 who was given time to read it,63 and
the search was witnessed by the barangay officials, police operatives, members of the media, and appellants kith and kin. 64 No
breakage or other damage to the place searched is shown. No injuries sustained by appellant, or any witness, appears on record.
The execution of the warrant, in our view, has been orderly and peaceably performed.
2. On The Alleged Violation of Appellants Substantive Rights
Appellant insists that the prosecutions unjustified and willful delay in presenting witness Abratique unduly delayed the
resolution of his case. He points out that a total of eight (8) scheduled hearings had to be reset due to the failure or willful refusal
of Abratique to testify against him. Appellant insists that said lapse on the prosecutions part violated Supreme Court Circular
No. 38-98.65 Appellant now alleges that the prosecution deliberately resorted to delaying the case to cause him untold miseries.
For the appellee, the OSG points out that the two-month delay in the trial is not such a great length of time as to amount to a
violation of appellants right to a speedy trial. A trial is always subject to reasonable delays or postponements, but absent any
showing that these delays are capricious and oppressive, the State should not be deprived of a reasonable opportunity to prosecute
the criminal action.
On record, the trial court found that prosecution witness Danilo G. Abratique failed to appear in no less than eighteen (18)
hearings, namely those set for February 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, and 24; March 9, 15, 22, and 23; April 6, 7, 8, 16, and 19, all in
1999.66 No less than four (4) warrants of arrest were issued against him to compel him to testify. 67 The NBI agent who
supposedly had him in custody was found guilty of contempt of court for failing to produce Abratique at said hearings and
sanctioned.68 The prosecution had to write the NBI Regional Director in Baguio City and NBI Director in Manila regarding the
failure of the Bureaus agents to bring Abratique to court. 69Nothing on record discloses the reason for Abratiques aforecited
absences. On the scheduled hearing of June 7, 1999, he was again absent thus causing the trial court to again order his arrest for
the fifth time.70 He also failed to show up at the hearing of June 8, 1999. 71
Appellant now stresses that the failure of Abratique to appear and testify on twenty (20) hearing dates violated appellants
constitutional72 and statutory right to a speedy trial.
A speedy trial means a trial conducted according to the law of criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free from
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.73 In Conde v. Rivera and Unson, 45 Phil. 650, 652 (1924), the Court held that
"where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a
reasonable period of time, as in this instance, for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus
to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom."
The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative. A determination as to whether the right has been violated involves the
weighing of several factors such as the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the conduct of the prosecution and the
accused, and the efforts exerted by the defendant to assert his right, as well as the prejudice and damage caused to the accused.74
The Speedy Trial Act of 1998, provides that the trial period for criminal cases in general shall be one hundred eighty (180)
days.75 However, in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation
of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. 76 The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when:
(1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; 77 or (2) when unjustified postponements are

asked for and secured;78 or (3) when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried.79
In the present case, although the absences of prosecution witness Abratique totaled twenty (20) hearing days, there is no showing
whatsoever that prosecution capriciously caused Abratiques absences so as to vex or oppress appellant and deny him his rights.
On record, after Abratique repeatedly failed to show up for the taking of his testimony, the prosecution went to the extent of
praying that the trial court order the arrest of Abratique to compel his attendance at trial. The prosecution likewise tried to get the
NBI to produce Abratique as the latter was in the Bureaus custody, but to no avail. Eventually, the trial court ordered the
prosecution to waive its right to present Abratique and rest its case on the evidence already offered.80
Nor do we find a delay of twenty (20) hearing days to be an unreasonable length of time. Delay of less than two months has been
found, in fact, to be not an unreasonably lengthy period of time. 81
Moreover, nothing on record shows that appellant Modesto Tee objected to the inability of the prosecution to produce its witness.
Under the Rules, appellant could have moved the trial court to require that witness Abratique post bail to ensure that the latter
would testify when required.82 Appellant could have moved to have Abratique found in contempt and duly sanctioned. Appellant
did neither. It is a bit too late in the day for appellant to invoke now his right to speedy trial.
No persuasive reason supports appellants claim that his constitutional right to speedy trial was violated. One must take into
account that a trial is always subject to postponements and other causes of delay. But in the absence of a showing that delays
were unreasonable and capricious, the State should not be deprived of a reasonable opportunity of prosecuting an accused. 83
Appellant next contends that the trial court gravely abused its discretion, and exhibited partiality, when it allowed the reopening
of the case after the prosecution had failed to present Abratique on several occasions and had been directed to rest its case.
Appellant stresses that the lower courts order to reopen the case to receive Abratiques further testimony is an indication that the
trial court favored the prosecution and unduly prejudiced appellant.
On appellees behalf, the Solicitor General points out that the trial courts order was in the interest of substantial justice and
hence, cannot be termed as an abuse of discretion. The OSG points out that the prosecution had not formally rested its case and
had yet to present its formal offer of evidence, hence, the submission of additional testimony by the same witness cannot be
prejudicial to the accused, it being but the mere continuation of an uncompleted testimony. Furthermore, appellant did not
properly oppose the prosecutions motion to reopen the case.
At the time Criminal Cases Nos. 15800-R and 15822-R were being tried, the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure were in effect.
There was no specific provision at that time governing motions to reopen.84 Nonetheless, long and established usage has led to
the recognition and acceptance of a motion to reopen. In view of the absence of a specific procedural rule, the only controlling
guideline governing a motion to reopen was the paramount interests of justice. As a rule, the matter of reopening of a case for
reception of further evidence after either prosecution or defense has rested its case is within the discretion of the trial
court.85 However, a concession to a reopening must not prejudice the accused or deny him the opportunity to introduce counter
evidence.86
Strictly speaking, however, there was no reopening of the cases in the proceedings below. A motion to reopen may properly be
presented only after either or both parties have formally offered and closed their evidence, but before judgment. 87 In the instant
case, the records show that on April 19, 1999, the prosecution was directed to close its evidence and given 15 days to make its
formal offer of evidence.88 This order apparently arose from the manifestation of the prosecution on April 16, 1999 that should
they fail to produce witness Abratique on the next scheduled hearing the prosecution would rest its case. 89 On April 19, 1999,
which was the next scheduled hearing after April 16, 1999, Abratique was absent notwithstanding notices, orders, and warrants of
arrest. However, on April 27, 1999, or before the prosecution had formally offered its evidence, Abratique was brought to the
trial court by the NBI. In its order of said date, the trial court pointed out that the prosecution could move to "reopen" the case for
the taking of Abratiques testimony.90 On May 7, 1999, the prosecution so moved, stressing that it had not yet formally offered its
evidence and that the substantial rights of the accused would not be prejudiced inasmuch as the latter had yet to present his
evidence. Appellant filed no opposition to the motion. The trial court granted the motion six days later. Plainly, there was nothing
to reopen, as the prosecution had not formally rested its case. Moreover, the taking of Abratiques testimony was not for the
purpose of presenting additional evidence, but more properly for the completion of his unfinished testimony. In U.S. vs.
Base,91 we held that a trial court is not in error, if it opts to reopen the proceedings of a case, even after both sides had rested and
the case submitted for decision, by the calling of additional witnesses or recalling of witnesses so as to satisfy the judges mind
with reference to particular facts involved in the case. A judge cannot be faulted should he require a material witness to complete
his testimony, which is what happened in this case. It is but proper that the judges mind be satisfied on any and all questions
presented during the trial, in order to serve the cause of justice.
Appellants claim that the trial courts concession to "reopen" the case unduly prejudiced him is not well taken. We note that
appellant had every opportunity to present his evidence to support his case or to refute the prosecutions evidence point-by-point,
after the prosecution had rested its case. In short, appellant was never deprived of his day in court. A day in court is the
touchstone of the right to due process in criminal justice.92 Thus, we are unable to hold that a grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the trial court when it ordered the so-called "reopening" in order to complete the testimony of a prosecution
witness.
3. On the Sufficiency of the Prosecutions Evidence
In bidding for acquittal, appellant assails the credibility of Abratique as a witness. Appellant insists that Abratiques testimony is
profuse with lies, contrary to human nature, hence incredible. According to appellant, Abratique was evasive from the outset with
respect to certain questions of the trial court. He adds that it appeared the court entertained in particular the suspicion that witness

Abratique had conspired with appellant in committing the crime charged. Appellant questions Abratiques motive in informing
the NBI about his activities related to the marijuana taking, transfer, and warehousing.
The OSG contends that Abratiques testimony, taken as a whole, is credible. It points out that Abratique testified in a
straightforward manner as to his knowledge of the huge cache of prohibited drugs stashed by appellant in two different places.
His testimony, said the OSG, when fused with the physical evidence consisting of 591.81 kilograms of marijuana found by law
enforcers at appellants residence, inexorably leads to the inculpation of appellant.
It is the bounden duty of the courts to test the prosecution evidence rigorously, so that no innocent person is made to suffer the
unusually severe penalties meted out for drug offenses.93 Though we scrutinized minutely the testimony of Abratique, we find no
cogent reason to disbelieve him. From his account, Abratique might appear aware treading the thin line between innocence and
feeling guilty, with certain portions of his story tending to be self-exculpatory. However, his whole testimony could not be
discredited. The established rule is that testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in other parts, depending
on the corroborative evidence and the probabilities and improbabilities of the case. But it is accepted, as a matter of common
sense, that if certain parts of a witness testimony are found true, his testimony cannot be disregarded entirely. 94
Abratique testified in open court that appellant rented the taxicab he was driving, and he helped appellant transport huge amounts
of marijuana to appellants rented room at No. 27 Dr. Cario St., Baguio City and to appellants residence at Km. 6, Dontogan,
Green Valley, Sto. Tomas, Baguio City. He also declared on the witness stand that out of fear of being involved, he decided to
divulge his knowledge of appellants possession of large caches of marijuana to the NBI. When the places referred to by
Abratique were searched by the authorities, marijuana in staggering quantities was found and seized by the law enforcers. Stated
plainly, the physical evidence in this case corroborated Abratiques testimony on material points.
Appellant imputes questionable motives to Abratique in an effort to discredit him. He demands that Abratique should likewise be
prosecuted. However, by no means is the possible guilt of Abratique a tenable defense for appellant. Nor would Abratiques
prosecution mean appellants absolution.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven with moral certainty: (1) that the
accused is in possession of the object identified as prohibited or regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law;
and (3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. 95
We find the foregoing elements proven in Criminal Case No. 15800-R beyond reasonable doubt.
In said case, the testimony of Abratique and the recovery of 591.81 kilograms of marijuana from appellants residence served to
prove appellants possession of a prohibited drug. Tests conducted by the NBI forensic chemist proved the seized articles to be
marijuana. These articles were seized pursuant to a valid search warrant and hence, fully admissible in evidence.
In People v. de los Reyes, 239 SCRA 439 (1994), we held that the Dangerous Drugs Act applies generally to all persons and
proscribes the sale of dangerous drugs by any person, and no person is authorized to sell such drugs. Said doctrine is equally
applicable with respect to possession of prohibited drugs. Republic Act No. 6425, which penalizes the possession of prohibited
drugs, applies equally to all persons in this jurisdiction and no person is authorized to possess said articles, without authority of
law.
Anent the third element, we have held that to warrant conviction, possession of illegal drugs must be with knowledge of the
accused or that animus possidendi existed together with the possession or control of said articles.96 Nonetheless, this dictum must
be read in consonance with our ruling that possession of a prohibited drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge
or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation of such possession. 97 In effect, the onus
probandi is shifted to accused to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi98 in this situation.
Appellant Modesto Tee opted not to testify in his defense. Instead, he presented his mother as his lone witness, who testified on
matters totally irrelevant to his case. We can only conclude that, failing to discharge the burden of the evidence on the possession
of prohibited drug, appellants guilt in Criminal Case No. 15800-R was established beyond reasonable doubt.
4. On The Proper Penalty
Under Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) 99 shall be imposed if the quantity
of marijuana involved in a conviction for possession of marijuana or Indian hemp shall be 750 grams or more.100
In the present case, the quantity of marijuana involved has been shown by the prosecution to be far in excess of 750 grams, as
stressed by the trial court:
The volume is rather staggering. It is almost one whole house or one whole room. In fact, when they were first brought
to the court, it took hours to load them on the truck and hours also to unload them prompting the court to direct that the
boxes and sack of marijuana be instead kept at the NBI office in Baguio. And the identification of said marijuana
during the trial was made in the NBI premises itself by the witnesses since it was physically cumbersome and
inconvenient to keep bringing them to the court during every trial. 101
In sentencing appellant to death, the trial court noted not only the huge quantity of marijuana bales involved, but also "the acts of
accused of hiding them in different placesand transferring them from place to place and making them appear as boxes of
cigarettes to avoid and evade apprehension and detection." They showed his being a big supplier, said the trial court, [whose]
criminal perversity and craft that "deserve the supreme penalty of death."102
We are unable to agree, however, with the penalty imposed by the trial court. The legislature never intended that where the
quantity involved exceeds those stated in Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425 the maximum penalty of death shall automatically
be imposed.103 The statute prescribes two indivisible penalties: reclusion perpetua and death. Hence, the penalty to be imposed
must conform with Article 63104 of the Revised Penal Code. As already held, the death penalty law, Republic Act No. 7659 did
not amend Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.105 The rules in Article 63 apply although the prohibited drugs involved are in

excess of the quantities provided for in Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425. 106 Thus, finding neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances in the present case, appellants possession of 591.81 kilograms of marijuana in Criminal Case No. 15800-R, does
not merit capital punishment but only the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The trial court imposed a fine on appellant in the sum of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency. The imposition of a fine is mandatory in cases of conviction of possession of illegal drugs. This being within
the limits allowed by the law, the amount of the fine must be sustained. All these sanctions might not remedy all the havoc
wrought by prohibited drugs on the moral fiber of our society, especially the youth. 107 But these penalties should warn peddlers
of prohibited drugs that they cannot ply their trade in our streets with impunity.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 6, in Criminal Case No. 15800-R, convicting
appellant MODESTO TEE alias "ESTOY" TEE of violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The fine of ONE
MILLION (P1,000,000.00) PESOS imposed on him is sustained. Appellant is likewise directed to pay the costs of suit.
FRANCISCO FLORES and FRANCISCO ANGEL, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. G.R.
No. L-25769 December 10, 1974
FERNANDO, J.:
FACTS: The accusation for robbery against petitioners was filed as far back as December 31, 1951. The decision rendered on
November 29, 1955 found them guilty of the crime charged. The notice of appeal was filed on December 8, 1955. For a period of
three years, until February 10, 1958, no action was taken by the CA. On that day, there was a resolution remanding the records of
the case to the lower court for a rehearing of the testimony of a certain witness deemed material for the disposition of the
case. Such a resolution was amended by a second resolution which granted the motion for counsel of appellants, now petitioners,
to set aside the decision so that evidence for the defense on certain new facts or matters may be received and that a new decision
in lieu of the old one may be rendered in accordance with the facts as found. Accordingly, the case was returned to the lower
court with the former decision set aside so that the trial could be had, but nothing was done for about a year because the offended
party failed to appear notwithstanding the six or seven dates set for such hearing.
It was further alleged that when thereafter he did take the witness stand, his testimony was far from satisfactory,
characterized as a mere "fiasco" as he could no longer remember the details of the alleged crime; there was even a failure to
identify the two accused. Instead of rendering a new decision, the former one having been set aside as required by the Court of
Appeals, the lower court merely sent back the records to the appellate tribunal. At that stage, five more years having elapsed
without anything being done, petitioners sought the dismissal of the cases against them due to such inordinate delay in their
disposition, which covered the period of December 8, 1955 to May 10, 1965, a period of almost a decade; thus did they invoke
their constitutional right to a speedy trial.
Respondent Court of Appeals was unresponsive, notwithstanding the vigorous plea on the part of counsel for
petitioners, its last order being a denial of a second motion for reconsideration dated January 28, 1966.
ISSUE: whether or not the right to a speedy trial had been accorded due respect
HELD: No.
On the above undisputed facts, there is more than sufficient warrant for the conclusion that the right to a speedy trial, so zealously
guarded in both the 1935 and the present Constitutions, had not been accorded due respect. There is thus merit in the petition.
1. The constitutional right to a speedy trial, as was noted in a recent decision, Acebedo v. Sarmiento, 9 "means one free from
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, ... ." 10 Thus, if the person accused were innocent, he may within the shortest time
possible be spared from anxiety and apprehension arising from a prosecution, and if culpable, he will not be kept long in
suspense as to the fate in store for him, within a period of course compatible with his opportunity to present any valid defense. As
was also pointed out in Sarmiento: "The remedy in the event of a non-observance of this right is by habeas corpus if the accused
were restrained of his liberty, or by certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus for the final dismissal of the case." 11 The above ruling
is a reiteration of the doctrine announced, even before the 1935 Constitution, in Conde v. Rivera, 12 a 1924 decision. In that case,
Justice Malcolm announced categorically that the trial, to comply with the requirement of the then organic law, the Philippine
Autonomy Act, must be "free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays." 13 Further: "We lay down the legal proposition
that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond
a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus
to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom." 14
In the first Supreme Court decision after the 1935 Constitution took effect, People v. Castaeda, 15 where it was shown that the
criminal case had been dragging on for almost five years and that when the trial did finally take place, it was tainted by
irregularities, this Court set aside the appealed decision of conviction and acquitted the accused. As was pointed out by
the ponente, Justice Laurel: "The Government should be the last to set an example of delay and oppression in the administration
of justice and it is the moral and legal obligation of this court to see that the criminal proceedings against the accused come to an
end and that they be immediately discharged from the custody of the law." 16 It was on the basis of the above judgment that the
dismissal of a second information for frustrated homicide was ordered by this Court, where the evidence disclosed that the first
information had been dismissed after a lapse of one year and seven months from the time the original complaint was filed during
which time on the three occasions the case was set for trial, the private prosecutor twice asked for postponements and once the
trial court itself cancelled the entire calendar for the month it was supposed to have been heard. 17 The same result followed
in Esguerra v. De la Costa, 18 where the first complaint was filed on August 29, 1936, the accused having been criminally

prosecuted for an alleged abuse of chastity in a justice of the peace court but after over a year and three months, with the lower
court twice dismissing the case, he still had to face trial for the same offense on a new information, thus compelling him to resort
to a mandamus suit to compel the lower court to terminate the case was his right to a speedy trial was violated, a remedy deemed
appropriate by this Court.
There was another occasion where Justice Laurel spoke for this Court on this specific issue. That was in Mercado v.
Santos. 19 Here, for a period of about twenty months, the accused was arrested four times on the charge of falsifying his deceased
wife's will. Twice, the complaints were subsequently withdrawn. The third time he was prosecuted on the same charge, he was
able to obtain a dismissal. Then came on the part of the provincial fiscal, a motion for reinvestigation. The lower court was in a
receptive mood. It ordered that the case be heard on the merits. The accused moved to dismiss, but he did not succeed. He tried
the Court of Appeals, but he failed again. He elevated the matter to this Court; he prevailed. It was stressed in Justice Laurel's
opinion: "An accused person is entitled to a trial at the earliest opportunity. ... He cannot be oppressed by delaying the
commencement of trial for an unreasonable length of time. If the proceedings pending trial are deferred, the trial itself is
necessarily delayed." 20 The opinion likewise considered as not decisive the fact that the provincial fiscal did not intervene until
an information was filed charging the accused with the crime of falsification the third time. Thus: "The Constitution does not say
that the right to a speedy trial may be availed of only where the prosecution for crime is commenced and undertaken by the fiscal.
It does not exclude from its operation cases commenced by private individuals. Where once a person is prosecuted criminally, he
is entitled to a speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner in which it is authorized to be
commenced." 21 The latest decision in point,Acebedo v. Sarmiento, 22 presented an even clearer case. The information for damage
to property was filed on August 3, 1959. There the matter rested until May 19, 1965, when the accused moved to dismiss. The
lower court denied the motion in his order of July 10, 1965. Two more years elapsed, the period now covering almost eight years,
when the trial was commenced. When one of the witnesses for the prosecution failed to appear, the provincial fiscal sought the
postponement, but the accused countered with a motion for dismissal. The lower court acceded, and this Court sustained him,
even if thereafter it changed its mind and reinstated the case.
Petitioners can thus invoke the constitutional guarantee that the trial should be speedy. In the absence of any valid decision, the
stage of trial has not been completed. In this case then, as of May 10, 1965, when they moved to dismiss in the Court of Appeals,
petitioners could validly contend that they had not been accorded their right to be tried as promptly as circumstances permit. It
was not the pendency in the Court of Appeals of their cases that should be deemed material. It is at times unavoidable that
appellate tribunals cannot, even with due diligence, put an end to suits elevated to them. What is decisive is that with the setting
aside of the previous decision in the resolution of August 5, 1959, petitioners could validly premise their plea for dismissal on
this constitutional safeguard. That is the sole basis for the conclusion reached by us considering the controlling doctrine
announced with such emphasis by this Court time and time again.
2. That is about all that needs be said. The crucial issue has been met. The decisive question has been answered. There is an
affirmation of the worth of the constitutional right to a speedy trial. Not too much significance should be attached to the
procedural defect pointed out in the answer of the People of the Philippines that the Court of Appeals should have been made the
party respondent. What cannot be sanctioned was its failure to accord respect to this particular constitutional right. It did amount
at the very least to a grave abuse of discretion. Whatever deficiency in the pleading may then be singled out, it cannot obscure the
obvious disregard of one of the most important safeguards granted an accused. To deny petitioners the remedy sought would be
to exalt form over substance. At any rate, the petition could be considered, and rightly so, as being directed at the Court of
Appeals. Moreover, the defenses that could have interposed to justify the action taken were invoked by the People of the
Philippines. They certainly did not avail. Our decisions on the right to a speedy rial speak too categorically to be misread. This is
one of those situations then where, in the apt language of the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Makalintal, "technicalities should
give way to the realities of the situation." 23
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted, and the order of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR No. 16641-R entitled,
People v. Francisco Flores, et al., of September 28, 1965 denying the motion to dismiss as well as its order of January 8, 1966
denying the motion for reconsideration, and the order of January 28, 1966 denying the second motion for reconsideration are
hereby set aside, nullified, and considered of no force and effect. The criminal case against petitioners in the aforesaid CA-GR
No. 16641-R are ordered dismissed. Costs de oficio.
AURELIA CONDE, petitioner, vs. PABLO RIVERA, acting provincial fiscal of Tayabas, and
FEDERICO M. UNSON, justice of the peace of Lucena, Tayabas, respondents.
G.R. No. L-21741
January 25, 1924
MALCOLM, J.:
FACTS: Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to respond to no less than five
informations for various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses and counsel at hearings no less than on eight
different occasions only to see the cause postponed, has twice been required to come to the Supreme Court for protection, and
now, after the passage of more than one year from the time when the first information was filed, seems as far away from a
definite resolution of her troubles as she was when originally charged.
ISSUE: whether or not petitioners right to speedy trial was violated

HELD: Yes. Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy
the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons, has a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent
she may go free, and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of law. Dismissed from her humble position, and compelled
to dance attendance on courts while investigations and trials are arbitrarily postponed without her consent, is palpably and openly
unjust to her and a detriment to the public. By the use of reasonable diligence, the prosecution could have settled upon the
appropriate information, could have attended to the formal preliminary examination, and could have prepared the case for a trial
free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.
Once before, as intimidated, the petitioner had to come to us for redress of her grievances. We thought then we had pointed out
the way for the parties. But it seems not. Once again therefore and finally, we hope, we propose to do all in our power to assist
this poor woman to obtain justice. On the one hand has been the petitioner, of humble station, without resources, but fortunately
assisted by a persistent lawyer, while on the other hand has been the Government of the Philippine Islands which should be the
last to set an example of delay and oppression in the administration of justice. The Court is thus under a moral and legal
obligation to see that these proceedings come to an end and that the accused is discharged from the custody of the law.
We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a
defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled
to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas
corpus to obtain his freedom. (16 C.J., 439 et seq.; In the matter of Ford [1911], 160 Cal., 334; U.S. vs. Fox [1880], 3 Montana,
512. See further our previous decision in Conde vs. Judge of First Instance, Fourteenth Judicial District, and the Provincial Fiscal
of Tayabas, No. 21236.1
The writ prayed for shall issue and the Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas shall abstain from further attempts to prosecute the accused
pursuant to informations growing out of the facts set forth in previous informations, and the charges now pending before the
justice of the peace of Lucena, Tayabas, are ordered dismissed, with cost against the respondent fiscal. We append to our order
the observation that, without doubt, the Attorney-General, being fully cognizant of the facts of record, will take such
administrative action as to him seems proper to the end that incidents of this character may not recur. So ordered.

MANUEL MATEO, JR., ROBERTO MARTINEZ alias RUBEN MARTINEZ, ENRIQUE CONCEPCION and
ESMERALDO CRUZ, petitioners, vs. HON. ONOFRE VILLALUZ, as Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, Seventh
Judicial District, respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-34756-59 March 31, 1973
FERNANDO, J.:
FACTS: On or about June 4, 1971, the American Express Bank at Sangley Point, Cavite, was robbed and an American
serviceman was killed. Four (4) criminal actions were filed against petitioners for robbery in band with homicide. The
Information fell in the sala of the Respondent Judge and it was the Honorable Respondent Judge who ordered District State
Prosecutor Cornelio Melendres [or] Assistant City Fiscal Enrique A. Cube to conduct the preliminary investigation.
Petitioners Manuel Mateo, Jr. and Esmeraldo Cruz were arraigned while petitioners Roberto Martinez @ Ruben
Martinez filed a Motion To Dismiss on the ground of "insufficiency of evidence for failure of prosecution (1) to prove the
existence of conspiracy, and (2) to identify the accused by competent evidence." On September 25, 1971, petitioner Roberto
Martinez Ruben Martinez amplified his motion to dismiss with a Supplemental Motion based on the claim that "the pre-trial
identification by prosecution witness Elliot Grey of your accused Roberto Martinez in a police line-up in the absence of
defendant's counsel is unconstitutional; and the in-court testimony of said Elliot Grey identifying your accused Roberto Martinez
is inadmissible in evidence and should be stricken out from the records".
The prosecution opposed the motion to dismiss. To date, the motions to dismiss have not been decided by the
Honorable Respondent Judge. ... In the meantime, another suspect in the Sangley Point Robbery one Rolando Reyes was
arrested. When petitioner's Motion to Dismiss together with the Opposition thereto were submitted for resolution, the Honorable
Presiding Judge in an Order ruled that 'pursuant to Sec. 6, Rule 135 of the New Rules of Court, let the Motion to Dismiss be
resolved until after the prosecution has presented and rested its evidence as against Rolando Reyes. ... It appears that the said
Rolando Reyes had executed an extra-judicial statement and had signed and sworn to its truth before the Respondent Judge; and,
in that statement had implicated petitioners; evidently, the Respondent Judge was aware of this, and it was for this reason that he
had deferred ruling on petitioner Ruben Martinez' motions and supplemental motion to dismiss 'until after the prosecution has
presented and rested its evidence as against Rolando Reyes.'
Rolando Reyes, however, was tried separately from and in the absence of petitioners; so that the proceedings against
him did not constitute evidence against petitioner. So, on November 26, 1971, while petitioner Martinez' Motion and
Supplemental Motion to Dismiss remained unresolved, the prosecution filed a 'Motion to Present Additional Evidence.'
Petitioner Manuel Mateo filed an Opposition to the prosecution's Motion to Present Additional Evidence on the ground that 'to
allow the prosecution to present additional evidence in favor of the State after the prosecution has rested, while the accused has a
pending motion to dismiss under consideration would be prejudicial to the substantial rights of herein accused because it would
effectively deprive him of a fair trial.'
Respondent Judge granted the prosecution's 'Motion to Present Additional Evidence. The prosecution called Rolando
Reyes as an additional witness, and in the course of his testimony, marked an extrajudicial statement purportedly executed by
him. Rolando Reyes repudiated it, stated that he had executed it because he had been threatened by a government agent. The

statement, Exh. 'P' ..., purports to have been subscribed and sworn to before the respondent Judge on October 1, 1971. As soon as
the foregoing facts were made of record in the case, defendants [petitioners herein) verbally moved to suspend the proceedings to
enable them to file a motion to disqualify the Honorable Respondent Judge; and the motion for suspension was granted.
On February 5, 1971, petitioners filed a Joint Motion for Disqualification of respondent Judge contending that
respondent Judge 'in the exercise of his sound discretion [should] disqualify himself from sitting in this case under the second
paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court,' because Rolando Reyes had repudiated the statement that he, Reyes,
had sworn to before the Honorable Respondent Judge and the latter perforce would have to pass upon that repudiation. The
prosecution filed an Opposition to petitioners' Joint Motion for Disqualification. .Respondent Judge denied petitioners' Joint
Motion for Disqualification."
Thereafter, with memoranda being submitted by both parties, the case was deemed submitted for decision on August 4
last year.
ISSUE: whether the circumstance of a party having subscribed before respondent Judge an extra-judicial statement purporting
to describe the manner in which an offense was committed, later on repudiated by him as the product of intimidation in the
course of his having been asked to testify against petitioners, would suffice to negate that degree of objectivity the Constitution
requires
HELD: Yes.
1. It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge
sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and being just. Thereby there is the legitimate expectation that the decision arrived
at would be the application of the law to the facts as found by a judge who does not play favorites. For him, the parties stand on
equal footing. In the language of Justice Dizon: "It has been said, in fact, that due process of law requires a hearing before an
impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge." 4 He should, to quote from another decision "at all times manifest depth of commitment and concern to the cause of
justice according to legal norms, a cerebral man who deliberately holds in cheek the tug and pull of purely personal preferences
and prejudices which he shares with the rest of his fellow mortals." 5 A judge then, to quote from the latest decision in
point, Geotina v. Gonzales, 6 penned by Justice Castro, should strive to be at all times "wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent. Elementary due process requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty
of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his
integrity." 7 Nor is this to imply that prior to Gutierrez, there had been no awareness of the due process aspect of an impartial
tribunal even if not explicitly referred to. As noted by Justice Street as far back as 1926 in Government v. Abella, 8 a 1926
decision, if the Supreme Court "were of the opinion that the litigant had not had a fair trial, a new trial could be granted." 9 There
was a reiteration of such a view in a case decided in 1933, Dais v. Torres, 10 with Justice Vickers as ponente, in these words:
"Although a judge may not have been disqualified [according to the Code of Civil Procedure], nevertheless if it appears to this
court that the appellant was not given a fair and impartial trial because of the trial judge's bias or prejudice, this court will order a
new trial, if it deems it necessary, in the interest of justice." 11
2. Conformably to what was so emphatically asserted in Gutierrez as the fundamental requisite of impartiality for due process to
be satisfied, the Rules of Court provision on disqualification when revised three years later in 1964 contains this additional
paragraph: "A judge may, in the exercise of sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons
other than those mentioned above." 12 Thereby, it is made clear to the occupants of the bench that outside of pecuniary interest,
relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for adjudication, there may be other causes that could conceivably
erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling for inhibition. That is to betray a sense of realism, for the factors that lead to preferences
or predilections are many and varied. It is well, therefore, that if any such should make its appearance and prove difficult to resist,
the better course for a judge is to disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being misunderstood. His reputation for probity and
objectivity is preserved. What is even more important, the ideal of an impartial administration of justice is lived up to. Thus is
due process vindicated. There is relevance to what was said by Justice Sanchez in Pimentel v. Salanga, 13 drawing "attention of
all judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacity to try and decide a case fairly and judiciously comes to the
fore by way of challenge from any one of the parties. A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when
suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant
arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He
should exercise his discretion in a way that: the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he
reflect on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously
tilted the scales of justice against him. That passion on the part of a judge may be generated because of serious charges of
misconduct against him by a suitor or his counsel, is not altogether remote. He is a man, subject to the frailties of other men. He
should, therefore, exercise great care and caution before making up his mind to act or withdraw from a suit where that party or
counsel is involved. He could in good grace inhibit himself where that case could be heard by another judge and where no
appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others involved therein. On the result of his decisions to sit or not to sit may
depend to a great extent the all important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. If after reflection he should resolve to
voluntarily desist from sitting in a case where his motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted
as giving meaning and substance to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He serves the cause of the law who forestalls
miscarriage of justice." 14

3. The imperfections of human institutions being such, what is fit and proper is not always achieved. The invitation to judges to
disqualify themselves is not always heeded. For that matter, it is not always desirable that they should do so. It could amount in
certain cases to their being recreant to their trust. Justice Perfecto's warning is not to be ignored; "to shirk the responsibility"
entails "the risk of being called upon to account for his dereliction." 15 It could be an instrument whereby a party could inhibit a
judge in the hope of getting another more amenable to his persuasive skill. With all such considerations in mind, there is still
cogency in the approach that would look with favor on the exercise of discretion in favor of disqualification, given the likelihood
that bias or prejudice is unavoidable. Even before the amendment of Section 1 of Rule 137, this Court, in at least two
decisions, 16 gave its approval to such a move. Then came People v. Gomez, 17 where this Court, the ponente being Justice J. P.
Bengzon, held: "Now considering that the Revised Rules of Court, already in effect when respondent Judge filed his answer
herein containing the prayer to be disqualified from the case, although not yet in effect when the proceedings at issue were taken
in the court below, states in Section 1 of Rule 137 that, "A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself
from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons' other than the usual grounds for disqualification, this Court, after considering all
the circumstances of the case, finds as' reasonable, respondent Judge's afore-stated request for disqualification from further sitting
in the Richard case, and We rule that he is thereby deemed, in light of the new Rules, to have inhibited himself from further
taking cognizance of the case." 18
There is even greater deference paid to the due process requirement of impartiality when, in Luque v. Kayanan,19 decided in
1969, this Court, through justice Sanchez, could categorically rule: "All suitors, we must say, are entitled to nothing short of the
cold neutrality of an independent, wholly free, disinterested and impartial tribunal. It has been said that "next in importance to the
duty of rendering a right judgment is that of doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of
the judge." Let it be said that the administration of justice in this country suffers from too many human imperfections. To our
mind, respondent judge should inhibit himself since it has become apparent that his further continuance in Case 4871 would be in
the best interest of justice, which he is bound to serve." 20 There was a reiteration of such a principle in Paredes v.
Gopengco, 21 where the following appears in the opinion Justice Teehankee for the Court: "It is pertinent to state the restriction
provided in the Rule against appeal or stay of the proceedings where the trial judge denies a motion for disqualification is not an
absolute rule even in civil cases, has not been taken as precluding a resort in appropriate to the special civil actions of prohibition
and certiorari the higher courts for determination, ahead of the judgment the merits, whether the trial judge committed a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction refusing to disqualify himself." 22 There is thus respectable
authority for the view that with the possibility of a trial tainted by partiality, this Court can step in to assure for the demands of
due process.
4. Petitioners can assert then, and rightly so, that we the power to set aside the order denying the motion disqualification. While
the discretion in the first instance belongs to respondent Judge, its exercise is subject to our corrective authority. Certainly, there
can be no question as to its being considered abused if it can be shown that to refuse inhibition is to cast valid doubts as to a
court's impartiality. The specific issue then that must be resolved is whether the circumstance of a party having subscribed before
respondent Judge an extra-judicial statement purporting to describe the manner in which an offense was committed, later on
repudiated by him as the product of intimidation in the course of his having been asked to testify against petitioners, would
suffice to negate that degree of objectivity the Constitution requires? The answer must be in the affirmative. Petitioners are thus
entitled to the relief sought. Respondent Judge could not be totally immune to what apparently was asserted before him in such
extrajudicial statement. Moreover, it is unlikely that he was not in the slightest bit offended by the affiant's turnabout with his
later declaration that there was intimidation by a government agent exerted on him. That was hardly flattering to respondent
Judge. It is not only that. His sense of fairness under the circumstances could easily be blunted. The absence of the requisite due
process element is thus noticeable. There is this circumstance even more telling. It was he who attested to its due execution on
October 1, 1971 wherein Rolando Reyes admitted his participation in the crime and in addition implicated petitioners. At that
time, their motion for dismissal of the charges against them was pending; its resolution was deferred by respondent Judge until
after the prosecution had presented and rested its evidence against affiant, who was himself indicted and tried for the same
offense, but in a separate proceeding. It cannot be doubted then that respondent Judge in effect ruled that such extra-judicial
statement was executed freely. With its repudiation on the ground that it was not so at all, coercion having come into the picture
there is apparent the situation of a judge having to pass on a question that by implication had already been answered by him. Such
a fact became rather obvious. For respondent Judge was called upon to review a matter on which he had previously given his
opinion. It is this inroad in one's objectivity that is sought to be avoided by the law on disqualification. The misgivings then as to
the requirement of due process for "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" not being met are more titan justified. Hence the
conclusion reached by us.
5. To avoid any further controversies of this nature, lower court judges are well-advised to limit themselves to the task of
adjudication and to leave to others the role of notarizing declarations. The less an occupant of the bench fritters away his time and
energy in tasks more incumbent on officials of the executive branch the less the danger of his being a participant in any event that
might lend itself to the interpretation that his impartiality has been compromised. There is much to be said for displaying zeal and
eagerness in stamping out criminality, but that role is hardly fit for a judge who must bide his time until the case is before him.
He must ever be on guard lest what is done by him, even from the best of motives, may be thought of as eroding that objectivity
and sobriety which are the hallmarks of judicial conduct. Thus should he attend to the performance of the sacred trust that is his.
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition granted. The restraining order is issued by this Court on February 25, 1972 is made
permanent. Without pronouncement as to costs.

HON. GREGORIO. N. GARCIA, Judge of the City Court of Manila, and FRANCISCO LORENZANA, petitioners, vs.
HON. FELIX DOMINGO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, EDGARDO CALO and SIMEON
CARBONNEL, respondents.
G.R. No. L-30104 July 25, 1973
FERNANDO, J.:
FACTS: In Branch I the City Court of Manila presided over by petitioner Judge, there were commenced, by appropriate
informations, eight (8) criminal actions against respondent Edgardo Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and Petitioner Francisco
Lorenzana,
"The trial of the aforementioned cases was jointly held on March 4, 1968, March 18, 1968, March 23, 1968, March 30,
1968, April 17, 1968, April 20, 1968, May 4,1968, May 11, 1968, June 1, 1968, June 15, 1968, June 22, 1968, June 29, 1968,
August 3, 1968 and August 10, 1968. All the fourteen (14) trial dates except March 4 and 18, and April 17, 1968 fell on a
Saturday. This was arranged by the parties and the Court upon the insistence of respondents Calo and Carbonnel who, as police
officers under suspension because of the cases, desired the same to be terminated as soon as possible and as there were many
cases scheduled for trial on the usual criminal trial days, Saturday was agreed upon as the invariable trial day for said eight (8)
criminal cases."
Also this: "The trial of the cases in question was held, with the conformity of the accused and their counsel, in the
chambers of Judge Garcia." Then came these allegations in the petition: "During all the fourteen (14) days of trial, spanning a
period of several months (from March to August, 1968), the accused were at all times represented by their respective counsel,
who acted not only in defense of their clients, but as prosecutors of the accusations filed at their clients' instance. There was only
one (1) day when Atty. Consengco, representing respondent Calo and Carbonnel, was absent. But at the insistence of Pat.
Carbonnel, the trial proceeded, and said respondent cross-examined one of the witnesses presented by the adverse party. In any
case, no pretense has been made by the respondents that this constituted an irregularity correctible on certiorari. The accused,
thru counsel, asked for and were granted time to submit memoranda. Respondents Calo and Carbonnel, thru counsel, Atty. Rafael
Consengco, submitted a 14-page memorandum with not less than 35 citations of relevant portions of the transcript of
stenographic notes in support of their prayer for exoneration, and conviction of petitioner Lorenzana in respect of their
countercharges against the latter. It is worthy of note that up to this late date, said respondents Calo and Carbonnel had not
objected to or pointed out any supposed irregularity in the proceedings thus far; the memorandum submitted in their behalf
is confined to a discussion of the evidence adduced in, and the merits of the cases." It was stated in the next petition:
"The promulgation of judgment was first scheduled on September 23, 1968. This was postponed to September 28, 1968
at the instance of Atty. Rafael Consengco, as counsel respondents Calo and Carbonnel, and again to October 1, 1968 at 11 o'clock
in the morning, this time at the instance of Atty. Consengco and Atty. Francisco Koh who had, in the meantime, also entered his
appearance as counsel for respondents Calo and Carbonnel. The applications for postponement were not grounded upon any
supposed defect or irregularity.
Mention was then made of when a petition for certiorari was filed with respondent Judge: "Early in the morning of
October 1, 1968, Edgardo Calo and Simeon Carbonnel, thru their counsel, Atty. Consengco, filed with the CFI a petition
for certiorari and prohibition... [alleging jurisdictional defects]." Respondent Judge acting on such petition forthwith issued a
restraining order thus causing the deferment of the promulgation of the judgment. After proceedings duly had, there was an order
from him "declaring that 'the constitutional and statutory rights of the accused' had been violated, adversely affecting their 'right
to a free and impartial trial' [noting] 'that the trial of these cases lasting several weeks held exclusively in chambers and not in the
court room open the public';" and ordering the city court Judge, now petitioner, "to desist from reading or causing to be read or
promulgated the decisions he may have rendered already in the criminal cases (in question) ... pending in his Court, until further
orders of this Court.'"
A motion for reconsideration proving unavailing, petition on January 28, 1969, elevated the matter to this Tribunal by
means of the present suit for certiorari and prohibition.
ISSUE: Was there a transgression of the right to a public trial?
HELD: None. 1. The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of the antecedents of this petition, as set forth at the
outset, explicitly enumerated the right to a public trial to which an accused was entitled. So it is, as likewise made clear, under
present dispensation. As a matter of fact, that was one constitutional provision that needed only a single, terse summation from
the Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, Delegate, later Justice, Jose P. Laurel, to gain acceptance. As was stressed
by him: "Trial should also be public in order to offset any danger of conducting it in an illegal and unjust manner." 11 It would
have been surprising if its proposed inclusion in the Bill of Rights had provoked any discussion, much less a debate. It was
merely a reiteration what appeared in the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, popularly known as the Jones Law. 12 Earlier, such a
right found expression in the Philippine Bill of 1902, likewise an organic act of the then government of this country as an
unincorporated territory of the United States. 13 Historically as was pointed out by Justice Black, speaking for the United States
Supreme Court in the leading case of In re Oliver: 14 "This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public trial to an accused
has its roots in [the] English common law heritage. 15 He then observed that the exact date of its origin is obscure, "but it likely
evolved long before the settlement of the [United States] as an accompaniment of the ancient institution of jury trial." 16 It was
then noted by him that there, "the guarantee to an accused of the right to a public trial appeared in a state constitution in
1776." 17 Later it was embodied in the Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution ratified in 1791. 18 He could conclude his

historical survey "Today almost without exception every state by constitution, statute, or judicial decision, requires that all
criminal trials be open to the public." 19Such is the venerable, historical lineage of the right to a public trial.
2. The crucial question of the meaning to be attached this provision remains. The Constitution guarantees an accused the right to
a public trial. What does it signify? Offhand it does seem fairly obvious that here is an instance where language is to be given a
literal application. There is no ambiguity in the words employed. The trial must be public. It possesses that character when
anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on
such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown. The thought
that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to be
conducted with regularity and not tainted with any impropriety. It is not amiss to recall that Delegate Laurel in his terse
summation the importance of this right singled out its being a deterrence to arbitrariness. It is thus understandable why such a
right is deemed embraced in procedural due process. 20 Where a trial takes place, as is quite usual, in the courtroom and a
calendar of what cases are to be heard is posted, no problem arises. It the usual course of events that individuals desirous of being
present are free to do so. There is the well recognized exception though that warrants the exclusion of the public where the
evidence may be characterized as "offensive to decency or public morals." 21
What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the convenience of the parties, and of the city court Judge, it was in the
latter's air-conditioned chambers that the trial was held. Did that suffice to investigate the proceedings as violative of this right?
The answer must be in the negative. There is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that the size of
the room allotted the Judge would reduce the number of those who could be our present. Such a fact though is not indicative of
any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Some are smaller than others. Moreover, as admitted
by Justice Black in his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if the accused
could "have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be charged." 22
Then, too, reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least fourteen hearings had been held in chambers of the city
court Judge, without objection on the part of respondent policemen. What was said by former Chief Justice Moran should erase
any doubt as to the weight to be accorded, more appropriately the lack of weight, to any such objection raised. Thus: "In one
case, the trial of the accused was held in Bilibid prison. The accused, invoking his right to a public trial, assigned the procedure
thus taken as error. The Supreme Court held that as it affirmatively appears on the record that the accused offered no objection to
the trial of his case in the place where it was held, his right is deemed waived." 23 The decision referred to, United States v.
Mercado, 24 was handed down sixty-eight years ago in 1905.
It does seem that the challenged order of respondent is far from being invulnerable.
3. That is all that need be said as to the obvious merit of this petition. One other objection to the conduct of the proceedings by
the city court Judge may be briefly disposed of. Respondent Judge would seek to lend support to an order at war with obvious
meaning of a constitutional provision by harping on the alleged abdication by an assistant fiscal of his control over the
prosecution. Again here there was a failure to abide by settled law. If any party could complain at all, it is the People of the
Philippines for whom the fiscal speaks and acts. The accused cannot in law be termed an offended party for such an alleged
failure to comply with official duty. Moreover, even assuming that respondent policemen could be heard to raise such a
grievance, respondent Judge ought to have been aware that thereby no jurisdictional defect was incurred by the city court Judge.
As was so emphatically declared by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cariaga v. Justo-Guerrero: 25 "The case below was commenced and
prosecuted without the intervention, mediation or participation of the fiscal or any of his deputies. This, notwithstanding, the
jurisdiction of the court was not affected ... but the court should have cited the public prosecutor to intervene ... ." 26
4. There is much to be said of course for the concern displayed by respondent Judge to assure the reality as against the mere
possibility of a trial being truly public. If it were otherwise, such a right could be reduced to a barren form of words. To the extent
then that the conclusion reached by him was motivated by an apprehension that there was an evasion of a constitutional
command, he certainly lived up to what is expected of a man of the robe. Further reflection ought to have convinced him though
that such a fear was unjustified. An objective appraisal of conditions in municipal or city courts would have gone far in dispelling
such misgivings. The crowded daily calendar, the nature of the cases handled, civil as well as criminal, the relaxed attitude on
procedural rules not being strictly adhered to all make for a less tense atmosphere. As a result the attendance of the general public
is much more in evidence; nor is its presence unwelcome. When it is remembered further that the occupants of such courts are
not chosen primarily for their legal acumen, but taken from that portion of the bar more considerably attuned to the pulse of
public life, it is not to be rationally expected that an accused would be denied whatever solace and comfort may come from the
knowledge that a judge, with the eyes of the alert court alert to his demeanor and his rulings, would run the risk of being unjust,
unfair, or arbitrary. Nor does it change matters, just because, as did happen here, it was in the air-conditioned chambers of a city
court judge rather than in the usual place that the trial took place.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted nullifying, setting aside, and declaring bereft of any legal force or
effect the order of respondent Judge Felix Domingo November 29, 1968 for being issued with grave abuse of discretion. The writ
of prohibition sought by petitioner is likewise granted, commanding respondent Judge or any one acting in his place to desist
from any further action in Criminal Case No. 74830 of the Court of First Instance of Manila other than that of dismissing the
same. The preliminary writ of injunction issued by this Court in its resolution of February 3, 1969 against the actuation of
respondent Judge is made permanent. With costs against respondent policemen Edgardo Calo and Simeon Carbonnel.
RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL OF IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER
CASES AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, CESAR

SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO and ATTY. RICARDO ROMULO, petitioners, vs.
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositors.
A.M. No. 01-4-03-S.C.
June 29, 2001
VITUG, J.:
FACTS: The Kapisanan ng mga BroadKaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association representing duly franchised and authorized
television and radio networks throughout the country, sent a letter requesting this Court to allow live media coverage of the
anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order
"to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history."
Honorable Secretary of Justice Perez formally filed the instant petition, submitting the following exegesis:
3. The foregoing criminal cases involve the previous acts of the former highest official of the land, members of his
family, his cohorts and, therefore, it cannot be over emphasized that the prosecution thereof, definitely involves a matter of public
concern and interest.
4. There is no gainsaying that the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern can best
be recognized by allowing the live radio and television coverage of the court proceedings.
5. Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of the proceedings will also serve the dual purpose of ensuring the
desired transparency in the administration of justice.
In effect, the petition seeks a re-examination of the October 1991 resolution of this Court in a case for libel filed by
then President Corazon C. Aquino.
'The television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an accused and his case in
the eyes of the public.'
"Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to due process as well as to the fair and orderly
administration of justice, and considering further that the freedom of the press and the right of the people to information may be
served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means, live radio and television coverage of court proceedings
shall not be allowed. Video footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom,
the judicial officers, the parties and their counsel taken prior to the commencement of official proceedings. No video shots or
photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper.
" Accordingly, in order to protect the parties' right to due process, to prevent the distraction of the participants in the
proceedings and in the last analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court resolved to PROHlBIT live radio and television
coverage of court proceedings. Video footage of court hearings for news purposes shall be limited and restricted as above
indicated."
ISSUE: whether or not media coverage of the trial of the plunder cases filed against former President Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan is permissible under the Constitution
HELD: No. Public interest, the petition further averred, should be evident bearing in mind the right of the public to vital
information affecting the nation.
In effect, the petition seeks a re-examination of the 23rd October 1991 resolution of this Court in a case for libel filed by then
President Corazon C. Aquino. The resolution read:
"The records of the Constitutional Commission are bereft of discussion regarding the subject of cameras in the
courtroom. Similarly, Philippine courts have not had the opportunity to rule on the question squarely.
"While we take notice of the September 1990 report of the United States Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on
Cameras in the Courtroom, still the current rule obtaining in the Federal Courts of the United States prohibits the
presence of television cameras in criminal trials. Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure forbids the taking
of photographs during the progress of judicial proceedings or radio broadcasting of such proceedings from the
courtroom. A trial of any kind or in any court is a matter of serious importance to all concerned and should not be
treated as a means of entertainment. To so treat it deprives the court of the dignity which pertains to it and departs from
the orderly and serious quest for truth for which our judicial proceedings are formulated.
"Courts do not discriminate against radio and television media by forbidding the broadcasting or televising of a trial
while permitting the newspaper reporter access to the courtroom, since a television or news reporter has the same
privilege, as the news reporter is not permitted to bring his typewriter or printing press into the courtroom.
"In Estes vs. Texas. the United States Supreme Court held that television coverage of judicial proceedings involves an
inherent denial of the due process rights of a criminal defendant. Voting 5-4, the Court through Mr. Justice Clark
identified four (4) areas of potential prejudice which might arise from the impact of the cameras on the jury, witnesses,
the trial judge and the defendant. The decision in part pertinently stated:
"Experience likewise has established the prejudicial effect of telecasting on witnesses. Witnesses might be
frightened, play to the camera, or become nervous. They are subject to extraordinary out-of court influences
which might affect their testimony. Also, telecasting not only increases the trial judge's responsibility to
avoid actual prejudice to the defendant, it may as well affect his own performance. Judges are human beings
also and are subject to the same psychological reactions as laymen. For the defendant, telecasting is a form of

mental harassment and subjects him to excessive public exposure and distracts him from the effective
presentation of his defense. 1wphi1.nt
'The television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an accused and
his case in the eyes of the public.'
"Representatives of the press have no special standing to apply for a writ of mandate to compel a court to permit them
to attend a trial, since within the courtroom, a reporter's constitutional rights are no greater than those of any other
member of the public. Massive intrusion of representatives of the news media into the trial itself can so alter or destroy
the constitutionally necessary judicial atmosphere and decorum that the requirements of impartiality imposed by due
process of law are denied the defendant and a defendant in a criminal proceeding should not be forced to run a gauntlet
of reporters and photographers each time he enters or leaves the courtroom.
"Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to due process as well as to the fair and orderly
administration of justice, and considering further that the freedom of the press and the right of the people to information
may be served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means, live radio and television coverage of
court proceedings shall not be allowed. Video footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and
limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and their counsel taken prior to the commencement of
official proceedings. No video shots or photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper.
" Accordingly, in order to protect the parties' right to due process, to prevent the distraction of the participants in the
proceedings and in the last analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court resolved to PROHlBIT live radio and
television coverage of court proceedings. Video footage of court hearings for news purposes shall be limited and
restricted as above indicated."
Admittedly, the press is a mighty catalyst in awakening public consciousness, and it has become an important instrument in the
quest for truth. 5 Recent history exemplifies media's invigorating presence, and its contribution to society is quite impressive. The
Court, just recently, has taken judicial notice of the enormous effect of media in stirring public sentience during the impeachment
trial, a partly judicial and partly political exercise, indeed the most-watched program in the boob-tubes during those times, that
would soon culminate in EDSA II.
The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along
with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. 6
When these rights race against one another, jurisprudence7 tells us that the right of the accused must be preferred to win.
With the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also the very life of an accused, it behooves all to make absolutely
certain that an accused receives a verdict solely on the basis of a just and dispassionate judgment, a verdict that would come only
after the presentation of credible evidence testified to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure, whether open or
subtle, in proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts free from
improper influence,8 and decreed by a judge with an unprejudiced mind, unbridled by running emotions or passions.
Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted above its
individual settings nor made an object of public's attention9 and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside
force or influence10 but only by evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is
demanded.
Witnesses and judges may very well be men and women of fortitude, able to thrive in hardy climate, with every reason to
presume firmness of mind and resolute endurance, but it must also be conceded that "television can work profound changes in the
behavior of the people it focuses on."11
Even while it may be difficult to quantify the influence, or pressure that media can bring to bear on them directly and through the
shaping of public opinion, it is a fact, nonetheless, that, indeed, it does so in so many ways and in varying degrees. The conscious
or unconscious effect that such a coverage may have on the testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be
evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it. 12 It might be farcical to
build around them an impregnable armor against the influence of the most powerful media of public opinion. 13
To say that actual prejudice should first be present would leave to near nirvana the subtle threats to justice that a disturbance of
the mind so indispensable to the calm and deliberate dispensation of justice can create. 14 The effect of television may escape the
ordinary means of proof, but it is not far-fetched for it to gradually erode our basal conception of a trial such as we know it
now. 15
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be
held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that
his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only
implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum
and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of
the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial
participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during the
proceedings.16
The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public information. It also approves of
media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in
acquainting the public with the judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still
the paramount right of the accused to due process17 which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional

proportions. Justice Clark thusly pronounced, "while a maximum freedom must be allowed the press in carrying out the
important function of informing the public in a democratic society, its exercise must necessarily be subject to the maintenance
of absolute fairness in the judicial process."18
This Court, in the instance19 already mentioned, citing Estes vs. Texas,20 the United States Supreme Court holding the television
coverage of judicial proceedings as an inherent denial of due process rights of an accused, also identified the following as being
likely prejudices:
"1. The potential impact of television x x x is perhaps of the greatest significance. x x x. From the moment the trial
judge announces that a case will be televised it becomes a cause celebre. The whole community, x x x becomes
interested in all the morbid details surrounding it. The approaching trial immediately assumes an important status in the
public press and the accused is highly publicized along with the offense with which he is charged. Every juror carries
with him into the jury box these solemn facts and thus increases the chance of prejudice that is present in every
criminal case. x x x.
"2. The quality of the testimony in criminal trials will often be impaired. The impact upon a witness of the knowledge
that he is being viewed by a vast audience is Simply incalculable. Some may be demoralized and frightened, some
cocky and given to overstatement; memories may falter, as with anyone speaking publicly, and accuracy of statement
may be severely undermined. x x x. Indeed, the mere fact that the trial is to be televised might render witnesses
reluctant to appear and thereby impede the trial as well as the discovery of the truth.
"3. A major aspect of the problem is the additional responsibilities the presence of television places on the trial judge.
His job is to make certain that the accused receives a fair trial. This most difficult task requires his undivided attention.
xxx
"4. Finally, we cannot ignore the impact of courtroom television on the defendant. Its presence is a form of mental if
not physical-harassment, resembling a police line-up or the third degree. The inevitable close-up of his gestures and
expressions during the ordeal of his trial might well transgress his personal sensibilities, his dignity, and his ability to
concentrate on the proceedings before him -sometimes the difference between life and death -dispassionately, freely
and without the distraction of wide public surveillance. A defendant on trial for a specific crime is entitled to his day in
court, not in a stadium, or a city or nationwide arena. The heightened public clamor resulting from radio and television
coverage will inevitably result in prejudice."
In his concurring opinion in Estes, Mr. Justice Harlan opined that live television and radio coverage could have mischievous
potentialities for intruding upon the detached atmosphere that should always surround the judicial process. 21
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, in its Resolution of 16 Apri1 2001, expressed its own concern on the live television and
radio coverage of the criminal trials of Mr. Estrada; to paraphrase: Live television and radio coverage can negate the rule on
exclusion of witnesses during the hearings intended to assure a fair trial; at stake in the criminal trial is not only the life and
liberty of the accused but the very credibility of the Philippine criminal justice system, and live television and radio coverage of
the trial could allow the "hooting throng" to arrogate unto themselves the task of judging the guilt of the accused, such that the
verdict of the court will be acceptable only if popular; and live television and radio coverage of the trial will not subserve the
ends of justice but will only pander to the desire for publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers.
It may not be unlikely, if the minority position were to be adopted, to see protracted delays in the prosecution of cases before trial
courts brought about by petitions seeking a declaration of mistrial on account of undue publicity and assailing a court
a quo's action either allowing or disallowing live media coverage of the court proceedings because of supposed abuse of
discretion on the part of the judge.
En passant, the minority would view the ponencia as having modified the case law on the matter. Just to the contrary, the Court
effectively reiterated its standing resolution of 23 October 1991. Until 1991, the Court had yet to establish the case law on the
matter, and when it did in its 23rd October resolution, it confirmed, in disallowing live television and radio coverage of court
proceedings, that "the records of the Constitutional Commission (were) bereft of discussion regarding the subject of cameras in
the courtroom" and that "Philippine courts (had) not (therefore) had the opportunity to rule on the question squarely."
But were the cases decided by the U.S. courts and cited in the minority opinion really in point?
In Nebraska Press Association vs, Stewart,22 the Nebraska State trial judge issued an order restraining news media from
publishing accounts of confession or admissions made by the accused or facts strongly implicating him. The order was struck
down. In Richmond Newspaper; Inc., vs, Virginia,23 the trial judge closed the courtroom to the public and all participants
except witnesses when they testify. The judge was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court which ruled that criminal trials were
historically open. In Globe Newspaper vs. Superior Court,24 the US Supreme Court voided a Massachusetts law that required
trial judges to exclude the press and the public from the courtroom during the testimony of a minor victim of certain sexual
offenses.
Justice Steward, in Chandler vs. Florida,25 where two police officers charged with burglary sought to overturn their conviction
before the US Supreme Court upon the ground that the television coverage had infringed their right to fair trial, explained that
"the constitutional violation perceived by the Estes Court did not stem from the physical disruption that might one day disappear
with technological advances in the television equipment but inhered, rather, in the hypothesis that the mere presence of cameras
and recording devices might have an effect on the trial participants prejudicial to the accused." 26
Parenthetically, the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts do not allow live television and radio coverage of their
proceedings.
The sad reality is that the criminal cases presently involved are of great dimensions so involving as they do a former President of
the Republic. It is undeniable that these cases have twice become the nation's focal points in the two conflicting phenomena of

EDSA II and EDSA III where the magnitude of the events has left a still divided nation. Must these events be invited anew and
risk the relative stability that has thus far been achieved? The transcendental events in our midst do not allow us to turn a blind
eye to yet another possible extraordinary case of mass action being allowed to now creep into even the business of the courts in
the dispensation of justice under a rule of law. At the very least, a change in the standing rule of the court contained in its
resolution of 23 October 1991 may not appear to be propitious.
Unlike other government offices, courts do not express the popular will of the people in any sense which, instead, are tasked to
only adjudicate justiciable controversies on the basis of what alone is submitted before them. 27 A trial is not a free trade of ideas,
Nor is a competing market of thoughts the known test of truth in a courtroom.28
The Court is not all that umnindful of recent technological and scientific advances but to chance forthwith the life or liberty of
any person in a hasty bid to use and apply them, even before ample safety nets are provided and the concerns heretofore
expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too high to pay.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES AGAINST
MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL.
[A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC, June 14 : 2011]
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS: On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media practitioners were killed while on their way to
Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. Touted as the worst election-related violence and the most brutal killing of journalists in recent
history, the tragic incident which came to be known as the Maguindanao Massacre spawned charges for 57 counts of murder
and an additional charge of rebellion against 197 accused, commonly entitled People v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et
al. Following the transfer of venue and the reraffling of the cases, the cases are being tried by Presiding Judge Jocelyn SolisReyes of Branch 221 of the RTC of Quezon City inside Camp Bagong Diwa in Taguig City.
Almost a year later, the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation,
GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the victims, individual journalists from various media entities, and members of the academe
filed a petition before this Court praying that live television and radio coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be allowed,
recording devices (e.g., still cameras, tape recorders) be permitted inside the courtroom to assist the working journalists, and
reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the use of devices.
The National Press Club of the Philippines (NPC) and Alyansa ng Filipinong Mamamahayag (AFIMA) filed a similar
petition. The President expressed earnest hope that [this Court] will attend to this petition with the dispatch, dispassion and
humaneness, such a petition merits.
The record shows that NUJP Vice-Chairperson Jose Jaime Espina, by January 12, 2010 letter to Judge Solis-Reyes,
requested a dialogue to discuss concerns over media coverage of the proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases. Judge
Solis-Reyes replied, however, that matters concerning media coverage should be brought to the Courts attention through
appropriate motion. Hence, the present petitions which assert the exercise of the freedom of the press, right to information, right
to a fair and public trial, right to assembly and to petition the government for redress of grievances, right of free access to courts,
and freedom of association, subject to regulations to be issued by the Court.

ISSUE: whether live television and radio coverage of the trial in these criminal cases should be allowed
HELD:
The Court partially GRANTS pro hac vice petitioners prayer for a live broadcast of the trial court
proceedings, subject to the guidelines which shall be enumerated shortly.
On Broadcasting the Trial of the Maguindanao Massacre Cases
Petitioners seek the lifting of the absolute ban on live television and radio coverage of court proceedings. They principally
urge the Court to revisit the 1991 ruling in Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon C. Aquinos
Libel Case[12] and the 2001 ruling in Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases
Against the Former President Joseph E. Estrada[13] which rulings, they contend, violate the doctrine that proposed restrictions on
constitutional rights are to be narrowly construed and outright prohibition cannot stand when regulation is a viable alternative.
Petitioners state that the trial of the Maguindanao Massacre cases has attracted intense media coverage due to the
gruesomeness of the crime, prominence of the accused, and the number of media personnel killed. They inform that reporters are
being frisked and searched for cameras, recorders, and cellular devices upon entry, and that under strict orders of the trial court
against live broadcast coverage, the number of media practitioners allowed inside the courtroom has been limited to one reporter
for each media institution.
The record shows that NUJP Vice-Chairperson Jose Jaime Espina, by January 12, 2010 letter[14] to Judge Solis-Reyes,
requested a dialogue to discuss concerns over media coverage of the proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases. Judge
Solis-Reyes replied, however, that matters concerning media coverage should be brought to the Courts attention through
appropriate motion.[15] Hence, the present petitions which assert the exercise of the freedom of the press, right to information,

right to a fair and public trial, right to assembly and to petition the government for redress of grievances, right of free access to
courts, and freedom of association, subject to regulations to be issued by the Court.
The Court partially GRANTS pro hac vice petitioners prayer for a live broadcast of the trial court
proceedings, subject to the guidelines which shall be enumerated shortly.
Putts Law[16] states that technology is dominated by two types of people: those who understand what they do not manage,
and those who manage what they do not understand. Indeed, members of this Court cannot strip their judicial robe and don the
experts gown, so to speak, in a pretense to foresee and fathom all serious prejudices or risks from the use of technology inside
the courtroom.
A decade after Estrada and a score after Aquino, the Court is once again faced with the same task of striking that delicate
balance between seemingly competing yet certainly complementary rights.
The indication of serious risks posed by live media coverage to the accuseds right to due process, left unexplained and
unexplored in the era obtaining in Aquino and Estrada, has left a blow to the exercise of press freedom and the right to public
information.
The rationale for an outright total prohibition was shrouded, as it is now, inside the comfortable cocoon of a feared
speculation which no scientific study in the Philippine setting confirms, and which fear, if any, may be dealt with by
safeguards and safety nets under existing rules and exacting regulations.
In this day and age, it is about time to craft a win-win situation that shall not compromise rights in the criminal
administration of justice, sacrifice press freedom and allied rights, and interfere with the integrity, dignity and solemnity of
judicial proceedings. Compliance with regulations, not curtailment of a right, provides a workable solution to the concerns raised
in these administrative matters, while, at the same time, maintaining the same underlying principles upheld in the two previous
cases.
The basic principle upheld in Aquino is firm [a] trial of any kind or in any court is a matter of serious importance to all
concerned and should not be treated as a means of entertainment[, and t]o so treat it deprives the court of the dignity which
pertains to it and departs from the orderly and serious quest for truth for which our judicial proceedings are formulated. The
observation that [m]assive intrusion of representatives of the news media into the trial itself can so alter and destroy the
constitutionally necessary atmosphere and decorum stands.
The Court concluded in Aquino:
Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to due process as well as to the fair and
orderly administration of justice, and considering further that the freedom of the press and the right of the
people to information may be served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means, live
radio and television coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed. Video footages of court hearings for
news purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and
their counsel taken prior to the commencement of official proceedings. No video shots or photographs shall be
permitted during the trial proper.
Accordingly, in order to protect the parties' right to due process, to prevent the distraction of the
participants in the proceedings and in the last analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court resolved to
PROHlBIT live radio and television coverage of court proceedings. Video footage of court hearings for news
purposes shall be limited and restricted as above indicated.[17]

The Court had another unique opportunity in Estrada to revisit the question of live radio and television coverage of court
proceedings in a criminal case. It held that [t]he propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve[s] the weighing
out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the
fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in
ensuring a fair and impartial trial. The Court disposed:
The Court is not all that unmindful of recent technological and scientific advances but to chance
forthwith the life or liberty of any person in a hasty bid to use and apply them, even before ample safety nets
are provided and the concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too high to pay.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.[18]

In resolving the motion for reconsideration, the Court in Estrada, by Resolution of September 13, 2001, provided a
glimmer of hope when it ordered the audio-visual recording of the trial for documentary purposes, under the following
conditions:
x x x (a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan
may determine should not be held public under Rule 119, 21 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras
shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the movement of TV crews shall be regulated
consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made for
documentary purposes only and shall be made without comment except such annotations of scenes depicted
therein as may be necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan
shall have rendered its decision in all the cases against the former President shall be prohibited under pain of
contempt of court and other sanctions in case of violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the conditions
are observed, the audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of
the Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and shall be made pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and (f)
simultaneously with the release of the audio-visual recordings for public broadcast, the original thereof shall
be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and
exhibition in accordance with law.[19]
Petitioners note that the 1965 case of Estes v. Texas[20] which Aquino and Estrada heavily cited, was borne out of the
dynamics of a jury system, where the considerations for the possible infringement of the impartiality of a jury, whose members
are not necessarily schooled in the law, are different from that of a judge who is versed with the rules of evidence. To
petitioners, Estes also does not represent the most contemporary position of the United States in the wake of latest
jurisprudence[21] and statistical figures revealing that as of 2007 all 50 states, except theDistrict of Columbia, allow television
coverage with varying degrees of openness.
Other jurisdictions welcome the idea of media coverage. Almost all the proceedings of United Kingdoms Supreme Court
are filmed, and sometimes broadcast.[22] The International Criminal Court broadcasts its proceedings via video streaming in the
internet.[23]
On the media coverages influence on judges, counsels and witnesses, petitioners point out that Aquino andEstrada,
like Estes, lack empirical evidence to support the sustained conclusion. They point out errors of generalization where the
conclusion has been mostly supported by studies on American attitudes, as there has been no authoritative study on the particular
matter dealing with Filipinos.
Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges, petitioners correctly explain
that prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the totality of circumstances test, applied
in People v. Teehankee, Jr.[24] and Estrada v. Desierto,[25] that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free
press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation
and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not
tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial.
Moreover, an aggrieved party has ample legal remedies. He may challenge the validity of an adverse judgment arising
from a proceeding that transgressed a constitutional right. As pointed out by petitioners, an aggrieved party may early on move
for a change of venue, for continuance until the prejudice from publicity is abated, for disqualification of the judge, and for
closure of portions of the trial when necessary. The trial court may likewise exercise its power of contempt and issue gag
orders.
One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao Massacre cases apart from the earlier cases is the impossibility of
accommodating even the parties to the cases the private complainants/families of the victims and other witnesses inside the
courtroom. On public trial, Estrada basically discusses:
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else,
where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt
with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of
long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be
open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the
trial process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of
the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to

distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they
have observed during the proceedings.[26] (underscoring supplied)

Even before considering what is a reasonable number of the public who may observe the proceedings, the peculiarity of
the subject criminal cases is that the proceedings already necessarily entail the presence of hundreds of families. It cannot be
gainsaid that the families of the 57 victims and of the 197 accused have as much interest, beyond mere curiosity, to attend or
monitor the proceedings as those of the impleaded parties or trial participants. It bears noting at this juncture that the prosecution
and the defense have listed more than 200 witnesses each.

The impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that will accommodate all the interested parties,
whether private complainants or accused, is unfortunate enough. What more if the right itself commands that a reasonable
number of the general public be allowed to witness the proceeding as it takes place inside the courtroom. Technology tends to
provide the only solution to break the inherent limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and
public trial.
In so allowing pro hac vice the live broadcasting by radio and television of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, the Court
lays down the following guidelines toward addressing the concerns mentioned in Aquino and Estrada:
(a) An audio-visual recording of the Maguindanao massacre cases may be made both for documentary
purposes and for transmittal to live radio and television broadcasting.
(b) Media entities must file with the trial court a letter of application, manifesting that they intend to broadcast
the audio-visual recording of the proceedings and that they have the necessary technological equipment and
technical plan to carry out the same, with an undertaking that they will faithfully comply with the guidelines
and regulations and cover the entire remaining proceedings until promulgation of judgment.
No selective or partial coverage shall be allowed. No media entity shall be allowed to broadcast the
proceedings without an application duly approved by the trial court.
(c) A single fixed compact camera shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom to provide a single
wide-angle full-view of the sala of the trial court. No panning and zooming shall be allowed to avoid unduly
highlighting or downplaying incidents in the proceedings. The camera and the necessary equipment shall be
operated and controlled only by a duly designated official or employee of the Supreme Court. The camera
equipment should not produce or beam any distracting sound or light rays. Signal lights or signs showing the
equipment is operating should not be visible. A limited number of microphones and the least installation of
wiring, if not wireless technology, must be unobtrusively located in places indicated by the trial court.
The Public Information Office and the Office of the Court Administrator shall coordinate and assist
the trial court on the physical set-up of the camera and equipment.
(d) The transmittal of the audio-visual recording from inside the courtroom to the media entities shall be
conducted in such a way that the least physical disturbance shall be ensured in keeping with the dignity and
solemnity of the proceedings and the exclusivity of the access to the media entities.
The hardware for establishing an interconnection or link with the camera equipment monitoring the
proceedings shall be for the account of the media entities, which should employ technology that can (i) avoid
the cumbersome snaking cables inside the courtroom, (ii) minimize the unnecessary ingress or egress of
technicians, and (iii) preclude undue commotion in case of technical glitches.
If the premises outside the courtroom lack space for the set-up of the media entities facilities, the
media entities shall access the audio-visual recording either via wireless technology accessible even from
outside the court premises or from one common web broadcasting platform from which streaming can be
accessed or derived to feed the images and sounds.
At all times, exclusive access by the media entities to the real-time audio-visual recording should be
protected or encrypted.
(e) The broadcasting of the proceedings for a particular day must be continuous and in its entirety, excepting
such portions thereof where Sec. 21 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court[27] applies, and where the trial court

excludes, upon motion, prospective witnesses from the courtroom, in instances where,inter alia, there are
unresolved identification issues or there are issues which involve the security of the witnesses and the integrity
of their testimony (e.g., the dovetailing of corroborative testimonies is material, minority of the witness).
The trial court may, with the consent of the parties, order only the pixelization of the image of the
witness or mute the audio output, or both.
(f) To provide a faithful and complete broadcast of the proceedings, no commercial break or any other gap
shall be allowed until the days proceedings are adjourned, except during the period of recess called by the
trial court and during portions of the proceedings wherein the public is ordered excluded.
(g) To avoid overriding or superimposing the audio output from the on-going proceedings, the proceedings
shall be broadcast without any voice-overs, except brief annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be
necessary to explain them at the start or at the end of the scene. Any commentary shall observe the sub
judice rule and be subject to the contempt power of the court;
(h) No repeat airing of the audio-visual recording shall be allowed until after the finality of judgment, except
brief footages and still images derived from or cartographic sketches of scenes based on the recording, only
for news purposes, which shall likewise observe the sub judice rule and be subject to the contempt power of
the court;
(i) The original audio-recording shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and
Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.
(j) The audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the trial
court which may issue supplementary directives, as the exigency requires, including the suspension or
revocation of the grant of application by the media entities.

(k) The Court shall create a special committee which shall forthwith study, design and recommend appropriate
arrangements, implementing regulations, and administrative matters referred to it by the Court concerning the
live broadcast of the proceedings pro hac vice, in accordance with the above-outlined guidelines. The Special
Committee shall also report and recommend on the feasibility, availability and affordability of the latest
technology that would meet the herein requirements. It may conduct consultations with resource persons and
experts in the field of information and communication technology.
(l) All other present directives in the conduct of the proceedings of the trial court (i.e., prohibition on
recording devices such as still cameras, tape recorders; and allowable number of media practitioners inside the
courtroom) shall be observed in addition to these guidelines.

Indeed, the Court cannot gloss over what advances technology has to offer in distilling the abstract discussion of key
constitutional precepts into the workable context. Technology per se has always been neutral. It is the use and regulation thereof
that need fine-tuning. Law and technology can work to the advantage and furtherance of the various rights herein involved,
within the contours of defined guidelines.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisition, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS PRO HAC VICE the request
for live broadcast by television and radio of the trial court proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, subject to the
guidelines herein outlined.

Republic Act No. 8493

February 12, 1998
AN ACT TO ENSURE A SPEEDY TRIAL OF ALL CRIMINAL CASES BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, AND MUNICIPAL
CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Speedy Trial Act of 1998."
Section 2. Mandatory Pre-Trial in Criminal Cases. - In all cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan, the justice or judge shall, after arraignment,
order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of Facts;
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial.
Section 3. Pre-Trial Agreement. - All agreements or admissions made or entered into during the pre-trial conference shall be
reduced to writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise the same shall not be used in evidence against the accused.
The agreements in relation to matters referred to in Section 2 hereof is subject to the approval of the court: Provided, That the
agreement on the plea of the accused to a lesser offense may only be revised, modified, or annulled by the court when the same is
contrary to law, public morals, or public policy.
Section 4. Nonappearance at Pre-Trial Conference. - Where counsel for the accused or the prosecutor does not appear at the
pre-trial conference and does not offer an acceptable excuse for his/her lack of cooperation, the pre-trial justice or judge may
impose proper sanctions or penalties.
Section 5. Pre-Trial Order. - After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting the actions taken, the facts
stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of and control the course
of action during the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.
Section 6. Time Limit for Trial. - In criminal cases involving persons charged of a crime, except those subject to the Rules on
Summary Procedure, or where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment, or a fine of One
thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, the justice or judge shall, after consultation with
the public prosecutor and the counsel for the accused, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term trial
calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty
(180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court.
Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and Between Arraignment and Trial.- The
arraignment of an accused shall be held within thirty (30) days from the filing of the information, or from the date the accused
has appeared before the justice, judge or court in which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. Thereafter, where a
plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least fifteen (15) days to prepare for trial. Trial shall commence within
thirty (30) days from arraignment as fixed by the court.
If the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, he/she shall state whether he/she interposes a negative or affirmative
defense. A negative defense shall require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while an
affirmative defense may modify the order of trial and require the accused to prove such defense by clear and convincing
evidence.
Section 8. Time Limit Following an Order for New Trial. - If the accused is to be tried again following an order of a court for a
new trial, the trial shall commence within thirty (30) days from the date the order for a new trial becomes final, except that the
court retrying the case may extend such period but in any case shall not exceed one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the
order for a new trial becomes final if unavailability of witnesses or other factors resulting from passage of time shall make trial
within thirty (30) days impractical.
Section 9. Extended Time Limit. - Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Act, for the first twelve-calendar-month
period following its effectivity, the time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial imposed by Section 7 of this
Act shall be one hundred eighty (180) days. For the second twelve-month period the time limit shall be one hundred twenty (120)
days, and for the third twelve-month period the time limit with respect to the period from arraignment to trial shall be eighty (80)
days.
Section 10. Exclusions. - The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must
commence:
(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the accused, including but not limited to the
following:
(1) delay resulting from an examination of the accused, and hearing on his/her mental competency, or
physical incapacity;
(2) delay resulting from trials with respect to charges against the accused;
(3) delay resulting from interlocutory appeals;
(4) delay resulting from hearings on pre-trial motions: Provided, That the delay does not exceed thirty (30)
days,
(5) delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating to change of venue of cases or transfer
from other courts;
(6) delay resulting from a finding of the existence of a valid prejudicial question; and
(7) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty (30) days, during which any proceeding
concerning the accused is actually under advisement.
(b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the accused or an essential witness.

For purposes of this subparagraph, an accused or an essential witness shall be considered absent when his/her
whereabouts are unknown and, in addition, he/she is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution or his/her
whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence. An accused or an essential witness shall be considered unavailable
whenever his/her whereabouts are known but his/her presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence or he/she
resists appearing at or being returned for trial.
(c) Any period of delay resulting from the fact that the accused is mentally incompetent or physically unable to stand
trial.
(d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and thereafter a charge is filed against the accused
for the same offense, or any offense required to be joined with that offense, any period of delay from the date the
charge was dismissed to the date the time limitation would commence to run as to the subsequent charge had there been
no previous charge.
(e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for trial with a co-accused over whom the court has not
acquired jurisdiction, or as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for severance has been granted.
(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any justice or judge motu propio or on motion of the
accused or his/her counsel or at the request of the public prosecutor, if the justice or judge granted such continuance on
the basis of his/her findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public
and the defendant in a speedy trial. No such period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court in
accordance with this subparagraph shall be excludable under this section unless the court sets forth, in the record of the
case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such
continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the accused in a speedy trial.
Section 11. Factors for Granting Continuance. - The factors, among others, which a justice or judge shall consider in
determining whether to grant a continuance under subparagraph (f) of Section 10 of this Act are as follows:
(a) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the proceeding would be likely to make a continuation of such
proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice.
(b) Whether the case taken as a whole is so novel, so unusual and so complex, due to the number of accused or the
nature of the prosecution or otherwise, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within the periods of time
established by this Act.
No continuance under subparagraph (f) of Section 10 shall be granted because of general congestion of the court's calendar, or
lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain available witnesses on the part of the public prosecutor.
Section 12. Public Attorney's Duties Where Accused is Imprisoned. - If the public attorney knows that a person charged of a
crime is preventively detained, either because he/she is charged of a bailable crime and has no means to post bail, or is charged of
a non-bailable crime, or is serving a term of imprisonment in any penal institution, the public attorney shall promptly:
(a) Undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial, or cause a notice to be served on the person having
custody of the prisoner mandating such person to so advise the prisoner of his/her right to demand trial.
(b) Upon receipt of a notice, the person having custody of the prisoner shall promptly advise the prisoner of the charge
and of his/her right to demand trial. If at any time thereafter the prisoner informs the person having custody that he/she
demands trial, such person shall cause notice to that effect to be sent promptly to the public attorney.
(c) Upon receipt of such notice, the public attorney shall promptly seek to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial.
(d) When the person having custody of the prisoner receives from the public attorney a properly supported request for
temporary custody of the prisoner for trial, the prisoner shall be made available to that public attorney.
Section 13. Remedy Where Accused is Not Brought to Trial Within the Time Limit. - If an accused is not brought to trial within
the time limit required by Section 7 of this Act as extended by Section 9, the information shall be dismissed on motion of the
accused. The accused shall have the burden of proof of supporting such motion but the prosecution shall have the burden of going
forward with the evidence in connection with the exclusion of time under Section 10 of this Act.
In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall consider, among other factors, the
seriousness of the offense, the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal, and the impact of a reprosecution
on the implementation of this Act and on the administration of justice. Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial
or entry of a plea of guilty shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal under this section.
Section 14. Sanctions. - In any case in which counsel for the accused, the public prosecution or public attorney:
(a) knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing the fact that a necessary witness would be
unavailable for trial;
(b) files a motion solely for the purpose of delay which he/she knows is totally frivolous and without merit;
(c) makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining continuance which he/she knows to be false and which is material to
the granting of a continuance; or
(d) otherwise willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification consistent with the provisions of this Act, the court
may, without prejudice to any appropriate criminal and/or administrative charges to be instituted by the proper party
against the erring counsel if and when warranted, punish any such counsel or attorney, as follows:
(1) in the case of a counsel privately retained in connection with the defense of an accused, by imposing a
fine not exceeding; fifty percent (50%) of the compensation to which he/she is entitled in connection with
his/her defense of the accused;
(2) by imposing on any appointed counsel de officio or public prosecutor a fine not exceeding Ten thousand
pesos (10,000.00); and

(3) by denying any defense counsel or public prosecutor the right to practice before the court considering the
case for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days.
The authority to punish provided for by this section shall be in addition to any other authority or power available to the
court. The court shall follow the procedures established in the Rules of Court in punishing any counsel or public
prosecutor pursuant to this section.
Section 15. Rules and Regulations. - The Supreme Court shall promulgate rules, regulations, administrative orders and circulars
which shall seek to accelerate the disposition of criminal cases. The rules, regulations, administrative orders and circulars
formulated shall provide sanctions against justices and judges who willfully fail to proceed to trial without justification consistent
with the provisions of this Act.
Section 16. Funding. - For the effective implementation of the rules, regulations, administrative orders and circulars
promulgated under this Act, the amount of Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) annually shall be appropriated from the
allocation of the Supreme Court under the General Appropriations Act. Thereafter, such additional amounts as may be necessary
for its continued implementation shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
Section 17. Act Not a Bar to Speedy Trial Claim Under the Constitution. - No provision of this Act shall be interpreted as a bar
to any claim of denial of speedy trial as required by Article III, Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 18. Repealing Clause. - All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 19. Separability Clause. - In case any provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional, the other provisions shall remain
in effect.
Section 20. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in
any newspaper of general circulation: Provided, That Section 7 of this Act shall become effective after the expiration of the
aforementioned third-calendar-month period provided in Section 9 of this Act.
Approved: February 12, 1998