Independent Baluchistan?

Ataullah Mengal's 'Declaration of Independence'

Lawrence Lifschultz

Theplight of smallnationsor nationalitiessituatedin cruciallystrategicregionson theborderlinebet-

ween two great systems has ever been one of tragedy,threatof extermination,and an all-too-familiar
manipulationof local aspirationstowardsself-determinationby more powerful and cynical regimes.
Baluchistan,Pakistan'slargestprovince,presentsa modernversionof the classicaldilemmaof a small
nation undersiege. Thedilemmaisfurtheraggravatedby the developmentsprecedingandsince the Soviet
interventionin Afghanistan.
This article, based on an interviewwith AtaullahMengal, the Baluch leader who headed the only
electedgovernmentof Baluchistan,considersthebackgroundof Baluchnationalismand theconsequences
of the 'Declarationof Independence'which,as AtaullahKhanMengalmakesclear in his interview,has
beenforced upon the Baluchin orderto ensuretheirmeresurvivalas a nationality.
Theinterviewitself is appendedat the end of the article.

THE plight of small nations or na- ious political repercussions not only for Baluchistan is situated at a strategic
tionalities wedged between great empires the future of Pakistan but for the Gulf crossroads of major importance wedged
has for centuries been a story of tragedy, and the entire central Asian region. At- between crucial Western concerns with
extermination and an all-too-familiar aullah Mengal, who headed the only security in the Gulf, and the presence of
manipulation of local aspirations elected Baluch government ever to serve Soviet forces to the north of Afghanistan.
towards self-determination by more in Pakistan's westernmost province, has In an extended interview, Mengal de-
powerful and cynical regimes. The Poles, declared that the Baluch will no longer clared that although the Baluch existed in
the Kurds, the Meo and the Eritreans all pursue their thirty-five year quest to the very vortex of a superpower confron-
know what it is like to be someone else's secure 'provincial autonomy' as a re- tation in South West Asia, it remained
battleground. Only at rare moments do cognised nationality within Pakistan, but their intent to become neither the pawn
small nationalities emerge on their own will now fight for 'complete indepen- nor the victim of either power, as they
conditions of self-determination. The dence' and the end of Pakistan as a state now pursue their own independent na-
price in blood and sacrifice is usually as in its present form. tional aims. Such a goal will require ex-
high as the tactical intelligence and Mengal, who has lived in exile since ceptional diplomatic skill and a capacity
heroism required to achieve the goal. shortly after his release from prison in to make their own position an intractable
When such a nationality finds itself in a 1977, is still regarded as a potent political factor which other powers in the region
crucially strategic region on the border- force within the province. His arrest in will have to come to terms with. They are
line between two great systems, rather 1973 along with most of his provincial prepared to have direct relations with
than in the same remote backwater of cabinet set off a province-wide rebellion both the US and the Soviet Union as well
world indifference, it may discover that which engulfed the Pakistan Army in one as the Gulf states in determining the
its own hopes are pressed tightly between of the more brutal, yet least reported, future configuration of the region's
the loaded gun-barrels of powers which wars in Asia. Mengal was detained by the political geography, so long as their own
care nothing for the independent rights of Bhutto governmnentin large part due to position is clearly taken into account as a
a peripheral people. A modern version of pressure from the Shah of Iran who op- factor by all concerned.
the classical dilemma of a small nation posed the presence of an elected social Mengal stated he has issued his declara-
under siege, fighting for survival on its democratic government contiguous to tion because a crucial turning point had
own terms, appears to be emerging in Iran's eastern border. The consequences finally been reached after three decades
Baluchistan, Pakistan's largest province. of the arrests were traumatic as rebellion of violence. The option of a democratic
The nationalism of the Baluch now lies at spread throughout the province. At one resolution to the crisis within the struc-
the intersection of what is potentially an stage nearly a quarter of the Pakistan ture of Pakistan had now passed the point
area of immense superpower conflict that Army was deployed in the province along of no return in his view. "We have tried
could conceivably draw the world to- with units of the Iranian Armed Forces. our best over all these years to find a solu-
wards a major war. While the Soviet The rebellion came to an end following tion to the issue within the framework of
Union sustains an unpopular puppet the coup d'etat which brought General Pakistan," he said, "It is the reason why
regime in Afghanistan on the bayonets of Zia-ul-Huq to power in July 1977. Within we have been fighting for provincial
80,000 soldiers, American policy has a week of the coup Zia personally flew to autonomy and democracy at the all-
found its own reflection in its unam- Hyderabad Central Jail where Mengal Pakistan level. Had Pakistan accepted
biguous and financially substantiv,esup- and others were detained to begin nego- the concept of nationalities within
port for Pakistan's military dictatorship. tiations for an end to the war. Ultimately, Pakistan and the rights of those na-
The Baluch are caught between these two the Baluch leaders were all released, a tionalities as partners within the boun-
contemporary dictatorships, solemnly ceasefire was declared, the Army with- daries of Pakistan, one could have said,
backed by Moscow on one side and drew from operations in the interior of 'Yes, adjustment is possible'. But they
Washington (plus Beijing) on the other. the province, and an amnesty to those in- have always denied the existence of such
The former Chief Minister of Balu- volved in the rebellion was offered. An rights. From 1973 to 1977 the Army's
chistan has issued a declaration from exile uneasy truce has existed in the province operations in Baluchistan has made clear
in London which threatens to have ser- ever since. to us that even if the demand for provin-

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Annual Number May 1983 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY

cial autonomy is made within a demo- the status of full independence as gua- al and arrest in 1973 of the first elected
cratic structure, it will be met with the ranteed in the 1876 treaty. A close re- provincial ministry in Baluchistan..The
same violence from the Army which is lationship with Pakistan was not ruled sense of betrayal from a civilian regime
more or less comparable to what we out, but the pre-condition of full national which had signed iron-clad constitutional
would have faced had we opted for in- sovereignty was laid down by the Diwan guarantees was only a part of the growing
dependence. For us there is only one way as the first step toward such an associa- nationalist sentiment which fueled the
left. If the Baluch are to survive, then we tion. However, the province was forcibly four year rebellion which followed.
must struggle for an 'independent' Balu- annexed after a nine-month stalemated Mengal claims that when the ceasefire
chistan, outside the framework of interregnum which followed partition. took effect in 1977 only one option re-
Pakistan". The annexation set off a rebellion and mained which could have persuaded the
Pakistani Army units suppressed the first Baluch to envisage a future within
POLITICAL POLARISATION modern armed revolt of the Baluch led by Pakistan. This was "a confederation of
Prince Agha Abdul Karim, the younger states similar to the United Arab
Mengal, who has spent nearly eight brother of the Khan of Kalat. The new Emirates". The confederation principle
years in Pakistani prisons, half of them Pakistan authorities imprisoned much of within the framework of a new form of
during the mid-sixties under the first mar- the recalcitrant Baluch leadership with republic, with four associated states bas-
tial law regime of General Ayub Khan, Karim spending the next 18 years of his ed on the existing provinces, was the
has always been considered one of the life behind prison bars. minimum they would have responded to.
more moderate leaders of the country's From the 1950s to the 1970s the Baluch The timing of Mengal's 'declaration of
democratic opposition. His sharp mili- leadership accepted thefait accompli and independence' occurs at an exceptionally
tancy today is one reflection of the poli- the political reality of Pakistan, but main- delicate and fluid moment within the
tical polarisation existing within the pro- tained that only elected democratic overall context of conditions in central
vince. governments at provincial and national Asia. In the opinion of senior United Na-
The central political dilemma that has levels would guarantee autonomy to the tions sources, the Soviet Union has in-
plagued Pakistan since its creation out of minority nationalities within the frame- dicated it is prepared to move forward
the partition of colonial India has been work of secure constitutional guarantees. toward a negotiated withdrawal of its
the country's unending confrontation This alone was seen as the solution for forces from Afghanistan, if Pakistan will
with the 'national question'. The forma- growing inter-regional tensions, par- co-operate in formulating a workable
tion of Pakistan brought together an ticularly the perceived material domina- solution. Last July in Geneva the Soviet
amalgamation of five provinces (two of tion by the Punjab of all other provinces. Union indicated its approval of the terms
them in part) into one state linked to The continued existence of military rule put forward by the UN Secretary Gen-
one another by the notion of it existing as in Pakistan from 1958 into the early 1970s eral's special negotiator, Diego Cor-
a 'Muslim nation', or homeland for the obstructed a democratic solution to the dovez, when nine days of indirect talks
principal persecuted religious minority of crisis and exacerbated inter-regional an- were held between the foreign ministers
the South Asian subcontinent. However, tagonisms. The democratic prospect of Afghanistan and Pakistan under UN
in three of the four provinces which today ultimately exploded into civil war when auspices. Three conditions were outlined
constitute Pakistan-NWFP, Sindh, and the Pakistan Army refused to accept the as part of the simultaneous process
Baluchistan-although formally existing results of Pakistan's first general election leading to a comprehensive solution.
as Muslim majority areas, dominant pol- in 1970. The election results, had they First, Soviet forces would be withdrawn
itical sentiment in 1947 was led by secular been implemented, would have made the in stages from Afghanistan. Second, in a
democratic nationalists opposed to the leader of the majority party, Sheikh Muj- phased manner refugees in Pakistan
founding of a separate theocratic state ibur Rahman of the Awami League, would be simultaneously repatriated to
based on a religious demarcation. This Prime Minister of Pakistan. Mujib's Afghanistan. And, third, Pakistan would
was to be seen most acutely in the pro- elevation to Premier along with his restrain insurgent activity originating
vince of Baluchistan at the very outset of political base in the majority province of within its borders and actively work for
the transition to partition. Bengal was perceived by more conser- an effective ceasefire, so as to allow both
The position of Baluchistan was one of vative Army elements as a threat to the en- withdrawal of troops and repatriation of
particular distinction from the other pro- trenched position of the Punjab within refugees under as near peaceful condi-
vinces which were to make up Pakistan. the existing state. Civil war in 1971 led to tions as possible.
The confederation of Baluch tribes and the emergence of Bangladesh as Pak- The movement towards a more com-
their titular head, the Khan of Kalat, con- istan's 'national question' ripened into prehensive settlement would be determin-
sidered their status within the disinteg- secession, and finally independence for ed by initial agreement on these points.
rating British Empire to be equivalent to the eastern half of the country. Ultimately, there is no question that a
that of Nepal. While other so-called political solution based on compromise
'native states' dealt with the British GROWING DISILLUSIONMENT would have to involve some form of coali-
'Indian government' in New Delhi, Nepal tion regime emerging in Kabul. The
and Baluchistan maintained treaty rela- Two principal events contributed to Soviet Union has indicated to a number
tions directly with London. More signifi- the growing disillusionment among the of non-aligned states including India that
cantly, the 1876 treaty which had permit- Baluch leadership who had become in- it would not be adverse to such a develop-
ted Britain access to areas of Baluchistan creasingly skeptical of a democratic ment. Whether such a position is a purely
and permission to establish specific for- Pakistan ever emerging. The first con- tactical element in Soviet strategy or a
tifications pledged that the British cerned events in Bangladesh where elec- sincere approach based upon the reality
"would respect the sovereignty and in- tions in Mengal's view led not to a transi- of the existing stalemate within Afghan-
dependence of Kalat". The Baluch tion to democratic institutions, but to istan has yet to be tested. The shape and
Diwan or Assembly repeatedly rejected in violent repression from an Army unwill- constituent elements of a future coalition
votes 'accession' to Pakistan and directed ing and incapable of accepting demo- would emerge at a later stage once pre-
its leadership to secure by negotiations cratic norms, The second was the dismiss- liminary agreement on the first steps of

736
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY Annual Number May 1983

the Geneva negotiations is reached and The strategy of posing the US and the Soviet view, Amin was a major cause and
implementation initiated. Andropov's USSR against each other so as to yield a source of deteriorating political and
long and unexpected discussion with maximum material benefit has until now military conditions within the country.
General Zia during the Brezhnev funeral proved exceptionally profitable for the Although a communist and a leading
is one indication of the seriousness of the military authorities in Islamabad. How- member of the Khalq faction of the
Soviet Union's desire for the terms for- PDPA, Amin's methods of harsh and ag-
ever, it is a policy with certain limitations
mulated in Geneva last July to move for- and dangers. A genuine dilemma does ex- gressively brutal military tactics combin-
ward. ist now for Pakistan's military regime in ed with mass arrestsand executions in the
how to approach negotiations with the leading urban centres were driving more
SOVIETINTERVENTION:
REPRIEVETo ZIA Soviet Union without undermining the and more of the population to take up
architecture of the American/Saudi arms against the regime. Attempts to
In Pakistan a genuine dilemma exists alliance upon which the regime in dislodge him from his position of direct
regarding an advance in negotiations Islamabad is now wholly dependent. command in the Afghan Army in favour
toward an Afghan settlement. The Soviet The issue of negotiations is not an of a more gradualist and reformist policy
invasion in December 1979proved to be a academic one from the point of view of had failed. In September 1979, four
political life-line for General the Soviet Union which is unlikely to months prior to the massive intervention,
Zia-ul-Huq's relatively new and still show unlimited patience if the process in- the Soviet Union in co-operation with
unstable military regime. On the verge of itiated at Geneva in July stagnates. Until then President Nur Mohammed Tarakki
financial insolvency and isolated poli- now the Soviet Union has been excep- had attempted to remove Amin. The
tically, following the execution of tionally restrained in its material scheme failed and in the first of several
Pakistan's last civilian premier, Zulfikar assistance to the wide array of political blunders, Tarakki, the 'father figure' of
Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's military authori- groups operating underground in Pak- the PDPA and once Amin's .mentor had
ties under Zia parlayed the Soviet inva- istan against the military government. himself been killed by Amin's proteges.
sion into a remarkable source for econo- The Soviet Union's Afghan allies in Amin, immediately took complete
mic assistance of a magnitude unimagin- Kabul have with Moscow's approval per- power, and demanded the withdrawal of
able until then. In October 1979, six mitted the city to become a refuge for a the Soviet ambassador whom Amin quite
months after Bhutto's hanging and three broad spectrum of political exiles oppos- correctly accused of complicity.
months prior to the invasion, the Zia ed to theTmilitaryauthorities in Pakistan. The Soviet Union found itself now in
government was entering a severe foreign By and large, however, the Soviet Union the dilemma of formally supporting a
exchange crisis. Bankers were reluctant to has until now done nothing to actively en- man it had attempted to remove and with
loan to a regime which then appeared to courage or provide significant material whose excesses it continued to be iden-
offer little prospect of political stability, support for an opposition which, if it tified internationally. Advocates of in-
and the Carter administration in Wash- were better armed and supplied, might tervention believed Amin could be dis-
ington was actively engaged in discourag- lodged quickly with a major show of
pose a serious threat to the stability of the
ing a major financial infusion. General Zia regime. Prior to the July negotiations force and persuaded to leave for a dip-
Zia's pariah' status at the time, even Pakistan was wracked by a series of ex- lomatic post abroad. His departure in
among the Gulf states who had publicly plosions and successful assasinations of their view would allow a reconstitution of
opposed Bhutto's execution, made long- figures associated with the military the PDPA coalition by the organised
range prospects look bleak. authorities. Most of these were associated return of the purged Parcham faction led
The Soviet invasion changed the equa- with militant elements identified with by Babrak Karmal. Tarakki, in a secret
tion. Taking upon themselves the image Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party. If the Moscow meeting with Soviet leaders and
of a 'front line' state, Pakistan's military Soviet 'olive branch' of a negotiated set- Babrak Karmal on his return from the
leadership developed their position as tlement is not seized upon in the months non-aligned conference in Havana, is
defenders of the 'free world' in spite of ahead by the Pakistani authorities and by reported to have agreed to such a move. A
the internal ambiguities of their own dic- elements within the Afghan insurgency new moderate political course would be
tatorship. From the edge of insolvency capable of conceiving of a framework of the first step to the scaling down of the
Pakistan entered a period .of sudden pro- negotiations whereby a withdrawal and civil war.
sperity in terms of foreign military and coalition formula could be arrived at According to detailed interviews with a
economic assistance. The new Reagan which might provide the form for an well informed Soviet source with intimate
Administration combined with Saudi 'honourable' exit of Soviet forces, then knowledge of events in Kabul between
financial co-operation to fund a multi- the situation regarding specific material September 1979 and January 1980, and
billion dollar aid package which was com- support for dissident groups within Communist Party of India sources with
parable to that received during the era Pakistan could change dramatically. close association with the PDPA, the en-
when Pakistan was an active member of tire Soviet operation in December 1979
both the CENTO and SEATO alliances. DIVISIONS IN CPSU POLITBURO backfired and was botched up badly.
Allocations in the financial year 1983 Amin chose to stage.a last ditch resistance
represented a 348 percent increase in US The CPSU Politburo was never unified and would not be gently persuaded to go
military assistance to Pakistan over the in the decision to intervene in Afghan- abroad on a diplomatic assignment. He is
previous year. No other nation has receiv- istan. Divisions at the top are believed to reported to have ordered the Soviet
ed such a sudden or comparable increase have been collegial but deep,with Mikhail emissary shot who presentedhim with the
in American largesse in the past decade. Suslov, the Party's senior ideologue who fait accompli. He then staged a final
The massive infusion of financial and died last year, dominating the majority at stand and after a twelve-hour gun battle
military aid was politically crucial in the time. The intervention was the final with Soviet forces at the Presidential
stabilising Zia's own position within the manoeuver in a sequence of efforts to Palace, Amin went to his death with near-
Army's still unsettled officer corps and to remove Hafizullah Amin from leadership ly 2,000 loyal members of his Armoured
securing the junta's own dominance over and direction of the People's Democratic Corps.
the body politic. Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). In the The smoothly planned transition to a

737
ECONOMICAND POLITICALWEEKLY AnnualNumberMay 1983
more moderate coalition was in a sham- This appraisal can be tested soon enough at moments by an almost equally savage
bles. According to Soviet sources, the when the United Nations Under-Secre- civil war between contending factions.
Soviet commander of the entire opera- tary General, Diego Cordovez, presents Certain elements, though not all, among
tion, General Paputin, reportedly com- his proposals for a settlement to the con- the insurgents are dominated by the prac-
mitted suicide upon his recall to the cerned parties in the months ahead. If it tice of warlordism. There is fierce rivalry
Soviet Union days after the invasion and becomes clear that Moscow is not serious, between the six principal exile groups bas-
Amin's death. The entire operation had then the onus wilWbe on Moscow and ed in Pakistan's North-West Frontier
gone quite differently than planned. Ac- Kabul for any breakdown in the dialogue. Province. A similar breach exists between
cording to the dissident Soviet historian, However, there are increasingindications members of the 'internal front' operating
Roy Medvedev, "The replacement of that Yuri Andropov's regime wants to within Afghanistan who are doing most
Amin by Karmal was meant to take place find out whether what it regardsas a face- of the fighting, and well supplied exiles in
2-3 days after the successful securing of saving settlement is actually possible". Pakistan who organise most of the press
the capital by the Soviet army, but it Mike Barry, a Paris-based American conferences. At this stage there appears
seems something 'went wrong' with this scholar of Afghan affairs, argues that if no one Afghan leader,with the possible
scenario. The murder and death of Amin the Soviet Union genuinely wants to exception of King Zahir Shah in exile in
and part of his circle of followers and negotiate a withdrawal it must bring Rome, who might command enough sup-
relatives on the night of December 28, about a fundamental shift in military tac- port to enter into negotiations. Even the
1979, was not planned but happened as a tics that are depopulating entire regions. King, who was overthrown in 1973, is op-
result of unexpected developments dur- Barry has been a leading participantin re- posed by a number of the exile factions.
ing the seizure of Kabul on December cent hearings held by the BertrandRussell Abdul Rahman Pazhwak, a senior Af-
27-28 . " Tribunal which has focussed on the Sov- ghan foreign service official who once
Although Soviet forces released iet occupation of Afghanistan. Accord- served as President of the UN General
thousands of political prisoners from ing to Barry, "There is not a single exile or Assembly and fled from Kabul last
Puli-i-Charkhi and other prisons the internal Afghan resistance group which March, has been one of the few Afghan
morning after the invasion, they were would not be prepared ultimately to figures advocating proposals calling for a
hardly seen as liberators in the country as negotiate an assured status of interna- negotiated settlement leading to a Soviet
a whole. The manoeuver to remove Amin tional neutrality in return for a Soviet withdrawal. However, at present with
and to reconstitute a moderate coalition withdrawal. All would certainly pledge such a divided and inchoate polity,
led by the Parcham had transformed it- not to accept membershipor involvement Pakistan would have to serve at least in
self into a very different phenomenon. with any Western military alliance. But if the preliminary stages as an intermediary
The invasion itself now eclipsed all prior the Soviets want to achieve withdrawal, if any serious process of negotiation is to
issues. they must first make peace with the Af- advance.
From the start a minority faction with- ghans on the ground. Everything they are A genuine dilemma exists for Pakistan
in the Politburo had opposed the invasion doing is in the opposite direction. One- regarding negotiations. If serious talks
arguing instead for a withdrawal of fourth of the population has fled as actually move forward toward the emer-
military and civilian support to Amin. refugees. Soon it will be a third. Military gence of a 'neutralist' Finnish style coali-
Even Soviet newspapers at the time des- operations particularly in Logar Pro- tion in Kabuland the ultimate withdrawal
cribed how tens of thousands of innocent vince, south of Kabul have been brutal of Soviet forces, Pakistan's status as a
people were suffering at the hands of the and murderous in the extreme, with 'front line' state would be dramnatically
ruling group in Kabul. The advocates of village after village burned to the ground. diminished. The public rationale for the
withdrawal argued it would mean Amin's I saw these with my own eyes. If the massive rearmament and economic as-
demise in the end, and was preferable to Soviets want a negotiated settlement, sistance programme that has sustained
the risks and uncertainties of full-scale in- they cannot expect to go on escalating the the mnilitaryregime would ebb. There are,
tervention. It is now widely reported, not war on the ground and find Afghans in thus, reasons from the point of view of
only by Soviet sources, that Yuri Andro- the opposition camp prepared to speak the Pakistani Army to prevaricate on
pov headed this minority view within the with them." Should negotiations not ad-, negotations and make progress a drawn
Politburo; that Suslov had his way over vance, Barry believes that an implicit out matter.
Afghanistan; and, because of its catastro- Soviet threat to back Baluch national However, there are also real potential
phic consequences, Andropov had his aspirations, and thus open a 'second costs to Pakistan's military government
way over Poland. If, in fact, it is correct front' in the region's conflict, must be should it be too coy for too long. The
that this earlier minority opinion has regarded with utmost seriousness. "If Soviet Union is unlikely to court Pakistan
ascended to power in Moscow with the Ataullah Mengal is prepared to declare for an indeterminate period without mak-
rise of Andropov, then it is plausible that independence," says Barry, "it means ing a serious evaluation of the realities
Soviet proposals regarding a negotiated the backing he needs is potentially within underlying the entire prospect of a nego-
settlement in Afghanistan may indeed be his reach. Such an announcement by tiated settlement. If a negotiated with-
serious. Mengal must be taken extremely serious- drawal of Soviet forces becomes impossi-
ly." ble due in part to equivocation on
PROSPECT OF NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT If the Soviet Union is indeed serious Pakistan's side, then the Soviet Union
regarding the negotiation process, then may be compelled to enact a severe and
In the view of Selig Harrison from the progress will have to move forward with- dramatic shift in its entire approach to
Carnegie Endowment for International out major -delay or prevarication. The Pakistan, so as to relieve pressure on its
Peace, and author of "In Afghanistan's role of Pakistan as an intermediary with forces in Afghanistan. A wide array of
Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet elements within the insurgency is ex- potential strategic alignmentsexist which
Temptations", the prospect of a nego- tremely crucial if the negotiations are to could readily encompass a spectrum of
tiated settlement must be taken seriously. progress. The insurgents are politically a forces within Pakistan which have never
"Sceptics argue that Moscow's participa- deeply divided force. Their bravery been, nor are ever likely to regard them-
tion in the negotiations is a cynical ploy. against Soviet forces has been paralleled selves as Soviet proteges, but are never-

739
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY Annual Number May 1983

theless, prepared to make alliances of a regional crisis. Gwadar overlooks the nor was that of Ahmed Shah, a member
united front character against the Strait of Hormuz, entryway to the Gulf, of Mengal's National Awami Party, who
military regime in Islamabad. and lies within eighty miles of Iranian was killed at the same time. Although
naval facilities at Chah Bahar. Access Bhutto is said to have deeply regrettedthe
INDEPENDENT BALUCHISTAN agreements for RDF forces already exist affair, no action was taken against the
with Oman which stands on the southern Brigadier in charge, since it was believed
It is here that the Baluchistan question flank of the Strait. The RDF itself has (as at the time that a court martial would
presents itself with its potential force. of early January) been integrated into the have had an unsettling effect within the
Within this broader context Ataullah newly formed United States Central Army-something Bhutto could little af-
Mengal's declarations regarding inde- Command for South West Asia. Its com- ford as time would demonstrate.
pendence must be assessed. In Mengal's mander has a military status comparable Within Pakistan Ataullah Mengal's
own judgement, if circumstances compel to commanders of American forces in 'declaration of independence' will be
an alternative approach, then the Soviet Europe and the Pacific. regarded by some merely as a 'max-
Union might at first seem to prefer a pro- "It must be understood that Balu- imalist' position, which following the
Soviet Pakistan, rather than to have an chistan is the only part of Pakistan that potential collapse of the military regime,
independent Baluchistan or a balkanised has special significance for the an elected civilian government might still
Pakistan. But future attitudes on their Americans. It now fits into American be able to negotiate with, and still find a
part, he argues, will depend on how far plans with regard to their approach to basis for national reconciliation. How-
the Soviet Union is forced to weigh fac- Gulf Security", says Mengal. "We ap- ever, none of the principal civilian parties
tors as they emerge and how actual forces prehend that the point where the RDF who might constitute such a new regime
mature within Pakistan. "As far as we are will come and land if a regional crisis have ever considered the minimum posi-
concerned," he says, "the Communists develops will be near Gwadar. As the tion put forward by the Baluch political
frequently claim that they believe in the elected representatives of the Baluch, we leadership, that of reforming Pakistan in-
rights of nationalities. We believe that object fundamentally to any bases being to a confederation of associated republics
within this overall situation the Russians set up in Baluchistan. I have no desire for based on the boundaries of the existing
will in the end have no objection as far as Baluchistan to become the battleground provinces. Mengal, who sees no immi-
the emergence of an independent Balu- for the big powers". nent or permanent return to democratic
chistan is concerned. We are trying our A spokesman for the Pakistan govern- institutions in Pakistan, claims such an
best to be 'non-committed' to any power. ment, Qutubuddin Azia, has called option no longer exists.
The interest we are committed to is that of Mengal's allegation 'baseless' and stated By thus challenging the Pakistani
our own people. That is our priority. But, that the United States is not building a authorities, Mengal has introduced a new
we have objectives and we would certain- military base in Gwadar or anywhere else and unsettling element into the politics of
ly accept any aid that comes from any in Baluchistan. The question of the possi- a region already buffetted by the Iranian
quarter without committing the integrity ble existence of contingency arrange- Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Af-
of Baluchistan". Mengal spoke of efforts ments for RDF access to Pakistani facil- ghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, and an ac-
he and Khair Bux Marri, former Presi- ities under crisis conditions has not been celerating arms build-up throughout the
dent of Baluchistan's National Awami answered. Spokesmen for the State Gulf. With their border extending from
Party and Sardar of the 1,35,000 strong Department have categorically denied the the southern reaches of Afghanistan
Marri tribe, had made to persuade existence of any American facility at along the eastern borders of Iran and
members of the US Congress not to sup- Gwadar. across the northern tier of the Gulf, the
port a comprehensive military aid agree- Mengal's life in exile has not been Baluch are at the vortex of the region's
ment for an undemocratic regime in without incident. On May 12 last year his conflicting currents. Having now issued a
Islamabad. In 1981 they had a meeting in residence in London was fire-bombed by 'declaration of independence', Mengal
London with a delegation of the House a Molotov cocktail in the middle of the and the Baluch he represents have yet to
Committee on Foreign Affairs. Accor- night. A week later one of his sons was demonstrate that they have the capability
ding to Mengal: "We spoke with them at seriously beaten by toughs in the local of forging the necessary alliances and the
some length and told them our views of village and had to be hospitalised. He has force within their own nationalist move-
the political repercussions such a major accused the Pakistan government of hav- ment to achieve their goal of a new state in
aid programme would have within the ing been behind both incidents. A spokes- Central Asia.
country. Most of the delegation seemed man for the Pakistan embassy categori-
determined that Pakistan must get this cally denies any association with either Interview with
aid. They had preconceived ideas and event. Local police have attributed both Ataullah Mengal
their interest in our opinions seemed only incidents to racial attacks.
a formality. Again like the past their con- In February 1976, while Mengal was in A taullah Mengal, former Chief
cern seemed to be more for the Russians prison, his eldest son, 21 year old Minister of Pakistan's Baluchistan
on the Northern border than with the Asadulla, was shot and abducted in front Province, has been in exile since 1978.
people who live within Pakistan." of his Karachi residence in full view of From his home in London he spoke
Mengal has alleged that new contingen- local residents. According to a former with Lawrence Lifschultz about his
cy arrangements exist between Pakistan member of Prime Minister Bhutto's cab- years of conflict with authorities in
and the United States for the use of base inet charged with investigating the inci- Pakistan, and the strategic dilemma 6,
facilities now being developed in Balu- dent and interviewed by this writer in Baluchistan in the present Soviet-
chistan. He claims facilities are under 1980, Mengal's son died soon after the American confrontation in Centaid
construction at Gwadar in south-western shooting while in the custody of a unit of Asia.
Baluchistan and elsewhere in the province the Army's elite commando formation,
which would be made available to units of the Special Services Group (SSG). The LIFSCHULTZ: How would you disr
the American Rapid Deployment Force SSG had carriedout the action. The boy's tinguish between the policies of General
(RDF) should the contingency arise in Fa body was never returned to the family; Zia-ul Haq's government towards Baiu-

741
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY Annual Number May 1983

chistan and those of previous regimes in Baluchistan in nearly twenty years. So MENGAL: No, I don't. Because, I
Pakistan? how is Zia better for us? have come to the firm conclusion that
MENGAL: In our view there has been LIFSCHULTZ: How can the 'national Pakistan is a country which exists only to
no basic change as far as the attitude and question' in Pakistan as it regards the maintain the privileges of its Army.
motives of the present government when Baluch be solved? Is it still feasible to Rather, it is one of the countries in the
we compare it to previous regimes. Their resolve it within a reconstituted denmo- third world where society is coerced so as
approach to the Baluch question has been cratic structure in Pakistan, or can it be to maintain the domination of a single in-
essentially the same. From our point of solved within a framework of martial stitution and the coercion is done by the
view they have one precise motive and law? Or, in your view has the point been same institution, the Army. Normally ar-
that is to colonise Baluchistan; to extract reached that the problem can no longer be mies in other countries are there to pro-
and plunder the maximum they can get solved within the framework of tect and maintain the integrity of the
out of it. Whether a regime enters into a Pakistan? country, but Pakistan is a country where
series of military operations, or whether it MENGAL: Actually, we have tried our the society is condemned to obey and
does it through peaceful means, as far as best over all these years to find a solution serve the Army's dictatorship. The mo-
our interests as a nationality are concern- to the issue within the framework of ment, in fact, a part of the country or the
ed it has come to one and the same. The Pakistan. It is the reason why we have public is no longer willing to obediently
Baluch interestwas in danger in the begin- been fighting for provincial autonomy accept the Army's privileged status, then
ning of Pakistan and it is still in danger. and democracy at the national level. Lit- as it happened in East Pakistan in 1971, it
The attitude of various governments to- tle did those in power know or com- will be the Army itself which will be.the
wards the Baluch national interest has prehend that by advocating provincial first to do away with its opposition,
been one and the same right from the autonomy we in fact were calling for the whatever the cost.
beginning. There has been no change. solidarity of Pakistan. We can now say LIFSCHULTZ: You say that East
About the Baluch one thing must be this no doubt was a mistake on our part. Pakistan (Bangladesh) was "kicked out"
kept in mind. The methods have been Rather, it was a blunder. It was a blunder of Pakistan. Some people in Pakistan.
changed but the object has been the same. which we came to realise as time went on; would say that East Pakistan had seced-
There were military operations against us not during the earlier stages. But when ed. How would you make a distinction
even in Jinnah's time. People were killed East Pakistan was kicked out of Pakistan between the two?
even back in 1947. Military operations in such a brutal way, the Punjabis refused MENGAL: I would disagree. It is well
were going on in Baluchistan a fortnight to learn a lesson from it. When they known that Mujib did not want in-
prior to Iskandar Mirza's departure from pounced upon Baluchistan in 1973 and dependence initially. I believe it was on
power in 1958. Then in Ayub Khan's time started their military operations, then we March 7 (19-l1), if I am not mistaken, that
there were major military operations and realised that the issue was not as simple as he held a public meeting in Dacca.
people were imprisoned and hanood. we had thought at the beginning. It was Everyone was expecting Mujib would an-
Then Bhutto and the Shah's militarl :t.- not because of one 'bad' government or a nounce the independence of Bangladesh,
tions you saw. We were also imprisoned few 'bad' elements within a government and there was a great deal of pressure on
during that period (1973-77). that we were being deprived of our rights. Mujib from many quiartersto make such
So that is that. Whether it has been Rather it was part of a clear and cal- an announcement af-- the Army had
through bullet or through the gallows the culated policy on the part of the domi- postponed the conver. Ifthe National
policy has remained. Death has been of- nant Punjabis that no rights would be Assembly and had virLua:iy cancelled the
fered us by every regime which came to allowed to the 'minority' nationalities, or election results. Still, Mujib refused to
power. Bhutto offered death through indeed the 'majority' nationality in the announce independence. Mujib was
bullets. Ayub Khan offered bullets and case of the Bengalis prior to 1971. 'One pushed into a corner where he had no op-
gallows. Jinnah gave us bullets. Zia's Unit' under Ayub was a move towards tion left. He had won the ele4ion with
regime so far has offered us gallows. So the direction of total denial of 'national' 99.9 per cent of the votes in East Pakistan
Pakistan from the Baluch point of view entities and only because of pressure and constituted thereby a majority in
has shown us one common face. There from East Pakistan, Pakistan had to Pakistan. Never in the history of any
has been no basic change by the Pakis- abandon 'one unit' and restore the pro- country was there such a measure of sup-
tanis toward the Baluch. Zia-ul Huq's vinces. They claim to believe in only one port.
order to hang the young student whom thing and that is to create a new nation, an The Army knew that if the election
the High Court had declared was wrongly artificial nation, on the name of the result was honoured and implemented in
convicted was a continuation of what we Muslim nation. And on that name they toto and its powers were handed over to a
have seen and expect from Pakistan. believe they have the right to dominate civilian government led by the Bengali
Zia has claimed variouismotives at dif- and exploit the smaller provinces and na- majority in the National Assembly, then
ferent moments. On the one hand he says tionalities. They believe in only one prin- the minimum the Bengalis proposed to do
he does not want to adopt a policy of ciple: that everything that belongs to you was to implement parity in the Army and
harshness and high-handedness toward is mine; whatever I have already is already other state institutions after so many
the Baluch. He wanted to say to us that he with me, and that is mine too. Now they years of neglect and discrimination. They
was a thorough gentleman, and at the don't believe in the principle of 'let live'; would ask for 56 per cent representation
same time he wanted to impress upon the they know only 'how to live'. And, they in the Army. The Army would not ac-
Americans his capacity to be harsh and choose to live off others. Now with that commodate itself to the consequences of
ruthless if called upon. When the type of thinking, withrthat concept, it is a democratic election. The Army would
American Under-Secretary of State, very difficujt for as to adjust. have had to accept patity as would have
James Buckley, arrived in Pakistan last LIISCHULTZ: But for a long while the civil servants. But, tjey would have
year to negotiate the military aid agree- you believed that the national problem none of it. They were not preparedto give
ment, they chose the day of his arrival to could be solved within the framework.pfa a proportionate quota to the Bengalis.
execute Hamid Baluch. This act was the 'democratic' Pakistan. Do you'ho lornger This leaves aside the Army's apprehen-
first hanging of a political prisoner in believe this? sions that Mujib was not even preparedto

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Annual Number May 1983 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY

retain the bloated scale of the Army itself. stand. Why at this moment have you largest province. Now, all this has a
They feared he might cut their- budget chosen to issue a declaration of in- definite motive behind it. If these small
size. Mujib had said that in such a poor dependence? provinces were left alone to look after
country there was no need for such a MENGAL: There are three aspects of their own problems and destinies, where
'white elephant'. Mujib wanted to have this question. The simplest of all is that would the Punjabi ruling class go as far as
good terms with India and with all states the consequences we have suffered in our its future programmes and plans are con-
neighbouring Pakistan. In such a context struggle for provincial autonomy and cerned? The Punjab must resettle and
there was no need to have such a 'white democracy would not have been worse deploy its population somewhere due to
elephant' like the existing Army which than what we would have suffered had we the crisis within the province. The
was consuming over 60 per cent of the en- been struggling for an independent Balu- Western countries will not permit
tire national budget. chistan. Bangladesh suffered a terrible anymore immigrants from the region.
At the beginning of the negotiations massacre only for asking for the im- Punjab is bursting as far as the popula-
with the Army after the elections Mujib plementation of the election results and tion to land ratio is concerned. From the
was forced into a compromise. He was the formation of a government which had perspective of the Punjab their popula-
asked to give a guarantee that he would been elected to take over Pakistan. The tion has to be resettled or employed
not touch the Army and he did agree that punishment rendered for asking merely elsewhere. It already employs nearly
for five years he would not touch it. The for democracy within Pakistan was not 4,00,000 with the Army itself. But, they
Army didn't believe him. They thought less than what would have occurred had are looking for land and resources else-
that Mujib was only making a tactical they set out from the start with the goal of where to expand into. Baluchistan is
concession and was not going to stick to an independent Bangladesh. From 1973 minerally a very wealthy area and has a
his word. Once power was handed over to to 1977 the Army's operations in Balu- great deal of potential. It potentially
him, once he became Prime Minister of chistan has made clear to us that even if a could accommodate hundreds of thou-
Pakistan, it would be extremely difficult demand for provincial autonomy is made sands of people coming from outside
for the Army to control him. So events within a democratic structure, it will be were these resources to be ffilly exploited.
were soon manipulated. You will met with the same violence from the But in the process they would ruin and
rememberthat Yahya Khan called off the Army which is more or less comparable to destroy us as they are already doing. It is
meeting of tije National Assembly. This what we would have faced had we this we have cast the die against.
was uncalled for on Yahva's part. There opted for independence. If at all LIFSCHULTZ: Under the provincial
had been fair elections which all parties the result we face is the same violence autonomy arrangements guaranteed
recognised. But when the Assembly was whether we want autonomy or indepen- under the 1973 Constitution, would you
due to meet, the Army simply refused to dence, then why should not one go for the have been able to restrict the type of im-
allow it to convene. The Army did this graceful and dignified course-indepen- migration and cultural destruction you
with the full connivance of Bhutto who dence? That is number one. Secondly, it have described?
was out for power himself. This is the is my firm belief now that the Baluch will MENGAL: If provincial autonomy
background to what preceded the never realise their rights within the had worked, our objective would have
crackdown in Dacca. Canl there be any framework of Pakistan. By Pakistan I been to rehabilitate and develop the
doubt the Bengalis were 'kicked out' of mean the Punjabi ruling elements. economy for our own people first. We
Pakistan after having won anlelection? Whenever I refer to Pakistan I inean the would have parted only with those
LIFSCHULTZ: If you no longer Punjabi ruling class. Had Pakistan ac- resources which are surplus with regardto
believe that the national question for the cepted the concept of nationalities within our needs. We would not have let our
Baluch can be solved within a renewed Pakistan, and the rights of those na- people look for a loaf of bread and give
democratic framework in Pakistan, what tionalities as partners within the boun- better things to our neighbours. No, cer-
now is your standpoint in terms of a solu- daries of Pakistan, one could have said, tainly not!
tion to the national question? "Yes, adjustment is possible". But, right LIFSCHULTZ: For many years you
MENGAL: We have opted for a very from the beginning there has been a maintained that a fully democratic and
difficult path. But for us there is only one denial of the rights of nationalities, as far constitutional set-up in Pakistan could
way left. If the Baluch are to survive, then as it concerned the Punjabi ruling class. resolve the national question. But, you
we must struggle for an 'independent' They have always denied the existence of are now saying after the four year civil
Baluchistan, outside the framework of such rights. Not only that, but on a war (1973-77), you have abandoned any
Pakistan. We are conscious of ourselves number of occasions they have dubbed such hope.
as a national entity. If the present situa- demands for the recognition of such MENGAL: Yes, that is correct because
tion is allowed to prevail, then that entity rights due to the nationalities to be we have had the bitter experience of that
will be lost. Efforts are being made in treacherous denmands.We who have al- period. The 1973 Constitution used to be
Pakistan at the moment to drawn us with ways tried to plead the case of the pro- a sacred document which a variety of
an influx of refugees and immigrants. vinces, have been labelled as traitors. You politicians, and even Zia-ul Haq, used to
The authorities in Pakistan want to out- will never point out to me a single Punjabi refer to concerning its guarantees re-
number the people of Baluchistan by br- politician in Pakistan who has been labell- garding provincial autonomy. Somebody
inging settlers from outside Baluchistan ed a traitor. No matter what language he has to go and ask them, where is that
into the province as labourers, peasants, might have used in his political speeches, wretched 1973 Constitution now! It has
and businessmen. The goal is to bring or what demands he put forward, or ac- been completely abrogated. Yet, the
people in and force the Baluch out. tions he may have taken, he will never military governors enjoy referring to the
LIFSCHULTZ: So you now stand une- have been labelled anti-state. This at- righteous promises of autonomy in this
quivocally for independence? tribution has been specified and reserved document. Where is the rest of this sacred
MENGAL: Yes, we are now absolutely exclusively for those who belong to the Constitution of 1973? The part concern-
out for independence. smaller provinces. At one time when ing the judiciary has been torn to pieces
LIFSCHULTZ: In all these thirty years there was an 'East Pakistan', it was also and thrown into the dustbin. The part
you have until now refused to take such a reserved for the political leaders of the which concerns the western democratic

744
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY Annual Nuziber May 1983

concept of elected government has been you envisage any possible co-operation country's nationalities to have their rights
torn to pieces with the enthusiastic sup- which could be sustained with democratic safeguarded. But, if you give the gun to
port of the West itself. The National elements within Pakistan? the Punjab and at the same time you de-
Assembly is completely gone. Zia-ul Haq MENGAL: As far as other democratic signate 56 per cent of the seats in a Na-
being head of state today is nothing less organisations and movements are con- tional Assembly to the Punjab, then how
than high treason according to that Con- cerned, we can only co-operate when we can there be any safeguards for provincial
stitution. All these concerns have been find a common ground for co-operation. rights? Now all three provinces together
thrown into the gutter. When we speak of an independent Balu- could not beat the Punjab in such an
The only part which the authorities say chistan, as we do now, there is hardly any Assembly. When there was East Pakistan
is still intact today is the Constitution's ground left for those parties or organisa- the votes would have been overwhelming-
provision regarding autonomy. Why do tions which still believe in the concept of ly against the vested interests of the Pun-
they even bother to refer to it at all? The Pakistan to meet with us on. According jabis. In this sense we constituted a clear
reason is simple: the actual provisions, to the general concept of secession, you majority in the country. It is precisely for
whatever the appearance, provided vir- have to think of disintegrating a country this reason that the Army would not
tually no autonomy whatsoever. The to bring into being a part of it as an in- abide by the 1970 elections and kicked
essence had been drained away before it dependent nation. Under these circum- East Pakistan out of the Federation. Now
was enacted. This is why all of them, not stances no organisation bearing al- all the guns lie with the Punjab. The
only Zia-ul Haq, but even opposition par- legiance to Pakistan will accommodate us Army and the civil service are overwhelm-
ties declare, "In the 1973 Constitution all nor will we be able to accommodate ingly Punjabi. In the beginning if the
political parties settled the issues of pro- them. At one stage there certainly was a Punjab had accepted these terms, the
vincial autonomy, so it cannot be reopen- possibility for co-operation and indeed provinces could have been satisfied. But
ed". there was co-operation. Within Pakistan today they are not prepared to listen to
LIFSCHULTZ: You are saying the there are many people who have a soft anything beyond the 1973 Constitution.
1973 Constitution provided no guarantee corner for the plight of the Baluch and As far as we are concerned, that is point
whatsoever for provincial autonomy? would like to search for a way back. But, I zero.
MENGAL: It did not. But, we did give am afraid it is ratherlate. It would only be LIFSCHULTZ: I am not clear on this
a fair trial even to their so-called possible if these elements had a real say in point. Are you saying you are still
autonomy provisions, even though it was the affairs of the Pakistani state. Nor, do prepared to consider the possibility of a
utterly against the concept we had been they have much prospect of political 'confederation', or has the situation gone
seeking in the constitution of our party. power. beyond that point also?
We gave it a fair trial. Our own party We also could not be persuaded to go MENGAL: I said that if at an earlier
Constitution reserved three subjects for down the old road of Constitutional stage the Punjabis had the vision, a con-
the jurisdiction of the Federal author- guarantees. Three constitutions have federation could have been a solution.
ities. These were defence, foreign affairs, been abrogated in toto-the '56, the '62, But at this stage if I can be independent, I
and currency. All other provisions were and the '73 constitutions have been com- would not choose a confederation. In
reserved as the responsibilities of the pro- pletely buried. So there is no question of order to have avoided an independent
vinces. In the 1973 Constitution there are trusting any constitutional guarantee, Baluchistan, or an independent Pak-
two 'lists': one is the 'Federal'; the other when the constitutions as a whole do not toonistan, or an independent Sindh, the
is the 'Concurrent' list. The 'Federal' list, count. So, what guarantees could be Punjabis could have offered such a solu-
of course, is precisely those areas of given for provincial rights. If constitu- tion. But now they have lost their credi-
responsibility reserved for the Federal tional guarantees are not worth anything, bility. Or, as I have said, they could have
government. The 'Concurrent' list is one then verbal guarantees certainly do not brought forward a proposal offering an
dominated by the Federal authorities count. equal division of power with the context
with the concurrence of the provinical For us a guarantee now could lie in only of Pakistan. But, they are not going to
government. I also call it a Federal list. one of two ways. First is to form a con- part with anything. They want to have the
But, there is a 'third' list, which does not federation of states similar to the United full cake and eat it at the same time.
specify anything exactly which is what I Arab Emirates (UAE). Secondly, if they LIFSCHULTZ: Baluchistan is now si-
call the 'residue' list. Whatever is left think a confederation is too much to tuated in an important strategic
from these two lists-the Federal and speak of at this stage, then let them accept crossroads between the Soviet Union in
Concurrent-is the rights remaining unto an equal division of power at the level of Afghanistan and the United States' own
the provincial government. But, if you the Federation. This could have been heavy commitment to the military regime
examine it all minutely, there is nothing another alternative. Under a confedera- in Islamabad. How will the specific
left out of the first two lists. We even tion four independent states would exist nature of your geo-political location bet-
agreed to that wretched list and said, all in association. They would be the four ween two major blocs in confro-ntation
right, let us give it a fair trial. If the Pun- provinces of the present federation of affect your own goal of achieving an in-
jabis have got no ulterior motive, well we Pakistan. In this arrangementthe four in- dependent state?
can work out problems in the future. But, dependent states could live comfortably MENGAL: As far as our situation in
they did not even allow us to function and in peace. As I said, something like the Baluchistan is concerned, it has a dark
within those provisions. Even those UAE. side and a bright one. There is no doubt
crumbs their hunger could not spare for Most people said that this is too much that Baluchistan today has a strategic at-
long. at this stage to ask for. They say nobody is traction for the Soviet bloc as well as the
LIFSCHULTZ: At one stage co-oper- going to agree. 'Nobody' means the Pun- American bloc. Now in that case one
ative relations existed between demo- jab and its Army. Earlier we also sug- stands to be a loser as well as a gainer.
cratic forces in Baluchistan and certain gested having an equal division of powl-er Loser, in the sense, that whatevergoes in
demociktic political parties from other at the level of the federation. This would the interest of one bloc will force the other
provinces. Now that you have given a call have been the only guarantee which bloc to use all its forces and resources to
for the independence of Baluchistan do would have allowed the rights of the stop the success of its antagonist. I can

745
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY Annual Number May 1983

say that the present geo-political situation in the rights of nationalities. We believe of thinking. But so far over all these years
in the region is certainly going to create a that within this overall situation, the Rus- the Americans have had no such reason to
great many hazards and problems for us. sians will have no objection as far as the inflict their bullets upon our people, but
It already has. But we are hopeful that a emergence of an independent Baluchis- they did! So there is a difference between
stage will come, or rather a situation will tan is concerned, unless they feel it is the two from our point of view. We have
develop, where Baluch independence will specifically against their interest. There is been no one's pawns. We have stood for
become an inevitable and acceptable no doubt that every state has to look after ourselves. But, for no rhyme or reason
reality even to those who at present would its own interest and for that matter the the United States has allowed their bullets
prefer our movement not to gain ground. Soviet Union cannot be expected to ig- and weapons to be used again and again
It will leave them with no other alter- nore its own interest. We as Baluch have against the Baluch people. How can the
native, but to accept the real fact, that tried to make a comparison between the Americans justify this?
once this idea has entered into the minds Soviet attitude and the American attitude LIFSCHULTZ: How is it possible
of the people of that area, and once they as far as their past actions in regard to us given the strategic position of the Gulf
are determined to achieve it, history are concerned. What we can see is that and the existing oil interests that the ma-
shows that they cannot be denied this there are bullet marks in the dead bodies jor powers will cease their confrontation
right. When the Americans come to this of the Baluch from bullets that were and withdraw to leave the smaller nations
conclusion, they will perceive their own made in America. Someone has to point and societies in the region to the resolu-
interest differently than they do now. At out a bullet mark made by the Russians tion of their own affairs without outside
the moment it is not suitable to the against the Baluch. Someone has yet to interference? Are there any conditions
Americans that Baluchistan should have point out to us Russian roubles flowing which might allow such an improbable
its own aspirations. The United States has into Pakistan to aid the anti-Baluch situation to arise? Is it possible or is it
selected Pakistan.as a whole to use in its gunmen in Pakistan. Someone has yet to naive to imagine you will be left alone?
conflict against Russia. In time they will show us Soviet manufactured aeroplanes, MENGAL: In our view a situation will
come to the conclusion that they are just helicopters, or military pacts like those emerge which will warranta sort of settle-
beating a dead horse. And, that will be for with the Shah which were used to aid the ment between the Soviets and the Ameri-
us to demonstrate, once the indepen- Pakistan government in its attempt to cans in the region. They will each reach
dence movement is launched and fully crush us in 1973. the conclusion that any move fro'meither
developed. There is no doubt the Soviets are a big side could bring them to the brink of
Pakistan's strategic importance exists power and like all big powers they wish to World War or nuclear war. I believe they
only because of Baluchistan. If you take extend their influence. But, we are trying will avoid such a situation and a settle-
Baluchistan out of it, Pakistan is not our best to be nobody's pawns; to make ment will emerge.
worth two pennies. Once it is established Baluchistan 'non-committed' to any LIFSCHULTZ: But for societies in
that Baluchistan is going to get its in- power. The interest we are committed to areas like Central Asia' where you are in
dependence under any circumstances, I is that of our own people. That is our Baluchistan, such a settlement could
think at that stage the venues of sense will priority. We have no desire or intention mean just a redrawing of the line of con-
not be shut, as far as the American mind to commit ourselves to any power. But we trol between two spheres of influence. In
is concerned. This is what I hope. How- have objectives and we would certainly your view could any conditions emerge
ever, it usually takes a very long period accept any aid that comes from any where the major powers might withdraw
for sense to prevail in American quarters, quarter without committing the integrity to leave the nations such as the Afghans
but I hope it will at that stage. of Baluchistan or allowing ourselves to be and the Baluch to resolve their own af-
LIFSCHULTZ: Is it also possible that used as anyone's pawn. fairs and exist without outside influence?
it may not be in Soviet interests that an in- LIFSCHULTZ: While no one can MENGAL: To a certain degree this
dependent Baluchistan emerge? point to a Soviet bullet in the body cffany depends on ourselves and how our own
MENGAL: According to my assess- Baluch or of any Soviet roubles financing forces develop and take hold of the situa-
ment, Russia would prefer to have a pro- military operations in Pakistan, one can tion. But I don't think either power is
Russian Pakistan, than to have an in- hardly regard the Soviet Union as purely satisfied with the present situation neither
dependent Baluchistan or a Balkanised beneficent in the region. After all there the Russians nor the Americans. If both
Pakistan. But future attitudes will de- are plenty of Soviet bullets in the bodies powers come to the conclusion because of
pend on how far the Russians are forced of Afghans and there is a civil war in the actual situation that they are each go-
to weigh factors as they emerge and how Afghanistan. ing to lose a great deal from further con-
actual forces mature within Pakistan. MENGAL: This is precisely why we do frontation and escalation, the conditions
The Soviets now face Pakistani involve- not want to be the pawns of any power. If for a settlement could emerge. Then our
ment with various forces opposing their we become the pawns of one, then cer- stand will have to be taken into account.
own position in Afghanistan. Much tainly the Baluch will find the bullets of LIFSCHULTZ: Last autumin the
depends upon the patience of these Rus- the other in his body. We have not been United States initiated a $1.2 billion
sians. At the same time, a complicated the pawns of the Soviets, yet still we have military aid programme for Pakistan.
game is being played from the Pakistani the bullets of the Americans in our body. What is your attitude toward this
side. When the Russians lose their pa- If we become the pawns of the Ameri- development and the Reagan Adminis-
tience and believe Pakistan is making cans, as some of the Afghans have, in par- tration's Pakistan policy in general?
things rather difficult for them, then the ticular some of these mullahs, then we MENGAL: I can say this is a most con-
Russians will come to certain conclusions will find Soviet bullets in Baluch bodies. demnable act. But, I don't believe anyone
of their own. What I mean is that But, the blame will not only lie with the in Baluchistan appreciates orrespects this
Pakistan ip adopting a strategic role Soviet Union, the blame will lie with us American move. Now there are two as-
which is becoming a permanent menace also because we have thrown ourselves in- pects to this issue. There is first the
as far as Russian interests are concerned. to the American lap. If we throw our- general attitude the Americans have
As far as we are concerned, the Com- selves into the Soviet lap in toto, then the towards a regime like the junta in
munists frequently claim that they-believe Americans might be justified in their way Pakistan. It is really surprising for us to

747
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY Annual Number May 1983

watch how the United States has moved LIFSCHULTZ: Before the militaryaid looking like the 'old' Quetta as far as the
to support this regime, but also previous agreement was voted by the Congress did Americans are concerned. The 'old'
regimes of a similar type. Somehow the you have any communication with repre- Quetta was when they secretly operated
Americans have become fond of support- sentatives of the American government their base at Badebar from whercethe U-2
ing unpopular regimes throughout the concerning your own views? Did you not planes flew.
world and Pakistan is no exception. Un- meet a Congressional delegation which What is happening is not a secret to us
fortunately, the United States has two was enroute to Pakistan to investigate the although people in Pakistan and America
yardsticks: one for their country and the merits of such aid? may not know much about it. The Ameri-
other for the third world. In the third MENGAL: Yes, we did indeed. The cans have themselves said in so many
world or the underdeveloped countries, Congressional delegation which was due words that Pakistan has agreed to extend
they support dictatorships and brutal to go to Pakistan stopped here in Lon- certain concessions to the United States in
regimes. They have a soft corner for this don. They did contact us and Khair return for the military and economic aid
type of regime. The United States pro- Baksh Marri and myself met with them. that has been given. Now what conces-
fesses a pure form of democracy, but its We spoke with them at some length and sions could Pakistan give in return?
actions have been ones which have des- told them our views of the political reper- LIFSCHULTZ: If these facilities are
troyed democratic rights in countries like cussions such a major aid programme actually based in Baluchistan, as the
ours. In the long run American foreign would have within the country. I don't former Chief Ministerof the province, do
policy has never gained. Policies of this know why, but most of the delegation you have a position regarding whether
type have gained the sympathies of those seemed determined that Pakistan must these facilities should be located in
within the dictatorship, but they have get this aid. They had preconceived ideas Baluchistan?
always lost the sympathies of the people and their interest in our opinions seemed MENGAL: Certainly, we object fun-
within these countries. This will be the only a formality. The reasons for this is damentally to any bases being set up in
final result of American policy in best known to them. Again like the past Baluchistan. I have no desire for
Pakistan. This is my firm prediction. their concern seemed to be more for the Baluchistan to become the battleground
We in Baluchistan have seen American Russians on the Northern border than for the big powers. We will stand to be
support to previous regimes like the one with the people who live within Pakistan. crushed between them. Suppose these big
we have nQw. I remember the 1964 mili- LIFSCHULTZ: To your knowledge powers come to a head-on collision and
tary operations. Even before that, also in has the US asked for any bases in the fighting ground is Baluchistan, then
1958 there were operations against us, Baluchistan? who will die? Other than those in the paid
and at that time we told the Americans MENGAL: According to our informa- forces, the normal man who will suffer
directly, "Look here your arms are being tion Pakistan has agreed to allow the use will be the Baluch, not any other
used against us which you always claim to of Baluchistan to the Rapid Deployment Pakistanis. Why should we suffer? Why
have given to Pakistan to use against Force (RDF). Facilities are now under should we bear the miseries of Pakistan?
Communism. But they have been using construction in Gwadar and elsewhere. It Why should we suffer for their military
them against the people within this coun- must be understood that Baluchistan is alliances? Why should we suffer for
try." Now again the weapons Reagan is the only part of Pakistan that has a Pakistan from which we get nothing? All
giving to Pakistan will be used against the special significance for the Americans. It that we have received from Pakistan has
people of Pakistan as a whole. It is com- now fits into American plans with regard been bullets, prisons, torture, and kill-
pletely ridiculous to assume these arms to their approach to Gulf security. This is ings. Should we suffer for that? There is
could be used against a Russian attack. If why we apprehend that the point where no justification in it.
it at all takes place, these arms will be of the RDF will come and land if a regional LIFSCHULTZ: You have argued that
no use. They will be worth two pennies crisis develops will be near Gwadar. Nor- the Americans lack any perception of the
against the Soviets. They are not meant to mally people talk of military bases and Baluch issue. Do you have any anxiety or
be used against India. So where will these think in terms of the old type. But, there is fear that a movement for independence
arms be used? These arms can only be us- a new military concept which was not could in the midst of a military,conflict
ed for internal purposes, that is at any there in the old days. Previously airfields with the Pakistan Army find itself up
time they feel there is an insurgency in had to be built and all venues had to be against American forces? Do you have
Pakistan then they will be used. In ready and open. But now with the RDF any fear that the United States and its
Pakistan the main apprehension is about the only thing you need is for the material Rapid Deployment Force might con-
the Baluch. Americans know it and the support requirements of the RDF to ceivably intervene on the side of the
Pakistanis have been claiming so. You be stored and ready for the moment when Pakistan government against your move-
can see Zia-ul-Huq's interview with the the RDF will land for its operations. ment in Baluchistan?
American writer Selig Harrison. Zia I know for sure that this material is MENGAL: As long as there is a gov-
leaves no doubt about his anxiety over being landed at Karachi port. Radar and ernment in power in the United States of
Baluchistan. It is clear these weapons will other electronic facilities are under con- Mr Reagan's type, then one could expect
as in the past be used against us. That is struction at Gwadar. There is an enor- anything from them. All I hope is that the
why for us the new militaryaid agreement mous peninsular rock face, the hill top of people in America will at one stage suc-
is the most condemnable act on the part which overlooks the Gulf. It projects out ceed in stopping their government from
of the Americans. from the coast and main town of Gwadar aiding dictatorships like that in Pakistan
Reagan tries to play upon the Ameri- for about two miles. For the first time which stand against movements which
can people's minds and fears over the ever civiiians have been banned from are genuinely fighting for democratic
Russian bear. The Reagan administration entering the area. There is a constant traf- rights. It is our hope that one day the
says only one thing to the American peo- fic in helicopters from ships offshore. Americans will succeed in having a
ple and Congress with regardto Pakistan. Construction of a base facility in under government of that sort. But, as far as the
Here is the Russian bear to the North. We way. Besides Quetta these days is filled present administrationis concerned, they
must deter it! We must deter it! But, at with American military and 'civilian' per- are there to help Pakistan and they will
what cost to people in Pakistan! sonnel. People are saying that Quetta is certainly come to Pakistan's aid even

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against the Baluch. ly many Arab governments do not make do not have any territorialclaims. All that
LIFSCHULTZ: In your view how long their policies on an independent basis. we can say is that the boundaries could be
will the United States continue to identify Regarding Pakistan they follow the redemarcated. There is Afghan territory
its own regional policy with Pakistan's Americans. It is our hope that these states in Baluchistan which Afghanistan claims
military authorities? will realise the situation in Pakistan and to be its territory. There are areas in
MENGAL: It is my assessment that at least cease their anti-Baluch aid which Afghanistan which the Baluch think to be;
Zia's regime is rapidly approaching the they are currently providing to Pakistan. their area. So there could be an arrange-
moment when it will have outlived its So at the moment all we have seen and are ment and a redemarcation in certain
utility. The Americans will not repeat the seeing is the antagonism on their part. At areas. Certain areas can go there and cer-
mistake they made in Iran. Sooner or the moment there is no co-operation, but tain areas can come here.
later they will try to put pressureon Zia to we hope in the future that they shall Iran is another matter. Iran for a long
accept the so-called transfer of power to realise we are potential friends within the time has been helping the Pakistan
so-called public cum American nominee region, and that as such they will at least government to crush our people in
politicians (mainly from a selected group cease to aid the enemies of the Baluch. Baluchistan. They have not only been
within the People's Party), because the LIFSCHULTZ: Do you believe India crushing people on our side of the border,
Americans fear that if they do not mani- will be neutral, antagonistic, or sym- but have also been curshing their own
pulate a change of their own choice, they pathetic? Baluch which is a considerable popula-
cannot stop the replacement of Zia by MENGAL: It all depends on a number tion. So we have been bearing this brunt
someone whose alignments could hardly of factors. There are negotiations going of Iranian might right from the begin-
be predictable. After the bitter experience on between India and Pakistan at the pre- ning. But, anyhow even then it is not we
of Iran, Americans are in no position to sent. One cannot say where they will end. who are going to decide, it is the people of
take a chance with Pakistan which is their But, if the negotiations fail then at least that Bauchistan who will decide. We can
only potential proxy on that side of the Pakistan will not have a big sympathiser only wish that they do so.
Gulf. Zia has undoubtedly all along been like India in that region and that will be an LIFSCHULTZ: You have also formed
a very faithful servant of the Americans, indirect help to the Baluch cause. an organisation called the Baluchistan
but this does not qualify him to gain pre- As far as Baluchistan itself is concern- Liberation Organisation (BLO). Can you
ference over American interest. There- ed, we might have expected quite a lot outline its objectives and the contents of
fore, Zia's replacement through a decep- from India. However, the experience of its social and political programme? What
tive democratic manoeuvre has more or Bangladesh has turned out rather dif- is the BLO's attitude and your own at-
less become an inevitable option. ferently than hoped for by the Indians. titude towards the traditional role of the
It will be very difficult for Zia to agree India went out of its way and came to the Sardar, the future role of the Sardar, and
to the proposition of a transfer of power assistance of Bangladesh. In return India the structure of tribal organisation in an
to elected representatives. He is being now faces at the United Nations and independent state?
haunted by Bhutto's ghost and for the elsewhere another representative of a so- MENGAL: The basic aim of the BLO
transfer of power the facade of an elec- called Islamic country voting against In- is to organise and to supervise the armed
tion is bound to take place for which the dia and rebuking India. What is the struggle in Baluchistan toward the objec-
1973 Constitution will be reactivated. Zia guarantee that there would not be an tive of an independent Baluchistan. Once
knows that the 1973 Constitution has a American backed coup d'etat in other this is achieved we will implement a series
provision where the imposition of Mar- countries which became independent, as of fundamental social reforms.
tial Law is an act of high treason and is in Bangladesh? The "Sardari" by itself is not a system.
punishable by death. And, at the same But, we can say one thing for certain. If The system is the tribal system. The Sar-
time there is no guarantee that after the the present relationship between India dar is the by-product of the tribal system.
transfer of power the Americans will go and Pakistan countinues to be one of an- Such a system can only be changed when
out of their way and stop the successive tagonism, then India will certainly not it is replaced by some other social system,
(sic) government from invoking that very feel unhappy if a part of Pakistan became not just by the stroke of a pen. Only social
provision of the constitution. Therefore, an independent state. This is our pre- and economic changes in the system can
it will be difficult to satisfy Zia on this sumption about India. But, India will do away with the Sardar.
point. The only other alternative left will definitely not play any positive role in the I will give you an example. There are
be to have Zia replaced and to achieve game. She does not want to be sorry again still Sardars in the Punjab, although of-
that goal the Americans at the appro- for her own efforts. However, if Balu- ficially they do not exist. The Mazariarea
priate moment may make things difficult chistan became independent by its own of the Punjab still has a Sardari system.
for him. It is merely a matter of time means, I do not believe India would bear Officially the Mazari Sardar is no longer
before the ball will be set rolling in us any grudge. there. But, the Mazari tribe still accept
Pakistan. LIFSCHULTZ: When you speak of an the Sardar, because no form of official'
LIFSCHULTZ: What do you anti- independent Baluchistan are you speak- reforms have brought a basic change in,
cipate the attitudes of other states in the ing exclusively of the territory that is now the tribal structure in the Mazari area.
region will be towards your indepen- part of Pakistan, or do you refer also to When there are serious disputes, people
dence? What response do you anticipate areas in Iran and Afghanistari? still go and seek solutions,from their Sar-
from the Arab states? Do you hope to MENGAL: I can wish for all Baluch, dar. Unless a better substitute is provided
secure their acquiescence their neutrality, but can only speak for the Baluch in Pak- people will continue to go to men they a
or their co-operation? Or, do you expect istan. It is certainly my hope that people traditionally familiar with. The substitute.
their antagonism given their current who live in other Baluchistans will be the present government and state are pro-
alliance with Islamabad? thinking in the same terms. If they think viding can hardly be considered better, It
MENGAL: Actually our own attitude in the same terms, then I think it will be is a worse substitute and people will nor
toward the Arab states is in principle rather good news for me. But, I cannot opt for a worse substitute. A substitqte
quite friendly. There are many Baluch speak for people in other countries. should only be a better one. Now if you
working in these states. But, unfortunate- As far as Afghanistan is concerned, we ask people to change from the Sardar to

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the present legal system as it is being ty, the Sardari system will automatically ment's war-time demands required a dif-
operated by the military and civilian of- vanish. Yet, as long as the tribal structure ferent approach, he had, all the same,
ficials at the local level, what do you ex- is not replaced by a better system, things once again opened a totally new vista for
pect people to do? Whenever someone will continue to work as they are until bet- the young engineers of the country. It is
goes to a government official with a pro- ter means are introduced. But, this has to this same unit that is now known as Hin-
blem there will only be talk of money. be replaced. It cannot go on for long. Our dustan Aeronautics Ltd.
When poeple see official selling justice, system is an old system and wherever Walchand did not lose sight of the im-
selling permits, selling their executive there has been a tribal system anywhere in portance of agriculture in the Indian eco-
powers, then certainly a tribal man will the world it has operated in similar ways. nomy. He acquired 1,500 acres of arid
prefer to go to his Sardar. When he goes But it has to go and it must go. land at Ravalgaon in 1923, and later,
to the Sardar he will get justice, whatever more,at Kalamb (Walchandnagar), where
LIFSCHULTZ: So you believe that he introduced scientific methods into
be the kind of justice, or whatever be the
you are the last of the Sardars? farming. Within a short space of time,
mode of the justice, but he will get it with
MENGAL: I hope so. I hope Balu- Ravalgaon and Kalamb were transform-
no cost and quickly. So at this level no ed into lush, green fields of sugarcane
better substitute has been given. chistan will become independent in my that have set records in yield per acre,
When social and economic changes age and that will bring an end to the Sar- sugar content and quality of cane. Keep-
which are superior are brought into socie- dari system. ing in mind that processing the raw
materials from his farms was a vital step
towards self-sufficiency, he set up.a fac-
tory at Ravalgaon from where some of
Walchand Hirachand Centenary the country's finest confectionery is pro-
duced.
THERE is a Jonathan Livingston Seagull information that a passenger ship was up Finding that dependence on suppliers
in all of us. It is this spirit which inspires for sale in Bombay. Directly he alighted for spare parts and machinery for his
some of us to dream what others have from the train, he went to the docks to ex- sugar factory at Walchandnagar was dis-
never imagined, and to do what others amine the ship. This was February 16, rupting his production routine, Wal-
have only dreamt. Walchand Hirachand, 1919. Within a matter of a few days Scin- chand decided to manufacture these
whose birth centenary year has just dia Steamship Navigation Ltd had been locally. Accordingly he set up a workshop
drawn to a close, was one such. The foun- registered, finance had been arranged, at Walchandnagar which specialised in
dations of the industrial empire that he the ship purchased and on April 5, 1919, the manufacture of sugar machinery. The
built in the short span of 34 years testify to it sailed for Europe and England on its workshop grew rapidly; expertise was ac-
quired in fields other than sugar
the spirit of his enterprise and sweep of maiden voyage for the company.
machinery and today the company is
the canvas he worked on. His untiring efforts at building the known as Walchandnagar Industries
At a very early stage of his career, Wal- shipping industry brought him the rea- Limited, an industrial giant with a turn-
chand Hirachand took up the construc- lisation that shipbuilding was as impor- over of Rs 60 crore.
tion of the Bhor Ghat tunnel, defying tant. The Imperial Government thwarted Adept at recognising a venture with
skeptics. It is interesting to note the his repeated attempts to select a site or potential, Walchand gave a new sense of
choice of his ventures. Without the back- give financial assistance. Undeterred, direction to two companies which were
ground and experience of a Tata, he step- Scindias started work at Visakhapatnam undergoing temporary setbacks-Coo-
ped into the core sector industries, where in 1941. The Japanese bombing of this per Engineering and Indian Hume Pipe
technological problems were bound to port city forced him to transfer men and Company. Walchand's principal objec-
deter any other ordinary person. machines to Bombay. But with bulldog- tive in taking over the management of
In his times, a developed capital mar- like tenacity, he was back on the scene in Cooper Engineering (now a division of
ket was non-existent. The attitude of the 1946, after the war, to complete three Walchandnagar Industries) was the in-
British government was invariably hos- berths and two steamers by 1948, despite digenous manufacture of internal com-
tile. There were a number of ways to beat bustion engines. Under his guidance, the
massive losses. He knew that a task as company commenced production of
down the native entrepreneur. Yet Wal- massive as this could not be undertaken horizontal cold-starting single cylinder
chand Hirachand moved from one idea to without the government stepping in and engines for industrial use and electricity
another, one activity to another with on March 1, 1952 the infrastructure he generation. As for Indian Hume Pipe, the
remarkable speed and organisational had created became the nucleus of Hin- company's technical prowess has now
capacity. Not surprisingly, he often dustan Shipyard Ltd. made it an acknowledged authority
sparked uneasiness amongst his family Only a Walchand Hirachand could world-wide on concrete pressure pipes.
members and partners. None of them, perhaps have drQamt of setting up as Walchand Hirachand did not need
bound by their traditions, could have sophisticated an industry as aircraft sales tax incentives to establish a sophis-
understood the panorama of his vision. manufacturing in India in the year 1939. ticated industrial infrastructure in
Before starting the shipbuilding yard at Again a chance meeting with an Ameri- Kalamb, in the interior of Maharashtra.
Visakhapatnam, he had carefully gone can launched him into a new exciting He chose highly technology-intensive in-
into a detailed process of site selection, flight. With characteristic stubborness, dustries when he could have easily estab-
generating local enthusiasm, obtaining he prodded the government until it came lished jute and cotton mills. Every area of
meticulous cost estimates, taking care forward with a challenge to establish the his work demanded the building of an
even to provide work shelter for all factory in six months. The Scindia share- organisation to continue the task after
engineers and workers. And yet there are holders were wary but he managed to him. Long before the term profession-
examples of instant decisions after which secure the Maharaja of Mysore's partici- alism was understood, he gave freedom
there was no stopping him in the speed of pation. By December 1940, the company to his managers on their projects. The
his execution. A chance meeting with a had been formed and by July 1941 the broadness of his vision and nationalistic
British engineer on a railway journey factory was ready. Though he had to pull approach made his and their objectives
from Delhi to Bombay brought him the out of this industry soon as the govern- common.

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