Romualdez-Marcos Vs COMELEC (GR 119976)

Romualdez-Marcos vs.
Commission on Elections, 248 SCRA 300 ,

September 18, 1995
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 119976. September 18, 1995.*
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.
Election Law; Domicile; Residence; Words and Phrases; Residence, for the purpose
of meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our
jurisdiction.A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELECS Second Division
reveals a startling confusion in the application of settled concepts of Domicile
and Residence in election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement
with the general proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is
synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or
mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended
for the purpose of determining a candidates qualifications for election to the
House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were,
residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective position,
has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
_______________
33 People v. Jalon, 215 SCRA 680 [1992]; Magat v. People, 201 SCRA 21 [1991];
People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57 [1991].
* EN BANC.
301
VOL. 248, SEPTEMBER 18, 1995
301
Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile includes the twin elements of the fact of
residing or physical presence in a fixed place and animus manendi, or the
intention of returning there permanently.Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees
that [f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the
domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence. In Ong vs.
Republic this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individuals
permanent home, a place to which, whenever absent for business or for
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the
sense that they disclose intent. Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the
twin elements of the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place and
animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile and Residence, Distinguished.Residence, in
its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a
certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community
or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that
residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident
has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as
pleasure, business, or health. If a persons intent be to remain, it becomes his
domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is
residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different
residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile,
unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of
another domicile of choice.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; As these concepts have evolved in our election
law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for
election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.For political purposes the
concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political
laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and
unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used
synonymously with domicile.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; When the Constitution speaks
of residence in election law, it actually means only domicile.The
deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain
elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the
Constitution speaks of residence in election law, it actually means only
domicile.
302
302
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the fact of residence, not a statement
in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or
not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification
requirement.It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of
candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual
has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement. The said
statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately
and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to
his or her disqualification.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The honest mistake in the certificate of
candidacy regarding the period of residency does not negate the fact of residence
in a congressional district if such fact is established by means more convincing
than a mere entry on a piece of paper.Having been forced by private
respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of
petitioners claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her
period of stay in her actual residence in a space which required her period of stay
in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item
8the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicilecoupled
with the circumstances surrounding petitioners registration as a voter in Tolosa
obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could be
disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the
fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means more
convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An individual does not lose his domicile even if he
has lived and maintained residences in different places.We have stated, many
times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived
and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating,
implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence
from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other
things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of
residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that she could not have been a
resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of
candidacy because she became a resident of many places flies in the face of
settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between
(actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes.
303
303
Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile of Origin; A minor follows the domicile of his
parents.A minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired
is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of
petitioners being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by
operation of law. This domicile was not established only when she reached the
age of eight years old, when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary
to private respondents averments.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites for a change of domicile.Domicile of
origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate: 1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile; 2. A bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one; and 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary
act of relinquishing former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile
with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).In the absence of clear
and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be
deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three
requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a
change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one
cannot have two legal residences at the same time. In the case at bench, the
evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of
persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile
of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an
abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioners former
domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own
choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Marriages; Husband and Wife; The presumption that the
wife automatically gains the husbands domicile by operation of law upon
marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term residence in Article 110 of
the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well
delineated.In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost
her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established
distinction between the Civil Code concepts of domicile and residence. The
presumption that the wife automatically gains the husbands domicile by
operation of law upon marriage cannot be
304
304
inferred from the use of the term residence in Article 110 of the Civil Code
because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A survey of jurisprudence yields nothing
which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of
origin in favor of the husbands choice of residence upon marriage.A survey of
jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as
they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest
that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the
husbands choice of residence upon marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 of
the Civil Code refers to domicile and not to residence.The duty to live
together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This
takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the
case of petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their
residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may live
together. Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to domicile and
not to residence. Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is
left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in
one of their (various) residences.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; What petitioner gained upon marriage was
actual residenceshe did not lose her domicile of origin.Parenthetically when
Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was
obligedby virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Codeto follow her husbands actual
place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos
had several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac,
Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his
familys residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as
the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual
residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Family Code; The common law concept of
matrimonial domicile appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our
jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the
New Family Code.On the other hand, the common law concept of matrimonial
domicile appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential
experi305
305
ences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To
underscore the difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family
Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an
entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that
found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the
concept of womens rights in the intervening years by making the choice of

domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses.
Same; Same; Same; The term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under
the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law.Without as much
belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or
under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is
that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of
husband and wife-the term residence should only be interpreted to mean actual
residence. The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law
delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in
1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a
domicilium necessarium.
Same; Statutory Construction; Mandatory and directory provisions; It is a settled
doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is
generally construed to be merely directory.It is a settled doctrine that a statute
requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to
be merely directory, so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the
judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have
clearly indicated it.
Same; Same; Same; The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision
is often made on grounds of necessity.The difference between a mandatory and
a directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same
view held by several American authorities, this court in Marcelino v. Cruz held
that: The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often
determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to
the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.
Same; Jurisdiction; Electoral Tribunals; The HRETs jurisdiction as the sole judge of
all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of
Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives.As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunals
supposed assumption of jurisdic306
306
tion over the issue of petitioners qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections,
suffice it to say that HRETS jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating
to the elections return and qualifications of members of Congress begins only
after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives.
Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that
the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
ROMERO, J., Separate Opinion :
Husband and Wife; A widow can no longer be bound by the domicile of the departed
husband, if at all she was beforeand, exercising free will, she may opt to
reestablish her domicile of origin.I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and
others similarly situated, can no longer be bound by the domicile of the departed
husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she automatically revert to her
domicile of origin, but exercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her domicile
of origin. In returning to Tacloban and subsequently, to Barangay Olot, Tolosa,

both of which are located in the First District of Leyte, petitioner amply
demonstrated by overt acts, her election of a domicile of choice, in this case, a
reversion to her domicile of origin. Added together, the time when she set up her
domicile in the two places sufficed to meet the one-year requirement to run as
Representatives of the First District of Leyte.
PUNO, J., Concurring Opinion :
Husband and Wife; It is not the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a
different domicile by the husband that will change the domicile of a wife from
what it was prior to their marriage.It is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage
but the deliberate choice of a different domicile by the husband that will change
the domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage. The domiciliary
decision made by the husband in the exercise of the right conferred by Article 110
of the Civil Code binds the wife. Any and all acts of a wife during her coverture
contrary to the domiciliary choice of the husband cannot change in any way the
domicile legally fixed by the husband. These acts are void not only because the
wife lacks the capacity to choose her domicile but also because they are contrary
to law and public policy.
Same; Family Code; In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality
between husband and wife as started and perpetuated by the common law, there
is no reason in espousing the anomalous rule that the wife still retains the
domicile of her dead husband.In light of the
307
307
Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as started
and perpetuated by the common law, there is no reason in espousing the
anomalous rule that the wife still retains the domicile of her dead husband. Article
110 of the Civil Code which provides the statutory support for this stance has
been repealed by Article 69 of the Family Code. By its appeal, it becomes a deadletter law, and we are not free to resurrect it by giving it further effect in any way
or manner such as by ruling that the petitioner is still bound by the domiciliary
determination of her dead husband.
Same; Constitutional Law; Equal Protection Clause; It can hardly be doubted that
the common law imposition on a married woman of her dead husbands domicile
even beyond his grave is patently discriminatory to womenit cannot survive a
constitutional challenge.Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we have to
consider our Constitution and its firm guarantees of due process and equal
protection of law. It can hardly be doubted that the common law imposition on a
married woman of her dead husbands domicile even beyond his grave is patently
discriminatory to women. It is a gender-based discrimination and is not rationally
related to the objective of promoting family solidarity. It cannot survive a
constitutional challenge.
Same; Domicile; The better stance is to rule that petitioner reac-quired her Tacloban
domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989.Prescinding from these
premises, I respectfully submit that the better stance is to rule that petitioner
reacquired her Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989. This is
the necessary consequence of the view that petitioners Batac dictated domicile
did not continue after her husbands death; otherwise, she would have no
domicile and that will violate the universal rule that no person can be without a
domicile at any point of time. This stance also restores the right of petitioner to
choose her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110 of the Civil Code, a
right now recognized by the Family Code and protected by the Constitution.
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Statutory Construction; Political Harassment;
Equal Protection; There is but one Constitution for all Filipinospetitioner cannot
be adjudged by a different Constitution, and the worst way to interpret the
Constitution is to inject in its interpretation bile and bitterness.All these
attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms of rank harassments
and invidious discriminations against petitioner to deny her equal access to a
public office. We cannot commit any hermeneutic violence to the Constitution by
torturing the meaning of equality, the end result of which will allow
308
308
the harassment and discrimination of petitioner who has lived a controversial life, a
past of alternating light and shadow. There is but one Constitution for all Filipinos.
Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a different Constitution, and the worst way to
interpret the Constitution is to inject in its interpretation, bile and bitterness.
FRANCISCO, J., Concurring Opinion :
Husband and Wife; Domicile; Petitioner reverted to her original domicile upon her
husbands death without even signifying her intention to that effect.Tacloban,
Leyte, is petitioners domicile of origin which was involuntarily supplanted with
another, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, upon her marriage in 1954 with then
Congressman Marcos. By legal fiction she followed the domicile of her husband. In
my view, the reason for the law is for the spouses to fully and effectively perform
their marital duties and obligations to one another. The question of domicile,
however, is not affected by the fact that it was the legal or moral duty of the
individual to reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. 11). Thus, while the wife retains
her marital domicile so long as the marriage subsists, she automatically loses it
upon the latters termination, for the reason behind the law then ceases.
Otherwise, petitioner, after her marriage was ended by the death of her husband,
would be placed in a quite absurd and unfair situation of having been freed from
all wifely obligations yet made to hold on to one which no longer serves any
meaningful purpose. It is my view therefore that petitioner reverted to her
original domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon her husbands death without even
signifying her intention to that effect. It is for the private respondent to prove, not
for petitioner to disprove, that petitioner has effectively abandoned Tacloban,
Leyte for Batac, Ilocos Norte or for some other place/s.
PADILLA, J., Dissenting Opinion :
Election Law; The one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not
the term residence is to be synonymous with domicilethe candidates intent
and actual presence in one district must in all situations satisfy the length of time
prescribed by the fundamental law.To my mind, the one year residence period is
crucial regardless of whether or not the term residence is to be synonymous

with domicile. In other words, the candidates intent and actual presence in one
district must in all situations satisfy the length of time prescribed by the
fundamental law. And this, because of a definite Constitutional purpose. He must
be familiar with the environment and problems of a district he intends to
represent in Congress and the one309
309
year residence in said district would be the minimum period to acquire such
familiarity, if not versatility.
Same; Statutes; R.A. 6646; The Court should re-examine and consequently abandon
the doctrine in the Jun Labo case.It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646
does not make the second placer the winner simply because a winning candidate
is disqualified, but that the law considers him as the candidate who had obtained
the highest number of votes as a result of the votes cast for the disqualified
candidate not being counted or considered. As this law clearly reflects the
legislative policy on the matter, then there is no reason why this Court should not
re-examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has
been stated that the qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be
erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the
ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility most especially when it is mandated by
no less than the Constitution.
REGALADO, J., Dissenting Opinion :
Husband and Wife; Domicile; In the absence of affirmative evidence to the contrary,
the presumption is that a wifes domicile or legal residence follows that of her
husband and will continue after his death.Thus, the American rule is likewise to
the effect that while after the husbands death the wife has the right to elect her
own domicile, she nevertheless retains the last domicile of her deceased husband
until she makes an actual change. In the absence of affirmative evidence, to the
contrary, the presumption is that a wifes domicile or legal residence follows that
of her husband and will continue after his death.
DAVIDE, JR., J., Dissenting Opinion :
Husband and Wife; Domicile; Evidence; Burden of Proof; Since the widow is
presumed to retain her deceased husbands domicile until she exercises her
revived power to acquire her own domicile, the burden is upon her to prove that
she has exercised her right to acquire her own domicile.The majority opinion
also disregards a basic rule in evidence that he who asserts a fact or the
affirmative of an issue has the burden of proving it (Imperial Victory Shipping
Agency vs. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178 [1991]; P.T. Cerna Corp. vs. Court of Appeals ,
221 SCRA 19 [1993]). Having admitted marriage to the then Congressman
Marcos, the petitioner could not deny the legal consequence thereof on the
change of her domicile to that of her husband. The majority opinion rules or at
310
310

least concludes that [b]y operation of law (domicilium necesarium ), her legal
domicile at the time of her marriage automatically became Batac, Ilocos Norte.
That conclusion is consistent with Article 110 of the Civil Code. Since she is
presumed to retain her deceased husbands domicile until she exercises her
revived power to acquire her own domicile, the burden is upon her to prove that
she has exercised her right to acquire her own domicile. She miserably failed to
discharge that burden.
VITUG, J., Separate Opinion :
Election Law; Electoral Tribunals; Commission on Elections; Jurisdiction; The
COMELECs jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal concerned begins.The COMELECs
jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction of
the Electoral Tribunal concerned begins. It signifies that the protestee must have
theretofore been duly proclaimed and has since become a member of the
Senate or the House of Representatives. The question can be asked on whether or
not the proclamation of a candidate is just a ministerial function of the
Commission on Elections dictated solely on the number of votes cast in an
election exercise. I believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the
performance of which, being adequately defined, does not allow the use of
further judgment or discretion. The COMELEC, in its particular case, is tasked with
the full responsibility of ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as may be
required by law before a proclamation is properly done.
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; The Court should refrain from any undue
encroachment on the ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunals on
matters which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their
exclusive domain.The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from
any undue encroachment on the ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral
Tribunals on matters which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are explicitly
within their exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were otherwise, would
be the effect of the Courts peremptory pronouncement on the ability of the
Electoral Tribunal to later come up with its own judgment in a contest relating to
the election, returns and qualification of its members.
311
311
MENDOZA, J., Separate Opinion :
Election Law; Commission on Elections; Jurisdiction; The COMELEC has no power to
disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which
they seek to be electedthe qualifications of candidates may be questioned only
in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or an election
protest, in the appropriate forum.In my view the issue in this case is whether
the Commission on Elections has the power to disqualify candidates on the
ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. I
think that it has none and that the qualifications of candidates may be questioned
only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or an
election protest in the appropriate forum, not necessarily in the COMELEC but, as
in this case, in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in
this case took part in the proceedings in the COMELEC is of no moment. Such
proceedings were unauthorized and were not rendered valid by their agreement
to submit their dispute to that body.
Same; Same; Same; The Omnibus Election Code, by its silence about a preproclamation remedy based on a candidates qualifications, underscores the
policy of not authorizing any inquiry into the qualifications of candidates unless
they have been elected.By providing in 253 for the remedy of quo warranto
for determining an elected officials qualifications after the results of elections are
proclaimed, while being conspicuously silent about a pre-proclamation remedy
based on the same ground, the Omnibus Election Code, or OEC, by its silence
underscores the policy of not authorizing any inquiry into the qualifications of
candidates unless they have been elected.
Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; The lack of provision for declaring the
ineligibility of candidates cannot be supplied by a mere rulesuch an act is
equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter
which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rulemaking power cannot do.
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the
ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993
so as to provide in Rule 25, 1 the following: Grounds for disqualification.Any
candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided
for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law
to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate. The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates,
however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the
creation of a cause of action which
312
312
is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rulemaking power
under Art. IX, A, 6 of the Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy that the
Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases
involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications
based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. (Art. IX, C, 2[3]).
Same; Same; Same; Proceedings for disqualification and for a declaration of
ineligibility, distinguished; The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of
grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident
intention of the law.The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds
for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident intention
of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are
proceedings for disqualification different from those for a declaration of
ineligibility. Disqualification proceedings, as already stated, are based on
grounds specified in 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in 40 of the
Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from
becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a
word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start
or during its progress. Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of the
qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public
office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to
remove the incumbent from office.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner.
Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. and Gracelda N. Andres for private respondent.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and
suppress the mischief at which it is aimed.1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that
an aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be a registered voter in
_______________
1 Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580 (1881).
313
313
the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not
less than one year immediately preceding the election.2 The mischief which this
provisionreproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitutionseeks to prevent is
the possibility of a stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and
needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to
serve that community.3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election
Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following information in item No. 8:4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_ _ _ _ _ _ Years and seven Months
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position,
filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification5 with the Commission on
Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked
the Constitutions one year residency requirement for candidates to the House of
Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter
Registration Record 94-No. 33497726 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He
_______________
2 CONST, art. VI, states:
Sec. 6. No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least
twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and except the party-list
representative, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and
a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding
the day of the election.
See, Jarrolt v. Mabberly, supra, note 1.

3 Gallego vs. Vera, 73 Phil. 453 (1941).
4 Rollo, p. 114, Annex D.
6 Rollo, p. 113.
314
314
prayed that an order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the
certificate of candidacy.7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,
changing the entry seven months to since childhood in item No. 8 of the
amended certificate.8 On the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of
Leyte informed petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy
on the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of the same
having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate of
Candidacy should have been filed on or before the March 20, 1995 deadline.9
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with
the COMELECs Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on March 31, 1995. Her Answer
to private respondents petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the head
office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the
word seven in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an honest
misinterpretation10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words since
_______________
7 Rollo, p. 111.
8 Rollo, p. 115, Annex E.
9 Signed by Virgilio S. Oledan, Provincial Election Supervisor IV, Leyte; Rollo, p. 116,
Annex F.
10 Rollo, p. 117, Annex G. Petitioner explained the circumstances surrounding the
filling up of the original certificate thus:
1. On March 8, 1995, I filed my certificate of candidacy for Member of the House of
Representatives (Congresswoman) of the First Legislative District of the province
of Leyte, which was drafted by Mr. Filomeno A. Zeta.
2. I learned lately that Congressman Cirilo Montejo wants to disqualify me as I
allegedly lack residence in the constituency because of the entry of the word
SEVEN in Item No. 8 of my certificate of candidacy.
3. I read my certificate of candidacy before signing it and I thought of the word
RESIDENCE to mean actual or physical residence, and the word SEVEN merely
reflected my actual and physical residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
315
315
childhood in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that she has

always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.11 Impugning
respondents motive in filing
_______________
3.1. The word SEVEN was placed on my certificate of candidacy to indicate that at
least one (1) month had passed from my registration as voter of Tolosa, Leyte, on
January 28, 1995, when I wrote 06 months under PERIOD OF RESIDENCE as my
actual or physical residence in the town.
4. I thought then that the sense in Item No. 10 of my certificate of candidacy
stating THAT I AM eligible for said Office was sufficient to affirm that I possess all
the qualifications, including my residence, for Member of the House of
Representatives for which I am aspiring in the May 8, 1995 elections.
5. The fact, however, is that my domicile or residence of origin is Tacloban City, a
component city of the First Legislative District of Leyte. I never intended to
abandon this domicile or residence of origin to which I always intended to return
whenever absent; indeed in 1992, I returned to Tacloban City to live and stay
there. On November 5, 1992, I bought my Residence Certificate No. 15226186L
there, which is made an integral part hereof as Annex I (Annex 2 hereof).
11 Id., at p. 120. See also, Rollo, p. 130-133, Annex I, petitioners Affidavit
explaining her residence:
13. I established my domicile, however in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City in 1938,
when I was little over eight (8) years old. Shortly after my mother died on April 7,
1938, my widowed father, Vicente Orestes Romualdez, brought me and my
brothers... and my sisters to Tacloban, Leyte (now Tacloban City) his hometown.
xxx
18. I have always considered Tacloban City as my permanent residence or
residence of origin. I have not abandoned and have never intended to abandon
my permanent residence or residence of origin there. To it I always intend to
return whenever absent.
19. In 1952, I went to Manila to work with my cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z.
Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives.
20. In May, 1954, I married President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still the
congressman of Ilocos Norte.
316
316
the petition seeking her disqualification, she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register
as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte,
petitioner immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter
stating that she is not a resident of said
_______________
21. As a dutiful wife who loved him deeply, I lived with him in Batac, Ilocos Norte
and registered as a voter there.
22. In 1965, my husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines.
Together, we lived in Malacaang Palace and I registered as a voter in San Miguel,
Manila.
23. My registration as voter in Batac, Ilocos Norte, San Juan, Rizal (now San Juan,
Metro Manila); and San Miguel, Manila, was for convenience because I had to live
with my husband to serve him when he was congressman, Senator and President
of the Republic of the Philippines. During those years however, I never intended
nor desired to abandon my domicile or residence of origin in Tacloban City, which
I established since I was a child.
xxx
33. Throughout the Marcos Presidency, I spent most of my birthday anniversaries
and attended the Sto. Nini Fiesta in Tacloban City. I regularly visited my domicile
or residence of origin in Leyte and even held important functions and entertained
guests and foreign dignitaries there.
34. After President Ferdinand E. Marcos and I, together with our children and
innocent grandchildren were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii, in
February, 1986, my Leyte properties were sequestered by the PCGG, and were
destroyed and cannibalized.
xxx
38. Upon my return to the country, I wanted to immediately live and reside in
Tacloban City or in Olot, Tolosa Leyte even if my residences there were not livable
as they had been destroyed and cannibalized. The PCGG, however, did not permit
and allow me.
xxx
40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in the residence of my
brother in San Jose, Tacloban City, and pursued my negotiations with PCGG to
recover my sequestered residences in Tacloban City and Barangay Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte.
317
317
city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter
in Tolosa following completion of her six month actual residence therein,
petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from
the First District to the Second District and pursued such a move up to the
Supreme Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as petitioners opponent
in the congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with
other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative district to
remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his purpose.
However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves,
petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same objective, as it is obvious
that he is afraid to submit along with respondent for the judgment and verdict of
the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free
and clean elections on May 8, 1995.12
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
by a vote of 2 to 1,13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondents
Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioners
Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling
her original Certificate of Candidacy.14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely,
the validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of
the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioners compliance with
the one year residency requirement, the Second Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word
Seven (months) was a result of an honest misinterpretation or honest mistake
on her part and, therefore, an amendment should subsequently be allowed. She
averred that she thought that what was asked was her actual and physical
presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative
District, to which she could have responded since childhood. In an
accompanying
_______________
12 Rollo, p. 122.
13 Commissioners Manolo B. Gorospe and Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores formed the
majority opinion. Commissioner Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando dissented.
14 Rollo, p. 64.
318
318
affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First
District, to which she always intended to return whenever absent and which she
has never abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to discredit
petitioners theory of disqualification by alleging that she has been a resident of
the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood, although she only became a
resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she has
always been a resident of Tacloban City, a component of the First District, before
coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa,
respondent announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she
can be a candidate for the District. However, this intention was rebuffed when
petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she
is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim and
instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondents claim of honest misinterpretation or honest
mistake. Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on
the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of residence of origin which she
interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in
her Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought what was asked
was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because
there is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item No. 8 in
the Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly of Residency in the CONSTITUENCY
where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election, thus, the
explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondents defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation,
therefore, is devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondents contention that an amendment may be made, she
cited the case of Alialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on
the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to the inconsequential
deviations which cannot affect the result of the election, or deviations from
provisions intended primarily to secure timely and orderly conduct of elections.
The Supreme Court in that case considered the amendment only as a matter of
form. But in the instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter
of form or an inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of
residence in the place where respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial
matter which determines her qualification as a candidacy, specially those
intended to suppress, accurate material representation in the original certificate
which adversely affects the filer. To admit the amended certificate is to condone
the evils brought by the shifting minds of manipulating candidate, to the
detriment of the
319
319
integrity of the election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her
residency in order to prolong it by claiming it was since childhood is to allow an
untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission. The arithmetical
accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent indicated in her certificate of
candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her Voters Registration Record
accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that she is a resident of Brgy.
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A,
Petition). Said accuracy is further buttressed by her letter to the election officer of
San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the cancellation of
her registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she can be reregistered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3)
different documents show the respondents consistent conviction that she has
transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such
limited period of time, starting in the last week of August 1994 which on March 8,
1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore, cannot be
persuaded to believe in the respondents contention that it was an error.
xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be
admitted by this Commission.
xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that
respondent has not complied with the one year residency requirement of the
Constitution.
In election cases, the term residence has always been considered as synonymous
with domicile which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but
also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent
for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto
Faypon v. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil. 294; Romualdez v. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408).
In respondents case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence
she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus
revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District
since childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of qualification where she
is otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the
facts admitted by the respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she
studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continu320
320
ously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and
resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she
lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she
served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of
Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have
served these positions if she had not been a resident of the City of Manila.
Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of candidacy for the office of the
President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. As a
matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter with the election
officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her registration
in the permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered or transferred to
Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest that she could not have been a
resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of
candidacy because she became a resident of many places, including Metro
Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she
was a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.
In this case, respondents conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban
her domicile, she registered as a voter in different places and on several
occasions declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although she spent her
school days in Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned such place when
she chose to stay and reside in other different places. In the case of Romualdez v.
RTC (226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by
choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality;
(2) intention to remain there; and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. In
other words there must basically be animus manendi with animus non revertendi.
When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her
intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that
she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City,
where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be
conduct indicative of such intention. Respondents statements to the effect that
she has always intended to return to Tacloban, without the accompanying
conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her choice of residence.
Respondent has not presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one year
prior the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was
evident was that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of
Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First
District of Leyte since childhood.
321

321
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First
District of Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on
January 28, 1995; respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration Record that she
resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months. This may be
inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers only to her residence
in Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First
District of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing
proof that she had been a resident of the district for six months only.15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC
en banc denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration16 of the April 24, 1995
Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the
House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte.17 The
Resolution tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to
DENY it, no new substantial matters having been raised therein to warrant reexamination of the resolution granting the petition for disqualification.18
_______________
15 Rollo, p. 57-64.
16 Petitioner filed a Motion to Recall Resolution Promulgated on April 24, 1995 and
to Dismiss the Petition Because of Lapse of Jurisdiction; Alternatively, Motion for
Reconsideration. The Commissions May 7, 1995 Resolution treated the same
simply as a Motion for Reconsideration.
17 Commissioners Regalado E. Maambong, Remedios A. Salazar Fernando and Julio
F. Desamito dissented. All filed separate dissenting opinions. In disqualifying
petitioner, the majority held:
As it stands now, only the Certificate of Candidacy respondent filed on March 8,
1995, stands, and on the basis of the entries therein, she is disqualified to run for
the House of Representatives for failure to meet the constitutional requirement of
one (1) year of residence in the place where she wanted to be elected.
18 Rollo, p. 78, Annex B.
322
322
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioners
proclamation should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the
highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of
Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a
second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in
the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May, 1995, petitioner averred that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First
District of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the
canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the
36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of
Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the
congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and the public respondents
Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The
principal issues may be classified into two general areas:
I. The Issue of Petitioners qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District
of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying
petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for
disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.
_______________
323
323
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive
jurisdiction over the question of petitioners qualifications after the May 8, 1995
elections.
I. Petitioners qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELECs Second Division reveals a startling
confusion in the application of settled concepts of Domicile and Residence in
election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general
proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with
domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept
of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of
determining a candidates qualifications for election to the House of
Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for
the purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled
meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that [f]or the exercise of civil rights and the
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of
habitual residence. In Ong vs. Republic20 this court took the concept of domicile
to mean an individuals permanent home, a place to which, whenever absent
for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and
circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent.21 Based on the foregoing,
domicile includes the twin elements of the fact of residing or physical presence
in a fixed place and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there

permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an
individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given
area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence and
domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for
_______________
20 19 SCRA 966 (1967). See also, Corre v. Corre, 100 Phil. 221 (1956).
21 Id., at 969.
324
324
which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes
such as pleasure, business, or health. If a persons intent be to remain, it
becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is
established it is residence.22 It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to
have different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a
single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile
in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this
distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to
indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of
returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another.
Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to
remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same
purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of
residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily
so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute
domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the
peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election
law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for
election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that the term residence . . . is synonymous
with domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving
the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of
Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs.
_______________
22
23
24
25
26
Uytengsu v. Republic, 95 Phil. 890 (1954).

Id.
52 Phil. 645 (1928).
Citing People v. Bender 144 N.Y.S., 145.
61 Phil. 36 (1934).
325
325
Quirino,27 held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a
profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected
does not constitute loss of residence.28 So settled is the concept (of domicile) in
our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated
that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the
intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain
elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the
Constitution speaks of residence in election law, it actually means only
domicile to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than
one year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What
is the Committees concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it
actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National
Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others,
and a resident thereof, that is, in the district for a period of not less than one
year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973
Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile.29
xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner
Nolledo has raised the same point that resident has been interpreted at times
as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go
back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
_______________
27 96 Phil. 294 (1954).
28 Id., see also Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 (1966); Nuval v. Guray, supra note
22.
29 II RECORD OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 110 (July 22, 1986).
326
326
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering
that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos
living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original
concept that it should be by domicile and not physical residence.30
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives,31 this Court concluded
that the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition
given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as having the same
meaning as domicile.32
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos
satisfied the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987
Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in petitioners
Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of
Leyte as seven (7) months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought
to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the
constitutions residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes
material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It
would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a
statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her
disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in
jotting down the word seven in the space provided for the residency
qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned
entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner
to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period
of residence in the First District, which was since childhood in the space
provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELECs
Sec_______________
30 Id.
31 199 SCRA 692 (1991).
32 Id., at 714.
327
327
ond Divisions questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For
instance, when herein petitioner announced that she would be registering in
Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District, private respondent
Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not
Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in the
First District, which was Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down
in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would reveal the
possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed
immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate
seeks election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte POST OFFICE ADDRESS
FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ Years and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual
residence in Leyte instead of petitioners claimed domicile, it appears that
petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her actual residence in a space
which required her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The
juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8the first requiring actual residence
and the second requiring domicilecoupled with the circumstances surrounding
petitioners registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an
unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should
not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if
such fact were established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a
piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioners domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioners domicile could not possibly be in the
First District of Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed
Resolution of April 24, 1995 maintains that except for the time when (petitioner)
studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she
continuously lived in Manila. The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as
indicative of the fact that petitioners domicile
328
328
ought to be any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban,
Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan,
Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the
election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel,
Manila where she registered as a voter in 1978 and thereafter, she served as a
member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. She could
not, have served these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila,
the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his
domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places.
Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for
various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a
profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semipermanent
nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC
that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to
the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of
many places flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court
carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election
law purposes. In Larena vs. Teves,33 supra, we stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house
wherein he lives with his family in a municipality without having ever had the
intention of abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or with his family
in another municipality, has his residence in the former municipality,
notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in the other municipality in
question and having been a candidate for various insular and provincial positions,
stating every time that he is a resident of the latter municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino,34 we explained that:
_______________
33 61 Phil. 36 (1934).
34 96 Phil. 294, 299-300 (1954).

329
329
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for greener pastures, as the
saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course includes study in other places,
practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is to be held,
the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his
native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business reasons, or for any
other reason, he may not absent himself from his professional or business
activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be
one and is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials
who are to run the government especially in national elections. Despite such
registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of
origin has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the registration of a
voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient
to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the
natural desire and longing of every person to return to his place of birth. This
strong feeling of attachment to the place of ones birth must be overcome by
positive proof of abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements
supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring
to petitioners various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so,
it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and the
deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881).35
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact
of petitioners domicile, which we lift verbatim from the COMELECs Second
Divisions assailed Reso_______________
35 B.P. 881, sec. 117 states:
xxx
Any person who transfers residence to another city, municipality or country solely
by reason of his occupation; profession; employment in private or public service;
educational activities; work in military or naval reservations; service in the army,
navy or air force; the constabulary or national police force; or confinement or
detention in government institutions in accordance with law shall not be deemed
to have lost his original residence.
330
330
lution:36
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant
Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated from high school.
She pursued her college studies in St. Pauls College, now Divine Word University
in Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in
the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to
work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the
House of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos
when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter.
When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her
husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In
1965, when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines,
she lived with him in Malacaang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel,
Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and
kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In
1992, respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed her
Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and
registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is
inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for different purposes
during the past four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an
intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while
petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of
her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually
established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even
during her husbands presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regimes powers,
petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences
in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in
her home province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of
_______________
36 Rollo, p. 38.
331
331
her province and hometown, and establishing a political power base where her
siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by
appointment, always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized
ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century
of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the
COMELECs Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the
rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioners domicile in Tacloban,
Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioners
domicile of origin because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He
avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she abandoned her residency (sic)
therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place
by merely expressing her intention to live there again. We do not agree.
First, a minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is
retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioners
being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of
law. This domicile was not established only when she reached the age of eight
years old, when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private
respondents averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, one must demonstrate:37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of
origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of
all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be
rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate
abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the
_______________
37 18 Am Jur 219-220.
332
332
same time.38 In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent
plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an
abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed
occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing
petitioners former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with
one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium ).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of
origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between
the Civil Code concepts of domicile and residence.39 The presumption that
the wife automatically gains the husbands domicile by operation of law upon
marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term residence in Article 110 of
the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well
delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence.
Both terms imply relations between a person and a place; but in residence, the
relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the
necessity of physical presence.40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 110.The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may
exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in
the service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or
residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which
would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin
in favor of the husbands choice of residence upon marriage.
_______________
38 20 Am Jur 71.
39 TOLENTINO, 1 COMMENTARIES & JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE, 220
(1987).
40 Id.
333
333
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889
which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los
Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion
cuando el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o a pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase donde quiera su fije de residencia in the aforequoted
article, which means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence . This
part of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to
a positive act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is
further strengthened by the phrase cuando el marido translade su residencia in
the same provision which means, when the husband shall transfer his
residence, referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another
home or place of actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to
refer to domicile which is a fixed, fairly-permanent concept when it plainly
connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to another not only once,
but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance
more consistent with the concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention
of the law to strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the
husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). This
difference could, for the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the
husband to fix a single place of actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the
heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately
preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live
together, thus:
Article 109. The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual
respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically
together. This takes into account the
334 [Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections, 248 SCRA 300(1995)]
334
situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of petitioner). If the
husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should
necessarily be with him in order that they may live together. Hence, it is
illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to domicile and not to residence.
Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile
while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one of their
(various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile.Whether the word residence as used with reference to
particular matters is synonymous with domicile is a question of some difficulty,
and the ultimate decision must be made from a consideration of the purpose and
intent with which the word is used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at
other times they are distinguished from one another.
xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a
person in a place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a country
residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in a place; on the
other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important
thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established in one place, there
be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in
some other place.41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife
during the marriage is not an iron-clad principle. In cases applying the Civil Code
on the question of a common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has
recognized certain situations42 where the spouses could not be com_______________
41 TOLENTINO, 1 COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE, 220
(1987).
42 Under modern laws, it is clear that many exceptions to the rule that the
domicile of the wife is determined by that of her husband must obtain.
Accordingly, the wife may acquire another and separate domicile from that of her
husband where the theoretical unity of the husband and wife is dissolved, as it is
by the institution of divorce proceedings; or where the husband has given cause
for divorce; or where there is a separation of the parties by agreement, or a
permanent
335
335
pelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a
residence different from that of her husband or, for obviously practical reasons,
revert to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In
De la Vina vs. Villareal43 this Court held that [a] married woman may acquire a
residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of
the marriage where the husband has given cause for divorce.44 Note that the
Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile
in such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts, under the Civil Code,
to live separately from her husband either by taking new residence or reverting to
her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be compelled to
live with her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasquez de Arroyo 45 the
Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the
province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to
cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the
property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such
rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an
order, enforcible (sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the
restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At best such an order can
be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under
_______________
separation due to desertion of the wife by the husband or attributable to cruel
treatment on the part of the husband; or where there has been a forfeiture by the
wife of the benefit of the husbands domicile. 9 R.C.L., 545, cited in De la Vina,
supra. If the law allows the wife to automatically revert to her original domicile or
acquire a new domicile under these situations, all the more should it sanction a
reversionor the acquisition of a new domicile by the wifeupon the death of her
husband.
43 41 Phil. 13 (1920).
44 The rule that the wife automatically acquires or follows her husbands domicile is
not an absolute one. A specific situation recognized in Spanish jurisprudence
involves the one in which husband acquiesces (1 Manresa 223) or gives his tacit
consent (Scaevola, (Civil Code, 354).
45 42 Phil. 54 (1921).
336
336
the same roof; and he experience of those countries where the courts of justice
have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy
of the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly the
Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the
instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it, that
court would make a mandatory decree, enforceable by process of contempt in
case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and
render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by the
judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon vs. Weldon (9 P.D.
52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and
Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the
English law on the subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland,
where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution of
conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could not
be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment
against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of
imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still be
procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the
basis of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of
alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we
can discover, has ever attempted to make a preemptory order requiring one of
the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case where a wife was
ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile to the
City of New Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn vs. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70)
was based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the
Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently
has not been fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the
American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is
rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have
affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to
return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to
make a particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession
and to deliver to her husband, as administrator of the ganancial property, all
income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from the property which
she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11). But it does not appear
that this order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by
any other penalty than the consequences that would be visited upon her in
respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not appear that her
disobedience to that order would necessarily
337
337
have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954,
petitioner was obligedby virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Codeto follow her
husbands actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that
time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Juan,
Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr.
Marcos did fix, as his familys residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed
any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon
marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of matrimonial domicile appears to
have been incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the
drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the
difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters,
the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new
provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in
Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of
womens rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a
product of mutual agreement between the spouses.46
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in
civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What
stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concernedaffecting the rights
and obligations of husband and wifethe term residence should only
_______________
46 Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy recognizes the same Civil Code distinction. However,
taking another approach, she writes:
(6) The above Article (Article 69, FC) uses the term family domicile instead of
family residence because the spouses may have multiple residences, and the wife
may elect to remain in one of such residences, which may destroy the duty of the
spouses to live together and its corresponding benefits. SEMPIO-DIY, HANDBOOK
ON THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 102 (1988).
338
338
be interpreted to mean actual residence. The inescapable conclusion derived from
this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married
the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a
new home, not a domicilium necessarium .
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new domicile
after her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her
husband died, petitioners acts following her return to the country clearly indicate
that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming
this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This choice was unequivocally
expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the
PCGGs permission to rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in
Olot, Leyte . . . to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our
homeland.47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992
in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brothers house, an act which supports the
domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She
could not have gone straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in a state of
disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals. Her homes and
residences following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified
as temporary or actual residences, not domicile. Moreover, and proceeding
from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse
either reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the
subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to assume that she
cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a
positive act of selecting a new one where situations exist within the subsistence
of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this
court up to this point, we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties
weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioners claim of legal
residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.
_______________
47 Rollo, pp. 132-133.
339
339
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed
considering that the assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995,
fourteen (14) days before the election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code.48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction
over the election of members of the House of Representatives in accordance with
Article VI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a
specified time is generally construed to be merely directory,49 so that noncompliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the
statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it.50 The
difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on
grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American
authorities, this court in Marcelino v. Cruz held that:51
The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on
grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general
public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.
_______________
48 The provision reads: Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy.A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election.
49 Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51 (1983).
50 American Tupe Founders Co. v. Justices Court, 133 Cal. 819, 65 Pac. 742; Heillen
v. Phillipps, 88 Cal. 557, 26 Pac. 366; Drake v. Bagley, 69 Mo. App. 39; State v.
Davis, 194 Mo. 585.
51 Supra, note 39, citing Huffines v. Gold 154 Tenn. 583, 588; 288 S.W. 353, 354.
340
340
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a
limitation of thirty (30) days within which a decree may be entered without the
consent of counsel, it was held that the statutory provisions which may be thus
departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory
proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing that
which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some
incident of the essential act. Thus, in said case, the statute under examination
was construed merely to be directory.
The mischief in petitioners contending that the COMELEC should have abstained
from rendering a decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code
because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other quasijudicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of
having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to
Section 78 of B.P. 881,52 it is evident that the respondent Commission does not
lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section
78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunals supposed assumption of
jurisdiction over the issue of petitioners qualifications after the May 8, 1995
elections, suffice it to say that HRETs jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress
begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House
_______________
52 SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives
the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.
341
341
of Representatives.53 Petitioner not being a member of the House of
Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over
the question.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution
for us to either to ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the
basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made
on such a ground here. Surely, many established principles of law, even of
election laws were flouted for the sake of perpetuating power during the preEDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit
of EDSA by ourselves bending established principles of law to deny an individual
what he or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn
ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the past.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence
qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District
of Leyte, the COMELECs questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11,
and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby
directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the
duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), I join Justice Mendoza in his separate opinion and, for the reasons
therein stated, vote to grant the petition.
Feliciano, J., On official leave.
Padilla, J., See dissenting opinion.
_______________
SEC. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy . The
procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa

Blg. 881.
53 CONST., art. VI, sec. 11 states:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all questions relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. x x x.
342
342
Regalado, J., See dissenting opinion.
Davide, Jr., J., I respectfully dissent. Please see dissenting opinion.
Romero, J., Please see separate opinion.
Bellosillo, J., I join Justice Puno in his concurring opinion.
Melo, J., I join Justice Puno in his separate concurring opinion.
Puno, J., Please see Concurring Opinion.
Vitug, J., Please see separate opinion.
Mendoza, J., See separate opinion.
Francisco, J., See concurring opinion.
Hermosisima, Jr., J., I join Justice Padillas dissent.
SEPARATE OPINION
ROMERO, J.:
Petitioner has appealed to this Court for relief after the COMELEC ruled that she was
disqualified from running for Representative of her District and that, in the event
that she should, nevertheless, muster a majority vote, her proclamation should be
suspended. Not by a straightforward ruling did the COMELEC pronounce its
decision as has been its unvarying practice in the past, but by a startling
succession of reverse somersaults. Indicative of its shifting stance vis-a-vis
petitioners certificate of candidacy were first, the action of its Second Division
disqualifying her and cancelling her original Certificate of Candidacy by a vote of
2-1 on April 24, 1995; then the denial by the COMELEC en banc of her Motion for
Reconsideration on May 7, 1995, a day before the election; then because she
persisted in running, its decision on May 11, 1995 or three days after the election,
allowing her proclamation in the event that the results of the canvass should
show that she obtained the highest number of votes (obviously noting that
petitioner had won overwhelmingly over her opponent), but almost
simultaneously reversing itself by directing that even if she wins, her
proclamation should nonetheless be suspended.
343
343
Crucial to the resolution of the disqualification issue presented by the case at bench
is the interpretation to be given to the one-year residency requirement imposed
by the Constitution on aspirants for a Congressional seat.1
Bearing in mind that the term resident has been held to be synonymous with
domicile for election purposes, it is important to determine whether petitioners
domicile was in the First District of Leyte and if so, whether she had resided there
for at least a period of one year. Undisputed is her domicile of origin, Tacloban,
where her parents lived at the time of her birth. Depending on what theory one
adopts, the same may have been changed when she married Ferdinand E.
Marcos, then domiciled in Batac, by operation of law. Assuming it did, his death
certainly released her from the obligation to live with him at the residence fixed
by him during his lifetime. What may confuse the layman at this point is the fact
that the term domicile may refer to domicile of origin, domicile of choice, or
domicile by operation of law, which subject we shall not belabor since it has
been amply discussed by the ponente and in the other separate opinions.
In any case, what assumes relevance is the divergence of legal opinion as to the
effect of the husbands death on the domicile of the widow. Some scholars opine
that the widows domicile remains unchanged; that the deceased husbands
wishes perforce still bind the wife he has left behind. Given this interpretation, the
widow cannot possibly go far enough to sever the domiciliary tie imposed by her
husband.
It is bad enough to interpret the law as empowering the husband unilaterally to fix
the residence or domicile of the family, as laid down in the Civil Code,2 but to
continue giving
_______________
1 Art. VI, Sec. 6, Const.: No person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the
day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write,
and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in
which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one
year immediately preceding the day of the election .
2 Art. 110: The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may
exempt the wife from living with the husband if he
344
344
obeisance to his wishes even after the rationale underlying the mutual duty of the
spouses to live together has ceased, is to close ones eyes to the stark realities of
the present.
At the other extreme is the position that the widow automati-cally reverts to her
domicile of origin upon the demise of her husband. Does the law so abhor a
vacuum that the widow has to be endowed somehow with a domicile? To answer
this question which is far from rhetorical, one will have to keep in mind the basic
principles of domicile: Everyone must have a domicile. Then one must have only
a single domicile for the same purpose at any given time. Once established, a
domicile remains until a new one is acquired, for no person lives who has no
domicile, as defined by the law he is subject to.
At this juncture, we are confronted with an unexplored legal terrain in this
jurisdiction, rendered more murky by the conflicting opinions of foreign legal
authorities. This being the state of things, it is as imperative as it is opportune to
illumine the darkness with the beacon light of truth, as dictated by experience
and the necessity of according petitioner her right to choose her domicile in
keeping with the enlightened global trend to recognize and protect the human
rights of women, no less than men.
Admittedly, the notion of placing women on par with men, insofar as civil, political
and social rights are concerned, is a relatively recent phenomenon that took seed
only in the middle of this century. It is a historical fact that for over three
centuries, the Philippines had been colonized by Spain, a conservative, Catholic
country which transplanted to our shores the Old World culture, mores, attitudes
and values. Through the imposition on our government of the Spanish Civil Code
in 1889, the people, both men and women, had no choice but to accept such
concepts as the husbands being the head of the family and the wifes
subordination to his authority. In such role, his was the right to make vital
decisions for the family. Many instances easily come to mind, foremost being
what is related to the issue before us, namely, that the husband shall fix the
residence of the family.3 Because he is made responsible for the support of the
wife and should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
_______________
3 Art. 110, Civil Code.
345
345
the rest of the family,4 he is also empowered to be the administrator of the conjugal
property, with a few exceptions5 and may, therefore, dispose of the conjugal
partnership property for purposes specified under the law;6 whereas, as a general
rule, the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husbands
consent.7 As regards the property pertaining to the children under parental
authority, the father is the legal administrator and only in his absence may the
mother assume his powers.8 Demeaning to the wifes dignity are certain
strictures on her personal freedoms, practically relegating her to the position of
minors and disabled persons. To illustrate a few; The wife cannot, without the
husbands consent, acquire any property by gratuitous title, except from her
ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the fourth
degree.9 With respect to her employment, the husband wields a veto power in
case the wife exercises her profession or occupation or engages in business,
provided his income is sufficient for the family, according to its social standing
and his opposition is founded on serious and valid grounds.10 Most offensive, if
not repulsive, to the liberal-minded is the effective prohibition upon a widow to
get married till after three hundred days following the death of her husband,
unless in the meantime, she has given birth to a child.11 The mother who
contracts a subsequent marriage loses the parental authority over her children,
unless the deceased husband, father of the latter, has expressly provided in his
will that his widow might marry again, and has ordered that in such case she
should keep and exercise parental authority over their children.12 Again, an
instance of a husbands overarching influence from beyond the grave.
_______________

346
346
All these indignities and disabilities suffered by Filipino wives for hundreds of years
evoked no protest from them until the concept of human rights and equality
between and among nations and individuals found hospitable lodgment in the
United Nations Charter of which the Philippines was one of the original
signatories. By then, the Spanish conquistadores had been overthrown by the
American forces at the turn of the century. The bedrock of the U.N. Charter was
firmly anchored on this credo: to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in
the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and
women. (Italics supplied)
It took over thirty years before these egalitarian doctrines bore fruit, owing largely
to the burgeoning of the feminist movement. What may be regarded as the
international bill of rights for women was implanted in the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)) adopted by
the U.N. General Assembly which entered into force as an international treaty on
September 3, 1981. In ratifying the instrument, the Philippines bound itself to
implement its liberating spirit and letter, for its Constitution, no less, declared
that The Philippines . . . adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.13 One such principle
embodied in the CEDAW is granting to men and women the same rights with
regard to the law relating to the movement of persons and the freedom to choose
their residence and domicile.14 (Italics supplied).
CEDAWs pro-women orientation which was not lost on Filipino women was reflected
in the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines and later, in the Family Code,15 both of
which were speedily approved by the first lady President of the country, Corazon
C. Aquino. Notable for its emphasis on the human rights of all individuals and its
bias for equality between the sexes are the following provisions: The State
values the dignity of every
_______________
13 Art. II, Sec. 2, Const.
14 Part IV, Art. 15, Paragraph 4, CEDAW.
15 Executive Order No. 209, July 6, 1987, as amended by Executive Order No. 227,
July 17, 1987, which took effect on August 3, 1988.
347
347

human person and guarantees full respect for human rights16 and The State
recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.17
A major accomplishment of women in their quest for equality with men and the
elimination of discriminatory provisions of law was the deletion in the Family Code
of almost all of the unreasonable strictures on wives and the grant to them of
personal rights equal to that of their husbands. Specifically, the husband and wife
are now given the right jointly to fix the family domicile;18 concomitant to the
spouses being jointly responsible for the support of the family is the right and
duty of both spouses to manage the household;19 the administration and the
enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly;20 the
father and mother shall now jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property
of their unemancipated common child21 and several others.
Aware of the hiatus and continuing gaps in the law, insofar as womens rights are
concerned, Congress passed a law popularly known as Women in Development
and Nation Building Act.22 Among the rights given to married women evidencing
their capacity to act in contracts equal to that of men are:
(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security
and credit arrangements under the same conditions as men;
(2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs
granting agricultural credit, loans and non material resources and shall enjoy
equal treatment in agrarian reform and land resettlement programs;
(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance
contracts; and
_______________
18 Art. 69, Family Code.
22 Republic Act No. 7192 approved February 12, 1992.
348
348
(4) Married women shall have rights equal to those of married men in applying for
passports, secure visas and other travel documents, without need to secure the
consent of their spouses.23
As the world draws the curtain on the Fourth World Conference of Women in Beijing,
let this Court now be the first to respond to its clarion call that Womens Rights
are Human Rights and that All obstacles to womens full participation in
decision-making at all levels, including the family should be removed. Having
been herself a Member of the Philippine Delegation to the International Womens
Year Conference in Mexico in 1975, this writer is only too keenly aware of the
unremitting struggle being waged by women the world over, Filipino women not
excluded, to be accepted as equals of men and to tear down the walls of

discrimination that hold them back from their proper places under the sun.
In light of the inexorable sweep of events, local and global, legislative, executive
and judicial, according more rights to women hitherto denied them and
eliminating whatever pockets of discrimination still exist in their civil, political and
social life, can it still be insisted that widows are not at liberty to choose their
domicile upon the death of their husbands but must retain the same, regardless?
I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others similarly situated, can no longer
be bound by the domicile of the departed husband, if at all she was before.
Neither does she automatically revert to her domicile of origin, but exercising free
will, she may opt to reestablish her domicile of origin. In returning to Tacloban and
subsequently, to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which are located in the First
District of Leyte, petitioner amply demonstrated by overt acts, her election of a
domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to her domicile of origin. Added
together, the time when she set up her domicile in the two places sufficed to
meet the one-year requirement to run as Representatives of the First District of
Leyte.
In view of the foregoing expatiation, I vote to GRANT the petition.
_______________
23 Ibid., Sec. 5.
349
349
CONCURRING OPINION
PUNO, J.:
It was Aristotle who taught mankind that things that are alike should be treated
alike, while things that are unalike should be treated unalike in proportion to their
unalikeness.1 Like other candidates, petitioner has clearly met the residence
requirement provided by Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.2 We cannot
disqualify her and treat her unalike, for the Constitution guarantees equal
protection of the law. I proceed from the following factual and legal propositions:
First. There is no question that petitioners original domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte.
Her parents were domiciled in Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in Tacloban. They
have vast real estate in the place. Petitioner went to school, and thereafter
worked there. I consider Tacloban as her initial domicile, both her domicile of
origin and her domicile of choice. Her domicile of origin as it was the domicile of
her parents when she was a minor; and her domicile of choice, as she continued
living there even after reaching the age of majority.
Second. There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner married the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos. By contracting marriage, her domicile became
subject to change by law, and the right to change it was given by Article 110 of
the Civil Code to her husband. Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family.But the court may
exempt the wife from living with the husband if he
_______________
1 Aristotle, Ethica Nichomachea, bk., v. 3, 1131(a) (W. Ross translation, 1925 ed).
2 It provides: No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless
he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines and on the day of the election, is at
least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and except the party list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and
the day of the election . (Emphasis supplied)
350
350
should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.3 (Italics supplied)
In De la Via v. Villareal and Geopano,4 this Court explained why the domicile of the
wife ought to follow that of the husband. We held: The reason is founded upon
the theoretic identity of person and interest between the husband and the wife,
and the presumption that, from the nature of the relation, the home of one is the
home of the other. It is intended to promote, strengthen, and secure their
interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and harmony
prevail.5 In accord with this objective, Article 109 of the Civil Code also obligated
the husband and wife to live together.
Third. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioners marriage to
former President Marcos ipso facto resulted in the loss of her Tacloban domicile. I
respectfully submit that her marriage by itself alone did not cause her to lose her
Tacloban domicile. Article 110 of the Civil Code merely gave the husband the right
to fix the domicile of the family. In the exercise of the right, the husband may
explicitly choose the prior domicile of his wife, in which case, the wifes domicile
remains unchanged. The husband can also implicitly acquiesce to his wifes prior
domicile even if it is different. So we held in de la Via,6
x x x. When married women as well as children subject to parental authority live,
with the acquiescence of their husbands or fathers, in a place distinct from where
the latter live, they have their own independent domicile .
x x x.
_______________
3 There are two (2) other instances when a married woman may have a domicile
different from the husband: (1) if they are legally separated pursuant to par. 1,
Art. 106 of the Civil Code, and (2) if the husband forcibly ejects the wife from the
conjugal home to have illicit relations with another. (De la Via v. Villareal and
Geopano, 41 Phil. 13 [1920]).
4 Op cit.
5 Id., at pp. 16-17.
6 Id., at p. 20, citing 1 Manresa 223.
351
351
It is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different
domicile by the husband that will change the domicile of a wife from what it was
prior to their marriage. The domiciliary decision made by the husband in the
exercise of the right conferred by Article 110 of the Civil Code binds the wife. Any
and all acts of a wife during her coverture contrary to the domiciliary choice of
the husband cannot change in any way the domicile legally fixed by the husband.
These acts are void not only because the wife lacks the capacity to choose her
domicile but also because they are contrary to law and public policy.
In the case at bench, it is not disputed that former President Marcos exercised his
right to fix the family domicile and established it in Batac, Ilocos Norte, where he
was then the congressman. At that particular point of time and throughout their
married life, petitioner lost her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte . Since petitioners
Batac domicile has been fixed by operation of law, it was not affected in 1959
when her husband was elected as Senator, when they lived in San Juan, Rizal and
where she registered as a voter. It was not also affected in 1965 when her
husband was elected President, when they lived in Malacaang Palace, and when
she registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila. Nor was it affected when she
served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements
and Governor of Metro Manila during the incumbency of her husband as President
of the nation. Under Article 110 of the Civil Code, it was only her husband who
could change the family domicile in Batac and the evidence shows he did not
effect any such change. To a large degree, this follows the common law that a
woman on her marriage loses her own domicile and by operation of law, acquires
that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes
or intends.7
Fourth. The more difficult task is how to interpret the effect of the death on
September 28, 1989 of former President Marcos on petitioners Batac domicile.
The issue is of first impression in our jurisdiction and two (2) schools of thought
contend for acceptance. One is espoused by our distinguished colleague, Mr.
Justice Davide, Jr., heavily relying on American authori_______________
7 25 AM JUR 2nd S. 48, p. 37.
352
352
ties.8 He echoes the theory that after the husbands death, the wife retains the last
domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change.
I do not subscribe to this submission. The American case law that the wife still
retains her dead husbands domicile is based on ancient common law which we
can no longer apply in the Philippine setting today . The common law identified
the domicile of a wife as that of the husband and denied to her the power of
acquiring a domicile of her own separate and apart from him.9 Legal scholars
agree that two (2) reasons support this common law doctrine. The first reason as
pinpointed by the legendary Blackstone is derived from the view that the very
being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at
least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband.10 The second
reason lies in the desirability of having the interests of each member of the
family unit governed by the same law.11 The presumption that the wife retains
the domicile of her deceased husband is an extension of this common law
concept. The concept and its extension have provided some of the most
iniquitous jurisprudence against women . It was under common law that the 1873
American case of Bradwell v. Illinois 12 was decided where women were denied
the right to practice law. It was unblushingly ruled that the natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many
of the occupations of civil life . . . This is the law of the Creator. Indeed, the
rulings relied upon by Mr. Justice Davide in CJS13 and AM JUR 2d14 are American
state court decisions handed down between the years 191715 and 1938,16 or
before the
_______________
8 28 CJS on Domicile, S. 12, 27; 25 AM JUR 2nd on Domicile S. 62, 46.
9 28 CJS, S. 12, p. 24.
10 Restatement of the Law, 2d, Conflict of Laws 2d., S. 21, p. 84.
11 Ibid.
12 83 U.S. 442; 21 Law Ed. 442; S.C. 16 Wall 130.
13 Supra.
14 Supra.
15 In re Greens Estate, 191 N.Y.S. 757, 117 Misc. 800, 165 N.Y.S. 1063, 99 Misc.
582.
16 Clark et al. v. Baker et al., 196 SE 750, 186 Ga 65.
353
353
time when women were accorded equality of rights with men . Undeniably, the
womens liberation movement resulted in farranging state legislations in the
United States to eliminate gender inequality.17 Starting in the decade of the
seventies, the courts likewise liberalized their rulings as they started invalidating
laws infected with gender-bias. It was in 1971 when the US Supreme Court in
Reed v. Reed,18 struck a big blow for women equality when it declared as
unconstitutional an Idaho law that required probate courts to choose male family
members over females as estate administrators. It held that mere administrative
inconvenience cannot justify a sex-based distinction. These significant changes
both in law and in case law on the status of women virtually obliterated the
iniquitous common law surrendering the rights of married women to their
husbands based on the dubious theory of the parties theoretic oneness. The
Corpus Juris Secundum editors did not miss the relevance of this revolution on
womens right as they observed: However, it has been declared that under
modern statutes changing the status of married women and departing from the
common law theory of marriage, there is no reason why a wife may not acquire a
separate domicile for every purpose known to the law.19 In publishing in 1969
the Restatement of the Law, Second (Conflict of Laws 2d) , the reputable
American Law Institute also categorically stated that the view of Blackstone x x x
is no longer held. As the result of statutes and court decisions, a wife now
possesses practically the same rights and powers as her unmarried sister.20
In the case at bench, we have to decide whether we should continue clinging to the
anachronistic common law that demeans women, especially married women. I
submit that the Court has no choice except to break away from this common law
rule, the root of the many degradations of Filipino women. Before 1988, our laws
particularly the Civil Code, were full of gender
_______________
17 Lefcourt, Women and The Law, 1990 ed.
18 404 US 71.
19 28 CJS S. 12, p. 25 citing Shute v. Sargent, 36 A 282, 67 N.H. 305.
20 Op cit., p. 84.
354
354
discriminations against women. Our esteemed colleague, Madam Justice Flerida
Ruth Romero, cited a few of them as follows:21
x x x
Legal Disabilities Suffered by Wives
Not generally known is the fact that under the Civil Code, wives suffer under
certain restrictions or disabilities. For instance, the wife cannot accept gifts from
others, regardless of the sex of the giver or the value of the gift, other than from
her very close relatives, without her husbands consent. She may accept only
from, say, her parents, parents-in-law, brothers, sisters and the relatives within
the so-called fourth civil degree. She may not exercise her profession or
occupation or engage in business if her husband objects on serious grounds or if
his income is sufficient to support their family in accordance with their social
standing. As to what constitutes serious grounds for objecting, this is within the
discretion of the husband.
x x x
Because of the present inequitable situation, the amendments to the Civil Law
being proposed by the University of the Philippines Law Center would allow
absolute divorce which severes the matrimonial ties, such that the divorced
spouses are free to get married a year after the divorce is decreed by the courts.
However, in order to place the husband and wife on an equal footing insofar as
the bases for divorce are concerned, the following are specified as the grounds for
absolute divorce: (1) adultery or having a paramour committed by the respondent
in any of the ways specified in the Revised Penal Code; or (2) an attempt by the
respondent against the life of the petitioner which amounts to attempted
parricide under the Revised Penal Code; (3) abandonment of the petitioner by the
respondent without just cause for a period of three consecutive years; or (4)
habitual maltreatment.
With respect to property relations, the husband is automatically the administrator
of the conjugal property owned in common by the married couple even if the wife
may be the more astute or enterprising partner. The law does not leave it to the
spouses to decide who shall act as such administrator. Consequently, the
husband is authorized to engage in acts and enter into transactions beneficial to
the conjugal partnership. The wife, however, cannot similarly bind the partnership
without the husbands consent.
_______________
21 Womens Status in Philippine Society, UP Law Center, 1979, pp. 4-6.

355
355
And while both exercise joint parental authority over their children, it is the father
whom the law designates as the legal administrator of the property pertaining to
the unemancipated child.
Taking the lead in Asia, our government exerted efforts, principally through
legislations, to eliminate inequality between men and women in our land. The
watershed came on August 3, 1988 when our Family Code took effect which,
among others, terminated the unequal treatment of husband and wife as to their
rights and responsibilities.22
_______________
22 In submitting the draft of the Family Code to President Corazon Aquino, the Civil
Code Revision Committee stated:
Close to forty years of experience under the Civil Code adopted in 1949 and
changes and developments in all aspects of Filipino life since then have revealed
the unsuitability of certain provisions of that Code, implanted from foreign
sources, to Philippine culture; the unfairness, unjustness, and gaps or
inadequacies of others; and the need to attune them to contemporary
developments and trends.
In particularto cite only a few instances(1) the property regime of conjugal
partnership of gains is not in accord with Filipino custom, especially in the rural
areas, which is more congenial to absolute community of property; (2) there have
considerably been more grounds for annulment of marriage by the Church than
those provided by the Code, thus giving rise to the absurd situation of several
marriages already annulled under Canon Law but still considered subsisting under
the Civil Law and making it necessary to make the grounds for annulment under
both laws to coincide; (3) unequal treatment of husband and wife as to rights and
responsibilities, which necessitates a response to the long-standing clamor for
equality between men and women now mandated as a policy to be implemented
under the New Constitution; (4) the inadequacy of the safeguards for
strengthening marriage and the family as basic social institutions recognized as
such by the New Constitution; (5) recent developments have shown the absurdity
of limiting the grounds for legal separation to the antiquated two grounds
provided under the Civil Code; (6) the need for additional safeguards to protect
our children in the matter of adoption by foreigners; and (7) to bring our law on
paternity and filiation in step with or abreast of the latest scientific discoveries.
(Italics supplied)
356
356
The Family Code attained this elusive objective by giving new rights to married
women and by abolishing sex-based privileges of husbands. Among others,
married women are now given the joint right to administer the family property,
whether in the absolute community system or in the system of conjugal

partnership;23 joint parental authority over their minor children, both over their
persons as well as their properties;24 joint responsibility for the support of the
family;25 the right to jointly manage the household;26 and, the right to object to
their husbands exercise of profession, occupation, business or activity.27 Of
particular relevance to the case at bench is Article 69 of the Family Code which
took away the exclusive right of the husband to fix the family domicile and gave it
jointly to the husband and the wife, thus:
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile . In case of
disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live
abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption.
However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the
solidarity of the family. (Italics supplied)
Article 69 repealed Article 110 of the Civil Code. Commenting on the duty of the
husband and wife to live together, former Madam Justice Alice Sempio-Diy of the
Court of Appeals specified the instances when a wife may now refuse to live with
her husband, thus:28
(2) The wife has the duty to live with her husband, but she may refuse to do so in
certain cases like:
(a) If the place chosen by the husband as family residence is dangerous to her life;
_______________
23 Article 96, Family Code.
28 Op cit., Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, pp. 98-99.
357
357
(b) If the husband subjects her to maltreatment or abusive conduct or insults,
making common life impossible;
(c) If the husband compels her to live with his parents, but she cannot get along
with her mother-in-law and they have constant quarrels (Del Rosario v. Del
Rosario, CA, 46 OG 6122);
(d) Where the husband has continuously carried illicit relations for 10 years with
different women and treated his wife roughly and without consideration (Dadivas
v. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 92);
(e) Where the husband spent his time in gambling, giving no money to his family for
food and necessities, and at the same time insulting his wife and laying hands on
her (Panuncio v. Sula, CA, 34 OG 129);
(f) If the husband has no fixed residence and lives a vagabond life as a tramp (1
Manresa 329);
(g) If the husband is carrying on a shameful business at home (Gahn v. Darby, 36
La. Ann. 70).
The inescapable conclusion is that our Family Code has completely emancipated the
wife from the control of the husband , thus abandoning the parties theoretic
identity of interest. No less than the late revered Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes who
chaired the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center gave this
insightful view in one of his rare lectures after retirement:29
x x x.
The Family Code is primarily intended to reform the family law so as to emancipate
the wife from the exclusive control of the husband and to place her at parity with
him insofar as the family is concerned. The wife and the husband are now placed
on equal standing by the Code. They are now joint administrators of the family
properties and exercise joint authority over the persons and properties of their
children. This means a dual authority in the family. The husband will no longer
prevail over the wife but she has to agree on all matters concerning the family.
(Italics supplied)
In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and
wife as started and perpetuated by the common law, there is no reason in
espousing the anomalous rule
_______________
29 As cited in Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, pp. 184-185.
358
358
that the wife still retains the domicile of her dead husband. Article 110 of the Civil
Code which provides the statutory support for this stance has been repealed by
Article 69 of the Family Code. By its appeal, it becomes a dead-letter law, and we
are not free to resurrect it by giving it further effect in any way or manner such as
by ruling that the petitioner is still bound by the domiciliary determination of her
dead husband.
Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we have to consider our Constitution
and its firm guarantees of due process and equal protection of law.30 It can
hardly be doubted that the common law imposition on a married woman of her
dead husbands domicile even beyond his grave is patently discriminatory to
women. It is a gender-based discrimination and is not rationally related to the
objective of promoting family solidarity. It cannot survive a constitutional
challenge. Indeed, compared with our previous fundamental laws, the 1987
Constitution is more concerned with equality between sexes as it explicitly
commands that the State x x x shall ensure fundamental equality before the law
of women and men. To be exact, section 14, Article II provides: The State
recognizes the role of women in nation building, and shall ensure fundamental
equality before the law of women and men. We shall be transgressing the sense
and essence of this constitutional mandate if we insist on giving our women the
cavemans treatment.
Prescinding from these premises, I respectfully submit that the better stance is to
rule that petitioner reacquired her Tacloban domicile upon the death of her
husband in 1989. This is the necessary consequence of the view that petitioners
Batac dictated domicile did not continue after her husbands death; otherwise,
she would have no domicile and that will violate the universal rule that no person
can be without a domicile at any point of time. This stance also restores the right
of petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110 of the
Civil Code, a right now recognized by the Family Code and protected by the
Constitution. Likewise, I cannot see the fairness
_______________
30 Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides: No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
359
359
of the common law requiring petitioner to choose again her Tacloban domicile
before she could be released from her Batac domicile. She lost her Tacloban
domicile not through her act but through the act of her deceased husband when
he fixed their domicile in Batac. Her husband is dead and he cannot rule her
beyond the grave. The law disabling her to choose her own domicile has been
repealed. Considering all these, common law should not put the burden on
petitioner to prove she has abandoned her dead husbands domicile. There is
neither rhyme nor reason for this gender-based burden.
But even assuming arguendo that there is need for convincing proof that petitioner
chose to reacquire her Tacloban domicile, still, the records reveal ample evidence
to this effect . In her affidavit submitted to the respondent COMELEC, petitioner
averred:
x x x
36. In November, 1991, I came home to our beloved country, after several
requests for my return were denied by President Corazon C. Aquino, and after I
filed suits for our Government to issue me my passport.
37. But I came home without the mortal remains of my beloved husband, President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, which the Government unreasonably considered a threat to
the national security and welfare.
38. Upon my return to the country, I wanted to immediately live and reside in
Tacloban City or in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, even if my residences there were not
livable as they had been destroyed and cannibalized. The PCGG, however, did not
permit and allow me.
39. As a consequence, I had to live at various times in the Westin Philippine Plaza in
Pasay City, a friends apartment on Ayala Avenue, a house in South Forbes Park
which my daughter rented, and Pacific Plaza, all in Makati.
40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in the residence of my
brother in San Jose, Tacloban City, and pursued my negotiations with PCGG to
recover my sequestered residences in Tacloban City and Barangay Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte.
40.1 In preparation for my observance of All Saints Day and All Souls Day that
year, I renovated my parents burial grounds and entombed their bones which
had been excavated, unearthed and scattered.
360
360

41. On November 29, 1993, I formally wrote PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo
for permissions to
x x x rehabilitate x x x (o)ur ancestral house in Tacloban and farm house in Olot,
Leyte x x x to make them livable for us the Marcos family to have a home in our
own motherland.
x x x
42. It was only on 06 June 1994, however, when PCGG Chairman Gunigundo, in his
letter to Col. Simeon Kempis, Jr., PCGG Region 8 Representative, allowed me to
repair and renovate my Leyte residences. I quote part of his letter:
Dear Col. Kempis.
Upon representation by Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos to this Commission, that she intends
to visit our sequestered properties in Leyte, please allow her access thereto. She
may also cause repairs and renovation of the sequestered properties, in which
event, it shall be understood that her undertaking said repairs is not authorization
for her to take over said properties, and that all expenses shall be for her account
and not reimbursable. Please extend the necessary courtesy to her.
x x x
43. I was not permitted, however, to live and stay in the Sto. Nio Shrine residence
in Tacloban City where I wanted to stay and reside, after repairs and renovations
were completed. In August 1994, I transferred from San Jose, Tacloban City, to my
residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, when PCGG permitted me to stay and
live there.
It is then clear that in 1992 petitioner reestablished her domicile in the First District
of Leyte . It is not disputed that in 1992, she first lived at the house of her brother
in San Jose, Tacloban City and later, in August 1994, she transferred her residence
in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. Both Tacloban City and the municipality of Olot
are within the First District of Leyte. Since petitioner reestablished her old
domicile in 1992 in the First District of Leyte, she more than complied with the
constitutional requirement of residence x x x for a period of not less than one
year immediately preceding the day of the election, i.e., the May 8, 1995
elections.
The evidence presented by the private respondent to negate the Tacloban domicile
of petitioner is nil. He presented petitioners Voters Registration Record filed with
the Board of Election
361
361
Inspectors of Precinct 10-A of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte wherein she stated that
her period of residence in said barangay was six (6) months as of the date of her
filing of said Voters Registration Record on January 28, 1995.31 This statement in
petitioners Voters Registration Record is a non-prejudicial admission . The
Constitution requires at least one (1) year residence in the district in which the
candidate shall be elected. In the case at bench, the reference is the First District
of Leyte. Petitioners statement proved that she resided in Olot six (6) months
before January 28, 1995 but did not disprove that she has also resided in Tacloban
City starting 1992. As aforestated, Olot and Tacloban City are both within the First
District of Leyte, hence, her six (6) months residence in Olot should be counted
not against, but in her favor. Private respondent also presented petitioners
Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 199532 where she placed seven (7)
months after Item No. 8 which called for information regarding residence in the
constituency where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election.
Again, this original certificate of candidacy has no evidentiary value because on
March 1, 1995 it was corrected by petitioner. In her Amended/ Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy,33 petitioner wrote since childhood after Item No. 8.
The amendment of a certificate of candidacy to correct a bona fide mistake has
been allowed by this Court as a matter of course and as a matter of right. As we
held in Alialy v. COMELEC,34 viz. :
x x x
The absence of the signature of the Secretary of the local chapter N.P. in the
original certificate of candidacy presented before the deadline September 11,
1959, did not render the certificate invalid. The amendment of the certificate,
although at a date after the deadline, but before the election, was substantial
compliance with the law, and the defect was cured.
_______________
31 Exhibit E; see also Exhibit B in SPA No. 95-001.
32 Exhibit A in SPA No. 95-009.
33 Exhibit 2 in SPA No. 95-009.
34 2 SCRA 957, 960 (1961); See Canceran v. COMELEC, 107 Phil. 607 (1960);
Gabaldon v. COMELEC, 99 Phil. 898 (1956).
362
362
It goes without saying that petitioners erroneous Certificate of Candidacy filed on
March 8, 1995 cannot be used as evidence against her. Private respondents
petition for the disqualification of petitioner rested alone on these two (2) brittle
pieces of documentary evidencepetitioners Voters Registration Record and her
original Certificate of Candidacy. Ranged against the evidence of the petitioner
showing her ceaseless contacts with Tacloban private respondents two (2) pieces
of evidence are too insufficient to disqualify petitioner, more so, to deny her the
right to represent the people of the First District of Leyte who have
overwhelmingly voted for her.
Fifth. Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution mandates that bona fide
candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination.35 A detached reading of the records of the case at bench will
show that all forms of legal and extra-legal obstacles have been thrown against
petitioner to prevent her from running as the peoples representative in the First
District of Leyte. In petitioners Answer to the petition to disqualify her, she
averred:36
xxx
xxx
xxx
10. Petitioners (herein private respondent Montejo) motive in filing the instant
petition is devious. When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was
intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First
District of Leyte, petitioner (Montejo) immediately opposed her intended
registration by writing a letter stating that she is not a resident of said city but of
Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. (Annex 2 of respondents affidavit, Annex 2).
After respondent (petitioner herein) had registered as a voter in Tolosa following
completion of her six-month actual residence therein, petitioner (Montejo) filed a
petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to
the Second District and pursued such move up to the Supreme Court in G.R. No.
118702, his purpose being to remove respondent (petitioner herein) as
petitioners (Montejos) opponent in the congressional election in the First District.
He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen,
_______________
35 Section 26, Article II of the Constitution also provides: The State shall guarantee
equal access to opportunities for public service x x x.
36 Annex G, Petition.
363
363
seeking to create another legislative district, to remove the town of Tolosa out of the
First District and to make it a part of the new district, to achieve his purpose.
However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves,
petitioner now filed the instant petition, for the same objective, as it is obvious
that he is afraid to submit himself along with respondent (petitioner herein) for
the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an
honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995.
These allegations which private respondent did not challenge were not lost to the
perceptive eye of Commissioner Maambong who in his Dissenting Opinion,37
held:
x x x
Prior to the registration dateJanuary 28, 1995the petitioner (herein private
respondent Montejo) wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban City not to allow
respondent (petitioner herein) to register thereat since she is a resident of Tolosa
and not Tacloban City. The purpose of this move of the petitioner (Montejo) is not
lost to (sic) the Commission. In UND No. 95-001 (In the matter of the Legislative
Districts of the Provinces of Leyte, Iloilo, and South Cotabato, Out of Which the
New Provinces of Biliran, Guimaras and Saranggani Were Respectively Created ),
x x x Hon. Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, Representative, First District of Leyte, wanted the
Municipality of Tolosa, in the First District of Leyte, transferred to the Second
District of Leyte. The Hon. Sergio A.F. Apostol, Representative of the Second
District of Leyte, opposed the move of the petitioner (Montejo). Under Comelec
Resolution No. 2736 (December 29, 1994), the Commission on Elections refused
to make the proposed transfer. Petitioner (Montejo) filed Motion for
Reconsideration of Resolution No. 2736 which the Commission denied in a
Resolution promulgated on February 1, 1995. Petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition
for certiorari before the Honorable Supreme Court (Cirilo Roy G. Montejo vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 118702) questioning the resolution of the
Commission. Believing that he could get a favorable ruling from the Supreme
Court, petitioner (Montejo) tried to make sure that the respondent (petitioner
herein) will register as a voter in Tolosa so that she will be forced to run as
Representative not in the First but in the Second District.
It did not happen. On March 16, 1995, the Honorable Supreme Court unanimously
promulgated a Decision, penned by Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
_______________
37 Petition, Annex B-1, pp. 6-7.
364
364
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it transferred the
municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon
of the Fourth District to the Third District of the province of Leyte, is annulled and
set aside. We also deny the Petition praying for the transfer of the municipality of
Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte. No
costs.
Petitioners (Montejos) plan did not work. But the respondent (petitioner herein)
was constrained to register in the Municipality of Tolosa where her house is
instead of Tacloban City, her domicile. In any case, both Tacloban City and Tolosa
are in the same First Legislative District.
All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms of rank
harassments and invidious discriminations against petitioner to deny her equal
access to a public office. We cannot commit any hermeneutic violence to the
Constitution by torturing the meaning of equality, the end result of which will
allow the harassment and discrimination of petitioner who has lived a
controversial life, a past of alternating light and shadow. There is but one
Constitution for all Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a different
Constitution, and the worst way to interpret the Constitution is to inject in its
interpretation, bile and bitterness.
Sixth. In Gallego v. Vera,38 we explained that the reason for this residence
requirement is to exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the
conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an
elective office to serve that community x x x. Petitioners lifetime contacts with
the First District of Leyte cannot be contested. Nobody can claim that she is not
acquainted with its problems because she is a stranger to the place. None can
argue she cannot satisfy the intent of the Constitution.
Seventh. In resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the need to
effectuate the will of the electorate. The election results show that petitioner
received Seventy Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-One (70,471) votes, while
private respondent got only Thirty-Six Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty-Three
_______________
38 73 Phil. 453, 459 (1951).
365
365

(36,833) votes. Petitioner is clearly the overwhelming choice of the electorate of the
First District of Leyte and this is not a sleight of statistics. We cannot frustrate this
sovereign will on highly arguable technical considerations. In case of doubt, we
should lean towards a rule that will give life to the peoples political judgment.
A final point. The case at bench provides the Court with the rare opportunity to
rectify the inequality of status between women and men by rejecting the
iniquitous common law precedents on the domicile of married women and by
redefining domicile in accord with our own culture, law, and Constitution. To rule
that a married woman is eternally tethered to the domicile dictated by her dead
husband is to preserve the anachronistic and anomalous balance of advantage of
a husband over his wife. We should not allow the dead to govern the living even if
the glories of yesteryears seduce us to shout long live the dead! The Family Code
buried this gender-based discrimination against married women and we should
not excavate what has been entombed. More importantly, the Constitution forbids
it.
I vote to grant the petition.
CONCURRING OPINION
FRANCISCO, J.:
I concur with Mr. Justice Kapunans ponencia finding petitioner qualified for the
position of Representative of the First Congressional District of Leyte. I wish,
however, to express a few comments on the issue of petitioners domicile.
Domicile has been defined as that place in which a persons habitation is fixed,
without any present intention of removing therefrom, and that place is properly
the domicile of a person in which he has voluntarily fixed his abode, or habitation,
not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of
making it his permanent home (28 C.J.S. 1). It denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent for business, or pleasure, or for like reasons one
intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that they
disclose intent. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966, 969).
366
366
Domicile is classified into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The law
attributes to every individual a domicile of origin, which is the domicile of his
parents, or of the head of his family, or of the person on whom he is legally
dependent at the time of his birth. While the domicile of origin is generally the
place where one is born or reared, it maybe elsewhere (28 C.J.S. 5). Domicile of
choice, on the other hand, is the place which the person has elected and chosen
for himself to displace his previous domicile; it has for its true basis or foundation
the intention of the person (28 C.J.S. 6). In order to hold that a person has
abandoned his domicile and acquired a new one called domicile of choice, the
following requisites must concur, namely, (a) residence or bodily presence in the
new locality, (b) intention to remain there or animus manendi, and (c) an
intention to abandon the old domicile or animus non revertendi (Romualdez v.
RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City , 226 SCRA 408, 415). A third classification is domicile by
operation of law which attributes to a person a domicile independent of his own
intention or actual residence, ordinarily resulting from legal domestic relations, as

that of the wife arising from marriage, or the relation of a parent and a child (28
C.J.S. 7).
In election law, when our Constitution speaks of residence for election purposes it
means domicile (Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199
SCRA 692, 713; Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, 651). To my mind, public respondent
Commission on Elections misapplied this concept of domicile which led to
petitioners disqualification by ruling that petitioner failed to comply with the
constitutionally mandated one-year residence requirement. Apparently, public
respondent Commission deemed as conclusive petitioners stay and registration
as voter in many places as conduct disclosing her intent to abandon her
established domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. In several decisions, though, the
Court has laid down the rule that registration of a voter in a place other than his
place of origin is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such
residence (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294, 300). Respondent Commission offered
no cogent reason to depart from this rule except to surmise petitioners intent of
abandoning her domicile of origin.
It has been suggested that petitioners domicile of origin was supplanted by a new
domicile due to her marriage, a domicile by
367
367
operation of law. The proposition is that upon the death of her husband in 1989 she
retains her husbands domicile, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, until she makes an actual
change thereof. I find this proposition quite untenable.
Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioners domicile of origin which was involuntarily supplanted
with another, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, upon her marriage in 1954 with then
Congressman Marcos. By legal fiction she followed the domicile of her husband. In
my view, the reason for the law is for the spouses to fully and effectively perform
their marital duties and obligations to one another.1 The question of domicile,
however, is not affected by the fact that it was the legal or moral duty of the
individual to reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. 11). Thus, while the wife retains
her marital domicile so long as the marriage subsists, she automatically loses it
upon the latters termination, for the reason behind the law then ceases.
Otherwise, petitioner, after her marriage was ended by the death of her husband,
would be placed in a quite absurd and unfair situation of having been freed from
all wifely obligations yet made to hold on to one which no longer serves any
meaningful purpose.
It is my view therefore that petitioner reverted to her original domicile of Tacloban,
Leyte upon her husbands death without even signifying her intention to that
effect. It is for the private respondent to prove, not for petitioner to disprove, that
petitioner has effectively abandoned Tacloban, Leyte for Batac, Ilocos Norte or for
some other place/s. The clear rule is that it is the party (herein private
respondent) claiming that a person has abandoned or lost his residence of origin
who must show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss (Faypon v.
Quirino, supra at 298; 28 C.J.S. 16), because the presumption is strongly in favor
of an original or former domicile, as against an acquired one (28 C.J.S. 16).
Private respondent unfortunately failed to discharge this burden as the record is
devoid of convincing proof that petitioner has acquired, whether voluntarily or

involuntarily, a new domicile to replace her domicile of origin.
_______________
1 See Articles 68-73 of E.O. 209, as amended, otherwise known as The Family Code
of the Philippines.
368
368
The records, on the contrary, clearly show that petitioner has complied with the
constitutional one-year residence requirement. After her exile abroad, she
returned to the Philippines in 1991 to reside in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, but the
Presidential Commission on Good Government which sequestered her residential
house and other properties forbade her necessitating her transient stay in various
places in Manila (Affidavit p. 6, attached as Annex I of the Petition). In 1992, she
ran for the position of president writing in her certificate of candidacy her
residence as San Juan, Metro Manila. After her loss therein, she went back to
Tacloban City, acquired her residence certificate2 and resided with her brother in
San Jose. She resided in San Jose, Tacloban City until August of 1994 when she
was allowed by the PCGG to move and reside in her sequestered residential
house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 6).3 It was in the same month of August
when she applied for the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan,
Metro Manila in order to register anew as voter of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, which she
did on January 28, 1995. From this sequence of events, I find it quite improper to
use as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement the date when
she applied for the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro
Manila. The fact which private respondent never bothered to disprove is that
petitioner transferred her residence after the 1992 presidential election from San
Juan, Metro Manila to San Jose, Tacloban City, and resided therein until August of
1994. She later transferred to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 7). It appearing that
both Tacloban City and Tolosa, Leyte are within the First Congressional District of
Leyte, it indubitably stands that she had more than a year of residence in the
constituency she sought to be elected. Petitioner, therefore, has satisfactorily
complied with the one-year qualification required by the 1987 Constitution.
I vote to grant the petition.
_______________
2 Residence Certificate No. 15226186L, dated Nov. 5, 1992.
3 PCGG Chairman Gunigundos letter addressed to Col. Kempis.
369
369
DISSENTING OPINION
PADILLA, J.:
I regret that I cannot join the majority opinion as expressed in the well-written
ponencia of Mr. Justice Kapunan.
As in any controversy arising out of a Constitutional provision, the inquiry must
begin and end with the provision itself. The controversy should not be blurred by
what, to me, are academic disquisitions. In this particular controversy, the
Constitutional provision on point states thatno person shall be a member of
the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
and on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five (25) years of age, able to
read and write, and except the party list representatives, a registered voter in the
district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less
than one year immediately preceding the day of the election. (Article VI, section
6)
It has been argued that for purposes of our election laws, the term residence has
been understood as synonymous with domicile. This argument has been validated
by no less than the Court in numerous cases1 where significantly the factual
circumstances clearly and convincingly proved that a person does not effectively
lose his domicile of origin if the intention to reside therein is manifest with his
personal presence in the place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
With this basic thesis in mind, it would not be difficult to conceive of different
modalities within which the phrase a resident thereof (meaning, the legislative
district) for a period of not less than one year would fit.
_______________
1 Nuval vs. Guray, G.R. No. 30241, December 29, 1928; Larena vs. Teves, G.R. No.
42439, December 10, 1934; Gallego vs. Verra, G.R. No. 48641, November 24,
1941; De los Reyes vs. Solidum, G.R. No. 42798, August 31, 1935; but see
Romualdez vs. RTC, Br. 7 Tacloban City, where a sudden departure from the
country was not deemed voluntary so as to constitute abandonment of domicile
both in fact and in law.
370
370
The first instance is where a persons residence and domicile coincide in which case
a person only has to prove that he has been domiciled in a permanent location for
not less than a year before the election.
A second situation is where a person maintains a residence apart from his domicile
in which case he would have the luxury of district shopping, provided of course,
he satisfies the one-year residence period in the district as the minimum period
for eligibility to the position of congressional representative for the district.
In either case, one would not be constitutionally disqualified for abandoning his
residence in order to return to his domicile of origin, or better still, domicile of
choice; neither would one be disqualified for abandoning altogether his domicile
in favor of his residence in the district where he desires to be a candidate.
The most extreme circumstance would be a situation wherein a person maintains
several residences in different districts. Since his domicile of origin continues as
an option as long as there is no effective abandonment (animus non revertendi),
he can practically choose the district most advantageous for him.
All these theoretical scenarios, however, are tempered by the unambiguous

limitation that for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the
day of the election, he must be a resident in the district where he desires to be
elected.
To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not
the term residence is to be synonymous with domicile. In other words, the
candidates intent and actual presence in one district must in all situations satisfy
the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. And this, because of a
definite Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar with the environment and
problems of a district he intends to represent in Congress and the one-year
residence in said district would be the minimum period to acquire such familiarity,
if not versatility.
In the case of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos, the operative facts are distinctly set out
in the now assailed decision of the Comelec 2nd Division dated 24 April 1995 (as
affirmed by the Comelec en banc)
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She
371
371
studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1948 when she
graduated from high school. She pursued her college studies in St. Pauls College,
now Divine Word University of Tacloban, where she earned her degree in
Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese High School, still in
Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late
Speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In
1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a
congressman of Ilocos Norte. She lived with him in Batac, Ilocos Norte and
registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the
Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she
registered as a voter. In 1965 when her husband was elected President of the
Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacaang Palace and
registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
During the Marcos presidency, respondent served as a Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila. She
claimed that in February 1986, she and her family were abducted and kidnapped
to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992
respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate
of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of
San Juan, Metro Manila. On August 24, 1994, respondent filed a letter with the
election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, requesting for cancellation of her
registration in the Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro
Manila, in order that she may be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte. (Annex 2-B, Answer). On August 31, 1994, respondent filed her Sworn
Application for Cancellation of Voters Previous Registration (Annex 2-C, Answer)
stating that she is a duly registered voter in Precinct No. 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas,
San Juan, Metro Manila and that she intends to register at Brgy. Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte.
On January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. She filed with the Board of Election Inspectors CE Form No. I, Voter
Registration Record No. 94-3349772, wherein she alleged that she has resided in
the municipality of Tolosa for a period of 6 months (Annex A, Petition).
On March 8, 1995, respondent filed with the Office of the Provincial Election
Supervisor, Leyte, a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of
the First District of Leyte wherein she also alleged that she has been a resident in
the constituency where she seeks to be elected for a period of 7 months. The
pertinent entries therein are as follows:
372
372
7. PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION: Housewife/Teacher/ Social Worker
8. RESIDENCE (complete address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
Post Office Address for election purposes: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
9. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHEREIN I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY
PRECEDING ELECTION:_______ Years Seven Months
10. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said office; That I will support and defend the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
That I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the dulyconstituted authorities; That the obligation imposed by my oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and That the facts
stated herein are true to the best of my knowledge.
(Sgd.) Imelda Romualdez-Marcos
(Signature of Candidate)2
Petitioners aforestated certificate of candidacy filed on 8 March 1995 contains the
decisive component or seed of her disqualification. It is contained in her answer
under oath of seven months to the query of residence in the constituency
wherein I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election.
It follows from all the above that the Comelec committed no grave abuse of
discretion in holding that petitioner is disqualified from the position of
representative for the 1st congressional district of Leyte in the elections of 8 May
1995, for failure to meet the not less than one-year residence in the constituency
(1st district, Leyte) immediately preceding the day of election (8 May 1995).
Having arrived at petitioners disqualification to be a representative of the first
district of Leyte, the next important issue to resolve is whether or not the
Comelec can order the Board of Canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner
out of the remaining qual ified candidates for representative in said dis_______________
2 Annex A Petition, pp. 2-4.
373
373
trict.
I am not unaware of the pronouncement made by this Court in the case of Labo vs.
Comelec, G.R. 86564, August 1, 1989, 176 SCRA 1 which gave the rationale as
laid down in the early 1912 case of Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 that:
x x x. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have
received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is
a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives
a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd,
S 243, p. 676)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later
declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected
does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast
for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner
into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which
clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes
were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible,
they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.
Under Sec. 6 RA 6646, (An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral
System and for other purposes) (84 O.G. 905, 22 February 1988) it is provided
that:
x x xAny candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified
shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may, during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of
such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
There is no need to indulge in legal hermeneutics to sense the plain and
unambiguous meaning of the provision quoted above. As the law now stands, the
legislative policy does not limit its
374
374
concern with the effect of a final judgment of disqualification only before the
election, but even during or after the election. The law is clear that in all
situations, the votes cast for a disqualified candidate SHALL NOT BE COUNTED.
The law has also validated the jurisdiction of the Court or Commission on
Elections to continue hearing the petition for disqualification in case a candidate
is voted for and receives the highest number of votes, if for any reason, he is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified .
Since the present case is an after election scenario, the power to suspend
proclamation (when evidence of his guilt is strong) is also explicit under the law.
What happens then when after the elections are over, one is declared
disqualified? Then, votes cast for him shall not be counted and in legal
contemplation, he no longer received the highest number of votes.
It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the
winner simply because a winning candidate is disqualified, but that the law
considers him as the candidate who had obtained the highest number of votes as
a result of the votes cast for the disqualified candidate not being counted or
considered.
As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no
reason why this Court should not re-examine and consequently abandon the
doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has been stated that the qualifications
prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of
the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility
most especially when it is mandated by no less than the Constitution.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to order the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Leyte to proclaim the candidate receiving the highest number of
votes, from among the qualified candidates, as the duly elected representative of
the 1st district of Leyte.
DISSENTING OPINION
REGALADO, J.:
While I agree with some of the factual bases of the majority
375
375
opinion, I cannot arrive conjointly at the same conclusion drawn therefrom. Hence,
this dissent which assuredly is not formulated on the basis of the personality of a
petitioner in a case.
I go along with the majority in their narration of antecedent facts, insofar as the
same are pertinent to this case, and which I have simplified as follows:
1. Petitioner, although born in Manila, resided during her childhood in the present
Tacloban City, she being a legitimate daughter of parents who appear to have
taken up permanent residence therein. She also went to school there and, for a
time, taught in one of the schools in that city.
2. When she married then Rep. Ferdinand E. Marcos who was then domiciled in
Batac, Ilocos Norte, by operation of law she acquired a new domicile in that place
in 1954.
3. In the successive years and during the events that happened thereafter, her
husband having been elected as a Senator and then as President, she lived with
him and their family in San Juan, Rizal and then in Malacaang Palace in San
Miguel, Manila.
4. Over those years, she registered as a voter and actually voted in Batac, Ilocos
Norte, then in San Juan, Rizal, and also in San Miguel, Manila, all these merely in
the exercise of the right of suffrage.
5. It does not appear that her husband, even after he had assumed those lofty
positions successively, even abandoned his domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos
Norte where he maintained his residence and invariably voted in all elections.
6. After the ouster of her husband from the presidency in 1986 and the sojourn of
the Marcos family in Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A., she eventually returned to the
Philippines in 1991 and resided in different places which she claimed to have
been merely temporary residences.
7. In 1992, petitioner ran for election as President of the Philippines and in her
certificate of candidacy she indicated that she was then a registered voter and
resident of San Juan, Metro Manila.
8. On August 24, 1994, she filed a letter for the cancellation of her registration in
the Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila in order
that she may be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. On
August 31, 1994, she followed this up with her Sworn Application for Cancellation
of Voters Previous Registration wherein she stated that she was a registered
voter in Precinct No. 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro Manila and that she
intended to register in Brgy, Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
9. On January 28, 1995, petitioner registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte, for which purpose she filed
376
376
with the therein Board of Election Inspectors a voters registration record form
alleging that she had resided in that municipality for six months.
10. On March 8, 1995, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she alleged that she had been
a resident for Seven Months of the constituency where she sought to be
elected.
11. On March 29, 1995, she filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy
wherein her answer in the original certificate of candidacy to item 8. RESIDENCE
IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK, TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING
THE ELECTION: was changed or replaced with a new entry reading SINCE
CHILDHOOD.
The sole issue for resolution is whether, for purposes of her candidacy, petitioner
had complied with the residency requirement of one year as mandated by no less
than Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
I do not intend to impose upon the time of my colleagues with a dissertation on the
difference between residence and domicile. We have had enough of that and I
understand that for purposes of political law and, for that matter of international
law, residence is understood to be synonymous with domicile. That is so
understood in our jurisprudence and in American Law, in contradistinction to the
concept of residence for purposes of civil, commercial and procedural laws
whenever an issue thereon is relevant or controlling.
Consequently, since in the present case the question of petitioners residence is
integrated in and inseparable from her domicile, I am addressing the issue from
the standpoint of the concept of the latter term, specifically its permutations into
the domicile of origin, domicile of choice and domicile by operation of law, as
understood in American law from which for this case we have taken our
jurisprudential bearings.
My readings inform me that the domicile of the parents at the time of birth, or what
is termed the domicile of origin, constitutes the domicile of an infant until
abandoned, or until the acquisition of a new domicile in a different place.1 In the
instant
_______________
1 Struble vs. Struble; Tex. Civ. App., 177 S.W. 2d, 279, 283.
377
377
case, we may grant that petitioners domicile of origin,2 at least as of 1938, was
what is now Tacloban City.
Now, as I have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of three kinds, that is,
domicile by birth, domicile by choice, and domicile by operation of law. The first is
the common case of the place of birth or domicilium originis ; the second is that
which is voluntarily acquired by a party or domicilium proprio motu ; the last
which is consequential, as that of a wife arising from marriage,3 is sometimes
called domicilium necesarium . There is no debate that the domicile of origin can
be lost or replaced by a domicile of choice or a domicile by operation of law
subsequently acquired by the party.
When petitioner contracted marriage in 1954 with then Rep. Marcos, by operation of
law, not only international or American but of our own enactment,4 she acquired
her husbands domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte and correspondingly lost
her own domicile of origin in Tacloban City.
Her subsequent changes of residenceto San Juan, Rizal, then to San Miguel,
Manila, thereafter to Honolulu, Hawaii, and back to now San Juan, Metro Manila
do not appear to have resulted in her thereby acquiring new domiciles of choice.
In fact, it appears that her having resided in those places was by reason of the
fortunes or misfortunes of her husband and his peregrinations in the assumption
of new official positions or the loss of them. Her residence in Honolulu and, of
course, those after her return to the Philippines were, as she claimed, against her
will or only for transient purposes which could not have invested them with the
status of domiciles of choice.5
_______________
2 This is also referred to as natural domicile or domicile by birth (Johnson vs.
Twenty-One Bales, 13 Fed. Cas. 863).
3 Story, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 46; Railroad Co. vs. Kimbrough, 115 Ky 512, 74 S.W.
229; and Johnson vs. Harvey, 261 Ky. 522, 88 S.W. 2d 42, 46, 47, as cited in
Blacks Law Dictionary, 4th ed.
4 Article 110, Civil Code.
5 Towson vs. Towson, 126 Va. 640, 102 S.E. 48, 52; Fisher vs. Jordan, C.C.A. Tex., 116
F. 2d. 183, 186; Minick vs. Minick, 111 Fla. 469, 149 So. 483, 488; Hartzler vs.
Radeka, 265 Mich., 451, 251 N.W. 554.
378
378
After petitioners return to the Philippines in 1991 and up to the present imbroglio
over her requisite residency in Tacloban City or Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, there is no
showing that she ever attempted to acquire any other domicile of choice which
could have resulted in the abandonment of her legal domicile in Batac, Ilocos
Norte. On that score, we note the majoritys own submission6 that, to
successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate (a) an actual

removal or an actual change of domicile, (b) a bona fide intention of abandoning
the former place of residence and establishing a new one, and (c) acts which
correspond with the purpose.
We consequently have to also note that these requirements for the acquisition of a
domicile of choice apply whether what is sought to be changed or substituted is a
domicile of origin (domicilium originis ) or a domicile by operation of law
(domicilium necesarium). Since petitioner had lost her domicilium originis which
had been replaced by her domicilium necessarium , it is therefore her continuing
domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte which, if at all, can be the object of legal change
under the contingencies of the case at bar.
To get out of this quandary, the majority decision echoes the dissenting opinion of
Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong in SPA 95-009 of the Commission on
Elections,7 and advances this novel proposition:
It may be said that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a
result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952 (sic,
1954). By operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the
time of her marriage became Batac, Ilocos Norte although there were no
indications of an intention on her part to abandon her domicile of origin . Because
of her husbands subsequent death and through the operation of the provisions of
the New Family Code already in force at the time, however, her legal domicile
automatically reverted to her domicile of origin. x x x (Italics supplied)
_______________
6 Citing 18 Am. Jur. 219-220.
7 Montejo vs. Marcos, En Banc, May 10, 1995.
379 [Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections, 248 SCRA 300(1995)]
379
Firstly, I am puzzled why although it is conceded that petitioner had acquired a
domicilium necesarium in Batac, Ilocos Norte, the majority insists on making a
qualification that she did not intend to abandon her domicile of origin. I find this
bewildering since, in this situation, it is the law that declares where petitioners
domicile is at any given time, and not her self-serving or putative intent to hold
on to her former domicile. Otherwise, contrary to their own admission that one
cannot have more than one domicile at a time,8 the majority would be suggesting
that petitioner retained Tacloban City as (for lack of a term in law since it does not
exist therein) the equivalent of what is fancied as a reserved, dormant, potential,
or residual domicile.
Secondly, domicile once lost in accordance with law can only be recovered likewise
in accordance with law. However, we are here being titillated with the possibility
of an automatic reversion to or reacquisition of a domicile of origin after the
termination of the cause for its loss by operation of law. The majority agrees that
since petitioner lost her domicile of origin by her marriage, the termination of the
marriage also terminates that effect thereof. I am impressed by the ingeniousness
of this theory which proves that, indeed, necessity is the mother of inventions.
Regretfully, I find some difficulty in accepting either the logic or the validity of this
argument.
If a party loses his domicile of origin by obtaining a new domicile of choice, he

thereby voluntarily abandons the former in favor of the latter. If, thereafter, he
abandons that chosen domicile, he does not per se recover his original domicile
unless, by subsequent acts legally indicative thereof, he evinces his intent and
desire to establish the same as his new domicile, which is precisely what
petitioner belatedly and, evidently just for purposes of her candidacy,
unsuccessfully tried to do.
Ones subsequent abandonment of his domicile of choice cannot automatically
restore his domicile of origin, not only because there is no legal authority therefor
but because it would be absurd. Pursued to its logical consequence, that theory of
ipso jure reversion would rule out the fact that said party could already very well
have obtained another domicile, either of
_______________
8 Citing 20 Am. Jur. 71.
380
380
choice or by operation of law, other than his domicile of origin. Significantly and
obviously for this reason, the Family Code, which the majority inexplicably
invokes, advisedly does not regulate this contingency since it would impinge on
ones freedom of choice.
Now, in the instant case, petitioner not only voluntarily abandoned her domicile of
choice (unless we assume that she entered into the marital state against her will)
but, on top of that, such abandonment was further affirmed through her
acquisition of a new domicile by operation of law . In fact, this is even a case of
both voluntary and legal abandonment of a domicile of origin. With much more
reason, therefore, should we reject the proposition that with the termination of
her marriage in 1989, petitioner had supposedly per se and ipso facto reacquired
her domicile of origin which she lost in 1954. Otherwise, this would be
tantamount to saying that during the period of marital coverture, she was
simultaneously in possession and enjoyment of a domicile of origin which was
only in a state of suspended animation.
Thus, the American rule is likewise to the effect that while after the husbands death
the wife has the right to elect her own domicile,9 she nevertheless retains the
last domicile of her deceased husband until she makes an actual change.10 In the
absence of affirmative evidence, to the contrary, the presumption is that a wifes
domicile or legal residence follows that of her husband and will continue after his
death.11
I cannot appreciate the premises advanced in support of the majoritys theory
based on Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code. All that is of any relevance
therein is that under this new code, the right and power to fix the family domicile
is now shared by the spouses. I cannot perceive how that joint right, which in the
first place was never exercised by the spouses, could affect the domicile fixed by
the law for petitioner in 1954 and, for her husband, long prior thereto. It is true
that a wife now has the
_______________
9 Cheely vs. Clayton, D.C., 110 U.S. 701, L. Ed. 298.

10 In re Gates Estate, 191 N.Y.S. 757, 117 Misc. 800In re Greens Estate, 164
N.Y.S. 1063, 99 Misc. 582, affirmed 165 N.Y.S. 1088, 179 App. Div. 890, as
reported in 28 C.J.S. 27.
11 Clark vs. Baker, 196 S.E. 750, 186 Ga. 65, op. cit. 37.
381
381
coordinate power to determine the conjugal or family domicile, but that has no
bearing on this case. With the death of her husband, and each of her children
having gotten married and established their own respective domiciles, the
exercise of that joint power was and is no longer called for or material in the
present factual setting of this controversy. Instead, what is of concern in
petitioners case was the matter of her having acquired or not her own domicile
of choice.
I agree with the majoritys discourse on the virtues of the growing and expanded
participation of women in the affairs of the nation, with equal rights and
recognition by Constitution and statutory conferment. However, I have searched
in vain for a specific law or judicial pronouncement which either expressly or by
necessary implication supports the majoritys desired theory of automatic
reacquisition of or reversion to the domicilium originis of petitioner. Definitely, as
between the settled and desirable legal norms that should govern this issue,
there is a world of difference; and, unquestionably, this should be resolved by
legislative articulation but not by the eloquence of the well-turned phrase.
In sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin since 1954 and
not having automatically reacquired any domicile therein, she cannot legally
claim that her residency in the political constituency of which it is a part
continued since her birth up to the present. Respondent commission was,
therefore, correct in rejecting her pretension to that effect in her amended/
corrected certificate of candidacy, and in holding her to her admission in the
original certificate that she had actually resided in that constituency for only
seven months prior to the election. These considerations render it unnecessary to
further pass upon the procedural issues raised by petitioner.
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, I vote to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
DISSENTING OPINION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority written by Mr. Justice Santiago
M. Kapunan, more particularly on the
382
382
issue of the petitioners qualification.
Under Section 7, Subdivision A, Article IX of the Constitution, decisions, orders, or
rulings of the COMELEC may be brought to this Court only by the special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Aratuc vs. COMELEC, 88
SCRA 251 [1979]; Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 [1989]).
Accordingly, a writ of certiorari may be granted only if the COMELEC, has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion (Section 1,
Rule 65, Rules of Court). Since the COMELEC has, undoubtedly, jurisdiction over
the private respondents petition, the only issue left is whether it acted with grave
abuse of discretion in disqualifying the petitioner.
My careful and meticulous perusal of the challenged resolution of 24 April 1995 of
the COMELEC Second Division and the En Banc resolution of 7 May 1995 discloses
total absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse thereof. The
resolution of the Second Division dispassionately and objectively discussed in
minute details the facts which established beyond cavil that herein petitioner was
disqualified as a candidate on the ground of lack of residence in the First
Congressional District of Leyte. It has not misapplied, miscomprehended, or
misunderstood facts or circumstances of substance pertinent to the issue of her
residence.
The majority opinion, however, overturned the COMELECs findings of fact for lack of
proof that the petitioner has abandoned Tolosa as her domicile of origin, which is
allegedly within the First Congressional District of Leyte.
I respectfully submit that the petitioner herself has provided the COMELEC, either by
admission or by documentary evidence, overwhelming proof of the loss or
abandonment of her domicile of origin, which is Tacloban City and not Tolosa,
Leyte. Assuming that she decided to live again in her domicile of origin, that
became her second domicile of choice, where her stay, unfortunately, was for
only seven months before the day of the election. She was then disqualified to be
a candidate for the position of Representative of the First Congressional District of
Leyte. A holding to the contrary would be arbitrary.
It may indeed be conceded that the petitioners domicile of choice was either
Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte. Nevertheless,
383
383
she lost it by operation of law sometime in May 1954 upon her marriage to the then
Congressman (later, President) Ferdinand E. Marcos. A domicile by operation of
law is that domicile which the law attributes to a person, independently of his
own intention or actual residence, as results from legal domestic relations as that
of the wife arising from marriage (28 C.J.S. Domicile 7, 11). Under the governing
law then, Article 110 of the Civil Code, her new domicile or her domicile of choice
was the domicile of her husband, which was Batac, Ilocos Norte. Said Article reads
as follows:
ART. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may
exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in
the service of the Republic.
Commenting thereon, civilist Arturo M. Tolentino states:
Although the duty of the spouses to live together is mutual, the husband has a
predominant right because he is empowered by law to fix the family residence.
This right even predominates over some rights recognized by law in the wife. For
instance, under article 117 the wife may engage in business or practice a
profession or occupation. But because of the power of the husband to fix the
family domicile , he may fix it at such a place as would make it impossible for the
wife to continue in business or in her profession. For justifiable reasons, however,
the wife may be exempted from living in the residence chosen by the husband.
The husband cannot validly allege desertion by the wife who refuses to follow him
to a new place of residence, when it appears that they have lived for years in a
suitable home belonging to the wife, and that his choice of a different home is not
made in good faith. (Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., 339).
Under common law, a woman upon her marriage loses her own domicile and, by
operation of law, acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually
lives or what she believes or intends. Her domicile is fixed in the sense that it is
declared to be the same as his, and subject to certain limitations, he can change
her domicile by changing his own (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile 48, 37).
It must, however, be pointed out that under Article 69 of the Family Code, the fixing
of the family domicile is no longer the
384
384
sole prerogative of the husband, but is now a joint decision of the spouses, and in
case of disagreement the court shall decide. The said article uses the term
family domicile and not family residence, as the spouses may have multiple
residences, and the wife may elect to remain in one of such residences, which
may destroy the duty of the spouses to live together and its corresponding
benefits (ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines,
[1988], 102).
The theory of automatic restoration of a womans domicile of origin upon the death
of her husband, which the majority opinion adopts to overcome the legal effect of
the petitioners marriage on her domicile, is unsupported by law and by
jurisprudence. The settled doctrine is that after the husbands death the wife has
a right to elect her own domicile, but she retains the last domicile of her husband
until she makes an actual change (28 C.J.S. Domicile 12, 27). Or, on the death of
the husband, the power of the wife to acquire her own domicile is revived, but
until she exercises the power her domicile remains that of the husband at the
time of his death (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile 62, 45). Note that what is revived is
not her domicile of origin but her power to acquire her own domicile.
Clearly, even after the death of her husband, the petitioners domicile was that of
her husband at the time of his deathwhich was Batac, Ilocos Norte, since their
residences in San Juan, Metro Manila, and San Miguel, Manila, were their
residences for convenience to enable her husband to effectively perform his
official duties. Their residence in San Juan was a conjugal home, and it was there
to which she returned in 1991 when she was already a widow. In her sworn
certificate of candidacy for the Office of the President in the synchronized
elections of May 1992, she indicated therein that she was a resident of San Juan,
Metro Manila. She also voted in the said elections in that place.
On the basis of her evidence, it was only on 24 August 1994 when she exercised her
right as a widow to acquire her own domicile in Tolosa, Leyte, through her sworn
statement requesting the Election Officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, to cancel her
registration in the permanent list of voters in Precinct 157 thereat and praying
that she be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, the place of
[her] birth and permanent residence (photocopy of Exhibit B, attached as
Annex 2 of
385
385
private respondent Montejos Comment). Notably, she contradicted this sworn
statement regarding her place of birth when, in her Voters Affidavit sworn to on
15 March 1992 (photocopy of Exhibit C, attached as Annex 3, Id.), her Voter
Registration Record sworn to on 28 January 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit E,
attached as Annex 5, Id.), and her Certificate of Candidacy sworn to on 8 March
1995 (photocopy of Exhibit A, attached as Annex 1, Id.), she solemnly
declared that she was born in Manila).
The petitioner is even uncertain as to her domicile of origin. Is it Tacloban City or
Tolosa, Leyte? In the affidavit attached to her Answer to the petition for
disqualification (Annex I of Petition), she declared under oath that her domicile
or residence is Tacloban City. If she did intend to return to such domicile or
residence of origin why did she inform the Election Officer of San Juan that she
would transfer to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, and indicate in her Voters Registration
Record and in her certificate of candidacy that her residence is Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte? While this uncertainty is not important insofar as residence in the
congressional district is concerned, it nevertheless proves that forty-one years
had already lapsed since she had lost or abandoned her domicile of origin by
virtue of marriage and that such length of time diminished her power of
recollection or blurred her memory.
I find to be misplaced the reliance by the majority opinion on Faypon vs. Quirino (96
Phil. 294 [1954]), and the subsequent cases which established the principle that
absence from original residence or domicile of origin to pursue studies, practice
ones profession, or engage in business in other states does not constitute loss of
such residence or domicile. So is the reliance on Section 117 of the Omnibus
Election Code which provides that transfer of residence to any other place by
reason of ones occupation; profession; employment in private and public
service; educational activities; work in military or naval reservations; service in
the army, navy or air force, the constabulary or national police force; or
confinement or detention in government institutions in accordance with law is
not deemed as loss of original residence. Those cases and legal provision do not
include marriage of a woman. The reason for the exclusion is, of course, Article
110 of the Civil Code. If it were the intention of this Court or of the legislature to
consider the marriage of a woman as a
386
386
circumstance which would not operate as an abandonment of domicile (of origin or
of choice), then such cases and legal provision should have expressly mentioned
the same.
This Court should not accept as gospel truth the self-serving claim of the petitioner
in her affidavit (Annex A of her Answer in COMELEC SPA No. 95-009; Annex I of
Petition) that her domicile or residence of origin is Tacloban City, and that she
never intended to abandon this domicile or residence of origin to which [she]
always intended to return whenever absent. Such a claim of intention cannot
prevail over the effect of Article 110 of the Civil Code. Besides, the facts and
circumstances or the vicissitudes of the petitioners life after her marriage in
1954 conclusively establish that she had indeed abandoned her domicile of origin
and had acquired a new one animo et facto (KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN, A Treatise
on Residence and Domicile, [1934], 214, 326).
Neither should this Court place complete trust on the petitioners claim that she
merely committed an honest mistake in writing down the word seven in the
space provided for the residency qualification requirement in the certificate of
candidacy. Such a claim is self-serving and, in the light of the foregoing
disquisitions, would be all sound and fury signifying nothing. To me, she did not
commit any mistake, honest or otherwise; what she stated was the truth.
The majority opinion also disregards a basic rule in evidence that he who asserts a
fact or the affirmative of an issue has the burden of proving it (Imperial Victory
Shipping Agency vs. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178 [1991]; P.T. Cerna Corp. vs. Court of
Appeals, 221 SCRA 19 [1993]). Having admitted marriage to the then
Congressman Marcos, the petitioner could not deny the legal consequence
thereof on the change of her domicile to that of her husband. The majority
opinion rules or at least concludes that [b]y operation of law (domicilium
necesarium ), her legal domicile at the time of her marriage automatically
became Batac, Ilocos Norte. That conclusion is consistent with Article 110 of the
Civil Code. Since she is presumed to retain her deceased husbands domicile until
she exercises her revived power to acquire her own domicile, the burden is upon
her to prove that she has exercised her right to acquire her own domicile. She
miserably failed to discharge that burden.
387
387
I vote to deny the petition.
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:
The case at bench deals with explicit Constitutional mandates.
The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. It is a bedrock in our legal system that
sets up ideals and directions and render steady our strides hence. It only looks
back so as to ensure that mistakes in the past are not repeated. A compliant
transience of a constitution belittles its basic function and weakens its goals. A
constitution may well become outdated by the realities of time. When it does, it
must be changed but while it remains, we owe it respect and allegiance. Anarchy,
open or subtle, has never been, nor must it ever be, the answer to perceived
transitory needs, let alone societal attitudes, or the Constitution might lose its
very essence.
Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character unless, either

by express statement or by necessary implication, a different intention is
manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51).
The two provisions initially brought to focus are Section 6 and Section 17 of Article
VI of the fundamental law. These provisions read:
Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least
twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and
the day of the election.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal
shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall
be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
388
388
who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
The Commission on Elections (the COMELEC) is constitutionally bound to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of election x x x
(Art. IX, C, Sec. 2, Constitution) that, there being nothing said to the contrary,
should include its authority to pass upon the qualification and disqualification
prescribed by law of candidates to an elective office. Indeed, pre-proclamation
controversies are expressly placed under the COMELECs jurisdiction to hear and
resolve (Art. IX, C, Sec. 3, Constitution).
The matter before us specifically calls for the observance of the constitutional oneyear residency requirement. This issue (whether or not there is here such
compliance), to my mind, is basically a question of fact or at least inextricably
linked to such determination. The findings and judgment of the COMELEC, in
accordance with the long established rule and subject only to a number of
exceptions under the basic heading of grave abuse of discretion, are not
reviewable by this Court.
I do not find much need to do a complex exercise on what seems to me to be a plain
matter. Generally, the term residence has a broader connotation that may
mean permanent (domicile), official (place where ones official duties may require
him to stay) or temporary (the place where he sojourns during a considerable
length of time). For civil law purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise of civil rights
and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of a natural person is the place
of his habitual residence (see Article 50, Civil Code). In election cases, the
controlling rule is that heretofore announced by this Court in Romualdez vs.
Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City (226 SCRA 408, 409); thus:
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms,
thus: (t)he term residence as used in the election law is synonymous with
domicile, which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent
for business or
389
389
pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. x x x. Residence thus acquired,
however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to
acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention
to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must basically be animus
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi . The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.
Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can charge the COMELEC with
having committed grave abuse of discretion in its assailed resolution.
The COMELECs jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal concerned begins. It signifies that the
protestee must have theretofore been duly proclaimed and has since become a
member of the Senate or the House of Representatives. The question can be
asked on whether or not the proclamation of a candidate is just a ministerial
function of the Commission on Elections dictated solely on the number of votes
cast in an election exercise. I believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an obligation
the performance of which, being adequately defined, does not allow the use of
further judgment or discretion. The COMELEC, in its particular case, is tasked with
the full responsibility of ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as may be
required by law before a proclamation is properly done.
The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from any undue
encroachment on the ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunals on
matters which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their
exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were otherwise, would be the effect
of the Courts peremptory pronouncement on the ability of the Electoral Tribunal
to later come up with its own judgment in a contest relating to the election,
returns and qualification of its members.
Prescinding from all the foregoing, I should like to next touch base on the
applicability to this case of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, in relation to
Section 72 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, each providing thusly:
390
390
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646
x x x
xxx
x x x.
SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
evidence of his guilt is strong.
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881
x x x
xxx
x x x.
SEC. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority.The Commission and the
courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this
Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days
before the election in which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not
be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for
any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified, and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent
his proclamation and assumption to office.
I realize that in considering the significance of the law, it may be preferable to look
for not so much the specific instances they ostensibly would cover as the
principle they clearly convey. Thus, I will not scoff at the argument that it should
be sound to say that votes cast in favor of the disqualified candidate, whenever
ultimately declared as such, should not be counted in his or her favor and must
accordingly be considered to be stray votes. The argument, nevertheless, is far
outweighed by the rationale of the now prevailing doctrine first enunciated in the
case of Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238 [1912]) which, although later abandoned
in Ticson vs. Comelec, (103 SCRA 687 [1981]), and Santos vs. COMELEC (137
SCRA 740 [1985]), was restored, along with the interim case of Geronimo vs.
Ramos (136 SCRA 435 [1985]), by
391
391
the Labo (176 SCRA 1 [1989]), Abella (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211 SCRA 297
[1992]) and, most recently, Benito (235 SCRA 436 [1994]) rulings. Benito vs.
Comelec was a unanimous decision penned by Justice Kapunan and concurred in
by Chief Justice Narvasa, Justices Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide,
Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza (Justices Cruz and Bellosillo
were on official leave). For easy reference, let me quote from the first Labo
decision:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed
the quo warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The
simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in
the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections,
(137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second
was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified
as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In
effect, the second placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight
members of the Court then, (Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr.,
Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay and Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with three
dissenting (Teehankee, Acting C.J ., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ .) and
another who reserving their vote. (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ .) One was on official
leave. (Fernando, C.J .)
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be
reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435) which
represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the
doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio v. Paredes, (23 Phil. 238) was
supported by ten members of the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente, with Teehankee,
Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas and
Alampay, JJ ., concurring) without any dissent, although one reserved his vote,
(Makasiar, J.) another took no part, (Aquino, J.) and two others were on leave.
(Fernando, C.J . and Concepcion, Jr., J.) There the Court held:)
x x x it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or
plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots
that they do not choose him.
392
392
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have
received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is
a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives
a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd,
S 243, p. 767.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later
declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected
does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast
for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner
into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which
clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes
were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible,
they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless. (at pp. 20-21)
Considering all the foregoing, I am constrained to vote for the dismissal of the
petition.
SEPARATE OPINION
MENDOZA, J.:
In my view the issue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections has the
power to disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the
office to which they seek to be elected. I think that it has none and that the
qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event that they are
elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or an election protest in the
appropriate forum, not necessarily in the COMELEC but, as in this case, in the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this case took part
in the proceedings in the COMELEC is of no moment. Such proceedings were
unauthorized and were not rendered valid by their agreement to submit their
dispute to that body.
The various election laws will be searched in vain for authorized proceedings for
determining a candidates qualifications for an office before his election. There
are none in the Omnibus
393
393
Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), in the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646),
or in the law providing for synchronized elections (R.A. No. 7166). There are, in
other words, no provisions for pre-proclamation contests but only election
protests or quo warranto proceedings against winning candidates.
To be sure, there are provisions denominated for disqualification, but they are not
concerned with a declaration of the ineligibility of a candidate. These provisions
are concerned with the incapacity (due to insanity, incompetence or conviction of
an offense) of a person either to be a candidate or to continue as a candidate for
public office. There is also a provision for the denial or cancellation of certificates
of candidacy, but it applies only to cases involving false representations as to
certain matters required by law to be stated in the certificates.
These provisions are found in the following parts of the Omnibus Election Code:
12.Disqualifications.Any person who has been declared by competent authority
insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a
penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude,
shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been
given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualification to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed
upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence
had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service
of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
(Emphasis added)
68.Disqualification.Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a
party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral
functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in
his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d)
solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96,
97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d,
e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate , or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified
to run for any elective office
394
394
under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement
provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis added)
78.Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be
filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false . The petition may
be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing,
not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis added)
the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646):
6.Effect of Disqualification Case.Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for , and the votes cast for him
the winning number of votes in such election , the Court or Commission shall
motion for the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added)
7.Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.The
procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881.
and the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160):
40.Disqualifications.The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or
for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2)
years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic;
395
395
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to
reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this
Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
The petition filed by private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo in the COMELEC, while
entitled For Cancellation and Disqualification, contained no allegation that
private respondent Imelda Romualdez-Marcos made material representations in
her certificate of candidacy which were false. It sought her disqualification on the
ground that on the basis of her Voter Registration Record and Certificate of
Candidacy, [she] is disqualified from running for the position of Representative,
considering that on election day, May 8, 1995, [she] would have resided less than
ten (10) months in the district where she is seeking to be elected. For its part,
the COMELECs Second Division, in its resolution of April 24, 1995, cancelled her
certificate of candidacy and corrected certificate of candidacy on the basis of its
finding that petitioner is not qualified to run for the position of Member of the
House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte and not
because of any finding that she had made false representations as to material
matters in her certificate of candidacy.
Montejos petition before the COMELEC was therefore not a petition for cancellation
of certificate of candidacy under 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, but
essentially a petition to declare private respondent ineligible. It is important to
note this, because as will presently be explained, proceedings under 78 have for
their purpose to disqualify a person from being a candidate, whereas quo
warranto proceedings have for their purpose to disqualify a person from holding
public office . Jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings involving members of
the House of Representatives is vested in the Electoral Tribunal of that body.
Indeed, in the only cases in which this Court dealt with petitions for the cancellation
of certificates of candidacy, the allegations were that the respondent candidates
had made false representations in their certificates of candidacy with regard to
396
396
their citizenship,1 age,2 or residence.3 But in the generality of cases in which this
Court passed upon the qualifications of respondents for office, this Court did so in
the context of election protests4 or quo warranto proceedings5 filed after the
proclamation of the respondents or protestees as winners.
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for
determining before election the qualifications of a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no
necessity for determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an
individual should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting election
offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a
prejudicial question which should be determined lest he wins because of the very
acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is why it is provided that if
the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for;
if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some
reason he has been voted for and he has won, either he will not be proclaimed or
his proclamation will be set aside.6
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates eligibility, e.g., his
citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile,
_______________
1 Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, 211 SCRA 297 (1992) (for mayor).
2 Loong v. COMELEC, 216 SCRA 760 (1992) (for regional vice governor).
3 Abella v. Larrazabal, 180 SCRA 509 (1989); Abella v. COMELEC, 201 SCRA 253
(1991) (for provincial governor).
4 Co v. HRET, 199 SCRA 692 (1991)(election protest against a Congressman).
5 Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 (1954)(quo warranto against a governor); Gallego
v. Verra, 73 Phil. 453 (1941) (quo warranto against a mayor); Larena v. Teves, 61
Phil. 36 (1934) (quo warranto against a provincial board member); Tanseco v.
Arteche, 57 Phil. 227 (1932) (quo warranto against a governor); Yra v. Abao, 52
Phil. 380 (1928) (quo warranto against a municipal president); Vivero v. Murillo,
52 Phil. 694 (1929) (quo warranto against a municipal president. Cf. Aznar v.
COMELEC, 185 SCRA 703 (1990) (quo warranto, although prematurely filed,
against a governor-elect).
6 R.A. No. 6646, 6; Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, supra note 1.
397
397
may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the
office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265,
Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of Aquinos residence
was still pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is
contrary to the summary character of proceedings relating to certificates of
candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a
ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers.7 The law is satisfied if
candidates state in their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the
position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to
be made after the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases
involving charges of false representations made in certificates of candidacy is the
COMELEC given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in
elections for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of
Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives
of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as sole
judges under the Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications of
members of Congress of the President and Vice President, as the case may be.
By providing in 253 for the remedy of quo warranto for determining an elected
officials qualifications after the results of elections are proclaimed, while being
conspicuously silent about a pre-proclamation remedy based on the same ground,
the Omnibus Election Code, or OEC, by its silence underscores the policy of not
authorizing any inquiry into the qualifications of candidates unless they have
been elected.
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the
ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993
so as to provide in Rule 25, 1 the following:
Grounds for disqualification.Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Consti_______________
7 OEC, 76.
398
398
tution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for
disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be
supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of
action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its
rulemaking power under Art. IX, A, 6 of the Constitution, cannot do. It is
noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to
decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry into
qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. (Art. IX, C, 2[3])
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into
grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not
only in their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings for
disqualification different from those for a declaration of ineligibility.
Disqualification proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified
in 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in 40 of the Local
Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming
a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their
purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or during
its progress. Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of the
qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public
office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to
remove the incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does
not imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a
candidate for a public office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our
Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the qualifications prescribed
in 2 of the law does not imply that he does not suffer from any of
disqualifications provided in 4.
Indeed, provisions for disqualifications on the ground that the candidate is guilty of
prohibited election practices or offenses, like other pre-proclamation remedies,
are aimed at the detestable practice of grabbing the proclamation and
prolonging the
399
399
election protest,8 through the use of manufactured election returns or resort to
other trickery for the purpose of altering the results of the election. This rationale
does not apply to cases for determining a candidates qualifications for office
before the election. To the contrary, it is the candidate against whom a

proceeding for disqualification is brought who could be prejudiced because he
could be prevented from assuming office even though in the end he prevails.
To summarize, the declaration of ineligibility of a candidate may only be sought in
an election protest or action for quo warranto filed pursuant to 253 of the
Omnibus Election Code within 10 days after his proclamation. With respect to
elective local officials (e.g., Governor, Vice Governor, members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, etc.) such petition must be filed either with the
COMELEC, the Regional Trial Courts, or Municipal Trial Courts, as provided in Art.
IX, C, 2(2) of the Constitution. In the case of the President and Vice President,
the petition must be filed with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (Art. VII, 4, last
paragraph), and in the case of the Senators, with the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
and in the case of Congressmen, with the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal. (Art. VI, 17) There is greater reason for not allowing before the election
the filing of disqualification proceedings based on alleged ineligibility in the case
of candidates for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House
of Representatives, because of the same policy prohibiting the filing of preproclamation cases against such candidates.
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over
SPA No. 95-009; that its proceedings in that case, including its questioned orders,
are void; and that the eligibility of petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos for the
office of Representative of the First District of Leyte may only be inquired into by
the HRET.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition and to annul the proceedings of the
Commission on Elections in SPA No. 95-009, including its questioned orders dated
April 24, 1995, May 7, 1995, May 11, 1995 and May 25, 1995, declaring petitioner
_______________
8 Lagumbay v. COMELEC, 16 SCRA 175 (1966).
400
400
Aquino vs. Commission on Elections
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos ineligible and ordering her proclamation as
Representative of the First District of Leyte suspended. To the extent that Rule 25
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure authorizes proceedings for the disqualification
of candidates on the ground of ineligibility for the office, it should be considered
void.
The provincial board of canvassers should now proceed with the proclamation of
petitioner.
Resolutions set aside. Comelec ordered to proclaim petitioner as duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte.
Notes.A persons immigration to the U.S., with intention to live there permanently
as evidenced by his application for an immigrants visa, constitutes an
abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. (Caasi vs. Court of
Appeals, 191 SCRA 229 [1990])
A petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by a Muslim divorcee is a
superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do so as her
former husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of
divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws. (Yasin vs. Judge, Sharia District
Court, 241 SCRA 606 [1995])
o0o
Copyright 2014 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved. [Romualdez-Marcos
vs. Commission on Elections, 248 SCRA 300(1995)]

Romualdez-Marcos Vs COMELEC (GR 119976)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Romualdez-Marcos Vs COMELEC (GR 119976)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Romualdez-Marcos Vs COMELEC (GR 119976)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Romualdez-Marcos vs.

Commission on Elections, 248 SCRA 300 ,

concept of womens rights in the intervening years by making the choice of

of origin. In returning to Tacloban and subsequently, to Barangay Olot, Tolosa,

crucial regardless of whether or not the term residence is to be synonymous

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

See, Jarrolt v. Mabberly, supra, note 1.

childhood in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that she has

VOL. 248, SEPTEMBER 18, 1995

in a fixed place and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there

Uytengsu v. Republic, 95 Phil. 890 (1954).

34 96 Phil. 294, 299-300 (1954).

cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa

6 Art. 171, Civil Code.

Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections

excluded, to be accepted as equals of men and to tear down the walls of

21 Womens Status in Philippine Society, UP Law Center, 1979, pp. 4-6.

whether in the absolute community system or in the system of conjugal

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections

intention or actual residence, ordinarily resulting from legal domestic relations, as

devoid of convincing proof that petitioner has acquired, whether voluntarily or

All these theoretical scenarios, however, are tempered by the unambiguous

successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate (a) an actual

If a party loses his domicile of origin by obtaining a new domicile of choice, he

9 Cheely vs. Clayton, D.C., 110 U.S. 701, L. Ed. 298.

Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character unless, either

before the election. To the contrary, it is the candidate against whom a

You might also like