American Sociological Review 2013 Hamilton 70 95
American Sociological Review 2013 Hamilton 70 95
American Sociological Review 2013 Hamilton 70 95
com/
Sociological Review
Published by:
http://www.sagepublications.com
On behalf of:
Additional services and information for American Sociological Review can be found at:
Email Alerts: http://asr.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts
Subscriptions: http://asr.sagepub.com/subscriptions
Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav
Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
472680
80American Sociological ReviewHamilton
2012
ASRXXX10.1177/00031224124726
Laura T. Hamiltona
Abstract
Evidence shows that parental financial investments increase college attendance, but we
know little about how these investments shape postsecondary achievement. Two theoretical
frameworks suggest diametric conclusions. Some studies operate from a more-is-more
perspective in which children use calculated parental allocations to make academic progress.
In contrast, a more-is-less perspective, rooted in a different model of rational behavior,
suggests that parental investments create a disincentive for student achievement. I adjudicate
between these frameworks, using data from nationally representative postsecondary datasets
to determine what effect financial parental investments have on student GPA and degree
completion. The findings suggest seemingly contradictory processes. Parental aid decreases
student GPA, but it increases the odds of graduatingnet of explanatory variables and
accounting for alternative funding. Rather than strategically using resources in accordance
with parental goals, or maximizing on their ability to avoid academic work, students are
satisficing: they meet the criteria for adequacy on multiple fronts, rather than optimizing their
chances for a particular outcome. As a result, students with parental funding often perform
well enough to stay in school but dial down their academic efforts. I conclude by highlighting
the importance of life stage and institutional context for parental investment.
Keywords
college completion, grade point average, higher education, parental investment, satisficing,
young adulthood
University of California-Merced
Corresponding Author:
Laura T. Hamilton, School of Social Sciences,
Humanities and Arts, 5200 North Lake Road,
Merced, CA 95343
E-mail: [email protected]
Hamilton
71
72
Hamilton
73
74
entrepreneurial parents underperform in relation to their peers. They posit that these students are less motivated because of anticipated
economic security through the family business. Economists Bodvarsson and Walker
(2004) found that among a small sample of
students at two Midwestern schools, parental
aid for tuition and books significantly weakened self-reported academic achievement.
This study suggests the need for more rigorous testing. Finally, a large (although conflicted) literature on effects of student
employment on performance indicates the
importance of personal financial responsibility. Several studies have found no effects
(Curtis and Nummer 1991) or positive effects
of low to moderate levels of student employment on GPA (Kalenkoski and Pabilonia
2008; Pike, Kuh, and Massa-McKinley 2008).
This scholarship suggests that young adulthood, sponsored by parental funds, may provide a context in which more is less. Here,
parental funds set the stage for moral hazard by
offsetting costs associated with low academic
performance. From this perspective, parental
aid will not boost GPA or the likelihood of
graduating and may even prove detrimental.
Hamilton
75
76
% Imputed
Mean
20.92
27.50
3.44
.27
n/ab
BPS90/94 (N = 3,810)
% Imputeda
3.57
16.46
306.43
Mean
4.77
.37
n/ab
.59
2.39
2.29
.57
24.99
.00
.00
.52
18.798
10.38
10.38
10.38
10.38
10.28
.06
.86
.04
.03
.06
.03
.03
.03
.03
.21
.08
.86
.05
.01
.05
1.92
.20
45.77
.40
.00
.00
48.75
.08
7.23
7.23
7.23
7.23
.31
.19
.29
.25
1.97
1.97
1.97
1.97
.27
.23
.25
.25
13.31
27.17
.76
1.28
.00
3.65
.74
1.40
19.83
987.41
36.72
17.14
980.69
262.02
.45
.45
.45
.45
.45
.45
.45
.45
.45
.45
.45
.45
.15
.03
.15
.07
.07
.11
.08
.02
.02
.17
.03
.11
.00
.20
2.25
12.10
.65
.66
.29
.20
.08
.09
.06
.14
.06
.01
.02
.16
.02
.07
.10
.87
.85
.30
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
2.97
1.29
(continued)
Hamilton
77
Table 1. (continued)
B&B93 (N = 10,870)
Variables
Employment during school
Full-time
Part-time
Not employed (reference)
Institution Characteristics
Private institution
Selectivity
Institution cost
Alternative Funding
Grants and scholarships
Loans
Work-study
Other forms of aid
Student employment
BPS90/94 (N = 3,810)
% Imputed
Mean
% Imputeda
Mean
10.13
10.13
10.13
.16
.54
.29
.00
.00
.00
.23
.55
.23
.20
2.38
7.97
.35
3.44
4.64
.00
5.20
.18
.57
3.28
5.91
2.25
2.25
2.25
2.25
19.32
1.51
1.32
.14
.08
5.71
.00
.00
.00
.00
13.94
2.20
.95
.14
.30
2.93
Note: Means are from imputation dataset m = 1. Monetary variables are in thousands of dollars.
Imputations were based on students not lost to follow-up in 1994.
b
Analytic sample does not include imputed values for dependent variables.
a
78
Explanatory Variables
The analyses also include a number of additional explanatory variables shown to shape
student GPA and BA completion, as well as
the provision of parental aid.12
Basic sociodemographics. Research shows
that women receive more parental aid for
higher education (Powell and Steelman 1995).
Hamilton
79
legally independent students, I use the students own income and include a variable
indicating independent status in the analyses.
Because there is a correlation between independent status and the log of parental aid (r =
.470, p < .001 for B&B93; r = .260, p < .001
for BPS90/94), including it provides a conservative estimate of effects of parental aid.
Family structure. Turley and Desmond
(2011) demonstrate that parents who are married to each other provide the greatest financial
contributions. Research also indicates that students from divorced families do not perform
as well in school as do those from nondivorced
families (Amato 2001). I include a dummy
variable indicating marriedas opposed to
single, remarried, or divorcedparents.
Strain placed on family resources by other
family members also shapes provision of
parental aid (Downey 1995; Powell and Steelman 1995). Therefore, I account for the number of family members in college. This
measure, like income, is reported on the basis
of dependency.
Academic ability. Although imperfect,
SAT scores are perhaps the most commonly
used predictor of academic ability and I thus
include them here (Camara and Echternacht
2000). In cases where SAT scores were not
available, I used the SAT-converted ACT
score. Because research has identified college
GPA as a factor shaping persistence, degree
completion analyses also include first-year
GPA as an independent variable (Cabrera,
Nora, and Castaneda 1993). The B&B93 and
BPS90/94 do not include high school GPA,
but the supplemental fixed-effects analyses
using the BPS96/01 account for this timeinvariant factor.
Student characteristics. I include a
series of dummies for major, with engineering
(which has the lowest average GPA) as the
reference.13 I also account for enrollment
status (full-year or part-year), intensity (fulltime or part-time), and residency (in-state or
out-of-state). Finally, I include a categorical
measure of employment status during the academic year. I define full-time employment as
35 hours or more per week and part-time as
less than 35 hours. No employment is the reference category.
Institution characteristics. Because
student GPAs are higher on average at private
institutions, I include a measure of institution
control (public versus private) (Rojstaczer
2002). When accounting for student quality,
increasing selectivity depresses GPA but
increases the likelihood of graduation (Alexander and Eckland 1977; Alon and Tienda
2005). I therefore include institutions scores
on the 1992 Barrons Admissions Competitiveness Index. Barrons Index ranges from
noncompetitive (1) to most competitive (6)
and is based on four criteria: SAT/ACT scores
of students accepted in the previous year, GPA
required for admission, class rank required for
admission, and percentage of applicants
accepted the previous year. I also include a
measure of tuition cost, because it directly
shapes how much money parents provide.14
Alternative funding. In the final set of
analyses for each dependent variable, I
include measures of aid from alternative
sourcesgrants and scholarships, loans,
work-study, and other aid (e.g., veteran benefits).15 I pulled information on alternative aid
sources from federal and institutional files, as
part of the NPSAS. Because educational
funds are often derived from student employment, I also include a measure of money
earned starting June 30 of the year in question
and ending July 1 of the following year.
Analytic Approach
The article is organized in two main sections.
First, I examine the influence of parental
financial aid on student GPA. Then, I move to
its effects on degree completion. For each
outcome variable I proceed as follows. I estimate a bivariate model, in which parental aid
is used to predict the outcome of interest. I
then include student sociodemographics and
80
RESULTS
Student GPA
Table 2 presents coefficients for the regression of GPA on parental aid (logged) and
other explanatory variables. Model 1 indicates that at the bivariate level, an increase in
parental aid is associated with a decrease in
student GPA (b = 2.182, p < .001).16 This
effect is apparent even though parental aid
operates as a proxy for a host of different
social processes linked to parental background.
Model 2 helps to disentangle effects of
social class from parental aid with the addition of controls for sociodemographics and
parental SES. The model again indicates that
as parental aid increases, student GPA
decreases (b = 2.233, p < .001). At the same
time, parental income and education work at
cross-purposes with parental investments. As
income increases, so does student GPA, and
having a parent with an advanced degree (as
opposed to a high school degree or less) is
associated with a significant increase in GPA.
Model 2 also shows that women and older
students have significantly higher GPAs.
White students (the reference category) have
the highest GPAs, followed by Asians, students of other races, and Blacks. Students
who identify as Hispanic have significantly
lower GPAs than other respondents.
Model 3 adds variables capturing family
structure, academic ability, student characteristics, and institution characteristics. Notably,
the significant negative effect of parental aid
on student GPA persists and, if anything, is
magnified (b = 4.570, p < .001).17 Here, the
positive effect of parental education is no
longer apparent. In fact, having a parent with
some college or a college degree significantly
decreases student GPA. As a long tradition of
educational research suggests, the positive
effect of parental education on student performance operates primarily indirectly through a
number of mechanisms such as advantages on
standardized tests like the SAT and greater
likelihood of admission to more selective
institutions. Net of these benefits, greater
selectivity in who attends college among
first-generation students, as opposed to those
with college-educated parents, becomes visible (see Torche 2011).
Students with married parents have, on
average, higher GPAs. As SAT score increases,
so does student GPA. All majors have significantly higher GPAs than the reference category of engineering.18 Students enrolled
full-year and full-time have higher GPAs.
Out-of-state students, who are typically from
wealthier families or recruited for merit, also
achieve greater GPAs. Although working
part-time during the academic year has no
adverse effects on GPA, full-time employment does. Students at private institutions
have significantly higher GPAs; however, as
selectivity increases, student GPA decreases.19
These findings indicate that parental aids
negative effect is not due to family, student,
or institution characteristics. It is possible,
however, that parental aids effects may not
be the same for students from different social
class backgrounds. I thus estimate a model
with an interaction term that allows the effect
of parental aid to vary by income. The interactive variable is significant, indicating some
heterogeneity.20
Hamilton
81
Table 2. Regression Coefficients for Student GPA on Parental Aid (Log) and Explanatory
Variables, B&B93 (N = 10,870)
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
2.182***
2.233***
4.570***
16.788***
1.165***
17.506***
1.084***
32.273***
7.040**
10.402**
11.503***
18.268***
3.517
6.231*
5.415*
3.802***
.239
3.125***
2.227
1.276
.141
5.799***
2.748*
4.319**
1.970
3.448**
.819
.096***
6.690**
8.458**
20.420***
15.432***
14.815***
9.163***
10.820**
7.864*
8.156***
8.276**
5.631**
10.554***
6.345***
2.222*
7.209***
1.593
12.103***
3.856***
1.605
Note: Omitted categories are White, high school degree or less, engineering, and no employment during
the school year.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).
82
Student GPA
3.15
3.1
3.05
3
2.95
2.9
2.85
0
12
16
20
24
28
32
Income = 5K
Income = 15K
Income = 60K
36
40
Income = 37K
Income = 90K
Note: Model includes controls for student sociodemographics, parental SES, family structure, academic
ability, student characteristics, and institution characteristics.
first $8,000 of aid. Regardless of class background, the toll parental aid takes on GPA is
modest. Yet, any reduction in student GPA
due to parental aidwhich is typically offered
with the best of intentionsis both surprising
and important. Even small disparities in GPA
are magnified in an increasingly competitive
labor market and disadvantage graduates
when their records are considered next to
those without such deductions.
Alternative funding. Next, I look at how
alternative aid shapes the relationship between
parental aid and GPA, net of explanatory variables. Table 3 presents regression coefficients
for GPA on a relative measure of parental aid
(Model 1). Here parental aid is divided by the
total amount of funding, including grants and
scholarships, loans, work-study, other forms
of aid (e.g., veteran benefits), and funds
earned through student employment.
Because parental aid largely determines
how much alternative aidparticularly nonmerit-based aidstudents receive, the absolute and relative measures are highly
correlated (r = .828, p < .001) and have a
similar effect. Model 1 indicates that as the
Hamilton
83
Table 3. Regression Coefficients for Student GPA on Relative and Absolute Parental Aid,
Alternative Aid, and Explanatory Variables, B&B93 (N = 10,870)
Model 1: Relative
Parental Aid/Total Funding
Parental Aid (log)
Alternative Funding
Grants and scholarships (log)
Loans (log)
Work-study (log)
Other forms of aid (log)
Student employment (log)
Sociodemographics
Female
Age
Race
Black
Asian
Other race
Hispanic
Parental SES
Income (log)
Independent status
Education
Some college
College degree
Advanced degree
Family Structure
Parents married
Number of members in college
Academic Ability
SAT/ACT score
Student Characteristics
Major
Business and management
Computer science
Education
Health
Humanities
Life sciences
Math
Physical sciences
Social/behavioral sciences
Vocational/technical
Other major
Enrolled full-year
Full-time intensity
Out-of-state student
Employment during school
Full-time
Part-time
Institution Characteristics
Private institution
Selectivity
Institution cost (log)
10.943***
Model 2: Absolute
3.637***
7.421***
3.949***
.069
3.580
.517
17.536***
1.103***
17.299***
1.074***
18.179***
3.574
6.256*
5.467*
19.155***
3.961
6.737*
5.946**
3.021***
2.661
4.128***
3.105*
2.906*
4.557**
2.335
2.650*
4.327**
1.943
3.080**
.794
3.362**
.492
.096***
.093***
6.542**
8.434**
20.477***
15.450***
14.503***
9.122***
10.581**
7.931*
7.953***
7.881**
5.516*
10.742***
6.299***
6.966**
8.269**
20.907***
15.932***
15.024***
9.437***
10.484**
8.457*
8.581***
8.361**
5.998**
9.661***
5.785***
2.771**
2.065
7.848***
2.488*
7.977***
2.063
11.827***
4.003***
2.299*
10.284***
3.791***
2.578*
Note: Omitted categories are White, high school degree or less, engineering, and no employment during
the school year.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).
84
I turn to the BPS96/01 panel data, which follow a group of students who started college in
1996, and estimate fixed-effects models in
which GPA is regressed on parental aid. Here,
I examine the effect of parental aid within the
educational careers of individual students,
effectively controlling for the potential impact
of differences between students. I include all
students, even those who do not persist in college to senior year, so as to avoid potentially
excluding low achieving students who receive
little parental aid.
I use a dichotomous indicator of aid
whether parents paid any tuition and fees
and student-reported GPA, because these
measures are available across all three
waves.23, 24 The full model includes year and
college majora potentially time-varying
factor that influences student GPA. I also
incorporate a variable that marks respondents
as transfer students if they left their original
institution. This is a rough indicator of changing institutional context, because the panel
data do not offer detailed measures of institution characteristics for all three time points.
As Table 4 indicates, when accounting for
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity there
is still a significant, negative effect of parental
aidin this case, providing any help with
tuitionon GPA. The effect is apparent at the
bivariate level (b = 21.603, p < .001) and
when controlling for time-varying factors (b =
4.990, p < .001). As expected, student GPA
improves with time. Transferring is also associated with a higher GPA and may be due to
moving to a less selective school or entering an
institution that provides a better fit, motivating
academic focus. In addition, most majors have
a positive effect on GPA, as compared to engineering. These results provide strong evidence
that selectivity processes are not driving the
negative relationship between parental aid and
GPA, and that this relationship is not an artifact
of using the B&B93 dataset.25
Degree Completion
It is possible that parental aid works in the
opposite direction or simply has no effect
Hamilton
85
Table 4. Coefficients from Fixed-Effects Models Regressing Student GPA on Parental Aid,
Year, Major, and Transfer Status, BPS96/01 (N = 7,210)
Model 1
Model 2
21.603***
4.990***
22.700***
28.862***
12.600***
8.967**
6.186
6.826
11.955
18.075***
8.967*
16.656***
10.595**
22.246***
14.325***
7.854*
36.798***
86
Table 5. Logistic Regression Coefficients for BA Completion on Parental Aid (Log) and
Explanatory Variables, BPS90/94 (N = 3,810)
Model 1
Model 2
.615***
.432***
.144**
.299***
.072***
.273**
.041*
.279*
.387*
.405
.118
.001
.304
.550
.090
.078
.568**
.086
.579**
.137
.333***
.522***
Model 3
.152
.216
.283*
.210*
.026
.000
.007***
.724***
.616**
.249
.399*
.666**
.271
.871*
.991***
.328
.413*
.749***
.709***
.451***
.134
.055
.084
.343**
.192***
.866***
Note: Omitted categories are White, high school degree or less, engineering, and no employment during
the school year.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).
Hamilton
87
90%
85%
80%
75%
70%
65%
60%
55%
50%
45%
40%
12
16
20
24
28
32
36
40
Note: Model includes controls for student sociodemographics, parental SES, family structure, academic
ability, student characteristics, and institution characteristics.
88
Model 1: Relative
Model 2: Absolute
.444**
.164**
.127
.085
.487*
.138
.225**
.269**
.040
.243**
.036
.006
.307
.548
.083
.066
.261
.421
.116
.078
.588**
.147***
.418
.151
.210
.273*
.158
.225
.285*
.207*
.021
.210*
.000
.007***
.000
.006***
.717***
.611**
.244
.395*
.666**
.771***
.616**
.235
.397*
.670**
.275
.865*
.987***
.355
.854*
.980***
.330
.402*
.754***
.718***
.421**
.383
.430*
.728***
.645***
.399**
.129
.124
.078
.065
.125
.096
.325*
.195***
.893***
.388**
.191***
.797***
Note: Omitted categories are White, high school degree or less, engineering, and no employment during
the school year.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed test).
Downloaded from asr.sagepub.com by guest on September 1, 2014
Hamilton
89
CONCLUSIONS
Parents often assume that one of the best
ways they can direct their money is toward
their childrens college education. However,
we have little empirical knowledge of how
parental funds shape student performance
during college. Within sociology, this intellectual gap can be attributed to a legacy of
research from status attainment, human capital, and cultural perspectives detailing the
positive impact of parental investments on
childrens academic, occupational, and economic outcomes. An alternative framework
derived from moral hazard theory suggests
that parental investments may actually provide an educational disincentive for children
by offloading costs of poor performance on to
parents.
In this article, I assessed effects of parental
financial investments on two key student outcomes: GPA and bachelors degree completion.
The findings provide mixed support for the
above perspectives. On the one hand, results
from BA completion analyses are most compatible with a more-is-more approach, as expected
within sociology of education. Although the
pattern is one of diminishing returns, parental
investments significantly increase students
likelihood of obtaining a BA, net of explanatory variables including first-year GPA and
accounting for money provided by alternative
funding sourcesgrants and scholarships,
loans, work-study, other aid (e.g., veteran benefits), and student employment.
Results from GPA analyses are surprising
and run counter to general expectations of how
parental investments should operate; they are,
however, consistent with a more-is-less
approach. As parental aid increases, student
GPA decreases, even net of sociodemographics, parental SES, family structure, academic
ability, student characteristics, and institution
characteristics. Although the effect is not linear,
and, ironically, the most harm comes from initial aid, increasing investments provide a gradual drag on student GPA. This pattern remains
when accounting for alternative sources of
funding. Supplemental analyses using fixed-
90
Hamilton
91
92
Acknowledgments
I wish to thank Elizabeth A. Armstrong, Kyle Dodson,
Neil Gross, Eliza Pavalko, Brian Powell, Patricia McManus,
Rob Robinson, and Regina Werum for comments.
Notes
1. One recent exception is Pell Grant expenditures,
which have nearly doubled since 2008. It is unlikely,
however, that this rate of increase will be sustained
in the coming years (College Board 2012).
2. EFC formulas rely on family income, assets, benefits, size, and the number of family members
attending college. The definition of family is based
on legal dependency status.
3. In earliest usage, moral hazard referred to individuals
whose problematic behaviors made them the scourge
of the insurance industry. The term was later reframed
as inefficiencies that can occur when individuals can
displace risk, rather than deficiencies of the individuals themselves. However, the concept is still not
politically neutral and has been used to push conservative legislation and public policies (Baker 1996).
Here I use the term to name a process, andto the
extent possibledivest it of political leanings.
4. Results also remain consistent when not using
imputed values for parental aid.
5. I rounded sample sizes to the nearest 10 students,
per U.S. Department of Education Institute of Education Sciences guidelines for restricted data use.
6. Including these cases in imputation yields nearly
identical results.
7. I randomly selected this dataset for ease of presentation when providing descriptions of the data.
8. The B&B93 and BPS90/94 report transcript data
normalized on a 4.0 scale. A dummy variable indicating the small number of cases in which the original
GPA was reported on a different scale is not significant when included in supplemental analyses.
9. The B&B93 only includes a measure of cumulative
GPA. This captures current as well as prior performance. Higher education research indicates that, if
anything, parents invest more in higher performing
Hamilton
93
References
Acocella, Joan. 2008. The Child Trap: The Rise of Overparenting. The New Yorker (http://www.newyorker
.com/arts/critics/books/2008/11/17/081117crbo_
books_acocella).
Alexander, Karl L. and Bruce K. Eckland. 1977. High
School Context and College Selectivity: Institutional
Constraints in Educational Stratification. Social
Forces 56:16688.
Alon, Sigal and Marta Tienda. 2005. Assessing the
Mismatch Hypothesis: Differences in College Graduation Rates by Institutional Selectivity. Sociology
of Education 78:249315.
Amato, Paul. 2001. Children of Divorce in the 1990s:
An Update of the Amato and Keith (1991) MetaAnalysis. Journal of Family Psychology 15:35570.
Armstrong, Elizabeth A. and Laura T. Hamilton. 2013.
Paying for the Party: How College Maintains Inequality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Arum, Richard and Josipa Roksa. 2011. Academically
Adrift: Limited Learning on College Campuses. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Bailey, Martha J. and Susan M. Dynarski. 2011. Gains
and Gaps: Changing Inequality in U.S. College Entry
and Completion. National Bureau of Economic
Research, Working Paper No. 17633.
Baker, Tom. 1996. On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard.
Texas Law Review 75:23792.
Baum, Sandy and Patricia Steele. 2007. Trends in Student Aid. College Board Trends in Higher Education
Series. Washington, DC: College Board.
94
Hamilton
95
Laura T. Hamilton is an Assistant Professor at the University of California-Merced. Her dissertation, Strategies
for Success: Parental Funding, College Achievement,
and the Transition to Adulthood, received the 2011 ASA
Dissertation Award honorable mention. Her book with
Elizabeth A. Armstrong, Paying for the Party: How College Maintains Inequality, examines how the organization
of public universities disadvantages all but the most affluent. Her other work explores parental investments in
adoptive youth (see Adoptive Parents, Adaptive Parents in American Sociological Review) and the
intersection of gender, class, and sexuality among college
students (see Gendered Sexuality in Young Adulthood
in Gender & Society).