EN BANC

[G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001]

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

(Third
Division)
and
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in
defense of the rights of the individual from the vast powers of the State and the inroads of
societal pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on
individuality beyond which the State cannot tread - asserting that "individual
spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very little regard to social interference - he
veritably acknowledges that the exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic
obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who would
endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says -

The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in

interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is selfprotection. The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to selfpreservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the body
politic, it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance
to its collective wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism
wrought changes in the social order, carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental
rights and duties more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political
ideologies. In the process, the web of rights and State impositions became tangled and
obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular and
broken. Antagonism, often outright collision, between the law as the expression of the
will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its members to preserve their individuality
and dignity, inevitably followed. It is when individual rights are pitted against State
authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test.

Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted

under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),[1] as amended by
RA 7659,[2] wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned
that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally
infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to
the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the
vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element ofmens rea in crimes already punishable
under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the
fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have
transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced
hereunder:

Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business,

enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section
Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies,
nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination
or series of the following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public
funds or raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage,
kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity
in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the
office or position of the public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging
to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of
stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the
promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests; or

(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection

or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the
damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer
who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by
affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons,
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or
series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00)
shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in
the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise
be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of
participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances
as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the court. The
court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other
incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from
the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring
supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of
plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by
the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate
or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable
doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight
(8) separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA
7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for
violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of
Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The
Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA
No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to
the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of the
charges in the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for
reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to
give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary

to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were only lack of
preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to
prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness
of the law under which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus
indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim.
Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to
justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001
petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No.
26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense
since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the
Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001
the Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on
26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the
Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September
2001, the issues for resolution in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder
Law is unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for
proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to
due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and
if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of
legislation is predicated on the basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be
in harmony with the Constitution.[3] Courts invariably train their sights on this
fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the
postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong predilection for constitutionality
takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government to
encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been said that the
presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch
- the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts
must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary
powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of
promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining
whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should
proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment
of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being
a measure of last resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must
first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question of
constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon[4] we held that as
long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the constitutionality

of the challenged law will not be touched and the case will be decided on other available
grounds. Yet the force of the presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally
deficient law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course, where the law clearly
and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic law, it must be struck down
on sight lest the positive commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party
challenging the validity of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt
that
there
is
indeed
an
infringement
of
the
constitution, for absent such a showing, there
can
be
no
finding
of
unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put
by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."[5] And petitioner has miserably failed in
the instant case to discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of
constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined
parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his
violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and
conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with
reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus -

1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance

with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through
misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or
raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any
commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary
benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer;
(c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to
the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any
shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including
the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official
position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich
himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,

3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed,
accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform
those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its
validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the
counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused,
in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with
little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in
amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or
combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law,
indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which petitioner
is alleged to have committed:

"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of

the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG
SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy'
Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma
Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy,
Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of
Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of
R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his coaccused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY
AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES,
SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE
ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY,
RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY
HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS(P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY
ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND

TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC

OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of
overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described
as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL
INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE
HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE
OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT,
SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with coaccused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in
consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL
GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating,
converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR
THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less,
representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS
(P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the
province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in
connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE
a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND
OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italic supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND
BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO
PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and
the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK,
MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT
OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION
NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN
PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR
LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED
TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
(P744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS
ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND
FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR
RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN

CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS

OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES
OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE
MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00)
MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH
BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK
UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS,
SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO
HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE
SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is
obviously none - that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof,
these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood
and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such
unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations against him
as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory
definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or
series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the
word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder
Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence,
violative of his fundamental right to due process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered
uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the
employment of terms without defining them;[6] much less do we have to define every
word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring
the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted
in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a
statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the
legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly
expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute
will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,
[7]
unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to

those words.[8] The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists
and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always
presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly
accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"

Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of

combining. To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure
individual characters.
Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after
another in spatial and temporal succession.
That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in
their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill
which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:

DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7

May 1991
REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say
THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS
AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say
combination, we actually mean to say, if there are two or more means, we mean
to say that number one and two or number one and something else are
included, how about a series of the same act? For example, through
misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be included also?
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.
REP. ISIDRO: Series.
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice
of one enumeration.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.

REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say combination, we mean, two different
acts. It cannot be a repetition of the same act.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
REP. GARCIA: A series.
REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or
series, we seem to say that two or more, di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that
is a very good suggestion because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime
but we have here a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So x x x x
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term series?
REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes one or maybe even
two acts may already result in such
a big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words a series
of overt or, to read, therefore: or conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such as.
Remove the idea of necessitating a series. Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in
this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because a series implies several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular
crime. But when we say acts of plunder there should be, at least, two or more.

SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.

Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two
(2) acts falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g.,
raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of
assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or
criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d),
say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall
under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or
distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in
specifically providing for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan [9] that this
term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -

x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a

combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1)
to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt
or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to
enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful
scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly
understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of
action or method' which the principal accused and public officer and others
conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the
alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods
used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a
conspiracy to attain a common goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and
sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's
reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has
been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute
establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that
persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the
statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its
face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its
application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2)
respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.[10] But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are

merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify

a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet
fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper
construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever
directed against such activities.[11] With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked
where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether
the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and practice.[12] It must be stressed, however, that the
"vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be
upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to
suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes
and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely
because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions,
especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all
the details in advance as in all other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is
vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity -

The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates
the first essential of due process of law." [13] The overbreadth doctrine, on the other
hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."[14]

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is

overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The
theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily
apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes
in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally
protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that
his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow
specificity."[15] The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected
speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected
speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester
because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have
general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented

from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal
law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to
free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As
the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we
have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the
First Amendment."[16] In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,[17] the Court ruled that "claims
of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which,
by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that
"overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked
against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a
legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the
Act would be valid."[18] As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant
may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly
proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the
conduct of others."[19]
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are
analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech
cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They
cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With
respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of
a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground
that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other
situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." [20] As has been
pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like
overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes
found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as
applied' to a particular defendant."[21]Consequently, there is no basis for
petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in
its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down
entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court
whose activities are constitutionally protected. [22] It constitutes a departure from
the case and controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions
to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts.
[23]
But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris[24]

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and

requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is
rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the
relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of
the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the
required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a
kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions,
whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as
"manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last
resort,"[25] and is generally disfavored.[26] In determining the constitutionality of
a statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a
case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is
charged.[27]
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the
Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined
than real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words
in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in
the law. Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to
every other part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the wellentrenched presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori,
petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the
Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively
deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he
even registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and
sound constitutional anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan[28] must be mentioned if only to
illustrate and emphasize the point that courts are loathed to declare a statute void for
uncertainty unless the law itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is
susceptible of no reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. In that case,
petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e),
of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited, among
others, that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no common law
meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative precedents; that, for its
vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or
sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued that the
Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of
"unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits
through evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross
inexcusable negligence while in the discharge of their official function and that their right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was violated

because they were left to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if not all, they were being
charged and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The
phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence"
merely describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of
the statute may be committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same Information
does not mean that the indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses.

The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official

support; unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third International Dictionary, p.
2514); or without justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc. v. US Dept. of Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and
Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part,
p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a
corrupt practice and make unlawful the act of the public officer in:
x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x
x x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as amended).
It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal
provisions penalize is the act of a public officer, in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions, in giving any private party benefits,
advantage or preference which is unjustified, unauthorized or without
justification or adequate reason, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence.
In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the
use of the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, which was understood in its primary and general
acceptation. Consequently, in that case, petitioners' objection thereto was held inadequate
to declare the section unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the
Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires
only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy -

SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder,

it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the

accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or

acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable
doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a
criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his
favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless
the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability
lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. [29] The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard
is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in the
application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not
diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being
condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his
ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a
criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost
certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in the
realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clausewhich protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. [30] The following exchanges
between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score during the
deliberations in the floor of the House of Representatives are elucidating -

DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080,

9 October 1990
MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is
alleged in the information must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove
only one act and find him guilty of the other acts enumerated in the information, does
that not work against the right of the accused especially so if the amount committed, say,
by falsification is less than P100 million, but the totality of the crime committed is P100
million since there is malversation, bribery, falsification of public document, coercion,
theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is
every element of the crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration
of the things taken by the robber in the information three pairs of pants, pieces of
jewelry. These need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent
the conviction of a crime for which he was charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs
of diamond earrings the prosecution proved two. Now, what is required to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder
the totality of the amount is very important, I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts
has to be taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to accumulate
only P50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate P1
million. Now, when we add the totality of the other acts as required under this bill

through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so how can we
now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of
the crime, there is a need to prove that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example,
one essential element of the crime is that the amount involved is P100 million. Now, in a
series of defalcations and other acts of corruption in the enumeration the total amount
would be P110 or P120 million, but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so,
we will sum up the amounts involved in those transactions which were proved. Now, if
the amount involved in these transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt, isP100
million, then there is a crime of plunder (underscoring supplied).

It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion
the standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the
prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to
constitute the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the
crime suffers from a dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the
prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to
form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount
of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in
the Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To
illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an Information for plunder with having
committed
fifty
(50)
raids
on
the
public
treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids,
it
being
sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt
provided only that they amounted to at least P50,000,000.00.[31]
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion
that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden
wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is
merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with
reason and common sense. There would be no other explanation for a
combination or series of
overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required
to make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with
the establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his
submission that "pattern" is "a very important element of the crime of plunder;" and that
Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the
crime," such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder -

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder
Law without applying Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the commission of the acts complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the
Revised Penal Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond
reasonable doubt without applying Section 4, can you not have a conviction under the
Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an
accused charged for violation of the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive
element of the law x x x x
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof
beyond reasonable doubt on the acts charged constituting plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of
evidence and it contains a substantive element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no
way by which we can avoid Section 4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate
crimes charged are concerned that you do not have to go that far by applying Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important element
of the crime of plunder and that cannot be avoided by the prosecution. [32]

We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of

plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1,
par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of
Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:

SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of

plunder x x x x
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a
criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or
establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of
a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even
without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the
prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by
the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus,
even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the reasons
advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest of the provisions without
necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can
supplant Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability
clause -

Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the

application thereof to any person or circumstance
is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application
of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected
thereby.
Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared
invalid as a result of the nullity of some of its provisions, assuming that to be the case
although it is not really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated
independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can
best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is
a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring
Opinion -

x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element

of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that
the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed
"willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the
part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens
rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the
following remarks of Senator Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. No.
733:
SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict
him would not be evidence for each and every individual criminal act but only
evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime
of plunder.[33]
However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the succeeding
portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is
contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's view,
would provide for a speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of
cases?
SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .[34]

Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit
plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to
further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or ciminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are
concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the
requisite mens rea must be shown.
Indeed, 2 provides that Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of
an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for
such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the
attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the
Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised
Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly
that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the
offender is determined by his criminal intent. It is true that 2 refers to "any
person who participates with the said public officer in the commission of an
offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe,
however, that it does not apply as well to the public officer as principal in the
crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not
supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no canon against
using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously
mean."[35]
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be
deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in
1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable byreclusion
perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight
penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this
Court held in People v. Echegaray:[36]
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their
very nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is
treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the
normal course of his or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light,
the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom
resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected
to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death; and drug offenses

involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other
crimes; as well as murder, rape,
parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention,
where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical
injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the
victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation,
destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua
to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance
and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger sociopolitical and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to
develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from
decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and
impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must muster the
political will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and
syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of
society and the psyche of the populace. [With the government] terribly lacking
the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of
misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual
threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the
people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects
and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in
death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or officers,
that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and
damage to society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense
implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently
immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se[37] and it does not matter that
such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder
the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat
prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations of
the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking,
without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law
of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late
in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally
consigned by People v. Echegaray[38] to the archives of jurisprudential history. The
declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a

declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution
now as an integral part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of
officials in high places which have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft
and corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous
people relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the
government. Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly
sophisticated,
extraordinarily
methodical
and
economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law,
especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which,
if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral
and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the
will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against
the avarice and other venalities in public office.
These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few
issues of national importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated by
petitioner's ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and
trial
under
a
virginal
statute. This
continuing
saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may linger for a long
time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and
prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as
the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the
petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED

Facts: Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be

prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder), 1 as amended by RA 7659, 2 wishes to impress upon us that the
assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line
which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a
stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of
constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice
of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already
punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear
violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused,

WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR

CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR
OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL
POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR
INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass,
accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, illgotten wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION
NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
(P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING
HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE
OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES
through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR
SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS.
RESPECTIVELY OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION
EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY
EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
(P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY
OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN
DOES JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF
SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE
CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE
EQUITABLE BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE'
Issue: R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on the following grounds:
I. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE FOR ITS VAGUENESS
II. IT VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE
ACCUSED TO KNOW THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE
ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM
III. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE BY LOWERING
THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE NECESSARY FOR PROVING THE
COMPONENT ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER
IV. IT IS BEYOND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE
LEGISLATURE TO DELIMIT THE REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD
AND TO ABOLISH THE ELEMENT OF MENS REA IN MALA IN SE
CRIMES BY CONVERTING THESE TO MALA PROHIBITA, IN

VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL

RESPONSIBILITY.
Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise
known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL.
Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED
for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
Ratio:
In view of vagueness and ambiguity
Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its
inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result
in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear,
or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in
the Plunder Law. Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics
that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification, 7 unless it is evident that the legislature intended
a technical or special legal meaning to those words 8 The intention of the
lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers
to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus,
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly
accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"
Combination the result or product of combining; the act or process of
combining. To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure
individual characters.
Series a number of things or events of the same class coming one after
another in spatial and temporal succession.
Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for
"combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically
providing for it in the law. As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of
the Sandiganbayan 9 that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation
to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2. . . under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists
of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in
subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the
pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal
which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten

wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or

'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term
'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which
the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him, follow
to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such
overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused
vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a
common goal.
With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute
is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case. The test in determining
whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language
conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and practice. It must be stressed,
however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld not absolute precision or mathematical
exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair
warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the
circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is
manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is
most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense
must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary
intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute.
In view of due process
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that
Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting
the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or
criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy. The running fault in this
reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for
plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the
presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless
the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that
culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.
What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a
number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would

constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There

is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have
been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme
or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill- gotten wealth.
In view of mens rea
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder
is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his
Concurring Opinion . . . Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala
in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is
noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was
committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty
knowledge on the part of petitioner.
[With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most
basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of
government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of
government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over.
Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effect and repercussions of
crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug
offenses involving government official, employees or officers, that their
perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to
society. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though
they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P.
Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent
wrongness of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the
amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say
however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect this long dead
issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People v. Echegaray 38 to
the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that
RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and
becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral
part of it.
In view of presumption of innocence
At all events, let me stress that the power to construe law is essentially

judicial. To declare what the law shall be is a legislative power, but to declare
what the law is or has been is judicial. Statutes enacted by Congress cannot be
expected to spell out with mathematical precision how the law should be
interpreted under any and all given situations. The application of the law will
depend on the facts and circumstances as adduced by evidence which will then
be considered, weighed and evaluated by the courts. Indeed, it is the
constitutionally mandated function of the courts to interpret, construe and apply
the law as would give flesh and blood to the true meaning of legislative
enactments.
A construction should be rejected if it gives to the language used in a statute
a meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was
enacted and that tends to defeat the ends that are sought to be attained by its
enactment. Viewed broadly, "plunder involves not just plain thievery but
economic depredation which affects not just private parties or personal interests
but the nation as a whole." Invariably, plunder partakes of the nature of "a
crime against national interest which must be stopped, and if possible, stopped
permanently."
In view of estoppel
Petitioner is not estopped from questioning the constitutionality of R.A. No.
7080. The case at bar has been subject to controversy principally due to the
personalities involved herein. The fact that one of petitioner's counsels was a
co-sponsor of the Plunder Law and petitioner himself voted for its passage
when he was still a Senator would not in any put him in estoppel to question its
constitutionality. The rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact, not of law.
Moreover, estoppel should be resorted to only as a means of preventing
injustice. To hold that petitioner is estopped from questioning the validity of
R.A. No. 7080 because he had earlier voted for its passage would result in
injustice not only to him, but to all others who may be held liable under this
statute.
What is RICO
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act is a United States
federal law that provides for extended criminal penalties and a civil cause of
action for acts performed as part of an ongoing criminal organization. RICO
was enacted by section 901(a) of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970
(Pub.L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, enacted October 15, 1970). RICO is codified as
Chapter 96 of Title 18 of the United States Code, 18 U.S.C. 19611968.

While its intended use was to prosecute the Mafia as well as others who were
actively engaged in organized crime, its application has been more widespread.
In view of facial challenge
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which
is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The
theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily
apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes
in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally
protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that
his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow
specificity.'
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have
general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented
from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal
law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
In view of burden of proof (accused) according to PANGANIBAN, J.
In sum, the law must be proven to be clearly and unequivocally repugnant to
the Constitution before this Court may declare its unconstitutionality. To strike
down the law, there must be a clear showing that what the fundamental law
prohibits, the statute allows to be done. 40 To justify the nullification of the
law, there must be a clear, unequivocal breach of the Constitution; not a
doubtful, argumentative implication. 41 Of some terms in the law which are
easily clarified by judicial construction, petitioner has, at best, managed merely
to point out alleged ambiguities. Far from establishing, by clear and
unmistakable terms, any patent and glaring conflict with the Constitution, the
constitutional challenge to the Anti-Plunder law must fail. For just as the
accused is entitled to the presumption of innocence in the absence of proof
beyond reasonable doubt, so must a law be accorded the presumption of
constitutionality without the same requisite quantum of proof.
Petitioner now concludes that the Anti-Plunder Law "eliminates proof of
each and every component criminal act of plunder by the accused and limits
itself to establishing just the pattern of over or criminal acts indicative of
unlawful scheme or conspiracy."

All told, the above explanation is in consonance with what is often perceived
to be the reality with respect to the crime of plunder that "the actual extent
of the crime may not, in its breadth and entirety, be discovered, by reason of the
'stealth and secrecy' in which it is committed and the involvement of 'so many
persons here and abroad and [the fact that it] touches so many states and
territorial units."'
"The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To justify nullification of a law,
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful
or argumentative implication; a law shall not be declared invalid unless the
conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt. 'The
presumption is always in favor of constitutionality . . . To doubt is to sustain.'
In view of burden of proof (State) according to KAPUNAN, J.
The Constitution guarantees both substantive and procedural due process as
well as the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. A criminal statute should not be so vague and uncertain
that "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and
differ as to its application. There are three distinct considerations for the
vagueness doctrine. First, the doctrine is designed to ensure that individuals are
properly warned ex ante of the criminal consequences of their conduct. This
"fair notice" rationale was articulated in United States v. Harriss: The
constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that
fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated
conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man
shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably
understand to be proscribed.
While the dictum that laws be clear and definite does not require Congress
to spell out with mathematical certainty the standards to which an individual
must conform his conduct, it is necessary that statutes provide reasonable
standards to guide prospective conduct. And where a statute imposes criminal
sanctions, the standard of certainty is higher. The penalty imposable on the
person found guilty of violating R.A. No. 7080 is reclusion perpetua to death.
Given such penalty, the standard of clarity and definiteness required of R.A.
No. 7080 is unarguably higher than that of other laws.
It has been incorrectly suggested that petitioner cannot mount a "facial
challenge" to the Plunder Law, and that "facial" or "on its face" challenges seek

the total invalidation of a statute. Fr. Bernas, for his part, pointed to several
problematical portions of the law that were left unclarified. He posed the
question: "How can you have a 'series' of criminal acts if the elements that are
supposed to constitute the series are not proved to be criminal?" The meanings
of "combination" and "series" as used in R.A. No. 7080 are not clear.
To quote Fr. Bernas again: "How can you have a 'series' of criminal acts if
the elements that are supposed to constitute the series are not proved to be
criminal?" Because of this, it is easier to convict for plunder and sentence the
accused to death than to convict him for each of the component crimes
otherwise punishable under the Revised Penal Code and other laws which are
bailable offenses. The resultant absurdity strikes at the very heart if the
constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection.
The component acts constituting plunder, a heinous crime, being inherently
wrongful and immoral, are patently mala in se, even if punished by a special
law and accordingly, criminal intent must clearly be established together with
the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. By
eliminating mens rea, R.A. 7080 does not require the prosecution to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the component acts constituting plunder and imposes
a lesser burden of proof on the prosecution, thus paying the way for the
imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death on the accused, in plain
violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
It obfuscates the mind to ponder that such an ambiguous law as R.A. No.
7080 would put on the balance the life and liberty of the accused against whom
all the resources of the State are arrayed. It could be used as a tool against
political enemies and a weapon of hate and revenge by whoever wields the
levers of power.
In view of due process according to YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
It is an ancient maxim in law that in times of frenzy and excitement, when the
desire to do justice is tarnished by anger and vengeance, there is always the
danger that vital protections accorded an accused may be taken away.
Substantive due process dictates that there should be no arbitrariness,
unreasonableness or ambiguity in any law which deprives a person of his life or
liberty. The trial and other procedures leading to conviction may be fair and
proper. But if the law itself is not reasonable legislation, due process is violated.
Thus, an accused may not be sentenced to suffer the lethal injection or life

imprisonment for an offense understood only after judicial construction takes

over where Congress left off, and interpretation supplies its meaning.
The Constitution guarantees both substantive and procedural due process as
well as the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. Substantive due process requires that a criminal statute
should not be vague and uncertain. More explicitly That the terms of a penal
statute. . . must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it
what conduct on their part will render them liable to penalties, is a wellrecognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and
the settled rules of law. And a statute which either forbids or requires the doing
of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of
due process.
In its early formulation, the overbreadth doctrine states that a governmental
purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to regulation
may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms. 9
A statute, especially one involving criminal prosecution, must be definite to be
valid. A statute is vague or overbroad, in violation of the due process clause,
where its language does not convey sufficiently definite warning to the average
person as to the prohibited conduct. A statute is unconstitutionally vague if
people of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.
In malversation or bribery under the Revised Penal Code, the criminal intent
is an important element of the criminal acts. Under the Plunder Law, it is
enough that the acts are committed. Equally disagreeable is the provision of the
Plunder Law which does away with the requirement that each and every
component of the criminal act of plunder be proved and instead limits itself to
proving only a pattern of overt acts indicative of the unlawful scheme or
conspiracy. 18 In effect, the law seeks to penalize the accused only on the basis
of a proven scheme or conspiracy, and does away with the rights of the accused
insofar as the component crimes are concerned. In other words, R.A. No. 7080
circumvents the obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt
every fact necessary to constitute the crime of plunder, because the law requires
merely proof of a pattern of overt acts showing an unlawful scheme or
conspiracy.
I agree with petitioner's concern over the danger that the trial court may
allow the specifications of details in an information to validate a statute

inherently void for vagueness. An information cannot rise higher than the
statute upon which it is based. Not even the construction by the Sandiganbayan
of a vague or ambiguous provision can supply the missing ingredients of the
Plunder Law. The right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him is most often exemplified in the care with which a
complaint or information should be drafted. However, the clarity and
particularity required of an information should also be present in the law upon
which the charges are based. If the penal law is vague, any particularity in the
information will come from the prosecutor. The prosecution takes over the role
of Congress.
In view of vagueness according to SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
As a basic premise, we have to accept that even a person accused of a crime
possesses inviolable rights founded on the Constitution which even the welfare
of the society as a whole cannot override. The rights guaranteed to him by the
Constitution are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social
interest. Thus, no matter how socially-relevant the purpose of a law is, it must
be nullified if it tramples upon the basic rights of the accused.
When Section 4 of R.A. No. 7080 mandates that it shall not be necessary for
the prosecution to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused, the
legislature, in effect, rendered the enumerated "criminal acts" under Section 1
(d) merely as means and not as essential elements of plunder. This is
constitutionally infirmed and repugnant to the basic idea of justice and fair
play. As a matter of due process, the prosecution is required to prove beyond
reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the
defendant is charged. The State may not specify a lesser burden of proof for an
element of a crime. 8 With more reason, it should not be allowed to go around
the principle by characterizing an essential element of plunder merely as a
"means" of committing the crime. For the result is the reduction of the burden
of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
In short, all that R.A. No. 7080 requires is that each Justice must be
convinced of the existence of a "combination or series." As to which criminal
acts constitute a combination or series, the Justices need not be in full
agreement. Surely, this would cover-up a wide disagreement among them about
just what the accused actually did or did not do. Stated differently, even if the
Justices are not unified in their determination on what criminal acts were
actually committed by the accused, which need not be proved under the law,
still, they could convict him of plunder.

The Special Prosecution Division Panel defines it as "at least three of the
acts enumerated under Section 1(d) thereof." 33 But it can very well be
interpreted as only one act repeated at least three times. And the Office of the
Solicitor General, invoking the deliberations of the House of Representatives,
contends differently. It defines the term series as a "repetition" or pertaining to
"two or more."
A statute which is so vague as to permit the infliction of capital punishment
on acts already punished with lesser penalties by clearly formulated law is
unconstitutional. The vagueness cannot be cured by judicial construction.
In fine, I can only stress that the one on trial here is not Mr. Estrada, but
R.A. No. 7080. The issue before this Court is not the guilt or innocence of the
accused, but the constitutionality of the law. I vote to grant the petition, not
because I favor Mr. Estrada, but because I look beyond today and I see that this
law can pose a serious threat to the life, liberty and property of anyone who
may come under its unconstitutional provisions. As a member of this Court, my
duty is to see to it that the law conforms to the Constitution and no other. I
simply cannot, in good conscience, fortify a law that is patently
unconstitutional
ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001
Facts: Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and
Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that
the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but
distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm.
His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it
suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable
doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element
of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code
saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused. The focal
point of the case is the alleged vagueness of the law in the terms it
uses. Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted.
Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of
the mentioned law.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus standi to attack
the validity of the law using the facial challenge.
Ruling: On how the law uses the terms combination and series does not
constitute vagueness. The petitioners contention that it would not give
a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks to penalize
cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly
misplaced under the petitioners reliance since ordinary intelligence can
understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be
invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face,
wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be
invoked. Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute is
clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires a
reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude.
On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that governmental
purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. Doctrine of
strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to
vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling
effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law,
the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial
challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists.
Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial challenge
of a statute in free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the
established rule is that one to who application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that
impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other
situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. On its face
invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely on the
ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose
activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the purported

ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real. The crime of
plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the
Congress decision to include it among the heinous crime punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death.
Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is
dismissed for lacking merit.